Public sitting held on Thursday 4 July 1991, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Sir Robert Jennings presiding

CR 91/13
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 1991
Public sitting
held on Thursday 4 July 1991, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Sir Robert Jennings presiding
in the case concerning Passage through the Great Belt
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures
(Finland v. Denmark)

VERBATIM RECORD

ANNEE l991
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 4 juillet 1991, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de sir Robert Jennings, Président,
en l'affaire du Passage par le Grand-Belt
Demande en indication de mesures conservatoires
(Finlande c. Danemark)

COMPTE RENDU

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Present:
President Sir Robert Jennings
Vice-President Oda
Judges Lachs
Ago
Schwebel
Bedjaoui
Ni
Evensen
Tarassov
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Judges ad hoc Paul Henning Fischer
Bengt Broms
Registrar Valencia-Ospina

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Présents:
Sir Robert Jennings, Président
M. Oda, Vice-Président
MM. Lachs
Ago
Schwebel
Bedjaoui
Ni
Evensen
Tarassov
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Weeramantry
Ranjeva, Juges
MM. Paul Henning Fischer
Bengt Broms, Juges ad hoc
M. Valencia-Ospina, Greffier

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The Government of Finland is represented by:
H. E. Mr. Tom Grönberg, Director general, Legal Department, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,
as Agent;
Mr. Martti Koskenniemi, Counsellor, Legal Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Co-Agent;
Sir Ian Sinclair,
Professor Tullio Treves,
as Counsel;
Mr. Tuula Svinhufvud, Attaché, Legal Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Kari Hakapää, Associate Professor, University of Lapland,
Mr. Erkki Kourula, Minister Counsellor, The Permanent Mission of
Finland in the United Nations, New York,
Mr. Seppo Silvonen, Marketing Director, Rauma-Repola Offshore,
Mr. Aarne Jutila, Professor, Helsinki University of Technology,
as Advisers.
The Government of Denmark is represented by:
H. E. Mr. Tyge Lehmann, Ambassador, Chief Legal Adviser, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Per Magid, Attorney,
H. E. Mr. Per Fergo, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agents;
Dr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga,
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Professor of
International Law, Queen's College, University of Cambridge,
Mr. N. J. Gimsing, Professor, Technical University of Denmark,
Adviser to A/S Storebaeltsforbindelsen,
Mr. Claus Gulmann, Professor, University of Copenhagen,
as Counsel and Advocates:
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Le Gouvernement de la Finlande est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Tom Grönberg, directeur général du département juridique
du ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agent;
M. Martti Koskenniemi, conseiller au département juridique du
ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme coagent;
Sir Ian Sinclair,
M. Tullio Treves, professeur,
comme conseils;
M. Tuula Svinhufvud, attaché au département juridique du ministère
des affaires étrangères,
M. Kari Hakapää, professeur associé à l'Université de Laponie,
M. Erkki Kourula, ministre-conseiller de la mission permanente de
Finlande auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à New York,
M. Seppo Silvonen, directeur de la commercialisation de la société
Rauma-Repola Offshore,
M. Aarne Jutila, professeur à l'Université de technologie d'Helsinki,
comme conseillers.
Le Gouvernement du Danemark est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Tyge Lehmann, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique principal
du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Per Magid, avocat,
S. Exc. M. Per Fergo, ambassadeur, ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agents;
M. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga,
M. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., LL.D., F.B.A., professeur de droit
international à l'Université de Cambridge, Queen's College,
M. N. J. Gimsing, professeur à l'Université technique du Danemark,
conseiller de la société A/S Storebaeltsforbindelsen,
M. Claus Gulmann, professeur à l'Université de Copenhague,
comme conseils et avocats:
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Mr. Kurt Lykstoft Larsen, Acting Head of Planning, Ministry of
Transport,
Mr. Søren Strange, Head of Section, Danish Energy Agency,
Mr. Leif Sjøgren, Project Manager, A/S Storebaeltsforbindelsen,
Mrs. Lene Rasmussen, Attorney, A/S Storebaeltsforbindelsen,
Mr. Niels Mogensen, Deputy Head of Division, Danish Maritime
Authority,
Mr. Henrik Dhal, Attorney,
Mr. J. R. Lilje-Jensen, Head of Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Jakob Høyrup, Head of Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mrs. Jeanett Probst Osborn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Secretary.
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M. Kurt Lykstoft Larsen, chef par intérim de la planification au
ministère des transports,
M. Søren Strange, chef de section à l'agence danoise pour l'énergie,
M. Leif Sjøgren, directeur de projet de la société A/S
Storebaeltsforbindelsen,
Mme Lene Rasmussen, avocat de la société A/S
Storebaeltsforbindelsen,
M. Niels Mogensen, chef de division adjoint de l'autorité maritime
danoise,
M. Henrik Dahl, avocat,
M. J. R. Lilje-Jensen, chef de secrétariat au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
M. Jakob Høyrup, chef de section au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
comme conseillers;
Mme Jeanett Probst Osborn, ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme secrétaire.
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The PRESIDENT: This morning we turn to the second round of the oral pleadings and hear
throughout this morning the case for the Republic of Finland. I think both Agents know that two
Judges will wish to ask questions of one of the Parties and we would propose to do that at the end of
this morning's session. The question of replies we can perhaps discuss later. So straight away I will
ask the Agent for Finland, Ambassador Grönberg to take the floor.
H.E. Mr. GRONBERG: Mr. President, Members of the Court, last Tuesday we heard a very
remarkable reconstruction of the Finnish claim and both its legal and factual background. In
litigation one of the first and often the most important battles is fought about the terrain on which the
rest of the war - if you allow me to use a military metaphor - will be waged. You will no doubt have
noticed that the terrain looked very different from the ground on which Finland had stood the day
before.
This change of terrain seemed to affect even the very perception of the purpose of the present
oral hearings. Where Finland concentrated on proving the presence of the conditions for provisional
measures under Article 41 of the Statute, Denmark chose to argue about Finland having no rights on
the merits. Where Finland spoke about the substance of the right of free passage, Denmark
advanced economic and technical data. Where Finland saw the dispute in light of the general conflict
of interests between a strait State and a user State, Denmark painted a picture about a private
company's economic interests being countered by the economic interests of the Danish society as a
whole. Where Finland formulated a request for provisional measures in the most reasonable and
limited terms, Denmark argues that the consequences of its acceptance are as if it were formulated in
the widest imaginable terms.
What might be the reason for Denmark's unwillingness to meet Finland on the precise grounds
of the Finnish request and indeed of the Application? I can hardly believe there to be any other
reason than Denmark's belief that its argument will not stand if it tries to rebut Finland's actual
contentions in the light of the actual rights that Finland claims. Instead, it has attacked a straw man,
an imaginary construction of what the Finnish request might have been - but most decidedly is not.
In my statement today, I shall first contest Denmark's view of what it is that Finland aims to
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attain and its characterization of the dispute as a conflict between the private economic interests of a
company and the Danish society at large. This I will do in order to move discussion back to the
substantive right of free passage which is the object of the main proceedings and the need for an
indication of interim measures to safeguard that right.
Thereafter, I shall say a few words about how Denmark's view that Finland has not even a
prima facie right in this case - a remarkable contention - is based on its distorted characterization of
the core of these proceedings.
Thirdly, I shall turn to the question of the alleged acquiescence by Finland in the Danish
project.
First, the question of the actual content of the Finnish request. Ambassador Lehmann claimed
on Tuesday that Finland "submits that provisional measures be indicated to stop further construction
of the bridge over the Great Belt". This same view about the scope of the Finnish request was then
repeated throughout the Danish statements. This is not only an incorrect reading of the very terms of
the Finnish request but is contradicted by everything that we had said here on Monday. What
Finland is requesting is not the complete cessation of the fixed link project. That would indeed be an
unreasonable request - though, one might argue, that would be a request which would perhaps be
easier to defend. What Finland is requesting is instead something both limited and reasonable - a
general declaration by the Court that the project should not be carried out, pending the judgment, in
such a fashion as to prejudice the rights claimed in the main proceedings.
What should be noted about that remedy is that it incorporates the very notions of
reasonableness and proportionality which provide the grounds on which Denmark hopes to challenge
it. Such a remedy in fact constitutes a balance between the rights of Finland and Denmark. On the
one hand, it will minimize harm to Finland's rights while the merits are being considered. On the
other hand, it enables Denmark to choose between the different alternatives for safeguarding the
Finnish rights the one which is least prejudicial to its own interests. The request specifically avoids
the imposition on Denmark of any one solution - and thus also the risk of arbitrarily and
unreasonably preferring one among the several existing technical alternatives to satisfy Finland's
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rights regardless of the costs Denmark would incur. Denmark's attempt to argue that Finland in fact
seeks a blanket prohibition is baseless and, as I shall argue in a moment, thrown against Finland only
to establish a more favourable ground for Denmark from which to argue that the Finnish request is
unreasonable.
Finland is not trying to impose any technical solution on Denmark - among them the solution
of full cessation of works. We believe that the reasonable solution is the one which leaves Denmark
maximum freedom of choice. I might, however, note one available alternative which would seem to
answer fully to the present request and the costs of which would not be exorbitant.
This is the possibility to modify the design of the East Bridge so as to postpone the final
construction of the two intermediate supports plus the corresponding three spans. This would allow
work to continue on the suspension bridge itself as well as with the access spans at the other end of
the bridge. By this means - on a stretch of 330 metres - provision would have been made for a
possibility to construct an opening - for example in the form of a swing bridge - in that section of the
bridge in case the final judgment turns in Finland's favour. This would have virtually no effect on
the construction schedule and would minimize any additional work necessary to safeguard free
passage, That additional work would mainly have to do with dredging the deep water channel into
the place where the opening exists, that is to say, that would mean the execution of the same type of
work as was already done when constructing the artificial island of Sprogø.
According to a very preliminary Finnish cost estimate, the construction in such a place of a
bridge - not taking into account the necessary dredging - would cost perhaps US$ 50 million more
than the fixed bridge. That is the additional cost that would ensue from the de- and reassembly of
the towers of three to four offshore rigs. A cable-stayed swing bridge, according to another
estimation, might also be an elegant alternative with reasonable cost.
Other possibly available alternatives would be:
(l) to make provision for the opening of the West Bridge - which is possible using
conventional techniques - and for the dredging of the West Channel. The main problem here would
relate to the safety precautions needed in the event of opening a railway bridge;
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(2) a second alternative would simply consist of the dredging in the Sound at Drogden, so that
it could accommodate deep-draught vessels. I understand that such a venture has already been
proposed by the city and harbour of Copenhagen and that it would have a significant, positive impact
on the harbour itself.
Now, I am certain that my Danish colleagues know these and other alternatives and are aware
of the advantages they have and of the difficulties their realization might entail. After all, they have
been studying them for half a century. But my point really is that technical alternatives do exist and
that Finland has refrained from trying to impose any of them on Denmark, because of the relative
arbitrariness and unreasonableness of doing so. Finland was accordingly astonished by the Danish
presentation of the exhorbitant consequences that the Finnish request might entail.
Let me at this point note a persistent inconsistency in the Danish case. Though Denmark has
based its arguments on the enormous social costs that granting the request would entail to Danish
society, it has, simultaneously claimed that there is no urgency in the matter because, as
Professor Bowett noted "the estimate is that the Great Belt will not be obstructed by the new bridge
until late 1994, at the earliest" (CR 91/12, p. 10,).
If the former argument is correct, i.e., if the only way to safeguard Finnish rights is to cease
the works completely, then we do not really understand how Denmark could claim that there is no
urgency and that it can anyway continue the work until 1994. If the latter argument is correct - that
there is no harm until 1994 - then we must remain puzzled about the claimed need for a complete
cessation of works and the enormous social costs this would entail. Surely Denmark must choose
between these two tacks: are the works immediately harmful? In which case, complete cessation is
not only needed but seems to follow from the requirements of urgency and irreparability. Or, is no
such immediate harm entailed? In which case, the whole argument about enormous social costs loses
its foundation.
So, let me repeat that the interpretation of the Finnish request as if it were a request for a
blanket cessation of all works is an incorrect reading of the terms of the very request. Nor can it be
argued, on the Danish side, that it anyway can be complied with only by a complete cessation of
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works, for, on their own words, the project will not create an obstacle before 1994. An order to that
effect might provide the relief Finland is seeking, though, I submit, this would be an order whose
consequences would indeed seem extensive if Denmark took no precaution for the possibility of a
final judgment in Finland's favour.
Now, I believe that Denmark knows all too well that the Finnish request in fact contains the
element of reasonableness in itself. This it tries to disguise by pretending that the measures
requested would be the simple cessation of all works. This is a very convenient interpretation to
take, as it will allow Denmark to embark upon what we must regard as the core of its argument
against the indication of interim measures, namely the argument that the measures, if granted, would
be wholly out of proportion and put a completely unreasonable burden on Denmark.
Thus, we heard Mr. Magid set out the enormous losses and "substantial economic and social
damage: CR 91/11, p. 31) that would be entailed, as he put it, "in the event of a suspension of the
Great Belt project" (ibid.). A complete cessation of the motorway part of the project for three years
would amount to US$ 500 million, plus very extensive losses for the public and private sectors with
investments dependent on the continuation fo the project. Professor Bowett, likewise, spoke of a
"total stoppage of all further construction work" and its "devastating effect" (CR 91/12, p. 21).
All of this, I submit, completely ignores the terms of the Finnish request and the arguments
Denmark has itself put forward about the absence of urgency and irreparable harm in this case. It is
a tactical move to put Denmark in the position of the unfortunate underdog, whose present plans are
being "interfered with" (CR 91/11, p. 9), as Ambassador Lehmann put it, by Finland, or, rather, not
really Finland at all but by what Professor Bowett called a capitalistic company's private interest.
The matter starts to look now as if it were Finland that aimed to change the existing situation.
There is no word about Finland's right of passage and the importance of that right, not only to
Finnish society but to the continued enjoyment by all States of this right. I need hardly point to the
consequences, if the straits regime generally would be looked at from the perspective which Denmark
has taken: its point is that there is a right of innocent passage and that is, as paragraph 103 of the
Written Observation puts it, "all there is".
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Having painted that distorted picture of the present case and of Finland's position in the
matter, Denmark then proceeds, in the different parts of its argument, to seek to demonstrate that the
Finnish claim is unjustified - indeed, its own argument presses it so far as even to hint at the extreme
position that there might be some kind of wrongfulness entailed by starting this legal action. Thus,
Denmark argues about proportionality, reasonableness, balancing of interests, etc. - all
considerations which seek to divert attention from the law - i.e., Article 41 of the Court's Statute - to
equity and economic considerations.
I do understand that Denmark might feel it reasonable that Finland proposes one concrete
alternative on how the Finnish rights could be safeguarded.
I have earlier sketched, with some hesitation I might add, three such alternatives together with
their cost-estimates and I have done this to show that Finland is prepared to participate in technical
discussions. But I have a feeling that Denmark will come tomorrow with the reply it has given us
whenever we have suggested these alternatives: a blanket denial of the possibility to realize the
suggestions and a dognmatic insistence on going ahead with the already established plans.
Denmark's straw man construction also belies its claim that there is not even a prima facie
right by Finland and, as Ambassador Lehmann argued, "not even a prima facie case exists in favour
of Finland's contention". This is an interesting statement from someone who has written in a recent
textbook, together with two other eminent Danish authors, that not only is there a right of free
passage in the Danish straits and that there is no right to barrage these straits but that
"it is all the less permitted to prevent navigation through straits by the construction of bridges,
tunnels or other such installations. The construction of such installations in the main channel
of a strait must therefore take into account the largest existing ships." (Folkeret,
Klaus Gulmann, John Bernhardt, Tyge Lehmann, Copenhagen 1989, original in Danish.)
It has been a consistently held Danish position ever since it was laid down in Max Sorensen'
statement to the Danish Great Belt Committee in February 1957 that there is a right of free passage
in the Danish straits and that this right extends to all existing ships (cf. Appendix to Annex 26 of the
Report of the Great Belt Committee; see also his statement of 29 January 1962, published in Danish
in Fast Forbindelse Over Store Baelt, Betaenkning No. 508 (1968) p. 109-112). In view of such
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statements, whatever one thinks the final judgment should be, the Finnish right clearly possesses a
prima facie validity. Even from the Danish perspective - that is to say, even if we grant the
correctness of the view held by Max Sorensen and Tyge Lehmann - the only open question would
seem to be whether drill ships, semi-submersible drill rigs and heavy-lift ships are "existing ships" in
the meaning of the Danish doctrine. There is nowhere a suggestion that the right of free passge
would not exist, or would exist only for some categories of activities or ships.
Now throughout our contacts with the Danish side, it has been argued consistent with that
Danish doctrine - that the craft moving in and out of Finland are not ships, and that they do not
therefore enjoy the right of passage. We have not really heard that argument here, though
Ambassador Fergo attempted to belittle the importance of several conventions which unambiguously
consider moving offshore craft as ships. The Danish side has not been impressed by the argument
that even the International Registry of Shipping of Denmark lists these craft as ships, as do the
registries of all the Nordic countries and that many recent academic materials have been published in
all the Nordic countries in which the position has been taken that these craft either are "ships" or
that, at least, the same rules of navigation should be applied to them as are applied to regular ships.
Indeed, if these rules were not applied to them it is difficult to see how they could move - and could
have moved - at sea at all.
All this is merits, of course, and I do not wish to dwell upon it longer. I have made these
points only to show how inconsistent the view is that there is not even a prima facie case in Finland's
favour with what I have called the Danish doctrine. The merits of this case will not turn on whether
or not there exists a right - we agree on free passage - but on how that right should be interpreted,
whether it should be extensive or narrow and whether it should be applied to certain craft which
have always enjoyed it everywhere, including in Denmark's territorial sea. To my knowledge, there
is not a single case, not one example from the practice of any country in which the rights of passage
of the kinds of craft manufactured in Finland would have been effectively denied.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will now move to the second point: the question of the
alleged Finnish acquiescence. First, of course, I have to add that I do this with some unease as it is
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so obviously a question of the merits. But I shall address it anyway as it has been consistently
claimed from the Danish side that Finland has agreed - albeit silently - in the cutting off of the
possibility of free passage by some ships manufactured in it from travelling beyond the Baltic.
It is clearly one of the principal substantive contentions of Denmark that, as formulated by
Ambassador Lehmann:
"the Danish circular Note of 12 May 1977, notifying foreign States about the then ongoing
project to construct a high-level bridge across the Great Belt, was left unanswered by Finland"
(p. 10).
This is then taken to signify that Finland saw no problem in the then ongoing project because,
as Ambassador Lehmann observed, Finland did not respond according to the normal practice within
a year's time.
Let me first note that there is no particular magic in the year 1977. The first plans for a
bridge originate in the 1930s. The Governmental Committee was set up in 1948 and made a report
in 1960 in which a high-level bridge was suggested. Several studies on the matter were carried out
during the 1960s and 1970s and different technical alternatives appeared and disappeared. The law
on which the 1977 note was based had been passed four years earlier, signifying that there hardly
was any particular rush in the project itself.
I would then wish to make three points. First, that project was substantially different from the
present one. This seems to be admitted by Ambassador Lehmann as well when he does not refer to
1977 as the project but the "then ongoing project". Indeed, that project provided for a high-level and
a low-level bridge, whereas the project initiated in 1987 contains the two alternatives of a high-level
bridge and a tunnel in the East Channel. That the later project is a different one, is perhaps best
manifested by the fact that the Danish Government felt it necessary to inform foreign missions anew.
And of course this was the correct procedure as the law on which it was based as well as the
modalities provided by the new law were completely different from the old one. Consequently, the
old law (No. 414 of 16 June 1973) was completely repealed, not modified by the new Law (Law No.
380 (1987)). The tunnel alternative was envisaged by the new law, I understand, as a prerequisite
for a political consensus between the major parties in Denmark, out of which, for instance, Venstre
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had been opposed to the bridge project.
Second, as we have already noted, the 1977 project was hotly contested in Denmark from the
outset. A motion for the suspension of the project was made in the Danish Parliament already in
1976 and thereafter motions for suspension were taken up, as noted in the Parliamentary debate by
Mr. Jorgen Fredriksen about every six months. The Danish Note of June 1977 was sent to
Foreign Missions in the midst of a political controversy. A new proposal to suspend the project was
debated in the Parliament on 28 October 1977 and after a lengthy debate the matter was sent to the
committee of public works. That proposal was finally rejected in March 1978. Nevertheless,
political discussion continued among the main parties and within the political-economic committee of
the Parliament. Finally an agreement was reached on 30 August 1978 that the project be suspended.
The same day the Danish Prime Minister informed the public that an agreement had been reached
between the Social Democrats and Venstre to suspend the project sine die (udskudt pa obestemt tid)
as stated in (En redogorelse for Statsbroen Store Baelt p. 18). The final decision on suspension,
which contains no reference to any period that the matter might be taken up was then made on
19 October 1978. Under such circumstances, I submit, there was already at the very moment the
Note of June 1977 was received, a reasonable expectation that the project - like all the projects
preceding it - would eventually be abandoned. And this expectation was of course finally fulfilled.
Third, in the ten years between 1977 and 1987 13 Finnish offshore craft passed through the
Danish straits. Surely whatever implied consent it might be argued Finland had given in 1977 must
be deemed to have expired by the continuous passage of such ships. In particular, as I noted on
Monday, important investments were made by the City of Pori as well as Rauma-Repola Offshore to
provide for the continued production of large offshore craft in its shipyard.
Taking into account the continuous use of Finnish offshore craft of the Danish straits, one
might in fact be tempted to turn the argument about acquiescence on its head. Is it not really
Denmark which has acquiesced in the passage of such craft in the Danish straits? That the Danish
authorities knew about the passage of the rigs there can be no doubt. Also, there is no report of
these authorities having ever intervened in any way to argue that these craft did not posses the right
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of free passage. So I believe that in fact the better argument is the one this Court used in the case
concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory, where certain kinds of Portuguese passage
"were not subject to any restriction, beyond routine control", and in which there had been established
thus a "constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Damao and the enclaves"
(I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 40). Whatever the differences between that case and the present, it seems
difficult to ignore the silence of the Danish maritime officials and other Danish officials in face of a
continuous practice taking place right under their eyes.
But that of course, again, is a matter for the merits.
Our opponents have likewise argued about acquiescence in respect of the Note of
30 June 1987. Here, however, there can scarcely be talk of any Finnish consent for the reason that
the note provided for a tunnel alternative and that it made express provision for the preservation of
existing maritime rights. The note read:
"In case a bridge solution is selected, the erection of the bridge section crossing the
Eastern Channel will, in conformity with international law, allow for the maintenance of free
passage for international shipping as in the past."
In this way, there was no reason to believe that the continued passage of drill ships and oil rigs
would be prevented by the future bridge. That became clear only in the note of 24 October 1989 -
by which time the Finnish concerns had already been communicated to the Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
In this way, Finalnd cannot accept the contention that it has consented to a limitation of its
rights by the Danish action. Finland most certainly has not consented to the present Danish project
whatever highly speculative inferences our Danish colleagues may make about the events of 1977
and 1978. Since the summer of 1989 in fact continuous contacts have taken place between Danish
and Finnish authorities on the bridge, as I explained in my opening statement. The statement on
paragraph 38 which refers only to the final Finnish note of protest of May 1990 paints an inaccurate
picture of the events. It also sets aside the well-known fact that contacts between Nordic countries
and Governmental authorities in this kind of matter - as really in any matters - are conducted on the
basis of extreme informality; a formal note of protest between the two Nordic States is, I must say,
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an event of extreme rarity.
Finally, let me come to another matter which has been taken up by our Danish colleagues. It
has been argued by them that none of the Parties to the Copenhagen Treaty have reacted to the
Danish plans and that
"The Parties to the 1857 Treaty have accepted a clearance of 65 metres as being
sufficient for the exercise of their right of passage through the Danish territorial sea."
(CR 91/11, p. 63.)
This is not correct. The Soviet Note Verbale of 29 March 1978 does not end with the
suggestion of 65 metres. After the paragraph in which that minimum height is noted, the note
continues by an expression of anxiety:
"because the Danish side, while preparing these plans, has not paid due attention to the
question concerning the safeguarding of unhampered passage through the Great Belt for
traffic" (cf. Annex 8 of the Danish Written Observation).
Thereafter follows a listing of the different obstacles that the bridge will anyway cause to
navigation in the Great Belt and finally a request for more information so that the Soviet authorities
could "scrutinize in more detail the subsequent questions and submit their viewpoints thereon".
Rather than an expression of consent to the bridge plan, the note in fact lays down several grave
reservations against it and clearly leaves the consent of the Soviet Union to be dependent on the two
States' future exchanges. No such exchanges, I believe, have taken place - at least not to the extent
that the Soviet Union might have been held to have consented to the Danish plans. As it is said on
page 38 of the Redogörelse for Broen - a Final Report which I already referred to - "reactions gave
no reason for changes in the project".
The Soviet Union has continued to express its anxiety over this projects. In the most recent
session of the Council of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), held in London on
10-14 June 1991, the Soviet Union expressed its concern over the restrictive effects of the planned
bridge and put forward the view that Denmark should reconsider design on the planned bridge. That
country also suggested that the matter should be looked into by the legal committee of the
organization. The following decision, I believe, was made at that session;
"On the issue of the construction of a fixed bridge over the Great Belt, the Council took
note of the concerns which had been expressed and requested the Secretary-General to keep
the matter, which is before the International Court of Justice, under review and inform the
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appropriate bodies of IMO."
The Council made the only appropriate decision in the matter - to defer it until the decision of
this Court. But my point is that the bridge project has not gone unchallenged and that there is a
challenge to its very legality by at least one country which is also an original party to the
1857 Treaty. Now lastly, Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me draw your attention to
some of the more technical aspects of this case which came out during last Monday's and Tuesday's
discussions. I shall briefly make some points on four sets of technical aspects:
First, let met take the question of the offshore rig market situation and Rauma-Repola
Offshore's outlook.
The market is - like most markets - very cyclical in nature. Ten years ago - during the
previous peak - over 200 rigs were under construction. The period 1986-1990 was particularly
difficult: only 14 orders were made. Today the number has gone down to ten. Of these ten, as was
explained on Monday, Rauma-Repola is the builder of three. In addition a contract for a fourth one
has been signed. In fact, the company is today the leading offshore exploration rig builder in
Europe.
What reason is there to be optimistic about the future trends, then? What is the basis for the
calculation of the company's situation in the 1990s? Now, the average age of an offshore drilling
unit is about 20 years (Source: Offshore Rig Newsletter, July 1989). Out of the present 641-unit
fleet of existing jack-ups and semi-submersibles, 403 will be reaching the age of 20 years during the
forthcoming ten-year period. Moreover, encouraging information about additional investments by oil
companies is provided in many places (e.g., Ocean Industry Magazine, February 1991).
Professor Bowett asked - rhetorically, I am sure - the question whether it might be possible that the
demand for oil rigs will shift to the Far East. Well, we do not really know. But we have no reason
to conjecture in such a fashion, as what we do know is that the largest offshore deposits are to be
found outside the coasts of Northern Europe.
Another set of questions related to the draughts of the Rauma-Repola built oil rigs and the
ways they have taken to pass to their buyers.
- 20 -
And here, Mr. President, I am afraid I now have to show pictures.
Picture 1
In this first picture we have listed the 20 oil rigs and drill ships which have travelled through
the Danish Straits. One (RR-8) could have passed through the Great Belt had the fixed link been in
existence already. One of them passed through the Sound (RR-6). The rest have either passed
through the Great Belt or we have not yet received information about their actual routes. You will
also see the dates of delivery and the actual draughts of these vessels, as established at shipyard at
delivery. As regards the possibility that some of them could have passed through the Sound, I refer
to Dr. Koskenniemi's statement on Monday.
Picture 2
But the issue is not only about rigs and ships actually built. The problem concerns also rigs
as regards the future, particularly rigs tendered. Here are some examples of such vessels with their
air and water draught. The company continues to make tenders on these types of craft.
Picture 3
Another question that was posed to us by our opponents and in particular Professor Bowett
(CR 91/11, p. 13) related to the basis of our calculations relating to the additional costs of
US$ 7.5 million to 14.5 million regarding the disassembly and reassembly of the derrick in case the
fixed link would be in existence. Rauma-Repola Offshore constructs heavy rigs for harsh
environments. Consequently, the derricks are also heavy and not designed for quick assembly. It
should be noted that, before the transportation, the rig has to undergo extensive inspection and test
runs. These runs will have to be made anew after the reassembly. In this picture we have explained
the calculations regarding the four additional months it takes to disassemble and reassemble the
derrick of a semi-submersible.
Picture 4
Here is the basis of the calculation for the sum of US$ 14.7 million regarding the disassembly
and reassembly of the rig. The calculation is based on all the operations being done by
Rauma-Repola Offshore personnel and equipment.
- 21 -
Let me then answer Professor Bowett's question "Do we know why they cannot be towed
through the sound by shallow-draught vessels? We do not." (CR 91/12, p. 15). But we do know.
The answer is simple. Transport by towing creates a risk of accidents which is about 20 times as
high as the risk in transport by a heavylift ship (Source: Accident History of Mobile Rig Fleet,
Offshore Data Services, Houston). There have so far been too many accidents relating to towing of
offshore vessels.
My second set of brief answers relates to the question of bridges. As regards the two
Bosphorus bridges, the first one of them was built in 1973. At that time, there were no ships which
would have needed a higher clearance than the present one and which would have needed to travel to
or from the Black Sea. The height of the first bridge naturally prejudiced the height of the second.
As regards the Kanmon Bridge in Japan, let me note that the situation is completely different from
the Baltic. That bridge can always be evaded by detouring around Kyushu Island. Our colleagues
left shyly unmentioned the similar situation at the other end of Japan's main island, Honshu, where a
tunnel is constructed to lead to the Island of Hokkaido. The Verrazano Narrows Bridge in New
York, the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco and the various other bridges referred to have only
local - sometimes national - influence in a limited area. If, however, we wish to embark on listing
bridges, then, for perfection, also the Tagus River Bridge in Lisboa which stands in 72 metres
height, should be mentioned - as well as the non-existent Channel bridge.
All in all, we cannot infer a customary law standard merely from the existence of a set of
bridges at a certain height. There will always be some bridges that are higher than other bridges and
many bridges of a similar height, but to attach that fact with juridical significance without any
additional proof of the opinio juris is simply a mistake.
Finally, as the last of my factual points I would like to present five additional technical
alternatives for how Finland's rights could be safeguarded by modifications in the bridge project:
1. Replace two spans with a pontoon bridge in the Western Bridge. The basic idea of this is
that when the bridge opens, the pontoon part will be moved aside in its entirety. It is a reasonable
cost alternative whose main difficulty is the general difficulty of opening a railway bridge. However,
- 22 -
additional cost should not be more than around US$ 25 million plus the costs of the additional
dredging in the Western Channel.
2. Move two spans aside by means of pontoons in the Western Channel. The advantage of
this alternative is that the appearance of all the spans remains the same while the disadvantage is that
the opening process is expensive and time-consuming. However, if it would be only rarely used - as
it probably would - this should be no unsurmountable problem. Its cost would be around
US$ 35 million plus the dredging.
3. Split two spans and turn them to the side in the West Bridge. The advantage of this option
is that opening could be done relatively quickly. The problems would relate to expansion joints
being perhaps problematic. The additional cost would be around US$ 30 million plus dredging.
4. Construct the East Bridge as a bascule bridge with intermediate joints across the East
Channel. This could be done by replacing one span by what is called a pylon-supported truss bridge
which when opened bends at two points in each half of the span. This would allow passage in the
Eastern Channel. It would be a technically demanding and untested structure. It requires the
changing of the main design into a shorter suspension bridge or a cable-stayed bridge. The
additional cost of this structure would be perhaps around US$ 50 million.
5. Finally, there is the continuously present alternative of the tunnel - this would be the
Channel alternative; tested elsewhere and still much supported in Denmark - in particular by the
national so-called tunnel-group. The additional costs would, as Mr. Magid told us, be less than
US$ 200 million.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I have wished to answer some of the technical points
and present some of the alternatives here in order to show that Finland continues to be seriously
seeking for an acceptable solution. Of necessity, this overview has been brief and summary. I hope
that the materials nevertheless have given light to some of the questions which may have arisen. Let
me note, however, that the main substance of our present dispute continues, for Finland, to remain
outside economic calculations and technical alternatives. The dispute is about the freedom of
passage. If we have wished to go into technical detail that is not to imply that the relevant law would
- 23 -
be found there, but that we have given much thought to understandable economic concerns in the
Danish society.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I have dwelled at some length on four issues: the
distorted perspective that our opponents have wished to present of what they wanted to call the "real
object" of these proceedings; on the question of the prima facie right; on the Danish claim regarding
acquiescence and on some of the technical points that were raised on Tuesday. The first and the
fourth are properly matters for this stage of the proceedings. The Court's jurisprudence requires
clarity over what are the rights at issue in the proceedings and the conditions for granting provisional
measures require that we go to some extent into technical detail. The second and third questions are,
I submit, matters relating to the merits of the case. If I have ventured to discuss them here it is only
to show that the substance of the Danish case is far from being so strong as they have assumed and
that there is absolutely no reason to believe that Finland is here seeking anything else than what it
has repeated it seeks: an order for the protection of the right of free passage which has been hitherto
enjoyed continuously by all ships entering and leaving Finnish ports and shipyards.
Thank you. I thank the Court and would like to ask to call on our counsel, Sir Ian Sinclair.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Grönberg. Sir Ian.
Sir Ian SINCLAIR: Mr. President, Members of the Court, with the permission of the Court,
there are several observations I would wish to make this morning on the presentation made to the
Court on Tuesday by my learned friends Dr. Jiménez de Aréchaga and Professor Bowett. I will first
of all make some general remarks about what appear to be certain underlying assumptions in those
presentations - assumptions which, I may say, are wholly unjustified. Thereafter, I will concentrate
on responding more specifically to the arguments advanced by Professor Bowett on "irreparability"
and on "urgency".
In the first place, Professor Bowett makes the basic assumption that the request for interim
measures which Finland has made is "for the protection of the economic interests of the Finnish
company Rauma-Repola Offshore". In a sense what I am about to say wil repeat, in slightly
- 24 -
different language, what Ambassador Grönberg has already said. In fact, Professor Bowett's
statement mischaracterizes completely the nature of the Finnish request, and indeed of the Finnish
Application. In this case, there is a dispute about the scope or extent of the right of free passage
through the Great Belt. It is a genuine and in no sense a manufactured, dispute. Denmark asserts
that, as the territorial sovereign, it is perfectly entitled to build a fixed link across the Great Belt in
pursuance of a wide-ranging plan for the economic development of Denmark. Finland does not
dispute that Denmark is in principle so entitled, but maintains that Denmark's entitlement so to
proceed is limited by its obligation to respect the principle of free passage through the Great Belt - a
principle you may note, whose existence Denmark does not deny, but whose scope is in dispute
between the Parties.
By way of illustration of the problems which the Danish Great Belt project poses for Finland, and
indeed for other States, Finland has pointed to the particular difficulties which completion of the
project, in its presently planned form, will present for the Finnish offshore oil rig industry. It has of
course, in a sense, been necessary to do so, given the need of Finland, in the context of a request for
provisional measures, to establish that "irreparable prejudice" is being, and will continue to be,
caused to Finland by completion of the East Channel bridge in its presently planned form.
That Finland is not the only State in the Baltic which has expressed concern about the more
general consequences of the Great Belt project for the right of passage through the Great Belt is
confirmed by the reaction of the Government of the Soviet Union to the Danish plans, not only in
direct contact with Denmark, but also within the framework of current discussions within the
International Maritime Organization. Ambassador Grönberg has already drawn attention to this
aspect of the matter, so I will not enlarge on it.
The dispute, therefore, is not about the economic interests of the Finnish oil rig industry: it is
about the scope of the right of free passage through the Great Belt. Finland contends that this right
extends to drill ships and oil rigs manufactured in Finland, which have, as the Court will have noted,
in practice enjoyed and exercised the right of free passage for nearly 20 years. Denmark denies this,
arguing that the right of free passage does not extend that far. Finland also contends in its
- 25 -
Application (but not, and I repeat not, in its request for provisional measures) that the right also
extends to "reasonably foreseeable" ships. This is even more vigorously denied by Denmark. This
then is the nature of the dispute which is before this Court, and no other.
Now, Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn to a second point. In his presentation on
Tuesday, my friend Dr. Jiménez de Aréchaga, I may say with his customary elegance and discretion,
effectively accused me of adopting what he described as a "comfortable position" by refusing, at this
stage, to enter too much into the merits of the present case. But the so-called "comfortable position"
is effectively dictated by the jurisprudence of the Court, which I sought - I hope fairly - to analyse in
my opening statement. The fact is that the Court has been very careful indeed to refrain from any
preliminary determination of the merits of a case at the stage of an application for interim measures.
Sztucki, who wrote the book Interim Measures in the Hague Court in 1983, under the heading of
"The Merits of Principal Claims" observes - and here I have a slightly lengthy quotation for you:
"From the theoretical and formal point of view, this factor is, in principle, irrelevant
[irrelevant, note]. The law of the Court does not require that the applicant and requesting
States show a prima facie case and, accordingly, as a rule, they do not argue this point."
I might just interpolate in the middle of that citation that, in the light of what has happened on
Monday and Tuesday of this week, perhaps Sztucki might have slightly amended that passage.
However, I revert again to the quotation. Sztucki goes on to say:
"Consequently, the Court does not have sufficient basis to assess whether a prima facie
case exists or not. Also, from the material point of view, attempts to determine the existence
of a prima facie case in limine litis would be of doubtful value in the case of the Court. For
the very nature of inter-State disputes is usually complex and the legal positions of the
litigants who can rely on the most competent legal expertise are more often than not fairly
balanced." (Sztucki, op. cit., p. 123.)
Now, having said this, one could perhaps envisage that, in very exceptional cases - I repeat,
very exceptional cases - the Court might be capable of being persuaded that an alleged right of an
Applicant State on the merits of the case is so "manifestly unfounded" - to use the language of the
European Convention on Human Rights - so obviously lacking in foundation in public international
law, that it ought not to accede to any request for an indication of interim measures to protect that
- 26 -
alleged right. But that, I would submit, is certainly not the case here. Some analogy can be drawn
from the Court's jurisprudence on the prospects of substantive jurisdiction where a request for
interim measures of protection is made. Where the Court will obviously be without jurisdiction to
hear the merits, or in all probability will be without jurisdiction - but where there is just a remote
possibility that jurisdiction might exist - the Court may be reluctant to indicate interim measures. I
did not review this jurisprudence in my earlier statement this week, and I do not intend to do so today
because, of course, in the present case, no issue of uncertain jurisdiction arises. But it will, I trust,
be obvious to the Court that, even applying this analogy - and I may say it is a very imperfect
analogy, since absence of jurisdiction will preclude the Court from giving judgment on the merits -
the circumstances of the present case are such that the Court should not heed
Dr. Jiménez de Aréchaga's siren-call of going too much into the merits. Of course, in his
presentation this morning, Ambassador Grönberg referred to certain matters relating to the merits,
but that was simply because these matters had been raised in a very controversial manner by our
opponents on Tuesday.
So, it is in this context that I am bound to take issue with the argument advanced by my
learned friend, Dr. Jiménez de Aréchaga, that - and here I quote from page 48 of the Verbatim
Record of the morning sitting on 2 July:
"the right claimed by the Applicant State constitutes one of the circumstances, perhaps the
most important one, to be taken into account in determining whether interim relief should be
granted or refused" (CR 91/11, p. 48).
In challenging that submission, I do so, inevitably, with some trepidation, given the authority
which he commands as a former President of this distinguished Court. But, Mr. President, I do so
nonetheless with conviction and, indeed, with confidence. The Court should not - and its
jurisprudence confirms this - enter into the merits of a particular case at the stage of deciding
whether or not to indicate interim measures. The only qualification I would make on that proposition
is the very exceptional case I have already mentioned. But, as I say, that very exceptional case is not
present here. Finland, accordingly, does not accept the proposition that the right claimed by the
Applicant State constitutes one of the circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether
- 27 -
interim relief should be granted or refused, save in the very exceptional case to which I have drawn
attention, a case which, I might add, has never yet arisen in the practice of the Court. Mr. President,
my learned friend, Professor Tullio Treves, will be elaborating on this aspect of the Danish
argument.
Mr. President, I turn now to the arguments advanced by Professor Bowett on "irreparability"
and "urgency". Professor Bowett's arguments on irreparability are largely conditioned by his view,
which I have already discussed, that the present case is not about the scope of the right of free
passage through the Great Belt but about the protection of the economic interests of Rauma-Repola.
Now, Professor Bowett and I obviously differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the
jurisprudence of the Court on interim measures. Professor Bowett would wish to see a reversion to
what I termed in my opening statement "the irreparability in law criterion", first developed by
President Huber in the Sino-Belgian Treaty case. He refers to those cases in which the Court has
indicated interim measures in circumstances where the Court was persuaded that interim measures
were called for in order to guard against "danger to life and health" (the United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran case), to protect "the rights of Nicaraguan citizens to life, liberty and
security" (in the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. United States of America) and to prevent the exposure of persons and property to a "serious risk
of irreparable harm" (in the Burkina Faso/Mali case). But, as the Court well knows, these are
certainly not the only circumstances in which the Court will grant interim measures of protection.
Professor Bowett seeks to distinguish those cases in which interim measures have been awarded in
other circumstances, that is to say, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case and the Fisheries
Jurisdiction case. He suggests that the order on interim measures in the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company case is perhaps best explained by Iran's failure to appear and contest the United Kingdom
request. Now, I must submit with respect that this explanation does not carry conviction. The
Court generally affords ample protection of the interests of a non-appearing party. In general terms
this is the clear object and purpose of Article 53 of the Statute. Now, of course, the better view is
almost certainly that Article 53 of the State is not applicable at the interim measures stage. It
- 28 -
certainly cannot be applied literally, since paragraph 2 of Article 53 requires that, in a case of
non-appearance, the Court must, before deciding in favour in favour of the claim of an Applicant
State:
"satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Article 36 and 37, but also,
that the claim is well founded in fact and law".
The Court will well be aware that these are not the condition which have been applied or
should be applied, to justify the making of an order indicating interim measures. The jurisprudence
of the Court is quite clear on this point. This having been said, the Order of the Court on interim
measures in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case cannot be explained away on the basis of Iran's
non-appearance if, as Professor Bowett would have us believe, the Court has consistently applied the
absolute irreparability in law criterion for the grant of interim measures, that is to say, by refusing to
grant them in those cases where financial compensation might be a possible remedy. Nor, with
respect, is Professor Bowett's explanation of the Court's Orders on interim measures in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction cases persuasive from this point of view. The damage done to United Kingdom and
German fishermen in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases was no doubt quite considerable, but it was no
more drastic than the damage which will be done to the Finnish ship-building industry in the present
case if the Great Belt project is completed in its presently planned form. Finland accordingly
continues to rely on the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court presented in my opening statement
of 1 July, as amplified by the additional points which will be made by my learned friend,
Professor Treves.
Two final observations on the irreparability point:
(1) Professor Bowett's argument presupposes that the injury caused to Finland by completion
of the bridge project in its presently planned form can be adequately compensated by an award of
monetary damages. But this, of course, is based on the misconception that Finland's purpose in
instituting the present proceedings is simply to protect the economic interests of a Finnish company.
Finland's purpose, of course, is much broader. It is to try to obtain a limited modification of the
Great Belt project so as to secure continued access to and from Finnish ports and shipyards of
- 29 -
special ships whose height may exceed the 65 metres clearance height of the proposed bridge. That
is why the dispute is about access and about the extent to the right of free passage, and not about
compensation.
(2) For the Court to resile from the position it has consistently taken in its more recent
jurisprudence whereby irreparability connotes irreparability in fact or in law, would be a thoroughly
retrogade step. The test which the Court now employs, and I explained this fully in my opening
statement, is that a prejudice is irreparable if it makes impossible full execution of the final
judgement if in favour of the Applicant State, and this without reference to whether the Applicant
State might at some future stage be compensated for the injury it has suffered. I would submit that
to abandon that test would be to deny the very object and purpose of interim measures as
conservatory measures designed to preserve the respective rights of the parties pending a final
judgment. I would also submit that it would in addition be a standing invitation to States to go
ahead with what the Court may subsequently determine to be internationally wrongful acts on the
basis that such acts could be remedied at a later stage by compensation and by compensation alone.
I would submit that the Court should not countenance such a limitation upon its discretion.
I now turn slightly more briefly to the argument of urgency. Ambassador Grönberg has
already dealt with the argument based on Finland's alleged acquiescence in the bridge project. How
can Finland be said to have acquiesced in the construction of a bridge over the Great Belt with a
clearance of 65 metres when, until October 1989, no final decision had been taken to build a road
bridge rather than a tunnel, which obviously would have presented no major problems to Finland.
Professor Bowett suggests that — and here again I quote from his presentation "it was clear much
earlier that a bridge was the more likely option".
But is this right? Finland can no doubt be presumed to have had at least some knowledge of
the project for a fixed link between England and France across the English Channel which was under
consideration in the early 1980s. Finland therefore would have known that the project for a bridge
over the English Channel, or even a combined bridge/tunnel, was eventually rejected by the two
Governments for a number of reasons. I will not elaborate on all these reasons but one them was
- 30 -
certainly the need to ensure the safety of shipping in a notoriously crowded strait. May I say that, in
drawing attention to the fixed link across the English Channel, I am not suggesting, on behalf of
Finland, that any real parallel can be drawn between the two cases. The factual and indeed the
geographical circumstances are quite different. But I am simply drawing attention to the fact that
rejection of the bridge solution in the case of the English Channel fixed link by reason inter alia of
the difficulties anticipated in securing international agreement to the erection of a bridge hardly
indicates that, in the case of the Great Belt, a bridge was the more likely option.
As to Professor Bowett's second point on urgency, there are clearly differences between
Denmark and Finland as to the technical possibilities for drill shps and oil rigs (including
semi-submersibles and jack-ups) to pass through the Sound. Ambassador Grönberg has already
responded to many of the Danish arguments on this point.
But it is perhaps Professor Bowett's fourth point which deserves most attention. This is of
course the argument that there is no urgency because the East Channel of the Great Belt will not be
physically obstructed by the bridge until late 1994 at the earliest. But both Dr. Koskenniemi and I,
in our earlier addresses, pointed to the inter-relation between the various elements of the Great Belt
project as a whole. That inter-relation has the consequence that completion of any one element
would reduce the possibilities of modifying other elements so as to enable effect to be given to any
judgment of the Court on the merits, if that judgment were to be in Finland's favour. What
particularly struck me about Professor Bowett's intervention was his suggestion that that could mean
only that Finland believes that Denmark will not comply with a judgment on the merits against
Denmark. I have to say that that is a quite unfounded allegation. The point that Finland is seeking
to make is quite different. Finland is of course aware that it would be possible to reconstruct or even
in extremis to demolish the bridge if the Court were to find in favour of Finland on the merits. But
of course the cost to Denmark would then be enormous. The UK/French Study Group on the Fixed
Channel Link, in considering the bridge project for the English Channel as recently as 1982, alluded
to the possibility that the promoters of the bridge might abandon the site during construction, for
example, following long delays or unexpected additional costs. The Study Group concluded - and I
- 31 -
have no reason to dispute this - that the cost of demolition could be very high. Finland therefore
suggests that it is very much in Denmark's own interest to exercise such restraint in proceeding with
construction works in connection with the bridge project over the Great Belt so as to permit full
implementation of the Court's final judgment on the merits if in favour of Finland. Finland has no
desire to see Denmark landed with such additional cost.
Finally, Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn to Professor Bowett's peroration. Here,
with respect, I think there is more than an element of exaggeration. My learned colleague,
Professor Treves, will be responding to the charges that we have ignored the "balancing of burdens"
notion inherent in the concept that the object of provisional measures is to preserve the respective
rights of the Parties. If, as counsel for Finland, I concentrated in my opening statement on the need
to protect the rights which Finland claims, that is only natural. It does not mean that Finland is not
aware of the rights which Denmark claims in the main proceedings. The real issue is that Denmark
is inexorably proceeding unilaterally with a construction or series of constructions which pay no
attention to the rights which Finland is asserting on the merits. Finland has done nothing save to
institute proceedings before this distinguished Court in order to have a declaration upholding the
rights which Finland asserts and to have those rights protected by conservatory measures. Finland is
of course aware that the grant of conservatory measures by the Court may cause considerable
inconvenience to Denmark by imposing possibly some delay in the completion of the project, and
possibly some additional cost. But, Mr. President, Members of the Court, with all respect, Denmark
has brought this difficulty upon itself. Finland has always been prepared to negotiate with Denmark
on possible modifications to the Great Belt project which could protect the right of free passage for
which Finland contends. Unfortunately, Denmark has refused hitherto to contemplate any
modification. Finland takes no pleasure in these proceedings against a fellow Nordic country, but
has felt it necessary to come to this Court seeking protection for the rights it is asserting in the
proceedings on the merits. There may indeed be a balance to be struck by the Court in determining
what, in these circumstances, should be done to respect the respective rights of the Parties. But, in
seeking that balance, the Court will certainly have to bear in mind that Finland is presently the
- 32 -
victim, I might say the innocent victim, of a project initiated by Denmark alone. This is a project
which I do not dispute will carry great benefits for Denmark, but it is a project which, in Finland's
submission, is clearly restrictive of the internationally recognized right of free passage through the
Great Belt and which, if completed in its presently planned form, would cause serious and lasting
injury to the Finnish shipbuilding industry. Thank you Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you Sir Ian. I think it is a convenient place now to take our break
and, as we have much to get through, we will try and keep it to ten minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.40 to 11.50 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Professor Treves.
Mr. TREVES: Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to appear
before this Court and I am grateful to the Government of Finland to have made it possible. As this is
the first time that I take the floor before this Court, let me say that for international lawyers of all
generations, and certainly for me, this Court embodies the finest tradition and the highest hopes for
progress of international law.
The task that has been entrusted to me is to reply to those of the legal arguments put forward
by Denmark in its Written Observations and in the pleadings of its Agents and counsel which have
not yet been addressed by my colleagues this morning.
The general impression which emerges from reading the Danish Written Observations and
from listening to oral pleadings on Tuesday is that the defence of Denmark tries to transform the
discussion of the Finnish request for interim measures in a discussion of the merits of the case. In
doing so, without saying it explicitly, Denmark also tries to insinuate the thought that Finland's
Application is frivolous, that it amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court.
- 33 -
This general impression is substantiated in the analysis of the various points of law which I
shall consider this morning. These points are the following:
First, the contention, developed in particular in President Jiménez de Aréchaga's pleading, that
the right claimed by Finland in its Application, and which Finland would like to see preserved by the
indication of provisional measures, does not exist.
Second, the contention, put forward by Professor Bowett, that the alleged lack of
consideration, in the Finnish request, for the Danish interests, would have the consequence that the
requirement of proportionality would be missing.
Third, I shall address the alternative request of Denmark, illustrated by Mr. Magid in his
second pleading, that, in the event that the Court should grant the request for interim measures in
whole or in part, it should also indicate that Finland shall undertake to compensate Denmark for
losses incurred in complying with the measures should the Court reject Finland's submissions in the
merits.
I. The alleged non-existence of the Finnish right
To consider this aspect of the Danish position, it seems useful to start from the analysis of
Article 41 of the Statute made in paragraph 83 of the Written Observations. According to Denmark,
the object of Article 41 may be summarized by distinguishing three elements: firstly, the object to
preserve the rights of the Parties; secondly, certain requirement which the power of the Court to
indicate provisional measures would "presuppose" - namely irreparable prejudice, urgency and prima
facie existence of the jurisdiction of the Court; and, thirdly, that circumstances require the indication
of the measures. To present the prospects of substantive jurisdiction as a "precondition" and not as a
"circumstance" may be helpful, and the point was made by Judge Mosler in his separate opinion in
the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (I.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 25). However, to do so as regards
irreparable prejudice and urgency amounts to a rather unusual analysis of Article 41. Indeed the
consequence of this analysis is that the very concept of circumstances becomes empty, or at least
vague, as it appears in the section on circumstances of the Danish Written Observations - a very
brief section which contains what we would more appropriately call "concluding observations".
- 34 -
However, it is humbly submitted, the real purpose of the Danish analysis of Article 41 is to
present the rights that are to be preserved with the interim measures as an independent element
whose existence has to be demonstrated in order for the measures to be indicated. It is true that the
section of the Written Observations relating to this element is entitled to the "alleged" right. By
doing so the Danish Written Observations merely pay lip service to the proper role which has to be
reserved, in the framework of proceedings on provisional measures, to the rights under discussion on
the merits. This emerges clearly from the pages that follow in the just mentioned section of the
Danish Written Observations. They contain a detailed incursion into the merits of the case. This
incursion concludes, in paragraph 140, by affirming that "the right for which Finland seeks interim
protection does not exist". One cannot avoid underlining that such an affirmation, in proceedings for
the indication of interim measures of protection, is, to say the least, rather startling.
In his pleading on Tuesday, President Jiménez de Aréchaga confirmed and developed the
points just mentioned. He affirmed that "the existence of the right claimed by the Applicant
constitutes one of the circumstances, perhaps the most important one, to be taken into account in
determining whether interim relief should be granted or refused". Starting from this affirmation
President Jiménez de Aréchaga embarked in an excursion into the merits even more detailed than the
one to be found in the Written Observations.
With respect, this point of departure cannot be accepted and, consequently, it is not necessary
to follow President Jiménez de Aréchaga in that excursion.
The existence of the right is not a "circumstance" within the meaning the term has in
Article 41 of the Statute of the Court. When Article 41 refers to the "rights" to be preserved through
the granting of provisional measures, it refers to "the rights which may be subsequently adjudged by
the Court to belong either to the Applicant or to the Respondent", as the Court said in its Order on
provisional measures in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 93) and repeated in
similar language at various times, more recently in its Order on provisional measures of
2 March 1990 in the case between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal concerning the Arbitral Award of
31 July 1989 where the Court confirmed that the purpose of exercising the power which Article 41
- 35 -
confers to it is "to protect the rights which are the subject of dispute in legal proceedings"
(I.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 69).
While President Jiménez de Aréchaga moves into the merits in order to examine the question
whether the right claimed by Finland "really exists", Ambassador Lehmann in his introductory
statement on behalf of Denmark envisages the right claimed by Finland from a different angle. In
doing so he probably reveals the real purpose of this branch of the Danish arguments. He
affirms that:
"not even a prima facie case exists in favour of the Finnish contention that the right of passage
through the Great Belt applies to all ships including drill ships, oil rigs and reasonably
foreseeable ships"
and that
"the Finnish Government must be able to substantiate the alleged right to a point where
reasonable prospect of success in the main case exists".
As it emerges from remarks already made this morning by Ambassador Grönberg and by
Sir Ian Sinclair it is Finland's contention that to establish whether there is a prima facie case for the
existence of the right to be adjuged in the merits phase - or, in other words, whether there exists the
so-called fumus boni juris - is, in proceedings on interim measures, as inappropriate as to consider
the question as to whether the alleged right exists.
Arguments concerning fumus boni juris or a prima facie assessment of the merits could make
sense if a provisional judgment on the merits were under discussion before the Court. But this is not
the case, and cannot be the case, with the proceedings for provisional measures under Article 41 of
the Statute. Only in a few individual or dissenting opinions of members of the Court did concerns
for the merits emerged in the consideration of requests for provisional measures. Even in the light of
these concerns, a recent commentator could not go beyond observing that:
"the preliminary view on the merits of the case can marginally play a role in the assessment of
circumstances of a case"
while confirming:
"the basically non-anticipatory character of decisions concerning interim protection" (Sztucki,
Interim measures in The Hague Court, 1983, p. 124, emphasis the quoted author's).
- 36 -
Even though it is not necessary to do so, out of respect for the authority of
President Jiménez de Aréchaga, I would like to show that the arguments used to demonstrate that the
right claimed by Finland, does not exist are, to say the least, questionable and that, consequently, it
is out of the question that Finland's case could be considered as prima facie unfounded.
The basic line of reasoning of President Jiménez de Aréchaga's pleading is the following: the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention is not applicable; the Geneva 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea is applicable, but it is so restricted that it cannot be the basis of the right claim by Finland;
customary law cannot be the basis of a right of transit passage; the 1857 Treaty of Copenhagen does
not encompass the right claimed by Finland, and in any case Finland cannot benefit from it as a
party but only as a third State beneficiary.
Finland, obviously, reserves its right to examine these arguments in detail at the appropriate
stage. For today's purposes it is sufficient to make two points.
The first is that the right of innocent passage as envisaged in the Geneva Convention is a
sufficient basis for the right Finland claims for offshore craft and reasonably foreseeable ships.
Indeed the "innocence" of such passage has never been questioned. There has been no question of
these craft passing through the Great Belt "ex gratia" and not as a matter of right. Consequently, it
is hard to see the relevance of the argument put forward by President Jiménez de Aréchaga
concerning the right of the coastal State to take steps against passage that is not innocent contained
in Article 16 of the Geneva Convention, and almost eliminated in the 1982 Convention. The same
can be said about the argument taken from the fact that the coastal State's regulatory powers are
broader according to the Geneva Convention than according to the 1982 Convention. These powers
may inded be broader, or at least less clearly defined, but one thing is certain: they concern the
regulation of innocent passage, not the elimination of the physical conditions for its exercise.
Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Geneva Convention, repeated with further clarifications in Article 24
of the 1982 Convention, provides that:
"The coastal State must not hamper innocent passage through the territorial sea".
It seems clear that to make innocent passage physical impossible is a very radical way of hampering!
- 37 -
The second point Finland would wish to make is that Denmark gives a very partial reading of
the 1857 Copenhagen Treaty, and that this reading does not coincide entirely with Danish views on
the same subject expressed before the present case arose.
Neither the Written Observations nor President Jiménez de Aréchaga quote one of the key
substantive provisions of the Treaty. This is the provision contained in Article 1, paragraph 1,
according to which:
"no vessel shall, henceforth, under any pretext whatsoever, be subjected, in its passage of the
Sound or Belts, to any detention or hindrance".
In its brevity, this provision envisages a passage which (leaving aside the question of warships) is
not subject to the limitations and conditions that are found in the Geneva and in the Montego Bay
Conventions.
The Danish position, as expressed both by President Jiménez de Aréchaga and by the Written
Observations interprets the 1857 Copenhagen Treaty as an ordinary treaty, which gives rise to rights
and obligations only for the Parties and whose consequences for third States are only those set forth
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This reading seems again a very narrow one, if
one considers that the other key substantive rule of the Treaty, namely the abolishing of all customs
and dues for ships passing through the Sound or Belts is established "for ever" and that that very
principle has now become a principle of customary law, as evidenced by Article 8, paragraph 1, of
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigous Zone, repeated in paragraph 1 of
Article 26 of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, stating that:
"No charge may be levied upon foreign ships by reason only of their passage through
the territorial sea."
These elements seem to confirm that the 1857 Treaty is more than an ordinary treaty. The
rule according to which passage in the Sound and Belts shall not be subject to any detention or
hindrance: "is an expression of a regime of passage through the straits". This quotation is taken
from a published intervention made by a well-known Danish diplomat who represented his country at
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Ambassador I. R. Andreasen. He
comes to the conclusion that:
"in the Danish straits a special regime of passage adapted to local conditions has been
- 38 -
developed over the years, based on the Copenhagen Convention of 1857, international
customary law and national regulations" (The Law of the Sea in the 1980's, Choon-ho-Park
ed., 1983, p. 600 f.)
Similarly another distinguished Danish diplomat who also represented his country at the Third Law
of the Sea Conference, Ambassador Peter Bruckner, stated, in another published intervention, that:
"The special legal regime governing innocent passage of the Danish straits by all ships
has developed over the years based on the Copenhagen Convention. The existing regime is an
expression of the general rules of international customary law as reflected in the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone."
It seems hardly necessary to underline that this position is very different from that put forward
in the present case by Denmark. Similarly to the Finnish position, the role of customary law is
recognized, while it is and vehemently so, discarded in the positions taken by Denmark in the present
dispute.
Moreover, passage through the Danish straits is repeatedly qualified by
Ambassadors Andreasen and Bruckner as a "regime". Whatever the exact definition of a regime in
international law may be, there can be no doubt that the concept connotes an exception to the
application of the ordinary rules on the law of treaties and on State succession to treaties. These are,
nonetheless, the very rules Denmark relies upon in its construction of the effects of the Copenhagen
Treaty.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I wish to apologize for having embarked in a rather
long excursus on a few of the questions pertaining to the merits of the case, which Denmark has
raised in its written and oral defences. Though strico jure unnecessary, this excursus, it is humbly
submitted, may have served to complete the argumentation put forward this morning by Ambassador
Grönberg and by Sir Ian Sinclair to dissipate any possible doubt that the right claimed by Finland is
prima facie non existent.
II. The alleged lack of proportionality
In his pleading on Tuesday, Professor Bowett held in rather foreceful terms the view that there
is a requirement of proportionality that the Court must consider in deciding on a request for
provisional measures. Professor Bowett then compared the losses Finland would incur in case the
measures are not granted with the Danish losses in case the measures are granted and concluded that
- 39 -
the latter are by far more important. I shall not go into a discussion of the items involved in his
analysis of costs. Ambassador Grönberg has shown that this analysis is, to say the least,
questionable.
When closely analysed, the situation does not, it is submitted, justify the clear-cut conclusion
that the granting of provisional measures would work only in the interest of Finland. What are, for
either party, the advantages and disadvantages involved in the Finnish request for provisional
measures?
For the purposes of such analysis it is not sufficient to compare the advantages for Finland of
the granting of the measures to the costs for Denmark of complying with them. The analysis must
distinguish two hypotheses, namely, that the request is accepted by the Court and that the request is
rejected. Furthermore, it must distinguish in either case the hypothesis that the judgment on the
merits is in favour of Finland and that it is in favour of Denmark.
If the Finnish request is rejected the disadvantages for Finland would be important: there
would be a change in the status quo which would prejudice its rights were the Court subsequently
find in its favour. Such change may or may not concern the physical situation in the Great Belt. It
would certainly concern the possibilities of Rauma-Repola and other Finnish shipyards to receive
and to accept orders for offshore craft. Denmark would have the advantage of being able to act in
full freedom while the proceedings on the merits were pending. Such advantage would, however, be
rather dubious: action taken in the exercise of such freedom by Denmark would probably make
compliance with the judgment - should it be in Finland's favour - more difficult and costly.
Were the Finnish request to be accepted, the advantages for Finland would consist in
maintaining the status quo for two or three years, the time it will presumably take for the case on the
merits to be brought to its conclusion. During such time no action could be taken or would be taken
by Denmark, which could prejudice Finland's rights. Denmark's disadvantages would be modest.
This appears in clear light if one recalls the contents of the provisional measures proposed by
Finland and the clarifications given this morning by Ambassador Grönberg. These measures do not
include the stopping of all construction work: they are limited to those aspects of construction work
- 40 -
"as would impede the passage of ships, including drill ships and oil rigs, to and from Finnish ports
and shipyards" and the request that Denmark - and I quote again from the Finnish Request - "should
refrain from any other action that might prejudice the outcome of the present proceedings". These
requests leave Denmark with a wide choice of possibilities on how to comply with the measures.
This, it is humbly submitted, is the balance of the relevant considerations. The advantages
which, were the judgment on the merits to be favourable to it, may ensue for Denmark from the
absence of provisional measures to be complied with appear overwhelmed by the disadvantages
which Denmark would incur from not adopting the restrained behaviour which the measures required
were the judgment on the merits to be favourable to Finland. Even if, contrary to the assessment
given above, the costs to be incurred by Denmark in complying with the provisional measures were
to be as important as the Danish advocates have indicated in their pleadings, they would be no
different from those Denmark would incur anyhow in adopting the restrained behaviour that it would
be prudent to adopt pending the decision of the case on the merits.
In the light of the above considerations, it would seem that, on balance, the conservatory
measures requested by Finland correspond also to the best interest of Denmark.
A different conclusion could perhaps be reached only in two sets of circumstances. First, that
it appeared manifest that the Court lacks jurisdiction on the merits and, second, that it appeared
beyond any reasonable doubt that the Finnish claim on the merits is so unfounded as to amount to an
abuse of the process of this Court.
Neither set of circumstances corresponds to the situation of the present case.
As regards the Court's possible lack of jurisdiction, it is totally irrelevant in the present case,
in which both Parties accept the jurisdiction of the Court.
As far as the manifest unfoundedness of the Finnish case on the merits is concerned, there is
no need to underline once again that in the proceedings on a request for provisional measures no
assessment of the merits is called for. The Court has often stated that its decision to grant
provisional measures "in no way prejudices ... any question relating to the merits" (United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1979, p. 20, para. 45). This is as true
- 41 -
when the submission is made by application as when it is made by agreement, and is particularly true
for a Nordic State as regards the decision to start a case against another Nordic State. This explains
also why the case-law of the Court contains, to our knowledge, no precedent where abuse of the
process of the Court is considered and why references to abuse of the process of the Court in the
legal literature on the Court are minimal. Finland does not believe that the serious character of its
Application can be doubted. This is confirmed by the serious attitude taken by Denmark in
responding to the present request.
In the light of all the above considerations, Finland feels justified in holding the opinion that
the provisional measures it is requesting the Court to indicate correspond to the interests of both
Parties in view of the uncertainty, which is inherent to all cases submitted to a judge, with which
both are faced as to the contents of the judgment on the merits.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, it may be added, should be added, that the provisional
measures requested by Finland correspond to the restrained behaviour that is envisaged, on the one
hand, in Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, and, on the other hand, in the provisional
measure, seldom if ever requested as such by States, but always indicated by the Court, that the
Parties ensure that no action of any kind is taken which migh aggravate or extend the dispute.
Of course, Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, concerns a specific situation which
is, ratione temporis, already behind us. According to this provision:
"Pending the meeting of the Court, the President may call upon the parties to act in such
a way as will enable any order the Court may make on the request for provisional measures to
have its appropriate effects."
This power of the President of the Court may be exercised, and has some times been exercised (for
instance, in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, case, I.C.J. Reports 1979,
p. 10, para. 6) during the time between the request for provisional measures and the decision of the
Court on such a request.
The above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court seems to us, nonetheless, to be the
expression of a more general principle which applies beyond the narrow time-frame for which
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paragraph 4 of Article 74 has been drafted. This principle may be stated as follows: the parties to a
dispute before the Court are under the obligation, until the Court has reached a decision on the merits
of the case, to refrain from any steps which might have a prejudicial effect on the Court's final
decision. This principle is analogous to the corresponding principle of the law of teaties according to
which, pending entry into force of a treaty, a State which has signed it, or has expressed its consent
to be bound by it, is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the
treaty (Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). This principle, in turn, stems
from the general idea of good faith. Both principles are indicated by Bin Cheng in his book on
General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1953) as concerning
"circumstances in which States are required by the principle of good faith to maintain the status quo
during a period between two events" (p. 140).
The minimal action required to maintain the status quo, in which the provisional measures
requested by Finland consist, corresponds well to this general principle.
Such action corresponds also to the duty not to take action which might aggravate or extend
the dispute submitted to the Court. The indication ex officio of this duty has indeed become a
standard clause in orders by the Court indicating provisional measures: suffice it to say that, with
slight variations, this clause appears in the operative parts of all such orders adopted by the
International Court of Justice.
The view has been held, in particular by the late Professor O'Connell in pleading for Greece in
the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, that the principle that actions should not be taken which
aggravate or extend the dispute is a ground for the Court's authority to order interim measures
separate from that according to which actions should not be taken which would prejudice the
execution of the decision (I.C.J. Pleadings, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, p. 100). Rather than
dwell at length on this theoretical question, I would propose to examine the passage of the Order on
provisional measures in the case of the case of the Electricity Company of Sofia, which was the
decision on which Professor O'Connell took his stand. This passage remains the only consideration
of this principle in the motives of a decision by the Court. The Permanent Court states that
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Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Statute:
"applies the principle universally accepted by international tribunals ... to the effect that the
parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in
regard to the execution of the decision to be given and, in general, not to allow any step of any
kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute (P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 79,
p. 199).
In this well known passage of the 1939 Order of the Permanent Court there are two words
which seem to have escaped the commentators' attention and which seem to us worth considering.
These words are: "in general". The Permanent Court saw the obligation to abstain from steps which
might aggravate or extend the dispute as "general" next to the obligation of abstaining from measures
capable of prejudicing the execution of the decision to be given. As abstention from the latter
measures corrsponds to the specific provisional measures which the Court may order, and which are
usually requested by the parties, the provisional measure consisting in abstaining from action which
might aggravate or extend the dispute would seem to correspond to the widest notion of what is the
duty of a party pending the decision of the dispute. In other words, as remarked above, the duty to
refrain from any steps which might have a prejudicial effect on the Court's final decision.
This explains, it is humbly submitted, why the Court considers it appropriate to introduce
such clause ex officio whenever it indicates provisional measures.
Being the most general, the provisional measure contained in this clause is also the minimal
one: it requires that the parties do whatever is necessary to avoid prejudice to the final decision but
nothing more than that. It is also the one that gives to the parties the highest degree of discretion in
its execution.
The provisional measures that Finland requests the Court to indicate, even though they are
couched in specific terms, come close to the just indicated characteristics of the Court's standard
clause. The request that Denmark should
"refrain from continuing or otherwise proceeding with such construction works in connection
with the planned bridge project over the East Channel of the Great Belt as would impede the
passage of ships, including drill ships and oil rigs, to and from Finnish ports and shipyards"
envisages the minimum Denmark could, and should, do in order to avoid prejudice to the outcome of
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proceedings, and affords Denmark a wide discretion in determining the ways and means to obtain
this result that is also characteristic of the Court's standard clause. The request that the Court
indicates that Denmark "should refrain from any other action that might prejudice the outcome of the
present proceeding" restates the general rule of conduct of parties pending a decision by a court.
It seems hardly necessary at this stage to make the point that the provisional measures
requested by Finland are reasonable and in line with the jurisprudence of the Court.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, with your permission, I shall now turn to my third and
last main point.
III. The requested undertaking by Finland to pay compensation
I shall now consider the Danish alternative request put forward in the Written Observations,
and supported by the second pleading of Mr. Magid on Tuesday, that the Court should indicate that
Finland compensate the losses that Denmark may incur in case the request for provisional measures
is granted and the Court later rejects Finland's submissions on the merits.
According to Mr. Magid, liability of the State that obtains from the Court the indication of a
provisional measure for the losses caused to the respondent by these measures in the event the Court
rejects the applicant's submissions on the merits is dictated by a general principle of law within the
meaning of Article 38 (c) of the Statute of the Court. In making this request, and in justifying it
by invoking the notion of "general principles of law", Denmark invites the Court to break new
ground, to innovate in its jurisprudence, and to do so twice.
Indeed, on the one hand, so far, the Court has never received a request for a provisional
measure identical or similar to that put forward by Denmark, nor has it indicated such a measure ex
officio according to Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, the Court has hardly ever based a decision on a "general principle of law"
within the meaning of Article 38 (c) of its Statute. As the late Professor Michel Virally says in his
1983 General Course at the Hague Academy of International Law, as regards the jurisprudence of
the Permanent Court and of the present Court:
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"le recours aux principes généraux de droit a été exceptionnel et presque toujours implicite"
(RCADI, Vol. 183, p. 172).
Judge Lachs in his General Course at the Hague Academy is of the same opinion as he states
that:
"international courts have very seldom relied on 'principles' evolved in municipal law"
(RCADI, (1980-V), p. 196).
Neither the Statute nor the Rules of Court mention the power of the Court to order the
applicant to undertake to compensate the respondent, or to pay a security, in case the judgment on
the merits is not in favour of the applicant, or in any other case. It should be added that the proposal
made by Judge Nyholm to include in the Rules of Court a provision which would have specifically
given to the Court the power to order the payment of a security, was not adopted in the Rules of
1922 and never considered again when subsequent revisions of the Rules were adopted.
The possibility for the Court to indicate the obligation to pay compensation, in the event that
the claim on the merits by the State that has obtained interim measures fails, is thus mainly a
creation of legal doctrine and certainly not one that all writers on the subject have considered. While
Dumbauld and Elkin mention it, it is not to be found in the authoritative books by Rosenne and
Fitzmaurice, nor in the recent, particularly detailed monograph by Sztucki.
The analogy with domestic law and the notion of "general principles" are mentioned in the
literature (see, for instance, Dumbauld, Interim Measures in International Controversies, 1932,
p. 162). But is this an admissible analogy? Can the notion of "general principles of law" be utilized
for the purpose Denmark would wish the Court to utilize it?
Within the terms of the Court's Statute, recourse to the "general principles of law" is to be
seen, to quote once again, Virally, as
"une disposition typique du droit judiciaire, destinée à empêcher le non liquet, lorsque le
tribunal ne trouve aucune règle de droit, parmi celles qui émanent des sources reconnues, sur
la base desquelles trancher de façon raisonnable le différend qui lui est soumis" (op. cit.,
loc. cit.).
- 46 -
It seems hardly thinkable that such could be the case as regards the procedural law of the
Court. The Statute and the Rules of Court are a very detailed body of law which, in the case of the
Rules, has frequently been revised by the Court. The fate of the proposal of Judge Nyholm I alluded
to a few minutes ago seems, if at all necessary, to confirm that, in the Statute and the Rules of Court,
there are no lacunae to be filled.
Even if we were to follow Denmark in its quest for a general principle of law, it would be
necessary to satisfy the requirement that the principle should be present in the main legal systems of
the world. Again Virally specifies that the principles qualifying under the terms of Article 38 (c) of
the Statue of the Court are:
"les principes communs à l'ensemble des systèmes juridiques développés" (op. cit., p. 171).
Mr. Magid's brilliant comparative law excursus does not go beyond a group of legal systems
of western developed States. Other forms of legal civilization are not taken into consideration.
While the practical difficulties of doing so can be easily understood, it is clear that the materials put
forward by Denmark are insufficient to meet the test of Article 38 (c).
Furthermore, even the materials from which Denmark claims that the existence of a general
principle of law can be inferred show remarkable differences between the various systems. These
differences justify questioning whether, even within the relatively narrow group of legal systems
considered, there really exists the uniformity of concepts that Denmark claims there is.
It is easy to remark that while some of the legal systems considered provide some means of
automatic relief, through the obligation to pay a security to be surrendered to the other party if the
plaintiff fails in the main case, or through the principle of strict liability, in other systems,
requirements such as fault or diligence emerge.
Even within the Nordic group of legal systems, the Finnish system is not as "identical" to the
others as it would appear from the citations made by Mr. Magid. In Finnish law, there is no such
think as general injunctive relief. In this respect, the Finnish legal system contrasts with at least
some of the other Nordic systems. The relevant rules are highly idiosyncratic and are collected in the
- 47 -
Executions Act of 1895. According to that Act, sequestration or interdiction against sale or
dispersion is given by an administrative official, not by a court. The discretion is administrative and
not judicial in nature. Thus the rule of Section 20, Part 7, of the Executions Act, modified on
18 May 1973/389, quoted by Mr. Magid, is not a rule on compensation but a procedural rule: its
puspose it to refer the question of compensation for damage caused by the executionary measure to a
regular lower court, which will decide according to the ordinary rules of the Compensations Act,
which include the requirement of fault.
One case of 1979 is sometimes quoted to support strict liability, but it was decided before
entry into force of the Compensations Act. This is rather far from the strict liability and the
injunctions granted by courts of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish systems.
The indication that Finland should undertake to compensate Denmark's losses arising out of
complying with the interim measures in case Finland's case fails on the merits could, perhaps, be
based on some argument other than the alleged existence of a general principle of law. The power of
the Court to indicate such measure could, perhaps, be argued to be based on an extensive
interpretation of Article 75, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Rules of Court, according to which the Court
may "at any time" indicate ex officio provisional measures independently from a request of a party,
and also indicate measures different from those that have been requested.
Of course, the fact that the Court has never resorted to that interpretation should not be
overlooked. But there are also other, more general considerations, that suggest that the indication as
a provisional measure of the undertaking to compensate, sought by Denmark, would be neither
appropriate nor in conformity with the Statute. Firstly, the mere possibility of such a measure
would add to the already long list of factors that discourage States from resorting to international
justice. This very observation further explains why analogies with rules of civil procedure in
domestic legal systems are not useful. In domestic law the system of remedies is firmly established
and the subjects of law interact on the basis of the full acceptance of the ramifications of this system
and of the enforcement power behind it. In international law even the submission of a dispute to a
court or tribunal depends on the principle of consent: no such acceptance can consequently be
- 48 -
presumed.
Secondly, the provisional measure requested by Denmark would be tantamount to impose on
the Applicant the payment of reparation for an act that would not be wrongful.
International law normally reserves the consequence of the payment of reparation to the
commission of internationally wrongful acts. It is very difficult to see why this consequence should
stem from the exercise of the right of asking the Court to pronounce on the existence of a substantive
right and of requesting measures for preserving such right. The only wrongful act that could be
envisaged perhaps would be - once again - a frivolous application - that it would constitute an abuse
of the process of the Court. As demonstrated when we encountered this recurrent implicit contention
before, this cannot be and is not the case in the circumstances of the present dispute.
Thirdly and lastly, such provisional measure would not fall within the terms of Article 41 of
the Statute. How can the undertaking by Finland to indemnify Denmark for losses caused by
compliance with the interim measures, in case the Finnish case is rejected on the merits, serve to
preserve the right to be adjudged on the merits? The undertaking to pay such indemnity has visibly
nothing to do with the right of free passage through the Great Belt, be it according to the Danish or
the Finnish interpretation.
*
* *
Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is almost customary for parties to proceedings for the
granting of interim measures of protection to claim that the other party is trying to pre-empt or
pre-judge the decision on the merits. Indeed, this is normal advocacy technique, as both sides are, of
course, perfectly aware that by definition the jurisdiction to indicate interim measures should be used
"to preserve, not to confer rights", as Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice says in his book on the Law and
Procedure of the International Court of Justice (1986, p. 547) in a section on the "inadmissible
objects of the jurisdiction to indicate interim measures".
As the supremely good advocate he is, Professor Bowett has not failed to accuse Finland of
- 49 -
the intent of pre-judging the merits. He does so with a special element of sophistication, as he
specifies that what Finland tries to pre-judge is the remedy it seeks on the merits. According to
Professor Bowett, a whole series of arguments put forward by Finland lead, and I quote from his
pleadings last Tuesday "to the proposition that, when we come to the merits, damages can never be
an appropriate remedy".
It is easy to answer that, at the end of its Application, Finland has explicitly reserved "the
right to claim compensation for any damage or loss arising from the bridge project". However, the
main object of its application is a judgment declaring that there is a right of free passage through the
Great Belt for all ships, including offshore craft and reasonably foreseeable ships, entering and
leaving Finnish ports and shipyards, with the purpose to be able, on that basis, to start negotiations
with Denmark in order to guarantee this right. Consequently, according to Finland, there should be
no damage that need to be compensated. The provisional measures Finland is requesting could
contribute to that result.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I would be remiss to my duty of advocate if, at this
juncture, I were not to retort the accusation of pursuing the intent of pre-judging the decision on the
merits. This task is, however, extraordinarily easy. Suffice it to say that if all the contentions put
forward by Denmark were accepted by the Court, there would be very little left to decide on the
merits. The right which Finland seeks to preserve, and upon which the Court will be called to decide
in its judgment on the merits, would be pronounced as non-existent and the Application would,
implicitly at least, be branded as an abuse of the process of this Court!
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I would wish to thank you most sincerely for the
courtesy, attention and patience with which you have listened to my statement.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor Treves.
Mr. Grönberg, I think that concludes the presentation of the case of Finland so that now we
may proceed to the questions which some of the Members of the Court wish to ask the Parties. Two
Judges will be asking questions. May I call first on Judge Schwebel?
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Judge SCHWEBEL: Thank you, Mr. President.
1. Two questions for Finland. One, in its letter of 29 August 1989 (Annex 5 to the
Application), Denmark maintains that drilling platforms, jacks and other high structures can usually
be lowered and that this "is often done for safety reasons in the open sea". Does this statement
coincide with the Finnish view and, if not, why not?
2. In his oral argument, the Co-Agent of Finland referred to
"three other categories of ships, namely, drill ships, semi-submersible drill rigs and jack-up
rigs, towed or transported by heavy-load transport vessels" (CR 91/10, p. 13).
Is this reference to be understood as meaning that all three types of these vessels are towed or
transported by heavy-load transport vessels? If so, but, as has been indicated, one or more types are
capable of being fitted out so as to move on its, or their own, power, please furnish details insofar as
they have not already been provided.
A question for Denmark. Finland maintains that all of the oil rigs built in Finland could not
traverse the Sound since the draught of some of them is more than 8 meters. Denmark deepened the
Sound some years ago. Can any further deepening of Drogden Channel be contemplated? And if so,
could such deepening be sufficient to permit oil rigs to pass? And if so, are there estimates available
of the dimensions of the cost of such dredging? I appreciate that the Agent of Finland referred to
such a possibility this morning, and to what may be a somewhat related proposal by the City of
Copenhagen, but would benefit by having Denmark's views. Thank you, Mr. President. The
PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Schwebel. And now Judge Shahabuddeen, please.
Judge SHAHBUDDEEN: Thank you, Mr. President. My question, which is in three parts, is
addressed to Denmark.
On Tuesday last Mr. Per Magid, for Denmark, told the Court the following:
"the official comments in the 1987 Act stated that the execution of a high-level bridge should
enable Denmark to abide by its obligations under international law to preserve free passage.
It was then estimated that the clearance should be 76 to 77 metres. Prior to the Bill the
Danish Maritime Authority had noted that drill ships built in Finland and in the Soviet Union
had a height above water-level of between 60 and 75 metres." (CR 91/11, p. 25.)
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There are three points which I would like to raise:
(i) Who or what body made the estimate that the clearance should be 76 to 77 metres?
(ii) Was the estimate referred to in the official comments in the 1987 Act? If so, is a copy of
those comments available?
(iii) Was the estimate influenced by, or intended to accommodate or take account of, the point
made by the Danish Maritime Authority that drill ships built in Finland and in the Soviet
Union had a height above water-level of between 60 and 75 metres?
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Judge Shahabuddeen. Those questions will of
course be available immediately to the Agents in writing. They may be answered either orally or in
writing. If Finland decides to answer orally then the time would be at the beginning of the session
tomorrow afternoon and before Denmark begins its final presentation. If Denmark wishes to answer
orally it would, of course, answer it wherever it wishes in the course of that oral presentation.
I should perhaps emphasize that some or all of the questions may, nevertheless, be answered
in writing if the Parties so wish.
I think it has been agreed that we meet tomorrow afternoon at 2.30 p.m. instead of 3 o'clock.
So we adjourn now until 2.30 tomorrow afternoon when we will hear Denmark's case. Thank you.
The Court rose at 12.45 p.m.