Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2009/3
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2009
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 3 March 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2009
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 3 mars 2009, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire du Différend relatif à des droits de navigation et des droits connexes
(Costa Rica c. Nicaragua)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Judges Shi
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Judge ad hoc Guillaume
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
ShiMM.
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
TCinçade
Yusuf
Greugesood,
Gjil.eume, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the Republic of Costa Rica is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Edgar Ugalde, Ambassador, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica,
as Agent;
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Prof essor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Lucius Caflisch, Emeritus Professor of Interna tional Law, Graduate Institute of International
and Development Studies, Geneva, member of th e International Law Commission, member of
the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, associate member of the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Sergio Ugalde, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr. Arnoldo Brenes, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica,
Ms Kate Parlett, Special Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, Solicitor
(Australia), PhD candidate, University of Cambridge (Jesus College),
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Aguilar-de Beauvillie rs Urbina, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Ricardo Otarola, Chief of Staff to the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica,
Mr. Sergio Vinocour, Minister and Consul General of Costa Rica to the French Republic,
Mr. Norman Lizano, Consul General of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Carlos Garbanzo, Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations
Office at Geneva,
Mr. Fouad Zarbiev, PhD candidate, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies,
Geneva,
Mr. Leonardo Salazar, National Geographic Institute of Costa Rica,
as Advisers;
Mr. Allan Solis, Third Secretary at the Embassy of Costa Rica in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Assistant Adviser. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Costa Rica est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Edgar Ugalde, ambassadeur, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères du Costa Rica,
comme agent ;
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.LuciusCaflisch, professeur émérite de dro it international de l’Institut de hautes études
internationales et du développement de Ge nève, membre de la Commission du droit
international, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Marcelo G. Kohen, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Institut de hautes études internationales
et du développement de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
M.SergioUgalde, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères du CostaRica,
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Arnoldo Brenes, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères du Costa Rica,
MmeKateParlett, conseiller spécial auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères du CostaRica,
Solicitor (Australie), doctorante à l’Université de Cambridge (Jesus College),
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Francisco José Aguilar-de Beauvilliers Urbina, ambassadeur du CostaRica auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M.RicardoOtarola, chef d’état-major auprès du vice-ministre des affaires étrangères du
Costa Rica,
M. Sergio Vinocour, ministre et consul général du Costa Rica en République française,
M. Norman Lizano, consul général du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M.CarlosGarbanzo, conseiller à la mission pe rmanente du Costa Rica auprès de l’Office des
Nations Unies à Genève,
M.FouadZarbiev, doctorant à l’Institut de haut es études internationales et du développement de
Genève,
M. Leonardo Salazar, Institut géographique national du Costa Rica,
comme conseillers ;
M. Allan Solis, troisième secrétaire à l’ambassade du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseiller adjoint. - 6 -
The Government of the Republic of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, former Chairman of the
International Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law,
University of Oxford, member of the Institut de Droit International; Distinguished Fellow, All
Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Professor of Internati onal Law at the University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, United States of America, former member of the
International Law Commission,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and
former Chairman of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Paul Reichler, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bar of the
United States Supreme Court, member of the Bar of the District of Columbia,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Irene Blázquez Navarro, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
Ms Clara E. Brillenbourg, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bar
of the United States Supreme Court, member of the Massachusetts Bar, member of the Bar of
the District of Columbia,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua,
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit International de Nanterre (CEDIN),
University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Counsellor, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs of Nicaragua,
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua,
as Assistant Counsel. - 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, ambassadeur du Nicaragua auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, ancien président de la
Commission du droit international, professeur ém érite de droit international public (chaire
Chichele) de l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international, Distinguished
fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,
M. Stephen C. McCaffrey, professeur de droit international à la McGeorge School of Law de
l’Université du Pacifique à Sacramento (Etats-Unis d’Amérique), ancien membre de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari s Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit international,
M. Paul S. Reichler, avocat au cabinet Fole y Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux
de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de dro it international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Mme Irene Blázquez Navarro, docteur en droit international public, Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid,
Mme Clara E. Brillenbourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux des districts de
Columbia et de New York,
M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre des
barreaux de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du Massachusetts et du district de
Columbia,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua,
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua,
M. César Vega Masís, directeur, direction des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et du territoire,
ministère des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua,
comme conseils adjoints. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court meets today to hear the
continuation of the first round of oral argument of the Republic of Costa Rica. The first person to
take the floor is Professor Crawford. Professor Crawford, you may take the floor.
Mr.CRAWFORD: Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before
you on behalf of Costa Rica and before the Court in its new composition.
R IGHT OF NAVIGATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS
Introduction
1. My purpose is to outline Costa Rica’s rights of navigation for public vessels. Article VI of
the Treaty of Limits, which recognizes a perpetual right of free navigation for Costa Rica, does not
distinguish between public and private vessels. I w ill outline the implications of this in the first
part of my presentation.
2. The second part will address CostaRica’s rights of public navigation as they were
affirmed in the Cleveland Award. Cleveland acknow ledged that Article VI of the Treaty of Limits
recognized a right of navigation for Costa Rican public vessels. This included navigation by armed
public vessels.
3. The third part of my presentation will explain the right of CostaRican public vessels to
navigate on the San Juan in order to fulfil Costa Ri ca’s obligation under Article IV of the Treaty of
Limits to safeguard the river, and to defend the common Bay of San Juan del Norte.
Costa Rican public vessels enjoy the perpetual right of free navigation under Article VI
4. I turn to my first point. Under Article VI Costa Rican public vessels enjoy the same right
of navigation for purposes of comme rce as CostaRican private vessels ⎯there is no relevant
distinction based on ownership of the vessel.
5. As Professor Kohen has explained, Costa Rica’s treaty rights of navigation for the purpose
of commerce includes navigation for the purposes of communication between villages and towns,
or any point of the Costa Rican bank to any other point on both banks of the river where navigation
is common, or to the interior of Costa Rica. Commerce includes communication. This navigation - 9 -
may be by CostaRican government officials or social service providers for the purpose of
providing essential services to the local population. Normally these people would travel on public
vessels.
6. Nicaragua contends that CostaRican public vessels are not entitled to any right of
navigation under Article VI, that the only right of navigation is that circumscribed by the Cleveland
Award 1. Nicaragua does not point to the text of ArticleVI to support its argument; there is
nothing in ArticleVI which suggests such a distin ction. The only evidence Nicaragua offers is a
rhetorical question posed by Costa Rica in its argum ent before Cleveland, which formed part of its
argument for a broad right of navigation for revenue vessels 2. Nicaragua argues that the entire
question of navigation by public vessels should be considered closed on the basis of the Cleveland
Award 3.
7. Nicaragua’s contention is based on two misrepresentations. First, the issue before
Cleveland was not the extent of CostaRica’s rights to navigate with public vessels in general. It
was carefully stated as: “wheth er CostaRica has the right to navigate the River SanJuan with
ships of war or revenue boats” 4. The fourth point of doubtful interpretation submitted by
Nicaragua essentially repeated this language. It read: “If Costa Rica, who, according to Article VI
of the treaty, has only the right of free navigation for the purposes of commerce... can also
5
navigate with men-of-war or reve nue cutters in the same waters?” This fourth question was
duplicative and was treated as such by Cleveland. Having answered the question in the second
paragraph of his Award, he merely referred to that determination in response to the fourth
6
question .
8. The issue arose because Nicaragua had object ed to CostaRica’s attempts to exercise its
rights under the Treaty of Limits by establishi ng a revenue guard based on the Colorado River 7.
1
RN, para. 2.140.
2
RN, para. 2.138.
3RN, para. 2.143.
4Art.VI, CostaRica-Nicaragua, Convention to submit to th e arbitration of the Government of the United States
the question in regard to the validity of the treaty of 15 April 1858 (Esquivel-Roman), Guatemala, MCR, Ann. 16; CMN,
Ann. 11. See also Cleveland Award: MCR, Ann. 26 p. 457 (p. 98).
5MCR, Ann. 207, p. 10.
6Third paragraph, point 8, President Cleveland Award, MCR, Ann. 26, p. 458 (p. 99).
7
CMN, Ann. 28. - 10 -
The revenue guard was established to reconnoitre the SanJuan at least once a week, with the
primary purpose of preventing contraband 8. Nicaragua protested and in reply the CostaRican
Foreign Minister argued that CostaRica, having the obligation to contribute to the custody and
defence of the river, had “the right to make use of the indispensable means to comply with that
duty”; he added that Costa Rica could “not exerci se any jurisdictional act over” the waters of the
river9. Against this background the Convention of 24December1886 asked Cleveland to decide
on Costa Rica’s right to navigate with revenue cutters and ships of war. The dispute concerned not
the right to navigate with public vessels in gene ral, but only navigation w ith those two types of
vessel.
9. Nicaragua’s second misrepresentation is that CostaRica’s pleading before Cleveland
somehow put in issue the broader question of navigation by public vessels 10. There are two
answers to this.
10. First, as I have said, Costa Rica’s arguments were limited to the specific question put to
the arbitrator. Second, it would have been beyond PresidentCleveland’s remit under the
Convention of 1886 to decide the broader point.
11. Before Cleveland, Costa Rica’s arguments dealt with navigation for revenue vessels and
ships of war separately. Before turning to the specific arguments relevant to each type of vessel,
Costa Rica asked a general rhetorical question in the following terms:
“Does this mean that Costa Rica cannot under any circumstances navigate with
public vessels in the said waters, whether the said vessel is properly a man-of-war, or
simply a revenue cutter, or any other vessel intended to prevent smuggling, or to carry
orders to the authorities of the bordering districts, or for any other purpose not exactly
11
within the meaning of transportation of merchandise?”
CostaRica then turned to its sp ecific arguments, dealing first with revenue vessels and then with
ships of war.
12. In respect of revenue vessels, CostaRi ca asserted as “beyond discussion that [it] can
navigate in the San Juan river w ith public vessels, which are not properly men-of-war”. Referring
8MCR, Anns. 205, 206.
9
MCR, Ann. 31.
10RN, paras. 2.142-3.
11MCR, Ann. 207, p. 155. - 11 -
specifically to its revenue police, CostaRica argued that the rights of Nicaragua under the
1858 Treaty to bring cargo to the Costa Rican banks presupposed the necessary, correlative right of
Costa Rica “to watch its own banks by the only practicable means”, otherwise Costa Rica would be
12
at the mercy of smugglers .
13. The pleading then dealt with the right of navigation for ships of war, which Costa Rica
supported by analogy with other situations. It ar gued again that its duty to defend its own bank
under the Treaty implied a necessary correlative right to use regular men-of-war on the river 13.
14. CostaRica made no further mention of other public vessels, stating “This is neither the
proper time nor the proper place to make any decl aration whatsoever, affecting questions not at
issue, and neither debated nor submitted . . .” 14
15. Cleveland evidently took heed of this statement, and his Award was carefully
circumscribed. The second paragr aph, which addresses the question included in Article VI of the
1886 Convention, holds that Costa Rica “has not the right of navigation of the river San Juan with
vessels of war”, but “may navigate said river with such vessels of the revenue service as may be
related to and connected with her enjoyment of the ‘purposes of commerce’ accorded to her in said
15
article, or [or] as may be necessary to the protection of said enjoyment” . Cleveland’s language is
not exclusive of other vessels. It is simply dir ected at the question he w as asked to decide. In
point8 of the third paragraph, which addressed the fourth point of dou btful interpretation,
Cleveland stated “The right of the Republic of CostaRica to the navigation of the river... with
16
men-of-war or revenue-cutters is determined and defined in the second article of this award.” If
he had thought that he was determining the entir e scope of CostaRica’s right to navigate with
public vessels of any kind, he would have said th at the second paragraph of his Award defined and
determined that question. He did not say that, neither did he imply it.
12MCR, Ann. 207, p. 156.
13
MCR, Ann. 207, at pp. 158-160.
14
MCR, Ann. 207 (b), p. 90.
15MCR, Ann. 16, p. 457 (p. 98), second paragraph.
16MCR, Ann. 16, p. 458 (p. 99), third paragraph, point 8. - 12 -
16. Moreover, if Nicaragua had thought that Cleveland was addressing all navigation by
public vessels, its pleadings would have been directed accordingly ⎯but it did not discuss
17
navigation by public vessels other than those specified in the question .
17. In these circumstances to argue that th e scope of navigation by public vessels is res
18
judicata and that Costa Rica asks this Court to “reverse” the Cleveland Award , is absurd.
18. By tying navigation by public armed vessels to the circumstances set out in Article VI of
the Treaty, Cleveland rejected his assistant Rives’ suggestion that any right of navigation for public
19
vessels would only exist by some general rule and could not derive from the Treaty . This is
confirmed by Cleveland’s formulation, which refers to the right of navigation for revenue service
20
vessels as being “under” the Treaty and its stipul ations in ArticleVI specifically mentioned .
Rives’ suggestion had been that CostaRica w ould have only have those privileges actually
extended to other friendly nations, what Clevela nd decided was that CostaRican revenue service
vessels had their own specific treaty right of navigation.
19. Costa Rica’s consistent position has been that its public vessels enjoy the same perpetual
right of free navigation under ArticleVI as privat e vessels. This is entirely consistent with
Cleveland’s approach.
Costa Rica’s treaty right of navigation on the river, affirmed by the Cleveland Award,
includes navigation by armed public vessels
(a)The Cleveland Award affirmed a right of navigation for revenue vessels which are armed
public vessels
20. I turn now to Cleveland’s Award in relation to armed public vessels, specifically revenue
service vessels.
21. As I have already explained, Cleveland’s treatment of this question was carefully phrased
to reflect the terms of his grant of jurisdiction. His Award stated:
17
MCR, Ann. 208 (b), pp. 48-49.
18RN, para. 2.142.
19Cf. Rives Report (Second), CMN Ann.70, p. 1, “The forego ing article, it will be observe d, is silent as to the
right of navigation by public vessels. If su ch a right exists, it must be by virtue of some general rule and not affected by
the Treaty . . .”
20MCR, Ann. 26, p. 457 (p. 98), second paragraph. - 13 -
“The Republic of Costa Rica under said treaty and the stipulations contained in
the sixth article thereof, has not the right of navigation on the river SanJuan with
vessels of war; but she may navigate said river with such vessels of the revenue
service as may be related to and connected with her enjoyment of the ‘purposes of
commerce’ accorded to her in said article, or as may be necessary to the protection of
said enjoyment.” 21
22. It is beyond dispute that these vessels of the revenue service were armed public vessels.
CostaRica’s argument in respect of revenue servi ce vessels referred to the need to protect its
22
commerce and its banks of the river, which protection implied the carrying of arms . Nicaragua
referred to vessels of the revenue service as “armed vessels, capable of enforcing their demands by
force” 23. Rives’ report suggested that revenue servi ce vessels were indistinguishable from vessels
24
of war . But Cleveland’s Award distinguished betw een the two, referring to the functions of
revenue service vessels as “protection” of Cost aRican navigation for purposes of commerce.
“Protection” would be futile without the capacity to carry arms.
23. PresidentCleveland was certainly aware of the uses of revenue cutters, which were
lightly armed vessels used for customs, quarantin e and revenue enforcement and for a range of
other purposes 25. In May 1886, PresidentCleveland pers onally arranged for a revenue cutter to
meet the ship carrying his fiancée, Fr ances Folsom, to New York. The cutter William E Chandler
brought Miss Folsom and her party into the harbour , followed by a boatload of reporters keen on a
glimpse of the President’s young bride 26. The Chandler measured 99feet and carried one
27
20-pounder gun . Its characteristics are similar to those of the cutter, the Forward, shown on the
28
screen (tab 32 in the judges’ folder). Despite extensive archival research we were not able to find
21
MCR, Ann. 26, p. 457 (p. 98), second paragraph.
22
MCR, Ann. 207 (b), p. 156.
23MCR, Ann. 208 (b), p. 49.
24Rives Report (Second), CMN, Ann. 70, p. 4.
25MCR, 4.81.
26
“The President’s Wedding”, Washington Post , 29 May 1886 (available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/
washingtonpost/search.html). See also “Miss Folsom’s Return”, New York Times , 28May1886 (available at
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9C0CE2DC1738E533A2575…);
“MissFolsom’s Homeward Trip”, New York Times , 29 May 1886 (available at http://query.nytimes.com/
mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9500E0DC1738E533A2575AC2A9639C94679FD7CF); Stephen F. Robar, Frances Clara
Folsom Cleveland (Nova History Publications: New York, 2002), p. 20.
27
See http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/Jasmine_1866.pdf; D. L. Canney, US Coast Guard and Revenue
Cutters 1790-1935 (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1995), p. 38.
28
http://www.coastguardpics.com/imagelib/sitebuilder/misc/show_image.html…
://www.coastguardpics.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderpictures/usrcforwa…; see
D. L. Canney, US Coast Guard and Revenue Cutters 1790-1935 (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1995), p. 45. - 14 -
a photograph of the William E. Chandler. The Chandler was still in service at the time of the
29
Cleveland Award, two years after Cleveland’s marriage to Miss Folsom . So when Cleveland
referred to revenue cutters he knew what he was talking about! In these circumstances,
Nicaragua’s argument that the Cleveland Award di d not affirm a right of navigation for public
30
armed vessels other than men-of-war cannot be sustained .
24. The Cleveland Award specified the scope of CostaRica’s right of armed navigation by
revenue service vessels under two heads: (1) “as may be related to and connected with her
enjoyment of the ‘purposes of commerce’ accorded to her in ArticleVI”; or (2) “as may be
necessary for the protection of said enjoyment” 3. In its familiar attempt to limit CostaRica’s
rights of navigation to the extent that they become meaningless, Nicaragua argues that these
requirements are cumulative rather than alternative 32. But clearly that is wrong: Cleveland used
the conjunction “or” and not “and”. In a further al ternative, Nicaragua argues that the concept of
33
necessity applies to navigation by revenue vessels under any circumstances . This is not the case,
since only navigation for the protection of CostaRica’s enjoyment of its right of navigation was
subject to this requirement.
25. Nicaragua also seeks to limit Costa Rica’s treaty rights of navigation by reference to later
negotiations which did not result in a concluded agre ement. It claims that the Soto-Carazo Treaty
34
of 26 July 1887 , which was ratified by CostaRica but not by Nicaragua, indicated that
CostaRica’s right of navigation did not comprise any right to navigate with revenue service
vessels. But unratified treaties do not change the la w or the meaning of earlier treaties in force.
And even if the 1887Treaty could be said to reflect CostaRica’s understanding of its existing
rights and obligations, it affirms CostaRica’s right of navigation for purposes of re-supply of
police posts and relief of personnel 35. Today Nicaragua denies that that right exists. I would add
29D. L. Canney, US Coast Guard and Revenue Cutters 1790-1935 (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1995), xiii.
30
Cf CMN, 4.2.15.
31
MCR, Ann. 26, p. 457 (p. 98), second paragraph.
32
For example, RN, 3.1.54-55.
33Cf RN, para. 5.45.
34MCR, Ann. 15.
35
MCR, Ann. 15, Art. VIII. - 15 -
that the unratified 1887 Treaty would have given Co sta Rica the right of navigation over the whole
length of the San Juan River and the Lake of Nicaragua 36. In these circumstances it cannot serve as
an aid to the interpretation of the treaty of limits.
26. In its 1916 decision, the Central American Court of Justice acknowledged the extent of
CostaRica’s rights of navigation with revenue service vessels. CostaRica’s argument was as
follows:
“with regard to the SanJuan River, the c onventional rights of CostaRica are, in a
certain aspect, less than the corresponding rights of co-ownership . . . Costa Rica, for
example, cannot ply that stream with war vessels as, of course, Nicaragua can do; but,
on the other hand, those rights are greater than those of a mere co-owner . . . because
the Costa Rican vessels, as well merchantmen as revenue cutters, in the zone in which
navigation is common, have a free course over the whole river... and free access,
exempt from imposts, to any point on the Nicaraguan shore.” 37
27. In its Judgment, the Court agreed in principle with this argument, holding that:
“the rights of navigation on the San Juan Ri ver that were confirmed in Costa Rica do
not extend to vessels of war, but simply to vessels devoted to revenue and defensive
purposes ⎯ an interpretation that in no wa y detracts from the doctrine set forth
concerning the practical ownership pertaini ng in great part to CostaRica over the
San Juan River because navigation with vessels of war, aside from constituting a cause
for disquiet, would imply a function appropriate to territorial sovereignty” . 38
28. The revenue vessels used at the time of the Cleveland Award were engaged in fiscal
control, border protection and other police tasks, and the relevant personnel carried service arms.
Now these tasks are performed by the National Coas tguard Service, the Fiscal Control Police, the
39
Border Police and the Rural and Civic Guards . Thus CostaRica’s tr eaty right of navigation
affirmed in the Cleveland Award covers navigatio n by public vessels carrying police with service
arms for purposes of re-supply of police posts a nd revenue personnel, a nd you can see the boats,
formidable as they are, on the screen (tab 33 in the judges’ folder).
29. That Costa Rican police may navigate with service arms is also consistent with the 1956
Agreement. That Agreement requires the Parties to “arrange for the supervision of their common
border as a means of preventing the illegal entry of either weapons or armed groups from the
36MCR, Ann. 15, Art. IV.
37
MCR, Ann. 21, p. 197.
38MCR, Ann. 21, p. 220.
39See MCR, App. B. - 16 -
territory of one of the Parties into the territory of the other”40. That task could only be performed
by Costa Rica, either by navigating on the San Juan with service arms or through its police posts on
the bank, which in turn implies navigation for the purposes of re-supply and relief of personnel.
There is no other way those tasks can be performed.
(b)This right is confirmed by subsequent practice
30. The right for public vessels to navigate on th e lower part of the SanJuan with arms is
consistent with subsequent practice. On the one hand, CostaRica respected Cleveland’s
prohibition on navigation with vessels of war. On the other hand, it continued to navigate with
armed personnel on revenue cutters or other ⎯mostly very much smaller ⎯public vessels and
Nicaragua respected that right.
31. The pleadings in the present ca se refer to the incident of the Adela in 1892. The journey
of the Adela is explained in sketch-map 1, which is in your folder at tab 35.
The PRESIDENT: Professor Crawford, could you speak a little more slowly.
Mr. CRAWFORD: Yes, of course, Sir.
The CostaRican steamer the Adela travelled with arms from the mouth of the San Carlos
River along the San Juan to the point 3 miles below Castillo Viejo ⎯ which, you will recall, is the
limit of the sector of the San Juan in which Cost a Rica has rights of navigation. Its mission was to
install guards at the fiscal post at Terrón Colo rado, Los Chiles, which is within CostaRican
territory near the source of the SanJuan in La ke Nicaragua. It stopped 3miles below Castillo
Viejo and left its arms and ammunition on the CostaRican bank. Beyond that point, CostaRica
has no right of navigation at all. The Commander of the Adela then continued to the Nicaraguan
post at Castillo Viejo to request permission to naviga te with arms for the remainder of the journey.
That permission was refused, and the CostaRican Commander was obliged to transport the arms
and ammunition by land 41. But the point here is that the Adela travelled with arms and ammunition
40
MCR, Ann. 24, Art. II.
4MCR, Ann. 209. - 17 -
on the lower SanJuan, where CostaRica has a treat y right of navigation, and did so without any
specific grant of permission.
32. Later that year, authorization was given fo r Costa Rica to navigate with armed vessels in
the upper part of the river. The Nicaraguan Customs Administrator in SanJuan del Norte
authorized the Costa Rican guard of El Colorado to pass beyond Castillo Viejo, for the purpose of
42
any mission in Rio Frio, which is west of Castillo Viejo towards Lake Nicaragua . Consistent
with Costa Rica’s treaty right of navigation, ther e was no need for authorisation on the lower part
of the San Juan and no authorization was given in relation to that part.
33. Costa Rica has also submitted documentary evidence of the navigation of its revenue and
43
fiscal guards on the river supported by affidavits and correspondence. The evidence suggests that
the revenue guard fulfilled the functions it was required to perform under the Decree of1886,
44
which included reconnoitring the river on a weekly basis . In more recent times, these functions
were fulfilled by the Costa Rican police and the annual reports of these police indicate that it was
usual for them to patrol the SanJuan 45. There is also documentary evidence of the practice of
supplying and relieving CostaRican border posts on the river 46 until 1998, when Nicaragua
47
prohibited all navigation by Costa Rican public vessels , in breach of the Treaty and the Cleveland
Award.
34. Nicaragua argues that Costa Rica has inflated the number of journeys on the river since
48
not every entry in the report expressly mentions the river . But it is physically impossible to travel
from one specified place to another by boat without transiting the river: for example, from the
border post at Sarapiquí to Remolinito, Tigra or La Cureña 4, or from the Sarapiquí to Delta
50
Costa Rica , you have to go on the river (tab 34 in the judges’ folder).
42MCR, Ann. 210.
43
MCR, Anns. 211, 212, 213, 214, 215 and 216; RCR Anns. 31 to 38.
44
MCR, Ann. 206, Art. 5th.
45
RCR, Ann. 38.
46MCR, Ann. 227.
47MCR, Anns. 240, 131, 132.
48RN, para. 5.78.
49
RCR, Ann. 36, p. 252; RCR, Ann. 37, p. 253.
50
MCR, Ann. 227, p. 934. - 18 -
35. CostaRica’s practice of navigating with arms in this case demonstrates that there is a
necessity for such navigation. Indeed, the police post at La Cureña had to be closed due to a lack
of alternative access, and other posts on the river are operating at a lower level of efficiency 51. But
CostaRica’s rights are perpetual and unconditional; they are not dependent on the existence of a
need.
36. To its Rejoinder, Nicaragua attached affidavits of officers of its army and other
individuals, including one who was a member of two successive revolutionary movements ⎯ for
52
him the revolution was indeed permanent ! Five of these affidavits are from commanders who
were responsible for security on the river between 1979 and 2006 53. Nicaragua claims that this
supports its argument that CostaRica “routinely requested and obtained prior authorization from
Nicaraguan authorities before sending its vessels on missions to supply the CostaRican border
posts” 54. No documentary evidence supports any of these affidavits. My colleague, Sergio Ugalde,
55
has discussed the affidavit of Mr. Walter Navarro Romero , which the Court kindly allowed us to
produce in rebuttal. Mr.Navarro emphatically denies that he or his predecessors requested
permission to navigate on the San Juan 56.
37. Indeed, one of Nicaragua’s own affidavits confirms that there was a practice of the
Costa Rican civil guard vessels navigating on the river in the 1960s and 1970s 57.
38. In addition, the Cuadra-Lizano Joint Communiqué suggests that the status quo ante did
not involve a requirement of authorization, as distinct from giving notice.
39. CostaRica’s position has been consistent ⎯before 1998, CostaRican public vessels
would notify Nicaraguan authorities of their navi gation but would not obtain prior authorization
because they were exercising an existing right. This is expressly stated in the note of the
51
RCR, para. 3.94.
52RN, Ann.68 (Carrión affidavit); RN, Ann.69 (Cente no affidavit); RN, Ann.73 (Membreño affidavit);
RN,Ann.72 (Largaespada affidavit); RN, Ann.78 (Talavera affidavit); RN, Ann.77 (Sánchez affidavit), Ann.70
(García affidavit); and RN, Ann. 75 (Pastora affidavit).
53
RN, Ann. 69 (Centeno); RN, Ann. 78 (Talavera); RN, Ann. 73 (Membreño); RN, Ann. 72 (Largaespada); and
RN, Ann. 77 (Sánchez).
54
RN, para. 5.80.
55Ann. IV to letter filed 27 Nov. 2008.
56Ann. IV to letter filed 27 Nov. 2008, para. 4.
57
RN, Ann. 65, p. 404, para. 6. - 19 -
Costa Rican President of June 2000 to his Nicaraguan counterpart: he suggested that the system of
notification which applied before 1998 be reinstated 58.
The PRESIDENT: Excuse me, the translator finds it very difficult to catch up with you.
Mr. CRAWFORD: I am sorry, I will go even slower, Sir.
40. Nicaragua has produced ⎯ again in its Rejoinder ⎯ what it calls a “contemporaneous
aide-memoire” of a meeting held between delegates from the CostaRican Minister of Public
Security and the Nicaraguan army in July 2000 59. This aide-memoire is a nnexed to an affidavit of
60
General Carrión of the Nicaraguan army . There is no indication that it was approved or even
seen by anyone from the CostaRican side. The aide-memoire suggests that ColonelAlvarado, a
member of the delegation from the Ministry of Pu blic Security of Costa Rica, stated that the
61
practice prior to 1998 was a system of authorization . This suggestion is not corroborated, not
even in the affidavit of Major Molina 62, said to have been the author of the aide-memoire. In the
circumstances it should be given no weight.
41. In summary, Costa Rica has provided the C ourt with substantial documentary evidence,
corroborated by affidavit evidence, supporting its cl aim of a consistent practice of navigating on
the San Juan in exercise of its right of naviga tion for public vessels with service arms, on the basis
of prior notification but without any requirement of authorization.
Costa Rican public vessels have a right to navigate on the San Juan which corresponds to its
obligations to safeguard (guarda) the river and to contribute to its defence, as well as
defence of the common bays pursuant to Article IV of the 1858 Treaty
42. I turn to my third point, which is that Costa Rica has a right of navigation corresponding
to its obligations under ArticleIV of the Treaty concerning defence of the common bays,
safeguarding the river and defence of the river in case of aggression.
43. These obligations are clear from the text of Article IV itself, which reads:
58
MCR, Ann. 64.
59
RN, Ann. 68.
60RN, Ann. 68, p. 421, para. 11.
61RN, Ann. 68, aide-memoire, p. 423, para. 2.
62RN, Ann. 74. - 20 -
“The Bay of San Juan del Norte, as well as the Salinas Bay, shall be common to
both Republics, and therefore, both the advantages of the use and the obligation to
contribute to their defence shall also be common. Costa Rica shall be bound, as far as
the portion of the banks of the San Juan river which correspond to it is concerned, to
contribute to its custody in the same way as the two Republics shall contribute to the
defence of the river in case of external aggression; and this they shall do with all the
efficiency within their reach.” 63
44. The Central American Court of Justice, in its 1916judgment, recalled the right and
obligation of Costa Rica under Article IV in the following terms:
“Costa Rica possesses undisputed title to th e right bank of the river, to the land
situated within her jurisdictional limits; she has joint ownership in the ports of
SanJuan del Norte and in Salinas Bay; she possesses the contractual right of
perpetual navigation in the river, beginning at a point three miles below Castillo Viejo,
accompanied by the full privilege of tr ansit and commerce, and Nicaragua is
impressed with the duty not to interfere with navigation, but, on the contrary, to keep
the course of the river open; Costa Rica enjoys also the right to moor her vessels on
both banks throughout the entire zone in which navigation is common, and the rights
involved in guarding and defense ‘with all means within her reach’.” 64
45. The first two obligations expressed in Artic le IV are permanent and continuing: they are
to contribute to the defence of the common bays and to contribute to the custody of the river.
46. Safeguarding the river requires navigation. In the twentieth century, this obligation was
understood as taking action to prevent trafficking and smuggling, and to counter threats to security
such as the passage of insurgents or of weapons from one country to the other. Safeguarding the
river was particularly important in the context of the tensions between the two States during 1948
and 1955. This led to the Treaty of Amity of 1949 65 and the further Agreement of 1956 . 66
47. Nicaragua argues that ArticleIV should to be construed as requiring CostaRica to
discharge its obligations to safeguard an d defend the river “onl y from her own banks” 67. This is
not the language used in ArticleIV, which requi res CostaRica to “contribute to [the river’s]
68
custody... with all the e fficiency within [its] reach” . Rives suggested that this phrase implied
that CostaRica’s obligation could be fulfilled by “defence of the [river] by land” 6. But again,
63MCR, Ann. 7 (b).
64MCR, Ann. 21, p. 222.
65
MCR, Ann. 23.
66
MCR, Ann. 24.
67RN, para. 5.10.
68MCR, Ann. 7 (b).
69MCR, Ann. 71, p. 251. - 21 -
PresidentCleveland took a broader view, and no such limitation was contained in the Cleveland
Award. The words “within their reach” could equa lly mean “as far as possible”, a reference to
available resources and not physical location. Even if a physical limitation was to be implied into
ArticleIV, given that much of the CostaRi can bank is inaccessible except via the river,
Costa Rica’s obligation to safeguard ⎯ whether from the bank or the river ⎯ necessarily entails a
right to navigate on the river.
Conclusions
48. Mr.President, Members of the Court, CostaRica has rights of navigation for public
vessels which I have categorized under three heads. First, its public vessels enjoy the right of
navigation recognized in Article VI. Second, its public vessels have a right of navigation with arms
as recognized in the Cleveland Award, for navigatio n which is related to and connected with the
enjoyment of the “purposes of commerce”; or navigation which may be necessary for the
protection of its enjoyment of that right of navigatio n. This right is consistent with the practice of
both States. Third, its public vessels have a ri ght to navigate on the SanJuan which corresponds
and is the correlative of the obligations under Artic le IV of the Treaty, to safeguard and defend the
river; these are affirmed by the 1956Agreement, by which both States committed to common
surveillance of the border for specified purposes.
Mr.President, I would ask you now to call upon ProfessorCaflisch, who will explain the
unreasonableness of Nicaragua’s purported regulation of Costa Rican navigation on the river.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Crawford, for your statement. I now invite
Professor Caflisch to take the floor.
CMAr.LISCH:
U NREASONABLENESS AND UNLAWFULNESS OF N ICARAGUA ’S REGULATIONS
APPLIED TO NAVIGATION ON THE SAN J UAN RIVER
1. Nicaragua’s right to regulate the river and its uses: the problem
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, my intervention today will deal with the
unreasonableness and unlawfulness of Nicaragua’s regulations and measures related to the - 22 -
navigation on the San Juan River by Costa Rican ve ssels. I shall first address the general issue of
Nicaragua’s right to regulate the river and its uses. The present status of the regulations applied
and the measures taken by Nicaragua will be ex amined next. And finally, a few general
conclusions will be drawn.
2. Mr.President, Members of the Court, as has been explained already in the present
hearings, under the 1858Treaty, the 1888Cleveland Award and the 1916judgment, the SanJuan
River is governed by a relatively complex régime. One element of that régime is the sovereignty
exercised by Nicaragua over the waters and bed of the river. Another element is the perpetual right
of free navigation enjoyed by Costa Rica. It has been shown already that there is no subordination
between the two; in particular, the sovereignty of Nicaragua cannot be used to rob Costa Rica’s
right of navigation of all or part of its substance.
3. Regarding navigation on international wate rcourses, several systems are in use in Latin
America. A first system is that of the “sp ecial concession” (“concesión especial”): the State
exercising sovereignty over part of an internationa l watercourse may, on the basis of its domestic
law, allow the vessels of the other riparian or even non-riparian States to sail ships on that
watercourse. Such permission, having been granted by domestic law , can be withdrawn or
modified unilaterally according to the terms of that law. In that case, navigation by ships of the
other States concerned amounts to a privilege rather than a right on the international level and, in
that sense, is subordinated to the riparian State’s sovereignty.
4. Under a second system, a State exercises full sovereignty over the waters of the river by
virtue of a treaty but subsequently , again by treaty, grants a right of navigation to another State.
This is, essentially, how Nicaragua views the present s ituation, this view leading her to assert that
her sovereignty has precedence over Costa Rica’s ri ght of navigation when it comes to regulating
the use of the San Juan River.
5. Finally, in a third system, one State exer cises sovereignty over the waters of the river on
the basis of treaty provisions, while another State, on the basis of a right deriving from that same
treaty, is entitled to navigate on the river. Here there is a treaty right of navigation benefiting that
other State which is on an equal footing with the sovereignty exercised by the first State. That - 23 -
right cannot be modified or terminated unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself or agreed on by
the States concerned, neither of which is the case here.
6. It is evident that the situation of the San Juan falls into the third rather than the second
category: Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the ri ver and Costa Rica’s perpetual right of free
navigation flow from a single conventional sour ce, the 1858Treaty. This being so, the two
elements are placed on an equal footing, and there is no presumption of supremacy of the one over
the other.
7. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is not the Court’s task to engage in theoretical
exercises such as elaborating a general definition of the attributions of Nicaragua as the territorial
sovereign over the SanJuan River. The Court’s ta sk is very specific: it has to determine what
Nicaragua is and is not entitled to do if Costa Rica ’s right of navigation is to remain meaningful
and effective instead of becoming an empty shell. Such a pragmatic approach could move along
the following lines:
⎯ First, Nicaragua enjoys territorial sovereignty ove r the waters and the bed of the SanJuan
River. The exercise of that sovereignty is, however, subject to Costa Rica’s rights under the
1858 Treaty, as interpreted by the 1888 Cleveland Award and the 1916 judgment of the Central
American Court of Justice.
⎯ Second, the right to sail Costa Rican ships on pa rt of the SanJuan is perpetual and
unconditional. No admission or permission by Nicaragua is required, and no measures
substantially diminishing that right, or turning it into a mere privilege, can be tolerated.
⎯ Third, Costa Rica’s perpetual right of free navigation is absolute in that it exists for Costa Rica
independently of the rights of others. It would exist even if Nicaragua, the territorial sovereign,
were to refuse it to its own boats.
⎯ Fourth, Costa Rica’s right to sail ships on the San Juan River, while minimized by Nicaragua,
was, is and will be of vital im portance for both international and domestic purposes. Together
with Costa Rica’s main internal waterways ⎯ the SanCarlos, the Sarapiquí and the
Colorado ⎯, it forms a communication network between points in inland Costa Rica, between
Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and between Costa Rica and the sea via the SanJuan and the
Colorado. Accordingly, much more than move ment on the main river to gain access to and - 24 -
from the sea is at stake: “comercio” on an inland water system in a country parts of which may
be difficult of access, especially during the rainy season. This is one of the reasons why the
right secured in 1858 is of such central importance to Costa Rica.
⎯ Fifthly, it is basically up to Costa Rica to regulate and control the navigation of her ships on the
San Juan, as it is up to Nicaragua to do so for he r own vessels. This is one of the reasons why
the presence of Costa Rican public vessels on th e river is appropriate and necessary, as was
indeed recognized by President Cleveland when , in his Award, he used the words “as may be
related to and connected with he r enjoyment of ‘the purposes of commerce’ accorded to her in
said article [Article VI] or as may be necessary to the protection of said enjoyment” 70.
⎯ Sixth and finally, the treaty régime of 1858 contains a series of other provisions showing that,
in more ways than one, managing the SanJuan River is a business transcending territorial
barriers. That business should be transacted on the basis of co-operation between riparians;
there is little point in constant references to the “sister republic” as long as there is friction
instead of co-operation.
8. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the time has now come to turn to specifics, i.e., the
question of whether the regulations in fact enac ted and the measures in fact taken by Nicaragua
may be regarded as reasonable and lawful when confronted with Costa Rica’s right of navigation as
recognized by the Cañas-Jerez Treaty of 1858.
2. Nicaragua’s right to regulate the river and its uses: the present status
(a) Introduction
9. Mr.President, Members of the Court, let me, then, turn to the present status of the
regulations applied and the measures taken by the defendant State in respect of navigation on the
SanJuan River. In her Rejoinder Nicaragua discusses at length the “reasonableness” of her
navigation measures and regulations from the a ngles of: environmental protection and illegal
logging; of prevention and control of criminal act ivities; of safety of navigation; and of border
71
protection and security .
70
MCR, Vol. 2, Ann. 16, p. 98.
71RN, Vol. I, 4.34-4.98. - 25 -
10. Before examining these regulations and measu res one by one, one will note with interest
the central place suddenly attributed to environm ental issues in Nicaragua’s arguments, especially
as these issues were certainly not, in 1858, or even in 1888 and 1916, essential factors of the river’s
legal régime and as Nicaragua, when examining th e general issue of interpreting the 1858Treaty,
resists attempts at doing so in an evolutionary manner 7.
11. One is delighted to note Nicaragua’s satisfaction with her environmental performance in
the San Juan River area, as one is gratified to learn how well the poison dart frog is faring on the
northern shore of the river as well. One is less happy, however, with the avalanche of criticism
heaped by Nicaragua on its neighbour: Costa Rica is alleged to have destroyed the environment on
her side of the SanJuan area by unbridled att acks on nature and natural resources and to have
allowed human settlement on parts of her shore.
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I am aware of no rule of international law ⎯ treaty
or other ⎯ precluding the settlement of the river’s ba nks; and settlements can be found on the
Nicaraguan side as well. That part of the river’s Costa Rican shore has been populated ⎯ sparsely
populated ⎯ is certainly no ecological crime, nor a violation of an international obligation, but ⎯
perhaps ⎯ a harbinger of economic progress. Furt hermore, as a photograph reprinted in the
73
Nicaraguan Rejoinder fails to show, the Costa Rican shoreline is not cleared everywhere, nor are
the Nicaraguan banks wooded throughout.
13. In addition, it is simply not true that Costa Rica has done little or nothing to protect the
environment in the San Juan River area. She has, in fact, established four protected areas, on and
around the right bank of the San Juan River. These areas, shown in the projection, are the corridor
of the river (1), the Caño Negro (2), the Laguna Maquenque (3) and the Barra del Colorado
area (4). On its banks of the river, Costa Rica applies policies for the protection of the environment
and for preserving biodiversity.
14. Finally, it can certainly not be said that Nicaragua herself is ecologically pristine and
blameless, witness the pollution of Lake Nicaragua or the sewer contamination in the town of
72
Ibid., 2.56-2.57.
7RN, Vol. I, p. 193. - 26 -
74
San Carlos . The truth of the matter would seem to be that, to justify its campaign to reduce and
erode the exercise of Costa Rica’s perpetual right of free navigation under ArticleVI of the
1858 Treaty, the defendant State mainly relies on ecological arguments for lack of anything better.
15. Another preliminary point to be made is that while in certain areas where Costa Rica
finds her right of navigation to be breached, this has been the consequence of the extension of the
scope of general regulations , such as those on tourist cards and visas, and to the transit of Costa
Rican ships on the San Juan River. On other issues, such as the imposition of timetables and of the
prohibition of travelling on the SanJuan River by night, there seem to be specific regulations or
instructions emanating from the Nicaraguan army and setting the duty to hoist the Nicaraguan flag
75
when transiting the San Juan River as well as a prohibition to travel by night . There are finally
measures for which there seem to be no legal basis at all, such as the requirement to stop at every
Nicaraguan border post in the course of transit, exce pt, of course, for the extension to the river of
the general rules on visas and tourist cards. This shows that, when taking measures restricting
Costa Rican navigation, Nicaragua paid little atten tion even to her own laws, the main objective of
her actions being to hamper Costa Rican navigation on the San Juan.
16. I shall now turn to some of the regulati ons applied or measures enacted by Nicaragua to
determine whether they are compatible with Costa Rica’s right of navigation, that is: first, the
obligation to stop and register, including immigrat ion control and control of visa requirements;
second,the obtaining of a departure clearance certificate; third, the prohibition to travel at night;
and fourth, the obligation to carry the Nicaraguan flag.
The obligation to stop and register
17. Let me then turn to the obligation to stop and register. According to an affidavit
presented by Nicaragua 7, the obligation to stop and register originated in the 1960s, CostaRica
77
having enacted similar rules on her domestic rivers connected with the San Juan . It imposes on
74
See “Contaminación al lago fue anunciada”, El Nuevo Diario (Managua), 3D1ec2.005,
http://impreso.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2005/12/31/nacionales/92/6.
75
Points 6 and 7 of the Nicaraguan army’s “Action Plan fo r Departure Clearance and Certificates in the San Juan
river”, RN, Vol. II, Ann. 48.
76RN, Vol. II, Ann. 65.
77Ibid., Vol. I, 4.71. - 27 -
CostaRican ships the duty, upon entering the SanJuan River, to stop and register at the first
Nicaraguan border post. That duty is, according to the defendant State, “very minimal” and
“non-intrusive” 78 and makes it possible to collect the names of passengers and to identify the cargo
at the beginning and the end of every journey. In addition, stopping at every Nicaraguan border
post is required unless the post is satisfied with a mere notice of passage. Regarding the protection
of its environment, this will allow Nicaragua, so she says, to make sure, at the end of the day, that
all those who were on the river have departed from it. The duty to stop and register applies, across
the board, to all navigators, Costa Ricans and Ni caraguans alike, even Costa Rican children being
carried to school or back home, every time they pass, the reason given being that they could fall off
the boat 79. Another objective to be achieved by the duty to stop and register is, according to
Nicaragua 80, the prevention of the illegal occupation of land by persons coming from the
81
CostaRican side. It is further contended, on the basis of an affidavit , that the registration of
departure at the end of a journey will help in making sure that no one has unlawfully entered the
Indio Maíz Reserve.
18. According to Nicaragua, stopping and registering makes it possible to control
immigration, to issue tourist cards and to ascertain the fulfillment of visa requirements 82. These
requirements are allegedly waived for “local” re sidents and boatmen, except for the duty to
register. The waiver does not, however, appear to be systematic and seems to depend on the
discretion of the official in charge. Finally, much is being made by the other Party of the fact that
if Costa Ricans have to obtain a Nicaraguan consular visa, this is based on reciprocity: Costa Rica
requires visas from Nicaraguans entering Costa Rican territory 8.
19. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there are several things wrong with these
arguments. One really fails to see what this type of obligation brings in terms of environmental
protection or, at least, what is achieved by them that could not be accomplished by other, less
78Ibid., 4.61.
79
Ibid., 4.80.
80
Ibid., 4.60.
81Largaespada affidavit, § 9, RN, Vol. II, Ann. 72.
82RN, Vol. I, 4.87, 4.90.
83Ibid., 4.91. - 28 -
radical measures. Thus, intentions of illegal en try and of unlawful occupation of the Indio Maíz
Reserve are certainly not carved on the faces of those who stop and register and can only be
thwarted in situ. Criminals do not turn up at Nicaraguan army posts prior to perpetrating crimes in
that country. To control every child travelling to and from school on each and every day borders
on obsession, and it is difficult to see how this could prevent accidents. Stopping as a device to
control immigration and visa requirements is based on the misapprehension that individuals
travelling on the San Juan on board Costa Rican vessels enter Nicaraguan territory in the same way
as a tourist does when landing at Managua airport. This is simply not true: such individuals
benefit from Costa Rica’s right of navigation under ArticleVI of the 1858Treaty; and most of
them are only transiting without entering Nicaragua with the intention to stay. The position may be
different where they subsequently moor on the Nicaraguan side and proceed on land. Another
misapprehension is the idea that if Costa Rica he rself requires visas and collects fees from tourists
entering her territory, Nicaragua may do the same in respect of individuals sailing on the San Juan
River on ships flying the Costa Rican flag. The de fendant State seems to forget that it enjoys no
perpetual treaty right of navigation on Costa Ri ca’s national waterways, whereas Costa Rica does
have such a right on the San Juan River. Finall y, the measures in question are most cumbersome
and have the practical effect of rendering near impossible the exercise of Costa Rica’s
conventionally granted rights of navigation.
20. The inevitable conclusion is that the requirements of stopping and registering do not have
much of a preventive effect. Their main virtue c onsists in making navigation more difficult. They
cannot, therefore, be regarded as either “reasonable” or lawful. By contrast, patrolling the river
more often would be reasonable, lawful and effective.
Requirement of departure clearance certificates
21. I now come, Mr. President, Members of the Court to the requirement of departure
clearance certificates. According to the defendant State, departure clearance certificates, which I
shall refer to as DCCs, are required from all those planning to sail on the SanJuan River. The
issuance of such documents is said to be contingent on an inspection conducted, before every
journey, by a Nicaraguan border post, that inspec tion seeming to be intended to disclose the - 29 -
identity of the passengers and the nature of the cargo carried. Further objectives are, according to
Nicaragua: the enforcement of customs regulati ons, the prevention of the carrying of illegal cargo
such as drugs and other items determined ad hoc by the Nicaraguan authorities, of illicit traffic of
persons, of navigation by unseaworthy boats, of unl awful discharge of pollutants, of the unlawful
removal of animals and plants, of crimes and thr eats against border security, and of illegal entering
of the Indio Maíz Reserve; and, for tourist boats, the verification that these dangerous individuals
do not carry weapons, explosives or other flammable substances 84.
22. According to Nicaragua, the requireme nt reported here was accepted by Costa Rica
herself at a binational meeting held in 1997 85, where it had allegedly been agreed that all ships
travelling on the SanJuan River should obtain DCCs and subsequently report to all Nicaraguan
86
army posts in the course of their journey . But the Final Minutes of the 1997 binational meeting
only refer to drug trafficking. The delegation of Costa Rica to the meeting had stressed, in that
particular matter, the need for greater presence of the au thorities, and Nicaragua had agreed to
make an effort to establish posts at determined s ites to intensify the fight against this particular
crime. “With respect to the movement of v essels,” the Minutes continue, “it was considered
necessary that they navigate only if duly registered by the posts that issue corresponding navigation
certificates; in this case, the posts at San Juan de l Norte, San Carlos and Sarapiquí”. This passage
does not refer to the practice of DCCs as conceive d of today by Nicaragua, but exclusively to a
practice to fight drug traffic; and it only means that DCCs should be obtained by vessels from their
respective countries.
23. In reality, the objective of these certifi cates is not one of promoting safety but one of
levying a tax. One wonders, moreover, considering Costa Rica’s right of navigation secured by the
1858Treaty, whether Nicaragua could not and should not simply accept and recognize DCCs
delivered by Costa Rica to Costa Rican boats. Wh at is more, a fee of US$10 is currently being
charged for every certificate and every journey. This is unacceptable on two grounds: first, such a
fee is not authorized by the 1858Treaty, the Cleveland Award, or anything else; second, it
84Sanchez affidavit, § 9, RN., Vol. II, Ann. 77.
85
RN, Vol. I, 4.75.
86RN, Vol. II, Ann. 4. - 30 -
amounts to charging a tax for the exercise of a conventionally guaranteed right of navigation.
Costa Rica’s right of navigation is of an absolute character, and the fact that Nicaraguans also have
87
to obtain such a certificate is irrelevant. Nicaragua further argues that Costa Rica too requires
DCCs for the use of her internal watercourses; certificates which, incidentally, are delivered free
of cost. This is both untrue and immaterial: on such waterways navigation is possible, not on the
basis of an internationally guaranteed right of navigation, as is the case for Costa Rica regarding
the SanJuan River, but at the discretion of the Costa Rican authorities; and the situation is, of
course, exactly the same for Costa Rican boats desirous of using Nicaragua’s internal waterways.
The San Juan River is, not, however, an internal wa terway of Nicaragua but an international river
on which Costa Rican ships enjoy the right of free navigation.
24. In view of these arguments, the requiremen t of Departure Clearance Certificates in their
present form is “unreasonable” and unlawful, as it purports to transform a conventionally
guaranteed right of free navigation into one the exercise of which is entirely placed into
Nicaragua’s hands.
(d)Prohibition of travelling by night
25. Now, if you will, a few words about the prohibition of travelling by night. Nicaragua
unilaterally prohibits navigation on the SanJuan by night and explains this measure at some
88 89
length . Poaching is singled out as being the greatest danger of nocturnal navigation . Also,
Colonel Sánchez asserts, navigation at night is pr ohibited “since navigation after dark is extremely
dangerous and unwise”. Brigadier General Membreño adds that the river “is treacherous to
navigate, since there are no lights, and fallen logs and sand bars, invisible in the dark, are prevalent,
as are crocodiles”.
26. The cloak of darkness also favours unsavoury activities such as hunting, poaching,
fishing and environmental depredation, as well as illegal occupation. This is why Nicaragua has
pronounced a unilateral ban on navigation by night, an additional justification appearing to be that
87
García affidavit, § 4, ibid., Ann. 70; RN., Vol. I, 4.73.
88
RN, Vol. I, 4.65-4.66.
89Sánchez affidavit, § 6, RN., Vol. II, Ann. 77; Membreño affidavit, § 9, ibid., Ann. 73. - 31 -
the prohibition applies to Nicaraguans and Costa Ri cans alike. These reasons raise a long series of
objections:
(i) the 1858Treaty and the related texts make no mention of the possibility of any such
limitation. It is true that Costa Rica hersel f, in the presentation made by her to President
Cleveland in 1887, recognized that navigation on the SanJuan River “encounters many
obstacles, not only on account of its shallowness at certain places, but also owing to its
rapids and other dangers” 90. This statement, however, relates to navigation on the river
generally and not to travelling by night; mo reover, the Cleveland Award is silent on the
issue.
(ii) In fact, shallowness and rapids characterize the upper part of the San Juan. Further down,
particularly after having received the waters of the SanCarlos, the SanJuan becomes a
large waterway allowing for navigation around the clock.
(iii)As conceded by Nicaragua herself, the preventive effects of the measure are not
particularly encouraging, and most of the events the prohibition is intended to avert could
also be prevented during the day. Intrusions into reserves, for instance, could be handled
most effectively by arresting and expelling the individuals concerned by daylight.
(iv) Another argument made by the defendant St ate is that the prohibition of navigation by
night decreed by it applies across the board and includes its own nationals. In this
connection too, it may be recalled that the perp etual right of free navigation, stipulated in
1858, is of an absolute character, whic h means that Costa Rica’s right exists
independently of whether Nicaraguans have such a right too. More importantly, the
argument is misleading. A timetable entitled “Regional Lake Services” 91reveals that the
National Port Enterprise of Nicaragua runs a service from Granada to SanCarlos which
leaves Granada at 2.00p.m. on Mondays and Thursdays, takes 16hours and returns to
Granada on Tuesdays and Fridays at 2.00 p.m. It seems obvious that part of that service is
operated by night, that is, after 5.00 p.m., on th e San Juan River. Thus, some navigators
90
RN, Vol. II, Ann. 5, p. 33.
9To be found on the website of the Empresa Portuaria Nacional de Nicaragua, www.epn.com.ni. - 32 -
seem more equal than others. And, while th ere are dangers for some, they do not appear
to exist for others.
(v) Lastly one should examine whether Nicara gua’s unilateral measures, when confronted
with the perpetual right of free navigation of Costa Rica, are reasonably proportional to
the objective they seek to achieve. This ra ises the further question of whether that
objective could not be met by other means. The answer will have to be in the affirmative:
the objective could be reached by prescribing that boats travelling at night shall carry
lights and that dangerous places should be marked by lights as well ⎯ this is a standard
requirement in rivers. It would seem that the display of a minimum of co-operation
between the two sides could readily produce a viable régime of navigation by night.
(e) Duty to fly the Nicaraguan flag
27. Now, the last type of measure, the duty to fly the Nicaraguan flag. According to the
defendant State, “[t]he requirement to fly her flag during navigation on her waters, including the
SanJuan, is an attribute of Nicaragua’s sovereignt y, and is a matter of international custom and
practice” 92.
28. Nicaragua alleges that that requirement is limited to larger foreign vessels having masts
or turrets at the stern93; she further contends that ships may also, in addition, show the Costa Rican
flag. Flying the Nicaraguan flag is described as “a gesture of respect for the sovereignty of the host
94
State” . Nicaragua “finds it disturbing that Costa Rica objects to this reasonable and
non-burdensome requirement” 95. I find it disturbing, for my part, that Nicaragua tends to speak of
“courtesy” when rights are at stake, such as Costa Rica’s rights of navigation; and that, conversely,
she refers to “custom” wherever international practice shows that mere courtesy is involved, as
when it comes to showing the flag of the State in whose waters a foreign vessel moves.
U2ng.enreral international law , and in situations where there are conventionally
guaranteed rights of navigation, there is unquestionabl y a rule to the effect that in foreign waters
92RN, Vol. I, 4.93.
93
Ibid., 4.94. See also RN, Vol. II, Ann. 48.
94
RN, Vol. I, 4.93.
95Ibid. - 33 -
ships must fly their national flag. The territorial State –– Nicaragua in our case –– certainly has an
interest in being able to identify the foreign sh ips navigating in waters over which it exercises its
sovereignty. That would appear to be the legal rule, and a sensible and useful one at that.
30. There may also be a practice, inspired by international courtesy, to show the flag of the
country whose waters are being navigated in. This is a ceremonial element rather than an
international obligation.
96
31. In addition, no legislation other than an “Action Plan” of its army has been submitted
by the defendant State to justify the requirement for foreign vessels to fly the flag of Nicaragua
when navigating in Nicaraguan maritime waters, nor, a fortiori , a requirement to do so when
sailing in waterways such as San Juan River.
(f) Conclusion
32. Mr.President, Members of the Court, my conclusion on the specific measures taken by
the defendant State to regulate navigation on the SanJuan River is that they are inconvenient,
unreasonable and unlawful, since their combined effect has led to transforming the navigation
régime established in 1858 into an obstacle course.
3. General conclusions
33. Mr. President, Members of the Court, th e general conclusions which may be drawn from
my intervention would seem to be the following.
⎯ First, according to Nicaragua, the restrictions imposed by her on navigational activities on the
San Juan River are “reasonable”. For Costa Rica, they are both unreasonable and unlawful.
⎯ Second, it has been pointed out time and again that there is no hierarchy between Nicaragua’s
sovereignty over the river and Costa Rica’s perpetual right of free navigation. That right is
intended to be real and effective, and one th at cannot be regulated out of existence by
Nicaragua. It is, furthermore, of an absolute character and will endure even if it ceases to exist
for Nicaraguans themselves –– I hope that will never be the case, of course. It cannot, in other
words, be made to disappear by refusing rights of navigation to Nicaragua’s own citizens.
96
RN, Vol. II, Ann. 48. - 34 -
⎯ Third, the measures taken and the regulations en acted by Nicaragua, invoking her sovereignty,
might be unobjectionable for an exclusively internal waterway. Thus, they would not be
contrary to international law, for example, if they were enacted by Nicaragua, in Nicaraguan
internal waterways, for Costa Rican nationals and/or third-State users. This is due to the fact
that such individuals do not benefit from an in ternationally guaranteed right of navigation in
those waters.
⎯ Fourth, the measures and regulations in question are unreasonable and unlawful in that they
turn Costa Rica’s conventionally guaranteed perp etual right of free navigation into a mere
privilege which Nicaragua can, at any moment, limit or take away by unilateral action.
⎯ Fifthly and finally, for Costa Rica, the situation created by the gradual erosion of the exercise
of her right is not only unlawful and unreasonable, it is also highly cumbersome and
impractical because, instead of facilitating relations between two neighbouring States, it makes
them more difficult. This is regrettable.
Mr.President, Members of the Court, I tha nk you for your attention and your patience and
should like you to invite Professor Kohen to take the floor.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, ProfessorCaflisch, for your statement. I now invite
Professor Kohen to take the floor.
M. KOHEN :
L ES VIOLATIONS NICARAGUAYENNES DU DROIT PERPÉTUEL DE LIBRE NAVIGATION
AUX FINS DU COMMERCE
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, l’ objet de ma première plaidoirie ce matin est
la violation par le Nicaragua du droit perpétuel de libre navigation du CostaRica aux fins du
commerce.
2. Ma tâche se voit facilitée, vu que le Nicaragua ne nie pas les faits qui constituent autant de
violations du droit en question. L’Etat défe ndeur se contente d’avancer comme justification
principale l’interprétation de l’article VI que nous avons repoussée hier. - 35 -
3. En réalité, le Nicaragua ne respecte même pas la navigation costa-ricienne «avec des
articles de commerce de marchandises», pour utiliser sa terminologie en lui imposant des obstacles
divers et variés allant jusqu’à la saisie des bateaux ou des biens qu’ils contiennent 97.
4. Une deuxième et tardive justification avancée par la duplique, à savoir son droit d’imposer
une réglementation jugée raisonnable, vient d’être réfutée par LuciusCaflisch il y a quelques
instants. Arrivent enfin en troisième lieu les prétendues justifications basées sur des considérations
de sécurité et de protection de l’environnement.
5. Dans un premier temps, j’aborderai les viol ations nicaraguayennes. J’examinerai dans un
second temps les prétendues justifications exposées en dernier lieu par le Nicaragua.
A. Les violations commises par le Nicaragua sont amplement prouvées
6. Les violations actuelles du droit costa-ricien de libre navigation aux fins du commerce
trouvent leur racine à l’époque de la guerre civ ile qui sévissait au Nicaragua. L’armée sandiniste a
commencé à imposer des restrictions à la navigation à ce moment-là.
7. En1982, cette armée interdit la navigati on à la compagnie touristique costa-ricienne
Swiss Travel Services 98. Face aux protestations du CostaRica 99, le Nicaragua a reconnu que les
mesures de ses autorités locales n’étaient pas conformes au traité et qu’elles seraient abrogées 100.
8. Au cours de la même période le Nicaragua a commencé à exiger des bateaux costa-riciens
de s’arrêter à leurs postes frontière sur la rive nicaraguayenne et de payer un «droit d’appareillage».
Suite à des protestations costa-riciennes 101, cette pratique fut abandonnée en1983 102, pour être
reprise en 2001, comme je l’expliquerai dans un instant.
97
Mémoire du Costa Rica (MCR), par.5.142-5.143; Rép lique du Costa Rica (RCR), par.4.56-4.58; RCR,
vol. 2, annexe 50.
98
Lettres adressées par la direction de Swiss Travel Services au ministère de la sécurité publique et au ministère
des affaires étrangères du Costa Rica, MCR, vol. 6, annexes 223, 224 et 225.
99
Notes adressées le 8 juin 1982, le 16 juillet 1982 et 20 juillet 1982 par le ministre costa-ricien des affaires
étrangères, Fernando Volio Jiménez, au chargé d’affaires du Nicaragua au Costa Rica, Oscar Ramón Téllez, MCR, vol. 3,
annexes 41, 42, 43.
100
Note adressée le 2 août 1982 par le chargé d’affaires du Nicaragua au CostaRi ca, OscarRam ón Téllez, au
ministre costa-ricien des affaires étrangères, Fernando Volio Jiménez, MCR, vol. 3, annexe 44 (dossier de plaidoiries,
onglet n 38.
101Voir la note adressée le 16 juillet 1982 par le mi nistre costa-ricien des affaires étrangères,
Fernando Volio Jiménez, au chargé d’affaires du Nicaragua au Costa Rica, Oscar Ramón Téllez, MCR, vol. 3, annexe 42.
102
MCR, par. 3.13-3.14. - 36 -
9. Il est intéressant de comparer la position du Gouvernement nicaraguayen en 1982 et celle
qu’il adopte aujourd’hui. Le ministre nicaragua yen des affaires étrangères de l’époque expliquait
la situation de la manière suivante :
«les Costariciens ont un droit de naviga tion sur le SanJuan conformément au
traité Cañas-Jerez. Toutefois, du fait de la présence de bandes contre-révolutionnaires
dans la zone, nous avons demandé aux Costa-riciens de nous notifier quand ils vont
par le San Juan».
Et il a ajouté :
«ce n’est pas que nous voulons ignorer leur droit de naviguer le fleuve, mais
simplement nous voulons qu’ils nous le notifient, comme le font les Honduriens quand
ils naviguent le fleuve Coco, afin d’év iter des incidents comme celui de mardi
103
dernier» .
10. Lors de ce mardi, dont fait mention le mini stre, l’armée sandiniste avait ouvert le feu sur
un navire costa-ricien transportant du personne l du ministère de la santé. La notification ⎯ pas la
permission ⎯ était requise à l’époque par le Nicaragua, se fondant sur la situation exceptionnelle
générée par le conflit armé interne.
11. La guerre civile nicaraguayenne est terminée depuis longtemps, fort heureusement. Mais
les restrictions ont fait leur réapparition en 1994. Cette fois-ci elles ne se limitent pas à l’exigence
de notification.
12. Ces restrictions sont toutes incompatibles avec le droit perpétuel de libre navigation du
Costa Rica. Je vais maintenant vous les exposer très brièvement.
a) Les restrictions incompatibles avec le droit de libre navigation
i) Les cartes touristiques
13. Depuis mars 1994, un montant de 5 dollars améri cains est perçu sous la forme de «carte
104
touristique» de chaque passager naviguant sur un bateau costa-ricien . Suite aux protestations du
103Traduction en anglais: «Costa Ricans have a right of navigation on the San Juan according to the Cañas-Jerez
Treaty. But because in that area there are counterrevoluti onary bands, we have asked the CostaRicans to notify when
they are going to cross the San Juan». He added that: «it is not that we want to ignore their right to navigate the river, but
simply that they notify us, as the Hondurans do when they na vigate on the Coco River, so as to avoid accidents like the
one of the previous Tuesday.» (MCR, par. 5.10; La Nación, San José, 8 novembre 1980, MCR, vol.5, annexe111).
o
(Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n 43.)
104MCR, par. 5.107-5.108 ; RCR, par. 4.09-4.11. - 37 -
Costa Rica 105, le Nicaragua a cessé d’exiger cette carte des ressortissants costa-riciens, mais a
106
continué à l’imposer aux ressortissants des Etats tiers .
ii) Les «droits d’appareillage»
14. A partir de mars 2001, un paiement de 25dollars américains est exigé par bateau
costa-ricien à titre de «droit d’appareillage». Malgré les protestations répétées du CostaRica 107,
ces mesures continuent à être appliquées.
15. Le montant de cette taxe s’élève actuellement à 10dollars américains par bateau pour
chaque course simple 108. En fait, il varie au gré de circonstances que le Nicaragua n’a pas jugées
utile d’expliquer. Vous voyez à l’écran deux reçu s datés du même jour et correspondant au même
bateau, l’un de 5 dollars pour la course aller Sarapiqui-San Juan del Norte et l’autre de 10 dollars
pour le retour San Juan del Norte-Sarapiqui.
16. Cette taxe est appelée «zarpe internaciona l», c’est-à-dire «appareillage international», et
109
elle est perçue des navires costa-riciens, quelle que soit leur destination . Appareillage
«international»: difficile alor s pour le Nicaragua d’affirmer ⎯comme il le fait 110 ⎯ que cette
mesure s’applique également aux bateaux nicaraguayens navigant le San Juan.
iii) La taxe d’immigration
17. Depuis mars 2001, 5 dollars sont exigés par personne comme «taxe d’immigration» pour
l’entrée et la sortie du territoire nicaraguayen. En 2002, la «taxe d’immigration» a été augmentée à
deux reprises. Depuis lors, tous les passagers des navires costa-riciens naviguant sur le SanJuan
sont obligés de payer 9dollars, même lorsqu’ ils se déplacent entre deux points du territoire du
105
Note adressée le 15 mars 1994 par le ministre des affaires étrangères du Costa Rica, Bernd Niehaus Quesada à
l’Ambassadeur du Nicaragua au CostaRica , Alfonso Robelo, contre-mémoire du Nicaragua (CMN), vol.II, annexe41;
Note adressée le 9 mai 2001 par le ministre des affaires étrangères du CostaRica , Roberto Rojas López au ministre des
affaires étrangères du Nicaragua, Francisco Xavier Aguirre Sacasa, MCR, vol. 3, annexe 71. La República, San José,
5 mars 1994, MCR, vol. 5, annexe 123.
106La Nación, San José, 13 avril 1994, MCR, vol. 5, annexe 129.
107
Note datée 18 avril 2001 du ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères du Costa Rica, Elayne Whyte au ministre
des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua, Francisco Xavier Aguirre Sacasa, MCR, vol. 3, annexe 70, note datée 9mai2001
du ministre des affaires étrangères du Costa Rica, Roberto Rojas López, au ministre des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua,
Francisco Xavier Aguirre Sacasa, MCR, vol. 3, annexe 71.
108RCR, par. 4.07.
109Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n 41.
110
Duplique du Nicaragua (DN), par. 4.25. - 38 -
Costa Rica, 4 dollars à titre de «despacho migratorio», des opérations de migration, d’entrée et de
sortie du Nicaragua 111, et 5 dollars perçus à titre de ⎯je lis encore en espagnol ⎯ «permiso de
112
tránsito en los punto[s] fronterizo[s]», «p ermis de transit par des points frontaliers» . En clair,
non seulement le Nicaragua impose illicitement à tout navire costa-ricien l’obligation de s’arrêter à
chaque poste frontalier nicaraguayen, mais en plus, il exige de toute personne qui circule
⎯ batelier ou passager ⎯ de payer pour cela !
b) Les restrictions incompatibles avec le droit perpétuel de libre navigation
i) Interdiction générale de naviguer de 17 h 30 à 6 heures
18. M. Calfisch s’est déjà référé à l’exigence des visas et à la pratique systématique de
fouilles, il s’est également référé à l’obligation de hisser le pavillon nicar aguayen, il a également
parlé de l’interdiction générale de naviguer de 17h30 et 6heures et j’ajouterai qu’il s’agit d’une
violation flagrante d’un droit qui est qualifié de «perpétuel» ⎯ donc permanent, ininterrompu ⎯ et
«libre» 113. C’est un étrange droit perpétuel que celui qui cesse tous les jours et qui ne peut être
exercé que moins de la moitié de chaque jour.
ii)Interdictionsspécifiques
19. La navigation costa-ricienne a été interdite lors de certaines journées spécifiques, comme
par exemple le 3août1998 entre 9heures et 17heures ⎯c’est-à-dire pendant la journée ⎯, sous
114
prétexte d’une visite du président nicaraguayen . Même la visite du plus haut fonctionnaire
public ne justifie l’interruption durant pratiquement toute la journée de l’exercice d’un droit
conventionnel de navigation tout au long des 141kilomètres du fleuve «où la navigation est
commune». Monsieur le président, je ne sais pas si vous souhaitez que l’on fasse une pause à ce
moment là, ou si vous le préférez, je peux continuer encore une dizaine de minutes.
111 o
Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n 39.
112 o
Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n 40.
113MCR, par. 5.68-5.77 ; RCR, par. 4.19-4.21.
114MCR, par. 5.73. - 39 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Kohen. I think it is a good suggestion, so we’ll
have a coffee break for about 10 minutes. Thank you.
The Court adjourned from 11.25 a.m. to 11.40 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Kohen, please continue.
Mr. KOHEN: Thank you, Mr. President.
B. Aucune justification invoquée par le Nicaragua n’est fondée
20. Le Nicaragua prétend n’avoir jamais empêché les navires costa-riciens transportant des
passagers d’entrer ou de naviguer sur le San Juan, sauf pendant 1982 115. Le problème qui se pose
ici sont les conditions contraires au traité que le Nicaragua impose à cette navigation, qui la
restreignent significativement et qui privent le droit costa-ricien de toute substance.
a) Aucun pouvoir réglementaire ne peut dénaturer le droit perpétuel de libre navigation
21. Lucius Caflisch s’est référé, il y a quelques in stants, à la règlementation de la navigation
sur le San Juan et a démontré qu’aucun pouvoir règlementaire ne doit dénaturer le droit perpétuel
de libre navigation.
22. Le Nicaragua prétend que les mesures qu’il a prises s’a ppliquent sans discrimination à
116
tous les navires, y compris aux navires nicaraguayens ou encore à tout étranger entrant dans son
117
territoire . Mon professeur et aujourd’hui collègue et ami a déjà démonté cette justification.
22. Nous l’avons précédemment vu, ce n’est pas même du traitement national dont il est
question. La réalité est que le zèle nicaraguayen est unidirectionnel: toutes ces entraves
s’appliquent à la seule partie du fleuve San Juan où la navigation est commune et, à l’exception de
l’horaire de navigation, avec les commentaires que M.Calfisch a faits, uniquement aux navires
costa-riciens.
115
DN, par. 4.30.
116DN, par. 4.25.
117DN, par. 4.87. - 40 -
23. Selon le Nicaragua, l’ensemble de ces mesures constituerait tout au plus des
inconvénients de minimis dont la nature «raisonnable» et «nécessaire» contre balancerait ces
intrusions mineures 118. Parler de simples «inconvénients» semble être une plaisanterie. Prises
isolément ou dans leur intégralité, ces exigen ces, imposent en fait de lourdes conditions
supplémentaires au droit de libre navigation aux fins du commerce. Elles visent à restreindre
l’exercice de ce droit et, de ce fait, sont illicites.
24. En imposant des conditions supplémentaires à la navigation qui ne résultent pas du traité,
le Nicaragua entrave l’exercice du droit costa-ricien découlant de l’articleVI et agit donc de
manière illicite. Ce que votre Cour a affirmé dans un autre contexte est ici parfaitement applicable.
Je cite: «La disposition perdrait sa signification et sa valeur si d’autres conditions, étrangères à
celles qui sont prescrites, pouvaient être exigées.» ( Conditions de l’admission d’un Etat
comme Membre des Nations Unies (article 4 de la Charte), avis consultatif, 1948,
C.I.J. Recueil 1947-1948, p. 62.)
b) Le Costa Rica n’a jamais consenti aux «règlementations» nicaraguayennes
25. Conscients de la faiblesse de leurs argumen ts, nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre font
valoir que le CostaRica aurait accepté le prét endu pouvoir de réglementation à l’égard de sa
navigation «touristique». Ils mentionnent à ce propos le mémorandum d’entente signé le
5 juin 1994 entre les ministres du tourisme des deux pays 119.
26. Déformant le texte, le Nicaragua fait valoir que, selon ce mémorandum, le CostaRica
aurait l’obligation d’acheter au Nicaragua des carte s touristiques et d’enregistrer les entreprises
touristiques.
27. En réalité, le texte du mémorandum indique que les opérateurs de tourisme devraient se
120
faire enregistrer et obtenir des cartes touristiques auprès des autorités de leurs pays respectifs . A
aucun moment, il ne mentionne une quelconque ob ligation pour les opérateurs costa-riciens
d’obtenir des cartes touristiques du Nicaragua, ni de se faire inscrire sur le registre nicaraguayen.
118DN, par. 4.34.
119
CMN, par. 1.3.41.
120Voir le texte du mémorandum, MCR, vol. 2, annexe 26. - 41 -
Les touristes qui transitent par le San Juan se déplacent d’un point à un autre du territoire
costa-ricien : ils ne font aucun séjour touristique au Nicaragua.
c) Les arguments de la sécurité de la navigation, de la prévention du crime et du contrôle des
frontières ne permettent pas de limiter le droit perpétuel de libre navigation
28. De manière extrêmement tardive, le Nicaragua est allé puiser des prétextes
supplémentaires pour justifier son comportement illicite dans de prétendus besoins liés à la
121 122 123
prévention du crime , à la sécurité de la navigation et au contrôle des frontières .
29. La duplique nous explique que le fait que des soldats de l’armée nicaraguayenne arrêtent
quotidiennement les navires transportant des enfants vers des écoles costa-riciennes vise à protéger
124
ceux-ci des crocodiles . Je sais bien que l’armée nicaraguayenne est puissante et aguerrie, mais
j’ignorais sa puissance dissuasive à l’égard des crocod iles. Et je suppose que le but de ces mêmes
militaires, qui arrêtent tous les jours ces enfants pour les enregistrer, est de vérifier si tout le monde
est présent et, donc, si leur pouvoir dissuasif vis-à-vis des crocodiles reste intact.
30. En revanche, je n’ai trouvé aucune explication au fait que les sacs de ces mêmes écoliers
contenant leurs fournitures scolaires soient soigneusement examinés par l’armée du Nicaragua 125.
31. Et soit dit en passant: les coupures de presse annexées à la duplique se référant à des
attaques de crocodiles subies par des enfants en train de se baigner ⎯et non de naviguer ⎯ ne
concernent aucunement le San Juan 126.
127
32. La duplique consacre de longs passag es à de prétendues actions de braconnage , de
128 129
destruction des forêts , de pollution du fleuve et d’autres méfaits qui, naturellement, ont tous
leur origine sur la rive costa-ricienne du fleuve. Encore une autre bizarrerie de cette procédure:
comment se fait-il que des actes d’une pareille gravité aient pu passer inaperçus au Nicaragua lors
121DN, par. 4.69-4.77.
122
DN, par. 4.78-4.85.
123
DN, par. 4.86-4.91.
124
DN, par. 4.80.
125Déclaration sous serment de Diane Gómez Bustos, 16 février 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 101.
126DN, vol. II, annexes 25 et 26.
127DN, par. 4.56-4.59.
128
DN, par. 4.53-4.55.
129
DN, par. 4.48. - 42 -
de la rédaction du contre-mémoi re? Comment se fait-il qu’aucun résident costa-ricien, pas un
seul, n’ait été jugé et condamné pour de tels acte s? Encore une fois, ces allégations ne sont
étayées par aucune preuve concluante.
33. Quoi qu’il en soit, il s’agit là d’une pure diversion. Revenons au vrai sujet de cette
130
affaire. Le traité Cañas-Jerez est clair , le Nicaragua lui-même l’a rappelé devant le
présidentCleveland: le droit cost a-ricien de libre navigation ne peut pas être restreint même face
131
au plus grave danger à la sécurité du Nicaragua, à savoir une situation de guerre . Oui, Monsieur
le président, conformément au traité, même en cas d’hostilités entre les deux pays, le droit
costa-ricien de libre navigation aux fins du commerce doit être respecté. Cela suffit pour apprécier
à leur juste valeur les arguments nicaraguaye ns relatifs aux restrictions à la navigation
costa-ricienne fondés sur la sécurité ou sur la prévention du crime.
34. Enfin j’ajouterai que, conformément au traité et à son interprétation par le
président Cleveland, il appartient au Costa Rica, et non au Nicaragua, de s’assurer que ses navires
et leur navigation soient sûres. Passons vite à l’environnement.
d) L’excuse «écologique» est un autre argument de dernière minute totalement infondé
35. A nouveau très tardivement, le Nicara gua s’est découvert une soudaine passion
écologique dans sa duplique. Jamais une seule pr otestation nicaraguayenne n’a été émise contre le
CostaRica en raison d’une quelconque atteinte à l’environnement du fait de sa navigation sur le
San Juan. Pas un mot dans le contre-mémoire non pl us. Mais voilà que la duplique s’adonne à de
longs développements, visant à démontrer que l’obligation de s’arrêter à chaque poste frontière, de
se faire enregistrer et d’obtenir un «droit d’appareillage», ainsi que la prohibition de naviguer
durant la nuit répondent à l’exigence de protéger l’environnement 13.
36. Imaginez-vous les dommages à l’environnement que des canoës et autres bateaux utilisés
par les Costa-riciens peuvent causer, y compri s aux espèces ichtyologiques. Je dis bien
«imaginer», car le Nicaragua n’a évidemment pas produit la moindre preuve pour démontrer que la
130
Article IX.
131Texte anglais original: «Even if waris flagrant, her commerce on this river could not be interfered with.»
o
MCR, vol. 6, annexe 208, p. 844 (dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n 44).
132DN, par. 4.61-4.66. - 43 -
navigation costa-ricienne porte atteinte à l’environnement du fleuve ou qu’elle est même en mesure
de le faire.
37. Imaginez maintenant ce que signifierait pour les espèces et pour l’environnement dont le
Nicaragua se soucie tant, que les travaux de dr agage du San Juan projetés par la Partie adverse
deviennent une réalité 133. Imaginons-nous encore qu’un jour le Nicaragua accomplisse son rêve
historique : la construction du canal interocéanique à travers le San Juan et le lac Nicaragua. Que
resterait-il de cette superbe réserve naturelle nicaraguayenne où personne ne peut s’installer, où pas
un seul arbre ne peut être coupé et où la pêch e d’un seul poisson est interdite? Tout cela,
Monsieur le président, ressemble à un argument de dernière minute d’une partie qui ne sait plus
que dire pour essayer de justifier une conduite manifestement illicite.
C. Conclusion
38. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, je viens d’illustrer les violations au droit
perpétuel du CostaRica de libre navigation a ux fins du commerce que M.SergioUgalde a
134
énumérées hier et l’absence de toute justification valide au comportement du Nicaragua.
39. Je vous remercie de votre attention Monsieur le président et vous prie de donner la parole
à Mme Kate Parlett, membre du barreau d’Australie.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Kohen for his statement and I invite Ms Parlett to take
the floor.
PMR sLETT:
N ICARAGUA ’S BREACHES OF THE RIGHT OF NAVIGATION OF PUBLIC VESSELS
Introduction
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour to make my first appearance
before you on behalf of the Government of Costa Rica.
133 CMN, par. 7.2.6 ; DN, par. 6.5-6.16.
13CR 2009/2, p. 29-30, par. 22 (Ugalde). - 44 -
2. It is my task to outline Nicaragua’s breaches of CostaRica’s rights of navigation with
public vessels. The evidence shows that Nicaragua has engaged in a series of violations of
Costa Rica’s rights, and that these have intensified since Costa Rica filed the present Application.
3. In the first part of my presentation I willshow that Nicaragua has breached Costa Rica’s
rights by prohibiting navigation w ith public vessels. In 1998 Ni caragua prohibited navigation by
Costa Rican police vessels, and subsequently it has prevented other public vessels and government
officials from navigating in order to provide essential services to the local population, including
health, education and security.
4. In the second part I will show that Ni caragua has breached CostaRica’s rights by
requiring CostaRicans to obtain a visa. This was a retaliatory measure imposed after CostaRica
filed the Application in the present case and it h as had detrimental consequences for the provision
of health and social welfare services to the local communities along the CostaRican bank of the
river, many of which cannot be reached by roads accessible throughout the seasons.
5. Nicaragua has failed to respond to the evidence of breaches which CostaRica has
presented in its written pleadings. It has merely de nied the existence of Costa Rica’s treaty rights.
Nicaragua also alleges that CostaRica recognizes a need to obtain permission to navigate on the
San Juan. This allegation appears to be based on a Nicaraguan policy of compelling Costa Rican
individuals and institutions to request written pe rmission to navigate on the SanJuan, a policy
which appears to have been intended to provide belated documentary support for these allegations.
Nicaragua’s prohibition of navigation with public vessels
6. I now come to my first point: that Nicaragua has breached CostaRica’s rights by
unilaterally prohibiting navigation with public vessel s. As Professor Crawford explained, public
vessels enjoy the perpetual right of free navigation under ArticleVI of the 1858 Treaty. This
includes navigation by officials providing essential services to the communities on the Costa Rican
bank. - 45 -
7. On 14July1998 Nicaragua unilaterally prohibited navigation by CostaRican police
vessels 135. Prior to this date, police had regularly na vigated on the river, in uniform and carrying
136
their normal arms, and had even carried out joint operations with the Nicaraguan army .
8. Nicaragua’s prohibition of police navigation breaches Costa Rica’s rights in four separate
ways. First, the prohibition is a breach of the tr eaty right to protect Costa Rica’s navigation for
purposes of commerce. This right includes navi gation with armed personnel, in accordance with
the 1858 Treaty and the Cleveland Award. Second, it violates Costa Rica’s treaty right to navigate
for purposes of commerce, which includes the use of the river as a means of communication. This
covers navigation for the purpose of resupplying and relieving personnel at border posts and for the
purpose of providing essential health, education and security services to the local population.
Third, it prevents CostaRica from exercising its right to safeguard the San Juan as established in
Article IV of the 1858 Treaty. Fourth, it hinders Costa Rica from complying with its obligation to
defend the common Bay of San Juan del Norte. Since the bay is effectively closed to the ocean, the
San Juan is the only means by which Costa Rica may access the bay.
9. Nicaragua’s prohibition of navigati on has not only prevented police vessels from
navigating, but has also prevented other public vessels and officials from navigating on the San
Juan in exercise of Costa Rica’s treaty rights of navigation. In its written pleadings, Costa Rica has
documented three examples:
⎯ on 4August 1998, officials from the Nicaragua n army prevented judicial officers from
navigating on the San Juan in a public v essel, on a journey to Fà tima de Sarapiquí to
137
investigate the death of an 11-month-old child ;
⎯ in September 1998 Nicaraguan officials pr evented CostaRican technicians from the
Programme of the Eradication of Screwworms from Cattle from navigating to implement the
138
programme in the Costa Rican border zone ; and
13MCR, Anns. 240, 131, 132.
136
MCR, Anns. 88, 89, 90, 94, 103 and 105.
13MCR, Ann. 150; MCR, para. 5.97; RCR, para. 4.25.
13MCR, Anns. 52 and 53; MCR, para. 5.98; RCR, para. 4.25. - 46 -
⎯ on 26 September 2000, two officials from the Costa Rican Bureau of Judicial Investigation and
a police officer were prevented from navigating to investigate a cattle robbery that had taken
place in the Caño Río Jardín area 139.
10. Nicaragua’s prohibition has adversely aff ected the capacity of CostaRican police to
140
combat trans-border crime . Additionally, it has resulted in a reduction of the level of human
security and an increase in illegal immigrants 141. There are particular concerns about drug
trafficking 142 and arms trafficking 143 in the region. From CostaRica’s border posts it may take a
long time to reach local communities; in some cases it is impossible to reach remote villages
during the wet season 144.
11. Nicaragua claims that CostaRica has adequate roads and landing strips and aircraft to
145
deliver these services by land, and consequently has no need to navigate on the San Juan . These
allegations are not true ⎯ and constant repetition does not make them true. There are no adequate
roads in the region. But even if there were, Costa Rica has treaty-established rights of navigation
on the San Juan, and it is no answer to say that th ere is no need for CostaRica to exercise those
rights.
12. Nicaragua’s prohibition of police navigation, and in particular of police navigating to
resupply and relieve personnel at its border posts, has resulted in the closure of one of Costa Rica’s
police posts. In 1999 the Costa Rican post at La Cureña had to be closed because it was impossible
to access it by land and Nicaragua had prev ented access to it by the SanJuan River 146. In
consequence there is no border post between Rio San Carlos and RioSara piquí. This has had a
negative impact on security in the region: resi dents of the local communities have repeatedly
139MCR, Anns. 166, 167, 168; MCR, para. 5.100; RCR, para. 4.25.
140
MCR, Anns. 164, 165 and 177.
141
MCR, Anns. 155, 177 and 164.
142
MCR, Anns. 154 and 181.
143MCR, Ann. 165.
144MCR, Ann. 177.
145CMN, para. 5.2.9; RN, para. 5.98.
146
RCR, para. 3.94. - 47 -
expressed concerns about their personal safety and th e level of human security in the region has in
147
fact deteriorated (tab 45 in the judges’ folder) .
13. Nicaragua’s restrictions on the navigation of CostaRican officials and public vessels
resulted in the suspension of the provision of basic health services to riparian communities in
148
November 2005 . This has resulted in the loss of primary health care to around 450people
149 150
including 200 children . In fact, around 50 per cent of them are Nicaraguan .
14. It was in these circumstances that Dr.Chi ng, Director of the Social Security’s Health
Area of Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí, approached the Nicaraguan authorities. Before May2006,
health workers travelled on the San Juan to r each communities located along the bank of the river
and they never required permission. But on 10 May 2006, the Nicaraguan military informed health
workers that they needed the appr oval of the Nicaraguan Vice-Consul in Sarapiquí to navigate on
151
the San Juan . Dr.Ching sent a Note to the Vice-Consul in Sarapiquí, “requesting the
152
collaboration” to transit on the San Juan to provide basic health services . The Vice-Consul in
Sarapiquí replied that he was not able to grant navigation permits 153. Dr. Ching then wrote to the
Vice-Consul in Ciudad Quesada in similar terms 154; the Vice-Consul directed her to the
155
Nicaraguan Embassy . When she visited the Nicaraguan Ambassador, she was told that “in order
to analyze the request, she had to change the term ‘Request for collaboration’ to ‘Request of
Authorization to navigate the San Juan River’ , otherwise her request would not be processed” 156.
Dr.Ching explains these events in an affidavit annexed to CostaRica’s Reply. In particular, she
says that “she wrote the note under the terms demanded by the Ambassador, all done as a result of
the urgent state of necessity . . . to safeguard the health and lives of people, particularly of children”
14MCR, paras. 5.123-124; MCR, Anns. 155, 164 and 177.
14MCR, Anns. 236, 237, 239, 98, 99 and 100; MCR, para. 5.101; RCR, para. 4.25.
149
RCR, Ann. 44.
150
Ibid., p. 268.
151
Ibid., p. 267.
15RCR, Ann. 55, p. 292.
15CNS014/05/06, cited in RCR, Ann. 44, p. 267.
15RCR, Ann. 55, p. 292.
155
Ibid.
156
Ibid. - 48 -
157
in the region . Nicaragua did not respond to Dr.Ching’s explanation of these events in its
Rejoinder.
15. This is not the only health service to the San Juan border area which has been affected by
158
Nicaragua’s prohibition of navigation by public vessels . Before mid-2006, personnel from two
agencies overseen by the Costa Rican Ministry of Health navigated on the San Juan twice a month
to provide basic health care services and to deliver food, education and other services to
communities along the CostaRican bank of the rive r. Since the middle of 2006 they have been
159
impeded in navigating; and those restrictions remain in force .
16. Another Costa Rican government institution, whose work has been adversely affected by
Nicaragua’s breaches of CostaRica’s rights, is the Joint Institute for Social Assistance, a social
welfare agency. In May 2007 the Institute was comp elled to request authorization to navigate on
the San Juan to participate in a regional environm ental and health fair a nd to bring financial and
160
other assistance to poor families in the comm unities of Boca San Carlos and La Cureña .
Nicaragua’s response purported to limit the places in Costa Rica that those officials could visit 161,
that is to say, Nicaragua limited the capacity of CostaRican authorities to attend places in their
own territory at a time of their own choosing.
17. Nicaragua’s conduct has also had a detrim ental effect on the provision of educational
services in the region. In addition to making it extremely difficult for teachers in the region to
162
attend training and meetings , government officials have been prevented from assisting in the
provision of education to children. Officials fro m the Joint Institute for Social Assistance were
“placed in a position where they needed to request the authorization demanded by the Nicaraguan
163
authorities to navigate the river, as there [was] no other means to reach those communities” . The
157Ibid.
158
RCR, para. 4.31.
159
See RCR, Ann. 45; RCR, para. 4.32.
160
RCR, Anns. 46 and 57.
161Ibid., Ann. 47.
162MCR, para. 5.103; MCR, Ann. 101; RCR, para. 4.25.
163
RCR, Ann. 56, p. 296. - 49 -
164
Institute requested pe rmission on 14August 2007 , but Nicaragua never responded and the
Institute has been unable to deliver those services 165.
18. Rather than denying the facts Nicaragua embraces them, arguing that it “has consistently
required that those from Costa Rica obtain authoriza tion to cross into her territory, whether on the
San Juan or elsewhere” and that “CostaRica ha s repeatedly recognized this need to obtain
166
permission” . But it claims that since permission is normally given in the result it “does not
prohibit Costa Rica from navigating on the San Juan River, with her public vessels, for the purpose
of providing medical and other social services to the residents of the riparian communities on
167
Costa Rica’s side of the river” .
19. The fact remains that CostaRica has a treaty right of navigation for the purposes of
commerce, which includes navigation by government officials to provide essential services to local
communities. There is no requirement that these offi cials obtain prior authorization to navigate on
the San Juan; that navigation is a treaty right and not a simple privilege to be granted or refused by
Nicaragua. In the circumstances Costa Rica has es tablished that Nicaragua has breached its rights
of navigation for public vessels.
Nicaragua’s imposition of a requirement that Costa Rican officials obtain a visa
20. I turn to the issue of visas. Before D ecember 2005, no Costa Rican required a consular
visa to travel to Nicaragua. As a retaliatory measure taken by the Nicaraguan Government, a
requirement that CostaRicans obtain a consular visa was imposed in December 2005, and it has
been maintained to the present day. Revenue from the visa has apparently been directed to finance
168
the costs of Nicaragua’s defence in the present case .
21. The charge for a consular visa is US$20, plus an additional $5 administrative charge. It
is required each and every time any CostaRican transits on the river, including CostaRican
officials. In addition to the cost, any Costa Ri can who needs to travel on the San Juan, including
164
RCR, Ann. 49.
165
RCR, Ann. 56.
166CMN, para. 6.2.11.
167RN, para. 5.109.
168RCR, Ann. 70. - 50 -
health and social service officials, must attend a Nicaraguan consulate to obtain a visa. In 2006,
Nicaragua opened a new consulate in Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí, but this consulate did not operate
regularly and in March 2007 it was closed. In cons equence, CostaRicans who need to transit on
the San Juan are forced to travel to either Ci udad Quesada or San José to visit a consulate, for
which they inevitably incur additional expenses (tab 46 in the judges’ folder).
22. Again Nicaragua does not deny that these charges are imposed on CostaRica’s
navigation on the river; nor does it make any stat ement or produce any evidence in respect of the
fact that the requirements are a retaliatory measure in response to Costa Rica’s filing of the present
case. In these circumstances, it is clear that Nicaragua has breached Costa Rica’s perpetual right of
free navigation in respect of public vessels.
Nicaragua’s responses to Costa Rica’s evidence of breaches
23. Mr.President, Members of the Court, my final point addresses Nicaragua’s pleas in
response to Costa Rica’s evidence of the breaches of its right of navigation.
24. First, Nicaragua argues that it has permitted navigation by CostaRican police vessels
169
carrying their arms only as a matter of “border courtesy” . This argument amounts to a denial of
the existence of rights of navigation with armed police vessels.
25. Second, Nicaragua makes a plea of acquiescence: it argues that “CostaRica has
repeatedly recognized [the] need to obtain pe rmission” from Nicaragua to navigate on the
San Juan 170. In support of its allegation, Nicaragua refe rs to two incidents, both of which occurred
in 2006, well after the institution of proceedings in the present case. The first of these is the
request from Dr.Ching 171. As I have explained, Dr.Ching was put in the position of having to
172
change her “request for collaboration” to a “request for authorization” ; otherwise health service
officials would be denied permission to transit on the San Juan. It appears that the intention behind
forcing her to request written permission in these terms was to produce evidence to support
Nicaragua’s claim in the present proceedings.
16CMN, para. 1.3.43.
170
CMN, para. 6.2.11.
17CMN, para. 6.1.12; CMN, Ann. 51.
17RCR, Ann. 55, p. 292. - 51 -
26. The second incident Nicaragua refers to in support of its plea of acquiescence is a note
from “the Christian and Missionary Alliance of Horquetas” relating to its missionary work 17. This
was a request made by a private entity and as such , its views and actions cannot be imputed to the
State of Costa Rica.
27. In respect of police navigation, Nicaragua claims in its Rejoinder that Costa Rican police
“routinely requested and obtained prior authorization from the Nicaraguan authorities before
174
sending its vessels on missions to supply the CostaRican border posts” . The only evidence
Nicaragua submits is affidavit evidence from Nicara guan army officers, annexed to its Rejoinder;
it has already been pointed out that none of these affidavits are supported by a single piece of
documentary evidence. The affidavit and docume ntary evidence CostaRica has been able to
produce in the short time available demonstrates that there was no practice of requesting prior
175 176
authorization for public navigation , and these Nicaraguan affidavits cannot be relied upon .
28. CostaRica affirms its rejection of any and all allegations by Nicaragua that it has
acquiesced in Nicaragua’s breaches of its perpetual right of free navigation on the river and its
related rights.
Conclusions
29. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the evidence I have addressed today leads to the
conclusion that Nicaragua has breached Costa Rica’s rights of navigation with public vessels. By
prohibiting CostaRican public vessels from naviga ting on the San Juan, Nicaragua has breached
Costa Rica’s treaty right to navigate on the San Juan, its right to protect its navigation for purposes
of commerce, its right to safeguard the San Juan and its obligation to defend the common bays. By
the imposition of a requirement to obtain a consular visa in advance, Nicaragua has also breached
CostaRica’s perpetual right of free navigation. These violations have prevented CostaRican
government officials from navigating on the San Juan to provide essentia l health, social and
173
CMN, Ann. 52; CMN, para. 6.2.13.
17RN, para. 5.80.
17See, Ann. IV and Ann. V to letter filed on 27 Nov. 2008 by Costa Rica.
176
See case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of th e Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p.203, para.65; pp.218-219, para.129; case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1986, p. 43, para. 70. - 52 -
security services to riparians. Local communities along the San Juan have suffered as a result, and
in particular CostaRica has been unable to provi de basic health services to 450people, including
200 children.
Mr. President, that concludes my submission. I would ask you to call on Professor Kohen.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Ms Parlett for her presentation and I invite Professor Kohen to
take the floor.
M. KOHEN :
L ES DROITS CONNEXES DU C OSTA R ICA ET LEURS VIOLATIONS PAR LE N ICARAGUA
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, il m’incombe maintenant de vous présenter les
droits connexes du Costa Rica sur le fleuve San Juan , ainsi que leurs violations par le Nicaragua.
JamesCrawford et KateParlett vous ont déjà parlé des droits de protection du commerce, de
protection du San Juan et de défe nse du fleuve et de la baie de San Juan del Norte, ainsi que des
droits d’approvisionnement des postes frontière. Je vais aborder les droits suivants :
A. droit d’accoster sur la partie de la rive nicaraguayenne où la navigation est commune ;
B. droit d’obtenir du Nicaragua qu’il s’acquitte de son obligation de faciliter et d’accélérer la
circulation sur le fleuve ;
C. droit d’exercer la libre navigation en battant uniquement le pavillon costa-ricien ;
D. droit de pêche des résidents de la rive costa-ricienne à des fins de subsistance.
A. Droit d’accoster sur la partie de la rive nicaraguayenne où la navigation est commune
2. Dans sa dernière partie, l’article VI du traité de 1858 reconnaît un second droit, connexe à
celui de la libre navigation : «Les bateaux des de ux pays auront le droit d’accoster indistinctement
sur l’une ou l’autre rive de la portion du fleuve où la navigation est commune sans qu’aucune taxe
177
ou droit ne soit perçu, sauf accord entre les deux Gouvernements.»
177
Traduction anglaise: «The vessels of both countries shall have the power to land indiscriminately on either
side of the river, at the portion thereof where the navigation is common; and no charges of an y kind, or duties, shall be
collected unless when levied by mutual conof both Governments.» (MCR, vol. II, annexeb).) Original en
espagnol : «Las embarcaciones de uno u otro país podrán indistintamente atracar en la s riberas del río; en la parte en que
la navegación es común, sin cobrarse ninguna clase de impuestos, a no establezca entre ambos Gobiernos.»
(MCR, vol. II, annexe 7 a).) (Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n - 53 -
a) L’interprétation nicaraguayenne du droit d’accostage est inadmissible
3. Le droit nicaraguayen d’accoster sur la rive co sta-ricienne est scrupuleusement respecté.
Des riverains et des fonctionnaires nicaraguayens traversent régulièrement le San Juan pour faire
leurs achats au Costa Rica 17.
4. Le Nicaragua pour sa part tente de vider de sa substance le droit costa-ricien d’accoster. Il
prétend qu’il existe uniquement pour les navires transportant des marchandises ⎯ articles de
commerce ⎯, mais que cela ne signifie pas un droit de libre commerce avec ces marchandises sur
la rive nord, car le traité de1858 ⎯nous disent-ils toujours ⎯ n’est pas un traité de
179
libre-échange . La position de l’Etat défendeur s’écroul e finalement en raison de ses propres
contradictions: à quoi bon alors la navigation «a vec des articles de commerce»? A quoi bon un
droit d’accoster exempté des taxes ? A en croire le défendeur, ce que le Costa Rica aurait obtenu
en 1858 serait le droit de promener des marchandise s sur le San Juan ou de les vendre en territoire
costa-ricien.
5. Que ceci ne soit pas le cas est, entre autres, démontré par la preuve apportée par la Partie
adverse, selon laquelle la navigation «avec des articles de commerce» s’exerce en bonne partie en
180
vue de leur vente à San Juan del Norte .
b) L’exigence de l’accostage et du paiement d’un droit d’appareillage est incom
patible avec
l’article VI du traité
6. La violation du droit d’accostage commise par le Nicaragua est patente. Primo, les
bateaux costa-riciens ont le droit d’accoster quand ils le décident et non quand le Nicaragua
l’ordonne. Secundo, ils ont le droit de le faire exemptés des taxes. Or, cet Etat impose d’abord
d’accoster et ensuite de payer un «droit d’appareilla ge» pour continuer à naviguer. A cela s’ajoute
l’exigence du visa et de toutes les autres taxes que nous avons déjà examinées.
181
7. Le Costa Rica a apporté la preuve des agissements du Nicaragua , que celui-ci n’a
d’ailleurs pas démentie.
178
Déclaration sous serment du colonel Ricardo Sánchez, 7 décembre 2006, CMN, vol. II, annexe 91.
179CMN, par. 4.1.48.
180Déclaration sous serment de M. Rigoberto Acev edo Ledezma, 27 mai 2008, DN, vol. II, annexe 66 ;
déclaration sous serment du lieutenant-c olonel Juan Bosco Centeno Arostegui, 9 mars 2008, DN, vol.II, annexe69,
p. 430.
181MCR, par. 5.06-5.53 ; RCR, par. 4.05.-4.11. - 54 -
B. Droit d’obtenir du Nicaragua qu’il s’acquitte de son obligation de faciliter
et d’accélérer la circulation sur le fleuve San Juan
a) De nouvelles obligations de moyens
8. Selon le Nicaragua, l’accord de 1956 n’ajoute rien au régime juridique du fleuve San Juan
établi par le traité de 1858 182. Cette vision prive l’article premie r de l’accord de 1956 de tout effet
utile, cet article contient deux nouvelles obligations de moyens bien précises: primo, celle de
faciliter et d’accélérer la circulation sur le San Juan ; secundo, celle de faciliter le fonctionnement
des services de transport des entreprises d’un Etat sur le territoire de l’autre 183.
b) Tout le comportement nicaraguayen compor te un manquement flagrant aux obligations
découlant de l’accord de 1956
9. L’ensemble des agissements du Nicaragua, que nous avons décrit au cours de ces deux
jours, montre, non seulement que le Nicaragua ne fa it rien pour faciliter et accélérer la circulation
et l’opération des services de transports costa-ricien s sur le San Juan, mais au contraire, qu’il fait
tout pour les entraver, violant ainsi les obligations stipulées dans l’accord de 1956.
C. Droit d’exercer la libre navigation en battant uniquement le pavillon costa-ricien
10. Passons maintenant au droit d’exercer la libre navigation en battant uniquement le
pavillon costa-ricien.
a) Subordonner la navigation à l’exigence de porter le pavillon nicaraguayen revient à nier le
droit de libre navigation du Costa Rica
11. Entre 1998 et 2001, le Nicaragua a de manière intermittente interdit aux bateaux
184
costa-riciens d’arborer leur pavillon . Après des échanges diplomatiques, le Nicaragua avait
cessé d’imposer cette exigence 185, qu’il a pourtant renouvelée aussitôt après l’introduction de la
182
CMN, par. 6.2.1-6.2.9 ; DN, par. 2.116.
183Accord complémentaire à l’article IV du pacte d'amitié, 9 janvier 1956, NURT, vol. 1465, p. 227 (MCR, vol.
o
2, annexe 24) (dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n 48).
184La Nación, San José, 4 août 1998, MCR, vol. 5, annexe 147; La Nación, San José, 27 septembre 1998, MCR,
vol. 5, annexe 152. Voir aussi, déclarat ion sous serment de Sergio Gerardo Ug alde Godínez, 5mai 2001, MCR, vol. 4,
annexe 83.
185Note du ministre des affaires étrangères du Costa Ri ca, Roberto Rojas López, au ministre des affaires
étrangères du Nicaragua, Francisco Xavi er Aguirre Sacasa, 9 mai 2001, MCR, vol. 3, annexe 71; note du ministre des
affaires étrangères du Nicaragua, Francisco Xavier Aguirre Sacasa, au ministre des affaires étrangères du Costa Rica,
Roberto Rojas López, 3 août 2001, MCR, vol. 3, annexe 72; note du mini stre des affaires ét rangères du Costa Rica,
Roberto Rojas López, au ministre des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua, Francisco Xavier Aguirre Sacasa, 26 septembre
2001, MCR, vol. 3, annexe 73. - 55 -
présente instance en septembre 2005. Ce comporte ment perdure à ce jour, malgré les demandes de
186
cessation du Costa Rica . En réponse à cette demande, le Ni caragua a invoqué le droit souverain
d’exercer un tel pouvoir sur son territoire 187. Nous en avons déjà démontré l’absence de fondement
188
juridique .
b)L’attitude du Nicaragua contredit sa propre position de principe exprimée il y a
cent quarante ans
12. Ce comportement est d’autant plus re grettable que le Nicaragua lui-même, il y a
centquarante ans, protestant contre la présence de navires sur le San Juan battant pavillon des
Etats-Unis, a expliqué au secrétaire d’Etat américain que le Gouvernement du «Nicaragua ne se
sent pas disposé à consentir à ce qu’un autre pavillon que le sien et celui du Costa Rica, Etat
189
frontalier, soit utilisé dans la navigation de ses eaux intérieures» .
D. Le droit de pêche à des fins de subsistance
a) La recevabilité de la demande costa-ricienne relative au droit de pê
che
13. Permettez-moi de traiter maintenant de la question du droit de pêche à des fins de
subsistance des habitants de la rive costa-ricie nne du San Juan. C’est seulement dans sa duplique
que le Nicaragua a invoqué l’irrecevabilité de la demande du Costa Rica y relative, sous prétexte
qu’elle n’avait pas été formulée dans la requête 190.
14. Cette démarche est surprenante, car le Nicaragua est directement entré en matière dans
191
son contre-mémoire . De ce fait, il a implicitement accepté la recevabilité de la demande relative
aux droits de pêche. On se trouve ici dans une situation semblable à celle décrite par la Cour
186Note du ministre des affaires étrangères du Costa Rica, Roberto Tovar Faja, au ministre des affaires étrangères
du Nicaragua, Norman Caldera Cardenal, 20 octobre 2005, MCR, Vol. 3, annexe 81.
187Note du ministre des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua, Norman Caldera Cardenal, au ministre des affaires
étrangères du Costa Rica, Roberto Tovar Faja, 9 novembre 2005, MCR, Vol. 3, annexe 82.
188
Plaidoirie de M. Caflisch du 3 mars 2009, par. 28-32.
189
Texte en anglais: «Nicaragua does not feel disposed to consent that any other flag, except her own and the one
of Costa Rica, as bordering state, should float in the navigation of her interior waters.» Lettre du ministre nicaraguayen à
Washington, Luis Molina, au Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, M. Seward, du 7 octobre 1868, in P. Perez
Zeledón, Argument on the Question of the Validity of the Tr eaty of Limits between Costa Rica and Nicaragua
(Washington DC: Gibson Breos, 1887), p. 100, MCR, vol. 6, annexe 207, p. 829 (dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n49).
190DN, par. 4.68.
191
CMN, par. 5.1.2- 5.1.16. - 56 -
permanente dans l’affaire des Ecoles minoritaires en Haute-Silésie : «Le contre-mémoire lui-même
démontre que l’agent du Gouvernement polonais avait déjà porté son attention sur ce fait et qu’il
aurait fort bien pu poser la question de compéten ce dans son contre-mémoire s’il l’avait voulu.»
(Droits de minorités en Haute-Silésie (écoles minoritaires), arrêt n° 12, 1928, C.P.J.I. série A
n° 15, p. 25.)
15. Se fiant à la position de l’Etat défendeur exprimée dans le contre-mémoire, le Costa Rica
a répondu dans sa réplique aux argum ents de fond développés par le Nicaragua dans sa première
pièce écrite. On est dans une situation semblable à celle dans laquelle «un Etat défendeur a, par sa
conduite devant la Cour ou dans ses relations avec la partie demanderesse, agi de manière telle
qu’il a accepté la compétence de la Cour» (Certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en
matière pénale (Djibouti c. France) , arrêt du 4juin2008, par.61). Clairement, le Nicaragua est
ainsi forclos d’invoquer l’irrecevabilité de cette demande. Par conséquent, nous demandons
respectueusement à la Cour de ne pas entrer en matière à propos de cette exception nicaraguayenne.
16. Du reste, même si la Cour acceptait d’examiner l’exception d’irrecevabilité, celle-ci
serait dépourvue de fondement et devrait ensuite être rejetée. Les considérations qui suivent et qui
démontrent le caractère infondé de cette ex ception d’irrecevabilité sont donc présentées à titre
purement subsidiaire.
17. La raison de l’invocation du droit de pêche dans le mémoire est év idente: la violation
192
par le Nicaragua de ce droit s’est produite ap rès l’introduction de l’instance par le Costa Rica .
Le Costa Rica s’est réservé le droit de compléter ou de préciser sa requête 193. C’est ce qu’il a fait
dans sa première pièce écrite en réaction aux nouveaux agissements illicites de l’Etat défendeur,
actes directement liés à la requête et constituant même une conséquence de son dépôt.
18. La Cour a déclaré qu’une demande introduite en cours d’instance est recevable si elle est
«implicitement contenue … dans [l]a requête» (Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande),
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962 , p. 38) ou découle «directement de la question qui fait l’objet de
192MCR, par. 5.142. Voir aussi déclaration sous serment de Víctor Julio Vargas Hernández, 6 juillet 2006, MCR,
vol. 4, annexe 105 ; déclaration sous serment de Leonl Morales Chacón, 6 juillet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 106 ;
déclaration sous serment de Erick Maikol Martínez López, 6 juillet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 107 ; déclaration sous
serment de José Moreno Rojas, 6 juillet2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 108; déclarat ion sous serment de Josefa Alvarez
Aragón, 6 juillet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 109.
193Requête, par. 12. - 57 -
cette requête» (Compétence en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale d’Allemagne c. Islande),
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974 , p. 203, par.72)» 194. La demande du Costa Rica tombe sous le
coup de l’une et de l’autre de ces formules, pourtant alternatives.
19. En effet, dans sa requête, le Costa Rica a affirmé sous la rubrique «Nature du différend»
que, «[p]our le cas où le Nicaragua prendrait les sanctions économiques visées ci-dessus [celles que
l’Assemblée nationale du Nicaragua avait menacé d’imposer en cas de saisine de la Cour par le
Costa Rica], ou toute autre sanction illicite, ou toute autre mesure propre à aggraver ou à étendre le
présent différend, le Costa Rica demande en outre la cessation de ce comportement et la réparation
intégrale des pertes subies» 195.
20. Incontestablement, l’interdiction du droit de pêche à des fins de subsistance constitue,
soit une «autre sanction illicite», soit une «autre mesure propre à aggraver ou à étendre le présent
différend». De ce fait, la demande relative aux violations du droit de pêche est parfaitement
recevable car elle peut être incluse dans la demande originale.
21. Enfin, la prétention nicaraguayenne selon la quelle l’inexistence d’un droit de pêche dans
le traité de 1858 rendrait la demande irrecevable n’est aucunement fondée. Sous la rubrique «Droit
applicable» de la requête, on trouve: « e)d’autres règles et principes applicables du droit
international» 196.
22. C’est par conséquent la demande ta rdive d’irrecevabilité du Nicaragua qui est
irrecevable. Et même si elle était jugée recevable, elle devrait être ensuite rejetée.
b) L’existence du droit de pêche à des fins de subsistance
23. Venons-en donc à l’existence de ce droit de pêche à des fins de subsistance. Le Costa
197
Rica a invoqué une règle coutumière locale, ainsi qu’un droit datant de l’époque coloniale .
194 Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 266, par. 67 ; Différend territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des
Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt du 8 octobre 2007, par. 110.
195Requête, par. 10. Original en anglais : «In the event that Nicaragua imposes the economic sanctions referred to
above, or any other unlawful sanctions, or otherwise takes st eps to aggravate and extend the present dispute, Costa Rica
o
further seeks the cessation of such conduct and full reparation for losses suffered.» (Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n
196Requête, par. 1. Original en anglais : «(e) other applicable rules and principles of international law».
197MCR, par. 2.08, 4.124-4.128, 5.141 ; RCR, par. 3.115-3.119. - 58 -
24. Plusieurs éléments permettent d’affirmer l’existence d’un droit de pêche. En effet, un tel
droit appartenant aux riverains des deux rives du fleuve San Juan avait déjà été explicitement
reconnu au tout début de la période coloniale et n’a jamais été révoqué 198. Le Nicaragua ne nie pas
l’existence de ce droit selon l’ordonnance roya le du 29novembre1540, mais considère que la
question ne mérite pas d’être discutée car cette ordonnance aurait été abrogée par une charte royale
de 1573 199. Ceci n’est pas pertinent, comme il a été expliqué hier par M. Arnoldo Brenes 200. Du
reste, le fait de la succession d’Etats n’est p as en soi une raison pour mettre fin à ce régime
territorial, pour reprendre l’expression de l’article 12 de la convention de Vienne sur la succession
d’Etats en matière de traités, que votre Cour a reconnue comme l’expression du droit coutumier 20.
25. Le traité Cañas-Jeréz n’aborde pas la question, mais son silence ne saurait être interprété
comme une abrogation de ce droit traditionnel, qui peut donc être considéré comme ayant survécu à
la période coloniale.
202
26. La pêche visée se pratique à des fins de subsistance . Le Nicaragua ne le conteste
pas 203. Cette activité obéit donc à une nécessité des habitants qui la pratiquent, en tant que moyen
de subvenir à leurs besoins alimentaires.
27. Le Comité des droits économiques, socia ux et culturels des NationsUnies, dans son
commentaire de l’article11 du Pacte internationa l de droits économiques, sociaux et culturels
(auquel le Nicaragua est partie), affirme que «[l]’obligation qu’ont les Etats parties de respecter le
droit de toute personne d’avoir accès à une nourriture suffisante leur impose de s’abstenir de
prendre des mesures qui aient pour e ffet de priver quiconque de cet accès » 204. Le Nicaragua a dû
prendre en considération cette obligation, qui existait sans nul doute avant l’entrée en vigueur du
Pacte. En fait, depuis l’établissement des premièr es habitations et des premiers villages sur la rive
costa-ricienne, l’Etat défendeur n’a jamais privé leurs habitants de l’accès à la pêche de subsistance
198MCR, par. 2.08 et 5.141 ; MCR, vol. 2, annexe 1. (Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n 51.)
199
CMN, par. 5.1.12 et 5.1.13.
200
CR 2009/2, p. 19-21, par. 15-21 (Brenes).
201Projet Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/Slovaquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1997, p. 72, par. 123.
202MCR, par. 4.128 ; RCR, par. 4.56-4.58.
203CMN, par. 5.1.6.
204
Comité de droits économi ques, sociaux et culturels , Observation générale 12 , 12 mai 1999,
doc. E/C.12/1999/5, par. 15. - 59 -
sur le fleuve San Juan. Malheureusement, le Ni caragua a modifié sa conduite après le dépôt de la
requête. Bien entendu, ce changement de co mportement est trop tardif pour prétendre à
l’inexistence du droit de pêche.
28. Le Nicaragua admet donc l’existence d’une pr atique de pêche par les habitants de la rive
costa-ricienne 205. Il conteste seulement l’existence d’une opinio iuris rendant cette pratique
206
obligatoire et, de plus, prétend que celle-ci est récente . Pour le Nicaragua, il s’agit d’une simple
courtoisie 207. Toutefois, le Nicaragua n’a pas présenté le moindre élément prouvant qu’il agissait à
titre de courtoisie.
29. La Partie adverse ne peut pas s’abrite r derrière l’argument selon lequel il appartiendrait
au Costa Rica de prouver l’existence de la coutume 208. Du moment qu’il reconnaît l’existence
d’une pratique constante sur son territoire qui va à l’encontre de sa souveraineté, il lui appartient de
réagir. Pour l’exprimer avec les mots que vous avez employés dans l’affaire du Temple de Préah
Vihéar : «les circonstances étaient de nature à appe ler dans un délai raisonna ble une réaction de la
part des autorités» ( Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambod ge cT. haïlande), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p.23). L’absence de réaction paraît très étrange de la part d’un Etat aussi
soucieux de protéger sa souveraineté que le Nicaragua.
30. Le Nicaragua n’a rien dit, rien empêché, rien revendiqué, n’a émis aucun avertissement,
alors que des individus en provenance d’un territo ire étranger se sont adonnés à la pêche dans des
eaux relevant de sa souveraineté. Cela ne corr espond pas au comportement d’un Etat qui estime
que les individus en question ne possèdent aucun dro it d’agir comme ils le font. Jusqu’à la fin de
l’année2005, les autorités nicaraguayennes n’ont ni empêché les riverains résidant au Costa Rica
de pêcher dans les eaux du San Juan, ni leur ont donné l’autorisation de le faire 209.
31. La situation est donc semblable à celle décrite par votre Cour dans l’affaire du Droit de
passage sur territoire indien à l’égard des personnes privées, des fonctionnaires civils et des
205CMN, par. 5.1.6.
206
CMN, par. 5.1.7-5.1.8 ; DN, par. 4.68.
207
CMN, par. 5.1.6.
208CMN, par. 5.1.5.
209MCR, par. 5.142. - 60 -
marchandises en général: une pra tique constante et uniforme de p êche à des fins de subsistance,
acceptée comme étant le droit 210.
32. La situation ressemble aussi à celle des droits de pacage et d’agriculture des habitants
d’un Etat sur les terres des Etats voisins, comm e vous l’avez constaté dans l’affaire de l’ Ile de
211
Kasikili/Sedudu .. La sentence arbitrale Erythrée/Ethiopie se réfère également aux droits
coutumiers des populations locales d’avoir accès au fleuve 212.
33. Le Nicaragua a prétendu que l’existence d’une telle coutume en Afrique «est une pure
invention du Costa Rica» et que les situations décrites dans l’arrêt Kasikili/Sedudu et la sentence
arbitrale Erythrée/Ethiopie n’ont rien à voir avec la situation dans la présente affaire 213. Ce sont
pourtant là des situations semblables où des populations frontalières ont un droit d’accès au
territoire des Etats voisins et même un droit d’expl oiter certaines ressources, certes de manière très
limitée, tout comme c’est le cas de la pêche de subsistance dans le San Juan.
34. L’attitude radicalement contraire que le Ni caragua affirme avoir adoptée s’agissant de la
navigation des bateaux de la force publique, mê me si elle ne correspond pas à la réalité, est
révélatrice du type du comporte ment que le Nicaragua croit devoir observer pour préserver ses
prétendus droits. Or, le Nicaragua n’a rien fait de pareil au sujet de la pêche de subsistance des
habitants de la rive costa-ricienne.
35. J’imagine l’objection : on me dira que la présence des navires de la police costa-ricienne
sur les eaux du San Juan est beaucoup plus importante que la pêche à des fins de subsistance. Je
rétorquerai en mentionnant le zèle extrême dont a aussi fait pre uve le Nicaragua relativement à
d’autres questions bien plus mineures que la pêche, comme par exemple celle du pavillon des
navires costa-riciens. C’est un zèle totalement injustifié, certes, mais un zèle qui démontre la façon
dont le Nicaragua estime devoir agir lorsqu’il considère que sa souveraineté est en cause.
210
Droit de passage sur territoire indien (Portugal c. Inde), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 40.
211
Ile de Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 1094, par. 74.
212Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between the State of
Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 13 avril 2002, 41 ILM 1057, 1116 (par. 7.3).
213CMN, par. 5.1.9. - 61 -
36. Un autre élément pertinent est l’aveu du Nicaragua selon lequel sa réglementation interne
214
ne s’applique pas à la pêche à des fins de subsistance des résidents de la rive costa-ricienne .
37. Le contre-mémoire affirme que «le Nica ragua a généralement toléré une utilisation
limitée du San Juan par des riverains costa-rici ens pour la pêche non commerciale» ou qu’il «a
215
accepté, à titre de courtoisie, la pêche de subsistance ou de loisir par les riverains costa-riciens» .
Aucune distinction n’est faite entre la pêche depuis la rive et la pêche en canoë sur le fleuve. La
216
duplique prétend en revanche que seule la pêche depuis la rive est permise .
38. L’objectif du Nicaragua est double. D’une part, nos amis nicaraguayens se sont rendu
compte qu’ils n’avaient rien objecté dans leur contre-mémoire contre cette navigation «sans articles
de commerce», du moins avant que les poissons ne soient pêchés… D’autre part, il s’agit d’une
tentative pour justifier d’une manière ou d’une autr e la saisie des canoës des résidents costa-riciens
s’adonnant à la pêche. Il paraît même que le Nicaragua aurait découvert, au moment de la
rédaction de sa duplique, que plusieurs espèces de poissons seraient menacées d’extinction du fait
de leur pêche illégale par des riverains costa-riciens 217. Naturellement, le Costa Rica rejette toutes
ces allégations infondées de dernière minute.
39. Le mémoire et la réplique du Costa Rica ont fourni plusieurs déclarations sous serment
des riverains costa-riciens. Il en découle qu’aucune distinction n’ est faite entre la pêche depuis la
218
rive costa-ricienne et celle depuis des canoës dans le fleuve .
40. Dans le sillage des nouvelles explications écologistes de l’Etat défendeur, la duplique
nous informe que le Nicaragua interdit la pêche à ses propres riverains, mais la permet à ceux de la
219
rive costa-ricienne . Décidemment, la courtoisie nicara guayenne atteint ici des sommets: le
214
Original en anglais : «the internal regulations of Nicaragua are naturally applicable and are generally
enforced» (CMN, par. 5.1.16).
215
Original en anglais : «Nicaragua has usually tolerated a limited use of the San Juan for non-commercial
fishing by Costa Rican riparians»; «Nicaragua has accepted, as a matter of courtesy, subsistence or leisure fishery by
Costa Rican riparians» (CMN, par. 5.1.6).
216
DN, par. 4.67.
217DN, par. 4.58.
218Voir déclaration sous serment de Leonel Morales Chacón, 6 juillet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe106;
déclaration sous serment de Erick Maikol Martínez López, 6 juillet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe107; déclaration sous
serment de José Moreno Rojas, 6 juillet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe108; déclar ation sous serment de Josefa Alvarez
Aragón, 6 juillet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe109. Voir aussi les déclarati ons sous serment de Víctor Julio Vargas
Hernández, Marleny Rojas Vargas, Mario Salas Jiménez and Leonel Morales Chacón, 29 juillet 2007, RCR, vol. 2,
annexe 54.
219
DN, par. 4.67. - 62 -
Nicaragua passe outre sa propre législation et discrimine ouvertement ses propres habitants pour
permettre gracieusement à ceux du Costa Rica de pêcher sur le San Juan ! En réalité, cette attitude
s’explique, mieux que par la courtoisie, par la conviction qu’elle revêt un caractère obligatoire.
41. Le Costa Rica est convaincu que cette pra tique, doublée de l’inapplication totale de la
réglementation interne à son égard et d’une absence totale de réaction négative du Nicaragua, a
donné naissance à une règle coutumière locale. Pe u importe au fond que l’on parle de coutume
220
locale, d’acquiescement, d’accord tacite , de régime territorial ou encore de subsistance d’un
droit traditionnel datant de l’époque coloniale auqu el il n’a jamais été dérogé. Le résultat est le
même : les résidents de la rive costa-ricienne ont un droit de pêche à des fins de subsistance dans
les eaux du San Juan.
c) La violation par le Nicaragua du droit de pêche à des fins de subsistance
42. Depuis l’introduction de la présente inst ance, le Nicaragua a interdit aux riverains
costa-riciens toute activité de pêche dans les ea ux du San Juan. Ceux d’entre eux qui tentent de
pêcher risquent de voir leurs instruments de pêche ainsi que leurs bateaux saisis 221. De telles
mesures punitives ont été effectivement prises vis-à-vi s des riverains qui, toute leur vie durant, ont
222
pêché dans le San Juan pour assurer leur subsistance .
43. Le Nicaragua a affirmé de manière générale qu’il n’a ja mais donné l’ordre d’empêcher
223
ce type de pêche . Mais il n’a pas contesté la véracité des témoignages fournis par le Costa Rica,
se bornant à signaler qu’il s’agit seulement d’ «une poignée de témoignages sous serment» 22. Qui
plus est, il n’a pas non plus produit des preuves qui contredisent les allégations du Costa Rica.
220
Cf. Droit de passage sur territoire indien (Portugal c. Inde), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 196, p. 39-40;
Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks et South Ledge (Malaisie/Singapour), arrêt du
23 mai 2008, par. 120-121.
221
Déclaration sous serment de Josefa Alvarez Aragón, 6 juillet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 109.
222
Voir déclaration sous serment de Ví ctor Julio Vargas Hernández, 6 juil let 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe105;
déclaration sous serment de Leonel Morales Chacón, 6 juillet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 106 ; déclaration sous serment
de Erick Maikol Martínez López, 6 jui llet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe107; décl aration sous serment de José Moreno
Rojas, 6 juillet 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 108 ; déclaration sous serment de Josefa Alvarez Aragón, 6 juillet 2006, MCR,
vol.4, annexe109. Voir aussi les déclarations sous serm ent de Víctor Julio Vargas Hernández, Marleny Rojas Vargas,
Mario Salas Jiménez and Leonel Morales Chacón, 29 juillet 2007, RCR, vol. 2, annexe 54.
223CMN, par. 5.1.15.
224CMN, par. 5.1.8. - 63 -
Conclusion
44. Monsieur le président, Messieurs de la Cour, j’arrive à ma conclusion, à la triste
conclusion que les droits costa-riciens ont non seulement été violés, mais également niés ou vidés
de leur contenu par le Nicaragua.
45. Je vous remercie de votre attention et vous prie de donner la parole à mon collègue et
ami James Crawford.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Kohen for his statement and I now invite
Professor Crawford to take the floor.
CMRA. WFORD:
R EMEDIES SOUGHT
Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is my final task to outline the remedial issues in
this case. In doing so, I will be, if I say so myself, commendably brief.
Costa Rica’s request for a declaration of violations of Nicaragua’s obligations
2. First, Costa Rica requests the Court to adjudge and declare that Nicaragua is in breach of
its international obligations in denying the exercise of the right of free navigation and related rights
on the San Juan.
3. Nicaragua does not dispute that it would be appropriate for you to issue a declaration in
the present case although, of course, it disagrees as to th e content of that declaration. I will return
225
shortly to the declaration Nicaragua would have you make .
4. As your predecessor, the Permanent Court, noted in 1926, a declaration serves “to ensure
recognition of a situation at law, once and for all a nd with binding force as between the Parties; so
that the legal position thus established cannot agan be called in question in so far as the legal
effects ensuing therefrom are concerned” ( Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at
Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p. 20). Costa Rica might be forgiven
225
CMN, 7.1.10; RN, 6.3. - 64 -
for feeling that it needs one of these definitive statem ents every 50 or so years but certainly that is
what we seek in this case.
Costa Rica’s request for cessation of continuing breaches
5. Secondly, Nicaragua is obliged to cease all internationally wrongful conduct having a
continuing character, which is the case with, in effect, all of the Nicaraguan conduct of which we
complain.
Restitution, including abrogation of all legislative and administrative measures infringing
Costa Rica’s rights
6. Thirdly, Costa Rica seeks restoration of the situation prior to the breaches of the
obligations. This includes the abrogation of all legi slative and administrative measures taken by
Nicaragua in breach of the Treaty of Limits.
7. Nicaragua argues that this request is “abusively vague” and, more importantly, that
“it goes far beyond the inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function
which the Court, as a court of justice, can never ignore. Among these limitations [says
Nicaragua] the most fundamental is the one which prompts the Court to refrain from
226
issuing orders to sovereign States.”
8. Now, of course it is true that “[t]here are inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial
function” by this Court, as you noted in the Northern Cameroons case (Northern Cameroons,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963 , p. 29). But issuing orders to States is not
excluded by any such inherent limitation. The C ourt gives decisions in its contentious jurisdiction
which are binding on States and to describe those Stat es as “sovereign”, which they are, is not to
the purpose. Nicaragua recites a number of cases in support of its alle ged proposition that the
227
Court must refrain “from issuing orders to sovereign States” , but none of those cases are
apposite.
9. I will take simply one for present purposes, the Arrest Warrant case. In that case, having
found that the existing arrest warrant was unlawful, you held “Belgium must, by means of its own
choosing, cancel the warrant in question and so inform the authorities to whom it was circulated”
(I.C.J. Reports 2002, para. 76). Now, it is true that the means by which Belgium was to cancel the
226
RN, 6.40.
22RN, 6.40. - 65 -
warrant were left to Belgium to decide, but the Cour t in that passage made two orders to Belgium:
(1)to cancel the warrant, and (2)to inform th e authorities of the other States to whom it was
circulated. There is no trace of any inherent limita tion in that decision. And we say that the same
thing is true for the other cases on which Nicaragua relies.
10. In short, the request that you order restitution in the form of abrogation of all legislative
and administrative measures which are in breach of Nicaragua’s international obligations to
Costa Rica is legitimate and is fully within your authority.
Compensation
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Co sta Rica also seeks pecuniary compensation for
all damage caused by the unlawful acts committed by Nicaragua.
12. In its Rejoinder, Nicaragua makes three arguments against the claim for compensation.
13. The first is that claims for losses cau sed for charges, visas and permits required for
CostaRican vessels and citizens are diplomatic pr otection claims to which the requirement to
exhaust local remedies applies. But, of course, Costa Rica’s claim is for navigational rights of
228
Costa Rica as a State under the 1858 Treaty .
14. The losses caused to Costa Rica or to Costa Rican individuals for charges, visas and
permits are a direct result of Nicaragua’s breaches of Costa Rica’s treaty rights. They have been
caused by Nicaragua’s internationally wrongful acts in violation of an interstate bilateral treaty.
15. I note in passing that a similar claim was made by Nicaragua in its applications against
the United States and Costa Rica in the 1980s, seek ing compensation “both on its own behalf and
229
in respect of wrongs inflicted upon its nationals” . Nicaragua made no suggestion then that these
claims involved elements of diplomatic protection; nor did this Court do so when it upheld those
claims in respect of freedom of na vigation under the bilateral treaty of 1956 (Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, I.C.J. Reports 1986 , p. 140, paras. 279-280;
228
MCR, 4.16; RCR, 5.05.
22Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 20, para. 17.
See also, MN, p. 112, para. 3. - 66 -
dispositif (7), (11) and (14)). Yet again, Nicaragua is very happy to come here as Applicant. When
it comes here as Respondent, it seems to play by a different set of rules!
16. Finally, even if Costa Rica’s claims for compensation could be characterized as
diplomatic protection claims, they are incidental to the Costa Rican claim for breach of its own
treaty rights. Any element of diplomatic protecti on is merely incidental and secondary: they are
230
certainly not, as Nicaragua alleges, clearly distinct . They are expressed in the same provision of
the same treaty. To repeat, Costa Rica’s claims in respect of compensation are analogous to the
claims made by Nicaragua in its earlier applications where no local remedies were pursued, much
less exhausted.
17. Nicaragua’s second argument against the claim for compensation is that these are
“entirely unsubstantiated claims” with no sufficient sp ecification of the character of the injury and
231
its quantum . This argument is based upon a misconception of the circumstances in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction case ( Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , para. 76). There, Germany requested “a declaration of principle
that Iceland is under an obligation to make comp ensation to [Germany] in respect of all unlawful
acts of interference with the fishing vessels of [Germany]” ( I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 204, para. 74).
Germany did not request in that case that compen sation be assessed in a subsequent phase of the
proceedings (ibid., pp. 204-205, para. 76). The Court noted that Germany’s request would have be
appropriate “provided the claimant asks the cour t to receive evidence and to determine, in a
subsequent phase of the same proceedings , the amount of damage to be assessed” ( ibid.,
pp.204-205, para.76). That is the crucial point. Costa Rica has asked the Court to reserve
determination of the amount of damage payable to a subsequent phase of these proceedings.
Precisely the same request was made by Nicaragua in the Military and Paramilitary Activities case
against the United States and accepted by the Court.
230
RN, para. 6.34.
23RN, paras. 6.41-6.43. - 67 -
Costa Rica’s request for assurances and guarantees of non-repetition
18. Costa Rica also requests the Court to de termine that Nicaragua provide assurances and
guarantees against repetition of its internationally wrongful acts. It is fair to say that the subject of
assurances and guarantees against repetition has had something of a rocky ride in the Court. But in
the context of Nicaragua’s continuing denial of the existence of Costa Rican rights and its
continuing violations of these right s despite repeated decisions and commitments to the contrary,
Costa Rica, to quote the words of the Commentary to the ILC Articles “has reason to believe that
the mere restoration of the pre-existing situation does not protect it satisfactorily” 232. That is a
situation in which assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are appropriate.
Nicaragua’s request for a declaration
19. Mr.President, Members of the Court, Nicaragua itself seeks what I might call a
counter-declaration on sundry questions. I will briefly address each of these requests.
20. The first is a counter-declaration that Costa Rica is required to comply with the
regulations Nicaragua has imposed on navigation and on landing in the San Juan 23. But as we
have shown, these regulations are contrary to the treaty and to the applicable instruments. That
excludes any possibility of a declaration in the contrary sense.
21. The second request is for a counter-declaration that Costa Rica “has to pay for any
special services provided by Nicaragua in the use of the San Juan either for navigation or landing
234
on the Nicaraguan banks” . As a matter of fact, no such services are provided. There are no
navigational aids, there are no aids on the bank. You clamber up a muddy bank. There is no
evidence of the expenditure of any money. Bu t even if they were, compulsory payment for
services on a river which is subject to a right of fre e navigation, perpetual as it is in this case, is
excluded by the Treaty of Limits.
22. Third, Nicaragua asks for a counter-declar ation that Costa Rica must comply with all
reasonable charges for improvements in navigation on the river 23. Again, as a matter of fact, there
232
United Nations, Report of the International Law Co mmission on the work of its Fifty-third session, General
Assembly Official Records, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10, 2001), 219; MCR, 6.19.
233
RN, 6.5; see also 6.17.
23RN, 6.5.
23RN, 6.5, see also 6.17. - 68 -
are no such improvements. But in any event Ni caragua cannot subject Costa Rica’s perpetual and
free right of navigation to charges of any kind. This point was directly addressed in the Cleveland
Award. Answering the fifth point of doubtful inte rpretation, PresidentCleveland expressly stated
that “[t]he Republic of Costa Rica is not bound to contribute any proportion of the expenses that
may be incurred by the Republic of Nicaragua for any of the purposes above mentioned”, and this
236
was true even when they included improvement of the river “for the common benefit” .
23. Fourth, Nicaragua asks you to declare th at “[r]evenue service boats may only be used
237
during and with special reference to actual transit of the merchandise authorized by Treaty” . But
we have shown that Nicaragua’s claim to lim it Costa Rican public navigation by reference to
articles of merchandise is without foundation 238.
24. Finally, Nicaragua asks you to declare that it has the right to dredge the San Juan to
return the flow of water to that obtaining in 1858, even if this would affect the flow of water in the
239
Colorado River .
25. Nicaragua’s claim is without merit and without incidence for the present case. In the
first place, there is no dispute between the Parties on the issue of dredging. In 2006, the Foreign
Minister of Costa Rica, Mr.Tovar, expressed support in principle for improvement works on the
San Juan 24. Costa Rica has not changed its position since then. Second, the issue of dredging
bears no relationship to the issues before the Court, which relate exclusively to rights of navigation
and related rights. Improvement works may fall within Nicaragua’s rights affirmed by
PresidentCleveland. He said that Nicaragua is entitled “to execut[e] at her own expense and
within her own territory such works of impr ovement”, but he added the following proviso
“provided such works of improvement do not result in the occupation or flooding or damage to
Costa Rican territory; or in the destruction or serious impairment of the navigation of the said river
236
MCR, Ann. 16, p. 99, third paragraph.
237
RN, 6.5.
238RCR, 5.30.
239RN, 6.5.
240See Costa Rican Foreign Minister, Roberto Tovar Faja, to Nicaraguan Foreign Minister,
Norman Caldera Cardenal, Note No. DM-187-06, 5 May 2006: RCR, Anns., Vol. 2, Ann. 42. - 69 -
or any of its branches at any point where Costa Rica is entitled to navigate the same” 241, so there
are significant limitations. But these issues are co mpletely abstract. They do not arise in the
absence of specific plans for particular dredging notifi ed to Costa Rica. In short, this is not the
place or time to deal with these questions: the parameters of the dispute before the Court are
clearly defined.
Nicaragua’s reservations
26. Finally I should refer to Nicaragua’s so-ca lled reservations. These relate to a claim that
the Colorado River is an international waterway, and to potential claims against Costa Rica for
242
ecological damage and even for diversion of the San Juan . These reservations are not
counter-claims nor do they relate to or arise from any relief sought by Costa Rica. They are
entirely without incidence for the present case and it w ould not be appropriate for you to take them
into account in any way. If Nicaragua wishes to present these claims or to sustain any argument
based upon them, they ought to have been presented properly in these proceedings or in a new
Application.
Conclusions
27. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there are no minor cases before the Court but there
are sometimes compressed cases. I hope I may be forgiven, in that respect, one closing remark. In
the time we have had to present our case, we ha ve sought to do so as economically as possible and
perhaps more quickly than desirable. We have not been able in the time available to deal with
every issue raised in the pleadings ⎯ a situation exacerbated by the fact that Nicaragua’s Rejoinder
was far more substantial than its Counter-Memorial and that it c ontained additional evidence that
could and should have been produced earlier. Any Nicaraguan assertions against us that we have
not had time to deal with are firmly and categorically denied!
28. Mr.President, Members of the Court, that concludes Costa Rica’s first round
presentation. We thank you for your patient attention.
241
MCR, Anns., Vol. 2, Ann. 16. See also Costa Rican Foreign Minister, Roberto Tovar Faja, to Nicaraguan
Foreign Minister, Norman Caldera Cardenal, Note No. DM-187-06, 5 May 2006: RCR, Anns., Vol. 2, Ann. 42.
24CMN, p. 251; RN, 6.49. - 70 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Crawford.
This marks the end of the first round of oral argument of the Republic of Costa Rica. Oral
argument in the case will resume on Thursday 5 March 2009 at 10 a.m. in order for the Republic of
Nicaragua to present its first round of oral argument. The sitting for the first round of oral
argument of the Republic of Costa Rica is closed.
The Court rose at 1 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Tuesday 3 March 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)