CR 2006/56
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LAAYE THAEGUE
ANNÉE 2006
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 19 décembre 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à des Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay
(Argentine c. Uruguay)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
YEAR 2006
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 19 December 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________ - 2 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vsce-prh,ident
RanMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skjoteiskov,
BeTroáesz.
juiesesa, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Present: Presideitgins
Vice-PresiKntasawneh
RanjevJaudges
Shi
Koroma
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc TorresBernárdez
Vinuesa
CoRuvrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
Le Gouvernement de la République orientale de l’Uruguay est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Héctor Gros Espiell, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès de la
République française,
S. Exc. M. Carlos Gianelli, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme agents ;
M. Alan E. Boyle, professeur de droit international, directeur du Centre écossais pour le droit
international, Université d’Edinburgh,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Florence,
comme avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Carlos Mora, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. M. José Luis Cancela, ambassadeur, secrétaire général du ministère des relations
extérieures,
M. Marcelo Cousillas, conseiller juridique à la direction nationale de l’environnement, ministère du
logement, de l’aménagement du territoire et de l’environnement,
M. Adam Kahn, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, membre du barreau du
Massachusetts,
Mme Nienke Grossman, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre du barreau du district
de Columbia, membre du barreau de la Virginie,
M. Andrew Loewenstein, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, membre du barreau du
Massachusetts,
Mme Christine Williams, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, membre du barreau du
Massachusetts,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à la faculté de droit, Université de Macerata,
Mme Paola Gaeta, professeur à la faculté de sciences politiques, Université de Florence,
M. Sebastian Lopez Escarceña, doctorant, Université d’Edimburgh,
M. Alberto Pérez Pérez, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de la République,
Montevideo,
comme conseillers.
Le Gouvernement de la République argentine est représenté par :
S. Exc. Mme Susana Ruiz Cerutti, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique du ministère des affaires
étrangères, du commerce international et du culte,
comme agent ; - 5 -
The Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay is represented by:
H.E. Mr.Héctor Gros Espiell, Ambassador of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay to the French
Republic,
H.E. Mr. Carlos Gianelli, Ambassador of the E astern Republic of Uruguay to the United States of
America,
as Agents;
Mr. Alan E. Boyle, Professor of International Law and Director of the Scottish Centre for
International Law, University of Edinburgh,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Florence,
as Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Carlos Mora, Ambassador of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
H.E. Mr. José Luis Cancela, Ambassador, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Marcelo Cousillas, Legal Counsel, National Di rectorate for the Environment, Ministry of
Housing, Territorial Planning and Environment,
Mr. Adam Kahn, Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, member of the Massachusetts Bar,
Ms Nienke Grossman, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bar of the District of
Columbia, Member of the Virginia Bar,
Mr. Andrew Loewenstein, Foley Hoag LLP, Bo ston, Massachusetts, member of the Bar of
Massachusetts,
Ms Christine Williams, Foley Hoag LLP, Bost on, Massachusetts, member of the Bar of
Massachusetts,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Macerata,
Ms Paola Gaeta, Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Florence,
Mr. Sebastian Lopez Escarceña, Graduate Researcher, University of Edinburgh,
Mr. Alberto Pérez Pérez, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of the Republic, Montevideo,
Asdvisers;
The Government of the Argentine Republic is represented by:
H.E. Ms Susana Ruiz Cerutti, Ambassador, Lega l Counsel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Religious Worship,
as Agent; - 6 -
S. Exc. M. Santos Goñi Marenco, ambassadeur de la République argentine auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre, membre
de la Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Institut universitaire de hautes études
internationales, Genève,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M.Alan Béraud, ministre, ambassade de la Ré publique argentine auprès de l’Union européenne,
ancien conseiller juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères, du commerce international et du
culte,
M. Holger Martinsen, ministre, bureau du conseille r juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères,
du commerce international et du culte,
M. Victor Marzari, conseiller d’ambassade, bureau du conseiller juridique du ministère des affaires
étrangères, du commerce international et du culte,
M.Fernando Marani, secrétaire d’ambassade, bureau du conseiller juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères, du commerce international et du culte,
M.Gabriel Herrera, secrétaire d’ambassade, bureau du conseiller juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères, du commerce international et du culte,
Mme Florencia Colombo Sierra, direction de la presse du ministère des affaires étrangères, du
commerce international et du culte,
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris X-Nanterre,
Mme Urusula Zitnik, bureau du conseiller juridi que du ministère des affaires étrangères, du
commerce international et du culte,
Mme Andrea Blumtritt, bureau du conseiller juridi que du ministère des affaires étrangères, du
commerce international et du culte,
comme délégués. - 7 -
H.E. Mr. Santos Goñi Marenco, Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor of Public International Law, University of Paris X-Nanterre, member of
the United Nations International Law Commission,
Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International Studies,
Geneva,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Alan Béraud, Minister, Embassy of the Arge ntine Republic, European Union, former Legal
Counsel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Religious Worship,
Mr. Holger Martinsen, Minister, Office of Legal Counsel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Religious Worship,
Mr. Victor Marzari, Embassy Counsellor, Office of Legal Counsel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Religious Worship,
Mr. Fernando Marani, Embassy Secretary, Office of Legal Counsel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Religious Worship,
Mr. Gabriel Herrera, Embassy Secretary, Office of Legal Counsel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Religious Worship,
Ms Florencia Colombo Sierra, Press Directorate, Mi nistry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade
and Religious Worship,
Mr. Daniel Müller, docteur en droit, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre
(CEDIN), University of Paris X-Nanterre,
Ms Ursula Zitnik, Office of Legal Counsel, Minist ry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and
Religious Worship,
Ms Andrea Blumtritt, Office of Legal Counsel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and
Religious Worship,
Dselegates. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open. The Court meets this morning
to hear the second round of oral observations on the request for the indication of provisional
measures of Uruguay in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.
Uruguay). This morning we shall hear the representatives of Uruguay and I imagine it is you,
Professor Boyle, who will immediately take the floor.
Mr. BOYLE: Thank you, Madam President.
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, yesterday Argentina made three arguments in its
defence. Let me summarize them briefly. Fi rst, they say the problem is not very serious ⎯ a little
local difficulty, some roads, a few. Secondl y, they say, well they didn’t do it anyway ⎯ someone
else did. And thirdly, and this is their best point , to which all their arguments kept returning, that
the case is in the wrong court. We should not have bothered you, we should have gone to
Mercosur. I pay tribute to the ingenuity of Ar gentina’s counsel, but none of this adds up to a
serious defence. Now let me explain.
Factual rebuttals
2. At various points in its presentation yesterday Argentina disputed a number of facts
provided by Uruguay, and questioned its good faith. In some cases, Argentina’s presentation was
confusing or misleading; in others, it was plainl y disingenuous. At the time, we did not have the
opportunity to review all of the factual claims rai sed by Argentina; the basis for their assertions in
some cases arrived only in the written observations presented by Argentina at yesterday’s coffee
break. As my colleague Professor Condorelli and I will show, most of the facts that Argentina
sought to throw into the dispute are largely irrelevant to the job at hand for the Court. But, the
factual assertions we have checked do not stand fo r the propositions that Argentina said that they
did.
3. Let me begin with the very serious accusation that Uruguay invented the statement of
President Kirchner; that statement is found in A nnex 23 of Uruguay’s request. It says that “there
will be no restraint against our brothers in Gualegua ychú”; that is what he said, that is what
Annex23 demonstrates. Uruguay rejects in its enti rety the allegation that it is some sort of - 9 -
fabrication. Not only does this statement appear in the article annexed to Uruguay’s request, but
precisely the same quotation appears in at least tw o other widely circulated Argentine newspapers,
including Clarin and La República de Corrientes . 1
4. Uruguay has also noted Argentina’s perhaps rather callous attitude toward the scope and
impact of the blockades. It is an indisputable fact that Uruguay’s most crucial inter-State transport
link ⎯ the Fray Bentos bridge ⎯ is presently and has been since 21November subject to a total
and indefinite closure. Nor can it be contested th at the two remaining international bridges have at
times been closed and are threatened with further cl osures. Unable to deny this incontrovertible
state of affairs, Argentina has sought artificially to minimize their economic impact. But Argentina
cannot escape the fact that a full 91percent of Uruguay’s exports to Argentina ⎯ under normal
circumstances ⎯ flow over the Fray Bentos bridge; that was Uruguay’s evidence in the Mercosur
proceedings. Argentina’s only response has been to cite misleading statistics (provided for the first
time yesterday) that are largely based on periods when the blockades were not in place, which
doesn’t tell us anything. If the Court should have any lingering doubt as to Argentina’s attempt to
exploit Uruguay’s economic vulnerability, Urugua y would respectfully refer the Court to the
Mercosur Ad Hoc Arbitral Award, there were all three arbitrators found that “for a large number of
2
people” the economic impact was, and I’ll use their words “extraordinarily significant” . The most
recent blockades, which promise to be continuous, comprehensive, and of indefinite duration, can
only have an even more profound impact. As s hould now be apparent, I think, Professor Pellet’s
rather unfortunate suggestion that this hearing is merely a “media stunt” is unworthy of the dignity
that should characterize these proceedings, and is so mewhat suggestive of Argentina’s approach to
the crisis ⎯ genuine crisis ⎯ which Uruguay currently faces.
5. Argentina also suggested that the bloc kades were somehow partial or intermittent.
Uruguay made clear yesterday that not all of the br idges were blockaded all of the time, the Salto
bridge, the most northerly crossing, and the one farthest from the population centres of Buenos
1The identical quotation is also available at Exhibit 4 to Uruguay’s Written Observations of 14December2006.
“Kirchner criticó los cortes pero insistió en que no los va a reprimClarin (Ar.) (23November2006); see also
“Kirchner defendió la postura Ar gentina contra las pasteras”, La República de Corrientes (Ar.), 22/11/06,
http://www.diariolarepublica.com.ar/notix/noticia.php?i=113874&f=2006-1…. (Original Spanish: “no habrá represion
contra los hermanos de Gualeguaychú.”)
2Ann. 2, Award of the Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal of Mercosur, 6/9/06, para. 114. - 10 -
Aires and Montevideo has only been closed occasionally, though ther e are certainly plans to close
it more consistently. This, of course ⎯ such closures are of course likely to happen with the
continued acquiescence in ⎯ and tacit encouragement of ⎯ further blockades by Argentina. The
Colon bridge is open intermittently ⎯ for now, but we do not know what the situation will be next
week or the week after; articles in yesterda y’s newspapers announced the most recent round of
3
scheduled blockades , there could be more. However, the Fray Bentos bridge, by far the most
important ⎯ as I said earlier ⎯ has undoubtedly been closed since 21 November, and as recently
as Saturday 16December, the leaders of the a ssembly in Gualeguyachú again declared their
intention to keep the bridge clo sed. One stated, “[o]ur interest is that [the Botnia plant] is
dismantled or relocated, but that in whatever manner that it leaves the zone of the watershed of the
River Uruguay, and we will not accep t another type of negotiation” 4, that is what the protesters
want, that is what they have said they want.
6. Argentina also sought refuge in Prof essor Kohen’s assertion that the Court somehow
cannot act to preserve Uruguay’s rights because Uruguay, at last week’s Mercosur Common
Market Council meeting in Brazil, allegedly ini tiated a new Mercosur arbitral proceeding.
Specifically, he went on to say:
“l’Uruguay a recherché ⎯ sans succès ⎯ au sein du Conseil du marché commun du
Mercosur exactement la même chose qu’il p oursuit par le moyen de cet incident de
procédure: obtenir ce qui aux yeux de l’ Uruguay serait l’exécution de cette sentence
arbitrale” (CR 2006/55, pp. 22-23, para. 17).
That is what he said. Now this contention really need not concern the Court. Uruguay did not
institute new arbitral proceedings last week ⎯ in Mercosur or anywhere else ⎯ and discussing the
dispute in the Council of the Mercosur Common Market ⎯ a political body where politicians
naturally discuss disputes of this kind ⎯ can have no effect on the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 41 of its own Statute and under Article 60 of the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay. So let
us discount the Mercosur Common Market and Ur uguay has not returned to arbitration with
Mercosur.
3
“Extienden los cortes en Colon” [“They extend the blockades on Colon”], LaNacion.com, 18/12/06.
4“Asembleístas ratificaron el corte de la ruta 136.”Nacion (Ar.), 16/12/06. [“ Nuestro interés es que se
desmantele o se relocalice, pero que cualquier manera se vaya de la zona de la cuenca del Río Uruguay, y no
aceptaremos otro tipo de negociación.”] - 11 -
7. Argentina’s advocates also referred, on a number of occasions to paragraph157 of
Uruguay’s written presentation before the Mercosur Ad Hoc Tribunal. They cited it for the
proposition that Uruguay itself does not believe the blockades and the pulp mills dispute are linked.
This, too, is false although it may be that they read it a little quickly.
8. The phrase repeatedly invoked by Argentina in this paragraph is located in the solitary
substantive paragraph of a 54-page document, it is a paragraph which Argentina translated for the
Court. Here is what they translated: “In the fi rst place, the construction of the referred plants and
the possible environmental considerations related to them, are absolutely alien to this controversy.”
What Argentina failed to mention, however, is that when it said that Uruguay was merely making
the point that the Assembleístas entirely discredite d environmental concerns about the pulp mills
dispute had nothing whatever to do with whethe r Argentina is violating its obligations under
Mercosur’s treaty. Mercosur is not an envi ronmental body, it is not the place you take
environmental disputes to. Obviously the e nvironmental dispute about the pulp mills was
irrelevant to the question whether there is a viola tion of trade treaty commitments, and that is the
only point Uruguay is trying to make. At paragraph 158, which Argentina did not translate for the
Court, Uruguay said this:
“There is no connection whatsoever be tween the normal and free circulation of
persons, goods and services and the alleged defense of the environment, making it
hardly arguable that the road cut-offs constitute environmental protection.
Nevertheless, the blockade measures adopted before the passivity of Argentine
authorities directly impede the right of free circulation.”
But, again, they have nothing to do with the environment. That is perfectly true and that was the
point, and the only point, that Uruguay was making to Mercosur.
9. Madam President, as this hearing draws to a close –– and as my voice draws to a close ––,
it may be useful to reflect upon the news today ⎯ literally today ⎯ from Gualeguaychu, the
epicentre of the blockades. Reflecting upon their st rategy, one activist apparently declared: “This
will be lifted only when the plant is removed. ” I think he meant the blockade. Another
Assembleísta affirmed that the roadblocks are “ our only possible solution”. Yet another declared:
“There is no other way for us to impose our wish es. If we leave the highway, the conflict is over
from Uruguay’s standpoint.” Still another said “the traffic blockade should be a bargaining chip to
get Uruguay to move the plant elsewhere”. When asked what other strategies, in addition to the - 12 -
blockade at Fray Bentos, they will implement, the leader of the protest promised to “block traffic
5
across the other two bridges as well” . That is what the protesters are saying on the news at the
moment.
10. There is no doubt the Argentine Government approves of this economic extortion. It will
not have escaped the Court’s notice that the represen tatives of Argentina at this hearing made no
real effort to distance themselves or their Governme nt from these tactics. But that is perhaps not
surprising, given that the Argentine authorities have never ⎯ not once ⎯ attempted to arrest or to
prosecute a single blockader, even when the ba rricades were manned by only a handful of them.
Uruguay would respectfully ask that you bear th is in mind as you consider its remaining
observations.
Irreparable harm
11. Yesterday Professor Pellet said that Uruguay has a choice: it can either continue with the
Botnia plant or give it up–– that is indeed the poi nt, absolutely. He might also have said that if
Uruguay does give up the plant the blockades will end immediately. That is indeed Uruguay’s
belief. Were Uruguay forced to terminate the Botn ia project in order to protect its tourism and
trade from Argentine blockades, the harm th at Uruguay would suffer would necessarily be
irreparable. It matters not at all that the plant is 70percent complete. The point is simple: the
coerced termination of the Botnia project would me an the end of Botnia’s presence in Uruguay.
The Court could provide no remedy for that.
12. Professor Pellet went some way towards admitting this when he conceded that cancelling
the Botnia plant would, at the very least, affect the Court’s final judgment. But he did not
acknowledge the true significance of his argument. He suggested that forced cancellation would
not render a final judgment in Uruguay’s favour an empty gesture because the co-operative
machinery established by the 1975 Statute would be preserved as if the importance of the dispute
was to preserve the machinery of a treaty rather than to preserve the investment that Uruguay is
seeking to make. Madam President, with respect, Uruguay disagrees, and submits that this would
be the very definition of an empty gesture. What substantive benefit, one may ask, would Uruguay
Marcela Valente, “Christmas at the Roadblock,Inter Press News Agency , 18 December 2006, available at
www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=35890. - 13 -
achieve by a procedural vindication that had been denuded of any substance? The Botnia plant
would be no more, and the Court, as I have said be fore, would have no power to order Botnia to
return. The very essence of the dispute ⎯ the Botnia plant ⎯ would be irretrievably compromised.
13. It is for this reason that Uruguay’s requ est for interim measures before this Court is
materially different from the request that Argentin a made before the Court in July. As the Court
correctly observed in its July Order, when it deni ed Argentina’s request, doing so would not cause
irreparable harm to Argentina because the Court retains the power to order the plant to be
dismantled if it should find for Argentina on the merits, and Uruguay recognizes that risk. But no
corresponding remedy is conceivably available to Uruguay should the Court decline to order
interim measures today. Once the Botnia plant is g one, it is gone. As I will say for the third time,
the Court can create no remedy to restore it. It is for that reason that a refusal to grant the relief
sought today by Uruguay would be very likely to lead eventually to irreparable damage to the
substance of Uruguay’s rights in relation to the plant.
14. Perhaps recognizing the force of this anal ysis, Argentina sidesteps it by focusing on the
economic harm now being visited upon Uruguay, and by maintaining that these economic losses
are not irreparable. Madam President, Argentina’s argument is misplaced. As should be clear by
now, Uruguay does not come to the Court today for the purpose of shielding itself from economic
damage inflicted by blockades. What it comes to the Court for is to protect its right to build the
plant and secure justice on the merits of the di spute in accordance with the Court’s Order of
13 July. Economic damage to tourism, to trade, is reparable of course, but that is not our point and
that is not why we are here.
15. Of course, as we argued yesterday, the C ourt’s power to indicate interim measures does
not depend solely on the risk of irreparable harm. Uruguay reiterates what it said yesterday that the
Court should not permit aggravation of the dis pute to result in undue interference with the
administration of justice or with the parties’ respect for the orders of the Court and in particular the
Order which it made on 13 July and on which Uruguay has relied in good faith.
16. There should be no doubt that the need for provisional measures is urgent. The means by
which Argentina is attempting to coerce Uruguay are already underway, and they threaten to grow
increasingly onerous. Argentina has not denied this fact; indeed, in these proceedings it repeatedly - 14 -
acknowledged, as it must, the ongoing blockades, ev en if it refused to admit their scope and
seriousness. Quoting statistics about the recent growth of trade and tourism between the two
countries is meaningless when what is in issue is the inevitable adverse effect of blockades now in
place on trade and tourism. What may have happen ed in the past is not necessarily what will
happen in the future; it certainly won’t happen if there are blockades. So there can be no doubt
that the upward spiral of economic coercion proceeds. And I reiterate Judge Treves’s comment in
the Bluefin Tuna case when he said that the trend is what matters, not the immediacy of the harm.
Jurisdiction
17. Now, Madam President, let me turn to jurisdiction. Argentina’s most insistent claim was
that the dispute which we have brought to this Court is essentially a trade dispute, falling within the
jurisdiction of Mercosur, and wholly outside th e jurisdiction of this Court. According to
ProfessorKohen freedom of trade and circulati on under the Mercosur agreements is the central
plank of Uruguay’s case ⎯ the central plank. He argued that we have brought to this Court the
very same dispute that was argued before the Merc osur Tribunal in September. This is a very
strange argument. The only obvious similarity between the two cases ⎯ between this case and the
Mercosur case ⎯ is the relief that we seek. Yes, on the face of it it is the same; we want to end the
blockades. But they are different kinds of relie f which we are seeking before the two tribunals.
Before this Court, Uruguay is trying to secure an end to blockades as interim relief to protect the
right to build the plant without interference or the requirement of Argentine consent, without
interference by Argentina in acco rdance with a proper interpretation of the 1975 Statute and in
reliance on the Court’s Order of 13 July. That is what we are asking for from this Court. Before
the Mercosur Tribunal, Uruguay sought to put an end to blockades as the principal relief, whose
effects are those proper to res judicata. But the blockades in issue in the two cases are also
different: they have occurred at different tim es, with different objectives. As the Mercosur
Tribunal found, the intention of the earlier blocka des was to call the attention of the Argentine
authorities to the problem. It was not to pressurize Uruguay into abandoning the Botnia plant. The
Tribunal went on to hold, “it does not appear that the Argentine authorities had the intent of
preventing free traffic . . .” (para. 142). The blockades which are an element of today’s Application - 15 -
are clearly very different in their purpose. I ha ve read out various statements today which show
that their purpose is to put an end to the Botnia plant and, for that purpose, to interfere with
freedom of traffic. As we have also sought to show the Court, today’s blockades are tolerated as an
act of government policy by Argentina, they are aimed entirely at Uruguay, and they are intended
to secure the abandonment of the Botnia plant. For that reason the potential consequences of these
blockades of indefinite duration, and much greater substance, are more likely to be rather more
serious than the blockades in issue before th e Mercosur Tribunal. So, factually I would
respectfully suggest to the Court, these are not the same disputes.
18. But let us assume that I am wrong ⎯ it’s perfectly possible. Let us assume that,
factually, they are the same. Does that mean that what was previously presented as a Mercosur
dispute must remain a Mercosur dispute, as was argued yesterday? The obvious fallacy in this
simplistic argument is that it is not the facts which determine the character of a dispute but the legal
rights in issue. Mercosur can only deal with Mercos ur law; its arbitral panels are not courts of
general jurisdiction with jurisdiction over everything. If the rights in issue before this Court are not
Mercosur rights then Uruguay cannot possibly have any obligation to take its case to Mercosur.
Whether we characterize today’s case as one concerning trade or pulp mills or the environment is
not the question. It is all of these things ⎯ it is certainly about trade and pulp mills. That is
blindingly obvious. The important question is wh ether the rights that Uruguay seeks to protect in
this Application to this Court today are trade ri ghts under Mercosur law or the right to carry out
works on the river, without previous consen t by Argentina, in accordance with Uruguay’s
sovereign right of sustainable development and in conformity with a proper interpretation of
obligations stemming from the procedure set out by Articles 7 to 12 of the 1975Statute.
ProfessorPellet argued that roadblocks are linked w ith freedom of traffic and that this is a matter
for Mercosur. Well, yes, it could be. But only if Uruguay formulates the legal basis of its claim in
terms of Mercosur rights and obligations. And ProfessorPellet is well able to appreciate that
Uruguay has made no such case before this Court.
19. Nowhere in its Application to the Court or in its oral argument does Uruguay invite the
Court to interpret or to apply Mercosur agreemen ts, nor does it wish to do so. As His Excellency
AmbassadorGrosEspiell indicated in his openi ng remarks yesterday: “L’Uruguay ne comparaît - 16 -
pas aujourd’hui devant la Cour pour se plaindr e de pertes économiques ou à propos des droits de
liberté de commerce ou de circulation qui sont enfreints par les barrages.” (CR2006/54, p.12,
para. 4.) My learned colleague Professor Condorelli made the same point: other mechanisms exist
within the Mercosur framework to deal with di sputes concerning freedom of trade and transport
under Mercosur agreements. Uruguay is well aware of that.
20. If this were a case about Uruguay’s Mercosur rights, then here is what it would look like.
Uruguay would be claiming today that Argentina had violated the following treaty provisions:
Articles 1 and 5 of the Treaty of Asuncion; Articles 1, 2 and 10 (2) of Annex I of that Treaty; and
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Montevideo Protocol on Trade in Services ⎯ I will not bore the Court by
reading these out. But all of these provisions are the rights on which Uruguay relied before the
Ad Hoc Mercosur Arbitral Tribunal which gave judgme nt in its favour in September. Those treaty
provisions establish a common market, they set out commitments with respect to trade
liberalization, co-ordination of economic policies, a common external tariff, elimination of trade
duties, and non-tariff restrictions, among other th ings. Uruguay argued before the Mercosur
Tribunal that all of these treaty provisions had been violated by Argentina. It has made no such
argument to this Court and I am not proposing to make such an argument. You will hear no
argument from Uruguay about any of these issues, and it is not for Argentina to reformulate the
legal basis of Uruguay’s claim today: that is a matter for Uruguay to determine.
21. As the Court will appreciate, these Mercosur rights, to which I have referred, bear no
resemblance to any rights contained in the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay, that is a treaty which
is concerned exclusively with co-operation, equ itable utilization of the river and environmental
protection of the River Uruguay. The 1975 Statute does not regulate trade or tourism. There is no
question here of parallel provisions in different tr eaties forming the subject-matter of the dispute,
and this case has no parallels of any kind with the Mox Plant dispute. None of the matters covered
by the 1975Statute are regulated by Mercosur in any way. None of the claims formulated by
Argentina in this case could be taken to Mercosur : not the environmental questions, not the treaty
interpretation or co-operation issues, not the claim concerning equitable use of the river. Nothing
in Argentina’s claim falls within the jurisdiction of Mercosur, but all of those matters are subject to
compulsory dispute settlement before this Court by virtue of Article60 of the 1975Statute. - 17 -
Uruguay and Argentina I think are in complete agr eement on that point. They both agree that this
Court is the only forum with jurisdiction to settle disputes relating to interpretation and application
of the 1975 Statute. They both agree that the dispute presented to the Court in May of this year and
argued before it in June is principally a disp ute under that Statute, with some reservations
expressed by Uruguay which are not relevant to this Application. Neither Party claims that the
pulp mills dispute is or should be a Mercosur dis pute, and that happens to be why the Mercosur
judgment cannot possibly be res judicata in these proceedings: it d ecides nothing about the legal
rights and obligations which are in issue in this case.
22. Has Uruguay then presented to this Court th e same dispute that it took to Mercosur in
September, as Argentina argues? And is it tr ying to obtain what it failed to achieve through
Mercosur, as Argentina argues? Not if one focuses on the most important question: the legal rights
in dispute. Those are plainly different. It is th e rights in issue that determine the character of the
legal dispute. It is the rights in issue which dete rmine which court if any has jurisdiction. The real
question, which we have to address this morning Madam President, is whether there is a sufficient
nexus between the rights relied on by Uruguay in th is Application now befo re this Court and the
case formulated by Argentina last May. That is a matter Madam President, which I will invite
Professor Condorelli to address, but in closing may I wish all Members of the Court and everyone
present a very Happy Hogmanay! Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Boyle. I now call Professor Condorelli.
M. CONDORELLI :
1. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, la première chose que je tiens à faire, en
prenant la parole pour soumettre à la Cour quelques observations très rapides au sujet des
plaidoiries de l’après-midi d’hier de l’Argentine, est de rendre hommage aux plaideurs de la Partie
adverse pour l’habileté remarquable dont ils ont fait preuve. Mais t out de suite après l’admiration,
le sentiment qu’il s’impose d’exprimer est l’étonnement. Le professeur Boyle l’a déjà noté: la
situation de fait qu’ils ont esquissée ne ressemble en rien, ou très peu, à celle qui vous a été décrite
par l’Uruguay et qui a amené celui-ci à formul er sa demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires. Mais surtout ne ressemble en rien , ou très peu, à ce que tout observateur impartial - 18 -
peut constater si seulement il s’informe correctem ent d’événements de notoriété publique, qui sont
d’ailleurs couverts largement par tous les médias s’occupant de l’Amérique latine.
2. Je reviens un instant seulement sur ce que le professeur Boyle a déjà noté. L’agent de
l’Argentine n’hésite pas à affirmer que les barrag es ne sont peut-être pas une invention de toutes
pièces de l’Uruguay, mais ils seraient «intermittents, partiels et géographiquement localisés»
(CR2006/55, p.14, par.36) et concerneraient de s routes en territoire argentin mais non pas des
ponts internationaux (CR2006/55, p.10, par.13). Madame le président, comment ne pas être
étonnés par un pareil propos ? Mais les routes ba rrées dont nous discutons sont celles amenant aux
ponts internationaux, de sorte qu’e n obstruant celles-là c’est bien l’utilisation des ponts qui s’en
trouve intentionnellement empêchée! Quant au caractère intermittent des barrages, ce n’est tout
simplement pas vrai pour le plus important d’entre eux, celui par lequel passent 91% des
exportations vers l’Argentine (l e pont généralSanMartin), qui est, lui, l’objet d’un barrage
permanent et à long terme, pernicieux pour l’éco nomie uruguayenne, alors qu’effectivement les
deux autres ⎯beaucoup moins importants cependant ⎯ sont barrés pour l’heure de façon
discontinue : nous l’avons admis sans difficulté. Mais les manifestants promettent d’en faire plus !
Et comment peut-on alléguer ⎯ainsi que le fait l’agent de la Partie adverse ⎯ qu’il ne s’agirait
pas là d’une «action coercitive», alors que le but proclamé haut et fort par les manifestants est un et
un seulement : celui de forcer l’Uruguay à arrêter la construction de l’usine Botnia ?
3. Non, Madame et Messieurs les juges, la situation est sérieuse: tellement sérieuse que
l’Uruguay s’est décidé à son corps défendant à de mander l’intervention de votre Cour pour que le
différend entre les deux pays ne s’aggrave pas enco re davantage. Faut- il vraiment apporter des
preuves quant à la gravité de cette situati on? Est-il vraiment sérieux de prétendre que
Sa Majesté le roi d’Espagne aurait décidé d’offrir ses bons offices afin d’aider si possible au
règlement d’un différend qui ne serait en fait rien de plus qu’une simple bagatelle ?
4. Je remarque que parmi les allégations de l’Uruguay que les plaideurs argentins n’ont pas
vraiment contestées il y a celle concernant ce que j’appellerai le «but partagé» : ce que les auteurs
des barrages souhaitent imposer à l’Uruguay par le ur action de rue est le même résultat que
l’Argentine poursuit par le biais de la saisine de votre Cour. Ce partage des buts en dit long sur les
raisons amenant le gouvernement de la Partie adverse à ne pas utiliser les moyens dont il dispose - 19 -
indiscutablement pour s’acquitter de ses obligations de diligence due. Je n’ai pas besoin d’en dire
davantage sur ce point puisque, pour l’heure, no s contradicteurs n’ont pas dit un seul mot pour
contester le bien-fondé de la démonstration que j’ai eu l’honneur de présenter hier à ce sujet et sur
laquelle l’Uruguay insiste. Je la résume: face aux barrages des ponts internationaux reliant les
territoires de l’Argentine et de l’Uruguay, il y a plus qu’une inaction du Gouvernement argentin.
Nous sommes confrontés ici à la décision étatique, prise au plus haut niveau, de rester inactif en se
gardant d’empêcher les barrages et de les faire cesser.
5. Mais, nous rétorque-t-on, même si cela est vrai, quel rapport avec le différend dont votre
Cour a été saisie par l’Argentine et dans le cadre duquel nous nous trouvons? Celui-ci porte
indiscutablement ⎯nous ne le nions aucunement ⎯ sur la question de savoir si, oui ou non,
l’Uruguay viole le statut de 1975 du fait d’avoir auto risé la construction de l’usine de pâte à papier
Botnia sans avoir obtenu l’accord préalable de l’Argen tine ; alors que, d’après la Partie adverse, la
question de la légalité ou de l’illégalité des barrages aurait trait à une tout autre affaire, à savoir aux
droits et obligations incombant aux deux Etats en matière de liberté de tr ansport et de commerce
entre les Etats membres du Mercosur. Nos contra dicteurs prétendent alors que l’Uruguay, en
demandant au titre des mesures conservatoires que la Cour ordonne à l’Argentine de prévenir et
faire cesser les barrages, tenterait d’attirer s ous la compétence de la Cour un différend lui
échappant, mais qui relèverait de la compétence d’autres mécanismes de règlement, tel ceux du
Mercosur. L’Argentine prétend, en somme, que l’Uruguay chercherait à obtenir par une procédure
incidente un jugement de fond sur cet autre diffé rend n’ayant aucune connexité, nous dit-on, avec
l’affaire qu’elle vous a soumise (CR2006/55, pa r.23; 60 (Kohen)). Les professeurs Kohen et
Pellet ont beaucoup insisté sur ce point.
6. Madame le président, rien, je dis bien rien, n’est plus éloigné de la position que l’Uruguay
fait valoir devant votre Cour en demandant d es mesures conservatoires. L’Uruguay ne demande
aucun jugement au fond concernant la responsabilité internationale de l’Argentine pour violation
des règles du Mercosur en matière de liberté de transport; l’Uruguay ne brigue d’ailleurs pas la
réparation des préjudices qu’il subit pour cause des barrages, que ce soit par rapport aux
dispositions du Mercosur, au statut de 1975 ou de n’importe quel autre principe de droit
international. Tout ce qu’il vous demande est d’ enjoindre à titre provisoire l’Argentine de ne pas - 20 -
tenir des comportements incompatibles avec le s obligations, qui pèsent sur les Parties à un
différend en cours de règlement devant votre Cour, de ne pas aggraver le différend en adoptant des
initiatives unilatérales risquant d’anticiper sur le futur arrêt au fond de la Cour.
7. L’initiative unilatérale de l’Argentine à laque lle je me réfère ici est bien entendu celle de
ne pas utiliser les moyens à sa disposition pour prévenir et faire ce sser des comportements
individuels visant à contraindre l’Uruguay à renon cer aux droits que celui-ci est convaincu de
pouvoir tirer des articles 7 et suivants du statut de 1975. Au demeurant, une telle inaction met en
danger le droit qu’a l’Uruguay, une fois la Cour sais ie par l’Argentine sur la base de l’article 60 du
statut, de voir le différend réglé définitivement par votre Cour ⎯ comme celle-ci en a pleinement
le pouvoir en vertu justement de l’article60 ⎯ à la suite d’une procédure qui ne soit pas faussée
par des comportements du demandeur risquant de porter atteinte au bon déroulement de cette
procédure et partant à l’autorité de votre haute ju ridiction. Contrairement à ce que prétendent avec
insistance les plaideurs de la Partie adverse, la demande de l’Uruguay en indication des mesures
conservatoires ⎯on le voit bien ⎯ se rattache directement et très intimement au statut du fleuve
Uruguay, puisqu’elle vise à en obtenir une applicat ion pleinement satisfaisante, y compris pour ce
qui est de sa clause compromissoire figurant à l’article 60. Une application satisfaisante ⎯ faut-il
le préciser? ⎯ afin que votre Cour puisse régler défi nitivement et sans entraves, comme il lui
appartient de le faire, l’affaire relative à des Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay . C’est
le nom officiel de notre différend. Il s’agit pour votre Cour de régler cette affaire-là, seulement
cette affaire-là et pas un autre litige.
8. Il faut encore, Madame et Messieurs les juges, que je commente rapidement les propos de
nos contradicteurs, qu’ils ont formulés avec une gra nde insistance, quant au lien qu’il y aurait (ou
plutôt qu’il n’y aurait pas d’après eux) entre les barrages et la construction de l’usine Botnia : ces
barrages ⎯ fait-on valoir ⎯ n’ont eu et continuent à ne pas avoir la moindre influence sur les
travaux de construction, qui, on nous dit, procèd ent régulièrement et rapi dement, sans qu’aucun
retard, aucun trouble, aucun inconvénient particu lier ne soient provoqués par les agissements des
manifestants.
9. Madame le président, il n’y a pas besoin de beaucoup de mots pour mettre en évidence les
défauts d’une telle approche, dont le moins que l’on puisse dire est qu’elle est bien étriquée. - 21 -
Comme si l’on pouvait parler de pressions indues et de contrainte uniquement lorsque de telles
pressions se déploient par la contrainte physique directe! Comme si des formes de pression se
réalisant par le chantage n’existaient pas ! Or, ju stement, le but poursuivi par les manifestants qui
barrent les ponts internationaux du côté argentin est celui d’infliger à l’Uruguay des préjudices
économiques et sociaux d’une exceptionnelle gravité afin de le contraindre à abandonner la
construction et la mise en fonc tionnement de l’usine Botnia. Si ce n’est pas du chantage, quel est
alors, Madame et Messieurs les juges, le nom le plus approprié ? Et le Gouvernement argentin, du
fait de ne pas adopter, ni des mesures de préventi on, ni des actions efficaces visant à faire cesser
ces conduites illégales, viole les obligations qui lui incombent en tant que Partie au présent
différend.
10. Il se justifie donc pleinement, Madame et Messieurs les juges, que l’Uruguay vous
demande de bien vouloir indiquer à l’Argentine, au titre des mesures conservatoires, qu’elle est
tenue de prendre des mesures raisonnables et appropriées pour prévenir et faire cesser les barrages
et qu’elle doit s’abstenir de toute mesure susceptib le d’aggraver le différend en évitant des actes
risquant d’anticiper sur le futur arrêt au fond de votre Cour.
J’en ai terminé, Madame et Messieurs l es juges. Je vous remercie beaucoup de votre
attention et je voudrais vous prier de bien voul oir donner la parole à l’agent de l’Uruguay,
l’ambassadeur Gros Espiell. Merci.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Condorelli. I now give the floor to His Excellency
Mr. Gros Espiell.
M. GROS ESPIELL :
1. Merci beaucoup. Madame le président, M essieurs les juges, cette séance touchant à son
terme, je tiens tout particulièrement à vous re mercier de l’attention portée à la demande en
indication de mesures conservatoires que par la na ture même des faits qu’elle vise à prévenir nous
avons dû déposer à une date inaccoutumée.
2. Ensuite, je souhaiterais présenter d’une manière synthétique nos conclusions et les
mesures conservatoires que nous prions respectueusement la Cour d’indiquer, et qui ⎯ je dois vous - 22 -
en informer dès maintenant ⎯ coïncident avec celles qui ont été exposées dans la demande en
indication de mesures conservatoires présentée à la Cour le 29 novembre 2006.
3. L’Uruguay estime que la Cour est compét ente, c’est-à-dire qu’elle a juridiction pour
considérer cette demande en indication de mesur es conservatoires; et qu’il y a un rapport direct
entre la gravissime situation créée par les barrage s des routes et des ponts internationaux et la
matière de fond du cas soumis à la Cour, et que, par conséquent, l’indication de mesures
conservatoires est pleinement justifiée.
4. La Cour est compétente, parce que les barrages des routes et des ponts internationaux
entrepris par des groupes de personnes, dans la p assivité et l’omission du Gouvernement argentin,
constituent une situation provoquée et voulue, des tinée à empêcher la construction des usines de
pâte à papier que l’Uruguay est en droit de cons truire sur son territoire, tout en assurant la
protection et la sauvegarde de l’environnement et en garantissant le respect du droit international
applicable.
5. Les faits sont plus éloquents que les parol es. On a beau s’efforcer de les minimiser en
disant qu’il ne s’agit que d’une interruption «i ntermittente», «partielle», «géographiquement
localisé[e]» qui n’affecte que «des routes [situées] en Argentine». La réalité est tout autre. Il est de
toute évidence que l’obstruction de la circul ation au long des routes qui mènent aux ponts
internationaux constitue vraiment, à toutes fins pratiques, un blocage des ponts internationaux
eux-mêmes; et que ce genre d’interruption a lieu to utes les fois et pendant tout le temps que les
responsables le considèrent fonctionnel à leurs buts.
6. La gravité de la situation créée par les blocages des routes et des ponts ne peut être mise
en doute qu’en méconnaissant complètement la situation vécue actuellement par notre pays. Le but
proclamé par les groupes qui barrent les rout es et les ponts est le démantèlement ou la
relocalisation de l’usine de pâte à papier Botnia. Tant que l’usine Botnia sera là, les blocages
continueront. Ce ne sont pas seulement les blo cages d’aujourd’hui ou de demain, c’est la menace
permanente, le danger clair et actuel (clear and present danger) de toute une chaîne de barrages
futurs, à durée indéterminée. - 23 -
7. L’Uruguay prie donc la Cour d’indiquer des mesures conservatoires pour que soit garanti
d’urgence l’exercice de ses droits, bafoués de façon grave et irréparable par les blocages des routes
et des ponts.
8. Nous n’avons pas choisi ce chemin d’un cŒ ur léger. Comme il l’a déjà exprimé dans le
paragraphe 24 de la demande pr ésentée le 29 novembre 2006, l’Ur uguay souligne sa préférence et
sa volonté de résoudre cette affaire par la voie di plomatique, par un accord amical entre les deux
Parties, obtenu sans pressions ni coactions, directes ou indirectes, d’aucune sorte. Cette absence de
pressions ⎯ en particulier, des blocages des routes et des ponts ⎯ est une condition incontournable
pour parvenir à une négociation.
9. Cet accord souhaitable serait l’expression, fondée sur le droit international, de la solidarité
fraternelle qui a toujours uni et qui continuera d’unir dans les temps qui viennent les peuples
uruguayen et argentin.
*
* *
10. Aujourd’hui, dans cette étape auprès de la C our internationale de Justice et alors que cet
accord souhaitable n’existe pas encore, l’Urugua y réitère les termes du paragraphe 28 de sa
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires et prie respectueusement la Cour, en attendant
l’arrêt définitif, d’indiquer à l’Argentine :
⎯ qu’elle doit prendre toutes les mesures raisonnables et appropriées pour prévenir ou faire cesser
toute interruption du transit entre l’Uruguay et l’Ar gentine, y compris la fermeture, le blocage
de la circulation ou l’entrave à celle-ci sur les ponts et les routes qui relient les deux Etats ;
⎯ qu’elle doit s’abstenir de toute mesure susceptible d’aggraver la situation actuelle ou d’entraver
le règlement ou la solution de cette dispute ;
⎯ qu’elle doit s’abstenir, également, de toute mesu re susceptible de léser ou d’affecter les droits
de l’Uruguay que la Cour internationale de Justice considère actuellement.
Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, merci beaucoup. - 24 -
The PRESIDENT: I thank the Agent of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay.
That ends the second round of oral observations of Uruguay.
The Court will meet again at 4.30 this afternoon to hear the second round of the oral
observations of Argentine.
The sitting is now closed.
The Court rose at 10.55 a.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Tuesday 19 December 2006, at 10 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding