Corrigé
Corrected
CR 2015/18
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2015
Public sitting
held on Monday 4 May 2015, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Abraham presiding,
in the case concerning Obligation to Negotiate Access
to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile)
Preliminary Objection
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2015
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 4 mai 2015, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,
dans l’affaire relative à l’Obligation de négocier un accès
à l’océan Pacifique (Bolivie c. Chili)
Exception préliminaire
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -
Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf
Judges Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian
Judges ad hoc Daudet
Arbour
Registrar Couvreur
- 3 -
Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président
MM. Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian, juges
M. Daudet
Mme Arbour, juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier
- 4 -
The Government of Bolivia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé, former President of Bolivia, former President of the Bolivian
Supreme Court of Justice, former Dean of the Law School from the Catholic University of
Bolivia, La Paz,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. David Choquehuanca Céspedes, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Plurinational State of
Bolivia,
as National Authority;
Mr. Mathias Forteau, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest , Nanterre-La Défense, Member of
the International Law Commission,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid,
member of the Institut de droit international,
Ms Monique Chemillier -Gendreau, Professor Emeritus of Public Law and Political Science,
University of Paris Diderot,
Mr. Payan Akhavan, LL.M. S.J.D. (Harvard) Professor of International Law, McGill University,
Montreal, Visiting Fellow at the Kellogg College of Oxford University, member of the State
Bar of New York and of the Law Society of Upper Canada,
Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Hector Arce, Attorney -General of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Professor of
Constitutional Law, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, La Paz,
Mr. Reymi Ferreira, Minister of Defence of the Plurinational State of Bolivia,
H.E. Mr. Juan Carlos Alurralde, Vice- Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Plurinational State of
Bolivia,
Mr. Emerson Calderon, Secretary General of the Strategic Maritime Vindication Office
(DIREMAR), Professor of Public International Law, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés,
La Paz,
H.E. Mr. Sacha Llorenty, Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations Headquarters
in New York,
H.E. Ms Nardy Suxo, Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations Office in Geneva,
Mr. Rubén Saavedra, Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR) inQuito,
as Advisers; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Bolivie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzé, ancien président de la Bolivie, ancien président de la
Cour suprême de justice bolivienne, ancien doyen de la faculté de droit de
l’Université catholique de Bolivie à La Paz,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. David Choquehuanca Céspedes, ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Etat plurinational
de Bolivie,
comme représentant de l’Etat ;
M. Mathias Forteau, professeur à l’Université de Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Antonio RemiroBrotóns, professeur de droit international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
Mme Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, professeur émérite de droit public et de sciences politiques de
l’Université Paris Diderot,
M. Payan Akhavan, L.L.M., S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit international à
l’Université McGill de Montréal, professeur invité au Kellogg College de l’Université
d’Oxford, membre du barreau de l’Etat de New York et du barreau du Haut-Canada,
Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau anglais,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Hector Arce, Attorney-General de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie et professeur de droit
constitutionnel à l’Universidad Mayor de San Andrés de La Paz,
M. ReymiFerreira, ministre de la défense de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie,
M. Juan Carlos Alurralde, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie,
M. Emerson Calderon, secrétaire général du bureau stratégique de reconnaissance des prétentions
maritimes (DIREMAR) et professeur de droit international public à l’Universidad Mayor de
San Andres de La Paz,
S. Exc. M. Sacha Llorenty, représentant permanent de la Bolivie auprès de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies à New York,
S. Exc. Mme Nardy Suxo, représentant permanent de la Bolivie auprès de l’Office des
Nations Unies à Genève,
M. Rubén Saavedra, représentant permanent de la Bolivie auprès de l’Union des
Nations sud-américaines (UNASUR) à Quito,
comme conseillers ; - 6 -
Mr. Carlos Mesa Gisbert, former President and Vice-President of Bolivia,
as Special Envoy and Spokesman;
Mr. José Villarroel, DIREMAR, La Paz,
Mr. Osvaldo Torrico, DIREMAR, La Paz,
Mr. Farit Rojas Tudela, Embassy of Bolivia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Luis Rojas Martínez, Embassy of Bolivia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Franz Zubieta, State Attorney’s Office, La Paz,
as Technical Advisers;
Ms Gimena González,
Ms Kathleen McFarland,
as Assistant Counsel.
The Government of Chile is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Felipe Bulnes S., Former Minister of Justice and Education of the Republic of Chile,
Former Ambassador of Chile to the United States of America, Professor of Civil Law, Pontificia
Universidad Católica de Chile,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Heraldo Muñoz V., Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile,
as National Authority;
Mr. Claudio Grossman, Dean and R. Geraldson Professor of International Law, American
University, Washington College of Law,
H.E. Ms María Teresa Infante C., Ambassador of Chile to the Kingdom of the Netherlands ,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Co-Agents;
Sir Daniel Bethlehem, Q.C., Barrister, Bar of England and Wales, 20 Essex Street Chambers,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies and
Development, Geneva, and University of Paris II (Panthéon- Assas), member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr. Ben Juratowitch, Solicitor admitted in Queensland and in England and Wales, Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, - 7 -
M. Carlos Mesa Gisbert, ancien président et vice-président de la Bolivie,
comme envoyé spécial et porte-parole ;
M. José Villarroel, DIREMAR, LaPaz,
M. Osvaldo Torrico, DIREMAR, La Paz,
M. Farit Rojas Tudela, ambassade de Bolivie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Luis Rojas Martínez, ambassade de Bolivie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Franz Zubieta, bureau de l’Attorney-General, La Paz,
comme conseillers techniques ;
Mme GimenaGonzález,
Mme Kathleen McFarland,
comme conseillers adjoints.
Le Gouvernement du Chili est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. FelipeBulnes S., ancien ministre de la justice et de l’éducation de la République du
Chili, ancien ambassadeur du Chili auprès des Etats -Unis d’Amérique, professeur de droit civil
à la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. HeraldoMuñoz V., ministre des affaires étrangères du Chili,
comme représentant de l’Etat ;
M. Claudio Grossman, doyen et professeur de droit international, titulaire de la chaire
R. Geraldson, American University, faculté de droit de Washington,
S. Exc. Mme María Teresa Infante C., ambassadeur du Chili auprès du Royaume des Pays -Bas,
membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme coagents ;
sir Daniel Bethlehem, Q.C., barrister, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
cabinet 20 Essex Street,
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et du
développement de Genève et à l’Université Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), membre de l’Institut de
droit international,
M. Ben Juratowitch, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles, et Queensland), cabinet Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, - 8 -
Mr. Harold Hongju Koh, Sterling Professor of International Law, member of the Bars of New York
and the District of Columbia,
Ms Mónica Pinto, Professor and Dean of the Law School of the Universidad Nacional de Buenos
Aires, Argentina,
Mr. Samuel Wordsworth, Q.C., member of the English Bar, member of the Paris Bar, Essex Court
Chambers,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Alberto van Klaveren S., Former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, Professor of
International Relations, Universidad de Chile,
Ms Ximena Fuentes T., Professor of Public International Law, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez and
Universidad de Chile,
Mr. Andrés Jana L., Professor of Civil Law, Universidad de Chile,
Ms Nienke Grossman, Professor, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, member of
the Bars of Virginia and the District of Columbia,
Ms Kate Parlett, Solicitor admitted in Queensland and in England and Wales,
Ms Alexandra van der Meulen, Avocat à la Cour and member of the Bar of the State of New York,
Ms Callista Harris, Solicitor admitted in New South Wales,
Ms Mariana Durney, Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms María Alicia Ríos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Juan Enrique Loyer, Third Secretary, Embassy of Chile to the Netherlands,
as Advisers;
Mr. Coalter G. Lathrop, Sovereign Geographic, member of the North Carolina Bar,
as Technical Adviser. - 9 -
M. Harold Hongju Koh, professeur de droit international, titulaire de la chaire Sterling, membre des
barreaux de New York et du district de Columbia,
Mme Mónica Pinto, professeur et doyen de la faculté de droit de l’Universidad Nacional de
Buenos Aires, Argentine,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, Q.C., membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de Paris, cabinet Essex Court
Chambers,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Alberto van Klaveren S., ancien vice -ministre des affaires étrangères du Chili,
professeur de relations internationales à l’Universidad de Chile,
Mme XimenaFuentes T., professeur de droit international public à l’Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez et
à l’Universidad de Chile,
M. Andrés Jana L., professeur de droit civil à l’Universidad de Chile,
Mme Nienke Grossman, professeur à l’Université de Baltimore (Maryland), Eta ts-Unis
d’Amérique, membre des barreaux de l’Etat de Virginie et du district de Columbia,
Mme Kate Parlett, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles, et Queensland),
Mme Alexandra van der Meulen, avocat à la Cour et membre du barreau de l’Etat de New York,
Mme Callista Harris, solicitor(Nouvelle-Galle du Sud),
Mme Mariana Durney, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme María Alicia Ríos, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Juan Enrique Loyer, troisième secrétaire à l’ambassade du Chili aux Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers ;
M. Coalter G. Lathrop, Sovereign Geographic, membre du barreau de Caroline du Nord,
comme conseiller technique. - 10 -
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte.
La Cour se réunit aujourd’hui pour entendre les Parties en leurs plaidoiries sur l’exception
préliminaire présentée par le Chili dans l’affaire relative à l’ Obligation de négocier un accès à
l’océan Pacifique (Bolivie c. Chili). Le juge Crawford ne siègera pas en l’affaire, en application de
l’article 24, paragraphe 1, du Statut.
Je relève par ailleurs que, la Cour ne comptant sur son siège aucun juge de la nationalité des
Parties, chacune d’elles s’est prévalue de la faculté que lui confère le paragraphe 2 de l’article 31
du Statut de d ésigner un juge ad hoc. La Bolivie a désigné M. Yves Daudet, et le Chili,
Mme Louise Arbour.
L’article 20 du Statut dispose que «[t]out membre de la Cour doit, avant d’entrer en
fonctions, prendre l’engagement solennel d’exercer ses attributions en plei ne impartialité et en
toute conscience». En vertu du paragraphe 6 de l’article 31 du Statut, cette disposition s’applique
également aux juges ad hoc . Bien que M. Daudet ait siégé comme juge ad hoc en l’affaire du
Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/Niger) dans laquelle il a fait une déclaration solennelle, il lui
faut, conformément au paragraphe 3 de l’article 8 du Règlement de la Cour, en faire une nouvelle
en la présente affaire. Avant de les inviter à faire leur déclaration solennelle, je dirai d’abord
quelques mots de la carrière et des qualifications de M. Daudet et de Mme Arbour.
De nationalité française, M. Daudet est docteur en droit et agrégé de droit public et de
science politique. Il a occupé divers postes d’enseignement et de recherche en France
métropolitaine, en Martinique, à l’île Maurice, au Maroc et en Côte d’Ivoire. Il a été membre de la
délégation française au groupe d’experts, puis à la conférence des Nations Unies sur le transfert
international de technologie. M. Daudet est secrétaire général de l’Académie de droit international
de La Haye et professeur émérite de l’Université de Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), dont il a été
premier vice-président. Il est par ailleurs membre du comité de rédaction de l’Annuaire français de
droit international , et membre de la société française pour le droit international et de la
branche française de l’Association de droit international/International Law Association. Il a publié
de nombreux ouvrages et articles dans différents domaines du droit international. - 11 -
De nationalité canadienne, Mme Arbour est titulaire d’une maîtrise en droit de l’Université
de Montréal et a été membre du barreau du Québec et à celui de l’Ontario. Elle a exercé de hautes
fonctions judiciaires dans son pays d’origine en tant que juge à la Cour suprême du Canada. Elle a
également occupé plusieurs postes universitaires à la faculté de droit Osgoode Hall de
l’Université York, au Canada. De 1996 à 1999, Mme Arbour a été procureur des Tribunaux
pénaux internationaux pour l’ex- Yougoslavie et pour le Rwanda. De 2004 à 2008, elle a été
Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme. Elle est l’auteur de nombreuses
publications dans le domaine du droit pénal international et a reçu nombre de distinctions pour son
action dans celui des droits de l’homme.
J’invite maintenant M. Daudet et Mme Arbour à prendre l’engagement solennel prescrit par
l’article 20 du Statut et je demande à toutes les personnes présentes à l’audience de bien vouloir se
lever. Monsieur Daudet.
M. DAUDET :
«Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et exercerai mes
attributions de juge en tout honneur et dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité et
en toute conscience.»
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Daudet. Madame Arbour.
Mme ARBOUR :
«Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et exercerai mes
attributions de juge en tout honneur et dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité et
en toute conscience.»
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Madame Arbour. Veuillez vous asseoir. La Cour prend
acte des déclarations solennelles faites par M. Daudet et MmeArbour.
*
Je rappellerai à présent les principales étapes de la procédure en l’espèce.
Le 24 avril 2013, l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie a déposé au Greffe de la Cour une requête
introductive d’instance contre la République du Chili au sujet d’un «différend concernant - 12 -
l’obligation du Chili de négocier de bonne foi et de manière effective avec la Bolivie en vue de
parvenir à un accord assurant à celle- ci un accès pleinement souverain à l’océan Pacifique». Dans
sa requête, la Bolivie entend fonder la compétence de la Cour sur l’article 31 du traité américain de
règlement pacifique, signé le 30 avril 1948 et dénommé officiellement, aux termes de son
article 60, «pacte de Bogotá».
Par ordonnance du 18 juin 2013, la Cour a fixé au 17 avril 2014 la date d’expiration du délai
pour le dépôt du mémoire de la Bolivie et au 18 février 2015 la date d’expiration du délai pour l e
dépôt du contre-mémoire du Chili. La Bolivie a déposé son mémoire dans le délai ainsi prescrit.
Le 15 juillet 2014, dans le délai prescrit au paragraphe 1 de l’article 79 du Règlement, le
Chili a soulevé une exception préliminaire d’incompétence de la Cour. En conséquence, par
ordonnance du 15 juillet 2014, le président, constatant qu’en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe 5
de l’article 79 du Règlement la procédure sur le fond était suspendue, et tenant dûment compte de
l’instruction de procédure V, a fixé au 14 novembre 2014 la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel
la Bolivie pourrait présenter un exposé écrit contenant ses observations et conclusions sur
l’exception préliminaire soulevée par le Chili. La Bolivie a déposé un tel exposé dans le dél ai ainsi
fixé, et l’affaire s’est ainsi trouvée en état pour ce qui est de l’exception préliminaire.
*
Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 53 de son Règlement, la Cour, après s’être
renseignée auprès des Parties, a décidé de rendre accessibles au pu blic, à l’ouverture de la
procédure orale, des exemplaires des pièces de procédure et documents annexés. En outre,
conformément à la pratique de la Cour, l’ensemble de ces documents sera placé dès aujourd’hui sur
le site Internet de la Cour.
*
Je constate la présence à l’audience des agents, conseils et avocats des deux Parties. Je salue
aussi la présence dans cette salle de S. Exc. M. Choquehuanca, ministre des affaires étrangères de
la Bolivie et de S. Exc. M. Muñoz, ministre des affaires étrangères d u Chili. Conformément aux - 13 -
dispositions relatives à l’organisation de la procédure arrêtées par la Cour, les audiences
comprendront un premier et un second tours de plaidoiries. Le premier tour de plaidoiries débute
aujourd’hui et se terminera le mercredi 6 mai. Chaque Partie disposera d’une séance de trois
heures. Le second tour de plaidoiries s’ouvrira le jeudi 7 mai et s’achèvera le vendredi 8. Chaque
Partie disposera d’une séance d’une heure et demie.
*
Le Chili, qui sera entendu en premier, pourr a aujourd’hui, si besoin est, déborder un peu
au-delà de 18 heures, compte tenu du temps consacré à ma déclaration liminaire et aux déclarations
solennelles des juges ad hoc . Je donne à présent la parole à S. Exc. M. Felipe Bulnes Serrano,
agent du Chili. Monsieur l’ambassadeur, vous avez la parole.
Mr. BULNES:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is my honour to appear before you as the Agent of
Chile. Chile is a vibrant democracy, respectful of the rule of law and fully comm itted to the
promotion of human rights and to policies designed to improve social inclusion and eradicate
poverty. In its interactions with other States , Chile aspires not only to a relationship of peace , but
to one of integration and co- operation, and this is the case especially with its neighbours. Indeed
Chile has been central to almostevery Latin American integration initiative.
2. Respect for treaties is fundamental to Chile’s foreign policy, since they constitute the
foundation of stabilit y and peace between nations . Chile requests the same level of respect for
treaties from its partners, as a basic commitment of international law.
3. Chile’s Preliminary Objection in this case has been made necessary by Bolivia’ s attempt
to circumvent the Treaty of Peace and Amity that was agreed between our two countries in 1904,
and to avoid the limits on the Court ’s jurisdiction under the Pact of Bogotá . In the 1904 Peace
Treaty, Bolivia and Chile agreed on the allocation of sovereignty over territorybetween them, and
on the character of Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean. They agreed that Bolivia would have “in - 14 -
1
perpetuity the fullest and most unrestricted right of commercial transit ” , through Chilean territory
and its P acific ports. Bolivia now asks the Court to order Chile to negotiate and to agree with
Bolivia to grant it coastal territory over which Chile is the undisputed sovereign, in order to change
the character of Bolivia’s access to the Pacific from non-sovereign to sovereign.
4. Yet, Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá excludes from the Court ’s jurisdiction any matter
already settled by arrangement when the Pact was concluded in 1948, or governed by a treaty in
force in that year . Whether Bolivia has a right to sovereign access to the Pacific is a matter that
was settled in, and governed by, the 1904 Peace Treaty . T hat matter is therefore outside the
Court’s jurisdiction under the Pact. The whole of Bolivia’s case concerns that same matter, and the
Court should at this preliminary stage rule that it has no jurisdic tion.
5. These points will be developed in the speeches that will follow mine, but against the
background of this brief summary of our case, Chile wishes to emphasize th at the principles before
you in this case are of interest not only to Chile, but to the entire international community. Bolivia
is challenging the stability of borders and territorial sovereignty solemnly agreed in a peace treaty
concluded 111 years ago . That Peace Treaty is in force today and it still underpins the daily
relations between Chile and Bolivia.
II.B OLIVIA ’S CLAIM IN CONTEXT
6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, allow me to underline the true character of Bolivia’s
claim. Bolivia’s claim before you is no more than a repackaging of its long- standing aspiration to
revise the territorial settlement contained in the 1904 Peace Treaty. What Bolivia seeks from the
Court is a declaration that Chile is under an obligation to negotiate and to agree with Bolivia to
grant it sovereign access to the Pacific . There is no conceivable basis on which this request can be
reconciled with the allocation of sovereignty and the character of Bolivia’s access to the Pacific
Ocean agreed in the 1904 Peace Treaty. Bolivia’s case is therefore excluded by Article VI of the
Pact of Bogotá.
1Treaty of Peace and Amity between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Santiago on Oct. 1904 (the 1904 Peace
Treaty), tab 1 of judges’ folder, pp. 5, 12 and 19, Art. VI.
2
Application of Bolivia (AB), submissions, para. 32 (and (c); Memorial of Bolivia (MB) , submissions,
para. 500 (a) and (c); see also, para. 28 (a) and (c). - 15 -
7. Bolivia’s effort to reopen the peace settlement reached in 1904 goes back to 1920. That
was the first occasion on which Bolivia explici tly sought revision of the 1904 Peace Treaty at
3
that stage, from the League of Nations . The League of Nations rejected that request as falling
outside its competence 4.
8. Bolivia then attempted, on at least four separate occasions, to secure support for a general
power to avoid or revise treaties, its focus on the 1904 Peace Treaty being clear. So, in 1928,
Bolivia made two reservations at the time it signed the Havana Convention on the Law of Treaties
5
that sought to expand the circumstances in which a treaty would cease to apply or woul d expire .
Then in 1945, during a meeting of the Second Commission of the San Francisco C onference, the
6
Bolivian delegate spoke in favour of a power of revision of treaties . In 1950, Bolivia also tried to
create a wide power to revise treaties in a decl aration that it made at the time it ratified the Charter
7
of the Organization of American States (OAS) . I n 1968, during the Vienna Conference on the
Law of Treaties, Bolivia again set out its case for the modification of treaties 8.
9. Bolivia directed its efforts not only at the 1904 Peace Treaty, but also at the jurisdictional
exclusion contained in Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá. T he reservation that Bolivia made on
signature of the Pact in 1948 is highly material tothis case, and is now on your screens. It provided
that:
3Letter from the Delegates of Bolivia to the League of Nations to James Eric Drummond, Secretary -General of
the League of Nations, 1 Nov. 1920; Ann. 37 to the Preliminary Objection of Chile (POCh), Vol. 2, pp. 578 and 579.
4League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Jurists on the Complaints of Peru and Bolivia, 21 Sep. 1921;
Ann. 39 to POCh, Vol. 2, pp. 591 and 593.
5
Havana Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at La Havana on 20 Feb. 1928, Arts. 14 and 15 and Bolivia’s
reservations made upon signature, Organization of American States (OAS), Law and Treaty Series , No. 34, doc. 10 of
Chile’s collection of readily available documents (RADCh), pp. 92 -101.
6
Statement by Mr. Andrad e, Ambassador of Bolivia to the United States and Acting Chairman of the Bolivian
Delegation, at the Fourth Meeting of the Second Commission of the General Assembly of the United Nations Conference
on International Organization (San Francisco Conference), 22 June 1945, UN doc. No 1151/II/17; doc. 17 of RADCh,
pp. 165-166: “We believe that in drawing up the Charter, we should make it possible to review any case of injustice
whether deriving from a treaty or not.”
7Bolivia’s Declaration made upon ratificati on of the Charter of the OAS, signed at Bogotá on 30 April 1948,
OAS, Law and Treaty Series, Nos. 1-C and 61; RADCh, doc. 18, p. 193.
8
Statement by Mr. Kempff Mercado, Ambassador of Bolivia, at the Sixty -Third Meeting of the First Session of
the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, 10 May 1968; RADCh, doc. 19, p. 202, paras. 45-46:
“Bolivia considered it an essential condition for the continuity of treaties that the possibility of
peaceful modification should not be excluded; that rule must apply both to treaties establishing
boundaries and to peace treaties which were manifestly unjust, and which belonged to a period when war
was considered legal. Consequently his delegation totally disagreed with the provisions of
paragraph 2 (a) of article 59 [the provision concerning f undamental changes of circumstances ], which
were not based on valid legal grounds.” - 16 -
“The Delegation of Bolivia makes a reservation with regard to Article VI,
inasmuch as it considers that pacific procedures may also be applied to controversies
arising from matters settled by arrangement between the Parties, when the said
arrangement affects the vital interests of a State.” 9
10
10. Bolivia failed to ratify the Pact for a fur ther 63 years, until 2011 . When it did so, it
11
restated exactly the same reservation . This reservation was an attempt to bring within the Court’s
jurisdiction Bolivian efforts to modify the settlement reached in the 1904 Peace Treaty . Chile
therefore immediately objected to it, preventing the entry into force of the Pact as between our two
countries 12.
11. So as to bring the Pact into force bet ween Bolivia and Chile, Bolivia withdrew its
reservation to Article VI on 10 April 2013 13 and, two weeks later, submitted to the Court its
Application in this case. Article VI is in full force between Bolivia and Chile, as it is between all
of the High Contracting Parties of the Pact. The device Bolivia chose to attempt to avoid the
obvious jurisdictional exclusion of its case was to package it as one concerning an obligation to
negotiate.
12. This historical sequence demonstrates an enduring policy on Bolivia ’s part to challenge
the settlement contained in the 1904 Peace Treaty, and an enduring appreciation on Bolivia’s part
that Article VI of the Pact prevented it from doing so before the Court . Bolivia entered its
reservation to the Pact precisely beca use it understood that Article VI excluded the Court ’s
jurisdiction over any attempt to change what was settled in , and governed by, the 1904 Peace
Treaty.
9American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, signed at Bogotá on 30 Apr. 1948 (entry into force 6 May 1949) (the
Pact of Bogotá), tab 3 of judges’ folder, pp. 24, 54 and 55.
10
See Organization of American States, Signatories and Ratifications, A -42: American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement, POCh, Ann. 77, Vol. 3, p. 1101; and letter from Luis Toro Utillano, Principal Legal Officer of the
Department of International Law of the OAS, to States signatory to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement,
OEA/2.2/36/11, 9 June 2011, enclosing Bolivia’s Instrument of Ratification; POCh, Ann. 63, Vol. 3, pp. 934 and 935.
11
See Organization of American States, S ignatories and Ratifications, A -42: American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement, POCh, Ann. 77, Vol. 3, p. 1101; and letter from Luis Toro Utillano, Principal Legal Officer of the
Department of International Law of the OAS, to States signatory to the American T reaty on Pacific Settlement,
OEA/2.2/36/11, 9 June 2011, enclosing Bolivia’s Instrument of Ratification; POCh, Ann. 63, Vol. 3, pp. 934 and 935.
12
Objection by Chile to the reservation made by Bolivia at the time it ratified the American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement, 10 June 2011; POCh, Ann. 64, Vol. 3, pp. 940 and 941.
13Bolivian Instrument of Withdrawal of Reservation to the Pact of Bogotá, 10 Apr. 2013; MB, Ann. 115, Vol. III,
Part IV. - 17 -
III.BOLIVIA SEEKS A JUDICIALLY COMPELLED TRANSFER
OF C HILEAN SOVEREIGN TERRITORY
13. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I wish to emphasize that with Article VI in force,
the device Bolivia adopted to seek to avoid the obvious jurisdictional exclusion of its claim was to
plead an obligation to negotiate. That is just the latest manifestation of Bolivia’ s long-standing
aspiration to revise the territoria l settlement agreed in the 1904 Peace Trea. Bolivia seeks a
declaration from the Court that Chile is under an obligation not only to negotiate, but as a resu lt of
14
negotiations “to grant Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean ”his would impose
upon Chile an obligation to cede to Bolivia a portion of territory over which Chile is the undisputed
sovereign. That Bolivia seeks to use the Court t o advance such a request is completely
unacceptable to Chile.
14. Although Bolivia dresses up its case as one concerning an obligation to negotiate that it
says has nothing to do with the 1904 Peace Treaty, its true nature cannot be hidden. According to
Bolivia, only how much territory and where it lies along the Chilean coast would remain to be
negotiated. In its pleadings, Bolivia describes the outcome of the “negotiation” that it asks the
15
Court to order as “predetermined” . That predetermined result that Bolivia asks you to order
would clearly require a change to the allocation of sovereignty, and to the character of Bolivia ’s
access to the Pacific Ocean, agreed in the 1904 Peace Treaty.
IV. B OLIVIA SEEKS TO UNSETTLE A MATTER SETTLED IN AND GOVERNED
BY THE 1904P EACE T REATY
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Bolivia is asking the Court to ignore the purpose of
Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá . Bolivia is asking the Court to close its eyes to the fact that
Bolivia’s case goes to the heart of th e 1904 Peace Treaty . The truth of the matter is : that the
1904 Peace Treaty pre-dates the Pact of Bogotá of 1948; that the 1904 Peace Treaty was in force
in 1948 and remains in force today ; and that the 1904 Peace Treaty clear ly settled and govern ed
Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean, establishing that Bolivia’s rights of access are not sovereign.
16. Bolivia barely refers to the 1904 Peace Treaty in the almost 200 pages of its Memorial .
Mr. President, a peace treaty does not disappear just because a State decides not to mention it.
1AB, submissions, para. 32 (c); MB, submissions, para. 500 (c); see also para. 28 (c).
15
MB, para. 404. - 18 -
Bolivia reviews at length its relationship with Chile from the early nineteenth century to the present
day, but devotes only two paragraphs to the content of the Peace Treaty that has been the
16
foundation of their relationship for 111 years . This settled territorial dispensation cannot be
brought within the Court ’s jurisdiction by pleading an obligation to negotiate, and referring to
exchanges that preceded and followed the Peace Treaty, but ignoring the Peace Treaty itself.
17. The Court has no jurisdiction over matters settled by arrangement or governed by treaty
in 1948, and whether Bolivia has a right of sovereign access to the Pacific is the archetype of such
matters. If that matter is within the Court ’s jurisdiction, then the list of historical issues in
Latin America that could be reopened before you is long indeed. The High Contracting Parties to
the Pact of Bogotá did not and do not consent to tha t, and Bolivia’s reservation shows that it took
the same view until two weeks before it sei sed the Court. Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá leaves
any matter settled or governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty, including any subsequent negotiations
concerning that same matter, within the exclusive jurisdiction of all of the States concerned.
18. Mr. President, Members of the Court, b efore you, Bolivia insists that its case does not
concern the 1904 Peace Treaty. In contrast, Bolivia has been clear elsewhere that what it seeks is a
renegotiation of that Treaty . Before the Organi zation of American States in 2012, less than
twelve months before commencing this case, the Honourable Foreign Minister of Bolivia
announced, and I quote , that “Bolivia requests the Govern ment of the Republic o f Chile to
renegotiate the 1904 Treaty” 17. This, he said, was in order to comply “with the Bolivian right to a
18
sovereign outlet on the Pacific Ocean” . Bolivia could not have been more clear , and it could not
be more clear now , that what it seeks from the Court is an order compelling Chile to agree to
change what was settled in the 1904 Peace Treaty.
19. Further evidence of how Bolivia’s case should be characterized is found in Bolivia’s
2009 Constitution. It purports to declare Bol ivia’s, I quote, “unwaivable and imprescriptible right
16
MB, paras. 10 and 92.
17Statement by H.E. Mr. Choquehuanca, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, at the Fourth Session of the
General Assembly of the Organization of the American States, 5 June 2012, tab 34 of judges’ folder, pp. 17-18.
18
Ibid. - 19 -
19
over the territory giving access to the Pacific Ocean and its maritime space” . It also provided that
by the end of 2013 the Executive Government had to “denounce” or “renegotiate” treaties contrary
20
to the Constitution . Bolivia ’s Congress then passed a law stating that the Constitutional
obligation to denounce such treaties could be fulfilled by the “ challenge of such treaties before
21
international tribunals” . That law was passed in February 2013, and two months later Bolivia
seised the Court, precisely to challenge the settlement reached in the 1904 Peace Treaty . That is
exactly what the parties to the Pact of Bogotá intended to prevent by including Article VI.
V. C ONCLUSION
20. Mr. President, Members of the Court, if pleading an obligation to negotiate is found to be
enough to avoid Article VI of the Pact, then the careful limits established by the Pact for dispute
settlement in Latin America will be destroyed. The Pact establ ished a framework for the peaceful
settlement of disputes, but subject to the important limit that the High Contracting Parties expressly
did not consent to the Court having jurisdiction over any matters already settled by arrangement or
governed by treaties in 1948. The parties to the Pact entrusted the Court with the role of guardian
of this limit, and Chile respectfully requests the Court to protect the Pact from Bolivia ’s attempt to
circumvent that limit. Chile did not, and does not, consent to the Court having jurisdiction in this
case. Chile thus requests the Court to find that Bolivia ’s claim is not within its jurisdiction, and to
do so without entertaining any further pleadings on the merits.
21. I conclude by indicating the scheme of Chile’s presentations to come, which will develop
the points that I have outlined.
(a) Next, Professor Pinto will address the purpose and interpretation of Article VI of the Pact of
Bogotá.
(b) Sir Daniel Bethlehem will then address the 1904 Peace Treaty.
(c) On those foundations, Mr. Wordsworth will apply Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá to Bolivia ’s
claim.
1Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of BolFebruary 2009; POCh, Ann. 62, Vol. 3, p. 926,
Art. 267.
2Ibid., p. 929, Ninth Transitional Provision.
21
Bolivian Law on Normative Application Statement of Rea sons, 6 Feb. 2013; POCh, Ann. 71, Vol. 3,
p. 1003. - 20 -
(d) To conclude Chile ’s first round submissions, Professor Dupuy will confirm that our
jurisdictional objection has a preliminary character and should be u pheld by the Court at this
stage.
22. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention and I invite you to
call upon Professor Pinto.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur l’agent. Je donne la parole à Mme le professeur Pinto.
Mme PINTO :
L’ ARTICLE VI DU PACTE DE BOGOTÁ
I. Introduction
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, j’ai l’honneur de plaider au nom
du Chili sur le sens et le but de l’articleVI du pacte de Bogotá. Après quelques remarques
préliminaires sur la relation entre les articleVI et XXXI du pacte, je vous exposerai mes
arguments en trois parties :
a) tout d’abord, je parlerai de l’importance que revêt l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá pour
l’Amérique ;
b) ensuite, j’évoquerai l’article VI tel qu’il a déjà été interprété par la Cour ; et
c) j’aborderai enfin l’attitude bolivienne vis-à-vis de l’article VI du pacte.
2. Tel qu’il ressort des pièces écrites de cette procédure, l’article XXXI du pacte de Bogotá
est l’unique base de compétence invoquée par la Bolivie dans la présente affaire2. Comme vous
pouvez le voir sur vos écrans, cette disposition donne à la Cour une compétence très étendue
s’agissant des différends portant sur :
«a) l’interprétation d’un traité ;
b) toute question de droit international ;
c) l’existence de tout fait qui, s’il était établi, constituerait la violation d’un
engagement international ;
22Requête de la Bolivie (RB), par.5 ; mémoire de la Bolivie (MB), par. 22 et 23. - 21 -
d) la nature ou l’étendue de la réparation qui découle de la rupture d’un engagement
23
international.»
3. Comme l’a établi votre Cour dans s on jugement sur la compétence et la recevabilité dans
l’affaire relative à des Actions armées frontalières et transfrontalières (Nicaragua c. Honduras) ,
dont un extrait apparaît sur vos écrans:
«[l]’engagement figurant à l’article XXXI vaut ratione materi ae pour les différends
énumérés par ce texte. Il concerne ratione personae les Etats américains parties au
pacte. Il demeure valide ratione temporis tant que cet instrument reste lui- même en
24
vigueur entre ces Etats.»
4. Même s’il est évident que la portée du consentement des parties à soumettre des différends
à la Cour est définie par l’article XXXI, cet article doit être lu en parallèle avec d’autres
dispositions du pacte, l’article VI étant la disposition déterminante pour l’exception préliminaire
chilienne. Cet article prévoit, comme vous pouvez le voir sur vos écrans, que :
«Ces procédures ne pourront non plus s’appliquer ni aux questions déjà réglées
au moyen d’une entente entre les parties, ou d’une décision arbitrale ou d’une décision
d’un tribunal international, ni à celles régi25 par des accords ou traités en vigueur à la
date de la signature du présent pacte.»
5. L’article VI constitue donc une limite à la compétence ratione materiae de la Cour. Les
questions auxquelles s’applique l’arti cle VI sont exclues de la compétence matérielle de la Cour,
compétence que l’article XXXI définit autrement de manière large. Dans l’affaire du Différend
territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), votre Cour a considéré dans l’extrait qui s’affiche
sur vos écrans que :
«si la Cour devait conclure que les questions qui lui ont été soumises par le Nicaragua
au titre de l’article XXXI du pacte de Bogotá ont déjà été réglées par l’une des voies
exposées à l’article VI dudit pacte, elle n’aurait pas la co mpétence requise aux termes
26
du pacte pour statuer sur l’affaire» .
23 Traité américain de règlement pacifique, signé à Bogotá le 30 avril 1948 (entré en vigueur le 6 mai 1949) (le
pacte de Bogotá), onglet n3 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 12, 40 et 41, art. XXXI.
24 Actions armées frontalières et transfrontalières (Nicaragua cHonduras), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1988, p. 84, par. 34.
25 o
Pacte de Bogotá, onglet n 3 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 4, 32 et 33, art. VI.
26 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 853, par. 57. - 22 -
II. L’importance de l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá pour l’Amérique latine
6. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, permettez -moi à présent de
parler de l’importance de l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá pour les Etats américains et notamment
pour l’Amérique latine car le cas que nous traitons aujourd’hui s’y déroule. Les républiques
d’Amérique en général et celles d’Amérique latin e en particulier ont fourni des efforts
considérables et soutenus en vue de promouvoir une approche cohérente aux règlements pacifiques
des différends. Le pacte de Bogotá constitue une étape importante d’un processus qui commence
au cours de la réunion de s nouveaux Etats d’Amérique latine au Congrès de Panama en 1826, à
l’invitation de Simón Bolívar. Dans le pacte de Bogotá, ces Etats ont réaffirmé leur engagement de
longue date pour le règlement pacifique des controverses, en prévoyant un règlement judiciaire
obligatoire par le biais d’un traité ouvert à tous les Etats de la région. Ils ont cependant refusé que
les règlements en particulier les règlements territoriaux soient rouverts à l’initiative d’un seul
Etat. Les républiques d’Amérique latine soit les parties au pacte de Bogotá ont refusé de
mettre en péril la stabilité de leurs frontières, souvent chèrement payée.
27
7. Il est évident que «la juridiction n’existe que dans les termes où elle a été acceptée» .
Dans l’affaire de l’Usine de Chorzów, la Cour permanente a établi que «[c]’est toujours l’existence
d’une volonté des Parties de conférer juridiction à la Cour, qui fait l’objet de l’examen de la
28
question de savoir s’il y a compétence ou non» . Si l’on avait demandé aux Etats d’Amérique, au
moment de la signature du pacte de Bogotá, s’ils avaient la volonté d’utiliser les procédures du
pacte pour permettre la saisine unilatérale de la Cour pour des réclamations relatives à des
questions territoriales déjà réglées par des traités existants, ils auraient répondu par un non
catégorique. Voilà pourquoi la compétence obligatoire de la Cour prévue par le pacte n’aurait pas
été acceptée sans les restrictions imposées par l’article VI.
8. Il est à noter que l’article VI n’avait pas un caractère nouveau. Animés par le souci d’aller
toujours de l’avant, les Etats d’Amérique avaient déjà exclu des arrangements régionaux pour le
règlement des différends les questions déjà réglées. C’est notamment le cas du traité pour le
27Phosphates du Maroc, arrêt, 1938, C.P.J.I. série A/B n 74, p. 23.
28 o o
Usine de Chorzów, compétence, arrêt n 8, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A n 9, p. 32 (le soulignement est de nous). - 23 -
29
règlement pacifique des conflits entre les Etats américains de 1923 . Ce traité est le premier texte
30
mentionné à l’article LVIII du pacte de Bogotá comme étant remplacé par le pacte . Les Etats
d’Amérique latine avaient également exclu les questions réglées du champ d’application des
dispositions relatives à la résolution des conflits contenues dans le traité anti guerre de 1933. Ce
traité prévoyait une procédure de conciliation tout en permettant à chacun des Etats parties
d’émettre une réserve excluant les «[q]uestions ou points résolus par des traités antérieurs» 31. Le
Chili a précisément émis une telle réserve 32. Il apparaît donc clairement, au vu de cette pratique,
que les républiques d’Amérique étaient désireuses d’un accord de portée large en matière de
règlement judiciaire des différends comme substitut à la guerre. Il est tout aussi clair qu’elles
étaient déterminées à exclure de la compétence de tout nouveau mécanisme de règlement des
différends les questions déjà réglées.
9. A la signature du pacte de Bogotá en 1948, la nécessité d’empêcher la réouverture
unilatérale de questions était encore plus pertinente qu’elle ne l’était en 1923 et en 1933, surtout en
ce qui concernait la souveraineté territoriale. Au moment de l’adoption du pacte, de nombreuses
frontières d’Amérique latine venaient tout juste d’être définies. En 1942, six ans à peine avant le
pacte de Bogotá, l’Equateur et le Pérou signaient à Rio de Janeiro leur protocole de paix, d’amitié
33
et de délimitation . Ils y réglaient, avec le Chili et d’autres Etats co mme facilitateurs, ce qu’ils
34
appelaient «le différend frontalier qui les avait longtemps séparés» . C’est ensuite le Pérou qui,
29Cet accord prévoyait l’établissement de commissions d’enquête. L’article I erde ce traité prévoyait cependant
que cette procédure ne serait pas appliquée pour les «questions déjà tranchées par des traités d’une autre espèce»
(«Cuestiones ya resueltas por tratados de otra naturaleza») , traité pour le règlement pacifique des cooflits entre les Etats
américains signé à Santiago (Chili), le 3 mai 1923 (entré en vigueurere 8 octobre 1924), document n 7 de la collection
chilienne de documents facilement accessibles, p.62, 71 et 72, art. I .
30
Le pacte de Bogotá remplaçait (s’agissant des Etats ayant ratifié le pacte)oneuf arrangements régionaux régulant
le règlement pacifique des différends en Amérique latine, pacte de Bogotá, onglet n 3 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 22 et
50-53, art. LVIII.
31
Traité antiguerre (non-agression et conciliation) signé à Rio de Janeiro le 10 octobre 1933 (entré en vigueur le
13 novembre 1935), document n o 13 de la collection chilienne de documents facilement accessibles, p. 123, 133 et 134,
art. V a).
32Ibid., p. 129, 139 et 140.
33
Protocole de paix, d’ami tié et de délimitation entre le Pérou et l’Equateur, signé à Rio de Janeiro le
29 janvier 1942, document n o16 de la collection chilienne de documents facilement accessibles, p. 154-159.
34
Ibid., préambule, p. 154 et 157. - 24 -
en 1948, a proposé l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá lors de la neuvième conférence internationale
35
des Etats américains .
10. Cette proposition du Pérou a été soutenue par le Chili lors de cette conférence 3. Le
pacte maintenait les réalisations du passé, et il les amplifiait. Il prévoyait non seulement une
procédure d’enquête et de conciliation mais il établissait aussi, pour la première fois, un système
contraignant de règlement judiciaire des différends pour l’ensemble de l’Amérique. La proposition
péruvienne concernant l’article VI intervenait donc dans le cadre de l’introduction du système de
règlement judiciaire obligatoire des différends et en tant que limite à celui -ci 37, c’est-à-dire que cet
article constitue une exclusion encore plus large que celles qui l’ont précédées. C’est ainsi donc
que les articles XXXI et VI du pacte lus conjointement permettent aux Etats parties d e saisir la
Cour de controverses liées à des questions qui n’ont pas déjà été réglées par un arrangement ni
régies par un traité en vigueur le 30 avril 1948. Le rôle de la Cour témoigne d’ailleurs de
l’importance que revêt cette délégation de compétence j udiciaire pour la région, ainsi que de ses
limites.
11. Je voudrais insister, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, sur le fait
que 1948 représentait le point de départ d’un nouveau système interaméricain, établi pour la
première fois à travers une organisation régionale en conformité avec l’article 52 de la Charte des
Nations Unies. Ce nouveau système impliquait son propre «système judiciaire» autonome et
j’emploie ici les mots de votre Cour pour le règlement pacifique des différends 38. Il était donc
essentiel pour l’Organisation des Etats américains et pour les instruments qui l’établissaient de
favoriser la coopération entre les Etats sans risquer de mettre en péril la stabilité déjà obtenue.
12. La restriction imposée par l’artic le VI à la compétence de la Cour est importante de
manière générale pour le Chili, mais elle l’est d’autant plus dans le cadre de sa relation avec la
Bolivie. Le Chili n’aurait pas signé ni ratifié le pacte si celui -ci n’avait pas empêché la Bolivie de
saisir la Cour unilatéralement de ses aspirations à un accès souverain à la mer. La préoccupation
35 Travaux préparatoires du pacte de Bogotá, ongletn 2 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 19 et 20.
36 Ibid., p. 37 et 38.
37
Ibid., p. 1-2, 5-8, 15-22 et 25-26.
38 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 852, par. 53. - 25 -
exprimée par le Congrès national du Chili à l’égard de la réserve émise par la Bolivie sur
l’article VI était, comme vous le voyez sur vos écrans, d’éviter que la Bolivie ne puisse saisir la
Cour unilatéralement en vue de «raviver son désir d’un accès à l’océan Pacifique, affaiblissant ainsi
39
l’effet du Traité de 1904» .
III. Le pacte de Bogotá tel qu’interprété par la Cour
13. J’arrive, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, à votre propre interprétation de l’article VI du
pacte, et notamment à votre décision de 2007 relative aux exceptions préliminaires en l’affaire du
Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie. Deux aspects de cette décisio n
sont particulièrement pertinents dans la présente affaire.
14. Tout d’abord, vous avez reconnu dans cette décision que l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá
«visait clairement» à «empêcher que de telles procédures, et en particulier les voies de recours de
40
nature judiciaire, puissent être utilisées afin de rouvrir des questions déjà réglées » . Je voudrais
insister sur la cohérence de cette approche avec les travaux préparatoires du pacte de Bogotá 41, que
je vais aborder d’ici peu, et avec la volonté et la prat ique des Etats d’Amérique latine, que je viens
de décrire.
15. Le second aspect de l’affaire Nicaragua c. Colombie sur lequel je voudrais insister est la
définition par la Cour du moment auquel une question doit avoir été réglée par une entente ou régie
par un traité en vigueur pour être exclue de la compétence ratione materiae de la Cour. En
l’espèce, la position de la Cour était que la question de savoir si le traité de 1928 avait pris fin
en 1969 était, comme vous le voyez à l’écran, «sans pertinence quant à sa compétence, étant donné
que le point déterminant, aux termes de l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá, est celui de savoir si le
42
traité de 1928 était en vigueur à la date de la signature dudit pacte, c’est -à-dire en 1948» . La
39Débat de la Chambre du Congrès national du Chili, contexte du décret no 526 – traité américain de règlement
pacifique (1967), exception préliminaire du Chili (EPCh), vol. 3, p. 738 et 739 (annexe 49).
40 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicarag ua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 858, par. 77 (le soulignement est de nous).
41 o
Travaux préparatoires du Pacte de Bogotá, ongletn 2 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 37 et 38.
42 Différend territorial et maritime ( Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 859, par. 82. - 26 -
Cour évoquait 1948 comme la «date à retenir aux fins de déterminer si les dispositions de
l’article VI de ce pacte … trouvent à s’appliquer» . 43
16. La Cour a clairement indiqué que la question de savoir si une question donnée est
«réglée» par entente ou «régie» par un traité aux fins de l’article VI doit être déterminée par rapport
à la date de 1948. Si c’est le cas, cette question est exclue de la compétence matérielle de la Cour
aux termes du pacte, même si l’entente ou le traité a été modifié après 1948.
17. Dans l’affaire Nicaragua c. Colombie , la Cour a établi que «dans les circonstances
propres à la présente espèce, aucune distinction quant aux effets juridiques n’est à faire, aux fins de
l’application de l’article VI du pacte, entre une question «réglée» et une question «r égie» par le
traité de 1928» 44. La Bolivie considère de la même façon qu’aucune distinction n’est à faire dans
45
la présente affaire entre les deux branches de l’article VI . En réalité, chacune de ces branches
joue ici un rôle différent, et ce, conformémen t à leur signification ordinaire et à leur présence
comme alternatives dans l’article VI. Chacune d’elles est suffisante par elle- même pour exclure la
demande de la Bolivie.
18. Une question est «réglée» par entente si elle est résolue par cette entente. Le traité de
paix de 1904, qui constitue l’aboutissement d’un processus entamé longtemps auparavant, réglaitla
question de savoir si la Bolivie avait ou non droit à un accès souverain à l’océan Pacifique. Cette
question avait donné lieu à un différend entre les deux Etats qu’ils avaient tenté en vain de résoudre
par traité en 1895 et qu’ils avaient finalement réglé par traité en 1904, comme l’expliquera
M. Daniel Bethlehem.
19. Une question est «régie» par un traité si le traité en question réglemente la relation
existant entre les parties concernant cette question. Le traité de paix de 1904 régit également la
question de savoir si la Bolivie a ou non droit à un accès souverain à l’océan Pacifique, et établit
qu’elle n’y a pas droit. Il détermine au lieu de cela un droit perpétuel d’accès non souverain, lequel
a été réalisé au moyen de nombreux instruments ultérieurs.
43
Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 859, par. 81.
44 Différend territo rial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 848, par. 39.
45
Exposé écrit de la Bolivie (EEB) sur l’exception préliminaire du Chili, par. 48 et 49. - 27 -
20. Qu’une question soit réglée par une entente ou régie par un traité en vigueur en 1948, la
conséquence juridictionnelle l’«effet juridique» 46 pour employer les mots de votre Cour dans
l’affaire Nicaragua c. Colombie en sera identique. Cette question est exclue de la compétence
ratione materiae de la Cour.
21. Au cours de l’examen de l’article VI lors du troisième comité de la conf érence qui a
conclu le pacte de Bogotá, le représentant cubain s’interrogea sur l’opportunité d’exclure des
questions si celles-ci avaient déjà été réglées 47. Le représentant du Pérou répondit dans ces termes :
48
«le risque est que la question pourrait être réouverte, ou que l’on pourrait tenter de réouvrir» . Au
cours de cette discussion, les Parties ont reconnu que les Etats continueraient à vouloir traiter des
questions réglées ou faisant l’objet de traités en vigueur en 1948. Ils ont explicitement envisagé le
risque que certains Etats pourraient tenter de rouvrir des questions qui, en 1948, avaient été réglées
par entente ou étaient déjà régies par un traité. Ces tentatives ne manqueraient pas de donner lieu à
des échanges divers entre les Etats concern és et à d’éventuels désaccords quant à leur signification
légale. Or, il convenait d’éviter de telles situations. En conséquence, si ces événements
subséquents concernaient une question réglée par entente ou régie par un traité en vigueur en 1948,
ils constitueraient précisément ce que l’article VI visait à exclure de la compétence de la Cour.
22. Le pacte a été conclu pour le futur, pour la période consécutive à 1948. C’est pour cette
raison que les parties ne cherchaient pas à entraver les efforts dip lomatiques futurs en faveur de la
paix et de l’harmonie de la région quant aux questions déjà réglées ou autrement régies par des
traités en vigueur en 1948. Ce qu’elles ont exclu, c’est la possibilité de demander de manière
unilatérale la résolution par un tiers de ces questions.
23. Soyons clairs, l’article VI concerne la compétence et non les sources de droit applicables
à un différend. L’intention des parties au pacte était de créer, par le biais de l’article VI,
l’exclusion juridictionnelle en 1948. Les sources de droit pertinentes pour une question, et donc
applicables au bien-fondé d’un différend résultant de cette question, peuvent très bien avoir changé
depuis 1948. L’existence de nouveaux instruments relatifs à cette même question ne peut
46 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c . Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 848, par. 39.
47Travaux préparatoires du pacte de Bogotá, ongletn 2 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 37 et 38.
48
Ibid. - 28 -
cependant remettre en cause l’exclusion de cette question de la compétence ratione materiae de la
Cour, telle qu’elle a été définie en 1948 par l’article VI du pacte.
24. La Cour a déjà adopté, à juste raison, cette interprétation de l’article VI dans l’affai re
Nicaragua c. Colombie . L’agent a parlé du rôle de la Cour comme gardienne des limites du
consentement qui lui a été conféré par les parties au pacte et, dans la présente affaire, la Cour a
devant elle une décision historique à faire relativement à ces limites. Pour ce faire et pour
maintenir la viabilité du pacte comme source continue de consentement à l’égard de la compétence
de la Cour pour les Etats d’Amérique, votre Cour n’a qu’à prendre une décision conforme aux
paragraphes 81 et 82 de sa décision relative à l’affaire Nicaragua c. Colombie.
IV. La Bolivie et le Pacte de Bogotá
25. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je voudrais maintenant parler
de l’attitude de la Bolivie à l’égard du pacte de Bogotá. Comme l’a expliqué l’agent, cette affaire a
été introduite par la Bolivie pour tenter de concrétiser ses aspirations de longue date à changer le
résultat du traité de paix de 1904. Si les aspirations de la Bolivie datent de plus d’un siècle, ce
n’est qu’en 2013 qu’elle a saisi la Cour. Et si la Bolivie a attendu si longtemps, c’est parce que,
jusqu’en avril 2013, elle reconnaissait que le résultat qu’elle espère obtenir aujourd’hui devant la
Cour ne relevait pas de la compétence de la Cour.
26. En effet, jusqu’en avril 2013, l’interprétation bolivienne de l’article VI du pacte était la
même que celle du Chili. Ceci apparaît clairement à l’examen de la réserve de la Bolivie à l’égard
du pacte, émise au moment de la signature en 1948, confirmée à sa ratification en 2011 49et retirée
50
en avril 2013 , juste avant l’introduction de sa requête auprès de la Cour.
27. La réserve bolivienne apparaît maintenant sur vos écrans. La traduction française, pour
rester fidèle au texte original en espagnol, s’énonce comme suit :
«La délégatio n de la Bolivie formule une réserve en ce qui concerne
l’article VI, car elle estime que les procédures pacifiques peuvent également
49 Voir l’Organisation des Etat américains, signataires et rati fications, A-42 : traité américain de règlement
pacifique, EPCh, vol. 3, p. 1101 (annexe 77) ; et la lettre de Luis Toro Utillano, juriste principal du département de droit
international de l’Organisation des Etats américains, aux Etats signataires du trai té américain de règlement pacifique,
OEA/2.2/36/11, 9 juin 2011, comprenant l’instrument de ratification bolivien, EPCh, vol. 3, p. 934 et 935 (annexe 63).
50
Instrument bolivien de retrait de la réserve au pacte de Bogotá, 10 avril 2013, MB, vol. III, part ie IV
(annexe 115). - 29 -
s’appliquer aux différends issus de questions résolues par arrangement entre les 51
parties, lorsque pareil arrangement touche aux intérêts vitaux d’un Etat.» Je me
réfère aux «controversias emergentes de asuntos resueltos por arreglo de las Partes ,
cuando dicho arreglo afecta intereses vitales de un Estado».
La Bolivie savait donc que le traité de paix de 1904 réglait la question de savoir si elle avait droit à
un accès souverain à l’océan Pacifique une question qu’elle considère comme affectant ses
«intérêts vitaux» et elle savait que cette question était exclue de la compétence de la Cour en
vertu de l’article VI du pacte. C’est pourquoi elle a émis cette réserve et tenté ainsi de faire entrer
cette question dans la compétence de la Cour.
28. Le Chili a toujours eu pleinement conscience de la réserve bo livienne. Dans ses
observations sur l’exception préliminaire du Chili, la Bolivie a cité, sans toutefois le fournir à la
52
Cour, le rapport d’une session du Congrès chilien daté du 12 mai 1965 . Ce rapport contenait un
message du président du Chili adressé au Congrès de son pays concernant l’éventuelle ratification
du pacte de Bogotá. Selon ce rapport, les débats sur cette question avaient, en 1954, été
«suspendus du fait que le Gouvernement souhait ait analyser plus attentivement la portée de la
53
réserve émise par la Bolivie à sa signature dudit pacte» . Une fois cette analyse effectuée, le
président a expliqué au Congrès, en 1965, que la réserve de la Bolivie ne constituait pas un danger
pour le Chili car, si la Bolivie maintenait cette réserve au moment d e sa ratification, le Chili
54
pourrait la rejeter à ce moment -là . Comme l’a expliqué l’agent, c’est précisément ce qui s’est
passé en 2011.
29. Une fois convaincu qu’il ne serait pas affecté par la réserve bolivienne, le Chili a voulu
renforcer le pacte en le ratifiant. Le président du Chili a donc demandé au Congrès d’approuver la
ratification du pacte, parce que le Chili s’inquiétait d’autres propositions qui visaient à le remplacer
et qui ne contenaient pas de restrictions équivalentes à celles de l’article VI du pacte 55. C’est dire à
51Pacte de Bogotá, onglet n 3 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 24, 54 et 55. La traduction française publiée dans le
Recueil des traités des Nations Unies, dont une retranscription exacte figure dans la diapositive°12, est incorrecte. E lle
traduit «controversias emergentes de asuntos resueltos» par «différends relatifs à des questions résolues»au lieu de
«différends issus de questions résolues».
52EEB sur l’exception préliminaire du Chili, note de bas de page n 41.
53 e o
Chambre des députés du Chili, 42 session, 12 mai 1965, onglet n 31 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 11 et 12.
54
Ibid., p. 13 et 14.
55Chambre des députés du Chili, 42 session, 12 mai 1965, onglet n 31 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 11-14. - 30 -
quel point était fondamentale la restriction de compétence énoncée dans l’article VI dans la
décision du Chili de ratifier le pacte.
30. Lorsque le Chili a finalement ratifié le pacte en 1974, il a émis une réserve en réponse à
56
celle de la Bolivie . Les archives parlementaires du Chili de 196 5 montrent que la réserve du
Chili était considérée comme souhaitable parce que, comme vous pouvez le voir sur vos écrans, la
Bolivie espérait, en formulant sa réserve sur l’article VI, et je me réfère à ce passage pour la
deuxième fois aujourd’hui, «raviver son désir d’un accès à l’océan Pacifique, affaiblissant ainsi
57
l’effet du traité de 1904» . L’article VI a toujours été d’une importance fondamentale pour le
Chili, précisément eu égard aux aspirations de la Bolivie à un accès souverain à l’océan Pacifique.
Monsieur le président, il est important de réaliser que le Chili n’a ratifié le pacte que parce qu’il
était convaincu que les réclamations de la Bolivie quant à son droit à un accès souverain à l’océan
Pacifique étaient et seraient toujours exclues par l’article VI.
31. La réserve de la Bolivie démontre non seulement que, jusqu’en 2013, la Bolivie
reconnaissait que ses aspirations au territoire chilien étaient exclues de la compétence de la Cour,
mais elle renforce également l’interprétation correcte, et partagée jusque très récemment, de
l’ampleur du mot «question» dans l’article VI du pacte. Et l’ampleur de ce terme est significative
pour la bonne application de l’article VI dans cette affaire. Dans son exposé , la Bolivie soutient
que le mot «question» dans l’article VI signifie «un différend sur un problème donné» 58. Ce n’est
toutefois pas ce que pensait la Bolivie entre 1948 et 2013 ! Dans sa réserve, restée en place tout ce
temps, la Bolivie cherchait à exclure du champ d’application de l’article VI et donc à inclure dans
la compétence de la Cour les «controverses issues de questions réglées» par un arrangement qui
affecte ses intérêts vitaux 59. La position d e la Bolivie n’était pas que l’article VI excluait les
différends déjà réglés, mais bien qu’il excluait toute controverse ou différend issu d’une question
réglée («las controversias emergentes de asuntos resueltos»).
56Acte de dépôt de l’instrument contenant la ratification par le Gouvernement chilien du traité américain de
règlement pacifique, 15 avril 1974, EPCh, vol. 3, p. 748-749 (annexe 51) ; et chambre des députés du Chili, 42ession,
12 mai 1965, onglet n 31 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 13 et 14.
57 o
Débat de la chambre du Congrès national du Chili, contexte du décret n 526 : traité américain de règlement
pacifique (1967), EPCh, vol. 3, p. 738 et 739 (annexe49).
58
EEB sur l’exception préliminaire du Chili, par. 47.
59Pacte de Bogotá, onglet n 3 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 24, 54 et 55 (les italiques sont de nous). - 31 -
32. Cette interprétation plus large du mot «question» est indubitablement correcte. Dans ses
observations, la Bolivie fait référence non seulement au mot anglais « matters» mais aussi aux
versions espagnole, française et portugaise du pacte , chacune faisant également foi . Il s’agit du61
mot « asuntos» en espagnol, « questions» en français, « matters» en anglais, et « assuntos» en
portugais. Tous ces termes ont une portée large et signifient «sujet» ou «question». Ils n’ont pas le
sens étroit que la Bolivie tente aujourd’hui de leur attribuer. Si les parties contractantes avaient
voulu limiter les exclusions de l’article VI aux différends, elles auraient utilisé ce terme en français,
«controversias» en espagnol, «disputes» en anglais et «controvérsias» en portugais. C’est du reste
ce qu’elles ont fait ailleurs dans le pacte lorsqu’elles entendaient évoquer les différends, notamment
62
dans l’article XXXI .
33. Les travaux préparatoires du pacte confirment également que l’intention des parties était
d’exclure des sujets, et pas uniquement des diffé rends donnés, des procédures du pacte. A la
conférence au cours de laquelle le pacte de Bogotá a été négocié, le représentant de l’Equateur
demanda au représentant péruvien s’il serait possible de tempérer la formulation catégorique de
l’article VI. La p réoccupation du délégué équatorien était que «de nouveaux différends pouvaient
63
surgir de questions déjà réglées » . L’Equateur souhaitait que la compétence s’étende à de tels
différends. Ceci provoqua aussitôt la réaction critique du représentant du Pérou ; il répondit que, si
la formulation de l’article VI était modifiée de façon à ce que de nouveaux différends issus de
questions réglées puissent être unilatéralement adressés selon les procédures obligatoires du p acte,
les Etats ne «poursuivraient [plus] un but de paix» mais inviteraient les litiges ; et ainsi,
64
ébranleraient les fondements de la paix . Le caractère absolu de l’exclusion fut discuté et
maintenu dans la version finale.
34. Permettre à de nouveaux différends, issus de questions déjà réglées , d’être
unilatéralement adressés à la Cour aurait été en contradiction avec l’objectif même de l’article VI.
60
EEB sur l’exception préliminaire du Chili, par. 47.
61 Pacte de Bogotá, onglet n 3 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 24, 52 et 53.
62 Ibid., p. 12, 13, 40 et 41, art.XXXI.
63 o
Travaux préparatoires du pacte de Bogotá, onglet n 2 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 34 et 36 (les italiques sont de
nous).
64 Travaux préparatoires du pacte de Bogotá, onglet n 2 du dossier de plaidoiries, p. 35 et 38. - 32 -
Un Etat aurait alors pu échapper à la restriction juridictionnelle de l’article VI en présentant
simplement une réclamation comme un différend nouveau, alors qu’il concernait une question déjà
réglée. Ainsi donc, la question devant être posée relativement à l’article VI n’est pas de savoir si
un différend donné adressé à la Cour a déjà été réglé par entente ou régi par un traité en vigueur en
1948, mais bien si la réclamation adressée à la Cour concerne une question précédemment réglée
par entente ou régie par un traité en vigueur en 1948. Et, comme le développera M. Wordsworth, il
appartient bien évidemment à la Cour, et non à l’Etat demandeur, d e définir la question qui lui est
adressée.
35. Si la question a été «réglée» par entente ou «régie» par un traité en vigueur en 1948, cette
question n’entre pas dans la compétence ratione materiae conférée à la Cour aux termes du pacte.
Permettez-moi d’insister sur le fait que l’article VI est une disposition qui se réfère à la compétence
ratione materiae de la Cour et non aux sources de droit applicables au bien- fondé du différend. Si
une question est réglée ou régie par un traité en 1948, la Cour n’a pas, aux termes du pacte, la
compétence ratione materiae pour connaître de telle question ; et ceci comp rend les différends
issus, après 1948, de questions réglées avant 1948 ou régie s par un traité en vigueur en 1948. Les
parties contractantes ne se voient pas interdire de saisir unilatéralement la Cour pour un certain
type de différends, mais plutôt de saisir unilatéralement la Cour de certaines questions qui seraient
susceptibles de donner lieu à de nouveaux différends.
36. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les j uges, le fait que la Bolivie n’a pas
droit à un accès souverain à l’océan Pacifiqu e est l’une des nombreuses questions réglées en
Amérique latine qu’un Etat mécontent de ce règlement souhaiterait maintenant pouvoir rouvrir de
façon unilatérale. Cette réalité politique vous est familière et l’est à plus forte raison aux
gouvernements démocratiques et aux citoyens d’Amérique latine. La volonté des r épubliques
d’Amérique, et surtout d’Amérique latine, lorsqu’elles ont convenu de l’article VI en 1948, était
précisément de prévenir ce type de problème.
37. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les j uges, je vous remercie de votre
bienveillante attention et je vous invite à appeler à la barre M. Daniel Bethlehem. Merci.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne la parole à M. Daniel Bethlehem. - 33 -
Sir Daniel BETHLEHEM:
T HE 1904 T REATY OF P EACE AND A MITY
I. Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour for me to address you on behalf of
Chile in these proceedings. Mr. President, with your permission, I will be on my feet for about
40 minutes.
The focus of my submission will be the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Amity between Bolivia
and Chile, a treaty that was in force on the date of the conclusion of the Bogotá Pact and remains in
force today. It is a treaty that settled the disputes and claims over sovereignty betweenthe Parties
and delimited the boundary between them. It also laid down a r égime of co-operation between the
two sides, including as regards Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean. By Article 6 of the 1904
Treaty, Bolivia was afforded “in perpetuity the fu llest and most unrestricted right of commercial
transit” through Chilean territory and its Pacific ports5. This access to the ocean, in accordance
with Article 6 of the 1904 Treaty, has been facilitated through a number of other treaties and
arrangements, as well as in Chilean law and practice66.
2. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will return to the detail of the 1904 Treaty in just a
momentand invite you to look at the text in tab 1 of your judges’ folders. Before I do so, however,
let me step back briefly to place my submissions in the wider context of Chile’s case.
3. Chile’s objection to jurisdiction in this case , as you have just heard, rests on Article 6 of
the Pact of Bogotá. This excludes from the jurisdiction of the Court matters already settled by
arrangement between the P arties or governed by treaties in force on the date of t he conclusion of
the Pact on 30 April 1948.
4. The question in these proceedings this week the only question is whether Bolivia’s
access to the Pacific Ocean is a matter that was, on 30 April 1948, governed by a treaty in force
65Treaty of Peace and Amity between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Santiago on 20 October 1904 (the 1904 Peace
Treaty), tab 1 of judges’ folder, pp. 5, 12 and 19, Article VI.
66
This element is addressed in paragraph 3.33 of the Preliminary Objection of Chile (POCh). - 34 -
between Chile and Bolivia or settled by arrangement between them. If it was, you are bound to
find for Chile in these proceedings.
5. The 1904 Treaty of Peace and Amity has been the foundation of Bolivia’s access to the
Pacific Ocean for the past 111 years. It remains the cornerstone of this access today. The character
of Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean was, on 30 April 1948, without any shadow of a doubt and
beyond any credible contention, settled and governed by the 1904 Treaty.
6. Mr. Wordsworth, whose submissions will follow mine, will develop this point and will
draw the threads of Chile’s arguments together. My submissions are on the 1904 Treaty; its terms
and its scope.
7. In its response to Chile’s Preliminary Objection, Bolivia states that neither in its
Application nor in its Memorial “is there any trace of a dispute concerning the revision or
nullification of the 1904 Treaty” 67. Bolivia, indeed, failed to address, or even to refer to, other than
in passing, the 1904 Treaty in its Application and Memorial. That silence, however, is a device ; it
is a device to sidestep the Treaty; an attempt to wish the Treaty away. The plain reality is that
what Bolivia seeks from the Court is fundamentally at odds with the 1904 Treaty.
8. Let me turn to the detail of the 1904 Treaty.
II. A definitive peace agreement
9. The 1904 Treaty was “a definitive treaty of peace” between Bolivia and Chile following
the War of the Pacific o f 1879 to 1884. The phrase “a definitive treaty of peace” comes from the
opening language of the Truce Pact between Bolivia and Chile of 1884 that brought the Pacific
War to an end 68. Twenty years later, the 1904 Treaty, referencing the Truce Pact and ter minating
it, re-established relations of peace and friendship between Bolivia and Chile.
10. The 1904 Treaty was a treaty of peace and of amity. It did more than simply declare the
re-establishment of peace and friendship. It established what was intend ed by the p arties to be
enduring arrangements for their future peaceful relations. It settled the territorial limits of the two
States vis-à-vis each other by delimiting the boundary. It acted to strengthen the political and
67Written Statement of Bolivia (WSB) on POCh, para.24.
68Truce Pact between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Valparaíso on Apr. 1884 (the 1884 Truce Pact ), POCh,
Ann. 2, Vol. 1, pp. 78 and 79, Preamble. - 35 -
commercial relations between the two States through a number of concrete initiatives. It
recognized in favour of Bolivia, in perpetuity, the fullest and most unrestricted right of commercial
transit through Chilean territory and ports. It accorded Bolivia the right to establish cust oms
agencies in designated Chilean po rts and established a customs régime between the two States. It
provided for a mechanism for settling disputes concerning the interpretation or execution of the
Treaty.
11. The 1904 Treaty was 20 years in the making. It closed a chapter of enmity in
Bolivia-Chile relations and looked to the future. It was a compact between two States, it was
a treaty of exchanges, that not only re -established peace between them but addressed key elements
of their sovereign relationship going forward.
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the 1904 Treaty was not unusual, either in form or
in substance. The nineteenth century saw a number of wars across the South American continent,
over disputed boundaries. The Pacific War of 1879 to 1884 with Chile was not the only war in
which Bolivia was engaged. Bolivia had disputed boundaries with all of its neighbours. Quite
apart from its boundary disputes with Chile, Bolivia’s boundary disputes with Argentina, with
Brazil, with Paraguay, with Peru, were collectively the subject of at least 12 separate treaties 69.
13. Theses treaties were amongst many others across the continent. They are instruments of
their time, but they have an enduring importance. As you have just heard from Professor Pinto,
maintaining the integrity and stability of these treaties was a dr iving imperative behind Article 6 of
the Bogotá Pact. Sovereignty and boundaries and territorial arrangements governed by pre -1948
69As regards Bolivia/Argentina , see the Boundaries Treaty between Argentina and Bolivia, signed at Buenos
Aires on 10 May 1889, RADCh, doc. 3, pp.24-29; the Final Treaty on Boundaries between Argentina and Bolivia, signed
at La Paz on 9 July 1925; RADCh, doc. 9, pp.86-89; and the Supplementary Protocol to the Argentine -Bolivian
Boundaries Treaty of 9 July 1925, signed at Buenos Aires on 10 Feb1941, RADCh, doc. 15, pp. 150-152. As regards
Bolivia/Brazil, see the Treaty of Friendship, Boundaries, Navigation, Commerce, and Extraditibetween Brazil and
Bolivia, signed at La Paz de Ayacucho on 27 Mar. 1867, RADCh, doc. 2, pp. 8-22; the Boundaries Treaty between
Brazil and Bolivia, signed at Petrópolis on 17 Nov. 1903, RADCh, doc. 5, pp. 40-50; and the Treaty on Boundaries and
Railway Communications between Brazil and Bolivia, signed at Rio de Janeiro on 25 Dec. 1928, RADCh, doc. 11,
pp. 104-111. As regards Bolivia/Paraguay , see the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries between Bolivia and
Paraguay, signed at Buenos Aires on 21 July 1938, RADCh, doc. 14, pp. 142-148. As regards Bolivia/Peru , see the
Preliminary Treaty of Peace and Amity between Peru and Bolivia, signed at Puno on 7 June 1842, RADCh, doc. 1,
pp. 2-5; the Treaty on Demarcation of Frontiers between Peru and Bolivia , signed at La Paz on 23 Sep. 1902, RADCh,
doc. 4, pp. 32-37; the Treaty on Rectification of Borders between Peru and Bolivia, signed at La Paz oSep. 1909,
RADCh, doc. 6, pp. 52-55; the Protocol for the Demarcation of the Border between Peru and Bol ivia, signed at La Paz
on 2 June 1925, RADCh, doc. 8, pp. 80-84; and the Ratifying Protocol for the Demarcation of the Second Section of the
Bolivian-Peruvian Border, signed at La Paz on 15 Jan.1932, RADCh, doc. 12, pp. 114-117. - 36 -
treaties or settled by pre-1948 arrangements were not to become the subject of a unilateral attempt
to unpick the continent’s history through litigation before the Court.
III. The 1904 Treaty
14. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me take you to the detail of the 1904 Treaty and
may I invite you to turn to tab 1 in your judges’ folder. The Spanish text of the Treaty is at pag e 1
of tab 1, with an English translation following at page 8 and a French translation at page 15. The
1904 Treaty is a treaty of 12 articles 7. Article 1 is brief, stating simply that the relations of peace
and friendship between Bolivia and Chile are re- established. This is not just a chapeau for what
follows, however, but language that connotes the “definitive treaty of peace” that the parties had in
contemplation at the time of the 1884 Truce Pact 71.
15. There follow ten substantive articles that addr ess two distinct issues. The fi rst issue,
addressed in Article 2, which, as you will see, covers almost three pages of dense text, is a
comprehensive territorial settlement between the two States. I will return to the details of this
settlement shortly. In essence, however, Article 2 both affirmed Chilean sovereignty, absolutely
and in perpetuity, over coastal territory that had been Bolivian before the 1879 Pacific War and
delimited the boundary between Chile and Bolivia. Under this settlement, Bolivia did not have
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The 1904 Treaty was and remains dispositive about the
sovereign, territorial settlement between the parties. There was no ambiguity. There was no space
for doubt. Nothing was left unresolved.
16. The second issue, addressed in Articles 3 through to 11, is a settlement of amity, of
forward-looking arrangements and commitments , having as their object the strengthening of
political and commercial relations between the two States and affording to Bolivia certain
extensive rights and benefits. I will take you through these arrangements and commitments in just
a moment. Amongst these, however, is Article 6 by which Chile recogniz ed in favour of Bolivia
“in perpetuity the fullest and most unrestricted righ t of commercial transit through its territory and
its Pacific ports” 72.
70
1904 Peace Treaty, tab 1 of judges’ folder.
711884 Truce Pact, POCh, Vol. 1, Ann. 2, pp.78 and 79, Preamble.
72
1904 Peace Treaty, tab 1 of judges’ folder, pp. 5, 12 and 19, Art. VI. - 37 -
17. Mr. President, Members of the Court, t wo considerations of importance flow from
Article 6 of the 1904 Treaty. The first consideration is that the 1904 Treaty provided to Bolivia a
treaty-based right, in perpetuity, of access to the Pacific Ocean through Chilean territory and ports.
The second consideration is that this treaty -based right of access affirms what follows from
Article 2 of the 1904 Treaty, namely, that the Treatydid not leave unresolved any Bolivian claim to
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The 1904 Treaty, both in the detail of its territorial
settlement and in the terms of its treaty -based right of access to the Pacific Ocean, defi nitively
settled the issue of Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean.
18. Following these substantive provisions , Article 12 of the 1904 Treaty established a
73
mechanism for settling disputes. As amended by a 1907 Protocol , Article 12 provides that all
questions which may arise with reference to the interpretation or execution of the Treaty shall be
submitted to arbitration before the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
19. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I skipped over the detail of the forward- looking
arrangements and commitments in Articles 3 to 11 of the Treaty. I would like, if I may, to take you
to these briefly by reference to the Treaty I don’t propose to spend a great deal of time but just
invite you to turn the pages with me.
20. Article 3 provides that, with the object of strengthening the political and commercial
relations between Chile and Bolivia, the P arties agree to unite the Chilean port of Arica with the
plateau of La Paz by a railroad to be constructed at Chile’s expense, with ownership of the Bolivian
section of the railroad to be transferred to Bolivia 15 years after completion of its construction. It
also provides that Chile would guarantee bonds issued by Bolivia to finance the building of other
railroads.
21. Article 4 requires Chile to pay to Bolivia the sum of £300,000, a sum that, in today’s
money, would be very considerably greater.
22. Article 5 addresses the cancellation of various sums of money and credits owed by
Bolivia.
7Protocol that designates an Arbitrator between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Santiago on 16 April 19 07, Ann. 32
to POCh, Vol. 2, pp. 542 and 543. - 38 -
23. We then have Article 6 , to which I have refe rred already, in which Chile recogni zes in
favour of Bolivia in perpetuity the fullest and most unrestricted right of commercial transit through
its territory and its Pacific ports.
24. By Article 7, Bolivia is granted the right to establish customs agenc ies in designated
Chilean ports and provides that goods in transit shall go directly from the pier to the railroad station
for transportation to the Bolivian customs houses in closed and sealed wagons.
25. Article 8 provides for most-favoured-nation status in respect of commercial interchange
between the Parties.
26. Finally, Articles 9, 10 and 11 address customs formalities in respect of certain goods and
products and in respect of the ports of Arica and Antofagasta.
27. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the 1904 Treaty was a compact in two parts. In its
first part, it settled comprehensively the territorial sovereignty of the P arties vis-à-vis one another
and delimited the boundary between them. In its second part, it established treaty -based
arrangements and commitments governing core aspects of the P arties’ relations going forward.
Amongst these arrangements and commitments was the unrestricted, in perpetuity, treaty- based
right of access by Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean through sovereign Chilean territory and ports.
28. All of this is evident on the face of the Treaty. It does not require fancy interpretative
footwork. It is plain for all to see. The Treaty was dispositive of the nature of Bolivia’s right of
access to the Pacific O cean. The Treaty was in force and governing of these issues on
30 April 1948.
Le PRESIDENT : Monsieur Bethlehem, le moment est sans doute approprié pour faire une
petite pause dans votre présentation de manière à permettre à la Cour de se retirer pour un e durée
de 15 minutes, puis nous reprendrons l’audience et je vous donnerai la parole pour la suite et la fin
de votre plaidoirie. L’audience est suspendue.
L’audience est suspendue de 16 h 25 à 16 h 45.
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. Monsieur Bethlehem, vous pouvez poursuivre.
Nous vous écoutons. - 39 -
Sir Daniel BETHLEHEM: Merci.
IV. Sovereignty and delimitation
29. Mr. President, Members of the Court, just before the Court rose for the short break, I had
sketched out the broad scheme of the 1904 Treaty. Let me return to the detail of the territorial
settlement in the 1904 Treaty in a little bit more detail.
30. Article 2 of the 1904 Treaty, which embodies the comprehensive territorial settlement
between Chile and Bolivia, has five components. First, it addresses Chilean sovereignty over what
had, until the Pacific War of 1879, been the Bolivian Littoral Department. Second, it delimited the
boundary between Chile and Bolivia from south to north in the area of the Chilean provinces of
Antofagasta and Tarapacá. Third, it agreed and delimited the frontier line between Chile and
Bolivia in the area of Tacna and Arica. Fourth, it provided for the demarcation of the enti re
boundary. Fifth, it recognized the legally -acquired private rights of nation als and foreigners in the
territories that remain under the sovereignty of either country.
31. For present purposes, the issues of demarcation and the recognition of private rights are
not material. The first three components are material, however, and are illustrated by the slide now
74
up on the screen . This slide shows the comprehensive nature of the territorial settlement between
Chile and Bolivia pursuant to Article 2 of the 1904 Treaty. In particular, it shows the territories
that had, until the Pac ific War, been the Bolivian Littoral Department; territories addressed in
Article 2 of the Truce Pact of 1884. By Article 2 of the 1904 Treaty , it was provided that these
75
territories are “recognized as belonging absolutely and in perpetuity to Chile” . And you see this
language from Article 2 of the 1904 Treaty up on the screen.
32. The slide also shows the boundary between Chile and Bolivia in the area of the Chilean
provinces of Antofagasta and Tarapacá, as well as the agreed frontier line between Chi le and
Bolivia in the area of Tacna and Arica; in other words, the entirety of the boundary between Chile
and Bolivia.
33. Let me take you through each of these elements in a little more detail.
7Tab 15 of judges’ folder.
71904 Peace Treaty, tab 1 of judges’ folder, pp.1, 8 and 15. - 40 -
34. Chilean sovereignty over what had been the Bolivian Littoral Department prior to the
Pacific War of 1879 is addressed in the openin g paragraph of Article2 of the Treaty. Once again,
76
you see this language on the second slide up on the screen . It highlights again the opening
language of Article 2 of the 1904 Treaty, which provides that “the territories occupied by Chile by
virtue of article 2 of the Truce Pact of April 4, 1884, are recognized as belonging absolutely and in
perpetuity to Chile” 77.
35. The delimitation of the boundary between Chile and Boliv ia in the area of the Chilean
provinces of Antofagasta and Tarapacá is addressed in the next part of Article 2 which, in 12 dense
paragraphs, delimits the boundary by reference to 77 geographic locations. The detail of the
delimitation is not material for present purposes. The boundary so delimited is shown on the slide
on the screen 78.
36. The next part of Article 2 reflects the agreement of the parties on the delimitation of the
frontier line between Chile and Bolivia in the area of Tacna and Arica by r eference to
20 geographic locations. This is addressed in four detailed paragraphs. These paragraphs are
introduced by a distinct chapeau, now shown on the slide on the screen 79. The chapeau reads as
follows: “To the North of this last point [ in other w ords, point 77] Bolivia and Chile agree to
80
establish between them the following frontier line .” The frontier line so delimited ran from the
northern point of the boundary in the area of Chile’s Tarapacá Province to the north- eastern corner
of the province of Tacna.
37. Mr. President, Members of the Court, putting the various parts of Article 2 together, it is
self-evident that the 1904 Treaty affected a comprehensive territorial settlement between Chile and
Bolivia that left Bolivia with no right to any territory on the coastal side of the agreed boundary.
38. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Bolivia says v irtually nothing about the
1904 Treaty in its Application and Memorial. In so far as it does say anything, it advances the
submission that “[t]he 1904 Treaty addressed the cession of Bolivia’s Department of Littoral but
76Tab 16 of judges’ folder.
77
1904 Peace Treaty, tab 1 of judges’ folder, pp.1, 8 and 15, Art. II.
78Tab 17 of judges’ folder.
79Tab 18 of judges’ folder.
80
1904 Peace Treaty, Tab 1 of judges’ folder, pp.3, 10 and 17, Art. II. - 41 -
81
not Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea on occupied coastal territories further to the north” .
This reference to “occupied coastal territories further to the north” is a reference to the territories of
Tacna and Arica, territories that, by the Treaty of Peace of Ancón of 1883 between Chile and Peru,
were in the possession of Chile and subject to Chilean jurisdiction pending a subsequent plebiscite
of the population on the issue of sovereignty 82. Sovereignty over Tacna and Arica was ultimately
settled by the Treaty of Lima between Chile and Peru of 1929, in which it was agreed that Peru
would be sovereign over Tacna and Chile sovereign over Arica 83.
39. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Bolivia’s claim that the 1904 Treaty did not
exclude the possibility of Bolivian sovereign access to the sea through Tacna and Arica has no
foundation whatever. The terms of the 1904 Treaty leave no room for doubt that, as regards Chile
and Bolivia, the issue of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean had been comprehensively settled.
Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean was addressed in the negotiations leading up to the
1904 Treaty. While it was evident that the status of Tacna and Arica was unresolved as between
Chile and Peru , the 1904 Treaty reflected an agreement between Chile and Bolivia that Bolivia
would have no rights in whatever part of Tacna and Arica might come under definitive Chilean
sovereignty by subsequent agreement with Peru. It is simply not credible for Bolivia now to claim
that, in the 1904 Treaty, the parties somehow left open scope f or a residual Bolivian claim against
Chile of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Any such claim runs counter to the plain language
and scheme of the 1904 Treaty.
40. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the relevant consideration for present purposes is
that, by the 1904 Treaty, Bolivia and Chile settled that Bolivia had no sovereign rights over any
territory on the coastal side of the entirety of th e boundary delimited by Article 2 of the
1904 Treaty and thus no right opposable to Chile in any territory in Tacna or Arica nor anywhere
further south.
81
MB, para. 93, emphasis added; and see, for example, WSB, para. 74.
82Treaty of Peace of Ancón between Chile and Peru, signed at Lima on 20 Oct. 1883 (the T reaty of Ancón),
POCh, Vol.1, Ann. 1, pp. 72 and 73, Art. 3.
83
Treaty between Chile and Peru for the Settlement of the Dispute Regarding Tacna and Arica, signed at Lima on
3 June 1929 (entry into force 28 July1929) (the Treaty of Lima), POCh, Vol. 1, Ann. 11, pp. 173 and 178, Art. 2. - 42 -
41. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is also clear that, at the point at which the
1904 Treaty was concluded, Bolivia was itself of the view that all of its issues had been fully
addressed and resolved by the Treaty, including the issue of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
This appreciation of the scope of the 1904 Treaty is illustrated by the statement of the Chairman of
the Bolivian National Congress in 1905 on presenting the 1904 Peace Treat y to the Bolivian
National Congress for its approval. He said as follows:
“The most important act of Congress, which concerns its responsibility before
the country and history, is the approval of the Treaty of peace, commerce, transfer of
territory, and setting of boundaries concluded with the Republic of Chile, which puts
an end to the truce we have been in since the War of the Pacific. These were
laborious, lengthy and difficult negotiations that resulted in the said arrangement,
which encompasses all of our issues. Bolivia has accepted the weight of the facts ,
with the firm purpose of committing to arbitration, faithfully complying with its
obligations, and maintaining cordial relations with said Republic.”
And the Chairman of the Bolivian National Congress then continued:
“Having recovered, as a consequence of this Treaty, its autonomy in trade and
customs matters, it [Bolivia] strongly wishes to strengthen its relationships with
friendly countries, and invites investors and capitalists from all over the world to
84
explore the richness of its soil.”
42. After this statement by the Chairman of the Bolivian National Congress, the President of
Bolivia took the floor before Congress and said as follows:
“As it is well said by the authoritative and respec ted word of the Chairman of
the Honorable Congress, the most important act of the current legislature . . .is the
approval of the Treaty of Peace and Amity concluded with the Republic of Chile.
. . . it should be noted that in entering into a peace agreement with Chile, we
have been guided by . . . the desire of working without obstacles, with full
independence, within our clear and finally determined borders; to prepare the country
for a future free of suspicions and fears, and abundant in prosperi ty for all, to
re-establish cordial relations with the Chilean people, proud in war and noble at peace,
aimed at joining in concert with the friendly countries, with which we have to carve
out the common work of progress and civilization in the Americas.
Fortunately [he continues], given the conditions of the treaty of peace that fully
guarantees our sovereignty in customs matters, the benefits to Bolivia will not be
long-awaited.” 85
43. Mr. President, Members of the Court, what Bolivia’s President, Bolivi a’s National
Congress Chairman and Bolivia’s National Congress accepted in February 1905, when solemnly
84
Bolivia, 13th Closing Session of the Honourable National CongressFeb. 1905, La Paz, 1905; Ann. 30 to
POCh, Vol. 2, pp. 530 and 531; emphasis added.
85Ibid., pp. 534 and 535; emphasis added. - 43 -
approving the 1904 Treaty, their successors now seek to deny before th is Court. Now, Bolivia
describes itself as “a State temporarily deprived of access to the sea as a result of war” 8. Now,
Bolivia argues that the 1904 Peace Treaty “did not cancel previous Chilean declarations and
commitments concerning Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea” 8. The historic reality, however, is
very different. Then, Bolivia described the Treaty as encompassing all of its issues. Then , Bolivia
described the Treaty as one through which Bolivia recovered its autonomy in trade and customs
matters. Then, Bolivia commended the Treaty as one that allowed it to move forward to obtain the
benefits of prosperity within clear and finally determined borders.
44. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Bolivia now proposes three sources for its claimed
right of sovereign access said to have arisen before the 1904 Treaty. It relies on treaties of 1866,
88
1874 and 1895 . Let me address briefly the 1866 and 1874 T reaties. I will come back to the
1895 Treaty shortly.
89 90
45. The Treaties of 1866 and 1874 were boundary treaties between Bolivia and Chile.
They were plainly superseded by the comprehensive boundary settlement in the 1904 Treaty. They
had no surviving legal effect following the 1904 Treaty. There is nothing more that needs to be
said about them.
46. Bolivia also claims, although without evidence, “that the 1904 Treaty was understood to
be without prejudice to the agreed intent of Chile and Bolivia to negotiate a sovereign access to the
sea” 91. One searches in vain, however, for any indication in the 1904 Treaty that its comprehensive
territorial settlement was somehow intended to be without prejudice to some residual Bolivian right
to territory on the Chilean side of the boundary. There is no basis on which any such right can be
92
implied. The Treaty is “clear on the face of the text” . Nor is there any basis whatever for
86
MB, para. 396; emphasis added. See also para.20 in which Bolivia says that “it has been landlocked for more
than a century while retaining a right of sovereign access to the sea that it has not been allowed to exercise”; emphasis
added.
87AB, para. 14.
88See AB, paras. 9-14.
89
Treaty of Territorial Limits Between Chile and Bolivia, signed at Santiago on 10Aug. 1866; MB, Vol. I,
Ann. 95.
90
Treaty of Limits Between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Sucre on 6 Aug. 1874; MB, Vol. I, Ann. 96.
91MB, para. 353.
92Territorial and Maritime D ispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (I), p. 861, para. 88. - 44 -
93
Bolivia’s assertion that it does not seek a “modification of the 1904 Treaty” . It would be
impossible for Bolivia to gain sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean through Chilean territory
without modification of the settlement reached in the 1904 Treaty.
V. The 1896 Exchange of Notes and Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá
47. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn finally to the issue of the 1895 treaties. In its
Application and Memorial, Bolivia rooted its claim to sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean in the
1895 Treaty on Transfer of Territory between Bolivia and Chile 9. Everything in Bolivia’s case
ultimately flows from this, including the weight that Bolivia seeks to attach to post-1948 conduct.
48. What Bolivia failed to mention, however, was that neither the Transfer Treaty nor any of
the other treaties concluded by Chile and Bolivia in 1895 ever entered into force. This is an
omission of considerable audacity on Bolivia’s part.
49. In its Application, Bolivia described the 1895 Transfer Treaty as “particularly
95
important” . In its Memorial, referring to the 1895 treaties, Bolivia claimed that “it retained a
right of sovereign access to the sea” 96. Bolivia’s Memorial is replete with numerous other
97
references to what it describes as “the 1895 settlement” .
50. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this is smoke and mirrors. The 1895 Transfer
Treaty never entered into force.
51. The reason why the 1895 treaties never entered into force is that, by an Exchange of
Notes in April 1896, Chile and Bol ivia agreed that, if the Congress of either State did not approve
98 99
the protocols of December 1895 and 30 April 1896 to the May 1895 treaties, this would “imply
a disagreement upon a fundamental basis of the May agreements which would make them wholly
93MB, para. 467.
94
Treaty on Transfer of Territory between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Santiago on 18 May 1895 (the
1895 Transfer Treaty); POCh, Vol. 1, Ann. 3, pp. 92-103.
95
AB, para. 13.
96
MB, para. 36; emphasis added.
97MB, para. 98 and see also para. 410. See also MB, para. 115. See also the sections of MB starting at Chap. I,
p. 26, and Chap. II, p.41, and more specifically paras. 9, 73, 76, 167, 228, 311, 340, 341, 343, 355, 368, 411, 416 and
428. See also AB, paras. 13-14.
98Protocol of 9 Dec. 1895 on the scope of the obligations agreed upon in the treaties ofMay between Bolivia
and Chile, signed at Sucre on 9Dec. 1895 (the December 1895 Protocol); POCh, Vol. 1, Ann. 4, pp. 106-108.
99Explanatory Protocol of the Protocol of 9 Dec. 1895 between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Santiago on
30 April1896 (the 1896 Protocol); POCh, Vol. 1, Ann. 8, pp. 122-129. - 45 -
100 101
without effect” . The language from this April 1896 Exchanges of Notes is up on the screen .
Bilateral congressional approval of the se two protocols was thus a pre condition of the consent of
the two States to the entry into force of the 1895 treaties.
52. Rather than consenting to these protocols, the Bolivian Congress purported to enter a
102
reservation to one of them . In the face of that reservation, the Chilean Congress declined to
approve the two relevant protocols. Since bilateral congressional consent to these two protocols
was never given, the 1895 treaties, including the Transfer Treaty, never entered into force and
remain “wholly without effect”.
53. Mr. President, Members of the Court, these observations on the 1895 treaties are not
merits points. They are jurisdictional points. The position I have just described was the position in
1948. Quite apart from the lack of legal effect of the 1895 Transfer Treaty, it is also the case that
the 1895 Transfer Treaty and the 1896 Exchange of Notes are themselves caught by the application
of Article 6 of the Bogotá Pact and are thus outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
VI. Summary of Chile’s case on the 1904 Treaty
54. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I come to my concluding remarks. Bolivia rooted
its claim to sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean in an 1895 treaty that never entered into force. It
all but failed to mention the 1904 Treaty. Such that it did refer to the 1904 Treaty, it suggested that
the territorial settlement of that Treaty left some residual space for Bolivia to assert a claim of a
right of sovereign access, although this residual space is utterly invisible to the naked eye. It failed
to address the comprehensive nature of the territorial settlement in Article 2 of the 1904 Treaty. It
failed to address the implications that follow from Article 6 of the 1904 Treaty. Mr. President,
Members of the Court, these are omissions of grave and fatal proportions by Bolivia.
55. On the other side of the equat ion, an examination of the 1904 Treaty leaves no doubt
about the compact tha t was agreed by the Parties 111 years ago. The Treaty rested on the twin
100Note from Adolfo Guerrero, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, to Heriberto Gutiérrez, Extraordinary Envoy
and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Chile, No 521, 29 April 1896; POCh, Vol. 1, Ann. 6, pp.114-115; and Note
from Heriberto Gutiérrez, Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plen ipotentiary of Bolivia in Chile, to Adolfo Guerrero,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 118, 30 April 1896; POCh, Vol. 1, Ann. 7, pp. 118-119.
101Tab 19 of judges’ folder.
102
Bolivia’s Reservation to the 1896 Explanatory Protocol of the Protocol ofDec. 1895 between Bolivia and
Chile, 7 Nov. 1896; POCh, Vol. 1, Ann. 9, pp. 132-135. - 46 -
pillars of a comprehensive territorial settlement and commitments of amity addressing the political
and commercial relations of the Parties going forward, including a treaty-based right, in perpetuity,
granting Bolivia access to the Pacific Ocean through sovereign Chilean territory and ports. This
right of access in perpetuity is the fullest and most unrestricted treaty -based right. But it is not a
sovereign right.
56. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the 1904 Treaty was in force on the date of the
conclusion of the Bogotá Pact. It governed and settled the matter then, just as it does now.
57. Mr. President, Members of the Court, t his concludes my submissions this afternoon.
Mr. Wordsworth will develop Chile’s submissions on the application of Article VI of the Bogotá
Pact to the circumstances of this case. Mr. President, if it is convenient, I would ask you to invite
Mr. Wordsworth to the podium.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne la parole à M. Wordsworth pour sa plaidoirie.
Mr. WORDSWORTH:
A RTICLE VI OF THE P ACT OF BOGOTÁ APPLIED TO B OLIVIA ’S CLAIM
I. Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a privilege to ap pear before you, and to have
been asked by the Republic of Chile to build on the submissions that you have just heard, and to
develop our position on why Bolivia’s claim is outside your jurisdiction.
2. You can see from the outline that is just before tab 20 of your judges’ folder, that there are
three key areas for me to address in considering how Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá, which is
now on your screens once more, applies to this case: that is (a) identification of the relevant
“matter” for the purposes of Article VI, and (b) assessing whether that matter is “settled” and/or
(c) ”governed” within the terms of this provision0.
103
American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, signed at Bogotá on 30 April 1948 (entMay 1949) (the6
Pact of Bogotá), tab 3 of judges’ folder, pp. 4, 32 and 33. A rticle VI provides: “The aforesaid procedures, furthermore,
may not be applied to matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or by arbitral award or by decision of
an international court, or which are governed by agreements orforce on the date of the conclusion of the
present Treaty.” - 47 -
3. In brief, Bolivia’s claim is for an order that Chile must negotiate with Bolivia “in good
faith, promptly, formally, w ithin a reasonable time and effectively, to grant Bolivia a fully
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean” 10. The ultimate object of the claim is, unarguably, the
grant of sovereign access to the sea.
4. It is necessary to cut through the obfuscation, but the short point is that the real issue in the
current case is whether Bolivia has a right to sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The alleged
obligation to negotiate is merely a means indeed a notably artificial means articulated by
Bolivia to seek to implement that alleged right. When one comes to the details of its claim, it is
plain that, for Bolivia, negotiation is not the usual process of good faith exchanges, but rather a
judicially prescribed procedure leading only to one predetermined outcome: that is, the grant to
Bolivia of Chilean territory in order to obtain sovereign access to the sea.
5. It follows that, with Article VI of the Pact firmly in mind as it must be, the case before
you concerns the “matter” of whether Bolivia has a right of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
6. And, that “matter” is one “settled by arrangement between th e parties”, notably by the
1904 Peace Treaty that Bolivia has sought to glide over, both in its Application and in its
Memorial. That Treaty established unequivocally that Bolivia does not have any right of sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean, and quite deliberately not, as Mr. Bethlehem has just shown. The only
way for Bolivia to be granted the sovereign access to the Pacific that it claims in this case would be
precisely through revision of the settlement reached in 1904 concerning territorial sovereignty and
the character of Bolivia’s access to the sea.
7. Further, the relevant “matter” is one “governed by” the 1904 Peace Treaty, which was in
force in 1948, and remains in force today; and it is likewise governed by a number of later
ancillary agreements that gave and still give further precision to the nature of Bolivia’s access to
105
the sea .
104MB, para. 500 (c).
105
See for example Convention on Transit between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Santiago on 16 Aug. 1937;
POCh, Ann. 44, pp. 616 -624; see also Convention on Trade between Chile and Bolivia, signed at Santiago on
6 Aug. 1912; POCh, Ann. 34, pp. 560-567. - 48 -
8. In short, whether formulated as a direct claim fo r revision of the settlement reached in the
1904 Peace Treaty or as an obligation to negotiate and to agree on the same result, the matter that
Bolivia has put before you is one excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of Article VI.
II. The relevant “matter” for the purposes of Article VI
9. I turn, then, to the details, starting with identification of the real issue in the case, which is
the necessary antecedent to the question of whether the case concerns a matter excluded from
jurisdiction by virtue of Article VI.
10. I pick up now from paragraph 3 of my outline, and also you can see it on the screen, the
obvious starting-point in this task of identification is the principal relief claimed by Bolivia that
is negotiation “to grant Bolivia a fu lly sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean” 106. And, so far as
concerns identifying the real issue in the case and the real object of the claim, the important point is
that the formulation of the alleged obligation to negotiate is an obligation to achieve one stated
result. This establishes what Bolivia is truly seeking, which is evidently not an open negotiation.
The claim to an obligation to negotiate is merely a legal construct to secure for Bolivia the grant of
fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, that is, to obtain the transfer to Bolivia of a stretch of
Chilean sovereign territory.
11. And I say “legal construct” precisely because sovereign access is the essential and
inevitable outcome of the relief sought. Negotiation only constitutes an apparent stepping-stone at
best: for, on the claim as formulated by Bolivia, whatever happens next in the negotiations, Bolivia
is to get its sovereign access, and the negotiation is relegated to matters of detail, or to “the precise
terms of Bolivia’s sovereign access”, which is the way it is expressed in Bolivia’s Memorial 10.
The result that Bolivia s eeks of sovereign access to the sea is described by Bolivia as having been
“predetermined” 108, and to similar effect Bolivia says in its Memorial that the obligation to
negotiate and you can now see this on the screens as well as in my o utline “will terminate
106
MB, para. 500 (c).
107MB, para. 498.
108
MB, para. 404. - 49 -
only when an agreement is concluded materializing in concrete terms the sovereign access to the
109
sea” .
12. So, whatever happens in the negotiation, there is to be a reallocation of sovereignty over
territory, with the effect that the character of Bo livia’s access to the sea changes from
non-sovereign access, as per the current position agreed in 1904, to sovereign access.
13. The object of the claim is thus correctly identified as the grant of sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean, and the real issue in this case is whether Bolivia has a right to that access. And, this
is confirmed by the fact that Bolivia’s claim is predicated on the alleged existence of a
long-standing right to sovereign access: it is said in the Memorial that Bolivia “is in a un ique and
unprecedented position” expressly through it “retaining a right of sovereign access to the sea that it
110
has not been allowed to exercise” .
14. And, although there is in fact little need for you to look beyond Bolivia’s current
pleadings when it c omes to the task of isolating the real issue before you, it must be emphasiz ed
that the current claim is not to be approached as if it were in a vacuum.
15. The jurisprudence that establishes this proposition will be very well known to you,
although I not e that Bolivia appears to wish to constrain the Court in its task of determining the
“real issue” in this case. At paragraphs 13 and 20 of its Written Statement, Bolivia says that: “In
considering the nature of [Chile’s] objection, the Court must first i dentify the subject-matter of the
dispute with reference to the terms of the application and the applicant’s submissions”, and then
111
that “Bolivia’s Application must therefore be read and interpreted in its own terms” .
16. Now, that does not capture the relevant principles from the Fisheries Jurisdiction case to
which Bolivia refers. As the Court first observed in the Nuclear Tests cases, and you can see that
at paragraph 4 of my outline, “it is the Court’s duty to isolate the real issue in the case and t o
112
identify the object of the claim” , and likewise that it “is entitled to interpret the submissions
[plural] of the parties [plural], and in fact is bound to do so” 113. And, as the Court then explained in
109
MB, para. 287; see also paras. 289 and 290.
110
MB, para. 20.
111WSB, paras. 13 and 20.
112
See Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 262, para. 29.
113
See Nuclear Tests (New Zealandv. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 466, para. 30. - 50 -
Fisheries Jurisdiction, in identifying the “real di spute” the Court “will base itself not only on the
Application and final submissions, but on diplomatic exchanges, public statements and other
114
pertinent evidence” .
17. It follows that, in considering the real issue before it, the Court’s attention is cor rectly
drawn to the context of the current claim, including, as the Honourable Agent explained earlier
today, that it constitutes the latest in a long line of initiatives taken by Bolivia with a view to
satisfying its aspiration of departing from the 1904 Peace Treaty and obtaining sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean.
18. And if I can ask you to turn to paragraph 5 of my outline, you will see, there, our position
that the true nature of the current claim is further confirmed by a number of recent Bolivia n
documents, including Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution. Article 267, as you can see on the screen,
contains a declaration of Bolivia’s “unwaivable and imprescriptible right over the territory giving
access to the Pacific Ocean and its maritime space”, and thi s provision must be read together with
the transitional provisions, which impose and you can see this in the second sentence on the
screen and in tab 23 of our judges’ folder a duty on the Government to “denounce and, if
necessary, renegotiate those tr eaties that are contrary to the Constitution”, which must inevitably
include the asserted Article 267 “right over the territory giving access to the Pacific Ocean and its
115
maritime space” .
19. What happened next is instructive. Bolivia did not then denounce the 1904 Peace Treaty,
which would undoubtedly be caught by these provisions of the Constitution. Instead, in the course
of early 2013, both the Bolivian Senate and its Constitutional Tribunal confirmed that this duty
could be fulfilled by challe nging treaties before international tribunals 11. You can see this from
the documents that we have included at tabs 24 and 25 of the judges’ folder. And indeed, in the
next tab (tab 26), you can see that on 3 April 2013, the Supreme Resolution of the President of
114Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998,449,
para. 31, referring to Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 262-263.
115Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 7 February 2009, POCh, Ann 62, pp. 926 and 929,
Art. 267 and Ninth Transitional Provision.
116
Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia, Plurinational Constitutional Declaration No 0003/2013, made in Sucre on
25 April 2013, POCh, Ann. 73, pp. 1025-1027, section III.11, tab 25 of judges’ folder, pp. 1 and 3, considering Bolivian
Law on Normativ e Application – Statement of Reasons, 6 February 2013, POCh, Ann. 71, p. 1003, Art. 6, tab 24 of
judges’ folder, pp. 1-5. - 51 -
Bolivia appointing Bolivia’s Honourable Agent to my right, made clear that this very case was
117
brought to vindicate the “right” set out in Article 267 of Bolivia’s Constitution . As you can see
from the highlighted passage, the appointment tak es as its starting -point Article 267 to Bolivia’s
Constitution; and you can see the communication to the Registrar is on the opposite page.
20. Bolivia now seeks to muddy the waters in its Written Statement of November 2014. It
appears to contest Chile’s reading of the 2009 Constitution, but without explaining why, and we
can only look forward to it developing that point in the face of its own official statements and
documents 118. Bolivia also asserts that Chile’s submissions are irrelevant because Bol ivia’s
“claim” is said to pre-date the 2009 Constitution, and hence could not have been the result of a
119
constitutional prescription .
21. But that assertion merely seeks to bypass Chile’s point. The 2009 Constitution imposes a
duty to denounce or renegotiate or challenge by way of international proceedings treaties contrary
to Bolivia’s alleged right of sovereign access to the sea, i.e. , the 1904 Peace Treaty. Bolivia
itself by a Supreme Resolution of the President no less has in effect confirmed that this case
was brought in fulfilment of that duty. In these circumstances, it is clear that this case concerns an
Article 267 matter, i.e., Bolivia’s alleged right of sovereign access to the sea. And, likewise, that it
puts squarely in issue the 1904 Treaty.
22. This is also confirmed in official Bolivian documentation that post -dates the
commencement of the current proceedings. In August 2013, Bolivia issued an Offering
Memorandum for government bonds 120, and you can see the relevant extract coming up on the
screen and the relevant extracts are also at t ab 27 of your judges’ folder where you can see the
first page of the bond and the relevant page placed next to it, on the slide.
Now, under the heading of Chile, Bolivia is describing its political re lations with Chile and it
is the second paragraph that is important for present purposes:
117
Bolivian Supreme Resolution 09385, 3 April 2013, attached to the letter from David Choquehuanca, Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, to Philippe Couvreur, Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 24 April 2013, POCh,
Ann. 72, p. 1007, tab 26 of judges’ folder, p. 2.
118WSB, para. 54.
119WSB, para. 53.
120
Bolivia, Offering Memorandum for government bonds, 22 August 2013, availab le at
https://www.bourse.lu/instrument/listdocuments?cdVal=201919&cdTypeVal=O… , tab 35 of judges’ folder, p. 6. - 52 -
“The Bolivian Political Constitution declares our indispensable and irreversible
right over the territories that give us access to the Pacific Ocean. [So that, of course, is
a reference to Article 267.] We have not had direct access to the Pacific Ocean since
the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904 that we signed with Chile after the War of
the Pacific. [So, the 1904 Treaty is portrayed there as being the impe diment to
sovereign access.] Since then, we have sought to reclaim lands from Chile in order to
regain our access to the Pacific Ocean, which to date have been uns uccessful. In
2011, President Morales reaffirmed his intention to seek a peaceful solution to our
maritime dispute with Chile through international courts, and on April 24, 2013 we
instituted proceedings against Chile before the International Court of Justice.” 121
23. So, this once again makes it as plain as can be that the current case has been brought
by way of fulfilment of a constitutional mandate to unsettle a matter settled by the 1904 Peace
Treaty and governed by it. I should say that a fuller extract of the bond Memorandum is at tab 35
of this judges’ folder.
24. And it inevitably follows from all the above that this case concerns the “matter” of
whether Bolivia has a right to sovereign access to the sea. Bolivia’s alleged right to sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean constitutes the real issue in the current case, and likewise constitutes
the relevant “matter” for the purposes of Article VI of the Pact.
25. The question, then, is whether this is a matter “already settled by arrangement”, or
“governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of” the Pact of Bogotá.
Chile’s position is that the matter before you is caught by both limbs of Article VI of the Pact; but,
as follows from a plain reading of Article VI, Chile need only satisfy you that the matter is one
“settled by arrangement” in or “governed by” a pre-1948 Treaty.
III. The “matter” is one “settled by arrangement”/”governed by” the 1904 Peace Treaty
and related instruments
26. Now dealing with these two limbs in order, I want to develop the argument in three
stages.
(a) First, to address the issue of whether the matter of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean was
settled by the 1904 Peace Treaty.
(b) Secondly, and consistent with the Court’s approach in Nicaragua v. Colombia, to ask the
question whether that matter remained settled as of th e date of conclusion of the Pact of
Bogotá, i.e., as of 1948.
12Bolivia, Offering Memorandum for government bonds, 22 August 2013, available at
https://www.bourse.lu/instrument/listdocuments?cdVal=201919&cdTypeVal=O… , tab 35 of judges’ folder, p. 6. - 53 -
(c) And thirdly, to ask whether the matter was “governed by agreements or treaties in force on the
date of the conclusion of” the Pact.
27. I will then come back to the way that Bolivia see ks to reframe the issue by reference to
exchanges between the Parties subsequent to the conclusion of the Pact.
A. The position as at 1904: the matter of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean was settled by
the 1904 Peace Treaty
28. As to the first ele ment of the argument, as noted at paragraph 7 of my outline, the
1904 Peace Treaty dealt in a definitive manner with the previously contested issues of territorial
sovereignty and access to the sea. There is no manifestation of any intent in the Treaty language
that the critical matter of Bolivia’s access to the sea be subject to reopening or that the Treaty be of
limited scope or duration on this m atter. To the contrary, as Mr. Bethlehem identified, the
1904 Treaty established a complete boundary and, in its Article VI, a régime for Bolivia’s access to
the sea that was expressly to endure “in perpetuity”.
29. The 1904 Peace Treaty was precisely the kind of arrangement that the drafters of
Article VI of the Pact will have had in mind; and, crucially for today’s purposes, the only way for
Bolivia to be granted the sovereign access to the Pacific that it now claims before you would be
through the unsettling of this arrangement reached in 1904. Certainly, with Article VI of the Pact
firmly in mind, Bolivia has chosen not to formulate its claim as o ne seeking revision of the
1904 Peace Treaty in direct language; but its claim is not somehow any less excluded from the
Court’s jurisdiction through being presented as a claim to revision via an alleged obligat ion to
negotiate.
30. As the necessary flipside to its tactical dec ision not to challenge the 1904 Treaty in any
express way in these proceedings, Bolivia contends in its Memorial that: “Sovereign access to the
122
sea was not addressed in the 1904 Treaty .” But of course it was, as Mr. Bethlehem has just
demonstrated. And the question has to be asked as to why Bolivia is taking such an untenable line;
and the only answer can be that Bolivi a recognizes that the matter before you does indeed concern
12MB, para. 10. - 54 -
its alleged right to sovereign access to the sea. Hence, to avoid the application of Article VI of the
Pact, it has to argue that this was not a matter settled in or governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty.
31. Bolivia therefore argues that, in the 1895 Transfer Treaty, Chile explicitly bound itself to
transfer territory to Bolivia to grant it a sovereign access, an obligation that is said to have been left
untouched by the 1904 Peace Treaty. But there are insurmountable difficulties here for Bolivia
I have summarized them at paragraph 8 of my outline, which is just before tab 20 of your slightly
industrial-looking judges’ folder:
(a) First, the issue of sovereign access was addressed and settled by the 1904 Treaty. It was at the
forefront of the Parties’ minds, and rejected in favour of a non- sovereign régime of access for
Bolivia. The Parties’ respective rights over territory were definitively established, and key
provisions were agreed in relation to explicitly and exclusively Bolivia’s non-sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean.
(b) Secondly, the juridical fact that the matter of access to the sea was settled by the 1904 Treaty
cannot somehow be undermined by reference to the 1895 Transfer Treaty. The 1895 Treaties
never came into force a nd, to quote the Parties’ April 1896 Exchange of Notes that
123
Mr. Bethlehem has just taken you to, they are “wholly without effect” .
(c) Thirdly, that 1896 Exchange of Notes settled the matter of whether the 1895 Transfer Treaty
has any effect, and it follows that this is also a “matter” caught by Art icle VI of the Pact of
Bogotá. The Court has no jurisdiction to hear any submission seeking to go behind the
agreement in the 1896 Exchange of Notes, as Mr. Bethlehem just noted.
B. The position as at 1948: the matter of sove reign access to the Pacific Ocean remained
settled by the 1904 Peace Treaty
32. I move, then, to the position as of 1948, when the Pact was concluded, which the Court
has identified as “the date by reference to which [it] must decide on the applicability of the
provisions of Article VI” 124.
12Note from Adolfo Guerrero, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, to Heriberto Gutiérrez, ExtraordinaryEnvoy
and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Chile, No. 521, 29 April 1896; POCh, Ann. 6, pp. 114-115; and Note from
Heriberto Gutiérrez, Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Chile, to Adolfo Guerrero, Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Chile, No. 118, 30 Apr. 1896; POCh, Ann. 7, pp. 118-119.
124
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 859, para. 81. - 55 -
33. And it is crystal clear that the matter of sovereign access to the sea remained settled. The
1904 Peace Treaty remained in full force and effect, and Bolivia does not suggest otherwise; its
terms had not changed; it had not somehow ceased to regulate in definitive terms the
apportionment of territory between the P arties, and the nature of Bolivia’s access to the
Pacific Ocean. Indeed, its validity and scope so far as concerns regulating the nature of access to
the sea was confirmed, and detailed, in various acts and agreements in the decades prior to 1948,
for example in the 1937 Convention on Transit between the two States, which is at Annex 44 of our
Preliminary Objections 12.
34. And, in addition, Bolivia’s long-standing reservation to the Pact of Bogotá confirmed its
contemporaneous understanding that the matter of access to the sea was settled by the 1904 Peace
Treaty. As Professor Pinto has explained, this reservati on remained in place till April 2013, and
purported in effect to modify Articl e VI such that, “pacific procedures may also be applied to
controversies arising from matters settled by arrangement between the Parties, when the said
126
arrangement affects the vital interests of a State” . And there ca n be little doubt that the
1904 Treaty, was one of the arrangements, if not the sole arrangement, that Bolivia had in mind.
35. Indeed this understanding is confirmed by the recent acts of Bolivia , listed out at
paragraph 11 in my outline. On 23 March 2011, President Morales proposed the establishment of a
specific governmental department “for Vindication of the Maritime Claim”, to “constitute the
127
authority within which the legal actions for the Bolivian maritime claim will be planned” .
36. On the following day, Bolivia’s reservation to the Pact of Bogotá was considered in its
Chamber of Deputies by reference to President Morales’s speech. The President of the Chamber
explained how the reservation was “in Bolivia’s interests and . . . defines the lines of the claim that
was yesterday expressed by the President of the State” 128. The extract as you can see is at tab 29
and on your screens and the full document is at tab 33, but there is no need to go to that right now.
125
Convention on Transit between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Santiago on 16 Aug. 1937; POCh, Ann. 44,
pp. 616-617, Art. I.
126Pact of Bogotá, tab 3of judges’ folder, pp. 24, 54 and 55.
127
Speech delivered by President Evo Morales on Bolivia’s Day of the Sea, 23 Mar. 2011, available at
http://www.diremar.gob.bo/node/265, tab 32 of judges’ folder, pp. 5-6.
128
Chamber of Deputies of Bolivia, Legislature 20 11-2012, 38th Session, 24 Mar. 2011, tab 33 of judges’ folder,
pp. 5-6. - 56 -
You can see overleaf at tab 29 that t he point was further developed by the then President of the
Commission of Constitutional Affairs, Deputy Marca, who explained:
“This reservation is important because it allows States that may be affected by
agreements between two States, and Bolivia in particular would have the right to
revise pacts that have been concluded, using the abovementioned procedural means.
An example is the issue we have with Chile; the Pact of 1904 as a result could be
revised if the Pact of Bogotá is applied.” 129
37. So, with a reservation in place that in effect re- wrote Article VI, Bolivia considered that
it could seek to revise the 1904 Peace Treaty through judicial means, but at the same time it
evidently recognized that, without the reservation, Article VI of the Pact excluded jurisdiction with
respect to any such attempt. Bolivia now seeks revision of the settlement reached in the
1904 Treaty, albeit through the guise of the alleged obligation to negotiate. And the difficulty for
Bolivia is that it is confronted by Ar ticle VI without the benefit of the reservation that it had
formerly considered so important.
38. In an attempt to navigate a way around the actual terms of Article VI, Bolivia says in its
Written Statement that:
“It is telling . . . that between 1947 and 1950, not only during the drafting of the
Pact but also subsequent to the signing of the Pact, Bolivia and Chile specifically
agreed to hold negotiations on Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea. [Bolivia
continues] This confirms that neither Boliv ia nor Chile were of the view that the
1904 Treaty had already ‘settled’ this matter or that Article VI of the Pact applied
thereto.” 130
39. But, to the contrary. Even if the underlying premise of a specific agreement to negotiate
were correct, the fact that Bolivia considered that negotiations were required in order to create the
possibility of leading to any different legal situation merely emphasi zes how th is was indeed a
settled matter. The correct position is precisely that, as of 1948, both P arties considered that the
matter was settled by the 1904 Peace Treaty.
40. And it follows that the matter of Bolivia’s alleged right to sovereign access falls within
the exclusion established by Article VI of the Pact. That conclusion is, of itself, sufficient to
establish the lack of jurisdiction over Bolivia’s current claim.
129
pp. 31-32.hamber of Deputies of Bolivia, Legislature 2011- 2012, 38th Session, 24 Mar. 2011, tab 33 of judges’ folder,
13WSB, para. 51. - 57 -
C. The position as at 1948: the matter of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean was
“governed by agreements or treaties in force”, in particular, the 1904 Peace Treaty
41. But, as a further and separate issue, I move on to the second limb of Article VI, which is
whether the relevant matter is one “governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the
conclusion of the [Pact]”. The points are set out at paragraph 14 of my outline.
42. As already explained by Professor Pinto, this raises a question different to that of
whether the matter is one “already settled by arrangement”. The question is no longer whether the
matter has been “settled”, i.e. , resolved by a given arrangement, but rather whether a given
arrangement or treaty governs the matter, that is , regulates the relationship between the Parties
concerning that matter.
43. But the same conclusion follows. To recall, the matter is whether Bolivia has a right to
sovereign access to the sea. That matter was without doubt governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty in
1948, and the position remains the same today. For more than 110 years the 1904 Peace Treaty has
defined and governed the régime of access to the sea, establishing that it is non-sovereign in nature.
44. And, as follows from the plain meaning of Article VI, this is a matter that the parties to
the Pact of Bogotá chose to exclude from the scheme of compulsory jurisdiction that they
otherwise wished to establish. And it likewise follows that the matter that Bolivia seeks to re -cast
in the current proceedings is one that is excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction.
D. Bolivia’s inappropriate reliance on events post-1948
45. Mr. President, Members of the Court, t he conclusion that the matter before you was, in
1948, governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty is again sufficient to establish the lack of jurisdiction
over the current claim.
46. As Professor Pinto has explained, the intention of the parties to the Pact was to cr eate a
jurisdictional exclusion as at 1948. The sources of law relevant to a given matter, and so applicable
to the merits of any dispute arising out of that matter, might vary post -1948 due to the conclusion
of new instruments. But the fact of any such new instruments was not intended somehow to bypass
the exclusion of a given matter from the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae as established by
Article VI of the Pact by reference to the position as at 1948. The parties to the Pact agreed to - 58 -
exclude matters settled or governed as of 1948, and what may or may not have happened next with
respect to these settled or governed matters is not an issue with which this Court may be concerned.
47. But even if it were nonetheless appropriate to look forward to events post -1948, this
would not assist Bolivia notwithstanding the very considerable emphasis that Bolivia places on
such post-1948 events in its Written Statement. It is argued there that the post-1948 exchanges and
statements gave rise to an inter national agreement independent of, and subsequent to, the
1904 Treaty 13. Thus Bolivia says that: “The 1904 Treaty could not settle or govern the agreement
reached, for instance, in 1950 to negotiate a sovereign access of Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean.” 132
And, related to this first point, Bolivia says that the separation between the obligation to negotiate
and matters settled by the 1904 Treaty is, in fact, one that Chile’s representatives insisted on
133
repeatedly .
48. There are three points in response and I have summarized them at paragraph 18 of
my outline.
49. First, and most obviously, Bolivia’s contentions presume in its favour that the correct
date at which to ask the question of whether the relevant matter was “already settled by
arrangement” or “governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of the
[Pact]” is not fixed at 1948, but was intended to be ambulatory. That is inconsistent with the plain
wording of Article VI, and with the Court’s prior jurisprudence.
50. Secondly, even if it were somehow correct to look forwards from 1948, Bolivia is still
asking the wrong question.
(a) The principal focus of the current enquiry must be whether the matter that is now before the
Court, as correctly characterized by the Court, is one that was settled by, or is governed by, the
1904 Peace Treaty. It was; it is.
(b) Bolivia wishes to confuse the issue by relying in particular on exchanges in 1950 and 1975, but
it cannot use those exchanges to gloss over the way in which it has in fact formulated its current
claim. It claims an order that Chile agree on, and grant to Bolivia, sovereign access to the sea.
131
WSB, paras. 68-69.
13Ibid., para. 68.
133
Ibid., para. 64. - 59 -
In light of the unalterable legal fact that the 1904 Peace Treaty settled the matter as to Bolivia’s
alleged right to sovereign access to the sea, it is for Bolivia somehow to establish that its
current claim does not seek to “unsettle” this Treaty. And, i t cannot do so. To adjudicate on
Bolivia’s current claim, this Court would, in substance, be adjudicating on the rev ision of the
1904 Treaty, and Article VI establishes that the Court has no jurisdiction in this respect.
51. Thirdly, the conclusion of an alleged agreement post -1948, and the reliance on that new
agreement in a claim before this Court, does not mean that there is a different “matter” that f alls
outside Article VI of the Pact:
(a) If it were somehow correct to look at the post-1948 events, which it is not, the Court would still
need to analyse the case before it to establish the precise contours of the r elevant “matter” for
the purposes of Article VI and to see whether there is, as Bolivia now maintains, a different
“matter”. And, although Bolivia will no doubt be making a great deal of the post -1948
exchanges in its oral submissions later this week, we ask you to keep firmly in mind that, in
substance, they all come back to the same matter that was settled by , that is governed by, the
1904 Treaty: that is, the matter of whether Bolivia has a right to sovereign access to the sea.
(b) Chile’s objection is not, as Bolivia would have it, that, in 1904, Chile and Bolivia purportedly
settled something that had not even happened yet. Rather, Chile’s objection is that events
occurring after 1948 are outside the Court’s jurisdiction if they concern the same ma tter that
was settled by arrangement or governed by treaty in 1948.
(c) And it is substance here that is important, and not what the relevant matter might look like after
some artful repackaging. The cases where there is a ratione temporis limitation on jurisdiction
offer an analogy. Where there is a consensual exclusion of disputes pre- dating a treaty’s entry
into force, what matters is substance not form, and the approach of international courts and
tribunals has been to reject jurisdiction where a pr ior dispute is suddenly re-cast to appear as if
134
it were newly-minted. The Phosphates in Morocco case is a good example .
52. And this leads me to Bolivia’s related point, which is to say that the separation of the
post-1948 negotiations from matters settled and governed by the 1904 Treaty is one that Chile’s
13Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 74, pp. 24 -26. - 60 -
representatives insisted on repeatedly and, hence, Bolivia now says, they are correctly to be
135
regarded as separate .
53. No doubt we will be hearing more on this fr om Bolivia as it seeks to glide over the
legally relevant point, which is that the claim as formulated by Bolivia inevitably places the alleged
obligation to negotiate and the long -agreed terms of the 1904 Peace Treaty on a collision course.
Bolivia cannot say that it is now keeping these two elements separate, and th at is regardless of its
current and notably artificial interpretation of what may have been said or allegedly agreed in 1950
or 1975. Its claim, and the relief sought, is predicated precisely on an inevitable unsettling of the
1904 Peace Treaty that somehow permits Bolivia to have the historical and current benefits of the
Treaty, but also to revise those matters settled in the Treaty to the extent that Bolivia wishes.
54. And, stepping back, the further point is that the 1950 and 1975 exchanges, even if taken
as international agreements for the purposes of jurisdiction, do not convey the faintest hint of an
intention to establish a basis for compulsory jurisdiction.
55. To the contrary, one might say, as can be seen from the related exchanges between the
Parties. Bolivia relies on a communi cation of 10 July 1961 fr om the Chilean Ambassador in
136
La Paz, Manuel Trucco, to Bolivia’s Foreign Minister , and it is useful to look at this in a lit tle
more detail. It is at tab 30 of the judges’ folder and now on your screens. Bolivia sets out the first
sentence of the relevant passage, where Mr. Trucco stated: “Chile has always been willing, along
with preserving the legal situation established in the Treaty of Peace of 1904, to examine in direct
negotiations with Bolivia the possibility of satisfying the aspirations of the latter and the interests
of Chile.” 137 Notably, however, Bolivia omits the very next sentence, highlighted over the page
and also at paragraph 21 of my outline , where it was stated in terms: “Chile will always reject
resorting, on Bolivia’s end, to organizations which are not competent to resolve an issue settled by
138
the Treaty, which could only be amended by direct agreement of the parties.”
135WSB, para. 64.
136MB, paras. 136-138.
137
Memorandum from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1961;
POCh, Ann. 48, pp. 730-731. See also statement by Mr. Schweitzer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, at the Fourth
Session of the General Committee of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, 18 Nov. 1983;
POCh, Ann. 55, pp. 778-785.
138Memorandum from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1961;
POCh, Ann. 48, pp. 730-731. - 61 -
56. That statement was not greeted by a response from Bolivia to the effect that there was, to
the contrary, an agreement to negotiate over which the International Court of Justice , no less,
would have jurisdiction pursuant to the Pact of Bogotá. Indeed, there was no pushback by Bolivia
of any kind. And this shows how the Parties were willing to, and did, discuss the issue of access to
the sea, but in no sense considered that, in doing so, they were somehow establishing a basis for the
jurisdiction of this Court, which they had already excluded through Article VI of the Pact.
IV. Conclusion
57. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I conclude.
58. Bolivia’s claim in this case has been formulated with mor e than a careful eye to
Article VI of the Pact, and with a relationship to the 1904 Peace Treaty which is quixotic in nature.
The 1904 Peace Treaty, in so far as it is mentioned at all by Bolivia, is portrayed as of no
relevance; and yet the claim positively requires that the settlemen t reached in this long- standing
peace treaty be revised through a judicially compelled cession to Bolivia of Chilean territory.
59. The correct application of Article VI in this case requires no more than an answer to the
following question at paragraph 23 of my outline: would adjudication of Bolivia’s claim a
claim that puts squarely before you the matter of Bolivia’s alleged right to sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean would that claim involve adjudication of a matter that was in 1948 settled or
governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty? Chile considers that the answer to this question is an
unequivocal “yes”. If you were to hear Bolivia’s claim, you would be hearing a claim that is in
substance for a revision of the settlement reached in that pre-1948 Treaty. And that is precisely the
type of claim that Article VI excludes from jurisdiction.
60. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention, and ask you to hand
the floor to Professor Dupuy to conclude our presentation.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne la parole au professeur Dupuy. - 62 -
M. DUPUY :
C ONCLUSIONS GÉNÉRALES : L’EXCEPTION À LA COMPÉTENCE DE LA C OUR SOULEVÉE
PAR LE C HILI PRÉSENTE UN CARACTÈRE AUTHENTIQUEMENT PRÉLIMINAIRE
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdam es et Messieurs les juges, c’est toujours un honneur de
prendre la parole devant la Cour. Je le fais cette fois- ci, comme la précédente, en défense des
intérêts de la République du Chili et je tirerai quelques brèves conclusions des plaidoiries qui m’ont
précédé. Le Chili a manifesté dans le passé tout le respect qu’il a pour votre compétence. Encore
faut-il que celle-ci soit vérifiée lorsque l’objet de l’affaire introduite devant elle peut légitimement
en faire douter.
2. Or, ainsi que ma collègue et a mie, Mme le professeur Pinto, vous l’a dit avant moi,
l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá combine des critères temporels et matériels pour marquer les limites
de la compétence de la Cour, par ailleurs posée selon l’article XXXI du pacte de Bogotá.
L’article VI dois-je le rappeler encore une fois ? exclut en effet de votre connaissance les
«questions … déjà … régies par des accords ou traités en vigueur à la date de la signature du
présent Pacte».
3. Or, la date de signature du pacte de Bogotá, c’était le 30 avril 1948, soit il y a presque
exactement soixante-sept ans. Du point de vue matériel à présent, la question régie à l’époque par
le traité de paix de 1904 était la détermination exacte du tracé des frontières entre les deux pays ; et
le tracé retenu avait pour effet d’interdire un accès direct de la Bolivie à la mer. La question de
savoir si la Bolivie dispose d’un droit d’accès souverain à la mer est donc, aujourd’hui, exclue de la
compétence de la Cour, par détermination de l’article VI du pacte.
4. Tel est précisément le fondement d’une exception d’incompétence dont l’article 79 de
votre Règlement indique à suffisance qu’elle doit être considérée comme préliminaire. Comme la
Cour le rappelait elle-même en 2007, c’est «une question préliminaire qu’elle doit trancher afin de
139
déterminer si elle a compétence» . Lorsque cette compétence fait question, il faut en effet, in
limine litis, avant toute chose, procéder à sa vérification !
139 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c.Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 852, par. 51. - 63 -
5. Il existe, de plus, une disposition convergente, propre, cette fois, non plus au Statut ou au
Règlement de la Cour mais au pacte de Bogotá. A son article XXXIII, le pacte pose quant à lui la
règle suivante : «Au cas où les parties ne se mettraient pas d’accord sur la compétence de la Cour
au sujet du litige, la Cour elle-même décidera au préalable de cette question.»
6. On doit alors se souvenir de ce que la Cour elle -même a indiqué dans son arrêt du
13 décembre 2007 intervenu en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et
la Colombie, au par agraphe51. La Cour affirmait «une partie qui soulève des exceptions
140
préliminaires a droit à ce qu’il y soit répondu au stade préliminaire de la procédure» .
7. Ce que le Chili demande par conséquent aujourd’hui, c’est ainsi tout simplement que lui
soit reconnu le droit énoncé par le Règlement de la Cour.
8. Ce droit doit être respecté en règle générale et il ne peut être écarté, comme la Cour l’a
elle-même indiqué dans son arrêt précité, que dans deux cas d’exception et deux seulement.
D’une part, «si la Cour ne dispose pas de tous les éléments nécessaires pour se prononcer sur
les questions soulevées» 141; et
d’autre part, «si le fait de répondre à l ’exception préliminaire équivaudrait à trancher le
142
différend, ou certains de ces éléments, au fond» .
Or, nous ne nous trouvons dans aucune de ces deux situations comme mes collègues vous l’ont
montré et comme je le rappellerai brièvement.
1. La Cour dispose de tous les éléments nécessaires pour se prononcer
sur les questions soulevées
9. Les écriture s respectives des deux Parties et les annexes qui les accompagnent,
particulièrement celles jointes au texte de l’exception chilienne, vous ont apporté toutes les
explications requises sur les faits et documents propres à permettre la pleine compréhension de
l’affaire. Au demeurant, pour constater qu’elle dispose de tous les éléments nécessaires pour se
140 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 852, par. 51 (les italiques sont de nous).
141 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminai res, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 852, par. 51.
142
Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 852, par. 51 - 64 -
prononcer sur l’exception d’incompétence, il suffit à la Cour de comparer l’objet de la requête avec
les termes du traité.
a) L’objet de la requête
10. La requête introduite par la Bolivie demande, certes, à la Cour de déclarer que la
République du Chili a une obligation de négocier ; mais cette obligation doit avoir, selon la
démarche bolivienne, un objet bien précis : celui d’accorder au demandeur « un accès pleinement
souverain à l’océan Pacifique».
11. Alors la Bolivie a semblé par ailleurs, du moins dans son mémoire, appuyer sa requête
sur l’existence d’un très hypothétique titre juridique à l’accès territorial à la mer qu’elle aurait
acquis par l’intermédiaire du traité sur la cession de territoire conclu entre les deux pays en 1895.
12. Or, ce titre territorial fantôme n’a jamais existé. Au demeurant, est -il besoin de le
rappeler, en ce qui concerne cet instrument le traité de 1895 , il ne peut nullement être
invoqué puisque, par un échange de lettres conclu l’année suivante, en 1896, les deux Etats ont
déclaré que l’accord de l’année précédente était dépourvu de tout effet juridique, n’ayant,
entre-temps, jamais été ratifié. C’est, du r este, ce que la Bolivie a reconnu dans ses dernières
143
écritures , en contradiction avec ce qu’elle avait imprudemment avancé dans son mémoire.
13. Les choses doivent par conséquent demeurer bien claires. Il n’y a qu’un seul traité liant
les deux Parties : c’est vous l’aurez reconnu sans peine le traité du 20 octobre 1904 conclu à
Santiago du Chili, et rapidement entré en vigueur après ratification par les parlements des deux
pays. Or, l’objet comme le contenu de cet accord bilatéral, tout comme la p ermanence de sa
validité, sont dépourvus de toute ambiguïté.
b) L’objet et le contenu du traité de 1904
14. Quant à l’objet et au contenu du traité de 1904, à ce stade de la procédure, Mesdames et
Messieurs les juges, il n’a nul secret pour vous.
Rappelons seulement qu’il fait principalement deux choses, et qu’il les fait de façon
parfaitement claire.
143Exposé écrit de la Bolivie concernant l’exception préliminaire du Chili, par. 60-62. - 65 -
D’une part, à son article II, il décrit de manière précise et détaillée la frontière entre les deux
pays ; et cette frontière on vous en a montré la carte tout à l’heure est uniquement
terrestre. Elle ne comporte aucun point d’aboutissement sur le littoral ;
d’autre part, à son article VI, le Chili reconnaît à la Bolivie «el más amplio y libre derecho de
tránsito comercial por su territorio y puertos del Pac ífico» (le droit de transit commercial le
plus ample et le plus libre sur son territoire ainsi que dans ses ports du Pacifique).
Ce droit de transit commercial est matériellement facilité par la construction, aux frais du Chili,
d’un chemin de fer, ainsi qu’il est prévu à l’article III du traité, un chemin de fer dont il est par
ailleurs convenu que la propriété de la section bolivienne sera transférée à la Bolivie elle- même,
passé un délai de quinze ans.
15. Dans la présente affaire, il n ’est par conséquent nul doute quant à la matière «régie» par
le traité de 1904. Aujourd’hui, il résulte du contenu limpide de l’accord de 1904 que la Cour peut
se contenter de constater qu’en outre, ce traité n’a jamais cessé d’être en vigueur depuis la d ate de
son adoption par les deux pays pour aboutir à la conclusion qu’elle n’a pas compétence.
2. Le fait de répondre à l’exception préliminaire du Chili n’équivaudrait
nullement à trancher le différend au fond
16. Et le fait de répondre à l’exception pr éliminaire du Chili n’équivaudrait nullement à
trancher le différend au fond comme cela résulte déjà du point précédent, à savoir la comparaison
des objets respectifs de la requête de la Bolivie et de l’exception à la compétence de la Cour
soulevée par le Chili. Comme on l’a vu, la Bolivie ne prétend qu’une chose ; à savoir qu’elle a un
droit d’accès souverain au Pacifique dont le Chili aurait l’obligation de négocier les modalités ; et
le Chili ne réfute qu’une chose, en disant que vous n’avez pas compétence pour en connaître parce
que toute remise en cause des frontières entre les deux pays remettrait inéluctablement en
discussion une question réglée il y a déjà cent onze ans par le traité conclu en 1904, question qu’il
régit toujours aujourd’hui comme c’était le cas en 1948 au moment de la signature du pacte.
17. Dois-je insister encore une fois sur cette date, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour ! 1948 !
C’est la date cruciale dans toute cette affaire. A la date de signature du pacte de Bogotá, les deux
Parties au présent différend avaient exclu de la compétence de la Cour, déjà quarante- quatre ans
auparavant, la question de savoir si la Bolivie avait ou non un droit d’accéder territorialement à la - 66 -
mer. Cette question était réglée. Or, sur la base de l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá, la Cour n’a pas
de compétence pour connaître une question réglée par un traité en vigueur en 1948 !
18. Il en résulte, on vous l’a déjà dit, que même si l’on acceptait d’envisager, «for the sake of
argument», que certains co mportements imputables au Chili mais postérieurs à 1948 aient pu
contribuer à la formation à son encontre d’une obligation de négocier, l’examen de pareils
agissements ne pourrait pas rentrer dans la compétence de la Cour.
19. Ainsi que la Cour permanente de Justice internationale l’avait dit dès 1923 dans le cas
concernant Certains intérêts allemands en Haute- Silésie polonaise 144, et qu’elle a eu l’occasion de
le rappeler à plusieurs reprises, notamment dans son arrêt précité de 2007 entre le Nicaragua et l a
145
Colombie , la Cour, lorsqu’elle examine des questions de compétence ou de recevabilité, peut
prendre en considération certaines questions qui «appellent par leur nature une étude préalable à
celle de ces problèmes». Mais en l’espèce, en l’espèce, vous avez, Mesdames et Messieurs les
juges, seulement besoin, sans vous engager dans l’examen au fond de la requête de la Bolivie, de
caractériser celle-ci, en tant qu’elle postule au droit à l’accès souverain à la mer, et puis d’en tirer
les conséquences en application de l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá.
20. Ainsi, parvenu au terme des conclusions générales de ces plaidoiries, Monsieur le
président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je terminerai par les rappels qui suivent :
a) L’intégralité de la requête de la Bolivie se place hors du champ de compétence de la Cour. La
question de savoir si ce pays a un droit d’accès souverain à l’ océan Pacifique ayant été réglée
par le traité de 1904. Or, c’est bien la même question qui est visée par la requête bolivienne.
Le Chili prie donc respectueusement la Cour de dire, à ce stade préliminaire, qu’elle n’a pas
compétence pour connaître de cette requête.
b) La prétention de la Bolivie selon laquelle elle disposerait d’un droit historique ininterrompu
dont la naissance serait antérieure au traité de paix de 1904 ne saurait être admise par la Cour
144 o
Affaioe relative à Certains intérêts allemands en Haute -Silésie polonaise, compétence, arrêt 6, 1925,
C.P.J.I. série A n, p. 15.
145 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 851, par. 49 ; Affaire du Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaume-Uni), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 29 ; Appel concernant la compétence du Conseil de l’OACI (Inde
c. Pakistan), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1972, p. 56 ; Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 259,
par. 22 ; Questions d’interprétation et d’application de la convention de Montréal de 1971 ré sultant de l’incident aérien
de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Royaume-Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 132,
par. 47. - 67 -
car elle serait incompatible avec ce traité lui -même, alors qu’il est le seul à avoir réglé la
question.
c) La Cour n’a pas compétence pour examiner une plainte qui se fonderait sur le traité de transfert
de 1895 puisque l’échange de notes intervenu entre les mêmes P arties un an plus tard, a
constaté que l’accord conclu antérieurement était dépourvu de tout effet juridique ; ceci a
comme conséquence, en application de l’article VI du pacte, d’exclure le traité, jamais valide,
de 1895 du consentement des Parties à la compétence de la Cour.
d) Ainsi, Monsieur le président, l e traité de paix de 1904 a définitivement réglé entre les deux
Parties, en lui apportant une réponse négative, la question de savoir si la Bolivie avait, en pleine
souveraineté, un droit d’accès à l’océan Pacifique.
Cette question est exactement du type de celles que l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá avait pour
objet d’exclure de la compé tence de la Cour ; et qua nt à lui, l’article XXXIII du même
instrument, en parfaite convergence avec les dispositions du Statut et du Règlement de la Cour,
confirmées par une jurisprudence constante, doit conduire à la conclusion que ce constat
d’incompétence devrait être décidé à titre préliminaire et définitif.
Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur. Voilà qui met un terme au
premier tour de plaidoiries du Chili. La Cour se réunira de nouveau le mercredi 6 mai, à 10 heures,
pour entendre la Bolivie en son premier tour de plaidoiries. L’audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 18 h 10.
___________
Public sitting held on Monday 4 May 2015, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case concerning Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) - Preliminary Objection