Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THEHAGUE LA HAYE
Public sitting
held on mesday 15 ûctober 1997, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
Vice-&-esiden t Wèeramntry, Acting Presiden t , presiding
in the case concerning Ques tians of In terpretation and Ap.plication of the
1971 Montreal C-tion arising frcnn the Aerial -cident at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America)
Preliminary Objections
VHZBATlM RECORD
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 15 octobre 1997, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Weerammtry, vice-président
faisant' fonction de président
en 1 'affaire relati~ à des Questions d'interprétation et d'application
de la convention de mtréal de 1971 résultant de 1 'incident aérien de
Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Etats-Unies d'Amérique)
Exceptions préliminaires
COMPTE RENDUPresent: Vice-PresidentWeeramantry, Acting President
President Schwebel
Judges Cda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Korm
Vereshchetin
Parr-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri
Registrar Valencia-OspinaPrésents : M. Weeramantryv,ice-présidentfaisantfonction de
présidenten l'affaire
M. Schwebel,présidentde la Cour
MM. ûda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
-jeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Korm
Vereshchetin
Parra-Aranguren
Kcoijmans
Rezek,juges
El-Kosheri,jugead hoc
M. Valencia-Ospinagreffier -4-
Ihe -t of the Libyan Arab Jamahlriyais representedby:
H. E. Mr. HamedAhrnedElhouderi, Ambassador,Secretary of the People's
Officeof theGreat Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyato
the Netherlands,
as Agent;
Mr. MohamedA. Aljady,
Mr.Abdulhamid Raeid,
as Counçel;
Mr. AbdelrazegEl-Murtadi Suleiman, Professor of PublI icternational
Law,Facultyof Law,University of Benghazi,
Mr. IanBrownlie, C.B.E.,Q.C.,F.B.A.,Chichele Professor of Public
InternationaL law,University of Oxford,
Mr. JeanSalmon,Professor of Lawemeritus, Université librede
Bruxelles,
Mr.EricSuy,Professor of InternationaL law,Catholic Universit of
Louvain(K.U.Leuven) ,
Mr.EricDavid,Professor of Law,Université libre de Bruxelles,
as Counçel and Advoca tes;
Mr. NicolasAngelet,Principal Assistant, Facuo ltyLaw,Catholic
University of Louvain(K.U. Leuven),
Mrs.BarbaraDelcourt, Assistant, Facultyof Social,Political and
EconomicSciences, Université librede Bruxelles; Researc Fhellow,
Centreof InternationaL law and Instituto ef EuropeanStudies,
Université librede Bruxelles,
Mr. MohamedAwad,
as Advisers.
Ihe Chenment of the United States ofAmerica is representedby:
Mr.David R.Andrews, LegaA ldviser,U.S.Department of State,
as Agent;
Mr.Michel J. Matheson, Principal Deputy Leg adviser, U.S. Department
of State,
as Co-Agent;Le Gomement de la Jdriya arabe libyenne sera représenté par :
S. Exc.M. HamedAhrned Elhouderi,ambassadeur, secrétaire du bureau
populaire de la Grande Jamahiriyaarabe libyenne populair socialiste
aux Pays-Bas,
carmie agent;
M. Mohamed A. Aljady,
M. AbdulhamidRaied,
canne conseils;
M. AbdelrazegEl-Murtadi Suleiman, professeur d droitinternational
public à la facultéde droitde l'université de Benghazi,
M. Ian Brownlie,C.B.E.,Q.C.,F.B.A., professeud re droit international
public,titulairede la chaireChichele à l'Université d'Oxford,
M. Jean Salmon,professeur émérite de droit à l'Université librede
Bruxelles,
M. Eric Suy,professeurde droitinternational à l'université catholique
de Louvain(K.U.Leuven),
M. EricDavid,professeurde droit à l'Université librede Bruxelles,
cavrmeconseilset avocats;
M. NicolasAngelet,premier assistan t la facultéde droitde
l'Université catholiquede Louvain (K.U. Leuven),
Mme BarbaraDelcourt,assistante à la faculté dessciencessociales,
politiqueset éconmiquesde l'université librede Bruxelles,
collaboratrice scientifiqueau Centrede droitinternational et
à l'Institut d'étudeseuropéennes de l'Université librede Bruxelles,
M. Mohamed Awad,
cavrmeconseillers.
Le Gomement des Etats-UnisdrAmérique sera représenté par :
M. David R. Andrews,conseiller juridiquedu département dlEtat
des Etats-Unis,
cavrmeagent;
M. MichaelJ. Matheson,conseiller juridiqueadjointprincipal du
département dtEtatdes Etats-Unis,Mr. John R. Crook,AssistantLegalAàviser,U.S.Department of State,
Mr. Sean D. Murphy,Counselorfor LegalAffairs,U.S. Embassy,The Hague,
l
Mr. OscarSchachter, Professorat the Columbia UniversiS tyhoolof Law, m
Ms ElisabethZoller,Professorat the University of Paris II,
as Counseland Advocates;
Mr. John J. Kim, Officeof the LegalAdviser,Department of State,
Mr. BrianMurtagh,U.S. Department of Justice,
as Counsel.M. John R. Crook,conseiller juridiqu adjointdu départementdlEtat
des Etats-Unis,
M. Sean D. Murphy,conseillerchargédes affaires juridiqu es
l'ambassadedes Etats-Unis auxPays-Bas,
M. OscarSchachter, professeurà la facultéde droitde l'université
de Columbia,
Mme ElisabethZoller,professeur à l'Universitéde ParisII,
cm conseils etavocats;
M. John J. Kim,du bureaudu conseillerjuridique du départementdlEtat
des Etats-Unis,
M. BrianMurtagh,du département de la justicedes Etats-Unis,
canne conseils. -8-
TheACTING PRESIDENT: Pleasebe seated. The Court meets todayto resumeits hearings
inthecaseconcerningQuestionsofInterpretationandApplicationofthe1971MontrealConvention
arisingfromtheAerialIncidentutLockerbie (Libyan ArabJamahiriyav. United StatesofAmerica).
Mr. Crook, Counsel for the United States, will resume his argument. Mr. Crook.
Mr. CROOK: Thankyou, Mr. President and goodmorning. Goodmorningto Members of
the Court. When 1concludedmy presentationyesterday 1wasjust aboutto begin a discussion on
the fashion inwhich resolution 748imposesspecificbinding legalobligationsuponLibyaandwith
the leave of the Court1will continuethere.
Binding Obligationsto TransferPersonsfor Trial
3.19. That resolution directs that Libya "must now comply without further delay with
paragraph 3 of resolution 731". That is the paragraph that tied backto the documents containing
the demands of the French, British and UnitedStates Governmentsthat 1summarized yesterday.
The Council thus placed a binding legalobligation upon Libya to do the things specified in those
documents. Libya islegallyrequired,arnongotherthings, to surrenderforcriminaltrial in Scotland
or the United States,the persons charged withdestroying Pan Am 103. Whatever Libya'slegal
positionmight otherwisehavebeenunderthe MontrealConventionor generalinternationallaw, its
controlling legal obligationsnow are those imposed by resolution 748.
3.20. To encourage compliance with these obligations, the Security Council also adopted w
additionalmeasures directed againstLibya involvingaviation,the sale of arms, and other matters.
These measures remain in force until the Council "decides that the Libyan Government has
compliedwith" the requirements of resolution 748. The Security Council hasnot so decided. It
continuesto meet every 120 daysto reviewthe matter. After 16suchreviews,the Councilhas not
found Libya to be in compliance with its resolutions, nor has it found reasons to alter its earlier
decisions.
3.21. The Security Council remained seizedof the situation followingresolution 748. On
11November 1993, it adopted a second Chapter VI1 resolution. Resolution 883 reaffirmed
resolutions 731and 748and expandedthe scopeof the United Nation'smeasures directed against - 9 -
Libya. Resolution 883 was adopted by 11votes to none. Brazil, Cape Verde, France, Hungary,
Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Spain, theUnited Kingdom,the United States and Venezuela voted
for it.
3.22. Thus, resolutions 748 and 883 create clearand binding international legal obligations.
In particular,they require Libyato surrenderfor a properriminaltrial the persons allegedto have
destroyed Pan Am 103.
II. THE CHARTER REQUIRES LIBYA AND OTHER STATES TO COMPLY WITH
RESOLUTIONS748 AND 883.
3.23. Mr. President,1will now turn to the second main headof my argumentto show that
the Charter requires Libya and other States to complywith resolutions 748 and 883. Libya is
legally bound to comply with these resolutions. It must transfer the persons who are alleged to
have destroyedPan Am 103for a criminaltrial with appropriatesafeguardsof their rights in either
Scottish or United States courts. Accordingly, Libya'sclaims in this proceeding based upon the
Montreal Convention are inadmissible. The legal rules that govern this situation are those laid
down by Security Council resolutions 748 and 883, not the rules of the Montreal Convention.
3.24. Article 25 of the Charter makes Libya's obligationto comply with the Council's
resolutionsquite clear: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisionsof the SecurityCouncilin accordancewiththe presentCharter." Of courseArticle 48 of
the Charter is to similar effect.
3.25. No claim of rights or obligationsunder the Montreal Conventioncan relieve Libya of
its clear dutyto carry out the Council's decisions.No countrycan invoke a treaty as an excuse for
refusing to comply with such decisions. Again, the matter is clear from the Charter itself.
Article 103 provides:
"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligationsder the present Charter shall prevail."
3.26.Libya,however,arguesthat itsclaimedrightsunderthe MontrealConventionandunder
general international law are entitled to priority over its Charter obligations.It advances a
remarkable set of argumentsto support this contention. - 10-
3.27.First, Libyaarguesthat the MontrealConvention was subsequentin time tothe Charter
and isalso a lex specialisregarding the matters it covers (Libyan Observationsand Submissions,
1
para. 2.18). Libya therefore urges that the rights it claims under the Montreal Convention take .
precedenceover itsobligationsunderthe Charter. It reliesonthe familiartreaty law principlesthat
the treaty obligationlatest in time prevails, and that a lex specialis prevails over more general
obligations,like the Charter.
3.28.Theseareimaginative,audacious,evendangerousarguments. Libyacites noconvincing
State practice, scholarly opinion,or other support for them. They are quite simply wrong.
3.29.In the firstplace,there is nonecessary inconsistencybetween Libya's obligationsunder
the Charterand its positionunder the Montreal Convention. Thetwo can be construed in perfect W
harmony. When Libya adhered to the Charter, it agreedthat the provisionsof any other treaty it
entered into- before orafter that time, including the Montreal Convention- would becarried
out in accordance with the Charter, including its Articles25,48 and 103.
3.30. Nothing in the Montreal Convention changesthis. Nothing in its language or history
suggests that the parties sought to change or supersede particular articles of the Charter. The
Charterremains fully binding upon Libya.
3.31.Now Libya's argumentis quite easily answeredonthis basis. Butwere this not so, the
argumentcouldnotbeacceptedbythis Court. Thesuperiorityofobligationsunderthe Charterover
obligationsunder subsequenttreaties is clear in internationallaw. This is reflected in Article 30, I
paragraph 1,of the ViennaConventionon the Law of Treaties,which statesthe rule thatthe treaty
later in time generallyprevails. However,this rule is made expressly "[slubject to Article 103 of
the Charterof the UnitedNations". The Montreal Conventiondoes not overrideArticle 103of the
Charter.
3.32.Libya's contrarypositionwould fundamentallyweakenthe Charter. Libya'sclaim would
allow Statesto "opt out" ofChapter VII, or out of anyother inconvenient partof the Charter, by
concluding inconsistent new treaties. This is a dangerous and wholly unsupported doctrine. It
should not beaccepted by the Court. - 11-
3.33. Libya also contends that it need not comply with the Security Council's Chapter VI1
resoiutions because those resolutions are not based onthe Charter or somehow go beyondthe scope
of the Council's powers under the Charter (Observations and Submissions at para. 4.2). This
argumentalso fails. The Charter gives the Members of the Security Council the responsibility for
determining which measures are required to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Once the Council has made a decision under Chapter VII, an individual Member of the
United Nations cannot refuse to comply because it claims to disagree with the validity of that
decision.
3.34. As with the previous argument, Libya'sposition here is one that could lead to grave
damage to the legal order established by the Charter. But, in any case, as 1shall show in the last
part of my presentation,the measures taken by the Council were quite reasonable and appropriate
in relation to the threat to peace and security associated with the bombings of Pan Am 103 and
UTA 772.
3.35. It has also been suggestedthat Article 103of the Charter,which speaks of obligations,
may not extend as well to rights under a treaty or under general international law. Thus, it is
appropriateto consider whether the rights of a Stateunder a treaty or general international law can
be supersededby action of the Security Council.
3.36.Theobligationto complywith SecurityCouncildecisionsapplies fullybothto decisions
affecting the rights and to those affecting the obligationsof States. The relevant provisions of the
Charter are phrased broadly andare intended to be broad in effect. They must be inrder to assure
the effectiveness of the régime of ChapterVI1 and in interpreting this aspect of the Charter, this
Court has notrecognized any distinctionbetween "rights" and "obligations". Instead,the Courthas
stressedthe breadth and importanceof these Charter provisions (see, e.g., Legal Consequencesfor
States oftheContinued PresenceofSouthAfvicainNamibia(SouthWestAfvica)notwithstanding
Securiiy CouncilResolution 276,Advisory Opinion,I.C.J.Reports1971,p. 54,para. 116; Military
and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaraguv a. UnitedStates ofAmerica),
Jurisdiction andAdmissibility,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports1984,p. 440). The scholarly literature has
also stressedthe breadth of States'obligationsto cany outthe decisions of the Council. It does notsupport the view that this duty does not apply to "rights" (see, e.g., The Charter of the
UnitedNations. A Commentary (B. Simma, ed.), pp. 1120et seq.).
3.37. Moreover, this suggested limitationcreates serious difficulties. Suppose a bilateral
treaty gives the nationals of each party the right to invest in the territoy of the other. Surelythe
Charter gives the SecurityCouncil the power in a Chapter VI1situation to require thatone pariy
prohibit investrnents by its nationals in the territory of the other, notwithstanding these treaty
provisions.
3.38. The explanationfor this is to be found, notjust in Article 103,but also in Articles 25
and 48. Their clear languagerequires Statesto cany out the decisionsof the Security Council. If
a'State must forego the exercise of sometreaty right in orderto carry out the binding decisionsof '(I
the Council, that is simplywhat the Charter requires. Embargoes,bans onthe sale of arms, other
compulsory measures adopted by the Council often prevent States from exercising rights under
treaties or under generalinternationallaw. A Statemay well be preventedby Council actionfrom
exercising rights undertreaties, such as the right to carry on bilateral airtraffic. But that is what
the clear language of the Charter requires.
3.39.This Court summarizedthe situationaptly in itsAdvisory Opinioninthe Namibiacase:
"[Wlhenthe Security Council adoptsa decisionunder Article 25 in accordance
with the Charter, it is for member States to comply with that decision . .. To hold
otherwisewould beto deprivethis principalorganof itsessentialfunctionsandpowers
under the Charter." (Legal Consequences for Statesof the Continued Presenceof
South Afiica in Namibia (South WestAfiica) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion,I.C.J. Reports 1971,p. 54, para. 116.)
The CourtHas Recognizedthe Effectof the SecurityCouncil's ResolutionsUnderArticles25
and 103.
3.40. Mr. President, the Court has recognized and given effect to these legal principles
regarding Articles 25 and 103of the Charter. At the Interim Measures stagein 1992,the Court
decided that it could not then finally decide the legal effect of resolution 748. Nevertheless,the
Court's Order clearly recognized the legal authority of the rules that it established, and stressed
States'duties to complywith them. This is clear in paragraph 42 of the Court'sOrder: "Whereasboth Libya andthe United States,asMembersof the UnitedNations,
are obligedto accept andcary out the decisionsofthe Security Councilinaccordance
with Article 45 of the Charter; whereas the Court, at the stageof proceedings on
provisionalmeasures,considersthat prima faciethisobligationextendsto the decision
contained in resolution 748 (1992); and whereas, in accordancewith Article 103 of
the Charter, obligations of the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations
under any international agreement, including theMontreal Convention." (Questions
of InterpretationandApplicationof the 1971MontrealConvention arising from the
Aerial Incidentat Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United StatesofAmerica),
Provisional Measures,Order of 14April 1992,I.C.J Reports 1992, p. 126.)
TheCourt in 1992 thus concludedthatprimafaciethe obligationsimposedby resolution 748
governed the case. Libya has shown no reason to arrive at a different conclusionnow, when the
matter can be finally decided by the Court. The Court should now decide definitively that the
obligationsimposedbyresolutions 748 and 883governthe dispositionofthis case. Mr. President,
1 will nowturn to the third mainhead of my argument,to show howthese resolutionswere validly
adopted by the Council.
3.41. This section will be brief.will show how theresolutions were validly adopted,and
answer some contrary contentions by Libya.
3.42.Resolutions 731,748 and883werevalidlyadoptedbythe Security Council. Theywere
adopted at regular meetings of the Council followingdebates in which Libya expressed its views.
They receivedthe required majorities, andthe President ofthe Security Councilpronouncedtheir
adoption.
3.43. Under Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter, a resolution requiresnine affirmative
votes and no vetoes. At present resolution 748received 10; resolution 883, 11. No Member of
the Security Council voted against either resolution. Chinajoinedwith other States in abstaining
on both. However,the established practiceof the Council for over 50 yearshas beenthat suchan
abstention by a Permanent Member is not a veto blocking a decision. The principle has been
accepted by the international communityand was affirmedby this Court in its NamibiaAdvisory
Opinion (Legal Consequences -forStates ofthe Continued Presence ofSouthAfrica in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstandingSecurity Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion,I.C.J.
Reports 1971, p. 22, para. 22.) 3.44. Thus, the situation is like that described by the Court there:
"A resolution of a properly constituted organ ofthe United Nations which is
passed in accordance with that organ's rules of procedure, and is declared by its
President to have been so passed, must be presumed to have been validly adopted."
(Id.,at I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 22, para. 20.)
3.45. Nevertheless, Libya attempts to paint the Security Council's actionsas procedurally
deficient. It advances several arguments. None stands up. First, Libya contendsthat Article 33
ofthe Charterrequiresthe partiesto a disputeto seek peacefulsettlementthroughthe variousmeans
listed in that Article. Only after suchmeansare attempted and exhaustedcanthe Security Council
act. Libya thus in effect reads the Charter to impose an "exhaustionof remedies" rule as a
precondition to action by the SecurityCouncil.
w
3.46. Thisargument fails. It restsupon anunjustifiably selectiveand narrow readingof the
inter-relatedelementsof Chapter VI oftheCharter. Moreimportant, however,Article 33 is located
in Chapter VI. It is part of that Chapter's systemfor promotingthe peaceful settlement ofdisputes.
The Security Council actions Libya attackedwere not taken in the context of Chapter VI. They
were taken under Chapter VII. The Councilwas actingto maintain or restore internationalpeace
and security.
3.47. TheCharterdoesnot requireinsucha situationthat thepartiesto thedisputeworktheir
way through the steps of ChapterVI beforethe Council can act. Kuwait and Iraq did not haveto
exhaust the options for peaceful dispute settlementnder Chapter VI before the Security Council
v
couldact underChapter VI1followingthe 1990invasionof Kuwait. It wouldcripplethe Council's
abilityto cany out its Chapter VI1responsibilitiesto protect peaceandsecurityif eachtime it faced
a threat to or breachof the peace, the Council had to wait for the parties to exhaustthens of
peaceful settlementbefore it could act.
3.48. TheCourt hasinthe past properlyrefùsedto read elements into the Charterthat arenot
stated there. (See,e.g., ConditionsofAdmissionof a State to Membershipinthe UnitedNations,
I.C.J.Reports 1948, p. 57.) It should do the sarne here. It should refuse the request to add an
exhaustion of remedies requirementto Chapter VII. - 15 -
3.49. Libya's second major claim is that the Council can only act on the basis of "fully
demonstrated" facts,andthat the Councilhadan inadequatefactual predicate forthe actionsittook
inthis Case (Libyan Observationsand Submissions, para. 4.17). Libya seemsto suggestthat there
should have been someadversarialprocess, in which the United Statesand Libyaeach presented
its evidence to be testedand debated beforethe Council.
3.50. This is not what the Charter or the rules or practice of the Council require. Itis not
realistic or appropriateto demand that the Councilhold a forma1evidentiary hearing before acting
in a specific situation. Given its functions and powers, the Security Council must make vital
decisions in evolvingandcomplex disputes. Often, it must act rapidly and at unpredictablehours.
Each Member brings to the Council's deliberationsits own store of informationand experience,
supplemented by information providedby the Secretariat, by other Govemments, here including
Libya. There is absolutelyno basis for this Court to prescribea process of forma1fact-finding or
a standard of evidence or some "burdenof proof' that must be met before the Council can act.
3.51.Libya alsocomplainsthat itwaswrong for France, Great Britain andthe United States
to take part in the Council's votingon these matters. (Libyan Observations and Submissions,
para. 4.34). Libya contendsthat none of these countries should have voted whenresolution 731
was unanimouslyadopted,and thatdoingsosomehowtainted or invalidatedresolution731andthe
subsequent Chapter VI1resolutions. Libya also claims thatthese three countries werebarred from
voting for resolutions 748 and883becausethe Council was performinga "quasi-judicialtask" in
adopting them.
3.52. Now, the second argument is whollywithout foundation. Article 27, paragraph 3, of
the Charter contains no such limitation on voting when the Council acts under Chapter VII.
Nothing in SecurityCouncil practicesupportsLibya'sclaim. Libya is askingthis Courtto impose
significant limits on the decision-makingpower of the Security Council thathave no basis in the
Charter.
3.53. The attack on resolution 731 likewise fails. The language of resolution731 and the
circumstancesof its adoption showthat the Council soughtto address a situation within the arnbit
ofArticles 34 and 35ofthe Charter,nota dispute underArticle 27,paragraph 3. Asthe textmakes -16-
clear, the Council was concerned by the broad problems of terrorism and ofattacks on aircraft.
Libya'ssuspected involvement in the attacks on Pan Am 103 andUTA 772 and its past conduct
were addressed as part of that broader situation. But, in any case, Libya's claim hasno legal
consequence. Questions regarding voting on resolution 731 cannot affect the validity of the
Council'ssubsequentactions under Chapter VII.
Mr. President, 1 will now turn to a rather long fourth head of argument to show that these
resolutions were a proper exercise of the SecurityCouncil's responsibilitiesunder the Charter.
IV. THE RESOLUTIONS WERE A PROPER EXERCISE OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITIESUNDER THE CHARTER.
3.54. In this last section, I shall answer Libya's claimsthat the Security Council acted
inappropriatelyor ultra vires. 1 shall also explain why, even if the Court concludesthat it has
jurisdiction andthat Libya'sclaims are admissible,the Court shouldneverthelessdeclinetode
those claims.
3.55. In adopting resolutions 748 and 883,the SecurityCouncil had to make two types of
determinationsunder Article 39 of the Charter. First, the Council had to determinewhether the
complexof circumstancesbefore it- the violent deathsof severalhundred people,the indications
of Libyan responsibility, Libya'srecurring and clear support of terrorism, and what the Council
foundto be Libya'sunsatisfactoryresponsesto itsresolutionsconstitutedathreatto international
peace and security.The Council concludedthat they did. The Council then had to decide upon
particularmeasuresto maintain or restore internationalpeace andsecurity. Themeasures adopted
includethose that Libya now asks this Court to invalidate.
3.56. In making these decisions, the Security Council was not acting as a criminal court.
In aproper criminaltrial,the guiltof accused persons mustbe provedby evidencethatmeetsa high
standard of persuasiveness. Libya attacksthe SecurityCouncil fornot conductingits proceedings
in accordancewith such standards. But that is not the task that the Charter gives to the Council,
and it is not the task it performed here. The Council sought here to ensure that there would bea
proper,faircriminaltriai of personsallegedto havecommittedaterrible crime,insomeappropriate
jurisdiction. Only though such a trial couldthe guilt of accused individuals be determined. - 17-
The Basis for the Council's Action.
3.57.Now, the Council'sdecisionsunder Article 39 are decisionsthat it alone has the power
to make under the Charter. No other body can substitute its judgrnent for the Council's.
Nevertheless, the Council had ample basis to decide as it did. Its decisionswere well-justified and
appropriate in the circumstances. The Council was not "incoherent, inconsistent,or irrational" as
Libya claims. (Libyan Observations and Submissions, para. 4.55).
3.58. Now, clearly,the Council'sdetermination that these matters indicated a threat to peace
and security had ample foundation. Severalhundred peoplewere dead followingcarefully planned
attacks on civilian airliners. These deaths indicated notjust a threat to international security, but
a massive breakdown of such security. The Council was also mindful of the grave threats posed
by internationalterrorism and of Libya's past support for terrorist actions.
3.59.Painstakinginvestigationscarried onbythree States indicatedthat Libyaplayeda direct
role inthese deaths. Specificcriminalchargeswere broughtby prosecutingauthorities intwo States
against narnedpersons alleged to have acted on behalf of Libya. Now of course, these charges did
not establish the guilt of the accused. Only a proper criminal trial with appropriate safeguards of
their human rights could do that. Nevertheless, these charges were facts that were relevant to the
Council's appreciationof the situation. The Council also knew of Libya'sunsatisfactoryresponses
to its resolutions. Clearly, in these circumstances, the Council had a basis to decide that
international peace and security were threatened.
3.60. The measures the Council adopted in response were likewise justified in the
circumstances. The Council adopted a set of precise, measured, limited and non-violent actions.
The Council also sought to ensure that the individuals accused of the Lockerbie murders faced a
legitimate and fair criminal trial. It was not unconcerned about the human rights of the accused
when it decidedthat they should be transferred to face trial. It acted in the expectation that they
would receive a trial satisfiing relevant international standards. This case does not raise any issue
whether the Council could ever act inconsistently with basic noms of human rights.
3.61. However, in the extraordinarycircumstances before it, the Council was not persuaded
of Libya's willingness or capacityto provide an appropriate trial. For example, as the Court may recall, a person who served as Minister of Justice of Libya was among those alleged by the
American grand jury to have been involved in the bombing of Pan Am 103. (US Exhibit 1
(Indictment), para. 10). In this connection, it is also important to recallthe views expressedby
Judge El-Kosheri in his dissenting opinionin 1992. Judge El-Kosheri wrote:
"[Iln view of the fact that the two Libyan suspectswere or still areworking for
the Government of their country, and that their trial could eventually lead to the
emergence of a subsequentcase of State internationalresponsibility against Libya,
feel that this factual situationconstitutessufficientgroundsto doubtthat the interests
of both the United States and the United Kingdom in ensuring a fair trial could be
adequatelysafeguardedincasethetrialwere conductedinLibya.Whatevermaybethe
merits ofthe Libyanjudicial systemundernormalcircumstances,theneedforaneven-
handedandjust solution leadsmeto consider,withinthe specialcontextofthe present
case, that the Libyan domestic courts could not be the appropriate forum." (Case
conceming Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
ConventionArisingfrom the Aerial Incidentut Lockerbie (Libyav. United States),
Dissenting Opinion of Judge El-Kosheri,I.C.J.Reports 1992, p. 217.)
3.62. TheCouncil thus decidedto requirethat the accusedindividualsbe transferredfortrial
by thejudicial authorities of another State. This was a reasonableand appropriate measurein the
circumstances. As Professor Tomuschathas written conceming the Council'saction:
"[Olne finds little whichgives rise to seriousobjections. Extradition of major
criminals is a legitimate concern within the fiamework of a strategy aimed at
combatingterrorism. Eradication ofterrorism presupposestheeffectiveelimination of
any shelter and refuge to terrorists." (C. Tomuschat,The Lockerbie CaseBefore the
International Court of Justice, 48International Commission ofJuristsReview 38, 44
(1992)).
The Council Did Not Determine Guilt or Discriminate Against Libya.
3.63. In calling for the transfer of these persons fortrial, the Council wasnot makinga legal w
judgment regarding their guilt or innocence. Guilt or innocence could only be determined by an
impartialjury after a proper criminal trial respecting the rights of the accused.
3.64.Now here, 1must respondto somemis-characterizationsofUS criminalprocedurethat
appear throughout Libya'spleadings. In particular, Libya makes the recurring claim that the US
I)
judiciary has pre-judged the guilt of the accused (e.g., Libyan Observations and Submissions,
paras. 1.6, 1.54). Libya argues that the US indictment somehow provesthat the US courts have
pre-judgedtheirguiltandtheLibyanpleadings thus speaksderisivelyofthe "so-called'independent'
court". (Libyan Observations and Submissions, para 1.6). - 19-
3.65. Now this recurring argument suggests an important mis-understanding of the US
criminalprocess. Immediatelyfollowing the destruction of Pan Am 103,responsible USofficiais
launcheda massivecriminalinvestigation. TheUS investigationproceededinparallel,and inclose
cooperation, with Scottish investigators. US and Scottish prosecutors shared evidence. In due
course,US prosecutors independently evaluatedthe results of the investigation. They determined
that criminal charges in the form of an indictment shouldbe brought under US law.
3.66. UnderUScriminalprocedure,theindictmentofthe individualsaccusedinthis case -
as in any other criminal case - is not the act of ajudge. In the US system, judges playno role
intheprocess of bringingcriminalcharges. Indictmentsaremerely accusationsdraftedonthe basis
ofavailable evidenceby careergovernmentprosecutors. Indictmentsare then presentedto a grand
jury, which is a group of23 ordinary citizens who under US Constitutional law act as a check on
thepower of prosecutorsto bring unwarrantedprosecutions. Atthe beginningofthetrial,thejudge
instructswhat is called inAmericanEnglishthe petitjury, which will decidethe guiltor innocence
of the accused, that the indictment is merely an accusation and that it is not evidence of the
defendant'sguilt.
3.67. No judge has reached any conclusions regarding the validity of the charges in the
indictment. At a public trial, the prosecutors must provethe charges in the indictmentto thejury
bypresentingevidencethatprovesthe guiltofthe accusedbeyondareasonabledoubt. Theaccused
neednot [email protected] accused wouldbe representedby counsel who can seek to discredit or rebut
al1of the prosecution's evidence andcan cross-examine al1of its witnesses.
3.68. This process, and the role of the grand jury, are explained in the US Preliminary
Objectionsat paragraph 1.06and in paragraphs6 etseq., of the Justice DepartmentMemorandum
atUS Exhibit 6. As explainedthere,the sufficiencyof evidenceto prove the charges containedin
the indictment can onlybe establishedthough a criminal trial in which the accusedare entitledto
the presumption of innocence, and in which the charges against them must be proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
3.69. Let me briefly mentionas well the US demand that Libya pay compensation forthe
destruction of Pan Am 103. Libya hasalso citedthis as evidence of officia1prejudgrnentof guilt. - 20 -
In November 1992,as today,the United Statesbelieved thatcompensationwas dueunderthe law
of State responsibility for the destructionof PanAm 103. The United States said so publicly, as
States commonly do when they believe thatthey have suffered an international injury for which
compensationis due. However, these viewsofthe United Statesarenot evidence. Theywouldnot
be admissible in court andwould notbeconsideredinthe criminaltrialof the accused individuals.
3.70. Now in acting as it did, the Council was not discriminating against Libya or singling
it out for unique measures. The Council has called for the transfer of persons for trial in other
important situations as well. It has in effect required that persons, including nationals of the
transferring State, be transferred for trial before boththe InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the Tribunal created to prosecute persons for crimes in Rwanda
(paragraph 4 of resolution 827 (Yugoslavia Tribunal),paragraph 2 of resolution 955 (Rwanda
Tribunal)). In addition, through resolutions 1044, 1054, adopted following the attempted
assassinationof President Mubarakof Egyptwhile attendingthe OAUSummitin AddisAbaba,the
Council, at the request of African States, called on theudaneseauthorities to comply with the
OAU'srequestto extraditetoEthiopiasuspectswantedinconnectionwiththe assassinationattempt.
The Council also adopted sanctionsthere aimedat encouraging compliance.
The Council 1sNot Precluded from Requiring Transferof Personsfor Trial.
3.71. Libya contends that the "principles of a sound administration of Justice render it
inappropriate or even ultra vires for the Council to adopt resolutions 748 and 883 (e.g., Libyan
Observations and Submissions,paras. 4.16, et seq.)
3.72. The contention seems to be that the Council cannot act in matters that have a legal
aspect, and in particular, it cannot requirethe transfer of persons fortrial. This cannot stand. The
Charter does not place such limits onthe Council's powers.Judge Bedjaoui,while questioningthe
actions of the Council in other respects, confirmsthat theCouncil'sdemand thatthese individuals
be transferred for trial "didnot in itself,of course, liebeyondthe Council'spowers".Bedjaoui,
TheNew WorldOrder and theSecuriw Council,p. 70). TheAppeals Charnber of the International - 21 -
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia hasalso upheld the powerof the Council to require
the transfer of persons for trial in the Tadiccase.
3.73. Libya cites the principle ofautdedere autjudicare, that a State may elect whether to
prosecuteor extraditethe alleged offender. It also urgesthat general internationallaw leavesLibya
sole discretion to decide whether to transfer Libyan nationals for prosecution abroad. Libya
sometimes contends as well that its constitution precludesthe extradition of Libyan nationals.
3.74.1 have previously answeredLibya's broadclaimthat the SecurityCouncilcannotaffect
or alter the international legal rights and obligations ofStates. The Council clearly has extensive
powerto do so. Manyofthe formsof mandatoryCouncilaction listedinArticle 41 of theCharter,
such as the interruption of economic relationsor of sea, postal or other forms of communication,
are likelyto impair or supersede pre-existing rightsundertreaties, customary law,or national law.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Council can adopt such measures.
3.75. Nothing in the Charter or in the practice of States or of the Council suggeststhat the
Council'spowers aresubjectto some implicit limitorqualification barringaction becauseproposed
decisions involve legal proceduresor legalquestions. As 1mentioned a moment ago,the Council
has taken a number of important ChapterVI1decisions bearing upon such matters, to the general
approbation ofthe international community.It has,for example,createdthe InternationalCriminal
Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslaviaand for Rwanda,SecurityCouncil resolutions 687, 827, and
955. The General Assembly has also created subsidiarybodies of a distinctly legal character,
notablythe United Nations Administrative Tribunal.
3.76. Somewriters have suggested a morenuanced viewof the situation. They suggestthat
a sort of hierarchy of internationallawrulesmay bear uponthe decisionsof the SecurityCouncil.
They acknowledge that the Council can indeed act to alter the effects of some international law
rules, includingrules with a legal aspect. However,they arguethat otherrules - for exarnplethe
prohibitionson genocide and torture - may be of a higher order, sothat the Council cannottake
actions that contradict them.
3.77. This idea leads to many difficulties. It is not apparent, for example, what the nature
or legalfoundationsofthe proposedhierarchyof legalrulesmight be,or howparticularrulescould - 22 -
be classified into onecategory or another. But, whateverthe intellectualinterest of this notion, it
isnotrelevant inthiscase. Wearenot dealinghere withthe SecurityCouncildisplacingjus cogens
or fundamental principles of human rights.
3.78.Certainly,there isnothing aboutthedoctrineofAut dedereautjudicare conferringupon
it superiorstatus precludingaction by the Council. Statepractice showsthat this is not a principle
of customary international law. States do not in general regard themselves as having an
internationallegal obligation to prosecute every person whom they may refuse to extradite to
another State. If theydid, theontreal Conventionwouldnot havebeennecessary. Moreover, in
other circumstances, notably the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda,theSecurityCouncil hasrequiredthatindividualsaccusedofcertaincrimesofintemational WV
concem be subjectedto internationalcriminaljurisdiction and not be tried in accordancewith this
principle.
3.79.It is equallyclearthat some States'practiceof notrequiringtheir nationalsto stand trial
abroad is not a rule of customary international law. Many States, including my own (and, 1
understand,the UnitedKingdom as well), regularlyextraditetheir ownnationals. Statesregularly
concludetreatiesand arrangementsbywhichtheyturn overtheirnationalsforforeignprosecutions,
without concern or protest from the international community. The obligationsto transfer persons
for trial before the Internationaliminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda also
extendto persons who are nationals of the transferring State. There areno principle of basic law u
involved here.
3.80. Indeed, notwithstanding its representationsthat the Libyan constitution bars it, Libya
has made proposals involvingtrial of the accused,of these accused outside of Libya, although on
conditions that do not meet the Security Council's requirements (e.g., Second Report of the
Secretary-General,para. 4, US Exhibit 21).
3.81. Thus, the rules invoked by Libya have no special or exceptionalstatus. They do not
limit or condition thepower of the SecurityCouncil to actunder the Charter as it has done here.
Mr. President, 1will now turn to my final argument to show why, in any event, the Court
should decline to decide this case.In Any Event, the CourtShould Decline to Decide This Case
3.82. Dr. Murphy showed how this Court does not have jurisdiction because Libya has no
claimsthat truly involvethe application or interpretationofthe Montreal Convention. 1have shown
how Libya's claims are inadmissible, because the goveming rules are those resulting from
mandatory decisions of the SecurityCouncil. In this argument, 1will show how, even if the Court
hadjurisdiction and the claims were admissible,the Court should decline to decide the case. This
is because the relief that Libya seeks has been rendered moot by the decisions of the
Security Council.
3.83.In theNorthernCameroonscase, (NorthernCameroons,JudgrnentI ,.C.J.Reports1963,
p. 15),the Court decidedthat it could not adjudicate upon the merits of a claim conceming alleged
breaches by the United Kingdom of its TrusteeshipAgreement for the Territory of the Cameroons
on the groundsthat the claim that had been rendered moot by a decision of the General Assembly
terminating the Trusteeship. The Court stated that:
"The function of the Court is to state the law, but it may pronouncejudgment only in
connection with concrete cases where there exists at the time of the adjudication an actual
controversy involvinga conflict of legal interests between the parties. The Court'sjudgment
must have some practical consequence in the sense that it can affect existing legal rights or
obligations of the parties." (Id., pp. 33-34.)
3.84. Since the Trusteeshipthere had been terminated, the Court could no longer pronounce
anyjudgment that would affectthe rights and obligations of the parties conceming it. As the Court
stated:
"Whenever the Court adjudicates on the merits of a dispute, one or the other of the
parties, or both parties, as a factual matter, are in a position to take some retroactive or
prospective action or avoidance of action, which would constitute a cornpliance with the
Court'sjudgment or a defiance thereof. That is not the situation here." (Id., pp. 37-38.)
3.85. The sarne reasoning applies to the present case. Here, the Montreal Convention of
course has not been terminated. However,the decisions of the SecurityCouncil have precluded as
a matter of law the course of action that Libya claims it has a right to take under the Convention.
Because of the actions of the Security Council, Libya cannot lawfully retain control of these
individuals and conduct its own investigation and possible trial. - 24 -
3.86. This Court'sJudgment in the 1974Nuclear Tests case (Nuclear Tests (Australia v.
France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974,p. 253) is to similar effect. There,the Courtdecidedthat
the claim before it no longer has any object and that the Court was therefore "not called uponto
give a decision thereon". (Id., p. 272.)The Court stated that "the present caseis one in which
circumstanceshavearisen [that]renderanyadjudicationdevoidofpurpose"(NorthernCameroons),
and that it "thereforesees no reason to allow the continuance of proceedings whichit knowsare
boundto be fruitlessu. (Id., p. .)1Preciselythe same considerations apply here. The only way
in which this Court can grant to Libya the relief it requests is for it to review and invalidatethe
binding decisions of the Security Council. As our next two speakers, Professor Schachterand
7
Zoller, will show, the Court cannot and should not do so. Accordingly, rulingon Libya's claims
under the Montreal Convention cannot affectthe legal rights or the obligationsof the Parties, and
would be devoid of purpose.
* * *
3.87. 1 am almost to the end. 1 am grateful to the Court for its continued attention and
courtesy.
3.88.1 have shown here how the SecurityCouncil'sresolutions establish the legalrulesthat
govem the dispute between Libya and the United States. These rules, and not the
Montreal Convention, define the obligations of the Parties. Libya's claims basedupon the
Montreal Conventionare therefore inadmissible. They arealso withoutpurposeand effect in light
w
of the Council's actions.
3.89. Our nexttwo speakerswill showthat the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider
Libya'ssweepingclairnsthat theCouncilhascornmittederrorsin interpretingthe Charter,infinding
the facts, or in conducting its proceedings, and that these claims are also inadmissible.
Nevertheless,1havealsoansweredthese clairnsby Libya, shownhowthe Council'sdecisionswere .
a proper exercise with responsibility, responsibility that the Charterassigns solely tothe Council.
3.90. Thus, the Court lacksjurisdiction, the claims are inadmissible. But evenif this were
not so,the Court shoulddeclineto upholdthe claims, becausethe reliefthat Libyaseeks iswithout
purpose and effect in light of the actions of the Security Council. -25 -
3.91. 1thank the Court for its patience and interest during a long presentation. It has been
an honour for me to appear before you. It is also an honour for me to invite the Court to hear Our
next speaker, Professor Oscar Schachter. We would suggest that the Court might wish to recess
for coffee following Professor Schachter'spresentation. Thank you.
The ACTING PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you Mr. Crook. 1 now give the floor to
Professor Schachter.
Professor SCHACHTER:
Relationship of the Court to the Council
4.1. Mr. President and Members of the Court, it is indeed an honour to appear before this
Court and a privilege to do so in a case that holds much significance for the maintenance of
international peace and security and the elimination of state-supported terrorism.
4.2. As Members of the Court have recognized, a central legal issue raised in this case
concerns the relationship of the Security Council and the Court. The Court is faced with a
challenge to binding decisions of the Security Council adopted pursuant to Chapter VI1 of the
United Nations Charter. Underlying this challenge is the Libyan contention that the Court in the
exercise of itsjudicial power has the authority and responsibility to judge the legality of the
Council's decision. My comments will be addressed mainly to this argument.
4.3. Let me Say, first, that the United States recognizes that the United Nations
Security Council is an organ whose powers are defined and limited by the Charter of the
United Nations. The pertinent resolutions ofthe Security Council, inthis case resolutions48 and
883, were adopted under the general authority of the Council in Articles 24 and 25 and pursuant
to the specific powers laid down in Chapter VI1 of the Charter, in particular Articles 39 and 41.
Article 48 of the Charter also affirms that the actions required to carry out the decisions of the
Council shall betaken by al1or some of the Members as the Council shall determine. Pursuant to
these Articles, the Council has imposed binding obligations not only on Libya but on al1other
Members of the United Nations. 4.4. Such enforcement measures have theeffect in many respectsof deprivingor curtailing
the legal rights of the affected States, and most drastically the rights of the target State, Libya.
When a State appeals to this Court to vindicate its legal rights as againstthe Council'ssanctions,
thejuridical question, as Judge Shahabuddeen remarked,"resultsnot from any collision between
the competence of the Security Council and that of the Court" (Questionsof lnterpretation and
Applicationofthe 1971MontrealConventionArising From theAerial IncidentutLockerbie(Libyan
ArabJamahiriyav. UnitedStatesofAmerica),Provisional MeasuresO , rderof14ApriI1992,I.C.J.
Reports 1992, p. 141). Rather, he went on to Say,it is more precisely and correctlya collision
1
betweenrightsthat the Statemay haveundertreatiesandthe obligations imposedbythe mandatory
measures of the Council.
4.5. What then is the role of the Court, if it were properly seizedof a case under a treaty,
faced with a challenge to the validity of the mandatory Councildecision? Libya has argued that
in that case the Court has the intrinsicauthorityand responsibilityto exercise itsjudicial function
as laid downinthe Charterand its Statute. The argumentis importantandwe donottake it lightly.
The United States places a high value on the role of theudiciary in internationaldisputes and in
particular on the contribution of this Court as a principal organ of the United Nations to the
understandingofthe Charter andthe commitrnentsof member States. We agreewith Judge Lachs'
w
much-quoted comment that the Court is the "guardianof legality", thoughwe would add, not the
sole guardian. The member States and the other principal organsare al1bound to respect and
conform to the Charter and international law.
4.6. The issue in the present case cannot be resolved simplyby referring to the pre-eminent
role of the Court in exercising itsjudicial function. The challengebyLibyato the SecurityCouncil
calls into questionthe basic constitutionalstructureof theUnited Nationsand the understandingof
member Statesas to powers delegatedto the organsandthe manner oftheir application. True,this
Court has recognized in one of its first cases that the
"political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty
provisionsestablishedby the Charterwhenthey constitute limitationson itspowers or criteria for itsjudgrnent" (Conditionsof Admissionof a State to Membershipin the
UnitedNations, Advisory Opinion,I.C.J. Reports 1948, p. 64).
But it has also recognized that the Court "[ulndoubtedly . . does not possess powers of judicial
review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned" (Legal
Consequences of Statesofthe ContinuedPresenceof SouthAfiica inNamibia(SouthWestAfiica)
notwithstandingSecurityCouncilResolution276, Advisory Opinion,I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 45).
Both of these propositions have been generally accepted; we regard them as unimpeachable
principles of United Nations law and relevant jurisprudence on the issues raised in this case.
4.7. Thepresentcasepresents itsown distinctive factsandjuridical configuration. The Court
is faced for the first time with a contentious case in which a State claims that a Council decision
which has overridden its legal rights has violated the Charter and basic principles of international
law. As we already indicated, we do not deny that the Council is obliged to comply with the
Purposes and Principles of the Charter and to act within the limits of the powers granted to it.
4.8. However, the salient fact ofjuridical relevance is that the resolutions in question were
decisions taken by the Council in the exercise of its supreme- and unique- responsibility under
the Charter. The Council'sdeterminationthat the situationconstitutedathreatto international peace
and security and that enforcement measures were necessary did not rest on conjecture or theory.
The acts of terrorism had cost hundreds of lives; intensive factual investigation pointed to the
responsibility of agents of Libya. The worldwide reaction called for effective responses. It was
reasonable - one might Say,inevitable - that a majorityofthe Security Council would regard the
situation as a threat to international peace and security and take action to ensure that those
responsible for the attack would be punished. The Council took action under Chapter VI1 and
imposed the sanctions that it alone was authorized to take.
4.9. It is surely beyond the competence and responsibility of the Courtto "second-guess"the
Council in its judgment as to the threat and the measures taken in response. The framers of the
Charter had devoted a largepart of their deliberations in San Francisco to the enforcement powers
of Chapter VII. The majority were clear - sometimes emphatic - in concluding that theSecurity Council, and the Council alone, had the duty to decide - in its discretion - that a
solution came within the terms of Article 39 and called for sanctions within the terms of
Chapter VII.
4.10. It is idleto speculatewhether in atheoretical world one could formulate legal standards
to govern decisionsas to the threat of peace and measures to enforcethe peace. The frarnersof the
Charter and the member States by and large did not consider that such standardswere "judicially
discoverable and manageable" (to quote from a US Supreme Court decision). More than that, they
considered it unwise and dangerous to subject the Council'spolitical decisionstojudicial control.
The proper function of the Court faced with a challenge to the legality of Council decisions under
ChapterVI1canonly beto underlinethediscretionaryauthority giventothe Council bytheCharter.
Judge Weerarnantry clearly summed up the legal position in his opinion in 1992, where he said:
"It would appear that the Council and no other is the judge of the existence of the state of affairs
whichbrings Chapter VI1into operation." (Questionsof InterpretationandApplication ofthe1971
Montreal ConventionArisingFrorntheAerial Incidentut Lockerbie (Libyan ArabJamahiriyav.
United Statesof America), ProvisionalMeasures, Order of 14April 1992, p. 176.)
4.11. In presenting this conclusion we do not deny that the Court may exercise itsjudicial
responsibility in somecontentiouscasesthat involve Securiw Councildecisions. The United States
Agent inthe case concerning UnitedStates DiplornaticandConsularStafin Tehrantold the Court: I
"There is absolutely nothing in the United Nations Charter or in this Court'sstatute to suggest that
action by the Security Council excludes action by the Court, even ifthe two actions might in some
respects be parallel" (case concerning United States Diplornaticand ConsuIarStaHin Tehran
(United States v. Iran), Pleadings,p. 229 (Roberts Owen)).
4.12. One can conceive of situations in which contentiouscases properly before the Court
may involve interpretation of law raised by Council decisions. Of course,the Court's decisionsin
such cases would not bind the Security Council nor would it bind States not parties to the case
(Article 59 of the Statute of the Court), but this may not matter if the dispute in question onlyinvolves the Statesparties to the case and the dispute isjusticiable. In short, the Court may still
fulfil itsjudicial role in somecontentious cases even if Security Council decisions are involved.
However, such exercise of the Court'sjudicial role is critically different from the claim made by
Libya in this case - a claim directed against the Council's exerciseof its discretionary authority
to determinethat a situationisa threattothe peaceandthat enforceentmeasures underChapter VI1
should be imposed. The non-reviewable authority of the Council in this case is not against or
outside of the law. It is grounded in the Charter itself and the obligations based onthe Charter.
The Court would properlyexercise its judicial responsibility by recognizing that the obligations
imposed on Libya by the Security Council constitute the applicable rule of law in this case.
4.13.1 shall tum now to two related points of legal significance. The first concems the
interestingquestion expressedsuccinctlyby Judge Bedjaouiin his opinion - namely, whetherthe
judicial function conferredon the Court by the Charter would be "impaired" if the Court were
deniedthe rightto fumish a legal solutionto a questionproperly beforeit. Counselfor Libyaresort
to more sweepingcharges,arguingthatthe denialoftheCourt'sjurisdictionwouldviolatethe "rule
of law" implicit in the principles of the Charter.
4.14. Both of these points emphasizethe role of the Court in assuring respect for the law.
We do not denythe importanceof thatjudicial role. We submitthat in this case the Court would
fumish a legal solutionby applyingthe goveming rule of law- namely, the mandatory effect of
the Security Council decision taken under Chapter VII. Surely there is no impairment of the
judicial function or disregard of the rule of law in the Court's determining that the law of the
Charter applies tothe Council'sdecision. The Court would then be fulfilling itsjudicial function
consonant with the rule of law.
4.15.1s there an inherentjudicial power of the Court that would in these circumstances
supportjudicial reviewof CouncildecisionsadoptedunderChapter VII? Anargumenttothateffect
has been made by counsel for Libya and suggested in some of the opinions of Members of the
Court. Counselfor Libya look for support for that position, for example, in Judge Fitzmaurice's observations in his dissenting opinion in the Namibia case - referring to his comment that the
Court if asked for an advisory opinion may have to determine whether a Council resolution is
binding or recommendatory.
4.16. Obviously, this Court - indeed any court, properly called uponfor an opinion- may
have to interpreta pertinent legal instrumentor decide on its legaleffect relevantto the issues. But
an interpretive determination isentirelydifferent from this case where the Councilhas not asked
for the Court'sadvice and the appellants demand that the Councildecision must be annulled bythe
Court. There is patently a fundamental distinction between a Court exercising its inherent power
to interpretand apply a legal rule in a case before it and the assertion apower ofjudicial control
that would annul decisions of an independent body not subordinateto it. The inherentpowers of
the Court to interpret texts cannot be stretched to a power of review and annulment. This is a
matter of such fundamental importance in the law of the United Nations - as in national
constitutionallaw - that it cannot be obscured by referring vaguely to an inherentjudicial power.
It would surely astonishthe legalcommunities inmany countriesifthis Court should announcethat
thejudicial power inherently encompassed the authority to override decisions of political organs
where constitutionalprovisions do not provide for such review.
4.17. 1 turn to a different question raised in the Libyan argument - namely, whether
international law governs decisions of the Security Council - or more precisely, whether the
Charter requires the Council to conform to the rules of international law in its decisions under
Chapter VI1of the Charter. Much of the legal argument on this question goes back to Article 1,
paragraph 1,of the Charter which sets out the purposes of the United Nations and includes in its
latter part the words "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law". As one
might expect, this phrase received closeattention in the draftingof Article 1at SanFrancisco. The
Committee concerned took a decision to move the phrase "in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law" from the first part of paragraph1 to the latter part, sothat it would
applyonlyto the "adjustrnentor settlement of international disputesor situations" (United NationsDoc. No. 944, Report of Committee 111).As stated in the report, this change was made to ensure
that the "vital duty of preventingand removing threats to and breachesof the peace" would not be
limited by existing law. It was clear then, as it is to us now, that preventive or enforcement
measures could - and often would - entai1overriding the legal rights of the States. However,
when it came to "adjusting or settling" disputes or situations, the Organization would be expected
to act in conformity with principles of justice and international law.
4.18. The distinction obviously makes sense. When the Council takes preventive or
enforcement measures under Chapter VI1- in a word "sanctions"- it will as a rule affect the
legalrights of States and override some of these rights; inthat particular sense,the measures would
not conform to international law as distinct from the Charter itself. The Charter itself is the
governing law, as affirmed by Article 103and other Articles. This brings us backto the argument
thatjudicial oversight of Councildecisionsisessential to ensure their legality and conformityto the
Charter. There is an old saying - "to a shoemaker there is nothing like leather, to a lawyer there
is nothing like a court". But much as we lawyers appreciate courts,they need not be - and are
not - the sole guardians of legality. In the world of sovereign States, the States themselves
collectively and individually have a responsibility and the capability to ensure adherence to their
fundamental law. True, the Security Council is pre-eminentlya political organ; its member States
generally apply political criteria and make politicaljudgments. That does not mean that they are
indifferentto the principles and rules of theCharteror incapable ofreaching decisionsbased onthe
Charter. It is surely in their collective interest to maintain the basic framework of their authority.
The records of the Council arnply demonstrate that the Members of the Council take account that
theCharterprovisions and onthe whole resolve such differences asariseby referencetothe Charter
and accepted principles of interpretation. The Council (as we know) is not a monolithic body. Its
Permanent Members and its elected Members are broadly representative of a plural world. It is
essentialto their collectiveauthorityto maintain their constitutionalcompact. We stressthis point
(though it may seem obvious)to respond to the suggestionthat the Court alone is the guardian oflegality. Under the Charter, the Security Council along with other principal organs,share that
responsibility. In the final analysis, itis the member States that have the powerand the duty
- to ensure that their Charter is maintained and respected. It is they, after all, who are
accountableto their peoples for internationalpeace and security.
4.19. That concludes my statement,Mr. President. With yourpermission,Mr. President, 1
shall invite ProfessorElizabeth ZolleroftheUniversityofParisIIto addresstheCourtonquestions
ofjurisdiction and admissibility.
The ACTING PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Schachter. 1 take it Professor Zoller
would like to commence her submission after the break?
Mr. ANDREWS: That is correct, Mr. President.
TheACTiNG-PRESIDENT: Yes, sowe willtakeOurmid-momingbreaknowandtheCourt
will adjoum for 15 minutes.
TheCourt adjournedffom 11.05 to 11.10 a.m.
The ACTING PRESIDENT: Please be seated. 1 give the floor now to Professor
Elisabeth Zoller.
Nature d'un éventueldroit de contrôle de la Coursur les actes du Conseilde sécurité
Mme ZOLLER :Monsieur le Président,Messieurs,
5.1. En me demandant de développer certaines de ses exceptions préliminaireas la requête
de la Libye dans l'affaire deLockerbie,legouvernementdes Etats-Unism'afaitundoublehonneur.
D'abord, il m'adonnéla possibilitéde parler devant la Cour pour la premièrefois et c'est un
privilègedontje mesure le prix. Ensuite, il m'aconfiéla mission d'exposerle point de vue d'un
membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité surune question juridique importante du droit del'organisation des Nations Unies. Cette question est celle de la nature d'un éventueldroit de
contrôle de la Cour sur les actes du Conseil de sécurité.
Si cette questionse pose, c'estparce que le véritabledifférend porpar la Libye devant la
Cour n'estpas un différend qui l'opposeaux Etats-Unis;c'estun différendqui l'opposeau Conseil
de sécuritéect'estcontre lui en réaliqu'ellevient demanderjustice. Eneffet, commel'aexpliqué
le Dr. Murphy, la Libye n'a pas un différendavec les Etats-Unis au sens de la convention de
Montréal. Son adversaire, c'estle Conseil de sécurité, eM. Crook vousa expliqué longuement
pourquoi, en tant qu'elles étaient dirigées contle Conseil de sécuritél,es prétentionslibyennes
étaientmal fondées. Aprèslui, le professeur Schachtera démontré que, si le Conseil de sécurité
étaitbien soumis au droit, il n'appartenait pasla Cour de se substitueà lui dans l'appréciation
qu'il est amené à faire des situations de nature à mettre en danger la paix et la sécurité
internationales.Il reste une dernière question. Si leConseil de sécuriest bien soumis au droit,
si l'organisation des Nations-Unies estune organisationde droit commeon peut parler d'un((Etat
de droit))(Rechtsstaat),alors qui contrôle cette soumissio?
Surcettequestion,la position delaLibyeest catégorique.Selonelle, la Courest compétente
purementetsimplementpourcontrôleraucontentieux,parvoie d'exception,la légalitéded sécisions
du Conseil de sécurité.Le Gouvernementdes Etats-Unis ne partagepas cette opinion dogmatique
et il entretient sur la question des vues plus nuancées.ne pense pas que la Charte et le Statut
autorisent la Cour à contrôler au contentieux la légalitédes actes du Conseil de sécurité. Il
considèredonc que la Cour n'a pas compétence pourconnaître de la requêtelibyenne et qu'au
surplus cette requêteest irrecevable. C'est à développer ces deux moyens que je vais
essentiellementm'attacher.
1.L'incompétencede la Cour
5.2.S'agissantde lacompétencede laCourpourcontrôlerlalégalité dersésolutions731,748
et 883 du Conseil de sécuritén,otre adversaire n'aqu'unargument, et un seul qui revient comme
un leitmotiv dans sa démonstration. Selon la Libye, le pouvoir de la Cour d'examinerla légalitédesrésolutionsduConseilde sécurité«puiss eonfondementdans lecaractèrejudiciaire delaCour))
(mémoire,p. 183,par. 6.46). Selonelle, la Courne saurait- sauf àdéchoir- renoncer àexercer
ce pouvoir. 11en va - nous dit-elle- de «l'importancedu maintien del'intégritéde la fonction
judiciaire))(observationset conclusions,p. 67, par. 3.11). Etl'appuide sa démonstration,notre
adversaire invoque deuxaffaires : d'unepart, l'affaireconcernant Certaines dépensesen 1962où
la Cour se serait appuyéesur «ses fonctionsjudiciaires))pour affirmer son pouvoir decontrôler la
régularitédes actions desorganes de l'organisation; d'autre partet surtout, l'affairede la Namibie
en 1971qui pour laLibyerevêt «uneimportanceparticulière))(observationset conclusions,p. 66, w
par. 36) et dans laquelle,toujours selon elle, la Cour aurait invoqué«sa fonction judiciaire)) pour
affirmer sa compétence à l'effet de se prononcer sur la validitéde la résolution2145 (XXI) de
l'Assembléegénérale.
Le Gouvernementdes Etats-Unis n'entendni approuver, ni infirmer l'interprétation que la
Libyeattache auxdeuxaffaires précitées.Lepoint décisif,selon lui,est que ces deuxaffaires sont
venues devant la Cour par la voie consultative,non par la voie contentieuse. Comme ill'aécrit
dans son mémoireen défense(version française, p. 96, par. 4.11) : «Dans ces deux instances, la
Coura agi en réponse à une demande d'avis consultatif.))LaLibyen'ajamais répondusur ce point.
Non pas qu'ellen'aitpasvu le problème;mais elle l'aéliminé sans le résoudreau motif selon elle
d
que«lajurisprudence enmatièreconsultativeprécités e'applique égalements,i cen'estàfortiori,au
contentieux» (mémoire,p. 187). Pour appuyer cette affirmation, la Libye s'est fondée surles
opinionsde trois juges :celles desjuges Onyearnaet Fitzmaurice dans l'affairede la Namibie et
celle du juge Bustamante dans l'affaire deCertaines dépenses. Nonobstant le respect dû à ces
membreséminentsde laCour, il est permis dedire que la démonstrationlibyenneest un peu courte
et pour le moins expéditive. La Cour est une juridiction collégiale et sesjuges, à eux seuls,
- quelleque soitleurautoritéindividuelle-ne créentpasdeprécédentsO . r c'estjustement parce
que la Libye ne peut pas invoquer un seul précédentau contentieux qu'on ne comprend pas
commentelle peut affirmer avec tant d'aplomb - «à fortiori))nous dit-elle (eod. lo-.)que cequi vaudrait en matièreconsultative vaudrait égalementen matièrecontentieuse. L'observation de
lajurisprudence de la Cour inviteà des observations plus nuancées.
5.3M.onsieur le Président,il est bien certain que la Cour exerce toujours une seuleet même
fonction, la fonctionjudiciaire, en sa qualitéd'«organejudiciaire principal des Nationss))au
sens de l'article92 de la Charte. Concrètement,cela signifie que la Courdit le droit))tantôt au
contentieux,tantôtà titre consultatif. Car la fonctionjudiciaire est la fonction de dire le droit. Et
cette fonction de dire le droit, les rédacteurs dela Charte l'ontàotitre principàlla Cour par
l'effet deI'article92 de la Charte.
Mais, si la fonctionjudiciaire est toujours une, s'ils'agit toujours de dire le droit, doit-on en
conclure que ses conditions d'exercice soient identiques? Autrement dit, les deux manières
d'exercer la fonctionjudiciaire sont-elleséquivalenteset la Cour peut-elle faire au contentieuxce
qu'elle s'autorisefairedans la procédureconsultative? Pour la Libye, la réponsàcette question
ne fait aucun doute et il n'y a pour elle aucune difficultéà faire au contentieux ce qui est
concevable dans le cadre consultatifet inversement. Pour elle il n'ya aucune autonomieentre les
deux procédureset il est possible de passer de l'une à l'autre au grédes besoins. Les deux
procédures sont pour ainsi dire fongibles et,forte de cette équivalence,elle demande la Cour
d'exercerson contrôle «à titre incident))(mémoire,p. 188).
5.4. Cette assimilation des deux procédureslaisse sceptique. Jamais dans le cadre de la
procédurecontentieuse,la Cour s'estreconnue ou a laisséentendrequ'ellepourraitavoir un pouvoir
de contrôle sur les actes du Conseil de sécurité. Jamais ellene s'estconsidcomme lejuge ou
le censeur du Conseil de sécurité,mais plutôt comme son bras droit et son conseil. Dans la
procédure contentieuse,tout se passe comme si la Cour se considérait investie de la mission
d'assisterleConseil desécuritédansl'exercicedesa responsabilitéprincipale demaintien de lapaix.
C'est ainsi qu'elleinterprétésacompétencedansl'affaire duPersonneldiplomatique etconsulaire
des Etats-Unis à Téhéran (1980) lorsqu'ellea remarqué qu'il nesaurait y avoir «rien d'irrégulier
dans l'exercicesimultanépar la Cour et par le Conseil de sécuritéde leurs fonctions respectives))(C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 21, par. 40;les italiques sont de moi). Et elle a justifié cet ((exercice
simultané))par des ((raison..évidentes)),ibid, p. 22)à savoirque les deux organes poursuivant
en même tempsle mêmebut, c'est-à-direle règlementpacifique des différends,il est logique que
la Cour puisse contribuerà ((résoudretoute question juridique pouvant opposer des partieà un
différend))(ibid, p. 22, par. 40).
Quatreans plustard, dansI'affaireduNicaragua (compétence,1984),laCouraété ànouveau
priéede se saisir des aspectsjuridiques d'undifférendqui était examipar le Conseilde sécurité.
Ellea repris exactementla même jurisprudence. Elle a séparentre les((attributionspolitiques» du
1
Conseil de sécurité et les((fonctionspurementjudiciaires))de la Cour, et elle a soulignéque les
deuxorganespouvaients'acquitter «deleursfonctionsdistinctesmaiscomplémentaires àproposdes
mêmesévénements)) (C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 435, par. 95; les italiques sont demoi). Dans cette
affaire comme dans la précédente,la Cour a considéréqu'elleétaitcompétente parce que,dans
l'exercicede sa compétence, ellepoursuivait le mêmebut que le Conseil de sécurité. Ella donc
acceptéde l'assisterdans l'exercice deses fonctions en seprononçant sur un point dedroit afférent
à un différend qui était pordevant lui. Deuxadjectifs, utiliséspar la Cour, résumentfort bien sa
position sur la manièredont elle conçoit sonrôle au contentieuxvis-à-vis du Conseilde sécur:té
il s'agit de ((simultanet ((complémentaire)).En mêmetemps et de concert avec lui, voilà la
1
manièredont la Cour comprend son rôle dans le traitement des aspectsjuridiques d'une question
examinéepar le Conseil de sécurité.
5.5. Mais dans laprésente affaire,la Libyene demandepas du toutàla Cour detenir un rôle
complémentaire à celui du Conseil de sécuritet de poursuivre le mêmebut que lui. Ce que la
Libyedemande à laCour, c'estenvéritéde défairele butquepoursuit leConseil. Elle luidemande
non pas de l'aiderà faire facà une situationde nature à mettre en danger la paix et la sécurité
internationales,maisbienau contrairede l'empêcher d'faireface. Elledemande à laCour d'arrêter
leprocessus politiquemis en Œuvre parle Conseilde sécurité.Mais la Cour n'admetpas ce genre
de démarche. Elle estime mêmequ'il lui appartient de soulever d'office le problème dans l'hypothèseoù il y aurait une quelconque ambiguïtédans la démarchedu demandeur. C'est ce qui
s'est passé dans l'affaire du Nicaragua (compétence). A l'objection selon laquelle l'instance
introduitepar leNicaragua n'était«en fait [qu']un appel devant la Cour d'une décision défavorable
du Conseil de sécurité)),la Cour a réponduceci :
((1n'estpas demandé àla Cour de dire que le Conseilde sécurita commis une
erreur, ni que la manièrede voter des membres du Conseilait étéen rien contraire au
droit.))C.LJ. Recueil 1984, p. 436, par. 98.)
Cela signifie que, si tel avait étéle cas, c'est-à-diresi le demandeur avait cherchéirejuger une
erreur ou une irrégularité des votes au Conseil de sécuritél,a Cour aurait refusé d'examinerla
requêteau contentieux. Mais ici c'estexactementce que la Libye demande à la Cour de faire. Elle
lui demande d'abordd'invalider les résolutions731, 748 et 883 eu égardjustement «à la manière
de voter des membres du Conseil de sécurité)).Selon la Libye, les Etats-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et
la France ne pouvaient pas participerau vote de ces résolutions(observationsetconclusions,p. 88,
par. 4.34). Et elle lui demande ensuite de censurer le Conseil de sécurité pour «erreur» et, très
précisémentpour quiconque est familier des cas d'ouverture du recours pour excèsde pouvoir en
droit administratiffrançais,pour erreur de fait, erreurde droit, erreur de qualificationjuridique des
faits, erreur de fait (les deux personnes que les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni voudraient voir
déférer àlajustice ne seraient en rien impliquéesdans la tragédiede Lockerbie), erreur de droit (le
Conseil de sécurité auraitmal interprétéles dispositions du chapitre VII), erreur de qualification
juridique des faits (les suites de l'attentat de Lockerbie ne seraient pas de natuàejustifier une
application du chapitre VII). A.vecl'invocation d'un«vicede forme))fondé surla manière de voter
des membres du Conseil de sécurité,avec l'invocation de la ((violation de la loi» tirée des
prétendueserreurs commisespar celui-ci(voirmémoire,p. 219et suiv.);observationsetconclusions
p. 93-94 et suiv.), il est clair que nous ne sommes plus dans le contentieux international, nous
sommesdans lecontentieuxadministratiffrançais. La requête delaLibyeest à lavéritéunrecoursen annulation déguiséc ,'estun recourspourexcès depouvoirqui ne ditpas son nom. Ladifficulté
c'est que la Cour n'atout simplement pas compétencepour entretenir ce genre de demande au
contentieux.
5.6. En effet, contrairement à ce que sous-tend la démarche libyenne, les deux chefsde
compétencepar lesquels la Cour exerce la fonctionjudiciaire, la compétence contentieuseet la
compétenceconsultative,ne sontpas interchangeables. Ils ne sont pasreliés entre euxcommedes
vases communicants. Les dispositionsde la Charte des Nations Unies complétées par celles du
Statut de la Cour ont établiune répartitiondes compétences. La compétence contentieuse eu stne
J
chose, la compétenceconsultative en est une autre. Cette répartition descompétencesest inscrite
dans les textes, d'aborddans la Charte qui traite des deux chefs de compétencedans des articles
séparés (art3. 6, par. 3, pour la compétencecontentieuse et art. 96, par. 1, pour la compétence
consultative),cette répartition descompétenceselle est ensuite et surtout inscritedans le Statutde
la Cour qui envisage les deuxchefsde compétence dans deuxchapitresdistincts(le chapitre II, qui
traite de la compétence contentieuseetle chapitre IV, qui s'appliqueaux avis consultatifs). Ce
traitement différenciédes compétencescontentieuses et consultatives signifie que la Cour
consultative est une chose et que la Cour statuant au contentieux en est une autre. De cette
distinction,laCourest parfaitementconsciente. Ellen'admetpasqueceuxquiviennentdevantelle,
les Etats ou les organisations internationales, puissent manipuler les deuxordres de compétencà 1
leurconvenance. Elle s'oppose àce que l'onpuisseobtenirpar lavoie consultativece qu'ilne serait
possible d'obtenir que par la voie contentieuse, ou vice-versa.
5.7. Nous venons de voir avec l'affairedu Nicaragua(compétence) comment la Cour avait
exclu toute possibilité derechercher au contentieux un quelconque prononcéjudiciaire sur une
prétendue irrégularitécommisp ear un organe del'organisation. Mais laréciproqueestvraie. Pas
plus qu'iln'estpossible de se servir de lavoie contentieusepour atteindreun résultatqui ne serait
envisageable que dans le cadre consultatif,il n'estpas possible d'utiliserla voie consultativepour
atteindre un résultatqui ne pourrait être obtenque par lavoie contentieuse. L'affaire décisiviciest celle du Statut de la Carélieorientale de 1923. Que nous apprend cet avis ? En quelques
mots :qu'on ne peut pas réglerun différendpar lavoie consultative. Je cite les trois phrases clés
de l'avispour ce qui nous concerne
«L'avis demandé a la Cour porte sur un différend actuellement né entre la
Finlande et la Russie ... [:L]econsentementde la Russie n'ajamais été donn .. [L]a
Cour se voit dans l'impossibilité d'exprimerun avis sur un différendde cet ordre.))
(C.P.J.I. sérieB no5, p. 27-28.)
Mutatis mutandis, nous sommes ici dans une situation similaire dans la mesure où la requête
libyennesoulèveau contentieux une ((questionjuridique))dont letraitement ressortirait en principe
de lavoie consultative conformémentaux dispositions de l'article96, paragraphe 1, de la Charte.
C'est la mêmesolution, mais renversée, quidoit s'appliquer : on ne peut pas répondre à une
((questionjuridique))au sens de l'article 96, paragraphe,de laChartedans le cadre de laprocédure
contentieuse. La question n'ayant pasété poséesous forme d'une requêtepour avis consultatif, la
Cour est dans l'impossibilitéde se prononcer. Et la Cour est dans cette impossibilité,non pas par
choix d'opportunité,mais parce que les textes l'obligent à agir de la sorte.
5.8. En effet, de par son Statut, la Cour a une compétence contentieuse d'attribution etune
compétence consultative de droit commun. S'ily a deux ordres de compétence, il y a
nécessairementdeuxordresdejuridiction (((juridiction)) étantprisiciau sensmatérieldejuris-dictio,
c'est-à-direde fonction qui consiste à dire le droit). La difficulté estqu'onne voit pas ces deux
ordres dejuridiction pour ainsi dire. Ils ne sont pas visibles. En d'autres termes, ces deux ordres
dejuridiction n'ontpas d'expression institutionnelle,en ce sens qu'ilsne s'exprimentpas dans des
organes distincts. C'est un même organe,la Cour internationale de Justice, qui exerce les deux
compétencescommeorganejudiciaire principaldesNations Unies, un peu commeleConseil d'Etat
en France qui exerce des attributions consultatives et des attributions contentieuses. Mais dans les
deux cas, que l'onsoit dans le cadre consultatif ou dans le cadre contentieux, la Cour fait bien la
mêmechose. Elle dit le droit. Mais - et c'estle point décisif- elle ne le dit ni aux mêmesfins,
ni aux mêmesconditions. Le rôle de la Cour statuant au contentieux est de dire le droit pour
trancher des litiges, pour résoudre des différends entreEtats. Le rôle de la Cour consultative estde dire le droit pour assister un organe de l'organisation des Nations Unies dans l'exercicede ses
fonctions. Dans le premier cas, la compétencede la Cour est strictement limitée;dans le second,
il n'est pas de «questionjuridique))qu'elle ne puisse examiner.
5.9. Alors bien entendu, le rôle de la Cour dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité
internationaleest si importantquetous les hommes de bonnevolontétravaillentsansrelâcheire
avancer la cause de la justice internationale sur les deux fronts, le front consultatif et le front
contentieux. Tous ces efforts participent de la recherche d'undéveloppementdu rôle de la Cour
et du droit dans la sociinternationaleet les Etats-Unis bien entendu s'enréjouissent. Dansces
-
recherches parfois fébriles,on ne voit pas, ou plutôt on ne veut pas voir la différenceentre la
compétencecontentieuse et la compétenceconsultative parce que, dans les deux cas, la cause du
combat estjuste, c'estle combat pour le droit. Et c'estvrai que, dans un cas comme dans l'autre,
la Cour exerce la fonctionjudiciaire au sens le plus haut q:elle dit et elle doit dire le droit.
Mais, dans l'exercice decette grande fonction qui est la sienne, la Cour ne peut pas paàser outre
la répartitiondes compétencesentre lajuridiction consultative et lajuridiction contentieuse. Non
pas seulement parce qu'il lui faut respecter les textes, mais aussi parce que la répartitiondes
compétencesentre lesattributions consultativeset contentieuses de la Cour est dans dtirectê
d'uneprotection de la fonctionjudiciaire. Ce principe est essàune bonne administration de
I
la justice internationale. Il protège la Cour contre les plaideurs, Etats ou organisations, qui
chercheraientàobtenir d'ellequ'ellerendît des serviceset non lajustice. C'est ce quenous allons
maintenant développer.
***
5.10. Si les rédacteursde la Charte et du Statut ont voulu que la compétencecontentieuseet
lacompétenceconsultativedelaCoursoient et restenttoujours deuxjuridictions sépar,'estpour
protégerl'intégride l'organejudiciaire principal desNations Unies qu'estla Cour. C'est pourlui
donner le pouvoir de rester toujours maîtresse de sa juridiction et de sa compéOn ne le
perçoit pas toujours clairement parce que les différencesentreles deux chefs de compétence sontgénéralemenp t résentéesous une formeabstraite. On souligne, par exemple, qu'àla différencede
la procédurecontentieuse, il n'ya pas de «parties» dans la procédureconsultative; qu'iln'ya pas
non plus de «conclusions»,mais une «question» qui est circonscrite par les termes de la demande
d'avis; qu'il n'y a pas enfin de «réponse»faità des Etats, mais un «avis» donné à l'organe de
l'organisation. Tout ceci reste bienthéorique. Pour prendre la mesuredes conséquencespratiques
du principede répartition des compétencesconsultativeet contentieuse, il faut envisager un instant
ce qui sepasse concrètement lorsquel'examende lavaliditédes actesd'un organede l'organisation
vient devant la Cour par lavoie consultative,non par lavoie contentieuse. Le point capital est que,
lorsqu'unedemande d'avisse présente àla Cour, la procédureque la Cour doit suivre n'aalors rien
à voir avec celle que lui impose une demande au contentieux.
5.11.La premièreet la plus importantedifférenceest qu'unerequêtepour avisconsultatifest
notifiée immédiatement à tous les Etats admisà ester devant la Cour. Il en résulte que- dans
l'hypothèseoù les accusations de la Libye seraient venues devant la Cour par la voie consultative,
non par lavoie contentieuse - ledébat auraitétéouvert à tous ceux qui y sont intéressés. Or, ceci
n'est pas possible au contentieux et c'est bien que gît la difficulté. Comment admettre qu'un
recours contre des résolutionsdu Conseil de sécurité resteune «affaire privée))entre trois Etats
seulement ? L'éventuellenullité derésolutiondsuConseil de sécurit- quiplusest, derésolutions
qui sont prises sur la base du chapitre VI1- est une question d'ordre public pour la communauté
internationale toute entière. Comment admettre que ceux qui ont votépour les résolutionsen
question ne soient pas «intéresséspar le sortjuridique des actesdont ils sont les auteursilest
vrai, comme le soutient la Libye, que la Cour a le pouvoir de contrôler la légades résolutions
du Conseil de sécurité,il serait inconcevableque, dans l'exercice d'untel pouvoir, la Cour accepte
- pour reprendre la formule utilisée par elledans l'affairStatut de la CarélieOrientale- de
«se départirdes règlesessentiellesquidirigentsonactivitédetribunal))(C.P.J.sérieB no 5,p. 29).
Mais parmi ces ((règlesessentielles)), il y a le principe du contradictoire et la Cour attache une
importancefondamentale àce principe. Et onla comprend car «la possibilitéofferteauxpersonnesdontles intérêts sont jnu, de se faire entendre))est unedes conditionsessentiellesde laprocédure
judiciaire, c'est-à-dire de cette ((fonctionjudiciaire)) qui préotant notre adversaire (sur la
significationde la((fonctionjudiciaire)),voirM. Hudson, Lesavisconsultatifsde laJI,8RCADI
(1925,III)345,408). La Courajugé,par exemple,qu'il seraitcontraireà son((caractèrejudiciaire))
de Cour dejustice qu'ellepuisse êtrjuge d'unacte sansque ceux qui sontdirectementaffectéspar
celui-ci soient admisà lui soumettre leurs vues et leurs arguments (cf. Jugementsdu Tribunal
Administratifde l'OITsur requêtescontre l'Unesco, C.I.J.Recueil 1956,p. 86).
5.12.Ladifficultéinsurmontableestquececin'esttout simplementpaspossible danslecadre
w
de la procédurecontentieuse. 11ne serait tout de même pasconcevable que les Etats-Unis tous
seuls,même avec le Royaume-Uni, représentent leautresmembres duConseilde sécurité et qu'ils
semettent à défendrelesrésolutions queces Etats ont adoptées.II serait encoreplus incongruque
les Etats-Unis représentassent les NationsUnies elles-mêmes. LesEtats-Unis n'ontreçu aucun
mandat pour parler au nom du Conseil de sécurité. Et de plus, à quel titre les Etats-Unis
parleraient-ilsau nom du Conseil de sécurit? Le problème- qu'onne peut tout de même pas
évacuer sousprétextequ'onne peut pas le résoudre - c'estque, pour que lesdroits de la défense
soient respectés,il faudrait que les Nations Unies, dont le Conseil de sécn'est qu'un organe,
soientreprésentéesà l'instance. Mais lesNationsUnies ne peuventpas êtreparties au contentieux.
Les rédacteursdu Statut ont exclu que les Nations Unies puissent êtreparties devant leur organe
judiciaire principal, réservant aux seuls Etatsalitépour se présenterdevant la Cour))(art. 34,
par. 1, du Statut). On ne peut pas ne pas en tirer les conséquencesqui s'imposent. Si la Cour
venaità se reconnaîtrecompétentepour examiner aucontentieuxpar voie d'exception la régularité
des actes du Conseil de sécurité,on seulement elle irait au-delà de ce que les textes autorisent,
maiselle statueraitpar laforcedes chosesenméconnaissance delarègle audialterampartem. Que
resterait-il alors de«intégride sa fonctionjudiciaire»à laquelle la Libyetient tan?
5.13. Monsieurle Président,les difficultésne s'arrêttas là. Supposonsencore - ce qu'à
Dieu ne plaise- que vous fassiez droit aux conclusionsqui vous sont soumiseset que vousvousreconnaissiez compétence àl'effetde contrôlerau contentieux la régularitédesdécisiosuConseil
de sécurité.Mais quel serait l'effet des éventuellesdécisionsd'annulation quevous prononcerie?
Pour les parties, elles auraient sans doute l'autoritéde la chose jugée. Mais pour les tiers ?
L'autoritéde lachosejugéeen droit internationaln'est pasabsolue,mais seulementrelative, en sorte
que l'organisation des Nations-Unies aurait deux voix, la vôtre et celle du Conseil de sécurité.
Laquellefaudrait-ilsuivre ? Au surplus, 1'Etatbénéficiaire lamesure d'annulationserait-iladmis
à aller devant le Conseil de sécurité àse prévaloirdes dispositions de l'article94, paragraphe 2,
de la Charte relatif aux mesures d'exécution de l'arr?t Et si c'étaitle cas, faudrait-il considérer
que les dispositionsde cet article l'emportentsurcelles de l'articleparagraphe 3, relatif au vote
des membres permanents ?
5.14. Monsieur le Président,lorsqu'onles examine de près, lesimplicationsjuridiques de la
requête libyennesont à proprement parler vertigineuses. De quelque côtéqu'on la prenne, cette
requêteest un cadeau empoisonnéfait à la Cour. La Libye a choisi de flatter la Cour, en excipant
de sa dignitéde tribunal qui lui ferait obligation de se prononcer sur la légalitédes résolutionsdu
Conseil de sécurité.Les Etats-Unis préfèrents'enremettre à sa sagesse. Le droit et la sagesse
- car ici les textes et le bon sens vont de pairconduisent àreconnaîtreque l'excèsde pouvoir
dont se plaint la Libye ne peut pas êtreapprécipar la Cour statuant au contentieux d'une manière
qui soit compatible avec sa fonctionjudiciaire. Ce n'est pas sans raison que les rédacteurs dela
Charte ont voulu que la compétencecontentieuse soit distincte de la compétenceconsultative. Il
y a en particulierd'importantesdifférencesdansla marge de libertédont dispose la Cour pour dire
le droit au contentieux et par la voie consultative. S'ilestvrai que la Cour peut contrôler la légalité
des résolutionsdu Conseil de sécurité,sanature d'«organejudiciaire)), telle qu'elle lui estconférée
par la Charte, lui fait obligation de n'exercer éventuellement ce pouvoir que dans le cadre
consultatif. Il en résulteque la question de la légalité des actesd'un organede l'Organisationdes
Nations Unies est toujours ce que l'onpourrait appeler une ((questionpréjudicielle))pour la Courstatuant au contentieux et que la Cour n'apas compétence pour se prononcer sur elle. J'aborde
maintenant,MonsieurlePrésident,mondeuxièmemoyen. L'irrecevabilitd ée la requête dlaLibye.
II. L'irrecevabilité de la requêtede la Libye
5.15. Si par impossible la Cour ne devait pas suivre les Etats-Unis,si contre toute attente
vous deviez affirmer votre compétencepour examiner au fond par voied'exceptionla validité des
résolutions731, 748 et 883 du Conseil de sécuritél,a requête dela Libye devrait néanmoins être
rejetée au stade des exceptions préliminairesparce que cette requête n'est pas recevable.
'cir
L'irrecevabilité dela requête libyenne a été dés àulevéepar M. Crook et par le professeur
Schachterdans le cadre des développementsqu'ils vous ont présentés su lrs actes du Conseil de
sécurité. Les irrecevabilités auxquellesje vais ici 'attacher sontprésentéeà titre subsidiaire.
Elles s'imposeraientà vous dans l'hypothèseoù vous ne vous considéreriezpas arrêtés par la
questionpréjudiciellede votreincompétence pour contrôler au contentieuxla légalitdes actes du
Conseilde sécurité.A supposerdoncque l'exception d'incompétenc neevousarrête pas,vousseriez
néanmoins conduitsde toute façon à rejeter dans cette hypothèsela requête libyenne, d'ueart
pour défaut de qualitépour agir et, d'autre part pour absence d'inturtidiquement protégé.
5.16. La Libye n'a pas qualitépour contester la régularitdes résolutionsdu Conseil de
sécurité.Si cette régularitpeut être examinép ear la Cour, nous venonsde démontrer que cene
1
pourrait être éventuellement que par la voie consultative. Or les Etats n'ontpas qualitépour
demander des avis à la Cour. C'était déjà le cas du temps de la Cour permanente de Justice
internationaleet la proposition faiàela conférencede San Franciscod'étendre aux Etatsle droit
de requérir des avisde la Cour até expressément rejetépear la commissiondesjuristes, rejet qui
fut confirmépar le ComitéIV11(UNCIO, vol. 14, p. 850; R. Russell,A History of the United
Nations Charter, 1958,p. 891). Le défaut de qualitépour agir du demandeurne saurait non plus
êtrecouvert par une éventuelle subrogation de la Libye dans les droits des organes de
l'organisation. Dans l'affairedu Sud-Ouestafricain, deuxièmephase (C.I.J. Recueil 1966, p. 29,
par. 33), la Cour ajugéque l'existencede voies de droit spécifiquesprévuesau profit exclusif desorganes d'une organisation avaitpour effet de priver ses membresconsidéréut singulide qualité
pour agir à sa place.
5.17. En second lieu, s'agissantd'un prétenexcès de pouvoir qu'aurait commisle Conseil
de sécuritéen adoptant les résolutions731, 748 et 883, la Libye ne saurait tirer de ces actes le
moindre droit ou intérêjtridiqueà faire valoir en l'espècecontre les Etats-Unis. Comme tousles
MembresdesNations-Unies, lesEtats-Unis sonttenusd'obéir auxrésolutionsdu Conseilde sécurité
pris sur la base du chapitre VI1 de la Charte. Il en résulte qu'ilsne peuvent pas être
individuellementresponsablesdevantla Libyedes actes qu'elleconteste. D'unemanière générale,
les Membres des Nations Unies ne sontpas responsables àtitre distinct enverschacun des autres
Etats Membres desactes pris par lesorganesde l'organisation. Si c'étaitle cas, l'organisationdes
Nations Unies ne pourrait pas avoir la personnalitéjuridique, solutionqui est évidemment exclue
par l'article 104 de la Charte et surtout par votre avis dans l'affaire de la Réparation
(C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 174). A partir du moment où l'organisation est plus qu'unconglomérat
d'Etats,àpartir du moment où elle est une personne juridique,la Libye ne pourrait avoir de droit
à faire valoir que contrele Conseil de sécurité et Nations Unies dans leur ensemble. Mais la
Charteet le Statutlaprivent de toutrecours titre individuel. Il ne lui appartientpas de contourner
cette interdiction en essayant d'obtenir parla voie contentieusece qui lui est interdit par la voie
consultative. Devant lesEtats-Unis,laLibyen'aaucundroitou intérêtjuridiqueà obtenirce qu'elle
demande. Sa demande est donc irrecevable.
MonsieurlePrésident,Messieurs,je vousremerciedevotreattention. Avecvotre permission,
Monsieur le Président,je vous prie de bien vouloir appeler à la barre M. Matheson qui va
développerle caractère proprement préliminaire des objections des Etats-Unis.
The ACTING PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Zoller. 1 now give the floor to
Mr. Matheson.
Mr. MATHESON: Mr. President,DistinguishedMembers of the Court.The UnitedStates Preliminary Objections and Article 79
6.1. It is again my great honour and pleasureto appear before you on behalf of the United
States. In mypresentationthis moming,1will explain the reasonsfor Ourview that the Court can
and shouldact upon the objections of the United States at this preliminaryphase of the case.
6.2.The central facts ofthis proceedingarethat Libya hasnotpointedto any conductby the
United Statesthat wouldbe in violation of the Montreal Convention,and that Libya has asked the
Court for relief which is precluded by mandatory decisions of the Security Council under
Chapter VI1of the Charter. We have suggested four possibleways of analysing this case in light
e
of these central facts. In each,the logical resultisthe sarne- the complaintshouldbe dismissed.
6.3.Firs wt,have arguedthat the Courtlacksjurisdiction overthe claimsbroughtby Libya.
We have shownthat Libya never had a valid claim under the MontrealConvention. But even if
this were not true, any such claim has been superseded,pursuantto Article 103of the Charter, by
the binding decisions of the Security Councilthat imposed different substantive obligations. Al1
that remains is Libya'scomplaintthat the SecurityCouncil itselfacted unlawfully,which is not a
claim under the Montreal Convention,and is therefore not within the Court's jurisdictionin this
Case.
6.4. Second, we have argued that Libya'sclaims are inadmissible, even if the Court had
1
jurisdiction. Since those claims are, on their face, inconsistent with binding decisionsof the
Security Council, the Court could only accept Libya's claimsby reviewing andertuming the
Councii's decisions. As we have argued, the Court has no authority to overtum or modifj the
Council's decisions,and certainly has no authorityto overtum the Councii's determination
Chapter VI1that a threat to the peace had occurred, or its choice of measures to deal with that
threat. In any event, the Council'sdecisions in the present casewere clearly lawful and were
abundantly justified by the circumstancesTherefore, the relief requested by Libya would be
incompatible with the role ofthis Court, and in any event Libya has no standingto make a
request. Accordingly, Libya'sclaims are invalid and inadmissible. 6.5. Third, we have argued that the Court should decline to grant the relief sought by Libya
because its claims have been rendered moot by the decisions of the Security Council. Any
judgment by the Court in favour of the rights asserted under the Montreal Convention could have
no lawful effect on the rights and obligations of the parties in light of the Council's binding
decisions, and would, therefore, not be within the Court'sproperjudicial function. Accordingly,
pursuant to the Court'sdecision in the Northern Cameroons case (case concerning The Northern
Cameroons(Cameroon v. UnitedKingdom),Preliminary Objections,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1963,
p. 15)the Court should dismiss the Libyan claims.
6.6.Fourth, even if the Court were to conclude that it has and should exercisejurisdiction
and that Libya's claims are admissible, we have argued that the Court should nonetheless resolve
the case in substance now by deciding, as a preliminary matter, that the decisions of the
Security Council preclude the relief sought by Libya. The Court is under no compulsion to pass
on the merits of Libya'sclaims under the Montreal Convention if it believes, as we do, that those
claims are, as a matter of substantivelaw, superseded by the decisions of the Council, whether or
not those claims are valid under the terms of the Convention. Nothing precludes the Court from
decidingthe case insubstanceonthis basis,withouthaving to inquirefurther into Libya'sassertions
under the Convention.
6.7. Under each of these four ways of analysing the case, there are compelling reasons to
dismissLibya's cornplaintatthis preliminary stage. In Ourview,the objections ofthe United States
are valid preliminary objections under any of these four alternative analyses.
6.8.Article 79 of the Rules of Court defines the scope of objections which may be made at
this phase of the case. Specifically, paragraph 1 of Article 79 refers to "any objection by the
respondent to the jurisdiction of the Court or to the admissibility of the application, or other
objection the decision upon which is requested before any further proceedings on the merits".
6.9. The breadth of this Rule was deliberate. It was specifically intended to facilitate the
dispositionof as manymattersas possible at an early stageofthe proceedings. Priorto 1972,whenthe current form of Article 79 was adopted,the Courthad been criticized inthe General Assembly
for a tendencytojoin to themerits issueswhich couldhave been resolvedatthe preliminaryphase
(see,e.g., Report of the Sixth Committee, 11 December 1970, United NationsDoc. A.18238,US
Exhibit 52, p. 19). Prior to 1972,the Court had felt compelled to join preliminaryissues to the
meritswherethe determinationofapreliminaryobjectionrequired considerationof questionsoffact
or law that might bear a close relationshipto some of the issues on the merits of the case.
6.10. By contrast,the current Article 79 not onlypermits, but in fact encourages,the Court
to deal at the preliminary phase with al1objections raised by a respondent State before further
-
proceedings on the merits. As Judge Jiménez deAréchagawrote in 1973concerningthe current
Article:
"The new paragraph 6 is intended to provide a different solution to the
difficultiesthat inthe past havecompelledtheCourttojoin to the meritsa preliminary
objection conceming its jurisdiction.In the presence ofsuch an objection, the
Court ... would, according to paragraph 6, request the parties to argue at the
preliminarystagethose questions,even thosetouchingupon the merits, whichbear on
thejurisdictional issue." (EduardoJiménez deAréchaga,eAmendmentstotheRules
ofProcedureof theInternationalCourt ofJustice,67AJIL13(1973),US Exhibit 55.)
6.11.Each of the objectionsof the United Statescan readily be resolvedat this phase ofthe
proceedings. None requiresthe resolutionof disputedfacts or the considerationof evidence. Each
turnson separateand discrete legalquestions: the scopeof the MontrealConventionorthe binding
effect of the decisions of the Security Council.are matters which the Courtcan and should 1
decide now, rather than waiting for the completion of the merits phase.
6.12. Each ofthe objectionsof the United Statesis genuinelypreliminaryin character. The
off~cialhandbookof the Court, preparedby the Registryunderthe authorityofthe President,States
that preliminary objections may include arguments that the Court has no jurisdiction; that the
disputeno longer hasanyobject, wouldbe without practicaleffect, or wouldbe incompatiblewith
the role of a court; or thatthe Applicant State has no legaltto assertthe claims in question
(ICJ, TheInternationalCourt ofJustice(4th ed. 1996),p. 58). The United States arguesthat the
Libyan claims should be dismissed for preciselyese reasons. 6.13. Our arguments that the Court lacks jurisdiction and that the Libyan claims are
inadmissible are patently preliminary in character. Such arguments are expressly recognized as
preliminary by the language of Article 79. However, Article 79 is expressly not limited to issues
ofjurisdiction and admissibility, but also includes any "otherobjection thedecision upon which is
requested before any further proceedings on the merits".
6.14. Our argumentthat the Court should dismiss the Libyan claims because they have been
rendered moot by the decisions of the Council, is also clearly one of a preliminary character, in
accordancewith the NorthernCameroonsdecision. In that case, the Court found:
"Whetheror not at the moment the Application was filed there wasjurisdiction
in the Court to adjudicate upon the dispute submitted to it, circumstancesthat have
since arisen render any adjudication devoid of purpose. Under these conditions, for
theCourt to proceed hrther inthe case would not, in itsopinion, be a proper discharge
of its duties ... No purpose accordingly would be served by undertaking an
exarninationof the merits in the case for the purpose of reaching a decision which, in
the light of the circumstances to which the Court has already called attention,
ineluctablymust be made." (Caseconceming TheNorthern Cameroons (Cameroon v.
United Kingdom),PreliminaryObjections,Judgment,I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 38.)
Likewise, in the Nuclear Testscase, the Court treated a similar question of mootnessas one
of those "questionswhich may not be strictly capable of classificationas matters ofjurisdiction or
admissibility but are of such a nature as to require exarnination in priority to those matter (the
merits of the claim)"(Nuclearlests (Australiav. France),Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1974, p. 259).
6.15. Our finalargument - that the Court, if it exercisesjurisdiction, should first resolvethe
case in substanceby findingthatthedecisions ofthe Councilprecludetherelief sought by Libya -
is likewise preliminary in character. It does not depend on matters which would be at issue in
proceedings on the merits - such as the determination of responsibility for the destruction of
Pan Am 103or the propriety of trial of the suspects in United States courts. Rather, it addresses
matters that are separate and discrete - notably the legal effect of the decisions of the
Security Council. It would completelyresolvethe case, without any need to proceed to the merits
phase. 6.16. Now, in the Libyan Observationson the Preliminary Objections of the United States,
Libya argues that the United States objections are not preliminary in character, because their
resolution would require the Court torule on the applicability of the Montreal Convention and the
binding effects of resolutions of the Security Council (Observations and Submissions on the
Preliminary Objections Raised by the United States, paras. 5.2-5.13). We do not agree.
6.17. Nothing in the Rules or jurisprudence of the Court suggests that an objection is not
preliminary because it may involvethe interpretationor applicationof provisionsoftreaties or other
legal questions. On the contrary, paragraph 1 of Article 79 of the Rules of Court refers to "any
1
objection . . the decision upon which is requested before any further proceedings on the merits".
There is no exception for objections requiring the interpretation or application oftreaty provisions.
Paragraph 6ofArticle 79specifically States"theCourt,whenevernecessary,mayrequesttheparties
to argue al1 questions of law and fact, and to adduce al1 evidence, which bear on the issue".
Certainly this includes any interpretation of treaty provisions that is necessary for the resolution of
the objection.
6.18. Further, Libya's argument conflicts with the modem practice of the Court under
Article 79. The Court has on several recent occasions interpreted or applied treaty provisions in
the course of ruling on preliminary objections, and has clearly not consideredthat this in any way
w
negated the preliminary character of those objectionsor prevented the Court from acting on them.
6.19. For example, in its Judgment onthe Preliminary Objections ofthe United States in the
OilPlatformscase(caseconcerning OilPlatforms,Judgmentof12December1996),the Courtwent
in considerable detail into the interpretation and application of three central articles of the 1955
Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran,sustainingthe United States objections with
respect to two of them and declining to do so with respect to a third. In so doing, the Court
determined whether these specific articles created legal obligations for the parties, what the scope
and character ofthose obligations were, and whether they applied to the specific allegations made
by the Applicant State. Since this process was necessary to resolve the preliminary objection -in that case, concerning the jurisdiction of the Court under the 1955Treaty - it was perfectly in
order for the Court to rule on these questions during the preliminary phase of that case, and this in
no way detracted from the preliminary character of the objection.
6.20. Similarly, in the Genocidecase (case concerning Application oftheConventionon the
Prevention andPunishmentof the Crimeof Genocide,Judgmentof II July 1996), the Court had
to interpretthe Genocide Conventionand apply ittothe circumstancesofthe casebefore it, inorder
to decide whether it had jurisdiction. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the
Convention applied to acts allegedly occurring during interna1 armed conflict in territory not
controlled by the Respondent. This in no way altered the preliminary character of the objection
presented.
6.21.In both the Platformsand Genocidecases, the Court did not defer to the merits phase,
issues posed by the preliminary objections because their resolution required the interpretation and
application of substantiveprovisions of a treaty. Rather, the Court went straight to the substance
of the interpretive questions and resolvedthem. This was a sensible and direct way of proceeding,
which simplified each case by dealing at the outset with an issue that could otherwise have
consumed additional time and effort later. It gave proper effect to the language and purpose of
Article 79 of the Rules of Court.
6.22. The same is tme inthe present case. To the extentthat the resolutionofthe preliminary
objections of the United Statesrequiresthe Court to interpretand applythe United Nations Charter
or the Montreal Convention,this does not lead in anyway to the conclusion thatthe US objections
are not preliminary in character.
6.23. Theresolution of these matters at this preliminary phase wouldbe of substantial benefit
to the Court and to the Parties. If the Court upholds any of the objections of the United States, a
decision now would avoid the necessity for proceedings on the merits. Such proceedings would
undoubtedly be lengthy, would require the resolution of many difficult factual issues, and would
probe deeply into highly sensitive questions of national security and criminal conduct. Theexposure of evidence and witnesses in proceedings before the Court could raise questions of
prejudicial publicity or otherwise compromiseal trials at a later date.
6.24. Nopurposewould be servedforthe Courtto conductsuchan arduousproceeding,only
to fîndin the end that none of these matters are relevant becausethe decisions of the Councilhad
renderedthem al1moot.
6.25. So in conclusion, we believe that aion of the Court on the objections of the
United States atthis preliminarystagewouldbe perfectlyproperandconsistentwiththe Statuteand
Rulesof Court. We respectfully urge the Court to take such a decision.
-
Mr. President, 1nowsuggestthatthe Court invitethe USAgent, Mr. Andrews,to summarize
the arguments of the United States. Thank you, sir.
the ACTING PRESIDENT: Thankyou,Mr. Matheson. TheAgent ofthe United Stateswill
now have the floor.
Mr. ANDREWS: Mr. President, and distinguished Members of the Court.
7.1.1 will nowsummarizethe initialpresentationsof the United Statesin theseproceedings,
andinaddition addresscertaindamentalmis-statementsoftheUnited States'positionthatappear
in the Libyan Observations and Submissions on the Preliminary Objections raised by the
United States. u0
7.2.In Ourview, thesituationbeforethis Court is straightforward. Libya has assertedclaims
underthe Montreal Convention,which istheonlypossiblebasisforjurisdiction ofthe Courtinthis
case. However, Libya has not pointed to any conduct which would violate the Convention.
Further,Libya's claimsare inconsistentwith the binding decisions of the Security Council
ChapterVII, whichtakeprecedencepursuantto Article 103oftheCharter. Accordingly, Libyacan
onlymaintain itsclaimsbyattemptingto persuadethe Courtto review andoverturnthosedecisions
of the Council. 7.3. In its Order of 14 April 1992 concerning the Libyan request for the indication of
provisionalmeasures,theCourtdemonstratedthat it understoodthe situationquitewell. Inrejecting
the Libyan request, the Court made the following five essential points:
First, that "both Libya andthe United States, as Members of the United Nations, are obliged
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25
of the Charter" (case concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal ConventionArisingFrom theAerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyav. UnitedStates),
Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 126, para. 42);
Second, that "the Court, which is at the stage of proceedings on provisional measures,
considers that prima facie this obligation extends to the decisions contained in resolution
748 (1992)" (id.);
Third, that "in accordancewith Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the Parties in
that respect prevail overtheir obligationsunder any other internationalagreement, including
the Montreal Convention" (id.);
Fourth, that "the Court, while thus not at this stage called upon to determine definitively the
legal effectof Security Council resolution 748(1992), considersthat, whateverthe situation
previous to the adoption of that resolution, the rights claimed by Libya under the
Montreal Conventioncannot now be regardedasappropriatefortheprotectionofprovisional
measures" (id., para. 43); and
Fifth, that "an indication of the measures requested by Libya would be likely to impair the
rights which appear prima facie to be enjoyed by the United States by virtue of
Securiv Council resolution 748 (1992)" (id.,p. 127, para. 44).
7.4. Mr. President, the question that then remains is whether Libya has presented any
argument that would cause the Court to change thejudgment that it made, on a prima facie basis,
in its 1992 Order. We submit that Libya has not done so. 7.5. Certainly Libya has presentednothing that would refute the Court'sconclusion thatthe
.
Parties are obliged to cany out decisions of the Councilpursuant to Article 25 of the Charter, or
that such decisions take precedence over any inconsistent obligationsin the Montreal Convention
pursuant to Article 103of the Charter. These conclusions are a fundamental part of the Charter
system,withoutwhichthe Council'sauthorityand effectivenesswouldbe drasticallycompromised.
7.6. In Ourview,Libya hasalso has failedto make any cogentchallengeto the Court'sprima
faciefindingthat theseconclusionsapplyto the Council's decisionsin resolution 748. As wehave
shown, that resolution was plainly inconsistent with Libya's demandsin this case, since Libya's
J
insistence on investigation (and, hypothetically, trial) of the two accused in Libya directly
contradicts the Council'sdirection that they be promptly surrendered for trial in the UnitedStates
orthe United Kingdom. This is clearlythewaythat resolution 748wasunderstoodbythe Council
and by the parties to the proceedings when the resolution was adopted.
7.7. This leavesonly Libya's assertionthat resolution748was invalidand its request thatthe
Court review and overtum that decision. You have heard Ourarguments in opposition to this
request. Professors Schachter and Zoller have explained Our position that such review in a
contentiousproceedingwouldbeinconsistentwiththe fi-ameworkofthe Charterandthejurisdiction
of this Court. Mr. Crook has set forth Our view that the situation presented to the Council
d
abundantlyjustified its determination that there was a threat to peace,and its choice of measures
to deal with that threat.
7.8.1 would onlyaddthat Libya'srequestto this Court - in effect,thatthe Courtreview and
invalidate resolution 748- would bea step of fundamental significancethat would, in Ourview,
drasticallyalterthe existingrelationshipbetweenthe Courtandthe Council,tothe detrimentofboth
institutions.Ifthe Council'sdecisions under Chapter VI1concerningthe existence of a threat to
peace, and the measures to be adopted to deal with such a threat, were subject to review and
reversa1 by the Court, then the work of both the Court and the Council could be seriously
compromised. In particular,the invalidationby the Court of the Council'sdecisionsinthe presentcase would have a drarnatic and negative effect on the credibility of the Council'sactions to deal
with international terrorism.
7.9.Theviability ofthe Council's decisions under Chapter VI1rests invery largepart ontheir
acceptance by Statesas binding decisions of the United Nations which must be promptly complied
with. For exarnple, the effectivenessand security of United Nations peacekeeping missions depend
heavily on the prompt acceptance by States of a legal duty to comply with the Council decisions
on which they are based. The review and reversal of such a decision by any other body could
seriously compromise the authoritative character of those decisions in general, and gravely
complicatethe resolution of the threat to the peace inthe situation inquestion. Inparticular, review
of such decisions by the Court:could be expected (as in the present case) to take years, during
which period the validity and effectiveness ofCouncildecisions would hang indangerous suspense.
For this very reason, the framers of the Charter gave to the Council the responsibility for making
the determinations called for in Chapter VI1and rejected the notion ofjudicial review over those
determinations.
7.10. For the Court, there may appear to be a certain attractiveness in the prospect of
exercising a power of review over Council decisions. In practice, however, the Court would be
faced with the fact that the decisions made by the Council under Chapter VI1 are essentially
political in character and notamenable tojudicial standards andjudicial processes. In effect, the
Court would find itself in the midst of intensely political controversieswithout much prospect of
making meaningful legal decisions.
7.11. At thesame time, it is importantthat the record clearly show that it is not the case, as
Libya asserted in its Observations and Submissions on the Preliminary Objections Raised by the
United States, that the United States takes the position that the Council has unlimited power in
Chapter VI1 functions, unconstrained by any obligation to comply with the noms of the Charter
(Libyan Observations and Submissionson the PreliminaryObjections Raised by the United States,
pp. 60-63). As we have reiterated in these proceedings, the United States fully accepts that thepowers of the Council are limited by the provisions of the Charter. What we question is the --
propriety of judicial review of the Council'scompliancewith these provisions.
7.12. Likewise, it is not the case, as Libya asserted in its Observations,that resolution 748
was adopted "withthe manifest aim of preventingthe Court from doing its work andundermining
the rule of law"(id.p. 80). Wehave shown thatthe Council,in adopting resolution748,acted not
for the purpose of disrupting or pre-empting the Court's proceedings, but in response to the
Secretary-General'sreport to the Councilthat Libyahad failedto comply withthe Council's earlier
Chapter VI resolution. In doingso,the Councilacted as ithasdoneonmanyoccasionswherethere
was no involvementby the Court - that is,to follow a Chapter VI resolution witha Chapter VI1
decision when the Chapter VI measures had failed to bring aboutthe desired result. The fact that
this occurred in the present case at a time whenLibya'sapplicationwas pending beforethe Court
was the result of a Libyan attemptto pre-emptthe SecurityCouncilby prematurely proceedingto
the Court, and not a United Statesattempt to pre-emptthe Courtby prematurely proceeding tothe
Council. In the normal and propercourse ofevents,Libya would have waitedthe six-month period
prescribed in Article 14 of theontreal Convention before resortingto the Court, at which point
theCouncilwould long since haveadoptedaresolution,748,inaccordancewith itsnormal practice.
Mr. President,this concludesthe initialpresentationoftheUnited Statesintheseproceedings.
We thank the Court for its attention and consideration ofurarguments.
The ACTINGPRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Andrews. The Court will resume itssittings
on Friday to hear the oral submissions that will be presentedto it on behalf of the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya. The Court stands adjoumed until 10 o'clock Fridaymoming.
The Court rose ut 12.45 p.m.
Public sitting held on Wednesday 15 October 1997, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding