Uncorrected
Non corrigé
CR 2009/26
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2009
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 2 December 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada, presiding,
on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo
(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)
_____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2009
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 2 décembre 2009, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
sur la Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance
des institutions provisoires d’administration autonome du Kosovo
(Demande d’avis consultatif soumise par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdmekta
Judges Shi
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
M. Tomka v,ice-président
Shi MM.
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Grejugesood,
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Republic of Albania is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Gazmend Barbullushi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Albania
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Professor Jochen Frowein,
Professor Terry D. Gill,
as Legal Advisers ;
Mr. Gentian Zyberi,
as Co-Adviser ;
MsLedia Hysi, Director of Legal Affairs and International Law at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs;
Mr. Sami Shiba, Director for Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs;
Mr. Genc Pecani, Minister Plenipotentiary at the Embassy of Albania in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Federal Republic of Germany is represented by:
Ms Susanne Wasum-Rainer, Legal Adviser, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin;
H.E. Mr. Thomas Läufer, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands;
Mr. Guido Hildner, Head of Division, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin;
Mr.Felix Neumann, Counsellor, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Abdullah A. Alshaghrood, Ambassador of the Kingdom of SaudiArabia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Head of Delegation ;
Mr. Mohammad I. Alaqeel, Counsellor,
Mr. Fahad M. Alruwaily, Counsellor,
as Members of Delegation .
For the complete list of delegations of all participants, please refer to CR 2009/24. - 5 -
La République d’Albanie est représentée par :
S. Exc. M.Gazmend Barbullushi, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de
l’ambassade d’Albanie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M. Jochen Frowein,
M. Terry D. Gill,
comme conseils ;
M. Gentian Zyberi,
comme co-conseil ;
Mme Ledia Hysi, directrice des affaires juridiques et du droit international au ministère des
affaires étrangères de l’Albanie ;
M.Sami Shiba, directeur pour le Kosovo, la Macédoine et le Monténégro au ministère des
affaires étrangères de l’Albanie ;
M.GencPecani, ministre plénipotentiaire, ambassade d’Albanie au Royaume des Pays-Bas
(personne à contacter).
La République fédérale d’Allemagne est représentée par :
MmeSusanne Wasum-Rainer, conseiller juridique, ministère fédéral des affaires étrangères
à Berlin ;
M. Thomas Läufer, ambassadeur de la République fédérale d’Allemagne auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas ;
M. Guido Hildner, chef de division au ministère fédéral des affaires étrangères à Berlin ;
M.Felix Neumann, conseiller à l’ambassade de la République fédérale d’Allemagne au
Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Royaume d’Arabie saoudite est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Abdullah A. Alshaghrood, ambassadeur,
comme chef de délégation ;
M. Mohammad I. Alaqeel, conseiller,
M. Fahad M. Alruwaily, conseiller,
comme membres de la délégation.
Pour consulter la liste complète de toutes les délégations, prière de se reporter au CR 2009/24. - 6 -
The Argentine Republic is represented by:
H.E.Ms Susana Ruiz Cerutti, Ambassador, Head of the Legal Adviser Office, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Head of Delegation ;
H.E.Mr.Santos Goñi Marenco, Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands;
Mr.FernandoMarani, Second Secretary, Em bassy of the Argentine Republic in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands. - 7 -
La République argentine est représentée par :
S. Exc. Mme Susana Ruiz Cerutti, ambassadeur, chef du bureau du conseiller juridique du
ministère des relations extérieures,
comme chef de délégation ;
S. Exc. M. Santos Goñi Marenco, ambassadeur de la République argentine auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M.FernandoMarani, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de la République argentine au
Royaume des Pays-Bas. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open.
The Court meets this morning to hear the following participants on the question submitted to
the Court, namely, Albania, Germany, Saudi Arab ia and Argentina. And each of the delegations,
as I said yesterday, is assigned 45 minutes at their di sposal for their presentation. In that context, I
would like to make two procedural points.
One is that, in order to have an expeditious conduct of affairs in these proceedings, I shall
introduce the first speaker of each delegation. B ecause some delegations have several speakers
within those 45 minutes, and it is not going to be easy for me to call each of the speakers, I will call
only the first speaker of the delegation, and each delegation can continue without my intervention.
The second point that I would like to make is th at, since we have four speakers today, each
assigned 45 minutes, it seems appropriate to have a short coffee break of 15 minutes after we have
heard two participating delegations, and then we shall proceed on to the next two delegations.
With that, I shall now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Gazmend Barbullushi.
Mr. BARBULLUSHI:
I.B ACKGROUND TO THE CASE
1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a great honour and privilege to
appear before you on behalf of the Republic of Albania which for obvious reasons has a great
interest in the present proceedings.
2. Twenty years ago, in 1989, Kosovo was illeg ally stripped of its autonomy and its right to
self-determination under the 1974Yugoslav Constitu tion. Ten years of State-sanctioned
discrimination followed where widespread and syst ematic violations of human rights occurred.
Ten years ago, in1999, the population of Kosovo was subjected to the largest ethnic cleansing
campaign since the Second World War. Thousands were killed and disappeared, and tens of
thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed. As the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia found, and as other sources also confirm, Serbian forces and paramilitaries
implemented a systematic campaign to ethnically cleanse Kosovo, which included the forcible
displacement of civilians, the looting of homes and businesses, wanton destruction of property, - 9 -
summary executions, rape, torture and inhuman a nd cruel treatment. Over 1.5millionKosovar
Albanians were forcibly expelled from their homes. During those dark days Albania hosted about
700,000 Kosovars. All of these facts are a matter of public record and have been brought to your
attention by a large number of States during these proceedings.
3. Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court, the situation I just referred to stands in
stark contrast with the situation today. Ko sovo is an independent and multi-ethnic State,
committed to democracy and the rule of law, with full protection for the rights of all its inhabitants.
Kosovo’s commitment to protection of human rights and the rights of minorities is an example for
other States in the world. With its mature st ance and behaviour, Kosovo contributes to peace and
stability in the Balkans. That is a widely acknowledged fact.
4. The Republic of Albania and many othe r countries have recognized the Republic of
Kosovo, considering that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence is in full accordance with
international law. Albania has supported and will continue rendering its full support to the people
of Kosovo in their efforts towards peace, progress and prosperity for all its citizens.
5. Mr. President, with your permission, Professor Frowein, leader of our legal team, will now
address in more detail a number of legal issues concerning this case. Thank you.
Mr. FROWEIN:
1. Mr.President, judges of the Internationa l Court of Justice, it is a great honour and
privilege to appear again before you, this time for the Republic of Albania which, as already stated
by the Ambassador, is very much concerned with the present proceedings. They are of great
importance for the people of Kosovo, the majority of which ⎯ over 90 per cent ⎯ are of Albanian
origin as to language and culture in general.
2. With your permission, Mr. President, I shall first very briefly come back to the issue of the
conditions for an advisory opinion. I shall then discuss the conformity with international law of the
Declaration of Independence.
3. My first point will be a few remarks concerning the general approach. The second part
will discuss under which circumstances declarations of independence may be in violation of
international law. The third part will deal with the relationship between a declaration of - 10 -
independence and the rule of territorial integrity. The fourth part will discuss the interpretation of
resolution1244. The fifth part on self-determination will be presented by my colleague,
ProfessorGill. I shall then come to a conclusion. I am afraid, Mr. President, there will be
repetitions, but I hope to shed some new light on some of the problems.
II. JURISDICTION AND PROPRIETY
4. Albania has submitted some remarks concerni ng jurisdiction to which I refer. However, I
would like to come back to two issues which coul d be of importance for the Court when deciding
whether or not to comply with the request for an advisory opinion.
1. Possible action of the General Assembly
5. As it is clear from the Court’s jurisprudence, advisory opinions have the purpose of
furnishing to the requesting organs of the United Nations the elements of law necessary for them in
their action.
6. The Court has held that the General Asse mbly has the right to decide for itself on the
usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs. But the Court has frequently indicated why
the opinion might be useful. It did so for the last time in paragraph 62 of the famous Wall Opinion
(Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 163. para. 62). The Court indicated that the General Assembly or
the Security Council may draw specific conclusions from the findings.
7. The present question is formulated in a way which limits it to the conformity with
international law of the Declaration of Independen ce on 17February 2008. It is only this narrow
and limited question on which the advisory opinion is requested. Since the Declaration, 63 States
have recognized Kosovo as an independent State, the last one being NewZealand. The General
Assembly cannot undo these recognitions. Nobody has argued that the recognitions are invalid
under international law, and this question is defi nitely not before the Court, as France and Japan
have rightly underlined.
8. Therefore, it would seem that in this particular case the Court must ask the question
whether an advisory opinion could be useful fo r any function to be performed by the General - 11 -
Assembly. Could the General Assembly draw an y conclusions from the findings? Assume that
Kosovo, one day, will apply for membership in the United Nations, as many of us hope.
9. The General Assembly will then have to decide upon the recommendation of the Security
Council. It would be required that Kosovo is a peace-loving State which accepts the obligations
contained in the Charter, as confirmed in your earlier Opinion on admission of States to the United
Nations (Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.4). For that decision of the General Assembly, not
tomorrow, not a few months from now, but certainly at some time, problems with the Declaration
of Independence of 17February2008 could play, I submit, no role whatsoever. This, I think,
should be taken into account when the Court exer cises its discretion whether or not to give an
advisory opinion. My second remark in that context concerns the ultra vires problem.
2. The argument that the Declaration was ultra vires
10. It is argued that the Declaration was an ultra vires act and therefore a violation of
international law. To go into that issue, th e International Court of Justice would act like a
municipal court and scrutinize the specific powers granted by the rules adopted on the basis of
resolution 1244 to the provisional organs set up in Kosovo. Some States even qualify these rules as
municipal law, for instance the United States and the United Kingdom. It seems very doubtful
whether it should be the task of the International C ourt of Justice to control the conformity of the
Declaration with these rules. Even if one do es not go as far as the United States and the United
Kingdom, as well as ProfessorMurphy for Kosovo yesterday (CR2009/25), the Court should
consider whether this is really a matter for its jurisdiction.
11. However, even assuming that the Court shou ld find that the Declaration as such was in
that sense ultra vires, what could be the effect of such a finding for action of the General
Assembly? It is clear that the Declar ation would remain the exercise of the pouvoir constituant of
the Kosovo people. Even if the provisional orga ns had no mandate for such a declaration this
would not change, in my submission, the situation at all. You can in fact compare it to the famous
action by the tiers état in Paris in 1789. This was within a St ate, but it is exactly the same with an
act of secession forming a new State. The pouvoir constituant is not bound by rules existing under - 12 -
the previous constitutional system. This is, I submit, an additional reason why it seems doubtful
whether the Court should entertain the advisory opinion. And let me add this, which we should I
think not forget, a considerable majority of St ates Members of the United Nations did not express
the wish to have an advisory opinion by your Court.
III. ONFORMITY OF THE D ECLARATION WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. General approach
12. I now come to the conformity with intern ational law of the Declaration. Many of the
statements have shown that international la w does not regulate as such a declaration of
independence. The practice of States ⎯ at least, I submit, since the declaration of independence by
the United States and the discussion which followed, and which is very well known, and until the
most recent period with the declarations of inde pendence in the context of the disintegration of
former Yugoslavia, the secession of many States from the former Soviet Union and other
examples ⎯ shows that international law has nothin g to say concerning a declaration of
independence as such.
13. Secession is not regulated by international law. The only question is, therefore, whether
in a specific case a violation of international law ca n be shown. In that respect I respectfully, but
very firmly, disagree with ProfessorsShaw, Zimmermann, and Kohen. There is no rule of
international law prohibiting secession. And there is ample proof for the correctness of this
statement in the study on secession edited by Profess or Kohen. We have, in our written pleadings,
quoted several of the contributions in that rather well organized book.
14. There are in particular two situations wh ere a declaration of independence is a violation
of international law. This is, first, the situa tion of illegal intervention a nd, secondly, the violation
of specific mandatory rules of international law, ius cogens.
2. A declaration of independence brought about by illegal intervention of any State
is a violation of international law
15. Where intervention by a third State, be it by the use of force or by other means, is
decisive for the declaration of independence this is of course a severe violation of international law.
Therefore, the Security Council and sometimes al so the General Assembly have called upon States - 13 -
not to recognize the newly formed entity. A particular telling example is, of course, Northern
Cyprus. No State, except the one having intervened, recognized the declaration of independence of
Northern Cyprus.
16. Nothing of that sort happened in the present case. The Security Council did not take any
action, nor did the General Assembly recomme nd non-recognition. Nobody has argued that
intervention by any State was at the origin of th e Declaration of Independence of the Republic of
Kosovo. Therefore, I submit, the situation ca nnot be compared to these cases where such an
intervention was at the origin of a declaration of independence.
3. Declaration of independence in violation of ius cogens
17. Second, when the racist minority régime in Rhodesia declared its independence, the
Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon States not to recognize that régime. It was
qualified as an “illegal racist minority regime”. Similarly concerning the independence of the
former South African homelands, the Security Council and the General Assembly called upon
States not to recognize these entities.
18. The General Assembly condemned these act s “as designed to consolidate the inhuman
policies of apartheid”. It rejected the declaration of independence as invalid and called upon all
Governments to deny “any form of recognition to the so-called independent Transkei” and the
other bantustans. Nothing of that sort is present here. It is quite telling that only these cases could
be quoted by Serbia for the proposition that secession as such is in violation of international law.
IV. D ECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
19. I come to problem of territorial integrity. Territorial integrity is of course one of the
foundations of international law. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Char ter, prohibits the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity of any State. It is argued that territorial integrity is also a
rule which guarantees the territory of a State against internal constitu tional developments, in
particular against declarations of independence by secessionist movements. However, this, I
submit, is a complete misunderstanding of the rule.
20. The creation of a new State by secession has nothing to do with the disregard of
territorial integrity of the State. This is show n by the practice of States which has never used the - 14 -
argument that a declaration of independence by a secessionist group is a violation of the principle
of territorial integrity.
21. Where a declaration of independence is brought about by the intervention of a third State,
one may very well call that intervention a violation also of the principle of territorial integrity.
However, this is not so where internal developmen ts within a State lead to a secession of a part of
that State. I submit that it is clearly wrong to argue that secession as such is a violation of
international law of the rule of territorial integrity.
22. It is, by the way, quite telling how Serbia, in its July Comments, deals with this issue. It
kindly quotes a statement made by myself about th e resolutions reaffirming the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iraq. It deletes, howev er, the one sentence which explains the formula as
being contained in Article2, pa ragraph4, prohibiting the use of force against the territorial
integrity of any State.
23. By deleting that sentence the impression is created that the notion of territorial integrity
applies also to secessionist movements. However, this is clearly not the case and I have not said
so. I refer to footnote 489 of Serbia’s July Comments.
24. Nobody doubts that a declaration of inde pendence may be a violation of constitutional
law and Serbia takes that view concerning Kosovo’s Declaration. But Serbia is unable to show that
such a violation has any relevance for international law. Serbia quotes in this context Security
Council resolution169(1961) concerning the situation in the Congo, but that again concerned
foreign intervention.
25. The resolution reaffirms that “all forei gn military, paramilitary and advisory personnel
not under the United Nations Command, and all merc enaries” must be withdrawn. And in its
operative part the resolution states under paragraph 1:
“ Strongly deprecates the secessionist activities illegally carried out by the
provincial administration of Katanga with the aid of external resources and manned by
foreign mercenaries.”
This shows that this was clearly a case of outside intervention.
26. The same is of course true for reso lution787(1992) concerning Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In paragraph5, the Security Council, in that resolution, demands “that all forms of
interference from outside the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including infiltration into the - 15 -
country of irregular units and personnel, cease immediately”. I think it is somewhat ironic that this
resolution should be quoted by Serbia for its arguments.
27. Let me also clarify one point: Where the Security Council determines a threat to the
peace it can, of course, intervene on the basis of ChapterVII. This was the legal basis for the
resolution just quoted in the Bosnia and Herze govina case. But no such decision was made after
the Declaration of Independence by Kosovo, brought about by peaceful means after a lengthy
period of negotiations had ended without an agreed solution being reached.
28. Although the rule of “territorial integrity” protects against outside intervention, it does
not apply to internal constitu tional developments. Secession as such is not regulated by
international law as State practice proves and as so many authors have underlined. We have shown
that with many citations.
29. All the resolutions quoted by Serbia con cerning the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia
are proof for the competence of the Security Council under Chapter VII to act against a threat to the
peace or breach of the peace. They do not prov e that secession as such is in violation of
international law or of the rule of territorial integrity.
30. This explanation is also relevant for the issue of non-State actors being bound by
international law. Serbia is of course correct in underlining that the Security Council has in many
resolutions now addressed non-State actors on the basi s of ChapterVII. But this does not at all
prove that a secessionist movement is bound by the principle of territorial integrity without such a
ChapterVII resolution. The Security Council did not adopt such a resolution when Kosovo
declared its independence in a peaceful way.
31. And let me add this: On page 111, paragraph 254, Serbia states that the United Kingdom
is correct in underlining a possibility for a dissolution or reconfiguration of the State. But Serbia
limits that to “the consensual rearrangements which may always take place” adding that the
comment of the United Kingdom “is not correct beyond this point”, to use Serbia’s words. This
has been repeated yesterday. With this limitation, Serbia tries to turn the clock of international law
back to the period when consent of the former sovereign was seen as the only way for a new State
to come into existence. This rule was abroga ted by about 1820 as we have shown, i.e., almost
200 years ago. - 16 -
32. One last point in this connection, Mr. Presi dent: It is true that the penultimate paragraph
in the famous Friendly Relations resolution2625 uses the notion of territorial integrity when
explaining the principle of self-determination. This is to be seen in the context of the whole
explanation. It is directed against the action of other States as the last paragraph shows and it
clarifies under which circumstances so-called “r emedial secession” may operate. ProfessorGill
will deal with that. The use of the notion here ⎯ of the notion of “territorial integrity” ⎯ does not
broaden the application of this rule to processe s of secession in general. A resolution of the
General Assembly could not have that effect anyway, as we know.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLUTION 1244
33. I now come to the importance of resolution1244. Serbia argues in detail that the
Declaration of Independence violates resolution1244. This resolution is, of course, of a very
special nature. It was adopted to set in motion a process by which the future status of Kosovo
should be clarified. The notions used in the r esolution as to the final outcome are, clearly on
purpose, not limited in any way. And Professor Murp hy had more time to outline that than I have.
The resolution speaks of “final settlement”, “political settlement”, “future status”. This shows that
the resolution does not in any way prejudge the final outcome of a process started with the adoption
of this resolution. And there can be no doubt th at all members of the Security Council were fully
aware of that situation.
34. This is also made clear by the formal reference to the Rambouillet Accords to be found
in Annex2, paragraph8. According to this pa ragraph, agreement is reached as to a political
process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement. This should
provide for substantial self-government. According to the last sentence, negotiations between the
parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing
institutions.
35. But this reference to Rambouillet creates a very important balance in resolution1244.
The Rambouillet Accords ⎯ as we heard yesterday and we all know ⎯ envisaged as one possible
solution the full independence of Kosovo as a sovereign State on the basis of the will of the people,
as expressly mentioned there. By referring to these Accords, resolution1244 confirms this - 17 -
possibility. On the other hand, the resolution refers to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY. By that reference it is made clear that at the time when resolution 1244 was adopted, no final
decision was taken. It is also made clear that the process would not in any way affect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.
36. One may assume that the system set up by the resolution prevented action changing the
situation before the negotiations envisaged in the resolution, including the Annexes, had come to an
end. After these negotiations had come to an end and it had been confirmed by all those concerned
that no consensus could be reached, resolution1244 did not any longer provide for an interim
solution.
37. Of course, when the resolution was adopted everybody hoped that a consensus could be
reached. However, after it became clear that no consensus could be arrived at, the system was no
longer workable as an interim system. Resolution1244 is, I submit, no basis for an eternal
deadlock between the parties. This would be the consequence of the position taken by Serbia
yesterday. This means that the Declaration of Independence cannot be seen as a violation of the
resolution, even if one would accept that the r esolution created an interim phase during which a
declaration of independence would have been a violation of the resolution.
38. This shows that resolution 1244 does not ex clude the Declaration of Independence in the
specific circumstances of the case. If Serbia now tries to imply that the political process was not
conducted in an open and unbiased manner one can only be astonished, I submit, taking into
account the reputation President Ahtisaari has throughout the world. I am happy to say that I could
co-operate with him in 2000 in establishing an important international report.
39. It is indeed quite telling that the Serbian Comments quote a remark by
PresidentAhtisaari and interpret it as showing that Ahtisaari’s view from the very beginning was
that independence was the only option. However, the language used by PresidentAhtisaari does
not in any way convey this meaning. I repeat wh at Serbia quotes in paragraph 106 as the words of
PresidentAhtisaari. According to this quotation he said: “L’une des conditions formulées au
départ était de ne surtout pas revenir à la situ ation d’avant 1999.” This does not in any way show
that independence was the only possible solution Pr esident Ahtisaari had in mind. Before 1999, as
we all know, Kosovo had no longer any autonomy and at that time the human rights of the people - 18 -
of Kosovo were severely violated. It was clear from resolution 1244 that at least a high degree of
autonomy was envisaged. To interpret this statement by President Ahtisaari as being biased, taking
only the possibility of full independence, is a complete reversal of the meaning of the sentence
expressed in the statement.
40. With your permission, Mr. President, I would now ask my colleague ProfessorGill to
explain our position on the issue of self-determination before I then come to a conclusion.
Mr. GILL:
1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before this
Court on behalf of the Republic of Albania. My presentation will address the relevance and
implications of the right of self-determination to the question of the legality of the Declaration of
Independence by Kosovo.
VI. SELF -DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO REMEDIAL SECESSION
2. My presentation is divided into two parts. Firstly, I will address the question whether the
right of self-determination should be seen as precluding the Declaration of Independence of the
people of Kosovo, thereby preventing the establishment of an independent State, guaranteeing
equal rights for all its inhabitants. Secondly, I will present arguments relating to the right of
remedial secession in cases of systematic discrimination and exclusion of a people from full
participation in the government and administration within an independent State, and relate these
observations to the question before the Court.
3. Before I proceed, I should like to point ou t that Albania’s position is that the legality of
the Declaration of Independence in no way de pends upon the necessity of an entitlement to
independence for Kosovo based on the right of sel f-determination. Consequently, the arguments
relating to the right of remedial secession are pur ely additional to those relating to the absence of
any illegality of secession under international law. - 19 -
1. Self-determination under international law
May it please the Court:
4. The right to self-determination is both a rule of conventional and customary international
law which is widely recognized and acknowledged as having an erga omnes and jus cogens
character. It is generally considered to have tw o distinct but closely re lated dimensions, usually
related to respectively as the external and internal dimensions of self-determination. The former
provides for the right of a people under colonial rule or under foreign occupation to independence
or to otherwise freely determine a political status through association or integration with another
State. In General Assembly reso lution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 ⎯ known as the Friendly
Relations Declaration ⎯ it additionally further is declared to be potentially relevant in situations
where a people is denied meaningful participation in the government and administration of a State
as a result of systematic discrimination and denial of equal rights of part of the population, with the
consequence that the government of the Stat e therefore is not representative of the entire
population.
5. The internal dimension of self-determination is generally considered to consist primarily
of the right of a people to full and meaningful participation and representation in the government
and administration of an existing State on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination.
6. The holders of the right of self-determination are of course peoples. While the question of
what constitutes a people can differ according to th e context in which it is used, there can be no
doubt that the population of Kosovo constitutes a people, as has been recognized in the
Rambouillet Accords, in the Constitutional Fram ework for Kosovo adopted by UNMIK, by the
Ministers of the Contact Group and by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
behalf of the United Nations, and th is is all referred to, Your Honour s, in paragraphs 61-65 of the
Albanian Written Statement of July 2009. And I might point out that this is in contrast to what our
respected colleagues from Serbia said to the Court yesterday in regard to the question of the
Kosovars being a people. While the Court is not called upon to pronounce whether the population
of Kosovo constitutes a people for the purpose of sel f-determination, there can be no doubt that
they do so qualify and this could be relevant if the Court should decided to exercise its jurisdiction. - 20 -
7. I will now turn to the question as to whet her the right of self-determination provides for a
prohibition of secession and an examination of whic h conditions could possibly give rise to a right
of unilateral secession in the sense of an entitlement within the specific context of the right of
self-determination. The starting point is to note that there is neither a general right, nor a
prohibition of secession under the right of self-determination. If secession by a people from an
existing State were precluded, then this would be stated in no uncertain terms in the text of the
Friendly Relations Declaration which sets out to clarify and restate the fundamental principles
underlying the Charter. This is done with regard to the territorial integrity of a State vis-à-vis any
other State where, in the last sentence of the para graph relating to self-determination, it is clearly
stated that: “Every State shall refrain from any ac tion aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country.” Professor Frowein has already
addressed this issue and, in doing so, has submitted that the principle of territorial integrity is
primarily externally oriented and this is no different when viewed from the perspective of
self-determination.
8. The normal mode of exercising self-determin ation within an existing independent State is
through the exercise of civil and political rights in accordance with the procedures in force in that
State on the basis of equal rights and non-discrimination. In any State which functions along these
lines, there is no doubt that self-determination does not give rise to a general right of secession.
However, in situations where the conditions are grossly and systematically violated and a people is
denied full participation in the political life and administration of the country, there is no
prohibition against secession under the law pertaining to self-determination or any other rule of
international law. This is indicated by the text of another passage in resolution 2625 which reads as
follows:
“Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples... and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.”
9. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this is by no means a passport to secession, but
neither can it be viewed as an unconditional right to maintain territorial integrity at the price of the - 21 -
practice of discrimination and exclusion from par ticipation in the political life and denial of
representation of part of the population. This is how it is widely viewed in academic opinion and
in the advisory opinion handed down by the Canadian Supreme Court in re Secession of Quebec
of 1998. In that decision, which is unique in th at it squarely addresses the issue of when a possible
lack of prohibition of secession could arise in the context of the exercise of self-determination, the
Court reasoned that since Canada met the require ments of a democratic State, guaranteeing full
participation of the entire population in the political life and administration of Canada, there was no
entitlement to unilateral secession on the part of the Quebec population.
10. Now, since the Canadian Supreme Court decision is generally considered to be correct in
its interpretation of the law, it logically follows that in situations where a State has a system of law
providing for participation of the entire populati on in the political life and administration on the
basis of equal rights and non-discrimination, ther e is no entitlement to secession contained within
the right of self-determination. On the other hand, where a State practises policies based on
exclusion of a part of the population, it cannot rely on the law pertaining to self-determination to
preserve its territorial integrity. The important po int is that the right of self-determination does not
provide for an unconditional guarantee of territorial integrity of States in relation to part of its own
population. In fact, it does not preclude secession under circumstances of systematic
discrimination and denial of equal treatment under the law.
2. Circumstances surrounding Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence and remedial secession
11. I shall now examine the question whethe r such exceptional circumstances existed in
relation to Kosovo.
12. The question whether the Declaration of Independence in any way violates the right of
self-determination is of signal importance to these proceedings. The question can only be
answered by applying the law to the specific f actual and historical circumstances surrounding the
declaration. These facts are set out in detail in the Written Statement of Albania and other States
and are incontestable and a matter of public record. They document a series of events extending
over a period of some ten years, which constitu ted a policy of systematic discrimination and
exclusion of the Kosovar Albanians from the public life of the province; consisting of cancellation - 22 -
of all representative bodies of government, exclus ion of the Kosovar Albanian population from all
levels of governmental administration, and s uppression of the Albanian language and culture,
resulting in mass opposition and the spread of th e armed conflict in the Former Yugoslavia to
Kosovo, ending finally in international intervention and the placing of the territory under
international administration.
13. This was the situation under which Secu rity Council resolution 1244 was adopted, and
over a period of a decade, all attempts to reach a negotiated solution under the auspices of the
international community have failed to achieve an agreement which would be acceptable and
durable. It has been argued by some that Serbia’s policies of the past should not stand in the way
of it reasserting sovereignty over Kosovo. In essen ce, this argument says that even if the policies
and events of the period from 1989 through 1999 were a violation of equal rights and
self-determination, that all this should be set asi de and that the present Serbian Government is
ready to reinstate the autonomous status of the province within Serbia and that therefore there is no
right for Kosovo to determine its future as an i ndependent State. Mr.President, distinguished
Members of the Court, this is an absurd and totally misconstrued reading of the right of
self-determination.
14. To begin with, this option is simply not acceptable to the people of Kosovo. They have
made abundantly clear that they have no faith in such assurances and no desire whatsoever to
remain within Serbia. This in itself makes su ch a solution completely untenable and doomed to
fail, even supposing the good faith of the present Serbian Administration. There can be no doubt
that the only way for Serbia to reassert s overeignty over Kosovo would be through forced
incorporation of Kosovo with the acquiescence of th e international community. To state that this
would not be a just or workable solution in th e light of the recent past and the meaning of
self-determination is to state the obvious.
15. The law of self-determination does not provide that when the rights of equal treatment
and full participation in the political life and administration within a State have been systematically
and violently denied for a decade, that the State responsible for such violations can lay claim to a
right to reassert sovereignty over a territory and pe ople, which as a result of such denial of equal
treatment, has chosen to seek its future as an i ndependent State. The same law does provide for a - 23 -
right of remedial secession in such situations an d it is submitted if there ever were a case of
remedial secession as a last resort, that this is such a case.
16. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the law is an instrument to promote and provide
for a just and acceptable, as well as a workable and durable solution to a problem such as this. On
all these counts, there should be no question of what is both just and workable in this situation.
Consequently, should the Court choose to exercise its jurisdiction to pronounce on this issue, it
should not do so in a way that would stand in the way of such a choice; a choice brought about by
a unique set of circumstances and historical events which have resulted in a new situation, whereby
a people has determined its future and one third of the international community has recognized this
as irreversible.
17. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, that concludes my statement. I
would like to thank the Court for its attention a nd, with your permission, give ProfessorFrowein
the floor to make some concluding statements on behalf of the Republic of Albania.
The PRESIDENT: I would like to warn the delegation of Albania that the time allocated to
you— the 45 minutes— has been exhausted. Th e Court has to keep impartiality to all the
delegations. I give you a few minutes to present your conclusion, but please do it as expeditiously
as possible. Thank you.
Mr. FROWEIN: I apologize, Mr. President, and I will make a very brief statement.
VII. C ONCLUSIONS
1. Let me sum up our arguments and come to my conclusion.
2. The fundamental rule protecting territorial integrity has nothing to do with the issue.
3. Resolution1244 did not guarantee in any wa y the final outcome. It was kept open, on
purpose, whether finally Kosovo would become an independent State.
4. I conclude our intervention. No case befo re the International Court of Justice and of
course no request for an advisory opinion has ha d such far-reaching possible importance for a new
member of the international community, recognized today by almost one third of this community, - 24 -
among them three permanent members of the Secu rity Council, all but one of the neighbouring
States, and the great majority of States of the region, organized in the European Union.
5. A non-binding statement by the Internati onal Court of Justice that the Declaration of
Independence of the young nation of Kosovo has b een a violation of international law would
certainly not have the effect of turning the clock back. As PresidentAhtisaari has recently
underlined, there is no doubt that Kosovo will remain an independent State. It will finally be
recognized by most if not all States in the world. However, such a finding would be very
unfortunate for the future development.
6. The attitude of the Kosovar people towards international law and the feeling of a young
nation which has suffered brutal suppression and has lost many of its citizens in the armed conflict
would certainly be affected in a very negative manner.
7. It is understandable that Serbia has difficulties to come to terms with the loss of a territory
which has been of great importance for the country b ecause of its history. It is not the first case in
the development of international law that a St ate had great problems with the recognition of a
newly independent State established on its former territory.
8. However, what seems very difficult to accep t is that Serbia tries to hide the real
background of the development when it is stat es that accepting the legality would amount to
awarding actors who are unwilling to further bona fi de continue with a negotiation process. Here,
Serbia seems to overlook completely what the background of the development was.
9. Rather, a finding of illegality would am ount to awarding actors who have brutally
suppressed the people which has finally opted for independence.
10. Albania asks the Court, Mr. President, to state that the Declaration of Independence was
in conformity with international law, if it decides to render the opinion.
11. Thank you very much, Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, for your kind
attention, and I apologize again for overstepping your time by a very few minutes. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Frowein, for your presentation. Now, we move to
the next participant: that is Germany. I call upon Dr. Susanne Wasum-Rainer to make her
presentation. - 25 -
Ms WASUM-RAINER:
1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is indeed a great honour for me to
appear before this Court in these oral proceedings with regard to the request for an advisory
opinion submitted to you by the General Assembly. With your permission I will present to you the
comments of the Federal Republic of Germany to th e questions of law raised by this request. I
appear before this Court to ask you respectfully to confirm that the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence by the Provisional Institu tions of Self-Government of Kosovo ⎯ as it was
formulated by the General Assembly ⎯ indeed was in accordance with international law.
2. Mr. President, let me begin my argument by underlining the good relations between both
Germany and Serbia ⎯ and between Germany and the Republic of Kosovo. My Government is
convinced that the independence of Kosovo has fo stered stability and security in the Balkans.
Germany sees the future of both States, of Serbia and of the Republic of Kosovo, as partners in the
European Union.
3. Germany has already stated its position in detailed written submissions. We have
carefully considered all of the other Written Stat ements submitted to you, as well as the arguments
put forward by Serbia and by Kosovo yesterday. In the light of this, I will limit my oral
presentation to a few particularly relevant points.
4. I would like to present our line of argument as follows. I will start by looking at the
question submitted to the Court by the General Assembly which is specific and narrow in scope (I).
In order to answer the question I will, in the second part of my presentation, search for rules of
international law which might be violated by the Declaration in question(II). The result of our
careful examination is that there are no such rule s and, therefore, that the Declaration is in
accordance with international law. After having clarified that international law does not contain
any rule prohibiting the Declaration I will, in the third part of my intervention, examine the
question whether international law does contain a rule explicitly justifying the Declaration. In this
regard I will address the fact that there is now a State of Kosovo ⎯ a fact which, in the light of the
principle of effectiveness in international la w, cannot be ignored(III). I will continue by
elaborating, in the fourth section, that the existence of this State is based on the exercise of the right - 26 -
to self-determination by the people of Kosovo(IV ). My conclusion will confirm that the
Declaration of Independence in question is in accordance with international law (V).
I. GENERAL A SSEMBLY RESOLUTION 63/3 OF 8 OCTOBER 2008
5. Mr.President, distinguished Members of th e Court, Germany is of the opinion that the
question before us was diligently chosen by the General Assembly. It relates only to Kosovo’s
Declaration of Independence. This was accepte d by the Written Statements submitted, including
that by Serbia as the main sponsor of General Assembly resolution 63 of 8 October 2008, as well as
by Serbia’s oral pleading yesterday (CR 2009/24).
6. Therefore, it is the Declaration of In dependence which is to be legally evaluated ⎯ and
nothing else. Acts of States or international organizations with regard to this Declaration, the status
of Kosovo under international law, or the issue of its recognition by third States are not the
subject-matter of our proceedings.
7. However, contrary to what the language of the question put to the Court suggests,
Kosovo’s Declaration of Inde pendence was not an act of the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government. Both the explicit wording of th e Declaration itself and the circumstances of its
adoption made it clear that those voting for and signing the Declaration of Independence were
acting as the democratically elected leaders of the people of Kosovo and not merely as members of
an assembly created under the international admini stration of Kosovo. They were expressing as
pouvoir constituant the will of the people of Kosovo to live in a State of their own.
8. As the Declaration emanated from the people’ s will, it was unilateral by its very nature.
However, the unique circumstances leading up to and encompassing Kosovo’s Declaration of
Independence, including the involvement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his
Special EnvoyAhtisaari, supported by the Security Council, reveal the multilateral context of the
issuance of Kosovo’s Declaration. Thus, the overall context of the events makes Kosovo an
extraordinary and special case.
II.P OSSIBLE NORMS PROHIBITING THE D ECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
9. Germany shares the opinion that a declaration of independence leading to secession, and
indeed secession itself, are merely factual eventThe question of that declaration’s legality may - 27 -
well be governed by domestic, notably constitutional, la w. International law, however, is silent on
this point.
10. The thorough search for rules of intern ational law which might prohibit such a
declaration in the present case leads us to the principle of territorial integrity and to Security
Council resolution 1244 (1999). With your permission, Mr. President, I will first discuss those.
11. The principle of territorial integrity of any State is well established in international law.
In the United NationsCharter this principle is interwoven with the fundamental principle of the
prohibition of the threat or use of force among States . The addressees of this rule are the States.
The States have to respect the territorial integrity of each other.
12. International law does not create any obligations for individuals in this regard. Whether
there is a corresponding norm for individuals is a ma tter of domestic law. This is not a subject of
international law. This is also the case for peopl es who have the right to self-determination. The
international legal norm of respecting the territorial integrity of States does not apply to them.
13. Allow me to refer in this regard to General Assembly resolution2625(XXV), the
“Friendly Relations Declaration”. It contains a chapter on “the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples” with a paragraph whic h seems to be particularly pertinent in our
context. While stressing the importance of self-determination, it states that nothing in the
Declaration shall be construed as authorizing the dismembering of the territorial integrity of States.
14. What does this mean in our case? Does this reply to the question of the legality of the
Declaration of Independence of Kosovo? The an swer is: No. The subject of the “Friendly
Relations Declaration” is relations among States. When the Friendly Relations Declaration
underlines the importance of the right to self-determination it reminds States of their duty to respect
this right. And when the Declaration clarifies that this shall not be understood as allowing to the
impairment of the territorial integrity of States, it also addresses States ⎯ and not individuals,
groups of individuals, an entity within a State or peoples.
15. The fact that there are Security Council resolutions which address specific conflict
situations and require that in these specific situations also non-State actors respect the territorial
integrity of a specific State does not contravene this finding. Contrary to what Serbia had stated - 28 -
yesterday, the inclusion of such an obligation in a Security Council resolution can also be seen ⎯
and this is our position ⎯ as establishing an obligation which otherwise would not exist.
16. In the context of a declaration of independence it is, of course, possible that States violate
their obligation to respect each other’s territorial integrity, for instance, by illicit acts of
intervention. Yet this was not the situation with regard to Kosovo and this question is not the one
before the Court today.
17. Let me now come to Se curity Council resolution1244(1 999). Does this resolution
prohibit a declaration of independence of Kosovo? The answer is, once again, No. Resolution 1244
establishes an interim situation with the purpose of enabling a political process which will bring
about a final solution.
18. Resolution 1244 does not anticipate a specific result of this political process, nor does it
contain a requirement that the final status be agreed. My Government had certainly hoped for such
an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo and had actively supported corresponding efforts. Allow
me to refer, in this context, to the contribution of Ambassador Ischinger as member of the “Troika”
made up by the European Union, the United St ates and Russia. Yet, however desirable an
agreement might have been, resolution 1244 does not require it.
19. The UnitedNations launched a political pro cess in order to decide on the future of
Kosovo. The situation was altered fundamentally when the process, having explored and
exhausted every conceivable avenue for reachi ng a negotiated settlement, failed unequivocally and
irretrievably. The international community was fa ced with the dilemma of how to deal with an
impasse that would, if allowed to persist, destabilize both Kosovo and the entire region. The focus
then turned to a settlement proposal which bu ilt upon the positions the parties had put forward
during the negotiation process and identified compro mises on all issues related to the status of
Kosovo. While it was not a negotiated solution, it was a solution which built upon the preceding
negotiation processes in order to establish a sust ainable solution conducive to stability in Kosovo
and in the region.
20. Resolution1244contained the requirement th at the final status process must take into
account the March1999 Rambouillet Accords. But it did not exclude a declaration of
independence. The fact that neither the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, nor the - 29 -
Secretary-General, nor the Security Council, acted to set aside the Declaration of Independence of
February2008 strongly supports the proposition that the issuance of the Declaration of
Independence did not violate resolution 1244.
21. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, let me pause here to summarize: The
Declaration of Independence of the people of Ko sovo does not violate international law and, in
particular, it is not prohibited by the principle ofterritorial integrity or by Security Council
resolution 1244 (1999).
22. Referring to the famous decision of the Pe rmanent Court of International Justice in the
Lotus case (“Lotus”, Judgment No.9, 1927, P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No.10) , it is possible to give the
following answer to the question posed by the General Assembly: Since the Declaration of
Independence is not forbidden by international law, it is in accordance with international law.
III.PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS : E XISTENCE OF THE STATE OF K OSOVO
23. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, having answered the General
Assembly’s question, I could end my presentation here. Allow me, nevertheless, to continue my
argument and to draw your attention to one further important aspect.
24. We have found that international law does not contain rules prohibiting the Declaration
of Independence in question. Let us now go one step further and examine whether international
law positively justifies the Declaration.
25. In this regard, I am referring to the fact that now, as I stand before you, an independent
State of Kosovo exists. The Declaration of Independence was a crucial step in the formation of this
State. If international law accepts the existence of the State of Kosovo, we have to conclude that
international law also accepts its constituent Declaration of Independence.
26. Let me first address the existence of the State of Kosovo. All three elements which are
required by the traditional doctrine of statehood are present: State population, State territory and
government. The continuous presence of the in ternational community in Kosovo is not
inconsistent with the authority of the Govern ment of Kosovo which acts independently and
autonomously. There has been considerable progress in stabilizing the State institutions. - 30 -
27. Recent examples include the independent municipal elections which took place on
15November and the establishment of the Constitu tional Court in June. Accordingly, so
far 63 States have recognized this State ⎯ including the successor States of the former Yugoslavia
with one exception ⎯ and it has been admitted ⎯ with the support of more than 100 States ⎯ into
both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group.
28. Even though the question before the Cour t addresses neither the status of Kosovo itself
nor its recognition by other States, it is related to a factual situation which exists and therefore
cannot be ignored. The legal principle I am referring to here is the principle of effectiveness.
29. Of course, not every factual situation is in accordance with the law just because it is
factual. When it comes to the question of state hood, however, international practice clearly refers
to the principle of effectiveness.
30. This also applies to the constituent act of statehood, the declaration of independence. In
past cases where violations of international law have been stated relating to a declaration of
independence, it was not the declaration itself but a separate act linked to the declaration which was
considered to violate a rule of international law. This is not the situation in the present case and,
consequently, no such question has been brought before this Court.
IV. R IGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION
31. Besides the principle of effectiveness, there is a norm in international law which seems to
positively justify the formation of the State of Kosovo: the right to self-determination.
32. While self-determination should, for the sake of the stability of the international system,
normally be enjoyed and exercised within the existing framework of a State, secession may, by
way of exception, be considered legitimate if it is possible to establish that this is the only remedy
to a prolonged, rigorous and oppressive refusal of internal self-determination.
33. This was precisely the situation the people of Kosovo faced. The developments
preceding the Declaration of Independence reveal a clear case of prolonged and severe repression
and denial of internal self-determination that left the people of Kosovo no other meaningful choice.
34. In the debate about the right to self-deter mination, concerns have been voiced that a
broad exegesis of its content might trigger risks for stability, peace and security. In order to - 31 -
prevent the concept getting out of hand, attempts have been made to narrow and limit the scope of
the right to self-determination.
35. Yet, the perspective of those arguments is the ex ante viewpoint: namely, the situation
prior to the exercise of a possible right to self-determi nation. Our case is different. Ours has an
ex post perspective.
36. The State of Kosovo exists, the people of Kosovo have exercised their right to
self-determination. Denying them this right woul d have triggered serious risks for stability and
security both in Kosovo and in the region. On the other hand, it has also been observed that
acknowledging and recognizing this right has been , visibly and beyond all doubt, conducive to
stability and security in Kosovo and in the region.
37. To date, as I have said already, nearly all countries in the region have recognized
Kosovo. Thus, the largest part of the region has expressed its trust in the legitimacy and
sustainability of the new State of Kosovo in their neighbourhood ⎯ a confidence that was rooted in
the now widely accepted evidence that this st atehood has benefited and strengthened regional
stability.
38. Mr. President, distinguished Members of th e Court, Kosovo is not a precedent. The case
is specific and unique.
39. The main elements of the case are, first: a period of massive and systematic repression in
Kosovo culminating in a policy of massacre and displacement directed against the majority
population ⎯ we have laid out the details in our wr itten submission. The second element was a
long-lasting presence of the international community under the umbrella of the United Nations over
a period in which Serbia, against the backdrop of its persistent repression and denial of the
democratic right to internal self-determination, retained neither power nor influence in and over
Pristina. The third element was a unique, and UN-led, negotiation process that explored all
imaginable settlement options in order to seek a ne gotiated settlement and failed. At this juncture,
given the specific history, an independent State of Kosovo the only possible remedy remaining.
40. In the light of the very special conditions of the Kosovo case, concerns that this case
might be used as an unwanted precedent are not justified. - 32 -
41. Let me sum up. The formation of the State of Kosovo was justified under international
law. It is based on the right to self-determination exercised by the people of Kosovo. It has
established a fact which has to be considered in the light of the principle of effectiveness in
international law. The Declaration of Independe nce in question was a constituent step in this
process. Therefore, international la w also justifies this Declaration ⎯ even though stricto sensu
international law does not specifically address the issuance of such a declaration.
V. C ONCLUSION
42. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, this brings me to the conclusion that
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence is in accord ance with international law. In particular, it
does not contravene the principle of territorial integrity of States or Security Council
resolution1244 (1999). It was a step taken by the people of Kosovo, a case with a very specific
history, to exercise their right to self-determination. It does not challenge the principle of territorial
integrity which retains its full relevance, not at l east in the case of the territorial integrity of the
State of Kosovo itself.
43. Mr. President, this year we are celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the
Berlin Wall. This event enabled the people of my country to reunite by exercising their right to
self-determination. And this event was also the starting-point of a success story integrating Eastern
and Western Europe ⎯ a development few observers would have thought possible 20years ago.
My Government is convinced there is room for both States, Kosovo and Serbia, in our common
house of Europe.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Dr. Susanne Wasum-Rainer for her presentation. As I announced
earlier, we shall have a short recess of 15 minutes. We will meet again at 11.30 a.m.
The Court adjourned from 11.15 to 11.30 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Now the Court resumes its session. I call upon
His Excellency Mr. Abdullah Alshaghrood to make his presentation on behalf of Saudi Arabia. - 33 -
Mr.ALSHAGHROOD: Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, I have the
honour, as a representative of my country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to participate before you
in this oral proceeding to render an advisory opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was
informed about the public hearings through a No te sent by the distinguished Court to the Royal
Embassy of Saudi Arabia in The Hague on 20 Octobe r 2008. In this Note the Court referred to the
request received from the General Assembly of th e United Nations to render an advisory opinion
on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
of Kosovo in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly No.63/3 dated
8 October 2008. The Embassy received also in the same Note the Order of the Court No. 141 dated
17 October 2008 concerning the organization of the hearings and their schedules. The Government
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had informed the Court about its intention to participate in these
hearings through a Note sent by the Embassy in The Hague to the Court on 14 September 2009. As
a response the Embassy received a Note from the Court on 29September2009, in which it
mentioned that according to the schedule adopted by the Court, th e Saudi delegation will have the
opportunity to participate in the oral proceedings before the Court on Wednesday
2 December 2009.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, my country has declared its recognition of the
independence of the Republic of Kosovo according to the statement of an official source at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 24RabiaII 1430 Hijri,
corresponding to 20April2009. The main motive of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to take this
sovereign decision was to contribute to strengt hening the security, stability and prosperity of
Kosovo and its neighbour States in the Balkan region. Especially, the region has suffered from a
long period of wars, fighting and instability. This resulted in the deterioration of its economic and
political situations and reflected badly on the human itarian circumstances of its people. It is
significant here to mention the assessment of the United Nations Secretary-General made in
September 2007 that if a resolution was not reached , there was “real risk of progress beginning to
unravel and instability in Kosovo and the region”. - 34 -
In our view, the Declaration of Independence issued by Kosovo on 17February2008 was
the final step in a process for r esolving Kosovo’s status, which cam e constant with both Security
Council resolution 1244 of 1999 and general interna tional law. Although my government has not
submitted a written statement to the Court, we agr ee with the conclusions in the written statements
submitted by Kosovo and by others that there wa s no violation of international law and that
resolution1244 did not forbid Kosovo from declaring its independence. It is important here to
mention the resolution adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic
Conference in its Thirty-Sixth Session in May2 008, in which the Council took note of Security
Council resolution 1244 and of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. In the same resolution the
Council recognized the progress made towards democracy, peace and stability in Kosovo and the
whole region.
In this regard, the decision of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding the recognition of the
independence and self-determination of Kosovo has come to meet the aspirations of the
overwhelming majority of the population of Kosovo who have indicated clearly that independence
is their choice, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, and to consolidate the Kingdom’s
desire to bring stability in the country and to in carnate the desire of the Saudi Government in
co-operating with the rest of the international community that strives to bring stability in the region
and to support its States in order to get their legitimate rights of political stability and economic and
social development. My Government urges the Co urt, in its consideration of the specific legal
question before it, not to lose sight of the broader context, including political, human and economic
sides. We are confident that the Court will take into consideration the s ubstantial progress that has
been made in Kosovo and the stability that exists today both there and in the whole region.
Finally, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, for
giving me this opportunity to clarify the viewpoints of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Republic of Kosovo.
Thyouk. - 35 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, His Excellency Mr.Abdullah Alshaghrood, for
your presentation on behalf of Saudi Arabia. I now call upon Her Excellency, MsSusanaRuiz
Cerutti, who will be making the presentation on behalf of Argentina.
Mme RUIZ CERUTTI :
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est un honneur de participer à la phase orale
de cette procédure consultative afin d’exposer les points de vue de la République argentine. Mon
pays attache une importance fondamentale au resp ect du droit international en général et des
résolutions des NationsUnies en particulier. L’avis que la Cour rendra à cette occasion aura un
impact certain non seulement sur la question du Kosovo, mais aussi au-delà. Il y va en effet de la
place que les acteurs internationaux accordent au droit international dans la conduite de leurs
relations, ainsi que de la capacité de l’Organisation à respecter ses engagements et à faire valoir ses
résolutions. L’Argentine a pleine confiance dans le rôle que l’organe judiciaire principal des
Nations Unies est appelé à jouer dans cette procédur e consultative, en tant que garant de l’autorité
du droit international.
2. Depuis le début des crises yougoslaves, l’ Argentine a participé à toutes les opérations de
maintien de la paix et d’administration décidées par les NationsUnies en ex-Yougoslavie, y
compris au Kosovo, à travers la MINUK et la KF OR. Participer à cette procédure devant votre
Cour pour défendre le respect du droit internati onal est aussi une manière de rendre hommage aux
ressortissants argentins qui ont perdu leur vie en accomplissant les missions à eux confiées par
l’Organisation dans cette région du monde. L’Ar gentine a également été membre du Conseil de
sécurité au moment de l’adoption de la résolution 1244, qui revêt une fonction clé dans la réponse à
donner à la question posée par l’Assemblée générale. C’est aussi en tant que l’un de ceux qui ont
voté en faveur de cette résolution que mon gouvernement souhaite contribuer à l’éclaircissement de
sa vraie portée dans cette procédure.
3. Cet exposé abordera sept points en particulier :
A. la compétence de la Cour et l’opportunité de son exercice ;
B. la portée de la résolution 1244 du Conseil de sécurité et s on infraction par la déclaration
unilatérale d’indépendance ; - 36 -
C. la violation de l’intégrité territoriale de la Serbie ;
D.l’impossibilité d’invoquer le principe d’autodétermination p our justifier la déclaration
unilatérale ;
E.l’obligation de poursuivre le règlement des différends par des moyens pacifiques et
l’impossibilité d’imposer une solution unilatérale ;
F. lecaractère sui generis du Kosovo, qui constitue une raison de plus pour déclarer illicite la
déclaration unilatérale ; et finalement,
G. les autres arguments avancés pour justifier la sécession, qui ne sont pas recevables.
A. Il y a des raisons décisives pour que la Cour exerce sa compétence consultative
4. Certains participants à cette procédure vous demandent explicitement de ne pas rendre
l’avis consultatif, arguant essentiellement que la question n’est pas réglée par le droit, ou que même
3
si la déclaration devait s’avérer illicite, la situation existante demeurerait inchangée . En réalité,
ces participants cherchent à ce que vous répondiez à la question comme ils le souhaitent, sans
rendre l’avis demandé par l’Assemb lée générale. D’autres participants ont avancé exactement les
mêmes idées pour prétendre que la déclaration un ilatérale d’indépendance n’est pas contraire au
droit international. Comme nous le verrons dans un instant, l’argu ment de la neutralité juridique
face à la déclaration unilatérale et l’argument du fait accompli ne sont ni l’un ni l’autre recevables.
5. Pour le reste, Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, il est évident que nous ne
4
sommes ni dans la situation de la Carélieorientale , ni dans la situation de l’avis sur les armes
nucléaires demandé par l’Organisation mondiale de la santé 5. Il n’est donc point nécessaire de
s’appesantir sur la question. Les trois conditions pour rendre l’avis consultatif sont clairement
remplies: la Charte donne à l’Assemblée générale le pouvoir de demander un avis, la question
posée est juridique et elle tombe sous le coup de la compétence de l’Assemblée générale.
6. Aucune raison décisive n’empêche la Cour d’exercer sa compétence. Au contraire, il est
absolument indispensable qu’une voix autorisée co mme la vôtre offre l’orientation juridique dont
3
Albanie, exposé écrit, p. 27, 30-37, par. 47, 54-70 ; France, exposé écrit, p. 16, 9, par. 1.6, 1.13.
4 Statut de la Carélie orientale, avis consultatif, 1923, C.P.J.I. série B n 5.
5 Licéité de l’utilisation des armes nucléaires par un Etat dans un conflit armé, avis consultatif,
C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (I), p. 66. - 37 -
tous les organes politiques ont tant besoin. Co mpte tenu de la responsabilité particulière des
NationsUnies à l’égard du Kosovo et de votre jurisprudence relevant l’exercice restreint du
6
pouvoir discrétionnaire en matière consultative , il n’est même pas imaginable que l’organe
judiciaire principal des NationsUnies décide de ne pas répondre à la question posée par
l’Assemblée générale.
7. L’Argentine soutient qu’il peut être répondu à la question en confrontant la déclaration
unilatérale d’indépendance à la résolution1244 du Conseil de sécurité ainsi qu’aux principes
fondamentaux du droit international. De l’avis de mon pays, la déclaration unilatérale n’est pas en
conformité avec la résolution 1244 ; elle viole l’obligation du respect de l’intégrité territoriale de la
Serbie, l’obligation de règlement pacifique des di fférends ainsi que le principe de non-intervention
⎯ pour avoir été faite en coordination avec des Etats étrangers. Par ailleurs, la résolution ne trouve
aucun fondement juridique dans le principe d’autodétermination.
B. La déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance est contraire à la résolution 1244 (1999)
du Conseil de sécurité
8. La déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance du 17 février 2008 n’est pas en conformité avec
la résolution 1244, et ce pour de nombreuses et graves raisons :
⎯ Primo, parce que ses auteurs, à savoir les institutions provisoires d’administration autonome du
Kosovo, elles-mêmes créées par l’ONU et qui puisent leur source principale dans la
résolution 1244, ne sont pas compétents pour procéder à une telle déclaration 7.
⎯ Secundo, parce que la déclaration, qui vise à étab lir un nouvel Etat souverain sur un territoire
qui est soumis à un régime établi par une réso lution adoptée en vertu du chapitreVII de la
Charte, remet en question la base même de ce régime. Permettre qu’un organe
d’administration locale créé par les NationsUnies puisse faire en toute impunité ce qu’aucun
Etat Membre ne serait autorisé à faire représenterait un développement grave. La déclaration
6 Certaines dépenses des Nations Un ies (article17, paragraphe2, de la Charte), avis consultatif,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p.155 ; Demande de réformation du jugement no333 du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies,
avis consultatif, C.I.J.Recueil198, p. 31, par. 25 ; Sahara occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.Recueil 1975, p.21,
par. 23 ; Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (I), p. 235, par. 14 ;
Différend relatif à l’immunité de juridiction d’un rapporteuspécial de la Commission des droits de l’homme, avis
consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 78-79, par. 29 ; Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le
territoire palestinien occupé, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 2004, p. 157, par. 45.
7 Argentine, exposé écrit, p. 26-27, par. 61-64. - 38 -
unilatérale sape ainsi les bases mêmes de la comp étence de l’organe qui a adopté la résolution,
et par là même l’ensemble du système de sécurité collective.
⎯ Tertio, parce que la déclaration prétend modifi er unilatéralement la distribution de
compétences entre l’administration internationale et l’Etat souverain telle qu’établie par la
résolution, violant à la fois les compéten ces d’administration des NationsUnies et les
compétences souveraines de la Serbie.
⎯ Quarto, et c’est là un corollaire de ce qui précède, la déclaration est en contradiction flagrante
avec le respect de l’intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, élément fondamental du régime établi par
la résolution 1244.
⎯ Quinto, parce que la déclaration implique que la pa rtie qui l’a adoptée a décidé unilatéralement
de mettre fin au processus politique visant à détermin er le statut futur du Kosovo. Or, seul le
Conseil de sécurité peut prendre une telle décision.
⎯ Sexto, parce que la déclaration vise à imposer à la Serbie et à l’ensemble de la communauté
internationale une solution donnée, qui ne peut pourtant que résulter de négociations menées de
bonne foi. Si même le Conseil de sécurité ne peut imposer une solution, ce n’est certes pas les
institutions provisoires d’administration locale créées par les NationsUnies elles-mêmes qui
pourront le faire.
a) Les auteurs de la déclaration sont les ins titutions provisoires d’administration autonome,
lesquelles ont reçu le soutien d’Etats étrangers
9. Conscients du caractère ouvertement contraire de la déclaration unilatérale au droit de la
Charte, ses auteurs et les Etats qui les soutiennent ont prétendu que cette déclaration n’avait pas été
adoptée par les institutions provisoires. C’est nier l’évidence même. Mais cette prétention peut
aisément être réfutée; c’est l’Assemblée générale qui a elle-même déterminé, dans la question
posée à la Cour, qui en sont les auteurs: ce s ont les institutions provisoires d’administration
autonome. Lors des débats et après le vote de la demande d’avis consultatif, aucun Etat ⎯ je dis
bien : aucun Etat ⎯ n’avait même soulevé la question. Pourquoi les Etats qui avancent aujourd’hui
cet argument n’ont-ils pas indiqué à l’Assemblée générale que la question était erronée et qu’il
n’aurait pas fallu mentionner comme auteurs les in stitutions provisoires d’autonomie ? La réponse
est simple: parce qu’ils savaient tous que c’étaient bien ces organes-là qui avaient adopté la - 39 -
déclaration. Personne à l’époque ne songeait à cet argument inventé de toutes pièces au cours de la
présente procédure.
10. La réalité est reflétée dans le débat à l’Assemblée générale sur la demande d’avis
consultatif, où l’on retrouve par exemple l’affi rmation suivante: «en coordination avec un grand
nombre des pays qui prenaient le plus activement part à la stabilisation des Balkans, l’Assemblée
du Kosovo a déclaré l’indépendan ce du Kosovo le 17février2008» 8. En clair, l’un des
participants à cette procédure a même pris le soin de préciser laquelle des institutions provisoires
avait déclaré l’indépendance: l’Assemblée; et il a indiqué en outre que cela avait été fait «en
coordination» avec un certain nombre d’Etats étrangers . Cet aveu on ne peut plus clair révèle que
la déclaration est le résultat de l’action cord onnée des institutions provisoires avec un certain
nombre d’Etats qui les ont soutenues et qui leur ont donné leur aval avant même la déclaration
d’indépendance. Or, s’il y a un point sur lequel il existe une unanimité de critères en la matière,
c’est bien celui qui reconnaît que l’encourag ement aux mouvements sécessionnistes avant que la
9
sécession ne réussisse constitue une ingérence dans les affaires internes de l’Etat concerné .
Ces Etats ne se sont pas limités à exprimer leur point de vue et à expliquer que la meilleure solution
était, à leurs yeux, l’indépendance. Non. Ils ont accompli des actions concrètes ⎯ ils se sont
coordonnés avec les auteurs de la sécession pour procéder à la déclaration unilatérale
d’indépendance. Absolument rien dans la résolu tion 1244 ne permet à des Etats de venir soutenir
et de promouvoir activement la sécession de concert avec un mouvement ou une province
séparatiste.
8 Sir John Sawers (Royaume-Uni), 8 oc tobre 2008, Nations Unies, doc. A/63/PV.22, p. 3. (Version anglaise : «in
coordination with many of the countries most closely involved in stabilizing th e Balkans, Kosovo’s Assembly declared
Kosovo independent on 17 February 2008»).
9 Sir Michael Wood, «The Principle of Non-Intervention in Contemporary International Law: Non-Interference in
a State's Internal Affairs Used to be a Rule of International Law: Is it Still?»,Summary of the Chatham House
International Law discussion group meeting ofF2 ebru2ay70 , disponible:sur
http://www.chathamhoese.org.uk/research/international_law/papers, p.7; Crawford, James, The Creation of States in
International Law, 2 éd., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.388-389; Crawford, James, State Practice and
International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession, Report for the Attorney General of Canada, 19février1997,
reproduit dans Bayefsky, Anne (éd.), Self-determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned , LaHaye,
Kluwer Law International, 2000, 31-61, p. 36. - 40 -
11. Pour le reste, il a été prouvé dans la phase écrite que le constat de l’Assemblée générale
est aussi en pleine conformité avec les faits: ce sont les institutions provisoires d’autonomie qui
10
ont déclaré l’indépendance ; et elles l’ont fait en toute illicéité.
b) Le Conseil de sécurité ne pouvait pas limiter et n’a pas limité le respect de l’intégrité
territoriale de la Serbie. Au contraire, il l’a renforcé
12. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, les Etats qui soutiennent la sécession
invoquent d’autres arguments qui sont en contradi ction flagrante avec la résolution1244. Pour
échapper au constat simple de la non-conformité de la déclaration à la résolution1244, ils
prétendent ainsi que celle-ci protégerait seulement l’intégrité territoriale de la Serbie durant la
période intérimaire 11. Messieurs les juges, l’Argentine a participé à l’adoption de la
résolution1244, en faveur de laquelle elle a voté. Aucun Etat n’a prétendu à ce moment que
l’intégrité territoriale de ce qui était alors la Ré publique fédérale de Yougoslavie était en sursis, ou
que sa garantie se limitait à l’étape intérimaire. Comment l’inclusion explicite de cette garantie,
qui visait à donner des assurances quant à l’intégrité territoriale de la Yougoslavie alors que celle-ci
consentait à soumettre une partie de son territoire à une administration internationale, pourrait-elle
être interprétée dans le sens exactement inverse ? L’Argentine n’aurait tout simplement jamais
voté pour la résolution1244 si celle-ci avait c ontenu une clause telle que celle qu’invoquent
aujourd’hui certains participants. Enfin, Monsieur le président, ce ne serait tout simplement même
pas de la compétence du Conseil de sécurité de r estreindre le principe du respect de l’intégrité
territoriale des Etats.
c) La résolution 1244 a privilégié l’autonomie et ne parle nulle part de sécession
13. J’en viens maintenant à l’argument selon lequel la résolution 1244 ne préjugerait en rien
du résultat final du processus politique visant à déte rminer le statut futur du Kosovo. Cette
prétendue «neutralité» de la résolution1244 est avancée comme argument pour justifier la
12
sécession . La résolution1244 montre toutefois la vo ie contraire lorsqu’elle affirme de manière
10
Argentine, observations écrites, p. 15-16, par. 26-27.
11 Etats-Unis d’Amérique, observations écrites, p3.1 ; auteurs, contribution écrite I,par. 9.05 ;
contra : Argentine, observations écrites, p. 20, par. 38.
12Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit, par. 6.6 ; Suisse, exposé écrit, p. 14, par. 56. - 41 -
générale ⎯et pas seulement pour la période intérimaire ⎯ «l’attachement de tous les Etats
13
Membres à la souveraineté et à l’intégrité territo riale de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie» .
La résolution privilégie plutôt une autonomie substan tielle dans le cadre de l’Etat, et elle prépare
cette autonomie en mettant sur pied les instituti ons provisoires d’administration autonome. Pas un
mot de la résolution1244 ne permet de supposer que le Conseil de sécurité a autorisé d’une
manière ou d’une autre les Albanais du Kos ovo, ou les institutions provisoires autonomes
envisagées, à proclamer unilatéralement leur indépe ndance. Au contraire, la résolution parle de
«règlementdéfinitif» et de «règ lement politique». Or, par définition, une décision unilatérale de
l’une des parties ne peut constituer un «règlement» ; c’est bien plutôt une aggravation du différend.
Ainsi, tant qu’un règlement sur le statut «futur» n’est pas atteint, le statut «présent» demeure. C’est
là la lecture normale de la résolution. Toute autre lecture serait lourde de conséquences pour la
stabilité des relations internationales.
14. Mais au fond, Monsieur le président, ce débat n’a même pas lieu d’être. Car à supposer
que la résolution1244 reste neutre quant au statut futur du Kosovo, cela signifierait simplement
que tout règlement, y compris un éven tuel accord sur l’indépendance, serait possible. Mais
certainement pas une tentative d’imposer unilatéralement l’indépendance.
15. Le Conseil de sécurité n’a jamais imposé à la Serbie, sans son consentement, la perte à
terme de son territoire. Il ne pourrait d’ailleurs pas le faire. Jamais les pères fondateurs des
NationsUnies n’avaient même envisagé la po ssibilité que les Etats Membres donneraient au
Conseil de sécurité le pouvoir d’amputer ou de permettre l’amputation du territoire d’un Etat
Membre.
16. En outre, Monsieur le président, il faut relever un élément essentiel qui distingue le
régime établi par la résolution 1244. Normalement, les résolutions mettant sur pied des opérations
de maintien de la paix ou d’administration territoriale établissent des mandats à durée déterminée
13Version anglaise: «the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia». - 42 -
14
qui requièrent une résolution ultérieure pour être reconduit
es . Par contre, la résolution1244 a
établi un régime à durée indéterminée, qui exige une nouvelle résolution du Conseil de sécurité
pour mettre fin à ce régime. Cela montre claire ment que le Conseil a voulu préserver ce régime
tant qu’une majorité nécessaire pour le modifier ne puisse être obtenue. Comment les institutions
provisoires pourraient-elles alors le faire de leur propre chef ?
17. Le constat est donc dépourvu d’ambiguïté : la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance est
en flagrante contradiction avec la résolution 1244. Mais ce n’est pas tout : cette déclaration heurte
également et de manière autonome des principes fondamentaux du droit international.
C. La déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance est contraire à l’intégrité territoriale
de la Serbie
18. Le premier de ces principes est celui de l’in tégrité territoriale. L’Argentine se félicite du
large consensus existant dans cette procédure concernant l’importance en droit international du
principe du respect de l’intégrité territoriale des Etats 15. Comme il a été expliqué dans la phase
écrite, il s’agit d’un principe fondamental du droit international 16. Cependant, certains participants
ont seulement reconnu cette importance du bout d es lèvres. Cette timide reconnaissance de
principe se heurte alors aussitôt à une autre affi rmation, selon laquelle le respect de l’intégrité
17
territoriale serait une règle applicable uniquement dans les relations d’Etat à Etat . Pour ces
mêmes participants, les acteurs infra-étatiques ne seraient donc pas tenus de respecter l’intégrité
territoriale des Etats 18. Mais tant l’Argentine que d’autres participants ont déjà démontré que
l’évolution du droit international a fait du respect de l’intégrité territoriale un principe applicable à
14Par exemple, le mandat de l’Opération des Nations Unies à Chypre, a été prolongé jusqu’au 15 décembre 2009
par la résolution 1873, 29 mai 2009, par. 6 ; le mandat de la Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti a été
prolongé jusqu’au 15 octobre 2010 par la résolution1892 (200 9), par.1; le mandat de la Force des NationsUnies
chargée d’observer le dégagement a été renouvelé jus qu’au 31 décembre 2009 par la résolution1875, 23juin2009,
par.3; le mandat de la Force inté rimaire des NationsUnies au Liban a ét é prolongé jusqu’au 31août2010 par la
résolution 1884, 27 août 2009, par. 1 ; le mandat de la Mission intégrée des Nations Unies au Timor-Leste a été prolongé
jusqu’au 26 février 2010 par la résolution 1867, 26 février 2009. La Mission d’appui au Timor Oriental a été créée par la
résolution 1410, 17 mai 2002, par. 1, d’une durée initiale de 1 mois, et a été prolongée successivement par les
résolutions 1480, 19 mai 2003, et 1573, 16 novembre 2004.
15Argentine, exposé écrit, p.28-30, par.69-75; Azerbaïd jan, exposé écrit, par.19; Bolivie, exposé écrit, p.1;
Chine, exposé écrit, p.2-3; Chypre, exposé écrit, par.81-82; Egypte, expos é écrit, par.26-29; Espagne, exposé écrit,
par.25 et 27; Iran, exposé écrit, par.2.1; Serbie, exposé écrit, p.28-30; Slovaquie, e xposé écrit, par. 3 ; Roumanie,
exposé écrit, par. 97 ; Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit, par. 5.8-5.11 ; Russie, exposé écrit, par. 76-78.
16Argentine, exposé écrit, p. 28, par. 69.
17Etats-Unis d’Amérique, exposé écrit, p. 69 ; Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit, p. 86, par. 5.10.
18Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit, p. 86, par. 5.9 ; auteurs, exposé oral du 1 décembre 2009, CR 2009/25 (Müller). - 43 -
19
tous les acteurs internationaux . S’agissant de la situation en Bosnie-Herzégovine, en Géorgie, en
Azerbaïdjan, aux Comores ou encore au Kosovo, parmi d’autres, la communauté internationale
s’est adressée à toutes les parties ⎯y compris donc les mouvements sécessionnistes ⎯ rappelant
l’obligation de respecter l’intégrité territoriale des Etats concernés 20. La pratique des
Nations Unies à l’égard du Kosovo le confirme, et ce avant même l’adoption de la résolution 1244.
19. En fait, ce débat serait même académique dans les circonstances de la présente affaire :
les institutions provisoires d’autonomie ⎯une création onusienne ⎯ doivent respecter le cadre
juridique défini par l’instrument international dans lequel elles trouvent leur source, et cet
instrument confirme le respect de l’intégrité territoriale de l’Etat souverain. Il en va de même de
tous les participants au processus politique déclenché en vertu de la résolution 1244, fussent-ils des
«représentants démocratiquement élus», des partis politiques ou autres. Prétendre le contraire,
c’est ignorer les désormais nombreuses résoluti ons du Conseil de sécurité régissant des conflits
internes qui menacent la paix et la sécurité internationales. C’est les condamner à n’être obligatoire
que pour les parties étatiques, alors qu’ell es deviendraient facultatives pour les acteurs
non étatiques.
20. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, au cŒur même du principe de respect de
l’intégrité territoriale se trouve l’idée de fournir une garantie contre tout démembrement. Or, en
voulant mettre fin à la souveraineté serbe sur la province du Kosovo, les institutions provisoires
d’administration autonome ont gravement porté atteinte à l’intégrité territoriale de la Serbie.
D. Le droit d’autodétermination ne constitue pas un fondement à la déclaration
unilatérale d’indépendance
21. Durant la phase écrite, de nombreux pa rticipants se sont référés au principe
d’autodétermination, soit pour relever sa non-per tinence, et cela même parmi des Etats ayant
21
reconnu la prétendue «République du Kosovo» , soit pour l’invoquer afin de justifier la prétendue
19Argentine, observations écrites, p. 20-21, par. 39-40.
20Pour la Géorgie, cf. les résolutions 876 (1993), 896(1994) et 906 (1994) du Conseil de sécurité. Pour
l’Azerbaïdjan, les résolutions 882 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (19et 884 (1993) du même organe. Pour les Comores,
cf. l’accord d’Addis-Abeba du 13 décembre 1997 dans : 4 Documents d'actualité internationale, Paris, La documentation
française, 1998, p. 143. Pour le Kosovo : les résolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) et 1203 (1998).
21Albanie, observations écrite s, p. 34, par.61; Etats-Unis d’Améque, observations écrites, p.21; Norvège,
observations écrites, p. 3, par. 8 ; Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit, par. 5.33, 6.65. - 44 -
22
conformité vis-à-vis du droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance .
L’Argentine a expliqué pourquoi à son avis ce prin cipe ne constitue pas un fondement juridique de
23
la déclaration .
22. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les j uges, votre Cour a eu l’occasion de rappeler à
plusieurs reprises l’importance de ce principe fonda mental dans les relations internationales ainsi
que les compétences des NationsUnies ⎯et en particulier de l’Assemblée générale ⎯ en la
matière, reconnaissant que seuls les «peuples» dans le sens juridique international du terme et
reconnus comme tels, sont titulaires de l’autodéterm ination. Dans votre avis consultatif sur le
Sahara occidental, votre Cour a relevé que
«La validité du principe d’autodétermin ation, défini comme répondant à la
nécessité de respecter la volonté librement exprimée des peuples, n’est pas diminuée
par le fait que dans certai ns cas l’Assemblée générale n’a pas cru devoir exiger la
consultation des habitants de tel ou tel terr itoire. Ces exceptions s’expliquent soit par
la considération qu’une certaine population ne constituait pas un «peuple» pouvant
prétendre à disposer de lui-même, soit par la conviction qu ’une consultation eût été
sans nécessité aucune, en raison de circonstances spéciales.» ( Sahara occidental, avis
24
consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 33, par. 59 ; les italiques sont de nous.)
23. Dans la présente espèce, ni le Conseil de sécurité ni l’Assemblée générale n’ont reconnu
l’existence d’un «peuplekosovar» ayant droit à disposer de lui-même. Ni explicitement, ni
implicitement. Ceci n’a rien d’étonnant. La conf érence de Paix pour l’ex-Yougoslavie avait traité
les Albanais du Kosovo comme une mi norité, non comme un peuple titulaire de
l’autodétermination. Selon la Constitution yougoslave de 1974, seules les républiques avaient droit
à l’autodétermination. Par ailleurs, le processus de dissolution de l’ancienne Yougoslavie a été
considéré par la commission Badinter comme mené à terme le 29 novembre 1991 25. Comme nous
26
l’avons déjà expliqué à la phase écrite , même Rambouillet, avec sa référence à la «volonté du
peuple», n’autorise pas à prétendre une reconnais sance quelconque du droit d’ autodétermination.
22
Albanie, exposé écrit, p.39, par. 74; auteurs, contribution écrite II, p.80-86, par.4.42-4.53; Pays-Bas,
observations écrites, p. 5 ; Slovénie, exposé écrit, p. 2/3 ; Suisse, exposé écrit, p. 21, par. 77.
23
Argentine, exposé écrit, p. 37, par. 95, et observations écrites, p. 26-27, par. 59-61.
24(Version anglaise : «The validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the
freely expressed will of peoples, is not affected by the fact th at in certain cases the General Assembly has dispensed with
the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. Those instances were based either on the consideration
that a certain population did not constitute a «people» en titled to self-determination or on the conviction that a
consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances»).
25Opinion nº 8 du 4 juillet 1992, reproduit dans RGDIP, 1993, t. XCVII, p. 590.
26Argentine, exposé écrit, p. 39, par. 98-99. - 45 -
Ceci n’est pas non plus autorisé par la seule mention dans la résolution1244 que l’on devra tenir
compte de Rambouillet 27. En effet, tenir compte d’un text e non contraignant ne signifie nullement
que ce texte soit devenu obligatoire.
24. Certainement, la population albanaise du Kosovo jouit d’importants droits reconnus sur
le plan international en tant que minorité et ses intérêts doivent être pris en compte. Cela ne la
transforme pas pour autant en décideur du destin du territoire sur lequel elle se trouve. Comme l’a
relevé un auteur: «[s]el f-determination for peoples or groups w ithin a State is to be achieved by
28
participation in the constitutional system and on the basis of respect for its territorial integrity» .
25. Certains participants ont également recouru à la doctrine controversée de la «sécession
corrective», sans avoir pourtant pr ouvé son existence en droit intern ational. J’ajouterai seulement
ici à tout ce qui a déjà été dit et écrit que cette doctrine ne repose pas même sur les prétendues
finalités dont elle est censée tenir compte. Comme l’a affirmé un autre auteur :
«[l]a création d’un nouvel Etat revêt par la force des choses une certaine permanence.
La durée est inscrite dans la vocation des Etats. En revanche, une situation de
violation des droits des minorités peut obéir à l’attitude d’un gouvernement, lequel est
par définition temporaire. Dès lors, on ne voit pas pourquoi on fait recours à une
situation de rupture, destinée à durer lo ngtemps, pour répondre à une situation qui ne
pourrait qu’être transitoire. La réponse à donner à une violation des droits des
minorités n’est pas de les ériger en peuples, mais de rétablir leurs droits et de les
29
garantir sur le plan international.»
26. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, certains participants vous ont demandé de ne
30
pas vous prononcer sur l’autodétermination . Mais dans le cadre de cette procédure, vous êtes
censés éclairer l’organe requérant quant à l’ensemble des règles qui ont été invoquées et qui
pourraient s’avérer pertinentes, soit pour attester la conformité du fait, acte ou situation sous
27Résolution 1244 (1999), par. 11 e).
28 e
Crawford, James, The Creation of States in International Law , 2 éd., Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2006, p. 417 (traduction : «L’autodétermination pour des peuples ou des groupes à l’intérieur d’un Etat
s’accomplit par la participation au système constitutionne l et sur la base du respect de son intégrité
territoriale.»).
29Kohen, Marcelo, «Création d'Etats en droit international contemporain», Cours euro-méditerranéens Bancaja
de droit international, vol. VI, 2002, p. 596. (Traduction : «once a new State is created it has by force of circumstance a
certain permanence. This duration derives from the vocation of States. In contrast, a viola tion of minority rights is a
reflection of the attitude of a government, which is by definitio n temporary. Consequently, there is no need to resort to
rupture, designed to be of long duration, in order to respond to a situation that is only temporary. A violation of minority
rights should not be addressed by creatin g peoples, but by re-establishing their rights and by guaranteeing these at the
international level.»).
30
Albanie, observations écrites, p. 34, par.61; auteurs, contribution écrite I, p. 157, par. 8.38 ; Etats-Unis
d’Amérique, observations écrites, p.21 ; Norvège, observations écr ites, p.3, par.8; Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit,
par. 5.33, 6.65. - 46 -
examen avec le droit international, soit pour l’ex clure comme justification juridique. C’est ce que
vous avez fait par exemple dans deux de vos derniers avis consultatifs 31. La manière stricte par
laquelle la communauté internationale détermine l’existence d’un peuple titulaire du droit à
disposer de lui-même, le fait que ce principe s’exerce par l’ensemble de la population à l’intérieur
du territoire d’un Etat souverain et le constat évident que les NationsUnies n’ont pas reconnu
l’existence d’un «peuple kosovar» ayant droit à l’autodétermination permettent d’écarter cet
argument comme justification de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance.
E. L’obligation de régler les différends par des moyens pacifiques impose aux parties de
s’abstenir de prendre des mesures unilatérales et de poursuivre les négociations
27. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les Memb res de la Cour, l’Argentine souhaite attirer
l’attention de la Cour sur un point de droit qui lui semble être particulièrement pertinent. Il s’agit
de l’obligation de régler les di fférends par des moyens pacifiques. A partir du moment où la
question du statut futur du Kosovo a été placée sur le plan international, que le Conseil de sécurité
a décidé d’un processus politique visant à détermin er ce statut, que les principales parties à la
négociation de ce statut ont été clairement définies et que des négociations sous la direction d’un
médiateur nommé par le Secrétaire général ont eu lieu, il ne fait pas de doutes que le règlement
pacifique des différends, en tant que principe fondamental du droit international contemporain, est
applicable aux parties. Ce n’est d’ailleurs pas la première fois que le Conseil de sécurité met en
place un processus de négociation visant à régler des différends internes ayant une composante
internationale, consécutivement à leur qualification comme des menaces à la paix et à la sécurité
internationales 32. On peut aussi mentionner des exem ples de conflits internes réglés par des
33
organes arbitraux internationaux appliquant des règles du droit international .
31 Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien o ccupé, avis consultatif,
C.I.J. Recueil 2004, p. 136 ; Licéité de la menace ou de l'emploi d'armes nucléaires, avis consultatif,
C.I.J Recueil 1996 (I), p. 226.
32
Résolution 367 du Conseil de sécurité, 12 mars 1975 ; résolution 874 du Conseil de sécurité, 14 octobre 1993 ;
résolution 1345 du Conseil de sécurité, 21 mars 2001 ; résolution 1393 du Conseil de sécutité, 31 janvier 2002.
33
Arbitrage Dubaï/Charchah, 91 ILR (1993), p. 543 ; Fédération de Bosnie-He rzégovine/République Srpska
(arbitrage pour la région de Brcko), sentence finale du 5 mars 1999, 38 ILM 534 ;Arbitrage Terre-Neuve et
Labrador/Nouvelle-Ecosse, 128 ILR (2002), p.425; Gouvernement du Soudan/le Mo uvement/Armée populaire de
libération du Soudan (arbitrage Abyei), Sentence finale du 22 juillet 2009, disponible :r
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Abyei%20Final%20Award.pdf. - 47 -
28. Dans le cas qui nous occupe, le Secrétai re général a nommé un envoyé spécial devant
remplir une fonction de médiateur. On peut re gretter certains partis pris d’avance ainsi que
l’absence de solutions imaginatives, telles qu’on en trouve dans différentes parties du monde et qui
auraient permis aux deux parties d’obtenir l’essentiel de leur revendication: souveraineté
territoriale du côté de la Serbie et le maximum imaginable de compétences d’auto-administration
pour la province. On sait la suite, moins de deux ans après le début des négociations, le médiateur
a fait une proposition d’indépendance qui a été acceptée par une partie et rejetée par l’autre.
29. Messieurs les juges, un médiateur n’est ni un arbitre ni un juge. Le plan de l’envoyé
spécial n’est jamais qu’une simple proposition aux pa rties, sans effet obligatoire. Il est impossible
de la considérer comme fondement de la déclar ation unilatérale d’indépe ndance, comme le font
certains 34. Ce ne serait d’ailleurs pas la première fois qu’un médiateur onusien voit sa proposition
35
rejetée .
30. Vouloir tirer parti de l’échec d’un médiateur pour transformer sa proposition en une sorte
de sentence arbitrale et vouloir l’imposer unilatéra lement à l’autre partie constitue un non-respect
grave des obligations découlant du principe du règlement pacifique des différends. Passer sous
silence une telle entorse à ce principe fonda mental constituerait un précédent fâcheux aux
conséquences dommageables pour l’application de l’obligation du règlement pacifique des
différends. L’article 7 de la décl aration de Manille énonce la démarc he à suivre par les parties en
cas d’impasse: «elles doivent continuer de rechercher une solution pacifique et se consulter sans
délai pour trouver des moyens mutuellement accep tables de régler pacifiquement leur différend» 36.
Une mesure unilatérale comme la déclaration du 17février2008 est l’antithèse même d’une telle
démarche.
34France, exposé écrit, par. 2.65-2.67.
35 Voir: rapport du Secrétaire général su r sa mission de bons offices à Chypre, 1avril 2003, Nations Unies,
doc.S/2003/398; commentaires de M.Alvaro de Soto, Secrétai re général adjoint et conseiller spécial du Secrétaire
général pour Chypre, Conseil de sécurité, 4738 séance, 10 avril, Nations Unies, doc. S/PV.4738, p. 2-4.
36A/RES/37/10. - 48 -
F. Le caractère sui generis du cas de Kosovo constitue une raison de plus pour déclarer illicite
la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance
31. Une autre manière de chercher à échapper au constat évident de l’illicéité de la
déclaration unilatérale est l’affirma tion selon laquelle le cas du Kosovo est sui generis et qu’il ne
constitue donc pas un précédent 37. Mais quels sont les éléments qui font du Kosovo un cas
sui generis? Certainement pas les considérations politiques avancées, mais bien plutôt ce qui
découle des résolutions pertinentes des Nations Unies. Les traits caractéristiques de la situation du
Kosovo sont la souveraineté serbe, une administra tion internationale, l’au tonomie locale dans le
cadre de cette administration et des négociations sous l’égide internationale en vue de déterminer le
statut futur du territoire. Rien de tout cela n’ autorise une déclaration unila térale d’indépendance.
Au contraire, en plaçant la situation du Kosovo sur le plan international, le mouvement séparatiste
interne ⎯ et à plus forte raison des institutions provi soires qui ont été créées par les Nations Unies
elles-mêmes ⎯ se sont mises en devoir de respecter les règles du jeu internationales.
G. Les autres arguments avancés pour justifier la sécession ne sont pas
juridiquement recevables
32. Permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de me référer brièvement à d’autres arguments
avancés pour justifier la sécession mais qui ne so nt pas recevables. En premier lieu, on doit
constater que les événements postérieurs à la d éclaration du 17février2008 ne peuvent en rien
déterminer la qualification juridique de cette dernière ou curer son illicéité intrinsèque. La Serbie
n’a pas accepté l’indépendance de sa province et les reconnaissances minoritaires ne changent pas
non plus la situation, qui demeure juridiquement celle établie par la résolution1244 aussi
longtemps que le Conseil n’en décide pas autrement.
33. L’argument selon lequel on ne pourrait pas constater l’illicéité de la déclaration
unilatérale d’indépendance du Koso vo dans la mesure où cela reviendrait également à condamner
l’émergence «controversée» de certains Etats 38 se heurte à la pratique existante depuis l’adoption
37
Albanie, exposé écrit, par. 72 et 95 ; Allemagne, exposé écrit, p. 26-27, observations écrites, p.6 ; Azerbaïdjan,
exposé écrit, par. 17 ; Danemark, exposé écrit, p. 6 ; Estonie, exposé écrit, par. 2.1 et 2.2 ; Finlande, exposé écrit, par. 10 ;
France, exposé écrit, par.2.1, 2.16-2.82; Irlande, exposé ét, par. 33 ; Japon, exposé écrit, par. 3 ; Lettonie, exposé
écrit, par.8; Luxembourg, exposé écrit, par.5-8; Maldives, exposé écrit, p. 1; Pologne, exposé écrit, par.3.2 et
5.1-5.25; République tchèque, exposé écrit, p.6; Royaum e-Uni, exposé écrit, par.0.17-0.23, observations écrites,
par.11-14; Slovénie, exposé écrit, p.2/3, observations écrites, par.6. Contra : Argentine, exposé écrit, par.60,
observations écrites, par.33-35; Chypre, exposé écrit, par77, observations écrites, par. 28-29; Serbie, observations
écrites, par. 124-170 ;
38Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit, p. 9, par. 0.15. - 49 -
de la Charte des NationsUnies. Cette pratique montre clairement que depuis1945, tous les
nouveaux Etats ont été créés en vertu des résolutions pertinentes de l’Organisation, du fait de la
dissolution de l’Etat prédécesseur ou lors de rares cas de séparation, toujours avec le consentement
de l’Etat parent ⎯ un consentement donné soit d’avance, so it postérieurement. Le cas du Kosovo
ne tombe sous le coup d’aucune de ces situations.
34. J’en viens maintenant à la tentative d’imposer le fait accompli. On invoque l’idée qu’une
décennie sans que la Serbie ait pu exercer son ad ministration sur le territoire, avec en sus la
présence internationale, aurait créé une réalité irréve rsible. Monsieur le président, cette tentative à
peine voilée de vouloir imposer le fait accompli se heurte à de nombreux exemples dans lesquels
certaines situations territoriales ont duré bien davantage, sans qu’il ait pour autant été impossible de
les modifier plus tard : songez aux plus de sept décennies de contrôle de la Namibie par l’Afrique
du Sud, au siècle écoulé pour la restitution de Hong Kong à la Chine, au quart de siècle pour le
Timor oriental et j’en passe. Les arguments du fait accompli et des prétendues «réalités
irréversibles» ⎯ qui ne le sont d’ailleurs pas ⎯ procèdent d’une politique de force qui ne constitue
en aucune manière un fondement juridique, et qui mériterait d’être condamnée pour le mépris du
droit international qu’elle représente.
Conclusion : il est temps de revenir au respect de la légalité internationale au Kosovo
35. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les j uges, aucune situation non conforme au droit
international ne peut apporter ni la stabilité ni la paix, ni la démocratie, ni le respect des droits
humains, ni aux Balkans ni ailleurs. Par définiti on, aucune mesure unilatérale n’est susceptible de
régler les différends. Bien au contraire : le mépr is du droit international et les tentatives d’imposer
des mesures unilatérales affaiblissent les bases même du système international.
36. L’Argentine estime opportun que votre C our examine les conséquences juridiques les
plus fondamentales qui découleront de votre répon se. Certes, à la différence d’autres questions
posées par voie consultative, la présente demande d’av is ne demande pas à la Cour d’établir «les
conséquences juridiques» d’une situation donnée. Toutefois, ce ne serait pas un obstacle pour que
la Cour, dans son pouvoir d’appréciation de la question, trace des orientations générales sur la
signification juridique de sa réponse. - 50 -
37. De l’avis de l’Argentine, la réponse de la Cour permettra au Secrétaire général et à son
représentant sur le terrain de remplir exactement leurs fonctions prévues par la résolution1244;
elle exigera aussi des institutions provisoires d’au tonomie qu’elles exercent leurs fonctions dans le
cadre juridique qui est le leur, cessant ainsi de s’autoproclamer organes d’un Etat indépendant qui
n’existe pas. Votre réponse permettra également aux Etats Membres d’ad apter leurs politiques de
reconnaissance aux exigences du droit international; elle permettra un nouveau départ aux
négociations sur le statut futur, sans pressions d’aucune sorte, si ce n’est la pression du respect
scrupuleux par toutes les parties du droit internat ional; elle aura une influence certaine et
bénéfique sur d’autres conflits semblables, aidant ainsi à écarter les politiques de double standard ;
elle apaisera également la situation interne des Etats voisins composés eux aussi de minorités
nationales ⎯qui d’ailleurs recevraient un très mauvais message si l’on devait considérer que les
indépendances sont des pures questions de fait. Aucun avenir ne sera solide s’il s’édifie sur le
mépris de normes fondamentales et sur la viol ation flagrante d’une résolution du Conseil de
sécurité adoptée en vertu du chapitre VII de la Charte.
38. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, l’Argentine n’adopte pas une position
juridique dans une situation et l’exact opposé dans une autre situation pourtant semblable ; elle est
guidée par sa détermination à respecter le droit international dans toutes les circonstances.
L’Argentine condamne les atteintes à l’intégrité territoriale où qu’e lles se produisent; elle rejette
les invocations de l’autodétermination sans fonde ment juridique où qu’elles soient faites; elle
soutient fermement l’application du principe d’autodétermination partout où il y a un peuple qui en
est titulaire et qui est privé de son exercice. C’est animée de cette forte conviction que l’Argentine
a participé à cette procédure et a tenu à y apporter sa cont
ribution.
39. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre attention. - 51 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Your Excellency Ms Susana Ruiz Cerutti.
Now that concludes the oral statement and comments of Argentina and brings to a close
today’s hearings. The Court will meet again to morrow at 10a.m. when it will hear Austria,
Azerbaijan and Belarus. The Court is adjourned.
The Court rose at 12.25 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Wednesday 2 December 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada, presiding, on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)