Uncorrected
Non corrigé
CR 2012/13
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2012
Public sitting
held on Friday 27 April 2012, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Tomka presiding,
in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2012
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 27 avril 2012, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président,
en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -
Present: Presient ka
Vice-Presipeúnltveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Sebutinde
Judges ad hoc Mensah
Cot
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Tomka,président
SepMúl.vvae-poé,ident
OwMada.
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
XuMe mes
Donoghue
Sebgutisnde,
MeMnsah.
jugesCot, ad hoc
Cgefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., Chichele Professor of Inte rnational Law, University of Oxford, Counsel
and Advocate,
MrA. lexOudeElferink, Deputy-Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea,
Utrecht University,
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University Pa risOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, former Member
and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr.PaulReichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of
the United States Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
Mr.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.RobinCleverly, M.A., DPhil, C.Geol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
Mr.JohnBrown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers;
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr.Lawrence H. Martin, Foley Hoag LLP, Washi ngton D.C., Member of the Bars of the United
States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Masschusetts,
MsCarmen Martínez Capdevila, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma,
Madrid,
as Counsel; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, ambassadeur de la République du Nicaragua auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M.VaughanLowe, Q.C., professeur de droit interna tional à l’Université d’Oxford, titulaire de la
chaire Chichele, conseil et avocat,
M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur adjoint de l’Ins titut néerlandais du droit de la mer de l’Université
d’Utrecht,
M.AlainPellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari sOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien membre et
ancien président de la Commission du droit inte rnational, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Paul Reichler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C. , membre des barreaux de
la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, professeur de droi t international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M.RobinCleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services du bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
M.JohnBrown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services du bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;
M. César Vega Masís, directeur des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et du territoire au
ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M.Lawrence H. Martin, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux de la
Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du district de Columbia et du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,
Mme Carmen Martínez Capdevila, docteur en droit international public de l’Universidad
Autónoma de Madrid,
comme conseils ; - 6 -
Mr.Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
MsClaudia Loza Obregon, Second Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr.Romain Piéri, Researcher, Centre for Inte rnational Law (CEDIN), University Paris Ouest,
Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Yuri Parkhomenko, Foley Hoag LLP, United States of America,
as Assistant Counsel;
Ms Helena Patton, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
Ms Fiona Bloor, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
as Technical Assistants.
The Government of Colombia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Professor of In ternational Relations, Universidad del Rosario,
Bogotá,
as Agent and Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, former
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Prof essor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , member of the New York Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the OPCW,
as Adviser;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, Preside ntial High-Commissioner for Citizenry Security,
former Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, former
Minister of State,
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, member of the International Law Commission, - 7 -
M. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, premier secrétaire de l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
MmeClaudia Loza Obregon, deuxième secrétaire de l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M.Romain Piéri, chercheur au centre de droi t international (CEDIN) de l’Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M. Yuri Parkhomenko, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme conseils adjoints ;
Mme Helena Patton, bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
Mme Fiona Bloor, bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
comme assistantes techniques.
Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Julio Londoño Paredes, professeur de relations internationales à l’Universidad del
Rosario, Bogotá,
comme agent et conseil ;
S.Exc.M.Guillermo Fernández de Soto, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, ancien
ministre des affaires étrangères,
comme coagent ;
M.James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de dr oit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
M.Rodman R.Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de NewYork,
Cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et
du développement de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’OIAC,
comme conseiller ;
S. Exc. M. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, haut conseiller présidentiel pour la cohabitation et la
sécurité des citoyens, ancien ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas, ancien ministre d’Etat,
M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre de la Commission du droit international, - 8 -
H.E. Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Andelfo García González, Professor of Intern ational Law, former Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs,
Ms Mirza Gnecco Plá, Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Embassy of Colombia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Legal Advisers;
CF William Pedroza, International Affairs Bureau, National Navy of Colombia,
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers;
Mr. Camilo Alberto Gómez Niño,
as Administrative Assistant. - 9 -
S. Exc. Mme Sonia Pereira Portilla, ambassadeur, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Andelfo García González, professeur de droit inte rnational, ancien ministre adjoint des affaires
étrangères,
Mme Mirza Gnecco Plá, ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Andrea Jiménez Herrera, conseiller à l’ambassade de Colombie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
Le capitaine de frégate William Pedroza, bureau des affaires internationales, Marine colombienne,
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
M. Thomas Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques ;
M. Camilo Alberto Gómez Niño,
comme assistant administratif. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open and I give the floor to
Professor James Crawford. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. CRAWFORD:
1. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF MARITIME DELIMITATION
TO THE PRESENT CASE
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, my colleague Mr.Bundy has set out the
geographical context and traced the evolution of Nicaragua’s mutable claim for maritime
delimitation. In this presentation I will briefl y discuss the applicable principles and rules and
identify the provisional equidistance line between the Parties, the first step in any delimitation.
After that, Mr.Bundy and I will address relevant circumstances in the delimitation area, and the
extent to which they may confirm or require adjustments to that line.
The principles and rules of maritime delimitation
2. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this Court and the various tribunals which have
dealt with questions of delimitati on have developed a standard appr oach to the settlement of such
questions. This approach is by now familiar.
3. First, it is necessary to be clear about what area it is that you are called upon to delimit.
Mr. Bundy has already discussed the coasts which define the relevant area. The opposing coasts of
Colombia, that is to say, the west-facing coast s of the archipelago and the east-facing coast of
Nicaragua, define the eastern and western limits of the relevant area.
4. Courts and tribunals then have taken care to consider the situation in view of its particular
geography and other circumstances. The variation between cases is considerable, and so the
process of analysis which has emerged is not a Procrustean bed: it would be a mistake to attempt
to conform every delimitation to an inflexible, fi xed standard. Delimita tion is, nevertheless, a
process having a definite form not to be aband oned lightly. The steps applied by courts and - 11 -
tribunals delimiting maritime areas between oppos ing coasts follow to a degree a methodical
approach that has contributed to predictability, as you stressed in Libya/Malta 1.
5. To identify the median line is, in principl e, a straightforward task of measurement. No
doubt the base points must first be identified from wh ich the measurement is to be taken. Where
the delimitation is in an area bounded by opposing coasts, the court or tribunal must identify the
relevant base points on the baselines of those coasts. So there are three steps:
⎯ identify the base points;
⎯ plot the equidistance or median line;
⎯ identify relevant circumstances which may justify adjustments in that line.
I refer the Court to your statement of principle in Cameroon/Nigeria 2, which has been echoed by
the various Tribunals, in particul ar the AnnexVII Tribunals in Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago 3
4
and Guyana/Suriname , the relevant passages are quoted in our Rejoinder and I will not repeat
them 5.
6. This, Colombia submits, is the proper method for delimiting the maritime area between
the archipelago and Nicaragua’s coasts.
7. Before applying that method to the present fa cts, I will briefly recall the cases which, over
the last several decades, have established this method because our opponents have been rather
ready to get rid of method and to adopt an idiosyncratic approach.
Equidistance as the starting-point
8. First, there is the equidistance or median line, the constant starting-point. It is true that in
the North Sea cases you noted the inequity that could arise for an adjacent State in the middle of a
concave coast 6⎯ we saw the same thing in Bangladesh/Myanmar ⎯ but you contrasted the
1
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahi riya/Malta), I.C.J. Reports 1985, pp. 46, para. 60; see also, ibid., p. 39,
para. 45.
2
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea
intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 441, para. 288.
3
Award of 11 April 2006, para. 242.
4Award of 17 September 2007, para. 342.
5RC, paras. 6.24, 6.30, 6.31.
6North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 38, para. 58. - 12 -
situation of States with opposite coasts, where “[l] ess difficulty” is produced by the equidistance
7
line .
9. In the maritime delimitation you were called on to effect between Libya and Malta ⎯
another case involving opposite coasts. You said that, to identify the median line “is the most
judicious manner of proceeding with a view to the eventual achievement of an equitable result”
(Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p.47,
para. 62).
10. The method was applied again in another opposite coast situation, Jan Mayen, which
involved the opposite coast of a relatively small and distant island dependency and a long mainland
coast. But you treated those coasts as equal ⎯ there was no assumption that Jan Mayen was
located as an excrescence on the continental shelf of Greenland. You said: “it is in accord with
precedents to begin with the median line as a provisional line and then to ask whether ‘special
circumstances’ require any adjustment or shifting of that line” (Maritime Delimitation in the Area
between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , p. 61,
para. 51, citing Gulf of Maine and Libya/Malta; and quoted in Qatar v. Bahrain, I.C.J. Reports
2001, p. 40, pp. 110-111 para. 227). You will recall th at in that case Denmark had argued that the
200mile EEZ was “its” zone, due to its much l onger continental coastline, just as Nicaragua has
done here. You roundly rejected that argument. The median line was the first step in determining
the delimitation between the zones generated from th e opposing coastlines. As you said: “it is
proper to begin the process of delimitati on by a median line provisionally drawn” (Maritime
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 62, para. 53).
11. Romania v. Ukraine was a hybrid case, partly between adjacent coasts, partly opposite
coasts, with a disputed junction between the two segments but you still described the establishment
of the provisional equidistance line as “the first stage of the Court’s approach” and as “[i]n keeping
with [your] settled jurisprude nce on maritime delimitation” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 101, para. 118).
7
North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 36, para. 57. - 13 -
12. In short, it has been your constant approach to start with the median or equidistance line,
as the presumptively equitable delimitation of entitl ement between opposite coasts. The next step
is to consider what, if any, special circumstances may require an adjustment in that line.
Consideration of special circumstances, if any
13. You indicated what is meant by sp ecial circumstances, for example in the Jan Mayen
case, where you said:
“special circumstances are those circumst ances which might modify the result
produced by an unqualified application of the equidistance principle . . . This concept
[i.e., the concept of special circumstances] can be described as a fact necessary to be
taken into account in the delimitation process.” ( Maritime Delimitation in the Area
between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1993, p. 62, para. 55.)
In Qatar/Bahrain, you said as follows: “For the delimitati on of the maritime zones beyond the
12-mile zone [the Court] will first provisionall y draw an equidistance line and then consider
whether there are circumstances which must lead to an adjustment of that line.” (Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), I.C.J.
Reports 2001, p.111, para.230.) By 2001, there was no need to question the principle which
already had taken form in earlier cases.
14. You said the same thing in Cameroon/Nigeria, as I have said.
Nicaragua’s rejection of the consistent approach
15. Yet Nicaragua, in the face of the Court’s consistent approach and the wide subscription
which that approach has received from other tribunals, suggesting in its Reply that here the
equidistance principle is not appropriate at all and should be abandoned. It asserts “that there is an
8
absence of a presumption in favour of an equidistance line” , that plotting such a line is “not
correct” as the first step 9. It contends that, in the relevant cases, “mention of equidistance was
10
carefully avoided when dealing with the delim itation of the more extensive maritime areas” . If
by this Nicaragua means that courts and tr ibunals start by plotting the equidistance line only where
8RN, p. 176, para. 6.67.
9
Ibid., p. 177, para. 6.69.
1Ibid., p. 176, para. 6.66. See also, p. 165, para. 6.49. - 14 -
a question arises of overlapping territorial sea or inshore waters, and not where the more extensive
jurisdictions of the EEZ or continental shelf are c oncerned, then it is plainly incorrect. Colombia
has already set out the clear position of this Court ⎯ in cases wide and narrow ⎯ that the relevant
principles for delimitation are cognate between the different maritime jurisdictions. In
Qatar/Bahrain, you said:
“the equidistance/special circumstances rule, which is applicable in particular to the
delimitation of the territorial sea, and the equitable principles/relevant circumstances
rule, as it has been developed since 1958 in case-law and State practice with regard to
the delimitation of the continental shelf a nd the exclusive economic zone, are closely
interrelated” ( Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 111, para. 231).
And you have never qualified that proposition. Th us despite considerable variations in coastal
geography, there has been a standard starting-point, and that is the equidistance line.
11
16. Even Nicaragua applied it , at least when advancing its original maritime claim but now
it has abandoned it in favour of a venture of its own 12.
17. A brief word is now in order about the proper function of equitable considerations when
delimiting the relevant area between opposite coasts.
18. Maritime delimitation is not subject to a pr inciple of equality of distribution. It takes
geography as the starting point. There is no “doctrine of the just and equitable share”. That is, as
you have said, “wholly at variance with what the Court entertains no doubt is the most fundamental
of all the rules of law” in respect of delimitation, namely that the rights of a State in its maritime
areas exist “by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in the exercise of
sovereign rights” (North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 22, para. 19. See also Jan
Mayen Case, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 67, para. 64). Of course, equ itable considerations play a role,
“[t]he delimitation itself must i ndeed be equitably effected” ( I.C.J. Reports 1969 , p.22,
para. 20) ⎯ as you said in the North Sea cases. And in that regard, you consider relevant
circumstances as possible bases for adjusting the median line. As geography is the starting point in
the analysis, geography can produce unwarranted results, as can other factors. But here we are not
11
MN, pp. 204-208, paras. 3.37-3.42.
12RN, p. 12, paras. 25-26. - 15 -
dealing with an “extraordinary, un natural or unreasonable” archipelago ( ibid., p. 23, para. 24) ⎯ a
merely incidental feature in the delimitation between other areas. We are dealing with a substantial
territorial community, the coastlines of which are the relevant coasts on the Colombian side.
19. The process is not one of adjusting the circumstances and, in particular, it is not a matter
of changing the geography or effacing its effects in pursuit of some vision of equal entitlement ⎯
a fortiori in pursuit of some vision of total proprietorshi p. The geography of the relevant area, as
you said in Cameroon v. Nigeria “is a given”: “[i]t is not an element open to modification by the
Court but a fact on the basis of which the Court must effect the delimitation” ( Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 443-445, para. 295). That is just as true of an archipelago made
up of predominantly small features as it would be of a mainland coast.
The principle applied: identifying the relevant base points
20. My colleague Mr.Bundy has identified the relevant coasts. It then falls to identify
precisely the base points on the baselines of those coasts.
21. As you said in Qatar v. Bahrain:
“The equidistance line is the line every point of which is equidistant from the
nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of
the two States is measured. It can only be drawn when the baselines are known.”
(Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Ques tions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar
v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 94, para. 177.)
You applied the same method in Cameroon-Nigeria, when you referred to Qatar-Bahrain with
approval. Article 15 defines the median line as that line, “every point of which is equidistant from
the nearest points on the baselines from which the bread th of the territorial seas of each of the two
States is measured” (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 442, para. 290).
22. The precise manner in which that basic principle is applied will depend, of course, on the
coastal geography. It may be noted that neither St ate has enacted a system of straight baselines in
respect of the relevant opposing coasts, so that issue does not arise.
23. Article 6 provides that a State setting out its base points for a delimitation, when these
fall on the low-water line of a fringing reef, is to refer to “the appropriate symbols on charts [which - 16 -
it] officially recognize[s]”. Colombia in the present proceedings has produced hydrographic charts
of the relevant area and has undertaken two detailed studies, which I have discussed, in order to
focus on the particular coastal geography. On the basis of the charts and the improved data made
available by the surveys, Colombia has set out the base points on its side of the relevant area for
measurement of the median line.
24. In respect of the Nicaraguan side, analysis is impeded by the lack of data in Nicaragua’s
pleadings, in this respect as in others. Nicaragua has advanced a series of mutable maritime claims,
but has undertaken scarcely any of the detailed wo rk which courts and tribunals, in other cases,
have found indispensable. Colombia is thus con fronted with a scantily-pleaded geography. This
has made it necessary to piece together the details of Nicaragua’s coastal front, a task ordinarily
belonging to the opposing State. Colombia has done so on the basis of publically available data as
concerns Nicaragua’s coastal islands.
Colombia’s base points
25. But, first, the base points on Colombia ’s side. This map was Figure 9.2 in the
Counter-Memorial. The three frames comprising the map represent the parts of the archipelago
relevant to the delimitation. Th e northernmost part, Quitasueño, is represented in the frame to the
left. The middle frame represents the islands of Santa Catalina, Providencia and Low Cay. The
right frame represents San Andrés Island and the Alburquerque Cays.
26. Starting at the north, Colombia has iden tified four base points on Quitasueño, denoted
Q1, Q4, Q18 and Q22, one island, three low-tide el evations, the latter covered by Article 6 of the
1982 Convention. The facts which establish their eligibility are confirmed in the geographic
surveys to which I have referred.
27. My colleague Mr. Bundy has already addressed what must pass for Nicaragua’s response
to Colombia’s proposed base points; it is a global response, which seeks to reject, grosso modo¸
the entire relevant coastal front on the Colombian side. But it is a global response that contains no
analysis of the base points as such. Colombia st ands by the data with which it has identified the
base points, and stands by the application of the rules and principles to that data. - 17 -
28. Moving south from Quitasueño, we come to the Providencia and Santa Catalina islands
in the central section of the archipelago. The west coast of Providencia furnishes two base points,
located on the “normal” baselines ⎯ the low-water line on the coast, marked on the map now
displayed. From the two Providencia base points, the central segment of the equidistance line can
be positioned. Approximately eight nautical mi les to the north of Santa Catalina, Low Cay
furnishes a further base point.
29. Finally, the southern section of the archip elago contains six further base points, four on
San Andrés Island, two on the Alburquerque Cays. The four base points on San Andrés Island are
located on the island’s west coast. The two southernmost base points are marked A3 and A4 on the
map now displayed.
30. These are the base points which control th e position of the equidistance line from the
Colombian side. I now turn to the Nicaraguan base points, which can be identified briefly.
Nicaragua’s base points
31. As we have said, the entire equidistance line between Colombia and Nicaragua is
controlled by base points located on the offshore islands and cays appurte nant to Nicaragua’s
Caribbean mainland shore. The relevant isla nds and cays are named in red on the map now
displayed. Edinburgh Reef, the Miskito Cays a nd nearby features generate the Nicaraguan base
points for the northern part of the equidistance line. The southern sector of the equidistance line is
controlled by base points on Great Corn Island and Little Corn Island.
Nicaragua’s rejection of the coasts
32. It is important to recall now exactly what Nicaragua has said about the coasts. It has
rejected the equidistance line as a starting point, and it did so in the following terms:
“In the present case, and under the scenario put forward by Colombia, the
exercise is indefensible, since there is no Colombian coast opposite Nicaragua’s , and
even if San Andrés and Providencia coul d be said to collectively constitute a
‘coast’ ⎯ which Nicaragua disputes ⎯ the area located between them and the
Nicaraguan mainland represents no more than 50% of the area to be delimited, and the
13
two ‘coasts’ are entirely dissimilar.”
13
RN. p 179, para. 6.72. - 18 -
33. There are two points here. First, Nicaragua categorically rejects the equidistance
principle as applicable in these circumstances. U nder Nicaragua’s theory, that equidistance is only
relevant where the coasts in question are “si milar”. Even there, its acknowledgment of
equidistance is grudging; it allows that equidistance “as a starting point could have merit” 14. This
subverts the principle of equidistance/special circumstances as consistently applied in maritime
delimitation cases: Nicaragua would introduce a new criterion, a limiting factor absent from the
decided cases. According to Nicaragua, the coasts must be “similar” if equidistance is to be the
proper starting-point. This “similar coasts” th eory is a complete novelty, unsupported by any
authority whatever. It would mean that in any delimitation between a continental coast and a group
of offshore islands, equidistance is ignored. It is as if the delimitation has already occurred ⎯ the
continental winner takes all or almost all, and the only question is what limited tolerance is to be
afforded to the insular losers who are begging at the continental gate. If Nicaragua is right with its
“similar coasts” theory the coast al maps of the world will have to be redrawn with a sign
“BEWARE. CONTINENTAL COAST. ISLANDS ARE WARNED NOT TO APPROACH
WITHIN 200MILES OR YOU WILL LOSE EVERYTHING YOU POSSESS!” Far from being
the Mosquito Coast, this is apparently the Crocodile Coast ⎯ with large bites!
34. That is not how maritime delimitation has occurred between mainland and insular coasts,
either diplomatically or in judicial practice. Th e coasts of Nigeria and Bioko are not similar; nor
are the coasts of Nigeria and Sao Tome e Principe. Yet the delimitations and cognate arrangements
there have not followed the “similar coasts” theory . I can give many other examples and in my
second speech this afternoon I will take you to more of the diplomatic practice-- something that
Mr.Reichler assiduously avoided. Nor did you regard the theory of similar coasts as having the
slightest relevance in dealing with Equatorial Guinea’s intervention in Cameroon/Nigeria. The
coasts of Libya and Malta are not similar; yet you treated them as pro tanto entitled to equal
respect. Under the “similar coasts” theory Libya would have got a whole lot more.
35. But, secondly and most strikingly, Nicaragua completely revises the geography. If
Nicaragua’s pleading is taken at face value, then , in its words, “there is no Colombian coast
14
RN, p. 179, para. 6.72; emphasis added. - 19 -
15
opposite Nicaragua’s” . We have already seen that Nicaragua seeks to excise Quitasueño from the
map of the western Caribbean. Now, it seems, Nicaragua has taken its pen to the map and
eliminated not just the northern part but the archip elago as a whole! In its territorial claim it failed
to see 80,000 Colombian citizens, whose future was regarded as a ma tter subject to a proprietorial
claim; in its maritime claim, it fails to see their coasts. It should consult an optician.
36. In its attempt to disqualify the coasts, Nica ragua refers to a number of situations, each of
which is completely inapposite to the geography of the western Caribbean. In particular, it refers to
Romania v. Ukraine and the treatment there of Serpents’ Isla nd; it refers to the rocky outcrop of
Fifla which the Court ignored in Libya/Malta; the sand bar of Qit’at Jaradah in the Qatar v.
Bahrain case; and the Tunisian island of Djerba in Tunisia/Libya. But the features in the first three
of these cases were minor features, and their geographic relation to the mainland coasts was
entirely dissimilar to that of the Nicaraguan co astal islands and Colombia’s relatively distant
archipelago. As for the Tunisian island of Dj erba, its presence was outweighed by the conduct of
the parties in respecting a de facto line. I would only make here three general observations.
37. First, Nicaragua contends that the archipel ago is a mere minor or insubstantial feature,
like Filfla or Serpents’ Island. Second, it conten ds that the archipelago, which is separated by
significant maritime spaces, is adjacent to its own coast 16. These contentions cannot be justified on
the facts. Finally, it ignores that, with the exception of Tunisia/Libya, where the coastal
configuration of the two adjacent States and th eir substantial practice indicated a special
17
approach , the equidistance method nevertheless was the method applied to the delimitation in
each of the cases in which Nicaragua pleads for its disapplication. Simply put, Nicaragua’s
examples do nothing to overturn the consistent position that the equidistance line is the starting line
for a maritime delimitation; they do not affect the identification of the relevant coasts; and they do
not affect the identification of the relevant b ase points. The equidistance method is the method
consistent with your jurisprudence; it applies as between the relevant coasts of Nicaragua and the
15
RN, p. 179, para. 6.72; emphasis added.
16
RN, p. 183, para. 6.80. See also ibid., p. 186, para. 6.88.
17Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, pp. 85-86, para. 121. - 20 -
archipelago; and Colombia’s base points are th e proper base points for the measurement of the
median line.
The course of the median line
38. With the relevant base points established, it then falls to trace the median line between
them. This is a straightforward exercise in measurement. The map now displayed represents the
relevant area and the median line resulting from th e application of the legal principles to the
geography. The median line is represented by a red line, running from the south to the north-east.
For reference and comparison, an orange line denotes the 82nd W meridian.
39. The southern portion of the median lin e runs between the Alburquerque Cays and
San Andrés Island on Colombia’s side; and the Littl e and Great Corn Islands on Nicaragua’s side.
The arrow at the southern extremity of the line de notes the proximity of that line in the region to
potential third State interests.
40. In the middle of the line, the relevant base points are those of San Andrés Island,
Providencia and Santa Catalina, including Low Ca y on Colombia’s side; Little Corn Island and
Roca Tyra on Nicaragua’s side. The median line, for most of its southern portion, follows a
north-south course.
41. The control points for the line further north shift its course to the east. These are the line
segments between Quitasueño on Colombia’s side and the Miskito Cays and Edinburgh Reef on
Nicaragua’s. The line continues until it reaches the area of potential third State rights, again
denoted by an arrow.
42. Mr. President, Members of the Court, once the median line has been identified, it falls to
consider circumstances which might call for an adjustment of it. We propose to do this in this song
and dance routine between two advocates with Mr.Bundy first addressing several circumstances
which confirm the median line as the proper line between Nicaragua and Colombia. Circumstances
other than geographical circumstances. I will retu rn, with your permission, Mr. President, then to
discuss the crucial geographical circumstances.
Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Crawford. I invite Mr. Bundy to take the floor. - 21 -
Mr. BUNDY: Thank you, Mr. President.
2. T HE RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Introduction
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, as ProfessorCrawford indicated in this part of our
presentation, we will address the second step in the delimitation process. This involves identifying
the relevant circumstances characterizing the area to be delimited and assessing whether they
confirm the equitable nature of the provisional e quidistance line or whether that line needs to be
adjusted in order to achieve an equitable result.
2. It will be apparent that the Parties take a very different approach to dealing with the
relevant circumstances, and, indeed, the entire delimitation process. Colombia has taken pains to
respect the two-step approach to delimitation that the Court has articulated under the rubric of the
“equitable principles/relevant circumstances” or “equidistance/special circumstances” rule. In
other words, as we have heard, Colombia has first calculated the provisional equidistance line, and
then examined the relevant circum stances to ascertain whether they should have an effect on that
line. As Colombia has shown, and will endeavour to do so this afternoon, consideration of the
relevant circumstances in this case does indeed confirm the equitable nature of an equidistance line
drawn between the relevant base points on the Parties’ coasts.
3. Nicaragua, on the other hand, rejects the C ourt’s consistent approach to delimitation.
Equidistance obviously plays no role in Nicaragua ’s new claim, which is based on geology and
nothing but geology: and it does not take into account the relevant circumstances of the relevant
area.
4. Not only is Nicaragua’s approach to delim itation divorced from the practice of the Court,
it is also inconsistent with Nicaragua’s previous view of the applicable methodology. Earlier
today, the Court will recall, that I pointed out that even in 2007 ⎯ six years after the case was
introduced ⎯ Nicaragua was vigorously arguing in this very room that the Court will certainly
want to proceed, as it now systematically does ⎯ in other words, drawing a provisional
equidistance line; and then taking into consid eration “special circumstances” which may be such
as to adjust that line.
5. That position has obviously been abandoned. - 22 -
6. Notwithstanding Nicaragua’s ever-changing position, in the present case, the relevant
circumstances fall broadly into two categories: geographic factors; and the conduct of the Parties
and that of third States in the region. I shall start by discussing the conduct of Colombia and
Nicaragua, as well as that of third States which sheds light on where an equitable delimitation
should be situated: and following my presentation, as Professor Crawford said, he will take up the
geographic circumstances.
7. But with respect to both sets of circumstan ces, the basic questions remain the same: do
those circumstances confirm that a delimitation based on the application of equidistance
methodology between the western string of Colombia’s islands and Nicaragua produces an
equitable result, which they do; and can Nicaragua ’s claims stretching far to the east be reconciled
with a proper application of the principles a nd rules of maritime delimitation taking into
consideration the relevant circumstances, which they cannot.
2. The nature and role of the relevant circumstances
8. The Court first pronounced on the notion of relevant circumstances in its Judgment in the
North Sea cases. The relevant passage is well known, but it is useful to quote it again, given that it
reflects an important statement of principle. The Court said:
“In fact, there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take
account of for the purpose of making sure th at they apply equitable procedures, and
more often than not it is the balancing-up of all such considerations that will produce
this result rather than reliance on one to the exclusion of all others. The problem of
the relative weight to be accorded to the different considerations naturally varies with
the circumstances of the case.” ( North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of
Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1969, p. 50, para. 93.)
9. In the Libya/Malta case, the Court repeated the point stating: “there is assuredly no closed
list of considerations” ( Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 40, para. 48); in Tunisia/Libya, those circumstances included the conduct of
the Parties and in fact the conduct of their colonial predecessors as well as geographic factors; in
Greenland and Jan Mayen, they included access to fishing resources; and in the Guyana/Suriname - 23 -
award, the Arbitral Tribunal said that internati onal courts and tribunals are not constrained by a
18
finite list of special circumstances .
10. Notwithstanding Nicaragua’s new claim, the subject-matter of the present dispute does
remain the delimitation of a single mariti me boundary involving the continental shelf and the
column of water.
11. There can be no doubt that geographic factors are of importance for this exercise. The
provisional equidistance line is, after all, the product of geography ⎯ namely, the base points on
the Parties’ coasts that control that line. But the relevant circumstances in this case encompass
other factors as well, it is these that I would like to turn to.
3. Colombia’s exercise of jurisdiction and control
12. As is the case with respect to the effectivités that Colombia performed over the islands,
the evidence regarding the administration, manage ment and control by Colombia over the waters
within the San Andrés Archipelago all goes in one direction. Colombia carried out a wide
spectrum of such activities; Nicaragua did not.
13. Now I assure the Court that I do not intend to rehearse all the evidence that has been set
out in the written pleadings. It is extensive and well documented. Instead, I will highlight some of
the essential elements of this practice ⎯ a practice that stands in sharp contrast to the absence of
any similar conduct on the part of Nicaragua.
(i)Co-operation with third States on the management and conservation of fish
resources
14. Let me start with the management and conservation of the living resources. Here,
Colombia has engaged both in co-operative initiati ves with other States in the region and has
adopted its own conservation measures. Why is this important?
15. Under international law, a coastal State not only has the sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the
sea-bed and subsoil, it also has obligations to conserve and manage the resources, living or
non-living, situated in the column of water.
18
Award in the Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, 17 Sep. 2007, para. 302. - 24 -
16. It follows that the delimitation of a single maritime boundary in the present case will not
simply result in a delimitation of areas where the Parties may exercise sovereign rights, it will also
delimit areas where the Parties have legal duties to conserve and manage the associated resources.
That is one factor that distingui shes the exclusive economic zone from the continental shelf. With
respect to the former, Article 56 of the Convention specifically mentions a coastal State’s duties, as
well as its rights, with respect to the column of water; with respect to the latter, the continental
shelf, Article 77 only speaks of a coastal State’s rights over the continental shelf.
17. Given this situation, and bearing in mind that the overall objective of maritime
delimitation is to achieve an equitable result, Colo mbia believes that it is appropriate for the Court
to ask itself whether an equidistance-based bounda ry respects, and is consistent with, the
long-standing practice of the Parties in exerci sing jurisdiction and managing and conserving the
natural resources in the area in dispute, and wh ether the Parties’ respective claims can be
reconciled with that practice.
18. In considering that question, one fact ag ain stands out from the evidence that has been
adduced in the pleadings. It has been Colombia, and Colombia alone, that has not only exercised
jurisdiction over all of the waters lying east of the 82nd degree meridian including between all the
islands of the San Andrés Archipelago, but h as also been engaged in the conservation and
management related to the resources of these waters . And I would note that none of the evidence
that Colombia produced to document these activities has been challenged by the other side.
19. With respect to practice involving co-operation with other States, each of Colombia’s
agreements with Panama, Costa Rica, Jamaica and even the United States ⎯ which was not in fact
a delimitation agreement with the United States ⎯ all contain provisions pursuant to which the
parties have agreed to co-operate in implementing measures for the preservation, conservation and
exploitation of the resources in the waters that ar e subject to those agreements. They have also
19
agreed to undertake marine scientific research and to fight against pollution .
20. Colombia has entered into agreements with Jamaica also regulating the quantity of fish
20
that may be caught to preserve the resources around Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo ⎯ a point that I
19
CMC, Anns. 4.5 and 14.
20RC, para. 8.44 and CMC, Anns. 7 and 9. - 25 -
mentioned yesterday ⎯ and with the United States to conserve the conch and spiny lobster species
in the waters adjacent to Quitasueño, Roncador and Serrana 21. In fact, Colombia and the United
States have an agreement which allows Colombia n officials to board United States flagged vessels
to verify their compliance with Colombia’s conser vation regulations within the waters of the San
22 23
Andrés Archipelago . Colombia has also enacted internal regulations for the same purpose .
21. These facts are telling in and of themselves. But they are even more significant when
viewed against Nicaragua’s claims advanced in this case. Both of Nicaragua’s claims ⎯ its
original mainland-to-mainland median line single maritime boundary claim and its new continental
shelf claim ⎯ extend far to the east of the islands of the archipelago. The necessary implication of
these claims is that Nicaragua now considers that it has a boundary relationship with both Panama
and Costa Rica in the south and the east, and with Jamaica in the north. Yet we have no evidence
that Nicaragua, let alone Panama, Costa Rica or Jamaica, ever acted on that assumption, either by
discussing delimitation questions, or by entering into agreements relating to the protection of the
marine environment and the conservation of its living and non-living resources. As I noted earlier
today, Nicaragua had no reaction to the Colo mbia-Panama agreement in the east, Costa Rica
considered that Colombia was its delimitation pa rtner in the south, and Nicaragua’s discussions
with Jamaica were focused on the areas around the Rosalind Bank lying to the north of our area of
concern.
22. Nicaragua has not produced any evidence showing that it had any interest in these issues,
or that it enacted any legislation or regulations relating to these areas dea ling with such critical
matters as the conservation and management of th e fish resources, the protection of the marine
environment, the control of contraband, and the carrying out of marine scientific research. Nor has
there been any evidence that Nicaragua engaged in co-operation with neighbouring States on these
types of matters in the areas it now claims.
21
RC, paras. 8.38-8.41.
22
Ibid., paras. 8.53-8.56.
2Ibid., para. 8.42. - 26 -
(ii) Fishing regulation by Colombia
23. With respect to the regulation of fi shing by Colombia, the Colombian Maritime
Authority has been tasked with the responsib ility for exercising surveillance over the maritime
activities throughout the waters of the archipelago. Vessels desiring to fish in these waters, in
addition to obtaining a fishing licence from the relevant authority, must also have a navigation
permit issued by the Colombian Maritime Aut hority (DIMAR). The issuance of Colombian
regulations governing fishing in the area is long-standing, dating back to the 1920s.
24. Colombia has produced extensive evidence demonstrating that foreign vessels have
24
respected these regulations . These include a number of vessels flying the Nicaraguan flag, which
have routinely been granted such permits on app lication, as well as vessels flagged by the United
Kingdom, the United States, Russia, Honduras, Ja maica, Belize, Venezuela, the Dominican
Republic, Panama and the Cayman Islands, amongst others. A list of 91 instances where Colombia
has licensed foreign fishing vessels in the waters of the archipelago may be found in Appendix 5 to
25
Colombia’s Counter-Memorial .
25. Due to the special features of the wester n Caribbean, one of the largest fishing potential
capacity in the area is actually in the waters close to Nicaragua’s mainland coast, and in the vicinity
of the Corn Islands and the Miskito Cays. In f act, over 87 per cent of Central-American exports of
26
the spiny lobster to the United Stat es come from Nicaragua and Honduras . Colombia’s claim in
this case does not prejudice Nicaragua’s ability to harness that potential at all.
26. As to the areas east of the 82nd meridian , the fishing resources are concentrated between
the cays of Roncador, Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. Those waters, it has been
documented, are rich in lobster, conch, turtles a nd white fish in general. Since time immemorial,
artisanal fishing has constituted an important, in f act absolutely critical, activity for the subsistence
of the archipelago’s inhabitants 27. As for industrial fishing, it is a structural element of the
archipelago’s economy as it accounts for the vast majority of exports from the San Andrés
Archipelago.
24CMC, paras. 3.29-3.42.
25
See also, CMC, para. 3.41 including the list of licensing of foreign fishing vessels in App. 5.
26CMC, para. 9.76.
27CMC, Ann. 87. - 27 -
(iii) Implementation of security measures
27. Let me now turn to security issues. In its Memorial, Nicaragua acknowledged the
relevance of these kinds of factors. In Nicaragua’s words ⎯ and I quote from their Memorial:
“International tribunals have given firm recognition to the relevance of security considerations to
the assessment of the equitable character of the delimitation.” 28 Yet, once again, it has been
Colombia, not Nicaragua, that has been active in this domain.
28. In an earlier presentation, I referred to the fact that all of Colombia’s islands possess a
contiguous zone, and that many of these zones overlap with each other. The exercise by Colombia
of control over the infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws within these
zones all obviously have important security ramifications. Nicaragua’s claims seek to deny to
Colombia its rights over these zones.
29. But security issues also exist with respect to the waters of the archipelago more widely.
As the Court indicated in the Greenland-Jan Mayen case, security interests can relate to all
maritime areas 29. Moreover, the notion of secu rity interests for States today has became a broader
concept than it was in years past when the defence of territory w as perhaps the primary concern.
For example, States now have essential security interests that relate to the tracking and control of
trafficking in arms, or in drugs, piracy and illegal immigration before their territory is reached.
30. One element relating to security that is pa rticularly pertinent in the present case concerns
the control of illicit drug trafficking in this part of the Caribbean. It is an area which has a past
record of being an important conduit for contraband headed north. Colombia is a party to the
1988United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances. Article17 of that Convention en courages States to co-operate in agreeing
arrangements to board and search vessels flagge d by another State suspected of illegal drug
trafficking. In 1997, Colombia entered into such an agreement with the United States, which is
implemented throughout the waters of the San Andr és Archipelago beyond the territorial sea of the
islands. In addition to permitting Colombia to board United States flagged vessels suspected of
drug smuggling, the 1997 Agreement also provides th at the Parties will develop and share tactical
28
MN, para. 3.69.
2Maritime Delimitation in the Ar ea between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , p.75,
para. 81. - 28 -
information to track suspicious vessels. Concrete evidence of this has been put into practice, and
that may be found under Appendix7 to Colombia ’s Counter-Memorial. Those documents show
that these kind of operations have been carried out both, mainly to the east, but also just to the west
of San Andrés Islands and Provide ncia, and south of Quitasueño. Numerous other operations
30
conducted by the Colombian Navy are also documented in Colombia’s pleadings . These kind of
operations are not only of benefit to Colombia, but they are a benefit to the international
community as well.
(iv) Search and Rescue Operations and Marine Scientific Research
31. Colombia has engaged, as I mentioned yesterday, in numerous search and rescue
operations in waters that Nicaragua now claims. Yesterday I focused on these examples when they
took place in the territorial seas of the islands. But there are other examples further out to sea, in
the middle of the archipelago. I do not intend to recount them now but I would respectfully refer
the Court to Colombia’s Rejoinder, where at least 18 individual missions are listed.
32. Colombia has undertaken hydrographic surv eys and the preparation of literally scores of
maritime charts relating to the area 31. Again, this exercise is not simply for the benefit of
Colombia, but to the international community in general. Colombia has furnished evidence of the
kinds of marine scientific research and hydrographic studies it has carried out in the waters of the
32
archipelago . Nicaragua can show nothing similar.
(v)NavalPatrols
33. In exercising its rights and duties with respect to these maritime areas, Colombia has also
carried out scores ⎯ in fact, even hundreds of naval operations within the waters situated east of
the 82°meridian. At least 163such examples can be found in Appendix7 to Colombia’s
Counter-Memorial. They range from routine patrol s, to the interdiction of illegal cargo, and the
control of fishing, etc. And a number of these operations have actually been carried out jointly
with other States.
30
See the list, CMC, p. 300, para. 8.56.
31
CMC, App. 11.
3Ibid., Apps. 10 and 12. - 29 -
34. Nicaragua has tried to excuse its absence from the areas it now claims by arguing that
“Colombia has consistently used her enormous superior military forces to impose [the 82°
33
meridian] as a limit on Nicaraguan vessels” . Let me respond to that argument by making four
points to show why the argument does not withst and scrutiny; and Professor Kohen will then
return to the issue later when he talks about and addresses Nicaragua’s request for declaratory
relief.
35. First, Nicaragua appears to have a sel ective memory. In its case against Honduras,
Nicaragua responded to similar Honduran complaints ⎯ i.e., that Honduras was being prevented
by superior Nicaraguan forces ⎯ Nicaragua responded by stressing that it was simply protecting
the jurisdiction of its country 3. Colombia was doing no different.
36. Second, the vast majority of Nicaragua n and other flagged vessels respected Colombian
law by applying for, and receiving, fishing permits to operate in the waters of the archipelago,
provided they did not engage in overfishing. I have already referred to these, and specific
examples of the issuance of such permits are in cluded in considerable detail and length in our
written pleadings 35.
37. Third, Nicaragua never took any interest in adopting regulations to manage and conserve
the resources of the sea, or to control pollution, which did not depend on a physical presence in the
area. Mr.President, Members of the Court, you can show your concern and interest in maritime
areas by enacting legislation and regulations rela ting to the conservation of the resources, the
control of pollution and the types of issues I have been discussing. No evidence of any of that by
Nicaragua.
38. Fourth, it was not only Colombia that was engaged in naval interdictions; Nicaragua did
the same thing, although the important point to no te is that all of its activities took place in areas
that were situated next to the 82° meridian, particularly when Colombian vessels strayed to the
west of that meridian 36.
33RN, para. 35.
34
Nicaragua’s Reply in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case, para. 7.60.
35
CMC, App. 5, pp. 64, 65, 92, 95, 96, 97 and 98.
36MN, Anns. 49-50, 53, 55 and 57. - 30 -
4. The Relevance of the 82° Meridian
39. That brings me to my final point ⎯ the significance of the 82° meridian of longitude as a
relevant circumstance. In Colombia’s view, the 82° meridian constitutes a relevant circumstance to
be taken into account in determining whether the provisional equidistance line requires any degree
of adjustment and where an equitable delimitation generally should lie.
40. Contrary to the impression that our colleagues have sought to create, in addressing the
role of the 82° meridian, Colombia has been fully mindful of what the Court had to say about that
line in its Judgment on the preliminary objections. There, the Court found that the terms of the
1930 Protocol were more consistent with the not ion that the provisions of the Protocol were
intended to fix the western limits of the San Andr és Archipelago at the 82° meridian, rather than
37
effecting a delimitation of the maritime boundary .
41. That is why Colombia’s delimitation position is today based on the principles and rules
of international law as those principles exist ⎯ the “equidistance/relevant circumstances” rule.
42. Mr. Crawford showed you this map [on screen]. It shows both the equidistance line ⎯
or the provisional equidistance line ⎯ and the 82° meridian. Now, obviously the course of the
equidistance line is dictated by the base points on the nearest baselines of the Parties and thus is not
the same as the meridian.
43. But, nonetheless, it is not surprising that the 82° meridian does fall in the same general
area as the equidistance line. To the extent that the purpose of the 82° meridian was to fix the
western limits of the San Andrés Archipelago, a nd in this manner to divide the archipelago from
the Nicaraguan archipelago consisting mainly of the Corn Islands and Miskitos Cays, it was natural
for that limit to fall between the territory of the two States ⎯ in other words, between the two sets
of islands, or two sets of archipelagos. That, of course, is what an equidistance line also does; it
delimits maritime areas between the territories of the two States. Hence, the location of the two
lines in the same general area.
44. After the Parties concluded the 1928/19 30 agreement, both Parties respected the 82°
meridian for purposes of exercising jurisdiction for almost four decades, close to 40 years, without
incident. That important fact was not menti oned in Nicaragua’s first round pleadings, which
3Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007, p. 867, para. 115. - 31 -
tended to focus on much more recent events. It was only in the late 1960s that Nicaragua began to
disturb the status quo in the north.
45. In his presentation on Monday afternoon, Prof essor Pellet tried to truncate the extent of
the 82° meridian that was agreed pursuant to th e 1930 Protocol to cover only the islands of San
Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. This is the map he used.
46. Curiously, despite his fondness for its spelling, Professor Pellet did not even place
Alburquerque or the East-Southeast Cays on the map. His focus was solely on the northern islands
of the San Andrés Archipelago. No doubt that was because Nicaragua’s Reply itself had indicated
that the group of islands comprising Alburquerque a nd the East-Southeast Cays did have “a certain
proximity and possible connection” with the San Andrés group 38. So, at least we have a small
concession by the other side.
So Professor Pellet’s 82° meridian extends south at least as far so as to include Alburquerque
and the East-Southeast Cays.
47. What about the islands lying further north?
48. As Professor Kohen explained yesterday, in 1929 Colombia informed Nicaragua of the
terms of the Olaya-Kellogg Agreement, between the US and Colombia, which established a special
régime for Quitasueño, Roncador and Serrana, which were in di spute between Colombia and the
United States. Colombia informed Nicaragua of this and of its claims, pursuant to that agreement,
to those three islands, before the 1928 Treaty wa s considered and approved by the Nicaraguan
Congress and before the 1930 Protocol emerged. Nicaragua thus knew of Colombia’s claims over
those specific islands when the 1930 Protocol wa s concluded, but did not raise the slightest
negative reaction. And, as I have said, for almost 40 years thereafter Nicaragua also never reacted.
It respected the 82° meridian in practice.
49. Thus, we can also extend Professor Pellet’s version of the 82° meridian to the north so as
to include Roncador, Serrana and Quitasueño, to th e east of that meridian, since they were well
known that Colombia claimed them as of 1930 and Nicaragua did not react.
38
RN, para. 1.74. - 32 -
50. Now, as you can see on the map, ProfessorPe llet has also drawn some dashed parallel
lines to the north of Providencia and to the south of San Andrés in an effort to box in Colombia’s
islands. But these are completely fictitious. Nicar agua knew how to draw parallels of latitude to
indicate areas that were of concern to it and to ci rcumscribe its area of interest when it wanted to.
That is what it did in connection with its reac tion to the Loubet Award, as can be seen from the
addition that has now been put on the screen. Th at red boxed-in area was the area that Nicaragua
indicated in reaction to the Loubet Award that was of interest to them. It had a meridian, but it also
had parallels of latitude in the north and south, circumscribing its area of interest.
51. Nothing of the kind was included with the 1930 Protocol. The 82° meridian has a
north-south axis that extended from south of Albu rquerque to north of Quitasueño. It was
respected by the Parties in exercising their maritime jurisdiction for nearly 40 years afterwards
without problems.
52. Now that respect by the Parties for the 82° meridian is also in line with the manner in
which they have depicted the situation cartographically. I am not going to go through all the maps,
I assure you, but I will show just two, to give a sample of what there is.
53. This map on the screen shows how Nicaragua’s General Directorate of Cartography
officially depicted Nicaragua in 1967 ⎯ that is just two years before ProfessorRemiro Brotóns’
critical date. Quite clearly, the map did not extend east of the islands of San Andrés and
Providencia where Nicaragua now purports to have claims. In fact, the labelling on the map clearly
indicates that the islands there to the east belong to Colombia. This map hardly suggests that
Nicaragua considered at the time that it had sovereign rights extending far to the east of the
82° meridian.
54. Cartographically, Colombia’s position represents the other side of the coin. It has
consistently shown the San Andrés Archipelago and the waters in between as appertaining to it.
55. The map on the screen will be familiar to the Court since it was produced during the
preliminary objections phase and I think it made another appearance yesterday. It was an official
map of Colombia dated 1931 ⎯ just after the 1930 Protocol. - 33 -
The Court will see that the entire archipelago is depicted as Colombian. And in contrast, the
Republic of Nicaragua is indicated as falling to the west of the 82° meridian, as can be seen if we
highlight that meridian on the map so that it is easier to see.
56. In its Judgment on the Preliminary Objections, the Court indicated that this map, as well
as other similar maps produced by Colombia, could be read either as identifying a general maritime
delimitation between the two States or as only a limit between the archipelagos. And given the
ambiguous nature of the dividing line depicted on the map, the Court concluded that it could not be
deemed to prove that both Parties believed th at the 1928 Treaty and 1930 Protocol effected a
39
general delimitation of their maritime boundary .
57. Nonetheless, what the maps do show is that, at a minimum, the 82° meridian was
considered, since the beginning, as a line between th e territories of both States. This is illustrated
not only by the maps that I have displayed, but also numerous others that are included in the
pleadings.
58. And in this context, the question ari ses whether it would comport with equitable
principles and with the aim of achieving an equita ble result for Nicaragua’s claims to sovereign
rights extending over a vast area that encircles Colombia’s islands and encompasses all the waters
in between, to be accepted given the role of the 82° meridian as a limit to the islands and the
territory of both States in the west.
59. If that is the limit of your territory and it is a dividing line between the territory, is it
really equitable when that line has been respected fo r decades to have sovereign rights extending
way to the east? Colombia feels very strongly th at it would not be. There is nothing equitable
about a claim that is inconsistent with the recognized limits of the Parties’ territory and inconsistent
with their past conduct. As Colombia has shown, it has not only consistently exercised jurisdiction
over the waters of the San Andrés Archipelago lyi ng east of the 82° meridian, it has also complied
with its obligations to conserve and manage th e resources of the area and it has co-operated with
other States in this and other respects. And the result has been a maritime area that is peaceful and
well-managed.
3Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (II), p. 868, para. 118. - 34 -
60. And in Colombia’s view, the factors I have discussed deserve to be taken into account in
determining where an equitable solution lies. Now Nicaragua may choose not to discuss these
elements, as happened with its first round presentation, but they are relevant circumstances which,
on the one hand, confirm the equitable nature of a delimitation based on equidistance principles
and, on the other hand, underscore the inequitable nature of Nicaragua’s claims.
61. Mr.President, that concludes my presentation, and I would be grateful ⎯ perhaps this
might be a good time for the pause, but obviously it is up to the Court ⎯ at the appropriate time, if
Professor Crawford could be called on to conti nue Colombia’s presentation. Thank you to the
Court.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Bundy. The Court will take 15 minutes’ break. After
that, Professor Crawford, you will be given the floor. The hearing is suspended for 15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 4.05 p.m. to 4.25 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed and I give the floor to
Professor Crawford. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. CRAWFORD: Thank you, Mr. President.
3.G EOGRAPHIC RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I am now going to discuss the geographic
circumstances relevant to the delimitation, befo re setting out Colombia’s main conclusions in
respect of the boundary.
The geography of the area
2. Geography holds a position of central impor tance in maritime delimitation. You have
affirmed the key role of geography and you ha ve cautioned against any approach that would
refashion or ignore it. In Cameroon v. Nigeria you said as follows: - 35 -
“The geographical configuration of the maritime areas that the Court is called
upon to delimit is a given. It is not an element open to modification by the Court but a
fact on the basis of which the Court must effect the delimitation.” ( Land and
Maritime Boundary between Ca meroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria:
Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 443-445,
para. 295.)
And in the Gulf of Maine case you said “the facts of geography are not the product of human action
amenable to positive or negative judgment, but the result of natural phenomena, so that they can
only be taken as they are” ( Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Canada/United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 271, para. 37). This was the
Chamber’s response to pleas from the opposing parti es to ignore, on the one hand, a considerable
part of the Nova Scotian peninsula and on the other hand the entirety of Cape Cod. To ignore them
would have been to delimit the Gulf on the basi s of hypothetical coasts which the parties wished
they had, instead of the real coasts geography has given them. Geography is not an optional
consideration. It is not something that you cannot see. It is not a choice for the Court or other
tribunal to pay it heed or to set it aside at discretion. It is, instead, a “fact” and on the basis of that
fact the delimitation is to be effected.
3. This leads me to stress once more the geographic configuration of the area which the
Court is called upon to delimit.
4. The geographic configuration of the arch ipelago as a unit; and its place in the wider
geographic configuration of the maritime area to which it belongs is the key factor. The
archipelago measures nearly 300miles from south-west to north-east 4. It consists of diverse
insular formations, including atolls with fringi ng reefs, extensive banks with permanent land
features, smaller and larger cays, and principal is lands containing sierras, running north to south,
and ranging in elevation from 100 to 360m. The map in the slide now displayed shows the
configuration of the archipelago, with its territorial sea and contiguous zones denoted by shading.
All of these features are well offshore: the clo sest to the mainland being 97.8 miles away, the
furthest 260.7 miles away.
5. As we have said, the archipelago is not one of the small maritime spaces which exist
around the globe, known only to a few scientists or occasional sojourners, on the political margins
40
CMC, Vol. III, p. 1, fig. 2.1. - 36 -
of the States to which they appertain. It is not a single small island. It is an expanse of insular
territory and associated waters, comprising a major feature of the western Caribbean.
6. This brings me to the place the archipela go occupies in the geographical configuration of
the region as a whole. Nearly 200nautical miles to the south of the archipelago is the Central
American isthmus, where Costa Rica and Panama have their Caribbean coasts. Closer to the north
are the maritime entitlements of Honduras and Jamaica. The northern and southern limits of the
relevant area are not the principal subject-matter of the present controversy, but both must be taken
into account in order to establish the proper limits of the eventual delimitation. In its written
pleadings Nicaragua, it will be recalled, paid them no heed at all. It ignored the effect of proximate
41
third States, and it did so both in its first delimitation claim ; and in its Reply delimitation
claim 42.
7. Mr. Reichler on Tuesday was more careful, and you will recall the map he showed you of
overlapping potential entitlements in relation to the exclusive economic zone. His area of the EEZ
took into account Colombia’s agreements with thir d States, in the sense that, as far as one could
see, it stopped at the boundaries Colombia has nego tiated with third States such as Costa Rica,
Panama and Jamaica. I will come back to this later.
8. And then there is the mainland of Nicaragua. This lies some 100 miles to the west of the
nearest point on the archipelago. Roncador and Serrana are separated from the mainland by
approximately 186 and 165 miles of sea. These ar e considerable distances in the context of
maritime delimitation. The archipelago is far enough from Nicaragua that no question arises
between the two States as to potential overlapping territorial seas, nor, for that matter, contiguous
zones.
9. The distance between Nicaragua’s coastal islands and the archipelago, though less than
that of the mainland coast, is still considerable. It ranges from 66miles: Alburquerque Cay to
Little Corn Island, to 95 miles: Providencia to Ned Thomas Cay; you can see the distances on the
screen.
41
MN, Vol. I, fig. I.
4RN, Vol. II, figs. 6-10. - 37 -
10. Of course, we have heard endlessly from our colleagues opposite, of the Nicaraguan
mainland coast. This is an important feature of the geography of the region. But it should be noted
that the mainland coast, shielded, as it were, behind the set of islands, does not contain any base
points controlling the median line. As I have shown, the controlling points from north to south are
the Edinburgh Reef, Miskito Cays, Roca Tyra and the Corn Islands. These features are up to
30nm from the Nicaraguan mainland. One effect of the island is to project the Nicaraguan
coast ⎯ on whose length Nicaragua’s whole argument depends ⎯ further east into the Caribbean
than it would be if only the mainland fronted the sea in this sector.
Similar and dissimilar geography in past delimitations
11. Geographic circumstances rather similar to those in the present case have existed and
exist between a number of States. A common approach to delimitation under such circumstances
has been to adopt the equidistance line as the final delimitation, thus giving full equidistance effect
even to very small island features.
12. For example, there is the 1978 delimitati on between Thailand and India. Both sides of
the delimitation area are bounded by islands. Indi a’s Nicobar Islands are located on the western
side of the area; a small island group of Thailand’ s coastal islands are located on the eastern side.
The mainland coast in this geographic configuration is not the starting-point for measuring the
position of the median line. It is measured from Thailand’s coastal islands. The resultant median
line is the final delimitation; the mainland coast of Thailand, though forming a backdrop to this,
did not call for any adjustment of the median line. India’s Nicobar Islands generated full
equidistance effect 43.
13. Full equidistance effect was also respect ed in the delimitation between Australia and
France of the maritime area near New Caledonia. The southern segments of that delimitation
involves median lines, which accord full equidi stance effect to small Australian features ⎯
Middleton Reef, which, I can assure you, is not much more than a low-tide elevation; in fact for a
44
considerable time Australia classified it as a low-tide elevation, and Norfolk Island . This, too, is
43
RC, Vol. II, p. 122, fig. R-7.7.
4RC, Vol. II, p. 121, fig. R-7.5. - 38 -
a situation in which a significant land mass ⎯ New Caledonia ⎯ lies on the opposing side of
mid-ocean islands; but does not reduce the equidistance effect.
14. Turning, or returning, to the Caribbean, virtually full effect has been accorded to the
famous Isla de Aves. This is a small insular feature of Venezuela, well beyond the
200-nautical-mile limit of the Venezuelan mainla nd. It faces substantial United States insular
territory in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands 45. It was also accorded full equidistance effect in the
delimitation between Venezuela and the Netherlands , where Isla de Aves fronted against Saba and
Saint Eustachius Islands 46.
47
15. Then we have the case of the Florida Cays, as now shown on the screen . You will see
that none of the delimitation is governed by the Flor ida coast: the tiny feature of the Dry Tortugas,
with a total area of 143 acres, governs the entire we stern segment of the line out to Point 27 -- the
construction lines are shown on the graphic. The island of Providencia is about 30 times as large as
the Dry Tortugas.
16. These delimitations are especially relevant, as they are the solutions adopted in
geographical circumstances most similar to those which exist between Nicaragua and Colombia in
the present case. The States accepted in these geographic circumstances that the proper
delimitation was that giving full equidistance effect to their opposing insular features. These
opposing insular features generate d overlapping maritime entitlements, and the solution was an
equidistance line. The presence in some cases of a larger mainland coast, behind the relevant
islands, did not lead to an adjustment in th e equidistance line, let alone the abandonment of
equidistance, which is what Nicaragua argues for here .
17. By contrast, all the cases Nicaragua relies on concerned coastal islands. For example:
⎯ Filfla (2.4 nautical miles from Malta)
⎯ The Channel Islands (between 8 and 23 nautical miles from the French coast)
⎯ St Pierre and Miquelon (between 9 and 11 nautical miles from the Canadian coast)
⎯ Serpents Island (about 9 miles from the Ukrainian coast)
45
CMC, p. 400, paras. 9.50-951; RC, p. 259, para. 7.44.
46CMC, pp. 400-401, para. 9.52.
47Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba, signed
16 December 1977, provisional application from 1 January 1978 (reprinted in Limits in the Seas, Vol. 110). - 39 -
⎯ St Martin’s Island (7 miles from the coast of Bangladesh).
The islands of the San Andres Archipel ago are like none of these. They are ⎯ taken collectively
and individually ⎯ relatively distant mid-oceanic islands in a rather confined area.
18. Even where the opposing coasts really are dissimilar ⎯ even where an island chain faces
a mainland coast ⎯ full effect, or nearly full effect, has generally been given to the islands. Let me
give several examples.
19. India, from the south-west coast of th e subcontinent, and the Maldives, which present
fringing reefs and sandbars towards India, both generate entitlements in to the same maritime area.
The overlapping entitlements of India and the Maldives as between Points 1 and 10 on Figure 7 are
incontestably generated by dissimilar coasts. None theless, the delimitation has been effected with
an equidistance line. The islands of the Mald ives facing India were accorded full equidistance
48
treatment .
20. The small islands of São Tomé and Príncipe present insular coasts facing the mainland of
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. The delimitation between São Tomé and Príncipe and the full
length of the African mainland coast, which is oppos ite, consists of an equidistance line. The tiny
islands are accorded full equidistance effect for th e entire length of the line, which was subject to
49
no adjustment .
21. Similarly the Cape Verde Islands genera te overlapping entitlements with both Senegal
and Mauritania. Notwithstanding the disparity between the island coasts and the continental
mainland, the starting-point was the equidistance line. Along segments comprising a significant
part of the line, the delimitation has been adjusted, not in favour of the mainland coast, but in
favour of the insular ⎯ the Cape Verdean coast 50. It has certainly not been abandoned.
22. The Turks and Caicos are separated from the north coast of the Dominican Republic by
less than 100nautical miles. The insular featur es of the Turks and Caicos fronting the maritime
area are extremely small. Hispaniola, the is land the eastern part of which constitutes the
Dominican Republic, is the second largest isla nd in the Caribbean. The Turks and Caicos
48RC, pp. 254-255, paras. 7.37-7.39.
49
RC, pp. 261-2.63, paras. 7.46-7.48.
50RC, pp. 263, para. 7.49. - 40 -
nonetheless are accorded very nearly full effect in the delimitation. The delimitation line is
51
adjusted off the median only slightly against the smaller islands .
23. In one delimitation after another, the practice supports the approach which Colombia
believes to be appropriate ⎯ in no case does the practice support Nicaragua’s radical abandonment
of the equidistance line in circumstances such as the present. In no case does it support the practice
of widespread enclaving. The Nicaraguan Reply r estricts itself to the speculative assertion that no
“delimitation effected by a third party” would have relied on the equidistance line 52, and in oral
argument Mr.Reichler suggested that these were all political deals without regard to entitlement.
Apparently Nicaragua believes that these agreements were concluded in a legal vacuum — that the
parties had no regard to the rules or principles of delimitation. But the parties plainly had the rules
in mind. For example, the Netherlands-Venezuela treaty expressly took account of “the current
53
provisions of international law and the development of the new law of the sea” . France and
Venezuela “bas[ed] themselves on the relevant rul es and principles of international law and [took]
54
into account the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea” . France
55
and Australia, in the Coral Sea de limitation, took a similar approach . The Cape Verde-Senegal
delimitation was adopted taking account of the United Nations Convention 56, the Turks and
57
Caicos-Dominican Republic delimitation “in accordance with the principles of international law” .
This is all State practice and is fit to be take n into account, whatever else may have motivated the
parties to reach agreement.
51
RC, p. 265, para. 7.50.
52
RN, pp. 205-206, para. 6.125.
5Boundary Delimitation Treaty between the Republic of Venezuela and the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
concluded 31 March 1978, entered into force 15 December 1978, preamble: 1140, United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS)
323, 324.
54
Delimitation Treaty between the Government of the Fren ch Republic and the Government of the Republic of
Venezuela, concluded 17 July 1980, entered into force 28 January 1983, preamble: 1319 UNTS 219.
55
Agreement on maritime delimitation (Australia-Fran ce), concluded 10 January 1982, entered into force
10 January 1983, preamble: 1329 UNTS 107, 108.
56
Treaty on the delimitation of the maritime frontier (Cape Verde-Senegal), concluded 17 February 1993, entered
into force 25 March 1994, preamble: 1776 UNTS 305, 306.
57
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the Dominican Republic concerning the delim itation of the Maritime B oundary between the Dominican
Republic and the Turks and Caicos Islands, 2 August 1996, preamble. - 41 -
24. As to the suggestion that no tribunal woul d consider Colombia’s bilateral practice with
other States, this is to ignore the jurisprudence of the Court 58. Of course, each instance of coastal
geography is unique, and each delimitation entails geographic considerations particular to its
setting. In a number of delimitations between islands and mainland coasts, the equidistance line,
according to the established method, has been set down as the first step; but, then, in
acknowledgement of a disparity in coastal fronts, the line has been adju sted in favour of the
mainland coast 59. So adjustments occur. We accept th at. The two main cases may be briefly
recalled here.
25. First, there was Libya/Malta. The Court, in accordance with the general method, set
down the median line between these opposing coasts 60. It then undertook a careful consideration of
relevant circumstances. The overall configuration of the geography, and the disparity in the lengths
of the opposing coasts, were central considerations 61. They favoured an adjustment to shift the
median line to the north ⎯ to increase the area appertaining to Libya. Other considerations,
effective State presence, use of resources, prior agreements, though in principle relevant, did not
affect the specific adjustment here. The provisional median line is now shown; the adjusted line is
shown in red. This was a relatively modest adjustment ⎯ 18 nautical miles in favour of the long
mainland coast 62.
26. The other case in which a smaller island faced a long mainland coast is Jan Mayen.
Jan Mayen is a small insular dependency of Norway, far distant from Norway’s mainland coast. It
generates its own maritime entitlements. Your star ting point, again, was to plot the equidistance
line and then to consider relevant circumstanc es which might call for a reduction in equidistance
effect. As in Libya/Malta, a long mainland coast faced a considerably shorter insular coast. A
difference between the cases is that Malta is a significant political entity ⎯an independent State
58
See, e.g., Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/M alta), Judgment, I.C. J. Reports 1985, p. 48, para. 65;
Maritime Delimitation in the Area be tween Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1993, pp.63-64, para.58; Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jam ahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982 ,
pp. 78-79, para. 109.
59
RC, pp. 243-245, paras. 7.16-7.20; ibid., pp. 242-243, paras. 7.14-7.15.
60Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, pp. 46, 48, paras. 60, 65.
61Ibid., pp. 48-51, paras. 64-71.
62RC, p.244, para.7.20; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya /Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985,
pp. 51-55, paras. 71-75. - 42 -
with its own population and a deve loped economy. The island of JanMayen, by contrast, is a
barren feature, of interest apparently only to scientists. This did not lessen the potential entitlement
of the island. The adjustment is shown on th e map on the screen. The equidistance effect of
63
Jan Mayen was substantially preserved, even though it was reduced in view of the circumstances .
27. In neither the Jan Mayen case nor in Libya/Malta did the mainland coast enjoy an
exclusive privilege to a 200-nautical-mile EEZ. Th e solution to a disparity between coasts was to
adjust the median line; not to exclude the entitle ment generated from the small insular territory.
These were cases of overlapping EEZs, resulting from the clear rule that insular and mainland
territories alike generate the 200-mile entitlement 64. A rule which, incidentally, Nicaragua accepts
as concerns the three main islands of the archipela go. That rule is embodied in Article 121 of the
1982 Convention; and there is no principle and no warrant under the modern law of delimitation to
disapply it.
28. In both cases, that is, Libya/Malta and Jan Mayen, it was a question as to the magnitude
of the adjustment called for. In both cases, the Court adopted an adjustment which reflected the
geographical circumstances, including the differences in coastal lengths but preserving a significant
entitlement as generated from small insular baselines. The final delimitations in the two cases are
represented in the map now displayed. The reductio n was calibrated having regard to the disparity
of the coasts ⎯ it came and it went, and it came again. It was not a sharp reduction, but a relative
one, reflecting the opposing coastal configurations which defined the area to be delimited.
29. Nor was this result arrived at through a mechanical application of coastal front ratios:
you explicitly rejected that approach. In Libya/Malta, you said that it would “go far beyond the use
of proportionality as a test of equity”, if you were to “use the ratio of coastal lengths as of itself
determinative of the seaward reach and area...”, (case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985 , p. 45, para. 58). In Jan Mayen you
similarly cautioned,
63
Maritime Delimitation in the Area be tween Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1993, pp. 64-81, paras. 59-93.
64Ibid., p. 69, para.70. - 43 -
“[i]t is not a question of determining the equitable nature of a delimitation as a
function of the ratio of the lengths of the coasts in comparison with that of the areas
generated by the maritime projection of the points of the coast” (case concerning
Maritime Delimitation in the Area betw een Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v.
Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 38, p. 68, para. 68).
Coastal lengths and their disparities are fact ors, but there is no question of applying a
“predetermined arithmetical ratio” (Libya/Malta, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 55, para. 75).
30. Nor is the disparity of coasts to be taken in isolation from the circumstances as a whole.
In Libya/Malta you affirmed what has been said in the North Sea cases: “there is assuredly no
closed list of considerations”. Whether an adju stment is needed and whether, if needed, what
magnitude it should assume are matters addressed on a holistic view of the setting in which the
delimitation takes place ( Libya/Malta, p. 40, para. 48, citing North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 50, para. 93). But the point I would stress is that the order of magnitude of
adjustment from equidistance in these two cases bear s no relation whatever to that sought by
Nicaragua in the present case.
31. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the cases I have been dealing with cover a range of
geographic circumstances which are sufficiently lik e that in the present case to guide you here.
The approach in these cases in geographical circumstances akin to that in the present case has been
to adopt the equidistance line either as the fina l delimitation or as a starting point for a modest
adjustment.
32. In response to that, Nicaragua relies principally on two cases, St. Pierre et Miquelon ;
and, endlessly, the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case. I should therefore deal with them in a
little more detail.
Nicaragua’s inapplicable precedents
33. First, St. Pierre and Miquelon. The coastal islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon are
comparative latecomers to Nicaragua’s case. They made their appearance as part of the new
65
delimitation claim in the Reply .
65
RN, pp. 151-155, paras. 6.16-6.23; p. 187, paras. 6.89-6.90. - 44 -
34. Nicaragua asserts that the circumstances in the present case are “geographically similar”
to those in St. Pierre et Miquelon 66. This is in aid of Nicaragua’s argument about what it calls a
67
“defensive wall” or “wrap around” effect . But to say that the Fr ench islands offshore of
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia are similar to the San Andrés Archipelago is an object lesson in the
dangers of disregarding geography.
35. At their closest, the islands are separated from Canada’s Burin Peninsula by a distance
not exceeding the breadth of a single territorial sea be lt. For much of the rest of their eastern and
northern coasts, the islands would generate a potential territorial sea entitlement overlapping
largely with that projected from the Canadian coasts. This is an obvious case of adjacency ⎯ to
the point of embeddedness. It is nothing at all like the relation between the San Andrés
Archipelago and Nicaragua. Even at its closest poi nt, Colombia’s archipelago is of an order of
magnitude further from Nicaragua than St. Pierre and Miquelon are from Canada ⎯ over ten times
the distance 68. The Court of Arbitration recognized th e adjacency of the French islands as a
69
cardinal fact: “the prevailing and overall relationship”, it said, “is one of adjacency” . This was
both a factual observation and a legal assessment. The islands are close to Canada, and their
proximity is “ the prevailing and overall relationship ”. Relevantly, the French islands were
considered part of the south-facing coastal frontage of Newfoundland itself.
36. Nicaragua would have the Court believe th at the overall geographic configuration is the
same as that in the present case. In its Reply, it says that “in this setting” ⎯ by which it means in
the setting of the present proceedings ⎯
“the mainland coast of Colombia (like that of France in the arbitration with Canada)
plays no role, and . . . beyond Colombia’s sm all islands (like St. Pierre and Miquelon)
there would be nothing but the open waters of the Caribbean Sea up to the outer limit
of Nicaragua’s maritime zones” . 70
This is a striking confusion between two utterly dissimilar geographic settings. “[B]eyond
[St.Pierre and Miquelon]’s sma ll islands” the Court of Arbitration was hardly able to find any
66RN, p. 153, para. 6.21.
67
RN, pp. 145-156, paras. 6.9-6.24; esp. pp. 155-156, paras. 6.23-6.24.
68
RC, pp. 247-248, para. 7.24.
69Case concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Cana da and the French Republic (St. Pierre and
Miquelon), International Law Reports (ILR), 1992, Vol. 95, p. 662, para. 35.
70RN, p. 152, para. 6.17; emphasis added. - 45 -
“open waters” at all. It had to search the full circumference around the islands before it found a
small “coastal opening” to the south 71. From the coasts of the San Andrés Archipelago, there is
open water in every direction. To the east, one of the archipelago’s two long coastal fronts, the
water is open all the way to the Colombian mainla nd, which is within 400 miles from all parts of
the archipelago but beyond 400 miles from all Nicara guan coasts. To the north and south, there is
no obstruction until one reaches the coasts of third States. Even to the west, the direction in which
the archipelago faces Nicaragua, there is a consider able distance. The French islands could not
present a starker contrast. They do not face open sea on three sides, but face mainland coasts
almost all around. Where they do face open sea, they present their shortest side. This is a small set
of insular features, nearly completely embraced by the concavity created by the coasts of a single
long opposing State.
37. The Court of Arbitration explicitly recognized this aspect of the geography. It said as
follows:
“But the coastlines that France wants to exclude form the concavity of the Gulf
approaches and all of them face the area where the delimitation is required, generating
projections that meet and overlap, either laterally or in opposition.” 72
Lest there be any doubt as to what the Court of Arabitration meant by this, one need only look a
little earlier in the Award. According to the Court, “The French islands of St Pierre-et-Miquelon
73
are within a concavity framed ex clusively by Canadian coasts.” The potential maritime zones of
St. Pierre and Miquelon ran into overlapping Canadi an entitlements not merely in one direction or
two; but in three directions. If the coastal front age of St. Pierre and Miquelon is considered as a
whole, as much as 90 per cent faced proximate Canadian coasts. The contrast with the San Andrés
Archipelago, where not even half the coast faces Nicaragua ⎯ and at a far greater distance ⎯ is
obvious. It is quite simply untenable to equate St. Pierre and Miquelon and the archipelago. The
unusual solution which the Court of Arbitration fashioned for the waters of the Gulf Approaches ⎯
the mushroom stalk, as it is called ⎯ has no applicability in the geographical circumstances of the
present case.
71
ILR. Vol. 95, pp. 671-672, para. 70.
72Case concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Cana da and the French Republic (St. Pierre and
Miquelon), ILR., 1992, Vol. 95, p. 661, para. 29, quoted at Nicaragua Reply, p. 153, para. 6.20.
73Ibid., ILR. Vol. 95, p. 661, para. 26. - 46 -
38. This brings us to the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case where, again, an unusual
solution was adopted in circum stances nothing like the present . Nicaragua gives pride of place in
74
its pleadings to the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case . It calls it the “classic example” in
75
support of the delimitation it insists the Court should adopt .
39. And the most striking thing about the Channel Islands and the San Andrés Archipelago is
their comprehensive geographic dissimilarity. The Channel Islands are close to the French
coasts ⎯ so close that the opposing coasts generate overlapping territorial sea zones. They are
nestled within a concavity of France ⎯ you might think a very favourable situation ⎯ in almost
every direction; they face French coastal front s, with immediate access to cheese and baguettes.
The Channel Islands are located in a narrowing stra it, a mere 100 nautical miles at its widest,
76
18nautical miles at its narrowest . They display no relevant likeness to the San Andrés
Archipelago with its entirely different geography.
40. The proximity of the Channel Islands to the opposing coasts of France and the
UnitedKingdom merits some further observations. First, there is the geographic relation of the
San Andrés Archipelago to Colombia. Nicaragua says that the San Andrés Archipelago is “wholly
77
detached geographically from Colombia” ⎯ which is correct if “Columbia” is confined to the
Colombian mainland. But of course Colombia is not so confined; it includes the Archipelago as an
integral part. This is yet another illustration of Nicaragua’s propensity to state its case in
completely question-begging, circular terms.
41. The archipelago is a prime example of what the Court of Arbitration called “the case
78
where numerous islands stretch out one af ter another long distances from the mainland” . The
Court of Arbitration was deliberately contrasting th at situation with that of the Channel Islands,
which are not “numerous islands stretch[ing] out . . . long distances from the mainland”. They are
74
MN, p.190, para.3.11; p.196, para.3.23; p.208, para.3.43; pp.240-243, paras.3.103-3.105; RN, p.128,
para. 5.9; pp. 132-135, paras. 5.18-5.25; pp. 149-151, paras. 6.14-6.15; p. 155, para. 6.23; p. 180, para. 6.74; p. 182,
para. 6.79; pp. 187-191, paras. 6.91-6.99.
75
RN, p. 132, para. 5.18.
76Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the Un ited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the French Republic, 30 June 1977, 18 United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), p. 18, para. 3.
77MN, p. 243, para. 3.105.
7818 RIAA, p. 94, para. 199. - 47 -
a small cluster ensconced within a French con cavity and not far from the opposing British coast.
The archipelago is nothing like them.
42. The problem for Nicaragua is that, for its argument here to work, the archipelago must be
in close proximity to one, or preferably both, of two opposing mainland coasts. There is nothing
Nicaragua can say about the opposing mainland coasts ⎯ because there are no mainland coasts in
opposition to each other in the present case. Yet so important is it to Nicaragua’s case that the
SanAndrés Archipelago be seen as analogous to the Channel Islands that it is repeated over and
79
over again . But repeating it does not make it so. Nicaragua’s islands are at some distance from
the coast of Nicaragua, but there are extensive maritime areas to the east of the Nicaraguan islands
before the archipelago is reached. It is inexplicable to describe the entitlement here as a mere
“beach front” 80. Colombia’s archipelago is in no mean ingful sense “adjacent” to the Nicaraguan
mainland. Nor is it adjacent to the coastal isla nds of Nicaragua. The dissimilarity with the
Channel Islands is stark.
43. Finally, there is the median line. As I noted a moment ago, the substantial distance
between mainland coasts means that there is, qui te simply, no median line here, except that
between the archipelago and Nicaragua. That median line is important. It is the first step in the
delimitation. It is not the sort of median line that concerned the Court of Arbitration in the Channel
Islands, a mainland-to-mainland median line in relatively confined waters. The
mainland-to-mainland line was central to the reasoni ng of the Court of Arbitration; the islands
were “on the wrong side” of that median line. To talk of islands being on the “wrong side” of a
median line in a case in which there is no me dian line is unintelligib le. The absence of a
mainland-to-mainland median line in the present case is yet another factor which renders the
Channel Islands arbitration irrelevant.
44. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this fact, the absence of a mainland-to-mainland
median line, is ground already covered in the present proceedings, one would have thought covered
to exhaustion. But Nicaragua reverts to its former argument ⎯ the one it expressly abandoned at
79
See, e.g., MN, p.15 (title to Chap.I: “The Mosquito Coast and Adjacent Islands...”); ibid., p.176,
para. 2.251; RN, p. 24, para. 1.6; p. 40, para.1.51; p.167, para.6.52; p.1para.6.58; p.178, para.6.69; p.183,
para. 6.80; p. 203, para. 6.118.
8RN, p. 135, para. 5.24. - 48 -
the beginning of its Reply 81 ⎯ about a median line between the mainland coasts of Colombia and
Nicaragua: and you will have noticed that one of the final graphics of Mr.Reichler had that
innominate statusless line shown on the screen. Nicaragua claims that there is a median line
between the mainland coasts which “Colombia tries to brush aside”: “the Archipelago ‘is not only
“on the wrong side” of the median line but wholly detached from Colombia’” 82. This is completely
unsupportable. Nicaragua in these proceedings advanced a median line claim, withdrew it,
attempted to replace it with a novel maritime claim, contradicting the withdrawn claim, and, then
produced a composite claim to both the EEZ and outer continental shelf ⎯ both, said
Winnie the Pooh. This is pleading by trampoline, impossible to pin down. We faced what is now
their claim for the first time this week. A median line between mainland coasts, “[a]s stated in the
Nicaraguan Memorial” was never relevant to th ese proceedings. Nicaragua abandoned it. There
should be no call now for Colombia to address it again ⎯ even though Mr. Reichler showed it in
one of his last graphics. To repeat, the median line which matters in the present proceedings is the
median line between the archipelago and Nicaragua. To refer to the archipelago as existing on the
“wrong side” of a median line ⎯ which has no other function but to incriminate, so to speak, the
archipelago ⎯ is to refashion geography out of recognition.
Minor straddling features
45. Mr.President, Members of the Court, Nicar agua refers to a number of cases in which
minor features were disregarded when settling th e median line through a delimitation area, and
contends that those cases, too, are controlling.
46. This is an argument based upon minor straddling features as they are called. The first
deficiency in Nicaragua’s argument likening the archipelago to minor straddling features can be
succinctly expressed: the archipelago is not minor; and, it does not straddle.
47. The main example of a minor straddli ng feature which Nicaragua contends should
disqualify the archipelago from generating its full maritime rights is Abu Musa. Abu Musa is a
small island in the Gulf close to Dubai and Sharjah ⎯ the two emirates which were parties to the
81
RN, p. 12, paras. 25-26.
8Ibid., p. 133, para. 5.21, quoting MN, pp. 242-243, para. 3.105. - 49 -
arbitration. Abu Musa is also close to Iran, a th ird State which claims the island; and the position
of Iran was obviously highly relevant to the case. It is located approximately half way between the
opposing coasts of Sharjah and Iran. The distance s in the area are modest; Abu Musa is only
83
35 miles from Sharjah . It is not far from the location of the provisional equidistance line which
extended laterally from the coasts of the two emirat es. Again, the geographic circumstances of the
case bear little resemblance to those in the present case.
48. The Court of Arbitration concluded that Abu Musa should not affect the equidistance
line: and it said as follows:
“Certain islands are clearly capable of giving rise to ‘special circumstances’ and
thus to the invocation of equitable cons iderations where their existence would
otherwise produce a distortion of the equidist ance line or an exaggerated effect which
would be inequitable. It may thus be n ecessary, in the delimitation of a boundary, to
84
abate the effect of an island which forms an incidental special feature.”
In the circumstances of that case, the Court of Arbitration concluded that it was indeed necessary
“to abate the effect” of Abu Musa, which formed an incidental special feature. Now, one tribunal’s
“special feature” might be perfectly ordinary and un special to another. But the word “incidental”
has a definite meaning. It means that one thi ng exists in subordinate conjunction with another
thing. For a feature to be “incidental,” it must be “incidental” to something. The subordinate entity
in Sharjah/Dubai was the small island of Abu Musa. That to which it was subordinate ⎯ that to
which it was incidental ⎯ was either the mainland coast or the provisional equidistance line which
that coast generated. Nothing like this can be said of the San Andrés Archipelago, for the simple
reason that there is nothing to which it is subordinate in that way. The only equidistance line here
is the line which the archipelago itself generates. That is not a line to which the archipelago is a
merely “incidental” feature. It is a line that results from the entitlement projected from the
archipelago itself, or as a minimum from the thre e main islands which Nicaragua concedes have
that entitlement. There is no mainland coast to which the archipelago is “incidental”: the mainland
coast of Colombia is hundreds and hundreds of miles away. The maritime jurisdiction which the
archipelago generates, though it overlaps in the eastern parts with the maritime jurisdiction
83
91 ILR, p. 543, 663.
8Ibid. p. 676, emphasis added. - 50 -
generated by the mainland coast of Colombia, is in no sense incidental to that mainland coast in the
relevant area.
49. The San Andrés Archipelago is, in short, a significant territorial feature generating
maritime entitlements of its own. It is not to be disregarded in the delimitation like a small
unpopulated coastal feature. It is entitled to full equidistance effect subject to delimitation, or at
least the three main islands are so entitled.
50. Serpents’ Island in the Black Sea is another small feature which the Court did not take
into account when considering possible adjustments to the delimitation. It is a small, barren
feature, belonging to Ukraine located approximate ly 20nautical miles from Romania’s mainland
coast and less from the Ukraine’s. It is a singular feature not immediately adjacent to the coast; it
85
is not a cluster of islands like that which the Eritrea/Yemen tribunal did take into account ; you
excluded Serpents’ Island from the coastal conf iguration for the purposes of identifying base
86
points . Nor did you treat it as a relevant circumstance which would have called for an adjustment
to the provisional equidistance line 87. Any entitlement which Serpents’ Island might have
generated would have been subs umed within the coastal projections from Ukraine’s mainland 88.
The disparity again with the San Andrés Archipelago is obvious and requires no further comment.
I51. Libya/Malta, the rock of Filfla was disregar ded in setting the equidistance line
between the principal Maltese coast and the Libyan mainland. It is less than 3miles from the
principal Maltese coast 89. It is hard to understand how the C ourt’s treatment of Filfla carries any
lesson for the proper treatment of the archipelago. A barren rock is not an archipelago with
80,000 inhabitants, millions of visitors per year, and a sel f-sustaining economy of regional
significance.
85Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime
Delimitation), 17 December 1999, RIAA, Vol. XXII, pp. 367-368, paras. 139-146.
86
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 109, para. 149.
87
Ibid., p. 122, para. 187.
88RC, pp. 223-225, paras. 6.52-6.56.
89Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya /Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p.20, para.15 and p.48,
para. 64. - 51 -
90
52. Nicaragua also refers to Qit’at Jaradah . This is a sandbar near the opposing coasts of
Bahrain and Qatar in very confined waters. The Court did not use it as a base point for the
equidistance line 91. But this minor coastal projection says nothing about the delimitation in the
92
present case . You called Qit’at Jaradah “a very sm all island, uninhabite d and without any
vegetation” 93. It does approximately straddle the equidistance line between the principal coasts
involved, had it been given effect in plotting that line, its effect would have been manifestly
94
disproportionate .
53. The key deficiency in Nicaragua’s argum ents likening the San Andrés Archipelago to
these various minor straddling features, coastal projections and other miscellaneous inshore islands
can be briefly put: not one of the special cases on which Nicaragua relies concerned a geographic
configuration bearing any resemblance to the area of the western Caribbean. Moreover, the varied
cases relied on defy distillation into any principle relevant here. Nicaragua picks piecemeal from
sundry judgments and awards addr essing geographic circumstances which, individually, have no
bearing in the present case; and, taken together, support no coherent argument at all.
Colombia’s conclusions in respect of delimitation
54. Mr.President, Members of the Court, that brings me to Colombia’s conclusions in
respect of the delimitation between the San Andrés Archipelago and Nicaragua.
55. Your consideration of the merits of th e present dispute has been greatly complicated by
the way in which Nicaragua has pleaded its case ⎯ the Nicaraguan trampoline, as I have called it.
I analysed these tergiversations yesterday and will not repeat what I said then, except to say that
this has put us in a difficult position to reply ⎯ not knowing even yet precisely what Nicaragua’s
claim is nor how it is articulated. So what I say now is unavoidably prelim inary, and we reserve
90RN, pp. 180-181, paras. 6.75-6.76.
91Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questio ns between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2001,pp. 104-109, para. 219.
92RC, pp. 226-227, para. 6.60.
93Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questio ns between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 104, para. 219.
94
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questio ns between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 104, para. 219. - 52 -
the right to comment further next week in light of clarifications, or dare I say it, further mutations
in Nicaragua’s position on Tuesday.
56. Nor will I repeat what Mr.Bundy has said about the fundamental inadmissibility of
Nicaragua’s claim to continental shelf within 200 miles of Colombia’s coast, except to make two
points. The first is that Nicaragua’s claim depends not merely on the principle of the existence of
Nicaragua’s continental shelf within 200 nm of Colombia’s coast, it depends on its precise location.
Yet that is a matter for the Annex II Commissi on. The second point is that the position in
Bangladesh/Myanmar was quite different; it did not require the Tribunal to do more than draw a
lateral line in the area of undisputed continental shelf. The position here, I say, is quite different. It
is exacerbated by the fact that Nicaragua in the present case has furnished the Court with nothing
approaching the data necessary to consider an extended continental shelf claim.
57. But quite apart from its inadmissibility, Nicaragua’s claim as now presented remains
obscure and uncertain in many respects. Let me me ntion one or two of them, and let me start with
the EEZ, since Mr.Reichler, for all his extravagan t ratios, did at least make some attempt to
address the issues. Professor Lowe on the other ha nd made an unnaturally prolonged speech about
natural prolongation, a speech full of the ab initio, the nullum temporis, the ex lege, but remarkably
light on detail.
58. The graph now on the screen comes from Mr. Reichler’s presentation of this week. One
supposes that it shows Nicaragua’s EEZ claim, but it raises many more questions than it answers.
For example, on what basis is Nicaragua claiming to exclude Colombia from what I will call the
outer area, the pink area of 35,000 and some square kilometres which is within 200nm of
Colombia’s coasts but beyond 200nm from Nicara gua’s? How does Nicarag ua have standing to
obtain a determination that waters to which Nicaragua has no right, no conceivable right, constitute
high seas and not Colombian EEZ, as they would othe rwise do? Above all, there is the question
how an infinitesimal distribution of maritime ri ghts to Colombia’s archipelago can possibly be
consistent with the legal principles I have outlined.
59. There are as many more questions one might ask about the intrusive continental shelf
claim unveiled by Professor Lowe this week. Ho w can it possibly be considered proportionate ⎯
or does proportionality not apply to continen tal shelf claims based on geomorphology beyond - 53 -
200 nm? If it does not apply, how can that be cons istent with the so-called unitary character of the
continental shelf, which ProfessorLowe stress ed so much? After all, the principle of
proportionality has been applied to the sea-bed in claims within 200 nm. What are the lateral limits
of the continental shelf claim, and how can it interrelate with EEZ rights of Colombia and third
States? What would be the implications, in terms of Article 61 of the Court’s Statute, of the
extremely likely scenario of the Annex II Commission disallowing or varying the Nicaraguan claim
on the basis of which the Court would have hypothe tically acted? It may be more than ten years
more. All things considered, Nicaragua’s claim is tantamount to throwing a very large rock into a
peaceful, orderly, treaty-regulated pool ⎯ though Nicaragua would no doubt say it is not a rock, it
is a piece of coral!
60. Even if Nicaragua were to make a fu ll submission to the Annex II Commission, if it
insisted on the same result, that would be, to our knowledge, an unprecedented result. Nicaragua’s
extended continental shelf would deprive Colombia of significant parts of its automatic entitlement
to 200-nm zone. Such an intrusion States, in maki ng their continental shelf claims, have almost all
avoided. My colleague Mr. Bundy has mentioned the pr actice in this respect; it is extensive; it is
virtually uniform 95.
61. Mr. President, Members of the Court, you will no doubt recall Oscar Wilde’s description
of an English fox-hunting gentleman ⎯ “the unspeakable in full pu rsuit of the uneatable”.
Nicaragua’s new outer continental shelf claim, substituting for its earlier mathematically
challenged single maritime boundary claim, in eith er of its manifestations, could similarly be
described as the inadmissible in full pursuit of the untenable.
62. In between absorbing itself, first in a claim that was, by its own admission,
unsupportable, and then, later, in two different versions of a new claim which is both unsupportable
and inadmissible, Nicaragua, in its written pl eadings, made very little attempt to address
Colombia’s delimitation case. This is a case whic h, Colombia submits, adheres to the principles
that you have repeatedly applied. It starts with a description of the relevant coasts, it defines those
coasts in the relevant maritime area. It identif ies base points on that coast. It sets out an
95
RC, pp. 149-156, paras. 4.60-4.69. - 54 -
equidistance or median line, and it considers the range of geographic and other circumstances
which might affect the final disposition of the lin e. Concluding that the circumstances in the
relevant area confirm the median line as the equita ble line between the parties, Colombia submits
that this should constitute the final delimitation with Nicaragua.
63. As against that argument, what we have is an abandonment of principle entirely.
Colombia’s claim is supported by the following four propositions:
(1) The San Andrés Archipelago is a significant historical, political and geographical unit. We
have explained that already in some detail.
(2)We have not found a single case in the juri sprudence or in State practice where offshore
islands ⎯ islands 100 miles or more offshore have been enclaved or enclosed.
(3)Nicaragua’s argument that one can ignore dissimilar coasts, in terms of the equidistance
principle, has no place in the law of maritime delimitation.
(4) Even if ⎯ for the sake of argument ⎯ the length of Nicaragua’s mainland coast were to
require some adjustment to the provisional equi distance line, any such adjustment would be
modest ⎯ as it was in Libya/Malta and Jan Mayen ⎯ it would not involve the abandonment of
the principle of equidistance in the way proposed by Nicaragua.
64. The claim line which Colombia submits derives from these considerations can be seen on
the screen now. The result is not inequitable inter alia for the following reasons:
(i) First, it does not distort or disregard any possible alternative median line, such as could be
drawn between proximate mainland coasts, as there is no alternative of such line here.
(ii) Second, the equitable principle at the heart of maritime delimitation accepts that, where
two States generate potentially overlapping maritime entitlements, neither State is likely to
obtain the full potential 200-mile EEZ entitlement; Colombia’s claim proposes a fair
division of potential entitlements in which bo th States realize some, but not all, of the
potential ⎯ and I recall yesterday, how I showed you that the distribution of potential in
the EEZ proposed by Nicaragua is 100 per cent to Nicaragua, 0 per cent to Colombia.
(iii) A number of third State delimitations in the same region have taken a similar approach to
Colombia’s claim line, which illustrates what ot hers have considered to be an equitable
solution. - 55 -
(iv)Nicaragua has not taken a consistent position in respect of the treatment of its own
fringing islands, sometimes ignoring them, sometimes paying attention to them;
Colombia’s claim line acknowledges that those islands have effect in the equidistance
calculation.
(v) Nicaragua’s conduct has been at best equi vocal in respect of the maritime spaces to the
east of the claim line; it hardly estab lishes that Nicaragua has any entitlement ⎯ I know
the Court has been reluctant to take conduc t into account in maritime delimitation cases,
but there are limits.
(vi) Insofar as Nicaraguan fishing vessels have fish ed in the waters east of the claim line, this
has been permitted under Colombian regula tions when done in accordance with
Colombian licences, which have been granted largely without interest; the claim line
would not have any inequitable, let alone, disastrous effect on the Nicaraguan fishing
industry.
(vii) Before the initial phase of the present proceedings, Nicaragua had never articulated a
claim line of its own to the east of the 82nd degree west meridian; which marked the
western limit of the San Andrés Archipelago for over 70 years.
(viii) The submitted claim line is the median line which accords effect to the geography of the
two relevant coasts and takes account of the geographic and other relevant circumstances.
Mr.President, Members of the Court, no doubt th ere is more that could be said, about the
adjustment of the line and we look forward to h earing what our colleagues will say about it, which
will be in respect of this issue for the first time. But we have become used to their saying things for
the first time in each successive round of pleadings . Mr.President, Members of the Court, thank
you for your attention. I would ask you now to call on my colleague, Professor Kohen, who will
conclude Colombia’s first round presentation by ad dressing Nicaragua’s claim for a declaration.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Crawford. Et je passe la parole à
M. le professeur Marcelo Kohen qui sera le denier or ateur au nom de la Colombie, cet après-midi.
Vous avez la parole, Monsieur. - 56 -
M. KOHEN :
4. LA DEMANDE NICARAGUAYENNE D ’UNE DÉCLARATION EN RÉPARATION
DOIT ÊTRE REJETÉE
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, il m’appartient d’examiner la
demande d’une déclaration formulée par le Nicaragua relative à des prétendus faits
internationalement illicites commis par la Colomb ie. Je vais replacer cette demande dans son
contexte véritable, c’est-à-dire, celui du comportement global des Parties par rapport au différend
porté devant vous, afin de vous montrer que, s’il y a une Partie qui ne respecte pas ses engagements
internationaux, cette Partie est le Nicaragua.
2. Je vais en effet illustrer, d’une part, que le demandeur non seulement a répudié un traité
établissant un règlement territorial après un demi-siè cle d’application pacifique, mais encore qu’il
continue d’ignorer la souveraineté colombienne sur SanAndrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina
même après votre arrêt du 13décembre2007. Je va is ensuite démontrer, d’autre part, que la
Colombie a, à tout moment, agi en conformité au droit international, limitant l’exercice de sa
juridiction aux zones dans lesquelles elle l’a toujours fait, en attendant votre arrêt sur le fond.
e
3. En effet, la Colombie a considéré le 82 méridien comme constituant la limite des
juridictions respectives. C’est bien jusqu’à ce mé ridien que les pêcheurs colombiens ont exercé
leurs activités ⎯ même si historiquement ils allaient à l’ouest de celui-ci 96 ⎯, et que des permis de
pêche et des concessions d’exploration d’hydrocar bures ont été délivrés. Traditionnellement, les
pêcheurs nicaraguayens ne s’ét aient pas aventurés à l’est du 82 eméridien jusqu’à ce que leur
97
gouvernement les y avait encouragé, da ns le contexte de ce différend . La Colombie a toujours
respecté le traité de 1928-1930 et s’est bornée à maintenir le statu quo existant.
A. S’il y a une Partie qui viole ses obligations internationales, il s’agit du Nicaragua
4. Monsieur le président, il est surprenant, pour dire le moins, que le Nicaragua soulève dans
cette affaire des questions de re sponsabilité. C’est la Partie qui a déclaré, après un demi-siècle
96CMC, p. 371, par. 8.79.
97Note du ministre colombien des affaires étrangères au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies du 25 février 2008,
Nations Unies, doc. A/62/733, annexe. RN, vol. II, annexe 6, p. 16. - 57 -
d’application, la nullité d’un traité établissant un règlement territorial. Ce mépris de la
reconnaissance de la souveraineté colombienne cons titue une violation substantielle de ce traité,
ainsi qu’une atteinte au principe de stabilité des traités territoriaux 98. Il s’agit d’un cas frappant de
rejet d’un traité, le premier des cas de violation substantielle mentionné à l’article 60, paragraphe 3,
99
de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités .
5. Cette situation de rejet s’est même prolong ée après la confirmation de la validité du traité
par votre arrêt du 13décembre2007 100, malgré les affirmations de son agent lundi dernier 101. Le
Nicaragua continue d’ignorer la souveraineté colombienne sur SanAndrés, Providencia et
SantaCatalina. Je cite une note du président DanielOrtega au Secrétaire général des
Nations Unies datée du 11 février 2008 :
«S’agissant de ces trois îles, dans son arrê t, la Cour se borne à indiquer qu’elle
n’a pas compétence pour connaître de cette partie de la requête et qu’elle ne peut donc
connaître de l’affaire. Le Nicaragua, quant à lui, fait valoir qu’il maintient sa requête
concernant la souveraineté sur ces trois îles, comme il l’a fait tout au long de son
102
histoire.»
6. Dans sa réplique, le demandeur a persisté à considérer que le traité de 1928 est «dépourvu
d’autorité morale et juridique» 103. Monsieur le président, la cartographie officielle nicaraguayenne
publiée postérieurement à votre arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires considère ⎯ comme c’est le
cas depuis 1980 ⎯ l’ensemble de l’archipel de San Andrés, y compris San Andrés, Providencia et
SantaCatalina, comme relevant de la souveraineté nicaraguayenne. La dernière carte officielle
104
datée de2011, que vous avez à l’écran, le montre clairement . La Colombie a dûment protesté
98CMC, p. 295-297, par. 6.28-6.32. Différend territorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1994, p. 37, par. 72-73 ; Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua cC. olombie), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 861, par. 89.
99
Art. 60, par. 3, litt. a) de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités. Nations Unies, Recueil des Traités ,
vol. 1155, p.331 et suiv. Voir Conséquences juridiques pour le s Etats de la présence continue de l’Afrique du Sud en
Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la résolution 27 6 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité, avis consultatif,
C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 46-47, par. 94-95.
100
Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c.o lombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 858-859, par. 78-81.
101
CR 2012/8, p. 18, par. 21 (Argüello).
102
Lettre du président du Nicaragua au S ecrétaire général des Nations Unies du 11 février2008, Nations Unies,
doc. A/62/697, annexe. RN, vol. II, annexe 5, p. 12.
103
RN, par. 9-10.
104
«Gobierno de la República de Nicaragua, Instituto Ni caragüense de Estudios Territoriales, República
de Nicaragua, Mapa de la división política administrativa (Mapa Escolar)», 2011. Disponible su:r
http://www.ineter.gob.ni/. - 58 -
contre la publication de cette carte. Ce comporte ment est inadmissible et témoigne du manque de
respect de la part du Nicaragua, non seulement à l’égard des traités et de la souveraineté
colombienne, mais aussi à l’encontre d’une décision de votre propre Cour.
B. Une demande de réparation changeante, comme toutes les revendications nicaraguayennes
7. Dans sa requête introductive d’instance, le Nicaragua s’est réservé «le droit de demander
réparation pour tout élément d’enrichissement i ndu, résultant de la possession par la Colombie, en
l’absence de titre légitime, des îles de SanAndrés et de Providencia, ainsi que des cayes et des
e
espaces maritimes qui s’étendent jusqu’au 82 méridien», tout comme «pour toute entrave à
l’activité des bateaux de pêche battant pavillon nicaraguayen ou des bateaux détenteurs d’un
permis délivré par le Nicaragua» [traduction du Greffe] 105. C’est au stade de la réplique que le
demandeur a formalisé cette dema nde, le montant de la réparati on étant réservé pour une phase
ultérieure de la procédure 106. Lundi dernier, le Nicaragua est revenu sur ses pas, demandant
107
dorénavant satisfaction et non plus une réparation pécuniaire . Même dans ce domaine, Monsieur
le président, les positions nicaraguayennes sont, me semble-t-il, comme le temps à LaHaye:
instables et imprévisibles.
8. Dans sa réplique, le Nicaragua n’a plus in sisté sur sa demande de réparation au sujet des
îles de SanAndrés et de Providencia. C’est co mpréhensible à la lumière de votre arrêt du
108
13 décembre 2007 . Par contre, il est tout à fait remarqua ble que le Nicaragua ne réclame plus
réparation au sujet des cayes, malgré le maintien fo rmel de leur revendicati on. Peut-être s’agit-il
d’un aveu inconscient du caractère totalement infondé de cette revendication. En ce qui concerne
la demande de réparation relative aux espaces maritimes, nous verrons qu’elle aussi est infondée.
C. La demande de déclaration du Nicaragua est infondée
9. Je vais à présent examiner la demande nicaraguayenne en réparation telle que l’agent l’a
décrite lundi dernier, donnant donc pour acqui s que le Nicaragua a renoncé à une réparation
105
Requête, par. 9.
106
RN, p. 235-238 et 240, conclusions II.
107CR 2012/8, p. 23, par. 40 i) (Argüello).
108 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragu.ocC lombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 860-861, par. 86-90. - 59 -
109
pécuniaire . L’agent du Nicaragua a également invoqué un prétendu emploi de la force par la
Colombie depuis 1969 pour «maintenir le Nicaragua bloqué» à l’intérieur du 82 e méridien 110.
10. Je m’arrête un instant sur cette accusation aussi légère qu’injurieuse, qui a déjà été
111
fermement rejetée par l’agent de la Colombie hier . L’attitude du Nicaragua lui-même témoigne
du fait qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une accusation fondée. En effet, s’il était vrai que la Colombie utilise
la force contre le Nicaragua depuis1969, on peut se demander pourquoi cette prétendue violation
grave d’une obligation d’une importance fondamentale n’a pas été portée à l’attention du Conseil
de sécurité ou à celle des organes compétents sur le plan régional, tant de l’OEA que du traité
interaméricain d’assistance mutuelle. Si l’on suit votre arrêt dans l’affaire Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis
d’Amérique 112, que le demandeur n’ignore certainement p as, le fait que le Nicaragua n’ait pas
recouru dans ces circonstances aux organes pertinen ts selon les chapitresVII etVIII de la Charte
des Nations Unies, témoigne de la conviction de cet Etat qu’il ne se trouvait pas dans la situation de
victime d’un emploi de la force.
11. Ce n’est pas la première fois, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, que le Nicaragua lance
gratuitement des accusations graves. Dans son mé moire, le Nicaragua prétendait que si le traité
de1928-1930 était valide, comme la Cour l’a dé claré, il y aurait une «violation substantielle»
113
colombienne de celui-ci, qui lui permettrait d’ invoquer l’extinction ou la dénonciation du traité .
Le Nicaragua a abandonné cette prétention.
12. Monsieur le président, le Nicaragua se plaint de prétendus dommages matériels causés
e
par la Colombie du fait de l’expl oitation des ressources à l’est du 82 méridien tout en affirmant
qu’il ne cherche pas une réparation pécuniaire. Le fait que lundi dernier le Nicaragua ait renoncé à
ce qui serait le mode de réparation approprié s’ il était vrai que de tels dommages eussent été
109CR 2012/8, p. 23, par. 40 i) (Argüello).
110Ibid., p. 23, par. 40 ii) (Argüello).
111CR 2012/11, p. 15, par. 30 (Londoño).
112
Activités militaires et param ilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (N icaragua c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique),
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 120-122, par. 233-235.
113
MN, p. 178-181, par. 2.254-2.263 et p. 266, conclu sion 5) ; CMC, p. 273-277, par. 5.62-5.70. Voir Différend
territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p.934
(déclaration de M. le juge ad hoc Gaja). - 60 -
114
commis témoigne à nouveau de la faiblesse de la demande nicaraguayenne. La réalité est que le
Nicaragua n’a subi aucun dommage du fait du compor tement colombien. Jusqu’à maintenant, le
demandeur a même été incapable de fournir la moindre précision au sujet des prétendus dommages
subis, et a fortiori de prouver leur existence. Raison amplement suffisante pour rejeter la demande
115
de déclaration nicaraguayenne . Il existe aussi d’autres raisons qui conduisent au rejet de cette
demande. La première est la nature du différend qui nous occupe. La deuxième tient aux
comportements des Parties. La troisième est le fait qu’il ne découle pas de l’arrêt sur les exceptions
préliminaires de 2007 que la Colombie aurait dû changer son comportement sur le terrain.
D. La nature du différend exclut la demande de déclaration nicaraguayenne
13. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et M essieurs les juges, la demande nicaraguayenne
doit être examinée à la lumière de la nature du présent différend. Il demeure aujourd’hui
essentiellement un différend de délimitation mariti me classique. Dans ce genre de différend, la
règle générale est que les parties ne demandent pas réparation au cas où la décision déclarerait que
les espaces sur lesquels une partie exerçait ses compétences s’avérerait être sous la juridiction de
l’autre partie.
14. La jurisprudence de votre Cour montre que même les différends territoriaux classiques
sont réglés par un jugement déclaratif, et non par une décision dans le domaine de la responsabilité.
Les affaires du Temple de Préah Vihéar , Libye/Tchad et Cameroun c. Nigéria témoignent des cas
où un différend frontalier débouche sur un jugeme nt affirmant que celui qui exerçait des
compétences sur un espace donné n’était pas son souverain. Dans votre arrêt du 10 octobre 2002,
la Cour a estimé que «du fait même du présent arrê t et de l’évacuation du territoire camerounais
occupé par le Nigéria, le préjudice subi par le Ca meroun en raison de l’occupation de son territoire
aura en tout état de cause été suffisamment pris en compte» ( Frontière terrestre et maritime entre
le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nig éria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt,
114 o o
Usine de Chorzów, fond, arrêt n 13, 1928, C.P.J.I. sérieA n 17, p.27-28 et 47-48; Projet
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/Slovaquie), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1997 , p. 81, par. 152 ; Avena et autres ressortissants
mexicains (Mexique c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt , C.I.J. Recueil 2004 (I), p. 59, par. 119 ; Application de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c.Serbie-et-Monténégro),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p. 232-233, par. 460.
115 Compétence en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale d’Allemagne c.Islande), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p.204-205, par.76;Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun
c. Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 453, par. 323-324. - 61 -
116
C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p.452, par.319) . Ce qui est vrai pour les frontières terrestres l’est
également pour les délimitations maritimes.
15. Par ailleurs, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, nous ne nous trouvo ns pas non plus dans
une situation dans laquelle la Colombie aurait évacué, que ce soit par la force ou autrement, les
autorités nicaraguayennes de l’exercice des foncti ons juridictionnelles dans les espaces maritimes
concernés. Nous sommes enco re moins confrontés à une situation d’occupation militaire ou
coloniale et à l’exploitation indue de ressources na turelles résultant d’une telle occupation. Tout
cela est très éloigné de notre affaire.
16. Que ce soit en 1969, lorsque le Nicaragua avança sa première revendication sur la zone
entourant Quitasueño, ou en 1972, lorsqu’il reve ndiqua la souveraineté sur Roncador, Quitasueño
et Serrana, voire même sur tout l’archipel et ses espaces maritimes en 1980, la Colombie exerçait, à
toutes les époques considérées, sa souveraineté et sa juridiction; et cette situation s’est prolongée
de manière ininterrompue, aussi bien avant qu’apr ès la requête introductive d’instance. Ainsi, la
Colombie s’est bornée à maintenir la situation exista nte en vertu du traité de 1928-1930 et du droit
international général, et à agir de bonne foi comme le ferait tout Etat défendant sa souveraineté et
sa juridiction.
117
17. Le Nicaragua nie l’existence d’un statu quo relativement aux espaces maritimes .
Nous sommes face à une pétition de principe. Statu quo signifie littéralement «en l’état où la
situation existe». Il est par ailleurs étrange de nier aujourd’hui l’existence d’un statu quo, alors que
même après sa revendication totale de 1980, le Ni caragua n’a pas réagi lorsque la Colombie a
établi, par exemple, des zones de pêche autour de Quitasueño, Roncador et Serrana, où l’activité
des navires battant pavillon états-uniens a été au torisée, sous certaines conditions, en vertu d’un
accord conclu avec les Etats-Unis d’Amérique 118. Vous pouvez voir ces zones de pêche à
119
l’écran . Le Nicaragua n’a jamais protesté contre cet exercice concret de juridiction, malgré la
publication de cet accord dans le Recueil des traités des Nations Unies et dans celui des
116
Voir aussi Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 37.
117
Lettre de l’agent du Nicaragua à la Cour du 20 mars 2012.
118Accord entre la Colombie et les Etats-Unis relatif à cer tains droits de pêche en application du traité relatif au
statut de Quitasueño, Roncador et Serrana, 6 décembre 1983, 2015, Nations Unies, RTNU 3 ; 35 UST 3105 ; TIAS 10842.
119CMC, p. 183, fig. 4.1. - 62 -
Etats-Unis 120, et le fait que plus de 700 perm is aient effectivement été délivrés 121. La Colombie a
simplement exercé sa souveraineté et sa juridiction jusqu’à la limite occidentale de l’archipel, telle
qu’elle fut définie par le protocole de1930. Le Nicaragua a fait de même à l’ouest du 82 e
méridien. Voilà le statu quo en question à tous les moments pertinents.
18. La Colombie a agi de manière cohérent e avec la position qu’elle a toujours soutenue,
comme tout Etat qui ne veut pas que son comportement puisse être interprété comme un
acquiescement à la position de l’autre 122. Il aurait été impensable que, face à la négation absolue
du traité de 1928-1930, la Colombie se conten te d’observer la manière dont le Nicaragua
exploiterait les ressources des zones que la Colombie revendique comme siennes.
E. Le Nicaragua a lui aussi intercepté des navires colombiens
19. Venons-en, Monsieur le président, aux comportements, qui selon le Nicaragua, lui
permettraient de demander satisfaction. Il s’agira it de l’interception par la Colombie de navires de
e 123
pêche battant pavillon nicaraguayen à l’est du 82 méridien .
20. La première remarque que l’on peut fair e est que la Colombie a délivré des permis de
pêche à des navires battant pavillon nicaraguayen. Lorsque des navires nicaraguayens ont exercé
leurs activités sans posséder les permis correspondant s, ils ont été interceptés et soumis à des
amendes 124. Par ailleurs, on voit mal de quoi le de mandeur se plaint, car le Nicaragua a lui aussi,
e
de temps en temps, intercepté des navires de pêche battant pavillon colombien sur le 82 méridien
125
ou à l’est de celui-ci, comme vous le voyez à l’écran . La Colombie a émis des protestations à
leur encontre 126. Le Nicaragua a d’ailleurs mentionné ces interceptions dans son mémoire, et votre
127
Cour l’a aussi relevé dans votre arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires .
120
DC, p. 181-183, par. 4.62-4.66.
121CMC, vol. I, p. 184, par. 4.67.
122Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la régi on du golfe du Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 65, par.130; Différend frontalier terrestre, insulair e et maritime (ElSalvador/Honduras;
Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 408, par. 80, p. 563, par. 341, p. 577, par. 364.
123RN, p. 237, par. 8, p. 240, conclusions II.
124CMC, p. 98, par. 3.41 ; DC, p. 288, par. 8.32.
125DC, p. 289, fig. R-8.2.
126
DC, p. 287, par. 8.30.
127
MN, vol. II, annexes 49,50, 53, 55 et 57 ; Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II),p. 846, par. 31. - 63 -
21. Monsieur le président, permettez-moi de rappeler que le Nicaragua a lui-même rejeté
devant votre Cour l’argument qu’il utilise aujourd’hui contre la Colombie. Commentant avec
ironie la position hondurienne relative à la saisie de navires par les deux parties, le Nicaragua
affirmait: «When the coastguard is Honduran an d the fishermen are Nicaraguan this is called
effective control of islands and maritime areas; however, if the fishermen are Honduran and the
128
coastguard Nicaraguan, this is considered harassment, aggression and incursion» . To conclude
as follows: «It cannot be considered «harassmen t» or «provocation» or «aggressive incursions»
when the Naval Force [of Nicaragua] demands resp ect for the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the
129
Republic» .
22. On ne saurait non plus critiquer la Colombie du fait de l’explorati on et de l’exploitation
de ressources naturelles à l’est du 82 eméridien. Très récemment le Nicaragua a annoncé sur le site
Internet de son président la mise en place d’ un vaste programme d’exploration de ressources
naturelles dans des zones situées à l’est du 82 e méridien 130. Dans sa note adressée à la Cour le
22février2012, le Nicaragua reconnaît que ces ac tivités se déroulent dans des zones qui font
131
l’objet du présent différend . Contrairement à ce que l’agent a mentionné lundi passé, ni le site
Internet du président ni la note du Nicaragua à la Cour ne se réfèrent à une vérification in situ des
132
rapports scientifiques sur Quitasueño . Comme mon collègue James Crawford l’a mentionné ce
matin, il ne s’agit que d’un écran de fumée de dernière minute pour prétendre justifier que le
Nicaragua n’a pas apporté la moindre preuve pour contrecarrer les rapports scientifiques prouvant
l’existence de formations insulaires à Quitasueño. Il n’y a pas la moindre preuve non plus que ce
navire ait été menacé ou intercepté où que ce soit.
128 Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua ele Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua
c. Honduras), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II) ; RN, p. 154, par. 7.38.
129Ibid., p. 160, par. 7.60.
130 «Gobierno Sandinista realiza inve stigaciones pesqueras en plat aforma continental Caribe», El 19 ,
24février2012. Disponible sur le siteht tp://www.elpueblopresidente.com/EL-19/8559.html , ainsi que sur le site
http://el19digital.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=358… :gobierno-sandinista-realiza-investigacio
nes-pesqueras-en-plataforma-continental-caribe&catid=23 :nacionales&Itemid=12.
131Note de l’agent du Nicaragua au greffier de la Cour, 20 mars 2012.
132CR 2012/8, p. 19-20, par. 24-27 (Argüello). - 64 -
F. L’arrêt du 13 décembre 2007 n’a pas modifié l’obligation de respecter le statu quo
23. Je vais maintenant traiter de la situa tion qui a suivi votre arrêt sur les exceptions
préliminaires. Le Nicaragua soutient que, par l’arrêt du 13 décembre 2007, votre Cour «a jugé que
e
le 82 méridien n’était pas une ligne de délimitation des espaces maritimes respectifs des Parties»
[traduction du Greffe] 133. Ce n’est pas exactement ce que vous avez décidé. En effet, selon votre
arrêt, «le traité de 1928 et le protocole de 1930 n’ont pas opéré de délimitation générale des espaces
134
maritimes entre la Colombie et le Nicaragua» . Il vous revient, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges,
de décider du tracé de la délimitation maritime unique entre les deux Etats. Vous pouvez tracer
cette délimitation à l’intérieur de la zone géographique pertinente , à l’endroit où vous l’estimerez
appropriée, conformément au droit international. Rien ne vous empêche de vous servir du
e
82 méridien et ce, même si la Colombie, suite à votre arrêt de2007, a considéré opportun de se
référer à la ligne d’équidistance. Votre décision n’ est donc pas encore prise et on ne peut préjuger
de l’issue du différend.
24. Après votre arrêt du 13 décembre 2007, la Colombie a continué de respecter le statu quo,
e
notamment en s’abstenant d’élargir l’exercice de sa juridiction à l’ouest du 82 méridien. Il est
évident qu’il ne serait possible de créer ni une vaste No Man’s Area ni une sorte de zone commune
en attendant l’arrêt sur le fond, du seul fait que le Nicaragua ait procédé à une revendication, qui,
rappelons-le, est totalement démesurée et infondée. En l’absence de tout accord intérimaire et dans
l’attente de votre décision, le respect du statu quo s’impose. C’est exactement cette ligne de
conduite que la Colombie a adoptée depuis le début de cette procédure et qu’elle s’attend de la part
du Nicaragua.
G. Conclusion
25. En arrivant à mes conclusions, Monsieur le président, je m’interroge sur les véritables
raisons de cette demande en réparation. Peut-ê tre le demandeur a-t-il cru qu’en agissant ainsi ses
revendications territoriales et maritimes seraient plus crédibles. Peut-être a-t-il cru qu’en
133RN, p. 236, par. 3.
134 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragu.ocC lombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 869, par. 120. - 65 -
demandant réparation ou satisfaction pour des fa its illicites imaginaires commis par la Colombie,
ses propres agissements pourraient alors mieux passer inaperçus.
26. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, la demande de déclaration du Nicaragua ne correspond
pas au droit applicable à ce genre de différends et au comportement que l’on peut attendre des
Parties dans de telles circonstances.
27. Je me permets, Monsieur le président, un commentaire final. Dans un autre contexte
juridictionnel, les revendications changeantes et clairement dépourvues de fondement juridique
auraient certainement résulté en l’imposition à la Partie demanderesse du paiement des frais de la
135
procédure . La Colombie ne va pas jusqu’à vous de mander cela. Elle s’oppose néanmoins avec
vigueur aux prétentions démesurées et infondées du demandeur, tout comme à ses accusations
gratuites.
28. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieu rs les juges, ainsi s’achève le premier tour
de plaidoiries de la République de Colombie. Au nom de l’ensemble de la délégation, je vous
remercie de l’attention que vous avez bien voulu nous accorder durant ces deux jours et je vous
souhaite un bon week-end.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le conseil. Avant de lever la séance, je voudrais donner
la parole à M.le jugeMohamedBennouna qui a une question aux deux Par ties. Monsieur le
juge Bennouna, vous avez la parole.
M. le juge BENNOUNA : Je vous remercie, Mons ieur le président. Comme vous venez de
le rappeler, ma question s’adresse aux deux Parties. Je vais la poser successivement dans les deux
langues de travail de la Cour. Cette question est la suivante :
«Le régime juridique du plateau continental est-il différent pour la portion de
celui-ci qui se situe en deçà de la limite des 200 milles marins et pour la portion située
au-delà de cette limite ?»
My question is as follows:
135 o
Voir par exemple Generation Ukraine, Inc c.Ukraine , affaire CIRDI n ARB/00/9, sentence arbitrale,
16septembre 2003, 44 ILM404 (2005),par. 24.1-24.8 et 25; Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. c. Hongrie, affaire
CIRDI n ARB/04/15, sentence arbitrale, 13 septembre 2006, 21 ICSID Rev. ⎯ FILJ 603 (2006), par. 104-108; Desert
Line Projects c. Yemen, affaire CIRDI n ARB/05/17, sentence arbitrale, 6 février 2008, 48 ILM 79 (2009), par. 304. - 66 -
“Is the legal régime of the continental shelf for the portion located within the
200-nautical-mile limit different from that for the portion located beyond this limit?”
Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président.
Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Monsieurle juge . Je demande aux Parties de répondre à la
question oralement au cours du deuxième tour de pl aidoiries. La version écrite de la question sera
transmise par le greffier dans les meilleurs déla is. La Cour se réunira prochainement mardi, le
1ermai, à 10 heures du matin. Cette audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 17 h 50.
___________
Public sitting held on Friday 27 April 2012, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Tomka presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)