CR 2006/49
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LAAYE THAEGUE
ANNÉE 2006
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 9 juin 2006, à 16 h 30, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à des Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay
(Argentine c. Uruguay)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
YEAR 2006
Public sitting
held on Friday 9 June 2006, at 4.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________ - 2 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vsce-prh,ident
RanMjev.
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skjoteiskov,
BeTroáesz.
juiesesa, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Present: Presideitgins
Vice-PresiKntasawneh
RanjevJaudges
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc TorresBernárdez
Vinuesa
CoRuvrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
Le Gouvernement de la République argentine est représenté par :
S. Exc. Mme Susana Ruiz Cerutti, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique du ministère des relations
extérieures, du commerce international et du culte,
comme agent;
S. Exc. M. Horacio A. Basabe, ambassadeur, dir ecteur général de l’Institut du service extérieur de
la nation, ancien conseiller juridique du ministère des relations extérieures, du commerce
international et du culte, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
S. Exc. M. Santos Goñi Marenco, ambassadeur de la République argentine auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagents;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre, membre
de la Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,
M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit international, University College, Londres,
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Institut universitaire de hautes études
internationales, Genève,
Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeur de droit international à la faculté de droit,
Genève,
comme conseils et avocats;
S. Exc. M. Raúl Estrada Oyuela, ambassade ur, représentant spécial pour les affaires
environnementales internationalesau ministère des affaires étrangères, du commerce international
et du culte,
comme conseil et expert;
S. Exc. M. Julio Barboza, ambassadeur, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de
Buenos Aires, ancien membre de la Commis sion du droit international des Nations Unies,
Mme Silvina González Napolitano, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de
Buenos Aires,
Mme Claudia Mónica Mizawak, procureurde la province argentine d’Entre Rios,
Mme Romina Picolotti, présidentedu Centre des droits de l’homme et l’environnement (CEDHA),
M. Daniel A. Sabsay, président de la Fundación Argentina para los Recursos de la
Naturaleza(FARN),
M. Juan Carlos Vega, avocat spécialisé dans laprotection internationale des droits de l’homme,
comme conseils et experts juridiques; - 5 -
The Government of the Argentine Republic is represented by:
H.E. Ms Susana Ruiz Cerutti, Ambassador, Legal Counsel for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Religious Worship,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Horacio A. Basabe, Ambassador, Director of the Argentine Institute for Foreign Service,
former Legal Counsel to the Ministry of Fore ign Affairs, International Trade and Religious
Worship, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
H.E. Mr. Santos Goñi Marenco, Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor of Public International Law, University of Paris X-Nanterre, Member of
the United Nations International Law Commission,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of International Law, University College, London,
Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International Studies,
Geneva,
Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, University
of Geneva,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.EM. r. Raúl Estrada Oyuela, Ambassador, Special Representative for International
Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Religious Worship,
as Counsel and Expert;
H.E. Mr. Julio Barboza, Ambassador, Professor of Public International Law, University of
Buenos Aires, former Member of the United Nations International Law Commission,
Ms Silvina González Napolitano, Professor of P ublic International Law, University of
Buenos Aires,
Ms Claudia Mónica Mizawak, Public Prosecutor, Entre Rios Province,
Ms Romina Picolotti, President of the Centre for Human and Environmental Rights (CEDHA),
Mr. Daniel A. Sabsay, President, Fundación Argentina para los Recursos de la
Naturaleza (FARN),
Mr. Juan Carlos Vega, international human rights lawyer,
as Legal Advisers and Experts; - 6 -
M. Elias Matta, ingénieur, directeur du centre de technologie de la cellulose, Univerisdad Nacional
del Litoral (UNL),
M. Lucio Janiot, chef du département de chimie du service d’hydrographie de la marine,
M. Alberto Espinach Ross, chercheur à l’Institut argentin pour la recherche et le développement de
la pêche (INIDEP),
comme conseils et experts scientifiques;
M. Ariel W. González, conseill er d’ambassade, bureau du conse iller juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères, du commerce international et du culte,
Mme Mariana Alvarez Rodríguez, secrétaire d’ambassade, bureau du représentant spécial pour les
affaires environnementales inte rnationales au minist ère des affaires étrangères, du commerce
international et du culte,
Mme Florencia Colombo, direction de la presse au ministère des affaires étrangères, du commerce
international et du culte,
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Mme Ursula Zitnik,
comme délégués.
Le Gouvernement de la République orientale de l’Uruguay est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Héctor Gros Espiell, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès de la
République française,
S. Exc. M. Carlos Gianelli, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme agents;
M. Alan E. Boyle, professeur de droit international, directeur du Centre écossais pour le droit
international, Université d’Edinburgh,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Florence,
M. Paul S. Reichler, avocat, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre du barreau de la
Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, membre du barreau du district de Columbia,
comme avocats;
S. Exc. M. Carlos Mora Medero, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Gonzalo Fernández, secrétaire de la présidence de la République orientale de l’Uruguay,
S. Exc. M. José Luis Cancela, secrétaire général du ministère des relations extérieures,
M. Alberto Pérez Pérez, professeur à l’Université de la République de l’Uruguay, Montevideo, - 7 -
Mr. Elias Matta, Engineer, Director of the Centre for Cellulose Technology, Universidad Nacional
del Litoral (UNL),
Mr. Lucio Janiot, Director of the Chemistry Department, Naval Hydrographic Service,
Mr. Alberto Espinach Ross, Researcher, National Fisheries Research and Development
Institute (INIDEP),
as Scientific Advisers and Experts;
Mr. Ariel González, Embassy Counsellor, Legal Adviser’s Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Religious Worship,
Ms Mariana Alvarez Rodríguez, Embassy Secret ary, Office of the Special Representative for
International Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and
Religious Worship,
Ms Florencia Colombo, Press Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and
Religious Worship,
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Ms Ursula Zitnik,
Dselegates;
The Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay is represented by:
H.E. Mr.Héctor Gros Espiell, Ambassador of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay to the French
Republic,
H.E. Mr. Carlos Gianelli, Ambassador of the E astern Republic of Uruguay to the United States of
America,
as Agents;
Mr. Alan E. Boyle, Professor of International Law and Director of the Scottish Centre for
International Law, University of Edinburgh,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Florence, Florence,
Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Attorney at Law, Foley Ho ag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bar of
the United States Supreme Court, Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia,
as Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Carlos Mora Medero, Ambassador of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Gonzalo Fernández, Secretary to the Presidency of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay,
H.E. Mr. José Luis Cancela, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Alberto Pérez Pérez, Professor, University of the Republic of Uruguay, Montevideo, - 8 -
M. Edison González Lapeyre, professeur à l’ Université de la Ré publique de l’Uruguay,
Montevideo,
M. Roberto Puceiro Ripoli, professeur à l’Université de la République de l’Uruguay, Montevideo,
M. Gustavo Alvarez, ministre conseiller, directeur de la direction des affaires multilatérales,
ministère des relations extérieures,
M. Marcelo Cousillas, conseiller juridique à la direction nationale de l’environnement, ministère du
logement, de l’aménagement du territoire et de l’environnement,
Mme Nienke Grossman, avocat, cabinet Foley Ho ag LLP, Washington D.C., membre du barreau
du district de Columbia, membre du barreau de la Virginie,
M. Adam Kahn, avocat, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, membre du barreau du
Massachusetts,
M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre du barreau de
la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, membre du barreau du Massachusetts, membre du
barreau du district de Columbia,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à la faculté de droit, Université de Macerata,
Mme Paola Gaeta, professeur à la faculté de sciences politiques, Université de Florence,
M. Sebastian Lopez Escarcena, doctorant, Université d’Edinburgh,
comme conseillers;
M. Martin Ponce de Leon, ingénieur,sous-sécretaire d’Etatau ministère de l’industrie, de l’énergie et
des mines,
Mme Alicia Torres, ingénieur, directrice nationalede l’environnement au ministère du logement, de
l’aménagement du territoireet de l’environnement,
M. Eugenio Lorenzo, ingénieur, conseiller technique de la division de l’évaluation des impacts sur
l’environnement, ministère du logement, de l’am énagement du territoire et de l’environnement,
M. Adriaan van Heiningen, professeur, titulaire de la chaire J. Larcom Ober au département
d’ingénierie chimique à l’Université du Maine, Orono, Maine,
comme experts. - 9 -
Mr. Edison Gonzalez Lapeyre, Professor, University of the Republic of Uruguay, Montevideo,
Mr. Roberto Puceiro Ripoli, Professor, University of the Republic of Uruguay, Montevideo,
Mr. Gustavo Alvarez, Minister Counsellor, Director, Multilateral Relations Directorate, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Marcelo Cousillas, Legal Counsel, National Di rectorate for the Environment, Ministry of
Housing, Territorial Planning and Environment,
Ms Nienke Grossman, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bar of
the District of Columbia, Member of the Virginia Bar,
Mr. Adam Kahn, Attorney at Law, Foley Ho ag LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, Member of the
Massachusetts Bar,
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bar
of the United States Supreme Court, Member of the Massachusetts Bar, Member of the Bar of
the District of Columbia,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Macerata,
Ms Paola Gaeta, Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Florence,
Mr. Sebastian Lopez Escarcena, Graduate Researcher, University of Edinburgh,
Asdvisers;
Mr. Martin Ponce de Leon, Engineer, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Industry, Energy
and Mines,
Ms Alicia Torres, Engineer, National Director , Environmental Impact Assessment Division,
Ministry of Housing, Territorial Planning and Environment,
Mr. Eugenio Lorenzo, Engineer, Technical Consu ltant for the Environmental Impact Assessment
Division, Ministry of Housing, Territorial Planning and Environment,
Mr. Adriaan van Heiningen, Professor, J. Larc om Ober Chair, Department of Chemical
Engineering, University of Maine, Orono, Maine,
Esxperts. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open and I give the floor to
His Excellency Mr. Héctor Gros Espiell, the Agent of Uruguay. You have the floor.
M.GROS ESPIELL : Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, seulement quelques mots
préliminaires pour annoncer que la Partie urugua yenne sera représentée aujourd’hui, cet après-
midi, par le professeur Boyle, le professeur Condorelli et Me Reichler et après, je ferai les brèves
conclusions et la pétition finale. Merci beau coup. Je vous demande si vous avez la bonté de
donner la parole au professeur Boyle.
The PRESIDENT: Yes. Thank you, Your Excellency. I call Professor Boyle.
Mr. BOYLE:
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, I am pleased to have a second opportunity to
address you. I shall do so only briefly and on a melange of topics. I have three propositions:
Firstly that siting the two plants further from the River Uruguay, was suggested by Argentina
this morning, would do nothing to minimize any risk to the environment of the river or of
Argentina but would damage the viability of the pl ants and in that way cause significant harm to
Uruguay.
Secondly that Article 41 of the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay does not prohibit pollution
and that my good friend, Professor Sands, has misunderstood the Statute in that respect.
Thirdly that the precautionary principle, to which reference was made this morning, is
already embedded in Uruguayan law and practice and in the regulations of the Commission on the
River Uruguay. I shall turn shortly to each of those propositions.
2. But before doing so I would also like to ta ke this opportunity to thank Professor Sands for
his comments this morning regarding the subtlety of at least part of my argument. Professor Sands
and I have known each other for a very long time an d it is the first time he has ever complimented
me on my subtlety. It is therefore with considerab le regret that I will have to revert to my more
usual Northern Irish directness and point out that neither I nor any other of Uruguay’s counsel
intended to suggest that the Statute is not applicable to the two plants: Uruguay fully accepts that it
is applicable. Let me be quite clear about that. - 11 -
3. What I did argue yesterday, Madam Preside nt, was a much less subtle point: that on the
basis of all of the information in its po ssession, Uruguay reasonably concluded that, its
environmental impact assessments showed no risk of significant harm to Argentina, or to the
quality, or environment of the river. Professo r Sands referred this morning once again to the
Hatfield report. The Hatfield report provides a critique of the accumulative impact study carried
out for the International Finance Corporation: it is not a critique of the assessments carried out by
DINAMA. Those assessments are entirely separate. Director Torres’s affidavit ⎯ which you have
at tab 13 of your folder ⎯ directly addresses the point which was made this morning by Professor
Sands, and I quote from paragraph VIII E of that affidavit:
“DINAMA believes that many of the questions and issues raised by the Hatfield
report about IFC’s draft Cumulative Impact Study were previously answered through
DINAMA’s EIA process, the AAPs and accompanying documents, or the information
that was presented to GTAN. Many of the doubts and concerns raised in the Hatfield
report arise from the lack of information contained in the CIS, and not from a
deficiency of the total amount of information available.”
That is information available both to DINAMA and u ltimately to Argentina. As that section of the
affidavit concludes, “DINAMA is confident th at the permitting process has established conditions
that assure that the plants will operate in a manner that will not produce any prohibited adverse
impacts” (para. VIII F).
4. Professor Sands also criticized the DINAMA EIA approval process, however, and
suggested that the frequency of revision cast so me doubt on the adequacy of that process.
Madam President, let me remind the Court of DINA MA’s role within the terms of Uruguayan law.
It is DINAMA’s duty to approve assessments carried out by the operators of the plants: it is not
DINAMA’s job to rubber-stamp those assessments. When the assessments need improvement or
when further information is required, DINAMA has the power to require revision and it has shown
that it is quite ready to use that power. DINA MA would merit very severe criticism if it never
sought improvements, if it took everything at face value. As regards fish, biodiversity and
ecosystems, these are the subject of monitoring pr ogrammes at present. They have neither been
forgotten nor ignored.
5. Madam President, this is probably also the right moment to comment on the Ramsar site at
Esteros de Farappos. We do not have the map but this site is in Uruguay, it is not in Argentina. - 12 -
Moreover it is more than 25 km upstream from the plants. The Court may now appreciate why I
said yesterday that there are no ecologically sensitive sites nearby, but for emphasis let me say now
that there are no such sites downstream from the plants. EsterosdeFrappa cannot be affected by
whatever discharges there may be from ENCE or Botnia. Let me conclude these preliminary
comments by remarking on the 2006sustainability report. I am advised by the Government of
Uruguay that, contrary to the speculations of Professor Sands, Uruguay’s omission from this list
has nothing to do with any change in its environm ental record and everything to do with its change
of government. Uruguay could not be ranked because it had not responded in time.
Madam President, I can now return to the th ree points which I outlined at the beginning of
my speech. So let me begin by saying something about the siting of the plants.
Siting of plants
6. Argentina said this morning that its main concern is the siting of the plants. The siting can
really only be an issue if the plants pose a risk of significant pollution harm to Argentina. If they
pose no significant risk then the siting cannot be cr iticized. Ease of transport, access to the river,
proximity to labour and to sources of timber ar e all critical to the su ccess of these plants and
Uruguay cannot accept that it is for Argentina to dictat e where the plants will be sited, or that that
is a matter for decision by the Commission on the River Uruguay.
7. Some reference has also been made to the port adjacent to the Botnia plant. This port is
not Rotterdam. It is a small dock, it will accommodate small ships. The wood pulp will be shipped
downstream from this dock. There are no effluent discharges from the dock. It causes no
pollution. It can cause no pollution. It is incapable of causing any of the imagined harms alleged
by Argentina.
No pollution?
8. Now, let me turn to pollution. Professo r Sands argued yesterday that Article41 of the
Statute of the River Uruguay creates an obligation of result ⎯ that it requires Uruguay to prevent
pollution ⎯ seemingly all pollution. Madam President, Members of the Court, this is not a serious
argument. Uruguayan monitoring of the river at Fray Bentos reveals that the river is polluted ⎯
mainly by raw sewage from Gualeguaychu and othe r locations in Argentina. But let us leave - 13 -
reality to one side for the present and let us, like lawyers, take a closer look at the regulations
adopted by the Commission on the River Uruguay on this point. That Commission, as we know,
has jurisdiction to establish water quality standards and to revise them every three years (CARU,
Art. 2). The regulations have been agreed by Argentina and Uruguay.
9. Now, the water quality standards which CA RU has agreed define permitted levels of
pollution in the water ⎯ in other words, they assume a certain level of pollution. They include ⎯
and it is set out in detail in the Digest of the Commission ⎯ permitted levels of the following
substances ⎯ and I am only going to read out the ones that I recognize as rather nasty: arsenic,
cyanide, mercury, DDT, heptachlorine, lindane, organophosphates, and PCBs. Now, many of
these, quite possibly all of them, are covered by the POPs Convention. All of them are toxic, some
of them are persistent, but none of them are abso lutely prohibited by the CARU regulations. Nor
are they absolutely prohibited by the POPs Convention. To some degree their discharge is allowed
by the regulations and by the Convention, and therefore by the Statute of the River. They become
prohibited pollution when they exceed levels specif ied in the regulations. Madam President, it is
simply not possible to talk about pollution in any legally meaningful sense without appreciating
this elementary but essential point.
10. So, when read together with the prac tice of the Parties as revealed by the CARU
regulations, the interpretation to be given to Ar ticle41 is plain and unambiguous: the Parties are
bound to take appropriate measures to prevent pollution of the river from reaching prohibited
levels. They are not bound to prevent all pollution.
11. CARU water quality standards would manifestly serve no purpose whatever if the Parties
had already agreed to prohibit all pollution. More over, Article 27 of the Statute permits the Parties
to use the river for industrial purposes. Well, what can this mean except the right to extract water
or to discharge effluents? How could Article 27 be compatible with a prohibition of all pollution?
It is precisely to allow for the industrial use of rivers that very few modern river treaties endorse an
absolute prohibition on the altera tion of water quality. Apart from a few, specific treaty régimes,
there is little contemporary support for the view that polluting uses are per se impermissible.
Instead, the modern trend of most river treaties is to require States to regulate and control pollution,
prohibiting only certain forms of pollutant discharge rather than all discharges. - 14 -
12. For that reason, Article21(2) of the 1997 United Nations Convention on the
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses provides:
“Watercourse States shall, individually a nd, where appropriate, jointly, prevent,
reduce and control the pollution [prevent, reduce and control the pollution] of an
international watercourse that may cause significant harm to other watercourse States
or to their environment, including harm to human health or safety, to the use of the
waters for any beneficial purpose or to the living resources of the watercourse . . .”
Now, Madam President, this is quite clearly not a prohibition of pollution. It confirms Uruguay’s
interpretation of Article 41, an interpretation with which until yesterday Argentina had also agreed.
13. Now, during the course of Argentina’ s submissions, the Court has heard numerous
assertions about the environmental threat posed by these mills. With one exception, Argentina has
cast these assertions in the most general terms. Without exception, Argentina has provided no
scientific support for any of them. The one specific assertion that Argentina has made is that these
mills pose the threat of unacceptable dioxin and fura n emissions. Like the rest of Argentina’s
assertions, this one is wholly unsupported by any scientific evidence put before the Court. But
because Argentina has repeated it on several occasions, Uruguay has submitted to the Court the
affidavit of one of the world’s foremost expe rts in pulp and paper technology, Dr.Adriaan van
Heiningen, Professor of Chemical Engineering at the University of Maine. I will summarize it very
briefly:
⎯ ProfessorvanHeiningen says that scientists from the Canadian Pulp and Paper Research
Institute recognized the risk of dioxin and furan production from the then current technology in
1988. Over the next decade, he says, new t echnology was developed which eliminated that
risk. The Orion and CMB mills, of course, will employ the new technology. Dr. Van
Heiningen concludes:
“In short, the Orion and CMB mills will be in the class of modern pulp mills in
which dioxins and furans have been eliminated as outputs. No scientist working in the
areas would disagree with that statement. Argentina’s suggestions during the course
of this hearing that there is any risk that the mills might pose the threats that Argentina
has identified has no scientific support.” (Tab 31 in the judges’ folder.)
⎯ More generally, Dr. van Heiningen confirms what Uruguay had previously concluded: he says
that the Orion mill will be a state-of-the-art facility that will comply fully with European Union - 15 -
best available techniques. In fact, he concludes that the Orion mill is “one of the best-designed,
environmentally-sensitive mills I have ever encountered in my 25 years in the field”.
And finally, his evidence ⎯ his affidavit ⎯ also shows that the dioxin emissions from the ENCE
plant, to which reference was made this mo rning, will be rather lower than quoted by
Professor Sands. But even if Professor Sands’s figure is correct ⎯ he referred to 200 mg or 0.2 g
per year of dioxin for ENCE ⎯ that is 10,000 times lower than the 2,110g of dioxin which
Argentina emits in one year according to its own National Inventory on the Discharge of Dioxins
1
and Furans, dated 2001 and available on the website of the POPs Convention . By comparison, in
2002 the whole of Uruguay emitted a total of 55g according to their national inventory, also
2
available on the same website . And that perhaps puts these figures in perspective.
So, Madam President, I would suggest that in the face of that ev idence, Argentina can
establish no prospect of harm to the environmen t from the operation of the mills, let alone an
urgent prospect of irreparable harm.
Precautionary principle
14. Now, Madam President, let me conclude by saying something about the precautionary
principle. ProfessorSands referred yesterday a nd this morning to the precautionary principle and
he seemed to suggest that it had some relevance to th e case. But this is more than a little baffling.
The precautionary principle deals with scientific un certainty. As set out in Principle15 of the
RioDeclaration, it provides as follows: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be usedas a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degrada tion.” Now Uruguay, I hope, ca nnot be accused of postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation; we have explained the measures we
have taken in great detail. Nor is there uncertainty about the technology employed by bleached Kraft
mills: the technology is tried and tested, the standards they must meet are clearly defined and
demanding, and the EIAs are comprehensive and precise about what the consequences are likely to be.
1
POPS Convention website at www.pops.int/documents/guidance
2Ibid. - 16 -
None of this is uncertain; and to call in aid the precautionary principle in circumstances of this kind is
to clutch at straws: it is more a sign ofdesperation than a serious legal argument.
15. However, more fundamentally, while the pr ecautionary approach helps us to identify
whether a legally significant riskexists, invoking it as Professor Sands has done tells us nothing about
how to control that risk, or about what level of risk is socially acceptable. The 2001Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which weseem to have referred to rather a lot in these
proceedings, expressly adopts a precautionary appr oach to the listing a nd control of hazardous
chemicals. It acknowledges⎯ and I quote⎯ in its preamble that “precaution underlies the concerns
of all the Parties and is embedded within this C onvention”. Article1 provides: “Mindful of the
precautionary approach as set forth in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration . . . the objective of this
Convention is to protect human health and the en vironment from persistent organic pollutants.”
Nevertheless, even this Convention does not ba n the use of POPs, like CARU regulations, it
regulates them strictly, it minimizes their use; it seeks to eliminate them as far as possible ⎯
which is probably what we would all like to do with the music from PCs! ⎯ but it does not ban
them outright. Some of these substances are t oo useful to be banned, others are inevitable
by-products of processes that are too important to be banned. But one of the fastest ways to
produce dioxins is to barbecue beef in your garden!
16. A modern industrial society, Madam Presid ent, is inevitably faced with balancing the
benefits and dangers of the many chemicals in everyday use, and the POPs Convention reflects
very well the role which the precautionary principle pl ays in that context. Argentina is a party to
this Convention. It presumably supports the phi losophy on which it is based. Uruguay certainly
does so. The purpose of Law 17.283 of 2000 is toestablish precautionary measures of environmental
protection and it repeats Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration verbatim. DINAMA must therefore give
effect to the precautionary principle when performig its regulatory duties. AsI noted yesterday, both
Botnia and ENCE will have to satisfy the requiremen ts of the POPs Convention if they are to comply
with the terms of their authorizations. There can be no question of suggesting that Uruguay has in
some speculative way fallen short of whatever the precautionary principle requires⎯ and the Court
will note that Professor Sands has made no attempt to plead in any detail what that might be. - 17 -
17. If Argentina nevertheless believes that the POPs Convention is insufficiently
precautionary to protect the River Uruguay, the remedy lies in its own hands ⎯ it should propose
that CARU water quality standards be enhanced. CARU is the appropriate forum for that purpose,
not the International Court of Justice: and I inte nd no disrespect whatever to the judges in making
that remark. Argentina has made no proposals of this kind in the River Uruguay Commission, so
we must assume that it finds the existing standards adopted by CARU, adequately precautionary.
Madam President, that is all that I wish to say this afternoon. I thank the Court for its
patience and courtesy in listening to me, and I would ask you to now give the floor to my
colleague, Professor Condorelli.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Boyle. Professor Condorelli, you have the floor.
M. CONDORELLI : Merci, Madame le président.
1. Permettez-moi de signaler qu’il m’a, bien évidemment, été impossible, dans le petit laps
de temps dont j’ai joui, de préparer des réponses à toutes les questions et critiques qui ont été
adressées aux positions prises par l’Uruguay par mon entremise. Je demande donc l’indulgence de
la Cour si je me limite à toucher deux points. L’ un brièvement : c’est le reproche fait spécialement
par mon ami le professeur Marcelo Kohen concernant les violations des obligations d’information
qu’aurait commises l’Uruguay envers l’Argentine. L’autre point plus longuement: c’est la
question qu’on a convenu d’appeler «le droit de veto».
Information, notification, procédures
2. Le professeur Kohen a présenté des critiques sévères à l’affirmation, dont je m’étais fait le
porte-parole, que l’Uruguay a respecté les dispositions du statut relatives aux échanges
d’informations prévues dans les articles 7 et suivants du statut. Je ferai à ce sujet trois remarques
seulement.
La première est que l’Argentine ne nie pas avoir obtenu de l’Uruguay une masse importante
d’informations à travers toute une variété de m écanismes et de canaux. Ce qu’elle fait valoir
essentiellement, c’est que ces mécanismes et canaux n’étaient souvent pas les bons, tels que prévus - 18 -
par le statut, voire qu’il n’était pas satisfaaux exigences techniques auxquelles il aurait fallu se
conformer. C’est là un thème pour la phase de fond, qu’on peut laisser de côté à ce stade.
4. Seconde remarque : différemment par rappor t à ce que mon contradicteur a allégué quant
à la qualification des échanges d’information, la Cour a à sa disposition des preuves sous la forme
d’une déclaration de Mme Martha Petrocelli, prési dent de la délégation de l’Uruguay à la CARU.
Cette déclaration, figurant au dossier des juges, document n o14, indique les mesures prises par
l’Uruguay en matière d’information, et est pleinement étayée par les procès-verbaux de la CARU
dont les parties relevantes lui sont annexées. Ces preuves n’ont pas été contredites par des preuves
produites par l’Argentine.
5. Troisième et dernière remarque: la Cour est en mesure d’apprécier l’énorme volume
d’informations fournies par l’Uruguay à l’Argentin e en se référant à la liste contenue dans
o
l’annexe B du document n 15. Permettez-moi de vous prier d’accorder de l’attention à cette liste,
dont la richesse et la pertinence n’ont pas été contestées. Si l’on examine soigneusement cette liste,
on se rend aisément compte de ce que l’Uruguay a fourni à l’Argentine des informations
extrêmement abondantes tant concernant l’usine CMB que l’usine Botnia.
Le statut du fleuve Uruguay est respectueux de la souveraineté permanente des Etats sur
leurs ressources naturelles et n’accorde pas à ch aque partie un droit de veto quant à la
réalisation des projets de l’autre partie tombant sous l’emprise des articles 7 et suivants
6. Et j’en viens maintenant au deuxième point, Madame le président. Les pièces écrites
présentées à votre Cour par la Partie adverse ne laissaient pas comprendre clairement si celle-ci
accuse ou non l’Uruguay d’avoir violé le statut du fait même d’avoir autorisé le début des travaux
de construction des usines de pâte à papier qui sont l’objet du présent différend sans avoir obtenu
l’accord préalable de l’Argentine. En effet, nulle part dans la requête introductive d’instance une
telle accusation n’est articulée explicitement; on n’y trouve non plus d’indication tant soit peu
précise de la disposition du statut qu’une telle auto risation enfreindrait, alors qu’on fait valoir la
violation prétendue par l’Uruguay de diverses ob ligations quant aux procédures prévues par le
statut ou quant à la protection des eaux du fleuve. Il en va de même concernant la demande en
indication de mesures conservatoires, qui est elle aussi assez peu limpide à ce sujet, mais qui
contient toutefois dans l’exposé des motifs (par.6 in fine) une phrase, une phrase seulement ⎯ - 19 -
dont par ailleurs on ne trouve pl us de trace dans la suite du doc ument. Une phrase qu’il convient
de citer : «En attendant l’arrêt de la Cour sur le fond, l’Argentine a le droit à ce que soit préservée
l’obligation de ne pas construire ou autoriser la construction de ce genre d’ouvrages tant que le
différend ne sera pas réglé.» Curieuse expression, celle du «droit à la préservation de l’obligation»,
dont la formulation quelque peu tarabiscotée laissait sans doute transparaître en filigrane un certain
embarras…
7. Plus aucune ambiguïté, plus aucun emba rras lors des plaidoiries d’hier matin et
d’aujourd’hui de la Partie adverse. Nos éminents contradicteurs expliquent haut et fort à votre
Cour que, d’après l’Argentine, le statut reconna ît à chacune des hautes parties contractantes un
véritable droit de veto, quant à la réalisation par l’ autre partie de projets tombant sous la prévision
des articles 7 et suivants, et ce tant que votre Co ur ne se sera pas prononcée en vertu de la clause
compromissoire de l’article 60. Un tel droit de veto subsisterait ⎯ à ce qui semble ⎯ même si la
partie sur le territoire de laquelle le projet doi t être réalisé s’est acquittée de bonne foi de ses
obligations substantielles et procédurales imposée s par le statut en matière de prévention,
d’information et de négociation, et même si l’o pposition de l’autre partie devait avoir à sa base des
motivations insuffisantes ou contestables, voire si elle s’explique en fait à cause des pressions
d’une opinion publique peu informée et hostile par principe.
8. Madame le président, il faut le dire d’ emblée: la thèse soutenue par l’Argentine est
hautement discutable. L’Uruguay la repousse comme totalement infondée parce qu’elle se base sur
une interprétation inacceptable du statut. Le débat de ces derniers jours a été clarificateur parce
qu’il a mis à nu le vrai objet, ou plutôt le cŒur même du différend qui oppose les parties. Le cŒur
du différend est justement représenté par la ques tion de savoir si, oui ou non, un droit de veto
subsiste d’après le statut qui nous intéresse : tout se résume en fin de compte à cela.
9. Or, il va de soi qu’un tel différend fondamental ne saurait être tranché par la Cour à ce
stade de la procédure. Il n’en reste pas moin s que votre Cour est bien obligée d’en connaître
sommairement maintenant parce que ⎯ il faut le dire ⎯ elle ne pourrait pas accorder les mesures
conservatoires demandées qu’à conditio n de reconnaître, tout au moins prima facie, que le statut
confère effectivement aux parties un droit de veto. Si par contre la Cour devait constater qu’il y a
des raisons sérieuses pour en douter, alors l’octroi d es mesures conservatoires ne se justifierait pas, - 20 -
l’Argentine n’ayant pas établi «the possible existence of the rights sought to be protected» (pour
utiliser la formulation du le juge Shahabuddeen dans son opinion séparée dans l’affaire du Passage
par le Grand-Belt (Finlande c. Danemark), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 29 juillet 1991,
C.I.J. Recueil 1991, p. 36).
10. Madame et Messieurs les juges, la conviction ferme de l’Uruguay est que le statut ne
confère pas de droit de veto aux pa rties. En effet, un tel droit, d’une part, ne figure pas dans le
statut et, d’autre part, est contredit par l’interprétation claire de celui-ci qui se fonde sur les
méthodes que prescrit l’article 31, paragraphe 3, de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités :
à savoir, les accords postérieurs entre les parties, la pratique de celles-ci relative à l’application du
statut et la prise en compte des principes et règles en vigueur du droit international.
11. Quant au texte du statut, les articles 7 et suivants réglementent pas à pas la procédure à
suivre pour que des projets, tels que ceux concerna nt les usines en question, puissent être examinés
et discutés par le biais de la CARU, dans le but de parvenir à un accord. Si l’on n’arrive pas à un
accord, la partie intéressée peut notifier formellement son projet à l’autre et, d’après l’article 9, peut
ensuite le réaliser «[s]i la partie notifiée ne formule pas d’objections ou ne répond pas…» dans un
certain délai. En cas d’objection, en revanche , suivant les termes de l’article 11, une nouvelle
phase s’ouvre, au bout de laquelle il pourrait y avoir, pour finir, saisine de la Cour internationale de
Justice conformément à l’article 60, «si les parties n’aboutissent pas à un accord» dans un délai que
prescrit l’article 12. Madame le président, il c onvient de noter que les dispositions sommairement
rappelées sont absolument muettes quant à la question de savoir si ⎯ voire le cas échéant à partir
de quand ⎯ la partie intéressée pourrait se considérer autorisée à prendre le risque de commencer à
réaliser son projet lorsque la nouvelle phase de né gociation ne débouche pas sur un accord, ou si
elle est par contre obligée pour ce faire à attendre l’ aboutissement de la procédure judiciaire : une
procédure qui durera au mieux plusieurs années. Que la Partie argentine le reconnaisse ou pas,
nous sommes bien confrontés à un silence du texte qu i prête indéniablement à des interprétations
divergentes. En effet, l’Argen tine l’interprète comme impliquant la reconnaissance d’un droit de
veto, alors que pour l’Uruguay c’est le contraire qui est vrai.
12. La thèse argentine se fonde sur un raisonnement a contrario simple et logique à première
vue, mais en réalité ⎯ avec tout le respect ⎯ assez simpliste et fourvoyant. L’article 9 établit bien - 21 -
qu’une partie puisse réaliser sans autre son projet si l’autre ne formule pas d’objection, mais ne dit
pas qu’en cas d’objection cette réalisation ne pourra plus intervenir pendant toute la période de
temps qui sera nécessaire pour que la Cour soit saisie et qu’elle se prononce par un arrêt de fond.
Cette implication grave et lourde de conséquen ces, cette prétendue ««no c onstruction» obligation»
(comme l’appelle le professeur Sands) n’est nullement articulée de manière explicite par le statut :
un statut, dont on nous souligne pourtant qu’il prescrit des obligations détaillées et précises,
«notably detailed and precise obligations» 3 dans le langage du professeu r Sands. Mais Madame le
président, s’il est vrai que le statut se caractér ise comme un instrument identifiant de manière
spécifique et précise, «specific and precise» 4, les obligations qu’il impose, ne faut-il pas en déduire
alors qu’en l’absence de cette spécificité et de ce tte précision l’obligation prétendue n’en est tout
simplement pas une ?
13. Cependant, il est clair que ce n’est pas par des considérations de pure logique juridique
qu’on peut venir à bout des difficultés interprétativ es engendrées par la lettre d’un texte lacunaire.
Il convient certainement de faire usage des mé thodes accréditées d’interprétation des traités.
Comme je l’ai anticipé, c’est à l’ article 31, paragraphe 3, de la convention de Vienne sur le droit
des traités qu’il faut recourir ici. Nous disposons, en effet, dans notre cas, d’une pratique ultérieure
dont on peut tirer d’importantes suggestions, just ement dans la mesure où celle-ci permet de
dégager l’existence d’un accord entre les parties qua nt à la manière d’interpréter le traité en
question.
14. Une pièce de choix de cette pratique u ltérieure est représentée par l’accord verbal
postérieur, conclu par les deux parties le 2 ma rs 2004 au niveau des ministres des affaires
étrangères: nous en avons déjà discuté à plusieur s reprises. Du côté uruguayen, nous avons hier
fait état de notre étonnement voyant que la Partie adverse n’en disait mot dans ses pièces écrites.
Maintenant, après avoir écouté ses plaidoiries de ce matin, nous gardons notre étonnement, au vu
de l’embarras qui semble transparaît de ses paroles à ce sujet. J’ai cru comprendre que ni l’agent
de l’Argentine, ni le professeur Kohen en cont estent l’existence. Comment le pourraient-ils
d’ailleurs, puisque celle-ci est rec onnue au plus haut niveau par l’ Argentine ? Sans doute dans le
3
CR 2006/46, p. 28 (Sands).
4CR 2006/46, p. 35 (Sands). - 22 -
futur, lors de l’examen au fond du différend, votre Cour pourra assister à d’intéressantes joutes
oratoires sur les accords non écrits et sur leur ré gime juridique. Mais pour l’heure ce qui compte
est que cet accord existe incontestablement, qu’il est intervenu à un moment précis, face à un
différend existant entre les parties, et qu’il a tout simplement clos le différend en question. La
Cour sait bien maintenant que, les négociations au sein de la CARU s’étant progressivement
enlisées suite à l’autorisation de construction de l’usine CMB donnée par les autorités
uruguayennes, il a été décidé par les gouvernements des deux pays de passer à des négociations
directes, ce qui représente d’ailleurs ⎯ il convient de le souligner ⎯ l’utilisation d’une possibilité
prévue explicitement par l’article 59 du statut. A l’issue de ces négociations directes les deux
gouvernements ont convenu qu’il n’y avait plus d’objec tion à soulever quant à la construction et à
la mise en service de cette usine (la seule dont la réalisation avait à l’époque débuté), mais que
l’Uruguay devait continuer de fournir à l’Argentin e toutes les informations appropriées pendant la
construction, alors que la CARU établirait en tre-temps un programme de vérification de son
fonctionnement pour assurer sa compatibilité avec la protection de la qualité des eaux du fleuve.
15. Madame et Messieurs les juges, dans ses plaidoiries d’hier l’Uruguay a longuement
entretenu la Cour sur le contenu et le sens de cet accord verbal, dont la pertinence a été reconnue et
confirmée par maintes déclarations officielles très explicites des deux gouvernements et, en
particulier, des chefs d’Etat, y compris bi en entendu le président de l’Argentine,
M. Nelson Kirchner. Il m’appartient d’attirer main tenant l’attention de vot re Cour sur le fait que,
tant l’accord verbal du 2 mars 2004 que la pratique dont il a été à l’origine ⎯ conformément aux
indications contenues dans l’article 31, paragraphe 3 a) et b), de la convention de Vienne sur le
droit des traités ⎯ témoignent de l’existence claire d’un e entente quant à l’interprétation à donner
aux dispositions des articles 7 et suivants du stat ut du fleuve Uruguay. C’est une interprétation
pouvant être qualifiée d’authentique, qui exclut tout droit de veto à l’avantage d’une partie pour ce
qui est de la réalisation par l’autre partie ⎯même avant la saisine de la Cour ⎯ des projets
tombant sous l’article 7 du statut, pourvu que cette partie s’acquitte préalablement de bonne foi de
ses obligations de prévention, d’information complète et de négociation et qu’elle continue de s’en
acquitter tant pendant la construction que pendant la mise en service des Œuvres projetées. - 23 -
16. Je tiens à être clair à ce sujet. Dire que l’accord de 2004 et la pratique dont il a été à
l’origine confirment que le statut ne reconnaît pas le droit de veto ne signifie nullement prétendre
que cet accord a fait disparaître comme par magi e tous les différends au sujet des obligations
découlant du statut, par rapport aux usines de pâ te à papier. Dans la prochaine phase de la
procédure la Cour aura à en connaître, mais pour l’Uruguay ces différends ne sauraient concerner
que le respect ou la violation des obligations prévues par le statut, notamment en matière d’échange
d’informations, de coopération po ur la protection du fleuve Uruguay, et non pas des prétendus
droits que le statut ne confère pas
17. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, cette interprétation du statut apparaît d’autant
plus judicieuse et satisfaisante qu’elle est la seu le en harmonie avec les principes fondamentaux du
droit international contemporain, qui jouent un rô le essentiel pour identifier la signification des
obligations découlant du traité. Et ce non seulement à cause du renvoi explicite qui figure à
l’article 1 dudit traité : comment oublier ce qu’établit en géné ral l’article 31, paragraphe 3 c), de la
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, d’après lequel il faut justement tenir compte, pour
l’interprétation d’un traité, «de t oute règle pertinente de droit international applicable dans les
relations entre les parties». Or, l’un des principes fondamentaux du droit international
contemporain ⎯ qui est aussi un principe fondamental du droit international de l’environnement ⎯
est celui relatif à la souveraineté permanente des Etats sur leurs ressources naturelles.
18. Innombrables sont les instruments proclama nt ou réaffirmant le principe de souveraineté
permanente des Etats sur leurs re ssources naturelles, à partir de la célèbre résolution 1803 (XVII)
de l’Assemblée générale de 1962 : il serait fastidieux, et même impossible de les citer tous. Il est
plus important de rappe ler que toutes les résolutions, décl arations et conventions les plus
significatives portant sur la protection de l’e nvironnement soulignent le rôle essentiel de ce
principe en en faisant application dans le domai ne qui est le leur. La formule utilisée reprend
souvent celle du principe 21 de la déclarati on de Stockholm de 1971 sur l’environnement humain
ou du principe 2 de la déclaration de Rio sur l’environnement et le développement de 1992, d’après
quoi :
«Conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies et aux principes du droit
international, les Etats ont le droit souverain d’exploiter leurs propres ressources selon
leur politique d’environnement et de dével oppement, et ils ont le devoir de faire en - 24 -
sorte que les activités exercées dans les limites de leur juridiction ou sous leur contrôle
ne causent de dommages à l’environnement dans d’autres Etats ou dans des zones ne
relevant d’aucune juridiction nationale.»
19. Madame le président, le principe de la souveraineté permanente, et son application en
matière de protection de l’environnement, ont des implications évidentes sur les questions qui nous
intéressent ici. Des implications qu’articule exp licitement de manière particulièrement suggestive
le paragraphe 3 de la résolution 2995 (XXVII) de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies de 1972,
où l’Assemblée confirme l es obligations de coopération et d’in formation auxquelles les Etats sont
soumis lorsqu’ils envisagent d’entreprendre des travaux risquant de porter préjudice à
l’environnement dans des zones non soumises à le ur juridiction; mais, ainsi que l’Assemblée
générale le souligne avec force, «sans que cela puisse être interprété comme habilitant un Etat
quelconque à retarder ou entraver des programmes ou projets d’exploration, d’exploitation ou de
mise en valeur des ressources naturelles des Etats su r le territoire desquels sont entrepris de tels
programmes ou projets».
20. Le débat qui a eu lieu devant votre prét oire a permis à la Cour de saisir quelle est
l’importance essentielle pour l’avenir de l’Uruguay du programme industriel relatif à la création
des usines de pâte à papier: c’est le programme industriel le plus importa nt qui ait jamais été
décidé, duquel dépend le développe ment durable du pays tout entier. Un programme qui doit se
réaliser indiscutablement dans le respect des obligations pesant sur l’Uruguay en matière de
protection de l’environnement, mais par rapport auquel il est inconcevable que sa réalisation puisse
être subordonnée au consentement préalable d’un autre Etat ⎯ fût-il un Etat voisin et frère ⎯ sauf
si une disposition conventionnelle préci se et explicite le prévoit. Ce n’est pas le cas du statut de
1975, comme ce n’est pas le cas d’ailleurs de l’ écrasante majorité des traités bilatéraux et
multilatéraux portant sur des questions similaires.
21. De l’idée qu’un Etat ne saurait ⎯en invoquant la protection de l’environnement ⎯
bloquer par une sorte de droit de veto la réalis ation de programmes impor tants de développement
par d’autres Etats qui s’acquittent de bonne foi de leur obligation de coopé ration et d’information
en vue d’éviter des dommages environnementaux, est empreinte aussi la convention de New York
de1997 sur le droit relatif aux utilisations des c ours d’eau internationaux à des fins autres que la
navigation. Les articles17, paragraphe3, et 19 de cette convention mettent au clair, en effet, - 25 -
qu’après l’échange d’informations et les négociations , l’Etat intéressé au projet peut, pourvu qu’il
respecte certains délais et conditions, décider de le réaliser, sans que sa décision soit subordonnée à
l’aboutissement des procédures de règlement des différends.
22. Il convient de remarquer que ces concepts ne représentent pas un nouveau
développement, mais sont bien ancrés dans la conscience juridique internationale depuis bien
longtemps. Il suffit, pour justifier cette affirmation, de se souvenir d’une célèbre sentence arbitrale
qui a été déjà rappelée, déjà an cienne: celle dans l’affaire du Lac Lanoux (Espagne c. France)
de 1957. Le Tribunal avait justement exclu la possi bilité d’admettre une sorte de droit de veto en
faveur de l’Espagne pour des travaux effectué s par la France et affectant un cours d’eau
international, en mettant en exergue qu’un tel droit aurait représenté une limitation excessive pour
la souveraineté de la France; mais le Tribunal av ait bien entendu insisté aussi sur les obligations
pesant sur la France en matière d’information, de coopération et de négociation avec le pays voisin.
Le professeur Sands a soutenu que ce précédent ne serait pas pertinent en l’espèce parce que, dans
cette affaire, il n’y avait pas un traité établissant un régime précis comme c’est le cas pour le
statut5. Or, c’est le contraire qui est vrai : en effet, ni le traité de Bayonne pour le lac Lanoux, ni le
statut pour le fleuve Uruguay n’octroient expr essément un droit de veto. Est donc parfaitement
approprié ici aussi le raisonnement du Tribunal arbitral dans cette affaire quand il affirme ceci :
«Admettre qu’en une matière détermin ée il ne peut plus être exercé de
compétence qu’à la condition ou par la voie d’un accord entre deux Etats, c’est
apporter une restriction essentielle à la souvera ineté d’un Etat, et elle ne saurait être
6
admise qu’en présence d’une démonstration certaine.»
Or, le moins que l’on puisse dire, c’est qu’une telle «démonstration certaine» n’a pas été
administrée dans le cas présent.
23. En conclusion, Madame le président, Messieu rs les juges, l’Etat défendeur vous prie de
juger que le fait que l’Uruguay ait accordé l’auto risation à la construction des usines de pâte à
papier sans l’accord préalable de l’Argentine ne constitue pas prima facie une violation des
obligations découlant du statut du fleuve Ur uguay: la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires ne se justifie donc non plus sous cet angle. Nous avons en tendu répéter à plusieurs
5
CR 2006/46, p. 36 (Sands).
6Affaire du Lac Lanoux, arrêt du 16 novembre 1957, Recueil des sentences arbitrales, vol. XII, p. 306. - 26 -
reprises que votre pouvoir de prescrire ce genr e de mesures a un caractère «exceptionnel».
L’Uruguay vous prie instamment, Madame et Mess ieurs les juges, de ne pas exercer ce pouvoir
exceptionnel en mettant en doute le droit de souveraineté permanente de l’Uruguay sur ces
ressources naturelles.
Je vous remercie, Madame et Messieurs les j uges. Je vous prie, Madame le président, de
e
bien vouloir donner la parole à M Reichler.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Condore lli. I now invite Mr. Reichler to address
us.
Mr. REICHLER: Madam President, Members of the Court, I am once again honoured to
appear before you. I would like to start off on a positive note by assuring you, Madam President,
and Members of the Court, that Uruguay shall not k eep you here until 6.30 today. It is my role
today to demonstrate why provisional measures are not required to protect what Argentina claims is
its procedural right under the Statute to prevent Uruguay from carrying out these works without its
prior consent.
Yesterday, I explained why provisional measu res are not warranted with regard to the
substantive right claimed by Argentina, that is , Argentina’s right to protect the UruguayRiver
against contamination in violation of Articles 40 to 43 of the Statute. I explained that, with respect
to that substantive right ⎯ the existence of which Uruguay does not dispute ⎯ Argentina’s request
for provisional measures must fail for three separat e reasons, each of which is itself sufficient to
require the denial of Argentina’s request: first, because Argentina has failed to demonstrate that
there is an imminent or urgent threat to its right to protect the river against contamination; second,
because Argentina has failed to demonstrate that its right is threatened with irreparable harm; and
third, because the indication of the provisional me asures requested by Argentina, especially the
suspension of construction, would irreparably prej udice the fundamental rights of Uruguay that are
at issue in this case.
Madam President, Members of the Court, for these very same reasons ⎯ and more ⎯
Argentina has failed to show why provisional measures are required to protect its alleged - 27 -
“procedural right” to prevent Uruguay from going forw ard with the cellulose plants in the absence
of Argentina’s prior consent.
In the first place, Uruguay maintains that the procedural right claimed by Argentina does not
exist. Put simply, there is no obligation on Urugua y’s part to obtain Argentina’s “prior consent”
for the construction of these cellulose plants. As Professor Condorelli has just demonstrated, the
Statute for the Uruguay River does not impose such an obligation. Nor does general international
law. Nor has either Party, Argentin a or Uruguay, ever before contended ⎯ in the 31-year history
of the Statute ⎯ that it requires one of them to obtain the prior consent of the other before
authorizing a project that might affect the water quality of the river. Nor does Argentina’s
Application of 4 May 2006 claim that such an ob ligation exists. Nor does Argentina’s request for
provisional measures of the same date contend that such an obligation exists. The very first time
Argentina offered this interpretation of the St atute was yesterday, when Professor Sands argued
that “where Argentina has objected to a project th at is subject to the requirements of the Statute ⎯
as it has in the present case ⎯ Uruguay is not entitled to carry out any works”, and that Argentina
has the right “to have this Court resolve any differences before construction takes place”.
ProfessorCondorelli has shown that Argentina h as no such right, and that Professor Sands’s
innovative interpretation of the Statute is incorrect.
This morning Professor Sands made a revealing, and Uruguay would suggest a significant
concession on behalf of Argentina. In response to my statement yesterday, that in the 31-year
history of the Statute Argentina has never before suggested, not even once, that Articles 7 to 13 of
the Statute imposed on the Parties an obligati on to obtain each other’s prior consent before
undertaking a project that is covered by Article7 ⎯ ProfessorSands said that, in response to my
statement ⎯ Argentina made every effort to identify an instance, at any time in the last 31years,
when it espoused the interpretation of Articles 7 to 13 that Professor Sands advocated yesterday in
these hearings. And Argentina found nothing. And Argentina supplied the Court today with
nothing. And that is because there is nothing. And that is because what I said yesterday on behalf
of Uruguay is correct and cannot be controverted: at no time in the 31-year history of this Statute,
until Professor Sands took the podium yesterday, did Argentina ever claim that the Statute required
one of the Parties to obtain the agreement or prio r consent of the other before undertaking a project - 28 -
that could affect the water quality of the Uruguay River. Nor did Argentina ever take the position
that the Party proposing to initiate a project coul d not do so until negotiations or litigation in this
Court have run their course. Pr ofessor Sands’s reference to the “limited time available” is not a
good excuse. This is a very serious case. Sure ly, if Argentina had evidence, documentary or
otherwise, of its having espoused his interpretation of the Statute at any time in the last 31 years it
would have brought that evidence with it to The Hague and presented it to the Court.
It presented nothing of the kind. Instead, all Argentina was able to produce was a single
statement by a Uruguayan lawyer, Dr.Edison Gonzalez Lapeyre. Uruguay agrees with
ProfessorSands that Dr. Gonzalez Lapeyre is an expert on the Statute. It is therefore most
significant what the excerpt from his book, introduced by Argentina this morning, does not say. It
does not say that Uruguay or Argentina must obtain the agreement or prior consent of the other
Party before undertaking a project that is subject to Article7. It does not saythatifoneofthe
Parties objects to the project, the other Party must delay commencement of it until the dispute
resolution process, including litigation in this Cour t, has run its course. All that the excerpt
presented by Argentina says is that for the CARU to make a decision both Parties have to be in
agreement. It says it is “ the Commission which gives a valid decision only with the agreement of
the two delegations”. While Dr. Gonzalez Lapeyr e’s book is quite erudite and informative, this
passage is nothing more than a statement of th e obvious. The CARU is a binational entity,
composed of delegations of equal size representing both Uruguay and Argentina. It can only make
decisions when the two delegations are in agreemen t. More to the point, there is nothing in the
book, and certainly nothing in the Statute, that sugg ests that either State must obtain the agreement
of the CARU before undertaking a project under Article7. Not even ProfessorSands claims that
such an agreement is required by the Statute. Nor has Argentina ever made such a claim.
Uruguay submits that it can now be concluded that neither Party, neither Argentina nor
Uruguay has ever before interpreted the Statute to require one Party to obtain the other Party’s
consent before undertaking a project under Article 7, and that the interpretation offered by
Professor Sands yesterday finds no support in the understanding or the practice of either Party over
the last 31 years. - 29 -
In any event, as ProfessorCondorelli has shown, this is an issue which goes directly to the
merits of the dispute between the two Parties. Th e interpretation of the Statute, and in particular
the rights and obligations of the Parties under Article s 7 through 13 of the Statute, are at the heart
of this dispute. Although the Application mak es no allegation that Uruguay had an obligation to
obtain Argentina’s “prior consent” before authoriz ing construction of the cellulose plants, or that
Uruguay violated such an obligation, it does allege in general terms that Uruguay violated Article 7
of the Statute in authorizing these plants. Urug uay has emphatically denied that it violated
Article7 or any other article of the Statute. It has also denied the existence of an obligation to
obtain Argentina’s prior consent before authorizing c onstruction of the works. It is quite apparent,
therefore, that at the merits phase of these proc eedings the Court will be called upon to determine
precisely what rights and obligations are created by the Statute, and in particular whether the
Parties are obligated to obtain each other’s prio r consent before authorizing a project that may
affect the water quality of the Uruguay River. At the merits phase, the Court will have to decide
whether such a right exists, and if so whether it has been violated by Uruguay.
mpajorlem ⎯ but not the only problem ⎯ with Argentina’s request is that it requires
the Court to make this decision now, at the interim measures phase, rather than at the merits phase.
Uruguay respectfully submits that it would be impossible for the Court to indicate the provisional
measures requested by Argentina ⎯ the suspension of construction ⎯ without prejudging the
merits in a way that fundamentally and permanen tly prejudices the very rights that Uruguay is
claiming in these proceedings.
In the words of ProfessorSands, Argentina claims a right under Articles7 to 13 and 60 of
the Statute “to have this Court resolve any di fferences before construction takes place”. Uruguay
not only denies that Argentina has such a right, but claims an equivalent and opposite right for
itself. Specifically, Uruguay claims that, having fulfilled all of its obligations under the Statute,
including its obligations under Articles7 to 13 and 60, it has the sovereign right to proceed with
construction of the plants unless and until the Cour t decides otherwise at the conclusion of the
merits phase. These competing claims and interp retations of the Statute offered by Uruguay and
Argentina will be resolved ⎯ and ought only to be resolved ⎯ at the merits phase. - 30 -
But Argentina asks the Court to resolve them now ⎯ in its favour and to Uruguay’s
prejudice. By ordering the suspension of the wo rks now, the Court would effectively decide the
merits of this issue in favour of Argentina a nd against Uruguay. Such an order would have the
practical effect of sustaining Argentina’s claim on the merits that it has the right, as
ProfessorSands alleged, “to have this Court r esolve any differences before construction takes
place”, because the order would accomplish exactly th at: halt all construction until the differences
between the Parties are resolved by the Court. And the order would necessarily have the
concomitant effect of denying ⎯ permanently ⎯ Uruguay’s claim on the merits that the Statute
entitles it to proceed with construction of the wo rks pending the Court’s ultimate decision on the
merits. Moreover, the denial of Uruguay’s claim would be final, and the right claimed by Uruguay
would be irretrievably lost, even if the Court were ultimately to decide this issue, on the merits, in
Uruguay’s favour. With respect, in such circum stances an eventual decision by the Court in
Uruguay’s favour would be meaningless. What good would it do Uruguay to have a judgment in
its favour, sustaining its right to proceed with cons truction of the plants during the course of this
litigation, after the litigation has ended and it has been prevented from proceeding with
construction during the entire course of the litigation?
The jurisprudence of the Court is clear that great care must be taken not to indicate interim
measures that in effect constitute an interim judgment. Many cases can be cited, including the case
concerning the Factory at Chrozów, in which Germany’s request unde r Article 41 was rejected by
the Court because “the request of the German G overnment cannot be regarded as relating to the
indication of measures of provisional protection, but as designed to obtain an interim
judgment . . .”.
On this point, there is great uniformity among the commentators. Professor Rosenne has
written: “The power to indicate provisional measure s cannot be invoked if its effect would be to
grant the applicant an interim judgment in favour of all or part of the claim formulated in the
document instituting proceedings.” ( The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996 ,
Vol. III, p. 1456). And I can also cite my frie nd Professor Pellet in support of this proposition, in
the case concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France : “[T]he request for the indication of
provisional measures cannot be designed to ‘obtain an interim judgment in favour of a part of the - 31 -
claim’. This obviously holds true a fortiori in cases such as this when th e request is quite simply
designed to prejudge the merits of the case as a whole . . .” (CR 2003/21, para. 3). Likewise in this
case, the Court must deny Argentina’s request for provisional measures in order to avoid
prejudging the merits and giving Argentina an interim judgment on its claim.
The Court must also deny Argentina’s requ est for provisional measures on the separate and
independent grounds that there is no urgent need to protect Argentina from imminent harm and
there is no risk of irreparable injury. While the Parties disagree about the nature and extent of the
procedural rights and obligations set forth in Articles 7 to 13 of the Statute, they are in agreement,
it would appear, on the purpose and objective of these procedures. They are intended to provide
some measure of protection for each State against violation of the substantive provisions of the
Statute by the other, in this case the substantive provisions against contamination of the river set
forth in Articles 40 to 43. To provide such protection, the Statute requires that a party initiating a
project, in this case Uruguay, notify the other party of the project, and it further requires the
initiating party to provide the other party with sufficient information to make a judgment as to
whether its interests will be adversely affected by the project. It also requires the initiating party to
engage in negotiations if the other party objects to the project. And finally, if the affected party
still opposes the project, that party can take the ma tter to this Court to determine whether the
project violates the substantive provisions of the Stat ute, again, in this case, the anti-contamination
provisions of Articles 40 to 43. It is quite appare nt that all of these procedures are directed toward
protection of the non-initiating State against a substantive violation of the Statute by the initiating
State. That is the harm that the procedures set forth in Articles7 to 13 are designed to protect
against.
I shall not repeat the arguments I made yesterda y, to the effect that Argentina has failed to
show that there is an urgent need to protect its substantive rights under the Statute, namely, the
right to protect the Uruguay river against contamin ation or impairment of its water quality. These
arguments can be found at paragraphs 8 through 50 of my speech of 8 June. However, I would like
to add a reference to the article by my friend Professor Marcelo Kohen which was published in the
Argentine newspaper El Clarín earlier this year, and which can be found at tab24 of the judges’ - 32 -
folder. Professor Kohen had this to say about a provisional measures request that might be filed by
Argentina:
“If taken to The Hague with the idea of obtaining provisional measures, the
strict interpretation of the Court of the requirements of ‘urgency’ and ‘irreparable
harm’ have to be taken into consideration. Going to the Court with the mere objective
of obtaining a judgment against Uruguay for supposedly infringing the consultation
mechanism of the Statute of 1975 makes little sense. The Foreign Ministry must
utilize its energies for other disputes of greater importance that merit a judicial
proposal. I do not advise going to the Court in this case.”
Both Professor Kohen and Ambassador RuizCe rutti have complained about the references
that my colleague Professor Condorelli and I have made to what they have labelled the “so-called
bilateral agreement of 2 March 2004”. With respect, it is not ProfessorCondorelli or I who first
called it so. It was the President of Argentina. And it was the Foreign Minister of Argentina. At
tab10 in the judges’ folder it can be confirmed th at the President of Arge ntina referred to this
agreement of 2 March 2004 as “a bilateral agreement which put an end to the controversy over the
cellulose plant installation at Fray Bentos”. The terms of this agreement were described by the
Foreign Minister, and can be confirmed at tab 11 of the judges’ folder, as including
“a work methodology for the three phases of construction of the project: the planning,
the construction and the operation. In this way comprehensive procedures of control
were developed with regard to the River Uruguay that will continue after the plants are
in operation.”
The fact of the agreement is also recorded in the minutes of the CARU meeting of 15 May 2004, in
which Argentina’s representative stated: “On 2 Ma rch 2004, the Foreign Ministers of Argentina
and Uruguay reached an understanding on a course of action to give to this subject.”
Professor Kohen was not correct this morning when he told the Court that there was no agreement
reached on 2March 2004, and that this was “nothing more or less than a consultation between”
Foreign MinisterBielsa of Arge ntina and Foreign Minister Opertti of Uruguay. ProfessorKohen
today told the Court: “At no time did Argentina gi ve its consent to the construction of the two
mills.” The evidence proves otherwise, and I re fer the Court again to the statements of the
President and the Foreign Minister of Argentina at tabs 9, 10 and 11 of the judges’ folder. I might
add that Argentina has not disputed either the authenticity or the accuracy of the statements located
at tabs 9, 10 and 11. - 33 -
Ambassador Ruiz Cerutti asked why Argentin a would make an agreement with Uruguay for
the construction and operation of the two plants. I do not believe it is incumbent on Uruguay to
supply Argentina’s motivation, but perhaps it could be found at tab 8 of the judges’ folder. This is
the statement that Argentina’s chief technical adviser made at the CARU meeting on 15 May 2004:
“[N]one of the different technical reports evidence that the activity in question
causes an irreversible and unavoidable dama ge to the environment, at least of a
sufficient level that would warrant the su spension of the plant or opposition to its
construction, at least with any scientific basis . . .”
In light of statements like these, a better question for Ambassador RuizCerutti to ask, or
perhaps to be asked of Ambassador Ruiz Cerutti, is: why would Argentina abandon the agreement
it made with Uruguay, and adopt a totally opposite position in these proceedings? The answer may
lie in Argentina’s internal politics in the run-up to national elections, but Ambassador Ruiz Cerutti
would know far more about that than I do.
In my speech yesterday, I explained that Ar gentina’s request for provisional measures, and
especially its request for an order suspending the construction of the plants, must also be denied
because of the irreparable prejudice that this would cause to the fundamental rights of Uruguay that
will be adjudicated on the merits. Referring to the declaration of Martín Ponce de Léon, at tab 15
of the judges’ folder, I detailed the irreparabl e damage to Uruguay’s economy that would result
from a suspension of the works and a cancellation of the projects and more than $1.5billion in
foreign investment by ENCE and Botnia. Ar gentina’s representatives have very cavalierly
suggested that a suspension of construction would have no adverse effects for Uruguay. They have
contended that one of the plants , the one being built by ENCE, agreed to stop construction for
90days. This is incorrect: ENCE did not agree to stop construction, nor did it in fact stop
construction. Except during Holy Week, when it is customary for businesses to give their
employees a holiday, ENCE has not interrupted its construction activities. ENCE issued a press
release for public relations purposes, stating that it would not construct any civil works for 90 days,
but it never had any intention ⎯ or authority from DINAMA ⎯ to construct any civil works
during this 90-day period. As I stated yesterday, to date ENCE has been authorized by DINAMA
only to move earth and prepare the terrain for the ev entual construction of the civil works, which is
scheduled to commence in the second half of this year, assuming DINAMA issues the necessary - 34 -
permits. In the meantime, ENCE has not stopped any of its ongoing construction activities. Nor
has Botnia stopped any of its construction activities.
It has been suggested by Argentina’s re presentatives that in March of this year
HisExcellency, President Tabaré Vazquez of Uruguay requested a 90day suspension of
construction activities by the two companies. This is not a complete description of what President
Vazquez requested. At the time, the two bridg es across the River Uruguay that connect Argentina
and Uruguay were blockaded by Argentine picketers opposed to the construction of the plants. All
truck and auto traffic between the two countri es, and between Uruguay and such key trading
partners as Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia were paraly zed. The cost to Uruguay of these blockades,
which continued uninterrupted through the first week of May, was between $400 and $500 million.
Tourism to Uruguay’s beaches during the critical summer months was dramatically reduced. Trade
was also severely impacted as more than 70percent of Uruguay’s truck traffic depends on the
bridges that were blockaded. Despite its intern ational obligations, the Government of Argentina
refused to dismantle the illegal blockades. In th ese circumstances, and at the specific request of
PresidentKirchner of Argentina, the two Preside nts agreed simultaneously to request that the
Argentine picketers immediately end their blockade of the two bridges to Uruguay, and that the two
companies halt construction of the plants for no more than 90 days as a gesture of good faith. The
requests were made. But the Argentine picketers refused to end the blockade of the bridges to
Uruguay. And the Argentine Government did nothi ng to clear passage across the bridges. Thus,
President Vazquez was moved to say, as record ed in a document presented to the Court by
Argentina on 6 June: “We are not going to nego tiate under pressure, that is to say, while the
blockades of Argentine citizens are cutting off th e bridges, the Government of Uruguay will not
negotiate over this subject, and we say also that the Government of Uruguay is not going to stop
the construction of the cellulose plants in Ur uguay.” Thus, there has been no acceptance by the
President or Government of Uruguay of a suspension of construction, not even for up to 90 days,
much less for the duration of this lawsuit as requested by Argentina.
This morning, Professor Pellet invoked the Blue Fin Tuna and the Land Reclamation cases
before ITLOS. The truth is, neither case is of any use to Argentina. In the Blue Fin Tuna case, all
parties to the dispute were in perfect agreement th at the stocks of blue fin tuna were “severely - 35 -
depleted and is at its historically lowest levels and that this is a cause for serious biological
concern” (Order of 27 August 1999 , para. 71). There is obviously no similar agreement between
the Parties here. The case is thus inapposite.
With respect to the Land Reclamation case, the most pertinent part of that decision is the fact
that Malaysia specifically requested an interim measure ordering Singapore to suspend all land
reclamation works that were the subject of the di spute pending decision of the arbitral tribunal (see
Order of 8 October 2003, para. 23). The Tribunal de nied that request; the works were permitted to
continue. I respectfully suggest that the very same result should pertain here.
Since Argentina has invoked ITLOS case law, I s uggest that there is another case that is far
more instructive on the issues now before the Court ⎯ the MOX Plant case. In that case, Ireland,
there also represented by Mr. Sands, presented essentially the same argument he has submitted here
about the violation of Argentina’s procedural rights (see Order of 8 October 2003). The Court
denied Ireland’s request for interim measures stopping the MOX Plant from commencing
operations. I would refer the Court in part icular to the separate opinion of former
President Mensah dealing with this point.
Finally, I wish to respond to my friend ProfessorSands’s comments about the 2006
environmental sustainability index, which wa s submitted by Argentina this morning.
ProfessorSands is truly one of my dearest friends, or as you would say, “mates”. Like his
countryman, Sherlock Holmes, ProfessorSands thinks he has come upon a clue, or as he put it, a
“nugget”, one which exposes Uruguay as an environmental delinquent. Actually the explanation is
simple and mundane. For the current year, in cont rast to 2005, Uruguay did not submit any of the
required data to the authors of the study. Hence it was not included in the study. As
Sherlock Holmes would say “Case closed”. And so is my speech.
Thank you very much, Madam President, Members of the Court, for your kind and courteous
attention to my remarks. I am very grateful for the honour of appearing before you these past two
days.
I respectfully request that the floor now be given to the honourable Agent of Uruguay who
will present Uruguay’s submissions. - 36 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Reichler. I now call the Agent of Uruguay.
M. GROS ESPIELL :
Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, merci beaucoup.
Pour finaliser dans cet après-midi cette audience dans laquelle l’Uruguay a répondu aux
manifestations faites ce matin pa r la République argentine, je voudrais, Madame le président,
résumer les conclusions qui, de l’ avis de mon pays, se dégagent de ce qui s’est passé dans les
audiences des 8 et 9 juin 2006.
Premièrement: l’Uruguay veut souligne r expressément, comme vous-même Madame le
président l’avez fait d’une manière absolument pe rtinente dans l’audience d’hier matin, qu’à ce
stade de la procédure on débat strictement sur la question des mesures conservatoires demandées
par la République argentine. Ce n’est pas correct de joindre à cette question le fond de l’affaire,
voire de donner une place prééminente à celui-ci, qui à ce stade peut seulement être évoqué dans
son étroite relation avec les mesures conservatoires demandées. La République argentine, dans ses
interventions d’aujourd’hui, s’est référée principalement à la question de fond, et seulement de
manière subsidiaire et minimale à la question que la Cour a maintenant devant elle pour décision.
Deuxièmement : l’Uruguay réitère sa volonté de r especter pleinement et totalement le statut
du fleuve Uruguay de1975 et son application. Cette volonté indéfectible de mon gouvernement
repose sur le constant respect du principe pacta sunt servanda, et en même temps elle est une
expression de la bonne foi avec laquelle l’Uruguay agit toujours dans ses rapports internationaux.
Comme expression concrète et exemplaire de cette volonté, je répète ce que j’ai dit hier dans
l’après-midi : mon pays propose et réitère son offre de réaliser un monitorage conjoint et constant
avec la République argentine.
Troisièmement : au cours des expositions réali sées par la République argentine, on a fait des
références réitérées aux effets environnementaux nuisibles qui pourraient résulter du futur
fonctionnement des deux usines. Je voudrais dé nier emphatiquement les données apportées par la
République argentine. Ces références non fondées ne reflètent pas la vérité, puisque aujourd’hui,
avec la technologie contemporaine et le progrès scie ntifique, on peut affirmer sans hésitation qu’il
n’y a aucun danger de contamination. - 37 -
Quatrièmement: je veux réitérer expresséme nt que les deux usines fonctionneront en
respectant les standards de l’Union européenne pour cette industrie, qui deviendront obligatoires en
Europe en2007. Ce fait assure l’application de la plus moderne et sûre technologie et ôte toute
vraisemblance à une affirmation faite à pr opos des conséquences environnementales du
fonctionnement des deux usines.
Cinquièmement: l’Uruguay est le principal intéressé dans la protection de sa population et
de l’écosystème envers tout effet environnemental négatif. Les droits de l’homme de ses habitants,
la protection et la garantie de ces droits sont un devoir inéluctable que mon gouvernement s’honore
à reconnaître. Le droit à vivre et le droit à la protection de la santé sont des formes concrètes du
droit à jouir d’un environnement sain et écologi quement équilibré que tout l’ordre juridique
uruguayen est orienté à protéger. A ces droits humains se joint la préoccupation de garantir le droit
individuel et collectif au développement soutenable , qui, harmonisé avec tous les autres droits de
l’homme, oblige à gouverner pour un pays productif qui assure le droit au travail de tous ses
habitants.
Sixièmement: je réitère maintenant tout ce que j’ai dit hier sur la gravité des blocages des
ponts internationaux, qui ont interrompu la libre communication et la circulation entre les deux
pays. Ces actions ont causé à l’économie urugua yenne des dommages énormes, dont l’évaluation
préliminaire est de quatrecents à cinqcentsmilli ons de dollars. Ces blocages, conséquence de
l’omission par le Gouvernement argentin en violation du droit international, ont aggravé le
différend existant et ont des projections sur la considération par la Cour des mesures conservatoires
de suspension des ouvrages demandées par la République argentine.
Septièmement: tout ce que je viens de dire, naturellement, joint à ce qu’ont dit les
e
professeurs Boyle et Condorelli et M Reichler, montre la volonté de l’Uruguay de respecter
pleinement l’environnement et tous les droits humains des Uruguayens et des Argentins, par une
conduite caractérisée par la transparence, la bonne foi et la volonté d’une action coopérative et
solidaire.
En vertu de toutes les considérations précédentes, l’Uruguay s’oppose fermement à toutes les
mesures conservatoires demandées par la République argentine et, par conséquent, à la suspension
des travaux de construction en cours. - 38 -
En conclusion, au nom de la République oriental e de l’Uruguay, je prie la Cour de rejeter la
demande de mesures conservatoires présentée par la République argentine.
Je vous remercie, Madame le président et Messi eurs les juges, de l’attention que vous avez
portée à l’exposition de la République orientale de l’Uruguay. Merci.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Gros Espiell. This brings the present series of
sittings to an end. It remains for me to th ank the representatives of the two Parties for the
assistance they have given the Court by their oral observations in the course of these four hearings.
I ask the Agents to remain at the Court’s disposal . Subject to this reservation, I declare the present
oral proceedings closed.
The Court will render its order on the request for the indication of provisional measures as
soon as possible. The date on which this order w ill be delivered at a public sitting will be duly
communicated to the Agents of the Parties.
As the Court has no other business before it today, the sitting is now closed.
The Court rose at 6.05 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Friday 9 June 2006, at 4:30 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding