Nofi-Corrigé
Uncorrected
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THEHAGUE LA HAYE
Publicsitting
held on Wednesday12May 1999,at 10.00 am, ut the PeacePalace,
Vice-PresidentWeeramanhy,Acting President,presiding
in the casesconcerningLegalityof Useof Force
(Yugoslaviuv. Belgium) (Yugoslmiiav. Canada)(Yugoslaviav. France) (Yugoslaviav.
Gerrnany)(Yugoslaviav. Italy) (Yugoslm>v. Netherlands)(Yugoslaviav. Portugal)
(Yugoslaviav. Spain) (Yugoslaviav. UnitedKingdom) (Yugoslavv.
UnitedStatesof America)
Requestsfor the indicationofprovisionalmeusures
VERBATIMRECORD
ANNEE1999
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 12mai 1999,10 heures, au Palais dela Paix,
sous laprésidencedeM. Weeramanhy,vice-président
faisantfonction deprésident
dans lesaffaires relatiàla Licéitde l'emploide laforce
(Yougoslavie Belgique)(Yougoslaviec Canada)(Yougoslavie c France) (Yougoslaviec
Allemagne) (Yougoslàviec Italie) (YougoslavcePays-Bas)(Yougoslaviec Portugal)
(Yougoslaviec Espagne) (Yougoslavic Royaume-Uni) (Yougoslaviec
Eta&-Unisd'Amérique)
Demandesen indicationde mesures conservatoires
COMPTERENDUPresent: Vice-President WeeramantryA , ctingPresident
President Schwebel
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra- ranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Judgesad hoc KreCa
Duinslaeger
Lalonde
Gaja
TorresBernhrdez
Registrar Valencia-Ospina Weeramantryv,ice-président, faisant fonctprésidentourles affaires
Présents: M. Schwebel,présidente la Cour
M.
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek,juges
Kreta
Duinslaeger
Lalonde
Gaja
TorresBemhdeq juges ad hoc
M. Valencia-Ospina,greffierThe Governmentof the FederalRepublic of Yugoslaviaisrepresentedby:
Mr. Rodoljub Etinski, Chief Legal Adviser in the Ministry-of Foreign Affairs, Professorof
International Law, Novi Sad University,
as Agent;
H. E. Mr. Milan GrubiC,Ambassadorof the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. TanBrownlie,C.B.E., Q.C., Chichele Professor of Public International Law, Oxford,
Mr. Carlos Casillas Velez, Vice-President of the Mexican Academy of International Law and
Professor of Law at UNAM University,
Mr. Olivier Corten,Lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the Free University ofBrussels,
Mr. Stevan DjordjeviC,Professor ofInternational Law, Belgrade University,
Mr. Pierre Klein, Lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the Free University ofBrussels,
Mr. Miodrag MitiC,Assistant Federal Minister for ForeignAffairs of the Federal Republic of
Y ugoslavia (Ret.),
Mr.Eric Suy,Professorat the CatholicUniversityof Leuven, former Under-Secretary-Generaland
Legal Counsel of the United Nations,
Mr.Paul J. 1M. deWaart,ProfessoremeritusofInternationalLaw,FreeUniversityof Amsterdam,
as Counsel andAdvocates;
Mrs. Sanja MilinkoviC,
as Assistant.
The Governmentof the Kingdomof Belgium isrepresentedby:
Mrs.RaymondeFoucart-Kleynen,Director-General LegalMattersattheMinistry ofForeign Affairs,
as Agent;
Mr.JohanVerbeke,DeputyDirector-General,Directorate-GeneralforMultilateralPoliticalRelations
and Special Matters at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Deputy-Agent;
Mr. Rusen Ergec,Advocate at the Brussels Bar and Professor at the Free University of Brussels,
Mr. Patrick Geortay,Advocate at the Bmssels Bar,
Mrs. Colette Taquet,Counsellorto the Minister for Foreign Affairs.Le Gouvernementde la Républiquefédérald ee Yougoslavieest représentépar :
M. Rodoljub Etinski, conseiller juridique principal au ministère des affaires étrangèresde la
Républiquefédérale de Yougoslavieet professeurde droit international l'universitéde Novi
Sad,
commeagent;
S. Exc. M. Milan GrubiS,ambassadeur de la Républiquefédérale de Yougoslavie aux Pays-Bas,
commecoagent;
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E.,membredu barreau d'Angleterre,professeurde droitinternationalpublic,
titulaire de la chaireicheleà l'universitéd'Oxford,
M. Carlos Casillas Velez, vice-président de1'AcademiaMexicanade Derecho Internationalet
professeur dedroit internationall'université nationale autonomedu Mexique (UNAM),
M. Olivier Corten, maîtrede conférencesà la facultéde droit de l'université librede Bruxelles,
M. Stevan DjordjeviC,professeur de droit internationàll'universitéde Belgrade,
M. Pierre Klein, maître de conférences la faculté de droitde l'université libre deBruxelles,
M. Miodrag MitiC,ancienministrefédéral adjointdes affairesétrangèree laRépublique fédérale
de Yougoslavie,
M. Eric Suy, professeurà l'universitécatholique de Louvain (K.U. Leuven), ancien Secrétaire
généraa ldjoint et conseillerjuridique de l'organisation des Nations Unies,
M. Paul J. 1.M. de Waart,professeur émérite de droit internationalà la Vrije Universiteit
d'Amsterdam,
commeconseil et avocats;
Mme Sanja MilinkoviC,
commeassistante.
Le Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique est représentépar :
Madame Raymonde Foucart-Kleynen, directeur général des affaires juridiques du ministèredes
affaires étrangères,
commeagent;
M. Johan Verbeke, directeur général adjointde la direction générale des relationspolitiques
multilatéraleset des questions thématiquesdu ministère des affaires étrangères,
commeagent adjoint;
M. Rusen Ergec, avocat au barreau de Bruxelles et professeàrl'université libre deBruxelles,
M. Patrick Geortay, avocat au barreaude Bruxelles;
Mme ColetteTaquet, conseiller du ministre des affaires étrangères. -6-
TheGovernmentof Canada isrepresentedby:
H. E. Mr. Philippe Kirsch, Q.C., Ambassadorand Legal Adviser to the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade,
as Agent and Advocate;
Mr. Alan Willis, Q.C., Department of Justice,
as Senior Counsel;
Ms. Sabine Nolke, Depariment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Ms. IsabellePoupart, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
as Counsel;
Mr. James Lynch, Embassy of Canada in the Netherlands,
as Adviser.
TheGovernmentof the Republicof France isrepresentedby:
Mr. Ronny Abraham, Director of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs,
as Agent;
Mr. Alain Pellet,
as Counseland Advocate;
Mr. Jean-Michel Favre, Depariment of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Guillaume Etienne, Depariment of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Defence,
as Counsellors.
TheGovernmentof the FederuiRepublicof Germany isrepresentedby:
Mr. GerhardWestdickenberg,DirectorGeneralforLegalAffairs and LegalAdviser,Federal Foreign
Off~ce,
asAgent and Counsel;
Mr. Reinhard Hilger, Deputy LegalAdviser of the Federal Foreign Office,
as Co-Agent and Counsel;
H.E. Mr.Eberhard U. B. von Puttkamer, Ambassador of theFederal Republicof Germanyto the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Christophe Eick, Federal Foreignffice,
Mr. Manfred P. Emmes, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Hague,
as Advisers.Le Gouvernement du Canada est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Philippe Kirsch, Q.C., ambassadeur et conseiller-juridique auprès du ministèredes
affaires étrangères etdu commerce international,
commeagent et avocat;
M. Alan Willis, Q.C., ministèrede lajustice,
commeconseil principal;
Mme SabineNolke, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce international
Mme Isabelle Poupart, ministère des affairesétrangèreset du commerceinternational
commeconseil;
M. James Lynch, conseiller à l'ambassade du Canadaaux Pays-Bas,
commeconseiller.
Le Gouvernement de la République françahe estreprésentépar :
M. Ronny Abraham, directeur des affairesjuridiques au ministère des affaires étrangères,
commeagent;
M. Alain Pellet,
commeconseil et avocat;
M. Jean-Michel Favre, direction des affairesjuridiques duministèredes affaires étrangères,
M. GuillaumeEtienne, direction des affairesjuridiques du ministère dela défense,
commeconseillers.
Le Gouvernement de la Républiquefédérale d'Allemagneest représentépar :
M. Gerhard Westdickenberg,directeur générad lu département des affairesjujridiques, ministère
fédéradl es affaires étrangères,
commeagent et conseil;
M. Reinhard Hilger, conseillerjuridique adjoint du ministère fédéral des affaétrangères,
commeCO-agentet conseil;
S.Exc.M.EberhardU.B.von Puttkamer,ambassadeurde laRépubliquefédérald e'AllemagneauxPays-Bas,
M. ChristopheEick, ministèrefédérad les affaires étrangères,
M. Manfred P. Emmes, ambassade de la Républiquefédérale d'Allemagne à La Haye,
commeconseillers.TheGovernmentof Ztalyisrepresentedby:
Mr. Umberto Leanza, Headof the DiplomaticLegal Serviceat the Ministry of ForeignAffairs,
as Agent;
Mr. Luigi Daniele, Professor at the University of Trieste,
Mr. Luigi Sico, Research assistant at the University of Rome II,
as Counsellors;
Mrs. Ida Caracciolo,
as Assistant.
TheGovernmentof the Kingdom of the Netherlandsisrepresentedby:
Prof.Dr. J. G. Larnmers,Acting Legal Adviserof the Ministryof ForeignAffain, Headofthe ~nternationf
Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agent;
Mr. H. A. M. von Hebel, Legal Counsel in the International Law Department ofthe Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
as Co-Agent.
TheGovernmentof the Republicof Portugal isrepresentedby:
Mr. José Maria TeixeiraLeite Martins, Head of the Legal Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
as Agent;
H. E. Mr. JoZioRosa La, Ambassador of the Republic of Portugal to the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent,
Mr. José Rosa, Counsellorat the PortugueseEmbassy in The Hague,
Mr. Pedro Carmona,member of the Department of Legal Affairs of the Foreign Ministry.
TheGovernmentof the Kingdom of Spain isrepresentedby:
H. E. Mr.Aurelio Pérez Giralda,Director of the InternationalLegal Departmentat the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
as Agent;
Mr. FélixValdés,Minister Counsellor (Chargéd'affaires)at the Embassyof Spain in the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mrs. Adela Diaz Bernhdez, Embassy Secretary, Member of the International Legal Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel.Le Gouvernementde la République italienne est représenp ar :
M. UmbertoLeanza, chef duservicecontentieuxdiplomatiqueduministèredesaffaires étrangèresdel'Italie
commeagent;
M. Luigi Daniele, professeur de l'universitéde Trieste,
M. Luigi Sico, chercheur de l'universitéde Rome II,
commeconseillers,
Mme Ida Caracciolo,
commeassistante.
Le Gouvernementdu Royaumedes Pays-Bas est représenté par :
M. J. G. Lammers, faisant fonction de conseillerjuridique auprèsdu ministèredes affaires étrang,hefc
du départementdu droit international duministère desaffairesétrangères,
commeagent;
M. H. A. M. von Hebel, conseiljuridique au départementdu droit international du ministère des affaires
étrangères,
commecoagent.
Le Gouvernementde la République portugaise est représentpar :
M. José MariaTeixeira Leite Martins, directeur du départementdes affairesjuridiques du ministère des
affaires étrangères dela Républiqueportugaise,
commeagent;
S. Exc. M. JoiioRosa L2, ambassadeur de la Républiqueportugaise aux Pays-Bas,
commecoagent.
M. JoséRosa, conseiller à l'ambassade du Portugalà La Haye,
M. Pedro Carmona,membre du département des affairesjuridiques du ministèredes affaires étrangères.
Le Gouvernementdu Royaume d'Espagneest représenté par :
M. Aurelio Pérez Giralda, directeurdu servicejuridique international du ministèredes affaires étrangères
d'Espagne,
commeagent;
M. Félix Valdésm , inistre conseiller (chargé d'affaàrl'ambassadedu Royaumed'Espagne à La Haye,
commeCO-agent;
MmeAdelaDiazBernArdez,secrétaired'ambassade,membreduservicejuridique internationaldu ministère
des affaires étrangères,
commeconseil.The Government of theUnitedKingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland
isrepresented by:
Sir FranklinD. Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Legal Adviser to th& Commonwealth Office,
as Agent;
The Rt. Hon. John Morris, M.P., Q.C., Attomey-General,
Professor Christopher Greenwood,Q.C.,
as Counsel;
Mr. Michael Wood, C.M.G.,Deputy Legal Adviser, For&iCommonwealthOfice,
as DepuîyAgent;
Mr. Martin Hemming,
Mr. Iain MacLeod,
Mr. Rupert Cazalet,
as Advisers;
Ms. Avril Syme,
as Secretary.
The Government of thUnite dtates ofAmricaisrepresentedby:
Mr. David R. Andrews, Legal Adviser, United States Department ofState,
as Agent;
Mr. Michael J. Matheson,Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Departmentof State,
as Co-Agent; -
Mr. JohnR.Crook, AssistantLegal Adviserfor United Nations Affairs, United StatesDepartmentof State,
as CounselandAdvocate;
Mr. Allen S. Weiner, Legal Counsellor, United StatesEmbassy, The Hague,
Mr.David.A. Koplow, Deputy General Counsel, United Nations Department ofDefense,
as Counsel;
H. E. Mrs. Cynthia Schneider,Ambassador of the United States of America to the Netherlands.Le Gouvernementdu Royaume-Unide Grande-Bretagneet d'Irlandedu Nord
est représentépar :
sir Franklin D. Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C.,conseiller juridique du ministèredes affaires étrangères etdu
Commonwealth,
comme agent;
le très honorable JohnMorris, M.P., Q.C.,Attorney-General,
M. Christopher Greenwood,Q.C., ,
comme conseils;
M. Michael Wood, C.M.G., conseiller juridique adjoint du ministère des affaires étrangères etdu
Commonwealth,
comme agentadjoint;
M. Martin Hemming,
M. Iain MacLeod,
M. Rupert Cazalet,
comme conseillers;
Mme Avril Syme,
commesecrétaire.
Le Gouvernementdes Etats-Unisdymérique est représenté par :
M. David R. Andrews,
comme agent;
M. Michael J. Matheson,
comme coagent;
M. John R. Crook, conseiller juridique adjoint chargédes questions concernant les Nations Unies au
département d'Etatdes Etats-Unis,
comme conseilet avocat;
M. Allen S. Weiner, conseillerjuridiqueà l'ambassadedes Etats-Unis d'Amérique à La Haye.
M. David.A. Koplow, conseil généraa ldjoint, ministèrede la défensedes Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
commeconseil;
S. Exc. Madame Cynthia Schneider,ambassadeurdes Etats-Unis d'Amérique auxPays-Bas. - 12 -
The VICE-PRESIDENT,acting President: Please be seated.
The Court meets today for the second round of hearingin the cases concerningLegalis, of
Useof Force institutedby Yugoslavia. And 1call upon thedistinguishedAgentof Yugoslaviato
commencethe second round of submissions.
Mr. ETINSKI: Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court.
Our second round presentation should cast more light on issues raised by the Respondents
and complete our arguments.
Mr. Brownlie will elaborate upon three propositions:
- First, the Respondents have failedto establish the legalityof their use of force;
- Second, in the circumstances,the intensive bombingof Yugoslav populatedareas constitutes 1
a breach of ArticleII of the Genocide Convention;
- Third,the respondentStatesarejointly and severallyresponsiblefor breachesof the Genocide
Conventionandotherbreaches ofinternationallaw committedthroughtheir instrumentalityof
NATO military command structure.
Mr. Corten will demonstratethat the declaration of the Federal Republicof Yugoslaviaon
the acceptanceof thejurisdiction of the Court of 25 April 1999is valid to establishjurisdiction of
the Court in relation to the Respondents which have also accepted compulsoryjurisdiction.
The second round will be concluded by my argument on the satisfactionof al1conditions
provided for by Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Article 73 of the Rules of Court.
Mr. President, would you be so kind as to call uponMr. Brownlie to take the floor.
The VICE-PRESIDENT,acting President: Mr. Brownlie,please.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President,distinguishedMembersofthe Court,1appearin the secondroundto elaborate
upon three propositions.
First, the ten respondentStateshave failed to establishthe legality of their use of force in a
situation in which the legal status of the use of force is a central question.
Secondly,inthecircumstancesthe intensivebombingofYugoslavpopulatedareasconstitutes
a breach of Article II of the Genocide Convention. - 13 -
Thirdly, the respondent States are jointly and severally responsible for breaches of the
GenocideConvention,andotherbreachesof international lawcommittedthroughtheinstrumentality
of the NATO military command structure.
As a preface, it is appropriate to affirm that, even in the context of a request for interim
measures,it isnecessaryforthe Courtto reviewthe issuesofthemerits. Perhapsnotina definitive
way but nonethe less so to do. This is evident from the perusal of the text of almost anyOrder
the Court hasevermade, as for example,in the recent past theOrder of 8 April 1993in the Bosnia
case.
If the bombing constituted a humanitarian interventionand, as such, it was lawfûl, two
consequences would follow:
First, itwould constitutea lawfuluse of forceand secondly, itwould notapriori constitute
genocide.
In this situation if the respondent State simplyreserved their position "on the merits", they
arenot assistingthe Court inthe exerciseof itsjudicial functions,and they are takingcertainrisks.
After this preface, 1turn to the first subject of this short speech.he respondentStates in
the course of the ten hours placed at their disposal made no effort to offer a developed legal
justification forthe air offensive. It is true that, quite exceptionally,the representative of Belgium
contended that it was an armed humanitarian intervention which was compatiblewith Article 2,
paragraph 4, and he admitted that the alleged principle was emerging slowly. (See CR 99/15,
pp. 16-17.)
Other Respondents made no reference to humanitarian intervention but used the unusual
phrase "humanitariancatastrophe". None of the Respondentsfound it possibleto offer alternative
authorities to those presented by Yugoslavia or to Saythat the British Foreign Officeassessment
of 1986was unacceptable.
The attitude adopted by the respondent States in these proceedings leads to strange
contradictions. Thus certain respondent States (see CR 99/16, p. 14, para. 33) assert that even
civilian casualtiesare an inevitable,and thereforepresumably lawful,risk generatedbythe alleged
humanitarian intervention. In contrast, when deaths and injuries were caused to diplomatic
personnel, President Clintonand otherHead of State,or Heads of Government,apologized, saying
that the missile strike was the result of a mistake. -14-
But, Mr. President, if humanitarian intervention is involved why should apologies be
forthcoming in respectof the diplomatsof third States,but not the civilians of Belgrade? Why is
it that considerationsof legality intrude on some occasionsand not others?
Before 1 leavethe issue of the alleged humanitarian intervention, itis necessary to remind
the Court that NATO briefing and numerous official statements have stressed the objective of
puttingthe populationunder pressure,withthe purposeofcreating interna1political upheavals. The
selection of targets confinns such a policy of collective coercion.
1 come now to the second propositionthat is, that the intensive bombing of Yugoslavia
constitutes a serious breach of Article II of the Genocide Convention. This provisiondefines
genocideintermsofacts "commiîtedwithintentto destroy,inwholeor in part,anational, ethnicalv
racial or religious group, as such".
The evidence available shows that the bombingaffects the populated areas of the whole of
Yugoslavia. In my submission,this wouldclearly constitutea national groupas such, andNATO
statementsmake it clear that it is the populationas a wholewhich isto be intimidated. Moreover,
the distinguished representative of Italy has pointed out that the actions affect "l'ensemblede la
populationd'unEtat", which, in this case of course, is Yugoslavia. (CR 99/19, p. 12.)
Severalopponents haveassertedthatYugoslavia hasfailedto produceevidenceof genocide.
This is not true. The evidence presented by Yugoslavia of the bombing and its effects permits a
number of inferencesrelevant to the constituentsof genocide, including"deliberatelyinflictingon
the group conditionsof life calculatedto bring about its physical destruction in whole or -n part".
Such inferencesinclude the following:
First: the largenumber of civiliandeaths and the resulting knowledge ofthe risk of death.
Second: the high explosive power of the missiles and the widespread effects of blast.
Third: the incendiaryelement in these new weapons andthe knowledgethat somevictims
are quite commonly bumt to death.
Fourth: the sheer extent of the destruction in urban areas.
Fifth: the general disruption of patterns of life.
Sixth: the extensivedarnageto the health care systemand the deliberatecreation of risksto
patients by causing power cuts. - 15 -
1 pause hereto ask a simple question: how many of the ladiesand gentlemen sittingon the
other side of the room have ever been bombed, evenonce? -
We are talking here aboutthe massive use of firepower, including,we are told - and this
is a boast we hear almost daily - 600 sorties every 24 hours. Now, British people of my
generationhave direct experienceof bombing. 1was brought up in Liverpool, 1was sevenwhen
the war began, and we were bombed every night. Liverpoolwas an important seaport. Perhaps
the more recent generationis less experienced in these matters, and perhaps less sensitive. And,
of course,the type of ordnanceused now is muchmore advancedthan Second WorldWarbombs.
Thismassive exerciseinthecoercionof a EuropeanState isdescribedinterms of euphemism
by Ouropponents. It is describedwithout referenceto real bombs andmissiles. The representative
of the United Kingdom referred to "the military action" (CR 99/23, p. 13, para. 17). The
representative of Canada spokeof the "NATO air operations (CR 99/16, p. 11, para. 20).
The direct evidence of civilian deaths and serious injuries, the destruction of towns and
villages and the meansof life, is complementedby the inferences which 1have already indicated.
Mr. President, the evidence of genocide is available. It is simply convenient for Our
opponents to ignore it. If the transcripts are studied in conjunction with the other documents
suppliedby Yugoslavia,there is sufficient evidence of genocide, and certainly of the seriousrisk
of genocide, as NATO makes daily threats to intensifj the bombing operations. The pressures
appliedto Yugoslaviaasa wholehave producedsubstantialinterna1refugeeflows, with about half
the people of Belgrade having leftthe city. In addition, Hungary is receiving a heavy influx of
Yugoslavnationals seeking refugefiom the airraids (seethe Budapest Sun, 6-12 May 1999,p. 5).
The headline is "Serbcrowds seeking passage to Gerrnany".
The Attorney-General, on behalf of the United Kingdom, referred to "systematic and
intolerable violence being waged against an entire population", quoting Mrs. Ogata. This
descriptionwould applyto the condition of Yugoslaviaasa whole, facing 600 bombing missions
every 24 hours - 600 bombing missions.
Mr. President, 1shall now move on to my lasttopic. Severalof the respondent States have
contendedthatthe actionsoftheNATO commandstructureare not imputableto individual member
StatesofNATO. Threereferenceswill be in the transcriptby way of exarnples(CR 99/17,p. 13,
para. 6 (France), CR 99/16, p. 15, para. 34 (Canada), CR 99/22, p. 10(Spain)). The generalimplicationsof suchcontentionscal1forsome consideration. TheNorthAtlantic
Council directsthe war against Yugoslavia asajoint enterprise.-It constantlysays so. It would be
a legal and political anomaly of the first order if the actions of the command structurewere not
attributablejointly and severally to the member States. This joint andal responsibility is
justified both in legal principle and by the conduct of the member States. Thus, after the
destruction of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the British Prime Minister apologizedto the
Chinese Government, although there had been no suggestion that a British plane had fired the
missiles. More recently the German Chancellorhas alsoapologized.
In the case conceming CertainPhosphateLandsinNauru (Nauruv. Australia),this Court
held that the possibility of a joint and several liability of the three States responsible for the
-
administrationof a Trust Territory at the material time didnot render inadmissiblein liminelitis
a claim brought against only one of them (1C.J Reports1992, pp. 258-259, para. 48; see also
President Jennings, p. 301).
In closing on this issue ofjoint responsibility,1would point out that it is quite remarkable
thatStateswhohavepubliclyassociatedthemselveswithamultilateralNATOcampaignofcoercion
should now seek to avoid the legal responsibilityinvolved.
In concludingthis short address, it maybe permissibleto revisit certain questionsof general
perspective.
First of all, the Kosovo crisis was a crisis selected and developedby the United States as a
part of a long-term anti-Serb campaign. The objectiveswere political and strategic. w
Secondly, the relentless coercion of a whole nation involving directed explicitly at the
population as a whole must, as a matter of law, involveresponsibilityfor genocide. As a general
principle, dolu- intentio- extends both to intendedconsequencesand also to risks of hm
which are deliberatelyinflicted as risks of And severalspeakershave made it clearthat the
population of Yugoslavia must bear the consequencesof so-called collateraldamage.
Mr. President, what is involved here is the politicalpunishment of a whole community. If
1can quote Mr. Barton Gellman,writingintheInternationalHeraldTribuneon 19April,in a long
article there surveyingUnited States policy, he said this:
whether the allianceuld act militarily without explicit authority from the Security
Council. On Sept. 24 [this is 1998, of course], a day after ally ambiguous Security Council resolution, Washington finally persuaded its allies to issue an
ultimatum to Mr. Milosevié topull back. Oct. 13brought the first 'activationorder'
in NATO'shistory [that's13October],a formal agreementto authorize the bombing
of Yugoslavia. But unbeknown at the time, the governing North AtlanticCouncil
approved only Phase 1 of the three-phase air campaign, amounting to about 50 air
defence targets. The real punishment[Mr. Gellman continues] of Belgrade would
come in Phase 2, with 'scoresof targets',and Phase 3, with 'hundredsandhundreds of
targets',accordingto a senior White House official.
Armed with the NATO threat, US special envoy Richard Holbrookepersuaded
Mr. Miloseviéto accepta cease-firein Kosovo andto withdrawthetroops andspecial
police who had not been there before 1998." (International Herald Tribune,
19 April 1999.)
What was then planned by the NATO Council is now taking place. The process of
punishment is illegal and has consequences which necessarilyconstitute seriousbreaches of the
Genocide Convention. Mr. Gellman, relying on insider sources, confirms that the air strikes,
including their phasing and their intensity, were plannedseveral months ago, and the bombing
always had two purposes unrelated to humanitarian issues. The first was punishment for
non-acceptance of NATO demands concerning the territorial status of Kosovo, and the second
purpose was quite simply to provide credibilityto the threats. And so in our submission the air
strikes cannot possiblyprovide a paradigrnof humanitarianintervention.
Mr. President, 1wouldthank you andthe Court for your patienceand consideration,and ask
you to give the floor to my colleague, Mr.Corten.
The VICE-PRESIDENT,acting President: Thank you,Professor Brownlie. Mr. Corten,
please.
M. CORTEN: Monsieur le président, MadameM , essieurs de la Cour, permettez-moi tout
d'abordde vous confier l'immensehonneurqueje ressens de m'adresserpourla première fois à la
plus hautejuridiction mondiale.
Il me revient de traiter un point particulier de l'exposéde la Républiquefédéralede
Yougoslavie, celuiqui concerne les effets ratione temporis de sa déclarationd'acceptationde la
juridiction de la Cour. Je préciàela Courque l'autreproblème,celui du statutd'Etatcontinuateur
de la Yougoslavie, sera traitéultérieurement parle professeur Etinski.
Parmi les six Etats défendeursqui ont eux-mêmes déposé une déclaration,cinq d'entreeux,
le Canada, les Pays-Bas, le Portugal, l'Espagneet le Royaume-Uni, excluentlajuridiction de la - 18 -
Couren invoquantparréciprocité ladéclarationyougoslave du25 avrildernier qui s'étendj,e vous
lerappelle,etje cite en frança«à tous lesdifférendsqui surviendraientou qui pourraientsurvenir
aprèslasignaturede laprésentedéclaration,concernantdessituationsoudesfaitspostérieurs àcette
signature).
Selon les cinq Etats défendeurs,l'emploide la force ayant commencéle 24 mars 1999,il
n'existeraitentre eux et la Yougoslavie qu'unseul différendantérieurau 25 avril et dèslors qui
échapperait,même prima facie, à la compétence dela Cour.
Monsieurleprésident,laréponsedelaYougoslavieacettequestionest simpleetelle s'appuie
d'abordsur uneévidence.Leproblèmeposé icia la Courestd'interpréteu rne déclaration unilatérale
d'acceptationde sajuridiction, et de donc de dégager le sensde cette déclarationsur la base de
w
l'intentionde son auteur.
Or, si on interprètede bonne foi la déclarationdu 25 avril 1999,la conclusionest claire et
non équivoque. La Cour est compétente, primafacie, d'abordsur la base du texte même dela
déclaration,et ce sera lapremièrepartiede monbref exposé,et ensuiteplus fondamentalement,sur
labase de l'intentionréelle del'auteur de cettedéclaration,enl'occurrencela Républiquefédérale
de Yougoslavie.
1. Le texte de la déclarationpermet de prendre en compte tous les différendsqui ont
effectivementsurgi postérieuremena tu 25 avril 1999
Partons donc, si vous le permettez, du texte de cette déclaration,qui concerne donc les
différends postérieursu 25 avril, concernantdes faits ou des situationspostérieàcette date.
w
Peut-on sérieusementprétendre que, depuis le 25 avril dernier, plus aucun différend,
c'est-à-dire,pourreprendrelestermesde la Cour,aucun((désaccord surun point dedroit ou defait))
(affairedes Concessions Mavrommatis enPalestine,C.P.J.I.série A no2, p. 11,affaire relatiàe
desQuestionsd'interprétation et d'applicationde la conventionde Montréal de1971résultantde
l'incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Royaume-Uni),
C.I.J.Recueil,par. 22), n'estsurgi entre la Yougoslavie et les Etats défende?rs
Permettez-moiderappelertrèsbrièvement àlaCourquelquesévénementq suisontpertinents
pour l'argumentationde la Yougoslavie.
'Texteorigin:"al1disputesarisingor which mayariseafter the signatureof the present Declaration, with regardto the
situationsor facts subsequentto this signature". - 19-
- le 28 avril les Etats membres de I'OTANbombardent une zone résidentiellede Surdulica,
causant 20 morts parmi la population civile;
- le 1" mai les Etats membres de I'OTANbombardent un autocar dans la province du Kosovo,
causant prèsde 75 morts parmi la populationcivile.
- le7 mailesEtats membresde I'OTANbombardentunmarchédanslaville deNis, causantplus
de 10mors parmi la population civile; et enfin,
- le 8 mai, comme nous le savons, lesEtatsmembres de l'OTAN bombardent l'ambassade de la
Républiquepopulaire de Chine à Belgrade, causant plusieurs morts parmi les diplomates en
poste.
Dans chacun de ces cas, qui ne sont que des exemples parmi d'autres, la Yougoslavie a
dénoncé lesviolations flagrantesdu droit internationaldont elle estimeavoir étélavictime. Dans
chacun de ces cas,les Etats membresde l'OTANont niéavoir violéunequelconque obligation de
droit international.
Monsieur le président, chacunde ces événements a doncdonnélieu à un ((désaccordsur
point de droit ou de fait)), désaccord dont,je me permets d'insister sur ce point, les termes
dépendent à chaque fois des spécificitéde l'attaquemilitaire.
Des désaccords sur despoints de droit peuvent eneffet concerner, selon les attaques, le
principe de précautionà l'égardde la populationcivile, l'utilisation d'armesprohibées,le principe
de proportionnalitédans le cadre d'attaques arméesl,'interdictionde causer certains dommages à
l'environnement ou encore, danscertains cas, la liberté de navigation sur certains fleuves
internationaux.
Des désaccordssurdespoints de fait peuventeux aussi survenirselon les cas, par exemple,
sur le caractèreintentionnel d'une attaque à l'encontre de la population civile, ou encore sur
l'étenduedes dommages causéspar telle ou telle attaque en particulier.
Il existe donc quantitésde différends distincts qui sontsurgi entre la Yougoslavie et les
Etats membresde I'OTANaprèsle 25 avril concernant des événements postérieurs àcette date.
Mais il y a plus, Monsieur le président. Régulièrement, ety compris depuis le 25 avril
dernier, dans des conditions qui évoluent et qui changenten fonction du développementdes
initiativesdiplomatiques,des différendssurviennent nonplus au sujet detelle ou telle attaque en
particulier, mais sur le principe mêmede la reprise ou de l'arrê,u encore de la suspensiondes -20 -
bombardements. Les Etatsmembresde l'OTANsontdonc,presque quotidiennement,en désaccord
avec la Yougoslavie,dans lamesure où ilsdécidentintentionnellementde commettrede nouveaux
actes illicitesen dépitdes protestationsdu Gouvernement yougoslave.
Monsieur le président, l'agedu Canada a évoqué lundd iernier une «situation continue»
- "continuingsituation- pour caractériserl'emploi dela force menépar lesEtats membresde
l'OTANdepuis le 24 mars dernier. La Yougoslavie récusecette qualification qui aurait pu
s'appliquerà l'occupation de tout ou partie de son territoire, mais certainement pasà un
comportementqui consisteen la répétition d'attaques militesistinctes. LaYougoslaviepréfêre
donc qualifier ces attaques de «délitsinstantaau sens donné àcette expressiondans le cadre
destravauxde laCommissiondudroit internationalsurlaresponsabilité internationdes Etats- -
(ACDI, 1978, vol. II, première partie,p. 36 et suiv.) Dans notre espèce,on est bien dans le cas
d'unesuccession et d'unerépétition de délinstantanés,et donc distincts pourlesquels, etje cite
le rapporteur de la Commission, «la déterminationdu tempuscommissidelicti..ne présenteen
principe,pasdeproblèmeparticulien)(p. 38,par. 26),etenl'occurrencelesdifférentsdéseuvent
être précisément datés, y compris après25 avril.
On ne saurait pas nonplus limiterl'ensemblede ces déàiun différend,unique et exclusif,
qui,enquelquesorte,absorberaitlesdifférendsultérieusuionteffectivement surgi.Dans l'affaire
relativà des Questions d'interprétationet d'application dela convention deMontréalde 1971
résultant del'incidentaériende Lockerbie,la Cour a admis qu'ilétaitpossiblede distinguer,etje
cite, d'une part,un «différendde nature générale)),,'autrepart, des ((différendsspécifiques)).
rl
Rien ne s'opposeà ce que la Cour, dans la présenteespèce procède, mutatis mutandis, puisque les
circonstancessont en effet bien différentes,de la mêmemanière.
Les affaires de la Compagnied'électricde SoJa et duDroit depassage, évoquéepsar nos
contradicteurs,ne remettent pas en cause la possibilitéde distinguer plusieursdifférendsdans le
cadre d'unemême affaire. Cesprécédentn s'attestentnullementde l'existenced'unprincipe selon
lequeldesdifférendsvalablementsoumis,comme c'estlecas en l'espèce,àlajuridiction de laCour
seraient exclus de cette juridiction en raison de certains liens qu'ils entretiendraient avec un
différendqui, quantà lui, échapperaitàcettejuridiction. Il n'existe aucune raison d'écar, rima facie, la compétencede la Cour pour traiter des
différendseffectivement survenusaprèsle25 avril conformémentautexte même de ladéclaration
yougoslave.
D'autant,Monsieurleprésident,etj'enviens àla deuxièmepartie de ma plaidoirie, que cette
exclusionprima facie de la compétenceseraiten totale contradictionavec l'intentionmanifeste et
claire de la Yougoslavie.
ïI. L'intentionréellede la Yougoslavie étaitde confier a la Courle règlementdes différends
l'opposant aux Etats défendeurs
Lorsque l'onest dans le cadre de l'interprétationd'unedéclarationd'acceptation,le critère
décisifest l'établissement de l'intenréelle del'auteur de cettedéclaration.
Dans une affairerécente quia étcitéehier par l'agent de l'Espagne, la r explicitement
affirméqu'il importede tenir compte:
«de l'intentionde l'Etatconcernéà l'époqueoù ce dernier a acceptéla juridiction
obligatoire de la Cour. L'intention d'unEtat qui a formuléune réserve peutêtre
déduitenon seulementdu texte mêmede la clause pertinente,mais aussi du contexte
dans lequel celle-ci doitêtre lue etd'unexamen des élémentde preuve relatifs aux
circonstancesde son élaborationet aux buts recherchés.)) (Compétence natièrede
pêcheries,C.I.J. Recueil998, p. 49.)
La Cour a fait constamment application de ce principe, ce qui l'amenéese livreràune
recherchefouillée visanàétablirlavéritableintentionde l'auteurdutexte interp(je me permets
devousrenvoyer à l'affaire de1'Anglo-IranianOilCo., C.I.J. Recueil 1952,p.à1107;à l'affaire
du Templede Préah Vihéar, C.I. Jecueil1961, p. 31à 34; à l'affaire desActivitésmilitaires et
paramililtaires au Nicaragua, C.I.J. Recue1984,p. 410 à 413).
Latâche de laCour estdonc, en l'espèce,d'interpréladéclarationdu 25 avril 1999en vue
d'établirquelle étaitl'intention de la Yougoslaviedans les circonstances de son élaboration.
Quelle était,en l'espèce,la volontéde laYougoslavie en déposantune déclaratio?
Monsieur le président,cette volonté est assez faàiétablir.La Yougoslaviea souhaité,à
partirdu25 avril 1999,reconnaîtrela compétencede la Courpourtoute une gammede différends,
à l'exceptionde certainsty-pesspécifiquesqui sont inclus dans les réserves,comme les différends
territoriaux. En tout état de causeet dans un premier temps, il est évident quela Yougoslavie a
entendurégler de manièrejudiciaire lesdifférendsentourant le conflit arméqui l'opposaitalors, et
qui l'opposetoujours, aux Etats défendeurs. Il va de soiet les rédacteursde cette déclaration - 22 -
pourraient personnellement en témoigner- que la Yougoslavieentendait bien inclure,et non pas
exclure, tous les désaccords qui portentsur les bombardementsdont elle est victime.
Que l'onpuisse considérer queletexte de la déclarationyougoslaveest quelquepeu ambigu
sur ce point est une chose qui est toutà fait possible. Que, par contre, on remette en cause
l'intentionréelle,certaineet claire de la Yougoslaàicet égardest tout autre chose, Monsieurle
président.
D'ailleursnos contradicteursne remettentpas en causecet aspect particulier de laquestion,
puisqu'ilsadmettent que, en déposantsa déclarationle 25 avril demier, la Yougoslavieentendait
bien conférercompétence à laCourpourtrancherlesdifférendsentourantleconflitquia commencé
il y a plusieurs semaines.
Sur ce point, il suffit donà la Cour de consacrer la seule interprétationqui permet de
concilier le texte de la déclarationavec l'intention,qui ne fait absolument aucun doute, de son
auteur.
Monsieurle président,pour terminerj'aimerais évoquetrrès brièvementl'affaire duTemple
de PréahVihéarque j'ai citéetout à l'heure, et ceci, bien entendu au stade des exceptions
préliminaires.
Dans cette affaire, la Cour a refusé d'écartra compétence,même siune interprétation
grammaticaled'un texte auraitpu la conduireàcette conclusion, parceque ce type d'interprétation
aurait mené à un résultatmanifestement absurde et déraisonnable(C.I.J. Recueil 1961, p.31),
c'est-à-dire contrairà la volonté de l'Etat concerné. Dans notreaffaire, il serait de même
particulièrementet manifestementabsurdeet déraisonnable d'écartelr compétenceprimafacie de
la Cour en interprétantladéclarationdu25 avrildernierdansun sensnon seulementcontraireà son
texte, mais surtouà la volontéincontestableet manifeste de son auteur, la Yougoslavie.
En conclusion,Monsieurle président, lacompétencede la Courest,primafacie, fondée sur
l'article36,paragraphe 2, du Statut,conformémentàlavolontémême de sonauteur, ladéclaration
de la Yougoslavie permetdeprendreen comptel'ensembledesdifférendsqui ont surgiaprès ladate
critique, le 25 avril demieàl'occasiondes attaquesmilitaires menées parles Etats membres de
I'OTAN. Monsieur le président,je remerciela Cour de sa bienveillanteattention et vous priede bien
vouloir donner laparole au professeur Etinskipour qu'il termine l'argumentatiode la République
fédérale de Yougoslavie.
The VICE-PRESIDENT,acting President: Thankyou Mr. Corten. The Agent please.
Mr. ETINSKI: Thank you Mr, President.
Mr. President, distinguishedMembersofthe Court, the membershipof the FederalRepublic
of Yugoslavia in the United Nations will be the first point that1shall address. The additional
grounds ofjurisdiction will be the second. Then,1would like to drawyour attention againto the
facts and to demonstrate that al1conditions provided for in Article 41 of the Statute of the Court
and Article 73 of the Rules of Court have been satisfied.
Your Excellencies, the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviais a Member Stateof the United
Nations. On 22 September 1992the General Assembly adopted resolution47/1, which reads:
"TheGeneral Assembly,
Having received the recommendationof the SecurityCouncil of 19 September
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ... should apply for membership in the
United Nations and that it shall not participatein the work of the General Assembly,
1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia . .. cannot
continueautomaticallythemembershipoftheformerSocialistFederal
Republic of Yugoslaviain the United Nations; andtherefore decides
that it shall not participate in the work of the GeneralAssembly;"
The Under-Secretary-Generaland Legal Counselof the UnitedNations addressed aletteron
29 September 1992 to the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of Bosnia and
HerzegovinaandCroatia, inwhichhe statedthatthe consequencesofthe resolution are as follows:
"Whilethe GeneralAssemblyhas statedunequivocallythattheFederalRepublic
of Yugoslavia ... cannot automatically continue the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and that the Federal
Republicof Yugoslavia should apply for membershipin the UnitedNations, the only
practical consequence that the resolution draws is that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia .. .shouldnotparticipateinthework oftheGeneralAssembly. It isclear,
therefore,thatrepresentativesof the FederalRepublicofYugoslavia .. .canno longer
participateinthe workoftheGeneralAssembly, its subsidiaryorgans,nor conferences
and meetings convened by it.
On the other hand,the resolution neither terminates nor suspendsYugoslavia's
membership in the Organization. Consequently, the seat and nameplate remain as
before, but in Assembly bodies representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia . . cannot sit behind the sign 'Yugoslavia'. The Yugoslav mission at
UnitedNations Headquartersandofficesmaycontinueto functionandmayreceiveand
circulate documents. At Headquarters,the Secretariatwill continue to fly the flag of
resolutiondoes not take away the right of Yugoslavia to participate in the work ofhe
organs otherhan Assembly bodies. The admission to the United Nations of a new
Yugoslavia under Article 4 of the Charter will terminate the situation created by
resolution4711;"
So, the resolution neither terminates nor suspends Yugoslavia's membershipin the
Organization. And the resolutiondoes not take away the right of Yugoslaviato participate in the
workoforgansotherthanAssemblybodies.TheUnder-Secretary-Generalp 'ositionwasconfirmed
by later practice of the Organization.
-
Indeed, on 28 April 1993the Security Council adopted resolution 821 (1993) by which it
v
recommendedto the GeneralAssemblyto decidethat the FederalRepublic ofYugoslavia shallnot
participate in the work of the Economicand Social Council. TheGeneral Assembly acceptedthe
recommendation by resolution471229. If Yugoslavia's membership in the Organization was
terminatedor suspendedbyresolution 4711,there would be no needfor a newresolutionexcluding
Yugoslavia from the work of the Economic and Social Council.
In the capacitasthe depositaryofmultilateraltreaties,the Secretary-General reportedevery
yearonthe statusofmultilateraltreatiesdepositedwiththe Secretary-General. Inal1annualreports
after 1992,the Secretary-Generallisted Yugoslavia as an originalMember of the UnitedNations.
(Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as at 31 Dec. 1996,
ST/LEGISER.E/lS,Ann. 1). Underthe samename Yugoslaviawasalways listed inannualreports
-
of the Secretary-Generalas an original Member of the United Nations, before and after 1992.
The Under-Secretary-Generalfor Management sent a letter to the head of the Permanent
Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, dated 5 December 1997,
requestingthe Govemment ofthe Federal Republic of Yugoslaviato pay contributionunder the
provision of Article 19 of the Charter of the United Nations. (The letter of the
Under-Secretary-Generalfor Management,dated 5 December 1997,will appearas Annex .)The
amount included contributionto the regular budget aswell asUNo peace-keepingforces and
missionsestablished after 1992. The documentof the United Nations Secretariatentitleds
of contribution as at 30 November 1998"refers to the debt of Yugoslavia as a Member Stateon
1January 1998. This documentwill appear as Annex 2. The FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia has paid itsfinancial contributionsas a member State
(letters of confirmation o3 October 1997 and 22 September- 1998 are enclosed as Annexes 3
and 4). There were noobjections from any other Member States.
The conclusionis clear: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannotparticipate in the work
of the General Assemblyand the Economic and Social Council and their bodies and conferences.
That isall. Thereare no other consequences. And the I.C.J. Yearbookinformsthat Yugoslavia is
one among 185 member States of the United Nations on 31 July 1997.
To arnplifythis argument 1submit to the Court the text of Mr. MitiE.related to this issue
titled "International Law and the Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United
Nations" as Annex 5.
Your Excellencies,withoutprejudicetothegroundsofjurisdiction oftheCourt, 1would refer
to additionalgroundsofjurisdictionin relationto the Kingdomof Belgiumandthe Kingdomofthe
Netherlands.
In its Judgmenton preliminary objections in the Genocide case, the Court said:
"The proceedings instituted before the Court are between two States whose
territoriesarelocatedwithinthe formerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia. That
Republic signed the Genocide Convention on 11 December 1948 and deposited its
instrumentof ratification,without reservation,on 29 Augu1950. At the time of the
proclamation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on 27 April 1992,a formal
declaration was adopted on its behalf to the effect that:
'The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the State,
international legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal
Republicof Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by al1the commitrnentsthat
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed intemationally.'
ThisintentionthusexpressedbyYugoslaviatoremain boundbythe intemational
treaties to which the former Yugoslaviawas party was confirmed inn official Note
of27 April1992 from the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations,
addressed to theSecretary-General. The Court observes, firthermore, that it has not
been contested that Yugoslavia was party to the Genocide Convention. Thus,
Yugoslavia was bound bythe provision of the Convention ..." (Applicationof the
ConventiononthePreventionand Punishmentof theCrime ofGenocide,Preliminary
Objections,Judgment,1C.J Reports 1996, p. 6 10,para.17.)
Having in mind the quoted position of the Court 1refer to the following agreements.
Yugoslaviaand Belgium have concludedthe Conventionof Conciliation,Judicial Settlement
and Arbitration. The Conventionwas signed at Belgradeon 25 March 1930. And it is in force.
Pursuant to Article 4 of the Convention, the two parties agreed as follows: "Al1 disputes with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to their
respectiverightsshallbe submittedfor decisiontothePermanentCourtof International
Justice unless the Parties agree in the manner hereinafter provided, to resort to an
arbitral tribunal.
It is understoodthat the disputes referred toabove includein particular those
mentionedinArticle 36ofthe StatuteofthePermanentCourtofInternational Justice."
YugoslaviaandtheNetherlandshaveconcludedtheTreatyofJudicialSettlement,Arbitration
and Conciliation. The Treaty was signed at The Hague, 11 March 1931, and it is in force.
Pursuant to Article 4 of the Treaty the two parties agreed as follows:
"If, in the case of one of the disputes referred to in Article2, the two Parties
have not had recourse to the Permanent Conciliation Commission, or if that
Commission has not succeeded in bringing about a settlement between them, the
dispute shall be submitted joi~ltlyunder a special agreement, eitherto the Permanent
Court of International Justice, which shall deal with the dispute subject to the
conditions and in accordance with the procedure laid down in its Statute, or to an
arbitral tribunal which shall deal with it subject to the conditionsand in accordance
with the procedure laid down by the Hague Conventionof October 18, 1907for the
Pacific Settlementof International Disputes.
If the Parties fail to agree as to the choice of a Court, theterms of the special
agreement,or inthe case of arbitratorprocedure,the appointmentof arbitrators,either
Party shall be at liberty,after giving one month'snotice, to bringthe dispute, by an
application, direct before the Permanent Court of Justice."
The Kingdom of the Netherlands could object that the provided procedure is not strictly
followed. In this regard 1would remind that the Court, like its predecessor,the PermanentCourt
of Justice, has always had recourse to the principle according to which it should not penalize a
defect in a proceduralact which the Applicant couldeasily remedy.
In relation to those two Respondents, Belgium and the Netherlands, there are additional
grounds of jurisdiction ofthe Court.
Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, informationon facts submittedto you
should be complete as much as possible.
The mostglaringexample of abuseuncheckedinformationwastheexplosionatthe Markale
market in Sarajevo in 1994. Withoutany investigation,the crime was attributed to the Bosnian
Serbs. It was an event influencing further development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including
NATO bombing. But, until now it has not definitelybeen established who committedthe crime.
After the killing of 39 Albanians in the village of Racak, in January 1998,the Head of the
OSCEVerification Mission for Kosovo declared,without any investigationat all, that a massacreof civilians was involved. He said at the time that although he is not a lawyer,he is sure that a
crime againsthumanity is in question. The forensicexperts fromYugoslavia,Belarusand Finland
worked togetherto produce an expertreportestablishingthe causesand circumstancesof the death.
After completingthe tearn work in Pristina,the Yugoslav and Belarus forensics signedreports on
joint findings. During the joint work the Finnish experts were agreed with the relevant findings,
butdid not signthe reports explainingthat they wishto make additionalanalyses. Theydid so, but
there was a delay in making the results public. The head of the Finnish tearn,Mrs. Ranta'spress
conference coincided with the holding of the meeting at the Kleber Conference Centre, when it
becarneclearthattheYugoslavdelegationwasnot preparedto signthe so-calledInterimAgreement
forPeace andSelf-Governmentfor Kosovo. Mrs. Rantasaidthekilled persons werecivilians. The
YugoslavandBelanis forensicsestablishedthat there weretracesof gunpowderonthe hands ofthe
killed,whilethe Finnishexpertsdeniedthis finding. Onthe basisof this and thefactthat the killed
personshadcivilianclothesonthem Mrs. Rantaclaimedthattheywere civilians. Ifthe findingthat
therewere tracesof gunpowderonthe handsofthe killed is correct,it is an indicationthat weapons
were used and that death occurred in armed skirmish. The difference in the findingsis essential.
However, withoutany further investigation, some countries qualified the event as a massacre.
Informationpresented by the Respondentsis selective, incompleteand lackingin accuracy.
It is quite untrueto presentthe situationinKosovo andMetohijaas repressionagainstthe Albanian
minority by the Serbianauthorities. The Agents of the Respondentsquoteda few words formthe
reportof the Secretary-Generalbasingtheir accusationsonthem. However,the relevantpart of the
report of the Secretary-Generalof 17 March 1999 reads:
"Thefollowing narrative of when and where major incidents occurredsuggests
how violenceagainst civilians in Kosovo continues to spread. On 18January 1999,
a Serb man was killed after reportedly failing to stop at a Kosovo Liberation Army's
(KLA) roadblock in Nedakovac, near Kosovska Mitrovica. On 19 January,the body
of a Kosovo Albanianteacher was discoverednear Istok. On20 January,two Serbian
women(motherand daughter)werewounded afterunidentifiedpersonsopenedfire on
theirhouse,apparently targeting the father. On 21 January,a KosovoAlbanian man
and woman were killed when their car was fired upon at an intersection outside
Orahovac. Thesame day, the body of a Kosovo Albaniandoctor was foundnear the
Pec-Mitrovica highway.
On 24 January, five Kosovo Albanians, two men, one woman and two boys,
aged 11 and 12, were killed on the Rakovina-Jablanica road, while repairing their
tractor. Accordingto internationalobservers,some60 spentcartridgeswere found on
the scene of the incident and the bodies revealed multiplebullet wounds. On 25 January, a Kosovo Albanian was killed and his son severely wounded
near Decani when masked assailants fired a reported 55 rounds into their car. On
26 January,a Serbman wasseverelywoundedin an attack directedat hishouse inthe
Istokmunicipality. The bodyof a 23-year-old Serbwas found underadriveway inthe
outskirtsof KosovskaMitrovicaon 27 January; thebody mayhavebeenmoved tothe
location after the victim waskilled elsewhere.
On 29 January, KosovoAlbanian sources reported that the body of a Kosovo
Albanian was found in Bistrazin village and that another Albanian, close to the
DemocraticLeagueof Kosovo(LDK),was seriouslywoundedinfrontofhis apartrnent
by two shots fired by unknown persons. On 30 January, a 36-year-old Kosovo
Albanian from Pec was found shot in the head onthe Pec-Pristina road. That same
day, the body of another reputed 'KosovoAlbanian loyalist', aphysicsteacher from
Djakovica,was found in the village of Gradis. In Istok municipality,an elderly Serb
was killed and his 72-year-oldwife was injured when unidentified personsthrew a
grenade into theirhouse in the village of Rakos.
On 31 January, the body of a Kosovo Albanian from the village of Begov
Vukovac was found, shot in the head, south of Istok. That sarne day, in Stimlje
rnunicipality, maskedgunmenreportedly broke intoa house in the village of Donje
Godance and wounded one man and two boys.
Attacks and killings in urban areas continuedduring the first half of February.
On 4 February, bodies of three Kosovo Albanians were found in a car between the
villagesof Istinic and GornjaLika, inDecani municipality, andthe bodyof a Serbwas
found nearthe village of Rastavica. Al1had been shot. On 4 February,a Serb male
was killed by automaticweapon fire while travelling on thePec-Djakovicahighway.
On 7 February, bodies of two Kosovo Albanians reported missing since
3 January were found in Kacanik, south of Urosevac. During the night of
7-8 February,the body of anunidentifiedman aged about 30 was foundin the village
of Livadja in Lipljan municipality. At thisriting, UNHCR is attemptingto chi@
severalreports of bodies foundin or around Djakovicaon 8 February. The bodies of
twoyoungpersons, onea 17-year-oldboyandonea20-year-oldwoman,werereported
found intwo differentlocationsinDjakovica suburb. The body of a KosovoAlbanian
male, dead from gunshotwounds,was found in his car in the Djakovicaarea, near the
village of Trakanic. The same day, again in Djakovica, bodies of a male and an
elderlywoman were also found. Bothvictims,who are believedto be fromthe Roma
community, died of gunshotwounds to the neck. Bodies of two KosovoAlbanians
from the village ofGoden near Djakovica were found on 10 February.
On 11 February,fourmorebodieswerediscoveredin differentareasof Kosovo.
According to media reports,the body of the Kosovo Albanian owner of an Istok tea
room was found on the Zac-Zablaceroad; he had been shot in the head. Two men,
one a Kosovo Albanian shotin the head,the other, as-yet-unidentified,were found in
separate locations in Novo Selo, near Pec. The body of an unidentifiedmale was
found in a pond in Klina.
Targeted violence against civilians in Kosovo is taking new, even more
dangerous, forrns. In particular, recently increased terrorist acts against Serb and
Albanianestablishmentsin urban areas,includinggrenadeattacks on cafesand shops,
are a cause ofserious concern. Sincethe end of January,at least 10suchincidents in
Pristina,ec,KosovskaMitrovicaandUrosevachavebeen reported. Theinvestigation
by UNHCR indicatedthat in many casesthese establishmentshad beenfrequentedby
SerbsandAlbaniansandnoincidentsbetween themhadpreviouslybeenreported. The
latest attack, on 13 February, in the main town square in Urosevac, was particularly
horrible: 12people were wounded andabout 20 neighbouringshopsandseveral cars
parked nearbyheavily darnaged. On 17February,another explosivedeviceplanted at
the Urosevac market was discovered and deactivated by the Kosovo Verification Mission. The result ofthese attacksisthegrowingalienation ofthe SerbandAlbanian
communities, a pervasive feeling of insecurity and the shrinking of the remaining
ground for coexistence.
Februarywasalsomarkedbythecontinuingdepartureofthe Serbian population
from towns and villages where they had been in the minority, or where clashes
between KosovoAlbanian paramilitaryunits and securityforcesoccurred. According
to informationprovidedby the SerbianCommissionerfor Refugees,some90 villages
in central and western Kosovo have lost their entire Serbian population in recent
months, while towns like Podujevoand Kosovska Mitrovicahave seen a reduction of
the Serbian population. The estimated number of displaced Serbs within Kosovo is
10,000while 30,000more have moved to other parts of Serbia."
On the basis of the above Report it is clear that there can be no question about repression
againstthe Albanian community in Kosovoand Metohija, massive violationof human rights, etc.,
by Serbian authorities.
The member StatesofNATO explaintheir armed actionby the wish to protectthe Albanian
refugees although any serious examination can show that the large streams of refugees appeared
only after the beginning of the bombing. As it is known, Kosovoand Metohija are targeted the
most. Not only towns,but also villagesare bombedon adaily basis. The number of casualties of
NATO bombing amongtheAlbanians far exceedsthe total nurnberof Albanians killed in Kosovo
and Metohija in the clashes with the Yugoslav army and police forces in the past decade. The
statement of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugeeswas made about a month after
the aggressionof NATO againstYugoslavia andit can by nomeansserveas a proof of large-scale
persecution of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija. Quite the opposite,the bombing is the main
reason for their fleeing from Kosovo. Not only Kosovo and Metohija but many towns across
Yugoslaviaare being abandonedalsoby Serbsandthe membersof othercommunitiesin an attempt
to find refuge against the systematic and massive bombing of populatedareas.
That before the NATOarmed interventionthere were no particularproblems in Kosovo and
Metohija is also shownby the German provincial authorities which, up until NATO intervention,
had refused furtherpermissionto stayto formerAlbanian refugees, invokingthe officialdocument
issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany that "in Kosovo an explicit political
persecution to Albanian ethnicity is not verifiable" and that
"actions of the security forces are not directed against the Kosovo Albanians as an
ethnically defined group, but against themilitary opponent and its actual or alleged
supporters,thatisthe KLA,whichisfightingforan independentKosovousingterrorist means" (letter of the Ministryof Foreign Affairsof the Federal Republicof Germany
No. 514-516.80.32426 of 12 January 1998,a copy of which is enclosed to Annex).
The sarne document says:
"Themembers oftheAlbanianpeople arenotthreatened bypolitical persecution
related totheir nationalffiliation. Thus, in Belgradealone severalthousandsof ethnic
Albanians live. Their status is not unfavourable and they are not treated as unequal
citizens on a systematicbasis by the State. In southem Serbia there are areas with a
majority Albanian population in which no cases of violation of human rights worth
mentioning have been registered againstthis categoryof persons." (Municipalitiesof
Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja.)
Respondents did not commenton the Applicant'sallegationsthatthere are bank accountsin
their banks for contributions to fund terrorist groups in Kosovo and Metohija and that these
accountshave been advertisedin newspapersand on the Internet. Theypassedover in silencethe
I
Applicant'sallegationsthatthey havenevercondemnedterrorism inKosovoandMetohija instrong
termsnor undertakenanythingat al1to really suppressit. They have not respondedto our assertion
thatthe attempt to imposethe so-calledRambouilletAgreementby an ultimatum - threatanduse
of force- is the most serious violation of international law.
Concemingthe greatesturgencyand irreparableprejudice,1wouldcal1your attentionto new
casualties inflictedin the past two days.
On 10 May 1999,Dragan Obrenovicand Velija Dzemilovic were killed in front of their
houses in a NATO attack on Cacak.
On 10 May 1999,a couple of minutes afier 3 .O0p.m., Nasko Ristic and Milos Jovic were
killed in a truck in Cacak. Twelve persons were wounded, four of them seriously: Milenko 4'
Cirovic,Milan Stankovic,Miodrag Maksimovic and Zoran Vuckovic.
On 11 May 1999inthemorning,threepeoplewerekilledandfourseriouslywoundedduring
theNATO attackon civilianfacilitiesinthe village of StaroGradsko, Lipljanidistrict, Kosovoand
Metohija.
The VICE-PRESIDENT,actingPresident: Mr. Etinski,1amsony to interruptyou, butmay
1 ask how much longer you expect to take.
Mr. ETINSKI: 1will finish in four minutes.
Four-year-old DraganaDimic and Bosko and Rosa Jankovic, both aged 60, were killed.
Woundedwere 7-year-oldBojan Dimic, his father Sinisa as well as Okica Seslija. -31 -
On 11May 1999 Dusan Matkovic was woundedin Nis in a NATO air strike.
On 11 May 1999 NATO planes fired several cluster bombs in the area of the village of
Babin Most, 15km fiom Pristina, a few minutes after 8 a.m. Five minutes before noon, NATO
planes fired three missiles in the area of Pristina. Around 1 p.m., two missiles hit the districts of
Grabovci and Belacevac, municipality of Obilic,with an exclusivelyethnic Albanian population.
The claim of the Respondentsthat the requested provisionalmeasures will not protect the
rights provided for by the Conventionon the Preventionand Punishmentof Genocide is not true.
Acts of genocide are committedby bombing, consequently,by the use of force. The cessation of
the use of force in this particular case also means the protection of rights provided for by that
Convention.
Mr. President, distinguished Membersof the Court, 1 am astonishedby the assertionof the
Agentsof theRespondentsthatthe provisionalmeasuresof protectionwould have negativeeffects;
that they would allegedly enable further expulsion of Albanians, etc. The Govemment of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reiterated on various occasions its readiness to accept a
United Nations monitoring civilianmission in Kosovo and Metohija. It is absolutely unclear how
the bombingcan ensure the returnof the refugeesandtheir securityinKosovo and Metohija. How
can the Albanian minority possiblybe protectedby bombing, whenthe members of that minority
are also the victims of bombing?
Mr. President, distinguished Membersof the Court, the requiredconditions providedfor by
Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Article 73 of the Rules of Court for the indication of
provisional measures have been satisfied:
- the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a Member State of the United Nations;
- the Declaration on the Acceptance ofthe Compulsory Jurisdictionof the Court is valid and
effective in relation to the case;
- there is jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the Respondents who have accepted the
compulsoryjurisdiction of the Court;
- there is the dispute relatedto the interpretation andapplication of the Genocide Convention;
- the Court hasjurisdiction on the basis of Article IX of the Convention;
- the requested measures are related to the rights of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviawhich
are the subject-matter of the dispute. - 32 -
The conditions of the greatest urgency andirreparableprejudice are satisfied a1ask the
Court to use its power under Article 41 of the Statute and tcrindicate the requested provisional
measures.
With your permission, Mr. President,1will now read the submission. 1ask the Court to
indicatethe followingprovisional measures. The United States of America,the United Kingdom
of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland,the Republic of France,the Federal Republicof Germany,
the Republicof Italy,the Kingdomof theNetherlands,the Kingdom of Belgium,Canada, Portugal
and the Kingdom of Spain shall cease immediatelythe acts of use of force and shall refrain fiom
any act of threat or use of force againstthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, 1thank you for your attention.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, acting President: Thank you very much, Mr. Etinksi. This
concludes the second round of hearings of Yugoslavia in the cases regarding the use of force
institutedby Yugoslavia against ten respondent States.
The Court today received two documents fi-omYugoslavia advancing certain additional
grounds of jurisdiction against Belgium and the Netherlands. These were immediately
communicated to the two States concernedand Yugoslaviahas now addressedthe Court on these
documents. The Courtwill, after hearingthe responses of the two States,considerwhether, sofar
as regardsthe cases againstthem, this necessitatesan alterationof the schedulesalready indicated
for the completion of the oral hearings.
Judge Guillaume wishes to ask a question, and1give the floor to Judge Guillaume.
M. GUILLAUME : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président. Ma questions'adresseà
M. l'agentdu Portugal. M. l'agentdu Portugal a précisé : «qu'à la date d'enregistrement de la
requête de laRépubliquefédérale de Yougoslavie, le 29 avril 1999,le Portugaln'était paspartàe
la convention pour la prévention etla répressiondu crime de génocide,bien que son instrument
d'accessionait déjàétédéposé auxNations Unies».J'aimeraissavoir à quelledate cet instrument
a étédéposé ? Et àquelle date, selonM. l'agent du Portugal,le Portugal est devenu ou deviendra
partieà la convention? Tout commentairede la part de M. l'agentde la Yougoslaviesur ce point
sera égalementle bienvenu. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président. -33 -
TheVICE-PRESIDENT, actingPresident: Thankyou, JudgeGuillaume.
TheCourtwill now adjourn andmeetat 3 p.m.to hearthe secondroundof submissionsof
the respondentStates.
TheCourt rose at 11.20a.m.Non- Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
CR 99/25 (traduction)
CR 99/25 (translation)
Mercredi 12 mai à10 heures
Wednesday 12 May at 10 a.m. -2-
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président :Veuillez vous asseoir.
La Cour siège aujourd'huipour le second tour de parole dans les affaires relatives àla Licéité
de l'emploi de la forceintroduites par la Yougoslavie. Je donne la parole, pour commencer, à
l'agent de la Yougoslavie.
M. ETINSKI : Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour :notre exposédu
second tour devrait jeter davantage de lumière sur les questions soulevées par les défendeurset
compléternotre argumentation.
M. Brownlie développerales trois points suivants :
- premièrement, les défendeursn'ont pas établila licéitéde leur emploi de la force;
*
- deuxièmement, le bombardement intensif de zones habitées yougoslaves constitue en
l'occurrence une violation de l'article II de la convention sur le génocide;
- troisièmement, les Etats défendeurs sont solidairement responsables des violations de la
convention sur le génocide et autres violations du droit international commises par
l'intermédiairedu commandement militaire de l'OTAN.
M. Corten montrera que la déclaration d'acceptationde la juridiction de la Cour faite par la
République fédérald ee Yougoslavie le 25 avril 1999 établitvalablement la compétence dela Cour
à l'égard des défendeursqui ont eux aussi acceptéla juridiction obligatoire.
Je terminerai ce second tour de parole en démontrantque toutes les conditions prévuespar
.(iiI
l'article 41 du Statut de la Cour et l'articl73 du Règlement sont satisfaites.
Monsieur le président, voudriez-vous avoir l'amabilitéde donner la parole à M. Brownlie.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Monsieur Brownlie, je vous en prie.
M. BROWNLIE : Merci, Monsieur le président.
Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, je développerai au cours de ce
second tour trois points.
Premièrement, les dix Etats défendeursn'ontpas établi la licéitéde leur emploi de la force,
dans une situation où la question de la validitéjuridique de l'emploi de la force est cruciale. -3-
Deuxièmement, le bombardement intensif de zones habitées yougoslaves constitue en
l'occurrence une violation de l'article II de la convention surle génocide.
Troisièmement, les Etats défendeurssont solidairement responsables des violations de la
convention sur le génocideet autres violations du droit international commises par l'intermédiaire
du commandement militaire de l'OTAN.
En préambule, il convient d'affirmer que, mêmelorsqu'il s'agit d'une demande de mesures
conservatoires, la Cour doit examiner le fond des questions qui lui sont soumises. Peut-êtrepas de
manière définitive, maisil faut néanmoinsqu'elle le fasse. Il suffit de parcourir le texte de presque
n'importe laquelle de ses ordonnances pour s'en rendre compte, par exemple celui de sa récente
ordonnance du 8 avril 1993 dans l'affaire de la Bosnie.
Si les bombardements constituaient une intervention humanitaire et, à ce titre, étaient licites,
il en découlerait deux conséquences :
Premièrement, ils constitueraient un. emploi licite de la force et, deuxièmement, ils ne
constitueraient pas à priori un génocide.
Cela étant,si les Etats défendeursont simplement réservéleur position «sur le fond», ils
n'aident pas la Cour dans l'exercice de sa fonction judiciaire et ils prennent certains risques.
Après ce préambule,j'en viens au premier point de ce bref exposé. Les Etats défendeurs,au
cours des dix heures dont ils disposaient, n'ont fait aucun effort pour offrir une justification
juridique circonstanciée de l'offensive aérienne. Il est vrai que, tout à fait exceptionnellement, le
représentantde la Belgique a soutenu qu'ils'agissait d'uneintervention humanitaire arméequi était
compatible avec l'article 2, paragraphe 4, de la Charte, et a admis que le principe allégué émergeait
lentement (voir CR 99/15, p. 16-17).
D'autres défendeurs n'ont pas parlé d'intervention humanitaire mais utilisé l'expression
inhabituelle de «catastrophe humanitaire». Aucun des défendeursn'aété en mesure d'invoquer des
sources faisant autoritéautresque cellescitéespar laYougoslavie ou de dire que l'opinionexprimée
en 1986 par le Foreign Office britannique étaitinacceptable.
L'attitude adoptée par les Etats défendeursdans la présente procédure aboutit à d'étranges
contradictions. Ainsi, certains Etats défendeurs (voirCR 99/16, p. 14,par. 33) affirment que même -4-
les victimes civiles sont un risque inévitabl- et donc, faut-il sans doute comprendre licite-
généré par l'intervention dite humanitaire. En revanche, lorsqu'iy a eu des morts et des blessés
parmi les membres de la communauté diplomatique, le président Clinton et d'autres chefsd'Etat,
ou des chefs de gouvernement, ont présenté des excuses, déclarantque la frappe des missiles était
due a une erreur.
Mais, Monsieur le président, s'il s'agitd'une intervention humanitaire, pourquoi faudrait-il
14
présenter des excuses dans le cas des diplomates d'Etats tiers et non dans celui des civils de
Belgrade ? Pourquoi les considérations de licéitéseraient-elles de mise dans certains cas et non
dans d'autres ?
1
Avant d'enterminer avec l'allégation d'interventionhumanitaire, il me faut rappelarla Cour
que de nombreuses notes et déclarationsofficielles de l'OTAN ont insistésur l'objectif consistant
à exercer une pression sur la population afin de créer des perturbations politiques sur le plan
intérieur. Le choix des cibles confirme cette politique de contrainte collective.
J'en viens maintenant à notre deuxième point, à savoir que le bombardement intensif de la
Yougoslavie constitue une violation grave de l'article II de la convention sur le génocideSelon
la définitionqui y est donnée du génocide,celui-ci s'entend d'actes «commis dans l'intention de
détruire,en tout ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, commetel».
Les éléments dont ondispose montrent que les bombardements affectent les zones habitées
de toute la Yougoslavie. A mon avis, il s'agitdonc bien d'un groupe national comme tel, et les
déclarations de l'OTANfont clairement apparaître que c'est la population dans son ensemble que
l'on chercheàintimider. D'ailleurs, le représentantde l'Italiea fait observer que les actions affectent
«l'ensemble de la population d'un Etat», cet Etat étantnaturellement, en l'espèce,la Yougoslavie
(CR 99/19, p. 12).
Plusieurs des Parties adverses ont affirmé quela Yougoslavie n'avait pas rapportéla preuve
du génocide. Cela n'est pas vrai. Les preuves produites par la Yougoslavie quant aux
bombardements et à leurs effets permettent d'inférer l'existence d'un certain nombre de
caractéristiques liées à des éléments constitutifs de génocide, notamment la «soumission -5-
intentionnelle du groupe àdes conditions d'existence devantentraîner sa destruction physique totale
ou partielle».
Ces caractéristiques sont les suivantes :
Premièrement :le grand nombre de civils tués et la connaissance qui en résulte du risque
mortel causé.
Deuxièmement :la forte puissance explosive des missiles et les effets étendusde l'explosion.
Troisièmement :la propriétéincendiaire de ces armes nouvelles et la connaissance du fait que
certaines victimes meurent souvent de leurs brûlures.
Quatrièmement :l'ampleur mêmedes destructions causées dans les zones urbaines.
Cinquièmement :le bouleversement général dela vie quotidienne.
Sixièmement :les dommages étenduscausésau systèmede santéet les risques que l'on fait
courir délibérément aux patientsen provoquant des coupures d'électricité.
Je m'arrêteraiun instant pour poser cette simple question :Combien sont-ils, parmi ceux et
celles qui sont assis de l'autre côtéde cette salle, avoir été bombardés, ne serait-ce qu'une fois ?
Nous parlons ici de l'emploi d'unepuissance de feu massive, comportant, nous dit-on - et
l'on nous en informe presque chaque jour avec orgueil - six cents sorties toutes les
vingt-quatre heures. Eh bien, les Britanniques de ma générationont l'expériencedirecte des
bombardements. J'ai été élevé à Liverpool, j'avais sept ans quand la guerre a commencé,et nous
étions bombardés toutes les nuits. Liverpool était un important port maritime. Peut-être la
générationplus récentea-t-elle moins d'expérienceen la matière, et est-elle moins sensibilisée. Et
bien sûr, les pièces d'artillerie utiliséesrésentsont d'un typebeaucoup plus perfectionnéque les
bombes de la seconde guerre mondiale.
Nos adversaires ont recours, pour désignercet exercice massif de la contrainte à l'encontre
d'un Etat européen, à divers euphémismes. Il n'est pas question de bombes et de missiles. Le
représentant du Royaume-Uni a évoqué «l'action militaire» (CR 99/23, p. 13, par. 17). Celui du
Canada a parlé des ((opérationsaériennesde l'OTAN» (CR 99116, p. 11, par. 20). -6-
La preuve directe de la réalité des victimes- morts et blessésgraves - faites parmi la
population civile, ainsi que de la destruction des villes et villages et des moyens d'existence, est
complétée parles inférences que j'aidéjàmentionnées.
Monsieur le président, la preuve du génocide a été rapportéeN . os adversaires trouvent
simplement commode de l'ignorer. Si l'on étudieles comptes rendus des audiences conjointement
avec les autres pièces fournies par la Yougoslavie, on y trouve une preuve suffisante du génocide,
à tout le moins d'un risque sérieux degénocide, dèslors que l'OTAN menace quotidiennement
d'intensifier les bombardements. Les pressions exercées contre la Yougoslavie tout entière ont
provoqué d'importants déplacementsintérieursde réfugiés, la moitié environ de la population de
-
Belgrade ayant quittécette ville. En outre, la Hongrie doit faire face à un afflux considérable de
Yougoslaves qui cherchent à se mettre à l'abri des raids aériens (voir le Budapest Sun,
6-12 mai 1999, p. 5, qui indique en manchette :«Déplacements massifs de Serbes cherchant a
passer en Allemagne»).
L'Attorney-General du Royaume-Uni, parlant au nom de ce pays, a fait état, citant
Mme Ogata, d'une((violencesystématique etintolérableexercéecontreune population tout entière».
Cette description peut s'appliquera situation de l'ensemblede la Yougoslavie, qui fait face toutes
les vingt-quatre heures à six cents missions de bombardement - six cents missions de
bombardement !
Monsieur le président, j'en viens maintenant à mon dernier point. Plusieurs des Etats j
demandeurs ont prétenduque les actions du commandement de l'OTANne sauraient êtreimputées
aux Etats membres de l'OTAN pris séparément. Je renvoie à cet égardaux comptes rendus des
audiences (par exemple :CR 99/17,p. 13, par. 6 (France); CR 99/16, p. 15, par. 34 (Canada);
CR 99/22, p. 10 (Espagne)).
Les implications généralesd'unetelle affirmation méritent qu'on s'y arrête.Le Conseil de
l'Atlantique Nord mènela guerre contre la Yougoslavie en tant qu'entreprise commune. Il ne cesse
de le dire. Ce serait une anomalie juridique et politique de premier ordre que de ne pouvoir
attribuer aux Etats membres solidairement les actions du commandement militaire. Cette
responsabilité solidairesejustifie tant sur le plan desprincipes juridiques qu'auvu du comportement - 7 -
des Etats membres. Ainsi, après la destruction de l'ambassade de Chine à Belgrade, le premier
ministre britannique a présenté des excuses au Gouvernement chinois, alors que rien n'indiquait que
les missiles eussent ététirés parun avion britannique. Plus récemment, le chancelier allemand a
lui aussi présentédes excuses.
Dans l'affairerelativeà Certaines terres àphosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), la Cour
aconsidéréque lapossibilitéd'uneresponsabilitésolidairedes trois Etats chargésde l'administration
d'un territoire sous tutelle au moment considéréne rendait pas irrecevable in limine litis une
demande forméecontre un seul d'entre eux (C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p.258-259, par. 48; voir aussi
opinion dissidente de sir Robert Jennings, président,p. 301, eod. loc.).
Enfin, j'en terminerai avec ce point de la responsabilité solidaire en faisant observer qu'ilest
vraiment remarquable que des Etats qui se sont associés publiquement à une action coercitive
multilatérale de l'OTAN cherchentmaintenant à se soustraire à la responsabilité juridique qui s'y
attache.
Pour conclure ce bref exposé, permettez-moide rappeler certains points de portéegénérale.
Premièrement, la crise du Kosovo est une crise qui a été choisieet amplifiée par les
Etats-Unis dans le cadre d'unecampagne anti-serbe à long terme. Les objectifs étaient politiques
et stratégiques.
Deuxièmement, la contrainte exercéesans relâche contre une nation tout entière,affectant et
visant explicitement la population dans son ensemble, doit, sur le plan du droit, emporter une
responsabilitépour génocide. C'est un principe généralque le dolus - l'intention - s'applique
non seulement aux conséquences voulues mais aussi aux risques de dommages que l'on fait
délibérément courir.Et plusieurs orateurs ont clairement donné à entendre que la population de
Yougoslavie devait supporter les conséquencesdes dommages dits collatéraux.
Monsieur le président,ce dont il s'agit ici,c'est d'un châtiment politique infligé à toute une
communauté. Permettez-moi de citer M. Barton Gellman qui, dans un long article publié dans
l'International Herald Tribune du 19 avril où il passait en revue la politique des Etats-Unis, a écrit
ceci : «Dans l'intervalle entre les deux réunionsde l'OTAN, un furieux débatinterne
a eu lieu sur le point de savoir si l'Alliance pouvait agir militairement sans
l'autorisation expresse du Conseil de sécurité.Le 24 septembre [1998, bien entendu],
le lendemain de l'adoption d'une résolutiondu Conseil de sécuritéà la formulation
soigneusement ambiguë, Washington a finalement persuadé ses alliés d'adresser à
M. Milosevik un ultimatum lui enjoignant de se retirer. Le 13octobre a vu le premier
«ordre d'activation» de l'histoire de l'OTAN,à savoir une décisionformelle d'autoriser
le bombardement de la Yougoslavie. Mais - ce qu'onne savait pas àl'époque- le
Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord (l'organe directeur) n'a approuvéque la phase 1 d'une
campagne aérienne en trois phases, phase qui visait une cinquantaine d'objectifs de
défenseaérienne. Le véritablechâtiment de Belgrade [poursuit M. Gellman]viendrait
lors de la phase 2, qui concernerait des «dizaines de cibles», et de la phase 3, avec
«des centaines et des centaines de cibles», selon un haut fonctionnaire de la Maison
Blanche.
Armé de la menace de l'OTAN, l'envoyé spécial des Etats-Unis Richard
Holbrooke a convaincu M. Milosevik d'accepter un cessez-le-feu au Kosovo et d'en
retirer les forces armées etforces de police spécialesqui n'yétaient pasavant 1998.~
(International Herald Tribune, 19 avril 1999.) [Traduction du Greffe.]
Le plan établialors par le conseil de l'OTAN est maintenant mis à exécution. Ce processus
punitif est illicite et a des conséquences qui constituent nécessairementdes violations graves de la
convention sur le génocide. M. Gellman, s'appuyant sur des sources internes, confirme que les
frappes aériennes, y compris leurs différentes phases et leur intensité, étaientprévues depuis
plusieurs mois, les bombardements ayant toujours eu deux buts sans rapport avec l'aspect
humanitaire :premièrement, infligerune punitionpour la non-acceptation des exigences de l'OTAN
concernant le statutterritorial du Kosovo, etdeuxièmement,donnertout simplement de la crédibilité
aux menaces. Aussi les frappes aériennesne sauraient-elles,notre avis, constituer un paradigme
-
d'intervention humanitaire.
Monsieur le président, je vous remercie ainsi que la Cour de votre patience et de votre
attention et vous prie de bien vouloir donner la parolemon collègue M. Corten.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction deprésident :Merci,Monsieur Brownlie. M. Corten,
je vous en prie.
Mr. CORTEN: Mr. President, Members of the Court, may 1begin by saying how much 1
appreciate the honour of addressing, for the first time, the world'smost senior Court. -9-
My task is to consider a particular point in the statement of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, conceming the effects ratione temporis of its statement of acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction. The other problem, that of Yugoslavia's successor status, will be considered later by
Professor Etinski.
Of the six respondent States which have themselves deposited declarations, five - Canada,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom - deny the Court's jurisdiction in
reliance, on grounds of reciprocity, on the Yugoslav declaration of 25 April last, which covers, you
18
will recall, "al1 disputes arising or which may arise after the signature of the present declaration,
with regard to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature".
The five respondent Statesargue that, the use of force having begun on 24 March 1999,there
was only one dispute between them and Yugoslavia before 25 April, a dispute which consequently
escapes - even prima facie - the Court's jurisdiction.
Mr. President, Yugoslavia's response to this point is simple and is based first and foremost
on something quite obvious. The problem before the Court is that of interpreting a unilateral
declaration of acceptance of its jurisdiction, and thus of ascertaining the meaning of the declaration
on the basis of the intention of its author.
But if the declaration of 25 April 1999 is interpreted in good faith, the conclusion is clear and
unequivocal. The Court does have jurisdiction, prima facie, firstly on the basis of the text itself of
the declaration- and this will provide the first limb of my short contribution- and further, more
fundamentally, on the basis of the real intention of the author of the declaration, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
1. The text of the declaration allows al1disputes effectively arising after 25 April 1999 to be
taken into account
Let us start then, with your permission, with the text of the declaration. It concems, as 1have
said, disputes after 25 April, relating to situations or facts subsequent to that date.
Can it seriously be argued that since 25 April no further dispute, i.e., to use the Court's
words, no "disagreement on a point of law or fact" (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions,
P.C.I.J.,Series A, No. 2, p. 11; case concerning Questionsoflnterpretation and Applicationof the - 10-
1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident ut Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jarnahiriya v. United Kingdom), I.C.J.Reports 1998,para. 22), has arisen between Yugoslavia and
the respondent States?
1 should like to summarize very briefly for the Court a number of events relevant to
Yugoslavia's lineof argument.
19 - on 28 April the NATO member States bombed a residential area of Surdulica, killing
20 civilians;
- on 1 May the NATO member States bombed a bus in the province of Kosovo, killing nearly
75 civilians;
w
- on 7 May the NATO member States bombed a market in Nis, killing more than ten civilians;
and finally,
- on 8 May, as we know, the NATO member States bombed the Embassy in Belgrade of the
People's Republic of China, killing a number of Chinese diplomats.
In each ofthese cases,whichare only examples, Yugoslaviadenouncedthe flagrant violations
of international law of which it considered itself to be a victim. In each ofe cases, the NATO
member States denied having violated any obligation under international law.
Mr. President, each of these events led to a "disagreement on a point of law or fact", a
disagreement - 1must stress this point- the substance of which varied in each case with the
nature of the military action.
Thus the disagreements onpoints of law may concern, depending on the attack, the principle
of taking precautions with regard to civilians, the use of bamed weapons, the principle of
proportionality in relation to armed attacks, theule prohibiting certain kinds of damage to the
environment, or again, in certain cases, the freedom of navigation on certain international
waterways.
Disagreement on points of fact may also arise according to case, for exarnple, as to the
intentional nature of an attack against civilians, orin as to the scale of the damage caused by
any given attack. - 11 -
Thus there have been a large number of separate disputes arising between Yugoslavia and the
NATO Member countries since 25 April conceming events occurring after that date.
But there is more, Mr. President. Disputes have been arising regularly, including in the
period since 25 April, in circumstances developing and according to the various diplomatic
initiatives, not just disputes with regard to any given attack in particular, but on the very principle
of the resumption, the cessation or the suspension of the bombing. Thus the NATO member States
are in dispute almost daily with Yugoslavia, whenever they decide deliberately to embark on further
illegal acts despite the protests of the Yugoslav Govemment.
Mr. President, the Canadian Agent mentioned last Monday a "continuingsituation" to describe
the use of force by the NATO member States since 24 March. Yugoslavia does not accept this
description, which might have been applied to an occupation of al1 or part of its territory, but
definitely not to conduct consisting in repeated separate military attacks. Yugoslavia thus prefers
to describe these attacks as "instantaneous wrongful acts" within the meaning given to this
expression in the context of the work of the International Law Commission on State Responsibility
(YILC, 1978, Vol. II, Part One, pp. 37 et seq.). Here we have clearly a succession and repetition
of instantaneous wrongful acts - and hence separate acts - for which, and 1 quote the
Commission'srapporteur, "the determination of the tempuscommissidelicti . ..in principle presents
no special problems" (p. 40, para. 26), and in fact the various wrongful acts can be precisely dated,
including those after 25 April.
Nor can there be any question of subsuming the totality of these acts into a single and
exclusive dispute which, as it were, would absorb the subsequent disputes that have effectively
arisen. In the case conceming Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arisingfrom the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie,the Court agreed that a distinction could
be made - and 1quote - between "disputes of a general nature" and "specific disputes". There
is no reason why the Court should not proceed in the same way in this case, albeit mutatis mutandis
given the quite different circumstances.
The case of the Electrici~ Company of Sofia andBulgaria and the Right of Passage case,
which were cited by Ouropponents, do not preclude the possibility of distinguishing a number of separate disputes within the framework of a single case. These precedents are no evidence of the
existence of a principle whereby disputes validly submitted, as in the present case, to the Court's
jurisdiction should be excluded from such jurisdiction because of their purported links with a
dispute which itself falls outside that jurisdiction.
There is no reason to exclude prima facie the Court'sjurisdiction over disputes effectively
arising after 25 April, in accordance with the specific terrns of the Yugoslav declaration.
Al1the more so, Mr. President - and this brings me to the second part of my statemen- in
that a prima facie exclusion of jurisdiction would run entirely counter to the manifest and clear
intention of Yugoslavia.
*
II. Yugoslavia's real intention was to entrust to the Court the settlement of the disputeswith
the respondent States
When interpreting a declaration of acceptance, the crucial criterion is to ascertain the real
intention of its author.
In a recent case cited here by the Agent of Spain, the Court expressly stated that due regard
must be had to:
"the intention of the State concemed at the time when it accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court. The intention of a reserving State may be deduced not only
from the text of the relevant clause, but also from the context in which the clause is
to be read, and an examination of evidence regarding the circumstances of its
preparation and the purposes intended to be served". (Fisheries Jurisdiction,
1C.J. Reports 1998, para. 49.)
The Court has applied this principle consistently,carrying out a detailed exarnination in an
effort to establish the true intention of the author of the text under interpretation (see case
concerning Anglo-Iranian OilCo., I. C.J. Reports 1952, pp. 105-107, case conceming the Temple
ofPreah Vihear,I.C.J. Reports 1961,pp. 31-34, and the case concerning Militaïy andParamilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1.C.J. Reports 1984,pp. 410-4 13).
In this instance,therefore, the Court's task isto interpret the declaration ofil 1999with
a view to ascertaining what Yugoslavia's intention was when it drafted that instrument.
What was Yugoslavia's purpose in depositing this declaration? -13 -
Mr. President, the purpose is not difficult to discern. Yugoslavia desired, from 25 April 1999
onwards, to recognize the Court's jurisdiction over a wide range of disputes, with the exception of
specific categories mentioned in the reservations, such as temtorial disputes. What is in any event
clear is that, initially, Yugoslavia wished tosecure ajudicial settlement of the disputes relating to
the armed conflict then - and indeed still- in progress between Yugoslavia and the respondent
States. It goes without saying - and the drafters of the declaration could personally testify to
*
this- that Yugoslavia did indeed wish to include, andnot to exclude, al1the disagreements relating
to the bombing to which it has been subjected.
It may well be that the wording of the Yugoslav declaration might be considered a little
ambiguous on thispoint. But to challenge the true, certain and clear intention of Yugoslavia on this
question is a completely different matter, Mr. President.
Indeed, Our opponents do not challenge this particular aspect of the question, since they
accept that, when it deposited its declaration on 25 April, Yugoslavia did in fact wish to confer
jurisdiction on the Court to settle the disputes surrounding the conflict which broke out a few weeks
ago.
On this point, it will therefore suffice for the Court to adopt the only interpretation enabling
the text of the declaration to be reconciled with the intention- as to which there can be absolutely
no doubt - of its author.
Mr. President, to complete my contribution, 1should like to touch very briefly on the Temple
ofPreah Vihear case, which 1 mentioned just now, that is to Say, of course, in relation to the
preliminary objections stage.
In that case, the Court declined to rule out its jurisdiction, even though a grammatical
interpretation of a document might have entailed this conclusion, since such an interpretation would
have led to a manifestly absurd and unreasonable result (I.C.J. Reports 1961, p. 31), that is to Say,
contrary to the will of the State concerned. In Ourcase, it would also be particularly and manifestly
absurd and unreasonable to exclude the prima facie jurisdiction of the Court by interpreting the
declaration of 25 April in a sense not only at variance with the text, but also with the undeniable
and manifest will of its author, Yugoslavia. -14 -
In conclusion, Mr. President, the Court'sjurisdiction is based prima facie on Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute. In accordance with the clear will o£its author, Yugoslavia's declaration
enables account to be taken of the totality of the disputes which have arisen since the critical date,
25 April last, in respect of the military attacks conducted by the NATO member States.
Mr. President, 1thank the Court for its kind attention and 1would ask you to give the floor
to Professor Etinski, who will complete the arguments presented by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Je vous remercie, M. Corten.
Monsieur l'agent,vous avez la parole.
M. ETINSKI : Je vous remercie Monsieur le président.
Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les membres de la Cour, je parlerai tout d'abord
de la qualitéd'Etat Membre des Nations Unies dont jouit la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie.
Je parlerai ensuite des bases supplémentaires de compétence. Enfin, j'appellerai une fois de plus
votre attention sur les faits et vous montrerai que toutes les conditions prescrites par l'article 41du
Statut de la Cour et l'article 73 de son Règlement ont étéremplies.
La Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie est un Etat Membre des Nations Unies. Le 22
septembre 1992, l'Assembléegénérale aadoptésa résolution47/1, qui se lit comme suit :
«L'Assemblée générale,
........................................................
Ayant reçu la recommandation du Conseil de sécurité en date du
19 septembre 1992,selon laquelle la Républiquefédérative de Yougoslavie ..devrait
présenter unedemande d'admissionàl'organisation desNations Unies etneparticipera
pas aux travaux de l'Assembléegénérale,
1.Considère que la République fédérative de Yougoslavie ..ne peut pas assurer
automatiquement la continuité de la qualité de Membre de l'ancienne République
fédérativesocialiste de Yougoslavie et, par conséquent, décide que la République
fédérativede Yougoslavie ...ne participera pas aux travaux de l'Assembléegénérale;))
Le Secrétairegénéral adjointaux affairesjuridiques et conseiller juridique de l'organisation
des Nations Unies a, le 29 septembre 1992, adressé aux représentants permanents de la Bosnie-Herzégovine et de la Croatie auprès des Nations Unies une lettre dans laquelle il indiquait
que la résolution de l'Assembléegénérale avaitles conséquences suivantes :
«Si l'Assemblée générala e déclarésans équivoque que la République fédérative
de Yougoslavie ..ne pouvait pas assurer automatiquement la continuité de la qualité
de Membre de l'ancienne République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie à
l'organisation des Nations Unies et que la République fédérativede Yougoslavie
devrait présenter une demande d'admission à l'organisation, l'unique conséquence
pratique de cette résolution est que la République fédérativede Yougoslavie ..ne
participera pas aux travaux 'de l'Assemblée générale. Il est donc clair que les
représentants de la République fédérativede Yougoslavie ..ne peuvent plus participer
aux travaux de l'Assemblée générale et de ses organes subsidiaires, ni aux conférences
et réunions organiséespar celle-ci.
D'un autre côté,la résolution ne met pas fin à l'appartenance de la Yougoslavie
à l'organisation et ne la suspend pas. En conséquence, le siège et la plaque portant
le nom de la Yougoslavie subsistent, mais dans les organes de l'Assemblée les
2 4 représentants de la République fédéralede Yougoslavie ..ne peuvent occuper la place
réservée à la <<Yougoslavie». La mission de la Yougoslavie auprès du siège de
l'organisation des Nations Unies, ainsi que les bureaux occupéspar celle-ci, peuvent
poursuivre leurs activités, ils peuvent recevoir et distribuer des documents. Au Siège,
le Secrétariat continuera de hisser le drapeau de l'ancienne Yougoslavie car c'est le
dernier drapeau de la Yougoslavie que le Secrétariatait connu. La résolutionn'enlève
pas à la Yougoslavie le droit de parti~iper aux travaux des organes autres que ceux de
l'Assemblée. L'admission à l'organisation des Nations Unies d'une nouvelle
Yougoslavie en vertu de l'article 4 de la Charte mettra fin à la situation crééepar la
résolution 4711;))
Ainsi donc, la résolution ne met pas fin à l'appartenance de la Yougoslavie à l'organisation
et ne la suspend pas non plus. Et la résolution n'ôtepas à la Yougoslavie le droit de participer aux
travaux d'organes autres que ceux qui relèvent de l'Assembléegénérale.La pratique ultérieurede
l'organisation a confirmé la position adoptée par le Secrétaire généraladjoint.
Au reste d'ailleurs, le 28 avril 1993, le Conseil de sécuritéa adoptésa résolution 821 (1993)
dans laquelle il a recommandé à l'Assembléegénéralede décider que la République fédéralede
Yougoslavie ne devrait pas participer aux travaux du Conseil économiqueet social. L'Assemblée
généralea acceptécette recommandation dans sa résolution 471229. Si la résolution 4711avait mis
fin à l'appartenance de la Yougoslavie à l'organisation ou l'avait suspendue, il n'y aurait pas eu
besoin d'unenouvelle résolutionpour empêcherla Yougoslavie departiciper aux travaux du Conseil
économique et social.
En sa qualité de dépositaire des traités multilatéraux, le Secrétairegénéralfait rapport tous
les ans sur l'étatdes traitésmultilatéraux qui ont été ainsidéposés. Dans tous les rapports annuels - 16 -
postérieursàl'année1992, le Secrétairegénéraa l dans son énumération cité la Yougoslavieomme
faisant partie des Etats Membres originaires de l'organisation des Nations Unies (Traités
multilatérauxdéposés auprèsdu Secrétairegénéral,Etat au31 décembre1996, ST/LEG/SER.E/15,
Ann. 1). Sous la mêmeappellation, la Yougoslavie a toujours figuré,avant et après 1992,dans la
liste publiée dans les rapports annuels du Secrétairegénéral,parmi les Etats Membres originaires
de l'organisation des Nations Unies.
Le Secrétaire généraaldjoint à la gestion a adresséau chef de la mission permanente de la
Républiquefédérale de Yougoslavie auprèsde l'organisation des Nations Unies une lettre datéedu
5 décembre 1997dans laquelle il invite le Gouvernement de la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie
w
averser àl'organisation sacontribution conformémentàl'article 19de la Charte des Nations Unies.
(Cette lettre du Secrétaire généraladjointà la gestion datéedu 5 décembre 1997 sera jointe à
l'annexe 1.) Le montant demandécomprenait la contribution àverser au budget ordinaire ainsi que
celle qu'il fallait verser aux forces de maintien de la paix et aux missions de l'ONU mises enplace
postérieurement à l'année 1992.Le document publiépar le Secrétariat desNations Unies qui est
intitulé«Etat des contributions versées au 30 novembre 19989 indique quels améréssont dûs par
la Yougoslavie en sa qualité de Membreau 1"janvier 1998. Ce document serajoint à l'annexe 2.
La Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie s'est acquittéede ses obligations financièresEtatMembre
(les lettres de confirmation duoctobre 1997 et du 22 septembre 1998 sontjointes aux annexes 3
et4). Aucun autre Etat Membre n'a formulé d'objection.
La conclusion est claire:la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie ne peut pas participer aux
travaux de l'Assemblée généraln ei du Conseil économiqueet social, non plus qu'aux réunionsde
leurs organes subsidiaires et aux conférencesorganiséespar eux. C'est tout, il n'y a pas d'autre
conséquence.Et l'Annuairede la C.I. Jous informe qu'au 31 juillet 1997, la Yougoslavie est l'un
des 185 Etats Membres de l'organisation des Nations Unies.
Pour développercepoint, je soumets àla Cour le texte de M. Mitic concernant cette question
qui est intitulé«International Law and the Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the
United Nations», lequel constituera l'annexe 5. Madame, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, sanspréjudice des motifs donnant d'oreset déjà
compétence à la Cour, je vais parler des bases supplémentaires de compétence qui concernentle
Royaume de Belgique et le Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Dans l'affaire relativeàl'Applicationde la conventionpour laprévention et la répression du
crime de génocide, la Cour statuant sur les exceptions préliminaires, a dit ceci :
«L'instance introduite devant la Cour oppose deux Etats dont le territoire est
situéà l'intérieur de l'ex-République fédérativ secialiste de Yougoslavie. Celle-ci a
signéla convention sur le génocide le 11 décembre1948 et a déposéson instrument
de ratification, sans réserves, le 29 août 1950. Lors de la proclamation de la
République fédérative de Yougoslavie, le 27 avril1992, une déclarationformelle a été
adoptée enson nom, aux termes de laquelle :
«La République fédérativd ee Yougoslavie, assurant la continuitéde
1'Etat et de la personnalité juridique et politique internationale de la
République fédérative socialistede Yougoslavie, respectera strictement
tous les engagements que la République fédérative socialistede
Yougoslavie a pris à l'échelon international.))
L'intention ainsi exprimée parla Yougoslavie de demeurer liéepar les traités
internationaux auxquels était partie l'ex-Yougoslavie a étéconfirméedans une note
officielle du 27 avril 1992 adressée au Secrétairegénéralpar la Mission permanente
de la Yougoslavie auprès des Nations Unies. La Cour observe en outre qu'iln'apas été
contesté que la Yougoslavie soit partie à la convention sur le génocide. Ainsi, la
Yougoslavie était liée par les dispositions de la convention .» (Application de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt,C.I.J.Recueil 1996, p. 610, par. 17.)
Compte tenu de la position qu'adopte ainsi la Cour,j'invoque àprésentles accords ci-après.
La Yougoslavie et la Belgique ont conclu une convention de conciliation, de règlement
Cette convention est en
judiciaire et d'arbitrage qui a été signée à Belgrade le 25 mars 1930.
vigueur. A l'article4 de ladite convention, les deux parties sont convenues des dispositions
suivantes :
26 «Tous différends ausujet desquels les parties se contesteraient réciproquement
un droit seront soumis pour jugement à la Cour permanente de justice internationale,
à moins que les parties ne tombent d'accord, dans les termes prévus ci-après, pour
recourir à un tribunal arbitral.
Il est entendu que les différends ci-dessus visés comprennentnotamment ceux
que mentionne l'article 36 du Statut de la Cour permanente dejustice internationale.))
Par ailleurs, la Yougoslavie et les Pays-Bas ont conclu un traitéde règlement judiciaire,
d'arbitrage et de conciliation qui a étésignéà La Haye, le 11 mars 1931, et qui est en vigueur. A
l'article 4 dudit traité, les deux parties sont convenues des dispositions ci-après: «Si, dans le cas d'un deslitiges visésà l'article 2, les deux parties n'ontpas eu
recours à la Commission permanente de conciliation ou si celle-ci n'a pas réussià
concilier les parties, le litige sera soumis d'uncommun accord par voie de compromis,
soità la Cour permanente dejustice internationale qui statuera dans les conditions et
suivant la procédure prévuespar son statut, soit à un tribunal arbitral qui statuera dans
les conditions et suivant la procédure prévuespar la Convention de La Haye du
18 octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.
A défaut d'accord entre les parties surle choix de la juridiction, sur les termes
du compromis ou, en cas de procédure arbitrale, sur la désignationdes arbitres, l'une
ou l'autre d'entre elles, aprés un préavis d'un mois, aura la faculté de porter
directement, par voie de requête, le litige devant la Cour permanente de justice
intemationale.»
Le Royaume des Pays-Bas pourrait formuler ici une objection et dire que la procédure prévue
n'est pas strictement suivie.cet égard,je rappellerai que la Cour, comme celle qui l'aprécédée,
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la Cour permanente dejustice internationale?a toujours appliquéle principe suivant lequel il ne faut
pas pénaliserle demandeur qui a commisdans un acte de procédureune erreur qu'il peutfacilement
réparer.
En ce qui concerne ces deux défendeurs,la Belgique et les Pays-Bas, il existe donc des bases
supplémentaires decompétencepour la Cour.
Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, les renseignements qui
vous sont communiquéssur les faits devraient, dans la mesure du possible, êtrecomplets.
Or, on abuse devant vous de renseignements non vérifiés;l'exemple le plus patent porte sur
l'explosion du marchéde Markale, àSarajevo, en 1994. Sans qu'ily aitlamoindre enquête, lecrime
a étéattribuéaux Serbes de Bosnie. Et l'événemena t joué un rôle dans l'évolution de lasituation T.lr
en Bosnie-Herzégovine, y compris dans des bombardements de l'OTAN. Mais, à ce jour, on n'a
toujours pas établide façon définitivequi est l'auteur du crime.
A la suite du meurtre de 39 Albanais dans le village de Racak, en janvier 1998, le chef de
la mission de vérification du Kosovo organisée par I'OSCE a déclaré,sans avoir procédéà la
27 moindre enquête,qu'il s'agissait d'unmassacre de civils. Il a dit à l'époqueque, sans êtrejuriste, il
étaitsûr qu'ilavait été commislà un crime contre l'humanité. Des médecins légistes originaires de
Yougoslavie, du Bélanis et de Finlande ont travaillé ensemble pour établir un rapport d'experts
visantà établir les causeset les conditions des décès. Après avoir terminéleur travail d'équipeà
Pristina, les légistes yougoslaveset bélarussesont signédes rapports consignant leurs constatationscommunes. Pendant le travail, les experts finlandais ont souscrit àces constatations, mais n'ontpas
signéles rapports en expliquant qu'ils souhaitaient procéder àdes analyses supplémentaires. C'est
ce qu'ils ont fait, mais la publication des résultats a été retardée. Laconférence de presse de
Mme Ranta, le chef de l'équipefinlandaise, a coïncidé avec la réunionqui s'est tenue au centre de
conférences de l'avenue Kléber, au moment où il est apparu que la délégationyougoslave ne
signerait pas l'accord intérimairepour la paix et l'autonomie du Kosovo. Mme Ranta a déclaré que
les personnes qui avaient ététuées étaientdes civils. Les légistes yougoslaves et bélarusses ont
indiqué que les mains des personnes tuéesportaient des traces de poudre, tandis que les experts
finlandais disaient ne pas en avoir trouvé. C'est cela, et aussi le fait que les personnes tuées
portaient des vêtementscivils, qui ont fait dire Mme Ranta qu'il s'agissait de civils. Mais s'ilest
exact qu'ily avait des traces de poudre sur les mains des personnes tuées, cela indique qu'on s'est
servi d'armes et que le décèsest intervenu au cours d'affrontements armés. Cette différencedans
les constatations est fondamentale. Mais, sans enquêter plus avant, certains pays ont qualifié
l'événement demassacre.
L'information présentéepar les défendeursest sélective,incomplète,ellemanque deprécision.
Il est tout à fait inexact de présenter la situation au Kosovo-Metohija comme témoignant de la
répression organisée par les autorités serbes à l'encontre de la minorité albanaise. Les agents des
défendeurs ont cité quelques mots extraits du rapport du Secrétaire général pour fonder leurs
accusations sur ces citations. Pourtant, l'extrait pertinent du rapport du Secrétaire général dadu
17 mars 1999 est le suivant
«La relation qui suit indique quand et où il s'est produit des incidents graves
donne à penser que la violence dirigée contre les civils au Kosovo ne cesse de se
généraliser. Le 18janvier 1999, un serbe a ététué parce qu'ilne se serait pas arrêté
àun barrage que l'armée de libération duKosovo a mis en place àNedakovac, près de
Kosovska Mitrovica. Le 19janvier, le corps d'un enseignant albanais du Kosovo a été
découvert près d'Istok. Le 20 janvier, deux femmes serbes (la mère et la fille) ont été
blesséesaprès que des personnes non identifiées ont ouvert le feu sur leur habitation,
apparemment pour chercher à atteindre le père. Le 21 janvier, un homme et une
femme albanais du Kosovo ont ététuésquand leur voiture a essuyé des coups de feu
àun carrefour, al'extérieurd'orahovac. Le mêmejour, le corps d'unmédecin albanais
du Kosovo a étédécouvert près del'autoroute qui relie Pec à Mitrovica. Le 24 janvier, cinq albanais du Kosovo, deux hommes, une femme et deux
jeunes garçons de onze et douze ans, ont ététuéssur la route reliant Rakovina à
Jablanica, alors qu'ilsréparaientleurtracteur. D'aprèsdes observateurs internationaux,
on aurait trouvé une soixantaine de cartouches sur les lieux de l'incident et les corps
portaient de multiples blessures par balles.
2 8 Le 25 janvier, un albanais du Kosovo a ététuéet son fils gravement blessé près
de Decani, quand des assaillants masqués ont tiré55 rafales, d'après ce qu'ontdit les
témoins,sur leur voiture. Le 26 janvier, un serbe a étégravement blessé lors d'une
attaque dirigéecontre sa maison, dans la municipalitéd'lstok. Le corps d'un serbe de
vingt trois ans a été découverlte27 janvier sous unepasserelle, dans les faubourgs de
Kosovska Mitrovica; il est possible que la victime ait ététuée ailleurset son corps
transporté jusqu'au lieuoù on l'a trouvé.
Le 29janvier, des sources albanaises du Kosovo ont fait savoir que le corps d'un
albanais du Kosovo avait étédécouvertdans le village de Bistrazin et qu'un autre
albanais, proche de la Ligue démocratique du Kosovo, avait étépèvement blessé
devant l'entréede son appartement par deux balles tirées par des inconnus. Le
30 janvier, un albanais du Kosovo âgé de trente six ans, originaire de Pec, a été
découvertune balle dans la têtesur la route entre Pec et Pristina. Le mêmejour, a été
découvert dans levillage de Gradis le corps d'un autrehomme réputéêtreun «albanais
kosovar loyaliste», un professeur de physique originaire de Djakovica. Dans la
municipalitéd'Istok, un serbe âgéa ététué etsa femme de 72 ans blesséequand des
inconnus ont jeté une grenade dans leur maison, dans le village de Rakos.
Le 31 janvier, le corps d'unalbanais du Kosovo originaire du village de Begov
Vukovac a été trouvé une balle dans la têteau sud d'Istok. Le mêmejour, dans la
municipalité de Stimlje, des hommes armés et masqués auraient pénétré dansune
maison du village de Donje Godance et blesséun homme et deux garçonnets.
Les agressions et les meurtres en milieu urbain se sont poursuivis au cours de
la première quinzaine de février. Le 4 février,les corps de trois albanais du Kosovo
ont étédécouverts dans une voiture entre les villages d'Istinic et Gomja Lika, dans la
municipalité de Decani, et le corps d'un serbe a étédécouvert près du village de
Rastavica. Toutes les victimes avaient ététuéespar balles. Le 4 février, un serbea
ététuésous le feu d'unearme automatique alors qu'ilse déplaçait sur l'autoroute entre
Pec et Djakovica.
Le 7 février, les corps de deux albanais du Kosovo portés disparus depuis le
3 janvier ont étédécouvertsà Kacanik, au sud d'urosevac. La nuit du 7 au 8 février,
le corps d'un homme non identifiéâgéd'une trentaine d'annéesa étédécouvertdans
le village de Livadja dans la municipalité de Lipljan. Au moment où nous rédigeons,
le HCRrecherche desprécisions surplusieurs comptesrendus de découvertesmacabres
qui ont eu lieu le 8 févriera Djakovica ou aux alentours. Les corps de deux jeunes
gens, un garçon de dix sept ans et une femme de vingt ans, ont été découverts dans
deux endroits différents des faubourgs de Djakovica. Le corps d'un albanais du
Kosovo, tuépar balle, a étédécouvertdans sa voiture dans la région de Djakovica,à
proximité du village de Trakanic. Le mêmejour, égalementà Djakovica, les corps
d'un homme et d'une femme âgésont également été découverts.Les deux victimes,
qui seraient de la communautéde Roma, sont mortes de blessures parballes tirées dans
le cou. Les corps de deux albanais du Kosovo originaires du village de Goden à
proximitéde Djakovica ont étédécouverts le10 février. Le 11 février,quatre nouveaux corps ont été découverts dans différentes régions
du Kosovo. D'après lesinformations transmises par les médias, lecorps d'unalbanais
du Kosovo propriétaired'unsalon de théà Istok a été découvert surla route entre Zac
et Zablace; il avait ététué d'une balledans la tête. Deux hommes, un albanais du
Kosovo tué d'une balle dans latête,l'autre toujours non identifié, ont étédécouverts
à des endroits différentsde Novo Selo, àproximitéde Pec. Le corps d'unhomme non
identifiéa étédécouvert, dans une mare à Klina.
Les violences dirigées contre les civils au Kosovo revêtentaujourd'hui des
formes nouvelles encore plus dangereuses. En particulier, les actions terroristes qui
s'intensifient depuis peu contre les établissements serbes et albanais en milieu urbain,
notamment les attaques àla grenadedirigées contredes caféset des magasins, prennent
un caractèreinquiétant. Depuis la fin dejanvier, ce sont au moins dix incidents de ce
type qui ont étésignalésà Pristina, Pec, Kosovska Mitrovica et Urosevac. L'enquête
menée par le HCR permet de dire que, très souvent, ces établissements avaient été
fréquentés pardes serbes et des albanais et qu'aucun incident entre eux n'avait été
signalé. La dernière attaque lancéele 13 févriersur la principale place d'urosevac fut
particulièrement homble : douze personnes ont étéblessées et une vingtaine de
magasins ainsi que plusieurs voitures garées à proximité ont été sérieusement
endommagées. Le 17 février, un autre engin explosif dissimulé sur le marché
d'urosevac a été découverett désamorcéparla mission de vérificationau Kosovo. Ces
attaques ont pour résultat qu'elles aliènentde plus en plus les communautés serbe et
albanaise, qu'elles répandentpartout un sentiment d'insécuritéet rétrécissent toujours
davantage le terrain de la coexistence.
Févriera également été marqué par de nouveaux départsde Serbes quittant les
villes et les villages où ils se trouvaient en minorité,ou bien où s'étaientproduits des
heurts entre les unités paramilitaires albanaises du Kosovo et les forces de sécurité.
D'après lesinformations émanantdu commissaire serbe aux réfugiés,quatre-vingt dix
villages environ du centre de l'ouest du Kosovo ont perdu toute leur population serbe
au cours des derniers mois, tandis que des villes comme Podujevo et Kosovska
Mitrovica ont vu se réduireleur population serbe. On estime à 10.000 le nombre de
Serbes déplacésà l'intérieurdu Kosovo tandis que 30.000 Serbes ont gagnéd'autres
régionsde Serbie.» [Traduction du Greffe.]
A en croire le rapport que je viens de citer, il est clair qu'il ne saurait être questionque les
autorités serbes mènent une campagne de répression à l'encontre de la communautéalbanaise du
Kosovo-Metohija, commettent des violations massives des droits de l'homme, etc.
Les Etats membres de l'OTAN expliquent leur action arméepar la volonté de protéger les
réfugiés albanaisalors que quiconque examine sérieusement la situation peut constater que les
énormesflux de réfugiésne se sont constitués qu'aprèsle débutdes bombardements. Comme on
le sait, c'est le Kosovo-Metohija qui est le plus visé. Nonseulement les villes mais aussi les
villages sont bombardés tous les jours. Le nombre de victimes que font les bombardements de
l'OTAN chez les Albanais est trèssupérieurau nombre total d'Albanais tués au Kosovo-Metohija - 22 -
à l'occasion de heurts avec l'arméeet les forces de police yougoslaves au cours des dix dernières
années. La déclarationde la Haut-Commissaire desNations Unies pour les réfugiésdate d'unmois
environ après que l'OTAN ait agressé la Yougoslavieet cette déclaration ne peut absolumentpas
prouver l'existence d'unevaste campagne de persécution des Albanaisau Kosovo-Metohija. Tout
au contraire, c'estprincipalement en raison des bombardements que les Albanais fuient le Kosovo.
Non seulement le Kosovo-Metohija mais beaucoup de villes situéessur tout le territoire de la
Yougoslavie sont actuellement abandonnées aussi par les Serbes et par les membres d'autres
communautés qui cherchent à trouver refuge contre ces bombardements systématiqueset massifs
visant les zones habitées.
J
Les autorités provinciales allemandes prouvent par ailleurs qu'antérieurementàl'intervention
arméede l'OTAN, il n'existait pas de problème particulier au Kosovo-Metohija, car, jusqu'à cette
intervention de l'OTAN, lesdites autorités refusaient tout nouveau permis de séjouraux anciens
réfugiésalbanais, invoquant à cet effet le document officiel émanant du ministèredes affaires
étrangères d'Allemagne qui dit qu'«au Kosovo, il n'est pas possible de vérifier qu'il y ait
expressément un mouvement de persécution politique dirigé contrela population de souche
albanaise)) et que
«l'actiondes forces de sécuritén'estpas dirigéecontre les Albanais du Kosovo en tant
que groupe définid'unpoint devue racial, elleest dirigée contre un adversairemilitaire
et sespartisans réels ouallégués, c'est-à-dirl'arméede libérationdu Kosovo, qui lutte
pour l'indépendancedu Kosovo par des moyens terroristes» (lettre du ministère des
affaires étrangèresde laRépublique fédéralde'Allemagneno 514-5 16.80.32 426 endate
du 12janvier 1998, dont nous annexons copie).
Le mêmedocument dit encore :
«Les membres de la population albanaise ne sont pas menacés par une
persécutionpolitique liéeàleur filiation nationale. C'estainsi qu'àBelgrade, pour ne
considérerque Belgrade, vivent plusieurs milliers d'Albanais desouche. Leur situation
n'estpas défavorableet ils ne sont pas traitéssystématiquementpar 1'Etatcomme des
citoyens de seconde zone. En Serbie méridionale, il y a des régions où la population
albanaise est majoritaire et où il n'a été constatéà, l'encontre de cette catégoriede
personnes, aucun exemple de violation des droits de l'homme qu'il y ait lieu de
retenir.» (Il s'agitdes municipalitésde Bujanovac, Presevo et Medvedja.) [Traduction
du Greffe.]
Les défendeursn'ontpas relevé l'affirmationdu demandeur qu' ilse trouve dansleurs banques
des comptes - ayant fait l'objet d'unepublicitédans les journaux et sur 1'Intemet- sur lesquels - 23 -
des contributions peuvent êtreversées pourfinancer des groupes terroristes au Kosovo-Metohija.
Ils ont gardéle silence au sujet de la remarque faite par le demandeur qu'ils n'ontjamais condamné
avec force le terrorisme au Kosovo-Metohija ni rien fait pour l'éliminer véritablement. Ilsn'ont pas
répondu ànotre argument selon lequel la tentative d'imposer leprétendu accordde Rambouillet par
la voie d'un ultimatum - le recours à la menace et à l'emploi de la force - est la plus grave des
violations du droit international.
Sur la question de l'extrême urgenceet du préjudiceirréparable,je voudrais appeler votre
attention sur les nouvelles victimes dénombrées ces deuxderniers jours.
Le 10 mai 1999,Dragan Obrenovic et Velija Dzemilovic ont ététuésdevant leurs domiciles
lors d'une attaque de l'OTAN sur Cacak.
A la mêmedate, quelques minutes après 15 heures, Nasko Ristic et Milos Jovic ont été tués
àbord d'uncamion à Cacak. Douze personnes ont étéblessées,dont quatre grièvement : Milenko
Cirovic, Milan Stankovic, Miodrag Maksimovic et Zoran Vuckovic.
Dans la matinéedu 11 mai 1999,trois personnes ont ététuéeset quatre grièvementblessées
lors de l'attaque lancéeparl'OTANcontre des installations civiles dans le village de Staro Gradsko,
district de~i~ljani, au Kosovo-Metohija.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président :Monsieur Etinski, je regrette de vous
interrompre, mais puis-je vous demander combien de temps vous pensez qu'il vous faudra encore.
M. ETINSKI :J'en aurai terminédans quatre minutes.
Une fillette de quatre ans, Dragana Dimic, et Bosko et Rosa Jankovic, âgéstous deux de
soixante ans, ont ététués. Ont étéblessés Bojan Dimic, âgéde sept ans, son père Sinisa, ainsi
qu'Okica Seslija.
Le 11 mai 1999, Dusan Matkovic a étéblessé à Nis au cours d'une frappe aérienne de
l'OTAN.
Le 11 mai également, quelques minutes après 8 heures, des avions de l'OTAN ont largué
plusieurs bombes-grappes aux alentours du village de Babin Most, à 15 kilomètres de Pristina. A
11 h 55, des avions de l'OTAN ont lancétrois missiles sur la régionde Pristina. Vers 13 heures, - 24 -
deux missiles ont frappéles districts de Grabovci et de Belacevac, dans la municipalitéd'obilic,
dont la population est exclusivement de souche albanaise. -
Les défendeursprétendentque les mesures conservatoires demandées ne protégerontpas les
droits visés par laconvention pour la préventionet la répressiondu crime de génocide. Cela n'est
pas vrai. Les actes de génocide sont commis au moyen des bombardements, donc par l'emploi de
la force. La cessation de l'emploi de la force signifie aussi, en l'espèce, la protectiondes droits
établispar cette convention.
Monsieur leprésident,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour,je reste stupéfaitdevant l'affirmation
des agents des défendeurs queces mesures conservatoires deprotection auraient des effets négatifs,
*
qu'elles permettraient de nouvelles expulsions d'Albanais, etc. Le Gouvernement de la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie a réaffirméàplusieurs reprises qu'ilétaitdisposéa accepter une mission
de surveillance civile de l'ONU au Kosovo-Metohija. Je ne vois absolument pas comment les
bombardements peuvent assurer le retour des réfugiéset leur sécuritéau Kosovo-Metohija.
Comment la minorité albanaise pourrait-elle êtreprotégée parles bombardements, alors que les
membres de cette minorité en sont égalementles victimes ?
Monsieur leprésident,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, les conditionsexigéesparl'article 41
du Statut de la Cour etpar l'artic73 de son Règlementpour l'indicationde mesures conservatoires
sont satisfaites
- la RépubliquefédéraledeYougoslavie estunEtat Membre del'organisation desNations Unies;
W
- la déclarationd'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour est valable et opéranteen
l'espèce;
- la Cour est compétenteà l'égarddes défendeursqui ont acceptélajuridiction obligatoire de la
Cour;
- il y a un différend relatif à l'interprétationet à l'application de la convention sur le génocide;
- la Cour a compétence sur la base de l'articlIX de la convention;
- les mesures demandéesont trait aux droits de la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie qui font
l'objetdu différend. - 25 -
Les conditions de l'extrême urgence ed t u préjudiceirréparablesont satisfaites, et je prie la
Cour d'user du pouvoir que lui confère l'article 41 du Statut pour indiquer les mesures
conservatoires demandées.
Si vous le permettez, Monsieur leprésident,jedonnerai maintenant lecture dema conclusion.
Je prie la Cour d'indiquer les mesures conservatoires suivantes : les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, le
Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, la République française, la République
fédérale d'Allemagne, la République italienne,le Royaume des Pays-Bas, le Royaume de Belgique,
le Canada, le Portugal et le Royaume d'Espagne doivent cesser immédiatement de recourir à
l'emploi de la force et doivent s'abstenir de tout acte constituant une menace de recours ou un
recours à l'emploi de la force contre la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie.
Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie de votre attention.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président :Merci beaucoup, Monsieur Etinski.
Ainsi prend fin le deuxième tour de parole de la Yougoslavie dans les instances relatives à l'emploi
de la force introduites par la Yougoslavie contre dix Etats.
La Cour a reçu aujourd'hui de la Yougoslavie deux documents dans lesquels elle fait valoir
à l'encontre de la Belgique et des Pays-Bas certains moyens supplémentaires pour fonder la
compétence de la Cour. Ces documents ont étéimmédiatement communiqués aux deux Etats
intéresséset la Yougoslavie vient de s'exprimer à leur sujet devant la Cour. Après avoir entendu
les réponses des deux Etats, la Cour examinera si cela nécessite, dans le cas des instances
introduites contre eux, une modification du calendrier déjà indiquépour l'achèvement de la
procédureorale.
M. Guillaume souhaite poser une question :Je lui donne la parole.
M. GUILLAUME :Thank you, Mr. President. My question is to the Agent of Portugal. He
stated that "on the date of Ming of the Application from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
29 April 1999, Portugal was not party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, although its instrument of accession had already been deposited with the United
And on what date
Nations". My question is, on what date was this instrument deposited? - 26 -
according to the Agent of Portugal, has Portugal become or will become party to the Convention?
Any comment from the Agent of Yugoslavia on this point vil1 also be welcome. Thank you,
Mr. President.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président :Merci, Monsieur Guillaume.
L'audience sera maintenant levée. La Cour se réunira à 15 heures pour entendre les
conclusions des Etats défendeursdans ce deuxième tour de parole.
L'audience estlevée à Il h 20. ANNEXES TO
Mr. ETINSKI'S
ORAL STATEMENT Annex 1
UNITED NATIONS 'NATIONS UNIES
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His ExceLlency
Mr. Vlâdislav Jovanovié r
Chargé d'atgaires a.i. I
Pernanent Mission of the Federal Republic Of Yugoslavia
to the Z!nit& Iqstions
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Sd. WdE :TB 666T TT 'AM : 'ON 3NOHd Annex 2
United Nations --
Distr.:General ,
8Deceinber1998
C...
. . I
1. ThepresentdocumenitpubtishendaccordanceithadecisiontakenbytheGenerai
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operationsfor whichthereisaspee~sessment T,hidecisionwastaken,.inter diin
responstbtheSecretarv-Generaarineat6M.ember Statesto hel~easethecash-flow
positionoftbeUnitedNationsbyfonvardingtheircontributionsmopromptly.
UIITIILULut WGUALLLS19QLIvi~sisLUCduhsivCïv1~rirJLOLLJLUtlh~p~.ILIIIILuCal
thefinancialsituati. hefollowingannexesareattachcd:
1. Srawsoradvancesduc rhLWorklngCaplrzrl unfur'~hcblennlu1991-1 999as
at30 November 1998 ................................................. 4
0 S&X~ nfefirrkiktittnthTYnitrNan'nnn~~mtlarhl~dasnt tNhvcrnhtr 199R 5
III. Sclm ofcontributiorstheUnitedNationsEmergencForce(1973) (UNEF) and
the'United .Nations DisengagementObserver Force (UNDOF) :srat
10 bTI.---L-rXQEO ................................................... 1O
W. StatuofcontributiontsotheUnitedNatio~nterimForceinLebanon(IJBJIFIL)
asat30November1998 ................................................ 14
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dtahrof ionaibutiotofhoUnitedPlntioTransition hzsismCrÿap (VS'FAC)
vl. 24
as at30November1998 .................:............................ t
98-3896 (4E) 181298
Ii31111 1111111 i1l11i1l111 I~I 7
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UNITED NATIONS NA'J'IONS IJNli:cj Annex 3
Z<J.
.,,S."..Pnntrihiilinn7.4 3Annhae 9 007
011~UIIBIIwl itieccreiaiy-QcriaiüI.Ilirvuihe honour 10 aanowlecrge reculplor a islier
datad 20 Scptember 1997 irom Ille Governmenlof the Fcderai#epirblic of Yiigosiavia,infoming
us ofa transiedeposit to Chase ManhaIfan Bank of $1,065,078.
An offidalrecelpl,Induplicate,is enclosed forthe foregeing. ayment whichhas hean
recordedas contributionfrom the Governrnent oftheFederal Republic ofYu~oslaviato the
UnitedNslionsrogularbudget for1991 (parlialpayment).
am* LIUIIYI~uIVOYWV(QI ~-USII=IQI,1 atruulII- LUWIW, (Iuvugn YOU,rn mo
Govemmen! offheFederalRepublic afYugoslavia ourappretiation for thipayment.
Accept, Ercellency, theassurances of my highest rotsideration.
x-..---7 \*
;--.--<I.-$ ! -..-.
~"rcph€.'~~nnor
UnQc?f-Sewelary.G~.o ÜI~
forAdministrationnndMairigeiiiciii
Hi5 Excsllency
Mr. VladislavJovanuvic
Ambassado r xîrnordinrirand Plenipaiei.ili,?ry
Charge d'affairesa.i. ofthFederal Rcpublicof
Yrigoslrivito theUnitedNations
New York, N.Y UIYI CU:IYY I ILJIYJ ISI!LCII'VLJVLI<Ln -1ltJ UCItIUIU1 LUl'Jll\~UUIlUlU lu\J.[>u.!!j \ If.,MAY. il 1999 01:37PN Pl
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r ..CIONES UlJlOASB.-. . S . . . .t'...........WBUC-.. GUAÊRNAME. .I-- .-II.-!:...pr...,---.tlJ
Iaronc.lu: Mvice of crdit rwc:ivCY1irml Cha~+. j:nhat.Lirn Bank, WJ York
rdnoe - value +te 19 Septc'iiit~'19Yl
yrnenol : Contrikation Po die ütiitcd Na~ionsKegular RLicJeer f. z1991.
(pr tial payi!aot)
ru0 d.r dd
W FIGURES ; $l,ï%s,~)63-00
YDNlrlM prckfl@~W€x
CANTlMd EN CfFluS
' Goverment OC the marai i<eplblic or \'ly,nsiaJia
c/o Pezr~anent Mission ofFedera l Pep35lic of
Y oslavia CO the Unird Xations
8% Fz&h Avenue
Ng7 York, N.Y. 10091
. <.,
11/05 '99 TUE 12:29 lTX/RX NO 85031 a001 Annex 4
UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
. WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The Secretary-General of the United Nations
has the honour to acknowledge receipt of a
contribution, the details and purpose of rhich
are bdicated on the official United Nations
.... receip~ encl osed herewith in dupl icate . ..-. ----
? UNITEDNATIONS RECEIPTVOUCHER -GOVERNMENT CONTR~BUTION
NO. B 0428~
* Y NATIONS UNIES RECU DE PAIEMENT -CONTRIBUTION DE GOUVERNEMEN7 .D~T~
U' NACIONES UNIOAS' RECIBO DE PAGO - CONTRJBUCION GUBERNAMENTAL 22 September 1
1
IrefaroncLQ: ~dvice of credit received fran Chase Manhatta nank, N.A.,NewYork
Réferénce - value date16 September 1998
Rcfcrcnrri
En~aicrnenr deContributia no theUnited Naiatiwsreg- budget
- as indicatd hlar:
En pagode
MONTANT FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGH TFHOUSAND IMONTA^wACH~FFRES
CANTIDAD EUlR HUbJDREDSm-sIX =LAW AM> 00/100 ~n~lo~oEN am~s USS5881476-00
- for1991 (balance)
- for 1992 (partial payment)
Received from/Reçu de/Recibdeo
r Government of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia
c/o Permanent~ission of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
854 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10021
L
11/05 '99 TUE00:56 ITX/RXNO 84801 @Io02 Annex 5
.... . -'
XLIX BELGRA1E
ASSEMBLTHEFRY l
INTERNATIONAL Editor-mChief i
Dr.RANKOPETKOVIC1
1 !
Pnce USJ1 00
POLITICS ECONOMICS LAW SCIENCE CULTURE
PEACEFULSETTLEMENT
ZitvadiJovanovif
THEBATTLEOFKOSOVO
Prof.Dr. RankoPetkovic'
CONTACTGROUPANDKOSOVO
ZoranLutovac
UNITEDNATIONSPEACEKEEPING
Prof.Dr.A.J.RGroom
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALCOURT
Prof.Dr. ObradRuci'C
STATUSOFYUGOSLAVIA INTHEUN
Dr. MiodragMitif
DOCUMENTSONKOSOVO PROET CONTRA
Sixth Anniversary of a Controversial Decision
Dr. Miodrag MITIC
his year marks the sixth anniversary (on 22 participatein the work of the General Assembly."At
TSeptember) of the adoption of UN General the sametirne.the Security Council "decidesto con-
Asseinblyresolution 47/1whichatternptedtosortout siderthematter again before the end ofthe mai. part
United Nationsin the wakeof secessionand recogni- Assernbly".y-seventh session of the Generai
tion of four former Yugoslav republics. Although
ado~tedasachcument ofa teqoW naturethedeci- Council recalls its resolution 757 which Statesthat
sion has not taken its "the claim by the
final fom to this date7 Federai Republic of
leaving Yugoslavia. 1 Yugoslavia (Serbia
totally unjustifiably / and Montenegro) to
and withno clear legal continue automatical-
grounds, stripped of ly the membershipof
some important rights the former SFRY in
of a member of the International the United Nations
United Nations. This hasnot beengenerally
in the history of the Law and accepted"andthat the
world Organization, "the statensfonnerlyt
aroused great interest ICXIOWKIs iheSocialist
and reaction of a con- the Statusof Federal Republic of
siderable number of Yugoslavia hasceased
renowned experts in the Federal to exist".
international law Only a few days
worldwide.Their reac- Republic later.on22September
tion could be briefly 1992,the UN General
defined as one of Assembly adopted
astonishmentand con- of Yugoslavia resolution 4711 in
stemztion at the con- which it "Having
and at the way inlution in the United Nations received the recom-
which it was adopted mendation of the
and put intoeffect. SecurityCouncilof19
Background.- On Septernber 1992 that
19 September 1993. of Yugoslavia(Serbiac
the UN Security and Montenegro)
Council adopted reso- . should apply for
lution 777 in which it,- -- rnembership in the
"considers that the 1 United Nations and
Federal Republic of ' that it shallnot partic-
Yrigoslavia(Serbia and MontenegrCannet continue ipa inthe work of the General Assembly,
automaticallythe membershipof the formerSocialist
Nations; andtherefore recommends to the General Yugoslavia(Serbia and Montenegro)cannotcontinue
Assemblythat itdecide thatthe Federd Republic of automaticallythe membership of the formerSociaiist
Yugoslavia(Serbiaand Montenegro)should apply for Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United
membershipinthe UnitedNationsandthat it shallnot Nations; and therefore decides that the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
should apply for membership in theUnited Nations and that it should be notedthat the SFRYno longer
and that it shall not participate in the work of the exists."(It rnay be added that a number of reputed
GeneralAssembly;
legal expertsconsider that "disintegration"is not a
2. Takes note of the intention of the Security memberStates in the UNGeneral Assemblydirectlythe
Councilto considerthematteragainbeforetheend of opposedsuch an arbitraryandunfounded opinion for.
the main part of the forty-seventh session of the as the BadinterCommissionitselfclairnsin its opin-
GeneralAssembly ." ion quotedearlier,"ihe existenceor disappearanceof
By comparing Security Council resolution 777 a Statearein any case defacto questions", therefore,
and General Assembly Resolution 4711 it cm be its positionthat federal Stateshave differentcriteria
inferredthat: for their survival is devoid of any legal and real
1.Both resolutionscontain the position that "the grounds.2Themoreso,sinceal1rnembersof theinter-
FRY cannot continueautomaticallythe membership nationalcomrnunity,with the exceptionof Malaysia
of the former SFRY inthe United Nations",that it and New Zealand, continueto maintain diplornatic
should applyfor mernbership in theUnited Nations
and that it shall not participate in the work of the relations with the "non-existent State" and have
GeneralAssembly; retainedtheir diplomaticmissionsin Belgrade, while
the delegationof Yugoslaviahad normallyparticipat-
2. Unlike Security Council resolution, General ed,unid the adoption of the UN General Assembly
Assembly resolutiondoesnotcontainthepositionthat resolution4711, inthe workof al1the organsof the
"the statefomerly known as the Socialist Federal United Nations,includingtheGeneralAssembly.
Republicof Yugoslaviahas ceasedto exist"; Thanksto ihe mentionedoppositionof a nurnber r
3. Both resolutions note the intention of the of States.the UN GeneralAssernblyhas not incorpo-
Secunty Councilto consider "the matter"before the ratedh its resolution 4711the said sentence fiom
end of the main partof the forty-seventhsession of Security CouncilResolution777 related to the "dis-
the GeneralAssembly. appearance" of Yugoslavia, behind which is the
Let us takeupthe first assertion:thatthe"Federal. BadinterCommission.
Republicof Yugoslaviacannot continueautomatical- Althoughboth resolutions (Security Counciland
ly thernembershipof the formerSFRYin the United GeneralAssembly) statethe intentionof the Security
Nations". Iteansthat the FRY cannotautomatically Councilto consider"thematter"againbeforethe end
continuethe membershipof the SFRYbutit doesnot of themainpart of the forty-seventh sessionof the
meanthat it cannotdo so at all.Therefore,the above GeneralAssembly,the SecwityCouncil,sixyearson,
assertiondoesnot signify the totalanfina dlniaiof has stillnot addressedthis question.The very inten-
this rightto theFRYbut onlysaysthat itcannotexer- tion of the Security Counciltoconsider the matter
cisethisrightautomatically,that someadditionalcon- again is proof enoughthatthe solution inresolutions
777 and4711is not finalandthat it is of atemporary
ditionsare required, some additionalprocedure(in character.
this particularcase, recognitionof internationallegal 1.The fact is that 127mernberStates of theUN
continuity).The clairnthat the FRY shouldapply for
membershipofthe United Nationsis logicallyrelated voted in favour of resolution4711,six were against,
to the previousclaim (although it seemsprernature with26abstentions.Itisonlynaturalthat sucha large
consideringthat theright to continuemernbershipis number of States voted in favour of the resolution -
not irrevocablydenied), but is entirelycontradictory because, shortly before the voting, the then Prime
io the positioninthesarne sentencethat"it shaYno: Miriisterof Yugoslaviahad acceptedthe conceptof
participate in the work of the General Assembly". the resolution,declaring explicitlythzt the Federal
For, the denialof participationin the workof one of Republicof Yugoslaviawouldapplyformembership
the organsofthe United Nationsis applicable onlyto in the UnitedNations(whichwasone of thecardinal
a memberof this Organizationregardlessof its tirne mistakesof the Yugoslavdiplomacyin resolvingthe
dimension.Why, then, should Yugoslavia applyfor Yugoslav crisis, by allowing such an unacceptable
membershipif itsright ofparticipationinthe workof position to be conveyed fromthe rostm of the
one of the United Nations organs - the General General Assembly as the official position of
Assembly - has been withheld to it (and only tem- Yugoslavia). Why would the delegations of other
porarily.at that)? StatesarouseangeroftheUSAand otherinitiatorsof
It is indicative that resolution 4711 does not the resolution if the official Yugoslav delegation
includetheformulationfrom SecurityCouncilresolu- 1.Thus.theformerprincipalLegaiCounseloftheUnited
tion-onthebasisofwhich ithasbeenadopted-"that Nations, PrEricSoy(Interviegiventothedaily"Borba"
the state known as the SFRY lias ceased to exist". on 10 April 1992). Prof. Vojin Dimitrijevic'(Hardly
This statementofthe Security Councilhas beentaken AcceptableDayton,weeklyIN. 23 Febxuar1996)and0th-
over from the opinion of the so-called Badinter ers.
Commission No.8of 4 July 1993.that"theprocessof vokcd sharp criticisms by expertsin the USA, France.ro-
the disintegrationofthe SFRYreferredtointhe opin- GermanyB, elgiumetc.headed bythe Prime Minister endorsed the US siand- 2.Immediatelyaftertheadoptionofthe resolution.
point? in view of its extremelyvague and confusing word-
At the General Assernbly session itself extremely hg, attempts were madeto interpret it in sucha way
coiitradictorypositions were voiced on the occasion that Yugoslavia has been excluded hm the United
Nations.Thus. themissions ofCroatiaand Bosniaand
of the adoption ofthe resolution. Herzegovina to the UnitedNations requested theUN
Already during the adoption of resolution 777 in Secretary-General.as earlyas25 September 1992,to
the Security Council, the representative of the USA confimi the exclusionof Yugoslaviafrornthe United
expressedhis satisfactionthat the resolutlon confms Nations. The UN chief Legal Counsel. Under-
the position "that the membership of the SFRY has Secretas, K.G. Fleischhauer (former chief legal
ceased and that, since Serbia and Montenegroare not
a continuation of the SFRY, they should apply for adviserofthe MinistryofForeignAffairsof Germany
and currently Judge of the International Court of
niembersliipif they wish to participate in the United Justice) reacted with his letter of 29 Septernber 1992.
Nations". Accordingto him "a country which is not a clearly pointingout thatresolution4711"has not been
nielilberof the UN cannot participate in the work of adopted either on the basisof Articl5of the Charter
tlie GeiieralAssenlblyW.3 (suspension) or on the basis of Article6 (exclusion)".
The position of the representative of the Russian aswell as that "it neither terminatesnor suspends the
Federation who accepted the concept of the resolu- rnenibershipof Yugoslaviain the ûrganization."
tion. altlioughit has seriousinherent contradictions,is On 14January 1994.the pennanent representative
fundamentally different from that of the United of Slovenia to thUN, DaniloTirk. in his letterto the
States. He proceeds from "the prevailing view in the UN Secretary -General repeatedly requested "neces-
international cornmunitythat neither of the republics sary action that should be taken by the Security
tliat iiaveenierged instead of the SFRY cannot claini Council and the General Assemblywithrespectto the
autornaticallyto continue membership in the United fmai termination of the mernbership of the former
Nations". However, he pointed out explicitly that Yugoslavia in the United Nations", demanding also
Russia does iiot go dong with the proposai put for- that Yugoslaviabe removedfrom the officia1publica-
ward by some States that the FRY be excluded for- tions of the UN as depositary of internationalmulti-
iiially or dfact orom the United Nations member- lateral treaties. On 31 January, chief Legal Counsel
Fleischhauer replied. on behalf of thUN Secretary-
ship.Heaisostressedthat "the decisionto suspendthe General,to the representative ofSloveniadrawinghis
participation of the FRY in the work of the General. attention to the following:
Assemblywili not affect inany way the possibilityof
participationof the FRY in the work of other organs a) that the Permanent Mission of the Federal
of the UN, in particular of the Security Council. nor Republic of Yugoslaviaaddressed to the president of
will it affect the issuance of documents or the func- the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General.
tioniong ofthe Permanent Mission of the FRY to the on 27 April 1992,a letter to which was enclosed the
United Nations or the maintenance of the plate with text of the Declarationadoptedat thejeint meeting of
the name of Yugoslaviain the General Assemblyand the Assernbly of theSFRY.the National Assembly of
the Republic of Serbia and the Assembly of the
in the meeting rooms of the organs of the United Republic of Montenegro. in which it is noted that.
Nations".4
The representative of China pointed out that the "strictlobserving the continuity of the international
resolution "does not mean the exclusion of legal personality of Yugoslavia,the FederalRepublic
Yugoslaviafrorn the United Nations", that the narne- of Yugoslavia will continueto exercise al1the nghts
plateof Yugoslaviarernainsin the GeneralAssembly. and to fulfil al1 the obligations undertaken by the
tliat the FRY continues to participatinother organs SFRY ininternational relations, including its mm-
bership in al1internationalorganizationsand the par-
of theUN exceptthe GeneralAssembly andcontinues ticipation in internaiionaltreaties ratified or acceded
to issue documents in the United Nations.5 (China to by Yugoslavia";
abstained from voting). The representatives of India b) that "various States have refused or reserved
a11dZimbabwe most strongly denied the legality of
the resolution stressing that no provision of the their position on the clairnof the FRY tocontinuethe
Charter authonses the Security Council to recom- membership of the formerYugoslavia in internation-
iiieildto the General Assembly that the participation al organizationsand to continue its international legal
of a country in the General Assernbly may be with- personality, arnongothers. Slovenia. but that"never-
drawn or suspe~ded".6(Zimbabwe, in addition to theless. approximately five months after the
Declaration of 27 April 1992 the representatives of
Keriya. Tanzania, Swaziland, Zanibia and the FRY participated.until27 Septernber 1992,in the
Yugoslavia. votedagainst the resolution while India sessions of the UN as representativesof Yugoslavia";
abstained). furthermore. that"01122 September 1992.the Prime
Minister of the FederalRepublicof Yugoslaviadeliv-
3. Security Council, S/PV 3616, 19 September 1991. ered a speech during the seventh plenary meeting of
pp.17-13.
1.Ibid.pp.7-5. the 47th session of the General Assembly";
5,Ibid. pp.14-15.
6.Ibid.p.7. 7.Doc.UN A/47/1S5.29 Septemer 1992. c)that,on29 September1992,he sentseparatelet- 1993):communicationinrespectofthepositionofthe
ters to the permanent representativesof Bosnia and Govemmentconcemingthe successionofBosniaand
Herzegovina and Croatia to the United Nations, Herzegovina in the Conventionon thePreventionand
"explaining the viewpoint of the Secretariat of the Punishrnentof theCrimeof Genocide(C.N.228.1993
United Nationson the practical consequencesof the Treaties-3of 26August 1993)andnotification ofthe
adoption of General Assembly resolution 47/1", in implementation of the Rules of Acceptance and
which it is noted that the resolution "neitherenni- ReciprocalRecognitionofEquiprnentandSpareParts
nates nor suspends the membershipof Yugoslavia in for MotorVehicles(C.N.219.1993Treaties-13of 39
the Organization"andthatit "doesnotdenytherights August 1993). No objectionto the cornmunjcations
of Yugoslavia to participate in the work of other hasbeenreceived wjthregardto the afore-mentioned
organs ofthe GeneralAssemblyexcept the bodiesof notifications"(emphasisadded-MM).
the General Assembly".The letter notes explicitly And,fmally,"theconcludingmessage"tothe per-
that "since the publication ofthat statement on the manent representative of Slovenia to the United
practical consequencesof the adoption of resolution Nations regardinghis intervention"in respectof the
4'711theSecurityCouncilrecalledthat resolution(res- defmitiveterminationof the mernbership ofthe for-
olution 821)/1993)andthe General Assemblywhich merYugoslavia inthe UnitedNations":
reaffmed it (resolutions471229and 48/88) without "Inthe lightof the aboveremarks1regretto have
any objectionswhatsoeverto the interpretationgiven to inform youthat the Secretary-Generalis notpre-
by the Secretariat;" paredto accept yourrequests".
d)thatuntilthe adoptionof GeneralAssemblyres-
olution 471229the representatives ofthe FRY were 3. Debatingon the questionof the membershipof
authorized to pariicipate in the meetings of the Yugoslaviain the United Nationsin comection with
Economicand SocialCounciland itsbodies"; the Memorial of the Governent of Bosnia and-
e)thatinparagraph19ofitsresolution48/88of20 Herzegovina against Yugoslavia, the International
December1993the GeneralAssemblyreaffirmedits Court ofJustice. stating that "thisquestionisonethat
resolution4711and calledupon the member Statesto the Courtshouldnotdetexminedefmitively andat the
implementthe spirit of that resolution "that the de presentphase of theproceedings",couldnot but also
factoworkingstatusofSerbiaandMontenegrobeter- refer to the controversialGeneral Assernblyresolu-
minated",butthat theviewpointof theUNSecretariat tion4711,notingdiplomaticallythat "theresolutionis
on the practical consequencesof resolution4711 has not fiee from legaldifîïculties".Otherwise,theusuaI
notbeenchangedbyparagraph19ofresolution48/88 official documents of the Intemational Court of
and that,asstated inthereport,"the Secretariat isnot Justice confm that Yugoslaviais a memberof the
in a positionto take actionin regard to the statusof UnitedNationsand,in thatcapacity,a memberof the
the memberStatesin theabsence of appropriatedeci- Statuteof the InternationalCourtofJustice.8
sions taken by the competent organs of the Inthe contextof the internationallegalcontinuity
Organization" (documentA/48/847,paragtaph 16); of Yugoslavia, thatis, its membershipin the United
f) "although aware that various States refuse or Nations, itis interesting to note anotherampleof
questionthe claim of the FRY to continue the inter- the objective position of the United Nations
nationallegaipersonalityof the SFRY,includingthe Secretariat which, unfortunately, unlike the men-
participationin internationaltreatiestifiedor acced- tionedinterpretationof the "practical consequences"
ed to by Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General as of General Assernbly resolution4711,was disgrace-
Depositaryis not in a positionto refuseor ignorethe fully withdrawn at the instance of the separated
claim relatingto the questionof succession ofStates, republicsand,firstand foremost, oftheUnited States.
in the absenceof anydecisionon he part of the com- As alreadymentioned, theUN General-Secretary w
petentorganrwresenting Uieinternationalcommuni- asDeposi'q-, despite &e intervention 4 hdividuak-
tyof Statesas a wholeor of the competentorgan of States,treats Yugoslaviain its publications,without
treaties with regard to individual treatiesor conven- interruption,inparticularin its sumrnariesof practice
tions. Neither one of the General Assemblyresolu- ofmultilateraltreaties,as a Statepartyto al1multilat-
tionsdealswith this questionof internationallaw"; erai treaties concluded by the SFRY andlor by the
FRY.Atthe begiming of 1996,theTreatySectionof
g) "inthe absenceofthedecisionof suchanorgan the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat
which would contain the guidelineson the question, issued.in the capacityas the depositary,A Summary
the Secretary-Generalretains the status quo with ofPracticeof the Secretary-Genexalas Depositaryof
regardtothe actions relatingto the treaties andrefer- MultilateralTreatieswhich,onp.89. para 297,explic-
ences in publications conceming Yugoslavia. For itlysays:
example,since 27 April 1992,the Secretary-General
issued three depositary notifications conceming "The independenceof the new successor State.
actions with regard to the treaties submittedby the whichthenexercisesitssovereigntyonits territory.is
Governrnentof Yugoslaviaand relatingto the treaties of coursewithouteffect asconcems the treatyrights
actions:depositionoftheinstrumentof acceptanceof and obligationsof the predecessor State asconcems
Organization (C.N. 153.1993Treaties-3 of 19altJune 8. Forexample.Internationl ourtof Justice,Yearùook
1993-94,N0.48,p.67.its own (remaining) temtory. Thus, after the separa- previous comrnents of the UN Secretariat were the
tion of parts of the temtory of the Union of Soviet result of some influence or, God forbid, pressure of
Socialist Republics (which becarne independent Yugoslavia on itsauthors.But. they were obviously a
States), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (as mistake. A political one of course because the hon-
the RussianFederation) continued to existas a prede- ourable legal experts of the United Nations did not
cessor State, and al1its treaty rights and obligations take into accountthe positionof the leadingmember
continuedin force in respect of itstemtory.Thesme State of the United Nations.
appliestotheFederaIRepublicof Yugoslavia(Serbia Positions of the autborsof internationallaw.- A
andMonteneOgo),which remains as thepredecessor large nurnber of renowned authors of international
State uponseparaiionof parts of ihe tem*touof the law made strong critical rernarks about the applica-
fonner Yugoslavia" (emphasis added - MM).9 On 1
Apnl 1996, the representatives of the four separated tion of international law to the Yugoslav crisis.more
republicsappliedto the UN Secretary-Generd oppos- specifically to the status of Yugoslavia in the United
Nations. and about Resolution4711.
ing the interpretation of the General Secretary In additiontothe fact thatthe majority ofthem are
referredto above and, on 8 April, the letter of the per- agreed that General Assernblyresoluton 4711has no
manentrepresentativeofthe UnitedStates.Madeleine
Albright. anived at the address of the Secretary- grounds in the United NationsCharter. because nei-
General. Inher letter, M. Albright drawsthe attention ther a case of exclusionnor of suspension is involved
to "the concern in connection with the publication" -clearly determinedin Arts. 5 and 6 of the Charter-a
and "in accordance with the instructions from the certain number of authors openly admit that here we
Governnientofthe United States. points out thatpara- are dealing with a case of punishment unprecedented
in thehistoryof the worldOrganization.Thus,writing
grapli297 rnay be interpreted in such a way that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and &out resolution4711andnon-acceptanceof the con-
Montenegro)constitutes the continuity of the former tinuity of Yugoslavia. the British author, Colin
SFRY". "The position ofmy Govenunent", continues Warbrick. cousiders rhar it was essentially.a kind of
Mrs Albright, "is that the SFRY has ceased to exist punishrnent. one of "the weapons for political pres-
andthatnoneof the newly emerged States constitutes sure".l0 A similar opinion was expressed by the
its continuityand, consequently,as long as the word- Austrian Professor of international law, Waldenlar
Hurnrner. He pointed to the fact that out of eleven
ing.of paragraph 297 of the Surnrnaryis contrary to
tlie describedlegal situation, my Governmentwishes cases of "succession" of niembership in the United
to note that it is strongly opposed to it". The letter is Nations sofar, only in thecase of Yugoslaviawas the
concludedwith the statement that "our views on this established practiceof continuity abandonedand that
questionshould not be understood as interferencein "discontinuity was deliberately accepted in spite of
relation to any other position in the Surnrnary".In the existence of objective and subjectivecriteria of
otlier words, it is the only thing that botbers the US identity.11According to him, such an outcome is
and it shouldbe eliinated. based, quite clearly, less on dogmatic considerations
Already the next day, 9 April 1996, the UN and much moreon aspectsof sanctions. Such an opin-
Secretanat prornptly reacted - distributing "Errata" ion has also been given by a prominent Yugoslav
uiiderNo.LA 41/ïR/220, in which it is noted: expert in international legal affairs, Prof. Obrad
RaEic',who considers tliat this absolutely unstatutory
"Paragraph297 shouldrad: decision means intlieiïrst place a politicalwarningto
111the absence of provisions which set specific Yugoslavia because of its behaviour. "The staternent
conditio~isfor succession or which otherwiserestrict
succession. the Secretary-General is guided by the that the State fomierlyknownas the SFRYhasceased
participaiionciausis of the t-ea:ieûs we!! 2s b.j the to exist, as far as tlieauthorof these lines canremem-
ber, is the firsr 'judgriiient'ûf this &adthebistorj
general principles governing the participation of , of the United Nations".:' The British author. Marc
States.The independence ofthe new successor State, Weller, also adrnits tliat the question of continuity
wliicli tlienexercises its sovereigntyon its temtory is andlor recogiiition was oiily a punitive means in the
witliouteffect on the treaty rights and obligationsof case of Yugoslavia He also clairns that in dealing
tliepredecessorState in its own (remaining)territory.
l'hus. after the separation of parts of the temto~yof with the Yugoslav crisis the international cornnlunity
the linion of Soviet Socialist Republics (which acted in a coiifuseciand inconsistentway.13
p ~~~
becaile independent States), the Russian Federation 10. Colin Warbrick: Recognition of StatesI,nternational
coiitiiiuedal1treaty rights and obligationsof the pre- and ComparativeLaw Quarterly.Vo1.4211993,p.440.
tlecessorState." 11. Walde~narHuirirner:Probleme der Staatennachfolge
Andwliatabout the case of Yugoslavia?It siniply am Beispicl Jugosla\\.ien. Schweizerische Zeitung für
disappeared;it was elirninatedfromthe text.Ttwould Internationalesand EuropeischesRecht, No.411993p.457.
be riciiculous.if not impossible, to assume that the 12. Obrad RaCic: Yugoslavia: Discontinuity of
Membership inthe I!N. Yueoslav Review for International
bw. No.1-711993. pp.42-45.
9. Summary of Practice of the Secretaxy-Gsneral as 13.MarcWeller: InternationalResponsetotheDissolution
Depositaryof Multilateral Treaties, prepared by the Treaty No.8611993,p.605.rican Journal of International Law.
Sccrioiof theOffice of Legal Affairs. UNI)oc.ST/LEG/8. Tliat these and sirnilar assertions of a number of nameplate) in the General Assembly and its flag is
authors of international law are well foundedis con- fluiteringin frontofthe United Nations,togetherwith
fmied also by the debate in the Security Councilon the fiags of the othermember States.
the occasion of the adoption of resoluti777, which 'The Yugoslav delegationis notallowedto partic-
was the initial proposa1 for resolution 4711On the
sanie occasion the representative of the Russian ipate in the debates in the General Assenibly, norto
vote; howëver, it continues to attend the meetings.
Federation.inter alia. said: Thus, Yugoslavia has actually been suspended from
"The reriched compromise that the Federal the work of the General Assenibly until the Security
Republic of Yugoslavia should not participatein the Council reconsidersthe decisionbefore theend ofthe
work of the General Assembly nlay seern unsatisfac- main part of the forty-seventh sessionof the General
tory to sorne. Frankly speaking. we would have pre- Assembly, in the rnanner not provided for by the
ferred not to have taken such a measure in order to Charter and which is in collision with its Articl5.
exert influence on the Federal Republic of The procedure resortedto has brought disorder into
Yugoslavia,becauseeven withoutthis measureit suf- the cntena which were adhered to in many respects
by the United Nationsandthe internationalcornmuni-
fers sufficieiitpressures of the internationalcornmu-
iiityin the fonli of economic sanctions.Butwe found ty for decades."16
it possible to agree witttrisgestureofcondemnation The already quoted Austrian Professor Hurnmer
by ihe worldcommuniiy (einphasis added - MM), comrnentson resolution4711 inthe followingway:
iniplyingthat with a view to makingfulicontribution " Thus the situationin respect of the membership
to die resolution of world problenis dealt wiîh in the
General Assembly, the Federal Republic of of 'Yugoslavia'intheUnited Nationsis defmedinthe
Yugcs!?via ~~iirsttake al1 pocsible measures for an following way: in a completely sui ,aeoen wkay the
early tem4nation of tiie fratricidal conflict in the seat and iiaiiïepiateieriminin ihe Ceiiera!Assembly. W
region."'4 as well as the flag of the SFRY in front of the UN
although this State should have disappeared through
The reputed world authors of international law dismenlberment(!). On the otlier hand, the Federal
have expressedcritical remarks about resolution4711 Republic of Yugoslavia whichhas never applied for
in much stronger and uncomproniisingtermsthan is mernbership and, consequently, could never have
the diplonintic. obfuscated statenient of the been adrnitted,has beenexcluded (sic)from coopera-
International Court of Justice tiiat the resolution 'fis tion in theGeneralAssemblyand instmctedto initiate
not free froni legaldifficulties". a forma1 procedure for admission to membership.
Thus. a foniier meniber of the UN International Since the 'cooperation' affectsonly participationin
Law Commission,Rosalyn Higgins. (otherwisevery consultations and voting - the Federal Republic of
critical about the beliaviour of the Serb andlor the Yugoslavia rnay, without ever being adrnitted to
Yugoslav side) bas sonle very senous objections to membership, participate in the meetings of the
make about the resolution: 'The resolution saysthat General Assenibly and in al1 other organs of the
Yugoslavia sliould apply for membership in the United Nations and continue fully to take part.
United Nations. Butthe resolution neithersuspends Consequently.whatis involved in tliisconstructionis
only the suspension of cooperation of the Federal
nor tenliinates the nienibership of Yugoslaviain the Republic of Yugoslaviainthe UN GeneralAssembly,
UN. Tlie consequeilce is abnonnal to absurdity under the reserve of a different decision of the
(eniphasisadded -MM). The seatand thenanieof the
couiitryranain the sanie as before.The oldYugoslav Security Council 'beforethe end of the main part of
flag continues to be flown in the 42nd Street. the forty-seventh session of the General
Yugoslavia rernains arnenlberof the UnitedNations, Assenibly"'.*7
wiiich does iiot incrui Strbia àiid Muiltencgictbiii rue kbiiIhuu~n-, GCZ~XS eExpertk hte~nticna!
Yugoslavia iii its entirety. But Croatia. Sloveniaand law, Professor K. Partsch. commentingon resolution
Bosiiia andHenegoviiia are also meinbers.Now, as 4711 speaks about "freezing of membership rights",
with an ironicai remark that,"from a purely legal
wecaiisee.tlieydoiiotappearonthe UNfinanciallist
wherethere exists only Yugoslavia.This isobviously aspect. itis surprisingthat a State whichdoesnotexist
unsatisfactoryfroni a legal point of view."l5 any more continues to belong to the Organization.
Tlie IsmeliProfessor of international law,Yehuda retains its representativesalso in organsoththanthe
Blum. colisidersuiimbiguously that the negation of General Assembly,and can continueto cooperate."ls
international legal continuity of Yugoslavia is not Tlie already quoted chief Legal Counsel of the
legally grounded.Conmenting on resolution4711he United Nations for many years. Prof. Enc Soy, says
says:
16.YehudaBlumU : NMembcrship of"New"Yugoslavia:
"Uiiusually and inconsistently.the allegedlynon- Continuity Break?,AmericanJournalof InternatioLlaw.
existent Yugoslaviacontinues to keep its seat (with Vol.86.No.411992.p.833
17.W.Hummer:0p.cit..p.453.
14.SecurityCouncil. StPV 3116. 19September1992, 18.K. Partsch:BelgradsLeerer Stuhiln Glaspalas,Das
pp.7-5. Einfrieren der UN Mitgliedschaft Jugoslawiens durch
15. Rosalyn Higgins:Ttie United Natioand Former Sicherheitsratund Generalversamlung, Vereinte Nationen.
Yugoslavia:IntematioiidAffrius,Vo1.69/1, .479. No.4011992.p.187.that "the position on 'disintegration' which would Yugoslavia, which constituted the basis of Badinter's
mean a total disappearance of Yugoslavia cannot be opinion and later on also of Security Council resolu-
defended from the legal aspect". tion 777, as well as of General Assembly resolution
Prof. Soy also clairns that: 4711.clairning, like many other Western international
lawyers, that it is a question of secession:
"Although temtorially reduced. Yugoslavia
retains its identity of a State with its international "The cases of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union
riglits and obligations ..Such a position has always were considered to be cases of dissolution and not
been defended by West Germany which clairned that secession despite the evident fact that secession is
itrepresents the continuation of Germany regardless precisely what happened in Yugoslavia".
of the 'rump' temtory. Holland remained Holland Hannum. like a number of other foreign authors.
even after the separation of Belgium".l9 speaks of the falsification committed by the Badinter
Commission in its opinion on the principle utipos-
Prof. Soy considers that Yugoslavia can invoke
the example of the Russian Federation,as well as the sideti os,itting the second partof the sentence from
case of India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the decision of the International Court which entirely
where the newly created States applied for member- changes the meaning. According to him, in the
ship in the United Nations, while the predecessor Yugoslav case " the traditional international practice
States (Russia, India, Pakistan) remainedmembers of of non-intervention in civil wars has been replaced by
a selective rule which prohibits some central govem-
tlieUN. He also adds that "it is up to intemational ments (for exanlple. to Belgrade) to suppress seces-
organizations to decide", believing already at that sion by force. but accepts the use of force by some
time, before the adoption of resolution 471120,that others (for example. Colombo and New Delhi) and
"politics will continue to play the tlecisive role", has yet to decide about even more difficult cases (for
stressinp that Serbia and Montenegro have "strong exarnple, the Kurds and the Tibetans)." Accordinp to
arguments and nurnerous precedents which are in
tlieirfavour". hirn. "much more dangerous is the unfounded sugges-
tion of the BadinterCommission that the statehood of
Denying the right of individual Yugoslav a federal State is something less solid than the state-
republics to secede, the Italian Professor of interna- hood of a unitary State if one or several constituent
tional law,Aldo Bemardini, (supportingthe same the- units wish to separate." Expressing the opinion that
sis of liis colleague and compatriot, former president "the political validity of the opinion of the
of the International Tribunal for the Former Commission is equally dubious" (as well as legal).
Yugoslavia, Antonio Cassese. that the secession in Hannum quotes the view of an American author,
Yugoslavia was canied out contrary to both interna- Benedict Kingsbury. that the activity of the European
Cornrnunity in the case of Yugoslavia "constitutes an
tional and intemal lawzi), claims that "up until the
establishment of consolidated extinction the interna- arnalgamation of often contradictory and irreconcil- .
tional 'legitimacy' of the existing State entity of able considerations conceming the existing right,
Yugoslaviashould be considered lastingW.22 order and justice".24 He wonders cynically whether
Strongly criticising the Badinter Commission for the opinions of the Badinter Commission mean " a
ignoringmany principles of international law (invio- long sigh for self-determination or only the death rat-
tle of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman
lability offrontiers, the nght of peoplesto self-deter- Empires".35Arnons such ironical remarks addressed
minatioii.non-interference in internal affairs of other to the Badinter Commission is certainly the correct
States). Professor of international law at the Fletcher observation that it "reinforced the principle ofemto-
Uiiiversity (USA), Horst Hannum, argues that it is rial integrity only wlienthe new States had been rec-
"unknown in international law that the internal con- ognized". The renowned American specialist in inter-
stitutionalstructure of a stateis relevantfor the aues-
tion of whether that State exists or not as a fact in cutiorial!2w, Prof Thomas Frlnck. is thbking a!~ng
the same lines.judgiiig the Yugoslav case as "the first
iriternationallaw", adding that "non-genialposition of confrontation in Europe in order to test the survival of
!lie European Cornrnunity is proof of the confusing the temtorial integrity against the pst-modern neo-
European approach to secession as a component of tribalistic claim to the right to selfdetemiination".26
self-detemination".23 Speaking about the extension of the powers of the
ProfessorHannum takes a very criticalview ofthe Security Council. Franck observes that "the sanctions
{liesis on the disintegration mdlor dissolution of under Chapter VI1 irllposed despite the fact that the
- confiict in Yugoslavia had initially developed in a
19.Eric Soy: quoted Interview.p.17. State that is still aberof the United Nations" and
20. Eric Soy: quoted Interview.p.17.
21. Antonio Cassese: Self-Detemination of Peoples. A that the preamble of the Security Council resolution
~cgal Reappraisal. A Grotius Publication. Cambridge "attempted to make blunttheedge of the precedent by
I.!iiiversityPress, p.273. pointing out at its beginning 'that Yugoslavia wel-
21. Aldo Bemardini: Yugoslavi- Self-Detemination of comed the conveniiig of the Security Council meet-
?rupies or RegionsIi diritti del uorno. translationof Tanjug -
I'ress.September 1995, pp.16-20. 24. Ibid.. p.67.
3, Horst Hannum: Self-Determinationand Europe. Old 25. Ibid.. p.66.
Wirie in New Boales? Transnational Law aridConternporary 26. Thomas M. Franck:Faimess in International Lawand
i':i~blerVo1.3.No.1/1993,p.64. Institutions.Oxford995.ingM'.Z(7The author notes that the representativeof the majoritypopulationof almost threefourthsof the
Ecuador expressed the hope at the meeting of the temtory of the former SFRY(includingthe Republic
SecurityCouncil thatthecrisiswillnotunderminethe of Srpska and the Republic of Serb Krajina)opted
principleof unity and temtorial integrity ofthe State againstsecession.
and that his position wassupported by Zimbabwe, OneoftherenownedEuropeanauthorsof interna-
India.ChinaandZaire, whoserepresentativesstressed tionallaw,-Professorat the BrusselsUniversity,Jean
that the secessionist civil war. except in case of Salmon, presented in the Belgian Review of
Yugoslavia's consent, is outside the powers of the InternationalLaw, in an extrernely unbiasedway. a
SecurityCouncilW).28 few months before the adoption of resolution4711
The chief legal counselof the State Department. (June 1992).the problemof recognitionof Statesand
Edwin Williamson, speaking about the problem of of continuity in connection with the cases of the
international continuityin the Arnerican Society of USSR and Yugoslavia.31Salmon notes that the
IntemationalLawon 1 April 1992,thatis,almosthalf EuropeanCommunity,including Belgiurn,inthe fmt
a year before the adoption of resolution4711,advo- phase,rightfuliytooka passive andcautiousposition
catedthe standpointthat for continuity,inadditionto on the separationof Slovenia and Croatia.This was
the principledpositionof the UNLegalCornmitteein dictatedbytheincontestableprinciplesofintemation-
connection withthe case of India. " the existence of ai law: the principleof non-interferencein intemal
one or severalfollowingelements:substantialpartof affairsand respectforthe sovereigntyandintegrityof
the temtory (includingthe historictemtorial nucle- States".Then cornesthe Badinter Commission and
us), the majority of theState'spopulation, resources the Declarationof the European Communiiyabout
and med force, the seatof the govemmentand the Yugoslavia seningconditionsforrecognition.
ï~mz ofthe formermexber" are of significance.29 "Recourse to ihe 'Artization Commission"' rr
Thespecialrapporteur ofthe UN Commissionfor which takespoliticaldecisionsunderîheguiseofla w
InternationalLaw. commenting on the positions of (emphasisadded- MM) cannot deceiveanyone.First
the UnitedStatesGovernmenton thenotionof disso- of all,becauseit followsfkomthetextthattheTwelve
lution and separation, at the meeting of the said held a meeting( meetingin connectionwithrecogni-
Cornrnissionin 1974,said:"There is a cleartheoreti- tion - our remark). Besides, already the next &y,
cal difference between dissolution (disintegration) without waitingfor the position of the Commission.
and separationof one part of a State.Indeed,the US Chancellor Kohl declared that the FR of Germany
Government itself identified this difference. In the was going to recognizeCroatia and Sloveniaon 15
firstcasethe predecessorStatedisappeares;inthe last January. And also because the commission was
case, the predecessor State continues to existfter termed"arbitration",inno respectdoesit appeartobe
separation.Let us take oneexamplewhichis not dif- an institutionof international publiclaw having the
ficultto imagine:a StateA consistsoffourparts,each samename.Itwasnotsetup by thepartiestothe dis-
of thernbeing temtoriaily separatein somemesure pute. It was comprisedof five presidentsof the con-
and each of thern has a different ethnicand cultural stitutional courts of the member States of the
background. Ifone part separates hm the State A, Community, headed by Robert Badinter. However
the internationallegal personalityof the StateAiil prestigiousand experienced in constitutionallaw its
continue inforce. If, on the otherhand,the State dis- rnernbersrnaybe,thisfact atiributesno specialcorn-
integrates and each one of the four partsbecornes petence to this institution in ternis of international
independent,the internationallegalpersonality ofthe law; stilllessdoesitconferthe rightto ittotakedeci-
State A will disappear.Of course, it is possible for sions on problernsassociated withinterna1airs of -
one of the four parts to continueto be consideredas countrieswhichare notmembers of theCommunity,
5: S:atrA und !CI joy i!sintemationallega!pnn- let aloneits objectivityand mhhnum pamitees for
ality. Then, what would otherwise be considereda the procedure which wouid n@üÙi& be expected
caseofdissolution,willbe considered acase of sepa- from an orp termed "arbitrafioncommission"
rationof parts of a StateW.0he conclusionthatcan (emphasisadded -MM). Stronglycriticisingthedoc-
bedrawnisthat continuityisnot excluded even inthe uments of the EuropeanComrnunityand its activity
case of complete separationof al1parts of a State the authorironicallyrefersto the thesisondisintegra-
inYugoslavianotonlyhasnotaffectedonehalfofthen tion, launchedby the European Cornmunity,as "the
temtory and of the populationwhich hasremainedin chronicleof announceddeath". He wonderson what
the cornmonState (FRY), but the fact is that more not ailowedtobe thelegal successorsof Yugoslavia.
than two thirds of the populationwhich constituted asis thecasewithRussia,addingthat thereisno legal
basis fora differenttreatment.Salmonsays:
27.Ibid.,p.337.
28. Ibid.,p.163. "Therd problemiscompletelyglossedover.Did
29. American Society of internationalLaw, Panel on the republics have theright tocarry out separation
"StateSuccession and Relationswith FederalStates",Gold withouttheconsentofYugoslaviaor withoutthecon-
Room-Raybum HouseOfficeBuilding,Washingto, S State
Dep30. Yearbookof Internationl aw Commission,1974, de Bruxelles:Reconnaissanced'Etats,Revue belge dedroit
Vol.11.pp.69-70. international..XXV.19921.pp.226-239.sent of al1 the republics as was the case with the part of the popdation by denying it someihing that
USSR? Iiiorder to evade the question a tertiurn genus has been granted to the otherpart. However. it is quite
was invented - unknown in international law: a State obvious that the drama created by secession is in that
in the process of dissolution ... If no agreement it provokes chain reaction".
between the interestedparties is reached. it is not clear
how it would be possible to abandon the framework Furtliem-iore.Salmon rightly argues that the con-
ditions of recognition of States set by the Europeaii
of international public law in the field of secessioii:it Comnlunity (rule of law. deniocracy, hurnan rights)
is an interna1 questioii. tliere is no application of are "certainly hoiiourable", but arenot provided for
-4rticle 3. para 4 of die Charter since this article is by the Charter of theUnited Nations as conditionsfor
only applicable wlieii "international relations" are iii mernbersliip iii the world Orgmization. In respect of
questio~i:liowever. the priiiciples of rion-interference recognitioii. Salmoiiclaims, Europe ixnposedits con-
by tliird parties. respect for the sovereignty and teni- ditions"niore liastily" thain the case of the USSR.
tonal iiitegrity of States. restraint froin preiiiature
recognition are applicable. The author conunents Prof. Salinon's article ends with the conclusion
tliatit "could be thought that we reverted to tlie law of whicli sublimates the whole problem of international
1815. wlien a few powers gathered at a congress legal continuity in the case of Yugoslavia and quite
(Vienna) decided the fate of other Europeaii peoples". clearly reveals the political background of the prob-
notirig that at that tiine the right of Holland to pre- lem that will be brought out into the open a few
serve its riailie was not denied despite the separatioii montlis later in resolutioii4711:
of one half of the temtory, as the same riglit was iiot "We will pobir out another inconsistency: if the
processof dissolution of a federation is in question.as
deriied to Pakistan following tlie secession of wasthe case with the USSR, why not allow one ofthe
Bangladesh. parts to be tlie coiitinuer of the predecessor State'!
Quotirig the opinion of the Badinter Coiimlission.
tliat is. the position of tlie European Coiiimuiiity that Unless cf course wiiatis involved is simply a way of
Yugoslavia isin "the process dissolution" and tliat "it punishment of'so~nme w60plucked thecouragenor
is up to tlie republics to resolve the problem of suc- to bow to the wiII ofpowerrùrneighbours:?" (empha-
cession", Salmon clairns that this argunientation is sis added -Miki)
conviiicing by no nea ans (eiiipliasis added- MM). Tlie Gemian Prorèssor of international relations.
"III it opposed are. as if representiiig antinonies. tlie Hans Maull. altliougli using the language fiom the
concepts of "continuity" and "successioii". There is arsenal of aiiti-SerDpropagmda such as"Serb aggres-
sion". quite opeiiiy speaks about "pro-Croatian par-
iio legal obstacle whatsoever for one part of a dis- tiality" ofoiiii'splicy. undue recognition of inter-
niembered State to be the legal continuer of the pre-
decessor State. Of course. that part can be tlie legal na1borders and tiie iiisistence of the Governrnent of
continuer only for the remaining territory. The State theFR of Geniiruiyon the recogntion of Croatia. He
tliat coiitixiuesto exist and tlie newly eriierged States states tliatliaiicellorKohl liad previously prornised
represeiit.al1ofthem taken together. the successorsof Tudjnian tliat Croatia would be recognized, that
the foniier entity. In other words. the fact tliat one of Geiischer declarcd. oii 16 Deceniber 1991, that
the successorsconsiders itself the continuer of tlie for- Gemiany was goiii~to recognize Croatia even in the
iner State does not affect in ariyway tlieprocessof the case of tlie BadiiiterCoiiiillissionbeiiig against (!) and
State succession silice this coiitinuer is iiot tlie only tliat tiiemiaii poliçywent tlirough with recognition
oiie.Tlie fact that a State lias cliangedts coiistitution despite the stroiip opposition no1only of France and
afier secession does not inean that it does not exist Great Bntaiii but ais0 of Lord Carrington, Cyrus
Vaice. UN Secretary-GeneralPeres de Cuellar, US
aiiy iilore as a State entity in relation to tliird coun- Secretary of State Jruiles Baker and US President
tries". George Bush liiiiiself.32He argues that Germany
Comnieiitiiig on the position of the Badinter
Coniriiissioiioii the questiori of tlie iight of ilic Seib helped Croatia evade the iniposition of sanctions.
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and iii Croatia to wliile "tlie direct catalysers of tlie war in Bosnia were
self-detemiiiiation. Salnloiicoiicludes: the refereiiduiliwliiclithe Arbitration Comiission of
the European Coiiuiluriityimposed on Bosnia and the
"Here again we are astonished at tlie inadequacy recognition of Bosnia aiid Herzegovina by the United
of the explmatioii. We are dealing with assertions, States and tlie EuropeanCommunity as a result of the
ofiicial decisions.Not a traceofany rationalebehind strong pressure Dy the United States." Professor
(eilipliasisadded -MM). Naniely. the riglit of peoples Maull clainis tlist"tliroughout the whoIe conflict
to secessioii liasnot beeii howi iii inteniatioiial law Boiiiicoiisidered Croatia and its leader Tudjrnan as a
so far. No inore for apart of a federal State tlian for a protepe of tlie Geniim foreign policy" ("although
part of a federal unit. There is iio reasoii in law to Tudjniai lieavily depended on Bonn, lie liad a tmp
ricceptthe riglit to self-detem~iiiatiori.for exariiple. of card iii liis liai-liad tlie West exerted greater pres-
Croatia aid for the sanie riglit to be deiiiedto apart of
tlieCroatiaiitemtory ixihabitedby Serbs. Or. it is pro- sure on liim. lie would have driven out the Bosnian
ceeded froin tlie criterion of iiunierical strei1gtl.i.in refugees froiii Croatia. tlie great majority of whoni
wliicli case tlie arms will decide: or. it is proceeded
32. Hais W. \iciullGermany inthe Yugoslav Crisis.
from the wisli of ihe populatioii as tlie critenon. in Survival.Tlie ISSS Quanerly. No.4. Vo1.3,inter 1995-96.
wliich case tI~erecm be no discrixnination against a pp.99-130.would have gone to Gerrnany"). Mau11also cnticises course of 1996,two important meetings were heldin
the European Cornrnunity's inconsistency in recog- the USAandGermany dedicatedto internationallegal
nizing Croatia,contrary tothe opinion of the Badinter aspectsof the Yugoslavcrisisand,in particular.to the
Commission. statusof Yugoslavia in theUnitedNationsandlorres-
olution4711.
The former special representative of the UN
Secretary-General for Yugoslavia. Yasushi Akashi, The firstmeeting washeldin Washington from27
says that "the two most difflcult conceptual issues to 30 March 1996 within theannual meeting of the
revolve around the notions of self-determination and American Society of International Law.
sovereignty.The mediator is confronted with a sub- In his introductory remarks on the theme of
jectively valid question: do the Bosnian Serbs have "Yugoslavia" Ambassador HerbertOkun. a former
the sanle rights to self-detemination as ail the other UN mediator for Yugoslavia. stressed that "many
ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia? Are interna-
tionally recognized borders inviolable? Why. in the important international law aspects of the Yugoslav
case of Ethiopia, are the Eritreans pemiitted to secede conflicthave been ignoredor slighted in the welterof
cornrnentary ".
if tlie Bosnian Serbs are not? The issues are endless. "This is unfortunate. but perhaps one should also
The sense of injustice nuis deep on al1sides. Faced note out that this lack of attention to international
with these questions, and in the absence of a clear legal noms and standardswas also a hallmarkof the
political framework in which to operate, the United international diplomacy that sought to solve the
Nations can achieve nothing more than a temporary Yugoslav problem. particularly in the early crucial
respite from the fighting". Akashi hirnself. although stage 1991-1993" notes AmbassadorOkun. He illus-
still bound by the obligations in the hierarchy of the trated this with how the European Cornmunity pro-
United Nations and the lirnits deriving from them.
cmnot help mentioning precisely partiality and one- ceeded lo act toward its own (Badinter)Comiissior Irr
sidednessshownby the internationa comrnunityinthe "treating its opinions as if they were items on a table
solutionof the Yugoslav crisis: d'hote menu" claims Okun. According to him" key
instances where internationallaw could have helped
"The additional tasks given to UNPROFOR.par- diplomats - vital issues such as the recognition of
ticularly those under Chapter VI1 of the UN Charter. States -were eitlier ignored orforgottenby the diplo-
have obligedUNPROFORto contai. the conflictand mats.'74
mitigate its consequences by imposing constraints One of the participants in the debate. Susan
mainly upon one of the parties. Those tasks have cre-
ated a great deal of confusion as to the nature of Woodwardfrom the BrookingsInstitution,answering
UNPROFOR: was it a peace-keeping or a peace- the basic question asked by the theme "Are
enforcement operation? This ambiguiiy, which still InternationalInstitutions DoingTheir Job?", saidres-
plaguesthe mission today, has affected itscredibility olutely "No". especially in the case of Yugoslavia.
. "We must accept and think senously about the total .
with the parties, the SecurityCouncil and the interna- and absolute disregard for precedent in international
tional comrnunityas a whole". lawby themajor powersandby Europeaninstitutions
Noting that "disagreement arnong the key coun- in the Yugoslav crisis." - was the conclusion of S.
tries at the international level has prevented a coher- Woodward.She is of the opinionthat the legalprece-
ent and unified policy" Akashipoints out as the first dent of the territorial integrityof Yugoslavia should
condition for a successful action of the United be primarily considred.
Natioiis the need to have "the collective will of the
iiitemational community identified and surnrnarised "Now the principle of temtorial integrity is being
irnposed uponBosnia-Herzegovina.or you miglitSay -
in 311unanibiguousand coherent way". Accordingto reinforced, without sufficient means. In either case.
l>i!l?.ter the CnldWar 2nd a rarelisenf the vetn the ULC .ifolLvl.c,L-b n:e=â:iûua! cûr;lr'~',~riQn'a% :a
iiuiiiberof u~ianimouslyadopted resolutionsdrastical- defend the integrity of Bosnia wouldnot have been
ly iiicreasedin which "however, there are often sen- necessary had tlie principlenot been violated in the
ous ambiguities". Hesays that questions are increas- first place. This began before either Croatia or
ingly raisedas to whether the Security Council, with Sloveniatook the stepofdeclaringtheirindependence
its present structure. is the real representative of the on the basis ofthe legril/constitutionalrightto nation-
international comrnunity. Another problem, accord- al self-detemination under the Yugoslavia
ingto him,is that the UnitedNations doesnot dispose
of tlie independent enforcement means33but depends Constitution. whicli- asapointof constitutionalinter-
on the consent of others. pretation withiri Yugoslavia -is not at al1a clearly
defined right. Nonetheless. it was a nght that the
Two important gatherings of experts in interna- EuropeanPulianient had alreadyseen fit to declarea
tional law held in the USA and Gemany devoted to legal principlein March 1991."S. Woodwardconsid-
the status of Yugoslavia in the United Nations.- In ers that this demonstrates "an absence of procedure.
additionto the opinions of individual expertsin inter- nieaning an accepted. legal and forma1procedure for
national law. it should be pointed out that, in the recognising States." She claims that the Badinter
33. YnsushiAkashi:The Lirnitsof UNDiplomacyand the 34. American Societyof Internationallaw. Proceedingsof
Future ofConfiict Mediation, Survival, Vo1.37,No.4. Winter the 90th Annual Mzctuig. March 27-30. 1996. Washington
!995-96pp.83-98. D.C.. p.471.Commissionwas established at the suggestion of the He claims that Slovenia and Croatia and, later on,
Slovenegovernent to resolve and arbitrate econom- Bosniaand Henegovina. separated andthattheywere
ic questions,pnor to the establishment of the fmt of prernaturely recognized by the internationalcomrnu-
three peace conferences. She says that Badinter him- niîy" while "Yugoslavia has notyet consentedto dis-
self has said that "such a Commission, particularly mernberment;the result is the bloodshedwhichis not
withitsmandateto arbitrateeconomic questions,can- yet finished"?
not arbitratequestions as fundamental as the fateof a
people." Her conclusion is that the Commission was Surely, the most important remah at the said
inappropriatelyused and its advice to the European gathering were those of one of the four panelists.
Community foreign ministers on the conditions for Larry Johnson, the third highestplaced person in the
hierarchy of the United Nations Office of Legal
recognizing thesovereigntyof each of the fourapply- Affairs38,who is a UN insider.He focused on a cer-
ing republics was ignored". She considers that the tain number of points that. according to him, have,
recognitionof the independenceof Sloveniaand then after Dayton,yet to be resolved.
of Croatia "was not only doue preemptively, without "These questionsrelatetothe statusof Yugoslavia
any forma1procedure devised in advance, but was in the United Nations: 1sit a member ofthe UN or is
also a procedure denied to the other four rernaining it not? Has the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviataken
republicsof Yugoslavia". over the seat of the former SocialistFederalRepublic
"The Germanswon inthe political strugglewithin of Yugoslaviaor not and. ifnot,why not?Whatis the
Yugoslavia over recognition. Germany's idea was
based upon its own experience at the time, and it status of multilateral treaties entered into by the for-
assurnedthat a referendum for the union of two pre- mer Yugoslavia?"
viously united but then dissolved parts of Germany Describingthe procedure of the adoption of reso-
lution 4711,Johson ~resentedthe position of the UN
was appropriate,'aswell, to the disunion of a country. Legai Committeetaken in co~ection with theseces-
But theseare two fundamentallydifferent actsW- con- sion ofPakistanfrom India,whichis consideredaUN
cludes S. Woodward.35 position of principle:
Abram Chayes of the Harvard University Law
School considers that "the prompt recognition of "1. As a generalde. it isinconformitywith legal
Statesin the former Soviet Union was on the whole principles to presume that a Statewhich is a Member
nght, despitethe fact that in most of those casesthere of the UN does not cease to be a Member sirnply
was no credible provision for the protection of because itsConstitutionoritsfiontiershavebeensub-
rninorities.in the Bosnia and Croatia cases,however, jected to changes, and that the extinctionof the State
it seems to me that the failure to attend to that prob- as a legal personality recognizedin the international
order must be shown before itsrights and obligations
lemwas a seriousmistake in the previolence period". can be consideredthereby to have ceased to exist.
He noted thatthe case of Nicaragua shows that it is 2. When a new State is created, whatevermay be
not appropriatefor a State unilateraily to interveneto
assist secessionists in order to promote those objec- the tenitoq and the populations which it comprises
tives. and whether or not they formed part of a State
Professor Woodward pointed out that two ele- Member of the UN, it cannotunder the system of the
ments are particularly characteristic for the crisis in Charter claim the status of a Member of the United
Yugoslavia.One is that "the policies of international Nations unless it has been formally admittedas such
organizations led to increasing politicai disintegra- in conformitywith the provisions ofthe Charter.
3. Beyond that, each casemust be judged accord-
tion". Thesecondelement is that there was no reason ing to its ments."
to do it violently.According to her, there were ways
to negotiatethe conflicts over republican rights. the Johnson says that, applyingthese principlesto the
bordersof the nations and îhe right to seif-detemiina- case in point, the question is:'has been shoïvnthat
tion. The conclusionis very interesting: the international legal personality of the former
"Since the outsiders were willing,to break up Yugoslavia, recognized in the internationalorder has
Yugoslavia andsupport separate States but unwiiling been extinguished?
to recognizethat they were supporting incompatible In anattemptto answer thisquestion he says:
principles- there was no alternative to war for many
peopleonthe ground".36Shepoints outthat there was "Resolutions of the Security Council and the
General Assembly do not particularlyhelp. They are
no effortmade toinsist on an dl-Yugoslav plebiscite internally contradictory and inconsistent. Fist, the
on theissueof dissolution.There was never an effort General Assembly does not repeat the prearnbular
topressureSloveuia.inexchangeforwaitingforinde- paragraph concerning the formerYugoslaviaceasing
pendence,to goahead with itsinternai cornmitmentto to exist. Second, the resolutionsSaythat the Federal
federal elections. Republic of Yugoslavia cannotautomaticallycontin-
ProfessorDinstein pointedout that "to suggestthat ue the membership of the former Yugoslavia, thus
the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia irnplying that it could so continue if somethinghap-
committedsuicide is, frankly speaking,.unhistorical". pened - suchas a decision confirmingor rejectingthe
35. Amencan Society. 113 37. Ibid.. p.317
36. Ibid.. p.487 38. Now ChiefLegal Counselof IAEAclaim of continuityby the relevant organs.However, Montenegro) will sit in the seat of Yugoslaviain any
the resolutions go on to Say that "therefore" the organ of the Assembly. This sounds as if the name-
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "should" apply for plate for Yugoslaviais to remain. in which case.why
membership and that it cannot participate in the have a nameplate for anonmernber?
GeneralAssembly.Butthatmakesno sensesincenor- By the-way. irnmediately following the British
mally you do not continue a membershipby submit- introduction as the "kick off' speakerfor the debate
ting a new application for rnernbership. Soperhaps on the proposal. the General Assembly heard none
the phrase rneant that only the relevant orga-snot other thanMr. MilanPanid.inîroducedas the ''Prinle
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unilaterally - Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".To
could decide the matter and that the subrnissionof an make matters even more unclear. Mr. PaniC.in the
applicationfor rnembershipwould be the appropriate "1 herewith formally
way to resolve that question. middle of his speech said:
request rnernbershipin the United Nationson behalf
Some Say that the most logical interpretation is of the new Yugoslavia. whose Governent 1repre-
that. by deciding that an application shouldbe sub- sent". The UnitedNations never receivedany written
mitted, the two organs have in effect stripped follow-upto that statement.
Yugoslaviaof membership. After all,normally there At this stage1should referto the politicalcontext
wouldbe no need to submit an application for mem- in which al1of this was happening.At the sarnetime
bershipif the State were alreadya rnember.Thereare that there were calls for additional sanctionsagainst
two problemscomected withthat approach: First,the the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.some Statesdid
Charterprovides inArticles5 and 6, respectively.the not want to punis11Mr.Panic'and his chancesfor suc-
proceduresfor suspensionof the nghts andprivileges cess in his campaign to unseat MiloSeviCin the
of membership and for expuision Goin the uporning elections for President of Serbla. It was
Organization.No one claimed that the resolution in said that this measure was purely ternporary and if.(rr
question was adopted pursuant to those Articles.
Another problem with the position that the Federal Mr.Panic'won the election he would surely make
good on his promiseto apply forrnernbershipandthe
Republic of Yugoslavia had been stripped of mem- whole situation wouldchange. Now was not the time
bership is the final clause of the decision: that the for arcane legalityto get in the wayof a politicaldeci-
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall not participate sion. That is what is behind the second paragraphof
in the workof the General Assembly. the resolution. wliich anticipated that by rnid-
At thispoint,one may alludeto the legislativehis- December the Security Council would revert to the
tory in the Security Council- hardly comforting to rnatterand the transitorydecision taken three months
those seeking evidence of unity and clarity of pur- earlier would besomehowset nght. Well, hereweare
pose.The United States made itclear -after the vote three-and-one-half yearslater with the same. unsatis-
-that it consideredthefinalclauseas stating the obvi- factory, transitory situation.
ous since clearly if the FRY was not a mernber it In addition, it was said that neither Russia nor
China would supportall-out suspensionor expulsion
could not participate in any UN body; however. two
other permanent mernbers had exactly the opposite under the Charter. The rnost. from a political and
understanding. For the Russian Federation. which practical point of view. that they wouldacceptwas to
spoke before the decision and voted in favour. and follow the South-African example -maintenance of
China, which spoke after the decision and abstained, membership, narneplate. delegates and flag- but no
the resolutiondoes not affect Yugoslavia'smember- representation in the General Assembly. Of course.
shipnor did it affectthe participation of therepresen- the South-African case was based on rejection of
tatives of theFRY in other organs of the United Assembly credentials whereas inthis case the basiw
Nations. sucn as the Ccoiiü~ïïizûi: Sociû!Cûünci! was a succession-to-inembership question - fairly
(ECOSOC)and its subsidiaries, the SecurityCouncil understandable to international lawyers but not very
or others. Both States, in their explanations of vote interesting for politicaldelegates.Needlessto Sno.
explicitly stated their understanding that the resolu- advie wassought tiom the UN lawyers (emphasis
tion didnot take away the nameplate of thecountryin added - MM) and 1 would franklybe surprisedif the
UN meetingrooms, evenif no one could sit behid it advice of many delegation legaladvisers was souglit
or followed."
in the GeneralAssernbly.They also made cleartheir
viewthatthe resolutioninno way affectedthenght of Johnson goes on explaining how only after the
the FederalRepublic of Yugoslaviato circulatedocu- adoption of the resolutionthe opinionof the thUN
ments and to maintain its missions to the United Legal Counsel was required and that he concluded
Nations.In the General Assembly,anumberof speak- that resolution 4711 "didnot terminateor suspend
ers expresseddisagreementwith,arnong otherthings, Yugoslavia's mernbershipin îhe United Nations
the procedure used.the ambiguity of what was being (emphasis added - MM) but had only one practical
doneandoppositionto thedecisionhavingbeen initi- consequence: the representatives of theFRY could
ated by the Security Councilwhenit was the General not participate in General Assembly bodies,but they
Assembly's exclusiveconcem. 1would pointoutthat could participate in other organs of the United
the Britishrepresentative.when introducingthe reso- Nations. Johiison also quoted the statement of the
lution in the General Assembly, stated that it meant International Court of Justice mentioned earlier that
tliat no representative of the FRY (Serbia and resolution 4711"is riot free from difficulties". He pointed out that most of the UN specialised agencies Finally, if any givenlegalopinion doesnot reflect
adopted decisionssimilar to the General Assembly's the correct interpretation of Assembly resolution
regardingthe statusof Yugoslavia. In respect of mul- 4711, the General Assembly is always fiee - and is
tilateral treatiesfor which the United Nations acts as sometimesencouraged -to simply adoptanotherdeci-
depositaq, Johnson informed the participants about
sion, making its interpretationclear and definitive. It
the position of the Secretary-General that the status has not done so here and no formai proposals have
quoshould be maintained since "the depositaryis not ever been circulated to that effect. The Dayton
in a position to reject or disregard the FRY claim of Conferencedid not solve thisproblem either.
continuiiy,which related to the general international What should have happened? Various options
lawquestionof succession of States in the absenceof were available butnotused Ifa majority of themem-
a decisionby a comptent treaty organ with regard to bers of the Organization questioned and challenged
a particulartreaty". the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia's claim of conti-
Johnson arguesthat "the current positionW3 9with
regard to the membership of Yugoslavia has been nuity, they could have asked the International Court
of Justice for an advisoryopinion on the question,or
terrnedas ''pundless, legaily indefensible,iilogicd, the General Assembly couldhave esîablishedits own
absurd,confüsiog and- at best-ambiguous"(empha- "BadinterCommission".a bodyof expertstoexamine
sis added - MM). the claim, or it could haveasked for the views of the
" Such comments come in particular from certain Legal Cornrnittee. In the meantirne, FRY representa-
Statesin EasternEurope and yet just last October a. tives wouldhave continuedto participate "provision-
amouncement appeared each week in theUN Journal ally", but with no diminution of rights, pending a
that the Chair of the Eastern-European Group of decision on the claim. This would not be unusual,
Statesat the UnitedNations for that month was - yes, since in the General Assembly's rules it is provided
it is true -Y.,igoslzvia (represented by the Charge that if the credentialsof anyrepresentative have been
d'Affairesof the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)." chaiienged, that representative may be seated provi-
The concludingremarks of Mr. Johnson are also sionally, withthe samerightsas other representatives,
interesthg and are carried here in their entirety: until the Credentials Cornmittee has reported on the
challenge and the general Assembly has given its
" 1,for one, remain convinced that the legal opin- decision".
ion at the the was the right one. If the Security The theme of the statusof the Federal Republicof
Council and theGeneral Assembly adopt ambiguous
and illogical resolutions, they will have to live with Yugoslavia in the United Nations was the subject of
ambiguousandillogical results: it isnottheroleofthe another gathering of prominent intemational lawyers
Legal Counsel to interpret illogical decisions to held at the most prestigious German institutioncon-
achieve a resultthat rnay be textually logical,suchas cemed with international law - the Max Planck
ousting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fiom Institute for Comparative Public Law and
membership, but which is a result achieved not by InternationalLaw - in Heidelberg inNovernber1996.
legal opinion, but only by applying specfic provi- The Max PlanckYearbookfor 1997publishedan arti-
sionsof the Charter.In addition, given thenature and cle by Michael Wood. deputy chief legal adviser of
the Minisûy of ForeignAffairsof Great Britain,writ-
complexity of the Yugoslav conflict and the enor-
mous difficulties of achieving success and results in ten on the basis of his presentation at the said meet-
negotiations between the parties, it would not have ing, entitled"ParticipationofFormer YugoslavStates
beenparticularlyhelpful for the Secretary-Generalto in theUnited Nations and in Multilateral TreatiesW.40
declarethat one of the parties was no longer a mem- Like Johnson, Wood pointsout at the beginningof his
ber of the UnitedNations based upon a legal opinion paper that the presented view is his personal and not
of an arnbiguousGeneral Assernbly resolution. Also, the position of Great Britain. Having in mind that a
- veillgclnArnerieur!aïrje~, 1t~ke se~~snlace &~m.- . bighly comuetent-an&experienced exg e-t s in ques-
the long line of constitutional law cases from the tion, who directly participated in these matters, a< --
well as that he was the chief rapporteur at the meet-
Chinese exclusion case. which provide that in order ing, we will quote some of his main theses and
for a later-in-time statute to supersede a treaty, the
intent of Congressto so supersede the treatymust be excerpts fromhis statementwhich shedmore lighton
clearly and unequivocally expressed. So, too, in my the problem ofthe statusofthe FRY in theUN and on
view. is the case with denying a claim from a State the questionof resolution4711.
tliat it is continuing the international personalityof a Focusing his attention primarily on the status of
member State that has undergone constitutional and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Wood begins
territorial changes.As is inferred fiom the1947 prin- with the assertionthat "the story is not over" andthat,
ciplesofthe LegalCornmittee, ifthe SecuntyCouncil
and the General Assenibly wish to reject that claim for the most part. the issues have not been resolved.
andfind that international personalityhas beenextin- Two initialobservationsof the author areparticularly
indicative:that "thepractice ofthe United Nationsin
guislied.they niust do so clearly and unarnbiguously.
Membership is too important a matter to be left to 40.MichaelC. Wood:Participationof FormerYugoslav
ambiguity StatesintheUnited NationsandinMultilateralTreatieMax -
PlanckYearbookof United NationsLaw,Vol.I/1997,pp.231-
39.At thetirne.in March1996. 257
39 -relation tomembership has often departed from legal continuity of the FRY, and the absence of general
theory"and that, kom 1990to 1993,"fast andfurious acceptance of such continuity by third States. The
changes in membership" took place. In comection author notes that "the recent developments might
withYugoslavia,Wood quotes the alreadymentioned indicatethat the positionis evolving". addinp further
positionof principle of the UN Legal Cornmitteeon that the sanctions were finally terminated on 1
continuity. that is, on the mle that States, despite October 1996.but that termination has not yet been
changes of the constitution and frontiers, remain "accompanied by the regularisation of the FRY'S
membersof the UN and that the newly created,seced- positionin internationalorganizations:inthis context.
ed Statesare bound to apply for membership in the some refer to "the outer wall of sanctions".42The
UnitedNations. In this context, he recails briefly the author refers to a certainnumber of bilateral treaties
examples of secession of Pakistan frorn India, anddocumentsbetweentheFRY. onthe onehandand
Bangladesh from Pakistmand Singapore from Croatia. MacedoniaandBosnia and Herzegovina.on
.Malaysia.where the predecessor States continuedthe the other. which appeartoacknowledge"some sortof
membershipin the UN. He points out that Yugoslavia continuity between the FRY and the SFRY". but he
was anoriginal member of îhe United Nations and points outthat theirpositionin New York withregard
that this had no influence on its treatment in the to the continuity of Yugoslaviaremained unchanged
UnitedNations in îhe 1990s.Quoting resolution4711, illustrating this with a later note of the four States
as well as the subsequent General Assemblyresolu- (including Slovenia)to the United Nations. in which
tioii (471229)by which it was decided on 5 May 1993 it isaid that the FRY. too.has to follow the proce-
that the FRY shall not participate in the work of the dure for admission to membership. He points to the
Econornicand SocialCouncil either. Woodnotesthat confusioncreatedwithmanyauthors.and even States
"tlie legal basis, and effect. of these General (includingthe EuropeanUnion). by ignoring the fun-
.4ssemblyresolutioiisrenlak coiit-~-v'~ial":n! damentaldifferericebetweeothe nstions.of continuit~ *
and succe~sion.~3
Recalling the clairn of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslaviaon its international legal continuity, stated Quoting the wordsofthe British representative in
in itsofficia1note to the Secretary-Generalof 27Apnl the GeneralAssemblywhointroduced the draft reso-
1992. the author says that in support of its position lution4711that"tliesituationis withoutprecedentand
Yugoslaviacan point in particular to: was clearly not foreseen by the authors of the
a) the respective declarations of independence of Charter". butthat "the sponsors are satisfied that the
Council and the .Assemblymust, by necessas, irnpli-
the otherfour republics; cation, have thepowerunderthe Charterto act in this
b)thefact that"nunp Yugoslavia"containsthe old way in an unforeseen situation",the author says that
federalcapital and a sizable proportion of the popula-
tionand econornicactivityof the SFRY, as wellasthe "calls to seek an advisory opinion from the
historyof Yugoslavia. which wasformed afterWorld InternationalCourtof Justice and the United Nations
War 1 around the kemel Serbia-Montenegro which Legal Counsel wentunheeded". Wood also says that
liadthemselvesbeenindependent Statesfrornthe 19th one cannotbeunniindfulofthe stem wordsof the rep- ,
resentative of Ghanaspeakingbefore the adoption of
centuryuntil their unificationin 1919; the resolution:
C)thatthe continuity of the Soviet Unionwas rec- "The draft resolutionbefore us maybe pragmatic.
ognizedto the Russian Federation almost at the same but it cannot be saidto be principled, logical or con-
riillewhen the case of Yugoslavia was debated.The
autliormaintaines that Yugoslavia insists upon conti- sistentto tlie extentthatitallows for Yugoslavpartic-
nuity to remain a member of internationalorganiza- ipation in the work of Our Organization. other than
tions andthat the emotional element may also be of that of the General Assembly.Principle shouldnot be
relevame - thatYugoslavia was a founding member made to yield to teniporaryexpediency."
of the United Nations and of the Non-Aligned Tut:colic~üsiuri *hC iJ+&$"+&= cSüCci!
and the Assembly have not tied themselves to any
Movement. He considers that it might even be particular resolurioiiof the matter" and that "at some
becauseit believed its position to be correct in law, point the poIitica1momentumwill exist to regularise
and that the contras, view, whether coming from the positionof the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia in
otlierformerYugoslav republics, fromthird Statesor
from tlie Arbitration Commission, was politically the United Nations"..\ccording to him, there seemto
iilotivated. The author wonders how do Slovenia. be essentiallytwo waysof doing this:
Croatia.Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedoniarec-
onciletlieir position on the negation of continuityof 42. Ibid.. p.244.
Yugoslaviawith the fact that each of them declared 43. Also. the EuropeariUnion erroneously claimsthat "the
independence,and on different dates at that. How do FRY cannotbe re~ardrà3sthe sole succestothe SFRY or
they distinguish between the case of the Federal Schermers/Blokker.in cheir book entitled International
as 'the successorof rhc SFRY'because it was not considered
Republic of Yugoslavia and that of tlie Russian the principalr1of tlieformerYugoslavia. butmore probably
Federation,adding that a possible difference referred becauseitwas corisiurred[liemain party responsible for [lie
IObyacertain nurnberof States - is their ownrefusai outbreak of warinthe rrnitory of the former Yugoslavia".
(uiilike the case of the former USSR) to accept the Wood expresses Iiissurpriseat the assertion about 'Thesucce-
sor" and. withregard ro"rheresponsibility for the outbreak or
41.Ibid.. p.241 war"h.e says rhat it is Icgallyirrelevant. a)the FederalRepublicofYugoslavia could apply in force to which the United Kingdom and the
for rnembership as the other former Yugoslav SocialistFederalRepublicof Yugoslaviawereparties
republicshave done; as rernainingin force between the UnitedKingdom
b) the relevant organsrnightaccept thecontinued and the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia".
mernbershipofthe FRYwithout insistingona forma1 Wood also recails the case of recognition of
application,forexamplebyreversingthedecisionson Yugoslavia by the UN Treaties Service(which we
non-participationof 1992and 1993.Thiswouldprob- have alreadydealt with),as well as that a correction
ably beexplicitly "withoutprejudice to questionsof was issued followingthe interventionof the seceded
State succession" (Wood thinks that this "could be republicsand theUnitedStates, addingimnicallythat
doneby a decision of the relevantorgansas a prag- Germauyfound itnecessaryto protestevenafterthe
maticsolution toa difficultsituation":). announcernentof the correction.
Theauthornotesthat sirnilarpmblemsthat should Referring to the practice of excluding the FRY
be resolved havearisenalso in other forain connec- hm participationin variousmeetingsof Statespar-
tion with the positionof the FRY in the specialized ties tovarious treaties. he wonders "on what legal
agencies,the internationalfinancial institutions and basis have various representatives who voted for
OSCE, stressing thatmost specializedagencies have exclusion done so. 1sit a form of reprisalfor breach
followedthe UnitedNations, adoptingresolutionsin of treaty by the FRY? Or is it sirnply on political
whichYugoslaviawasnot expelled,but onlyprevent- groundswithoutregardto, indeedin disregard of,the
edfromparticipatinginthe plenaryorgan. law?".
In the part of his presentationrelatingto multilat- Wood argues that resolutions 4711and 471229
eral treaties of which the Seaetary,-Generalis the "merely decide that the Federal Republic of
depositary, Wood recalls a few facts which are -Yugoslaviashaii not participate in the work.of the .
extremely relevant for the recognition of General Assembly and ECOSOC", concluding that:
Yugoslavia'sinternationalcontinuity: "If the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were not a
memberofthe UnitedNations,sucha decisionwould
a) Yugoslaviaremained listed on the publication be absurdsince,as a non-rnember. it could notin any
Multilateral Treaties whose depositary is the event participate in these two organs, except asan
Secretary-General; observer". According to hm "unlike the Badinter
b) the introductionto MultilateralTreatiesxplic- Commissionwhich saysthat 'the SFRYhasceasedto
itly says that the nurnber of participants "does not exist'GeneraiAssembly resolution asserts thaithe
includethoseStateswhichhaveceasedtoexist"(thus, General Assemblyconsiders"that the Stateforrnerly
the former German Democratic R.epublic is not known as the SFRYhas ceased to exist". He draws
included); theattentionto the factthat the preambularparagnph
c) no one suggested that the ratification by of the resolution that Yugoslavia'sclairnto continue
Yugoslavia ofthe UN Conventiononthe Lawof the automaticaily the membership of theformer SFRY
Sea should not count towards the sixty ratifications has notbeengenerallyaccepted"leaves openthepos-
required for entry into force (whereasthat of the sibilitythatin the futureit might begenerallyaccept-
GermanDernocraticRepublic,forexarnple,wasdis- edthatthe FRYcouldcontinuethemembershipofthe
counted); SFRY".He emphasisesin particularthatinoperative
d) "the International Courtof Justice appears to paragraph 1 of resolution No.777 the Security
have had no difficulty in reading the FRY'S Council"considers"andnot "decides" that"the FRY
Declarationand note as indicatingthe FRY'S"inten- cannotautomaticallycontinue themembership of the
tionto honour the internationaltreatiesof the former SFRY", which equailyconfirmsthe aboveassertion.
'iugoslavia"; - - --.
-- -Wood~unciuciesihai"&mekofttri büfi temion-
e)theUNSecretanat initsSurnmaryofPracticeof betweenlaw and politicsin connectionwiththe for-
the Secretary-General as Depositaryof Multilateral mer Yugoslavia" and says:
Treaties44took the explicit position that General " Itrnayfiom tirneto tirnehaveseemedthat hter-
Assemblyresolution 47/1 "doesnotaffectinanyway nationallaw has ben given short skiff bypolicy
the capacity of the FRY to participate in îreaties, makers.Thereis muchthatcanhardlybe explabed
including those deposited with the Secretary- by referenceto tbenormalmies ofinternationalpub-
General"; lic law (emphasisadded - MM). The recognition of
f) that, in October 1992. the Human Rights the various former Yugoslav States, to which only
Comrnittee called upon the Govemrnent of passing referencehasbeen made in this article, is a
Yugoslaviato submit, as a Partyto the Intemational case inpoint.As a result,the valueof precedentsfor
CovenantonCivil andPoliticalRights, itsreporton internationallawyers of much of what happened in
theirnplementationof the Covenant; the formerYugoslaviamayprovetobe limited.There
g) that the British Govemment confmed, on 10 are anurnberof possibleexplanations,includingthe
April 1996,that "we regardtreatiesand agreements speedat which the eventsunfoldedduring 1991,at a
time when attention was elsewhere (Iraq,the Soviet
44.Surnmary of Practice of the SecretaGenera as Union, other parts of Central and Eastern Europe);
Depositaryof MultilateralTreaties (Doc.ST/LEGB). and the involvementof a new and largely untnedactors in international affairs (the European Union K. Malone clairns that "Serbia and Montenegro
and its Troika, the OSCE, the Co-Chairmenof the belongtoa suigeneriscategory".addingthat"evenin
International Conferenceon the Fonner Yugoslavia, this casethere are no legal grounds for them to par-
the Badinter Commission). Even the UN Securiiy ticipate in the workof the Organhtion, not evenin
Council and the General Assembly were venturing otherbodies. in additionto the GeneralA~sembly."~s
downthe new paths.'"S
ProfessorBlumansweredtheminthe samejournal
Epilogue without an end- The above account notingthat theassertionsof Bringand Malonearenot
reflects thethinking of the majority of international based eitheron the law or on facts. Theirassertions
lawyers.It would be unfair to say that there are not need no comrnents since, by their absurdity,the'
thosewhodefendthe actsofpolitics,buttheyarefew, show not only the authors' level of knowledgeof
no matter what they thinkabout the character, the internationallaw,butalsoraremaliciousnesstowards
consequencesand responsibilitiesfor thebloody con- Yugoslavia which they were unable to conceal
flictscausedby the Yugoslavcrisis. It isinterestingto (avoidingeven tu mention itsnarne,at leastas it was
note thatarnongthose rarelawyerstheauthorof these officially referred to in the UN at the time - "the
lineshasnot founda singleAmencan authorsupport- Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
ingresolution 47/1.When,attheendof 1992,thefirst Montenegro)".
article on this theme authored by Yehuda Blum The alreadyquotedGerrnanProfessorK. Partsch.
appeared in the Arnerican Journal of International descnbing resolution 4711, says that "the selected
Law46.supportingthe continuityof Yugoslavia,three solutionfmdsits legitimacyinits provisionalcharac-
opponentspublished theirviewsinthe ensuingissues ter for a bnef transitory period", and "whetherit is
of the Joumal: Professor at the Faculty of Law in permanent or in confonnity with the Charter for a
Zagreb,VladoDjuro Degan.who. in the capacityas a longer period oftirne. we cul wait am!ceeW.4H 9e
seniorofficia1of the newCroatianState,correctlyset claimsin the same article that the appliedprocedure
out Croatia's position,the chief legal counseiof the (for the adoption of resolution) was "under the
Ministryof Foreign Affairsof Sweden, Ove Bring, Charter althoughit was politically motivatedand is
and thelegaladviseroftheMissionoftheRepublicof notforeseen intheCharter".Hemaintainsthat"itwas
Croatia to the United Nations, Kelly Malone. essentialto exerî pressure on the partiesto the con-
Politeness does not permit to qualify with proper flictsoto rneet the dernands ofthe SecurityCouncil
words the allegations of the two last authors.Thus, and togetreadyfora peacefulsolutionthroughnego-
Bnng says: tiations". And.finally, the incredible conclusion:
"This aiieged non-existent Yugoslaviacontinues "Political motiveis also in confomiitywiththe main
to keep its seat (with the narneplate)in the General objectives of the United Nations. The objectives
Assernblyand its flag continuesto flutterin frontof could hardly be achieved through expulsionor sus-
the United Nations, dong with the flags of other pension".
mernber States"- accordingto the wordsofProfessor To whatextentthe utterancesof this oneandsim-
Blum. "But,there is a simpleanswerto this apparent ilar lawyersmirror the real political backgroundof
inconsistency.The nameplateand theflagarenotthe individual legalacts is bestillustratedby the presen-
iiameplateand the flag of a member State (because tationof NicholasNitri of the Washigton Schoolof
that State has ceased to exist) but of another so far Law, who, at the annual meeting of the Amencan
undefmed internationalegalpersonalitywhoserepre- SocietyofInternationalLawreferred to earlier,inthe
sentativesare tolerated in the UN. Of courseit is not debate on the right to selfdetermination, inter alia.
thefgst tirnetbatde faco àiflerentinternationallegal said:
personalities, dthough ihey are not membersof fhe I
UN,are represen~edh ihe Ûrgmita~ûïî as ob~e;.~~~~ 'The rightto secessionis not recognized;it isnot
or in other ways(ernphasisadded - MM-)T . he cases ïecogriizcc! i;: th:: clsr cf the dissolution of
of PL0 (Palestine)andtheAfricanNationalCongress Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia.Ethiopia or the Soviet
(South Africa)are cases inpoint: althoughthey are Union either. Tliose are al1cases of dissolutionof
not States, both entitiesare establishedas actors on Statesand theinternationalcornrnunityverycautious-
the international arena and as legal personalities of ly distinguished betweenthese two ternis. 1 would
internationallaw.Theseand other exarnplesof legal simplychallenge anyoneof you to quoteherea reso-
personalities(theMalteseOrder.Taiwan) areunique lutionof any internationalbody or an ordinaryhigh-
er-level statementofanyministryof foreignaffairs in
by their character and special features and in this the world.inwhichthe specificnght to secession.not
sense the case of theFederalRepublic of Yugoslavia to self-determination,butto secession,asbeenmen-
confims t~smodel(emphasis added -MM).Thereis tionedw.51
no doubt.however, thatSerbia-Montenegroisa State
altliough it is not exactly the State that Belgrade 48. Ibid,pp.311-313.
claimsto be and it isnota memberoftheUNW.47 49.Theauthorappearsto haveforgonen that pressure was
45. Ibid., pp.256-257. itsparticipationin the main organof the United Nations.
46. American Journal of International Law. Vo1.86, 50.K. Partsch.op.cit.
No.4/1992. 51. Mohammed Bedjaoui:Nouvel ordremondial etconr-
47. Yugoslav Review for InternationalLaw. No.311993, role dela legalitedes actesdu Conseil de Secunte. Bruxelles.
pp.308-309. 1994. Consequently, it is clear that, in the case of In confomity with comrnon international law. the
Yugoslavia, "dissolution"(orinthe Slovenelanguage UnitedStates considersthatail fiveStatessuccessors,
"razdruiivanje") has in the case of Yugoslavia, pri- Bosnia and Henegovina, Croatia, FormerYugoslav
rnarily been used in order to recognize seceded Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia and ''theFederal
Yugoslavrepublics.withouthavingtheappearanceor Republicof Yugoslavia"are equal successorsof the
- even more dangerously - without becorning the SFRY.TheUnitedStatesshares this positionwith the
precedentof secession.That is whythere werernany internationaicommunity.
shenanigansin theEuropean Community,the United The outer wall of sanctions against Serbia and
Nationsand inother internationalfora,sothat resolu- Montenegro remains fully in force. The saocrions
tion47/1 isjust oneexample.Itisnot byaccidentthat includeihebanonmembemh~p ioiotemationalorga-
the recent president of the lntemational Court of nizations, such as ihe UV and ihe OSCIE. and on
Justice, Mohammed Bedjaoui.in his book"The New access to ihe international financial iostitutions
World Order and Control of the Legality of Acts of (emphasisadded -MM),as weiias on thenomializa-
the Security Council".arnongeight Security Council tion of relationswiththeUnited States.
resolutionswhich, inhis opinion, shouldprimarilybe Progresson the questionof successioncontinues
the subject of controlof legality, listedthree resolu- to be the ceniral element of the outer wall ofsanc-
tions concemingthe Yugoslavcrisis. tions."54
American specialist in internationallaw Thomas
Raju says: Any commentis superfiuous.What is the use of
"When a few rich and powerful Statesdecide to Security Council resolutions. no matter how clear
dissolve a sovereign independent State through the theymaybe. whensomeStates,as in the abovemen-
policy of recognition, how can that State defend tioned example. can introduce the socalled outer
itself?Thereis no eliminationor defenceagainstthis walls ofsanctionsandimpose"ban onrnembershipin
form of international destructionof a State. Indeed, .intemationalûrganization-si,ncludingthe UN-and-the..
Europe, led by Germany, dismembered Yugoslavia OSCE'.
withouta bullet shotV.s2 As a conclusion, the opinion of two renowned
Cornrnenting on the "work" of the Badinter expertsin internationallaw.
Commission, the already quotedAmericanProfessor TheeminentBritishProfessorofinternationallaw.
of internationalaw,Horst Hannum,states: Jan Brownly,in his work on peaceful settlementof
international disputes,publishedin 1995/55,saysthat
new"Irule of internationallaw: if a State has beencre- there is a "disturbing situation" - "the Security
ated on the bais of federal (or possibly confederal) Council is a means of the current policy of a very
principles,then it is enough that one or severai con- smallgroupof States,in £actof three."
stituent republics cease to participate in the federal The wellknownFrenchProfessorandmemberof
governmentwith a view to deprivingthat Stateas a the UNInternationalLaw Commission,AlainPellet,
whole of recognitionas a State by the international expressed Brownly'sthoughtin evenclearertemis:
cornmunity. Sucha de wouldno doubtsurprisethe
USA, Canada,Gemany and other federalStates and 'There is againmuch talkabout 'thenew interna-
would lead to a direct recognition of secessionist tionalorder'.Inthefieldof law,thetermissomewhat
movernentsinfederalStates,denyingatthe sarnetune exaggerated. Nonetheless, a fundamental element
thesamerecognitionto variousregionswhichattempt remains:the law is the expressionof the interestsof
to secede£romunitaryor centraliseciStatesW.53 the most powerfulState or States.The absenceof a
seriousintemationalcounterpoisehas as a resultthe
However, in the Yugoslav case, this rule was fact that the United States, currentlythe only super-
applied and thus,at least for someactorsin the inter- power, can easily make its positions prevalent.
nationalcommunity,Yugoslavia"disappeared". Nothingpreventsthe thought thatthe UnitedNations
lnstead of fmally doing away with this sharheful nas become the insîïtuneniof &c Niericas pEry?
and controversialGeneral Assembly resolution, six thankstowhichtheUSpositionsaremadelegitimate.
yearsafter theend of the forty-seventhsessionof the TheUnitedNationsîïndsitselfat acrossroads.Either
UN General Assembly,the questionis still "on ice". itwiilforgeinstrumentsof genuineworlddebatethat
Even worse, theso-called "outer wall of sanctions" willmake possiblethe elabomtionand applicationof
has been contrivedwithoutanydecisionof any organ balanceddes of internationallaw conespondmgto
of the internationalcornmunity. the generalinterestor at leastfacilitatethecreationof
APress Staternentof theUSADepartmentofState such rules, or itwill just be an instrument of 'Yius
of 29 September1997statesthe following: Amencanum':whichin the longruncmot serveas
"The Governmentof the United States reiterates a guarantorof a lasting internationalorderV*.56
that it clearly rejects the claim of "the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia" to be the sole successor Statement,September29. 1997,p.1.f the Spokesrnan.Press
Stateor the sovereigncontinuityof theformerSFRY. 55.JanBrownly:The Peaceful Settlementof International
Disputes in Practice, Peace International Law Review.
52. Thomas G.C. Raju: Nations, States and Secession, Vol.VI1NO.^,Spring 1995.
Lessons from the Former Yugoslavia, Mediterranean 56. Alain Peilet:La formation du droit internationaldans
Quarterly,Fa111994,pp.40-65. lecadredes NationsUnieJourn Ealropeen de droit interna-
53.H.Hannum,op.cit., pp.64-65. tional, ~01.6,No.3, p.425. If there is somethingof a solace in this situation, it
is the fact thatrecisely in these powerful States, in ~~~
particular in the United States, there are countless INTERNATIONAL
world renowned great narnes of international Iaw,
whose ethical noms did not bow to the daily policy AFFAIRS
that ignores the law. Their criticisms and waniings
cannot leave the politicians' minds at ease nor make
valid their legaily untenable decisions. Including the
controversial resolution711and also those that have
never been drawn up and adopted in the United
Nations. but areeagefly enforced in its name against
Yug.,lavia. CONTENTS
International legal continuity is not an alchemist
formula to be politically manipulated with in the
longer run. It is true that continuity requires recogni-Cornmitment of the FR of Yugoslavia to
tion, but there are also objective criteria which cannotPeaceful Settlernentof the Question of
be easily circumvented. Kosovo and Metohija ,
Continuity is manifested in three forms: through -zivadi~JOVANO WC. ......................................1.
diplomatic relations, through multilateral treaties and
through membership in internationalorganizations. It The Battle of Kosovo
is more than obvious that in respect of the frrst two -P~L DL R&O PETKO WC. ..............................4
forms (diplomatic relations, international treaties) Models Suggested by the Contact Group
Yugoslavia has a generailyacceptedinternationallegal to Resolve the Prohlem of Kosovo
continuityhas not beenyet generallyaccepted,but hass -ZoranLUTOVAC. MA. ......................7...............
not been fdly denied either. The indisputable fact
that Yugoslavia remained a member of the United A Look at the (Pmanent) International
Nations, thatinthe OSCE it has only been suspended Criminal Court
(which also means a confmation of its membership -Prof Dr.0bradRA CI^..................................1
andlor continuity) and th. it has notbeen excluda United Nations Peacekeeping
from almost any significantinternationalorganization
(despitevarious restrictions)shows thatthis third form -A.JR. GROOM............................................
of manifestationofcontinuityis hardto deny, fact Documentation ...............................21...................
that in the association of parliamentsof the world, the International Law and the Status of tFR of
Inter-ParliamentaryUnion, Yugoslavia'sinternational Yugoslavia in theUnjted Nations
legal continuity has been recognized (in spite of the -Dr.MiodragADTIC.....................................-.2
attemptsto challenge it)is an importantelemeninthe
endeavours to resolve this questionfmally and clearly
also in ail international governmentalorganizations.57
It is a paradox that the representativesof parliaments
of States clearly confmed by an overwhelming
majority, only a few days before the adoptionof reso-
lution 4711, the international legal continuity of
Yugoslavia. But the governmentsof some countries
areplaying a cat-and-mousegamewiththe position of
this country in the United Nationa.country which is
one of its founding members and, althoughit may not I
be m^ng the ~CSZ eiern~lw iy,s surely not one of ~~VEW ~TI=~NAT!QN-L,L A-FFATRS
those member States that have for decades flagrantly W ISSN T 486-6096
violated theUN Charter and that arepeacefullysitting
in the highest organsof that Organization.
http://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.yufmteraff;
57. The Inter-ParliamentaryUnion, at the 151st of thee-mail:intera~eunet.yu
Inter-Parliamentary Council (Stockholm, 7-12 September
1992)with 69 votes in favour, 19against and23 abstentionArticles signedtheirauthorsdo not necessarilyrepresent
broughtdecision on "maintenance of the membership of the theviewsof theevierv.Arrangementshavebeen madewith
"tiaving exarnined the situationof the nationalgroup of thehnson Reprint Corporation,111 Fith Avenue. NewYork.
Socialistderai Republicof Yugoslavia". N.Y.10003.for the reprinting ofour out of print issues.
ReiriewofIntemaionMairs DirectorMiüvojeObradov: Editorn-hiefandResponsibleEdiror:DI RankoPetkovicsubs@tion
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Ik: 642-531CornputertpdiinpDIBBO. BelgradP.nBteby "Slui?beni@a~rÙk':l,.~ade.Yu~oslavia. Annex 6 1
514-516.80132MT 426 . - Bonn,
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Betr.:Venvalt~ingsstreitverfa dierendegepublikDeutschlandwegen Asylrechts;
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Selirgeehrte Daiiieniind Herren.
ziideiiiiBeziipsschreihenaiifgeworfenenFragen nimmtdas AuswaAmtewie folgt . .
Stelliiiig:
1)AlbaiiisclienVolksziigehorigeninder BiindesrepublikJugoslawienkeine politische
Verfolgiiiig. dieexplizitanclieVolksziigehfirigkeitanknüpfenwürde.
So lebenalleininBelgrad iiiehrereZehntausendetlinischeAlbaner.beidenenkeine staatiiche
~chlechrerstell«der systeiiiatischeUngleichbeliandlung(dies wiirenz.B.diskrimminierende
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Gegeiicieniialbaiiisc~evfilken~ngsnlehrh. iine daflnennenswenestaatliche
Rechtsverletningengegen diesenPersonenkreisgemeldet würden (v.a. GemeindenBujanovac.
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Preiwo iindMedvedjainitca60% albanischemBevolkemngsanteil). Vielealbanische
VolksuigehiirigelebenseitGenerationenregulîr in Montenegro. wosie indas politische
Lebenintepriesiidiindi1.a aish einenMinisterstellen. S. f3).er su
3) NacliEi-teiintiiisdes AiiswaitigenAiiitssinddie MaBnahmender SicherheitskniReinerster
Linieaiifdie Brkaiiilrlrr U('Kgerichtet. die tinter Einsatz terroristischerMittel für die
UnabliaiipipdestKosovo.nacliAlpabeii eiiiigerihrer spricher sogarfurdie Schaffung
riiies,.CroD-Alba~'n~lilitiOpfer iiiirerder Zivilbevfilkeningsowiediedrohende
IiiiliianitareKarasti-oplieivibisziiiiiEi~ileiaiifdas NATO-UltiinatiimbewuDt .
Iierbeipet~iteler'ziiiiiiiidestIiiiiy,.eKollateralsciiadeii~. Einer Einschatziingder ECMM(03.11.98)ziifolgelassensichaus ofiziellen ~u~erun~en,
AngabeiialbanischerOrganisationen sowie diircliAugeiischeifi(Ablaufder Offensive,
Zerstoningen) hlgende Aspekte-derStrategie der Sicherheitskrafie ableiten:
. - Beherrscliiingder Versorgiingswege durchEinnaliineder Hauptmagistralen,Kontrollevon
Schliisselpositioneiiiind ,,Siiubeningaeines dreibisviesK.m breiten Streifensum die
Versorgungswegeinit dein NebenefTekt,da0 dasvoin Gegner (UÇK) kontrollierteGebietin
kleinereTeilgebietezersplittert wird;
- Eintluflnalinieaiifdie ZivilbevtilkeninginitdeinZiel, dein Gegnerderen Unterstützungzu
entziehen.DieUCKhatte breiten Riicklialtinder Bevolkerung (beteiligtesichinEinzelfallen
aiich aktivaiiKiiiiîptliaiitili~~idie ,,EintliiBnahine"der Siclierheitskrafiedrückte sichdurcli
inassiveEiiiscliiiclitei-1zynisclieMachtdenionstration(~ereitstelluni von Hilfsçüternin
iiiiniittelbarNiihe zii PolizeiiindMilitarstelltingen.grofiangelegteKontrollenvon
Fliichtlingenaiif~atfen~hrauch (Paraffintests)iisw.)und -irnweitergnVerlaufder Offensive
4
init steigeiiderTendenz -,.StrafinaBnahitien"wiewillkïirliche(aber durch die Vielzahl-der +
Eiiizelt3lleiinEi-gebriisiiiassive)Zerstoning von Gebaiiden,Plünderungenund MiBhandlunçen
festgenoiniiieiie-dei-konti-olliei-tPersonenaus.
Mit deinBosiiieii-Kriegvergleiclib'arei~iassivstaatlich~eduldeteEinsatzevon
parainilitarisch'Gnippen sindailsdein Kosovo-Konfliktnicht bekannt.
Eiiie aiifVeqeibuiigails der BiindesrepiiblikJiigoslawienausgerichtete Strategie der
Sicherheitskrafteist nicht erkennbar.Hierfürspriclitauch, daBder GroBteilder ~üchtlin~eals
.,Binnenvertriebene"iinKosovo (in nenneiiswerteinUrnfangauchinMontenegro) verbIiebund
niir eingeringei.Teil ins Ausland(v.a. Mazedonienund Albanien)floh.
2) Eineesplizi~ ai die all~ai~isceolksziigelitirigkeitanknüpfende politischeVerfolgungist
auch iiiKosovo riiclittèstzustelleii.Dei-Ostendes Kosovo ist von den bewaRneten'~ont1ikten
bis1ai.iiicliterGil3t.diisGtYeiitliLeben iiSticitenwie PriStina,UroSevac,Gnjilan usw.
verlief'iiiigesaiiitenKoiitliktzeitraiinrelativnoi-iiiaienBahnen. 3
Der o.a. EiiiscIiRrziidi,r ECMMziifolgewar das Vorgehen der Sicherheitskraftenichtçegen
Kosovo-Alhiineia -lsetlinisch ciefinieiteGiuppe gerichtet, sondernçegen den militarischen
Gegner iiiiddessentatsiclilicl~eoder vermiiteteUiiterstützer.Aufden teilweisetotalen
Retrot'feiiIieitsgiddei-Zivilbevtilkei-uniiiKotitliktsgebiethatte diese SchluBfolgerunçkeinen
Eintliil3.sir spi.iclitjedocligedas Voi-liegeneiner~nippengei-ichtetenund für das Vorliegen
einer (indeilMitteliiiiiaBlosiiberzogenen)z&ericliteten Verfolgung.
Nach Aiignben ciesCDHRFkaiiieniinKosovo-Konfliktbis zuin 02.11.98 1.326ethnische
Albaneriii~isLeheii.davon 204 Fraiien. 189Kinderund 364 Personenüber 55Jahre (Angaben
liber ideiitifizierteTote). Dit'fereiizierii. ievieleUCK-Angehorigebzw. aktivan den
Kaiiipfenheteiliytel)ortl~e\vohnertinter(leilToten siiid.wiirdeiijedoch nichtçetroffen, so daB
eine Eiii';cli;ttzglesiiiiigekoiiiineiieriririni1i-einenZivilistennichtgetroffen werden
kaiiii. Einer friiliereiiAngabedes CDHRF von 1.O50Getoteten war dieZahl von 538 Verwundeten
gegeniibei-gestelltworden.
Nach Einscliatziingendes UNHCRsind iiber300.000 Menschenançesichts der Kampfeaus
den D6rkrn gefliiclitet.Davon bliebenetwa 200 000 als~innbvertriebene imKosovo. etwa
50.000 Iiieltensichzuiiiiiidestzeitweise inden Waldem auf..Seitdemdtjkchdas NATO-
. ~itimatiiinerzwiingenenTeilnickmg von Polizei-und ~rrnee-~inheiten(Wiederherstellunç
. .
des Niveauszii Jaliresbeginn)koinint esgegenwartig ziirRückkehr einer Vielzahlvon
Flüchtlinçenin ihre Dorkr. Mit der einsetzendenNormalisiemnçist aber vielerortsauch ein
Wiederautleben von UCK-Stniktiirenfestziistellen:
4) Wie bereitsenvalint.sind die MaBnahinender Sicherheitskraftegegen die UÇK und ihre
Unterstiitzerpericlitetiincinicht an diepolitischen.karitativenoder venualtungsmaBigen *
Tatigkeiteiider Beti-oifeiiengeknüpft. lnsokrn diese Tatigkeitenjedoch der UÇK nigute
koinineii.ist eiiiejiii-istischeWiirdigiin=als UiiterstütziingdeUÇK nicht aiisgeschlossen.So
ist deiiiiis\verti~en AiiitcieiFalleinesArztes bekannt.der wegen der Behandlung
iiiutiiiafllicl-ICK-Angelibrigerzii einer Haftsti-afevenirteilt wurde.
5) RïickkelireralbanisclierVolksziigehori=keit,die aufgrunddes ~ückübernahmeabkommens
nickgefiihrt wiirden.siiidaiich s'cliovor Ausbmch der bewaffnetenKonfliktebei ihrer
Einreise zii ihreiiiAiifeiitlialtin Deutschlandbefragt worden. ~ine Verschiirfungder Befiagung
seit Aiisbnichder Kainpiekoniitedurclidas Auswartiçe Amt nicht beobachtet werden, ist aber
iiichtKirjeden EinzelfallaiisziischlieBen.Mittlerweileistdie Rückfiihrunçausgesetzt und dem
AuswartigeiiAnit liegenkeineaktuellereiiErkenntnisse ni dieser Thematikvor. Einerseitsist
davon~usziigelieii.da0 diejugoslawischenBehiirdensehr.wohlmutmaBliche
Reknitienings\vege der UÇK auch inDeiitsclilandzu ermittelnsuchen,andererseits dürfte die
Melirhcitder diirclidieUÇK ails Deiitschlandreknitierten Kosovo-Albanernichtaufdem
..RiicktiiIii-ii~igs\\~ondernriiifrtndereni- Kontrollenund Befragiingenumgehendem -Wege
.
nacliJiigoslawièiieiiigereistsein. Letzteresist denjugoslawischenBehorden auch aus
mehrei-en Terrciriçi~iiisverfalibnekannt,die gegeiidiesenPersonenkreisgeführt wiirden.
Ein EiiitliilSexilpolitisclierTiitigkeitenaiifiiifigliclieEinleitungvon Strafterfahren oder
Strafscliarfiingheibel-eitsbestelieiiderAiiliiiigiykeitvon Strafverfahrenkonnte durch das
Aiis\viirtig.An11 iiacli.wievor niclitbeobaclitetwerden.
6) ln .liigoslawieii~ibtesZutl~ichtsiiiiigliclikeifür albanischeVolksziigehorige,die vor den
bewaftiieteiiF\iisoiiiaiiders tlicliten.DieeKnontlikteimKosovo haben daziiçefubrt,daB
ca. 300.000 MeiisclienilireOrtscliatienverlassenIiatteniindan anderenOrten Schutz suchten.
Dabei habeiica. 40.000 MenscheninMontenegro. 20.000 in Südserbien,der überwieçende
Teiljedoch iiinishi hetrottiirieiiGebieteiides'Kosovoselbstvonibergehende Aufiiahme .,.. Bersen iindWalderii (ineist in uniiiittelbarerNahe ihrer Dorfer) aufçehaltenhatkn. sind seit.
deii Teilahziig ci&- siclie*-haitskrafiefast vollstandiginfeste U~terkiinfiezurückgekehrt. .. '.. '
Bis dato liegtdein Ai~swfirtiyenAmt keineMeldiingüber eineunmittelbardurch Rückfuhmng
oder freiwilligeRückkelir venirsachte Obdachlosigkeitvor. . .
. .
7) Die ~clitheit des mit Beuigsschreiben.übersandtenUrteilsdes LandgerichtsKosovska 0'
.
Mitrovica, K-18/90, kann durcli das AuswartigeAmt ailsden folgendenGründen nicht
bestatigt werden: -
Laut Gericlitsregister des LandgerichtsKosovska Mitrovica war dasVerfahren K- 18/96 an
diesein Gerichtyejen eine andere Person alsdiedes KIagers (A. Mehaj)anhângig.
Laut Gerichtsreyister des Landgerichts Kosovska Mitrovica warvon 1996 bisheute überhaupt
kein Strafverfahren geg& den Klajer an diesernGericht anhançiç. c,
Mit fi-eiind1ichkii'~;rü~en
Public sitting held on Wednesday 12 May 1999, at 10.00 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding