Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2007/22
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2007
Public sitting
held on Thursday 8 November 2007, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President, presiding
in the case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,
Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malaysia/Singapore)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2007
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 8 novembre 2007, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président,
faisant fonction de président
en l’affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,
Middle Rocks et South Ledge
(Malaisie/Singapour)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President
Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Dugard
Sreenivasa Rao
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en l’affaire
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
Dugard.
Sreenivasa Rao, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Malaysia is represented by:
H.E.Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Ambassado r-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Malaysia, Adviser for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister,
as Agent;
H.E. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassador of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
H.E. Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit inte rnational, member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration,
Mr.James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.Nicolaas Jan Schrijver, Professor of Public In ternational Law, Leiden University, associate
member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of International La w, Graduate Institute of International Studies,
Geneva, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Ms Penelope Nevill, college lecturer, Downing College, University of Cambridge,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Datuk Azailiza Mohd Ahad, Head of Interna tional Affairs Division, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Datin Almalena Sharmila Johan Thambu, Deputy Head 1, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
MsSuraya Harun, Senior Federal Counsel, Inte rnational Affairs Division, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Mr. Mohd Normusni Mustapa Albakri, Federal Coun sel, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Mr. Faezul Adzra Tan Sri Gani Patail, Federal C ounsel, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
MsMichelle Bradfield, Research Fellow, Lauterpach t Centre for International Law, University of
Cambridge, Solicitor (Australia),
Coausnsel; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Malaisie est représenté par :
S. Exc.M. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, ambass adeur en mission extrao rdinaire, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Malaisie, conseille r auprès du premier ministre pour les affaires
étrangères,
comme agent ;
S. Exc.Mme Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeur de la Malaisie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid Albar, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
M. Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., professeur honorai re de droit international à l’Université de
Cambridge, membre de l’Institut de droit inte rnational, membre de la Cour permanente
d’arbitrage,
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de dr oit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Nicolaas Jan Schrijver, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Leyde, membre
associé de l’Institut de droit international, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Marcelo G. Kohen, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Institut universitaire de hautes études
internationales de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
Mme Penelope Nevill, chargée de cours au Downing College de l’Université de Cambridge,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Datuk Azailiza Mohd Ahad, chef du département des affaires internationales, cabinet de
l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Datin Almalena Sharmila Johan Thambu, pr emière adjointe au chef du département des
affaires internationales, cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Suraya Harun, conseiller fédéral principal au département des affaires internationales, cabinet
de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
M. Mohd Normusni Mustapa Albakri, conse iller fédéral au départ ement des affaires
internationales, cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
M. Faezul Adzra Tan Sri Gani Patail, conseiller fédéral au département des affaires internationales,
cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Michelle Bradfield, Research Fellow au Lauterpacht Research Center for International Law
de l’Université de Cambridge, Solicitor (Australie),
comme conseils ; - 6 -
Dato’ Haji Abd. Ghaffar bin Abdullah, Deputy State Secretary of Johor (Administration),
Mr.Abd. Rahim Hussin, Under-Secretary, Maritime Security Policy Division, National Security
Council, Department of the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
Mr.Raja Aznam Nazrin, Under-Secretary, Adjudi cation and Arbitration, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Malaysia,
Capt. Sahak Omar, Director General, Department of Hydrography, Royal Malaysian Navy,
Mr. Tuan Haji Obet bin Tawil, Deputy Director 1, Land and Mines Office of Johor,
Dr.Hajah Samsiah Muhamad, Director of Acqui sition, Documentation and Audiovisual Centre,
National Archives,
Cdr. Samsuddin Yusoff, State Officer 1, Department of Hydrography, Royal Malaysian Navy,
Mr.Roslee Mat Yusof, Director of Marine, Nort hern Region, Marine Department Peninsular
Malaysia,
Mr.Azmi Zainuddin, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Malaysia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Sarah Albakri Devadason, Principal Assistant Secretary, Adjudication and Arbitration Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
Mr. Mohamad Razdan Jamil, Special Officer to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
MsHaznah Md. Hashim, Principal Assistant Secr etary, Adjudication and Arbitration Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
as Advisers;
Professor Dato’ DrS. haharil Talib, Head of Special Research Unit, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
as Consultant;
Mr.Tan Ah Bah, Director of Survey (Boundary Affairs Section), Department of Survey and
Mapping,
Professor Dr.Sharifah Mastura Syed Abdullah, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and
Humanities, National University of Malaysia,
Professor Dr. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Director of the Institute for Malaysian and International
Studies, National University of Malaysia,
Mr. Ahmad Aznan bin Zakaria, Principal Assistant Director of Survey (Boundary Affairs Section),
Department of Survey and Mapping, - 7 -
M. Dato’Haji Abd. Ghaffar bin Abdullah, secrétaire d’Etat adjoint du Johor (administration),
M. Abd. Rahim Hussin, sous-secrétaire au département de la politique de sécurité maritime, conseil
de la sécurité nationale, services du premier ministre de la Malaisie,
M. Raja Aznam Nazrin, sous-secrétaire au département de la justice et de l’arbitrage, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
Le capitaine Sahak Omar, directeur général du service hydrographique de la marine royale
malaisienne,
M. Tuan Haji Obet bin Tawil, premier directeu r adjoint du bureau du territoire et des mines du
Johor,
M. Hajah Samsiah Muhamad, directeur des acquisitions, centre de documen tation audiovisuel des
archives nationales,
Le commandant Samsuddin Yusoff, premier officier d’état-major du service hydrographique de la
marine royale malaisienne,
M. Roslee Mat Yusof, directeur de la marine pour la région septentriona le, département de la
marine de la Malaisie péninsulaire,
M. Azmi Zainuddin, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade de la Malaisie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Sarah Albakri Devadason, secrétaire adjointe pr incipale au département de la justice et de
l’arbitrage, ministère des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
M. Mohamad Razdan Jamil, assistant spécial du ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
Mme Haznah Md. Hashim, secrétaire adjointe prin cipale au département de la justice et de
l’arbitrage, ministère des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
comme conseillers ;
M. Dato’ Shaharil Talib, professeur, directeur du service des études spéciales du cabinet de
l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
comme consultant ;
M. Tan Ah Bah, directeur de la topographie, ser vice des frontières, département de la topographie
et de la cartographie,
Mme Sharifah Mastura Syed Abdullah, professeur, doyenne de la faculté des sciences sociales et
humaines de l’Université nationale de la Malaisie,
M. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, professeur, directeur de l’Institut d’études malaisiennes et
internationales de l’Université nationale de la Malaisie,
M. Ahmad Aznan bin Zakaria, directeur adjoint pr incipal de la topographie, service des frontières,
département de la topographie et de la cartographie, - 8 -
Mr.Hasnan bin Hussin, Senior Technical Assist ant (Boundary Affairs Section), Department of
Survey and Mapping,
as Technical Advisers.
The Government of the Republic of Singapore is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Tommy Koh, Ambassador-at-Large, Mini stry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Singapore, Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Anil Kumar s/o N T Nayar, Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
H.E. Mr. S. Jayakumar, Deputy Prime Minister, Co -ordinating Minister for National Security and
Minister for Law, Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore,
Mr. Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of the Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Chao Hick Tin, Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, Chairman of the United
Nations International Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International
Law, University of Oxford, member of the Institu t de droit international, Distinguished Fellow,
All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, member and former Chairman of
the United Nations International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar,
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’ap pel de Paris, member of the Rome Bar,
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. S. Tiwari, Principal Senior State Counsel, Ch ambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic
of Singapore,
Mr. Lionel Yee, Senior State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of
Singapore,
Mr. Tan Ken Hwee, Senior Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of Singapore
,
Mr. Pang Khang Chau, Deputy Senior State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the
Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Daren Tang, State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore, - 9 -
M.Hasnanbin Hussin, assistant technique principal du service des frontières, département de la
topographie et de la cartographie,
comme conseillers techniques.
Le Gouvernement de la République de Singapour est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Tommy Koh, ambassadeur en mission ex traordinaire (ministère des affaires étrangères
de la République de Singapour), professeur de droit à l’Université nationale de Singapour,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Anil Kumar s/o N T Nayar, ambas sadeur de la République de Singapour auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. S. Jayakumar, vice-premier ministre, mini stre coordinateur pour la sécurité nationale et
ministre de la justice, professeur de droit à l’Université nationale de Singapour,
M. Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice de la République de Singapour,
M. Chao Hick Tin, Attorney-General de la République de Singapour,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Un ies, professeur émérite de droit international
public (chaire Chichele) à l’Univer sité d’Oxford, membre de l’In stitut de droit international,
Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies, membre associé de l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de Rome, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. S. Tiwari, Principal Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Lionel Yee, Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Tan Ken Hwee, premier greffier adjoint de la Cour suprême de Singapour,
M. Pang Khang Chau, Deputy Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la
République de Singapour,
M. Daren Tang, State Counsel au cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la République de Singapour, - 10 -
Mr. Ong Chin Heng, State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of
Singapore,
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Counsel;
Mr. Parry Oei, Chief Hydrographer, Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore,
Ms Foo Chi Hsia, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Philip Ong, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
Ms Yvonne Elizabeth Chee, Second Secretary (Political), Embassy of the Republic of Singapore in
the Netherlands,
Ms Wu Ye-Min, Country Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
as Advisers. - 11 -
M. Ong Chin Heng, State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris X-Nanterre
comme conseils ;
M. Parry Oei, hydrographe en chef de l’autorité maritime et portuaire de Singapour,
Mme Foo Chi Hsia, directeur adjoint au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de
Singapour,
M. Philip Ong, sous-directeur au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de Singapour,
Mme Yvonne Elizabeth Chee, deuxième secrétaire (affaires politiques) à l’ambassade de la
République de Singapour aux Pays-Bas,
Mme Wu Ye-Min, chargée de mission au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de
Singapour,
cocomnseillers. - 12 -
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The sitting is open and I give
the floor to Mr. Bundy.
Mr. BUNDY: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
THE CONTINUOUS EXERCISE OF STATE AUTHORITY BY S INGAPORE ON PEDRA BRANCA
FROM 1851 TO THE PRESENT
Mr.President, Members of the Court. As always , it is a privilege for me to appear before
this Court and it is also an honour for me to repr esent the Republic of Singa pore in this important
case. May I also take this opportunity, on behalf of myself and my colleagues, to extend our best
wishes to all those in the courtroom who celebrate the Hindu Holy Day of Dipabali today.
Introduction
1. Yesterday Mr.Brownlie explained the roots of Singapore’s title over Pedra Bran⎯ a
title which resulted from the lawful occupationand possession of the island by GreatBritain,
Singapore’s predecessor in interest, during the period from 1847 to 1851. My task this morning is
to address the subsequent exercise of State aut hority carried out by Singapore after 1851 by which
Singapore confirmed and maintained the title that it had previously acquired.
2. By any standard, Singapore has produced with its written pleadings an impressive quantity
of contemporary documentary evidence demonstra ting the wide range of sovereign activities it
performed on Pedra Branca. These activities represent a pattern of conduct that was undertaken
à titre de souverain and which has been carried out on a continuous basis for over 150 years right
up to the present. For almost all of this period ⎯ in fact, for 130 years, from 1847 until 1979 when
Malaysia first raised a claim to Pedra Branca ⎯ Singapore’s conduct on the island went completely
unopposed by Malaysia. Not only did Malaysia not once protest any of Singapore’s activities
carried out on Pedra Branca during this extended period, it never carried out any competing
activities on the island of its own.
3. Malaysia’s complete inactivity with respect to Pedra Branca is simply the reverse side of
the coin of Singapore’s constant exercise of sove reign authority on and over the island. The two
elements are entirely consistent. Singapore carried out a steady stream of activities on - 13 -
PedraBranca, starting in 1847, while Malaysia did absolutely nothing. ProfessorPellet and
MsMalintoppi later this morning will be ad dressing Malaysia’s conduct, and tomorrow
ProfessorPellet will discuss Malaysia’s express disclaimer of ownership over PedraBranca in
1953. My purpose this morning is to review the factual and legal significance of Singapore’s
long-standing pattern of conduct over PedraBranca and within its territorial waters, starting in
1851.
4. In taking up this task, I cannot fail to recall what Malaysia had to say on the subject of
State conduct relating to disputed territory during th e oral hearings held in this courtroom five
years ago in the Indonesia/Malaysia case, which also concerned tw o other small islands in the
region, the islands of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. During those oral hearings, in the words of
Malaysia’s counsel:
[slide]
“first I must stress again a basic and inescapable historical fact. These islands are now
in the possession of Malaysia, subject to its control and administration, and they have
been so at all material times for more th an a century and a half. There is not a
glimmer of actual display of Indonesian State authority on the islands. Indonesia is
effectively a claimant attempting to oust the State in possession from its
long-possessed territory.” (CR 2002/30, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, p. 30, para. 12.)
5. If anything, this statement applies with even greater force in the present case where
Singapore has shown both a prior legal title stemming from the activities of Great Britain in the
period 1847 to 1851, discussed by Mr.Brownlie yest erday, and sovereign acts in confirmation of
that title that are far more intensive than the scattered examples of effectivités that Malaysia
adduced during the Ligitan/Sipadan case. Thus, if we change the language of Malaysia’s argument
in the Ligitan/Sipadan case to fit the present case, Malaysia’s observation is an apt description of
the situation in which the Parties now come befo re you in these proceedings. If I can borrow the
relevant language, I would say as follows. First, I must stress again a basic and inescapable historic
fact. These islands, PedraBranca, MiddleRock s, SouthLedge, are now in the possession of
Singapore, subject to its control and administration a nd they have been so at all material times for
more than a century and a half. There is not a glimmer of actual display of Malaysian State activity
on the islands. Malaysia is effectively a claimant attempting to oust the State in possession from its
long-possessed territory. That is what we have in this case. - 14 -
[On slide, now replace “Malaysia” with “Singapore” and replace “Indonesian” and Indonesia” with
“Malaysian” and “Malaysia”.]
1. The wide range of Singapore’s administra tion and control and the long period during
which such conduct was carried out
6. I mentioned earlier that Singapore’s administration and control of Pedra Branca has a long
and unopposed pedigree. In addition to the activities described by Mr.Brownlie, the story
continues in 1851 after the British had taken possession of the island and constructed the
Horsburgh lighthouse.
(a) Notices to mariners issued from Singapore starting in 1851
7. In September of that year, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, the most senior British
official based in Singapore, issued a Notice to Mariners announcing that the lighthouse had been
erected on Pedra Branca (MS, Ann.56). And ot her such Notices to Mariners were issued from
Singapore in the years following and have been documented in the written pleadings. It was also in
1851 that a complement of staff from Singapore took up residence on the island.
8. Malaysia contends that Notices to Mariners are irrelevant for questions of sovereignty.
Well, that may be Malaysia’s position now, but it was not the view that it expressed when it
appeared before this Court in the Indonesia/Malaysia case five year’s ago. There, Malaysia
expressly relied on the construction and notification by means of Notices to Mariners of unmanned
lights it had built on the two islands in dispute in th at case, and Malaysia further argued that those
actions were a straightforward reflection of Malaysia’s sovereignty which had never been
challenged by Indonesia (RM, p.75). Consistenc y appears to have its limits for Malaysia when
territorial questions are at issue.
(b) The flying of the Singapore marine ensign on Pedra Branca
9. It was also during this same period from 1851 that the British marine ensign began to be
flown on the lighthouse. Subsequently, the British ensign was replaced by the Singapore ensign,
but the flag has been displayed continually for over 150 years in an open and notorious manner and
as a clear manifestation of sovereignty. - 15 -
10. Malaysia is sensitive to this fact, and ri ghtly so, given the important implications that
such actions give rise to as evidence of sove reignty, as has been held in cases such as the Island of
Palmas arbitration and in the Temple of Preah Vihear case (2 RIAA 829, p.870; I.C.J. Reports
1962, p. 30). Consequently, Malaysia is forced to complain that the flag was small and difficult to
identify, and that it was therefore not displayed in an open and notorious manner calling for any
reaction.
11. Now these are highly defensive arguments wh ich are singularly unpersuasive when other
aspects of Malaysia’s conduct are taken into consid eration. How, how, for example, can Malaysia
suggest that it was unaware of the presence of the Singapore ensign on Pedra Branca and at the
same time try and impress upon this Court that Malaysia regularly patrolled the waters around the
island and that one of its naval officials even landed on the island, scampered up the rocks
according to his affidavit in 1962? If Malaysia failed to notice the flag or appreciate its
significance, then this simply unde rscores Malaysia’s complete lack of interest in Pedra Branca.
Conversely, if Malaysia was aware of the flag, then it should have reacted if it genuinely
considered that it possessed sovereignty over the island.
12. Let me pause on this issue for a moment. As the evidence on the record in the written
pleadings demonstrates, Malaysia certainly knew how to protest the flying of the Singapore marine
ensign when Malaysia considered that the embl em was being displayed on Malaysian territory.
Here, I am speaking about an incident that occurred with respect to another island in the area where
a lighthouse was located, Pulau Pisang.
[Place map on screen showing Pedra Branca and Pulau Pisang]
13. Pulau Pisang, which the Court will see from the map on the screen, is a small island
which unquestionably belongs to Malaysia. Nonetheless, pursuant to an agreement dating from
1885, which was subsequently confirmed by a wr itten indenture in 1900 — and that indenture has
been filed with the pleadings (MM, Ann. 89 a nd CMS, Ann. 24)—, the Ruler of mainland Johor
granted to Singapore the right to operate and ma intain a lighthouse on Pulau Pisang. Until 1968,
Singapore flew its marine ensign over the lighthouse on Pulau Pisang.
14. In 1968, however, Malaysia made a diplomatic protest to Singapore about this ensign and
requested that Singapore issue instructions to bring the flag down as soon as possible. Malaysia’s - 16 -
actions were the result of a complaint that the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had received
from an internal Malaysian political constituency that the Singapore flag was being flown over
Malaysian territory.
15. Singapore respected Malaysia’s request and lowered the flag on Pulau Pisang. What is
significant however is that Malaysia made absolutely no similar request concerning the identical
flag that Singapore flew at Pedra Branca. There was not even a hint of a suggestion from Malaysia
at the time that Singapore should lower the flag at Pedra Branca as well because the island
belonged to Malaysia.
16. I shall be returning in a later presentati on to discuss other key differences in the way in
which Malaysia acted with respect to islands on which lighthouses were located where Malaysia
possessed sovereignty, such as Pulau Pisang, and is lands where sovereignty rested with Singapore,
such as Pedra Branca. For present purposes, I w ould simply note that the only explanation for
Malaysia’s inconsistent attitude is that it did not regard itself as possessing sovereignty over
PedraBranca. Had it thought differently, it undou btedly would have and should have made a
similar diplomatic démarche about the Singapore fl ag being flown on Pedra Branca. Of course, as
Professor Pellet will explain a little later, Malaysia’s inaction was entirely consistent with its earlier
confirmation in 1953 that Malaysia did not claim ownership over Pedra Branca.
(c) Legislative activities relating to Pedra Branca
17. Let me now turn to the legislative measu res that Great Britain enacted dealing with
PedraBranca. Evidence of such activities rela ting to the specific territory in dispute is
unquestionably of prime importance as an indica tion of administration and control. As the
Permanent Court stated in the Eastern Greenland case, “Legislation is one of the most obvious
forms of the exercise of sovereign power” (Judgment, 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, p. 48).
18. In 1852, just after Great Britain ha d acquired sovereignty over Pedra Branca, the
Government of India enacted Act No. VI of 1852, which specifically related to Pedra Branca. The
relevant part of this legislative measure, which the judges will also find in tab31 of their folders,
provided as follows:
[slide] - 17 -
“Section I
The Light-House on Pedra Branca afor esaid shall be called ‘The Horsburgh
Light-House’ and the said Light-House, a nd the appurtenances thereunder belonging
or occupied for the purposes thereof, and a ll the fixtures, apparatus, and furniture
belonging thereto, shall become the property of, and absolutely vest in, the East India
Company and their successors.”
The Act went on in Section IV to state:
[slide]
“The management and control of the said ‘Horsburgh Light-House’, and of the
keeper thereof, and of everything relating ther eto, is hereby vested in the Governor of
the Straits Settlements.” (MS, Ann. 59.)
19. There are a number of important points which deserve to be mentioned in connection
with this legislation.
20. First, as the Act makes clear, it dealt expressly with Pedra Branca and the lighthouse on
the island. In other words, the legislation was specific to the territory in dispute.
21. Second, the 1852 Act was clearly a sovereign act. It was adopted by the Government of
India and vested in the East India Company and its successors the lighthouse and all appurtenances
occupied for the purposes thereof as well as the management and control of everything related
thereto. As Singapore has shown, the extensive public works it carried out on the island effectively
covered the entire island just as did the activities of the British Crown undertaken from 1847
to 1851 discussed by Mr. Brownlie yesterday.
22. Third, although Malaysia makes a thin attempt to argue that the 1852 Act was only a
matter of private law, this is clearly not the case. The Act was a public act taken by the
Government of India, which had no power to legisl ate extraterritorially. Moreover, the acts of the
British East India Company, just as Judge Huber held in the Island of Palmas case with respect to
the East India Company’s counterpart, the Dutch East India Company, were entirely assimilated to
the acts of the State itself (2 RIAA, p. 858).
23. Fourth, the 1852 Act made no mention of an y indenture or permission that Malaysia
alleges had been granted by the Ruler of Johor for the establishment of the Horsburgh lighthouse.
Had such a document existed ⎯ and Singapore has shown that it did not ⎯ it inevitably would
have been referred to. By the same token, neith er Johor nor Malaysia ever reacted to the 1852 Act
or protested it. - 18 -
24. All of these considerations underscore the fact that the 1852 Act was a classic example of
State activity carried out à titre de souverain on the very territory now in dispute.
25. Later in 1852, a second light, a new floati ng light was established by the East India
Company on a submerged sandbank known as the 2½fa thom bank. This light was subsequently
replaced by a permanent fixture on a nearby feature known as the “One Fathom Bank”, and you
can see its location on the screen.
[slide]
[Map showing location of 2½ fathom bank light]
26. Malaysia asserted in its Counter-Memoria l that this light was established with the
permission of the local Malay Ruler (CMM, p. 155), but Malaysia produced no evidence to support
that contention and the contention is incorrect. There was no Malay permission for the East India
Company to erect the light ⎯ a fact which actually is perfectly understandable when it is recalled
that the light was situated some 15miles off the mainland coast in the high seas on a submerged
sandbank not susceptible to appropriation.
27. Two years later, ActNo. XIII of 1854 was enacted replacing the 1852Act (MS,
Ann.62). The 1854 Act continued to provide that the lighthouse on Pedra Branca and all of its
appurtenances belonging thereto or occupied for that purpose were vested in the East India
Company and its successors.
28. In contrast, there was no language in the 1854 Act vesting the 2½ fathom light in the East
India Company in trust for the British Crown as there was for the lighthouse on Pedra Branca
where sovereignty had been established. With respect to the 2½ fathom Light, the 1854 Act simply
provided that its “management and control” ⎯ nothing else ⎯ vested in the Governor of the Straits
Settlements, because the sandbank on which the light was situated was not capable of appropriation
or under British sovereignty. And this, once again, illustrates the sovereign nature of both the 1852
and 1854 Acts with respect to Pedra Branca.
(d) Singapore’s continuous staffing, maintenance and improvement of the lighthouse on Pedra
Branca and its construction of other facilities on the island
29. During the entire period from 1851 to the present, Singapore has been the sole party to
staff, maintain and improve the lighthouse on Pedra Branca, and it has similarly been the only party - 19 -
to erect other installations on the island and to use the island for public works. All of this has been
fully documented in Singapore’s written pleadings, a nd Malaysia, in contrast, has remained totally
inactive with respect to the island.
30. Permit me to give the Court a flavour of the kinds of activities that Singapore carried out
on Pedra Branca from 1851 all the way up to the present.
31. In 1853, and again in 1902, the author ities in Singapore commissioned the expansion of
the jetty on Pedra Branca and constructed a landing stage on the island (MS, Anns. 70, 74 and 75).
This work was carried out pursuant to an open te ndering process that was publicized at the time in
the Straits Settlements Government Gazette with tenders for the works to be submitted to the
Colonial Secretary’s Office in Singapore. Those actions were clearly of a sovereign character
administered by Singapore government officials. Despite their public nature, Singapore’s actions
did not elicit the slightest reaction from Malaysia.
32. Nor did Malaysia react when Singapore built radar reflectors on the island, and radio
beacons, and a new alternator room, enlarged crew quarters, boat davits, solar panes and other
facilities on the island, or when Singapore installed military communicati ons equipment on Pedra
Branca in 1977. These were all quintessentially act s of a sovereign nature on the ground, which
took place on a steady basis both before and af ter 1953 when Malaysia disclaimed ownership over
Pedra Branca.
33. Throughout this period ⎯ in other words, for over 150 years ⎯ the lighthouse was
staffed and provisioned from Singapore. The orig inal staffing plans for Pedra Branca dated from
1851 and were approved by Gover nor Butterworth, who also approved the expenses relating to the
salaries of the personnel stationed on the island a nd, as the need arose, the staff on Pedra Branca
was supplemented periodically by maintenance and re pair crews. On the other hand, and in sharp
contrast, no one from Malaysia, or its predecessors, was ever stationed on Pedra Branca whether
before 1851 or afterwards ⎯ never.
(e) Singapore’s exercise of jurisdiction and control over Pedra Branca
34. A State naturally regulates visits by fo reigners to its territory, and Singapore was no
exception when it came to Pedra Branca. This al so has been amply docu mented in Singapore’s - 20 -
written pleadings in which Singapore has prod uced, amongst other evidence, copies of the
logbooks that were kept by Singapore personnel on the island documenting the many visits and
other activities that Singapore regulated with respect to Pedra Branca (MS, Ann. 87).
35. What is particularly significant is that Singapore’s control of access to Pedra Branca
extended to Malaysian nationals as well as to nationals of third States. Two incidents in particular
stand out which evidence not only Singapore’s exercise of administration and control over the
island, but also Malaysia’s recognition of that fact.
36. The first took place in March1974 when a number of Malaysian officials sought
permission from Singapore to visit Pedra Branca as pa rt of an international team to carry out tidal
surveys. In order to obtain the necessary approval from Singapore government ministries,
Singapore requested Malaysia to furnish the names and passport numbers of the individuals
concerned and to indicate their proposed length of stay on the island (MS, Ann. 120). Once again,
that attests to Singapore acting in a sovereign capac ity with respect to the island. Malaysia duly
complied with Singapore’s request. Indeed, it was an officer of the Malaysian navy who provided
the relevant details and who also confirmed th at the Malaysian personnel landing on the island
would be escorted by a representative of Singapore (MS, Ann.122) and, accordingly, the survey
team was allowed to land and stay at Pedra Branca. At no point did Malaysia ever intimate that
Pedra Branca belonged to Malaysia or that Malays ian officials therefore had the right to visit the
island without obtaining permission from Singapore.
37. That event of 1974 may be contrasted w ith a second episode that occurred fouryears
later in 1978, when two officers from the Malays ian Survey Department arrived unannounced on
Pedra Branca ostensibly to carry out further surveys. They were told in no uncertain terms by the
Singapore lightkeeper that they could not be allowed to stay without prior permission from the Port
of Singapore Authority and the Malaysian officials therefore left the island (MS, Ann.136; RS,
Ann. 51).
38. These incidents reflect two basic rea lities. The first is that Singapore acted à titre de
souverain in controlling access to Pedra Branca, and the second, which was made particularly clear
by Malaysia’s acceptance of the need for it to obtain Singapore’s permission to visit the island in
1974, is that Malaysia recognized Singapore’s right to exercise such regulatory control. Malaysia’s - 21 -
actions at the time were diametrically at odds with the position it adopts in these proceedings ⎯
namely, the proposition that Malaysia somehow enjoyed an historic title over the island.
39. Of course, Singapore did not discriminate when it came to vetting applications to visit
Pedra Branca. Singapore, in its written pleadings, has also documented the fact that when nationals
of third States wished to visit the island, whether for scientific research projects or otherwise, they
needed to obtain, and did obtain, Singapore’s prio r permission to do so. I would respectfully refer
the Court in this connection to the evidence Singapore has produced at Annex117 and
Annexes 151 to 154 of its Memorial, where this is documented.
40. At the same time, a number of high-ranking Singapore public officials have made official
visits to Pedra Branca in addition to Singapore’s naval personnel who frequently carried out
operations there. These officials included the Mini ster of Communications, the Minister of Home
Affairs, a Member of the Singapore Parliament, and police and military officials ⎯ and all of these
are documented and can be found in the logbook th at Singapore has filed (MS, Ann.87). These
visits were of a character normally carried out by a sovereign on its territory, and no permission
was ever sought from Malaysia, which never protested. As such, the activities in question once
again reflect the fact that Singapore consistently regarded itself as possessing sovereignty over the
island and acted accordingly.
(f) Singapore’s use of Pedra Branca for the collection of meteorological data
41. Another governmental use to which Singapor e has constantly put Pedra Branca is for the
collection of meteorological data. Malaysia may la bel this a routine activity carried out at many
lighthouses, but this hardly detracts from the sovereign nature of such activities carried out on
Singapore territory. As Singapore has shown, it collected meteorological readings from Pedra
Branca ever since 1851, up to the present.
42. But that is not all: there is a further important aspect of this element of conduct to which
I would like to draw the Court’s attention, and that is the way in which Malaysia itself referred to
such activities in its own official government publications.
43. The Court will recall from the written pl eadings that, even during the period when
meteorological observations were carried out on a pan-Malayan basis, the Malayan Meteorological - 22 -
Service was divided into a Singapore branch and a Federation of Malaya branch. Significantly, this
Meteorological Service collected data on a territorial basis.
44. Let me place on the screen a number of extracts ⎯ which can also be found in tab 32 of
your folders ⎯ these are a number of extracts, first, from the 1959 Summary of Meteorological
Observations from the Malayan Meteorological Service (RS, Ann.28). The Court will first note
that the Malayan Service referred to 29rainfall st ations said to be situated “in Singapore”, in
addition to 43 auxiliary stations located in the Federation of Malaya. In other words, the location
of the rainfall stations was referred to in Malayan official reports by reference to the territory in
which they were located.
[slide]
[Place introductory paragraph from p. 190 of RS, Ann. 28 on screen]
45. The 29 stations “in Singapore” are all listed in this report, and the relevant page now
appears on the screen. [Slide of p.189 of RS, Ann.28 “Singapore Rainfall Stations” on screen
with Horsburgh lighthouse highlighted.] The Horsburgh lighthouse is expressly listed as one of the
29 stations in Singapore, just as the other 28 stations included on the list are also all unquestionably
on Singapore territory.
46. As the Court knows, Singapore merged w ith the Federation of Malaya in 1963, and
Singapore became independent two years late r, in 1965. In 1966, consequently, the Summary of
Meteorological Observations was published jointly by the Meteorological Services of Malaysia and
Singapore. The 1966 Summary, as you can see on the screen [slide, RS, Ann. 35] and which is also
in your folders to examine at your leisure, c ontinued to list the station at Horsburgh lighthouse on
Pedra Branca as one of the stations “in Singapore”. One year later, in 1967, when Singapore and
Malaysia began reporting meteorological informa tion separately, Malaysia no longer listed any
reporting stations in Singapore, including the station at Pedra Branca (RS, Ann. 36).
47. Let me emphasize again that this was an official Malaysian governmental publication
which listed the meteorological station at Ho rsburgh lighthouse on Pedra Branca as being “in
Singapore”. The recognition by Malaysia of Pedr a Branca’s sovereign status is highly relevant,
and it is also entirely consistent with the contempor aneous maps that were prepared by Malaysia’s
official mapping agency at the time: these will be discussed by Ms Malintoppi tomorrow. In short, - 23 -
the record concerning the collection of meteorological data fits comfortably ⎯ fits perfectly ⎯
within the overall pattern of conduct that so cl early emerges demonstrating Singapore’s sovereign
authority over Pedra Branca, and Malaysia’s recognition of that sovereignty.
(g) Singapore’s continued exercise of administratio n and control after the so-called “critical
date”
48. Up to this point, I have focused on official acts of a governmental nature that Singapore
carried out on Pedra Branca itself, and have shown that the acts performed by Singapore were
striking, really quite remarkable, for their breadth and scope, encompassing both lighthouse and
non-lighthouse public works carried out as a natura l consequence of Singapore’s sovereignty over
the island. I have also purposely discussed events that transpired well before Malaysia first
indirectly raised a claim to the island in 1979-1 980 with the publication of its 1979 map. In other
words, I have intentionally ignored, up to this point, discussing any of Singapore’s effectivités
carried out on Pedra Branca after the so-called “critical date”, when Malaysia first advanced its
claim, in order to reduce the scope for any controversy. As I hope I have shown, Singapore carried
out an impressive array of State activities on a constant basis from 1851 to 1979.
49. Yet this in no way diminishes the legal effect of Singapore’s continued administration
and control of Pedra Branca after 1979 ⎯ administration and control that has endured right up to
the present. As the Court so clearly articulated in the Indonesia/Malaysia case, acts which take
place after a dispute has crystallized between the pa rties will be taken into consideration provided
that they are “a normal continuation of prior acts and are not undertaken for the purpose of
improving the legal position of the Party which relies on them” ( I.C.J. Reports 2002, p.682,
para. 135, citing the Palena case).
50. With respect to Pedra Branca, it is appare nt that Singapore continued to administer the
island after Malaysia’s belated claim emerged in 1979 in the same way Singapore had administered
the island before that date. The nature of Singapore’s c onduct did not change one bit, and none of
Singapore’s post-1979 activities on Pedra Branca we re in the least self-serving. They were ⎯ to
borrow the Court’s words ⎯ a “normal continuation of prior acts” carried out by Singapore.
51. For example, as discussed in Chapter4 of Singapore’s Reply, Singapore continued to
staff, maintain and improve the facilities on Pedra Branca, as it had done before. It upgraded - 24 -
communications and lighting equipment, all of which had existed before, and it improved access to
the island by constructing a helicopt er landing pad to supplement the pier and the jetty, which had
been in existence for over 100 years. It carried out a detailed topographical survey of Pedra Branca
and a bathymetric survey of the surrounding waters, including Middle Rocks. Singapore also
continued to investigate shipping incidents in the vicinity of Pedra Branca and continued to
exercise jurisdiction over accidents occurring on Pedra Branca and within its territorial waters.
52. Singapore also continued to perform re gulatory activities pertaining to the island, and
issued legislation. For example, in 1991, Singa pore issued the Protected Places (No. 10) Order of
1991, which provided that a number of places in Singapore, including Pedra Branca ⎯ which is
named in the Order ⎯ were protected places and that all visits to such places required a permit
from the Port of Singapore Authority (MS, Ann. 178). That legislation was entirely consistent ⎯ a
normal continuation of prior acts ⎯ with the previous control of access to Pedra Branca that I
discussed and that Singapore has always maintained.
53. Singapore also continued to explore the po ssibility of reclaiming areas around the island
to enlarge its facilities, and open tenders were published for a reclamation project in 1978.
Although that project was ultimately shelved, it represented yet another example of Singapore
conducting itself as sovereign over the island to which Malaysia did not react.
54. Malaysia complains that these actions ⎯ post 1979 ⎯ were self-serving and undertaken
after Singapore had begun to prepare its claim to Pedra Branca. But Singapore engaged in no such
“preparation” of a claim. By 1979, Singapor e’s title over Pedra Branca, and its exercise of
administration and control over the island, had been in existence for well over 100years. It was
Malaysia which was the Party that belatedly began to hatch a claim to Pedra Branca at the end of
the 1970s. Moreover, as Singapore has documented and showed in its Reply, Singapore had
already actively considered reclamation proj ects around the island as early as 1972, well before
Malaysia first articulated its claim by issuing its 1979 map (RS, Ann. 42).
55. In short, Singapore scarcely needed to manufacture more effectivités on Pedra Branca
after 1979. Prior to the emergence of Malaysia’s claim, the British had taken lawful possession
over the island during the period of 1847 to 1851, accompanied by the extensive public works
discussed by Mr.Brownlie yesterday. The Du tch had recognized British sovereignty over Pedra - 25 -
Branca in 1850, and Singapore had carried out an unopposed stream of State activities on the
islands for 130years leading up to 1979. Singapore’s administration and control over Pedra
Branca simply continued thereafter, as it does today.
(h) Singapore’s naval patrols around Pedra Branca and its investigation of shipping incidents
within Pedra Branca’s territorial waters
56. Not surprisingly perhaps, Singapore also ex ercised jurisdiction over its territorial waters
surrounding Pedra Branca. Permit me to recall briefly the kinds of activities that Singapore
performed in this connection.
57. First, Singapore has shown that it routin ely carried out naval patrols in pre-designated
areas just off Pedra Branca. [Place map showing Patrol Sector F5 on screen] The Court will see
from the map on the screen, which is also at tab 33 of your folders, Singapore, unlike Malaysia,
specifically delineated a naval patrol area ⎯ the F5 area ⎯ which lay just to the north of Pedra
Branca in the Middle Channel. That area w as designated and identified in 1975, well before
Malaysia first raised a claim to Pedra Branca, yet Malaysia never protested Singapore’s naval
activities in this area until 2003 ⎯ a mere four years ago and 28years after Singapore’s patrol
sector had been established.
58. Second, Singapore has documented the fact that when high-ranking Singapore officials
visited Pedra Branca, such as the Minister of State for Communication who went to the island in
1974 and again in 1976, these officials were accompanied by Singapore naval vessels without any
reaction from Malaysia. Similarly, Singapore us ed its navy to evacuate stranded Singapore
fishermen who had sought refuge on Pedra Branca, to rescue a contractor who had been injured on
the island while installing new equipment in 1975, and to carry out search and rescue activities in
connection with the accidental drowning in 1980 of Singapore naval pe rsonnel who were on a
mission to maintain military communications equi pment on Pedra Branca. In 1977, the Singapore
Marine Police apprehended an Indonesian craft which had been involved in the robbery of
Singapore fishing vessels operating just a few miles off of Pedra Branca in its territorial waters
(RS, Anns. 45, 48, 50 and 55). All of these ⎯ the references will be in the transcript ⎯ are fully
documented in the pleadings. - 26 -
59. Third, unlike Malaysia, Singapore took responsibility to investigate ship wrecks that
occurred within Pedra Branca’s territorial wate rs pursuant to powers granted by Singapore
legislation which applied precisely because Pedr a Branca was Singapore territory. Singapore’s
written pleadings documented many such instan ces spanning a period from 1920, when a Dutch
ship ran aground about 1.5miles north of Pedra Branca, to 1963, when an incident involving a
British cargo vessel was similarly investigated by Singapore, to more recent examples in 1979,
1985, 1986, 1992, 1996, 2003 and 2005. The location of these incidents is depicted on the map
that now appears on the screen, a copy of which is at tab 34 of the folders [slide: insert 10 facing
p. 160 of RS]. Singapore exercised jurisdicti on over these incidents becau se they occurred off its
coast ⎯ in other words, in the waters off Pedra Branca . It was only after the incident in 2003 that
Malaysia evidently realized the obvious implications of these actions for its belated claim to Pedra
Branca, and began to react ⎯ only in 2003.
60. I could go on in the same vein, but it is hardly necessary. The Court has all of the
relevant documents attesting to Singapore’s ac tivities on Pedra Branca in the written pleadings.
Suffice it to recall that the activities that I ha ve discussed were long-standing and they were
continuous, and they were undertaken on an open an d notorious basis, they were acts of an official
nature not private acts, and they went totally unopposed by Malaysia at least until well after
Malaysia raised a claim to the island in 1979 with the publication of its map.
2. The legal context within which conduct is to be assessed
61. Mr. President, having discussed the substance of the effectivités ⎯ and I’ve given a tour
d’horizon; obviously I haven’t walked the Court, or imposed on the Court all of the documents
attesting to the activities Singapore carried out ⎯ but having discussed the substance of the
effectivités that Singapore carried out on Pedra Branca and within its territorial waters, it may now
be useful to place the question of Singapore’s cond uct in its proper legal context. The matter, I
would submit, is really quite straightforward desp ite certain attempts by Malaysia to muddy the
waters in its written pleadings. There are five basic principles which I would respectfully invite the
Court to bear in mind in considering the significance of Singapore’s effectivités. - 27 -
(a) The requirement for both the intention and will to act as sovereign and an actual display of
such authority
62. The first principle, indeed the fundamental starting-point is the well-established principle
articulated by the Permanent Court in the Eastern Greenland case, and cited with approval in the
Court’s more recent judgments in the Indonesia/Malaysia and last month in Nicaragua v.
Honduras, that:
[slide]
“a claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title such as a treaty of
cession but merely upon continued display of authority, involves two elements each of
which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some
actual exercise or display of such authority” ( Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,
Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 45-46).
63. In other words, the Court is well aware, a State claiming title to a particular territory
must demonstrate both the animus occupandi and the corpus as well. And as the Court noted at
paragraph72 of its Judgment handed down last month in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case: “A
sovereign title may be inferred from the exercise of powers appertaining to the authority of the
State over a given territory.” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras
in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, para. 172.)
64. Singapore’s conduct fits perfectly within these legal criteria. As Mr. Brownlie explained,
Singapore’s predecessor ⎯ Great Britain ⎯ manifested the intention to acquire sovereignty over
Pedra Branca by its actions from 1847 to 1851, a nd this, by itself was sufficient to establish
Singapore’s territorial title at that time. Thereafter, as I have shown, Singapore carried out a
considerable array of State activities on the isla nd and within its territorial waters in the
maintenance and confirmation of its title. Malays ia, in contrast, has not even begun to satisfy
either criteria. Not only is there no evidence of any Malaysian intention or will to act as sovereign
over Pedra Branca, whether before 1847 or afterwar ds, there is similarly not a shred of evidence
that Malaysia ever engaged in any display of such authority on the island, on the ground, on the
disputed territory, at any time. - 28 -
(b) Singapore’s activities confirming and maintaining its prior legal title
65. This leads me to the second principle that supports the legal underpinnings to
Singapore’s case. As the Chamber of the Court observed in its oft-cited passage from the Frontier
Dispute case:
[slide]
“Where the act corresponds exactly to law, where effective administration is
additional to the uti possidetis juris , the only role of effectivité is to confirm the
exercise of the right derived from a legal title.” ( Frontier Dispute, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 586-587, para. 63.)
66. In the present case, we have a pre-existing title derived from the actions of Great Britain
on PedraBranca during the period 1847-1851. We also have thereafter the extensive and
continuous exercise of sovereign authority carried out by Singapore on the island. Singapore relies
on its conduct after 1851 not for purposes of establishi ng a legal title to the territory in dispute ⎯
that title was already established by 1851 ⎯ but rather to demonstrate that that title was maintained
and confirmed by a series of concrete activities on the ground which have lasted for over 150 years.
67. Yet even if title to Pedra Branca was somehow indeterminate as of 1851 ⎯ which
Mr.Brownlie has shown was not the case ⎯ even if that situation existed, title today would still
vest in Singapore by virtue of its subsequent St ate conduct on the island. As the Chamber also
noted in the Frontier Dispute case: “In the event that the effectivité does not co-exist with any legal
title, it must invariably be taken into consideration.” ( Frontier Dispute, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports
1986, p. 587, para. 63.)
68. In such a case, the Court would be faced w ith the same kind of situation it confronted in
the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, the Indonesia/Malaysia case, the recent Nicaragua v. Honduras
case ⎯ and as the Arbitral Tribunal in Eritrea/Yemen was confronted in the sovereignty phase of
that case ⎯ where the issue of sovereignty was decided on the basis of which party could show the
better title based on sovereign acts undertaken on the disputed territory
à titre de souverain. Here,
and ignoring for a moment Singapore’s pre-existing title established by the British Crown from
1847 to 1851, here not only did Singapore car ry out the overwhelming preponderance of
administrative activities on Pedra Branca, it performed all such activities. Indeed, neither Malaysia
nor its predecessor, Johor, has ever acted on Pedra Branca in any sovereign capacity. - 29 -
69. Now that leads me to a related argument ra ised by Malaysia in its written pleadings.
Malaysia seeks to reverse the order of things by asserting that Singapore must show, by its actions
on Pedra Branca, that this conduct somehow displaced a prior Malaysian title. Now that is an
argument essentially predicated on the notion of prescription which has no role to play in the
present case. The plain fact, as my colleague Professor Pellet has shown, is that Malaysia has not
produced a scintilla of evidence th at it possessed an historic title over Pedra Branca, the specific
territory, prior to 1847 or, indeed, at any time thereafter. Consequently, there was no pre-existing
title which Singapore’s conduct displaced.
70. Nonetheless, it is instructive, once agai n, to recall how Malaysia’s arguments have
mutated since it appeared before th is Court five years ago in the Indonesia/Malaysia case. There,
counsel for Malaysia argued during the oral proceedings with respect to its ⎯ that is Malaysia’s ⎯
own conduct in Indonesia/Malaysia:
“A title based on a peaceful and continuous display of State authority would in
international law prevail over a title of acqui sition of sovereignty not followed by an
actual display of State authority.” (CR 2002/30, pp. 35-36, para. 22).
That was Malaysia’s argument five years ago.
71. Thus, even on Malaysia’s thesis, a nd accepting purely for purposes of argument that
Malaysia could somehow show an historic title over the island, Singapore would still possess
sovereignty over Pedra Branca since Singapore has exercised continuous sovereignty over the
island while Malaysia has done nothing, even on Malaysia’s thesis advanced in the
Indonesia/Malaysia case. Fortunately, however, the Cour t does not need to engage in such
speculative reasoning or to enter into the controversial realm of prescriptive title. Singapore has
shown a title derived from the activities of the British Crown from 1847-1851, and Singapore has
also shown that it maintained that title on the groun d ever since. Malaysia, in contrast, has shown
nothing.
(c) The extent of State conduct on its territory is a function of the nature of the territory in
question
72. The third legal principle deserving mention at this stage is the principle that the degree of
State authority on the ground to establish or maintain a legal title is a function of, and must be
adapted to, the nature of the territory in question. This principle has been endorsed both by this - 30 -
Court and its predecessor, and by arbitral tribunals such as in the Island of Palmas and
Eritrea/Yemen arbitrations.
73. Pedra Branca is an important island ⎯ at least for Singapore, it is a very important
island ⎯ and the island has been the focus of a significant and well-documented series of
administrative activities emanating from Singapore ever since 1851.
74. As I have said, these activities obvious ly include the staffing, maintenance and
improvement right up to the present of the li ghthouse which Great Britain constructed between
1847 and 1851. However, as Singapore has also doc umented in its written pleadings, its exercise
of sovereignty on Pedra Branca has not been limite d to lighthouse activities alone. The island has
also hosted many other non-lightho use activities of an official character, which I have discussed
and which are documented, and it supports a number of facilities which have effectively made full
use of the island, as I think the Court will appreciate from the photograph appearing on the screen.
[slide] When the entire body of evidence of Singa pore’s administration is considered, what is, I
would suggest, truly remarkable is the breadth and the scope ⎯ the consistent pattern ⎯ of
Singapore’s public works that it carried out on this parcel of territory. Thus, not simply has
Singapore’s sovereign conduct on Pedra Branca been commensurate with the nature of the territory
in question, that conduct far exceeds what might be expected given the characteristics of the
territory in question.
(d) Singapore relies exclusively on official conduc t, not the activities of individuals in their
private capacity
75. The fourth legal element which characterizes Singapore’s conduct is that Singapore, as I
have said, relies exclusively on acts of an official nature performed by it on Pedra Branca. As the
Court has many times stated in the past, including in Qatar v. Bahrain, Indonesia/Malaysia, what
is legally relevant to questions of disputed sovereignty are official actions undertaken in a
governmental capacity, not actions of private indivi duals. Unlike Malaysia, which has been forced
to rely on statements by private fishermen who a llegedly fished in the waters around Pedra Branca,
all of the conduct that Singapore has adduced in its pleadings is of an official, governmental
character and that underscores the sovereign nature of that conduct ⎯ conduct constituting the - 31 -
exercise and display of administration and control on Pedra Branca, and within its territorial waters,
à titre de souverain.
(e) Singapore’s official conduct was specific to Pedra Branca
76. The fifth legal principle upon which Singapor e’s conduct is founded is that, in order to
be legally relevant, the conduct in question must relate to the specific territory in dispute. Again, as
the Court stated in the Indonesia/Malaysia case, and in fact reiterated at paragraph 174 of its recent
Judgment in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case:
[slide]
“The Court finally observes that it can only consider those acts as constituting a
relevant display of authority which leave no doubt as to their specific reference to the
islands in dispute as such.” (I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 682-683, para. 136.)
Specific reference to the islands.
77. In contrast to Malaysia, which cannot point to a single example of State authority it
carried out on Pedra Branca itself, the official acts on which Singapore relies are unambiguous in
their reference to the actual territory at issue in this case. Permit me to e xpand very briefly on this
point.
78. Take the legislation of the Parties ⎯ on the one hand you have legislation such as
Malaysia’s 1969 Emergency Ordinance, which essentia lly set the breadth of Malaysia’s territorial
waters, as compared to legislation enacted by Singapore and its predecessor Great Britain. While
the Malaysian 1969 Ordinance makes no reference whatsoever to PedraBranca and thus begs the
question as to what territory it relates, the rele vant legislation of Great Britain and Singapore,
including both the 1852 and 1854 Acts and the 1991 Protected Places Order, expressly refers to
Pedra Branca. Then there is the evidence relating to the staffing, maintenance and improvement of
both lighthouse and other facilities introduced by Singapore which also relates to Pedra Branca and
which is named ⎯ the island is named ⎯ in the relevant documentation. Next, there is
Singapore’s exercise of jurisdictional control over individuals visiting the island, including
Malaysian officials, which was also specific to Pedra Branca. Turning to other elements, the
Singapore marine ensign has been flown for 150 years on the island itself without eliciting any
reaction from Malaysia despite their vigorous reac tion to the exact same emblem flown on Pulau - 32 -
Pisang. And when Singapore military, government and civilian personnel trav elled to the island,
the destination of their visit was clearly stated to be Pedra Branca. Applications for permission to
undertake scientific research and other activities submitted to Singapore by third parties similarly
concerned the island itself and its territorial waters. Investigation of accidental deaths and shipping
incidents once again were either on Pedra Branca or within its territorial waters. And the collection
of meteorological information was documented as having originated from Pedra Branca which was
described by official Malaysian publications as being located “in Singapore”.
79. In short, there is no question that the evidence of Singapore’s administration and control
has related specifically to the territory in dispute ⎯ Pedra Branca. The evidence on the record
relates to concrete activities on the ground, not woolly and generalized assertions of alleged
jurisdiction over undefined areas asserted by Ma laysia. These actions leave no doubt as to which
Party considered itself to be sovereign over Pedra Branca and acted as such.
3. Malaysia’s arguments on conduct placed in perspective
80. Having set out the factual and legal frame work underlying Singapore’s conduct on Pedra
Branca, I would now like to turn to the arguments Malaysia has raised in its written pleadings in an
effort to explain away that conduct. Malaysia obviously faces quite an uphill battle in this respect
given the existence of Singapore’s constant ad ministration of Pedra Branca as compared with
Malaysia’s total inactivity on the island. Indeed, as Ms Malintoppi will discuss later this morning,
one of the striking aspects of this case is that there are absolutely no competing Malaysian activities
on the island at all ⎯ none.
81. Notwithstanding this, Malaysia has asser ted in its Reply that Singapore’s conduct is
“peripheral” to the question of title and that Si ngapore relies on what Malaysia terms “isolated acts
of conduct leaving out of account any assessment of whether the conduct referred to was part of a
pattern of routine acts of administration of the Horsburgh Lighthouse or whether it amounted to
manifestations of sovereign activity” (RM, p. 148).
82. In responding to these arguments, it is first necessary to recall once again the legal
context. - 33 -
83. As I have explained, the acts that Gr eat Britain and Singapore carried out on Pedra
Branca and within its territorial waters after 1851 we re performed clearly in a sovereign capacity.
They were clearly actions that were premised on the fact that title to Pedra Branca rested with
Singapore as a result of the lawful possession of the island from 1847 to 1851 discussed by
Mr.Brownlie. In other words, they represented a continuous display of State authority on the
territory at issue and, as such, represented the confirmation and maintenance of Singapore’s
pre-existing title.
84. In these circumstances, there is nothi ng “peripheral” about the significance of
Singapore’s conduct as Malaysia would have the Court believe. That conduct shows Singapore
consistently and actively maintaining and exercising its pre-existing title. Yet even in cases where
there is no pre-existing title, in contrast to the situation we have here where Singapore has shown
such a title, even in those cases, the question as to which party to a territorial dispute can show that
it performed effectivités on the territory in question has been tr eated by this Court, and by arbitral
tribunals, as a critical element in deciding issues of disputed title. One need only refer to the
Court’s recent cases involving questions of disputed sovereignty over small islands to appreciate
the point ⎯ the Qatar v. Bahrain case where sovereignty over the small island of Qit’atJaradah
was at issue, the Indonesia/Malaysia case which concerned the two small islands of Ligitan and
Sipadan and the recent Nicaragua v. Honduras case concerning a series of small islands lying off
the mainland coast. In none of those cases was ther e a pre-existing title of the nature we have here
with respect to the British activities from 1847 to 1851. And nor, in none of those cases ⎯
Qatar v. Bahrain, Indonesia/Malaysia, Nicaragua v. Honduras, and in fact one can go back to
Minquiers and Ecrehos as well ⎯ in none of those cases, was there the wide array of State
activities performed on the territory at issue in an y way comparable to the activities that Singapore
has carried out on Pedra Branca. Nonetheless, in all of these cases, the Court determined
sovereignty on the basis of which party could show that it had carried out administrative acts on the
disputed territory. Indeed, in the Qatar v. Bahrain and Indonesia/Malaysia cases, the Court also
held that, “The construction of na vigational aids... can be legally relevant in the case of very
small islands.” (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 100, para. 197.) - 34 -
85. In the present case, we are not dealing mere ly with the construction of navigational aids
on Pedra Branca. Both during the period 1847 to 1851, when Great Britai
n took possession of the
island, and afterwards when that title was maintained and confirmed, the acts on Pedra Branca, as I
have shown, were wide-ranging in nature and covered effectively the whole island and including its
territorial waters. These were not, to use Malaysia’s term, mere lighthouse activities.
86. But lighthouse related or not, Singapore’s conduct was precisely the kind of sovereign
conduct that any State would carry out on territory to which it held title having the characteristics
of Pedra Branca. Malaysia’s labelling of tho se activities as “routine lighthouse activities” is not
only wrong, it in no way establishes that such activities were not part of the normal exercise of
sovereign prerogatives that coastal States, incl uding Singapore, perform on their territory where
lighthouses are situated. In fact, Malaysia acknowledged as much in its own Counter-Memorial
when it stated [slide]: “The construction and administration of lighthouses was usually a matter for
the State on whose territory the lighthouse was to be located.” (CMM, p. 103.)
87. In short, Singapore’s administration of the lighthouse, as well as the non-lighthouse
activities that Singapore carried out on Pedra Bran ca, was a normal exercise of the sovereignty it
had acquired as of1851. Contrary to Malaysia’s assertion, Singapore’s conduct and its activities
were anything but isolated. Given the nature of the territory concerned they were, in fact, a
strikingly consistent pattern of State conduct encompassing a broad spectrum of administration and
control spanning a long period of time. Throughout this period, once again, I would emphasize the
fact that Malaysia never disputed Singapore’s right to exercise authority over the island, never
advanced a claim of its own, and never carried out any competing acts.
88. What are isolated, on the other hand, are the miscellaneous and wholly unimpressive
examples of Singapore conduct that Malaysia has tr ied to seize upon to bolster its contention that
somehow Singapore did not consider that it had sovereignty over the island.
89. Malaysia first refers to the 1927 Stra its Settlements and Johor Territorial Waters
Agreement, which was discussed on Tuesday. Th at agreement, when you read it carefully,
concerned the retrocession of certain small islands lying in the immediate vicinity of the main
island of Singapore to Johor. The agreement did not purport to deal with Pedra Branca, did not
deal with Pedra Branca, and is irrelevant to this case. - 35 -
90. Next, Malaysia seeks refuge in the 1946 Singapore Order in Council pursuant to which
the Settlement of Singapore was defined as includi ng the Island of Singapore and its dependencies,
as well as all other islands and places then known and administered by Singapore and its territorial
waters. At the time that that was issued, in 1946, Pedra Branca was clearly a “dependency” of
Singapore. In fact, as Mr. Brownlie noted yesterday, Pedra Branca was expressly described as such
during the ceremony for the laying of the foundation stone for the Horsburgh lighthouse as early
as 1850. And Pedra Branca was also unquestionably an island being administered by Singapore, as
I have discussed. So, far from strengthening Malaysia’s case, the 1946 Order in Council is entirely
consistent with Singapore’s position, as are th e other constitutional instruments concerning
Singapore that Malaysia has cited, in its written pleadings, dating from 1951, 1952, 1960 and 1965.
All, all of them referred to Singapore “and its dependencies” ⎯ and areas that Singapore
administered and controlled ⎯ a description which included Pedra Branca.
91. Malaysia also grasps at straws when it refers to two publicati ons issued in Singapore
which are said by Malaysia to be telling in that they did not include Pedra Branca as one of the
islands appertaining to Singapore. The first such publication is a booklet ⎯ it is really essentially
no more than a tourist publication ⎯ called Singapore Facts and Pictures. It was published by the
Singapore Ministry of Culture and had nothing to do with a legal definition of Singapore’s
territory. Nor did it concern Pedra Branca for the obvious reason that Pedra Branca had no tourist
facilities.
92. The second set of publications comprise two editions of the Annual Report of the Rural
Board of Singapore taken from 1953 ⎯ that was the year that Johor expressly disclaimed
ownership of Pedra Branca ⎯ and 1956. These, too, had nothing to do with Pedra Branca.
Singapore fully explained, in its written pleadings, that the impetus behind these publications lay in
the Rural Board’s revision of electoral boundaries in Singapore, which obviously did not concern
Pedra Branca. Even Malaysia is forced to c oncede as much when it acknowledges that the Rural
Board was not responsible for any management of lighthouses.
93. Equally unavailing is Malaysia’s reliance on a passage from J.A.L. Pavitt’s book, First
Pharos of the Eastern Seas: Horsburgh Lighthouse, published in 1966. Pavitt says nothing to
suggest that Pedra Branca did not belong to Singapore. The only passage which Malaysia has tried - 36 -
to hang its argument on is a single sentence where Pavitt described the lighthouse on Pedra Branca
as an “outlying station” in the South China Sea, which geographically it was. But by no account
does this mean that Singapore did not possess or exercise sovereignty over the island. And I would
suggest that what is more directly relevant is th e written note prepared by one of Pavitt’s assistants
on Pavitt’s behalf one year later, in 1967 ⎯ which is also at tab 35 and the relevant part is on the
screen ⎯ in which the author, Pavitt’s assistant, states:
[slide]
“I have nothing to add... except to state that in addition to the waters
immediately surrounding Singapore, I ha ve been advised that the waters
within3miles of Horsburgh Lighthouse (at the eastern entrance to the Singapore
Strait) may be considered to be Singapore waters.” (CMS, Ann. 42).
94. Obviously, if the waters around Pedra Branca were considered to be Singapore waters,
that necessarily implied that the island itself belonged to Singapore. Equally obviously, none of the
sparse pickings referred to by Malaysia even remotely begins to counteract the long and unimpeded
pattern of State conduct that Singapore carried out on Pedra Branca. And none of them bears any
resemblance to Malaysia’s own conduct ⎯ or, more accurately, its lack of conduct ⎯ relating to
Pedra Branca which, as my colleagues will show, included the famous express disclaimer of
ownership over Pedra Branca and a series of offici al Malaysian maps specifically attributing Pedra
Branca to Singapore.
Conclusions
95. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I have taken the Court through the factual and
legal elements which demonstrate that Singapore has actively and continuously maintained up to
the present the sovereignty it acquired over Pedra Branca during the period 1847-1851. It has done
so by concrete actions undertaken à titre de souverain on the ground. I would suggest that the
evidence is compelling, it is consistent, and the fact s stand unrebutted. It also comports with the
standard articulated recently in the Nicaragua v. Honduras Judgment at paragraph 175, that what is
relevant is evidence of sovereign activities which “cover a considerable period of time and show a
pattern revealing an intention to exercise State functions” ( Territorial and Maritime Dispute
between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment
of 8 October 2007). And that is what Singapore’s conduct does. - 37 -
96. In the final analysis, Malaysia would have the Court find that a party that can show no
basis of title to the territory in dispute ⎯ whether a so-called “historic title” or otherwise ⎯, which
has not carried out a single act, a single sovereign act on the territory at any time, which has
let130years of unimpeded administration by its neighbour go unprotested and unopposed, which
disclaimed any ownership of the territory in question in official correspondence, and which
published a series of official maps showing the island as belonging to its neighbour, Malaysia
would have this Court believe that that party has a better title than the party which established
sovereignty over the territory by official government acts on the territory in question, and then
maintained that title through a constant stream of administration and control on the actual territory
in dispute for over a century and a half thereafter. And to put it mildly, that proposition is
manifestly unsound.
97. Mr. President, that concludes my presentation. I am grateful to the Court for its attention
and patience. Perhaps this would be a good tim e for the coffee break, after which I would be
grateful if you would call upon Ms Malintoppi to continue Singapore’s presentation. Thank you.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I thank you for your arguments, Mr. Bundy.
We will now take our customary break and in ten minutes’ time when we resume I shall call
on Ms Malintopppi.
The Court adjourned from 11.25 to 11.40 a.m.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. Ms Malintoppi, you have the
floor.
Ms MALINTOPPI: Thank you, Mr. President, Me mbers of the Court. It is an honour and a
privilege to appear before you again and to represent Singapore in these proceedings.
THE ABSENCE OF M ALAYSIAN EFFECTIVITÉS
1. In his first speech, my friend and colleagueProfessorPellet demonstrated that Malaysia
has been unable to produce any evidence of an orig inal title held by Johor over Pedra Branca, or
any evidence of sovereign acts carried out on the island prior to 1847. For my part, I will show - 38 -
how Malaysia never conducted any acts of administration and control ⎯ or effectivités ⎯ on Pedra
Branca at any time after Great Britain had acquired title over the island in the period 1847 to 1851.
2. The fact that Malaysia cannot point to a single act of administration and control over the
disputed territory, Pedra Branca, represents a f undamental defect in its case. The absence of any
Malaysian effectivités on Pedra Branca also stands in stark contrast to the acts of the British Crown
in taking possession of the island discussed by Mr. Brownlie yesterday, and the evidence reviewed
earlier today by Mr.Bundy demonstrating the manner in which Great Britain and Singapore
thereafter confirmed and maintained that title by conduct undertaken à titre de souverain on the
ground.
3. In trying to overcome this problem, Mala ysia has been faced with a dilemma which
resulted in an inconsistent and equivocal approach in its written pleadings.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Madam, may I ask you to slow down a little bit
for the sake of the interpreters.
Ms MALINTOPPI: I shall.
4. On the one hand, Malaysia asserted in its Memorial that it “had no need actively to assert
its title” to Pedra Branca because it possessed an alleged “original title” (MM, p.117, para.269).
In its Counter-Memorial, Malaysia e xpanded on this reasoning by citing the Meerauge arbitration
as authority for the proposition that its possession of Pedra Branca had lasted for so long that it is
impossible to provide evidence of a different situation (CMM, p. 13, para. 21).
5. On the other hand, Malaysia clearly realizes the extent of its predicament, and the fact that
the Court has always required evidence of an actual display of sovereignty on the ground to support
a claim of title, because it still feels it necessary to invoke what it terms “assertions of sovereignty”
which are said to constitute proof of Malaysia’s view that Pedra Branca was regarded as Malaysian
territory, and which are alleged to be confirmatory of its historic title. As I shall show, in actual
fact, the acts in question ⎯ which are enthusiastically referred to as “numerous examples” by
Malaysia ⎯ are nothing more than a handful of episod es, all irrelevant, as they concern matters
having nothing to do with conduct carried out à titre de souverain on the actual territory in dispute. - 39 -
6. Malaysia’s Memorial identified four examples of Malaysian conduct which Malaysia
contends confirm its claim. These were: (i) an internal 1968 letter of the Malaysian navy attaching
two naval charts showing Malays ian territorial waters; (ii) a 1968 Petroleum Agreement between
the Government of Malaysia and Continental Oil Company of Malaysia; (iii) the establishment of
the breadth of Malaysia’s territorial sea, and, (iv) the 1969 Indonesia-Malaysia Continental Shelf
Agreement (MM, p.117, para .269). In its Counter-Memoria l, Malaysia grouped these items
together under the rubric of a so-called practi ce in the “maritime context” (CMM, pp.262-263,
paras.555-556). In addition, it ventured to add two more examples to those already mentioned:
First, the use of the waters around Pedra Bran ca by Johor fishermen, and second, the alleged
patrolling of the waters around Pedra Branca by the Royal Malaysian Navy (CMM, pp.240-260,
paras. 515-549).
7. With your permission, Mr.President, I shall focus on each of the elements relied on by
Malaysia in order to show that none of them individually, or taken together, are capable of
confirming an original title over Pedra Branca, even assuming arguendo that such title existed in
the first place, which ⎯ as Singapore has shown ⎯ is not the case.
1. The 1968 letter by Commodore K. Thanabalasingham and attached naval charts
8. Let me start with the so-called “Le tter of Promulgation” of 16July 1968 by
CommodoreK.Thanabalasingham of the Royal Ma laysian Navy. This document was submitted
by Malaysia as Annex 76 to its Memorial, while the charts attached to it were not reproduced in the
same annex, but as maps 20 and 25 of Malaysia’s Memorial Atlas. This internal and confidential
letter ⎯ which is now on the screen ⎯ read as follows:
“1. The attached chartlets showing th e outer limits of Malaysian Territorial
Waters and foreign claimed waters in West Malaysia are promulgated for the
information of Senior and Commanding Officers.
2. As can be seen, there are certain areas in which these limits have never been
properly determined or negotiated and those promulgated are basically a determination
with strict regard to the 1958 Geneva Convention.
3. Strict attention is to be paid tothe Notes on certain chartlets which are also
reproduced after the Index.” - 40 -
9. This document and its attachments call for a number of comments. First, the title of the
letter is a misnomer: when something is “promulg ated”, it is ordinarily made known publicly and
officially, but this was ⎯ by Malaysia’s own admission ⎯ an internal and confidential letter,
intended only “for the information of Senior a nd Commanding Officers”. Singapore never saw it,
something particularly striking in light of the fact that there was no shortage of opportunities during
the negotiations between the Parties to raise this poi nt. Therefore, the position raised in this letter
and the charts were never advanced by Malaysia as a formal claim and Singapore never had an
opportunity to challenge the contents of this letter and its attachments.
10. Malaysia contends that the fact that these were internal documents adds to their “weight
and veracity”. However, this argument misses the point. The point worth emphasizing is that
Commodore Thanabalasingham’s letter is an internal letter from the Chief of the Malaysian navy to
his own officers. In other words, these were documents produced for internal Malaysian
consumption and were never made known to Singapore. As such, they represent, at most, the view
of just one department, a view which is also inconsistent with the conduct of the Malaysian
Government as a whole. As the Court will recall, the same year when the letter was written, 1968,
Malaysia demanded that Singapore stop flying the Singapore ensign at the Pulau Pisang lighthouse.
However, no similar request was made in relation to Pedra Branca. As also discussed by Singapore
in its written pleadings, well after 1968, Malaysia continued to recognize Singapore’s sovereignty
over Pedra Branca through the actions of its mapping agency and other official conduct.
11. Moreover, the so-called “Letter of Promul gation” specifies that the limits shown on the
charts “are basically a determination with st rict regard to the 1958Geneva Convention”.
Therefore, at most, this document represented an interpretation of that Convention by the then
Chief of the Malaysian navy for internal use, nothing more. As stated by the Arbitral Tribunal in
the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration
“internal memoranda do not necessarily represent the view or policy of any
government, and may be no more than the personal view that one civil servant felt
moved to express to another particular civil servant at that moment” (Award, Phase
One, 9 October 1998, p. 28, para. 94).
12. This is more than enough to show that these documents lack any probative value with
respect to Malaysia’s putative claim of title. - 41 -
13. As for the author of the letter ⎯ Rear-Admiral Thanabalasingham, as he now is ⎯ he
makes the following observation in his affidavit which was filed as Annex4 of Malaysia’s
Counter-Memorial:
“As I examine this chart today [map 25 in Malaysia’s atlas] and read the
accompanying notes, 36years after I issued the Letter of Promulgation, I am quite
clear that, in 1968, we had no doubt that Pulau Batu Puteh (as well as Middle Rocks
and South Ledge) were Malaysian territory.”
14. In its Reply, Singapore responded to this statement, and recalled the similarity between
this situation and the Court’s ruling on a similar matter in the Nicaragua case. As in Nicaragua ,
the testimony of Rear-Admiral Thanabalasingham is simply the expression of an opinion, or, to
borrow the words of the Court, the “mere personal and subjective evaluation of a possibility, which
has yet to be shown to correspond to a fact”. In other words, it is “not proof in itself”, and ⎯ I
would add ⎯ cannot replace contemporary evidence ( Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1986, p. 42, para. 68). As held by the Court in the Congo v. Uganda case: “The Court will treat
with caution evidentiary materials specially prepar ed for this case and also materials emanating
from a single source.” ( Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 201, para. 61.)
15. This statement was also cited with approval by the Court in the Genocide case
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Judgment of 26 February 2007, para. 213).
16. In the present instance, the Rear-Admiral’s statement is not only not contemporaneous,
for it is rendered 36 years after the facts on which he testifies, it is also not supported by the
contemporaneous factual context. As Singapore has shown, there is no evidence on the record that
Malaysia ever expressed the intent to act as sovereign over Pedra Branca or that it ever carried out
any acts of sovereignty on the island itself. Neither the 1968 Letter of Promulgation and its
attached chartlets, nor Rear-Admiral Thanabalasingham’s affidavit changes this picture. - 42 -
2. The 1968 Petroleum Agreement between the Government of Malaysia
and Continental Oil Company of Malaysia
17. Malaysia also relies on the grant of an offshore petroleum agreement on 16 April 1968 to
the Continental Oil Company of Malaysia (“Continental”) as evidence of Malaysia’s so-called
appreciation that the concession area encompassed Pedra Branca and, as such, constituted State
conduct on the part of Malaysia which was made public and not protested by Singapore. I will
respond to these allegations in turn. For ease of reference, the Members of the Court will find a
copy of the agreement at tab 36 of the judges’ folder.
18. The map which is now on the screen is a reproduction of map 37 of Malaysia’s map atlas
depicting the Continental licence area. This is also at tab 36 of the judges’ folder. The first thing
to note about this map is that it does not show Pedra Branca. This is not surprising, given that the
Petroleum Agreement expressly excluded from th e concession area islands and international
boundaries “wherever they may be established” (M M, Ann.110, p.31; see, also, MM, p.119,
para. 274) [place relevant quote on screen]. As Si ngapore pointed out in its Counter-Memorial, it
is obvious that this petroleum agreement was without prejudice to the question of boundaries and
the sovereignty of islands located where no boundaries had been agreed.
19. In its Reply, Malaysia accuses Singapore of failing to address the fact that the “area of
uncertainty” south of the concession was “precisely de fined” by one of the charts attached to the
Letter of Promulgation I discussed earlier (RM, p. 168, para.356). In other words, Malaysia is
blaming Singapore for failing to interpret the 1968 Petroleum Agreement through a chart attached
to a totally unrelated, and unpublished, internal Malaysian letter. Howeve r, there is no relation
between the concession and the letter and there is no attempt on the part of Malaysia to show any
other than through an artificial connection with the so-called “contemporaneous conduct of
Malaysia” which is said to evidence Malaysia’s “appreciation of sovereignty over this area”.
However, a claim to title requires more than vague presumptions. At the very minimum, Malaysia
must show some actual exercise or display of State authority over Pedra Branca itself, and this it
has not done.
20. It should also be noted that the co-ordinates of the concession were never made public, as
Malaysia itself admits (RM, p.169, para.359), and no exploration was ever carried out on Pedra
Branca or within its territorial waters. It is also significant that Malaysia’s written pleadings - 43 -
ignored the fact, which was documented in Singapore’s Counter-Memorial, that, only a few years
after the agreement was signed, Continental relinquished a large portion of its concession including
the whole area in the vicinity of Pedra Branca (CMS, Ann. 47). The result can be seen on the map
appearing on the screen, which was produced by Singapore as Annex 47 of its Counter-Memorial
and is also included at tab 36 of the judges’ fo lder. In these circumstan ces, what was there for
Singapore to protest?
21. As recalled by Singapore in its Counter-Memorial (pp.169-170, para.6.86), in the
Indonesia/Malaysia case— Sovereignty over PulauLigitan and PulauSipadan — Malaysia’s
position on similar issues relating to oil concession activities was very different from the stance it
adopts in this case. In the former case, Malaysia stressed the fact that the concessions in question
did not encompass the disputed islands and were thus irrelevant for questions of sovereignty, had
no bearing on sovereignty. The Court’s Judgm ent summarized Malaysia’s position in the
following terms:
“For its part, Malaysia notes that the oil concessions in the 1960s did not
concern territorial delimitation and that the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan were never
included in the concession perimeters. It adds that ‘[n]o activity pursuant to the
Indonesian concessions had any relation to the islands’.” ( Sovereignty over Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002,
p. 664, para. 78.)
Consequently, the Court held that it could not “draw any conclusion... from the practice of the
Parties in awarding oil concessions” (ibid., p. 664, para. 79).
22. In the light of the facts in this case, the same reasoning applies here with regard to the
Continental oil concession: no conclusions can be drawn from the granting of the concession for
purposes of determining sovereignty over Pedra Branca since the concession did not include the
island. The concession agreement recognized that boundaries remained to be determined, and a
large part of the concession area, including th e area in the vicinity of Pedra Branca, was
relinquished shortly after it was granted.
3. Malaysia’s arguments based on the breadth of its territorial sea
23. Let me now turn to Malaysia’s arguments based on the breadth of its territorial sea in the
vicinity of Pedra Branca. In this connection, Malaysia relies on the Emergency (Essential Powers) - 44 -
Ordinance of 1969— recalled by Mr.Bundy earlier— which it enacted in order to extend its
territorial waters from three to 12 nautical miles. This Ordinance is mentioned by Malaysia in an
attempt to show that it thereby extended its terr itorial waters “to and be yond” Pedra Branca (MM,
p. 123, para. 279; RM, p. 169, para. 360). However, the legislation in question does nothing of the
sort.
24. The Ordinance does no more than indicate the methodology which Malaysia intended to
adopt in subsequently negotiating the delimitation of its territorial sea. As can be seen from the
text of Section 12, paragraph 1, of the Ordinance ⎯ which is Annex 114 of Singapore’s Memorial
and Annex111 of Ma laysia’s Memorial ⎯ the language essentially repeats the provisions of the
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of 1958. There is no reference at
all to Pedra Branca or to questions of sovereignt y, and no public map was ever issued showing
Malaysia’s territorial waters as encompassing the waters around Pedra Branca until, arguably,
Malaysia’s continental shelf map was produced in 1979.
25. In its Reply, Malaysia accuses Singapore of failing to mention that Section3 of the
Ordinance made an express renvoi to certain Articles of the 195 8 Geneva Convention including in
particular Article 12 (RM, pp. 170-171, paras. 362-364). As the Court will be aware, this provision
provides that ⎯ in the absence of agreement ⎯ States with opposite or adjacent coasts are not
entitled to extend their territorial seas beyond the median line. Malaysia further notes that
Section6 of the Ordinance constitutes a variation from Article12 to the extent that it stipulates
that ⎯ in the event of an agreement with another coastal State ⎯ Malaysia may modify by order
the areas of its territorial waters. With a remarkable leap of logic, Malaysia then claims that this
legislation provides support for its contention that Pedra Branca fell within Malaysia’s territorial
waters.
26. Frankly, it is difficult to follow Malaysia’s reasoning. Even when reference is made to
Section3 of the Ordinance and to the 1958Geneva Convention, Mala ysia’s case is not furthered.
The drawing of a median line clearly depends on the base points used for that purpose. Malaysia’s
Ordinance did not suggest that any such base points were situated on Pedra Branca or that Malaysia
possessed a territorial sea around the island. There is nothing in the 1969Ordinance relating to
sovereignty and no reference to Pedra Branca and its related features. The Ordinance might have - 45 -
represented the expression of Malaysia’s intention with regard to how it would approach future
territorial sea delimitations. However, the fact of the matter is that the Ordinance does not provide
for any delimitation, nor does it make any mention of Pedra Branca. In short, the Ordinance
contains nothing that Singapore might have found ob jectionable or that might have given rise to a
need to protest. What is significant on the other hand is that when there was cause to object, in
other words when Malaysia finally did publish a map in 1979 depicting the outer limits of its
territorial waters and continental shelf and its intentions became clear, then Singapore promptly
protested.
4. The 1969 Indonesia-Malaysia Continental Shelf Agreement
27. Likewise, the Indonesia-Malaysia Contin ental Shelf Agreement of 1969 called for no
reaction on the part of Singapore. As a bila teral agreement, the 1969Agreement was without
prejudice to the rights of third States. Moreove r, as can be seen from the enlargement of the
relevant area of the sketch-map now on the scree n, and under tab37 of the folders, the agreed
delimitation line stayed well clear of Pedra Bran ca as confirmed by the co-ordinates listed in
Article I, Section B, and depicted on the map.
28. Had Pedra Branca played any role in this delimitation as fa lling under Malaysia’s
jurisdiction, it would presumably have had some effect on the delimitation. However, there is no
evidence whatsoever that Pedra Branca was taken into account. In such ci rcumstances, what was
there for Singapore to object to?
5. The use of the waters around Pedra Branca by Johor fishermen
29. Malaysia also contends that the wate rs around Pedra Branca were traditional fishing
grounds of Johor fishermen. In its Counter-Mem orial, it provided the affidavits of two local
fishermen to that effect (CMM, Anns. 5 and 6) and in its Reply Malaysia added that the Oräng-laut
also fished in Pedra Branca’s waters (p. 132, para. 262).
30. The first comment to make in this respec t is that these two statements only represent
subjective, personal opinions regarding a certain st ate of things. Moreover, they are drafted in
vague and general terms: only one of them specifically refers to isolated landings on Pedra Branca
(CMM, Affidavit of SabanBinAhmad, Ann.6), while the other merely mentions, without any - 46 -
details, that the lighthouse keepers were known to provide occasional shelter to fishermen (CMM,
Affidavit of Idris Bin Yusof, Ann. 5, p. 4).
31. In any event, the views expressed in these affidavits as to the fishing practices of Johor
fishermen do not support Malaysia’s case since, even admitting that such practices were of the kind
described in the affidavits, the fact that Johor fishermen may have occasionally used the waters
around Pedra Branca as fishing grounds, as did fishermen from Singapore and other countries, is
not capable in itself of establishing or confir ming sovereign title. Malaysia recognizes as much
when it concedes at paragraph530 of its Counter-Memorial that “these are private acts” and not
evidence of “conduct à titre de souverain by Malaysia”.
32. What is striking, on the other hand, is the total absence of any evidence of Malaysian
State activity relating to Pedra Branca, such as fi shing legislation referring to Pedra Branca or any
regulation of fisheries or enforcement activities in Pedra Branca’s waters. Indeed, there is nothing
in this case resembling any form of administrative or legislative control, not even the kind of
licensing of activities related to fishing in the disputed islands that were carried out by Honduras in
the recent Nicaragua v. Honduras case (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras) , Judgment of 8October2007,
paras.190-198) and which was held by this Court to represent “a display, albeit modest, of the
exercise of authority” (ibid., para. 196). In short, there is no evidence on the record of any exercise
of authority undertaken by the Malaysian Govern ment with respect to the actual territory in
dispute.
33. In this connection, the observa tion of the Court in the case concerning Sovereignty over
Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) relied on again by this Court in the
Nicaragua v. Honduras Judgment of last month ( Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras) , Judgment of
8 October 2007, para. 194) is very relevant. As the Court stated: “activities by private persons, . . .
‘cannot be seen as effectivités if they do not take place on the basis of official regulations or under
governmental authority’ (Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 683, para. 140)”. - 47 -
34. Likewise, in the present case, the recen t and limited private activities to which the
witness statements produced by Malaysia refer, even if taken at face value, cannot even begin to
prove the existence of Johor or Malaysian title.
6. The alleged patrols of the waters around Pedra Branca by the Royal Malaysian Navy
35. Finally, with respect to Malaysia’s ar guments concerning the alleged patrolling of the
waters around Pedra Branca by Malaysian vessels, they also do not assist Malaysia in advancing its
case, particularly since these arguments are en tirely based on Rear-AdmiralThanabalasingham’s
affidavit (CMM, Ann. 4), representing his own personal evaluation, and nothing else.
36. As Malaysia acknowledges, Singapore did not formally establish its own navy until 1975
and was therefore not in a position to patrol the waters off Pedra Branca independently until then
(RM, p.250, para.537). Malaysia also recognizes that it continued to “have some responsibility
for the defence of Singapore under the Separation Agreement of 1965”. The fact of the matter is
that for a number of years the Parties continued to co-operate very closely on coastal defence, so
much so that their activities were referred to as being “indivisible” in a joint communiqué of
June 1968 (RS, Anns. 37, 38 and 39).
37. As recalled in Malaysia’s Counter-Memorial (CMM, p.249, para.536) and in the
affidavit (CMM, Ann.4, paras.11-15), vessels of the Malayan Naval Force, then the Royal
Malayan Navy, and subsequently of the Royal Malaysian Navy, were based in Singapore for
almost 50years, until 1997. Given this situation, there is nothing extraordinary in the fact that
Malaysian vessels may have transited in the vicini ty of Pedra Branca on their way to or from the
base in Singapore, and nothing in the documents pr oduced by Malaysia shows that these transits
could be appropriately termed as formal “patrols”, or that they had any direct relationship with
Pedra Branca and related features. In short, Ma laysia’s alleged “patrols” do not provide any
evidence of Malaysian sovereignty over Pedra Branca itself. By contrast, as recalled by
Mr.Bundy, for 28years the Singapore navy routinely undertook specific enforcement actions in
pre-designated areas just off Pedra Branca (RS, A nn.50), and such official activities raised no
protest from Malaysia until 2003. - 48 -
38. It is also in this context that R ear-Admiral Thanabalasingham’s affidavit in his
recollection of his landing at Pedra Branca in 1962 mu st be viewed. Five years prior to that date,
the Federation of Malaya had concluded a security agreement with Great Britain ⎯ the
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agre ement of 12October1957 ⎯ which provided for the protection of
British territories in the Far East, including Singa pore. Even admitting that the episode recounted
by Rear-Admiral Thanabalasingham could amount to “patrolling” around Pedra Branca’s waters,
which is difficult to accept, at the time of these ev ents the Royal Malayan Navy had an obligation
to protect Singapore’s waters under the Anglo-Ma layan Defence Agreement. There was therefore
nothing particularly noteworthy about this episode, which would have called the attention of the
lighthouse keeper at the time and which could have triggered a protest from Singapore. In contrast,
what is significant is that Rear-Admiral Thanabalasingham never protested the flying of
Singapore’s ensign on Pedra Branca. This could not have escaped his attention any more than the
exact same ensign that flew over the lighthouse on Pulau Pisang, which Malaysia protested, as
Mr. Bundy recalled earlier.
39. A pertinent example of the lack of speci ficity of the evidence filed by Malaysia is
provided by two documents relating to a survey carried out by a ship of the British Royal Navy,
HMS Dampier, in 1967. These documents consist of a letter of request for the survey together with
an attachment, which is entitled “Details of Surveys in West Malaysia: March to May 1967” and a
survey fair sheet (attachments 6 and 7 to Rear-Admiral Thanabalasingham’s affidavit).
40. In the details of the survey provided in th e attachment to the letter, there is no reference
whatsoever to areas in the vicinity of Pedra Branca. In fact, the points mentioned in this document
are situated along the Malaysian coast and do not concern any area of sea near Pedra Branca.
Clearly, this is not a request for permission to survey the area around the island, and the fact that a
vessel of the British Royal Navy, HMS Dampier, subsequently surveyed the waters around Pedra
Branca, is no proof whatsoever that permission to conduct the survey was sought and obtained, and
shows nothing regarding Malaysia’s current claim to sovereignty over the island. At the time, as
the Court will recall, vessels of the British fleet which were based in Singapore were frequently
transiting and monitoring Singapore’s waters, as part of their mission. - 49 -
Conclusions
41. In conclusion, none of the activities adduced by Malaysia as confirmatory of a presumed
original title amounts to an act undertaken à titre de souverain on the actual territory in dispute ⎯
Pedra Branca and related features.
⎯ Not the undisclosed 1968 letter by the then CommodoreThanabalasingham and its attached
naval charts, for they were internal and confid ential and they lack the necessary legal force to
establish title or displace Singapore’s sovereign title.
⎯ Not the 1968 Petroleum Agreement between Ma laysia and Continental, for no legal
conclusions can be drawn from the granting of an oil concession that expressly excluded all
islands in the area, recognized that boundaries still had to be determined, and with respect to
which no exploration was ever carried out and which was relinquished shortly after the
agreement was signed.
⎯ Not the 1969 Ordinance concerning the extension of Malaysia’s territorial sea because the
Ordinance did nothing more than enunciate th e methodology for future delimitations without
identifying the areas which Malaysia considered to comprise its territorial sea, and did not
mention Pedra Branca at all.
⎯ Not the 1969 Indonesia-Malaysia Continental Shelf Agreement because it was res inter alios as
far as Singapore was concerned and because in any event it avoided the area around Pedra
Branca.
⎯ Not the sporadic and non-exclusive fishing by J ohor fishermen, for these activities are entirely
of a private nature and have not been carried out on the basis of official regulations or
legislation which might represent a display of authority over Pedra Branca.
⎯ And finally, not the alleged patrols of the wa ters around Pedra Branca by Malaysian vessels,
for there is no evidence of actual patrolling demons trating that Malaysia considered that Pedra
Branca and related features were under its sovereignty.
42. At the end of the day, Mr.President, Members of the Court, Malaysia’s conduct is
fundamentally different from that of Singapore. Singapore has shown that its sovereignty over
Pedra Branca was established by the taking of possession of the island in 1847-1851, and that
Singapore’s title was confirmed and maintained th ereafter throughout formal acts of a sovereign - 50 -
nature, consistently carried ouon the ground, and which have been expressly and implicitly
recognized by Malaysia’s own conduct.
43. In contrast, there are no competing activities of a similar nature on the part of Malaysia.
The fragmented and vague activities that Malaysia adduces to support its claim are so remarkably
thin and unpersuasive that they do not rise to the level of effectivités on Pedra Branca, and cannot,
a fortiori, be confirmatory of any title to the island.
44. When all is said and done, the questionas to which Party possesses sovereignty over
Pedra Branca hinges on an assessment of the evid ence showing the acquisition of sovereignty and
the exercise of State functions on the ground. In the light of the facts of this case, the conclusion
must be that Pedra Branca is, and has been, at all relevant times, subject to the territorial
sovereignty of Singapore.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, this c oncludes my presentation. I thank you for your
attention and I would be grateful if you could give the floor to Professor Pellet.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you very much, MsMalintoppi. I now
give the floor to Professor Pellet.
M. PELLET : Thank you very much Mr. President.
LA RECONNAISSANCE PAR LA M ALAISIE DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ
DE SINGAPOUR SUR P EDRA BRANCA
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, la deuxièm⎯je le crains pour vous pas la
dernière ⎯ plaidoirie que j’ai l’honneur de présentr au nom de Singapour va me conduire à
revenir sur les différentes circonstances dans les quelles la Malaisie a reconnu la souveraineté de
Singapour sur Pedra Branca, à la fois par des condu ites positives et par son silence. Il va s’agir
d’un tour d’horizon général, mais je précise d’emblée que je n’évoquerai ce matin, ni les cartes qui
témoignent aussi de cette reconnaissance comme le montrera Loretta Malintoppi, ni le Straits
Lights System , dont Rodman Bundy établira la signifi cation juridique, ni la si importante
déclaration par laquelle Johor a expressément renoncé, en1953, à toute prétention sur Pedra
Branca. Nous reviendrons sur ces aspects particu liers demain matin. Mais il est important de
garder à l’esprit que tout ceci forme un tou⎯ une pattern pour emprunter un mot anglais qui - 51 -
montre particulièrement bien ce dont il s’agit ⎯ une pattern de conduites cohérentes, qui se
confortent mutuellement, et établissent sans cont estation possible que ni la Malaisie, ni son
prédécesseur Johor, n’ont jamais éprouvé le moi ndre doute quant à la souveraineté de Singapour
sur l’île que revendique aujourd’hui la Partie ma laisienne, en contraste flagrant avec sa conduite
passée.
2. Ceci étant, Monsieur le président, je dois avouer mon embarras : nous avons, dans toutes
nos plaidoiries écrites, longuement insisté sur ce tte reconnaissance par la Malaisie, par action ou
1
par omission, de la souveraineté de Singapour sur Pedra Branca . A la brève exception de
quelques paragraphes de son contre-mémoire 2, la Partie malaisienne s’est constamment bien gardée
de réfuter cette argumentation, pourtant précise et claire. Sans doute faut-il voir dans ce «refus
d’obstacle» une nouvelle forme de reconnaissance par la Malaisie, «procédurale» cette fois, de la
souveraineté de Singapour.
3. Dans ces conditions, il pourrait suffire, Messi eurs de la Cour, de vous renvoyer à ce que
Singapour a dit sur ce point dans ses écritures. Malheureusement, il nous a semblé impossible de
vous épargner complètement cette plaidoirie : passer sous silence les reconnaissances expresses ou
tacites de la souveraineté singapourienne sur Pe dra Branca par la Malaisie conduirait à donner une
image incomplète et tronquée de l’affaire ⎯ car tout s’enchaîne, Monsieur le président :
⎯ Singapour a pris possession de l’île (auparavant terra nullius) durant la période 1847-1851 ;
⎯ depuis lors, elle l’a constamment occupée et y a exercé de nombreuses activités diversifiées, à
titre de souverain ;
⎯ ces effectivités contrastent, de manière frappante, avec l’absence totale de toute présence
malaisienne officielle, comme Loretta Malintoppi vient de le montrer ;
⎯ mais cette «ineffectivité» est parfaitement c onsistante avec, et la renonciation expresse de
Johor (disclaimer) à tout titre sur Pedra Branca en 1953, et toute la série de reconnaissances
expresses ou implicites de la souveraineté de Singapour, sur lesquelles la Malaisie refuse
obstinément de s’exprimer.
1
Voir notamment, MS, p. 139-154 et p. 160 ; CMS, p. 156-163 ou 172-173 ; ou RS, p. 187-213 et p. 218-219.
2CMM, p. 92, par 185, et p. 227-234, par. 485-500. - 52 -
I. Les reconnaissances implicites
4. Monsieur le président, à plusieurs repri ses, la Malaisie —pour reprendre le passage
célèbre de la Cour dans l’affaire du Temple — «n’a pas réagi à une circonstance qui appelait une
réaction tendant à affirmer ou à conserver un titr e de souveraineté en face d’une prétention
contraire évidente» ( Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge cT .haïlande), fond, arrêt ,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 31). Ce faisant, elle a acquiescé à l’exercice par Singapour des prérogatives
découlant de sa souveraineté sur Pedra Branca. Or, selon les termes de la Chambre de la Cour dans
l’affaire du Golfe du Maine , «l’acquiescement équiv[aut] à une reconnaissance tacite manifestée
par un comportement unilatéral que l’autre par tie peut interpréter comme un consentement»
(Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis
d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 305, par 130).
5. En réalité, comme Rodman Bundy l’a m ontré, les activités de Singapour «à titre de
souverain» ont été constantes et continues; le s ilence gardé par la Malaisie (et son prédécesseur)
face à ces activités l’a été tout autant : ni Johor, ni la Malaisie n’ont protesté contre elles avant la
naissance du différend, ni même, à vrai dire, durant les dix années qui ont suivi la publication de la
carte de 1979.
6. Ce n’est en effet qu’en 1989 que, pour la première fois, la Malaisie a adressé à Singapour
une note formelle de protestation contre une activ ité de celui-ci: il s’agissait de l’implantation à
PedraBranca d’un radar venant compléter le syst ème de régulation du trafic maritime déjà établi
sur l’île3. Auparavant : rien, si ce n’est une remarque faite en passant au sujet du refoulement de
deux fonctionnaires du service géographique de Mala isie occidentale se présentant à Pedra Branca
pour procéder à des mesures de triangulation 4. Cette remarque fut faite au cours d’un entretien qui
eut lieu en 1978 à la demande d’un conseiller du haut Commissariat de Singapour à
Kuala-Lumpur 5.
o
7. Aucune réaction de Johor, par ex emple, suite à l’adoption de l’acte n VI de 1852 du
6
gouvernement de l’Inde , qui consacra l’intégration du phare Horsburgh dans le système juridique
3MS, annexe 164, note EC 60/89 du 14 juillet 1989.
4
MS, p. 112, par 6.63 ; CMM, p. 204-205, par. 424-425 ; RS, p. 154-155, par 4.146.
5Voir CMM, annexe 45 ; RS, annexe 51.
6Voir MS, annexe 59. - 53 -
colonial britannique , ou à celle, en 1854, de l’acte n o XIII , qui renforça la compétence du
9
gouvernement de l’Inde à cet égard , M. Bundy en a parlé tout à l’heure. Rien non plus, en 1883,
10
lorsque que la jetée fut renforcée et un petit embarcadère construit ; ni en 1902, lorsque les
équipements portuaires furent réaménagés 11. Pas davantage de réaction de la Malaisie lorsque,
en1977, Singapour a installé sur l’île un équi pement lourd de communications militaires.
Pourtant, cette activité, de puissance publique par excellence, a nécessité l’intervention, qui ne
pouvait passer inaperçue, d’un hélicoptère militaire, non seulement au moment de la construction
elle-même, mais aussi après l’installation de la station-relais, en vue de sa maintenance 12. Et ce
silence est d’autant plus parlant que la construc tion de la station a été faite deux ans avant la
publication de la carte de 1979 et qu’il a persisté dans les années qui ont suivi.
8. La même remarque s’impose au sujet du silence gardé par Kuala-Lumpur lorsque
Singapour a lancé, en 1978, un appel d’offres en vue de la récupération ou de la poldérisation
13
(après tout, nous sommes aux Pays-Bas…) de zones marines autour de Pedra Branca : cela aussi
a été fait ouvertement ; ceci aussi concerne, à l’évidence, l’île elle-même et les eaux adjacentes, et
non le phare; et ceci s’est produit peu avant la première revendication de la Malaisie sur
Pedra Branca ⎯c’est-à-dire à un moment où l’on aurait pu s’attendre à ce qu’elle soit
particulièrement attentive à faire valoir ses prétendus droits.
9. Il en va de même, par exemple, s’agissant du silence observé par la Malaisie à l’occasion
de l’adoption du communiqué tripartite du 16 novembre 1971 sur le régime des détroits de Malacca
14
et de Singapour ou de la résolution 375 (X) de l’OMCI du 14 novembre 1977 qui établissait un
nouveau schéma de navigation dans ces mêmes détroits et, en particulier, dans la région du phare
15 16
Horsburgh . Quoiqu’en ait écrit la Malaisie , on aurait pu légitimement s’attendre à ce qu’un
7 Voir MS, p. 94-96, par. 6.11-6.19 ; RS, p. 47-48, par. 3.34, ou p. 132-134, par. 4.88-4.91.
8
MS, annexe 62.
9
Voir MS, p. 96-98, par. 6.20-6.22 ; RS, p. 136, par. 4.97, ou p. 196, par. 6.20-6.21.
10
Voir MS, p. 99, par. 6.28.
11 Voir MS, p. 100, par. 6.28.
12 Voir MS, p. 116-118, par. 6.72-6.75 ; RS, p. 204-205, par. 6.47-6.49.
13 Voir MS, p. 123-124, par. 6.88-6.90 ; RS, p. 208-210, par. 6.56-6.60.
14
MS, annexe 116.
15
MS, annexe 134, voir l’annexe III. - 54 -
Etat soucieux de préserver ses droits sur une zone maritime sur laquelle il avait des revendications,
contredites par la pratique, profitât de ces occasions pour les formuler. Il n’en a rien été.
10. Plus généralement, il est révélateur que, à la seule exception de l’incident de 1978, que
j’ai mentionné à l’instant, suite à l’expulsion de deux géomètr es malaisiens de Pedra Branca, en
aucune autre circonstance, la Malaisie n’a, avant 1989, protesté contre aucune des très nombreuses
manifestations de souveraineté de Singapour sur Pedra Branca et les eaux et îlots environnants, que
M. Bundy a décrites tout à l’heure. Le mutisme est total, qu’il s’agisse :
⎯ des nombreux aménagements apportés non seulement au phare Horsburgh, mais à l’île
elle-même 17 ;
⎯ de la réglementation (tout ce qu’il y a de plus publique) relative à l’accès à Pedra Branca et à
18
l’administration de l’île ;
19
⎯ des patrouilles navales singapouriennes dans les eaux adjacentes ;
⎯ des notices aux marins et des nombreuses mesures prises par Singapour au sujet de la sécurité
20
dans la zone ; ou
⎯ des secours suite à des naufrages et autres incidents de navigation et des enquêtes qui ont suivi,
ou de la protection des épaves 21; ou encore
22
⎯ de la collecte des données météorologiques .
11. Sur tous ces points, la seule chose que la Partie malaisienne trouve à dire est ceci: «It
was not conduct à titre de souverain. It did not, in the language of the Court in the Temple Case,
23
demand a reaction from Malaysia.» But it did, Mr.President! Ne fût-ce que parce que ce sont
bien des actes de puissance publique ⎯d’activités «à titre de souverain» ⎯ qu’il s’agit, comme
mon collègue et ami Rodman Bundy l’a excellemment montré. (Je note d’ailleurs en passant que
16
CMM, p. 233-234, par. 499-500.
17
MS, p. 99-102, par. 6.27-6.34 ; RS, p. 139-142, par. 4.107-4.114.
18
MS, p.93-99, par.6.10-6.25, p.103-104, par.6. 35-6.40, p.109-113, par.6.54-6.64; RS, p.132-138,
par. 4.87-4.103, p. 151-156, par. 4.138-4.148.
19
MS, p. 115-116, par. 6.69-6.71, p. 156-158, par. 4.149-4.154.
20MS, p. 116-118, par. 6.72-6.75 ; RS, p. 138-139, par. 4.104-4.106, p. 159-160, par. 4.155-4.158.
21MS, p. 118-124, par. 6.76-6.90 ; RS, p. 160-168, par. 4.159-4.178.
22MS, p. 105-107, par. 6.42-6.46 ; RS, p. 142-145, par. 4.115-4.120.
23
CMM, p. 226-227, par 485. - 55 -
lorsque la Partie malaisienne a, bien plus réce mment, tenté d’«étayer son dossier», elle a protesté
précisément contre le même type d’actes que ceux dont elle conteste qu’ils eussent été, auparavant,
24
effectués «à titre de souverain»: par exemple, contre la constructi on d’une station radar ou au
25
sujet d’activités liées à des incident s maritimes autour de Pedra Branca et des patrouilles navales
effectuées par la marine singapourienne autour de l’île 26.) Toutes ces activités de Singapour étaient
menées au grand jour et ne pouvaient être ignorées de la Malaisie ; il s’agit d’un ensemble d’actes
cohérents qui se sont produits su r une période de plus de cent tr ente années. Je ne peux que le
répéter, il n’est tout simplement pas pensable qu’un Etat soucieux de préserver ses droits se fût
montré à ce point négligent, et ceci d’ autant moins que la Malaisie a prouvé ⎯ en d’autres
circonstances, mais s’agissant de droits lui appartenant réellement ⎯ qu’elle ne l’était nullement.
12. Le contraste est, en effet, frappant entre sa négligence totale, constante, à l’égard de ses
prétendus droits sur Pedra Branca, d’une part, et l’ affirmation sourcilleuse de ses droits (bien réels
ceux-ci) sur Pulau Pisang, d’autre part.
13. Une précision s’impose d’emblée à cet égard: dans leurs écritures, les deux Parties ont
comparé le régime et la pratique relatifs aux deux situations; la Malaisie a fait grand cas des
27 28
similitudes existant à cet égard ; Singapour a mis l’accent sur ce qui distingue ces deux
situations. Malgré ce que veut faire croire la Pa rtie malaisienne, il n’y a aucune symétrie entre les
deux démonstrations: d’une pa rt, celle de Singapour concerne non seulement les phares en
question, mais aussi et surtout, les îles sur lesque lles ces phares sont situés, alors que la Malaisie
tente de polariser exclusivement l’attention sur l es phares; d’autre part, autant il est tout à fait
évident que les activités de gestion et de maintena nce des deux phares sont comparables, autant, ce
qui importe ce sont les différenc es d’attitude des Parties à l’égar d des îles sur lesquelles ils sont
implantés ⎯ et ces différences sont extrêmement significatives.
14. Il y a d’abord celles, qui sont flagrantes, dans le mode d’établissement des deux phares,
⎯l’un (Pisang) a fait l’objet d’une autorisation de Johor, l’autre (Pedra Branca) n’a pas l’objet
24MS, annexe 164.
25
MS, annexes 202 et 204 ; CMS, annexes 57 et 63.
26
MS, annexe 203.
27MM, p. 106, par. 232-234, p. 112, par 250 ; MCM, p. 145-146, par. 304-305 ; RS, p. 155-156, par. 319-323.
28MS, p. 143-145, par. 7.12-7.17 ; CMS, p. 156-158, par. 6.63-6.66 ; RS, p. 200-203, par. 6.32-6.43. - 56 -
d’une telle permission comme je l’ai montré hier. Il y a aussi l’affirmation claire de sa
souveraineté par la Malaisie sur Pulau Pisang, qui contraste, de manière frappante, avec la
renonciation expresse de Johor à toute revendication sur Pedra Branca comme je le montrerai
demain. Mais ces différences concernent aussi, comme Singapour l’a montré 29 :
⎯ le financement de la maintenance des deux phares ;
⎯ le contrôle de l’accès à l’île ;
⎯ y compris celui des personnes chargées de l’entretien des phares ;
⎯ les activités singapouriennes qui ne sont pas liées à ceux-ci, nombreuses sur Pedra Branca et
dans les eaux environnantes, inexistantes sur Pulau Pisang et dans la mer territoriale adjacente ;
et,
30
⎯ last but not least, le pavillon qui flotte sur l’un et l’autre phares .
15. A ce propos, M eBundy a rappelé tout à l’heure que la Malaisie avait exigé, en 1968, que
Singapour cesse de hisser son propre pavillon sur Pisang; elle n’a jamais objecté à ce qu’il flotte
sur Pedra Branca ⎯ ce qui est le cas pour le pavillon britannique depuis la construction du phare,
pour celui de Singapour depuis son accession à l’indé pendance. C’est que, Monsieur le président,
Pulau Pisang appartient à la Ma laisie, Pedra Branca, sur laquelle Singapour a constamment agi en
qualité de souverain sans objection de la part de la Malaisie, ne lui appartient pas ! Bien entendu,
le fait que le phare établi sur l’une et l’autre îl es fût, dans les deux cas, opéré par Singapour ne
change rien à l’affaire.
16. En vain la Malaisie fait- elle valoir qu’elle ignorait t out des activités de Singapour sur
Pedra Branca et dans ses environs immédiat s, ou qu’elle souhaitait éviter une improbable
confrontation violente avec Singapour. Outre que ces deux «défenses», présentées en passant dans
le contre-mémoire malaisien 31, sont parfaitement incompatibles l’ une avec l’autre, il ne peut pas
être exact que la Malaisie ait ignoré toutes ces activités, menées tout à fait ouvertement, sur une
très longue période, et alors que nos contradicteurs se prévalent par ailleurs d’une intense activité à
titre de souverain dans la mer territoriale de Pedra Branca et même sur l’île elle-même et, en
29
Voir ibid.
30Voir MM, p.142-144, par.7.10-7.14, voir aussi p.73-74, par5.89; RS, p.205-208, par.6.50-6.55, voir aussi
p. 145-150, par. 4.121-4.137.
31CMM, p. 92, note 247. - 57 -
32
particulier, d’une présence navale constante dans les eaux adjacentes . Mais, comme l’a montré
Mme Malintoppi, il s’agit là de présence imaginaire.
17. On peut, je crois, Monsieur le président , transposer sans hésitation, la jurisprudence
abondante, constante et claire, que la Cour arbitr ale a magistralement recensée dans sa sentence du
19 octobre 1981 dans l’affaire de la Frontière entre Dubaï et Sharjah 33. Il ne me paraît pas utile de
vous en infliger à nouveau la lecture, Messieurs les juges : le passage et les références pertinents se
trouvent dans notre mémoire 34 ( Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El
Salvador/Honduras ; Nicaragua (intervenant), arrêt , C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 577, par 364 ;
Différend territorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1994 , p. 35, par 66 ;
Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie), arrêt , C.I.J. Recueil 2002,
p.685, par148). Mais, la conclusion s’impose: «It emerges from this analysis that a State must
react, although using peaceful means, when it consider s that one of its rights is threatened by the
action of another State.» La Malaisie n’a jamais réagi à aucun des actes de souveraineté, nombreux
et consistants, accomplis par Singapour sur l’île et dans les eaux qui la baignent, et force est de
constater en paraphrasant l’arrêt de la Cour de 1951 dans l’affaire des Pêcheries(Royaume-Uni c.
Norvège) «qu’à l’égard d’une situation qui ne pouvait manquer de se fortifier d’année en année, le
Gouvernement [de la Malaisie] s’est ab stenu de formuler des réserves» ( arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1951,
p.139). Je note d’ailleurs que la Partie mala isienne aurait mauvaise grâce à contester cette
conclusion, au moins sur le terrain du droit : elle se prévaut elle-même du silence de Singapour face
35
à ses prétendus actes de souveraineté sur l’île et dans les eaux environnantes . La différence est
que les actes en question sont le fruit de l’imagination de ses conseils, imagination fertile à laquelle
je me plais à rendre hommage comme M eBundy l’a montré, alors que ceux dont Singapour peut
faire état sont bien réels…
32Cf. CMM, p. 234-235, par. 501-502, et p. 248-260, par. 533-549.
33ILR, 1993, p. 622-624.
34MS, p. 148-150, par 7.24. Voir aussi la sentence rendue le 9 octobre 1998 par le tribunal arbitral au terme de la
première phase de la procédure entre l’Erythrée et la République du Yémen (Souveraineté territoriale et portée du
différend), RSANU, vol. XXII, p. 282, par 306.
35Cf. MM, p. 121, par 278; p. 133, par 280; p. 124, par 282; RM, p. 169, par 359; p. 171, par. 364 et 366-367,
ou p. 175, par 372. - 58 -
II. Les reconnaissances expresses
18. Mais ceci va plus loin, Monsieur le président. La Malaisie ne s’est pas contentée de ne
pas réagir lorsqu’elle l’aurait dû face aux manifest ations de souveraineté de Singapour sur l’île;
elle a aussi reconnu cette souveraineté, par des actes ou des abstentions d’agir dénués d’ambiguïté.
Projection n o1 — Croquis illustrant la délimitation du plateau continental conformément à
o
l’accord de 1969 entre l’Indonésie et la Malaisie (dossier des plaidoiries, onglet n 37)
19. Parmi ces dernières, j’attire votre atten tion, Messieurs les jug es, sur l’accord que la
Malaisie a conclu avec l’Indonésie en 1969 en vue de la délimitation du plateau continental. Il est
révélateur que les Parties à cet instrument se soie nt accordées sur la délimitation de leurs plateaux
continentaux respectifs, mais en s’abstenant soigneusement de prol onger cette limite à l’approche
de Pedra Branca 36, ce qui manifestait de la part de l’Indon ésie et de la Malaisie une conscience
claire que ces eaux ne pouvaient pas être délim itées entre eux. Cette abstention, à l’évidence
soigneusement délibérée, n’est bien sûr pas dé pourvue de signification juridique, comme ma
collègue et amie Loretta Malintoppi vient de le montrer. Le croquis illustratif figurant à l’onglet
no 37 est à nouveau projeté derrière moi.
[Fin de la projection 1.]
20. Il en va à fortiori ainsi s’agissant des actes, positifs, par lesquels la Malaisie a clairement
manifesté sa conviction selon laquelle Singapour exerçait sa pleine souveraineté sur l’île. Tel est le
cas, en particulier, des demandes d’autorisation que les autorités officielles malaisiennes ont, à
plusieurs reprises, adressées à Singapour pour pouvoir se livrer à diverses activités sur
Pedra Branca ou dans les eaux environnantes.
21. Tel est le cas, par exemple, d’une mission d’étude des marées de 1974 qui souhaitait
37 38
effectuer des observations depuis Pedra Branca . Comme l’a montré la réplique singapourienne ,
la demande d’autorisation émanant d’un officier de la marine malaisienne concernait bien l’île
elle-même et non le phare: une demande limitée au phare n’aurait pas grand sens dès lors qu’il
s’agissait
36
MS, vol. 6, annexe 114 (ou MM, vol. 3, annexe 111).
37Voir MS, p. 111-112, par 6.61 ; CMM, p. 202-203, par. 417-418 ; RS, p. 188-190, par. 6.5-6.9.
38Voir ibid. - 59 -
«a) To replenish Tide Camp with food and water.
b) To provide emergency repair for the Responder.
c) To carry out Triangulation» . 39
Et il ne peut y avoir de doute non plus sur le fait que c’est bien au souverain territorial sur l’île que
le commandant du navire s’était adressé et que c’ est en cette qualité que la Port Authority de
Singapour a agi. Une précision contenue dans la réponse du commandant à la demande de
renseignements formulée par Singapour ne trompe pas à cet égard: «It is proposed that list of
personnel carrying out on and off landing at Hors burgh Lighthouse be exempted and each landing
will be escorted by your representative as the landing will normally be a few hours.» L’anglais
n’est peut-être pas parfait, mais c’est bien d’actes de puissance publique qu’il s’agit.
40
22. L’affaire du Pedoman, sur laquelle les Parties se sont assez longuement exprimées , va
dans le même sens: le Pedoman était un navire public malais ien chargé, lui aussi, de mesurer
l’intensité des marées dans le détroit de Singapour. Alors qu’il se préparait à pénétrer dans les eaux
territoriales de Pedra Branca, le haut Commissaria t de la Malaisie à Singapour adressa une note au
ministère des affaires étrangères singapourien a ux termes de laquelle: «The High Commission
would be grateful for the Ministry’s assistance in securing clearance for NV Pedoman to enter
Singapore’s territorial waters for the abovementioned purpose.» 41 Compte tenu du contexte, il ne
pouvait faire de doute que les eaux territoriales en question étaient celles de Pedra Branca.
L’autorisation fut accordée 4.
Projection 2 — Extrait du croquis annexé à la lettre du haut Commissariat de la Malaisie à
Singapour en date du 26 mars 1980, annoté (RS, encart 11)
23. Le même scénario se reproduisit après la pub lication de la carte de 1979. Tel est le cas
de l’épisode de 1980 relatif à un projet de câble d’électricité sous-marin entre Sarawak et la
péninsule malaise 43. Dans son contre-mémoire , la Malaisie, qui n’y revi ent pas dans sa réplique,
39
MS, annexe 122 (Letter from Lieutenant Commande r Mak S.W., KD Perantau, to Hydrographic Department,
Port of Singapore Authority, 22 April 1974) [Lettre du 22 avr il 1974 adressée au service hydrographique de l’autorité
portuaire de Singapour par le lieutenant-commandant S. W. Mak, commandant du KD Perantau].
40
MS, p. 112, par 6.62 et p. 152-153, par 7.32 ; CMM, p. 203-204, par. 420-422 ; RS, p. 191, par. 6.10-6.11.
41MM, annexe 137, note EC 219/78 du 9 mai 1978.
42MS, annexe 138, note MFA 115/78 du 12 mai 1978 .
43MS, p.153-154, par7.34; CMM, p.205-208, pa r.426-435; RS, p.155, par4.147 et p.192-194,
par. 6.12-6.16. - 60 -
s’est employée à obscurcir autant qu’elle l’a pu les circonstances pertinentes. Celles-ci se limitent
à ceci :
⎯ le 28 janvier 1980, le haut Commissariat de la Malaisie à Singapour adressa une note au
ministère des affaires étrangères de Singapour requérant l’approbati on par le Gouvernement
singapourien d’un projet d’implantation d’un câble électrique entre l’Indonésie et la Malaisie :
«I would appreciate if early approval could be granted by your Government, since the above
project will cover also your territorial waters» 44;
⎯ ici encore, il ne pouvait s’agir que des eaux territoriales de Pedra Branca ⎯ comme le montre
d’ailleurs nettement le croquis projeté en ce moment derrière moi, qui est extrait de celui qui
était joint à la lettre du haut Commissariat de la Malaisie à Singapour du 26 mars 1980 donnant
des précisions sur le projet. Cette lettre indiquait qu’il s’agissait de «l’endroit probable où cette
étude serait effectuée» («the likely point where the said survey would take place» 45);
l’intention est claire : il s’agissa it d’illustrer le trajet envisagé, à cette époque, pour le câble et,
par suite, pour l’étude ⎯ la survey ⎯ elle-même ;
⎯ le ministère des affaires étrangères de Singapour a donné son accord le 7 juin 1980 46; et, à ma
connaissance, la Malaisie ne s’est pas formalis ée de la question posée dans cette même note,
par laquelle le ministère s’enquérait du tracé exact envisagé dans les eaux territoriales
singapouriennes: «Since the proposed areas for the survey would affect Singapore territorial
waters, the Singapore authorities concerned would li ke to have the co-ordinates of the areas in
Singapore territorial waters to be surveyed» ;
⎯ il va de soi que, ni cette demande de précisions, ni le fait qu’en définitive un autre trajet a été
retenu, n’enlèvent rien au caractère probant de l’épisode; pas davantage que le «repentir»
tardif de la Malaisie qui, quelques jours après avoir reçu la protestation singapourienne contre
la carte de 1979 47, a fait mine de s’aviser que, finalement, les eaux concernées par l’étude (et le
44MS, annexe 143.
45MS, annexe 145.
46MS, annexe 147 (Note from the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Malaysian High Commission,
7 June 1980) [Lettre du 7 juin 1980 adressée au haut Commissariat de la Malaisie par le ministère des affaires étrangères
de Singapour].
47MS, annexe 144 (Singapore’s Note MFA 30/80, 14 February 1980) [Note 30/80 du 14 février 1980 adressée au
haut Commissariat pour la Malaisie par le ministère des affaires étrangères de Singapour]. - 61 -
câble) seraient exclusivement indonésiennes 4. Ceci ne saurait rien changer au fait que la
Partie malaisienne avait, spontanément, estim é que, puisque la mer voisine de PedraBranca
était concernée, l’autorisation de Singapour était nécessaire, conformément à la pratique
antérieure.
[Fin de la projection 2.]
24. Monsieur le président, il ne s’agit là que d’exemples, mais ô combien significatifs:
jusqu’en 1989, ni la Malaisie, ni son prédécesseu r, Johor, n’ont émis le moindre doute sur la
souveraineté de Singapour sur Pedra Branca. L’un comme l’autre ont gardé le silence face à
l’exercice, par Singapour, de ses prérogatives de puissance publique sur l’île et la Malaisie n’a
jamais manqué de demander à Singapour l’auto risation de mener des études océanographiques ou
météorologiques à Pedra Branca ou dans les eaux adjacentes. Ce sont là, sans aucun doute, des
manifestations concordantes de la souveraineté de Singapour. Et cela n’est pas sans rappeler
l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar , dans laquelle le Siam s’est vu opposer un ensemble
d’omissions, de silences et d’actes positifs ⎯ à mon avis bien moins nets que dans notre affaire ⎯
dont la Cour a déduit qu’il semblait clair que
«le Siam ne pensait pas en réalité posséder de titre de souveraineté ⎯ ce qui
correspondrait parfaitement à l’attitude qu ’il avait toujours observée et qu’il a
maintenue à l’égard de la carte de l’annexe I de la frontière qu’elle indique ⎯ ou bien
qu’il avait décidé de ne pas faire valoir son titre, ce qui signifierait encore une fois
qu’il admettait les prétentions françaises ou acc eptait la frontière à Préah Vihéar telle
qu’elle était tracée sur la carte» ( Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c.Thaïlande),
fond, arrêt , C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p.31; voir aussi, p.32-33 et, par exemple,
Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligita n et Pulau Sipadan (Ind onésie/Malaisie), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 685, par 148.)
25. Au demeurant, Monsieur le président, tous les comportements de la Malaisie que j’ai
décrits, qu’il s’agisse d’actes «positifs» ou d’omissi ons d’agir, de silences lorsqu’il aurait fallu
parler, ne sont que certains des éléments d’un ensemble plus vaste; il en est d’autres qui, à tous
égards, confirment cette conclusion :
⎯ le Straits Lights System que M. Bundy décrira dans sa prochaine intervention,
⎯ les cartes malaisiennes, antérieures à 1979, dont Mme Malintoppi parlera demain,
48Voir CMM, annexe 47 (Letter from Di rector General of the Economic Pla nning Unit, Malaysia, to Secretary
General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 26 February 1980) [Lettre du 26 février 1980 adressée au secrétaire
général du ministère des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie par le directeur général du service de planification économique
de la Malaisie]. - 62 -
⎯ la renonciation de Johor à toute prétention su r Pedra Branca, sur laquelle je reviendrai
moi-même brièvement.
Tous ces faits concourent à la même conclusion et la renforcent encore: jusqu’en1979 (et,
en pratique, jusqu’en 1989), la Malaisie s’est constamment comportée avec la claire conscience que
la souveraineté sur Pedra Branca appartenait à Singapour ⎯souveraineté qu’elle a du reste
expressément reconnu à maintes reprises.
Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie vivement de votre attention.
We are ready to stop now or, if you prefer, Mr. Bundy is ready to begin his pleading on the
Straits Lights System, on which Malaysia seems to be impatient to have our views.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: How long will that take, may I ask?
Mr. PELLET: It can be stopped whenever you like. So it is really in your hands.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I think he could start now. Thank you.
Mr. PELLET: Thank you very much.
Mr. BUNDY: Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court.
T HE STRAITS LIGHTS SYSTEM
Introduction
1. At this stage of Singapore’s first round presentation, my task is to address a further
element of Malaysia’s case. This is the legal significance of the Straits Lights System that was
established over the years for the financing and upkeep of various lighthouses situated in the Straits
of Singapore and the Straits of Malacca. My pr esentation is probably a total of 30 to 35 minutes,
but I will find an appropriate stopping place, I hope, close to 1o’clock, if that meets with the
Court’s approval.
2. Now, as part of its effort to counter the fact that Singapore has administered and
controlled Pedra Branca from 1851 to the present, Malaysia’s written pleadings include an
extended discussion of the financial arrangements that were put in place for the administration of a
number of lighthouses in the relevant area, including the lighthouse on Pedra Branca. Malaysia’s - 63 -
purpose for introducing this material is made tolerably clear in its Counter-Memorial where
Malaysia states the following: “The establishment and administration of the Straits’ Lights was not
regarded as determinative of the sovereignty of the underlying territory” (CMM, para. 298).
3. On one level, Malaysia’s contention is unexceptional. Singapore does not suggest that the
system that was put in place for the funding of lighthouse operations after 1851, after the
lighthouse on Pedra Branca had been commissioned, was, in and of itself, determinative of the
issue of sovereignty over Pedra Branca. As Singapore has explained, both in its written pleadings
and thus far in its first round presentations, Sing apore’s title derives from the lawful possession of
the island by Great Britain during the period from 1847 to 1851, discussed by Mr. Brownlie, and on
Singapore’s long-standing and continuous exercise of sovereign authority over the island ever since
that date in the confirmation and maintenance of that title. And, as we have heard earlier today,
Singapore has also discussed the manner in whic h Malaysia effectively recognized Singapore’s
sovereignty and carried out no competing activities on the disputed territory of its own, and how
there is no evidence for this extravagant claim of an “historic title” to Pedra Branca.
4. But, nonetheless, the manner in which the Parties addressed issues relating to the
establishment and upkeep of various lighthouses in the area does shed important additional light on
how the Parties viewed questions of sovereignty. As I shall show in this presentation, the Parties
acted very differently with respect to islands, such as Pedra Branca, where Singapore’s sovereignty
had been established, as opposed to islands, such as Pulau Pisang, which I mentioned earlier, where
Malaysia held title. That is the real relevance of the Straits Lights System for purposes of this case:
the fundamentally different way in which the Parties, particularly Malaysia, acted with respect to
islands where there were lighthouses where Singapor e had sovereignty, such as Pedra Branca, as
opposed to islands that had lighthouses where Malaysia had sovereignty, such as Pulau Pisang.
*
* * - 64 -
1. The legal framework concerning lighthouses in the region
5. My starting point for the review of the Straits Lights System is the legal framework within
which the lighthouses in question were established. To assist in this discussion, I have had placed
on the screen, and in the judges’ folder ⎯ I believe it will be put in the folders tomorrow morning,
at tab 38 ⎯ a map depicting the various lighthouses that I shall be addressing. This is the map, you
will have it in your folders in the morning.
[Slide: map showing Horsburgh lighthouse on Pedra Branca, the Pulau Pisang light, the
Cape Rachado light, the One Fathom Bank light and the location of Pulau Aur]
6. Now, in considering the issue of these lighthouses, the point I would respectfully ask the
Court to bear in mind is the following: when the intention of the State actors in the region was to
authorize the building and management of a lighthouse by one of the parties on territory belonging
to the other, they agreed to such arrangements in an express written document. In contrast, when
there was no need to obtain the written permission of a local ruler, either because the lighthouse
was located on the high seas or it was located on territory that did not belong to that ruler, then no
such agreements and arrangements were concluded. And I will show how this principle operated in
practice by addressing each of the lighthouses depicted on the map in the order in which they were
established.
7. With respect to Pedra Branca ⎯ the first lighthouse constructed in the area ⎯ despite
Malaysia’s assertion that the British built the Horsburgh lighthouse only after receiving the
permission of the Ruler of Johor, ProfessorPelle t has shown that there was no such permission
sought or obtained, or needed. None was needed because Pedra Branca did not belong to Johor and
what actually took place, as discussed by Mr.Brownlie, were the official actions of the British
Crown in taking lawful possession of the island in the period 1847to 1851, followed by specific
legislation, also issued by British authorities ⎯ the 1852 and 1854 Acts that I discussed earlier this
morning ⎯ dealing with Pedra Branca and vesting the lighthouse and its appurtenances in the
British Crown, and the unimpeded administration of the island by Singapore afterwards, right up to
the present day.
8. Similarly, the second light that the British established in the region and put into operation
in 1852 ⎯ this was a floating light at a location called One Fathom Bank ⎯ which had originally
been called the 2½ Fathom Bank, but it was moved ⎯ that light, as well ⎯ it was not a - 65 -
lighthouse ⎯ was not accompanied by any permission or indenture granted by a ruler of mainland
Malaysia. As I noted in my earlier interventi on today, the light was situated on a submerged
sandbank lying well beyond the territorial waters of the Malaysian mainland in the high seas and
thus was not under the sovereignty of any Mala y State, and no permission was consequently
required for the British to establish the light.
9. But the situation changed dramatically wh en it came to the next lighthouse that was built
by Great Britain in the area ⎯ the Cape Rachado lighthouse, constructed in 1860 and located on
the coast of mainland Malaysia along the Straits of Malacca at a place also known as Tanjung
Tuan. You can see that highlighted on the map. In this instance, sin ce the territory where the
lighthouse was situated belonged to the local Malay ruler, the Sultan of Selangore, the Governor of
the Straits Settlements in Singapore sought and received written permission from the Sultan for a
grant of land on which to establish the light. The relevant documents were attached in Annex 62 to
the Malaysian Memorial, and tomorrow, when furthe r judges’ folders are circulated, they will be
found in tab39 of your folders. Here was a li ght on the Malaysian mainland, clearly under the
sovereignty of the local Malaysian ruler and it was subject to an express written grant.
10. The same procedure was followed when the lighthouse on the island of Pulau Pisang was
later constructed. As the Court will see from th e map, Pulau Pisang is an island located off the
coast of Malaysia in the Straits of Malacca: and the island, as I said earlier today, has always been
regarded as belonging to Johor and, subsequently, to Malaysia.
11. In 1885, an agreement was reached between the Ruler of Johor and the Governor of the
Straits Settlements in Singapore pursuant to which the former ⎯ the Ruler of Johor ⎯ granted to
the Government of the Straits Settlements a pl ot of land on which to build and maintain a
lighthouse and a roadway access to the lighthouse. The lighthouse itself was erected on Pulau
Pisang in 1886 and, in accordance with the 1885 Agreement, was managed and maintained by the
Government of the Straits Settlements and later by Singapore, which continues to do so up to the
present. The 1885 grant by the Ruler of Johor was not reduced to writing at the time, but it was
subsequently recorded in an express written indenture signed on 6October 1900 between the
Sultan of Johor and the Governor of the Colony of the Straits Settlements after the Sultan of Johor
had sent a reminder to this effect to the Governor of the Straits Settlements (CMS, Ann. 24). What - 66 -
is striking about this event is that the Sultan neve r referred at the time to the need to execute a
similar indenture for the lighthouse on Pedra Branca: only for the light on Pulau Pisang. And that
is further striking evidence that Pedra Branca was not regarded by the Sultan as falling under
Johor’s sovereignty.
12. Tomorrow morning you will be able to find a copy of the 1900 indenture relating to
Pulau Pisang in your judges’ folders ⎯ it will be at tab 40 ⎯ and it set out in considerable detail
the precise limits of the grant and the conditio ns under which it was accorded (MM, Ann89).
Thus, while Singapore has always managed the lighthouse on Pulau Pisang pursuant to that
indenture, this has taken place on the clear understa nding that the underlying territory is Malaysian
territory. But there is no similar indenture for the lighthouse on Pedra Branca, because it did not
appertain to Johor.
Mr. President, I think that would be an appropr iate time to stop for lunch. Thank you for
according me this time.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Mr. Bundy. The sitting is closed for
today. We will meet tomorrow at 10 o’clock.
The Court rose at 1.05 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Thursday 8 November 2007, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President, presiding in the case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore)