Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
Courinternationale
InternationalCourt
of Justice de Justice
THEHAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2000
Publicsitîing
heldon Wednesday28June 2000,at 10am., at the Peace Palace,
PresidentGuillaumepresiding
in the caseconcerningMaritime Delimitationand Territorial Questionsbetween
QatarandBahrain (Qatav.Bahrain)
VERBATIMRECORD
Audiencepublique
tenuele mercredi28juin 2000,0heures,au PalaisdelaPaU,
sous laprésidencedeM. Guillaume,président
en l'affairedelaDélimitation marietdesquestionsterritoriales entre QataretBahreïn
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)
COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Judges ad hoc TorresBernardez
Fortier
Registrar CouvreurPrésents:M. Guillaume, président
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Pana-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges
MM. TorresBemirdez
Fortier,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur,greffierTheStaâeof Qatarisrepresentedby:
H.E.Dr.AbdullahbinAbdulatifAl-Muslemani,Secretary-Generalof the Cabinet,
as AgentandCounsel;
Mr.AdelSherbini,LegalAdviser,
Mr.SarniAbushaikha,Legal Expert,
as Counsel;
Mr. Eric David,Professorof InternationalLaw, Universitélibre de Bruxelles,
Dr.Alibin FetaisAl-Meri,DirectorofLegalDepartment,DiwanArniri,
Mr.Jean-Pierre Quéneudec,Professor of International Law at the University of Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Mr. JeanSalmon, Professoremeritusof InternationalLaw, Université libree Bruxelles,Member
oftheInstitutdedroit international,
Mr.R. K.P. Shankardass, SeniorAdvocate, Supreme Court of India, Former President of the
InternationalBarAssociation,
SirIanSinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,Barristerat Law, Memberof the Institute of InternationalLaw,
SirFrancisVallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,Professor emeritus of International Law, Universitof
London,Memberemeritus ofthe Institutde droit international,
Mr.RodmanR. Bundy,Avocat à la Courd'appelde Paris, Member of theNew York Bar, Frere
Cholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,
MsNanetteE. Pilkington,Avocatàla Courd'appeldeParis,FrereCholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
as CounselandAdvocates;
MsCherylDunn,Memberofthe State Barof California,FrereCholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
MsInesSabineWilk, Lawyer before the German Court of Appeal, Member of the Chamberof
Lawyersof Berlin,Germany,
as Counsel;
Mr. ScottB. Edmonds,Directorof CartographicOperations, MapQuest.com, ColumbiaM , aryland
(UnitedStatesofArnerica),
Mr. Robert C.Rizzutti,Project Manager, MapQuest.com,Columbia,Maryland (United Statesof
Arnerica),
Ms Stephanie K. Clark,Senior Cartographer,MapQuest.com,Columbia,Maryland(United States
of America),
asExperts;
H.E.SheikhHamad binJassimbin Jabor Al-Thani, Ministef rorForeignAffairs,
H.E. Mr.AhrnedbinAbdullahAl-Mahmoud,Ministerof StateforForeign Affairs,
as Obsewers.
TheState of Bahrainisrepresentedby:
H.E.Mr.Jawad SalimAl-Arayed, Ministerof Stateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
as Agent;L'Etaide Qatarestrepreséntép ear :
S.Exc. M. Abdullahbin Abdulatif Al-Muslemani,secrétairegénéra dlu gouvernement,
commeagentet conseil;
M. Adel Sherbini,conseillerjuridique,
M. SamiAbushaikha,expertjuridique,
comme conseils:
M. Eric David,professeurde droit internatioàal'Universitélibre de Bruxelles,
M. Alibin FetaisAl-Men, directeur desaffairesjuridiquesdu conseilde l'émir,
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à l'université de Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M.Jean Salmon,professeuréméritd ee droit internatioàal'universitélibre de Bruxelles,membre
de 1'Institutde droit international,
M. R. K.P. Shankardass, avocat principal à la Cour suprêmede l'Inde, ancien présidentde
l'AssociationinternationaleduBarreau,
Sir Ian Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,avocat,membre del'Institutde droit international,
Sir Francis Vallat,G.B.E., K.C.M.G.,Q.C., professeur éméride droit internationàl'université
de Londres,membre éméritd eel'Institutde droitinternational,
M. RodmanR.Bundy,avocat àla Courd'appel deParis,membre dubarreau de New York,cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mlle Nanette Pillungton, avocatàla Cour d'appel de Paris, cabinet FrereCholmeleyEversheds,
Paris,
comme conseilset avocats;
Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de lYEtat de Californie, cabinet Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mme InèsSabineWilk, avocat prèsd'une courd'appel d'Allemagne, membre de lachambredes
avocatsa Berlin,Allemagne,
comme conseils;
M. Scott B. Edmonds, directeur du service des levés cartographiques, sociétéMapQuest.com,
Columbia,Maryland (Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
M. Robert C. Rizmm, administrateur de projet, sociétéMapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
Mme Stephanie K. Clark, cartographe hors classe, sociétMapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
comme experts;
S.Exc. le cheikhHamadbin Jassimbin Jabor Al-Thani,ministre des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Ahrnedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,ministred7Etataux affaires étrangères,
comme observateurs.
L'EtatdeBahreïnest representé par :
S.Exc. M. JawadSalimAl-Arayed,ministred7Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
comme agent;Dr. FathiKemicha,Memberofthe BarofParis,Kemicha & Associés (Tunis),
ProfessorSirElihu Lauterpacht,Q.C.,C.B.E.,HonoraryProfessorof theUniversityof Cambridge,
Memberofthe Institutde droit international,
Mr. Jan Paulsson, Freshfields,Paris,MemberoftheBars of Paris andthe Districtof Columbia,
Professor Michael Reisman, Myres S. McDougalProfessor of InternationalLaw of Yale Law
8
School,Memberof theBarof Connecticut, Associate of the Institutedroit international,
Mr. RobertVolterra,Freshfields, London,MemberoftheBarofUpperCanada,
ProfessorProsperWeil,Emeritus Professoratthe University of ParisII (Panthéon-Assas), ember
of the Académie des sciences moraleest politiques (Institutde France), Member ofthe Institut
de droit international,
as CounselandAdvocates.
SheikhKhalidbin AhmedAl-Khalifa, First Secretary, Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Stateof
Bahrain,
CommanderChristopherCarleton,M.B.E., Headof the Law of the Sea Divisionof the United
KingdomHydrographicOffice,
Dr. HongwuChen,Freshfields,Paris,MemberoftheBarsof ParisandBeijing,
Mr. GrahamCoop,Freshfields,Paris,Barristerand SolicitoroftheHigh Court ofNewZealand and
Solicitorofthe SupremeCourtof EnglandandWales,
Mr.AndrewNewcombe, Freshfields, ParisM , emberof theBarofBritishColumbia,
Dr. Beth Olsen,Advisor,Ministryof Stateofthe State of Bahrain,
Dr. John Wilkinson,Former Readerat the University of Oxford, EmeritusFellow, St.Hugh's
College,Oxford,
asAdvisors;
H.E.SheikhMohammedbin MubarakAlKhalifa, MinisterforForeign Affairs,StateofBahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Ambassadorof the State of Bahrain to the
Netherlands,
H.E. Dr. Mohammed Jaber Al-AnsariA , dvisorto HisHighness,theAmirofBahrain,
Mr.GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-Secretaryof Foreign Affairs, Stateof Bahrain,
Her Excellency SheikhaHaya Al Khalifa,Arnbassadorof the State of Bahrain to the French
Republic,
Mr. YousefMahmood,Directorof theOffice oftheForeign Minister, StateofBahrain,
Mr.Jon Addison, Ministryof Stateof theStateof Bahrain,
Ms Maisoon Al-Arayed, Ministry of State othe State of Bahrain,
Ms Alia Al-Khatar,Freshfïelds,
Mr.NabeelAl-Rurnaihi,Ministry of State ofthe State of Bahrain,
Mr. HafedhAl-Qassab, Ministryof State of the State of Bahrain,
Mr. Yousif Busheery, MinistryofForeign Affairs of the State of Bahrain,
Ms JanetCooper,Minisûyof Stateof the State of Bahrain,
Ms EleonoreGleitz,Freshfields,
Ms AneesaHanna,Embassyof BahraininLondon,
Ms JeanetteHarding,Ministry ofStateofthe State of Bahrain,
MsVanessaHarris,Freshfields,
Ms Iva Kratchanova,Minisûy of Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
Ms SonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfields,
Ms Sarah Mochen,Freshfields,
Mr.KevinMottram,Freshfields,
Mr. YasserShaheen,SecondSecretary,MinistryofForeign Affairsofthe StateofBahrain,
asAdministrativeStafM. Fathi Kemicha, membre dubarreaude Paris,cabinetKemicha & Associés,Tunis,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,Q.C., C.B.E.,professeurhonorairàl'universitéde Cambridge,membrede
l'Institut dedroit international,
M. Jan Paulsson, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, membre des barreaux de Paris et du district de
Columbia,
M. Michael Reisman, professeurde droit internationàll'universitéde Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S. McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut, associéde l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Robert Volterra,cabinetFreshfields, Londres,membredu barreauduHautCanada,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l'université deParisII (Panthéon-Assas),membre de
l'Académie des sciencesmorales etpolitiques (Institut de France), membrede l'Institutde droit
international,
commeconseilset avocats:
Le cheikh Khalidbin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, premier secrétaire, ministèrees affaires étrangères de
1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Le capitainede frégateChristopher Carleton,M.B.E.,directeurde la division dudroit maritimedu
bureau hydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,
M. HongwuChen,cabinet Freshfields,Paris,membredesbarreaux de Pariset de Beijing,
M. Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, avocat et conseil de la High Court de
Nouvelle-Zélandeet conseillerde la Coursuprêmed'Angleterreet du Pays de Galles,
M. Andrew Newcombe,cabinetFreshfields, Paris,membredubarreaude laColombiebritannique,
Mme Beth Olsen,conseiller,ministèred7Etatde 17Etadte Bahreïn,
M. John Wilkinson, ancien maître de conférence à l'université d'Oxford, membre émérite du
CollègeSaint Hugh, Oxford,
commeconseillers;
S.Exc. le cheikh Mohammedbin MubarakAl Khalifa,ministredes affairesétrangères deBahreïn,
S. Exc.le cheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de 17Etatde Bahreïn aux
Pays-Bas,
S. Exc.M. MohammedJaberAl-Ansari, conseillerde SonAltesse l'émirde Bahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi, sous-secrétaird7Etatauxaffairesétrangères de17Etatde Bahreïn,
S.Exc. la cheikha Haya Al Khalifa, ambassadeurde 17Etatde Bahreïn auprès de la République
française,
M. YousefMahrnood,directeurdubureaudu ministredes affairesétrangères de Bahreaïn,
commeobservateurs:
M. Jon Addison,ministèred7Etatde17Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme Maisoon Al-Arayed, ministèred'Etatde 17Etat deBahreïn,
Mme Alia Al-Khatar,cabinetFreshfields,
M.NabeelAl-Rumaihi, ministèred7Etatde 17EtatdeBahreïn,
M. Hafedh Al-Qassab, ministèred7Etatde 1'EtatdeBahreïn,
M. Yousif Busheery,ministèredesaffaires étrangèresdelYEtatde Bahreïn,
MmeJanet Cooper, ministèred7Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeEleonoreGleitz,cabinetFreshfields,
Mme AneesaHanna,ambassadede Bahreïn,Londres,
MmeJeanetteHarding,ministèred7Etatde 17EtatdeBahreïn,
MmeVanessaHarris,cabinetFreshfields,
MmeIva Kratchanova, ministèred7Etatde 1'EtatdeBahreïn,
Mme SonjaKnijnsberg, cabinet Freshfields,
Mme Sarah Mochen,cabinetFreshfields,
M. KevinMottram,cabinet Freshfields,
M.Yasser Shaheen, second secrétaire,ministèrdeesaffairesétrangèresde17Etatde Bahreïn,
commepersonneladministratg Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vous asseoir. La séanceest ouverte et je donne la parole pour
1'Etatde Bahreïnà su ElihuLauterpacht.
SirElihuLAUTERPACHT:
BAHRAIN T'TLE 1868 ONWARDS
Introduction
1. Mr. Presidentand Members of the Court, it falls to me to examine anurnber of matters
that relateto the originaltitleof Bahrainto the HawarsandZubarah.
2. The order in which 1shall deal with these items is setout in the outline ofthe argument
that is to be foundattab 123of thejudges'folders.
3. Only if the Courtrejects the utipossidetis argument andthen, in relation to the Hawars,
also rejects theesjudicata argumentwill it be necessary forthe Court toturn to the fundamental
questionput byme in myopening speech:
"How will Qatar dischargethe burden of proof that undoubtedly rests upon
it...of showing how,where and in whatdegree Bahrain lostits title to the peninsula
including, more particularly, Zubarah and the Hawars?" (CR2000111, p. 16,
para. 19.)
4. The short answer,saidMr.Bundyin his speechon 20June:
"isthat it was byirtueof the 1868Agreementsthat Bahrainwas obligedto stayin its
island and respect the maritimepeace, while the Al-Thaniruler of Qatar was, for the
first time, recognizedas a sovereignin his ownright possessingterritorialrights in the
Qatarpeninsula. So,whatever vestigeof a Bahrain presencein Qatarhad existedprior
to 1868 ... that presence was teminated by the 1868 Agreements." (CR2000117,
p. 43,para. 5.)
Shortly aftenvards, Mr. Bundy asserted that "Bahrain, in its first round, scarcely mentioned the
1868Agreements ..." (CR200011 7,p. 43,para. 7).
5. Well, it may beasked,why should Bahrain havedoneso? As Mr.Paulsson pointed outin
5
his speechin the first round, Qatarbas been constantly changingits position regardingthe date at
which it first became a State (CR2000111, p. 47, paras. 22-25). In thewritten pleadings, when
Qatarthought it could relyonthe 82forged documents tocounterevidence of Bahrain's positionin
the Hawars, Qatarwas content to put the date of statehoodat some time after the Second World
War. Once it decidednot to rely on the forged documents, Qatar hadto find some other basis onwhich to contest Bahrain'stitle. So the date of its own statehoodbegan creeping backwards. As
expressed in these oral proceedings, we have heard Professor Salmon put that date at the
"beginningof the twentieth century"(CR200015,p. 28,para. 15(a);Mr. Bundythen put it "roughly
at 1870" (CR 200017,p. 9, para. 7) and with ProfessorDavid it crept back to "the middle of the
nineteenth century" (CR200018,p. 53, para. 12). Now, in Qatar's secondround, Mr.Bundy has
firmly cemented Qatar's origin as a State to a foundation in the 1868 Agreements. Well,
Mr. President and Members of the Court, Mr. Bundy having at this late stage thus elevated the
1868 Agreements to a position of dominatingprominencein Qatar's argument, 1am obliged, in
response to what has been said, to begin by examining quite closely the texts of the two 1868
Agreements. As 1shall hopeto show you, they do not do either of the things that Qatar saysthey
do.
The 1868Al-ThaniAgreement
6. Letme take first,the Agreementwiththe Al-Thani. Mr. Bundy has assertedthat by virtue
of the 1868 Agreement "the Al-Thani Ruler of Qatar was, for the first-time, recognized as a
sovereigninhis own rightpossessingterritoial rights inthe Qatarpeninsula".
7. The English text of the so-calledQatar Agreementis to be found attab 123 inthejudges'
folders and is alsoup on the screen. 1regret that it is necessary forme to go over the whole text
with you in orderto provea negative,in orderto show whatit doesnot Say.
8. First, 1must drawyour attentionto the title that has been givento the item by Aitchison,
the editor of the authoritativecollectionin whichthe text appears.hold Volume 11of Aitchison
in my hand, it has been a bible to al1of us. The title of the text as it appears in Aitchison is:
"Agreement ofthe Chief of El-Kutr (Guttur)engaging notto commit any breach of the maritime
peace,- 1868". Now, contraryto the assertionin the speech of Mr.Bundy (CR2000117, p.43,
para. 6) the word "Chief"doesnot appear in the actualtext of this document. Only in the title
the editor'saddition- is any reference made to "the Chief' of Qatar. This is not surprising
because, asthe Court will seewhen1cometo thenextdocument,MohamedAl-Thaniwas onlyone
of a numberofrelatively minorSheikhsreferredto in this latter documenton the eastem sideof the
peninsula. 9.Wethen have the introductoryparagraph
"1,Mahomed bin Sanee, of Guttur[noteplease, 'of Guttur'n , ot 'chief ofGuttur
or anythinglike that] do hereby solemnlybind myself in the presence of theLord, to
cq into effect the undermentioned terms agreed upon between me and
Lieutenant-ColonelPelly,HerBritannicMajesty's Political Resident, Persian Gulf."
There is no reference here to sovereignty,so we proceed to the five substantivearticles in which
Mr. President,Members of the Court, our task is to find, if it can be found, the recognition of
Qatar's sovereignty that counsel forQatarhas sorepeatedlyallegedis to be found there. But, first,
please note that the undertakings given by Mohamed Bin Sanee were persona1undertakings,
limited to himselfand didnot extendto his successors. Lorimernoted the positionas follows:
"The Governmentof India, recognizing thatthe agreement made in 1868 with
SheikhJasim'sfather,by which SheikhMuhammad [ofQatar]undertooknot to make
war by sea, could hardly, on account of its personal character and the subsequent
assumption by the Turks of authority at Dohah, be regarded as binding on Sheikh
Jasim ..." (Emphasisadded.) (Memorialof Qatar,Vol. 3, Ann.11.5,p. 217.)
A bit furtheron Lorimercontinuedthus:
"About the same time, Colonel Ross, the British Political Resident, proposed
that Shaikh Jasim ... should be compelled to acknowledgein writing the continued
validity of the Agreementsignedby his fatherin 1868, butthe Governmentof India,
being of opinion that proceedingsto this end might bring about a difficultywith the
Turks, ordered that a verbal assurance only shouldbe obtained. This was done; and
the renewalof his treaty obligations to abstain from war atsea and to referhis dispute
with bis neighbours to the British Resident appearedfor a time to have a restraining
effectupon this unrulyShaikh."
10. These persona1undertakings al1 run, it should be observed, in one direction, from
MohamedBin Sanee to the British. It seems impossibleto extractfrom such a text any concession
or recognitionof sovereigntyor independenceby the British.
11.Solet us return tothe rest ofthe 1868Agreement.
12. "1st- 1 promise to return to Dawka [Le. Doha] and reside peaceably in that port."
That, of course,is the basis on which1said in my first intervention thatthis Treatysimplytold the
Sheikh to go home and stay there. It certainlysays just that. But there is nothing there about
sovereignty !
13. "2nd.- 1 promise that on no pretence whatsoever will1 at any time put to sea with
hostile intention,and in the event of disputes or misunderstanding arising, willinvariablyrefer to
the Resident." Again, nohint of sovereigntythere! 1takethe thirdand fourthparagraphstogether: 14. "3rd.- 1 promise on no account to aid Mahomed bin Khalifeh[that is the deposed
Shaikhof Bahrain],or in anyway connectmyselfwith him." And
15."4th.-If Mahomedbin Khalifeh falls into my hands,1promise tohand him overto the
Resident." No sovereignty in either of those two articles either. So only one article remains in
which to find the recognitionof sovereigntythat Qatarsaysisthere.
16. "5th.- 1promise tomaintaintowardsShaikhAli binKhalifeh,Chief of Bahrein,al1the
relations whichheretofore subsistedbetweenme and the Shaikh of Bahrein,and in the eventof a
differenceof opinion arisingas toany question, whether money payrnentor other matter, the same
is to be referred tothe Resident."
Well, Mr. President,1can seeno recognitionof Al-Thani sovereigntythere. Indeed,there is
the very opposite. MohamedAl-Thani is promisingto maintain al1the relations which heretofore
subsistedbetween hirnand the Sheikhof Bahrain. By Qatar'sown admissionin paragraph5 ofthe
Application in this case, the pre-existing situationwas that the entire Qatar peninsula was a
dependencyof Bahrain. Inthe presentproceedings Qatar has never deniedthe truth and relevance
of its original admission. The 1868 Al-Thani promise was thus a promise to maintain the
pre-existing dependency - the pre-existing dependency ofQatar upon Bahrain. So, if there is no
recognitionof Qatarisovereigntyin Article 5,it is nowherein the 1868Agreement and counselfor
Qatar is manifestly wrongin suggesting the opposite. Moreover,the whole of Qatar'scase about
the emergenceof Qatar into sovereignty and the acquisition oftitle by it to the peninsula and the
Hawars at thattimevanishes intothe sand.
17.But that is not the end of this demonstration of thesubordinatestatus of Qatar in 1868.
Earlierin the samevolume ofAitcbison'sTreatieswhich1showedyou a moment ago andin which
the text of the 1868Agreement is reproduced, there is a section which the editor calls
"Narrative"-a rather matter-of-fact recital ofmaterial events,many of which are reflectedin the
treatytexts that follow. Onpage 193there appearsthe following statement:
"Through the mediation of the Resident an agreementwas also concluded
between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikhs [notethe plural] of the Qatar tribes,
determiningtheamountof tributeannuallypayableby the latter andthe manner of its
payments."The Narrative goes on to observe that "the tribute, which was only paid for two years, was
discontinued when the Turks established themselvesin Bida" (text also at Memorial of Bahrain,
Vol. 2, Ann. 13, p. 160). The short life of this Agreement probably explains why its text was .
relegated by the editor to a footnote. But itis an event that did occur, the Court cannotneglect it
because it provides further evidence of the limited standing of the Al-Thanis in 1868. It is
reproduced at tab124ofthe judges'folders,and continues:
"We, the undersigned Chiefs, al1residing in the province of Qatar,do hereby
solemnly agreeand bind ourselves topay Shaikh Ali bin Khalifah,Chief of Bahrein,
the sum of money per annum heretofore paid by us to the Chiefs of Bahrein, as
follows: thistotal sum to be paid by us to Muhammadbin Thani of Doha and by him
to theResidentfor deliveryto the Agentof the ChiefofBahrein,at Bushire."
19. There then follows, as you can see, a list of seven payments, totalling 9,000Krans,
including one of 2,500Krans to be paid "on account of Muhamrnedbin Thani (Chief of the
Maadhid)and theMusallamtribe": notChiefof Qatar,not Sheikhof Qatar.
20. Thetext concludes thus:
"Andwe, the said Chiefs [note,al1the Chiefs, includingMuhamrnedbin Thani
who was but one of them], understandingthat the Bahreini Chief claims from us a
total of 15,000Krans per annumin lieuof the 9,000as above set forth,we do hereby
further agreeto pay any extra sums not aggregatinga total larger than 15,000,which
the Residentafterjudicial investigationmaydecree."
This Agreementisalsodated 13September1868.
21. If any further evidence were required of the limitation of the authority of
Moharned binThani, it is to be found in the statement of the sarne date by the British Political
Residentin the Gulf,Col. Pelly, as follows:
"Be it known to al1the Shaikhsand others on the Guttar Coastthat Mohamed
bin SaneeofGuttar, is returningwith histribe to reside at hitown of Dawka, and has
bound himself to live peaceably there and not to molest any of his neighbouring
tribes." (Memorial of Qatar, Vol.5,Ann.11.29,p. 89.)
Sothatthe Courtmay see the very limited areato which al1this activity relates,there is now onthe
screen(and in yourjudges' folders attab 125)a map illustratingthe location ofthe tribes whothus
undertookto continuetheir paymentsto the Al-Khalifah. Unfortunately themap doesnot placethe
namesof eachtribeagainst the precise locationbut1am assuredthatthosearethe districtsin which
they were. Al1onthe east Coastof Qatar,notfar fromDoha. 22. The most generous - but still significantlyrestrictedinterpretationof this epi-odis
to be found in a report some 37 years later by CaptainPrideaux. He wrote that at some tirne
between 1851and 1866SheikhMahomed-bin-Thani
"was enabledto consolidatefor himself ...a compactlittle dominion containing the
toms of Wakrah,Doha and Bida, the independence of which from Bahrain was
practically [and 1think that means in a practice, notforma1sense, as has been seen]
establishedand ratifiedby the Governrnentof Indiain 1868,when aforma1agreement
was first taken from ShaikhMohammedbinThani" (Memonal of Bahrain, Vol. 3,
Ann.71,p. 357).
But that falls a long way short of recognizing the sovereigntyof the Al-Thanis over the Qatar
peninsula includingthe north-westandthe Westofthe peninsula, as wellasthe Hawars.
23. In this way, Mr. President and Members of the Court, the statement so confidently
presentedon behalfof Qatarregardingthe effectof the 1868Agreement between Britainand Qatar
isshown to be totally incorrect. And that has far-reachingimplicationsbecause, as will be seen,
between that dateand 1913 Qatar has advancedno material in purported supportof the Al-Thani
claimsto sovereigntyover the peninsula.
The1868BahrainAgreement
24. And so, 1turn now to the second limb of Qatar's propositionregarding the effectof the
1868Agreements. Having quite misleadingly represented that the 1868Qatar Agreement
recognized "the Al-Thani ruler of Qatar...as a sovereignin his own right possessing territorial
rights in the Qatarpeninsula" (CR2000117, p. 43, para. 5), Mr.Bundy then went on to Saythat 1
had got thingsbackwards and that it was "the Ruler of Bahrain whowas told to go home and not
breach the maritimepeace again" (CR2000117,p. 43, para. 8). From this he drew the conclusion
that "whatevervestigeof a Bahrainipresence in Qatar hadexistedprior to 1868- wasterminated
by the 1868 Agreements" (CR2000117, p. 43, para. 5). So now we have to look at the other
1868Agreement, theone made betweenBritain and Bahrain. The myth that the 1868Agreement
placed some temtorial limit on Bahrain was again repeated by Sir Ian Sinclair, "no doubt
inadvertently",as he would put it (CR2000118,p. 33, para.21) when, in the second of hs
comprehensive propositions he said that afier 1868the Ruler of Bahrain had "been specifically
forbidden by theBritish authoritiesfi-ombreaching the maritime peace by interferingin Qatar".The documents, 1 subrnit, indicate otherwise. Not a word to this effect as regards Bahrain's
relationswith Qataris to be foundin the 1868Agreement. It is onlyin Article 2 of the 1868Qatar
Agreement,which 1 have already read tothe Court, that precisely such a restriction is placed on
Qatar.
25. So now we have to subjectthe 1868Bahrain Agreementto the samekind of scrutiny as
we havejust doneto the 1868QatarAgreement. 1must take the risk of wearyingthe Court with
such a close examination, but itdoes expose, for the inventionthat it is, that Qatari pretence that
1868is a crucialyear in the pretendedemergence of Al-Thani authority in Qatar and the alleged
correspondingdisappearanceof Bahrainiauthority there.
26. So, once again, Mr. President,we must turn to the actual text (Memorial of Bahrain,
Vol. 6, Ann.317, pp. 1414-1416; judges' folders,tab 126). But just before looking at the
1868Agreement itself we must take note of the text that almost immediately precedes it,in the
samevolume of Aitchison, the Friendly Convention of 1861betweenBahrainand Britain, for it is
there that we find a major and critical distinction in standing between theAl-Khalifa of Bahrain
and the Al-Thani of Qatar at this period (Memorial of Bahrain, Vol.2, Ann.8, pp. 110-113;
judges' folders, tab 127) the 1861Convention is described in its preliminary provisionas being
made between "SheikhMohammedbin Khaleefa, independent rulerof Bahrain" and the British
Government. This is a very differentmode of descriptionfrom that used in the 1868Agreement
with "Mahomedbin Sanee,of Guttur"- not a Sheikh,not a chief,not a mention of independence,
not a hint of beinga ruler. In short,apersonnot of a statusin any way comparableto the Sheikhof
Bahrain. It is of course a distinctionthatQatar is most anxiousto obliterate, butthe pretence that
there was some measure of equality of standing between the two, Bahrain and Qatar, is quite
groundlessandremainssountilafterthe SecondWorld War.
27. So now we can proceedto the 1868Bahrain Agreementitself- the Agreementwhich
L
Qatar contends marks the termination of whatever vestigeof Bahraini presence in the peninsula
might still have remained.
28. In its opening paragraph, the Agreement declares that Mahomedbin Khalifa, having
committedacts ofpiracy and otherirregularitiesat sea,has fled Bahrainandforfeited al1his claims
to title as principal Sheikh and Chief of Bahrain, andthat Alibin Khalifah hastaken over. Therefollow four operativearticles: (i) to make over tomorrowal1the war buglas and buteels [another
kind of war boat] belongingto Mahomedbin Khuleefaand himself; (ii)to pay the Resident the
surn of one lakh of dollars in four instalments; (iii)to consider Mahomedbin Khalifeh as
permanently excludedfrom the affairs of Bahrain and as having no claim to that temtory; and
(iv)to appoint an agent at Bushire to keep theResidentinformed of what happens. And that is al1
that there is in the Agreement. From what is it possible, even by the most energetic play of
imagination,to squeezeout of this any suggestionof abandonment of Al-Khalifa authorityor title
in the Qatar peninsula? Qatar'srepresentations in this regard are wholly fictitious. There is no
basis whatsoeveron which theCourt can findthat by virtue of this agreementor otherwise Bahrain
authorityin the Qatarpeninsulaendedin 1868.
Absence ofevidenceofQatari authorityoverthe wholeofthe peninsula,1868onwards
29. So what else has Qatar invoked by way of response to the challenge thrown down in
Bahrain's opening round to show how Bahrain'stitle to the north-west and west of the Qatar
peninsulacameto an end?
30. Well, it is a ratherpoor story. Notethe sequenceof eventsin Mr.Bundy's speech.From
the spurious citation of the1868Agreementshe passed to the Ottoman presencein Qatar. This
presence was said to extendto the whole of the Qatar peninsula. But on what was this based?
Qatar has produced absolutelyno evidenceof anyphysical extensionof Ottoman presence to the
north-west of the Qatar peninsula or to the Westor to the Hawars or of any Ottoman attempt to
replacethe Al-Khalifain thoseregions.
31. The only item invoked is the forma1or administrative distinction drawn between the
rrkaza"of Qatar, and the "Kasaba"or central town of the province also sometimes called Qatar.
That serves no purpose here. And as to Qatar'sdismissalof CaptainIzzet'smap, the only reason
why the Hawar Islandswouldhave been specifically named in it was because of their association
with Bahrain. Qatar wasevidentlyno morethan a place in the south-eastcorner of the peninsula
and its total non-involvementin the Hawars wouldnot have led CaptainIzzetto name the Hawars
as being associatedwith Qatar. 32. Mr.Bundy further assertedthat "The fact remains that SheikhJasimAl-Thani ruled the
entire province of Qatar,and that he governed thetemtory both in his own nght and as surrogate
t
for the Ottoman Empire." (CR2000117,p. 47, para. 24.) What is the Court to make of that
statement when it is read inconjunction with (a) the 1868matenal that we have already covered,
and (b) the following letter fiom SheikhJassimbin Thani to the British Political Residentdated
9 March 1881(Memorial of Bahrain,Vol.2, Ann.38,p. 216)-it is onthe screen:
"You writeto me that1shouldkeepguardoverthe whole of the Katar Coastbut
1have nopower over it. You are aware of the treaty made in the time of my father
between us and the British Governmentnarnely that we were only to be responsible
for Dohatal BidaaandAl Wakra. The Al Katar Coastis very largeand extensiveand
1have notthe power to forbid anyonefiom landing or embarking ... 1 have before
reportedto you thisstateofthe case and that1ampowerless."
33. One small, but significant,episode may be mentioned at this point. Also in 1881,the
brother of the Sheikh of Bahrainpaid a visit to the west coast of the Qatar peninsula. The only
available evidence of this appears tobe in one item in a chronology of eventsin a reportprepared
by CaptainPrideauxin 1905. Hethen said:
"In December [1881], SheikhAhmed, the brother of SheikhIsa [of Bahrain],
landed onthe west coast of Katr with about 200 followers for the purpose of sport.
SheikhJasim[ofQatar] sent a deputationfromBida towelcomehimandinvitehimto
an entertainment in the interior. SheikhAhmed [thatis, the visitor] insisted upon
Jasim'scoming himself to greet himwhere he was, which the Bidachief accordingly
did, and subsequently SheikhAhmed accompanied hirnto his camp." (Memorial of
Bahrain, Vol.3, Ann.71,p. 362.)
Note, the Bida chief, not the Sheikh of Qatar,the Bida chief as identified by CaptainPrideaux.
But, if SheikhJasimhad trulybeen the effectiveruler of the western part ofthe peninsula,it would
hardly havebeen appropriate for SheikhAhmedof Bahrain (nothimself a ruler) to requirethe local
sovereignto cometo him,a foreignerfiom overseas!
34. Sixyears afterthis episode,in 1887,an Ottoman reportstated that "SheikhJasim has for
a long time functioned only in name as provincial govemor in the Qatar district, between Oman
and Bahrain" (Memorialof Bahrain,Vol. 2, Ann.39 (a), p. 217).
35. And lastly, and1 Saylastly so as not to be thought to be flogging a dead horse, let me
recall that on 7 May 1893 the British Political Residentreported a meeting with SheikhJasim
Al-Thani of Qatar in the course of whichthe Sheikh expressed a wish forBritish protection and a
place of safety to which he might retire. This is the so-called sovereign chief, mler of anindependent Qatar: "a place of safety to which he might retire". Colonel Talbot'sreport then
continuedasfollows,in part:
"1then asked hirn [Sheikh Jasim]where he would wish to settle if any new
arrangementwere made, pointing outthat Zobarah and Odeid were impossible. The
latter,however,they al1admittedto be outsideKatr,andthereforenot withinthe scope
of discussion. .."
The discussion about a possible place of retirement continued and,after consulting his brother,
SheikhJasim, inthewords ofthe report,asked
"whetherthey could obtain the wholeof Katr as in the days of his father. 1 replied
[i.e., Talbot] thateven if the Turks could be inducedto waive their claims, those of
Bahrainto Katrcould not beignored. SheikhJasim at once acknowledged the rights
of Bahrain, and expressed his willingness to pay tribute as before." (Mernorialof
Bahrain,Vol.2,Ann. 51,pp. 250-251,7 May 1893.)
36.In the lightof material ofthis kind,how could it possiblybe saidthat Bahrain'sauthority
in the peninsula and more particularly in Zubarah and the Hawars was displaced by the
1868Agreementsandreplacedby Al-Thaniauthority?
37. The historyof the period from 1868to 1916,is one which,if seriously pursued,would
require a detailed consideration both impossible and inappropriate at this stage of the case.
Moreover, it is unnecessary. That history consists of a complex web of relations between the
Turks, the British,the Sheikhs of Bahrain,the leaders of theAl-Thani family and sundrytribes in
the east and north of the Qatar peninsula. There is nothing in that history to suggest that the
Sheikhs of Bahrainabandonedtheir claimsto Zubarahor the Hawarsor, particularly in relationto
the Hawars, that Bahrain was in anyway confronted by physical or administrative competition
from Qatarthere.
Theunratified1913Anglo-Turkish Convention
38. So we cornenow to heading five, the unratified 1913Anglo-TurkishConvention. This
related to the Persian Gulf and adjacent temtories (Mernorial of Bahrain, Vol. 3, Ann. 81,
pp. 431-432). This was presentedby Mr.Bundy(CR2000/17,p. 51,para. 41) as a textwhich
"did accuratelyreflect the partiescornrnonview as to the territorial situation at the
time and the status of the Al-Thani Rulers as govemed in the past, and as still
goveming,theentire Qatar peninsula" . 39.Now,the parties whose viewswere said to be reflectedin this documentwere,of course,
Britain and Turkey, whose viewsare obviouslyespeciallypertinent. Well, once again,we have to
lookcloselyat thetext to seewhether it really didreflect aornmonview that in 1913the Al-Thani C
had ruled and were still goveming "the entire Qatar peninsula",as now suggestedby counsel for
$
Qatar.
40. Therelevant articleis Article 11.It containsfour elements. One is the establishmentof
a line separatingthe Nejd from the El-Katr peninsula; the Nejd being what is subsequently to
become Saudi Arabia - the blue line is now up on the screen. The second elementrecords the
renunciationby the Ottoman Govermnent of"al1their claimswithregard to the El-Katrpeninsula"
coupled with the third element, the provision that "the said peninsula shall be govemed, as
heretofore by Sheikh Jasim bin Sani and his successors"- to which 1 shall return in a moment.
The fourth element is the British undertakingthat it "will not permit the Sheikhof Bahrain to
interferein theintemal affairsof El-Katr,to infringethe autonomyof the country,orto annexit".
41. Nowthere is nothing here that arnountsto a recognitionof an independentState of Qatar
existing throughoutthe peninsula and the HawarIslands or evenZubarah. The crucialwords are
that the peninsulashall be govemed "as heretofore"by the Al-Thani. But we knowthat the prior
govermnent on the peninsula by the Al-Thani did not extend to large parts of the peninsula,
including Zubarah,and certainlyit didnot extendto the Hawars. True, some 30 years hadpassed
sinceSheikhJasim'ssadpleathat he hadno authorityoverthe interiorand, afortiori, overthe west
Coastandthe HawarIslands. But the possibilitythat the area ofhis authority mighthaveexpanded
in the interval has never been supported by any evidence of actual control. Qatar has been
prepared,or content,to rely on the text ofthe 1913Agreementas evidence of its title, whereas the
true hction of the documentwas to record the departureof the Turks and the Britishintention to
restrainthe Sheikhof Bahrainfrom interferingin the intemalaffairsof El-Katr.
-
42. Thebottomlineof the 1913Agreementis really thatBritainand Turkeywereagreeing to
leave the peninsulaof Qatar to the Al-Thanisto make the best of the possibilitiesthus affordedto
them to develop and consolidate their authoritywithin such area of the peninsulaas they rnight
come to control. Nothing in the Agreement gavethe Al-Thanititle to areas whichthey did notactually possess. For one thing,the Al-Thaniwere not party to the Agreementand for another, of
course,Britain did nothavethe authorityto giveaway temtory belongingtothe Al-Kalifa.
43. The cap is put on this analysis by an extract from a document which Qatar itself
producedin the Annexes toits Counter-Memorial(Counter-Memorialof Qatar, Vol.3, Ann.111.40,
p. 216) and from which ProfessorSalmon quoted on 29 May (CR200015.trans., p. 29, para. 19).
This is a memorandum prepared in 1934 by J. G. Laithwaite of the India Office, to whom
Mr. Paulsson referred yesterday,on "The Southem Boundary of Qatar and Connected Problems".
In the sectiondiscussingthe 1913Convention, Laithwaiteobserved that the wordingof Article 11
"wouldjustify the contentionthatthe blue line"- thatis,with an anow onthe screennow- "was
at once the eastern frontier of Nejd andthe western frontier of Qatar". He then immediately
continued:
"Butthere are definiteobjectionsto adoptingthis view. In the first place there
is nothing to show that this was, in fact, the intent of HMG at the time when the
Conventionwas concluded or that the [word garbled in the photocopybut probably
'provision']had any object beyond limiting the eastern boundary of the Turkish
possessionsin this area. Secondly, thereis no evidence of any claim to suzeraintyby
Qatar so far to the Westor so far to the south. Thirdly, the Resident'stelegram of
11January 1934 emphasises the absenceof control by the Sheikh of Qatar over the
interiorof his State andafortioo rverregionssoremote from Dohaas arenow under
consideration."
And please recall 1am quoting- and this was writteneven in 1934!- that the Sheikhof Qatar
had no control "over the interior of his State and afortioorier regions so remote fromDoha as
are. ..under consideration"; andthose regions under consideration were no more remote from
Doha than were Zubarah andthe Hawars. And, as ifthat was not enough, Laithwaite continuesa
few lines later:
"Fifthly, it is arguable that even in a forma1 document such as the
1913Conventionthe fact that the blue line is spoken of as separating Nejd from the
Qatar Peninsula need notbe regarded as determining the boundary of Qatar. [The
clear distinctionbeingdrawnbetweenthe politicalconcept of a Stateor entity of Qatar
and the geographical conceptof a Qatar peninsula.] The Qatar Peninsula was the
closest prominent geographicalfeature and thenearest adjoiningArab political entity
on the mainland, and a reference to it for descriptive purposes was not unnatural.
Finally, thereis much to be said for givingno avoidable extensions tothe boundaries
of Qatar,even if the consequenceis that we haveto deal withan areaof indeterminate
ownership betweenthoseboundaries andthe blueline." (Counter-Memorialof Qatar,
Vol. 3,Ann.111.40p , . 216.) The 1914Agreement
44. Sowe can turnnow to the 1914Agreement. Whataboutit betweenBritainand Turkey?
The only thing that need be said about that treaty is that the mention in it of "conforming with"
Article 11 of the 1913 Convention was simply for the purpose of describing by reference to a
pre-existing document a line separating the two "temtories". There is nothing in it to suggest
recognition of the political status of the temtory of El-Katr or the area of authority ofse who
governed part of it (Memorialof Qatar,Vol. 5,Ann.11.45,p. 161).
The 1916Agreement
45. Finally, we come to the 1916 Agreement. 1 Say"finally" because it is the last of the
agreements with Britain constantlyinvokedby Qatar as "repeatedlyand consistently" recognizing
Al-Thani "sovereignty ... as encompassingal1of the areas included in the Qatar peninsula",as
well as the 3-mile belt of territorial watersninground its Coast(CR2000118,pp. 8-9,paras. 51
and 57 (Mr.Bundy); ibid.,p. 24, para. 2 (4)(Sir Ian Sinclair)).
46. Now, in examiningthis agreementitmust berecalledthat we arenot seekingevidenceof
a grant or recognition of title of Qatar to a terra nullius, an area in which there was no other
effective authority. We are assessing whetherthis agreementhelps to answer the basic question
posed by Bahrain - how and when did Bahrainlose to Qatarthe title overthe whole of the Qatar
peninsula, including Zubarahand the HawarIslands,whichQatar admitsthat Britainrecognizedas
possessed by Bahrain prior to 1868? We have looked at each of the earlier texts invoked by
Qatar - its agreement with Britain of 1868,the unratified Treaty with Turkey of 1913 andthe
1914Treaty. We have found that none of them gave to Qatar,or acknowledged,the title to which
it now pretends. So at this point the garne stands or falls on the 1916 Agreement. As the Court
will see, itrovidesQatarwith liîtle, if any,help.
47. Let us begin withthe most summaryrecollection ofits provisions. Bear in mind- we
are looking for acknowledgements of Qatar's status and title to tenitory. Articles1and II relate to
CO-operationwith the British Governmentin the suppression of the slavetrade and piracy and
general acceptanceof the obligationsof the treaties withHer Majesty'sGovernment concludedby
the Trucial Sheikhdoms. Article III relatesto the supply ofarms. ArticleIV containsthe standard
treaty of protection undertaking,that the Sheikh "willnot have relationsnor correspondwith, norreceive the agent of any other power withoutthe consent of the High British Government". Nor
could he, without such consent, cede to any other poweror its subjects,land either on lease, sale,
transfer,gift or in any other way whatsoever. Article V contained a similar restrictionon
pearl-fishery concessions or any other concessions to anyone whomsoever. ArticleVI gave
Bahrain merchants national treatmentinrespect of customdues. Sofar,nothingontemtory.
48. Then come three Articles, the operationof whch, so the history books tell us, was
suspendedby agreement until, as ittumedout, as late1949. For this 1turnto Zahlanlshistoryof
TheCreation of Qatar mentionedbyMr.Paulssonyesterday. Itrecallsthat:
"the concessionsmade to ensure Adbullah'ssignature were as follows: the articles
concerning a British agent (ArticleVIII), British postal and telegraphic offices
(ArticleIX) and the protection of British residents (ArticleVII) were to remain
inoperative forthe time beingsinceAbdullah [thatis the Sheikh ofQatar]did not feel
sufficientlystrongintemallyto imposethem onhispeople"(op. cit.,p. 60).
Not strong enoughintemally.
49. There were two further Articles. By Article X the British Govemment undertook to
protect the Ruler, his subjects and his territory from aggression. By ArticleXI, Britain also
undertook to grantthe Ruler good officesshould he or his subjectsbe assailed by land withinthe
temtories of Qatar.
50. Neither in ArticlX orXI was any definitiongiven of these temtories referred to. We
know, however, from the record of a meeting between the Sheikh of Qatar and the Political
Residentin 1934 (Counter-MemorialofBahrain,Vol. 2,Ann.122,pp. 411-412) that even 18years
after the Treaty,the Ruler was under the impression that the Treaty coveredonly the coast of his
country- that musthave meant the eastcoast, becausethere was no authority exercised overthe
Westcoast. The Political Residentconected him, sayingthat the Treaty extended tothe whole of
Qatar. But evenif the Ruler had thoughtin the meanwhile thatthe Treaty did cover the whole of
his country, it would make no differencebecause the "whole" ofhis country was undefined. It
couldonly havemeantin law the wholeof whateverunoccupiedtemtory he was legallyentitled to
take possessionof. As Bahrain was in possession of bothZubarahand the Hawars, theywere not
unoccupied temtories. Britain couldnothavevested themin Qatar sincethey were notBritain'sto
give, and since Qatar did not occupythem peacefullyor, indeed,at all, it was not entitled to treat
them as part of its temtory. The actualpossession of the Hawarsand Zubarahby Bahrain was inlaw an effectivelimitation upon any conceptual extensionof Qatari title. It is not necessary to
engage in any discussion about the meaning of the passage from Judge Huber'saward quotedby
Mr. Bundy (CR2000118, p.9, para. 58) because the facts do not supportthe applicationof the
dictum. We are not confronted hereby a situationin which an uninhabited region is involved; nor
were the Hawars and Zubarah "regions enclosed within temtories in which sovereignty [thatis
Qatar's sovereignty]is incontestablydisplayed. The Sheikh of Qatar was in 1916,and still in
1934, and even indeed until 1949,so weak and impovenshed that he could not even accept the
implementationof Articles ViI, VI11andIX ofthe 1916Treaty.
51. As Qatar acknowledgedin its Counter-Memorial(para. 2.13), it did not really emerge
into statehood untilafter WorldWar II. Throughout theinterveningperiod Bahrain maintainedits
presencein the Hawars undisturbed; and hascontinuedto do so. The argumentthat "the integrity"
of the tenitory of Qatar automaticallycarrieswithit title tothe Hawarsis quite unsustainable.
52. The crowning surprise liesin Qatar'sconcluding assertion in support of its contention
that the Al-Thani rulers did not need to exercise sovereignty over the whole peninsula to justiQ
their title to al1of it. True, it wassaidby Mr. Bundy, Qataris "stilltodaya relativelyunpopulated
country" (CR2000118,p. 9, para. 59). Butthe south and south-eastemcoasts of Bahrain werealso
relativelybarren. So, he suggested,Bahrainis applyinga double-standard! The suggestionverges
on the absurd. Bahrain'stitle over the whole of the main island of Bahrain is not and has never
been in issue. It is only the title ofthe Sheikhsof Qatarto parts of thepeninsulaof Qatarand tothe
Hawar Islandsthat is in issue. Bahrain'stitle across the water has nothingto do with the present
case. Referenceto it is totally irrelevant,and only serves to strengthenthe impressionthat Qatar
has no betterargumentsto offer.
53. Somuchthen for the basic elementsin the discussion about Qatar's claim to title over the
HawarsandZubarah.
A titre desouverain
54. 1now tum to heading 8-A titre de souverain. 1Saya bief word about this as being
one aspect of Bahrain's conducton the Hawars, that has been discussed. This is the distinctionbetween the Kasikili/SeduduIsland case and the present case, regarding the application of the
conceptofpossession à titredesouverain.
55. In my opening speech 1pointed to the clear distinction between the facts in the two
cases- in particularthe factthat whenpart of the Dowasirtribe first went to the Hawarsthey did
so on the basis of a gantfiom the Ruler of Bahrain. They were thus acting à titre desouverain.
This was in contrast with the position in the Kasikili/SeduduIsland case where the Masubia
tribesmenused Kasikili without the benefitof any comparablegant. And 1may Say,their use of
Kasikiliwas muchlessthantheusethatismadeby the Dowasiron the Hawars.
56. Mr. Shankardassasserted that"thismust surely bewrong" because Bahrainitself asserts
in its Memorial(paras. 36-37) that"itsjurisdictionandcontrolover the Hawar Islands' cornrnenced
withthe grantofthe allegedpermissionin around 1800"(CR2000117,p. 25, para.2).
57. In tmth, the position in the Bahrain Memorial is not at al1 as Mr. Shankardass has
indicated. The BahrainiMemorialsaid: "In about 1800,members of the Dowasirtribe soughtand
obtainedpermissionfrom the Qadiof Zubarah,an officialof the Al-Khalifafamily,to settle onthe
islands." Then, in the next paragraphthere appears the sentence: "Bahrain'sjurisdiction and
controlovertheHawar Islands thuscornmencedtwo centuriesago."
58. It must,of course,beadmittedthat theomissionof the word"over"before the expression
"two centuries ago"- so that it shouldhave read "over two centuries ago"- could be read as
suggesting- as Qatar now appearsto contend- that there was no authorityorjurisdiction of the
Al-Khalifa overthe Hawars prior to the grantmade to the Dowasirin about 1800. But this would,
to Say the least, be a rather strainedinterpretation of the words. If there was no Al-Khalifa
authority over the Hawars prior to the grant, there was no reason why the Dowasir shouldhave
soughtpermissionfrom the Al-KhalifatsQadi to settle there. Their request could only havebeen
made on thebasis that the Al-Khalifa possessedknown authority over the Hawarsbeforethe grant
to the Dowasir,that the Dowasir recognizedthis fact and that in going to the islands they were
manifesting the authority of the Al-Khalifa. If the Al-Khalifa were never sovereign over the
Hawars and the Al-Thani were, is it not extraordinarythat at no time since 1868-and obviously
notbefore-have the Al-Thani eversoughtto exercise anyauthorityoverthem? 59.This interpretationis in full conformitywiththe facts. Forthe matter is reallytakencare
of by the Qatariadmissionin paragraph 5of its Application, ofwhich1ventureagainto remindthe
Court: "Until 1868, the Qatar peninsula was considered by the British as a dependency of
Bahrain." Itis noteworthy thatnot a word has been saidby Qatar about this crucial point. Thisis
hardlysurprising. Obviously,becausethe admissionemanatesfiomQatar,it cannot nowbe denied
by them. So, from their point of view, the less said about it the better. But in truth the fact
conceded in the admission mustbe, for Qatar, a painful and controllingreality. On the approach
adopted by Qatar, the Hawars are an integral part of the peninsula. If until 1868 the Qatar
peninsula was considered a dependency of Bahrain,then it follows thatthe Hawars were also a
dependencyof Bahrain. And so they must havebeen even at the time of the grant to the Dowasir.
An earlier paragraph of the Qatari Application, paragraph3, refers without qualification to the
Al-Khalifaas having settledin Zubarahin about 1766. Although the sentencegoes on to mention
the subsequent expulsion by the Al-Khalifa of the Persians from Bahrain and the Al-Khalifa
settlementthere, itdoes not suggestthat the Al-Khalifa thereupon abandonedtheir authority over
Zubarah. There is thus no bais for any suggestion that Al-Khalifa authority over the Qatar
peninsula(includingthe Hawars) did not pre-existthe grantto the Dowasir. This is an inescapable
historical fact. So the Dowasir came to and remainedin the Hawars à titre de souverain. The
present case is in no way affected by the Court's assessmentof the facts in the Kasikili/Sedudu
Islandcase,a quitedifferentcase onthe facts.
60. An additional point must be made by way of rebuttal of the statement by
Mr. Shankardass(CR2000117,p. 25, para.2) questioningthe arriva1of the Dowasir in the Hawars
in 1800. He cited Lorimer as providing "positive evidence thatthe Dowasir only arrivedin 1845
from Najd via Zakhuniyan". Surelythe evidence ofCaptainBrucks,which dates from 1821 -1829
(see Memorialof Bahrain,Vol. 2, Ann.7, p. 92), 80years earlier, and15yearsbefore the datethat
Lorimergave, is more to be trusted in this connectionthan even thatof Lorimer. Bruckswrote of
"Warden's Islands"(alias the Hawars) that the principal island of this group "ha two fishing
villages onit andbelongsto Bahrain". Proximity
61. 1now come to point 9, which 1call proximity. 1move to consider in relatively short
compass those parts of SirIan Sinclair's argumentthat deal with the basis on which Qatarclaims
title to the Hawars.
62.The reason 1canbe brief is that asregardsthe lawapplicableto the situation thereis only
limited disagreement betweenthe two sides. We both tum to the Isle of Palmas case and the
Eritreanemen Awards as authoritative sources, though we emphasize different parts of each
Award. In the Palmas case, Qatar leans heavily on Judge Huber's mention of islandsin the
temtorial sea. Bahrain, on the other hand, points to those passages which stress the need for
occupation or the performanceof acts of authority as well as the need to maintain continuityof
title. In Eritrea/YemenBahrain points tothe criteriaof exercise ofjurisdiction on a continuousand
peaceful basis, whileQatar points to the lesseregree of activity permittedin the case of islands
that layuninhabitedandungoverned.
63. The real contention between the Parties lies in their diametrically opposed factual
starting-pointsin applyingthe law. For Bahrain,the starting-pointis in the nineteenthntury; for
Qatar, the starting-point is 1936. Allow me to go over the relevant parts of the respective
chronologiesof thetwo sidesin summaryform.
64. First,Bahrain'sposition.
(A) We start from the absolutelyundeniable(and undenied) fact that at the end of the eighteenth
centq the Al-Khalifafamilyandtheiradherentswere incontrolin the Qatar peninsula. Even
the tribes on the east coast paid them tribute. The Al-Thani were no more than a pearl
merchantfamilyinDoha.
Since Qatar reliesso heavily on the maps,the Court may wish to be reminded that thereare
three maps in the Qatari MapAtlas whicheven as late as 1870placethe narne"Bahrain"over
the peninsulathat wenow call the Qatarpeninsula: map 1(1863); map 2 (1870); andmap3
(1876)which,thoughplacingthe name"Katar"on the peninsula,clearlymakes its subordinate
toname "BAHREIN"in capital lettersstretchingeastwards alongthe Gulf coast.
(B) We proceed next to the equally undeniable (and notablyundenied) fact of the terms of
paragraph5 of the Qatari Application.(C) Applying Qatar'sarguments about theintegrityof Qatar'stemtory, this means that eventhen
Bahrainhad authorityor titleover the Hawars.
(D) This Bahrainititle is not dependentupon demonstrating thatthe Al-Khalifaor their adherents
performed acts à titre de souverainin the Hawars. Theirtitle was in those days absolute. It
preceded the grant to the Dowasir of permission to settle on the islands. Thus the act of
making the grant was merely confirmatoryof the grantor'stitle. It was not an act on which
Bahrain's titlewas dependent. Moreover, that title was never confionted by any physical
manifestationofany competing Al-Thanior Qatarclaims.
(E) Contrary to Qatar'scontentions,no politicalentity of Qatarwas identifiedbefore 1913. Even
then the extent of Qatari temtory was ill-defined. As Mr.Laithwaite said in 1934,Qatar's
authority didnoteven extendtothewestcoast. Itcertainlydidnot extendtothe Hawars.
(F) The date of 1936is advanced by Qatar as some kind of turning-point in the historyof the
Hawars. But this is merely a Qatari pretence thatit was in that year that Bahrain illegally
occupied the Hawars. The proposition is a figment of Qatar's imagination. Nothing
previously had servedto bring to an endBahrain's pre-existingtitle or presence in the islands.
Qatar's continuousrepetition ofmentionof 1936 meansabsolutelynothing.
(G) At no time has Qatar ever performed anyact of sovereignty onthe ground in the Hawars.
Indeed, until the commencement of the activities of the oil Companyat Durkan, there was
virtually nohuman presence in the central and southem portions of the west coast of the
peninsula.
6.5.Sonow letus look at Qatar'sposition
(A) Qatarnever demonstrateshow or whenBahrain's title,asacknowledgedby Qatarto havebeen
in existencepriorto 1868,cameto anend.
(B) Qatar invokes the writings of Sir Robert Jennings in support of the proposition that"when a
occasion demands,the law doesrecognizean abstract titlepresently divorcedfrom a material
display" (CR2000118, p. 35, para.25). Bahrain sees no reason to dissent fiom this
proposition. But where is Qatar's "abstracttitle"? Qatarhas never pointedto its own root of
abstract title otheran in terms of legal presumptionswhich inthe present case are rebutted
by the facts. 66. Qatar invokesanotherlegal dicturnwhichin itself need not bedenied. It takesthe form
of a quotationromthe Eritreaflemen Award:
"There is a strong presurnptionthat islands withinthe twelve-mile coastalbelt
will belong to the coastal state unless thereis a fully-establishedcase to the contrary
(as, forexample,in the caseofthe Channel Islands)."(CR2000118,p. 36,para. 27.)
If the facts were as Qatar constantly misrepresentsthem to be, narnely, that "Bahrain simply
occupiedthe HawarIslandsin 1937" (ibi d.r,. 28),Qatarmight have a case. But thefactsdonot
support Qatar. The presumption relating tothe effecton title of the partial location of theHawars
within Qatari territorial seannot operate in a case where there has been the long previous
possessionofthe Hawarsby Bahrain.
67.1hopethat Sir Ian Sinclairwill notthinkme lackingin respect for him if 1do not pursue
much furtherthis response to his arguments. But thetruth is that we are dividedby our different
understandings ofthe facts-and the factsarematters to which mycolleagues- as 1have also-
devoteddirectdetailedattention.
68. Comingto point 10,1needonlyadd that Mr. Bundyconcludedhis presentationwithfive
conclusions (CR2000118, p. 15, para. 86) and Sir Ian Sinclair prefaced his arguments by a
surnmary expressed in seven propositions (CR2000118,p. 23, para. 2). Both series of assertions
sharethe sameweakness and demonstratethe fundamentaldefect inQatar'scase. Bothserieshang
upon the claimedvalidity of the firstitem ineach: forundy it was that "the 1868Agreements
formallyrecognizedthe existenceof Qatarand Bahrainas separatepolitical entities"; forSirIan it
was that
"Britain recognized Qatar as an entity separate fiom Bahrain in 1868, that
recognition necessarily encompassing acknowledgement thatthe Al-Thani Rulers of
Qatarexercisedor were entitledto exerciseauthorityoverthe wholeofthe peninsula."
69. Both propositions are simplywrong; and, as they arethe predicates ofal1that follows,
their errors lead to the collapseof al1that follows. 1need Sayno more on this subject.ow
tum to the subjectof maps.
Maps
70. As to maps, Bahrain adheres tothe views that wereexpressed in our argumentsduring
the first roundand1need not repeatthem. 71.Mr.Bundyhas cnticizedthoseviewsin a numberofrespects. 1ventureto suggestthat to
the extentthat theCourt thinksit necessary topursuethis subject,it will find on close examination
that nothingthat Mr. Bundyhas saidreally undermines Bahrain'sposition. Despite their apparent
profusion,themapsdo not strengthenQatar'scase.
72.Even so, afew comrnentsarecalledfor.
73. One: Mr. Bundy put at the forefront of his reply the observation that "maps are not a
game. [They] are serious evidence of. .. 'general opinionor repute'." (CR2000118,p. 10,
para. 63.) Because of the prominence givenby Mr. Bundyto this point it bears repetition that
"generalopinion orrepute" is at besta subsidiaryelementin the determinationof title. Inso far as
opinion or repute may be relevant, the most important consideration is the identity of those on
whose opinionorrepute relianceisbeing placed.
74. In this regard, it should be emphasized that theofficia1British view of the matter as
expressed in maps or recorded in documents is worth more than the opinion or repute of anyone
else. At every significant juncture there is evidence of a British view of the matter that far
outweighstheviewsof al1others. To identiQ but some: in 1829there is the recognitionby Brucks
in his report and his map that the Hawars belong to Bahrain; as at 1868,there is Qatar'sown
admissionin theApplicationin this very case; in 1939thereis the British award to the effect that
the Hawarsbelongto Bahrain; and in 1972,that is, immediatelyfollowingthe 1971exchanges of
notes giving both Bahrain and Qatar the right to conduct theirforeign affairs, there is the British
Ministry of Defence map to which Mr.Paulsson referred again yesterday. This clearly drew the
boundary betweenthe Hawarsand Qatar. Compared withthese acts of recognitionby the country
closestto the wholematter,the views of others- whetherStatesor privateparties - cannoteven
beginto shiftthebalance.
75. As to the strength of Bahrain's positivecase against which Qatar pleads opinion or
general repute,Bahrain's submissionis that the mapmatenal producedby Qatar - even ifit were
freefrom defects - can makeno dentin it.
76.Secondcomment- thescale of maps: The importantpoint to note is that Qatarhas not
respondedin specific terms to one of the most telling criticismsmade by Bahrain,namely,that the
enlargementof small- scalemapsleads to a distortion ofcolour. It thereforecreatesthe misleadingimpression regarding the connectionof the Hawars with Qatar, as achieved for example in the
QatarMapAtlas No. 41. Bahrain'scriticismsin respectof scaleremain essentially unanswered.
77. Third commen- t colouringof maps: Recourseto colouring as ameans of linkingthe
Hawarspoliticallyto Qatarassumesthat at the timethernapwas made, Qatarwas a politicalentity
within established boundaries- so that the map-maker couldlegitimately treat the Hawars as
being politically attributableto an authorityruling the peninsula.t, as1have already shownin
some detail, there was no recognizable politicalentity called Qatar until at earliest 1913. In
consequencerecouse to coloursprior to that date could notpossibly be evidencethat the Hawars
belongedto any countrycalled "Qatar".
78. Whateverthe identityof colouringthat the mapspresented by Qatarmay showbetween
Qatar and the Hawars, the fact remains that the colouringvaries even between identical maps by
the same map-maker in such a way as to raise the most senous doubts about the accuracy or
knowledgeof the map-makers orthe reliabilityof their product. Take but oneexarnple,Map 11in
theQatarMapAtlaswhich was publishedin 1884byJustusPerthes. It showsBahrainand El-Hasa
outlinedin the same orangecolour,quite distinguishablefromthe green colourof Oman of which
Katar appears as a part. Map 22 is virtually the same map, by the sarne publisher published
11yearslaterin 1895. Butin this rnapwhile El-Hasa appearsin the sameorangecolour asbefore,
the colour of Bahrain has changed completelyto resemblemore closely that of Qatar. Yet in the
intervening 11years therewas nochangein the politicalrelationships in that area, though it isjust
possible that the map-maker may have learned thathis original attribution of Bahrain to the
Ottoman Empire was wrong and that he should havejoined Bahrain to the Hawars and Qatar to
both of them as a dependencyof Bahrain. Inthat case, neitherrnap 11nor rnap 22 supportsQatar's
case. Both maps can be found inthejudges'folders at tab 128. They still leaveone asking: what
importance can one safely attach to colouring as an indication of political relationships, of
recognition orof generalreputewhen its useis sounreliable.
79. Fourth comment: As an illustration of the misrepresentation of his understanding
characterizingQatar'sresponseon maps, mention may be madeof the rnapdescribedby counsel as
one "preparedin 1910by the cartographie Companywhich acted as the cartographerto the British
Crown" (CR2000118,p. 12, para. 71). Now, this mode of description was clearly intended toconvey the impressionthat this rnap possessed some special officia1status and cogency. On the
faceof the rnapit is stated that it is "byJ. Bartholomew, FR-S"a private individual. 1910was
the year in which KingGeorgeV accededto the Britishthrone. He promptlygave a royalwarrant
to J. Bartholomewpersonally,who had bythen probablyalreadypreparedthe 1910map. A royal
warrant is a public indication that the holder of the warrant provides a service persona1to the
monarch or to a member of his family. Thus the well-known department store, Fortnum and
Mason,in Piccadilly,London, possessesa numberof royal warrants. It is:
"By appointmentto H.M. QueenElizabethII, grocersandprovisionmerchants;
by appointment to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother, suppliers of
leather and fancy goods; and by appointment to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, tea
merchantsandgrocers."
Now these appointments do not endow the biscuits, the handbags or the marmalade sold by
Fortnum and Mason with any official status. Itjust shows that the shop is speciallyfavouredby
particularmembersof the Royal Family. John Bartholomew was, of course,morethan a purveyor
of maps. He was apersona1friend ofKing GeorgeV when he was Princeof Wales. The Princeof
Wales had aparticularinterestin maps. Sohe marked his friendship byissuingthe warrantworded
"J.Bartholomew Cartographer to the King". But bear in mind, in Britain the King is not the
government. Possessionof the royal warrant did not make the maps prepared byJ. Bartholomew
into officia1British maps. Such maps could be produced only by either the Ordnance Swey
Department or by the Cartographic Department of the War Office or by the Hydrographic
Departmentof the Royal Navy. The point may appear a small one, but it is reflective of Qatar's
somewhatcavalierapproachto the facts.
80.Fifthcomment:When attemptingto reply to my comments onrnap58 - the rnapwith
the red line roundrabia- counselto Qatardid not respondto my suggestionthat heidentiQ the
provenanceof the rnapand provide someproof that the red circle round Bahrain hadbeen placed
on the rnap at the same time as the principal line and was intended to have the purpose he
suggested. Instead, in words which are speculative,though not acknowledgedassuch, Mr.Bundy
said: "Had Bahrain not been enclaved by a red circle, the rnap would have given the false
impressionthat the Bahrain Islands formedpart of the ArabianPeninsula." But if that is accepted
as an explanationof the red circle,we must ask: what would it havemattered if the circlehad notbeen drawn and Bahrain had been taken for part of the Arabianpeninsula? The only answerthat
can be givento this questionmust be interms of Article 1of the draft agreement- which is now
up on the screen- whichthe map is saidto have illustrated,namely,that Bahrain wouldthus have
fallen within thearea whose independence from external domination would have been recognized
andwithinwhichthe parties declaredthat they seek notemtorial aggrandizementfor themselves.
81.Butthat answeris not convincingbecauseincludedinthatarea anyway werea numberof
mainlandterritones that were in muchthe same legal position as Bahrain in that they were British
protectedStatesor protectorates andwere obviouslyintendedsoto remain. Thesewere: the Aden
Protectorate; Kuwait, which was a British protected State; and to some extent, the Trucial
Sheikhdoms. Thiswas acknowledgedin paragraph5 of the accompanying Memorandum (Reply of
Qatar,Vol. 3, Ann.111.38p , . 217).
82. So, if there was no reason for distinguishingBahrain fromthe mainland territoriesjust
mentioned, there was noreason for drawing a circle around it and Mr. Bundy'sexplanationjust
does not hold water; and we are thus left still without any officia1explanation of the fünction of
thecircle. Wedo not knowwhy it wasput on the map, whenit wasput onthe map and by whomit
was put there. Certainly we cannot accept it as a line intended to draw a political distinction
betweenBahrainand the Hawars. Moreover,it hasto be observedagain- inview of Mr. Bundy's
disregardofthe point - that the Hawars, not being inthe Red Sea, did notfa11within thescopeof
the provision in the draft treaty that the islands the Red Sea, not those in the Gulf, within the
lines should beplacedunderthe sovereigntyofthe independent chiefsof the mainland.
83. Mr Presidentand Members ofthe Court, 1could continuewith this catalogueof defects
in the answersgivenby Qatar onthe subjectof maps. But were1to do so 1would beelevatingthe
maps to a place out of al1proportionto their insignificanceand perhaps1have already done so. 1
doubt whether you would wish me to take your time firther on an exercise of no more than
marginal relevance. 1 seek to justi@ the detail into which 1 have gone principally in order to
illustrate the lund of methodology adopted by Qatar, an illustration which must serve as a
cautionarysignalto the Courtto approachQatar'spresentationnot onlyof the maps, butalso of the
facts generally,in a verycritical manner. 1repeatmy submission that, even if themaps produced
by Qatar were al1flawless and clear,the Court should pay noregardto any of them on the groundsthat they couldnot constitute evidenceof recognitionandrepute sufficientto ovemde the evidence
of direct recognitionby the BritishGovernmentof a different state of affairs. Nor can the maps
ovemde the proven facts on the ground. Moreover, many of the maps, by virtue of scale,
enlargement,distortionof colouringand contradictory detail,cannotbe acceptedas valid evidence
of the points in support of whichtheyhave been adduced.Now, Mr. President, 1have one further
sectionwhichisnot long, whichwilltakeme a few minutes. May1continuebeforethebreak?.
TheTimeline
84.1 cornenow to my lastheading,which 1cal1the timeline. By way of conclusion1should
like todraw to theparticular attentionofthe Court the Timeline ofKey Events whichis folded into
Bahrain'sReply,just after the Political Mapof the Gulf ofArabiathat follows page9. As it is both
useful and easily overlooked, it has now been reproduced andis at tab 129of the judges'folders.
And if 1may bepermittedto suggest,you might find it helpfulto open it upin orderto follow what
1have to Say. It is too large to be put on the screen in one piece, but it can be put up in three
segments which 1 shall do for a few moments in order, forgive me, to explain what is largely
self-explanatory.
85. The first segment is the left-hand or inner part of the timeline, chronologicallythe
earliest. It is divided into three layers. Thetop layer presents the dates pertinent to the Hawar
Islands, the bottom layer presents the dates pertinent to Zubarah and the middle layer presents a
nurnberof additionaldates not exclusivelyreferableto the toporbottom layers.
86. The colour coding of the boxesis: red, for events indicative of Bahrain's sovereignty;
brown for eventsindicativeof Qatar'sclaimsto sovereignty; andwhite representingneutralevents.
The initials arepretty obvious: GBequals Great Britain; RB equalsRuler of Bahrain; RQequals
Rulerof Qatar.
87. The firstfold occursjust before 1840. As you can see, with the exceptionof the white
boxes in the bottomlayer, al1the boxesto the left of the fold are redones. This featurereflectsthe
fact that in that segmentthere is onlyahrainiactivity tobe noted. Thus, in the top layerthe most
importantitemsto be seen are:
- 1800: the gant to the Dowasirs,- in 1829: the Brucks survey.
88.Thenin the middlelayer thereis referenceto:
- the occupationin 1783 of themainislandby theAl-Khalifa,and
- in 1820 Great Britain recognizedthe Ruler of Bahrain's authority over the Qatar peninsuby
meansofthe implicationsofthe Preliminary Treatywiththe Sheikhsof Bahrainwhichreferred
to "Bahrainor its dependencies"(MernorialofBahrain Ann.2, Vol. 2, p. 4).
- In 1823 GreatBritain recordsBidatobe a dependencyof Bahrain.
- 1838 refers to the Lapie map (see Replyof Bahrain,Vol. 1, opposite p. 5) placing the name
Bahrainoverthe whole of the Qatarpeninsula.
89.Andthen we cometo thebottomlayerwherethereis areferenceto:
- 1796: the Al-Khalifamovetheircapital fromZubarahto the main islandof Bahrain torule the
Qatarpeninsula,and soon.
90.The second or middle segmentof the timeline coversthe period fiomjust before 1840to
just after 1920. In theop layer,youwill see suchitemsas:
- 1845: the Dowasir permittedto settleonthemainislandof Bahrain,
- 1873: therescue by the RulerofBahrainof Ottomansoldiersstrandedonthe Hawars,
- 1908 and 1909: recognitionby the Britishand Ottomansof the Ruler of Bahrain's sovereignty
overtheHawars,
- 1911: the Ruler of Bahrain compels thepresence of Hawar residents in a Bahrain court at
GreatBritain'srequest.
91. Then in the middle layer there are many references to theexercise of authority by the
Ruler of Bahrain over the Qatar peninsula. You will notethat it is only in 1871that any brown
(Qatari) boxesbegin to appear - and even then only inrelationto the lirnited area around Doha.
In addition, under 1913 there is the unratified Anglo-Ottomanagreement and under 1916 the
agreementbetween Britainandthe Al-Thani.
92.Inthe bottom layer therearemany referencesto the position inZubarah.
93. Thethird segment, or right-handsegment(which has goneup on the screen now)of the
folder covers fromjust after 1920to the present day where webegin to find more brown boxes.
Forexample,in relation to the top layer- the Hawars - Qatar'sfirstclaimto the Hawarsis notedin 1938,as is its protestagainst the British Award of 1939. The brown boxes inthe bottom layer
record,arnongstotheritems, theinire of Zubarahby Qatar.
94. Mr. President and Members of the Court, 1 think that 1 have given you enough
explanationsand examplesto enableyouto makeefficientuse ofthe Timeline. It should serveas a
convenientguide to theprincipal historical eventson which sof this caseturns. It can thus
replacethe sumrnary,that 1might otherwisehaveofferedyou.
95.And so,Mr.Presidentand Membersof the Court,this is a good placefor me to end and
to request you,r.President, to cal1upon Mr. Volterra to deal with what we have called the
«efectivité Msay1thankthe Court forthe courtesy and patience withwhichithas heard me asa
memberof a tearninwhich 1have felt itan honourto serve. Thank Mr.,President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, SirElihu. The Court will now adjom for a quarter of an
hour.
The Courtadjournefrom 11.30am. to 11.45am.
Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vous asseoir. Laséanceest reprise, and1now give the floorto
Mr.RobertVoltera.
Mr.VOLTERRA:
QATAR HASFAILEDINITS ATTEMPTTODISCREDITTHE 80EXAMPLESOF
BAHRAIN ACTIVITIESONTHE HAWA RSLANDS
Introduction
1.Thankyou, Mr.President,Membersofthe Court.
2. May 1directthe attention ofthe Court to the slide on the screen. You might recall that
this was the slide used at the end of Shankardass'spresentation last week in an attempt to
demonstratethat, inQatar'sview,180of the examplesof Bahrainiactivitiesonthe HawarIslands
hadbeen elirninatedfromconsiderationin the presentcaseby the force of Qatar'sarguments1. The
slide showsthat Qatarunderstandsthat it must somehow suppresseacheof historical evidence
'CR2000117,pp. 37-38,para. 42.of Bahraini activities on the HawarIslands or suffer the same fate as it did in the arbitration of
1938-1939.
3. In so far as it shows evidenceof the parties' activitieson the Hawar Islands, Bahrain
agrees with half the slide. Thereis no evidenceof anyQatariactivitieson the Hawar Islands. The
only disagreement is whetherthe evidenceof Bahrainiactivitiesis to be accorded anyweight by
the Court. Qatar says thatit should not, hasstrippedthe historical record bare andthen presented
the Court with a blankslide.
4. In my remarksduringthe firstroundoforal pleadings1remindedthe Court that, of the list
of 80Bahrain activities, some 60tookplacebefore Qatar'sfirstclaim tothe islandsin 1938. 1shall
not repeat that analysis. Today1will examine how Qatar responded in its second round of oral
pleadings.
Qatarhasfailedto overcornetheevidenceofBahrainieffectivités
in the three categoriesthat it haschosento address
5. In its firstround,Qatar limited itself to analysingwhatQatar choseto cal1three categones
of effectivités. Qatar thus tried to pretend that there were onlythree Bahraini eflectivités. In its
second round of oral argument, Qatar recognizedthat what it had in fact discussed was no fewer
than 20 of the eflectivitéfromthe listof 80'.
6. The threecategonesof Bahrainiefectivitésthat Qataraddressedwere:
- first, the original permission of the Qadi of Zubarah to the Dowasir to settle in the
Hawar Islands;
- second, the 1909and 1910 Bahraincourt cases dealing with property andfishing rights in the
Hawar IslandsandinvolvingDowasirresidents of the islands; and
- third, the two 1932court cases, the 1911subpoena, and the 1936Bahrain Police Directorate
memo, dealingwith property and fishing rights in the HawarIslands and involving Dowasir
residentsofthe islands.
2~~ 2000117,p.38,para.44. 7. The Court will recallthat, duringBahrain'sfirstround, 1examinedQatar's attackon these
documents,with referenceto the evidence. 1shall now examine Qatar's response toeach of these
categoriesduringits secondround.
The originalpermissionof the Qadiof Zubarahto the Dowasirto settle
inthe Hawar Islands
8. First, the original grant fromthe Qadi of Zubarah,an official of the Al-Khalifa. In the
first round, 1pointed out thatQatar argued for the exclusionof this evidence on the groundsthat
some of it had been marshalled by Britain in 1909 in response to the Zakhnuniya incident3.
Mr.President, a fact is a fact. The motivation behindBritain'sintemal investigationin no way
diminishes theforce of the evidence. 1also exposed theoutrightmisrepresentationby counsel for
Qatar of the texts of the relevant documents4. Qatar has failedto respond to either of these in its
secondround.
9. Qatar also argued that the Bahraini Dowasir were not really subject to the authority of
~ahrain~. Qatar has done this because it realizes that it must establish that theDowasir living in
Hawar had noconnection with Bahrain.Othenvise, its clairn to the original title to the islands
would fail.
10. As Mr.Paulsson rerninded the Court yesterday, Qatar's wishful thinking is that Bahrain
illegally occupiedthe islands in 1937,thereby displacing ~atar~. The reality is that even before
1868the islands had been occupied by Bahraini Dowasir for at least seven rnonthsout of every
year in permanent settlements that included houses and mosques and cemeteries7.
Professor SirElihu Lauterpacht has already explainedtoday that, even if Qatar were somehow
accorded instant coast-to-coast title over the Qatar peninsula from 1868 based on the
1868Agreements, a claim that the texts of the relevant documents donot support, thatpapertitle
could not overcome the reality of the previous and continuing occupation ofthe islands by the
BahrainiDowasir.
3~~ 2000113,p. 28,para. 119.
4~~ 2000113,pp. 28-29, para. 122.
'CR2000113,p. 26,para. 109; CR2000/17,p. 28,para. 11.
6~~ 2000117,p. 38,para42.
'CR2000113,p. 5,para. 26. 11.Qatar'sinstantcoast-to-coastoriginal title theory including theHawarIslandswould have
the effectof cleansingtemtory of itspeaceful,long-term residentsby the forceof a piece of paper
whose authors were actively focusedon ananging peace amongstthe squabbling local groupsin
Doha, with not the slightestthought of the Hawar Islandson the other side of the peninsula- in
the GulfofBahrain.
12.This is why Qatar wouldlike the Courtto believe that the islands were empty, that the
Dowasir never really lived there or, if they did live there, that somehow theywere not connected
with Bahrain à titre de souverain. The evidence, starting fiom the 1820sand continuing to the
witness statementsof former Hawar Islandsresidents who were bom on the islands, is entirely to
the conkary.
13.In the first round,1examinedthe relationship ofthe branch of the Dowasirwho lived in
Bahrain at Zellaq,Budaiya andthe Hawar lslandsg. 1shall not revisit that analysisbecause Qatar
did notrespondtoit.
14.Nonetheless, in its second round, Qataragain attempted to convincethe Court that the
BahrainiDowasirsomehow constituted an independententityg. The documentsrelied on by Qatar
simply do not Saywhat Qatar wishes that they wouldSay. For exarnple, Qatar cited Lorimer in
support of itsallegationthat the BahrainiDowasir were independentfiom ~ahrain". However, at
the part of his bookcited by Qatar, Lorimerwas writing aboutthe Dowasir ûibe as a whole- a
far-flung group living across theArabian peninsula and the Gulf. He was not writing about the
Bahraini branch of the tribe who had settled in the HawarIslands in the early 1800s and on the
main islandofBahrainin 1845.
15.WhenLorimerlater in his workturnedto considerthe Bahrani Dowasirinparticular, he
wrote, and 1quote from counsel for Qatar'sown reference to Lorimer during the second round:
"The Dawasir of Bahrain are a practically independent comrnunity."" (Emphasis added.)
'CR2000113,pp.4-6,paras.24-28.
'CR2000117,pp.26-29,paras.5-14.
''CR2000117,p. 26,para.5.
"CR2000117,p. 27, para.6.Practicallyindependentbut, by the forceofgramrnarand logic,not actually - let alonelegally-
independent. Qatar'sthesisgets no supportfromLonmer.
16. Qatar also cited Khuri as a purported authority for its thesis on this point. However,
what Khuriactuallywrote was that theBahrainiDowasir "werethe mostpowerful,influentialand
autonornousof al1tribal groups" (emphasisadded) in ~ahrain'~. Autonomy is not the sarne as
independence. In many States,there areautonomouspeoplesandregionsthat arenot independent.
Autonomy connotes a degree of freedom,but freedom thatis necessarily subordinatedtoa higher
authority. It seems significant that Khuri carefully used the word "autonomy" and not
"independence"to describethe BahrainiDowasir.
17. In 1922, MajorDaly, the British Political Agent, evaluated the relationship of the
Dowasir to Bahrain - years before anyQatariclaim to theHawarIslands. MajorDalywrote that
the Dowasir who lived in the main island of Bahrain and the Hawar Islandswere recognized as
Bahraini subjects13.
18. Both Lorimer's and Khuri's description of the Bahraini Dowasir is consistent with
Bahrain'sdescription of their status and inconsistent with Qatar's description.Neither authority
gives support for counsel for Qatar's speculation that: "It is entirely unlikely thereforethat [the
Bahraini Dowasir] would have acceptedany regulation or paid any taxes for any fishingor other
activity in~awar."'~
19.This ispure speculation,in a casewhere there is no need to speculate. Thereis evidence
of the Bahraini Dowasiraccepting the authority ofthe Ruler of Bahrain. For example: the 1869
anti-smuggling order; the 1909and 1910Bahrain courtjudgments; the 19 11request fromBritain
to the Ruler of Bahrainto produce a Dowasirman fiom Hawar; the factthat the BahrainiDowasir
turned for protectionto the Ruler of Bahrainduring the 1909Zakhnuniya incidentandat the same
time, expressed unequivocally their allegianceto the Ruler of Bahrain to the Ottomans and the
British; and al1the otherexamplesthatBahrain submittedin its pleadings to showits sovereignty
and the BahrainiDowasir's acceptanceofit. Qatarhasno answerto them.
"CR 2000117,p. 26, para.5, quotedfromCounter-Mernorialof Qatar,Ann.11.74,Vol. 2, p. 408.
I3~otefrom BritishPolitical Agent to BritishPolitical Resident entitled "BahrainAffairs" dated 13July 1922at
p. 3. Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.49, Vol. 2,pp. 155-158.
I4C~2000117,p. 27, para.7. 20. The only other argumentraised by Qatar onthis issue in its second round was thefact
that some, but notall, of the BahrainiDowasirtemporarilylefi Bahrain before returning in 1927.
But Qatar itself citedin its secondround the uncompromising conditionsupon which the Bahraini
Dowasir were permitted to return to Bahrain in 192715.Furthermore,counsel for Qatar accepted
that those conditions alone, imposed in 1927,were sufficient for the Dowasirto be considered
subjects of the Ruler of Bahrain. And Qatar cited thestatementby the British PoliticalAgent that
the conditions described were intended to prevent "the establishment of anyauthority whatever,
independent" ofthe Ruler of ~ahrain'~. Toprevent theestablishmentof any authority whatever,
independentoftheRulerofBahrain.
21. Despite his clear language, Qatar chooses to interpret the British Political Agent as
meaning that there hadbeen suchan independent authority previously establishedby the Dowasir
in ~ahrainl'. Qatar'swishfulinterpretationcannotbe correct. This is furtherborne outby scrutiny
of anotherpassagefi-omKhuriquotedby Qatar lastweek. In it, Khuriexplainedthat certainofthe
Bahraini Dowasirlefi Bahrainin 1924because,"Theyabhorredthe ideaof being treated likeother
subjectsin the country" (emphasisadded)I8.Likeothersubjectsin the country,like otherBahraini
subjects.
22. Qatar's speculation that the Dowasir were independentof Bahrain clearly finds no
support eveninthe documentsreliedon by Qatar.
23. Qatar alsoargued that theBahrainiDowasirwere semi-nomadic19.Again, Qatar relied
as authority forthis propositionon the part of Lorimerthat discussedthe entire Dowasirtribe as a
whole, not the Bahraini Dowasir inparticular. Qatarcould point to no evidence that the Dowasir
who were subjects of Bahrainwere semi-nomadic. The evidenceis al1to the contrary. The Hawar
islanderswerenotnomads. Theydidnot wanderthe desertswith their flocks. Since 1845theyhad
had two fixed places of habitation: the Hawar Islands and the main island of Bahrain. Indeed,
"CR 200017,p. 28,para.11.
I6CR 2000117p. 28,para.11.
"CR 2000117p. 28,para.11.
"CR 2000117p. 27,para8.
I9CR 2000117,p.26,para.5.Qatar has not challengedthe recordedfactthat the Dowasirfamilieswho livedin Hawardid so for
seven monthsoftheyear.
24.Until last week, Qatarhad claimedthat the Dowasironly visitedthe islands. Now Qatar
acceptsthat there wasmore to their inhabitation; that theyhad a "presence" there20.
25. The truth-unchallenged by Qatar's rhetoric- is that the Dowasir did not have a
"mere" presence on the islands onlyfor fishing purposes. They lived there as families - for the
greaterpart of eachyear: sevenmonthsduringthe winter2'.The remainingfivemonths they lived
in ell la^^^.
26. Qatar'sattempt to disregard the original grant of the Qadi of Zubarah therefore fails.
Qatar has merely attempted to refüte documentary evidence longin the historical record with
self-serving speculation. In thesecircumstances,the evidencemustbe returnedto its rightfulplace
on thehistorical record.
The 1909 and 1910 Bahrain court casesdealing with property and fishing rights in the
HawarIslandsand involvingDowasirresidentsof the islands
27.The secondof the threecategories ofeffectivités addressedby Qatarin its firstroundwas
the evidence of Bahrain's exerciseofjudicial authority over the Hawar Islands andin particular the
1909and 1910Bahrain court cases dealingwith property andfishing rights in the Hawar Islands
and involvingDowasirresidents of the islands. In the first round, Qatar statedthat this historical
evidencewas of doubtful authenticig3. Bahrain responded with a challengefor Qatar toprove its
last-minute allegationor withdrawthestatementZ4.Qatar,of course,cannotprove its allegationand
so it hasresiled. Inthe secondround,Qatar saidthatthe documents wereof doubtfülrelevance2'.
28. The Court can take its own view of the relevance or not of judicial decisions by the
Bahraini courts dating from the first decade of the twentieth century and dealing with land and
property rights of Bahraini Dowasir in the Hawar Islands. This evidence was analysed fully in
*'CR2000117,p. 32, para. 22.
2 1 ~2000113,p. 5,para. 26.
2 2 2000113,p.5,para. 26.
2 3 2000/8,p. 28,para. 28.
2 4 2000113,p.30, para. 129.
"CR 2000117,p.29, para. 13.Bahrain's firstround and 1shall notdiscuss itfurthernow. This evidence,too, must be restored to
the historical record.
The two 1932 courtcases,the 1911 subpoena andthe 1936 BahrainPolice Directoratememo,
al1dealing with property andfishing rightsin the HawarIslands and involvingDowasir
residentsofthe islands
29. In its first round of pleadings, Qatar asserted that the evidence of a third category of
effectivités,elated tothe exerciseof Bahrain's judicial andpoliceauthorityoverthe HawarIslands
and datingfiom before Qatar'spreferred criticaldate in 1936,didnot Saywhat Bahrainsaidit did26.
Qatar's assertion was unsupported by any evidenceor analysis.
30. In the first round,Bahrainexposed Qatar's assertionon this issue as misleading simply
by referring to the actualtextsof the documents2'. Qatar haschosen not to respondto Bahrain on
this point. The Court should makethe appropriate inference: retm those documentsas wellto the
list.
31.The Courtwill recall that theBahraincourt casesfiom 1932,as well as the 1936Police
Directorate memorandum, deal with the activities ofBahrainiDowasir on the Hawar Islands. So
much for Qatar'stheory that there is no evidence of Dowasiractivities on the islands after the
retm ofthe dissatisfiedDowasirto Bahrainin 1927.
32. So, in relation to thethree categoriesof Bahrain'seffectivitésover the Hawar Islandsthat
Qatar has thought fit to address, Qatar did not even attempt to resurrect its arguments about the
evidence of Bahrain's judicial and quasi-judicial exerciseof authority over the Hawar Islands.
Qatar'sattackon the first category ofeffectivitésr,elatedto the status of the Bahrainibranch ofthe
Dowasir tribe, likewise failedto withstand scmtiny.
Qatar's attemptto excludetheevidenceof otherBahrainiactivities
on theHawarIslandshasalsofailedto withstandscrutiny
33. In the secondround,Qatar considered a numberof otherBahrainiactivitiesonthe Hawar
Islands and contended that none of them should be considered by the Court. Qatar's analysis
cannotwithstandexamination.
2 6 200018,p. 30,para. 37.
2 7 ~2000113,pp. 301,paras. 130-133.CaptainBrucks'ssurveyof 1820-1829
34. In its second round, Qatar again failed to address the substance ofthe Brucks report of
the 1820s to the effect that the Hawar Islands were recognized as belonging to Bahrain. Qatar's
attack on Captain Brucks'smethodologyis uncon~incin~~~.Captain Brucks'smap of the Gulf of
Bahrain and his informationabout this partof the Gulf was precise and detailed,as can be seenby
reading his report, extractsof which are containedin the Partieswritten pleadings,and to which1
provide references here29. Captain Brucks, too, is entitled to reclaim his place in the historical
record.
The physical evidenceofBahrainioccupation ofthe islands for centuries
35. Also in the second round, Qatar referred in passing to the physical evidence of the
centuries-oldoccupationof the HawarIslandsby the Bahraini~owasir~'. Counsel for Qatarnoted
the not very remarkable factthat the witnessstatements of former Hawarislanders "speakof the
past". And he concludedthat the evidenceof houses in ruins and cemeteries fit intoa past history
of BahrainiDowasirlinksto the HawarIslandsthat was "of a number ofgenerationsagoM3'A . past
history of a numberof generationsago. Bahrainrequests the Court to pay particular attentionto
this admissionby Qatar. It certainly contradicts Qatar's visionof a sudden, artificial, andillegal
occupation of the Hawar Islands in 1937. These exarnples of Bahraini activities must also be
returnedto the list.
Fishinginthe HawarIslands
36. Then, fishing. In the first round, Bahrain pointed out that Qatar had no evidenceto
support its assertion that fishermen fiom al1over the Gulf fished off the Hawar ~slands~~.One
would have expected Qatar in the secondround to support its assertion by reference to specific
evidence. It did not do so. Instead, Qatar referred to general statements by Lorimer and the
Persian GulfPilot. Butthose authoritiesdo not state that fishermenfiom al1over the Gulffished
2 8 ~2000117 ,p. 33-34,paras29-30.
2%4emonalofBahrain,Ann. 7,Vol.2,pp. 92-109.
''CR 2000117 ,. 34,para31.
3 ' ~2000f17,p. 34,para31.
"CR 2000113 , . 17,para74-76.off the HawarIslands. It would be most surprising if they did, because the comrnon fishing
grounds of theGulf did not extendto fishtraps or to areasjust off inhabitedland. It seemsthat, in
Qatar's view, because Lorimerand the Persian Gul filot did not specificallySaythat Qatariand
other non-Bahraini fishermen did not go to the HawarIslands, Qatar is therefore entitled to
concludethat theymusthavegonethere. Qatar's argumenton this point amountsto no morethana
leapof faith33.
37. The best Qatar can do, once again, is speculate, and 1 quote: "In any event, there is
nothing to suggestthat the Dowasirstopped anyoneelse from fishingin the waters surroundingthe
i~land.''~~
38. Qatarproves nothing bythis. Theseexamplesof Bahrainifishingactivitiesare therefore
reinstatedonthe historical inventory.
Gypsumcuttingon theHawarIslandsandvisitsofthe Ruler ofBahrain
39. In relation to gypsurn cutting, Qatar attempted to convince the Court that it never
occurred on the HawarIslandsand that, if it did, it was not conductedunder licence. To do this,
Qatar:
(i) ignoresthe physicalevidenceofthe gypsumquarrieson the islands;
(ii) ignoresthewitnessstatementsthat attestto the gypsumquarrying; and
(iii) dismissesother historicdocumentsrecordingthe gypsumtrade - includingthereports of
Britishofficiais- becausethey werewrittenafterthe startofthe Britisharbitrati~n~~.
In the same manner Qatar alsoignores the witnessstatements and dismissesthe historieevidence
of the annualvisits of the Ruler ofBahrain to the HawarIslands. This analysisis superficialatbest
and it is insufficientto negatethe evidence. So theseactivitiestoo must bereinstated.
Qatar'sattemptto ignorehalfof the evidenceby
unsupportedassertionscannotwithstandscrutiny
40. Finally, Qatar has attempted to convince the Court to disregard a large number of
examples of Bahraini occupationof the Hawar Islands based onlyon the unsupported assertions
3 3 2000117,p.31,para.20.
3 4 2000/17,p.32,para.21.
3 5 2000117,pp. 35-36paras34-35.that the exarnpleswere not supportedby evidenceor that they were not relevant36.Qatar has still
declined to identifi with any precision whichof the 80 examples of Bahraini activities it would
includein this categoryof documents,but counselforQatar referred to themas "agreat maj~rity"~~
and "at least half' of the list of 80~~.In any event, Qatar statesthat it includes al1the evidence
other than that which Qatar grouped into the three categories of effectivitésthat 1 have just
discussed.
41. In the first round,Qatarclaimed thattheseexamplesshouldbe disregardedbecausethey
were: "simplybold assertions,without any supportingevidence andtherefore hardly deservingof
seriousc~nsideration"~~.
42. The Court will recall that 1pointed out that this statement- itself a bold assertion-
was demonstrablyfalse. 1described the location of thecitationsin Bahrain'swrittenpleadingsthat
identified the supporting evidence for these items4'. In its second round, Qatar changed its
position. Conceding that there was, after all, supporting evidencefor al1 these examples of
Bahraini activities, Qatar now stated - without explaining why - that the supporting evidence
wasnot credible4'.
43. The Court will no doubtreachits own conclusion aboutwhy Qatar failedto explainwhy
the evidenceshould notbe deemed credible. The evidencethat Qatarhas now gratuitouslylabelled
as not being credible includes documentsfiom the BritishPublic Records Office,documents from
the India Office Archives, documentsfromother British archivesand sources,documents fromoil
companies, and even correspondence from the Rulers of ~atar~~. Qatar was again effectively
taking the position that historical evidence shouldbe excluded if it disproves Qatar'slatest theory
ofthe history of the Hawar Islands. Thisis neither refutationnor legalargument.
36~R2000117,p.25,para.1.
3 7 ~200018,p.17,para.4.
3 8 ~2000117,p.37,para.42.
3 9 ~200018,p. 17,para.4.
4 0 ~2000113,p.27,para.113.
41~R2000117,p. 25,para.1; CR2000117,p. 37,para.41.
42~ndiaOffice Minute,7 June1939 (F01371123185)(PublicRecordsOffice); LetterfromPrideaux,British
Political Agentto BritishPoliticalResident, 4April1909 (IOR R/1512/547)(IndiaOffice Archives); Letterfiom
J.Black,BAPCO,toC.Belgrave,8Oct.1939. MemorialofBahrain,Ann.290, Vol.5,p. 1187(oil companies);Letters
fromRulerof Qatarto H.Weightman,8 and 12July1938. Memonalof Bahrain,Anns.265-266,Vol. 5, pp. 118-119
(Rulersof Qatar). 44. In relation to this category of examples of Bahrain'sactivities on the HawarIslands,
Qatar also made theunsupportedassertion that: "Noneof them constitutesan act perforrnedby or
onbehalf ofBahrain à titre desouverain .43
45. Qatar'sassertion was emphatic and unqualified. None of these documents, accordingto
Qatar, areacts à titredesouverain. None.
46. But the evidence that the Ruler of Bahrain appointed HawarIsland residents to act as
guardsonthe islands during the 1920sandearly 1930s~~ wasnever challengedby Qatar,whether in
its written or oral pleadings. Qatar did not address this fact during its second round of oral
pleadingsevenafter1had made explicit referenceto it duringBahrain'sfirst round. Thereforethis
evidencestandsunchallenged. Appointing local guardsclearly fulfilsthe requirementsof an act à
titre de souverain. On the basis of thatone activity alone, therefore,Qatar'sambitious assertion
that noneof thiscategoryof activitieswas à titredesouverainis provedfalse.
47. In Bahrain'sview Qatar'sreal evaluation of the potency and relevanceof the sort of
evidencethat Bahrainhas produced inrelationto the HawarIslandsofthe eflectivités,he conduct
of the inhabitants,and the understandingof third parties, can be seenin Qatar'ssubrnissionof the
82 forged documents. Those documents purportedto include survey maps, letters from private
fishermenaboutthe Hawar Islands, records offishing activitieson theislands, visits of Qataristo
the islands, statementsof the opinions of thirdparties, andtestimonyofprivate citizensaboutother
activities on the islands. In fact, precisely the same types of authentic evidence that is available
from the public recordin relationto Bahrain. As SirElihu noted to the Court in Bahrain'sfirst
round, when Qatar thought that the 82 documents couldbe accepted as evidence of this kind to
support its case, Qatar was eager to present it to the Court as proof of its authority over the
Hawar~slands~~.It is only now, when it has been stripped of such evidence and lefî with
absolutely nothing, that Qatar tries to diminishthe relevance of Bahrain's evidenceof a similar
nature.
4 3 ~200018,p. 17,para. 4; see alsoCR2000117,p. 25, para. 1.
44~ernorialofBahrain, Ann.313(a),Vol.6,para. 10; Mernorialof Bahrain,Ann.31(a),Vol. 6,para. 19.
4 5 ~2000111,p. 11,para6; pp. 13-14,paras. 11-13. 48. Qatar'sattempt to excludethis evidencefrom the Courtis without merit. Qatar has now
conceded that al1the examples of Bahrain'sactivities in this category are, in fact, supportedby
evidence. And Qatar has failed to establishthat this evidenceis not relevant, let alonethat none of
it isà titredesouverain. They mustthereforebe returnedto thelist. a
49. Beforemoving on to the post-1936efectivités, 1 would like to remind the Court of the
effectivitésdescribed in the various witness statements submitted by Bahrain and found in
Volume6 ofthe BahrainMemorialandVolume 2 ofthe BahrainReply. Theseinclude:
- The RulerofBahrainrebuildinghousesand m~s~ues~~.
- The RulerofBahrain appointinglocalguards,as1just said4'.
- Licensingofpearling48.
- Licensinggypsum~uttin~~~.
- The RulerofBahrainresolvingislanders'disputes5'.
- The Governmentof Bahrainbuildinga pipe on Jananto guideBahraini fishermen from nearby
reefs5'.
- The RulerofBahrain compensatingaBahrainifisherman whodarnagedhis boaton thepipe52.
- Theprovisionof medicaltreatmentto Hawar Islandresidentsby the Govermnentof ~ahrain~~.
50. These witness statements are an important and uncontroverted oral history of the
connectionsbetweenthe HawarIslandsandthe rest ofBahrain.
46~emorialofBahrain, Ann.313 (a)paras.8-9; Memorial of Bahrain,Am. 314 (a)para. 5.
47~emorialofBahrain, Ann.313 (a)para. 10; Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.314 (a),para. 19.
48~emorialof Bahrain, Ann.313 (a),para.21; Memorial of Bahrain, AM. 315 (a), para.10; Memorial of
Bahrain,Am. 316 (a)para. 23.
49~emonal of Bahrain, Ann.313 (a),para. 23; Memorial of Bahrain, AM. 314 (a), para. 19; Memorial of a
Bahrain,Am. 316 (a)para. 14.
5%emonal of Bahrain, Ann.313 (a),para.24; Memonal of Bahrain, Ann.315 (a),para. 9; Memonal of
Bahrain, AM. 316 (a)para. 15.
"Memonal ofBahrain, Ann. 313 (a)para. 26.
52~emonalofBahrain, Ann.313 (a)para.26.
53~emorialofBahrain, Ann.314 (a)para.6. Qatarhas notdisputedthe14examplesof
Bahrain'seffectivb etéseen1936 and1938
51.Qatarhas not contestedthe substanceofthe 14examplesof Bahrain'seffectivitésthat are
recorded as having occurredbetween 1936 and 1938.It is common ground between the Parties
that these eventstook place. Qatar'sattempt to excludethem fromconsiderationis based entirely
on its claimthatApnl 1936isthecriticaldateinthiscases4.
52. But 1936 cannot be the critical date in this case. Indeed, Qatar cannot have been
convincedofits own position. Qatar did not developits criticaldateargumentuntil it was required
to transfom its arguments radically because of its effective withdrawal of the 82 forged
documents.
53. The 14examplesof Bahrainieffectivitésoverthe HawarIslands between 1936 and 1938
must therefore be returned to their rightful place on the screen as part of the list of Bahrain
activitiesoverthe islands.
Rejectionof Qatar'sclaimthatthehistoricalrecorddoesnotincludeBahrainiactivities
demonstratingtheexerciseofStateauthorityonthe HawarIslands
54.Qatardrew the attention of the Courttocertaintypes of State activities,demonstrativeof
the exerciseof a State'sauthority overtemtory, that Qataraid were conspicuousby their absence
from Bahrain'slid5. Counsel for Qatar notedthat there were no references to schools, medical
facilities,or transportation facilitieson the HawarIslands. Bahrainadmits that in 1938there were
no schoolson Hawar. Nor were there hospitals. And the Hawars remain still today without an
airport.
55.But it does not followthat there was somethingabsentfiom Bahrain'sauthority over the
HawarIslands because of this. Therewere onlytwo villageson the Hawar Islands. In 1938,there
were only two hospitals in al1of Bahrain. Not surprisingly, they were located near the main
population centres of Bahrainin Manama. So, too, at that time, the schools in Bahrain were
locatedinthemajor urban centres.
56. It is absurd for Qatarto suggestthat Bahraindid not exercise authorityover the Hawar
Islandsmerely because therewereno governmentschoolsor hospitalsthere. Untilthe 1950sthere
5 4 ~2000/8,pp. 38-42,paras.7-18.
5 5 ~2000/17,pp.38-39,para.47.were no schools in the entirety of the Qatar peninsula andthe first hospital wasonly openedin
Doha in October 1947. Until then, even the Qatarirulingfamilycameto Manamato attendschool
and receive medicaltreatment.
57. As recently as the 1950s,Ahmedbin SaifAl-Thani, a former Qatari Cabinet Minister,
attendedschoolin Bahrainwith the Agent of Bahrain's brother.And in 1951,it is recordedthatthe
Ruler of Qatar was having his rheumatic arthritis treated by the Government of BahrainMedical
Servicein Manama.
58.Qatariswentto Manamaformedicaltreatment. Just as didthe HawarIslanders. Indeed,
the statementsof formerHawar Island residents confirmthat when they wereil1the Govemment
sent them to the main island of Bahrain for treab~~ent~~T . he only difference was that, being
Bahraini,the HawarIslandersdidnot have toaskthe permission of theRulerofBahrain.
59. And yet Qatarsuggeststhat the lack of hospitals andschoolsin the Hawarsin the 1930s
and earlier is reason to doubt Bahrain's authority overthem. If the Court wereto follow Qatar's
logic, then Qatar can no longer maintain that the Al-Thani exercised authority even over
Doha- the centre of over 90 per cent of its population- let alone overthe north and west of the
Qatarpeninsula.
60. The relevantpoint is that even prior to 1938there was a degree of administrationand
exercise of authority over the islands by the Govemment of Bahrain consistent with the social,
political and economic context of Bahrain and the Hawar Islands. The record shows that the
administrative and other activities of the Govemment and Rulers of Bahrain in the Hawars well
before the 1938-1939arbitration included: judicial administration; police administration; the
appointment of local guards; the repair of houses and mosques; adrninisteringvarious licenses;
constructingand maintainingdamsand cisterns; issuing passports; installingametalpipe inJanan
to assisttheislandersto avoid nearbyshoals; andconstructing a
61. The Courtmight be interested tonote that the majority of the activities that1havejust
listed are recorded to have occurred before 1936 and al1of them occurred before Qatar made its
claim to the islandsin 1938.
5%4ernoriolfBahrain,Ann.314(a), Vol. 6,para.6.
57~emorialofBahrain, ara434,435,439,446,451,455-457,458,464,466,471,474,477and484. Qatar didnotchallengetheevidenceofBahrain'seffectivités
overthe Hawar Islandsafterthe 1939Award
62. Finally, Qatar has not contested the existence of Bahrain'seflectivitéson the Hawar
Islands after the 1939Award. Bahrainof course does not rely on these to establish its title. They
are presented as confming Bahrain's consistent exercise of authority in the Hawars. These
include:
- Authorizingthe mappingofthe HawarIslandsby the Bahrainioilconcessionairein 193958.
- Introducing nativeArabian fauna to the islandsunder a wildlifepresewation programmeand
the creation of an animal wildlifepreserveonJazzirat ~awar".
- The furthererectionandmaintenanceofmaritimemarkers6'.
- Regular patrollingof the HawarIslandsincludi Jnananby the Bahraincoastguard6'.
- The presence of a defensivemilitary capability,and the maintenanceof a fullmilitarycomplex
on the isiandssince 19416'.
- Reinforcement ofBahrain'smilitarypresenceon the ~slands~~.
- Constructing and maintaining freshwaterinfrastructure (including a desalination plant)on the
lslandsM.
- Consûucting and maintaining anelectricityinfrastructure on the islands which is integrated
withthe restof Bahrain'spower grid6'.
- Constructing and maintaining a telecommunications system which is fully integrated with the
BahrainiBATELCO stem^^.
58~etterfrom Black(BAPCO)to Belgrave,8Oct. 1939. Memonal of Bahrain,Ann. 290,Vol. 5,p. 1187.
59~ranslationof statementof Hamoud bin Muhanna,7 Sept. 1996. Memorial of Bahrain, Ann. 313 (a), Vol.6,
p. 1366.
60Memonalof Bahrain,para. 487.
61~emonalof Bahrain,para. 487.
62~Crystal,"Oiland Politicsin the Gulf: RulersandMerchantsin Kuwaitand Qatar" (1990),p. 166,Memonal
of Bahrain, Ann.307, Vol.6, p. 1285; R.Zahlan, "The Making of the Modem Gulf States" (1989), pp. 140-141,
Memonalof Bahrain, Ann.307,Vol.6,p. 1285.
63~emorialof Bahrain,para.489.
64~emonalof Bahrain,Ann.307,Vol. 6,p. 1285.
66~upplementalDocuments submitted by State of Bahrain, p. 107.al of Bahrain, Ann.307, Vol.6,
p. 1285.- Licensing tourist complexes on both the north and south of the main Hawar Island, and
establishinga twice dailypassenger shuttle-boatservicebetween Manarnaandthe i~lands~~.
- Constructing residencesforthe Bahrainrulingfamily68.
- Constructingpublichousing6'.
- Visitsto the islandsby the Bahrain rulingfamily70.
- Regulating oil prospecting and concessionactivities on the islands (including the granting of
concessionsandthemonitoring ofoil e~~loration)~'.
- Geological mappingof the area by the Bahrain PetroleumCompany (BAPCO), actingunder
authorization from theGovemmentof ~ahrain~*.
- Includingthe HawarIslandsresidentsin the Bahrain cens use^ ^ ^;
- Providing postalservices.
Thisphotograph,and a close up of the sign,are providedattab 130of yourjudges' folders.
63. The distinguished Agent of Qatar described this photograph as being mislabelledby
Bahrain and not, in fact, showing the North In this he was wrong. The Court will
discern in the backgroundof this photograph the holidaychalets that appearin other photographs
of the NorthVillage submittedby Bahrain. Indeed,the Agent of Qatar himself recognized thisfact
in his remarks. Furthemore, these chalets appearedin the satellite photographsthat the Agent of
Qatar showed in his opening statement to theCourt. Also in the background, althoughperhaps
more difficult to make out, are the mosque andthe ruins of the old Dowasirhouses in the North
Village, as well, fùrther back, as the modem housing units, the latter of which were also
highlightedon the Agent'ssatellitephotographs. The sign shownhere isone of severalaroundthe
67~dvertisement of Gulf Tourism Company, 25June 1996 in Al Ayam newspaper, Ann.312, Vol.6,
pp. 1359-1362;Mapof the HawarIslands-Location, Memorialof Bahrain, Annex,Vol. 7,map 4.
6s~emorialof Bahrain,Anns. 1,2,3, Vol. 2,pp. 2,4,6.
69~eplyof Bahrain,para. 180.
'%ote by C. Belgrave, Adviser to the Governmentof Bahrain, entitled "TheHawar Islands", 29May 1938.
Memonal ofBahrain,Ann.261,Vol. 5,p. 1108; Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.274,Vol.5, pp. 1129-1135.
i
7'~emorialof Bahrain,Ann.295, Vol. 5, p. 1204; Letter from Brown (BAPCO)to Secretary to Governmentof
BAPCO,2Nov. 1961,MemorialofBahrain,hraiAnn.303,Vol. 5,p. 1225.21Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Schmidt of
72~emorialof Bahrain,Ann.295, Vol. 5,p. 1204;MemorialofBahrain,Ann.285, Vol.5, p. 1179; Memonalof
Bahrain,Ann.290, Vol.5,p. 1187.
73~emorialof Bahrain,para. 41.
7 4 ~2000/19,p. 42,para. 19.island placed by the Bahrain Defence Forces outside tourist residential areas, instmcting the
Bahrain Defence Forces personnel not to enter. The English texton the sign does not have the
punctuationadded in last week, self-servingly,by Qatar. It reads in fact: "No entrysoldiers and
military vehicles in this area." This is an abbreviation for "Noentry for soldiers and military
vehicles in this area." This reading is borne out by the Arabic text on the sign, which reads:
"Tah'theer: Mamnoo dukhool alaskareyinwa alaliyat alaskariyyaila hathihi al mintaqa." Thisis
translated into English literally as: "Warning: No entry for military personnel or military
equipmentintothis area."
64. Bahrain is puzzledby Qatar's mistake,and can only attribute it to haste. After all, both
sidesare ableto read Arabic,andsome evenread abit out.
65. Onemore clarificationmust bemade aboutthe images submittedby Bahrain. The Courî
will no doubtrecall this image ofthe tail of Hawar at lowtide lookingtowardsthe Qatar peninsula
and Qatar'sinsinuation that this photograph somehow wassubject to manipulationby Bahrain. 1
assurethe Court that this is not the case at all. But the obviousway for Qatar to have shown that
this photographis wrong wouldhave been to submita photograph ofits, own showing the tail at
low tide othenvise than as this. But Qatar hasnot submittedsucha photographeithernow orin its
written pleadings. Yet Qatar submitted over the course of its written andoral pleadings, a
considerablenurnberof photographsandsatelliteimagesof the HawarIslands. Many ofthemwere
of high resolutionand someof them showedgreat detail. Qatar hastold the Court how it scoured
the endsof the earth for documentsto supportits case. It clearly spentconsiderabletime and effort
over a period of more than a decade photographingthe Hawar Islands fiom various angles. And
yet notoneof Qatar'sphotographs showsdetailsofthe tail of the mainHawar Islandthat contradict
this photographor shows the island as being so closeto the Qatarpeninsula as Qatar would like
youtobelieveit is. We can be confidentthatif itwere otherwiseQatarwould have submittedsuch
a photograph.
66.1 must add, therewere nootherkindsof manipulationeither.
67. Bahraindid not spendtens of millionsof dollarsto excavateand obliterate4 km of ridge.
And, ifit had,Qatar wouldhavenoticed it. Whatis, is. 68. Qatarwouldprefer the Courtto look atits maps and imagesprepared especially forthese
pleadings, rather than that the Courtsee the reality. Bahrainaffirms to the Court that at low tide
the distancefiom the tail of Hawarto the Qatar peninsulais 3 km,and at hightide morethan4 km.
And finally, may 1 show without commentthe view from Qatar of the very closest point of the
main Hawar island. Qatar'smessageto the Courtwas that itwished that these photographs did not
showthisto be thereality.
69. And so, Mr. President, the historical record hasbeen restored in its entirety. Youan
find a copy of this slideat tab 130ofthejudges' folders. Thereis no blank slateupon which Qatar
can draw its fancifil theories abouta sudden occupationof emptyislands in 1937. Bahrainhas a
wealth of evidencedemonstrating Bahrainiactivities overthe HawarIslands fromthe early 1800s.
The majorityof theseoccurredbeforethe British arbitrationof 1938,andeven before 1936. There
was no blank slate in 1868. There was none in 1937. The record of Bahrain's uninterrupted
continuum of sovereigntyover the HawarIslandsis unassailable.
70. As in its firstround, Qatar'srebuttal of Bahraini activitieson the Hawar Islands during
the second round was in fact nothing more than an attempt to refute specific evidence with
generalized theories to the contrary, based on extrapolations fiom documents that were not
warranted by the texts of those documents. Despitehaving had more than 60 years since the last
arbitrationto scourthe world for documents,Qatardoesnot have a singlepiece of evidence ofany
Qatariactivitiesonthe Hawar Islands. The inevitableconclusionis thatthere were none.
71. Qatar's attemptto do a conjuring trick, to make the historical record of Bahrain's
activitiesdisappear,hasbeen exposed. The record hasbeenrestoredintact. Thereis no blank slate
on whichQatar cancomposeits imaginativestory ofthe suddenillegal occupation of empty islands
in 1937.
Mr.President, Membersof the Court, 1thankyou for your attentionduringmy presentation.
1askif youcouldnowcal1upon Mr.JanPaulssonto continuewithBahrain's case.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Volterra. Je donne maintenantla parole a
MeJanPaulsson. M.PAULSSON :Merci. Monsieurleprésident, Madame et Messieurslesjuges.
ZUBARAH
1.AZubarah,il y a eu agression. A Zubarah,il y a eu mort d'homme. A Zubarah, il y a eu
une communautédépossédée,déracin exiel,ée.
2. En une phrase :il y a eu une occupationillégale dansce conflit, et ce sont les Naïm de
Bahreïnquien furentles victimes.
3. L'histoirede Zubarah est bien plus denseque celledes îles Hawar. Zubarah, aujourd'hui
en ruines, fut jadis une ville prospère et cosmopolite, la capitale d'une dynastie, l'objetde
convoitisede la partdesOttomansetdes cheikhsde Doha.
4. Les détailsde cette riche histoirene seprêtent àun débatoral dans cette enceinte il
nous faudrait des sessions entières.M. le professeur David nous a fait le reproche que pour
rappeler les élémentsde l'histoire deZubarah qui sont décisifsaux yeux de Bahreïn, nous nous
sommes référéa sux développements trèsfouillésdu mémoirede Bahreïn sans tenir compte de
l'ensembledestentativesde réfutationdu contre-mémoire de Qatar.
5. C'estpartiellementvrai, mais alorsilne fautpas oublier qu'il eu ensuite le mémoireen
réponse deBahreïn qui,selon nous, a neutraliséces tentatives de réfutation. Qatardevient alors
l'arroseur arrosé,carM. le professeur David n'a pas tenu compte de notre réfutationécrite des
prétenduesréfutationsqatariemes.
6. En vérité, les plaidoiries orase donnentpas l'occasion appropriée pour aller aubout
d'undébatde détails. Dansla mesure où la Cour estime que tel ou tel aspect de l'histoire est
pertinent pour sa décision, ellene se fiera pas aux affirmationsdes conseils, mais procédàrsa
propre vérificationdes éléments d pereuve. Plutôt quede tenter de faireun long résumé dce qui
est, au bout de compte, l'histoire presque intégralede deux nations, j'ai fait établir uneliste de
références au dossier, questionpar question. Par exemple, sous la rubrique(Zubarab vous lirez
en sous-titre «viséesOttomanes» avec les références aux pages dem s émoire,contre-mémoire,
mémoireen réponseet compte rendu d'audienceoù est traitéecette matière. Nouspoumons en
faire la lecture,mais ce serait d'uneépouvantablearidité,et heureusementla pratique nouspermet
d'inclure ces référencessans une telle lecture. Afin que les références puissent comprendre lesdernières interventions orales, Bahreïn se propose de joindre ces références à la dernière
intervention deSonExcellencel'agent deBahreïn.
7. Pourl'instant,j'aimeraistraiter le problème de Zubarahd'une manièresynthétique.Voici
ce qu'il convient de retenir selon Bahreïn.
8. Primo, les deux Parties conviennentque jusqu'en 1868 toute la péninsulede Qatarfut
sousl'autoritéde Bahreïn.
9. Secundo,Qatar a tenté en vain de prouver que diverses conventions, 1868et de 1916,
en passant par les années1913 et 1914, ont créé unEtat de Qatar avec une étendueterritoriale
comprenant l'ensemble de la péninsule. Sir Elihu Lauterpacht a mis à néant cette tentative
désespérén e,ée dela «perte»des quatre-vingt-deuxdocuments.
10. Tertio,Qatar n'ajamais pu prouver quand et comment il a pu établir sonautoritésur
Zubarah avant 1937. En cette matière, les éléments de preuve sont parcellaires.'est vrai, il n'y
avait pas de cadastreà Zubarah il y a un siècle. Mais toutes les preuves qui existent et les
mémoiresde Bahreïn en contiennent un nombre impressionnant sont à 100 % favorablesà la
thèsede Bahreïn,car du côtédes Al-Thani,jusqu'au 1"juillet 1937,iln'y avaitstrictementrien.
11.Quarto, Bahreïn n'a jamaisrenoncé àZubarah. A diversesreprises,Bahreïn étaitprêta
le faire, dans l'intérte la paix mais seulementàcertainesconditions. Celles-ci n'ontjamais
été acceptéesB . ahreïn a proposén plébisciteparmi les Naïm, ce qui fut refusépar les Al-Thani.
La signature de l'accord de 1944, loin de valoir renonciationsur Zubarah, ne parlait que de la
restaurationde lapaix commepar le passé the restoration offriendly relationss theywerein
thepast ce qui impliqueplutôt larestaurationde Bahreïndanssesdroitsà ~ubarah'.
12.Dans ce contexte, lalettre officielleque lePolitical Agentadressaauconseil de l'émirde
Bahreïn le 18mars 1950~est plus que significative. Elleintervient - il faut le rappel-r
plusieurs annéesaprès l'accord que Qatar persiste faussement à présenter comme valant
renonciation auxdroits deBahreïn àZubarah.
'
'CR2000112,p.23, par.102.
*lbid. 13. Il est question ici d'un décret que l'émirse propose de proclamer au sujet de
ressortissantsde Bahreïnvoulantse rendre àZubarah. La lettreduPolitical Agent estinstructive à
plusd'untitre.
14. Tout d'abord, nous constatons que les décretsde l'émirsont soumis à l'approbation
préalable des autoritésritanniques. On est assezloin de la visiondu professeur Salmond'un Etat
de Bahreïnsouverain.
15.D'ailleurs,la lettredittoutàfaitexplicitement
«Il n'appartientpas au Gouvemementde Bahreïn d'autoriser des particuliers à
se rendreàQatar (ou àKoweït ou à n'importe quel autreEtat du golfe Persique). Le
Gouvemementbritanniquese réserve le droit de donnerdesvisas pour desparticuliers
serendant àces Etats(Bahreïny compris).))
16. Ensuite, lePolitical Agent exprime une restriction lourde de sens. Il appartient aux
autorités anglaisesde donner des visas pour des gens se rendant à Qatar, sauf- etj'insist- :
«saufqu'ilne serait évidemmenp tas question d'insistersur des visaspour ceux qui serendentavec
la permissionde SonAltesse [l'émir deBahreïn] à Zubarah.)) Enfin,le PoliticalAgent indique ce
qui suit, au paragraphe 3 : ((J'espèrevous écrireséparémena tu sujet des concessionsque Son
Altessele cheikhSalmana promis pourQatarafin de réglercette affaire.))
17.C'estclaircomme del'eau de roche : l'affaire deZubarahn'est pasencore réglée e,t elle
ne l'estpasjusqu'à cejour.
18. Jointe à la lettre se trouve un projet de proclamation ou le Political Agent propose la
formulesuivante
((2) Aucun de nos sujets ne pourra se rendre de 1'Etatde Bahreïn à la régionde
Zubarahde Qatar sansau préalable, comme par le passé,avoir reçu l'autorisation
de SonAltesse l'émir de Bahreïn.))
19. L'expression«la régionde Zubarah de Qatam a immédiatementfait réagirle cheikh de
Bahreïn,compte tenude sonambiguïté. 11ne sauraitêtrequestiond'assimiler ((régionde Qatar)) à
«régiondes Al-Thmi». Il rectifie la formule. La proclamation est faite, vous la trouverez au
no132 du dossier d'audiencessous le sous-titreb) :((Aucunde nos sujets ne pourra se rendre à
Zubarahsansaupréalable,commeparle passé,avoirreçu notreaut~risation.))~
3~oumisàlaCourle 1juin2000. 20. Dans lessemainesqui suivent,lePoliticalAgents'enquiertdu nombre desgens quivont
retournerà Zubarah. Le cheikhde Bahreïn,après avoir établqiueces gens :
- ne serontpas soumisàl'autoritéde Qatar,
- ne s'acquitteront pas des droitsde douaàeQatar,et que
- le fort construitpar les Al-ThaniàZubarahsera vide (lettredu 1" février1950);
répondra qu'il s'agira d'envirocent cinquantea deux cents personnes avec leursfamilles (lettre
du4 février 1950)~-un nombre tout à fait considérablecompte tenu de la faible population de
cette régionde la péninsule. (Rappelonsque pour toute la côte ouest de Qatar, l'estimationde
source qatarienneest de huit centspersonnes).
21.Par la suite, au mois demars,le cheikh Salman fourniraune liste détailléefamilleset
des particuliers qui sont repartisZubarah avecleurs effets-y compris «chèvres,vaches, et
chameaux»(lettredu 21mars 1950)~.
22. Je le répète, la questide Zubarahn'étaitpas régléee ,t la réalisur le terrain semble
plutôt avoir étuneréalitébahreïnite.
23. Avant de quitter le sujet des Naïm de Bahreïn résidantà Zubarah, permettez-moide
rappelerà la Courque labranchebinJabbardesNaïm - celle-làmême qui a toujours prédomin àé
Zubarah- fut intégréà la sociétbahreïnitedepuis longtemps. A titre d'exemple, laCour peut
se rapporter au CivilLists de Bahreïnpourles années 1924et 1925,où figuraientdes personnalités
dont la contribution à Bahreïn était suffisamment importantequ'elles recevaient une dotation
annuelle, surces CivilLists,vous trouvezplusieurs de cesbinbb bar'.
24. Monsieur le président,nous sommesarrivésau terme des présentations de Bahreïnsur
les questionstemtoriales relativesauxîles Hawaret de Zubarah. Maisavant qu'il plairaàla Cour
d'entendre les professeurs Reisman et Weil sur la délimitation maritimeet les questions
temtoriales propres à la zone maritime,permettez-moid'évoquer, enguise de conclusion, deux
sujetsqui revêtent pour Bahreïn une importancefondamentale.
4~bid.
'lbid.
6~bid.
'contre-mémoiredeBahreïn, vol.2, annexe54,p. 174;annexe55,p. 179. ACQUIESCEMENT
25. Aujourd'hui, Qatar s'emploie à nourrir l'impression quele rejet par le Gouvernement
britanniquede sa revendication sur les îles Hawar en 1939n'a, depuis cette date, cessé d'êtrea
source de plaintesaiguës et amèresde sa part. Mais ils'agit, ne pas s'y tromper, d'une attitude
de circonstance.Qatar feint d'avoir étmeurtri par «la perte))des Hawar depuis des générations.
Les élémentd sepreuve historiquessont clairs; ils démontrentque cette attitude estde facture toute
récente.
26. J'aimeraisà ce propos,évoquerdeuxrencontres,toutes deux entreun cheikhde Qataret
un fonctionnairebritannique. Ces deux rencontressont, nous semble-t-il,hautementrévélatrices.
Elles ont eu lieu en 1941 et 1961. La Cour est, en mesure de se référer à des comptes rendus
contemporains. L'imageque donnentces notesne ressembleen rien àcelle décrite parQatar pour
lesbesoinsde sonargumentationaujourd'hui.
27. La première rencontrefut celle à laquellej'ai eu l'occasion de faire allusion au cours
d'une interventionprécédente8l;es protagonistes furent le cheikh Abdullah Al-Thani de Qatar et
sir Rupert Hay, lePolitical Residentbritannique,en 1941. Vousvous souvenezque sir Rupert, le
plus haut fonctionnairebritannique dansle Golfe,quitteManamadans une chaloupe lematin pour
inspecter les opérationspétrolièresde PCL à Dukhan avant de déjeunersur place. Ensuite il
traverse le"stonyand uninhabiteddesert", comme il l'écrira dansson rapport, pour atteindre la
côteestde Qataroù il estreçupar le cheikhAbdullah. Et sir Rupertd'écrireà ce propos :
«[Le cheikh Abdullah]est un vieil hommevénérablede 65 ans avecune longue
barbe blanche et il s'est montré très aimable. Certes, les revenus de la société
pétrolière ontrandementaccrusa prospérité.»g
"He[CheikhAbdullah]is a venerableold man of 65years with a long white
beard and appeared veryfriendly. The Oil Company's operations have of course
greatlyincreasedhisprosperity. "'O
28. C'est tout, et c'est remarquable. Remarquable d'abord du fait de l'identitédes deux
hommes. D'un côté,il y a sir Rupert Hay - le plus haut représentant britannique dans toutela
région. Puisqu'il évoque la«longue barbe blanche))du cheikh, on peut raisonnablementdéduire
'CR 2000112,p. 27, par. 127.
9~érnoiredeBahreïn, vol. 5,annexe296.
'%lémoirede Bahreïn, vol. 5, ann. 296.que c'est leurpremièrerencontre. Et si lecheikhAbdullahavait àcŒurun sujet important à porter
à l'attentiondu Gouvernementbritannique,ce seraitpar l'intermédiairede cet homme. S'il y avait
une personne qu'il convenait de convaincre de l'existence d'un grief, c'est bien ce
Political Resident. AucunPoliticalAgentn'est basé à Doha à cette époque- il n'y en aura pas
avant 1949. Voicidoncune occasionimportantepour souleverun problème.
29. En face, le cheikh Abdullah. Ce fut bien sûr en son nom que les Hawar ont été
revendiquées-avec ou sans l'ombrede M. Sklirosde PCLderrièrelui. Cette rencontremet ainsi
face à face la victime supposée d'une injustice,'un côté,et le représentantde l'auteur de cette
prétendue injusticede l'autre côté.
30. Et pourtant:le nom des îles Hawarne paraît mêmepas avoir été prononcé;en tous cas,
leur importance dansla discussionn'estpas telle que ces îles méritent la moindremention dans le
rapportde sir Rupert-pas un mot de ladécision ((sordidet honteuse))pourtant rendue seulement
vingt etun mois auparavant,ni d'uneplaintequelconque àcetitre.
31. Il est catégoriquementexclu que le cheikhAbdullah ne se rende pas compte de
l'importance de son visiteur. En ce temps là, l'autoritéet la capacitéd'initiative desolitical
Residentssont formidables. Le propregrand-pèredu cheikh Abdullah, Mohammed Al-Thani,avait
pu constater le pouvoir duPoliticalResidenten 1868de la manière la plusdécisive. La Cour a
souvent entenduparler de cet épisode.Le cheikh de Bahreïn fut sévèremenp tuni, destitué, parle
Political Resident. Sesnavires furentbrûlés.Parallèlement,les autoritésanglaises ont obtenu des
tribus de Doha qu'elles reprennent le paiement de l'impôt, avec Mohammed Al-Thani comme
collecteurprincipal". Vousvenez de levoirau cours de laprésentationde sir Ian.
32. Revenons-en à 1941. Deux générationsplus tard, voici le petit-fils de Mohammed
devenucheikh de Qatar à son tour. Il setrouve facà un nouveauPoliticalResident,le successeur
de celui qui lui a notifiéla décisionanglaiseenjuillet 1939. Voici doncl'occasion de se plaindre
de la mainmise sur les îles Hawar- aprèstout, ce nouveauPolitical Residentvient d'arriversur
3
scèneet n'ajoué aucun rôledans la procédurequi a mené à la reconnaissancede la souveraineté de
Bahreïn sur les îles Hawar. Mais le cheikhAbdullah ne dit mot : il se révèlà sirRupert comme
"~émoire deBahreïn,vol. 2, ann. 160..«un personnagetrèsaimable»danssa récenteprospéritépétrolière C.ommele cheikhAbdullahn'a
jamais mis lespieds sur les îles Hawar,et comme il ne savaitmêmepas où elles se trouvaient,ou
quelle était leursuperficiemêmeapproximative,on comprendqu'ilne déplore guèrela perte de ce
qu'il n'a jamaiseu.
33. Vingt années passent. Le cheikhAli succède àson père Abdullah;il est cheikh de Qatar
entre 1948et 1960. Cet Alibin Abdullaha-t-il même prononcé le nod mes îles Hawar? Personne
ne peut l'affirmer. Entout cas,tout aulongde son règne iln'y a pas la moindretrace de plaintede
sa partàce sujet. En 1960, son fils Ahmeddevient cheikhde Qatar. A cette époquelà, il y a un
Political Agent à Qatar même, en la personne de M.John Moberly- ultérieurement
sir John Moberly. C'estavec luiqu'alieula deuxièmerencontrequeje voulais évoquer
34. La date est d'une importance capitale. Vous avez entendu la semaine dernière le
professeurSalmon s'étendre assezlongtemps sur une suite de correspondances au milieu des
années soixanteconcernantles diverses pommesde discordeentre Bahreïnet Qatar. A son tour,le
professeurDavids'est exprimé le lendemainavecunetrès grande assurance.Je le cite:
«La Cour appréciera qui,de Qatar ou de Bahreiïn,utilise le règlementjudiciaire
des différendsà des fins essentiellementtactiques, mais en gardanà l'esprit que les
tentatives répétéepsar Qatar de soumettre la question des îles Hawar au règlement
arbitral oujudiciaire remontenà 1964,alors que la volontépar Bahreïnde soumettre
la question de Zubarah à un tel règlement n'a étéintroduite qu'en 1988.»12 (Les
italiquessontdemoi.)
35. Maisvoyons. Bahreïn estparfaitementd'accord pour laisserlaCourapprécierqui faitde
la tactique, etquiutilisequoi comme contre-poids. Mais cefaisant,la Cour netomberapas dans le
piègede s'arrêteràla datechoisieparQatar,àsavoir 1964,commele débutde l'histoire.
36. Car larencontreentreM. Moberlyet le nouveaucheikheutlieu en 1961. Voici enréalité
le débutdes hostilitésjuridico-politiques.
37. M. Moberly décrit cetterencontredans son rapport du 1"mars 1961sur les événements
du premier trimestrede cette année-là. Voustrouverez ce rapport dans votre dossier d'audience.
Sousla rubrique 'XelationswithBahrain", il écrit cec:
«[le cheikhAhrnedAl-Thani] a été fortementimtépar la parutiond'un rapport dansle
Daily Telegraph,qui suggèreque le souverain de Bahreïna engagé des avocatspour
faire avancer ses revendications sur Zubarah. 11avait du mal à croire que le
'*CR 2000118, 43,par.3 cheikh Salman[deBahreïn]auraitpris cette initiativesans consultation préalable avec
le Gouvernementbritannique et qu'en conséquencea insinuéque ce dernier n'avait
pasjoué francjeu. Il a dit que siSalmanpersiste àfaire valoir sa revendication sur
Zubarah, il soulèverait laquestionde l'île de Hawar [sic]. Qatar n'a jamais été
satisfaitde l'attributionde cetteîlehreïn en 1939par le Political Resident[sic] et
a seulement gardéle silence par déférence vis-à-vis du Gouvernement britannique.
Son intention est que les deux différends doivent être soumis à l'arbitrage
international. Cependant,le faitd'avoir reçu l'assurance[anassuranceen anglais]du
PoliticalResidentselon laquelle leGouvernement britanniquen'a jamais reconnu, et
ne reconnaît toujours pas,un droitde souverainetéde Bahreïà Zubarah l'a calmé,et
selon toute vraisemblanceil laissera tomber cette questionà moins qu'elle ne soit
soulevéeànouveau du côtéde ~ahreïn.))'~
["TheRuler[CheikhAhmedAl Thang was veïy irritatedby the appearancein
the Daily Telegraphof a reportsuggesting thatthe Ruler of Bahrain was employing
lawyerstofurther his claim to Zubarah. He found itdifficult to believethat Sheikh
SaIman [the Emir of Bahrain] would have taken this step without previow
consultationwithH.M. G. and asa result suggestedthat H.M.G. had beenless than
frank with himover this. He said that ifSalman persisted inpursuing his claim to
Zubarah hefor his part wouldraisethe questionof Hawar Island. Qatarhad never
been satisjied with the award of this island in 1939 to Bahrain by the Political
Residentand had only remained silentabout itin deferenceto H.M.G. His intention
was that both disputesshouldbe referredto international arbitration. However, the
receiptof an assurancefrom thePolitical Resident thatH.M.G.had neverrecognized
andstill did notrecognizeanyBahrainiright to sovereignîyin Zubarahmollzjîedhim
and theprobabiliîyis thathewillletthe matterdropunlessit is raisedagainfrom the
Bahrain b ide."'^]
38. Ceci n'a guère-besoin d'être commenté. Puisque Bahren ï'a jamais abandonnésa
plainte au sujet de Zubarah, Qatar s'est servi très précisément du contre-poids annoncpar le
cheikhAhmed en 1961 : Qatar a ressuscité sa vieille revendication sur les îles Hawar.
Quaranteans plus tard, Qatar met le mondeà l'envers, etrépète inlassablement quec'est Bahreïn
qui est alléchercherZubarah commecontre-poids. Ceci est peut-être de bonne guerrem , ais c'est
une dénaturation totalde la vérithistorique.
39. La secondeet dernièrede mes observations finales concerneles considérationsmorales
introduitespar Qatardansses plaidoiries.
40. Nous avons en effet été témoinsd'une présentationqui doit assurémentêtretrèspeu
fréquente. Un ancienhaut fonctionnaireintervient en tant qu'avocat d'un autrepays pour déclarer
que les agissementsde son propregouvernementont été ({sordideset honteux)). Nous comprenons
certes, ainsi queM.le professeurReisman l'a expliqué,qu'il faut s'attendre à une rhétorique
I3MémoiredeBahreïn,vol. 5, am. 301,p. 1216-1217.
I4Mémoirdee Bahreïn,vol. 5, am. 301,p. 1216-1217.désespérée lorsqu'ov neut faire annuler une délimitationfrontalière décidée par une autorité
compétente soixante ans auparavant.
41. Mais dans son empressement iconoclaste Qatara trèsprécisément comprilses chosesde
travers. Loin de mériterd'être taxée de toutes les turpitudes, la conduite du Gouvernement
britannique en 1939 fut très exactement ce qui étaitnécessaire afin ...d'éviterle sordide et la
honte.
42. Jugez plutôtvous-même.En décembre 1937M , . Rende1du Foreign Office,un des rares
Anglais à trouver grâce auyeux de Qatar lorsqu'il s'agit desHawar- on remarquerapar ailleurs
que tous les Anglais semblent héroïquesdèsque surgit la question de Zubarah-M. Rende1écrit
dans une noteque sir Ian ajugéutile d'insérer dansle dossierd'audience deQatar. J'ai suivi son
exemple pour aller plus vite; vous trouverez cette note dans le dossier d'audience de Bahreïn.
«Pource qui estdesîles Hawar)),écritRendel,
«Je ne peux que regretter que 1'IndiaOffice soit allé aussi loin qu'ilsemble
avoir fait en attribuant ces îleà Bahreïn. De toute évidence,elles font du point de
vue géographique, partie de Qatar,et puisque la concessionpétrolière à Qatar est
tenue par une société britannique a,lors que la concessionà Bahreïn est tenuepar une
sociétépurement américaine,j'aurais pensé que notre intérêt,ainsi que des
considérations géographiques,aurad itûnous inciteràles attribueà Qatar.))
['Ycannothelp regrettingthattheIndia Ofice wentsofur as theyseem to have
done in allotting theseIslands to Bahrain. They are obviously,from the geographic
point of view, apart of Qatar,and since the Qatar oil concessionis held by a British
company, while the Bahrain concessionis held by a purely American company, I
should have thought that interest, as well as geography, ought to have led us to
allocate themto Qatar.1'115
SirIan Sinclaira ajouté devantvousque :
«CetteobservationdeRende1 ...est aussipertinenteaujourd'huiqu'alorset l'on
ne trouve aucuneréponsevéritable à son argument,ni dans les archives britanniques
ni ailleurs.»16
["Rendel S comment. .. is as cogent today as when itwasfirst expressed;and
no realanswer to thepoint which he makes isforthcomingfrom the British Archives
or indeedfrom anywhereelse.""]
'5~épliqueeQatar,ann.111.5,ol3,p. 349.
1 6 2000/6,tradfk,p. 50,par.38.
"CR2000/6,p. 53,par.38. 43. ((Aucune réponse véritabl? e» [No real answer ?] Mais, Monsieur le président,la
réponse est évidente.Il n'appartient paà Bahreïnde défendrela politique britannique,mais dans
cette affaire force est de constaterque la conduiteduGouvernementbritanniquefutirréprochable.
44. L'idée de M. Rendel, que sir Ian trouve si «pertinente» (cogent) est que la
,
Grande-Bretagne ne devrait pas agir en conformitéavec des principes, mais avec son propre
«intérêt»- le mot est là, brutal, sans la moindrerestriction ((puisquela concession pétroàière
Qatar est tenue par une société britannique, alorsue la concessionà Bahreïn est tenue par une
sociétépurement américaine)).
45. Le prétextede ces agissements en fonction de son intérêaturait, selon Rendel, étéla
proximité. La proximité commeprétexte. Ceci auraitété de «l'hypocrisie»-pour employerune
autre expression de sirIan-puisque Rende1et leForeign Officene croyait pas uneseconde que
proximité confere souveraineté. Quel fonctionnairedu Foreign Officen'étaitpas au courantde la
position du Gouvernement britannique àl'égard desîles anglo-normandes, pourtant dansles eaux
territoriales de la France Faut-il rappeler que la question étaitd'actualité,car l'affaire des
Minquiers etdesEcréhousne devrait être décidée qu'en1953 ?
46. Comme Bahreïn a déjà eu l'occasion de le dire, les actesd'une puissance colonialedans
lapoursuitede ses intérêts propressonttout saufsurprenants. Quellequesoit l'absencede moralité
dans de telles décisions,le droit international a,d'une manière constante, inssur la pérennité
des frontières dans l'intérêdte la paix. Mais ici, dans notre affaire, au moins la puissance
dominatrice a agi contre son intérê ptropre; sa conduite a trouvéson fondement dans des
principes, en l'occurrence l'exercicede lasouverainetéde Bahreïnsulres îlesHawar,et l'absence
totale desliensentreI'Etatde Qatarin statunascendiavec ces îles.
47. En somme, ce fut M. Rende1qui avaitpréconisé une manŒuvre «sordide (le mot n'est
pas de moi, vous l'aurezcompris). Trèsheureusement,le Gouvernementbritanniquen'a pas donné
suiteàsa suggestion«honteuse».
48. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, je quitte la barre en vous
remerciant devotre patiente courtoisieau cours de mes présentations.S'il plaàtla Cour,je vous
prie d'appelerM. leprofesseur Reismandemain matinpour traiter desquestionsmaritimes. Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, Maître Paulsson. Ceci metun termà la séancede ce
matin. La prochaine séancede la Cour aura lieu cet après-midi à 16heures dans l'affaire
concernantle Congoet l'Ouganda. En ce qui concernela présente affaire,la prochaine séance aura
lieu demainmatin à10heures. La séanceest levée.
L'audienceestlevéeà 13heures.
Public sitting held on Wednesday 28 June 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding