oh-corrige
Uncorrectecl
InternationalCourt Courinternationale
ofJustice deJustice
THE HAGUE LAHAYE
Publicsitting
heldon Tuesday13June 2000, at10am., atthePeace Palace,
PresidentGuillaumeresiding
in thecaseconcerningMaritimeDelimitationand TerritorialQuebetween
QatarandBahrain(Qatarv. Bahrain)
VERBATIMRECORD
ANNEE2000
Audiencepublique
tenuelemardi13juin 2000,à10heures,auPalaisdelaPaLu,
souslaprésidencdeM. Guillaume,président
en1'affairedelaDélimitation marietdesquestions territorentreQatareBahreïn
(Qatarc.Bahreïn)
COMPTERENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Judgesad hoc TorresBemiudez
Fortier
Registrar CouvreurPrésent: M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges
MM. TorresBemkdez
Fortier,jugesad hoc
M. Couvreur,greffierTheState of Qataris representedby:
H.E.Dr.Abdullah binAbdulatifAl-Muslemani, Secretary-Generalotf he Cabinet,
asAgentandCounsel;
Mr.AdelSherbini, LegalAdviser,
Mr.SamiAbushaikha,Legal Expert,
as Counsel;
Mr.EricDavid, Professorof International Law, Université lireBruxelles,
Dr.Alibin FetaisAl-Men,Directorof LegalDepartment,DiwanAmiri,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professor of Internationa Llaw at the University of Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Mr.Jean Salmon,Professor emeritus ofInternationalLaw,Universitélibre de Bruxelles,Member
ofthe Institutde droit international,
Mr. R. K.P. Shankardass,Senior Advocate, Supreme Courtof India, Former Presidentof the
InternationalBar Association,
SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G., Q.C.,BarristeratLaw,Member of theInstituteof InternationalLaw,
SirFrancisVallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,Professor emeritusof International Law, Universitof
London, MemberemeritusoftheInstitutde droit international,
Mr.RodmanR.Bundy,Avocat à la Courd'appel deParis,Memberof theNew York Bar, Frere
Cholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,
MsNanetteE.Pilkington,Avocat àla Courd'appeldeParis,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,
asCounselandAdvocates:
MsCheryl Dunn, Memberofthe StateBar ofCalifornia,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,
MsInes SabineWilk,Lawyer befote the GermanCourt of Appeal,Member of the Chamberof
LawyersofBerlin,Germany,
asCounsel;
Mr.Scott B. Edrnonds,Directorof CartographicOperations,MapQuest.com,Columbia, Maryland
(United Statesof America),
Mr.RobertC.Rizzutti,Project Manager, MapQuest.com,Columbia,Maryland(United Statesof
America),
MsStephanieK.Clark, SeniorCartographer,MapQuest.com,Columbia, Maryland (United States
of America),
asExperts;
H.E.SheikhHarnadbinJassimbinJaborAl-Thani,Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H.E.Mr.Ahmedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud, Minister of StateforForeign Affairs,
TheState of Bahrainis representedby:
H.E.Mr.JawadSalimAl-Arayed,MinisterofStateof theStateof Bahrain,
asAgent;L'Etatde Qatarestrepreséntép ear:
S. Exc.M.Abdullah binAbdulatifAl-Muslemani,secrétaire génér dalgouvernement,
commeagentetconseil;
M. AdelSherbini,conseillerjuridique,
M. SamiAbushaikha,expertjuridique,
commeconseils;
M. Eric David,professeurde droit internatiàl'université libree ruxelles,
M.AlibinFetaisAl-Men, directeurdesaffairesjuridiquesdu conseil de l'émir,
M.Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à l'université de Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M.JeanSalmon,professeuréméritd ee droit internatioàl'université libree ruxelles,membre
de1'Institutde droitinternational,
M. R. K.P. Shankardass, avocat principal à la Cour suprêmede l'Inde, ancien présidentde
l'AssociatiointernationaleduBarreau,
Sir Ian Sinclair,K.C.M.G., Q.C.,avocat,membre de l'Institeroit international,
SirFrancis Vallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C.,professeur éméridtee droitinternational'université
de Londres, membreéméritd eel'Institutde droit international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy,avocatàla Cour d'appeldeParis, membre du barreaude NewYork,cabinet
FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
Mlle NanettePilkington,avocat à la Cour d'appelde Paris, cabinet FrereCholmeleyEversheds,
Paris,
commeconseilset avocats;
Mme Cheryl Dunn, membre du barreau de 1'Etat de Californie, cabinet Frere'
Cholmeley/EvershedsP, aris,
MmeInèsSabine Wilk,avocat près d'unecour d'appeld'Allemagne,membrede la chambredes
avocatsàBerlin, Allemagne,
commeconseils;
M. Scott B. Edrnonds,directeur du service des levés cartographique,ociétéMapQuest.com,
Columbia, Maryland(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
M.Robert C.Rizzutti, administrateur de projet, société MapQuest.com, ColumbiMa,aryland
(Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
Mme StephanieK. Clark, cartographehors classe, société MapQuest.com, Columbia, Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
commeexperts;
S.Exc.le cheikhHamadbin JassimbinJabor Al-Thani,ministredes affairesétrangères,
S. Exc.M.AhmedbinAbdullahAl-Mahmoud,ministredYEtaa tuxaffairesétrangères,
commeobservateurs.
LtEtatdeBahrein estrepresentépar :
S. Exc.M.Jawad Salim Al-Arayed, ministre'Etatde1'EtatdeBahreïn,
commeagent;Dr.FathiKernicha,Memberof theBar ofParis,Kemicha& Associés (Tunis),
Professor SirElihuLauterpacht,Q.C., C.B.E.,HonoraryProfessorof theUniversityof Cambridge,
Memberof theInstitutde droitinternational,
Mr. JanPaulsson, Freshfields, Par, emberofthe BarsofParisandthe Districtof Columbia,
Professor MichaelReisman,Myres S. McDougalProfessor of International Law of Yale Law
School,MemberoftheBar of Connecticut,AssociateoftheInstitutde droitinternational,
Mr.RobertVolterra,Freshfields, London, emberof theBarof UpperCanada,
Professor ProsperWeil,EmeritusProfessoratthe UniversityofParis II(Panthéon-Assas, ember
of theAcadémiedessciencesmoraleset politiques(Institutde France),Memberof theInstitut
de droit international,
as CounselandAdvocates;
SheikhKhalidbin AhmedAl-Khalifa, FirstSecretary,Ministry of ForeignAffairsof the Stateof
Bahrain,
Commander ChnstopherCarleton,M.B.E.,Head of the Law of the Sea Division of the United
KingdomHydrographicOffice,
Dr.HongwuChen,Freshfields, Paris,Memberofthe Bars of Paris and Beijing,
Mr.GrahamCoop, Freshiields,Paris,Banisterand SolicitoroftHighCourt of New Zealand and
Solicitorof theSupremeCourtofEnglandand Wales,
Mr.Andrew NewcombeF , reshfields,Paris,MemberoftheBarof British Columbia,
Dr.BethOlsen, Advisor,MinistryofStateofthe StateofBahrain,
Dr. John Wilkinson,Former Reader at theUniversity of Oxford, Emeritus Fellow,St. Hugh's
College,Oxford,
asAdvisors:
H.E.SheikhMohammedbin MubarakAlKhalifa, MinisterforForeignAffairs,StateofBahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Azizbin MubarakAl Khalifa, Ambassadorof the State of Bahrainto the
Netherlands,
H.E. Dr. MohammedJaber Al-AnsarA i,dvisorto HisHighness,theAmir of Bahrain,
Mr. GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-SecretaryofForeign Affairs, Stateof Bahrain,
Her ExcellencySheikhaHaya Al Khalifa,Ambassadorof the State of Bahrain to the French
Republic,
Mr.YousefMahmood,DirectoroftheOfficeof theForeign Minister,StateofBahrain,
Mr. Jon Addison, Ministrof Stateofthe Stateof Bahrain,
MsMaisoon Al-ArayedM , inistryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
Mr.NabeelAl-Rumaihi,MinistryofStateofthe StateofBahrain,
Mr.HafedhAl-Qassab,Ministryof StateoftheState ofBahrain,
MsAneesa Hanna,Embassyof BahraininLondon,
MsJeanetteHarding,Ministryof StateoftheState ofBahrain,
Ms VanessaHanis, Freshfields,
Ms IvaKratchanova, Ministryof State of theState Bahrain,
Ms SonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfields,
Mr.KevinMottram,Freshfields,
Mr.YasserShaheen, Second Secretary,MinistroyfForeign Affairsof the StateofBahrain,
asAdministrativeStaffM.Fathi Kemicha,membre du barreau dP earis,cabinetKernich& Associés, unis,
SirElihu Lauterpacht, Q.C, .B.E.,professeur honoraireuniversitéde Cambridge,membrede
l'Institutde droitinternational,
M.Jan Paulsson, cabinetFreshfields, Paris, membre des barreaux de Paris et du district de
Columbia,
M. Michael Reisman, professeure droit internationaluniversitéde Yale,titulairede lachaire
Myres S.McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut, associéde l'Institut de droit
international,
M. RobertVolterra, cabinet Freshfie,ondres,membredu barreauduHautCanada,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite l'universitéde Paris II (Panthéon-Assas, embre de
l'Académiedessciencesmoralesetpolitiques(Institutde France),membredel'Institutdedroit
international,
commeconseilset avocats;
Le cheikh Khalidbin Ahmed Al-Khalifa,premier secrétaire, ministees affairesétrangèrse
lYEtate Bahreïn,
Le capitaine de frége hristopherCarleton,M.B.E.,directeurde la division du droit madutime
bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
M. HongwuChen,cabinetFreshfields,Paris, membredesbarreauxdePariset deBeijing,
M. Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields,Paris, avocat et conseil de la High Court de
Nouvelle-Zélandeet conseillerdela Cour suprêe'Angleterre etduPaysde Galles,
M. AndrewNewcombe,cabinetFreshfields,Paris,membredubarreau dela Colombiebritannique,
Mme BethOlsen,conseiller,ministèredYEtt e 1'EtatdeBahreïn,
M. John Wilkinson,ancien maître de conférenceà l'universitéd'Oxford,membre émérite du
CollègeSaintHugh,Oxford,
commeconseillers;
S.Exc.le cheikhMohammedbin MubarakAl Khalifa,ministre desaffairesétrangèrese Bahreïn,
S.Exc.le cheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de1'Etatde Bahreïn aux
Pays-Bas,
S.Exc.M.MohammedJaberAl-Ansari,conseillerdeSonAltessel'émir de Bahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi,sous-secrétaidYEtaatuxaffairesétrangèrese1'Etatde Bahre'ïn,
S.Exc. la cheikhaHaya Al Khalifa, ambassadeurde 1'Etatde Bahreïnauprès dela République
fiançaise,
M. YousefMahrnood,directeurdubureaudu ministre desaffairesétrangèrese Bahreïn,
commeobservateurs;
M. Jon Addison, ministèreYEtade1'Etatde Bahreïn,
MmeMaisoon Al-Arayedm , inistère'Etatde 1'EtatdeBahreïn,
M.NabeelAl-Rumaihi,ministère d'Etatde1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. Hafedh Al-Qassab, ministèreYEtatelYEtatdeBahreïn,
MmeAneesaHanna,ambassadede Bahreïn, Londres,
Mme JeanetteHarding,ministèred'Etatde1'EtatdeBahreïn,
Mme Vanessa Harri cabinetFreshfields,
Mme Iva Kratchanovam , inistèred9Etatde1'EtatdeBahreïn,
Mme SonjaKnijnsberg,cabinetFreshfields,
M. KevinMottram,cabinet Freshfields,
M. Yasser Shaheen, seconsecrétaire,ministèredesffaires étrangère1e'Etatde Bahreïn,
commepersonneladministratif: Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. La séanceest ouverte et nous allonsce matin
entendrela continuationde la présentpar 1'Etatde Bahreïn etje donned'oreset déjàla parole
àM. RobertVolterra.
Mr. VOLTERRA:
1Mr. President, Members oftheCourt, itis anhonourformeto appearbeforethistribunal.
THE UNINTERRUPTED CONTINUUMOF BAHRAIN 'SVEREIGNTY OVER THE HAWAR ISLANDS
ASEVIDENCEDBYITSEFFECTMTÉS AND THE CONDUCTOFTHERESIDENTSOF HAWAR
Introduction
2. Bahrain has asked meto present its arguments in relation to Bahrain'suninterrupted
continuumof sovereigntyover theHawarIslandsas evidencedby its efectivitésandtheconductof
the islands'inhabitants. ProfessorSirElihu Lauterpacht spokeon Fridayaboutthe legal principles
involvedindeterminingquestionsoftitle totemtory andmycommentsprovidethe factualcontext
fortheprinciplesthatheelucidated.
3. This morning, 1 shall discuss evidence of Baefectivités,conduct on the Hawar
Islands that qualifies asà titre de souverain, the understandingof third parties thatthe islands
belonged to Bahrain, and the general social, political and economic context of Bahrain's
centuries-oldownershipofthe islands. 1willconcludemyremarksby consideringQatar'sanalysis
of this evidence.
QatarversusBahrain: physicalgeographyversushumanhistory
4. The issue before the Court of title to the Hawar Islandsis one of physical geography
versus human history. The islands dolie off the Coastof the Qatar peninsula. But Bahrain has
historical evidencethat the islands have belongedto it for manygenerations. Qatar
that thehistorical record showsBahraini activities in the Hawar Islands and shows no Qatari
activitiesthere.
5. It will not have escaped the attention otfhe CourtthatQatar spentmuchof its firstround
describinghow theHawarIslandsare situatedst off the Qatarpeninsula. Qatar would haveyou
believe that the Hawar Islands were untouchedby Bahrainis or other human beings, with thepossibleexception ofpassingfishermen,until 1936. The satellitephotographsshownby Qatar's
distinguishedAgent, forexample,to depict the recentmilitaryand civilconstructiononthe islands
by Bahrain,very conspicuously omittedto label the buildings andruins that still exist on the
islandsandpre-datethe 1938-1939arbitrationby decades.
6.Qatar hasrecounted at somelengthto the Courtthe geomorphologyof the islands, which
incidentally,is theameas BahrainandtheHasaCoastof SaudiArabia. But Qataris silentabout
the presenceof no lessthan six cemeterieson the islands. Qatarclaimstherewereno settlements
onthe islands. But Qatarhas no answerto the existenceof two permanentvillagesonthe islands,
recordedrepeatedly fiom asearlyas 1820. Qatar callsthe islands waterless,but- again- has
declined to notethe existence of watercistemsthere. Qatar claimsthat its sovereigntyoverthe
HawarIslands, by virtue of the purportedcontrol of the Qatarpeninsula, was recognized until
1936. ButQatarcan onlypointto inferencesdrawn fiom speculation basedon documentsthatare
intruthsilentonthe subject.
7. This slide showsthe evidence presentedby bothPartiessupporting theirclaims tohave
authorityoverthe Hawar Islands.Atleastthisishow theevidence rnighthavebeen. But Qatarhas
had to withdrawits 82 forged documents.And Qataragreesthat maps donot establishlegaltitle.
As a result,Qatar has not beenable to provide one single
And soyou see the case of Qatar.
exampleof the exercise ofits authorityon the islands. Nor hasQatar been ableto pointto the
conductof any Qatarisonthe islands, letaloneQatarisactingunderthe authorityof the Rulersof
Qatar.
8. In contrast, Bahrain'swrittenpleadingscontainmore than 80 documentedexamplesof
Bahrainiactivitiesonthe HawarIslands.
9.Indeed,the public record establishes that te awarIslands have been anintegralpart of
the socialandpoliticaleconomyof Bahrainformore than200years. The Britisharchivesconfirm
that Britain,British oficials, and British records recognizethe Hawar Islandsto be Bahraini
consistentlyfiom 1820onward. Qatar haschosenmerely to ignoreal1but a dozenor soof these
documents. 10.Qatar'sclaimto theHawarIslands,madeinitiallyin 1938and raisedagain subsequently
aftera decades-longsilence,is at besta calculation that Qahadnothingto lose bydoingso, and
mightsomehowcounterbalanceBahrain'v seryreal claimtotheZubarahregion.
11. If Qatar obtainsnothingfromthis present case,then Qatar will have lostnothing. If
Qatar somehowacquires even Janan Island, let alone Dibal, Jaradah , asht al Ani or other
territones,that willreward its speculatand its courseof conduct.
12.Bahrainhas submittedas 1said, more than 80 examplesof its activities in theHawar
Islands in its written pleadings. Alist of 70 of them can be found at paragraphs 28 to 30 of
Bahrain'sReply,with a furtherten containedin the Supplementary Documents.1do notintendto
recitetheseto you. Instead, 1will describeselectedexamplesplaced in their socialandhistorical
context.
13. Themost effectiveway to do this is to breakdownmy presentationinto timeperiods.
Thus, 1 will first review Bahrain'seffectivitésover theHawarIslands during the eighteenthand
nineteenthcenturies. Then1shallmove onto the first twodecadesof the twentiethcentury. Next
the 1920s. Thenthe 1930s. Finally,1will remindthe Courtof Bahrain'sefectivitésduringthe
decadesfollowingthe 1938-1939arbitration.Theselast,of course,showthe continuingexercise
of sovereigntyoverthe islandsby Bahrainsincethe arbitration. Reviewing Bahrain'esflectivités
and activitiesinthis way shows that,startingfrom 1783untilthe presentday,there isa substantial
body of publiclyaccessible,genuineand - perhaps mostimportantly - uncontradictedevidence
of Bahrain's authority over the islands.
14. Thereis evidenceof Bahrainiactivityfrom everyperiod ofthe Hawar Islands' history,
includingwellbefore theRuler ofQatarfirstmade a claim tothe islandsin 1938. Indeed,of the
80Bahrain activities mentioned in the written pleadings,some 60 took place beforethe British
arbitrationof 1938-1939. Andof those46tookplacebefore1936.
TheevidenceofBahrain'seffectiv oiveétheHawarIslandsdunng
the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies
15.In 1783,the Al-Khalifadefeatedthe Persiangamson on themain islandof Bahrainand
extendedtheirdominionbeyond the Qatar peninsula to includethe islandsin the Gulf ofBahrain.
Shortlythereafter, a nearby branchof the Dowasir tribe petitionthe Rulerof Bahrain to permitthemto settleonthe HawarIslands. TheQadiof Zubarah, thehighest-rankinglegaland religious
officia1of theAl-KhalifaGovernrnent,appointedbytheRulerofBahrain, granted their requesa tnd
theDowasirsettledintothe islands'.
16. TheAl-Khalifa grant of permissionwas referredto in a despatch senton 4 April 1909
from CaptainPrideaux, the British Political Agent,to the Political Resident. In that
correspondence,CaptainPrideauxrepeatedthe fact of the existence ofthe grant and noted the
writtenpermission from the Qadi still existed2.
17.But1anticipateevents. Itwasspecificallyrecognized thatthe Hawar Islandsbelonged to
Bahrain from as earlyas the 1820s. CaptainGeorgeBrucks,a BritishIndianNavy officer,was
cornmissionedto conduct a detailed andcareful studyof the Arabian Gulf Coastfrom 1821 to
1829'. The report ofhis fmdingsis entitled theArabian Coast Survey and it is considered the
authorityon the political configuration otfhe Gulfduringthe first half of the nineteenthcentury.
Mr.Paulssonbroughtthis document tothe attention of theCourton Friday. It bearsemphasizing
thatthis wasa vastandcomprehensiveundertaking: youwillfindtherelevantextractofthis report
at tab 27 of your judges' folders; if you turn to page93, which is designatedon the bottom
right-hand cornerof the pages, andturnto the last full paragraphyou willseethe meticulouscare
withwhichCaptainBrucks conductedhis surveyovera period ofnineyears. Thisis how Captain
Brucksdescribedhismethodology:
"Myinformationhas beenobtainedin the followingmanner: 1haveproposed
to the chiefs certain questionsrelative to the tribes, and their localities, ofthe
revenues, trade,etc.,which1havenoted,withtheir replie^."^
18. The next paragraph of CaptainBrucks' introductory remarks describeshow he
cross-checked and verifiedhis information.
ette feomCapt. PrideauxoBritishPolitical Resid, April1909. Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.236, Vol.5,
p. 1039atp. 1041.
ette feomCapt.Prideauxto BritishPolitical Resi, April1909. Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.236, Vol.5,
p. 1039atp. 1041.
3~aptainG. Bmcksof the BritishIndianNavy "Memorial escriptiveof theNavigationof theGulfof Persia
1821-1829",MemonalofBahrain,Ann.7,Vol.2,pp.92-109.
4~emorialofBahrainA, nn.7, Vol.2,p.93. 19. In relation to the HawarIslands, referredto then by Europeans asWarden's Islands,
CaptainBrucks observed- and this quotationcan be found, again, at tab27, page 101,third
paragraph:
"Warden's Islandsis a group of eightor nine islands and rocks ... The
principal is calledAlHowahk,andis aboutfour mileslong. It has twofishingvillages
on it, andbelongsto ah rein."'
20.Verysimple: theHawarIslandshavetwo fishing villageson themandthe Hawar Islands
belongto Bahrain. Thesewere the facts recorded bythis Bntishnavalofficerin 1820.
21. Thus some 120yearsbefore the British arbitration of 1938-1939,detailed, reliableand
neutral observationrecordedtwo important facts about the HawarIslands that entirelycontradict
Qatar'slatest theory: first, the islandswere inhabited. CaptainBrucks notedthe existence ofno
lessthantwovillagesthere; andsecond,theislands belongedto Bahrain.
22. Itis difficultto reconcilethe findings ofCaptainBruckswith Qatar's vision oanempty
group of islands that wasconsistently recognizedby Britainas belongingto Qatar until asudden
reversa1of policyin 1936. Itis notwithoutsignificancethat Qatar's pleadingsdo not attemptto
addressthis.
23. Qatar has subrnittedno evidenceto suggestthat anythmgoccurredbetweenthe time of
CaptainBrucks'1820sreportandthe Bntish arbitrationof1938-1939that changedthe statusquo
ofthe islands.
24. Lonmer's Gazeteer,published in 1908 and referred toby both Parties - 1908being
decadesbeforethe first Qatariclaimto the islands- recallsthatthe Rulerof Bahrainhad invited
the nearby branchof theDowasirto settle alsoon themain island ofBahrainin 1845. The Dowasir
did so6. That act affirmed and reinforcethe political relationsbetweenthe Bahrainibranchof
the Dowasir and theRulers of Bahrain. The BahrainiDowasircontinuedto inhabit the Hawar
Islands even afterthey moved toBudaiyaand Zellaqon themainisland ofBahrain,as thisextract
fromLorimerconfis. Hewrote:
"[The main Island of Hawar is about] 10 miles long, north and south, and
roughly parallelto the Qatarcoast. Thereare no wells butthere is a cistem to hold
'~emorialofBahrain, nn.7,Vol.2,p. 101.
Ann.74, Vol.3, p.378.er of the Persian Gulf;Oman and Central Arabia, Vol.II (1908). Mernorialof Bahrain, rainwaterbuiltbytheDowasirofZellaq inBahrainwhohavehousesat twoplaceson
the islandandusetheminwinteras shootingboxes."'
25. Almost 100yearsafter CaptainBrucks, Lorimer was reporting essentially the same
thing.
26. Following the1845invitationto establish themselvesonthe main islandof Babrain,the
Hawar islanderswere engagedin a settledpattern of life. They followed theseasons and the
resources ofthe Gulf spendingfivemonthsof the year on the mainisland ofBahrainduringthe
pearlingseasonand the remainderof the yearin regular habitationin their villageson the Hawar
Islands.
27.TheCourtwill havenotedthat Qatar,in its oral argumentsin the firstround, recognized
the importance of oral testimonyin the "Arab oral culture", to use counsel for Qatar'sown
expression8. This will undoubtedly haveput the Court in mind of the affidavitssubrnittedby
Bahrainin its writtenpleadingsthat containthe testimony ofBahrainiswho grewup inthe Hawar
Islandsduringthe 1920sand 1930s. One oftheseformer Hawarislanderswhowas bornin 1920,
HamoudbinMuhannaalDosari,and who grewup in the north villageof Hawar in the reign of
SheikhIsabin Ali,whodied in 1932,hasdescribedtheirpattern oflife overgenerations. Thiscan
be found attab28ofthejudges'folders,page 1363,atparagraph5:
"Everyonelivedwiththeirfarniliesandcattleand propertyon theIslands. They
would come everyyearwith their families,their servantsand their belongingsfiom
Zellaqafterthesummerpearlingseason."
Hecontinued:
"1do not knowexactlyhow long theDowasirhad been inthe HawarIslands.
When1was a child,1servedcoffeeinthe Majlis[thevillage meeting place] to people
whowere 80and90years old. Theyusedto tell storiesof livingin the HawarIslands
whentheywere
Hamoudbin Muhannaal Dosari, whose testimony1just read- at least his English translation
thereof- is80years oldnow. The factthathewasrelatingeventsfiom the 1920sand early 1930s
meansthat the elderswerepassingdownoral histories oftheir livesin the HawarIslands fiomthe
mid- 1800s.
'~emorialofBahrain, nn.74,Vol.3,p.399.
'CR 200015,p48para.10.
tate te ofHnamoudbinMuhannabinHamadal Dosari,7 Sep. 1996.Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.313(a),
Vol.6,pp. 1363-1364. 28.The testimonyofthe Hawar islandersuniformly tells otfheirregular,seasonalmigration
to and fiomthe main islandof Bahrain. AnotherformerHawarIslandresident now livingon the
main islandof Bahrain,is Abdallahbin Ali binThamirAl Dosari. He was bom on the Hawar
Islands in1924andrecountsthe pattern of their lives:
"We would stayin Hawar in the winterand in the summerwe would go to
Zallaq,becausetherewas no waterin Hawar. Our relations were divers.Durin the
divingseasonwewouldgoto Zallaq, andafierwardswewouldretumto~awar."' %
29. The testimony of the former Hawar islanders also shows that the Al-Thaniand the
populationcentresin Dohawere faraway fiomthe HawarIslands. An understandingofthehuman
geographyof the Qatar peninsula confirms this. Travellingwest from Doha,one wouldhave to
cross theentirebarren interiorof the Qatarpeninsula beforeaniving at the westernCoastacross
fromthe HawarIslands. Onewouldnot haveencountered asinglepermanent settlement along the
way. As counselfor Qatarnoted, thefirst recordedvisit ofa Rulerof Qatar anywhere close to the
Hawar Islands occurredin 1938when the then Ruler of Qatarvisited Zekrit,on the west of the
Qatarpeninsula,to inspectthe new oil worksthere". Thereis no record of any contact between
the islandersandthe peopleof Doha. Hawarresidentsdenythatthereever wasany12.
30. In contrast,the populousand comparatively wealthy market centresof Manarna,Riffa,
Budaya, Zellaqand the othertowns on Muharraqand the main island of Bahrainwerecloseby.
The main islandof Bahrainis only 11nauticalmiles away. Theshorttrip overthe shallowwaters
of the Gulf of Bahrain was easily coveredin one of the dhows that plied the waters, carrying
gypsumandfishfiomthe Hawar Islandsandretumingwithgoodsand supplies.
31.The life of theislandersappearsto have remainedmuch the samefrom 1845until the
1940swhen the oil erachanged Bahrain society.The islanders fished- under permitfromthe
Rulerof ~ahrain'~- theydived forpearls - underlicencesfiom theGovernment of~ahrain'~ -
'Ostatemenotf AbdallahbinAl BinThamirAlDosari,5May1999. Replyof Ba, nn.23(a)p. 145.
"CR200015,p. 61,para.82.
IZstatementof formerHawarresidents. Memorialof Bahrain,p. 188, para.4Memorialof Bahrain,
Anns.313-316, Vol.6,pp. 1363-1413.
I3~etterfiom Belgraveto Packer,Managerof PCL,31 Jan. 1938. Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.250,5,ol.
p. 1078.
I4~etterfiom C. Belgraveto H. Weightman,22 Dec. 1938 (BahrainCounter-Claim).Memorialof Bahrain,
Ann.274, Vol. 5,pp. 1132Statementsof former Hawarresidents.nalof Bahrain,Ann.313(a)and316 (a),
Vol.6,p. 1367,paras.20-1andpp. 1405-1406,para.23.theybuiltcistems,tendedtheirlivestock,minedgypsum - underlicencesfiom theGovernmentof
Bahrain - and tradedwithotherparts of~ahrain".
32. The antiquity, stability and permanenceof the settlementis illustratedby physical
evidenceon the Hawar ~slands'~.ProfessorPaoloCostaof the Universityof Bologna produced a
reportin 1995of his fieldworkonthe HawarIslands. Bahrain has submitted c aopy of this report
in its~emorial" and1shallnotgothroughithere. ProfessorCostanotedthethreeancient villages
and houses - these imagescanbe foundat tab30. Healsonoted the sixcemeteries,including the
children's cemetery.He notedthe many dams andwatercistems,the animal-powered millstones,
the potteryshards, games carvedinto therocks; healsonoted thegypsumquanies and theancient
mosquesandprayer walls,the grazingpasturesused bythe Hawar islandersand finally Professor
Costa concluded: "(1)cannotrefiain fiom expressingthe belief thatwhatresults isdefinitelythe
pictureofsettledpeopleandnotofwandenngfishermenoroccasionalvi~itors."'~
33. Although theBahrainiDowasirwere proudand independent-minded, they lived under
the authority ofthe Rulersof Bahrain. Britain recognized that theBahrainiDowasir were subject
to the lawsof Bahrain. In a letterfiom the BritishPoliticalResident addressed to"the Chiefand
members of the Dowasir tribeat Budaiya and Zellaq" dated 21November1869, the British
PoliticalResident insistedthatthe BahrainDowasirconform toan interdictionon smugglingthat
appliedto al1~ahrainis'~.
34.TheRulersof Bahrainarerecorded tohavemadeannualvisitsto the Hawar residents,as
farbackasthe nineteenth cendO. In 1873,SheikhIsa bin Ali,the Rulerof Bahrain,wasvisiting
his relativeson the islandswhena groupof Ottomansoldierswas shipwreckedon the coast. The
"~tatementsof formerHawar residents. Mernorialof Bn,m. 313-316,Vol.6,pp. 1363-1406.
16~xpenditureSurnmaryfor Governmentof Bahrain for1358 Hejra(1939). Memorialof Bahrain,Am. 293,
Vol. 5, pp. 1200-1; Statement ofHamoudbin Muhannabin Hamad alDosari.Memorialof Bahrain, Ann.31(a),
Vol. 6,p. 1364,para.9.
"~e~ortby Dr.P. Costa on the Archaeological Investigtne HawarIslands, 17Jan. 1995.Memonalof
Bahrain,Ann.310,Vol. 6,pp. 1332-1351.
''~emorialof Bahrain,Ann.310, Vol.6,p. 1351.
ette tfrrmthe BritishPoliticalResidentto theChiefandMembersof theDowasirtribeat BudaiyaandZellaq,
21Nov. 1869.Counter-Memonal ofBahrain, Ann.7,Vol.2,pp. 14-15.
'%etterfiomBelgravtoWeightman,22 Dec. 1938.Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.247,Vol. 5,p. 1134.Rulerassistedintheirrescueandarrangedfor thetransfertothemain islandof Bahrain - ofthose
soldiers- andthenceonwardtotheirintendeddestination.".
35.TheOttoman Empireclearlyunderstoodthat theislandsbelongedto Bahrain andthatthe
Al-Thaniand Doha were separateand farto the east. The Courtwill no doubt recallthe 1878
Ottoman survey map prepared by CaptainIzzet of the OttomanNavy. Suffice to note that
CaptainIzzet's map was consistent witth his map shown onthe screen andfound at tab 31of the
judges' folders. This map was prepared by CaptainE.L. Durand to accompanyhis report on
Bahrainin 1879 - oneyearafierCaptainIzzet.Youcan seefkomCaptainDurand'smap,Dohais
shown faroff on the south-eastcoast of the Qatar peninsula. The peninsulaitself, Mr. President,
Members of theCourt, is labelled "El-Bahrain"l,eavingno roomfor Qatar'sinstant coast-to-coast
sovereigntyclaimto theHawarIslands.
TheevidenceofBahrain'seffectivités overtheHawar Islands
duringtheearlytwentiethcentury
36. Bahrain's continued administratioo nf the Hawar Islands as well as the continued
occupation ofthe islandsby the BahrainiDowasir actingunder the authorityof the Rulers of
Bahraincontinueto berecordedinthepublic documentsdating fiomthebeginningofthe twentieth
century. Theseincluderecords of court casesp ,oliceactivities,andgovemmentdirectives22.
37. There are Bahrainicourt decisionsdating fkom1909and 1910 that relate toland and
fishingrightsonthe Hawar1s1and.s~T ~.hejudgment inthe 1909case wasmadeby the Qadiofthe
Sharia Court of Bahrain. Thejudge was an officia1of the Ruler of Bahrain, acting under his
authority. It canbe foundattab 32ofthejudges' folders.Thejudgmentinthatcasereads,inpart:
"Be it known that Ahmad bin Shahin Dosari and Bati bin Salman and
JabrbinMuhannaand Hamadbin Saeed have appeared before me and disputed the
ownershipof land and sea propertiesin Hawar. Ahmad binShahinclaimedthose to
be his propertyinheritedfkomfathersand forefathers; Jabrand Baticlaimedthem to
be theirpropertiesand that theyhelddocuments ..."24
2'Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.274,Vol.5,p.1134.
22~ounter-~emoriaiofBahrain, pa159.
23~udgmenmt ade by Sharafbin Ahmad,Qadi of the Bahrain Sharia C1327,Hejrah(1909),Memorial of
Bahrain,Ann.235,Vol.5,p. 1049.MemorialofBahrain para434;Judgmentw-iittenby Sharafbin Ahmad,Qadiofthe
Bahrain ShariaCour1328 Hejra(1910),Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.238 A,Vol.5,p.1049(a).
"~emorial of Bahrain,An235,Vol. 5p. 1049.Memorialof Bahrain par434. 38.Andsoit continues.
39. In 1910,the Bahrain Court describedthe subpoena power exercisedby the Bahrain
Govenunentover the Hawar islanders - this can be foundat tab33 of the judges'folders. The
judgment oftheCourt inthatyearbegins:
"Bythe orderof ShaikhAbdullah binIsa Al-Khalifa, Ahmadbin ShahinDosari
and Isa bin Ahmed Dosari appeared before mein a dispute about land and sea
propertiesin Hawar .. ."25
40. Thejudgmentissignedand sealedbythe Ruler of Bahrain.
41. To contest the evidence of Bahrain's exercise of judicial authorio tver the Hawar
Islands, Qatar drew the attentionof the Court toabstract theories of the generaljurisdiction of
QadisunderIslamic law. Qatarthus hopedto showthe irrelevanceof the factthat disputesover
property in the HawarIslandswere broughtto Bahrain courtsz6. Mr.President,Members of the
Court,the Rulerof Qatar tried that sameargument backin 1939. The responseof Britishofficiais
atthattime stillholdstruetoday- andyoucanfindthisin tab34on page 1170,startingat thelast
sentence:
"Thisstatementis of coursetrueup to a pointin 'personal' casesb ,utthe Shaikh
of Qatar wouldbe the first to deny that a Nejdi (Saudi)Qadhi, for instance,could
settlea disputebetweentwoQatar subjectsinrespectof landedpropertiesin ~oha."~'
(Emphasisadded.)
42.Inthe courseofitsargumentsonthis point, Qatar conceded:
"Forwhat theyare worth,Bahrain'sown Dowasirwitnessstatementspoint out
that if the Dowasirhad disputes ...they wentto the tribalelder ... [and]. ..only if
they couldnot solve a dispute, theywentto the RulerofBahrainor hisdescendantsto
solveit,presumably asarbitrator~."~~
43. Bahrainis unable to discern in Qatar's argumentanything other than evidence of the
exerciseofjudicial authorityby Bahrain over the Hawar Islands.
44. British recordsdating from 1911 tell of the Ruler of Bahrain's ability to exercisehis
authorityoverthe HawarIslands andthe peoplelivingthere2'. The requestforthe Ruler to bring
25~emorialofBahrain, nn.238 A, Vol.5,p. 1(a).
2 6 2000/8,p.29,paras.34-36.
27~eportfH.Weightman2 ,2 April1939,MemonalofBahrain,Ann.281, Vol.5,pp.1170-1171.
"CR200018,p.28,para.28.
'%etterfiomRulerofBahraintoMajorCox,15Jan.1911.Memonalof Bahrain, Ann2.39(a),Vol. 5,p. 1050.an individualfkomthe Hawar Islands to the main island of Bahrain was madeby the British
PoliticalAgent"regardingthematter of Rajab bin Abbas and Isa bin Ahmadal-Dosari". This is
not only an example of the authorityof the ~ulers of Bahrain overthe Hawar Islandsand the
people who livedthere. It is Mer evidence of Britain'scontinuedrecognitionthat the islands
were underthejurisdictionandcontrol of Bahrain.
45. Boththe OttomansandBritain continuedto recognizethat theHawar Islandswereunder
the jurisdiction of Bahrain during this period, as confirmed by their responses during the
Zakhnuniyahincidentof 1909.
46. Inspring 1909,the Ottomans sent troopsto occupy Zakhnuniyah Island,justofftheCoast
of whatisnowSaudiArabiaintheGulfofBahrain. TheDowasir whowere on theisland,andwho
were partof the Bahraini branch of the Dowasir tribe,irnrnediatelycomplainedto the Rulerof
Bahrainaboutthe Ottoman acts. Theyrefusedto CO-operatewiththe Ottomanson the groundsthat
they - andtheislands - wereBahraini.
47.Bahrainand Britaintook upthematterwiththeOttomans.
48. A nurnberof significantdocumentswhichwereproducedduringthe courseof theaffair
are examinedinBahrain's pleadings altength3'andreferencesto thosearecontainedinthefootnote
to my speech.1will onlynow,note six highlightsfkomthesedocuments:
(1) Bahrainand Britain invoked,as the basis for protesting against the Ottoman activities,the
Ruler ofBahrain'ssovereignty over Zakhnuniya Island.That sovereigntywas understoodby
BahrainandBritainto existby virtueof the regularseasonaluse of the islandby theBahraini
Dowasir,whoweresubjectto theauthority of~ahrain~'.
(2) The Ottomans eventually backed down. The fact that the Ottomans backed down was
tantamountto recognitionby them that the Bahrain Dowasir were subject to the authorityof
~ahrain~~.
3%emorialof Bahrain, Ann2.36, Vol.4, p. 1041-2Memonal of Bahrain, Ann2.35, Vol.4, pp.1034,
1037-1038;AdministratiReportforBahrainfortheyear1909,monalofBahrain,Ann.237, Vol. 4,p. 1044.
3'~wolettersfkomCaptainPndeauxto the BritishPolitical Residentdated20 March1909and4 Apnl 1909.
Memonalof Bahrain, nns.235and236, Vol.5,pp. 1034and1039.
32~bid.(3) Britaininvestigatedthe situation"onthe ground" vis-à-visthe BahrainiDowasir,includingthe
relationship of theahrainiDowasirto the Ruler of Bahrain andto the Hawar Islands. The
BritishPoliticalAgent - CaptainPrideaux - visitedthe islandsin 1909. In a letter,thatcan
be found at tab 35 of the judges'folder, dated 20March 1909,he wrote to the Political
Resident:
"The facts are that Dowasirof Budaiya andZellaq on the north-west coast of
Bahrainare in the habitof everywinterpartiallymigratingto Zakhnuniya andHawar
Islandsfor fishing...andhawl~in~."~~
CaptainPrideauxalsoreportedthatthe BahrainiDowasirhad two villageson the islands. His
report notedthat in oneofthetwo villageshe hadfound: "a collectionof 40 largehutsunder
the authority of a cousin of the tribal principal Shaikh. This individual is... related by
marriageto [theRuler of ~ahrain]."~~
It is not without significancethat the DowasirChiefwas relatedby marriage tothe Rulerof
Bahrain. In the Gulf at this time,if not even now, marriage was an important way of
demonstratingpoliticalties.
(4) Not only did CaptainPrideaux'sreport reflect the historical reality, iptrovided the factual
basis for Britain'spolitical response to the Ottomans in 1909. Britain thus confirmedits
recognitionthat the HawarIslandsbelonged toBahrain.
(5) In evaluating howto respondto the Ottomans, Britishofficiaisnoted that if Bahraindid not
assert its uncontested sovereignty over theHawar Islands, there would be difficultiesin
promotingBahrain'sclaimto Zakhnuniyabecauseboth were basedon the BahraniDowasir
connection. The BritishPoliticalAgentnoted: "if ShaikhEsa (theRulerof Bahrain) doesn't
wantor dareasserthis sovereigntyoverHawar weshallbe inrather aquandary"35.
TheCourtwill note,thatthedebatewasnot about whetherthe Ruler'ssovereigntyexisted,but
whetherhe would assertit. Thereis no recordof the Ruler's responseon the issue, itis me.
The onlyrecordis ofthe Rulerof Bahrain'sresponse to theOttoman claimto Zakhnuniya(he
refutes thatclaim by statinghis sovereigntyoverthoseislands). The Ottomansdidnotmakea
33~emonalof Bahrain,Ann.235, Vol. 5,p. 1035.
34~emonalof Bahrain,Ann.236, Vol.5,pp. 1041-1042.
35~emonalof Bahrain,Ann.235, Vol.5,p. 1038. sirnilarclaim to the Hawars andso there was no response fromBahrain to a non-existent
claim. As 1noted the Ottomanswithdrewfrom Zakhnuniyaafter being presentedwith the
evidence of Bahrain's authority therb ey virtue of the Ruler'sauthority over theBahraini
Dowasir. Theonly inferencethat can be drawn is that the Ottomansrecognizedthat the
BahrainDowasirwere subject tothe authorityof theRulerof Bahrain. Thesarnewouldhave
been logicallyextendedtoany claimto theHawar Islands.
(6) Finally,this episode affirmsthat theBahrainDowasir recognizedthe authorityof theRulerof
Bahrain.
49. In 1911, Britishofficiaisagain investigatedthe situation ofthe BahrainiDowasirand
ZakhnuniyaIsland. Their report, publishedin the British AdministrativReportsfor the Persian
Gulfof 1911, confmed that the situation remainedunchangedand that the Bahraini Dowasir
continuedto dernonstratetheirallegianceto theRulerof Bahrain,interalia, bylyinghis flag36.
50. The Court will no doubt have observedthat none of the documents availablein the
historical record tothis point havenoted any connection betweenthe Hawar Islandsand the
Al-Thanior the people livingon the Qatar peninsula. No such connectionwill in fact everbe
reflectedinanyrecord.
TheevidenceofBahrain'seffectiv oivtétheHawarIslandsduringthe 1920s
51.The 1920ssaw the firstsustainedinterestin oil developmenin the Gulf. Mr. Paulsson
will discuss thehistoryof the oil concession negotiatithis aftemoon. 1will notdwellon them
now, therefore, otherhan to note that theyshowthat al1therelevantparties understoodthe Hawar
Islandsto belongto Bahrain.
52.In the mid-1920s,some, but farfiomall, ofthe BahrainDowasirleftBahrainbecauseof
a dispute over taxes and privilegeswith the Govemmentof Bahrain. Most ofthose who lefl
Bahrain stayed awayfor aboutthreeand a half years.Somestayedaway fora fewyearslonger.
36~dministrateeport forBahrainPoliticalAgencyfor theyear 1911. Memonalof Bahrain,Ann5,40,Vol.
p.1054. 53. Qatar has attempted to show that this episodedemonstrates that theBahrainiDowasir
were not subject tothe authorityof the Rulers of~ahrain~'. The historyof the affair showsthe
oppositeto betrue.
54. Soon aftertheir departure,the Dowasirwho had left Bahrain began supplicating the
Rulerof Bahraintopermitthem to return. AnIndiaOfficefile,entitled"Desireof Dowasir tribeto
retumto Bahrain" dated 7 July1927~d ~escribesthis.A sufficientdescriptionof this iscontainedin
Bahrain'sCounter-Memonal,startingat paragraph 190,and1willnotreviewit here.
55. When theDowasirwhohadleftretumedto Bahrain,most of themin the springof 1927,
conditionswere imposedon themby the Governmentof Bahrainthat cannot becharacterizedas
anythingotherthana humbleaffirmationby themofthe authorityof the Ruler ofBahrain. It wasa
full acknowledgement.Theconditions included thattheycontinueto recognizetheauthority of the
Bahrain policeand courts, that they pay taxes, thatthe Ruler of Bahrain couldnominate and
removeîheir officia1headmen,thattheyrelinquishany claimto privilegedstatuswithin~ahrain~~.
Theseunequivocal termsareevenacknowledgedinQatar's~emorial~~.
56. The Dowasir whohad left Bahrainwere required to agree expresslyand in a public
mannerto theseconditions before they were allowed tro etum to Bahrain. On27 March 1927,the
British Political Resident, Lieutenant-ColonelHaworth,describ tedmeetinghehadwithDowasir
representativesto the Foreign Secretaryof Indiain the followingdespatch - this canbe foundat
tab37, on the thirdpage, page387,in the secondfull paragraph. 1quotefiom the secondsentence
of thatdocument. Lieutenant-ColonelHaworth said:
"1informedthem categorically thatthe wholematter(of theirbeingpemitted to
rem) rested with their acceptanceof the laws ofthe country,that as long as they
realisedthat they were as subjectto law as any other person in Bahrainand hadno
privileged position ShaikhHarnad would naturally be glad to see them back in
Bahrain. They accepted the condition withoutreserve and the interviewended
a~nicabl~."~'
of Qatar,paras.4.160-4.164.
"IOR,371112;one documenftromthatfileatCounter-Memonaolf Qatar,Ann.11..3
3g~ounter-~emoriaolf Bahra, ara.193.
Wemorial ofQatar, para6..54.
4'~espatchfromBritishPolitical ResideForeignSecretaryof India,27March1927. Memonalof Qatar,
Ann.111.73, ol.6,p. 383.TheBahranireturningDowasirthus agreed toretumunderthetermsimposedby theRuler. Again
1 would remind you that at tab 37 on the third page, page 387, second full paragraph, second
sentence.
57.Qatar'ssubmissionsto the Courtin response tothis incidentwereexpressed forthe first
tirne afier it had to drop its arguments based on the forged documents,in its Reply at
paragraphs4.160to 4.164. Qatar argued there:
"In the WesternSaharacase, the Court consideredthat tribal allegiances, to
support any claim for sovereignty,must be real andevidencedby acts manifesting
acceptance of political authority. No such evidenceis offered by Bahrain for the
period before 1936 inregard to the Dowasirwho seasonally fiequentedthe Hawar
i~lands."~*
58. Bahrain cannotunderstandhow Qatar can attemptto reconcilethat statement withthe
evidenceof the relationship betweenthe BahrainiDowasir andthe Rulerof Bahrain submittedby
Bahrain. The evidence of Lt.-Colonel Haworth that 1just recounted, describingthe explicit
reaffirmationin 1927by theDowasir whohad departedfiomBahrainof the authorityofthe Ruler
of Bahrain,is surelyevidence of anactmanifesting their acceptance otfhe politicalauthorityof the
Rulerof Bahrain. Itis difficultto imagine amore real orexplicitacceptancethan that. Qatar's
assertioncannotstandinthe faceofthe evidence.
59.As Bahrain notedin its Counter-Mernorial,the principal documenrte slatingto the short
episodewherein some of the Bahraini Dowasir leftBahrainfor a few years are containedin a
specialIndia Office file entitledTheDowasir tribe andtheirremovalfrom Bahrain; their return
andretrievalof theirproperty43.The file containsdocumentswhichcoverthe period 1922-1928
andBahrainhas includedrelevant documentf sromthefileinitswrittensubmis~ions~~.
60.1 do not proposeto recount for theCourtal1the contents of thefile. As Bahrainmade
clearin its writtenpleadings,the documents thereentirelyconfm Bahrain's description of events
andentirelycontradictQatar's hypothesis.
61. Qatar's thesis accords to theDowasir a degreeof independencethat wouldtake them
outsidethe authorityof Bahrainor any otherpolitical entity.DoesQatarwishto asserttothe Court
42~eplyof Qatar, p4..160.
4 3 ~ RI15/2/87.
"~emonal of Bahrain,Ann.49, Vol.2, pp. 155-158; Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.50, Vol.2, pp. 159-161;
Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.53, Vol.2,pp. 170-172.thattherewasan independentStateoftheDowasir? Werethe Dowasir who livedinZellaq andthe
HawarIslands independent ofBahrain butsomehow subject tothe Chief of Dohaon the otherside
of thedesert? OrwouldQatar havetheCourtbelieve that they were part-the Bahrainicitizens?
62. Thedefinitivewordonthe subjectwascontainedin the report of MajorDaly,the British
Political Agent, to the British Political Resident dated13July 1922, over a year before the
temporarydeparture of the Dowasir and16years before Qatar first made a claim to the Hawar
Islandsin 1938. Major Daly stated: "The Dowasir have been settle so long in Bahrain thatthey
arerecognizedas Bahrain~ubjects".~~ F.airly simple,Mr.President.
63.Qatarhas tried,inthe oral pleadings, topretendthat Bahrain has somehowbeen forcedto
alteritsdescription of the inhabitation otfheHawar Islands. Counselfor Qatar statedlast week:
"In fact Bahrainnow itself also admitsthat the Dowasir livedin Buddaiya or
Zellaq on the main island of Bahrain,and only seasonally visitedthe Hawar Islands
forfishingandhur~tin~."~~
64. However,if one tums to the text of Bahrain'sMemorialpurportedlycited by Qatar for
thisproposition, onefindswrittentherewhatBahrain hasalwaysmaintained. WhatBahrainwrote
abouttherewas not aboutvisitingthe Hawars. It was aboutlivingthere. Allowme to read to you
theparagraphcitedby Qatar. 1warnyou,and1apologize,that itwillsoundfarniliar:
"Many of the Dowasir who lived on the main island of Bahrain spent five
monthsof the yearthere duringthe pearlingseasonand the remainderof the year on
the Hawar Islands. Although the presence ofsomeHawar Islanders wasseasonal,the
settlementwasnevertheless permanent(seeparagraphs458 to 465). The ruins of old
mosques and the six cemeterieson the Hawar Islands, one achildren'scemetery,
demonstrate the stability othe cornmunitythere(seeparagraphs463 to464)."47
Bahrainseesno changeinitsposition,no inconsistencywithany ofthe documents.
65.Theinescapable fact, recorded inthepublic archivessince 1820,is thatthere wasa stable
cornmunityof Bahrain Dowasir who lived therea ,nd fiom 1845, theyalso lived in Zellaq andthe
Budaiya forfivemonthsoftheyear (that is to Saythe surnrner)andinthe Hawarsfor sevenmonths
of the year(in the winter). This inhabitationwas not nomadic, it was not transient,it was not
haphazard. It was seasonal,annual, stable. The documents showthat it includedfamilies and
4%otefromBritishPolitical AgetoBritishPoliticalResidententitled"BaAffairs",13July1922atp.3.
MemoriaolfBahrain,Ann.49,Vol. 2,pp.155-158.
4 6 ~200018,p. 19,para.9.
47~emonalofBahrainp,ara.419.childrenand livestockand chattels. The links betweenthe Hawarislandersandthe rest of Bahrain
didnot ceaseor were notsuspendedduringthe winter monthswhenthey werein the Hawars. The
islanders hadnot goneto the moonor to Doha. They had taken a shortboat ride. Andal1done
underthe authorityofthe RulersofBahrain.
66. The evidence of former Hawar residents, submittedin affidavit form in Bahrain's
pleadings, confms Major Daly's 1922 conclusion that they were Bahraini and describes the
exerciseof authorityof the Rulerof Bahrain overthe islandsduringthisperiod. Onesuch former
resident's testimonyis containedat tab 39,Nasr bin Makki al Dosari. He wasbom on theHawar
Islands in about 1922,and he recallsthat as a child on the Hawar Islands,he used to help the
guards- who were appointedby the Ruler of Bahrain - who policed theHawar Islands. He
stated:
"When1was Young,1used tohelp the guardsof the islandsbeforethe police
fort was built. We were acting under the authority of Sheikh Hamad,the Ruler of
Bahrain. Weuseda smallstrawhut onthe shorejust north of theNorth Village. We
would check that the gypsurn cutters who used to come fiom the main island of
Bahrain had a valid permitissued by the govemment of Bahrain. The other guards
were Rahrnabin Rashid, Muhannabin Hazeem, Abdullah bin Hazeem, Hazeem bin
Muhanna, Hamad bin Mohammed,Mohammed bin Irhama, Afoor andhis father,
Faris andmy fatherMa&. Rahmahad a boat which wasarmedwitha gun,whichhe
would use to guardthe islands. When1recentlyretumedto the main HawarIsland1
was ableto recognisethe spotwhere the guard hut usedto be. 1could tellwhere the
kitchen had been nextto the hut. We used to cook fish there whichwe caughtnear
Rabad Island(one ofthe other Hawar Islandsnorth of themain island)and fiom our
fish traps.lt4'
67. Another formerHawar islander, Hamound bin Muhanna al Dosari, (whom 1 quoted
earlier) cameto livein the islandsin 1938whenhe was eight years old. His testirnony is foundat
tab 38and 1amgoingto quotefiomparagraph10,foundat page 1364. Hetestified:
"The Rulerof Bahrain appointedlocal guards to keep watch over thecoast.
They kept a guard postonthe coastuntilthe Bahrain Governmentbuiltthe policefort
just outsidethe NorthVillage .. .1remember one policeman who spent ove4 r0 years
on Hawar. His name was Juma. He was a Baluchi. Healso used to tendto fishing
traps onBraiberHeadwith thevillagersfiom the North
48~tatemenotf NasrbinMakkibin Ali al Dosari, 16Sep. 1996. Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.3(a)Vol.6,
pp.1383-1384. HamoudbinMuhannabinHamadalDosarirecallstheguardpostprior totheconstructioof thePolice
Fort- seepara.10of hisstateme, emorialof Bahrai, nn.313(a)Vol. 6,pp. 1364-1365.
4%4emonao lfBahrain,Ann.313(a),Vol.6,para.10,pp. 1364-65. 68. FormerHawarislanders havealsotestifiedthat the islanders continuedto referdisputes
to the Ruler of Bahrainand 1made reference tothis earlier, as did counsel for Qatarlast week.
Hamoudbin MuhannaalDosarihas recalled:
"If twoDowasirmenin the HawarIslands had adispute,theywentto thetribal
elderto solve it. If he didnotsolveit, theywentto ourRuler,ShaikhIsabinAli orhis
descendantsandaskedhimto solve it. Thedisputeswere usuallyabout fishingnghts
and fishtraps."50
69.Yet another formerHawarIslandresident, Salman binIsabinAhmadbin Saadal-Dosari,
whowasbom in 1916,alsoprovided a witness statement. Bahrain ha iscludedthisat tab 40and1
am going to quote fromparagraph 9 oftab40, at page 1394. Salman bin Isa, who was born in
1916,alsotestifiedabouthis lifeon theislandswhenhewasyoungandhe stated:
"If therewas a quarrelon the HawarIslands, for exampleabout fish traps or
fishing rights,the people wouldgo to the villageelders for adjudication. My father
was an elderandpeoplewould goto hirnwiththeir arguments ... TheDowasirliked
to settletheir disputesbetweenthemselves. However,if the quarrelwas seriousand
was not solved wewould refer itto the Rulerof Bahrain, SheikhHarnadand before
that ShaikhIsa, hisfather.""
70.The Court willrecallthatSheikh Isadied in1932-the SheikhIsareferredtobythelast
witness,so thepenodinquestioniswell beforethe 1938-1939arbitration.
71. If 1may invoke yet another witnessI,brahimbin SalmanbinAhmedAl-Ghattam,whose
testimonyis foundat tab 41,and1shallrefer to paragraph15,foundat page 1403. 1shouldnote
thatMr. Al-Ghattamwasa non-DowasirBahrainiwhostartedgoing to theHawarIslandswith his
familybeforethe 1920s.Hetestified:
"Ifa quarrel took place amongst thHe awarislanders,theywouldgo firstto the
village elders and, if this did not resolvematters, to the Courts of Bahrain for
adjudication. The quarrelscouldbe abouttrivial things or sometimes about fishing
rights. If a crime hadbeen suspected, a policeman would be sent to the islandsto
bring the wrongdoerto the Chiefof Police,ShaikhKhalifa,at the Fort in Manama.
No one ever wentto Dohafor adjudication. Ourlife had no connection withDoha.
Most ofus would nothaveevenknownwhereDoha~as."~*
72. The testimonyof former Hawar Island residenti ss consistentwith the evidencefiomthe
publicrecord that, wellbeforethe 1938-1939Britisharbitration, theGovernmentof Bahrain was
S%4emoriaolfBahrain, nn.31(a),Vol.6, pp. 136, ara.24.
tate te moeSatmanbinIsabinAhmadbinSaadalDosari,15Sep. 1996. Memorialof Bahrain,AM.315(a),
Vol.6,p. 1394,para.9.
52~tatementf Ibrahimbin Salambin Ahmed AlGhattam,15Sep. 1996. Memorialof Bahrain,AM.31(a),
Vol.6,pp. 1403-1404,para.15.administeringjustice on the islands,was licensinggypsum cutters there and was policing the
islandsboth by appointinglocalresidentsasguards andbypatrolsofthenational police.
73.In addition, former Hawar islanders have testified thtahte Bahrainflagwastraditionally
displayedby the islanders onspecial occasions such as duringthe Eidd festivals3. Thisis again
entirely consistentwith the evidencefrom theBritishreportdated 1911,that 1recountedto you
earlier,of the BahrainiDowasirin ZakhnuniyaIsland flyingBahrainflagss4. Ibrahim binSalman,
who wasbom in 1914,recalled theEiddfestivitiesin the HawarIslands whenhe wasa boy. His
testimonyis foundattab41,paragraph11 :
"1alsoenjoyedmanyEidd festivalsin Hawar. Duringthe Eidd, wewouldfly
the flag ofBahrain fromthe dhowandthe roofsof thehousesandthe youngchildren
wouldWeardaggersandsomeonewouldbeat thedrumforthem."55
74.Fishingrightswere originallygrantedto the peopleof Hawarby the Rulerof ~ahrain'~.
At this point 1 must inteject an observation aboutQatar'sclaim that the Hawar Islands were
frequentedbyal1sortsof fishermen,andnotjust ~ahrainis~'.
75. Qatarhasno genuineevidenceforthis assertion. Its claimin this respectwas formerly
based on the forgeddocumentsbut it now appearsto be basedon the submissionsof the Rulerof
Qatarinthe 1938-1939arbitrations8.
76. Thoseparticularsubmissionswere,of course,rhetoricaland cited no evidenceor facts.
Qatarnow doesrefernow toa documentsubmittedby Qatarto Britainin 1939thatpurportedto be
a statementmade by Qatari fishermens9.Qatar omits to relate thatthat document was,in fact,
rejectedby Britainduringthe arbitration6'.In 1939,Hugh Weightman,being theBritish Political
Agentatthe time,wrotethat thedocumentwasnot toberelied uponbecauseof:
"the fact that the signature... are in one handwriting... Nor is any descriptionof
the alleged signatoriesgiven, their place of resideneeor reason for having special
knowledge ofthe HawarIslands ..."
53~emorialofBahrain, ara.475.
54~emorialofBahrain, ara.429.
55~emorialofBahrain,Ann.316 (a),Vol. 6,para.11,p. 1403.
56h.lemoriolfBahrain, An.50, Vol.5,p. 1078.
or example,CR200018,p. 37,para.5 andp.33,para.46. Replyof Qatar,4..173(d),p. 152.
5s~emorialofQatar,Ann.iiI.157,Vol. 7,p.285andMemonalofQatar,Ann.III.192,Vol. 7,p. 453.
'%eplyof Qatar, par4..173(d),p. 152.
60ReporotfH.Weightman2, 2April1939,MemorialofBahrain, Ann2.81, Vol.5, pp. 1166-1167.Weightmanconcludedthat the supposed statement ofQatar'sfishermen: "is to my mindentirely
valuelessN6'.Qatarprovidesno basis in factfor its self-serving conjectures about fishermen from
outsideBahrainusingtheHawarIslands.
77. The affidavits offormerHawar residentsattestto the fact thatin exercisingtheirfishing
rights JananIsland was treated as one of the Hawar group. Hamoundbin Muhanna- whose
testimonyappearsat tab 28; 1shallquotefrom paragraph 26, found ap tage 1368- testified:
"Apartfrom the main Hawar Island,there were manyfish traps on the other
islands. Just north of the island of Janan, there were many reefs which were
dangerousfor the fishingdhows. A pipe wastherefore built thereby the Bahrain
Governmentto leadthe dhowsaway from the reefs.1remember that a fisherman from
Muharraqonce accidentallyhit thepipe and brokehis dhow. Hewas compensatedby
the BahrainGovernment,by Sheikh al man."^*
78.NasrbinMakki,who youwill recallwasbom on theHawarIslands in 1922,was able to
identifj the names and locationsof many of the Hawar islanders'fishtraps around the main
Hawar Island. He added inhis statement: "Thereweremany fish trapson the otherislands which
belongedto theHawar islandersincluding JananS , awad,AjirahandRabad~slands."~~
79. Salmanbin Isa Saad al Dosari - whose testimony is found attab 40 - was bom in
1916andlivedonthe islandswhenhe wasgrowingup. He alsotestifiedabout thefishing patterns
oftheresidentsofthemainHawarIslandswhenhewasyoung:
"Manyof the Hawarislandersalso had fish traps on the other islands. They
would sail there to checkthe traps and put up makeshift shades. Janan Island and
Hadd Islandwere particularlynch in fish andmany Hawar islandershad fishtraps
there, includingmy fatherandMuhannabin Hazeemfiomthe South~i1la~e.l'~~
80.Thetestimonyofthe formerHawarIsland residents,al1nowlivingon the main island of
Bahrain, confirmsthat theGovenunentof Bahrainalsoregulated theirpearling activities,including
the registration ofboats and the provision of diving books and log books to divers and boat
captainsre~~ectivel~~~.
6'~emorialofBahrain,Ann.281,Vol. 5,p. 1165atpp. 1166-1167.
62~emoriaol fBahrain,Ann.31(a),Vol. 6,para.26,pp. 1368-69.
63~emoriaolfBahrain, Ann3.1(a),Vol. 6,para.16,pp. 1382-83.
"Statementof SalmanbinIsabinAhmad binSaad alDosari,para.7, Memorialof Bahrain,Ann. 315(a), Vol.6,
p. 1393.
6S~tatemenotsf former residentosntheHawarIslands. Memorialof Bahrain,Anns(a)314 (a)316 (a)in
Vol.6,pp. 1367,1384,1405-1406. 81.Mr. President,in support ofits argumentsabout theHawarIslands,Qatarhas attempted
to characterizethem asemptyanduninhabited.
82. The reality isdifferent. The HawarIslands werenot empty. Andthe islands arenot as
closeto the Qatarpeninsulaas Qatarwould haveyoubelieve. In ordertoassistBahraintodescribe
thisinastirne-efficientmanneras possible,Bahrainhasprepared a short presentation fohe Court.
Itcontainsimages subrnittedby Bahrainin itswrittenpleadings. May1nowdirectyour attention
to thescreen.
VIDEO PRESENTATION -THE HAWAR ISLANDS
1.TheAl-ThanineverchallengedBahrain'scontrol of thetenitory withinthe watersknown
oncountlessmapsastheGulfof ~ahrain~~T . hiswasparticularlytrueforthe islandsof Hawar.
II. Atabout thetirneofthe Al-Khalifaconquestof Bahrain,the Dowasirtribe fiomAl Hasa
onthe Arabianmainlandobtainedpermissionfiom theAl-Khalifa tosettleinthe Hawar Islands.
III. In themiddleofthe nineteenthcentury,the allegianceofthe HawarDowasirto Bahrain
strengthened. In 1845 theywere invitedby the Ruler of Bahrainto settleon the main island of
Bahrain. Theretheyestablishedthe townsof BudaiyaandZellaqonthewestCoast.
IV.Most membersofthe Dowasirtribehavethe familynameAl Dosari,whichis simplythe
Arabicsingularformof "theDowasir".
V. Theymovedbackand forthfieelyfromHawar to Budaiya and Zellaq on themain island.
Inthe climateofthe Gulf, wateris an easymediumfortran~~ortation~s~ a,nda very difficultone.
VI. Qatar'sinterior-* shownhere- isnot a pleasantplace. In thetimeswhen onehadto
use camelsto findone'sway throughemptyspaceswherepathswereobliteratedby sandstorms,it
wasalso dangerous. This explainswhythe Hawarislandershad practicallyno exchangeswiththe
people of Qatar,and why thepeopleof Qatargave littlethoughtto theseislandsthat are soremote
andisolatedfiomthem. Andyou seea shotofthe HawarIslandsfiomQatarpeninsula.
66~asht u Thu,eeBahrainSupplemental ocument,. 15(e).
67~ishindhow,seeBahraiSupplemental Documenp.,135.
"~eeBahrain SupplemenDtalcuments,p.141. VII.Bycontrast,therehasalwaysbeen an easyandregularly used sealinkbetweenthemain
island of Bahrainand the Hawar Islands, less than 20km across the water - a short boat ride
awaY6'.
VIII.Throughoutthe timessincethey werefirstgrantedpermissionby the Rulers ofBahrain
to occupytheHawarIslandsaroundthe year 1800,manyof the DowasirfiomHawarhavebecome
leading figuresin the history of ~ahrain~'. For example,in the South Village of Hawar lie the
remains of the home ofthe father ofYusufbin Rahma,a prominentandhighly respected figurein
Bahrain publiclife. For 30years,he was the head of the Amiri Court and as such directed the
entirestaffof SheikhIsabin Salman,the late Amir. Yusuf binRahma,who died in October1995,
livedon Hawarasa child7'.Someof hischildhoodfiiends,now oldmen, are stillalive7*.
IX. Villagelife on the Hawarscontinuedinto the 1970s. But bythen most ofthe original
Hawar populationreturned to the main island of Bahrainwhere they find jobs and schools. The
towns of Zellaq and Budaiya remainDowasir towns, as may be seen by the frequent Dowasir
nameson shops and businessesthere73.
X. Many Dowasir breathed theilraston ~awar'~.
XI. The island hasmany cemeteries,such as the one pictured here. There was theNorth
cemetery7' - this one- the Circular~ernetery~~ in the southof the island,but perhapsnone of
the cemeteriesis aspoignantastheChildren's~ernetery~n ~earthesouth.
XII. The cemeteriesbear testament to the harsh existence of theislands. Life revolved
aroundthe difficulttradesofpearling,fishing andtheextractionofgypsum78.
69~awarIslandsExpress,see BahrainSupplementalDocuments,pp. 118-120.
70~ishtrap,seeBahrainSupplementalDocuments,p. 132.
"cemetenes, seeBahrainSupplementalDocuments,pp. 130-131.
72~eestatementof HamoudbinMuhannaal Dosari,paras. 11and 12,Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.(a)Vol.6,
p. 1365,andstatementofNasrbinMakkialDosari,paras. 1and25,Ann.314(a), Vol.6,pp. 1379and 1385.
73~eeBahrain SupplementalDocuments,p. 137.
74~eeBahrainSupplementalDocuments,pp. 129-132.
75~eeBahrainSupplementalDocuments,p. 126.
76~eeBahrain SupplementalDocuments,p. 130.
77~eeBahrain SupplementalDocuments,p. 133.
"Sec Bahrain SupplementalDocuments,p. 135. XII. To obtainthe most basic necessityof humanexistence,water, large ci~tems'~ were
designed throughoutHawar to catch and store the water from the rainy season or from an
unexpected storm. The ingenuity of the Hawar islandersin collecting this precious liquidis
reflectedinthe designof this coveredcistemsO, hichfilters water collecin anothercistemand
covers the resultingdrinking water to prevent evaporation. Wherever depressionsin the land
causedwater channelstoform,a cistemwouldbe foundattheend. TheHawarislanders even built
a dams'to controlthe flowof waterinthisdepressioninthe southernmostpart ofthe mainHawar
Island.
XIV. Thepeopleofthe Hawar Islandsdid notjust lookto the sea fortheirlivelihoodS2.The
gypsumrock foundontheislandswas highlyprizedforits quality. It was sold apremiumin the
bazaarsandmarketsofthemainislandofBabrain.
XV. This is His Highness Sheikh Hamadbin Isa Al Khalifa, theAmir of Bahrain. He is
picturedat his palace onthe main HawarIsland. That palace,as many traditional buildingsin
Bahrain, has detailing madewith Hawar gypsum. Here you can see a piece. The Bahrain
Govermnentissued licencesfor gypsumextractionin the HawarIslandsbegiming in theearlypart
of thetwentiethcentury.
XVI.GypsumfromHawarwas broughtto the mainisland of Bahrainand usedintraditional
housesand palaces. The fine gypsumdetailingcan stillbe seen in SheikhIsabin Ali'spalace in
Muharraq,which wasbuilt in themid-nineteenthcenturyS3a ,s wellasin the beautifulBeitSeyadi
housenearby.
XVII. The remains of gypsum detailing may also be found in the palace of
Abdullahbin Jabr AlDosari, the famous Dowasir secretary to SheikhHamad, the Amir's
great-grandfather. This is not surprisinggiven thlink wshich AbdullahbinJabrAlDosarihad
withthe islands. Hisfatherhad a fishtrap nearthe SouthVillageof Hawar.
79~eeBahrainSupplerneDlocuments, p.125,131and134.
*OSeBahrain Supplementalocument, . 125.
"SecBahrain Supplementalocument, . 132.
82~earlings,eeBahrainSupplementalDocums., 135.
83~eeBahrain Supplemenalocument, . 138. XXN. One can only wonderhow thisrnap could possibly havebeen prepared, or if the
mapmakerhad everbeennearthearea. Becausethis isthereality.
XXV.As one descendsalongHawar'seastem coast,theTai1firstappearsas a wide crescent.
Arriving atits base,one seesthat itextendsseawardin a verystraightline. This imagewastaken
from a helicopter between high and low tides late in the aftemoon of 13February2000, a
particularlyclear day fortheseason. The s ail^'nfactextendsabout2 kmoutfromtheheadlands,
that is toSayless thanone third ofwhat Qatar's mapsshow. As one can clearly see, the Qatar
shorelineis distant,morethan4 km off.
XXVI. To take stock of the situationat lowtide, these images weretaken at groundlevel
early inthe moming of 13February2000. TheTai1nowextends a iùrther 1.5km in the direction
of the Qataricoast. A fewobservations are obvious. Thp eartof the Tai1whichemergeswhenthe
searecedesat low tide is narrowandbrokenby naturalpoolsand channels. Itis a rough calcified
reef', andprovidesnoconvenient passage.Last butnot least,its endremainsa significantdistance
from theQatari shore.
XXVII.Howdoesthe Tai1of Hawar appear when one looksat it fiomQatar? Thefollowing
images are taken from three different pointson the Qatari coast. First, fiom the northemtip of
what mightbe called, forpurposesof identification,the Dukhanpeninsula. This is the angleof
vision as shown on rnap No. 8 of Bahrain'sMemorial. The low-lyingTai1of Hawar is sirnply
invisiblealthough the moredistant cliffs of Hawar are clearlyto be seeng2. Second, from the
westemmost point of what might be called, again for purposes of identification,the Zekreet
peninsula. And this iswhat one seesg3.Third,fiom thepointQatar'srnapshowsas beingwithin
250m ofthe Tai1of Hawar. Thisis whatrnap5 of Qatar's Memorias lhows. And fromthis point
here iswhatone seesinrealiV4.
XXVIII.Qatar'srnapis clearlywrong. It Statesthat it is compiledfiomBahrainchartscale
1:50,000sheet 3. But Qatar's mapmakers used an outdatedversion of the map, producedbefore
"See SupplementalDocumentsof Bahrai,p.143-144.
"~ee SupplemantalDocumentsof Bahrain,pp. 143-144.
92~eeSupplementalDocumentsof Bahrainp,. 146.
93~eeSupplementalDocumentsof Bahrai,p.147-148.
SupplementalDocumentsof Bahrain,148.there had beena field survey of theTai1of Hawar. Since 1988,successivesurveyedversionsof
thismapg5consistently showthetrue length oftheTai1ofHawar.
XXIX. Anothermisleadingfeatureof the Qatarimapisthat it depictsareassubmergedunder
wateras thoughthey wereland, creatingthe impression that theregionis practicallya solidmass
traversedby a few channels. But,as the Bahrainimaps show,wide stretchesofwater separatethe
HawarIslands fiomQatar.
XXX. What theeye actuallyseesconfinnsthe Bahrainichart. Forexample,considerSuwad
alJanubiyah,the secondlargest of theHawarIslands andthe HawarIslandwhichlies the closestto
Qatar. The angleof visionis this,looking at Suwadal Janubiyahfiomthenearestspot on theCoast
of Qatar. Andhereis whatthe eyeactuallyseesg6.
XXXI. Significantdevelopmenthas occurredon the HawarIslands. Theycontinueto be a
regularandintegralfeature ofBahrainilifetoday9'.
XXXII. On weekends, hundredsof Bahraini fishing enthusiastsenjoy the Hawar Islands
waters in their own boats. Events take placeon the Hawar Islands for the entertainmentof the
Bahrainipopulation. Daily public transportationis provided bythe popular Hawar ~x~ress~~,
which makes the crossingin a little more than 30 minutes. On the weekends,it makes several
roundtrips.
XXXIII. Housingand other infrastructure aroundthe Hawar Resort ~ote1~~- images of
which you have just seen- and even more aroundthe North Village- which you see here-
havetransformedthe Island.
XXXIV.Majorprojectsareunderwayonthe HawarIslands. A comprehensiveplandivides
the main island into two zones'00. The western half has fine beaches. There is where al1the
infrastructureis being concentrated. Al1buildings must comply with stricg t uidelines. On the
eastern side,whichfeaturespristinecliffsandbays of surpassingbeauty,aswellas remarkablebird
95~awarIslands,1:50,000,sheet3, 1997,SupplementalDocumetf Bahrai, . 175.
%~eeSupplementaD l ocumentsofBahrai, . 151(a).
97~eeSupplementaDl ocumentsofBahrai, p. 1-120.
"~ee SupplementaDl ocumentsofBahrai, p. 118-120.
99~eeSupplementaDl ocumentsofBahrai, p. 101-117.
'%eply of Bahrain, ect.2.11.life, building will not be permitt-dnor any motor vehicles. Oncerelations with Qatar are
normalized,Bahrain hopes to dismantlethe heavy defensivefortificationsit was compelled to
installfterthe 1986armedattackbyQatar.
Thisbringstoanendthevisualpresentation.
83. Counsel for Qatar commented on the photographs Bahrain submitted withits
SupplementalDocuments(pages 143to 151(a))by saying: "Al1thesephotographs were clearly
taken at high tid... so that the distanc... are alwaysexaggerated."lO'No explanationwas
given for this assertion. Perhaps counselfor Qatar have becomeso used to repeatingthat the
Hawars are 150 m or 250m from Qatarthat whenthey seeproofto the contrarythey assume this
"clearly"must meanthatthere issometrick. Now,this is thephotographtakenfiomthetip of the
Tai1of Hawar,providedin the SupplementalDocuments,which Qatar'smapsshowasbeing250m
fiom Qatarevenat lowtide.
84. As you can see, even at lowtide, Qatar is far off in the distance. For the r,hisdt
picturewastakenat lowtide on 13Februarythis year. Counselfor Qatar may have overlookedthe
fact that Bahrainfiled therelevantTide Tables at page153ofthe Supplemental Documents,which
confirm that thiswas lowtide. You can see, evenat low tide the distanceto the nearest spotin
Qataris faintlyvisibleinthebackgroundalmost 3km away.
85. Mr.President,1wonderwhethernow mightbe a convenienttime to take the moming
break?
Le PRESIDENT :Je vousremercie. LaCoursuspendpourun quartd'heure.
L'audience est suspendu ee11 h20 à Ilh 40.
Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvous asseoir. La séanceest reprise etje donne à nouveau la
paroleàM.Robert Volterra.
'''C R00016, .33,para.1. Mr.VOLTERRA:
86. Mr.President,1hopethat Bahrain'svisualpresentationbefore thebreakhas enabledthe
Court to getan idea ofthereality of the Hawar Islands.If the Courthad visitedthe Hawar Islands
to seethereality foritself,what wouldhavebeenthe fastestway to get there? The fastestwayto
get to theHawarIslandsis by helicopterfiom Bahrain. Fromthe time one leavesthe shoreof the
main islandof Bahrain untilone reachesthe main HawarIsland it takes less than six minutes. It
wouldtakemuch longerto make thetrip fiomDoha. Andwherewouldyou sleep,ifyou chosenot
to stayonthe islands,or in the lovely Hawar Island resohotel? The factis that theclosesthotels
to theHawarIslandsarein Manarna,inBahrain.
87. In terms of humangeography,Manarna,Muharraq,Zellaq, Budaiya,have alwaysbeen
closer to the Hawar Islands than Doha. This helps tounderstand the close connectionof the
islanderswiththe restofBahrain.
Theevidenceof Bahrain's effectivitésover the HawarIslandsduringthe 1930spriorto
the 1938-1939British arbitration
88.It is important to notethat onlynowinmy presentationdo wereachthe 1930s. ThePace
of Bahrain'seconomicdevelopment increased withthe discovery andthen brief productionof oil
fiom 1932. Not surprisingly,the activitiesof theGovernmentof Bahrainin generalalsoincreased
from themiddle of the 1930s. Just asdid the governmentsof its neighbourswhen they began
receiving oil revenues. In the case of Bahrain, this included, but was not unique to, the
Government'sactivities in Hawar. In 1932theAmir, ShaikhIsa, died and ShaikhHamadbecame
Amir. TheregularvisitstotheHawarsof the Rulers of Bahrain continuedasbefore.
89. Throughoutthe 1930s,Bahraincontinuedits regulation ofthe gypsumcutting industry
on the islands,includingby issuinglicenceslo2.Also duringthe 1930s,the Government continued
to supervisefishing activitiesby the HawarIsland residents and to adjudicatefishing disputes,
'02~ahrainSupplementalDocuments,Ann.6, pp. 79-81, 83-84, 86-87; Memonal of Bahrain,Ann.261, Vol.5,
p. 1107; Memonal ofBahrain,Ann.313(,ol.6,pp. 1367-1368.including in relation to Janan ~sland"~. The courts of Bahraincontinuedto deal with disputes
relatedto theHawarIslandsandtheislanders.
90.For example,there are therecords oftwo cases involving Hawar Island residentsbefore
theBahrain courts fiom 1932.
91. One involved aresidentof theHawarIslands whowassubpoenaed toappearbeforethe
courts of Bahrain. The Court ordered the defendantw , ho was living in the Hawar Islands,to
appear. When hefailed to do so, the court tmed to the Rulerof Bahrain"infonninghim of the
case and askinghim to orderhis servant toproduce[the]defendantfrom Hawar". An orderwas
issued and finally the Bahrain policewere directed to producethe defendantfrom the Hawar
~slands'~~ T.heother case from1932involvedafishingdisputebetweenHawarIslandresidents'05.
92. In relation to yet anotherdispute,there is a record of the BahrainPolice Directorate
bringing to the Bahrain courts a violent dispute over fishing traps in the Hawar Islands in
April 19361°6.Bahrain'sanalysis of this documentis containedin its writtenpleadings:1 will
discussit furtherwhen1dealwithQatar'sattackonthe historicalevidence,towardsthe endof my
remarks.
93. You mayrecall that 1noted afewstatistics aboutthe evidenceof Bahrain'ssovereignty
overthe Hawar Islandsat the outsetof myremarks today. Ofthe 80efectivitéslistedin Bahrain's
writtenpleadings, some60of the activities took place before the British arbitrationthat startedin
1938; and no less than 46 of the activities took place prior to the date in 1936 that Qatarhas
chosenasitspreferredcriticaldate.
94.1 haveso farnot mentioned a single oneof thepost-1936,pre-1939effectivités.Counsel
forQatar didnotdeny the existenceofthesepost-1936activitiesand onlyproposedtheir exclusion
onthe basis ofQatar's criticaldatetheory'07.
'03~emorialof Bahrain,Ann.274,Vol. 5,p. 1129;Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.281,Vol.5,p. 1165; Memorial
ofBahrain,AMS.313(a)-316(a),Vol.6,pp. 1363,1392, 137, 400.
(1932).MemonalofBahrain, Ann2 .42,Vol. 5,p. 1065.nBahrainsubjectsliving in Hawar- Case No.24611351
'OS~ahrainourtRecord for Cae11351.MemorialofBahrain, Ann2.43,Vol. 5,p. 1066.
'06L,ettromPoliceDirectorate tothe Bahrain Cou, April1936. Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.245,Vol.5,
p. 1070.
'''CR2000/8,pp.38-42,paras.7-18. 95.Asthereis no factual controversyaboutthem1 , shall onlylist them briefly.
- Oil concession negotiations,startingin 19361°8.
- Surveyingactivitieslog.
- Erecting and maintaining maritimemarkers in and around the islands, althoughit must be
notedthat Qatarconteststherelevanceoftheseactivities'lO.
- Maintaining andirnprovingtheislands'cistems.
- Drillingforwaterl '.
- InstitutingregularvisitsbytheBahrain~hiefof~olice"~.
- Replacing the oldpolice stationwith the new Police Fort,followingQatar'sarmed attackon
Zubarahin 1937lI3.
- Regulatingimmigration,issuingBahrainipassports toi~landers"~.
- Constructing apier in 1937'15.
- Building a new mosque at the request of the islanders toreplace the old one that had fallen
down'I6.
- Replacingdamagedhousesinthevillagesontheisland.
- Promulgatingand enforcingBahrainilaws' ".
Io8~etterfrom T. C.Fowle to MJ.Clauson,India Office, 4 Jan.1936. Memorial of Bahrain, Ann.71, Vol. 2,
p. 232.
"%etter from Fnpp (BAPCO) to Belgrave, 10Aug.1941, Memonal of Bahrain, Ann.295, Vol. 5, p. 1204;
Letter from PCLto Under Secretary ofStatefor India,30June 1939,Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.285, Vol. 5, p. 1179;
LetterfromBlack(BAPCO) toBelgrave, 8Oct. 1939,MemonalofBahrain,Ann.290, Vol. 5,p. 1187.
"%lemonal of Bahrain,para. 487.
etter tfrrm Weightrnanto Fowle, 15May 1938,Memonal of Bahrain,Ann. 257,Vol.5, p. 1096; Note by
Belgrave entitled "TheHawar Islands", 29May 1938,Memonal of Bahrain,Ann.261, Vol.4, p. 1107; Memonalof
Bahrain,AM. 295, Vol. 5,p. 1204.
"2~emorial of Bahrain,Ann.316(a),Vol.6,pp. 1404-1405.
etter tefom Belgrave to Capt. Hickinbotham, 19Aug. 1937, Memonal of Bahrain, Ann.158, Vol.3,
pp. 729-730; AnnualReport of the Governmeno tf Bahrainfor year 1356(March1937-Febniary1938),Memonalof
Bahrain, AM. 253, Vol.5, p. 1086; Policeorders of Governmentof Bahrain,24 May 1938,Memonal of Bahrain,
Ann.259,Vol.5,p. 1101.
'I4~etterfromAdviserto Governmentof Bahrainto HeadNatur(PoliceOfficer)onHawarIsland, 10Nov. 1937.
Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.249,Vol.5,p. 1077.
"S~emonal of Bahrain,Ann.253,Vol. 5,pp. 1086-1087.
"6~xpendituresummaryof Govemmentof Bahrain for1358Hejrah(1939). Memorialof Bahrain, Ann.293,
Vol. 5,p. 1201.
BelgravetoLoch,28Apnl 1936. Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.246, Vol.5,pp. 1072-1073. 261,Vol.5,p. 1108; Letterfrom- Arrangingforthepublicdisplayofofficialproclamations118.
- Andrepresentingthe interests of theHawarislandersin a dispute over darnageto theirfishing
interestsandtrapswithQatar's oil concessionairnJanuary1938'19.
96.RecallthatQatardoesnotcontestthattheseactivitiestookplace. Qatar'sonlygroundfor
arguingthat theseactivitiesshouldbe discountedis thattheyoccurredafterthe datethatQatarnow
suggestsshould bethe criticaldatein the dispute. Bahrain rebuttethis argument last weekand 1
am notgoingto dealwithit here.
97. In 1938, Qatarfirst made a claim to the HawarIslands. Thatclaim gave rise to the
1938-1939Britisharbitration. It rnightbe appropriate, therefore,to take stock of theevidence of
Bahrain'sactivitiesintheHawarIslands tothisdate.
Priorto the 1939Awardal1the relevantactorsrecognizedthat the Hawar Islands
were partofBahrain
98. One wayto take stockof theseBahrainieffectiv ittoésxamine theviewsof relevant
actorsabout the sovereigntyof the HawarIslandsup to the 1938-1939arbitration. The historical
record shows that,prior to the 1939 Award, al1the relevant actors recognized thatthe Hawar
Islandswere partof Bahrain. 1shalldescribebuta fewhighlights.
TheRulersof Bahrain
99. The Rulers ofBahrainalways considered that the Hawar Islandsbelonged to Bahrain.
This canbe seenfiomthe factsthat:
- Theyoriginallygrantedpermission to theDowasirtoinhabitthe HawarIslandsthroughone of
theiroffi~ials'~~.
- TheyinvitedtheHawarIslandresidents tosettle alsoonthemain islandof Bahrainin 1845.
- TheyexercisedauthorityovertheBahrainibranchofthe Dowasirand enjoyedtheir loyalty and
allegiance.
- TheyregularlyvisitedtheIslands.
- Theypaid forhousingand a newmosque.
118Zbid.
etter fomBelgravetoPacker(PCL 31,Jan. 1938,Memonalof Bahrain,Ann.250, Vol.5,p. 1078.
12qirherecitationgivenalreadyabove,notrepeated here.- They settleddisputes.
TheGovernmentofBahrain
100.As it becamedistinct fiom thepersonof the Rulersduringthe development ofBahrain,
the Govemment of Bahrainalsodemonstratedthatit consideredthatthe Hawar Islandsbelongedto
Bahrain:
- The Government regulated economic activitieson the islands, includingfishing, gypsum
cutting,andpearling.
- It provided policeand civiladministrationto the islands.
- It exercisedlegislative,executiveandjudicialfunctions.
- It built infrastructurethere,drilled for water,negotiforoilconcessions.
- It regulated immigrationandissued passports.
TheDowasirofBahrain
101. The Dowasirof Bahrain considered thatthe Hawar Islands belongedto Bahrain,as is
evidencedby thefact that:
- They requested the original grant of permission to reside in the Hawar Islands fiom the
Al-Khalifa officials.
- They also settledon the main island of Bahrainin 1845and moved seasonally between there
and the Hawar Islands for a centurybefore the British arbitration. Britishofficialsrecorded
that the islanders even sent their livestockto the main island of Bahrain during water
shortages1".
- They tumed to the Rulersof Bahrain for assistance when facingexternalthreats,for example
duringthe 1909Zakhnuniyaincident and the 1938 fishtrapdisputewiththe PCL oil Company.
- They repeatedlydeclaredthemselvesto be underthe authority ofthe Rulerof Bahrain. This
includedtheBahrain DowasirwholefiBahrain forseveralyearsduringthemid-1920s.
- They repeatedlyexpressedtheircontinuingallegianceto theRulers of Bahrain.
- They flewthe Bahrainflag ontheislands.
'*'~ei~htmanReport. Memonal ofBahra, nn.281,Vol. 5,p. 1169.- They tumed to the Rulers of Bahrain forhelp in rebuilding homes and mosques and in
controllinggypsumminersonthe islands.
OtherBahrainis
102.OtherBahrainis, theyalsoconsideredthat theHawarIslandsbelongedto Bahrain:
- Non-Dowasir Bahrainis resided intheHawarIslandsaswellasthe~owasir'~~.
- The witness statementsconfirmthat merchantsfi-omthe other islands of Bahrain regularly
tradedwiththe islanders.
- Other Bahrainigypsumcuttersworkingin the Hawarshad to operateunder licencefi-omthe
GovemmentofBahrain.
Britain
103.Britain consideredthat the BahrainiDowasirwho resided in the Hawar Islands were
subjectsof theRulerof Bahrain. The evidence supportingthis includes:
- Theanti-smugglingorderof 1869.
- Thereports ofCaptainPrideauxduringthe 1909Zakhnuniyaincident.
- Thereports of Britishofficialsinthe 1911Administrative Reports.
- Admiraltyreportsof 1915and 1916123.
- MajorDaly'sreportof 1922.
- The positionstakenby Britishofficialsin relation tothose of the BahrainiDowasirwho lefl
between 1923to 1927.
- Not tomention, of course,the investigationsof Britishofficialsreportedduringthe 1938-1939
arbitration.
104.Britainalso consistentlyrecognizedand expressedthe view internallybetweensenior
officials,inpublic reportsandinrepresentationsto thirdparties,that theHawarIslandsbelonged to
Bahrain. Theevidence for this includes:
- TheBrucks'reportofthe 1820s.
122~emorialfBahrain,Ann.316(a),Vol.6,p. 1406,para.25.
123~Collectionof FirstWorldWar MilitaryHandbooks ofArabia1913-1917,Vol.IV, A Handbookof Arabia,
Vol. 1,General,1916,ArchiveEditions(1988),p. 326. MernorialofQatar, Ann., ol.8,p. 485.- Themapof CaptainDurrandproduced in 1879.
- Britain'sconductandevidence gathering duringtheZakhnuniya incidentof 1909.
- Inthe request ofBritishofficialsto the Rulerof Bahrainto subpoenaa HawarIslandresident in
1911.
- Thehistoryoftheoilnegotiationsinthe 1920sand 1930s.
- And,of course,the 1938-1939arbitration.
TheOttomans
105.The Ottomans recognizedthatthe HawarIslands belongedto Bahrain. This evidence
includes:
- TheCaptainIzzetmapfrom 1878.
- And the response ofthe Ottomans to the evidence ofBahraini sovereignty of Zakhnuniya
Islandbased onBahrainiDowasirduringtheZakhnuniyaincidentof1909.
TheRulersof Qatar
106. The Rulers of Qatar also recognizedthat the Hawar Islandsbelonged to Bahrain.
Reasoningfor thisincludes:
- The fact that the Rulersof Qatar never claimed the Hawar Islands until 1938,even inthe
contextofthe oil negotiations,asMr. Paulssonwillshow.
- Nor, until 1938, did Qatar ever protest against any of the Bahraini activities taking place
there'24.
- At the time of the arbitration,the Rulerwasunaware ofthe regularinhabitationof the islands
or the two villages there orany of thethingsthat you havejust seen,before thebreak,in the
video and in thephotographs.
- Indeed, the Ruler of Qatar recognized Bahrain'ssovereignty and jurisdiction over the
HawarIslands on a number of occasions,even after Qatar had madeits first claim tothe
islands. Thisis illustratedin a documentsent by the Ruler of Qatar to British officialsin
lZ4~etterfrom Lt. Col. Gordon Loch, British Political Agent, tothe British Political Resident,6 May 1936.
Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.247,Vol. 5,p. 1074. LetterfromRuler of Qatarto Hugh Weightman,BritishPolitical Agent,
8 July 1938. Memorial of Bahrain,Ann.265,Vol.5,p. 1118. Letter fromRuler of QatartoHugh Weightman, British
PoliticalAgent, 12July 1938,MemorialofBahrain,Ann.266,Vol. 5,p. 1119. 1938 - foundat tab45. It was inrelation to two incidentfiom 1938,where Qataricitizens,
landedonthe HawarIslands,werearrestedand sentto the mainislandof Bahrain. The Ruler
of Qatar complainedto the BritishPoliticalAgentprotestingthemannerin which Bahrain had
exercised itsjurisdiction over the islands. The Rulermade no objection to the jurisdiction
itself. TheRuler of Qatar'slettèrraised the theoretical questionas to what wouldhappen if
Bahraini ships seeking shelter on the Qatari Coastwere treated in a similar manner. By
comparingthe incident withwhatmight happenif it had occurredwithin Qatar'sjurisdiction,
the Ruler accepted and acknowledged that the HawarIslands were within Bahrain's
jurisdicti~n'~~.repeat,thiswas in1938.
107. Mr.Paulsson will later today describe how the parties to the oil negotiationsal1
recognizedthatthe Hawar Islandsbelonged to Bahrain.
Qatar'sattemptsto refutetheevidenceofBahrain'seffectivités
ontheHawarIslands
108. Qatarhas notbeen ableto locateone exarnpleof its having exercised authontyon the
Hawar Islands.Bahrainsubmitsthat Qatar hasnotbeenablesuccessfullyto challengetheevidence
of Bahrain'sefectivités. In its Reply,Qatar allocates only 21pages out ofthe 360-pagetotal in
attempting toaddress the evidence of Bahrain's efectivitésand activitieson the HawarIslands.
Qatar'soralargumentswerenomoreeffective.
109. Qatarrelied on two ovemdingpropositionsfor its attackon Bahrain's connection with
the Hawar Islands. Thefirstwasthatthe Bahrain branch ofthe Dowasirwerenomads, notsubject
to theauthority of Bahrain, hosefishermen occasionallydroppedby theHawarIslands.
110. The records clearly showthe opposite. This was not the case of isolated and
unverifiableinstances of shipwrecksor fishennen seeking shelter fiom a storm before leaving
without atrace- as was thecasewithal1the islandsintheEritredemen dispute, astheAwardin
the first phase of that case descnbes it. The Bahraini Dowasir engaged in annual seasonal
migration patterns- transhumancei,f you will- betweenthe main island of Bahrainand the
Hawar Islandsfor 100 yearsbeforethe 1939 Award. Theywere not nomads. Theylivedon the
'2S~etthm Ruler of Qatarto Hugh Weightman,BritishPolitical Agent, 12July 1938. Memorialof Bahrain,
Ann. 266,Vol. 5,p. 1119.islands withtheir families,as the remains of their villages yousaw attest. So too the cemeteries,
includingthe children'scemetery. TheBahrainiDowasirdidnot travelfromZellaq toHawar with
their dead children in order to bury them in the children'scerneteryon the Hawars. Theywere
buriedneartheir homes - onHawar.
111.Thesecondpropositionputforwardby Qataris that Bahrainexercisedno authorityover
the HawarIslands and that the Hawar islandersbecame insome way autonomousfrom Bahrain
whenthey lefithe mainislandand travelledto theHawars. Theactivitiesthat1havebroughttothe
attention ofthe Court, based on the historical record, massively contradicQ t atar'sunsupported
assertionsonthispoint.
112.In its firstround of oral pleadings, counseflor Qatar referredto the bullet-point listof
examplesof Bahrain's exerciseof authorityover the HawarIslandsthat is containedin Bahrain's
Reply. Hestated:
"In my respectfulsubmission, agreat majority of the bulletpoints are simply
bold assertions,without any supporting evidence andtherefore hardly deservingof
seriousconsiderati~n."'~~
113.Butthe Courtwill be able tosatisQ itself that this statement,by Qatar, is itself a"bold
assertion". Itis unsupportedby any citation. Nor did Qatar developor sustainthat argument. It
cannot. As the Courtis aware, thebullet point listin Bahrain's Replysumrnarizedfor the reader
the evidencesubmittedby Bahrainin its Memorialand Counter-Memorial.Every sumrnarypoint
on the list provides a citationthat refersto the location ofthe detailedargument elsewherein the
written pleadings that in tm cite the underlying evidence supporting the proposition.
Mr. President,the pleadingsspeak for themselves. Bahrain'sexamples - al180 of them - are
supportedby evidenceand aretherefore "deservingof seriousconsideration". Qatarhas chosento
ignorethem.
114.Next, Qatarargued: "Noneof them [theexamplesof Bahrain'sactivities onthe Hawar
Islands]constitutesanact performedby or onbehalf of Bahrain àtitre de~ouverain."'~~
126~~200018,p.17,para4.
200018,p.17,para.4. 115.Quitea sweepingstatement, butit is verytelling. Ittells us thatQatar understandsthe
very high thresholdthat it faces. Qatarunderstandsthat it must destroyysingleexampleof
Bahrain's activiton theHawarIslands.
116. Qatareverthelessfailed toaddressal1butthreeitems fromthe listof 80.
117. Or,rather, in fact, whatQatar chose tol1"three" efectivib tecause in factthey
turnedouttorelateto afar greaternumber of documents that togethrescribeBahrainicontrolof
theHawarsranging fkomtheeighteenthcenturythroughto 1936.
118.The first in this series of "three"efectiveéerred to by counsel for Qatar is the
Al-Khalifa grant of permission to the Dowasir tribe to settle in the Hawar Islands in the
eighteenth~entury'~~.In support ofthis historic event, Bahrain has submitted anumber of
documents fiom the public record, datingwell before any dispute over the Hawars. Qatar's
principal response tothis is thatthe Dowasirwholivedin Zellaqand theHawars mightnot really
havebeen ahr rai ni'Thi.speculationisdirectlyrefutedbytheevidence that1havereviewedthis
moming.
119.Qataralso triesto attack theBritish recordsthat referto the grant of permission tothe
Dowasirto residein the Hawars givenby the Qadi of Zubarah.ounselforQatar arguedthat this
evidence shouldbe dismissed. On whatbasisdidtheydothis? Becauseit hadbeenmarshalledby
Bntain in reactionto a threat to Bahrain frthe Ottoman Empireduringthe 1909Zakhnuniya
incident. Bahraincannotseehowthismakesthe evidenceanylessprobative.
120. In the course of his argumentson this point, counselfor Qatar questioned what
CaptainPrideauxmeantin 1909when hewroteto thePolitical Residentasfollows:
"asthe Kaziof Zubarah wasinthosedays anofficia1of the AlKhalifa,the island[the
HawarIslands] would seem to bea dependencyofthemainlandState,whichthe Chief
ofBahrainstillclairnsasmorallyand theoreticalhi^"'^'.
121.To Bahrain, Pndeaux's meaningis clear. Did Prideauxmean to Saythat the Hawar
Islandswerethedependenciesofthe Al-Khalifaor thedependencies ofthe Al-Thani? No mention
is made of the Al-Thani.Thecontextis unmistakable: he wasquestioningwhetherthe Dowasir
'"CR200018,p.17,par5.
200018,pp.18-19,paras.6-9.
"%emofia ofBahrai n,n.236,Vol. 5,p. 1039atp. 1042.wereindependent,or whether they were dependeno tn some authority elsewhere.The answerwas
yes: the islandis a dependency. AndCaptainPrideauxnotedthat theDowasir were,by virtueof
the actsof an "officialof the Al Khalifa"- his words - present inthe HawarIslands, andthat
they were a dependencyof the mainlandState,giventhe factthat the Al-Khalifawere stillclaiming
it. Thegrantto theDowasir was not madeby an "AlThaniofficial"or someamorphous"Qatari"
official.
122. In addition, Qatar outright misrepresents the words used by Prideawc inthese
1909documents.For exarnple,one reportby Prideawcnotesthe grant ofthe Qadiof Zubarahto
the Dowasir andadds thatthe Qadi of Zubarah"of coursewasan officia1underthe al-~halifa"'~'.
Counselfor Qatar,presumablyrecognizingthe forceof this evidencein reducingits thesis,claims
that the report1just cited merely "mentionsi,n effect,that theKazi, over 100years earlier,was
likelytobeanofficia1underthe~l-~halifa"'~~T . his ismorethanjust a tripofthetongue.
123. The secondof the three series of documentsthat Qatarattacks is the records of the
Bahrain court dating fromthe first decadeof the twentiethcentury. As counselfor Qatarnoted,
therearetwo suchrecords'33.Qatar haschosento question theauthenticityof these documentsin
this stage of theoral proceedingsin the followingterms: "In al1the circumstancestherefore,
Mr.President,the authenticityof thetwojudgments ...mustbe open toseriousdoubt." '34
124."Inal1the circumstances".It isnotacceptabletomakesuchassertionssirnplybecausea
documentisunfavourableto one'scase orsimply becauseit isproducedby one'sadversary. When
Bahrain read theQatar Memorial and encountered the forged documents ,ahrain spent a
year-and-a-half,in consultationwith more than a dozen world-renownedexperts-historians,
scientists,forensicdocumentexaminers - in the most minute andexactingexaminationof the
documents. Those experts prepared reports describing the many ways in which it could be
established thatthe 82documents submittedby Qatar were forgeries. Bahrain subrnitted to the
Court thosereportsalongwithextensive analysisof itsown.
'3'~emorialofBahrai, nn.235,Vol.5,p. 1034atp. 1037.
'3Z~~200018,p. 21,para.15.
'"CR 200018,p.27,para.28.
134~~200018,p.28,para.28. 125.Qataritself, when facedwiththe evidenceof the forgenes,preparedfourreportsof its
own on the forged documents before apologizing and effectively withdrawing them. The Court
will no doubt recall that,ofthose four Qatari documents, twoagreedwith Bahrain's conclusion;
one of Qatar's reportsevenpointed outmer evidence oftheirforgednaturethatBahrainhad not
botheredto submit. Of the remaining twoQatari reportsone made irrelevant observations about
Arabichandwriting,and only onedisagreedwith some of Bahrain'sanalysis. Eventhen,not one
expertreportproducedbyQatarcould Saythatthe documentswere authentic.
126.Now, let us considerwhat "al1the circumstances" are thatlead Qatar to questionthe
evidence ofBahrain's exercise ofjudicialjurisdictionover theHawar Islands, evidence1 , remind
the Court, that hasbeen in the publicdomainfor morethan 60 years. Whatis the basis for this
veryseriouscharge?
127.Well, Qatarquestionstheevidence becauseBahrain didnothave a regular filing system
in thefirstecadeof thetwentieth~entury'~~.
128.The relevantpassage from the 1938documentrelied upon by Qatar to challengethe
authenticityof the evidencereads as follows,it can be foundat tab46, page 1133,paragraph11.
The Court will observethat it is in fact a letter fiom the Adviserto the Bahrain Government
explainingtoBritishofficials,whyevenmorejudgmentscouldnotbe providedby Bahrainduring
the 1938-1939arbitration:
"Particularsof casestried in the BahrainCourts regarding disputes amongthe
people of Hawar about moveableand immoveableproperty are given in the note
attached tothis letter. It willbe appreciated thatuntil the presentregime [i.e.,until
afier SirCharlesBelgravebecameAdviserto the Governmentof Bahrain]no regular
filing systemor preservationof recordsexisted and a search for oldcasesregarding
Hawar has beenunproductiveand has only produced two judgments dated 1327and
1328 Hejrah[1909 and 1910]."'~~
129.Thisis "al1the circumstances" upon whichQatarraisesits allegationsofinauthenticity:
Bahrainexplaining,in 1938, why a search ofthe government archives had only locatetd wo such
judgrnents relatedto the Hawars. Qatar does not explain its reasoningMer. Nor did Qatar
'35~2000/8,p.28,para.28.
I3'~ahraCounter-Claiin 1938-1939arbitratin the fom of a LettotheBritish Politil gentdated
22Dec. 1938.MemonalofBahrainA, nn.274, Vo5,p. 1133.provide any evidenceupon whichan allegationof inauthenticity could responsibly be made. In
Bahrain'ssubmission,Qatarmusteitherprovideevidenceofitsassertionorwithdrawit.
130. The thirdand finalseries of effectivitésreferred to by Qatar relates, in fact, to the
furtherexerciseof Bahrain'sjudicialand quasi-judicialpowersin relationto the Hawar~slands'~'.
Qatarmerelyassertsthat the documentsdo not showwhat Bahrainsaysthey do: that is, thatthey
show Bahrainiauthority over the Hawar Islands. The documentsare before the Court. There
seems little point in the partiesarguing about what the texts actuallysay. 1 will only address
Qatar'streatrnentof the firstdocumentunderthiscategory,asbeing exemplary of Qatar's approach
to the remainder. The document isa policerecorddatingfiom 14April 1936. You may recallthat
1referredto itearlier inmyremarks. So,what doesBahrainclaimthat thisdocumentsays? In its
Memorial,Bahrain wrote of this document: "In 1936, thereis a record ofthe Bahrain Police
Directorate seizing the Bahrain Courts of a violent dispute over fishing traps in the Hawar
~slands."'~~
131.The 1936documentin questionis addressedfiom thePolice Directorateto theBahrain
Court. It describes thefactsofthe dispute, an altercationinvolvingHawar Island residents.The
memoof thePoliceDirectorate concludes:"Havinginformedyou thus,we leavethematterto you.
HajjAbbas, Chiefof Police."
132. Bahrain'soriginalconclusionthat this is a record of the Bahrain Police Directorate
bringingto theattention of the Bahrain Courts a violentdisputeover fishingtraps in theHawar
Islandsstandsunchallenged.Indeed,a postscript atthe bottomof the Bahrain PoliceChiefs memo
reads:
"The two partieswerepresentandweinformed them thatthe fishingareaswere
not theirsthis year. Wesaidthat iftheycauseda problem,the Court would lock them
al1up and that if any of them had a petitionto make, he should presentit and the
Courtswouldlookintoit.
[signedby thumbprinted]
SabahbinSaqrand RahrnabinRashid al- osar ri."'^^
"'CR200018,p. 30,para.37.
r o et feom PoliceDirectorato the BahrainCourt,14April1936,Memorialof Bahrain,Ann.245, Vol. 5,
p. 1070.
'3g~emoriaolfBahrain,Ann.245,Vol. 5,p. 1070. 133.ThissurelyMer confms Bahrain'sviewofthe document.
134.As fortheremainderof Bahrain'sevidence,Qatarapparently hasno replytomakeother
than that Qatardoesnot considerthat it deserves"anyseriouscon~ideration"'~~ Q.atar'sstatement
that theevidence has"inreality.. .nocredibilitywhatsoever" ismerelyself-serving14'.
135.As the Courtcan observe,Qatar'sresponseto the evidence ofBahrainiactivityon the
Hawar Islandsover generations amounts to little morethan the bold andincorrect assertionthat
only three of the 80 exarnplesof Bahrain'sconduct, submitted by Bahrain, warrantmer
c~nsideration'~~.
136.Counselfor Qatar,as 1notedearlier,calledthemthree exarnplesof Bahrain's conduct,
but infacthereferredto nolessthan 20suchexamplesinthe course of hisrebuttal oftheevidence.
Counselfor Qatarreferredto: fourcasesbeforethe Bahrain courts;three examplesofthe exercise
of policeor quasi-judicialactivitiesthereby Bahrain; theregularseasonalmigrations toandfiom
Hawarby the BahrainiDowasir; the existenceforcenturies oftwo Bahrainivillageson theislands;
the ancientgrantby the Qadiof Zubarah; theinvitationfiom the Ruler ofBahrainto theDowasir,
in 1845,the activitiesof the DowasirontheHawarIslands; the loyalty of theDowasirto Bahrain;
the reportsby Britishofficiaisof, and1quotefiom one suchBritishreport as citedby Qatar,"his
[theRulerof Bahrain's]sovereigntyover~awar"'~~.
137.Mr. President,1couldgo onlistingthe BahrainactivitieswhichcounselforQatarcould
notavoidmentioning.CounselforQatarnodoubthadhisownreasons forcalling them butthree.
138.Qatar's rebuttalhusattemptstorefutespecificevidencewithgeneralizedtheories based
on extrapolationsfromdocumentsthatarenotwarrantedbythe textsof thosedocuments. Counsel
forQatar's remarkswere shotthroughwithphrasessuchas,and1quote: "thereforeseemstohave
"%R 2000/8,p. 33,para.45.
I4'c2000/8,p. 34,para.52.
142~2000/8,p. 17,para.5.
'43~2000/8,pp. 17-34.bee~~"'~~ "i;n other ~ords"'~~;"seems to haveass~med"'~~;"wasnot ~u~~estin~"'~'a ;nd "itis
inconceivable,Mr.President that"14*.
139.Just asQatarlabelsevery BritishofficialwhodidnotagreewithQatar'scurrentviewof
historyas biasedor corrupt,just as Qatar attemptsto refùte everyone of the historicaldocuments
thatshowsitstheories tobe incorrectby callingit mistaken,sotoo Qatar seemsnableto conceive
that itmightbe wrongand so it bmshes aside al1the evidencethat contradicts itsargumentsas
being inconceivable.
140. Qatar'sattemptto challengeBahrain'sevidencestopswiththis.
Theevidence of Bahrain'seffectivsi itéetheBritishAwardof 1939
141.Mr. President,bothParties have reviewed Bahrain'esflectivitéson the Hawarssincethe
BritishAwardof 1939. Theseactivitiesconfirm Bahrain's titl.heyhave beenfùllycanvassedin
Bahrain'swritten pleadings and 1 do not propose to do more now than to bring them to your
attention. TheyfüllyconfirmBahrain'ssovereigntyand actsofauthorityovertheHawarIslands.
CONCLUSION
142.In concluding, Mr. President, may1remindthe Courtof the Eastern Greenlandcase,
whichSirElihu discussedlastweek.
143. In that case, as in this, the party in possession ofthe territory was faced with a
speculative claimby an acquisitiveneighbourthat had no realevidenceto support itsclaim. In
truth,at leastiEasternGreenland,Nonvayhad some evidence ofits exerciseof authority,if only
recent. The CourtinEasternGreenlandprovidedno consolationprizetoNorwayforattemptingto
takepartofDenrnark's temtory bywayofsucha speculativecase.
144.As 1notedat the outsetof myremarks,the issue oftitle to theHawarIslandsdoesnot
involvea weighing ofcompetingevidenceofthe eflectivitésoftwoparties. Bahrainhas presented
massive evidenceinthepublic domainthatconfirmsthehistoricalfact that formorethan200years
'"CR200018,p. 21,para.15.
I4'cR2000/8,p. 21,para.17.
14cR 200018,p.22,para.18.
147~~200018,p. 22,para.18.
I4'cR200018,p. 25,para.25.the Hawar Islandshave beenpartof the fabricof Bahrain,sociallyandpolitically. Today, Qatar is
left with nothing but a claim based on geographical proximity, justas it did in the previous
arbitrationof 1938-1939. Having effectively abandonetdhe 82 forgeries, Qatarno longer even
claims thatthereeverwereanyQatarieflectivitésoverthe islands. Thereis nothingforBahrainto
refute.
145. 1end my remarksto the Courtby recallingthe analysis madeby one of the Assistant
Legal Advisersto the BritishForeignOffice,Mr.H. G.Darwin,foundat tab47. His remarks are
at page 4 in handwritten observation. In 1964a,nticipatingQatar'srevival of its claims to the
Hawars, Mr.Darwin asked the Foreign Officeto investigate the issueof sovereignty over the
HawarIslands. On 13May 1964, Mr. Darwinreceivedthe resultsof the enquiryand recorded his
conclusionsasfollows:
"It appears fiom the inquiry that Bahraincan rely for their claim on tribal
affiliations of the residents as well as acts of administrationof the Bahrain
Governmentwhereas Qatar can rely on no argument except geographicalontiguity
which is on the whole not avery strong argument. [In1964the AssistantLegaI
Adviserconcluded] Bahrain therefore inseasily."'49[Citationsomitted.]
146. Mr. President, may 1 ask you to cal1upon Maître FathiKemicha to continue the
presentationofBahrain'scase.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you verymuch, Mr. Volterra. Je passe maintenantla parole au
Dr. FathiKemicha.
M. KEMICHA:
1.Monsieurle président, Madame et Messieursde la Cour,j'ai l'honneuet leprivilège de
comparaîtreaujourd'huidevantvotrehautejuridictiondansl'intérêdte1'EtatdeBahreïn.
UTI POSSIDETIS
2. Ma tâcheconsisteàvous exposerla positionselon laquellele principe d'intangibilité des
frontières,dont l'utipossidetis est uneexpression, devrait s'appliquer au différend qui oppose
I'EtatdeBahrein à 1'Etatde Qatar.
'49~oreiOfficeMinutedated15June1964. ReplyofBahr, nn.2,Vol.2, p.2. 3. L'uti possidetisest le principeselonlequel doivent êtrreespectéeset maintenues enl'état
les frontièrescolonialeshéritées u omentdel'indépendance palresnouveaux Etats.
4. La Chambre de la Cour, constituée poucronnaître de l'affaire du Dzférendfrontalier
(Burkina Faso/Républiquedu Mali), a considéréd , ans son arrêtdu 22 décembre 1986, que
1'utipossidetis,
((constitueun principe général, logiquemenltié au phénomène de l'accession à
l'indépendanceo ,ùqu'ilse manifeste. Sonbut évident est'éviterque l'indépendance
et la stabilitédesnouveauxEtatsne soientmises en danger pardes luttes fratricides
nées de la contestation des frontières à la suite du retrait de la puissance
administrante.))(C.I.J.Recueil1986,p. 565,par. 20.)
5. La seule limite à l'applicationdu principe de l'uti possidetis dansle contexte d'une
décolonisation est qu'ilne peut porter atteinte audroit d'autodéterminatdes peuples, qui est,
comme l'a rappeléla Cour dans l'affaire duTimor Oriental (Portugal/Australie), «l'un des
principes essentiels dudroit internationalcontemporain))(C.I.J.Recueil 1995,p. 102,par. 29; les
italiquessont de moi).
6. Une telle limitation à l'application del'uti possidetis n'existepas dans le cas des
îles Hawar. Aucungroupeouminoritéethniquene revendique, ànotreconnaissance, ces îles.
7. Quoique,àentendre M. Shankardassciter,non sans malice,une lettre del'agent politique
Prideaux,onpuisse avoir desdoutes !
8. Le capitane Prideauxrelève,dans cette lettre du 20mars 1909, qui vous aétécitéeà
plusieursoccasions,surlafoice quelui auraitditun habitant del'île, ce quisuit :
«les Dowasir considèrentHawar comme leur propre temtoire indépendant,la
propriété de l'île ayanttoctroyée à la tribu par le casi deZubarahplus de centans
auparavant,dans une déclarationécritequ'ils possèdentencore))(CR200018,p. 18,
par. 18)
9. Il a étédémontré par Bahreïn que les Dowasir se sont totalement intégrés dans la
population bahreïnite etsont devenus,depuisplusieursgénérations d,es citoyensàpart entière de
l'émirat.
10.Il reste, cependant, quesi ces îles devaient échappàrla souveraineté deBahrein,on
seraitinévitablement confrontéàunproblèmed'autodétermination d'unepopulationbahre'ïnite(cf.
contre-mémoiredeBahreïn,sect.3.7,trad.fr.,p. 130,par.438). 11.Contrairementà ce que prétend Qatar en affirman qtue «lesparties n'[avaient]jamais
invoquéle principe de l'uti possidetisjuris dans la présenteagaire)(CR 200015,29 mai 2000,
p. 29,par.5; les italiques sont demoi),Bahreïninviterespectueusement la Cour àse référe r son
contre-mémoire quliuia été soumisle31décembre 199e 7tdanslequelil estditce qui suit:
«La position de Bahre'ïnest par ailleurs confortéepar le pnncipe de
l'utipossidetis qui établitue les pays accédant à l'indépendance aprè asvoir été
soumis au colonialisme reconnaissent l'inviolabilité desfrontières coloniales
existantes. Dansle cas deBahreinet Qatar, l'analyseest simplifiéparleur qualitéde
protectorats de la Grande-Bretagne, ayant tousles deux accédé à l'indépendance
pleine et entièreen 1971. La position dela Grande-Bretagne à cette époque était
claireet établiedepuislongtemps :lesîles deHawarappartenaientàBahre'ïn comme il
avait étéreconnu lors de l'arbitragede 1938-1939et commel'indiquentles cartes
établiesdepuislors parle Gouvernementbritannique.)) (Contre-mémoir de Bahreïn,
sect.3.7,trad.fi., p. 130,par.435.)
12.Qatar,poursapart, s'estabstenu, toutaulong delaprocédure écrite, d faireconnaîtresa
positionquant à l'applicationde ceprincipe.
13. 11aura fallu attendre le 29 maidernier pourentendre mon éminentcontradicteur,le
professeurJean Salmonnous dire qu'il estimait quele principe uti possidetis «ne trouvepas à
s'appliquer ici» pour utiliser ses propres termes(CR2000J5, 29 mai 2000, p. 29, par.5; les
italiquessontdemoi).
14.Cettepositionestbien compréhensible ! L'utipossidetisdessertQatar.
15. Nous allonsnous employer d'abord à réaffirmerla portée générale dp urincipe d'uti
possidetis et son applicabilau différendentreBahreïnet Qatar.
16.Pource faire,il nousappartiendradedémontrer que :
- l'utipossidetis est une règlede portée universelet applicable,en l'occurrenceà Bahreiïnet
Qatar; et que
- ce pnncipen'apas un caractère conventionnel m, ais qu'il s'agitplutôtd'une règlecoutumière
applicable,enl'absence dedispositionsconventionnellescontraires.
17.Nousnousattacherons,parla suite, àexaminerles rapportsentre titreet effectivitdans
le contexte d'un utiossidetisapplicableauxîlesHawar.
18.Bahreïn soutiendraalors, d'une part ue:
- la décision de 193c9onstitueun titrequi s'appuiesurles eflectivitantérieures,t qued'autre- les eflectivités,postérieuàe1939, confirment le mêmetitre constituépar cette décision
britanniquede 1939.
19.Mais avant detraiter ces deux question, ous nous trouvonscontraints, eu égaa la
positionde Qatar,d'avoirà démontrerl'évidenceà, savoir,que Bahreïnet Qatar, sont d'anciens
protectorats britanniques,et qu'a cetitre, l'utipossidetis leur est applicableà la date de leur
indépendance.
1.BAHREÏNET QATAR SONTD'ANCIENS PROTECTORAT BRITANNIQUES; ET A CE TITRE,L'UT1
POSSIDETZS LEUR ESTAPPLICABLEÀ LADATEDELEURINDEPENDANCE
20. Bahreïn commeQatar sontdeux Etats issusde la décolonisationa ,yant étd'anciens
protectoratsbritanniquesquiavaient proclamé leur indépendanee197 1(le 15août pourBahreïn
et le 3 septembrepour Qatar).
21.Cettevéritéhistorique ne semblepas être accepéaeQatar.
22. Le professeur Salmon nousa, en effet, indiquélors de sa plaidoirieque«les deux
Emiratsn'étaiennt i dansunesituationcolonialeni sousprotectoratdu Royaume-Uni)CR200015,
p. 29,par. 6).
23. Si Bahreïn et Qatar n'étaient,ni dans une situation coloniaei sous protectorat,
pourquoi avaient-ils proclameurindépendance en1971?
24.Nousallonsdémontrerque :
- les déclarationsde l'indépendance deahre'ïnet Qatar établissentleur statut de protectorats
britanniques;et que,
- larelativeautonomieinterne de Bahreïnet Qatarn'entamaiten rienleurstatutd'Etatsprotégés.
25. Pris, en effet, par le doute,j'ai pris soin d'aller consulter la proclamation de
l'indépendancede Bahreïn en date du15août 1971, laquelle est constituéepar un échange de
lettresentrelerésidentpolitique britanniet l'émirde Bahreïn.
26. Cet accord relatif a l'abrogation du régimespécial de traité a étéenregistré,
le 10février1972,aux NationsUnies sur l'initiativedu Royaume-Uni[ce document figure dans
votredossierd'audience- doc.no 481.
27. Lapremièrelettre, constituant cet accord, est apaer lerésident politiàl'émir. 28. Permettez-moi,Monsieurle président, de vous en lue un extrait (dansune traductionen
françaisréaliséepar les servicesde sations Unies).Jecommence lalecturede cettelettre :
«J7ail'honneurde me référer aux entretien qsuej'ai eus avecvous au sujet de
l'abrogation du régime spécialde traité entrele Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d'lrlande du Nord et 1'Etatde Bahreïnet ses dépendancee st au désirqu'a manifesté
votre gouvernementde voir 1'Etatde Bahre'ïnassumer uneentièreresponsabilité,sur
leplaninternationalentantqu'Etatsouverainetindépendant.))
Onnotera ici que le texte original anglais, qui figure'écranen même tempse ,st rédigé comme
suit:
"Thatthe StateofBahrainshouldresumefull internationalresponsibilityas a
sovereignandindependentState .
29.Je reviensàprésentau texte français :
«Au nom du Gouvernement duRoyaume-Uni jepropose maintenantce qui
suit:
1) Le régime spéciad le traité entrele Royaume-Uniet 1'Etatde Bahreein,qui est
incompatible avec l'exercice d'une entière responsabilité s,ur le plan
international, en tant qu'Etat souverain et indépendant,prendra fin à la date
d'aujourd'hui.
2) Les accordsexclusifsdu 22décembre 1880et du 13mars1892et tous accords,
engagements, dispositions et arrangements qui auraient étéconclus entre le
Royaume-Uniet 1'Etatde Bahrein dansle cadredu régimespécialde traitéentre
les deux Etats cesseront d'avoir effetà cette mêmedate.)) (Nations Unies,
Recueildes traités,1972,no11586.)
30. A cette lettre estjointe la réponse de l'émir de Bahreqni confinne l'agrémentde son
gouvernement.
31. L'échangede lettres intervenule 3 septembrede la mêmeannée1971entre cettefois
l'émirde Qataret laGrande-Bretagneest rédigd éansquasimentlesmêmes termes[ilfiguredans le
dossierd'audience- doc.no49.1
32. A l'instar de l'accordconcluavec Bahrein,le résident politique britannique adressuene
leme à l'émirde Qatar. Permettez-moi, Monsieurle président,de vous enlire un bref extrait,au
risquedeme répéter :
«J'ai l'honneur de meréférer aux entretiensquej'ai eus avecvous au sujetde
l'abrogationdu régimespécialde traitéentrele Royaume-Unide Grande-Bretagneet
d'Irlandedu Nord et 1'Etatde Qatar [on ne parle pas de dépendanceis ci] et au désir
qu'a manifestévotre gouvernementde voir 1'Etatde Qatar reprendre les pleines
responsabilitésinternationales entantuYEtas touverainetindépendant.))
Letexte originalanglais estrédigé commesuit : "That theState of Qatarshouldresumefull internationalresponsibilityas a
sovereignandindependentState. "
33.Jereviens à présent au texte franças
«Cesentretiensontabouti aux conclusions ci-après:
1) Le régime spécia dle traitéentre le Royaume-Uniet 1'Etatde Qatar qui est
incompatibleavec le plein exercicedesresponsabilités internationaleds'unEtat
souverainetindépendant,prendra fi ncejour.
2) Le traitégénérad lu 3 novembre 1916 et les traitéset engagementsque1'Etatde
Qatara acceptés autitre dudittraitégénéraelt tous autres accords,engagements,
dispositionset arrangements conclus entrele Royaume-Uniet 1'Etatde Qatar
dans le cadredu régime spéciadle traitéentre les deux Etatscesserontd'avoir
effetà cejour.» (NationsUnies,Recueildestraités,1972,no11811 .)
34.A sontour, l'émireQatar confirme au résiden ptolitiqueque«lespropositionsénoncées
dans[votre]notereprésentent correctemen ltsconclusionsauxquelles [nos]entretiensontabouti)).
35.Il apparaît, ainsi,et àla lecturede ces deuxlettres,que Bahreïnet Qatar ont j,squ'à
la proclamationdeleurindépendanceen 1971,desprotectora bsitanniques.
36. Si toutefoisn doute subsistait, l'examedes seuls instrumentsjuridiques, auxquelsil
estfaitréférencdeansleséchanges de lettresentre Bahreïnet Qatard'une partet leRoyaume-Uni
d'autrepart,établiralasubordinationdecesdeux entités étatiquesà1'Etatprotecteur.
37. Des traitésdu 22décembre1880 et du 13mars 1892pour Bahreïn, ainsique le traité
du3 novembre1916 pourQatar ont étéjoints au dossierd'audience [doc. n090, 5 1,521. On y
reviendraplustard.
38.On peutcertesdiscuter dela nature etdel'étendue des compétencd ee1'Etatprotecteur.
Les prérogatives de cedernier sont-elles limitées à la représentationinternationale ou
couvrent-elles,au contraire, la gestionemeetl'exercicede compétencestemtoriales ?
39.Il seradémontréque la relative autonomie do onttpujouir Bahreïn etQatar, aucoursde
la périodeantérieureà la proclamationde leur indépendance, n'entame en rien leur statutd7Etats
protégés. A. Larelativeautonomieinternede Bahreinet Qatarn'entameenrien
leur statutd9Etatsprotégés
40. La Cour permanente deJustice internationale aeu à examinerle régimedu protectorat
dans l'avis consultatifqu'elle avaitdonnéle 7 février1923concernantles Décretsde nationalité
promulguésen Tunisieetau Maroc (zonefrançaise).
41.La Cour relève:
«L'étenduedes pouvoirs d'un Etat protecteus rur le temtoire de 1'Etatprotégé
dépend, d'unepart, des traités deprotectorat entre1'Etatprotecteuret 1'Etatprotégé,
et, d'autre part, des conditions danslesquelles le protectorat aétéreconnu par de
tierces Puissancesvis-à-vis desquelleon a l'intention de se prévalires dispositions
de ces traités. Malgré les traits communsque présententles protectorats de droit
international, ils possèdent des caractères juridiques individuels résultant des
conditions particulières deleur genèseet de leur degré de développement.)()Avis
consultut$ 1923,C.P.J.I.série B no 4,p. 27.)
42. Le professeurSalmonprend soinde soulignerque:
«Le Royaume-Unipossédaitsansdoutele monopolede l'exercice desrelations
extérieuresdes deux Etats, mais il n'avait pas la compétencd ee disposer de leurs
droits de souverainetéterritorialesans leur consentement.))(CR200015,p. 29, par.6;
les italiquessontdans l'original.)
43. Cette affirmationtend à créer l'impressioque les deux Etats bénéficiaiend'une large
autonomieinterne,laquelle les mettrait en dehors d'une situationcoloniale.
44. Force estdeconstaterquesi autonomieil y avait, elle ne pouvaitu'êtretouterelative.
45. Dans l'affairedes Phares en Crèteet à Samos,la Cour permanente arelevé, dans son
arrêdtu 8 novembre1937que :
«Malgré sonautonomie,la Crète n'avaitpas cessé defaire partie de l'Empire
ottoman. S'il est vraique le Sultan avait dû y admettred'importantesrestrictionsà
l'exercicede ses droitsde souverainetéc,ettesouverainetémêmeq , uellequ'enait été
la qualzj?cationdoctrinale, n'avaitpas cessé delui appartenir.)) (C.P.J.I. sérieALB
no71, p. 103.)
46. Qatar nous a involontairement fourni une claire indication sur la nature des liens
qu'entretenait laGrande-Bretagneavecles deux Emirats. Elleestcontenuedansunepièceannexée
àsaréplique,et quenousavonsjointeau dossier d'audience(doc.no53).
47. Le documenten question,dont l'intérê ptour Qatar est d'ordrecartographique,est une
note, endate du 5janvier 1933,rédigéepar un agent du ForeignOffice,Rendel;et danslaquellece
dernierdécritle statutdesEtatsduGolfecouvertsparlerégime spécia dle traité encestermes:
«les autres Etatsde la région jouissentd'un statut particulier dansla mesureoù,bien
qu'il s'agisse, techniquement,de principautés souveraineset indépendantes,ils entretiennent avec le gouvernementde Sa Majesté des relationsconventionnelles
spécialesqui les transforment pratiquementen Etats protégés. Généralemec ne,s
traitéscontiennentdes clausespar lesquellesles Etats concernéss'engagentàne pas
céder uneparcellequelconquede leur territoire, à ne pas recevoir des représentants
d'unepuissance étrangèr(eendehorsde ceuxdu gouvernementde SaMajesté)et à ne
pas octroyer deconcession pétrolièro eu de pêche(de perlesou aux éponges) sansla
permission du gouvernementde Sa Majesté. Ce dernier, en retour, s'engage à les
protéger...» (Répliquede Qatar, annexe111.41v ,ol. 3,p. 247; trad.fi., p. 77.)
48. La meilleureillustration de ce qui vient d'être ainsi décrn itous est fournie par le
professeurSalmon lui-même l,rs de sadernière plaidoirisurla délimitationmaritime.
49. Son propos étaitalors de démontrerle rôle du Royaume-Uni dansla répartitiondes
concessions pétrolière:
«Les opérationsdes sociétép sétrolières étaient soumiseàsun double contrôle
de lapart dugouvernement deSaMajesté.D'unepart, touteconcessionconsentiepar
les deuxEtats concernésdevait recevoir l'accord deprincipe du gouvernement de
SaMajestéen vertudes accordspassésavec chacundes Emiratset dont on vousa
parlé précédemment(c'était l'article3 de l'accord Bahreïn/Royaume-Unidu
13mars 1892et l'article IV du traitéQatar/Royaume-Unidu 3 novembre 1916).
D'autre part, et c'est ce qui étaitneuf, les parties concessionnaires devaient,
elles-mêmes,passer un accord «politique» ('political agreement" avec le
gouvernementde SaMajestéqui leurimposaitdes zones desécurité où les opérations
de forage ou d'exploitation ne pouvaient avoir lieu qu'avec l'aval dudit
gouvernement.))(CR2000/10,p.29,par. 15;les italiquessontdemoi.)
50.Quedisent ces deuxarticlesauxquelsleprofesseurSalmonfait référence ?
51. L'article 3du traitédu 13mars 1892, quevous trouverezdans le dossier d'audience
(doc.no5l), constitueun engagementdel'émir de Bahrein,et estainsirédigé :
"ThatI willonno accountcede,sell, mortgageor otherwisegivefor occupation
anypari of myterritorysave totheBritishrr.
52. Quantàl'article IV du traitédu3 novembre1916entreQataretla Grande-Bretagne(qui
figure dansle dossier d'audience,doc.no52),il contientl'engagementsuivantdu cheikh Abdullah
bin Jasimbin Thani
"neitherwill 1, withoutsuch consent,cede to any otherPower or its subjects,land
eitheronlease,sale, transfer,ggif,rinanyotherwaywhatsoever".
53.Nous sommesainsidans lasituationdécritepar la doctrine,ed t anslaquelle:
«La compétenceterritorialeelle-même peuê t trereconnue à un Etat dans un
espacequi n'estpas proprementle sien et sur lequel iln'a pas de «titre»territorial.»
(J. Cambacau et S. Sur,Droit internationalpublic, 3' éd., Montchrestien,1997,
p. 395.) 54. La relation qui a existé jusqu'en1971 entre Bahrein et Qatar d'une part et la
Grande-Bretagned'autrepart est indiscutablementune relation entreun Etat protecteuret un Etat
protégé, commiel en avait existéenAfriqueetenAsieaucoursdu siècledernier.
55. Devant autant d'éléments prouvan l'existence d'une situation coloniale, nous ne
pouvons que nous interroger surle pointde savoirsi nos contradicteurscroyaienteux-mêmesla
fiction voulant que«lesdeuxEmiratsn'étaienn t i dans une situation colonialeni sousprotectorat
duRoyaume-Uni)).
56. Cela ne semble pas êtrele cas du professeur Davidqui, au détourd'une phrase, afait
référence à la position de «la puissance protectrice elle-mêm, savoir la Grande-Bretagne))
(CR2000/9,p. 25,par.55; lesitaliquessontdemoi).
57. Quel que soitle qualificatif qu'on donne naturede ces «liensspéciaux),ul ne peut
prétendre que Bahreïnet Qatardisposaientalorsdelaplénitudeet del'exclusivitédes compétences
interneset externesqui sont lesattributsde la souveraineté.
58. Nier le fait colonialn'a d'autre despour Qatar que de dresser desobstaclesdevant
l'applicationdel'uti possidetis.
59. Ayant ainsi, j'espère,rétablila vérité historique, revenonss,i vous le permettez
Monsieur le président,à l'essentieà,savoir:l'applicationde l'utipossidetis au différend entre
Bahreïn et Qatar.
II.PORTÉEGÉNÉRALEDUPRINCIPEDEL'UTIPOSSIDETIS ET SON APPLICABILITÉ AU
DIFFÉRENDENTREBAHREÏNET QATAR
60. Monsieurleprésident,
61. Madameet Messieursdela Cour,
62. On nesauraitcontesteraujourd'hui quel'utipossidetissoitunerègleapplicableauxEtats
issus de la décolonisation où qu'elee produise,qu'ils lesoient d'unemêmeou de différentes
puissancescoloniales.
63. Je me dois de rappelerque la Chambrede la Cour a explicitementdonnéà ce principe
une portée universelle en le qualifiant,dans son arrêtdu 22 décembre1986 dans l'affaire du
Dzffërend frontalier (Burkina Faso/Républiquedu Mali), de ((principe de portée générale,logiquement liéau phénomène del'accession à l'indépendanceoù qu'il se manifeste))(C.I.J.
Recueil1986,p. 565, par. 20).
64. L'uti possidetis nousparaît devoirrecevoir pleineapplication dans le litigeopposant
deuxEtats issusde ladécolonisation britannique.
65. Devant le silence qatarien, nous allons devoir examiner deux arguments que ne
manqueront pasdesouleverceux quinepréconisentpas unesolutioninspiréepar l'utipossidetis.
66. D'abord,ce principene seraità leursyeux, qu'unerègle coutumière de portéerégionale.
Nous allons démontreq ru'au contraire:
A.L'utipossideiisestunerègledeportée universelle e,t applicable,en l'occurrence, Bahreïn
et àQatar
67. Quoiqued'inspirationlatino-américainel,'uti possidetisfut repris en Afrique et a été
notamment consacré par la résolutionadoptée à la premièresession de la Conférence des chefs
d'Etatafiicainsréunieau Caireen 1964,quia proclamé cequisuit :
((Considérante,n outre, que les frontières desEtats afiicains, au jour de leur
indépendance,constituent une réalité tangible( ,la Conférencedes chefs d'Etat
afiicains) déclare solennellementue tous lesEtats membres s'engagentà respecter
les frontières existant au moment où ils ont accédé à l'indépendance.))
(AGH Res 16(1)du 21juillet 1964.)
68. L'attachementdu continentafiicainàl'intangibilitédes frontièresa étréaffirméencore
récemment à l'occasiondu dernier sommetdes chefs d'Etatafiicains tenu à Alger entre le 12et
14juillet 1999.
69. Le principe del'uti possidetisa, par ailleurs, trouvéapplication dans les situationsde
dissolutiond'unEtatfédéral.
70. La commissiond'arbitrage de la conférence pourla paix en Yougoslavieavait ainsi
estiméque :
«Le principe de l'uti possidetisjuri...bien qu'initialement reconnu dansle
règlement des problèmes de décolonisatie on Amériqueet en Afiique, constitue
aujourd'huiun principe présentanutn caractère général.» (Avino3, 11janvier 1992,
RGDIP1992,p. 268.)
71. La commissionprésidée par M.Badintera, parailleurs,fermementconsidéré s,'agissant
delaYougoslavie, que : «à défautd'un accord contraire, les limites antérieures acquièrenlte caractère de
frontières protégées par le droit international conformémentau principe
d'utipossidetisjuris» et qu'«aucune modification des frontières et des limites
existantes établiespar la force ne peut produire d'effets juridiques)()avis no 3,
11janvier 1992,RGDIP 1992,p. 268-269).
72. En dépitdu recours àce principedans diverses régiondu monde,commenousvenons
de le souligner, certains continuent à chercher à circonscrire le champ d'application de
l'utipossidetià l'Amérique latine.
73. Leur argumentprincipal consiste s'attachercurieusementàl'originelatino-américaine
duprincipe.
74. Et d'aucunsont cru voir dansl'arrêt dla Courdu 11septembre1992dans l'affairedu
Dzférendfrontalier, terrestre, insulaire et maritime(ElSalvador/Honduras),confirmation deleur
proprevision.
75.Le passageauquelil est faitréférencestainsi rédig:
76. «On ne peut douter de l'importance del'uti possidetisjuris qui, en général, a donné
naissanceà des frontièrescertaines etstablesdans la plus grandepartiede l'Amériquecentraleet
de l'Amériquedu Sud.» (C.I.J.Recueil1992,par.41,p. 386.)
77. Nul ne contesteque le principeait reçu le plus large échodans cette régiondu monde
qui, comme le dit justement la Cour dans ce mêmearrêt de1992, a manifestéj,e la cite, un
((attachement fermeet constant ... au principe del'uti possidetisjuris» (C.I.J.Recueil 1992,
par. 355,p.569)
78. Est-il besoin de rappeler par ailleurs, que tout en évoquant «les républiques
hispano-américaines»l,a Chambrede la Cour dans son arrêt de 1992fa aitfréquemmentréférence
à sadevancièredansl'affaire BurkinaFaso/République duMali de 1986.
79.La Courd'ailleurs n'avaitpasbesoinderéaffirmer l'universalitéuprincipe, l'ayantdéjà
fait et d'unemanièreéloquente,précisémen dtans sonarrêdu 22 décembre1986dansl'affairedu
Dzférendfi-ontalier (Burkina F'aso/République du Mali) où elle prononceson dictum devenu
célèbre :
((11faut voir, dans le respect par les nouveaux Etats afiicains des limites
administrativeset des frontièresétabliespar les puissances coloniales,non pas une
simple pratiquequi aurait contribuéà la formation graduelled'un principede droit
internationalcoutumier dont la valeurserait limitéeau continentafricaincommeelle
l'aurait étauparavant à l'Amérique hispanique m, ais bien l'applicationen Afrique d'unerègledeportéegénérale)()C.I.J.Recueil 1986,par.21, p.565; lesitaliquessont
demoi.)
80. Il n'y a donc à nos yeux aucun obstacleà l'applicationde l'uti possidetàsdeux Etats
arabesissusdela décolonisation.
81.Leprincipedemeuredeportée général e. monde arabe ne faitpasexception.
82. L'autreargument qu'on se doit à présentde réfuter est celuiqui consiste àattribuerà
l'uti possidetisun caractèreconventionnel.
83. Nousestimonstoutau contraireque
B.L'utipossidetis estunprincipede caractérecoutumierapplicabeln e l'absencede
dispositionsconventionneiles contraires
84. Ceux qui attribuent à l'uti possidetisle caractère derèglepurement conventionnelle
considèrentquele principene seraitapplicablequedans la mesureoù les parties l'acceptent pour la
détermination deleurs frontières.
85. Lameilleure illustrationen serait,selonles tenants decette thèse, l'existence mêmde
traitésquis'éloignent de l'utipossidetsour la fixation desfrontières.
86.Nousne pouvons admettre ceraisonnement, car commel'a fortjustement dit un auteur
dansun ouvragerécent etbiendocumenté :
((L'existencede nombreux traitésqui tracent les frontières concernées en
appliquant des critèresautres que l'uti possidetistémoigne del'autonomie de la
volontédes Partiesetnonforcément d'un reje dtuprincipe.En somme,l'utipossidetis
n'est qu'une règledispositive,à laquelle les Etats peuvent ensubstituer d'autres.))
(Marcelo G. Kohen, Possession contestéeet souveraineté territoriale,PUF 1997
p. 453.)
87.L'utipossidetis constitue ainsiune normecoutumièrede droit internationalà caractère
dispositifquis'appliqueenl'absence d'une volonté contraid resparties intéressées.
88. Si la délimitation des frontièrea étéétablie par voieconventionnelle,il sera alors
inutiledefaireappel àl'utipossidetis.
89. Tel a étéle cas dans l'affairedu Dzférendterritorial entre le Tchad et la Libye, oùla
Cour avaitestimé,dans sonarrêd tu 3février1994,qu'ellen'avaitpas :
«à étudierplus avantdes sujets qui ont étélonguementtraitésdevantelle commele
principe de l'uti possidetis et l'applicabilité dela déclaration adoptée par
l'organisation de l'unité africaineau Caire en 1964))(C.I.J. Recueil1996, p. 38,
par. 75).dèslorsque
«le traitéde 1955a déteminéde manièrecomplètela frontièreentre La Libye et le
Tchad»(C.I.J.Recueil 1994,p.40, par. 76).
90. Ainsi rienn'empêcheles Etats intéressésdéciderd'un communaccord de déroger à
P
l'uti possidetis,et de détenninerles frontièresrespectivesen utilisant desnormesdifférentes;mais
tant qu'ilsne l'aurontpas fait,l'applicationde l'utipossidetis reste larègle.
91. Un accordexpliciteest donc requis pour toute modificationd'une situationterritoriale
résultantde l'uti possidetis.
92.Un tel accordn'ajamais été conveneuntreBahreïn etQatar.
93.Ayantainsiexposéles raisonspourlesquellesil noussembleopportund'écarter ledeux
argumentspouvants'opposeràl'applicationde l'utipossidetis dansl'affaire quiest devantvous,je
souhaiteàprésent,
94. Monsieurle président,Madameet Messieursde laCour, vous inviterà examiner, dans
une troisièmeet dernière partie,les rapportsentre le titre et les effectivitésdans le contexted'un
utipossidetisapplicableau différend opposantBahreetQatar.
In.LESRAPPORTS ENTRE LE TITREETLESEFFECTZVITE SANS LE CONTEXTED'UN
UTI POSSZDETZ SPPLICABLEAUXILES HAWAR
95. Bahreïn invite respectueusemenlta Couràexaminerla relationjuridiquequi existeentre
lesefectivitéset letitreservantdebaàelamise en Œuvre del'uti possidetis.
96. La Chambrede la Cour, constituéepour connaîtrede l'affairedu Dzgérendfrontalier
opposantle Burkina Faso à la Républiquedu Mali, a retenu l'approche consistantà distinguer
plusieurssituationsqu'ellea décridansson arrêt du 2décembre 1986.
97. Le passage en question estreproduit, cette fois dans son intégralité,ran devant
vous;permettez-moidevouslerelire :
- «Dans le cas où le fait correspond exactement audroit, où une administration
effective s'ajouteàl'uti possidetisjuris, l'«effecn'intervient enréalique
pour confirmer l'exercicedudroitnéd'un titrejuridique.))
-
«Dans le cas où le fait ne correspond pas au droit, où le territoire objet du
différendest administréeffectivementpar un Etat autre que celui quipossède le
titrejuridique,yia lieudepréférelretitulairedutitre.)) - «Dansl'éventualité oùl'«effectivité»ne coexisteavec aucuntitrejuridique,elle
doitinévitablement être prieseconsidération.))
- «Il est enfindes casoù letitrejuridique n'estpas de natuàefaireapparaître de
façonprécise l'étendue territorialesur laquelleil porte; les «effectipeuvent
alorsjouer un rôle essentiel pourindiquercommentle titre estinterprétédans la
pratique.))(C.I.J. Recueil1986,p. 586-587,par.63.)
98. Si l'on devait appliquer, à titre de test, ces quatre hypothèses aux deux Etats
revendiquant lasouverainetésurles îles Hawar,on se rendrait rapidementàl'évidenceque 1'Etat
de Bahreïn est celui des deux qui détientà la fois un titre juridiquement valableet qui peut se
prévaloir, enmême temps, del'exerciceeffectifde lasouverainetésur leterritoire en question.
99. Des quatre situations envisagées,seule la premièrenous semble s'appliquer à notre
affaire,je relis leparagraphe correspondant
(une administration effective s'ajoutàl'utipossidetisjuris, l'effectivitén'inte~ent
en réalitéque pour confirmer l'exercice du droit né d'un titre juridique))
(C.I.J.Recueil1986,p. 586,par. 63).
Il s'agit,d'une situation idéd'exactecorrespondanceentrele fait et le droit; celle-la
100.
même qui caractérisla souverainetde Bahreïnsur les îles Hawaroù une administration effective
confirmetoutnaturellement un titrejuridique.
101. L'effectivité n'intervient icqiue pour confirmer l'exercicedu droit néd'un titre
juridique.
102. Qu'ilme soit àprésentpermis d'attirerrespectueusement l'attentionde la Cour surle
fait que les effectivitsur lesquelles Bahreïns'appuieaujourd'hui,et dont l'inventairevient de
vous êtreexposéparmon confrère,RobertVolterra,se caractérisenp tar leur permanence.
103. Elles sont, dans une large mesure, antérieuresà la décision de 1939et ont même
constituéle fondementsur lequel la souveraineté sur les îles Hawar aétéattribuéeà Bahreïn,en
vertude la décisionbritanniquede1939.
104.Je meproposed'établirque,d'une part :
- la décisionde 1939constitue un titrequi s'appuiesur leseflectivitantérieures,t qued'autre
- les effectivités,postérieuresà 1939, confinnent le mêmetitre constitué parla décision
britanniquede 1939. A.Ladécisionde 1939constitueuntitre quis'appuiesurles effectivités antérieures
105.Mon collègueet ami, le professeur MichaelReisman,vous a exposéla position de
Bahreïn, selon laquellela décisiondu Il juillet 1939 constitue belet bien un titresur lequel
Bahreïn sefonde pour asseoirsa souverainetésur les îlesHawar.
106.Que cette décisionait le caractèred'une sentencearbitraleou d'une décision politique
ou même administrativeimportepeu ! Noussommes en présenced'un titrejuridique.
107.Il convient derappeler l'importancedutitredansleconcept même dle'utipossidetis.
108.La Chambrede laCoursouligne dansson arrêt de1986 que :«lepremier[élément]mis
en relief par le génitiflatinjuris, accorde au titre juridique la prééminesurla possession
effectivecommebasede lasouveraineté));avand t'ajouterplusloi:
«Mais le principede l'uti possidetis nes'épuise dans l'élémenp tarticulier
quel'on vient dedécrire.Il en estun autrà,savoirque,soussonaspectessentiel,ce
principe vise, avant tout, à assurerle respect des limitestemtoriales au momentde
l'accessionàl'indépendance.) )C.I .ec.eil1986,p. 566, par.23.)
109.Dans le cadre del'uti possidetisjuris, et donc d'unefrontièrehéritée de lcaolonisation,
le titre sur lequel on se fonde peut résulterd'un arbitrage antéromme dans l'affairede la
Laguna del Desierto entre l'Argentineet le Chili (RGDIP1996- 2, p 520-597);commeil peut
aussi résulterdes lois et règlements fixant leslimites entre lesdifférentes sdministratives
appartenantau mêmeempirecolonial (affaire duDzférendfrontalier, op.cit.,p568).
110.Quelle que soit sa naturejuridique, la décision de1939fait incontestablementpartie
intégrantedu legs colonial.
111.Cette décision, faut-illerappeler, arendue sur labase desefectivitésdontBahreïn a
pu alorsapporterla preuveàl'occasion d'uneprocédurearbitraleinitiéepar Qatar.
112.S'agissantmaintenantdes effectivitésenregistréepsar Bahreïn postérieuremeà 1939,
Qatar s'est évertuà leurcontestertoutevaleur juridique. Nouspensonstout au contraireque les
effectivitéspostérieureà 1939confirmentle titre juridique constituépar la décision britannique
de 1939. B. Les effectivitépostérieurei sl 1939 confirmentle titrejuridiqueconstitué
par la décision britanniqu dee 1939
113. Il a étéen effet démontré par Bahreïnque les effectivités postérieure àsla décision
britanniquen'ont faitqu'appuyer letitreconfirméparladécisionde 1939.
114.L'indépendance acquiseen 1971a intégré cette décisio dans un ensemble global qui
estprécisémenlt'utipossidetis.
115.Nous savonsqu'ilexiste, s'agissantde I'utipossidetis,un débat surlestatutréservéaux
effectivitésostcoloniales.
116. La Chambre de la Cour, dans son arrêtdu 11 septembre 1992 dans l'affaire
El Salvador/Honduras,a tranchéce débaten reconnaissantàces efectivitéspostcolonialesun effet
117. Elle a d'abord estimé que sa devancièrede 1986 dans l'affaire Burkina
Faso/Républiquedu Mali : «avait égalementà l'esprit les effectivitéspostcoloniales» (C.I.J.
Recueil1992,p. 398,par. 61;les italiques sontdemoi).
118.Et la Chambreconsidèreensuite :
«[L]apossession effectiveparl'undesEtatsdugolfed'uneîle du golfe [ils'agit
bien évidemmentdu golfe de Fonseca] pouvait constituer une effectivité,certes
postcoloniale, révélatricede la manière dontla situation juridique étaitperçue à
l'époque. La possession étayépear l'exercicede la souverainetpeut être considérée
comme une preuveconfirmantle titre d'utipossidetis.)) (C.I.J.Recueil1992,p. 566,
par. 347;les italiquessont de moi.)
119.Telleest exactementla situation dans notreaffaire:un Etat,Bahreïn,hériteau moment
de la proclamation desonindépendance, d'un utipossidetis,dontfaitpartieintégranteune décision
renduepar l'autorité colonialee,t reconnaissant explicitementla souverainetéde Bahreïn surles
îlesHawarsurlabase d'effectivités prouvéeetsétablies.
120.Les effectivitésdontse prévautBahreïn couvrant aussibien la périodecolonialeque la
période postcoloniale, La décisionbritannique de 1939 se trouve ainsi encadréedans une
séquence ininterrompued'effectivitéset s'appuie surplus de soixante ans d'exercicecontinu,
prolongé,paisible et effectifdesfonctionsétatiquepar 1'EtatdeBahreïn.
121.Monsieurleprésident,
122.Madameet Messieursde la Cour, 123.Je souhaite,en conclusion,soulignerque lerejet de l'utipossidetis ne peut s'effectuer
qu'au profit decelui de «la table rase));ce qui ne peut que susciter latentationen faveurd'une
4
modificationdesfrontièrespar laforce.
124.Ce principede la table rase a été, comme nou s savons tous,mis en oeuvredans la t
région, lorsquel'Iraqdécidale 8 août 1990d'occuperle Koweït.. .
125.Noussommes,pournotre part, convaincus que loindesouscrire auprincipede «latable
rase)),les Etats arabesduGolfesont,plusquejamais, attachéa suprincipede l'intangibilité etela
stabilitédes frontières.
126.Dansce contexte, je souhaite soumettreàvotreréflexion ce dictumdela Chambre dela
Courdans son arrêd te 1986:
«le maintiendu statuquo territorialen Afiiqueapparaltsouvent commeune solution
de sagesse visant à préserverles acquis des peuples qui ont lutté pour leur
indépendanceet à éviterla rupture d'un équilibre qui ferait perdre au continent
africain le bénéfice de tant de sacrifices. C'est lebesoin vital de stabilitépour
survivre,se développer et consolider progressivemenlteurindépendancedans tousles
domaines qui a amené lesEtats africains à consentir au respectdes fiontières
coloniales.))(C.I.J.Recueil1986,p. 567, par.25;lesitaliques sont de moi.)
127.Nous n'avonsaucuneraisonde penser que, «ce besoinvital de stabilitépour survivre,
se développer et consolidep rrogressivementleur indépendance)), auquel la Cour faitréférence,
puissenepas être partagé par lestous Etats arabes du Golfy,comprispar1'EtatdeQatar.
128. Bahreïn,pou sa part, je peux vousen donner l'assurancen , 'aspireàrien d'autrequ'à
vivre en paix,àl'abridetoute menace,àl'intérieurde frontières fondées surle droit international
et auxquelles,nousensommesconfiants,la Courapporterala sanction desahaute autorité.
129.J'en arriveainsiau termedemaprésentation. Ilme reste àvousexprimer,
130.Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, ma vive et réelle
reconnaissancepourvoirepatienceetvotre indulgence.
131.J'espère,enfin, qu'il plairaà la Courde bien vouloir appeler,a sa convenance,Sir
Elihu Lauterpacht. Le PRESIDENT :Je vousremercie, MaîtreKemicha. Ceci met un termà notre séancede
cematin. La Courseréuniraànouveau cet après-midi 15heures. Laséanceest levée.
L'audienceest levéà13heures.
Public sitting held on Tuesday 13 June 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding