International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
Public si tting
held on Tuesday 1 March 1994, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Bedjaoui presiding
in the case concerning Maritime Delimi tation and Territorial Questions
Between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahrain)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNEE 1994
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 1.' mars 1994, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Bedjaoui, Président
en l'affaire de la Délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales
entre le Qatar et Bahreïn
(Qatar c. Bahrein)
COMPTE RENDU President Bedjaoui
Vice-President Schwebel
Judges Oda
Ag0
Sir Robert Jennings
Judges Tarassov
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Jiuyong
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Judges ad hoc Valticos
Ruda
Registrar Valencia-Ospinats ; M. Bedjaoui, Président
M. Schwebel, Vice-Président
MM. Oda
Ag0
sir Robert Jennings
MM. Tarassov
Gui11aume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Jiuyong
Fleischhauer
Koroma, juges
MM. Val ticos,
Ruda, juges ad hoc
M. Valencia-Ospina, Greffier -4-
The Government of Qatar is be represented by:
H.E. Dr. Najeeb Al-Nauimi, Minister Legal Adviser,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Adel Sherbini, Legal Expert,
as Legal Adviser;
Mr. Sami Abushaikha, Legal Expert,
as Legal Adviser;
Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professor of InternationalLaw at the
University of Paris 1,
Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles,
Mr. R. K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate, SupremeCourt of India,
Former President of the International BarAssociation,
Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G.,Q.C., Barrister at Law, Member of the
Institute of International Law,
Sir Francis Vallat, G.B.E., K.C.M.G., Q.C., Professor emeritus of
International Law at the University of London,
as Counsel and Advocates ;
Mr. Richard Meese, Advocate, partner in FrereCholmeley, Paris,
Miss Nanette E. Pilkington, Advocate, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Mr. David S. Sellers, Solicitor, Frere Cholmeley, Paris.
The Government of Bahrain is represented by:
H.E. Dr. Husain Mohammed Al Baharna, Minister of State for Legai
Affairs, Barrister at Law, Member of the International Law
Commission of the United Nations,
as Agent and Counsel ;
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor emeritus a
in the University of Cambridge,
Mr. Keith Highet, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and *
New York, -5-
Le Gouvernement du Qatar est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Najeeb Al-Nauimi, ministre conseiller juridique,
comme agent et conseil;
M. Adel Sherbini, expert juridique,
comme conseil 1er juridique;
M. Sami Abushaikha, expert juridique,
comme conseiller juridique;
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à
l'université de Paris 1,
M. Jean Salmon, professeur à l'Université libre de Bruxelles,
M. R. K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate à la Cour suprême
de l'Inde, ancien président de l'International Bar Association,
Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister at Law, membre de
1 'Institut de droit international,
Sir Francis Vallat, G.B.E., K.C.M.G., Q.C., professeur émérite de
droit international à l'université de Londres,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Richard Meese, avocat, associé du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à Paris,
Mlle Nanette E. Pilkington, avocat, du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à
Paris,
M. David S. Sellers, Solicitor, du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à Paris
Le Gouvernement de Bahreïn est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Husain Mohammed Al Baharna, ministre dtEtat chargé des
affaires juridiques, Barrister at Law, membre de la Commission du
droit international de l'Organisation des Nations Unies,
comme agent et conseil;
M. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., professeur émérite, ancien
titulaire de la chaire Whewell à l'université de Cambridge,
M. Keith Highet, membre des barreaux du district de Columbia et de
New York,Mr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Professorof InternationalLaw at
the Law School, Catholic University, Montevideo, Uruguay,
Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professorof
InternationalLaw and Director of the Research Centre for
InternationalLaw, University of Cambridge; Member of the Institut
de droit international,
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor emeritus atthe Université de droit,
d'économie et de sciences sociales de Paris,
as Counsel and Advoca tes ;
Mr. Donald W. Jones, Solicitor, Trowers & Hamlins, London,
Mr. John H. A. McHugo, Solicitor, Trowers & Hamlins, London,
Mr. ~avid Biggerstaff, Solicitor,Trowers & Hamlins, London,
as Counsel .M. Eduardo Jiménezde Aréchaga, professeur de droitinternational à
la faculté de droit de l'universitécatholique de Montevideo,
Uruguay,
M. Elihu Lauterpacht,C.B.E., Q.C., professeur honoraire dedroit
internationalet directeur du Research Centre for International Law
de l'universitéde Cambridge; membre del'Institut de droit
international.
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l'universitéde droit,
d'économie et de sciences sociales deParis,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Donald W. Jones, Solicitor, du cabinet Trowers et Hamlins à
Londres,
M. John H. A. McHugo, Solicitor, du cabinet Trowers et Hamlins à
Londres,
M. David Biggerstaff, Solicitor, ducabinet Trowers et Hamlins à
Londres,
comme consei1 S. -8-
Mr. PRESIDENT: Please beseated. The Sitting is open. 1 give the
floor to Mr. Shankardass. Please continue.
Mr. SHANKARDASS: Thank you. Mr. President, Membersof the Court,
before the Court rose for the day yesterday 1 was dealing with the
proceedings of the Tripartite Cornmitteeformed under the third paragraph
of the 1987 Agreement setup to work out the procedure for implementing
the Partiest cornmitment to bring their disputesto this Court.
The Court will recollect 1 had shown that the First Meeting was .
addressed on the two different methodsof approaching the Court. Because
of Bahrain's insistence that a special agreementwould be a more
appropriate way to approachthe Court, the Second, Third and Fourth
meetings considereddrafts of possible special agreements but no
agreement could be reached on a list of disputes that could be included
into such a single document. A kind of dead-lock situation had been
reached so that no meetings of the Committee were held for several
months. One question raised at these meetings whichhad remained
unanswered was whether therewas a way in which each party could place
its own separate claims before the Court.
Mr. President, I will now continuemy submission from the period a
few months after the Fourth Meeting.
(vii) The Bahraini formula
Eventually, as a result of a Saudi Arabian initiative (yetagain),
and after discussions during an exchange of visits of the Heirs Apparent
of Bahrain and Qatar to each other's country, the Heir Apparent ofBahrain transmitted tothe Heir Apparent of Qatar a general formulafor
reference of the disputesto the Courtwhich, the Court will have seen,
was in the following terms:
IlTheParties request theCourt to decide any matter of
territorial rightor other title or interest which may be a
matter of difference between them; andto draw a single
maritime boundarybetween their respective maritime areas of
seabed, subsoil and superjacentwaters." (See,MQ,
AIUI.11.29.)
(viii)The Fifth TripartiteConmittee Meeting
Mr. President, this proposed general formula was discussed at the
Fifth Meeting of the Tripartite Committee on 5 November 1988. Qatar
welcomed the proposed formulaas a good step forward, but its initial
reaction was that its scope was too wide. Qatar continuedto hold the
view that the subjects of the dispute had already beendefined in the
course of the Saudi Arabian Mediation.
Nevertheless,Qatar decided to seek certain clarificationsin regard
to the newly proposed general formulainow called the Bahraini formula).
It was also felt by the Meeting that it would be desirable to have the
Parties' legal advisers consider various questions relatingto the
formula beforethe next meeting of the Tripartite Committee
The Fifth Meetlng therefore endedon a somewhat optimistic note.
However, as the Court willhave seen from the pleadings and documents on
record, Prince Saud stated to the Meeting that he had been directed to
submit a report on the progress madeby the Committee and that King Fahd
considered the Cornmittee's mission wouldterminate by the date ofthe
forthcomingGCC Summit Meeting in December 1988 and he said "whetheror - 10 -
not it succeeded to achieve what was required from it" (see, CMB,
para. 3.50 and Minutes of the Fifth Tripartite Committee Meeting,Qatar's
T.C.M. Documents, p. 208).
(ix) The Sixth Tripartite Codttee Meeting
1 now turn to the closing stagesof the work of the Tripartite
Committee in December 1988. The Sixth and final meeting of this
Committee on 6 December 1988 was preceded by a meeting of thelegal
experts of both sides who discussed the scope of the Bahraini formula
Professor Jean Salmon will address the Court in more detail on the
implicationsof this discussion in his later presentation. Forthe
purpose of my submission it is only necessary forme to point out that
Dr. Al-Baharna informed the meeting that the Bahraini formula was meant
to be a "compromiseformula" to enable each Party to submit whatever
claims it wished concerningthe disputed mattersto the Court. The
Chairman of the meeting, SheikhAbdul Rahman Mansuri of Saudi Arabia,
expressed his understandingof Bahrain's proposal, i.e., its formula, in
the following words:
"Bahrainproceeds £rom the view that there is no agreement
to define particular pointsfor presentation to the Court. It,
therefore, proposes that a particular formulasatisfying both
Parties be reached, which will give the Court the jurisdiction
to consider any claims by them whether they relateto
sovereignty, rights or interests. Thus, the Parties go to the
Court not with defineddisagreementsbut by giving the Court
jurisdictionand power, and the disagreementswill be defined
there. " (Ibid., p. 238.)
Dr. Al-Bahrana himself offered a most significantclarification when
he observed:
"We are faced witha delicate problem which hinderedthe
two Parties from reachingan accepted formulafor the Special
Agreement for a whole year. That is Qatar's objection to the reference to Zubara, and the attitude of Bahrain regarding
Hawar. It is the sensitivityof this matter which has,
undoubtedly,made us propose this general formula." (Ibid.,
p. 242.)
1 would submit, Mr. President, that when Dr. Al-Baharna has himself
explained that the Bahraini formula was specifically devisedto enable
Bahrain to raise the subject of Zubarah in any way that it wished, it is
impossible to understandhow Bahrain can now cornplainit is unable to do
so merely because the formula is not incorporatedin a special agreement
and because Qatar has approached the Courtwith its own Application under
Article 38 of the Rules of Court. Bahrain itself admits in its
Counter-Memorialthat it is possible even fora special agreement to
provide that one party could commence proceedings before theCourt and
the other would respond (see,CMB, para. 5.22)
It is particularly interesting,Mr. President, to note that in fact
in justifying the general formulaDr. Al-Baharna spoke of Article 40 of
the Statute and the requirernents of Article 38 of the Rules of Court
ii.e.,for an application)rather than Article 39 which, the Court is
aware, concerns notificationof a special agreement.
Dr. Al-Baharna explained:
"1 would liketo make clear that inconsulting theStatute
and Rules of the 1I.C.J.(Article 40, Article 38) 1 did not find
any provision requirlng the two parties to a dispute to submit
it to the Court according to thegeneral traditional rule
referred toby the Qatari note. Moreover, the Statute gives
the two parties the full rightand freedom in selecting the
formula theyconsent to. Al1 that is required is that the
formula should contain two basic foundations: the subjectof,
and parties to thedispute." (See,Minutes of the Legal
Experts Meetings, Sixth Tripartite CommitteeMeeting, Qatar's
T.C.M. Documents, p. 234.)
Dr. Hassan Karnelfor Qatar read out and also dealt with the requirements
of Article 38 of the Rules of Court, in particular theneed "to specify - 12 -
the precise natureof the clairn" in an application,as provided by
&ticle 38, paragraph 2 (ibid.,p. 239). It is of interest to note that
in this discussion that took place at a Legal Experts Meeting, Article 39
dealing with a special agreement was not referred to. What the parties
were now talking about was not a joint subrnission but simply giving the
Court jurisdictionand thereafter enabling each party to specifythe
precise nature of its claims and present them to the Court in accordance
with the requirernent of its Rules.
It was in this context thatQatar at that stage expressed some
doubts as to whether the Bahraini general formula was specific enough. I
For this reason, Qatar proposed an arnendedversion of the general formula
and also suggested that the formula could have two annexes attachedto
it; each State could define in its annex the subjects of dispute it
wanted to refer to the Court. Dr. Al-Baharna described this asa very
uconstructiveproposal" (ibid., p. 242) but stated he was not authorized
to accept it.
When this proposa1 was placed beforethe meeting of the Tripartite
Committee later on in the day, both Bahrain and Qatar declared that
neither would sign the other's annex. This demonstratesthat the Parties
simply could not reach an agreement on the specific subjects of dispute w
that the other would wish to refer to the Court. However, at the end of
the Meeting, Bahrain sought further timeto consider Qatar's amendrnents.
Bahrain contends in its pleadings (see,CMB, para. 6.29) that the
signed Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Tripartite Cornmitteerecorded
the Parties' "agreement"on the subjects of dispute to be referred to the
Court. Mr. President, a mere reading of theMinutes shows this clairnto
be wholly unfounded. These Minutes record theterms of the Bahraini - 13 -
formula, the amended version suggestedby Qatar, Qatar's proposa1 of
attaching twoAnnexes, and the Bahraini request for time to consider the
Qatari amendments. If there was any agreementat all, it was to the
effect that even under the Bahraini Formula (either with or without the
Qatari amendments), the subjects to be raised before the Court would be
"confined"to the list mentioned in the Minutes. Furthermore, while
"Zubarah"is included in this listat item (l), which Bahrain claimsis
an agreed list, item (3) records Qatar's disagreement that:
"if the content of the dispute regardingZubarah related to
sovereignty over the area, then it would not agree to its
inclusion in the subjects to be referred"
and Bahrain's position that it would make "the most unrestrictedmaximum
possible claimsn (see,Signed Minutes of the Sixth Tripartite Committee
Meeting, Qatar's T.C.M. Documents, pp. 282-283).
In any event, Bahrain's contention is not consistent withthe
statement in its Counter-Memorial (see,CMB, para. 7.7) that "as late as
the Sixth Tripartite meeting on 6 December 1988 the Parties had reached
no agreement". As 1 have just explained, the signed Minutes of
7 December 1988 and the fact that the Tripartite Committeeceased to
function from that date 1s further evidenceof the failure of the Parties
to reach any agreementeven at the Sixth Meeting of the Committee.
As 1 have said, Bahrain soughttlme to consider Qatar's amendments
to the Bahraini formula and its proposals of two annexes. However,
without any explanation orexcuse, Bahrain failedto react or respondto
these proposals either up to the time of the GCC Summit two weekslater,
when the Tripartite Committeeceased to function, or indeed at any time
thereafter. Thus, the exercise, initiated at Bahrain's proposa1 in
January 1988, to implement the 1987 Agreement by way of a Special - 14 -
Agreement, ended in failure; and in view of King Fahd's direction
terminating its deliberations, the Tripartite Committee ceased to
function - facts which Bahrain simplyfails to address. 1 would
emphasize, however, that in spite of these developments, thereis no
evidence that it was ever in the contemplationof the Parties thatthe
1987 Agreement to refer the dispute to the Court.wouldbe abandoned or
rendered invalid merely because no special agreementwas signed.
The proceedings of the Tripartite Cornmitteedid however have one
positive feature.
This was that bothQatar and Bahrain had accepted the factthat
whatever method was eventuallychosen for "communicatingwith" the Court
would, instead of a joint submission,have to enable each of the Parties
to put forward its own claims to the Court which (in the words of Dr. Al-
Baharna) "would be left to the Courtto decide upon" (ibid.,pp. 235-6).
In view of Dr. Al-Baharna's explanationsof the scope of the Bahraini
formula that 1 have just referred to, 1 respectfullysubmit,
Mr. President and Members of the Court, it had become immaterialwhether
the reference to the Court was by notificationof a special agreement or
by application. The Parties weresimply not going to be able to agree on
a list of specific subjects of dispute to be incorporated ina single
document making a joint submission. It was this situation that the Doha
Agreement eventually dealt with.
(XI 1988-1990: Purther Saudi efforts to eettle the dispute
After the conclusion of the Sixth Tripartite CommitteeMeeting and
the GCC Sumrnit,it will be seen from the pleadings of the Parties that
the matter was discussed again at the GCC SurnmitMeeting in Bahrain in
December 1988, which followed that meeting. A meeting which was not only - 15 -
final but a most undecisivemeeting. At this GCC Meeting, it was agreed
that Saudi Arabia be givena further periodof six months to see if it
could secure an agreement on the substanceof the disputes through its
rnediation. No agreement was achievedduring the whole of 1989 and the
unresolved situation was discussed again at the GCC Sumrnitin Muscat in
December 1989. Once again, it was agreed to try to achieve a resolution
on the substanceof the disputes through the Saudi mediation. These
efforts continueduntil the next Summit Meetingin Doha in December 1990.
There were, of course, during these two years, no meetings of the
Tripartite Committeeas it had ceased to function at the GCC Summit in
December 1988.
4. THE DOHA AGREEMENT
(il The 1990 Summit Meeting
Mr. President and Members of the Court, by the time of the next GCC
Summit Meeting in Doha in December 1990, Qatar had been seeking
resolutionof its disputes with Bahraln for over 40 years. This issue
had been raised at every GCC Surnrnit since 1987, but without any effective
resolution. The Tripartite Cornritteeconstitutedunder the third
paragraph of the 1987 Agreement nad ceased to function two years earlier.
The Doha Summit was held in the rnidstof the crisis following upon the
invasion and occupaticn of Kuwalt by Iraq - a situation which led
everyone presentto be conscious of the urgent need topeacefully resolve
al1 boundary disputes betweenthe member States.
Qatar had been deeply disappointedthat its disputes with Bahrain
had not been resolvedduring the preceding two yearsof Saudi mediation
and articulatedits frustrationat the opening sessionof the Summit - 16 -
Meeting in strong terms. In the course of the discussionsthat followed,
Bahrain soughta further extensionof Saudi mediation withouta
time-limit, to which Qatar was strongly opposed. During the discussions
several suggestionswere made and, eventually, an understanding emerged
that the decision to refer the disputes to the Court shouldnow be
implemented. To facilitate such submission, Qatarannounced it would
accept the Bahraini fonnula as a definition of the subject and scope of
the disputes to be adjudicatedby the Court. Qatar thus decided it would
deal with any claims Bahrainmight make under the Bahraini formula.
Bahrain wrongly statesin its Counter-Mernorial (see, CMB, para. 1.9) that
Qatar began by insisting that the Saudi efforts to achievea solution
should terminate in May 1991 after which the Parties shouldbe free to
take the matter to the Court. In fact, Bahrain's Foreign Minister
confirms in his Staternentfiled with the Counter-Memorial,that it was
His Majesty Sultan Qaboos of Oman who made this suggestion, i.e., that
before the submission was made to the Court, a further period up to the
end of Shawwal imid-May 1991) should be granted to Saudi Arabia to see if
a solution on the merits could be achieved; if no such solution was
reached during this period, the distinguished Foreign Minister states
"the matter might proceed to the I.C.J." (see,CMB, Vol. II, p. 160).
This suggestionwas accepted by the Parties and it was also agreed that
the Saudi mediationwould continue even after the submission to the Court
and that the case be withdrawn from the Court if a mutually-agreed
solution was achieved. It was this understandingwhich emergedat the
Summit meeting thatled to theagreement between Qatarand Bahrain which
was recorded in the Doha Agreement of 25 December 1990. The accuracy of - 17 -
Qatar's report of the observations ofKing Fahd of Saudi Arabia and the
Sultan of Oman to this effect, contained inQatar's Memorial, has not
been challengedby Bahrain.
As also explained in Qatar's Memorial, it was Oman which took on the
main work of helping to implement theunderstanding reachedat the
GCC SurnmitMeeting. It was Oman which producedthe draft of the
Doha Agreement. It was Oman which undertookthe negotiations with Qatar
and Bahrain which resulted inthe final text of the Doha Agreement that
was also signed by Saudi Arabia in the contextof its role under the
Framework and as a guarantor of the 1987 Agreement, under paragraph 4 of
that Agreement.
Mr. President, the Doha Agreement wasseen as a final resolutionof
the problem in the way of implementing the 1987 Agreement andof
resolving al1 the disputes between the partiesin terms of the Framework
"comprehensivelytogether". There was no question of any further
negotiations to reacha Special Agreement.
Dr. Al-Baharna,who had so strenuously advocatedthe proposa1 to
approach the Courtby a Special Agreement atthe first meetingof the
Tripartite Committeein January 1988 and had said "what is required is a
special agreement specifying the disputed points", had since lucidly
explained theadequacy of the Bahraini general formula interms of
Article 38 of the Rules of Court by showing thatit would enable each
party to raise its own separate claims before the Court. In
December 1990 he no longer foundit necessary to suggest thatthe
Doha Agreement, which evidencedthe acceptance by both Parties of the
Bahraini Formula, should specifythe need fora Special Agreementor for
the incorporationof the Bahraini Formula in such an agreement. The - 18 -
Bahraini Formula by its very terms was capableof standing on its own and
was understood andaccepted as such.
Both Qatar and Bahraindeclare in their pleadings that each was most
anxious to ensure inclusion of the reference to the Bahraini formula and
its acceptance by Qatar in the Doha Agreement. (see, CMB, para. 6.71 and
RQ, para. 3.62). 1 respectfully submit, Mr. President and Members of the
Court, that this was obviously to ensure that each could raise its own
claims before the Court. Each Party was seeking to secure and secured
the other's consent to the Bahraini formula, which, in turn, 1 submit
sustains the Court's jurisdictionto deal with Qatar's application.
(ii) Evente following the 1990 GCC Sudt Meeting
Let me now turn, Sir, briefly, to the events thatfollowed the
Doha Agreement. In accordancewith the provisions of the Doha Agreement,
Saudi Arabia duly enteredupon further effortsto bring about a
settlement of the matters in dispute betweenQatar and Bahrain. However,
because these efforts were unsuccessful,the Amir of Qatar wrote to
King Fahd on 6 May 1991 informing him that as the agreed period was
approaching its end, Qatar intendedto go to the Court after its expiry
(see,MQ, Ann. 11.34). The Foreign Ministerof Bahrain confirmsin his
Statement amexed to Bahrain's Counter-Memorial isee, CMB, Vol. II,
Ann. 1.25, p. 165) that King Fahd told the Amir of Bahrain at a meeting
on 3 June 1991 "that he had been approachedseveral times by the Amir of
Qatar regardingthe matter ..." but that he hadasked him "not to be in
such a rushv - a comment whichobviously related-tothe reference to this
Court and not to a settlement by Mediation which was to continue in any
event even after the reference to the Court. - 19 -
After a meeting with King Fahd on 5 June 1991, the Amir of Qatar
agreed in a letter to the King of 18 June to give Bahrain threemore
weeks to respondto Qatar's most recent proposals to settlethe dispute
after which Qatarsaid it would go to the Court (see,MQ, Ann. 11.35).
Having received no response, Qatar filedits Application on 8 July 1991.
Thus, Mr. President, King Fahd was informedseveral times (and twice
in writing) of Qatar's intention to go to the Court. At no time did the
King suggest thatQatar was not entitledto go to the Court or should not
do so.
Let me turn to another event that Bahrain refers to (see, CMB,
paras. 7.22 and 7.33 and RejB, para. 1.14) which it regards as
significant,and that is that in September 1991, i.e., after Qatar had
filed its Application in the Court, Saudi Arabia submitted to both
parties a suggested "compromise"Special Agreement. Bahrain claims that
Saudi Arabia therefore perceived therh ead been no agreement betweenthe
parties at Doha to abandon the search for a Special Agreement; and
furthermorethat Saudi Arabia's action is incompatible withQatar's
assertion that the work of the Tripartite Committeehad terminated in
failure in December 1988 (see,RejB, para. 4.24). 1 would respectfully
draw the Court's attention to the following aspects in consideringthe
validity of Bahrain's argument:
(a) Saudi Arabia did not attempt to convene a meeting of the Tripartite
Committee after December 1988 or even after September 1991 to
consider any further draftsof a possible Special Agreement. In
fact it was at the instance of King Fahd that the workof the
Committee was terminated in December 1988. Furthermore, neither
Qatar nor Bahrain made any attempt to summon a meeting of the - 20 -
Cornmitteeafter that date, nor after the Doha Agreement, either to
consider the September 1991 Draft or any other procedural stepsfor
referring the caseto the Court.
(b) The circumstancesin which the so-called September draft was sent
also bear mention. By letter of 23 August 1991 to the Registrar of
this Court, Bahrain announced its refusa1 to attend a meeting of the
Parties' Agents (calledunder Article 31 of the Rules of Court) with
the Presidenton 26 August 1991 claiming "it would be inappropriate
for it to participate in a meeting whichproceeds on the assumption
that Qatar has filed a valid Applicationw. After the Registrarof
the Court explained the legal position in his letter of
26 August 1991, Bahrain agreed to attend the proposed meeting with
the President which was eventually held on 2 October 1991. It was
just before this meeting that the so-called "September 1991 draft"
of a Special Agreement madeits appearanceand reached Qatar in a
very strange manner. by facsimile,and without the covering
Memorandum that Bahrain claims was sent to both Parties. Even the
copy of the Memorandum now filed by Bahrain is undated. Until now,
Qatar has not received the so-called Memorandum
(cl The recent attemptby Bahrain initiatedat the begiming of this year
and shortly before the openrng of these oral hearings, to secure the
leave of the Court under Article 56 of the Rules of Court forthe
production of further correspondence betweenthe mir of Bahrain and
King Fahd of Saudi Arabia is a further sign of Bahrain's efforts to
involve Saudi Arabia inthe present proceedings before the Court.
This attempt is certainly not consistent with what Prince Saud of
Saudi Arabia declaredas early as at the Second Meeting of the - 21 -
Tripartite Comrnittee, which was that Saudi Arabia's role "was
limited to proposing certainideas with the expresspurpose of
avoiding any exploitationof Saudi mediation to strengtheneither
partyls position at the expense of the other party" (see,RejB,
p. 129).
In al1 these circumstances,Mr. President,Qatar cannot but raise a
number of questions with respect tothe so-called "September 1991 draft"
of a Special Agreement. 1s it conceivable that Saudi Arabia would have
itself entered upon an exercise to draft a Special Agreement (something
it had never attempted during the life of the defunct Tripartite
Committee)? 1s it possible that Saudi Arabia would take this initiative
after King Fahdhad been informed "severaltimes" by the Amir of Qatar of
Qatar's intention to take the disputes to this Court after the expiry of
the deadline - with no objection £rom King Fahd? Or that it would
transmit it to the Parties in such a casual manner? Was the whole thing
a ploy enqineered by Bahrain to distract the Courtby raising the "Aeyean
Sea case" type of argument? Frankly, Mr. President, Qatar is simply
mystified and left only with these questions.
Qatar suggeststhat this draftis not only strictly speaking
irrelevant to the issues before the Court but also that in the
circumstancesit is impossible to infer anything either aboutits
provenance or its alleqed significance.
CONCLUSION
Mr. President,Members of the Court, 1 submit with great respect
that the circumstancesthat 1 have outlined clearlyestablish that there
was never any question onceBahrain and Qatar had been helped by the
Mediator to conclude the 1987 Agreement that theirdisputes would not be - 22 -
submitted to this Court for adjudication if they could not conclude a
Special Agreement. 1 believe, Sir, 1 have shown that both Parties
understood the 1987 Agreement as recording their commitmentto refer
their disputes to the Court and the work of theTripartite Committee to
be directed only to "conLider the procedures" by which their commitment
to make the reference couldbe implemented (see,RB, Ann. 1.1, p. 83).
The formation of the Tripartite Committee forthis purpose could in no
sense be regarded as transformingthat commitment to makethe reference
or turning it into a conditional one.
In conclusion,Mr. President, and Members of the Court, 1 believe
that the events describedby me show the following:
(il By accepting the Saudi Framework in 1983 with the amended.Fifth
Principle, Bahrain and Qatar agreed to have their long-standing
disputes decided accordingto internationallaw.
(ii) Under the 1987 Agreement the Parties made a firm and
acknowledged commitmentto refer the disputes to this Court.
iiii) In an effort to agree on the procedure for the reference to the
Court the Parties made an attempt to finalize a Special
Agreement throughthe Tripartite Committee;but the attempt
failed. This situation was finally resolved by the Doha
Agreement, whereby each Party consentedto the other moving the
Court in terms of the Bahraini formula aftera further short
period of SaudiMediation up to May 1991.
Mr. President andMernbersof the Court, it only remains forme to
say again what a very great honourand a privilege and a pleasure it has
been for me to address the Court as counsel for The State of Qatar, and - 23 -
to express my very deep gratitude for the attention and the patient
hearing you have given me.
May 1 suggest, Mr. President, that it would now be appropriate to
cal1 upon Sir Ian Sinclair to address the Court on the next part of the
submissions for the State of Qatar. Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Shankardass. 1 give the floor to
Sir Ian Sinclair.
Sir Ian SINCLAIR:
THE STATUS OF THE DOHA MINUTES OF DECENBER 1990
Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is my task this morning to
address the Court on the status of the Doha Minutes of 25 December 1990,
and related issues. In referring to this written instrument as "the Doha
Minutes", 1 am not to be taken as detracting in any way £rom Qatar's
basic contention that these Minutes constitute a binding international
agreement. I will, of course, enlaroe on this point in a minute. Having
regard to the written pleadings of the Parties, it would seem that the
following are the more important questions that require analysis in
relation to the status and iegal effect of the Doha Minutes:
(1) First, whether the Doha Minutes constitute an international
agreement binding on Bahrain and Qatar.
(2) Secondly, whether, if so, they constitute a "treaty" or "convention"
within the meanlng of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute.
(3) Thirdly, whether the Foreign Mlnisters of Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi
Arabia had capacity to enter into an international agreement of the - 24 -
kind constituted by the Doha Minutes without the need to produce
full powers.
(4) Fourthly, whether the agreement constituted by the Doha Minutes
entered into forceon signature.
(5) Fifthly, assuming that the Doha Minutes do constitute a binding
international agreement in force between Bahrain andQatar, whether,
in the circumstances, Bahrain is entitled to invoke the fact that
its consent to be bound by that agreement has been expressedin
violation of Bahrain8s constitutional requirements, thereby
invalidatingthat consent.
1 will deal with the first four questions; and ProfessorSalmon, who
will follow me, will address the fifth question.
1. Do the Doha Minutes constitute an international agreement
binding on Bahrain and Qatar?
The Court will needno reminding that there existsno generally
accepted definition in customary internationallaw of what is an
internationalagreement. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
incorporatesa definition of the term "treaty"as follows:
"an internationalagreement concluded betweenStates in written
form and governed by internationallaw, whether embodied ina
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever itsparticular designationu.
But this definition, as the Court will beaware, is expressly stated
to be "for the purposes of the present Conventionu,so it does not
purport to be all-embracing. For example, it deliberatelyomits
internationalagreements concluded between Statesand international
organizationsor internationalagreements concludedbetween two or more
internationalorganizations. Other definitionsof the term I'treaty" have been suggestedby
distinguished writers. Thus, Lord McNair used the term "treaty" to
denote :
"a written agreement by which twoor more States or
internationalorganisationscreate or intend to create a
relation between themselves operatingwithin the sphere of
international law" (McNair,Law of Treaties, 1961, p. 2).
Paul Reuter utilized a broader definition in his magisterial work on
the law of treaties:
"A treaty is an expression of concurring wills attributable
to two or more subjects of international law and intended to
have legal effects under the rules of internationallaw."
(Reuter,Introduction to the Law of Treaties, 1989, (English
translation of a revised version ofthe 2nd. ed. published in
French in 1985), p. 23.)
Finally, Mme Suzanne Bastid finds three elements which serveto
distinguisha "treaty" from other internationalinstruments. According
to Mme Bastid, a treaty is an agreement betweenStates, it is designed to
have legaleffects and it is governed by internationallaw (Bastid, Les
traités dansla vie internationale, 1985, pp. 19-22) .
The commentariesto the final set of draft articleson the law of
treaties prepared by the InternationalLaw Commission shed some light on
the definition of the term "treaty" for the purposes of the Vienna
Convention. For example, it 1s stated ln the commentary to the
definition of "treaty"which was incorporated withoutchange in the final
text of the Vienna Convention:
"The term 'treaty'is used throughout the draft articlesas
a generlc term coverlng al1 forms of internationalagreement in
writing concluded betweenStates. Although the term 'treaty1
in one sense connotes onlythe single forma1 instrument, there
also exist internationalagreements, such as exchanges of
notes, which are not a single forma1 instrument,and yet are
certainly agreementsto which the law of treaties applies.
Similarly, very many single instrumentsin daily use, such as
an 'agreed minute' or a 'memorandumof understanding',could not appropriately be calledformal instruments, but they are
undoubtedly international agreements subject to the law of
treaties" . (Reports of the InternationalLaw Commission, 1966,
p. 21.)
The Commission goes on in its comrnentary to explain why it preferred to
use the term "treaty" rather than "internationalagreement":
"First, the treaty in simplified form, far from
being at al1 exceptional, is very common, and its use
is steadily increasing. Secondly, the juridical
differences, in so far as they really exist at all,
between formal treaties and treaties in simplified
form lie almost exclusively in the method of
conclusion and entry into force." (Ibid.)
Thus, there can be little argument with the proposition that the
term "treatyU is normally used in a generic sense as encompassing al1
types of internationalagreement, whatever be the designation of the
particular instrument or instruments. In the recently published
ninth edition of Oppenheim, the learned editorsdraw attention to a
number of features in the Vienna Convention definition. 1 need not
reproduce them all, but the following perhapsmerit attention:
"(1) 'Treaty'is given a generic meaning, rather than a meaning
limited to one particular form of internationalagreement.
(2) Whether or not an instrumentconstitutesa treaty does not
depend on its designation ...
[Iomit (311
(4) The agreementmust be governed by internationallaw. So
agreements subject to some national system of law will not
constitute treaties, even though the parties are states, or
perhaps more usually in these circumstances, government
departments of different states ...
(5) In addition to the traditional formof treaties - i.e.,
treaties negotiatedand signed expressly on behalf of the
Head of State by virtue of full powers received from him -
treaties may be concluded betweengovernments or
departments of governments ..." (Oppenheim'sInternational
Law, Ninth Ed. (Jenningsand watts), Vol. 1, Parts 2-4
(1992),pp. 1199-1200.) - 27 -
The editors of the ninth editionof Oppenheim go on to point out
that the ViennaConvention definitionof the term "treatyvdoes not
assist very much with the answer to the question whethera particular
instrument is "an internationalagreement ... governed by international
lawu. They continue:
"It is suggested that the decisive factoris still whether
the instrument is intendedto create internationallegal rights
and obligations betweenparties - an element which the
international Law Commission regardea ds embraced within the
phrase 'governedby internationallawl. The existence of such
an intention will need to be determined in the lightof al1 the
circumstancesof each case. The registrationof an instrument
with the United Nations may imply that it was intended and
understood to be a treaty." (Op. cit., p. 1202.)
Now, these being the broadly acceptedcriteria which serve to
distinguish treaties (in the generic sense) £rom other international
instruments ortransactions,how should onecharacterisethe Doha Minutes
We know that Bahraindenies that theDoha Minutes constitute an
internationalagreement. The Bahraini contention is rather that they
were no more than a diplomatic documentand "non-bindingin character"
(CMB,para. 6.80). Now, let us look at this contention rather more
closely, in the llght of existing doctrineand practice. The fact that
the Doha Minutes are designated as "minutes"is, of course, far from
being evidencethat they do not constitute an internationalagreement.
Even Bahrain does not seek to deny that an international agreementcan
take the formof agreed minutesof meetings (MCB,para. 6.3). Qatar
equally does not dispute that agreed minutescan be so formulated asto
evidence the intention of the States concernednot to regard those agreed
minutes as constitutinga binding internationalagreement. Now, the
Court will be aware that, in the 1970s, the Institute of InternationalLaw took up a topic entitled (a rather lengthytitle) "International
Texts of Legal Import in the Mutual Relations ofTheir Authors and Texts
Devoid of Such Importu. 1 apologize for the title, it is not my
responsibility. The late and highly respectedMichel Virally acted as
Rapporteur on the topic, which led to the adoption of a resolution of the
Institute at its Cambridge sessionin 1983. The resolution was
essentially of a procedural nature, and in particular the Instituteas a
collective body took no position on the conclusions presentedby the
Rapporteur. But some of the conclusions suggested by MichelVirally are
of interest in the context of the present case and deserve to be
recalled. Thus, he proposes, as paragraph 1 of his conclusions,a
definition of internationaltexts of legal import in the following terms:
"International textsof legal importin the relations
between their authors include, irrespectiveof their form:
fa) texts by which their authors agree to define, to amend or
to revoke legal commitments;
(b) texts by which their authors agree to produce other legal
effects, whatever theirnature, such as the establishment
of a legal frameworkfor future action of the parties, the
creation of an organ or institutional mechanismlikely to
act at the legal level, the recognitionof a specific legal
situation or claim, and the recognitionof the legal
authority of principles or rules of internationallaw."
By way of contrast, the Rapporteur seeks to define international
texts devoid of legal import in paragraph 4 of his conclusions in the
following terms:
"Subject to what is stated in paragraphs 5 and 6, texts
containing commitments which States that accepted them intended
to be binding solely at the political level andwhich have al1
their effects at that level do not constitute textsof legal
import in the mutual relations between theirauthors. However,
a specific text, whatever its name, may contain at the same
time provisions of a legal character within the meaning of
paragraph 1 and purely political commitments withinthe meaning
of the preceding sub-paragraph." - 29 -
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Rapporteur's conclusionsare not
immediatelyrelevant in the contextof the present proceedings. But
paragraphs 7 and 8 are perhaps relevant.
Paragraph 7 provides that commitments set forth in the text of an
international treatywithin the meaning of the Vienna Convention are
legal comrnitments unless it follows unquestionably£rom that text that
the intention was to the contrary.
And paragraph 8 provides more significantly:
"The legal or purely political character of a commitment
set forth in an internationaltext of uncertain character
depends upon the intention of the parties as may be established
by the usual rules of interpretation,including an examination
of the terms used to express such intention, the circumstances
in which the text was adopted and the subsequentbehaviour of
the parties."
How do the Doha Minutes fit into these prescriptions? TheVirally
conclusions donot of course amount to a treaty text, and it would be a
rnistaketo interpret themas if they were. But, even with this
qualification,Qatar is firmly of the view that the Doha Minutes
constitute an international text of legal import within the intended
scope of paragraph 1 of the Virally conclusions. Their effect is to
confirm and supplement the legal commitmentsalready entered intoby
Qatar and Bahrain by virtue of the 1987 Agreement, and indeed toproduce
other legal effects such as the fixing of a time-limit after which the
dispute betweenthe Parties couldbe referred to the Court; and this
quite irrespectiveof whether the reference to the Court shouldbe by the
Parties jointly or by each of the Parties individually. Bahrainwould
appear to be contending that the Doha Minutes embody "purely political
cornrnitrnent s" that expressionis described inparagraph 4 of the
Virally conclusions. But this can hardly be reconciled with the fact - 30 -
that the Doha Minutes confirmand indeed build upon the legal commitments
already embodiedin the 1987 Agreement; and the Court will, of course,
recall that Bahrain does not, in relation to the 1987 Agreement, dispute
"the existence of an agreement in the terms of the Saudi Arabian
proposalstt (CMB, para. 5.9). An alternative argumentmight be
constructed to the effect that the Doha Minutes constitutewhat Virally
would refer to as an "internationaltext of uncertain character"as
described in paragraph 8 of his conclusions. Qatar would strongly
dispute this, but, even applying this test, would submit that the legal
character of the comrnitments entered into by Qatar and Bahrainby virtue
of the Doha Minutes is wholly confirmed by:
(a) an examination of the terms used to express the intention of the
parties;
(b) the background against whichthe text was negotiated;
(cl the circumstancesin which the text wasadopted; and
(dl the subsequent behaviour of the parties.
As regards the examination of the terms used to express the
intention of the parties, the reaffirmationof what had been agreed
previously between the parties certainly covered the legal comrnitment of
both Qatar and Bahrain, expressed in paragraph 1 of the 1987 Agreement,
that al1 the disputed matters shouldbe referred to the present Court for
a final ruling; the agreement that "the parties" would be at liberty to
submit the natter to the Court after 15 May 1991 is self-evidently a
cornmitment of a legal character, and this is irrespectiveof the dispute
between Qatar and Bahrain as to whether the phrase "the parties" is to be
interpretedconjunctivelyor disjunctively; and the recording of the - 31 -
acceptance by Qatar of the Bahraini formula is self-evidentlythe written
expression of a legal commitmentundertaken by Qatar.
As regards the background againstwhich the text was negotiated, it
is self-evidentthat the would-be interpreterof a treaty must bear in
mind that backgroundin seeking to determine the meaning of the terms
used in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the
treaty. The background willbe of particular significance in
ascertaining the object and purpose of the treaty. In stressingthe
importanceof the historical backgroundto the treaty, one noted
authority has commented:
"11 s'agit du cadre historiqueque forme l'ensemble des
événements qui ont porté les parties à conclure le traité pour
maintenir ou confirmer le statu quo ou apporter un changement
qu'une nouvelle conjoncture nécessite." (Yasseen,
"L'interprétationdes traitésd'après la Convention de Vienne
sur le droit des Traités", 151 Recueil des Cours (1976-1111,
p. 90.)
Now, any objective observer called uponto consider the historical
background to the signature of the Doha Minutes in 1990 will inevitably
focus on certain key events. These events include:
(1) the unfortunate failure of Saudi Arabia to secure a substantive
solution to the disputes between Bahrain andQatar, notwithstanding
repeated attempts made over 11 years of the mediation effort between
1976 and 1987;
(2) the initiative taken by Saudi Arabia in 1987 leading to the
conclusion of the 1987 Agreement;
(3) the setback to the process of referring the disputed matters to the
Court occasionedby the terminationof the work of the Tripartite
Comrnittee at the end of 1988 without havingdischarged the mandate
entrusted to it by virtue of paragraph 3 of the 1987 Agreement; and - 32 -
(4) the subsequent lack of any progress by Saudi Arabia in 1989 and 1990
to achieve, through its mediationefforts, any agreement on the
substance of the disputes between Qatarand Bahrain.
Our notional objective observerwould no doubt have anticipated in these
circumstancesthat a major effort wouldbe made at the GCC summit meeting
in Doha in December 1990, to breathe new life into the agreed proposa1
that the matters in dispute between Bahrain and Qatarshould be referred
to this Court; and our notional objective observer would not have been
mistaken.
This brings me to a considerationof the circumstancesin which the
text of the Doha Minutes was adopted. Here, 1 would like to begin by
drawing attentionto what Mr. SherlockHolmes might have referredto as
"the strange episodeof the appearance of Dr. Al-Baharna at Doha". In so
characterizingthis episode, 1 intend no disrespect to the distinguished
Agent for Bahrain. The point 1 wish to makeis, however, of some
significance. The Court will be aware that Bahrain has sought to develop
the argument that the Doha Minutes are not a binding agreement, are
indeed no more than a diplornatic document and were not regarded by the
parties as constituting an international agreement (CMB, paras. 6.75 to
6.89). The plausibility of these arguments is severely impaired when one
takes into account the following facts whichare not essentially, as far
as Qatar understandsit, in dispute. The final text of the Doha Minutes
derives from a text originally put to both parties on the evening of
24 December 1990, by the Foreign Minister of Oman, acting as
intermediary. It would appear that the text was put first to the Qatari
delegation, since there is clear evidence that the phrase "in accordance
with the Bahraini formula, which has been acceptedby QatarM was inserted - 33 -
into the original Omani drafton the initiative of Mr. Sherbini, Legal
Adviser to the Qatari delegation. The Omani draft, with this addition,
was then put to the Bahraini delegation,again on the evening of
24 December. The ForeignMinister of Oman reported to the Qatari
delegation later in the same evening thatBahrain would like to study the
draft, and that it had been sent by fax to Dr. Al-Baharna who would be
arriving in Doha early the followingmorning with his comments (RQ,
para. 3.65)
Now, the fact thatDr. Al-Baharna was suddenly summoned toDoha on
the night of 24/25 December 1990, to participate in the further
negotiation of the Omani text, is hardly consistent with the subsequent
Bahraini attempt to downplay the legal significanceof the Doha Minutes.
One does not suddenly summonone's most senior law officer to participate
in the drafting of a mere diplomatie document not intended to have any
legal effects. No doubt it was because the Bahraini delegation was well
aware that theproposed agreed mlnuces recording the outcomeof the
discussion at the GCC Summit on 23 December 1990 were intendedto
incorporate bindinglegal undertakings that it urgently summoned
Dr. Al-Baharna to Doha.
My second point under this head can be put more briefly. Bahrain
places great stress on the two modifications whichit succeeded in having
made to the original Omanidraft of the Doha Minutes, namely the
substitutionof the phrase "the parties" (al-tarafan)for "either of the
two parties" and the insertion intothe text of the phrase "and the
proceedings arising therefrom" (see CMB, para. 6.53 and RejB, paras. 5.20
to 5.22 and 5.31 to 5.36). Other of my colleagues,notably
Professor Quéneudec and the Qatari Agent, Dr. Najeeb Al-Nauimi, will be - 34 -
addressing the significance of these changes and the interpretationto be
given to these phrases within the contextof the Doha Agreement as
signed. The point 1 wish to make is that, throughout the proceedingsof
the Tripartite Committeein 1988, Bahrain had been insistent on the need
for a special agreementas an essential preliminary to reference of these
disputes to the Court. 1s it not therefore astonishing that Bahrain made
no attempt to secure the inclusion in the Doha Minutes of a reference to
the continued need fora special agreement, given that,on Bahrain's own
argument, as developed in the written pleadings, the Bahraini formula was
only capable of acceptance as part of a special agreement betweenthe
parties? Or is it rather thatBahrain was well aware that the other
participants in the GCC Summit favoured immediate reference of the
disputes between Qatarand Bahrain to the Court, and would not have taken
kindly to a further attempt by Bahrain to veto such a reference by
striving yet again to insist on the conclusion of a special agreement
between Bahrainand Qatar?
Now, Mr. President, my third point is closely related to my second
point. If, as Bahrain contends, the understandingbetween the parties at
Doha was that negotiations for the conclusion of a special agreement
between Bahrain and Qatar would have to be resumed after the expiry of
the extended five-monthperiod of Saudi mediation, why was this not
reflected in the Doha Minutes? The answer, Qatar would submit, must be
that it was in nobody's contemplationat the time - not even Bahrainus -
that the wearisome task of formulatinga special agreementwould have to
be resumed after May 1991, particularly inthe light of Qatar's
unqualified acceptance of the Bahraini formula in theDoha Agreement.
Bahrain might well have subsequentlyregretted havinggiven its basic - 35 -
consent to the jurisdictionof the Court in the 1987 Agreement.
Certainly, Bahraini conduct after 1987 must give rise to the suspicion
that Bahrain was anxious to wriggle out of its commitment to seek
judicial settlement of its disputes with Qatar.
My fourth point is more general. The Court will be aware that, in
the jurisdictionalphase of the Fisheries Jurisdiction case betweenthe
United Kingdom and Iceland, it emphasized repeatedly the significanceof
the history of the negotiations in interpretingthe compromissoryclause
in the UK/Icelandic Exchange of Notes of 11 March 1961. Thus, the Court
states in its Judgment on jurisdictionof 2 February 1973:
"The history of the negotiationsnot only shows the
intentions of the parties but also explains the significanceof
the six monthst notice requiredto be given by the Government
of Iceland to the United Kingdom Government."
(I.C.JReports 1973, p. 13, para. 21.)
1 cite this brief passages from the Court's judgment in the
jurisdictional phasecf the Fisheries Jurisdictioncase simply in order
to stress the importance of the history of the negotiation of a
compromissory clausein the context of a challenge by a State to the
jurisdictionof the Court based on that compromissoryclause. Qatar, for
its part, entertalns r-Odoubt that the history of the negotiations at
Doha leading up to the adopt-on of the Doha Agreement in the form of
Agreed Minutes, particularly when read in the light of the events from
1987 onwards, can lead only to the conclusion thatthe Court has
jurisdictionto rule on the matters submittedto it in the Qatari
Application.
Finally, 1 turn to the subsequent behaviour of the Parties. This
confirms the Qatari analysisof the significanceof the Doha Minutes. - 36 -
The Court will recall that, subsequent to the conclusion of the ~oha
Agreement but before the expiry, on 15 May 1991, of the extended
time-limit for Saudi Mediation,the Amir of Qatar wrote two letters to
King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. The substanceof these letters is reproduced
in the Qatari Memorial (para. 3.62). The second of these two letters,
dated 6 May 1991, urged King Fahd to renew his good offices as soon as
possible in view of the imminent expiryof the extended time-limit agreed
at Doha, and informed him that Qatar intendedto subrnitthe dispute with
Bahrain to the Court thereafter. In a further letter to King Fahd of
18 June 1991, the Amir of Qatar agreed to a further extensionof three
weeks from 5 June 1991, of the extended time-limit for Saudi Mediation.
The Amir repeatedhis warning that thereafter Qatar would takethe
necessary measures to submit its disputewith Bahrain to the Court in
accordance with the Doha Agreement of 25 December 1990. Thus, Qatar had
certainly made clear to Saudi Arabia, in the early months of 1991 and
well before the Qatari Application to the Court was filed on 8 July 1991,
its intention to refer its dispute with Bahrain to the Court on the
expiry of the fixed five-monthperiod for mediation for whichprovision
had been made in the Doha Agreement; and indeedQatar had given a
further demonstrationof its extraordinarypatience by agreeing to an
additional three-week period £rom 5 June 1991, for the Saudi Mediation
effort. we know from parayraph 15 of the affidavit of the Bahraini
Foreign Minister dated 21 May 1992 (CMB, Vol. II, Ann. 1.25) that, at
least on 3 June 1991, the Amir of Bahrain had been informedby King Fahd
that he had been approachedby the Amir of Qatar several times about the
matter since the Doha summit; in the circumstances,Qatar, while in no
way impugning inany sense the veracity of the affidavit, finds it - 37 -
difficult to believe that Saudi Arabia did not even give a hint to
Bahraini officials that they must expect Qatar to make a unilateral
application to the Court on the expiry of the extended time-limit if no
substantive solution had been found. Indeed, this would have been a
powerful weapon in the hands of the mediator to urge a degree of
moderation on Bahrain. What can be stated with absolute certainty,
however, is that Saudi Arabia did not seek to dissuade Qatar £rom giving
effect to its stated intention after 26 June 1991.
To sum up, there ean be little doubt in these circumstances that the
Doha Minutes incorporated legal commitments confirming and supplementing
the agreement of both parties to refer their disputes to the Court. By
December 1990, when the GCC summit met in Doha, two years had elapsed
since the work of the Tripartite Cornmitteehad been brought to an end and
three years had elapsed since the conclusion of the 1987 Agreement.
Having regard to the history of the previous negotiations in 1988 within
the framework of the Tripartite Comr,ittee,Qatar could not reasonably
have been expected, after it had demonstrated its good faith by its
unquallfied acceptance of the Bahraini formula, to contemplate a
resurnptionof negotiatlons with Bahrain for the purpose of concluding a
special agreement; and Bahrain could not reasonably have assumed that
Qatar would be prepared to contemplate such a resumption of negotiations.
For Bahrain to affect surprise at the Application filed by Qatar on
8 July 1991, is no doubt good theatre, but lacks any sense of conviction.
In surn,and for the totality of the reasons given, Qatar submits
that the Doha Mlnutes constitute an international agreement binding on
both Qatar and Bahraln. 2. Can the Doha Minutes be said to constitute a mtreatym or mconventionm
within the meaning of Article 36(1) of the Statute?
Bahrain has of course contended that neitherparty saw the 1987
Agreement as a treaty or convention for the purpose of Article 36,
paragraph 1, of the Statute - in Bahraints words - "but rather as a
cornmitmentto negotiate in good faith a special agreement"; and that
"[the] acceptance of the jurisdictionof the Court wouldarise in due
course from such Special Agreementtt (CMB, p. 99). Bahrain is, of course,
perfectly entitled to set out its own position, but is not entitled to
distort Qatarts position. Qatar submits tothe contrary that, by virtue
of the 1987 Agreement, both Stateshad consented to submit their disputes lllr
to the Court for decision, although they had not explicitly agreed upon
the way in which the Court was to be approached.
Bahrain equally denies that the Doha Minutes constitute a binding
internationalagreement. 1 have already dealt with this contention.
But, assuming that the Court accepts the Qatari contention that the Doha
Minutes do constitute a binding internationalagreement, can they be
regarded, when read with the 1987 Agreement, as constitutinga "treaty'
or "convention"within the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the
Statute? Qatar submits that theanswer is certainly "Yesw. 1 have
I
already demonstratedthat the term"treaty" is normally used in a generic
sense. It is clearly so used in Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute.
The referenceto "treatiesand conventions in force" in that provision is
not confined to internationalagreements designated as lttreatiesu or
"conventions"; it certainly comprehendsany international agreement
between States which is governed by internationallaw, whatever be the
designation of that agreement. A "treatynor "convention"within themeaning of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute in fact covers a wider
category of treaty instrumentsthan 1 have just described. The
jurisprudence of the Court reveals,for example, that a mandate
instrument (that is to Say, an agreement between theLeague of Nations
and a Mandatory Power) isregarded as a "treatyuor "conventionNwithin
the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute. Thus, in the
South West Africa case (jurisdictional phase) the Courtunhesitatingly
held that: "TheMandate, in fact and in law, is an international
agreement having thecharacter of a treaty or convention." (1.C.J
Reports 1962, p. 330.) This expressionof view was advancedprecisely in
the contextof an argument that the Mandatefor South West Africa was not
a treaty or conventionwithin the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute.
It was a view reaffirmedby the Court in its advisory opinionon the
Legal Consequencesfor States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (1.C.J Reports 1971, p. 46)
The Court will also recall that, in the jurisdictional phaseof the
Aeyean Sea ContinentalShelf case, it observed:
"that it knows of no rule of internationallaw which might
preclude a jolnc cornrnunlquférom constitutingan international
agreement to submit a dispute to arbitrationor judicial
settlernent ... Accordlngly,whether theBrussels Communiqué of
31 May 1975 does or does not constitutesuch an agreement
essentially depends on the nature of the actor transaction to
which the Communiqué gives expressiona ;nd it does not settle
the question simply torefer to the form - a communiqué - in
which that act ortransactionis embodied."
(1.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 39, para. 96) .
Professor Quéneudecwlll deal more fully with the significance,in the
context of the present case, of the Court's Judgment in the
jurisdictional phase of the Aegean Sea case. 3.Did the Foreign Ministers of Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have
capacity to enter into an international agreementof the kind conetituted
by the Doha Minutee without the need to produce full powere?
1 need hardly remindthe Court of the tenns of Article 7,
(a) of the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties which
paragraph 2
provides that:
"In virtue of their functionsand without havingto produce
full powers, the following are considered as representingtheir
State;
(al Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for
Foreign Affairs, forthe purpose of performing al1 acts
relating to the conclusion of a treaty."
Bahrain does not appear to contest that, by virtue of the rule which1 -
have just cited, the Bahraini Foreign Ministerwas ipso jure competent to
express the consent ofBahrain to be bound by theDoha Agreement,
assuming thatthe Doha Minutes constitute,as Qatar submits, a binding
internationalagreement. Yet Bahrain advances an argument whichseeks to
deprive this impliedadmission of al1 substance. Bahrain arguesthat
there is nothing in Article 7, paragraph 2 (al, that accords to a Foreign
Minister full powers to give immediate effectto his signature to a
treaty if he does not intend to do so or is prohibited by his
constitution from doing so. With al1 respect, Mr. President, this is
pure casuistry. What Article 7, paragraph 2 (a),does is precisely to
entitle the named categoriesof perçons to represent theirState for the
purpose of performing al1 acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty.
This would includethe act of affixing his signature to an international
agreement either expressly or impliedly designet do enter into force on
signature. Bahrainhas completely misunderstoodthe object and purpose
of Article 7, paragraph 2 (a), of the Vienna Convention if it believes
that the capacity of a Foreign Minister to bind theState which herepresents to a treaty which by its terms or by necessary implication
enters into forceon signature should have been speltout in that
particular provision. Whether the internationalagreement constitutedby
the Doha Minutes did enter into forceby virtue of signatureis a quite
different issue which1 hope to address in a few moments. 1 would simply
add that the InternationalLaw Commission specifically disavowed the
argument impliedlyput forwardby Bahrain that a Foreign Minister is not
entitled to give immediate effectto his signature of a treaty if he is
prohibited by his constitutionfrom doing so. In its commentaryto what
is now Article 46 of the Vienna Convention, the Commission rejectedthe
view that interna1 laws limiting the power ofState organs to enter into
treaties may render voidable any consent given on the international plane
in violation ofa constitutional limitation. In doing so, the Commission
commented:
"If this view were to be accepted, it would follow
that other States would not be entitled to rely onthe
authority to commit the State ostensiblypossessed bya
Head of State, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, etc.
under Article [ï]; they would haveto satisfy themselves
in each case that the provisions ofthe State
constitutionare not infringedor take the riskof
subsequentlyfinding the treaty void." (ILCReports
(1966),pp. 69-70, para. 2.)
Qatar does not believe it necessary at this stage toanalyse in
the abstract whether there exists a category of international
agreements "in simplified form". Certainly, the fact that the
expression "treaty in simplified form" does not appear in the Vienna
Convention isnot determinative,just as the absence of any reference
in the Vienna Convention tothe conceptof a "restrictedmultilateral
treaty" does not mean that no such concept exists. What Qatar would
wish to emphasizeis t,hatState practice over thelast 50 years or so - 42 -
undoubtedly confirms the growing trend towardsthe elimination of
formalities in the conclusion of treaties.
In the early years of the twentieth century, it came gradually
to be accepted that, as a general rule, ratification was necessaryto
render a treaty binding. The Court will be aware of the view
expressed by the PermanentCourt in the Territorial Jurisdiction of
the InternationalCommission of the River Oder case.
But this traditionalview is now out-moded. A detailed study of
state practice by Blix in the early 1950s led him to the conclusion
that :
"whenever States intend to bring treaties into force by
some procedure other than signature, that intention is
evidenced by express provisionsor by cogent implication"
and that :
"in the present practiceof States the treaties in which
there is no clear evidence, express or implied, of the
parties' intentions asto the modeof entry into force
almost withoutexception enter into force bysignature"
(Blix, "The requirementof ratification",30 BYBIL
(19531,p. 380).
Blix had studied 1,760 treaties published inthe League of Nations
Treaty Series between 1932and 1940 and 1,300 treaties published in
the U.N. Treaty Series between 1946 and 1951 and had pointed out that
53% of the treaties publishedby the League had been ratified,
whereas inonly 23% of the treaties publishedby the United Nations
had the same procedure been followed (loc. cit., pp. 359-60). Even
more startling figures havebeen provided more recently by
Maria Frankowska who points outthat only nine of the 1,579 treaties
published in the U.N. Treaty Series between 1963 and 1965 requiredratification (Frankowska,"De la prétendueprésomption en faveur de
la ratification", 73 RGDIP (19691, p. 78). These figures strikingly
confirm the following view expressed by theInternationalLaw
Commission in 1966:
"Meanwhile,however, the expansion of intercourse
between States, especially in economic and technical
fields, led to an ever-increasing useof less forma1
types of internationalagreements,amongst which were
exchanges of notes, and these agreements are usually
intended by the parties to become binding bysignature
alone. On the other hand, an exchange of notes or other
informa1 agreement, though employedfor its ease and
convenience,has sometimes expressly been made subject to
ratification because of constitutionalrequirements in
one or other of the contractingStates." (ILCReports
(1966),p. 30, para. 3.)
The PRESIDENT: This will, 1 understand,be a convenient moment
for the customary coffeebreak; the Court will adjourn for fifteen
minutes
The Court adjourned from 11.20 a.m. to 11.40 a-m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Sir Ian Sinclair
Sir Ian SINCLAIR: Mr. President,Members of the Court, my
fourth headlng is:
4. Did the Agreement constituted by the Doha Minutes
enter into Force on Signature?
1 have alreadybegun to trespass into this area by having cited,
just before the coffee break, the authority of Blix and indeed of the
International Law Commission in their commentary on the final set of
draft articles on the law of treaties. But still something more - 44 -
needs to be said. Let us look initially at the arguments on this
point developed by Bahrain in its written pleadings.
There is, first of all, Bahrain's denial "that the 1990 in ut es,
even if amounting to an agreement, constitutedan agreement that did
not require ratificationn (CMB, p. 93). In a rather condescending
manner, Bahrain then proceeds to assert that "it is not necessary for
this purpose to pursue the question of whether or not the agreement
was in a simplified formu. The constraintsof time have persuaded
Qatar not to take issue specificallywith this assertion, while
reminding the Court that oneof the generally recognized features of
a treaty in simplified form is that it enters into forceon
signature, unless the parties specificallyprovide for ratification
or some other form of subsequent confirmationor approval. Thus, one
comrnentator maintains that "the only juridicalcriterion for
distinguishing between 'treaties'and 'agreementsin simplified form'
is the existence or absence of the requirementof ratification"
(Bolinteanu,"Expressionof consent to be bound by a treaty in the
light of the 1969 Vienna Convention", 68 AJIL, 1974, p. 677).
Now, we know that the rule expressed in Article 24 of the Viema
Convention is that a treaty enters into force in such manner and upon
such date as it may provide or as the negotiating States may agree;
and that, failing any such provisions or agreement, a treaty enters
into force assoon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been
established for al1 the negotiating States. As both the 1987
Agreement and the Doha Minutes are silent as regards entry into
force, we are driven back to Articles 12 and 14 of the Vienna
Convention which set out thecircumstancesin which the consent ofa - 45 -
State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by signature or by
ratification respectively. Article 12, paragraph 1, lists three
cases in which the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be
expressed by the signature of its representative and Article 14,
paragraph 1, lists four cases in which the consentof a State to be
bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification.
then analyse the question of the entry into force of
Now let us
the 1987 Agreement and of theDoha Minutes in the light of the rules
expressed in Articles 12, paragraph 1 and 14, paragraph 1, of the
Vienna Convention. It is convenient to take the 1987 Agreement
first. That Agreement containedno provision with regard to entry
into force or consent to be bound; nor did the Amirs of Bahrain or
Qatar sign their lettersof acceptance of King Fahd's proposais
subject to ratification. Can it be said that, in the case of the
1987 Agreement, it has been, in terms of oneof the three cases
listed in Article 12, paragraph 1, otherwise establishedthat the
negotiating States were agreed thatsignature should havethe effect
of expressing consentto be bound, so that the 1987 Agreement entered
into forceby virtue of signature and without the requirementof
ratification.Qatar confidently submitsthat it has been so
established. Let us look closely at the terms of the 1987 Agreement
and at the action taken in implementationof that Agreement.
Paragraph 2 of the 1987 Agreement contains three undertakings by the
parties to respect the status quo. The first two of these
undertakings are expressed to be operative "frornto-date". This is
consistent only witha common understandingthat the proposals are to
be operative immediately,that is to Say, from 26 December 1987 - the - 46 -
date of signature of the last of the letters of acceptance from the
Amirs of Bahrain and Qatar. This is confirmed by the action taken in
implementationof the 1987 Agreement. A preliminary meeting was
already held in late December 1987, at Riyadh on the margins of the
GCC Sumrnitmeeting (MQ,p. 45, para. 3.34). The first formal meeting
of the Tripartite Committeetook place inRiyadh on 17 January 1988
bd. These undisputed facts demonstratebeyond a shadow of doubt
that both Bahrain and Qatar were agreed that the 1987 Agreement
should enter into force by virtue of signature, and should not be
subject to ratification.
Against thisbackground, one can begin to assess whetherthe
Doha Minutes of 1990 are to be regarded as an agreement entering into
force on signature or as an agreement entering into force on the
exchange of instrumentsof ratification. The text of the Doha
Minutes makesno provision for ratification;nor was the idea of
ratification ever raised in Doha by the Bahraini Foreign Minister,
who signed the Doha Minutes along withhis counterparts fromQatar
and Saudi Arabia. Perhaps most significantlyof all, the Doha
Minutes were aimed at implementinga previous agreement, the 1987
Agreement, which itself had entered into forceby virtue of
signature. The notion that the Doha Minutes may have been signed
subject to ratification is not only totally incomprehensible in the
light of its relationship to the 1987 Agreement; it is also
contradictedby the internal evidenceof the time-limit of May 1991,
after which the parties would be free to submit their disputes to the
Court. It is the relationship betweenthe Doha Minutes and the
1987 Agreement, combined with the internal evidence of the time-limit - 47 -
of May 1991, which entitles Qatar confidentlyto submit that, in
terms of the rule expressed in Article 12, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Vienna Convention, it has been otherwiseestablished thatboth Qatar
and Bahrain were agreed that signatureof the Doha Minutes by their
respective ForeignMinisters expressed theconsent of the two States
to be bound by the agreement constitutedby those Minutes.
One final point, Mr President. Qatar hasto anticipate a
possible Bahraini argument that bilateralagreements to submit a
dispute to arbitrationor to judicial settlementare, by their very
nature, agreementswhich are subject to ratification. Qatar has
carried out alimited study of recent agreements of thistype; and
the only conclusionwhich can be reached is that practice is variable
and does not support any such rule. Qatar has identified four
agreements of this typeconcluded in recent years which were made
subject to ratification, but it has equally identified seven
arbitrational similar agreements concluded since 1975 which were
expressed tocorneinto force onsignature, including the Accord-Cadre
of 31 August 1989 between Chad and Libya, which provided thebasis
for the exercise of jurisdictionby the Court in the recent
Libya/Chad Territorial D~spute case (Art. 8).
Qatar does not claim that lt has carried out an exhaustive
survey of al1 recent agreementsof this type; but the resultsof the
study which it has undertaken onlygo to confirm thatState practice
in this matter is variable and that, in particular, it does not
support any claim thatbllateral agreements providing for reference
of disputes to arbitrationor judlcial settlement or other form of - 48 -
third-partydetermination are always concluded subject to
ratification.
Before 1 conclude, Mr. President, 1 should perhaps make
reference to a new argument advancedby Bahrain in paragraph 5.25 of
its Rejoinder. This argument is derived from the recent Judgmentof
the Chamber of the Court in the El Salvador/Hondurasdispute, where
the Chamber determined that it had no jurisdiction to delimit the
waters of the Gulf of Fonseca. Bahrain suggests that this conclusion
was based upon direct evidencein the form of a statement by the
Foreign Minister of El Salvador that he never had the intention of
conferring upon the Chamber a power to carry out a delimitation in
the area in controversy. Qatar does not read the Judgment of the
Chamber in this sense. What the Chamber was saying was that Honduras
had not established that the Special Agreement shouldbe so
interpreted as to require that the phrase "determinethe legal
situation of the maritime spaces" must encompass delimitation. In
the words of the Chamber's Judgment:
"In essence, [Honduras]is arguing thata special
meaning - one comprising the concept of delimitation - was
lntended by the Parties to attach to the phrase 'determine
the legal situation of the ... maritime spaces'. The onus
is therefore on Hondurasto establish that such was the
case." (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 585, para. 377.)
The Chamber found that Honduras had not discharged thatburden.
This is perfectly understandable in the contextof the El
~alvador/Honduras case. The Chamber did not in fact, in denying its
jurisdictionon this aspect of the case, seek to rely on an ex post
facto statement by the Foreign Ministerof El Salvador that he never - 49 -
had the intentionof conferringa power of delimitationof the Gulf
of Fonseca upon the Chamber.
5. Conclusione
Mr. President,Members of the Court, this analysisof the status
and legal effect of the Doha Minutes has inevitablybeen somewhat
arid and, it might seem, theoretical. Nonetheless, Qatarwould urge
the Court to look at the totalityof Bahraini and Qatari conduct in
relation to the 1987Agreement and throughoutthe three-yearperiod
immediately preceding signature of the Doha Minutes in order to
assess what was the implied intent of the parties in signing theDoha
Minutes. Qatar is confident that the Court will draw the following
conclusions:
(1) that the Doha Minutes were intended to constitute, and did
constitute,an international agreement binding upon botB hahrain
and Qatar;
(2) that the 1987 Agreement, as conf~rmedand supplementedby the
Doha Minutes, conçtitutesa "treaty"or "convention"within the
meaning of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute so as to
afford the necessary basis for the exercise of jurisdictionby
the Court rn relation to the matters identified inthe
Application filed by Qatar with the Court on 8 July 1991;
(3) that the ForeignMinisters of Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia
had capaclty to enter intoan international agreement ofthe .
kind constituted. by the Doha Minutes without theneed to produce
full powers; and - 50 -
(4) that the agreement between Bahrainand Qatar, constitutedby the
Doha Minutes of 25 December 1990, entered into forceby virtue
of signature.
Mr. President,Members of the Court, 1 thank you for your patience
and courtesy. 1 suggest that it would now be appropriate forProfessor
Salmon to be invited to address the Court on the issue of the alleged
violation of Bahrain's constitutional requirementsas invalidating
Bahrain's consent to be bound by theDoha Agreement.
Mr. PRESIDENT: Thankyou, Sir Ian. J'appelle à la barre le
professeur Jean Salmon.
M. SALMON : Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour,
c'est toujours avecémotion et humilité qu'un professeur de droit
international se présente à cette barre. J'en mesure le privilège.
C'est aujourd'hui à la confiance de 1'Etat du Qatar que je dois cet
honneur et je lui en suis profondément reconnaissant.
Sir Ian Sinclair vient d'exposer à la Cour que le textede l'accord
de Doha est un accord international,entré en vigueur à la signature, qui
crée donc desobligations juridiques pour lesParties. Pressentantle
caractère inéluctablede ces conclusions, Bahreinprésente une
argumentationsubsidiaire. 11 n'y aurait pas eu de consentement
valablement donnépar le ministre des affaires étrangères deBahrein, car
le consentement aurait été donné, aurait été expriméen violation des
prescriptions constitutio~elles de cet Etat.
Avant d'examiner la validité de l'argument,encore faut-il en saisir
la portée. Bahrein a été fluctuantsur la nature de l'exceptionet les
conséquences juridiques qu'il attache à la prétendue violation. - 51 -
A l'origine, dans sa notedu 18 août 1991, il a soutenu que le fait
que ce consentementaurait été donné enviolation de la constitutionde
Bahrein faisait tomber la situation sous le coup de l'article 46 de la
conventionde Vienne sur le droit des traités. La Cour se souviendra que
cette disposition se trouve dans le chapitrerelatif aux nullités.
Bahrein invoquaitdonc un motif de nullité.
Dans le contre-mémoire du 11 juin 1992, Bahreïn avance qu'il
soutient simplement qu'il n'y aurait pas de traité valide car il y aurait
défaut de consentement (contre-mémoirede Bahrein, par. 6.97) et
subsidiairement seulement que s'il y avait un traité il pourrait invoquer
l'article 46 de la conventionde Vienne (id., par. 6.98). Si l'on
interprète convenablementla pensée des auteurs de ce texte, il ne
s'agiraitplus à proprement parler d'unenullité mais bien d'une
inexistence,pour défaut de consentemenr.
Sans vouloir entrer dansla controversethéorique, il y a sans
doute, à première vue,quelque logique à soutenir qu'il n'y a pas d'acte
luridique à défaut de consentement. Il n'y a en effet pas d'acte à
annuler là où il n'y a pas d'acte du tout. Pourtant,la théorie de
l'inexistencetrouve difficilemen:son chemin en droitinternational. La
doctrine sur cepornt est d'une insigne pauvretéet c'est tout dire.
Le régime des nullités en droit international étant déjà par
lui-même assez fruste, la théorie de l'inexistence,fortement critiquée
en droit interne, n'a pas eu de succès en droit international faute d'une
structurationsuffisante de l'ordre internationalet à vrai dire d'une
utilité concrète quelconque. Le regretté PaulReuter, dans son cours à
l'Académiede 1961, se bornait à consacrer à cette notion une note en bas - 52 -
de page la qualifiant de"si controverséeet polymorphe" (RCADI, t. 103,
Paul Guggenheim, un professeur sérieux qui consacra quelques pages à
la question tant dans son cours de 1949 à l'Académie de droit
internationalque dans les deux éditions successivesde son magistral
traité, définissait l'acte "inexistantnde la manière suivante:
"Il y a acte inexistant lorsque des individus ou des
entités juridiques élèvent laprétention d'avoir créé un acte
juridique, bien que les élémentsd'un tel acte fassent à tel
point défaut que, de toute évidence, il ne saurait en être
question. Un examen sommaire suffit pourdénier validité à
l'acte. " (2e édition, t. 1, 1967.)
Les exemples domés ensuite par PaulGuggenheim sont dès lors des
évidences : actes auxquels procèdent des individus au nom d'une entité
n'ayant pas la qualité de sujet de droit internationalou bien actes
auxquels procèdent des individusqui n'ont aucune qualitépour
représenter un sujet de droit international.
Pour que l'inexistences'impose donc et que le problème de
l'annulabilitésoit écarté, il faut que l'absenced'acte soit l'évidence
pour tous. Dès qu'il y a contestation sur l'existence,dès qu'il y a
apparence d'un acte, c'est le problème de sa validité qui se pose. C'est
bien le cas ici où l'accord de Doha répond à la définition du traité
donnée par l'article 2, paragraphe 1 a), de la convention de 1969 ainsi
que vient de vous le démontrer sir Ian Sinclair.
Il est très symptomatiqueque pendant les longs travaux de la
Commission du droit international,puis de la conférence de Vienne sur le
droit des traités, et d'aucuns ici se souviendrontde tout cela, il ne
fut jamais question d'inexistencemais simplement de nullités. Le fait
que le consentement de llEtat à être lié par un traité a été exprimé en - 53 -
violation d'une disposition constitutionnelle est envisagé par la
conventionde 1969 dans le cadre du régime des nullités.
Nous examinerons doncsi l'article 46 de cette conventionpeut
trouver à s'appliquer en l'espèce.La Cour me pardonnera de citer un
texte qui lui est certes familier:
"Disposition du droi t interne concernant la compétencepour
conclure les traités"
"1. Le fait que le consentementd'un Etat à être lié par un
traité a été expriméen violation d'unedisposition de son
droit interne concernant la compétencepour conclure des
traités ne peut être invoquépar cet Etat comme viciantson
consentement, à moins que la violation n'ait été manifeste et
ne concerne une règle de son droit interne d'importance
fondamentale.
2. Une violation est manifeste si elle est objectivement
évidente pour tout Etat se comportanten la matière
conformément à la pratique habituelleet de bonne foi."
Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour, l'histoirede ce texte
vous est bien connue. Deux courants s'opposaienten doctrine: les
constitutionnalistes,donnant le primat au respect des textes
constitutionnelset les internationalistes estimant que la validité d'un
traité concluselon les formes reconnues du droit internationalpar des
représentantsautorisés ne pouvait être remiseen cause. Les deux
premiers rapporteurs dela Commission du droit international(le
ProfesseurBrierly et Sir Hersch Lauterpacht) penchaient pourla première
thèse (la thèse constitutionnaliste). Sir GeraldFitzmaurice,dans son
troisième rapport (1958) prit au contraire fermement parti pour la
seconde thèse (la thèse internationaliste).Sir Humphrey Waldock, fut,pour sa part, à l'origine d'un compromis à dominante internationaliste.
Il fut suivi par la Commissionet enfin par les gouvernements dans leurs
observations.L'équilibrene fut plus rompu à la conférencede Vienne.
Désormais, lléconomie de l'article 46 est la suivante.
En principe, la violationdes règles constitutio~elles relatives au
pouvoir de conclure les traités ne peut être invoquée comme viciant le
consentementd'un Etat à être lié, à moins que - la formule négative a
été adoptée à dessein pour souligner le caractère exceptionnel de
l'hypothèseenvisagée - il s'agisse d'une violation manifesteconcernant
une règle interne d'importance fondamentale concernant la compétenc dee
conclure un traité.
C'est à cette aune qu'il nous faut maintenantmesurer le texte de
l'article 37 de la Constitution de Bahreinqui a été publiée dans le
Journal officiel de Bahrein du 26 mai 1973. La traduction française que
j'utilise et que je vais lire est tirée du Corpus constitutionnel,
supplément no 1, édité par Brill à Leiden en 1976, page 94:
"L'Emir conclura les traités par décret et les transmettra
immédiatement à l'Assembléenationale avec lerapport
approprié. Le traité n'aura force de loi qu'après avoir été
signé, ratifié et publié au Journalofficiel.
Cependant, les traités de paix et d'alliance, les traités
concernant le territoire de llEtat, ses ressources naturelles,
ses droits souverains, ou les droits publics ou priv6s des
citoyens, les traités de commerce, de navigation et de
résidence, et les traités qui entraînent des dépenses
supplémentairesqui ne sont pas prévues dans le budget de
l'Etat, ou qui impliquent une modification des lois de Bahrein,
n'entreront en vigueur que lorsqu'ilsauront fait l'objet d'une
loi.
L'argument de Bahrein peut se résumer de la manière suivante.Le
traité n'a été approuvé ni par décret ni par une loi. Il y a donc
violation de la constitutionde Bahrein, que le Qatar connaît fort bien - 55 -
puisqu'il y a échange entre les deux pays des journaux officiels. Le
ministre des affaires étrangères de Bahrein, qui connaît ses limites
constitutionnelles,n'aurait pas souscritun accord avec le Qatar sans
assurer le respect de sa constitution. La violation de la Constitutionde
Bahrein est donc manifeste.
Le Qatar a, de ce texte constitutionnel, une lecturetout à fait
différente de celle expriméedans les écritures de Bahrein. Le Qatar
soutient que Bahreïn fait une confusion entre la procédure relative à la
conclusion des traités,qui est régiepar le droit internationalpublic
et à laquelle le texte de l'article 37 ne fait aucune allusion, et la
procédure relative à 1 'introductiond'un traité en droit interne à
laquelle cetarticle est exclusivementconsacré.
L'article 37 ne traite, en effet, que des procédures d'introduction
du traité dans l'ordre juridique interne. Cette incorporationpeut
s'effectuersoit par décret de l'Emir, soit par une loi. Cette seconde
forme est réservée au: traités qui touchent les matières relevant de la
compétence de l'Assembléenationale.
Le contrôle parlementaire et démocratique établi par cet article n'a
cependant jamaisété ]usqutà subordonner le pouvoir de conclure de 1'Emir
à l'accord de cette Assemblée. On ne se trouve pas ici dans un cas - que
l'on trouve dans certaines constitutions - où le pouvoir de l'exécutif
serait partagé avec le législatif et où l'exécutifdevrait êtreautorisé
par une loid'habilitationpour pouvoir conclure internationalemenl te
traité. L'Assembléenationale n'a aucun rôle dans l'exercice du pouvoir
de conclure les traités, ni au stade de la négociation,ni au stade du
consentement à être lié. Les traités lui sontsimplement communiqués. - 56 -
Le vocabulaire de l'article 37 est lumineux. Il y est question pour
llEmir de conclure les traités"par décret", que le traité acquiert
"force de loiw après signature, ratificationet publication au Journal
officiel, de traités qui "n'entreronten vigueur que lorsqu'ils auront
fait l'objet d'une loi1'.Il est notoire, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs
de la Cour, que l'on ne conclut pas un traité internationalement par
décret publié au Journal officielou par une loi. Cette terminologieest
révélatrice qu'il s'agit d'actes de l'ordre juridique interne à des fins
propres à cet ordre. A supposer donc qu'il y ait eu, en l'espèce,
violation du texte del'article 37 de la Constitution, cette violationne
porterait pas sur le pouvoir de faire des traités mais sur leur
incorporationdans l'ordre interne.
La ratio legis de ce type de disposition,que l'on rencontre dans
bon nombre de constitutions,est d'assurer un contrôle par une assemblée
parlementaire,sans affecter la compétence externe de l'exécutif en
matière de conclusion des traités.
C'est donc un partage, mais cette fois-ci sous forme de contrôle
démocratique.
Mais ici, entre de discrètes parenthèses, Bahreïn signaleque
l'Assembléenationale a été dlssoute par un décret de 1'Emir de 1975,
no 14, et qu'une ordonnance no 4 de 1975 a transféré lespouvoirs de
l'Assembléenationale au Conseil desministres.
Dans le cas de Bahrein, ce contrôle législatifa été supprimé en
même temps quel'Assembléenationale.
Une telle dissolution de l'Assembléenationale, opéréeau demeurant
en contravention,semble-t-il,de la Constitution de Bahrein dans
plusieurs de ces articles, fut certes patente, mais elle n'affecte que le - 57 -
contrôle interne, sans toucher au pouvoir de faire les traités.Si l'on
devait considérer que ce contrôle était une condition de la conclusion
internationale des traités, Bahreinse serait trouvé depuis 1975 dans
l'impossibilité de conclure aucun traité requérant l'approbation
législative, ce que Bahreins'est bien gardé de soutenir.
Il en résulte toutefois qu'au moment des faits qui nous occupent la
séparation des pouvoirs proclamée à l'article 32 a) de la Constitution
n'existe plus. Le pouvoir législatifappartient à l'exécutif seul. La
différence entre décret et loi est doncdevenue purement formelle
puisqulellene recouvre plus aucun contrepoidsréel entre lespouvoirs.
A supposer donc que l'on considère l'accord de Doha comme un 'traité
concernant le territoire de llEtat, ses ressources naturellesou ses
droits souverainsv,le contrôle législatif estdésormais sans objet faute
d'organe pour l'exercer.
On soulignera en passant qu'il est d'ailleurs discutable que
l'accord de Doha tombe dans cette catégorie car si l'accord a pour objet
de faire trancherpar la Cour un différend entre lesdeux Etats sur des
questions de cette nature, il n'a aucun caractère constitutif. Selon la
doctrine dominante, un arrêt de la Cour en matière territoriale a un
caractère déclaratif des drolts des parties.
Selon l'article 32 b) de la Constitutionde~Bahrein "Le pouvoir
exécutif appartient à l'Emir, au Conseil des ministreset aux ministres".
Ceci est importanten l'espèce car, lors de la réunion du Conseil de la
coopération dans le Golfe a Doha, les personnes représentant Bahreïnet
ayant avalisé l'accord signé après trois joursde discussions difficiles
étaient le premier ministre représentant le chef de llEtat, le ministre
des affaires étrangeres et le ministre desaffaires juridiques,Dr. AlBaharna. On voit donc mal quel contrôlele pouvoir exécutifpourrait
avoir sur une telle délégation.A supposer qu'il y en ait un, encore une
fois, il serait, au demeurant, d'effet purement interne, leconsentement
de 1'Etat à l'accord ayant été valablement donnépar un organe engageant
1'Etat conformémentau droit international,c'est-à-dire à l'article 7 de
la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités.
Répondant à Qatar qui demandait où se situait la violation
manifeste, Bahreinse borne à répondre:
"la règle était d'importance fondamentale puisqu'elle était
incorporée dans la Constitutionde Bahreinn (contre-mémoirede
Bahrein, par. 6.98).
Cette réponseest assez inattendue. Toutd'abord parce qu'elle
confond "règle" et "violationde celle-ciu.Je ne peux pas résisterau
plaisir de citer ce que déclara à bon escient M. Jiménez de Aréchaga à la
Commission du droit international
"la condition poséepar l'article n'est pas que la disposition
de la constitutionnationale qui a été violée doit avoirété
'notoire' , mais que la violationparticulière d'une disposition
constitutio~elle doit avoir étémanifeste.Autrement dit,
c'est la violation concrèted'une dispositionconstitutionnelle
qui doit 6tre manifeste; ce n'est pas la disposition
constitutionnelleelle-même qui doit être notoire." (888e
séance, 12 juillet 1966,Annuaire, 1966, vol. 1, 2e partie,
p. 332-33, par. 84.)
Par ailleurs, si le slmple fait qu'une disposition soit incluse dans
la constitutionsuffisait à en faire une règled'importance fondamentale,
on voit mal ce qui resteraitdes limites que les rédacteursde la
conventionde Vienne sur le droit des traités ont entendu poseren
spécifiant qu'il devait s'agir des violations lesplus manifestes des
règles de son droit interned'importancefondamentale.
En prévoyant cetteexigence, les rédacteursde la conventionde
Vienne ont eu en vue la difficulté fréquentepour un Etat d'apprécier - 59 -
l'impact exact des prescriptionset des modifications constitutionnelles
d'un cocontractant. Toutd'abord, des textes, bien qu'utilisantdes
formules identiquesou similaires,peuvent avoir un sens différent d'un
pays à l'autre. D'autre part, la coutume constitutionnelle, sousla
pression des exigences des relations internationales, joue parfois un
rôle d'assouplissement considérable, notamment dans le domaine des
accords en forme simplifiée.
L'affaire soumise aujourd'hui à la Cour est une preuve de la sagesse
des rédacteurs de la convention de Vienne de 1969. A supposer en effet
qu'il y ait eu, en lloccurrence,une division du pouvoir de conclureles
traités entrel'exécutif et le législatif,ce qui, en l'espèce, on l'a
vu, n'est pas le cas, que peut faire 1'Etat cocontractantd'un Etat qui
supprime le contrepoids législatifen violation apparentede sa
constitution? Monsieurle Président,Messieurs de la Cour, on l'a dit et
répété les Etats sont des monstres froids. Ils traitent avec ceux qui
sont au pouvoir à peine de ne pouvoir conclure avecpersonne. Toute
remarque sur les modifications constitutionnelle du cocontractant,comme
l'a relevé la Commission du droit international (Annuaire, 1966, II,
p. 263, par. 8) et quci qx'en prétende Bahreïn (par. 5.61 de sa
duplique), risquerait d'ailleursd'être considérée comme une immixtion
inadmissible dansles affaires intérieuresde 1'Etat qui a pris ces
initiativeset ne faciliteraitpas les rapports conventionnels.Le seul
risque d'une telle attitude est que la violation de la constitutionsoit
invoquée par un pouvoir autrement composé du point de vue politique, mais
certainementpas par le gouvernementqui a lui-même violé sa propre
constitution. Mais, encore une fois, on n'est pas ici dans cette hypothèse.Si un
décret ou une loi, ou leur publication au Journal officielde Bahrein,
sont requis par le droit interne de Bahrein à des fins de cet ordre
juridique, ces exigences sont entre les mains de l'exécutif qui a
souscrit le traité. La difficulté de droit interne soulevéepar Bahrein
est donc le résultatde sa propre inaction.Comme le relevait à bon
escient la Commission du droit international:
"chaque fois qu'il y a inobservation de prescriptions
constitutionnelles lors dela conclusion d'un traité, la
responsabilitéen incombe de toute évidenceau gouvernement de
1'Etat intéresséu (Annuaire, 1966, vol. II, p. 263, par. 8).
Il en résulte Monsieur lePrésident,Messieurs de la Cour, qu'aux
yeux du Qatar Bahreinn'a pas apporté la moindre preuve qu'il y aurait
eu, en l'occurrence,violation manifeste d'une disposition d'importance
fondamentalede son droit interne concernant la compétencepour conclure
les traités et que par conséquent, le consentementdonné par le ministre
des affaires étrangères de Bahreïn est parfaitement valableet la
validité de l'accord de Doha n'est en rien entamée.
Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour, le conseil du
Gouvernement du Qatar vous exprime sa reconnaissance pour la
bienveillante attentionque vous avez bien voulu lui prêter. Il vous
serait reconnaissant,Monsieur le Président,de bien vouloir accorder
maintenant la parole à M. le Professeur Jean-Pierre~uéneudec qui doit
poursuivre les arguments du Qatar.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup ProfesseurSalmon. Je donne la parole
au professeur Jean-Pierre ~uéneudec. - 61 -
M. QUENEUDEC : Monsieur le Président, Messieursles Juges,
L~i~t~~ét~ti~~ de 1l~~~~~d de Dob
C'est un honneur que d'apparaîtreune nouvelle fois devant la Cour
et de vous présenter les argumentsqui, selon 1'Etat du Qatar, militent
en faveur de votre compétence pourconnaître des différends qui
l'opposent à 1'Etat de Bahrein.
Mon intervention sera consacrée à l'interprétationdu texte signé à
Doha par les deux Etats le 25 décembre 1990, lequel constitue, commel'a
montré sir Ian Sinclair,un véritable accord international comportand tes
engagements juridiquesde la part des signataireset doit être regardé
comme un traité en vigueur, au sens de l'article 36 du Statut.
Avant d'aborder le problème de l'interprétation proprementdite, il
paraît toutefois nécessaire d'attirer l'attentionde la Cour sur la
confusion entre les problèmes de compétence et de saisine que Bahreïna
introduite dansle débat. Une miseau point préalable s'impose à ce
sujet.
1. Compétence et saisine de la Cour
Le Gouvernement de Bahreïn conteste la compétence de votre haute
juridictionpour connaître du différend porté devant vous pal re Qatar,
en prétendant essentiellement qu'il n'a jamais consenti à ce que la Cour
puisse être saisiede cette affaire par voie de requête unilatérale
Le coeur de la thèse de Bahreïn surce point tient tout entier dans
la phrase suivante de sa dernière pièceécrite:
"In the absence of clear evidence of agreement orconsent
by Bahrain that the Courtshould possessjurisdictionon the
basis of a unilateral application,the Court has no
jurisdictionon that basis." (Duplique,par. 5.24, p. 36.) - 62 -
Cette phrase est soulignéedans le texte de la duplique de Bahrein,
afin d'en montrer toute l'importance.
Elle est importanteen effet. Elle démontreon ne peut plus
clairement que la Partie adversemaintient constamment une confusion
entre les problèmes de compétence et de saisine de la Cour.
Plus précisément, Bahreintend à faire comme si la compétencede la
Cour dépendait du mode de saisine, alors que l'on s'accorde généralement
pour recomaître que la saisine n'est possible que s'il existe
préalablement une base de compétence - exception faitede la situationde
forum prorogatum où la compétencesuit la saisine.
Dans ces conditions,on ne saurait parler, commele fait Bahrein, de
la compétence de la Cour sur la base d'une requête unilatérale -
"jurisdictionon the basis of a unilateralapplicationu - et dire que la
Cour n'a pas compétencesur cette base; car la base de compétencede la
Cour ne réside pas ici dans la requête unilatérale déposéepar le Qatar.
La compétence de la Cour en l'espèce repose sur l'accord des deux Etats,
qui ont accepté l'obligationde soumettre leur différend à la Cour.
Sans doute existe-t-ilun lien assez étroit entre les problèmes de
compétence et de salsine, lorsqu'uneexception préliminaire
d'incompétence vient ouvrir une procédure incidente,ou bien - comme
c'est le cas dans la présente affaire - lorsqu'ila été décidé que la
première phase del'affaireporterait sur la compétence de la Cour et la
recevabilitéde la requête.
Il n'en demeure pas moins cependant qu'il s'agit de deux problèmes
de nature différente.La question de la compétenceest régie uniquement
par le chapitre II du Statut de la Cour (art. 34 à 38). Au contraire, la
question de la saisine, en tant que question de procédure, relève à la - 63 -
fois du chapitre III du Statut (plus précisémentde l'article 40) et du
titre III, section C, sous-section 1, du Règlement de la Cour, où les
articles 38 à 43 sont consacrés à l'introductionde l'instance.
S'il en est ainsi, c'est parce que la compétencede la Cour dépend
de la volonté desparties - hormis, bien sûr, les cas particuliers des
recours en interprétationou en revision d'un arrêt ou des demandes
d'intervention.Et l'on doit rappeler à ce sujet que, selon le Statut,
l'expressionde cette volonté des parties n'est nullement assujettie à
une quelconque conditionde forme, comme l'avait souligné la Cour
permanente en 1928 dans l'affaire des Droits de minorités en Haute-
Silésie (écolesminoritaires) ,arrêt no 12, 1928, C.P.J.I. série A no 15,
p. 23.
Quant au mode de saisine - notificationd'un compromis ou requête -
il n'a pas nécessairementla même base volontariste.Le mode de saisine
peut certes être convenu entre les parties;mais, en l'absence d'accord
entre elles sur ce point, comme c'est le cas dans la présente affaire, il
appartient à la Cour d'apprécier la régularitéde la saisine, parce que
le mode de soumissiond'une affaire à la Cour est réglé par les textes
régissant son fonctionnement.
L'appréciationde la régularitéde l'acte introductif d'instance
consiste alors à vérifier, comme cela avait été fait dans l'affaire du
Détroit de Corfou, C.I.J. Recueil 1947-1948, p. 28, que tel mode de
saisine n'est pas exclu par'un texte obligatoire pourles parties en
cause.
A la lumière de cette observation préliminaire,il est possible de
dire que le Qatar a pu valablement porterla présente affairedevant la
Cour par une requête introductived'instance,parce que la saisine - 64 -
unilatérale apparaît commele corollaire inéluctablede la compétence
obligatoire. Pour qu'une telle saisine soitpossible, il faut que les
intéressés aient accepté la juridiction de la Cour mais il
deux Etats
suffit que cette possibiliténe soit pas expressémentou implicitement
exclue par les textes luiconférant compétence obligatoire.
Dès lors, si le Qatar a pu valablement saisir la Cour par voie de
requête unilatérale, c'est parce que la compétence de la Courétait
définitivement acceptée par les deuxEtats en cause et parce que ce mode
de saisine n'était pas exclu par les textes pertinentsen l'espèce, même
si ces textes ne l'avaientpas expressément prévu.
C'est ce que je voudrais maintenant m'attacher à démontrer à travers
l'examen de la question relative à l'interprétationde l'accord de Doha
de 1990.
A cette fin, il n'est peut-être pas inutilede commencerpar
rappeler la manière dont nous concevons l'application enl'espèce de la
règle générale qui prévaut en matière d'interprétation,dans la mesure où
Bahrein n'a pas hésité, dans ses pièces écrites, à prendre quelques
libertés avec les normes les mieux établiesen matière d'interprétation.
Puis il conviendra d'examiner la significationqui s'attache aux termes
employés dans l'accord de Doha, et dont nous verrons qu'elle conduit à la
conclusion selon laquellela Cour est compétentepour connaître de la
requête du Qatar. 11 ne restera plusqu'à vérifier si cetteconclusion
est confirmée lorsque l'on prend en considérationles circonstances de
l'élaborationde cet accord. - 65 -
2. L'application de la règle généraledlinterprétation
Afin d'interpréterl'accord de 1990, il est à la fois nhcessaire et
suffisant, ici aussi, de s'en tenir à la règle générale d'interprétation
énoncée à l'article 31 de la conventionde Vienne sur le droit des
traités.
Une telle démarcheest ici d'autantplus indispensableque chacun
sait, depuis l'arrêt de la Cour permanente dans l'affairedes Zones
franches de la Haute-Savoieet du Pays de Gex, que ctoute clause
prévoyant la juridictionde la Cour doit êtreinterprétéestrictement,
(C.P.J.I. série A/B no 46, p. 138-139).
Toutefois, chacun sait aussi que l'interprétationstricte d'une
clause de juridiction nepeut pas conduire à une interprétation
restrictivequi aboutirait à ce que l'interprèteresterait en deçà de ce
qui est prévu ou autorisé par les termes employés dans le texte prévoyant
la soumissiondu différend à la Cour
En effet, selon la belle formule de CharlesDe Visscher :
«Le juge international respecte une volonté qus ie
restreint; il est sans complaisance pour une souverainetq éui
se dérobe. » (Problèmesd'interprétationjudiciaire en droit
internationalpublic, 1963, p. 201. )
Or, il semble que Bahrein tente aujourd'huide çe dérober à un
engagement préalablementsouscrit. Cette tentative de se soustraire à la
juridiction dela Cour est menée en se fondant sur les intentions qui
auraient été celles des représentants deBahreïn lors de la réunion de
Doha en décembre 1990. Ceux-ci n'auraientpas eu, nous dit-on,
l'intentionde conclureun accord juridiquementobligatoire,et encore
moins celle de permettrela saisine de la Cour sur la base du texte
adopté à cette occasion - 66 -
Mais c'est oublier qu'un accord entre Etatsne se fait pas
nécessairement sur les intentionsde telle ou telle partie, mais
uniquement sur une formulationécrite de ce qui apparaît comme
l'expressionde la commune intention des auteurs du texte. C'est
pourquoi l'interprétationd'un accord doit avant tout s'attacher à la
manifestation de la volonté concordantedes Parties telle qu'elle est
exprimée dans le texte del'accord. Cette volonté commune ou concordante
n'est pas nécessairement le refletmécanique de deux intentions
rigoureusementidentiques,mais elle peut apparaître comme le produit OU
la résultante d'intentionsplus ou moins divergentes à l'origine. Aussi
ne peut-on se fier à l'intentionprimitive des Parties, ou a fortiori de
l'une des Parties, car cela reviendrait à supposer ou à présumer que-
cette intention était unique; ce qui, on en conviendra,n'est pas
toujours le cas le plus fréquent. On ne saurait doncs'attacher aux
arrière-penséesdes négociateurset leur donner la préférence sur ce que
ces mêmes négociateurs ont décidé d'exprimer dans le texte qu'ils ont
signé, c'est-à-diresur une volonté qu'ils ont extériorisée.
Dans ces conditions, le point de départ de toute opération
d'interprétationest le texte lui-même, tel qu'il a été rédigé. La Cour
l'a encore rappelétout récemment dansl'affaire du Différend
territorial : *L'interprétationdoit être fondée avant toutsur le texte
du traité lui-même.> (Arrêtdu 3 février 1994, par. 41.) La soumission
au texte n'est en effet pas autre chose quela soumission à l'expression
la plus directe de la volonté des parties.
Cette prlmauté du texte, dans laquellePaul Reuter voyait *la règle
cardinale de toute interprétations (Introduction au droit des traités,
2e éd., Paris, 1985, p. 851, revêt une importanced'autant plus grande - 67 -
que le texte à interpréter fondeici la compétence de la Cour, dont ala
juridictionn'existe que dans les termes où elle a été acceptée,, selon
la formule utilisée parla Cour permanentedans l'affaire des Phosphates
du Maroc, C.P.J.I. série A/B no 74, p. 23-24.
Partir du texte, ce n'est cependant pas, comme le faitBahrein,
isoler une ou deux expressions dansun texte rédigé en langue arabe pour
tenter d'identifier la ou les formules qui reflètentle mieux en anglais
ou en français le véritable sens des termes arabes utilisés
(contre-mémoirede Bahreïn, par. 6.8, p. 54). Partir du texte, ce n'est
pas davantagevouloir déterminerson effet en considérant uniquement
l'interprétationde quelques mots qui y ont été introduits à l'initiative
de Bahreïn notamment.
La jurisprudence internationale, et celle de la Cour en particulier,
a eu l'occasion à maintes reprisesde soulignerque, dans tout processus
d'interprétation,le sens d'un mot ou d'une expression ne saurait être
déterminé isolément,car un mot «tire son sens du contexte danslequel il
est employé* (Compositiondu Comité de la sécurité maritime de
llOrganisationintergouvernementale consultative de la navigation
maritime, C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 158), et lorsque la convention de
Vienne sur le drolt des traités pose la règle qu'il convient de suivre le
sens ordinaire destermes, elle précise en même temps que ce sens est à
attribuer aux termes pris dansleur contexte.
11 paraît ici nécessaire de souligner que lecontexte strictosensu,
tel qu'il est défini dans l'article 31, paragraphe 2, de la convention de
Vierne, n'est toutefo~spas ce que Bahreïn appelle, dans ses écritures
(contre-mémoirede Bahrein, par. 6.68-6.74, p. 82-84; duplique de
Bahrein, par. 5.42-5.48, p. 45-49), "le contexte général du procès-verbal - 68 -
de 1990"; car les éléments qui sont invoqués à ce titre par Bahrein
concernent en réalité les circonstances dela conclusion de l'accord de
Doha. Il s'agit là, non du contexte auquel la convention de Vienne
assigne un rôle spécifique dans le processusd'interprétation,mais d'un
moyen complémentaire, extérieurau texte, et permettant de vérifieret de
confirmer, le cas échéant, l'interprétationselon le sens ordinaire,
comme nous le verrons ultérieurement
De plus, contrairement à la prétention de Bahrein, (contre-mémoire
de Bahrein, par. 6.29, p. 63-64; duplique de Bahrein, par. 5.18,
p. 32-33), faire référenceau contexte, ce n'est pas replacer le texte
signé à Doha dans le cadre de prétendus aaccordss qui seraient intervenus
préalablement entre les Parties quant à la conclusion d'un compromis et
quant à la soumission conjointede leur différend à la Cour.
L'article 31, paragraphe 2, de la convention de Vienne n'envisage, comme
faisant partiedu contexte ou lui étant rattachés, que les instruments
établis à l'occasion de la conclusion de l'accord à interpréter. Ce qui
n'est évidemment pas le cas des sol-disant accords préalablesinvoqués
par Bahrein. Nous aurons égalementl'occasionde revenir sur ce point
Faire appel aucontexte, c'est envisager lesdiverses dispositions
de l'accord en les considérant dans leurs rapportsentre elles. Ce que le
Tribunal arbitralchargé de 1 'interprétation de 1'accord aérien du
27 mars 1946 entre les Etats-Unis et la France explicitaitdans sa
sentence du 22 décembre 1963 :
"L'interprétation,en tant qu'opérationlogique visant à
établir avec le maximum de certitude l'intentioncommune des
Parties, ne saurait parvenir à fixer le sens à attribuer à un
terme figurant dans une clause du traité que dans lecadre et
en fonction de la clause tout entière. A son tour, une clause doit être interprétée par référence au contenu du traité pris
dans sa totalité ..." (RSA, vol. XVI, p. 11-71; RGDIP, 1965,
p. 189-260, à la page 230).
Le contexte interdit doncd'examiner isolément une disposition, en
la séparant de l'ensemble dont elle fait partie.
Il s'agit en quelque sorte de ce que le regretté Mustafa Kamil
Yasseen appelait "la règle de l'examen global" ("L'interprétationdes
traités d'après la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités", RCADI,
vol. 151, p. 36). Et, dans le cours qu'il avait donné à l'Académiede
droit internationalde La Haye sur 11interpr6tationdes traités,
l'éminent juriste arabe insistaitsur le fait que le sens ordinaired'un
terme employédans un traité ne peut pas être conçu dans l'abstrait;car,
disait-il, il s'agit "d'un sens ordinaire concret qui ne peut être
discerné que parl'examen du terme en question dans le contextede ce
terme et à la lumière de l'objet et du but du traité" (ibid., p. 26).
Cet examen global du texte, en effet, ne peut lui-même se faire
qu'en ne perdant jamaisde vue l'objet et le but de l'accord, c1est-à-
dire en prenant en considérationl'éclairageprojeté par les finalités
d'un texte sur l'interprétationde celui-ci.
Dans l'affaire de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries, la Cour
avait ainsi accordéune place nonnégligeable à l'examen de l'objet et du
but d'un échange de notes entre le Royaume-Uniet l'Islande, en vue de
déterminer s'il existait une volonté communedes parties de reconnaître
la compétence de la Cour (Compétence en matière de pêcheries, C.I.J.
Recueil 1973, p. 17, par. 32).
Si l'on cherche à déterminer l'objet et le but de l'accord de Doha,
la question essentielle est celle de savoir ce que les parties ont voulu
atteindre dans les limites des dispositionsqu'elles ont formulées. - 70 -
Selon Bahrein, le texte adopté à Doha n'aurait eu d'autre but que de
mettre un terme à une initiativeintempestiveet malencontreuse prisepar
le Qatar à l'ouverturede la réunion du Conseil de coopérationdu Golfe,
sans pour autant faire perdre laface à l'auteur de cette initiative.
Quant à son objet, le texte en cause se serait borné,aux dires de
Bahrein, à enregistrer l'acceptationpar le Qatar de la "Bahraini
formulaw;et les deux parties seraient simplement convenues de prendre
les mesures en découlant pour pouvoir ensuite soumettre leur litige à la
Cour par voie de compromis.
Mais si l'objet et le but de l'accord de Doha se résumaient à cela,
le texte aurait fort bien pu avoir un libellé extrêmement simple.11
aurait alors suffi, par exemple, d'avoir un paragraphe ainsi rédigé:
"Le Qatar a accepté la formule bahreïniteet les deux
Parties poursuivront leursefforts pour conclure un compromis
en vue de saisir la Cour internationalede Justice."
Il ne s'agit pas là d'une caricature; car telle est bien, au fond,
la position que soutient Bahreïn
Or, cela revient à considérer que certaines dispositions de l'accord
de Doha devraient être tenuespour des dispositions inexistantes ou non
avenues qui n'auraientpas été réellement voulues par les auteurs du
texte. En particulier, que devient la référence,qui est faite dans le
texte, au mois de mai 1991 ? Le membre de phrase "A l'expirationde ce
délai" n'aurait plus aucune signification.Il en serait de même de la
clause prévoyant la poursuite desbons offices de l'Arabie saoudite
pendant la soumission de l'affaire à la Cour, ainsi que de la disposition
faisant obligation aux Partiesde retirer l'affairedu règlement
juridictionnelen cas de solutionamiable. - 71 -
L'objet et le but de l'accord de Doha, tels qu'ils se dégagent du
texte même de l'accord,ne peuvent doncpas se limiter à ce que Bahrein
prétend qu'ils sont, sinon on aboutit à une interprétationdu texte qui
ne permet pas-de donner à toutes ses dispositions,sans exception, la
portée et l'effet qui sont normalementles leurs.
L'accord de Doha vise, en réalité, à permettre la mise en oeuvre de
l'obligation que les deuxEtats avaient antérieurement contractée dans le
cadre de la médiation de l'Arabie saoudite.Le préambule de l'accord
situe d'ailleurscelui-ci "dans le cadre des bons offices du roi Fahd Ben
Abdul Aziz, Gardien des deux saintes Mosquées"
Il convient de rappeler à ce sujet que l'un des principes approuvés
dans le cadre de la médiation en 1983 avait prévu qu'en cas d'échec des
négociationspour régler le différend,
"les gouvernements des deux payss'attacheront,en consultation
avec le Gouvernementde l'Arabie saoudite, à déterminer les
meilleurs moyensde régler laditeou lesdites questions, sur la
base des dispositi~nsdu droit international. La décisionque
prendra l'instance cholsie d'un commun accord à cette fin sera
définitive et obligatoire."
Devant l'impossibilitéde parvenlr à une solution négociéeentre les
deux parties, le médiateur entrepriten 1987 de mettre enoeuvre le
principe en question. 11 formula dlverses propositions concernant la
procédure à suivre, et ces propositions, acceptéespar les deux Etats,
ont constitué l'accord de 1987, qui comporte notammentl'engagement
suivant :
"Toutes les questions en litige seront soumises à la Cour
internationale deJustice, à La Haye, pour qu'elle rende une
décision définitive et obligatoirepour les deux Parties, qui
devront en exécuter lesdispositions." - 72 -
Dès ce moment-là, les deux Etats avaient ainsi consenti à soumettre
leurs différendsau jugement de la Cour, sans toutefoisse mettre
explicitementd'accord sur la manière d'approcher la Cour.
Eu égard à son contenu, l'accord de Doha a eu manifestementpour
objet et pour but, d'une part, d'englober dans une référence générale à
la "formule bahreiniteu les questionsen litige qui pouvaient être
déférées à la Cour et, d'autre part, de préciser la date à partir de
laquelle la Cour pouvaitêtre saisie.
L'accord de Doha se présente donc comme un instrumentpermettant, à
partir de la date qu'il fixe, c'est-à-dire à partir du mois demai 1991,
la réalisation complète de l'engagement souscrit par les deux Etats en
1987.
L'engagement contenu dans l'accord de 1987 constitue, à n'en pas
douter, une règle particulièrementpertinente aux fins de
l'interprétationde l'accord de Doha. Il y a là une "règle pertinente de
droit internationalapplicable dans les relations entre les parties", au
sens de l'article 31, paragraphe 3, alinéa c), de la convention de Vienne
sur le droit des traités, dont il doit être tenu compte en même temps que
du contexte.
C'est pourquoi, lorsque le Qatar affirme quel'accord de Doha
rendait possible la saisine de la Cour conformément à l'article 40 du
Statut, on est fondé à considérer quel'interprétationainsi retenue est
celle qui répond le mieux à l'objet et au but de cet accord et celle qui
est en même temps la plus propre à réaliser cetobjectif.
De surcroît, une telle interprétationest celle qui tient le plus
compte de l'unité fondamentalede tout processus interprétatif.Celui-ci, - 73 -
en effet, constitue un véritable creuset où viennent se fondre les
différents éléments mentionnés à l'article 31 de la conventionde Vienne.
C'est en faisant applicationde cette démarche qu'ilest possible de
déterminer le sens véritable et la portée exactedu texte de l'accord du
25 décembre 1990.
Monsieur le Président,j'en viens donc à présent à l'examen de la
signification des termes de l'accord de Doha.
3. La signification des termes de l'accord de Doha
Dans la réplique qu'il avait présentée à la Cour, le Qatar avait
pris soin d'analyser,paragraphe par paragraphe, l'ensembledu texte
signé à Doha. La dupliqueprésentée par Bahrein a été beaucoupplus
sélective sur ce point et s'est bornée - pour l'essentiel - à reprendre
le schéma et le contenu de soncontre-mémoire.
Aussi, sans nécessairement revenirsur tout ce qui se trouve à ce
sujet dans nos piècesécrites, convient-ilnéanmoins de rappeler les
termes qui composentchacun des deux premiers paragraphes de l'accord de
Doha. Le troisième paragraphepeut être laissé de côté, dans la mesure où
il n'y a pas vraiment de divergence entre lesParties quant à son
interprétation.Mals il est évident que l'interprétationdes deux
premiers paragraphescioittenir compte de l'existencede ce troisième
paragraphe en tant qu'élément du texte dans son ensemble.
A. Le premier paragraphe de l'accord tend à "réaffirmerce dont
les deux partiessont convenues précédemment".
A en croire Bahreïn, par cette disposition,les deux Etats auraient
purement et simplement réaffirmé en 1990 'a course of conductu visant à
l'élaborationd'un compromis et à une saisine de la Cour par voie de - 74 -
notification conjointede ce compromis (contre-mémoire de Bahrein, p. 62,
par. 6.27). Selon la Partie adverse, le texte adopté à Doha se situerait
donc dans la suite logiquede la Commission tripartitequi avait été
constituée en 1987 et dont il viserait en quelque sorte à poursuivre les
travaux .
Une telle attitude passecomplètement soussilence le fait que cette
commission avait échoué danssa tâche et que, conformément à l'annonce
faite par le prince Saud le 5 novembre 1988, elle était arrivée au terme
de son mandat à la fin de l'année 1988. Elle aurait certespu être
reconstituée, avec sansdoute un mandat différent etplus spécifique,en
vertu d'un accord exprèsde toutes les parties intéressées. Mais aucun
accord de ce type n'a été consignédans le texte adopté à Doha, qui ne
fait d'ailleurs aucunemention de la Commission tripartite.
En raison de la généralité de la formulationdu premier paragraphe
de l'accord, on ne peut certainement pas interpréter celui-ci comme le
fait Bahreïn et prétendre que cette disposition fait renvoi à un
engagement qu'auraientcontracté les deux Etats de conclure un compromis.
Sans doute, la voie de l'élaborationd'un compromis a-t-elle été explorée
dans le cadre de la Commission tripartite; mais, outre lefait que cette
tentative n'a pas pu aboutir, il convient de souligner que l'accord de
1987 ne fixait pas la manière dont les parties devraient approcher la
Cour et n'édictait aucune obligation de conclure un compromis. Il se
bornait à prévoir la création d'une commission composéede représentants
des deux Etats en litigeet de l'Arabie saoudite, en vue dl
"entrer en rapport avec la Cour internationale deJustice et
d'accomplir les formalitésrequises pour que le différend soit
soumis à la Cour conformément à son Règlement ..." - 75 -
Il est évident quele premier paragraphede l'accord de 1990 ne peut
pas être regardécomme réaffirmantla dispositionde l'accord de 1987,
relative à la Commission tripartite, puisquecelle-ci avait cessé de
fonctionner. On doit donc considérer quela disposition de l'accord de
1987 concernant cettecommission est, de ce fait, devenue obsolète.
A fortiori en est-,ilde même de ce qui avait été convenu dansle
déroulementdes travaux de cette commission,contrairement à ce que
Bahrein prétend danssa duplique (par. 5.18, p. 32-33).
En particulier, le fait que les deux Etats étaient convenus, à un
moment donné, de tenter d'élaborerun compromis ne saurait être regardé
comme un engagement définitifde leur part d'envisager exclusivement une
soumission conjointedu différend à la Cour au moyen d'un compromis; car
ce n'était qu'une des voies possibles. On peut, de surcroît, noter que,
même si un compromisavait été conclu, cela n'aurait pas nécessairement
conduit à une notification conjointedudit compromis.
En outre, après l'échec de la tentative d'élaborationd'un compromis
et à la suite de l'expirationdu mandat de la Commission tripartite,il
est tout de même diffkile de concevoir que les accords partiels
intervenus entreles participants à cette commissionont été en quelque
sorte réactivésou réaffirmés par le texte de l'accord de Doha. Une telle
position ignorerait lefait que ces "accords partiels"étaient intervenus
dans le cadre et à propos des travaux dela commission tripartite et
qu'ils ont donc perdu tout intérêtet toute pertinence dès lors quecette
commissionavait cessé de fonctionneret d'exister.
Qui plus est, cela revientou reviendrait à réduire le texte de
l'accord de Doha à son premier paragraphe, c'est-à-dire à détacher
totalement ce paragraphe de son contexte. - 76 -
Or, nous l'avons vu, aux fins de l'interprétationde la disposition
contenue dans le premier paragraphe,celui-ci doit être replacédans le
contexte de l'ensembledes dispositionsde l'accord. Il apparaît alors
que la position adoptéepar Bahrein sur ce point est difficilement
compatible avec les autres dispositions contenuesdans l'accord de Doha,
en particulier avec la fixationd'une date limite à partir de laquelle
l'affaire pouvait être déférée à la Cour.
Le sens naturel et ordinaire des termes employésdans ce premier
paragraphe, replacés dans leur contexteet entendus à la lumière de
l'objet et du but de l'accord, conduit à dire que la réaffirmationde ce
qui avait été préalablement convenu entre les deux Etatsn'est rien
d'autre qu'une référence aux principes sur lesquels les parties s'étaient
mises d'accord antérieurementquant au mode de règlementde leurs
différends; ce que confirment d'ailleurs les termes du préambule de
l'accord situant celui-ci "dans le cadre des bons officesdu roi Fahd".
L'interprétationcorrecte de cette disposition conduit à y voir en
réalité une double référence. Il s'agit, pour partie,d'un renvoi au
principe adopté en 1983 dans le cadre de la médiation, qui prévoyait le
règlement du litige par une instance choisie d'un commun accord et
statuant sur la base du droit international. Mais il s'agit aussi plus
particulièrementd'une référence à l'accord intervenu en 1987 qui
prévoyait ensuite que "toutes les questions en litige serontsoumises à
la Cour internationalede Justice".
Comme le Qatar a déjà eu l'occasionde le rappeler dans ses
écritures, cette interprétationse trouve confirmée par les circonstances
dans lesquelles a été conclu l'accord de 1990. Dans la dernière partie du
présent exposé, nous reviendronssur ce caractèreconfirmatif de l'examen - 77 -
des circonstancesentourant l'accordde Doha. Il suffit pour l'instantde
noter que si la disposition du premier paragraphe de l'accordde Doha se
présente comme un rappel de la teneur des engagements pris par lesdeux
parties quant- à la soumission du litige à la Cour, c'est essentiellement
parce qu'un tel rappel est apparu à l'époque d'autantplus nécessaire
qu'à l'ouverturede la réunion du Conseil de coopérationdu Golfe à Doha
en décembre 1990, le premier ministre de Bahrein, qui représentait1'Emir
de Bahrein à cette réunion, avait semblé vouloir remettreen cause
l'engagementqu'avait souscritson Etat d'aller devant la Cour (réplique,
par. 3.58, p. 35-36).
Ces différentes raisons mènent à la conclusion que le premier
paragraphe de l'accord de Doha doit être interprété commeréaffirmant.ou
confirmant,purement et simplement, l'acceptation dela juridiction de la
Cour par les deux Etats.
Monsieur le Président, si la Cour en est d'accord, je pourrais
arrêter ici mon exposé et poursuivre à l'audience de demain matin la
présentationde l'interprétationdu deuxième paragraphe de l'accord de
Doha.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Professeur Quéneudec. La Cour
ajourne ses travaux et les reprendra demain matin à 10 heures.
L'audience est levée à 13 h 01.
Public sitting held on Tuesday 1 March 1994, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Bedjaoui presiding