Non Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2010/15
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2010
Public sitting
held on Thursday 14 October 2010, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)
Application by Costa Rica for permission to intervene
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2010
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 14 octobre 2010, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)
Requête du Costa Rica à fin d’intervention
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Cot
Gaja
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
viceMpra,ident
KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
XuMe mes
Dojnogshue,
CotMM.
jugesaja, ad hoc
Cgeffrrr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel;
MrA. lexOudeElferink, Deputy-Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea,
Utrecht University,
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, Member and
former Chairman of the International Law Co mmission, associate member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr.PaulReichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of
the United States Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
Mr.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, Professor of Intern ational Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid;
Member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.RobinCleverly, M.A., DPhil, CGeol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
Mr. John Brown, Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty Consultancy Services,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers;
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel;
Ms Clara E. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
Ms Carmen Martinez Capdevila, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma,
Madrid,
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), University ParisOuest,
Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Assistant Counsel. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S.Exc.M.CarlosJoséArgüelloGómez, ambassadeur du Nicaragua auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur adjoint de l’Ins titut néerlandais du droit de la mer de l’Université
d’Utrecht,
M.Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M.PaulReichler, avocat au cabinetFoley Hoag LLP, WashingtonD.C., membre des barreaux de
la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, professeur de droi t international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M.RobinCleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
M. John Brown, consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty Consultancy Services,
comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;
M. César Vega Masís, directeur, direction des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et du territoire,
ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils ;
Mme Clara E. Brillembourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de New York,
Mme Carmen Martinez Capdevila, docteur en droit international public à l’Universidad Autónoma
de Madrid,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M.EdgardoSobrenesObregon, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme conseils adjoints. - 6 -
The Government of Colombia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Professor of International Relations, Universidad del Rosario,
Bogotá,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, Chair of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, Member
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and former Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , Member of the NewYork Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr.MarceloKohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva; associate member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the OPCW, former Minister of
State,
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Member of the International Law Commission,
H.E. Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Republic of
Honduras,
Mr. Andelfo García González, Professor of Interna tional Law, former Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs,
Ms Victoria E. Pauwels T., Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julián Guerrero Orozco, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Thomas Fogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Adviser. - 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Julio Londoño Paredes, professeur de relations internationales à l’Université del Rosario
de Bogotá,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, président du comité juridique interaméricain, membre de
la Cour permanente d’arbitrage et ancien ministre des affaires étrangères,
comme coagent ;
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
M.RodmanR.Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de NewYork,
cabinet Eversheds LLP à Paris,
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et
du développement de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’OIAC, ancien
ministre d’Etat,
M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre de la Commission du droit international,
S. Exc. Mme Sonia Pereira Portilla, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès de la
République du Honduras,
M. Andelfo García González, professeur de droit inte rnational, ancien ministre adjoint des affaires
étrangères,
Mme Victoria E. Pauwels T., ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julián Guerrero Orozco, ministre-conseiller à l’ambassade de la République de la Colombie aux
Pays-Bas,
Mme Andrea Jiménez Herrera, conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Thomas Fogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseiller technique. - 8 -
The Government of Costa Rica is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Edgar Ugalde Álvarez, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Republic of Colombia,
as Agent;
Mr. Coalter G. Lathrop, Lecturing Fellow at Duke University School of Law, member of the North
Carolina State Bar, Special Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Sergio Ugalde, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Senior Adviser to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Member of the Costa Rican Bar,
Mr. Arnoldo Brenes, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Member of the Costa Rican
Bar,
Mr. Carlos Vargas, Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Jorge Urbina, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Michael Gilles, Special Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Ricardo Otarola, Minister and Consul General of Costa Rica to the Republic of Colombia,
Mr. Christian Guillermet, Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the
United Nations Office at Geneva,
Mr. Gustavo Campos, Consul General of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Shara Duncan, Counsellor at the Embassy of Costa Rica in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Leonardo Salazar, National Geographic Institute of Costa Rica,
as Advisers. - 9 -
Le Gouvernement du Costa Rica est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Edgar Ugalde Álvarez, ambassadeur de la République du Costa Rica auprès de la
République de Colombie,
comme agent ;
M. Coalter G. Lathrop, Lecturing Fellow à la faculté de droit de Duke University, membre du
barreau de l’Etat de Caroline du Nord, conse iller spécial auprès du ministère des affaires
étrangères,
M.SergioUgalde, membre de la Cour perman ente d’arbitrage, conseiller principal auprès du
ministère des affaires étrangères, membre du barreau du Costa Rica,
M.ArnoldoBrenes, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères, membre du
barreau du Costa Rica,
M. Carlos Vargas, directeur du département juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Jorge Urbina, ambassadeur du Costa Rica auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Michael Gilles, conseiller spécial auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Ricardo Otarola, ministre et consul général du Costa Rica en République de Colombie,
M. Christian Guillermet, ambassadeur, représentant permanent adjoint du Costa Rica auprès de
l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève,
M. Gustavo Campos, consul général du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Shara Duncan, conseiller à l’ambassade du Costa Rica aux Pays-Bas,
M. Leonardo Salazar, Institut géographique national du Costa Rica,
comme conseillers. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court meets today to hear the
second round of oral argument of Costa Rica. I shall now give the floor to Mr.Coalter Lathrop.
You have the floor.
LMAT.HROP:
THE STAGES OF INTERVENTION AND HOW THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES WOULD AFFECT
C OSTA RICA ’S INTEREST OF A LEGAL NATURE
1. Thank you, Mr.President. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is an
honour to be before you again today on behalf of the Republic of Costa Rica.
I. The two stages of intervention
2. Mr.President, we are in the application stag e of the intervention process. At this stage,
the first of two stages in the overall interv ention process, Costa Rica must demonstrate
convincingly that it has an interest of a legal nature that may be affected by a decision of this Court
in this case. Costa Rica submits that it met its burden in its written Application, and exceeded its
burden in its oral submissions on Monday. We are here again today to reinforce our points and to
respond to the arguments made by the Parties yesterday.
3. It is not our intent at this stage, nor is it the purpose of these oral arguments, to inform the
Court of the full extent of Costa Rica’s interest. Informing the Court of those interests will occur in
the second stage of the in tervention process when ⎯ if Costa Rica is permitted to intervene ⎯ we
will draft a Written Statement and make observa tions during the arguments on the merits.
Mr.Reichler confounds these two stages arguing that Costa Rica’s “purpose in bringing this
Application was to inform the Court of its legal interests. It has done so. Mission accomplished.”
But, like others before him, Mr.Reichler has spoken too soon. Costa Rica’s Application has the
purpose, not of informing, but of requesting the pe rmission of the Court to intervene. It will be
during the intervention itself that Costa Rica informs the Court of the full extent of its legal interest.
To date, in the limited time available to it, Ca Rica has only demonstrated that it has a legal
interest that may be affected by the decision ithis case. And while this task necessarily entails
1
CR 2010/13, p. 31, para. 12 (Reichler). - 11 -
some overlap with arguments that would be made during the next stage of the intervention process,
the information provided thus far does not fully comp rise, in scope or detail, the information that
Costa Rica will provide if allowed to intervene.
4. Costa Rica has not, for example, provided full information regarding the role of islands in
delimitation, or the effect of Nicaragua’s claim in this case on the 1977 line. Costa Rica has not
informed the Court of the delimitation result that would accompany the application of the bisector
method or the necessary and appropriate adju stment required to account for Costa Rica’s
disadvantaged position in the back of a coastal concav ity. This is to be left for the next phase of
the proceedings.
5. Nevertheless, counsel for Nicaragua suggests that Costa Rica ⎯ and this Court ⎯ should
accept this week’s hearings as a substitute for actua l intervention. This notion would effectively
create a new form of incidental proceedings ⎯ a mini-intervention so to speak ⎯ that finds no
basis in law and has little else to recommend it. Mo reover, to deny Costa Rica the opportunity to
submit its observations to the Court in the context of oral hearings on the merits would deprive
Costa Rica of the ability to respond to new claims by the Parties. As the Agent for Nicaragua said
many years ago during the hearings on Nicaragua’s request for permission to intervene in
El Salvador/Honduras,
“the Submissions of the Parties can be changed after the end of this hearing on
intervention and right up to the end of the h earings on the merits. And if this hearing
is the only opportunity Nicaragua will be given to defend its rights, then how can
Nicaragua express its position if, during the h earings on the merits, Nicaragua will be
excluded from participating?”
Costa Rica would ask the same question. If excl uded from participating in the hearings on the
merits how can Costa Rica defend its interests agai nst new claims that might be advanced by the
parties? Costa Rica would be unable to do so, and for that reason, among others, Costa Rica should
be allowed to continue to the next stage.
II. The effect of the Parties’ claims on Costa Rica’s interest of a legal nature
6. Mr.President, Colombia and Nicaragua alike continue to argue their claims against each
other as if the Court were being asked to choose between the two options presented: optionA
Nicaragua’s line dividing overlapping continenta l margins; optionB Colombia’s median line - 12 -
between opposite islands. This perspective does not reflect the role of the Court itself in
determining the location of the boundary between the Parties. However, because Costa Rica is not
concerned with the east-west location of the Court’ s boundary, it will take the Parties’ positions at
face value. Nonetheless the east-west location of the boundary works in tandem with the southern
endpoint of the boundary and changes the ways in which the Court’s delimitation decision may
affect Costa Rica legal interests.
7. This interaction can be illustrated by examin ing more closely the Parties’ claims against
each other. As counsel for Colombia noted in reference to Costa Rica’s presentation on Monday:
2
Costa Rica “focused very largely on Nicaragua’s claim” . As a matter of balance and fairness we
will turn back to Colombia’s claim for a moment. As Costa Rica wrote in its Application: “The
boundary claimed by Colombia in this case is situated west of the [1977 line]... and, thereby
encompasses area that would go to Costa Rica under the terms of their 1977 agreement.” 3 This
assertion can be illustrated using Colombia’s map from tab16 of yesterday’s folder. Despite
4
Mr. Crawford’s attempt to allay Costa Rica’s concerns with assurances that “this is quite normal” ,
from Costa Rica’s perspective Colombia’s claim encroaches in a significant way on Costa Rican
interests as illustrated on the map now on the screen. If Colombia’s boundary claim were to prevail
and be adopted by the Court in its delimitation decision, that delimitation decision would affect
Costa Rica’s legal interest. It would also have an impact on the location of Costa Rica’s tripoint
with Colombia and Nicaragua at the northern end of the 1977 line. According to the terms of the
Treaty, the westward extent of Colombia’s interests end there and Costa Rica’s begin.
8. Speaking of tripoints, counsel for both Pa rties focused a great deal of attention on Costa
Rica’s other tripoint at the eastern end of the 1977 line ⎯ the tripoint between Costa Rica,
Colombia and Panama. Both Parties provided maps of this tripoint but the map now on the screen
is map PSR 7 from Nicaragua’s folder. Counsel for Colombia went into some depth describing the
trilateral relationship formed a nd strengthened by mutually rein forcing bilateral relationships
among these three States. As a treaty partner in tw o of the three treaties, Costa Rica endorses the
2
CR 2010/14, p. 31, para. 4 (Crawford).
3
Application for permission to intervene by the Republic of Costa Rica, p. 5, para. 20.
4CR 2010/14, p. 35, para. 19 (Crawford). - 13 -
views expressed by Colombia with respect to this tr ipoint. What is surprisi ng is that counsel for
5
Nicaragua also seems to endorse the view that a tripoint exists here among those three States .
Apparently this was part of an attempt to lock Costa Rica behind the line it agreed with Colombia,
even if Colombia should no longer be the State on the other side.
9. This line of argument indicates that Nicara gua has no appreciation of the actual impact of
its claims in this case ⎯ iftheyweretoprevail ⎯ the impact that the claim would have on the
bilateral and trilateral relationships existing in this area. As of now, the interests of Costa Rica,
Colombia, and Panama meet at the tripoint circled in black on Nicaragua’s map. Nicaraguan
interests are not present in the vicinity of th is point as far as Costa Rica, Colombia, and,
presumably, Panama are concerned. Nicaragua thinks otherwise as indicated by its claims to
boundary lines and maritime area in this case. On the screen we will illustrate the effect those
claims have on these existing relationships. The bilateral and trilateral relationships with Colombia
are eliminated by Nicaragua’s presence. But Nicaragua does not simply take Colombia’s place.
Instead, new boundary relationships would necessarily be formed. One would be a new trilateral
relationship among Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama , location to be determined. Another would
be a bilateral relationship between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Although Costa Rica has provided
some indication of its perspective on the line dividing their respective maritime areas, Nicaragua
has not. Here Costa Rica has used an arrow to indicate the continuation of the Costa Rica-Panama
boundary toward areas in which Nicaragua appears to claim an interest.
10. Speaking of arrows, counsel for both Parties also spent a good deal of time discussing the
meaning to be given to arrows at the end of maritime boundaries. Both Parties seemed to reach the
general conclusion that the mere presence of an arrow at the end of a boundary line renders that
6
line harmless to third States . But before we are lulled into a false sense of security we should
recall that arrows, traditionally used as weapons ar e, in fact, quite sharp. In order to better
understand the role of arrows, a distinction must be drawn between the two types of arrow one
might find at the end of a maritime boundary: arrows that point and arrows that pierce. The former
are helpful. They show us a direction in which to go. The latter are harmful. They injure, or ⎯ in
5
CR 2010/13, pp. 38-39, paras. 33-35 (Reichler).
6Ibid., pp. 34-35, paras. 20-22 (Reichler); CR 2010/14, p. 35, paras. 18-19 (Crawford). - 14 -
the language of the Statute ⎯ affect interests. They are difficult to remove and they tend to leave a
scar. The difference between them can only be det ected if the interests of a third State in the
vicinity of the arrow are known: pointing arrows depart from a point safely outside the area of
third State interests; piercing arrows do not. The Court, in the past, has been very careful to use
only pointing arrows. But in order to avoid accidental piercing when the intention was only to
point, the Court must have full information about the extent of third State interests. That
information can only be reliably provided by the third State itself, and in the context of
intervention, only at the second stage of the intervention process.
11. But enough of tripoints and arrows, allow me to turn to an issue that clearly confused
counsel for Nicaragua and see if we can straighten things out: that is, the relationship between
Costa Rica’s area of interest and the 1977 line. Counsel for Nicaragua mockingly attributed to
Costa Rica the idea that “Nicaragua brought Co sta Rica’s newly-expande d maritime claim upon
7
itself by protesting the treaty with Colombia which contains a more modest claim” . This is, in
fact, only half wrong. In an attempt at sarcasm, c ounsel accidentally stumbled over a partial truth.
But a better formulation would be that Costa Rica ’s area of legal interest only extends beyond the
1977 line because Nicaragua’s claim in this case ⎯ if it were to prevail even in part ⎯ would
disrupt existing boundary relationships in the re gion and eliminate the very purpose for which the
1977 line was negotiated and agreed.
12. Continuing on that same point, counsel for Colombia noted that Costa Rica’s minimum
area of legal interest contains areas that “are closer to San Andrés and the other Colombian features
8
than they are to Costa Rica” . Counsel continued, acknowledging that while Costa Rica can claim
these areas against Nicaragua “which is even further away”, to do so “stands in acute tension with
9
the long-standing position of Costa Rica as to the maritime entitlements of Colombia’s islands” .
There is most certainly a tension here, however, to be clear, it was not created by Costa Rica, but
by Nicaragua. And it will not be resolved by Costa Rica, but by the Court when it renders a
delimitation decision in this case. If Nicaragua’s claims prevail in this case, it is indisputable that
7CR 2010/13, p. 41, para. 41 (Reichler).
8
CR 2010/14, p. 36, para. 21 (Crawford).
9Ibid. - 15 -
Colombia would no longer be Costa Rica’s neighbour in this part of the Caribbean, effectively
extinguishing the essential basis of the legal instru ment concluded by Colombia and Costa Rica.
This is not an outcome that Costa Rica has pursued or that Costa Rica desires. To the contrary, as
Costa Rica has said in its Application and throughout these proceedings, and as the Parties
themselves have reiterated several times, Costa Rica has acted consistently with its agreement and
has refrained from conduct that would defeat the ob ject and purpose of that agreement. Despite
these efforts and through no fault of its own, Cost a Rica is now caught in the middle of a dispute
between Nicaragua and Colombia that could well r esult in the disruption and, possibly, outright
elimination of a long-standing maritime boundary relationship with Colombia.
13. Counsel for Nicaragua discussed the 1977 lin e at great length apparently in order to
demonstrate that Costa Rica has obligations vis- à-vis Colombia related to the 1977 line and the
treaty from which that line arose. Costa Rica does not contest this. But counsel’s merely
unnecessary argument on this point transforms into a wholly inaccurate argument when he asserts
that “Costa Rica in effect asks the Court to ignore that treaty” 10 on the basis that the treaty remains
unratified by Costa Rica. This is simply wrong. Costa Rica does not ask the Court to ignore the
treaty between Costa Rica and Colombia as it pertains to the boundary relationship with Colombia.
Instead, Costa Rica simply states a fundamental pr inciple of international law which dictates that
the bilateral treaty between Costa Rica and Colombia created no rights or obligations for
Nicaragua. As such there is nothing for the Cour t to ignore as it considers the extent of Costa
Rica’s area of interest should Nicaragua’s claim prevail in this case. Nicaragua knows this general
rule of treaty law and admits as much sayin g “[o]f course Nicaragua derives no rights or
obligations from the bilateral Treaty between Costa Rica and Colombia” 1.
14. Even so, Nicaragua still hopes to deri ve some benefit from the 1977 line arguing that
“Costa Rica . . . did not consider the areas beyond the 1977 Treaty line as appertaining to itself, and
12
therefore any decision by the Court in regard to those areas could not affect its legal interests” .
Nicaragua is wrong again. Nicaragua’s claim against Colombia in this case, if it were to prevail,
10
CR 2010/13, p. 38, para. 30 (Reichler).
11
Ibid., p. 40, para. 39 (Reichler).
12Ibid., p. 37, para. 29 (Reichler). - 16 -
would create a vacuum in the areas of the south-western Caribbean now under Colombian
jurisdiction. Costa Rica is not precluded in any wa y from filling that vacuum to the fullest extent
possible in accordance with principles of international law.
15. Mr. President, I have focused on Colombia’s boundary claim in this case and the manner
in which it might affect Costa Rica’s interest of a legal nature. And I have just explained the
impact that Nicaragua’s claim to maritime area would have on existing boun dary relationships, in
particular the relationship between Costa Ri ca and Colombia. I will now demonstrate how
Nicaragua’s boundary claim in this case might also affect Costa Rica’s legal interest.
16. Nicaragua makes a claim to a boundary line in its Reply that is now shown on the screen.
This line represents the outer or easternmost limit of Nicaragua’s claim against Colombia to
maritime area. Nicaragua’s argument that this line somehow stands alone delinked from any area
is convoluted, bizarre, and ultimately incorrect. Clearly the maritime area claimed by Nicaragua in
the Caribbean Sea is limited on the east by this line and on the west by Nicaragua’s coast. But we
are left to wonder about the southern limit of the ar ea. The location of that limit will indicate the
extent of the overlap between Costa Rica’s area of interest and Nicaragua’s claimed area in this
case.
17. Nicaragua tells us that “[i]t expresses no opinion as to the location of any lateral
13
delimitation lines with Costa Rica” , and yet it depicts half a dozen areas throughout its written
pleadings the southern limits of which are being added to the map now in rapid succession. What
should Costa Rica make of all this? First, if any of the lines shown on the screen represents, even
roughly, the southern limit of Nicaragua’s claimed area, then that area encroaches on Costa Rica’s
entitlements and a delimitation in this case that reached as far south as any of these lines would
affect Costa Rica’s interest. This includes even the most northerly of these possible limits: the line
connecting the Costa Rica-Nicaragua land boundary terminus with the southern endpoint of
Nicaragua’s boundary claim in its Reply. Second, if none of these lines represent the southern limit
of Nicaragua’s claimed area, then what is that limit? Costa Rica is left to guess. And, if the issue
13
CR 2010/13, p. 32, para. 16 (Reichler). - 17 -
is not clarified before the close of oral submi ssions, the Court will be left to guess as well.
Costa Rica’s rights and interests are at stake here and guessing will not suffice.
18. Costa Rica has shown the Court the possible outcomes if either of the Parties’ boundary
claims were adopted wholesale and without modificat ion by this Court in its delimitation decision.
Both boundary claims would affect Costa Rica’s legal interest. As stated on Monday, Costa Rica
believes that the boundary delimited in this case is likely to be located somewhere between those
claims within the area in dispute between the Parties. That area, along with Costa Rica’s minimum
area of interest is shown on the map now on th e screen. When the Court delimits the boundary
between the Parties somewhere w ithin the disputed area, Costa Rica hopes that the line will end
well short of the area in which Costa Rica has an interest of a legal nature in the exercise of its
sovereign rights and jurisdiction. From that endpoint, located safely beyond Costa Rica’s area of
interest, an arrow could be used to indicate the further continuation of the boundary toward Costa
Rica’s area. To be certain that this arrow will point and not pierce, the Court must first be aware of
the full extent of that area and only Costa Rica can provide the necessary information.
III. Conclusions
19. Mr. President, Costa Rica’s argument in this stage of the intervention is still quite simple:
Costa Rica’s area of interest overlaps with the area in dispute between the Parties to this case and,
therefore, a delimitation decision in this case may a ffect Costa Rica’s interest. Costa Rica is in the
middle of a dispute between its neighbours Nicar agua and Colombia. The link between Costa
Rica’s interest and the dispute in this case is further demonstrated by the fact that all three of Costa
Rica’s bilateral boundary relationships in the Caribbe an could be affected by the outcome in this
case. Moreover, the Court will not have failed to notice that many ⎯ many ⎯ of yesterday’s
arguments ⎯ ostensibly on Costa Rica’s Application to intervene ⎯ could well have been made by
the Parties against each other at the merits phase of the main case. Costa Rica’s interests and the
delimitation in this case are inextricably linked. There can be no question that Costa Rica has an
interest of a legal nature that may be affected by the delimitation decision in this case and for that
reason Costa Rica should be allowed to intervene in order to inform the Court of the full extent of
those interests and thereby to protect those interests. - 18 -
20. Mr.President, distinguished Members of th e Court, this concludes my presentation. If
you would now give the floor to my colleague, Sergio Ugalde.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Coalter Lathrop for his presentation. I now invite Mr. Sergio
Ugalde to take the floor.
UMG. LDE:
THE LEGAL N ATURE OF COSTA RICA’SINTEREST THAT M AY BE AFFECTED
BY THE DECISION INTHISC ASE,THE TRUE CRITERIA FORS TATUTORY
ITERVENTION ,AND THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMING THE COURT
OFC OSTA RICA’SLEGAL INTEREST THROUGH INTERVENTION
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a great honour to stand before you
to deliver my second and final presentation ese proceedings on behalf of Costa Rica.
Generally speaking, opposition can be an easy task; it only requires to say “no”. The more “no” is
said, the easier the task of opposition becesterday, in its persistent challenge to Costa
Rica’s request to be allowed to intervene in the present case, we witnessed a little bit of that from
Nicaragua.
2. Of the great volume of statements made yesterday, I will, in the interest of time, extract
the arguments that merit attention because they are relevant to the discussion of our purpose here.
I. The legal nature of Costa Rica’s interest
3. Regardless of the stringent and gess opposition offered by Nicaragua to Costa
Rica’s request to intervene, Costa Rica has demonstrated, beyond any shred of doubt, the existence
of an interest of a legal nature in the Caribbean Sea which is also part of the subject-matter of the
present dispute. Costa Rica has also categorically established that, as a result of the submissions of
the Parties, a decision of the Court incase may affect those interests, as the Court’s
delimitation decision must take place within the area of the subject-matter of the dispute, and
therefore, may potentially reach the area of Costa Rica’s legal interest. - 19 -
4. Nevertheless, Nicaragua contends, in its Written Observations, that Costa Rica supports its
Application on the basis of a “thesis ⎯ that ‘nearness’ of a delimitation constitutes grounds for
14
intervention under article 62” . However, Nicaragua’s true argument ⎯ as revealed yesterday by
Nicaragua’s distinguished counsel ⎯ seems to be that, because a Chamber of the Court denied
Nicaragua itself the right to intervene on matters related to the delimitation inside and outside the
Gulf of Fonseca, the Court must deny Costa Rica’s Application to intervene in this case.
5. These two cases are entirely different, both factually and legally, and ⎯ as I hardly need
to recall ⎯ the Court has consistently reaffirmed that it looks at each case it hears independently.
In the El Salvador/Honduras case, the Chamber found that Nicaragua could not intervene, on the
aspects related to delimitation, because it did not show how the decision of the Court could affect
Nicaragua’s rights and interests 15.
6. Contrary to the findings in that case, where Nicaragua ⎯ in the Chamber’s words ⎯
“failed” to show the Court how a delimitation could in any way affect its interests, Costa Rica has
presented all the relevant facts and graphics i ndicating, clearly and convincingly, how the
delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia ⎯ in general and in particular ⎯ may affect its
legal interests in the Caribbean Sea. Costa Ri ca has illustrated how the maritime areas bounded by
the to-be-awarded boundary line, that is, the subj ect-matter of this case on which Costa Rica seeks
to intervene, could intrude into the maritime inter ests and rights of Costa Rica. Therefore, clearly
this is not a case of “nearness”, as argued by Nicar agua, but one in which a decision of the Court,
not taking into consideration the legal interests of Costa Rica, may result in serious prejudice of
those interests.
7. Nicaragua’s counsel portrayed Costa Rica’s interest in the Caribbean Sea as “ de fait”, and
not “d’ordre juridique” 16. As ProfessorChristine Chinkin has observed, “it is hard to think of a
clearer example of an interest of a legal nature” than the “desire to protect [a State’s] ‘sovereign
rights’”17. This is exactly the nature of the rights Costa Rica desires to protect through intervention
14
Written Observations of Nicaragua, p. 4, para. 11.
15
See Land, Island, and Maritime Dispute (El Salvador/ H onduras), Application to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1990, p. 123, para. 74, p. 128, para. 84.
1CR 2010/13, p. 24, para. 20 (Remiro).
1Christine Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law, 1993, p. 161. - 20 -
in this case. Furthermore, the subsequent presentation by Nicaragua seemed to accept the existence
of a Costa Rican legal interest in the Caribbean, suggesting, however, that they are not as extensive
as Costa Rica has described them to be, but these were not denied in its existence 18.
II. The criteria for statutory intervention
8. Mr. President, counsel for Nicaragua also gave us an insightful overview of the procedure
of intervention. Among the conclusions that merit at tention is the fact that we are engaged in the
process of what is called “statutory intervention”, wh ich, as has been constan tly referenced by all
Parties, is derived from the Statute and the Rules of Court. The significance of this is that a
country wishing to intervene is only asked to fulf il the requirements established therein, and is not
called to fulfil any other particular requirement.
9. Yet, in the opinion of Nicaragua’s counsel, it is necessary that, for an intervention to
flourish, the interest of a legal nature must be “their own, precise, direct and actual”. What,
exactly, is the legal source of these new requi rements? We do not know, because no explanation
whatsoever was given to us. And we certainly cannot find them in the Statute or Rules of the
Court, despite the rightly affirmed “statutory” character of interven tion. Rather, they seem to be
the by-product of Nicaragua’s attempt to disqualif y Costa Rica’s Application by creating a new set
of requirements that are not grounded in law. Thus, once the impression is created that there are
requirements that have not been met by Costa Rica in its Application, the Court is asked to dismiss
the same. Notwithstanding the fact that an appli cation need only fulfil the actual requirements laid
down by the Statute and the Rules of Court, Costa Rica has, if anything, shown the Court that its
interests of a legal nature are its own, are preci se, are directly connected to the principal ongoing
case, and are actual, in the sense that they are intrinsically connected to the outcome of the decision
of this Court in the instant case.
10. Nicaragua’s counsel also argued that inte rvention has another characteristic, which is:
that it should not be easily accepted by the Court. In underpinning this view with citations from the
Court’s jurisprudence, we came to see, at certain length, the great importance that Nicaragua gives
to Court’s decisions on the applications to intervene of Malta, in the Tunisia/Libya case, and of
18
See CR 2010/13, pp. 36-41, paras. 27-41 (Reichler). - 21 -
Italy, in the Libya/Malta case. We learned how, in the latter case, the Court apparently gave Italy
everything it had asked for, despite not allowing the intervention to proceed. Though appreciative
of this history, we could not see what relevance this has to the facts for the case before us.
Apparently Nicaragua considers that those cases reflect the alleged position of the Court that
intervention should be seriously restricted, indeed to the extent that no intervention should ever be
allowed to proceed, either because a country has made too general a statement about its legal
interests, which therefore should be considered insufficiently “precise, direct, or actual”; or
because, on the other hand, an application meeting these new criteria renders intervention itself
unnecessary. And Nicaragua’s apparent reforms of the system of intervention do not stop there. If,
perchance, an application successfully navigates the twin pitfalls of generality and particularity, it
should nevertheless be denied as constituting a “new dispute”, or, even further, as seeking not to
protect legal interests but to “extort from the Court a decision of rights”, as it was put by
19
Nicaragua’s esteemed counsel .
11. These views also connect to another poi nt, which Nicaragua seems to find highly
relevant, namely: that the Court has rejected a ll intervention requests subject to opposition from at
least one party. All, of course, except its own in the El Salvador/Honduras case. Nicaragua
considers that objection alone should be sufficient to deny an intervention request. Counsel for
Nicaragua goes as far as to suggest that the interv ention of Equatorial Guinea was not rejected by
the Court only because it was not opposed. It al so seems to attach less importance to that
intervention on the basis that the Court authorized intervention through an Order, rather than a
judgment. Frankly, I fail to see what the way the Court chose to render that decision has to do with
anything, but one thing is certain: it cannot be su ggested that Equatorial Guinea’s intervention is
reduced in significance or validity because it was not opposed. That intervention is as good as any
other that the Court has allowed or may allow in the future.
19
CR 2010/13, p. 21, para. 9 (Remiro). - 22 -
12. Furthermore, when the Court has accepted or rejected an intervention, it has not done so
because the parties have or have not opposed it; rather, it has done so because it has considered
that the circumstances of the particular case, the applicable law and the facts or information known
to it, warrant permission to intervene.
13. Mr.President, intervention under Article 62, in the form recognized to exist by this
Court, is not an inconvenient procedure, loosely pl aced in the Statute of the Court, created with the
purpose of allowing third countries to interfere in judicial cases. Article 62 is as much a norm as
any other from the Statute, and it is intended to be used as a legal means to protect the legal
interests of third States by ensuring that justice is carried out in the fairest of ways, and that a State,
any State, is heard when the circumstances of a case are such that a decision may affect, even if
only indirectly, the legal interests of that State. To allow or to impede intervention merely on the
basis of judicial policy, because of a desire either to encourage countries to queue up to intervene,
or alternatively, to dissuade countries from interv ening at all, as seems to be what Nicaragua
suggests, is wrong and defies everything international law stands for.
14. Mr.President, Nicaragua also endeavoured yesterday to disqualify Costa Rica’s
intervention on the basis of Costa Rica’s alleged malic ious motive to take advantage of its sister
republics, parties to this case. Thus, Nicaragua w ould have us believe that Costa Rica first plotted
with Colombia, back in 1977, to strip maritime areas in the Caribbean Sea out of Nicaragua’s
20
hands . As counsel for Colombia rightly pointed out yesterday, it should be noted that Nicaragua
did not protest that agreement. Furthermore, a ccording to Nicaragua, in a later stage, and only
because Costa Rica secretly felt short-changed by its 1977 agreement with Colombia, it is seizing
the opportunity opened by Nicaragua to strip back from Colombia areas it felt it lost in the 1977
negotiation. As Nicaragua was saying this, it was simultaneously acknowledging ⎯ over, and
over, and over again ⎯ that Costa Rica has, indeed, full y respected the 1977 agreement with
Colombia for its entire duration. It made quite a point out of this, and even went so far as to say “It
is undisputed that Costa Rica has complied with the 1977 Treaty ever since it was executed,
21
including to this day.” However, despite this acknowledgme nt, it continued to challenge Costa
20
CR 2010/13, p. 41, para. 42 (Reichler).
2Ibid., p. 39, para. 37 (Reichler). - 23 -
Rica’s motives, by reading between the lines of Costa Rica’s three decades of assurances and
practice of recognition to Colombia, to find a secret plot to do exactly the contrary. Counsel for
Nicaragua even took it upon himself to warn this Court of this plot, stating that
“After 33 years of maintaining a consistent and public view of its legal interests,
and conducting itself in strict accordance with that view in all respects, the Court
should treat with some caution Costa Rica’s sudden effort to throw the entire historical
and geographical record out the window in order to claim a new, expanded set of
interests in regard to Nicaragua alone.” 22
Why is Costa Rica’s conduct of strict compliance with the 1977 agreement evidence of throwing
the historical and geographical record out the window, particularly in regards to Nicaragua?
Obviously there is no relationship between one thing and the other, but it does indeed sound
impressively ominous.
15. When Costa Rica affirmed that it had not ratified the 1977 Treaty with Colombia, out of
deference to Nicaragua, that also seems to tr ouble Nicaragua, which apparently objects to Costa
Rica’s display of good neighbourliness. The fact of the matter is that the treaty has not been
ratified yet, not because Costa Rica expects or wishes for a specific outcome in this case, as
suggested by Nicaragua, but, first, because the dispute over the San Andrés archipelago between
Nicaragua and Colombia caused the treaty to be withdrawn from the Costa Rican legislature, as
reflected in Charney and Alexander 23, which was only partially quoted by Nicaragua yesterday,
and second, because after finding out that Nicaragua’s submissions in this case truly may affect
Costa Rica’s legal interests, it understood that a ra tification of that treaty would need to wait a
decision by this Court. Nicaragua’s story line, much of which is devoted to impugning Costa
Rica’s reasons for protecting its legal interests in this case, does share an attribute with the works of
SirArthurConanDoyle: they are both as riveting as they are extraordinarily fictitious. Can we
still feel assured that Costa Rica’s interests ar e duly protected after what we have witnessed
yesterday? Obviously not.
22
CR 2010/13., p. 40, para. 38 (Reichler).
2American Society of International Law, International Maritime Boundaries , Vol. I, J.I. Charney &
L.M. Alexander (eds.), 1996, p. 465. - 24 -
16. Mr. President, it appears that we came to learn only now, at this hearing, that Nicaragua
filed the instant case merely to ask the Court to fi nd “that the line dividing the continental shelf of
Nicaragua from the continental shelf of Colombia lies where Nicaragua has placed it” 2. That is,
Nicaragua is asking the Court to only posit a line, somewhere in the middle of the Caribbean Sea,
floating idly and completely disembodied from any ma ritime entitlements west of that line. This
strange submission, if it is correct, has the effect of apparently leaving the waters west of that line
to Colombia. This argument would seem to be confirmed by Nicaragua’s counsel’s half-hour
lecture on the 1977agreement between Costa Rica and Colombia, and how the waters east and
north of that boundary line appertain to Colombia. To make the point even clearer, counsel for
Nicaragua accused Costa Rica of making false ar guments, when Costa Rica commented that the
Nicaraguan line implied the recognition of the maritime areas bounded by that line 25. So, the
conclusion would have to be that Nicaragua wants the line but not the water.
17. However, at the same time Nicaragua comp lains that Costa Rica discriminates against it,
because if Colombia is the State to whom the waters beyond the limits of the 1977 line pertain,
Costa Rica has no legal interests in those maritime areas; but, if the waters beyond those limits
were to fall on Nicaragua, Costa Rica claims lega l interests in that area. Beyond the oddness of
these arguments, what exactly is Nicaragua compla ining about? Have we not been informed that
Nicaragua’s claimed delimitation line does not bind an y maritime area west of that line? And that
as a result, since Nicaragua is not Costa Rica’s neighbour there, because it does not claim those
waters, Costa Rica cannot have a contingent inter est in that area. And yet, despite the clear
contradiction, we hear complain ts about discrimination if Nicaragua comes to be Costa Rica’s
north-eastern neighbour. So, it seems that Nicaragua does indeed claim those areas; otherwise it
could not be accusing Costa Rica of discrimination. Therefore, the falsity does not lie in Costa
Rica’s arguments.
24
CR 2010/13, p. 32, para. 14 (Reichler).
2Ibid., p. 33, para. 18 (Reichler). - 25 -
III. The issue of information
18. Mr.President, I would like now to refer to the issue of information. In light of my
observations thus far, it is clear that Costa Rica may well face new theories, incomplete
information or new submissions throughout the remainder of this case. It is thus equally clear that,
in order to properl y protect its legal interests from what has already been asserted, and from what
might be asserted in the upcoming phase of this case, Costa Rica must make use of the procedure
of intervention for that purpose.
19. The informational importance is further emphasized by what we have seen thus far.
Counsel for Nicaragua, and also for Colombia, to a lesser degree, have said all manner of things
about Costa Rica’s legal interest. It is true, and even proper, that the parties may express their
views on a third State’s application to intervene. What is less proper, however, is to have third
State legal interests qualified, or disqualified, enlarged or diminished, as the views of the parties on
their respective claims against each other dictate. I would have to say that the legitimate
determination of a third State’s legal interest falls on that third State, which best understands its
interests, how they may be affected by foreign ci rcumstances, and what the best way to protect
them is. And it is for the Court, and only for the Court, to decide if the third State’s legal interest
falls within the scope of Article62, thus warranting the acceptance of the request to intervene.
Costa Rica’s interest of a legal nature stems out of Costa Rica’s true and good-faith understanding
of what its rights and interests are according to international law, and as a result has been framed as
such. Those are the rights and interests that are at stake here, not the ones that have been presented
by the Parties in their respective arguments.
20. Finally, if there can be any doubt about the importance of the procedure of intervention,
as the most effective means to inform the Court of the relevant facts, in order to render an informed
and complete decision in complex disputes ⎯ like the present one ⎯, where legal interests of third
States are in play, it is quite appropriate to recall ProfessorShabtaiRosenne’s views on this very
question. He said:
“Protection for a third State can only be assured if the Court is in full possession
of the relevant facts and information as that third State sees them and as the principal
parties can contest them in adversarial proceedings. The procedure of requesting - 26 -
permission to intervene, which assumes an adversarial character almost from its
initiation, is one of the methods by which the Court is supplied with these facts and
information, and can assess their impact on the bilateral case originally brought before
it. Article 59 is manifestly insufficient for this purpose.”
21. Mr. President, with these judicious words I come to the conclusion of my presentation. I
thank you and the distinguished Members of the Court for lending me your kind attention.
22. MrP.resident, if it pleases the Court, I would ask you to call on
Ambassador Edgar Ugalde, for Costa Rica’s closing statement.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr.SergioUgalde for his presentation. Maintenant, j’invite
M. l’ambassadeur Edgar Ugalde Alvarez, agent du Costa Rica à prendre la parole.
M. UGALDE ALVAREZ :
C ONCLUSIONS
1. Monsieur le président, distingués membres de la Cour : nous avons atteint la fin de cette
audience et nous sommes satisfaits car le Costa Rica a démontré clairement à cette honorable Cour,
l’existence d’intérêts d’ordre juri dique qui peuvent être mis en cause par la décision de la Cour
dans cette affaire.
2. Le Costa Rica a rempli pleinement les exigences de l’article 81 du Règlement de la Cour.
La demande d’autorisation d’intervenir a été déposée dans les délais fixés par la Cour, plus de
six semaines avant la clôture de la procédure écrite. Le Costa Rica a indiqué avec précision l’objet
de son intervention, tel qu’établi par la Cour. En conséquence, la Cour a été informée des intérêts
d’ordre juridique qui pouvaient être affectés par la décision dans cette affaire.
3. A l’appui de sa requête à fin d’interven tion, le Costa Rica a exposé ses arguments et
présenté des graphiques sur les zones géographiques dans la mer des Caraïbes qui prouvent, en
vertu du droit international, l’exis tence d’intérêts d’ordre juridique dans ladite mer. Nous avons
aussi démontré comment une décision de cette honor able Cour pourrait avoir une incidence directe
dans ses intérêts. Le Costa Rica a aussi précisé que ces régions géographiques font partie du litige
entre les Républiques du Nicaragua et la Colombie devant cette Cour.
2Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005, Vol. III, 2006, pp. 1596-1597;
emphasis added. - 27 -
4. Malgré les efforts intenses du Nicaragua de miner la valeur des intérêts du Costa Rica
dans la zone soumise à la décision de la Cour, l es éléments de preuve solides, juridiques et de fait
présentés par mon pays nous mènent à une seule conclusion possible : les Parties dans ce cas ont,
bel et bien, demandé à la Cour de prendr e une décision par rapport aux zones maritimes
costa-riciennes. Par conséquent, il est évident qu ’il y a un intérêt juridique légitime du Costa Rica
et que celui-ci peut être mis en cause par la décision de la Cour dans cette affaire.
5. En outre, mon pays a démontré comment une décision de la Cour, sans tenir compte des
intérêts juridiques du Costa Rica, est susceptible d’affecter, directement ou indirectement, lesdits
intérêts, avec des conséquences irréparables, qui ne pourraient pas être surmontées en présentant un
nouveau cas devant la Cour. Egalement nous avons examiné la façon dont l’article 59 du Statut de
la Cour, par la nature même de la règle, ne fournit pas la protection nécessaire pour prévenir les
effets négatifs pour le Costa Rica.
6. Par conséquent, pour mon pays, il est i ndispensable d’utiliser la procédure indiquée à
l’article 62 du Statut pour assurer la pleine protection de ses droits, face aux effets, même indirects,
d’un arrêt de cette honorable Cour, à la suite de réclamations de la Colombie comme du Nicaragua.
7. Monsieur le président, le peuple du Costa Rica a été éduqué dans la paix, et a toujours été
guidé par le respect du droit international, ai nsi que de l’utilisation des mécanismes pour la
résolution pacifique des différends entre Etats, en vertu des instruments internationaux.
Aujourd’hui, nous réaffirmons cette conviction deva nt la Cour internationale de Justice. La
demande du Costa Rica répond uniquement à sa volonté de protéger adéquatement ses droits et
intérêts conférés par le droit international.
Le PRESIDENT : Monsieur l’ambassadeur. Excusez-moi, il n’y a pas de traduction.
M. UGALDE ALVAREZ : Je m’excuse. Merci beaucoup. Je répète avec votre permission.
8. En aucune façon, le Costa Rica ne cherche, par le biais de cette requête, à «se présenter
comme partie ⎯non pas au différend qui oppose le Nicaragua à la Colombie ⎯ mais à un
différend entre lui-même et le Nicaragua concernant la délimitation maritime entre les deux pays»,
ainsi que l’a exprimé le professeur Remiro Brotons, ni «ignore the 1977 treaty» avec la Colombie, - 28 -
comme il a été suggéré par le conseil M. Paul Reichler . Nous invitons sincèrement la République
du Nicaragua à retourner à la tabl e des négociations dans le but de définir les limites maritimes
dans un esprit de bon voisinage et de fraternité propre à deux nations sŒurs.
9. D’autre part, le Costa Rica n’a, en au cun cas, donné raison pour qu’on puisse interpréter
ses arguments oraux ou écrits, comme un moyen d’ignorer ses obligations internationales, en
particulier le traité de 1977 avec la République de la Colombie. Pour étayer cette affirmation,
l’éminent agent de la République de la Colombie a dit : «The Treaty has been complied with good
28
faith by both countries since the date of its conclusion in 1977.» On se demande qui interprète le
mieux les motivations du Costa Rica dans cette affa ire : les conseils du Nicaragua ou l’agent de la
Colombie ?
10. Mon pays est optimiste ; nous sommes sûrs que cette honorable Cour a été convaincue du
bien-fondé de notre demande, des faits dont elle s’ inspire et de la pleine conformité avec les
dispositions du Statut et le Règlement de la Cour.
11. Par conséquent, Monsieur le prési dent, au nom de mon pays, je demande
respectueusement à la Cour d’octroyer le droit d’ intervenir à la République du Costa Rica, afin
d’informer la Cour sur ses intérêts d’ordre juridique qui pourraient être affectés par la décision dans
cette affaire, selon l’article 62 du Statut.
12. Au nom de la République du Costa Rica, je souhaite énoncer à nouveau les mesures que
mon gouvernement sollicite à la Cour dans le cadre de la présente requête à fin d’intervention.
13. Nous demandons l’application des dispositions de l’article 85 du Règlement, à savoir :
⎯ Paragraphe1: «L’Etat intervenant reçoit copie des pièces de procédure et des documents
annexés et a le droit de présenter une déclaration écrite dans un délai fixé par la Cour.»
⎯ Paragraphe 3 : «L’Etat intervenant a le droit de présenter au cours de la procédure orale des
observations sur l’objet de l’intervention.»
27
CR 2010/13, p. 21-22, par. 11 (Remiro) ; ibid., p. 38, par. 30 (Reichler).
28CR 2010/14, p. 12, par. 14 (Londoño). - 29 -
14. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, permettez-moi de remercier les
traducteurs pour l’excellent travail accompli, ai nsi que le personnel du secrétariat pour l’aimable
coopération et les facilités offertes. Je remercie également les membres distingués de cette Cour et
vous, Monsieur le président, pour l’attention généreuse accordée au Costa Rica. Bon après-midi.
Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, Monsieur l’ambassadeurUgaldeAlvarez pour vos
conclusions comme agent du Costa Rica.
The Court will meet again tomorrow at 3 p.m. to hear the second round of oral argument of
Nicaragua and Colombia.
The sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 3.55 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Thursday 14 October 2010, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) - Application by Costa Rica for permission to intervene