Non corrigé
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CR 2011/8
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2011
Public sitting
held on Thursday 24 March 2011, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2011
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 24 mars 2011, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995
(ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Roucounas
Vukas
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
vceMpra,ident
KoroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crnçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue mes
Djngogshue,
RoMcou.nas
juVeskas, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is represented by:
H.E.Mr.Antonio Miloshoski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,
as Agent;
H.E.Mr.Nikola Dimitrov, Ambassador of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, Un iversity College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,
Mr.Sean D.Murphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University,
Mrs. Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, Professor of Law, University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Mr.Pierre Klein, Professor of International Law, Director of the Centre of International Law,
Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Counsel;
Mr. Saso Georgievski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Toni Deskoski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Igor Djundev, Ambassador, State Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr.GoranStevcevski, State Counsellor, International Law Directorate, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
MsElizabetaGjorgjieva, Minister Plenipoten tiary, Deputy-Head of Mission of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Union,
Ms Aleksandra Miovska, Head of Co-ordination Sector, Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mr. Mile Prangoski, Research Assistant, Cabinet of Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Remi Reichold, Research Assistant, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Assistants; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Antonio Miloshoski, ministre des affaires étrangères de l’ex-R épublique yougoslave de
Macédoine,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Nikola Dimitrov, ambassadeur de l’ ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M.PhilippeSands, Q.C., professeur de droit au Un iversity College de Londres, avocat, Matrix
Chambers, Londres,
M.SeanD.Murphy, professeur de droit à la George Washington University, titulaire de la chaire
de recherche Patricia Roberts Harris,
Mme Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, professeur de droit à l’Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
M.PierreKlein, professeur de droit internationa l, directeur du centre de droit international de
l’Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Mme Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, avocat, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme conseils ;
M. Saso Georgievski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Toni Deskoski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Igor Djundev, ambassadeur, conseiller d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M.GoranStevcevski, conseiller d’Etat au minist ère des affaires étrangè res, direction du droit
international,
Mme Elizabeta Gjorgjieva, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef adjoint de la mission de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine auprès de l’Union européenne,
MmeAleksandraMiovska, chef du département de la coordination au cabinet du ministre des
affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
M. Mile Prangoski, assistant de recherche au cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères,
M. Remi Reichold, assistant de recherche, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme assistants ; - 6 -
Ms Elena Bodeva, Third Secretary, Embassy of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Liaison Officer with the International Court of Justice;
Mr. Ilija Kasaposki, Security Officer of the Foreign Minister. - 7 -
MmeElenaBodeva, troisième secrétaire à l’ ambassade de l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme attaché de liaison auprès de la Cour internationale de Justice ;
M. Ilija Kasaposki, agent chargé de la sécurité du ministre des affaires étrangères. - 8 -
The Government of the Hellenic Republic is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Georges Savvaides, Ambassador of Greece,
MsMariaTelalian, Legal Adviser, Head of the Public International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agents;
MrG. eorgeAbi-Saab, Honorary Professor of In ternational Law, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
member and former Chairman of the Interna tional Law Commission, associate member of the
Institut de droit international,
Mr.MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Senior Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.ArghyriosFatouros, Honorary Professor of International Law, University of Athens, member
of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, University of Athens,
Mr. Evangelos Kofos, former Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specialist on
Balkan affairs,
Csounsel;
Mr.TomGrant, Research Fellow, Lauterpacht Ce ntre for International Law, University of
Cambridge,
Mr.AlexandrosKolliopoulos, Assistant Legal Advi ser, Public International Law Section of the
Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, Assistant Legal Adviser, Public International Law Section of
the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre de droit inte rnational de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Asdvisers;
H.E. Mr. Ioannis Economides, Ambassador of Greece to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
MsAlexandraPapadopoulou, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Greek Liaison Office in
Skopje, - 9 -
Le Gouvernement de la République hellénique est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Georges Savvaides, ambassadeur de Grèce,
MmeMariaTelalian, conseiller juridique, chef de la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agents ;
M.GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire de droit international à l’Institut universitaire des
hautes études internationales de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.AlainPellet, professeur de droit international à l’Université ParisOuest, Nanterre-LaDéfense,
membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de
l’Institut de droit international,
M. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Université de Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S. McDougal, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils principaux et avocats ;
M.Arghyrios Fatouros, professeur honoraire de dr oit international à l’Université nationale
d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international à l’Université nationale d’Athènes,
M. Evangelos Kofos, ancien ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères, spécialiste des
Balkans,
comme conseils ;
M.TomGrant, collaborateur scientifique au La uterpacht Centre for International Law de
l’Université de Cambridge,
M. Alexandros Kolliopoulos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la secti on de droit international public
du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international
public du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
MmeAlinaMiron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseillers ;
S. Exc. M. Ioannis Economides, ambassadeur de Grèce auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Alexandra Papadopoulou, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef du bureau de liaison de la Grèce à
Skopje, - 10 -
Mr. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, First Counsellor, Embassy of Greece in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr.EliasKastanas, Assistant Legal Adviser, P ublic International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Konstantinos Kodellas, Embassy Secretary,
as Diplomatic Advisers;
Mr. Ioannis Korovilas, Embassy attaché,
Mr. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, Embassy attaché,
as Administrative Staff. - 11 -
M. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Grèce au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M.EliasKastanas, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Konstantinos Kodellas, secrétaire d’ambassade,
comme conseillers diplomatiques ;
M. Ioannis Korovilas, attaché d’ambassade,
M. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, attaché d’ambassade,
comme personnel administratif. - 12 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court meets today to hear the
first round of oral arguments of Greece. I shall now give the floor to the first speaker, the Agent of
Greece, Ms Maria Telalian, the Legal Adviser at the Ministry.
Mme TELALIAN :
Introduction
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, avant toute chose, permettez-moi
de m’associer, au nom de mon gouvernement et de la délégation grecque, aux mots de sympathie
de la Cour pour le peuple japonais dans l’épreuve terrible qu’il subit et d’exprimer notre admiration
pour sa dignité et son courage dans l’adversité.
2. Monsieur le président, c’est un grand honneur, pour M .Ambassadeur
GeorgesSavvaides, ainsi que pour moi même, de représenter mon pays aujourd’hui devant votre
Cour, même si nous regrettons vivement les circonstances qui l’y conduisent.
3. Monsieur le président, la Grèce a toujours participé à la vie internationale dans le respect
du droit international et s’est toujours abstenue de faire primer ses intérêts immédiats sur les
engagements contractés ou les règles élémentaires de la bonne foi. Il ne saurait en aller autrement
de la part d’un pays qui a connu lors de son hi stoire l’agression, l’occupation militaire, ainsi que
des tentatives d’amputation de son territoire. Du même coup, elle est profondément attachée au
principe du règlement pacifique des différe nds internationaux comme en témoignent ses
nombreuses comparutions devant votre Cour comme devant la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale, ainsi que sa déclaration au titre de l’ar ticle36, paragraphe2, du Statut de la Cour.
En souscrivant la clause compromissoire figurant à l’article 21 de l’accord intérimaire conclu avec
l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine, la Grèce a de nouveau fa it preuve de sa confiance dans
votre sagesse et dans la justice de vos décisions. Elle se présente devant vous, convaincue que
vous prendrez la juste mesure de cette clause, dans le contexte global de l’accord intérimaire. Nous
sommes également confiants que vous saurez interp réter les autres dispositions pertinentes de
l’accord et les faits qui sont en cause dans le présent différend, sans vous laisser abuser par la
présentation pernicieuse qu’en fait l’Etat demandeur. - 13 -
4. Dans cet esprit, permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de formuler quelques remarques
liminaires, au nom de ma délégation, afin de mi eux cerner le différend dont vous êtes saisis et le
contexte général dans lequel il s’inscrit. Je souhaite, en particulier, insister sur le différend relatif
au nom du demandeur, dont l’importance pour notre pa ys et la région toute entière est cruciale, ce
qui est d’ailleurs reconnu dans la résolution81 7(1993) du Conseil de sécurité. Monsieur le
président, je traiterai d’abord de l’objet du di fférend(A), ensuite de ses enjeux(B), avant de
conclure par un bref aperçu des circonstances dans lesquelles il est né et a évolué (C).
A. L’objet du différend
5. Le demandeur présente cette affaire comme une question d’engagement de la
responsabilité internationale de la Grèce pour violation d’une di sposition conventionnelle précise,
l’article 11, paragraphe 1, de l’accord intérimaire de 1995.
6. L’allégation de l’Etat demandeur selon laquelle la Grèce a violé cette disposition en
s’opposant à son admission à l’OTAN, tout par ticulièrement lors du sommet de Bucarest en
avril2008, repose sur une vision réductrice des fait s, sur une lecture abusivement restrictive de
l’article 11 et sur une déconnexion de celui-ci du reste de l’accord, notamment son article 22.
7. Pour ce qui est des faits, c’est la décision du sommet de l’OTAN à Bucarest, qui a
subordonné l’invitation du demandeur à accéder au tr aité de l’Atlantique Nord à la résolution du
différend relatif au nom de ce pays, et c’est cette décision, et elle seule, qui fait obstacle à son
admission immédiate au sein de l’Alliance. Or,il s’agit d’un acte de l’OTAN adopté par le
consensus de tous ses membres, qui n’est point imputable à la Grèce et dont cette dernière ne
saurait être rendue responsable.
8. Pour ce qui est du droit, je souligne que l’ article 11 contient une clause de sauvegarde en
faveur de la Grèce, sur laquelle le demandeur préfèr e ne pas s’attarder : il résulte clairement de son
libellé que la Grèce peut s’opposer à l’admission ou à la participation de l’Etat demandeur dans une
organisation internationale si celui-ci y est mentionné par une appellation différente de celle prévue
dans la résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité. Or, le fait que l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine ait posé sa candidature à l’OTAN sous son nom contesté, ainsi que sa pratique
constante d’utiliser ce nom dans toutes les organisa tions internationales dont elle est membre au - 14 -
mépris des engagements pris, montrent que les co nditions prévues par la clause de sauvegarde de
l’article 11 sont bien réunies en l’espèce.
9. Au surplus, la Grèce, que ce soit lors du sommet de Bucarest ou avant ce dernier, a agi au
sein de l’Alliance en sa seule qualité d’Etat membre de celle-ci, et était dans l’obligation juridique
de donner son avis sur la question de savoir si les critères posés par l’OTAN pour invite
r un Etat à
accéder au traité, y compris celui des relations de bon voisinage, étaient remplies dans le cas de
l’Etat demandeur. L’article 22 de l’accord intérimaire prévoit d’ailleurs très exactement ce cas de
figure, en réservant les droits et obligations découlant d’autres traités auxquels la Grèce ou
l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine sont parties.
B. L’étendue du différend
10. Monsieur le président, l’agent du dema ndeur a présenté, dans sa plaidoirie orale, le
différend que son pays a choisi de porter devant la Cour, comme une affaire bien circonscrite de
non-respect d’une disposition particulière de l’accord intérimaire, en l’occurrence l’article 11. De
ce fait, il tente de présenter le litige comme s’il pouvait être détaché du différend sur le nom, du
reste des dispositions de l’accord intérimaire, et des autres obligations assumées par les Parties, en
particulier celles qui découlent, pour la Grèce, du traité de l’Atlantique Nord. Cette approche
réductrice vise à occulter le fait que la présente affaire concerne en réalité une décision de
l’Alliance atlantique qui est indissociable du diffé rend sur le nom de l’Etat demandeur, ainsi que
d’une cohorte de violations par l’Etat demandeur touchant tout un éventail d’autres dispositions de
l’accord intérimaire.
11. En premier lieu, Monsieur le président, l’affaire dont l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine a saisi la Cour revient, en réalité, pour l’Etat demandeur, à contester la décision de
l’Alliance adoptée lors du sommet de Bucarest, déci sion imputable à l’OTAN, qui ne participe pas
à cette procédure. Il en résulte que la Cour n’ est pas compétente en l’absence de cette organisation
et, même si elle se reconnaissait compétente, une décision faisant droit aux conclusions du
demandeur ne serait pas susceptible d’applicati on effective, car elle reviendrait à réviser ⎯ ou à
ordonner de réviser ⎯ un acte non de la Grèce, mais de l’Allia nce elle-même. Il est en fait sans - 15 -
précédent dans l’histoire de la Cour qu’un Etat lui demande de s’immiscer à un tel degré dans la vie
interne d’une organisation internationale absente de la procédure contentieuse.
12. En second lieu, cette affaire ne peut être dissociée du différend sur le nom du demandeur,
lequel, on le sait, est exclu de la compétence de la Cour en vertu de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, de
l’accord intérimaire.
13. Le lien inextricable entre l’admission du demandeur à l’OTAN et la solution du différend
sur le nom ressort clairement, tout d’abord, du communiqué du sommet de Bucarest lui-même,
lequel, selon le demandeur, ne serait que le résultat du prétendu comportement illicite de la Grèce.
Or, ce communiqué, dans son passage relatif à l’Etat demandeur, en l’occurrence le paragraphe 20,
prévoit expressément qu’«une invitation serait fa ite à l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine
dès qu’une solution mutuellement acceptable aura été trouvée à la question du nom». De surcroît,
le demandeur lui-même, reconnaît que la raison pour laquelle la Grèce n’aurait pas consenti à son
1
admission à l’OTAN était la non-résolution du différend sur le nom .
14. Le lien entre le différend sur le nom et l’article 11 est également avéré dans la clause de
sauvegarde de cette disposition, laquelle réserve le droit qu’a la Grèce de s’opposer à l’admission
de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine dans une organisation internationale si cet Etat doit y
être mentionné par un nom différent de celui pré vu au paragraphe 2 de la résolution 817 (1993) du
Conseil de sécurité des NationsUnies. Ceci montre que l’article11 lui-même, loin d’être
déconnecté du différend sur le nom comme le préte nd le demandeur, a été conçu pour s’appliquer
pleinement en cas de persistance du différend sur le nom, car c’est uniquement dans ce cas que la
clause de sauvegarde a vocation à s’appliquer.
15. Monsieur le président, bien évidemment la non-résolution du différend sur le nom n’est
pas une fatalité repoussant sine die et à l’infini l’admission du demandeur à l’OTAN. En revanche,
et contrairement à ce que l’agent du demandeur a dit lors de sa plaidoirie orale, c’est en raison de
l’attitude intransigeante de cet Etat que nous en sommes là aujourd’hui. Depuis le début, l’Etat
demandeur a fait traîner les négociations sur le nom, avec pour seul objectif d’imposer l’usage
international du nom contesté, en envisageant comme seule concession la «double formule». Selon
1Voir le paragraphe 20 de la requête introductive d’in stance de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine, et le
paragraphe 4.39 de la réplique. - 16 -
2
les déclarations expresses de ses dirigeants , la trouvaille de la «doubl e formule», consiste dans
l’adoption de son nom contesté pour l’ensemble de ses relations internationales et un autre nom,
négocié, uniquement pour ses relations bilatérales avec la Grèce.
16. [Projection n o1.] Il suffit de renvoyer aux déclarations en ce sens du président de la
République de l’Etat demandeur, M.Crnvenkovski, qui sont projetées sur l’écran. Je cite en
anglais les passages les plus pertinents :
«in the recent years Republic of Macedonia had a strategy... What were the
principles of that concept? First of all, in the negotiations under the UN auspice we
participated actively, but our position was al ways the same and unchanged. And this
was the so called dual formula. That means use of the Republic of Macedonia
constitutional name for the entire world, for all international organizations and in the
bilateral relations with all countries, a nd to find a compromise solution only for the
bilateral relations with the Republic of Gr eece... that position is considered by
everyone including our major supporters and friends, as a position which obstructs or
interrupts the negotiations from our side.» 3
Or, il s’agit là d’une vision des choses qui ne cad re ni avec la résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil de
sécurité, ni avec l’article5 de l’accord intérima ire. En effet, selon cette déclaration, les
négociations sous l’égide des NationsUnies pour le règlement du différend sur le nom sont
dépourvues de toute substance.
17. En fait le demandeur, tout au long de ces années, a essayé de conduire les négociations,
menées sous l’égide du médiateur des Nations Unies, M.Matthew Nimetz, à un point mort en
méprisant l’obligation de négocier de bonne foi, alors que la Grèce s’est montrée flexible, par
exemple en acceptant, en septembre 2007, un nom composite qui pouvait inclure le terme
«Macédoine» accompagné d’une qualification géographique, comme ba se pour une solution
4
mutuellement acceptable . Par contre, l’ex-République yougos lave de Macédoine s’est montrée
2
Voir le discours prononcé par le président de l’ex -République yougoslave de Macédoine le 3 novembre 2008
devant le Parlement de son pays, compte rendu sténographique de la septiè me séance de la vingt-septième session ,
p. 27-7/10-12, contre-mémoire, annexe 104; voir également la déclaration du premier ministre M. Gruevski au cours de
cette même séance du Parlement, ibid., p. 27-7/14 et 27-7/17, contre-mémoire, annexe 104.
3
Discours prononcé par le président de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine le 3 novembre 2008 devant le
Parlement de son pays, compte rendu sténographique de la septième séance de la vingt-septième session, p.27-7/10-11
et 12, contre-mémoire, annexe 104.
4
Voir la lettre du 14 avril 2008 adressée au Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies par le premier
ministre de la Grèce, sous le couvert d’une lettre en date du 15 avril 2008 adressée sous la référence F.4608/434/AS1121
à l’Organisation des NationsUnies par M.John Mourikis, représ entant permanent de la Grè ce auprès de l’Organisation,
contre-mémoire, annexe 9; vo ir également la lettre en date du 14 avril 2008 adresséous la référence F.4608/450/
AS1161, à M.Wang Guangya, représentant permanent de la Chine auprès de l’Organisation des Na tions Unies, par
M. John Mourikis, représentant permanent de la Grèce auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies. La même lettre a été
adressée aux quatorze autres représentants des membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité, contre-mémoire, annexe 54. - 17 -
intransigeante, en insistant sur sa position initiale et en n’acceptant en pratique aucune autre
appellation pour ses relations internationales que son nom contesté.
18. En même temps que le demandeur faisa it traîner les négociations, il développait toute
une stratégie visant à instaurer une situation de fait accompli. A cette fin, il a essayé, que ce soit au
sein des organisations internationales dont il est membre ou dans ses relations bilatérales, de
consolider l’usage de son nom contesté, dans l’objec tif de priver la procédure de médiation de tout
effet utile. De ce fait, et au mépris des obligatio ns qu’il a assumées en vertu des articles 5 et 11 de
l’accord intérimaire, il a tenté d’obtenir en fait ce qu’il ne peut avoir en droit: amener la Grèce
ainsi que les instances des organisations internationales qui ne reconnaissent que le nom prévu dans
la résolution817 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité, à jeter l’éponge et à s’incliner devant une
pseudo-évidence, ayant pour seule origine le co mportement du demandeur, qui est contraire aux
obligations qu’il a assumées dans l’accord intérima ire ainsi qu’à toutes les résolutions d’admission
de celui-ci dans les organisations internationales dont il est membre. Toutefois, la Grèce ne saurait
accepter une pareille tentative: la question du nom ainsi que la propagande irrédentiste de notre
voisin constituent un enjeu majeur pour notre pays, tant les territoires macédoniens grecs ont été
e
l’objet de convoitises lors du XX siècle.
C. Naissance et évolution du différend
19. Monsieur le président, même si la Cour n’est pas ouvertement appelée à trancher la
question du nom de l’Etat demandeur, il nous pa raît indispensable d’exposer brièvement son
origine et son importance pour la Grèce. En fait, les enjeux que celle-ci génère pour la sécurité de
la région ont été au cŒur de la décision de l’OTAN, lors du sommet de Bucarest, de reporter
l’invitation à ce pays pour accéder au traité de l’Atlantique Nord, jusqu’à la résolutionde ce
différend.
20. Monsieur le président, les Balkans ont connu, tout au long de leur histoire, des conflits
sanglants dus à des affrontements ethniques qui r estent gravés dans notre mémoire. Il est donc
évident que la peur de leur recrudescence reste une préoccupation constante. C’est dans cet esprit
que l’accord intérimaire avait comme objectif princi pal de contenir l’irrédentisme manifesté par
l’appropriation par le demandeur du terme géographique «Macédoi ne» ainsi que des symboles de - 18 -
l’histoire grecque y afférente. De cette façon, l’accord intérimaire faisait en sorte que ces éléments
ne soient pas utilisés pour promouvoir les ambiti ons irrédentistes et expansionnistes de
l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine aux dépens de l’héritage historique et culturel de notre
pays, ainsi que de son intégrité territoriale.
21. La région connue comme «Macédoine hist orique» se réfère à l’ancien royaume grec de
Macédoine à l’époque du roiPhilippeII (IV esiècle avant Jésus-Christ). Son fils, Alexandre le
Grand, élève du philosophe Aristote et figure embléma tique de l’histoire de notre pays, a rallié les
cités grecques dans une expéditio n vers l’Orient, qui a été à l’origine d’une nouvelle ère pour
l’antiquité, connue sous le term e de «période hellénistique». Cette «Macédoine historique»
comprenait des territoires qui font aujourd’hui par tie, à environ 90%, de la région macédonienne
grecque.
22. La «Macédoine géographique» telle qu’elle était conçue durant la période ottomane et
surtout à partir de la dernière moitié du XIX e siècle couvrait une étendue plus vaste. Pendant cette
période, les Grecs, les Serbes et les Bulgares se sont disputés cette région, au fur et à mesure que
l’autorité de l’Empire ottoman sur ces territoires présentait des signes grandissants de déclin. C’est
ainsi que la «question macédonienne» a vu le jour. Suite aux guerres balkaniques de 1912-1913 et
à la défaite militaire de l’Empire ottoman, la M acédoine géographique, ainsi que la majeure partie
des possessions européennes de l’Empire, a été cédée, par le traité de Bucarest de 1913, à la Grèce,
la Serbie et la Bulgarie. De tous ces pays , la Grèce a été le premier à utiliser le terme
«Macédoine», dès 1914, pour désigner une large unité administrative de ses nouveaux territoires.
23. Tel n’a été le cas ni de la Serbie ni du Royaume de Yougoslavie. Le territoire de
l’actuelle ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine ne portait pas le nom de «Macédoine» avant la
deuxième guerre mondiale. Ce n’est qu’en 1946 que la portion serbe de la Macédoine
géographique a été nommée la «République populaire de la Macédoine», comme composante de la
République populaire fédérale de Yougoslavie de Tito. En même temps, la Yougoslavie aspirait à
annexer dans la Fédération les territoires macédoniens des pays limitrophes, y compris les
territoires macédoniens grecs. C’est à cette fin qu ’elle a activement soutenu l’insurrection armée
en Grèce qui éclata en 1946. La victoire des forces gouvernementales grecques en 1949, qui a mis - 19 -
un terme à la guerre civile dans not re pays, ainsi que la rupture de Tito avec Staline, ont freiné les
ambitions yougoslaves.
24. Pendant les années qui ont précédé la di ssolution de la Yougos lavie, un nationalisme
slavo-macédonien, prônant l’unification sous un Et at indépendant, de toute la «Macédoine», y
compris ses territoires soi-disant «occupés» par la Grèce ainsi que par d’autres pays limitrophes,
s’est manifesté avec de plus en plus de force da ns cette république. Très légitimement, quand, en
septembre 1991, celle-ci a proclamé son indépendance sous le no m de «Republika Makedonija», la
Grèce a contesté cette tentative de s’approprier le nom de la Macédoine et s’est inquiétée des
ambitions irrédentistes que son usage impliquait. En effet, ce pays ne s’est jamais privé de recourir
à une propagande irrédentiste, que ce soit par le biais de livres d’histoire à l’école cultivant des
sentiments expansionnistes au sein de la jeuness e, par l’appropriation du soleil de Vergina,
symbole de la dynastie macédonienne dans l’An tiquité, qu’il avait même apposé sur son drapeau
national jusqu’en 1995, ou par les déclarations de ses dirigeants.
25. Monsieur le président, le souci principal de la Grèc e est que le terme «Macédoine»
désigne une région géographique beaucoup plus vaste que le territoire de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine. La plus grande partie de cette région est sous la souveraineté de la
Grèce. L’appropriation du terme «Macédoine» par un pays indépendant dont le territoire ne couvre
qu’environ un tiers de cette régi on concourt à engendrer un sentiment d’injustice historique: les
territoires macédoniens des Etats limitrophes et surtout de la Grèce feraient partie inaliénable de
l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine considérée comme leur mère patrie, ce qui implique
qu’ils devraient dans le futur se rattacher à elle.
26. C’est pour cette raison que la Grèce a demandé à ses partenaires de l’Union européenne
de ne pas reconnaître le nouvel Et at sous son nom constitutionnel. Le Conseil européen, soucieux
de préserver la stabilité de la région, a décidé dans sa sagesse, lors du sommet de Lisbonne de
juin1992, de reconnaître cet Etat dans ses frontières existantes mais sous un nom ne comportant
pas le terme «Macédoine». Dans le même or dre d’idées, le Conseil de sécurité, sensible aux
préoccupations légitimes de la Grèce, a recommandé à l’Assemblée générale, par sa résolution 817
(1993), que le nouvel Etat soit admis aux Nations Unies, et soit «désigné provisoirement, à toutes
fins utiles à l’Organisation, sous le nom d’«e x-République yougoslave de Macédoine»…». Puis, - 20 -
par la résolution 845 (1993), il a encouragé la Gr èce et l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine
à continuer leurs efforts, sous les auspices du Secrét aire général, en vue de régler les questions en
suspens entre elles.
27. C’est ainsi que les NationsUnies ont fac ilité les négociations entre les deux pays, pour
régler le différend au sujet du nom, «dans l’inté rêt du maintien de relations pacifiques et de bon
voisinage dans la région», selon les termes de la résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité. Le
Secrétaire général, qui avait été chargé de la médiation, a nommé CyrusVance et lordOwen
comme ses représentants. Ceux-ci ont présenté un projet d’accord couvrant toute la gamme des
points litigieux, dont quelques éléments ont été repris dans l’accord intérimaire conclu en 1995.
28. Cet accord, tout en laissant en suspens la question du nom, aspirait à normaliser les
relations bilatérales. L’Etat demandeur y a assumé des obligations juridiques concrètes et précises,
portant sur l’interdiction de s’immiscer dans les affaires internes de la Grèce, de recourir à une
propagande hostile, d’usurper des symboles histor iques, autant d’actes qui visent à susciter et
encourager des aspirations irrédentistes. Il est évident que toutes ces activités ne s’inscrivent pas
uniquement dans le cadre d’un déba t historique; elles mettent en danger la sécurité et la stabilité
dans la région, ainsi que les relations amicales et de bon voisinage entre les deux pays. C’est
pourquoi elles ont fait l’objet d’une réglementation contraignante par le biais d’un instrument
international, l’accord intérimaire. Dans ce contexte, la Grèce, tout en se montrant flexible lors des
négociations sur le nom, a également adopté une attitude de la main tendue envers son voisin en lui
offrant son assistance, à la fois politique et matérielle, et a même soutenu la perspective européenne
du demandeur ainsi que son statut de pays participant au partenariat pour la paix et au plan d’action
pour l’adhésion (MAP) à l’OTAN. Parallèleme nt la Grèce a soutenu le processus de
développement et la mise en place de structures d’Etat de droit dans ce pays. Celui-ci, par contre, a
adopté ces dernières années et surtout à partir de2006, un ton nationaliste, bloquant toute
perspective de compromis. De surcroît, il a mu ltiplié les provocations, entre autres en accentuant
l’utilisation de symboles de notre patrimoine hist orique et culturel, au mépris des obligations
assumées au titre de l’accord intérimaire. On ne peut donc prétendre, comme l’a fait l’agent de
l’Etat demandeur, que cet accord ait fonctionné sans entraves pendant quinze ans. Ce qui est vrai,
Monsieur le président, est que l’Etat demandeur a tiré un grand bénéfice de l’accord, tout en violant - 21 -
à plusieurs reprises ses engagements envers la Grèce, malgré nos protestations qui s’étalent au long
de ces années, pour lesquelles je me permets de renvoyer aux paragraphes4.73 à4.81 de notre
contre-mémoire ainsi qu’aux paragraphes 7.42 à 7.52 de notre duplique.
29. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, l’attitude attentatoire de l’Etat
demandeur aux règles du bon voisinage et le fque le différend sur le nom perdure par sa faute
affectent la sécurité régionale et sont àigine de la décision adoptée par l’Alliance lors du
sommet de Bucarest. La Grèce se présente donc devant vous avec le confiant espoir que vous
rejetterez les griefs du demandeur. Il reviendra à l’ambassadeur M. Georges Savvaides, agent de la
Grèce, de vous présenter les procédures et les critères de l’OTAN quant à l’admission de nouveaux
Etats membres ainsi que leur application impeccable par l’Alliance dans le cas de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine et de tirer les conclusions qui en découlent pour notre affaire.
30. Je vous remercie Monsieur le président, et je vous prie de bien vouloir donner la parole à
l’ambassadeur Georges Savvaides, en sa qualité d’agent de la Grèce dans la présente affaire.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Ms Maria Telalian, the Agent of Greece, for her statement. I now
invite Ambassador Georges Savvaides, the Agent of Greece, to make his presentation.
SAVr.VAIDES:
T HE NATO MEMBERSHIP PROCESS
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you in
a matter so vital for my country. The honour is the greater in that, though trained as a jurist, my
career has been in the diplomatic service of Greece, often in international organizations and for an
extended time in NATO in various capac ities including that of Ambassador⎯ Permanent
Representative of my country. I approach the Court with all the more awe.
I.T HE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF NATO AS AN A LLIANCE
2. It is my task this afternoon to outline the process by which NATO collectively invites new
members to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, and to show how the character of
NATO as an alliance weighs decisively in that process. - 22 -
3. NATO is an intergovernmental military allia nce based on the North Atlantic Treaty. As a
system of collective defence, its member States agree that they will come to one another’s defence,
should there be an armed attack by an outside party. The North Atlantic Treaty is a closed
multilateral treaty which commits the member States, by the terms of Article3, “separately and
jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid”, to “maintain and develop
5
their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” . The Treaty prescribes that the
Parties “will consult together whenever, in the op inion of any of them, the territorial integrity,
6
political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened” . Under Article5, if an
armed attack has occurred against any member State, it “shall be considered an attack against them
all”, and each party undertakes to assist, “by taking forthwith, individually an d in concert with the
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, in cluding the use of armed force, to restore and
7
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” .
4. Embodied in Article5, the process of collective defence is at the heart of NATO’s
founding treaty. It is a principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect one
another through concerted action. Co llective defence is the raison d’être of the Alliance. It would
have little meaning ⎯ and thus the Alliance would have little meaning ⎯ if complete solidarity
within the Alliance were not maintained. Solidarit y, in turn, entails a close alignment of all the
member States in their foreign and security policy. To ensure that this alignment is preserved,
NATO considers the policies espoused, and actuall y pursued, by every prospective new member,
before it extends an invitation to accede to its Tr eaty. The Alliance must be convinced that the
prospective new member is truly aligned with th e other member States, so that its accession will
enhance, rather than impede, the necessary solidarity of the Alliance.
II.NATO’ S CONSULTATION PROCESS
5. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the requirement of solidarity among NATO member
States is no mere formality. The rules and procedures under which NATO operates are designed
expressly to effectuate its mission as a military allia nce. Its purpose is to guarantee the collective
5North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 3, 34 UNTS 242, 246.
6
Ibid., Art. 4.
7Ibid., Art. 5. - 23 -
defence, security and territorial integrity of its me mbers. As such, it operates under a strict system
of collective decision-making at all its levels. NATO’s decision-making system, in turn, is
predicated on consensus. In order to build con sensus on every single issue there exists one single
methodology, that of the consultation process.
6. Consultation between member States is a key part of the decision-making process in
NATO. Consultation allows the Allies to exch ange views and information prior to reaching
agreement and taking action. The process is conti nuous. It takes place within the North Atlantic
Council ⎯ the NAC ⎯ where “matters concerning the implementation” of the Treaty are
considered 8. It takes place also among the member States communicating with one another at
NATO headquarters and in preparation for Alliance summits. Consultation is a real, thorough,
energetic and compelling function ⎯ I repeat, consultation is a real, thorough, energetic and
compelling function. It is the means by which the Allies put their consensus rule into practice.
III.NATO D ECISION M AKING
7. The principle of consultation and consensu s is embodied concretely in the procedures by
which NATO reaches decisions. In NATO there is no provision for majority voting. When a
“NATO decision” is announced, it is the expression of the collective will of all the members of the
Alliance. Under consensus decision-making, no formal votes are taken. Instead, consultations take
place until a decision acceptable to all is reached. Where there are disagreements between Allies,
efforts will be made to reconcile their differenc es. Once taken, any decision by NATO represents
the common determination of all member States to implement it in full 9.
8. I stress that the rationale of the consensus rule is not to provide each member State with
the power to block organizational decisions. It exists, instead, to instigate mutually agreed
solutions among the member States, satisfactory to all the member States, and thereby ensuring the
solidarity of the Alliance10. “Blocking” or “vetoing” a NATO decision is out of the question: the
Alliance knows no such negative procedure, wh ich would introduce the possibility of dissent
foreign to NATO’s purpose as an integrated military organization.
As provided under Article 9 of the Washington Treaty, 32 UNTS 242.
9
NATO Handbook, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO, 2006, p. 39.
1Ibid., p. 33. - 24 -
IV. T HE NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS
9. I turn to the enlargement process. Decisions on enlargement are of great importance to the
Alliance, and the rationale for th e consensus rule applies with special strength to enlargement
decisions. A central characteristic of NATO enlargement is that, to be invited to accede to the
North Atlantic Treaty, the candidate State must satisfy certain prescribed criteria. In part, these are
set out in the Treaty; in part, they are specified by decisions of the Council and may be refined or
augmented in respect of particular States.
10. Article10 of the Treaty provides as follows: “The Parties may, by unanimous
agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and
to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” As the text of
Article10 makes clear, the member States may inv ite any other State meeting these criteria. But
they will decline an invitation to a candidate State which does not satisfy the criteria specified.
11. The Study on NATO Enlargement, adopted on 3 September 1995 11by the Heads of State
and Government, deals with the question of main taining the effectiveness of the Alliance to
perform its core functions 12. New members must accept the full obligations of the North Atlantic
Treaty. This includes “participation in the consultation process within the Alliance and the
principle of decision making by consensus, which requires a commitment to build consensus within
13
the Alliance on all issues of concern to it” .
12. NATO has thus controlled its membership process in view of its character as a closed
multilateral treaty and an integrated military alliance. NATO does not apply an identical accession
process to every candidate for membership. Inst ead, it sets out individually tailored requirements
in view of the conditions prevailing with respect to a given candidate country.
14
13. At the Washington Summit in April 1999 , NATO launched the Membership Action
Plan(MAP) to assist further countries wishing to join the Alliance. The Action Plan provides
advice, assistance and technical support to aspirant countries. Nine countries, including the former
11
Study on NATO Enlargement, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council,Brussels, 3 Sep. 1995 (published in NATO Handbook Documentation , NATO Office of
Information and Press, 1999, p. 335.
12
Ibid., Chap. 4, paras. 42 et seq.
1Ibid., para. 43.
1Press Release NAC-S (99)64, An Alliance for the 21st Century. Washington Summit Communiqué issued by the
Heads of State and Government in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., 24 Apr. 1999, para. 7. - 25 -
15
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, initially adhered to the Plan . The Plan is not however simply a
check-list for aspirants, and participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership.
Instead the MAP sets the criteria which the aspir ant should fulfil. One such criterion is the
commitment to [PPslide2] “settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes including
16
irredentist claims . . . and to pursue good neighbourly relations” . In short, the MAP,
implementing Article10 of the Treaty, entails an ongoing process of evaluation and engagement.
Decisions to invite candidate States to start accession talks are taken by consensus among NATO
17
members and on a case-by-case basis .
14. Since the end of the Cold War, the Parties have invited 12countries to join NATO. In
1997, the Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to accede. Seven further
States acceded to the Treaty in 2004: Bulgaria, Es tonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia. Albania and Croatia acceded in 2009.
15. The requirement of Article 10 of the Treaty for a unanimous agreement is fulfilled once
all member States notify the Depository of their acceptance of the Accession Protocol. The
Depository ⎯ or the Secretary-General in more recent Accession Protocols ⎯ is then mandated to
communicate to the invited State the invitation to accede.
16. The Study on Enlargement stresses that [PP slide 3]:
“Decisions on enlargement will be for NATO itself... Ultimately Allies will
decide by consensus whether to invite each new member to join according to their
judgment of whether doing so will contribute to security and stability in the North
Atlantic area at the time su ch decision is made... No country outside the Alliance 18
should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process of decisions.”
[PP slide 4]
17. Consistent with the rule of decision-ma king in the Alliance, bilateral agreements of
NATO members with third States of whatever kind are in no way opposable to decision-making in
NATO. If it were otherwise, the treaty practice of a NATO member could destabilize the Alliance
and impede the conduct of its busin ess and a third State could readily obtain unilateral influence
15NATO Handbook, ibid., p. 189.
16
Press Release NAC-S(99)66, Membership Action Plan (MAP), dated 24 Apr. 1999, Chap. I, para. 2 (c).
17NATO Handbook, idem, p. 189.
18NATO Handbook Documentation, idem, p. 339. - 26 -
over collective NATO decisions, in effect exercising the very “droit de regard” which the Alliance
has explicitly excluded.
18. Admission to membership requires multiple affirmative steps by NATO allies. Each step
is performed either by consensus in its initial phases ⎯ for example, preparation for invitation for
accession negotiations as dealt with under the MAP ⎯ or by unanimity at a later stage ⎯ for
example, signature and acceptance of ratifi cation of the Accession Protocol. The Alliance
continues to consider the candidacy until an affirmative decision can be reached.
V. THE A PPLICANT ’S PARTICIPATION IN THE MAP
19. Let me now turn to the Applicant’s participation in the MAP. In 1999, the Applicant
began its participation in the MAP. In the va rious MAP Progress Reports on its candidature, the
Alliance stressed the need for fu ll compliance with the undertakings required for membership in
NATO, including “good neighbourly relations” with all NATO members and the need to resolve
any “outstanding issues”.
20. From the beginning of this process, it was well known that the Applicant’s difference
with Greece over its name was an “outstanding issu e” that would have to be resolved before it
would receive an invitation to accede.
21. In early 1999 Prime Minister Georgievski in a letter sent to the Foreign Minister of
Greece stated that [PP slide 5]:
“the upgrading of our relations with the European Union and NATO aiming at the
integration of my country to both organi zations depends to a large extent on the
support of the Hellenic Republic and the solution of pending issues”.
The Prime Minister continued: “The only exis ting bilateral difference between our countries is
referred to Article5 of the said Accord.” Accordi ngly, at that time when the Applicant began its
participation in the MAP, it understood that the resolution of pending issues, specifically the
difference over the name, was a necessary condition for its integration into NATO. - 27 -
22. The NATO Riga Summit Declaration of 29 November 2006 provided that [PP slide 6]:
“In the Western Balkans Euro-Atlantic Integration, based on solidarity and
democratic values remains necessary for long-term stability... This requires
co-operation in the region, good-neighbourly relations, and working towards mutually
19
acceptable solutions to outstanding issues.”
The Declaration, which was carefully drafted, made it clear that good-neighbourly relations and the
resolution of outstanding issues was a condition for Euro-Atlantic integration.
23. In its Final Communiqué at the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on 7 December 2007, the
North Atlantic Council stated, in relation to the Applicant, that [PPslide7]: “In the Western
Balkans, Euro-Atlantic integration . . . involves... good-neighbourly relations, and mutually
20
acceptable, timely solutions to outstanding issues . . .” .
24. The Applicant should have noticed the inser tion of the word “timely” before the word
“solutions” in the NATO Ministerial Communiqué. This was the last public Ministerial document
to be issued before the NATO Bucharest Summit. It was not a mere coincidence but it served as a
strong warning if the Applicant really wished to be invited for accession negotiations at the
forthcoming NATO summit.
25. The Applicant could have also been under no misapprehension that the “resolution of
outstanding issues” as a condition to join the Allian ce included the resolution of the name issue.
During a joint press conference with Prime MinisterGruevski, the then Secretary General of
NATO Mr. Scheffer referred to the Communiqué as follows [PP slide 8]:
“Euro-Atlantic integration . . . demands and requires good neighbourly relations
and it is crystal clear that there were a lot of pleas around the table to find a solution to
the name issue . . . I would not give you a complete report if I would not say referring
to the communiqué by the way of the NAT O Foreign Ministers last December where
there is this line on good neighbourly relations and the name issue.” 21 [PP slide 9]
19NATO Press Release (2006) 150, Riga Summit Declaration , Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006, para. 28.
20NATO Press Release (2007) 130, Final Communiqué. Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at
NATO Headquarters Brussels, 7 Dec. 2007, para. 14.
21Joint Press Point with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Prime Minister of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Gr uevski, 23 Jan. 2008, available at:
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7381.htm. - 28 -
26. In other words, NATO considered th e resolution of the name issue to be a
“performance-based standard” 22 in the context of good-neighbourliness, which the Applicant
would have to satisfy before bei ng invited to join the Alliance. This was the collective position of
NATO Foreign Ministers at the Brussels meeting on 7December 2007. It was maintained
throughout their consideration of the Applicant’s candidacy.
27. On 23 January 2008, the Permanent Repr esentatives of NATO discussed the most recent
MAP Progress Report with Prime Minister Gruevs ki. The Applicant was given a full opportunity
to present to the North Atlantic Council its progr ess in fulfilling the MAP criteria. Numerous
delegations intervening at that Council meeting ma de reference to the need to resolve the name
issue before the Applicant would be invited to accede.
28. Prime Minister Gruevski, responding to the Ambassadors, admitted the need to resolve
the name issue with Greece. In a Joint Press C onference with the Secretary General of NATO he
declared publicly that: “the main issue that ma ny of the Ambassadors mentioned is potential risks
and the issue that has to be solved is the name issue with Greece where many of them said that it’s
necessary to intensify the discussions” 23.
Thus resolution of the name issue would be a determining factor; moreover, this was a requirement
set forth by NATO as a whole.
VI. T HE B UCHAREST DECISION
29. Let me now turn to the Bucharest decision. On 2-4 April 2008, NATO member States
met in Bucharest. The Applicant would have the Court believe that, by that time, it had fulfilled all
NATO accession criteria and that it was only the intransigent insistence of one NATO member,
based on what the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia dismisses as a “trivial” issue, which
prevented it from receiving an invitation to accede. The Bucharest Summit decision, however, was
clear as to what prevented the Applicant from immediate accession to membership. The Alliance
2Statements of Foreign Minister of Greece Ms Bakoyannis and NATO Secretary General Mr. Scheffer following
their meeting, dated 3 Mar. 2008, available at http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/
en-US/04032008_ALK1539.htm: Counter-Memorial, Ann. 133: “This is a performance-based process.”
2Joint Press Point with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Prime Minister of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Gruevski, 2J2.008, available at: www.nato.int/cps/
en/natolive/opinions_7381.htm - 29 -
at Bucharest applied its own well-known criteri a under its own long-standing procedures. The
NATO decision of 2008 reflected the Allies’ concer n that the continuation of the name issue was
an impediment to good-neighbourly relations in the region; and that, if brought within NATO, that
issue would interfere in the decision-making procedures of the Alliance and jeopardize the
solidarity necessary to its functions as an integrated military organization.
30. NATO’s decision at Bucharest did not close the door to the Applicant’s future
membership. On the contrary, the decision made cl ear that an invitation “will be extended” to the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia once the name issue has been resolved, and there is no
longer any doubt as to the Applicant’s ability to maintain “good neighbourly relations”, in
accordance with the duties of a ll member States and with the operational necessities of the
Alliance.
VII. NATO’ S DECISIONS AFTER B UCHAREST AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE TO
PEACE AND SECURITY
31. Mr.President, since Bucharest, Greece a nd other NATO Allies have continued to work
toward an eventual integration of the Applicant in to the Alliance. At its meeting in Brussels on
3December2008, the North Atlantic Council ag ain discussed the possibility of extending an
24
invitation to it . Paragraph 17 of the Final Communiqué re iterates: “the agreement of Heads of
State and Government at the Bucharest Summit to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been
reached . . .”.
32. This position was restated in the NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration of
4 April 2009 25, and again in the NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration of 20 November 2010.
33. The unchanged wording repeatedly adopted by the Council at its highest level is telling.
The Allies recognize that the difference over the na me and its security-related ramifications would
impede the life of the Alliance, if accession came before a resolution of the difference was
achieved. NATO is clear that an aspiring State must adhere to all Alliance principles, including the
2NATO Press Release (2008) 153, Final Communiqué, meeting of the NortAtlantic Council at the level of
Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 3 Dec. 2008.
2NATO Press Release (2009) 044, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration I ssued by the Head of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 Apr. 2009, para. 22. - 30 -
principle of good-neighbourly relations. The App licant, by indefinitely postponing the resolution
of an important bilateral difference, has failed to demonstrate fealty to the principle.
34. The future of the Applicant in NATO and the necessity of the resolution of the
outstanding difference has been recognized and properly understood since 2008 within the Alliance
and without. For example, as recently as last m onth, the Vice President of the United States and
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, indepe ndently, articulated that the settlement of the
difference is central to further progress in the Applicant’s Euro-Atlantic integration, including
membership in NATO. Vice President Biden said that he hoped: “that Macedonia and Greece
resolve together the longstanding ‘name issue’ so that Macedonia can move forward on seeking
NATO membership and fulfilling its Euro-Atlantic aspirations” 26.
Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon noted [PP slid10] that
Mr.MatthewNimetz, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, “is continuing to meet with the
27
parties to have a mutually agreeable solution of this name issue” .
The Secretary-General further noted that he has been
“urging both government leaders that this name issue should be resolved as soon as
possible, [for] their own national government aspirations and also their agendas to join
the European Union and NATO. There are many important issues, therefore all these
issues should be addressed as soon as possible for peace and stability in the region” . 28
These senior officials have been clear that the name issue is connected inseparably to peace and
stability in the region, and its resolution is the sine qua non of the further progress which the
Applicant seeks. [PP slide 11]
VIII. C ONCLUDING REMARKS
35. To conclude, Mr.President, the NATO Bucharest Summit decision regarding the
deferment of the Applicant invitation to begi n the accession process until a mutually acceptable
solution to the name issue has been reached was a unanimous decision taken by the Allied Heads of
State and Government. In that decision, the Alli es reiterated by consensus that the continuation of
26Readout of the Vice President’s Meet ing with Prime Minister Gruevski ⎯ 16 Feb. 2011:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/16/readout-vice-pres…-
macedonia.
27Secretary-General’s remarks to the press fllowing his briefing of the Security Counci⎯8 Feb. 2011:
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=1719.
28Ibid. - 31 -
the dispute over the name issue was a substantive im pediment to the admission of the Applicant to
NATO. This collective decision of the Alliance was in accordance with th e specific character of
the Washington Treaty as a closed multilateral trea ty and the specific character of NATO as an
integrated military alliance whose primary objectiv e is to enhance and maintain the military and
political security of a particular region, through preparedness and solidarity among its member
States. At the Bucharest Summit NATO’s member States said, collectively, as they had said
29
before, that “a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue” is a basic condition which must be
fulfilled, if the Alliance is to invite the Applicant to assume the full obligations of a NATO member
State.
36. Mr.President, distinguished Members of th e Court, the Applicant attempts to convince
the Court that Greece had given its consent in advance to the Applicant to become a full member of
a closed military Alliance by concluding a bilate ral agreement in 1995, irrespective of intervening
events in the 13 years before Bucharest, irrespective of criteria expressly articulated by the
Alliance, irrespective of the general requirement of solidarity of the Allies, irrespective of the
long-established modes of selection of candidates, irrespective of the modus operandi of NATO for
reaching unanimous and collective agreements. This reflects neither the letter nor the spirit of the
Interim Accord of 1995 ⎯ much less the letter or the spirit of the rules governing admission to
NATO.
37. The reality is that all that Greece did before or during Bucharest was to fulfil its role as a
NATO member in accordance with the principles, provisions and practices of the consultation
process which is the single tool of the Alliance to arrive at collective decisions, decisions which
can be neither preordained nor imposed by third parties.
IX. O UTLINE OF PLEADINGS
38. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, may I conclude my presentation by
briefly outlining the oral pleadings now to be presented on behalf of Greece.
39. First, Professor Georges Abi-Saab will app ear before you to consider the contents and
the overall characteristics of the Interim Accord. He will be followed by
29
Memorial, Ann. 65: Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 Apr. 2008, para. 20. - 32 -
ProfessorMichaelReisman, who will address the ques tion of the jurisdiction of the Court in the
present case. Finally today, Professor Alain Pellet will start with our observations concerning the
admissibility of the Applicant’s request and the judicial function of the Court.
40. Tomorrow morning after ProfessorPellet, Professor JamesCrawford will present our
position in respect of the interpretation of Art11, paragraph1, of the Interim Accord; and
Professor Reisman, in respect of the meaning of Article 22 of the Interim Accord, and its relevance
to Article11. Then, Professor Crawford will address you again, to consid er the application of
Article11, paragraph1, to the facts in the present dispute. ProfessorPellet then will address
breaches by the Applicant of Articles 5 and 11 of the Interim Accord.
41. Tomorrow afternoon, MsTelalian will addr ess breaches by the Applicant of Article6,
paragraph2, and Article7 of the Interim Accord; ProfessorPellet will then set out the legal
consequences which follow from these breaches. He will be the last of our counsel to speak during
the first round of oral arguments by Greece.
42. Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you very much for your attention.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Georges Savvaides, Agent of Greece, for his
statement. Now I give the floor to Professor Georges Abi-Saab to make his presentation.
AMBrI.-SAAB:
T HE INTERIM A CCORD
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it a great honour and privilege for me to appear
before you once again to present the Hellenic Republic’s views in the presencase, and more
particularly as concerns the Interim Accordconcluded between Greece and the Applicant on
13 September 1995; an agreement that largely governs the dispute before you. - 33 -
The road to the Interim Accord
2. The Applicant portrays a dispute before you as being exclusively limited to the
interpretation and implementation of Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord.
However, this text cannot be properly interpre ted in clinical isolation, that is in total
detachment from its immediate context, which is the other provisions of the Interim Accord and
related instruments, as well as the larger context that surrounded its conclusion.
3. MsTelalian, the Agent of the Hellenic Re public, has explained in some length, in her
introductory remarks, the importance and real dimensions of the name issue to Greece.
I would like to relate briefly what she said to the circumstances that led to the conclusion of
the Interim Accord, which would shed light on th e object and purpose of that agreement and the
legal functions the Parties expected it to perform.
4. First of all, one has to recall that most of the historical and geographic Macedonia lies
within the present Greek boundaries and constitutes a sizeable part of Greece’s national territory;
its inhabitants being an important component of the Greek national community; and that the
historic and cultural heritage and symbols of Macedonia form an essential part of Greece’s historic
and cultural patrimony and defining elements of its national identity.
5. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the emergence of the Applicant as an independent
State, in September 1991, was fraught with strong irredentist tendencies and pretentions, which
were expressed, not only by words and deeds both on the official and the popular levels, but went
as far as being enshrined in its own constitution an d its flag. These pretentions were epitomized in
the name that the Applicant chose for itself.
6. In these circumstances, it was natural for Greece to feel alarmed by these irredentist
tendencies and pretentions, and to seek effective guarantees of their termination and
non-recurrence, before recognizing the Applicant in its new status and establishing normal
diplomatic and good-neighbourly relations with it. The first and foremost such guarantee was for
the new State to have a name that does not convey on its face the pretention of englobing the whole
geographic and historical Macedonia. - 34 -
7. These concerns were clearly expressed in the letter of the Permanent Representative of
Greece to the President of the Security Council on the eve of the adoption of resolution817 on
7 April 1993.
8. In his letter, the Greek Permanent Representative wrote:
“My Government considers the three main elements of the resolution, namely
the settlement of the difference over the name of the Applicant State, the adoption of
appropriate confidence-building measures and the procedure for admitting the new
State to the UN under a provisional name, an integral and indivisible package which
alone can resolve the outstanding difference between Greece and the new Republic.”
(Rejoinder, Ann. 59.)
9. Security Council resolution817 addressed th ese concerns. Thus, while recognizing that
the “dispute... over the name of the State... needs to be resolved in the interest of the
maintenance of peaceful and good neighbourly relations in the region”, it urged the Parties to
continue co-operating with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International
Conference of the former Yugoslavia, Mr.Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen; and directed the
Secretary-General to report to it on the results of their efforts.
10. Just over a month later, Mr. Vance and Lord Owen submitted to the Parties a draft treaty
which would have settled the dispute between them by resolving the name issue, but the two
Parties rejected the proposed name.
11. Thereafter, the United Nations Secretar y-General, pursuant to Security Council
resolution845(1993), appointed Mr.Vance as his Special Representative, who continued his
intermediation for another two years before the Parties finally reached an agreement on the Interim
Accord.
The structure and functions of the Interim Accord
12. This brings me to the structure and functions of the Interim Accord.
In the absence still of an agreement between the Parties on the name, the Interim Accord’s
more modest purpose was to bring them to agree at least on a strategy for the resolution of this
issue, while providing a provisional formula that allows, in the meantime, for normalization of their
relations to the extent possible in these circumst ances, until a mutually acceptable final solution to
the name issue is reached. - 35 -
13. Accordingly, the provisions of the Interim Accord fall, from a substantive point of view,
into three categories, which I shall review very briefly.
14. The first category consists of provisions concerning the obligation to settle and the
modalities of settling the dispute over the name: these are mainly Article 5 (1), which imposes on
the Parties a positive obligation to continue negotiating under the auspices of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, with a view to reaching a final agreement to the name issue. And whilst it is
an obligation of “means” or “best efforts” ⎯ une obligation de moyen ⎯ it is a “hard” obligation.
An obligation to engage in good faith in “meaningf ul negotiations” as defined by this Court in the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
15. This category of provisions also includes the exception, at the end of Article 21 (2), that
establishes the jurisdiction of the Court over disputes on the interpretation or implementation of the
Interim Accord, which reads, “except for the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1”. This
exception highlights the exclusive character of the procedure provided for in Article 5(1) for the
settlement of the dispute over the name; excluding even its judicial settlement by this august
Court ⎯ whether directly or indirectly ⎯; and a fortiori by unilateral acts or conduct, in order to
create a fait accompli, pre-empting the outcome of any meaningful negotiations.
16. The second category of provisions, are those relating to the normalization of the relations
between the two Parties to the extent possible, given the persistence of the difference over the
name. These provisions are taken almost literally from the Vance-Owen draft, and cover a wide
range of subjects, including confidence-buildin g measures and assurances, given the tensions
between the Parties. Some of these provisions are of a general nature, whilst others are specially
geared to the particular circumstances of the situation.
17. Thus, by Article1, Greece recognizes the Applicant, under the acronym FYROM or
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Parties undertake to establish diplomatic
representations.
18. Articles2 to 4 confirm the existing bou ndary between the Par ties as enduring and
inviolable, and express their respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political integrity of
each other, as well as their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force, or the assertion of
any claims to change the frontier, or claims to any part of the territory of the other. In the same - 36 -
vein, Article 9, paragraph2 states that no provisi on in the relevant human rights instruments shall
be interpreted as giving a right to take any action contrary to the aims and principles of the United
Nations Charter, including the principle of territorial integrity of States.
These are in fact restatements of obligations under general international law, addressed to the
particular concerns of the Parties, more par ticularly those of Greece, about irredentism and
intervention.
19. Other provisions contain assurances related to the particular circumstances of the
situation. Thus, Article6 is a declaration by the FYROM that nothing in its constitution, and in
particular the Preamble and Article3, as we ll as Article49 as amended, can or should be
interpreted as laying claim on territories beyond its existing borders; or as constituting a base for
the FYROM to intervene in the internal affairs of another State to protect persons who are not
citizens of the FYROM; and that this interpreta tion of the constitution in the Interim Accord will
not be superseded by any other.
20. Article 7, also of special importance to Greece, bears, in its first paragraph, the obligation
of the Parties to prohibit hostile activities and propaganda by State-controlled agencies and to
discourage acts of incitement to violence, hatred or hostility by private entities. The second
paragraph of this Article bears a prohibition for the FYROM “to use in any way the symbol that
was” displayed in its national flag prior to the entry into force of the interim agreement, which is in
fact the Sun of Vergina. Finally, the third paragraph of Article7 institutes a proceeding for
handling claims of violations of the preceding paragraph, i.e., clai ms that “one or more symbols
constituting part of its historic or cultural patrimo ny is being used by the other Party”. But this
procedure is limited to these claims only under Artic le 7 and does not concern claims of violations
under any other provisions of the Interim Accord.
21. Finally, in this sub-category of special assurances, the Parties undertake, in Article 8, not
to impede the movement of people or goods between their territories or through their territory to
the territory of the other Party. This is a cr ucial guarantee given by Greece to the FYROM, which
is a land-locked State. - 37 -
22. The third category of provisions of the Interim Accord are those which are “provisional”,
in the sense that they are contingent on the resolution of the name issue.
23 These are: Article1, paragraph1, the recognition by Greece of the FYROM under this
acronym; Article23, paragraph2 concerning the duration of the Accord, “until superseded by a
definitive agreement”. But foremost among these provisional Articles are Articles 5, paragraph 2,
and 11, paragraph 1 which is at the heart of the present case.
24 These two provisions provide the formula that allows relations between the Parties to take
place in spite of the persistence of the diffe rence over the name, through the device of the
provisional designation or name, by regulating its use both in the purely inter-se bilateral relations,
i.e., Article 5, paragraph 2 or in multilateral settings, i.e., Article 11, paragraph 1.
It is particularly through these two Articles that the Interim Accord functions as a modus
vivendi, a provisional arrangement serving as a stop-gap, and at the same time, as a “holding
operation” preserving the positions and interests of the Parties in the state in which they were at the
time of the adoption of the Interim Accord, until th e dispute is definitively resolved through the
exclusive procedures provided for in that Accord itself.
25. This protective function of the interests and positions of the Parties is exercised,
however, in different ways depending on the setting. In the exclusively inter-se relations of the
Parties, pursuant to Article5, paragraph2 a nd the two complementary Memoranda which were
negotiated a month or so later, each Party agreed to refer to the Applicant by the name of its choice
within its territorial jurisdiction and diplomatic premisses; but the other Party, beyond these limits,
or when he is at the receiving end of communications, can revert to the other name. By contrast, in
the purely multilateral settings, the preservation of th e position of the Parties operates through the
exclusive use of the provisional name in these settings , as is clear from the comparison of the texts
of Article5, paragraph2 and 11, paragraph1. This is why the analogy that counsel of the
Applicant draws from Article5, paragraph2 to ju stify the use by the Applicant of its preferred
name in international organizations, is patently wrong.
26. These three categories of provisions, though fulfilling different functions, are all
intimately linked together as part of a single legal transaction, conveying an integrated legal
strategy. - 38 -
27. This strategy can be described as follows ⎯ it is a little bit complicated: that through the
use of the device of provisional name, to normalize the relations between the Parties to the extent
possible, given the persistence of the difference over the name; this being a means of buying time,
while waiting for the obligation that the Parties undertook to negotiate in good faith, to be fully
discharged, leading to an agreed solution over the name that is satisfactory to both Parties.
28. In order to fully implement this strategy, which thus reflects the object and purpose of
the agreement, it becomes clear that the Accord had to fulfil simultaneously three functions:
29. First, a modus vivendi function, as a temporary or pr ovisional arrangement, bridging a
time-gap in the regulation of the controverted s ubject-matter between the Parties; and this by
papering over it through the device of provisional na me or denomination, allowing for relations
between them to take place, to the extent possibl e before, and in the wait for a final settlement of
the issue, through the exclusive procedure provided by the Interim Accord.
This characterization particularly applies to the third category of provisions of the Interim
Accord ⎯ I just described those contingent on the resolu tion of the name issue. But in a way, all
of the Interim Accord is provisional as, pursuant to Article 23 (2), its whole existence is contingent
on reaching a final solution to the name issue.
Mr.President, characterizing the Interim Accord as a modus vivendi does not mean ⎯ and
Greece has already written that in the Counter-Memorial ⎯ that it is less binding or not subject to
the law of treaties, as my good friend Professor Sands contended and repeatedly said so, that we are
saying that it is not subject to the law of treati es or exempt from the application of the law of
treaties. On the contrary, as a modus vivendi the Interim Accord has to preserve and protect the
delicate balance between all the rights, obligati ons and positions of the Parties throughout the
interim period; rather than sanctuarizing one obligation and immunizing it from the consequences
of circumventing and flouting the rest of the Interim Accord, and thus perturbing the balance of the
whole legal transaction, as the FYROM has been doing all the time.
30. I come now to the second function that the Interim Accord is to fulfil, and this is the
settlement of disputes ’ function, through the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to Article5(1) to
engage in good-faith and meaningful negotiations as defined by the Court, with a view to reaching
a final and mutually satisfactory agreement on the name issue. - 39 -
31. Finally, there is the protective or holding operation function, that underlies and sustains
the two others. This is because for the modus vivendi to be able to sustain a significant degree of
normalization in the relations between the Parties notwithstanding and before the settlement of the
controverted subject-matter between them, and to buy time for the dispute settlement function to
produce its expected effect, it has to be “without prejudice” to the position of the Parties over that
controverted subject-matter. In other words, it has to ensure that normalization does not undermine
the possibilities of reaching a negotiated settlement or work itself out ⎯ or facilitate action ⎯ in
favour of the position of one party to the detriment of the other.
32. Whence, the protective function of such a provisional arrangement ⎯ partaking of the
same rationale as the interim measures of protection or more expressively in French “les mesures
conservatoires”, because they conserve ⎯ which is to maintain or preserve the subject-matter of
the dispute in the state in which it was at the time of the adoption of the arrangement or measure, so
that it neither evolves through accretion of practi ce, nor is deliberately changed through unilateral
action or otherwise in favour of one party or the other; particularly under the guise of saying we
are implementing the provisional arrangement; and this until the final settlement of the controversy
is reached.
33. These three functions of the Interim Accord are highly interdependent. Particularly, the
“holding operation” or “protective” function, is a sine qua non and a condition precedent, for the
proper performance of the other two functions.
34. This functional analysis of the Interim Accord is very relevant to its interpretation. It
sheds light on the close inter-connection between its various provisions in spite of their different
functions within the agreement, and hence inform s their interpretation. But this conclusion is
strongly contested by the Applicant, which brings me to the FYROM’s method of interpreting the
Interim Accord.
Mr. President, Members of the Court.
The PRESIDENT: Mr.George Abi-Saab, I think that it is about the time when we should
have a short coffee break. As you are still conti nuing, I think there is a sizeable amount of time
that you would need for your presentation. If that is acceptable to your side ? - 40 -
Mr. ABI-SAAB: I am in the middle, and this is a good way of stopping. And I would also
appreciate a cup of coffee. Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: The Court adjourns for 10 minutes, until a quarter to five.
The Court adjourned from 4.35 to 4.50 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Now the Court resumes its session and I invite
Professor Georges Abi-Saab to continue his presentation.
Mr. ABI-SAAB:
The FYROM’s method of interpreting the Interim Accord
35. Thank you, Mr.President. I was going to speak about the FYROM’s method of
interpretation. In its efforts to represent Gr eece’s obligation under Article11, paragraph1, as
“absolute” and totally isolated from the rest of the Interim Accord, the FYROM follows a method
of interpretation radically at variance from the genera l rule of interpretation codified in Article 31,
paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention.
36. First, in the textual interpretation of Gre ece’s obligation “not to object” under the first
clause of that paragraph, it adopts a very extensive approach that it then abandons completely for a
very restrictive one when it comes to the inte rpretation of the suspensive condition of that
obligation, prescribed in the second clause of the same sentence. But that is a subject which will be
treated at length by my colleague Professor Crawford.
37. Secondly, it insists on interpreting the obligation not to object and the provision
prescribing it, in total isolation from the rest of the treaty, purporting to disconnect it from its
immediate context, which is the other provisions of the treaty; in other words jumping over the
context consisting of the terms of the treaty itsel f, to land on its own truncated rendering of the
object and purpose of the Interim Accord.
38. Finally, and for the same reasons, the FYROM strongly attacks Greece’s characterization
of the Interim Accord as a synallagmatic agreement. But first, I turn to the object and purpose of
the Interim Accord. - 41 -
The object and purpose of the Interim Accord
39. To start with a preliminary remark, I seem to have heard someone from the other side, on
Monday or Tuesday, speak of the “object and purpo se” of Article 11 (CR 2011/6, p. 27, para. 20),
which would be a legal aberration. For a single provision, we can speak of its function or effet utile
within the treaty, but not of the object and purpose which belong to the treaty as a whole, providing
its diverse provisions with a common sense of direction and informing their coherent interpretation.
But this goes down well with the FYROM’s strategy of “carving out” ⎯ I am borrowing the
term from Professor Murphy ⎯ carving out Article11(1) from the Interim Accord and
sanctuarizing it from being infected by the fate of the other provisions, a strategy I will come back
to later on.
40. Thus, according to the FYROM, the object and purpose of the Interim Accord as a whole
was “to find a way to allow for pragmatic coopera tion bilaterally and multilaterally on an interim
basis” (Reply, para. 4.63); as if the sole purpose of the Interim Accord was to enable the FYROM
to obtain recognition and co-operation from Greece a nd clear access to international organizations,
with nothing given in return.
In fact, ProfessorSands on Tuesday used almo st the same terms when he said that the
Interim Accord “was intended to provide for th e immediate normalization of relations between the
two Parties, and to allow the Applicant to join international organizations” (CR 2011/6, p. 53,
para. 11. Cf. CR 2011/5, p. 30, para. 14; p. 32, para. 32; Prof. Murphy, CR 2011/6, p. 22, para. 6).
41. Elsewhere, in the Reply, the FYROM writes:
“The whole point of the Interim Agreement was to create certain rights and
obligations of the Parties that would ope rate even in the absence of a negotiated
settlement of the difference over the name.” (Reply, para. 4.2.)
Again, this formulation suggests that the In terim Accord is based on the premise that, in
order to be able to operate, it must neutralize, that is, set aside, the question of reaching “a
negotiated settlement of the difference over the name”; or, in other words, that this question lies
outside the ambit and the concerns of the Interim Accord. But as we have seen, the very text of the
agreement clearly shows, on the contrary, that the future negotiated settlement lies at the heart of
the concerns of the Interim Accord and constitutes one of its main functions. - 42 -
42. Far from being an accurate description of the object and purpose of the Interim Accord,
these formulations by the FYROM are truncated renderings of the objectives of the agreement,
limiting them to the benefits the FYROM expected to draw from it, while ignoring the benefits, in
terms of commitments and obligations, it had to concede in exchange, to make the legal transaction
acceptable to Greece.
43. For the FYROM, what counted most was to obtain recognition and the normalization of
its relations with Greece, both bilaterally ⎯ Greece being its biggest neighbour and, as a
land-locked State, its bridge to the sea ⎯ and multilaterally, in order to facilitate its access to
international and regional organizations and institutions.
44. For Greece, what counted most, was to secu re the abandonment by the FYROM of its
irredentist tendencies and pretentions, not only by formal statem ents in the treaty ⎯ concerning
territorial integrity, hostile propaganda, the appropriation of national symbols, etc. ⎯ but first and
foremost by guaranteeing in the treaty itself that a satisfactory agreement would be reached over
the name; that name would stop serving as a beac on beaming continuously the same irredentist
ambitions; and this through meaningful good faith negotiations.
45. It was thus essential to accommodate simultaneously these concerns and interests: the
normalization of relations sought by the FYROM through the modus vivendi function, and the
negotiated final settlement sought by Greece th rough the dispute settlement function; both
functions being guaranteed by the “holding operati on” or “protection function”, barring the way in
the interim to unilateral action and fait accompli.
46. These three functions constitute together the object and purpose of the Interim Accord,
not only the first, as contended by the FYROM. And it is their combination that made the
conclusion of the Interim Accord possible, and also explains its synallagmatic character.
The synallagmatic character of the Interim Accord
47. I had alluded briefly before to the questi on of synallagmatic character, a characterization
which the FYROM strongly attacks.
It first attacked the concept itself by describing it sarcastically ⎯ together with “holding
operation” ⎯ as a “talismanic characterization”. - 43 -
Yet, this is an elementary classification know n in all legal systems. It simply designates
agreements by which parties exchange commitments and considerations; by contrast to “unilateral
contracts”, by which one party only assumes an obligation towards the other. In other words, these
are agreements based on reciprocity and, as we all know, reciprocity is at the basis of the law of
contracts and the law of treaties.
48. In a course given in the Academy in 2002, my former colleague Hugh Thirlway, who is
very well-known in this Court, explains the municipal law origins of the concept as follow:
“In national systems of law, a legal obligation of non-delictual nature normally
arises from a synallagmatic contract. In English law, the general rule is that a
contractual obligation is not recogni zed as enforceable in the absence of a
‘consideration’, that is to say what the International Court refers to as a ‘ quid pro
quo’... French law arrives at a very similar position by a different route: every
contractual obligation must have a ‘ cause’, and in a synallagmatic contract, the
obligation of each party is the cause of the obligation of the other.” (H. Thirlway,
“Concepts, Principles, Rules and Analogies: International and Municipal Legal
Reasoning”, in RCADI, Vol. 294, 2002, p. 340).]
Very simple notions.
49. Unable to undermine the concept, the FYROM uses a whole range of arguments to go
around it, starting by denying the synallagmatic character of the Interim Accord. It then retreats to
claiming that Article11, paragra ph1, is a self-contained régime ⎯ or what can be called a
self-contained régime ⎯ that does not allow for the suspensi on of Greece’s obligations “not to
object”, except in the unique contingency provided for in the second clause of this provision, which
is that “if and to the extent [the Applicant] is to be referred to … differently than” as FYROM. We
heard the same on Monday and Tuesday from both Professors Sands and Murphy. And if I can
borrow again from Professor Murp hy, the Applicant thus neatly “carves out” Article11(1) ⎯
“out” of the Interim Accord, thus immunizing it from all other possible grounds of stay of
execution, suspension or termination under the law of treaties or general international law that may
attain or originate from the rest of the Interim Accord.
50. Finally, the FYROM argues that the obliga tions allegedly violated by the FYROM are
not synallagmatic, or are “unconnected to each other” (Reply, para. 5.52) or not directly linked as
“quid pro quo” (Reply, para. 5.81). Elsewhere, the argument is more explicit, and I quote from the
Reply: - 44 -
“While the Interim Agreement as a whole obviously imposes obligations on
both Parties in different ways, in no sense are these obligations ‘synallagmatic’, if by
that it is meant that the obligation is de pendent upon the other Party’s fulfilling of
some other obligation.” (Reply, para. 4.74.)
However, in a footnote at the end of this st atement, the Applicant qualifies it as follows ⎯ I quote
again:
“Of course, if one Party were to co mmit material breach of a provision, the
other Party might be able to suspend or terminate its obligations under that or a
different provision, provided relevant steps are taken under the law of treaties...”
(Reply, p. 116, para. 4.74, footnote 255.)
51. First, two remarks on this footnote. The first is that it confuses substantive grounds
justifying a claim of suspension or termination and the procedure to be followed to prosecute such
a claim. A substantive ground either exists or it does not exist, regardless whether the claim is
prosecuted or not. And if by “relevant steps” is meant the prior notification requirement by
Article65(1) of the Vienna Convention, and as my colleague Professor Pellet will demonstrate
later on, this is not required when the claim is put forward as a defence or a shield, pursuant to
Article 65, paragraph 5, of the sa me Vienna Convention. A point we have already raised twice in
our written pleadings, and which also takes car e of all the noise the Applicant makes about ex post
facto protests, but which it chose to ignore ⎯ not to say anything about it.
Secondly, and more importantly, the foot note constitutes a clear admission of the
synallagmatic character of the agreement. For what can be the legal basis and rationale, in case
“one party were to commit material breach of a provision”, for the claim of the other party “to
suspend or terminate its obligations under that or a different provision” of the treaty; what can be
the rationale if not reciprocal interdependence and community of destiny of these obligations and
the provisions from which they flow, in sum, the synallagmatic character of the agreement?
52. However, the most serious legal flaw in this whole line of argument by the FYROM, that
the obligations allegedly violated by it are not “synallagmatic”, is precisely that it uses this
characterization as if it were the description of a particular right, obligation or commitment; that
which is legally and conceptually wrong.
53. This is because what is synallagmatic is the agreement itself as such or as a whole, and
not the individualized rights and obligations that flow from its provisions. And what makes it
synallagmatic is not that the rights and obligations it establishes and the provisions from which - 45 -
they flow, are explicitly related by their own terms, or refer to each other. It is rather the fact that
the agreement constitutes a legal act or a transaction, a negotium by which each party assumes its
bundle of commitments or obligations , which constitutes the quid, in exchange for the
commitments assumed by the other party, the quo. For each party, the bundle of commitments it
receives by the operation of the agreement constitu tes the “cause” or the “consideration”, in the
technical sense, of the commitments and obligatio ns it assumes by virtue of the same obligation
towards the other party.
54. What ties the two bundles together is the legal transaction itself that confers legal
sanction on the exchange of considerations and establishes a community of legal destiny between
the components of the two bundles. Thus, the violation of a significant obligation, in the bundle
assumed by one party, leads to the frustration of the legal transaction as a whole, and cannot but
affect, by feed-back as it were, the commitments assumed by the aggrieved party vis-à-vis the party
responsible for the violation.
55. The Interim Accord provides a clear example of such legal transaction, whereby Greece
recognized the FYROM and accepted to establish diplomatic relations with it, in spite of the
persistence of the dispute over the name, and unde rtook to guarantee the freedom of movement of
persons and goods, as well as “not to object” to the admission of the FYROM in international
organizations, as long as it is referred to therein, for all purposes, under the provisional name.
These are substantial concessions offered by Greece to the FYROM.
56. The FYROM, on its part, undertook to ch ange its flag, renounce irredentist claims,
repress all related activities. But above all, it unde rtook to negotiate in good faith with a view to
reaching a final solution to the name issue. Th ese were concessions that the FYROM agreed to
make to Greece in exchange of the ones it received.
57. The Interim Accord, while purporting to satisfy these legal interests through its modus
vivendi function for normalization, and its dispute settlement function for the meaningful good faith
negotiations, had to guarantee their simultaneous and stable performance through its third
“protective” function of “holding operation”, or interim measure of protection. This function was
thus meant to keep the name issue in suspense, not so much in the inter-State relations between the
Parties, where each was allowed, pursuant to Artic le5, paragraph2, to maintain its position until - 46 -
reaching agreement, but on the multilateral level, by the exclusive use of the provisional name or
designation until reaching, through “meaningful negotiations”, a mutually satisfactory solution.
58 That was the balance struck by Article11 (1) of the Interim Accord, and the condition
under which Greece accepted that Accord and the oblig ations that came with it. And it was that
balance that the Interim Accord had to keep and guarantee until a final agreement on the name
issue is reached.
59. The attempt to use the Interim Accord, and more particularly Article 11 (1), as a shield,
behind which to subvert that balance, destroys th e very object and purpose of the Interim Accord.
And, as my colleagues will show, this is exactly what the FYROM has been trying to do all along,
through the flouting and systematic violation of the diverse articles of the Interim Accord,
particularly Article5, paragraph1 and even the second clause of Article11(1) itself, while
claiming that the obligation of Greece under the first clause of that same Ar ticleis absolute and
totally detached from the fate of the rest.
I thank you, Mr. President and Members of the Court and, if I may, ask you to call on my
colleague, Professor Reisman.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorGeorgeAbi-Saab for his statement. Now I invite
Professor Michael Reisman to give his statement.
RMEr. MAN:
J URISDICTION
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you on behalf of
Greece. I have the privilege of explaining why the claim which the Applicant has submitted falls
outside the jurisdictional régime of the Interim Accord. Charged with analysing objections to
jurisdiction, I will assume that Greece did object to Applicant’s petition for membership in NATO.
This is not an admission, but an assumption for purposes of analysis.
2. Two preliminary but related observations: first, counsel have suggested that had Greece
been serious about its objections, it would have insisted on a separate, preliminary phase.
Mr.President, Greece is entirely serious that this case is without jurisdiction and is inadmissible. - 47 -
The decision to forego a separate phase was strategic. By not seeking a bifurcated procedure, with
a separate, preliminary phase dedicated only to ju risdiction, neither Greece nor the Court is
precluded from examining any part of the substan tive record that could illuminate issues of
jurisdiction and admissibility.
3. Second, and related to the previous observation, opposing agent and counsel have insisted,
on more than one occasion, that this is a simple case. It is not a simple case. It is complex, as
should be clear merely by looking at the jurisdicti onal clause, a provision which refers obliquely to
an exception which is supposedly expressed in anot her provision which, rather than explaining the
exception, refers, in turn, to a Security Counc il resolution,which itself was the outcome of a
complex political process. Not simple.
The jurisdictional clause
4. I turn to the jurisdictional clause which is found in Article 21, paragraph 2. [Slide 2]
“Any difference or dispute that arises between the Parties concerning the
interpretation or implementation of this Inte rim Accord may be submitted by either of
them to the International Court of Justice, except for the difference referred to in
Article 5, paragraph 1.”
5. It is that last emphasized phrase, [slide 3] “except for the difference referred to in
Article 5, paragraph 1” that is the starting-point of jurisdictional analysis. The “except for” phrase
refers to Article 5 but when we turn to it, we find another allusion [slide 4]
“The Parties agree to continue negotiations under the auspices of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council
resolution845(1993) with a view to re aching agreement on the difference described
in that resolution and in Security Council resolution 817 (1993).”
6. Allusion again. Article 5, rather than de fining the “difference” which is excluded by the
“except for” phrase, effects a renvoi to Security Coun cil resolutions 817 and 845. [Slide 5] In the
third considerandum of resolution817, the Counc il, before prescribing the condition under which
the Applicant’s bid for membersh ip in the United Nations was to be forwarded to the General
Assembly, notes [slide 6] “that a difference has arisen over the name of the State which needs to be
resolved in the interest of th e maintenance of peaceful and go od-neighbourly relations in the
region”. That difference is to be negotiated but pending settlement of the difference over the name,
the Security Council, in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 817, [slide 7] - 48 -
“ Recommends to the General Assembly that the State whose application is
contained in document S/25147 be admitted to membership in the United Nations, this
State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pe nding settlement of the difference that
has arisen over the name.”
[Slide 8] So, Mr. President, this supposedly “simple” clause requires a virtual odyssey to other
parts of the treaty and, beyond it, to a resolution of the Security Council. The construction of this
“simple” clause must take account, not only of the la w of treaties but also the constitutional law of
the United Nations.
7. Before I turn to those interpretations, I ask you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, to
reflect on the threshold question: the trigger for the operation of the “except for” phrase. On
Monday, Professor Klein argued for a contradictory approach: interpret half the clause broadly, the
other half narrowly, rather than, as the Court has said, avoid both extensive and restrictive readings
of jurisdictional clauses and interpret them corr ectly. The contradictory approach proposed by
ProfessorKlein is not what the Applicant had said ear lier. In its Application [slide 9] in2008, it
stated:
“Upon the filing of the present Application, any matters in dispute between the
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of Article 11 of the Interim Accord
of 1995 are plainly subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. [Slide 10] The
subject of the dispute does not concern ⎯ either directly or indirectly ⎯ the difference
referred to in Article5, paragraph1 of the Interim Accord and, accordingly, the
exception to jurisdiction provided for in Article 21, paragraph 2, . . . does not apply.”
Consider those words. “[T]he subject of the dispute does not concern ⎯ either directly or
indirectly ⎯ the difference referred to in Article5.” On Monday, Professor Klein attributed those
30
words ⎯ critically I should say ⎯ to Greece . They are, in fact, the A pplicant’s words, issued at
the very outset of the case: but Greece agrees that if the dispute concerns “the difference” referred
to in Article5 “either directly or indirectly”, then the “excep t for” phrase in the jurisdictional
submission in Article 21 operates and the Court does not have jurisdiction. [Slide 11]
8. Does this case concern “directly or indirec tly”, the difference over the name? The Court
may have remarked how many times on Monday Ag ent and counsel, while insisting that this
“simple” case did not involve the name difference, were constrained to utter the “name” word: 93
times in some two hours. And could the Applicant have done otherwise? There is no way to say
30
CR 2011/5, p. 58, para. 5 (Klein). - 49 -
that the issues which the Applicant raises in this case do not “directly” and certainly “indirectly”
concern the difference described in Security Council resolution 817, the difference over the name.
9. The Applicant, in spite of itself, had to acknowledge this fact in its Application. There, it
accused Greece of violating Article11, in that ⎯ it alleged ⎯ Greece “acted to prevent the
Applicant from receiving an invitation to join NATO under the provisional designation of ‘the
31
former Yugoslav Repub lic of Macedonia’” . Then, in the immediately following paragraph, the
Applicant stated: [slide 12]
“The Respondent has made clear, by its actions and subsequent statements, that
the sole reason for its objection to the Applicant’s membership of NATO was the
difference between the Parties as to th e Applicant’s constitutional name. The
Respondent has also made clear that it w ill continue to object to the Applicant’s
NATO membership, and prevent it from procee ding, until that difference is resolved
permanently to its satisfaction.” [Slide 13]
10. Now, as is already clear from our presentations today, this is a distortion of Greece’s
concerns and actions in the face of the Applicant’s repeated violations of the Interim Accord. But
the point is that the Applicant, in the very next paragraph, says “the subject of the dispute does not
concern ⎯ either directly or indirectly ⎯ the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1, of the
Interim Accord”.
Applicant’s revised theory of jurisdiction
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as the Applicant in spite of itself makes clear, one
cannot say that the subject of the dispute does not concern either directly or indirectly the
difference over the name. And, Mr. President, the Applicant appreciates that fact. Which is why,
in its Reply, the words “does not concern ⎯ either directly or indirectly”, words, we assume, the
Applicant had thought necessary in order to be inscr ibed on the Court’s docket, now disappear. In
their place, the Applicant introduces an entirely new standard, tailored, it hopes, to rescue it from
its acknowledgement in its Application of the actual applicable test.
12. Instead of the words, “concern directly or indirectly”, the Applicant now argues that the
32
“except for” phrase relates only to the resolution of the difference over the name. In its Reply ,
the Applicant announces that it has “not referred to the Court for resolution of the difference over
31
Application, para. 9.
3Reply, para. 3.13. - 50 -
[sic] name”, and it advises the Court [slide 14] “the dispute that has been submitted to the Court
does not require the Court to resolve the difference referred to in Article5 (1), or to express any
view on the matter...”. [Slide 15] Thus, the standard “does not concern ⎯ directly or
indirectly ⎯ has been hurried away in an embarrassed silence and in its place, the Applicant now
prays the Court to read the “except for” phrase in Article 21, as if it said “‘except for’ resolution of
the difference referred to in Article 5 (1)”.
13. Mr. President, the Court will excuse me if I display once more the precise language of
Article 21, paragraph 2. [Slide 16] As you can see, the “except for” phrase does not say “except
for [the resolution of the] difference referred”. [Slide 17] But those absent words are necessary for
the Applicant’s argument, if it is to evade the c onsequences of the “directly or indirectly” test
whose authority it acknowledged when it commenced this case. [Slide 18]
14. Alas for the Applicant, those words are not to be found in Article 21. So in its Reply, the
Applicant does the only thing it can; it ignores this inconvenient fact. In a most unusual
interpretive exercise, the Applicant urges you to ignore the text and go directly to objects and
purposes. All right?
15. When we turn to the A pplicant’s idiosyncratic conception of objects and purposes, we
find that even it fails to help the Applicant in its quest for jurisdiction. Greece agrees with the
Applicant when it says ⎯ and it says twice ⎯ “the Parties have established a particular and
33
important role for the Court in assisting them to resolve disputes that might arise” . And Greece
agrees with the Applicant when it says: “It is plain that Article 21 (2) gives the Court a central role
34
in ensuring that the parties comply with their obligations in the Interim Accord” . But Greece
rejects the Applicant’s assertion that the ordinary reading of Article21, Greece’s reading, would
have the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction over all matters in the Interim Accord
because, the Applicant says in its Reply, “any di spute concerning any provision of the Interim
35
Accord is necessarily related to the name issue” . On Monday, counsel retreated from that
position; the Applicant’s position now is that Greece’s interpretation would deprive the
33Memorial, para. 3.10; Reply, para. 3.12.
34
Reply, para. 3.12.
35Ibid., para. 3.15. - 51 -
jurisdictional clause of “a considerable part of its practical effect” 3. This new position, while at
least acknowledging some effect for the “except for” phrase, is still incorrect.
16. Mr. President, Article21 gives the Court an extensive ⎯ but not unlimited ⎯
jurisdictional role “in ensuring”, and here I use the Applicant’s words, “that the parties comply
with their obligations in the Interim Accord”. Moreover, the Interim Accord accomplishes these
objects and purposes most effectively. Greece’s interpretation in no way undermines the Court’s
role. The Applicant is simply wrong when it c ontends that Greece’s interpretation of Article 21 ⎯
and again I use the Applicant’s words ⎯ “would undermine[]” the central role of the Court”
because ⎯ again, I use its words ⎯ “any dispute concerning any provision of the Interim Accord is
37
necessarily related to the name issue” . That is simply incorrect. The Interim Accord is a
comprehensive modus vivendi as ProfessorAbi-Saab has just explained; disputes about
compliance with a large number of its obligations which do not concern “the difference”, whether
“directly or indirectly” were clearly made justiciable. These matters, covering a large number of
the provisions of the Interim Accord, have nothing to do with the difference over the name and are
completely unaffected by Greece’s interpretation.
17. Mr. President, on Monday, counsel used a slide to give the impression that jurisdiction
over most of the Interim Accord will disappear if you give effect to the “except for” phrase. That is
not correct. The “except for” phrase which th e Parties inserted and which Greece submits you
should respect, leaves a very substantial jurisd iction over disputes about provisions that do not
“necessarily relate to the name issue”.
18. Article 3 of the Interim Accord [slide 19] requires each party “to respect the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of the other party”. It prohibits each party from
supporting “the action of a third party directed ag ainst the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the other Party”. Would a dispute about this provision, in the Applicant’s
words, “necessarily relate[] to the name issue”?
36
CR 2011/5, p. 58, para. 5 (Klein).
3Reply, para. 3.15. - 52 -
19. Article 4 [slide 20] requires the parties not to “assert claims to any part of the territory of
the other Party or claims for a change of their existing frontier”. Would a dispute under this
provision “necessarily relate to the name issue”?
20. Article 6 [slide 21] requires the Applicant not to interpret its constitution so as to claim
any territory not within its existing borders. Would a dispute about that “necessarily relate[] to the
name issue”?
21. Article7 [slide 22] requires the parties to “take effective measures to prohibit hostile
activities or propaganda by State-controlled agen cies and to discourage acts by private entities
likely to incite violence, hatred or hostility against each other”. Does that “relate[] to the name
issue”?
22. Article 7, paragraph 2, re quires the Applicant to “cease to use in any way the symbol in
all its forms displayed on its national flag . . .”. Does that “relate[] to the name issue”?
23. Article 8 [slide 23] requires the parties to “refrain fro m imposing any impediment to the
movement of people or goods between their territories...”. Would a dispute arising under this
provision “necessarily relate[] to the name issue”? [Slide 24]
24. Mr.President, I need not review each pr ovision of the Interim Accord over which the
Court has jurisdiction. The point is clear. Whether one looks only at the few provisions which I
have reviewed or proceeds to examine Articles12, 13, 14, 17 or 20, respecting the “except for”
phrase in Article 21 and declining jurisdiction in th is case, does not undermine the Court’s central
role of ensuring that the Parties comply with those of their obligations which the Interim Accord
does assign to the Court’s jurisdiction. But explicitly and unequivocally, Article 21 does not assign
jurisdiction “for the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1”. That “difference” is explicitly
specified in only two provisions of the Inte rim Accord: in Article 5, as mentioned, and, centrally
for this case, in Article11, paragraph1. Dis putes about these provisions will not fall within the
Court’s jurisdiction. All other disputes, arisi ng under the Interim Accord and not concerning the
difference over the name, will.
25. Mr.President, the “difference” to which Article21 refers concerned the difference over
the name of the Applicant, as my colleagues explai ned earlier. It was then a matter of such acute
political sensitivity to at least one ⎯ if not both ⎯ of the parties to the Interim Accord that, unlike - 53 -
the rest of the Interim Accord, matters that concerned it ⎯ directly or indirectly ⎯ were not to be
submitted to the decision of the Court. So the question for the Court is whether the Applicant’s
claim, which the Applicant insists is based only on Article11, paragra ph1, concerns, in the
Applicant’s words, “either directly or indirectly ⎯ the difference referred to in Article5,
paragraph 1”. And the answer to that question, in our view, is unmistakable. The action which the
Applicant attributes to Greece in NATO concerns the difference described in resolution 817. The
Applicant itself has acknowledged this fact in its Application and despite its efforts to cabin and
conjure it away, it is central to this dispute. Accordingly, Greece submits that the Court does not
have jurisdiction over the case by operation of Article 21.
Accepting jurisdiction would effectively resolve the name difference and undermine the
Interim Accord
26. Mr.President, a moment ago I quoted the Applicant’s words: [slide 25] “In short, the
dispute that has been submitted to the Court does not require the Court to resolve the difference
referred to in Article5(1), or to express any view on that matter...”. I read this as an
acknowledgement by the Applicant that if the C ourt’s decision would resolve the difference over
the name or would involve expressing any vi ew on the matter, the Court would not have
jurisdiction. [Slide 26] Even if one were to accept the Applicant’s invention and were to
interpolate those absent words into Article 21 so as to allow the “except for” phrase to be read as if
it had been designed by the Parties only to limit jurisdiction for actions which would resolve the
name issue, the Application would still fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction.
27. The reason for this is that the de facto resolution of the name issue is precisely the
consequence which the Applicant is pursuing in this case. Were the Court to take jurisdiction and
were it to accede to the Applicant’s prayer, it will have, ipso facto , effectively decided the name
issue putting an end to any incentive the Applicant might have had to negotiate resolution of the
difference as required by the Interim Accord and the Security Council. Finding jurisdiction with
the Applicant’s theory would thus be outcome-determinative of the merits, effectively resolving the
name difference in favour of the Applicant.
28. To appreciate why this consequence w ill follow, we must understand the Applicant’s
strategy on the dispute over the name. And we have it on the authority of none other than - 54 -
President Crvenkovski, speaking to his legislature: [Slide 27] Ms Telalian quoted part of it to you;
I draw your attention only to two paragraphs. President Crvenkovski said:
“First of all, in the negotiations under United Nations auspices we participated
actively, but our position was always the same and unchanged. And that was the
so-called dual formula. That means the use of the constitutional name of the Republic
of Macedonia for the entire world, in all international organizati ons and in bilateral
relations with all countries, with a compromise solution to be found only for the
bilateral relations with the Republic of Greece.
Secondly, [PresidentCrvenkovski co ntinues] to work simultaneously on
constant increase of the number of countries which recognize our constitutional name
and thus strengthen our proper38olitical capital in international field which will be
needed for the next phases.”
29. What does Mr. Crvenkovski tell us? The A pplicant’s programme on the name issue is to
avoid negotiating in good faith, as required by resolution817, while persuading as many other
States as possible to support its campaign for its preferred name. At the same time, to win
admission to every international organization, inte nding, once admitted, to ignore its obligations
under resolution 817 and the Interim Accord. Its st rategy? Use the provisional name required by
the Security Council and the Interim Accord to wi n admission, then with the impunity which that
affords it, use, for all other purposes, the name whose use the Interim Accord precludes. [Slide 28]
This case, Mr.President, is one part of the Cr venkovski strategy to ci rcumvent the provisional
arrangement and frustrate the required negotiation process which was to resolve the difference and,
thus, to accomplish by fait accompli the resolution of the difference over the name in the way the
Applicant wants.
30. May I display operative paragraph2 of resolution817 once again and just draw your
attention to it: [slide 29]
“Recommends to the General Assembly that the State whose application is
contained in document S/25147 be admitted to membership in the United Nations, this
State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pe nding settlement of the difference that
has arisen over the name.”
31. The legal key to the judicial phase of the Crvenkovski strategy is the Applicant’s radical
reinterpretation of resolution817 ⎯ and remember resolution817 is incorporated in the Interim
Accord ⎯ the Applicant avoids focusing on the text but would rely on the “recollection”, 17 years
38
Counter-Memorial, Ann. 104. - 55 -
later, of Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who was not th en Permanent Representative in New York, indeed,
not even based in New York at the time, and the recollection of a remark by Mr. Nimetz, who was
not in the Security Council a nd who, moreover, was not even addressing, in his remark, the
question of what the Applicant was to call itself. Is this how one interprets international
instruments?
32. Greece proposes to look at the text. It says “being provisionally referred to for all
purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’”. [Slide 30]
The Applicant was admitted to the United Nati ons on the condition that it be “provisionally
referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’”. That condition was to continue “pending settlement of the difference that has arisen
over the name”. [Slide 31]
33. Mr. President, five points about resolution 817.
34. First, the Applicant’s contention that the resolution is only a recommendation, stated in
39
its Reply and repeated on Tuesday , is incorrect. The resolution was issued under Article4,
paragraph 2, of the Charter which requires the Security Council to recommend the candidate before
the General Assembly can admit it. Th e Court confirmed this in its second Admissions opinion
(Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 10). The Applicant’s contention in its aide mémoire of 2005 that
40
resolution817 “runs contrary to the United Nations Charter” may explain why the Applicant
treats it so dismissively.
35. Second, the obligation in operative paragraph2 of resolution817 was not extinguished
upon the Applicant’s admission. It was a contin uing obligation to use the name the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia “for all purposes within the United Nations... pending
settlement of the difference”.
36. Third, the condition for the termination of the obligation, “settlement of the difference”,
has not occurred. The obligation continues.
39
Reply, para. 4.41 at p. 98.
4Reply, Ann. 24, p. 1. - 56 -
37. Fourth, compliance with that obligati on was, and continues to be, required under
international law. Charter Article2, paragraph2, reinforces the obligation imposed by Security
Council resolution817. As for the contention that only decisions taken by the Security Council
under Chapter VII are binding; I refer counsel to the Namibia opinion, where the Court held that
“Article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but applies to ‘the decisions
of the Security Council’ adopted in accordance with the Charter.” ( Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 53, para. 113.)
38. Fifth, even if, for the sake of argument, resolution817 were, in terms of its legal effect
under the Charter, only a recommendation, the Applicant explicitly affirmed and acknowledged the
continuing force of that “Recommendation” as an obligation it owed to Greece in the Interim
Accord’s Article 5, paragraph 1, Article 11, paragr aph 1, and, by necessary implication, Article 21,
paragraph 2. In other words, the obligation arising from resolution 817 is also treaty-based.
39. Thus, the binding legal arrangement whic h governs until there is a settlement of the
difference over the name, requires of the Applicant two things:
first, use of the provisional name, the form er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, “for all
purposes within the United Nations”, and,
second, good faith negotiation with the objective of securing a resolution of the difference.
40. President Crvenkovski confirms that the Applicant is intentionally violating both of these
obligations. In Court, the Applicant has tried to launder the violations by a new interpretation.
Consider its elaboration of its understanding of its obligations under resolution 817: [slide 32]
“Significantly, the Resolution [817] did not require the Applicant to call itself
‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, and the Applicant never agreed to refer
to itself as such. Consequently, in accordance with resolution 817 and without raising
any difficulties with the United Nations Secretariat, [Slide 32A] the Applicant has
always used its constitutional name in written and oral communications with the
41
United Nations, its members and officials.”
41. This is a violation of the Interim Accord, thinly disguised as an interpretation. But it
wreaks havoc with two of the canons of internati onal interpretation: it is unfounded textually and
absurd substantively. In order to generate a textually plausible interpretation of the Security
41
Memorial, para. 2.20. - 57 -
Council resolution, the Applicant must imply a phr ase, which is not there, and make two other
phrases, which are there, vanish. Only by doing this, can it defeat both the generality of the passive
voice, in which the Security Council chose to cast its words, and the maximum generality achieved
by the words “for all purposes”.
42. In 2005, the Applicant indicated its conviction that resolution817 was “contrary to the
Charter”. What, then, in light of the Crvenkovski strategy is the Applicant’s operational reading of
resolution817? As President Crvenkovski explai ned, while adopting an implacable posture in
negotiation, the Applicant has actively sought to persuade other United Nations members to refer to
it “for all purposes within the United Nations” as the “Republic of Macedonia”. Thus, one can
deduce from the Applicant’s public statements and behaviour that its conception of resolution 817
is drastically revised and it goes something like this: [Slide 33]
“Recommends to the General Assembly that the State whose application is
contained in document S/25147 be admitted to membership in the United Nations, as
‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ and thereafter be referred to for all
purposes as the Republic of Macedonia.” [Slide 34]
43. Overlooking the profound bad faith in this operational reading of resolution817, it is
obvious that it mangles the text and produces an absu rdity. The function of a nominal designation
is to clarify reference. But in the Applicant’s interpretation, th ere must be multiple international
designations for the same entity within the Unite d Nations and by implication in every other
international organization to which the Applic ant applies, shifting steadily, thanks to the
Applicant’s vigorous diplomatic initiatives, towa rd its preferred version. Aside from the
impracticality, the Applicant’s read ing of the text affords no indication that such an arrangement
was the intention of either the Security Council or the parties to the Interim Accord. Why Greece’s
concerns about the irredentist implications of the Applicant’s use of the name “Republic of
Macedonia”, when so much of Macedonia is in Greece, would be assuaged if this were the intended
meaning of resolution 817 is simply never explained. But, then again, the Applicant never explains
or takes of account of any accommodation of Greece’s interests in the Interim Accord.
44. If the Court were to adopt the Applicant’s interpolated reading of resolution817, it
would effectively decide the name issue, for the Applicant would secure all its objectives and have
neither need nor interest in negotiating. But that is the very thing which even the Applicant, - 58 -
according to its second jurisdictional theory, says cannot be decided under the jurisdictional clause,
42
as Professor Klein told the Court on Monday . Thus, Mr.President, whether one accepts, as the
Applicant originally proposed, the “concerns directly or indirectly” test or whether one accepts the
Applicant’s later interpolated reading of Article 21 and its neutered reading of resolution817,
Greece respectfully submits that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the case before it. It is
paradoxical, Mr.President, but only by rejecting jurisdiction will the Court, if I may quote
Professor Murphy, “keep the two States on the path they set for themselves in the Interim Accord 43.
45. I thank the Court for its attention and ask that my colleague, ProfessorPellet, be
recognized.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorMichaelReisman for his statement. Now I invite
Professor Alain Pellet to make his statement.
M. PELLET : Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le président.
L ES LIMITES INHÉRENTES À L ’EXERCICE DE LA FONCTION JUDICIAIRE
Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, avant d’en venir à ma plaidoirie
proprement dite, permettez-moi, de m’associ er à l’hommage que l’agent du demandeur et
PhilippeSands ont rendu à mon grand ami TomFranck . Nous n’étions pas, cette fois, dans la
même équipe de plaidoirie ; nous l’avions été parfois. C’était un grand internationaliste, un homme
de bien et de cŒur, et un ami irremplaçable.
1. Monsieur le président, mon autre collègue et ami, le professeur Reisman a montré que la
Cour est incompétente faute de consentement à sa ju ridiction par la Grèce. En terminant, lorsqu’il
vous a demandé de bien vouloir me donner la paro le, M. Reisman a indiqué que j’allais présenter
d’autres causes d’incompétence. C’est évidemment exact ⎯je n’aurais garde de contredire mon
éminent collègue. Mais c’est un peu plus que d’incompétence ou d’irrecevabilité qu’il s’agit
puisque c’est l’intégrité même des fonctions judiciaires de la Cour qui est en cause.
2. Comme vous l’avez rappelé dans votre arrêt de 1974 dans l’affaire des Essais nucléaires :
42
CR 2011/5, pp. 58-59, paras. 4-6 (Klein).
4CR 2011/6, p. 48, para. 87 (Murphy). - 59 -
«il convient de souligner que la Cour possède un pouvoir inhérent qui l’autorise à
prendre toute mesure voulue, d’une part pour faire en sorte que si sa compétence au
fond est établie, l’exercice de cette compét ence ne se révèle pas vain, d’autre part,
pour assurer le règlement régulier de tous l es points en litige ainsi que le respect des
«limitations inhérentes à l’exercice de la fonction judiciaire» de la Cour et pour
«conserver son caractère judiciaire» ( Cameroun septentrional, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
1963, 2p9. )» ( Essais nucléaires44Nouvelle-Zélande F c.rance), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 463, par. 23) .
3. Or, en l’espèce, il existe au moins deux «obstacles décisifs au règlement judiciaire»
(Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaum e-Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p.30) de l’affaire que vous a so umise l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine ⎯appelons-la «ARYM» par commodité puis que telle est l’appellation abrégée que
retiennent les sites du ministère français des affaires étrangères 45 ou de l’Union européenne 46
⎯ mais je précise que ceci n’a, dans mon esprit, au cune portée juridique particulière. D’une part,
l’arrêt que la Cour serait conduite à rendre ne pourrait avoir aucune espèce d’effet concret(I);
d’autre part, il constituerait une interférence da ns un processus éminemment politique(II). Je
m’abstiendrai en revanche de revenir sur la discutable «réserve de droit» que le demandeur avait
cru pouvoir formuler puisqu’il y a expressément renoncé 47.
I. U N ARRÊT DÉPOURVU DE TOUTE PORTÉE EFFECTIVE
4. Premier point donc, Monsieur le président : si la Cour venait à rendre un arrêt en faveur du
demandeur, celui-ci ne pourrait avoir aucun effet sur la situation qui est en cause en l’espèce et qui
concerne la non-admission immédiate de l’ARYM dans l’OTAN. Il est en effet patent que, si la
Cour constatait une violati on par la Grèce de l’article 11, paragra phe 1, de l’accord intérimaire, et
ordonnait au défendeur de violer son obligation de consultation lo yale au sein de l’organisation
(comme, en fait le lui demande le pointiii) des conclusions), il n’en résulterait aucune espèce
d’effet concret dans la situati on du demandeur à l’OTAN: ni l’Alliance, ni ses Etats membres ne
seraient liés par l’arrêt à intervenir, la décisi on de Bucarest (et celles qui la confirment)
44
Voir aussi Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun c. oyaume-Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 29.
45
Voir, par exemple: http://www.dipl omatie.gouv.fr/fr/conseils-aux-voyageurs_909/pays_12191/arym-ancienne-
republique-yougoslave-macedoine_12282/index.html.
46Voir, par exemple: http://eur opa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PESC/08/48&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=FR&guiLanguage=en.
47Cf. CR 2011/6, p. 12, par. 1 (Klein) et CR 2011/7, p. 26, par. 4 (Bastid-Burdeau). - 60 -
demeurerai(en)t intacte(s) et l’ARYM ne serait pas admise au sein de l’organisation aussi
longtemps que les conditions posées par celle-ci ne seraient pas remplies.
5. Le demandeur affirme avec véhémence qu’il a «the right to pursue membership of NATO
and other international organizations» 48. La Grèce ne conteste nullement ceci: l’ARYM est
parfaitement en droit de poursuivre cet objectif et il n’existe pas de différend sur ce point entre les
Parties. Mais demander à faire partie (to pursue membership), ce n’est pas la même chose qu’«être
admise à l’OTAN et dans d’autres organisations». Or, Monsieur le président, de deux choses
l’une :
⎯ ou bien la Cour est appelée à se prononcer sur le droit de l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine de demander son admission au sein de l’OTAN, et elle ne peut que refuser de se
prononcer faute de différend sur ce point entre les Parties ;
⎯ ou bien elle doit prendre position non plus sur la demande d’admission de l’ARYM mais sur la
décision de l’admettre et elle doit encore s’abstenir de juger. Ce faisant en effet, elle devrait
nécessairement se prononcer sur la question du nom ⎯qui est exclue de sa compétence. En
outre, de toute manière, un tel arrêt ne pourrait strictement rien changer à la situation dont se
plaint le demandeur puisque la décision de l’ad mettre au sein de l’orga nisation relève de la
compétence collective (et unanime) des Etats membres; ceux-ci ont collectivement et
unanimement subordonné une réponse positive à la demande de l’ARYM à l’issue favorable de
la question du nom.
6. Reprenons brièvement chacun de ces aspects, Monsieur le président, si vous le voulez
bien, mais je crois que je m’arrêterai en route.
7. Il y a peu à dire sur la première branche de l’alternative (le fait que nul ne conteste que
l’ARYM puisse continuer à demander (pursue) son admission à l’OTAN), sauf à faire les trois
remarques suivantes :
1) S’il faut en croire la Partie demanderesse, te l est bien l’objet même de l’affaire qu’elle a
soumise à la Cour puisque, dès le paragraphe premier de sa requête, elle explique: «Le
demandeur introduit la présente instance aux fins de protéger les droits qu’il tient de l’accord
48
Mémoire, p.5, par.1.1; passage repris dans la réplique, p.8, par.1.3. Voir aussi requête, p.7, par.1. Voir
aussi CR 2011/5, p. 20, par. 13 (Miloshoski). - 61 -
intérimaire…parmi lesquels le droit de demander son admission à toute organisation
internationale pertinente.»
2) Il n’existe aucun désaccord sur ce point entr e les Parties: la Grèce a fait savoir à maintes
reprises qu’elle était favorable à l’admission de l’ARYM à l’OTAN 49 dès lors que la condition
prévue à l’article11 est remplie; du reste, l’ OTAN elle-même a claire ment indiqué dans le
communiqué de Bucarest (et pl usieurs fois par la suite 50) que «[N]ous sommes convenus
qu’une invitation serait faite à l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine dès qu’une solution
51
mutuellement acceptable aura été trouvée à la question du nom.»
3) En l’absence de tout désaccord sur le dr oit du demandeur de poursuivre le processus
d’admission en cours, ce droit revendiqué (et non contesté) ne relève pas de la fonction
judiciaire de la Cour, «dont la mission est de régler conformément au droit international les
différends qui lui sont soumis». «L’existence d’un différend est donc la condition première de
l’exercice de sa fonction judiciaire.» (Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c.France), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 476, par. 58.)
8. Seconde branche de l’alternative, Monsieur le président : admettons, pour les besoins de la
discussion, que, réinterprétant l’objet de la requê te tel que l’ARYM l’a pourtant exposé, la Cour
estime que ce n’est pas le droit de ce pays de demander son admission à l’OTAN, mais son
prétendu droit d’y être admis, qui est en cause. Dans ce cas, il existerait bien un différend, mais il
s’élèverait non pas entre la Grèce et l’ARYM, mais entre cette dern ière et l’Alliance; et il serait
également contraire à l’intégrité des fonctions j udiciaires de la Cour que vous vous prononciez.
D’abord vous ne sauriez admettre la substitution d’un défendeur fictif (la Grèce) à celui qui est
l’auteur réel de la décision contestée (l’OTAN); ensuite, le demandeur ne peut isoler ainsi un
49
Voir notamment le discours de la ministre des affaires étrangères de la Grèce, MmeBakoyannis,
contre-mémoire, annexe 119 ; ou la déclaration du porte-parole du minist ère grec des affaires étrangères,
M. G. Koumoutsakos, contre-mémoire, annexe 120.
50
Voir notamment OTAN, co mmuniqué de presse (2009) 044, déclaration du sommet de Strasbourg-Kehl
publiée par les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement participant à la réunion du Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord tenue à
Strasbourg-Kehl le 4avril2009, contre -mémoire, annexe35 ou OTAN, déclara tion du sommet de Lisbonne publiée par
les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement participant à la réunon du Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord tenue à Lisbonne le
nov2000r,ecommuniqué de presse PR/CP(2010) 0155 1,4,par.
http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm ; voir aussi la conférence de presse du secrétaire général de
l’OTAN, M. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 15 novembre 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_68225.htm .
51OTAN, déclaration du sommet du Bucarest, 3avril2008, communiqué de presse (2008)049; note de bas de
page omise. - 62 -
élément du différend global et vous priver de la connaissance de celui-ci comme il tente de le faire ;
enfin, si, malgré tout, vous le suiviez sur cette voie, votre décision ne pourrait avoir aucun effet sur
la solution de ce différend global. Je reprends brièvement chacun de ces trois points, mais je
m’arrêterai en temps utile.
9. Premièrement, l’ARYM se plaint de n’avoir pas ⎯ pour l’instant ⎯ été admise à l’OTAN
⎯ et j’insiste : elle s’en plaint, ce qui montre bien que tel est e ffectivement l’enjeu de la présente
affaire52. Elle en impute la responsabilité à la Grèce. Mais, si responsabilité de la Grèce il y avait,
elle serait indissociable de celle de l’ensembl e des membres de l’organisation en tant que
collectivité.
10. Je sais bien, Monsieur le président, que le demandeur veut à toute force faire accroire que
la toute puissante Grèce a pu objecter, seule contre tous, telle une sorte d’Astérix hellénique, à
l’invitation que les autres membres de l’Alliance unanimes se seraient apprêtés à lancer à l’ARYM.
Mais ceci est clairement démenti par les faits :
⎯ je me réfère, par exemple, à la déclaration de l’ambassadeur tchèque Stefan Füle, pourtant
favorable à la demande d’admission de l’ARYM, qui a tenté (en vain d’ailleurs) de dissiper les
graves méprises entretenues par les officiels de Skopje sur les événements de Bucarest :
«what happened in the Summit was that member-states could not reach an agreement
and consequently there was no voting procedure. There was no procedure during
which one can say that this particular country or group of countries did not agree.»
And the report of Ambassador Füle’s speech continued:
«He [Füle] warned at journalists that, insofar as they will report on the veto to
be fully aware that ’this is not in accordance with what really happened in Bucharest.’
Ambassador Füle stressed that as long as the name 53spute is not resolved, Macedonia
cannot expect to become a NATO member.» ;
⎯ je relève également que le fait que les instan ces de l’Alliance atlantique aient, à plusieurs
reprises, réitéré la position collective de l’ensemble de ses Etats membres établit à lui seul qu’il
est impossible d’imputer la responsabilité de cette situation à la Grèce ; et
⎯ j’attire en outre votre attention, Mesdames et Messi eurs les juges, sur le fait que l’on voit mal
pourquoi la Grèce aurait entrepris la campagne systématique d’obstruction qu’a prétendu
52
Voir, par exemple, CR 2011/5, p. 34, par. 23 (Sands).
53«The Czech Republic continues to support Macedonia in NATO», Utrinski Vesnik , 22 novembre 2008,
disponible sur : http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=FCA3114349781142BDFC9200560B889A , duplique, annexe 54. - 63 -
décrire le professeur Murphy lundi dernier 54, s’il lui avait suffi d’opposer un veto sec à
l’admission de l’ARYM au sein de l’OTAN.
11. On conçoit mal aussi comment la Cour pourrait se prononcer sur la position de la seule
Grèce sans établir la part relative de chacun des participants à la décision collective et consensuelle
dont se plaint le demandeur et dont elle est inséparab le. Certes, en tant que membre de l’Alliance,
la Grèce y a participé et elle est, à ce titre, arrivée aux mêmes conclusions que l’ensemble des
autres participants, elle s’est ralliée au consensus ⎯ ni plus, ni moins.
[Projection n o1 ⎯ article 22 de l’accord intérimaire]
12. «Ah, ah», va sans doute dire le professeu r Sands, «mais s’agissant de la Grèce, la chose
est différente car elle est liée à l’ARYM par un accord spécial». Oui, Monsieur le président, elle
est liée par l’accord intérimaire dont, une fois de plus , nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre font une
lecture partielle et partiale, en voulant dissocier l’article11 de cet instrument de son article22,
selon lequel: «Le présent accord intérimaire…ne por te pas atteinte aux droits et aux devoirs
découlant d’accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux déjà en vigueur que les Parties ont conclus avec
d’autres Etats ou organisations internationales.»
Monsieur le président, je vois l’heure passer et je ne pourrai évidemment pas terminer ma
plaidoirie aujourd’hui, sauf à dépasser très abusivement l’horaire, bien que ce soit un peu abrupt et
artificiel. Peut-être devrais-je suspendre ma présentation ici.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorAlainPellet for his statement although his statement
has not been completed. In any case, Greece will continue its presentation tomorrow at a sitting in
the morning from 10.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. and conc lude its first round of oral argument during the
afternoon sitting from 3.00p.m. to 4.30p.m. Th erefore we will continue to hear the presentation
by counsel from Greece tomorrow morning. The Court is adjourned.
The Court rose at 6.00 p.m.
___________
54
CR 2011/5, p. 43-47, par. 19-32 (Murphy) ; voir aussi CR 2011/6, p. 28-29, par. 25 (Murphy).
Public sitting held on Thursday 24 March 2011, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)