CR 2006/32
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LHAAYE
YEAR 2006
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 19 April 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2006
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 19 avril 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieitgins
Vice-Presi-Kntasawneh
RanjevJaudges
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Mahiou
Kre ća
Couevrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-K.vsce-prh,ident
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
MaMhou.,
Kre ća, juges ad hoc
CgoMfferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by:
Mr. Sakib Softić,
as Agent;
Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, Amsterdam,
as Deputy Agent;
Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission of the United Nations,
Mr. Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law,
Ms Brigitte Stern, Professor at the University of Paris I,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professorat the Faculty of Law of the University of Florence,
Ms Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec, LL.B, LL.M., Barrister at Law, Melbourne, Australia,
Ms Joanna Korner, Q.C., Barrister at Law, London,
Ms Laura Dauban, LL.B (Hons),
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Morten Torkildsen, BSc, MSc, Torkildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norway,
as Expert Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Fuad Šabeta, Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Wim Muller, LL.M, M.A.,
Mr. Mauro Barelli, LL.M (University of Bristol),
Mr. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M,
Mr. Amir Bajrić, LL.M,
Ms Amra Mehmedić, LL.M,
Mr. Antoine Ollivier, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University of Paris X-Nanterre, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine est représenté par :
M. Sakib Softić,
comament;
M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, Amsterdam,
comme agent adjoint;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pa risX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,
M. Thomas M. Franck, professeur émérite à lafaculté de droit de l’Université de New York,
Mme Brigitte Stern, professeur à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Florence,
Mme Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec., LL.B., LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne (Australie),
Mme Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, Londres,
Mme Laura Dauban, LL.B. (Hons),
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Morten Torkildsen, BSc., MSc., Torkildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norvège,
comme conseil-expert et avocat;
S. Exc. M. Fuad Šabeta, ambassadeur de Bosnie-Herzégovine auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Wim Muller, LL.M., M.A.,
M. Mauro Barelli, LL.M. (Université de Bristol),
M. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M.,
M. Amir Bajrić, LL.M.,
Mme Amra Mehmedić, LL.M.,
M. Antoine Ollivier, attaché temporaire d’ense ignement et de recherche à l’Université de
Paris X-Nanterre, - 6 -
Ms Isabelle Moulier, Research Student in International Law, University of Paris I,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the University of Macerata (Italy),
as Counsel.
The Government of Serbia and Montenegro is represented by:
Mr. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., Head of the Law Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Serbia and Montenegro, Professor at the Belgrade University School of Law,
as Agent;
Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetković, Second Secretary of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr.Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the Central European University,
Budapest and Emory University, Atlanta,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Member of the International Law Commission, member of
the English Bar, Distinguished Fellow of the All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Xavier de Roux, Master in law, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Ms Nataša Fauveau-Ivanović, avocat à la cour, Paris and member of the Council of the
International Criminal Bar,
Mr.Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Director
of the Walther-Schücking Institute,
Mr. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), Attorney at Law, Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, and President of the International Law Association of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Sanja Djajić, S.J.D., Associate Professor at the Novi Sad University School of Law,
Ms Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Indianapolis),
Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, Expert-associate at the Office of the Prosecutor for War Crimes of the
Republic of Serbia, - 7 -
Mme Isabelle Moulier, doctorante en droit international à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à l’Université de Macerata (Italie),
comconseils.
Le Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro est représenté par :
M. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., chef du conseil juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Belgrade,
comament;
M. Saša Obradovi ć, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Vladimir Cvetković, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents;
M. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université d’Europe centrale de
Budapest et à l’Université Emory d’Atlanta,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre de la Commission du droit international, membre
du barreau d’Angleterre, Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College, Oxford,
M. Xavier de Roux, maîtrise de droit, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Mme Nataša Fauveau-Ivanovi ć, avocat à la cour, Paris, et me mbre du conseil du barreau pénal
international,
M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université de Kiel, directeur de
l’Institut Walther-Schücking,
M. Vladimir Djeri ć, LL.M. (Michigan), avocat, cabinet Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, et président de l’association de droit international de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,
comme conseils et avocats;
Mme Sanja Djajić, S.J.D, professeur associé à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Novi Sad,
Mme Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Indianapolis),
M. Svetislav Rabrenovi ć, expert-associé au bureau du procur eur pour les crimes de guerre de la
République de Serbie, - 8 -
Mr. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and
Montenegro,
Mr. Miloš Jastrebić, Second Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. PhD. (Cambridge), Walther-Schücking Institute, University of Kiel,
Ms Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
as Assistants. - 9 -
M. Aleksandar Djurdji ć, LL.M., premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Miloš Jastrebi ć, deuxième secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., PhD. (Cambridge), Institut Walther-Schücking, Université de Kiel,
Mme Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
comme assistants. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Franck you have the floor.
Mr. FRANCK: Thank you, Madam President, Members of the Court. I will be speaking this
morning again about the subject of State responsibility for genocide in the context of Article IX of
the Genocide Convention.
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE
The law of State responsibility for genocide is precisely applicable to this case
1. The Applicant asks that this honourable Court determine that actions committed in Bosnia
by the Respondent constitute genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention. Article IX
of the Convention clearly authorizes the Court to make that very determination. The facts we have
presented in evidence ⎯ facts about killings, torture, rape and deliberate displacement of very large
numbers of non-Serbs within the territories identified for ethnic cleansing ⎯ make clear that the
policy of Belgrade was one of deliberate destru ction of the ethnic and religious groups that
inhabited the coveted territories and stood in the wa y of their incorporation into a Greater Serbia.
This is precisely the sort of thing that Article IX covers.
2. The policy of Belgrade, as early as 12Ma y1992, was reported by the Secretary-General
to the Security Council to the effect that Serb forces, with the active participation of the JNA ⎯ the
Yugoslav army ⎯ were engaged in a campaign to create “ethnically pure regions” through “the
1
seizure and intimidation of the non-Serb population” of large parts of Bosnia.
3. A few days later, on 15 May 1992, the Secu rity Council called for an end to the forcible
expulsion of persons from these territories and condemned “any attempt to change the ethnic
composition of the population” by force: a force it recognized, at that very time, was being exerted
2.
by “units of the Yugoslav People’s Army . . .”
4. Yet, by the end of the year, the Secretar y-General reported that the JNA forces still had
not been withdrawn . . . 3. And the General Assembly cried out that “the Muslim population [is]
1S/23900, para. 5, 12 May 1992.
2
SC res. 752 (1992), 15 May 1992.
3
A/47/147, 18 December 1992. - 11 -
4
threatened with virtual extermination” for which it blamed “the Republic of Serbia” and “the
Yugoslav Army” 5. These findings were reiterated in December of 1993 . This is not a matter of
attribution. It is a finding of direct responsibility.
5. What is Belgrade saying in response? That it did not happen? That we are making it all
up? That the Security Council and the General Assemb ly were hallucinating? Or that it was all so
long ago that the embers have all but died and we should not be raking the coals?
7
6. When we quote Karadzic as promising that the Muslim people would be “annihilated”
shall we dismiss this as a mere figure of speech? Can we do so after the execution of thousands in
cold blood at Srebrenica by Serb militias armed, paid, supported and guided by Belgrade? What
are we to call Karadzic and Mladic and the Serb generals and colonels? Mad dogs? But who fed
them? Who unchained them? And who, when th eir mayhem became obvious, kept on caring for
them whenever they needed replenishment?
7. Co-President Mrs. Plavsic has answered that question: by October 1991, she admitted to
the ICTY, the leadership
“knew and intended that the separation of the ethnic communities would include the
permanent removal of ethnic populations, either by agreement or by force and . . . that
any forcible removal of non- Serbs from Serbian8claimed territories would involve a
discriminatory campaign of persecution” .
But this was also obvious from the actions taken, and it could not have been less than obvious in
Belgrade, as it was at United Nations Headquarters. It was a very public campaign.
8. And what a campaign of persecution it was. The Trial Chamber of the ICTY, in the
Brdanin case confirmed this and found that there was agreement to use force and fear to expel
9
non-Serbs from the areas to be ethnically cleansed of non-Serbs . One may cavil at the precise
numbers of civilians killed, or women raped, or pers ons tortured, but that in no way alters the fact
that is central to this case and that has been confirmed, again and again, by the evidence we have
4
GA res. 820 (1993), 17 April 1993.
5
Ibid.
6GA res. 44/88 (1993).
7ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Motion for Acquittal, cas e No. IT-02-54-T, 16 June 2004,
para. 241, exhibit 613, tab 8.
8ICTY, Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Factual Basis for a Plea of Guilty, case No. IT-00-39 & 40, 30 September 2002,
para. 10.
9Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, Judgement, case No. IT-99-36-T, 1 September 2004, para. 65. - 12 -
presented: that during the period 1992-1995 there occurred a deliberate effort, one that was largely
successful, to destroy the non-Serb communities of substantially more than half of the country.
Not one shred of evidence produced before this Cour t begins to rebut this simple fact. And, so,
what are we to do with it? Forget about it? Are we to shrug and say, “Oh, well, that was another
Yugoslavia, another government, another day.”? Are we to applaud the “new” Yugoslavia, for
having, after only eight years of defiance, applied under a brand new name to resume its full
participation in the United Nations? And must that applause include an absolution for everything
done in the past, including the commission of genocide? Is that the appropriate baptismal gift?
The applicable law is Article IX of the Genocide Convention
9. In the first round of the present oral pr oceedings, Professor Brownlie correctly identified
one of the tasks of this litigation. It is to secure the “identification of the applicable law” which, he
added, “is clearly the law of tr eaties, together with the principles of State responsibility for
breaches of the obligations laid down in the treaty instruments” (CR 2006/16, p. 13, para. 13).
10. We fully subscribe to that. We also agree with him that the applicable law in this case is
the Genocide Convention. Indeed, it is precisely the Respondent’s violation of that instrument’s
obligations that is the matter which has brought us before this Court, and it has been brought
exactly in accordance with the treaty’s terms. What Applicant wants redressed is the Respondent’s
breaches of its treaty obligations, the Respondent’s failure to take responsibility for those breaches,
together with the Respondent’s persistent unwillingness to end some of the continuing breaches.
11. Thus, there is a measure of agreement between the Parties as to the centrality of the
Genocide Convention to these proceedings. However, there is no agreement whatsoever as to what
those treaty-based obligations entail. There is no agreement about whether the events we deem
genocidal actually occurred, and, if they did occur, whether they constitute genocide as defined in
the Convention. There is no agreement as to whether the acts can be attributed to the Respondent.
Each of these areas of disagreement will have been addressed by my colleagues during this second
round of pleading. My object in this interven tion is to address the first of the areas of
disagreement. What do the treaty-based obligations actually entail at law? - 13 -
12. Professor Brownlie has given us his version of the actual obligations entailed. In his
view, the Convention requires States to prevent genocide and to punish those persons who commit
genocide. And that is all. Yugoslavia, he says , has already begun to bring to trial several of its
citizens who committed atrocities in what the Respon dent calls the Balkan civil wars. But, he
maintains, that is all the Convention requires.
13. Well, we asked in our written pleadings, what about Article IX of the Convention? Does
it not quite explicitly impose on States a direct responsibility themselves not to commit genocide or
to aid in the commission of genocide? And is th is not an obligation enforceable at law in these
very Chambers? To this, Professor Brownlie responds with a cloud of ambiguity. In his view,
Article IX gives rise to that ambiguity. Where that Article appears to enunciate a principle of State
responsibility for genocide, he sees ambiguity. Where that Article seems to establish the
jurisdiction of this Court to resolve disputes be tween the parties regarding a State’s responsibility,
he sees more ambiguity.
14. It seems necessary to join my colleague and friend Professor Pellet in helping to clear up
the ambiguity about Article IX of the Genocide Convention or, rather, show that there is no
ambiguity at all.
15. On its face, the provision is almost undi plomatic in its utter clarity. The Article
explicitly and clearly imposes on treaty partie s State responsibility for any violation of the
obligations assumed under the treaty, including ⎯ what could be more obvious? ⎯ State
responsibility for genocide or aiding the commission of genocide. It equally establishes that it is
the task of this Court to determine whether there has been a genocide for which a State is
responsible or for the commission of which it has been the facilitator.
Article IX is entirely unambiguous about imposing State responsibility for genocide
16. In construing the law pertaining to State responsibility for genocide, Professor Brownlie
counsels that “two interpretations are possible”: either that Article IX establishes State
responsibility and makes this Court responsible fo r implementing it, or, alternatively, that the
Article merely establishes the Court’s competence to “render a declaratory judgment relating to
breaches of the duties to prevent and punish the commission of genocide by individuals” - 14 -
(CR2006/16, p.13, para.14). Such a reading, were it adopted by the Court, would leave one of
the most important provisions of the Convention, carefully drafted, in a cloud of ambiguity.
17. But there are not two plausible interpreta tions of Article IX. To support his claim,
Professor Brownlie summons up, from the deepest recesses of the instrument’s drafting history, an
early version of the Convention that, indeed, did not include Article IX in its present crystalline
form. That rudimentary draft envisaged a much more limited role for this Court. And it made no
provision for State responsibility.
18. But the omissions of the early draft, sure ly, merely underscore the importance of the
changes made by the Parties, when those omissi ons were remedied during later stages of the
negotiations. We canvassed those changes extens ively in our earlier written and oral pleadings.
The changes were made carefully, after ample discus sion, precisely to ensure that States, and not
only individuals, would be held accountable ⎯ and accountable before this very Court ⎯ for acts
of genocide. It was cl ear from the drafting discussions that this would be an obligation, and a
remedy, which would complement and supplement the institution of criminal penalties that could
be levied against individual miscreants.
19. In order to present as ambiguous the draf ting changes made to Article IX, changes that
were so clearly meant to institute State responsibility for genocide, Professor Brownlie immerses us
in an account of the debates in which delegates laboriously explained that the changes they were
making would not entail criminal penalties: that the responsibility being affixed to States was not
to be regarded as criminal responsibility. While this is certainly true, it proves nothing. Indeed,
when he quotes the French delegate, Charles Chau mont, Professor Brownlie rather dismantles the
case for ambiguity. What Mr. Chaumont actually said, very sensibly, was that he was “in no way
opposed to the principle of the international respon sibility of States so long as it was a matter of
civil, and not criminal, responsibility” ( id., p.20, para.46). Well, exactly. The changes of which
Mr. Chaumont approved were to establish, beyond any doubt, State responsibility. No one, then or
now, argues that this is criminal liability. Were it otherwise, this Court would have had to create an
entirely different and unimaginable procedure, and the outcome, presumably, would involve the
possibility of punitive penalties. We have never sought anything of the sort. - 15 -
20. What we have here, from the Respondent, is simply a diversion: an obfuscation of the
obvious meaning of Article IX, a meaning that is totally explicit on its face. The text makes
“[d]isputes between the Contracting Parties... including those relating to the responsibility of a
State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III” amenable to resolution by this
Court, applying the Convention’s clearly enunciated principles of State responsibility.
21. Members of this Court, Professor Brownlie even quotes at some length from your
Judgment at the jurisdiction phase of this case, way back in 1996. But you will recall that, in your
Judgment, you had already rejected precisely this same argument, the very one being made again
now. And, you held then that Article IX establ ishes State responsibility for genocide. And you
also held, very precisely, that the same Article IX designates you, this Court, to determine any
dispute between the parties arising out of a purported violation of that responsibility.
22. I urge you, Members of the Court, to put th is tired horse out to pasture. There is nothing
in the least ambiguous about Article IX. It says what it means, it means what it says, and it was
very deliberately drafted with precisely a situation⎯ a dispute ⎯ such as this one in mind.
The acts constituting genocide are not defined in terms of numbers but of intent
23. Permit me, Madam President, to examine briefly another of the many aspects of the
definition of genocide as to which we appear to be at odds with the Respondent. Ever since this
case began, the Respondent has tried to draw us into a sort of numbers game, in which the issue
between us becomes: who has the most precis e demographics of genocide, rather than the
genocide itself. We have done our best, as evidence has become available, as it has been received
by UnitedNations Commissioners and Rapporteurs, as it has been reported by reputable news
sources and recorded by cameras, sometimes ones held by the Respondent’s own militiamen, we
have done our best to present this evidence to the Court as objectively as possible. But it is not our
principal object to fix the precise number of men shot at Srebrenica, or women raped or prisoners
tortured at Prijedor, or in the many other camps whose existence and operation has been so richly
documented in this Court and in the processes of the ICTY. Numbers matter, of course, but
genocide, Madam President, does not have a numerical threshold. - 16 -
24. To the extent that the demographics of genocide do matter, it is primarily because, to
demonstrate genocide it is necessary to demonstrate intent. And intent, honourable Members of the
Court, can be inferred from the magnitude of acts, from the dimension of the acts and the pattern of
their commission. Let there be no ambiguity about it, and, please, let it not become a numbers
game. In Bosnia, the acts committed were of such seriousness, and involved such large numbers of
victims, and occurred in such a pattern of re petition all over the area designated for ethnic
cleansing, that there can be no question about the intent of those who orchestrated those policies.
In the Plavsic case, the ICTY accepted that the forcible expulsion s “included mass killings” of
non-Serbs in “numerous municipalities” 10occurred. The numbers there cited by the Tribunal to
support these conclusions were believed by the Yugoslav Criminal Tribunal to be accurate, but
they were important, not alone because they were huge, but also because of what their dimension
signified about motive. In the Kristic case the ICTY found that, at some point, at Srebrenica, “a
decision was taken... to kill all the captured Bosnian Muslim men indiscriminately” and from
this, the judges said, could be inferred the intent to destroy in whole or in part the group “as
such” 11. Can it really matter whether the actual number killed in that one event turns out to be
7,000 or 10,000?
25. There is something else that needs to be stressed here. The number killed is only
relevant to a calculation of the size of what is only the tip of the iceberg. The demography of
genocide is not constituted solely by counting the nu mbers killed, or tortured, or raped. As the
ICTY said in the Blagojevic case, genocide can occur through “the intentional destruction of the
12
social existence of the group” which can be demonstrated, as we surely have done, by the
“forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly” which, in that instance, manifested the intent
13
to rid an entire area of its Bosnian Muslim population .
26. The Appellate Chambe r of the ICTY in the Krstic case also decided that it was the
evidence of “culpable acts systematically directed at the same group” ⎯ not specific numbers, but
10ICTY, Prosecutor v. Plavsic, case No. IT-00-39 & 40, Judgement of 27 February 2003, paras. 41-42.
11ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 549.
12
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement of 17 January 2005, para. 664.
13Id., para. 675. - 17 -
a pattern of acts systematically directed against the same group ⎯ that constitutes evidence from
14
which genocidal intent can be inferred . Were such culpable acts directed at the same group? It is
beyond doubt. The Krstic Trial Chamber said it
“has been established beyond all doubt that Bosnian Muslim men residing in the
[Srebrenica] enclave were murdered, in mass executions or individually. It has also
been established that serious bodily or mental harm was done to the few individuals
15
who survived the mass executions.”
27. So, Madam President, the question is not: precisely how many were killed? How many
were tortured, how many were raped? How many were displaced? We believe that we have drawn
an accurate record of the dimensions of the disaster that was visited on Bosnia for daring to declare
its independence. The Krstic Trial Chamber has found precisely this pattern of “widespread and
systematic attack . . . launched against the Bosnian Muslim group”. It confirmed
“the humanitarian crisis in Potočari, the burning of homes in Srebrenica and Poto čari,
the terrorization of Bosnian Muslim civilians, the murder of thousands of Bosnian
Muslim civilians in Poto čari or in carefully orchestr ated mass executions, and the
forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly out of the territory controlled by
Bosnian Serbs . . .” 16
Thus there is essentially unrebutted evidence of the scale of acts inflicted on the non-Serb
population, a scale that indisputably is of a di mension, and of a pattern, so as to constitute
“destruction in whole or in part” of that group “as such”. The numbers, surely, are large enough to
make justice weep. What really matters, however, is the project. And, indeed, there was a project,
for the pattern of these acts is far too clear to be random. That pattern speaks for itself: it speaks of
the intent to destroy ⎯ one way or another ⎯ as much as necessary of the non-Serb communities
of Bosnia in order to clear more than half the nation’s territory and, therein, to eradicate any vestige
of the multicultural, multi-religious, multi-ethnic fabric of civic life that had been typical of much
of Bosnia. And it is that intent, rather than the precise counting of corpses, that provides the
fundamental, irrefutable proof of genocide.
28. With your permission, Madam Presiden t, I will address the matter of intent, of mens rea,
further in my pleadings next Thursday.
14Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, paras. 32-38.
15Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33-T, para. 543.
16
Id., para. 537. - 18 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Franck. I now call upon Professor Stern to address
the Court.
Mme STERN :
L ES CRITERES DE DETERMINATION DU GROUPE OBJET DU GENOCIDE AU SENS
DE L ’ARTICLE IIDE LA CONVENTION SUR LE GENOCIDE
1. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, l’élément déterminant qui caractérise le crime
de génocide réside, on le sait, en plus de la comm ission des actes matériels visés à l’article II de la
convention sur le génocide, actes qui ont largement été décrits lors de ces plaidoiries, dans
l’intention spéciale de «détrui re, en tout ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou
e
religieux comme tel». De ce point de vue, je ne peux qu’être d’accord avec M de Roux, lorsqu’il
dit que «[l]e génocide n’est pas un acte criminel diri gé contre un individu, le génocide n’est pas,
non plus, dirigé contre un Etat, il est dirigé co ntre un groupe défini selon les critères national,
ethnique, racial ou religieux» 17.
2. Dans ma plaidoirie sur les violences sexue lles lors du premier tour, j’avais indiqué que
pour qu’il y ait génocide, il fallait que les violence s sexuelles soient commises dans cette intention
de détruire un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux comme tel: cela m’avait amenée à
examiner, comme vous vous en souvenez peut-être, le sens des expressions «détruire», «un
groupe», «comme tel», «en tout ou en partie». L’objet de mon intervention de ce matin ne sera pas
centré sur l’ensemble de ces expressions et je m’appesantirai essentiellement sur le terme de
détermination du «groupe comme tel». Autrement di t, la Bosnie voudrait aujourd’hui précisément
revenir sur la détermination et sur les moyens d’identification du groupe qui a été victime du
génocide, génocide dont nous soutenons que la re sponsabilité incombe à la Serbie-et-Monténégro.
Ce groupe n’aurait pas, selon le défendeur, été suffisamment défini en ce sens que la Bosnie 18a
alternativement pu l’identifier comme le groupe national des Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine
ou encore sous la dénomination générique du groupe des non-Serbes. M e de Roux va jusqu’à dire
19
que le groupe visé est «assez flou» tandis que le professeur Stojanovi ć a déclaré: «[l]e
17CR 2006/19, p. 51, par. 285 (de Roux).
18
CR 2006/19, p. 51, par. 285 (de Roux); CR 2006/21, p. 43, par. 54 (Stojanović).
19CR 2006/19, p. 51, par. 285 (de Roux). - 19 -
20
demandeur aurait dû spécifiquement déterminer le groupe qui aurait été la victime du génocide» .
Je ne pense pas me tromper en disant que nombreux sont ceux qui ici, dans ce grand hall de justice,
n’ont aucun doute sur le groupe victime du génocide qui est tout sauf flou ! Mais, je m’efforcerai
néanmoins d’en préciser les contours.
e
3. Quoi qu’il en soit, je ne reviendrai pas sur la première critique adressée par M de Roux à
la position de la Bosnie, lorsqu’il fait mine de croi re que pour la Bosnie, il y aurait deuxvictimes
du génocide: le ou les peuples de Bosnie, d’une pa rt, et l’Etat bosniaque, d’autre part. Mon ami
AlainPellet a déjà fait justice à cet argument vraiment peu pertinent et a montré de façon
convaincante que si nous ne nions pas que le gé nocide ne peut être perpétré qu’à l’égard d’un
groupe, à notre connaissance les groupes n’ont pas ac cès à votre Cour et c’est bien sûr en ce sens
que la Bosnie présente cette affaire dans laquelle elle accuse la Serbie-et-Monténégro de génocide à
l’égard d’une partie de sa population. Autrement dit, la Bosnie-Herzégovine s’inscrit en faux, de
e
façon véhémente, contre ce qu’a déclaré M de Roux, lorsqu’il l’a accusée de prétendre tour à tour
que le génocide avait été commis contre le peuple bosniaque et contre l’Etat bosniaque, «sans faire
21
une distinction entre les deux» et, ajoute-t- il «sans d’ailleurs à cet égard [s’]expliquer» . J’espère
que les explications que je viens de donner l’éclaireront sur ce point.
4. Je reviendrai par contre un peu plus longuement sur la seconde série de critiques
concernant cette fois l’identification du ou des groupes visés, même, je dois dire, s’il ne m’a pas
toujours été facile de bien saisir où se situait exactement cette critique.
L’identification des victimes, membres des groupes visés à l’article II
de la convention sur le génocide
La victime du génocide doit être ciblée en raison de son appartenance à un des groupes visés
à l’article II
5. Il est clair que le critère de l’appart enance des individus à un groupe déterminé est un
élément essentiel de la définition du génocide, en ce qu’il exclut la qualification de génocide des
actes matériels prohibés mais qui ont d’autres motifs que l’identification d’une personne à un
groupe, comme par exemple l’identité personnelle de la victime, ses relations avec l’auteur ou
20CR 2006/21, p. 43, par. 54 (Stojanović).
21
CR 2006/20, p. 10, par. 297 (de Roux). - 20 -
encore les activités politiques ou militaires de la victime. On sait que la convention sur le génocide
22
a été élaborée pour protéger «le refus du dr oit à l’existence à des groupes humains entiers» et
qu’au-delà même des personnes qui sont individuel lement les victimes immédiates du génocide,
c’est le groupe auquel appartiennent ces individus qui constitue, au final, le destinataire ultime du
crime. Le Tribunal pénal international pour l’ ex-Yougoslavie a, à cet égard, très justement
souligné dans l’affaire Sikirica, que :
«[q]uand bien même ce sont les personnes qui sont les victimes de la plupart des
crimes, la victime ultime du génocide est le groupe , dont la destruction exige
nécessairement que des crimes soient commis contre ses membres, c’est-à-dire contre
23
les personnes appartenant audit groupe» .
Cette même idée a été énoncée par le Tribunal péna l international pour le Rwanda dans l’affaire
Akayesu sur laquelle j’aurai l’occasion de revenir.
6. Ce n’est ainsi pas, je le répète, l’id entité personnelle propre des victimes mais
l’appartenance de ces victimes à un groupe partic ulier qui constitue le critère déterminant dans le
choix des victimes immédiates du crime de géno cide. Lorsqu’est commis un génocide, ceux qui
sont visés ne le sont pas parce qu’ils sont enga gés dans des activités politiques ou militaires, mais
ils sont visés uniquement parce qu’ils appartie nnent à un groupe. Ce n’est pas pour ce qu’elle fait
que la victime d’un génocide est visée, c’est pour ce qu’elle est, ou pour ce que les génocidaires
considèrent qu’elle est. J’ajouterai cependant que si une vict ime est visée pour ce qu’elle est, cela
peut constituer un génocide, même s’il se trouve que cette victime est par ailleurs engagée dans des
activités politiques ou militaires. Je prendrai ici simplement l’exemple des Hutus modérés, visés
parce qu’ils étaient assimilés aux Tutsis, et étai ent donc considérés comme partie intégrante du
groupe, même s’ils étaient aussi visés pour leur soutien politique aux Tutsis.
7. Cette distinction entre les victimes visées pour ce qu’elles sont et les victimes visées pour
ce qu’elles font a été l’occasion d’une étrange contestation par la Serbie-et-Monténégro de son
intention génocidaire, sur la base de l’aide qu’elle a apportée à certains Musulmans contre d’autres
Musulmans. Le raisonnement est alors simplis te: puisqu’il nous est arrivé d’aider certains
22
Résolution 96 (I) de l’Assemblée générale, «Le crime de génocide», 11 décembre 1946, NationsUnies,
doc. A/RES/96 (I), 11 décembre 1946, premier alinéa du préambule.
23
o TPIY, Le procureur c. Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, Dragan Kolundzija (Sikirica et consorts) , affaire
n IT-95-8, Chambre de première instance III, jugement relaf aux requêtes aux fins d’acq uittement présentées par la
défense, 3 septembre 2001, par. 89; les italiques sont de nous. - 21 -
Musulmans, nous disent nos contradicteurs serbes, à lutter contre leurs frères, il en résulte
nécessairement que nous n’avions pas d’intenti on génocidaire, celle-ci ne pouvant se concilier
qu’avec le fait de viser tous les Musulmans. Outre le fait qu e cela ne tient pas compte de la
possibilité envisagée notam ment dans l’affaire Krstic que l’intention génocidaire puisse viser un
groupe dans un cadre géographique restreint 24, cette analyse ⎯ je crois ⎯ méconnaît la complexité
des voies et des moyens par lesquels un génocide peut être commis. Mes contradicteurs se sont
ainsi focalisés sur les événements de Bihac pour tenter de prouver qu’il n’y avait pas de génocide
puisque, dans cette région, il est de notoriété publique que deux factions musulmanes se sont un
temps affrontées. C’est ainsi que nos adversaires sont revenus à de nombreuses reprises sur les
événements de Bihac dans plusieurs plaidoiries et ils ont conféré à ces événements un rôle majeur
dans la contestation de l’existence de leur intention génocidaire. Si nous ne contestons pas les faits,
nous contestons certainement les conclusions qu i en sont tirées. Je rappellerai d’abord très
rapidement l’analyse de la Serbie-et-Monténégro sur ces événements. Voici ce qu’ils nous disent :
«Si une intention génocidaire avait existé chez les Serbes contre les Musulmans
bosniaques en tant que groupe, en tant que groupe ethnique ou en tant que groupe
religieux, il est évident que les Serbes n’auraient pas aidé les Musulmans de
Fikret Abdic car la guerre entre les Serbes de Bosnie et les Musulmans n’était pas une
guerre fondée sur des différences ethniques, nationales ou religieuses…» 25
Cependant, l’explication de cette étrange collusion est donnée par nos adversaires eux-mêmes, sans
qu’ils en soient sans doute parfaitement conscients, quelques séances plus tard, par la bouche du
professeur Brownlie qui a expliqué que: « [t]he relations between Abdi c and the Government of
26
Serbia were evidently opportunist» . Je n’aurais pas pu mieux dire. Mais avant de souligner ce
que cela implique en ce qui concerne l’intentio n génocidaire, je tiens, par parenthèse, à attirer
l’attention de la Cour sur ce que le conseil de la Serbie-et-Monténégro a ainsi reconnu, à savoir
qu’il y avait des relations entre Abdic et le Gouvernement de Serbie, ce qui signifie que le
Gouvernement de Serbie était intimement lié aux événements qui se sont déroulés en Bosnie durant
toute la période du nettoyage ethnique. Outre cette reconnaissance de l’implication de la Serbie,
24TPIY, Le procureur c. Radislav Krstic , affaire n IT-98-33, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
2 août 2001, par. 590; TPIY, Le procureur c. Radislav Krstic , affaire noIT-98-33-A, Chambre d’appel, arrêt,
19 avril 2004, par. 37.
25
CR 2006/18, p. 37, par. 92 (de Roux).
26CR 2006/21, p. 19, par. 14 (Brownlie). - 22 -
qui devrait faciliter nos démonstrations sur l’imputation des actes de génocide à la
Serbie-et-Monténegro, le conseil de cet Etat reconnaît également que les Serbes ont eu des relations
opportunistes avec Abdic, c’est-à-dire qu’ils l’on t manipulé, qu’ils l’ont instrumentalisé. Comme
e
cela a été également expliqué par M de Roux,
«les partisans de Fikret Abdic se sont allié s aux Serbes pour assurer leur survie et,
effectivement, ils ont pu assurer cette su rvie grâce à cette collaboration avec les
Serbes. Mais la collaboration des Serbes et des Musulmans dans cette région ainsi que
l’aide que les Serbes ont donnée à cette population démontrent bien que la guerre
n’avait pas pour objet de détruire un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou
27
religieux…»
Nous ne partageons nullement cette analyse : d’abord, nous pensons qu’il serait plus juste, compte
tenu des rapports de force, de di re que ce sont les Serbes qui se sont alliés avec les Musulmans de
Fikret Abdic, plutôt que l’inverse. Par ailleurs, et surtout j’insiste sur ce point, cette aide ne prouve
pas que l’intention ultime n’était pas de détrui re le groupe, puisqu’il y avait là une tentative
d’introduire dans le groupe lui-même des ferments d’autodestruction. Les Serbes ont utilisé les
Musulmans fidèles à Fikret Abdic pour lutter contre les autres Musulmans, ce qui avait un double
o
avantage, d’une part, poursuivre l’objectif stratégique n 1 dont on vous a déjà longuement parlé de
réunion des territoires peuplés de Serbes et nettoyés de tous les non-Serbes à la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, qui pourrait ainsi atteindre son objectif de Grande Serbie réunissant tous les
Serbes dans un seul Etat et, d’autre part, part iciper de façon particu lièrement perverse à la
destruction du groupe des Musulmans de Bosnie en tant que tel en faisant faire une partie du travail
de destruction par certains membres du groupe. Loin d’être donc un argument à l’appui de
l’absence d’intention génocidaire, on voit donc qu e les événements de Bihac peuvent parfaitement
s’inscrire dans l’intention génocidaire globale. Co mme je l’ai déjà suggéré, ce n’est pas parce que
certains Hutus modérés ont été victimes du génocide à côté des Tutsis qu’il n’y a pas eu de
génocide au Rwanda. De la même façon, ce n’ est pas parce que certains Musulmans ont été des
instruments du génocide commis par les Serbes contre les Musulmans de Bosnie qu’il n’y a pas eu
de génocide en Bosnie-Herzégovine. La perver sion maximale consistant à utiliser certains
membres du groupe en désaccord avec d’autres pour parvenir à la destruction du groupe en portant
le germe de la destruction au cŒur même du groupe visé me semble ici atteinte.
27CR 2006/19, p. 13, par. 154 (de Roux). - 23 -
Les groupes visés à l’article II sont les groupes national, ethnique, racial ou religieux
8. En dépit de certaines propositions tendant à définir le génocide comme la destruction
délibérée d’êtres humains visés en raison de leur appartenance à une collectivité humaine
quelconque comme telle 2, nous savons que les rédacteurs de la convention sur le génocide n’ont
pas retenu une approche aussi large; ils n’ont envisagé la protection que de certains groupes
humains spécifiques, énumérés à l’article II, aux termes duquel le groupe victime du génocide doit
donc être soit un groupe national, soit un groupe ethnique, soit un groupe racial, soit un groupe
e
religieux. Et en ce sens, je ne peux encore qu’être d’accord avec M de Roux, lorsqu’il déclare que
«[l]a liste des groupes déterminés dans l’article II de la convention doit être considérée comme
exhaustive» 29.
9. Après avoir brièvement rappelé les contours généraux du concept de groupe protégé par la
convention, la Bosnie-Herzégovine s’attachera à l’examen des moyens et méthodes qui permettent
de procéder à la détermination et à l’identificat ion du groupe ciblé par les mesures génocidaires.
Cet examen permettra à la Bosnie-Herzégovine de montrer que le groupe visé et considéré comme
protégé au sens de la convention peut théoriquement être envisagé de deux façons. Il peut être
envisagé alternativement sous la dénomina tion positive du groupe des Musulmans de
Bosnie-Herzégovine principalement visé par le génocide et du groupe des Croates de
Bosnie-Herzégovine également visé, même si ce fut à un moindre degré, par les actes de génocide,
ou sous l’appellation négative du groupe des non-Serbes, ce qui évidemment inclut au moins les
deux groupes précédemment mentionnés, et ce ⎯ je le montrerai ⎯ de façon parfaitement
conforme à la convention. Personnellement, il me semble que compte tenu des données de notre
affaire où le génocide est équivalant à un «nettoyage ethnique», la définition négative rend mieux
compte des enjeux, même si je le souligne, les de ux approches permettent plus ou moins d’arriver
au même résultat. N’oublions pas que dans sa résolution 47/121 du 18 décembre 1992,
l’Assemblée générale avait solennellement déclar é que «l’ignoble politique de nettoyage ethnique
est une forme de génocide». Tout ce qui n’étai t pas serbe devait disparaître des territoires
convoités, et, en ce sens, la définition négative rend mieux compte de l’intention génocidaire, ce
28Voir notamment en ce sens, P. N. Drost, The Crime of State. Genocide (vol. II), Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1959,
p 122-123.
29
CR 2006/19, p. 51, par. 287 (de Roux). - 24 -
qui au regard de l’histoire de la région con cernait essentiellement le groupe des Musulmans de
Bosnie, accessoirement celui des Croates de Bosnie, deux groupes qui sont aussi parfaitement
définis si on adopte une approche positive.
L’absence de définition des différents groupes vi sés à l’article II de la convention sur le
génocide
10. Nous savons que si la convention énumère bien les groupes qui ont vocation à être
protégés, elle ne définit cependant pas le sens des expressions employées, elle ne donne aucune
précision supplémentaire s’agissant de la singul arisation de chacun des épithètes «national»,
«ethnique», «racial», «religieux». Il ressort des travaux préparatoires de la convention que «cette
énumération visait davantage à décrire un seul et même phénomène, correspondant en gros à ce
qu’il était convenu d’appeler, avant la deuxième guerre mondiale, les «minorités nationales» qu’à
30
renvoyer à différents groupes distincts de groupes humains» .
11. Les concepts de nation, de race et de relig ion, qui sont par essence imprécis, ne font pas,
31
à ce jour, l’objet de définitions précises gé néralement et internationalement acceptées ; il va donc
sans dire que ces notions suscitent des difficultés importantes d’interprétation dans la mesure où
ces qualifications ne revêtent pas forcément un sens autonome, que certains qualificatifs peuvent
parfois difficilement être envisagés isolément et qu’ils peuvent même se recouper ou se
32
chevaucher . Pour ne prendre qu’un exemple, on a ai nsi pu souligner la difficulté d’opérer une
distinction tranchée entre les notions de «groupe racial» et de «groupe ethnique». Si, pour certains,
l’épithète «ethnique» se rapporte à toutes les caractéristiques biologiques, culturelles ou historiques
30TPIY, Le procureur c. Radislav Krstic , affaire n IT-98-33, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
2août2001, par.556. Dans le même sens, voir W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, Cambridge, University
Press, 2000, p. 116.
31
Nations Unies, ECOSOC, Commission des droits de l’homme, Sous-Commission de la lutte contre les mesures
discriminatoires et de la protection des minorités, version revisée et mise à jour de l’étude sur la question de la prévention
et de la répression du crime de génocide établie par M. B. Whitaker, trente-huitième session, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6,
2juillet 1985, p.19, par.30. Ce manque de clarté est souligné par une jurisprudence constante. Pour le TPIY, voir
notamment Le procureur c. Goran Jelisic , affaire n IT-95-10, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
o
14 décembre 1999, par. 62; Le procureur c.Radislav Krstic , affaire n IT-98-33o Chambre de première instanceI,
jugement, 2 août 2001, per.555; Le procureur c. Radoslav Brdjanin , affaire n IT-99-36-T, Chambre de première
instance II, jugement, 1 septembre 2004, par.682. Pour le TPIR, voir notamment Le procureur c.Georges Andersen
Nderubumwe Rutaganda, affaire n ICTR-96-3-T, Chambre de première instance I, jugement, 6 décembre 1999, par. 56;
Leprocureur c. Alfred Musema, affaire n ICTR-96-13, Chambre de première instance I, jugement et sentence,
27 janvier 2000, par. 161; Le procureur c.Ignace Bagilishema , affaire n ICTR-95-1A-T, Chambre de première
o
instanceI, jugement, 7 juin2001, par.65; Lerprocureur c.Juvénal Kajelijeli , affaire n ICTR-98-44A-T, Chambre de
première instance II, jugement et sentence, 1 décembre 2003, par. 811.
32
Voir W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, Cambridge, University Press, 2000, p. 111. - 25 -
d’un groupe tandis que le terme «racial» ne se rapporte qu’aux caracté ristiques héréditaires
33
physiques , eh bien, d’autres considèrent en revanc he que les deux expressions doivent être
considérées comme synonymes 34.
12. L’absence de définitions précises et internationalement acceptées des épithètes
mentionnées explique la fluctuation et la variété des méthodes qui ont pu être mises en Œuvre par la
jurisprudence pour tenter de définir et d’identifier les groupes protégés par la convention.
Vers une définition des groupes visés : les différentes approches possibles
13. Je montrerai plus précisément que les insuffisances d’une approche fondée sur la
détermination du groupe protégé selon des critèr es purement objectifs ont mis en relief la
nécessaire prise en compte, en parallèle, d’une ap proche subjective de la notion, qui permet de
rendre plus efficace, dans un sens conforme à l’objet et au but de la convention, la détermination du
groupe visé et donc sa protection.
L’inadéquation de la détermination de l’appartenance au groupe selon la seule approche
objective
14. Il semble qu’une des premières affaires dans la jurisprudence des deux tribunaux ad hoc
qui ait procédé à une tentative de définition des qu atre adjectifs qualifiant le groupe pouvant être
visé par un génocide est l’affaire Akayesu. Confronté à la difficulté d’application pratique de ces
concepts, le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda a tenté d’apporter des éléments
d’indications permettant d’éclairer, de manière objective, les différentes épithètes, et de déterminer
par là même l’appartenance des victimes à un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux.
15. Il a ainsi pu considérer, dans cette affaire Akayesu, que le «groupe national» qualifiait
«un ensemble de personnes considérées comme partageant un lien juridique basé sur une
35
citoyenneté commune, jointe à une réciprocité de droits et de devoirs» . Pour définir un groupe
national, on peut en effet se baser sur la défi nition de la nationalité qu e vous reconnaissez comme
33
Dans le sens de cette distinction, voir par exemple S. Glaser, Droit international pé nal conventionnel,
Bruxelles, Bruylant, t. I, 1970, p. 111-112.
34
Voir M. N. Shaw, «Genocide and International Law», in International Law at a Time of Perplexity. Essays in
Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Y. Dinstein (dir. pub.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 807.
35TPIR, Le procureur c. Jean-Paul Akayesu, affaire n ICTR-96-4-T, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
2 septembre 1998, par. 512. - 26 -
étant celle qui a été donnée par votre Cour dans l’affaire Nottebohm ((Liechtenstein c. Guatemala),
deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1955, p.4), dans laquelle elle a indiqué que la nationalité
correspondait à «un lien juridique ayant à sa base un fait social de rattachement, une solidarité
effective d’existence, d’intérêts, de sentiments, jointe à une réciprocité de droits et de devoirs»
(Nottebohm (Liechtenstein c. Guatemala), deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1955, p.23). En
36
ce sens, cette définition englobe d’a illeurs également les minorités nationales . Toujours selon la
jurisprudence du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda, le groupe «religieux», lui, peut être
considéré comme un «groupe dont les membres partagent la même religion, confession ou pratique
de culte» 37 ou les «mêmes croyances» . Le terme «ethnique» qualifie pour sa part généralement
39
un groupe dont les membres partagent une «langue et une culture communes» . Enfin, la
définition du groupe «racial» se trouve fondée sur «les traits physiques héréditaires, souvent
identifiés à une région géographique, indépenda mment des facteurs linguistiques, culturels,
nationaux ou religieux» 40.
16. Il est cependant reconnu que ces qualifi catifs s’avèrent parfois largement artificiels,
41
comme l’a d’ailleurs consta té le défendeur lui-même , et que l’appartenance d’individus à un
groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, par une application stricte de ces critères objectifs et
rigoureusement scientifiques, est parfois extrêmement difficile à établir en pratique. La doctrine et
la jurisprudence sont ainsi unanimes à reconnaître que les concepts d’ethnie, de race ou de nation
36
Nations Unies, ECOSOC, Commission des droits de l’homme, Sous-Commission de la lutte contre les mesures
discriminatoires et de la protection des minorités, version revisée et mise à jour de l’étude sur la question de la prévention
et de la répression du crime de génocide établie par M. B. Whitaker , trente-huitième session, doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6,
2 juillet 1985, p. 18, par. 65. Voir également W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, Cambridge, University
Press, 2000, p. 115; M. N. Shaw, «Genocide and International Law», in International Law at a Time of Perplexity. Essays
in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Y. Dinstein (dir. pub.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 807.
37TPIR, Le procureur c. Jean-Paul Akayesu, affaire n ICTR-96-4-T, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
2 septembre 1998, par. 515.
38TPIR, Le procureur c.Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana , affaire n ICTR-95-1, Chambre de première
instance II, jugement, 21 mai 1999, par. 98.
39TPIR, Le procureur c. Jean-Paul Akayesu, affaire n ICTR-96-4-T, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
o
2 septembre 1998, par. 513; Le procureur c. Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana , affaire n ICTR-95-1, Chambre de
première instance II, jugement, 21 mai 1999, par. 98.
40 o
TPIR, Le procureur c. Jean-Paul Akayesu, affaire n ICTR-96-4-T, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
2 septembre 1998, par. 514.
41
CR 2006/20, p. 14, par. 313 (de Roux). - 27 -
revêtent un certain degré de subjectivité selon le contexte dans lequel ils s’inscrivent et que, par
essence, «l’appartenance à un groupe est une notion plus subjective qu’objective» 42.
La nécessaire prise en compte de critères subjectifs dans l’appréciation de l’appartenance des
victimes à un groupe spécifique
1’a.ffaire Akayesu illustre cette difficulté d’applic ation pratique des seuls critères
objectifs de qualification du groupe. Pour carac tériser juridiquement le génocide des Tutsis,
le TPIR se devait préalablement de déterminer l’appartenance des victimes tutsies du génocide à un
groupe protégé par la convention. Par application du critère objectif, le groupe ethnique se définit,
je venais de le dire, par le fait que ses membres partagent une langue et une culture communes. Or,
la stricte application de ces critères, de même que l’application du critère de la religion, ne
permettait pas en l’espèce de di stinguer les Hutus et les Tuts is, ceux-ci partageant la même
religion, la même langue, la même culture, et il n’ était dès lors pas possible de parler de groupe
ethnique sur la base des critères objectifs en ce qui concerne les Hutus et les Tutsis. C’est la raison
pour laquelle le TPIR a été conduit à situer cette appartenance dans une appréciation plus
subjective.
18. Il s’est à cet égard fondé sur le fait que
«dans le contexte de l’époque…, [les Hutus et les Tutsis] étaient considérés,
reprenant une distinction opérée par la colonisation elle-même comme formant deux
groupes ethniques différents aussi bien par les autorités que par les populations
43
elles-mêmes et leurs cartes d’identité mentionnaient leur appartenance ethnique» .
Pour pouvoir caractériser le groupe des Tutsis en tant que «groupe ethnique» 44 protégé au sens de
la convention, le Tribunal a donc, on le voit, pris en considération à la fois une donnée objective,
fondée sur la détermination institutionnelle du gro upe ethnique (par la mention officielle de la
dénomination «Tutsi» ou «Hutu» sur la carte d’id entité) et une donnée subjective, fondée sur la
perception par la collectivité elle-même de cette différenciation ethnique. Selon le TPIR :
42 o
TPIR, Le procureur c. Georges Andersen Nderubumwe Rutaganda , affaire n ICTR-96-3-T, Chambre de
première instance I, jugement, 6 décembre 1999, par. 56; Le procureur c. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, affaire nTR-01-64-T,
Chambre de première instance III, jugement, 17 juin 2004, par.254. Voir ég alement W. A. Schabas, Genocide in
International Law,Cambridge, University Press, 2000, p. 111.
43TPIR, Le procureur c. Jean-Paul Akayesu, affaire n ICTR-96-4-T, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
2 septembre 1998, par. 122, note n 56; les italiques sont de nous.
44 o
TPIR, Le procureur c. Jean-Paul Akayesu, affaire n ICTR-96-4-T, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
2septembre 1998, par.638; Le procureur c. Juvénal Kajelijeli , affaire n ICTR-98-44A-T, Chambre de première
instance II, jugement et sentence, 1 décembre 2003, par. 817. - 28 -
«[à] la lumière des faits portés à sa connaissance durant le procès, la Chambre
considère que les Tutsis constituaient, au Rwanda, en 1994, un groupe dénommé
«ethnique» dans les classifications officielle s. Ainsi, les cartes d’identité rwandaises
comportaient à l’époque la mention «ubwoko» en kinyarwanda ou «ethnie» en
français, à laquelle correspon dait, selon les cas, les mentions «Hutu» ou «Tutsi» par
exemple. De plus, la Chambre a constaté que chacun des témoins rwandais qui s’est
présenté devant elle a toujours spontanément et sans hésitation répondu aux questions
du procureur s’enquérant de son identité ethnique.» 45
19. Autrement dit, pour répondre à la difficulté d’appréciation du groupe ethnique dans le
contexte rwandais, le TPIR a considéré qu’un «gr oupe ethnique» pouvait être défini à la fois selon
le critère objectif, comme «un groupe dont les membres ont en commun une langue et une
religion», et par application de la méthode dite subjective, comme ⎯je cite encore une fois le
Tribunal, car c’est particulièrement clair ⎯ «un groupe qui se distingue comme tel
(auto-identification) ou un groupe reconnu comme tel par d’autres, y compris par les auteurs des
46
crimes (identification par des tiers)» .
20. La jurisprudence a ainsi mis en évidence une approche dite subjective, permettant de
déterminer le groupe ciblé en fonction du sentiment d’appartenance des victimes elles-mêmes du
crime à ce groupe ou, plus encore, en fonction de la stigmatisation du groupe en tant qu’entité
nationale, ethnique, raciale ou religieuse, par les aute urs du crime, c’est-à-dire «lorsque la victime
47
est perçue par l’auteur du crime comme appartenant à un groupe dont la destruction est visée» . Il
va en effet sans dire que la dénomination du groupe visé implique parfois une certaine subjectivité,
comme Sartre a pu le relever dans ses Réflexions sur la question juive, lorsqu’il écrivait : «[l]e juif
est un homme que les autres hommes tiennent pour juif : voilà la vérité simple d’où il faut partir» 48.
21. Mais cette approche subjective n’est pa s l’apanage du seul TPIR. Cette approche
«subjective», fondée sur la perception soit par la victime, soit par l’auteur du génocide de la
composition du groupe, a été mentionnée dans la jurisprudence du TPIY, pour la première fois,
dans la décision rendue en applicat ion de l’article 61, dans l’affaire Nikolić, donc avant même que
ne soit rendue la décision Akayesu. Le Tribunal a considéré, dans cette affaire, dans le cadre de
45 o
TPIR, Le procureur c. Jean-Paul Akayesu, affaire n ICTR-96-4-T, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
2 septembre 1998, par. 638.
46 TPIR, Le procureur c. Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana , affaire n ICTR-95-1, Chambre de première
instance II, jugement, 21 mai 1999, par. 98.
47 TPIR, Le procureur c. Juvénal Kajelijeli , affaire n ICTR-98-44A-T, Chambre de première instance II,
jugement et sentence, 1 décembre 2003, par. 811.
48 J.-P. Sartre, Réflexions sur la question juive (1954), Paris, Gallimard, coll. Folio Essais, 2005, p. 74-75. - 29 -
l’appréciation de persécutions en tant que constitu tives de crimes contre l’humanité, que: «la
population civile faisant l’objet des mesures discri minatoires précédemment visées était identifiée,
par les auteurs des actes discriminatoires, principalement par ses caractéristiques religieuses» 4.
22. Cette approche a été ensuite reprise dans l’affaire Jelisić, par la Chambre de première
instance, dans les termes qui suivent ⎯et je me permets de citer un assez long extrait de cette
décision, car je crois qu’elle est particulièrement claire :
«[s]i la détermination objective d’un gro upe religieux est enco re possible, tenter
aujourd’hui de définir un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux à partir de
critères objectifs et scientifiquement non c ontestables serait un exercice périlleux et
dont le résultat ne correspondrait pas n écessairement à la perception des personnes
concernées par cette catégorisation. Aussi est-il plus approprié d’apprécier la qualité
du groupe national, ethnique ou racial du point de vue de la perception qu’en ont les
personnes qui veulent distinguer ce groupe du reste de la collectivité. La Chambre
choisit donc d’apprécier l’appartenance à un groupe national, ethnique ou racial à
partir d’un critère subjectif : c’est la stigmatisation, par la collectivité, du groupe en
tant qu’entité ethnique, raciale ou nationale distincte, qui permettra de déterminer si
la population visée constitue, pour les auteurs présumés de l’acte, un groupe ethnique,
racial ou national.» 50
23. Si, dans cette affaire, la Chambre de première instance n’a pris en considération que
l’approche subjective, la Bosnie -Herzégovine tient à préciser que cette approche ne saurait en
général être considérée comme exclusive mais que les deux approches doivent être envisagées de
manière combinée, comme d’ailleurs la jurisprudence majoritaire le reconnaît. On peut en donner
une illustration, de cette jurisprude nce majoritaire, dans l’affaire Blagojević, qui préconise une
51
approche fondée «on a case-by-case basis, consulting both objective and subjective criteria» .
Il convient maintenant encore de raffiner quelque peu l’analyse.
49TPIY, Le procureur c. Dragan Nikolic, affaire n IT-94-2-R61, examen de l’acte d’accusation dans le cadre de
l’article 61 du Règlement de procédure et de preuve, décision de la Chambre de première instance I, 20 octobre 1995,
par. 27.
50TPIY, Le procureur c. Goran Jelisic , affaire n IT-95-10, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
14 décembre 1999, par. 70; les italiques sont de nous; c’est nous qui soulignons.
51TPIY, Le procureur c. Vidoje Blagojevic , Dragan Jokic , affaire n IT-02-60-T, Chambre de première
instanceI, jugement, 17 janvier 2005, par.667; les italiques sont de nous; c’est nous qui soulignons. Cette approche
mixte eso d’application constante dans la jurisprudence du TPIR. Voir notamment Le procureur c. Laurent Semanza ,
affaire n ICTR-97-20-T, Chaobre de première instance III, jugement et sentence, 15 mai 2003, par. 317erLe procureur c.
Juvénal Kajelijeli, affaire n ICTR-98-44A-T, Chambre de oremière instance II, jugement et sentence, 1 décembre 2003,
par. 811; Le procureur c.Sylvestre Gacumbitsi , affaire n ICTR-01-64-T, Chambre de première instance III, jugement,
17 juin 2004, par. 254. - 30 -
Les définitions objective et subjective peuvent être formulées de façon positive ou négative
24. Il y a ici un important point que j’aimerais préciser, car il me semble qu’aussi bien
leTPIY que M e de Roux n’ont pas toujours bien procédé aux distinctions nécessaires. Ce point
c’est qu’au-delà de l’approche objective ou subjecti ve que je viens de vous présenter, l’analyse du
groupe peut en outre s’opérer de deux façons distinctes, soit de façon positive, soit de façon
négative, et ceci donc que l’on se fonde sur des critères objectifs ou des critères subjectifs ou même
e
une combinaison des deux. Si je tiens à préciser ce point, c’est, comme je l’ai dit, parce que M de
Roux a semblé assimiler l’approche subjective avec l’approche négative, et peut-être même aussi,
même si cela est moins clair, l’approche objective avec l’approche positive, confondant ainsi à mon
sens une analyse procédurale et une analyse substantielle alors que ces assimilations ne reposent
sur rien. Je reprendrai donc ce qu’il a dit dans l’une de ses plaidoiries :
«La même Chambre du Tribunal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie qui a opté, je vous l’ai
dit, pour une approche subjective et qui permet une définition du groupe par des
critères négatifs indique cependant dans son jugement…en même temps «que les
[t]travaux préparatoires de la convention montrent que l’on a voulu limiter le champ
d’application d52la convention à la protect ion de groupes «stables», définis de façon
objective»…»
Il me semble qu’il procède ainsi à certain nombre de confusions conceptuelles.
25. Je répète, en effet, que l’analyse positive ou négative peut s’appliquer que l’on adopte
des critères subjectifs ou objectifs. Et je vais illustrer cette affirmation. Ainsi, une analyse positive
des critères objectifs consistera par exemple à déterminer un groupe religieux parce qu’il a une
certaine religion, tandis qu’une analyse négative des critères objectifs conduira à la définition d’un
groupe religieux n’ayant pas la religion de ceux qui poursuivent une politique génocidaire, groupe
qui selon le contexte historique dans lequel le problème se pose pourra concerner un, deux ou
plusieurs groupes religieux différents, différe nts mais unis dans leur commune qualité ⎯ ou en
l’espèce défaut ⎯ aux yeux des génocidaires, de ne pas avoir la même religion qu’eux. Il en va de
même de la détermination du groupe selon des crit ères subjectifs. Ainsi, la stigmatisation du
groupe visé par les actes génocidaires peut s’opérer de deux façons distinctes, soit selon des critères
positifs, soit selon des critères négatifs, qui ont été identifiés par le TPIY dans l’affaire Jelisic,
comme je le rappellerai un peu plus tard. On peut ainsi subjectivement ⎯je reprends un
52CR 2006/20, p. 12, par. 307 (de Roux). - 31 -
exemple ⎯ définir un groupe ethnique de façon positive parce qu’ on considère qu’il a certaines
caractéristiques physiques, ou au contraire de façon négative parce qu’on déplore l’absence de
certaines caractéristiques physiques propres au groupe des génocidaires. Disons pour conclure que
tout concept peut se définir de façon positive ou néga tive : je suis moi/je ne suis pas l’autre. C’est
cette dialectique de l’autre précisément exclu, so it parce qu’il est l’autre, soit parce qu’il n’est pas
comme le génocidaire, qui est au cŒur de l’intention génocidaire.
26. Alors face à ces outils fort divers, ap proche objective positive, approche objective
négative, approche subjective positive, approche subjective négative, ou encore combinaison de ces
différentes analyses, comment définir les groupes visés à l’articleII de la convention sur le
e
génocide ? M de Roux a souligné quant à lui que l’approche négative ⎯ sans plus de précisions
d’ailleurs ⎯ «ne fait pas l’unanimité dans l’état actuel du droit international» 5. Je lui en donne
bien volontiers acte, mais il en va de même des autres approches, dans leurs différentes
combinaisons. Il y a ainsi, me semble-t-il, pour votre Cour, saisie pour la première fois d’une
affaire de génocide, une occasion unique de clarif ier les choses, de poser un précédent auquel il
sera possible de se référer en ce qui concerne la façon de définir les groupes visés à l’article II de la
convention sur le génocide. Certes, tout n’est pas controversé. D’un côté, il semble ne pas y avoir
de grandes divergences quant à la nécessité de combiner l’approche objective et subjective pour
tenter de définir le groupe en tenant compte de la complexité des choses. Mais d’un autre côté, il y
a des positions assez divergentes quant à l’admissibilité d’une appr oche négative du groupe : ainsi
serait à proscrire pour certains, dont nos contra dicteurs serbes, la référence au groupe des
non-Serbes comme pouvant être un groupe visé à l’articleII, tandis que d’autres y voient au
contraire l’essence même d’un groupe visé parce qu’il doit être éradiqué parce qu’il est différent du
groupe des génocidaires.
27. Il me reste donc à tenter une analyse de l’approche négative, afin de déterminer si elle est
conforme à l’objet et au but de la convention sur le génocide.
53CR 2006/20, p. 12, par. 306 (de Roux). - 32 -
La conformité de l’approche négative avec l’objet et le but
de la convention sur le génocide
L’approche négative est tantôt retenue, tantôt rejetée par la jurisprudence
28. Qu’il nous soit permis, pour commencer, Ma dame le président, Messieurs les juges, de
rappeler l’analyse des groupes effectuées par la commission d’experts qui a été formulée dans les
termes qui suivent :
«[s]’il y a diversité ou pluralité de groupes victimes et si chaque groupe est protégé
comme tel, peut-être est-il conforme à l’esprit et au but de la convention de considérer
tous les groupes victimes comme constituant une entité plus large . C’est le cas par
exemple, s’il apparaît que le groupe A veut détruire en tout ou en partie les groupes B,
C, et D, c’est-à-dire quiconque n’appartient pas au groupe national, ethnique, racial
ou religieux A. En quelque sorte, le groupe A a défini un groupe non A pluraliste sur
la base de critères nationaux, ethniques, raciaux ou religieux, et il semble pertinent
d’analyser le sort du 54oupe non A de la même manière, comme si le groupe nonA
avait été homogène.»
M29. ede Roux estime que cette analyse est «un peu compliquée en droit» 5. Je ne vois
quant à moins rien qui soit plus simple, c’est une constatation élémentaire de théorie des
ensembles: toute collectivité peut être divisée en A et non A, de même qu’une porte doit être
ouverte ou fermée. Et je ne vois pas en quoi une définition négative conduirait à des groupes
moins stables, puisque le groupe défini négativem ent sera toujours le groupe qui ne possède pas
certaines caractéristiques nationales, ethniques, r aciales ou religieuses, elles-mêmes présumées
stables.
30. Cette analyse juridique trouve des échos d’ailleurs dans les analyses politiques des
Serbes. C’est ainsi que le SDS a été le prem ier parti proposant de diviser la population entre
Serbes et non-Serbes. Je rappellerai que lors de l’organisation d’un référendum par le SDS tenu
les9 et10novembre1991 sur la question suivante: «Do you agree with the decision of the
Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herz egovina of October 24, 1991, that the Serbian
people shall remain in the joint state of Yu goslavia together with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO
Krajina, SAO Slovenia, Baranja and Western Srem, and others who declare themselves in favor of
staying ?» 56 Eh bien, dans ce référendum les non-Serbes ont reçu un billet de couleur jaune, pour
54Nations Unie, doc.S/1994/674, rapport final de la commission d’experts établie conformément à la
résolution 780 (1992) du Conseil de sécurité, p. 26-27, par. 96; les italiques sont de nous.
55CR 2006/20, p. 12, par. 306 (de Roux).
56
Assemblée des Serbes de Bosnie, première session, 24 octobre 1991, English ERN 0301-5405,
BCS ERN SA01-2082. - 33 -
que l’on puisse distinguer leurs votes de ceux des Serbes: il me semble qu’il y a là à n’en pas
douter une définition négative d’un groupe dont la se ule caractéristique est dans ce qu’il n’est pas,
c’est-à-dire dont la seule caractéristique est la non-serbianité.
31. En ce qui concerne la jurisprudence des tribunaux ad hoc, elle est à cet égard quelque
peu confuse. Alors nous ne sommes évidemment pa s sans savoir, Madame le président, Messieurs
les juges, qu’une définition du groupe envisagée, de manière négative, c’est-à-dire par exclusion ne
fait pas l’unanimité et que le TPIY, dans l’affaire Stakic, l’a rejetée, en des termes très généraux, en
première instance d’abord ⎯ et je cite :
«[l]’article 4 du Statut protège les groupes nationaux, ethniques, raciaux ou religieux.
Lorsque plusieurs groupes sont pris pour cibles, on ne saurait les regrouper sous une
appellation générale telle que, par exemple, les «non-Serbes» . A ce propos, la
57
Chambre de première instance ne so uscrit pas à l’«approche négative».»
Cette conclusion a ensuite été confortée et longuement explicitée en appel ⎯ mais j’y reviendrai ⎯
58
et reprise en termes similaires mais sans plus d’explications dans l’affaire Bradnin .
32. Cette jurisprudence n’est cependant pas la seule et l’on sait qu’il y a également plusieurs
affaires, où c’est au contraire l’approche négative qui a été rete nue. C’est ainsi que le TPIY a
adopté l’approche négative dans l’affaire Jelisic, certes en première instance mais cela n’a pas été
remis en cause en appel. Et le Tribunal, je crois, s’est exprimé en termes très clairs :
«[u]ne telle stigmatisation du groupe peut s’effectuer selon des critères positifs ou
négatifs. Une «approche positive» consistera pour les auteurs du crime à distinguer
le groupe en raison de ce qu’ils estiment être les caractéristiques nationales,
ethniques, raciales ou religieuses propres à ce groupe. Une «approche négative»
consistera à identifier des individus comme ne faisant pas partie du groupe auquel les
auteurs du crime considèrent appartenir et qui présente selon eux des caractéristiques
nationales, ethniques, raciales ou religieuses propres, l’ensemble des individus ainsi
59
rejetés constituant, par exclusion, un groupe distinct.»
33. Si l’on fait une application pratique de cette approche à notre affaire, on peut ainsi
considérer que les Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine, en tant que groupe national, ethnique ou
religieux, ⎯visé, à titre principal, je l’ ai déjà dit, par le génocide ⎯, et les Croates de
57 o
TPIY dans l’affaire Le procureur c. Milomir Stakic , affaire n IT-97-24-T, Chambre de première instance II,
jugement, 31 juillet 2003, par. 512; les italiques sont de nous.
58 o
er TPIY, Le procureur c. Radoslv Brdjanin , affaire n IT-99-36-T, Chambre de première instance II, jugement,
1 septembre 2004, par. 685-686.
59 TPIY, Le procureur c. Goran Jelisic , affaire n IT-95-10, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
14 décembre 1999, par. 71; les italiques sont de nous; c’est nous qui soulignons. - 34 -
Bosnie-Herzégovine, en tant que groupe religieux ou groupe ethnique ⎯accessoirement visé par
les actes de génocide ⎯ peuvent être envisagés, soit de façon positive, comme deux groupes
individualisés en prenant en compte leurs caractéris tiques propres que j’ai indiquées, soit de façon
négative comme constituant une entité plus large, désignée, pour les besoins de la cause, sous
l’appellation plus générique et négative du «groupe des non-Serbes», en tant que formant la
collectivité humaine distincte visée et ciblée par les auteurs du génocide. C’est en effet bien parce
que les Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine et les Croates de Bosnie-Herzégovine ne présentaient
pas, dans l’esprit des génocidaires, au-delà des ca ractéristiques nationales, ethniques ou religieuses
propres à chaque groupe, des Musulmans ou des Cr oates, les mêmes caracté ristiques nationales,
ethniques ou religieuses que les Serbes qu’ils ont collectivement été stigmatisés par les auteurs du
génocide en tant que groupe distinct du leur. Aucun obstacle juridique, Madame et Messieurs de la
Cour, ne s’oppose à mon sens à ce que l’on souscr ive à une telle approche d’autant plus que les
deux groupes victimes, envisagés collectivemen t pour les besoins de la cause en tant que
non-Serbes, constituent, pris isolément, aussi deux groupes protégés au sens de la convention sur le
génocide.
Le rejet de l’approche négative dans l’affaire Stakic n’emporte pas la conviction
34. Si la Cour prend position sur cette questi on, il m’apparaît, comme je vous l’ai déjà dit,
que l’approche négative est particulièrement oppo rtune dans une affaire de nettoyage ethnique
génocidaire. La Cour, bien sûr, dans ses analys es juridiques n’est pas liée par les décisions des
Tribunaux ad hoc mais de toute évidence les analyses développées par ces Tribunaux sont des
points de repère qui peuvent être stimulants dans nos réflexions. Aussi voudrais-je reprendre
devant vous le raisonnement suivi par le Tri bunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie dans
l’affaire Stakic60 mais je ne reprendrai pou r le critiquer. Je vais do nc montrer que le rejet de
l’approche négative dans l’affaire Stakic n’emporte pas la conviction. Comme je l’ai déjà dit, c’est
donc dans cette affaire que le Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie a rejeté
l’approche négative Et il est probable que cette affaire nous sera opposée par le défendeur, qui
semble contester la référence fréquente faite par la Bosnie, dans ses écritures comme dans ses
60TPIY, Le procureur c. Milomir Stakic, affaire n IT-97-24-A, Chambre d’appel, arrêt, 22 mars 2006. - 35 -
plaidoiries, au groupe des non-Serbes, encore une fois définis négativement par opposition au
groupe des Serbes. Si dans la décision donc, le Tribunal n’a pas adhéré à la détermination du
groupe selon une approche subjective, mise en Œuvre par l’entremise d’un critère négatif, nous
allons voir que le raisonnement suivi par la Ch ambre d’appel présente plusieurs incohérences et
incertitudes et n’emporte pas, au final, la conviction.
35. Qu’il nous soit permis d’abord de rappeler brièvement l’analyse juridique à laquelle s’est
livrée la Chambre d’appel. Je rappelle que la Chambre d’ap pel n’a en fait pas souscrit à
l’argumentation de l’accusation, qui faisait valoir que la Chambre de première instance avait
commis une erreur de droit en s’abstenant justemen t de définir le groupe ciblé par le génocide
comme étant celui des non-Serbes dans la région de la municipalité de Prijedor et en demandant
donc cette Chambre de première instance à l’accusa tion de prouver, de manière séparée, que le
génocide avait été commis d’une part contre les Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine, d’autre part
contre les Croates de Bosnie-Herzégovine. Eh bien, les arguments juridiques avancés pour réfuter
la définition négative du groupe ne m’apparaissent absolument pas décisifs d’un point de vue
juridique. Qu’il me soit permis à cet égard de no us attarder quelque peu, Madame le président,
Messieurs les juges, pour vous montrer successi vement qu’une définition négative du groupe est
conforme au texte, est conforme à l’objet et au but comme d’ailleurs il est conforme aux travaux
préparatoires de la convention sur le génocide.
La détermination du groupe par exclusion n’ est pas contraire au texte de la convention
sur le génocide, qui se réfère au «groupe comme tel»
36. Pour refuser de souscrire à la définition du groupe par exclusion, la Chambre d’appel
insiste beaucoup sur cette expression de «groupe comme tel» considérant que cette locution «has
great significance, for it shows that the offence requires intent to destroy a collection of people who
have a particular group identity» 61. Et sur ce point, elle considère que
«when a person targets individuals because th ey lack a particular national, ethnical,
racial or religious characteristic, the intent is not to destroy particular groups with
particular identities as such, but simply to destroy individuals because they lack
certain national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics» .2
61TPIY, Le procureur c. Milomir Stakic, affaire n IT-97-24-A, Chambre d’appel, arrêt, 22 mars 2006, par. 20.
62
Ibid. - 36 -
37. Cette argumentation ne suscite guère l’adhé sion dans la mesure où il me semble qu’elle
procède d’une confusion, d’une interprétation erronée de l’expression «comme tel». Cette
expression en effet ne renvoie pas à l’identité particulière du groupe mais renvoie simplement à
l’intention spécifique constitutive du génocide.
38. En effet, l’expression «comme tel» signif ie que «l’acte de destruction doit être dirigé
contre le groupe, comme tel, c’est-à-dire qua groupe» 6. Et, c’est le groupe ciblé, comme je l’ai
déjà dit au début de ma plaidoirie, qui est la victim e ultime et finale du génocide. Dans la mesure
alors où la locution «comme tel» ne tend qu’à fa ire valoir que la victime du génocide n’est pas
l’individu mais le groupe, la Bosnie ne voit pas en quoi une définition négative du groupe
s’avérerait en contradiction avec cette exigence 64 : c’est parce que les Musulmans de Bosnie et les
Croates de Bosnie ne présentaient pas les mêmes car actéristiques nationales, ethniques, raciales et
religieuses que celles du groupe des Serbes qu ’ils ont été visés par les auteurs des actes
génocidaires en tant que formant un groupe distinct de non-Serbes, groupe visé comme tel et je ne
vois pas donc en quoi il y aurait la moindre difficulté d’appliquer une définition négative dans cette
optique.
La détermination du groupe par exclusion n’es t pas contraire à l’objet et au but de la
convention
39. Dans un second temps, la Chambre d’appe l a fait valoir que la nécessité de définir le
groupe de manière positive ressortait de l’étymologie du terme de génocide composé, comme on le
sait, de la racine grecque, genos, et de la racine latine caedere (tuer) et des travaux de
RaphaëlLemkin. Pour la Chambre d’appel, ces éléments tendent à montrer que les groupes
envisagés ne peuvent être que des groupes possédant une identité propre («a particular positive
identity» 65) et non «the destruction of various people lacking a distinct entity» 66. Si la Bosnie sait
bien que les rédacteurs avaient en vue des groupes homogènes, elle fait cependant valoir, avec le
jugeShahabuddeen, qui était en désaccord avec la Chambre d’appel sur ce point, que «that need
63 o
TPIR, Le procureur c. Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana , affaire n ICTR-95-1, Chambre de première
instance II, jugement, 21 mai 1999, par. 99.
64
Voir dans le même sens, l’opinion partiellement dissidente du juge Soahabuddeen, attachée à l’arrêt rendu par
la Chambre d’appel dans l’affaire Stakic (Le procureur c. Milomir Stakic, affaire n IT-97-24-A, Chambre d’appel, arrêt,
22 mars 2006), par. 10.
65 o
TPIY, Le Procureur c. Milomir Stakic, affaire n IT-97-24-A, Chambre d’appel, arrêt, 22 mars 2006, par. 21.
66Ibid. - 37 -
not prevent a more general approach from being taken to the matter; even the genocidal campaigns
of the Second World War were not understood ex clusively through the lens of the «positive»
67
approach» .
La détermination du groupe par exclusion n’est pas non plus contraire aux travaux
préparatoires de la convention, travaux préparatoires qui insisteraient selon nos
contradicteurs sur le caractère stable et homogène du groupe visé
40. La Chambre d’appel a ensuite fait valoir que la détermination du groupe par exclusion
était en contradiction avec les travaux préparatoires car, selon elle, ces travaux préparatoires
indiquaient que l’on ne voulait exclure que des groupes présentant un caractère permanent et
stable, et excluant au contraire les groupes n’ayant pas ce caractère permanent et stable, comme les
groupes politiques, économiques ou sociaux. Là encore, l’argument, je crois, n’est pas décisif,
d’une part parce qu’il n’est pas certain que le caractère stable du groupe soit fondamental pour sa
définition, mais d’autre part, parce que même s’il l’est, un groupe défini négativement peut dans un
contexte donné être tout aussi stable qu’un groupe défini positivement.
41. Je voudrais d’abord dire qu’il n’est pas cert ain, qu’à la lecture des travaux préparatoires,
que la convention n’ait eu en vue que les groupes homogènes, stables et permanents. Bien sûr, on
se réfère souvent au caractère de permanence de stabilité pour justifier l’exclusion des groupes
politiques mais on sait qu’il y a bien d’autres raison s pour lesquelles ces groupes ont été exclus.
C’est ainsi que certains auteurs ont pu faire valoir que
«the debates leave little doubt that the decision to exclude political groups was mainly
an attempt to rally a minority of member St ates, in order to facilitate rapid ratification
of the Convention, and not a principled decision based on some philosophical
distinction between stable and more ephemeral groups» 68.
42. Quand bien même, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, l’on souscrirait à ce critère de
permanence et de stabilité, force est cependant de constater, que, à l’exception du groupe racial si
on considère qu’il est fondé sur des caractéristiques génétiques qu’on ne peut pas modifier, les trois
autres groupes ne peuvent que se prévaloir d’une permanence et d’une stabilité toutes relatives, si
l’on veut bien prendre en compte le fait que :
67
Voir l’opinion dissidente partielle du juge Shahabuddeen, attachée à l’arrêt rendu par la Chambre d’appel dans
l’affaire Stakic (TPIY, Le procureur c. Milomir Stakic , affaire n IT-97-24-A, Chambre d’appel, arrêt, 22 mars 2006),
par. 12.
68
W. A Schabas, Genocide in International Law, Cambridge, University Press, 2000, p. 133. - 38 -
«[n]ational groups are modified dramatically as borders changes and as individual and
collective conceptions of identity evolve. Nationality may be changed, sometimes for
large groups of individuals where, for example, two countries have joined or secession
has occurred. Religious groups may come into existence and disappear within a single
lifetime» .9
43. Si l’on veut bien de surcroît bien prendre en considération que la déclaration universelle
des droits de l’homme, adoptée au lendemain de la convention sur le génocide, reconnaît le droit
fondamental de chaque indivi du à «changer de nationalité» 70et qu’elle conçoit le droit à la liberté
71
de religion, comme impliquant «la liberté de changer de religion» , il s’avère malaisé de conclure
que la nationalité et la religion étaient, mê me à l’époque, considérées comme présentant un
caractère absolument permanent et stable.
44. La Bosnie-Herzégovine tient en tout état de cause à faire valoir qu’au-delà de leur
caractéristiques nationales, ethniques ou religieu ses intrinsèques, le groupe des Croates et des
Musulmans de Bosnie s’auto-identifiait comme constituant une entité plus large et qu’ils se
sentaient principalement visés et ciblés, parce qu’ ils ne présentaient pas, comme je l’ai dit, les
caractéristiques nationales, ethniques ou religieus es des Serbes, et il ne fait aucun doute, Madame
le président, que c’était cela exac tement la perception des auteurs du génocide. La Bosnie ne voit
pas à quoi cette entité plus large ⎯le groupe des non-Serbes ⎯ constituée des deux groupes
susmentionnés, ne présenterait pas un caractère perm anent et stable, dans le contexte des faits, des
persécutions et des actes de génocide qu’ils ont subis.
45. A la lumière de tout ce que je viens d’ exposer, la Bosnie-Herzégovine espère avoir
démontré à la Cour qu’une définitio n négative du groupe ne contredit en rien la lettre, l’objet et le
but et les travaux préparatoires de la convention . Elle pense avoir démontré qu’aucun obstacle
juridique ⎯je le répète ⎯ ne s’oppose à ce qu’une telle appr oche puisse être retenue. Cette
approche n’élargit pas la notion de groupe protégé par la convention, elle optimise simplement
69W. A Schabas, Genocide in International Law, Cambridge, University Press, 2000, p. 133.
70Article 15 de la déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme du 10 décembre 1948.
71
Article 18 de la déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme du 10 décembre 1948. - 39 -
l’application de la convention dans un sens qui me paraît particulièrement conforme à l’objet et au
but du traité.
*
* *
46. Au terme de cette plaidoirie et des pr écisions ainsi apportées aux différentes méthodes
permettant de déterminer le groupe protégé, la Bosnie-Herzégovine demande à la Cour de
reconnaître, pour les besoins pratiques de la caus e, que le groupe qui a été visé par le génocide
commis par la Serbie-et-Monténégro, peut être envisagé sous l’appellation générique du «groupe
des non-Serbes» en ce qu’elle permet de regroupe r le groupe des Croates de Bosnie-Herzégovine
en tant que «groupe ethnico-religieux» protégé par la convention sur le génocide ainsi que le
groupe qui a été visé principalement en l’espèce, le «groupe national ⎯ très exactement ⎯ des
Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine» 72, comme le groupe a été défini par de nombreux jugements
du TPIY.
47. Qu’il nous soit donc en dernier lieu pe rmis, Madame le président, de revenir sur
l’allégation du défendeur qui, dans un dernier élan, nous dit : «Mais ce «groupe des Musulmans de
73
Bosnie-Herzégovine», vous ne définissez pas clairement les critères sur lesquels il est défini» . Eh
bien, pour répondre, je lirai simplement un extrait du jugement rendu dans l’affaire Krstić, qui, me
semble-t-il, est suffisamment explicite :
«A l’origine, les Musulmans de Bosnie -Herzégovine ont été considérés comme
un groupe religieux et ils ont été reconnus comme «nation» par la Constitution
yougoslave de 1963. En outre, les preuves présentées au procès indiquent très
clairement que les plus hautes autorités politiques serbes de Bosnie et les forces serbes
de Bosnie opérant à Srebrenica en juillet 1995 considéraient les Musulmans de Bosnie
74
comme un groupe national spécifique …
72 o
TPIY, Le procureur c. Goran Jelisic , affaire n IT-95-10o Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
14 décembre 1999, par. 72; Le procureur c. Radislav Krstic , affaire n IT-98-33, Chambre de première instanceI,
jugement, 2 août 2001, par.560; Le procureur c. Radislav Krsti, affaire nIT-98-33-A, Chambre d’appel, arrêt,
19 avril 2004, par. 591; Le procureur c. Vidoje Blagojevic, Dragan Jokic , affaire noIT-02-60-T, jugement,
17 janvier 2005, par. 667.
73CR 2006/20, p. 14, par. 315 (de Roux).
74 o
TPIY, Le procureur c. Radislav Krstic , affaire n IT-98-33, Chambre de première instance I, jugement,
2 août 2001, par. 559. - 40 -
La Chambre conclut que le groupe protégé, au sens de l’article 4 du Statut, est
en l’espèce les Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine.»
Si la Cour ne souscrivait pas à l’approche du groupe défini par exclusion en tant que groupe
des non-Serbes alors même qu’aucun obstacle théo rique, nous l’avons vu, ne s’oppose à un telle
acception, la Bosnie-Herzégovine demanderait alors à la Cour de reconnaître que les deux groupes
indiqués ont été tous les deux visés ⎯donc d’une part le groupe des Croates de
Bosnie-Herzégovine et, d’autres part, et principalement, le groupe national des Musulmans de
Bosnie-Herzégovine.
Je remercie la Cour de son attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Stern. The Court will now rise for 15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.30 to 11.45 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Ms Karagiannakis, the Court will hear you.
KMARs AGIANNAKIS:
Introduction
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, Bosnia has demonstrated to this Court that the
massacre of thousands of men and the forced transfer of tens of thousands of women and children
from the Srebrenica enclave was genocide and that this can be attributed to the Respondent. The
Respondent denies both that Srebrenica was genocide and that these events can be attributed to it.
The purpose of this pleading is to rebut these arguments and the underlying factual allegations
upon which they are based.
Genocide in Srebrenica was committed as part of a policy to cleanse eastern Bosnia
which originated in Belgrade
2. The genocide that was committed in Srebre nica was the culmination of a Serb policy to
cleanse eastern Bosnia. This was part of an overall policy to create an ethnically purified,
geographically contiguous Greater Serbia. Mr. va n den Biesen, in his pleadings on eastern Bosnia
and Srebrenica set out the critical facts that demonstrate this long-standing policy which - 41 -
subsequently crystallized into a pl an to eradicate the Muslims of Srebrenica. These facts have not
been denied by the Respondent. They are:
(a) The decision which was made by the political and State leadership of the FRY that an area of
50km from the Drina would be Serb. This decision was conveyed to the Bosnian Serb
municipal leaders in May 1991 75.
(b) On 12 May 1992, the Strategic Goals of the Serbian people were declared. They included
Strategic Goal1 to “establish State borders se parating the Serbian people from the other two
ethnic communities” and Strategic Goal 3 to “esta blish a corridor in the Drina River Valley,
that is, eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serb States” 76.
(c) On 8 March 1995, the Supreme Commander of the RS Armed Forces, Karadzic, issued
Directive 7 which mandated the creation of “an unb earable situation of total insecurity with no
hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants” of Srebrenica and Zepa. This task was
77
assigned to the Drina Corps ;
(d) On 31 March 1995, as a result of this directiv e, General Ratko Mladic issued a Directive for
Further Operations No. 7/1, which specified the Drina Corps’ tasks 78.
(e) On 4 July 1995, Colonel Ognjenovic, the then commander of the Bratunac Brigade, sent a
report to his units where he stated that the fina l goal of the Bosnian Serb army was an entirely
Serbian Podrinje which meant the expulsion of the Muslims from the Srebrenica enclave. He
stated that the enemy’s life had to be made unb earable and their temporary stay in the enclave
impossible so that they would leave en masse as soon as possible, realizing that they cannot
79
survive there .
7CR 2006/4, pp. 38-39, paras. 9-10 (Mr. van den Biesen); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, case
No. IT-02-61, Sentencing Judgement 30 March 2004, para. 54.
7CR 2006/4, pp. 38-39, para.10 (Mr. van den Biesen); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No.IT-02-60,
Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 96; ExhibitP746a, ICTY Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgement, case No.IT-98-33-T,
2 August 2001, para. 562.
7CR 2006/4, p. 49, para. 48 (Mr. van den Biesen); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No.IT-02-60,
Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 106.
7CR 2006/4 p. 49, para. 48 (Mr. van den Biesen); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No.IT-02-60,
Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 106.
7CR 2006/4, p. 49, para. 49 (Mr. van den Biesen); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No.IT-02-60,
Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 103. - 42 -
(f) The takeover operation of Srebrenica was conducted under the plan code named “Krivaja95”
which was issued on 2 July 1995. The stated objective of this plan was “to separate and reduce
in size the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, to impr ove the tactical position of the forces in depth
of the area, and to create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves” 80.
3. Finally, the Respondent has not rejected the description of the actual mass forced transfers
or the mass killings. The manner in which they we re perpetrated clearly shows that they were well
planned and organized. This is supported by findings of the ICTY. More specifically, the Krstic
Trial Chamber found that “following the takeover of Srebrenica, in July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces
devised and implemented a plan to transport all of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and
81
elderly out of the enclave” . The Blagojevic Trial Chamber found that:
“There is ample evidence before the Trial Chamber of a wide-scale and
organised killing operation carried out by VRS and the MUP forces from 12 until
19 July 1995. Thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the Srebrenica enclave were
executed and burie82in different locations in the Srebrenica, Bratunac and Zvornik
municipalities.”
4. A central theme which underlies the Resp ondent’s arguments is apparently one of a
prolonged civil war in the Srebrenica area betw een the army of Republika Srpska and the
28thDivision of the Bosnian army 83. The main argument posited by Mr.Brownlie was that
Srebrenica was “in local terms the taking of re venge” and that there was no long-term planning
84
involved in those events and certainly no long-term planning by Belgrade . Mr. de Roux argued
that the massacre was not committed with the intent to destroy Muslims but with the motivation to
85
destroy an enemy military force . Although these arguments are different, they are based on the
same basic factual allegations. First, that the Bo sniak forces in Srebrenica launched raids on Serb
villages and attacked the Serb populations in the region, causing deaths and casualties. Second,
80CR 2006/4, p.53, para. 62 (Mr. van den Biesen); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No.IT-02-60,
Judgement, 17 January 2005, paras. 120, 137, 674.
81ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001 para. 52.
82ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No. IT-02-60, Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 291.
83
CR 2006/16, para. 3 (Mr. Brownlie).
84Ibid., para. 9.
85CR/2006/19, paras. 96-102 (Mr. de Roux). - 43 -
that the Srebrenica enclave was not demilitarized after the declaration of the United Nations Safe
Area and Bosniak raids continued.
Events prior to the declaration of the Srebrenica Safe Area in April 1993
5. With respect to the events prior to the declaration of the Srebrenica Safe Area in
April1993, Mr.de Roux argued that at the beginning of the war, Bosniak forces under the
command of Naser Oric expelled the Serbs of Srebrenica, turned Srebrenica into a fortified town
and launched raids on surrounding Serb villages with the objective of riding the entire municipality
around Srebrenica of its Serb population. He sa id that these raids “produced several hundred
86
victims among Serb farmers” . Mr. Brownlie also asserted that the Bosnian Army raided Serbian
villages in the Srebrenica-Bratunac region and caused substantial civilian casualties 87.
6. As we will see the best available and objective sources on the nature of these raids do not
support the factual allegations forwarded by the Respondent. However, prior to considering the
substance of the allegations, it is important to ex amine the two main sources of evidence used by
the Respondent in support of these arguments, Balkan Battlegrounds and the Dutch Srebrenica
report.
7. Mr. Brownlie presented material from Balkan Battlegrounds 88to imply that the offensive
of Serb forces in the Drina Valley during 1993, was only a response to local raids by Bosniak
forces from Srebrenica during 1992, under th e command of Naser Oric and they were not
conducted to control and ethnically cleanse eastern Bosnia by Serbs. However, when one reads
Balkan Battlegrounds, it is apparent that this text supports the proposition that the activities of the
Serb armed forces in the Drina Valley were indeed aimed at creating an ethnically clean Serbian
territory.
8. Balkan Battlegrounds describes the Bosnian Serb Strategic Goals in 1992. They included
the aim to ensure that the “Drina is not a border” 89; the report states that “the Bosnian Serbs
86CR 2006/18, para. 94 (Mr. de Roux).
87
CR 2006/16, para. 4 (Mr. Brownlie).
88
Ibid., para. 5.
89Balkan Battlegrounds A Military Hist ory of the Yugoslav Conflict 1990-1995 , CIA (2002) (“ Balkan
Battlegrounds”) Vol. 1, p. 140. - 44 -
wanted to create an independent, territorially con tiguous republic that wo uld eventually join the
Federal Republic” 9. Further, it states that “a war aim also appears to have been that the population
of the new state, Republika Srpska, must be almost purely Serb” 91. According to this source “the
systematic way that the Bosnian Serbs, particular ly the SDS organizations, carried out their ethnic
cleansing operations makes it almost certain that they had high level direction” 92.
9. In relation to Srebrenica, Balkan Battlegrounds clearly states that it was the Serbs who
first took over Srebrenica town in April 1992 usi ng the same pattern that had been employed in the
eastern Bosnian municipalities of Bijelina, Zvornik and Foca. The Muslim inhabitants were forced
to abandon their town as Serb artillery fire rained down on their homes. According to this source,
Naser Oric was “able to form and lead a small resistance band that employed classic tactics against
Serb occupiers” and he succeede d in defeating the Serb occupier s. As a result “the Serbian
93
population decided to flee the town and its environs” . After this rare victory, “Srebrenica was
like a magnet to the Muslim population of the Drina Valley as refugees flooded in from ethnically
cleansed areas such as Zvornik and Bratunac, soon to be followed by armed Serbs converging on
94
the Serbrenica lowlands” . From this time and during 1992, Bosniak forces engaged in a stalwart
resistance to the Bosnian Serb efforts to control this strategic valley bordering Serbia 95.
10. It is as a result of this resistance that the Serb forces launched an offensive in the Drina
Valley to finally achieve their long-standing goals.
11. This analysis is supported by Operational Directive4. In November 1992,
General Ratko Mladić issued this directive for further ope rations which set out the tasks of the
Drina Corps in the Podrinje region, that is, the Drina Valley region. The directive states that:
“forces in the wider Podrinje region sha ll exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest
possible losses on him and force him to leave the Birac, Zepa and Goražde areas
together with the Muslim population. First offer the able-bodied and armed men to
surrender, if they refuse, destroy them.” 96
9Ibid., p. 140.
9Ibid., p. 140.
92
Ibid., pp. 140-141.
93
Ibid., p. 317.
9Ibid., p. 317.
9Ibid., p. 150.
9ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Judgement, case No. IT-02-60-T, 17 January 2005, para. 97, Exhibit P400. - 45 -
12. Accordingly, Serb military operations in the Drina Valley from November 1992 were not
simply a defensive reaction to Bosniak raids but we re aimed at forcing the Bosniak forces to leave
together with the Muslim population. Again this directive was another step in the long-standing
policy to cleanse the Drina River Valley of its Muslim population.
13. During his pleadings, Mr. Brownlie also quoted Balkan Battlegrounds for the proposition
that “according to one estimate, more than 3,000 Serb soldiers and civilians had been killed or
wounded by Bosnian soldiers from the Srebrenica area since the war began” 9. The number quoted
in Balkan Battlegrounds is derived from a book. The footnote associated to this figure in the book
states: “the figure of 2,000 dead was given by officials in the new Serb-run municipality
98
government in Srebrenica who were interviewed in September 1996 but asked not to be named” .
14. This figure of 3,000 dead and wounded Serb soldiers and civilians has been presented to
this Court as one which is derived from an independent and reliable source. However, when one
looks at the underlying source for the number quoted, it actually comes from unnamed Bosnian
Serb officials. For these reasons, these figures can hardly be considered as objective and reliable
evidence.
15. The second main source relied upon by th e Respondent in relation to the arguments
99
regarding Bosniak raids and resulting casualties is, as I said, the Dutch report . Two of the quotes
from this cited by the Respondent refer to Mu slim sallies, meaning assaults from defensive
positions, on Serb villages in the second half of 1992 until early 1993. These quotes contain
allegations that Serb hamlets were attacked, residents were murdered, and settlements were
100
burnt . When these quotes are placed in the context of the Dutch report it is clear that these raids
were part of a Muslim resistance to a campaign of Serb ethnic cleansing that had begun in 1992 in
the Drina region and a desperate need for food arising from the dire situation in the Srebrenica
97CR 2006/16, para. 6 (Mr. Brownlie).
98
David Rohde, Endgame. The betrayal and fall of Srebrenica: Europe’s worst massacre since World WarII
(1997), p. 16, fn. 8, p. 395.
99
http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/
10CR 2006/16, para. 7 (Mr. Brownlie) and CR 2006/17, para. 283 (Mr. Brownlie). - 46 -
enclave 101. Further, as we will see in a moment, th e alleged crimes committed against the Serb
population are not substantiated by the findings of the ICTY.
16. Apart from the Dutch report that was quoted by the Respondent, he also quoted the
assertion that it “is estimated that between 1,000 a nd 1,200 Serbs died in these attacks, while about
3,000 of them were wounded” 10. The footnote associated with this quote is a document which was
103
produced by Yugoslav State Commission for War Crimes and Genocide . It was submitted to the
General Assembly on 24May1993 by the Char gé d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of
Yugoslavia to the United Nations with a request that it be distributed.
17. Madam President, this quote was presented to the Court as a finding of the Government
of the Netherlands when in fact its ultimate source is the Respondent itself. In these circumstances
these figures cannot be relied upon as objective and independent evidence.
18. The Respondent has levelled serious allega tions of a campaign of ethnic cleansing and
atrocities at Bosniak forces and Naser Oric in particular. The Respondent seeks to rely on
third-party sources for the facts that it asserts. However, when one examines the quotes provided
one sees that they have not been provided to you in their full context. The Court also may have
noticed the discrepancies between the alleged numb ers of dead and injured Serb civilians resulting
104
from the raids . They are confusing and contradictory. Where the ultimate basis for these sources
can be ascertained, they can be traced to the Yugoslav or unnamed Bosnian Serb officials. Yet
again, this is very far from objective and conclusive evidence on this very serious issue. Apart
from these questionable sources, the Respondent has not provided any detailed and objectively
substantiated figures for its allegations in this regard.
19. Notwithstanding this, the question still remain s as to what extent, if any, these factual
assertions regarding the nature of the Bosniak raids are accurate. We will seek to answer these
questions using the best available independent sources on the topic.
10Dutch report. See Part II: Dutchbat in the enclave; Chap. 2: The history preceding the conflict in Eastern
Bosnia up until the establishment of the Safe Area; Part 3: The beginning of the war April 1992 and Part 4: The
Muslims fight back.
102
CR 2006/17, para. 283 (Mr. Brownlie).
103
Dutch report, p. 910, fn. 5 citing UN A/48/177 and S/25835.
10CR 2006/16, para. 6 (Mr. Brownlie); CR 2006/17, para. 283 (Mr. Brownlie); CR 2006/18, para. 94
(Mr. de Roux). - 47 -
20. The primary United Nations sources of evid ence for the activities of Naser Oric around
Srebrenica prior to the declaration of the United Nations Safe Area in April 1993, are the decisions
of the ICTY Trial Chamber hearing his trial. In respect of the topic of village raids, the Oric
indictment alleges that during May 1992 to February 1993, Muslim armed units engaged in various
military operations against the VRS in the munici palities of Bratunac, Srebrenica and Skelani of
eastern Bosnia and during those operations these units burnt and plundered Serb villages 10. There
are no factual allegations agains t Mr.Oric of a widespread or systematic campaign waged against
the Serb civilian population. There are no factual allegations against Mr.Oric that Serb civilians
were deliberately killed or forcibly transferred from these villages during th e raids. There are no
factual allegations against Mr. Oric stating that he or his forces were acting pursuant to a policy of
ethnic cleansing.
21. After the end of the prosecution case in the Oric trial, the defence made a motion for
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the Tribunal Rules. The Trial Chamber issued an
oral decision acquitting NaserOric of charges of plunder arising from the operations. The Trial
Chamber unanimously found:
“Under normal circumstances, the taki ng away of livestock or cattle would
undoubtedly amount to plunder but in the extraordinary circumstances of this case,
this appropriation of plunder together with food had become indispensable for the
survival of the population of Srebrenica . The evidence brought forward by the
Prosecutor itself shows that not only was Srebrenica under siege, but that in the course
of this protracted siege, the town was completely encircled and isolated and that the
population which kept increasing in geometric proportions because of the influx of
refugees, was starving. In addition, there is always abundant evidence that in spite of
the repeated calls for help and for supplies by the Srebrenica authorities, they never
arrived precisely because the town was surrounded and isolated and, therefore, could
never arrive in Srebrenica... It is fina lly pertinent to point out that there is no
evidence to show that the plunder of cattle was disproportionate given the
circumstances... As regards the alleged pl under of furniture and television sets, the
Trial Chamber has come to the conclusion that the evidence is so puny that although
there is evidence that a bed, a sofa, and a television set may have been taken away,
this does not rise to the level of seriousness ... which is106lated to the jurisdictional
requirement of Article 1 of the Statute of the Tribunal.”
22. Madam President, Members of the Court, this allegation of plunder was part of the
factual matrix that the Respondent has characterized as atrocities. This finding reflects the fact that
10ICTY, Prosecutor v. Oric , case No.IT-03-68, Second Amended Indictment, 1October 2005, Count 3-6,
para. 27.
10ICTY, Prosecutor v. Oric, case No. IT-03-68, Wednesday 8 June 2005, Transcript, p. 9031. - 48 -
the activities of the Bosniak forces in respect of Serb villages were largely motivated by the
legitimate necessity to feed the starving and besieged Muslims of Srebrenica.
T2he. Oric Trial Chamber also issued another decision which is pertinent to the issue of
Bosniak raids and the context within which they occurred. In the Oric decision on the first and
second defence filings pursuant to scheduling orde r, the Trial Chamber found that there was no
need for Oric’s defence to adduce evidence on a number of facts because they were “sufficiently
addressed during the Prosecution case in a manner and to an extent in which in the Trial Chamber’s
opinion does not require any further evidence”. These facts included:
“⎯ The large number of attacks by Bosnia n Serb forces on Bosnian Muslim villages
within the geographical scope of the Indictment, including the wanton destruction
and plunder of Bosnian Muslim villages and hamlets and the laying of mines by
Bosnian Serb forces in and around destroyed Bosnian Muslim villages and
hamlets;
⎯ The killing and inhumane treatment of Bosnian Muslims, whether civilians or
non-civilians, by Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Serb forces;
⎯ The policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by Bosn ian Serb political or military authorities
before, during and after the crimes charged in the Indictment, in and around
Srebrenica;
⎯ The positive treatment of Serbs ⎯ whether civilians or non-civilians, hostages or
wounded, in Bosnian Muslim hospitals ⎯ by Bosnian Muslims, unless relating to
persons identified in Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment;
⎯ The situation of Srebrenica during the period relevant to the Indictment, namely
the positioning of Bosnian Serb forces in and around Srebrenica, and the isolation
of Srebrenica from the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina while being under constant
siege and suffering from air and artillery bombardment;
⎯ The influx of refugees in Srebrenica an d the critical condition under which the
population of Srebrenica had to live during the period relevant to the Indictment,
to include food and medical shortages, hygiene issues, security concerns, sporadic
electricity and telecommunications shortages;
⎯ The genocide committed against Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995;
⎯ The military superiority of the Bosnian Serbs at the time relevant to the
Indictment, namely that the Bosnian Serbs were better equipped militarily than the
Bosnian Muslims and that, in addition, the Bosnian Serbs benefited from the
support of the former JNA and from Serbia;
⎯ The Bosnian Muslim military capacity in Srebrenica was largely dependent on
weapons that could be captured from the Bosnian Serb forces; and - 49 -
⎯ The urgent necessity for the Bosnian Mus lims to attack villages and hamlets
named in the Indictment in order to tr y and secure food, medicine and weapons,
for the purpose of the survival of the Muslim population in Srebrenica . . . ” 107
24. Madam President, these are the objective and credible facts that the Court can rely upon
for its consideration of the Bosniak raids prior to the declaration of the Srebrenica Safe Area in
April 1993. They tell a different story than that presented to you by the Respondent. The Muslims
were huddled together in Srebrenica desperately trying to survive and this survival included
resistance and raids for food, medicine and we apons to defend themselves. They were not
victimizers, they were not the perpetrators of a policy of ethnic cleansing, but were the victims of
it. Accordingly, there is no proper factual basi s upon which the Respondent can rest its so-called
“revenge” argument.
Demilitarization of the Srebrenica Safe Area after April 1993
25. As previously noted the Respondent has ar gued that after the declaration of the United
Nations Safe Area in April 1993, the 28th Divisi on of the Bosniak army was based there and was
launching raids from the enclave. The Respondent therefore argues that the subsequent massacre
was motivated by revenge for these ongoing raids or a desire to eliminate an enemy military
108
force .
26. Mr. Stoijanovic cited Balkan Battlegrounds as a basis for the proposition that the
109
28thDivision was present in the Srebrenica Safe Area . This source also states that by early
1995:
“The Bosnian Serbs were equally determ ined to take the enclave to achieve
their fundamental war aim of an ethnically pure state in eastern Bosnia and they
needed to do this soon to free up desp erately needed troops for military actions
elsewhere.” 110
27. Pages 321 to 322 of this same source states that the 28th Division’s available manpower
total was essentially irrelevant as there were far too few weapons to arm them. Only one third to
one half of these men carried weapons of any kind. Neither the weapons nor their ammunition
10ICTY, Prosecutor v. Oric, case No.IT-03-68, Decision on the First and Second Defence Filings pursuant to
Scheduling Order, 4 July 2005.
10CR 2006/16, para. 4 (Mr. Brownlie) and CR 2006/19, para. 98 (Mr. de Roux); CR 2006/19, paras.146-149
(Mr. de Roux).
109
CR 2006/15, para. 186 (Mr. Stojanovic).
11Balkan Battlegrounds, p. 319. - 50 -
came close to being adequate in numbers or in types for a serious defence of the town. The
Bosniak army did not trust the United Nations to gu arantee the enclave’s safety and was critical of
peacekeepers’ weak responses to Serb violations including the shelling of the Safe Area and the
blockading of entire enclaves 111.
28. Again the most reliable evidentiary sources on the issue of demilitarization of the enclave
are those emanating from the United Nations. The Blagojevic Trial Chamber described the
situation in Srebrenica immediately prior to the declaration of the Safe Area. It found:
“By March 1993, Bosnian Serb forces were advancing rapidly, causing more
civilians to flee. During this offensive, the Zepa enclave was separated from the
Srebrenica enclave. Bosnian Muslims from neighbouring villages sought refuge in an
area of approximately 150 sq km around Srebrenica town. At one point the population
in this area reached 50,000 to 60,000 people. As the Bosnian Serbs advanced, they
destroyed Srebrenica’s water supply and the town’s electricity supply; the population
increased, while the supplies of food and water ran low and public hygiene and living
conditions deteriorated rapidly.” 112
29. In response to this humanitarian emerge ncy and the fears that the Bosnian Serbs would
take over the enclave, on 16 April 1993 the United Nations Security Council adopted
resolution819. It demanded that “all parties an d others treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a
safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act”. It also demanded
“the immediate cessation of armed attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against Srebrenica
and their immediate withdrawal from the areas surrounding Srebrenica”. It further demanded that
“the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and
services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The
resolution did not place any specific restrictions on the activities of the army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina 113.
30. On 18 April 1993, a demilitarization agreement was signed by General Mladic and
GeneralHalilovic. This agreement had been brokered by UNPROFOR. The Bosniak forces
handed over some of their arms to the peacekeepers. On 21 April, UNPROFOR released a press
statement declaring the demilitarization of Srebrenica a success. On 25 April 1993, a Security
11Ibid., p. 321.
112
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojević, case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 98.
113
S/RES/819 (1993) 16 April 1993: The report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly
resolution53/35 dated 15 November 1999 and entitled “The Fall of Srebrenica” (A54/549) (“Report of the
Secretary-General”), para. 55; see paras. 52-58. - 51 -
Council mission arrived in Srebrenica. In their subsequent report, the mission members noted that
whereas resolution 819 (1993) had demanded that ce rtain steps be taken by the Bosnian Serbs, the
demilitarization agreement of 18 April 1993 had required the Bosniaks to disarm. They supported
UNPROFOR’s role in brokering the demilitarization agreement because the alternative would have
been a massacre of 25,000 people. The mission members then condemned the Serbs for
perpetrating a slow-motion process of genocide 114.
31. A further demilitarization agreement was fi nalized on 8May 1993. Under the terms of
the new agreement there would be further disarmament of Bosniak forces within the enclave and
the Serb heavy weapons and units surrounding the enclaves would be withdrawn. On 6 May 1993
the Security Council passed resolution 824 (1993) which called for the “the immediate cessation of
armed attacks or any hostile acts against the safe areas, and the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb
military or paramilitary units from these towns to a distance wherefrom they ceased to constitute a
menace to their security and that of their inhab itants”. As in resolution819 (1993), all of the
Security Council’s demands in resolution 824 (1993) were directed at the Bosnian Serbs 115.
32. The Secretariat of the United Nations explained to UNPROFOR that the Security
Council had laid great emphasis in resolution 824 (1993) upon the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serbs
from their positions threatening the Safe Areas. The Secretariat stated that the implied sequence in
the second demilitarization agreement ⎯ Bosnian Government forces disarming first, followed by
a Serb withdrawal later ⎯ would be unacceptable to the Security Council 11. That is, the
international community was of the view that the Serbs should withdraw from the areas
surrounding the enclave and only then should the Bosniak forces be fully disarmed.
The PRESIDENT: Could you please speak just a little slower? I hear that the interpreters
are doing their best but are lagging behind. Thank you.
Ms KARAGIANNAKIS: I apologize.
33. In resolution 836 the Security Council decided:
11Report of the Secretary-General, paras. 59-64.
115
Report of the Secretary-General, paras. 65-69.
116
Ibid., para. 69. - 52 -
“to extend... the mandate of UNPROFOR in order to enable it, in the safe areas
referred to in resolution 824 (1993), to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor
the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than
117
those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . .” (emphasis
added).
This means that the presence of the Bosnian gove rnment forces in the Safe Area was explicitly
permitted by the Security Council.
34. This is what the United Nations Secretary- General concluded in his report on the fall of
Srebrenica, regarding the demilitarization of the Safe Area.
“Criticisms have also been levelled at the Bosniacs in Srebrenica, among them
that they did not fully demilitarize . . . it is right to note that the Bosnian Government
had entered into demilitarization agreements with the Bosnian Serbs. They did this
with the encouragement of the United Nations. While it is also true that the Bosniac
fighters in Srebrenica did not fully demilitarize, they did demilitarize enough for
UNPROFOR to issue a press release, on 21 April 1993, saying that the process had
been a success. Specific instructions from the United Nations Headquarters in New
York stated that UNPROFOR should not be too zealous in searching for Bosniac
weapons and, later, that the Serbs should withdraw their heavy weapons before the
Bosniacs gave up their weapons. The Serbs never did withdraw their heavy weapons.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Srebrenica, military experts consulted in connection with this report were
largely in agreement that the Bosniacs could not have defended Srebrenica for long in
the face of a concerted attack by armo ur and artillery. The defenders were an
undisciplined, untrained, poorly armed, and totally isolated force, lying prone in the
crowded valley of Srebrenica. They were ill- equipped even to train themselves in the
use of the few heavier weapons that had been smuggled to them by their authorities.
After over three years of siege, the popu lation was demoralized, afraid and often
hungry. The only leader of stature was absent when the attack occurred. Surrounding
them, controlling all the high ground, handsomely equipped with heavy weapons and
logistica118rain of the Yugoslav army, were the Bosnian Serbs. There was no
contest.”
35. Madam President, according to these findings of the Secretary-General, the so-called
failure to demilitarize on the part of the major Bosnian government forces could not and cannot be
used as a pretext to justify the attack on Srebrenica.
36. The United Nations Secretary-General also reached the following conclusion regarding
the raids from the Safe Areas.
“A third accusation levelled at the Bosnia c defenders of Srebrenica is that they
provoked the Serb offensive by attacking out of that safe area. Even though this
accusation is often repeated by international sources, there is no credible evidence to
11S/RES/836 (1993), 4 June 1993.
11Report of the Secretary-General, paras. 475-476. - 53 -
support it. Dutchbat personnel on the ground at the time assessed that the few ‘raids’
the Bosniacs mounted out of Srebrenica were of little or no military significance.
These raids were often organized in order to gather food, as the Serbs had refused
access for humanitarian convoys into the enclave. Even Serb sources approached in
the context of this report acknowledged that the Bosniac forces in Srebrenica posed no
significant military threat to them . . . The Serbs repeatedly exaggerated the extent of
the raids out of Srebrenica as a pretext for the prosecution of a central war aim: to
create a geographically contiguous and ethnic ally pure territory along the Drina, while
freeing their troops to fight in other parts of the country. The extent to which this
pretext was accepted at face value by international actors and observers reflected the
prism of ‘moral equivalency’ through which the conflict in Bosnia was viewed by too
many for too long.” 119
37. Yet again we see that the allegations made by the Respondent lack substance. These
raids of the defenders of Srebrenica were often organized to gather food because the Serbs were
strangling Srebrenica and blocking humanitarian aid. These raids were exaggerated by the Serbs in
order to provide a pretext for creating an ethnically pure territory along the Drina River.
38. Indeed it is this “moral equivalency”, referred to by the Secretary-General, which
underlies the Respondent’s approach to this whole case. These unsubstantiated allegations and
exaggerations were used at the time as a pretext for genocide and they are being recycled and
repeated to this Court during these proceedings. Even if these allegations were true, could they
ever justify or excuse committing genocide as a response?
39. These United Nations findings are entirely consistent with the factual findings made by
the ICTY. The defence in the Krstic case advanced the same basic arguments that are being made
by the Respondent in this case. These arguments were rejected by the ICTY.
40. In the Krstic case the defence argued that revenge or the alleged failure of the Bosniak
120
forces to demilitarize may have been a motivation for the massacre in Srebrenica . The Trial
Chamber considered the alleged crimes against the Serb population by Bosniak forces, their alleged
failure to fully demilitarize and the allegations of subsequent raids from th e Srebrenica enclave.
The Trial Chamber found that the Krivaja operation, that is, the attack plan on Srebrenica
“was not confined to mere retaliation. Its objective, although perhaps restricted
initially to blocking communications betw een the two enclaves and reducing the
Srebrenica enclave to its urban core, was quickly extended. Realising that no
resistance was being offered by the Bosnian Muslim forces or the international
community, President Karadzic broadened th e operation’s objective by issuing, on
9 July, the order to seize the town. By 11 July, the town of Srebrenica was captured,
11Report of the Secretary-General, para. 479.
12ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, 29 June 2001, Trial transcript, pp. 10155-10157. - 54 -
driving 20,000 to 25,000 Muslim refugees to flee towards Potocari. Operation Krivaja
1995 then became an ins121ment of the policy designed to drive out the Bosnian
Muslim population.”
41. The defence in the Krstic case also argued that the Srebrenica massacre was motivated
by a desire to eliminate an enemy military force and was therefore not committed with the requisite
genocidal intent. This argument was considered and rejected on appeal. The argument was
rejected because the Serb forces killed civilians and military personnel alike, able-bodied and
disabled people alike, they did not differentiate and therefore the perpetrators were not seeking just
to eliminate an enemy military threat, they were seeking to destroy the Bosnian Muslims of
122
Srebrenica .
42. In sum, these United Nations sources speak with one voice in rejecting the exaggerations
and pretexts invoked to justify the attack on Srebrenica. The Serb forces that subsequently
massacred the men and boys and terrorized and expelled the women and children were not doing so
to rid themselves of the opposing side’s military forces or out of revenge. Rather, the events in
Srebrenica were the culmination of a long-standing Serb ethnic cleansing policy for eastern Bosnia
that was finally executed in a cold-blooded, organized and planned manner.
Terrorization and forced transfer of Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly people
43. Madam President, Members of the Court, the Respondent has also made a number of
factual assertions and arguments in support of its basic proposition that the events in Srebrenica did
not constitute genocide. It has characterized the mass expulsion of women, children and elderly
persons as an “evacuation”, it ha s questioned the numbers of people who were killed and has also
questioned whether the victims of the mass executions included civilians.
44. In his narrative on the events in Srebrenica, Mr.de Roux addressed the fate of the
civilians. He stated that the Appeals judgment in the Krstic case found that they were “allowed to
123
flee” and “evacuated” through a corridor to territory held by Bosnian Muslims” . This is not what
the judgment says and not an accurate description of what happened. The Krstic Appeals Chamber
12ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, 29 June 2001, para. 568.
122
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 19 April 2004, paras. 26-27.
123
CR 2006/18, paras. 95 and 104 (Mr. de Roux). - 55 -
confirmed that the fate of the te ns of thousands of women, children and old people after the fall of
124
Srebrenica constituted a “forcible transfer” .
45. The fate of these people was graphically described by the Krstic Trial Chamber. After
the takeover of Srebrenica, thousands of Bosnian Muslim residents fled to Potocari seeking
protection in the United Nations compound. By the evening of 11 July 1995, approximately 20,000
to 25,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees were gathered there. Several thousands had squeezed inside
the United Nations compo und itself, while the rest were sp read throughout the neighbouring
factories and fields. The vast majority of these people were women, children, elderly or disabled
people 12.
46. The conditions were awful. There was little food or water. The population was panicked
and terrified. As they sat there they heard sniper fire and shelling. On 12 July the conditions got
even worse as the day progressed and they were subjected to an active campaign of terror. The
refugees saw Serb soldiers setting houses and haysta cks on fire. They were told by Serb soldiers
that they would be slaughtered; that this was Serb country. K illings occurred. The terror of the
people escalated as night fell. Screams, gunshots and other terrifying noises were heard throughout
the night. Soldiers were picking people out of the crowd and taking them away. In one case
reported in the Krstic Trial judgment a witness recounted how three brothers ⎯ one merely a child
and the others in their teens ⎯ were taken out in the night. When the boys’ mother went looking
126
for them, she found them with their throats slit . Some people became so desperate that they
committed suicide by hanging themselves 127.
47. On 12 and 13 July 1995, the women, children and elderly were transported out of
Potocari by the Drina Corps to Bosnian Muslim held territory. Most of them did not even know
where they were headed. Importantly, they had no choice in the matter. They had to go. These
people were hit and abused by Serb soldiers as they boarded the buses. After getting off the buses
they were forced to walk for several kilometres through “no-man’s-land” to Bosnian territory. The
124ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No.IT-98-33, Judgement, 19 April 2004, paras. 31 and 33; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 532.
125ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 37.
126
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, paras. 41-44.
127Ibid., paras. 45-46. - 56 -
removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population from Potocari was completed on the evening of
13 July 1995. By 14 July, United Nations soldiers visiting Srebrenica did not find a single Bosnian
Muslim alive in the town 128.
48. Mr.de Roux also seemed to imply that because the United Nations peacekeepers
participated in the mass forced transfer, this so mehow meant that genocidal intent could not be
129
inferred from this expulsion .
49. Dutch Bat soldiers tried to escort the buses carrying the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of
Potocari. They were only allowed to accompany the first convoy of refugees on 12 July 1995.
After that they were stopped and their vehicles were stolen at gunpoint. According to the Deputy
Commander of Dutch Bat, they were being stoppe d by the Bosnian Serb soldiers “because they
didn’t want anybody to be around; that’s obvious... they didn’t want us to witness whatever
130
would happen” . The fact that the United Nations tried to protect these people does not
legitimize the cleansing and forced transfer of these women, children and old people or the
genocidal intent that can be inferred from it.
50. Finally Mr.de Roux argued that if the UNHCR proposal to evacuate the enclave had
been “accepted a few months ear lier, many lives would have been saved. But UNHCR’s proposal
was not accepted and its rejection was nothing ot her than the direct consequence of a struggle
among the warring parties for the conquest of territory.” 131
51. Indeed, on 2 April 1993, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees wrote to
the Secretary-General saying that the people of Sr ebrenica were convinced that the Bosnian Serbs
would pursue their military objective to gain control of the enclave. She noted that the evacuation
of non-combatants from Srebrenica was one option, and that these people were desperate to escape
to safety because they saw no other prospect than death if they remained where they were. She
stressed, however, that the Bosnian government authorities were opposed to the continued
128Ibid., paras. 48-52.
129CR 2006/18, paras. 98, 104-105 (Mr. de Roux).
130
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 50.
131CR 2006/18, paras. 98, 104-105 (Mr. de Roux). - 57 -
evacuation of people, which they saw as designed to empty the town of its women and children in
132
order to facilitate a subsequent Serbian offensive .
52. Madam President, the argument forwarded by Mr. de Roux is extraordinary. It amounts
to blaming the Bosnians for the mass forcible tr ansfers of their own people in Srebrenica during
July 1995 because they did not want to accept their so-called “evacuation” in 1993. According to
this perverse logic it is the defenceless victim who is to blame for not agreeing to quietly leave her
home before she is ethnically cleansed from it.
53. In any event, and as the Secretary-Gene ral’s report points out, it was the Security
Council that finally rejected the “evacuation” proposal in 1993 and instead condemned “the
deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of the civilian population from
Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as well as from other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part
133
of its overall abhorrent campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’” .
54. Madam President, Members of the Court, the Krstic Trial Chamber found that this
expulsion constituted forcible transfer and that this transfer, while not an act of genocide, was
evidence of the intent to destroy the Muslims of Srebrenica as part of the group of the Muslims of
Bosnia and Herzegovina 134. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY confirmed this and set out the
reasons why genocidal intent ⎯ why genocidal intent ⎯ to destroy the Muslims of Srebrenica
could indeed be inferred from the mass expulsion, coupled with the killings. It confirmed that:
“Forcible transfer could be an additional means by which to ensure the physical
destruction of the Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica. The transfer completed
the removal of all Bosnian Muslims from Sr ebrenica, thereby eliminating even the 135
residual possibility that the Muslim community in the area could reconstitute itself.”
Numbers of people killed
55. The Respondent has also challenged the number of people killed after the fall of
Srebrenica. Mr.de Roux recognized that the ICTY had found that 7,000 to 8,000 men and boys
132Secretary-General’s Report, para. 59.
133
United Nations Security Council resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993; Secretary-General’s Report, para. 57.
134
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No.IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 595; ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 19 April 2004, paras. 31 and 33.
135ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 31. - 58 -
had been killed after the fall of Srebrenica, but nevertheless proceeded to question this finding on
136
the basis of an ICTY indictment and an article .
56. It must be said at the outset that this is a deeply distasteful argument that constitutes the
denial of the existence of thousands of victims of Srebrenica.
57. In any event, the argument posited by Mr .de Roux lacks merit. The press article to
which he referred was written by a Mr.McKenzie, who was not there at the time and is not an
expert demographer. It is about one internet pa ge long and is not sourced. It provides nothing
more than the editorial-like opinion of one person. The indictment quoted by Mr.de Roux, the
137
Mladic indictment, does not contain the figure of 5,390 people killed as stated by him . Counsel
has obviously added up the figures cited in Anne x B of the indictment. The annex sets out
conservative and approximate figures for some of the execution sites, but not all of them. The
execution sites referred to in this indictment, the Mladic indictment, have been the subject of
factual findings in the Krstic and Blagojevic cases which have heard and seen the relevant evidence
and come to the accurate figure. Accordingly, the macabre and crude arithmetic of Mr.de Roux
simply cannot be used to argue that less than 7, 000 to 8,000 people were killed after the fall of
Srebrenica.
58. In any event, the Respondent’s resort to sources in this case is contradictory.
Mr.Obradovic had previously argued that indictments and press articles could not be used as
sources of evidence in this Court 13. Despite this Mr.de Roux used precisely these sources to
question a finding of the Krstic Trial Chamber which was subseq uently confirmed by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber 13.
59. The figure found by the Krstic Trial Chamber and confirmed on appeal is an entirely
reliable and credible one. The figure is based on a detailed demographic report by
ProfessorBrunborg who conservatively estima ted that a minimum of 7,475 persons from
Srebrenica were listed as missing on the basis of ICRC lists. The figure was corroborated by
136
CR 2006/18, para. 67 (Mr. de Roux).
13CR 2006/18, para. 67 (Mr. de Roux).
138
CR 2006/12, p. 31, para. 39, p. 37, para. 67 (Mr. Obradovic).
139
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 2. - 59 -
forensic evidence from exhumations of mass graves that had been uncovered up until the time of
the trial. Significantly it was corroborated by st atements of the main perpetrators themselves, the
140
Bosnian Serb army . Lastly, the murders were corroborated by the evidence of survivors. This
figure has most recently been confirmed by the Blagojevic Trial Chamber which found that over
141
7,000 Muslim men from Srebrenica were massacred . In addition to these sources the Republika
Srpska has adopted a report by its own Srebrenica commission which has also found that some
142
8,000 Bosniaks were liquidated after the fall of Srebrenica .
Civilians were targeted for killing
60. In part of his argument about why Srebrenica was not genocide Mr.de Roux also
questioned whether the males who were slaughter ed after the fall of the enclave were truly
civilians. He argued that it was the military-age men, together with members of the 28th Division
of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who received the order to leave the enclave and attempt to
break through Serb lines 143. He quoted from a part of a paragraph of the Blagojevic judgment in
support of his argument.
61. However, if one looks at all of the para graphs dealing with the escape of the column
from the judgment one sees that it tells a different st ory. A story of desperation. According to the
Trial Chamber, the column was formed through wo rd of mouth because the community feared that
if their men were to be caught by Serbs they woul d be killed. Escaping was their only chance of
survival. They did not leave pursuant to an order, but a decision of the military and civilian
leaders. The column was made up of 10,000 to 15,000 Bosnian Muslims. This consisted of
predominantly men and boys between the ages of 16 and 65, including a few women, children and
old people 144.
T6he. Blagojevic Trial Chamber went on to conclude:
14ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, paras. 80-84.
141
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No. IT-02-60, Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 671.
142
26th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations XII. he Srebrenica Commission http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?
content_id=33537.
143
CR 2006/18, para. 96 (Mr. de Roux).
14ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No. IT-02-60, Judgement, 17 January 2005, paras. 218-220. - 60 -
“The attack was clearly directed against the Bosnian Muslim civilian population
in the Srebrenica enclave. The Trial Chamber has heard evidence that the
28th Division of the ABiH was located in the Srebrenica enclave and that members of
that division were among the men that formed the column. However, the Trial
Chamber finds that the estimated number of members of the ABiH present in the
enclave and among the column, ranging from about 1,000 soldiers to 4,000 soldiers do
not amount to such numbers that the civ ilian character of the population would be
affected, as the vast majority of the people present in the enclave itself and in the
column were civilians.” 145
63. The fears of the Bosniak population were confirmed and those that were captured from
this column were killed: civilian or military, young or old, able-bodied or handicapped, all
captured people were to be killed 14. There was to be no mercy.
64. We have previously described the effici ent and cold-blooded nature of the killing
operation, which in turn demonstrated military planning and implementation. This was an
industrial killing operation. Men were transpor ted to detention facilities or schools where they
were held under guard. Many were blindfolded and had their hands tied behind their backs. They
were taken to the killing fields. One group after another was mowed down. At the same time
bulldozers were used to bury the bodies. The ma in killing operation was co mpleted in less than a
week. By some miracle a handful of survivors, usually hiding under bodies, lived and were able to
bear witness.
65. One of the survivors described what happe ned at the Orahovac execution site on the
14 July 1995, to the Blagojevic Trial Chamber:
“We got off the lorry, and we were told to line up as quickly as possible. When
we did so, I was together with my cousin Hariz, and we held hands. And he said they
would kill us. And I said they wouldn’t. He didn’t even finish speaking when the
bursts of fire started... The burst of fire killed my cousin. He was shouting,
screaming. I fell on the ground. He fell on top of me. That’s when screaming and
groaning of injured men started... Afterw ards, they continued to bring more shifts,
more groups. They continued to execute those injured people who were
147
screaming.”
66. Finally, the Appeals Chamber in the Krstic trial also concluded that captured men were
killed regardless of their age or status: “They stri pped all the male prisoners, military and civilian,
14ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No. IT-02-60, Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 552.
14ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, paras. 75 and 85, fn. 155.
147
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No. IT-02-60, Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 327. - 61 -
elderly and young, of their personal belongings and identification, and deliberately and
methodically killed them solely on the basis of their identity.” 148
Planning
67. Mr.Brownlie denied that there was any plan, arguing: “the existence of a definitive
149
plan, providing a political chart of some kind, is seen not to be a part of the picture” . If we have
appreciated this argument correctly, the Respondent ’s position is that if you don’t have a piece of
paper setting out the plan in terms, and containi ng a political chart, then you cannot infer that
genocide was committed. This approach must be rejected both legally and factually.
68. First, the existence of a written plan is not a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide.
Secondly, and notwithstanding this, in the case of Srebrenica a policy and a plan did exist. The
Court is entitled to find and ought to find that there was a long-standing policy to ethnically cleanse
eastern Bosnia and Srebrenica, in particular. The killings and expulsions were committed in
furtherance of that policy and pursuant to a plan to kill the men and boys and expel the remainder
of the Muslim population. The Court should make this finding on the basis of the uncontested facts
that were presented at the commencement of th ese pleadings and the relevant factual findings
surrounding the crimes themselves as set out in the United Nations sources and in particular the
findings of the ICTY.
6h9. Krstic Appeals Chamber found that intent may be inferred from factual
circumstances of the crimes themselves and may be inferred even where the individuals to whom
150
the intent is attributable are not precisely defined .
70. The ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the factual circumstances surrounding
Srebrenica as found by the Trial Chamber permitted the inference that the killing of Bosnian
Muslim men was done with genocidal intent. It held:
“The scale of the killing, combined with the VRS Main Staff’s awareness of the
detrimental consequences it would have for the Bosnian Muslim community of
Srebrenica and with the other actions the Main Staff took to ensure that community’s
physical demise, is a sufficient factual ba sis for the finding of specific intent. The
14ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 37.
14CR 2006/21, paras. 10 and 11 (Mr. Brownlie).
150
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 34. - 62 -
Trial Chamber found, and the Appeals Chamber endorses this finding, that the killing
was engineered and supervised by some members of the Main Staff of the VRS. The
fact that the Trial Chamber did not attribute genocidal intent to a particular official
within the Main Staff may have been motivated by a desire not to assign individual
culpability to persons not on trial here. This, however, does not undermine the
conclusion that Bosnian Serb forces carried out genocide against the Bosnian
Muslims.” 151
71. In addition to the killing of the men and bo ys and the expulsion of the women and of the
civilian population, the Court can also consider the destruction of Muslim religious and cultural
property in Srebrenica as a fact from wh ich it may infer genocidal intent. The Krstic Trial
Chamber considered that the deliberate destruct ion of mosques was evidence of the intent to
152
destroy the group . This Court has heard the expert tes timony of Mr.Riedlmayer who testified
that after Srebrenica was overrun by Serb forces in July 1995
“all traces of Muslim heritage in Srebrenica were also destroyed. The town’s five
mosques, all of which were still standing at the time Srebrenica fell, were all destroyed
along with the religious153chives recording the history and properties of the town’s
Muslim community.”
72. Mr.de Roux also made arguments regarding the planning behind the events in
Srebrenica. He argued that “the judges of the Tribunal... identified 12 July 1995 as the starting
date for genocidal intent” and he used this asser tion to argue that the strategic objectives of the
Serbian people which he characterized as a plan “has nothing at all to do with the genocidal intent
established by the Tribunal” 154.
73. However, the paragraph quoted by the Respondent from the Krstic Appeals Chamber
judgment does not make that finding 15. None of the ICTY judgments dealing with Srebrenica
identify precisely when the genocidal plan was first formulated. The Krstic Trial Chamber was
“unable to determine the precise date on which the decision to kill all the military aged men was
taken” but was “confident that the mass executions and other killings committed from 13 July
onwards were part of this plan” 156. The Blagojevic judgment went further in its factual findings
and stated:
151
Ibid., para. 35.
152
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 580.
15CR 2006/22, para. 59 (Mr. Riedlmayer).
15CR 2006/19, para. 275 (Mr. de Roux).
155
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 19 April 2004, para. 93.
15ICTY Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 573. - 63 -
“The Trial Chamber is convinced that the criminal acts committed by the
Bosnian Serb forces were all parts of one single scheme to commit genocide of the
Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, as reflected in the ‘Krivaja 95’ operation [dated
2July1995], the ultimate objective of which was to elimina157the enclave and,
therefore, the Bosnian Muslim community living there . . .”.
74. Significantly, both the Krstic and Blagojevic Trial Chambers referred to the strategic
158
objectives as part of the relevant factual background to the events in Srebrenica during 1995 . In
this regard the Krstic Trial Chamber found:
“The Bosnian Serbs’ war objective was clearly spelt out, notably in a decision
issued on 12 May 1992 by Momcilo Krajisnik, then President of the National
Assembly of the Bosnian Serb People. The decision indicates that one of the strategic
objectives of the Serbian people of Bosn ia-Herzegovina was to reunite all Serbian
people in a single State, in particular by erasing the border along the Drina which
159
separated Serbia from Eastern Bosnia . . .”
75. Mr. de Roux also said that that Directiv es 7 and 7.1 contained no indication of genocidal
160
intent . In this regard we invite the Court to consid er the plain meaning of the text from Karadzic
in Directive 7, that is, “create an unbearable situ ation of total insecurity with no hope of further
survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa”. Barring a directive quoting the terms
of the Genocide Convention itself, it is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of genocidal intent.
76. This is especially the case when one considers that the Serb forces to which this directive
was addressed, subsequently organized, planned and committed the mass murder of men and boys
in Srebrenica. That Karadzic intended this genocide is supported by a statement that he made when
he addressed the 54th Assembly of Republika Srpska held on 15 and 16 October 1995. He
declared: “I . . . found General Krstic and advised him to go into the city and proclaim the fall of
Srebrenica, and after that we will chase the Turk s through the woods. I approved that radical
mission, and I feel no remorse for it.” 161
157ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case No. IT-02-60, Judgement, 17 January 2005, para. 674.
158
Ibid., para. 96.
159
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 562.
160CR 2006/17, para. 276 (Mr. de Roux).
161“The Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1992-95: Highlight s and Excerpts” by Dr. Robert J. Donia submitted
29July 2003; Exhibit No. 537, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, case No.IT-02- 54-T, p.83; ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Milosevic, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, case No. IT-02- 54-T, 16 June 2004, para. 245. - 64 -
FRY participation in Srebrenica
77. The final aspect of the Respondent’s argument that remains to be addressed is that of
Belgrade involvement in Srebrenica. Mr.Brownlie asserted that the Government of the FRY did
162
not “formulate or adhere to a plan” for genocide or that it was involved in planning or
implementing the murders in Srebrenica 163.
78. The Respondent refers to a lack of evid ence of Belgrade involvement in various sources
to support its view. The first three sources that are referred to are the Krstic Trial and Appeal
164
judgments and the Blagojevic judgment . However, these ICTY Chambers were not seised with
the question of Belgrade involvement and thus were not presented with relevant evidence of this.
Therefore, the lack of findings in this regard is not surprising.
79. The Dutch Srebrenica report is also cite d by Mr.Brownlie as a source which does not
165
implicate Belgrade. However the report, by its own admission, is not exhaustive . Further, a
perusal of the sources used for the report indicates th at the writers did not have the benefit of all of
the evidence of Belgrade involvement which we have presented to the Court.
80. Balkan Battlegrounds is also quoted for the proposition that Belgrade’s military or
166
security forces were not implicated in the Srebrenica atrocities . However, the quote provided by
the Respondent states that the Yugoslav army or Serbian State Security (MUP) forces may have
contributed to the Srebrenica battle. Indeed in the preceding passages from this section of Balkan
Battlegrounds one sees the following quote:
“There are some reports from UN officials and Bosnian survivors that suggest
Yugoslav Army (VJ) troops (likely from the elite formations such as the 63rd
Airborne or 72nd Special Operations Brigades) as well as possibly elements of the
Serbian State Security Department (RDB) Special Operations Unit (“Red Berets”)
may have been engaged in the battle in Sreb renica. Bosnian Army forces have cited a
jeep they captured with Yugoslav Army license plates–– N2660–– as evidence that
VJ forces had been directly involved in the fighting, although this could indicate only
that VJ equipment was being used on the other side of the Drina. VJ and RDB
assistance in some form is also cons istent with President Milosevic’s close
co-ordination and planning with General Mladic of Bosnian and Krajina Serb political
162
CR 2006/16, paras. 260 and 262-263 (Mr. Brownlie).
16CR 2006/17, para. 267 (Mr. Brownlie).
16Ibid., paras. 166-169 and 279 (Mr. Brownlie).
165
Ibid., paras. 173 and 269 (Mr. Brownlie).
16Ibid., paras. 276-277 (Mr. Brownlie). - 65 -
goals and military strategy during 1995. El ements of the same units had helped the
167
Bosnian Serbs at other times and other places in Bosnia.”
81. Mr.Brownlie has cited the testimony of Zo ran Lilic in the ICTY Milosevic trial for the
168
proposition that Milosevic did not have a role in Srebrenica . Zoran Lilic was the President of the
FRY when Srebrenica took place. He formerly headed the SDC of which Mr. Milosevic was a key
member. He is a person who is clearly associated with the Respondent and with Mr.Milosevic.
Mr.Lilic was due to testify before you but he did not, for unknown reasons. Certainly, in these
circumstances the Court should not consider the favourable testimony that Mr.Lilic provided for
his former colleague in the ICTY on the issue of Srebrenica, as objective and conclusive evidence
on this issue.
Madam President, I see that we are approaching the . . .
The PRESIDENT: Yes. Ms Karagiannakis, for compelling reasons the Court cannot sit
beyond ten past one, so I hope you will be able to conclude with that small overrun.
Ms KARAGIANNAKIS. I will do my best.
The PRESIDENT: I would suggest that for any long citations you might find it useful just to
refer the Court to where they will find those.
Ms KARAGIANNAKIS: I am obliged.
82. Mr.Brownlie also quoted Lord Owen on Milosevic’s attitude to Srebrenica during
1993 169. He did so in order to rebut the testimony of General Clark in the Milosevic case. General
Clark had asked Mr.Milosevic why, if he had this influence over the Bosnian Serbs, he had
allowed Mladic to kill all those people at Srebrenica . Milosevic replied: “Well, General Clark, I
told him not to do it but he didn’t listen to me.” This testimony clearly establishes that Milosevic
knew about Srebrenica before it happened 17. Lord Owen testified in the Milosevic case that
16Balkan Battlegrounds, pp. 322-353.
168
CR 2006/17, paras. 271-272 (Brownlie).
169
CR 2006/17, paras. 177-183 and 292-296 (Mr. Brownlie).
17ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosevic , Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal , case No.IT-02-54-T,
16 June 2004, para. 280. - 66 -
Mr.Milosevic intervened and was of considerable help in stopping General Mladic going in and
171
taking Srebrenica in 1993 .
83. There are two points that can be made a bout this. First, there is no reason why
Lord Owen’s version of events in 1993 would affect the knowledge of Mr. Milosevic in 1995 about
the Srebrenica massacre before it happened. Se condly, according to Lord Owen, Mr.Milosevic
clearly had considerable influence over General Mladic in 1993 and managed to stop him from
taking Srebrenica. The only question is why didn’t he exert the same influence to stop Mladic in
1995.
84. What the Respondent has not denied or ev en addressed is the evidence that the political
and military leadership of the FRY decided that th e area which was 50km from the Drina should
be Serb. It has not denied that Mihal Kertes arme d the Bosnian Serbs pursuant to that aim. It has
not addressed the fact that the JNA and Serbian paramilitaries engaged in ethnic cleansing of
Muslims in Eastern Bosnia during 1992.
85. The Respondent is silent about Serbian bus es that were used to forcibly transfer the
women, children and elderly from the enclave. It has been silent about the use of Dutch APCs
seized in Srebrenica which were subsequently used by the Yugoslav army in Kosovo 172.
86. As the Secretary-General stated, the Bosnian Serb forces that surrounded the enclave
“were handsomely equipped with the heavy weapons and logistical train of the Yugoslav army” 173.
87. VJ officers posted to the VRS played a critical leadership role in the Srebrenica
genocide. The first of these o fficers is General Mladic, the m ilitary leader of the gruesome
174 175
operation . He was an officer of the VJ and was only retired in 2002 . Even after Mladic was
charged with genocide and up until this day, he enjoys freedom in Serbia.
88. A number of other officers, who played key leadership roles or who otherwise
participated in Srebrenica, were officers of the VJ who were posted to the VRS. This is evidenced
by documents submitted to the Court by Bosnia and Herzegovina that demonstrate that they were
171
CR 2006/17, para. 181 (Mr. Brownlie).
172CR 2006/ 4, p. 50, para. 52; and p. 52, para. 58 (Mr. van den Biesen).
173Report of the Secretary-General, para. 476.
174
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, e.g., paras. 407, 619, 631.
175CR 2006/9, p. 26, para. 13 (Mr. Torkildsen). - 67 -
promoted in the Yugoslav army and/or were on active duty in the 30th Personnel Centre of the
General Staff of the Yugoslav army. These officers included:
⎯ General Krstic, the Chief of Staff and subs equent Commander of the Drina Corps from
13 July 1995, who was found guilty of aiding and abetting the Srebrenica genocide 176;
⎯ General Zivanovic, the commander of the Drina Corps up until 13 July 1995. He issued orders
organizing transport for the forcible transfer of civilians from Potocari and to capture the men
from the fleeing column 177;
⎯ Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, who was the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade and was
instrumental in the murders of thousands of men and boys. He has been charged with
genocide 17;
⎯ Lieutenant Colonel Blagojevic, who has been co nvicted of complicity to commit genocide in
179
Srebrenica ;
⎯ Lieutenant Colonel Obrenovic, who pleaded guilty and was convicted of persecution as a crime
180
against humanity ;
⎯ Captain Momir Nikolic, who pleaded guilty and was convicted of persecution as a crime
against humanity in relation to Srebrenica 181;
⎯ Major Dragan Jokic, who was convicted of exte rmination as a crime against humanity for his
182
participation ;
⎯ Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic, who organized the transportation for the forcible transfer 183;
176
Document submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 16 January 20 06, No. 42; also see Nos. 44 a-44j; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 19 April 2004.
177
Documents submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 16 January 2006, No. 51 b; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic,
case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, paras. 126, 128, 137, 169.
178
Documents submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nos. 42, 46c; also see Nos. 45a-45e; ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Krstic, case No.IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, paras. 392, 393, 411, 423; Prosecutor v. Popovic et al. , case
No. IT-05-88, Consolidated Amended Indictment, 11 November 2005.
179
Document submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 16 January 2006, No. 42; ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Blagojevic, case No. IT-02-60, Judgement, 17 January 2005, p. 304.
180
Document submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 16 January 2006, No. 48 b; Prosecutor v. Obrenovic, case
No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, 10 December 2003.,
181
Document submitted by Bosn ia and Herzegovina on 16 January 2006, No. 46 b; Prosecutor v. Nikolic, case
No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, 2 December 2003.
182
Document submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 16 January 2006, No. 42; Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, case
No. IT-02-60, Judgement, 17 January 2005, p. 305.
183
Document submitted by Bo snia and Herzegovina on 16 January 2006, No. 69 a; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic,
case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 2 August 2001, paras. 138, 177 and 344. - 68 -
184
⎯ Lieutenant Colonel Sobot, who was also involved in this organization of transportation ;
⎯ Colonel Cerovic, who was engaged in communications for the Drina Corps Command
185
regarding the handling of Muslim prisoners .
89. Instead of being the subject of criminal investigations or prosecutions or dismissals or
demotions, or even having their pay stopped, some of these officers including Krstic, Pandurevic
and Obrenovic, were promoted in the VJ after they had played leadership roles in the notorious
186
events in Srebrenica .
90. None of us can forget the video-tape d, cold-blooded executions committed by the
187
Scorpions, a unit of the Serbian MUP, after the fall of Srebrenica . They were not there to engage
in legitimate policing activities. They were there to kill. They were there to kill Muslims. They
shot those teenage boys because they were Muslims.
Conclusion
91. In conclusion a final quote from the Secretary-General’s report encapsulates the place of
the Srebrenica enclave within the overall Serb policy regarding the Safe Area and Bosnia in
general:
“the key issue ⎯ politically, strategically and morally ⎯ underlying the security of
the ‘safe areas’ was the essential nature of ‘ethnic cleansing’. As part of the larger
ambition for a ‘Greater Serbia’, the Bosnian Serbs set out to occupy the territory of the
enclaves; they wanted the territory for th emselves. The civilian inhabitants of the
enclaves were not the incidental victims of the attackers; their death or removal was
the very purpose of the attacks upon them. The tactic of employing savage terror,
primarily mass killings, rapes and brutalizati on of civilians, to expel populations was
used to the greatest extent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it acquired the now
infamous euphemism of ‘ethnic cleansing’ . The Bosnian Muslim civilian population
thus became the principal victim of brutally aggressive military and paramilitary Serb
operations to depopulate coveted territories in order to allow them to be repopulated
by Serbs.” 188
184Document submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 48 c; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No.IT-98-33,
Judgement, 2 August 2001, paras. 138, 177 and 344.
185
Document submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 48 c; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, case No.IT-98-33,
Judgement, 2 August 2001, paras. 199 and 412, also see paras. 104, 247, 248, 275.
186
CR 2006/8, p.46, para. 29 (Mr. van den Biesen); document submitte d by Bosnia and Herzegovina on
16 January 2006, No. 48b.
187
CR 2006/9, pp. 15-16, paras. 17-23 (Ms Karagiannakis).
188Secretary-General’s Report, para. 495. - 69 -
92. What happened in Srebrenica was not an is olated incident motivated by visceral desires
or the wish to eliminate an enemy force. It was part of a larger policy of achieving Greater Serbia,
a policy which was conceived and instigated from Be lgrade and was expressed in a decision of the
FRY leadership to ensure that 50 km from the Drina River would be Serb. It was executed by the
Bosnian Serbs and the FRY Serbs, from the beginning of the war through ethnic cleansing in
eastern Bosnia. It culminated in the plan to kill the men and boys of Srebrenica and expel their
mothers, sisters, wives and children. This plan was executed by Bosnian Serb forces and organs of
the FRY. It resulted in the destruction of Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica through death and
removal.
93. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, this was genocide. The victims
of this triumph of evil look to this International Court of Justice to give it its proper name. Thank
you, that completes my pleading.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ms Karagiannakis. The Court now rises and the hearings
will resume at 10 o’clock tomorrow.
The Court rose at 1.10 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Wednesday 19 April 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding