CR 2006/6
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2006
Public sitting
held on Thursday 2 March 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2006
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 2 mars 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieitgins
Vice-PresiKntasawneh
Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc AhmedMahiou
Milenko Kreća
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
AlKh.vsce-prh,ident
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
MM. Ahmed Mahiou,
KMrilenko ća, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by:
Mr. Sakib Softić,
as Agent;
Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, Amsterdam,
as Deputy Agent;
Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission of the United Nations,
Mr. Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law,
Ms Brigitte Stern, Professor at the University of Paris I,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Facultyof Law of the University of Florence,
Ms Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec, LL.B, LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne, Australia,
Ms Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, London,
Ms Laura Dauban, LL.B (Hons),
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Morten Torkildsen, BSc, MSc, Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norway,
as Expert Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Fuad Šabeta, Ambassadorof Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Wim Muller, LL.M, M.A.,
Mr. Mauro Barelli, LL.M (University of Bristol),
Mr. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M,
Mr. Amir Bajrić, LL.M,
Ms Amra Mehmedić, LL.M,
Mr. Antoine Ollivier, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University of Paris X-Nanterre, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine est représenté par :
M. Sakib Softić,
coagment;
M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, Amsterdam,
comme agent adjoint;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,
M. Thomas M. Franck, professeur émérite à lafaculté de droit de l’Université de New York,
Mme Brigitte Stern, professeur à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Florence,
Mme Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec., LL.B., LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne (Australie),
Mme Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, Londres,
Mme Laura Dauban, LL.B. (Hons),
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Morten Torkildsen, BSc., MSc., Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norvège,
comme conseil-expert et avocat;
S. Exc. M. Fuad Šabeta, ambassadeur de Bosn ie-Herzégovine auprès duRoyaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Wim Muller, LL.M., M.A.,
M. Mauro Barelli, LL.M. (Université de Bristol),
M. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M.,
M. Amir Bajrić, LL.M.,
Mme Amra Mehmedić, LL.M.,
M. Antoine Ollivier, attaché temporaire d’ense ignement et de recher che à l’Université de
Paris X-Nanterre, - 6 -
Ms Isabelle Moulier, Research Student in International Law, University of Paris I,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the University of Macerata (Italy),
as Counsel.
The Government of Serbia and Montenegro is represented by:
Mr. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., Head of the Law Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Serbia and Montenegro, Professor at the Belgrade University School of Law,
as Agent;
Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetković, Second Secretary of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr.Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the Central European University,
Budapest and Emory University, Atlanta,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Member of the International Law Commission, member of
the English Bar, Distinguished Fellow of the All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Xavier de Roux, Masters in law, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Ms Nataša Fauveau-Ivanović, avocat à la cour, Paris and member of the Council of the
International Criminal Bar,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Directo
r
of the Walther-Schücking Institute,
Mr. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), Attorney at Law, Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, and President of the International Law Association of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Sanja Djajić, S.J.D., Associate Professor at the Novi Sad University School of Law,
Ms Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Minneapolis),
Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, Expert-associate at the Office of th e Prosecutor for War Crimes of the
Republic of Serbia, - 7 -
Mme Isabelle Moulier, doctorante en droit international à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à l’Université de Macerata (Italie),
cocomnseils.
Le Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro est représenté par :
M. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., chef du conseil juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Belgrade,
coagment;
M. Saša Obradovi ć, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Vladimir Cvetković, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents;
M. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université d’Europe centrale de
Budapest et à l’Université Emory d’Atlanta,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre de la Commission du droit international, membre
du barreau d’Angleterre, Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College, Oxford,
M. Xavier de Roux, maîtrise de droit, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Mme Nataša Fauveau-Ivanovi ć, avocat à la cour, Paris, et membre du conseil du barreau pénal
international,
M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université de Kiel, directeur de
l’Institut Walther-Schücking,
M. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), avocat, cabinet Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, et président de l’association de droit international de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,
comme conseils et avocats;
Mme Sanja Djajić, S.J.D, professeur associé à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Novi Sad,
Mme Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Minneapolis),
M. Svetislav Rabrenovi ć, expert-associé au bureau du procureur pour les crimes de guerre de la
République de Serbie, - 8 -
Mr. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and
Montenegro,
Mr. Miloš Jastrebić, Second Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. (Cambridge),
Ms Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
as Assistants. - 9 -
M. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Miloš Jastrebić, deuxième secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. (Cambridge),
Mme Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
comme assistants. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I give the floor to Ms Dauban.
DMAUs BAN:
T HE TAKEOVER OF THE MUNICIPALITIES ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF B OSNIA
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, in the section of the pleadings on Srebrenica, we
have already demonstrated to the Court how the Serbs, from both sides of the river Drina, were
involved in a closely co-ordinated ethnic cleansing operation. We also explained how the
Respondent and the Bosnian Serbs ignored the fact that the river Drina was actually, in parts, a
border between two independent States: Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro.
2. Moreover, we have demonstrated that the Srebrenica massacre formed the completion of
the ethnic cleansing of all of the Drina Valley, i.e. all of eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this
was in accordance with the Greater Serbia concept and also in accordance with strategic goals
Nos.1 and 3, which have been dealt with by other members of the legal team of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
3. What we have not yet done is to explain in more detail how exactly the ethnic cleansing of
the eastern side of Bosnia and Herzegovina was accomplished. This is what I will show to the
Court during the course of my pleadings on this subject.
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina has already pr esented evidence to you, in its Reply of
1
23 April 1998 , of the pattern of takeovers in the municipalities. We particularly focused on the
municipalities of Zvornik and Opstina Prijedor. The evidence presented in our Reply on the
takeovers and events in those municipalities was pr incipally based on reports carried out by bodies
of the United Nations. Since 1998, the work of th e ICTY has confirmed a lot of those findings and
the conclusions within them, while adding to th e picture of events through numerous witness and
expert testimonies and further documents which have since become public.
5. The sources I will be drawing upon to illu strate what happened in the eastern side of
Bosnia and Herzegovina revolve pr imarily around the factual findings made by the ICTY. There
are, at this point in time, only a limited number of finalized trial chamber and appeal chamber
1
Chapter 5, Sections 6 and 7. - 11 -
judgments to which I can refer the Court. Howeve r, there are also a number of other available and
very reliable sources to which I will be referring the Court. These include the adjudicated facts
from the cases, judgments on motions for acqu ittal and witness testimonies given in cases which
have not yet been adjudicated on.
6. During the course of this session I will present to you the pattern of takeovers in the
eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily , those municipalities which are located along or
close to the river Drina. The map which is curre ntly projected on to the screen behind me shows
these territories.
[Photo: Show map of eastern Bosnia with municipalities highlighted]
I would like, at this point, to explain to the Court that this map is one which has been made
by Bosnia and Herzegovina and is based on data from the official topographic maps of a company
specializing in such map production.
7. In explaining how the municipalities of Bijeljina, Foca, Zvornik, Visegrad, Bosanski
Samac, Bratunac, Vlasenica and Brcko came to be under Serb control, I will show the Court a
pattern that was more or less repeated in each area. As I speak about each of these municipalities, a
map will appear on the screen behind me and, for the reference of the Court, it shows where that
municipality is located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on what date it was taken over.
Bijeljina
[in]ap
8. The takeover of Bijeljina, which is a st rategically important municipality close to the
banks of the river Drina, was one of the first events of the Greater Serbian project. It took place on
2
31 March 1992 . The build-up to it was marked by an escalation of discrimination against the
Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, which eventually tu rned into outright violence. Alija Gusalic, who
testified before the Milosevi ć trial chamber, had served in th e JNA and was from Bijeljina. He
stated that letters were sent out by the Territorial Defence for reservists but they did not send them
2ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Judgment on Motion for Acquittal on
16 June 2004, para. 223. - 12 -
3
to Muslims in the municipality . He also gave evidence regarding the role of the paramilitaries
from Serbia in the takeover, stating that these pa ramilitaries were primarily under the control of
Zeljko Ranotović, who was infamously known as “Arkan” ⎯ and it is Arkan to whom I refer ⎯
and Vojislav Seselj, Head of the Serbian Radical Party in Belgrade 4. Both of these men have been
indicted by the ICTY for crimes against humanity and, Madam President, Members of the Court,
both of these men are from Serbia and under Serb control. Mr.Gusali ć testified that these
paramilitary groups started to come to the region a few months before the violence began and held
meetings and training sessions in preparation for what was to follow. He estimated that these men
numbered about 100 from Seselj’s group and 100 from Arkan’s group 5.
9. The Milosevi ć trial chamber, in their dismissal of the defence motion for acquittal of the
charge of genocide, concluded that they had heard enough evidence for a trial chamber to find
6
beyond reasonable doubt that a number of events had occurred . I will list the most important of
those events to the Court now, in order to give you a picture of the takeover and events in Bijeljina:
⎯ the decision referred to the testimony of a pr otected witness who had been assigned to escort
convoys transporting weapons, am munition and other military equipment from Serbia to a
number of municipalities including Bijeljina, Brcko and Zvornik;
⎯ 48 non-Serbs were killed, including tens of peopl e in the centre of the town and even behind
the SDS headquarters: that is the Serbian Democratic Party, a Republika Srpska political
organization;
⎯ at that time ⎯ this is still according to the trial chamber ⎯ Bijeljina Television announced that
Captain Dragan’s guards, the Chetniks of Vojvoda and Mile Blagi ć,weresomeofthe
paramilitary groups involved in the violence;
⎯ the local police used a list with names of prom inent Muslims in the town who were to be
arrested. These were usually businessmen and othe r prominent local figures. Those that were
3
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Testimony of Alija Gusali ć given on
31 March 2003, p. 18258.
4
Ibid., p. 18259.
5Ibid., p. 18259.
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Judgment on Motion for Acquittal on
16 June 2004 ⎯ all the events listed are described in para. 225. - 13 -
not arrested at checkpoints were rounded up by Arkan’s men who went from house to house
with a list of suspects: many of the people who were on those lists disappeared;
⎯ for those that were not killed in Bijeljina, lif e became gradually unbearable: non-Serbs were
dismissed from their jobs and, where possible, replaced with Serbs; property was seized from
the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croat members of the municipality. This then escalated into
arbitrary detentions and beatings; and finall y, about 2,000 people, mainly Muslims, were
detained at Batkovi ć camp, where at least 100 people died and many atrocities were
committed.
10. On 4 April 1992, BiljanaPlavsi ć, then a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and
Herzegovina 7, came to Bijeljina to congratulate Arkan on its takeover. While it is widely
documented that Arkan was involved in the operati on to take over Bijeljina at the invitation of
Biljana Plavsić, testimony given by protected witness B-129, a former secretary of Arkan’s, before
the Milosević trial chamber, shows upon whose orders Arkan was acting, and I would like to quote
the relevant part of this examination:
“Q.These early operations in Bijeljina, Zvornik and Brcko, who gave the order that
they should go and work there?”
The reply of the witness
“A.Arkan would always say that without orders from the DB, the state security,
[SNFRY?] the Tigers were not deployed anywhere.” 8
11. The Milosevi ć trial chamber concluded in its d ecisions on the defence motion for
acquittal that “the Serb plan was to cleanse Bi jeljina of its non-Serb population by first targeting
people with economic, political and religious influence so the remainder of the population would
be easier to control” 9. When Bijelijna was taken over its str eet names were changed and all five
mosques in the town were destroyed.
7
Mrs. Plavsi ć resigned four days later, on 8 April 1992. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavsi ć, case
No. IT-00-39&40/1, Trial Chamber Sentencing Judgment, 27 February 2003, para. 14.
8ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosević, case No.IT-02-54-T, Testimon y of B-129, 16 and 17 April 2003,
pp.19425-19426.
9ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevi ć, case No.IT-02-54-T, Judgment on Motion for Acquittal on
16 June 2004, para. 225. - 14 -
12. Madam President, Members of the Court, in 1991, the population of Bijelina was made
up of 31.2percent Bosniaks, 59.2percent Serbs and 0.5percent of Bosnian Croats . After the
10
war, the Bosniaks numbered 2.6 per cent, the Serbs 91.1 per cent and the Croats 0.7 per cent .
13. One photo-journalist, Ron Haviv, was given permission to follow Arkan’s activities in
the takeovers. He was present with Arkan and his men in Bijeljina, and I would like to show three
of the horrifying events he captured on film. These images, Madam President, Members of the
Court were shown to the world on the highly r espected and infamous BBC documentary, “The
Death of Yugoslavia”.
[Video footage: clip 13 Death of Yugoslavia ⎯ Ron Haviv’s photos]
Foca
[in]ap
14. I would now like to talk about the munici pality of Foca. This is the most southerly
district I will be presenting in this part of the pleading. It has become notorious for its detention
centres primarily KP DOM, which MsKaragiannaki s included as part of her pleadings on camps
yesterday morning. I would like to make a shor t summary of the events which took place in the
actual takeover of the municipality to further highlight how the takeovers followed a pattern in the
eastern side of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15. Before the takeover, Republika Srpska politician Maksimovi ć stated that the Muslims
were the greatest enemies of the Serbs. Furthermore, Karadzi ć said that either Bosnia would be
divided along ethnic lines, or one of the et hnic groups would be wiped out from the area 11. SDS
leaders said that, if they were to reach power, the political and economic affairs of Foca would be
run by the Serbs only 12. The ICTY trial chamber in the Krnojelac case found that in the months
preceding the outbreak of the conflict in Foca, both the Bosnian Serbs a
nd the Bosnian Muslims
10Figures based on 1991 census population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, State Institute for Statistics of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sa rajevo, December 1993; Ewa Tabeau, Marcin Zoltkowski, Jakub Bijak,
ArveHetland (Demographic Unit, Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY), “Ethnic Composition, In ternally Displaced Persons
and Refugees From 47 Municipalities of Bosnia and He rzegovina, 1991 to 1997-98”, submitted as an Expert Report in
the case of Slobodan Milosević, 4 April 2003.
11ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik, Decision on Third and Fourth Prosecution motions for Judicial Notice
on Adjudicated Facts given on 24 March 2005, No. 338.
12ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, case No. IT-97-25, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 15. - 15 -
began to arm themselves but the Serbs were more successful as they had access to the weapons of
the JNA and Territorial Defence 13. This finding was confirmed by the trial chamber ⎯ again
ICTY ⎯ in the Kunarac judgment who found that the JNA military depot in Livade handed
weapons over to the Bosnian Serb fighters 14.
16. On 8April 1992 Serb military forces be gan the occupation of Foca town, which was
completed between the 16 and 17 April 1992. Those Serb for ces include local Bosnian Serb
soldiers as well as soldiers from the Federal Repub lic of Yugoslavia and in particular a Serbian
paramilitary formation known as the White Eagles 15 (led by Milan Lukic). MadamPresident,
Members of the Court, this was an attack which directly involved Belgrade and this took place after
Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized as an international sovereign State.
17. Once the Serb forces had gained cont rol over parts of Foca town, military police,
accompanied by local and non-local soldiers, st arted to arrest Muslim and other non-Serb
inhabitants. Men and women we re separated and arrested. Be ginning on around 14April 1992,
the KP Dom prison became the primary detention centre for Bosnian Muslims and other non-Serb
men, as well as a few Serbs who tried to avoid military service.
18. In 1991, the population of Foca was made up of 51.3percent Bosniaks, 45.2percent
Serbs and 0.2percent Croats. After the war, the Bosniaks were 3.7percent, the Serbs
16
92.6 per cent and the Croats 0.3 per cent .
Zvornik
[in]ap
19. The municipality of Zvornik is situated at the very east of Bosnia on the banks of the
river Drina and it was scenes filmed from the take over here which were shown to the world on
“The Death of Yugoslavia”. These scenes sent s hock waves through the international community.
The detailed facts and conclusions by various United Nations bodies up to 1998, who documented
the situation in Zvornik, is evidence that Bosnia and Herzegovenia has submitted to the Court in its
1Ibid., para. 16.
14
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, case No. IT-96-23&IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 18.
15
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik, case No. T-00-39-PT, Adjudicated facts, 28 February 2003, para. 360.
1Op. cit., Note 10. - 16 -
17
Reply . As I have shown to a small extent and will continue to show to the Court this morning,
Zvornik was not the first and would not be the la st place to be ethnically cleansed in order to
facilitate the strategic goal of eradicating the river Drina as a border.
20. The testimony of Izet Mehinagić, a high-ranking businessman from Bosnia who had
frequent contact with the Bosnian Serb politicians during the relevant period, confirms the role of
paramilitaries from Belgrade in the takeover of the municipalities. What he recounted before the
Milosević trial chamber shows that Arkan, who was unde r the control and instruction of Belgrade,
was taking the lead over the Serbian Democratic Pa rty, the SDS, in actions in the takeover. I
would just like to quote what he said in his testimony now: “Arkan stated that unless the Muslims
18
laid down their weapons by 1700, the destiny of Zvornik would be the same as Bijeljina.”
21. Some of the paramilitary formations that were involved in the takeover of Zvornik are
the same ones that were involved in the takeove rs and crimes committed in other municipalities in
eastern side of Bosnia, those paramilitary groups which I have been presenting: Arkan’s tigers and
19
Seselj’s men . The actual takeover of Zvornik took place on 9 April 1992. I would like to show
the Court a small clip of an interview with Jose-Maria Mendiluce, an official of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees who was working in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. He is
clear in this interview as to the direction from which the shelling of Zvornik was being done.
[Video footage: Mendiluce 1]
22. The scenes that greeted Mr. Mendiluce as he passed through Zvornik on 9 April 1992 are
truly sickening. I would like to show the C ourt a few of these images, again aired on the BBC
documentary “The Death of Yugoslavia”, as they provide a lucid picture of the form of the
takeover of the municipality ⎯ the form which this takeover actually took.
[Video footage: Mendiluce 2]
17Chapter 5, Section 6.
18ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik, case No.IT-00-39 and 40, Testim ony of Izet Mehinagic given on
26 April 2005, p. 12609.
19ICTY, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, case No IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment, given on 30 March 2004,
para. 68. - 17 -
Visegrad
[in]ap
23. Visegrad, a municipality situated at th e very east of Bosnia bordering Serbia and
Montenegro, on the river Drina, was another strate gically important area which needed to be under
Serb control if the Drina River was to be eliminated as a border ⎯ strategic goal No. 3. Bosnian
Muslims were made to disarm in early 1992 while the Serbs, with the support of the JNA, started to
20
arm . In Visegrad, the Serbian project against th e Bosniaks and Bosnian Muslims began in early
April1992: on 14April the Uzice Corps, a wholly Serb unit of the JNA, shelled the city of
Visegrad and many of the Muslims, Bosnian Muslims, fled the town 21. Despite assurances from
the JNA that they would act as peacekeepers rather than aggressors, they announced to hundreds of
Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats that they had gathered together in the football stadium that they had
cleansed those areas where they consider ed there to be “reactionary forces” ⎯this was on the left
side of the Drina River. The civilians who lived on the right-hand side of the Drina were told they
were not allowed to return home; many either fled or went into hiding as a result 22.
24. Just after the takeover, JNA Lt. Col. Jovanovi ć made a statement about the cleansing of
Visegrad and stated in his speech that the para military group the “White Eagles” were under his
command 23.
25. When the JNA “withdrew” from the municipality on 19 May 1992, which was the
deadline set by the United Nations Security Council for a withdrawal of all forces of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia from Bosnia, the paramilitary formations stayed behind in Visegrad 24. The
subject of what one of the paramilitary formations did in this municipality is the focus of one ICTY
Appeals and Trial Chamber Judgment prosecuting one of this group’s associates,
20
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, case No. IT-98-32, Judgment delivered on 29 November 2002, para. 41.
21Ibid., para. 42.
22Ibid., para. 44.
23ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevi ć, case NoI.T-02-54-T, testimony of B-1505 given on
2 September 2003, p. 25827.
24
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik, Decision on Third and Fourth Prosecution motions for Judicial Notice
on Adjudicated Facts given on 24 March 2005, No. 630. - 18 -
25
Mitar Vasiljević . Two of the most horrific and notorious acts form the basis of the case against
Vasiljević. On 7 June 1992, the White Eagles forcibly took seven Muslim men to the edge of the
Drina River, lined them up and shot them in cold blood. Five of them were killed; and the two that
26
did survive only did so by falling into the water and pretending to be dead . Only one week later,
the White Eagles carried out another atrocity, even more chilling. They directed a group of Muslim
women, children and elderly men to a house, strippe d them of their valuables and barricaded them
into one room. They then set the house on fire. Those that managed to get out of the house had a
light shone on them and were fi red upon. Between 65 and 70 civilians died in this incident. The
few survivors all sustained serious physical injuries 27.
26. Madam President, Members of the Court, it was Vinko Pandurevi ć who led the Bosnian
28
Serb forces in this area . Vinko Pandurević was an officer in the VJ, the Yugoslav army, and was
also an officer in the VRS, the Bosnian Serb army, but at all times remained under the
administration of Belgrade: we have shown to the Court some of his personnel files in the
documents submitted on 16 January 2006. One of those documents, namely No. 45 (e), shows that
Pandurević entered duty as a Lt. Colonel on the 10 November 1993 with the 30th Personnel Centre
of the army of Yugoslavia. There is no mention of the Bosnian Serb army despite the fact that he
was, at this time, Lt. Col in command of the Zvor nik Brigade of the Drina Corps of the VRS. For
Pandurević’s actions during the conflict in relation particularly to Srebrenica he is charged by the
ICTY with genocide.
27. The adjudicated facts from the Krajisnik trial chamber, at the ICTY, show some of the
facts which have been adjudicated at one or more trials and have been c onfirmed on appeal or not
appealed. Thus these facts have been repeatedly tested and upheld in the ICTY and are of the
highest order of reliability. I would like to show to the Court some of the adjudicated facts
submitted surrounding the takeover of Visegrad:
25ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, case No.IT-98-32, Judgment given on 29 November 2002; Appeals
Chamber Judgment given on 25 February 2004.
26ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, case No. IT-98-32, Judgment deliver ed on 29 November 2002, paras. 98
and 99.
27Ibid., para. 117.
28ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vinko Pandurevi ć, Consolidated Amended Indictment , 28 June 2005, IT-05-88-PT,
para. 12. - 19 -
⎯ for the next few months, hundreds of non-Serbs, mostly Muslim, men, women and children and
29
elderly people, were killed ;
30
⎯ Muslim homes were looted and often burnt down ;
⎯ the two mosques located in the town of Visegrad were destroyed 31;
⎯ within a few weeks, the municipality of Visegrad was almost completely cleansed of its
non-Serb citizens, and the municipality was eventually integrated into what is now the entity of
Republika Srpska (RS) 32.
28. In 1991, the population of Visegrad was made up of 63.6 per cent Bosniaks,
31.8percent Serbs and 0.2percent Croats. After the war, the Bosniaks were 0.0percent, the
33
Serbs 95.9 per cent and the Croats 0.6 per cent .
Bosanski Samac
29. Madam President, Members of the Court, on 17 April 1992, Bosanski Samac, a
municipality lying on the river Sava which divides Bosnia and Croatia, was forcibly taken over by
34
Serb military; these forces included Serbia n paramilitaries and the JNA acting together . It is
unsurprising that the FRY was involved so directly in the takeover of this municipality, as it was of
such tactical importance to the first strategic goal of the Bosnian Serbs.
30. Many of the facts surrounding this takeove r have been discussed and ruled upon by the
35
ICTY in a multi-defendant trial; it is the Simic case . I would like to show the Court the main
factual conclusions of that trial chamber now:
⎯ “From the time of the takeover, the Serb forces participated in executing a plan to
36
persecute the non-Serb civilians in the Municipality .
29
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik, Decision on Third and Fourth Prosecution motions for Judicial Notice
on Adjudicated Facts given on 24 March 2005, No. 634.
30
Ibid., No. 645.
31
Ibid., No. 646.
3Ibid., No. 650.
3Op cit., Note 10.
3ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, 17 October 2003, paras. 442-456.
35
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, 17 October 2003.
36
Ibid., para. 984. - 20 -
⎯ Life was made increasingly difficult for the non-Serbs after the takeover: they had
37
their property systematically looted and they were subject to arbitrary detention .
⎯ Serbian paramilitaries, members of the local Bosnian Serb police and JNA soldiers
participated in the arrests of Muslim civilians, and in the violence towards
civilians when they are in detention 38.
⎯ Non-Serbs from this municipality were de tained in a JNA barracks in Brcko from
April 1992 and then from 1 or 2 May 199239in the JNA barracks in Bijelina. There
was mistreatment in these barracks .
⎯ Bosnian Muslim detainees were transferred across the border to Serbia and
detained in Batajnica.” 40
31. On the night of 7 May 1992, there was a massacre in this municipality by members of the
State Security of the Federal Republic of Yugosla via of 16men held in custody in Crkvina. The
survivors of the massacre were made to clean up the bodies and blood and load the bodies onto a
41
truck . A meeting took place two days later in Belgrade at the Federal Secretary for People’s
Defence, where high-ranking Belgrade o fficials were informed of the massacre 42. There was no
condemnation of the actions of these men-agents of the State of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. What actually happened was that the torture, killings and sexual abuse was continued
to be committed by the Special Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia throughout the month
of May. In order to further provide information about this, I would like to cite the conclusions of
the Todorovic trial chamber at the ICTY, which based itself also on the guilty plea put in by the
accused 43. They found that:
⎯ “[there was a] forcible takeover by Se rb forces of cities, towns and villages
inhabited by non-Serb civilians; [there was] murder, sexual assaults and repeated
beatings of non-Serb civilians detained in various detention camps in the region;
⎯ [there was] unlawful detention and c onfinement of non-Serb civilians under
inhumane conditions on political, racial or religious grounds;
⎯ [there was] cruel and inhumane treatment of non-Serb civilians including beatings,
torture, forced labour and confinement under inhumane conditions;
37Ibid., paras. 791, 842-843 and 846.
38
Ibid., paras. 654-659; 661-666.
39
Ibid., paras. 568; 700; 708; 714.
40
Ibid., paras. 442-456. 654-669;718; 770,984.
41Ibid.,para. 667.
42Ibid., para. 363.
43
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorović, case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 31 July 2001, para. 12. - 21 -
⎯ [there was] interrogation of non-Serb civilians who had been arrested and detained
and they were forced to sign false and coerced statements;
⎯ [there was] deportation, forced transfer and expulsion of non-Serb civilians from
their homes and villages; and
⎯ [there was] the issuance of orders and directives which violated the rights of
non-Serb civilians to equal treatment under the law and which infringed their
enjoyment of basic and fundamental rights”.
32. Madam President, Members of the Court, in 1991, the population of Bosanski Samac
was made up of 6.8 per cent Bosniaks, 41.4 per cent Serbs and 44.7 per cent Croats. After the war,
44
the Bosniaks were 1.9 per cent, the Serbs 91.5 per cent and the Croats 1.3 per cent .
Bratunac
33. The municipality of Bratunac is located on the Drina River, directly on the border with
Serbia and Montenegro. According to the “Varia nt A and B” document, issued by the Serbian
Democratic Party, Bratunac was a Variant B municipality ⎯ thus it had a Serb minority. The
President of the Crisis Staff and Commander of the Territorial Defence, MiroslavDeronji ć, was
indicted by the ICTY and pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity. His sentencing judgment
45
summarizes and gives his detailed account of the events which took place in Bratunac .
34. As you have already heard, the role of MiroslavDeronji ć was a crucial one in the
takeover of the municipality of Bratunac. This municipality was a strategically important one
which needed to be under Serb control in order to enable the link to a contiguous Serb State 46. I
would like now to quote the findings of the Deronjić trial chamber in their sentencing judgment:
“As part of the process of ensuring that the Municipality of Bratunac would
become ethnic Serb territory, ‘volunteers’ from the SFRY, with the co-operation of the
SFRY authorities, crossed the Drina River on 14 or 15 April 1992 . . . Their purpose
for entering Bosnia and Herzegovina was to assist the Bosnian Serbs in taking over
power and forcibly removing Muslims from the area.” 47
35. The Court has heard how Deronji ć took the lead in implementing the instructions which
mandated the mobilization of all Serbian police forces, as well as JNA reserve forces and the
Territorial Defence. This was not where their participation ended. According, again to the
44Op cit., Note 10.
45
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Deronjić, case No IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment given on 30 March 2004.
46
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Deronjić, case No IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment given on 30 March 2004, para. 49.
47Ibid., para. 69. - 22 -
sentencing judgment of Deronji ć, based on the factual basis of his plea agreement and his
testimony, which was given twice, the ta keover was carried out by Captain Relji ć of the JNA, the
Territorial Defence, and paramilitaries plus the Bosnian Serb police force. I would like to quote the
trial chamber now: “The arrival of th e JNA unit under the command of Captain Reljić and the
arrival of ‘volunteers’ from Serbia was agreed upon by the top leadership of the Republika Srpska
and the SFRY.” 48
D3er. nji ć testified that their commander met with and issued an ultimatum to the leaders
of the Srebrenica and Bratunac Muslim communitie s to surrender weapons a nd legal authority to
the Bosnian Serbs. Otherwise they were to suffer from destruction at the hands of thousands of
49
Serb soldiers who were amassed across the Drina River in Serbia . Deronjić, in the factual basis
for his guilty plea, concluded that paramilitary units were sent to these regions from Serbia and
50
they engaged in the use of fo rce against the Muslim population . Based on what Deronji ć had
disclosed in his testimony, the trial chamber found that:
“The final or ultimate objective of such conduct was to expel the non-Serb
population from those municipalities. Due to the fact that the Accused had the
opportunity to monitor these events in E astern Bosnia and Podrinje, which were
municipalities close to and with a similar population makeup as Bratunac, he was able
to conclude that the operative part ⎯ that is the actual implementation of the use of
force ⎯ was directed from Belgrade.” 51
37. Madam President, Members of the Court, the JNA did not only arm the local Serbs; they
actively took part in the actual takeover. Be tween 21 and 25 April 1992, two JNA formations
arrived in the municipality, one w as under the command of Captain Reli ć. Reli ć declared a
military government in Bratunac 52. Another JNA formation from the Novi Sad Corps from Serbia
arrived with armoured personnel carriers (APCs), military trucks and police cars. Captain Reli ć
had decided that the Muslim villages in the municipality and in particular the Muslim village of
Glogova should be disarmed and the JNA troops participated in this process. As I have said before,
the arrival of the JNA unit under the command of Captain Relji ć and the arrival of the “volunteers”
48ICTY, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, case No IT-02-61-S given on 30 March 2004,
para. 81.
49Ibid., para. 70.
50
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, Factual basis for guilty plea, 30 September 2003.
51ICTY, Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, case No IT-02-61-S given on 30 March 2004, para. 68.
52Ibid., para. 72. - 23 -
from Serbia was agreed upon by the top leadership of the Republika Srpska and the SFRY. These
“volunteers” are more paramilitary formations incl uding units of Arkan’s Tigers, the White Eagles
53
and Seselj’s men .
38. After the Muslims acquiesced to the demands for disarmament, the Crisis Staff assumed
political power in the municipality and the disarmament and ethnic cleansing of the Muslim
population proceeded. This included the intimidat ion, looting and random killings of Bosnian
Muslims by “volunteers” from Serbia. It also in cluded the cleansing of the Muslim village of
Glogova in a joint operation between the JNA, the Bratunac Territorial Defence, the Bratunac
police, and with paramilitary “volunteers” from Serbia 54. This was a truly horrifying event, and I
would like to quote directly the Deronjić trial chamber judgment:
“On 30 September 2003, Miroslav Deronjic pleaded guilty to the crime of
Persecutions of non-Serb civilians in the village of Glogova, committed through the
following underlying acts: ordering to attack the village of Glogova on 9 May 1992,
burning it down, and forcibly displacing of Bosnian Muslim residents from the village.
As a result, 64 Muslim civilians from the v illage were killed, Bosnian Muslim homes,
private property, and the mosque were dest royed, and a substantial part of Glogova
was razed to the ground.” 55
39. Madam President, Members of the Court, in 1991, the population of Bratunac was made
up of 64.1percent Bosniaks, 34.1percent Serbs and 0.1percent Croats . After the war, the
56
Bosniaks were 0.1 per cent, the Serbs 97.0 per cent and the Croats 0.4 per cent .
Vlasenica
40. The municipality of Vlasenica is located 5 km from the Drina River and the border with
Serbia and Montenegro. The municipality was take n over by forces of the JNA, paramilitaries and
armed Serb locals on the 21 April 1992 57. Five months before this had taken place, a member of
the SDS board in the municipality, Vajagic Z vonko, had mobilized an army of Bosnian Serb
volunteers to fight. In an intercepted telephone conversation with Radovan Karadzić, he stated that
53Ibid., para. 74.
54
Ibid., para. 73.
55
Ibid., para. 44.
56Op. cit., Note 10.
57ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, case No. IT-94-2-A, Judgment, 4 February 2005, para. 52. - 24 -
these volunteers were under the command of the JNA, and Karadzi ć made some very telling
remarks in response:
“Those up there have helped the Army, th e Party has helped the Army to form
volunteer detachment, there is six hundred people... they are under the JNA
command, they are trained, in JNA uniform s etc... Well, volunteer, but we are
58
reinforcing war units, you know.”
41. On 21 April 1992 a JNA unit, with the assi stance of members of the Serbian Volunteer
59
Guard, took over the town .
42. Many Muslims and other non-Serbs fled from the Vlasenica area, and beginning in
May 1992 and continuing until September 1992, those who had remained were either deported or
arrested and placed into the notorious Susica camp 60. This detention facility was documented in
our Reply and has been discussed at length by Ms Karagiannakis.
43. Madam President, Members of the Court, in 1991, the population of Vlasenica was made
up of 55.2percent Bosniaks, 42.3percent Serbs and 0.1percent Croats . After the war, the
61
Bosniaks were 0.2 per cent, the Serbs 96.8 per cent and the Croats 0.4 per cent .
Brcko
44. Brcko municipality is located in the north- eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the
west of Bijeljina and on the south bank of the Sava River. In 1992 the SDS issued an ultimatum in
the Parliament of the municipality of Brcko that the municipality should be partitioned into three
separate cantons for the different groups 62. Shortly after this ultimatum was issued, hostilities
63
broke out on 30 April 1992, when the bridges on the Sava River were blown up by the JNA . This
resulted in many casualties because approximately 150 people were crossing that bridge at the time
this action took place. Even before the hostiliti es had begun, the JNA had been building up its
58
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosević, case No. IT-02-54-T, Exibit P613, tab 136a, Intercept on 11.12.1991.
59
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, case No. IT-94-2, trial chambe r Judgment given on 18 December 2003,
para. 52.
60
Ibid., para. 54.
61Op. cit., Note 10.
62ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, case No. IT-94-1-T, Ex. 536, tab 1.
63
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevi ć, case No. IT-02-54-T, Judgment on Motion for Acquittal on
16 June 2004, para. 153. - 25 -
personnel in the area and started operating checkpoints 64. The JNA had also transported
65
paramilitaries into the area from Serbia including Captain Dragan’s Red Berets . On 1 May 1992
the Serb forces commenced a week of shelling of Brcko town. All of the combined Serb forces
participated in attacks on the area and JNA plan es bombed the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
66
areas of the town on the 8 and 9 May 1992 .
45. Goran Jelisić, who liked to call himself the “Serbian Adolf” claimed that he had gone to
Brcko in order to kill Muslims 67. In fact, when Mr. Jelisić appeared in his initial hearing before the
68
ICTY, where he was charged with genocide, he even presented himself to the court as “Adolf” !
He pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity and his sentencing judgment contains many chilling
admissions of the dreadful events that took place in the municipality 69. For instance, five of the
13 murders to which Jelisić pleaded guilty were perpetrated in an always identical manner. I would
like to quote from the trial chamber judgment:
“Having undergone an interrogation at the Brcko police station, the victims
were placed in the hands of the accused who took them out to an alley near the police
station. The accused executed them, generally with two bullets to the back of the neck
70
fired . . . A lorry then came to gather up the bodies.”
46. Many non-Serbs were rounded up and de tained in a number of temporary collection
centres until they could be taken to the newly created camp at Luka. This was one of the notorious
places of detention run by the Serbs and was exam ined in the pleadings yesterday. Testimony
given in the Milosević trial chamber indicates that the Serbs were selecting those to be killed from
lists, which included many of the prominent members of the local community and this testimony is
71
corroborated by the findings of Jelisić trial chamber judgment .
6ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, case No. IT-94-1-T, Ex. 536, tab 1.
6Ibid.
66
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisi ć, case NoI.T-95-10, Judgment of the trial chamber given on
14 December 1999, para. 102.
67
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisi ć, case NoI.T-95-10, Judgment of the trial chamber given on
14 December 1999, para. 102.
68
Ibid.
69
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisi ć, case NoI.T-95-10, Judgment of the trial chamber given on
14 December 1999.
70
Ibid., para. 37.
71
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosević, case No.IT-02-54, Testimony of B-1405 given on 31 March 2003,
and see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisi ć, case No.IT-95-10, Judgment of the trial chamber given on
14 December 1999, para. 92. - 26 -
47. Madam President, Members of the Court, in 1991, the population of Brcko was made up
of 44.1percent Bosniaks, 20.7percent Serbs and 25.4percent Croats . After the war, the
Bosniaks were 31.4 per cent, the Serbs 54.1 per cent and the Croats 7.9 per cent.
Conclusions
48. Madam President, Members of the Court. I have, over the course of pleadings, shown to
you what the pattern of ethnic cleansing was in the Drina municipalities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. I have shown you how two of the st rategic goals of the Serb people were achieved
and that this could not have been done without the involvement of Belgrade in the form of
manpower, equipment and logistics. I have looked at the pattern of takeovers in eight strategically
important municipalities.
[Map: eastern Bosnian municipalities with dates of takeovers]
49. There was a pattern to the ethnic cleansi ng of the municipalities, which I have discussed
in my pleadings. First of all, the Serbs in the municipalities were armed by the JNA and the
Territorial Defence; then, the combined Serb fo rces made of up of the JNA, paramilitaries from
Belgrade and local Bosnian Serb forces, cleansed the towns and villages of Bosniaks and Bosnian
Croats. The map, which is on the screen behind me, shows the municipalities and the dates upon
which they were taken over.
50. From what I have shown you in this part of the pleadings, you may have in your minds
now a clear picture of what ethnic cleansing is and how it happened in municipality after
municipality, time and time again. These actions we re co-ordinated. These actions were planned.
These actions were brutal and targeted. These actions were part of a plan, a plan to eradicate and
purify the strategically important municipalities of the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats to make a
State for the Serbs.
51. I would like now to conclude my pleadings and ask the Court to give the floor to
Professor Franck.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ms Dauban. I give the floor to Professor Franck. - 27 -
Mr. FRANCK: Thank you, Madam President, may it please the Court:
THE LAW OF GENOCIDE AS DEVELOPED BY THE C RIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR
THE FORMER Y UGOSLAVIA AND FOR RWANDA
Decisions of the criminal tribunals
1. I, this morning, will be discussing the la w of genocide, as it has been developed by the
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia a nd for Rwanda. Since this case began, so many
years ago, the files of evidence of the events have burgeoned. In adducing that evidence, our task
has been aided by the intrepid and inexorable wo rk of the fact finding done by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, as you have just heard from my colleague,
Ms Dauban.
2. That Tribunal has found many indicted persons guilty of various offences, and of course,
has acquitted others. It has dealt with crimcommitted in the entire period since 1991. It has
heard cases implicating persons from Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia, persons of various religions and
ethnic origins. Fact finding is the Tribunal’s speciality, but its decisions have covered important
concepts, from genocide to crimes against humanity, war crimes and joint criminal enterprises, and
conspiracy to commit such crimes. Basically, however, it has been applying the prohibitions of the
Genocide Convention and the applicable Geneva Conve ntions. It has applied this body of law to
indict individuals accused of these crimes, and to ac quit or indict them of acts they are accused of
perpetrating individually, or in concert with other individuals.
3. The ICTY, then, has assembled pieces of a puzzle. Occasionally, it has found that a
defendant has actually committed crimes of such scopethat the intent to destroy in whole, or in
part, a community, could be attributed to his crim es and he has been then convicted of genocide,
because that factor was present. More oftenwhen defendants were charged with both genocide
and crimes against humanity, the Yugoslav Tribunal has convicted them of the latter, for which a
demonstration of broader destructive intent was not a necessary component. In the Brdacase,
the trial chamber explained why: it said that it was satisfied that there was a strategic plan “to link
Serb-populated areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina together, to gain control over these areas and
create a separate Bosnian Serb State, from whic h most non-Serbs would be permanently removed, - 28 -
and that force and fear were used to implement it [that is, the plan] . . .”. But, said the Tribunal, the
evidence in this one case, alone, did not allow the conclusion that “there was an intention to do so
by destroying the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups in the region”. It then added this very
important explanation of why it had chosen to conv ict of crimes other than genocide. “The trial
chamber stresses,” it said, “that it is only on the basis of the evidence in this concrete case,
temporally and geographically limited, that it reaches the conclusion that genocidal intent is not the
72
only reasonable inference that may be drawn from the Strategic Plan.”
4. Our case, Members of the Court, is not te mporally or geographically limited. You have,
and will continue to be presented with, a very large canvass and with many parts of that puzzle.
Individual pieces may simply ⎯ one shudders at the word “simply” ⎯ demonstrate murder,
extermination, rape, terrorization of people to ma ke them flee. But, put together, you will see
clearly that genocidal intent is, indeed, the onl y reasonable inference that may be drawn from the
strategic plan. And the author of that plan is the Respondent.
5. On Tuesday, I discussed the various sources of evidence on which Bosnia and
Herzegovina rely in presenting to you our claim to have been the victims of a terrible genocide, one
deliberately committed by the Respondent. I discussed our reliance on judicial notice and
inferences, visual evidence, expert testimony, th e reports and determina tions of various United
Nations organs and agencies, and the decisions of fact and of law made by the International
Tribunal for Rwanda and, most importantly, the ICTY. In my present pleadings, I will try to
demonstrate the salience of the findings in matters of law and of fact made by the Yugoslav
Tribunal, but primarily in matters of law, and of course, also the findings of law made by the
Rwanda Tribunal.
6. My co-counsel, Magda Karagiannakis, also on Tuesday, showed why these findings of
tribunals, constituted under the binding authority of the Security Council and adhering to the
highest international standards of justice and prob ity, are entitled to the most serious consideration
by, and can be very helpful to, the deliberations of this Court. In this part of my pleadings, I intend
to take you through that jurisprudence of the two ad hoc Criminal Tribunals in so far as these have
72
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, IT-99-36-T, 1 September 2004, para. 981. - 29 -
directly construed the law of genocide. My coll eagues have already begun, and I will continue to
present you with the essential fact finding which h as been done in the ICTY, facts many of which
arise out of cases in which crimes against humanity were proven but which are, nevertheless, very
relevant to the factual issues in contention in this case. For the present, however, let us focus on
the Tribunals’ development of the law of genocide.
7. The jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rw andan Tribunals is particularly helpful in
elucidating the terms of the Genocide Convention. As I indicated in my pleadings yesterday, the
Convention is a salient landmark on humanity’s lo ng and agonizing ascent to civilization. It
defines genocide as enumerated acts: killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, or
deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring a bout a group’s destruction. It classifies these
acts as genocide only when there is the requisite intent, when these acts are “committed to destroy,
73
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” . When this case began
these many years ago, these were words on a page. In the ensuing decade, they have become the
subject of extensive legal practice. The jurisp rudence of the two Tribunals, when it has been
focused on genocide, has addressed four specific asp ects of genocide’s definition in ways that are
immediately relevant to the present case. Each bears on the essential matter of guilty intent:
(1) what evidence may be used to determine “intent to destroy”?
(2) what does “destroy” mean?
(3) what does “in whole or in part” mean? and
(4) what does “as such” mean?
The “intent to destroy”
8. Let us turn first then to “intent to destroy”. The Plavsić case, determined by the Yugoslav
Tribunal in 2003, is especially instructive as it is based not on contested evidence but, rather, on the
voluntary admissions made by a person in a position to know, who had served in the highest
echelons of the Serb Bosnian author ity. This is what Mrs.Plavsić told the Tribunal in her
74
statement of agreed facts . She said to the judges that
73
Genocide Convention, Art. II.
7Prosecutor v. Plavsić, Factual Basis for a Plea of Guilty, case No. IT-00-39 and 40, 30 September 2002. - 30 -
“the Bosnian Serb leadership knew that the Serb forces fighting on the side of the
Bosnian Serbs were far more powerful militarily than those of the non-Serbs. The
Bosnian Serb forces, collaborating with the JNA... ‘to implement the objective of
ethnic separation by force’ committed . . . persecutory acts [which] included: killings
during attacks on towns and villages; crue l and inhumane treatm ent during and after
the attacks; forced transfer and deportati on; unlawful detention and killing, forced
labour and use of human shields; cruel and inhumane treatment and inhumane
conditions in detention facilities; destruc tion of cultural and sacred objects; and
plunder and wanton destructions.”
These, Madam President, are not conjectures, these are not simply our pleadings, these are not even
simply opinions of the judges of the ICTY. Th ese are the admissions of one of the most senior
participants in the conflict, a person well positioned to know what happene d, and one of the few
perpetrators to have shown remorse. Moreover, the acts Mrs.Plavsi ć described, she said, were
committed by forces of the Bosnian Serb Republic whose Co-President was “collaborating with the
JNA and the MUP of Serbia”, the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia ⎯ the forces,
MadamPresident, of Belgrade. And the acts, she admitted ⎯ the killings and inhumane
treatment ⎯ were committed precisely to bring about ethnic cleansing.
9. So, we know from Mrs.Plavsi ć’s agreed facts that these even ts occurred, that they were
deliberately organized to clear large swathes of Bosnia and Herzegovina to make room for an
ethnically-cleansed Republika Srpska, and that this collaborative campaign of murder and mayhem
was facilitated by the decisive intervention of forces from neighbouring Serbia. But was it
genocide? As we know, in order for these acts to add up to genocide, they must have been
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group. First, therefore, we must look for the
elusive element of intent.
10. The ICTY, however, has been in no doubt th at the requisite genocidal intent may readily
be inferred, first of all, from statements made by the key leaders such as the one I have just
75
quoted . Another example, Radovan Karadzić, the future President of Republika Srpska from
1992 until 1995, in an intercepted telephone communication of 12 October 1991, said: “They [the
Muslims] will disappear, those people will disappear from the face of the Earth... They do not
understand that there would be bloodshed and that the Muslim people would be exterminated.” 76
7See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosević, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquitta, case No.IT-02-54-T,
16 June 2004, paras. 238-245.
7http://www.domovina.net/tribunal/page_006.pbp. Intercepted communication with Goiko Djogo, dated
12 October 1991; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosević, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, case No. IT-02-54-T,
16 June 2004, para. 241. - 31 -
11. Three days later, on 15 October, 1991, Radovan Karadzić publicly addressed his
genocidal intent to the legislature of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the world when he said:
“This [by which he meant independence] is the road that you want Bosnia and
Herzegovina to take, the same highway he ll and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia
went through. Don’t think that you won’t take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and
Muslim people to extinction because the Muslim people will not be able to defend
77
itself if it comes to war here.”
12. My colleagues, ProfessorsCondorelli and Pellet, will later demonstrate that this
genocidal intent was inspired by, and shared with Belgrade, which actively participated and
supported these aspirations. For the present, it is merely my task to demonstrate that there has been
ample opportunity for the ICTY to hear, evaluate and verify evidence which demonstrates that the
killings, the rapes, the torture, the destruction of schools and cultural properties ⎯ acts committed
with careful targeting against the non-Serb population of Bosnia ⎯ were not, as Respondent would
have us believe, merely the unfortunate happenstance of war, or of random criminality but, rather,
that they were endemic, were part of an inte nded policy that involved terror and, when thought
makes it necessary, extermination.
13. The judges at the Yugoslav Tribunal have verified the dimension of these crimes. In
1992, alone, in one area of Bosnia that the Serbs had decided to “cl ear”, the Tribunal, again in the
Plavsić case, confirmed “mass killings” of at least 50,000 persons, 850 villages that “were
completely devastated” and 408detention facilities in which “people were detained by force and
exposed to serious physical and mental abuse” 78.
14. Such gross, patterned and systematic br utality must lend itself to conclusions about
motive, and both the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals have reached that conclusion. In the
Yugoslav Tribunal’s 2August 2001 decision in the Krsti ć case, the judges held that they could
infer by irrefutable logical inference the requisite mens rea to commit genocide ⎯ on the part of
the defendants. They concluded that the genocid al intent was itself manifest in the very acts
committed. What acts? A systematic pattern of ta rgeted murders, for example. Thus, they said,
“[a]ll of the executions [that is at Srebrenica] systematically targeted Bosnian Muslim men of
77
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milosević, id., para. 241.
7Plavsić, id., paras. 41 and 45. - 32 -
79
military age, regardless of whether they were civilians or soldiers” ⎯ that is still from the Krsti ć
case. From this they ⎯ the judges ⎯ inferred that the intent was to destroy all or part of that
community, that “a decision was taken at some point to kill all the captured Bosnian Muslim men
indiscriminately...”. The Tribunal inferred “the strength of [that] desire” from the fact that
“Bosnian Serb forces systematically stopped the buses transporting the women, children and
elderly . . . and checked that no men were hiding on bo ard . . .” and that, then, “[t]he men . . . were
80
lined up and shot in rounds” . “In such cases” the Tribunal said, “the intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, as such, must be discernible in the criminal act itself” because, the Tribunal had concluded,
“the objective of the criminal enterprise” is “discernible in the act itself” 81.
82
In15. Prosecutor v. Blagojević , the ICTY trial chamber, applying earlier precedents in its
jurisprudence 83, held that, while “the specific intent re quires that the perpetrator seeks to achieve
the destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”, this
intent need not be evidenced through a master plan ; “[t]he existence of a plan or policy is not a
legal requirement of the crime” 84.
16. We have demonstrated, nevertheless, that there was a plan. But, as the Yugoslav
Tribunal has said so clearly, a plan can ⎯ and should ⎯ also be inferred from the methodical and
patterned way the very same kind of criminal ac tions were replicated, over and over, in widely
scattered parts of Bosnia. From that pattern it can certainly be inferred, in the words of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Akayesu judgment, that the “perpetration of the act
charged therefore extends beyond its actual commissi on... [to advance] the realization of an
ulterior motive, which is to destroy, in whole or in part, the group of which the individual is just
85
one element” . This is the law of evidence to which I alluded on Tuesday. It makes the point that,
when a person of one group, over and over again, kills and mutilates pers ons of another group, it
7ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 549.
80
Id., para. 547.
81
Id., para. 549.
82
17 January 2005.
8See, also, Jelisić, Appeal Judgment, paras. 46-48.
8Blagojević, para. 656.
85
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment 2 September 1998, para. 522. - 33 -
must be inferred, absent convincing evidence to the contrary, that he has a lethal objective directed
not only against random individuals but also against the whole group to which all the victims
belong. In some national jurisdictions, we have the concept of “hate crimes”. In international law,
we have the concept of genocide. Both require a showing of animus but, in both national and
international law, animus can be derived from a showing of a pattern of victim selection.
17. So far we have spoken mainly of murder, but murder is not the only act from which
requisite intent may be deduced by inference. A nother act that permits the inference of genocidal
intent is “ethnic cleansing” ⎯ which was sometimes brought about by terrorizing a population into
flight through selective murder, bu t also by such other acts as systematic rapes, beatings, and the
creation of impossible conditions of life. These acts, committed to induce flight in order to clear
out the non-Serb populations, call for an inference of the intent to destroy all, or part, of a
population. In Blagojevi ć, the ICTY inferred, from the forcible transfer of that city’s Muslim
population, “a manifestation of the specific intent”, a manifestation of the specific intent to destroy
86
the Muslim community of Srebrenica . No evidence of a master plan or blueprint could speak
more clearly than the actions by which a policy of ethnic cleansing was pursued in Bosnia, actions
from which it is impossible not to infer de liberate genocidal intent. The Blagojevi ć trial chamber
said it “has no doubt that all these acts constitute d a single operation” and that the perpetrators
87
“clearly intended through these acts to physically destroy this group” .
18. So much for victim selection, but what about scale, what about patterns of victimization?
Whether the act is murder, torture, ethnic clean sing or rape, its scale is also key to inferring
intentionality. In the Krsti ć case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY said that “given the scope of
the killings the trial chamber could legitimately draw the inference that [the extermination of the
men of military age at Srebrenica] was motivated by genocidal intent” 88⎯ could infer that from
the scope of the activity From the scope ⎯ the enormity ⎯ of the acts can be inferred the
86
Id., para. 675.
87
Id., para. 677.
88ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, para. 27, case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgment, 19 April 2004. - 34 -
genocidal intent of the actors. In Akayesu, the Rwanda Tribunal held that the “scale of the
89
atrocities committed . . . can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act” .
19. In the present case, the Respondents deny this. In their 1999 Rejoinder , they argue that
“the pattern of acts, mass scale, gravity, the number of victims are not facts sufficient to draw the
conclusion of the existence of genocidal intent” 90. By this the Respondents apparently did not
mean to challenge the established facts: that killings, murder, rapes and pillaging occurred on a
massive scale and followed a common pattern. Ra ther, they seek to deny that mass scale and
common pattern of killings, rapes and torture can ever form the basis of a judicial inference: that
those who committed these acts acted out of genocidal intent. The ICTY and the ICTR have
clearly rejected this argument and held that, in Bosnia, as in Rwanda, the pattern of proven acts,
their massive scale and extreme gravity, the number of victims, all this does, indeed, make
inevitable the inference of the intent to destroy a people, not just persons. We urge this Court to
endorse this sound inferential reasoning.
20. Of course, the Criminal Tribunals have onl y been asked to look at the acts of solitary
indicted individuals. You, however, are being asked to see all the acts committed by many; and
from that panoramic optic will emerge Bosnia’s wi der patterns which, it will be clear, cannot be
dismissed as isolated atrocities, committed agai nst random persons by a few wanton individuals
but, rather, as a concerted policy of genocide. That inference is compelled, not only by the number
of wrongful acts but, also, by the repetitive patterns of their commission, which, when seen as such,
can only be construed as genocide. We have introduced, and will introduce, more evidence of very
great numbers of acts which, taken in isolation, are evidence of horrendous cruelty but which, taken
in unison, as they must be, create an irrefutable pr esumption that they were planned and intended.
Taken together, this pattern of planned and intended acts converts the repetitive acts of murder,
rape, torture, and ethnic cleansing into what those acts obviously were meant to accomplish ⎯ the
destruction of a significant part of Bosnia’s Muslim population.
Madam President, may I request you to adjourn us for the tea break?
89
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment 2 September 1998, para. 523.
90Id., para. 3.3.3.1. - 35 -
The PRESIDENT: The Court will rise for ten minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.25 to 11.35 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated.
Mr. FRANCK: Madam President, Members of the Court. We have been discussing the
question of intent as analysed by the ICTY and th e ICTR. Permit me now to turn to the term “to
destroy”
“To destroy”
21. A population’s destruction can be accomplis hed in various ways. Genocide occurs, of
course, when a population is killed. But that is not the only way to destroy a people. Here, again,
the words of the Genocide Convention have been interpreted in the jurisprudence of the two
Tribunals that have been charged with giving them effect in the context of contemporary events.
22. The Convention defines genocide as an act “to destroy” a populace. Killing is a means to
achieve such destruction. But is that threshold established by the Convention passed only when the
destruction is carried out by killing? The Tribunals have answered that question with a firm “no”.
In Prosecutor v. Blagojević, the trial chamber found that, although purely “cultural genocide” as
such is not within the definition of genocide adopt ed by the Convention, the intent “to destroy the
group as a separate and distinct entity” can also be manifest in other ways short of murder,
including “the forcible transfer of a population” 91 which is likely to lead, the court continued, “to
92
the physical or biological destruction of the group” qua group , as ⎯ and I quote the court
again ⎯
“when the transfer is conducted in such a way that the group can no longer
reconstitute itself ⎯ particularly when it involves the separation of its members.
Here, again, ethnic cleansing, carried out in this manner and for this purpose, equals
genocide.”
91
Id., para. 665.
9Id., para. 666. - 36 -
In such cases, the trial chamber found “the forcible transfer of individuals could lead to the material
destruction of the group, since the group ceases to exist as a group, or at least as the group it
was” 93.
23. “Ethnic cleansing” is the ironic and terribl e name by which this forcible transfer has
become known, and it is one of the several ways a genocide has been held, as a matter of law, to
have been committed. It is one of the ways in which the existence of a group as a group can be
made impossible. At her sentencing hearing, Re publika Srpska Co-President Mrs. Biljana Plavsić
said she had “come to the belief and accept the fact that many thousands of innocent people were
victims of an organized, systematic effort to remove Muslims and Croats from the territory claimed
by Serbs” 94. For this, she accepted responsibility “fully and unconditionally” 95. She also
expressed remorse ⎯ which we have yet to hear from the Respondent. One can but pray that this
Court will change the hearts and minds of tho se not yet able to seek reconciliation with their
victims and with their own humanity.
24. In the context of Bosnia in the first half of the 1990s, ethnic cleansing was more than a
violation of humanitarian law: it was genocide. Clearly, the concept of destruction of a group is
not one inherently limited to the killing of its memb ers, but also includes any other acts intended to
destroy the group’s viability as a distinct entity by undermining the group’s ability to survive as
such. The ICTY has adopted a notion of genocide th at “includes the intentional destruction of the
social existence of the group . . .” 96. That is the Blagojević case. In the specifics of the case before
it, the trial chamber found that the perpetrator had “the intent... ultimately to bring about the
destruction of the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica” 97 not only by the murder of its men but also by
the “forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly” which “is a manifestation of the specific
98
intent to rid the Srebrenica enclave of its Bosnian Muslim population” . It held that the
perpetrators must be assumed to have known that “t he combination of the killings of the men with
93Ibid.
94
Plavsić, id., para. 72.
95
Id., para. 71.
96ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojević, case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment of 17 January, 2005, para. 664.
97Id., para. 674.
98Id., para. 675. - 37 -
the forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly, would inevitably result in the physical
disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population” and that they “clearly intended through these
99
acts to physically destroy this group” .
25. The Blagojević ICTY trial chamber also inferred genocidal intent from the evidence that,
with the majority of Srebrenica’s Muslim men killed or missing, their spouses would be unable to
remarry in the social circumstances of their community and start new families 100. The killing of so
high a percentage of the men, therefore, had sev ere procreative implications. The ICTY judges
concluded that the perpetrators were aware of these consequences when they embarked on their
genocidal spree 101.
26. Although this intent is the only possi ble inference from the acts committed, it scarcely
needs to be inferred when it is directly demonstrable by the words of the perpetrators. The ICTY
has accepted as proven that, in
“ March, 1995, political and military leaders in the Republika Srpska issued orders
specifically calling for, inter alia , the creation of ‘an unbearable situation of total
insecurity, with no hope of further survival or life’ for the [Muslim] inhabitants of
102
Srebrenica.”
What could be a more clear-cut definition of the genocidal intent to destroy on the part of the
authorities in Pale?
27. These cases are cited, here, because it would appear to be relevant to the definition of the
law pertaining to genocide as enunciated by the ad hoc Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. In the Yugoslav Tribuna l, the judges have clearly indicated that it is
appropriate to draw inferences from demonstrated facts. The evidence of targeted killings, but also
the evidence of patterns of other acts intended to force a population to abandon its homes, mosques,
schools, and intended to destroy its social and cu ltural cohesion, to scatter it, battered and beaten,
into alien lands, also establishes an intent to destroy that population as a population and to
transform them into the rootless, the demoralized and the internally and externally displaced.
99
Id., para. 677.
100Id., para. 93 and Notes 195, 196.
101Id., para. 595.
102
Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenović, IT-02-60/2-S, Judgment of 10 December 2003, para. 27. The quote is based
on Radovan Karadzić’s instructions in “Operation Directive 07” issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
of the Republika Srpska, on 8 March 1995, and quoted as proven by the ICTY in several cases, including Obrenović, but
also Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, IT-02-60/1-S, 2 December 2003, para. 29. - 38 -
28. In the cited cases, the judges of the Yugos lav Tribunal have attributed these acts to the
Bosnian Serb forces and authorities who were st anding accused before them, or were actually
before them. But, surely, not to them alone, fo r the authorities in Belgrade, we have shown and
will show, were also, themselves, perpetrators a nd willing partners in, and facilitators of, this
genocide. That will be demonstrated to you by the pleadings, beginning tomorrow, which pertain
to attribution. For the present, I wish merely to emphasize the unanimity with which the
jurisprudence on genocide has determined that acts of extreme violence and intimidation, acts
intended to destroy the coherence of a community and to achieve its displacement and dispersal,
that such acts also amount to genocide, just as surely as does killing.
29. In this respect it is worth recalling the Blagojević judgment in somewhat greater length:
“The trial chamber finds in this respect that the physical or biological
destruction of a group is not necessarily the death of the group members. While
killing large numbers of a group may be the most direct way of destroying a group,
other acts or series of acts can also lead to the destruction of the group. A group is
comprised of individuals, but also of its history, traditions, the relationship between its
members, the relationship with other groups, the relationship with the land. The trial
chamber finds that the physical or biological destruction of the group is the likely
outcome of a forcible transfer of the population when this transfer is conducted in such
a way that the group can no longer reconstitute itself ⎯ particularly when it involves
the separation of its members. In such case s the trial chamber finds that the forcible
transfer of individuals could lead to the material destruction of the group, since the
103
group ceases to exist as a group, or at least as the group it was.”
The judges added that they were not making an argument for a concept of cultural genocide, but,
rather, clarifying the meaning of genocidal destruction itself.
30. The two ad hoc Criminal Tribunals have also made it clear that genocidal intent need not
be an intent to effect the universal destruction of an entire race, ethnicity or religious group: an
object usually beyond the means of even the most heinous perpetrators. The intent may be limited
to attacking the key socio-cultural elements that hold the group together. Such a more limited
enterprise can still be genocidal. As the 1992 report of the United Nations Commission of Experts,
established under Security Council resolution780 to examine evidence of genocide, has noted:
destruction of the leadership of the targeted group may be an important part of the overall scheme.
“If the group suffers extermination of its leadership and in the wake of that loss,
a large number of its members are killed or subjected to other heinous acts, for
example deportation, the cluster of violations ought to be considered in its entirety in
103
Id., para. 666. - 39 -
order to interpret the provisions of the C onvention in a spirit consistent with its
purpose.” 104
The concept of a “cluster of violations” is one th at has been adopted by the ICTY, for example in
the Krstić case 105, and it surely merits the serious consideration of this tribunal.
31. Similarly, the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part need not be universal in the
geographic sense. As the Krstić tribunal has pointed out, “the intent to eradicate a group within a
limited geographical area such as the region of a country or even a municipality may be
106
characterized as genocide” . “Although the perpetrators of genocide need not seek to destroy the
entire group protected by the Convention, they must view the part they wish to destroy as a distinct
107
entity which must be eliminated as such.” The Jelisi judgment of the ICTY, too, has held that
108
genocide could target a limited geographic zone . In the Rwanda Tribunal, the judges of the trial
chamber in the Ruzindana case 109concurred with the International Law Commission, which had
stated that “it is not necessary to intend to achie ve the complete annihilation of a group from every
corner of the globe”. We have demonstrated, and will further demonstrate, that the genocide
committed in Bosnia was a concerted effort, thr ough various means, to eliminate, as such, the
Bosnian Muslim community in those parts of Bo snia and Herzegovina which has been designated
for exclusive Serb control.
32. The same intent to destroy a group may become evident in a pattern of rapes.
33. In our pleadings later today, my colleague Professor Stern, who will follow me, will have
occasion to demonstrate the existence of such a prevalent pattern of rape. She will prove that this
has been shown, in the case of Bosnia, to be a matt er of fact. In law, she will further show, this
pattern, like the patterns of killings and forcible population displacement, has been construed by the
Criminal Tribunals as being means intended to effect the destruction of the group.
34. We also demonstrate clearly discernible patterns in the destruction of Muslim places of
worship and learning. Individually, the burning of a mosque or a library is an act of pillage. In
104United Nations doc. S/1994/674, para. 94.
105
Id., para. 587.
106
Id., para. 589.
107Id., para. 590.
108ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisi, para. 83.
109ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, para. 95. - 40 -
law, however, the concerted destruction of all, or almost all, of the mosques in the territory of a
population may be evidence of the intent to commit genocide. In the Plavsić decision, the Tribunal
speaks of 850 villages that became “no longer inha bitable” as a result of their “looting, ransacking
and destruction” by Serb forces, and “the destru ction of over 100 mosques . . . and seven Catholic
churches” 110. When these prevalent acts are taken togeth er, and when they are set next to other
patterns of killings, torture, rape and displacement, they permit, indeed, they compel the drawing of
an inference that these acts constitu te evidence of intent to destroy the history, the culture and the
intellectual life that holds the group together. In the Krsti ć case, the Tribunal agreed that mere acts
against the culture of a group cannot form the basis of a charge of genocide by itself. But, the trial
chamber said:
“Where there is physical and biological destruction [of a group] there are often
simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted
group as well, attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent
to physically destroy the group.”
In that instance, the Tribunal took “into account as evidence of intent to destroy the group the
111
deliberate destruction of mosques and houses belonging to members of the group” .
35. Genocide, in Article II of the Convention, is also defined as the causing of serious bodily
and mental harm to members of the group.
112
36. Here, again, the Tribunals have helped develop the jurisprudence. Both the ICTR and
the ICTY 113have created an impressive body of precedent which has construed “bodily or mental
harm” to include “acts of torture, inhuman or de grading treatment, sexual violence including rape,
interrogations combined with beatings, threats of death and deportations”, as well as other acts of
cruelty that cause “a traumatic experience from which one will not quickly ⎯ if ever ⎯
114
recover” . That is the Blagojević case. In the decision of the Yugoslav Tribunal on review of the
indictment against Karadzić and Mladić, it was stated by the Tribunal that cruel treatment, torture,
rape and deportations c ould constitute the serious bodily or mental harm done to members of a
110
Plavsić, id., paras. 43, 44.
111
Id., para. 580.
11See Rutaganda trial Judgment, para.51; Musema trial Judgment, para. 156; Bagilishema trial Judgment,
para. 59; Gacumbitsi trial Judgment, para. 291; Kajelijeli trial Judgment, para. 815.
11Krstić trial Judgment, paras. 513 and 516; Blagojevic trial Judgment, paras. 644-647.
11Blagojević, id., paras. 646 and 647. - 41 -
115
group so as to sustain a count of genocide . The matter is summarized in the Yugoslav Tribunal’s
2004 judgment in the Brdanin case:
“‘Causing serious bodily or mental ha rm’ [as a means to commit genocide as
defined by the Genocide Convention] is understood to mean, inter alia, acts of torture,
inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual vi olence including rape, interrogations
combined with beatings, threats of death, and harm that damages health or causes
disfigurement or serious injury to members of the targeted national, ethnical, racial or
religious group.” 116
The evidence of incredible torm ents inflicted on these prisoners by Serb militias and prison camp
guards obviously meets any reasonable definitional standard to qualify as “bodily or mental harm”.
From the breadth and scope of the infliction of this harm it is impossible not to deduce the intent to
inflict harm. From the sharp focus of the torm ent on an ethnic and religious group it is impossible
not to infer the intent that transforms torment into genocide.
37. According to the ICTR, serious bodily or mental harm includes measures aimed at a slow
death, such as starvation, systematic expulsion, excessive work, and deprivation of proper housing,
117
clothing, medical services and hygiene .
38. These acts, in other words, are the bloodsta ined building blocks of genocide, whenever
they are intentionally deployed to “destroy” a comm unity’s ability to exist. Co-President Biljana
Plavsić has voluntarily testified in confirmation of the evidence given by other witnesses, as well as
confirming the Prosecutor’s evidence of “the scale and planning of the offence, the number of
victims, the length of time over which the crimes were committed, the violence associated with the
crimes and the repeated and systematic nature of the crimes” 118. In her admissions to the ICTY,
she said:
“Although I was repeatedly informed of allegations of cruel and inhuman
conduct against non-Serbs, I refused to accept them or even investigate... In this
obsession of ours to never again become victims, we had allowed ourselves to become
119
victimizers.”
115
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzić and Ratko Mladić, Review of the Indictments pursuant to Rule 61 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, cases Nos. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, 11 July 1996, para. 93.
116
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, case No. IT-99-36-T, 1 September 2004, trial chamber II, para. 690.
117
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 505-506.
118Plavsić, id., para. 56.
119Plavsić, id., para. 51. - 42 -
39. That the Serbs throughout much of Europ ean history have suffered and been victimized
is beyond question. But, as she herself has admitted explanation cannot justify. You, the judges of
the World Court, have before you ample evidence of patterned and endemic practice of torture and
abuse. From these you can surely conclude, as ha ve the Rwanda and Yugos lav Tribunals, that the
intent to destroy a group is the only possible logical inference that can be drawn from the
systematic prevalence of these practices. Wh at must be inferred from these heinous acts,
inescapably and inexcusably, is genocide.
“In whole or in part”
40. With your permission I would now like to say some words on the phrase “in whole or in
part” found in the Genocide Convention ⎯ destroy “in whole or in part”. The evolving
jurisprudence on genocide has also cast light on th e meaning of the phrase “in whole or in part”.
ArticleII of the Convention defines genocide as act s intended to destroy a group in whole or in
part. The Genocide Convention, developed in the aftermath of the European holocaust, was not
intended to deal with the trivial. To qualify as genocide the acts must have been undertaken with
the intent to destroy a substantial number of indivi duals in the targeted group. The International
Law Commission, in its drafting of a comprehens ive code of crimes prohibited by international
law, has reported that “the crime of genocide by its very nature requires the intention to destroy at
120
least a substantial part of a particular group” . In the Krsti ć case, the Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY said: “The intent requirement of genocide... is therefore satisfied where evidence shows
that the alleged perpetrator intended to destroy at least a substantial part of the protected group.” 121
The Appeals Chamber then went on to explain th at the “protected group” in that case was “the
Muslim population of Srebrenica” 122and not, of course, every Muslim in Bosnia and Herzegovina ,
or in the former Yugoslavia, or in Europe. The murder of the men and boys, the Tribunal
120
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May-26 July 1996,
p. 89.
121
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, para. 12, case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgment, 19 April 2004.
12Id., para. 19. - 43 -
concluded, must be seen as the killers’ way of ensuring that the group as a whole ⎯ by which the
123
judges meant the Muslims of the Srebrenica region ⎯ could not perpetuate itself .
41. The Krsti ć Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 124, on 19April2004, concluded that the
threshold determining when the killings in a targeted population become genocidal involves
considerations of its proportion of that popula tion, but, also, of the victims’ prominence and
leadership role within the group. We have presented you, Members of the Court, with the findings
of fact by the ICTY that show the deliberate policy of eradicating the religious cultural and
intellectual leaders of the victimized groups.
42. We will present evidence of the deliberate targeting of the Muslim population in such a
way as to kill as many as necessary and destr oy as much as was necessary to prevent the
perpetuation of a Muslim community in those areas the Serbs wished to establish as their
“ethnically cleansed” State. The creation of a geographically contiguous purely Serb Republika
Srpska made it necessary, in the minds of the perpetrators, to kill ⎯ not all Muslims, not even all
Muslims of Srebrenica ⎯ but all, or as many as possible, of the Muslim men and boys. And so,
also, in the Drina Valley. That policy of targeted killing and destruction, the ICTY has determined,
constitutes the intended obliteration of the Muslim comm unity in that area “in whole or in part” so
as to meet the grim requirements of the Genocide Convention. As the ICTY said in the Krstić case,
those who massacred the Bosnian men “knew... th at the combination of those killings with the
forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly would inevitably result in the physical
disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim community at Srebrenica” 125.
43. “In whole or in part”, then, is a standard which, we have demonstrated, and will continue
to demonstrate, is all too readily met by overwhelming evidence of the targeted destruction ⎯ by
killings, rapes, torture, forcible removal, and by the patterned destruction of Muslim homes,
mosques, schools and libraries ⎯ in those designated areas the perpetrators sought to clear of the
large and historic Muslim communities that stood in the way of their plan to join those areas to
Greater Serbia.
12Id., para. 17.
124
Id., paras. 8-14.
12Id., para. 595. - 44 -
44. The Convention makes clear that “in whole or in part” does not need to be satisfied by
evidence of an intent to kill every Muslim in Bosnia and Herzegovina . The “part” the perpetrators
sought to destroy was the part that stood in the way of their dream of a Serb State, a State of all the
Serbs, a State of Serb hegemony and contiguity. As the Krstić tribunal has made clear, the intent to
destroy the Bosnian Muslim community was pursu ed by a combination of means. And, the
Tribunal concluded, to the extent these means, in combination, were successful in eradicating the
Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslim community in parts of the country coveted by the perpetrators, the
definition of genocide had been met. As the Y ugoslav Tribunal stated in the Brdanin case, “the
jurisprudence of the Tribunal supports the approach that permits the characterization of genocide
even when the specific intent to destroy a group, in part, extends only to a limited geographical
126
area” . That area was not so limited and, in fact, entailed more than 60percent of the former
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This Court will surely wish to take into acc
ount that
definition of the Convention’s requisites.
“As such”
45. And now we come to the last phrase “as su ch”: to destroy in whole or part a group as
such”. In the Musema case, the ICTR defined the meaning of the phrase “as such” as used in the
Genocide Convention’s definition of the crime: the destroying of a group “as such”.
“For any of the acts charged to constitute genocide, the acts must have been
committed against one or more persons because such person or persons were members
of a specific group, and specifically, because of their membership in this group. Thus,
the victim is singled out not by reason of his individual identity, but rather on account
of his being a member of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. The victim of
the act is, therefore, a member of a give n group selected as such, which, ultimately,
means the victim of the crime of genocide is the group itself and not the individual
127
alone.”
46. In other words, as the Rwanda Tribunal said in the 1999 Rutaganda case, the acts must
have been committed “against one or more persons because such person or persons were members
128
of a specific group, and specifically, becau se of their membership in this group” . There can be
no doubt that the systematic murder, expulsion, torture, rape and despoliation committed in Bosnia
126
Brdanin, id., para. 703.
127
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Musema, trial chamber I, ICTR, 96-13-A, 27 January 2000, para. 165.
12ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, 6 December 1999. - 45 -
and Herzegovina was not the result of animus against individual victims but, rather, the
victimization of persons, institutions and places precisely because of their identification with a
group: the Bosnian Muslim community or a specific part thereof, or the Croat community.
47. As for the term “group” it has been held, by the Rwanda Tribunal in Akayesu 129, to
signify persons whose membership is automatic, by birth, and whose membership is essentially
unchallengeable by its members. The State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in this case, clearly
qualifies as the representative of the victim groups c onsisting of persons who are its citizens. The
sovereign State of Bosnia and Herzegovina h as the right, under the Genocide Convention, as
construed by the ad hoc Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia an d Rwanda, to bring this action on
behalf of those of its citizens who were killed or otherwise egregiously victimized by actions of
another State, killed because ⎯ and solely because ⎯ they were members of an ethnical or
religious group within Bosnia who were perceived by that other State as obstructing its plan to
expand its dominion into parts of what w as internationally recognized to be part ⎯ indeed, the
larger part ⎯ of Bosnian territory. The intent was to destroy these obstructionist groups by
targeting their members.
48. The crimes committed against those citizen s because of their group identity have been
clearly distinguished by the Rwanda Tribunal’s ju risprudence from other kinds of brutality. For
example, a dispute between persons, or communities, regarding title to land or resources may be
the occasion of atrocities and even of large-scale slaughters. However, a clear distinction now
exists, Members of the Court, in law, between an attack on a community in order to deprive it of a
resource and one directed at vitiating its right to exist. The events in Bosnia and Herzegovina
during the 1990s clearly come within the latter category.
49. The ICTY has adopted the same interp retation of the Convention as did the Rwanda
Tribunal, for example in distinguishing acts whic h fall under its jurisdiction as constituting crimes
against humanity from its jurisdiction over act s that constitute genocide. In the Jelesi ć case, the
ICTY stated that genocide differs from persecution, a crime against humanity, in that, in the latter,
the perpetrator chooses the victims because of the group to which they belong but does not
129
Id., para. 511. - 46 -
necessarily seek to destroy that community. There can be no doubt that, in the instance of the
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, they were selected for wholesale killing, rape and torture not
only because of their membership and role in th e group, but because the perpetrators sought to
destroy the group. The acts were directed at them because the intended victim was not the
individual person, but the group as such.
50. In the course of our pleading, we are seek ing to make clear that the crimes committed
against the Muslims and other non-Serbs of Bosnia were motivated by that intent to destroy the
group. They were killed, raped, tortured and made to flee their burning homes because the aim was
to destroy their communities as such. True, many of the offences for which individuals have been
convicted in the ICTY were prosecuted as discrete crimes against humanity. But, this was because,
in the limited mandate of that Tribunal, each defe ndant could only be convicted of the individual
acts he or she had committed. In this Court, with its far broader jurisdictional horizon, we ask that
the pieces of the puzzle be pieced together to show that they were not random acts, but parts of a
common criminal enterprise which, seen in toto, can readily be identified as genocide.
Madam President, this concludes my pleadings for this morning. I now respectfully request
that you call on my colleague, Professor Brigitte Stern.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Franck. I now call upon Professor Stern.
Mme STERN : Madame le président, Messieurs les juges.
1. L’affaire qui est aujourd’hui devant vous est un moment fort, j’oserai même dire un
moment fondateur, dans cette lutte contre ce ma l absolu qu’est le génocide de ses semblables,
semblables mais considérés comme si différents que leur humanité même est niée. Dans cette
affaire, un Etat, pour la première fois dans l’histoire de l’humanité, un Etat poursuit un autre Etat,
devant la plus haute juridiction internationale, pour génocide commis contre un groupe faisant
partie de sa population. Dans cette affaire un Etat, la Bosnie-Herzégovine, qu’avec mes collègues
je représente, demande à votre Cour, de reconnaître un autre Etat, un de ses voisins, la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, responsable d’un génocide, et de lui faire assumer les conséquences de ses
actes. - 47 -
2. S’il l’on en croit Elie Wiesel, votre prét oire devrait aujourd’hui être placé au centre du
monde. Dans l’allocution qu’il a prononcée lors de la remise de son prix Nobel en 1986, celui-ci
en effet a déclaré, et je le cite: «Wherever men or women are persecuted because of their race,
religion or political views, that place must at that moment ⎯ become the centre of the
universe.» 130
3. Dans ce lieu central où nous nous trouvons, pour demander à cette Cour de reconnaître la
responsabilité de la Serbie-et-Monténégro pour des actes de génocide commis en
Bosnie-Herzégovine, il me faut préalablement vous emmener sur un chemin difficile et douloureux,
un chemin parcouru essentiellement par des milliers de femmes bosniaques, mais également par
des hommes bosniaques, mais également par des en fants bosniaques, il y a de cela un peu plus de
dix ans.
4. Dans la décision relative à l’examen de l’acte d’accusation de Karadzi ć et Mladić, rendue
le 11juillet 996 dans le cadre de l’article 61, le Tribunal pénal international pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) a déclaré : «de l’avis de la Chambre, les violences sexuelles méritent une
attention particulière parmi les méthodes de nettoyage ethnique , en raison de leur systématicité et
131
de la gravité des souffrances infligées à la population civile» .
5. C’est précisément sur ces violences sexuelles, dont le viol constitue sans conteste la forme
132
la plus grave , que je vais concentrer mon attention. Et, ce qu’il m’incombe de vous montrer
dans les heures qui viennent est que l’on est face, non pas à des violences sexuelles et aux viols qui
accompagnent hélas tous les conflits, mais que l’on est face à une véritable politique de violences
sexuelles, qui était partie intégrante, peut-être même essentielle, du nettoyage ethnique génocidaire
qui visait les non-Serbes et en particulier les Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine.
6. Pour cela, je vais commencer par égrener une litanie d’horreurs, je m’en excuse d’avance.
Les faits sont brutaux. Les faits sont violents. Mais ce sont les faits et vous devez les connaître.
Mes premiers développements seront donc consacrés à un rappel des faits, certains qui ont déjà été
130Allocution d’E. Wiesel, reproduite dans le New York Times, 11 décembre 1986.
131TPIY, Le procureur c. Radovan Karadzić et Ratko Mladić, affaires nsIT-95-5-R61 et IT-95-18-R61, examen
de l’acte d’accusation dans le cadre de l’article 61 du Règl ement de procédure et de preuve, 11juillet1996, par.64; les
italiques sont de nous.
132TPIY, Le procureur c. Anto Furundzija, affaire n IT-95-17/1-T10, Chambre de première instanceII,
jugement, 10 décembre 1998, par. 175. - 48 -
mentionnés dans notre réplique, mais aussi et surtout, tous les faits qui ont été nouvellement avérés
et constatés depuis par les instances international es, en particulier dans les jugements du Tribunal
pénal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) (I).
7. Je démontrerai ensuite que ces faits sont des actes constitutifs du génocide qui s’est
produit. Certes, ni les violences sexuelles en généra l, ni le viol ni la grossesse forcée ne sont
mentionnés en tant que tels dans l’article II de la convention sur le génocide, que je ne citerai pas
une fois de plus, car il est désormais inscrit dans toutes vos mémoires. Bien que les violences
sexuelles ne soient pas énoncées expressis verbis dans le vocabulaire de l’article II, je ne pense pas
avoir beaucoup de difficultés à vous convaincre, dans un second volet de mes développements,
qu’en raison du contexte dans lequel ces actes ont été commis, les violences sexuelles et les viols
peuvent entrer dans les cinq catégories juri diques d’actes constitutifs de génocide énumérés à
l’article II de la convention sur le génocide (II).
8. Mais, nous le savons bien, il ne suffit pas que soient commis les terribles actes mentionnés
à l’articleII, pour qu’il y ait génocide. Il faut bien sûr, un élément supplémentaire, qui fait toute
l’horreur, qui fait toute la spécificité du génoc ide, qui lui confère son «caractère exceptionnel» 133.
Il est en effet nécessaire que ces différents actes aient été effectués, vous le savez, dans «l’intention
de détruire en tout ou en par tie, un groupe national, ethnique, raci al ou religieux, comme tel». On
n’insistera jamais assez sur l’importance de l’inte ntion génocidaire dans la qualification des actes
de génocide. Mes derniers développements auro nt donc trait à l’intention génocidaire qui se
retrouve, comme nous le verrons, derrière le s actes de violence sexuelle commis en
Bosnie-Herzégovine (III).
The PRESIDENT: Ms Stern, could I ask you to assist the interpreters by speaking a little
more slowly?
Ms STERN: Yes, Madam President, I will try.
133TPIY, Le procureur c. Milomir Staki ć, affaire n IT-97-24-T, Chambre de prem ière instanceII, jugement,
31 juillet 2003, par. 520. - 49 -
I.L ES FAITS (LA BASE FACTUELLE PERMETTANT DE DETERMINER
QU ’UN GENOCIDE A ETE COMMIS )
9. La première constatation qu ’il convient de faire est que le s faits, les actes de violence
sexuelle, sont extrêmement nombreux et qu’il n’est pas possible d’en effectuer devant vous un
sinistre inventaire qui serait exhaustif. Les viols et les violences sexuelles ont été commis à un
niveau inégalé jusque-là, comme l’avait déjà constaté Cherif Bassiouni, président de la commission
d’experts, dont le rapport a notamment servi de ba se à la création du TPIY, lorsqu’il a déclaré que
134
«[l]e conflit dans l’ex-Yougoslavie aura vu des violences sexuelles d’une nouvelle ampleur» .
10. Je ne vais donc que vous présenter les gra ndes lignes de force qui apparaissent aux yeux
de quiconque se penche sur les innombrables violences sexuelles qui se sont produites en Bosnie,
que j’illustrerai par quelques exemples, pour que le tableau que je vous présente sorte de la sphère
intellectuelle pour s’incarner dans la douleur de celles et de ceux qui les ont vécues. Je ne
reviendrai donc pas en détail sur les plus de trente pages de la réplique de la Bosnie-Herzégovine
en date du 23avril1998, trente pages consacrées à la description de nombreuses violences
sexuelles relatives à cette instance devant la Cour, ne rappelant qu’ici ou là tel ou tel incident et je
m’efforcerai plutôt d’attirer l’attention de la Cour sur des faits soit nouvellement connus, soit
nouvellement confirmés.
11. Mais il me faut au préalable revenir, même s’il n’y aura pas lieu de s’y attarder
longuement, sur les allégations inadmissibles présentées par la Serbie-et-Monténégro dans sa
duplique, qui s’évertue, une nouvelle fois, à réfute r la réalité des violences sexuelles, qu’elle ne
daigne envisager que sous la dénomination, co mbien lourde de sens, combien insultante de
135
«prétendus viols» .
12. Au-delà même de la contestation par le défendeur de certaines sources d’information
présentées dans notre réplique, qui résulte d’une lecture et d’une interprétation soit sollicitée soit
tronquée des propos effectivement cités et sur lesquelles il n’y a pas lieu de revenir, la
Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a, pour contester la réa lité des viols et violences sexuelles, trouvé d’autre
issue que de se lancer dans une véhémente criti que de l’impartialité du procureur du TPIY dans
134Cherif Bassiouni, «Sexual Violence», («Violences sexuelles, une arme de guerre invisible dans
o
l’ex-Yougoslavie»), document spécial n, Institut international des droits de l’homme, faculté de droit de l’Université
DePaul, 1996, p. 2, (réplique, annexe 71).
135Duplique de la Serbie-et-Monténégro, 22 février 1999, par. 3.3.5 : «Les prétendus viols». - 50 -
l’élaboration des actes d’accusation qu’il émet. Elle a ainsi fait valoir que celui-ci pratiquerait une
«politique de deux poids deux mesures» 136 dans l’appréciation des faits indiquant que lorsque des
Serbes sont en cause, les incriminations sont pl us graves lorsqu’il s’agit de Bosniaques. Si la
Bosnie ne compte pas s’engager sur le terrain de cette discussion avec le défendeur, qui est sans
intérêt dans la présente affaire, elle doit cependant examiner plus avant la conséquence qui en est
tirée, c’est-à-dire la remise en cause par notre adve rsaire de la véracité des faits établis dans les
137
actes d’accusation, qu’elle juge, et ce sont les mots qu’elle a écrits, «peu crédibles» .
13. La Bosnie-Herzégovine tient à préciser qu’elle n’a jamais pr étendu que les actes
d’accusation revêtaient la valeur du jugement définitif.
14. Mais, qu’à cela ne tienne : les allégations de la Serbie-et-Monténégro sont à présent aussi
malvenues qu’inutiles. Personne ici n’ignore que les actes d’accusation que la Bosnie-Herzégovine
mentionnait dans sa réplique ont depuis lors été étay és et corroborés par des jugements définitifs et
que les faits qu’ils incriminaient sont donc solidement établis. Ainsi, pour s’en tenir à la seule
jurisprudence du TPIY, la réplique se référait à dix actes d’accusation, deux décisions d’examen
d’actes d’accusation dans le cadre de l’article61 et un seul jugement, celui rendu dans l’affaire
Tadić. Or, il y a aujourd’hui, nous le savons tous , de nombreux jugements qui ont été rendus, dont
vous pourrez trouver les références dans les notes de ma plaidoirie.
15. Cela étant précisé, je commencerai ce terrible récit en prenant justement comme exemple
les faits établis par le TPIY dans l’affaire Kunarac, Kovac et Vukovic 13, que l’on a appelé « the
rape-camp case », l’affaire du camp des viols: je précise que même si cette affaire n’est pas
stricto sensu centrée sur un camp de détention, elle a cependant été nommée ainsi car toute la ville
de Foca et ses alentours sont devenus, dans des maisons, dans des écoles, dans des gymnases, un
gigantesque espace de viols et de violences sexuelles.
16. Si je prends cet exemple, c’est qu’il s’ agit d’un exemple particulièrement significatif,
même s’il est loin d’être isolé, de la façon dont a été effectué le nettoyage ethnique et surtout de la
136
Duplique de la Serbie-et-Monténégro, 22 février 1999, par. 3.3.5.6.
137Duplique de la Serbie-et-Monténégro, 22 février 1999, par. 3.3.5.36.
138Le procureur c. Dagoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac et Zoran Vukovic , affaires n osIT-96-23 et IT-96-23/1,
Chambre de première instance II, jugement, 22 février 2001. - 51 -
façon dont les viols ont été utilisés dans le cadre de ce nettoyage ethnique. D’après le TPIY,
nombre de femmes
«ont été violées à de nombreuses reprises. Des soldats ou des policiers serbes
venaient dans ces centres de détention, sélectionnaient une ou plusieurs femmes, et les
emmenaient pour les violer. De nombreuses femmes et jeunes filles, y compris 16 des
témoins à charge, ont été violées de cette façon.» 139
17. Les exemples précis de viols et de violences sexuelles ne manquent pas dans ce
jugement. Je n’en ferai pas le triste invent aire et ne retiendrai que quelques occurrences
particulièrement représentatives et révoltantes :
«FWS-62 a décrit comment, une nuit, la femme qui dormait près d’elle avait été
violée devant tous les autres détenus, alors que son fils de dix ans était à ses côtés 140.
FWS-95 a estimé que pendant sa détention tant au lycée de Foca qu’au Partizan,
c’est-à-dire à peu près quarante jours, elle avait été violée environ cent cinquante
141
fois .
FWS-95 a déclaré que, la nuit précédant la libération des femmes du Partizan,
elle avait été emmenée dans un stade142ec FWS-90 et violée, par de nombreux soldats,
généralement par deux à la fois .
FWS-75…et A.B., alors âgée de douze ans, ont été conduites…à un
appartement…. FWS-75 et A.B. y sont rest ées une vingtaine de jours durant lesquels
elles ont été constamment violées par les deux occupants… A la mi-novembre, les
deux femmes ont été emmenées dans une maison… Elles y sont restées une vingtaine
de jours pendant lesquels elles ont été vi olées à maintes reprises par un groupe de
soldats qui les ont emmenées dans un autre appartement et ont continué de les violer
pendant environ deux semaines…A.B. a été vendue pour 200 deutsche mark et
personne ne l’a jamais revue.» 143
18. Cette affaire n’est qu’un exemple d’une stratégie maintes fois renouvelée. Si l’on voulait
caractériser d’une seule phrase ⎯ mais combien lourde de sens ⎯ les violences sexuelles qui ont
eu lieu en Bosnie-Herzégovine, je vous dirai si mplement que les violences sexuelles se sont
produites à très grande échelle, dans toutes les sphères et composantes de la société musulmane de
Bosnie, de façon répétée, partout en Bosnie, et surtout avec une violence et une perversité inouïes.
139
Le procureur c. Dagoljub Kunarac et consorts, ibid., par. 574.
140 os
TPIY, Le procureur c. Dagoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac et Zoran Vukovic , affaires n IT-96-23
et IT-96-23/1, Chambre de première instance II, jugement, 22 février 2001, par. 31.
141
Ibid., par. 37.
142Ibid., par. 39.
143Ibid., par. 42. - 52 -
Les violences sexuelles se sont produites à très grande échelle
19. Mais les chiffres, vous le savez, dans leur sécheresse et leur abstraction, ne reflètent pas
toute la douleur qu’ils recouvrent, même s’ils sont un point de repère permettant de la mesurer.
Les données chiffrées sur les violences sexuelles
20. Je ne vais pas m’engager dans une bataille de chiffres. Je mentionnerai simplement le
rapporteur spécial de la Commission des droits de l’homme, qui, sous la direction de
M.TadeuszMazowiecki, a déclaré qu’il y avait eu «probablement douze mille cas de viols
144
environ» . Mais pour les besoins de cette affaire, une telle conclusion est inutile.
La sous-estimation des violences sexuelles
21. Les chiffres ne rendent pas la réalité et, en outre, les chiffres avancés, aussi
impressionnants soient-ils, sont très vraisemblablemen t en deçà de la réalité. Il est en effet de
notoriété publique, et d’ailleurs Tadeusz Mazowiec ki l’avait rappelé dans son rapport, que «les
145
viols sont parmi les crimes les plus sous-estimés» . Les femmes violées se retranchent le plus
souvent derrière un mur de silence, et plus encore peut-être dans la société musulmane que dans les
autres. L’opprobre, la honte, voire la crainte des représailles, qui accompagnent le viol, leur font
souvent préférer l’angoisse du silence à la libération que peut donner la dénonciation de ce qui leur
est arrivé. Amnesty International a bien mis ce phénomène en évidence, dans un rapport sur les
violences sexuelles en Bosnie-Herzégovine, où il est écrit: «[c]ertaines femmes, semble-t-il,
pensent qu’elles doivent effacer cette épreuve de leur mémoire; d’autres se sentent dégradées et
honteuses ou craignent d’être l’objet d’un ostracisme social si elles font savoir ce qui leur est
arrivé» 146. La femme violée non mariée craint de ne pl us pouvoir trouver de mari, la femme violée
mariée craint de soutenir le regard de son mari et de ses enfants, les deux craignent d’être rejetées
par leur communauté. Cela suffit, me semble-t- il, à expliquer que la Bosnie ne cherche pas à
144NationsUnies, situation des droits de l’homme dans le territoire de l’ex-Yougoslavie , rapport soumis par
M.Tadeusz Mazowiecki, rapporteur spécial de la Commission des droits de l’homme, doc.E/CN.4/1993/50,
10 février 1993, annexe II, p. 70-71, par. 30.
145Réplique de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, 23 avril 1998, chap. 7, par. 25.
146Rapport d’Amnesty International, Bo snie-Herzégovine: viols et sévices sexuels pratiqués par les forces
armées, index AI : EUR 63/01/93, janvier 1993, p. 1-2, (Réplique, annexe 77). - 53 -
impressionner la Cour avec de grands nombres, ceux-ci, quels qu’ils soient, risquant en tout état de
cause d’être bien en deçà de la réalité.
La controverse sur la preuve des violences sexuelles
22. Une réalité ⎯ cette réalité des viols et des violences sexuelles ⎯ que le défendeur s’était
évertué à nier dans son contre-mémoire, en soulev ant une controverse sur la preuve des violences
sexuelles, plus précisément, le défendeur a soutenu que la Bosnie-Herzégovine n’ayant pas apporté
la preuve des séquelles des violences sexuelles, celles-ci n’étaient pas prouvées. La
Serbie-et-Monténégro demandait en particulier que soient rapportées les preuves des conséquences
immédiates et à plus long terme des viols et d es violences sexuelles. Parmi les conséquences
immédiates, la Serbie-et-Monténégro demandait à la Bosnie d’apporter la preuve de «blessures au
vagin et du rectum à la suite de l’insertion de force d’objets et de maladies sexuellement
147
transmissibles» ; parmi les séquelles tardives, la Serbie -et-Monténégro demandait encore à la
Bosnie-Herzégovine d’apporter les preuves suivantes :
«chez les hommes, il doit y avoir des cicatrices sur le pénis …, une atrophie des
testicules, des modifications sur les tubes sémi nifères et la prostate, en particulier une
stérilité; chez les femmes : des cicatrices sur les organes génitaux externes, le vagin ou
l’utérus, …; chez les deux sexes : des fissures de l’anus …, des lésions des muqueuses
et des tissus vasculaires, etc.» 148.
La Bosnie-Herzégovine voudrait faire partager à la Cour son indignation devant une telle défense.
Comment oser nier la réalité des viols et violences sexuelles, face aux innombrables témoignages
des victimes : pourquoi auraient-elles parlé de viol, si ce n’était pas vrai, alors que l’on sait la honte
qui s’attache à un tel événement subi par une victime ? Comment oser ensuite demander des traces
physiques alors que bien évidemment elles ne s ont pas nécessaires pour prouver le viol, un viol
peut s’inscrire dans la chair et l’esprit de la victime sans qu’aucune trace apparente ne subsiste. Un
viol est un viol, quelles que soient les traces physiques qui subs istent. La Bosnie-Herzégovine ne
s’engagera donc pas dans cette voie dont l’inanité semble finalement avoir été reconnue par la
Serbie-et-Monténégro elle-même, dans la mesure où elle a passé sous silence cette prétention, aussi
fallacieuse dans les faits qu’erronée en droit, dans sa duplique, même si elle ne s’est pas
147
Voir contre-mémoire de la Serbie-et-Monténégro, par. 1.3.4.3.
148Ibid.. - 54 -
explicitement rétractée. Pour clore ce débat artificie l, lancé par le défendeur, je citerai simplement
l’affaire Bradnin, où le TPIY a déclaré sans l’ombre d’une ambiguïté que :
««l’atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique et mentale» sanctionnée par l’alinéa b)
s’entend, en particulier, d’actes de torture, de traitements inhumains ou dégradants, de
violences sexuelles, y compris les viols…. Il n’est pas nécessaire que des dommages
149
soient permanents ou irrémédiables.»
Ce faux débat étant écarté, je vais maintenant montrer que les violences sexuelles se sont
produites à l’égard de toutes les composantes de la société musulmane de Bosnie.
Les violences sexuelles se sont produites à l’égard de toutes les composantes
de la société musulmane de Bosnie
Les viols et violences sexuelles ont principalement été commis contre des femmes musulmanes
de Bosnie
23. Ils ont été commis de façon tout à fait généralisée, à l’égard de femmes de tous âges : à
l’égard de jeunes adolescentes de treize ans, de quatorze ans, de dix-sept ans, qui découvraient ainsi
brutalement la vie sexuelle, à l’égard de jeunes épouses et de jeunes mères dont la vie de femme
était inexorablement brisée, mais aussi à l’égard de vieilles femmes de plus de quatre-vingtsans,
«qui ont du affronter la mort accablées par ce dernier outrage indécent» 150et même ⎯ j’ose à peine
prononcer ces mots ⎯ de fillettes de quatre à sept ans.
Je démontrerai tout à l’heure que les violences sexuelles à l’égard des femmes ont suivi un
schéma qui leur donne leur dimension génocidaire . Les femmes ont été victimes de violences
sexuelles aussi bien à l’extérieur des camps, et notamment au moment de la prise de villes et
villages par les forces serbes, que lors de leur in ternement dans les camps, où les viols ont encore
été plus fréquents 151. S’il est indéniable que les femmes ont été les victimes principales des
violences sexuelles, y compris des femmes très je unes, des jeunes filles, des petites filles même,
comme je viens de le dire, les hommes n’ont pas été épargnés.
149TPIY, Le procureur c. Radoslvan Bradnin, affaire n IT-99-36-T, Chambre de première instance II, jugement
1 septembre 2004, par.690. Voir aussi TPIY, Le procureur c. Milomir Stakic , affaire n IT-97-24-T, Chambre de
première instance II, jugement, 31 juillet 2003, par. 516.
150Réplique de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, 23 avril 1998, chap. 7, par. 45.
151Réplique de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, 23 avril 1998, chap. 7, par. 60-80. - 55 -
Des violences sexuelles ont en effet également été commises contre des hommes musulmans de
Bosnie
24. Les violences sexuelles contre les hommes ont été perpétrées essentiellement dans les
camps de détention. De nombreux témoignages relatent des violences sexuelles en tous genres
exercées à l’encontre d’hommes 152, parfois un père et son fils, parfois deux frères. Comme cela
avait été souligné dans la réplique, contre les hommes, «les agressions sexuelles revêtaient
principalement deux formes : l’une était les act es sexuels forcés avec d’autres hommes, l’autre les
atteintes à leur virilité» 153. Bien sûr, un schéma d’ensemble, comme celui qui existe sans
contestation possible pour ce qui est des violences sexuelles à l’égard des femmes, un tel schéma
d’ensemble est moins aisément discernable en ce qui concerne les violences sexuelles commises à
l’égard des hommes, ne serait-ce que parce qu’elles sont, comme je viens de l’indiquer moins
nombreuses. Mais cela disqualifie -t-il pour autant leur prise en considération dans une affaire où
est dénoncé un génocide ? Je ne le pense pas. Je ne le pense pas car en effet, des actes de violence
sexuelle entre des hommes non-Serbes, et en partic ulier Musulmans de Bosnie, qui pourraient ne
pas être qualifiés d’actes de génocide, s’ils étaient considérés isolément, deviennent de tels actes
s’ils sont analysés dans le schéma global du génocide, dans lequel ils s’inscrivent aisément, surtout
dans un contexte culturel musulman.
Les violences sexuelles se sont également produites de façon répétée
25. Il est évident que les viols et les viol ences sexuelles ne se sont pas limités à des actes
sporadiques entre les auteurs et leurs victimes. De nombreux viols ont en effet été perpétrés par
plusieurs agresseurs en même temps sur une même victime. Ainsi que le TPIY l’a par exemple
corroboré dans l’affaire dont j’ai déjà parlé dite du «camp des viols», des viols collectifs ont été
commis, je cite le Tribunal :
«[l]es appelants ont été pour l’essentiel condamnés pour avoir violé des femmes
détenues dans des locaux qui servaient de qua rtiers généraux militaires, des centres de
détention et dans des appartements où logeaient les soldats… De manière générale,
ces femmes ont été violées par plus d’un agresseur et avec une régularité quasi
inimaginable.» 154
152TPIY, Le procureur c. Milomir Stakic , affaire n IT-97-24-T, jugement, Chambre de première instance II,
31 juillet 2003, par. 241.
153Réplique de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, 23 avril 1998, chap. 7, par. 54.
154Le procureur c. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac et Zoran Vukovic, affaires nIT-96-23 et IT-96-23/1-A,
Chambre d’appel, arrêt, 12 juin 2002, par. 132; les italiques sont de nous. - 56 -
26. Si la commission des viols et violences sexuelles a connu son paroxysme en1992, la
politique des viols en tant que moyen de terreur, ne s’en est pas moins poursuivie bien après,
comme en attestent les rapports périodiques du ra pporteur spécial désigné par la Commission des
droits de l’homme des NationsUnies, rapports re ndus en 1993, 1994, 1995 et encore1996, qui
font, sans relâche, état de la persistance de la commission de tels actes 155. En 1996, l’Assemblée
générale des NationsUnies se déclarait ainsi toujours «indignée que la pratique systématique du
viol soit employée comme arme de guerre et co mme instrument de la politique de nettoyage
156
ethnique contre les femmes et les enfants dans la République de Bosnie-Herzégovine» . Madame
le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est l’Assemblée générale qui le souligne : en Bosnie, la pratique
systématique du viol a été utilisée comme inst rument de la politique de nettoyage ethnique,
c’est-à-dire comme instrument du génocide.
Les violences sexuelles se sont produites partout en Bosnie
27. Ce nettoyage ethnique dont les violences sexuelles étaient un élément central se sont
produites partout en Bosnie, sur tout le territo ire. Les violences sexuelles ont tout d’abord
accompagné la prise d’assaut des villes et des villages.
Les violences sexuelles ont accompagné la prise d’assaut des villes et des villages
28. Ils ont alors pris la forme d’une véritable stratégie visant à intimider et terroriser les
populations pour les contraindre à fuir et à quitter leurs territoires. Les occurrences précitées tirées
de l’affaire Kunarac mettent en Œuvre les violences commises dans la municipalité de Foca. Je
pourrais redire cela pour bien d’autres villes mais cela vous a déjà été exposé longuement depuis le
début de la semaine et je n’y reviendrai pas. Je rappellerai cependant simplement quelques noms
qui évoqueront pour vous ce qui a déjà été dit.
Les violences sexuelles se sont surtout déchaînées dans les camps
29. Les violences sexuelles en effet se sont surtout déchaînées dans les camps de détention
dans lesquels la population non serbe , en particulier musulmane, qui n’avait pas encore fui, a été
155
Voir réplique de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, 23 avril 1998, chap. 7, par. 88-92.
156Nations Unies, doc. A/RES/50/192, «Viols et sévices dont les fe mmes sont victimes dans les zones de conflit
armé dans l’ex-Yougoslavie», 23 février 1996, par. 2. - 57 -
transférée. Ces camps ont été installés dans plusieurs régions comme cela vous a été exposé par
collègue Magda Karagiannakis.
30. Des viols et violences sexuelles ont ainsi été régulièrement commis dans le centre de
157
détention de Luka, dans la municipalité de Brcko .
31. Ils ont également été commis dans la région de Prijedor, avec les tristement célèbres
camps de détention d’Omarska, de Keraterm, de Trnopolje. Ils ont également été commis dans la
région de Bosanski Samac, ils ont également été commis dans la municipalité de Vlasenica où a été
installé le sinistre camp de Susica dont le commandant Dragan Nikolic a reconnnu dans son
plaidoyer de culpabilité avoir lui-même violé d es femmes. Je pourrais encore continuer cette
litanie mais je m’arrêterais là.
32. Au-delà du fait que l’on voudrait pouvoir se persuader que cette liste soit exhaustive, il
ce que je voudrais surtout, Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, montrer à votre Cour, c’est
que toutes les décisions ⎯ toutes les décisions ⎯ qui ont trait aux événements qui se sont produits
dans ces camps ont expressément tenu à souligner que les viols et les violences sexuelles avaient
été commis par leurs auteurs avec une inte ntion discriminatoire à l’égard des femmes parce
qu’elles étaient musulmanes 158.
Les violences sexuelles se sont produites avec une violence et une perversité inouïes
33. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, je ne peux cacher à cette Cour, avant de
clôturer la présentation des faits, que les violences sexuelles se sont produites avec une violence et
une perversité inouïes. Si l’exposé brut des fa its s’avère parfois seul à même de permettre de
mesurer toute la cruauté et la perversité avec laquelle les viols et violences sexuelles ont été
perpétrés en Bosnie et qu’il permet par là même de saisir l’intensité des souffrances physiques et
des humiliations, la Bosnie-Herzégovine, n’entend pas, dans le temps qui lui est imparti, procéder à
un inventaire exhaustif, qui ne pourrait être que sordide.
157 Le procureur c. Slobodan Milosević, affaire n IT-02-54-T, Chambre de première instance I, décision relative
o
à la requête aux fins d’acquitt ement, 16 juin 2004, par.159; Le procureur c. Rando Cesic, affaire n IT-95-10/1-5,
Chambre de première instance I, jugement portant condamnation, 11 mars 2004, par. 13.
158 Le procureur c. Radoslvan Bradnin, affaire n oIT-99-36-T, Chambre de prem ière instance II, jugement,
er o
1 septembre 2004, par.518; Le procureur c. Milomir Stakic, affaire n IT-97-24-T, Chambre de première instance II,
jugement, 31 juillet 2003, par.806; Le procureur c. Momcilo Krajisnik, Chambre de première instance I, Decision on
third and fourth prosecution motions for judicial notice of adjudicated facts , 24 mars 2005, par.607-608 (dans ses
conclusions générales à propos de l’affaire Kunarac). - 58 -
34. C’est ainsi à dessein que je ne m’étendrai s pas longuement sur les détails des mutilations
sexuelles que certaines victimes ont subies, sur le fait, qu’en certaines occasions, des frères ou des
parents ont été contraints de se livrer à des relations sexuelles entre eux, en public 159; sur les viols
de femmes commis devant leurs enfants en bas âge 160; sur les viols collectifs 161; sur le fait que les
objets les plus divers ont été utilisés à des fins de pénétration sexuelle, pour ne citer que l’usage
«d’une matraque de police [qui] a ét é enfoncée dans l’anus d’un détenu» 162, ce qui a justement été
considéré par le TPIY comme un «acte de torture» 163. Il va en effet sans dire que les vocables de
viol et de violences sexuelles, que j’utilise dans ma plaidoirie, s’avèrent parfois notoirement
insuffisants pour décrire la brutalité et la perv ersité d’actes qui correspondent à de véritables actes
de «torture» sexuelle.
35. L’exemple qui suit, issu de l’affaire Stakic, relative à des viols et violences sexuelles
commis dans le camp d’Omarska, permettra de donner à la Cour un aperçu des conditions,
particulièrement dégradantes et humiliantes pour les victimes, dans lesquelles certains viols et
violences sexuelles ont été commis. Je cite un passage de cette affaire :
«le témoin G [je précise que le témoin G est une femme] a été conduit dans un bureau
du poste de police où se trouvaient cinq homm es portant des uniformes différents.
«Lugar» lui a ordonné de se déshabiller. Elle l’a fait très lentement en posant ses
vêtements sur la table. Ce jour là, elle avait ses règles. Un des hommes l’a donc
insultée; il lui a ordonné de se coucher sur la table et d’écarter les jambes. «Lugar»,
qui se tenait à côté de la table, lui a ordonné de s’allonger de manière à ce qu’elle ait
un couteau sous la gorge. Deux hommes l’ ont alors battue à maintes reprises, l’un
armé d’une ceinture, l’autre d’une batte, tout en l’insultant. Après le premier coup, le
couteau a glissé. Elle a pleuré; les hommes ont poussé à fond le volume de la
164
musique. L’un d’eux a annoncé qu’il fallait la rafraîchir et il a uriné sur elle.»
36. S’il fallait convaincre davantage encore la Cour, il ne serait besoin que de reprendre ici le
cas tristement célèbre des sévices sexuels infligés à Fikret Harambasic, qui ont entraîné sa mort, et
159 o
TPIY, Le procureur c . Rando Cesic, affaire n IT-95-10/1-5, Chambre de prem ière instance I, jugement
portant condamnation, 11 mars 2004, par. 13.
160 os
TPIY, Le procureur c . Dagoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac et Zoran Vukovic , affaires n IT-96-23 et
IT-96-23/1, Chambre de première instance II, jugement, 22 février 2001, par. 30.
161 o
TPIY, Le procureur c. Slobodan Milosevic, affaire n IT-02-54-T, Chambre de première instance I, Décision
relative à la requête aux fins d’obtenir un jugement d’acquittement, 16 juin 2004, par. 200.
162 o
TPIY, Le procureur c. Blagaje Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Simo Zaric, affaire n IT-95-9-T, Chambre de première
instance II, jugement, 17 octobre 2003, par. 728.
163
Ibid., par. 772.
164 o
TPIY, Le procureur c. Milomir Stakic , affaire n IT-97-24-T, Chambre de prem ière instance II, jugement,
31 juillet 2003, par. 236. - 59 -
qui ont été relaté dans l’affaire Tadić. Le récit du TPIY souligne la barbarie des faits lorsqu’il
montre que «G» et «H» ont été contraints de commettre des violences sexuelles sur
Fikret Harambasic 165. Ce récit souligne la barbarie des fait s, surtout si l’on ne perd pas de vue
que derrière l’abstraction des dénominations, «H» et «G», se trouve des êtres de chair et de sang.
Je lis le récit que l’on trouve dans la décision Tadić :
«[l]e témoin «H» a reçu l’ordre de lécher ses fesses nues et «G» a été obligé de sucer
son pénis et de mordre ses testicules. Pendant ce temps, plusieurs hommes en
uniforme qui se tenaient autour de la fosse ont assisté à ce qui se passait et criaient de
mordre plus fort. Les trois hommes ont ensuite reçu l’ordre de s’extraire de la fosse et
le témoin H a été menacé, le couteau sur la gorge, que ses deux yeux seraient énucléés
s’il ne fermait pas de force la bouche de Fi kret Harambasic pour l’empêcher de crier;
G a ensuite dû s’allonger entre les jambes nues de Fikret Harambasic et, tandis que ce
dernier se débattait, il a dû frapper et mord re ses organes génitaux. G a ensuite
arraché d’un coup de dents l’un des testicul es de Fikret Harambasi c et l’a recraché,
après quoi on lui a dit qu’il était libre de partir. Le témoin H a reçu l’ordre de traîner
FikretHarambasic jusqu’à une table proche, où il s’est tenu à ses côtés avant de
recevoir l’instruction de retourner dans la pièce d’où il venait, ce qu’il a fait. On n’a
ni revu, ni entendu parler de Fikret Harambasic depuis.» 166
37. Nous arrêtons là cet inventaire sordide, l’énoncé même de l’aperçu qui vient d’en être
présenté s’avérant amplement suffisant pour perm ettre à la Cour d’entrevoir les souffrances
physiques, les souffrances psychiques, les humiliations que ces actes odieux ont pu engendrer chez
les victimes.
38. Au regard de toutes les considérations qui précèdent, la Bosnie-Herzégovine tient à
insister sur le fait que les caractéristiques générales des viols et violences sexuelles commis sur tout
son territoire que je viens de présenter à la Cour, démontrent, Madame le président, Messieurs les
juges, à suffisance, que les viols et les violences sexuelles commises à l’égard de la population
nonserbe, et en particulier musulmane, de Bosnie-Herzégovine, ne sauraient décidément et
décemment pas être considérés ⎯si l’on ose cette expression ⎯ de «dommages collatéraux» qui
seraient inhérents à toute guerre, à tout conflit armé. Les faits de viols et de violences sexuelles
sont désormais avérés. Ils n’ont plus à être prouvés : ils sont de notoriété publique, même s’ils sont
avant tout une blessure intime.
J’en ai ainsi terminé, Madame le président, avec l’exposé des faits.
165 o
TPIY, Le procureur c. Dusko Tadic alias «Dule», affaire n IT-94-1-T, Chambre de première instance,
jugement, 7 mai 1997, par. 198.
166Ibid., par. 206. - 60 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you Professor Stern. The Court will now rise and resume at
3 o’clock this afternoon.
The Court rose at 1.05 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Thursday 2 March 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding