Corrigé
Corrected
CR 2013/1
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LA HAYE THE HAGUE
ANNÉE 2013
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 15 avril 2013, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président,
en l’affairerelative à la Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962
en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)
(Cambodge c. Thaïlande)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
YEAR 2013
Public sitting
held on Monday 15 April 2013, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Tomka presiding,
in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962
in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodiav. Thailand)
(Cambodia v. Thailand)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________ - 2 -
Présents : M. Tomka, président
M. Sepúlveda-Amor, vice-président
MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M. Bhandari, juges
MM. Guillaume
Cot, juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier
- 3 -
Present: President Tomka
Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Judges ad hoc Guillaume
Cot
Registrar Couvreur
- 4 -
Le Gouvernement du Royaume du Cambodge est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong, vice -premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères et de la
coopération internationale,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Var Kimhong, ministre d’Etat,
comme agent adjoint ;
S. Exc. M. Long Visalo, secrétaire d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération
internationale,
M. Raoul Marc Jennar, expert,
S. Exc. M. Hem Saem, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Royaume du Cambodge
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Sarun Rithea, conseiller du ministre des affaires étrangères et de la coopération internationale,
M. Hoy Pichravuth, assistant du vice-premier ministre,
comme conseillers ;
M. Jean-Marc Sorel, professeur de droit international à l’Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne),
sir Franklin Berman , K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Cour
permanente d’arbitrage, profess eur invité de droit international à l’Université d’Oxford et à
l’Université de Cape Town,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Guillaume Le Floch, professeur à l’Université de Rennes I,
Mme Amal Alamuddin, membre des barreaux d’Angleterreet de New York,
Mme Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (Angleterre et Pays de Galles), cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris,
comme conseils. - 5 -
The Government of the Kingdom of Cambodiais represented by:
H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and International
Co-operation,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Var Kimhong, Minister of State,
as Deputy Agent;
H.E. Mr. Long Visalo, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Co-operation,
Mr. Raoul Marc Jennar, Expert,
H.E. Mr. Hem Saem, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Cambodia
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Sarun Rithea, Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation,
Mr. Hoy Pichravuth, Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister,
as Advisers;
Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel, Professor of International Law at the University of Paris I
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., member of the English Bar, Member of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, Visiting Professor of International Law at Oxford University and the University
of Cape Town,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la c our d’appel de Paris , member of the Ne w York Bar ,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Guillaume Le Floch, Professor at the University of Rennes I,
Ms Amal Alamuddin, member of the English and the New York Bars,
Ms Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (England and Wales), Eversheds LLP, Paris,
as Counsel. - 6 -
Le Gouvernement du Royaume de Thaïlande est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Virachai Plasai, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Royaume de
Thaïlande auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
M. Voradet Viravakin, directeur général du département des traités et des affaires juridiques du
ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agent adjoint ;
S. Exc. M. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Phongthep Thepkanjana, vice-premier ministre et ministre de l’éducation,
S. Exc. M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, A.C.M., ministre de la défense,
M. Thana Duangratana, vice-ministre rattaché au cabinet du premier ministre,
M. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, secrétaire permanent du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Nuttavudh Photisaro, secrétaire permanent adjoint du ministère des affaires étrangères,
Le général Nipat Thonglek, secrétaire permanent adjoint du ministère de la défense,
Le général Nopphadon Chotsiri, directeur général du s ervice géographique royal thaïlandais,
quartier général des forces armées du Royaume de Thaïlande,
M. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, secrétaire général adjoint du bureau du conseil d’Etat, cabinet du
premier ministre,
M. Jumpon Phansumrit, procureur expert au bureau des politiques et stratégies, bureau de
l’Attorney General,
M. Darm Boontham, directeur de la division des frontières du département des traités et des
affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires étrangères ;
*
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., profe sseur de droit à l’Université de Cambridge, titulaire de la
chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
M. Donald McRae, professeur à l’Université d’Ottawa, titulaire de la chaire Hyman Soloway,
membre de la Commission du droit int ernational, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international, membre du barreau de l’Ontario, - 7 -
The Government of the Kingdom of Thailand is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Virachai Plasai, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of
Thailand to Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent;
Mr. Voradet Viravakin, Director-General, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Deputy Agent;
H.E. Mr. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Phongthep Thepkanjana, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education,
H.E. A.C.M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, Minister of Defence,
Mr. Thana Duangratana, Vice-Minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister,
Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Nuttavudh Photisaro, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
General Nipat Thonglek, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence,
Lieutenant General Nopphadon Chotsiri, Director -General, Royal Thai Survey Department, Royal
Thai Armed Forces Headquarters,
Mr. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, Deputy-Secretary-General, Office of the Council of State, Office of
the Prime Minister,
Mr. Jumpon Phansumrit, Expert Public Prosecutor, Office of Policy and Strategy, Office of the
Attorney General,
Mr. Darm Boontham, Director, Boundary Division, Department of Treaties and Legal Affai rs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
*
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister,
Mr. Donald McRae, Hyman Soloway Professor, University of Ottawa, Member of the International
Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit international, member of the Ontario
Bar, - 8 -
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, président de la Société
française pour le droit international, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Thomas Grant, membre du barreau de New York, maître de recherche au Lauterpacht Centre
for International Law de l’Université de Cambridge,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseils ;
M. Alastair Macdonald, M.B .E., membre honoraire de l’unité de recherche sur les frontières
internationales du département de géographie de l’Université de Durham,
M. Martin Pratt, directeur de recherche à l’unité de recherche sur les frontières internationales du
département de géographie de l’Université de Durham,
comme conseillers experts ;
M. Ludovic Legrand, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseil adjoint. - 9 -
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest , Nanterre-La Défense, President of the
Société française pour le droit international, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Dr. Thomas Grant, member of the New York Bar, Senior Res earch Associate, Lauterpacht Centr e
for International Law, University of Cambridge,
Ms Alina Miron, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University Paris
Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel;
Mr. Alastair Macdonald, M .B.E., Honorary Fellow, International Bound aries Research Unit,
Department of Geography, Durham University,
Mr. Martin Pratt, Director of Research, International Boundaries Research Unit, Department of
Geography, Durham University,
as Expert Advisers;
Mr. Ludovic Legrand, Researcher, Centre de dr oit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Assistant Counsel. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: The sitting is open.
Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, It is with great honour and joy
that the Court meets today for the first time in the newly -renovated Great Hall of Justice. On this
important occasion, I wish to emphasize that the renovation of the Great Hall coincides with the
centennial anniversary of the Peace Palace, which opened its doors in August of 1913. This
momentous occasion will be celebrated later this year, in many ways.
The Great Hall of Justice was first used by the Permanent Court of Arbitration for arbitral
proceedings administered by that institution. In 1922, it became the home f or judicial proceedings
conducted before the Permanent Court of International Justice and, since 1946, the International
Court of Justice has made it its permanent courtroom. Over the decades, countless eminent agents
and counsel have appeared before these institutions; ground-breaking legal arguments have been
put forward by parties; peaceful solutions and settlement of international disputes have been
articulated while upholding the rules and principles of international law; and greater adherence to
the international rule of law has been continuously promoted.
This room has been the breeding ground for some of the most seminal and important
decisions in the field of international law during the last 90 years. The prospect of bringing a
dispute to t he World Court for adjudication which should not be construed as an inimical or
hostile act, as the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes tells
us actually serves to further the objectives of international peace, secur ity and justice.
Proceedings before the Court may contribute to diffusing tensions between disputing States and
ultimately help strengthen the rule of law on the international plane. Needless to say, this room has
seen its share of historical disputes ov er the last century and has remained a locus for the
formulation of timely, well-reasoned and just legal solutions. The Great Hall of Justice quite a
suitable name, indeed!
What is more, today the Court is presented with the outcome of the first major renovation of
this Hall in 100 years. In the past, minor refurbishment works had been carried out to - 11 -
accommodate certain requirements of the Court’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of
International Justice, such as extending its bench in view of its e nlarged composition. Yet, no
renovation project of this magnitude had ever been envisaged prior to the recent reconfiguration
and refurbishment of this Hall.
Today, the Great Hall features vastly superior working capabilities, being now equipped with
first-rate and modern technical facilities, all while exhibiting a fresh and modern look. Thus, the
Court is very pleased that it will continue hearing the cases submitted to it faithfully and
impartially, as dictated by the noble judicial mission entruste d to it, in improved and modern
working conditions. In many ways, therefore, this centennial anniversary year provides a
propitious opportunity not only to reflect and meditate on the great past and history surrounding
this Hall, the Palace and institutio ns housed in it, but also to look forward and to embrace a future
in which international peace, justice and modernity can work hand in hand.
While it is no doubt important to commemorate the past, we must not forget those more
immediate actors that have helped shape the present. The initiative of renovating the Great Hall of
Justice was first raised by Dame Rosalyn Higgins when she was President of the Court, for which
she must be heartily commended. The renovation of this Great Hall was made possible through the
tireless efforts of several individuals and institutions. In this spirit, the Court extends its sincere
gratitude to the Carnegie Foundation its Board led by Dr. Bot and its Director -General
Mr. Steven van Hoogstraten, to the Dutch Government, and to the United Nations for financial
support towards the achievement of this renovation project.
Warm thanks are also due to those individuals and companies that have helped create the
newly-designed Great Hall, namely: the main architect, Mari jke van der Wijst; the co -architect,
JulianWolse; the carpet designer, Annet Haak; the project managers, Edwin van Eeckhoven and
Corne Noordam; the co-ordinator for the Carnegie Foundation, Guido Bennebroek; the company
Smeulders for providing the ne w bench, the technical booth and the interpreters ’ booths; the
company ERCO which designed the lighting; the company Verkaart for handling all technical
aspects of the renovation; the company Du Prie for carrying out the rebuilding tasks in the Great
Hall; and the company Vitra for furnishing the Great Hall. - 12 -
It is to be hoped that this Great Hall of Justice which has served for 90 years as a bastion
of international peace and justice and as an incubator for the peaceful settlement of disputes will
be of further use in promoting and strengthening the international rule of law.
*
Excellencies, distinguished guests, the Court meets for the first time since the passing away
on 13 February 2013 of our esteemed former colleague, His Excellency Judge Pieter Kooijmans,
who was a Member of the International Court of Justice from 1997 to 2006. His spouse,
Mrs. Jeanne Kooijmans-Verhage, is now among us here in the Great Hall of Justice.
It was with profound sadness and sorrow that Members of the Court lea rnt of the death of
Judge Kooijmans, which is a tremendous loss for the Netherlands, for the international legal
community and for international law and justice which he served with exemplary authority and
great talent. As a Judge of the International Court of Justice, he was highly respected for his moral
and human qualities, his knowledge and skills. As a professional jurist, he was eminently wise,
perceptive and pragmatic, possessed a remarkable sense of compromise and was widely praised for
his balanced judgments.
None of us will forget the major contributions Judge Kooijmans made to the fulfilment of the
Court’s important mandate: he participated actively in numerous cases, offering all his experience
and knowledge and thus serving the cause of in ternational peace and justice. We will also
remember the great significance he attached to human rights, which permeated all his work.
During his long and illustrious legal career Judge Kooijmans also served as a Member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Chairman of the Administrative Council of the Hague Academy of
International Law and lecturer at the same Academy, Chairman of the Netherlands Branch of the
International Law Association, Member of the Board of Editors of the Netherlands Internationa l
Law Review, Professor of Public International Law at the Free University of Amsterdam and at the
University of Leiden. In addition he occupied numerous other important posts. - 13 -
Judge Kooijmans’s political and diplomatic career was no less illustrious: w e need only
recall that he served first as Secretary of State and later as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands and was appointed Minister of State.
In all the positions he held, he discharged his responsibilities with the utmost competence
and professionalism. In recognition of Peter Kooijmans’s outstanding service to his country,
Queen Beatrix made him Knight of the Order of the Netherlands Lion, Commander of the Order of
Oranje-Nassau and Knight of the Order of the Gold Lion of the House of Nassau.
We are keenly aware of how devoted Judge Kooijmans was to his family and we hope that
Mrs. Kooijmans, his children and other close family members will be able to find support and
solace in the shared memories of their departed loved one.
On behalf of Members of the Court and myself, the Registrar and Registry staff, let me
extend our deepest sympathy and our heartfelt thoughts to them at this time of affliction.
May I kindly ask you to stand and observe one minute of silence in memory of
Judge Peter Kooijmans.
Please be seated. Thank you.
*
* *
Le PRESIDENT : La Cour se réunit aujourd’hui pour entendre les Parties en leurs plaidoiries
dans l’affaire relative à la D emande en interprétation de l ’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l ’affaire du
Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge c. Thaïlande).
La Cour ne comptant sur le siège aucun juge de la nationalité des Parties, chacune d’elles
s’est prévalue de la faculté que lui confère le paragraphe 3 de l’article 31 du Statut de désigner un
juge ad hoc. M. Gilbert Guillaume, désigné par le Cambodge, et M. Jean-Pierre Cot, désigné par la - 14 -
Thaïlande, ont été tous deux dûment installés le 30 mai 2011 comme juges ad hoc en l’affaire à
l’ouverture des audiences sur la demande en indicati on de mesures conservatoires présentée par le
Cambodge.
*
Je rappellerai à présent les principales étapes de la procédure en l’espèce.
Le 28 avril 2011, le Royaume du Cambodge a déposé au Greffe de la Cour une requête
introductive d’instance dans laquelle, se référant à l’article 60 du Statut de la Cour et à l’article 98
de son Règlement, le Cambodge demande à la Cour d’interpréter l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu le
15 juin 1962 en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) . Le Cambodge,
dans sa requête, prie notamment la Cour de dire que l’arrêt de 1962 se fonde sur l’existence
préalable d’une frontière internationale reconnue entre les deux Etats et définie par la carte sur la
base de laquelle la Cour a constaté la souveraineté du Cambodge sur le temple de Préah Vihéar.
Le même jour, après avoir déposé sa requête, le Cambodge, se référant à l’article 41 du
Statut et à l’article 73 du Règlement, a également déposé une demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires afin de «faire cesser [l]es in cursions [de la Thaïlande] sur son territoire» en
attendant que la Cour se prononce sur la demande en interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962.
Par ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011, la Cour, après avoir rejeté la demande de la Thaïlande
tendant à obtenir la radiat ion de l’affaire du rôle de la Cour, a dit qu ’elle avait prima facie
compétence et indiqué certaines mesures conservatoires.
Par lettres du greffier en date du 20 juillet 2011, les Parties ont été informées que la Cour, en
application de l ’article 98, paragraphe3, du Règlement, avait fixé au 21 novembre 2011 la date
d’expiration du délai dans lequel la Thaïlande pourrait présenter des observations écrites sur la
demande en interprétation du Cambodge.
Le 21 novembre 2011, dans le délai prescrit à cet effe t, la Thaïlande a déposé ses
observations écrites sur la demande en interprétation du Cambodge.
Par lettre datée du 22 novembre 2011, l’agent du Cambodge a indiqué à la Cour que son
gouvernement sollicitait «un délai d’ une quinzaine de jours pour étudier au préalable [l]es - 15 -
observations» écrites de la Thaïlande, suivi d ’un «délai de trois mois pour apporter sa réponse
[auxdites] observations».
Par lettres du 24 novembre 2011, le greffier a fait savoir aux Parties que la Cour avait décidé
de donner à ces d ernières la possibilité de lui fournir par écrit un supplément d’ information,
conformément au paragraphe 4 de l ’article 98 du Règlement, et avait fixé au 8 mars 2012 et au
21 juin 2012, respectivement, les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt par le Cambodge et par
la Thaïlande d ’un tel supplément d’ information. Chacune des Parties a déposé celui -ci dans le
délai prescrit à cet effet.
Par lettre du 2 mars 2012, l’agent de la Thaïlande a prié la Cour de donner aux Parties la
possibilité de lui four nir oralement un supplément d’ information. Dans un courrier du
7 mars 2012, l’agent du Cambodge a fait savoir à la Cour que son gouvernement n’y était pas
opposé.
Par lettres du 22 juin 2012, le greffier a informé les Parties que la Cour avait décidé de leur
donner la possibilité de lui fournir oralement un supplément d ’information, conformément au
paragraphe 4 de l’article 98 du Règlement.
*
Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l ’article 53 de son Règlement, la Cour, après s ’être
renseignée auprès des Partie s, a décidé de rendre accessibles au public, à l ’ouverture de la
procédure orale, des exemplaires des pièces de procédure et documents annexés. En outre,
l’ensemble de ces documents, y compris leurs annexes, seront placés dès aujourd’hui sur le site
Internet de la Cour.
*
Je constate la présence à l ’audience des agents, conseils et avocats des deux Parties.
Conformément aux dispositions relatives à l ’organisation de la procédure arrêtées par la Cour, les
audiences comprendront un premier et un second tours de plaidoiries.
* - 16 -
Le premier tour de plaidoiries débute aujourd’ hui et se terminera le mercredi 17 avril 2013.
Le second tour de plaidoiries s ’ouvrira le jeudi 18 avril 2013 et s ’achèvera le
vendredi 19 avril 2013.
*
Le Royaume d u Cambodge, qui est l ’Etat demandeur en l ’affaire, sera entendu le premier.
Etant donné mon discours de ce matin, la délégation cambodgienne peut, si c’est nécessaire,
dépasser 13 heures d’une dizaine de minutes.
Je donne à présent la parole à S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong, agent du Royaume du Cambodge.
Excellence, vous avez la parole.
M. HOR NAMHONG :
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, c ’est avec beaucoup d’émotion
et de gravité que je me présente une nouvelle fois aujourd’hui devant vous en tant qu’ agent
représentant le Royaume du Cambodge.
2. Il s’agit cette fois -ci de clore la procédure qui mènera votre Cour vers sa décision finale
dans l’affaire qui nous occupe . Je mesure donc la gravité de ce moment pour mon pays et je
souhaite que votre juridic tion puisse rendre un arrêt sur l’interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962, qui
clôturera définitivement ce litige qui obscurcit depuis quelques années les relations entre notre
voisin la Thaïlande. Il est temps désormais d’entretenir entre les deux pays des rel ations cordiales,
pacifiques et animées par un esprit constructif. Le Cambodge le souhaite plus que jamais.
3. Comme il se doit, je laisserai les conseils du Cambodge répondre aux différents arguments
juridiques qui ont pu être développés dans les écrits successifs de la Thaïlande. Pour ma part, il me
revient de rappeler le contexte dans lequel nous nous trouvons, contexte qui nécessite que votre
Cour prenne une décision d’une importance fondamentale pour la paix, l’amitié et la coopération
entre les deux pays, et pour la région en général.
4. Auparavant, je souhaite remercier sincèrement la Cour pour avoir permis au Cambodge et
à la Thaïlande de s’exprimer de manière conséquente durant cette procédure, car vous avez bien
voulu laisser au Cambodge et à la Thaïlande un cycle complet de procédures écrite et orale, - 17 -
prouvant par là même l’importance que vous attachez à l’affaire que le Cambodge a portée devant
vous. Le Cambodge veut croire que ceci n’est pas dû au hasard mais résulte du sérieux des
fondements sur lesquels cette affaire a été portée devant vous.
5. D’abord je souhaite rappeler rapidement pourquoi le Cambodge revient devant la Cour
50 ans après l’arrêt initial ; quelle est aujourd’hui la situation sur le terrain, notamment au regard
des mesures conservatoires prononcées par votre Cour en juillet 2011 ; quelle est l’attitude de la
Thaïlande vis-à-vis de cette situation ; ce que le Cambodge souhaite, et pourquoi la Cour doit se
prononcer sur l’interprétation pertinente à l’issue de cette procédure.
I.R APPEL DE L ’HISTOIRE RÉCENTE
6. Pourquoi le Cambodge revient 50 ans après l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 devant votre
juridiction ? Il ne s’agit nullement pour le Camb odge d’une procédure superflue, mais bien de la
nécessité qui s’est imposée de reveni r devant votre Cour pour élucider la bonne interprétation à
donner à l’arrêt initial afin de régler le différend portant sur le sens et la portée de l’arrêt de 1962.
7. Cette nécessité résulte, comme on le sait , d’actes d’agressions armées de la Thaïlan de
alors gouvernée par le premier ministre Abhisit Vejjajiva contre le Cambodge de 2008
à 2011 à la frontière entre les pays dans la région du temple de Préah -Vihéar, depuis que le
Cambodge a réussi à faire inscrire ce temple sur la liste du patrimoine mondial de l’Unesco
en 2008, en dépit d’une forte opposition de la Thaïlande. Sans ces agressions armées, le Cambodge
aurait continué de jouir paisiblement de sa souveraineté dans cette région . C’est donc bien le
classement de ce temple au patrimoine mo ndial de l’Unesco qui constitue le point de départ de ces
incidents armés, ainsi que la réclamation de 4,6 km², à proximité du temple, comme ceci est
explicitement mentionné dans une publication du m inistère thaïlandais des a ffaires étrangères en
décembre 2011 sous le titre «Les informations que le peuple thaï doit savoir», et ainsi que plusieurs
autres publications thaïlandaises.
8. Mystérieusement, la Thaïlande, dans ses observations écrites du 21 juin 2012, semble
oublier que cette série d’attaques militaires contre le Cambodge, faiblement armé, de 2008 à 2011,
ponctuée de destructions y compris celles touchant le temple lui-même de blessés et de morts
à la suite de ces agressions armées. Elle souhaite donc faire oublier la raison pour laquelle il e st - 18 -
nécessaire que votre juridiction se prononce sur la bonne interprétation à donner à l’arrêt de 1962.
Ceci n’est guère étonnant puisque, après avoir fait ressurgir les tensions que le Cambodge pensait
de l’ordre du passé, la Thaïlande feint d’ignorer qu ’il existe bien un différend entre les deux Etats
sur l’interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962.
9. Ce sont pourtant bien ces événements qui ont poussé le Cambodge, faute d’arrangements
diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement thaïlandais à cette époque, le gouverne ment de
M. Abhisit Vejjajiva, à revenir devant la Cour internationale de Justice. L’attitude incohérente de
la Thaïlande prouve surtout que cet Etat n’a jamais réellement accepté la solution de l’arrêt
de 1962. Certes, après quelques tergiversations, la Thaïlande aurait finalement accepté l’arrêt du
15 juin 1962, mais son interprétation dudit arrêt, comme en témoignent essentiellement ses prises
de position depuis 2008, prouve qu’elle a toujours cherché à en minimiser le sens et la portée.
C’est bien la raison pour laquelle le Cambodge se voit obligé de poser aujourd’hui à votre
juridiction la question du sens et de la portée exacte de l’arrêt de 1962.
II.L A SITUATION AUJOURD ’HUI
10. Malheureusement, le Cambodge ne peut que déplorer la situation actue lle dans la région
du temple de Préah Vihéar puisque les négociations bilatérales sur le retrait des troupes de la zone
démilitarisée provisoire conformément aux mesures conservatoires décidées par votre juridiction le
18 juillet 2011 n’ont pas abouti, con trairement à ce que souhaite le Cambodge pour un retrait
rapide et simultané . Lors des réunions du « groupe de travail conjoint» créé à la demande de la
Thaïlande en décembre 2011, chargé du retrait des troupes de la z one démilitarisée provisoire, la
Thaïlande trouve toujours des échappatoires pour ne pas respecter votre ordonnance du
18 juillet 2011. Il en fut ainsi lors des trois réunions entre avril et décembre2012. En
conséquence, il n’a pas été possible de mettre en place des observateurs indonésien s chargés, sous
les auspices de l’ASEAN, de contrôler le retrait des troupes de la zone du temple en attendant votre
jugement définitif.
11. Le Cambodge ne peut que regretter cette situation contraire à votre jurisprudence qui
rend l’application des mesures provisoires obligatoire pour les deux Parties. Dans le «Livre Blanc»
de la Thaïlande de décembre 2011, que le Cambodge a versé au dossier de la Cour, il est - 19 -
notamment indiqué que «La Thaïlande souhaite que le Cambodge retire ses forces armées et sa
population civile de la zone du temple de Phra Viharn, de la colonie, du marché et de la pagode
Keo Sekkha Kiri Svara, avant que les observateurs indonésiens puissent y entrer .» Dans la
décision de la Cour du 18 juillet 2011, il n’a été nullement demandé le retrait de la population
vivant paisiblement dans cette zone depuis des décennies qualifiée en l’espèce d’une manière
injurieuse et contraire au droit de «colonie». Cette expression de colonie veut faire accroire que le
Cambodge aurait installé des popul ations sur un territoire thaïlandais occupé par le Cambodge et
qui se situerait en dehors de sa souveraineté, alors que la population cambodgienne vivait aux
abords du temple, en territoire sous la souveraineté cambodgienne.
12. En réalité, la Thaïlande continue de s’arc-bouter sur une hypothétique négociation sur la
délimitation des frontières dans le cadre du «Memorandum of Understanding» (MoU) de l’an 2000.
La Thaïlande fait de ce mémorandum l’instrument d’une future délimitation des frontières entre les
deux Etats, alors que le MoU en question stricto sensu ne concerne que la démarcation qui est
différente de la délimitation car la frontière d e la région du t emple de Préah Vihéar a déjà été
délimitée par la carte de l’annexe I, ainsi que l’indique votre arrêt de 1962.
III.L’ ATTITUDE DE LA THAÏLANDE
13. En effet, pour la Thaïlande, il n’existerait pas de différend et, selon une expression
qu’elle utilise à plusieurs reprises, l’arrêt de 1962, et notamment son dispositif, serait clair comme
«crystal clear». Cette affirmation quelque peu ironique est d’ailleurs dans la lignée du ton qu’elle
utilise dans ses écrits où se mêlent la mauvaise foi, l’ironie et même le mépris, quand il ne s’agit
pas d’arguments absurdes ou répétitifs.
14. En réalité, au-delà de ce ton, la Thaïlande essaie une nouvelle fois de refaire l’arrêt de
1962. Elle introduit des éléments de confusion dans le débat, notamment en alimentant une
soi-disant querelle sur les cartes présentées ou en réfutant des affirmations qu’elle a elle -même
soulevées, comme la question du périmètre de 4,6 km², revendiqué par la Thaïlande dans son
«Livre Blanc» de décembre 2011 que j’ai déjà cité.
15. La vérité, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, est
que la Thaïlande ne sait plus comment défendre une position contradictoire et intenable et qu’elle - 20 -
fait tout pour retarder un jugement que le Cambodge souhait erait au contraire rapide de manière à
éclaircir la situation. Cette stratégie du recul est bien connue de la pa rt d’Etats dont l’argumentaire
n’est guère fondé. Le refus par la Thaïlande d’accepter la présence d’observateurs indonésiens déjà
évoqué va également dans ce sens.
IV. CE QUE LE C AMBODGE DEMANDE
16. Comme ceci fut exprimé dans des phases précédentes, l e Cambodge souhaite aboutir à
une interprétation authentique et définitive de l’arrêt de 1962. Il ne s’agit pas d’une question
d’exécution de l’arrêt, il ne s’agit pas non plus d’une question de délimitation de la frontière
puisque celle-ci est déjà délim itée par la carte de l’annexe I , sur laquelle s’est basée la Cour pour
rendre son a rrêt en 1962. Il s’agit d’une interrogation «sur le sens ou la portée» de l’arrêt
du 15 juin 1962.
17. La question posée est celle de la souveraineté et de l’intégrité te rritoriale du Cambodge
dans la zone du t emple puisque l’arrêt de 1962 indique cl airement que le temple de Préah Vihéar
est situé en territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge et qu’il demande à la Thaïlande de
retirer ses troupes du temple et de ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien. Or, comment peut
être compris ce retrait si ce n’est en rapport avec la seule carte carte de l’annexe I sur laquelle
votre arrêt de 1962 s’est basé , pour la simple raison que celle- ci est reconnue par la Tha ïlande
comme étant la frontière entre les deux Etats dans cette région de temple de Préah Vihéar ?
18. En clair, ce n’est pas une délimitation que le Cambodge souhaite obtenir elle existe
déjà mais c’est une interprétation du dispositif de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962. En essayant de créer
des diversions par rapport aux questions essentielles, la Thaïlande veut faire douter la Cour du sens
de la question posée.
19. Il en résulte que, pour le Cambodge, l’interprétation qui prévaut de cet arrêt est que le
Cambodge est souverain sur un territoire dont les limites dans la région du temple de Préah Vihéar
sont décrites dans la carte de l’annexe I sur laquelle la Cour s’est entièrement basée pour
l’intégralité de la décision qu’elle a prise en 1962, et qu’il en découle bien une obligation continue
dans le temps du retrait des troupes thaïlandaises jusqu’aux limites de ce territoire. - 21 -
20. En conclusion, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour,
l’importance que le Cambodge accorde à la décision de la Cour va bien au- delà du simple
périmètre concerné ; il s’agit d’un symbole très fort des relations entre les deux Etats, symbole dont
dépendent la paix et la sécurité, la coexistence pacifique et amicale entre le Cambodge et la
Thaïlande. Le Cambodge veut croire que la Cour, en tant qu’organe j udiciaire principal des
Nations Unies, a un rôle fondamental dans la paix entre les peuples. Sans interprétation de l’arrêt
du 15 juin 1962, la situation de statu quo qui en résulterait aurait très p robablement des
conséquences fâcheuses qui empêcheraient d’autant la nécessité de vivre dans un environnement
amical, paisible et coopératif entre les deux Etats. Il en résulte que le Cambodge attend
impatiemment la décision que vous prendrez pour clore un chapitre conflictuel de ses relations avec
son voisin, surtout dans la région du temple de Préah Vihéar d ont chacun connaî t l’extrême
importance historique, politique et culturelle pour le peuple cambodgien.
21. Des confrontations armées en 2008, 2009 e t 2011 ont provoqué des dommages
irréparables sur les éléments architecturaux du temple lui -même, patrimoine de l’humanité, mais
elles ont entraîné surtout la perte inutile de vies humaines, des blessés ainsi que des déplacements
de population. Au- delà des aspects proprement juridiques, c’est une réalité que ne peut i gnorer
votre Cour dont on connaît l’influence et le poids sur la conduite des Etats.
22. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et M essieurs les juges, je vous remercie pour
l’attention que vous av ez portée à mes propos et je vous prie de bien vouloir donner la parole au
professeur Jean-Marc Sorel. Je vous en remercie.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie Monsieur le vice- premier ministre et je passe la parole
au professeur Jean-Marc Sorel. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur.
M. SOREL :
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, c’est pour moi un
très grand honneur de me présenter de nouveau devant vous au nom du Royaume du Cambodge
dans le cadre de cette procédure en inter prétation. Après la présentation générale de S. Exc. le
vice-premier ministre, agent du Royaume du Cambodge, il me revient d’introduire la manière dont
nous souhaitons répondre aux différents arguments de la Thaïlande présentés dans ses écrits, et - 22 -
particulièrement dans son supplément d’informations du 21 juin 2012. Pour cela, le Cambodge v a
successivement indiquer dans cette brève présentation : tout d’abord, quelle est, en résumé, pour le
Cambodge, la manière dont se présente simplement l’affaire qui est portée devant vous ; ensuite,
l’impression globale ressentie par le Cambodge à la lecture des observations écrites de la Thaïlande
et, notamment, les principaux arguments développés par cet Etat ; enfin, quelle est la structure de la
réponse du Cambodge.
I.U NE SIMPLE QUESTION D ’INTERPRÉTATION DE L ’ARRÊT DE 1962
2. Alors que la Thaïlande cherche à nous plonger dans les méandres d’une argumentation
complexe peu linéaire, il est nécessaire de résumer simplement la manière dont le Cambodge
aborde l’affaire qui est présentée devant vous. Il s’a git d’interpréter le paragraphe 2 du dispositif
de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962, à la lumière du paragraphe 1, en liaison directe avec l’obligation pour la
Thaïlande de retirer ses troupes stationnées dans le temple ou dans les «environs situés en territoire
cambodgien». Dès lors, la référence au territoire du Cambodge ne peut être comprise qu’au regard
de ce que la Cour dit à propos de l’acceptation par les deux Parties de la carte de l’annexe 1
comme indiquant la ligne fr ontalière dans la région du t emple. C e motif central, fondamental
quasiment unique indiqué par votre Cour est par conséquent inséparable du dispositif. Il en
découle que l’obligation d’évacuation des troupes est une obligation continue et qui doit être
comprise en rapport avec la ligne indiquée sur la carte de l’annexe 1. L’interprétation unilatérale et
volontairement restrictive de l’arrêt par la Thaïlande ne peut donc être accept. Voilà d’une
manière simple et sans ambiguïté comment le Cambodge comprend le dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962.
La Thaïlande est malheureusement très loin de le comprendre de la même manière et il existe donc
clairement un différend sur l’interprétation de l’arrêt. Ceci ressort de la lecture des écrits de la
Thaïlande.
II.Q UELLE EST L ’IMPRESSION ET LA COMPRÉHENSION PAR LE C AMBODGE
DES ARGUMENTS DE LA T HAÏLANDE ?
3. Cette impression peut être résumée par un triptyque : le ton utilisé, l’agencement des
arguments et la teneur des arguments. - 23 -
4. Concernant le ton utilisé , celui-ci est le plus souvent ironique, condescendant, voir e
méprisant. L’ironie qui sous-tend les observations de la Thaïlande n’est en effet pas exempte d’une
1
certaine condescendance. Ainsi est dénoncée «la paranoïa» du Cambodge . [Nous laissons au
Greffe le soin d’introduire les notes et références précises dans le compte rendu de cette plaidoirie.]
De même, l’ironie perce à plusieurs reprises lorsque certains arguments du Cambodge sont jugés
2
dignes d’«Alice aux pays des merveilles» , et sans doute le Cambodge pourrait-il préférer «Orgueil
et Préjugés» de Jane Austen comme référence caractérisant l’argumentaire de la Thaïlande. Certes,
on peut y reconnaître le sens de la formule par exemple, lorsque le «dispositif implicite» devient
le «dispositif par accident» 3 mais cette ironie ne peut suffire à masquer un argumentaire pauvre
qui se cache derrière un ton détaché. C ela va plus loin lorsque le ton devient plus méprisant ,
4
notamment lorsque la Thaïlande évoque des arguments «déformés, dénaturés, non pertinents»
dans la r éponse du Cambodge. Ceci semble plutôt démontrer la gêne de la Thaïlande pour
répondre aux arguments du Cambodge, sinon il semblerait inutile de répéter, comme le fait la
Thaïlande, un très grand nombre de fois le même argument.
5. L’agencement des arguments est tout aussi significatif. La Thaïlande estime que l’affaire
à l’origine n’est pas une affaire de délimitation et que le Cambodge cherche aujourd’hui à obtenir
quelque chose qu’il n’aurait pas obtenu en 1962, à savoir que la carte de l’annexe 1 est bien celle,
acceptée par les deux Parties, qui définit la frontière dans la région du t emple. Le leitmotiv de la
Thaïlande est qu’il n’existe aucun lien entre les motifs et le disposi tif, ce qui rend la carte de
l’annexe 1 hors sujet et la requête irrecevable. L’impression est que l’en semble n’est guère
coordonné, que la réponse de la Thaïlande aurait pu te nir en une vingtaine de pages, et pour le
moins, on aura compris que le dispositif est, pour la Thaïlande, «clair comme de l’eau de roche», ce
qui n’a pas été toujours le cas depuis 1962 comme ceci sera démontré ensuite.
6. L’aspect le plus significatif tient sans doute dans la teneur des arguments. Globalement,
la Thaïlande essaie de faire passer l’idée que le t emple se trouve «naturellement» en Thaïlande
1
Further Written Explanations of the Kingdom of Thailand (ci -après : «FWE»), 21juin 2012, vol. I, par. 1.15.
2«Alice-In-Wonderland-Like», FWE, 21 juin 2012, vol.I, par. 1.27.
3Ibid., par. 2.52
4
Voir titre C : «Misrepresentation, Distortion, Irrelevancy in Cambodia’s Response», FWE, vol. I, p. 17. - 24 -
même si la Cour, par erreur, l’a attribué au Cambodge en 1962. Et, en quelque sorte, elle signifie à
la Cour que cette erreur ne doit pas être poursuivie par une interprétation de son arrêt qui définirait
clairement le terr itoire sur lequel se trouve le t emple. Pour ce faire, bizarrement, la Thaïlande
arrête son historique avant 2007, mais ne dit quasiment rien des incidents armés qu’elle a
provoqués en représailles à l’inscription du temple sur la liste du patrimoine mondial de l’Unesco.
Ceci est bien sûr contradictoire avec un argument central de la Thaïlande selon lequel le Cambodge
aurait acquiescé à la séparation opérée depuis 1962, car on peut alors se demander comment des
incursions armées de sa part pourraient avoir l ieu sur un territoire qu’elle prétend être le sien et
qu’elle prétend contrôler, incursions à la base de la volonté pour le Cambodge de demander à la
Cour une inte rprétation claire de l’arrêt de 1962, et dont témoignent les mesures conservatoires
adoptées par votre Cour.
7. Au- delà, le raisonnement tortueux s uivi par la Thaïlande dans ses observations du
21 novembre 2011 et s on supplément d’information du 21 juin 2012 permet de distinguer
trois étapes correspondant à trois lignes successives de défense. Premièrement, pour la Thaïlande,
il n’existerait pas de conflit d’interprétation, mais une simple discorde sur l’applicati on ou
l’exécution de l’arrêt de 1962 et, dès lors, la Cour ne serait pas compétente et la requête serait
irrecevable. Deuxièmement, néanmoins, si la Cour devait se reconnaître compétente et déclarer la
requête recevable, l’interprétation ne serait pas possible car il faut opérer une lecture isolée du
dispositif, ce qui rend inutile la prise en compte des motifs pour l’interprétation car ils ne sont pas
res judicata. Au surplus, le dispositif serait sans ambiguïté pour la Thaïlande. Troisièmement
enfin, si la Cour décidait finalement d’interpréter son arrêt de 1962, cette interprétation ne pourrait
être que favorable à la Thaïlande car la Cour devrait reconnaître qu’il s’agit d’un conflit territorial
et non d’un conflit frontalier, que dès lors la carte de l’annexe 1 n’est pas pertinente mais un autr e
faisceau de preuves le serait , qu’une définition unilatérale de la frontière est donc possible pour la
Thaïlande, que l’accord du 14 juin 2000 existe pour régler le conflit frontalier, que le retrait des
troupes thaïlandaises exigé en 1962 des environs n’aurait pas un caractère continu et, qu’enfin, le
Cambodge aurait modifié le sens du diff érend entre sa requête et ses observations en mettant e n
avant désormais le paragraphe 1 du dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962 au lieu du paragraphe 2 sur lequel
le Cambodge se serait initialement appuyé pour sa requête. Cela fait beaucoup. Incontestablement, - 25 -
il y a une certaine fébrilité dans l’argumentaire débridé de la Thaïlande doublé d’un manque
d’assurance propre à douter de sa cohérence.
8. Il paraît plus simple à la Thaïlande d’affirmer, finalement, que le Cambodge ne répond pas
à ses arguments, ce q ui a pour objectif d’entraîner la Cour vers une refonte de l’arrêt de 1962,
autrement dit de refaire le jugement, si la Cour acceptait d’interpréter son arrêt. Or ceci est inutile
car il ne s’agit pas de refaire le jugement ni même de reprendre le process us de 1959 à 1962, mais
il faut partir de celui-ci. Le Cambodge a toujours affirmé que la question en débat partait de l’arrêt
de 1962, et non y aboutissait. Finalement, la Thaïlande opère ainsi un magnifique renversement du
raisonnement de la Cour, et a bien du mal à comprendre ce qu’est une affaire en interprétation.
9. Sur tous ces points, le Cambodge va désormais apporter des réponses appropriées selon la
structuration suivante :
10. Tout d’abord, s ir Franklin Berman exposera les arguments du Cambo dge concernant la
compétence de la Cour et la recevabilité de la requête en interprétation déposée par le Cambodge.
Il démontrera que les faits établissent clairement qu’il existe une série de différends liés entre eux
qui correspond strictement aux critè res posés par la Cour pour l’interprétation d’un arrêt dans le
cadre de l‘article 60 du Statut de la Cour, et que les arguments dans les réponses de la Thaïlande ne
possèdent aucune base solide au regard de l’arrêt de 1962.
11. Mon collègue Rodman Bundy prendra ensuite la parole et son exposé portera
essentiellement sur deux aspects. Premièrement, il démontrera, sur la base des faits avérés dans
cette affaire, qu’il existe incontestablement un différend entre les Parties sur le sens et la portée de
l’arrêt de 1962. Dès lors, la requête en interprétation du Cambodge est sans conteste pleinement
recevable. Deuxièmement, il discutera des différents arguments avancés par la Thaïlande dans ses
observations écrites pour amoindrir l’importance de la carte de l ’annexe 1 au regard de «versions
différentes» de cette carte qui auraient été récemment découvertes par la Thaïlande, ainsi qu’au
regard d’autres cartes qui n’ont joué aucun rôle dans l’arrêt de la Cour en 1962. Comme mon
collègue le démontrera, la seule carte qui fut au centre de la décision de la Cour fut la carte produite
par le Cambodge sous l’appellation d’annexe 1 dans sa requête et son mémoire lors de la procédure
entre 1959 et 1962. - 26 -
12. Pour clore cette journée de plaidoirie, je vous demanderai, Monsieur le président, de bien
vouloir me redonner la parole cet après-midi. Il sera alors temps de revenir sur le raisonnement de
la Thaïlande pour parvenir à ce qu’elle souhaite, à savoir la stricte séparation des motifs et du
dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962. Le caractère pourtant inséparable des motifs et du dispositif comme il
sera démontré entraîne des conséquences que la Thaïlande préfère ignorer. Il en va ainsi de
l’impossible définition unilatérale d’une frontière à l’encontre des motifs, tout comm e il devient
impossible d’établir une claire coupure entre un conflit territorial et un conflit de délimitation,
comme le souhaiterait la Thaïlande. Pour parvenir à ses fins, la Thaïlande est dans l’obligation
d’inverser totalement le raisonnement de la C our en 1962 au mépris de la plus élémentaire des
logiques, et ceci dans l’objectif de provoquer une refonte insidieuse de l’arrêt de 1962, à l’opposé
de la lecture constante par le Cambodge des paragraphes 1 et 2 du dispositif d’une manière
simultanée.
13. Pour entamer cette démonstration, je vous prie, Monsieur le p résident, de bien vouloir
donner la parole à mon collègue sir FranklinBerman.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, professeur Sorel. I now give the floor to Sir Franklin
Berman. Sir Franklin, you may present your pleading without any break, or you can also indicate
an appropriate moment for a pause if this does not have an impact on the flow of your argument.
Sir Franklin BERMAN: Mr. President, it had been my intention to signify a point a t which
it might be appropriate for the Court to take a break, if that is your wish.
The PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.
Sir Franklin BERMAN:
JURISDICTION AND A DMISSIBILITY
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is wit h the customary sense of honour, but
coupled with a heavy responsibility, that I address the Court once again on behalf of the Kingdom
of Cambodia. The responsibility weighs heavily not merely because this case is of such central
significance for Cambodia, and for peaceful and co -operative relations in the region, as has just - 27 -
been so eloquently described by the Agent. There is a heavy responsibility as well, because a
request for interpretation and especially one brought in these hitherto unprecedented
circumstances engages in the most direct way the integrity of the Court’s judicial process, and
the binding and definitive character of its judgments, as laid down in the Charter of the United
Nations and the Court’s own Statute. I am sure that this is a theme that our distinguished
opponents will accept and endorse. My fear is that we will read different consequences into it.
Interpretation under the Court’s Statute
2. Mr. President, the procedure for interpretation is built into the Statute itself. It is there for
a purpose. The purpose is to ensure that, if difficulties ensue in understanding and giving effect to
a judgment formally pronounced by the Court, the Court itself on the application of either
party can be moved into action once more, and the outcome of this process wil l be an
authoritative, an authentic and, above all , a definitive statement of how the original judgment
should be interpreted and understood. I have laid stress on “ definitive” because this quality
emanates from the very fact that it is the Court which has the duty of laying down for the parties
the proper understanding that must be given to its judgment. This is the antithesis, in other words,
of a renewed struggle of wills between the disputing parties over what the Court had or had not
decided; it is the absolute antithesis of a situation in which one p arty juts its jaw, decides for itself
what the judgment is to mean, and sets about compelling others to accept that interpretation.
3. Mr. President, a request for the Court to interpret its own past judgment requires no further
act of consent by the parties beyond that on the basis of which the Court originally assumed
jurisdiction to hear the dispute. That is important. Its importance is that it shows that this faculty
to interpret constitutes an inherent part of the process by which the Court settles, with binding legal
force, the dispute between the parties brought before it. To put it another way: the purpose of the
process of interpretation, as laid out in Article 60 of the Statute, is to reinfo rce the legal situation as
it results from the judgment, and to do so with all the clarity that may be needed for operational
purposes. The matter was neatly and precisely put by the Permanent Court as far back as 1927 in
its decision on the interpretatio n of its Judgments in the Chorzów Factory case, where the
Permanent Court said: - 28 -
“the Court is of the opinion that the expression ‘to construe’ [in Article 60] must be
understood as meaning to give a precise definition of the meaning and scope which the
Court intended to give to the judgment in question” (Interpretation of Judgment s
Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13 ,
p. 10).
4. It is not the purpose of interpretation to re -do what the Court has already done; it is not its
purpose to undo what the Court has done. I expect that our opponents will, once again, accept this
cardinal proposition; they could hardly do otherwise. Or at least they may accept the proposition
in theory, but then invite you, the Court, to take a different view of what it means in practice.
5. It is against this background that the Court will, at the end of the day, have to weigh the
competing assertions of the Parties: Thailand’s assertion (which we will demonstrate is entirely
without foundation) that Cambodia’s only intention in these proceedings is to inveigle the Court
into deciding something which the Court deliberately did not decide in 1962; and, against that,
Cambodia’s assertion (which we will substantiate inter alia from the materials which Thailand is
now seeking to put before the Court) , that Thailand’s whole line of argument, culminating
ultimately in its final submissions, is designed to persuade the Court that its predecessors were in
error in 1962, that they could not have meant what they said, and that this is the opportunity
therefore for the present Court to put matters right by revising what was then decided in final and in
binding form.
6. Mr. President, Cambodia has come to the sad reali zation that a continuation of the
wrangling between the two States, which has not led to a common understanding of the
1962 Judgment and its implications over the past 50 years, is most unlikely to lead to a common
understanding in future either. Moreover Cambodia has been faced in the starkest fashion in recent
years by the fact that the continuation of that situation has serious implications for peace in the
region, that it endangers human life and normal existence and, indeed, that it is all too prone to
result in direct physical damage to the very sacred site which so Thailand continues to insist
constituted the whole essence of what the Court was focusing on in 1962. And the Court will have
seen that vividly illustrated by the slides and other materials that were put before it during the
proceedings on provisional measures two years ago. [Photo slide showing shelling damage to
Temple fabric] Mr. President, that cannot be acceptable as between two civilized neighbours. - 29 -
And it would no longer be possible once the Cour t had given its own definitive explanation of the
meaning and scope of its Judgment. That is why we are here today.
7. Mr. President, let me say at this point with the utmost simple clarity: what Cambodia is
seeking in these proceedings is the elucidati on by the Court of the meaning and scope of its 1962
Judgment, as those terms and concepts have been consistently defined over the years by this Court
and its predecessor; that and nothing more. I can state that with full authority because it is no
more than a simple repetition of what Cambodia said in its Request for Interpretation and has
repeated in its subsequent written observations. Having said it, I now invite our distinguished
opponents, when they come to the podium, to say the same, equally clea rly and equally simply;
that they are not, in other words, seeking from the Court a penitent admission of past error. If they
can do that, they will have become partners in the process of assisting the Court to interpret its
decision in the 1962 Judgment , and that is a development that Cambodia would warmly welcome,
whether or not the Parties continue to differ on what the proper interpretation of the Judgment
should be.
Jurisdiction and Admissibility
8. I can now pass, Mr. President, Members of the Court, to a series of points on which I can
happily say with confidence there is, not disagreement, but agreement between the Parties.
9. In the first place, and very specifically, there is no disagreement between us that
Cambodia must now establish that its Request for Interpretation is admissible, and falls within the
powers of the Court under the Statute. Thailand says in its Written Observations of
November 2011 (para. 4.1) “This is now the proper stage for the Court to engage in a thorough
analysis of Th ailand’s arguments relating to the admissibility of Cambodia’s request.” It is
common ground between us, between the two Parties, that those questions were not conclusively
determined by the Court’s Order of 18 July 2011 granting Cambodia’s request for an indication of
provisional measures of protection.
Jurisdiction
10. So I begin, Mr. President, with the question of jurisdiction which I can deal with very
quickly as Thailand has raised no serious question in this regard. It is well settled that the Cou rt’s - 30 -
power of interpretation under Article 60 of the Statute is an automatic and inherent one, or, in the
Court’s own words, “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court to give an interpretation of one of its own
judgments . . . is a special jurisdiction deriving dir ectly from Article 60 of the Statute” (Application
for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the C ase concerning the
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),
Judgment, I.C.J. Repor ts 1985, p. 216, para. 43). The Court has repeated this in its Order on
Provisional Measures in the present case, adding that “the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of
Article 60 of the Statute is not preconditioned by the existence of any other basis of jurisdiction as
between the parties to the original case” ( Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of
15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Order of
18 July 2011, para. 21 ). I need add only that it has l ong since been established that, if the
conditions emanating from Article 60 are duly met, “the Court cannot avoid the duty incumbent
upon it of interpreting the judgment in so far as necessary” (Interpretation of Judgment s Nos. 7
and 8 (Factory at Chorzów ), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p. 12). That is a
further quotation from the Judgment of the Permanent Court in the Interpretation phase of the
Chorzów Factory case.
The conditions for admissibility
11. Nor is there disagreement betw een the Parties that the admissibility of Cambodia’s
Request for Interpretation depends on three requirements, which must be independently satisfied:
(a) There must be a dispute between the Parties to a case in which the Court has given judgment.
(b) The dispute must relate to the meaning or scope of the Judgment.
(c) The Request must seek interpretation of what the Judgment decided with binding force.
Those conditions have been laid down in a l ong series of cases, going back once again to the
decision by the Permanent Court in 1927 which I referred to a moment ago.
12. It is only necessary to add that the third condition, namely, that the Request must seek
interpretation of what the Judgment decided with binding force, includes also the case in which the
dispute between the Parties is over whether a particular matter has or has not been decided with - 31 -
binding force and that, too, once again goes back to the Permanent Court’s decision in the Chorzów
Factory case.
Thailand contests that any of those requirem ents is met which will therefore be the main
focus of this part of the argument. Other issues raised by Thailand will be dealt with after that,
either by me or by my co-counsel who will follow.
The existence of a dispute
13. I move now to a demonstrati on that there is indeed a dispute between Cambodia and
Thailand over the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment, first by looking at the Court’s consistent
jurisprudence as to the meaning of a “ dispute over interpretation” , and then by identifying the
materials which the Court has regularly examined in order to establish the existence of a dispute of
this kind in particular cases.
14. Mr. President, the Court’s classic definition of a “dispute” is so well known that it hardly
needs repeating. When it comes, however, to the particular kind of dispute in question here,
namely a dispute between the Parties over the meaning and scope of a judgment, it was once again
laid down by the Permanent Court as far back as 1927 that
“the Court considers that it cannot req uire that the dispute should have manifested
itself in a formal way; according to the Court’s view, it should be sufficient if the
two Governments have in fact shown themselves as holding opposite views in regard
to the meaning or scope of a judgment of t he Court” (Interpretation of Judgment s
Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13,
p. 11; emphasis added).
And later in the same Judgment, the Permanent Court observed:
“It thus becomes necessary to ascertain whet her such a difference of opinion
has in fact become manifest in the present case between the two Governments, as
regards the meaning or scope of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8.” ( Ibid., p. 12; emphasis
added.)
And that approach has regularly been endorsed by the present Court, which recently made
plain, for example, in the Avena case that “‘the manifestation of the existence of the dispute in a
specific manner, as for instance by diplomatic negotiations, is not required’ for the purposes of
Article 60” (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v . United States of America) ( Mexico v.
United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, - 32 -
pp. 325-326, para. 54) and, the Court went on to say , nor is it required that “‘the dispute should
have manifested itself in a formal way’” (ibid., p. 326, para. 54).
15. Mr. President, in the face of the sharply clashing submissions that have been put before
the Court in these proceedings to date, Cambodia has some difficulty in grasping on what basis
Thailand can be arguing that there is “no dispute” between the two States. One could hardly have a
clearer demonstration that “ the two Governments have in fact shown themselves as holding
opposite views in regard to the meaning or scope of a judgment of the Court” or that a difference of
opinion in that regard “has in fact become manifest . . . between the two Governments”, borrowing
the words of the Permanent Cou rt in 1927. So, i f this claim of “no dispute” by Thailand is to be
understood more as signalling an argument over whether the dispute does concern interpretation of
the 1962 Judgment, in other wor ds, over the content and subject -matter of the dispute, that will be
dealt with in the next section of my presentation. For the moment, so far as we can discern any
substance in the submission of “no dispute ”, it seems to derive from the argument that what
Cambodia asserts is the dispute in this case can only be discovered from the written pleadings in
these proceedings themselves, and that that is somehow inadmissible.
Establishing a “dispute” for interpretation purposes
16. That argument seems to consist of two parts: first, that Cambodia has in the past
accepted Thailand’s interpretation of the 1962 Judgment and cannot go back on that now; second,
that the Parties’ submissions in interpretation proceedings can not themselves be used either to
establish the existence of a dispute over interpretation or to define its scope.
17. The first of these two arguments is largely one of fact, and Mr . Bundy will show the
Court that, as such, it is without foundation. I preface what he will have to say on the subject with
only one remark and that is that no basis can be found in Article 60, or in the past judgments of the
Court itself, for the notion that a p arty to contentious proceedings can by subsequent conduct
modify or “ sacrifice” the proper meaning of what the Court has decided in its judgment. The
notion is fundam entally at odds with the way in which the Statute and the Court in its
turn treat the role of authentic interpretation as being an integral and inherent part of the judicial
function of the Court. That is why no further jurisdictional basis is needed, why Article 60 - 33 -
expresses the function of interpreting its own judgments as a duty on the part of the Court, and why
the Article puts authentic interpretation by the Court itself as the counterpart to the finality of the
Court’s judgments which are not sub ject to appeal. Thailand wants to turn a j udgment into
something like an agreement between the litigating parties, the interpretation of which may depend
on their subsequent practice, and that submission by Thailand is therefore profoundly subversive of
the integrity of the judicial function. But we pointed all of that out some time ago in our own
written submissions, and it has had no answer.
18. Likewise, t he second argument about the use of submissions in interpretation
proceedings finds no basis in t he past practice of the Court either. At its highest, what Thailand
says in this context is that, although Cambodia’s Request did show the existence of a relevant
dispute, we have shifted our position since then in order to try to construct artificially a dispute
implicating the first paragraph of the dispositif of the 1962 Judgment as well, and Thailand chides
us for having “ only discovered the dispute after we had filed our Request for Interpretation ”
(FWETh, para. 1.6). What in fact we said in our Resp onse was that Thailand’s Written
Observations “reveal the existence of an even clearer dispute regarding the meaning and scope of
the 1962 Judgment” ( Response of the Kingdom of Cambodia (FWEC), para. 1.7) and we then go
on to explain that in detail in para graphs 3.3-3.15 of the same written submission . Not only is it
counter to logic to assert that the formal submissions put to the Court on a request for interpretation
cannot be taken into account in ascertaining whether a dispute really exists, but it als o flies in the
face of the Court’s past practice. One need only look at paragraph 29 of the recent judgment on
interpretation in the Avena case where the Court said the following:
“It is for the Court itself to decide whether a dispute within the meaning of
Article 60 of the Statute does indeed exist . . .
To this end, the Court has in particular examined the Written Observations and
further written explanations of the Parties to ascertain their views . . .” (Request for
Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) ( Mexico v. United
States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 13, para. 29; emphasis added.)
And that is a passage we rely on as confirmation of our approach. - 34 -
Subject-matter of the dispute:
(a) The link between the first and second paragraphs in the dispositif
19. Mr. President, I turn now to the crucial issue of the subject -matter of the dispute. The
starting-point must of course be the question that Cambodia put to the Court for interpretation; it
can be found in the final paragraph of Cambodia’s Request for Interpretation, and in identical terms
in the final paragraph of Cambodia’s Response to Thailand’s Written Observations, and t he text, I
am glad to see, is now on your screens. As the Court will observe, the question Cambodia has
posed to the Court focuses squarely on the operative part of the 1962 Judgment, and specifically on
the second paragraph which contains the withdrawal obligation. And to simplify the Court’s
examination, the full text of the operative part of the Judgment is now on your screens, and
alongside it, the text of Cambodia’s question. This will enable the Court to see at a glance that the
second paragraph of the operative part that is the one to which Cambodia’s question is
directed does not stand on its own but is organically linked to the first paragraph: the one is the
“consequence” of the other; that is what the Judgment says expressly. But the two paragraphs are
symbiotically linked in a deeper way as well. Both paragraphs employ the concept “ territory of
Cambodia”: in the first paragraph, it is that the Temple “is situated in territory under the
sovereignty of Cambodia”, in the second paragraph, it is that Thailand must withdraw its military
and police forces, etc. stationed by her at the Temple “or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory”.
And Cambodia submits that the concept of “Cambodian territory” must have the same meaning in
both paragraphs.
20. So what is Thailand’s position over those two basic propositions? Well, Thailand rejects
them both. It denies the way in which the second paragraph depends on the first, and in fact seeks
to give the second paragraph pride of place, to make it in to the primary element, and indeed to
make the interpretation of the first paragraph depend on the second, and thus denying both the legal
hierarchy between the two and denying as well how the meaning of the withdrawal obligation is
coloured and determined by the sovereignty finding.
21. This represents a categorical opposition of views about the relationship between the two
main paragraphs in the dispositive part of the Judgment. And Cambodia submits that it plainly - 35 -
constitutes in and of itself a dispute between the Parties over the meaning and scope of the
Judgment.
(b) The withdrawal obligation under the second paragraph of the dispositif
22. Mr. President, my next submission centres on the withdrawal obligation enunciated in
the second paragraph which as I have said is the focus of Cambodia’s formal request for
interpretation, and this time on the continuing nature of that obligation. Cambodia has advanced
the position throughout these proceedings that the withdrawal obligation is continuing in character;
indeed we say that to construe it in that sense is the only way in which to give meaningful and
practical effect to what the Court decided in 1962. As I put the matter in the oral phase of the
proceedings on Provisional Measures: the fallacy be hind reading this paragraph any other way is
that it would allow Thailand to withdraw its troops the day after the Judgment and move them back
in again a week later. That is obvious. It seems to us equally obvious that the Court could not have
intended to lay itself open to a total absurdity of that kind. So Cambodia is and remains firmly of
the view that the obligation laid on Thailand by the second paragraph is of a continuing character.
(b)(i) The continuing nature of the withdrawal obligation
23. Thailand’s position on this elementary question is however puzzling. We heard
repeatedly through the mouth of counsel on the Provisional Measures application that the
withdrawal obligation was “ponctuelle et instantanée” or “immédiate et instantanée” or ev en
simply just “instantanée” tout court. And that is reiterated in Thailand’s Written Observations of
November 2011 [para. 4.25]; and there we read that the second and third paragraphs of the
dispositif required action to be taken, and so Thailand continues “[a]s such, they are extinguished
when the measures ordered therein are taken”. That is a pure repetition of the “ instantaneous”
theory of the withdrawal obligation. It is, to be sure, glossed though in a rather mysterious
way by the remark that follows, to the effect that Cambodia did not complain about Thai
withdrawal in the aftermath of the Judgment or for a long time afterwards. Well, t hat is factually
incorrect, as Mr. Bundy will demonstrate later, and we maintain our submission that the Court must
have intended the obligation in the second paragraph to have a continuing character. But in any
event, Thailand’s written submissions culminate in their Further Written Explanations, and the - 36 -
reference is paragraph 4.103 (v), with an outright denia l that the withdrawal obligation is a
continuing one.
24. They may have changed that view a little; that is not entirely clear. Because t he Further
Written Explanations continue to maintain, on the one hand, that the withdrawal obligation was one
“discharged instantaneously” in 1962 [para. 4.102] , and “d ischarged instantaneously ” can only
mean: it no longer exists. They do, however, precede that by a limited recognition of the
continuing character of Thailand’s duty to stay out of the areas in question, or at least out of certain
areas; only they then seek to attribute that duty to Thailand’s obligations under general
international law, and these are roundly declared to be “independent of the Judgment and
independent of the jurisdiction under which t he Judgment was reached”. It is not clear to us
whether this confirms or contradicts what had been said in paragraph 3.81 of one and the same
Further Written Explanations, to the effect that the Parties are in agreement that “there is an
obligation for Thailand not to have troops in the area awarded by the Court to Cambodia” and, so
Thailand continues, that it matters little if this obligation exists by virtue of general international
law or by virtue of the particular conclusion drawn by the Court in 1962 on the basis of the general
obligation. And on that basis, so Thailand says, no question of interpretation arises.
25. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that is surely disingenuous. Of course Thailand
has an obligation under general international la w not to invade and occupy Cambodian sovereign
territory, and that is something which one imagines a law -abiding Thailand would never dream of
doing. But that is not the question, any more than it was the question when the Court gave
judgment in 1962; the question was, where, to what areas, does that obligation relate? Had the
answer to that question been clear and undisputed between the Parties at the time, there would have
been no occasion for the matter to go to the Court; nor would there have been a ny occasion for the
Court to have to enunciate a withdrawal obligation. The Court gave a binding answer to that
question then and we say that that answer continues to be binding now. Were Thai armed forces to
make a fresh incursion into those areas, shal l we say next week, after the end of this hearing, as
they have done in the recent past, our complaint would not be in the form that this would be
contrary to international law; obviously it would. Our complaint would be that it was in breach of
the conduct required on the part of Thailand by the 1962 Judgment . And what can one foresee - 37 -
would be the nature of Thailand’s response: that it acknowledged that it was consciously
disobeying the Court’s Judgment but that that constituted a fresh dispute which s adly could not be
brought back to the Court because Thailand no longer maintains an acceptance of jurisdiction under
the Optional Clause? I have some real difficulty in imagining that. No, the response would be that
there is no breach because the areas i n question are not covered by the Judgment . And that is as
clear-cut an example as one could wish of a dispute a bout the meaning or scope of a j udgment of
the Court. And it illustrates perfectly why we submit that there is an inextricable bond between the
first and second paragraphs in the 1962 dispositif. But it also explains precisely why, in the hope of
heading off that undesirable state of affairs, Cambodia now comes to the Court asking the Court to
say authoritatively and definitively what the meaning and scope of the withdrawal obligation is.
26. It must be for our opponents now to say definitely whether or not they accept that the
withdrawal obligation is a continuing one with continuing effect under the Judgment of the Court.
If they do not accept that, then there is without any shadow of doubt a dispute on that question and
one which grounds the competence of the Court to pronounce on it by way of interpretation.
(b)(ii)The meaning of “withdrawal”
27. Mr. President, I want to move on now to a key point on the content of the withdrawal
obligation, that is to say, the nature of withdrawal, what it means “to withdraw”. Thailand seems to
view that in an abstract, half -dimensional sort of way, as if it simply consisted in movement of
some kind. The crucial fact is, however, that “withdrawal” necessarily means not just withdrawal
from somewhere but withdrawal to somewhere else. It is not clear whether Thailand does or does
not recognize this inescapable fact, because it simply fails to deal with the question. We are told
over and over again with absolute assurance that in 1962 Thailand did “withdraw”and that in doing
so it fulfilled and exhausted the obligation arising out of the Judgment. But we are never told what
units were withdrawn, where they were at the time, or where they were moved to. The last of those
three elements is the essential one: where were they moved to? Without knowing that, how can
one possibly judge whether Thailand is justified in asserting that it did at the time com ply?
Cambodia’s submission on this central point is a simple one: that by casting the withdrawal
obligation within the envelope of territory “or in its vicin ity on Cambodian territory” the - 38 -
Court required all Thai units to be removed from Cambodian te rritory, and that in turn can only
mean removal into Thai territory . Which leads inexorably back , of course, to the umbilical link
between the first paragraph and the second paragraph, inas much as both of them are about
“territory”: the first is about “territory” as the fundamental postulate for the appurtenance of the
Temple to Cambodia, and the second is about “territory” as the underlying spatial element behind
the obligation “in consequence” that Thailand must withdraw. Then, of course, t here is a further
dispute over whether “ Cambodian territory ” in the second paragraph has to be understood,
following the first paragraph, in terms of the Court’s identification of the boundary which the two
States had agreed upon for Treaty purposes, and that is equal ly a dispute over the meaning and
scope of the Judgment. Just as the Court says in express terms that it canno t decide whether the
Temple lies in territory under Cambodian sovereignty without having regard to what the frontier
line is and where it runs, so there is no way of assessing the withdrawal from Cambodian sovereign
territory of Thai forces emplaced there without having regard to the frontier line which divides
Cambodian sovereign territory from Thai sovereign territory.
28. The fact that Thailand refuses to accept this refuses indeed to accept any of its
component parts establishes unambiguously the existence of a dispute, or series of linked
disputes, between the Parties; and it would test to breaking point even the ingenuity of our highly
able opponents to deny that those disputes, as I have formulated them, are about the interpretation
of what the Court decided with binding force in its 1962 Judgment.
(c) The status of the Annex I Map
29. Finally, Mr. President, I will not disappoint our opponents; I will make a brief reference
to something to which the Court devoted, on a conservative estimate, about 12 out of the 36 pages
that constituted the 1962 Judgment. I refer, of course, to the Annex I map. I almost feel I ought to
apologize for doing so, given the violent re action that any mention of the m ap provokes from the
Thai side. If anyone is obsessed by the Annex I map, it is Thailand, not Cambodia. All that
Cambodia has attempted to do is to distil, by careful analysis, the status which the 1962 Judgment
gave to the Annex I map. Thailand’s indignant rejection of the notion that the Judgment gave any
status at all to the Annex I map in itself creates a yet further dispute; and it is a dispute over - 39 -
whether something has or has not been decided with binding force in the Judgment; and that has
been established since 1927 as being a dispute of a kind which is within the Court’s power of
interpretation under the Statute.
30. So, to summarize: as set out in detail in paragraph 5.9 of Cambodia’s Response to
Thailand’s Written Observations, there are at minimum three disputes between the two States in
issue in the current proceedings; all three of them relate directly to the operative part of the
1962 Judgment and therefore indisputably entail interpretation of what the Court had decided with
binding force in the Judgment, or equally indisputably they relate to whether something was
decided with binding force, as foreseen in the settled jurisprudence of the Court.
Mr. President, this is a natural break in my argument. Would it suit the Court to call a
recess?
The PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you very much, Sir Franklin. Indeed it is a good moment to
take a pause of some ten minutes. The hearing is suspended for ten minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.30 a.m. to 11.45 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing resumes and Sir Franklin may have the
floor. Please proceed.
Sir Franklin BERMAN:
Thailand’s position
31. Thank you, Mr. President. Before the break I had explained in summary why
Cambodia’s request is admissible. Thailand has no real answer to any of the points that I made. Its
effort to argue the inadmissibility of Cambodia’s request for interpretation rests essentially, as you
heard from Professor Sorel, on two points:
(1) the status which the Judgment attributes to the Annex I map is not part of the res judicata; and
(2) Cambodia is seeking to gain now what it could not achieve in 1962.
32. Both arguments are fallacious, and both are largely beside the point as arguments on
admissibility. But before I move on to them, let me first take the Court to a very significant - 40 -
document that has only recently become available. This document is significant for so many
aspects of the present proceedings that I would like to spend some time on it and, for that purpose,
it might be convenient if the Members of the Court had it before them on their screens as they now
have (Project Thai Annex 5). This document is Annex 5 to the Further Written Explanations filed
by Thailand in June of last year. In other words, it is a Thai document and it only became available
for inspection at a very late stage in the course of these proceedings on interpretation, and one can
see from the cover sheet that the document was “Declassified on 26 May 2011”. One can also see
that reflected in the document itself which is now on your screens, where a security classification at
the head and foot of each page has been struck through.
The 1962 decision of the Thai Council of Ministers
33. What the document represents is the “resolution of the Council of Ministers” on the
implementation of the Court’s 1962 Judgment on which Thailand has placed considerable reliance
in these proceedings. More precisely, it consists of a brief note, that is the one now on your
screens, dated 11 July 1962 recording a decision that had been taken by the Council of Ministers on
the previous day. This is backed by a two -page document from the Minister of the Interior dated
6 July which evidently represents the paper which the Council of Ministers had for consideration at
its meeting; and attached to that in turn is a small -scale map on the scale of 1:5,000 of the part of
the promontory on which the Temple stands. The history of this document’s eventual production is
also of interest. It shows that it was not until the very close of the second round of written
argument which the Court, exceptionally, has decided to order in the present proceedings that
Thailand finally let the document see the light of day.
34. What does Thailand say about that? It says that the document “simply adds nothing to
understanding what occurred” (FEWTh, para. 1.34). Well, once again this is surely disingenuous.
Cambodia begs to differ: now that the document is available in full, we can see just how
significant it is. I would like to begin by taking the Court to the page which is on your screens.
This records the actual decision taken by the Council of Ministers; nothing there, as the Court will
note, in the way of a reasoned determination, just a bare choice, without justification or reasoning,
between two alternatives. To try to find out more, you have to go to the supporting paper which - 41 -
appears on the next two pages and that is now coming up on your screen. That is the proposal that
was put forward by the Minister of Interior to the Prime Minister and by him to the Council of
Ministers, for decision. The supporting paper says (you can see that in the second paragraph) that
it was drawn up after consultation with all of the relevant aut horities who had been involved in the
handling of the case, the Foreign Ministry, the Royal Thai Survey Department and, of course, the
Interior Ministry itself.
35. And what does the Interior Minister propose in this paper to the Council of Ministers?
Well, the paper talks, perfectly properly, about implementation, about compliance, about execution
of the Court’s Judgment, and about determining “the limit of the location of the vicinity of the
Temple” in the context of Thailand’s obligation to withdraw it s forces. And that is presumably an
implicit reference to the second paragraph of the dispositif of the Judgment which I was discussing
this morning. And all of that looks very satisfactory, until you come to the end of the sentence in
question, which reads “on the principle that Cambodia will only obtain the ruins of the Temple . . .
and the ground on which the Temple stood”.
36. And the paper then continues in the next paragraph in the beginning, that what it calls the
determination of the vicinity of the Temple “may be done according to two methods, namely . . .”.
And it goes on to spell out the “two methods” which are illustrated on the map attached and that is
on your screens now. So the two methods, one is an abstract triangular figure, starting i t seems
from the corner of the Temple buildings themselves; and if you look at the map on the screens, you
can see the abstract nature of the figure reflected in the fact that the triangle is bounded to the north
by straight lines, the yellow line and the red line. The other limits of this triangle are its two long
sides to the west and to the east and these coincide with parts of the escarpment edge which
as the Court will recognize is the self -same escarpment edge that formed part of the “watershed
line” which Thailand had been advancing as the course of the frontier in the case, and which the
Court had declined to uphold as representing the Treaty settlement between the two States.
37. Now we come to the second alternative, the other “method”: t his is the one entirely in
red, it is equally an abstract figure. The document calls it not a triangle but a rectangle, though in
fact, as you can see from the red lines on this sketch -map, it is still basically triangular in shape,
except that this time the western boundary of the area is formed by a further arbitrary line. This is - 42 -
a single straight line running due north- south, immediately flanking the Temple ruins which lie to
the east. And the drafters of the document are kind enough to spare us trou ble because they
calculate for us the extent of the discrepancy between the areas resulting from the
two “methods” that is in the paper from the Ministry of the Interior and the discrepancy turns
out to be sizeable: one of the “methods” produces an area which conveniently amputates the other
“method” almost exactly in half; the actual figures are one- half a square kilometre and one-quarter
of a square kilometre. So those are the two “alternatives”. And which of the two “alternatives”
does the Council of Ministers opt for? Well the Court will not be surprised to note that it is the
small one, the half-size one.
38. Then finally, in the last paragraph of the paper (on the second page, that is, of the
Ministry of Interior’s paper) he and his colleagues propose and the Prime Minister evidently
endorses it because he passes the paper on to the Council of Ministers the proposed erection of
the sign boards which we have subsequently seen in Thailand’s photographic exhibits which talk
about “the limits o f the vicinity of the Temple”. The paper proposes the erection of these sign
boards but it does not propose a barbed-wire fence; the barbed-wire fence was evidently something
that was added by the Council of Ministers itself and you can see that from the first page which
is now on your screens if you go back to the first page, this is the Council’s decision, look
towards the very end it says that in addition the barbed-wire fence should be constructed.
The implications of the 1962 decision of the Thai Council of Ministers
39. Mr. President, Members of the Court, a number of highly significant points shout out,
loud and clear, from this very revealing document. Let me list some of them (and I am sure there
are others as well):
(1) This is pure int erpretation; what else could it be, given that it consisted in a choice between
alternative methods for how to read a cited portion of the Judgment?
(2) And this interpretation is as unilateral as unilateral can be; it was after all kept secret from us
(even in these proceedings) until ten months ago. - 43 -
(3) It is not only interpretation but it relates to precisely that part of the Judgment on which
Cambodia’s present Request for Interpretation is focused, i.e., the second paragraph of the
dispositif.
(4) It also represents proof positive of what Cambodia has said in its written argument on the
subject of interpretation versus implementation: that the two are distinct, but that it is not
logically possible to proceed to “implementation” except on the basis of an “interpretation”.
(5) It puts paid at a stroke to the argument Thailand now advances over and over again that the
Judgment is “crystal clear”, that it needs no interpretation, there is no room for any
interpretation. Interpretatio cessat in claris, as the Further Written Explanations so engagingly
say; to us it seems to be more a case of ut interpretatio non contentos adjuvet.
(6) Moreover, Mr. President, the alternative interpretations put forward are purely arbitrary, purely
abstract, as the strai ght lines on the map show; no justification is given for them, no
explanation why they are said to correspond in spatial terms to what the Court had decided, and
the two interpretations differ widely from one another, by a factor of 2:1.
(7) The choice ma de between the two interpretations by the Council of Ministers is equally
arbitrary and abstract: no reasoning whatsoever, none of any kind.
(8) Nor is this a simple case of an administrative arrangement for withdrawal, with no intended
implications for t erritory or an inter -State boundary. Far from it: not only, as already
indicated, does it purport to be based on the “principle” that Cambodia will only “obtain” the
ruins of the Temple and the ground on which it stood, but it also states with explicit c larity that
the purpose of “determining the vicinity of the Temple” is “so as Cambodia will have
sovereignty in accordance with the Judgment of the World Court”. This is the pure language of
the first paragraph of the dispositif; it proves graphically th at Thailand has always accepted,
right from the very beginning, the link that Cambodia now maintains in these proceedings,
namely, the link that must exist between the first and second paragraphs of the dispositif , and it
shows that Thailand was perfectly conscious that it was setting out to give an interpretation to
the Judgment, and to give an interpretation that would encompass the first paragraph just as
much as the second. - 44 -
40. So what, Mr . President, Members of the Court, does Thailand now say about its own
document, now that it has finally allo wed us all to see it? It says and you will find this at
paragraph 1.13 of Thailand’s Further Written Explanations of last June:
(a) That this was not a case of Thailand providing its own interpretation of th e term “vicinity” in
the 1962 Judgment and seeking to enforce it through resort to force. Well that is clearly
nonsense: I have just demonstrated that this was unequivocally interpretation and that the
Council of Ministers decided of its own volition to add a barbed-wire fence to the proposal that
had already been put up to it; and the documents already before the Court at an earlier stage
show that it was plainly evident at the time, even to outside observers, that anyone who
transgressed the fence woul d be fired upon. What else could that be other than a unilateral
decision to be imposed if necessary through resort to force?
(b) Well, says Thailand, this was not really a “boundary” but just a line of withdrawal, and the
fence was there just as much to keep our own soldiers back in the one direction as to keep the
Cambodians out in the other. But who “ withdraws” and sets up a barbed -wire fence behind
him if not to create a “boundary” ? And who says that a line is to keep your own soldiers in,
except by asserting that the territory within which they are to be kept is your own territory?
Moreover, as I have shown, the Thai m inisterial document was disarmingly plain that the
intention was to mark off the area that Cambodia would “obtain” and that it was in connection
with Cambodian “sovereignty” in accordance with the Court’s Judgment. The Court may have
noticed that the Thai Agent spoke during the proceedings on Provisional Measures of a
so-called deliberate Cambodian policy “of progressively encroaching on Thai territory beyond
5
the line established by the Council of Ministers in 1962” . And the final conclusive touch
surely lies, as we can now see with hindsight, in the Thai unilateral map of 2007 and I have
that on the screen now which purports to show nothing less than a frontier line, and one that
runs along the old watershed line until it reaches the Council of Ministers line, at which point
the purported frontier line has a little nick, rather like a cut on the chin while shaving, before
regaining the old watershed line and continuing along it. Well, Thailand makes a great fuss, of
5CR 2011/14, p. 11, para. 34 (Plasai). - 45 -
course, about Cambodia’s treatment of this map and whether the map says anything new or not.
Thailand can say what it likes about the map and its origins but the document from which that
nick on the map has its origin was kept secret until declassified in 2011 and then released in
these proceedings a year later, which shows that the map was of a piece with other unilateral
Thai actions designed to transmute into an art ificial inter-State boundary line the effec t of the
Court’s 1962 Judgment a Judgment which Thailand now insists before the Court cannot be
construed as having established any boundary at all in the disputed region.
(c) Which brings us inexorably back, M r. President, to the question of interpretation. Here
Thailand relents a bit this is at the end of paragraph 1.13 by claiming that, if the former
barbed-wire fence was not a boundary, it was at least “consistent with” the area the Court was
focusing on; well, what is an assessment of “consistency with” the Court’s focus if not a form
of interpretation? But then, when it comes to the 1962 Judgment itself, and specifically t o
Thailand’s core issue of the “vicinity” of the Temple under the second paragrap h of the
dispositif, we discover that it is not really “interpretation” at all, it is no more than an
“estimate” of what the vicinity is; but it seems that that does not matter, because it is not a
mere estimate, but a “good faith” estimate, and moreover one that is “solidly grounded”. And
then, Mr. President, Members of the Court, then we come to the reall y telling point: what is
this “good faith estimate” “solidly grounded” in? The Thai Written Explanations tell us: it is
solidly grounded in “the arg uments of the Parties before the Court”. That is the phrase
Thailand uses at the very end of paragraph 1.13 of its Further Written Explanations, and we
might pause for a moment to let its implications sink in. We have a specific term used in the
dispositive part of a judgment of the Court; it creates a specific obligation for Thailand arising
out of the Judgment; Thailand needs to take action to comply, and intends to take action
amongst other things by erecting a fence designed to act as a barrier ; but regrettably
compliance is not straightforward because the terms employed by the Court in the dispositif are
not clear, or not sufficiently clear; so they need to be given meaning, in other words
interpreted; and how does one set abou t giving them mea ning which, incidentally, you
intend to compel others physically to respect ? one makes an “estimate”, which, by the bye,
is exactly one half of one’s other “ estimate” of what the Court meant ; and on what does one - 46 -
ground this “estimate”? Not on the Judgment of the Court, but on what the Parties had argued
in their submissions to the Court before it came to its Judgment! It is as if the Judgment of the
Court is purely evanescent: a blip on the screen, a momentary happening that then descends
into the past and can be safely forgotten so that the argument between the Parties can resume
again where it left off before the Court spoke.
Thailand’s attempts to marginalize the Court’s Judgment
41. Mr. President, this is fairly breathtaking. It contains no h int of a recogniti on that the
pronouncement of a judgment by the Court creates a new legal situation between disputing States.
Or of a recognition that, if the effects of this new legal situation need to be interpreted for practical
purposes, the material for that is to be found in the Judgment itself, including , of course, the
Court’s reasoning. What else is the reasoning in a reasoned judgment for? But at least it does go
to explain why such a large portion of the Thai argument in these proceedings is devoted to
rehearsing what the Parties had been arguing to the Court before it pronounced its Judgment, and to
the practice of the two States in the years after that : all part of a strategy of de -emphasizing what
the Court itself had said and submerging i t in a continuing power play between the two
neighbouring States. And the Court will be able to see that vividly illustrated in the Further
Written Explanations, at paragraph 3.109. Here we have Thailand accusing Cambodia, the very
State seeking through these proceedings to revalidate and vindicate what the Court decided,
accusing Cambodia of having the outrageous temerity to suggest that a Judgment of the Court, once
handed down, has “a life of its own”. Yes, Mr . President, we do say that a j udgment of the Court
has a life of its own, because it definitively settles the dispute between the parties which was before
the Court and creates of its own force a new legal situation that is thenceforth binding on the
parties. And that is why Cambodia considers i tself entirely justified in recalling once again the
extreme reluctance with which Thailand was eventually driven to accept in 1962 that it had to
comply with the Judgment and the contortion through which it asserted that, if so, this was only
because of an obligation under the United Nations Charter not as a direct effect of the Judgment
itself. - 47 -
Res judicata
42. And that may be a suitable introduction, Mr . President, to Thailand’s treatment of the
question of res judicata.
43. Thailand does not disdain to rewrite Cambodia’s submissions. A gross example is at
paragraph 3.7 of the Further Written Explanations, which would have the reader believe that
Cambodia “alleges” that the status of res judicata attaches to the whole of the 1962 Judgment,
reasons and dispositif together. This is so far from the truth that I shall not bother with it further.
In similar vein, Thailand’s submissions seek regularly to elide what the Court has said in the past,
what the Court has laid down about the status of reasons in the process of interpretation. The Court
consistently says that reasons cannot be the subject of a request for interpretation except in so far as
they are inseparable from the operative part. Conversely, if the reasons are indeed inseparable
from the operative part, then they fall within the res judicata and thus within the interpretative
jurisdiction of the Court. The locus classicus of course is the Request for Interpretation in the
Cameroon v. Nigeria case, where the Court said:
“These reasons are inseparable from the operative part of the Judgment and in
this regard the request therefore meets the conditions laid down by Article 60 of the
Statute in order for the Court to have jurisdiction to entertain a request for
interpretation. . .” (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the
Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections ( Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 36, para. 11.)
44. That is the situation here. But, u nlike in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, it is not even
necessary for the Court to make a fresh assessment of the essential nature of the particular
reasoning which Cambodia invokes for the proper understanding of the meaning and scope of the
1962 Judgment that is not necessary, because the Court has already done so in 1962. As the
Court said at the very outset of its reasoning, a mere two pages in to the reasoning, it could “only
give a decision as to the sovereign ty over the Temple area after having examined what the frontier
line is” (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 17). In our submission,
in Cambodia’s submission, this is a plain and simple determination by the Court itself that
establishing the boundary line and where it runs in the region in dispute is the essential basis for the
formal decisions that will follow in due course in the dispositive part. - 48 -
No alternative basis in the Judgment to the Annex I Map
45. Thailand’s attempt to suggest that there was some alternative legal basis for the above
other than the Annex I map is ludicrous in the light of the Judgment itself. The best that our
opponents can dredge up in this connection is the well -known visit to Préah Vihéar by
Prince Damrong in 1930, which indeed the Court itself referred to as the “ most significant” of the
series of episodes which Thailand had tried to put forward, like King Canute, against the incoming
tide. I have already had the opportunity to describe to the Court, in the proceedings on provisional
measures, how the Prince Damrong incident occupies no more than two paragraphs in the
Judgment, in contrast to some 12 pages the Judgment devotes to the Annex I map, its origins, and
to Thailand’s acceptance of it. But what may matter as much as the sheer weight of material is the
fact that the Court explicitly put these episodes under the rubric of attempts by Thailand to “efface
or cancel out the clear impression of acceptance of the frontier line ” or to “overrid[e] and
negative[e] the consistent and undeviating attitude of the central Siamese authorities to the frontier
line as mapped” (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 30; emphasis
added). Not only that, but when the Court proceeds to evaluate Prince Damrong’s visit, it does so
expressly in terms of Thailand’s consistent attitude to the Annex 1 map and line and acceptance of
the frontier as drawn on the map the Court will see that at pages 28 and 29 of the Judgment,
which to sa ve time, I will not read out now . So there is not a shred of support for Thailand’s
attempt now to assert that the Court had an alternative basis for its decision, and that all of the
discussion of the Annex I map was just an interesting excursus of no lasting importance at the legal
level. Quite the contrary, the Judgment treats the episode simply as further confirmation of a
conclusion it had already reached about the binding nature of the boundary on the map. And the
decisive element is surely the Court’s own statement:
“The real question, therefore, which is the essential one in this case, is whether
the Parties did adopt the Annex I map, and the line indicated on it, as representing the
outcome of the work of delimitation of the frontier in the re gion of Preah Vihear . . .”
(Ibid., p. 22; emphasis added.)
That is at page 22 of the 1962 Judgment; I ask the Court to put it alongside the paragraph from the
Further Written Explanations which is now on your screens the Court says “the real question
therefore, which is the essential one in this case, Thailand says: “the map is simply not an essential
part of the reasoning and thus not relevant to a request for interpretation”. - 49 -
46. Earlier in the Further Written Explanations paragraph 1.8 Thailand sets out to
suggest that Cambodia has retreated from its position, now admits that the Court recognized but did
not determine the Cambodia/Thailand boundary, and that in consequence there is nothing that
could be part of the res judicata and as such available for interpretation. The situation is however
perfectly simple and perfectly normal; there is no need for caricature. The Court in its Judgment
was abundantly clear about what it was laying down: that it could only decide the dispute , by
having regard to the boundary, that the boundary was determined by the Franco- Siamese treaty
settlement, and that the acceptance of the Annex I map by the two States caused it to become part
of the treaty settlement and thus binding on them. The situation is e xactly similar to any disputed
treaty issue that comes to the Court for settlement: it is their treaty which creates the legal
obligations binding the litigating Parties, it is the Court which settles definitively the dispute
between them over what their treaty obligations mean. That no more entails that the Court creates
the treaty than it entails in this case that the Court determined the boundary. The treaties
determined the boundary; the Court settled the argument as to what the treaties meant and it did
so with binding force, because that is what the Charter and the Statute say. It’s as simple as that.
47. Mr. President, if what the Judgment said about the frontier and about the map is not part
of the res judicata, then it would mean that Thailand is now free to deny that it had ever accepted
the Annex I map as the Court held or that the Annex I map had entered into the treaty
settlement as an integral part of it as the Court also held. Well, if that is, a gain, Thailand’s
position, it ought now to say so.
Cambodia is seeking to gain now what it could not achieve in 1962
48. Mr. President, I move now to the other Thai argument that Cambodia is seeking to gain
now what it could not achieve in 1962. Perhaps this is the real kernel of Thai land’s argument. It
seems to us to take two forms. There is the form which says: Cambodia’s request goes beyond the
dispute submitted to the Court in 1959, so for the Court to decide it would be ultra petita. Then
there is the form that says, more specifically: the Court formally determined not to decide this
point in 1962, so to ask the Court to decide it now goes beyond the bounds of interpretation. - 50 -
49. In neither form is this a sound argument. But before I proceed to analyse it, let me make
one general observation. This is that Thailand regularly accuses Cambodia, in outraged tones, of
invoking parts of the Court’s reasoning to explain the res judicata; the dispositif, says Thailand, is
self-contained and must be interpreted as it stands. But Thailand does exactly the same thing. It
cites various paragraphs in the reasoning as showing that, when the Court refers in the dispositif to
the territory in which the Temple is situated, it means in fact only the Temple and the Temple
ground; and it cites two single paragraphs at the beginning and at the end of the reasoning to show
that the Court deliberately decided not to accord any formal status to the Annex I map. Where
Thailand picks out a few selective quotations and tries to give overriding effe ct to them, our effort
has been to use the whole central run of the Court’s argument to illuminate an understanding of its
final conclusions.
The Court’s treatment of the maps
50. Let me address the classic example of this selective abstraction and conf ront head-on
Thailand’s central assertion that the Court refused in 1962 to answer the question of the status of
the Annex I map that had been posed formally in Cambodia’s final submissions. This is what
Cambodia had asked the Court to adjudge and declare : “that the frontier line between Cambodia
and Thailand, in the disputed region in the neighbourhood of the Temple of Preah Vihear, is that
which is marked on the map of the Commission of Delimitation between Indo- China and Siam
(Annex I to the Memorial of Cambodia) ” (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 11).
And this is what the Court said:
“Accordingly, the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court is confined to a
difference of view about sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear.
To decide this question of territorial sovereignty, the Court must have regard to the
frontier line between the two States in this sector. Maps haven (sic) been submitted to
it and various considerations have been advanced in this connection. The Court will
have regard to each of these only to such extent as it may find in them reasons for the
decision it has to give in order to settle the sole dispute submitted to it, the subject of
which has just been stated.” (Ibid., p. 14.)
And then at the end, at page 36, the Court says, immediately before the dispositif: - 51 -
“Referring finally to the Submissions presented at the end of the oral
proceedings, the Court, for the reasons indicated at the beginning of the present
Judgment, finds that Cambodia’s first and second Submissions, calling for
pronouncements on the legal status of the Annex I map and on the frontier line in the
disputed region, can be entertained only to the extent that they give expression to
grounds, and not as cl aims to be dealt with in the operative provisions of the
Judgment.” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 36.)
Mr. President, it defies logic to read into those two pronouncements by the Court a “refusal to
decide” the question that had been put to it. The first ext ract, it will be noted, refers to far more
than just the Annex I map, but to a whole category of evidence that had been presented to the
Court, including maps in general and other , unspecified, materials as well. The Court seems
simply to be saying that it will have regard, amongst this mass of material, only to that which is
relevant to the issue before it. The central indeed unique relevance of the Annex I map is
then established later on by the progression in the Court’s reasoning , which Cambodia set out in
detail in paragraph 39 of the Request for Interpretation. As to the second extract, the one just
before the dispositive part, it is perfectly plain just from the words which the Court used that the
Court was not refusing to “decide” a question, a question which, indeed, it had already stated to be
the “essential” question in the case, it was simply declining to decide it in a particular way, i.e., as a
formal determination in the dispositive part of its Judgment. The status of this question with in the
Court’s reasoning was, self-evidently, left untouched, as was its “essential” place in this reasoning.
The doctrine of ultra petita
51. Mr. President, before I leave the question of ultra petita, may I make two brief
comments:
first, that the purpose and sense behind the doctrine of ultra petita is to ensure that a tribunal
stays within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon it, so that in principle it has no
application to proceedings for the Court’s interpretation of its own past j udgments given that
this is, in the Court’s own words, “a special jurisdiction deriving directly from Article 60 of the
Statute”; the explication by the Court of the express wording of the 1962 dispositif in terms of
its own reasoning at the time could not by definition be ultra petita; - 52 -
secondly, that there is in any case no warrant for undertaking , as Thailand has done, a search
aliunde for the petita when the Court has itself laid down the scope and subject of the dispute,
as it did here in plain and simple terms : “Accordingly, the subject of the dispute submitted to
the Court is confined to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of the Temple
of Preah Vihear.” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 14.) Let me touch briefly on the interesting word
“confined”. What looks on the surface like a term of restriction is in fact a term of inclusion.
When the Court finds and this is an operative finding, not a piece of reasoning that the
dispute before it is to be understood as “ confined” to the region of the T emple, it certainly
means that the dispute does not extend beyond that region ; but it also means that the dispute
does extend to everything related to sovereignty within that region. Moreover the Judgment
goes further; it defines for us what the Court itself decided was the Applicant’s petitum and the
Respondent’s contra-petitum, because it says: “‘ In the present case, Cambodia alleges a
violation on the part of Thailand of Cambodia’s territorial sovereignty over the region of the
Temple of Preah Vihear and its precincts.’” (Ibid., p. 14; emphasis added.) And: “‘Thailand
replies by affirming that the area in question lies on the Thai side of the common frontier
between the two countries , and is under the sovereignty of Thailand .’” (Ibid.) And, having
recited the petitum and the contra-petitum, the Court then links this description of the petita to
its immediately following decision on the “subject of the dispute” by using the word
“[a]ccordingly” (ibid.). “Accordingly. the subject of the dispute su bmitted to the Court is
confined to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah
Vihear.”
52. So, the ultra petita argument is thus devoid of all foundation.
53. It follows, Mr. President, that the three- stage test for ad missibility is amply satisfied:
that there is a dispute(or more than one) between the Parties, which relates to the meaning or scope
of a judgment, and the Request seeks interpretation of what the Judgment decided with binding
force. - 53 -
Thailand’s new submission
54. Before concluding, I must however devote one brief moment to a further matter; a new
submission by Thailand i n paragraph 5.10 of its Further Written Explanations : Thailand accuses
Cambodia of having maintained over the past 50 years “a strateg y of claiming with growing
insistence that, contrary to the terms of the Judgment, the Court decided on the boundary between
the two States”. This is then elaborated in the last of Thailand’s formal submissions in that written
document, which asks the Cou rt in somewhat different terms to “formally declare that the
1962 Judgment does not determine that the line of the Annex I map is the boundary line between
the Kingdom of Thailand and the Kingdom of Cambodia” . Leaving to one side the obvious
procedural objections to the introduction of a new formal submission in this manner at this very
late stage, Cambodia finds itself constrained to observe that while it can understand why the
inexorable logic of the 1962 Judgment has driven Thailand to do so this new submission asks
the Court for a pronouncement covering in terms the entire length of the Annex I map, in flagrant
contradiction of Thailand’s whole position in these proceedings as to the limited scope of the
dispute which it says was brought before the Court in 1959. Given, however, that the substance of
this submission finds no basis in the terms of the Judgment itself and given, moreover, that its
scope does not respond to any submission put before the Court in these proceedings by Cambodia,
Cambodia will, in its closing submissions, ask the Court formally to reject Thailand’s new
submission, and to reiterate instead the findings of the 1962 Judgment that “ [t]he Court considers
that the acceptance of the Annex I map by the Parties caused the map to ent er the treaty settlement
and to become an integral part of it” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 33), and that “the Parties at that time
adopted an interpretation of the treaty settlement which caused the map line, in so far as it may
have departed from the line of the watershed, to prevail over the relevant clause of the treaty”
(ibid., p. 34).
Lapse of time
55. Mr. President, I close this oral pleading with a brief discussion of the legal effect of the
lapse of time between the pronouncement of the Judgment and the lodging of Cambodia’s Request
for Interpretation. I can do it very briefly by putting before the Court four simple propositions: - 54 -
1. The Court has now settled definitively that there is no statutory time -limit on a request for
interpretation. I refer t he Court to paragraph 37 of its Order on Provisional Measures in this
case, which is a definitive finding, not a provisional one.
2. The claim that Cambodia has acquiesced in Thailand’s unilateral interpretation, and cannot
therefore come to the Court to s eek the correct interpretation now, is nothing more than an
attempt to introduce a time-limit by the back door.
3. Thailand’s allegation that the lapse of time raises major questions as to the integrity of the
interpretation process is unsupported and inexplicable; if a judgment of the Court has a legal
meaning, that meaning stays fixed over time.
4. Lastly I feel bound to recall the extraordinary anomaly lying at the heart of Thailand’s position
in this case: that the consequence of a judgment of the International Court of Justice is that it
confers on the losing party a unilateral right to interpret what the judgment means, to enforce
that on the ground, and to dare the successful p arty to do something about it on pain of
sacrificing the full extent of its rights deriving from the judgment.
56. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I submit therefore that no question remains as to
the admissibility of Cambodia’s Request.
57. That brings me to the end of my pleading. Might I ask you, Mr. President, to be good
enough to give Mr. Bundy the floor.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Sir Franklin, and I invite Mr. Bundy to address
the Court. You have the floor, Sir. Mr. Bundy.
Mr. BUNDY: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
T HE EXISTENCE OF A DISPUTE OVER INTERPRETATION AND THE QUESTION OF MAPS
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is, as always, an honour to appear before you and
to represent the Kingdom of Cambodia in this important case. - 55 -
Introduction
2. My task this morning is to address two issues that continue to divide the Parties.
3. The first is whether a dispute exists between the Parties as to the meaning and scope of the
6
Judgment . A nd, as I shall show, the factual record clearly attests to the existence of such a
dispute. The dispute was already alluded to in the Court’s Order on Provisional Measures, where
the Court stated that “a difference of opinion or view appears to exist between them [the Parties] as
to the meaning or scope of the 1962 Judgment ” (Request for Interpretation of t he Judgment of
15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Order
of 18 July 2011, para. 31). And it is conclusively demonstrated by the documentary materials that
both Parties , including many documents filed by T hailand, have produced with their written
pleadings following the Court’s Order.
4. The second issue I shall address concerns the myriad of maps and technical arguments that
Thailand has introduced in its written pleadings in an attempt to undermine the p robative value of
the Annex I map, or to limit artificially the area constituting the “ vicinity” of the Temple within the
meaning of paragraph 2 of the dispositif.
5. In taking aim at the Annex I map, Thailand relies on a number of maps that were not
relevant to the Court’s Judgment or that Thailand has only unearthed recently, and technical studies
commissioned a short time ago specifically for these proceedings. None of this played the slightest
role in the Court’s original Judgment. In short, Thailand’s new line of attack is no more than a side
show designed to detract attention from the only map that does have status in this case the
Annex I map.
1. The Legal Context for Appreciating the Relevant Facts
6. Before getting into details, let me briefly place the facts in their proper legal context . It
need scarcely be recalled that this is not a case aimed at reopening the merits of the dispute that the
6Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Order of 18 July 2011, para. 22; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of
20 November 1950 i n the Asylum Case, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402; Application for Revision and
Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985223, para. 56; Interpretation of
Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p. 21. - 56 -
Court decided in 1962 and it is not a case of revision. It is a case of interpretation. In such cases,
three key principles must be borne in mind in assessing the factual materials that both Parties have
placed before the Court in their pleadings.
7. The first principle is that post- judgment facts are only relevant in so far as they show that
a dispute exists between the Parties as to the meaning or scope of the Judgment . It is obviously
self-evident that a dispute over interpretation can only arise following the delivery of a judgment 7.
8. Second, as Sir Franklin noted, it is also well settled that the manifestation of the existence
of a dispute in a spe cific manner is not required. In other words, the dispute need not have been
dealt with in a formal way 8.
9. Third and this is the other side of the coin of the first principle post-judgment facts,
and facts that did not form the basis of the original judgment, are irrelevant to the interpretation of
that j udgment. I think t he Permanent Court put the point very succinctly in its judgment on
interpretation in Chorzów Factory where it stated:
“Moreover, the Court, when giving an interpretation, refrains from any
examination of facts other than those which it has considered in the judgment under
interpretation, and consequently all facts subsequent to that judgment. ”
(Interpretation of Judgment s Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11,
1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p. 21.)
10. These points of principle should be uncontroversial . The only reason I have felt it
necessary to mention them is because Thailand’s written pleadings continuously confuse the issue.
11. On the one hand, Thailand ignores the vast quantity and it is a vast quantity of
documentary evidence that shows that the Parties held fundamentally opposing views as to the
meaning and scope of what the Court decided. But , on the other hand, Thailand shows no
hesitation in referring to maps and technical matters that were either discovered long after the
Judgment was rendered or which did not figure at all in that Judgment. None of these matters has
any bearing on the question of interpretation now before your Court.
7Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the T emple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, para. 37.
8
Interpretation of Judgment s Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzó), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A,
No. 13, pp. 10-11; Order of 18 July 2011, para. 22; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the
Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of
America), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 325-326, paras. 53-54. - 57 -
2. The Existence of a Dispute Over Interpretation
12. Having discussed the legal framework, permit me now to turn to the facts that evidence
the existence of a dispute between the Parties over the Judgment’s interpretation.
13. In its written pleadings, Thailand repeatedly asserts that no such dispute exists. In its
Written Observations, for example, Thailand claimed that the Court lacks jurisdiction because
“there is no dispute between the Parties over the meaning and scope of the 1962 Judgment”
(Written Observations of Thailand (WOTh) , p. 293, para. 7.5) . And Thailand’s Further Written
Explanations go further, where, our opponents allege the following:
“The impossibility for Cambodia to identify a single document, predating its
seising of the Court, in which the Parties held opposing views on the characterisation
of the obligation of withdrawal shows beyond any doubt that no such dispute existed.”
(Further Written Explanations of Thailand (FWETh), para. 3.82.)
So, apparently we have been unable to show a single document where there is a difference of view
over the withdrawal obligation.
14. Let me test that rather extravagant assertion against the documentary record . Because, I
believe, Mr. President and Members of the Court, that that assertion is demonstrably wrong and
that the record leaves no doubt that the Parties hold differing views over the meaning and scope of
the obligation of withdrawal, and that Thailand itself considered the Judgment was subj ect to
different interpretations.
(a)The Events of the 1960s
15. The Court rendered its original Judgment on 15 June 1962. Following the delivery of
that Judgment, a series of internal events took place in Thailand that are highly relevant because
they set the stage for the dispute that exists today between the Parties over the interpretation of the
Judgment.
16. As Sir Franklin pointed out a short while ago, on 3 July 1962, about two weeks after the
Judgment was rendered, at a meeting of the Thai Counc il of Ministers, Thailand’s Prime Minister
instructed the Minister of Interior to travel to the Temple area to give guidelines to officers on duty
there to establish the limits of the Temple and its vicinity 9. At the conclusion of its work, the
expert group established by the Minister sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister dated
9Further Written Explanations of Thailand (FWETh), Ann. 5, p. 34. - 58 -
6 July 1962, which recorded the Thai expert group’s view that the determination of the vicinity of
the Temple could be carried out according to two different methods . Those metho ds were
described in the memorandum and were depicted by red and yellow lines on a map. That is the
map that Sir Franklin showed you, which appears again on the screen [and in tab 6].
[6 July 1962 Thai map on screen]
17. As we have heard, on 10 July 1962, Thailand’s Council of Ministers decided to adopt the
second method for determining the vicinity of the Temple; the much more restrictive one.
18. The Court may recall that, on 26 May 2011, that was just four days before the opening of
the oral hearings on provisional measures, Thailand submitted a number of documents . This map
was one of them: it was No. 4 on the list submitted by Thailand. Surprisingly, however, this map
was the only document submitted by Thailand which its c ounsel chose not to discuss or to display
during those hearings on provisional measures. And, as we have heard , when Thailand filed its
Written Observations on 21 November 2011, Thailand once again did not mention this map, or file
a copy of the Council of Ministers’ Resolution. It was only after Cambodia called attention to this
rather striking omission that Thailand realized it had no choice but to produce the relevant
documents, which it did with its Further Written Explanations in Annex 5 [included at tab 5 of the
folders].
19. I think the Court will appreciate why Thailand has been so reluctant to discuss these
documents when it examines the materials in question. I would make just three brief points:
First, it is clear from the two proposals considered by the Thai Council of Ministers that
Thailand’s experts themselves realiz ed that the identification of the area from which Thailand
was obliged to withdraw was open to different interpretations hence two proposals
although neither of those proposals can be reconciled wi th what the Court decided in its
1962 Judgment.
Second, the Thai Council of Ministers decided on the more restrictive of the proposals (the red
line). That decision was taken unilaterally without any attempt to engage Cambodia on the
matter or to justify it under the Judgment . And as I shall show, Thailand’s interpretation was
firmly and repeatedly disputed by Cambodia; and - 59 -
Third, the Council of Ministers ordered a barbed -wire fence to be constructed along the red
line, and Thai forces were instructed to respond forcibly to any violation of the red line.
20. The unilateral, and I would suggest self -serving, nature of Thailand’s determination of
the limits of the vicinity of the Temple was acknowledged at the time by Thailand’s Deputy Prime
Minister. On 12 July 1962, he stated that “ the marking of the vicinity of the Temple of Phra
Viharn would be done by the Royal Thai Government unilaterally ” (WOTh, Ann. 17, p. 91). And
it was also noted in Thailand’s Further Written Explanations, which have attempted to justify that
decision by arguing that, “the Thai government had to decide itself the limits of troop withdrawal ”
(FWETh, para. 1.13.). Why? What gave Thailand the authority to aggregate to itself such a
determination that was manifestly at odds with t he Court’s Judgment is left unexplained in our
opponent’s pleadings.
21. But in any event, Cambodia’s objections were made clear afterwards. And w ithout
recanvassing the details let me just highlight a number of representative examples. For
convenience, we have listed them all in tab 10 of your folders these are references to materials
that are on the record in the case.
22. One month after the Thai Council of Ministers issued its resolution, Cambodia’s Head of
State, Prince Sihanouk, issued a press s tatement in which he took strong exc eption to the
construction by Thailand of its barbed- wire fence following the red line, and the presence of Thai
military personnel on Cambodian land. Let me quotewhat the Prince said at this time:
“although the soldie rs stationed at Preah Vihear [the Thai soldiers] have been
withdrawn, the foot of the hill is surrounded by barbed wire and Thailand’s Minister
for the Interior has ordered his police forces to fire on anyone approaching the barbed
wire. It is clear, ther efore, that they [the Thais] have not given up on their objectives
as regards Preah Vihear.” (WOTh, Ann. 26, p. 130.)
In itself, that statement evidences a difference of views as to how Thailand had interpreted the
Court’s Judgment.
23. In the autumn of 1962, the Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed a personal
representative, Mr. Nils Gussing, to gather information on tensions that existed between the two
countries. Mr. Gussing issued a report on 25 November 1962 which recorded that Cambodia
strongly disagreed with Thailand’s view of the Judgment. The relevant passage in the report noted
the following (tab 11) this is from the Secretary-General’s representative: - 60 -
“In Cambodia, the Preah Vihear Temple plays an extremely important role in
the attitude shown towards the other Government concerned; although the case has
been ‘won’, the Thais are criticized as being ‘bad losers’ and as not having accepted
their defeat graciously, and the allegation is made that a part of the territory which,
under the ruling of the International Court of Justice, should, in the Cambodian view,
be under Cambodian sovereignty, is now fenced off . . ., with land mines placed here
and there . . .” (WOTh, Ann. 32, p. 180.)
24. So it follows that, by November 1962, the Member States of the United Nations were
aware of Cambodia’s disagreement with the position adopted by Thailand with respect to the area
that was the subject of the Court’s Judgment.
25. That same month, November 1962, the French Government also evidenced its awareness
of Cambodia’s rejection of Thailand’s position. A diplomatic despatch sent from the French
Embassy in Bangkok refers to Cambodia’s objection that Thailand continued to occupy an area
that, according to the Annex I map line, was in Cambodian territory . 10
26. And in November of that same year , Cambodia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an
aide-memoire that referred to the barbed -wire fence, stating that “ this limit was in complete
disagreement with the Court’s decision, which confirmed the frontier as it appeared on the 1907
map [the Annex I map] ” (ibid., Ann. 34, pp. 205 and 214). The same point was reiterated by
11
Cambodia’s Ministry of Information in December 1962 . Those are documents that Thailand
itself submitted with its Written Observations. They clearly show a difference of view.
27. Now Prince Sihanouk visited the Temple in early January 1963, at which time he took
official repossession of it . Shortly before that visit, the French Embassy again reported on
Cambodia’s disagreement with Thailand’s interpretation of the Judgment . A nd as the Embassy
noted, Cambodia’s position with respect to the barbed- wire fence and I quote from the French
dispatch was that it: “was placed there unilaterally by the Thai army and police with no regard
to the frontier line imposed by the International Court of Justice” (ibid., Ann. 41, p. 261).
28. And when Prince Sihanouk visited the Temple, he repeated Cambodia’s position that
Thailand had established a new frontier line in the immediate vicinity of the Temple, constructed a
1Further Written Explanations of Thailand (FWETh), Ann. 33, p. 193.
1Ibid., Ann. 38, p. 240. - 61 -
barbed-wire fence around it, and erected military and police posts that encroached on Cambodian
territory in contravention of the Court’s Judgment . 12
29. Mr. President, what does Thailand say about these episodes? First , Thailand alleges
and I quote from their pleadings “in the aftermath of the 1962 Judgment, and clearly for a very long
period afterwards, Cambodia has made no complaint as to the way paragraph 2 of the dispositifwas
implemented by Thailand.” (WOTh, para. 4.25) this is Thailand’s allegation. And Thailand also
argues that in January 1963, “Prince Sihanouk declared himself completely satisfied with
Thailand’s implementation.” ( Ibid., para. 4.32.) Now b oth of those assertions are directly
contradicted by the facts I have just discussed.
30. Thailand also maintains that, after Prince Sihanouk’s visit to the Temple and I am
quoting from Thailand’s pleadings again “never again did Cambodia claim that Thailand’s
compliance with the Judgment had not bee n completed because of the barbed- wire fence” (ibid.,
para. 4.47.). And once again, that assertion ismanifestly incorrect.
31. In January 1965, Cambodia’s Head of State repeated the complaint that Thailand w as
continuing to refuse to recognize the front ier1. On 23 April 1966, Cambodia’s Minister for
Foreign Affairs addressed letters to the Secretary -General of the United Nations and the President
of the Security Council which referred to Prince Sihanouk’s earlier statements complaining about
the barbed- wire fence and to Thailand’s failure to respect the Court’s Judgment 14. And on
11 May 1966, Cambodia sent a further letter to the Secretary-General protesting the fence 15.
32. In August 1966, the Secretary -General appointed another Special Representative
(Mr. Herbert de Ribbing) to mediate between Cambodia and Thailand. In a letter dated
26 October 1966 to Mr. de Ribbing from Cambodia , Cambodia repeated its position that the
Temple and its vicinity are situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodi a according to the
12Cambodia’s Response (FWEC), Ann. 6.
13
FWEC, Ann. 10.
14Ibid., Anns. 11 and 12.
15
Ibid., Ann. 14. - 62 -
16
Court’s 1962 Judgment . And, in November of that year, Prince Sihanouk repeated the complaint
that Thailand was refusing to stop laying claim to the Temple and its surrounding area 17.
33. And the fact that the dispute between the Parties continued to persist is further evidenced
in a report that Mr. de Ribbing provided to the Secretary- General of the United Nations in
September 1966. That report referred to a meeting that the Special Representative had had with the
Prime Minister of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Kantol, in the following way (tab 12):
“The Prince [the Prime Minister of Cambodia] mentioned in this connection
that the barbed wire fence that the Thais had put up on its side of the Temple was not
even halfway between the Temple and the border line fixed by the International Court
of Justice in its decision regarding Phra Viharn. Cambodia could, if it wanted, take
this question to the Security Council and request the Thais to withdraw to the
borderline. The Cambodian Government had preferred, however, to abide until
further, in order not to have on hand still more trouble with Thailand. ” (WO Th,
Ann. 72, p. 436.)
34. Thailand’s Written Observations argue that Mr. de Ribbing’s reports show that the
barbed-wire fence was not a real issue and that it was never mentioned again . That is clearly not
true. There is the proof in the report. It is quite clear that Cambodia viewed the issue very
seriously and specifically mentioned it to the Secretary- General’s Special Representative. And
when Mr. de Ribbing informed Thailand about Cambodia’s views regarding the barbed-wire fence,
19
Thailand’s representative reacted in anger . That scarcely suggests that the fence was not an issue.
35. But not only that, Cambodia continued to protest Thailand’s actions in 1967. On
22 October 1967, for example, Cambodia’s Head of State gave a press conference in which he
drew attention to the res judicata effect of what the Court had decided, objected to the Thai
barbed-wire fence which lay between the T emple and the proper frontier according to the Annex I
map, and insisted that Thailand must return to Cambodia the land situated between Preah Vihear
20
and the Annex I map line .
36. In February 1968, Prince Sihanouk delivered a further address in which he referred to the
dispute in the following way:
16FWEC, Ann. 16.
17
Ibid., Ann. 17.
18WOTh, para. 4.56.
19Ibid., Ann. 72, p. 442.
20
FWEC, Ann. 19. - 63 -
“They [the Thais] have, since 1962, revealed their bad faith by failing fully to
implement the decision of the International Court of Justice . The Court ordered that
the Temple and the strip of surrounding la nd be returned to Cambodia . And yet, the
Thais have21efused to surrender that land, laying barbed- wire around the edge of the
Temple.”
37. All of the events and I have given you a sample, but I have spared you all of them.
All of these events I have discussed are supported by contemporaneous documentary evidence .
That evidence shows that Thailand itself was unsure how the Judgment should be interpreted, but
that it took the decision to limit the “vicinity” of the Temple as close to the Temple as poss ible.
Afterwards, Cambodia repeatedly objected to Thailand’s position and insisted that, under the
Judgment, the vicinity of the Temple should extend to the Annex I map line . Cambodia’s
objections were made known to the Special Representatives of the Sec retary-General of the United
Nations, diplomatic missions and the public generally.
38. In the light of these facts, it is simply not credible for Thailand to say that “Cambodia
identifies no document where it accused Thailand of not having completely com plied with its
obligations to withdraw ” and that “[a]ll the evidence submitted by Thailand in the Written
Observations remains unchallenged” 22. It is extraordinary. T he facts, Mr. President, are precisely
the opposite.
(b) Events Between 1970 and 2007
39. As Thailand’s written pleadings acknowledge, by 1970 the security situation had
23
deteriorated in Cambodia because of the outbreak of civil war . The Temple area was one of the
first areas occupied by the Khmer Rouge in the early 1970s, and one of the las t from which they
were driven out towards the end of the 1990s. During this period, the Temple was not an issue.
40. On 23 October 1991, the Paris Peace Agreements were signed . That process allowed the
Temple temporarily to be opened to tourists . Representatives of the Parties therefore met on
24
7 November 1991 to agree on a number of measures to regulate tourist activity . Thailand’s
Further Written Explanations assert that this agreement represented “ consistent evidence of
2FWEC, Ann. 23.
22
FWETh, para. 3.78.
2WOTh, para. 4.58.
24
Ibid., paras. 4.61-4.65 and Ann. 87. - 64 -
sovereignty in the area Cambo dia is now claiming, situated north or west of the Cabinet line ” on
the part of Thailand 25. That is pure wishful thinking . At that time, there was no evidence that
Thailand remained committed to its unilateral delimitation of the limits of the Temple decided by
the Thai Council of Ministers in 1962. The tourist regulations agreed by the Parties make no
mention of that decision or of the 1962 Thai map, or the red line. And it was Cambodia that took
responsibility for clearing landmines in the area and indicating the areas where tourists could
visit26.
41. Between 1993 and 1997, the Temple was again closed due to the presence of
KhmerRouge in the area . After the Khmer Rouge had been reintegrated, Cambodians settled
peacefully around the Temple on Cambodia ’s side of the frontier delimited by the Annex I map
line.
42. In November 1998, Cambodia built a pagoda to the west of the Temple pursuant to a
27
decision of the Ministry of Religion . A market was also established near the Temple. While the
pagoda and the market lay outside of the red line promulgated by Thailand in 1962, they gave rise
to no Thai protest . Nor did Thailand object to the fact that Cambodia occupied the Phnom Trap
hill, which is also located in the Temple’s vicinity on Cambodia’s side of the Annex I map line
you can see that on the Annex I map.
43. On 14 June 2000, the two Parties signed a “ Memorandum of Understanding on the
Survey and Demarcation of [the] Land Boundary ” 28. That instrument, as its title makes clear,
provided for the conduct of joint surveys by the Parties for the demarcation of the land boundary ,
on the ground. It had nothing to do with the delimitation of the boundary.
44. I mention the 2000 MOU because Thailand mixes up question s of delimitation and
demarcation. The MOU concerns the latter demarcation and is entirely irrelevant to the
present case. It is undisputed that the Court was not requested to demarcate the boundary on the
ground in the original case, and it is not being asked to do so in the present proceedings. Rather,
25
FWETh, para. 3.76.
26WOTh, Ann. 87, p. 513.
27FWEC, Ann. 24.
28
WOTh, Ann. 91. - 65 -
the meaning and scope of the Court’s 1962 Judgment must be analysed in the light of what the
Court said about the Annex I map, which was recognized as showing a pre -existing delimited
frontier in the region of the Temple that Thailand had accepted.
45. From the late 1990s until 2007, the situation was peaceful . Cambodians continued to go
about their business on Cambodia’s side of the Annex I map line in the vicinity of the Temple .
And Thailand did not once mention its Council of Ministers “red line”.
46. The only complaints that Thailand raised came several years later when, i n
November 2004, Thailand sent a Note to Cambodia in which it referred to the fact that the
Cambodian community around the Temple “and in its vicinity ” those were words used by
Thailand at the time and its vicinity that community was expanding such that it then included
29
over 700 inhabitants, and that this was affecting the “natural environment of the frontier zone” .
The complaint was about pollution from the se people. Not a word was said about these activities
being inconsistent with the Thai Council of Ministers map, which was never mentioned.
47. It is significant that Thailand considered Cambodia’s activities to be taking place in the
“vicinity” of the T emple. Evidently, Thailand’s views at that time about the scope of the word
“vicinity” were different from what it had decided unilaterally in 1962 or what it argues in these
proceedings. Regrettably, however, this peaceful situation that existed between the late 1990s and
2007 began to change in 2007 because, and as a result of Thailand’s reaction to Cambodia’s
request to UNESCO to inscribe the Temple on the World Heritage List and that is a matter I
would like to turn to next.
(c) The re-emergence of the dispute in 2007
48. The re-emergence of the dispute starting in 2007 was m ainly the result of political
changes in Thailand.
49. When Cambodia first issued a Royal Decree in April 2006 to have the Temple site
inscribed on the World Heritage List, Tha iland’s reaction was positive. At that time, the
PrimeMinister of Thailand was Thaksin Shinawatra, who was in favour of friendly relations with
Cambodia.
2WOTh, Ann. 93. - 66 -
50. In September 2006, one month before general elections were scheduled to take place in
Thailand, a coup d’état was staged against Prime Minister Thaksin. The election was cancelled and
the army took control.
51. On 17 May 2007, Thailand sent Cambodia an aid- memoire concerning the inscription of
30
the Temple on the UNESCO list . In that document, Thailand complained about the zones marked
out in Cambodia’s submission to the World Heritage Committee to protect the Temple, and
asserted Thailand asserted that the international boundary between Thailand and Cambodia
was as depicted on a Thai map: the map was Series L7017, unilaterally prepared by Thailand and a
copy of that map was attached to this May 2007 aide-memoire.
[Thai map L7017 on screen]
52. The map now appears on the screen and at tab 13 of your folders. It was a new map,
marked “secret” at the top , and not one of the maps listed in the 2000 Memorandum of
Understanding as a basis for the demarcation of the boundary . For the first time in decades, if we
zoom in on the relevant part of the map, it showed a boundary around the Temple as it had been
depicted on the Thai Council of Minister’s 1962 map.
53. In 2008, the political situation in Thailand changed again following the election of a new
Prime Minister. As a result, representatives of the two Governments signed a Joint Communiqué
on 18 June 2008 in which Thailand supported Cambodia’s proposal to inscribe the Temple on the
World Heritage List 31. That Joint Communiqué had a map attached to it which did not depict the
1962 Thai Council of Ministers line , or this line. On 7 July 2008, the World Heritage Committee
32
formally decided to place the Temple on the list .
54. But unfortunately, events kept changing in Thailand. Because, on the very day
7 July 2008 of the World Heritage Committee’s decision, Thailand’s Constitutional Cou rt
declared that the signature by Thailand’s Foreign Minister of the 18 June 2008 Joint Communiqué
violated Thailand’s Constitution and that the document was a nullity 33. In those circumstances,
30
FWEC, Ann. 27.
31Ibid., Ann. 31.
32Ibid., Ann. 32.
33
Ibid., para. 5. - 67 -
Cambodia had no option but to protest this new Thai map, which it did on 19 July 2008 in a letter
sent to the President of the United Nations General Assembly . That letter stated that this new map
34
was manifestly incompatible with the Annex I map relied on by the Court in its Judgment .
55. Thailand’s actions at this time had the consequence of resurrecting the dispute over the
Judgment’s interpretation that had been dormant for many years . T he fact that the dispute had
re-emerged was made patently clear when Thailand subsequently sent a letter to the Security
Council on 21 July 2008 in which it referred to the area adjacent to the Temple in the following
way (that is at tab 14 and now on the screen). This was Thailand’s letter:
“Cambodia’s territorial claim in this area is based on Cambodia’s unilateral
understanding of the said ICJ Judgment that a boundary line was determined by the
Court in this Judgment. Thailand contests this unilateral understanding since the ICJ
ruled in this case that it did not have jurisdiction over the question of the land
boundary and did not in any case determine the location of the boundary between
Thailand and Cambodia.” (FWEC, Ann. 36.)
56. And I would suggest that i f any further evidence was needed to show the existence of a
dispute between the Parties over the interpretation of the Judgment, this statement provides it.
57. In summary, Mr. President, Members of the Court: in 1962 Thailand’s expert group
considered that the Judgment, in particular the vicinity of the Temple from which Thailand was
obliged to withdraw, could be interpreted in different ways. In July 1962, Thailand issued its own
unilateral interpretation of the meaning and scope of the Court’s Judgment.
58. Cambodia vigorously protested that decision throughout the 1960s, and it also protested
when Thailand reintroduced its “ red line” in its 2007 map. For its part, in July 2008 Thailand
objected to what it claimed was Cambodia’s understanding of the Judgment, which was that
Thailand was obliged to withdraw from the Temple and its vicinity up to the Annex I map line. I
would suggest that it is clear in these circumstances that a dispute exists between the Parties
regarding the meaning or scope of the Judgment and that Cambodia’s request on this ground, the
request for interpretation, is fully admissible.
3FWEC, Ann. 34. - 68 -
3. The Irrelevance of Maps Relied on by Thailand
59. Mr. President, I was now going to turn to the second part of my pleading which will be
briefer and in which I will address the irrelevance to the present proceedings of the other maps and
technical studies that Thailand has introduced in its written pleadings . As I said, on this I hope to
be quite brief, precisely because of the lack of relevance of this material.
60. There are two aspects to this whole map business. The first concerns the technical report
that the International Boundaries Research Unit , that is IBRU of Durham University my good
friends MartinPratt and Alistair McDonald what they prepared, dealing with what IBRU called
an “Assessment of the t ask of translating the Cambodia -Thailand boundary depicted on the
‘Annex I’ map onto the ground”. That was the title of the report. It was included at Annex 96 of
Thailand’s Written Observations. We will deal with that first and then the second aspect I shall
address involves Thailand’s attempt to resurrect its claim in the original case that the Annex I map
does not follow the actual watershed. Thailand refers to maps prepared mainly by its own experts
in the original case that played no role in the Court’s Judgment . I will deal with each of the se
matters in turn.
(a)Thailand’s Expert Report on the Annex I Map
61. As for the IBRU report, its purpose is to show that the Annex I map, and I am quoting
from the report, “contains a number of errors which distort the line of the watershed and hence t he
boundary” (WOTh, Ann. 96, p. 627, para. 1). Further on in that report, the authors make a more
candid admission when they state: “The aim of this report is to move beyond the debate in the
Temple case, which focused almost entirely on a very small sec tion of the Annex I map, and
examine the map as a whole...” (Ibid., para. 3.)
62. That is a rather telling description, Mr. President: “to move beyond the debate ” in the
original case. But the purpose of interpretation proceedings is not to move beyond what the Court
considered in the original Judgment, or to examine new “ facts” and arguments that were not
introduced by the Parties at the time . It is to interpret what the Court actually decided in its
Judgment based on materials it considered at that time.
63. Notwithstanding that, the IBRU report tries to discredit the Annex I map by referring to
maps that Thailand apparently only recently discovered, along with satellite imagery, and a visit to - 69 -
a number of sites along the boundary undertaken by the authors of the IBRU report in August 2011.
All of this post-dates the Judgment. Do I need to recall what the Permanent Court said in Chorzów
Factory that I mentioned earlier, namely, that : “the Court, when giving an interpretation, refrains
from any examination of facts other than those which it considered in the judgment under
interpretation, and consequently all facts subsequent to that judgment” (Interpretation of Judgments
Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, p. 21).
64. Despite that admonition, the IBRU report gives particular emphasis to what it claims is a
“revised version” of the Annex I map that it discovered when it visited the Department of Treaties
and Legal Affairs in Thailand in 2011, and which is said to show changes to the contour lines and
registration errors in the original Annex I map. Following that visit of the IBRU authors to
Thailand, the legal team apparently looked at copies of the same sheet in archives in Paris and
London, as well as at the Institut géographique national of Paris, where a so-called “third version”
of the Annex I map was said to have been found. According to the IBRU report, it is not possible
35
today to discover the reasons for the revised editions of this map sheet .
65. What is clear is that none of these versions were considered by the Court in the original
proceedings or referred to in its Judgment. And, as the IBRU report itself frankly admits and I
could not have said it better myself: “Neither the reg istration error on the Annex I sheet nor the
revised versions of the sheet appear to have been discussed at any point during the original Temple
case.” 36
[Original Annex I map on screen]
66. Exactly, Mr. President. That is why all of this is irrelevant. The only map the Court
focused on in the original case was the map that Cambodia attached as Annex I to its Application
and again to its Memorial in the original case. That map is reproduced at tab 15 of your folders and
is now on the screen. It is the m ap that the Court found Thailand had accepted, and it is the map
that depicts the boundary line which the Court said both Parties agreed to regard as being the
frontier line.
35WOTh, Ann. 96, p. 635, para. 12.
36Ibid., p. 635, para. 13. - 70 -
67. As the Court noted in its Judgment, as early as 1908- 1909 Thailand “did acce pt the
Annex I map as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation, and hence recognized the
line on that map [the map you see] as being the frontier line” ( Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 32; emphasis added).
68. Now t he Court will see that the map filed by Cambodia as Annex I in the original
proceedings was in poor shape. It was held together with scotch tape. Apparently for this reason,
the Court had prepared a copy of the map, which is the map that is reproduced in the Court’s
publication of the Parties’ pleadings.
[Court’s Annex I map on screen]
69. That map now appears on the screen. It is also at t ab 16. It is the same as the Annex I
map filed by Cambodia except for the fact that a small cartouche in th e top right corner of the map
and two registration marks were not reproduced.
70. Now, in the original proceedings, Thailand claimed that the Annex I map in the disputed
area of Preah Vihear had errors, although these assertions were not made on the basis of any
“revised” versions of the Annex I map, but rather on the grounds, as Thailand argued, that the
frontier line depicted on the map was not the true watershed line ( Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 21). But the Court flatly rejected that contention stating that the
plea of error had not been made out (ibid., p. 27). Still less can Thailand plead error in the present
case based on newly discovered documents and arguments that never saw the light of day during
the original proceedings and did not form part of the Court’s Judgment.
71. Notwithstanding all of this, Thailand seeks to cast a further cloud on the Annex I map by
pointing out that the map that Cambodia filed with its Request for Interpretation in these
proceedings is not the same version of the map filed by Cambodia in the original proceedings 37.
But this too is a smokescreen of no relevance to the interpretation of what the Court decided in
1962.
[Place Annex I map from Cambodia’s Request on screen]
3FWETh, para. 1.23. - 71 -
72. It is well known that Cambodia’s archives were destroyed during the Khmer Rouge
period. Cambodia therefore turned to the Institut géographique national (IGN) of Paris to obtain
the map, which is what it produced with its Request and which is now on the screen and at tab 17
of your folders. And I have to say that Thailand’s own experts acknowledge that this version of the
map, and I am quoting from the expert report, contains “largely cosmetic changes which, to an
38
observer today, hardly justify the work involved to produce a further edition of this map” .
73. And similarly, the version of the Annex I map that the IBRU authors purported to have
located in Thailand’s archives is also without consequence. Because, once again, the IBRU Report
says that this version “is essentially the same map as the Annex I map” 39.
74. So, in short, Mr. President and Members of the Court, the entire démarche introduced by
Thailand regarding the Annex I map is without relevance to the case before you. The Annex I map
is the Annex I map that Cambodia filed in the original case and which the Court referred to in 14 of
the last 16 pages of the 1962 Judgment. And if that Annex I map has any potential technical
limitations, as alleged in the IBRU Report 40, those are matters that can be raised in connection with
the demarcation of the boundary pursuant to the 2000 MOU. But they are without the slightest
relevance to a case that concerns the interpretation of a Judgment that was delivered, not in 2000,
but in 1962.
(b)Other Maps Relied on by Thailand
75. Now f ollowing the submission of its first pleading, Thailand obviously realized the
shortcomings of the IBRU report, and Thailand scarcely refers to that report in their second set of
pleadings. Instead, Thailand embarked on a new tactic. That tactic consists of relying on a number
of other maps produced by experts during the original proceedings back in 1959 -1961 showing
different versions of the watershed line. Thailand’s aim in revisiting these materials is to argue that
these maps prepared by experts in the original proceedings somehow limit the “area” around the
41
Temple to a very narrow strip of land consistent with the 1962 Thai Council of Ministers map .
38
IBRU Report, WOTh, Ann. 96, para. 9.
39Ibid., para. 7.
40WOTh, p. 286, para. 7.9.
41
FWETh, paras. 4.45-4.63. - 72 -
Now that argument has no merit whatsoever, given that the Court, in its Judgment, clearly indicated
that, in the light of Thailand’s acceptance of the Annex I map showing the frontier, the location of
the watershed was irrelevant.
76. Permit me just to recall briefly the sequence of the Court’s reasoning on this point.
77. First, after indicating that the acceptance by the Parties of the Annex I map caused the
map to enter into the treaty settlement and to become an integral part of it, the Court added:
“In other words, the Parties at that time adopted an interpretation of the treaty
settlement which caused the map line, in so far as it may have departed from the line
of the watershed, to prevail over the relevant clause of the treaty.” ( Temple of Preah
Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p.34.)
78. And second, after noting that when two countries establish a frontier between them, one
of the primary objects is to achieve stability and finality, the Court said the following:
“The Parties in the present case must have had a reason for taking this further
step. Thi s could only have been because they regarded a watershed indication as
insufficient by itself to achieve certainty and finality. It is precisely to achieve this
that delimitations and map lines are resorted to.” (Ibid., p. 34.)
79. And finally, after pr onouncing in favour of the Annex I map line as delimited and
accepted by the Parties, the Court stated the following:
“Given the grounds on which the Court bases its decision, it becomes
unnecessary to consider whether, at Preah Vihear, the line as mapped does in fact
correspond to the true watershed line in this vicinity, or did so correspond in
1904-1908, or, if not, how the watershed line in fact runs.” (Ibid., p. 35.)
80. The plain fact is that not one of the “watershed” maps to which Thailand refers in its
Further Written Explanations here was mentioned in the Court’s Judgment. The watershed lines
they purported to depict did not need to be considered by the Court, and were not so considered,
given the status of the Annex I map. And for Thailand, a s it does in its Further Written
Explanations, to label these materials, and I quote, these watershed materials as “The Material
before the Court in Light of Which It Reached Its Decision”, is fundamentally misleading . These 42
maps are not even referred to in the Judgment.
81. By the same token, Thailand’s argument that the “vicinity” of the Temple considered by
the Court was limited to a small area between the different watershed lines is groundless. Because
if the Court did not consider such maps becaus e they were irrelevant, they cannot possibly be used
4FWETh, p. 41, and paras. 2.14-2.25. - 73 -
by Thailand now to show what the Court meant when it referred to Thailand’s obligation to
withdraw from the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory, in paragraph 2 of the
dispositif.
82. In fact, it is clear from the 1962 Judgment that the geographical focus of the Court was
much broader than the very limited area circumscribed by Thailand on its famous Council of
Ministers map. The Court’s view as to the positions of the Parties was the follo wing: Thailand
asserted that the frontier line ran along the edge of the escarpment to the south and east of the
43 44
Temple , while Cambodia principally relied on the line appearing on the Annex I map .
Logically, it follows that the area lying between these two lines was the disputed area and the
“vicinity” of the Temple to which the Court made reference. And it is that area by the way that
constitutes the famous 4.6 km² area in dispute to which Thailand’s own recent government
publications have referred to.
83. Now t he soundness of this reasoning is confirmed by a further citation from the
Judgment. Following its analysis of the evidence presented to it by the Parties, the Court
concluded that it felt “bound, as a matter of treaty interpretation, to prono unce in favour of the line
[Annex I map] as mapped in the disputed area” (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35; emphasis added). And
from that statement, it is clear that the Court considered that the disputed area to had to encompass
the Annex I map line. And, i n fact, even Thailand’s experts IBRU in these proceedings,
acknowledge: “The evidence before the Court mainly concern the 7 kilometres by 12 kilometres
area mapped by Professor Schermerhorn [one of the experts in the original proceedings] in the
vicinity [there are those words again, in the vicinity] of the Temple, a small part of the roughly
100 kilometres of boundary covered by the Annex I map” (WO Th, Ann. 96, p. 669, para. 61). So
the vicinity and the focus, according to the IBRU Report in the orig inal proceedings, was on this
area of 7 by 12 km, not the small area circumscribed by the 1962 Thai Council of Ministers map.
84. And Thailand’s new arguments in its last round of written pleadings aimed at bolstering
its unilateral interpretation of the Judgment that it arrived at in July 1962 are unsupported given
4Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962 , p. 15.
4Ibid., p. 21. - 74 -
that the Council of Ministers map does not even depict the Annex I map line, let alone the genuine
vicinity of the Temple.
4. Conclusions
85. Mr. President, I come to my conclusions.
86. I think the evidence on record clearly shows that there is a dispute between the Parties
over the meaning or scope of the Judgment. Even, in 1962, Thailand thought that the Judgment
could be interpreted in different ways. That dispute persisted throughout the 1960s. Between 1970
and 2007, it became dormant, first because of the civil war in Cambodia, and then when
Cambodians settled peacefully around the Temple and its vicinity without any protest from
Thailand except for occasional complaints about pollution. The dispute only re -emerged in
2007-2008 as a result of Thailand’s objections to the inscription of the Temple as a World Heritage
Site, and the publication of Thailand’s new “secret” map (L 7017). That map was protested by
Cambodia after these incidents. This led to hostilities in the area, as the Court is aware, and
ultimately to Cambodia’s request for interpretation and the indication of provisional measures.
87. And Thailand’s attempt now to cast aspersions on the Annex I map by “moving beyond
the debate” in the original case, and relying on maps it has either recently discovered, or maps
never introduced in the original case such as its Series L 7017, which Cambodia saw only in 2007
for the first time, all of that is completely irrelevant. Equally irrelevant is Thailand’s attempt to
limit the vicinity of the Temple by resurrecting maps that purported to show different watershed
lines in the original proceedings, but which the Court neither referred to nor considered relevant in
its Judgment.
88. I thank the Court very much for its attention and for the time to complete my pleading
and to compete against lunch, and I would be grateful if perhaps after the lunch break,
Mr. President, the floor could be given to Professor Sorel. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Bundy. Certainly, after the lunch break. The sitting is
closed. The Court will meet this afternoon at 3 o’clock.
The Court rose at 1.20 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Monday 15 April 2013, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Tomka presiding, in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand)