Non- Corrigé
Uncorrectecl
International Court Cour internationale
de Justice
of Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
Public sitting
held on Thursday 10 March 1994, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
Presiden t Bed jaoui presiding
in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
Between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahrain)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNEE 1994
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 10 mars 1994, à 10 heures, au Palais de'la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Bedjaoui, Président
en 1'affaire de la Délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales
entre le Qatar et Bahreïn
(Qatar c. Bahreïn)
COMPTE RENDUPresent L President Bedjaoui
Vice-President Schwebel
Judges Oda
Ag0
Sir Robert Jennings
Judges Tarassov
Gui1laume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Weeramantry
Ran jeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Judges ad hoc Valticos
Ruda
Registrar Valencia-OspinaPré~nts : M. Bedjaoui, Président
M. Schwebel, Vice-président
MM. Oda
Ag0
sir Robert Jennings
MM. Tarassov
Gui11aume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma, juges
MM. Valticos,
Ruda, juges ad hoc
M. Valencia-Ospina, Greffier -4-
The Government of Qatar is be represented by:
H.E. Dr. Najeeb Al-Nauimi, Minister LegalAdviser,
as Agent and Counsel ;
Mr. Adel Sherbini, Legal Expert,
as Legal Adviser;
Mr. Sami Abushaikha, Legal Expert,
as Legal Adviser;
Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professor of InternationalLaw at the
University of Paris 1,
Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles,
Mr. R. K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India,
Former Presidentof the InternationalBar Association,
Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister at Law, Member of the
Institute of InternationalLaw,
Sir Francis Vallat, G.B.E.,K.C.M.G., Q.C., Professor emeritusof
InternationalLaw at the University of London,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Richard Meese, Advocate, partner in Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Miss Nanette E. Pilkington, Advocate, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Mr. David S. Sellers, Solicitor,Frere Cholmeley, Paris.
The Government of Bahrain is represented by:
H.E. Dr. Husain Mohammed Al Baharna, Minister of State for Legal
Affairs, Barrister at Law, Member of the InternationalLaw
Commission of the United Nations,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E.,Q.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor emeritus I
in the University of Cambridge,
Mr. Keith Highet, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,Le Gouvernement du Qatar est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Najeeb Al-Nauimi, ministre conseiller juridique,
comme agent et conseil;
M. Adel Sherbini, expert juridique,
comme conseiller juridique;
M. Sami Abushaikha, expert juridique,
comme conseiller juridique;
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à
l'université de Paris 1,
M. Jean Salmon, professeur à l'université libre de Bruxelles,
M. R. K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate à la Cour suprême
de l'Inde, ancien président de l'InternationalBar Association,
Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G.,Q.C., Barrister at Law, membre de
l'institut de droit international,
Sir Francis Vallat, G.B.E., K.C.M.G., Q.C., professeur émérite de
droit international à l'université de Londres,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Richard Meese, avocat, associé du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à Paris,
Mlle Nanette E. Pilkington, avocat, du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à
Paris,
M. David S. Sellers, Solicitor, du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à Paris
Le Gouvernement de Bahreïn est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Husain Mohammed Al Baharna, ministre dlEtat chargé des
affaires juridiques, Barrister at Law, membre de la Commission du
droit internationalde l'Organisationdes Nations Unies,
comme agent et conseil ;
M. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., professeur émérite, ancien
titulaire de la chaire Whewell à l'université de Cambridge,
M. Keith Highet, membre des barreaux du district de Columbia et de
New York,Mr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Professor of International Lawat
the Law School, Catholic University, Montevideo, Uruguay,
Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E.,Q.C., Honorary Professorof
InternationalLaw and Director of the Research Centre for
InternationalLaw, University of Cambridge; Member of the Institut
de droit international,
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor emeritusat the Université de droit,
d'économie et de sciences social es de Paris,
as Counsel and Advoca tes;
Mr. Donald W. Jones, Solicitor, Trowers & Hamlins, London,
Mr. ~ohn H. A. McHugo, Solicitor, Trowers & Hamlins, London,
Mr. David Biggerstaff, Solicitor,Trowers & Hamlins, London,
as Counsel.M. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, professeur de droit international à
la faculté de droit de l'université catholique de Montevideo,
Uruguay,
M. Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., professeur honoraire de droit
international et directeur du Research Centre for International Law
de l'Université de Cambridge; membre de l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l'université de droit,
d'économie et de sciences sociales de Paris,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Donald W. Jones, Solicitor, du cabinet Trowers et Hamlins à
Londres,
M. John H. A. McHugo, Solicitor, du cabinet Trowers et Hamlins à
Londres,
M. David Biggerstaff, Solicitor, du cabinet Trowers et Hamlins à
Londres,
comme conseilS. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. This morning the Court resumes
the hearings in the ~atar/Bahrain case on questions of jurisdictionand
admissibility in order to hear Qatar, the second round of oral arguments.
1, therefore, give the floor or His Excellency Mr. Nauirni.
Dr. NAJEEB AL-NAUIMI: [Greetings] Mr. President, Members of the
court,
1. In opening the second round of oralpleadings on behalf of the
State of Qatar in these proceedings dealing withthe questions of the
jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibilityof Qatar's Application, 1
will draw the Court's attention to certain pointsthat 1 feel obliged to
make after listening toBahrain's first round of oral pleading.
2. First, the Court will no doubt have noted that it is Qatar which
for many years has been seekingthe peaceful settlement of the long-
standing disputes.1 am here now before the Court because Qatar firmly
believes that the 1987 Agreement expressesthe consent of the two Parties
to refer al1 the disputed mattersto the Court, and that this Agreement
contained no reservation that such reference could only be by means of a
joint submission.
3. What was agreed and recorded in the text of the Doha Agreement
signed by Bahrain on 25 December 1990 was that the Bahraini formula
indicating the subject of the dispute was accepted by Qatar. At the same
time the seisin of the Court by means of a special agreement wasnot
contemplated andBahrain's draft Article V was not incorporated in that
text. Bahrain entered intothis Agreementknowing perfectly well what it
was agreeing to or "bargainingforn. 4. Qatar firmly believesthat it was perfectly entitledto file its
Application, and analyses Bahrain's attitude since that filingas an
attempted withdrawal of the consent whichit gave in 1987 and 1990.
Qatar has been accused of "manoeuvring" (CR 94/4, p. 13). Qatar does not
see how recourse to the Court under its Statute and Rules could be
characterizedas a lamanoeuvre .llIf .the= -areany '%anoeuvres in this
case, it is Bahrain who is manoeuvringin trying to withdraw its consent
to the jurisdictionof the Court. Qatar is convinced that the Courtcan
adjudicate on the dispute covered by the Bahraini formula and that
Bahrain is at liberty to file a separate application with respect, for
example, to its own claims concerning Zubarah.
Qatar does not want to prevent Bahrainfrom sharing in justice. But,
as Beckett is quoted by Manfred Lachs as saying:
"It is not correct as a matter of practice and experience to state
that the meaningof a treaty cannotbe clear, or otherwise the States
concerned would not be going to the trouble and extent of litigating
about it. It certainly happens that the meaningof a treaty provision is
perfectly clear, but that one ... party ... has for one reasonor another
found the provision inconvenient." (ManfredLachs, "Evidence in the
procedure of the InternationalCourt of Justice: the role of the Court"
in Hacia un nuevo ordén internacional y europeo; Hommaje al ProfessorM.
Diez de Velasco, Editorial tecnos, Madrid, 1993, p. 437).
5. Second, 1 turn to the Bahraini question about the absence of a
reaction by Qatar to the two different draft special agreements that it
received in September 1991 and June 1992, after the filing of the
Application. Bahrainhas asked whyQatar rejected these offers. Why?
The answer is quite simple. In the first place, Qatar had already filed
a valid unilateral Applicationon the basis of the 1987 and 1990
Agreements. Furthermore, it is obvious that the 1992 Bahraini draft was
intended as a trap for Qatar. 1 am sure that the Courtwill have been as
astonished as Qatar was, to note that, despite Qatar and Bahrain's - 10 -
acceptance in December 1990 of the Bahraini formula, Bahrain has changed
that formula in its June 1992 draft. Quite simply, and contrary to what
Bahrain tries topretend, the draft special agreementof June 1992 is far
from being "a perfectly reasonableproposa1 for a joint submissionu. In
addition, al1 these attempts made by Bahrain for the signature of a
special agreement havebeen made in full knowledge of Qatar's Application
of July 1991. As 1 said earlier, the Mediator did not depart £rom his
role as Mediator, and Bahrain is using the draft special agreementsnot
only in an attempt to withdrawits consent under the Doha Agreement but
perhaps also to evade its consent under the 1987 Agreement.
6. Third, last Friday, we were told that "States likely to be faced
by boundary questions are reluctantto accept compulsory jurisdictional
clauses permittingthe unilateral institutionof proceedings relatingto
such matters", and that "the initiation of proceedings in relation to
such matters under pre-existing clauses of compulsory jurisdictionor
under the Optional Clause is exceptional" (CR 94/4, pp. 19-20). This was
repeated again on Tuesday (CR 94/6, p. 48). The truth of the matter is,
however, that out of the 57 States which have made Optional Clause
declarations,only six have excluded territorial questions from their
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction - only six. In addition, the
Court will not need to be reminded that three cases concerning
territorial disputes have beenbrought before it by unilateral
application on the basis of an Optional Clause declaration (theTemple of
.
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) case (I. C.J. Reports 1962, p. 6) and,
very recently, both the Maritime Boundary (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) case
in 1991 and the case concerningMaritime Delimitation in the Area between
Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway) (I.C. J. Reports 1993) ). - 11 -
7. Fourth, 1 was surprised to hear last Friday that the only members
of the GCC Summit who knew anything about the problembetween Qatar and
Bahrain were Saudi Arabia and the two Parties themselves,and that
therefore thefirst paragraph of the Doha Agreement as drafted by Oman,
reaffirming "what had previously been agreed" between the Parties, can
only have referred to "whatever had been previously-agreedM,including
matters agreed upon in the Tripartite Committee (CR 94/4, p. 55).
Mr. President,Members of the Court, 1 submit that quite the
opposite is true. Oman, like the other members of the GCC, was very well
aware of the 1987 Agreement, which had been made public at the 1987 GCC
Summit and was reported at the time to the press by the officia1 speaker
of the Summit, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the very person who, in 1988
informed theTripartite Committeethat its work would terminate at the
end of December 1988. Oman, and indeed the other members of the GCC,
were also aware of the further attemptsto try to reach a mediated
settlement which had been announcedin the subsequent GCC summit
meetings, and of the understandingwhich had been reachedby the heads of
State at the Doha Summit. What it could not have been awareof, and
therefore could not have had in mind when it produced its draft, were the
various so-called agreements reached during the Tripartite Committee
meetings. In otherwords, the phrase "what was previously agreed" in the
first paragraphof the Doha Agreement clearlymust be understood as
referring to the 1987 Agreement.
8. Fifth, another point 1 would like to discuss is the extraordinary
presentation by Bahrain of the factualelements of the Doha Agreement.
At the outset, 1 should Say that it was astonishing to hearthe Agent for
Bahrain citing his own statement as if it were objective evidence - 12 -
(CR 94/2, p. 22). 1 would also recall that almost no face-to-face
discussions took place between the two Parties uponthe occasion of the
conclusion of the Doha Agreement. The same was the case for the
conclusion of the 1987 Agreement by exchange of letters.
On 4 March, however, one of Bahrainos counsel (CR 94/4, pp. 51 ff.)
commented on the self-serving statements by Bahrain4s Foreign Minister
and by the Agent of Bahrain which were manufactured 18 months after the
events and were annexed to the Bahraini Counter-Memorial. At the
beginning, we heard that "the accuracy of the statement has never been
challengedol.This is simply not true - it is not true - and 1 would like
to refer the Court to page 34 of Qatar's Reply.
Next, it was said that since Qatar has refrained from filing similar
statements or introducing oral testimonyto contradict the statements,
"it is now impossible for Qatar ... to contend that the Court
should qualify, question or reject the evidence of these
statements regardingwhat happenedat Doha or the understanding
that the Minister had of the effectof the texts or thenature
of his intentions".
There are two points 1 wish to make.
As the Bahraini Minister for Foreign Affairshas recognized in his
statement,
"throughoutthe summit there were no direct discussions on this
matter between the Bahraini and Qatari delegations. At al1
times a representativeof Saudi Arabia or Oman shuttled between
the two delegations." (CMB, Vol. II, -ex 1-25, p. 161,
para. 5.)
In these circumstances, howcould Qatar provide evidence to contradicta
statement concerning discussionsat which it was not present?
The direct discussions betweenthe two delegations whichare
referred to in the Foreign Minister's statement were between the Amir of
Qatar and the Prime Minister of Bahrain at the opening sessionof the - 13 -
Summit. But Qatar has noted that the Prime Ministerof Bahrain did not
provide a written statement.
Similarly, Dr. Al Baharna's statement reports no direct contact with
Qatar's delegation. It is clear that Qatar could not have provided
evidence relating to alleged discussions which took place in its absence.
1s Bahrain really suggesting that Qatar--should have produced similar
statements? Why would such a statement have more value than the
narrative of events appearingin Qatar's written pleadings? Theanswer
is certainly that Qatar did not want to use such statements in an attempt
to induce in the Court the falseidea that they have thevalue of an
affidavit. In Qatar's view, the evidentiary valueof the statements
submitted by Bahrain is no greater than the value of the text of Qatar's
written pleadings.
Furthermore, counsel forBahrain insinuated thaton the Qatari side,
"no one appears ready to come forward and accept responsibility"for
having negotiated the Doha Agreement, and that no one would be willing to
be cross-examinedby Bahrain. This assertion is extraordinary. Qatari
are being accused of not having the courage to be responsible;but the
words of Bahrainls counsel could also apply to the authors of the two
famous statements. For a statement to be an accepted type of evidence,
it should be made in the form of an affidavit.
In Qatar's view, witnesses who acceptto give a statement under oath
no doubt accept responsibility, because they are subject to al1 the
sanctions which a court can apply when it is proven that the particular
statement made is incorrect. Qatar notes that the statements made by the
two Bahraini Ministers do not involve any responsibilityon the part of
their authors. - 14 -
Finally, to end my remarks on the lack of evidentiary value of the
two Bahraini Ministersl statements which, 1 repeat, should not be given
more weight than Qatar's statements in its written pleadings, 1 would
remind the Court that, following a request from the Registrar dated
16 November 1993, the two Agents remindedthe Registrar of the agreement
reached between them that no experts or witnesses would be called
(Qatar's letter of 20 November 1993 and Bahrainus letter of
23 November 1993). 1 am confident that Dr. Al-Baharna will remember that
1 made this agreement at his request.
To sum up, if the Court were to allow statements of this kind to be
used as "evidencenunder the Statute and Rules of Court, this would be
equivalent to a Party, in its oral pleadings, using statementsmade in
its written pleadingsas if they were evidence.
9. Sixth, 1 now turn to linguistic issues.
Counsel for Bahrain (CR 94/4, p. 57) addressed the question of the
meaning of "al-tarafan"in the Doha Minutes, misstating the issue as
being whether "al-tarafanumeans "either of the parties" or "both the
parties togetheru. However, as Qatar has repeatedly explained,
"al-tarafan"means simply "both" or "each of the parties" and there is no
suggestion of the need for joint action in the Doha Agreement. In
particular, there is no use of the word "mauan" "togetheru.
Bahrain, in oral argument, referred to the uhistoricalcontextu -
which was also describedas the emergence of a pattern of usage of the
words "al-tarafan"by the Parties. Bahrain attempted toshow that the
Parties had always used the word "al-tarafan"to refer to joint action.
However, not a single example given from the so-called "historical
contextu is in fact relevant to an interpretationof the Doha Agreement. - 15 -
Why? Because in every single example "al tarafan" was used wherean
obligation was placed on both Parties - both Parties must take a certain
action. But the Doha Agreement does not contain an obligation, but
rather gives a right to both Parties. Specifically, it uses the word
~yagouzW (ItmayR)not even mentioned by Bahrainls counsel. This is a
fundamental difference. TheDoha Agreement gives both Parties the right
to submit the matter to the Court. Al1 the experts agree that words must
be interpreted in their linguistic context. It is thus significant that
Bahrain's counsel sought to useexamples which do not reflect the
"linguisticcontext" of the Doha Agreement.
Equally important there are many exarnplesfrornthe so-called
"historicalcontextu where "al-tarafan" was used where separate action by
each Party was envisaged. 1 referred to a number of such examples in my
first roundpresentation whereDr. Al Baharna himself used"al-tarafanv
to describe the right of each Party under the Bahraini formula to present
their case or claims to the Court (CR 94/3, p. 37).
Bahrain's counsel make much of the fact that Bahrain "rejectedUboth
the Saudi and Omani drafts because they envisaged unilateral application.
But did Bahrain really reject these drafts? On the basis of anything
known to Qatar the answer is no. From Bahrain's pleadings, it appears
that on the Saudi draft, Bahrain simply inserted the following: "as
specified in the Bahraini memorandum". 1 must note that, in his
statement, Dr. Al Baharna said that the draftenvisaged unilateral
action.
In that connection,Dr. Al Baharna stated that he recommendedthe
deletion of the text of the Bahraini formula, replacing it with
confirmationthat the Parties had agreed on this formula. He also said - 16 -
that he recommended changingthe words "either party" to "the two
partiesn. But neither of these changes appearson the Saudi draft.
Rather, it is clear that once again Dr. Al Baharna is mixingup his
drafts. These were changes made to the Omani draft, not the Saudi draft.
Moreover the reference to the acceptance of the formula was inserted in
the Omani draft by Qatar, not by Bahrain.
NOW, what about theOmani draft? Again, there is no evidence of a
rejection of unilateral application. On the Omani draft, Bahrain simply
changed "either of the partiesw to "the parties", thus making clear that
both Qatar and Bahrain had the right to make a unilateral applicationto
the Court. Bahrain also addeda reference to the Court's procedures. 1
believe that these objective changesto the text are not at al1
rejections of the agreement reachedduring discussions at Doha that
reference to the Court couldnow be by unilateral application,but rather
subjective statementsof the alleged intentions of Bahrain's negotiators.
Qatar made clear its understandingof the Doha Agreement in its
letter of 6 May 1991 to Saudi Arabia stating thatin pursuance of the
said Agreement "we [i.e.,Qatarl intend to take the necessary measures to
submit the matter to the ICJ at the end of the above-mentionedperiodI1
(MQ,Vol. II, Ann. 11-34, p. 215). This statement could only refer toa
unilateral application and simply could not havebeen understood
otherwise. Had the intentionbeen as Bahrain suggests, the letter would
have said that "we [i.e.,Qatarl intend to enter into contact with
Bahrain at the end of the above-mentionedperiod with a view to the joint
submission of the matter to the Courtu. It did not. The fact that
Qatar's action was to be taken alone, without Bahrain, is equally clear
in Qatar's letter to King Fahd of 18 June 1991. Saudi Arabia did not - 17 -
query Qatar's letters, either suggesting that there wasno such
internationalagreement allowing Qatar to go to Court after the deadline,
or suggesting that Qatar did not have the right to go by unilateral
application.
1 should make clearnow that Qatar is not going to respondthis
morning to every argument put forward byBahrain, but that it will deal
only with the matters regarding the essence of thecase. In particular,
it is not the intention for counsel to deal with each and every
distortion and omission in Bahrain's presentation. However, any failure
to address an argument put forward by Bahrain cannotbe understood to
mean that Qatar concedes the argument.
In this second roundof oral pleading, Mr. President, on behalf of
the State of Qatar, Mr. Shankardass will deal with some of the important
factual inaccuracies, contradictions and distortions in Bahrain's
presentation.
Sir Ian Sinclairwill respond to the Bahraini arguments relatingto
the status of the Doha Agreement and will demonstrate that the essential
elements of the 1987 Agreement andthe Doha Agreement supportthe case
advanced by Qatar.
Professor Jean Salmon will focus on the consent concerning.the
subject and extent of the dispute and on the alleged disadvantages
arising from the seisin of the Court by the mean of an unilateral
application. - 18 -
Professor Quéneudecwill then deal with Bahrain's contention that
there is no ground for the Applicationmade by Qatar.
Mr. President, Mr. Shankardass is ready to deliver his statement
upon your invitation. Thank you Sir.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Your Excellency. 1 give now the floor to
Professor Shankardass.
Mr. SHANKARDASS: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Members
of the Court, it is my task this morningto try and see if 1 can help
remove some of the cobwebs that might have appeared in the last three
hearings of the Court, in particular on some of the factual issues.
1. TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND THEIR SIGNED MINUTES
(i) The 1987 Agreement and a Special Agreement
May 1 first consider some aspects of the Tripartite Committee
Meetings and their Minutes.
1 have already shownin my first roundpresentation that when the
1987 Agreement was reached, it was in no one's contemplationthat the
Agreement had inevitably to be implementedby the negotiation of a
special agreement. We have Dr. Al Baharna's own statement that it was
only after consulting expertssometime after the 1987 Agreement that
Bahrain was advised that contact with the Court should be through a
Special Agreement.
In his presentation, Professor Bowett picked out and presented
certain observations madeon behalf of Qatar by the late Dr. Hassan Kamel
in the Tripartite Committee Meetingsto show that the Parties had agreed
to go to the Court by a special agreement. It is regrettable, - 19 -
Mr. President, that Bahrain chose to refer to Dr. Hassan Kamel's
observations so totally out of context. 1 have already shown:
First, that the whole object and purpose of the Committee was to try
and agree the procedure to implement what Bahrain also agreedat that
time was the commitment and undertaking of the Parties to take their
disputes to the Court; Dr. Hassan Kamel's statements were made in that
procedural contextso that they did not in any way affect the Parties'
commitment.
Second, that at the First Tripartite CommitteeMeeting Qatar
rejected any language for the proceduralagreement which would restrict
the reference to Court only by means of a Special Agreement. Of course
Dr. Hassan Kamel said the Parties required a further agreement to submit
the case to the Court - and, in the event, the Doha Agreement turned out
to be that Agreement. The Court will recollect it was at the First
meeting he also specificallypointed out thatunder Article 40 of the
Court's Statute, cases are brought before theCourt either by the
notification of a Special Agreementor by a written application; and
again, at the Legal Experts1 meeting, he read out and analysed the
requirementsof Article 38 of the Rules of Court in the context of the
Bahraini formula.
Once the parties proceeded, £rom the second meetingonwards, to try
and reach a special agreement,Dr. Hassan Kamel sincerely appliedhimself
to that task. Al1 his statementsnow quoted clearly meant .thatonce it
had been agreed to try and reach a special agreement, al1 concerned
should act realisticallyand reasonably, in trying to achieve one. But
the fact is that the parties failed to reach a special agreementto
submit their disputes to the Court. 1 have explained, and so have other - 20 -
of Qatar's counsel, the reasons for the failure. It is therefore wrong
to quote Dr. Hassan Kamel to show that Qatar had agreed to submit the
disputes only by way of a special agreement. 1 would respectfullydraw
the Court's attention to some of his observations referred toin Qatar's
pleadings and the record of the First and Sixth Meetings of the
ri parti temmittee.
Mr. President, as 1 have said, no one stated or even hinted that in
view of the Tripartite Committee's failure the long pending disputes
would not be submitted to the Court.
The essence of the 1987 Agreement was in paragraph one - that is the
decision of the Parties to submitthe nearly 50-year old disputes to this
Court, - not in paragraph threewhich required the Tripartite Cornmittee
to finalize the procedure to implementthe decision. The attempt to
negotiate a special agreementwas pursued because it was the preferred
method and not because it was a requirement flowing fromthe
1987 Agreement
After a whole year's work, the Committee failedin its task and was
never summoned again after December 1988.
(ii) The end of the Tripartite Committee
Professor Bowett asks how is it possible to consider that King Fahd
terminated theComrnittee1s work and thereby amendedparagraph three of
the 1987 Treaty without the Parties1 consent. He overlooks the fact that
under paragraph four of the 1987 Agreement, Saudi Arabia had another role
and duty - to guarantee the implementationof the decision to refer the
disputes to this Court. After King Fahd found that the Committee was
going nowhere in search of the procedure to implement the decision, he
informed the Committee through PrinceSaud at its Fifth Meeting that its - 21 -
work would terminateby the end of the next GCC summit meeting the
following month "whether or not it succeeded to achieve what was
requested fromitu. Prince Saudwent on to Say
"1 think we as politicians and legal advisors, have
expended long and adequate time in Our discussions (knowing
that we have started Our meeting during last December)." (See,
Minutes of the Fifth Tripartite CommitteeMeeting, Qatar's TCM
Documents, pp. 208-209.)
Bahrain did not respond to Qatar's amendment proposais madeat the
Sixth Meeting up to the time of the GCC Summit in December 1988; the
Committee ceased to function; and the issue went backto the summit
which requested and gave King Fahd some more time to mediate the
substance of the disputes. ProfessorBowett referred to the Bahraini
Foreign Ministers' statement annexed to the Counter-Memorialto show
King Fahd had said at Doha "it was the duty of the Tripartite Committee
to meet and finalize the procedure forthe parties to go to the
International Courtof Justice". If this statement was evermade,
Mr. President, it was obviously made in the context that it was a duty
the Committee had failed to discharge - and not to suggest revival of the
Committee. It is no one's case that Saudi Arabia attempted to reconvene
the Tripartite Committee - not even to discuss the so-called Saudi draft
of the September 1991 special agreement. In anyevent the Doha
Agreement, being subsequentin point of time to the 1987 Agreement,
replaced thelatter to the extent that there were inconsistenciesbetween
the two; and by making provision for the Parties to refer their disputes
to the Court after the expiry of the five-month time-limit, the Doha
Agreement clearly foresaw no further role for the Tripartite Committee
even if, which Qatar denies, it was still in existence. - 22 -
(iii) The December 1988 Minutes and the Doha Minutes
Mr. President, 1 would now like to refer briefly to the signed
Minutes of the Sixth Tripartite Committee meeting. These Minutes, in
Bahraints translation,appear as Annex 1.18 to the Counter-Memorial
These Minutes are a record of certain facts: that "the Committee met in
Riyadh"; that it 'lconsidered" certain issues; the Committee "listened
to the reply of the State of Bahrainu and the b discussions then turned to
the objective of defining exhaustivelythe matters which would be
referred to the Court ..." Five topics were then listed. Thereafter
occurs this important sentence:
"The two parties agreed tothese matters, and the
delegation of the State of Qatar proposed that there should be
two annexes to the agreement which wouldbe referred to the
Court one of which wouldbe Qatari and the other Bahraini.
Each State would specify in its annex the matters of difference
which it wished to refer to the ICJ."
The Minutes next record thatBahrain statedQatar's proposa1 "would
be studied" and "requestedsufficient timen. Qatar then "requested
clarification" regarding Zubarahand Bahrain "repliedu.
1 respectfully submit, Mr. President,that these minutes areby
their very nature demonstrablyno more than a mere record of discussions
Where in al1 this does Bahrain find any agreement that was covered by
"what was previously agreed" in the Doha Agreement?
And when theMinutes refer to the fact thatthe "Parties agreed" on
the list of subjects to which the reference was to be confined,the same
sentence recordsQatar's suggestion of two annexes. In otherwords
despite the so-called agreed list the Parties were still to set out their
respective claimsin separate annexes which the other Party would not
sign - in substance not very differentfrom filing separate applications. - 23 -
In the light of these considerations, Mr.President, 1 would
respectfully invite the Courtto compare these Tripartite Committee
Minutes with the so-called Doha Minutes.
After its preamble (which refers to the Frameworkbut, unlike the
Committee Minutes 1 have just referred to, makes no mention of the
Tripartite Committee), it refers to the Framework-and.unequivocally
records: "Agreementwas reached as follows" and then contains three
clear agreed declarationsof the Parties. This, Mr. President, is
totally different in formand content to the Tripartite Committee
Minutes.
1 submit therefore, Mr. President, that in reaffirming what was
previously agreed, the Doha Agreement, recording the understanding
reached at a GCC Summit Meeting (withthe help of Oman which was not even
a member of the Tripartite Committee),was reaffirming the 1987
Agreement. This was the Agreement with which the GCC summit had also
been concernedin December 1987; and the Doha Agreement was understood
by everyone to be the final step in implementingthe 1987 Agreement.
As pointed out by Qatar in its written pleadings, the phrase
reaffirmingwhat was previously agreed was put in because Bahrain at the
opening meetingof the GCC Summit in Doha had called intoquestion the
1987 commitment to go to Court, which causedan angry reaction from King
Fahd. These facts have never been disputedby Bahrain.
So that, Mr. President, it could not be that in reaffirmingwhat was
previously agreed, the Parties were preservingwhat Professor Bowett said
the Parties had already agreed: namely, he said, (i) the Parties would
use the fullCourt, not a chamber - this was never discussed; (ii) that
the Parties were to go to Court exclusivelyby means of a special - 24 -
agreement - something the Tripartite Committeewas simply unable to agree
on; (iii) that the ideaof a unilateral applicationwas not within the
contemplationof either Party - the fact is they discussed the idea both
at the First and Sixth meetings of the Tripartite Committee; and (iv)
the Bahraini formula was a possible solution - but this was only accepted
under paragraph two of the Doha Agreement.
II. THE MEDIATOR'S ROLE
Mr. President, 1 will now turn, if 1 may, to the ~ediator's role -
for the reason that Bahrain has attempted to exploit some of its actions
for its own purposes.
While expressing his admiration and appreciation of the Mediator's
role, the Agent for Bahrain drew the attention of the Court to the
so-called ItSeptember 1991 draft SpecialAgreement" and claimed it
evidences Saudi Arabia's attempt, after Qatar's Application was filed, to
persuade the Parties to adhere to the course which had for so long been
their preoccupation,and that is, according to Bahrain, that of
concluding an agreement to submit their disputes jointly and
comprehensively tothis Court. Mr. President, in my presentation in the
First Round 1 have already drawn attentionto the strange and somewhat
mystifying circumstancesin which this draft madeits appearance in
September 1991. 1 wish to refer to another circumstance to whichDr. Al-
Baharna has drawn pointed attention, i.e., that after theDoha GCC
Summmit Session, where an understanding emergedthat the decision to
refer the Qatar Bahrain disputesto this Court shouldnow be implemented,
Saudi Arabia presenteda draft of a proposa1 to Bahrain's Foreign
Minister which in fact provided that the consultationsin Doha "had concluded with the agreement of the two parties on the
formulationof the question which will be presented to the
internationalCourt of Justice by each of them".
Here, then, Mr. President, is the Mediator himself confirming that
separate applications could be made to the Court by each of the Parties,
obviously pursuant to the understandingwhich emerged at the Summit
Meeting earlier. The Court will recollectOman's later draft based on
the same understandingwas to a similar effect. Bahrainfails to
explain, or even attempt to explain, how this position of the Mediator is
consistent with the view or intent that Bahrain tries to attribute to
Saudi Arabia by virtue of the appearance of the September 1991 draft,
namely, that the Parties were always intended to continue discussionsfor
a special agreement.
In any event, and in fairness to the Mediator, 1 believe it is
important for me to draw attentionto the fact that Saudi Arabia has
always been anxious to stress the impartialityof its role as Mediator.
As will be seen £rom the records of the Tripartite Committee meetings,
Prince Saud repeatedly reminded the Parties of this fact fully realizing
that this wasan essential requirement for SaudiArabia to play an
effective role as a Mediator. 1 had occasion to refer to one such
statement by Prince Saudat the second Tripartite Committeemeeting
during the First Roundof the oral hearings and would respectully invite
the Court's attention to a number of statements to a similar effect at
other meetings whichare recorded in theproceedings of the Tripartite
Committee (e.g.,pp. 4, 12, 85, etc.).
So that even if it was Bahrain that somehow persuaded SaudiArabia
to send the September 1991draft of a Special Agreement it could,
Mr. President, at most only have beenan attempt by the Mediator to see - 26 -
if this unnecessary round of jurisdiction proceedingscould be avoided.
However, given Saudi Arabials declared impartiality,it must in any event
be interpreted as being without prejudiceto the right of each Party to
go to Court after the expiryof the stipulateddeadline, in accordance
with the Doha Agreement.
1 must therefore reiterate-ineven stronger terms-thatno reliance
can or should be placed for any purpose on the so-called September 1991
draft Special Agreement which is wholly irrelevant to the issue before
the Court, and in any case, on ~ahrain's own argument cannot, as a
subsequent event, have any effect on the validity of Qatar's ~pplication.
Mr. President, there are two other aspects to which 1 believe 1
should draw the Court's attention.
(1) Bahrainls Foreign Minister himself admits in paragraph 8 of his
statement filed withBahrain1s Couriter-Memorial that the only change he
made in the Saudi draft was "as specified in the Bahraini memorandum'
(see Bahrain1s Hearing Book, Item 12). In his first reaction to the
draft there was no disapproval of the reference to eachof the Parties
presenting their own claims. 1 submit this is because he was aware these
words were consistent with the understanding reachedat the Summit
Meeting earlier. Betweenhis statement and the Agent's opening address
to this Court, we are told that it is only after consultationwith other
members of the Bahraini delegation that the draft was found
"unacceptable"and was "rejectedas a wholel'.
2. Bahrain finds it difficult to believethat Qatar was unawareof
the Saudi draft of the Doha Minutes that 1 have just referred to
(~1-~aharna - para. 32, E.L. para. 26). Bahrain claims it found this
draft unacceptable. If this is correct it provides a plausible reason - 27 -
why the Saudi delegationnever bothered to present it to Qatar's
delegation as it would obviously have served no usefulpurpose.
III. NO PRIOR NOTICE TO BAHRAIN
(i) Qatar raising the disputes at Doha GCC Suamiit
May 1, Mr. President, turn to another claim that Bahrain's counsel
made. Bahrain claims that Qatar raised the issue of the pending disputes
at the Doha Summit without notice, suggesting it caught Bahrainby
surprise and never approached Bahrain in advance with a draft of a
proposed agreement it intended to secure at Doha.
Firstly, there is no basis for the suggestion that Qatar had any
prior plans whereby it "intended to secure" the kind of agreement Bahrain
mentions. Qatar simplywanted to ensure that the commitment to refer the
case to this Court shouldbe implemented. It therefore raised the issue
at the Doha Summit and the Doha Agreement was the result.
Secondly, 1 must Say this pretenceat being taken unawares is
nothing short of amazing and factually incorrect ina number of respects.
Bahrain has apparently forgottenthe assertion in Bahrain's own
Foreign Minister's Statement (para. 2) that at themeeting of the GCC
Foreign Ministers on 8 December 1990, about two weeks before the summit,
to discuss the Agenda for the forthcomingsummit meetingwhen Qatar asked
for the issue of Qatar-Bahraindisputes to be added to the Agenda, he
said
"1 disagreed with thissuggestion saying the matter had
always been outside the fomal agenda for GCC meetings and
should not thereforehe included. This was agreed and the
issue was not includedon the agenda ..."
This complaint also contradictsBahrain's admission in its
Counter-Memorial (para. 5.38) that "the dispute was adverted to at the Gulf Co-operationCouncil
Summit Conferencein December 1988 and again at the
corresponding meetingin December 1989"
although it was similarly not on the fomal agenda for either of those
meetings.
The fact is that the issue was raised at the Doha Summit in just the
same way as at earlier similar meetings: It is true that it was only at
the Doha meeting that an understanding emergedthat after a period of
another five months of mediation, the matter could be referred to the
Court; and to facilitate the reference Qatar announced its acceptance of
the Bahraini formula. But this was hardlya surprise. The Summit was
well aware of the 1987 Agreement to go to the Court. The leaders of the
Gulf countries had been troubled by the issue which they had had to
discuss and deal with at each of their previous three meetings.
King Fahd had indicated that he wished he had not asked for more time for
his mediation at the previous two meetings as otherwise the disputes
would already have been before the Court. He had further observed that
as Qatar had accepted the Bahraini formula, there was no excuse for
Bahrain not to referthe disputes to the Court. The accuracy of these
statements, Mr. President,adverted to in Qatar's pleadings, has not been
challenged.
The Court will see it is against this background andwith full
knowledge of the failure of the Tripartite Committee toevolve a Special
Agreement that at the Doha Summit meeting, in which the senior most
representativesof both Parties had participated, the understanding to
refer the disputes to this Court, under its appropriate Rules, was
reached. - 29 -
There is thus no basis for Bahrain to feign surprise at the matter
being raisedat the Doha Summit or the lack of prior notice of an
agreement fromQatar. The new agreement - i.e., the Doha Agreement was a
consequenceof the discussions at the Doha GCC Summit.
in this context 1 would like to refer to another surprising
assertion by Bahrain - namely, that Qatar when -raisingthe matter at the
Doha GCC Summit "chose to raise the matter in a body whose members -
apart from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain - knew nothing of the subject"
(E.L.,para. 13, Al-Baharna, para. 46). This ill-conceivedsubmission
(apart from being disparagingof members of the GCC) has only to be
stated to be rejected. Bahrain forgets thatright £rom the time of the
GCC resolutionof 8 March 1982, which requested SaudiArabia to mediate
in the disputes, that body, i.e., the GCC Summit, had been fully informed
of and even been involvedwith al1 important developments including, in
particular, at the time of the "Dibal incident" in 1986, and the
announcement of the 1987 Agreement. In any event, almost every student
of the history of Qatar and Bahrain is aware of the nature of their
disputes because almost every book on the subject, including oneby the
distinguishedAgent for Bahrain, Dr. Al-Baharna, tells you the disputes
are about the Hawar Islands and the delimitationof the maritime
boundary .
Dr. Al-Baharna also declared that inraising the disputes at the GCC
Summit most of whose members knew nothing about the rnatter,"Qatar was
trying to push Bahrain intoaccepting a formula which would haveenabled
Qatar to proceed unilaterally to the Court on any terms it wishedv. In
the light of what 1 have just said, this seemed an incredible statement
on behalf of Bahrain. At the Summit, Qatar accepted Bahrainss own - 30 -
formula. Bahrain was most anxious to ensure that this acceptance was
recorded in the Doha Agreement. Notwithstandingthat, Bahrain itself has
now discarded that formula in proposing yet another draft special
agreement of June 1992 - a year after Qatar filed its Application.
iii) Bahrain was unaware of communication between Qatar and
Saudi Arabia after Doha Agreement
Mr. President, in my first roundpresentation 1 adverted to
two letters sent by Qatar to Saudi Arabia on 6 May and 18 June 1991. In
these letters, the Court may recollect, Qatarmade clear itsintention to
go to Court unilaterally after the expiry of the deadline. Saudi Arabia
never once suggestedthat Qatar did not have the right to take this
action.
Bahrain surprisingly claimsit was unaware of any communication
between Qatar and the Mediator after the Doha Agreement. 1 have already
shown in the first round that Bahrain's Foreign Minister himselfadmits
in his statement filed with the ~ounter-Memorial (in para. 15) that
King Fahd told the Amir of Bahrain in a meeting on 3 June 1991
"that he had been approachedseveral times by the Amir of Qatar
regarding the matter but that he had asked him not to be in
such a rush. King Fahd also confirmed thathe had sent Prince
Saud Al Faisal, the Saudi ForeignMinister, to Qatar with Saudi
Arabia's proposals concerningthe matter and when Saud Al
Faisal returned he would send him to Bahrain".
Furthermore,Mr. President, is it conceivable that when, at
King Fahd's request, the Amir of Qatar agreed to give Bahrain three more
weeks to respondto Qatar's latest proposals, King Fahd would not have
informed Bahrain of the proposals or of the extended time limit ?
In fact a most pertinent conclusionto be drawn is that while these
exchanges were going on, Bahrain did not respond by saying "How can Qatar
go to the Court before wehave negotiateda Special Agreement?" Nor did - 31 -
Bahrain summonor request Saudi Arabia to cal1 a meeting of the defunct
Tripartite Committee. Those ideas clearly developed only after Qatarhad
filed its Application. If Bahrain reallybelieved thatthe Doha
Agreement contemplateda further roundof Tripartite CommitteeMeetings
to evolve a Special Agreement, it would have produced some evidence to
show it had asked Saudi Arabia to reconvene the Committee. The fact is
that Bahrain took no such initiative after the Doha Agreement and before
Qatar's Application was filed because Bahrain fully understood there were
to be no further meetings of any Tripartite Committeeand no further
attempt to reach a special agreement.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1 hope 1 will be forgiven for
repeating what 1 would respectfully Say is a most important submission,
and that it that Qatar and Bahrain agreed under the Fifth Principleof
the Framework to have their disputesdecided according to international
law; they agreed to refer their disputes to this Court under the 1987
Agreement; during the Tripartite Committeemeetings, they recognized
they had distinct claims to make but neither was prepared to sign a
special agreement which referred to the other's claims. The issue was
resolved when the Doha Agreement gave each of them the right to bring its
claims to this Court under a general formula after an agreed time-limit.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1 am not sure whether there is
such a thing as harmonious litigationbut 1 have come to learn that this
forum is certainly a place where litigation is dealt with in a most
harmonious way. May 1 again, therefore, express my sense of privilege at
appearing in thishonorable Court and my deep gratitude for the patient
hearing that 1 have been given. - 32 -
Mr. President, may 1 suggest thatyou now invite Sir Ian Sinclair
for Qatar's next presentation. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT: Thankyou Professor Shankardass. 1 give the floor
to Sir Ian.
Mr. SINCLAIR: Mr. President,Members of the Court, my task this
morning is to respond to someof the points made in their first round
statements by the Agent for Bahrain, and by other ahr rai co unsel.
Dr. Al Baharna (CR 94/4, p. 23) reproached me for having drawn
attention in my first round statement to his sudden appearance at Doha;
and he enquired rhetorically: "If you donlt want to enter into a legal
commitment, who better than a lawyer to tell you how to avoid it?" 1
willingly accept the reproach, for it only goes to show that Bahrain's
protestations thatit has no objection, in principle,to the settlement
of the whole of the dispute that presently divides the States of Bahrain
and Qatar (CR 94/4, p. 10) are mere empty words. For Bahrain has had
every opportunity, since the conclusion of the Doha Agreement, to have
had the whole of the dispute currently dividing Qatarand Bahrain
adjudicated by the Court. The Qatari acceptanceof the Bahraini formula
has ensured this by conceding that the question of Zubarah falls within
the jurisdictionof this Court. Yet Bahrain has sought, by every means
possible, to frustrate this result. What 1 therefore understand
Dr. Al Baharna to be saying is thathe was sent to Doha with the clear
objective of preventing any immediate referenceto the Court of the
matters in dispute between the two States. The questionis whether he
succeeded in this objective; and that is, at least in part, an issue to
which 1 will in due course revert. 1 turn now to another point raisedby Dr. Al Baharna. In
paragraph 41 of his statementof 4 March (CR 94/4, p. 26), he cites a
short passage from a book by Hans Blix, which he apparently thinks
supports the argumentthat the Bahraini Foreign Ministerwas manifestly
not competentto bind Bahrain by an agreement falling withinthe treaty-
making power of the executive. 1 fear .howeverthat Dr. Al Baharna may
not have fully understood the position taken by Dr. Blix. Only a few
pages prior to the passage cited by Dr. Al Baharna, Dr. Blix discussesat
some length the significanceof the treatment of theIhlen declarationin
the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case. The Court will need no
reminding of that case. Butwhat Dr. Blix emphasizes is that
"the Norwegian Government contendedbefore the [Permanent]
Court that, to conform withNorwegian constitutional lawand
standing instructionsfor the Government, the declaration - if
binding - ought to have been deliberatedby the King in
Council ";
and that
"since this formality had not been observed, the declaration
was one made in excessof the constitutional authorityof the
minister, and invalid internationallyu (Blix, Treaty-Making
Power (19601, p. 35).
Naturaliy, the Danish Government took the opposite view and so argued
In giving Judgment, the Permanent Court, in a much cited passage, stated:
"The Court considers it beyond al1 dispute thata reply of
this nature given by the Minister for Foreign Affairson behalf
of his government in response to a request by the diplomatic
representativeof a foreign Power in regardto a question
falling within hisprovince, is binding upon the country to
which the Minister belongs . (P.C.I. J., Series A/B, No. 53,
p. 71.)
This passage is normally cited as authority for the proposition that oral
declarationsby a Foreign Minister can, depending on the circumstances,
be regarded as binding on the State which he represents. But, as - 34 -
Dr. Blix does not fail to point out, the passage, in fact, has a much
wider significancein the Law of Treaties generally:
"The border-linebetween la reply of this nature1 - so
forma1 as to be embodied in minutes and given in the knowledge
that a quid pro quo would follow - and some treaties in
simplified form, like exchangesof notes, or agreed minutes, if
at al1 existent, is very difficult to establish, and rules
applying to one categorymay with good reason apply to the
other." (Blix,op. cit., pp. 36-37.)
Now, Mr. President, at this point 1 am obliged to comment on an
issue of much greater significance. In seeking todeny the status of a
binding international agreementto the Doha Minutes, counsel for Bahrain
repeatedly advance the argument, which they assume to be decisive, that
the Foreign Ministerof Bahrain did not intend to enter into a binding
international agreement at Doha. The intentionof the Bahraini Foreign
Minister is a constant and recurringtheme in the Bahraini presentations
(see CR 94/4, pp. 23, 24, 25, 26, 50, 61 & 62). But, as a matter of law,
how relevant is the ex post facto expression by a representativeof one
of the parties to a bilateral agreement of what was his intentionin
entering into that agreement? The Agent for Qatar has alreadyaddressed
this morning theso-called "evidenceUpresented in thestatements of the
Bahraini Foreign Minister andDr. Al Baharna. 1 would simply ask the
Court yet again to note that these statements were prepared some
18 months or so after the events to which they makereference.
1 also feel bound to draw to the attention of the Court that this
constant reliance by Bahrain on what is alleged to have been the
intention of its Foreign Ministerat Doha does not accord with the
general rule of interpretationof treaties codified in Article 31 of the
Vie~a Convention on the Law of Treaties. At the risk of reminding the
Court of what it must already be aware, 1 would recall that the - 35 -
InternationalLaw Commission, in their commentaryto what is now
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, States categoricaliy:
"The article as already indicated is based on the view that
the text must be presumed to be the authenticexpression of the
intentions of the parties; and that, in consequence,the
starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the
text, not an investigationab initio into the intentions of the
parties. " (ILC Reports (1966) , p. 51. )
Indeed, as Professor Quéneudec reminded usthe other day, the Court
itself, in its most recent judgement in the Libya/Chad Territorial
Dispute case, reiterated the fundamentalproposition that "interpretation
must be based above al1 on the text of the treaty" (Judgmentof
3 February, 1994, para. 41). It is the text which is the written
expression of the intentions of the parties; and it is the text which
calls for interpretation. Whatever may have been the doctrinal disputes
among publicists prior to the adoption of the Vienna Convention in 1969,
it is now, Qatar would subrnit,beyond disputethat the aim and goal of
treaty interpretationis to ascertain the meaning of the text as the
agreed expressionof the intention of the parties; it is most decidedly
not to mount a new investigationinto what is ex post facto alleged to
have been theintention of one of the parties at the time of the
conclusion of the treaty. Indeed, as one learned authority reminds us,
"one has to exercise a considerable degreeof caution generallywhen
referring to 'intention1as an element of internationallegal conductu
(E. Lauterpacht, llGentlemanlA sgreements" in Festschrift fur F. A. Mann
Let us consider the consequencesof the view contended forby
Bahrain in the context of the interpretationof a multilateral
convention. In Bahrainls view, it would be open to any party to that - 36 -
convention to come along five or ten years later and claim that its
representativein the negotiation of that convention had not intended at
the time thata particular provisionmight be interpreted in such and
such a way; and, on Bahrain's view, the Court wouldbe bound to give
effect to what is now claimed to have been theintention of the
negotiating Stateat the time. It would not even be a question of an
interpretative declarationmade at the time of the conclusion of the
treaty. It would be a subsequent, interpretative declarationmade in the
light of a dispute that had arisen with anotherState.
Mr. President, 1 would submit that there could be no concept more
destructive of the security of treaties than the one 1 have just
outlined. The ex post facto subjective view of one of the parties to the
written instrumentwould on thisview have to be preferred to an
objective assessmentof what is the true meaning of the particular
provision whose interpretationis in issue.
Now, Mr. President, if that is the consequence of the view contended
for by Bahrain in the context of the interpretationof a multilateral
convention, the consequence is exactly the same in the contextof the
interpretationof a bilateral treaty. What Bahrain is doing is asking
the Court to give effect to what, in May 1992, Bahrain asserts to have
been the intention of its Foreign Minister in signing the Doha Minutes in
December 1990. Qatar intends no disrespect whatsoeverto the Bahraini
Foreign Ministernor indeed to Dr. Al Baharna when it points out that
their statementsof 21 and 20 May 1992, on which my learned friend,
Professor Lauterpacht reliesso heavily, are inevitablyself-serving.
Their evidentiaryvalue has been analysed this morning by the Agent for
Qatar. - 37 -
Mr. President, 1 must now turn briefly to another point raisedby
Dr. Al Baharna. He argues, with referenceto the Doha Minutes, that the
Court should not "impose upon Bahrain an agreement that it never intended
to make and thatit did not make"; and he immediately follows this
statement by the following assertion:
"Bahrain did nothing whatsoever to change the pre-existing
objective of the Parties which was to negotiate a special
agreement providing for a joint submission." (CR94/4, p. 30.)
But, Mr. President, Qatar contests and has always contestedthat
this was the "pre-existingobjective" of the Parties. Qatar had always
understood that, if the Mediator was unable to find a solution on the
matters in dispute between Qatarand Bahrain, the agreed objectiveof the
Parties was to ensure that these matters were referred to this Court for
a binding decision. This certainly was the agreed objectiverecorded in
paragraph 1 of the 1987 Agreement. There was admittedly no agreement at
that time on how the matters shouldbe referred to the Court and it was
the task of the Tripartite Committee to investigate this. Yet Bahrain
insists that the only method of seising the Court of disputes between
Qatar and Bahrain is by "joint recourse",by the conclusion of "an
agreement to submit their dispute jointly and comprehensively tothe
Court", by "joint submission to the Court of its difference with Qataru
or by the negotiation of "a joint submissionunder the 1987 Agreementu.
With respect, Mr. President, the Court must have been as weariedwith
this constantrepetition of a theme (and a theme without variations) as
were Qatarls counsel. Qatar would only comment thata cracked gramophone
record is no substitute for reasonedargument. And what Qatar would
instead stress is that it was the failure of the Tripartite Committeeto - 38 -
fulfil its task by the end of 1988 which led inevitably to the conclusion
of the Doha Agreement.
1 must turn now to some further points raised by my learned friend,
Professor Lauterpachtin his renewed address tothe Court on the morning
of 7 March 1994. In commenting on the status of the Doha Minutes,
Professor Lauterpacht seeksto argue from the consideration thatthe Doha
Minutes are designatedas "minutes"and carry the same title as earlier
Minutes of the Tripartite Cornmitteein 1988 that they are not intendedto
be legally binding. My learned friend is too good an international
lawyer to place much reliance on this point, since he knows as well as 1
do, and as well as the Court knows, that it is not the title given to an
internationalinstrument,but its content, which determines whetheror
not it is to be considered a treaty. As one noted authority confirms:
"The term 'treatylmay be taken to cover al1 international
engagements concluded between Statesand governed by
internationallaw, whatever designationsmay be given to the
written instrumentor series of written instrumentsin which
such engagements are embodied." (Satow'sGuide to Diplornatic
Practice, Fifth Edition (1979),p. 238.)
So 1 turn to the next criticism which my learned friend makes of my
first roundpresentation. He immediately distorts my argument by
complaining that 1 have not demonstrated the"intentions'of the Parties
but have sought to analyse some operativeprovisions of theDoha Minutes.
But that isprecisely what one must do if one takes the pretty well
universally accepted viewthat what is involved in the process of treaty
interpretation is not a renewed search for the intentionsof the parties
but rather the meaning to be attributed to a text which is itself the
agreed expressionof the intention of the parties. 1 must simply leave
it to the Court to determine whetherthe three matters to which 1 - 39 -
specifically drew attentionin my statement of 1 March (CR 94/2,
pp. 30-31) are or are not the written expressionof legal commitments
undertaken by the Parties or by one specific Party. Qatar entertains no
doubt that the answer must be in the affirmative.
Professor Lauterpachtthen proceeds to enquire who is the "notional
observer" whose authority 1 seek to invoke in analysing the background
against which the Doha text was negotiated (CR 94/5, pp. 12-13). 1
regret to Say that, on this particular point, my learned friendmade a
Freudian, but perhaps a very revealing, slip. 1 did not refer to a
"notional observeru: 1 referred to "a notional objective observerm (CR
94/2, p. 32). And this is sufficient surelyin itself to exclude my
learned friend's suggestion that 1 should look insteadto the "evidence"
of the Bahraini Foreign Minister. Whatever his manypositive qualities
may be, and 1 am sure there are verymany, the Bahraini Foreign Minister
can hardly be accounted an objective observer in this particular context.
No, Mr. President, by my "notionalobjective observeru, 1 was seeking to
refer, with al1 due respect, to you, Mr. President, and to theother
distinguishedMembers of this Court who will be called upon to assess the
relative weight of the arguments presented by the Parties.
Now, if time permitted, 1 would like to take issue with some other
points of much lesser significancein that part of the argument presented
by Professor Lauterpachtwhich is directed to my submission that the Doha
Minutes were clearly intended to be legally binding. Unfortunately, 1
can at this stage do no more than make a general traverseof any points
in his argument which 1 have not specificallyaddressed, and invite the
Court to reread my earlier statement. 1 am confident thatthe Court will - 40 -
conclude that the Doha Minutes constitute an international agreement
between Qatar and Bahrain which is legally bindingon the PartieS.
1 must however conclude on this point by responding specificallyto
the question posed by Professor Lauterpachton 7 March.
Professor Lauterpacht enquires: How could any negotiator on behalf of
Bahrain have known on 23 to 25 December 1990-thatthe document he was
discussing was in any way legally different from earlier documents
bearing exactly the same title, introduced by virtually the same words
and signed by the same people in exactly the same way? (CR 94/5, p. 16.)
The answer is simple - and for this purpose 1 will ignore the slantedway
in which the question is put. On 23 December, there had been a serious
and profound discussion amongal1 the heads of delegations present at the
Doha Summit. Some progress had been made - or so it must have seemedto
the vast majority of the participants, including the representativesof
Saudi Arabia and Oman. It was necessary to pin down the parties by
putting on record what had been agreed. Three important elements had
certainly been agreed:
1. Qatari acceptanceof the Bahraini formula;
2. An agreed date after whichthe parties would be at liberty to go the
Court ;
3. A reaffirmationof the commitment already embodiedin the 1987
Agreement to refer al1 the matters in dispute to the Court.
So the short answer to the question posed by my learned friend is:
certainly, Bahraints negotiators would or should have known that the
Doha d in ut wesre intendedto embody legally bindingundertakings.
Mr. President, 1 would wish to conclude on a more positive note.
There has been so much in the Bahraini first round presentationswith - 41 -
which Qatar is obliged to take issue inorder to correct the false
impressions created that sight may be lost of the many positive features
of the total picture which strongly support the Qatari submissions.
There is first of al1 the basic undertakingof the Parties,
expressed inparagraph 1 of the 1987 Agreement, to refer al1 the disputed
matters to the Court. But, Bahrain seeks.topersuade us, this was only
an agreement in principle and it requires to be completed by being
incorporated in a special agreementwhich would define more closely the
scope and subject matter of the disputes. Qatar, believing inthe
strength of the Bahraini commitment under paragraph 1 of the
1987 Agreement, was prepared in good faith to explore thepossibilities
of concluding a special agreementwith Bahrain. This was clearlya
possible method (but notthe exclusive method) of having the dispute
referred to the Court; and Qatar, in al1 innocence, accepted that the
primary objectiveof both parties in the Tripartite Committeeshould be
to attempt to draw up a special agreement. And what happens? In its
first round presentations, Bahrainhas been careful to avoid making much,
if any, reference to its first draft of a special agreementdated
March 1988. It is just mentioned inthe first statementmade by my
learned friend, Professor Bowettof 4 March (CR 94/4, p. 40). 1 would
respectfullyask the Court to look again carefully at the proposed
formulationsof the question to be referred to the Court in Article IIof
the Qatari firstdraft (reproducedat MQ, para. 3.36) and in Article II
of the Bahraini first draft (reproducedat MQ, para. 3.37). The Court
will see at a glance that the Bahraini first draft wouldhave required
Qatar to accept in advance that the Hawar islands and the Dibal and
Jaradah features appertainedto Bahrain and would equally have brought - 42 -
within the jurisdictionof the Court the alleged rightsof Bahrain in and
around Zubarah. The highly prejudicial expressionof the questions in
the Bahraini first draft of a special agreementshould be compared with
the formulation of Article II in the Qatari first draft. Here at least
is a genuine attempt toset out inneutral terms the issues to which the
Saudi mediation effort had been directed. Thecomparison of these two
texts is enlightening because it will enable the Court to understand why
Qatar thereafterbecame so suspicious of Bahraini tactics.
Mr. President, 1 leave this pointto concentrateon another, my
final point. One of the major weaknessesof the Bahraini first round
presentation is that it offers no believable explanation of the
five-month time-limit in the Doha Minutes after which the Parties would
be at liberty to refer the matters in dispute to the Court. We know
that, at the GCC Summit in Bahrain in December 1988, it had been agreed,
on the proposa1 of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, that Saudi Arabia shouldbe
given a further period of six months to try to achieve an agreement on
the substance of the disputes through mediation. We know that he did not
succeed even thoughde facto his mandate continued throughoutthe whole
of 1989. We also know that the unresolved situation was discussed again
at the GCC Summit held in Muscat inDecember 1989, when it was agreed
that the Saudi mediation on the substance of the disputes be given a
further limited time to achieve its objective. Again, his mandate
continued de facto throughout the wholeof 1990 without any discernible
progress having been made (seeMQ, para. 3.52).
1 have recited these facts, Mr. President, and they are essentially
uncontested (see CMB, para. 5.38), in order to point up the significance
of the five-month time-limit in paragraph 2 of the Doha Minutes. The - 43 -
previous GCC Summit decisions (in 1988 and 1989) to extend the time-limit
for Saudi mediation had not been accompanied by any indicationof what
consequencewould follow if the extended periodof Saudi mediation on the
merits did notachieve any result. But the Doha Minutes of 1990 did
indicate what consequence would follow: and that consequence was that,
after the end of the new five-monthperiod for which the Doha Minutes
made provision, the Parties "may submit the matter to the International
Court of Justice in accordance with the Bahraini formula, which has been
accepted by Qatar and the proceedings arising therefrom". So Bahrain
could not have anticipatedthat the consequenceof failure of the Saudi
mediation effort during the new five-monthperiod would have beenthe
same as it had been in the extendedperiods of Saudi mediation forwhich
provision had been made at the 1988 and 1989 GCC Summits.
Now, my learned friend, Professor Lauterpacht does not really touch
upon the significanceof the time-limit in the 1990 Doha Minutes; nor
indeed did any of the other Bahraini counsel in their first roundof
presentations. Professor Lauterpacht analyses at some length whetherthe
expression "al-tarafan"is properly to be understood as meaning "the
Parties", "the two Parties" or "the Parties together". But Qatar would
pose the preliminary question: why a time-limit at al1 with a particular
consequence attached to it, if the consequencewas not to permit either
Party to institute proceedingsbefore the Court on the expiry of the
time-limit? If the consequencewas only to permit both Parties, acting
jointly, to take this action, why the time-limit,since it is always open
to two States, acting jointly, to invoke the jurisdictionof the Court?
Mr. President, 1 would submit that the time-limitwould have hadno
raison d'être in the circumstancesif it had not allowed action to be - 44 -
taken by either Party; and it is, as you Mr. President, and al1 the
other Members of the Court, would be well aware, a cardinal principle of
treaty interpretationthat a meaning must be attributed to everyphrase
occurring in a text. Qatar takesthe view that this considerationby
itself militates stronglyin favour of the position for which Qatar
contends. And Qatar is reinforced in this view by the consideration
that, in the nine hours of oral pleadings already allocated tothem, none
of the Bahraini counsel touched upon the crucial significanceof the
time-limit in the Doha Minutes.
Mr. President, that concludes the remarks 1 wish to make this
morning. 1 am sorry if 1 have gone a little bit over the time-limit for
the coffee break. 1 would suggest, Mr. President, that we have the
coffee break now and on the resumption Professor Salmonwill continueto
present theQatari arguments.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Ian, it is the moment to have a
break. The Court will resume in 15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.30 a.m. to 11.45 a.m.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous prie de vous asseoir et j'appelle à la barre
le professeur Salmon.
M. SALMON : Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, deux tâches
bien distinctesm'incombent ce matin. Je vous entretiendrai tout d'abord
des conditions dans lesquellesle consentement à l'objet du différend
sont remplies. Je reviendrai ensuite brièvement sur les prétendus
inconvénients résultantd'une saisine unilatérale. 1. VOYONS TOUT D'ABORD LES CONDITIONS DANS LESQUELLES
LE CONSENTEMXNT SUR L'OBJET DU DIFFRREND SONT RENPLIES
Selon l'article 38 du Règlement de la Cour
«1. Lorsqu'une instance est introduite devant la Cour par
une requête adresséeconformément à l'article 40, paragraphe 1,
du Statut, la requête indiquela partie requérante, 1'Etat
contre lequel la demandeest formée et l'objet du différend
(«the subject of the disputes) .
2. La requête indique ... en outre la nature précise de la
demande («natureof the claims )».
L'article 49 du Règlement parle des pièces écriteset on y fait
allusion à la fois aux «demandes» (claims)et aux «conclusions»
Le Qatar a le regret de constater que les plaidoiries orales de
Bahreïn mélangent allègrement ces trois concepts : objet du différend,
demande et conclusion c est-à-dire «subject of the dispute», «nature of
the claim» et «submissions» .
Dans 1'espècequi nous retient, 1'objetdu différend est régi par
1 accord de Doha.
Le paragraphe 2 de cet accord comprendla phrase suivante :
UA l'expirationde ce délai, les parties pourront soumettre
la question [et celle-ci en fait s'expliquepar le préambule,
où l'on dit 'le différend existant entreBahreïn et le Qatar']
à la Cour internationalede Justice conformément à la formule
bahreïnite qui a été acceptéepar le Qatar, et à la procédure
qui en résulte. ..»
Le Qatar soutientqu'en ayant souscrit à l'accord de Doha qui
incorpore la formulebahreïnite, les Parties sont maintenant d'accord sur
l'objet du différend pouvant êtresoumis à la Cour aux termes de
l'article 38, paragraphe 1, du Règlement. Le fondement obligatoire se
trouve bien entendunon pas dans la formule bahreïnite prise isolément - 46 -
mais dans l'accord de Doha contrairement à ce que laissent entendrenos
contradicteurs.
Néanmoins, l'objet du différend a été décrit dans la formule en
question :
«Les parties prient la Cour de trancher toute question
relative à un droit territorialou à tout autre titre ou
intérêt qui peut faire l'objet d'un différend entre elles; et
de tracer une limite maritime entre leurs zones maritimes
respectives, comprenant les fonds marins, le sous-sol et les
eaux sur jacentes B
Je ne reviendrai pas sur les citations faites dans les écritures du
Qatar et au cours de mon propre exposé de la séance du 2 mars (CR 94/3,
p. 45-46). Il en résulte que la formule fut miseau point par Bahrein
pour inclure tous les différends entre les Parties, en particulierHawar
et Zubarah sans les citer explicitement.
Cette formule de nature généraleet abstraite a été conçue pour que
chaque Partie puisse présenter les différends qu'elle avait à coeur de
présenter. C'est pourquoi elle utilise un mot collectif au singulier :
le mot «di£férend» .
On croit donc rêver lorsqu'on entend maintenantles conseils de
Bahrein reprocher à la formule d'être de nature générale et abstraite
sans aucune indicationde divergences concrètes (CR 94/5, p. 49) et
soutenir qu'elle ne serait pas l'expressiond'un consentement de Bahreïn.
Bien plus, Bahreïn va maintenant jusqu'à dire qu'il n'aurait jamais
consenti, en souscrivant à ladite formuleou de toute autre manière, à
soumettre à la Cour ses droits souverainssur les parties essentiellesde
son territoire que sont les îlesHawar, Dibal et Qit'at Jaradah (CR 94/5,
p. 49) ! Ceci nous a été dit - et nous l'avons entendu avec stupeur -
par M. Jiménez de Aréchaga - 47 -
La Cour jugera de la conformité de ces nouvelles déclarationsavec
les engagements de Bahreïn.
Le nouveau thème développémaintenant parBahreïn est que le Qatar
choisit en quelque sorte dansle menu ce qui lui plaît, et laisse le
reste par un procédé qualifié deapick and chooses. En ceci, Bahreïn
feint de ne pas comprendre que, par sa requête, le Qatar n'a fait que
présenter ses propres demandes («its own claimsw) et qu'il ne lui
appartient pas de présenter celles del'autre Partie.
Bahreïn pourtant soutient que le Qatar devrait aussi présenter
celles de l'autre Partie pour que la totalité du différend soitportée
devant la Cour.
Plusieurs formes d'argumentationsont avancées pour soutenir cette
prétention singulière.
Selon la première, le Qatar aurait violé le premier principe de
l'accord-cadreélaboré en 1978 mais, comme vous lesavez, définitivement
adopté seulement en 1983 et selon lequel toutes lesquestions doivent
être présentées de manière complémentaireet indivisible (CR 94/4,
p. 16). Ce premier argument est erroné en fait comme en droit.
Ce premier principeposait en effet que
«Toutes les questions en litige entre lesdeux Etats au
sujet de la souveraineté surles îles, des frontièresmaritimes
et des eaux territorialesdoivent être considérées comme des
questions complémentairesformant un tout indivisiblequi doit
faire l'objet d'un règlement d'ensemble.»
Le pourquoi de cette disposition était simple. Le Qatar réclamait
Hawar. Bahreïn n'était pas satisfait de la décision britannique du
23 décembre 1947 sur la délimitation de la frontière sur le fond de la
mer. L'un et l'autre contestaient le statut de Dibal et de Qit'at - 48 -
Jaradah. Bahrein estimait que ses droits de pêche (notamment perlière)
étaient un élément pertinent et il était évidentque pour tracer la ligne
maritime divisoireentre les deux pays, la prise en comptede ces
éléments pouvait se poser. A l'époque, il n'y avait pas d'autres
conflits que ceux que je viens de vous citer. A l'époque, l'Arabie
saoudite le savait fort bien. Le principe de 1983 ne mentionne donc rien
d'autre, il n'y est question que d'îles ou de frontières maritimes.
Inutile de dire qu'il n'a jamais été soutenu que Zubarahfût une île.
Ceci démontre que la question de Zubarah n'était nullement présente
à l'époque. Le professor Bowett et le professeur Jiménez deAréchaga
sont obligés d'en convenir (CR 94/4, p. 33)
Cette situationa-t-elle été modifiée par l'accord de
décembre 1987 ?
Le paragraphe 1, qui se lit comme suit, n'apporte aucun élément
nouveau sur ce point. Je le lis :
u1. Toutes les questions en litige seront soumises à la
Cour internationale deJustice, à La Haye, pour qu'elle rende
une décision définitiveet obligatoire,pour les deux parties,
qui devront en exécuter les dispositions.~
En décembre 1987 le Qatar n'avait aucune connaissanced'une
réclamation concernant Zubarah. Lemémorandum secret que Bahrainprétend
avoir adressé au roi Fahd en octobre 1986 reste à ce jour inconnu du
Qatar et de la Cour. Il est symptomatique à cet égard de noter que ce
prétendu mémorandumn'a pas dû rester dans la mémoire du roi Fahd car
comment la lettre de ce dernier adresséele 19 décembre 1987 aux deux
Emirs décrit-elle l'objet du différend ? La deuxième phrase de la lettre
du roi a le contenu suivant : «J1ai le plaisir d'adresser cette lettre à Votre Altesse au
sujet du différend qui oppose depuislongtemps les Etats frères
du Qatar et de Bahreïn au sujet de la souveraineté sur les îles
de Hawar, des frontièresmaritimes de ces deux pays frères,
ainsi que d'autres questions.»
Est-il un instant pensable quesi le roi avait eu connaissanced'une
réclamation aussi importante quecelle relative à Zubarah en plein
continent qatari il ne l'aurait pas mentionnée demanière spécifique ?
En tout cas, aucun engagement nouveau par rapport à 1983 n'a pu
alors être souscrit parle Qatar.
Par conséquent, rien dans la requête du Qatar n'est contraire ni à
cet engagementsouscrit en 1983 ni à celui souscrit en décembre 1987.
Incidemment,le Qatar regrette que la foi de Bahreïn pour la
complémentaritéet l'indivisibilitédes matières lui soit venue si
tardivement. Bahreïnn'était pas mu par de tels scrupules lorsqu'en 1988
il proposait un compromis octroyantd'avance à Bahreïn toutes les îles ou
hauts-fonds découvrants contestés,vidant ainsi sans vergogne lesaccords
de 1983 et de 1987 de toute substance.
Certes, en acceptant la formule bahreïnite à la réunion de Doha - et
pas avant - le Qatar a accepté que Zubarah, qui tombe dans cette formule,
relève de la compétence de la Cour. Ceci s'est opéré néanmoins dans un
nouveau contexteet par un nouveau texte : l'accord de Doha, prévoyant la
saisine de la Cour. En tout état de cause, comme il a été dit et répété,
le Qatar ne s'oppose nullement à ce que Bahreïn introduiselui-même sa
propre demande à ce sujet en applicationdudit accord.
Le second argumentde Bahreïn est le suivant :du fait que le Qatar
aurait présenté les différends concretsde manière incomplète,notamment
dans ses conclusions («submissions»),il y aurait absence de consentement - 50 -
sur l'objet du différend (intervention du professeur Jiménez de Aréchaga,
CR 94/5, p. 41 et suiv.).
Ceci dénote encore une fois une confusion complèteentre accord sur
l'%objet du différend», sur l'expressiondes «demandes» et la rédaction
de «conclusions» !
Bien entendu, lorsque le Qatar a défini dans sa requête et dans son
mémoire les différends sur lesquels portait sa demande, il l'a fait,
contrairement à ce qui est soutenu par Bahrein, de manière aussi
objective que possible dansde telles circonstances. C'est ainsi que le
mémoire du Qatar fait allusion à la divergenced'opinion sur le statut de
Dibal et Jaradah, contrairement à ce que l'on nous dit, ainsi que sur la
question de Jinan à propos de son inclusion ou non dans le périmètrede
la ligne de 1947, contrairement à ce que l'on nous dit. Comme on l'a
signalé plus haut, les droits de pêche sont un argument que Bahreïn a
utilisé depuis 1964 pour demander une modification de la ligne de 1947
(ce document est signalé parle Qatar et repris à l'annexe 1.56 (vol. II)
au mémoire du Qatar), contrairement à ce que l'on nous dit. La question
des lignes de bases archipélagiquesest plus obscure mais - si Bahreïn y
a droit - ce serait incontestablementune question implicite à trancher
dans le cadre du différend maritime. Le Qatarn'a donc en rien préjugé
ces questions par ses demandesou ses conclusions quoiqu'en prétendent de
manière extrêmement légère les conseils de Bahreïn (par ex. Monsieur le
professeur Jiménez de Aréchaga (CR 94/5, p. 47) et Keigh Highet,
(CR 94/6, p. 49) ).
Ainsi, on en revient toujours à l'affaire de Zubarah qui n'est
évidemment pas incluse dans les demandes du Qatar, ni a fortiori dans ses
conclusions. Mais ceci ne signifie pas qu'elle soit exclue de l'objet du - 51 -
différend. Le Qatarne s'oppose pas à ce que Bahreïn indroduiselui-même
une demande à ce sujet.
****
On s'aperçoitdonc, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, que
sous couvert de contestationdu consentement sur l'objet du différend,
Bahreïn s'en prend, en réalité, au mode .desaisine utilisé par le Qatar,
la requête unilatérale.
Un troisième argumentest orienté plus franchement de cettemanière,
c'est celui selon lequel l'accord de Doha prévoit que les parties
pourront soumettre «la question» («the matten) à la Cour internationale
de Justice (CR 94/5, p. 25). Selon cet argument, puisque le Qatarne
peut soumettre toute la question, l'ensembledu différend, par voie de
requête unilatérale, cela signifieraitque l'accord de Doha n'avait pas
prévu cette formede saisine.
Ceci n'est cependant qu'une pétition de principe puisque
l'interprétationcorrecte de l'accord de Doha permet ce mode de saisine.
A dire vrai, toute l'argumentationde Bahreïn concernantla
prétendue débilitéde la requête unilatérale du Qatar repose sur un dogme
présenté comme une vérité révélée : que l'action doit être introduite
conjointement. Or ce n'est pas le cas. Les deux Etats peuvent - selon
les termes de l'accord de Doha - introduireune requête à la Cour sur
base de la formule bahreïniteaprès l'expirationdu délai de cinq mois.
Comme le soutient Bahreïn, il faut certes se placer à la date de la
requête du Qatar pour juger de sa validité. Et bien, à cette date la
requête était parfaitementvalable, complèteet recevable.
Il faudra aussi se placer à la date de la requête de Bahreïn,
introduite en conformité avec l'accord de Doha - puisque les deux Etats - 52 -
peuvent saisir la Cour de leurs demandes - pour apprécier sa validité et
sa recevabilité.
Entretemps il est incontestablequ'il y avait un accord entre les
Parties sur l'objet du différend, que la requête du Qatar n'en est pas
sortie, et qu'elle n'avait pas à inclure des demandes et a fortiori les
conclusions de Bahrein.
S'agissant de ceux-ci rien de bien neuf n'a été avancé par les
conseils de Bahrein.
Nous nous réjouissonsde la reconnaissancepar Bahreïn que, tout
compte fait, il n'y a pas déshoxmeur et que l'égalité juridique est
respectée. Nous comprenons quel'ambianced'une requête unilatérale
n'est pas nécessairementla même que celle d'un compromis. Encore ne
faudrait-ilpas sublimer cette dernièreau point d'en faire un royaume de
Walt Disney.
Nous ne reviendrons pas sur l'article V. Les prétentionsque son
objet s'est soudainement rétréci commeAlice au pays des merveillesne
nous ont absolument pas convaincu. Nous ne reprendons pas non plus la
question constitutionnelleque les défendeurs, la Cour l'aura remarqué,
se sont bien gardés d'aborder de front. Tout compte faitd'ailleurs, si
ces deux questionsétaient à ce point importantesil fallait les
introduire dans l'accord de Doha. Les termes mêmes de ce dernier
excluent, en tout état de cause, de telles dispositions.
Je m'en tiendrai donc seulement à quelques éléments nouveaux.
Sur Zubarah, tout d'abord, comme l'a dit excellemmentM. Bowett,
Zubarah est bienun piège («a traps) (CR 94/5, p. 39) mais pas dans le - 53 -
sens où il l'entend. Il apparaît clairement maintenant que ce que
Bahrein veut obtenir c'est un blanc-seing à propos de la recevabilitéde
sa demande éventuelle concernant Zubarah sanspasser par le contrôlede
l'autre Partie et de la Cour. Le Qatar s'y est pourtant soumis à propos
de sa demande concernantHawar. Considérant l'esprit dans lequel Bahreïn
se présente maintenant à cette barre, peut-on imaginer un seul instant
que s'il avait pu faire valoir unecause d'irrecevabilité à l'égard de
Hawar, il y aurait renoncé ?
On ne peut pas laisser passer non plus la prétention del'agent et
d'un conseil de Bahreïn selonlaquelle, si l'affaire avait été introduite
par un compromis, toute exception préliminaire relative à la recevabilité
se serait trouvéeexclue par définition (CR 94/4, p. 18 et CR 94/6,
p. 54). S'il est vrai, et c'est souvent le cas, il n'y a là aucune
conséquence inéluctable. Jene dois pas rappeler à la Cour l'exemple de
l'affaire Borchgrave, qui avait été portéedevant la Cour permanente de
Justice internationalepar un compromis entre la Belgique et l'Espagne,
ce qui n'empêcha pas cette dernière de soulever des exceptions
préliminairesqui firent l'objet d'un arrêt de la Cour.
* * *
L'agent de Bahrein a prétendu que le Qatar voulait contrôlerla
procédure à son avantage. A cet effet il présente comme évidencesdes
propositions pour le moinsdouteuses (CR94/4, p. 12, par. 9) :
a) tout d'abord déposer le mémoire lepremier seraitun avantage, alors
que de nombreux praticiens sont convaincus du contraire, puisque
cette procédure donne le dernier mot au défendeur. Le Qatarpour sa
part est un ferme partisan du dépôt simultané des pièces écrites; - 54 -
b) ensuite parler le premier serait un avantage; tous les praticiens
savent qu'en ce domaine il y a deux écoles et que la controverse
n'est pas tranchée. Au début de chaque affaire devant la Cour on a
de longues discussions dansl'équipe pour savoir qui va parler le
premier. La preuve du contraire résulterait plutôt ici dufait que
Bahrein s'est bien gardé de déposer des exceptions préliminaires,ce
qui l'aurait placé dans cette position soi-disant avantageuse.
Il a, en tout état de cause, été répondu à cela que pour la phase
relative au fond - et c'est celle-là qui compte, le Qatar est favorable
au dépôt simultané des pièces.
* * *
L'agent de Bahreïn a également souligné les incertitudes qui
existeraient à propos de la jonction des deux instances relativesau même
différend.
Il est exact que la jonction des instances dépendd'une décision de
la Cour.
Mais l'article 47 du Règlement prévoitcette situation expressément.
Cet article date de 1978, mais déjà auparavant en l'absence de tout
article dans le Règlement de la Cour, la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale avait admisune telle jonctiondans l'affaire du Statut
juridique du Groënland oriental, dans des conditions qui ne sont pas sans
analogie avec la situation présente.
Bahreïn peut donc introduire une action concernant Zubarah. Laour
on l'a dit est compétente. Il suagit d'un différend prévupar
l'accord-cadrede Doha.
Qatar n'objecte pas à la jonction - on l'a dit - 55 -
aussi. On voit mal dans ces conditionspourquoi la Cour refuserait une
ordonnance dont le seulbut serait de faciliter l'exercice d'une bonne
justice.
Un dernier point enfin : pourquoi leQatar refuse-t-il la
proposition de Bahreïnde conclure un compromis ? Monsieur le Président,
Messieurs de la Cour, la réponse estsimple et évidente.
1. Depuis longtempsla voie du compromis est bouchée. Je ne
reviendrai pas sur ce qui a été exposé longuementpar les conseils du
Qatar.
2. Quant à la proposition d'un compromis, et sans allusion aucune
ici à la nationalité d'un distingué juge ad hoc ~Timeo Danaos et dona
ferentes» (<je crains les Grecs même lorsqulils apportent des présents*).
Le projet proposé par Bahreïn en 1992, après la saisine de la Cour, est
un cheval de Troie qui ne peut que conduire à de nouvelles impasseset à
la poursuite des impasses anciennes. On en voudra pour preuve deux
exemples :
a) Bahreïn change le texte de la bahraini formula, de la formule
bahreïnite, excusez-moide parler franglais (voyez l'article II,
paragraphe 3), dont il proclamait pourtant quec'était le seul point
acquis à l'accord de Doha !
b) De plus, Bahreïn ne profite pas de l'occasionpour rendre l'article
5 acceptable en le limitantaux propositions de fond faites pendant
la médiation saoudienne, ce qu'il prétend pourtant, contre toute
apparence, être son seul objectif.
Le Qatar ne peut donc en conclure qu'une chose : ce projet de
compromis n'est qu'une nouvelle manoeuvre dilatoire. - 56 -
La voie choisie par leQatar était engagée devant la Cour et donc
non seulement conforme à l'accord de Doha; elle est aussi la plus
raisonnable.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, jlen ai terminé avec
ces quelques mises au point dont on m'avait chargé. Il me reste à
remercier du fond du coeurla Cour de sa patience et de sa bienveillante
attention dont jlespère ne pas avoir abusé. Puis-je vous prier Monsieur
le Président, d'appeler à la barre, Monsieur le professeur Quéneudec.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, professeur Salmon. La parole est au
professeur Quéneudec.
M. QUENEUDEC : Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, de tous
les genres littéraires,le conte est sans doute celui qui, de tous temps,
a été le plus apte à séduire.
Telle paraît être la réflexion que se sont faite nos amis de
Bahrein, puisqulils ont pris le parti de nous conterune belle histoire.
Sur le mode de: «Il était une fois ...», ils ont narré l'histoire
d'un Etat dont les représentantssignaient des textes où les mots et les
phrases présentaientl'étonnantevertu d'être des mots et des phrases «en
transits versdes significationslointaines et inconnues. Et ces textes
eux-mêmes, paraît-il, avaient eu le pouvoir magiquede rendre aveugles
ceux qui avaient l'audace de vouloir lesdécrypter.
Monsieur le Président, entre l'accord du 21 décembre 1987 et le
procès-verbal signé à Doha le 25 décembre 1990, il s'est écoulé plus de
«mille et une nuits». Aussi peut-on douter qu'il y ait place ici pour le
merveilleux, l'extraordinaire ou l'incroyable. Il nous faut revenir à la
réalité. - 57 -
La réalité, en l'espèce,n'est pas de savoir ce que llEtat de
Bahreïn a voulu ou n'a pas voulu faire. La réalité de la présente
affaire consiste uniquement à rechercher s'il existe, dans les textes
signés par les deuxEtats, une base suffisante de compétencepour que la
Cour puisse connaître de la requête de 1'Etat du Qatar.
Dans cette recherche, la volonté de l'un des deux Etats en litige ne
peut pas planer «comme un vague nuage surla terre ferme d'un texte
contractuel»,selon la formule imagée de Max Huber à la session de Sienne
de l'Institut de droit international(Annuaire de l'Institut de droit
international, 1952, vol. 1, p. 199).
En 1987, Bahreïn et le Qatar ont conclu un accordinternationalen
vue de soumettre leur litige à la Cour. Bahrein ne conteste pas la
valeur conventionnellede ce texte adopté sur propositionde l'Arabie
saoudite.
Sur la base de cet accord, les deux Etatsont tenté en 1988
d'élaborer un compromis. Cette tentativea échoué et l'idée même de
négocier un compromisn'a pas été reprise au cours des deux années
suivantes. Aucune initiative en ce sens n'est venue ni de l'Arabie
saoudite, ni du Qatar, ni de Bahreïn.
En 1990, a été signé le procès-verbalde Doha ouvrant la voie à la
soumission du différend à la Cour à l'expirationd'un délai de cinq mois.
Bahreïn dénie à ce procès-verbaltoute valeur conventionnelleet
conteste qu'il ait donné son accord à une saisine unilatérale dela Cour.
Telles sont, Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour,
schématiquementrésumées, les données essentielles du problèmesur lequel
la Cour est appelée à statuer. - 58 -
Afin de se prononcer, il ne paraît pas douteux que la Cour aura à
répondre à trois questions principales.
La première question peut être formulée de la manière suivante : y
a-t-il acceptation expliciteet formelle, de la part des deux Etats, de
l'obligationde se soumettre à la juridiction de la Cour ?
La réponse, nous n'en doutons pas, ne peut qu'être affirmative.
L'accord de 1987 est on ne peut plus net sur ce point. La première
disposition qu'il contient est suffisamment connue de laCour et n'a pas
besoin d'être rappelée. Quant à sa deuxième disposition, on ne saurait
perdre de vue qu'elle s'ouvre par les mots :
aJusqulà ce que les questions en litige soientréglées
définitivement conformément à l'article précédent.»
Tout en insistant surle fait que cet accord de 1987 constitue «un
titre de juridiction imparfait»(CR 94/5, p. 561, Bahrein reconnaît avoir
souscrit à cette obligation.
La deuxième questionest de savoir s'il y a accord des deux Etats à
l'égard de l'objet des différendspouvant être portésdevant la Cour.
La réponse, ici encore, est :oui.
Selon Bahreïn, la référence à la formulebahreïnite dans le
procès-verbal de Doha n'aurait pas eu pour effet d'énoncer un
consentement à l'objet et à la portée des différends à soumettre à la
Cour. La formule aurait été destinée exclusivement à être insérée dans
un compromis.
«It was designed to be used within theframework of a
special agreement, the essential idea beingthat, under such a
general and <neutral» formula, each Party would be free to
formulate its own claims. » (CR 94/5, p. 39.)
nous a expliqué le professeur Bowett. Comment peut-on croire que cette
formule était plus appropriée pour un compromis ? Rédigée en termes - 59 -
neutres et généraux pour définir le cadre général («the outline») des
différends, et constituant unesorte dl«umbrella agreements,
d'accord-cadresur ce point, la formulebahreïnite supposait par
définition - ab initio en quelque sorte - que chaque Partie seraitlibre
de formuler ses propres demandes : ueach Party would be free to formulate
its own claims».
Dès lors, n'était-ellepas, au contraire,plus appropriée à la
saisine de la Cour par voiede requête ?
Comme l'a rappelé il y a un instant M. Salmon, lorsque la Cour est
saisie par la notification d'un compromis, l'article 39, paragraphe 2, de
son Règlement prévoitque :
«La notification indique ... l'objet précis du différend
(«theprecise subject of the dispute») ... pour autant que cela
ne résulte pas déjà clairement du compromis.»
Et lorsque l'instanceest introduitepar voie de requête,
l'article 38, paragraphe 1, prévoit que «la requête indique ... l'objet
du différend» («thesubject of the dispute»). Et le paragraphe 2 du même
article ajoute qu'«elle indique en outre la nature précise de la demande»
(«theprecise nature of the claimw).
Si la formule bahreïnite n'était pas en elle-même assez détaillée
pour identifierl'objet précis des différends et si, une fois incorporée
dans un compromis, elle devait encore êtrecomplétée par les demandes
concrètes présentées par chaque Partie, qui ne voit qu'elle se prêtait
beaucoup mieux à servir de base à une requête unilatéralede-chacune des
Parties ?
Dans ces conditions,peut-on venir prétendre, commeon l'a fait de
l'autre côté de la barre, que le Qatar a dénaturé la formule bahreïnite ?
N'est-ce pas plutôt Bahreïn qui s'est attaché à déformer à la fois la - 60 -
position du Qatar à ce sujet et l'effet juridique de l'incorporationde
la formule bahreïnite dansl'accord de Doha ?
La troisième question qui se pose, enfin, est celle-ci : y a-t-il un
engagement définitif des deuxEtats de saisir la Cour exclusivementde
manière conjointe, ou bien ont-ils laissé ouverte la possibilité d'une
saisine unilatérale ?
Mon ami M. Weil a entrepris de démontrer, avec tout le talentqu'on
lui connaît, que «le consentement à la saisine par voie de requête,
constituait une <composante à part entièredu principe général dela
juridiction consensuelle>> (CR 94/5, p. 71). Sa démonstrationa été
éblouissante et elle nous aurait presque convaincusdu bien-fondé de sa
conc~usion,si elle n'avait omis une donnée essentielle. L'éminent
conseil de Bahreïn a reproché au Qatar d'accumuler «fiction sur fiction»;
il me permettra certainement,eu égard à sa grande courtoisie, de lui
retourner le compliment. La démonstrationqu'il a faite est impeccable,
mais présente le vice rédhibitoire de faire commesi l'accord de Doha
n'existait pas, comme si la formule bahreïnite n'était «rien d'autre
qu'un projet» (CR 94/6, p. 361, comme si les deux Etats n'étaient pas
convenus qu'après le mois de mai 1991, ils pouvaient saisirla Cour
conformément à cette formule bahreïnite.
L'extraordinairediscrétion dont Bahreïn a fait preuve à l'égard de
la date limite mentionnée dansl'accord de Doha doit-elle être
interprétée comme une reconnaissance tacite de ce que la simple existence
de cette date limite a pour effet de ruiner toute l'argumentation
bahreïnite ? Le silence de Bahreïnest ici assurément plus éloquent que
«les silences du colonel Bramble» . - 61 -
Il est vrai qu'un autre conseilde Bahreïn a expliqué que le
procès-verbal signé en 1990 ne comportait que des «points d'accord
provisoiresw et que le Qatar avait simplement accepté à titre provisoire
la formule bahreïnite : «Qatar provisionnallyagreed to accept the
Bahraini formula», a dit M. Lauterpacht (CR 94/5, p. 17).
Faut-il en déduire que les Parties avaient aussi aprovisoirementw
accepté d'aller devant la Couraprès mai 1991 et qu'elles avaient
également «provisoirement»accepté la continuation des bons offices de
l'Arabie saoudite ?
Ce n'est évidemment ni sérieux ni raisonnableet cela suffit à
montrer que la Cour ne saurait admettrele point de vue de Bahreïn.
Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour, les juristes sont un
peu comme les pharmaciens d'antan :ils adorent lescatégories et les
classifications. Comme les anciens apothicaires,ils aiment les bocaux
bien rangés avec leurs étiquettes bien distinctes. Mais la vie, surtout
la vie internationale,ne se laisse pas aisément enfermer dansles
flacons des juristes.
«La théorie est grise, mon ami, et l'arbre de la vie est tellement
vert.» Nul doute que la phrase de Henri Heine trouve à s'appliquer à la
présente affaire.
Vouloir s'interrogersur le bocal dans lequel pourrait être placé le
consentementdonné par le Qataret Bahreïn et affirmer que, puisque la
requête du Qatarne peut trouver placedans aucun schéma prédéterminé, la
Cour n'est pas compétentepour statuer sur cetterequête, dire cela
revient à oublier que l'article 36, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour
n'a jamais été interprété de manière littérale. - 62 -
Peut-être convient-il de rappeler que, si la mise en oeuvre du droit
d'ester devant la Cour dépend toujours du consentement des parties
(quelle que soit la forme sous laquelles'exprime ce consentement),la
modalité d'introductiond'une instance devant la Cour n'est pas
obligatoirement régléepar le texte exprimant le consentement à la
compétence de la Cour. Il existe de nombreux textes conventionnels qui
ne précisent pas si la saisine de la Cour peut se faire par voie de
requête. Et en ce cas, joue généralement la présomption selon laquelle
on est en présence d'une clause de compétence obligatoire autorisant le
dépôt d'une requête, comme le soulignaitWilfried Jenks (The Prospects of
International Adjudication, 1964, p. 36).
Aussi, toute la démonstration de Bahreïnprouve-t-elleune chose et
une seule. Elle montre la réticence de Bahreïn à s'engager,notamment au
moment de la signature de l'accord de Doha, mais elle ne démontre
certainement pas son absence d'engagement.
11 paraît aujourd'hui difficile de se servir du point de vue exprimé
par le ministre des affaires étrangèresde Bahreïn plus d'un an après la
signature de l'accord de Doha pour faire dire à ce texte ce qu'il
n'énonce pas et pour puiser dans la déclaration dudit ministre une
condition que le texte de Doha ne prévoit pas.
Quelle meilleure manifestationde la volonté d'un Etat peut-on
trouver d'autre que la signature apposéepar un représentant qualifié de
cet Etat au bas d'un texte comportant des engagements de natureet de
portée juridiques ?
Ce représentantpeut-il venir ensuite s'exclamer, comme l'empereur
Guillaume II à l'issue de la première guerre mondiale: «Ich habe nicht
das gewollts - «je n'avais pas voulu cela» ? - 63 -
11 y a bien eu un engagement qui a été pris à Doha. Et l'engagement
pris par lesdeux Etats dans le texte de Doha a porté sur la possibilité
de saisir la Cour à l'expirationd'un délai prédéterminé.
Or, la Cour le sait bien, il n'existe que deux voies - et deux voies
seulement - pour saisir la Cour, aux termes de l'article 40 du Statut,
«soit par notification d'un compromis, soit par requête».
Eu égard au fait que la voie du compromis était de facto abandonnée,
et compte tenu de la circonstance que le texte fixait une date à partir
de laquelle la Cour pouvait êtresaisie, les termes de l'accord de Doha
excluaient en réalité toutepossibilité d'élaborationd'un compromis.
Cet accord ne laissait donc d'autre issue que la voie de la requête. Il
n'a certes pas expressément indiquéque la saisine pouvait être
unilatérale,mais il n'a pas formellementexclu ce mode de saisine.
Contrairement à ce que Bahreïnn'a cessé de soutenir, il n'était
nullement nécessaireque le texte de l'accord de Doha le précisât
expressément. Sinon, si une disposition expresse autorisantformellement
la saisine unilatéraleétait exigée danschaque cas, on pourrait juger
bien inutile la rédaction de l'article 38, paragraphe 2, du Règlement de
la Cour, selon lequel :
«La requête indique autant quepossible («as far as
possible») les moyens de droit sur lesquels le demandeur
prétend fonder la compétence de la Cour.»
Dans sa requête, 1'Etat du Qatar a indiqué que, par les accords
de 1987 et 1990, les deux Etats avaient donné leurconsentement
- à la soumission de leurs différends à la Cour,
- à l'objet des différends à soumettre à la Cour,
- à la date à partir de laquelle ces différendspouvaient être soumis à
la Cour. - 64 -
Et selon ltEtat du Qatar, il n'y a pas le moindre <doute destructif
de la compétencewde la Cour pour cornaître de cette requête.
Monsieur le Président, quand va se baisser le rideaudes plaidoiries
devant la Cour, pour le Conseil d'un Etat, c'est toujours un sentiment
mêlé de satisfactionet de confiance qui monte en lui.
Satisfaction,d'abord, du devoir accompli, lorsqu'il s'est efforcé,
dans les limites de sa faiblesse, de présenter avec toutela clarté
possible les argumentsqui, à ses yeux, sont les plus raisonnableset les
mieux fondés.
Confiance, ensuite, dans la sagesse des juges auxquels il s'est
adressé, parce qu'il sait, au tréfonds de lui-même, et quelle que soit la
décision qui sera prise, que la paix et la justice en sortiront
renforcées.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de
votre attention. Monsieurle Président, l'agent de 1'Etat du Qatar doit
conclure et souhaiterait pouvoir reprendrela parole à cette fin.
Le PRESIDENT :Merci, professeur Quéneudec. 1 now give the floor to
His Excellency Al-Nauimi.
Mr. AL-NAUIMI: [Greetings] Mr. President, Members of the Court, it
is now time for me to conclude Qatar's presentation in the present
hearing .
Today I wish to confirm the interest of the State of Qatar in the
present proceedings and the importance of this case for the Government of
the State of Qatar by indicating thatit has closely followedthe whole
of the presentation made by both States before the Court. 1 should also - 65 -
like to confirm the confidence of the Government of Qatar in this Court
and especially that, when the Court will come to adjudicate on the
merits, it will certainly protect the rights of both States.
My sincere thanks are given to the President and the Membersof the
Court for the patience and attention which they have devoted to the
hearing in thiscase. In particular, 1 would like to thank you,
Mr. President, for holding this hearing under your high authority. 1
would also like to convey the thanks of the delegation of Qatar to the
Registrar and other staff of the Court for their contribution tothe
efficient operation of the services put at the disposa1 of the Parties.
1 have also the honour to indicate thatthe answers to the question
posed by Vice-PresidentSchwebel will be handed over, in writing, to the
Registry beforethe close of the present oralhearing.
Finaiiy, 1 would repeat thatthe road to this Court has been a long
and difficultone, and that Qatar's position is quite clear: there are
two valid internationalagreements with clear texts conferring uponthe
Court the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the existing and long-standing
disputes which have been admittedby both Parties and have been submitted
to the Court by Qatar by means of an admissible unilateral application.
Qatar has always held that seisin of the Court by means of a unilateral
application is not an unfriendlyact. Indeed, as is apparent from the
friendly relationswhich have existedbetween the,Partiesduring the time
they have spent before the Court over the past two weeks, reference to
the Court does not create hostility, but on the contrary takes thesting
out of the situation.
In accordance withArticle 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, 1
will now read the final submissionsof the State of Qatar. "The State of Qatar respectfully requeststhe Court to
adjudge and declare, rejecting al1 contrary claimsand
submissions,that -
The Court has jurisdictionto entertain the dispute referred to
in the Application filed byQatar on 8 July 1991 and that
Qatar's Application is admissible."
Thank you Mr. President and Members of the Court.
The PRESIDENT: Thankyou, Your Excellency. TheCourt takes note of
your final submissions. The Court shall now rise. It will continue the
hearings tomorrowmorning at 10 a.m. in order to hear Bahrain in its
second round of oral pleadings. The meeting is over.
The Court rose at 12.50 p.m.
Public sitting held on Thursday 10 March 1994, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Bedjaoui presiding