Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2008/17
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LHAAYE
YEAR 2008
Public sitting
held on Friday 20 June 2008, at 4.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in
the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)
(Mexico v. United States of America)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2008
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 20 juin 2008, à 16 h 30, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à la Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’affaire
Avena et autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique)
(Mexique c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieitgins
Vice-PresiKntasawneh
Judges Ranjeva
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-K.vsce-prh,ident
RaMjev.
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the United Mexican States is represented by:
Mr. Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo, Ambassador, Under-Secretary for Multilateral Affairs and
Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico,
Mr. Joel Antonio Hernández García, Ambassador, Legal Adviser, Mi nistry of Foreign Affairs of
Mexico,
Mr. Jorge Lomónaco Tonda, Ambassador of Mexico to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agents;
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York,
MsSandraBabcock, Clinical Director, Center for International Human Rights, Northwestern
University Law School, Chicago, Illinois,
Mr. Víctor Manuel Uribe Aviña, Deputy Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico,
Ms Catherine M. Amirfar, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York,
Mr. Gregory J. Kuykendall, Director of the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program,
Mr.Agustín Rodríguez de la Gala, Director for Foreign Litigation, Office of the Legal Adviser,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico,
Mr. Erasmo Lara Cabrera, Legal Counsel, Embassy of Mexico in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Advocates-Counsellors;
Mr. Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga, Office of the Le gal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Mexico,
Ms Jill van Berg, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York,
as Assistants.
The Government of the United States of America is represented by:
Mr. John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser, United States Department of State,
as Agent;
Mr. James H. Thessin, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of State,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Stephen Mathias, Assistant Legal Adviser for the Office of Political Military Affairs, United
States Department of State, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis du Mexique est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo, ambassadeur, sous-secrétaire aux affaires multilatérales
et aux droits de l’homme, ministère des affaires étrangères du Mexique,
S. Exc. M.Joel Antonio Hernández García, am bassadeur, conseiller juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères du Mexique,
S. Exc. M. Jorge Lomónaco Tonda, ambassadeur du Mexique auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agents ;
M. Donald Francis Donovan, cabinet Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York,
MmeSandraL.Babcock, directrice de la Human Rights Clinic, Center for International Human
Rights Northwestern University Law School, Chicago, Illinois,
M. Víctor Manuel Uribe Aviña, conseiller juridi que adjoint du ministère des affaires étrangères du
Mexique,
Mme Catherine Amirfar, cabinet Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York,
M. Gregory J. Kuykendall, directeur du programme d’assistance juridique du Mexique aux
personnes encourant la peine de mort,
M. Agustín Rodríguez de la Gala, directeur ch argé des contentieux à l’étranger au bureau du
conseiller juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères du Mexique,
M. Erasmo A. Lara Cabrera, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade du Mexique aux Pays-Bas,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga, bureau du conseiller juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères du
Mexique,
Mme Jill Van Berg, cabinet Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York,
comme assistants.
Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d’Amérique est représenté par :
M. John B. Bellinger, III, conseiller juridique du département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme agent ;
MJ.amesHT. hessin, conseiller juridique ad joint du département d’Etat des Etats-Unis
d’Amérique,
comme coagent ;
M.D. StephenMathias, conseiller juridique adjo int du bureau des affaires politico-militaires du
département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, - 6 -
Professor Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., Chichele Professor of International Law, University of Oxford,
member of the English Bar, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Todd F. Buchwald, Assistant Legal Adviser fo r the Office of United Nations Affairs, United
States Department of State,
Ms Rebecca M. S. Ingber, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of State,
Mr. Daniel P. Kearney, Jr., Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser, United States Department of
State,
Ms Mary Catherine Malin, Assistant Legal Adviser for the Office of Consular Affairs, United
States Department of State,
Ms Denise G. Manning, Deputy Legal Counsellor, Embassy of the United States of America,
The Hague,
Ms Julie B. Martin, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of State,
Mr. Michael J. Mattler, Attorney-Adviser, Offi ce of United Nations Affairs, United States
Department of State,
Ms Heather A. Schildge, Legal Counsellor, Embassy of the United States of America, The Hague,
Mr. Charles P. Trumbull, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of State,
as Counsel. - 7 -
M.Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., professeur titulaire de la chaire Chichele de droit international à
l’Université d’Oxford, membre du barreau d’Angl eterre, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M.Todd F. Buchwald, conseiller juridique adjoint chargé des questions concernant les
Nations Unies au département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
Mme Rebecca M. S. Ingber, avocat-conseiller au département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
M. Daniel P. Kearney, Jr., assistant spécial du conseiller juridique du département d’Etat des Etats-
Unis d’Amérique,
Mme Mary Catherine Malin, conseiller juridique adjoint du bureau des affaires consulaires du
département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
Mme Denise G. Manning, conseiller juridique adjoin t à l’ambassade des Etat s-Unis d’Amérique à
La Haye,
Mme Julie B. Martin, avocat-conseiller au département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
M.Michael J. Mattler, avocat-conseiller chargé des questions concernant les NationsUnies au
département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
MmeHeather A.Schildge, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade des Etat s-Unis d’Amérique à
La Haye,
M. Charles P. Trumbull, avocat-conseiller au département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
commceonseils. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Cour t meets this afternoon to hear the second
round of the oral observations of the United States of America on the request for the indication of
provisional measures filed by Mexico. And the Agent, Mr. Bellinger, has the floor.
Mr. BELLINGER:
Closing
1. Good afternoon. Thank you again, Madam President and Members of the Court, as we
draw to the conclusion of our discussion of these issues.
2. We presented the substance of the United States argument yesterday. And as we stated,
the United States agrees with the interpretation re quested by Mexico, and in particular that the
Avena Judgment imposes an “obligation of result” on the United States. Accordingly, there is no
dispute “as to the meaning or scope” of that J udgment. Under these circumstances, there is no
basis for the Court to proceed, and the Court lack s prima facie jurisdiction to indicate provisional
measures. Indeed, because the import of Mexico’s Application is not a request for interpretation,
but rather a request for the Court to monitor enforcement of the Avena Judgment, the Court should
use its inherent powers to dismiss Mexico’s Application. That summarizes our position.
3. I now would like to respond to a few points in Mexico’s presentation this morning.
A. The existence of a dispute is necessary for the indication of provisional measures
4. Mexico this morning conceded the need for the Court to satisfy itself that it has prima
facie jurisdiction over a claim on the merits before it may indicate provisional measures in
connection with that claim. As the United States explained yesterday, Mexico has not met this test.
Mexico’s claim on the merits arises under Article 60 of the Court’s Statute. Accordingly, Mexico
must show that its Request for interpretation is capable of falling under that Article in order to
satisfy the prima facie jurisdiction requirement.
5. Mexico has not done so. Because there is no dispute between Mexico and the United
States with respect to the interpretation of the Avena Judgment that Mexico has asked this Court to
render, Mexico’s Request for interpretation is not cap able of falling within the scope of Article 60.
Article 60 by its terms provides jurisdiction only where a dispute exists with respect to the scope or - 9 -
meaning of a judgment of the Court. Because, as I will explain in a moment, Mexico has not
identified such a dispute, Article60 does not provide a jurisdictional basis for its Request for
interpretation. And in the absence of such a jurisdictional basis, the Court should not proceed to
consider the other factors identified by Mexi co, and should instead dismiss its request for
provisional measures.
6. Now this morning, Mexico suggested that th e Court should not, at this stage, enquire into
whether Mexico’s Request for interpretation proper ly states the existence of a dispute as to the
meaning or scope of the Avena Judgment.
7. But this misreads the Court’s jurispruden ce. The Court’s provisional measures Order in
the Legality of Use of Force case between Yugoslavia and Belgium shows that the Court does not,
in fact, accept as true all allegations in determini ng whether prima facie jurisdiction exists. In that
case, the Court observed “that [the] essential characteristic [of genocide] is the intended destruction
of ‘a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’” (Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v.
Belgium), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports
1999 (I), p.138, para. 40). For its part, Yugoslavia alleged that Belgium’s acts had deliberately
created “conditions calculated at th e physical destruction of an ethnic group, in whole or in part”
(id., p.125, para 2; p.136, para.34). The Court concluded, however, that “it does not appear at
the present stage of the proceedings that the bom bings which form the subject of the Yugoslav
Application... ‘entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision
quoted above’” (id., p.138, para.40). And on this basis, the Court decided that the Genocide
Convention could not “constitute a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court could prima facie be
founded in this case” (id., p.138, para. 41). In other words, the Court did not simply accept all
allegations as true in determining whether prima facie jurisdiction existed.
8. Likewise here, it is not sufficient for Mexico to allege that a dispute exists about the
interpretation of the Avena Judgment. The Court must find some indication that the alleged dispute
is a real one. As Mr. Thessin observed yesterday, if allegations alone were sufficient to satisfy the
prima facie jurisdiction test, then that test woul d be a hollow form that any party could satisfy
merely through artful pleading. More is re quired before the Court’s “exceptional powers” to
indicate provisional measures can be invoked. - 10 -
9. But even putting questions of prima faci e jurisdiction aside, Mexico does not meet the
other criteria for the indication of provisional measures. Mexico’s claim to have met these
requirements rests on the foundation that there are currently rights at issue that the Court will
resolve at a later date. Where, as here, there are no rights that are in dispute, none of the
requirements for provisional measures are met.
10. Since the United States agrees that the i ndividuals covered by para graph 153 (9) of the
Avena decision must get review and reconsideration, th ere are currently no rights “in issue” in the
main proceedings. This is in contrast, and this is important, this is contrast to the prior cases under
the Vienna Convention in which there were genuine disputes on the issues raised by the applicants’
claims on the merits. And I will touch on that later.
11. With regard to irreparable prejudice to rights that are the subject of the dispute, Mexico
addressed this question solely by asserting that the application of the death penalty would prejudice
the interests of its nationals. Now as we noted yesterday, we fully appreciate the gravity presented
by cases involving the death penalty. But Mexico’s analysis paid little attention to the second half
of the irreparable prejudice requirement ⎯ that the rights to be protected must be the subject of a
dispute in connection with a claim on the merits. Again, since no dispute exists on the issues on
which Mexico seeks interpretation, there are no rights at issue that could be the subject of a dispute.
B. There is no dispute
12. Mexico argues that there is in fact a dispute because it claims that the state of Texas, or
perhaps even one judge in the state of Texas, has a different interpretation of this Court’s Avena
Judgment than Mexico does. This, Mexico conten ds, forms the basis of a claim under Article60
1
because “the actions of Texas engage the international responsibility of the United States” . But
here, Mexico has conflated two sets of principles u nder international law. The first is the law of
State responsibility, under which a State is responsib le for the actions of its political organs. This
includes federal, state, and local officials 2. But the second principle involves the question of who
speaks authoritatively on behalf of the State.
1
CR 2008/16, p. 9, para. 3 (Hernández).
2See Article 4, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. - 11 -
13. Of course, the United States agrees that it is responsible under international law for the
actions of its political subdivisions. That is not the same, however, as saying that the views of a
state court are attributed to the United States for purposes of determining whether there is a dispute
between the United States and Mexico as to the meaning and scope of the Avena Judgment. As the
Commentary to the Articles on the Responsibility of States makes clear, the question of who can
speak on behalf of a State is “a separate questi on from whether the conduct of that person or entity
3
[is] attributable to the State” .
14. This Court’s Gulf of Maine case also makes clear that the Court will give legal effect
only to statements made by officials with authority to speak on behalf of the State. Accordingly, in
determining whether a dispute exists between the United States and Mexico, the Court must look to
statements made by officials with authority to speak internationally on behalf of the United States.
State officials do not have this authority.
15. As between the federal government and the state government, the United States
4
Constitution places power over foreign re lations in the federal government . Our Supreme Court
has said specifically that “the power over all the fo reign relations of the country . . . [is] forbidden
5
to state governments” . In the field of international relations, the United States speaks with one
voice through the executive branch, not through the states, not through local officials, not through
the Congress. The statements and actions of state officials simply do not represent the position of
the United States Government on these matters, even though the United States would be
responsible, clearly, under the principle of State responsibility for the internationally wrongful
actions of those officials.
16. The implications of Mexico’s contrary position are breathtaking. Might the views of a
local government, or even a local official, constitute the views of a country in other cases as well?
If a city or a province in a particular country issued a proclamation that a treaty should be
interpreted in a certain way, could that constitute the basis of a dispute with another country about
the meaning of that treaty, subject to the jurisdiction of this Court? Of course it is not just
3
Commentary to Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 20, para. 5.
4
See Art. I, Sect. 8; Art. II, Sect. 2; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).
5Chinese Exclusion case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). - 12 -
questions on the interpretation of treaties that might be implicated. Particular cities or provinces
might well have their own views on how a judgment of this Court should be interpreted. Would
this be grounds for an interpretation case under Artic le 60? What would that do for the basic rule
under Article 60 that the judgments of this Court are supposed to be “final and without appeal”?
C. Response to Judge Bennouna’s question
17. Now this might be a good place to respond to the question that JudgeBennouna asked
yesterday afternoon about the views of the United States Congress regarding the Avena Judgment.
Congress has not in fact adopted legislation on this issue, so there is no real way for me to represent
to you the view of our “Congress” as such. Indi vidual Members of Congress may of course have
individual views, but that is really a separa te question. It is worth noting though that ⎯ even
assuming a large number of individual Members of Congress might agree that the Avena decision
is binding as a matter of international law ⎯ it does not necessarily mean that Congress would
adopt legislation on the point. Congress is a political body, and the actions of Members of
Congress can be affected by a wide range of factors. These may include such things as Congress’s
need to deal with the press of other legislative business, the political need of individual Members to
focus on particular issues, and the need to accommodate the concerns of individual Members with a
particularly strong interest in an issue, so that even measures with wide support may not be adopted
as Congress works to help ensure the success of other parts of its legislative agenda.
18. In any event, I should reiterate that ⎯ under the United States Constitution ⎯ it is the
executive branch, under the leadership of the President and the Secretary of State, not the Congress,
that speaks authoritatively for the United States internationally. There is a famous case that
addresses this point, which many of you may know, in which our Supreme Court confirmed that it
is the President who “is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations” 6⎯ the President, not Congress.
19. The idea that the execu tive branch speaks for the Gove rnment also of course accords
with the practice internationally in which Heads of State and Ministers for Foreign Affairs are
responsible for representing States and presenting their views. There is just no question that this is
6
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). - 13 -
the basis on which international relations are conducte d. This is reflected in State practice in the
negotiation and conclusion of treaties, the re presentation of governments at international
organizations and meetings, the opening and closing of embassies and, indeed, the representation of
countries before this Court. It is foreign ministries, and embassies operating under their
direction ⎯ not municipalities or parliaments ⎯ to which the international community looks to
represent authoritatively the views of States around the world.
D. The United States actions are consistent with its understanding that the Avena Judgment
imposes an obligation of result
20. Before this Court, the United States has, unequivocally, agreed with Mexico that the
Avena Judgment imposes an “obligation of result”. Mexico nevertheless claims to detect a genuine
dispute about interpretation in diplomatic corr espondence between the United States and Mexico.
But the correspondence reveals no such thing. It is true that the United States discussed with
Mexico measures that could move the United States toward a practical solution. But the United
States never suggested that any particular measu res would in themselves fulfil the United States
obligations under Avena.
21. To the extent that Mexico is suggesting that the United States should take or should have
taken particular steps to implement the Avena Judgment, this is not a dispute as to the scope or
meaning of that Judgment, but something else.
T2he. Avena Judgment quite plainly states that the United States is to implement the
review and reconsideration requirement “by means of its own choosing”. Full stop. A request that
the Court require additional or particular actions on the part of the United States would have the
Court rewrite the Avena Judgment, not interpret it.
23. Mexico made several references this morning to various steps that it would like the
United States to take, that it asserts that the United States has not taken. Mexico stated “neither the
Texas executive, nor the Texas legislature, nor th e federal executive, nor the federal legislature” 7
has taken particular steps that Mexico seeks.
7
CR 2008/16, p. 18, para. 25 (Donovan). - 14 -
24. Now, we can understand that Mexico wants the United States Congress
to undertake
legislation to implement Avena, that it wants Texas to implement such legislation, that it wants the
Governor of Texas and the Texas Pardons and Parole Board to gr ant Mr.Medellín a reprieve in
order to allow time for legislation. But it simply cannot be said that an omission on the part of any
of these bodies to take specific actions, such as these, reflects a legal dispute as to the interpretation
of the Avena Judgment.
25. According to Mexico, these omissions “reflect[] a dispute over the meaning and scope of
Avena”. Not so. The United States has made clear ⎯ consistently ⎯ that we fully agree with
Mexico that the Avena Judgment imposes an obligation of resu lt. Thus, there is no basis for the
Court to divine a different interpretation from particular alleged acts or omissions, which often
reflect, to quote the Court’s Judgment in Haya de la Torre, “considerations of practicability or of
political expediency”. To infer a legal dispute from such acts or omissions would be inappropriate.
E. Conclusion
26. Now, let me conclude with a few final point s. First: this morning, Mexico revised the
provisional measures order that it is asking the Court to issue. Rather than asking the Court for a
blanket order that no executions be carried out in the five specified cases, Mexico now asks for an
order that no executions be carried out in those cases unless and until the individuals in question
have received review and reconsideration consis tent with paragraphs138 to 141 of the Court’s
Judgment in Avena. We welcome this clarification of Mexico’s Request.
27. We note also though, that the revised provisional measures Order adds nothing to the
obligation that is already imposed on the United States by paragraph153(9) of the Avena
Judgment. The proposed order would do no more than restate the obligation to provide review and
reconsideration in the cases at issue. Any points on which it might provide some arguable
additional clarity are not in dispute. There is no question that if a death sentence were carried out
in any of these cases without the required review a nd reconsideration, this would be inconsistent
with the Avena Judgment. In short, the redundant order that Mexico seeks would serve no purpose.
Where a final judgment of this Court clearly states the respective rights of the parties, there is
simply no need, and no role, for a provisional measures order under Article 41. - 15 -
28. Yesterday, Mexico characterized its request for provisional measures as “familiar” and
“straightforward”, and suggested that this case is no different from the requests for provisional
measures in the earlier Vienna Convention cases of Avena, LaGrand, and Breard. But this is
simply not so. In the earlier cases, there was a basis for issuing provisional measures to protect the
status quo while the Court resolved an issue of “disputed rights” ⎯ that is, whether, in light of their
Vienna Convention claims, the named defendants we re entitled to review and reconsideration of
their convictions and sentences. In other word s, provisional measures in these earlier cases were
preliminary to resolving a legal dispute regarding the rights of the Mexicans, and were necessary to
preserve the status quo until that resolution. Mexico’s present Application is entirely different.
There no longer are “disputed rights” at issue beca use the nature of those rights was resolved by
this Court in its Avena Judgment. And as we have made abunda ntly clear, there is no dispute as to
the “meaning or scope” of the Avena Judgment.
29. There was reference this morning to Mexico’s motivation in initiating these proceedings.
The United States does not in any sense question such motivation; we understand and respect the
seriousness and depth of Mexico’s concerns about the scheduled execution of a Mexican national
and implementation by the United States of the Avena Judgment. By stating that Mexico’s real
purpose in these proceedings is enforcement, rather than interpretation, of the Avena Judgment, we
are not stating that Mexico’s goal of enforcement is somehow untoward as a general matter. But
enforcement of a judgment is not this Court’s role.
30. Our legal concerns about the filing of an application that would involve the Court in what
is essentially a proceeding to enforce one of its j udgments are fundamental. This would not be an
appropriate role for the Court under its Statute or th e Charter. It does not reflect the proper role of
the Court in the international legal system. It would have ramifications well beyond this case. The
Court, in our view, should decline such a role. This is the case even if what is requested amounts
to no more than a restatement of the judgment it has already delivered.
31. We understand the seriousness of the issue before the Court. We acknowledge that a
5August execution date has been set for Mr.Medellín. But we contest that this gives rise to a
dispute as to the “meaning or scope” of the Avena Judgment. To carry out Mr. Medellín’s sentence
without affording him the necessary review and re consideration obviously wo uld be inconsistent - 16 -
with the Avena Judgment. But it would not be a misunderstanding of the Avena Judgment. And
we are doing as much as we practically can to avoid that outcome.
32. We therefore continue to work with Mexico to provide review and reconsideration to the
named Avena defendants. We regret that our full e fforts thus far have not arrived at a full
resolution of this matter and have brought us agai n before this Court. The United States deeply
values its strong relations with Mexico. We consider Mexico one of our closest friends and allies.
Of course, neighbours have their disputes from time to time, and our relationship with Mexico is no
different. But I do want to make clear that even though we and Mexico stand on opposite sides of
this litigation, we hope to continue to work w ith our Mexican friends to find a practical and
effective way to obtain review and recons ideration for the defendants named in the Avena
Judgment.
33. At the moment, our efforts are focused on requesting the state of Texas’s assistance and
initiating a discussion with Texas officials. We belie ve that this is the most effective way to seek
to implement Avena and to win review and reconsideration for the named Avena defendants. It is
not a futile enterprise. The personal participation of the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General, who wrote jointly to the Governor of Texas, testifies to the seriousness of the United
States commitment and our belief that this approach can succeed.
34. Madam President, Members of the Court, our formal submissions are as we stated
yesterday. The Court should reject Mexico’s request for provisional measures of protection and, at
this time, also dismiss Mexico’s Application for interpretation.
35. Thank you for your time a nd consideration. It has been a privilege to present our
position to the Court. Thank you and good afternoon.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Bellinger. The presentation of the United States is now
concluded and it brings the present series of sittings to an end. It remains for me to thank the
representatives of the two Parties for the able assistan ce they have given to the Court by their oral
observations in the course of these four hearings.
In accordance with practice, I would ask the Agents to remain at the Court’s disposal. - 17 -
The Court will render its Order on the request for the indication of provisional measures as
soon as possible. The date on which the Order will be delivered at a public sitting will be duly
communicated to the Agents of the Parties.
The Court, having no other business before it today, now rises.
The Court rose at 4.55 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Friday 20 June 2008, at 4.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America)