Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
InternationalCourt Courinternationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
Public sitîing
heldon Thursday22June 2000,ut10am., utthePeacePalace,
PresidentGuillaumepresiding
in the caseconcerningMaritimeDelimitationand TerritorialQuestionsbehveen
QatarandBahrain(Qatar v.Bahrain)
VERBATIMRECORD
Audiencepublique
tenuelejeudi 22juin 200à,10heures,au PalaisdelaPaix,
sous laprésidencdeM. Guillaume,président
en l'affairedelaDélimitatmaritimeet desquestions territorialesentreQataret Bahrein
(Qatarc.Bahrein)
COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Judgesad hoc TorresBernhdez
Fortier
Registrar CouvreurPrésents:M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges
MM. TorresBemirdez
Fortier,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur,greffierTheStateofQataris representedby:
H.E. Dr.Abdullahbin AbdulatifAl-Muslemani,Secretary-Generalofthe Cabinet,
asAgent andCounsel;
Mr. AdelSherbini,Legal Adviser,
Mr. SamiAbushaikha,Legal Expert,
as Counsel;
Mr. EricDavid,ProfessorofInternationalLaw,Universitélibrede Bruxelles,
Dr.Alibin FetaisAl-Men, Directorof LegalDepartment,DiwanAmiri,
Mr.Jean-PierreQuéneudec, Professor of International Law at the University of Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Mr. Jean Salmon,Professor emeritus of InternationalLaw,Universitélibre de Bruxelles,Member
of theInstitutdedroit international,
Mr. R.K. P.Shankardass, Senior Advocate, Supreme Courtof India, Former President of the
International Bar Association,
SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G., Q.C., BarristeratLaw,MemberoftheInstituteof InternationalLaw,
SirFrancisVallat, G.B.E.,K.C.M.G., Q.C.,Professor emeritus of Internatil aw,University of
London, MemberemeritusoftheInstitutdedroitinternational,
Mr.RodmanR.Bundy,Avocat à la Cour d'appelde Paris, Memberof the New York Bar, Frere
Cholmeley~EvershedsP ,aris,
MsNanette E.Pilkington,Avocatà la Cour d'appeldeParis,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
as Counseland Advocates;
Ms CherylDunn,Memberofthe StateBarofCalifornia,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,
MsInes SabineWilk, Lawyer before theGermanCourt of Appeal, Member of the Charnberof
Lawyers of Berlin, Germany,
as Counsel;
Mr. ScottB. Edmonds,Directorof CartographieOperations, MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(UnitedStatesof Arnerica),
Mr.Robert C.Rizzutti, ProjectManager,MapQuest.com,Columbia, Maryland (United States of
America),
Ms StephanieK.Clark, Senior Cartographer, MapQuest.com, Columbia M, aryland(United States
ofAmerica),
asExperts;
H.E.SheikhHarnadbin JassimbinJaborAl-Thani,MinisterforForeign Affairs,
H.E.Mr.Ahrnedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,Minister ofStateforForeignAffairs,
asObservers.
TheStateofBahrainis representedby:
H.E. Mr. Jawad SalimAl-Arayed,Minister of Stateof theStateof Bahrain,
asAgent;L 'Etatde Qatarest represéntéepar:
S.Exc. M.Abdullah binAbdulatif Al-Muslemani,secrétairegénérad lu gouvernement,
commeagent et conseil;
M.Adel Sherbini,conseillerjuridique,
M. SamiAbushaikha,expertjuridique,
commeconseils;
M. Eric David,professeurdedroit internationàll'universitélibre de Bruxelles,
M.Ali bin FetaisAl-Men, directeur des affairesjuridiques du conseilde l'émir,
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à l'université de Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M.Jean Salmon,professeurémérite de droitinternationàll'université libre deBruxelles,membre
de 1'Institutde droit international,
M. R. K.P. Shankardass, avocat principalà la Cour suprêmede l'Inde, ancien président de
l'Associationinternationaledu Barreau,
SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C., avocat,membrede l'Institutde droitinternational,
Sir Francis Vallat, G.B.E., K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,professeur éméride droit internatioàal'université
de Londres,membre émérite de l'Institutde droit international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocatàla Courd'appelde Paris,membredubarreaude New York,cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mlle Nanette Pilkington, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, cabinet Frere Cholrneley/Eversheds,
Paris,
commeconseils etavocats;
Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de 1'Etat de Californie, cabinet Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mme Inès SabineWilk, avocat prèsd'unecour d'appel d'Allemagne, membrede la chambredes
avocatsà Berlin, Allemagne,
commeconseils;
M. Scott B.Edrnonds, directeur du service des levés cartographiques,sociétéMapQuest.com,
Columbia,Maryland(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
M. Robert C.Rizzutti, administrateur de projet, sociétéMapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
Mme Stephanie K. Clark, cartographe hors classe, sociétéMapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
commeexperts;
S.Exc. le cheikhHarnadbinJassim bin JaborAl-Thani,ministre desaffairesétrangères,
S.Exc. M.Ahrnedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,ministred'Etatauxaffairesétrangères,
commeobservateurs.
L'EtatdeBahreïnest representépar :
S.Exc. M.Jawad SalimAl-Arayed,ministred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
commeagent;Dr. FathiKemicha,Member of theBarof Paris, Kemicha & Associés(Tunis),
ProfessorSir ElihuLauterpacht,Q.C.,C.B.E.,Honorary Professor of the Universiof Cambridge,
Memberof theInstitutde droit international,
Mr. JanPaulsson,Freshfields, Paris,Member otfhe BarsofParis and theDistrictofColumbia,
Professor Michael Reisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of InternationalLaw of Yale Law 8
School,Memberofthe BarofConnecticut,Associate of the Institut dderoitinternational,
Mr. RobertVolterra,Freshfields,London,Member of the Bar ofUpperCanada,
ProfessorProsperWeil,Emeritus Professor attheUniversity of ParisII (Panthéon-Assas, ember
of the Académie dessciencesmoraleset politiques(Institutde France),Memberof the Institut
de droit international,
as CounselandAdvocates;
SheikhKhalid bin AhmedAl-Khalifa,First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs otfhe State of
Bahrain,
Commander Christopher CarletonM , .B.E., Headof the Lawof the Sea Divisionof the United
KingdomHydrographie Office,
Dr. HongwuChen,Freshfields,Paris,Memberof theBars of Paris andBeijing,
Mr.GrahamCoop,Freshfields,Paris,Barristerand Solicitorof theHighCourtof NewZealandand
Solicitorof theSupremeCourtofEnglandand Wales,
Mr.AndrewNewcombe, Freshfields, ParisM , emberoftheBar of British Columbia,
Dr.BethOlsen, Advisor,Ministryof State ofthe State of Bahrain,
Dr. John Wilkinson, Former Reader at the Universityof Oxford, Emeritus Fellow, St.Hugh's
College,Oxford,
asAdvisors;
H.E.SheikhMohammedbinMubarakAl Khalifa, Minister for Foreign Affairs,Stateof Bahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Aziz binMubarakAl Khalifa, Ambassador of theState of Bahrain to the
Netherlands,
H.E.Dr. Mohammed JaberAl-Ansari, Advisorto HisHighness,theAmir of Bahrain,
Mr.GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-Secretaryof Foreign Affairs,StateofBahrain,
Her Excellency Sheikha HayaAl Khalifa, Ambassador ofthe State of Bahrain to the French
Republic,
Mr.YousefMahmood,DirectoroftheOfficeoftheForeignMinister,StateofBahrain,
as Observers;
Mr.JonAddison,Ministryof Stateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
Ms Maisoon Al-Arayed, Ministry ofStateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
MsAliaAl-Khatar,Freshfields,
Mr.Nabeel Al-Rumaihi, Ministry of Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
Mr.HafedhAl-Qassab, MinistryofState of the State of Bahrain,
Mr.Yousif Busheery, Ministry of ForeignAffairs otfe StateofBahrain,
MsJanetCooper,Ministry of Stateofthe State of Bahrain,
Ms EleonoreGleitz,Freshfields,
Ms AneesaHanna,EmbassyofBahrain inLondon,
Ms JeanetteHarding, Ministry ofStateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
Ms VanessaHarris,Freshfields,
MsIvaKratchanova,Ministry of Stateof the State of Bahrain,
Ms SonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfields,
Ms SarahMochen,Freshfields,
Mr.KevinMottram,Freshfields,
Mr.Yasser Shaheen,Second Secretary,Ministry of ForeignAffairsofthe StateofBahrain,
asAdministrativeStaHM. FathiKemicha,membredu barreau de Paris, cabinet Kemicha & Associés, Tunis,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,Q.C.,C.B.E., professeurhonoraireàl'universitéde Cambridge,membrede
l'Institut de droit international,
M. Jan Paulsson, cabinet Freshf~elds,Paris, membre des barreaux de Pariset du district de
Columbia,
M.Michael Reisman, professeur dedroitinternationala l'universitéde Yale, titulaire dela chaire
Myres S.McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut, associé de l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Robert Volterra,cabinetFreshfields,Londres,membredubarreauduHautCanada,
M.Prosper Weil, professeur éméritea l'université deParisII (Panthéon-Assas),membre de
l'Académie dessciencesmorales etpolitiques(Institutde France),membrede l'Institutde droit
international,
commeconseilsetavocats;
Le cheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, premiersecrétaire,ministèredes affaires étrangères de
1'Etatde Bahrein,
Le capitaine de frégateChristopherCarleton,M.B.E.,directeurde la divisiondu droit maritimedu
bureau hydrographiquedu Royaume-Uni,
M. HongwuChen,cabinetFreshfields,Paris,membredes barreauxde Parisetde Beijing,
M. Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, avocat et conseil de la High Court de
Nouvelle-Zélandeetconseillerde laCoursuprême d'Angleterreet duPaysde Galles,
M. AndrewNewcombe,cabinetFreshfields,Paris, membredubarreau de la Colombiebritannique,
MmeBeth Olsen,conseiller,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahrein,
M.John Wilkinson, ancien maître de conférence à l'université d'Oxford, membre éméritd eu
CollègeSaintHugh,Oxford,
commeconseillers;
S.Exc.le cheikhMohammedbin MubarakAl Khalifa,ministredesaffairesétrangères de Bahrein,
S.Exc. le cheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de 1'Etatde Bahreïn aux
Pays-Bas,
S.Exc. M.Mohammed JaberAl-Ansari, conseiller de Son Altessel'émirde Bahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi,sous-secrétairedYEtatauxaffairesétrangères de1'Etatde Bahreïn,
S.Exc.la cheikha Haya Al Khalifa, ambassadeurde 1'Etatde Bahreïn auprèsde la République
française,
M. YousefMahrnood,directeur dubureauduministredes affairesétrangèresde Bahre-ïn,
comme observateurs;
M. Jon Addison, ministèredYEtatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeMaisoon Al-Arayed,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahrein,
Mme Alia Al-Khatar,cabinetFreshfields,
M.NabeelAl-Rumaihi,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. Hafedh Al-Qassab, ministèred'Etatde 1'EtatdeBahrein,
M. Yousif Busheery, ministèredes affairesétrangèrse 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme JanetCooper,ministèredYEtatde1'Etatde Bahrein,
MmeEleonoreGleitz,cabinetFreshfields,
MmeAneesaHanna,ambassadede Bahrein,Londres,
MmeJeanetteHarding,ministèred'Etatde 1'EtatdeBahrein,
MmeVanessaHarris, cabinetFreshfields,
MmeIva Kratchanova,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeSonja Knijnsberg,cabinetFreshfields,
MmeSarahMochen, cabinetFreshfields,
M. KevinMottram,cabinetFreshfields,
M.Yasser Shaheen,secondsecrétaire,ministèredesaffairesétrangères de1'Etatde Bahrein,
commepersonneladministratg Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. La séanceest ouverte et je donne la parole au
professeurEric Davidquis'exprimeraaunomde 1'Etatde Qatar.
M. DAVID :Merci beaucoup, Monsieur leprésident. Monsieur le président,Madame et
Messieurs de la Cour, lors de l'interruptionde mon exposéhier, j'étaisoccupéà examiner les
documents qui, selon la Partie adverse, impliquaient reconnaissancepar les Britannique. de la
souverainetédeBahreïnsur Zubarah. Et nous avions examinédeux de ces documents. Il en reste
un troisième.
35. Il s'agit d'undocument datédu 29 mai 1937, attribuéà l'agent politiqueHickinbotham,
documentdans lequel Belgrave proposede céder à Qatar la régionadjacenteà Zubarah pourvu que
Bahreïn puisse conserver Zubarah, les Naïm pourraient alors décider par plébiscite de leur
allégeance [6.9],et s'ilsserendaient dansune quelconqueportiondu territoirede Qatar,ils seraient
soumis à l'impôt comme n'importe quel résidentde Qatar. M. Paulsson fait grand cas de la
formule ((touteportion appartenantaucheikhde Qatar))qui, selonM. Paulsson, devrait heurternos
oreilles car ce texte date de 1937, soit soixante-neuf ans aprèsque Qatar aurait prétendument
acquis - c'estM. Paulssonqui le dit- a "coast-to-coastsovereigntyn'.Ce texte suggérerait que
cen'est pas le cas.
Ce commentaireappelle deuxremarques
1) Le texte, signédes initiales B. T.,est écritnon par l'agentpolitique Hickinbotham,mais par
son assistant,un certainomlinson~;
2) Ce texte n'est rien d'autre que le rapportd'une discussionde cet assistantavec Belgrave qui
étaitvenu faire unecontre-offre àune proposition antérieurede l'émirde Qatar pour réglerle
différend3;ilne s'agissait donc que de simples contre-propositions - le texte est d'ailleurs
rédigéau conditionnel-émanant deBahre'in [6.10] et sur la formulation desquelles
l'assistant de l'agentpolitique etelgravese mettent d'accord;sur cette base, il nous paraît
'CR2000/12,9 juin 2000,p. 20-21,par.91-92.
2~émoire de Qatar, annee11.1,vol. 7,p. 157.
3~extedansmémoire de Qatar, ann11e1.130v,ol.7,p. 153-155. pour le moins légerde chercher dans la simple relation d'une contre-offie faite par Bahreïn
l'expressionde laposition officielledu Gouvernementbritannique surZubarah.. .
2. Les actes de reconnaissanceémanantde Bahre[ ï7.1]
36. Ici aussi,nos contradicteursn'ont guèrecontreditce que M. Shankardasset moi-même
avons présenté comme autant d'actes implicitesou explicites de reconnaissance par Bahreïn de
l'appartenance de Zubarah à ~atar~. Nous avions sélectionné pour la périodequi va de 1868 à
1976plus d'unedizainede faits de reconnaissance. Nos adversairesne les ont mêmepas discutés,
à l'exception de l'accord de 1944 dont ils se bornent à souligner l'ambiguïtéet auquel ils
n'accordent qu'un effedte standstil15.Par contre, rienn'estdit sur des faitsaussi importants:ue
- la conclusionpar Bahreïnavecles Britanniquesdu traité du 6 septembre1868sansque Bahreïn
n'émetteaucuneréservequant à sesdroitséventuelssurlapéninsule6 [7.2];
- l'acceptationparBahreïn de l'occupation permanente deZubarahpar lesTurcs en 1878'[7.3];
- la demande adresséepar Bahreïn à Qatar en 1911 de pouvoir prendreen location zubarah8
i7.41;
- l'absence de protestation de Bahreïn en1923-1924 à l'égarddes cartes de l'Eastern and
General Syndicatepour les discussions de sa concessionpétrolière,cartes qui n'indiquent pas
Zubarahparmiles possessions de ~ahreïn~[7.5];
- l'envoi parBahreïnaux autoritésbritanniques en1938d'unecarteduterritoire de Bahreïnpour
leszonesde concessionàpartagerentre la BAPCOet PCLsans que larégion deZubarah y soit
indiquée1'[7.6];
- l'absence de protestationpar Bahreïn à propos du fait que la Grande-Bretagne n'avaittenu
aucun compte de Zubarah dans le tracé dela délimitationmaritime du 23 décembre1947"
i7.71;
4~~ 2000/9,5 juin 2000,p. 1016-17,par. 17,26,32,3M.K.Shankardass,ibid.,p. 26-33.
'M. J. Paulsson,CR2000/12,9juin 2000,p. 23,par. 102-103.
6MK . Shankardass,CR 2000/9,5 juin 2000,p. 26, par. 3.
'lbid., p. 10,par.16.
'~bid.,p. 14,par. 26.
'M.K. Shankardass,CR 2000/6,30 mai2000,p. 21,par. 30;Bajudge'folder, Vol.2, No 67-70.
'%.K. Shankardass,CR 2000/9,5juin 2000,p.32,par. 22.- la demande adresséepar l'émirde Bahreïn à Emest Bevin le 28 juin 1948 de ne se voir
reconnaîtreque certainsdroits de caractèreprivéà ~ubarah'~[7.8];
- la confirmation adressée enjanvier 1950àl'émirde Qatar par les Britanniques que l'émirde
Bahreïn réclamaitnon la souveraineté surZubarah, mais seulementle droit d'y envoyer ses
sujetsavec leurs troupeaux13[7.9];
- la demande adresséeen 1957par Bahreïnaux Britanniquesde se prononcer définitivemens tur
la question et l'engagementformel deBahreïnde respecterladécisionqui serait [7.10];
- l'acceptation par Bahreïn en 1976 de la médiation del'Arabie saoudite pour résoudrele
différend «sur les îles, lesfrontièresmaritimeset les eauxterritoriales)),sans qu'il soit question
de zubarahl' 17.111.
37. Cette liste est loin d'êtreexhaustive. On pourrait y ajouter, par exemple, entre autres
descriptionsde Bahreïn,cellefaite par Belgraveen 1928où il n'est questionni de Zubarah,ni des
îlesHawar,et rappeléelorsde ce deuxième tour de plaidoiriespar sir Ian ou l'admissionpar l'émir
de Bahreïn le 13juillet 1937que les Naïm s'étaient désormais soumis àl'émir de~atar'~. On doit
cependant àla véritéscientifiquede direque Qatar ne pouvaitpas êtreau courantde tous ces actes
de reconnaissance, et qu'il serait donc difficilede leur conférer globalementun effet d'estoppeà
l'égardde Bahreïn. Mais un tel effet doit cependant êtrereconnu aux faits que Qatar devait
nécessairementconnaître, àsavoir ceux de[7.12] 1868, 1878,1911,1944,1950et 1976.
Mis àpart l'accordde 1944, Bahreïnn'a pas discutéde ces différentsargumentset Qatar en
prend acte. Bahreïn déclaretoutefois avoirprotesté àde nombreusesreprisesdepuis 1937contrela
présence de Qatar à ~ubarah". C'est vrai, mais il s'agit de valses-hésitations entre tantôt des
protestations, tantôt des acceptations. Il n'en demeure pas moins que certains faits de
reconnaissance sont largement antérieurs à 1937, que Qatar est fondé à s'en prévaloir en tant
"lbid.,p. 30,par.13.
I21bid.,. 30,par.14.
I3lbid.,p. 30,par.15.
I4lbid.,p. 17,par.34.
I5M.K.Shankardassi, id.,p. 31,par.19.
l6h4érnoidreQatar,annexeIII.138,vol.7,p. 192.
"M.J. Paulsson,CR2000/12,9juin 2000,p.22,par.100.qu'«accords singularisés»18e,t que les protestationsultérieuresde Bahrein sont impuissantesà les
remettre en cause.
38. En conclusion, sur les différents exemplesd'actes d'autoritéeffectuéspar Qatar à
Zubarah entre 1868et 1937, Bahreïnn'a contesté quedeux d'entre eux, etnous avons vu que ces
contestationsrestaient vaines.
Quant aux nombreux faits impliquant la reconnaissance de l'appartenance deZubarah à
Qatar, reconnaissance émanantdu Royaume-Uni, d7Etats tiers ou de Bahreïn lui-même,nos
adversairesn'y ontopposéquedes exceptionstrèslimitéeset dontaucunene résistait à un examen
sérieux.
Je peux aborderàprésent,et trèsbrièvement, ledernierpointde cetteplaidoirie.
111.L'ABSENC DERÔLEDESLIENSTRIBAUXD'ALLEGEANCEDESNAÏM
ENVERS L'ÉMIRDEBAHREÏN [8.1]
39. Monsieur le président,et vous m'en serezsans doute reconnaissant, la question n'est
abordée quepour mémoire :en dehors dece que nousavons déjàrelevé(supra,par. 9 et 22), nos
contradicteurs n'ont pas vraiment contesté les arguments développés sur ce poiin lty a deux
semaineslg. Qataren prend acte,une foisde plus et,pardonnez-moide me répéter, Qatar n'enira
pas davantage :s'iln'y a pas de réponse,il nepeuty avoirde réplique.
40. Monsieurle président,Madameet Messieursde la Cour,Bahreïn n'a riendit qui soit de
natureà remettre en cause les conclusions de Qatar surZubarah. Beaucoup d'argumentsde Qatar
sont restéssans réponse,et ceux auxquels Bahrein a tentéde répondren'ont pas étéébranlés.
'*~haurnont,Ch., Coursgénle droit internationalpublic, RCADI,1970,vol. 129,p. 430.
"M. J.Paulsson,CR 2000/12,9 juin 2000,p. 14et 18,par. 61 et 82.Goethe disaitque la clarté«est unejuste répartition d'ombreset de lumières»20.Pour l'instant, la
réclamationdeBahrein surZubarahne comportequedesombreset aucun rayon.
Monsieurle président,Madame,Messieursde la Cour,je vous remercieune foisde plus de r
votre patienceet de l'attentionsoutenuequevousm'avezaccordéehier comme aujourd'hui. Et,je
vous demande à présent,Monsieur le président,de bien vouloir appeler sir Ian Sinclair à cette
barre. Je vousremercie.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie Monsieur le professeur. 1 now give the floor to
Sir Ian Sinclair.
SirIan SINCLAIR:
RESPONS TO PROFESSO RREISMAN 'LEADINGOF 9 JUNE 2000
ONTHE 1936 AND 1939BRITISH DECISIONSON HAWAR
Mr.President, Membersofthe Court,
1. My taskthis morning is to respond to the arguments advanced by Ouropponents, in
particular Professor Reisman, on theal consequences of what ProfessorReisman terms the
"award" in the "1939 arbitration", that "award" enjoying in his submission the stress of
judicata.
Weightman'sfailuretoreport hisconversationswith
theRulerof QataronHawarinFebruary1938
2. Before1begin, however,1must say a fewwordsaboutthe manner in whMr. Paulsson
dealt on 9June with Weightman'sletter to the Political Resident of 15May 1938, belatedly
reporting onhis conversationwiththe Ruler of Qatar in February ofthateightman'sletter
of 15May 1938is at Annex III.152to the QatarMemorial,and 1would invite the Members of the
Court tostudythat letter carehlly. 1have caused a copy of the letter to be placed in the judges'
folders as item 28. Quite how Mr.Paulsson can interpretthat letter as establishing the tmth of
Weightman'sastonishing surmise that the Ruler of Qatar was by no means prepared to make a
claim to the Hawargroup of islandsat that time Imay put it mildly, puzzling (CR2000112,
"1nMaximeset réflex,aris,llimard.p. 38,paras. 174and 175). WeightmanStatesin the letterthat the Ruler ofQatarhad adrnittedthat
the Bahrainishad occupied Hawar, buthad gone on to statethat "theyhad no dejure rights there",
as youwill now seeon the screen. Achangeof conversation thereaftercan hardlybe interpretedas
amountingto a refusa1on the part ofthe Ruler of Qatar to advance a claimto Hawar at that time.
After all, if the Bahrainis had no jure rights there, as the Ruler of Qatar was protesting, who
had? Surely only the Rulerof Qatar himself. Themildest reproach onecan make of Weightman's
reportingof the conversationinFebruary 1938,is that it was an exercisein self-deception; hewas
reporting what he wanted to report, and putting an unsustainable gloss upon a conversation
incapableof bearing the interpretationwhich he wasputting on itIn short, in a word which has
beenused in modem times,he was beingeconomicalwiththe truth. But theMembersofthe Court
must decide for themselves,bearing in mind, of course,that Weightmanhad to explain away his
failureto report this important conversationwiththe Rulerof Qatarat the time.
Theuninformedviewof Mr.Darwin
3. 1 turn now to ProfessorReisman's presentation. My learned opponent had some
knock-about fun about my citation of the viewsof certain British "bureaucrats",sucMr.sLong
whoproduced in 1964what even1wouldconcedewas a pottedand incompleteaccount of someof
the principal eventsurroundingthe two British decisions of 1936and 1939(CR2000/12, p. 44,
para.3). Indeed, it could well be, and here 1would refer to the presentationby Mr. Volterra on
13June (CR2000/13, p. 51, para. 145), that, precisely because my former colleague,
Mr. Henry Darwin, whowas anAssistantLegalAdviserin the Foreign Officein June 1964,didnot
have access atthetime to thevery widerangeof docurnentaryandcartographicmaterials whichthe
Partiesto the present case have now made availableto the Court, that he camewn in favour of
the Bahraincase as regards sovereigntyoverthe HawarIslands.Regrettably,Mr.Darwindiedvery
shortlyafter his retirement fiomthe Foreign andCommonwealth Officejust over ten years ago. 1
wouldonly Saythat his manuscript minute of 9June 1964is based upon certainassumptions,such
as the tribal affiliationsof the supposed "residents"of the HawarIslands andthe supposed"actsof
administration"of the Bahrain Government, thevery basis of which Qatarstrongly challengesin
the present proceedings. Accordingly,1 have to Saythat Mr. Darwin'sview on the merits of thedispute betweenQatarand Bahrain overthe HawarIslands is an uninformedview reached on the
basis of incomplete information. Those Members of the Court who have previously served in
national administrationsas legal advisers to Ministries of Foreign Affairswill be only too well b
awarethat, on specificissues, the individuallegaladviser often hasto give his advice on the basis
ofthe limited materialswhich mayhave beenputbefore him.
Professor Reisman's failureto citetheDubaVSharjahBordercase
4. The main thrustof ProfessorReisman'sargumentis of course that theissue of sovereignty
over Hawar was,in hiswords, "resolved61yearsago, by a valid and bindingarbitration,in favour
of Bahrain, which is res judicata" (CR2000112, p. 44, para. 2). One would think that
Professor Reismanwould seek to followup this bold assertionby demonstrating conclusivelythat
what the British Governmentdid on 11July 1939was to issue an arbitral award determiningthat
the Hawar Islandsappertainedto Bahrain. But whatjurisprudence does ProfessorReismaninvoke
in his argumenton whetherthe Courthas jurisdiction to reviewthe award of another tribunal? He
invokes the Socobelgecase before the PermanentCourt in 1939,the ArbitralAward Made by the
King of Spain case, andthe Judgment ofthis Court inthe Arbitral Award of 31July 1989relating
to the maritimeboundarydispute betweenSenegaland Guinea-Bissau. Innoneof these caseswere
the parties in dispute as to whetherthe very process in which they or othershad been previously
engaged had been a processof arbitrationat all. In other words, none of themare in the slightest
degree relevant tothe issue which the Court has todetermine in the present case, namely,whether
the procedures followedby the British Govemment in 1938 and 1939 amounted to a process of
arbitration whichcould result in an arbitral award binding upon the parties. Curiously enough,
however there is one recent case in which the arbitral tribunal constituted to hear it had to
determinequestionsraisedby the argumentsof the partiesas to whether certaindecisions takenby
a third party wereor werenot arbitral awards. This was of course the Dubai/SharjahBorder case, !
wherethe Court ofArbitrationdeliveredits Awardon 19October 1981.
SalientpointsintheDubaVSharjahcase
5. The Award in the Dubai/SharjahBorder case, which was published in Vol. 91 of the
International Law Reports (p. 549), contains much that is of direct relevanceto the present case.And yet Professor Reismanmadeno referencetoit whatsoever. Why? Qatar wouldsuggest thatit
is because the Awardin that caseruns directlycounterto the argument hewas seeking to present.
Letme brieflyrecallsome of the salientpointsintheAwardin theDubaiBharjah case:
(1) One of the principal issues in the arbitrationwas whether decisions made by the Political
Agent in the Trucial States, aMr. Tripp,on the course of the land boundary betweenDubai
and Sharjah shouldproperlybe characterizedasarbitralawards. The Awardstates:
"In their simplestform, the argumentsof the Parties may be surnmarised as
follows. In the view of the Governent of Dubaithe British authoritiesdid not have
the right to delimitthe boundarywithoutthe consentof the Emiratesconcemed. The
consent given by the Ruler of Dubai was invalidated ab initio and therefore the
subsequentadministrative decisionsweredevoidof al1legalvalue. In theview of the
Govemment of Sharjah,however, theconsentgiven by the Ruler of Dubai could not
in any way be considered as invalidatedand the subsequent decisionsarrived at by
Mr.Trippmustbe interpretedasbindingarbitralawards."(91ILR,p. 566.)
(2) The Court ofArbitrationin that casethen consideredwhether the British Governmenthadthe
right todecide, unilaterally and on its own initiative, upon the delimitation of aboundary
between the twoEmirates. This is clearlyequivalentto the rightto decide,unilaterallyandon
itsown initiative, upon the appurtenance of a disputed parce1of temtory as between two
sheikhdoms; andthe Courtof Arbitrationdecidedthat:
"no treaty authorised the British authoritiesto delimit unilaterally the boundaries
between the Emirates and. .. no British administration ever asserted that it hadthe
right to do sou(loc. cit.,p. 567).
Parity of reasoning requiresthat the same conclusion shouldbe applied to the attribution of
disputed temtory as between two sheikhdoms. So, as the Court of Arbitration found, the
consent of the Rulers concemed wasnecessarybefore any such delimitationor attribution of
territory could bemade.
(3) Having determinedon thefacts that, contraryto the submissionsof Dubai,the consentof the
Ruler of Dubai to a determinationof his boundaries with Sharjah had, in fact, been fieely
given, the Courtof Arbitrationtumed to the statusof the Tripp decisions. The Rulerof Dubai
had advanced four objections to Sharjah'ssubmission that the Tripp decisions should be
characterizedas arbitralawards. Thefourobjectionswere as follows:
(i) there wasno arbitration agreement;
(ii) the arbitratorwas not independent; (iii) theparties hadbeenunableto presenttheirarguments; and
(iv) thedecisionshad notbeenreasoned.
Requirement thatarbitratorbeindependent
6. TheCourt willofcoursebe aware,fromthe contentof Qatar'sMemorial,that theCourt of
Arbitration in DubaiBharjah upheld the third and fourth objections raised by Dubai to the
submission that the Tripp decisions constituted arbitral awards (Memorial of Qatar,
paras. 6.113-6.119). In the present case, Qatarrelies, not onlyon the third and fourthobjections
which were upheld in Dubai/Sharjah, but alsoon the second objection, namely,that the arbitrator
was not independent. In this context, Qatar relies on the voluminous evidence which it has
presented in itswritten pleadings that Weightman, the British official appointed to conduct the
"enquiry"in 1938and 1939,was not onlyprejudicedin favourof Bahrain andagainstQataron this
particularissue,but, evenmoreimportantly,and incornmonwith someotherBritish officialsin the
Gulf and in Londonat thetime, had alsoprejudgedthe outcomeof the "enquiry" before ithad even
begun. 1 should perhaps add that, quite apart from these reasons, Qatar also relies on the fact
that- and hereit is in contrastto the positionin the Dubai/Sharjah Bordercase- its Ruler did
not consentatthe time or subsequentlyto the appointmentof a nomineeof the BritishGovermnent
as sole arbitrator in an agreed process of arbitration. There is accordingly no legal basis for
concludingthat the British decision of 11July 1939on the Hawar Islandsamountedto an arbitral
awardhavingthe force ofresjudicata.
7. If it were not enough for Qatar to point out that Professor Reisman,inhis oral argument
on 9 June, failedto addressthe Dubai/Sharjah Bordercase, Qatar must add that he alsoseems to
have been unaware that the United Kingdom Government itself waived, in the 1960~~ whatever
objection they might have been able to raise to the considerationby this Court, or indeed by any
process of true international arbitration,of the continuingdispute between Qatar and Bahrain as
regards sovereigntyoverthe Hawar Islands. BritishGovernment'sacceptanceofinternational arbitrationin th1 e960sasa rneansof
solvingdisputesbetween Bahrain and Qatar onHawar andthe maritime delimitation
8. 1do not proposeto go into this in anydetail, since my leamed friend, Professor Salmon,
has alreadydrawnto the attentionofthe Court,in the secondround, the circumstancesunder which
the British Govemment expressed their agreement in October 1965to a process of international
arbitration to settle the continuingdispute between Qatar and Bahrain, that dispute including the
differences betweenthe two Statesas regards their claims to sovereigntyover the Hawar Islands
(CR2000117,pp. 18-20,paras. 16-17). So there is no way in which it can be argued that what is
involved in the present case is an attempt to reopen an arbitral award having the force of
resjudicata. Even if what had taken place in 1938 and 1939had been in fact a process of
arbitration, which Qatar strenuously denies, the sole "arbitrator",the British Govemment, was
prepared 35 years ago to see its 1939and 1947decisionson Hawar andthe maritime delimitation
referred to a process of independent arbitration between Qatar and Bahrain.This, Qatar would
submit,is wholly inconsistent withany notionthat the 1939Britishdecisionon Hawar has or ever
had the forceof resjudicata.
Denialof alleged"conspiracy"theories
9. 1 must add that the extraordinary conspiracy theories attributed to me by
ProfessorReisman hardlyment a response. Qatarhas neveralleged a conspiracyon the part of the
BritishGovernmentto depriveQatar ofthe HawarIslands. Whatit has alleged, and indeedwhatit
has established,is that a very limited numberof Britishoficials in the Gulf and in London acted
with less than full impartiality and objectivity in setting up and participating in the procedures
appliedbetween 1936and 1939to determine,asbetween Qatar andBahrain,the issue of whichof
these two sheikhdomshad sovereigntyoverthe HawarIslands.
The "provisionaldecision"of 1936
10. What then of Professor Reisman's responseas regards the British Government's
"provisionaldecision"of 1936? First ofall, he saysthat there wasno arbitrationin 1936. 1can in
factagreewith this, preciselybecausethe "provisional decision"was an exparte decisiontakenby
the BritishGovemmentwithout the knowledgeor consentofthe Ruler of Qatar: and itis pointless
for Bahrain to point out that the British Govemmentwas unaware at the time that the Ruler ofQatarmight havea valid claim tothe HawarIslands. Thisis specificallydisprovedby the content
ofparagraph7 of Fowle'sletterto the Secretary of State forIndiaof 25 May 1936: and, Members
of the Court,1wouldbe gratefülif you wouldnotethat date-25 May 1936. [Show on screen.] .
Here,Fowle, in presenting hisviewthat Hawar shouldbe regardedas belongingto Bahrainadds
that "theburdenof disprovinghis claim lieson the Shaikh of Qatar".He thengoeson to Saythat:
"We have heard nothingon the subjectfiom the Shaikh of Qatar,and it is quitepossible that he
may not dispute the claim ofthe Shaikh of Bahrain." (Memorialof Qatar, Ann.111.107,Vol.7,
11.But this,1would submit,is whollydisingenuous. The reasonwhytheBritishauthorities
in the Gulf had heard nothingfromthe Ruler ofQataron the 1936 Bahrainiclaimof sovereignty
over the Hawar Islands, is thatthey were carefullykeeping secretfiom him the existence of the
Bahraini claim first put fonvard in writing in Belgrave's letter to the Political Agent of
28April 1936.
12.Theremay well of coursehave beenmuttenngs in Bahrainin the earlymonths of 1936
that the Ruler of Bahrain maintained aclaimto the Hawar Islands,but this claimhadneverbeen
treated seriously, nor had it ever been subjectedto any critical scrutiny. Belgravehimself had
nevervisited theHawar Islands, whichpresurnablyfiguredaspartof the RulerofBahrain's"rather
nebulous claim tocertainareasonthe Arabcoast"to which referenceis madein Laithwaite'sletter
to Starling of 3 May 1933 (Memorialof Qatar, Ann.111.84,Vol.6, p. 431). It is obvious that
Laithwaitein 1933did not attachthe slightest importance to this"rather nebulousclaim" of the
Ruler of Bahrain, which, strangely enough,only began to surface in the wake of the Ruler's
discovery that the "unallottedarea" of Bahrain for whichhe could offer a new oil concession
comprised lessthan half of the land temtory of the mainBahrainIsland, Muharraq,Sitrah,Nabi
SalihandUmmNaa'san.
.
13.WhatProfessorReismandoesnot discussin his commentson the relevanceof the 1936
"provisionaldecision",is that that "provisional decision" obviocreated an expectationamong
British officiais dealing with this matter that the eventual finaldecision would be in Bahrain's
favour. Now this inevitablygave rise to some of the examplesof pre-judgmentof the issue of
sovereigntyoverthe Islandsto whichQatarhasinevitablydrawnattention. The 1936 "provisionaldecision"and thequestionof consent
to arbitration: informed consent
14.1return to the argumentadvancedby ProfessorReisman. He argues first of al1that the
Ruler of Qatardidin fact consentto the supposedarbitrationby virtueof his letter of 10May 1938.
But this of courseignores the oralrotest againstBahrainibuildingactivities on Hawar which the
Ruler had made to Weightmanin February 1938and which Weightman hadnot even reported to
his superior. Evenmore significantly,it ignoresthe BritishGovernrnent's"provisionaldecision"of
1936in favour of the Bahrainiclaim to the HawarIslands, a provisional decision, which 1would
repeat,was reached exparte and without any indication to the Ruler of Qatar that the Ruler of
Bahrainhad advanceda claimto the Islands,and you will recall,Members ofthe Court,that many
of these islands lay within the 3-mile belt of territorialsea appertaining tothe mainland of Qatar.
In thelight of thefacts now known to us, there is no way in which the Ruler of Qatar'sletter of
10May 1938, can be interpreted as a true consent by the Ruler to arbitration by the British
Governmentoverthe disputeasto title overthe HawarIslands. Nor, indeed, can his later letter of
27 May 1938be so interpreted. Incidentally,Professor Reismanis rnistaken in thinkingthat prior
to 27 May 1938,the Ruler of Qatar had been "informedof the claimsand evidence submittedby
Bahrain" (CR2000112,p. 49,para. 18). Hehad certainly not received acopy of Belgrave'sletterof
28 April 1936to Loch advancingthe Ruler of Bahrain'sclaim to the Hawar Islands. Al1he had
received wasWeightman'sletterto him of20 May 1938,whichwasfar from forthcomingaboutthe
"claimsand evidencesubmittedby Bahrain". Indeed,al1it sayson this aspect is the following,and
here 1am quoting fromWeightman'sletterto theRulerof Qatarof27 May 1938:
"1remember thatyou mentioned the questionof Hawar to me when 1last met
you in Dohah and at that time 1 said to you that 1 understood that the Bahrain
Govemment claimedtheIslands andwere in factin occupationof them. It is indeed a
fact that by their forma1occupation of the Islands for some time past the Bahrain
Government possess a prima facie claim to them ..." (Memorial of Qatar,
Ann.111.156V , ol. 7, p.279.)
15. Thiscan hardly be saidto amountto an indicationof the evidence being relied upon by
Bahrain to support its claim. Indeed, the Court will certainly remember that Weightman did
everyhng in his power to prevent the Ruler of Qatar from even seeing Bahrain's eventual
"counter-claim", and wasonly overruled on the advice of Mr. Beckett, at that time Second Legal
Adviserto the Foreign Office. Norof course had theRuler of Qatarbeen informedthat the BritishGovemment had already, nearly two years previously (on 9 July 1936), made a "provisional
decision" in favour of the Bahraini claimto the Hawar Islands. 1suspectthat ProfessorReisman
would in factagree withme that anyconsentby a State - anyconsent by a State- to participate
in a process of arbitrationwhich wouldresult in an award havingthe forceof resjudicata has to be
an informedconsent. Thereis certainlyno way inwhich it canbe maintainedthat,by hisletters of
10and 27May 1938,the Ruler of Qatarhad, in full knowledgeof al1the circumstances, accepted
that the British Govemment should act as sole arbitrator in a process which would result in a
binding award havingthe force of resjudicata. Lookat what hadbeen deliberately withheldfrom
him:
- First, that more than two years previously (on 28 April 1936),Belgrave had presentedto the
PoliticalAgent a forma1claim of title to the Hawar Islandson behalf of the Rulerof Bahrain,
this claim of title being presented andquotefrom the letter, "in connectionwith the present
negotiations for an oil concession over the territory of Bahrain whichis not included in the
1925oil concession".
- Second, that the British Governrnenthad, without informing the Ruler of Qatar even of the
existenceof this claimof title onbehalf of Bahrain,had provisionally decided nearlytwo years
previously(on 9 July 1936)that, onthe basisofthe evidenceat presentbeforethem, "it appears
to them that Hawar belongs to the Sheikh of Bahrein, and that the burden of disproving his
claim would lie on any other potential claimant" (Memorialof Qatar, Ann. 111.110,Vol. 7,
p. 47).
Would the Ruler of Qatar have consented in May 1938 to the appointment of the British
Govemment as sole arbitrator in an agreed processof arbitrationif he had been made fully aware
of these two vital facts? Surely, the answer must be "No". Qatar entirely denies the Bahraini
assertion that, by virtue of his letters of 10 and 27 May 1938, the Ruler of Qatar indirectly
consentedto a processofarbitrationwiththe BritishGovernmentactingas solearbitrator.
16.And it is pointlessfor Bahrainto pretendthat neitherthe Ruler of Bahrainnorthe British
Govermnent was aware at the time that the Ruler of Qatar also claimed the Hawar Islands.
Already, as 1have alreadysaid this morning, in 1936,Fowle had acknowledgedin hisletterto the
Secretaryof State for Indiaof 25 May 1936 (Memorial of Qatar, Ann. III.107, Vol.7, p. 3l), thatthe Ruler of Qatar was also at least a potential claimant to the Hawar Islands, since he was
proposing"that the burden of disprovingthe[Rulerof Bahrain's]claim should lie on the Ruler of
Qatar". There is absolutely nothing in the record corresponding tothe assurances given by the
Rulers of Sharjah and Dubai in 1955 and 1956 that they wouldnot contest the decisions of the
Political Agent in the Trucial States as regards the boundaries betweenthe two Emirates. The
Rulerof Dubai'sconsentis embodiedin his assuranceof 18March 1955,recorded in the Award of
the Courtof Arbitrationin Dubai/Sharjahin the followingterms:
"1herebyundertake on behalfof myself and al1my successorsas Rulersof the
Emirate of Dubai that we will not dispute or object to any decision that may be
decided by the Political Agent regarding the questionof the boundaries between our
Emirateandthe Emirateof Sharjah." (91ILR,p. 577.)
A similarassurancewas givenby the Rulerof Dubaiwithrespectto the boundaryin the interioron
14June 1956;andtheseassuranceswereparalleledby correspondingassurancesgivenby the Ruler
of Sharjah. Mr.President, Membersof the Court,you will look in vain through al1the voluminous
documentation presentedto the Court in the present proceedings to fmd sirnilar expressionsof
consent given by the Ruler of Qatar or the Ruler of Bahrain to the British Governrnentbefore it
embarkedon the enquiryby Mr.Weightrnanin 1938and 1939. And the Court will certainlyrecall
that, in 1964,r.ChristopherLongof theForeign Office,in summarizingthe events of 193811939,
admitted:
"Neitherof the two Rulerswas asked beforehandto promise his consent to the
award, norafterwardsto give it. HMGsimply'made'the award. Although it followed
theform of anarbitrationto someextent, itwas imposed fromabove, and no question
of its validityor othenvisewas raised." (Replyof Bahrain,An.. 2, Vol. 2,p. 4.)
Qatar mustleave it to the Courtto determinethe accuracy ofthis summary. Qatar believes that it
doesfairlyrepresentwhat happenedinthe contextof the "enquiry"conductedby Weightrnan.
17. Indeed, it is again the mere existence of the "provisional decision" of 1936 which
undermines the argument advancedby Mr.Paulsson and ProfessorReisman aboutthe burden of
proof. If an "arbitration"is aboutto get under way, it wouldsurely be rather odd if the supposed
"arbitrator"had already,unknownto oneofthe parties,madea "provisional decision"on the merits
of the case in favour of the other party. And yet this is precisely what happened in this case.
ProfessorReismanmay put on an air of injured innocencein seeking to defend the indefensible,but it will hardly convince those prepared to read tlie full documentary evidencein the British
archivesaboutthe 193811 939 Weightmanenquiryor,as our opponentswouldhave it, "arbitration".
.L
Failuretoprovidereasons
18. It is, however, in relation to Qatar's charge that the 1939 British "decision" was
unsupported by reasons that 1 genuinely,quite genuinely, fail to understand ProfessorReisman's
response. He says,andhere 1quote fromCR2000112(p. 55,para.35):
"This assertionis simply factually incorrect. Inretrospect, it is clear that the
process of reachingthe award is comprised of two documents ... The first was the
eight-page, detailedreview of the evidence by Sir Hugh Weightman to the Political
Resident, of 22 April 1939.. .the second is the shorter communication to the
respective Rulers fromthe PoliticalResident on 11 July 1939, whichis plainly based
upon andimplementsWeightman's memorandum of law andfact, inno way departing
fromit."
1will come back in a moment to the so-called "memorandumof fact and law". First, 1want to
concentrateon what ProfessorReisman leaves unsaid. He fails to mentionthat Weightman'sletter
of 22 April 1939was giventhe securityclassification "Confidential"and accordinglydid not come
into the publicdomain until 1970, some30 yearslater. It was not, 1repeat, not comrnunicatedto
the Ruler of Qatar as an enclosure to the Political Resident's brief letter to the Ruler of
11July 1939. ProfessorReismanwill,1amsure,be farniliarwithLord Mansfield'sfarnousdictum:
"Justice must not onlybe done, but mustbe seen to be done." Thejustification for the rule that
arbitral awards mustbe reasoned is to ensurethat the losing party is made awareof the groundson
which the decision has been taken. This clearly did not happen in July 1939, when the only
conclusion notified to the Ruler of Qatar was that the British Governmenthad decided, after
"carefulconsideration"ofthe evidence submittedby both Rulers,that the HawarIslands belongto
the State ofBahrainandnotto the Stateof Qatar. 1have already explainedtothe Court, duringmy
first-round presentation on the 1936 and 1939 British decisions (CR200017, pp. 45-54 and
CR 200018, pp.8-16),thenature of that "carefulconsideration". In passing, 1may note thatneither
ProfessorReisman nor Mr.Paulsson sought to respond to my suggestion that, before
recommending to London that the HawarIslands be allocated to Bahrain provisionally,Loch or
Fowle shouldhave investigatedat least someof the claims and assertionsmade in Belgrave'sletter
to Loch of 28 April 1936; but neither of them were prepared to do so and, unlikely as it may be,neither of them seemseven to havebeen prepared topause in order to consult highly relevantpast
papers ontheir ownfiles.
Proceduralviolations intheconductof the1939proceedings
19. Professor Reisman'sresponseto Qatar's allegation that Weightmancomrnittedserious
procedural violations inthe conductof what Bahrain says was an arbitration and what Qatarsays
was an "enquiry"is interesting. Heanswers the most insignificant ofhese allegationsand sirnply
ignores the more serious. 1do not of course dispute that anumber of intemational administrative
tribunals do not have oral hearings and do not provide an opportunity for the examination or
cross-examinationof witnesses as tomatters of fact; nor do 1suggestfor a moment that thefailure
to provide these facilities wouldprovidegroundsfor seekingto invalidate their awards. But here
we are confrontedwithsomethingverydifferentand something much more disturbing. This was a
process embarkedupon by the BritishGovemmentwithoutthe consent of either of the twoRulers
concemed. The British Governmentassumed that it was entitled at the time to determinewith
binding effect a dispute as to sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, title to these islands being
contested between thetwo sheikhdomsof Bahrain and Qatar. No thought seems to have been
given to the questionwhether, in the light ofthe status of the two sheikhdomsat the time andtheir
relationshipwith Britainas the ProtectingPower, such a determinationcould properly be madeby
the BritishGovemmentwithouttheexpressconsentof bothRulers.
20. Even supposing that the Court were to hold, contrary to Qatar'ssubrnission,that the
Ruler of Qatar did consent to the British Government's actingas sole arbitrator in a process of
arbitration,there are othereriousproceduralviolationsin the conduct of the Weightman enquiry
in 1939which preclude,in Qatar's view,the British Government'sdecision of 11July 1939,fiom
being treated as an arbitral award havingthe force of resjudicataO.ur opponents invited us to
look carefully at what ProfessorReisman terms Weightman's"memorandum of fact and law"
(Memorial of Qatar, Ann. 111.195,Vol. 7, p. 497), and that is what 1 now propose to do. If
ProfessorReismanis satisfied thatthis constitutedin his words "a very careful examinationof the
evidenceand of reasonsand amplyfulfilledthe requirementfor a reasoned decision in arbitrations
of the time"(CR2000112,pp. 55-56,para. 36),then he and 1 must inevitably continueto disagree.Let us look- and 1 take this simply by way of example- at the fundamentalquestion: what
documentaryandother evidenceshould anarbitratortakeinto account?
21. In paragraph 2 of his letter to Fowle of 22April 1939(the so-called "memorandum of
law and fact"), Weightman seeks to list what he characterizes as "the documents in this case"
(Memorialof Qatar, Ann.111.195V , ol. 7, p. 497). He lists five such documents andQatar would
simply point out that one out of the five documents in this list, the so-called "prelirninary
statement"by Bahrain, had been deliberately withheld from the Ruler of Qatar. So also had the
initialelgrave letter to the Political Agent of 28 April 1936, which had formulated the Bahrain
claim to the Hawar Islands. The denial of these two documents to the Ruler of Qatar was a
fundamentalbreach of the principle ofequality of arms,since the Rulerof Qatar had inthe course
of the "enquiry", on several occasions pleaded with Weightman to be informed of the grounds
whichthe Rulerof Bahrainhadinvoked tosustainhisclaim oftitle to the HawarIslands.
22. The fact thatthese important documentswhich contain evidence advancedon behalf of
the Ruler of Bahrain werewithheld fromthe other claimant- the Ruler ofQatar - is sufficientin
itself to render invalid any subsequentdecision on the matter of the Hawar Islandsin favour of
Bahrain.
23. Thereis also the considerationthat Weightman,in his letter of 22 April 1939,took into
accountas evidencematerialswhich had not evenbeen putto the Rulerof Qatar,and to whichthe
Ruler of Qatar otherwise had no access, namely, statementsin Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian
Gu% Oman and Arabia, at that tirne, in 1939, a confidential document; and, also, he took into
account as evidence Agency archives dating fiom 1909- again, archives to which the Ruler of
Qatar hadno access; and he took into account his own "knowledge"derived fiom two brief visits
to Hawar in 1938 and 1939after the Bahraini "occupation" ofthe islands in 1937 (Memorialof
Qatar, para.6.93).
24. Weightrnanwas not of course a lawyer, andthe overridingimportanceof maintaininga
stance of complete imparîialityand objectivity during the course of his "enquiry" may not have
been sufficientlyexplainedto him. Evenso,his conductofthe "enquiry"in 1938and 1939was, as
is onlytoo apparent,considerablyless than satisfactory. The link betweenthe1936"provisionaldecision" and thefinaldecisionof 11July 1939
25. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, the Court may well conclude that the procedures
followedby the Bntish Governmentbetween 1936and 1939to determine the disputed questionof
title to the Hawar Islandswere flawedfrom the outset. The problem- the real problem- was
the coincidencein time of the pursuitof the oil concession negotiations from 1936 onwards with
the begimings of the "enquiry" into the appurtenanceof Hawar. There was no way in which
Weightman could act in a quasi-judicial manner in the "enquiry" while it was being assumed,
indeed taken for granted, in the paralleloil concessionnegotiations thatthe Ruler of Bahrainwas
the personentitledto grantan oil concessioncoveringinteraliathe HawarIslands. The only result
was the extraordinarysituationin which,in May andJune 1938,Weightman and Fowlecanbe seen
combiningtheir roles as advisersto the Secretaryof State for India in Londonas to the divisionby
the Ruler of Bahrain of his unallottedarea, includingthe HawarIslands,with invitingthe Ruler of
Qatar to state his case on the ownership of Hawar (see Reply of Qatar, paras.4.219-4.249,
especiallythe correspondencereferredto in paras.4.227and 4.233).
26. Theonly satisfactory solution,Mr. President,Membersof the Court, would have beento
reverse the priorities- that is to Say,initially to determine the question of title to the Hawar
IslandsasbetweenBahrainand Qatarbefore embarkingon any oil concession negotiations overthe
"unallottedarea". Thisis whattheBntish authoritiesshouldhave given priorityto alreadyin 1936.
The authoritiesin the Gulfand in Londoncertainlyknew in 1936,even before a claim tothe Hawar
Islands was advanced on behalf of the Ruler of Bahrain,that the Ruler of Qatar believed that the
Islands belonged to him: otherwise, why would Fowle, when recommending that the British
Governmentmake a "provisionaldecision"in favourof Bahrain,putthe "burdenof disproving"the
Ruler of Bahrain'sclaimontheRulerof Qatar?
27. Altematively, the British authorities could have permitted the negotiations for an oil
concession over the "unallottedarea" to proceed in 1936,but excluding the Hawar Islands from
that "unallotted area" at leastntil the dispute over title to the islands had been resolved. This
would certainlyhave meanta delayin the exploitationof anypotential sourcesof oil on the Hawar
Islands,butit would havegivenlegalsecurityto whicheverRulerit was determinedhad title to the
islands. 28. Fowle, as Political Resident, eventuallyrecognizedthis, buttoo late.he action which
he recommendedin 1938 as part of his initial proposals to solve the Hawar dispute - that he
shouldwrite a secondleîter to the Rulerof Bahrainaskinghim to postpone negotiations with the
oil companies until the ownership of Hawar and Fasht Dibal had been decided- might have
workedhad he recommended itin 1936. Sucha recommendationcould have avoided theissuance
of a "provisionaldecision"on Hawarin favour of Bahrainanda continuationof the oil concession
negotiations on the assumption that the Ruler of Bahrain was entitled to grant a concession
coveringthe Hawar Islands as part of Bahrain's"unallottedarea". And the oil companies could
have beentold simplythat the issue of which of the two sheikhdoms - Bahrainor Qatar- had
title to the disputed islands must first be settled. But of course, by 1938, the oil companies
concemed were determined to have a quick solution.As the Courtwill recall, Longriggof PCL
was wholly opposedto any postponement ofthe oil concessionnegotiations in 1938, and Fowle
rapidlywithdrewthiselementofhis proposals.
Therelevanceandeffectof the1939Britishdecisioninthecurrentproceedings
29. But, Mr.President, Membersof the Court, enough of what might have been. The
question is: what legal effect shouldbe attributedin the year 2000to a decisionby the British
Governent in the year 1939on the question oftitle to the HawarIslands? In the submission of
Qatar, the Ruler of Qatar had not given his consent to any process of arbitration involving the
British Govemmentas sole arbitrator, the requirementof consentbeing that of informedconsent.
In thealternative,Qatar submitsthat,evenifthe Courtwere to findthat informedconsenthad been
given,the 1939 decisionwouldstill notbe bindingon Qatarby reasonof the procedural violations
in the conductof the enquirywhichQatarhas invoked. In either case,the resultwouldbe that the
1939 decision was not opposableto Qatar as a binding arbitral awardor administrative decision.
At the very most, the 1939decision is no morethan a fact in the present case. It is part of the
record, butnot bindingas an arbitral awardor as an administrativedecision. In particular,it is not
resjudicata.
30. Mr. President,Membersof the Court, thatconcludesmy presentationthis moming. As
thisis the last occasiononwhich1will be appearingbeforeyou, atleast in the present proceedings,1would liketo expressmysincerethanksto you, Mr. President,andto al1the otherMembersofthe
Court, fortheunfailingpatience and courtesywith which you have always been prepared to hear
me. May 1 suggest, Mr.President, that you now cal1 on ProfessorQuéneudecwho will be
addressing you on themaritime delimitation,but youmay think that, as the time is now just after
11o'clock,it mightbepreferableto take an earlypause for coffeeand then resumethereafter. It is
entirelyup to you,r.President.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, sirIan. La Cour va suspendremaintenantpour unquart
d'heure. Etnous attendonsde passer de la terre versla mer.
L'audienceestsuspenduede 11h 1 Oà Il h 25.
Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. Je donne maintenant la parole au
professeur Jean-PierreQuéneudec.
M. QUENEUDEC :
LA DÉLIMITATIONMARITIME
Monsieurleprésident, MadameetMessieurslesjuges,
1.Il me revient de fairele point en matière de délimitmaritime. Fairele point:si c'est
là un impératif essentieldans toute navigation, il s'impose ici d'autant plus que, pendant le
premier tour des plaidoiries, la Partie advarcherché,semble-t-ilà accréditerl'idéeque nous
avionsperdu le nord, quenotre compas gyroscopiquenous faisaitmettre le cap sur des mirages,en
sommequenotre boussolejuridique était totalementdéréglée.
2. Je voudraistout de suite rassurer lesconseils de Bahreinqui se sont exprimés sujet.
Qatar ne cherche nullement à provoquer un grand schisme dans le droit des délimitations
maritimes. Qatar n'ajamais prétendu qu'il convenaite renverserles principesétablisdu droit de
la mer et qu'il fallait trancher la présente affairecomme si la mer dominait la terre. Qatar ne
considère pas en particulier que l'application en l'espèce du principe de non-empiètement
conduirait inévitablement ce qui a étéappelé del'autre côté dela barre «un révisionnismede
vaste envergure))(CR 2000115,p.36,par. 44). Qatar n'estimepas davantagequela mise en Œuvrede la méthode consistantà tracerune frontièremaritimeentre côtesprincipalesse traduirait par«un
révisionnismeterritorialà grande échelled'un bout de la planète à l'autre))(ibid., p. 49, par. 67).
Ce sont là certainementdes formules où l'exagération occupe une grande place. Et, commedisait
Talleyrand, (tout ce qui estexagéréest insignifiant)).
3. Au risque de décevoir noséminents contradicteurs,il me faut ajouterque nous sommes
entièrement d'accord avec eux sur une chose : le problème de la délimitation maritime esu tn
problème seconddans la présenteinstance. Un problème second,mais non pas un problème
secondaire. Il est second en ce sens qu'il ne pourra être résolu par aour qu'aprèsqu'elle aura
tranché les questions temtoriales. Comme l'a déclaréle professeur Reisman, "theCourt's
disposition of the territorial issues the Hawars and Zubarah - will significantlyaffect the
maritimeboundary"(CR2000/14,p. 34,par. 2 d)). Nouspartageonscepointde vue.
4. Cela est évidenten ce qui concerne le secteur sud de la zone de délimitation. Puisque
dans ce secteur,en effet, le tracéde la frontièremaritimedépendrade la réponsequi sera donnée à
la question de la souveraineté surles îles Hawar et sur ce que Bahreïn,a appelé«la régionou la
zonede Zubarah)).
5. Dans le secteur nord, le tracé dela lignede délimitationpourra également être affecté, de
manière indirecte,par la solutionapportéeàces questionsterritoriales. Il pourraen être ainsi ans
la mesure où la Cour, conformémentàunejurisprudencebien établie,aura àcŒurde dégager une
solution qui soit globalement équitablepour les deux Parties. La Cour sait mieux que personne
que, dans l'ordre international, le règlement judiciaire n'estqu'un succédanéau règlement
diplomatiquepar voie de négociations.
6. S'ily a bien accordentre les deux Etats pourreconnaîtrele caractèresecond ou dérivé de
la délimitation maritime en l'espèce, le premier tour des plaidoiries a toutefois confumé
l'opposition radicale deQataret de Bahreïn surtouslesautres aspectsdu problème de délimitation
de leurs espaces maritimes respectifs. Cette oppositionse manifeste principalement de deux
façons. Elle apparaît, d'une part,dans la vision qu'ontles deux Etats de la situation de fait qui
caractérise la présentedélimitation.Elle se traduit,d'autre part, dans l'applicationqu'ils font des
règlesdu droit de la mer enl'espèce. 7. Je me propose donc d'envisager successivement les éléments de fe atitles considérations
de droit qui paraissent les plus remarquables,en me limitant à ce qui semble le plus important.
Autant dire qu'il ne saurait êtrequestion de reprendre dans le détailtous les points qui nous
séparentdespositionsdéfenduep sar les conseilsde Bahreïn. Et ce d'autantplus que nousy avons
déjàen grandepartierépondu, soit dansnos piècesécrites,soitdans les plaidoiries du premiertour.
Il ne saurait non plus êtrequestion de théoriserad nauseam sur les perspectives du droit de la
délimitation maritime; carles circonstancespropres à la présente affairetendenà démontrer,une
fois de plus,ue chaqueaffaire de délimitationmaritime estbienun unicum.
8. Les quelques observations qui vont suivren'ont, en conséquence,pas d'autre ambition
que de faireune miseaupoint. Voyonsd'abordlasituationde fait.
1.LA SITUATIONDE FAIT
9. Il n'est pas besoin de s'appesantir longuement surce qui a été didte l'autre côtéde la
barre. Ce qui n'a pas été dit est beaucoup plus éloquentet est tout à fait révélatede la vision
bahreïnitedes faits etcirconstancesde l'affaire.
10. Aux yeux de Bahreïn, la situation pourrait se résumer ainsi : étant un Etat
intrinsèquementarchipélagique,la destinée de Bahreïn esdt 'incorporer sontemtoire tout élément
naturel qui apparaîtà la surface des flots, ainsi que la majeure partie de l'espace maM compris
dans la zonede délimitation.Ce serait là le fait géographique prépondéran qt,i effaceraittous les
autres. "Itsarchipelagic status is a geographicalfact", nousa-t-ondit (CR2000/14,p. 37,par. 7).
11.Pris au piègede ce refrain qu'ils ont entonnéet qui ressemble fort au chant des sirènes,
les conseils de Bahreïn n'ont pas hésité à affirmer que Qatar avait implicitement reconnu la
souverainetéde Bahreïn sur toutes les formations insulaires et autres de la zone de délimitation,
puisque, ont-ils dit, Qatarrefusait de prendre en compte ces formations pourle tracéde la ligne de
délimitation(CR2000115,p. 27, par. 26; p. 40, par.50). Il va sans dire qu'il s'agit là d'une
présentationinexactede laposition de 1'Etatde Qatar.
12.Il est inutiled'épiloguerdavantagesur la manièredontBahreïn a présenté la situatioenn
déclarantqu'il s'agissaitd'une délimitation entre un Etat continentald'une part, et un Etat
multi-insulaireou archipélagiqued'autrepart (CR2000116,p. 40,par. 1). 13. De même,il n'est pas nécessaire d'insistesrur le fait que la situation géographique de
Bahreïn n'a ici riende comparable aveccelle de la Norvège dansl'affaire desPêcheriesen 1951,
ni avec celle de laGuinée-Bissaudans l'arbitragerelatifà la frontière maritimeentre la Guinéeet
la Guinée-Bissauen 1985.
14.De façonassez étonnante,Bahreïnsemble oublierque la présenteaffairede délimitation
concernedeux Etatsriverains du golfe Arabo-Persique.
[Illustration :Generalsettingof theArabian Gufl
Plus précisément, la délimitation doit intervendiarns la partie la plus resserréedu Golfe. Il
s'agit, de surcroît, de la partie du Golfe où les eaux sont les moins profondes. Cela est
particulièrement vraidans le secteur sud,où l'on a peu de chances de rencontrer un porte-avionsou
un super-pétrolier. Dans ce secteur, la délimitationest effectivement une ((délimitationde
proximité))ou une «délimitationàbrève distance))p , our utiliser les expressionsqu'a employéesle
professeurWeil (CR 2000115,p. 18, par.4; p. 20, par. 6). On ne peut cependant pas prétendre,
comme l'a fait le conseil de Bahreïn, que «la délimitation à effectuer est essentiellement une
délimitationde mer territoriale))(ibid., p. 17,par.); car la Cour est invitéeà tracer une ligne
unique de délimitation maritime. Cet aspece tst important. Nous l'avons souligné aupremiertour
(CR2000110, p.50-51, par. 35-38). Et il convient d'envisager cetaspect dans le cadre de la
situation géographiqued'ensemble. En d'autres termes, on ne saurait perdre de vue que la ligne
unique de délimitationdoit êtretracéedansun espace maritimetrèsparticulier. Nous ne sommes
pas ici confrontés à une question de délimitation entreun archipel océanique (mid-ocean
archipelago) etun Etat côtierriverain de l'océan Atlantique.
15. D'autre part, on ne doit pas non plus oublier que l'opérationde délimitationest à
effectuer à partir des côtes, en tenant compte de leurs caractéristiques respectives.Or, partir des
côtes, c'est prendreen considération la façade côtière, c'est-à-dire lliagne de côte représesure
les cartesparletrait de côte. Nous l'avons déjà d(CR 200019,p. 40, par. 17-18). Partirdescôtes,
ce n'est pas commencer par faire intervenirune sortede «côte génétiquement modifiéec )),mmeil
existe des organismes génétiquementmodifiés doo ntparle beaucoup aujourd'hui.
16.C'est pourtant cequeBahreïnn'a cesséde faire,suivantun processustout àfait artificiel.
Qu'avons-nous entendu, en effet ? On nous a dit qu'il fallait prendre en compte «la côtejuridique)),que «la côtejuridique))d'unEtat multi-insulaire était constituée par uériede lignes
reliant entreelles les îlesetautres formationsles plus éloignée,t que les points de base pertinents
pour le tracéde la ligne de délimitation dérivaiend te «la côte juridique)) ainsi définie. Et le
professeur Reisman en a déduitque "the critical question in determiningBahrain S coast with
respect to Qatar is what are its basepoints" (CR 2000114, p. 37, par. 9). Mon ami
Michael Reismanme permettra delui faire remarquerque c'est peut-être mettre la charrue avant
lesbŒufs.
17.Quelleest, eneffet, l'implication de cettefaçon d'identifierles côtespertinen?es
[Illustration2:Basepoints usedbyBahrain (Bahrain 'judges'folders Nos. II Oand Il 1)
allegedasrepresenting thecoasts]
Les côtes se trouvent réduitesà une sériede points. Sans doute, est-ce ce à quoi on doit
parvenirpour procéder techniquement au tracé d'unle igne de délimitation. Maistoute la question
est de savoirsi ce procédtechniqueest à mettreen Œuvrecommepoint de départ de l'opératiod ne
délimitation. Enjoignant entre eux cesdifférentspoints, on voit que la prétendue((lignecôtière))
de Bahrein esttout à fait irréelleet n'a aucun rapport avec la véritable façadecôtièrede Bahreïn.
Peut-on, dès l'abord,réduireainsi les côtes ? Partir de là, n'est-ce pas commencer par fausser
complètement la situation géographique ? La représentationdes côtes des deux Etats par ces
différentspoints donne-t-elleune vue de la réalitécôtière,telle qu'elle apparaîten particulier sur
lescartesmarines ?
18. Souleverces différentesquestions, c'est du mêmc eoup montrer le caractère totalement
artificiel de la perceptionqu'ont nos adversaires dela situationconcrète. De surcroît, cette façon
d'aborderleproblème de délimitation esn ton seulement inacceptable,mais elle est aussi viciéepar
le fait que Bahreïnpart d'unpostulat- indémontrableet indémontré-que tout ce qui se trouve
entre les côtes des deux Etats est nécessairement placsous sa souveraineté. Ce faisant, Bahrein
feint d'oublierque Qatarpeut tout autantprétendre àun titre surplusieurshauts-fonds découvrants
existantdansla zonededélimitation.
19.Mais cette façonde faireprésente incontestablement pour Bahrein un avantage. Elle lui
évitedeprocéder àune étude comparative des côtespertinentes desdeux Etats. Elle luipermet,au
contraire, de nier l'existenced'une quelconque disproportionentre les longueurs côtières. Il estassez significatif de relever que Bahreïn ne s'est guère préoccupé d'évoquer ln aotion de
proportionnalité,soittitre de facteur, soiten tant que testdu résultat équitable. Plus exactement,
Bahreïnn'a mentionnéla proportionnalité qu'en une seule occasion, en prétendatu'ily avaitune I
stricteproportionnalitéentre leslignesde côtes de Qataret de Bahreïn.
[Illustration3:Map 113ofBahrain's judges'folders showingproportionalityof
Bahrain LandQatar'scoastlines]
20. Commeonle voit surla carte 113du dossier d'audience présentp éar Bahreïnaupremier
tour, deux lignes rouges, de longueur rigoureusement égale, oné t tétracées. L'une, à droite,
représenteplusoumoins fidèlementce que nousavonsnous-mêmec sonsidéré commé e tantla côte
pertinente de Qatar. L'autre,àgauche, est censée représentelra côte de Bahreïn. Mais c'est tout
de mêmeune ligneassez curieuse, et ceci a un triple point de vue. D'une part, hormis les îles de
Janan et Hawar,elleprend appuiuniquement sur deuxhauts-fondsdécouvrants, Qit'aa tsh Shajarah
etFasht ad Dibal. D'autre part, elle est tracéeen prenantappui sur des formations naturelles dont
Qatar a démontré par ailleurs qu'elleslui appartenaient. Enfin etsurtout,cette prétenduegnede
côte» court principalementsur des étenduesd'eau. Qu'importe ! Cela permet à Bahreïn de dire
qu'il n'y a aucunedifférenceentre les deux côtes. Mais qui ne voit qu'il s'agit,une fois de plus,
d'untour de passe-passe ?
21. L'attirance que Bahreïn ressent manifestement pour la prestidigitationne se limite
cependantpas à la manipulation des élémentdse fait. Elle se retrouve également ans la manière
dejongler avecplusieursconsidérationsd'ordre juridique.
II.L'APPLICATIO ENNL'ESPÈCE DESRÈCLES DUDROITDE LAMER
22. Une grandepartie desexposésprésentéa su nomde Bahreïnsur les questionsproprement
juridiques que l'onrencontredanscet aspectde l'affairea porté surlesnotions d'îleet de haut-fond
découvrant. A travers l'examen de la définitionde ces notions, le débata aussi porté sur la
fonction assignéeaux expressions ((laisse de pleineer» et ((laissede basse mer». Il ressortà
l'évidence, quenosadversairesont, à cetteoccasion,tentéde semerletrouble dansles esprits.
23. Et,à proposde trouble,il en estun sur lequelje souhaiteraisattirerl'attention dela Cour.
Le 13juin, au cours de l'audience de l'après-midi,l'un des conseils de Bahreïn a expressémentdéclaré :"Theinternationallegalconceptionofan islanddid not clystallize untiI1982". J'avoue
avoir éprouvé un certainétonnementdevantune telle affirmation.
Le professeurReismanvoudrabienm'excuser de luifaire remarquer que la cristallisation de
la notionjuridique d'île n'est nullement le résultat dela Troisième Conférencdes Nations Unies
sur le droit de lamer. Les auteurs de la convention de 1982ont simplementrepris dans l'article
12 1,paragraphe 1,la définitionde l'île quedonnaitdéjàl'article 10de la convention deGenèvede
1958sur la mertemtoriale. Onpourrait même à, la limite, faire remonter la cristallisationde cette
notion àla conférence de codificationréunieàLa Hayeen 1930sous les auspicesde la Société des
Nations.
Dès lors, tenter d'expliquer les incertitudes portant sur le statut juridique de certaines
"maritimf eeatures"par la consécrationtardiveourécentede la notionjuridique d'île relève,j'aile
regretde le dire,de la pure fantaisie.
24. Qui plus est, partantde l'idéejuste selon laquellela laisse de pleine mer est pertinente
pourdéterminersiune particularitémaritime est une île, le professeurReismannous a ditque,si tel
étaitle cas, la laisse de pleinemer étaitalors aussitôt remplacéepar la laisse de basse mer pour
identifierla ligne de côte sur cette île ou pour déterminerl'existence d'un haut-fond découvrant
que le droit internationalautorise prendrecomme pointde base pour la déteminationde lacôte
(CR2000/14, p. 39, par. 14). C'est, semble-t-il, vouloirallerun peu vite en besogne. Il aurait
peut-êtreétébon de s'interrogerun peu plus sur la fonction exercépar la laissede haute mer dans
le droitde la mer contemporain,avant de lafairedisparaîtrerapidement,commepar enchantement.
25. La même remarque peutêtrefaite, jusqu'à un certainpoint, à propos de la question,
poséepar le professeur Weil, de savoir ce qu'il faut entendre par (terre)) et par ((territoire)).Il a
rappeléque Qatar déniaitcette qualitéde terre aux hauts-fonds découvrants. Ce qui est exact.
Cependant,emporté par son élan,il a affmé :«pourQatar leshauts-fondsdécouvrantsne sont pas
de laterre;ils sontde la mer,ils sont de'eau))(CR2000115,p. 26,par. 22). Pour êtrerelativement
aimableet plaisante, la formulen'en estpas moinsinexacte. Il suffit d'avoir quelquesnotions de
navigation maritime poursavoir qu'un découvrantou une roche affleurante ne sont certainement
pasdel'eau et qu'il vautmieuxles éviter. 26. Ce que lesconseils de Bahreïn ontomisde préciser,c'est queledroit de lamer assigne à
la laisse de pleine mer une fonction spécifique. Elle permet, en effet, et elle seule permet de
déterminersi l'on est en présence d'uneterre, d'une terrafirma, c'est-à-dired'une terre émergée.
Le recours à la notion de laisse de pleine mer sert, autrement dià,déterminerce qui constituele
temtoire terrestre d'unEtat côtier,au sens oùl'entend en particulierl'article 121,paragraphe2, de
la conventiondesNationsUnies sur ledroitde la mer. Il suffit,pours'enconvaincre, dese référer
auDictionnaire hydrographiquede l'Organisation hydrographique internationale. Sous la rubrique
((territoireterrestre)),on peut y :i«en droitde la mer, temtoire insulaireou continentalémergé à
maréehaute» (OHI,Dictionnaire hydrographique, première partie,vol. 2,publication spécialeno
32, 5" éd.,1998). La version anglaise de ce mêmedictionnaire, publiéequatre ans auparavant,
indique, sous l'expression "land territory", "Continental or insular land masses that are above
water at high tide"(IHO,HydrographicDictionary, 5' ed., 1994).
27. Les hauts-fonds découvrants ne sontcertainementpas de l'eau. Mais ils ne sont pasnon
plus regardéscomme appartenant au territoire terrestre d'un Etat. Ce n'est pas parce que, dans
certaines situations et sous certaines conditions,un Etat côtier peut utiliserla laisse de basse mer
surun haut-fonddécouvrantafin de fixer la limiteextérieurede sa mertemtoriale cen'estpas pour
cela que ce haut-fonddécouvrantdoit être considéré comme faisant partie dtu emtoire terrestrede
1'Etatcôtier. Celane suffit pas à en faire un élémenr teprésentatifde la côte d'un Etat auxfins
d'unedélimitationmaritime avecun Etatvoisin.
28.Mais il en découleune autre conséquence,sur laquelle Qatar adéjàattirél'attention de la
Cour et qu'il suffira doncde rappelerd'un mot. Ne faisant pas partiedu temtoire terrestre d'un
Etat, un haut-fond découvrant est insusceptible d'appropriation. La position juridique
traditionnelle, que Qatar s'est bornéà appliquerici, repose d'ailleurs sur la simple raison debon
sens qu'aucuneactivitésouverainenepeut vraiments'exercer lespiedsdansl'eau. Parconséquent,
toutes les prétendueseffectivitésalléguées par Bahreïn pour affirmer sa souveraineté,notamment
sur Fasht Dibal, ne peuvent pas, en tout étatde cause, êtreprises en considération. D'autanpt lus ,
qu'elles sont de surcroît hautement discutables. Ni l'érection dp eiliers ou de marques, ni la
conduite de patrouilles maritimes, ni les activités depêche nesont juridiquement créatricesd'effectivités,ainsi que Qatar l'aprécédemment démont( réR2000/5, p. 40, par. 22; CR2000/17,
p. 30-33,par. 16et suiv.).
29. Maintenant, en ce qui concerneplus particulièrementdeux de ces hauts-fondsqui sont
revendiquéspar la Partie adverse et que Bahreïn souhaite voir jouer un rôle dans la présente
délimitationj,e voudraisapporter quelques précisions supplémentaires.
30. S'agissant en premier lieu de Qit'at Jaradah, tout ou presque a déjà été dit. Je ferai
simplementobserver que, dans sa plaidoirie du 13juin, le professeur Reisman a reconnuque les
cartes del'amirautébritanniquene caractérisaient pasJaradahcomme une île. De façon bizarre, il
a pourtanttenté d'expliquerque cela étaitdû au fait que : "Therewere inconsistentreports about
the status of Qit'atJaradah,due. .. to inclariiyin the legal conceptionof an island. .." Et il a
ajouté qu'àl'avenir les cartes nautiques - sans toutefois préciserlesquelles- indiqueraientque
c'est bien une île (CR2000/14,p. 46, par. 29). La Cour apprécierasi l'on peut se fonder sur des
cartes quin'ontpasencorevu lejour.
31.Ainsi que nous avonseu l'occasion dele soulignerau premier tour,la situationphysique
et, partant,l'éventuel statujturidique, de Qit'ataradahn'ontcessé d'êtrs eoumisàde perpétuelles
variations. Il n'en demeure pas moins que, sur les cartes nautiques,Jaradah a constamment été
décritcommeun haut-fond découvrant.
32.Quant à Fashtal Azrn,onpeut se limitera troisbrèvesremarques.
33. Le professeur Reisman a critiquéle rapport établipar le professeur Rabenhorst,en
arguant notamment du fait que celui-ci s'étaitfondé sur des cartes terrestres publiéesen 1977et
non sur des cartes marines. Sansentrer dansune discussionau sujet de l'existenceou de l'absence
de levéshydrographiques qui auraient permisde donner une représentationde cette étroitezone
comprise entre l'île de Sitrah et Fasht al Azm, je me bornerai a signaler le fait que les cartes
terrestres utiliséespar le professeur Rabenhorst coïncidentde façon quasi parfaite avec les cartes
marines dela régionconcernée.
34.La deuxièmeremarque quel'on peut faire, s'agissant toujours de Fasht al Azm,a traitau
contenud'une étudetechnique rédigée en mars 1982par uneressortissantede 1'Etatde Bahreïn. Il
s'agit d'une étude intitulée ((Activitédse dragage et d'assèchementle long des côtes de Bahreïn»,
qui a été reproduiteen annexe au contre-mémoirede Qatar et que Bahreïn paraît avoir négligée(contre-mémoirede Qatar, annexe IV.24, vol.4, trad. fr.p. 79, p. 167de l'original anglais). On
peut y lire,à propos de la zone asséchée du site des usines pétrochimiques,qu'elle «est reliéeà
Sitrapar une chaussée enremblaid'accès de 1250 mètresde long)).Puis, l'étude poursui t
«Deux chenaux seront dragués. Un des chenaux sera utilisépour l'eau de
refroidissement... L'autrechenal est un passagealternatifau chenal existantpour les
pêcheurs, quiest comblé à certains endroitspar le remblai d'assèchement.» (Ibid.,
trad. fr.p. 100,p. 187del'originalanglais ;lesitaliques sont de nous.)
Letexte de cette étudefait expressémentrenvoi à la figure 9 quiy est incorporée.Et la figure 9 en
questionest un croquis descriptifétablile 7 mai 1981.Ce croquismontre entraits tiretésce quiest
appeléle «chenal pour les pêcheurs actuellement fermé))et, un peu plus loin sur le croquis, le
«chenal alternatifpour les pêcheurs)).Je prie respectueusementla Courdejeter un coup d'Œilàce
croquis (contre-mémoirede Qatar,vol. 4, trad. fi. p. 101,p. 188de l'originalanglais). Quoi qu'il
en soit,l'existence d'uneséparationnaturelleentre Sitraet Fasht alzm se trouve semble-t-il ainsi
confirmée.
35. A titre de dernièreremarque au sujet de Fasht alAn, il convient derappeler, une fois
encore,que Bahreintend à endonnerune imagetrompeuse.
[Illustration4:BritishAdmiraltyChart 37901
Surles cartesprésentéep sarlaPartie adverse,Qit'atat Shajarahest attaché à Fasht alAzm. Ce qui
n'est nullement le cas, commele prouve la carte marine anglaise laplus récente,à savoir la carte
no3790 de 1993corrigéeau débutde cette année.Surcette carte,on voit nettement qu'ils'agitde
deux hauts-fondsdistincts,l'espaceles séparantétantparsemé de têtes de corail.
36. J'en viensàprésent, Monsieurleprésident, aux critiques quinous ont été adresséesen ce
qui concerne la méthodede délimitation préconisé par Qatar. On nous a reproché, enparticulier,
d'avoir recours à l'idée du tracé d'une ligne provisoire d'équidistanceétablie en prenant
uniquement en considération les côtes principalesdes deux Etats,c'est-à-dire d'avoireu recours à
la méthodequ'on aappelée"mainland-to-mainland".Cetteméthode,nous a-t-on dit, ne seraitpas
seulement ambiguë -on ne voit pas en quoi d'ailleurs; elle serait également inacceptable
juridiquement et politiquement (CR2000115,p. 40, 41 et 48). Mais la critique qu'en afaite de
façon éloquente monami le professeur Weil ne tient pas. Cette critique repose, en effet, tout
entièretoujours sur le mêmepostulat, qui peut s'énoncer ainsi :tous les éléments naturels situésentre la côte occidentalede Qatar et la côte orientalede Bahreïn sont sous souveraineté bahreïnite
et doivent servirde points de base pour la fixationde laontièremaritime. Partant de ce postulat,
on prétendensuite que Qatar nie cette souverainetébahreïnite parcqeu'une limite maritime tracée
en tenant comptede ces formations intermédiaires serait trop proche dea côte. Et letour estjoué.
On peut alors conclure, je cite ce qu'a déclaréle professeur Weil : «Qatar part ainsi de la
souverainetéde Bahreïn sur les formationsintermédiairespour nier cette souveraineté aunom de
sesconséquencesmaritimes))(CR 200011 5, p. 41,par. 52).
37. Or, répétons-luene fois de plus, si les droits de Bahreïn sur certainss et hauts-fonds
découvrantsne sont pas contestés,ils ne portent cependant pas sur toutes ces particularités
maritimes. Et surtout, ces différentes particularités ne sptas des éléments essentiellsorsqu'on
les replace dans lecontexte géographique général. N'y a-tp -ials d'ailleursde nombreux casdans
lesquelsune frontièremaritimeentreEtats a été établiesanstenircomptedepetitesîles ou d'îlots?
38. Quantàl'ajustement dela ligne d'équidistance que nous avons eu l'audacede suggérer
en tenant comptedes circonstancesgéographiqueset autres, il ne trouve pas davantage grâceaux
yeux de nos adversaires. Non seulement ils nient toute disparité deslongueurs côtières,mais
encore ils estiment qu'en invoquant la fameuse ligne de 1947 nous agitons un «fantôme»
(CR2000114,p. 34, par. 2) et que la référenceque nous faisons à la ligne Boggs-Kennedyn'est
rien d'autre qu'unappui sur«uneplanche ...pounie))(CR 2000116,p. 10,par. 93).
39. Constatantque le rapport Boggs-Kennedyne faisait aucune mention de la ligne tracée
par les Britanniques en 1947, le professeur Weil en a déduitque cette ligne n'avait aucune
importance puisqu'elle avait échappé dit-il«à deux experts aussi avertis des choses du Golfe»
(CR2000116,p. 10,par. 92).
40. Rappelonsque Boggset Kennedy avaientsuggéré une ligne de délimitationen sefondant
exclusivement sur des considérations géographiqueest techniques, mais en indiquant clairement
que leur but était de proposerune solution équitable. Ils ne s'étaientcertes pas fondéssur des
considérationsjuridiques, n'étantpas eux-mêmes des juristes. Mais faut-il croire que seuls des
juristes sont même de proposerune solutionéquitable ?
41. De plus, le conseil de Bahreïn s'est bien gardéde signaler qu'en 1959,soit douze ans
aprèsla ligne britannique de 1947,le mêmeKennedyfaisait expressément référence à cette lignede 1947dans la letûe qu'il adressaitau ForeignOffice. Cette lettre,d'abord publiéeen annexe au
mémoirede Qatar (mémoiredeQatar, annexeIV.223,vol. 11,p. 180,trad. fi.;p. 301de l'original
anglais),a pourtantété égalementinsérée dans ledossier d'audiencepréparé par Bahreïn (Bahrain
judges'folders, Vol.2, No.91).
*
42. Au total, il ne nous a pas sembléque le premier tour desplaidoiries orales de Bahre'in
devait nous amener àmodifieren quoi que ce soit la demande présentép ear Qatar en matière de
délimitationmaritime.
[Illustration:Thesinglemaritimeboundalyclaimedby Qatar]
43. Bahreïnnenous a pas convaincusdubien-fondéde sa position. Il nous resteàsouhaiter
que Bahreïn n'a pas davantage convaincu la Cour. Son insistance sur sa qualité dyEtat
multi-insulaireou archipélagiquenous a paru hors de propos. Sa vision de la géographiecôtière
nous a semblédonner une représentation déforméd ee la situation concrète. Son interprétationes
règlesdu droitde la mer applicablesà la délimitationnous aparu elle-même sujetteàcaution.
Monsieur le président,ayant délibérément rédu ciet dernier proposà quelques remarques
inspirées par les plaidoiries de la Partie adverse, j'ai parfaitement conscience du caractère
incomplet de ma présentation. Puissent néanmoins cesquelques remarques êtreutiles à la Cour
lorsqu'elleentamerason délibéré.
Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs les juges. Je vous remercie de votre
bienveillanteattention. Je vousdemanderai,pourterminer, Monsieurle président,de bien vouloir
appelerà la barrel'agentde 1'Etatde Qatar,le Dr.Abdullah Al-Muslemani.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, Monsieur leprofesseur. And 1now give the floor to .
HisExcellency, Dr. AbdullahbinAbdulatifAl-Muslemani.
Dr. AL-MUSLEMANI:
1.Mr.President, distinguishedMembersofthe Court,it fallsto me to make a few remarks to
close the presentationof Qatar'scase. f
2. At the outset, 1 feel obliged to commentupon the statementsmade by the distinguished
Agent of Bahrain, with regardto Qatar'sso-called"expansionism". Mr. President,Membersof the
Court, in no way can Qatar be called expansionist. In fact, it is Bahrain who might be calledexpansionist, for claiming the Hawar Islands, which lie so close to Qatar'sshores, or Zubarah,
whichis an integralpart ofthemainland,notto mentionits grossly exaggeratedmaritimeclaim.
3. The Agent of Bahrain also said that it wouldbe "intolerable"if the Hawar Islands were
taken fiom Bahrain. But thisignores the fact that these islands are Qatar'stemtory, which was
taken away fromQatar illegally,over 60yearsago. For Bahrain to Saythat it would be intolerable
forQatarto recoverterritory thatis itsownis certainlyanabuseof language.
4. Tuming now to Qatar'scase, the Courtwill haveseen,fiom Qatar'sfirst and secondround
presentations,that Qatar'sbasic case has remained fundarnentallyunchangedduring the course of
theseproceedings.
5. As regards the temtonal issues in the case, 1 can first be very bnef on the subject of
Zubarah. In my opening statement 1mentioned Qatar'slong-held convictionthat Bahrain was
using Zubarah purelyas a litigationtacticand not asa seriousclaim'. Thishasnow beenborne out
by Bahrain's own oral pleadings,which havedevoted verylittle attentionto Zubarah. In fact 1am
sure that Bahrain would hardly have argued so strongly for application of the principle of uti
possidetis if it had really beenserious in its claimto Zubarah. As has now become perfectly clear,
the onlyreal temtorial issueinthis case isthe questionof sovereigntyover theHawar Islands.
6. As regards the HawarIslands, Qatar is confident that your judgrnent will restore the
temtorial integrityof Qatarbyretuming thoseislandstoits sovereignty.
7. 1 would like to remind the Court that when the Ruler of Qatar protested to the British
against the 1939decision on the Hawar Islands, he pointed out that he could have physically
prevented the unlawfül occupation of the islands by Bahrain. He added, however,that he had
deliberatelyrefrainedfiom resortingto forceat that time2.
8. Qatar bas never consented to, or acquiesced in, Bahrain's illegal occupation of the
HawarIslands or the 1939Bntish decision. It has continuedto protest, and has been seeking a
peacefül solution to the disputefor many years. During al1this time, Qatar has always refrained
from any use of forcein an attemptto recoverthe HawarIslands.
'CR2000/5,pp.20-22,paras.51-59.
*~eeCR200018,p. 46, para.23. 9. Againstthisbackground, the Courtwill understand why1found itquite disturbingto have
to listen to the Agentof Bahrain when,in his openingpresentation,he speculatedthat Qatar would
"undoubtedlyhave invaded"the HawarIslandsif Bahrain had noterected defensive fortifications
there3. Asimilar statementwas latermadeby Mr.paulsson4. 1foundthese statementsparticularly
s
shocking,in the lightof the extraordinaryeffortsthat Qatar has exertedover severaldecades in an
attempt to achieve apeaceful settlementofthisdispute.
10.Qatar agrees withBahrain that"Mightis not rightU5.A clearconsequenceof this precept
is that Qatar should notnow be penalized for having instead always followed a peacefulpolicy.
And yet it is the perpetuationof an illegal occupationthat Bahrain is now seeking,by urgingthe
Court to apply the maxim of quieta non movere,or the doctrine of uti possidetis. As Professor
Salmonhas shown,thereis no legalbasis for the application ofsuchdoctrinesin this case.
11.It must be emphasized that Qatar has continued to followits peaceful policy in the face
of Bahrain's persistent andblatantviolationsofthe statusquoon Hawar. 1had occasionto mention
these violations in my opening speech6.1now regrettably have toreturn to the subject, following
the statementsthat weremadeby SirElihuLauterpacht duringBahrain'sfirstround.
12.Accordingto Sir Elihu, "Bahrainconsidersthat the questionof the statusquo requiresno
further discussionin this case". This statementwas based on Qatar'salleged breach of the status
quo in extending its temtorial sea, and also on the fact that the King of Saudi Arabia, in his
capacityas Mediator, didnot intervenein relation to Bahrain's breachesof the statusquo7. In other
words, it appears to be Bahrain'sview that if there is no interventionby the King of Saudi Arabia,
there canbe no breachof the statusquo.
13. Mr. President,Bahrain cannotloftilydismissits numerousviolationsof the statusquoin
this fashion. First of all, in the face of Qatar's numerousrotestsagainst Bahrain'sbreaches of the
status quo, Bahrain has never responded that it is entitled to commit such breaches because of
Qatar's ownallegedbreachin extending itstemtorial sea.
3~~ 2000/11,pp.8-9,paras.8-9.
4~~ 2000112,p.37,para.172.
'CR2000/11,p.9,para.10.
6~~ 200015,pp.22-24,paras.60-83.
'CR200011 1,p.29,para.51. 14.Second,none ofthe Parties' status quo undertakings, eitherin the SecondPrincipleof the
Frarnework, draftedin 1978and signedin 1983,or in the 1987 and 1990Agreements,placed any
kind of requirement on the Mediator in relation to violations of the status quo. The requirement
was onthe Partiesthemselves,to refrainfiom anyaction that would changethestatusquo.
15.Third, as ProfessorSalmondemonstratedon Tuesday,the Parties subsequently enshrined
their status quo undertakings in the 1987Agreement and,by reference, in the 1990Agreement.
Bahrain cannot just brush aside these solernn and binding undertakings as if they were of no
substance.
16. Finally,while other counsel have shown why none of Bahrain'sso-called efectivités
should be given any weight, 1 would like to address here the specific legal implications of the
violationsby Bahrain of itsstatus quoundertakings,withregardto activitiesundertakenby Bahrain
on Hawar since 1983. Both the Second Framework Principle andthe 1987Agreement expressly
state that any action that changes the status quo with regard to the disputed matters is to be
regardedas nul1andvoid andas havingno legaleffectin this respect. Thismeansthat the Courtis
required,by agreementoftheParties, to disregardal1the activitiesthat Bahrainhas undertakenon
the HawarIslands since22 May 1983,the dateof signatureof the Principles ofthe Framework for
reaching a Settlement. As counsel for Qatar have shown, a significant number of the so-called
eflectivitéthat are reliedupon by Bahrainfa11intothis category.
17.It will be recalledthat Bahrain suddenly engagedupon activitieson Hawar intheperiod
following the so-called "provisional" decision of 1936, in an artificial attempt to strengthen its
claimbefore an officia1decision was given. However, after Bahrain's failure to find oil in Hawar,
the islandswere completelyneglected by Bahrain exceptas a militarybase fromwhich to threaten
Qatar'sshores,as maybe seen fromthe mosaics provided with Qatar's ~emorial~. It was onlyafter
the filing of Qatar's Applicationin this case in 1991 that Bahrain suddenly embarkedupon
numerousnew activitiesonthe main Hawarlslandg.
8~emonalofQatar,App.7, Vol.16.
'~eeReplyofQatar,App.4, Vol.6. 18.Moreover,evenas 1speak,it seemsthat Bahrainisundertakinground-the-clockwork on
dredging,reclamation andother activitiesonthe Hawar Islands.Qatarprotestedthesecitations last
week,and hascomrnunicateda copyofitsprotestto theCourt.
19. Buteven today, it seems that Bahrain hasnot succeededin creating agenuinecivilian
i
populationonHawar. Inits Supplemental DocumentsB , ahrainprovided dozens of photographs of
Hawar; but not one,not one, showeda school, a hospital, apost office,or any other facility that
one would expectto findin a stableciviliancomrnunity. It is truethat in its erratasheet furnished
to the Court under cover of its letter dated 12April2000, Bahrainstatedthat the photographsat
page 104 had been wrongly captioned,and that they showed notthe "Bahrain Defence Force
Camp"but "aresidentialsectionofthe North Village". Strangelyt,he notice thatis picturedat the
entrance to this so-called "residentialsection" is headed "G.H.Q. [or General Headquarters]-
Bahrain DefenceForce",andcontinueswiththe words: "WARNRVGN . O ENTRY. SOLDIERS
AND MILITARY VEHICLESIN THIS AREA". 1leaveit to the Courtto decidewhetherthis is
really a "residential sectionof the NorthVillage"or whether itis not, as originallyacl.iowledged
by Bahrain,a militarycamp. TheCourtwillalsonotice theexîraordinaryresemblancebetweenthe
housespicturedon thispage andthoseonthe preceding page, whicharecaptioned"Houses,North
Village".
20. In any event,by virtue of the agreementsbetweenthe Parties,al1Bahrain's actionson
Hawar since22 May 1983must of course beregardedas havingno legal effect. Thereis therefore
no need for the Courteven to examine thequestionsof whetherthey areprovenor whether they
reallyconstituteeffectivités.
21. Onceagain,1stress thatBahrainshouldnot be allowedto benefit fromits ownbreaches
of its solemnundertakings,and fiomQatar'sbeliefinthe legal process,ratherthanthe use offorce,
to resolve this dispute.Bahrain'sbreachesshould not resultinthe settingof anewprecedentin this
,
regard.
22. Inthisconnection,1shouldbriefly referto Bahrainlsargument concerningthe allegedres 7
judicata character of the 1939 decision. Professor Reisman suggested that the Court should
confineitselfto declaringthe finalityofthatdecision,withoutconcerningitself withthe respectivemerits of each Party'scase on the Hawar ~slands'~.He stated that there is no consent to the
reopeningof this so-called "arbitral award"in the 1990 Agreement which forms the basis of the
Court'sjurisdictionin thiscase". HisExcellencytheAgentof Bahraineven suggestedthat Qatar's
claim is an "abuse of the legal pro ces^"' ^nd he asked "How can the finality of the 1939
decision .. .nowbe o~emled?"'~.
23. Mr.President,Members oftheCourt, BahraincannotnowSayto the Courtthat it would
be unacceptableto reopen the disputeonthe merits. Not onlyhad the British Governrnentagreed,
inthe 1960s,that its decisioncould bereopenedin an arbitralproceeding,but Bahrain'sstatements
alsofly inthefaceof theCourt's ownprevious Judgrnentsinthis case.
24. In itsMemorial,Qatar requestedthe Court toadjudgeand declarethatthe Stateof Qatar
has sovereigntyover theHawarIslands. Inits Judgmentof 1July 1994,the Courtheldthat by the
terms of the 1987and 1990 Agreementsthe Parties had undertaken to submitto the Court the
whole of thedispute between them, as circumscribedby the "Bahraini formula"14. It will be
recalled that under the "Bahraini formula" the Court wasrequested to "decide any matter of
territorialright or other titleornterestwhich maybe a matterof differencesbetweenthem"15.It
will furtherbe recalledthat in its Judgment of15February 1995,the Court concludedthat it was
nowseisedofthewholeofthe dispute, andthatthe Application ofQatarwasadmi~sible'~.
25. Inthe light oftheseJudgments,it is Qatar's submission that whatis now "unacceptable"
is Bahrain'sown insistence that the Court cannot hearon its merits the clairn of Qatar to
sovereigntyoverthe HawarIslands.
26.1 wouldlikenowtoturnbrieflyto a fewfurtherlegalconsiderations,in thecontext of the
situationas it existed on the groundin the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Bahrain has
shownus picturesof thewestCoastof Qatar. Stilltoday, largeareasof Qatar, including partsof the
''CR2000112,p.48, para.14.
"lbid.
"CR 2000111,p. 9para.11.
I3cR2000/11,p. 9,para.14.
14c.J.Reports1994,para4l(2).
'%c.J.Reports1994,para.18.
'%C.J .eports1995,para.48.west coast, are barren and uninhabited. The same is true of a largeportion of the main Bahrain
island,including its south-eastemcoast that is closest to the HawarIslands. The same would also
be true of the main Hawar Island if Bahrain had not made its artificial attempts to transformthe
situationin breach of its statusquoundertakings. And the same remainstrue todayof al1the other
t
HawarIslands.
27. Until oil came along,the only interestin the Hawar Islandslay in theiruse for seasonal
fishing. These islands, like the other islandsof the Gulf, were traditionally open to al1the Arab
û-ibes.
28. To the extent that there was no hostile purpose, and given that the population in these
areas, if any, was smalland fluctuating,there wasno need for any forma1acts of authority in such
places. This did not mean that the territory concerned was terra nullius, or could be lawfully
acquiredby anybodywho came alongand performedprivate activities,or even actsof authority,in
the temtory.
29. In the present case, as Qatar has shown, by the time Bahrain first raised a claim to the
Hawar Islands in 1936, Qatar had been long-establishedand recognized as a separate political
entity, whose temtory extended throughout the peninsula. Given that Qatar had a title to the
peninsulathat was generally recognized, it wasnot requiredto perfonn acts of authority throughout
the peninsulain orderto obtainor conserve thattitle- as was recognizedin theIsland ofPalmas
case.
30. There is nothing to suggest that, after the emergence ofQatar as a separate entity, the
Hawar Islands, Janan or Zubarah were consideredas not forming an integral part of that entity. If
the opposite had been the case, this would surely have been spelt outin the various treaties that
were entered into by the British with regard to Qatar, or would have been reflected in the
contemporary maps. But it was not. In these circumstances,and in the absenceof any consentor
s
acquiescenceby Qatar,any attemptby Bahrain to claim title by assertingeffectivités - especially
such unfounded effectivitésas those invoked by Bahrain - wouldbe unable to overcome Qatar's ,
originaltitle.
31. In addition, al1 Bahrain's efforts to introduce a human factor into the debate are
unfounded. Any links that might have existed betweenthe Hawar Islands and certain tribesmenfrom the main island of Bahrain were fluctuating and intermittent at best, and no convincing
evidence has been provided that they have continued until the present day or even until recent
years. In anyevent, suchallegedlinks arein themselvesofno legal relevance.
32. As a consequence of al1these considerations,Bahrain'sclaims to sovereigntyover the
HawarIslands,Jananand Zubarah must fail.
33. With regard to the maritime delimitation, Qataris confident that the Court will reject
Bahrain'shighlyexaggerated claim,andthat it will draw a linethat achievesan equitable result,in
accordance with international law. In Qatar's submission,the line that is clairnedby Qatardoes
achievesucha result.
34. Finally,1would liketo informthe Courtthat Qatarwill respond in writing,by the end of
theseoral proceedings,to thequestionsput forwardby Judge Vereshchetinatthe end of thesession
of 15June. Thiswritten responsewillbe comrnunicatedby Qatarto the Regisûy.
35. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this concludes my closing remarks. Although
these oral proceedingsmay have seemedlong, thisis a complexcase with many issues of fact and
law. Moreover, Qatar has not attempted to rebutal1the arguments put forwardby Bahrain in its
firstround of oralpleadings. 1am certainin this contextthatthe Court will have given the greatest
attentionto thewrittenpleadingsofthe Partiesinthis case.
36.1 thankyou, Mr. PresidentandMembersofthe Court,on behalf of the State of Qatar and
its counsel, forour unfailing patience and attention over thepast weeks. 1must also express Our
gratitude to the staff of the Registryandthe interpreters,who havebeen so helpful in ensuringthe
smoothming ofthese oralproceedings.
37.1 willnowpresent Qatar's submissions.
SUBMISSIONS
The State of Qatar respectfully requests the Court, rejecting al1 contrary claims and
submissions:
1. Toadjudgeanddeclarein accordancewith internationallaw:
A. (1) thatthe StateofQatarhassovereigntyover theHawarIslands; (2) that Dibal and Qit'atJaradah shoals are low-tide elevations whichareunder Qatar's
sovereignty;
B. (1) thatthe Stateof Bahrainhas no sovereigntyoverthe island ofJanan;
(2) that theStateof Bahrainhas no sovereigntyoverubarah;
v
(3) that anyclaimby Bahrainconcemingarchipelagicbaselines andareasfor fîshingfor
pearls and swirnming fish would be irrelevant for the purpose of maritime
delimitationin thepresent case;
II. To draw a single maritime boundary between the maritime areas of seabed, subsoil and
superjacent watersappertainingrespectivelyto the State of Qatarand the Stateof Bahrainon
the basis that Zubarah, the Hawar Islands and the island of Janan appertain tothe State of
Qatar and not tothe State of Bahrain,that boundary starting from point 2ofthe delimitation
agreement concludedbetween Bahrain andIran in 1971 (5 1" 05'54" E and 27" 02'47"N),
thence proceedingin a southerly direction upto BLV (50" 57'30" E and 26"33'35" N),then
followingthe lineof the Britishdecisionof 23 December 1947up toNSLB (50"49'48"Eand
26" 21'24" N) and up to pointL (50"43'00" E and 25" 47'27" N), thence proceeding to
point S1 of the delirnitation agreement concludedby Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in 1958
(50' 31' 45"E and25" 35' 38"N).
Mr. President,Membersofthe Court,thankyou verymuch indeed.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, DocteurAbdullahAl-Muslemani. Cecimarque leterme
du deuxièmetour deplaidoiriesde 1'Etatde Qatar. La Courprend actedes conclusionsfinalesdont
il a étédonnélecture par M. l'agentde Qatar au nom de Qatar. Comme suite à l'une de ses
dernièresobservations,je puis en outre l'assurerque, commed'ordinaire,la Courapporterala plus
grandeattention non seulementauxplaidoiriesdes Partiesmais encoreà leurs mémoiresécrits. Je
remerciel'agentet lesconseils de Qatar pour la présentation qu'ils ndtonnéedeleur position.
La prochaine séancede la Cour aura lieu le lundi 26juin à 16heures dans l'affaire des
mesures conservatoires opposant la République démocratique du Congo à la République de
l'Ouganda. Pour ce qui est de la présenteaffaire, la prochaine séance auralieu le mardi 27juin à
10heurespour commencerle deuxièmetour de plaidoiries aunom de 1'Etatde Bahreïn. La séance
est levée. Jevous remercie.
L'audienceestlevéeà12h35.
Public sitting held on Thursday 22 June 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding