Public sitting held on Tuesday 8 December 1998, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Schwebel presiding

Document Number
100-19981208-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
1998/16
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

I ,n ,,. 3 F~~J-T Non-Corrigé
1 ! 4"i. '!+ , jh. zIr ,:!&.A s:s3i Uncorrecteci
1

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THE HAGUE
LA HAYE

YEAR 1998

Publicsitting

held on Tuesday 8 December1998,at IO am, at the Peace Palace,

PresidentSchwebelpressing

in the case concerning theDiffeence Relating to Immunityfrom Legal Process
of a SpeciaZRapporteur ofthe Commissionon Human Rights

(Requestfor Advisory Opinion)

VERBATIMRECORD

ANNEE1998

Audience publique

tenue le mardi décembre 1998, 10 heuresauPalais de la Paix,

sous laprésidencedM. Schwebel,président

en l'affairedu Différendrelatifmmunitédejuridiction d'un rapporteur spécial
de la Commissiondes droitsde l'homme

(Requêtpeour avisonsultatz3

COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Schwebel
Vice-President Weeramantry
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh

Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra- ranguren
Kooijmans

Rezek

Registrar Valencia-OspinaPrésents: M. Schwebel, président

M. Weeramantry, vice-président
MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh

Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins,
MM. Parra-Aranguren,

Kooijmans
Rezek,juges

M. Valencia-Ospina, greffierTheSecretary-Generalof the UnitedNationsisrepresentedby:

His Excellency Mr. Hans Corell, Under-Secretary-Generalfor Legal Affairs, The Legal Counsel,

Mr. Ralph Zacklin, Assistant Secretary-GeneralforLegal Affairs,

Mr. Anthony Miller, Principal Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel,

Ms. Mona Khalil, Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel.

The Governmentof CostaRica is representedby:

His Excellency Mr. Joséde J. Conejo, Ambassadorof Costa Rica to theNetherlands,

Mrs. Gabriela Mufioz,

Mr. Charles N. Brower, White & Case LLP,

Mr. Charles H. Brower II, Croft VisitingAssistant Professor of Law,University of Mississippi

Schoolof Law.

The Governmentof Italy isrepresentedby:

Mr. Umberto Leanza, Head of the Diplomatic Legal Serviceat the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Luigi Sico, Professorof InternationalLaw at the University of Naples,

Mrs. Ida Caracciolo, researcherin international law at the Universityof Rome.

The Governmentof Malaysiaisrepresentedby:

Dato' Heliliahbt Mohd Yusof, SolicitorGeneral of Malaysia,

Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professor of InternationalLaw, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de Droit International

His Excellency Mr. A. Ganapathy,Ambassadorof Malaysia to the Netherlands, Embassy of
Malaysia,

Datuk Ahmad bin Haji Maarop, Head of the Advisory and InternationalLaw Division, Attorney
General's Chambers, Malaysia,

Mr. Daniel Bethlehem, Barrister, Deputy Director of the Lauterpacht Research Centerfor
International Law and Lecturer in Law, University of Cambridge,

Mrs. Suryna bt Ali, Federal Counsel, Advisory and InternationalLawDivision, Attorney
General's Chambers,Malaysia, -5 -

Le Secretaire Generaldes Nations Unies estreprésenté par :

S. Exc. M. Hans Corell, Secrétaire général adjoin atux affairesjuridiques, conseillerjuridique de

l'Organisation des NationsUnies,

M. Ralph Zacklin, Sous-Secrétairegénéra alux affaires juridiques,

M. Anthony Miller, administrateur généraa lu bureau du conseillerjuridique,

Mme Mona Khalil,juriste au bureau auconseillerjuridique.

Le Gouvernementdu Costa Rica est représentépar :

S. Exc. M. José de J. Conejo, ambassadeurdu Costa Rica aux Pays-Bas,

Mme Gabriela Mufioz,

M. Charles N. Brower, membre du cabinet White & Case LLP,

M. Charles H. Brower II, Croj VisitingAssistantProfessor of Law à la faculté de droitde

l'universitédu Mississipi..

Le Gouvernement d'Italieest représentépar :

M. Umberto Leanza, chef du service du contentieux diplomatiquedu ministère des affaires

étrangères,

M. Luigi Sico, professeurordinaire de droit international auprès del'universitéde Naples,

Mme Ida Caracciolo, chercheurde droit international auprèsde l'universitéde Naples.

Le Gouvernementde Malaisie est représenté par :

Dato'Heliliah bt Mohd Yusof, Solicitor Generalde Malaisie,

Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., professeur honoraire de droit international l'universitéde
Cambridge, membre de l'Institutde droit international,

S. Exc. M. A. Ganapathy,ambassadeurde Malaisie aux Pays-Bas,

DatukAhmad bin Haji Maarop,jurisconsulte et directeur de la division du droit internationaldu

ministère delajustice, membre du cabinet du ministre de la justice, Malaisie,

M. Daniel Bethlehem,avocat, directeur adjointdu centre de recherche Lauterpachten droit
international de l'université deCambridge,

Mme Suryna bt Ali, conseil fédéral, division des affaires juridiques et du droit internationaldu

ministère delajustice, cabinet du ministre de la justice, Malaisie,Miss Farahana bt Rabidin, Federal Counsel, Advisory and International Law Division, Attorney
General's Chambers, Malaysia,

Mr. Abdul Rahman bin Mohd Redza, FederalCounsel, Drafting Division, Attorney General's
Chambers, Malaysia.Mme Farahana bt Rabidin, conseil fédéral, division des affaires juridiques et du droit
international du ministère de lajustice, cabinet du ministre de lajustice, Malaisie,

M. Abdul Rahman bin Mohd Redza, conseil fédéral, division de r édactiondu ministèrede la
justice, cabinet duministre de la justice, Malaisie. -8-

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearings are open. 1 cal1upon the distinguished

Legal Adviser of the Foreign Ministry of Italy, Ambassador Leanza.

M. LEANZA :

Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs lesjuges de la Cour,

C'est pour moi un grand honneur de vous soumettre au nom du Gouvernement italien,

quelquesconsidérationsessentiellessur leproblèmequi constituel'objetde la procédureen cours.

Cette procédure dérive d'un différend entre l'organisation des Nations Unies et le

Gouvernementde laMalaisie portant sur l'applicabilitédes règlessur l'immunitéde lajuridiction
1
à M. Dato'Param Cumaraswamy, rapporteurspécialde la Commissiondes Nations Unies sur les

droits de l'homme, relativement la questionde l'indépendancedesjuges et des avocats; différend

à trancherauxtermesde la section30 (art.VIII)de la conventionsurlesprivilègesetles immunités

des Nations Unies de 1946 (dorénavant conventiongénérale).

Le Gouvernement italienest intéresséàce différendetà sa solutionparce qu'il estconscient

que seulement un fonctionnement physiologique de l'ordre international peut assurer un

développementpacifique des relations interétatiques.

Ceci est le but de l'organisation des NationsUnies, qui visefavoriser la naissance et la

consolidationdes conditionsgrâceauxquelleslajustice et le respectdesobligations découlant des
'J

traités etdes autres sources du droit internationalpeuvent êtregardés.

Le droit international contemporain n'impose plus seulement aux Etats des obligations

concernant le déroulementde leursrelations réciproquesmaisaussi l'obligation de conformer les

systèmesjuridiques nationaux àdes standardscommunsqui assurentleplein respectdes droitsde

I'homme et des libertés fondamentales. Tout cela gagne une valeur morale et juridique

particulièrementprofonde, en tenant compte du cinquantenaire de la Déclarationuniverselle des

droit de l'homme que nous allons célébrerle 10 décembreprochain. - 9 -

Conscient de sesresponsabilitéspour laréalisationde ces buts, leGouvernement italienacru

que c'étaitson devoir de participeà cette procédure,en déposant ses observationsécritedans le

délaifixédu 7 octobre, et il désire donnermaintenant son exposé oral.

Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour.

1.La décision 297adoptéepar consensusle 5 août 1998par le Conseiléconomiqueetsocial

a posé à cette illustreCour deux questionsjuridiques distinctes. La premièreconsisàevérifiersi

la section 22, article VI, de la convention générale, tpplicable au cas de M. Cumaraswamy,

rapporteur spécial dela Commission des droits de l'homme chargé des problèmes concernant

l'indépendance dejsuges etdes avocats. La deuxième, àdéterminerquellessontles obligationsqui

incombent à la Malaisie, au cas où la réponsà la première question serait positive.

La premièrequestion inclut de nombreux aspectsqui se traduisent en autant de problèmes

juridiques qui exigent une solution correcte pour que laquestion poséepuisse avoir une réponse

satisfaisante.l faut avanttout établir sila relation entrele rapporteur spécialetl'Organisationdes

NationsUnies, matérialiséedans les tâches qui lui ontété confiéeesn tant que rapporteur spécial

de la Commission des droits de l'homme, est telle qu'ellelui confêrel'immunitéou en fait un

bénéficiairedes situations d'immunité prévues palra convention générale.

On sait que la conventiondistingue trois positionsjuridiques auxquelleselle rattache, selon

desmodesetmesuresdifférentes,dessituationsd'immunité.La première est celledesreprésentants

desEtats Membres auprèsdes organesprincipauxou subsidiairesdesNationsUnies ou auprèsdes

conférencesconvoquées par lesNations Unies. Les immunitésdes représentantsdes Etats sont

prévuespar l'article VI de la convention, sections 11à 16. Il est important de rappeler que la

section 15 pose une restriction qui n'a pas son parallèledans les autres positions juridiques

conférantl'immunité,lorsqu'elleexclut que les dispositions en la matièresoient applicables aux

relationsentre le représentant d'unEtat Membre et les autoritésde 1'Etatdont il est ressortissant

ou quil'a désigné comme son représentant. On signalenotamment que, M. Cumaraswamy ayant

la nationalitémalaisienne, il invoque dans le cas d'espècel'immuniténon pas en sa qualitéde - 10-

représentantde la Malaisie, mais, commeon l'adéjàmentionné,en tant que rapporteur spécial de

la Commission des droits de l'homme, à savoir en raison d'une mission spécifique quliui a été

confiéenon pas pour des raisons inhérentes sa nationalitémais pour ses qualités personneetes

sesconnaissances,qui lerendaientspécialementapte àrapportersurl'indépendancedesorganesde

justice et des avocats. Ceci prouve que la position du rapporteur spécial n'estaucunement

comparable avec celle d'un représentantd'Etat, de la Malaisie notamment. Par conséquent,les

restrictionsétabliespar lasection 15que nousvenons de mentionnerne sont pas applicablàson

égard.

La deuxièmeposition qui, selon la convention généralec,onfère l'immunitéest celle de W

fonctionnaire de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. En cette matière et notamment en ce qui

concernel'extension desprivilègeset des immunitésdes fonctionnairesde cetteOrganisation,c'est

l'article de la conventiongénéralequi dispose,en particulierles sectionsà21. Evidemment,

ce n'est pas dans cette qualitéque M. Cumaraswamy peut être considéré comme bénéficiaire

d'immunité :commenous l'avonsplusieursfoismentionné,dans le casd'espèce cequi relèvec'est

exclusivementle fait qu'une missiond hoclui ait étconfiée,consistant dans la préparationd'un

rapport pour la Commission des droits de l'homme.

Latroisièmepositionconférantl'immunité est cellees expertsautres queles fonctionnaires

chargésde missions par l'organisation, auxquels est applicable la section (article VI de la J

convention générale), expressémenm t entionnéedans la requêted'avis adresséepar le Conseil

économiqueet social a cette illustre Cour. En la matière,on ne peut pas se passer de l'important

précédentde l'avisconsultatifdu 15décembre 1989surl'affaireMazil(C.I. Recueil1989, p. 176

et suiv.). Dans cet avis, la Cour a explicitement déclaréque la section 22 de la convention

générale

«est applicable aux personnes (autres que les fonctionnaires de l'organisation des
Nations Unies) auxquelles une mission a été confiear I'Organisationet qui sont de
ce fait en droit de bénéficier desprivilègeset immunités prévupar ce texte pour
exercer leurs fonctions en toute indépendance))(par. 52). -11 -

Dans ledit prononcé,la Cour a interprété avec une précision philologiquela notion de

mission,en soulignant que la portée dece terme est plus ampleque celle qui lui est attribuéedans

le langage courant, et en affirmant notamment que la notion de mission d'étudey étaitincluse

(par.55); par conséquent,les personnes chargéespar l'Organisationd'effectuerune étude pourson

compteet en toute indépendance((doiventêtreconsidéréec sommeexperts en mission au sens de

la section 22)).

Pas de doute que pour lesraisons sus-viséeset compte tenu de la teneur du mandat qui lui

a été confié, M C.umaraswamy doit êtreconsidéré comme expert en mission pour le compte de

l'Organisationdes Nations Unies, et qu'il a donc le droit, au moins en principe, de jouir des

privilègeset des immunitésénuméréasux lettres a) à$ de la section 22.

Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs les juges de la Cour,

2. Au vu de ces dernières dispositionsil faut donc établirla portéeobjective de ladite

immunité, c'est-à-dirsi les faits dont sont néslesprocédures internesqui se sontdéroulsu qui

sont en cours devant les tribunaux malaisiens contre M. Cumaraswamy doiventêtre considérés

commecouverts par l'immunité. Nous rappelone sn particulier,aux fins de la réponseonner au

problèmequenous venons d'énoncer,que le libellé dela lettreb),section 22 précitéee,n disposant

que lesactes accomplispar les expertsau coursdeleur missionsontcouvertspar l'immunitéi,nclut

expressémentdans la notion d'actesles paroles et les écritsrespectivement prononcéeou rédigés

par les experts.Il faut donc retenir que sont couverts par l'immunitous les écritsque l'expert

chargéd'une missiondonnéearédigés, ou lesparolesqu'il aprononcéespour déclarerdeséléments

de fait, oupourexprimerdesappréciationsou desopinionsfonctionnellement liées à la mission que

l'Organisationluia confiée.

La raison d'être del'immunitéd, ans l'hypothèseexaminée,est éminemmentmotivéepar la

nécessité que l'expert s'acquittede la mission d'étudeque l'Organisationlui a confiéeen toute

indépendanceet àl'abri detoute immixtionde lapart des autoritésde n'importe queltatMembre - 12-

de l'organisation. C'estdonc par rapporà la satisfactionde ce besoin qu'ilfaut appréciersi les

paroles prononcées oules écrits rédigésar l'expertsont, oui ou non, couverts par l'immun,née

tenant compte que la Malaisien'afaitaucune réservelorsde sonadhésion laconvention générale.

Or,on reprocheen substanceau rapporteurspécialle contenud'une intewiew ou ilexprimait

certaines appréciations laissant transparaître desgraves doutes sur l'impartialitéde la justice

malaisienne. Les déclarationsrenduesà la presse ont étéensuite divulguéesdansun article de la

revue International Commercial Litigation sous le titre ((Malaysian Justice on Trial)).

Incontestablementlesdéclarationsrendues parlerapporteur spécialontenaientdes critiquesd'une

gravitéconsidérablecontrelajustice malaisienne. Maisil est égalementvraique lamission confiée
W

à M. Cumaraswamyétaitprécisémentd'investigue etrdeporteràlaconnaissancede laCommission

des droits de l'hommel'étatde santéde lajustice dans les divers pays conceméspar l'étude, dont

la Malaisie.

C'estdonc pour ces raisons qu'ilfaut conclure queles déclarationsrendues etdiffuséespar

voie médiatique sont des actesdirectement liésà I'accomplissement dela mission confiéeau

rapporteurspécial,même des actes qui peuvent êtrqualifiéscommed'exécution de cette mission.

On ne peut pas non plusretenir le comportementdece dernier commesusceptiblede blâme

au point de vue du moyen de divulgation employé.Certes, on ne peut pas affirmer que le fait de

J
donner des interviews ou de publier par des voies autres que celles propresorganisation, les

données ou les évaluations obtenues, faisait partie des tâches expressément confiées à

M. Cumaraswamypar la Commission desdroits de l'homme. Mais, comme l'organisation aurait

en tout cas divulgué les résultatsobtenusles évaluationsdu rapporteur spécial, leur divulgation

ultérieureet probablement anticipéene peut guères'estimeren contradiction avec les buts de la

mission qui lui a étéconfiée. En effet, si l'onsongeque tel genre de divulgation a pour résultat

objectifindéniablederendre lesEtats concemésconscientsdesviolationsdesdroitsde l'hommequi - 13-

se sont produites sur leur territoire, on doit nécessairement en conclurequ'elles constituent pour

l'expertune formepossibleet toutà fait licite,encore quenon expressémentautoriséeaupréalable

par l'Organisation, de s'acquitterde sa mission.

D'ailleursonne sauraitdouterducaractèreofficieldel'activitéreprochée. Cumaraswamy

a été interviewen sa qualitéde rapporteurspéciaà la Commissiondes droitsde l'hommeet c'est

danscette qualité qu'l répondu, en exprimanutne partiede sesopinionssur lethèmede l'enquête

dont il avait été chargé.Il résulte aussique M. Cumaraswarny,en délivrantson interviewet en

consentant à la publication de son contenu dans une revue, n'a pas étépoussépar des motifs

fallacieux:la raison principale- et probablementla seule- de son acte, était des'acquitterde

la mission qui luiavait été confiée nivulguantet en attirant l'attention de largeset d'importants

milieux sur les résultats obtenuset sur les évaluationsque ces résultatslui inspiraient.

Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs les juges de la Cour,

3. Il y a lieu d'approfondirun autre aspectde la question, concernant ees pouvoirs du

Secrétairegénéral del'organisation desNations Unies en matière dedéterminationet de fixation

deslimites précises l'immunitédes experts. Que cette question soit de première importan,ela

est prouvépar la décisiondans laquelle on a demandé à cette illustre Cour d'adopter l'avisqui

constituelebutde laprocédureactuelle. Dans ladécisionprécitéee,n effet, leConseiléconomique

et social a soulignéque la réponsela questionde l'applicabilité de la section 22a,rticle VI, de la

convention généraleau cas de M. Cumaraswamy, doit êtredonnée en tenant compte des

paragraphes 1 à 15 de la note du Secrétairegénéral (El1998194 ) . ajoute que dans les

paragraphes 16et 17de la note, le Secrétairegénéralffirmeque ses appréciationsontunevaleur

contraignantepour les Etats Membres de l'organisation.

Le pouvoir d'adopter des déterminationscontraignantepour lesEtats Membres a étéfondé

surla section 23, article VI, de la conventiongénéquiattribueau Secrétairegénérallepouvoir,

voire le devoir, de lever l'immunité accordàeun expert dans tous les cas o((àson avis cette

immunitéempêcherait que justice soit faite et où elle peut êtrelevéesans porter préjudiceaux - 14-

intérêtsde l'organisation)). Ladite norme attribue incontestablementun rôle considérableau

Secrétairegénéram l,ais la thèse selon laquellele pouvoir négatifde lever l'immunité comporte

et présupposele pouvoir positif de constater,avec une efficacitécontraignantevis-à-vis desEtats,

l'applicabilitéchaquecas d'espèce desdispositionsenmatièred'immunité - semblequelquepeu

forcéesur le plan logique.

En réalité,la règlecitée toutsimplementqualifie le droità l'immunitécomme un droit de

l'organisation, dontelle peut disposer en renonçant paracte du Secrétairegénéral.Mais si, au

contraire, le Secrétaire décide dene pas lever l'immunité à l'expert, cet acte n'a pas d'effet

contraignant vis-à-vis de 1'Etatconcerné: il représentele point de vue de l'organisation sur la J

question de l'applicabilité de l'immunitéun cas donné, etce point de vue peut bienne pasêtre

partagépar I'Etatconcerné.

Néanmoins,il y a lieu dereconnaîtrequedans une matièreaussidélicatequel'immunité, les

décisionsdu Secrétairegénéral des Nations Unies paraissent spécialementinfluentes. Que l'on

réfléchisse sur le fait quela réponsà la question si, oui ou non,l'immunité est applicable,bien

souvent présupposela déterminationde la manière laplus appropriéedont les experts peuventou

doivent s'acquittere leurtâche et que cette déterminationne peut êtrfaite quepar les organesde

l'organisation.Ils'ensuitdoncquel'actedu Secrétairegénéralne serac itontestablepar lesautorités

de 1'Etatconcernéque s'il étaiten contradiction évidenteavec la lettre et l'espritde la norme Y(

conférant l'immunité ou si - hypothèse possible sur le plan logique, mais en fait fort peu

probable - ces déclarationsétaient atteintede do1ou formuléesen mauvaise foi.

Mais si, comme au cas échéantu ,ne différenced'opinionsubsiste,elle ne pourraêtre réglée

que d'aprèsla section 30, articleVIII, de la convention généraà,laquelle se réfèrexpressément

la résolution297 du Conseil économique et social. Il s'agit d'une disposition supplémentaire

qui - entantqu'applicableuniquement à défautd'autresméthodesdesolution - attribuà laCour

internationale de Justice la compétencepour donner un avis consultatif «sur tout point de droit

soulevé)).((L'avisde laCoun),énoncela section30, ((seraacceptépar lesparties comme décisive)). - 15-

L'acte conclusif de la procédure,qualifiéd'«avis», se voit donc attribuer une fonctio- et une

efficacité- en outrequecellestypiques,puisque, à l'instard'unarrêtou d'une sentence,iltranche

un différendet oblige les parties au litige. y a mêmelieude retenir que le terme «avis» - qui

désignel'instrument spécifique de coopératiod ne l'organe suprême dejustice des Nations Unies,

destiné à assurer le fonctionnement administratif correct et régulier de la vie des relations

internationales-, a étéemployédans la section 30 précisémend t u fait qu'une des parties au

différenddevant être réglé pa cre moyen, est l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Il y a par

conséquent une connexion,au moins indirecte, avec l'exercice de lafonction d'administration

internationale.

Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs les juges de la Cour,

4. Ilnousresteà examinerladeuxième question :cellerelativà une identificationponctuelle

desobligationsqui incombent àlaMalaisie au casoù,commenous lesouhaitons,cetteillustre Cour

constatequeles situationset lesfaitsquiontdonnélieu à cedifférendsontcouvertspar l'immunité.

A ce propos, qu'ilnous soit permis de rappelerau préalableque les obligationspesant sur la

Malaisie pour la miseen oeuvreponctuelleet complète des dispositionsdela conventiongénérale

ne peuvent pas faire l'objet d'exemptions pour le fait que la Malaisie est lYEtat dont

M. Cumaraswamyest ressortissant. En effet, contrairement à ce qui est établà ce sujet dans la

section 15,article IV, de laconvention généraler,elative, commevous vous en souviendrez, aux

représentantsdes Etats Membres, les immunités donjtouissent les fonctionnaireset les experts en

missionpour le compte de l'Organisation des NationsUnies doiventêtreappliquées vis-à-visde

tous lesEtatsMembres. Ce sontmême les Etatsauxquelslessujetschargésd'unemission sont liés

par un rapport spécialcomme la nationalité,la résidenceou le domicile, qui sont lesdestinataires

privilégiédse la règlede l'immunité carc'estprécisémentà cesEtats qu'ilincombeleplus souvent

d'assurer que le fonctionnaire ou l'expert s'acquitte des tâches qui lui sont confiées par

l'organisation en toute libertéou indépendance. - 16 -

D'ailleurs,la règlesur l'immunitéou,pour mieux dire, lesprincipes gque l'onpeut

dégagerde la conventionet du fonctionnementde l'institutiondans le cadre du droit international

généralp,osent deslimitesla libertéd'actionde laMalaisiedéjàbien avantl'émanatil'avis

de laCour internationale deJustice. On remarque notammentque le seul fait queI'interessé ait

soulevé l'exceptiond'immunitéet que, du côté du Secrétairegénéraldes Nations Unies, une

décisionait été adoptée et adreàsla Malaisie dans laquelleil a invoqué l'imet déclaré

sa pertinence avec les faits déduits devant les organes de justice de ce pays, entraîne des

conséquencesnon négligeables. En effet on doit bien reconnaîtreque, lorsqu'unacte de ce genre

estémané, leautoritéstantgouvernementalesquejudiciaires detatoù laquestionde l'immunité
W
est soulevéesont quand mêmetenues d'accorder une considérationimmédiateet attentive aux

délicatsproblèmesrelatifs'immunité,telles doiventtenir dûmentcomptedel'influentedécision

prononcée àce sujet par le Secrétairegénles Nations Unies.

On ne pourrait pas affirmer que la situation décriteimpose aux tribunaux de où la

question de l'immunitéa été soulevéu,ne obligation juridique de suspendre les procéduresen

cours,en attendantque le problèmede l'existenceou pas de l'hypothèsed'immunitésoit constaté

surle plan international. Maisau moinsondevrait s'attendreue cestribunauxfassentpreuve

de prudence en évitantde déterminer,par des décisionshâtives, des situationsde responsabilité

la charge de cet Etat. -

Une fois quela Couraura constatél'applicabilitédes dispositionsen matièred'immunitéde

la convention généraen l'affaire Cumaraswamy, aussibien leGouvernement queles tribunaux

malaisiensseronttenus d'entirer les conséquencesqui s'imposentet notammentque l'Organisation

est en droit de réclamer laréparation dutort par elle subi directement et dans la personne de son

expert.Il est évidentquetelle réparation,d'aprèsl'avisconsultatifsur l'affaireBernadotte, adopté

par cette Cour le 11avril 1949(C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 174et suiv.), incluttous coets, dépenses

dommages encourus par l'organisation elle-même, et pM. Cumaraswamy bien entendu, se

rattachant aux faits de l'affaire. - 17-

11fautreconnaîtreque l'exécution correcte de certainsaspectsde l'obligation derespecter les

immunitésdesexperts de l'organisation desNations Unies,tels qu'ilsont été précisés, pourrait se

heurter àdes difficultés considérablepar rapportau système constitutionnel desEtats tourà tour

tenus au respect decetteobligation. Nous nous enréféronsnotamment àlaprescription declôturer,

moyennantun arrêt de rejetde la demande d'indemnisation(introduitepar quiconque)et un arrêt

d'acquittement,tous lesprocèscivilsetpénauxintentéscontrelebénéficiaire de l'immunité,ou bien,

sices procèssontterminés,de bloquer l'exécution desprononcés de condamnatid onfonctionnaire

ou de l'expertdes Nations Unies.

Souscet angle, ilest évidentque dans un Etat où les organesdu pouvoirjudiciairejouissent

d'uneindépendancecomplètevis-à-vis du pouvoir exécutifl,e gouvernement de l'Etatconcernéne

pourra pas stopper l'activité des tribunaux. Ljuges pourraientmêmeaboutir àl'émanation d'un

arrêt définitif dcondamnation dont l'exécution ne pourrait êtrebloquée qu'enfaisant appelà des

moyens judiciaires exceptionnels, s'ils sont prévus; end'autrescas, l'exécutif pourratmpêcher

I'accomplissementd'un acte illiciteinternationalendédommageantdirectementou indirectementle

bénéficiairede l'immunité. Mais iflaut affirmer aussiclairementquepossibleet de façondécisive

queces difficultésnepeuvent et ne pourrontjamaisjustifier d'éventuels manquements de lapart de

la Malaisie.

Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs lesjuges de la Cour,

5. D'aprèsles considérationsqui ont étéprésentées et les arguments qui ont été porté s

l'attentionde cette illustre Cour, le Gouvernement italiendemande :

1.qu'ilsoit reconnu queles dispositionsde laconvention générals eont applicableà l'affaire

et notamment :

a) queM. Cumaraswamy, entant qu'experten mission pourle compte del'organisation des

Nations Uniessoitdéclarébénéficiaidre elasituationd'immunité établiedanslasection 22

de l'articleVI, de la convention générale; - 18-

b) et qu'ilsoit décidé que les faisui ont donnéorigine à cette affaire sont couverts par la

section 22, lettre) du même articlede la convention;

II. que la Malaisie soit déclarée obligee réparertout coût, dépense et dommage subipar

l'organisation directement et en la personne de M. Cumaraswamy.

Les conclusions auxquelles nous sommesparvenus semblent certaineset inévitables :elles

découlent,comme on peut bien le comprendre, d'uneinterprétation correctedes dispositions en

matièred'immunité. Tout Etatqui setrouveraità contesterà tort ouavecdesraisons plus ou moins

fondées,l'existence d'une situation d'immunitévis-à-vis d'un expertdes Nations Unies doit donc

s'attendreà ce que ces contestations se retournent contre lui, si les obligations prévuespar la

convention générale ne sont pas entièrement et correctement respectées.

Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs lesjuges de la Cour, nous vous remercions de

votre bienveillante attention.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 1 now cal1 on the distinguished

Solicitor-Generalof Malaysia,Dato'Heliliah Yusof.

Mr. DATO'HELILIAH YUSOF: Mr. President and Members of the Court,

1. 1have the honour, Sir,to appearon behalf of the Government of Malaysiain the present

oral proceedings relatingto the request by ECOSOC foran advisory opinion. Appearing withme

is my leamed friend, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,QC.

2. At the very outset,1 wish to emphasize that Malaysia isnot an unwilling or reluctant

participant inthese proceedings. Malaysia welcomesthis opportunityto appear before the Court

and to present publicly, and especially to the other parties to the 1946 General Convention on

Privilegesand Immunities,itsinterpretationofSection 22ofthat Conventionwithinthe framework

of the question put to the Court as understoodby Malaysia. - 19 -

3. Malaysia is fully supportiveof the human rights systemto which the United Nations has

made so massive and useful a contribution overthe pasthalf-century. However,Malaysia greatly

regrets that the position that it hasaken in this case has been publicly pilloried as one which

threatens this system. Malaysiagreatly regretsthat its position should havebeen represented by

criticsasamountingto a denialwithoutqualificationofthe immunitiesofhumanrightsrapporteurs.

That,Mr. PresidentandMembersof the Court, isnotMalaysia'sposition.Rapporteursdonot enjoy

an absolute persona1immunity. There are limits to their functional immunity,limits which al1

Statesacceptand insiston. Thatimmunity is limitedto words spoken orwritten and acts doneby

the Rapporteurs"inthe course ofthe performance oftheir mission". It is for that reasonalonethat

thewordingofthe CertificateoftheMinisterfor ForeignAffairsofMalaysiawas phrased as itwas.

Al1that it intendedto statewas thatthe immunityis functionalandthat it was up to the Malaysian

court to decide whether the words were spoken or written in the performance of the Special

Rapporteur's mission.The onlyquestion now beforethis Court is, in Malaysia's submission,who

is todecidewhetherthe allegedlydefamatorywords were spokenor written in the performanceof

the Rapporteur's mission. Thedecision on this point does not affect the substantive range of the

immunity. If the words were truly spoken in the performance of the Rapporteur's mission,he is

and will remain entitledto immunity in respect of them.

4. It is, if 1may respectfullysay so, ratheran exaggerationfor the Secretary-Generalto say

that "whatis at stakeinthis caseisnotjust the SpecialRapporteur'sinterestsand independencebut

that oftheentirehumanrights system". Thisis certainlynot whatis at stake,forthat istantamount

to assertingthat the systemcanbepursued withoutregardfortherightto be heardof those accused,

rightly or wrongly, of any departure from actual or emerging human rights standards. What

Malaysia is calling for in the present cases the correct applicationof the system of immunityin

such a way as to maintain the operation of the rule of law for al1concerned.

5. Wetake heedMr. Presidentand Membersofthe Court,ofthe Secretary-General'sconcern

for the preservation and indeed for the proper advancement of the United Nations human rights - 20 -

system. And that includes the use of Special Rapporteurs to look into questionsthat arouse

international concern. But theefficient operation of the systemof Special Rapporteursdoes not

require that they should be putabove the law or even outside it. The very idea that a Special

Rapporteur is immunefromjurisdiction in respect of words spokenor written in the performance

of his mission placeshim, and indeedthe organizationwhich he represents,underan even greater

responsibilitythan wouldotherwise be the caseto ensure that his observationsare notonly always

accurate and within the bounds of fair comment but also reflect his integrity and absence of bias.

6. 1would like toturnnow to the scopeof the question beforethe Court. This is necessary

becausethere is somelackof consistencyinthe statementssubmittedto the CourtbyGovernments. w

The absence of consistencymay have its roots in the manner in which the matter was approached

by the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations and by ECOSOC.

7. In the Note of the Secretary-General to ECOSOC of 28 July 1998 (El1998194;

Dossier No. 59) the Secretary-General set outthe history of the matter, making it quite plain in

paragraphs 16 and 17that the principal issuewas the acceptabilityof

"the principle ... that it is for himself, that is the Secretary-General, alone to
determine whethera member of the staffof the Organizationor an expert has spoken
or writtenwordsor performed an act 'intheir officia1capacity'(in the caseof officiais)
or 'inthe performance of their mission'(in the case of experts on mission)".

8. This approach to the matter was reflected in the first paragraph of the draft question W

originally submitted by the Secretary-Generalto the ECOSOC on 28 July 1998: subject only to

Section 30 ofthe Convention"doesthe Secretary-Generalhavetheexclusiveauthorityto determine

whether words were spoken in the course of the performance ofa mission for the United Nations

within the meaning of Section 22 (b) of the Convention"? The second paragraph of the draft

questionrelatesto theobligationsofapariy oncethe Secretary-Generalhasmadehis determination.

But leaving asidethe second paragraph,itwas clearly understoodinthe first draftofthe resolution

that the main target of the question was whether the Secretary-Generalalone has the authority to - 21 -

determine conclusively whether the words were spoken in the course of the performance of a

mission.

9. However,the formofthequestionwasalteredbetween28 July 1998and itsfinaladoption

on 7 August. In the final version the Court was asked for

"an advisory opinion on the legal question of the applicability of Article VI,
Section 22, of the Conventionin the case of Dato'Param Cumaraswamy . . taking
into account the circumstances set out in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the
Secretary-General,contained in documentE11998194,and onthe legal obligations of
Malaysia in this case".

The content of the question appears to have been adjusted to limit it more precisely to the

circumstances of the Special Rapporteur's activity. Thismaybe a limitationof someimportance

in that the proceedings against Mr. Cumaraswarnyare civil, not criminal, proceedings.

10. The change in wording fromthe 28 July draftto the 7 August request hasnot been the

subject of specific discussionin any of the statements made to the Court. However, some of the

States filing statements appear to have read the 7 August requestas an invitationto the Court to

range morewidely than was foreseeninthe 28 July text. Theearliertext made itplainthat the case

was limited to the question of the Secretary-General's authority. The alteretext appearsto have

been read by some as placing beforethe Court the question of whether the Secretary-Generalin

using his supposedauthority to qualiQ the Special Rapporteur'sconduct has properlydetermined

that the SpecialRapporteurwas acting in the performance of his mission. The misunderstanding

probably flows from the use in the later draft of the word "applicability"in the phrase "the legal

question oftheapplicabilityof Section22"andfrom theinsertionofthephrase "takingintoaccount

the circumstances set out in paragraphs 1to 15of the note of the Secretary-General containedin

document El1998194".

11. In Malaysia's submission, thequestion does not range so widely. The correct

interpretation of the7 August wording is that the first question is limited to the extent of the

Secretary-General'sauthority. It doesnot extendto invitingthe Courtto decidewhether,assuming

the Secretary-General to have had the authority to determine the character of the Special - 22 -

Rapporteur's action, hehadproperly exercisedthatauthority. Malaysiaobservesthatthewordused

was "applicability",not "applicati". "Applicability"means "whetherthe provisionis applicable

to someone" not "how it is to be applied".

12. Theprincipalconsiderationfavouringthisview isthatthejurisdiction oftheCourtto give

theadvisoryopinionnow requestedof it derivesfrom Section 30ofthe GeneralConvention. This

sectionpresupposesthe existenceof a "difference"betweentheUnitedNations onthe onehandand

a Memberon the other. Indeedthe prearnbleto the question refersto the existence ofa difference

between the United Nations and Malaysia within the meaning of Section 30. But the only

differencethat has arisen betweenthe UnitedNations and Malaysiaregardingthe immunity of the
w

Special Rapporteur was identified in the draft question proposed by the Secretary-General to

ECOSOC: does the Secretary-General of the United Nations have the exclusive authority to

determine whetherthe wordswere spokeninthe course of Mr. Cumaraswamy's mission.Thatwas

the only issue that had previously been discussed between the United Nations and Malaysia.

Consequently, it would not have been open to the United Nations unilaterally to redefine and

enlargethe scopeof the already defined disputeby rewording the question in broaderterms. The

principal reasonwhy no such enlargement waspermissible and therefore could not have occurred

isthat the "difference" betweenthe UnitedNations and Malaysiahad never been discussed in any

suchenlarged terms. Nor 1 submit,would itbe correct for the Court, in the exercise of its power w

to interpretthequestion, itselfto enlargethequestionin a mannerwhicheventhe Secretary-General

and ECOSOC would not have been entitled to do; and to which Malaysia would not have

consented.

13. It isonthat basisthat Malaysiaapproachesthe questionnow beforethe Court. Malaysia

notesthat the originalissueisthe onetreated inthewritten statementsof the Secretary-General,the

FederalRepublic of Germany, Sweden,the United Kingdom andthe United Statesof America as

centralto thematter. Malaysia has not corne here to consider whether, objectively viewed, the

SpecialRapporteur'sconduct occurredin the performance of hismission. That is not the question - 23 -

at this stage of the proceedings. At this moment,the sole question is: who decides whether the

Special Rapporteur'sconductdid or did not occur inthe course of the performance of hismission.

14. Tothe extentthat someof the written statementshave ventured into considerationof the

substantivequestion,there is novalid basis for their having done so. Treatment of the question of

whether the relevant acts were done in the performance of the Rapporteur's missionis a second

question which can only follow a determination of the first question, of who may classifi the

relevant conduct. The secondquestioncannot be considered until the first has been resolved; the

issue now before the Court is limited to the first question.

15. In short, Mr. President and Membersof the Court, Malaysia's submissionis that the

properscopeofthe questionis limitedto the issueof principle involvedinthe first questionset out

in paragraph 21 of the Secretary-General'sNote of 18 July 1998.

16. The limitationof the principal questionin the mannerjust indicated does not preclude

consideration of the content of Malaysia's obligations pursuant to Section 34 of the 1946

Convention. That,however,isoneofthematters whichwill be discussedby Sir ElihuLauterpacht.

17. Malaysia would like to echo the statement of another member State that "the

provisionsof the General Conventionrequirea particular result". Malaysiadoes not believe

that the Convention dictates or prescribes the manner in which Malaysia has to meet its

obligation. There already exists in Malaysia legislationthat has been place almost sincethe time

whenthe GeneralConvention entered intoforce. TheUnitedNations Secretary-Generalhasalways

beenaware of this legislationandhas been silentaboutit. Our obligations,as stated in Section 34,

are to be implementedin accordance withOurlaws. If Malaysia is found not to be correct in its

position, the legislationof many other parties to the Convention whose manner of implementing

their Convention obligations has been similar to that of Malaysia will also need to be reviewed.

18. 1havebeenat pains,Mr.PresidentandMembersof the Court,to insistonthenarrowness

of the issue now before the Court. At the sarnetime, in concluding my remarks 1feel bound to

observethat at leastpart oftheoriginofthe present problem liesinthe relativelyundevelopedstate -24 -

of the procedures and devices which the United Nations has come to utilize in its understandable

and notablezeal formethodsof ensuringcompliancewith humanrights standards.Malaysia hasnot

complainedof the unexpected selectionof one of its nationalsas a Special Rapporteur. Nor, in

principle would the Malaysian Govemment complain if continued observationswere made about

any aspects of its Govemment if they were indeedtrue and fair. But Malaysia does suggest that

there seemsto be very little guidance,at any rate of a publicnature, givento Special Rapporteurs

as to the suitable limits of theirs comments on various aspectsof governmental behaviouror the

appropriatemeans by which they givecurrencyto such comments. Thereis, it seems,no properly

established code of conduct to govem their practices and procedures.1make these observations
1

only to suggest that, if there had been,the eventswhich havegiven rise to this whole controversy

might wellhave beenavoided; and 1would urgethat whateverelse maycome out of this case,the

opening of discussions on this subject should no longer be delayed.

19.As 1 have already submitted, the sole issue before the Court is whether the

Secretary-Generalpossessesthe rightexclusivelytodeterminethequalityofthe conductinquestion.

Before concluding, Mr President and Members ofthe Court,allow me, Sir,to refer to the several

certificates issued by the Secretary-General.

20. Quite apart from the considerationthat the 1946General Conventiondoes not give the

Secretary-General any such powers, a matter to which Sir Elihu Lauterpacht will presently be W

referring,there is an importantfactorwhich relatesto the actualcontent ofthe Secretary-General's

certificatesnamely that the ceriificates are peremptory in format as well as in content.

21.Perhaps the format does not matter, at any rate in other than political terms, though the

GovernmentofMalaysiafeels obligedthatforthe Secretary-Generaltoaddresshiscertificateto "To

Whom It May Concern"when the intended recipient is knownto be the Government of Malaysia

and shouldaccordingly be identified as such and,accordingly,should be addresseddirectly and in

appropriateterms, falls short of the couriesies of diplomaticpractice to which, in other contexts,

the Government of Malaysia has become accustomed. - 25 -

22. More important is the point about the peremptory content of the certificate. This does

matterbecause it affectsthe persuasivequalityof the certificate even though it is, in any event, not

legallybinding. The point would of course matter even more if the certificate were binding. The

certificate is peremptorybecause it givesnoreasons for its conclusion. It merely recites Section 22

of the 1946 Convention which Statesthe Secretary-General'sdetermination that the words which

constitutethe basisofthe plaintiffs complaintswere spokenbythe SpecialRapporteur inthe course

of hismission andthe Secretary-General"therefore"maintainsthe Special Rapporteur'simmunity.

The certificate contains no recitation of the relevant facts and not a word of reasoning or

justification by reference to which the validity of its conclusion can be assessed.

23. If a certificatesosolute in itscontentsis legallycontrolling, then the Secretary-General

would be able to certify that conduct of no matter what kind has occurred in the course of the

performance of an expert's mission. Of course, Malaysia does not doubt the good faith of the

Secretary-General, but the correctness of hisconclusions could be questioned. Those conclusions

cannot be assessed in the absence of any satisfactory reasoning, on the facts of this specific case,

by which he reached that conclusion. And therefore, arbitrariness may be possible. It is not

acceptable that this possibility should be permitted.

24. Mr. President and Members of the Court, 1 thank you for the opportunity you have

afforded me of addressing you; and 1 now respectfully ask you, Mr. President, to invite

Sir Elihu Lauterpacht to continue the argument on behalf of Malaysia.

The PRESIDENT: 1 wish to thank the Solicitor-General and 1 cal1 now on

Sir Elihu Lauterpacht.

Sir Elihu LAUTERPACHT: Mr. President and Members of the Court, please forgive the

croak in my voice. 1would like to think that it is more pneumatic than geriatric.1.INTRODUCTION

1. Onceagain 1have the privilege and pleasureof appearing beforeyou, thistime on behalf

of the Government of Malaysia.

2. Al1 present in the Court have reason to be grateful to the representatives of the

Secretary-General,Costa Rica and Italy for the lucid manner in which they have expressed their

respectivepositions. 1intend no disrespectto them in observing, however,that, byand large, they

havenot gonesignificantlybeyondtheir written statements. By way of contrast, however,1shall

haveto go intothe matterrather moredeeplythenwaspossible inthe Malaysianwrittenstatements.

The arguments that 1now submit shouldtherefore be taken as representingthe up-datedposition 'I

ofthe Governmentof Malaysia. For reasonsthat will presently becomeclear the submissionsthat

1 am obliged to make will be somewhat longerthan might otherwise have been expected. 1must

thereforeaskthe Courtto hear mewithevenmore than its customarytoleranceand patience. 1will

not give referencesduring my speech; these will be included in my text handed to the Registry,

andwill appear in the transcript.

Theprincipal legal obligationof Malaysia

3. Before indicatingthe general lines of my argument on the principal questionbefore the

Court, it may be helpful if 1referto the main aspect ofthe second part of the questionput to the
r,

Court, narnely, the legal obligations of Malaysia. If 1 do this, it will be clear from the very

beginninghow narrowis the division between,onthe one hand, the Secretary-General and,on the

other,not onlyMalaysiabut avery largenumber oftheMembersoftheUnited Nations who appear

to share Malaysia's position.

4. Malaysia does not disputethe Secretary-General's assertion thata party is under a legal

obligationto ensure that the requirements of Section22 of the 1946General Conventionare met

in any given case. If those requirements are not met, the Party would be in breach of the

Convention and a case would then have arisen suitablefor a referenceto the Court or to another

mode of settlement pursuant to Section30. Of course, it cannot be established that a party is in -27 -

breachof the Conventionuntil the local remediesin that party'scourt systemhave been exhausted

in the manner familiar to this Court. We agree with the learned counsel of Costa Rica that the

obligation is one of result.

5. As the Court is aware, Malaysia'sview of the main question is that it is for courts of

Malaysia to assess the character of the conduct as a preliminary or threshold question, without

entering into the substance of the case more than is necessary for that limited purpose. In the

courseof that preliminary procedurea certificatefrom the Secretary-Generalwould havea role to

play. That role is one of conveying detailedinformation to the local court aboutthe character of

the activity inwhich the expert was involved. Such a certificatewould naturallybe one to which

thegreatest respectwould be paid. It wouldbe of the highest authority in establishingthe relevant

facts. But it would not be conclusive of the legal question of whether the relevant conductfell

within the scopeof the limited functional immunity accorded to the official or expert.

The PRESIDENT: Couldyou speak a little more slowly, please?

Sir ElihuLAUTERPACHT: 1am sorryMr. President, 1amconsciousofthe factthat 1have

rathera lot to Sayand that time is limited.

Indeed, within the legal system as at present operative in Malaysia and in many other

Members of the United Nations, it couIdnot be conclusive.

6. The position of Malaysiain this regard is thus virtually identical to the position taken by

the United Kingdom and the United States as expressed in their written statements in this case.

7. So longas the certificateof the Secretary-General reachesthe relevant court and is taken

intoaccount by it, the precise mannerin whichthe certificate is communicatedto the court is not

of controlling importance. In the present case, the Secretary-General has complained that the

certificate issuedto the courtby the executivebranch of the Govemment of Malaysiadid not itself

specifically referto the positioriadopted by the Secretary-General. In the light of the position to

whichMalaysia adheres, no such referencewas required. However, it mustbe recalled that even - 28 -

so two of the Secretary-General's certificatesand othercommunicationsfromthe United Nations

came beforethe Malaysiancourt by reasonof havingbeenattached toaffidavitsfiled on behalf of

the Respondent andthe court thus knew of their contents'.

8. Once the national courthas been informedof the claim to immunity, it will stay the

substantiveproceedingswhilethequestionof immunityisconsidered. If theimmunity is accorded,

the claim will be dismissed. If the immunity is not recognized, then the case will proceedon its

merits unless the Secretary-General decidesto takestepsto seek an advisoryopinion of the Court

under Article 30 of the Convention,in whichevent the local proceedings willbe stayed again. 1

must emphasize,Mr. President,thatthe decisionastowhethertheRespondentfallswithinthescope
1

of the immunityis not amatterfor the discretionof the localcourt, as was suggestedin one of the

written statements,but of the applicationof law to the facts of the case. If the merits stage of the

case iseventually reached,the Special Rapporteurwill be ableto defendhisposition by reference

to suchdefences asjustification or fair comment ifthey happento be appropriate. No assumption

should be made that because the courts may find that the Special Rapporteur does not enjoy

immunitytherefore he will necessarilybe found liable onthe case that ismade against him. That

is a matter for the Court to decide.

9. 1should justrefer inpassingto the complaintofthe Secretary-Generalthat the certificate

issued by the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in some way defective because it V

introducedthe word "only" beforethe phrase "in respectof the words spokenor written and acts

done by him inthe course of the performanceof his missionu2. Thiscomplaint,with the greatest

respect, seems quite pointless. How could the word "only" possibly changeor narrow the scope

of the immunity in question? In its absence,would the Malaysiancourt have been able to accord

'SeeDossiersNo. 23 andNos. 18 and22 referredto the therein; No. 30 andNo. 29 thereinreferredto (whichwas
communicatedto the Courtevenbefore itwas receivedby theGovernmtf Malaysia).

2SeeDossierNo. 31. - 29 -

immunity in respect of matters that did not arise in the course of the performance of the

Rapporteur'smission?

10.In short, therefore, solfar as the question of the principal legal obligation of Malaysia is

concerned, Malaysia concludes that the position in general terms is quite plain: there is an

important, even essential, role for the certificateof the Secretary-General, but it is not a conclusive

role. It must set out the facts on the basis of which the Secretary-General offers his conclusions

on the nature of the mission and the manner in which the activity which was the basis of the

proceedings can be said to have been carried out in the course of the mission. Such evidencewill

necessarily be mostauthoritative. In the absenceof evidenceto the contrary, itwill inal1likelihood

conclude the matter. But it will be conclusive by virtue of its weight as evidence; not by virtue

of any mle of law that attributes determinative effect to the Secretary-General'smere affirmation.

11. With these opening remarks made, 1 may turn now to the outline of my argument in

relation to the first part of the question - the applicability of Section 22 in the case of

Dato' Param Cumaraswamy. 1am assuming, Mr. President, that the Court has before it copies of

that outline and that they have been given to my fiiends who are participating. 1shall return at the

end of my argument to a few remaining aspects of Malaysia'sobligations.

12.The main part of the question relates to the issue on which the Secretary-General has

touched, narnely: asa matterofprinciple, istheSecretary-General'sdetermination,characterization,

qualification or certificatio- 1shall use these words as being virtually synonymouswith each

other - of the character of the conduct legallyconclusiveof the questionwhether it is covered by

the expert's immunity. 1 propose, first, to place the question of the immunity of officials and

experts of the United Nations within the fiarnework of the overall treatment by international law

of the whole question of jurisdictional immunity. My purpose will be to demonstrate that

entitlementto immunity fiom the jurisdiction of national courts has always been decided by those

courts, notbythe Stateor authoritythat is thebeneficiary ofthe immunities. Thiswill demonstrate,

incidentally,that to accord to national courts the right toqualify the character of the conduct in - 30 -

questionis not tantamountto a total denialof immunity. Nor in that widercontexthas it everbeen

suggestedthat it might be, except in these proceedings on behalf of the Secretary-General.

13. My second submission will be that there is only one category of exception to this

situation, narnely,where a specific provision is included in a treaty which expressly vests in the

sending State or its authorities the right toaliS, or characterize the nature of the conduct in

respect of which the immunity is claimed.

14. Mythirdsubmissionwillbethattheattributionofimmunityto internationalorganizations

is no more than the latest development in the overall history of the international system of

immunity. The 1946 General Convention is but one amongst several examples of the rli

development - though it is no doubt the most prominent. The Convention incorporates the

distinction between,on the one hand, absolute persona1immunity and, on the other, functional

immunity. The very concept of functional or limited immunity necessarilycarries with it an

acknowledgementthata decision must be taken by someoneas to whetherthe conduct, in respect

ofwhichthe immunity isclaimed, fallswithinthe scopeofthe immunity. The GeneralConvention

contains no provision on this point. The position under that Convention is in this respect

indistinguishablefrom the position under international law in relation to other situations where

immunityis restrictedor qualified. Therehasbeen no opendiscussionbetweenthe UnitedNations

andthe Statesconcemedas to whetherthe Organizationpossesses an exceptionalright ofunilateral W

qualification- a rightthat does not exist anywhere else inthe immunity system exceptby virtue

of specific treaty provision.

15. 1 shall then submit, Mr. President, that the interpretation of the Convention does not

supportthe United Nations view that it possesses a right of unilateral qualification. Malaysia's

interpretationis based uponthe factorsusuallyadoptedaspertinentto interpretationoftreaties. The

literalinterpretationof the treaty does not support the UnitedNations claim. Nor do the travaux

prépamîoires. Nor does the practice of the parties. This practice is demonstrated both in the

legislation by which States have given effect to their dutiesunder the Convention and by the -31 -

manner in which courts have dealt with immunity claims. The practice asserted by the

Secretary-General,such as it is, cannot have the effect which he seeks for it. Even leaving aside

the technical consideration that the United Nations is not a party to the General Convention,the

conduct of the United Nations alone cannot evidence, and 1 quote the words of the Vienna

Convention, "theagreementof the parties"whenthe other partieshavepursueda courseof conduct

that contradicts the assertions made by the UnitedNations. Lastly, it is notable thatrt from a

and uncriticalecho of the UnitedNations claim,textwriters do
rare,perhaps even singular,limited

not support the United Nations position.

16. 1shall also submit that the fact that the United Nations has, on a number of occasions,

made a claimto a right of unilateral qualificationisnsufficientin al1the circumstancesto effect

achange - asopposed to mereinterpretation - inthe contentoftheConvention.Ashardlyneeds

saying, it is theunction of the Court to apply the Conventionas it is, not to revise it.

17. 1 will then deal very shortly with a number of other points made in the

Secretary-General'sarguments. And at the end, 1shall retum brieflyto the remainingobligations

of Malaysia.

18. 1can now tum to the substance of my argument,Mr. President, butif youwish to have

a break, this would be a convenient moment at which to do so.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Elihu, let us recess for 15minutes please.

TheCourtadjournedfrom II. 15 to 11.30a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Sir Elihu LAUTERPACHT:

PART ONE

2. THE QUESTIONBEFORE THE COURTIS A NARROWAND LIMITEDONE

19. On the basisofwhat the Solicitor-Generalhas alreadysaid,the Courtwill recognizethat

the question before it is one ofarrow compass. It really relates onlyto the interpretation of one

phrase in Article VI, Section22, of the Convention. Theimmunityof experts is particularized,in

so far as it is relevantto the facts which occasionthe request for thepresent opinion, as follows:

"In respect of words spokenor written, and acts doneby them in thecourse oftheperformance of

their mission, immunity fromlegal process of every kind".
Iirl

20. The question is also of limited scope: who is to decidein the first place whether, in a

case where other conditionsfor immunityexist, the act is done "inthe course of the performance

of their mission".

21. The United Nations says that the Secretary-Generalmust decide. Malaysia says the

Malaysian courts are entitledto decide.

22. In considering this division of opinion, it is possible at the outset to identifi certain

matters that this case is not about and to exclude them from further discussion.

(a) This case is not about whether Mr. Cumaraswamy is or is not an expert falling within

the scope of Section22. Malaysiahas never disputedMr. Cumaraswamy's status.

(b) This case is not about whetherMr. Cumaraswamy is, in general, entitledto immunity.

He is entitled to the immunities laid down in Section 22 of the Convention - to the

extent therein provided and no more.

(c) It is not about whether Mr. Cumaraswamy'spositionis affected by the fact that he is a

national of Malaysia. It is no part of Malaysia's case that Mr. Cumaraswamy's

immunities, suchas they may beyare limitedby the factthat he isa Malaysian national.

(4 This caseis notabout whetherMr. Cumaraswamy'swordswere spokenor written inthe

course of the performance of his mission. As the Solicitor-General has just made -33 -

abundantly plain,this is not the question that isnow beforethe Court, and Malaysiawill

not be drawn into a discussion of it.

(e) The case is not about whether Mr. Cumaraswamy has, or has not, incurred liability in

defamation under the law of Malaysia. That is not a question which has yet been

reached in the proceedings in Malaysia and it may never be. If the Malaysian courts

decide in due course that the allegedly defamatory words were spoken or written in the

performanceof Mr. Cumaraswamy'smission, he will enjoy immunity in respect of them

and the question of whether they are or are not defamatory will never be reached.

Finally,this case is notaboutthe nature andeffect of any internationalresponsibilitythat

Malaysia may incur if at some later date it should be found in the light of any decision

that its courts may reach to have breached its obligations under the 1946 Convention.

Any such considerationwould be entirely speculative, and it is not the Court'spractice

to consider purely hypothetical questions. Indeed, the Court has in the past said that it

will not assume that Statesmay fail to complywith their international obligations. And

1 can assure the Court that Malaysia has no intention of acting in a manner violative of

its international duties.

23. So, Mr. President, thls case is solely abowho is to decidein the first instancewhether

thewordsattributed to Mr. Cumaraswamywere spokenorwritten "inthe courseofthe performance

of his mission".

24. Narrow though the questionnow is, it ison its own quite sufficiently important to engage

the full interest of the Court to the exclusion of the consideration of other matters that have been

raised here by the other participants inhese proceedings.

25. For Malaysia the case is important as raising a matter of basic principle. Malaysia sees

the Secretary-Generalas asserting a right not accordedto him by the 1946 Convention, narnely, to

decide a question that initially falls within the exclusive province of Malaysia's courts. -34 -

26. For the United Nations the case is said to be important because, so it is alleged, the

outcomecould affectthe freedom and independenceofthose who work as rapporteursin the field

of human rights and a mass of conflicting decisions would be inevitable.

27. Naturally, suchaclaim comingfromthe Secretary-Generalmustbe consideredseriously,

but onemay observe immediately,apart fromeverythingelse, thatthe Secretary-Generalhas made

no distinction between immunityrom criminal suit and immunityfrom civil suita distinction

whichinterms ofthe "functioning"of anofficialisofcriticalimportance. Theseproceedingsrelate

to a civilcase. Thereis noquestionhereofany interferencewiththepersonof Mr. Cumaraswamy.

He has not been arrested or imprisoned or threatened with arrest or imprisonment. Nor has his rC

freedomof movementbeen impaired. TheCourt will recallthat the questionputto it requests the

Court to take "into accountthecircumstances set out in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the

~ecretary-Generalnandthatthose paragraphsreferonlyto thedevelopmentofthecivilproceedings

against Mr. Cumaraswarny.

28. And turning to the Secretary-General'sassertion of a risk of "a mass of conflicting

decisions",this seemsto be morehan a littleexaggerated. One mustbear in mindthat the United

Nations has already been in existence for 53 years and the law reportsreflect onlya few cases of

this kind and, as will be seen, not in the terms asserted by the Secretary-General. True, the

Secretary-Generalhasfor longbeen awareof the existenceof the problem. He cannothave been -

unawareof the factthat if Stateswere confrontedby the issuethey mighttake a position different

from his own. The content of the written statements filed in this case by the United Kingdom

cannot have come as a surpriseto him. Even less could he havebeen surprised by the statement

of the United States, for this was written notwithstanding the clear assertion of the

Secretary-General's presentposition madeto the United States in~- anassertion whichthe

United States has clearly not accepted. Yet, the Secretary-General hasnever proposeda specific

'El998194.
4DossierNo.1. - 35 -

open discussion of the problem, nor has he suggestedthat this provision of the Convention should

be clarified, if necessary by amendment. And, it may also be noted, that despite the alleged

"inevitability"of "a mass of conflicting decisions", aninevitability which necessarily presupposes

a mass of situationslikely to occasion the need for recourse to the dispute settlement procedures

contemplated in Section 29 of the Convention, the United Nations has not, as yet, made any

provision for appropriate modes of settlement as required by that Section, even though the

requirement - "The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of

settlement" - isnoton itsface limitedto the establishment ofadhocsettlement arrangementsonly

after a particular dispute has arisen.

3. THE BASICPRINCIPLESINVOLVEDIN THE CASE

29. Mr. President and Members of the Court, permit me now to turn in more detail to the

basic points of principle involved in the case.

30. All who are taking part in the present proceedingsare agreed that the task of the Court

is tointerpret the Convention.

31.In approaching this task it is desirableto place the Convention in its proper setting. The

Convention is not a text that exists in a vacuum. It is part of an extensive body of law that deals

with the limitations upon the jurisdiction that each State normally possesses over al1that goes on

in itsterritory. Thus, more prominently perhaps than in most legal questionsthat come beforethis

Court nowadays, the starting point, in this case, is the sovereignty of the State.

32. Evex-yimmunity representsa reduction of Statejurisdiction. The existence of immunity

cannot be presumed in the absence of a clear rule establishing its existence. Moreover, because

immunity is a subtraction fiom sovereignty the determination of its extent must be approached

cautiously and in a manner favouring the Statethat grants it. In makingthese observations 1do no

more than echo the classic statement by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus

case that "restrictions upon the independence of States cannot be presumed". - 36 -

4. THE RANGE OF IMMUNITIESIN INTERNATIONALLAW

33. Immunity fromthejurisdiction of the courtsof a Statein favour of certaincategories of

person is not a concept that was introduced into international law by the 1946 Convention.

Immunityhasexisted inrelation to variouscategoriesof personsfor centuries- States,diplomats,

consuls and foreign armedforces. Let me brieflytake the Courtthrough those categoriesfor the

purpose of identifiing the relevance toour present situation. Let me startwith State immunity.

A. State immunity

34. It is now generally acceptedthat a distinction mustbe drawn betweenactsjure imperii,

in respectof whichthe Stateenjoysimmunity,andactsjure gestionis, inrespect of whichthe State 1

does not possess immunity. The important pointaboutthis distinction is that the determinationof

whether the facts of a case place it within one or the other category is a matter entirely for the

courts ofthe State in whichthe proceedingsare brought. The Stateclaimingthe immunityand the

party seekingto deny it haveto arguetheir positions in the courtsof that State. The determination

or classificationof the nature of the act is treated as a preliminary step in the procedure. Butthe

defendant Statemust answerin the proceedingsand present itsposition. If the courtholds that the

matter is onejure gestionis, the Statemust answeron the substance.

35. Nodoubt there is a measureof inconveniencefor a State in havingto participate in this ..
w
process of determination,by the national courts of another State, of the character ofthe sending

State'sactivities- a determinationwhichnecessarilyinvolvesthe court inexaminingsomedetails

of the transaction. No doubt there are occasionaldifferencesbetween the ways that the courts of

different States may classie the same conduct. Nonetheless, States have accepted that the

consequenceofdepartingfromthe conceptof absoluteimmunity isthat theprocess ofclassification

is one that hasto be carried out by national courts.

35A. Of course, it is always open to the State to waive its immunity. Justas it is open to

the Secretary-General towaive the immunityof officials in this situation. The State may do this

beforethenationalcourtembarksonthepreliminaryprocessofclassificationandthusavoid it. But - 37 -

the fact of the existence of this power does not mean that the State thereby retains a right

unilaterally to control the national court'spower to determine the question.

35B. What goes for States is true equally for heads of State or even for ex-heads of State,

as is shown by the recent proceedingsin Englandrelating to Mr. Pinochet. The circumstancesof

this case havebecome sowell knownthat 1need nottake the time of the Court in rehearsingthem.

The point to which 1would draw attention in the context of the present proceedingsis that the

positive expression of the immunity of an ex-head of State is limited to "acts performed in the

exercise of his functions as a head of State". Who isto decide this question? Only the English

courts - as isevidentfromthe outcome. Nor,indeed,was the contraryeven suggested. Although

al1the relevant conducttook place in Chile, onlythe English courts could classify or qualify, for

the purposes of extradition,the character of the Senator'sconduct are in the United Kingdom.

B. Diplomatic immunity

36. 1turn to diplomatic irnmunity,the same is true of the classification of acts involved in

a claim to qualifiedor functional immunity. Article31 of the Vienna Conventionon Diplomatic

Relations distinguishes between immunity from criminal jurisdiction and immunity from civil

jurisdiction. Immunityfromciviljurisdiction isqualified. The diplomatis notentitledto immunity

in an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the agent in the

receiving State "outside his official function". If the plaintiff contends that the cause of action

relates to a commercialactivity outsidethe officialfunctions of the diplomat, it is forthe national

court in which theproceedings are brought to quali@or categorize the activity.

37. Whilethe terms in which diplomatic immunilyis limited are not identicalwith those in

whichthe imrnunityof expertson missionsforthe UnitedNations are expressed,the varioustreaty

texts are al1conceptually comparable. They al1involve a decision as to whether the activity to

which the claim relates falls inside or outside the limitation.

38. So again, in relation to diplomatic immunity, who decides whether the activity of the

diplomat is "outsidehis officialfunctions"? Theanswer is undoubtedlythat it is notthe diplomat'shome-State (the authority which, for present purposes,is to be comparedto the United Nations).

The answer in positive tems is that the decision lies with the courts of the State in which the

proceedings have begunand in which the diplomat is pleading his immunity.

39. This position hasnever been questioned. It is helpfully set out in an extended footnote

inVolume 1of Oppenheim'sInternational ~aw'. The samewill be foundinmanyothertextbooks.

Reference is madethere to cases in the French, Italianand American courtswhich involvesthose

courts in examiningthe natureof the diplomat'sactivityfor the purposeof determiningwhetheror

not immunity attachedto it. Althoughthe outcomeof those cases varied, thedecision was always

taken by the courts of the receiving State on the basis of their assessment of the facts and their
*

appreciation ofthe law. Sometimesthe immunity was granted; sometimesnot6.

40. Again, simply by way of illustration, reference maybe madeto two cases taken almost

at random fiom the International Law Reports.

41. There is, for example, a Chilean case of SzurgeIies v. Spohn (1988)' which is of

particular interest. The petitioners claimed that certain investigations by the Counsellor at the

German Embassy in Santiagoviolated their constitutionalrights. The German Embassy claimed

thatthe Respondentwas entitledtojurisdictional immunity since he hadbeenacting inthe exercise

of his functions as a diplomat protecting the interests of German nationals. The SupremeCourt

nonetheless felt fiee to investigatethe nature of the Counsellor'sactivities.

42. Again, inthe Belgiancase ofPortugal v. Goncalves,theBrusselsCivilCourthadto deal

with the contention by Mr. Goncalves that the request by the Director of the Portuguese

59mEdition, at p. 1094.

%ee Hackworth'sDigest ofInter~tional Law, Vol.4, p. 550 and 13ILM217 (1974) which reprintsa GermanCircular
DiplomaticNote of 1973.This Note starts by setting out the distinction between contracts conclulff an behao
foreign State andose concludedon behalf of individual membersof diplomatic misThe basis of the Noteis
evidentlythe fact that al1such caseswere to bedecided by the German courts. Moreover, theNote also stated that:
"judicialdecisionsmay be influencedonly by the partiesto the proceedings,throughthe pleadings providedby law and
may be contested, after their pronouncements,only with the remediesto which the parties are entitled. The Federal
ForeignOfflce has no such means of recouse sinceit is nota partyto the proceedings."

'89ILR45. - 39 -

CommercialOffice in Brussels forthe preparationof a translationwas nota mattercovered bythe

functionsof a diplomaticmissionandwas a commercialactivityoutsidethe official'sfunction.The

Court examined the matter and held that the transaction was covered by immunity8.

43. Once again,it hardly needssayingthatthe fact thatArticle 32of the ViennaConvention

lays downthat immunitymay be waived by the sending Statehas never been treatedas a ground

for the suggestion that the sending State is the sole authority entitled toualifi the nature of the

Act in respect of which the immunity is claimed.

C. Consular immunity

44. The same analysis is applicable to consuls. The Vienna Convention on Consular

Relations (1963) providesthat "Consularofficers . ..shall not be arnenableto thejurisdiction of

thejudicial and administrativeauthoritiesof thereceiving Statein respectof acts performed inthe

exercise of consular finctions".

45. Once againthis provision raises the question of who decideswhether an act falls within

the excepted category. The answer is: only thecourts before whichthe proceedings havebeen

instituted. A number of the relevant cases were collected in a usefül article by Mr. (later Sir)

Eric Beckett in theBritishYearBookofInternationalLaw (1945)'. SirEric was, atthe date itwas

written, Second Legal Adviser to the British Foreign Office. A factually pertinentillustration is

providedby the French case of'ZizianofJv.Kahnand~i~elow". In this case, PrincessZizianoff

sued Kahn and Bigelow for defamation. Bigelow, the Director of the Passport Section of the

United StatesConsulateinParis,pleaded consularimmunity. The Frenchcourt heldthatthe actions

of Bigelowdid not forma part of his officialfünctions. Insodoing,they evidentlyhadto examine

the nature of his fünctionsand the character of the alleged act. No guidancewas sought fromthe

'82 ILR 117.

'(1945) Vol. 21, p. 34.

''4ILR (AnnualDigest1)927-28,p. 384. - 40 -

United States authorities. Additionalcases of the same kind are to be found in the United States

written statement in the presentoceedings".

46. Once more, it is hardly necessaryto Saythat the fact that a sending Statecan waive the

immunity of its consuls does not justifi the assertion that the sending State alone is entitled to

characterize the nature of their activities.

D. Irnmunityof foreign armed forces

47.1 turn now to the immunitiesof foreign armedforces. Here the position is for present

purposes even more interesting. The status of foreign armedforces is now normally governedby

treaty, in just therne way as the position of international officiais and experts of the United r.

Nations is govemed by the 1946 Convention.

48. For exarnple, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement of 1951 provides that in some

mattersjurisdiction isexclusivetothesendingState. Inothermattersit isexclusivetothe receiving

Stateand, in yet a third category,jurisdiction is concurrent. Thus, primaryjurisdiction is accorded

to the sending State if theoffence was one "arising out of any act or omission done in the

performance of official duty". The situation was analysedby the late Judge Baxter in an article

written in 1958". He said:

"The proper authority to determine whether an act was committed in the
performanceof official duties wasat one time quite clear, but subsequentevents have
made it lessso. Accordingtothe travauxpréparatoiresoftheNATO StatusofForces
Agreement, the certificate of the military authorities of the sending State would be
taken as determinative of that fact."

However, no specificprovision to that effect was inserted in the treaty. Judge Baxter continued:

"Notwithstandingthisclear history, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State testified to the

Foreign Relations Committee of the United StatesSenate that it rested with the courts of the

receivingStareto review anysuchcert13cateandtoreach itsown conclusionsaboutthe question".

"Seeparas21-24.

I2zc vole7,pp.77-79. -41 -

JudgeBaxter thenreferredtothe BritishVisitingForces Act 1952,whichhe said "reflectsthe same

view". He continued: "The certificate is merely to be 'sufficientevidence ofthat fact unless the

contrary is proved'. This languagewas not in the text originally submittedto Parliament, which

would have given the certificate a conclusive effect". The reason stated by Judge Baxter "for

makingthis certificatemerelysufficientevidenceunless the contraryisproved,wasthat to givethe

finalSayto the man'scommandingofficer might lead to abuses,for a stroke of the pen wouldthus

oust the courts of Great Britain of jurisdiction which was rightfully theirs".

49. So even in respect of criminalprosecution the determinationwhether an offence arose

out of "any act or omissiondone in the performance of official duty" was one over which it was

expectedthat the courts of the receiving Statewould have the right of decision. The treatment of

civil cases does not affect Oursituation here.

50. An exampleof the determinationby the courts of the receivingcountry of the character

of anact in relationto foreignvisiting forces is provided by the decisionof the Japanese Supreme

Court inJapan v. Cheneydecided in 1955'). Cheney was charged with breaking intoa private

houseand attemptingto commit rape. Althoughthe defendant arguedthat the offence had been

committed whilehe was onpatroldu@,the Japanesecourts assumedjurisdiction underthe relevant

Agreement. ThisAgreement providedthat, wherethe right to exercisejurisdiction was concurrent,

the military authorities ofthe United States would have the primary right to exercisejurisdiction

overUnited States armedforces inrelation toofSeencea srisingout ofanyact or omissiondone in

theperformance of ofJicialdus.. TheJapanesecourts examinedthe natureof the actand concluded

that they had jurisdictionbecause the act in respect of which the accusedwas convicted wasof a

persona1nature. In other words, the courts of the receiving State, Japan, asserted the right to

qualie the offence.

1323ILR 264. -42 -

51. But what really matters in relation to the immunityof foreignvisiting forces is that in

someof the treaties relating to their positionwe findexamplesof specificprovisionsassertingthe

exclusive right of the sending State to qualiS, or characterize theconduct in question.

52. In at least three agreements provision is made that a certificate to be issued by the

authoritiesof the visiting force will constitute evidenceas to the nature ofthe conduct in question.

This is true of two agreements relating tothe position of foreign armedforces in GermanyI4and,

more pertinently here, of paragraph 13of the 1964 Agreement between the United Nations and

Cyprusconcerningthe statusof the UnitedNations forcein Cyprus. Thistreaty15providesthat, as

regards criminaloffences,members oftheforce shallbe subjecttothe exclusivejurisdiction oftheir
WY

respectivenational States. As regards civiljurisdiction, membersof the force shall no?be subject

to the civiljurisdiction ofthe Courts ofCyprus in anymatterrelatingto theirofJicialduties. From

this it followsthat members of the Force are subjectto the civiljurisdiction of Cyprus in matters

notrelated to their officia1duties. Article 13 providesthat the Force Commander shallcertifi to

the court whether or not the proceedingis related to the officia1duties of such member. In other

words, it wasthought desirable, in that particular context, thatthe question ofwho determinesthe

scope of "official duties" should be dealtwith specifically - in this case by giving that power to

the Commanderof the ForceI6. But, 1must emphasize,the right ofqualificationthus accordedto

the Commanderof the Force was specz~callyprovidedfor in the agreement.

53. And because the point is so important- the exception being one that most cogently

provesthe rule - 1shouldrefer to a furtherexample,the 1976Agreementfor the Implementation

of the Treaty of Friendship between the United Statesand Spain. This provides in Article XXVI

that military members of the United States personnelin Spain shall not be subject to suit before

'qhe Convention otheRightsandObligationsofForeignForcesandtheir Memberisnthe Federl epublicofGermany
(1952)andArticleVI11(17) of theFinanceConvention1952,asarnendin 1954,betweentheUS, UK,Franceandthe
FederalRepublicof Germany.

"UNJYB1964,p. 40, para.1 1.

161bid.,. 40. - 43 -

Spanish courts orauthorities forclaimsarisingout ofacts or omissionsattributable tosuchpersons

done in the performanceof theirofJicialduties.

54. The Agreement then providesthat if it shouldbe necessary to determine the applicability

of this Article, the military authorities of the United States may issueanofJicialcertificatestating

that a certain act or omission of a military member of the United States personnel in Spain or

civilian employee of the United States Forces was done in the performanceof his ofJicialduties.

TheSpanishauthorities will acceptsuchcertzjicateassufJicienp troof oftheperformanceofofJicial

duty".

E. Conclusions of this section

55. On the basis of the material presented thus far it should, 1 submit, be clear that the

problem of determiningwhether any given case falls within the scopeof qualified immunity is one

that has always been resolved by the courts of the receiving State. There is only one category of

exception. That is the case where there has been an express provision to a different effect - as

in the Cyprus and Spanish agreements - that the question should be determined by a certificate

of the sending authority.

56. Apart from these treaty exceptions, al1the situationsset out above are comparableto the

1946Convention. It is difficuh to seewhy there should be a difference in approach between these

cases - which exclude any role for the sending authority in the absence of specific

provision - and the position under the 1946 Convention.

57. Subject to immaterial variations in wording, the concept of qualified immunity as it

appears in the United Nations Convention is the same as it is in the examples already cited to the

Court. Such waiver provisions as there are, are no further reaching. There is no express provision

givingthe Secretary-General specialpowersof unilateral determination. Themeaning ofthe words

is clear.

"~i~estof UnitedStates Practic1976,p. 295. - 44 -

58. Does the natureofthe 1946Conventionmake any difference? This isa crucial question,

yet none of the statementsmade in this case, whether writtenor oral, approachit. If the Court is

to find in favour of the United Nations, it must be able to point to some effective distinction

betweenthe position of the United Nations underthe 1946 Convention andthe position of States

generallyin relation to the types of immunity that1havejust discussed. If no cleardistinctioncan

be identified,then the decisionthat the sending Stateis as a matterof law entitledto determinethe

character ofthe act in respect of which qualified immunityis soughtwould amount to a massive

extension of irnmunityand a major and unprecedented invasionof the sovereigntyof States.

59.It is not for Malaysiato speculateonthegroundswhichmightbe advancedby theUnited *

Nations for such a distinction. If any suchgroundsare developedbythe UnitedNations, Malaysia

must, on the basis of the rule of audi alterempartem, be entitled to respond to them. But even

now, incase it shouldbe suggestedthattheprotection ofthoseworking inthe fieldof humanrights

is distinguishable, the Court may find one case particularly helpful. It is in some respects

comparable to Mr. Cumaraswamy's case. In 1954 Sir Humphrey Waldock, beforehe became a

Member and President ofthis Court, who had by that time been a member and President of the

European Commission on Human Rights, was sued for negligence and corruptionby a person

whose petition to the Commission had been unsuccessful. The case was Zoernsch v. Waldock
e

(1964)18a,n Englishdecision. Under the Conventionmembers of the Commissionwere entitledto W

immunity"in respect of words spoken or writtenand al1acts done in their officialcapacity". One

judge of the English Court ofAppeal said: "1constniethis as meaningthat the immunity depends

on the quality of the words spoken or the acts done, and not on the time when suit is bro~~ht"'~

Yet nowhere in the case is any hint to be found that the determination of the quality of the acts

done rested with anyoneother than the English courts. No suggestion appearsever to have been

made that the Secretary General of the Councilof Europe had the power to determine the quality

"41 ILR 438.

I9Atp.445. -45 -

ofthe acts done. This case, of the immunity conferred upon persons working for an international

organization in the field of human rights, was treated in the sarne way as any other case raising

questions of immunity in the English courts.

5. THE INTERPRETATIONOF THE 1946 CONVENTION

60. Mr. President and Members of the Court, 1now turn to develop Malaysia's interpretation

of the 1946Convention. 1 will do so by reference to:

(a) The literal wording of the Convention;

(b) The travaux préparatoires;

(c) The practice of al1involved in the application of the Convention; and

(4 The views of writers of authority.

(a) The literal interpretation

6 1.Section 22 ofthe 1946 Conventionaccords experts suchimmunities "asare necessary for

the independent exercise of their functions during the period of their missions". This is quite

evidently a limited gant.

62. The particulars of this limited gant are then spelled out: "In particular they shall be

accorded . ..(3) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of the

performance oftheir mission inimunity from legalprocess of everykind". Permitme to emphasize

the character of the words actually used: the text does not Saythat experts shall enjoy absolute

immunity unless they act outside the course of the performance oftheir mission. It says that they

shall enjoy immunity if they act in the course of their mission. Theydo not startwith anabsolute

immunity which is reduced to functional immunity, they start with no immunity and are raised up

to a limited immunity no more than can be justified by the needs of the performance of their

mission.

63. There then follows a reference to the right and duty of the Secretary-General to waive

the immunity in cases, where, in his opinion,the immunity would impede the course ofjustice and - 46 -

can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations. The right and duty of

waiver is not expressed as a right to qualzfythe act as being,or not being,one performed in the

official capacity of the official. Waiver can only occur wherethere existsan immunityto waive.

There can be no immunity for non-officia1acts. So there can be no right or duty to waive

immunity in respect of such non-officia1acts. There is no immunity to waive. The fact that the

Secretary-Generalmay have chosen not to waive immuniv in a given case does not necessarily

mean that an immunity exists that could have been waived. Conversely, the fact that the

Secretary-Generalmay chooseto waive immunityin a givencase, doesnot mean that there would

havebeen immunityif he had not purportedwaive it. Thedecision of the Secretary-Generalcan
I
be seen merely as a reflection of his view of what he considersappropriatein the circumstances.

In short, therecan be no waiver of an immunity that does not exist; and a refusal to waive a

non-existent immunity cannot positively create an immunitywhere none would othenvise have

existed.

64. In summary, there is nothing in the literal analysis of Section22 to support the

Secretary-Generai'sview anoverridingright ofqualificationisvested inhim. In particular,thetext

does not contain any words that reserve forthe benefit of the Secretary-Generalor of the United

Nations a right to decide in a binding manner the characterof the activity in question.

(8) The travauxpréparatoires

65. The Secretary-General has includedin the dossierthat he has prepared for the Court a

numberof items evidencingthetravauxpréparatoiresoftheconventionzo.Referencemaybe made

on the basis of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for the purpose of

confirming the meaning resulting from theapplication of Article 31, the traditional literal or

grammaticalapproach which1havejust pursued. These itemsconsist principallyof extractsfrom

the Report of the Preparatory Commission ofthe United Nations in 1946. Pemsal of those items -47 -

reveals nothing that can alter the clear wording of the Convention - nothing that justifies the

introduction into the text of words that are not there for the purpose of reserving to the

Secretary-Generalthe conclusive power that he now claims. The only featureof interest isthe fact

that the Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Privileges and Immunities of the Preparatory

Commission of the United Nations is identified as being Mr. W. E. Beckett of the United

Kingdom - that same Mr. Beckett who only two years earlier had published in the British Year

Book of International Law the article on consular immunityto which 1 have already referred. In

that article he had dealt inetail with the immunity of consuls in respect of their officia1functions

and had referred to the many cases in which the courts of the receiving State had examined the

character of the conduct in order to determine whether it had occurred in respect of officia1

functions. No one could have been better qualified than he to identifi and grapple with any special

problem that might occur in a parallel situation in the United Nations. But he does not refer to it

in any of his reports; nor does anyone else refer to the problem in the course of the debates. In

short, in 1946the problem of qualificationwas a non-problem. It was passed over in total silence.

Thismust bethe strongest indicationthat no departurewas contemplated from the practicethat had

untilthen prevailed inthe existing system of immunity - of States,diplomats,consuls andforeign

armed forces - to which 1have already referred in detail.

(c) The practice of al1concerned

66. Under Article 31 (3) (6)of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Court is

directed to take into account, togetherwith the context, "any subsequent practice in the application

of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation".

67. What is the relevant bodyof practice? In the submission of Malaysia it consistsof three

separate elements:

(i) the legislation of the parties;

(ii) the decisions of those courts that have applied the Convention; and

(iii) the conduct of the United Nations itself. (i) The legislation of the parties

68. The most cogentevidence ofthe view taken bythe Parties to the 1946Convention ofthe

scope of their obligations is to be found in the legislation adopted by most of them to implement

those obligations.

69. It is essential in looking at this legislation to bear in mind that the function of the

legislation was to give binding directions to the national courts of that party regarding the manner

in which they were to treat cases brought against United Nations officials and experts. So the

starting point in any given case is the assumption that proceedings have been brought in that

nation'scourts. A question is: what instmction does the legislation give to the national courts *

regarding the treatment of the question of whether or not the challenged conduct falls within the

qualified immunity?

70. The expectation would be that in the absence of any specific provision on such a matter,

the courts would apply their normal mle. That is to Say,they would treat al1the issues that come

before them asjusticiable. Does any national legislation prescribe differentor special procedures

in this regard?

71. 1have exarninedthe national legislation implementingthe obligations ofmembers under

the 1946Convention as collected together in the volume published by the Secretary-General in

1959" and 1 have also looked at some of the later legislation published in the United Nations j

Juridical Yearbook. 1 can find no statute which directs a national court to seek or receive a

certificate from the Secretary-General, let alone to accept such a certificate as conclusive and

determinativeof the issue of qualified immunity. Maybe 1have not looked carefully enough and,

if 1have not, no doubt 1 shall be corrected, but that is the present state of my reading.

72. This is significant fortwo reasons. First, if the Secretary-General,holdingthe viewsthat

he does,had reason to believethatthe legislation of anygiven member precluded himfrom issuing

a certificate binding on the courtsof that country, he should have said so. Of course, it is possible

2'UnitedNationî LegislativeSeUnite NationDsoc.ST/LEG/SER.B/lO. - 49 -

that the Secretary-General may have taken the view that what happens within the national legal

system isnot hisconcern and, provided thatthecourtseventually reachedthe right decision,he was

not concerned as to how they rriightget there. But if, as the Secretary-General now maintains, he

believed that his certificate would be a necessary and conclusive element in that process, he could

hardlyhavebeensatisfied with the situation thathis owncollection ofdomestic legislationrevealed.

He could not have been unaware of the limited extent to which the executive branches of member

States can influence national courts. He could not haveassumed that the United Kingdom and the

United Statesto take but two, would have been in a position to convey in a manner binding on the

courts an intimation fiom the Secretary-General that he considered the particular kind of conduct

to be or not to be of an officia1character. Moreover, though certificatesmay be issuedin relation

to "fact", they cannot be issued in relation to "law"; and the statement that conduct is or is not of

an official nature is not simply a statement of fact; it is also an application of law.

73. Thus, confionted by an accumulation of national legislation which does not reflect the

Secretary-General'spositionregarding the effect of his owncertificate, it could havebeen expected

thatthe Secretary-Generalwould either confiont the issueby raising itopenly or that he would have

protested to each of the legislating parties to the Convention. So far as 1am aware only one case

of such protest has been identified - the letter addressed to the United States in 1976.

74. It is also important to look at national legislation fiom another point of view. Given its

content, how can one Saythat any agreement of the parties has been established regarding the

interpretation of the Convention along the lines now asserted by the Secretary-General? It takes

the concordant practice of all, or most of, the parties to a Convention to establish an agreement

regarding its interpretation. The only identity of outlookthat can be perceived inthis case arnongst

the State partiesto the 1946Convention is that they al1appear to have approachedthe question of

the immunities of international organizations and officials along the lines of the other types of

immunity in the international system. (ii) Decisions of national courts

75. One maylook at these as elementsin the practice of the partiesto the 1946Convention,

with a view to seeingto what extent these courts havefelt fi-eeto formtheir ownjudgment of the

characterof the act in question.

76. A numberof cases may be citedto show that domestic courts have not approachedthe

problem in the sameway as the Secretary-General.

77. In UnitedStatesv.Egorov(1963)" aUnited StatesdistrictcourtappliedtheUnitedStates

International Organisations Immunity Act. This is the reflection in United States law of the

obligations of the United Statesunder Article 105 of the Charter and serves in place of the 1946
riii
Convention. It provides inter alia that "officers and employees of such organisations shall be

immune fiom suitandlegalprocess relatingto acts performedbythemintheirofJicialcapacityand

fallingwithin theirjùnctions". It might have beenexpected thatif the position now taken by the

Secretary-Generalwere accepted inthe United States,the court wouldhave declined to decidethe

classificationquestionwithouttheassistanceofa controllingcertificatefi-omthe Secretary-General.

However,in this casethe courtdecidedthe matter withoutany suchassistanceby forming its own

view of the extentto which the defendant'sduties and functions in the Personnel Section ofthe

UnitedNations did or did not include such acts as those charged in the indictment.

78. The sarne is true of the approach in UnitedStates ex rel. Casanova v. FitzpatricP3. w

Casanovawas chargedwith conspiracyto commit sabotage in violation of UnitedStates criminal

law. He contendedthat he was not subjectto arrest orprosecutionby the United Statesauthorities

becausehe was entitledto immunityunderArticle 105ofthe Charter. The courttook theviewthat

underthe Charter,the petitionerwas entitledonly to a fünctional immuniv. If the positiontaken

223I4LR151.

2334ILR154. - 51 -

in the present case by the Secretary-Generalwere correct, thecourt should not have proceeded to

review the petitioner'sconduct. However,the court had no hesitation in making that a~sessment?~?

79. Again in the case of'Menonv. Weilin 1971, which was decided by the Small Claims

Court of New York ~iv, the estranged wife of a United Nations field worker instituted actions

for support andmaintenance against officials of the United NationsHeadquarters staff. The United

States attorney made a suggestion of immunity and moved to dismiss. The court accepted the

suggestion butobservedthat "wherean immunity claim wasassertednot bythe Department of State

but by the alleged sovereign entity itself, the court could enquire whether the activity was

governmental or commercial and proceed onthe merits in the latter case". In other words clear

distinction being drawn betweena certificate of the United States executive, which the court was

prepared to accept, andthe certificate that might be issuedby someone else which the court was

not prepared to accept.

80. A similar position was taken by the Administrative Court of Vienna in the case of

X v. ViennaFederal Police Board in 197526. There the issue involved the interpretation of the

Headquarters Agreement between Austria and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which

conferred immunity fromlegalprocesson officials of that organization "inrespect ofwords spoken

or written, and of acts perfonned by them, in their official capacity". The Police Board took the

view that the plaintiffs travel at the time of the offence was of a purely private nature and in no

way arose from the exercise of'his officia1duties on behalf ofthe Agency. The court expressed

its agreement with the opinion, evidently the court did not feel prevented from making its own

2434ILR 162. Theindependenceofthecourt in thisrespectis clearlyreflected in thefollowingquotation:"Whether,upon
the factspresentcby both the Govemment and the individuai involveodr his Govemment, immunityexists by reason
of the agreement.is not a political question, but a justiciable cnvolvingthe interpretationof the agreement
and its applicationto the particular facts. In this instancethe decision is for the court and it is not concluded by the
unilateral statementof the Government, a partyto that Agreementand to this controversy, that the indisotual in
entitled to immunity thereunder"."The court aisod: "... by its very language the immunity isconfined to acts
necessaryfortheindependent exerciseoffunctions in connectiontheUnited Nations. Conspirato commitsabotage
against the Governmentof the United Statesis not a functionof any mission." - 52 -

assessment of the character of the conduct in respect of which the immunitywas invoked, without

any assistance from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

81. Nor are these the only cases - as will be seen when 1refer in my next section to the

Secretariat'sown study of immunity prepared in 1967.

(iii) The position ofthe United Nations

82. So 1come now, Mr. President, Members of the Court, with your leave, to the practice

of the United Nations. The written statement of the United Nations contains a section2'entitled

"TheUnitedNations establishedpracticeinvariablyhasmaintainedthe Secretary-General'sexclusive

v
authority to assert or to waive immunity". In fact, it is in this section that the Secretary-General

most specifically develops his position28, and 1 quote, "it is the long-lasting and uncontested

practice of the United Nations that the authority to determine what constitutes an 'official'or an

'unofficial'act is vested exclusively in the Secretary-General and that the question of whether the

acts concemed were official acts, cannot consistently with the Convention, be determined by a

national court"

83. Malaysia agrees, of course, that reference may be made to the practice of the parties in

interpreting a treaty. But thematter is far from being as simple as the Secretary-General seemsto

suggest.

84. One must ask, in what manner precisely does the assertion made on behalf of the

Secretary-General establish a relevant practice.

85. What is the practice? The Secretary-General's statement contains five references to

documents in his dossier. 1shall look at each of them - in chronological order.

27SectionB of Chapter IV, paras.45-49.

28Statedin para.46.

l9see also paras. 48 and 49 of the Secretary-General's Statement. - 53 -

86. The firstisthe Secretary-General'slettertothe United Stateswritten on 11 February 1976

in reaction to a decision of the New York City Criminal Court of 19 January 1976~'. The letter

contains a clear assertion of the Secretary-General's present position. No indication isgiven in the

Secretary-General's written statement of whether the United States Government responded

specificallyto this letter. But the United States has by its own subsequent conduct - not least by

the position it hastaken in its written statement in the present proceedings - made it plain that it

does not accept the Secretary-General'sview of the matter.

87. Five years later, on 4 November 19813',the Secretary-General submitteda Report to the

Fifth Committee of the General Assembly in connectionwith "Personnel Questions". This Report

was not addressed tothe SixthCornmittee - the Legal Committee - where, ifanywhere, its legal

content might have been better appreciated. We al1know how we feel about non-lawyers in the

Fifth Committee. But that is a relatively minor, though not unimportant, point.

88. What matters more is the content of the Report and the date at which it was made. As

can readilybe seen,the principal focusof theReport isonthe persona1protection of staff members.

Indeed,the section which contains the statement of principle on whichthe Secretq-General relies

is headed "Arrest and detention of staff members". It is not directed in terms to the immunity of

stafffiom civil jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the principle is stated in the following terms3':

"First, the distinction between acts performed in anofficial capacity,which lies

at theheart of the concept of fünctional immunity, is a questionof factwhich depends
on the circumstances of the particular case. The position ofthe United Nations is that
it is exclusively for the Secretary-Generalto detennine the extent of the duties and
fùnctions of United Nations officiais."

89. It is unlikelythat that statement, unconnected to any suggestion that it was applicable at

thethreshold stageof civil proceedings,would havetroubled any butthe most propheticof lawyers,

even if they had seen it. Taken in its particular context, it can hardly be regarded as a general

'ODossie81.

"Dossier113.

32~pnara7. -54 -

statementof positionin relationto the provisionsof the 1946Convention bearingon the immunity

of officials from civiljurisdiction.

90. However, the Secretary-General'swritten statement and Mr. Corell's oralstatement

yesterdayattributesignificanceto theNovember 1981Report byassertingthat "the latterstatement

ofthe Secretary-General'sexclusive authori~wasnotedbytheGeneralAssemblywithoutobjection

in its resolution 361232of 18December 1981"~~.Malaysia suggests that it is necessaryto look

more closely at the terms of that resolution. Itis true that the third preambularparagraph of the

resolution reads: "Noting the Report of the Secretary-General",not an operative paragraph. The

Reportis identifiedas the report requestedbythe GeneralAssemblyin 1980on cases inwhich the
w

international status of staff of the United Nationsor the SpecializedAgencies had not been fully

re~~ected~~T . he Report gave details of 47 cases of arrest,detention or disappearanceof officials

invarious parts of the world. TheReportwasnot concernedwith the question of who isto decide

in the course of civil litigation whether the conduct of the official or the expert occurred "inthe

course of the performanceof their mission".

91. The preamble of the resolution goes on to note the position consistently upheld by the

United Nations "in the event of the arrest and detention of United Nations staff members by

govemmentalauthorities". That is languagedescriptive of criminalproceedings. It doesnot refer

to theposition of the United Nations in relationto civil litigationadistinctionwhichmay have I

significant implicationsfor the problem nowbefore the Court. When one comes to the operative

partof the resolution,one observesthat thefirstparagraphcontainsan appeal to any member State

inrelation to the "arrestor detention"of a staffmember to informthe Secretary-Generalof the fact

so as to enable him to apprise himself of the grounds for the arrest or detention. This appeal is

included in a paragraph concernedwith criminalproceedings, not civil proceedings.

33~ossier106.

"Dossier113. 92. Nothing else in the resolution has any direct bearing on the problem presently under

consideration by the Court35.

93. The Report of 4 November 1981 36was followed on 1 December 1981by a statement in

the Fifth Committee by the Legal ~ounsel~'in which he said:

"the substance of the Secretary-General's protest in such cases [Le., violations of
immunity from legal process] was not that a particular staff member had been

subjected to legalprocess butthat he [the Secretary-General] had been prevented from
exercising his right under the intemational instruments in force to independently
determine whether or not an officia1act had been involved".

Thisobservation, it must be recognized, approximates to the principle which the Secretary-General

now asserts, but it does not itself refer to instances of practice. In so far as it refers generally to

the earlier Report, one finds of course that the report contains illustrations of the non-application

of the practice rather than of its application.

94. The Legal Counsel repeated the United Nations position in an intemal memorandum on

5 April 1983~'.An intemal memorandum,particularlyone published two years afterthe event, can

hardly add to the relevant body of practice.

95. The next mention of the matter is in a Report by the Secretary-General to the Fifth

Committeedated 25 October 1983~~ on the subject of staff of UNRWA detained in Lebanon. The

report refers to an exchange of correspondence with the Govemment of Israel, in particular to a

3'~nparagraph43 of the Secretary-General's stateme, ere are a numberof assertions aboutthe contentof resolutions
of the General Assembly after981confirmingthe responsibilitiesof the Secretary-General in reto the functional
immunityof al1United Nationoficials. But these referencesdo not advancethe argument that the Secretary-General
alonehas authorityto determine whether the condutr the words of expertsfa11within "the courseof the performance
of their mission". It is not correct to"the General Assemblyhas thus confirmed the exclusive authority of the
Secretary-Generalto determinethe extentof the duties and functionsofUnitedNationsofficialsandcalledfor recognition
of his assertionsof their functional irnmunity".The General Assembly not said that in civil litigationof the kind
involved inthis case the Secretary-Generals the right to displace the function of national courts. And eveinf the
General Assembly hadsaid that, would it be sufficientto excludethe dominating significance ofthe manner in which
Membersof the United Nationshave dealtwith the matter in their national legislation? - 56 -

letter from the Secretary-General of 28 June 1983. In that letter40the Report states, "the

Secretq-General also referred to the recognized principle that it is exclusively for the

Secretary-General .. .to determine the extent of the duties and functionsof the United Nations

officiais".

96. A further brief allusionto his positionwas made bythe Secretary-Generalin a letter to

a Permanent Representative, unnamed, of 22 May 1985~'.

97. The next item mentioned in the Secretary-General'swritten statement is a letter of

24 January 1995addressedto one of the missionsinNewYork4'. Inthis letter - which isclearly

not a public document and is one in which the Secretary-Generalhaseven deletedthe nameof the w

recipient - he statesthat "the UnitedNations cannotacceptas a matterof principle, theassertion

contained in your letter that 'Whether the alleged acts by Mr.X giving rise to this suit were

performed in his officia1capacity is a question for the court'."

98. A last example of the assertion of the principle addressed by the Secretary-Generalis

anothernon-publicnote of25 Februq 1998addressedtoanunnamedMinisterfor ForeignAffairs

in which the Secretary-General "maintains the position that it is exclusively for the

Secretary-General,not for the Governmentof the [unnarnedcountry]to determinewhethercertain

words or acts fa11within the course of the performanceof a United Nations mission".

99. Now before summarizingvery brieflythe itemsinvokedbythe Secretary-Generalon his W

practiceand my commentsthereon, it is necessary to addressone very importantfact. This is that

the earliest of the items in theSecretary-General'slist of episodes establishing his practice is

11 February 1976,some30 yearsafterthe 1946Conventionwas adopted. Ifthe principleforwhich

the Secretary-Generalcontends was so important to theUnited Nations, it is surprisingthat there

had been no earlier expression of it. And this was not for lack of opportunity. In 1967 the

4At para9.

41Dossier7.

42~ossie100. - 57 -

Secretariat produced a major study entitled "The Practice of the United Nations, the Specialized

Agencies and the IAEA concerning their status,privileges and immunities". This was prepared in

connection with the International Law Commission'sagenda item on relations between States and

international organizations. The document covers 180closelyprinted pages of the Yearbookofthe

InternationalLaw ~ommission"~.The chapter dealing with privileges and immunities of officials

begins with a general section which contains no reference to the alleged principle or practice44

100. The next section is entitled "judicialdecisions". This contains summaries of four cases

in national courts involving proceedings againstofficials of the United Nations. In three of them

it isquite clear that the decision depended upona finding that the official's conduct had not been

perforrned in his official capaciîy. In none of them was there a determination by the

Secretary-General of the character of the c~nduct~~.In not one of the summaries is any reference

made to the alleged principle or practice. Therethen follows a number of sections which do not

bear on the alleged practice and contain nothingof relevance. The section on "Wai~er"~~ contains

nothing which could suggest a connection between it and the principle and practice now claimed.

101.There is nothing else in this part of the 1967study that relates to this matter except an

observation in the section on "Settlement of Disputes" that

"Where the Secretary-General determines that the dispute involves the staff

member in an official capacity and that the interests of the United Nations do not
permit the waiver of the immunity, the usual methodof settlementhas been by means
of discussions and correspondencewith theGovernmentconcemed inaneffortto reach
agreement."47

This, as will be appreciated, is hardly a direct statement of the principle, or indeed of the practice,

to which the Secretary-General now attaches such importance.

43YI~C1,967,Vol. II,pp. 154-334.

"From p. 264.

45SeeWestchesterCountyv. Ranollo,p. 267; USv. Coploid;and People oftheState ofNew Yorkv. Coumatos,ibid,

p. 268.

47~.296, para.387. -58 -
102. In short, the so-called "established practice" of the United Nations in a matter now

represented to you by the Secretary-General as being of vital importance to United Nations

operationswas quite disregardedin the part of the 1967study devotedto the United Nations itself

and was only mentioned in an obscure and incompletemanner in the section on the Specialized

Agencies.

103. So, how may we summarize the Secretary-Generallscase for the existence of an

establishedpractice? silence for the first 30 years of the Convention andparticularly in 1967

when he hadthe opportunityfully to assess it withina comprehensiveand systematicstatementof

the United Nations position but in fact then cited exarnplesto the contrary; then a protest to the
w
United States in 1976which that State evidently did not accept and which led to no change of

positionon its part;en two statementsof'the principle in 1981,in the Fifth Committee,in the

context ofa report on criminal, not civil, proceedingsng officiais; then one openstatement

in the Fifth Committee in983 in a context where his remarks were unlikely to generate wider

concern; a brief allusion totheer in 1985; and,finally,two assertionsof the principle in 1995

and 1998innon-publicdocumentswhich couldnot havecorneto the attentionof anyoneotherthan

their anonymous recipients? These are hardly the building blocks of a practice to support the

assertionof a major point of principle.

104.But let us, for the sake of argument, and conceding nothing as to the value of the-e

episodes,assume that they couldbe regarded as evidenceof the practice ofthe United Nations as

a partyto the 1946Convention. How can one find in these episodes evidenceof "the agreement

oftheparties" regardingthe interpretationof theonvention? The answeris, it is impossible.

This is nota situation in whichthe otherparties have tacitly acquiescedin a position advancedby

the Secretary-General. They could hardly haveone so in view of the obscure and shrouded

manner in which he expressed his position.

105.But much more to the point is the fact that the Secretary-General'spractice, whatever

it may be, is contradicted by the widespread counter-practiceof States parties to the Convention - 59 -

who have expressed their understanding of their obligations under the Convention in a quite

different manner. 1 need not repeat here what 1have already said about the significance of the

Statesparties' domestic legislation. It cannot be disregarded. Nor is it possible to disregard the

practice evidenced by the judicial decisions to which 1have already referred. These items quite

outweigh in significance the items of so-called "practice" produced by the Secretary-General. In

Malaysia'ssubmission,the Secretary-General'srelianceupon a so-calledestablished practice isquite

unsustainable.

Mr. President, 1am sure that you and Members of the Court may be becoming conscious

of thetime. 1am too. 1amreminded of the story about the public speakerwho said that 1 will not

wony if you look at your watches, 1will worry if you put them to your ear and shake them. It is

goingto take me, Mr. President.,approximately 25 minutes to finish. 1hope you will allow me to

continue.

D. The Views of Writers

106. 1 come now to the view that have been expressed by writers who have given special

attentionto the law of international organizationsor the law of immunities. Only a few of those

who have dealt with this subject have grappled with the specific question of who is to decide

whether conduct falls within the scope of a functional immunity. On the whole the authors may

be grouped in four categories - only one of which, the smallest, lends any support to the

Secretary-General's position.

107. The first group consists of those who, though they deal with the question of immunity

generally,have failed to identie the existence of the problem. Their silence on the matter suggests

either a lack of awareness of its importance or, as is more likely, an implied acceptance that the

matter falls within the competence of the national court4*.

48
An example is provided bythe majortreatise of ProfessorsSchermers andBlokkerentitled InternationalInstitutional
Law (1995).Though it contains paragraphs(Nos.534and 535)on immunity from jurisdiction,it does not really touch
on the problemof identifyingthe natureof officia1acts. The sameis true of the morbyeC. F. Amerasinghe
on Principlesof theInstitutionalLaw oJInternationa1Organisations. His sectionontheimmunityofofficiaiscompletely
passesover the problem. - 60 -

108.The second group consists of publicists whoidentifi the problem butdo not providea

solution to it. In effect, therefore, they do not accept the idea that the beneficiary organization

should determinefor itself the scopeof its ownfinctions. The two writersconcemedare amongst

the most distinguished in the intemational legal sphere.

109.The first was Kelsen. In his study TheLawofthe UnitedNations(1950) he discusses

one of the formulae in which the concept of qualified immunity is expressed, "namely, such

privilegesand immunityas are necessary". Of this formulaehe says that "for certainpurposes[it]

requires an authority to determine what is necessa~y"~~.Having quoted from the Report of

Committee IV12of the San Francisco Conference,Kelsencontinues: "However,the interpretation
1

of the phrase,'suchprivileges and immunitiesas are necessary'is not authentic- authenticis his

word which 1presume means not self-evident- and the Charter doesnot answerthe questionas

to who iscompetentto decidewhat is'necessary"'.HethenmentionsthatArticle 105,paragraph3,

provides for "recommendations"to be made bythe GeneralAssembly "witha view to determining

the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article" or for "conventions to be

concluded between Members and the Organization for this purpose". He concludes: "If no

conventionexiststhere is no possibilityof imposinguponaMember a definiteinterpretationofthe

provisionsof Article 105,paragraphs 1 and2." The 1946Conventionis,of course,the Convention

that Article 105contemplated. However,the whole problemnow beforethe Court stemsfromthe ril

fact that the Convention did not see the problem of qualification as one requiring specific

treatment - in al1likelihoodbecause it was obviousto thosepreparing itthat the matterwould be

determined in the first instance by the courts of the receiving State, subject to the possibilityof

arbitration or of appeal to this Court.

110.The more detailed consideration of the problem,but in equally inconclusive terms,is

to be found in the work by Wilfred Jenks on InternationalImmunities(1961). The relevant - 61 -

passageS0 hasalready been quotedby Malaysia in itsobservations. Jenks identifiedthe problem and

then statedthat there appeared to be three possible ways of avoiding difficulty in the matter. One

would be for the municipal court, before which the question of the officia1or private character of

a particular act arose, to accept as conclusive in the matter any claim by the international

organization that the act was official in character. That is of course the position of the

Secretary-General inthis case. But, it must beobserved,Jenks doesnot identi* it as being the only

or necessarily the right positiori. He goes on to a second approach. This would be for a court to

accept as conclusive in the matter a statement by the executive branch of the country where the

matter arises, certifiing the official character of the act. And the third approach would be to have

recoursetothe procedure of internationalarbitrationand the suspension of anynationalproceedings

pending the outcome of the arbitration. He recognizes that it may well be that none of these three

solutionswould be applicable irial1cases. The first might be readily acceptable only inthe clearest

case and the second is availableonly if the executive government of the country where the matter

arises concurs in the view of the international organization concerning the officia1character of the

act. He concludes that "taken in combination these various possibilities may afford the elements

of a solution of the problemV5'.

111.It is thus absolutely clear that Jenks - the best informed and most practical writer on

the law ofinternationalorganization inhistime - was aware oftheproblem. Nonetheless,writing

about it in 1961, some 15years after the adoption of the 1946Convention, he did not find in the

practice of the United Nations, or of other international organizations, any basis for asserting that

the only correct approach wasthe one now asserted by the Secretary-General. Nor did he mention

'OA~pp. 117-118.

"The viewsof Jenks wereechoed, albeit withoutexpressacknowledgement,by Professor Bowettin his textbookon The
Law of InternationaIInstituti2nd edition, 1982,p. 356. He identifiedthe problem and its possible solutionsin the
following passage: "Thisaises the problem,to which thereis no clear solution,of who decidesthe officialor private
character ofa particular act;a municipal courtcouldwell acceptas conclusivea statement bythe organisation,or by the
executiveofthe State inwhichthe matterhas arisen,or proceedings mightbe stayedwhilst thematterwentto arbitration.
Certainlya conflict of viewbetweenhe organisation anddomesticcourts ispossible". -62 -
that approach in terms indicating that this was currently a rule of law or even an established

practice.

112.The third categoy of writer clearly recognizesthat the decision as to the character of

the conduct in question is one to been by the domestic court. The Restatementof the Law,

(Third),Foreign Relations Lawofthe UnitedStates(1986)confrontsthe problem squarely. After

stating that officials of international organizations are immune from a State'sjurisdiction "in the

exercise of their official functions", the Restatement concludes:

"whetheran actwas performedinthe individual'sficia1capacityis a question forthe
courtinwhich the proceedingis brought,but if the internationalorganizationdisputes
the court'sfinding [i.e., afterthe finding]the disputebetween theorganizationandthe
state of the forum is to be resolved by negotiation,by an agreedmode of settlement,
or by the International Court of ~ustice"~~.

But first always the courts of the national State.

113. Fourthly and lastly, there is at any rate one writer who supports the position of the

Secretary-General. In the commentary on the Charter of the United Nations, edited by

Professor Simma, referenceis made in connectionwith Article 105ofthe Charterto the fact that

"forgood reason,the UnitedNations claims exclusivecompetence todeci-e generally andcase

by case- what constitutesan official act. Immunity ofthe UnitedNationswould bejeopardized

if precedenceof scrutiny and decision had to be left to the national courts". But this is evi-ently

not a deeplyreasoned analysis of the situation in a work where more might have been expected;

nor isit convincing.

114.The conclusion which, it may be submitted, shouldbe drawnfiom this analysisof the

views of anumber of publicistswhohave writtenon or aroundthis question(and thereareno doubt

manymore - so manythat it is impossibleinthetime availableto meto have examinedthem all),

it is possiblethat the viewpresentedby the Secretary-Generalis not onethat has commendeditself

as the onlyor obvious solution. Certainly nobodyhas soughttoexplainthe present positionof the -63 -

Secretary-General as being a reflection of the modification of the 1946 Convention by practice.

Equally, certainly,obody has seen the Secretary-General's position as flowing from a literal

interpretation of the text of the 1946Convention. In circumstances, one is driven back to the

analysis which formed the first part of this argument, namely, that there is no reason why the

immunities of international organizations should be approached on a basis different from the

immunities of States, diplomats, consuls and foreign armed forces.

6.CONSIDERATION OF SOME OTHER POINTS MADE BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

115. The Secretary-Generalhasattachedweighg3to the factthat under Section 30differences

arising out of the interpretationor application of the Convention shall be referred to the Court by

means of a request for an advisoryopinion. But the conclusion which the statementdraws from the

existence of Section 30, does not at al1follow from what precedes it. The conclusion is expressed

in the last sentence of paragraph 39 as follows:

"The factthatsucha procedure [that isArticle 301ismandated demonstratesthe
weakness of the assumptionthat national courts may adjudicate the question whether
certain words or acts were spoken, written or in the course of the performance
of a mission for the Unit:edNations."

To Malaysia the position appears quite different. The fact that the procedure of Section 30 is

mandated in the case of a difference arising out of the application of the Convention rests on the

basisthat a nationalcourt, havingadjudicated onthequestion ofwhether certainwordswere spoken

or written in the course of the performance of a mission for the United Nations, may reach a

conclusion with which the Secretary-General does not agree. In such a case Malaysiaacceptsthe

prospect ofecourse to this Court. But that does not displace the necessity that the issue must first

have been considered by a national court. We are speaking, in effect, of a requirement of

exhaustion of local remedies before proceeding to an agreed international forum.

"Seepara.39. -64 -

116.The Secretary-General next~eeks~t~ o extract from the Court'sAdvisory Opinionon

Reparationfor Injuries, and the obligation acknowledgedtherein of the Organizationto exercise

a measure of functional protection on behalf of its agents, the conclusion that it is for the

Secretary-Generalto afford expertson missionthe functionalprotectionto which theyare entitled

when acting in the course of the performance of their United Nations mission. As a general

propositionMalaysia would not contest that assertion. But unlessthe expert has been deprived of

an immunity to which he is objectively and lawfully entitled there is nothing that requires

protection.

117.The Secretary-Generalalso recalls theterms of StaffRegulation 1 .855, hichrestatethe J

proposition that immunities and privileges attached to the United Nations are conferred in the

interestsof the organizationand requires staff membersto report to theSecretary-Generalin any

case wherethese immunitiesneedto be invoked. Onceagain, the Secretary-Generalassertsthat it

is he who alone decideswhether immunityshouldbe waived. Oncemore,however,this statement

reaches a conclusion which is not connectedto the observationswhichprecede it. Then again he

says: "The exclusively international character of the responsibilitiesof the Organization and its

agents, both officials and experts on missions, cannot be equally and uniformly maintained

throughoutthe worldifthey weresubjectto challengeinthe national courtsof eachmemberState".

This observation doesnot connectwith what precededit. Nor is it supportedby any reasoningor 'rr

authority. Itconfusesthe propositionthat theresponsibilitiesofthe Organizationand its agentsare

internationalin character(a proposition which Malaysia does not question)with a pretended legal

consequencethat thisinternationalcharactercannotbeequallyanduniformlymaintainedthroughout

the world if the officials and experts "were subject to challenge in the national courts of each

memberstate". It isdifficultto seethe connectionbetweenthe premiseand the conclusion. Again

the importantpoint is that the observationfailsto appreciatethat immunitiesare only enjoyedfor

"~ee para40.

5See para41. - 65 -

acts done "inthe course of the performance of their mission". The determinationof what acts are

done inthe performanceof anofficial'smission issomethingthat cannot inany event be maintained

equally and uniformly throughout the world when the responsibilities of the officials or experts

manifestly differ fiom country to country and situation to situation. Moreover, one must ask, do

the problems of the UnitedNations in this respect differ fiom the comparableexposure to diversity

in national approaches by which States are faced when making claims of State, diplornatic or

consular immunity or of immunity for their armed forces abroad?

118.It hasto be appreciated thatthe matter now in issue before the Court has never been the

subjectof openand specificdehate. This may well bebecause the Secretary-General has taken the

viewthat if a debate were totake place, a differenceof views could be revealed that would be quite

inconsistent with his position; and he may well have concluded that in the circumstances it was

better to leave the position obscure than risk an open exposure of disagreement.

119. In these circumstances what is the proper way of approachingthe problem that arises

when civil litigation is instituted against United Nationsfficials or experts? Malaysia is far fiom

wishingto addtothe enormousburdenthatthe Secretary-Generalsoadmirablydischarges.Malaysia

hasdeeply appreciatedthe way inwhich the Secretary-General and hisstaffdischargetheironerous

responsibilities. At the sametime, Malaysia considersthat the work of the Secretary-General must

be conducted within the established legal framework. What is true for every other organ of the

United Nations is no less true for the Secretary-General. If there is doubt or obscurity in the rules

by which he has to operate, then it is his responsibility to bring those doubts and obscurities

specifically and prominently to the attention of al1the Members of the Organization so that the

problems may be tackled openly and effectively.

120. In relation to the qualification of conduct in the context of functional immunity, the

alternatives are limited, even though the choice may not be simple. The options were foreseen by

Wilfred Jenks 37 years ago. If the Secretary-Generalinsiststhat the determinationof the character

on conduct in issue must be a matter for him and him alone, then either there must be an - 66 -

amendmentto the General Conventionorthe Secretary-GeneralmustnegotiatewithmemberStates

on a bilateral basis to establish expressly the right which he now claims. Malaysia wouldnot

necessarilybe opposedto changesinthe present situation brought aboutby agreementandwithdue

respect forthe sovereigntyof the parties to the946Convention. WhatMalaysia cannot acceptis

that it should bethe State that is internationallycriticizedfor insistingon a position whichis fully

consistentwith the history and policyof the system of internationalimmunily- a position which

has never been openly challenged and which is shared by a number of other member States.

121. It is,of course,unfortunatethat the presentdifferenceof opinionbetweenMalaysia and

the Secretary-Generalshould have occurred in the context of the work of the Human Rights *

Commission. By taking a position that appearsto be adverseto the promotion ofhuman rights in

the judicial sphere, Malaysia may incur the disapproval of those who generally support the

promotion and protectionof humanrightsbut who maybeunaware of al1the aspectsof the present

legal situation.A dispute of a purely legal character becomes emotionally charged; andthat is

unsatisfactory. The Secretary-Generalhas a~serted~t~hat "national adjudicationwould inevitably

frustrate and, ifallowedto proliferate,potentiallydangerthe entirehuman rights mechanismof

the United Nations system". This is an overstatement which goes far beyond the needs of the

present situationandfalls short ofthe admirablestandardsof fairnessandobjectivitythat normally

characterizethework ofthe Secretariat. Malaysiamust askthe Courtto detach itselfEromthiskind 1

of generalization whichstands as an implied slur upon al1the nationalsystemsof adjudicationthat

the Special Rapporteurwas considering. If the assertion ofthe Secretary-Generalis correct,then

the task of strengtheningjudicial independencewithin national legalsystems is one which is quite

beyond any prospect of achievement.

'%ee para.55. -67 -

PART TWO

7. THE SECOND QUESTION:THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF MALAYSIA

122. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this brings me to the end of Part One and 1can

dealwith PartTwo quitebriefly. My remainingcommentsare on "thelegalobligationsof Malaysia

inthis case". My submissions in this connection follow directly from the tenor of the submissions

that 1have been making on the principal question. Malaysia maintains that its obligations under

the 1946 Convention are to ensure that its courts properly perform their duties in relation to cases

inwhich immunity ispleaded -- as 1have alreadystated at the beginningof this argument andwill

not repeat now. In the absence of a change in the present system that would take treaty form and

couldthen be incorporated into nationalsystems byappropriate implementinglegislation, Malaysia

cannot acceptthat the normaljudicial process may be properly interfered with by any intervention

of the executive branch of govemment going beyond the presently accepted role of the executive

certificate. Malaysiaventures to believe that what istrue for it isprobably also true for many other

Members of the United Nations, especially those with a common law background.

123. The Secretary-General suggestsS7that ifthe Govemment of Malaysia disagreedwith his

assertion of the Special Rapporteur's immunity from legal process, the Govemment could have

invoked the dispute settlement mechanism provided for under Section 29 of the Convention.

Malaysia cannotallowthisobservation to pass withoutcomment. Section 29 doesnot itselfprovide

for any dispute settlement mechanism, nor has the dispute settlement mechanism which is

contemplated in it yet been established.There was therefore no mechanism under this Section to

which Malaysia could have tumed. In any case, it isdoubtful if it would have been appropriate for

Malaysia as a State to take the. initiative under this Section. Section 29 appears to contemplate

proceedings between the plaintiff in civil cases and the defendant claiming immunity. Ites not

extend on its face to disputes between States parties to the Convention and the United Nations.

These are covered by Section 30. And in that regard, though Malaysia might take an initiative, it

57Separa.61. - 68-
wouldbe dependent upon thewillingnessof someauthorizedorgan of the UnitedNations actually

to seek the advisory opinion from the Court. There is no way in which Malaysia can directly

initiatethe advisory opinion process.

124. But the truth of the matter is that any initiative should have been taken by the

Secretary-General,as eventuallyitwas whenthe matterwas placed beforetheEconomicandSocial

Council. At that point the disputewas not one betweenthe plaintiffsin civil litigationin Malaysia

and the Special Rapporteur,but was one between the Secretary-Generaland Malaysia, with the

former alleging and the latter denying that the Secretary-Generalcould oust the interlocutory

jurisdiction of the Malaysian courts to make aliminary determination of the nature of the -

conduct in question.

125. Lastly,the Secretary-GeneralhasassertedthatMalaysia isultimatelyresponsibleforany

costs,expenses or darnagesarising out of proceedingsin the International Court. It follows from
al1that Malaysia has so far submittedto this Court that this contention is entirelypremature. The

costs in the civil proceedings will beorne in accordance with the usual practice by the

unsuccessful party or otherwise in accordance with the of the Malaysiancourt. The costs

incurredby the United Nations or by Malaysia in the present proceedingsbeforethis Court are a

matter for this Court to determine after having heardsuch submissions as the Parties may make

after and in the light of the Court's eventual opinion.

126. Mr. President and Members of the Court, that brings me to the end of the oral

submissions which 1 have been instructed to make on behalf of the Governrnent of Malaysia.

Needless to Say,1 regret their length, but having regard to the nature of the issues and of the

arguments previously placed before you, 1would not havefelt justified in withholding fiom you

an analysisand authoritiesnotpreviously presentedby anyparticipating State. 1hope that youwill

not judge me wrong in my estimate of the needs of the situation.

127. Mr. President and Members of the Court,1thank you very much for having heard me

so patiently. -69 -

The PRESIDENT: Thankyou, Sir Elihu. Thereare questionsof Membersof the Court,and

1 call first on Judge Vereshchetin.

Question by Judge Vereshchetin

Mr. VERESHCHETIN: Thank you Mr. President. 1have the following question which 1

would like to address to the Secretary-General. Under Section23 of the 1946Convention, the

immunity of any expert must be waived if in the opinion of the Secretary-General"theimmunig

wouldimpedethecourseofjustice [emphasisadded]and it can bewaived withoutprejudiceto the

interests of the United Nations". In the light of this provisionof the Convention, if the positionof

the Secretary-Generalin this case were sustained by the Court, what would be in the view of the

Secretary-Generalthe legal remedies available to the Malaysianprivate plaintiffs?

The PRESIDENT: Thankyou. 1now call on Judge Higgins.

Question by Judge Higgins

Judge HIGGINS: 1havetwo questionsfor the Secretary-General. First,are there examples

where the Commission on Human Rights has declined to ratifi acts of a SpecialRapporteur as

being appropriateto his mission? Second, is it the position of the United Nationsthat an expert,

if he is answering questionsput to him as Special Rapporteur,related to the topic of his mission,

is acting "in the course of performanceof his mission" regardlessof the content of his remarks?

Put differently,oesthe contentofan expert'sremarkshave anyroleto play indeterminingwhether

he has immunityunder Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention?

The PRESIDENT: Thankyou. Thatcompletesthe proceedingsfor this moming. The Court

contemplates, in the light of the views expressed to it by some of the participants in these

proceedings,affordingthemtheopportunityto putforththeir observationsonthepositionsthathave

been stated. 1 contemplate doing that on Thursday if al1 of those concerned will be able to

participate then; at any rate, if not with the whole of their delegations then with part of their -70 -
delegations. And it so proposes in the light of consultations onthe matter that have goneon, and

therefore the preparations made in the light of those consultations. 1s that satisfactory to those

participants who contemplate making further statements? The Court would thus contemplate

meeting on Thursdaymorning of this week at 10 a-m.andwe assumethat the proceedings would

conclude that morning.

Mr. Corell, did you wish to comment on that?

Mr. CORELL: Thank you, Mr. President. May 1consult a little before you rule please?

Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: The Solicitor-General,please,you have a comment?

Mr. DATO' HELILIAHYUSOF: If it pleases the Court, the proposa1is acceptableto us.

Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: Thankyou so much, Solicitor-General. Mr. Corell, please?

Mr. CORELL: Mr. President,thank you very muchfor your indulgence. 1have consulted

and theproposal is also acceptableto us. 1must add thatthe reasonwhy 1wantedto ponderupon

this was that the statement made by the counselfor Malaysiarequires some careful studyon Our
w

part, but it is acceptable to us. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT :hankyou somuch. Well, 1think meetingon Thursdaywill affordyou

the more time for that study. - 71 -

1 believe that the proceedings then for today are conclude1.wish to thank al1those that

have participated yesterday andtodayfor the excellenceof their presentationsand we lookvard

to further observations on Thursday. Those who contemplate speaking should of course confirm

their intentions to the Registrar. We stand adjourned.

The Court rose ut1.15 p.m.

Document Long Title

Public sitting held on Tuesday 8 December 1998, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Schwebel presiding

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