Judgment of 13 June 1951

Document Number
014-19510613-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARKETS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET
ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE

HAYA DE LA TORRE

(COLOMBIE PÉROU)
ARRÊT DU 13 JUIN 1951

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISOR17 OPINIONS AND ORDERS

HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE

(COLOMBLA /PERU)

JUDGMENT OF JUNE 13th, 1951

LEYDE LEYDEN
SOCIÉTÉ D'ÉDITIONS AW. SIJTHOFF'S
A. SIJTHOFF Il PUBLISHING COMPANY Le présent arrêt doit êtrecité comme:suit
((Aflaire Hayadela Torre,
Arrêt du13 juin 1951: C.I. J. Recueil p.5711)

This Judgmentshould be citeas follow:
"Haya de la Torre Case,
Judgmentof June 13th, 195:I.C.J. Reports 195p.71."

NO de vente:
1Saies nurnber60 1 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1951
YEAR 1951 General List :
NO. 14
June qth, 1951

HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE

(COLOMBTA /PERU)

Diplomatic asylum.
Intervention under Article 63 of the Statute and Article 66 of Rules.
-Admissibilitof intervention.-limits.

Jurisdiction based on attitude of Parties.of carrying out
Judgment of November zoth, 1950.-Chobetween various means.-
Judicial function of Court.
Res judicata.-Provisicharacterof diplomatie asy1um.-Methods
of terminating asylum under Havana Convention on Asylum of 1928.
-No surrender of political oiJenders to territorial authorities.

Characterandegalconsequencesof Judgment of November zoth, 1950.
- Termination of asylum.

JUDGMENT

Present: President BASDEVAN ;T Vice-President GUERRERO ;

Judges ALVAREZ,HACKWORTHW , INIARSKIZ, ORICIC,
DE VISSCHERS ,ir Arnold MCNAIR,KLAESTAD B,ADAWI
PASHA,READ, HSU MO ;MM. ALAYZA Y PAZSOLDAN
and CAICEDOCASTILLA,Judges ad hoc ; Registrar

HAMBRO.
4 In the Haya de la Torre case,

the Republic of Colombia, represented by :

M. José Gabriel de la Vega, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of Colombia to The Netherlands, as Agent, assisted
by
M. Camilo de Brigard, Ambassador, Professor of International
Law, former Member of the Advisory Committee of the Colombian
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as Counsel,

and

the Republic of Peru, represented by :
M. Felipe Tudela y Barreda, Advocate, Professor of Constitu-
tional Law at Lima, as Agent, assisted by
M. Fernando Morales Macedo R., Parliamentary Interpreter,

M. Juan José Calle y Calle, Secretary of Embassy,
and, as Counsel :

M. Gilbert Gidel, Professor of the Faculty of Law of the Univer-
sity of Paris,
M. Julio L6pez Olivkn, Ambassador,

with, as intervening Party,
the Republic of Cuba, represented by :

Mme. Flora Diaz Parrado, Chargéd'Affaires of the Republic of
Cuba at The Hague, as Agent,

composed as above,

delivers the following Judgment :

On December 13th, 1950, the Government of Colombia filed in
the Registry of the Court an Application which referred to the
Judgments given by the Court on November zoth, 1950, in the
Asylum Case, and on November 27th upon the Request for the
Interpretation of that Judgment. After stating that Colombiaand
Peru were unable to come to an agreement on the manner in which
effectshould be given to the said Judgrnents asregards the surrender
of the refugee Victor Rad1 Haya de la Torre, the Application made
a request to the Court in the following terms :

"(a) PRINCIPAL CLAIM :
Requests the Court to adjudge and declare,whether the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Peru enters an appearance or not, after such time-limits as the Court may fix in the absence of an agree-
ment between the Parties :
In pursuance of the provisions of Article 7 of the Protocol of
Friendship and Co-operation between the Republic of Colombia
and the Republic of Peru signed on May zdth, 1934, to determine
the manner in which effect shall be given to the Judgrnent of
November zoth, 1950 ;
And, furthermore, to state in this connection, particularly :
Whether Colombia is, or is not, bound to deliver to the Govem-
ment of Pem M. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, a refugee in the
Colombian Embassy at Lima."

"(6) ALTERNATIVE CLAIM :
In the event of the above-mentioned claim being dismissed,
May it please the Court, in the exercise of its ordinary com-
petence, whether the Government of Pem enters an appearance
or not, and after such time-limits as the Court may fixin the
absence of an agreement between the Parties, to adjudge and
declare whether, in accordance with the law in force between the
Parties and particularly American international law, the Govern-
ment of Colombia is, or is not, bound to deliver M. Victor Raul
Haya de la Torre to the Government of Peru."

The Application was accompanied by a certified true French
translation of Article 7 of the Protocol of Friendship and Co-
operation between the Governments of Colombia and Peru signed
at Rio de Janeiro, May 24th, 1934, and also of two notes
exchanged between those two Governments.
Notice of the Application was given under Article 40, para-

graph 3, of the Statute of the Court to Members of the United
Nations through the Secretary-General, and also to the other States
entitled to appear before the Court. It was also transmitted to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
At the suggestion of the Parties, the written proceedings were
limited to the submission of a memorial and a counter-memorial,
and these pleadings were filed within the time-limits prescribed in
the Order of January 3rd, 1951.
As the Court did not include upon the Bench any judges of the
nationality of the Parties, they availed themselves of the right
provided by Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute. The Judges
ad hoc chosen were M. José Joaquin Caicedo Castilla, Doctor of
Law, Professor, former Deputy and former President of the Senate,

Ambassador, for the Government of Colombia, and M. Luis Alayza
y Paz Soldan, Doctor of Law, Professor, former Minister, Ambas-
sador, for the Government of Peru.
By a letter dated January zznd, 1951, the Colombian Agent
informed the Registrar that his Government relied on the Conven-
tion on Asylum signed at Havana on February zoth, 1928 ; he
requested the Registrar to give effect to the provisions of Article63
of the Statute. Accordingly, the Registrar informed the States
6which were parties to that Convention, other than those concemed
in the case, of this fact.
The Minister of State of Cuba on February 15th, 1951, addressed
to the Registrar, in reply, a letter and a Memorandum which
contained the views of his Government concerning the construction
of the Convention of Havana of 1928, as well as this Government's
general attitude in regard to asylum.

This letter, considered as a Declaration of Intervention under
Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, was, in accordance

with paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article, communicated to the
Parties in the case and to the Members of the United Nations and
other States entitled to appear before the Court. The Memorandum
annexed to that letter was at the same time communicated to the
Parties.
The pleadings and documents annexed had already been placed
at the disposal of the Government of Cuba, at the request of that
Government and with the consent of the Parties.
On March 28th, 1951, the Agent of the Government of Colombia
stated that he did not raise any objection to the intervention of
Cuba. On April znd, 1951, the Agent of the Government of Peru
addressed a letter to the Registrar in which he requested the Court
to decide that the intervention was not admissible.
In application of Article 66, paragraph 2,of the Rules of Court,
the Court decided to hear the observations of the Agents of the

Parties and of the Government of Cuba on the admissibility of that
Government's intervention before the argument on the merits. A
public hearing was held for that purpose on May 15th, 1951, during
which the Court heard statements submitted on behalf of the
Government of Peru by M. Felipe Tudela y Barreda, Agent, and
M. G. Gidel, Counsel ; on behalf of the Government of Colombia
by M. Camilo de Brigard, Counsel ; and on behalf of the Govem-
ment of Cuba by Mme. Flora Diaz Parrado, Agent.
At this public hearing the following Submissions relating to the
Request for Intervention were presented to the Court :

On behalf of the Government of Peru :
"May it please the Court to adjudge :

convention within the meaning of Article t63 of the Statute of the
Court, and in particular of the Havana Convention, concerning
the meaning of which the Court gave judgment on November zoth,

19and that, therefore, the interventioof the Government ofCuba
is not admissible."

On behalf of the Government of Colombia :
"May it please the Court to decidethat the Government of Cuba
is entitled to intervene in the present case."

7 HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51) 75

On behalf of the Government of Cuba:
"May it please the Court to declare that the request to intervene
is admissible."

On May 16th, 1951, the Court decided, for the reasons which are
stated below, to admit the intervention of the Government of Cuba
and to open immediately the oral proceedings on the merits of the
case.
In the course of publichearings held on May 16th and 17th, 1951,
the Court heard statements by M. José Gabriel de la Vega, Agent,
on behalf of the Government of Colombia, and by M. G. Gidel,
Counsel, on behalf of the Government of Peru ; furthermore, in
accordance with Article 66, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, it

heard a statement on the interpretation of the Havana Convention,
presented on behalf of the Government of Cuba by Mme. Flora
Diaz Parrado, Agent.
Ar the end of the written proceedings, the Parties presented the
following Submissions :

On behalf of the Government of Colombia (Submissions in the
Memorial) :
"May it please the Court,
To state in what manner the Judgment of November zoth, 1950,
shall be executed by Colombia and Peru, and furthermore, to
adjudge and declare that Colombia is not bound, in execution of
the said Judgment of November zoth, 1950, to deliver M. Victor
Raul Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities.
In the event of the Court not delivering judgment on the fore-
going Submission, may it please the Court to adjudge and declare,
in the exercise of its ordinary competence, that Colombia is not
bound to deliver the politically accused M. Victor Rad1 Haya de
la Torre to the Peruvian authonties."

On behalf of the Government of Peru (Submissions in the Counter-
Memorial) :

"May it please the Court,
1. To state in what manner the Judgment of November zoth,
1950, shall be executed by Colombia ;
II. To dismiss the Submissions of Colombia by which the Court
is asked to state solely ["sans plus"]that Colombia 1snot bound
to deliver Victor Raul Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authoritie;
III. In the event of the Court not delivering judgment on Sub-
mission No. 1, to adjudge and declare that the asylum granted to
SeÏior Victor Raul Haya de la Torre on January 3rd, 1949, and
maintained since that date, having been judged to be contrary to
Article 2, paragraph 2,of the Havana Convention of 1928, ought
to have ceased immediately after the delivery of the Judgment of
November zoth, 1950, and must in any case cease forthwith in
order that Peruvian justice may resume its normal course which
has been suspended."
8 HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51) 76
In the course of his oral statement on May 16th, 1951, the Agent
of the Govemment of Colombia re-stated the Submissions of the

Memorial with the following addition relating to the Submissions
of the Co'unter-Memonal of Peru :
"To state in what manner the Judgment of November zoth,
1950,shall be executed by Colombia,when stating, in accordance
with the frrst point of Our principal claim, 'in what manner the
Judgment of November zoth, 1950,shall be executed by Colombia
and Peru' ;
On SubrnissionII of the same Counter-Memorial : To reject it;
And, should occasion arise, to reject Submission III of the said
Counter-Memorial."

On the other hand, Counselfor the Government of Peru requested
the Court to decide in its favour upon the Submissions set out
in its Counter-Memorial.
Finally, the Agent of the Govemment of Cuba presented her
Government's interpretation of the Havana Convention so far
as concerns the surrender of the refugee tothe Peruvian authorities.

The Government of Cuba, availing itself of the right which
Article 63 of the Statute of the Court confers on States parties
to a convention, filed a Declaration of Intervention with the

Registry on March 13th, 1951, and attached thereto a Memorandum
in which it stated its views in regard to the interpretation of the
Havana Convention of 1928 ratified by it and also its general
attitude towards asylum. The Court considered that this Memo-
randum was regarded by the Govemment of Cuba as constituting
the written observations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 66
of the Rules of Court.
The Government of Peru contended that the intervention of the
Government of Cuba was inadmissible, owing to the Declaration
of Intervention being out of time, and to the fact that the Declara-
tion and the Memorandum accompanying it did not constitute
an intervention in the true meaning of the term, but an attempt

by a third State to appeal against the Judgment delivered by the
Court on November zoth, 1950.
In regard to that question, the Court observes that every inter-
vention is incidental to the proceedings in a case ; it follows that
a declaration filed as an intervention only acquires 'that character,
in law, if it actually relates to the subject-matter of the pending
proceedings. The subject-matter of the present case differs from
that of the case which was terminated by the Judgment of
November zoth, 1950 : it concerns a question-the surrender of
Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authonties-which in the previouscase was completely outside the Submissions of the Parties, and
which was in consequence in no way decided by the above-
mentioned Judgment.
In these circumstances, the only point which it is necessary to
ascertain is whether the object of the intervention of the Govern-
ment of Cuba is in fact the interpretation ofthe Havana Convention

in regard to the question whether Colombia is under an obligation
to surrender the refugee to the Peruvian authorities.
On that point, the Court observes that the Memorandum attached
to the Declaration of Intervention of the Government of Cuba is
devoted almost entirely to a discussion of the questions which the
Judgrnent of November zoth, 1950, had already decided with the
authority of res judicata, and that, to that extent, it does not
satisfy the conditions of a genuine intervention. However, at the
public hearing on May 15th, 1951, the Agent of the Government
of Cuba stated that the intervention was based on the fact that
the Court was required to interpret a new aspect of the Havana
Convention, an aspect which the Court had not been called on
to consider in its Judgment of November zoth, 1950.
Reduced in this way, and operatingwithin these limits, the inter-
vention of the Government of Cuba conformed to the conditions of

Article 63 of the Statute, and the Court, having deliberated on the
matter, decided on May 16th to admit the intervention in pursuance
of paragraph 2 of Article 66 of the Rules of Court.

In its Judgment of November zoth, 1950, the Court defined the
legal relations between Colombia and Peru with regard to matters
referred to it by them relating to diplomatic asylum in general and
particularly to the asylum granted to Victor Ra61 Haya de la Torre
by the Ambassador of Colombia in Lima on January 3rd-4th, 1949.
On the day of the delivery of this Judgment the Government of
Colombia submitted to the Court a Request for Interpretation,
which by the Judgment of November 27th, 1950, uras declared to
be inadmissible.

On the following day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Public
Worship of Peru, relying on the Judgment of November zoth,
addressed a note to the Chargé d'Affaires of Columbia at Lima,
stating in particular :
"The moment has come to carry out the Judgment delivered
by the International Court of Justice by terminating the protection
which that Embassy is improperly granting to Victor Raul Haya
de la Torre. It is no longer possible further to prolong an asylum
which is being maintained in open contradiction to the Judgment
which has been delivered. The ColombianEmbassy cannot continue
to protect the refugee, thus barring the action of the national courts. You must take the necessary steps, Sir, with a view to terminat-
ing this protection, which is being improperly granted, by deliver-
ing the refugee Victor Rad Haya de la Torre, so that he may be
placed at the disposal of the examining magistrate who sumrnoned
him to appear for judgment, in accordance with what 1 have
recited above."

In a Note dated December 6th, 1950, addressed to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Public Worship of Peru, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Colombia refused to comply with this request ;
he relied in particular on the following considerations :

"Consequently, the Court formally rejected the complaint made
against the Government of Colombia in the counter-claim of the
Government of Peru, namely, that it had granted asylum to per-
sons accused of or condemned for common crimes. Should Colombia
proceed to the delivery of the refugee, as requested by Your Excel-
lency, [it] would not only disregard the Judgment to which we
are now referring, but would also violate Article 1, paragraph 2,
of or condemned for common crimes taking refuge in a legationcused
shall be surrendered upon request of the locaI government.' "

These are the circumstances giving rise to the present case which
has been brought before the Court by the Government of Colombia
by Application of December 13th, 1950.
The Partieshave in the present case consented to the jurisdiction
of the Court. Al1 the questions submitted to it have been argued by
them on the merits, and no objection has been made to a decision
on the merits. This conduct of the Parties is sufficient to confer

jurisdiction on the Court.

In the first part of its principal Submission the Government of
Colombia requests the Court

"to state in what manner the Judgment of November zoth, 1950,
shail be executed by Colombia and Peru....".
On the other hand, the Government of Peru in its first Submission
requests the Court

"to state in what manner the Judgment of November zoth, 1950,
shall be executed by Colombia".

These Submissions are both designed to obtain a decision from
the Court as to the manner in which the asylum should be term-
inated. The portion of the Judgment of November zoth, 1950, to
which they refer is the passage where, in pronouncing on the ques-
tion of the regularity of the asylum, it declares that the grant of HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51) 79

asylurn was not made in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 2
("First"), of the Havana Convention on Asylum of 1928. The Court
observes that the Judgment confined itself, in this connection, to
defining the legal relations which the Havana Convention had
established between the Parties. It did not give any directions to
the Parties, and entails for them only the obligation of compliance
therewith. The interrogative form in *hich they have formulated
their Submissions shows that they desire that the Court should

make a choice amongst the various courses by which the asylum
may be terminated. But these courses are conditioned by facts and
by possibilities which, to a very large extent, the Parties arelone
in a position to appreciate. A choice amongst them could not be
based on legal considerations, but only on considerations ofpractic-
ability or of political expediency ;it is not part of the Court's
judicial function to make such a choice.
In the second part of its principal Submission, the Government of
Colombia requests the Court

"to adjudge and declare that Colombia is not bound, in execu-
tion of the said Judgrnent of November zoth, 1950, to deliver
M. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities".

This part of the principal Submission of Colombia is strictly
limited by the words "in execution of the said Judgment of Novem-
ber 2oth, 1950". These words serve to confine the request thus
formulated, as in the first part of the same Submission, to the
execution of the Judgment of November zoth, 1950.
As was stated both in that Judgment and in the Judgment of

November 27th, 1950, the Government of Peru had not demanded
the surrender of the refugee. This question was not submitted to
the Court and consequently was not decided by it. It is not there-
fore possible to deduce from the Judgment of November zoth
any conclusion asto the existence or non-existence of an obligation
to surrender the refugee. In these circumstances, the Court is not
in a position to state, merely on the basis of the Judgment of
November zoth, whether Colombia is or is not bound to surrender
the refugee to the Peruvian authorities.
For these reasons, the Court cannot give effect to the above-
mentioned Submissions.

The alternative Submission of the Government of Colombia is as
follows :
"In the event of the Court not delivering judgment on the
foregoing Submission, may it please the Court to adjudge and
declare, in the exercise of its ordinary competence, that Colombia
is not bound to deliver the politically accusedictor Rad Haya
de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities."

In its second Submission the Government of Peru requests the
Court

12 HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51) 80

is asked to state solely ("sans plus") that Colombiais not bound
to deliver VictorRaul Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian author-
ities".

The Government of Peru states in this Submission that the Court
is asked by the Submissions of Colombia "to state solely that Colom-
bia is not bound ...."By using this word "solely" ("sans plus")
the Govemment of Peru wishes to convey that the legal position
which the Judgment of November 20th created for it must in any
case be preserved ;it refers thus to the statement set forth in its
third Submission, which will be examined later.
As mentioned above, the question of the surrender of the refugee

was not decided by the Judgment of November 20th. This question
is new ;it was raised by Peru in its Note to Colombia of Novem-
ber 28th, 1950, and was submitted to the Court by the Application
of Colombia of December 13th, 1950. There is consequently no
res judicata upon the question of surrender.
According to the Havana Convention, diplomatic asylum is a
provisional measure for the temporary protection of political
offenders. Even if regularly granted it cannot be prolonged inde-
finitely, but must be terminated as soon as possible. It can, accord-
ing to Article 2,paragraph 2, only be granted "for the period of
time strictly indispensable for the person who has sought asylum
to ensure in some other way his safety".

The Court finds that the Convention does not give a complete
answer to the question of the manner in which an asylum shall
be terminated.
As to persons accused of or condemned for common crimes who
seek refuge, Article Iprescribes that they shall be surrendered upon
request of the local government. For "political offenders" another
method of terminating asylum is prescribed, namely, the grant of
a safe-conduct for the departure from the country. But, under the
terms of the Judgment of November zoth, a safe-conduct can only
be claimed under the Havana Convention if the asylum has been
regularly granted and maintained and if the territorial State has
required that the refugee should be sent out of the country. For
cases in which the asylum has not been regularly granted or main-

tained, no provision is made as to the method of termination. Nor
is any provision made in this matter in cases where the territorial
State has not requested the departure of the refugee. Thus, though
the Convention prescribes that the duration of the asylum shall
be limited to the time "strictly indispensable....",it is silent on
the question how the asylum should be terminated in a variety
of different situations.
As the Court pointed out in its Judgment of November zoth,
the Havana Convention, the first article of which requires
that perçons accused of or condemned for common crimes shall be
surrendered to the territorial authorities, does not contain any

13 HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51) 81

similar provision in regard to political offenders. This silence cannot
be interpreted as imposing an obligation to surrender the refugee
in case the asylum was granted to him contrary to the provisions
of Article 2 of the Convention. Such an interpretation would be
repugnant to the spirit which animated that Convention in conform-
ity with the Latin-American tradition in regard to asylum, a tradi-
tion in accordance with which political refugees should not be
surrendered. There is nothing in that tradition to indicate that an
exception should be made where asylum has been irregularly
granted. If it has been intended to abandon that tradition, an
express provision to that effect would have been needed, and the
Havana Convention contains no such provision. The silence of the

Convention implies that it was intended to leave the adjustment
of the consequences of this situation to decisions inspired byonsi-
derations of convenience or of simple political expediency. To infer
from this silence that there is an obligation to surrender a person
to whom asylum has been irregularly granted would be to disregard
both the rôle of these extra-legal factors in the development of
asylum in Latin America, and the spirit of the Havana Convention
itself.
In its Judgment of November 20th the Court pointed out that,
in principle, asylum cannot be opposed to the operation of justice.
The safety which arises out of asylum cannot be construed as a
protection against the regular application of the laws and against
the jurisdiction of legally constituted tribunals. Protection thus

understood would authorize the diplornatic agent to obstruct the
application of the laws of the country, whereas it is his duty to
respect them. The Court further said that it could not admit that
the States signatories to the Havana Convention intended to
substitute for the practice of the Latin-American republics a legal
system which would guarantee to their own nationals accused of
politicaloffences the privilege of evading national jurisdiction.
But it would be an entirely different thing to Say that the State
granting an irregular asylum is obliged to surrender the refugee
to the local authorities. Such an obligation to render positive
assistance to these authorities in their prosecution of a political
refugee would far exceed the above-mentioned findings of the
Court and could not be recognized without an express provision

to that effect in the Convention.
Thus, the Havana Convention does not justify the view that
the obligation incumbent on a State to terminate an asylum
irregularly granted to a political offender, imposes a duty upon
that State to surrender the person to whom asylum has been
granted.
In its Judgment of November 20th the Court, in examining
whether the asylum was regularly granted, found that the Govern-
ment of Peru had not proved that the acts of which Haya de la
Torre was accused, before asylum was granted to him, constituted

14common crimes. Moreover,when the Court considered the provisions
of Article 2, paragraph 2, relating to political offenders, it held,
on the basis of these provisions, that the asylum had not been
granted in conformity with the Convention. It follows from these
considerations that, so far as the question of surrender is concemed,
the refugee must be treated as a person accused of a political offence.
The Court has, consequently, arrived at the conclusion that the
Government of Colombia is under no obligation to surrender Haya

de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities.
The third Submission of the Government of Peru is as follows :

"In the event of the Court not delivering judgment on Sub-
mission No. 1, to adjudge and declare that the asylum granted to
Sefior Victor Raul Haya de la Torre on January 3rd, 1949, and
maintained since that date, having been judged to be contrary to
Article2, paragraph 2,of the Havana Convention of 1928,it ought
to have ceased immediately after the delivery of the Judgment
of November zoth, 1950, and must in any case cease forthwith, in
order that Peruvian justice may resume its normal course which
has been suspended."

The Government of Colombia has requested the Court to reject
this Submission.
In its Judgment of November zoth, the Court held that the
grant of asylum by the Government .of Colombia to Haya de la
Torre was not made in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 2
("First"), of the Convention. This decision entails a legal conse-

quence, namely that of putting an end to an illegal situation : the
Government of Colombia which had granted the asylum irregularly
is bound to terminate it.As the asylum is still being maintained,
the Govemment of Peru is legally entitled to claim that it should
cease.
But the latter Government adds in its Submission a demand
that the asylum should cease "in order that Peruvian justice may
resume its normal course which has been suspended". This addition
appears to involve, indirectly, a claim for the surrender of the
refugee. For the reasons given above, this part of the Submission
of the Government of Peru cannot be accepted.

The Court has thus arrived at the conclusion that the asylum
must cease, but that the Government of Colombia is under no
obligation to bring this about by surrendering the refugee to the
Peruvian authorities. There is no contradiction between these
two findings, since surrender is not the only way of terminating
asylurn. Having thus defined in accordance with the Havana Convention
the legal relations between the Parties with regard to the matters
referred to it, the Court has completed its task. Itis unable to give
any practical advice as to the various courses which might be
followed with a view to teminating the asylum, since, by doing
so, it would depart from its judicial function. But it can be assumed
that the Parties, now that their mutual legal relations have been
made clear, will be able to find a practical and satisfactory solution
by seeking guidance from those considerations of courtesy and

good-neighbourliness which, in matters of asylum, have always
held a prominent place in the relations between the Latin-American
republics.

For these reasons,

on the principal Submission of the Government of Colombia and
the first Submission of the Government of Peru,

unanimously,

finds that it cannot give effect to these Submissions and conse-
quently rejects them ;

on the alternative Submission of the Government of Colombia
and the second Submission of the Government of Peru,

by thirteen votes to one,
finds that Colombia is under no obligation to surrender Victor
Ratil Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities ;

on the third Submission of the Government of Peru,
unanimously,

finds that the asylum granted to Victor Ratil Haya de la Torre on
January 3rd-4th, 1949, and maintained since that time, ought to
have ceased after the delivery of the Judgment of November zoth,
1950, and should terminate. HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51)
84

Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this thirteenth day of June, one
thousand nine hundred. and fifty-one, in four copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the otherstrans-
mitted to the Government of the Republic of Colombia, to the
Government of the Republic of Peru and to the Government of
the Republic of Cuba, respectively.

(Signed) BASDEVANT,

Presiden.

(Signed) E. HAMBRO,
Registrar.

M. ALAYZA Y PAZSOLDANJ,udge adhoc,declares that if the Court
had stated under the second point of the operative clause that
Colombia was under no obligation, as the sole means of executing

the Judgment, to surrender the refugee to the Government of Peru,
he would have been in a position to concur in the opinion of the
majority of the Court. But the brevity of the sentence employed,
which may be misunderstood, prevents him from concurring in the
.opinion of the Court as a whole.

(Initialled) J. B.
(Initialled)E. H.

Bilingual Content

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARKETS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET
ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE

HAYA DE LA TORRE

(COLOMBIE PÉROU)
ARRÊT DU 13 JUIN 1951

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISOR17 OPINIONS AND ORDERS

HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE

(COLOMBLA /PERU)

JUDGMENT OF JUNE 13th, 1951

LEYDE LEYDEN
SOCIÉTÉ D'ÉDITIONS AW. SIJTHOFF'S
A. SIJTHOFF Il PUBLISHING COMPANY Le présent arrêt doit êtrecité comme:suit
((Aflaire Hayadela Torre,
Arrêt du13 juin 1951: C.I. J. Recueil p.5711)

This Judgmentshould be citeas follow:
"Haya de la Torre Case,
Judgmentof June 13th, 195:I.C.J. Reports 195p.71."

NO de vente:
1Saies nurnber60 1 COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

Le 13juin
Rôle général
no 14
13 juin1951

AFFAIRE

HAYA DE LA TORRE

(COLOMBIE /PÉROU)

Asile diplomatique.
Interventioaux termes de l'arti63edu Statut et de l'art66le
du Règlement- Admissibilité de l'interventSes limites.
Juridictiofondée sur l'attitude des Pa-tiManière d'exécuter
l'arrêtdu20novembre I950 - Choix entre diverses voies. -Fonction

judiciaire de la Cour.
Chose jugée.-Caractère provisoire de l'asile dipl-mModese.
de cessation de l'asile selon la Convention de La Havane de 1928 relati~~e
à l'asile- Non-remisede criminelspolitiques aux autorités terri-
toriales.

Caractère et conséquencesjuridiques de l'20rnovembreI950.
- Fin de l'asile.

Présents: M. BASDEVANT P résident;M. GUERRERO V,ice-Prési-
dent; MM.ALVAREZ H,ACKWORTW H,INIARSKZ I,ORI~IC,
DE VISSCHER, Sir Arnold MCNAIR,M. KLAESTAD,

BADAWI PACHA, MM. READ, HSU MO, Juges;
MM. ALAYZA Y PAZ SOLDAN et CAICEDO CASTILLA,
Juges ad hoc ; M. HAMBRO G,reijîer.

4 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1951
YEAR 1951 General List :
NO. 14
June qth, 1951

HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE

(COLOMBTA /PERU)

Diplomatic asylum.
Intervention under Article 63 of the Statute and Article 66 of Rules.
-Admissibilitof intervention.-limits.

Jurisdiction based on attitude of Parties.of carrying out
Judgment of November zoth, 1950.-Chobetween various means.-
Judicial function of Court.
Res judicata.-Provisicharacterof diplomatie asy1um.-Methods
of terminating asylum under Havana Convention on Asylum of 1928.
-No surrender of political oiJenders to territorial authorities.

Characterandegalconsequencesof Judgment of November zoth, 1950.
- Termination of asylum.

JUDGMENT

Present: President BASDEVAN ;T Vice-President GUERRERO ;

Judges ALVAREZ,HACKWORTHW , INIARSKIZ, ORICIC,
DE VISSCHERS ,ir Arnold MCNAIR,KLAESTAD B,ADAWI
PASHA,READ, HSU MO ;MM. ALAYZA Y PAZSOLDAN
and CAICEDOCASTILLA,Judges ad hoc ; Registrar

HAMBRO.
4 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)
72
En l'affaire Haya de la Torre,

entre

la République de la Colombie, représentéepar :
M. José Gabriel de la Vega, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre
plénipotentiaire de la Colombie aux Pays-Bas, comme agent,
assisté de

M. Camilo de Brigard, ambassadeur, professeur de droit inter-
national, ancien membre de la Commission consultative du
ministère des Affaires étrangères de la Colombie, comme conseil,

la République du Pérou, représentéepar :
M. Felipe Tudela y Barreda, avocat, professeur de droit consti-

tutionnel à Lima, comme agent, assistéde
M. Fernando Morales Macedo R., interprète parlementaire,
M. Juan José Calley Calle, secrétaire d'ambassade,

ainsi que, comme conseils, de
M. Gilbert Gidel, professeuà la Faculté de droit de l'université
de Paris,

M. Julio L6pez Olivan, ambassadeur,
avec, comme Partie intervenante,

la République de Cuba, représentée par:
Mme Flora Diaz Parrado, chargé d'affaires de la République de
Cuba à La Haye, comme agent,

ainsi composée,

rend l'arrêt suivant :

Le 13 décembre 1950, le Gouvemement de la Colombie a saisi
la Cour d'une requêtequi se réfèreaux arrêts rendus par la Cour
le zonovembre 1950 en l'affaire du droit d'asile et 27 novembre
1950 en l'affaire de la demande d'interprétation de l'arrêtprécité.
Aprés avoir énoncéque la Colombie et le Péroun'ont pu se mettre
d'accord sur la suite à donner auxdits arrêts en ce qui concerne

la remise du réfugié VictorRad1 Haya de la Torre, la requête
demande :

((a) A TITRE PRINCIPAL:

absence du Gouvemement du Pérou,et japrès les délaisque, sousen

5 In the Haya de la Torre case,

the Republic of Colombia, represented by :

M. José Gabriel de la Vega, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of Colombia to The Netherlands, as Agent, assisted
by
M. Camilo de Brigard, Ambassador, Professor of International
Law, former Member of the Advisory Committee of the Colombian
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as Counsel,

and

the Republic of Peru, represented by :
M. Felipe Tudela y Barreda, Advocate, Professor of Constitu-
tional Law at Lima, as Agent, assisted by
M. Fernando Morales Macedo R., Parliamentary Interpreter,

M. Juan José Calle y Calle, Secretary of Embassy,
and, as Counsel :

M. Gilbert Gidel, Professor of the Faculty of Law of the Univer-
sity of Paris,
M. Julio L6pez Olivkn, Ambassador,

with, as intervening Party,
the Republic of Cuba, represented by :

Mme. Flora Diaz Parrado, Chargéd'Affaires of the Republic of
Cuba at The Hague, as Agent,

composed as above,

delivers the following Judgment :

On December 13th, 1950, the Government of Colombia filed in
the Registry of the Court an Application which referred to the
Judgments given by the Court on November zoth, 1950, in the
Asylum Case, and on November 27th upon the Request for the
Interpretation of that Judgment. After stating that Colombiaand
Peru were unable to come to an agreement on the manner in which
effectshould be given to the said Judgrnents asregards the surrender
of the refugee Victor Rad1 Haya de la Torre, the Application made
a request to the Court in the following terms :

"(a) PRINCIPAL CLAIM :
Requests the Court to adjudge and declare,whether the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Peru enters an appearance or not, after73 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)

réserve d'un accord entre les Parties, il appartienàrla Cour de
fixer:
En exécutionde ce qui a étédisposé à l'article 7 du Protocole
d'amitiéet de coopération signéentre la Républiquede la Colombie
et laRépubliquedu Pérou,le 24mai 1934,de déterminerla manière
d'exécuterl'arrêtdu 20 novembre 1950 ;

Et, en plus, de direàcette finn,otamment :
Si la Colombieest ou n'est pas obligée deremettre au Gouverne-
ment du PérouM. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, réfugiéà l'ambas-
sade de Colombie à Lima. »
(b) A TITRE SUBSIDIAIRE :

Au cas où la demande ci-dessus serait rejetée,
Qu'il plaiseà la Cour, en exercice de sa compétenceordinaire,
tant en présence qu'en absencedu Gouvernement du Pérou et après
les délaisque, sans préjudiced'un accord entre les Parties, il appar-
tiendraà la Cour de fixer, de dire et juger si, conformément au
droit en vigueur entre les Parties et particulièrement au droit
international américain,le Gouvernement de Colombie est ou n'est
pas obligé deremettre M. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre au Gou-
vernement du Pérou. »

A la requête se trouvait jointe la traduction en français, certifiée
conforme, de l'article 7 du Protocole d'amitié et de coopération
entre les Gouvernements de la Colombie et du Pérou, signé à Rio-
de-Janeiro le 24 mai 1934 ,insi que de deux notes échangéesentre
ces mêmes Gouvernements.
Conformément à l'article 40, paragraphe 3, du Statut de la Cour,
la requête a étécommuniquée aux Membres des Nations Unies

par l'entremise du Secrétaire général ainsi qu'aux autres Etats
admis à ester en justice devant la Cour. Elle a été également
transmise au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies.
Les Parties ayant proposé de limiter la procédure écrite à la
présentation d'un mémoire et d'un contre-mémoire, ces pièces ont
étédéposéesdans les délais fixéspar une ordonnance du 3 janvier
1951.
La Cour ne comptant sur le siègeaucun juge de la nationalité des
Parties, chacune d'elles s'est prévalue du droit prévu à l'articl31,
paragraphe 3, du Statut. Ont étéainsi désignésen qualité de juges
ad hoc : par le Gouvernement de la Colombie, M. José Joaquin

Caicedo Castilla, docteur en droit, professeur, ancien député et
ancien président du Sénat, ambassadeur ;par le Gouvernement du
Pérou, M. Luis Alayza y Paz Soldan, docteur en droit, professeur,
ancien ministre, ambassadeur.
L'agent de la Colombie fitconnaître, par une lettre en date du
22 janvier 1951, que son Gouvernement invoquait la Convention
relative au droit d'asile signée à La Havane le 20 février 1928 ;
ilpriait le Greffier de donner suite aux dispositions de l'article 63
du Statut. En conséquence, le Greffier informa de ce fait les Etats, such time-limits as the Court may fix in the absence of an agree-
ment between the Parties :
In pursuance of the provisions of Article 7 of the Protocol of
Friendship and Co-operation between the Republic of Colombia
and the Republic of Peru signed on May zdth, 1934, to determine
the manner in which effect shall be given to the Judgrnent of
November zoth, 1950 ;
And, furthermore, to state in this connection, particularly :
Whether Colombia is, or is not, bound to deliver to the Govem-
ment of Pem M. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, a refugee in the
Colombian Embassy at Lima."

"(6) ALTERNATIVE CLAIM :
In the event of the above-mentioned claim being dismissed,
May it please the Court, in the exercise of its ordinary com-
petence, whether the Government of Pem enters an appearance
or not, and after such time-limits as the Court may fixin the
absence of an agreement between the Parties, to adjudge and
declare whether, in accordance with the law in force between the
Parties and particularly American international law, the Govern-
ment of Colombia is, or is not, bound to deliver M. Victor Raul
Haya de la Torre to the Government of Peru."

The Application was accompanied by a certified true French
translation of Article 7 of the Protocol of Friendship and Co-
operation between the Governments of Colombia and Peru signed
at Rio de Janeiro, May 24th, 1934, and also of two notes
exchanged between those two Governments.
Notice of the Application was given under Article 40, para-

graph 3, of the Statute of the Court to Members of the United
Nations through the Secretary-General, and also to the other States
entitled to appear before the Court. It was also transmitted to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
At the suggestion of the Parties, the written proceedings were
limited to the submission of a memorial and a counter-memorial,
and these pleadings were filed within the time-limits prescribed in
the Order of January 3rd, 1951.
As the Court did not include upon the Bench any judges of the
nationality of the Parties, they availed themselves of the right
provided by Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute. The Judges
ad hoc chosen were M. José Joaquin Caicedo Castilla, Doctor of
Law, Professor, former Deputy and former President of the Senate,

Ambassador, for the Government of Colombia, and M. Luis Alayza
y Paz Soldan, Doctor of Law, Professor, former Minister, Ambas-
sador, for the Government of Peru.
By a letter dated January zznd, 1951, the Colombian Agent
informed the Registrar that his Government relied on the Conven-
tion on Asylum signed at Havana on February zoth, 1928 ; he
requested the Registrar to give effect to the provisions of Article63
of the Statute. Accordingly, the Registrar informed the States
6autres que les Parties en cause, qui avaient participé à ladite
Convention.
Faisant suite à cette communication, le ministre d'État de Cuba
adressa le 15 février1951 au Greffier une lettre, accompagnée d'un
Mémoiredans lequel était exposéela manière de voir de son Gouver-
nement relativement à l'interprétation de la Convention de La
Havane de 1928, ainsique le critérium généraladoptépar ce Gouver-
nement en matière de droit d'asile.
Cette lettre, considéréecomme déclaration d'intervention prévue

par l'article66, paragraphe 1, du Règlement, fut, conformément
aux paragraphes 2 et 3 dudit article, communiquée aux Parties
en cause ainsi qu'aux Membres des Nations Unies et aux autres
Etats admis à ester en justice devant la Cour. En mêmetemps,
le Mémoireannexé à la lettre fut communiqué aux Parties.

Les pièces et docunients de l'affaire avaient antérieurement été
mis à la disposition du Gouvernement de Cuba, à la demande de
ce Gouvernement et avec l'assentiment des Parties.
L'agent du Gouvernement de la Colombie fit connaître le 28mars
1951 qu'il ne formulait aucune opposition à l'intervention de Cuba.

L'agent du Gouvernement du Pérou adressa au Greffier, le 2 avril
1951, une lettre où il demandait à la Cour de décider que l'inter-
vention n'était pas admissible.
En application de l'article 66, paragraphe 2, du Règlement, la
Cour décida d'entendre avant tout débat sur le fond les observa-
tions des agents des Parties et du Gouvernement de Cuba, relative-
ment à l'admissibilité de l'intervention dudit Gouvernement. Une
audience publique fut tenue à cet effet l15 mai 1951, au cours de
laquelle la Cour entendit les observations présentées au nom du
Gouvernement du Pérou par M. Felipe Tudela y Barreda, agent,
et M. G. Gidel, conseil ;au nom du Gouvernement de la Colombie

par M. Camilo de Brigard, conseil ; au nom du Gouvernement de
Cuba par Mme Flora Diaz Parrado, agent.
A cette audience,la Cour s'est trouvée, relativement à lademande
d'intervention, en présence des conclusions suivantes :

Au nom du Gouvernement du Pérou :
(Plaiseà la Cour de dire
que la présente affairene saurait donner lieuà l'interprétation
d'une convention, aux termes de l'article63 du Statut de la Cour,
et notamment de la Convention de La Havane sur le sens de
laquelle la Cour s'est prononcéele 20 novembre 1950 ;

et que, partant, l'intervention du Gouvernement cubain n'est
pas admissible. »

Au nom du Gouvernement de la Colombie :
(Que la Cour veuille bien décider quele Gouvernement de Cuba
est en droit d'intervenir dans cette affaire.

7which were parties to that Convention, other than those concemed
in the case, of this fact.
The Minister of State of Cuba on February 15th, 1951, addressed
to the Registrar, in reply, a letter and a Memorandum which
contained the views of his Government concerning the construction
of the Convention of Havana of 1928, as well as this Government's
general attitude in regard to asylum.

This letter, considered as a Declaration of Intervention under
Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, was, in accordance

with paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article, communicated to the
Parties in the case and to the Members of the United Nations and
other States entitled to appear before the Court. The Memorandum
annexed to that letter was at the same time communicated to the
Parties.
The pleadings and documents annexed had already been placed
at the disposal of the Government of Cuba, at the request of that
Government and with the consent of the Parties.
On March 28th, 1951, the Agent of the Government of Colombia
stated that he did not raise any objection to the intervention of
Cuba. On April znd, 1951, the Agent of the Government of Peru
addressed a letter to the Registrar in which he requested the Court
to decide that the intervention was not admissible.
In application of Article 66, paragraph 2,of the Rules of Court,
the Court decided to hear the observations of the Agents of the

Parties and of the Government of Cuba on the admissibility of that
Government's intervention before the argument on the merits. A
public hearing was held for that purpose on May 15th, 1951, during
which the Court heard statements submitted on behalf of the
Government of Peru by M. Felipe Tudela y Barreda, Agent, and
M. G. Gidel, Counsel ; on behalf of the Government of Colombia
by M. Camilo de Brigard, Counsel ; and on behalf of the Govem-
ment of Cuba by Mme. Flora Diaz Parrado, Agent.
At this public hearing the following Submissions relating to the
Request for Intervention were presented to the Court :

On behalf of the Government of Peru :
"May it please the Court to adjudge :

convention within the meaning of Article t63 of the Statute of the
Court, and in particular of the Havana Convention, concerning
the meaning of which the Court gave judgment on November zoth,

19and that, therefore, the interventioof the Government ofCuba
is not admissible."

On behalf of the Government of Colombia :
"May it please the Court to decidethat the Government of Cuba
is entitled to intervene in the present case."

7 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)
75
Au nom du Gouvernement de Cuba :

((Plaise à la Cour de déclarer recevable la demande d'interven-
tion.))
La Cour décida le 16 mai 1951, pour des motifs qui seront énoncés

plus loin, d'admettre l'intervention du Gouvernement de Cuba et
d'ouvrir immédiatement la procédure orale sur le fond de l'affaire.

Au cours des audiences publiques tenues les 16 et 17 mai 1951,
la Cour entendit dans leurs plaidoiries :pour le Gouvernement de
la Colombie, M. José Gabriel de la Vega, agent, et pour le Gouver-
nement du Pérou, M. G. Gidel, conseil ; elle entendit, en outre,

conformément àl'article 66, paragraphe 5, du Règlement, un exposé
relatif à l'interprétation de la Convention de La Havane, présenté
au nom du Gouvernement de Cuba par Mme Flora Diaz Parrado,
agent.
A la fin de la procédure écrits, les Parties avaient énoncéles
conclusions suivantes :

Pour la Colombie (conclusions du Mémoire) :

« Plaise à la Cour,
Dire de quelle manière doit êtreexécutépar la Colombie et par le
Péroul'arrêt du 20 novembre 1950 et, en plus, dire et juger que la
Colombie n'est pas obligée, enexécution dudit arrêt du 20 novem-
bre 1950, de remettre M. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre aux
autorités péruviennes.
Au cas où la Cour ne statuerait pas sur la conclusion précédente,
qu'il lui plaise de dire et juger, en exercice de sa compétence ordi-
naire, que la Colombie n'est pas obligéede remettre l'accusépoli-
tique M.Victor Raul Haya de la Torre aux autorités péruviennes. ))

Pour le Pérou (conclusions du Contre-Mémoire) :

(<Plaise à la Cour,
1. Déclarer de quelle manière doit être exécuté par laColombie
l'arrêtdu 20 novembre 1950 ;
II. Rejeter les conclusions de la Colombie tendent à faire dire,
sans plus, que la Colombie n'est pas obligée de remettre Victor
Raul Haya de la Torre aux autorités péruviennes ;

III. Au cas où la Cour ne statuerait pas sur la conclusion no 1,
dire et juger que l'asile octroyéau sieur Victor Raul Haya de la
Torre le 3 janvier 1949 et maintenu depuis lors ayant étéjugé
contraire à l'article2, paragraphe 2,du Traité de La Havane de
1928, aurait dû cesser immédiatement après le prononcé de l'arrêt
du 20 novembre 1950et doit en tout cas cesser désormaissans délai,
afin que la justice péruvienne puisse reprendre le cours suspendu
de son exercice normal. )) HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51) 75

On behalf of the Government of Cuba:
"May it please the Court to declare that the request to intervene
is admissible."

On May 16th, 1951, the Court decided, for the reasons which are
stated below, to admit the intervention of the Government of Cuba
and to open immediately the oral proceedings on the merits of the
case.
In the course of publichearings held on May 16th and 17th, 1951,
the Court heard statements by M. José Gabriel de la Vega, Agent,
on behalf of the Government of Colombia, and by M. G. Gidel,
Counsel, on behalf of the Government of Peru ; furthermore, in
accordance with Article 66, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, it

heard a statement on the interpretation of the Havana Convention,
presented on behalf of the Government of Cuba by Mme. Flora
Diaz Parrado, Agent.
Ar the end of the written proceedings, the Parties presented the
following Submissions :

On behalf of the Government of Colombia (Submissions in the
Memorial) :
"May it please the Court,
To state in what manner the Judgment of November zoth, 1950,
shall be executed by Colombia and Peru, and furthermore, to
adjudge and declare that Colombia is not bound, in execution of
the said Judgment of November zoth, 1950, to deliver M. Victor
Raul Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities.
In the event of the Court not delivering judgment on the fore-
going Submission, may it please the Court to adjudge and declare,
in the exercise of its ordinary competence, that Colombia is not
bound to deliver the politically accused M. Victor Rad1 Haya de
la Torre to the Peruvian authonties."

On behalf of the Government of Peru (Submissions in the Counter-
Memorial) :

"May it please the Court,
1. To state in what manner the Judgment of November zoth,
1950, shall be executed by Colombia ;
II. To dismiss the Submissions of Colombia by which the Court
is asked to state solely ["sans plus"]that Colombia 1snot bound
to deliver Victor Raul Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authoritie;
III. In the event of the Court not delivering judgment on Sub-
mission No. 1, to adjudge and declare that the asylum granted to
SeÏior Victor Raul Haya de la Torre on January 3rd, 1949, and
maintained since that date, having been judged to be contrary to
Article 2, paragraph 2,of the Havana Convention of 1928, ought
to have ceased immediately after the delivery of the Judgment of
November zoth, 1950, and must in any case cease forthwith in
order that Peruvian justice may resume its normal course which
has been suspended."
876 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)

En plaidoirie, le 16 mai 1951, l'agent du Gouvernement de la
Colombie a repris les conclusions du Mémoireen ajoutant ce qui
suit au sujet des conclusions du Contre-Mémoire du Pérou :

« Déclarerde quelle manière doit êtreexécuté parla Colombie
l'arrêtdu 20novembre 1950,au moment de dire, conformémentau
premier point de notre demande principale, ((de quelle manière
«doit êtreexécutépar la Colombie et par le Pérou l'arrêtdu
«20 novembre 1950 ));
Sur la conclusion II du mêmeContre-Mémoire :La rejeter ;
Et, le cas échéant, rejeterla conclusion III du Contre-Mémoire
cité))

D'autre part, le conseil du Gouvernement du Pérou a demandé
à la Cour de lui adjuger le bénéficedes conclusions formulées dans
son Contre-Mémoire.
Enfin, l'agent du Gouvernement de Cuba a fait connaître l'inter-

prétation que donne son Gouvernement à la Convention de La
Havane, relativement à la question de la remise du réfugiéaux
autorités péruviennes.

Le Gouvernement de Cuba, se prévalant du droit conférépar
l'article 63 du Statut de la Cour aux Etats parties àune convention,
a déposéau Greffe, le 13 mars 1951, une déclaration d'intervention,
en y annexant un Mémoireoù il exposait ses vues relativement à
l'interprétation de la Convention de La Havane de 1928, ratifiée

par lui, et au critérium généralen matière de droit d'asile. La Cour
a estimé que ce Mémoirecorrespondait, dans l'esprit du Gouver-
nement de Cuba, aux observations écrites prévues par l'article 66,
paragraphe 4, du Règlement.

Le Gouvernement du Pérou a soutenu que l'intervention du
Gouvernement de Cuba n'était pas admissible, motifs pris du
caractère tardif de la déclaration d'intervention et du fait que cette

déclaration et le Mémoirequi l'accompagnait ne constituaient pas
une intef-vention au sens véritable, mais une tentative de recours
par un Etat tiers contre l'arrêtrendu par la Cour le 20 novembre
1950.
A ce sujet, la Cour rappelle que toute intervention est un incident
de procédure ; par conséquent, une déclaration déposéeà fins
d'intervention ne revêt, en droit, ce caractère que si elle a réelle-
ment trait à ce qui est l'objet de l'instance en cours. L'instance

actuelle a un autre objet que l'instance à laquelle a mis fin l'arrêt
du 20 novembre 1950 :elle concerne une question, la remise de
Haya de la Torre aux autorités péruviennes, qui, dans l'instance
antérieure, était restée complètement en dehors des demandes des

9 HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51) 76
In the course of his oral statement on May 16th, 1951, the Agent
of the Govemment of Colombia re-stated the Submissions of the

Memorial with the following addition relating to the Submissions
of the Co'unter-Memonal of Peru :
"To state in what manner the Judgment of November zoth,
1950,shall be executed by Colombia,when stating, in accordance
with the frrst point of Our principal claim, 'in what manner the
Judgment of November zoth, 1950,shall be executed by Colombia
and Peru' ;
On SubrnissionII of the same Counter-Memorial : To reject it;
And, should occasion arise, to reject Submission III of the said
Counter-Memorial."

On the other hand, Counselfor the Government of Peru requested
the Court to decide in its favour upon the Submissions set out
in its Counter-Memorial.
Finally, the Agent of the Govemment of Cuba presented her
Government's interpretation of the Havana Convention so far
as concerns the surrender of the refugee tothe Peruvian authorities.

The Government of Cuba, availing itself of the right which
Article 63 of the Statute of the Court confers on States parties
to a convention, filed a Declaration of Intervention with the

Registry on March 13th, 1951, and attached thereto a Memorandum
in which it stated its views in regard to the interpretation of the
Havana Convention of 1928 ratified by it and also its general
attitude towards asylum. The Court considered that this Memo-
randum was regarded by the Govemment of Cuba as constituting
the written observations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 66
of the Rules of Court.
The Government of Peru contended that the intervention of the
Government of Cuba was inadmissible, owing to the Declaration
of Intervention being out of time, and to the fact that the Declara-
tion and the Memorandum accompanying it did not constitute
an intervention in the true meaning of the term, but an attempt

by a third State to appeal against the Judgment delivered by the
Court on November zoth, 1950.
In regard to that question, the Court observes that every inter-
vention is incidental to the proceedings in a case ; it follows that
a declaration filed as an intervention only acquires 'that character,
in law, if it actually relates to the subject-matter of the pending
proceedings. The subject-matter of the present case differs from
that of the case which was terminated by the Judgment of
November zoth, 1950 : it concerns a question-the surrender of
Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authonties-which in the previous77 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)

Parties et surlaquelle, par conséquent, il n'a été aucunement statué
par ledit arrêt.

Dans ces conditions, le seul point qu'il importe de vérifier est
de savoir si l'intervention du Gouvernement de Cuba a bien pour
objet l'interprétation de la Convention de La Havane relativement
à l'obligation qui incomberait à la Colombie de remettre le réfugié

aux autorités péruviennes.
La Cour observe à ce sujet que le Mémoirejoint à la déclaration
d'intervention du Gouvernement de Cuba était presque exclusive-
ment consacré à l'examen de questions que l'arrêt du 20 novembre
1950 avait tranchées avec force de chose jugée et que, dans cette
mesure, il ne remplissait pas les conditions d'une véritable inter-
vention. Mais, à l'audience publique du 15 mai 1951, l'agent du
Gouvernement de Cuba a déclaré que l'intervention avait pour
fondement la nécessitéoù se trouvait la Cour d'interpréter un nouvel
aspect de la Convention de La Havane, aspect que n'avait pas eu

à retenir l'arrêtdu 20 novembre 1950.

Ainsi circonscrite et s'exerçant dans ces limites, l'intervention
du Gouvernement de Cuba répondait aux conditions de l'article 63
du Statut, et la Cour, après en avoir délibéré,a, le 16 mai, décidé
de l'admettre en application de l'article 66, paragraphe 2, du
Règlement.

Dans son arrêtdu 20 novembre 1950, la Cour a définilesrapports
de dfoit entre la Colombie et le Pérou au sujet des questions que
ces Etats lui avaient soumises relativement à l'asile diplomatique
en général,et notamment à l'asile que l'ambassadeur de Colombie
à Lima avait accordé à Victor Ratil Haya de la Torre les 3-4 janvier
1949. A la date où ledit arrêt fut prononcé, le Gouvernement de
la Colombie saisit la Cour d'une demande en interprétation qui fut
déclaréeirrecevable par arrêt du 27 novembre 1950.

Le lendemain, le ministre des Affaires étrangères et du Culte du

Pérou,invoquant l'arrêt du 20 novembre, adressa au chargéd'affaires
de Colombie à Lima une note où il déclarait notamment :

nationale de Justice, mettant fià'la protection que cette ambas-
sade accorde, indûment, à Victor Raul Haya de la Torre. Il n'est
plus possible de prolonger davantage un asile dont le maintien est
en contradiction ouverte avec l'arrêt rendu. L'ambassade de
Colombie ne peut continuer à protéger le réfugié,entravant ainsi
l'action des tribunaux nationaux.

IOcase was completely outside the Submissions of the Parties, and
which was in consequence in no way decided by the above-
mentioned Judgment.
In these circumstances, the only point which it is necessary to
ascertain is whether the object of the intervention of the Govern-
ment of Cuba is in fact the interpretation ofthe Havana Convention

in regard to the question whether Colombia is under an obligation
to surrender the refugee to the Peruvian authorities.
On that point, the Court observes that the Memorandum attached
to the Declaration of Intervention of the Government of Cuba is
devoted almost entirely to a discussion of the questions which the
Judgrnent of November zoth, 1950, had already decided with the
authority of res judicata, and that, to that extent, it does not
satisfy the conditions of a genuine intervention. However, at the
public hearing on May 15th, 1951, the Agent of the Government
of Cuba stated that the intervention was based on the fact that
the Court was required to interpret a new aspect of the Havana
Convention, an aspect which the Court had not been called on
to consider in its Judgment of November zoth, 1950.
Reduced in this way, and operatingwithin these limits, the inter-
vention of the Government of Cuba conformed to the conditions of

Article 63 of the Statute, and the Court, having deliberated on the
matter, decided on May 16th to admit the intervention in pursuance
of paragraph 2 of Article 66 of the Rules of Court.

In its Judgment of November zoth, 1950, the Court defined the
legal relations between Colombia and Peru with regard to matters
referred to it by them relating to diplomatic asylum in general and
particularly to the asylum granted to Victor Ra61 Haya de la Torre
by the Ambassador of Colombia in Lima on January 3rd-4th, 1949.
On the day of the delivery of this Judgment the Government of
Colombia submitted to the Court a Request for Interpretation,
which by the Judgment of November 27th, 1950, uras declared to
be inadmissible.

On the following day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Public
Worship of Peru, relying on the Judgment of November zoth,
addressed a note to the Chargé d'Affaires of Columbia at Lima,
stating in particular :
"The moment has come to carry out the Judgment delivered
by the International Court of Justice by terminating the protection
which that Embassy is improperly granting to Victor Raul Haya
de la Torre. It is no longer possible further to prolong an asylum
which is being maintained in open contradiction to the Judgment
which has been delivered. The ColombianEmbassy cannot continue
to protect the refugee, thus barring the action of the national courts. 78 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)

Votre Seigneurie doit faire le nécessairedans le but de mettre
fin à cette protection indûment accordée, en livrant le réfugié
Victor Rafil Haya de la Torre pour qu'il soit mis à la disposition du
juge d'instruction qui l'a sommé de comparaître pour êtrejugé,
conformément à ce que je viens d'exposer. »

Par une note en date du 6 décembre 1950, adressée au ministre
des Affaires étrangères et du Culte du Pérou, le ministre des Affaires
étrangères de la Colombie refusa d'accéder à cette demande ; il

faisait valoir notamment :
(La Cour, par conséquent, rejeta formellement le grief adressé
au Gouvernement de la Colombie dans la demande reconvention-

nelle du Gouvernement du Pérou, à savoir, d'avoir accordé asile à
des personnes accusées oucondamnéespour délits communs. Si la
Colombie procédait à effectuer la remise du réfugié, que Votre
Excellence demande, non seulement [elle] méconnaîtrait l'arrêt
auquel nous sommes en train de nous référermais violerait encore
l'article premier, paragraphe 2, de la Convention de La Havane,
où il est établi que les personnes accuséesou condamnéespour
((délits communs, qui auraient trouvé refuge dans une légation,
((devront êtrelivrées aussitôt que le gouvernement local l'aura
((demandé 1).»

Telles sont les circonstances qui sont à l'origine de la présente
instance que le Gouvernement de la Colombie a introduite devant
la Cour par requête en date du 13 décembre 1950.
Les Parties ont dans la présente affaire accepté la juridiction

de la Cour. Elles ont discuté au fond toutes les questions soumises
à celle-ci et n'ont rien objecté contre une décision au fond. Cette
attitude des Parties suffit à fonder la compétence de la Cour.

Dans la première partie de sa conclusion principale, le Gouverne-
ment de la Colombie a demandé à la Cour de

((dire de quelle manière doit êtreexécuté parla Colombieet par
le Perou l'arrêt du 20 novembre 1950.. )).

De son côté, le Gouvernement du Pérou, par sa première conclu-
sion, prie la Cour de

déclarer de quelle manière doit êtreexécuté parla Colombie
l'arrêtdu 20 novembre 1950 )).

Ces conclusions ont l'une et l'autre pour objet d'obtenir de la
Cour une décision sur la manière dont l'asile doit prendre fin. La
partie de l'arrêt du 20 novembre 1950 à laquelle elles se réfèrent
est celle où, statuant sur la régularitéde l'asile, l'arrêtditque l'octroi
de l'asile n'a pas été fait en conformité de l'article 2, paragraphe 2, You must take the necessary steps, Sir, with a view to terminat-
ing this protection, which is being improperly granted, by deliver-
ing the refugee Victor Rad Haya de la Torre, so that he may be
placed at the disposal of the examining magistrate who sumrnoned
him to appear for judgment, in accordance with what 1 have
recited above."

In a Note dated December 6th, 1950, addressed to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Public Worship of Peru, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Colombia refused to comply with this request ;
he relied in particular on the following considerations :

"Consequently, the Court formally rejected the complaint made
against the Government of Colombia in the counter-claim of the
Government of Peru, namely, that it had granted asylum to per-
sons accused of or condemned for common crimes. Should Colombia
proceed to the delivery of the refugee, as requested by Your Excel-
lency, [it] would not only disregard the Judgment to which we
are now referring, but would also violate Article 1, paragraph 2,
of or condemned for common crimes taking refuge in a legationcused
shall be surrendered upon request of the locaI government.' "

These are the circumstances giving rise to the present case which
has been brought before the Court by the Government of Colombia
by Application of December 13th, 1950.
The Partieshave in the present case consented to the jurisdiction
of the Court. Al1 the questions submitted to it have been argued by
them on the merits, and no objection has been made to a decision
on the merits. This conduct of the Parties is sufficient to confer

jurisdiction on the Court.

In the first part of its principal Submission the Government of
Colombia requests the Court

"to state in what manner the Judgment of November zoth, 1950,
shail be executed by Colombia and Peru....".
On the other hand, the Government of Peru in its first Submission
requests the Court

"to state in what manner the Judgment of November zoth, 1950,
shall be executed by Colombia".

These Submissions are both designed to obtain a decision from
the Court as to the manner in which the asylum should be term-
inated. The portion of the Judgment of November zoth, 1950, to
which they refer is the passage where, in pronouncing on the ques-
tion of the regularity of the asylum, it declares that the grant of79 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)
<(premièrement », de la Convention de La Havane de 1928 relative

à l'asile. La Cour rappelle que ledit arrêts'est borné à définir,dans
cet ordre d'idées, les rapports de droit que la Convention de La
Havane avait établis entre Parties. Il ne comporte aucune injonc-
tion aux Parties et n'entraîne pour celles-ci que l'obligation de s'y
conformer. La forme interrogative qu'elles ont donnée à leurs
conclusions montre qu'elles entendent que la Cour opère un choix
entre les diverses voies par lesquelles l'asile peut prendre fin. Mais

ces voies sont conditionnées par des éléments de fait et par des
possibilités que, dans une très large mesure, les Parties sont seules
en situation d'apprécier. Un choix entre elles ne pourrait être
fondé sur des considérations juridiques, mais seulement sur des
considérations de nature pratique ou d'opportunité politique ; il
ne rentre pas dans la fonction judiciaire de la Cour d'effectuer ce

choix.
Dans la seconde partie de sa conclusion principale, le Gouveme-
ment de la Colombie demande à la Cour de

«dire et juger que la Colombie n'est pas obligée,en exécution
dudit arrêtdu 20 novembre 1950,de remettre M.Victor Rad Haya
de la Torre aux autorités péruviennes 1).

Cette partie de la conclusion principale de la Colombie est stricte-
ment limitéepar les termes (en exécution dudit arrêtdu 20novem-
bre 1950 N.Ces termes visent à rattacher la demande ainsi formulée,
tout comme celle énoncéedans la première partie, à l'exécutionde
l'arrêt du 20 novembre 1950.

Ainsi qu'il a été dit dans cet arrêt, de mêmeque dans l'arrêt
du 27 novembre 1950, le Gouvernement du Pérou n'avait pas
demandé la remise du réfugié. Cette question n'avait pas été
soumise à la Cour, qui ne l'a par conséquent pas tranchée. Il n'est
donc DIs ~Lssible de déduire de l'arrêtdu 20 novembre une conclu-
sion quelconque relative à l'existence ou à l'inexistence d'une
obligation de remettre le réfugié.Dans ces conditions, la Cour n'est

pas en mesure de dire, sur la seule base de l'arrêtdu 20 novembre,
si la Colombie est obligéeou non de remettre le réfugiéaux autorités
péruviennes.
Par ces raisons, la Cour ne peut donner effet aux conclusions
précitées.
La conclusion subsidiaire du Gouvernement de la Colombie est

la suivante :
Au cas où la Courne statuerait pas sur la conclusionprécédente,
qu'il lui plaise de dire et juger, en exercice de sa compétence ordi-
naire, que la Colombien'est pas obligéede remettre l'accusépoli-
tique M. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre aux autoritéspéruviennes. ))

Dans sa seconde conclusion, le Gouvernement du Pérou demande
à la Cour de
12 HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51) 79

asylurn was not made in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 2
("First"), of the Havana Convention on Asylum of 1928. The Court
observes that the Judgment confined itself, in this connection, to
defining the legal relations which the Havana Convention had
established between the Parties. It did not give any directions to
the Parties, and entails for them only the obligation of compliance
therewith. The interrogative form in *hich they have formulated
their Submissions shows that they desire that the Court should

make a choice amongst the various courses by which the asylum
may be terminated. But these courses are conditioned by facts and
by possibilities which, to a very large extent, the Parties arelone
in a position to appreciate. A choice amongst them could not be
based on legal considerations, but only on considerations ofpractic-
ability or of political expediency ;it is not part of the Court's
judicial function to make such a choice.
In the second part of its principal Submission, the Government of
Colombia requests the Court

"to adjudge and declare that Colombia is not bound, in execu-
tion of the said Judgrnent of November zoth, 1950, to deliver
M. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities".

This part of the principal Submission of Colombia is strictly
limited by the words "in execution of the said Judgment of Novem-
ber 2oth, 1950". These words serve to confine the request thus
formulated, as in the first part of the same Submission, to the
execution of the Judgment of November zoth, 1950.
As was stated both in that Judgment and in the Judgment of

November 27th, 1950, the Government of Peru had not demanded
the surrender of the refugee. This question was not submitted to
the Court and consequently was not decided by it. It is not there-
fore possible to deduce from the Judgment of November zoth
any conclusion asto the existence or non-existence of an obligation
to surrender the refugee. In these circumstances, the Court is not
in a position to state, merely on the basis of the Judgment of
November zoth, whether Colombia is or is not bound to surrender
the refugee to the Peruvian authorities.
For these reasons, the Court cannot give effect to the above-
mentioned Submissions.

The alternative Submission of the Government of Colombia is as
follows :
"In the event of the Court not delivering judgment on the
foregoing Submission, may it please the Court to adjudge and
declare, in the exercise of its ordinary competence, that Colombia
is not bound to deliver the politically accusedictor Rad Haya
de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities."

In its second Submission the Government of Peru requests the
Court

1280 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)

«rejeter les conclusionsde la Colombietendant à faire dire, sans
plus, que la Colombien'est pas obligée deremettre Victor Rad1
Haya de la Torre aux autoritéspéruviennes ».

Le Gouvernement du Pérou relève ici que les conclusions de la
Colombie tendent à faire dire,« sans plus, que la Colombie n'est

pas obligée ...1).Par ces mots « sans plus », le Gouvernement du
Pérou entend que la situation de droit que lui a faite l'arrêt du
20 novembre soit en tout cas sauvegardée ;il se réfèreainsi à la
déclaration énoncéedans sa troisième conclusion, qui sera examinée
plus loin.
Ainsi qu'il a étérelevéplus haut, l'arrêtdu 20 novembre n'a pas
statué sur la question de la remise du réfugié.Cette question est
nouvelle ; elle aétésoulevéepar le Pérou dans sa note à la Colombie
en date du 28 novembre 1950 et soumise à la Cour par la requête
de la Colombie en date du 13 décembre 1950. Par conséquent, il

n'y a pas chose jugée en ce qui concerne la question de la remise.
Selon la Convention de La Havane, l'asile diplomatique est une
mesure provisoire en vue de la protection temporaire des criminels
politiques. Mêmerégulièrement accordé,il ne saurait se prolonger
indéfiniment mais doit prendre fin aussitôt que possible. Selon
l'article2, paragraphe 2, il ne pourra êtreaccordé que «pour le
temps strictement indispensable pour que le réfugié semette en
sûreté d'une autre manière 1).
La Cour relève que la Convention ne donne pas de réponse
complète à la question de savoir de quelle manière l'asile doit
prendre fin.

En ce qui concerne les personnes accusées ou condamnées pour
délits de droit commun et qui cherchent refuge, l'article premier
prévoit qu'elles devront être remises aussitôt que l'exigera le
gouvernement local. Quant aux criminels politiques », la Conven-
tion prévoit un autre mode de cessation de l'asile : l'octroi d'un
sauf-conduit pour quitter le pays. Mais, aux termes de l'arrêtdu
20 novembre, un sauf-conduit ne peut êtreexigé en vertu de la
Convention de La Havane que si l'asile a étérégulièrement accordé
et maintenu et si l'Etat territorial a demandé que le réfugiésoit
mis hors du pays. Quant aux cas dans lesquels l'asile n'a pas été
régulièrement accordé ou maintenu, rien n'est prévu en ce qui

concerne Je mode de cessation. Rien non plus n'est prévu pour le
cas où l'Etat territorial ne demanderait pas le départ du réfugié.
Ainsi, et bien que la Convention prévoie que la durée de l'asile
sera limitée au temps « strictement indispensable ....»,elle reste
muette, dans un certain nombre de cas, quant au point de savoir
comment il faut mettre fin à l'asile.
Ainsi que la Cour l'a relevé dans son arrêt du 20 novembre, la
Convention de La Havane qui, dans son article premier, prescrit
la remise aux autorités territoriales des personnes accusées ou
condamnées pour crimes de droit commun, ne contient aucune

13 HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51) 80

is asked to state solely ("sans plus") that Colombiais not bound
to deliver VictorRaul Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian author-
ities".

The Government of Peru states in this Submission that the Court
is asked by the Submissions of Colombia "to state solely that Colom-
bia is not bound ...."By using this word "solely" ("sans plus")
the Govemment of Peru wishes to convey that the legal position
which the Judgment of November 20th created for it must in any
case be preserved ;it refers thus to the statement set forth in its
third Submission, which will be examined later.
As mentioned above, the question of the surrender of the refugee

was not decided by the Judgment of November 20th. This question
is new ;it was raised by Peru in its Note to Colombia of Novem-
ber 28th, 1950, and was submitted to the Court by the Application
of Colombia of December 13th, 1950. There is consequently no
res judicata upon the question of surrender.
According to the Havana Convention, diplomatic asylum is a
provisional measure for the temporary protection of political
offenders. Even if regularly granted it cannot be prolonged inde-
finitely, but must be terminated as soon as possible. It can, accord-
ing to Article 2,paragraph 2, only be granted "for the period of
time strictly indispensable for the person who has sought asylum
to ensure in some other way his safety".

The Court finds that the Convention does not give a complete
answer to the question of the manner in which an asylum shall
be terminated.
As to persons accused of or condemned for common crimes who
seek refuge, Article Iprescribes that they shall be surrendered upon
request of the local government. For "political offenders" another
method of terminating asylum is prescribed, namely, the grant of
a safe-conduct for the departure from the country. But, under the
terms of the Judgment of November zoth, a safe-conduct can only
be claimed under the Havana Convention if the asylum has been
regularly granted and maintained and if the territorial State has
required that the refugee should be sent out of the country. For
cases in which the asylum has not been regularly granted or main-

tained, no provision is made as to the method of termination. Nor
is any provision made in this matter in cases where the territorial
State has not requested the departure of the refugee. Thus, though
the Convention prescribes that the duration of the asylum shall
be limited to the time "strictly indispensable....",it is silent on
the question how the asylum should be terminated in a variety
of different situations.
As the Court pointed out in its Judgment of November zoth,
the Havana Convention, the first article of which requires
that perçons accused of or condemned for common crimes shall be
surrendered to the territorial authorities, does not contain any

13 81 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)

disposition semblable pour les criminels politiques. Ce silence ne
saurait êtreinterprété dans le sens d'une obligation de remettre
le réfugiéau cas où l'asile lui aurait été octroyé contrairement
aux prescriptions de l'article2 de la Convention. Une telle inter-
prétation irait à l'encontre de l'esprit qui anime celle-ci, conformé-
ment à la tradition latino-américaine en matière d'asile, tradition
selon laquelle un réfugiépolitique ne fait pas l'objet de remise.
Cette tradition ne fait pas apparaître qu'exception ait étéfaite
pour le cas où l'asile a étéirrégulièrement octroyé. Pour rompre

cette tradition, il eût fallu une disposition expresse qui ne figure
pas dans la Convention de La Havane. Le silence de la Convention
implique qu'on a voulu laisser l'aménagement des suites de cette
situation à des décisionsinspiréesde considérations de convenance
et de simple opportunité politique. Ce serait méconnaître le rôle
de tels facteurs extra-juridiques dans le développement de l'asile
enAmériquelatine, ainsi que l'esprit dela Convention de La Havane,
que dese prévaloir du silence de celle-ci pour conclure àl'obligation
de remettre celui à qui l'asile a étéirrégulièrement octroyé.

Dans son arrêtdu zo novembre, la Cour a déclaré qu'en principe

l'asile ne peut êtreopposéà l'action de la justice. La sûreté décou-
lant de l'asile ne saurait être entendue comme une protection
contre l'application régulière deslois et la juridiction des tribunaux
légalement constitués. Une protection ainsi entendue autoriserait
l'agent diplomatique à mettre obstacle à l'application des lois du
pays alors qu'il a l'obligation de les respecte;. La Cour a encore
déclaré qu'ellene saurait admettre que les Etats signataires de
la Convention de La Havane eussent entendu substituer à la
pratique des républiques de l'Amérique latine un régimejuridique
qui garantirait à leurs propres nationaux accusés de crimes poli-
tiques Je privilège d'échapper à la juridiction nationale. Mais dire
que 1'Etat qui a irrégulièrement octroyé l'asile a l'obligation de

remettre le réfugiéaux autorités locales serait tout autre chose.
Une telle obligation de fournir une assistance positive à ces auto-
rités dans leurs poursuites contre un réfugiépolitique dépasserait
de beaucoup les propositions énoncéespar la Cour et rappelées
ci-dessus ;elle ne saurait êtreadmise en l'absence d'une disposition
expresse de la Convention à cet effet.
La Convention de La Havane ?'autorise donc pas à admettre
que l'obligation incombant à un Etat de mettre fin à l'asile irré-
gulièrement octroyé à un criminel politique entraîne l'obligation,
pour cet Etat, d'opérer la remise de celui à qui cet asile a été
ainsi octroyé.

En examinant si l'asile avait étérégulièrement octroyé,la Cour,
dans son arrêt du 20 novembre, a estimé que le Gouvernement
du Pérou n'avait pas démontré queles faits dont Haya de la Torre
avait étéaccuséavant que l'asile lui fût octroyé, étaient des délits
14 HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51) 81

similar provision in regard to political offenders. This silence cannot
be interpreted as imposing an obligation to surrender the refugee
in case the asylum was granted to him contrary to the provisions
of Article 2 of the Convention. Such an interpretation would be
repugnant to the spirit which animated that Convention in conform-
ity with the Latin-American tradition in regard to asylum, a tradi-
tion in accordance with which political refugees should not be
surrendered. There is nothing in that tradition to indicate that an
exception should be made where asylum has been irregularly
granted. If it has been intended to abandon that tradition, an
express provision to that effect would have been needed, and the
Havana Convention contains no such provision. The silence of the

Convention implies that it was intended to leave the adjustment
of the consequences of this situation to decisions inspired byonsi-
derations of convenience or of simple political expediency. To infer
from this silence that there is an obligation to surrender a person
to whom asylum has been irregularly granted would be to disregard
both the rôle of these extra-legal factors in the development of
asylum in Latin America, and the spirit of the Havana Convention
itself.
In its Judgment of November 20th the Court pointed out that,
in principle, asylum cannot be opposed to the operation of justice.
The safety which arises out of asylum cannot be construed as a
protection against the regular application of the laws and against
the jurisdiction of legally constituted tribunals. Protection thus

understood would authorize the diplornatic agent to obstruct the
application of the laws of the country, whereas it is his duty to
respect them. The Court further said that it could not admit that
the States signatories to the Havana Convention intended to
substitute for the practice of the Latin-American republics a legal
system which would guarantee to their own nationals accused of
politicaloffences the privilege of evading national jurisdiction.
But it would be an entirely different thing to Say that the State
granting an irregular asylum is obliged to surrender the refugee
to the local authorities. Such an obligation to render positive
assistance to these authorities in their prosecution of a political
refugee would far exceed the above-mentioned findings of the
Court and could not be recognized without an express provision

to that effect in the Convention.
Thus, the Havana Convention does not justify the view that
the obligation incumbent on a State to terminate an asylum
irregularly granted to a political offender, imposes a duty upon
that State to surrender the person to whom asylum has been
granted.
In its Judgment of November 20th the Court, in examining
whether the asylum was regularly granted, found that the Govern-
ment of Peru had not proved that the acts of which Haya de la
Torre was accused, before asylum was granted to him, constituted

1482 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)

de droit commun. D'autre part, la Cour, considérant la disposition
de l'article 2, paragraphe 2, relative aux criminels politiques, a
constaté sur la base de cette disposition que l'octroi de l'asile
n'avait pas étéfait en conformité de la Convention. Il en résulte
que, pour autant qu'il s'agit de la remise, le réfugiédoit êtretraité
comme une personne accusée d'un crime politique. La Cour arrive
donc à la conclusion que le Gouvernement de la Colombie n'est

pas obligéde remettre Haya de la Torre aux autorités péruviennes.

La troisième conclusion du Gouvernement du Pérou est ainsi
conçue :

« Au cas où la Cour ne statuerait pas sur la conclusion no 1, dire
et juger que l'asileoctroyéau sieur Victor Ra61Haya de la Torre
le3 janvier 1949et maintenu depuis lors ayant été jugécontraire à
l'articl2, paragraphe 2, du Traitéde La Havane de 1928, aurait
dû cesserimmédiatement aprèsle prononcéde l'arrêtdu 20 novem-
bre 1950 et doit en tout cas cesser désormaissans délai,afin que
la justice péruviennepuisse reprendre le cours suspendu de son
exercice normal. 1)

Le Gouvernement de la Colombie a demandé à la Cour de rejeter
cette conclusion.
Dans son arrêt du 20 novembre, la Cour a jugé que l'octroi de
l'asile par le Gouvernement de la Colombie à Haya de la Torre
n'avait pas été fait en conformité de l'article 2, paragraphe 2,
((premièrement », de la Convention. Cette décision entraîne une

conséquence juridique, celle de mettre fin à une situation irrégu-
lière: le Gouvernement de la Colombie, qui a octroyé irrégu-
lièrement l'asile, est obligé de le faire cesser. L'asile ayant été
maintenu jusqu'à présent, le Gouvernement du Pérou est fondé
en droit à en demander la cessation.
Toutefois, le Gouvernement du Pérou ajoute dans sa conclusion
que l'asile doit cesser (afin que la justice péruvienne puisse repren-

dre le cours suspendu de son exercice normal 1).Cette addition
parait comporter une demande indirecte de remise du réfugie.
Pour les motifs exposés ci-dessus, cette partie de la conclusion du
Gouvernement du Pérou ne saurait êtreadmise.

La Cour arrive donc à la conclusion que l'asile doit prendre fin
mais que le Gouvernement de la Colombie n'est pas obligé de

s'acquitter de cette obligation en remettant le réfugiéaux auto-
rités péruviennes. Il n'y a pas contradiction entre ces deux
propositions, car la remise n'est pas la seule manière de mettre
fin à l'asile.common crimes. Moreover,when the Court considered the provisions
of Article 2, paragraph 2, relating to political offenders, it held,
on the basis of these provisions, that the asylum had not been
granted in conformity with the Convention. It follows from these
considerations that, so far as the question of surrender is concemed,
the refugee must be treated as a person accused of a political offence.
The Court has, consequently, arrived at the conclusion that the
Government of Colombia is under no obligation to surrender Haya

de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities.
The third Submission of the Government of Peru is as follows :

"In the event of the Court not delivering judgment on Sub-
mission No. 1, to adjudge and declare that the asylum granted to
Sefior Victor Raul Haya de la Torre on January 3rd, 1949, and
maintained since that date, having been judged to be contrary to
Article2, paragraph 2,of the Havana Convention of 1928,it ought
to have ceased immediately after the delivery of the Judgment
of November zoth, 1950, and must in any case cease forthwith, in
order that Peruvian justice may resume its normal course which
has been suspended."

The Government of Colombia has requested the Court to reject
this Submission.
In its Judgment of November zoth, the Court held that the
grant of asylum by the Government .of Colombia to Haya de la
Torre was not made in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 2
("First"), of the Convention. This decision entails a legal conse-

quence, namely that of putting an end to an illegal situation : the
Government of Colombia which had granted the asylum irregularly
is bound to terminate it.As the asylum is still being maintained,
the Govemment of Peru is legally entitled to claim that it should
cease.
But the latter Government adds in its Submission a demand
that the asylum should cease "in order that Peruvian justice may
resume its normal course which has been suspended". This addition
appears to involve, indirectly, a claim for the surrender of the
refugee. For the reasons given above, this part of the Submission
of the Government of Peru cannot be accepted.

The Court has thus arrived at the conclusion that the asylum
must cease, but that the Government of Colombia is under no
obligation to bring this about by surrendering the refugee to the
Peruvian authorities. There is no contradiction between these
two findings, since surrender is not the only way of terminating
asylurn.83 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI 51)
Ayant ainsi défini,conformément à la Convention de La Havane,
les rapports de droit entre Parties relativement aux questions qui

lui ont étésoumises, la Cour a rempli sa mission. Elle ne saurait
donner aucun conseil pratique quant aux voies qu'il conviendrait
de suivre pour mettre fin à l'asile, car, ce faisant, elle sortirait
du cadre de sa fonction judiciaire. Toutefois, il est présumer que,
leurs rapports juridiques réciproques se trouvant désormais pré-
cisés,les Parties seront en mesure de trouver une solution pratique
satisfaisante, en s'inspirant des considérations de courtoisie et de
bon voisinage qui, en matière d'asile, ont toujours tenu une très
large place dans les relations entre les républiques de l'Amérique

latine.

Par ces motifs,

sur la conclusion principale du Gouvernement de la Colombie

et la première conclusion du Gouvernement du Pérou,
à l'unanimité,

dit qu'elle ne peut donner effet à ces conclusions et, en conséquence,
les rejette;

sur la conclusion subsidiaire du Gouvernement de la Colombie

et la seconde conclusion du Gouvernement du Pérou,
par treize voix contre une,

dit que la Colombie n'est pas obligéede remettre Victor Raul
Haya de la Torre aux autorités péruviennes ;

sur la troisième conclusion du Gouvernement du Pérou,

à l'unanimité,

dit que l'asile octroyàVictor Kaul Haya de la Torre les 3-4 janvier
1949 et maintenu depuis lors aurait dû cesser après le prononck
de l'arrêtdu 20 novembre 1950 et doit prendre fin. Having thus defined in accordance with the Havana Convention
the legal relations between the Parties with regard to the matters
referred to it, the Court has completed its task. Itis unable to give
any practical advice as to the various courses which might be
followed with a view to teminating the asylum, since, by doing
so, it would depart from its judicial function. But it can be assumed
that the Parties, now that their mutual legal relations have been
made clear, will be able to find a practical and satisfactory solution
by seeking guidance from those considerations of courtesy and

good-neighbourliness which, in matters of asylum, have always
held a prominent place in the relations between the Latin-American
republics.

For these reasons,

on the principal Submission of the Government of Colombia and
the first Submission of the Government of Peru,

unanimously,

finds that it cannot give effect to these Submissions and conse-
quently rejects them ;

on the alternative Submission of the Government of Colombia
and the second Submission of the Government of Peru,

by thirteen votes to one,
finds that Colombia is under no obligation to surrender Victor
Ratil Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities ;

on the third Submission of the Government of Peru,
unanimously,

finds that the asylum granted to Victor Ratil Haya de la Torre on
January 3rd-4th, 1949, and maintained since that time, ought to
have ceased after the delivery of the Judgment of November zoth,
1950, and should terminate.84 AFFAIRE HAYA DE LA TORRE (ARRÊT DU 13 VI51)

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le treize juin mil neuf cent cin-
quante et un, en quatre exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposéaux
archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respective-
ment au Gouvernement de la République de la Colombie, au
Gouvernement de la République du Pérou et au Gouvernement de
la République de Cuba.

Le Président,
(Signé) BASDEVANT.

Le Greffier,

(Signé) E. HAMBRO.

M. ALAYZA Y PAZ SOLDAN, juge ad hoc, déclare que, si la Cour
avait exposé,au second point du dispositif, que la Colombie n'était
pas obligée, en tant qu'unique manière d'exécuter l'arrêt, de
remettre le réfugiéau Gouvernement du Pérou, il aurait étéen
mesure de se rallier l'opinion de la majorité de la Cour. Mais le
laconisme de la phrase employée, qui peut êtremal comprise,

l'empêche dese rallierà l'opinion de l'ensemble de ses collègues.

(Paraphé) J. B.

(Paraph,é)E. H. HAYA DE LA TORRE CASE (JUDGMENT OF 13 VI 51)
84

Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this thirteenth day of June, one
thousand nine hundred. and fifty-one, in four copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the otherstrans-
mitted to the Government of the Republic of Colombia, to the
Government of the Republic of Peru and to the Government of
the Republic of Cuba, respectively.

(Signed) BASDEVANT,

Presiden.

(Signed) E. HAMBRO,
Registrar.

M. ALAYZA Y PAZSOLDANJ,udge adhoc,declares that if the Court
had stated under the second point of the operative clause that
Colombia was under no obligation, as the sole means of executing

the Judgment, to surrender the refugee to the Government of Peru,
he would have been in a position to concur in the opinion of the
majority of the Court. But the brevity of the sentence employed,
which may be misunderstood, prevents him from concurring in the
.opinion of the Court as a whole.

(Initialled) J. B.
(Initialled)E. H.

ICJ document subtitle

(including the text of the declaration of judge <i>ad hoc</i> Alayza y Paz Soldán)

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 13 June 1951

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