Public sitting held on Monday 23 February 2004, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Document Number
131-20040223-ORA-02-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2004/2
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

CR 2004/2

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THHEAGUE LHAAYE

YEAR 2004

Public sitting

held on Monday 23 February 2004, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Shi presiding,

on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD
________________

ANNÉE 2004

Audience publique

tenue le lundi 23 février 2004, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Shi, président,

sur les Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur
dans le Territoire palestinien occupé
(Demande d’avis consultatif soumise par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU

____________________ - 2 -

Present: Presidenit
Vice-Presidejetva

Guillauueges
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins

Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh

Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Simma

Tomka

Couvgisurar

 - 3 -

Présents : M. Shi,président
Ricejpra,ident

GuiMllu. e
Koroma
Vereshchetin
HigMgmse

Parra-A.anguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh

Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Simma

juges ka,

Cgoefferr,

 - 4 -

Palestine is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Nasser Al-Kidwa, Ambassador, Perman ent Observer of Palestine to the United
Nations;

Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, Professor of Internationa l Law, Graduate Institute of International

Studies, Geneva, Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. James Crawford, Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge;

Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Chichele Professor of International Law, University of Oxford, Counsel
and Advocate;

Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor Emeritus of Interna tional Law, Université libre de Bruxelles,
Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. Peter Bekker, Member of the Bar of New York, Senior Counsel;

Mr. Anis Kassim, Member of the Bar of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Senior Counsel;

Mr. Raja Aziz Shehadeh, Barrister at law, Ramallah, Palestine, Senior Counsel;

Ms Stephanie Koury, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel;

Mr. Jarat Chopra, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Professor of International Law,
Brown University, Counsel;

Mr. Rami Shehadeh, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel;

H.E. Mr.Yousef Habbab, Ambassador, General Delegate of Palestine to the Netherlands,
Adviser;

Mr. Muin Shreim, Counsellor, Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United
Nations, Adviser;

Ms Feda Abdelhady Nasser, Counsellor, Perm anent Observer Mission of Palestine to the

United Nations, Adviser;

Mr. Michael Tarazi, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Adviser/Media Co-ordinator;

MsKylie Evans, Lauterpacht Research Cent re for International Law, University of
Cambridge;

Mr. François Dubuisson, Centre de droit international de l’Université libre de Bruxelles;

Mr. Markus W. Gehring, Yale University;

Mr. Jafer Shadid, delegation of Palestine in the Netherlands. - 5 -

The Republic of South Africa is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the Delegation;

H.E. MsP. Jana, Ambassador of the Repub lic of South Africa to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and diplomatic representative to the International Court of Justice;

H.E. Mr. D. S. Kumalo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the
United Nations;

Mr. M. R. W. Madlanga, S.C.;

MsJ.G.S. de Wet, Acting Chief State La w Adviser (International Law), Department of
Foreign Affairs;

Mr. A. Stemmet, Senior State Law Adviser (International Law) Department of Foreign
Affairs;

Ms T. Lujiza, State Law Adviser (International Law) Department of Foreign Affairs;

Mr. I. Mogotsi, Director, Middle East Department of Foreign Affairs.

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Noureddine Djoudi, Ambassador of Algeria to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;

Mr. Ahmed Laraba, Professor of International Law;

Mr. Mohamed Habchi, Member of the Constitutional Council;

Mr. Abdelkader Cherbal, Member of the Constitutional Council;

Mr. Merzak Bedjaoui, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Fawzi A. Shubokshi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations in New York, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Hazim Karakotly, Minister plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh;

Mr. Sameer Aggad, First Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh;

Mr. Saud Alshawaf, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Ziyad Alsudairi, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Muhammed Omar Al-Madani, Professor Emeritus of International Law, Legal
Counsellor;

Mr. Khaled Althubaiti, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. David Colson, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Brian Vohrer, Assistant Legal Counsellor. - 6 -

The People's Republic of Bangladesh is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, Ambassador of Bangladesh to the Netherlands;

Ms Naureen Ahsan, First Secretary at the Embassy of Bangladesh in The Hague.

Belize is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Bassam Freiha, Permanent Representative of Belize to Unesco;

Ms Mireille Cailbault.

The Republic of Cuba is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Mr. Elio Rodríguez Perdomo, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the

Kingdom of the Netherlands;

Mr. Enrique Prieto López, Minister Counsellor at the Embassy of Cuba in the Netherlands;

Mrs. Soraya E. Alvarez Núñez, Official of the Multilateral Affairs Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

The Republic of Indonesia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Mohammad Jusuf, Ambassador the Republic of Indonesia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Head of Delegation;

Ms Nuni Turnijati Djoko, Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission, member;

Mr. Mulya Wirana, Counsellor (Political Affairs), member;

Col. A Subandi, Defence Attaché, member;

Mrs. Kusuma N. Lubis, Counsellor (Information Affairs), member;

Mr. Sulaiman Syarif, First Secretary (Political Affairs), member;

Mr. Daniel T. S. Simanjuntak, Third Secretary (Political Affairs), member.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is represented by:

H.R.H. Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussi en, Head of the Delegation and Permanent
Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations, New York;

H.E. Mr. Mazen Armouti, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Kingdom

of the Netherlands;

Sir Arthur Watts, Senior Legal Adviser to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan;

Mr. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Legal Adviser to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan; - 7 -

Mr. Nigel Ashton, Historical Adviser to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan;

Mr. Mahmoud Al-Hmoud, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Bisher Al Khasawneh, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Samer Naber, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Ashraf Zeitoon, Political Adviser;

Ms Diana Madbak, Support Staff.

The Republic of Madagascar is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Alfred Rambeloson, Permanent Representative of Madagascar to the Office of the
United Nations at Geneva and to the Specialized Agencies, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Odon Prosper Rambatoson, Inspector, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Malaysia is represented by:

H.E. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Head of Delegation;

Datin Seri Sharifah Aziah Syed Zainal Abidin, wife of the Minister for Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, Secretar y-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Malaysia;

H.E. Dato’ Rastam Mohd Isa, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations;

H.E. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassa dor of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands;

Mr. John Louis O’hara, Head, International Affairs Division, Attorney-General’s Chambers;

Professor Nico Schrijver, Professor of Interna tional Law, Free University, Amsterdam and
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration;

Professor Dr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of In ternational Law, The Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva;

Mr. Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, Undersecretary, OIC Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Mr. Hasnudin Hamzah, Special Officer to the Foreign Minister;

Mr. Zulkifli Adnan, Counsellor, Embassy of Malaysia in the Netherlands;

Mr. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim, Firs t Secretary, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United

Nations;

Mr. Mohd. Normusni Mustapa Albakri, Federa l Counsel, International Affairs Division,
Attorney-General’s Chambers. - 8 -

The Republic of Senegal is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Saliou Cissé, Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Cheikh Niang, Minister-Counsellor, Pe rmanent Mission of Senegal to the United

Nations;

Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, Director of Legal and Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

The Republic of the Sudan is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abuelgasim A. Idris, Ambassador of the Sudan to the Netherlands;

Mr. Ali Al Sadig, Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of the Sudan in the Netherlands.

The League of Arab States is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Amre Moussa, Secretary General of the League of Arab States;

Mr. Michael Bothe, Professor of Law, Head of the Legal Team;

Ms Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Professor of Law;

Mr. Yehia El Gamal, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Salah Amer, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Mohammed Gomaa, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Mohamed Redouane Benkhadra, Legal Adviser of the Secretary General, Head of the
Legal Department, League of Arab States.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secretary Ge neral of the Organization of the Islamic

Conference;

Ms Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Professor of Public Law, University of
Paris VII-Denis Diderot, as Counsel;

Mr. Willy Jackson, chargé de cours , University of ParisVII-DenisDiderot, as Assistant to
Counsel;

H.E. Mr. Babacar Ba, Ambassador, Permanent Ob server of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva. - 9 -

La Palestine est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Nasser Al-Kidwa, ambassadeur, obser vateur permanent de la Palestine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Georges Abi-Saab, professeur de droit in ternational à l’Institut de hautes études

internationales, Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseil et avocat;

M.James Crawford, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Université de Cambridge (chaire
Whewell), conseil et avocat;

M.Vaughan Lowe, professeur de droit internat ional à l’Université d’Oxford (chaire
Chichele), conseil et avocat ;

M.Jean Salmon, professeur émérite de droit inte rnational à l’Université libre de Bruxelles,
membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseil et avocat;

M. Peter Bekker, membre du barreau de New York, conseil principal;

M. Anis Kassim, membre du barreau du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie, conseil principal;

M. Raja Aziz Shehadeh, Barrister at Law à Ramallah, Palestine, conseil principal;

Mme Stephanie Koury, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, conseil;

M.Jarat Chopra, membre du groupe d’a ppui aux négociations, professeur de droit
international à la Brown University, conseil;

M. Rami Shehadeh, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, conseil;

S.Exc. M. Yousef Habbab, ambassadeur, dé légué général de la Palestine aux Pays-Bas,
conseiller;

M. Muin Shreim, conseiller à la mission perm anente d’observation de la Palestine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies, conseiller;

Mme Feda Abdelhady Nasser, conseillère à la mission permanente d’observation de la
Palestine auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Michael Tarazi, membre du groupe d’a ppui aux négociations, coordonnateur pour les

médias;

Mme Kylie Evans, Lauterpacht Research Cent re for International Law, Université de
Cambridge;

M. François Dubuisson, Centre de droit international de l’Université libre de Bruxelles;

M. Markus W. Gehring, Université de Yale;

M. Jafer Shadid, délégation de la Palestine aux Pays-Bas. - 10 -

La République sud-africaine est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Aziz Pahad, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères, chef de la délégation;

S. Exc. Mme P. Jana, ambassadeur de la République sud-africaine auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

S. Exc. M.D. S. Kumalo, représentant perman ent de la République sud-africaine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M. M.R.W. Madlanga, juge;

Mme J. G.S. de Wet, conseiller juridique en chef a.i. (droit international), ministère des
affaires étrangères;

M.A. Stemmet, conseiller juridique principa l (droit international), ministère des affaires
étrangères;

Mme T. Lujiza, conseiller juridique (droit international), ministère des affaires étrangères;

M. I. Mogotsi, directeur, direction du Moyen-Orient, ministère des affaires étrangères.

La République algérienne démocratique et populaire est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Noureddine Djoudi, ambassadeur d’Algérie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas;

M. Ahmed Laraba, professeur de droit international;

M. Mohamed Habchi, membre du conseil constitutionnel;

M. Abdelkader Cherbal, membre du conseil constitutionnel;

M. Merzak Bedjaoui, directeur des affaires juridiques au ministère des affaires étrangères.

Le Royaume d’Arabie saoudite est représenté par :

S.Exc. M. Fawzi A. Shubokshi, ambassad eur et représentant permanent du Royaume
d’Arabie saoudite auprès de l’Organisation d es NationsUnies à NewYork, chef de la
délégation;

M. Hazim Karakotly, ministre plénipotentiaire au ministère des affaires étrangères à Riyad;

M. Sameer Aggad, premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères à Riyad;

M. Saud Alshawaf, conseiller juridique;

M. Ziyad Alsudairi, conseiller juridique;

M. Muhammed Omar Al-Madani, professeur émér ite de droit international, conseiller
juridique;

M. Khaled Althubaiti, conseiller juridique; - 11 -

M. David Colson, conseiller juridique;

M. Brian Vohrer, conseiller juridique adjoint.

La République populaire du Bangladesh est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, ambassadeur du Bangladesh auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

Mme Naureen Ahsan, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Bangladesh auprès du Royaume

des Pays-Bas.

Le Belize est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Bassam Freiha, ambassadeur délégué permanent du Belize auprès de l’Unesco;

Mme Mireille Cailbault.

La République de Cuba est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères;

S.Exc. M. Elio Rodríguez Perdomo, ambassad eur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire auprès
du Royaume des Pays-Bas;

M. Enrique Prieto López, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade de Cuba aux Pays-Bas;

Mme Soraya E. Alvarez Núñez, fonctionnaire à la direction des affaires multilatérales du
ministère des affaires étrangères.

La République d’Indonésie est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Mohammad Jusuf, ambassadeu r de la République d’Indonésie auprès du

Royaume des Pays-Bas, chef de la délégation;

Mme Nuni Turnijati Djoko, ministre, chef de mission adjoint, délégué;

M. Mulya Wirana, conseiller (affaires politiques), délégué;

Le colonel A. Subandi, attaché de défense, délégué;

Mme Kusuma N. Lubis, conseiller (affaires de presse), délégué;

M. Sulaiman Syarif, premier secrétaire (affaires politiques), délégué;

M. Daniel T. S. Simanjuntak, troisième secrétaire (affaires politiques), délégué.

Le Royaume hachémite de Jordanie est représenté par :

S. A. R. Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussien, ambassadeur, chef de la délégation, représentant
permanent du Royaume hachémite de Jo rdanie auprès de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies;

S. Exc. M. Mazen Armouti, ambassadeur du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie aux du
Royaume des Pays-Bas; - 12 -

Sir Arthur Watts, conseiller juridique principal du Gouvernement du Royaume hachémite de
Jordanie;

M.Guy Goodwin-Gill, conseiller juridique du Gouvernement du Royaume hachémite de
Jordanie;

M.Nigel Ashton, conseiller historique du Gouvernement du Royaume hachémite de
Jordanie;

M. Mahmoud Al-Hmoud, conseiller juridique;

M. Bisher Al Khasawneh, conseiller juridique;

M. Samer Naber, conseiller juridique;

M. Ashraf Zeitoon, conseiller politique;

Mme Diana Madbak, personnel administratif.

La République de Madagascar est représentée par :

S.Exc. M. Alfred Rambeloson, représentant permanent de Madagascar auprès de l’Office
des Nations Unies et des institutions spécialisées à Genève, chef de délégation;

M. Odon Prosper Rambatoson, inspecteur au ministère des affaires étrangères.

La Malaisie est représentée par :

S. Exc. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie, chef

de la délégation;

Mme Datin Seri Sharifah Aziah Syed Zainal Abidin, épouse du ministre des affaires
étrangères;

S. Exc. Tan sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, se crétaire général du ministère des affaires
étrangères;

S. Exc. Dato’ Rastam Mohd. Isa, représentant permanent de la Malaisie auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

S. Exc.Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeur de la Malaisie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

M. John Louis O’hara, directeur de la divi sion des affaires internationales, bureau de

l’Attorney-General;

M. Nico Schrijver, professeur de droit international à l’Université libre d’Amsterdam et à
l’Institut d’études sociales de La Haye, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage;

M. Marcelo G.Kohen, professeur de droit inte rnational à l’Institut universitaire de hautes
études internationales, Genève;

M. Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, sous-secrétaire à la division de l’Organisation de la Conférence
islamique, ministère des affaires étrangères;

M. Hasnudin Hamzah, conseiller spécial auprès du ministre des affaires étrangères; - 13 -

M. Zulkifli Adnan, conseiller de l’ambassade de la Malaisie aux Pays-Bas;

M. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim, premier secrétaire de la mission permanente de la Malaisie auprès
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Mohd. Normusni Mustapa Albakri, conseil (Federal Counsel) , division des affaires

internationales, bureau de l’Attorney-General.

La République du Sénégal est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Saliou Cissé, ambassadeur du Sénégal aux Pays-Bas, chef de la délégation ;

M.Cheikh Niang, ministre-conseiller à la mission permanente du Sénégal auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, directeur des affaires juridiques et consulaires au ministère des
affaires étrangères.

La République du Soudan est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abuelgasim A. Idris, ambassadeur du Soudan aux Pays-Bas ;

M. Ali Al Sadig, chef de mission adjoint à l’ambassade du Soudan aux Pays-Bas.

La Ligue des Etats arabes est représentée par :

S.Exc. M. Amre Moussa, Secrétaire général de la Ligue des Etats arabes;

M. Michael Bothe, professeur de droit, chef de l’équipe juridique;

Mme Vera Gowlland-Debbas, professeur de droit;

M. Yehia El Gamal, conseiller juridique;

M. Salah Amer, conseiller juridique;

M. Mohammed Gomaa, conseiller juridique;

M. Mohamed Redouane Benkhadra, conseiller juridique du Secrétaire général, chef du
département des affaires juridiques de la Ligue des Etats arabes.

L’Organisation de la Conférence islamique est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secrétaire général de l’Organisation de la Conférence

islamique;

Mme Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, professeur de droit public à l’Université
Paris VII - Denis Diderot, conseil;

M. Willy Jackson, chargé de cours à l’Univer sité Paris VII – Denis Diderot, assistant du
conseil;

S. Exc. M. Babacar Ba, ambassadeur, obser vateur permanent de l’Organisation de la
Conférence islamique auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève. - 14 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The s itting is now open. The Court meets this

afternoon to hear the following participants on th e question submitted to the Court: South Africa,

Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh. Thus, I shall now give the floor to His Excellency

Mr. Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa.

Mr.PAHAD: Mr. President, honourable judges, the Government of the Republic of South

Africa humbly submits to this Court that there ar e compelling reasons for this Court to give an

advisory opinion as requested by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 2003. As

we have submitted in our Written Statement, we wish to reiterate that the jurisdiction of this Court

to hear this matter is beyond question.

We believe that at stake are the lives of all the peoples in the Middle East, particularly the

Palestinians and Israelis, as demonstrated by the suicide bombing in Jerusalem just yesterday, an

incident that we also condemn.

This underlines the urgency for this hearing. The decision to confirm the jurisdiction of this

Court would send a clear message to the Palestinia ns and Israelis that they must redouble their

efforts in achieving peace in the interest of their peoples.

Honourable judges, the legal consequences ar ising from the construction of the separation

Wall is an issue that this Court cannot ignore. Th e separation Wall is not a security wall. It is a

wall to enforce occupation, a wa ll that has separated hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from

their families, homes, lands, and religious sites.

We submit that this Court should deal with th e merits of this case no matter how difficult or

complicated they may be.

South Africa, which was once a subject of this C ourt, is in the midst of celebrating ten years

of our democracy. After centuries of division a nd conflict, South Africans found the political will

to build a new democratic society based on reconcil iation and peaceful coexistence. The fact that

this Court had the courage to pronounce on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued

Presence of South Africa in Namibia contributed to the achievement of democracy in our region.

We fully understood then, as we do now, that there could be no military solution to

fundamental political problems. - 15 -

Therefore, South Africa is committed to a two-State solution  the State of Israel within

secure borders and a viable Palestinian State within equally secure borders. The separation Wall is

anathema to the peace process as e nvisaged in the Road Map as it e liminates the prospect of the

two-State solution. As His Holiness Pope John Pa ul II has so eloquently stated, the Middle East

needs bridges and not walls.

Honourable judges, in rendering the advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly,

this Court could play a fundamental role in c ontributing meaningfully towards sustainable peace

and security in the Middle East, and indeed the whole world.

I now have the honour to introduce Advocat e Madlanga, Senior Counsel, and his legal

team  Ms de Wet, Ms Lujiza, and Mr. Stemmet  to complete our submission.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Your Excellency. I now give the floor to Mr. Madlanga.

Mr. MADLANGA: Thank you, Mr. President. Honourable Members.

I. ITRODUCTION

1. We are honoured to stand here today a ddressing you on this very important issue in the

history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and we trust that our submissions will be of some value in

the determination of the issues.

2. Let me at the outset indicate that our oral submissions differ somewhat from our written

submissions as a result of the focus by some States on the jurisdiction issue.

3. We then saw it necessary to focus sharply on this issue in our written submissions.

Having said that, let me indicate that the format that our submissions will take is the following: we

will deal firstly with and focus on the objections ra ised to the jurisdiction of the Court by others

and secondly, indicate why the Court has jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion. If time permits,

we will touch on the substantive issues or the merits of the matter.

4. In case time does not permit, let me at the outset state and emphasize that South Africa

strongly affirms the submissions that have already been made on the merits of the matter. South

Africa also strongly affirms the illustrations in the substantiation that has been given by the

Palestinian representatives on the issue. - 16 -

5. Indeed, it was quite plain from those subm issions and substantiations what effect the

separation Wall has  the horrendous effect it has on the liv es of the people and therefore on the

violation of international law norms, and all of those negatively affected the Palestinian people.

6. Assertions that the Court does not have jurisdiction in the present matter, or that it should

apply its discretion against considering the merits thereof, are tantamount to a request to the Court

to paralyse itself and undermine the very role ascr ibed to it by the Charter. Acceding to these

unfounded arguments will result in the Court fo regoing this unique opportunity at this crucial

moment in its history to fulfil its primary role and obligation to provide advice on international law

matters, something which falls squarely within its jurisdiction. To d ecline to act in respect of this

burning issue may bring the relevance of the Court into question at a time when the United Nations

system is under severe pressure.

I shall now deal with the first of the two point s I indicated will be dealt with, and that is the

question of jurisdiction.

II. JURISDICTION OF THE C OURT

7. A matter that has been raised by all those that contest the jurisdiction of the Court is the

fact that the Court has a discretion to decide whether or not to give an advisory opinion. This fact

cannot be contested as Article65, paragraph1, clearly states that the Court may give an advisory

opinion on any legal question at the request of wh atever body that may, in accordance with the

Charter of the United Nations, make such a request.

8. In this regard, the position of the Court in the case concerning the Interpretation of Peace

Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion (I.C.J. Reports

1950, p.72) is noted. The discretion therefore undoubtedly exists. The question that begs

answering, though, is how the Court should exercise this discretion in such a manner that it remains

faithful to the requirements of its judicial character.

9. In answering this question, it is instru ctive to recall and to reflect on the Court’s own

views on this matter. The main aspect arising from the Court’s earlier consideration of how it

should exercise its jurisdiction is the f act that the Court should in principle not refuse to give an

advisory opinion. This the Court stated in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case. The Court

expressed itself thus - 17 -

“[t]he Court has constantly been mindfu l of its responsibilities as ‘the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations’ . . . When considering each request, it is mindful

that it should not, in principle, refuse to gi ve an advisory opinion. In accordance with
the consistent jurisprudence of the Court, only ‘compelling reasons’ could lead it to
such a refusal.” ( Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports
1996(I), p. 235, para. 140.)

10. The Court then declared that there has been no refusal in the history of the present Court,

based on the discretionary power of the Court, to act upon a request for an advisory opinion. In

fact, the Court has never refused to give an advi sory opinion whenever all the other requirements

for the exercise of this jurisdiction have been met. In sum, the Court asserted quite strongly that it

will not take lightly a decision to refuse to give an advisory opinion.

11. The question should then be what are the “compelling reasons” that need to exist in order

for the Court to decide not to issue an advisory opinion?

12. One may here indicate that perhaps being able to tease out examples of these

“compelling” reasons may be made somewhat diffi cult by the very fact that there has been no

refusal of an exercise of discretion on this ground. That notwithstanding, what is positive

therefrom is that this fact underscores the very poi nt that the Court has made repeatedly, which is

that it will not lightly or readily refuse to exercise this jurisdiction.

13. One of the main issues raised by the opponent s of the Court’s jurisdiction, is the lack of

the judicial propriety for the Court if it accedes to the request to give an advisory opinion. This

position appears to be based on a number of grounds, inter alia, the following:

 the lack of consent to the jurisdiction of the Court by Israel;

 the question relates to a substantive dispute between the parties;

 the fact that this is a political and not a legal question;

 the alleged ultra vires nature of the request;

 the assumption that any opinion on this matter will serve no purpose, and will be harmful to

achieving a settlement of the conflict;

 the lack of facts before the Court due to the withdrawal by Israel to participate in the hearing.

14. “Propriety” is defined in the Oxford Dic tionary as “correctness concerning standards of

behaviour or morals; the details or rules of conventionally accepted behaviour; appropriateness;

rightness”. Based on the reasons that follow, we immediately conclude that there can be no doubt

that it is correct and appropriate for the Court to give an advisory opinion in this case. If the - 18 -

arguments against the Court’s jurisdiction are we ighed one by one, the only logical conclusion is

the unquestionable jurisdiction of the Court to issu e an advisory opinion in the present case. We

will now deal with some of these arguments individually.

(i) The lack of consent to the jurisdiction of the Court by Israel

15. By virtue of being a Member of the United Nations, a State and, in this particular case

Israel, accepts the possibility of the General A ssembly requesting an advisory opinion from the

Court in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and the Statute of the Court on a

legal question.

16. The Court, in the Namibia case, emphasized the aforementioned principle by stating:

“South Africa, as a Member of the United Nations , is bound by Article 96 of the Charter, which

empowers the Security Council to request advisory opinions on any legal question” ( Legal

Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)

notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276(1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971 ,

p. 23, para. 31).

17. A number of States, in their written opinions or submissions, have used the Eastern

Carelia case as authority that “no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes

with other States either to mediation or arbitra tion, or to any other kind of pacific settlement”

(Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5, p. 27). However, this

case needs to be distinguished from the present, as all Member States of the United Nations by

virtue of acceding to the Charter have accepted the competence of the United Nations organs to

refer matters to the Court for advisory opinions.

18. Furthermore, Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court provides that: “The

Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be

authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.”

19. Article 96, paragraph 1, of the United Na tions Charter stipulates that: “The General

Assembly or the Security Council may request th e International Court of Justice to give an

advisory opinion on any legal question.”

20. These two provisions establish the competen ce of the General Assembly to request an

advisory opinion from the Court and also the competence of the Court to give the requested opinion - 19 -

on any legal question. The choice of “any” in both Articles makes th e Court’s jurisdiction quite

expansive and circumscribed by whether the issue at hand is a legal question.

21. The advisory opinion h as been requested by the General Assembly in line with

Article 96, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter. This provision does not require the General

Assembly to obtain the consent of any party before it requests an advisory opinion from the Court.

22. The Court, in the Western Sahara case (I.C.J. Reports 1975) affirmed that its competence

to give an opinion did not depend on the consen t of the interested States, even when the case

concerned a legal question actually pending between them. An instance where the Court would

refuse to render an opinion is when the circumstan ces disclose that to give a reply would have the

effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted

to judicial settlement without its consent.

23. The lack of consent to the giving of an advisory opinion from any particular State is not

relevant to the jurisdiction of the Court to provide the requested opinion. As the Court said in its

Advisory Opinion on the Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges

and Immunities of the United Nations:

“The jurisdiction of the Court . . . to give advisory opinions on legal questions,
enables United Nations entiti es to seek guidance from the Court in order to conduct

their activities in accordance with law. These opinions are advisory, not binding. As
the opinions are intended for the guidance of the United Nations, the consent of States
is not a condition precedent to the co mpetence of the Court to give them. ” ( I.C.J.

Reports 1989, pp. 188-189, para. 31; emphasis added.)

24. Similar views were expressed in the earlier case of the Interpretation of Peace Treaties

with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania case ( I.C.J. Reports 1950 , p.71). A clear distinction has

always been maintained between contentious cases on the one hand and advisory opinions on the

other. In the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case this Court has gone even

further to say that:

“[I]t is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an advisory
opinion is needed by the Assembly for th e performance of its functions. The General
Assembly has the right to decide for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light

of its own needs.” ( Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996[I], p. 237, para. 16.)

25. Furthermore, this Court has found in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case:

“It follows that no State can prevent the giving of an advisory opinion which the
United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to the - 20 -

course of action it should take. The Court’s Opinion is given not to the States, but to
the organ which is entitled to request it; the re ply of the Court, itself an ‘organ of the

United Nations’, represents its participation in the activities of the Organization, and,
in principle, should not be refused.” (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania, I.C.J. Reports 1950.)

We feel that this argument, raised by those opposin g the jurisdiction of the Court, is an argument

which, in our view, is completely misplaced because it seeks to bring in Article 36, jurisdiction of

this Court, in a situation where it does not altogether apply.

(ii) The question before the Court relates to a substantive dispute pending between the
Parties

26. The Court has acknowledged that underlying a request for an advisory opinion it is

probable that there will be a controversy which has led the United Nations to make the request. In

the case concerning the Legal Consequences for States of th e Continued Presence of South Africa

in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the Court logically remarked

that: “[d]ifferences of view among States on legal issues have existed in practically every advisory

proceeding; if all were agreed, the need to resort to the Court for advice would not arise” ( I.C.J.

Reports 1971, p. 24, at para. 34).

27. As the Court stated in its Advisory Opinion given in 1973 concerning the case on

Application for Review of Judgement No.158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal : “The

existence, in the background, of a dispute the par ties to which may be affected as a consequence of

the Court’s opinion, does not change the advisory nature of the Court’s task, which is to answer the

questions put to it . . .” (I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 171; emphasis added.)

28. In the case concerning the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and

Romania (I.C.J. Reports 1950) the Court was of the view that a State could not prevent it from

giving an advisory opinion “even where the request for an opinion relates to a legal question

actually pending between States” (p. 71).

29. Relying on the aforementioned case, the Court, in the Western Sahara case reaffirmed

this principle (I.C.J. Reports 1975) and rejected the contention of Spain that it should not give an

advisory opinion because it would be an opinion on what in effect was the subject of a dispute

between itself and other States. - 21 -

30. The present legal question before the Court is similar to the one dealt with in the Western

Sahara case in that it is “located in a broader frame of reference than the settlement of a particular

dispute and embrace[s] other elements. These elements... are not confined to the past but are

directed to the present and the future.” (I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 26, para. 35.)

31. In the present case the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion on the legal

consequences arising from the use of this unique measure. It is thus correct and appropriate for the

General Assembly to request an advisory opinion as the use of such a measure is of international

concern and, being unique, its legal consequences under international law need to be established.

(iii) The question is a political and not a legal one

32. It has been submitted that the question before the Court is not a legal question, because it

is not possible to ascertain with reasonable certain ty the meaning of the question, there is an

underlying assumption of illegality and it does not specify for whom the legal consequences will

arise.

33. It has been contended by some that the question before the Court has two possible

meanings: firstly that it requires the Court to fi nd that the construction of the separation Wall is

unlawful and then to proceed to the consequences, a nd/or alternatively, that the Court must assume

illegality before proceeding. In this regard an attempt is made to distinguish the present matter

from the Advisory Opinion given on the legal c onsequences that arose from the continued South

African presence in Namibia, where the illegality of such presence had already been established by

Security Council resolution 276 (1970).

34. It is submitted that this is a highly artif icial interpretation of the question posed to the

Court. In the first place it disregards the resolu tion by the referring organ, the General Assembly,

that the construction of the separation Wall is “i n contradiction to the relevant provisions of

international law”, resolution ES-10/13. Secondly, it assumes that the Court can only work during

the second stage of a two-stage process, requiring fi rst a determination on the illegality of actions

by Member States from another organ, the Security Council. This approach denies the Court, as

the principal legal organ of the United Nations, the opportunity to interpret legal questions put

before it. - 22 -

35. Furthermore, the point has been raised th at, unlike the question put before the Court in

the Namibia case which enquired as to the legal consequences for States, no such specification has

been made in the present case. This, I submit, is not unusual.

36. Both Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter and Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute of

the Court define legal questions to be put to the Court unconditionally and in the widest possible

terms. Prescriptions on the term “any legal question” referred to the Court are nowhere to be found

and will serve only to undermine the competency bestowed on the Court by the Charter and its own

Statute. This approach lacks any legal basis a nd will only serve to make the Court a hostage of

terminology, denying it the opportunity to play its proper role and, as the Court itself has

determined in the Corfu Channel case, its role is “to ensure respect for international law” ( Corfu

Channel, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 35).

37. As to the interpretation of the question, it is submitted that the meaning is clear within

the context: the Court is requested to pro nounce on the legal consequences, in terms of

international law, that will arise from a specific f actual situation, namely the construction of the

separation Wall by Israel. This determination mu st be done in terms of applicable rules and

principles of international law, including the Four th Geneva Convention of 1949, and the relevant

Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. It should be noted that the factual situation,

namely the construction of the separation Wall referre d to in the question, is without precedent. It

necessarily raises several legal questions and unc ertainties in respect of which the General

Assembly could need the opinion of the Court.

38. It has also been argued that due to the a lleged “political” nature of the matter before the

Court, it should be entrusted to resolution by pol itical process rather through an advisory opinion

by the Court. This approach implies an inability of the Court to address matters with a political

complexion. The Court has already vigorously denied that this argument has any validity. In the

Nuclear Weapons case, the Court found:

“The fact that this question also has politi cal aspects, as, in the nature of things,
is the case with so many questions which ari se in international life, does not suffice to

deprive it of its character as a ‘legal qu estion’ and to ‘deprive the Court of a
competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute’.” ( Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234.) - 23 -

(iv)Thealleged ultra vires nature of the request

39. We state here that Professor Crawford has, quite correctly in our view, indicated that the

Court unquestionably does have jurisdiction and al so that the General Assembly unquestionably

does have the competence to refer this matter to this Court for the giving of an advisory opinion. It

has been contended that the requ est for the advisory opinion is ultra vires the 10thEmergency

Special Session of the General Assembly fro m which resolutionES-10/14 emerged. This

contention is based on inter alia the fact that the Uniting for Peace resolution, in terms of which the

10thSpecial Emergency Session had been convene d, foresees that only issues of immediate

concern can be dealt with, while the Session has been going on since 1997. It was also convened to

deal with another matter, namely Israeli settlement s. The argument continues that the Security

Council is exclusively mandated to deal with areas accorded to it by ChapterVI, i.e., the pacific

settlement of disputes. Thus, the argument cont inues; the present matter falls within such

competence to the exclusion of the General Assembly.

40. In this regard, it was further argued that even if the General Assembly was convened in a

regular session, it would not have the competence to adopt the request for an advisory opinion, as

the special powers of the Security Council relati ng to the maintenance of international peace and

security exclude the General Assembly, with gene ral powers in this regard, from acting in this

field.

41. We submit that the arguments raised in th is regard, which we will not repeat fully or

itemize, aim to restrict the competence of the General Assembly to request advisory opinions to the

point where such competence will be negligible an d are incompatible with the broad competence

ascribed by Article96, paragraph1, of the Char ter, to the Security Council and the General

Assembly on the basis of equality. The competence of the General Assembly to request advisory

opinions matches the scope of its other competencies provided for in the Charter.

42. It is also legally untenable to argue th at the General Assembly’s competence to request

an advisory opinion is excluded by the Security Council’s competencies in terms of Chapter VI of

the Charter, and, by implication, that the Cour t’s competence to pronounce on such request is also

excluded. Such an interpretation apparently r ests upon Article12 of the Charter which stipulates

that while the Security Council is exercising the functions assigned to it in the Charter, in respect of

any dispute or situation, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to - 24 -

that dispute or situation unless upon request of the S ecurity Council. It is argued that this includes

requests for an advisory opinion from the Court.

43. This contention implies that as far as the re ferral to the Court of legal questions relating

in some or other way to the peace and security is concerned, the Security Council has the exclusive

competence. The contention is, in our view, fata lly flawed, and is aimed at unduly restricting the

role of the Court as principal legal organ of the United Nations.

44. There is clear authority that Article12 does not trump the authority of the General

Assembly to request advisory opinions on matters in respect of which the Security Council is

exercising its functions:

“The General Assembly and the Secu rity Council may request Advisory
Opinions directly on the basis of Article 96 (1). This competence extends the scope of
the activities of either organ according to the general provisions of the Charter

concerning the competence of the one or the other .” (Simma, B. (ed), The Charter of
the United Nations: A Commentary, 1995, p. 1010.)

We are certain here that the honourable Memb ers and the President will recognize where this

particular quotation comes from, from the honourable Member on the extreme side. Any

suggestion that there exists within the Charter a separation of powers that prevents the General

Assembly from seeking an advisory opinion under su ch circumstances, is untenable. There is also

authority that the Security Council has primary, no t exclusive, responsibility in this regard which

does not exclude separate but complementary competence by the General Assembly and the Court

(Gray, Christine, The Use and Abuse of the International C ourt of Justice: Cases concerning the

Use of Force after Nicaragua, European Journal of International Law , 2003, p.871). The Court

has also reached the same conclusion in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran

case:

“Whereas Article12 of the Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly to

make any recommendations with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security
Council is exercising its functions in respect of that dispute, no such restriction is
placed on the functioning of the Court by an y provision either of the Charter or the
Statute of the Court.” (I.C.J. Reports 1980, pp. 21–22.)

45. As regards Article 12, it has been interp reted very narrowly by the General Assembly, a

situation which has been accepted by the Member States and the Security Council. We again quote

from the honourable Member of the Court: - 25 -

“The General Assembly does not lose its competence to discuss the dispute or
situation while the Security Council is d ealing with it, nor even to assess it.

Article 12 (1) in United Nations practice bars the General Assembly only from making
recommendations concerning the specific dispute or situation. This does not restrict
its recommendatory power... with regard to aspects of the dispute or situation not
directly connected with the maintenance of or threat to the peace. For example, the

General Assembly, having referred the Pal estine question to the Security Council,
certainly did not stop dealing with the problem and making recommendations
concerning it. It in fact continued to deal with the political, economic and social
aspects, while the Security Council dealt w ith the military and security aspects of the

issue.” (Simma, op. cit., p. 258.)

46. In view of the long-standing practice with regard to the application of Article12,

paragraph1, it is difficult to imagine that its application can prevent the General Assembly from

seeking an advisory opinion within the present circumstances.

(v) Assumption that an advisory opinion will serve no purpose and will be harmful to
achieving a negotiated settlement of the conflict

47. As regards the argument that the Israe li-Palestinian conflict is being addressed by a

political process, and that an advisory opinion on the question put to the Court by the General

Assembly will be devoid of legal purpose, will not assist the General Assembly in its work and will

hinder, rather than help, the achievement of the Road Map’s objectives, it should be noted that the

Court has, on several occasions, rejected objections of this nature: both in the Nicaragua case and

in the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (I.C.J.

Reports 1998, p. 275, para. 61). It is submitted that this principle is not affected by the fact that in

the present case the Security Council forms part of the Quartet. As the Court pronounced in the

case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Jurisdiction, I.C.J. Reports

1984, p. 436 para. 98): “[The Court] has been asked to pass judgment on certain legal aspects of a

situation which has also been considered by th e Security Council, a procedure which is entirely

consonant with its position as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations”.

48. The Court has been consistent in its appr oach that neither the motive nor context of a

question matters with regard to the issue of ju risdiction. In this regard it stated in the Use of

Nuclear Weapons case that it: “also finds that the political nature of the motives which may be said

to have inspired the request and the political imp lications that the opinion might have are of no

relevance in the establishment of its jurisdiction to give such an opinion” (Legality of the Threat or

Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), para. 17). - 26 -

49. The Court continued that “no matter what might be its conclusions in any opinion it

might give, they would have relevance for the co ntinuing debate on the matter in the General

Assembly and would present an additional element in the negotiations on the matter”. The Court

thus rejected the notion that its opinion might adversely affect ongoing negotiations as a ground to

find no jurisdiction.

50. It should be pointed out that any statement to the effect that an opinion by the Court on

the question before it will hinder, rather than he lp, the Road Map process, is mere conjecture.

Quite the opposite is true: the request for an advisory opinion from the Court by the General

Assembly was motivated in resolutionES/10/14 of 12December2003 on the basis of its grave

concern about the devastating impact that the Wall will have on the prospects of solving the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and establishing peace in the region (preambular paragraph 16).

51. The Court should not shy away from its obligation where an opportunity presents itself to

provide advice, based on solid legal principles, esp ecially when faced with a unique situation of

international concern like the one we have here t oday, in respect of which there have been clear

indications of the horrendous effects that the Wall has on the Palestinian people.

52. The Court’s role in an advisory opinion w ill be complementary in nature and will not be

binding on either of the parties. Thus, it is our contention that the Cour t’s opinion can serve to

bring the current situation from the brink of disaster, back on track.

53. Furthermore it must also be asked how can an argument be sustained before this Court,

given its past record, that in exercising its duty as primary judicial organ of the United Nations on a

matter of such grave international concern, the C ourt’s involvement will harm rather than help an

international peace process. Is this not another attempt to call into question the relevance of the

role of the Court as part of the broader United Nations system?

(vi) The lack of facts before the Court

54. With regard to the argument that there is a lack of facts before the Court, the Court needs

to determine “whether it has before it sufficient info rmation and evidence to enable it to arrive at a

judicial conclusion upon any disputed questions of fact, the determination of which is necessary for

it to give an opinion in conditions comp atible with its judicial character” ( Western Sahara,

Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, pp. 28–29, para. 46). - 27 -

55. In the present case there are no disputed f acts that we must emphasize. The Court has

before it the two reports: that of the Secretar y-General of the United Nations and that of the

Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Ri ghts on the Situation of Human Rights in the

Palestinian Territories occupied by Israel. The exis tence of the Wall is an undisputed fact that is

bound to have legal consequences in terms of th e rules and principles of international law as

provided for in the question put to the Court and on which the Court should pronounce itself.

56. In the Namibia case, the Government of South Africa argued that: “Since the Court may

only give an Advisory Opinion on a legal question, it may consequently be doubted whether it is

entitled to furnish an Opinion if, in order to do so, it also has to make findings as to primary facts.”

(Statement submitted by the Government of the Republic of South Africa, Vol. 1, p. 143, para. 45).

The Court rejected this argument completely (I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 27, para. 40).

57. As a matter of policy a Member State s hould not be allowed to undermine the judicial

function of the Court by refusing to place facts it considers essential before the Court, and then

benefit from this situation by seeking to use it as a means of denying the Court jurisdiction. Such a

stratagem is, in our view, so simple and transparen t that it falls to be rejected out of hand by the

Court.

Conclusion

58. In light of the arguments raised above , it is submitted that the Court does have

jurisdiction to provide the advisory opinion soug ht by the General Assembly. The Court must

remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character, discharge its functions as the principal

legal organ of the United Nations and thus dispel any possible perceptions of abdicating its judicial

responsibility.

IV. S UMMARY OF MERITS

59. We now, assuming that time still permits, summarize or give a summary of the merits.

Detailed arguments on the merits were placed befo re the Court in our written statement and it

suffices to summarize the main substantive legal arguments raised in respect of the legal

consequences of the construction of the separation Wall. - 28 -

Applicability of international humanitarian law

60. There is no doubt that the Geneva Conventions apply to the 1967 armed conflict. Israel’s

obligations as an Occupying Power in the Palestinian Territory are governed by rules and principles

of international law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The

general framework of international law gove rning occupation as contained in the Hague

Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention, is applicab le to the Occupied Palestinian

Territory and to Israel as the Occupying Power. Is rael is a party to the four Geneva Conventions

and it is widely accepted that the Hague Regul ations of 1907 are declaratory of general

international law, as confirmed by the Court in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion .

Furthermore, the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth

Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of

12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied

Arab territories, in its resolution A/RES/56/60 of 14 February 2002.

De facto annexation

T6he. de facto consequence of the construction of the separation Wall, which deviates

from the Green Line, which represents the actual boundary between Israel and Palestine, is that that

area will be annexed and incorporated within the territory of Israel. This de facto annexation is an

attempt to create facts on the ground that will be di fficult to change. Such a construction not only

violates various Security Council resolutions, but is also in direct breach of the rule of customary

international law against the acquisition of territory by force or annexation. In international law,

annexation of this kind is tantam ount to conquest, which was banned by the prohibition of the use

of force contained in Article2, paragraph4, of the Charter. Furthermore, the construction of the

separation Wall violates one of the fundamental rule s of international humanitarian law as laid out

in Article47 of the Fourth Geneva Conventio n, under which the rights of persons living in

occupied territories are fully prot ected by international law. Th e Occupying Power, in this case

Israel, may not alter their legal situation by either a unilateral act or annexation of the territory, for

they remain protected persons. - 29 -

Justification of self-defence and military necessity

62. The principle of self-defence cannot be employed as a justification for the construction of

the separation Wall. It is established internationa l law that the right to self-defence is a temporary

right. In the present case however, the permanen t structure of the separation Wall suggests the

opposite. The principles of necessity and proporti onality, which form part of the doctrine of

self-defence, enshrined in Article51 of the Charte r, have been violated by Israel through the

construction and the severe consequences of the separation Wall. These consequences have been

the unwarranted restrictions of movement, isolation of civilians from their farmlands, destruction of

crops and impairment of access to essential social services as described in the report of the

Secretary-General prepared pursuant to Genera l Assembly resolution ES-10/13 (A/ES-10/248

dated 3December 2003) which is before th e Court. These consequences are totally

disproportionate and unnecessary, bearing in mind th at the focus of Israeli defence is occasional

and irregular attacks by lone operators.

63. A question of fact that begs the Court’s consideration is why, if the separation Wall as a

measure of self-defence is intended to protect Israeli citizens and territory, it is not being

constructed on undisputed Israeli territory? Is the logical expl anation for the chosen route of the

separation Wall cutting across occupied territory not an attempt of de facto annexation? The

answer in our view is obvious and in the affirmative.

64. The justification that has consistently b een advanced by the Israeli Government for the

construction of the separation Wall, is that it is necessary to ensure the security of Israel. They

maintain that the destruction and seizure of Pal estinian property and the violation of human rights

of the Palestinian population are demanded by the necessities of war, as permitted by Article 23 of

the Hague Regulations of 1907. In this regard the Court should take note that the Israeli

Government in this instance is relying for protection on the very same Hague Regulations that they

have always maintained do not bind them. N onetheless, it is submitted that the concept of

“military necessity” does not release a State from the obligations of complying with international

humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions of 194 9 and their Additional Protocols, together with

the Hague Regulations, have already struck the balance between the demands made on the law of

conduct of war and the requirements of humanity. - 30 -

65. The right of Israel to security has never been denied, but this right must be exercised

within recognized norms of international law.

The right to self-determination

66. The separation Wall violates two of the most fundamental principles of contemporary

international law, namely the prohibition on the forc ible acquisition of territory and of the right to

self-determination.

67. The right to self-determination and the concep t of territory are intrinsically linked. The

right of the Palestinian people to self-determinati on is unquestionable, has been reaffirmed by the

United Nations on numerous occasions and forms the underlying principle of the two-State

solution.

68. As the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights has correctly pointed out

in his report,

“A people can only exercise their right to self-determination within a territory.

The amputation of Palestinian territory by the construction of the Separation Wall
seriously interferes with the right of self-d etermination of the Palestinian people as it
substantially reduces the size of the self-determination unit.”

Human rights violations

69. Further consequences of the separa tion Wall have been grave infringements of

recognized human rights principles as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Cove nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

(ICESCR) of 16December 1966, which Covenants ha ve both been ratified by Israel. The grave

human rights situation resulting from the construction of the separation Wall is well documented in

both the report of the Secretary-General and al so the report of the Special Rapporteur, which

documents are in the Court’s possession.

70. Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides clearly that

“each State Party to the present Covenant unde rtakes to respect and to ensure to all

individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised by
the Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status”. - 31 -

71. These rights are universal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family, and

it is incorrect in law and even amoral to suggest that the residents of the Occupied Palestinian

Territory are not entitled to these rights.

Mr.President, honourable Members of the Court, we thank you very much for the

opportunity you gave to us.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Madlanga. I now give the floor to Professor Laraba who

will speak for Algeria.

M. LARABA :

INTRODUCTION

Merci, Monsieur le président. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, j’ai

l’honneur de vous faire part des observations de la République algérienne relatives à la demande

d’avis consultatif qui a été demandée en urgence par l’Assemblée générale dans sa résolution du

18 décembre 2003 portant sur les conséquences en dro it de l’édification d’un mur par Israël en tant

que puissance occupante en Territoire palestinien occupé.

Je n’entends pas revenir ici sur un certain nom bre de considérations factuelles liées à la

construction du mur. Le rapport du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies en date du

24 novembre 2003 est a cet égard suffisamment éloquent. De même, un certain nombre d’exposés,

notamment ceux de ce matin, ont envisagé avec beaucoup de précision le processus de construction

du mur et les bouleversements déjà constatés à l’égard de la population palestinienne vivant dans la

région où le mur est en train de se construire. Je ferai simplement un cer tain nombre de brèves

remarques avant de passer à l’essentiel de mon propos :

 l’Histoire retiendra que c’est le 14 avril 2002 que la décision de principe de construire un mur a

été arrêtée par le Gouvernement israélien. Il faudra sans doute que l’on se souvienne

également que, en vérité, l’idée de la construc tion d’un mur de séparation date du milieu des

années quatre-vingt-dix. C’est autour de l’année 1995 qu’a été envisagée pour la première fois

cette construction. Ce rappel est important parce qu’il incite, il oblige, à analyser avec

circonspection l’argument avancé selon lequel la construction du mur a été fondamentalement

motivée par les opérations menées par les Palestiniens; - 32 -

 ce mur est censé être provisoire. Rien n’est moin s sûr. En effet, tout laisse penser qu’il est

construit pour durer, en application de l’idée sel on laquelle tout ce qui est construit est gardé.

Il consiste, nous le savons, en un système de cl ôtures, de barrières, de murs et d’enclaves qui

portent, de façon frontale, atteinte à l’unité du Territoire de la Palestine;

 ce mur n’est en vérité qu’un aspect d’une opération beaucoup plus vaste. Il est une illustration,

sans doute la plus spectaculaire --car c’est le plus grand changement introduit depuis1967--

d’un projet politique et juridique global devant a boutir à rompre la continuité territoriale du

Territoire de la Palestine;

 les deux principales conséquences qui en découlent sont les suivantes :

a) d’une part, une dégradation progressive mais sûre des droits les plus fondamentaux de la
protection de la population pal estinienne. Selon le bureau de l’ONU pour la coordination
des affaires humaines, ce sont près de 700 000 Pa lestiniens qui vont pâtir de la construction
de ce mur. Une fois terminé, ce dernier em piétera sur près de 15% du territoire de la

Palestine occupé. Et ce sont 270 000 Palestiniens qui vont vivre dans des zones fermées;

b) la deuxième conséquence inéluctable réside dans l’immigration forcée de la population
palestinienne soit par expulsion directe ou par expulsion indirecte en raison d’une situation

quotidienne devenue intenable.

C’est sous le bénéfice de ces brèves remar ques, sans doute teintées d’aspect politique mais

également ayant des conséquen ces juridiques extrêmement importantes, que la République

algérienne entend faire part de son point de vue en envisageant les trois questions principales qui

font l’objet de débats à l’occasion de cette demande d’avis consultatif, I) celle de la recevabilité de

la demande et de la compétence de la Cour inte rnationale de Justice, II)celle relative à la

détermination du droit pertinent pour évaluer, pour apprécier la demande de l’Assemblée générale

et III) les conséquences juridiques de la constructi on du mur au regard précisément de ce droit une

fois qu’il aura été déterminé. Donc trois points qui s’articulent, qui s’enchaînent logiquement les

uns après les autres.

I. LA QUESTION DE LA RECEVABILITÉ ET DE LA COMPÉTENCE

Je ne voudrais pas davantage revenir sur deux point s qui ont été déjà très largement abordés.

Je voudrais simplement envisager d’une part la qu estion du droit de l’Assemblée générale de

demander un avis consultatif avant d’en arriver à la compétence de la Cour pour donner l’avis

consultatif demandé. - 33 -

I.1. Sur le droit de l’Assemblée générale de donner un avis consultatif

On pourrait penser que songer à envisager pa reille question semble relever de l’évidence

parce que l’article96 de la Charte des Nations Unies accorde dans son pa ragraphepremier un tel

droit à l’Assemblée générale. Je voudrais simplement dire que l’Assemblée générale peut en vertu

de ce paragraphe premier demander un avis consultatif sur «toute question juridique». Je voudrais

faire la comparaison entre la formulation retenue par ce paragraphe premier in fine avec celle qui a

été retenue dans le paragraphe2 du même arti cle s’agissant des autres organes de l’ONU ou des

institutions spécialisées. Dans un cas, l’Assemblée générale peut demander un avis consultatif sur

toute question juridique. Dans le deuxième cas, la marge de manŒuvre, si je puis dire ainsi, des

autres organes et des institutions spécialisé es est beaucoup plus circonscrite puisque le

paragraphe2 de l’article96 précise que la qu estion posée devrait être liée aux activités de ces

organes et institutions. Il semble que la portée de l’article96, paragraphe premier, est beaucoup

plus absolue alors que la deuxième est toute relative.

Dès lors que l’Assemblée générale peut de mander un avis consultatif sur toute question

juridique, dès lors dans le même temps que l’A ssemblée générale exerce un certain nombre de

compétences en application notamment des articles10 et11 de la Charte, vu précisément en

matière de maintien de la paix, il est tout à fait logique qu’un certain nombre de questions

comportant à la fois des aspects politiques et des aspects juridiques soient au quotidien traitées par

l’Assemblée générale. Les rédacteurs de l’article 96, paragraphe premier, ne l’ignoraient pas. Eux

qui ont été dans le même temps les rédacteurs d es articles10 et 11. Il est donc évident que sur

toute une série de questions, les aspects politiques peuvent coexister et coexistent avec les aspects

juridiques. Il est évident également que si l’A ssemblée générale sollicite un avis consultatif, c’est

parce que, en son sein, bien évidemment, des opini ons différentes, des points de vue divergents se

sont exprimés. Ce qui importe là, ce n’est pas le fait que la question posée ait pu ou pourrait avoir

des aspects politiques, ce qui importe c’est de voir si véritablement la question posée par

l’Assemblée générale renvoie à un certain nombr e de questions juridiques sur lesquelles elle

demande à être éclairée par l’organe judiciaire principal s’agissant des Nations Unies.

Dans son avis consu ltatif de 1980 relatif à l’ Interprétation de l’accord du 25mars1951

entre l’OMS et l’Egypte , la haute juridiction a précisé qu’«e n fait, lorsque des considérations - 34 -

politiques jouent un rôle marquant, il peut être particulièrement nécessaire à une organisation

internationale d’obtenir un avis de la Cour sur l es principes juridiques applicables en la matière en

discussion» (C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 87, par. 33). Dans le même temps, il est vrai que la Cour «doit

refuser de donner l’avis qui lui est demandé» ( C.I.J. Recueil 1962, Certaines dépenses des

Nations Unies, avis consultatif, p. 155) si elle considère que la question qui lui a été posée n’est pas

une question juridique.

Ce dictum a une interprétation a contrario qui est la suivante : face à une question juridique,

la Cour ne peut pas se soustraire à son rôle de conseil juridique. Elle doit donner un avis

consultatif, malgré les aspects politiques de la ques tion, car cet avis peut être d’une très grande

importance. Ainsi que le souli gnait le président Bedjaoui dans son intervention lors de la

célébration du cinquantième anniversaire de la Cour internationale de Justice, «les avis de la Cour

déploient des effets pacificateurs importants, ne serait-ce que par leur apport considérable au bon

fonctionnement des organisations universelles… La Cour a également assisté l’organisation

concernée dans la recherche d’une solution à un diff érend déjà né.» («le cinquantième anniversaire

de la Cour internationale de Justice», RCADI 1996, p. 27). Cette référence au différend déjà né me

permet d’aborder, s’agissant toujours de la possi bilité pour l’Assemblée générale de demander un

avis consultatif, un second point.

Un second point qui renvoie à un argument qui est souvent avancé pour contester le droit de

l’Assemblée générale de demande r un avis consultatif. Cet ar gument consiste à dire que

l’Assemblée générale s’est déjà prononcée sur la question et que, dès lors qu’elle s’est déjà

prononcée sur la question qu’elle pose, il n’y a plus lieu pour elle de demander un avis consultatif.

Dès lors qu’elle se serait prononcée notamment sur l’illicéité de la construction du mur, la demande

de l’Assemblée générale perdrait de son objet, de son opportunité, de son utilité. Cette thèse ne

peut pas être retenue pour deux raisons principales. Tout d’abord, un argument de fait. Ce n’est pas

la première fois que l’organe qui sollicite l’avis consultatif a eu à se prononcer préalablement sur

des questions qui concernent le problème qu’il soul ève devant la haute juridiction. On peut

rappeler à cet égard, par exemple, mais c’est à titr e illustratif simplement, l’avis consultatif rendu

dans l’affaire du Sahara occidental de 1975 qui n’a pas cessé de faire l’objet de résolutions

adoptées par l’Assemblée générale entre 1966 et 1973. Cela n’a pas, bien évidemment, empêché la - 35 -

Cour de donner son avis consultatif comme on le sait sur cette question. On peut songer, deuxième

exemple, à l’avis consultatif demandé pour la première fois par le Conseil de sécurité s’agissant de

la situation de la Namibie. Cet avis consulta tif a été demandé par le Conseil de sécurité alors

même qu’il s’était déjà prononcé sur la question qu’il soumet à la Cour et alors même qu’il ne s’en

était pas caché puisque la rédaction de la question elle-même renvoyait à cette prise de position. Je

vous rappellerai, Monsieur le pr ésident, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, que la question du

Conseil de sécurité était libellée de la manière su ivante : «Quelles sont les conséquences juridiques

pour les Etats de la présence continue de l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain)

nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité ?», résolution par laquelle il avait bien

évidemment condamné en 1970 la présence continue de l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie.

Il y a ensuite un argument de droit qu’on pou rrait également faire prévaloir qui consiste à

dire que même lorsqu’un organe, comme le Conseil de sécurité ou l’Assemblée générale, a eu à

envisager des questions juridiques, il peut éprouver la nécessité de solliciter la Cour internationale

de Justice car c’est elle qui, en dernier resso rt, peut porter toute une série d’aspects juridiques

précis, de commentaires et d’analyses qui peuvent contribuer utilement à faire évoluer la question

débattue au sein de l’Assemblée générale.

I.2. La Cour internationale de Justice est dans son rôle en donnant un avis consultatif sur les
conséquences de la construction du mur par Israël

L’un des arguments avancés pour contester cette compétence pour demander à la Cour de se

déclarer incompétente réside dans le fait de c onsidérer que cette demande d’avis vise en fait à

régler un différend que l’une des parties concerné es ne souhaite pas régler par le recours à la

juridiction internationale. On serait en somme en présence d’une espèce de détournement de

procédure. Ici encore, l’argument n’est pas inéd it. Il présente même de fortes similitudes avec

celui qui avait été avancé en son temps, fin 1974-début 1975, à l’occasion de l’affaire du Sahara

occidental et de la demande d’avis consultatif form ulée par l’Assemblée générale. Dans le cas du

Sahara occidental, la question de la compétence de la Cour a même été compliquée par la tentative

avortée de saisine de la Cour au contentieux et pa r le refus d’une des parties intéressées d’aller au

contentieux devant la Cour. Ceci n’a pas empêch é la Cour de rendre comme on le sait cet avis

consultatif, alors même qu’elle a considéré que «l e consentement d’un Etat intéressé conserve son - 36 -

importance… pour apprécier s’il est opportun de rendre un avis consultatif» (affaire du Sahara

occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1975, par. 32). Ce passage de l’avis consultatif de 1975

est traditionnellement abondamment cité par ceux des Et ats qui veulent amener la Cour à rejeter la

demande d’avis consultatif. Ce que l’on oublie simplement ou ce que l’on perd de vue, c’est que

cet extrait n’est pas isolé, il s’intègre dans un tout. Ce que l’on oublie, c’est que la Cour

internationale de Justice a fini par rendr e son avis consultatif dans l’affaire du Sahara occidental.

Donc, cet extrait n’est pas du tout décisif tout co mme d’ailleurs le sempiternel rappel de l’affaire

du Statut de la Carélie orientale de 1923 affaire qui date maintenant de quatre-vingt-un ans et qui

est souvent utilisée pour demander à la Cour de se déclarer incompétente.

Dans le cas précis qui nous occupe aujourd’ hui, l’Assemblée générale a fini par solliciter

pour avis consultatif la haute juridiction parce qu’il y a eu débat en son sein, parce qu’elle a

constaté l’existence d’opinions divergentes. En vérité, il en est toujours ainsi. Une demande d’avis

consultatif postule automatique ment le constat de points de vue différents, voire même

contradictoires. C’est pour l’ensemble de ces ra isons que la République al gérienne considère que

la Cour devrait se déclarer compétente pour répondre à la question posée par l’Assemblée générale.

II. LE DROIT PERTINENT POUR APPRÉCIER LA LÉGALITÉ

DE L ’ÉDIFICATION DU MUR

Cette question est d’une importance particu lière, parce qu’il y a eu un certain nombre de

prises de positions de la part des parties concernées , de la part d’Etats et d’organisations qui font

que l’examen de ce point est absolument déterminant et essentiel. On y a fait allusion tout à

l’heure.

La question de l’Assemblée générale se caractérise par une très forte connotation juridique, il

s’agit d’examiner «en droit» les conséquences de l’édification d’ un mur au regard des «règles et

des principes du droit international, notamment, la quatrième convention de Genève de 1949, et les

résolutions» pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité et de l’Assemblée générale. On est sur un terrain

éminemment juridique. La rédaction adoptée par l; Assemblée générale n’est pas une rédaction

limitative. Elle est plutôt indica tive, et suggestive, de sorte, je crois, que pour déterminer quel est

le champ d’application, quel est le droit applicab le, il importe d’envisager à côté des références de

l’Assemblée générale un certain nombre de conve ntions, un certain nombre de développements du - 37 -

droit coutumier indispensables pour avoir une appr éciation juridique précise en la matière. Mais

c’est aussi par rapport aux thèses juridiques exposées en annexe du rapport du Secrétaire général,

thèses juridiques d’Israël et de la Palestine, qu’ il convient d’envisager cette question du droit

pertinent en la matière.

La position juridique d’Israël consiste à nier tout à la fois l’applicabilité de la quatrième

convention de Genève de 1949 et les deux pact es onusiens de 1966 relatifs respectivement aux

droits civils et politiques d’une part, aux droits économiques sociaux et culturels d’autre part. Pour

la Palestine, le droit pertinent pour apprécier la liceité de la construction du mur renvoie à la

violation des règles fondamentales du droit international général, du droit international humanitaire

et du droit international des droits de l’homme.

C’est principalement à la lumière de l’ensemble de ces données que la République algérienne

exposera son point de vue. Ce point de vue sur le droit pertinent s’articule autour des quatre points

principaux suivants :

1) les principes et règles du droit international général;

2) l’applicabilité du droit international humanitaire;

3) l’applicabilité du droit international des dr oits de l’homme, notamment, les deux pactes de

1966, notamment mais pas seulement;

4) les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et de l’Assemblée générale.

Mais avant d’aller plus avant dans le raisonnement de ces quatr e points, il importe de faire

une observation d’ordre général sur l’attitude juridique israélienne. Celle-ci repose  je l’ai dit, il

y a un petit instant  sur l’inapplicabilité du droit humanitaire, et plus précisément de la quatrième

convention de Genève de 1949, et des deux pactes d es droits de l’homme de 1966. Seul, en vérité,

l’article 23, lettre G, du règlement de La Haye de 1907 trouverait à s’appliquer à la situation, bien

que non incorporé dans le droit interne israélie n, comme d’ailleurs la quatrième convention de

Genève de 1949. Mais, dans un cas, la non-inco rporation n’empêche pas l’application; dans

l’autre, conjugué avec le fait que la Palestine n’est pas une haute partie contractante, cette

convention du 12août1949, la quatrième en l’ occurrence, n’aurait pas à s’appliquer. Cette

attitude, qui consiste à n’envi sager qu’une convention de19 07 et à écarter les conventions

largement postérieures qui ont eu à préciser, à affiner et à développer ce droit de1907, tend à - 38 -

suspendre le temps juridique. Elle exprime la volonté d’appliquer au présent uniquement des

normes élaborées hier. C’est une certaine manière de réécrire l’Histoire et de nier qu’il ait pu y

avoir des progrès dans la protection des droits fondamentaux de la pers onne humaine, ici de la

population palestinienne confrontée à l’édificatio n du mur. Cette population ne serait pas en

somme éligible pour tirer profit de ces progrès. Et le territoire palestinien serait une espèce de zone

de non-droits humains.

1. Sur le droit international général

Les principes et règles qui me semblent être pertinents pour apprécier la licéité de la

construction du mur, ces principes et règles sont ceux qui sont incorpor és notamment dans la

Charte des Nations Unies, dans les conventions universelles d’une manière générale, mais ceux qui

ont été consacrés plus particulièrement dans la Ch arte des NationsUnies et qui font partie des

règles fondamentales dont l’évolution coutumière ne cesse de rendre compte.

On songe bien évidemment ici au respect du principe du droit des peuples à disposer

d’eux-mêmes, au respect du principe de l’intégrité territoriale et au principe de l’interdiction de la

modification des frontières et de l’occupation du territoire par la force. Par ailleurs, comme le droit

de légitime défense a été également invoqué par Is raël, il conviendra le moment venu d’en étudier

et le contenu et l’applicabilité à la matière.

2. S’agissant du droit international humanitaire applicable

2.1. Sur l’applicabilité de la quatrième convention de Genève du 12 août 1949

Deux arguments ont été avancés par Israël pour estimer que, bien qu’il l’ait ratifiée, cette

convention ne s’applique pas. Elle ne s’applique rait pas, d’une part, parce qu’elle n’aurait pas été

incorporée dans le droit interne israélien; elle ne s’appliquerait pas, d’autre part, parce que la

Palestine n’est pas une haute partie contractante . Cette thèse n’est pas recevable pour un certain

nombre de raisons que je vais formuler assez rapidement.

S’agissant tout d’abord de la non-incorporati on de la quatrième convention dans le droit

interne israélien :

a) on sait que le droit internationa l conventionnel et coutumier con tient des règles fondamentales

auxquelles cet argument contrevient. En effet, d’une part, les Etats sont tenus d’exécuter de - 39 -

bonne foi les traités auxquels ils ont librement sous crit. Telle est la lettre, nous le savons, de

l’article26 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, pacta sunt servanda , qui

s’applique en la matière. C’est même une règl e qui n’est pas simplement conventionnelle mais

également une règle coutumière qui s’applique à l’ensemble des Etats, même ceux qui n’ont

pas ratifié, comme c’est le cas d’Israël et c’est le cas de beaucoup d’autres Etats  cette

convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités. Deuxièmement, on sait qu’il existe une deuxième

règle bien établie en droit international qui cons iste dans la règle qu’un Etat ne peut pas se

prévaloir de son droit interne pour ne pas respect er ses engagements internationaux. C’est au

demeurant ce qui se dégage de l’article 27 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités et,

de manière générale, on le sait, l’une des évolu tions les plus importantes du droit international

contemporain a consisté dans l’affirmation absolue du principe de la supériorité des traités sur

le droit interne des Etats. C’était là la première observation;

b) deuxième observation pour répondre donc à cette question de l’in applicabilité de la quatrième

convention pour cause de non-incorporation, il ne faut pas perdre de vue qu’un grand nombre

de règles de la convention du 12août1949 sont d’application directe et qu’elles n’ont pas

besoin d’une incorporation pour être exécutées;

c) c’est notamment le cas des dispositions de la section trois de la troisième partie de la quatrième

convention qui, intitulée «Territoires occupés», tra ite précisément de la situation juridique des

territoires et de la population par rapport à la puissance occupante.

II.2. Sur le deuxième argument selon lequel la Palestine n’est pas une haute partie
contractante

On peut d’emblée sur ce point préciser que si la Palestine n’est pas, à ce jour, formellement

une partie contractante, ce n’est pas faute de l’avoir demandé à plusieurs reprises et exprimé

clairement sa volonté de rejoindre le consensus international sur ce point. On peut aussi, et surtout,

souligner l’archaïsme de la thèse israélienne en ce qu’elle fait fi de la remarquable évolution

observée dans l’application du droit international humanitaire depuis 1949. Faut-il ici rappeler que

le Gouvernement provisoire de la République algé rienne (GPRA) a adhéré aux quatre conventions

de Genève en 1960, c’est-à-dire deux ans avant son accession à l’indépendance ? Peut-on ignorer

les avancées que le protocole additionnel1 de Genè ve de1977 a fait faire au droit humanitaire? - 40 -

Son articlepremier, paragraphe 4, a étendu le champ d’applicati on des conventions de Genève à

l’ensemble des conflits internationaux. Ce protoc ole est considéré aujourd’hui comme reflétant le

droit international en la matière. D’ailleurs, la jurisprudence internationale des années

quatre-vingt-dix a eu à constater cette évolution. Dans son avis consultatif de juillet 1996, la Cour

internationale de Justice a souligné que «Tous l es Etats sont liés par celles des règles du protocole

additionnel1 qui ne représentaient, au moment de leur adoption, que l’expression du droit

coutumier préexistant.» (C.I.J. Recueil 1996, par. 84.)

II.3. L’objectivation du droit international humanitaire

La thèse israélienne méconnaît totalement la caractéristique sans doute la plus essentielle de

l’évolution de ce droit international humanitaire.

Déjà, l’article premier commun aux quatre conve ntions de Genève de 1949, en faisant peser

sur les Etats contractants l’obligation de respecter et de faire respecter le droit humanitaire, avait

ouvert cette voie de l’objectivation du droit inte rnational humanitaire. Aujourd’hui, le noyau dur

du droit international humanitaire est composé, selon la fameuse formule de la Cour internationale

de Justice dans son avis consultatif du 8 ju illet 1996, de «normes intransgressibles». Cette

évolution remarquable a été prise en compte dans d’autres circonstances, dans une autre hypothèse,

par le Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex -Yougoslavie. En effet, dans sa décision Kupreskic du

14janvier2000, le Tribunal a estimé que le s normes du droit international humanitaire

«n’imposent pas d’obligations synallagmatiques», ma is «des obligations enve rs l’ensemble de la

communauté internationale, ce qui fait que chacun des membres de cette communauté a «un intérêt

juridique» à leur observation» (par. 519). La conc lusion que le Tribunal en tire dans le paragraphe

suivant est que «la plupart des normes du droit international humanitaire sont des normes

impératives du droit international ou jus cogens, c’est-à-dire qu’elles sont impérieuses et qu’on ne

saurait y déroger» (par. 520).

3. A propos du droit international des droits de l’Homme (DIDH), notamment les deux pactes de
l’ONU de 1966

En ce qui concerne l’application des deux p actes de1966, là également deux observations.

Tout d’abord au plan conventionnel et ensuite au plan coutumier. Au plan conventionnel, alors

même qu’Israël a ratifié ce… - 41 -

The PRESIDENT: May I interrupt you for a minute, Professor? I would like to point out to

you that, with the exception of Palestine, all partic ipants are supposed to speak for no more than

45minutes, and you have already spoken for 40. It seems to me that you are far from finishing

your statement, so may I suggest that you try to summarize the rest of your statement. Thank you.

M. LARABA: L’applicabilité des deux pactes de 1966, au plan conventionnel comme au

plan coutumier, les deux pactes s’appliquent notamme nt parce que le pacte sur les droits civils et

politiques dans son article2, pa ragraphe1, souligne qu’il s’ap plique à l’égard des individus

relevant de la compétence de l’Etat partie et pas simplement sur le territoire. A propos du pacte sur

les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, là également il y a dans la convention une certaine

transcendance incontestable qui peut expliquer que ce pacte puisse faire l’objet d’application. Mais

c’est surtout l’évolution coutumière qui permet de considérer que ces deux pactes s’appliquent.

III. Les multiples violations du droit international découlant de la construction du mur

Dans son avis consultatif de 1996, la Cour internationale de Justice y a souligné que «la

protection offerte par le pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques ne cesse pas en

temps de guerre, si ce n’est par l’effet de l’article 4 du pacte…» (p. 240, par. 25).

La construction du mur viole d’une part les principes fondamentaux du droit international

général, les principes fondamentaux du droit inte rnational humanitaire y compris les dispositions

de la quatrième convention dont la section 3 de sa tr oisième partie et viole également les principes

les plus fondamentaux du droit international des droits de l’homme.

Je voudrais ici insister sur l’évolution la plus récen te en la matière. Elle consiste dans le fait

que, à côté de règles relatives à la déportation, relatives à l’expulsion, sont apparues de nouvelles

formes d’atteintes aux droits de l’homme qui sont tout à fait applicables en la circonstance. Ce sont

les décisions, notamment du Tribunal pénal intern ational pour l’ex-Yougoslavie, qui peuvent à cet

égard être particulièrement intéressantes même si on est encore une fois dans une hypothèse qui est

différente, qui n’est pas exactement celle qui nous occupe ici.

Dlaffsaire Kupreskic déjà citée, le Tribunal international a considéré par exemple que «la

destruction généralisée des maisons et des biens s’apparentait à une vér itable persécution». Et - 42 -

poursuivant son avis, le Tribunal international a cons idéré que cette atteinte ««s’apparente en fait à

une destruction des moyens d’existence d’une population donnée» (par. 631).

Dans la décision Blaskic, qui date du mois de mars 2000, le Tribunal pénal a considéré que

«La confiscation ou la destruction d’habitations ou d’entreprises privées…ou

de moyens de subsistance … peuvent être qualifiés d’actes de persécution… Le crime
de persécution englobe…des actes… visant, par exemple, les biens pour autant que
les personnes qui ont en été victimes aient été spécialement choisies pour des

motifs … discriminatoires.» (Par. 227 et 233.)

C ONCLUSION

Au total, Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, et en conclusion, la

République algérienne prie la Cour de se déclarer compétente et de répondr e à la demande d’avis

consultatif de l’Assemblée générale à la lumière du droit pertinent en la matière dont elle a présenté

la quintessence. Elle lui demande respectueusement de déclarer l’illégalité de la construction du

mur par Israël au regard de ce droit.

Selon l’Algérie, les conséquences en droit sont de deux ordres. D’une part, Israël est dans

l’obligation de mettre fin à la situation illicite, d’autre part, cet Etat est tenu de réparer les

dommages causés par la construction du mur. Ceci conduit à l’application du premier principe en

la matière à savoir celui de la restitutio in integrum qui passe par la destruction du mur et la remise

en état de la situation antérieure. C’est à ce pr ix que «le mur diabolique», pour reprendre la forte

expression de UriAvnery sera exorcisé, ce mur qui «se situe entre les enfants et leur école, entre

les étudiants et leur université, entre les malad es et leurs médecins, entre les parents et leurs

enfants, entre les villages et leurs puits, entre lepaysans et leurs champs». Je vous remercie de

votre attention.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you Professor Laraba. Now this is time for a break of ten minutes

and the hearings will resume at 4.45 p.m.

The Court adjourned from 4.40 a.m. to 4.45. p.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I now give the floor to His Excellency Ambassador

Shobokshi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations. - 43 -

SMHr.BOKSHI:

1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to appear before you

today. This is the first time that Saudi Arabia has made an oral presentation to the International

Court of Justice. I am deeply grateful for this opportunity to present the position of my country

before this esteemed body.

2. I have the honour to represent my country as its Permanent Representative to the United

Nations. I recognize that today I am in a different setting, and I will put forth my best efforts to

make my comments within a legal framework.

3. As the Court is aware, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has presented a Written Statement on

the question before the Court. We are mindful of ou r duty not to simply repeat what is said there.

We are also cognizant of the time pressure the Court is under and the fact that the position of many

of the parties that are here touch upon similar points. Thus, in using my time today, I will not make

a comprehensive statement that responds to all of the points that have been raised with which we

disagree. We will let our Written Statement stand and reflect our comprehensive point of view.

Rather, I propose to address one specific argument th at has been raised. That argument concerns

the discretion of the Court. The argument is that an advisory opinion on the question is at cross

purposes to the negotiating effort, designed to bring peace in the Middle East, which is today called

the Road Map. We strongly disagree with this argu ment. We believe it is a false argument that if

accepted leads only to further disintegration of the p eace process. It is hoped that by responding to

this one argument we will provide the Court with “information”, as called for by Article 66 of the

Statute of the Court. That is our responsibility here; it is not to argue as if this is a contentious

case.

4. Before I proceed, however, I wish to make three preliminary observations.

5. First, we take note of the highly unusual pos ture of the pleadings that have been presented

to the Court.

6. On the one hand, no State or other party appearing in this matter has sought to justify in

law the separation Wall that Israel is building. On the other hand, some of us that are before the

Court have made the case in law that there ar e legal consequences of the separation Wall, or

barrier, or fence, whatever it may be called  and from here forward I will simply refer to it as the - 44 -

Wall  and that those consequences arise from the c onclusion that the Wall is unlawful. Since no

party has argued to the contrary, we believe our conclusion is sound.

7. Of course, a group of States argues that the Court should not render an advisory opinion

on the question as the General Assembly has request ed. The argument they present is similar to

arguments made in other advisory opinion cases to th e effect that the question is vague, or that the

Court will be in danger of prejudicing negotiations or of departing from its judicial function. Such

arguments have failed in the past before this Cour t. It is notable, however, that in the cases where

such arguments are made, one often at the same time finds those same States arguing in the

alternative: that is, they argue their view that the Court should not render an opinion, but they then

go on to argue their position on the substance of th e matter in the event that the Court proceeds to

render an opinion. This is not the case here.

8. For instance, in the Nuclear Weapons case, seven States argued in their Written

1
Statements that the Court should not give its opinion ; of those States, six presented the alternative

2
argument . In the present matter, these same six States provided the Court with Written Statements

again arguing that the Court should not render an advisory opinion, but this time in doing so they

presented no alternative argument. The copy of my prepared remarks given to the Registry

contains the relevant citations.

9. Thus, the alternative argument is not presented here. The States that argue that the Court

should not exercise its power to render an advisory opinion on the question before it do not argue in

the alternative that if the Court does, it should fi nd that there is a legal basis for the Wall and thus

no adverse legal consequences. The question may be asked, why not? The answer, simply, is that

the Wall is indefensible as a matter of law.

10. Many States that have taken the position in their Written Statements that the Court

should not render an advisory opinion on the ques tion before it have elsewhere condemned the

1
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weap ons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996(I) , p.236, para.15
(hereafter “Nuclear Weapons case”). See United States of America, Written Statement, pp.3-7; United Kingdom,
Written Statement, pp.9-20; Russian Federation, Written Statement, pp.1-4; France, Written Statement, pp.4-20;
Finland, Written Statement, p. 1; Netherlands, Written Statement, pp. 2-4; Germany, Written Statement pp. 2-6.
2
See United States of America, Written Statement, pp7-47; United Kingdom, Written Statement, pp.21-73;
Russian Federation, Written Statement, pp. 4-18; France, Written Statement, pp. 20-53; Netherlands, Written Statement
pp.4-13; Germany, Written Statement, p.6 (incorporating argument that Germany made in a Written Statement
submitted in the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict advisory case referred to the Court
by the World Health Organization). - 45 -

Wall. They have done so by their affirmativ e vote for General Assembly resolutionES-10/13 of

3
October 2003 , which demands that Israel stop and reverse the construction of the Wall and states it

is in contradiction with international law.

11. Therefore, the Court is in a curious position. Almost all States making written

appearances before the Court hold the position that the Wall is illegal. Nonetheless, some of those

States believe that the Court should not render an advisory opinion on the question before it

because they say it will inhibit a negotiating process.

12. In our view, that is a sad commentary on th e state of things. There is an internationally

supported negotiating process. One side in the negotiations  that is, the Israeli side  has been

and continues to deliberately enhance its position and change the territorial status quo to its benefit.

It has been doing so since 1967; the Wall is the mo st recent manifestation. Nothing is being done

about it, although almost all States say it is wrong. Whatever rhetorical exhortations may be made

by the Quartet have done nothing to make Israel be lieve that there is an adverse consequence to

taking more Palestinian land. Yet the argument is made that the General Assembly should be

denied the Court’s opinion on the legal consequences of the Wall  a wall that in our view denies

a viable Palestinian State, denies the right of self-determination, and exacerbates the hatred that

leads to increased violence.

13. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this attitude that the Court should not speak on this

question does not make sense to us. If the Court, the highest international judicial body, cannot

take a clear position on the law to guide the General Assembly on a specific request by that body as

negotiations progress, it is not hard to understand the further descent into chaos and procrastination.

14. The second preliminary matter that I must touch on concerns terrorism.

15. It is important that the record show that Saudi Arabia condemns terrorism in all of its

forms. We are committed to the fight against terrorism. We are a party to relevant multilateral and

3
United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/ES-10/13 (October 2003). Paragraph one states:
“ Demands that Israel stop and reverse the constructi on of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, which is in depart ure of the Armistice Line of 1949
and is in contradiction to relevant provisions of international law.” - 46 -

4
regional conventions and ha ve embraced Security Council resolution 1373 of 2001 . However, as

we have said in many fora, it is not enough just to condemn terrorism and fight terrorism. If one

wishes to defeat terrorism, one needs also to address the motivation and the provocation that lead to

terrorism. As our Foreign Minister, His Royal Highness Prince Saud al-Faisal said last year during

the General Debate at the General Assembly:

“[T]his international effort directed against terrorism will not eradicate this
phenomenon if handled without addressing its roots . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The deteriorating situation of peoples who are suffering oppression, injustice
and persecution, or who are overburdened by occupation, and the inability of the
international community, for one reason or a nother, to find just solutions for these
5
problems, is what creates the environment that is exploited by evildoers . . .”

This is part of the issue of terrorism.

16. A third preliminary point is to emphasize th e constructive role and the interest of Saudi

Arabia in the success of the Road Map. Indeed, the Road Map refers specifically to the initiative of

His Royal Highness Crown Prince Abdullah  which was endorsed by the Beirut Arab League

6
Summit of March 2002  that calls for acceptance of Israel as a neighbour living in peace and

security, in the context of a just and equitable settlement. The Road Map refers to the Saudi

initiative as “a vital element of international e fforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all

tracks” 7. Any student of this conflict will recognize that this initiative constitutes a major stride

towards peace. We accept two States living si de by side in harmony based upon a negotiated

settlement.

4Saudi Arabia is party to a number of multilateral convent ions against terrorism including: Convention of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating Inte rnational Terrorism, adopted at Ouagadougou (1July1999);

Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed at a m eeting held at the General Secretariat of the League of
Arab States in Cairo (22April1998); Convention on the Mark ing of Plastic Explosives fo r the Purpose of Detection,
signed at Montreal (1March1991); Protocol on the Suppr ession of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal (2 4February1988); International Convent ion against the Taking of Hostages,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations (17December1979); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, si gned at Montreal (23September1971); Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague (16 December 1970); and Convention on Offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo (14 September 1963).

5His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Statement during the General Debate at the General Assembly,
Fifty-eighth Session (29 Sept. 2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/saudeng030929.htm.

6Arab Peace Initiative, Arab League Summit (Beirut, 27-28 March 2002), available at
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm.

7United Nations doc. S/2003/529, p. 2. - 47 -

17. Thus, Mr.President and Members of th e Court, our criticism of the Wall cannot be

viewed as supporting terrorism or as undermining th e Road Map. To the contrary, we believe an

advisory opinion on the question presented will cont ribute to the objective of eliminating terrorism

and to bringing about a just and lasting peace in the region.

18. Before continuing, however, in the light of the importance that has been attached to the

Road Map in the presentations made to the Court, and given the importance of the Saudi initiative

to the Road Map, it is important to be very clear about what was decided at the Beirut Summit.

The Saudi Arabian proposal, formulated in a speech by His Royal Highness Crown Prince

Abdullah, said:

“The only acceptable objective of the peace process is the full Israeli
withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, the establishment of an independent

Palestinian state with [East Jerusalem] as its capital, and the return of refugees.

Without moving towards this objective, the peace process is an exercise in
futility and a play on words and a squanderi ng of time which perpetuates the cycle of
8
violence.”

Thus it was proposed, and again I quote: “Normal relations and security for Israel in exchange for

a full withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, recognition of an independent Palestinian state

9
with [East Jerusalem] as its capital, and the return of refugees.” This proposal was adopted

unanimously; and as noted, it is referred to as “a vital element” of the Road Map.

* *

19. I now turn to our response to the argument that has been made that the Court’s advisory

opinion on the question of the legal consequences of the Wall would prejudice or hinder or be at

cross-purposes to the Road Map, and thus the C ourt should refrain from giving its opinion. I will

respond by looking at the argument from five different points of view.

20. To begin, the argument may be examined from what might be said to be a logical point

of view. It is hard for us to understand how an advisory opinion from this Court that could inform

the General Assembly and that is non-binding wo uld truly hinder negotiations between two parties

as claimed by Israel and several other States. The advisory opinion is an opinion of law, and the

8
His Royal Highness Crown Prince Abdullah, Speech at Arab Summit (Beirut, 27-28March2002), available at
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/abdullah02.htm.
9Ibid. - 48 -

General Assembly believes it will be useful to its deliberations. We cannot lose sight of the fact

that the purpose of the General Assembly’s request for this position is to advise it in the conduct of

its work, such work including the concern for hum an rights and self-determination, not to mention

international peace and security. It is a fact th at the Palestinian people have been denied the

exercise of the right of self-determination for many decades, and this is a legitimate concern of the

General Assembly.

21. The negotiations that are mandated by the Road Map do not take place in a vacuum. The

interest of the General Assembly is not new. Resolution after resolution of both the General

Assembly and the Security Council have been disregarded by the Occupying Power in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around Jerusalem. It is the Security Council that:

 beginning with resolution242 in 1967 and, later, resolution338 of 1973 requires the

withdrawal of Israel from the territory it occupied in the 1967 War 1;

 beginning with resolution252 in 1968 consider s that all legislative and administrative

measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon,

which purport to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that

11
status ;

 in resolution446 in 1979 determined that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing

settlements in Palestine and other Arab territo ries occupied since 1967 have no legal validity

and constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace 12;

 determined in resolution452 of 1979 that Israel ’s settlement policy constitutes a violation of

13
the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 .

The list goes on and on, and includes Security Council resolution465 of 1980, which specifically

14
referred to Israel’s settlement policies as a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention .

10
United Nations Security Council resolution 242 (1967).
11
United Nations Security Council resolution252 (1968); United Nations Security Council resolution267
(1969); and United Nations Security Council resolution 298 (1971).
12United Nations Security Council resolution 446 (1979).

13United Nations Security Council resolution 452 (1979).

14United Nations Security Council resolution 465 (1980). Paragraph 5 states: - 49 -

22. It remains for the parties to negotiate thei r own solution, but it is perfectly legitimate for

the General Assembly to request the Court for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the

Wall in the context of those resolutions and other principles of international law, and for the Court

to exercise its mandate and to give its opinion.

23. The second point of view that I offer looks at this question chronologically over the last

two years in light of the argument made in the Israeli Written Statement that the General

Assembly’s request is improper in light of the S ecurity Council’s endorsement of the Road Map in

its resolution1515. A chronological review of the last two years shows that the General

Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion is consistent with its responsibilities and does not

infringe upon those of the Security Council. The Israeli Written Statement, at paragraph 3.2, states

that Security Council resolution 1397 of 12 March 2002 “sets the agenda for the Quartet initiative”.

It is, of course, that initiative, which arose from the Madrid process, that resulted in the plan now

called the Road Map. According to paragra ph1.16 of the Israeli Written Statement, the

Government of Israel approved the construction of the Wall the very next month. Actual

construction began in June that same year.

24. During 2002 and 2003 the Quartet issued communiqués following its meetings recording

15
its progress . In the communiqué of the Quartet dated 17September 2002, one can see the

complete Road Map 16. It is true that it was not formally presented to Israel and to the Palestinian

Authority until 30 April 2003, and it was not un til 19 November 2003 that the Security Council

passed a resolution in which it “endorsed” the Road Map 17. That is the operative word

“endorsed”  that is all. Throughout 2002 and 2003 the Road Map was promoted, acted upon,

called upon and interpreted. Thus, leading up to th e end of 2003, the Road Map was the centre of

“ Determines that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic
composition, institutional structure or status of the Pa lestinian and other Arab territories occupied since
1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof have no legal validity and that Israel’s policy and practices

of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a
serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.”
15The Quartet issued seven joint-communiqués in total including one statement at the Envoys level, available at

http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rt/c9963.htm.
16Middle East Quartet Communiqué (17 Sept. 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rt/15207.htm.

17United Nations Security Council resolution 1515 (2003). - 50 -

the diplomacy on this subject; but even before the Security Council endorsed it in November 2003,

its viability had become open to question.

25. The Israeli Written Statement portrays the scene as if on 19 November 2003 the Security

Council took a momentous action  as if it had just discovered the Road Map  rather than

simply endorsing something that had already been the focus of diplomacy for more than one year . 18

The Israeli Written Statement goes further to cast the General Assembly in the role of a villain by

calling for this advisory opinion a few weeks later: as if the General Assembly sought to pre-empt

the powers of the Security Council  making, as Israel asserts, the call for this advisory opinion

ultra vires to the General Assembly 19.

26. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the genesis  the date of the beginning of the

Road Map  is not 19November2003. If so, the Road Map is itself internally inconsistent as it

calls for a three-year process to be completed by 2005. The Road Map is a negotiating effort that

dates from early 2002, receiving the endorsement (a ra ther modest word after all) of the Security

Council only recently.

27. In light of Israel’s arguments that the actions of the General Assembly are ultra vires, it

is useful to note what occurred in respect of the Wall in 2002 and 2003.

28. From the date of approval of the Wall by the Israeli Government to the adoption by the

Security Council on 19November2003 of resolution1515, the Quartet issued six communiqués.

Only the last of these referred to the Wall, which was by then well along in its construction, and

then only expressed general concern. Noneth eless, throughout the period there was mounting

evidence of the humanitarian crisis created by the Wall, the growing realization that new de facto

territorial annexation by Israel was occurring, and the increasing concern that the Wall would make

negotiations impossible. However, the Security Council did not act nor did the Quartet act to

convince Israel to reverse the situation.

29. In light of these growing concerns, howev er, on 14October2003 the Security Council

considered a draft resolution 20. A preambular paragraph of th at draft resolution condemned “all

18
Israel, Written Statement, Chap. 4.
19
Ibid.
20United Nations doc. S/2003/980. - 51 -

acts of violence, terror and destruction”, wh ile an operative paragraph decided “that the

construction by Israel, the occupying Power, of a wall in the Occupied Territories departing from

the armistice line of 1949 is ille gal under relevant provisions of international law and must be

ceased and reversed”.

30. The draft resolution was not adopted by th e Security Council but in the debate no one

said that the legal conclusion of the defeated resolution was wrong 21.

31. It is in this context of the failure to comment on the legality of the Wall, and thus to

protect the Road Map, that the Emergency Special Session was called, which resulted in a request

for this advisory opinion. Thus, this review of recent events shows that the General Assembly’s

action is not precipitous, it is not irresponsible , and that it is focused on the Wall, which is

destructive of peace. There is no evidence in th e chronology that suggests that the Road Map will

be harmed if an advisory opinion is given.

32. We now turn to a third point of view on th e argument that an advisory opinion will have

negative consequences for the Road Map. This vi ewpoint looks at the issue from a practical and

historical point of view. Let us be clear, the Ro ad Map is simply a negotiating process. It is well

supported by the international community, and that is good. However, one cannot avoid the fact

that there have been other well-supported nego tiating initiatives on this problem over the last

40 years. I say this not to cast doubt on our commitment to the Road Map but simply to ensure that

the Road Map is seen for what it is.

33. The Court has been faced before with the argument that an advisory opinion on a

question before it would prejudice sensitive negotiations . It was confronted in particular with the

same argument ten years ago in the Nuclear Weapons case. At paragraph 17 of that Judgment the

Court said, and I quote:

“The Court is aware that, no matter wh at might be its conclusions in any
opinion it might give, they would have relevance for the continuing debate on the

matter in the General Assembly and woul d present an additional element in the
negotiations on the matter. Beyond that, th e effect of the opinion is a matter of
appreciation. The Court has heard contra ry positions advanced and there are no

evident criteria by which it can prefer one assessment to another. That being so, the

2Ibid. - 52 -

Court cannot regard this factor as a comp elling reason to decline to exercise its
22
jurisdiction.”

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia respectfully submits that those same reasons apply here.

34. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the argument that doing something today might

prejudice something tomorrow is a feature of diploma tic life. It probably would be hard to find an

experienced international diplomat who has not made that argument. As is the case here, it is

normally made when we want to avoid putting the spotlight on what is happening now.

35. What is happening now is that the Road Ma p is in trouble. We recognize that some of

the Quartet come to the Court and say: do not shine the spotlight on the problem. We support

these members’ work, but we believe they have seriously misread the situation. Fortunately

another member, the United Nations, and one of its organs  a competent organ  the General

Assembly  wants to put the spotlight on the problem and be informed of the legal consequences

of Israel’s actions  the legal consequences in light of the humanitarian crisis, the legal

consequences for self-determination, and indeed, the legal consequences for international peace

and security, not just for Palestine and Israel but for all States and international institutions.

36. Why should the spotlight be put on the problem? The spotlight should be put on the

problem because the Wall is so provocative, so overreaching, so aggressive, and so

disproportionate, that we believe it will be the d eath knell of the Road Map if it is not immediately

reversed.

37. The Quartet knows this. Their last joint communiqué entitled “Final Quartet Statement”

and dated 26 September 2003 indicated that they re garded the implementation of the Road Map as

stalled. The Quartet also said the settlement ac tivity must stop, and then expressed great concern

over the Wall and its effect on the Road Map 23. That was the position of the Quartet in September

of last year. What has happened since then? Since then, the Security Council did endorse the Road

22Nuclear Weapons case, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 237, para. 17.
23
Middle East Quartet Communiqué (26 Sept. 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/24721.htm.

“The Quartet members view with great concern the situation in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza
which has stalled implementation of the roadmap.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Quartet members reaffirm that, in accordance with the roadmap, settlement activity must
stop, and note with great concern the actual and proposed route of Israel ’s West Bank fence, particularly
as it results in the confiscation of Palestinind, cuts off the movement of people and goods, and
undermines Palestinians’ trust in the roadmap process as it appears to prejudge final borders of a future
Palestinian state.” - 53 -

Map, but the Wall continued to be built. The “fab ric of life”, as the Israeli Written Statement calls

it, has become even more intole rable for the Palestinian people, and, yes, the cycle of violence

continues.

38. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the fact that there was an Advisory Opinion on

24
South West Africa may have informed the views of some States and international organizations.

In spite of South Africa’s arguments that an opinion in that matter should not be issued, that did not

deter the Court. The fact that the Court conc luded that South Africa’s occupation was illegal may

actually have helped the process and left South A frica to conclude that its only option was to do

what was right: withdraw. Today, Namibia is an independent State.

25
39. The concerns of Spain in Western Sahara and those of a number of States in the

Nuclear Weapons case 26 concerning the impact of an advisory opinion on sensitive issues in a

sensitive process proved not to be true.

40. Thus, the argument that an advisory op inion on this question is counterproductive to the

Road Map cannot be sustained. This is an advisory opinion. It is not binding, but it will inform the

General Assembly that, by virtue of its requ est, has sought the Court’s opinion on the question

posed.

41. Before moving on I must say one thing about Israel’s portrayal of the Road Map. To be

sure, stage one of the Road Map concerns terrorism directed at Israel, but it also concerns Israeli

provocations against Palestine. The Road Map is not as Israel repeatedly states a document that in

bold letters says the first step is to eliminate all terrorist acts. What the Road Map says is that at the

outset of stage one, I quote: “All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel”, and

following thereafter  and again I quote: “All official Isr aeli institutions end incitement against

Palestinians” 27. The Palestinian obligation appears first on the page, but that is not an indication

that Israel is free to continue its provocations, including the construction of the Wall, until it judges

24
Legal Consequences for States of the Conti nued Presence of South Africa in Namibia , I.C.J. Reports 1971
(21 June).
25
Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports 1975 (16 Oct.).
26Nuclear Weapons case, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 236, para. 15.

27United Nations doc. S/2003/529, p. 3. - 54 -

it is satisfied that official Palestinian institutions have utterly succeeded in winning the war against

terrorism.

42. The fourth point of view about this argum ent that the Road Map could be prejudiced if

there is an advisory opinion is to note the vacuum of silence that accompanies the argument.

43. The silence I refer to is that no one say s why the Road Map will be prejudiced if the

Court gives an advisory opinion. Indeed, if one examines closely the words used, one finds that the

argument is generally hedged with phrases su ch as “could potentially prejudice” or “could

undermine”. Thus, there is simply the qualif ied assertion without any reasoned support for the

assertion. This is all the more surprising in that such assertions are normally accompanied by a

reference to the Road Map as something that needs to be restarted  not as something that is active

and vibrant and moving along. That the Road Map needs to be “relaunched,” the term used by the

European Union 28, there is no doubt; that this is a difficult and sensitive and long-standing

problem, there is no doubt; but no reason is given as to why an advisory opinion would make it all

more difficult.

44. We agree that the Road Map needs to be reinvigorated, but there is no basis for

concluding that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the Wall hinders that possibility.

45. The fifth and final point of view concerning the argument that the Court should not

pronounce upon matters that are the subject of negot iations considers the argument in light of its

legal context.

46. Mr.President and Members of the Court, this Israeli position needs to be carefully

considered because it is particularly counter-produc tive and not in accord with international law.

In fact, what Israel is saying is that the Cour t should not examine the Wall in the context of the

many resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations  nor

should it examine treaties to which Israel is a party  based upon facts supplied by the United

Nations or the Conference of the Parties to that treaty.

2Remarks of the President of the Council of the European Union at the General Assembly of the United Nations
after the adoption of resolutions A/RES/ES-10/14 and A/RE S/ES-10/13, reproduced in the Written Statement submitted
to the Court by the European Union. - 55 -

47. The fact is that the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the Conference of

29
the Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention , have spoken to some of the core issues at the heart

of this matter. In any objective sense it is not prejudicial to the Road Map if the Court examines

the Wall against those resolutions and treaty obligat ions. If Israel believes the Road Map will be

prejudiced if the Court does no more than review a fact  namely, the Wall  and this is not a

complex factual question  in light of the resolutions of the United Nations, customary

international law and Israel’s treaty obligations, that is a serious problem. That is a serious

problem for the peace process. It is a serious probl em because what it means is that so much that

has gone before is in Israel’s view irrelevant. Israel would prefer to live in a world where the

International Court of Justice has not spoken on these same questions.

48. Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem by force in 1967. The use of

force is illegal under the United Nations Charter. The Security Council called for withdrawal by

Israel in resolutions242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973, but it has not occurred. Into the territory it

occupied by force Israel moved its settlers. That is fundamentally illegal under international law no

matter what the justification for the occupation might be; it was confirmed by the Security Council

to apply in this instance; but Israel argues to the contrary.

49. Further, while it holds Palestinian territory by force, Israel denies the Palestinian people

their human rights and denies it is an Occupying Po wer subject to international humanitarian law,

and denies that it has obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention, no twithstanding decisions

of the Security Council and the General Assembly and the Conference of the Parties to the Fourth

Geneva Convention to the contrary. Israel even takes issue in its Written Statement with the fact

that the question before the Court uses the phrase “Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and

30
around East Jerusalem” .

50. Mr.President, Members of the Court, th e international community through the political

institutions of the United Nations and othe r treaty bodies has spoken to these issues on many

occasions. The list of resolutions is long. Is rael has rebuffed these conclusions and has sought

excuses for its own failures in the short comings of others; or more boldly, it has challenged the

29
Declaration of Conference of High Contracting Pa rties to the Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva,
5 Dec. 2001), available at http://www.eda/admin.ch/eda/e/home/foreign/hupol/4gc/docum2.Par0006.upf….
3Israel, Written Statement, p. 11, para. 2.9. - 56 -

international community by taking contrary positions and acting upon those positions to which

there has been no or only a muted response. Now Is rael builds a Wall. What Israel seeks to avoid

today is hearing the Court say, in connection with the legal consequences of the Wall, what the

Security Council and the General Assembly and the Conference of the Parties to the Fourth Geneva

Convention have already said but have failed to en force or implement in connection with Israel’s

post-1967 activities in the Occupied Palestinian Te rritory, including in and around Jerusalem. If

Israel is not going to meet such obligations re gardless of the prior failings of international

institutions, there is no hope for the Road Map or future peace efforts.

51. The Court need not decide those issues that have been relegated to Phase III of the Road

Map, which appears to be a central concern, including the borders of Palestine, when it answers the

question before it; but at the same time, it will not be at cross purposes with the Road Map if:

 the Court notes that the Wall is largely within te rritory that Israel has occupied by force for

more than 35years and from which it has not withdrawn as required by Security Council

31
resolution 242 of 1967 and later by 338 of 1973 ;

 the Court notes that the Wall encloses and makes c ontiguous to Israel almost all of the Israeli

settlements in the West Bank which were condemned as illegal in Security Council

resolution 446 of 1979, thereby consolidating an d enhancing Israel’s annexation of Palestinian

land 32;

31See also United Nations Security Council resolution 471 (1980) (“Reaffirm[ing] the overriding necessity to end

the prolonged occupation of Arab territo ries occupied by Israel since 1967,including Jerusalem”); United Nations
Security Council resolution 476 (1980) (same).
32See also United Nations Security Council resolution452 ( 1979) (considering the settlements to be in violation
of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and calling upon Israel “to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment,

construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territries occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem”); United
Nations Security Council resolution465 (1980) (considering th e settlements to be a violation of the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949; determining that the settlements “constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just
and lasting peace in the Middle East”; and calling upon Israel “to dismantle the exis ting settlements and in particular to
cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied
since 1967, including Jerusalem”). - 57 -

 the Court notes that the Wall in and around East Jerusalem violates the Security Council’s

decision found first in resolution252 of 1968 that Israel’s attempt to annex East Jerusalem is

33
illegal ; and

 the Court notes that the Wall is a breach of the duties of the Occupying Power under the Fourth

Geneva Convention of 1949 to which Israel is a party, as has been stated and restated by the

Security Council and the General Assembly in resolutions for more than one quarter of a

century 34.

Such findings by the Court in the course of cons idering the illegal consequences of the Wall, far

from running at cross purposes with the Road Map, would be a welcome reminder of the reality,

the legality, and the context within which those negotiations must occur.

52. Nowhere is this more obvious than with re gard to the Israeli view that Security Council

resolutions242 and 338 do not require its withdr awal from the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

including in and around East Jerusalem, and that its settlements are perfectly legal. Israel portrays

its occupation and annexation of territory as a complex problem 35. It is not a complex problem as a

legal matter. It may be a complex political problem for Israel, but the Israeli Government does

nothing but continue to make that problem mo re difficult. The establishment of settlements

continues unabated with only an occasional ch arade of removing a far-flung outpost. Israel

believes it has the right to acquire the territory of these settlements by force. Israel also believes it

33The Security Council has repeatedly declared attempts to change the status of East Jerusalem illegal and has
called upon Israel to rescind such measures. See United Nations Security Council resolution 267 (1969); United Nations
Security Council resolution271 (1969); United Nations Security Council resolution298 (1971); United Nations
Security Council resolution446 (1979); United Nations Security Council resolution465 (1980); United Nations

Security Council resolution471 (1980); United Nations Security Council resolution476 (1980); United Nations
Security Council resolution 478 (1980).
34The following resolutions affirm the applicability of the F ourth Geneva Convention of 1949: United Nations

Security Council resolution271 (1969); United Nations Security Council resolution446 (1979); United Nations
Security Council resolution465 (1980); United Nations Security Council resolution471 (1980); United Nations
Security Council resolution484 (1980); United Nations Security Council resolution592 (1986); United Nations
Security Council resolution605 (1987); United Nations Security Council resolution607 (1988); United Nations
Security Council resolution636 (1989); United Nations Security Council resolution641 (1989); United Nations
Security Council resolution672 (1990); United Nations Security Council resolution726 (1992); United Nations
Security Council resolution799 (1992); United Nations Security Council resolution904 (1994); United Nations
Security Council resolution 1322 (2000). Further, the following resolutions found Israel to be in violation of the Fourth

Geneva Convention of 1949: United Nati ons Security Council resolution452 (1979); United Nations Security Council
resolution465 (1980); United Nations Security Council re solution469 (1980); United Nations Security Council
resolution471 (1980); United Nations Security Council re solution592 (1986); United Nations Security Council
resolution605 (1987); United Nations Security Council re solution607 (1988); United Nations Security Council
resolution636 (1989); United Nations Security Council re solution641 (1989); United Nations Security Council
resolution681 (1990); United Nations Security Council re solution694 (1991); United Nations Security Council
resolution 799 (1992).

35Israel, Written Statement, p. 40, para. 3.52. - 58 -

is not subject to the requirements of internationa l humanitarian law in the territory it occupies.

These are astounding propositions that fly in the face of international law and the will of the

international community. That an advisory opinion might touch on such basic points in the

examination of whether there are legal consequences of the Wall Israel finds to be prejudicial. It

can only be prejudicial to Israel if Israel is deem ed to have special rights to avoid the same rules

that bind other States.

* *

53. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there is no legal bar that prevents the Court from

rendering its opinion. The General Assembly has asked a legal question and is competent to do so.

The question is neither vague nor abstract, and the facts are perfectly clear. The jurisprudence of

the Court requires the Court to render an advisory opinion unless there are compelling reasons for it

not to do so. In this matter the argument has been made that such a compelling reason is the Road

Map, which as is said, must be relaunched, which some States believe could be prejudiced if the

Court gives its opinion. We have sought to give a contrary view. We do not believe that the fact

that there is a negotiating process is such a compelling reason to cause the Court to decide not to

render its opinion.

54. In closing let me make one final comment . In its Written Statement Israel has made a

reckless assertion to intimidate the Court. It argues that an opinion from the Court could embolden

36
terrorists . It is much more likely that the opposite is true. An advisory opinion on this question

will not increase terrorism, nor will it harm the Road Map, but it may give hope that the rule of law

will be respected. An advisory opinion will give guidance to the efforts of the General Assembly.

It may recall the law that is applicable to all a nd that protects the people in occupied territory, and

leads to self-determination and to peace. We all know this matter will not be resolved in a court;

hopefully, it will be resolved one day through negotiations. Having the Court’s advisory opinion as

negotiations go forward to inform the General Assembly can hardly be a bad thing.

55. Finally, before I close, I must note that in addition to all of the other concerns, the Wall

in East Jerusalem has an additional dimension. Its impact is to make access to the Holy Sites there

3Ibid. - 59 -

virtually impossible to access by those who come to worship. This is of special concern to Saudi

Arabia and should be of special concern to all.

* *

56. Thank you, Mr. President and Members of th e Court, for your attention. That concludes

my presentation.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr.Ambassador. I now give the floor to HisExcellency

Ambassador Choudhury of Bangladesh.

Mr. CHOUDHURY: Mr. President, esteemed Members of the Court, let me at the outset

thank you for giving me this opportunity to app ear before you and make this presentation. On

behalf of the Government of Bangladesh I deem it a great honour and privilege to make certain

submissions on the legal consequences of the cons truction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory. As a Member of the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization

of Islamic Conference, Bangladesh has consistent ly supported early termination of the illegal

occupation of Palestinian territory as well as the right of self-determination of the Palestinian

people. In line with its consistent prin cipled position Bangladesh voted in favour of

resolution ES-10/16 of 3 December 2003 in the Gene ral Assembly and in favour of the decision to

request the International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article65 of the Statute, to urgently render

an advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from the construction of the Wall by Israel.

I would make our submissions in the following order:

1. Submissions on the overriding importance and universal applicability of the advisory opinion to

be rendered by the International Court of Justice.

2. Submissions on application of United Nations Security Council and United Nations General

Assembly resolutions for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on the termination of

the illegal occupation of Palestinian territory and the self-determination of the Palestinian

people.

3. Submissions in respect of the applicati on of the Fourth Geneva Convention and other

international instruments. - 60 -

4. Submissions in respect of the legal consequences of the construction of the Wall.

1. The overriding importance and universal app licability of the advisory opinion to be
rendered by the International Court of Justice

Under the first heading Bangladesh would like to submit that the request for an advisory

opinion made in resolutionES-10/16 is well f ounded in international law and is timely and

appropriate in the context of the prevailing conditi ons in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The

basis of this submission is the persistent and con tinuing Israeli disregard of resolutions adopted by

the United Nations Security Council, principally resolutions242 and 348 and relevant resolutions

of the United Nations General Assembly, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and Additional

Protocols and general international law. This persisting pattern of disregard over the decades

threatens to undermine the authority and applicati on of fundamental and peremptory norms of the

United Nations Charter and international law.

Bangladesh considers that for the above reasons the advisory opinion to be rendered by the

International Court of Justice will have significance beyond the Middle East and to future situations

of conflict in different parts of the world. Sin ce in the view of Bangladesh, the International Court

of Justice will deliberate on fundamental princi ples of the Charter of the United Nations and

international law, the Court’s pronouncement, will be timely, appropriate and likely to make a most

valuable contribution to the establishment of p eace not only in the Middle East but all over the

world.

In this connection Bangladesh would like to recall the observations of the distinguished

South African delegations in the debate of 8December 2003 at the 10th Emergency Special

Session of the General Assembly, in reference to the request for an advisory opinion as follows:

“a clear precedent already exists for such an approach. In 1971 the United Nations
Security Council called for an advisory opinion from International Court of Justice on

the legal consequences for States of the occ upation of Namibia. That opinion proved
to be a turning point in the long struggle for independence of that country. We believe
that Palestinians and Israelis alike w ould similarly benefit from a ruling of the
International Court of Justice.”

Bangladesh fully concurs with this view. We also fully concur with the positions strongly

stated in the previous presentations highlighting how the advisory opinion of this esteemed court

will be in full consonance with positions taken by it in the past, the objective dictates of moral and - 61 -

legal compulsions and the overarching imperative to take all necessary steps to establish enduring

peace in Palestine.

Bangladesh expresses its conviction that the advisory opinion to be rendered by the

International Court of Justice will strengthen the application of the basic principles enshrined in the

United Nations Charter and in gene ral international law and would reaffirm that a just and lasting

peace in the Middle East can only be established on the basis of these principles.

2. The application of the principles of the United Nations Charter, the resolutions of United
Nations Security Council and United Nations General Assembly, for a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East based on the terminat ion of the illegal occupation of Palestinian

territory and the self-determination of the people of Palestine

We would like to submit that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is based on the

fundamental principle of the United Nations Charte r and general international law that forcible

occupation of Palestinian territory is illegal and attempted annexation of territory through use of

force is also illegal. This principle underlin es the relevant Untied Nations Security Council

resolutions including resolutions 2 42, 338, 1397 and 1402. It also informs the peace process, and

the recommendations of the Mitchell Report, the Tenet Work Plan and the Road Map endorsed by

the Quartet. This fundamental principle requires the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied

territories and the declaration of Israeli settlements illegal and an obstacle to peace and calls for the

complete cessation of settlement activities. The construction of the Wall operates to frustrate and

undermine the application of this fundamental principle and represents a move to annex and

permanently occupy the territory of Palestine and alter the ground realities to the detriment of the

people of Palestine. A series of United Nations Ge neral Assembly resolutions have reaffirmed the

inalienable right of the Palestinian people to sel f-determination including their right to have an

independent State of their own while recognizing that all States in the region have the right to live

in peace within secure and internationally recogni zed boundaries. The ongoing construction of the

Wall effectively denies the right of the people of Pa lestine to self-determination. The construction

also negates the inalienable right to return of the Palestinian people. - 62 -

3. The application of international humanitar ian law and in particular the Fourth Geneva
Convention

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 pr ohibits the occupying power from depriving

protected persons from the benefit of the Conve ntion in any case or in any manner whatsoever

including annexation of the whole or part of the occupied territory (Art.47). This provision has

been described as having “an absolu te character”. The provision also incorporates a universally

recognized rule endorsed by jurists and conf irmed by numerous rulings of national and

international courts, namely, “As long as hostilities continue the Occupying Power cannot therefore

annex the occupied territory, even if it occupies th e whole of the territory concerned. A decision

on the point can only be reached in the peace treat y.” The construction of the Wall violates and

breaches this basic rule, which has b een declared applicable to the Occupied Territory of Palestine

by resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly.

The construction of the Wall also breaches Articles 9, 39, 51 of the Fourth Ge neva Convention. It

effectively deprives the Palestinian people from enjoyment of their property, access to employment

and means of livelihood, access to natural resources necessary for human survival.

For these reasons it is our submission that th e construction of the Wall constitutes a grave

breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and th e Additional Protocols of 1977 enjoy universal

acceptance and have passed into customary international law. These instruments constitute the

central pillars of international humanitarian la w. In the hierarchy of norms, the Geneva

Conventions enjoy precedence. The Israeli claim that the Wall constructed in the Occupied

Palestine Territory as a security barrier is not tena ble. The location of the Wall itself raises grave

questions of legality and the actual motive behind the construction of the Wall in the Occupied

Territories. As was made amply clear in the Pale stinian presentation this morning, the security

needs could very well have been addressed by Isr ael without fundamentally altering the character

of the Occupied Territories and segmenting it in to small parcels with the presence of Israeli

settlements. Bangladesh respectfully submits that the International Court of Justice reaffirms the

sanctity of the Geneva Conventions and their application to the situation now obtaining in

Palestine. It is necessary that this be so for the maintenance of international peace and security and

that an affirmation of fundamental points of law is essential to uphold the rule of law amongst - 63 -

nations. The International Court of Justice, we hope, will adjudge and declare the construction of

the Wall as illegal and contrary to general international law. We also hope that the esteemed Court

will spell out in clear terms the legal consequences of the construction of this Wall.

4. The legal consequences of the construction of the Wall

The construction of the Wall in Palestine te rritory by the Occupying Power represents the

culmination of a long-standing policy of permanen t occupation and annexatio n of territory. The

construction engenders crimes against humanity and in particular the following:

(a)Intentionally directing attacks against the ci vilian population as such or against individual

civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities,

(b) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military

objectives,

(c)Intentionally directing attacks against personne l, installations, materials, units or vehicles

involved in a humanitarian assistance or peace-keep ing mission in accordance with the United

Nations Charter, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian

objects under the international law of armed conflicts,

(d)The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian

population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the

population of the Occupied Territory within or outside this Territory,

(e) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or

charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospita ls and places where the sick and wounded are

collected, provided they are not military objectives,

(f) Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unl ess such destruction or seizure be imperatively

demanded by the necessities of war,

(g) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the

nationals of the hostile party,

(h) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,

(i) Intentionally directing attacks against buildin g, materials, medical units and transport and

personnel using the distinctive emblems of th e Geneva Conventions in conformity with

international law, - 64 -

(j) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects

indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for

under the Geneva Convention.

Bangladesh submits that the impact of the cons truction of the Wall in and at the vicinity of

Jerusalem also deserves special consideration by th e International Court of Justice, as it alters or

purports to alter the special status of the Holy City sacred to three great faiths. Bangladesh believes

that the solution of the problem of Jerusalem and abandoning the construction of the Wall in the

vicinity of the Holy City is a key to the achievement of just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Conclusion

Mr. President, in conclusion, we would like to reiterate that the construction of the Wall

contravenes, in letter and sprit, the United Na tions General Assembly resolutionA/ES/10/13 of

October 2003, which asserts that the construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

including in and around East Jerusalem, is a departure from the Armistice of 1949 and it does not

follow the “Green Line” of 1967. Bangladesh believes that the advisory opinion of the

International Court of Justice, based on the submissions made by us and others, can act as a catalyst

for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and to the re-establishment of the

rule of law amongst nations.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. This concludes the oral statement and the

comments of Bangladesh and brings these hearings to a close. The Court will meet again

tomorrow at 10 a.m. when it will hear Belize, Cuba, Indonesia and Jordan.

The Court is adjourned.

The Court rose at 5.50 p.m.

___________

Document Long Title

Public sitting held on Monday 23 February 2004, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

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