Public sitting held on Thursday 2 May 1996, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Bedjaoui presiding

1 ARCHIVES (
Nor,-Corrigé

Unco rrected

CR 96/10

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THE HAGUE LA HAYE

YEAR 1996

Public sitting

held on Thursday 2 May 1996, at 3 p-m., at the Peace Palace,

PresidentBedjaoui presiding

in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

(Bosnia and Herzegoviv. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)),

ANNEE 1096

Audience p~blique

tenue le jeudi 2 ma1996,à 15 heures, au palais de la paix,

sous la présidence dM. Bedjaoui, Président

en1 'affaire de l'Application de la convention pour la prévention
et la répression du crime de génocide

(Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro))

COMPTERENDUPresen t: President Bedjaoui

Judges Oda
Gui11aume
Shahabuddeen
Weeramantry
Ranjeva

Herczegh
Shi
Koroma
Vereshchetin

Ferrari Bravo
Parra-Aranguren
Judges ad hoc Lauterpacht
KreCa

Registrar Valencia-OspinaPrésents : M. Bedjaoui, Président
MM. Oda
Gui11aume
Shahabuddeen

Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Koroma

Vereshchetin
Ferrari Bravo
M.Parra-Aranguren, juges
MM. Lauterpacht

KreEa, juges ad hoc

M. Valencia-Ospina, GreffierThe Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey, Ambassador and Permanent Representativeof the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the UnitedNations,

As Agent;

Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney in Amsterdam,

As Depu ty-Agent , Counsel and Advoca te;

Mr. Thomas Franck, Professor at the School of Law, New York University;
Director, Center for InternationalStudies;

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor, University of Paris X-Nanterre and Institute
of Political Studies Paris,

Ms. Brigitte Stern, Professor, University of Paris 1 (Panthéon,
Sorbonne) .

As Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Khawar M. Qureshi, Barrister in London, Lecturer in Law, King's

College, London,

Mr. Vasvija VidoviC, Minister-Counsellorwith the Embassy of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in Brussels, Representative of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia

Mr. Marc Weller, Assistant Director of Studiês, Centre for International
Studies, University of Cambridge, Member of the Faculty of Law of the
University of Cambridge,

As Counsel;

Mr. Pierre Bodeau, Research Assistant/Tutor,University of
Paris X-Nanterre,

Mr. Michiel Pestman, Attorney in Amsterdam,

As Counsel lors;

Mr. Hervé Ascensio, Research ~ssistant/Tutor,University of Paris X-
Nanterre,
Ms .Marieke Drenth,
Ms. Froana Hoff,

Mr. Michael Kellogg,
Mr. Harold Kocken,
Ms. Nathalie Lintvelt,
Mr. Sam Muller,
Mr .Joop Nijssen,
Mr. Eelco Szab6,

As Assistants.Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine est representé par :

S. Exc. M. Muhamed Sacirbey, ambassâdeur et représentant permanent de la

République de Bosnie-Herzégovineauprès de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies,

comme agent;

M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat à Amsterdam,

comme agent adjoint, conseil et avocat;

M. Thomas M. Franck, professeur à la faculté de droit et directeur du
centre d'études internationales de l'université de New York,

M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'université de Paris X-Nanterre et à

l'institut d'études politiques de Paris,

Mme Brigitte Stern, professeur à l'université de Paris 1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne) ,

comme conseils et avocats;

M. Khawar M. Qureshi, avocat à Londres, Lecturer in Law au King's College

de Londres,

Mme Vasvija VidoviC, ministre-conseiller à l'ambassade de la République
de Bosnie-Herzégovine à Bruxelles, représentant de la République de
Bosnie-Herzégovineauprès du Tribunalpénal internationalpour

l'ex-Yougoslavie,

M. Marc Weller, directeur adjoint des études au centre d'études
internationales de l'universitéde Cambridge, membre de la faculté de

droit de l'université de Cambridge,

comme conseils;

M. Pierre Bodeau, allocataire-moniteur à l'Université de
Paris X-Nanterre,

M. Michiel Pestman, avocat à Amsterdam,

comme conseil 1ers;

M. Hervé Ascencio, allûcataire-moniteur à l'université de
Paris X-Nanterre,

Mme Marieke Drenth,
Mme Froana Hoff,
M. Michael Kellogg,
M. Harold Kocken,

Mme Nathalie Lintvelt,
M. Sam Muller,
M. Joop Nijssen,
M. Eelco Szab6,

comme assistants.The Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Rodoljub Etinski, Chie: Legal Adviser in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Professor of
International Law, Novi Sad University;

Mr. Djordje Lopicic, Chargé d'Affaires of the Ernbassyof the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, The Hague,

as Agents;

Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., F.B.A., Queen's Counsel, Chichele Professor of
Public InternationalLaw,

Mr. Miodrag Mitic, Assistant Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Ret.),

Mr. Eric Suy, Professor in the CatholicUniversity of Leuven, formerly
Under-Secretary-Generaland Legal Counsel of the United Nations,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Stevan Djordjevic, Professor of InternationalLaw, Belgrade
University,

H.E. M. Shabtai Rosenne, Ambassador,

Mr. Gravro Perazic, Professor of InternationalLaw, Podgorica University,

as Counsel.Le Gouvernement de la Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) est représentée

par :

M. Rodoljub Etinski, conseiller juridique principalau ministère des
affaires étrangères de la République fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie

et ~onténégro),professeur de droit international à l'universitéde
Novi Sad,

M. Djordje Lopicic, chargé d'affaires à l'ambassade de la République

fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbieet Monténégro) à La Haye,

comme agents ;

M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., F.B.A., Q.C., professeur de droit international
public, titulaire de la chaire Chichele à l'université d'Oxford,

M. Miodrag Mitic, ancien ministre adjointdes affaires étrangères dela
République fédérativede Yougoslavie (Serbieet Monténégro),

M..Eric Suy, professeur à l'universitécatholique de Louvain (K.U.L.),

ancien Secrétaire généraladjoint et conseiller juridique de
l'organisationdes Nations Unies,

comme conseilset avocats;

M. Stevan Djordjevic, professeur de droit international à l'universitéde
Belgrade,

M. Shabtai Rosenne, ambassadeur,

M. Gavro Perazic, professeur de droit international à l'université

Podgorica,

comme conseil S. -8-

Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir.La Cour reprend ses audiences

de plaidoiries dans cette affaire relative à la Convention sur le

génocide en ouvrant cet après-midi le second tour de plaidoiries. La

Yougoslavie s'exprimera la première. Nous avons appelé à la barre le

professeur Ian Brownlie. Je voudrais vous signaler que le Vice-président

qui est légèrement souffrant regrettede ne pouvoir participer à la

présente séance de cet après-midi. Je donne donc la paroleau Professeur

Ian Brownlie.

Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, DistinguishedMembers of the Court,

The Forensic Approach Adopted by the Applicant State

Before 1 approach my main tasks this afternoon, it is necessary to

remind the Court of the eccentricitiesof the forensic style and general

approach adoptedby the delegation on the other side.

First, there was a general avoidanceof specifics. The tactic was to

make a comment upon one item in a series, a comment whichdid not touch

on the substance of things, and then to ignore the series of items as a

whole. This was Professor Franck's way of dealing with the significant

literature on the subject. The point at issue, that is, the territorial

scope of application of the Genocide Convention,was for the most part

ignored. We were told thatthe piece in the Yale Law Journal was

unimportant and that reference should be made to 'Othemost highly

qualified publicistsw. But we were also told that the Applicantts

lawyers had no duty to examine the literature. "Why should we?" said

Professor Franck. -9-

Secondly, the other side deliberately ignoresthe fact that

Article IX of the Convention is a compromissory clause anddoes not

create responsibilities in vacuo.

Thirdly, the Applicant State has spentvery little time or effort ln

addressing the content of the preliminary objectionsin relation to the

provisions of Article IX. And Mr. President, in yesterdayls proceedings

it was 12.25 before Article IX was referred to.

Fourthly, there was a general tendencyto avoid referring to

Articles IV, V and VI of the Genocide Convention. These are, no doubt,

inconvenient for theother side in that theyprovide a clear indication

as to the conditions in which the Convention is applicable.

Fifthly, there is a general dislike of resort to specific

demonstration,and this was evidencedby appeals to the Court to decide

issues as the Applicant wishes, why, because the answer is "obvious".

1 shall now move on to address specificissues, and first of all, the

question of the existence of a dispute.

The Existence of a Dispute

Yesterday counsel for the Applicant assuredthe Court that a

"disputet1exists for the purposes of Article IX and he quoted the

classical definition from the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case

But the difficulty,Mr. President, is that counsel for the Applicant

then refers to the alleged types of liability which fa11 outside the

provisions of the Convention and which therefore cannot involve disputes

falling within the provisions of Article IX.

And here the ad hoc jurisprudential styleof the Applicant State

cornesinto play. Professor Franck off'eredthe Court a series of alleged

violations of the Convention "by the Respondent". The first of these was - 10 -

"that Respondent has comrnittedgenocide" and Articles 1, II and III of

the Convention were relied upon.

But these provisions refer exclusively to the acts of individuals.

The travaux makes this clear, and so do the provisions of Article IV

which are as follows:

"Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts

enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsiblerulers, public officiais or private
individuals."

The subject-matter of the alleged violations does not represent a

dispute within the provisions of Article IX.

The same is true of Professor Franck's other offerings. Thus

Article IV is invoked as the basis of the alleged violation: "that

persons for whom the Respondent is legally responsible have committed or

aided such acts of genocideu. Mr. President, that is a travesty of the

provisions of Article IV. These can only be applied in conjunction with

the provisions of Article III to which it expressly refers. Article IV

makes it clear that State responsibilityis not involved. What is

involved is the criminal responsibility of individuals.

The result is that Professor Franck has provideda series of

formulations of alleged "disputes" which conspicuously fa11 outside the

provisions of Article IX.

Issues of State Responsibility

The reasoning offered to the Court in relation to the question of the

existence of a dispute reveals the fundamental confusionbehind the

thinking of the Applicant concerning the Genocide Convention.

Professor Franck has said that the issue of civil or criminal

responsibility is perfectly clear, that the Memorial (pp. 209-213) make - 11 -

this clear, and that of course the remedy envisagedby Article IX is

civil.

Such generalities do not alter the fact that both in the Memorial and

in the speech of Professor Franck the Convention is consistently

misapplied.

Thus in the Memorialthere are assertionsof direct responsibilityon

the part of Yugoslavia for actsof genocide. This appears at pages 186-

188 of the Memorial. Again, at pages 200-204, Article IX is relied on as

the basis for assertionsof State responsibility for actsof genocide.

And the same is true of the Submissions.

This major confusion also affects much of Professor Franck's speech.

Although affirmingthe civil nature of responsibilityunder the

Convention,his practical applicationsinvolve assertions of direct

responsibilityof the Contractingparties to the Convention for criminal

acts. This appearsfor example in paragraph 6 of his speech and also in

the various sections devoted to conspiracy, complicityand incitement.

Perhaps the most serious confusion derives £rom the insistence that

Article IX is a substantive provision.It is not. It is a straightforward

compromissory clause.In al1 this there is an almost endearing arrogance

in the forensic approach of the other side.

The travaux are relied uponbut not in detail because that would

reveal the true picture.

As for the literature,we still have to ask why it is that al1 these

experts, covering a span of some years failed to see what we are now told

is "obvious".And yet the views offered by Professor Franck stand in

splendid isolation.

It is, at the least, a pity that his view is not supported by the

Yale Law Journal, Professor Kunz, Jean Graven, Judge Manley Hudson, - 12 -

Dr. Whiteman of the State Department, Professor Sibert, Dr. Robinson, the

Sorensen Manual or Professor Shaw.

It can also be recalled that the one serious authority relied upon,

the 9th ed. of Oppenheim, by Jennings and Watts, does not support the

Applicant's position when the full passage is examined.

No attempt wasmade to rehabilitate this citationof Oppenheim. As

Professor Franckwould no doubt Say, 'Why should we?'

And, Mr. President, 1 can only hope that Christopher Columbus, Ibn

Battuta and other travellers spent more timein the libraries before

setting out on their journeys than Our colleagues opposite. After all,

the Application is dated 20 March 1993, and a Memoriaï has been filed.

Genocide as an Offence Erga Omnes

Counsel for the Applicant also invokes the principle that genocide'

involves a peremptory norm and that, consequently,al1 acts of genocide,

wherever committed, constitute a violation actionableby any other party

to the Convention.

Mr. President, In my submission this argumentfaces two substantial.

obstacles.

In the first place, it confuses the issue of locus standi with the

different question of the territorial application of the Convention and

of its applicability in general.

Secondly, the invocation of peremptory normsdoes not absolve the

Court, which is a court of law, £rom a normal determinationof its

competence and of the justiciabilityof the issues presented in the

Application.

The truth of my second proposition is attested by the decision of the

Court in the East Timor case. And if 1 could remind the Court of the relevant passage. The Court

"However, Portugal puts forward an additional argument

aiming to show that the principle formulated by the Court in the
case concerningMonetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 is not
applicable in the present case. It maintains, in effect, that
the rights which Australia allegedlybreached were rights erga

omnes and that accordingly Portugalcould require it,
individually,to respect themregardless of whether or not
another State had conducted itself ina similarly unlawful
manner ."

And the Court continues;

"In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right
of peoples to self-determination,as it evolved from the Charter
and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character,

is irreproachable. The principle of self-determinationof
peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charterand in
the jurisprudenceof the Court (see Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia

(South West Africa)notwithstandingSecurity Council Resolution
276 (19701, Advisory Opinion, I.C. J. Reports 1971, pp. 31-32,
paras. 52-53; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion,I.C.J. Reports
1975, pp. 31-33, paras. 54-5);

It is one of the essentialprinciples of internationallaw.
However, the Court considers that the erga omnes characterof a
nom and the rule of consent to jurisdictionare two different
things. Whatever the nature of the obligations invoked, the

Court couldnot rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of a State
when its judgment would implyan evaluation of the lawfulness of
the conduct of another State which is not a party to the case.
Where this isso, the Court cannotact, even if the right in
question is a right erga omnes. " (I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102,

para. 29.)

The issue tnerewas, of course, the effect on the rights of Third

States. Here it is the argumentthat the compromissory clause shouldbe

given a distorted application by reason of the principle of erga omnes.

Territorial Applicability of the Convention

1 shall move now to the fifth preliminary objectionof Yugoslavia,

namely, that there is no dispute betweenthe Parties falling within the

provisions of Article IX of the Genocide Conventionbecause at the - 14 -

material time Yugoslavia had no territorial jurisdiction in the relevant

areas.

The Genocide Conventioncan only apply when the State concernedhas

territorial jurisdictionin the areas in which the breaches of the

Convention are alleged to have occurred.The key provisions of the

Convention involve the duty of States "to prevent and to punish the crime

of genocide" (Art. Il, the enactment of the necessary legislation to give

effect to the Convention, and the trial of perçons charged with genocide

"by a competent tribuqal of the State in the territory of whichthe act

was committed" (Art.VI). It is my submission that the Respondent State

dia not have territorial jurisdictionor control, either for enforcement

purposes or for prescriptive purposes, in the relevant areas in the

period to which the Application relates.

The Applicant Statehas signally failed to address this issue

effectively in these oral hearings.

The actual provisions have been treated assecondary to various

general principlesnone of which can override the text of the Convention

and the evidence of the travaux. In general the Convention has been

reconstructedand reduced so that it now consists, in the eyes of the

Applicant State, only of Article III and Article IX.

The responsibilityinvolved is in fact of the normal type and it can

only relate to breaches of the provisions of the Convention. The

provisions are only applicableto the territory of the State or the

territory within itscontrol.

Article IX, the jurisdictionalclause, cannot be used as a gateway to

liabilities not envisaged in the actualprovisions of the Convention. - 15 -

The First Preliminary Objection: the Civil War Issue

Next 1 shall consider the response of the other side to the first

preliminary objectionof the Respondent State.

This is based on the fact that at the material time a civil war

existed in Bosnia and that thekey elements adducedby the Memorial

relate to civil strife. Consequently, thereis no dispute between Bosnia

and Yugoslavia for the purposes of Article IX of the Genocide Convention,

and this is apparent on the face of the Application and the Memorial.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, the response of the other side

to this objection to the admissibilityof the claim has verged upon the

inarticulate. The mainpoint is not whether or not there was a civil war

as such, but that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not a party to

the armed conflict.

In this connection, as elsewhere,the approach of the Applicant State

has been, in forensic terms, very eccentric.

In my role as counsel, 1 introduced seven items of evidence. The

response of my learned colleague, Professor Pellet, was to criticize the

status of one of the seven items, and to ignore the others.

In other words, the other side has made no effort to challenge either

the veracity or the expertise of the following:

- The opinion of Lord Owen, one of the leading figures on the

diplomatic stage at the material time, and Co-Chairman of the

International Conferencefor the Former Yugoslavia.

- The opinion of the former MissionHead, the United Nations

Protection Forces.

- The opinion of the Director of the Defence IntelligenceAgency, the

United States Defence Department.

- Keesing's Press Digest, Record of World Events, and - 16 -

- The opinion of the German FederalMinister of Justice speakingin

her official capacity.

As 1 have said, counsel for the Applicant made no attempt to

challenge eitherthe veracity or expertise of these sources.

Moreover, Professor Franck endedup observing: "Of course, there was

a civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Again, the relevant United Nations documents demonstratethat

Yugoslavia was not a party to the armed conflict within Bosniaand, once

again, the other side has made no attempt to comment upon the specific

documents adducedby the Respondent State.

It is to be hoped that at least in the second round counsel forthe

Applicant State can find the time to comment upon the substance of the

specific documents invokedby the Respondent State. It would be a oreat

pity if we were al1 to depart on new journeys of discovery on Friday

without having heard thatresponse.

There is very substantial evidencethat the conflict was a series of

civil wars to which Yugoslaviawas not a party. No effective

contradiction hasbeen offered by the other side

In this context 1 would Say a final word about the Tadi6 case in the

Appeals Chamber. In his speech ProfessorFranck criticized the reference

to this decision on behalf of the Applicant State. He said:

"Contrary to the Respondent'sanalysis of that Decision, the
Appeals Chamber did not decide that the war in Bosnia andHerzegovina
was purely internal.Rather, it held that 'the International Tribunal

has jurisdiction over the acts alleged in the indictmerit,' including
genocide 'regardlessof whether they occurred within en internal or
an international armedconflict' ."

The point here, Mr. President, is that the careful analysis produced

by the Appeals Chamber, which 1 quoted (CR 96/7, pp. 44-45), clearly - 17 -

does not accept that the Bosnian Serbs were acting as the agents of

Yugoslavia.

Preliminary and Pre-preliminary Objections: The Standard of Proof

Mr. President, 1 turn finally to a question which must face the

tribunal inproceedings of this kind. The question is: according to which

standard of proof should the issue ofcompetencebe decided?

No doubt the State objectinghas an initial burden of proof, but at

the end of the day, the Court is bound to make a final determinationof

its jurisdiction and of its competence in general. Such a determination

must be based upon al1 the relevant legal issues taken in conjunction.

Included among those legal issuesare questions of mixed fact and

law, such as the existence or not of any territorial jurisdictionof

Yugoslavia at the material time and in the relevantareas.

In Our submission the Applicant State has failed to provide a prima

facie basis, either in law or in fact, for a decision that a dispute

exists in accordance with the provisions of Article IX.The Applicant

State has failed to provide sufficient evidenceto contradict the

evidence adducedby the Respondent Stateto the effect that the eventsto

which the Application refers relatedto an armed conflictto which

Yugoslavia was nota party.

Alternatively,and independentlyof this firstproposition, the

Application and the Memorial do not revealthe existence of a dispute to

which the provisions of the Genocide Conventionare applicable and this

in Our submission was amply confirmed yesterday by the analysis placed on

the record by Professor Franck.

Mr. President, 1 would like to thank you and your colleagues for your

patience through both roundsof these proceedings and 1 would ask you to

give the floor to my friend and colleague, Professor Eric Suy. - 18 -

Mr. PRESIDENT: 1 thank you very much Professor IanBrownlie for your

statement. 1 give now the floor to ProfessorEric Suy.

REPLIQUE RELATIVE A LA SUCCESSION D'ETATS EN MATIERE DE TRAITES

M. SW : Merci Monsieur le Président.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Membresde la Cour, je voudrais

faire quelques brèves observations à propos de la présentation faitehier

après-midi par ma collègue Mme Stern à propos de la problématique de la

succession d'Etats en matière de traités. Ce faisant, je suivrai pour

autant que possible la structure de l'exposé de Mme Stern.

1) Il y a tout d'abord l'objectionde la République fédérale de

Yougoslavie du 15 juin 1993, objection à la notification de süccession

par la Bosnie-Herzégovine à la convention sur le génocide.

a) La Bosnie-Herzégovine se pose d'abord la question de savoirpour

quels motifs laYougoslavie n'a fait aucune objection aux notifications

de succession à la convention sur le génocide émanant d'autres Etats nés

sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie. Mme Stern relève également

l'absence d'objection aux notificationsde succession de la

Bosnie-Herzégovine concernant, notamment,les pactes des Nations Unies

sur les droits de l'homme.

Selon la Bosnie-Herzégovine,la Yougoslavie voulaitainsi se

soustraire au mécanisme de l'article IX de la convention sur le génocide.

Ceci serait illustrépar le fait que cetteobjection est intervenueplus

de deux mois après l'ordonnanceàe votre Cour en indication demesures

conservatoiresdu 8 avril 1993.

La raison de l'absence d'objection contre les autres déclarationsde

succession est, en effet, que la Bosnie-Herzégovineavait introduit une - 19 -

requête devant votre Coursur la base de l'article IX de la convention.

Une absence d'objection aurait pu être interprétée comme une

reconnaissance implicitede la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Ce risque n'existait

pas pour les autres républiques non reconnues parla Yougoslavie.

b) C'est à tort aussi, que la Bosnie-Herzégovines'est prévalue du

contenu de l'objection formulée par la Yougoslavie.

Dans la note en question, la Yougoslavie affirme quela

Bosnie-Herzégovineest tenue de respecter lesrègles applicables à la

prévention et la répression du crime de génocide envertu du droit

internationalgénéral. Cela veut dire qu'il existe, indépendamment de la

convention,une obligation de préveniret de réprimer le crimede

génocide commis par les individus.

Mais la Yougoslavie insisteque l'article IX n'est pas une

disposition du droit internationalgénéral. En tant qu'elle a trait au

règlement judiciaire obligatoiredes différends, cette clause a un

caractère purement contractuel. Je me réfère une fois encore à l'analyse

de sir Humphrey Waldock, que j'ai citée lors de ma première plaidoirie.

Vous vous rappellerez que pour sirHumphrey les clauses contractuelles

excluent la succession automatique dans lestraités-loi.

2) Il est faux de prétendre que la Yougoslavie veut empêcher la

Bosnie-Herzégovinede participer à la convention sur le génocide. Nous

avons dit dans notre plaidoirieque la Bosnie-Herzégovinepeut, par

l'acte d'engagementunilatéral, devenir partie à la convention sur le

génocide. Mais cet engagement ne saurait avoir des effets juridiques

entre Etats qui ne se reconnaissent pas mutuellement.

3) J1en viens maintenant à l'argument selon lequel il y aurait

continuité automatiquea une conventionuniverselle de protectiondes

droits de l'homme les plus fondamentaux. J'ai, lors de ma première plaidoirie, montré que la règle dela

succession automatique n'est pas d'application générale. Mme Stern ne

l'a pas réellement contesté. Je relève brièvementque, contrairement à

ce qu'affirme ma collègue, les avis 1 et 9 de la commission Badinter

n'établissentnullement que la Yougoslavie aurait consenti à

l'applicationde la convention sur la succession dlEtats en matière de

traités. La commission Badinterse réfère uniquement, notamment dans

1'avis no 9, aux principes de droit international incorporés dansla

convention. Ces principes, qui plus est, ne devaient constituer qu'une

base pour les discussions entreles parties.

La Bosnie-Herzégovineprétend toutefois que la succession automatique

vaudrait pour les conventions universelles en matière des droits de

l'.homme. La Yougoslavie le conteste. C'est donc sur cette prétendue

exception que nous devons nous concentrer.

a) Mme Stern considèrecomme particulièrementsignificative,et

preuve d'une opinio juris, la position adoptée à la cinquième réuniondes

présidents des organes créés en vertu d'instrumentsrelatifs aux droits

de l'homme, qui s'est tenue fin septembre 1994. La position de cette

réunion de présidents appelletrois remarques.

Premièrement, à la fin du rapport, de cette réunion des présidents,

nous lisons la phrase suivante :

les présidents ont fait observertoutefois qu'à leur avis
les Etats successeursétaient automatiquementliés par les
obligations découlantdes instrumentsinternationaux relatifs
aux droits de l'homme à compter de leur date respective

d'indépendanceet que le respect de ces obligations ne devait
pas dépendre d'une déclaration de confirmation faite parle
Gouvernement de llEtat successeur.» (Etat des pactes relatifs
aux droits de l'homme, Succession drEtats en matière de traités
internationauxrelatifs aux droits de 1 'homme;rapport du

Secrétaire général, E/CN.4/1995/80,par. 10.)

Ce passage, Monsieur le Président, mérite une lecture très attentive. - 21 -

De la part des présidents descomités, les termes aà leur avis» ont une

significationtoute particulière. Ils impliquent que les opinions

exprimées ne reflètent que l'avis personnel des présidents de ces

organes. Emanant d'experts siégeant à titre individuelet personnel, ces

opinions ne sauraient certainementêtre considérées comme des éléments

pouvant servir comme preuve d'une opinio juris attribuée à des Etats.

Deuxièmement, les présidents de ces organes (de ces comités créés par

les conventions sur les droits de l'homme) expriment toutd'abord leur

préoccupation qu'un certain nombre dlEtats successeursn'avaient pas

encore officiellement confirméleur succession au Secrétaire général.

Or, pourquoi se préoccuper de l'absence d'une confirmation de succession

s'il y a, comme le prétend la Bosnie-Herzégovine,une succession

automatique ?

Enfin, les présidents de ces comités de ces organes invitent tousles

Etats successeurs qui ne l'avaientpas encore fait «à confirmer dès que

possible leur adhésion par süccession à ces instruments» (les italiques

sont de nous) .

b) Ceci nous mène à la Commission des droits de 1'homme, qui a

également été citée parMme Stern. La Commission a «encouragé les Etats

à confirmer officiellementqu'ils demeuraient liés par lesobligations

contractées au titre de traités internationaux relatifs auxdroits de

1 homme» .

Mais nonobstant ces exhortationset ces affirmations de confirmation,

il reste que les Etatssuccesseurs qui ne notifient pas leur confirmation

ne sont pas mentionnés par le Secrétaire général commeétant parties aux

conventionsmultilatérales,même sur les droits de l'homme (voir

E/CN.4/1995/80,p. 12, annexe).

Enfin, Monsieur le Président, il convient d'apprécier à leur justeportée ces déclarationsdes organes des droits del'homme. La formule

utilisée, est très exactement la suivante, que

«les Etats successeursétaient automatiquement liéspar les

obligations découlant des instruments internationaux relatifs
aux droits de l'homme à compter de leur date respective
d'indépendance» (E/CN.4/1995/80).

Il est donc question seulement desobligations qui découlent de ces

instruments. Il n'est pas dit, que ces Etats sontparties aux traités

Cette distinction s'explique du fait que ces obligationsdécoulant des

pactes sont des obligations dedroit internationalgénéral.

c) Un tout petit mot encore, Monsieur le Président, sur le Comité des

dro.its de l'homme. Mme Stern a dit à ce sujet - et je cite très

littéralement :

«Au moment de la présentation du rapport de la Bosnie sur
les atrocités commises surson territoire,la présidente du
Comité des droits de l'home, Rosalyn Higgins, a pris acte de ce
que la présence de la délégation bosniaque et la soumission de
son rapport témoignaientbien de la continuité automatique,

indépendammentde toute notification ...»

Cette affirmation figurait déjà dans le Statement de la

Bosnie-Herzégovine,novembre de l'an dernier, à la page 74, au

paragraphe 3.50. Il y est référé au documentCCPR/C/SR.1200,du

9 novembre 1992, page 5, paragraphe 14.

Monsieur le Président, il s'agit là d'une ahurissante distorsion des

faits

D'abord, contrairement à ce qu'affirme la Bosnie-Herzégovine,le

président du Comité des droits de l'homme n'était pas Mme Higgins, mais

Fausto Pocar - comme il ressort, est-il utile de le dire, de la page de

garde du document précitéqui se trouve dans lesannexes no 3.53.

Ensuite et surtout, ni Mme Higgins, ni M. Pocar n'ont tenu les propos

rapportés par la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Et je cite le documentque je viens

de mentionner notamment le paragraphe 14 : eMme Higgins remerciela délégation de Bosnie-Herzégovine
et considère sa présence comme la preuveque le Gouvernement de
Bosnie-Herzégovine s'estime tenu de faire appliquer le pacte sur

son territoire.» (Les italiquessont de nous.)

Et c'est tout

Mme Higgins n'a fait aucune référence à la thèse de la succession

automatique. Il n'en va pas autrement de M. Pocar, qui a seulement

déclaré que : «Le Comité a estimé que tous les peuples de l'ancienne

Yougoslavie avaient droitaux garanties prévues parle pacte.» (Ibid.,

p. 2, par. 1.)

Je trouve regrettable quela Bosnie-Herzégovine doive avoir recours à

de telles distorsionspour étayer sa thèseconcernant la prétendue

succession automatique.

La Yougoslavie soutientdonc, Monsieur le Président, qu'il ne ressort

pas de la pratique des organesdes droits de l'homme que les Etats

successeurs seraient parties auxtraités sur les droits de l'homme à

ccmpter de leur indépendance. Ces déclarationssignifient que le fait

pour un Etat successeur de ne pas être partie à ces conventions,ne

l'autorisepas à violer la coutume internationale.

*

4) Je tiens encore, Monsieur le Président, à revenir sur la

distinction entre les conventions sur les droits de 1'homme,et la

convention sur le génocide, qui est une convention de droit international

pénal tout comme, par exemple, les nombreuses conventions surla

répression d'actes de terrorisme.

La Yougoslavie a relevé cettedistinction pour montrer que les

considérations invoquéespour soutenir la thèse de la succession

automatique en matière de droits de l'homme ne peuvent, en tout état de

cause, s'appliquer à la convention sur le génocide. Comme nous allons le - 24 -

voir, cette distinction ne saurait choquer quelqu'un qui analyse la

convention du point de vue de la technique juridique.

Précisons d'abord ce cpi partage la Yougoslavie et la

Bosnie-Herzégovine. La Bosnie-Herzégovinese prévaut du «caractère

humanitaire» et du but civilisateur de la convention sur le génocide. Ce

sont les expressions utiliséespar votre Cour dans son avis de 1951.

Elle se réfère donc aux objectifs de la convention, au sens le plus large

du terme.

La Yougoslavie, en revanche, soutient que, à supposer qu'il puisse

être question de succession automatique, un critère différent devrait

être retenu, qui tient à l'objet du traité. J'en veux pour preuve

l'analyse du professeur Rein Mulierson, qui se réfère à la théorie des

droits acquis, et il dit :

"human rights treaty obligations are not only obligations of a
State vis-à-vis other States parties; rather, they are at the
same time the foremost rights of individuals protected by
relevant instrumentsv («The Continuity and Succession of States,
by Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia», ICLQ, 1993,

p. 491).

La succession automatiquedevrait donc êtrefondée sur l'idée que les

conventions sur les droits de l'homme créent des droitssubjectifs - des

droits acquis - en faveur des individus

De toute évidence, ce critère présente l'avantage d'une plus grande

objectivité. Selon la Yougoslavie, ce critère est également consacrépar

le Comité des droits de L'homme, qui a souligné que

«tous les peuples qui occupent le territoired'un nouvel Etat
qui faisait partie de l'ex-Yougoslaviesont en droit de jouir
les garanties prévues par le pacte» (E/CN.4/1995/80,p. 2,
par. 3).

Or, Monsieur le Président, la convention sur le génocide ne contient

aucune clause conférant desdroits subjectifs aux individus. Les

considérations qui pourraient éventuellement justifier une succession - 25 -

automatique - qui sont des considérations de technique juridique - ne

sont donc pas applicables à la convention sur le génocide.

Tout ceci est encore confirmépar les déclarationsdes organes des

droits de l'homme cités par Mme Stern. Comme je l'ai déjà souligné, ces

déclarationsne disent pas que les Etats successeurs sontparties aux

conventions sur les droits de l'homme à compter de leur indépendance.

Elles soulignent seulementque les Etats successeurs sont liés par les

obligations découlantde.ces instruments internationaux. Le principe des

droits acquis contribue à expliquer cette nuance importante.

*

5) Mme Stern a analysé, enfin, l'effet de la déclaration de

succession en l'absence de succession automatique.

Tout d'abord, ma collègue s'est référée à l'auteur Marco Marcoff pour

dire que lanotification de successionn'est là que pour confirmer la

continuité automatiqueet qu'elle ne serait qu'un «révélateur»de cette

succession. Cette idée apparaîtdéjà dans le Staternentde la

Bosnie-Herzégovine (par. 6.9), où il est dit que la notification de

succession du 29 décembre 1992 n'aurait aucune valeur juridiqueen

elle-même,mais informerait la communauté internationalede la succession

de la Bosnie-Herzégovine à la convention sur le génocide. Cette

notification serait un«signal juridique» (legal signal) pour confirmer

sa participation en tant que partie à la convention sur le génocide.

Si cette notificationn'a aucune valeur juridique, comment peut-on en

déduire un effet rétroactifjusqulà la date de la déclaration

d'indépendance ? Commer-tpeut-elle créer des droits et des obligations à

partir de cette date ? Sur ce point aussi, la thèse de la

Bosnie-Herzégovineest remarquablement contradictoire.

Mme Stern a fait valoir aussi, q-dela Yougoslavie confondle droit, - 26 -

et l'obligationde succéder. Je voudrais vous montrer, Monsisur le

Président, que c'est au contraire la Bosnie-Herzégovinequi confond les

deux hypothèses. Nous verrons que la Bosnie-Herzégovinetranspose à

l'hypothèse du droit de succéder, des considérationsqui ne pourraient se

justifier que pour une éventuelle obligation de succession.

Rappelons d'abord que j'ai développé, lors de ma première plaidoirie,

deux thèses qui menaient à situer l'entrée en vigueur de la convention

sur le génocide entre les Partiesau présent litigeen mars 1993.

Ces deux hypothèses sont inspirées d'une idée unique. Il s'agit

d'éviter qu'un Etat partie à une convention soit lié à son insu et contre

sa'volonté vis-à-vis d'un autre Etat. Puisquela codificationdu droit

de succession enmatière de traités continueet continuera de soulever

des controverseset des solu+ions contradictoires,il est important, à

notre avis, qu'en cette matière on en revienne à l'applicationdu droit

des traités, qui lui est universellementreconnu, et qui fournit des

réponses plus claireset plus logiques. Après tout, la succession en

matière de traités n'est qu'un aspect tout particulier du droit des

traités en général.

Mme Stern a passé sous silence ce problème cardinal. Elle a fait

valoir uniquement que l'analyse de la Yougoslavie était «inadmissible»,

parce qu'il en résulteraitun time-gap dans l'applicationdes

conventions.

Selon la Yougoslavie, cet argument du time-gap ne fonde aucunementla

prétendue rétroactivitédes déclarations de succession,par lesquellesun

Etat consent volontairement à être lié par un traité.

En effet, dans la présente hypothèse, 1'Etat successeur aurait le

droit, mais non l'obligation,de devenir partie à un traité par

succession. Il aurait donc la facultéde ne pas devenir partie à ce - 27 -

traité. Il pourrait aussi choisird'y adhérer. Rien ne garantirait donc

l'applicationcontinue du traité, ni même l'absence de time-gap.

L'argument du time-gap est compatible seulement avecla thèse de la

succession automatiquequi, nous l'avons vu, n'est pas de droit.

La thèse de la Yougoslavie tient donc en deux points :premièrement,

la succession automatiquene fait pas partie du droit en vigueur;

deuxièmement,dès lors qu'il en est ainsi, l'argument tiré du time-gap

est dépourvu de tout fondement. Il faut donc admettre qu'un Etat ne peut

être lié à son insu vis-à-vis d'un autre Etat qui a fait une déclaration

de succession.

Cette thèse, Monsieur le Président, n'est nullement contredite parla

pratique invoquéepar la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Rappelons une fois encore

que les organes des conventions surles droits de l'homme considèrent que

1'Etat successeur est lié par les obligations découlant du traité à

compter de la date de son indépendance. Ceci n'équivaut pas à dire que

llEtat successeur devient partie au traité à la même date.

En tout état.de cause, rien ne s'oppose à ce que les Etatsparties

conviennent implicitementde reconnaître la qualité de partie à llEtat

successeur avec effet rétroactif. Il ne peut toutefois en être question

que moyennant le consentementdes autres parties au traité.

Je conclus donc qu'une analyse correcte des principes juridiqueset

de la pratique mènent à la conclusion, premièrement, qu'iln'y a pas de

succession automatiquedans la convention sur le génocide, et

deuxièmement, qu'une déclaration de succession volontairene peut avoir

d'effets rétroactifs.

Ceci, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, termine ma

plaidoirie dans la présente affaire. Jem'en remets maintenant à la - 28 -

justice, et vous remercie de l'attentionque vous avez bien voulu

m'accorder

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie Monsieur le professeur Eric Suy pour

votre exposé et jlappelle à la barre Monsieurle professeur Perazic.

M. PERAZIC : Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges.

Dans la pratique des relations internationales, dans la science du

droit internationalet l'histoire diplomatique, ce cas est, bien sûr,

exceptionnel, mais aussi difficile à comprendre. Hier on a dit que

c'était la première fois dans l'histoire qu'un Etat est inculpé pour le

génocide.

Comme l'a indiqué le professeurBrownlie dans son exposé, 1'Etat de

Bosnie-Herzégovineest né et vivait jusqulaux accords de Dayton en une

guerre civile. C'est pour cela que devant lenom de 1'Etat de

Bosnie-Herzégovinenous utilisons l'adjectif «prétendu». Ce n'est pas

sans raison.

Nous avons le sentiment que cette guerre a été aidée par la

communauté internationale,avant tout par uneorganisation régionalequi,

elle, imposait le changement des frontièresadministratives en frontières

étatiques et c'est ainsi que ces unités administrativessont devenues des

Etats. En utilisant un vieux principe utl possidetiç, appliqué depuis le

début du siècle passé à l'occasion de la décolonisation,la communauté

internationalea favorisé la collision entre le droitdes peuples à

l'autodéterminationet le principe de l'intégritéterritoriale de llEtat.

A cause du mélange ethnique danscette république centrale de l'ancienne

Yougoslavie, nous-avons tous eu des conflits opposant les unscontre les

autres. C'est ainsi qu'ont eu lieu les conflits des Serbescontre les - 29 -

Croates et les Musulmans, des Musulmans contre les Croates, des Musulmans

contre lesMusulmans.

Ainsi, toutes les partiesau conflit ont protlamé leurs Etats

respectifs et s'efforçaientde les présenter comme légauxet légitimes.

La communauté internationalecomptait de manière persistante

seulement sur la Bosnie-Herzégovinecomme l'unique Etat séparé de la

Yougoslavie. Elle a proclamé son indépendance le 6 mars 1992, la

Communauté européennel'a reconnue le 6 avril 1992, elle est devenue

membre de l1ONU le 22 mai 1992.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, nous savons tous que de

nombreux Etats importants et capables comme tels restaient pendant des

décennies en dehors del'ONU pour à peine prendre leur siège auquel ils

avaient droit, tandis que celuiqui n'est pas encore né devient membre

des Nations Unies. Comment pouvait-il être capable et disposé à remplir

ses obligations qui découlentde la Charte des Nations Unies ? Tout cela

a eu lieu au cours de la guerre civile qui était menée sur le fond

ethnique et religieux.

A cette époque-là les parties au conflit concluentde différents

arrangements militairesportant sur l'armistice,le mémorandum sur

l'élargissement de l'applicationde la convention de Genèvesur le droit

humanitaire, sur l'échange des prisonniers,etc. A ce niveau-là se

limitait la capacité contractuellede toutes les trois parties au

conflit. Donc, cet Etat ne disposaitni du ius tractatumni du ius

representionis. Dans cette période-là, la Yougoslavie, en tant que l'un

des fondateurs de la Société des Nations ainsique des Nations Unies se

voit exclue de différents organeset organisations des NationsUnies.

Nous devons mentionnersurtout, parmi quelques hommes dlEtat, lord

Carrington qui à l'époque avait proposé le plande la destruction de la - 30 -

Yougoslavie en déclarant d'erreur tragique de la reconnaissancede la

Bosnies mais malheureusementtrop tard.

Cette guerre civile a été différente selon les Etats dans lesquels

elle était menée. Au début, depuis le mois de mars 1992 jusqu'au mois de

mai de la même année, à savoir jusqu'au retrait de l'armée populaire

yougoslave de la Bosnie, les parties au conflit y étaient la Yougoslavie,

d'une part, et le territoire rebelle, de l'autre. Donc, l'armée

populaire yougoslave, comme toute autre armée dans lemonde, selon la

constitution du pays, défendait l'ordre constitutionnelet dans le

premier temps s'efforçait de se trouver entre les partiesau conflit pour

empêcher le conflit entre-ethniquejusqu'au moment où elle a été attaquée

par les forces rebelles. Depuis cette date, la guerre civile a continué

sans l'armée populaire yougoslaveentre les unités armées serbesd'un

côté, et celles des Musulmans et Croates de l'autre, et entre-tempsun

conflit s'est produit entre ces dernières. Toutes ces sortesde guerre

ont donc été de caractère non international, à savoir elles ont eu lieu à

l'intérieurde la.Yougoslavie et puis à l'intérieurde la

Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Maintenant la question se pose de savoir si la requête de la

Bosnie-Herzégovinea été alors adresséeau bon endroit. Malheureusement,

il existe dans le monde le doute provoqué parle fait que lespremiers

jours l'armée populaire yougoslavese trouvait sur le champ de bataille

avec les buts de guerre que nousvenons de mentionner. N'oublions pas

que le système de mobilisation dans l'ancienneYougoslavie, comme dans de

nombreuses armées dansle monde, se fondait sur le principe territorial

surtout en ce qui concerne la défense territorialequi était plus massive

et sous le commandement des autoritéslocales. Au moment de la décision

sur la sécession, les membres de l'armée populaire yougoslave de - 31 -

nationalité musulmane ont toutde suite fui dans les unités musulmaneset

ceux de nationalité croate dans lesunités croates. C'est parce que les

partis musulman et croate ont déjà formé aes unités illégales dans

lesquelles se sont intégrés les déserteurs de l'armée populaire

yougoslave. L'équipementmilitaire a connu le même sort. Musulmans et

Croates luttaient pour démanteler la Yougoslavie et les Serbes pour la

sauvegarderet y rester, afin de garderpour leur peuple le caractère

constitutif en vue d'éviter que ce peuple ne devienne une minorité

nationale, comme il était prévu dans une opinion de la commission

Badinter.

On dit souvent que les Serbes ont occupé ces territoires. Nous,

présents ici, dans cet honorable édifice, nous savons bien quemême

depuis l'instructionde Lieber datant de la moitié du dernier siècle, et

jusqu'aw conventions de La Haye et de Genève, l'occupation ne peut

concerner que le territoire d'un Etat étranger ennemi et non pas son

propre territoire où on se trouve depuis dessiècles.

Lors de la séance de la Cour le lermai 1996 le demandeur a indiqué

plusieurs faits alléguésqui devraient réfuternos affirmations. Etant

donné qu'il n'y a pas de temps pour en parler de manière plus détaillée,

permettez-moi,Monsieur le Président, de faire quelques remarques

seulement.

En ce qui concerne l'observationde M. Sacirbey selon laquellela

Bosnie est uz?Etat démocratique séculier avec une démocratie

parlementaire, malheureusementles données que nous avons indiquées et

que le demandeur a niées n'offrent aucun fondement à une telle

conclusion. Cela est, entre autres, démontré aussi par des déclarations

de membres de la plus haute autorité - présidence de la

Bosnie-Herzégovine,de même que par des déclarations de l'ancien premier - 32 -

ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères,M. Silajdzic. En formant

l'objection à la demande du Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine

relative aux mesures provisoires,la Partie yougoslavea transmis à la

Cour une photoccpiedes lettres de l'ancien premier ministrede la

Bosnie-Herzégovine, M. Akamdzic, Croate, envoyées respectivementau

président des Etats-Unis et au président du Conseil de sécurité des

Nations unies, et dans lesquellesil affirme que M. Alija Izetbegovicn'a

plus le mandat de président dela présidence étant donné que son mandat a

depuis longtemps expiréet qu'il ne représente même pas la majorité du

peuple musulmanpour ne pas parler des peuples serbeet croate en

Bosnie-Herzégovine. La question du mandat de M. Izetbegovicn'est pas

seulement une question formelle. Elle symbolise l'usurpationde pouvoir

en Bosnie-Herzégovine,contrairement à la volonté du peuple serbeet

probablement du peuple croateet d'une bonne partie du peuple musulmanen

Bosnie-Herzégovine.

M. Sacirbey allègueque la Bosnie-Herzégovinea accepté toutes les

initiatives de paix appropriées,mais il ne conteste pas et ne confirme

pas non plus notre affirmationque le Gouvernementde la Républiquede

Bosnie-Herzégovinea refusé une des premièresinitiatives de la

Communauté européenne, le soi-disantplan Cutilieroet ceci à l'époque où

le conflit armé ne s'était pas encore produit, ce qui a plus tard

entraîné des conséquences catastrophiquespour l'ensemble de la

population de la Bosnie-Herzégovine

Pour ce qui est de notre exposé sur le principe des droits égauxet

de l'autodéterminationdes peuples, la question de savoir sila

Yougoslavie étaitou non le champion dans ses efforts déployés en vue de

l'autodétermination des peuples n'a aucune importance. Le fait est que

la Yougoslavie, comme d'ailleurs la communauté internationalejusqu'à la - 33 -

crise yougoslave, était contre une sécession unilatéraleet faite par la

force, ce qui correspondaitnon seulement à sa compréhensiondu droit

international,mais aussi à son système constitutior~lel et juridique. Le

demandeur n'a avancé aucun argumentni l'opinion des milieux

scientifiquesqui nie la position démontréesur ce principe. En

conséquence,nous continuons à affirmer que l'accession à l'indépendance

de la Bosnie-Herzégovinen'est pas en conformité avecle droit

international, à savoir avec le principe de l'égalité en droit et de

l'autodéterminationdes peuples. Nous répétons : il n' y a pas d'auteur

sérieux dans le domainedu droit international quiaffirme que la

Bosnie-Herzégovinea eu le droit à la sécession et que la sécession ait

été faite sans violations sérieuses dudroit international. La sécession

de force de quelques anciennesrépubliquesyougoslaves et la

reconnaissance de leur indépendanceresteront un des précédents sérieux

dans le développementde la communautéinternationale, avecles

conséquencesd'une portée imprévisible.

Mme Stern considèreque les événementshistoriques ne contribuentpas

à la compréhensiondes problèmes. Bien que le défendeur n'ait pas

analysé l'histoire en détails, il considère que celle-ci et surtout

l'histoire de la deuxième guerremondiale et du génocide qui a été

perpétré contre le peuple serbe, souvent contre lesmêmes familleset

dans les mêmes régionset endroits, avec les menacesde la même coalition

croato-musulmanependant la sécession faite par la force, n'a pu rester

sans influence sur les rapports dans la population et sur la résistance

de la population serbe. Attribuer aux Serbesla vengeance pour les

événements du passé nlest pas du tout'correct. Merci, Monsieur le

Président. - 34 -

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Perazic, pour votre exposé.

La Cour observera maintenantune pause d'une quinzaine de minutes.

L'audience est suspendue de 16 h 10 à 16 h 45.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous prie de vous asseoir. L'audience est reprise

et j'appelle à la barre S. Exc. M. Etinski, agent de la Yougoslavie.

Mr. ETINSKI: ,Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Court.

At yesterdayls session many unfounded contentionswere made which

went beyond the framework of Our Preliminary Objections. 1 therefore

submit not to make them the subject-matterof my presentation today.

As the Court is well aware, the first request for the extension of

the time limit fixed by the Court for the filing of the Mernorialwas made

by the Applicant. The Court had ordereda six-month time limit, but at

the request of the Applicant it extendod it to another six months.

Nevertheless, the Applicant contendedyesterday that the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia wishes to prolong the proceedings. The filing of the

Preliminary Objectionswas not motivatedby the desire to prolong the

proceedings, rather, it was motivated by the desire to stop the

proceedings. It could not be qualified as an abuse of rights.

At the begiming of yesterday's session we also were witness to an

exercise in grandstanding. Pointedly, the Agent of the Applicant readthe

letter that Mr. Sherif Bassiouni had sent to him. In addition, he

informed the Court thathe had enclosed two other letters: the letter of

Mr. Hans Corell, United Nations Under-Secretary-Generalfor Legal

Affairs, of 24 October 1994 to Mr. David Erne and the letter of Mr.Sherif Bassiouni of 24 July 1994 also to Mr. David Erne. The other letter

reads :

"Dear David :

To my great surprise 1 received from two sourcesa copy of
your report to this Institute.The report's cover, which is

attached, is on United Nations stationery. The placementof my
name under the title suggeststhat 1 am the report's author. The
report has been distributedto officials of foreign governments
and to members of the press without authorization.As you know,
the report was prepared subjectto a confidentiality agreement.

Furthermore, the report is not an official document of the
United Nations nor of the Commission of Experts. Therefore, 1
view its distributionsand misrepresentationsas a very serious
matter. If you nave any knowledge concerning the distribution of

the document, 1 would appreciate your informing me immediately
and taking immediate action toprevent the further dissemination
of the document.

Sincerely yours,
M. Sherif Bassiouni
Professor of Law."

1 regret very much indeed that this misunderstandingshould have

occurred between Messrs.Bassiouni and Erne of which 1 was not aware

However, this is not the only case that a United Nations employeehas

disclaimed an objective and honest report.

Considering thatno new important argiinientas presented in

yesterdayls nearing concerningthe alleged successicn of the Applicant to

the Genocide Convention. 1 continue to maintain the arguments of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia submitted inthe first-roundhearing.

The Appiicant holds in reserve certain matterswhich it considers

could provide additionai bases of the jurisdictionof the Court and it

brings themup occasionallybefore the Court or indicates that it might

do so. It submitted the alleged additional bases of the jurisdictionof

the Court in its two requests forthe indication of provisional measures.

The Applicant did not specify the additional basis in theApplication,

nor did it explain it specifically in the Memorial. In paragraphs 4.1.0.9 and 4.1.0.10 of the Memorial, page 132, the

Applicant says:

I1Itis firm conviction of the Government of Bosnia and

Herzegovina that, if studied carefully, the additional basis it
offered for the jurisdiction of the Court would prove well-
founded, and that the Court has also jurisdictionon the basis
of forum prorogatum, to the extent that specific requestsmade
by the Respondent State, in particular in its letter of

1 April 1993, "overlap in kind with those of the Applicant" and
"pass beyond the limits of the Genocide Conventionu ...

However, there is no doubt that these grounds for the

jurisdictionof the Court areless obvious and less indisputable
than Article IX of the Convention on the Preventionand
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 Decernber 1948 ..."

Accordingly, the Applicant itself says that these bases of the

jurisdictionof the Court are lessobvious and less indisputable.

Furthernore, in paragraph 4.2.4.5, page 178, of the Memorial, the

Applicant says:

"It is evident fromSection IV of the Application made by
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the breaches by tne

Respondent Stateof its obligation under the Genocide Convention
and its responsibility derivingtherefrom wereamong the main
submissionsmade by Bosniaand Herzegovina. They arethe
substance of points (a) and (q)of the Application and many
other submissionsare related to them, as will be demonstrated

below. Moreover, as explained in Chapter 1 of the present
Memorial, Bosnia and Herzegovina has limited itssubmissions to
points having a "reasonableconnection"with the Genocide
Convention, subjectto the forma1 reservation that it may take

for grantod that Yugoslavia has accepted the Court's
jurisdiction on the basis of Article IX of this Convention."

As the Applicant providedno new argument in connection with the

allegrd new additional bases of the jurisdictionof the Court, it left no

possibility to the Respondent for new commentaries.For, al1 the alleged

additional bases of the jurisdictionof the Court were thesubject-matter

of the comment and rejection by the Respondent in theprocedure related

to the indication of the provisional measures of protection.

However, in paragraphs, 23, 25, 27 and 28 of the Statement of 14

November 1995, the Applicant reversesto the alleged additional bases ofthe jurisdictionof the Court. Bosnia and Herzegovina reservesagain "its

right to revive al1 or some of the previous submissions andrequests" and

goes on to Say that it "integrallymaintains that thejurisdiction of the

Court to deal with its submissions is based, alternatively and/or jointly

on four different grounds."

In connection with the alleged additional bases of its jurisdiction,

in its Order of 13 September 1993, the Court said:

mWhereas the Agent of the Applicant has, both in its
Application institutingproceedings and in its second request
for the indication of provisional measures, reserved"the right

to revise, supplement or amend" the Application and the request
respectively; whereasin reliance on these reservations,by
letters dated 6 August, 10 August and 13 August 1993, he
submitted that the Courtls jurisdiction is grounded not onlyon

the jurisdictionalbases previously put forward but also on
certain additionaltexts, specified in the letters referredto."

Whereas the Applicantcannot, simply by reserving 'the
right to revise, supplement or amend' its Application or

requests for provisional measures, conferon itself a right to
invoke additional groundsof jurisdiction, not referredto in
the Application institutingproceedings; whereasit will be for
the Court, at an appropriate stageof the proceedings, to

determine, if necessary, the validity of such claims; whereas
however, as the Court has recognized, 'Anadditional ground of
jurisdictionmay ... be brought to the Court's attention' after
the filing of the Application,

'and the Court may take it into account provided the
Applicant makos it clear that it intends to proceed
upon that basis ... and provided also that theresult
is not to transform the dispute broughc before the

Court by the application into anotherdispute which is
different incharacter ...' (Militaryand Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 41
United States of America), Jurisdiction and

Admissibility,Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 427,
para. 80) ."

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of the Crime of Genociàe, ProvisionalMeasures, Order of 13
September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, paras. 27, 28, pp. 338,
339.)

The Applicant has not continued the dispute on the basis of the

alleged additional groundsof jurisdiction.On the contrary, Bosnia and - 38 -

Herzegovina has clearly confineditself to the requests which it

considers to have the basis for the jurisdictionof the Court in

Article IX of the Genocide Convention.Other alleged bases of the

jurisdiction of the Court are held inreserve by the Applicant, hopeful

that the Court might acceptsome of them, so that the Applicant could

then "revive al1 or some of its previous submissionsand requests". The

Applicant repeated this possibility yesterday.

This attitude of the Applicant transgressesthe bounds of fair

litigation, it is unacceptable and we rejectit. The Applicant failed to

present any document at the appropriate stageof the proceedings, i.e.,

at'the time of the submission of the Memorial, the alleged additional

bases of the jurisdictionof the Court, as well as the possible requests

to be based on them, and we consider that it cannot do it now in this

separate procedure related to the Preliminary Objections. Theattempt to

do so, would certainly transgress the bounds of procedural proprietyand

we reject each and every additional groundof jurisdictionand continue

to maintain Our arguments that we ~resented in the incidentalprocedures

related to the indication of provisional measures in whichthe Applicant

presented the alleged additional basesof jurisdiction.

FORUM PROROGATUM

A submission of the request for the indication of provisional

measures of protection does not mean the consent to the jurisdiction of

the Court

Yesterday, the Applicant contendedthat a submission of the request

for the indication of provisional measures of protection impliesa

consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. This contention is not based on

law . - 39 -

The principal rule is that the decision of the Court on the

provisional measuresof protection is not conditional on its decision on

jurisdiction.The proceedings on interim protection do not involve a

definitive determinationby the Court of the existence of jurisdiction

for the purpose of Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute. Did it not happen

in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., case that the Court indicated provisional

measures of protection, but still declared itself without jurisdiction?

(Anglo-IranianOil Co., Order of 5 July 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 89;

Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Jurisdiction,Judgment of 22 July 1952, I.C.J.

Reports 1952, p. 93). The contentionof the Applicant that the request

for the indication of provisional measures implies a consent to the

jurisdictionof the Court is contrary to the principle of the equality of

Parties. In such a case, a party which considers from the very begiming

that the Court has no jurisdictionwould be bereft of a procedural

instrument. In the case of interim protection, both parties are present

before the Courtsubject to its Rules on incidentalproreedings and the

principle of equality dictates equal availability of interim protection

without a procedural penalty. In addition, the Order of the Court

concerning the indication of provisional measuresdoes not prejudge the

merits of a case. The duration of these measures is limited until the

completion of such a case. A party acquires, nor is it denied, any right

whatsoever by these measures. The request for such a measure has no

relevance for a decision on the merits of a case. Consequently,there can

be no effect of forum prorogatum in such a procedural framework.

Writing in Non-Appearancebefore the InternationalCourt of Justice,

H.W.A. Thirlway said:

"even the submission of arguments going beyond the
jurisdictional questionwill only be liable to be read as a
waiver of that question if, in the words of the P.C.I.J., it is done 'withoutmaking reservations in regard to the question of
jurisdiction',so that it can be 'regardedas an unequivocal
indication of the desire of a State to obtain a decision on the
merits ' (Upper Silesia, Minority Schools, C.P.I.J., Series A,
NO. 15, p. 24)".

On several occasions, Professor Pelletquoted the statement of

Shabtai Rosenne. Yet, he did so very selectively, leavingout the

following and very relevant part of Mr. Rosenne1s statement:

"1 would not at this stage dispute that al1 the words of

Article IX £rom 'fulfilmentof the present Convention' to 'acts
enumerated in Article III' relate to the merits of the case, and
we are not concerned with that now, beyond reserving al1 Our
rights as to how we shall deal with the jurisdictionof the
Court and the meritswhen the time cornes."(CR 93/13, p. 18.)

It is quite clear therefore that Mr. Rosenne has reservedal1 Our

rights concerningthe jurisdictionof the Court.

Besides, in paragraph 12 of the Order of the Court of 8 April 1993,

"Whereas in the written observationsreferred to in
paragraph 9 above, Yugoslavia niadewhat it termed a 'preliminary
objection with regard to the legitimacy of the Applicant',

claiming that neither the President of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina,Mr. A. Izetbegovic,who appointed the Agents of
that State and authorized the institutionof the present
proceedings, nor the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, are legally elected; whereas Yugoslaviaclaims that

the legitimacy and mandate of the Government and the President
of the Republic of Bosriiaand Herzegovina are disputed notonly
by representativesof the Serb people but also by
representativesof the Croat people, and furthermore that the

mandate of Mr. Izetbegovic expired on 20 Decernber 1992, and was
challenged on this ground by the Prime Minister of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in a letter to the Chairman of the European Affairs
Subcommittee of the United States Senate Foreign Relations

Cornmitteedated 24 February 1993, circulated,at the requestof
the Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina,by the Secretary-
General of the United Nationsas a document of the General
Assembly and the Security Council."

Likewise, paragraph 24 of the same Order, reads:

"Whereas Yugoslavia has disputedthe validity and effect of

the Notice of 29 December 1992, contending that no rule of
general international law givesBosnia-Herzegovinathe right to
proclaim unilaterally that it is now a party to the Genocide
Convention merelybecause the former Socialist FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia was a party to the Convention and the Convention

was thus applicable to what is now the territory of
Bosnia-Herzegovina,that the 'declarationof succession'
procedure provided for in the Viema Convention on Succession of
States in respect of Treaties (which Conventionis not in force)

was evolved for, and is applicable only in, cases of
decolonization,and is therefore not open to Bosnia-Herzegovina;
and that the Notice of 29 December 1992, if construed as an
instrument of accession under Article XI of the Genocide
Convention, can only 'becomeeffective on the ninetieth day

following the deposit of the instrument1 in accordance with
Article XII1 of the Convention; whereas Yugoslavia concludes
that the Courthas jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention,
if at all, only in respect of facts subsequentto the expiration
of 90 days from the Notice of 29 December 1992."

In the proceedings on interim protectionbefore the Court on 1 and

2 April 1993, the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia pointedout quite

clearly that it does not accept the jurisdictionof the Court.

As to the doctrine of forum prorogatum, in its Order of

13 September 1993, the Court said:

"Whereas, in the context of the first requestmade by the
Applicant for the indication of provisional measures, the
Respondent also, by a communicationof 1 April 1993, recommended

that such measures, listed in paragraph 9 of the Court's Order
of 8 April 1993, be indicated;whereas someof the measures so
requested mightbe directed to the protection of rights going
beyond those covered by the Genocide Convention;and whereas the

question thus arises whether, by requesting such measures, the
Respondent might have agreed thatthe Court should have a wider
jurisdiction,in accordance with the doctrine known as that of
forum prorogatum; whereas howeverthe provisional measure

requested by Yugoslavia ina subsequent request, dated
9 August 1993 (para. 12 above), was directed solely to
protection of asserted rightsunder the Genocide Convention;
whereas moreover the Respondent has constantly denied thatthe
Court has jurisdictionto entertain the dispute, on the basiç of

that Convention or on any other basis; whereas in the
circumstancesthe communicationfrom Yugoslavia cannot, even
prima facie, be interpretedas 'an unequivocal indication'of a
'voluntaryand indisputable'acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction (cf. Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia

(Minority Schools), P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 15, p. 24 ; Corfu
Channel, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1947-1948, p. 27) ." (Applicationof the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishmen t of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional

Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993,
pp. 341-342, para. 34.) And indeed, ever since its first appearance before the Court,

Yugoslavia has continuallyand consistentlydenied the jurisdictionof

the Court on whatever ground. It has made no act with an intent to

accept the jurisdictionof the Court.

In paragraph 3 of its Request for the indication of provisional

measures of 8 August 1993, the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia reserved

al1 the rights of objection to the jurisdictionof the Court and the

admissibilityof the Application. In submittingthe Request for

Indication of Provisional Measures atthe session of the Court of

26 August 1993, 1 myself in my capacity as Agent of the FederalRepublic

of Yugoslavia reserved al1 rights of objection to the jurisdictionof the

Court and theadmissibllityof the Application (CR 93/35, p. 33).

There do not exist the conditions to attribute to the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia the consent to the jurisdictionof the Court.

The Letter of the Two Presidents

In connection with the letter of the presidents of the two Yugoslav

Republics of 8 June 1992, in its Order of 8 April 1992, the Court says:

I'Whereashowever at the present stageof the proceedings,

and on the basis of theinformationbefore the Court, it is by
no means clear to the Court whether the letter of 8 June 1992
was intended as an 'immediatecommitment1by the two Presidents,
binding on Yugoslavia, to accept unconditionallythe unilateral

submission to the Court of a wide range of legal disputes
(cf.Aegean Sea ContinentalShelf, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 44.
para. 108); or whether it was intended as a commitment solely
to submission to theCourt of the three questions raisedby the

Chairman of the Committee; or as no more than the enunciation of
a general policy of favouring judicial settlement,which did not
embody an offer or commitment; . ." (Applicationof the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishmentof the Crime of
Genocide, Provisional Measures,Order of 8 April 1993,

I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 18, para. 31).

In its subsequent Order of 13 September 1993, the Court reiterates:

"Whereas the second ofthe additional bases of jurisdiction put forward by the Appiicant is the letter, dated 8 June 1992,
addressed to the President of the Arbitration Commissionof the
International Conference for Peacein Yugoslavia by
Mr. Momir Bulatovic, Presidert of the Republic of Montenegro,

and Mr. SlobodanMilosevie, President of the Republic of Serbia,
already referredto in paragraph 26 above; whereas in its Order
of 8 April 1993 the Court, after examining thisletter,
concluded thatit was unable to regard it 'as constituting a

prima facie basis of jurisdiction in the present case ' (I.C.J.
Reports 1993, p. 18, para. 32); whereas theApplicant has not
put forward any new fact which might lead the Court to reopen
the question; whereasthe Applicant's submission on the point
must be rejected; .. ." (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 340, para. 32.)

The said letter does not imply the consent of the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia to the jurisdictionof the Court. The declarationof the

Presidents of the two Republics is only a political statementwith no

legal effects. It should be considered in thecontext of the

circumstancesin which it was made. The letter of 8 June 1992 referred

to a letter which the President of the Arbitration Commissionhad

addressed, on 3 June 1992, to the Presidents of the Republics of the

so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina,Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,Serbia and

Slovenia and to the Presidency of the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia. The

declaration of the two Presidentscontains their reply to the question,

made by the President of the Arbitration Commission in hisletter of

3 June 1992, which reads as follows:

"on what basis andby what means should the probleas of the
succession of States arising betweenthe different States
emerging fromthe Socialist Federal Republicof Yugoslavia be
settled?"

The question resultedin the said declaration which shouldbe

considered only withinthe framework of this question. The letter of

8 June 1992 waç addressed to the President of the Arbitration Commission

and it referred to the concrete situation. This declaration was not

drawn up in abstracto, erga omnes and without a specific timing. It was - 44 -

the expression of the political opinionsof the two Presidents that al1

disputes, concerning the matters raised by the letter of 3 June 1992,

should be resolved in a peaceful manner and, if agreement is not

possible, by judicial settlement. In addition, according to the general

rules of international law, this letter cannot be seen as a treaty offer

or a unilateral declarationof the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia. Our

arguments to this effect were presented in the Observations of the

Federal Republicof Yugoslavia concerningthe Request for Indicationof

Provisional Measuresof 27 and 29 July, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 13 August 1993

that we forwarded to the Court in August 1993. As Professor Pellet

presented no convincing counter-argument in his statement yesterday, we

uphold Our arguments presented inAugust 1993.

It is not clear at al1 how the Treaty between the Allied and

Associated Powersand the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

(protectionof Humanities), signed at St. Germain-en-Layeon

10 September 1919 is related to the present case. In any case, we uphold

what we have said in the aforementioned observations.

Mr. President, distinguishedMernbersof the Court, with your

permission 1 will now present Our final submissions.

The Federal Republicof Yugoslavia asks the Court to adjudge and

declare :

. .
st Prellmlnarv Obiectioa

Whereas the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina to which the Application

refers constituteda civil war, no international dispute exists within

the terms of Article IX of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, consequently, - 45 -

the Application of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not admissible

. .
Second Obiectiqn

Whereas Mr. Alija Izetbegovicdid not serve as the President of the

Republic at the time when he granted the authorization to initiate

proceedings and whereas the decision to initiate proceedings was not

taken either by the Presidency or the Government as the competent organs,

the authorization for the initiation and conduct ofproceedings was

granted in violation of the rules of interna1 law of fundamental

significance, consequently,

the Application by Bosnia-Herzegovinais not admissible.

Whereas Bosnia andHerzegovina has not establishedits independent

statehood in conformity with the principle of equal rights and

self-determinationof peoples and for that reason could not succeedto

the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide ,

Whereas Bosnia-Hzrzegovinahas not becomea party to the 1948

Convention on thePrevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in

accordance with the provisionsof the Convention itself,

Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a party to the 1948 Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, consequently

the Court lacks the competence over t'hecase.Eif th PrellmlnarvObiecti-

Whereas the case in point is an interna1 conflict between three sides

in which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not taking part and

whereas the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia did not exercise any

jurisdiction withinthe region of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the material

time ,

Whereas the Memorial of the Applicant State is based upon a

fundamentally erroneous interpretation of the 1948 Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and, in consequence

the claims contained in the "SubmissionsHare based on allegations of

State responsibilitywhich fa11 outside the scope of the Conventionand

of its compromissoryclause,

There is no internationaldispute under Article IX of the 1948

Convention on the Prevention and ~unishment of the Crime of Genocide,

consequently,

the Court lacks the cornpetence over the case

If the Court does not accept anyof the above-mentionedPreliminary

Objections, then we ask the Coürt to consider further the sixth and

seventh preliminaryobjections.

Obiectioa

Without prejudice to the above exposed PreliminaryObjections,

whereas the two Parties recognized each otheron 14 December 1995, the

1948 Convention cn the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

was not operative between them prior to 14 December 1995, consequently, - 47 -

the Court lacks the cornpetence before 14 December 1995 over the case.

Alternativeiy and without prejudice tothe above exposed Preliminary

Objections, whereas the Notification of Succession, dated

29 December 1992, whereby Bosnia-Herzegovinaexpressed the intention to

enter into the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide can only produce the effect of accession to the

Convention,

the Court lacks competenceover this case before 29 March 1993 and, thus,

the Applicant's claims pertaining to the alleged acts or facts which

occurred prior to that date do not fa11 within the competence of the

Court.

In case the Court refuses to adopt the above Preliminary Objections

. .
Seventh PrellmuiarvObiection

If the Applicant State's Notification of Succession, dated

29 December 1992, is construed as having an effectof the Applicant State

becoming a party to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of the Crime of Genocide from 6 March 1992 and whereas the

Secretary-Generalof the United Nations sent to the parties of ths said

Convention the Note dated 18 March 1993, informing of the said

succession,according to the rule of general internationallaw, the 1948

Convention on the Prevention and Punishmentof the Crime of Genocide

would not be operative betweenthe Parties prior to 18 March 1993 and,

consequently,this would not confer the cornpetence on the Court in - 48 -

respect of events occurring priorto 18 March 1993, consequently,

the Applicant's claims pertaining to the alleged acts or fact which

occurred prior to 18 March 1993 do not fa11 with the competence of the

Court.

As a final alternative,

If the Applicant State's Notification of Succession, dated

29 December 1992, is construed as having theeffect of the Applicant

State becoming a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of the Crime of Genocide from 6 March 1992, according to the rule of

general internationallaw, the 1948 Conventionon the Prevention and .

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide would not be operative betweenthe

Parties prior to 29 December 1992, consequently,this would not confer

competence on the Court in respectof events occurringprior to

29 December 1992, consequently,

the Applicant's claims pertaining to the alleged acts or factswhich

occurred prior to 29 December 1992 do not fa11 within the competence of

the Court.

Objections on Alleged Additional Bases of Jurisdiction

In view of the claim of the Applicant to base the jurisdictionof the

Court under Articles XI and XVI of the Treaty between Allied and

Associated Powersand the Kingdom of ~erbs, Croats and Slovenes, signed

at Saint-Germain-en-Layeon 10 September 1919, the Federal RepublicofYugoslavia asks the Court

to reject the said claim,

- because the Treaty betweenAllied and Associated Powersand the

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye

on 10 September 1919 is not in force; and

- because the Applicant is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the

Court according to Articles XI and XVI of the Treaty.

In view of the clairnof the Applicant to establishthe jurisdiction

of the Court on the basis of the letter of 8 June 1992, sent by the

Presidents of the two Yugoslav Republics, Serbia and Montenegro, Mr.

Slobodan Milosevic and Mr. Momir Bulatovic, to the President of the

Arbitration Commissionof the Conference on Yugoslavia, the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia asks the Court

to reject the said claim,

- because the declaration containedin the letter of 8 June 1992 cannot

be understood as a declaration of the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia

according to rules of internationallaw; and

- because the dêclaration was not in force on 31 March 1993 and later.

In view of the claim of the Applicant Stateto establish the

jurisdicticnof the Court on the basis of the doctrine of forum

prorogatum, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia asks the Court

to reject the said claim

- because the request for indication of provisional measures of

protection does not imply a consent to the jurisdictionof the Court;

and

- because the conditions for the application of the doctrine of forum

prorogatum are not fulfilled. - 50 -

Thank you, Mr. President and distinguishedMembers of the Court. We

have completed our submissions. Thank you for your attention.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Excellence,aussi bien pour votre

exposé que pour les conclusions finales quevous venez d'articuler il y a

un instant au nom de la Yougoslavie. Je remercie égalementles autres

membres de la représentation yougoslavequi ont contribué à éclairer la

Cour. Ainsi s'achève le second tour de plaidoiries de la Yougoslavie.

La Cour poursuivrademain, vendredi à 15 heures, ses audiences pour

entendre la Bosnie-Herzégovineen son second tour de plaidoiries.

L'audience est levée.

L'audience est levée à 17 h 30.