Corrigé
Corrected
CR 2015/24
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2015
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 30 September 2015, at 4 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Abraham presiding,
in the case concerning Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and
Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)
Preliminary Objections
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2015
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 30 septembre 2015, à 16 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,
en l’affaire relative à des Violations alléguées de droits souverains
et d’espaces maritimes dans la mer des Caraïbes
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)
Exceptions préliminaires
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -
Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf
Judges Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian
Judges ad hoc Daudet
Caron
Registrar Couvreur
- 3 -
Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président
MM. Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mme Xue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian, juges
MM. Daudet
Caron, juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier
- 4 -
The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
Oxford University, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Alex Oude Elferink, Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Professor of
International Law of the Sea, Utrecht University,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Emeritus Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former
member and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. César Vega Masís, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Director of Juridical Affairs,
Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel;
Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, Counsellor, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Claudia Loza Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Benjamin Samson, Ph.D. Candidate, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Defense,
Ms Gimena González,
as Assistant Counsel;
Ms Sherly Noguera de Argüello, Consul General of the Republic of Nicaragua,
as Administrator. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, ambassadeur de la République du Nicaragua auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
international, Oxford University, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur de l’Institut néerlandais du droit de la mer, professeur de droit
international de la mer, Université d’Utrecht,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur émérite à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien
membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre de l’Institut de
droit international,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de droit international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. César Vega Masís, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères, directeur des affaires juridiques, de la
souveraineté et du territoire au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils ;
M. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, conseiller à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Claudia Loza Obregon, première secrétaire de l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Benjamin Samson, doctorant au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mme Gimena Gonzales,
comme conseils adjoints ;
Mme Sherly Noguera de Argüello, consul général de la République du Nicaragua,
comme administrateur. - 6 -
The Government of Colombia is represented by:
H.E. Ms María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Francisco Echeverri Lara, Vice Minister of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
as National Authorities;
H.E. Mr. Carlos Gustavo Arrieta Padilla, former Judge of the Council of State of Colombia, former
Attorney General of Colombia and former Ambassador of Colombia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, former President of the Constitutional Court of Colombia,
former Permanent Delegate of Colombia to UNESCO and former Ambassador of Colombia to
the Helvetic Confederation,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. W. Michael Reisman, McDougal Professor of International Law at Yale University, member of
the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, former avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Singapore,
Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., member of the English Bar, member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. Tullio Treves, member of the Institut de droit international, Senior Public International Law
Consultant, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP Milan, Professor, University of Milan,
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, member and Special Rapporteur of the International Law
Commission, President of the Latin American Society of International Law,
Dr. h.c. Matthias Herdegen, Director of the Institute of International Law and Institute for Public
Law at the University of Bonn,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Juan José Quintana Aranguren, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the OPCW, former Permanent
Representative of Colombia to the United Nations in Geneva,
H.E. Mr. Andelfo García González, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom of
Thailand, Professor of International Law, former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, - 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :
S. Exc. Mme María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar, ministre des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Francisco Echeverri Lara, vice-ministre des affaires multilatérales, ministère des
affaires étrangères,
comme autorités nationales ;
S. Exc. M. Carlos Gustavo Arrieta Padilla, ancien juge au Conseil d’Etat de la Colombie, ancien
Attorney General de la Colombie et ancien ambassadeur de la Colombie auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, ancien président de la Cour constitutionnelle de
Colombie, ancien délégué permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’UNESCO et ancien
ambassadeur de la Colombie auprès de la Confédération helvétique,
comme coagent ;
M. W. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Yale, titulaire de la
chaire McDougal, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, ancien avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York,
cabinet Eversheds LLP, Singapour,
sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Commission du
droit international,
M. Tullio Treves, membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseiller principal en droit
international public, cabinet Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt et Mosle LLP, Milan, professeur à
l’Université de Milan,
M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre et rapporteur spécial de la Commission du droit
international, président de la société latino-américaine de droit international,
M. Matthias Herdegen, docteur honoris causa, directeur de l’Institut de droit international et de
l’Institut de droit public de l’Université de Bonn,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Juan José Quintana Aranguren, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’OIAC, ancien
représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès des Nations Unies à Genève,
S. Exc. M. Andelfo García González, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume de Thaïlande, professeur de droit international, ancien vice-ministre des affaires
étrangères,
Mme Andrea Jiménez Herrera, conseiller, ambassade de la République de Colombie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas, - 8 -
Ms Lucía Solano Ramírez, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Andrés Villegas Jaramillo, Co-ordinator, Group of Affairs before the ICJ, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Giovanny Andrés Vega Barbosa, Group of Affairs before the ICJ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Ana María Durán López, Group of Affairs before the ICJ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Camilo Alberto Gómez Niño, Group of Affairs before the ICJ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Juan David Veloza Chará, Third Secretary, Group of Affairs before the ICJ, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Rear Admiral Luís Hernán Espejo, National Navy of Colombia,
CN William Pedroza, International Affairs Bureau, National Navy of Colombia,
CF Hermann León, National Maritime Authority (DIMAR), National Navy of Colombia,
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers;
Ms Charis Tan, Advocate and Solicitor, Singapore, member of the New York Bar, Solicitor,
England and Wales, Eversheds LLP, Singapore,
Mr. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., New York University School of Law,
Mr. Renato Raymundo Treves, LL.M., Associate, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle
LLP Milan,
Mr. Lorenzo Palestini, Ph.D Candidate, Graduate Institute of International and Development
Studies, Geneva,
as Legal Assistants. - 9 -
Mme Lucía Solano Ramírez, deuxième secrétaire, ambassade de la République de Colombie au
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Andrés Villegas Jaramillo, coordinateur, division des affaires portées devant la CIJ, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
M. Giovanny Andrés Vega Barbosa, division des affaires portées devant la CIJ, ministère des
affaires étrangères,
Mme Ana María Durán López, division des affaires portées devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires
étrangères,
M. Camillo Alberto Gómez Niño, division des affaires portées devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires
étrangères,
M. Juan David Veloza Chará, troisième secrétaire, division des affaires portées devant la CIJ,
ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
le contre-amiral Luis Hernán Espejo, marine nationale de Colombie,
le capitaine de vaisseau William Pedroza, bureau des affaires internationales, marine nationale de
Colombie,
le capitaine de frégate Hermann León, autorité maritime nationale (DIMAR), marine nationale de
Colombie,
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
M. Thomas Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques ;
Mme Charis Tan, avocat et Solicitor (Singapour), membre du barreau de New York, Solicitor
(Angleterre et Pays de Galles), cabinet Eversheds LLP, Singapour,
M. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., faculté de droit de l’Université de New York,
M. Renato Raymundo Treves, LL.M., associé au cabinet Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt et Mosle
LLP, Milan,
M. Lorenzo Palestini, doctorant, Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement,
Genève,
comme assistants juridiques. - 10 -
Le PRESIDENT : L’audience est ouverte. La Cour se réunit aujourd’hui pour entendre le
second tour de plaidoiries de la Colombie. J’indique d’abord que, pour des raisons dont elle m’a
dûment fait part, la juge Donoghue n’est pas en mesure de siéger aujourd’hui. Je donne à présent la
parole à Sir Michael Wood.
Sir Michael WOOD: Thank you, Mr. President.
FIRST PRELIMINARY OBJECTION : ARTICLE LVI OF THE PACT OF BOGOTÁ
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the order of speakers in Colombia’s second round,
responding to what Nicaragua said yesterday, will be as follows.
2. I shall address Colombia’s first objection to jurisdiction, based on Article LVI of the Pact
of Bogotá.
3. Professor Reisman will follow on the non-existence of a dispute between the Parties.
4. Mr. Valencia-Ospina will address Colombia’s alternative argument, that the dispute is not
one which, in the opinion of the Parties, could not have been settled by direct negotiations.
5. Professor Treves will then deal with the supposed inherent jurisdiction.
6. Mr. Bundy will then offer some concluding remarks.
7. And he will be followed by the Agent of Colombia, who will read out Colombia’s final
submissions.
8. Mr. President, in this short intervention, I will respond to what Professor Remiro Brotóns
had to say yesterday concerning Colombia’s first objection to jurisdiction.
Correct approach to the interpretation of Article LVI
9. The Parties agree on two important points. First, that the core issue is the proper
interpretation of Article LVI. Second, that the applicable rules of treaty interpretation are those set
forth in the Vienna Convention.
10. Despite the common understanding that the issue of concern is the interpretation of
Article LVI, Nicaragua continues to ignore half of its text. That is hardly a good faith
interpretation. In an effort to avoid interpreting the ordinary meaning of Article LVI, taken as a - 11 -
whole, Professor Remiro Brotóns yesterday followed the same methodology as that found in
Nicaragua’s written pleadings. He began with the first paragraph of Article LVI, and only the first
paragraph . He then moved straight to Article XXXI, thus concluding Nicaragua’s interpretation
2
of the applicable texts . He even said that the consent to the jurisdiction of the Court is based on
Article XXXI and the first paragraph of Article LVI . He then supported his conclusion, reached
on the basis of Article XXXI and the first paragraph of Article LVI, by referring to his subjective
view of the object and purpose of the Pact and of the principle of good faith. And only at this
point, he moved on to consider the travaux préparatoires, and it was only then that he
acknowledged that Article LVI consists of two paragraphs. Rather than interpreting all the
elements of Article LVI as a whole, in an effort to reach a harmonious interpretation he
acknowledged Colombia had done Nicaragua prefers to contrast the second paragraph of the
article with its first paragraph and with Article XXXI in an attempt to deprive the second paragraph
of any real meaning. Professor Remiro Brotóns only tells the Court what the second paragraph
cannot do: for Nicaragua it cannot override Nicaragua’s understanding of the first paragraph.
11. Nicaragua has nowhere explained what the purpose of the second paragraph is. The only
thing the learned Professor had to say about the second paragraph was that “its raison d’être is to
5
protect ongoing proceedings” . Precisely, but the whole question is which procedures are protected
by the second paragraph? The answer, we say, is clear the second paragraph protects
procedures initiated prior to the moment of transmission of the notification, not procedures initiated
thereafter. This is the only reading of the text that harmonizes its various elements, and ensures
that each of the paragraphs has effect.
12. Our colleagues opposite scarcely referred to the actual text of Article LVI, but when they
did so they were mistaken. For example, Professor Remiro Brotóns’ reliance on the word
“préavis” in the French version of the article “notice” in English seeks to attach a
significance to the word that it simply does not bear. Moreover, the thesis advanced by the learned
1
CR 2015/23, pp. 20-21, paras. 4-6 (Remiro Brotóns).
2Ibid., p. 21, para. 6 (Remiro Brotóns).
3Ibid., pp. 22-23, para. 10 (Remiro Brotóns).
4
Ibid., pp. 23-24, para. 13 (Remiro Brotóns).
5Ibid., p. 27, para. 26 (Remiro Brotóns). - 12 -
Professor that the specific provision in the second paragraph cannot override what he curiously
called the “general rule of intertemporal law” in the first paragraph is contrary to established rules
concerning lex specialis and lex generalis. To accept this thesis would be to deprive more specific
rules in treaties of any meaning or purpose.
13. In short, Mr. President, Nicaragua’s approach to the interpretation of Article LVI is
6
fundamentally flawed. We set out the correct approach in our written pleadings , and I described it
again on Monday and I shall not repeat now what I said then.
Object and Purpose
14. Mr. President, Members of the Court, my colleague opposite sought to bolster his
interpretation by referring to the object and purpose of the Pact. Yes, the Pact aimed to advance the
peaceful settlement of disputes as compared with prior treaties in the Americas. As the Court said
in its 1988 Judgment, in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case “the purpose of the American States in
8
drafting [the Pact] was to reinforce their mutual commitments with regard to judicial settlement” .
But the Pact advanced that cause within the limits of the consent of the Parties given in the Pact,
neither more nor less. You cannot use the general object and purpose of a treaty on pacific
settlement to interpret away conditions and safeguards contained therein. Treaties conferring
jurisdiction are neither to be interpreted restrictively nor broadly. They are to be interpreted, like
any other treaty, in accordance with the Vienna rules. It does not further the cause of judicial
settlement to ignore the limits that States place on their consent. Without the assurance that the
limits of the consent will be respected, parties will not consent in the first place. It is by no means
uncommon for States to denounce a particular treaty setting out procedures for the peaceful
settlement of disputes. That in no way diminishes their commitment to the fundamental principle,
set out in the United Nations Charter, that disputes must be settled by peaceful means.
15. We see this, for example, with the optional clause. The optional clause undoubtedly
serves the object and purpose of the peaceful settlement of disputes. On Monday I drew attention
6Preliminary Objections of Colombia (POC), Vol. I, Chap. 3.
7CR 2015/22, pp. 19-30 (Wood).
8
Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 89, para. 46. - 13 -
to the reservations, frequently included in declarations under the optional clause, of the right to
withdraw with immediate effect. This may be seen in recent practice. Since 2011, new
declarations have been made by Ireland , Italy , Lithuania 10 11 and Romania , and revised
13 14
declarations have been made by Greece and the United Kingdom . Each one of these
declarations reserves the right to withdraw consent with immediate effect.
16. In the 2014 Handbook on accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice:
15
model clauses and templates that is, United Nations document A-68/93, which may be found
through the Court’s website that Handbook includes the following text as one option for a
termination clause in an optional clause declaration:
“This Declaration will remain in force until notice is given to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations withdrawing the declaration, with effect as
from the moment of such notification.”
17. Professor Remiro Brotóns sought to argue that because, as he claimed, all denunciation
clauses in dispute settlement treaties only take effect at the end of the period of notice. Article LVI
16
had to be interpreted in the same way . That, with respect, is a non sequitur, but in any event it
seems to be based on a false assumption. Thus, Article 72 of the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention)
provides that notice of denunciation (which takes effect six months later) pursuant to Article 71
shall not affect rights or obligations of a State arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of the Court
9Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court by Ireland, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&code=IE (last visited: 29 September 2015).
10Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court by Italy, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&code=IT (last visited: 29 September 2015).
11Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court by Lithuania, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&code=LT (last visited: 29 September 2015).
12Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court by Romania, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&code=RO (last visited: 29 September 2015).
13Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court by Greece, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&code=GR (last visited: 29 September 2015).
14
Declaration Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court by United Kingdom, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&code=GB (last visited: 29 September 2015).
15
Letter dated 24 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/963 (last visited:
29 September 2015).
16CR 2015/23, pp. 30-31, para. 35 (Remiro Brotóns). - 14 -
17
given before such notice was received by the depositary . This means that jurisdiction is
preserved only for proceedings that were initiated before the transmission of the notice of
denunciation.
Article by Jiménez de Aréchaga and the Court’s 1988 Judgment
18. Mr. President. In seeking to justify its position, Nicaragua relied in its written
18
proceedings rather heavily on an article published in 1989 by Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga .
This was referred to again yesterday by Professor Remiro Brotóns . We have included the full text
20
of this article in your folders at tab 39 , though I do not think you need turn to it, because the short
passage relied upon by our friends opposite has to be read in context. Nicaragua relies on the
statement that under the Pact “the withdrawal of the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction as soon
21
as the possibility of a hostile application looms in the horizon has been severely restricted” .
Restricted, perhaps, but not excluded the distinguished author chose his words carefully. He did
not say that jurisdiction persisted throughout the one-year period following transmission of the
notification. The context was the distinction between an agreement under Article 36, paragraph 1,
of the Statute and the optional clause. The point being made was that when the obligation is
“contractualized”, to use the author’s word, it is not sufficient simply to withdraw a declaration
as under the optional clause. The State has to go much further, it has to denounce an agreement, as
in this case, the Pact of Bogotá as a whole. That is politically a much more significant step, a step
that States do most certainly not take lightly. In this sense, “contractualization” does indeed place
restrictions on States.
17Article 72 reads:
“Notice by Contracting State pursuant to Articles 70 or 71 shall not affect the rights or obligations
under this Convention of that State or of any of its constituent subdivisions or agencies or of any national
of that State arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given by one of them before such
notice was received by the depositary.”
18
Written Statement of Nicaragua (WSN), para. 2.33.
19
CR 2015/23, p. 28, para. 29 (Remiro Brotóns).
20E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, “The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under the Pact of
Bogotá and the Optional Clause”, International Law at a time of perplexity: Essays in honour of Shabtai Rosenne,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1989, pp. 356-360.
21Ibid., p. 357. - 15 -
19. It was in this context that Professor Remiro Brotóns again cited the Court’s statement in
the 1988 Nicaragua v. Honduras case, and he claimed that “the Court itself has recognized that a
State’s consent to compulsory jurisdiction under Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá ‘remains valid
22
ratione temporis for as long as that instrument itself remains in force between those States’” .
20. In its 1988 Judgment this Court was not considering the effect on consent to jurisdiction
of the transmission of a notification of denunciation. That question simply did not arise in the case
before it. What the Court was actually addressing were arguments put forward by Honduras in an
attempt to import the conditions, including the temporal conditions, of its optional clause
declaration into its consent to jurisdiction under Article XXXI of the Pact. The Court in 1988
simply did not address Article LVI of the Pact in any way . 23
The various provisions of the Pact of Bogotá
21. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Professor Remiro Brotóns next tries to attack
Colombia’s interpretation of Article LVI by claiming that the provisions of the Pact of Bogotá are
inseparable and that without jurisdiction over procedures initiated under Chapters II through V
after the transmission of the notification of denunciation, the Pact would remain an empty shell, as
he put it, during the one-year period of notice. He does so by selectively canvassing the articles of
the Pact.
22. Mr. President, this argument distorts both the content of the Pact and Colombia’s
24 25
argument. As Colombia demonstrated in its written and oral presentations, a significant number
of substantive obligations continue to apply to the denouncing State during the one-year period,
even though new procedures cannot be initiated against it.
23. First, Professor Remiro Brotóns conveniently overlooked several important provisions of
the Pact. For example, he did not mention Article L on the steps to be taken in the case that a
contracting Party fails to carry out a decision of this Court. He did not mention Article LI on
22WSN, para. 2.11; see also MN, para. 1.23.
23Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 84, paras. 33-34.
24
POC, Vol. I, paras. 3.5-3.7; see also Appendix to Chapter 3 (Pact of Bogotá).
25
CR 2015/22, pp. 21-23, paras. 10-23 (Wood). - 16 -
requests for advisory opinions. He summarily dismissed the relevance of Article I on refraining
from the threat or use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes, two very fundamental
obligations under the Pact adopted in 1948, just three years after the United Nations Charter.
Moreover, Article I in fact contains an obligation to refrain from “any other means of coercion”
which is not contained, in terms at least, in the United Nations Charter.
24. Second, the learned professor is wrong to assert that other articles would become
redundant. The principles contained in some of them would continue to carry substantive
obligations for the denouncing Party and are clearly separable from the procedures in Chapters II
to V of the Pact. Article II provides that “[t]he High Contracting Parties recognize the obligation to
settle international controversies by regional procedures before referring them to the Security
Council of the United Nations” this is not limited to procedures under Chapters II to V of the
Pact. But Article II further provides that,
“[c]onsequently . . . the parties bind themselves to use the procedures established in
the present Treaty, in the manner and under the conditions provided for in the
following articles, or, alternatively, such special procedures as, in their opinion, will
permit them to arrive at a solution” .26
This reference to “special procedures” is likewise clearly separable from Chapters II to V.
25. Furthermore, many “procedural” provisions of the Pact will still be in effect after the
transmission of the notification of denunciation: they continue to govern any procedures initiated
before the transmission and their content and applicability are independent of the ability to initiate
new procedures during that period. Moreover, the reservations of Argentina and the United States
when signing the Pact, which exclude the applicability of the majority of the procedures under the
Pact, demonstrate that the various elements of the Pact can be separated one from another . 27
Travaux préparatoires
26. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Professor Remiro Brotóns finally turned to the
28
travaux préparatoires of Article LVI . He asserted that there was “not an element, not a single
2CR 2015/22, pp. 21-23, paras. 10-23 (Wood).
27
Reservations of the Pact of Bogotá by United States, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-
42.html#United States (last visited:29 September 2015); Reservations of the Pact of Bogotá by Argentina,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-42.html#Argentina (last visited: 29 September 2015).
28
CR 2015/23, pp. 29-31, paras. 31-35 (Remiro Brotóns). - 17 -
element” which supported Colombia’s interpretation, and that this had explained our brevity on the
subject on Monday . To the contrary, we were brief because we had set out the preparatory work
30
fully in our written pleadings , and Nicaragua, in its Written Statement in response, had said
31
hardly anything . The learned professor asserts that in 1948 there was no debate in the relevant
Commission, no explanation, etc. 32 Well, it may be that the records are limited not unusual for
conferences of that date, or even now, and certainly not unusual in relation to the final clauses of a
treaty, or for matters discussed in a drafting committee. But, in fact, as we have shown at length in
our written pleadings, the travaux do confirm that the drafters of the Pact consciously chose to
word Article LVI as they did so as to limit with immediate effect the initiation of new procedures
upon the transmission of the notification of denunciation.
27. Nicaragua accepts that the original draft of Article LVI was based on Article 9 of the
General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration of 1929. Yet despite the change, despite the
additional sentence, introduced in 1938 to the text which eventually became Article LVI,
Nicaragua continues to assert that the meaning of the article remained the same . The change is
obvious from tab 9, which is now on the screen, where the two provisions are set out side-by-side.
28. In support of his wholly untenable position, Professor Remiro Brotóns now relies upon
one sentence from the records of the 1948 Conference . The Rapporteur of the Third Commission,
Mr. Enriquez from Mexico, in his report to the Conciliation Committee said: “We decided that the
best drafting would consist on replicating Article 16 [he actually meant Article 9 it was
Article 16, I think, in the Conciliation Treaty Article 16, Article 9] of the 1929 Treaty.”
Mr. Enriquez then read out both paragraphs of Article LVI (which was then numbered LV).
Colombia did not ignore this, as the learned professor claimed . We included what Mr. Enriquez
said, in full, and in an English translation, at Annex 31 of our preliminary objections. But it is
29
CR 2015/23, p. 29, para. 31 (Remiro Brotóns).
30POC, paras. 3.33-3.52.
31WSN, paras. 2.35-2.39.
32
CR 2015/23, p. 29, para. 31 (Remiro Brotóns).
33
WSN, para. 2.39.
34CR 2015/23, pp. 29-30, paras. 32-34 (Remiro Brotóns).
35Ibid., p. 30, para. 33 (Remiro Brotóns). - 18 -
hardly a sentence of great import Mr. Enriquez’s statement since it is clear that Mr. Enriquez
was referring to the first paragraph of Article LVI, which does indeed follow Article 9 of the
1929 Treaty. He simply could not have been referring to the second paragraph. The second
paragraph was clearly new, having been introduced in 1938 as I said on Monday upon a
36
proposal by the United States of America . When the new text was introduced, in 1938, the then
Legal Adviser to the State Department, Mr. Green Hackworth, emphasized orally that there was a
new addition to the draft. And the addition was italicized to draw further attention to the alteration
of the text .
29. Professor Remiro Brotóns suggested yesterday that the additional paragraph in
Article LVI must be interpreted so as not to be “regressive” compared with the 1929 General
Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, or indeed other treaties, which the Pact of Bogotá was to
replace . That, with great respect, is a false argument. The Pact of Bogotá and the 1929 Treaty,
and the other treaties, are wholly different instruments. As its name suggests, the 1929 Treaty was
only concerned with a particular form of arbitration. It contained no provisions referring, for
example, to the jurisdiction of the then Permanent Court of International Justice.
30. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that concludes my response to what
Professor Remiro Brotóns said yesterday.
31. I thank you for your attention and I would ask you to invite Professor Reisman to the
podium.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne à présent la parole au professeur Michael Reisman.
3POC, Vol. II, Ann. 25: Delegation of the United States of America, Report of the Meetings of Sub-
Committee 1 of Committee I, Consolidation of American Peace Instruments and Agreements, 19 Dec. 1938, p. 5.
37
Ibid, Ann. 24, Art. XXII, p. 203.
38
CR 2015/23, p. 30, paras. 34-35 (Remiro Brotóns). - 19 -
Mr. REISMAN:
A BSENCE OF A DISPUTE
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I am grateful for the opportunity to return to
Colombia’s discussion of the “absence of dispute” in order to correct some of Nicaragua’s
misstatements.
2. This is a proceeding on jurisdiction. Colombia’s principal contention is that its consent to
jurisdiction ended with immediate effect upon the transmission of its denunciation of the Pact of
Bogotá on 27 November 2012. Thus Nicaragua’s Application is out of time by one year. But, for
the sake of argument, let me assume Nicaragua’s contention that Pact Article LVI requires that a
year must run for jurisdictional purposes from the date of denunciation; on that assumption, other
things being equal, Nicaragua’s Application of 26 November 2013, would be admissible because it
was lodged one day before Colombia’s consent to jurisdiction lapsed.
3. In Nicaragua’s view, its Application was admissible but the “critical date” for the
Application was one day before the expiration of Colombia’s consent to jurisdiction under the Pact.
That means that in order to fall within the Court’s jurisdiction, events that constituted Nicaragua’s
grievance must have occurred before that date and, as Peace Treaties said, in “a situation in which
the two sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or
non-performance of certain treaty obligations” 39.
4. How does one determine the objective existence of such a dispute? Yesterday,
Professor Lowe cited the Hostages case as authority against Colombia’s submission that
international law requires some modality of communication of a claim to the other party as a means
of confirming the objective existence of a dispute. But he only quoted what the Court said about
the Hostages case in the Headquarters Agreement case, namely and this is the Headquarters
Agreement summary: “The Court saw no need to enquire into the attitude of Iran in order to
40
establish the existence of a ‘dispute’.” With respect, Professor Lowe ignored the actual holding
3Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 74.
4CR 2015/23, p. 40, para. 42 (Lowe). - 20 -
and the context of the Hostages case in which modalities for establishing the existence of a dispute
were fully and amply complied with by the United States. I quote the Court:
“From the outset of the attack upon its Embassy in Tehran, the United States
protested to the Government of Iran both at the attack and at the seizure and detention
of the hostages. On 7 November a former Attorney-General of the United States,
Mr. Ramsey Clark, was instructed to go with an assistant to Iran to deliver a message
from the President of the United States to the Ayatollah Khomeini.” 41
5. The Court went on to note that it was Iran’s leader who forbade members of the
42
Revolutionary Council and all the responsible officials to meet the United States representatives .
Quoting the Court again:
“Subsequently, despite the efforts of the United States Government to open
negotiations, it became clear that the Iranian authorities would have no direct contact
with representatives of the United States Government concerning the holding of the
hostages.”
6. But there was more. The Court quoted the Security Council “resolution 457 (1979)
calling on Iran to release the personnel of the Embassy immediately, to provide them with
43
protection and to allow them to leave the country” .
And the Court concluded:
“In the present instance, neither of the parties to the dispute proposed recourse
to either of the two alternatives, [in the 1955 bilateral treaty] before the filing of the
Application or at any time afterwards. On the contrary, the Iranian authorities refused
to enter into any discussion of the matter with the United States, and this could only be
understood by the United States as ruling out, in limine, any question of arriving at an
agreement to resort to arbitration or conciliation under Article II or Article III of the
Protocols, instead of recourse to the Court.” 44
Mr. President, the existence of the dispute was established beyond a shadow of doubt.
7. The Pact of Bogotá, Nicaragua’s principal basis of jurisdiction, is particularly relevant in
this regard. Under its Article II, not every dispute can be submitted to the Court. As
Mr. Valencia-Ospina explained the day before yesterday, Article II preconditions access to
Article XXXI’s judicial procedure to the demonstration that the parties were of the opinion that the
41
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1980, p. 15. para. 26.
4Ibid.
4Ibid., p. 16. para. 28.
44
Ibid., p. 26. para. 49. - 21 -
relevant dispute or disputes “cannot be settled by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic
channels”.
8. Now, Mr. President, the Parties’ opinion on the possibility of resolving the dispute
through “the usual diplomatic channels” presupposes knowledge of the other Party’s legal position.
Hence the Pact requires a positive communication of the claim before a dispute can be brought to
the Court on its basis.
9. Article II of the Pact refers specifically to negotiations through “the usual diplomatic
channels”. The Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry is well aware that “the usual diplomatic channels”
include such modalities as sending a formal diplomatic Note. The fact that Nicaragua even cared
to belatedly send a formal Note on 13 September 2014 (almost ten months after the Application
was filed) alleging infringement of their sovereign rights as well as the purported use of force by
Colombia, means that they were well aware of the meaning of the need for recourse to the “usual
diplomatic channels”.
10. Now, in the case before you, what events, which are alleged to have occurred before the
critical date, can be deemed to constitute “a situation in which the two sides hold clearly opposite
views concerning the question of the performance . . .” of a legal obligation and which cannot be
settled through “the usual diplomatic channels”? The evidence adduced by Nicaragua to answer
this question is selective and contradictory. On 14 August 2013, President Ortega announced that
“the Naval Force of Colombia . . . has been respectful and there has not been any kind of
46
confrontation between the Colombian and Nicaraguan Navy . . .” . Eight days before the
submission of Nicaragua’s Application, Nicaraguan Admiral Corrales Rodriguez declared that “we
47
have not had any problems with the Colombian Naval forces . . .” . Now, nine months later, nine
months after having submitted its Application, the Nicaraguan Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked
the Admiral for an inventory of “any incidents that may have taken place between the Colombian
Navy and the Nicaraguan Navy” . This time, for some reason, the Admiral reported ten low-level
45
POC, Vol. II, Ann. 17.
4POC, Vol. II, Ann. 11, p. 118.
47
POC, Vol. II, Ann. 43, p. 355.
48
Memorial of Nicaragua (MN), Ann. 23 A, p. 281. - 22 -
incidents allegedly occurring up to the critical date. Far be it from me to impugn the good faith of
Admiral Corrales but it is striking that not one of those events was deemed, at the time of its
occurrence, important enough to protest, or otherwise to bring to the attention of the Colombian
Government, let alone to Nicaraguan President Ortega.
11. Similarly selective is Nicaragua’s presentation of President Santos’ speech to the nation
on the evening the 2012 Judgment was handed down. The theory that statements by Colombian
officials may constitute per se a dispute led Nicaragua to pick out sentences and to read them in
ways that create an impression of a defiant non-compliance and repudiation of the Judgment. But
the President’s statement, for example, that he “emphatically rejects this aspect of the decision”
meant absolute disagreement, not an intention of non-compliance. And, incidentally, the
disagreement was only with that part of the Judgment dealing with maritime enclaves, not with the
whole maritime delimitation. And, indeed, shortly after this sentence in the speech, the President
stated: “Therefore, we will not discard any recourse or mechanism available to us in international
49
law” and he went on to inform his countrymen about the method by which Colombia would
implement the decision. Mr. President, this is not a declaration of non-compliance.
12. Counsel yesterday said, rightly, that to rely on the first days’ reaction of Colombian
officials to the Judgment would be “a cheap shot” but he then carefully ignored later statements and
the judgment of the Constitutional Court, all of which manifest the intention to comply by means of
the conclusion of a treaty. Nor could Nicaragua’s Agent resist taking that “cheap shot”: the Agent,
selecting passages from the President’s statement on the day of the Judgment, asserted that it
showed “the existence of a serious dispute between the parties” as of the day of the delivery of the
Judgment, as purported evidence that “quite obviously . . . Colombia does not accept the
delimitation carried out by the Court” . And, Mr. President, I am not sure this goes into the
“cheap shot” category, but I note that Nicaragua’s propensity is not to quote President Ortega’s
statement of satisfaction with the comportment of Colombia’s President Santos.
13. So, having cited Hostages as his authority, we are baffled by Professor Lowe’s
conclusion that “it is evident from the record in this case that what international law does
4POC, Vol. II, Ann. 6, p. 89.
5CR 2015/23, p. 17, para. 29 (Argüello). - 23 -
require the clear presentation of positions, so that each side can understand what the
51
disagreement is is abundantly satisfied” . Quite the contrary. By contrast to Hostages, not
once did Nicaragua protest or otherwise indicate to Colombia that it had grievances or complaints
of fact and law that amounted to an objective dispute with Colombia, not once. It simply initiated
this case before the Court. Considering that some of Nicaragua’s claims involve allegations of
threats to use force, its failure to timely protest by any modality renders the existence of that
dispute even more doubtful. Nicaragua’s efforts to demonstrate the existence of a dispute on these
matters at the critical date thus fails.
14. Nicaragua, conscious of the insubstantiality of proving the existence of its claimed
dispute before the critical date, argues that the objective existence of the dispute can be proved by
reference to events occurring after the submission of its Application. In this regard, it sweeps in,
again selectively, speeches and events occurring, in some instances almost two years after
26 November 2013, the date of its Application and the crucial date for the purpose of jurisdiction.
Now, it may certainly be argued that when consensual jurisdiction continues, there may be a basis
in law for sometimes adducing evidence occurring after the date of the application. But in this
case, such events are inadmissible because the critical date and the end of jurisdiction, even on
Nicaragua’s reading of the Pact, are only one day apart. Hence no jurisdiction exists after
27 November 2013, the end of the one year period after Colombia’s denunciation of the Pact. So,
wholly apart from the substantive failure of these various post-Application events to demonstrate
an objective dispute, they are also without a basis for jurisdiction.
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Nicaragua claims that it is a small State compared
to Colombia and, apparently, is entitled to special treatment with respect to the brevity of the period
between its Application and the cessation of jurisdiction under the Pact. But it was not a short
period: Ambassador Argüello stated that Nicaragua had known of a serious dispute since the
delivery of the Judgment . The consequences of Nicaragua’s delay and concealment of its action
are its own responsibility. Nicaragua has used the Court more than any other Member of the
United Nations and it is wise in its ways. It needs and deserves no special treatment, no matter
5CR 2015/23, p. 41, para. 44 (Lowe).
5CR 2015/23, p. 17, para. 28 (Argüello). - 24 -
how large the respondent State may be. Legally, Mr. President, the Charter teaches that all States
are equal.
16. Mr. President, there are compelling reasons for insisting on a demonstration of the
objective existence of a dispute as a condition for an otherwise valid basis of jurisdiction. Parties at
the international level should know of claims against them and have the opportunity to react to
them and to look for ways to resolve them without litigation in order to avert an unnecessarily
frictive political and economic transaction which can leave in its wake decades if not
generations of hostility. The objective existence standard also protects international judicial
processes from being exploited with adjudication becoming a tactical device for pressuring a State.
And it facilitates the litigation process. In Certain Property, where there had been bilateral
consultations between Germany and Liechtenstein, you said:
“The Court thus finds that in the present proceedings complaints of fact and law
formulated by Liechtenstein against Germany are denied by the latter. In conformity
with well-established jurisprudence . . ., the Court concludes that ‘[b]y53irtue of this
denial, there is a legal dispute’ between Liechtenstein and Germany.”
17. In this case, nothing prevented Nicaragua from communicating its claims and grievances
to Colombia through the usual diplomatic channels or by any other modality at any time prior to
the termination of jurisdiction under the Pact. Not only did it not protest or otherwise
communicate: to the contrary, at the highest levels, it assured Colombia of its satisfaction with its
comportment. Recall President Ortega’s statement of 14 August 2013 that “there has not been any
54
kind of confrontation between the Colombian and Nicaragua Navy” . Having failed to
communicate any “complaints of fact and law”, to borrow your language from Certain Property,
indeed, from expressing at the highest political level, the opposite until the critical date, Nicaragua
must bear the responsibility and cannot evade it by claiming to be a “small” country. Now,
Mr. President, Members of the Court, that may seem to be a matter of rules, but the rule of law is
comprised of rules which are applied to all equally. It is the hallmark of the law.
18. Before concluding, I must comment on Nicaragua’s tendency to malign a State that dares
to criticize a judgment, or part of a judgment, of the Court while burnishing its own appreciation.
5Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 19,
para 25.
5POC, Vol. II, Ann. 11. - 25 -
There is no violation of international law when a State or a scholar criticizes a decision of the
Security Council, or of the General Assembly or of a judgment of the Court. When, however, a
party that has not prevailed undertakes the arduous process of implementing a deeply unpopular
judgment, it demonstrates all the more its commitment to international law.
19. Mr. President, yesterday, Professor Lowe mused whether there is really a dispute or
“whether we are all here as a result of some ghastly misunderstanding”. The Court will surely have
realized by now that it is indeed the latter; we are here as the result of a ghastly misunderstanding
and none of us should really be here. As a result of Nicaragua’s filing of an entirely artificial
application, we have been compelled to appear before you to respond to frivolous claims without a
jurisdictional base, which are said to constitute a phantom dispute, the subject-matter of which was
entirely unknown to Colombia until it was informed by the Registry that, once again, proceedings
had been instituted against it. Ghastly, indeed, Mr. President.
20. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention and ask that
Mr. Valencia-Ospina be invited to address you.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne à présent la parole à
M. Valencia-Ospina.
Mr. VALENCIA-OSPINA:
THIRD PRELIMINARY OBJECTION : THE C OURT LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE
THE PRECONDITION OF A RTICLE IIOF THE PACT OF B OGOTÁ HAD NOT BEEN
FULFILLED AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE APPLICATION
Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, after having heard Nicaragua’s first round of oral
pleadings, it becomes necessary to shed more light on the Applicant’s misguided interpretation of
the applicable law and appreciation of the facts relevant for the third objection.
2. In so doing, I shall concentrate on the objective assessment of the opinion of the Parties.
During the first round, Colombia dealt extensively with the interpretation of Article II of the Pact
of Bogotá, a question that Nicaragua largely neglected at that round. In this respect I will,
therefore, limit myself to highlighting four of the many additional points that could be made. - 26 -
First, Nicaragua has now gone as far as to suggest that, “the judgment of the negotiability of
the dispute is a matter . . . not for a third party” . In other words, the Applicant argues that the
Court contrary to what it stated in the 1988 Judgment is not entitled to make an
objective assessment of the opinion of the Parties but only to take note of what Nicaragua says.
Second, the fact that the Inter-American Juridical Committee’s Rapporteur moved an
amendment to Article II of the Pact did not imply that for him the proper interpretation of that
provision was the one suggested by the French text. On the contrary, as he explained in his
report: “[n]either party is legally in a position to invoke the Pact at the time when, in its
57
individual judgment, a controversy can no longer be settled by diplomatic means” . He thus
confirmed the view he had expressed four years earlier that Article II enshrined “a qualified
obligation to have recourse to the peaceful means of settlement only when there is a concurrent
58
opinion of the State Parties” ; and most significantly, that the terminology in the opinion of
the parties “was not a mistake in drafting technique” . 59
Third, Nicaragua seeks to strengthen its reading of Article II by drawing attention to Article 26
60
of the OAS Charter which also uses the expression “in the opinion of one” of the Parties .
However, the reliance of Article 26 on the term in the singular is virtually effaced by that
article’s injunction that the “Parties [in the plural] shall agree on some other peaceful procedure
that will enable them to reach a solution”. In other words, what matters according to Article 26
is in the end the opinion of both Parties since one of them cannot unilaterally determine the
procedure to be used.
55CR 2015/23, p. 42, para. 47 (Lowe).
56Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 95, para. 65.
57Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of
Bogotá), Organization of the American States doc. OEA/SER.G, CP/Doc. 1603/85, 3 Sep. 1985, English Text, Ann. 23 of
Nicaragua’s Counter-Memorial in the Border and Transborder Armed Actions case (Nicaragua v. Honduras),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 461.
58Galo Leoro, F., “La Reforma del Tratado Americano de Soluciones Pacíficas o Pacto de Bogotá”, Anuario
Jurídico Inter-Americano, 1981, p. 48, para. 93.
59Galo Leoro, F., “La Reforma del Tratado Americano de Soluciones Pacíficas o Pacto de Bogotá”, Anuario
Jurídico Inter-Americano, 1981, p. 51, para. 106.
60WSN, para. 4.28. - 27 -
Fourth, counsel for Nicaragua stated that “it is enough if one of [the Parties] holds the view that
there is no prospect of a negotiated settlement” . Colombia has rejected this proposition,
which, in any event, would be inapplicable in the present case given the repeated statements by
the President of Nicaragua emphasizing that negotiations were possible.
The opinion of the Parties
3. Yesterday, the Agent of Nicaragua stated that, “President Ortega has repeatedly reiterated
Nicaragua’s willingness to initiate conversations on different topics related to the implementation
62
of the judgment” . In fact, he stressed as if Colombia had reasons to think otherwise that
“[t]hese are not empty words” . 63
4. Colombia certainly appreciates that Nicaragua has recognized on several occasions the
many subject-matters over which the Parties are in agreement concerning the possibility to
negotiate. Already in its Written Statement, Nicaragua asserted that, “it ha[d] kept the door open to
talking about the treaty Colombia wants, including on issues like fishing and environmental
protection” , that “there were . . . subjects on which negotiations might eventually be had” and 65
66
that “both Parties had expressed willingness to consider” certain issues . These are correct
depictions of the situation at the time of the seisin of the Court.
5. However, in the same Written Statement, Nicaragua proceeded to downplay the value of
its assertions. In those pleadings, Nicaragua indeed argued that the subject-matter of the claims it
had brought before the Court was different from “the subject matter of the negotiations both Parties
had expressed willingness to consider” . In other words, for Nicaragua the alleged violations of its
sovereign rights and maritime zones had nothing to do with the implementation of the
2012 Judgment.
61CR 2015/23, p. 42, para. 47 (Lowe).
62Ibid., p. 12, para. 12 (Arguëllo).
63
Ibid., p. 12, para. 12 (Arguëllo).
64
WSN, para. 4.7.
65WSN, para. 4.56.
66WSN, para. 4.59.
67WSN, para. 4.59. - 28 -
6. In fairness, it must be acknowledged that Nicaragua has not repeated this argument in the
first round. Nicaragua must have realized that arguing that the Parties are willing to negotiate
issues related to the implementation of the 2012 Judgment but not the alleged violations of its
maritime zones resulting from that Judgment is artificial and deceptive.
7. Nicaragua has likewise avoided reasserting its argument that, “pending the decision of the
Constitutional Court, Colombia was of the opinion that no negotiation was even possible” . In 68
fact, Nicaragua made no mention during the first round of the statements made by the President and
69
Foreign Minister of Colombia on 15 and 18 September 2013 . Similarly, Nicaragua has failed to
rebut the statements made on 9 and 10 September 2013 by Colombia’s Executive that expressed
70
Colombia’s willingness to negotiate .
8. Instead, for Nicaragua now, what rendered negotiations futile was the enactment of
Colombian Decree 1946, a decree that was not protested by Nicaragua prior to the critical date. To
quote the Agent of Nicaragua, “the possibility of successful negotiations became clearly closed
when Colombia enacted the 1946 Decree” . But this is implausible to say the least. For if the
words of the President of Nicaragua “are [to be considered as] not [being] empty” , what about his
statements made in September 2013, January and May 2014? After all, the Agent of Nicaragua
does refer to them in his speech as being instances in which Nicaragua has expressed “willingness
73
to initiate conversations” . Indeed, at the same time he recognizes that the words of his President
must be taken seriously, the Agent cites passages from the Memorial that explicitly refer to the
September and May statements . 74 The Memorial rightfully emphasizes that the September
declaration was made “the day after President Santos introduced Decree 1946 establishing the
75
Colombian ‘ICZ’” . How can Nicaragua then demonstrate that the Decree had rendered
68WSN, para. 4.46 and paras 4.38-4.52, Anns. 12 and 39.
69POC, Anns. 13 and 42.
70
POC, paras 4.68 and 4.69, Anns. 12 and 39; CR 2015/22, p. 55, para. 24 (Valencia-Ospina).
71
CR 2015/23, p.17, para. 31 (Arguëllo).
72
Ibid., p. 12, para. 12 (Arguëllo).
73Ibid., p. 12, para. 12, fn. 9 (Arguëllo); MN, paras 2.53-2.63.
74CR 2015/23, p. 12, para. 12 (Arguëllo); MN, paras 2.58 and 2.60.
75MN, para. 2.58. - 29 -
negotiations futile if on the very next day, and the following months, its President had continued to
express such bona fide willingness?
9. The elements of conduct adduced by Colombia “[t]o measure the validity of the
Applicant’s assumption that the complaint to the Constitutional Court made negotiations useless”,
are equally relevant to dispose of the new Nicaraguan argument based on the adoption of the
Decree . Contrary to what Counsel for Nicaragua stated, these declarations by the Executive of
Nicaragua certainly do not support the contention that by the critical date “it quickly bec[a]me
77
evident that a deadlock [had been] reached” . In spite of what Nicaragua would have us believe, it
is Colombia and not the Applicant that takes with the utmost seriousness the words of the
Nicaraguan President.
10. As it turns out, Nicaragua has itself defeated its own proposition that it had seised the
Court because in its opinion direct negotiations were impossible. Rather, its motives were purely
opportunistic. For as the Agent of Nicaragua stated, after having recognized that “unilateral
78
recourse” to the Court would be impossible after 27 November 2013 , Nicaragua “reluctantly took
79
the decision to come to the Court before the denunciation of the Pact of Bogotá came into force” .
What the Agent thus emphasizes is Nicaragua’s will to preserve the jurisdictional avenue, not the
futility of negotiations. Counsel for Nicaragua also stated, in terms that are illuminating, that
Nicaragua “had to make [a] judgement (sic) call” . What he meant, of course, is that Nicaragua
took this decision not on the basis of whether negotiations were, in the opinion of the Parties,
possible, but because it faced the last possible opportunity in which to do so.
11. In this respect, I want to stress that the Agent of Nicaragua’s query as to whether it is
“reasonable to suppose that Nicaragua had to continue attempting to negotiate before attempting
procedures which would cease to be in effect one day later” is simply beside the point . The 81
coming into effect of Colombia’s denunciation of the Pact of Bogotá did not relieve an informed
76CR 2015/22, pp. 55-57, paras 25-29 (Valencia-Ospina).
77CR 2015/23, p. 44, para. 58 (Lowe).
78Ibid., p. 15, para. 22 (Arguëllo).
79
Ibid., para. 23 (Arguëllo).
80Ibid., pp. 42-43, para. 52 (Lowe).
81Ibid., p. 16, para. 27 (Arguëllo). - 30 -
Applicant from its duty to fulfil the preconditions for the Court’s jurisdiction. It cannot trump the
positive statements made by the President of Nicaragua immediately before and after the filing of
the Application. In light of those explicit statements, the unsubstantiated assertion by Counsel for
Nicaragua that “[a]t the time of the Application, there seemed [to be] no hope of a negotiated
settlement” could not be further removed from the truth.
12. Also beside the point is Nicaragua’s reference to the case law of the Court, according to
which negotiations and recourse to judicial settlement can be pursued pari passu . For obviously3
that is only relevant when the Court’s jurisdiction is not limited by a clause such as Article II of the
Pact. Indeed, in the 1978 Judgment in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, the Court did not
uphold the argument that in general “the existence of active negotiations in progress constitutes an
84
impediment to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction” . It so acted because under general
international law the governing principle is the free choice of means . Had Turkey and Greece
been parties to a treaty such as the Pact, the situation would have been very different. In this
respect, counsel for Nicaragua’s reference to the 1998 Judgment in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case 86
is also totally irrelevant because the applicable law was likewise general international law and not a
treaty in which the parties had agreed to incorporate a precondition of unavailability of
negotiations. Nicaragua is well aware that that precedent confirms Colombia’s argument since in
the very paragraph quoted by the Applicant, the Court also dealt expressly with the question of the
special clauses embodied in treaties, which it significantly termed “precondition[s]” and
87
distinguished it from the situation under general international law .
13. In fact, as the Court stated in its 2011 Judgment in Georgia v. Russia, referring to a
provision similar to Article II of the Pact, preconditions pertaining to negotiations are “conditions
88
precedent to the seisin of the Court even when the term is not qualified by a temporal element” .
82CR 2015/23, p. 43, para. 54 (Lowe).
83Ibid., p. 17, para. 30 (Arguëllo).
84
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 12, para. 29.
85
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.
86CR 2015/23, p. 42, para. 49 (Lowe).
87Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 303, para. 56.
88Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 124, para. 130. - 31 -
Moreover, as Colombia has already stressed during the first round, the precondition of Article II of
the Pact had to be met at the time of the filing of the Application, also for an additional reason
specific to this case. Due to the fact that the jurisdiction under the Pact had, even on Nicaragua’s
theory, lapsed at the latest on 27 November 2013, it would be impossible for Nicaragua to bring
fresh proceedings after that date.
14. For all these reasons, the Applicant must demonstrate that the precondition was met at
the latest by the time of the seisin of the Court. Whether the precondition under Article II has been
fulfilled later, which in any event it has not been, is irrelevant once jurisdiction under the Pact has
expired.
Conclusion
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, by manufacturing a deadlock which Nicaragua
attributes to the authorities of Colombia, the Applicant has made a desperate attempt at diverting
the attention of the Court from the analysis of the statements of its own Executive. Yet, as
Nicaragua itself admits when quoting the Georgia v. Russia case, “primary attention” should be
“given to statements made or endorsed by the Executives of the two Parties” . 89
16. Consequently, would it not be more appropriate for Nicaragua to objectively assess its
own opinion on the basis of all the statements made by its Executive that explicitly recognized that
negotiations were the way to proceed? Instead Nicaragua seeks to establish its opinion from an
inconclusive element of tacit conduct, namely, the filing of its Application which neither
mentioned Article II of the Pact nor referred to the opinion of the Parties concerning the viability of
negotiations.
17. Finally, Nicaragua has stated during the first round that it “has been and still
remains willing to conclude a treaty implementing the Court’s judgment” and that it is “open to
make some adaptations to the régime applicable in the areas recognized by the Court to belong to
it” . For the purpose of this third objection, what really matters is that these assertions confirm
what has been stated by the Parties all along, namely, that negotiations are in the opinion of both
8WSN, para. 4.53.
9CR 2015/23, p. 44, para. 58 (Lowe). - 32 -
Parties still possible. The fact that a treaty has not yet been reached cannot evidence that the
precondition under Article II had been met at the relevant time.
18. Mr. President, having arrived at the end of my presentation, may I express my thanks to
you and the Members of the Court for your courteous attention and respectfully ask that you call on
my colleague, Mr. Treves.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne à présent la parole au professeur Tullio Treves.
M. TREVES :
L A C OUR N ’A PAS UN POUVOIR INHÉRENT POUR JUGER DES DEMANDES DU N ICARAGUA
(QUATRIÈME ET CINQUIÈME OBJECTIONS PRÉLIMINAIRES )
1. Merci, Monsieur le président. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges,
ma tâche est aujourd’hui de démontrer que la compétence de la Cour à se prononcer sur la demande
du Nicaragua ne saurait trouver sa base sur un pouvoir inhérent qu’aurait la Cour. Pour ce faire, je
vais répondre aux arguments, pourtant brillants, soumis par mon collègue et ami Alain Pellet à
l’audience d’hier matin.
2. Le leitmotiv de l’argumentation du professeur Pellet est que l’allégué pouvoir (ou
91
compétence) inhérent de la Cour «découle de l’existence même de la Cour» expression utilisée
dans les arrêts sur les Essais nucléaires, ou, selon une formule que le professeur Pellet utilise aussi,
92
«de la qualité d’organe judiciaire de la Cour» . Ainsi, du simple fait que la Cour est un organe
judiciaire (et personne n’en doute), elle serait automatiquement compétente à se prononcer sur
toute demande relative à l’inexécution d’un arrêt.
3. Une affaire conclue par un jugement qui l’a tranchée en portant ainsi à exhaustion la
compétence de la Cour, donnerait comme par parthénogénèse naissance à la compétence à
juger sur une autre affaire portant sur la responsabilité internationale découlant des obligations qui
incombent à un autre Etat aux termes d’un arrêt de la Cour.
91CR 2015/23, p. 48, par. 12 (Pellet) citant Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974,
p. 259, par. 23 et Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 463, par. 23.
92
CR 2015/23, p. 46, par. 5 (Pellet). - 33 -
4. Chacun voit qu’il s’agit d’une idée qui manque de cohérence avec le principe consensuel
de la compétence de la Cour. En acceptant cette compétence sur la base de n’importe quel titre
prévu par le Statut, les parties acceptent que la Cour se prononce sur l’objet de la demande ou de la
question qu’elles soumettent par compromis et non sur une question ayant un objet différent, tel
qu’est la prétendue non-exécution de l’arrêt qui a mis fin à l’affaire.
5. Un argument important visant à exclure l’existence d’un pouvoir inhérent qui, à lui seul,
fonderait la compétence de la Cour, que la Colombie fait valoir est que les cas d’invocation de
pouvoirs inhérents qu’on trouve dans la jurisprudence de la Cour sont tous basés sur la prémisse
que la compétence de la Cour soit établie.
6. C’est ce qu’a dit la Cour dans les arrêts sur les Essais nucléaires et encore dans
l’arrêt LaGrand de 2001, dans des passages dûment cités dans ma plaidoirie d’avant-hier . Pour 93
mémoire, dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires, la Cour a dit que ses pouvoirs inhérents pouvaient
être exercés «si sa compétence au fond est établie» ; dans l’arrêt LaGrand, la Cour a dit que son
pouvoir de juger sur l’inexécution d’une ordonnance portant mesures conservatoires pouvait
s’exercer «lorsque la Cour a compétence pour trancher un différend» . 95
7. Le professeur Pellet semble ne donner aucune importance à ces affirmations de la Cour. Il
s’attache à démontrer, toutefois, l’existence de cas envisagés par la Cour où la compétence de
celle-ci trouve sa base dans un pouvoir inhérent même en l’absence d’une compétence établie.
8. Ainsi, fait-il valoir que, dans les arrêts sur les Essais nucléaires, la Cour, après avoir dit
qu’elle possède un pouvoir inhérent l’autorisant à prendre toute mesure voulue «d’une part pour
faire en sorte que, si la compétence au fond est établie, l’exercice de cette compétence ne se révèle
pas vain» dit que cette compétence vaut «d’autre part pour assurer le règlement régulier de tous les
points en litige ainsi que le respect des «limitations inhérentes à l’exercice de la fonction
93CR 2015/22, p. 62-63, par. 12 et p. 63, par. 14 (Treves).
94 Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 259, par. 23 et Essais nucléaires
(Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 463, par. 23.
95
LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 484, par. 45. - 34 -
96
judiciaire»» . Cela indiquerait, d’après M. Pellet, qu’existent des pouvoirs inhérents pour
l’exercice desquels la présence d’une compétence établie ne serait pas nécessaire . 97
9. On ne saurait trop lire dans la structure de la phrase que l’on vient de citer. Il n’en reste
pas moins que les pouvoirs mentionnés après l’expression «d’autre part» n’ont rien à voir avec une
possible compétence sur le fond d’une affaire. En effet, ils ont trait à la régularité procédurale et au
fait que la Cour ne saurait se prononcer sur une requête ne correspondant pas à la notion même de
la fonction judiciaire. Tel serait un arrêt, comme celui envisagé dans l’affaire du Cameroun
septentrional, qui n’aurait pas des «conséquences pratiques» ne pouvant pas «affecter les droits ou
98
obligations juridiques existants des parties» . Partant, la Cour est loin d’affirmer un pouvoir
inhérent la rendant compétente pour se prononcer sur l’inexécution d’un arrêt.
10. Pour ce qui est de l’arrêt LaGrand, invoqué par M. Pellet, il faut souligner d’abord que la
décision de la Cour de se prononcer sur l’inexécution d’une ordonnance portant mesures
conservatoires adoptée dans le cadre du même procès, ne fut pas prise en accueillant l’argument
«accessoire et subsidiaire» de l’Allemagne que la compétence était comprise dans un pouvoir
inhérent. La Cour, comme déjà souligné avant-hier , n’accepta pas cet argument et affirma que la
conclusion de l’Allemagne relative à l’inexécution de l’ordonnance indiquant des mesures
conservatoires portait «sur des questions qui découlent directement du différend opposant les
100
Parties devant la Cour, à l’égard desquelles la Cour a déjà conclu qu’elle était compétente» .
11. La Cour réaffirme ensuite l’arrêt sur l’affaire de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries
en soulignant que lorsque la Cour
«a estimé que, afin de considérer le différend sous tous ses aspects, elle pouvait aussi
connaître d’une conclusion qui «se fonde sur des faits postérieurs au dépôt de la
requête mais découlant directement de la question qui fait l’objet de cette requête…»
(Compétence en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale101Allemagne c. Islande),
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 203, par. 72)» .
96 Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 259, par. 23 et Essais nucléaires
(Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 463, par. 23 les italiques sont de nous.
97CR 2015/23, p. 49, par. 13 (Pellet).
98 Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaume-Uni, exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963,
p. 34.
99
CR 2015/22, p. 63, par. 14 (Treves).
100
LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 483, par. 45.
101Ibid., p. 484, par. 45. - 35 -
12. C’est sur cette base et non sur l’idée du pouvoir inhérent que la Cour affirma que
«[l]orsque la Cour a compétence pour trancher un différend, elle a également
compétence pour se prononcer sur des conclusions la priant de constater qu’une
ordonnance en indication de mesures rendue aux fins de préserver les droits des
Parties à ce différend n’a pas été exécutée» . 102
M. Pellet affirme que : «Il s’agit là encore d’un pouvoir inhérent, déduit de la qualité d’organe
103
judiciaire de la Cour et nullement d’une compétence prévue expressément par le Statut…»
13. Il semble oublier que c’est un pouvoir inhérent que la Cour n’exerce que quand elle a
établi sa compétence et seulement quand elle l’a établie, d’autant plus que les mesures
conservatoires sont, par définition, provisoires. C’est pourquoi la transposition de l’affirmation de
la Cour relative à sa compétence à se prononcer sur l’inexécution d’une ordonnance portant
mesures conservatoires à la compétence pour se prononcer sur l’inexécution d’un arrêt n’est pas
104
soutenable. Ce ne serait pas faire un raisonnement a fortiori comme le voudrait M. Pellet . Ce
serait suivre un raisonnement possible dans le cadre d’une affaire où la compétence est établie, qui
n’est pas admissible pour établir une compétence sur une affaire où une telle compétence n’existe
pas.
14. En somme : reste valable l’affirmation faite par le juge Guillaume dans son article
«De l’exécution des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice». En se référant à l’exécution
des arrêts de la Cour, l’éminent juge s’exprime ainsi :
«Par ailleurs, tout différend relatif à cette exécution doit être regardé comme un
différend distinct de celui réglé par le jugement. La Cour ne saurait dès lors s’en saisir
105
sans un nouvel accord des parties.»
15. Ces deux phrases, citées dans les plaidoiries orales de la Colombie, sont les seules
omises dans la citation faite par M. Pellet de la demi-page de l’article de M. Guillaume qui les suit
106
immédiatement . Elles donnent néanmoins un sens précis à la phrase suivante d’après laquelle la
Cour a
102LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 484, par. 45.
103CR 2015/23, p. 50, par. 14 (Pellet).
104
Ibid., p. 62, par. 43 (Pellet).
105Gilbert Guillaume, «De l’exécution des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice» (1997), dans La Cour
e
internationale de Justice à l’aube du XXI siècle, Le regard d’un juge, Pédone, Paris, 2003, p. 178-179 (références
omises).
106CR 2015/23, p. 51, par. 16 (Pellet). - 36 -
«jugé à plusieurs reprises qu’elle ne pouvait, ni ne devait envisager l’inexécution de
ses arrêts et ne s’est-elle prononcée sur cette exécution que dans les cas où les Parties
lui avaient donné spécifiquement compétence à cet effet» . 107
16. Le sens qu’il faut tirer de cette affirmation est que pour juger d’un différend portant sur
l’inexécution d’un arrêt de la Cour, un titre spécifique de compétence est nécessaire, que ce soit un
accord ad hoc des parties ou une autre forme de consentement.
17. Le professeur Pellet semble confondre la possibilité abstraite de la Cour de se prononcer
sur l’inexécution d’un arrêt avec la possibilité concrète de le faire qui requiert un titre spécifique de
compétence qui ne saurait être le simple fait que l’objet du différend est une question de
responsabilité pour inexécution d’un arrêt déjà adopté. Quand il se demande et il s’agit
évidemment d’une question rhétorique sur quelle base la Cour a pu adopter les paragraphes 60
et 63 des arrêts de 1974 sur les affaires des Essais nucléaires , le professeur Pellet donne un
exemple de pouvoir inhérent dans l’abstrait un pouvoir qui ne fonde pas une compétence de la
Cour mais qui peut s’exercer à la condition que la Cour soit saisie d’un différend sur lequel sa
compétence est établie, ce qui était le cas dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires.
18. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, l’invitation que le Nicaragua
dirige à la Cour de suivre d’autres juridictions internationales, qui se considèrent investies du
pouvoir de juger sur l’inexécution de leurs décisions, peut paraître attrayante dans l’optique d’une
hypothétique «fonction judiciaire internationale» dont feraient partie toutes les cours et tous les
tribunaux internationaux.
19. L’invitation devient moins attrayante et juridiquement moins persuasive si l’on considère
les différences entre votre Cour et les cours et tribunaux internationaux qui se sont déclarés
compétents pour juger sur l’exécution de leurs décisions. Il s’agit notamment des cours dont la
compétence concerne la protection des droits de l’homme, des tribunaux administratifs
internationaux et de la cour très spéciale (quasi domestique) qui était la Cour des communautés
européennes. Ni les unes ni les autres ne basent leur compétence sur le consentement des parties.
20. Il faut ajouter que les cours et tribunaux internationaux qui se considèrent investis du
pouvoir de juger de l’inexécution de leurs jugements sont moins nombreux que ce qu’il apparaît de
107Gilbert Guillaume, «De l’exécution des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice» (1997), dans La Cour
internationale de Justice à l’aube du XXI siècle, Le regard d’un juge, Pédone, Paris, 2003, p. 179 (références omises).
108CR 2015/23, p. 62, par. 64 (Pellet). - 37 -
la plaidoirie de M. Pellet. En effet, la position de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ne
correspond pas à celle de la cour interaméricaine comme on pourrait le croire en écoutant M. Pellet.
Dans l’arrêt Meltex du 21 mai 2013, la Cour européenne dit en effet :
«la Cour souligne continuellement qu’il ne relève pas de ses compétences de vérifier
si une partie a rempli les obligations que lui impose un des jugements de la Cour. Par
conséquent, elle refusa d’examiner des requêtes relatives au manquement des Etats
d’exécuter ses jugements, en déclarant de telles requêtes inadmissibles
ratione materiae.» 109
110
21. En outre, contrairement à ce que le Nicaragua a soutenu avant-hier , l’arrêt Saiga II du
Tribunal international du droit de la mer n’a pas utilisé un pouvoir inhérent quand il s’est prononcé
sur une demande relative à l’inexécution de son arrêt antérieur portant sur la prompte mainlevée du
navire. Le Tribunal était en effet investi d’une demande portant sur la violation d’un ou plusieurs
articles de la convention sur le droit de la mer. Et il était compétent pour toute affaire portant sur
111
l’interprétation ou l’application des dispositions de celle-ci .
22. Le pas franchi par les cours et tribunaux internationaux dont la compétence est
indépendante du consentement des parties aux procès qui se déroulent devant elles est infiniment
plus modeste du pas que le Nicaragua invite la Cour à faire en se déclarant pourvue d’un pouvoir
inhérent à juger de l’exécution de ses arrêts. Un tel pas, si la Cour devait le faire, pourrait
décourager les Etats qui envisagent d’accepter la compétence de la Cour.
23. Non seulement la sagesse d’un tel pas serait ainsi contestable. Sa compatibilité avec le
Statut le serait aussi. Comment considérer cohérente avec un Statut qui base la compétence de la
Cour sur le consentement des parties à la soumission à la Cour de différends bien définis, la
revendication d’un pouvoir «inhérent» de juger de différends portant sur la responsabilité
internationale pour violation des obligations contenues dans un arrêt, dont la base serait cet arrêt et
que les Etats peuvent considérer avoir définitivement réglé une affaire ?
24. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, nonobstant les arguments portés
par le Nicaragua à l’audience d’avant-hier, la Colombie continue à penser que l’article L du pacte
109Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH), Meltex Ltd. c. Arménie, application n 45199/09, jugement
du 21 mai 2013, par. 28.
110CR 2015/23, p. 56, par. 26 (Pellet).
111 er
Tribunal international du droit de la mer (TIDM), arrêt du 1 juillet 1999, Affaire du navire «SAIGA» (No. 2)
(Saint-Vincent-et-les Grenadines c. Guinée), par. 30. - 38 -
de Bogotá a une importance dans notre affaire. Lu conjointement à l’article 52, paragraphe 2, de la
Charte des Nations Unies (les deux apparaissent sur l’écran), cet article indique que en tout cas
d’alléguée inexécution d’un arrêt de la Cour les Etats américains parties au pacte s’obligent à
entreprendre tout effort possible pour obtenir une solution pacifique au niveau régional. Pour
donner plein effet à ces deux articles, l’obligation de «faire tous leurs efforts» au niveau régional et,
notamment, pour les Etats parties au pacte de Bogotá, d’investir la réunion de consultation des
ministres des relations extérieures des Etats parties au pacte, doit comprendre non seulement les cas
où une partie envisage de recourir à l’article 94, paragraphe 2, de la Charte, mais aussi les cas où
elle envisage de recourir à la Cour pour soutenir que l’alléguée inexécution a causé une
responsabilité internationale. Or, le Nicaragua n’a entrepris aucun pas au niveau régional avant de
recourir à la Cour. La Colombie soumet respectueusement ce fait à la considération de la Cour.
25. Les quatrième et cinquième exceptions préliminaires de la Colombie sont ainsi
confirmées.
26. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie pour votre
patience. Je vous prie bien, Monsieur le président, de donner la parole à M. Bundy.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne à présent la parole à M. Bundy.
Mr. BUNDY:
C ONCLUDING REMARKS
1. Thank you very much, Mr. President, Members of the Court. Having heard my colleagues
address Nicaragua’s contentions advanced yesterday with respect to each of Colombia’s
preliminary objections, it falls to me to make some brief concluding remarks.
2. Nicaragua has advanced two bases of jurisdiction for its claims. The first is Article XXXI
of the Pact of Bogotá . Now, that was the basis of jurisdiction for the case decided by the Court’s
Judgment of 19 November 2012. And the second, which Nicaragua put forward as an alternative
basis of jurisdiction in its Application, is grounded on a novel theory, which counsel for Nicaragua
admitted is nowhere authorized in the Court’s Statute, in the Rules of Court or even in the Pact of
11Application of Nicaragua, paras. 16-17. - 39 -
113
Bogotá and that theory is that, even though the case was fully and finally decided in 2012, and
was thereafter removed from the List of pending cases before the Court, and I quote from
Nicaragua’s Application: “the jurisdiction of the Court lies in its inherent power to pronounce on
114
the actions required by its Judgments” .
3. Colombia, for its part, has raised five preliminary objections. The first three the
absence of jurisdiction ratione temporis, the lack of a dispute, and the failure of Nicaragua to fulfil
the [pre]conditions of Article II of the Pact, concern the absence of jurisdiction under the Pact of
Bogotá.
4. To be clear, if the Court decides that there is no jurisdiction ratione temporis under
Article LVI of the Pact, as Colombia believes to be the case, it does not need to reach the question
whether, objectively, there was a dispute between the Parties over the subject-matter of
Nicaragua’s claims as of the critical date the date of Nicaragua’s Application and similarly,
the Court would not need to decide whether Nicaragua had satisfied the requirements of Article II
of the Pact prior to instituting these proceedings. However, if the Court were to subscribe to
Nicaragua’s reading of Article LVI, including the all-important second paragraph, that would still
not be the end of the matter, for the Court would still need to decide whether there really was
objectively a dispute between the Parties as to the allegations advanced by Nicaragua in its
Application, as of the critical date, and whether, if so, the facts show that the Parties were of the
opinion, as of 26 November 2013, that such dispute could not be settled by direct negotiations
through the usual diplomatic channels. If either of those requirements were not met, there would
still be no jurisdiction under the Pact.
5. Colombia’s fourth and fifth objections are interrelated and are directed to Nicaragua’s
alternative theory of jurisdiction. The fourth objection is that the Court has no “inherent
jurisdiction” to pronounce on the actions required by one of its previous judgments and the fifth
objection is centred on the principle that the Court has no post-adjudication enforcement
jurisdiction.
11CR 2015/23, p. 48, para.11 (Pellet).
11Application, para. 18. - 40 -
6. I think it is pretty evident that Nicaragua has advanced its alternative basis of jurisdiction
because it realizes the fragility of its arguments that there is jurisdiction under the Pact of Bogotá.
If Nicaragua were as confident as it professes to be that jurisdiction vests under the Pact, there
would have been no need for it to conjure up its novel and far-reaching “inherent jurisdiction”
theory. As Professor Treves has explained, Nicaragua’s alternative basis of jurisdiction does not
save Nicaragua because such “inherent jurisdiction” does not exist in the circumstances of this
case.
7. I should also add that all of Colombia’s preliminary objections have an exclusively
preliminary character. In other words, all of them can be decided on the basis of the facts that have
been adduced relevant to jurisdiction.
8. That being said, there is one common factor that has a bearing on each of Colombia’s
objections and that concerns the timing of Nicaragua’s Application. I trust that the significance of
the fact that Nicaragua lodged its Application on 26 November 2013 the very last day it could
under its interpretation of Article LVI of the Pact will not be lost on the Court.
9. That date had nothing to do with whether a dispute genuinely existed between the Parties
at the time. Nor did it have any relation with the question whether, if a dispute actually existed, the
Parties or even Nicaragua alone considered that the dispute was one that could not be settled
by negotiations. No, Mr. President; the date of 26 November 2013 was chosen for pure reasons of
expediency. As Nicaragua’s Agent acknowledged: “After this last date Nicaragua would be left
without clear recourse to the instruments of peaceful resolution of conflicts which was at the heart
of the Pact of Bogotá.” 115 And it is precisely because there are a host of reasons why there is no
jurisdiction under the Pact as of the critical date that Nicaragua had to invent its “inherent
jurisdiction” alternative.
10. With respect to the question whether the Court has jurisdiction ratione temporis, I would
only add one point to what Sir Michael Wood has already said.
11. As Sir Michael explained, the addition of the second paragraph to Article LVI was new
in the Pact. The fact that it was a new addition to what had been provided for in previous treaties
11CR 2015/23, p. 15, para. 22 (Argüello Gómez). - 41 -
was deliberate, and it was highlighted during the travaux. The negotiating States obviously
considered the situation where dispute resolution procedures might have been instituted before a
party to the Pact denounced it, and they wanted to ensure that such procedures survived the
particular notice of denunciation and that is what the second paragraph of Article LVI does. In
contrast though, what it does not do and what it does not say is that denunciation shall have no
effect with respect to procedures initiated after the transmission of the particular notification. The
negotiators could perfectly easily have provided for that outcome, but they did not do so.
12. On the screen, you will see the text of the second paragraph of Article LVI, which you
are familiar with. “The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures
initiated prior to the transmission of the particular notification.” [Emphasis added.]
13. For Nicaragua’s interpretation to be valid, what the second paragraph should have said is
the following. “The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures initiated
prior to the date when the Pact ceases to be in force with respect to the State denouncing it.”
[Emphasis added.] But that obviously did not happen, and it fundamentally undermines
Nicaragua’s interpretation of the provision.
14. Then there is the question whether there was a dispute between the Parties concerning
the allegations in Nicaragua’s Application and, if so, whether it could not be settled by
negotiations.
15. According to Nicaragua’s Agent and Professor Lowe, the existence of a dispute had been
public knowledge since the very day that the Judgment was rendered 19 November 2012 as a
result of President Santos’s remarks that were made really just a few moments after the Judgment
116
was read out . But, as Professor Reisman has shown, that allegation is completely contradicted
by what Nicaragua’s President and what Nicaragua’s highest military commanders said over the
next twelve months. The Court will not find a single accusation on the record from these senior
State representatives that they considered that a dispute had emerged you won’t find it
whether as a result of President Santos’s remarks or otherwise.
11CR 2015/23, p. 17, para. 28 (Argüello Gómez); p. 42, para. 52 (Lowe). - 42 -
16. I respectfully invite the Court to look at the record as a whole. There is a consistent
pattern of statements emanating from President Ortega that show just the opposite of what our
colleagues on the other side contend. I referred to many of these on Monday and counsel for
Nicaragua studiously avoided mentioning any of them yesterday. Sometimes, Mr. President, it is
instructive to listen to the silences.
17. We also heard yesterday that the Nicaraguan navy did not attempt to interfere with what
are alleged to be illegal Colombian patrols in Nicaraguan waters, and that this is the reason there
117
was no confrontation . Apparently, Nicaragua wishes to take credit for the fact that the situation
at sea was calm and without incident, as was repeatedly confirmed by Nicaragua’s highest military
officials. But let us not forget that it was President Ortega himself, on 13 August 2013, who
credited Colombia’s President Santos with the lack of any confrontations in the pacific situation . 118
18. And let us also not forget that, not simply on this occasion, but also on many others right
up to the time the Application was filed, both President Ortega and President Santos had confirmed
that they welcomed having negotiations, and that Foreign Minister Holguín had expressly stated
that Colombia’s doors were always open to negotiate a treaty . I hope that responds to my good
120
friend, Mr. Lowe’s question whether Colombia ever responded to Nicaragua’s offers . It did.
19. Mr. President, Members of the Court: in the light of the factual context, the timing of
Nicaragua’s Application was artificial. It was lodged when it was because Nicaragua thought it
was about to run out of time to institute proceedings under the Pact. But, at that time, there was not
a shred of evidence that the Parties had a dispute over the allegations that appeared for the first time
in the Application, or that they could not settle any issues relating to the implementation of the
Judgment by negotiations. That is, as I said, why we have this far-fetched alternative theory of
11CR 2015/23, p. 14, para. 20 (Argüello Gómez).
11Preliminary Objections of Colombia (POC), Ann. 11; and see CR 2015/22, pp. 33-34, para. 11 (Bundy).
119
CR 2015/22, p. 34, para. 11 (Bundy), and Written Statement of Nicaragua (WSN), Ann. 8, and Memorial of
Nicaragua (MN), Ann. 40.
12CR 2015/23, p. 43, para. 56 (Lowe). - 43 -
inherent jurisdiction expounded by Professor Pellet yesterday. It is supposed to act as some kind of
safety net in the event Nicaragua cannot show that it satisfied the conditions for instituting
proceedings under the Pact. But, as innovative as Professor Pellet’s exposé was, it does not create
a basis of jurisdiction where none otherwise exists.
20. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Colombia firmly believes that jurisdiction must be
grounded on the fundamental principle of consent, which includes any conditions that are attached
to that consent. We have shown that Colombia’s consent to jurisdiction in this case does not exist
under the Pact of Bogotá, and that there is no basis for implying consent with respect to
Nicaragua’s theory of “inherent jurisdiction”.
Mr. President, that concludes my remarks. I thank the Court for its attention, and I would
ask if the floor could now be given to Colombia’s Agent. Thank you.
Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Monsieur Bundy. Je donne à présent la parole à S. Exc. M. Carlos
Gustavo Arrieta, agent de la Colombie.
Mr. ARRIETA:
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as this will be our final presentation in this case and
since Nicaragua has made some accusations about Colombia’s position purportedly challenging
your authority and rejecting your Judgment of 19 November 2012, I wish to stress two very
important points before presenting our final submissions:
First, Colombia firmly rejects Nicaragua’s tendency to distort Colombian officials’
declarations and statements. As Nicaragua recognized yesterday, what they have tried to do is
nothing less than a “cheap shot”. We believe it is not even that; it has been an outright
misrepresentation of those statements. Mr. President, let me say something. It is true that
Colombian public opinion does not agree with some aspects of the Judgment; Colombia is,
after all, a democracy, and Nicaragua seems to forget that democratic debate about a Court
decision is very different from defiance of it. Then, having a dualist system on boundaries is
not a sin, we are proud of our constitutional system; but what should be clear, first, is that
Colombia is, above all, a law-abiding country, and, second, that we are committed to the - 44 -
Judgment’s implementation. Our Constitutional Court, whose decisions are final, has held that
judgments of the International Court of Justice are binding, that they have to be incorporated
through treaties in case they affect our boundaries, and that it is our duty to negotiate them.
That is the rule of law. And that is the way domestically for us to proceed; it is not, as
Nicaragua has misstated, our use of domestic law to justify non-compliance.
Second, as Colombia has made abundantly clear since November 2012, negotiations are the
way to proceed for implementation of the Judgment. Now, last, Nicaragua’s delegation seems
to have fallen in line with President Ortega’s declarations. Colombia wishes to confirm to
them and to you what we have always said: we are willing to sit at any moment, with
Nicaragua, and however many times it should prove necessary, to negotiate a treaty for the
implementation of the Court’s decision. This has been our position from the very start. I am
glad Nicaragua’s delegation has accepted it, and hope that they will show the Court that their
position regarding negotiations is not purely rhetorical.
2. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I now have the honour formally to read Colombia’s
final submissions, which are as follows:
“For the reasons set forth in our written and oral pleadings on preliminary
objections, the Republic of Colombia requests the Court to adjudge and declare that it
lacks jurisdiction over the proceedings brought by Nicaragua in its Application of
26 November 2013 and that said Application should be dismissed.”
3. A copy of the written text of Colombia’s final submissions is now being communicated to
the Court and transmitted to the Agent of Nicaragua.
4. Mr. President, Members of the Court, before I conclude let me express, on behalf of all the
members of the Colombian delegation, our thanks to you, Mr. President, and to the Members of the
Court, for your attention and for the efficient manner in which these proceedings have been
prepared and conducted. We are very grateful to all concerned: to the Registrar and his staff, to
the interpreters, to the translators and to all those who have worked so hard behind the scenes to
make this hearing possible.
5. That, Mr. President, concludes Colombia’s case. Thank you. - 45 -
Le PRESIDENT : Excellence, je vous remercie. La Cour prend acte des conclusions finales
dont vous venez de donner lecture au nom de la Colombie. Le Nicaragua présentera son second
tour de plaidoiries le vendredi 2 octobre, à 10 heures.
L’audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 17 h 45.
___________
Public sitting held on Wednesday 30 September 2015, at 4 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case concerning Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) - Preliminary Objections