Oral Arguments on the Preliminary Objections - Public sitting held on Tuesday 12 November 1991, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Sir Robert Jennings presiding

CR 91/16
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 1991
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 12 November 1991, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Sir Robert Jennings presiding
in the case concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru
(Nauru v. Australia)

VERBATIM RECORD

ANNEE l991
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 12 novembre 1991, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Sir Robert Jennings, Président,
en l'affaire de Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru
(Nauru c. Australie)

COMPTE RENDU

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Present:
President Sir Robert Jennings
Vice-President Oda
Judges Lachs
Ago
Schwebel
Bedjaoui
Ni
Evensen
Tarassov
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Ranjeva
Registrar Valencia-Ospina

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Présents:
Sir Robert Jennings, Président
M. Oda, Vice-Président
MM. Lachs
Ago
Schwebel
Bedjaoui
Ni
Evensen
Tarassov
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Ranjeva, Juges
M. Valencia-Ospina, Greffier

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The Government of the Republic of Nauru is represented by:
Mr. V. S. Mani, Professor of International Law, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi; former Chief Secretary and Secretary to
Cabinet, Republic of Nauru; and Member of the Bar, New Delhi,
Mr. Leo D. Keke, Presidential Counsel of the Republic of Nauru;
former Minister for Justice of the Republic of Nauru; and Member
of the Bar of the Republic of Nauru and of the Australian Bar,
as Co-Agents, Counsel and Advocates;
H. E. Hammer DeRoburt, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., M.P., Head Chief and
Chairman of the Nauru Local Government Council; former President
and Chairman of Cabinet and former Minister for External and
Internal Affairs and the Phosphate Industry, Republic of Nauru,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, Member of the English Bar; Q.C., F.B.A., Chichele
Professor of Public International Law, Oxford; Fellow of All
Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. H. B. Connell, Associate Professor of Law, Monash University,
Melbourne; Member of the Australian Bar; former Chief Secretary
and Secretary to Cabinet, Republic of Nauru.
Mr. James Crawford, Challis Professor of International Law and Dean
of the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney; Member of the
Australian Bar,
as Counsel and Advocates.
The Government of Australia is represented by:
Dr. Gavan Griffith, Q.C., Solicitor-General of Australia,
as Agent and Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Warwick Weemaes , Ambassador of Australia,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Henry Burmester, Principal Adviser in International Law,
Australian Attorney-General's Department,
as Co-Agent and Counsel;
Professor Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Professor of International
Law at Montevideo,
Professor Derek W. Bowett, Q.C., formerly Whewell Professor of
International Law at the University of Cambridge,
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La Gouvernement de la République de Nauru est représenté par :
M. V. S. Mani, professeur de droit international à l'Université
Jawaharlal Nehru de New Delhi; ancien secrétaire en chef et
secrétaire du conseil des ministres de la République de Nauru;
membre du barreau de New Delhi,
M. Leo D. Keke, conseiller du Président de la République de Nauru;
ancien ministre de la justice de la République de Nauru; membre du
barreau de la République de Nauru et du barreau d'Australie,
comme coagents, conseils et avocats;
S. Exc. M. Hammer DeRoburt, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., M.P., chef principal
et président du conseil de gouvernement local de Nauru; ancien
Président et responsable de la présidence du conseil des
ministres, ancien ministre des affaires extérieures et intérieures
et de l'industrie des phosphates de la République de Nauru;
M. Ian Brownlie, Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d'Angleterre;
professeur de droit international public à l'Université d'Oxford,
titulaire de la chaire Chichele; Fellow de l'All Souls College,
Oxford,
M. H. B. Connell, professeur associé de droit à l'Université Monash
de Melbourne; membre du barreau d'Australie; ancien secrétaire en
chef et secrétaire du conseil des ministres de la République de
Nauru,
M. James Crawford, professeur de droit international, titulaire de
la chaire Challis et doyen de la faculté de droit de l'Université
de Sydney; membre du barreau d'Australie,
comme conseils et avocats.
Le Gouvernement australien est représenté par :
M. Gavan Griffith, Q.C., Solicitor-General d'Australie,
comme agent et conseil;
S.Exc. M. Warwick Weemaes, ambassadeur d'Australie,
comme coagent;
M. Henry Burmester, conseiller principal en droit international au
service de l'Attorney-General d'Australie,
comme coagent et conseil;
M. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, professeur de droit international à
Montevideo,
M. Derek W. Bowett, Q.C., professeur et ancien titulaire de la
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chaire Whewell de droit international à l'Université de Cambridge,
Professor Alain Pellet, Professor of Law at the University of Paris
X-Nanterre and at the Institute of Political Studies, Paris,
Dr. Susan Kenny, of the Australian Bar,
as Counsel;
Mr. Peter Shannon, Deputy Legal Adviser, Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Mr. Paul Porteous, First Secretary, Australian Embassy, The Hague,
as Advisers.
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M. Alain Pellet, professeur de droit à l'Université de
Paris X-Nanterre et à l'Institut d'études politiques de Paris,
Mme Susan Kenny, du barreau d'Australie,
comme conseils;
M. Peter Shannon, conseiller juridique adjoint au département des
affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur d'Australie,
M. Paul Porteous, premier secrétaire à l'ambassade d'Australie aux
Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers.
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The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. We will continue with the pleading of Australia, in this
case. Professor Bowett.
Professor BOWETT: Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, when I addressed you yesterday I had submitted three
propositions: first, that Nauru's claim was essentially a claim for breach of the Trusteeship
Agreement; secondly, that such a claim lay exclusively within the competence of the Trusteeship
Council and the General Assembly; and, thirdly, that no such claim of breach was ever made to
either body and no finding of breach was ever made by either body.
4. Is the Termination of the Trusteeship Agreement by the General Assembly, without any
finding of breach, conclusive for the Parties?
If, therefore, there was no finding of breach by any competent United Nations organ when the
Trusteeship Agreement was terminated, the question then arises, does this conclude the matter? In
other words, was Nauru thereafter precluded from contending that there was a breach?
Prima facie, one would assume that where the General Assembly discharges an Administering
Authority from its obligations under the Agreement - unconditionally and without any reservation as
to future liabilities - that discharge is definitive. That must be the basic assumption. The act of
discharge, unconditionally and without reservation, implies an acceptance by the Assembly that the
Administering Authority has fully discharged its treaty obligations.
And, if that is so, it would be an extraordinary situation if a Member State - especially the
former Trust Territory - could subsequently challenge that definitive, unconditional discharge by
alleging a breach.
Certainly such an extrardinary situation was not contemplated by the Court in the Northern
Cameroons case. The Court referred to the Assembly's resolution on termination as having
"definitive legal effect" (I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 32). Moreover, the Court took the view that a
Member State's right under the Trusteeship Agreement, to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court in
order to challenge the legality of acts of the Administering Authority would be at an end. It would
not survive as the sole means of challenge, when all the other forms of supervision were terminated.
The only exception would be where a Member State sought a remedy in the Court for injury to itself,
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or to its nationals, presumably because the remedy would be for a wrong lying outside the
Trusteeship Agreement.
The general principle was aptly stated by Judge Wellington Koo, in a separate opinion, in
these terms:
"when the ultimate objective of a Trust is attained, and the particular Trusteeship Agreement
is terminated, all questions relating to the Administering Authority's observance of the
obligations thereunder are obviously intended to have been settled also" (at p. 61).
In order to test this hypothesis - the hypothesis of the conclusiveness and finality of the
Assembly's resolution on termination - it may be useful to contemplate what the position might have
been, had Nauru alleged a breach.
Let us assume the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly rejected the allegation and
found that there was no breach. Would not that have ended the matter? Would it have been possible
for Nauru to wait until after independence, and then come to this Court to argue that the General
Assembly was wrong, that it did not have exclusive jurisdiction, and that the Court was competent to
find that a breach had occurred?
Surely not, Mr. President! In the Northern Cameroons case, the Court noted that counsel for
the Republic of Cameroon had expressly stated that:
"Cameroon is not asking the Court to criticize the United Nations; Cameroon is not
asking the Court to say that the United Nations was wrong in terminating the Trusteeship..."
(I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 33).
Although the Court did not, therefore, have to decide the issue, since it was not asked, the
tenor of the judgment leaves little doubt that the Court would have refused to find that the
United Nations was wrong. This is confirmed by the Court's Opinion in Certain Expenses of the
United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), in 1962, where the Court emphasized
that, unlike courts in most national systems of law, it had no power to review the validity of
legislative or governmental acts (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 168). The same point was made in Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), (I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 45),
where the Court acknowledged that it had no powers of judicial review over General Assembly
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resolutions.
So, we can safely assume that, had the issue of breach been expressly put to the
United Nations in 1967, and the allegation rejected, it would not now be open to Nauru to challenge
that rejection before this Court. The question is, therefore, should Nauru be in a better position 24
years later, because it failed to make that challenge in the appropriate United Nations bodies in
1967?
If the challenge had been made, and breach alleged, the General Assembly certainly had power
to decide on the question of breach. That much is clear from the Assembly's finding of breach in
relation to South-West Africa, a mandated territory: a fortiori the power to decide on a breach of
Trusteeship must reside in the Assembly. This is confirmed by the Court's dictum in the Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) case:
"it would not be correct to assume that because the General Assembly is in principle vested
with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the
framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative
design" (I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 50).
And, of course, in the Namibia case the Court totally rejected the argument that, being a
political organ, the General Assembly was not competent to act judicially and make a finding of
breach. That view would, in the words of the Court, "amount to a complete denial of the remedies
available against fundamental breaches of an international undertaking" (para. 102). If that is true
of breaches of a mandate, it must certainly be true of breaches of trusteeship.
Moreover, the Assembly had extensive powers to deal with such a breach; it could call upon
the Administering Authority to remedy the breach. It could delay terminating the Agreement until
the breach had been remedied, or it could terminate the Trusteeship with an express proviso that the
Administering Authority remained liable for all the financial consequences of the breach or even an
express proviso that the matter of responsibility remained to be decided after independence.
It is not unknown for the General Assembly to recognize expressly that there are outstanding
problems or disputes to be resolved after independence. For example, in 1949 by resolution 289
(IV) of the Fourth Session, the Assembly recommended independence for Libya not later than 1952.
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But it knew there were boundary problems, and so it called on the Interim Committee to study them
meanwhile. This study revealed that the southern boundary of Libya was in dispute. Accordingly,
by resolution 392 (V) of the Fifth Session of 15 December 1950, the General Assembly called on
France and Libya to negotiate and resolve this problem after independence.
But this did not happen in the case of Nauru. There is no finding of breach, and not even a
recognition by the Assembly that an issue of responsibility remained to be decided after
independence. The General Assembly's resolution appears as final and definitive. So we are back to
the question: why should Nauru be in a better position, 24 years later, because it failed to make any
allegation of breach in 1967?
The answer is surely that it should not. There is no reason why a delay of 24 years should
strengthen Nauru's case which it now brings before this Court. Nor is it possible for Nauru to argue
that the "finality" of the Assembly's termination of the Agreement does not extend to a final
disposition of the claim of breach, because Nauru made no such claim in 1967, and therefore the
Assembly did not deal with the question.
No, Mr. President, the fact is that the Trusteeship Committee and the General Assembly were
fully aware of the Nauruan claim, and of all the facts on which that claim rested. But the way in
which the Assembly dealt with the claim changes dramatically once the terms of the Canberra
Agreement were known, and Mr. DeRoburt assured the Assembly that, by virtue of that Agreement,
Nauru would have at its disposal all the financial means to solve the problem.
So the issue was addressed by the Assembly and was fully embraced within the overall finality
of the Assembly's termination of the Agreement, and all matters of responsibility arising from that
Agreement. It cannot be right to allow Nauru to re-open the matter now, on the basis of an
allegation of breach it never saw fit to make to the Assembly. And there are various arguments to
support this conclusion.
There is first the argument of exclusivity. If, as we have demonstrated in relation to this type
of claim, the General Assembly was exclusively competent during the currency of the Agreement,
why should that exclusivity be now denied simply because Nauru waited until 24 years after the
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Trusteeship had been terminated?
Second, there is an argument based on the range and effectiveness of the remedies for any
such breach. As I have explained, the Assembly had various options available to it in dealing with
any breach, both political and legal. The Court has more limited options, given that the Agreement
is terminated.
Third, there is an argument about authority. For if this Court were now to decide that there
was in fact a breach by reason of the failure to rehabilitate the mined lands, does this not reflect upon
the authority - even the competence - of the General Assembly? After all, the General Assembly had
at its disposal the whole apparatus of supervision - the questionnaires, the reports, the system of
petitions, the Visiting Missions, the facility for questioning the Administering Authority within the
Trusteeship Council - so that if there was a breach why did not the Trusteeship Council or the
General Assembly detect it? It is no answer to say that Nauru did not complain of any breach.
Because the elaborate system of supervision was designed to safeguard the Trusteeship system
against breaches, quite independently of whether the inhabitants of the territory complained of a
breach. And, in any event, the issue of rehabilitation was out in the open from 1964 onwards, so the
problem was one of judgment, not one of detection.
The Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly were well aware of the difference of
opinion between the Nauruans and the Administering Authority over this question of rehabilitation.
So, if there was a breach, why did not the General Assembly declare that there was a breach?
The Court will see that if it now proceeds to find there was a breach, this would constitute the
most damning indictment of the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly. It will amount to an
accusation of either incompetence or bias. If the substance of Nauru's case were correct, the United
Nations itself would be responsible for a total failure to exercise adequate supervision amounting to
collusion in the allegedly wrongful activities of the Administering Authority. Indeed, misdeeds on
the scale of those alleged could only have been possible with the tacit approval of the United Nations
and ultimately, at the end of the Trusteeship, with its condoning of the activities of the three
Administering States in the performance of their functions. A finding in favour of Nauru would
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diminish the authority of the General Assembly. Fourth, there is an argument about finality.
From the point of view of the United Nations, the act of terminating a trusteeship ought to be an act
of finality. It brings to an end the whole system of supervision and discharges from further
obligations the Administering Authority. The final resolution of 19 December 1967,
resolution 2347 (XXII) is in unqualified terms: it welcomes the achievement of full and unqualified
independence. There is a false note introduced into this ostensibly final act if you then postulate the
possibility that, years later, one United Nations organ - the Court - may re-examine the record to see
whether breaches, which ought to have been identified and censured by the Assembly, were in fact
committed.
Nauru attempts to oppose the finality of the General Assembly's action in terminating the
Trusteeship by pointing to the Assembly's treatment of Namibia (Written Statement, p. 80). And, of
course, it is true that the Assembly continued to hold South Africa responsible for usurpation of the
rights of the people of Namibia to the natural resources of the territory after the Mandate had been
terminated.
But, Mr. President, the argument is little short of ludicrous. The Mandate for South-West
Africa was terminated because there was a fundamental breach and South Africa continued to be
responsible because it continued in unlawful possession.
Here we have a totally different situation. There is no finding of breach and the Administering
Authority handed over the territory as required. Thus the presumption must be one of finality, of a
complete discharge by the Assembly, granted to the Administering Authority.
From the point of view of the Administering Authority, the need for finality is even greater. It
seeks an absolute, unconditional discharge from its obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement.
And there can be no question but that, on the basis of the resolution adopted by the Assembly in
1967, the three Administering Powers believed that they had been given such a discharge. This is
why, in 1969, they refused to enter into discussions on rehabilitating land for the construction of a
new airstrip (see Nauru Memorial, Annexes, Vol. 4, Anns. 76 and 77); and why, in 1984, they
again refused to re-open the rehabilitation issue (Anns. 78 and 79).
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There is an element of unfairness in seeking to impose a legal responsibility on the
Administering Authority for breaches of an Agreement, some 24 years after being discharged from
their responsibilities under that Agreement. For, this is not some new issue of responsibility which
has come to light only 24 years afterwards. This is exactly the same issue as was discussed and
fully known to all the Parties - including the General Assembly - before the termination was effected.
II. WAIVER OF THE CLAIM
Mr. President, I now turn to address the question whether, assuming Nauru to have had a
valid claim for breach, that claim was in fact waived. Obviously, we reach this question only if the
Court rejects my previous argument and decides, contrary to Australia's submission, that Nauru had
a valid claim for breach, which was not extinguished by the termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement. On that hypothesis, the question remains: was such a claim, in any event, waived by
Nauru?
We have to examine the waiver in two rather different contexts. There is first the question
whether, in the context of Nauru's negotiations with the three Partner Governments, leading to the
Canberra Agreement of 1967, Nauru in fact accepted the terms of that Agreement as a final
settlement. Obviously, if that is so, the acceptance of the Canberra Agreement by Nauru constituted
an implied waiver of its previous claim on rehabilitation. Second, there is the question whether, after
the signing of the Canberra Agreement, Nauru in effect signalled to the General Assembly that it
waived its claim. I will examine these two contexts separately, and in that order.
1. Waiver vis-à-vis the Partner Governments
From 1966 onwards, the Partner Governments were under increasing pressure within the
United Nations to move towards independence for Nauru as quickly as possible: General Assembly
resolution 2226 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 recommended 31 January 1968 as the latest date.
Given the lateness of the Nauruan people's decision not to resettle, but to stay on Nauru itself
and, given further, the repeated technical reports that large-scale rehabilitation was not practical, you
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can see that the Partner Governments were not themselves prepared to contemplate rehabilitation.
They did not believe it to be feasible, or to make good economic sense, and they did not have time
enough to do it prior to independence, in any event.
They took the decision, therefore, that it should be left to the Nauruans to decide for
themselves whether to rehabilitate or not. They, the Partner Governments, would transfer the
ownership and control of the phosphate industry to the Nauruans. And the terms of the transfer
would be such that the Nauruans would be guaranteed sufficient financial resources, not only to
maintain a high standard of living, but also - if they so chose - to rehabilitate the island. But it was
to be for the Nauruans to decide and to do. The Partner Governments accepted no responsibility for
rehabilitation. They would make sure the Nauruans had all the necessary finances, but there the
responsibility of the Partner Governments ended.
This position emerges clearly from the records of the discussions in 1966-1967. And it is
important to trace through the positions of the two sides in the records of those discussions. Nauru
has provided those records in Volume 3 of its Annexes. They have to be examined carefully to see
whether Nauru did, or did not, waive its claim.
Now, in June of 1966 the Partner Governments stated their position in a formal statement on
behalf of the Joint Delegation:
"this Delegation [the Joint Delegation] would envisage that the project level of receipts by the
Nauruan community should be discussed from the point of view of building up a long term
fund adequate for the long term security of the Nauruan people and adequate also ... for
making appropriate and practicable provision for the rehabilitation of Nauru if that remains
the definite objective of the Nauruan people" (Ann. 4, p. 386).
Note that this clearly referred to rehabilitation of the lands already mined, pre-independence. This
position was reiterated in July 1966. And, at this stage, the Nauruans seemed to agree. The Agreed
Minute of the meetings between 14 June and 1 July 1966 sets out the Nauruan position in the
following terms:
"The Nauruan view was ... that they should receive the full financial benefit from the
phosphate industry, so that there would be funds available to rehabilitate the whole of the
island." (Ann. 4, p. 407.)
Clearly, the Nauruans were referring to the areas mined pre-independence and they were assuming
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that they, the Nauruans, would be responsible for all rehabilitation. But over the next few months a
significant change occurred in Nauruan thinking, and they decided that they would hold the Partner
Governments responsible for rehabilitating areas mined pre-independence. In the record for the
meeting on 20 April 1967 there is noted a statement by the Nauruans that they accepted
responsibility for rehabilitation in respect of future mining, post-independence, but not past mining.
The reply of the Partner Governments was clear and categorical. It was the Nauruan's decision not
to resettle elsewhere, and, in the words of the Secretary, speaking on behalf of the three Partner
Governments:
"it was the view of the Partner Governments that decisions regarding rehabilitation were also
matters for the Nauruans, and that the Partner Governments' proposals in respect of the
financial arrangements provided adequate means to carry out whatever redevelopments of the
mined areas might prove to be necessary" (Ann. 5, p. 81).
And that seemed to be that. The proposals of the Partner Governments on 10 May 1967 (Joint
Delegation 67/2) repeated that:
"the Partner Governments consider that the proposed financial arrangements on phosphate
cover the future needs of the Nauruan community including rehabilitation or resettlement"
(ibid., p. 160)
For this reason, the Partner Governments sought to persuade the Nauruans to withdraw their
claim. The record for the meeting on the morning of 16 May states that: "the Joint Delegation
would like to see the Nauruans withdraw their claims in respect of rehabilitation" (Ann. 5, p. 56).
But evidently the Nauruans at this stage were not prepared to do so. This is clear from the
record for the afternoon meeting on that same day, for that states that the Nauruans would still
maintain their claim on the Partner Governments in respect of rehabilitation of areas mined in the
past.
Thus the Nauruans were claiming that the Partner Governments should meet the cost of
rehabilitation of areas mined pre-independence. They had abandoned the idea that they would
themselves assume the responsibility, provided their revenues were adequate.
But let us note two further things. The Nauruan claim is against "the Partner Governments",
not just Australia. And there is no hint that the Nauruans viewed this claim, this responsibility, as
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deriving from the Trusteeship Agreement.
However, no more is heard of the Nauruan claim, and the Canberra Agreement on the
Transfer of the Phosphate Industry was duly signed on 14 November 1967. It contained not a word
about rehabilitation.
But it did, as the Partner Governments had promised, make rather generous financial
provision for the Nauruans. They could look forward to US$21 million income for 1968, that is to
say $40,000 per annum for each family, over and above whatever they might earn for themselves.
If, from this total income, the Nauruans maintained the existing level of contributions into the
long-term fund, this would amount to $400 million by the time the phosphates were exhausted. And
if that sum were invested, they could anticipate around $24 million per annum, as an income from
that investment.
So the Partner Governments had kept their promise. The financial arrangements were
generous enough to enable the Nauruans to tackle the entire rehabilitation problem, if they so wished.
Clearly, the Partner Governments did not expect to hear any more of the Nauruan claim that
they, the Partner Governments, should also bear the cost of rehabilitation. And they did not. From
the middle of May until the signing of the Canberra Agreement on 14 November 1967 all was
silence.
Now I would invite the Court to consider very carefully the implication of this five months of
silence.
The Partner Governments had insisted throughout that they did not accept the Nauruan claim
and that the financial terms they were offering were a sufficient discharge of any obligation the
Nauruans might think they owed. That was the offer in the 1967 Agreement, and it was signed and
accepted by Nauru. The question is, was that, or was it not, a waiver of the Nauruan claim?
Nauru says not. It argues in its written observations that, because the Agreement contained
no waiver clause, therefore there was none.
But, of course, that cuts both ways. One could just as well argue that the Agreement
contained no "without prejudice" clause, and that if the Nauruans did not agree that the Agreement
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was a comprehensive one, the onus was on them to say so, and to insist that the Agreement contained
a clause preserving their claim. And the Agreement contained no such clause.
If you look at the transaction in terms of simple offer and acceptance, then there is no doubt
that the Nauruans knew the Partner Governments were offering a comprehensive settlement. They
knew that, if they again voiced their claim, the offer would be withdrawn, or at least reduced in
value. So they kept their silence. They maintained that silence at the very time when, in good faith,
they should either have reasserted their claim, or refused to sign the Agreement if it lacked a "no
prejudice" clause. In the result, elementary considerations of good faith suggest that the Nauruans
could not both accept the Agreement and renew their claim.
2. Waiver vis-à-vis the United Nations
Mr. President, that is precisely what they did. On 22 November, only one week after signing
the Agreement, in addressing the Trusteeship Council, Chief DeRoburt said this:
"There was one subject, however, on which there was still a difference of opinion -
responsibility for the rehabilitation of phosphate lands ... He merely wished to place on record
that the Nauruan Goverment would continue to seek what was, in the opinion of the Nauruan
people, a just settlement of their claims." (Annex 29 to Preliminary Objections of Australia.)
If that statement was intended to preserve the claims it was, in my submission, too late and
addressed to the wrong audience. Any statement of preservation of claims had to be made before the
Canberra Agreement was signed, not after. And it had to be made directly to the Partner
Governments, not the Trusteeship Council.
In short, Mr. President, if one party accepts a comprehensive offer, so that an agreement is
made with another party, that party cannot, by a unilateral statement a week later, in a different
forum, revise the agreement. The waiver had been made, implicitly, on 14 November in Canberra.
It could not be retracted on 22 November in New York.
It seems likely that these rather elementary propositions of good faith, and good sense, began
to occur to Chief DeRoburt himself. For, at the crucial stage in the United Nations discussions, on
6 December 1967, Chief DeRoburt changed his position. He then said:
"One [problem] which worried the Nauruans derived from the fact that land from which
phosphate had been mined would be totally unusable. Consequently, although it would be an
expensive operation, that land would have to be rehabilitated and steps were already being
taken to build up funds to be used for that purpose ... The revenue which Nauru had received
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in the past and would receive during the next 25 years would, however, make it possible to
solve the problem." (Preliminary Objections of Australia, Ann. 30, para. 20.)
You will note that the "problem" he refers to is the whole problem of rehabilitation, not just
that produced by post-1967 mining. And he speaks of this as a Nauruan problem. There is no
mention, this time, of any continuing responsibility in the Partner Governments or of any claim
against the Partner Governments.
Thus, at the crucial stage, when the Assembly has to vote on terminating the Trusteeship, the
silence returns: and that can only be construed as a waiver of any claims. For that was the time to
speak out, so that, if the Assembly agreed with the Nauruans in their claim of a continuing financial
responsibility on the Partner Governments, the Assembly could record that agreement in its
resolution. We would then have seen, not a complete discharge of the three Partner Governments
from all their obligations as Administering Authority, but a qualified discharge. The resolution
could have qualified that discharge by noting that there was this continuing responsibility. But
nothing of this kind happened. And so, in Australia's submission, we are entitled to treat that
statement on 6 December as a clear waiver. This was no mere "superficial inconsistency", as Nauru
suggests, placing all the emphasis on the statement of 22 November. This was the principal
statement by Nauru, before the principal organ, the General Assembly, at the critical point when the
decision on termination had to be made. And it confirmed entirely the view of the Partner
Governments that the Canberra Agreement was intended to be a complete and comprehensive
settlement, was offered as such, and was accepted by Nauru as such.
III. THE UNREASONABLE DELAY IN THE PRESENTATION
OF THE PRESENT CLAIM BY NAURU
The discussion of waiver leads me naturally into the third, and last, part of my presentation.
Here I shall deal with the quite extraordinary delay in the presentation of this claim. It is this long
delay which confirms the implication that any real claim had been waived long ago.
As Nauru says at paragraph 125 of its Written Observations:
"It is generally accepted that delay may in the circumstances of the particular case
constitute an implied waiver of the claim."
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That is true. And so the question arises, how does Nauru explain this long delay - 24 years -
except as a waiver of any claim it might have contemplated?
In effect, Nauru says only two things: first, that Nauru did renew the claim after
independence, and, second, that in any event Australia has suffered no prejudice. Let me take those
two arguments separately.
1. The so-called post-1967 claims
Nauru refers to a letter dated 5 December 1968 (Nauru Memorial, Vol. 4, Ann. 76). The
operative part of this letter was the following:
"We are now concerned at the expansion of air services in the Pacific region and feel
that if we remain inactive for too long, we may lose important opportunities for economic and
communications development. This approach, therefore, is to request your concurrence and
that of your Government and its Partners, New Zealand and the United Kingdom to a meeting
with representatives of my Government to work out how best the airstrip could be constructed
as a rehabilitation project and to determine the degree of financial and technical assistance the
Partner Governments would be able to offer."
What can one make of this letter? The Court will note that this is not the previous
rehabilitation claim. This is a request for financial and technical assistance to construct an airstrip.
The rehabilitation element is purely incidental: rehabilitation is involved only in the sense that the
airstrip will have to be on the mined areas, so filling in and flattening out of the land will be
involved. The Court will also note that it is addressed not to Australia alone, but to the three Partner
Governments. And the Court will note that there is no mention of any breach of the Trusteeship
Agreement, or of any legal responsibility arising from that Agreement, or, indeed, of any legal
responsibility of any kind. It is a request for financial and technical assistance, pure and simple.
The Australian reply (Ann. 77), having consulted the Partner Governments, was that those
three Governments had made it clear in the talks prior to independence that they accepted no
responsibility for rehabilitation as such, and that the terms of settlement agreed were sufficiently
generous to enable Nauru to meet all its needs, for rehabilitation and development. But technical
assistance could be offered.
Then Nauru refers to a visit by Mr. DeRoburt to Canberra in 1973, during which he raised the
rehabilitation issue. The same thing happened ten years later in 1983 (see Ann. 78). But, again, this
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was not raised as a legal claim. It was raised as "a matter of concern" to Nauru. And, again, there
is no reference to any responsibility arising from the Trusteeship Agreement, and remaining
undischarged by the termination of that agreement. And, again, Nauru got the same reply (Ann. 79).
Finally, in 1986, Nauru addressed identical Notes to the three Partner Governments - not just
to Australia (Ann. 80). But this was not a claim of any sort. It was merely to notify the three
Governments that Nauru was establishing a Commission of Inquiry, to enquire into the question of
who had responsibility for rehabilitation. All it asked of the three Partner Governments was their
co-operation in producing documents or information.
So, what conclusion must one reach? The fact is that no legal claim was ever presented
post-independence. The conclusion must be, inevitably, that Nauru had waived that claim way back
in 1967. Nauru knew it had accepted the Canberra Agreement as a final settlement. This is why
Nauru waived the claim in addressing the General Assembly in December 1967. And that is why
Nauru no longer referred to any legal claim, or any claim of right, in all the years from 1967 to
1991. This long delay in bringing proceedings in this Court simply confirms that the claim had been
waived.
2. The lack of prejudice to Australia
But, of course, Nauru now says that the delay does not matter, because Australia has not been
prejudiced by the delay. Let me deal briefly with this argument.
It must be obvious that if what is in issue is essentially a waiver, then prejudice does not enter
into it. Either there was a waiver, or there was not. If there was a waiver, then the fact that
Australia may not have been prejudiced by the long delay between the waiver and the bringing of this
present case is beside the point. The waiver would remain valid.
But, in any event, Australia has in fact been prejudiced by this long delay in connection with
these present proceedings. Nauru says this cannot be so because Australia has all the documents it
needs. But the Court must be aware that the present claim of Nauru takes us back to the days of the
Mandate - and Australia does not have all those documents. The British Government might, but
Nauru has chosen not to make the United Kingdom a Party to these proceedings.
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And there are more important matters of prejudice than documents. As I have indicated, any
claim of breach of the Trusteeship Agreement ought to have been made in the United Nations, prior
to termination. If it had been made, it would have been made against all three Partner Governments.
It would have had to have been made against all three, because it is inconveivable that the
General Assembly would have allowed only one of the three Administering Powers to be singled out
as legally responsible for the obligations held jointly by all three.
Moreover, the Trusteeship Council or the General Asssembly would have dealt with the claim
of breach, and either dismissed it, or held the three Governments accountable for the breach by
reference to the standards of administration reasonably required at that time.
But look at the position now. Australia is sued alone. Nauru seeks to colour the issue of the
legitimacy of the acts of administration by reference to current standards of environmental
protection. And Australia can no longer seek a ruling on the charge of maladministration from the
competent political organs: they now have no role, and so Australia may be forced to defend itself -
on matters of political and economic judgment - before this Court. I mean no disrespect to this
Court when I say that Australia does find that prejudicial. It is a burden Australia never expected to
shoulder - alone, and 24 years after it had been discharged from all further obligations by an
appreciative and grateful General Assembly.
So, Mr. President, for all these reasons Australia submits that this claim is inadmissible. It is
too late, it is brought against the wrong respondent, and in the wrong forum: and the very tardiness
of the claim confirms Australia's view that Nauru waived any claim long ago, and knows it.
Mr. President, that concludes my statement. I appreciate the patience of the Court and would
ask you to call upon Mr. Henry Burmester.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Bowett.
Mr. Burmester, please.
Mr. BURMESTER: Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to
address the Court as Co-Agent for Australia. I had the honour to be associated with the previous
case in which Australia appeared before this Court, some 17 years ago. Hence, it is an even greater
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honour that I am on this occasion able directly to address the Court, for which I have the greatest
respect.
Mr. President, my submissions concern first Nauru's claim to the overseas assets of the British
Phosphate Commissioners, and secondly, the issue of good faith.
As to the Nauruan overseas assets claim, Australia makes four submissions. Australia
submits the claim is inadmissible because it was not first made in Nauru's Application, but was left
to Nauru's Memorial. Secondly, Australia submits that, in any event, the claim does not arise from a
legal dispute, within the meaning of Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court. Thirdly, Australia
submits that Nauru can in fact show no legal interest in the overseas assets of the BPC. And finally,
in relation to the overseas assets claim, Australia also relies on each of the submissions which it
makes in relation to the other parts of Nauru's case.
I turn first to the facts. The British Phosphate Commissioners, commonly called the BPC,
were appointed by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, under an Agreement made in
1919 and amended in 1923. We have already given an account of the Agreement in our written
submissions (see paragraphs 24-31 and 131-135 of Preliminary Objections). Under a further
Agreement made in 1920, the BPC acquired a mining concession over the phosphate deposits on
Nauru.
In 1967, just prior to Nauruan independence, the Nauruan assets of the BPC were sold to
Nauru pursuant to the Canberra Agreement of that year (see paragraphs 95-107, and 136 of the
Preliminary Objections). As we have already said, the terms of the 1967 Agreement were
particularly favourable to Nauru.
Then, in 1987, some 20 years later, the three Partner Governments determined to wind up the
undertaking of the BPC. Accordingly, pursuant to an Agreement between them, the BPC's
remaining assets were distributed amongst the Partner Governments (Nauruan Memorial, Ann. 31).
Subsequently, on 23 June 1988, there was an exchange of notes between the Partner Governments,
under Article 5(2) of the Agreement, confirming that all agreed steps had been taken and bringing the
1919 Agreement to an end.
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The assets distributed in 1987 were derived from a number of sources. They, in fact,
represented decades of trading by the BPC in phosphate, in shipping, and other activities. Some of
the assets may have been derived from the proceeds of sale of Nauruan phosphate. Some may have
come from the sale, in 1967, of the BPC's Nauruan assets to Nauru. However, much of the BPC's
remaining assets came from elsewhere, and did not derive from Nauru at all. And this is clear from
an examination of the 1987 Agreement itself. The Preamble emphasizes that in more recent years
the BPC had been managing agents in relation to the mining of phosphate on Christmas Island, an
Australian territory. It was because that function had come to an end that it was decided to proceed
to wind up the affairs of the BPC.
I turn then to Nauru's claim.
This is a new claim. It did not appear in the Nauruan Application, but was left to the
Nauruan Memorial. Nauru says, in effect, that the claim was wrapped up in its original Application,
in the sense that its original Application concerned breaches of obligations relating to the Trusteeship
Agreement.
Australia submits, however, that this cannot be accepted. An examination of the Nauruan
Application, particularly Parts IV and V, shows the care and precision with which the Nauruan
claims have been formulated. There is no reference to overseas assets. In its Application, Nauru
challenged only Australia's failure to rehabilitate phosphate lands worked out before 1 July 1967.
The relief sought in the Nauruan Application related only to this. Compensation for rehabilitation
was the stated purpose of the Application.
The terms of Nauru's Application are consistent only with this interpretation. Presumably it
was for this reason that Nauru referred to its unsuccessful efforts to get Australian recognition of the
obligation to rehabilitate (Application, para. 40). It was also in keeping with this that Nauru drew
attention in its Application to its appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into the rehabilitation of
the phosphate lands. Everything in the Application indicates that the fons et origo of this case, to
adopt an expression used in the Nuclear Tests case (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 263), is the claim for
rehabilitation.
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Yet, we now find, in the Nauruan Memorial a claim to what is termed "the Australian
allocation" of the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners. This is clearly very
different from a claim for rehabilitation.
Not surprisingly, Nauru has not shown any real connection between claims for rehabilitation
and its claim to the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners. Nor, indeed, any
connection between its claims to the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners and
alleged breaches of the Trusteeship Agreement.
The fact is that the claim to the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners
appears as an after-thought. Perhaps someone thought of it after the Application was lodged and
said "let us add it to the original claim". Australia submits that this cannot be done. And this issue
is not a matter of form only. It is a matter of procedural fairness, not only to Australia, but to third
States as well.
The Rules of the Court are clear. Article 38 provides:
"The Application shall specify as far as possible the legal grounds upon which the
jurisdiction of the Court is said to be based; it shall also specify the precise nature of the
claim, together with a succinct statement of the facts and grounds on which the claim is
based."
I repeat, "shall specify the precise nature of the claim". In relation to the overseas assets claim,
however, it is clear Nauru did not comply. There is not a single reference in the Application to the
overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners.
An important purpose of Article 38 is to give proper notice of claims to the immediate
respondent, here Australia, as well as to other States whose interests may be affected. This is
because, under Article 42 of the Rules, a copy of the Application is specifically required to be
transmitted to "other States entitled to appear before the Court". An application (or notification of a
special agreement instituting proceedings) is the only document which is required to be transmitted in
this way.
Article 42 is clearly intended to protect the interests of States which may be affected by the
proceedings. Once on notice, such States can determine whether or not to make application to
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intervene or to take any other action which may seem appropriate.
As Nauru's Application did not refer to its overseas assets claim, however, the transmission of
its Application to other States would not have notified other States of the claim.
The possibility of prejudice in this case is far from fanciful. Together with Australia, the
United Kingdom and New Zealand have each received a share of the assets held by the BPC. The
interests of those two other States are also at stake. Indeed, this much has already been recognized
by Nauru, in the diplomatic exchanges between it and all three Partner Governments (Nauruan
Memorial, Ann. 80, Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 17). By failing to comply with the Rules of Court,
Nauru has deprived two of the Partner Governments of the notice to which each was entitled.
Clearly, the Rules of this Court should not be applied so as to impair the rights of other States
which are not parties to the proceedings. The Permanent Court, in the Société Commerciale de
Belgique case, noted this specifically, in relation to the amendment of claims and submissions. The
Court said:
"It is clear that the Court cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought before it by
application to be transformed by amendments in the submissions into another dispute which is
different in character. A practice of this kind is calculated to prejudice the interests of third
States to which, under Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, all applications must be
communicated in order that they be in a position to avail themselves of the right of
intervention provided in Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute. Similarly, a complete change in the
basis of the case submitted to the Court might affect the Court's jurisdiction."
(1939 P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78, p. 173.)
Now Nauru argues for a liberal approach, but the result for which it contends is not supported
by the authorities to which it refers. For Nauru cannot show that its claim to the overseas assets of
the BPC is a claim implicit in, or consequential on, or arising directly out of, the original claim for
rehabilitation. Nauru cannot, therefore, satisfy the tests referred to in the Temple of Preah Vihear
case and the Fisheries Jurisdiction case - both cases mentioned by it in its written submissions (see
paras. 350-351).
It is for these reasons that Australia submits that Nauru's claim to the overseas assets of the
BPC is inadmissible, because it is a new claim, made contrary to the Rules of Court which are
intended to ensure that proper notice is given not only to the Respondent but to non-party States as
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well.
A Legal Dispute
I turn to my second argument. Apart from the issue of procedural fairness, Australia also
submits that, in any event, the Court has no jurisdiction under Article 36 (2) of the Statute, to deal
with this claim. It says, first, that Nauru has not identified a legal dispute within the meaning of
Article 36 (2). Secondly, it says that Nauru has not demonstrated a legal interest sufficient to
support a valid claim.
For there to be a legal dispute, there must be first, a dispute in the legal sense, and secondly, it
must be a dispute falling within one of the four categories set out in Article 36 (2).
In the Mavrommatis case (1924 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11), the Permanent Court did
define a dispute as "a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests
between two persons". But as later cases show a mere assertion of a disagreement is not sufficient.
There must be something more. This much is clear from the recent Applicability of the Obligation
to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947
(I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 27). In that case, the Court referred to the 1962 South West Africa case
and said in substance that there will only be a dispute in the relevant sense if there is a claim by one
party which is positively opposed by the other. This can only be determined by reference to the
attitudes of the parties.
So let us turn then, Mr. President, to the diplomatic exchanges because in this case there have
been no prior negotiations as a result of which the claim of Nauru can be seen to be positively
opposed by the Partner Governments. In this case, the attitudes of the Parties must be determined by
reference to diplomatic exchanges. And these are set out in the Nauruan Memorial (paras. 471-476)
and in Australia's Preliminary Objections (Ann. 13). (Some parts of them are also set out at
paragraphs 335 to 340 of Nauru's Written Statement.)
The subject was opened by Nauru in January 1987 when, in a Note of 5 January, Nauru wrote
for information concerning the BPC assets and asked that it "be consulted in matters relating to
[their] disbursement ...".
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Australia on 20 January 1987 confirmed that "arrangements are in hand" for winding up the
BPC and indicated that the Partner Governments would shortly sign an agreement to bring this
about. At the end of that month, and following Australia's reply, Nauru wrote again, expressing:
"regret that the three Partner Governments are contemplating the winding-up of the British
Phosphate Commissioners and distribution of their funds".
However, the Note did not go any further than "requesting" the three Partner Governments to
keep the funds of the BPC intact and its records preserved until Nauru's Commission of Inquiry into
land rehabilitation had completed its task.
Some months went by. Then in May 1987, the President of Nauru wrote to the Australian
Prime Minister indicating that it was the "strong view" of the Nauruan Government that the assets of
the BPC should be "directed towards" rehabilitation, but as the terms of that letter make clear, the
Nauruan President was not making any specific claim. He wrote:
"The Note [of 30 January 1987] to you and other Governments, however, was by way
of an interim measure merely moving you to withhold distribution of assets until the report of
the present independent Commission of Inquiry into the Rehabilitation of the Worked-Out
Phosphate Lands of Nauru has been completed and published ... The whole rehabilitation
question is a most vexing problem. On this question, there appears to be a number of
intangibles, and it is the belief of my Goverment that irrevocable stances should not be
assumed by the various governments at the outset."
The Nauruan President did not take the matter much further. In his last letter, of July 1987,
he wrote:
"I find it difficult to accept [the Australian Government's statement] that the residual assets of
the BPC were not derived in part from its Nauru operations. I shall not, however, pursue that
here but leave it perhaps for another place and another time."
Now this last sentence in the letter, "I shall not, however, pursue that here ..." indicates that
there was no claim between Australia and Nauru that was positively opposed. Australia submits
that none of this exchange adds up to a specific claim by Nauru to the overseas assets of the BPC
which was positively opposed by the Partner Governments, including Australia. Furthermore, none
of this indicates any basis on which a claim might have been made. On the contrary, the exchange
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amounts only to an expression of strong interest in the assets, on the basis, it was said, that they
were derived from the BPC's Nauruan operations. This fact was denied by Australia. But no claim
to the assets was in substance made until Nauru lodged its Memorial in this case. There is,
therefore, no dispute in the legal sense revealed by the diplomatic exchanges.
Even if, contrary to my submissions, the Court were to find that there was a dispute
concerning the source of the BPC's overseas assets, it does not follow that there is a legal dispute
within the meaning of Article 36 (2) of the Statute.
For a dispute, in the legal sense, to exist there must, as I have indicated, be an opposition of
views. To be a legal dispute the opposition must relate to a matter falling within Article 36 (2) of
the Statute. But Nauru has not said that there is an opposition of views concerning any such matter.
Hence, in relation to this particular claim, Nauru has not said that any question of
international law is involved in the claim. It does not point to any fact which, if proven, would
indicate a breach of international obligation. It does not say that there is any question concerning the
interpretation of a treaty. Yet these are essential elements of the definition in Article 36 (2) of a legal
dispute over which the Court has jurisdiction.
The diplomatic exchanges in this case contain no material which would turn the alleged
dispute into a legal dispute. Thus, the overseas assets claim quite clearly does not fall within the
principle of the Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Preliminary Objections case. In that case
the Court was able to identify a legal dispute from the relevant negotiations and diplomatic
exchanges which had disclosed a definite complaint based on action alleged to be inconsistent with
international law. There is no such complaint in this case (I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 149).
If Australia's submissions in this regard are accepted and the Court is satisfied that there is no
legal dispute in relation to Nauru's overseas assets claim, it follows that the claim does not fall
within Article 36 (2) and the Court has no jurisdiction in respect of the claim.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, there is a further reason why Australia submits that the
claim to the overseas assets of the BPC cannot fall within Article 36 (2). It is accepted that this
Article cannot confer substantive rights. Australia submits that the claim cannot give rise to a legal
- 30 -
dispute, within the meaning of this provision, because Nauru has not shown any legal interest in the
overseas assets of the BPC.
Indeed, Australia submits that Nauru could not demonstrate any relevant interest in these
assets. Nauru does not claim that the assets belong to it. And clearly the assets belong to the BPC.
The BPC was an instrumentality of three Partner Governments. The BPC did conduct phosphate
operations on Nauru from which it derived revenue. It does not, however, follow from this that
Nauru has a legal interest in the assets of the BPC. A State does not acquire a legal interest in a
claim relating to the business of a foreign national simply because the foreign national carried on
business in that State many years before. Nauru has not, however, asserted any other possible basis
for its claim.
Furthermore, the present claim to the assets of the BPC is not consistent with Nauru's conduct
in the past. In 1967 Nauru asked to buy those assets of the BPC on Nauru. It paid the Partner
Governments an agreed price. It did not make any claim at this time to any other assets of the BPC.
Yet it knew at that time the extent of the assets of the BPC. A balance sheet of the assets of the
BPC was attached to each Annual Report of the Administering Authority which was submitted to the
United Nations.
The facts which Australia has set out in some detail in its Preliminary Objections show that
the purchase by Nauru of the assets of the BPC was an entirely voluntary transaction
(paras. 109-112 of Preliminary Objections). Nauru does not now seek to re-open its purchase of
those assets, except to found a claim for compensation. The only reasonable interpretation of
Nauru's actions in 1967 is that at that time it did not consider that it had any basis to claim the
overseas assets. Nauru seeks to put off the consideration of its legal interest in this matter until
the merits stage. But these questions of jurisdiction are necessarily preliminary. Article 36 (2) of
the Statute cannot give jurisdiction if there is no legal dispute, whether because there is no dispute in
the relevant sense or because Nauru has shown no legal interest in the claim. All these matters are
interconnected. All aspects of Australia's submissions on Article 36 (2) are essentially preliminary.
And the Rules make it clear that questions which are preliminary should be determined at this stage
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of proceedings.
Mr. President, I turn briefly to my final submission on the overseas assets claim. That is, that
each of the preliminary objections made by Australia to Nauru's other claims apply equally to the
overseas assets claim. The overseas assets claim is either a new claim (as Australia has submitted),
or part of Nauru's other claims because directly connected to the question of Trusteeship obligation.
If it is not a new claim, then Australia's submissions concerning the termination of obligations under
the Trusteeship apply equally to the overseas assets claim. So too do its submissions concerning
waiver. That is, Australia submits that Nauru's overseas assets claim, like the claim for
rehabilitation, was settled, satisfied, or waived in the comprehensive settlement reached by the
Partner Governments with Nauruan representatives in the Canberra Agreement of 1967, or
extinguished by the United Nations decision to terminate the Trusteeship.
Further, the reservation contained in Australia's Declaration of Acceptance of 17 March 1975
applies equally to the overseas assets claim.
Australia's submissions concerning the absence of consent of States which are very directly
the object of Nauru's claim, stand in a slightly different position. For Australia's contentions in this
regard apply whether or not the Nauruan claim to the overseas assets of the BPC is regarded as
new, or part of the original Application. Australia's submissions on this issue of absence of consent
are to be presented by Professor Pellet, so here I do no more than briefly draw the Court's attention
to the salient facts.
The Nauruan claim in relation to the overseas assets is to one pot of gold. Consider the
position if Nauru had made claim to the assets of the BPC when it was still a going concern. The
claim would, of necessity, have been made against all three Partner Governments for no one of the
Partners could have dealt on its own with the assets of the BPC. The reason was that the BPC was
created by, and subject to, all three Governments.
Is the position any different now that the BPC has been wound up and the assets distributed?
Australia submits that this fact cannot improve the Nauruan claim. It is legally beside the point.
For if Nauru has a claim, it is against the assets of the BPC generally. It is in keeping with
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this that Nauru has said that it may seek access to the accounts of the BPC. There can be no basis
for assigning a special liability to Australia. Indeed, none has been suggested.
The same requests in relation to the overseas assets were made of New Zealand and the United
Kingdom (see e.g., Ann. 80, Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12). Yet in the Nauruan Memorial those
requests and expressions of interest have become an alleged legal dispute with Australia alone.
This points to only one conclusion. The claim to the overseas assets of the BPC can only be
regarded as a claim against all three Partner Governments. For the reasons about to be given to the
Court, in the absence of the United Kingdom and New Zealand, such a claim cannot be adjudicated
upon by this Court.
Mr. President, that would be a convenient time for me to pause.
The PRESIDENT: Do you wish to go on after the break, Mr. Burmester?
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Mr. BURMESTER: I have some brief submissions on the issue of good faith, Mr. President.
I could continue now; it would take about 15 minutes.
The PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we should have our break now. Thank you.
The Court adjourned from 11.30 to 11.45 a.m.
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Mr. PRESIDENT: Mr. Burmester.
Mr. BURMESTER: Mr. President, Members of the Court. Before the break I completed my
submissions on Nauru's overseas assets claim. But, as I indicated earlier, there is one other matter
for me to address and this is the issue of good faith, in relation to the Nauruan claims as a whole.
This issue is covered in Part V of Australia's Preliminary Objections.
We do not rely on the issue of good faith as a separate ground but as a matter relevant to the
exercise, as a matter of judicial propriety, of the Court's discretion to decline jurisdiction. In dealing
with it, we seek to draw together much of our previous submissions. We submit that when Nauru's
claims are considered as a whole, it is clear that they are not credible claims. That is, they are not
bona fide claims in any real sense and that, therefore, the Court should exercise its discretion so as to
decline jurisdiction in this case. Australia puts its submissions on good faith on this basis.
Take the matter with which I have just dealt, the claim by Nauru to the overseas assets of the
BPC. I have already shown that this has never been a real claim. Nauru has never really had a legal
interest in the subject-matter and, although Nauru knew the relevant facts for many years, it did not
make any claim to the overseas assets of the BPC until it came to lodge its Memorial. The truth is
that this claim has never been a bona fide claim at all but has been invented in the course of
preparing the Nauruan Memorial.
As to Nauru's other claims, as Professor Bowett and Professor Jiménez de Aréchaga have
shown, each of the claims now made by Nauru was settled as between Nauru and Australia by the
1967 Canberra Agreement and each of them was recognized as settled in the termination of the
Trusteeship by the United Nations. That is, all these claims have in fact been satisfied. They cannot
be given new life by this Application.
That Nauru's claims are not credible claims is confirmed by the fact that Nauru has delayed
many years before bringing them to this Court.
What is more, during the period of the Trusteeship, no one alleged that Australia, as part of
the Administering Authority, had been guilty of any act of maladministration. Certainly, the
Nauruan representative never made any such suggestion.
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Indeed, all the contemporary evidence points the other way. Thus in the final report of the
Trusteeship Council before independence, the Council noted that:
"Relations between the Administering Authority and the Representatives of the Nauruan
people continue to be cordial; that economic, social and educational conditions continue to be
satisfactory and that commendable progress has been made in the Territory." (Para. 310,
reproduced in Annex 28 to Australia's Preliminary Objections.)
This tends to confirm the fact that there can be no real claim against Australia for acts done by the
Administering Authority during the period of the Trusteeship.
In view of this, it is not surprising that Nauru did not make any allegation of
maladministration against Australia at any time in the decades immediately after independence.
More than 20 years have now passed since then but only now Nauru accuses Australia of a variety
of breaches of International Law, including breaches of the Trusteeship Agreement. These include
claims that Australia "abused its rights" over the territory, and "by reason of its improper and
arbitrary conduct as Administering Power in Nauru, engaged in acts of maladministration, wrongful
under International Law". (Para. 47 of the Application.)
This is clearly inconsistent with the historical record. That record gives no support whatever
to Nauru's claims and it is for this reason that Australia has felt it necessary to point in its
Preliminary Objections (paras. 400-407) to what it considers the absence of good faith on the part of
Nauru in now bringing its claims to this Court.
Before independence, the issue of rehabilitation had, of course, been the subject of much
debate and was well known to all the Parties, as well as to the United Nations General Assembly -
that has been covered in earlier submissions. The record makes it clear, however, that Nauru did not
at any time allege that Australia, as part of the Administering Authority, was guilty of a breach of
the Trusteeship. As other Australian counsel have noted, in November 1967, the Nauruan Head
Chief informed the Trusteeship Council that the issue of rehabilitation was not "relevant to the
termination of the Trusteeship Agreement", "nor did the Nauruans wish to make it a matter for
United Nations discussion". (Para. 178 of Australia's Preliminary Objections.)
Now, in these circumstances, Australia says that Nauru does not bring its claims in good
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faith. For 24 years, Nauru represented to the Administering Authority and to the United Nations that
it had no quarrel with the Administering Authority and that it was pleased with the way in which the
Administering Authority had brought it to independence. It has not shown any different attitude until
now and there is some unfairness in bringing these claims against Australia at this late date.
In addition, the conduct of Nauru indicates that even it does not believe in the practicability of
rehabilitating the worked-out phosphate lands. Nauru does not deny that if it wishes to rehabilitate
the lands worked-out after 1 July 1967, it must bear the cost. This in fact represents about
two-thirds of the whole worked-out area. As we have already noted, there is little evidence that
Nauru has taken any significant steps towards that end and it is not as though there has been any
lack of funds. Nauru has derived considerable income from phosphate mining since 1 July 1967.
Certainly, Nauru has given no evidence that rehabilitation is a practicable course. It therefore
scarcely seems open to Nauru to accuse Australia of a breach of a legal obligation to take action
which may be impracticable, even impossible and, moreover, action which Nauru itself has not been
prepared to take.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, Australia submits that if Nauru's claims are taken as a
whole, it is clear they are not bona fide claims. They have for the most part been settled or satisfied
and in one case the relevant claim never did constitute a real claim at all.
Now Nauru emphasizes in its Written Statement (para. 42) that the principle of good faith
does not create obligations . But Australia submits that this is beside the point. What is relevant,
and what Australia submits, is that the Court clearly has an inherent jurisdiction to protect the
integrity of the judicial processes. Accordingly it has jurisdiction to ensure its processes are not
misused.
Mr. President, this idea is familiar in common law jurisdictions. In such jurisdictions, the
court is said to have an inherent jurisdiction to protect its processes so as to ensure that they can
operate effectively. As part of this jurisdiction a court is said to have power to stop an abuse of its
process. In common law jurisdictions it is said to be an abuse of process to bring proceedings if the
dispute has been settled or if the action is groundless.
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In these jurisdictions another way of putting this is to say that such an action has not been
brought in good faith for a proper purpose. The standard texts recognize this. I refer particularly to
Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed. Vol. 36, para. 75, Vol. 37, paras. 14, 434-435, 437, 442-443)
and to the English Supreme Court practice (1991, paras. 18/19/17 and 18/19/18).
In common law jurisdictions, in a case where an abuse of the court's process is shown, the
court may, in the exercise of its discretion, decide to prevent the case from going further. This
action is not, of course, taken lightly. Nonetheless, it will be taken if the court believes the facts
justify it.
Australia submits that the Court should be guided by similar principles in this case. This is in
keeping with the Court's statement in the Northern Cameroons case: "The Court itself, and not the
parties, must be the guardian of the Court's judicial integrity." (I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 29.)
Australia submits that this Court has an inherent power to protect the integrity of the judicial
process and that therefore the Court has the power to prevent the continuance of these proceedings.
The Court's discretion is a broad one.
In this case there is ample evidence which would enable the Court to exercise its discretion
against Nauru, as a matter of judicial propriety. We submit that, having regard to all relevant
circumstances, it is clear that Nauru is misusing the Court's processes by pursuing claims which are
not credible and not brought bona fide and the Court should exercise its discretion against hearing
the claims brought by Nauru against Australia.
Mr. President, we make these submissions without prejudice to the other grounds of objection
to the Court's decision on this case.
Mr. President, that concludes my submissions on this point. I invite you to call on
Professor Pellet.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Burmester..
Mr. Pellet, if I may, I will leave it to you to find a convenient place to break your presentation
anywhere within a reasonable range of 1 o'clock.
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Mr. PELLET: Thank you very much, Mr. President. It is a big responsibility for me but I
will try.
M. PELLET : Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les juges, un internationaliste ne peut qu'être
honoré et, peut-être, un peu ému, chaque fois qu'il se présente devant vous. Je suis à la fois l'un et
l'autre - et je vous remercie bien vivement de votre bienveillance. J'ajoute que l'éminence des
collègues qui composent les deux équipes de plaidoirie et dont beaucoup, de part et d'autre de cette
barre, sont aussi des amis avec lesquels - ou contre lesquels - j'ai eu déjà l'occasion de plaider, ajoute
encore à cet honneur et à cette émotion.
Monsieur le Président,
1. Il m'échet de présenter l'exception préliminaire de l'Australie fondée, comme ceci est indiqué
dans les écritures australiennes sur l'absence de consentement de tiers exception que Nauru croit
pouvoir présenter différemment comme portant sur "la jonction ou le consentement de tierces parties
("Joinder or Consent of third Parties"; exposé écrit, p. 85).
Ce n'est pas vraiment la même chose, Monsieur le Président. Mais l'Australie a la prétention
de définir comme elle l'entend les exceptions qu'elle soulève et je m'en tiendrai donc à celle qui est
vraiment la nôtre : comme l'Australie l'a montré dans ses exceptions préliminaires, la requête de
Nauru met inévitablement en cause d'autres Etats, sur la responsabilité desquels la Cour ne pourrait
pas éviter de se prononcer si elle devait exercer sa compétence. Ce faisant, elle négligerait en effet le
principe, absolument essentiel, qui fonde sa compétence : celui du consentement à la juridiction
internationale.
Et c'est ce que je vais maintenant m'efforcer d'établir.
2. Monsieur le Président, si vous m'autorisez cette parenthèse, je le ferai, en évitant d'alourdir
mes propos par la mention des références exactes de la jurisprudence ou de la doctrine que je vais
citer. Ces références figurent dans le texte écrit de ma plaidoirie que je viens de remettre au Greffe
et je serais très reconnaissant à celui-ci de bien vouloir rétablir ces références dans le procès-verbal.
3. Cette parenthèse refermée, je souhaite revenir à titre liminaire sur le fait que Nauru déforme
indûment la nature et la portée de l'exception préliminaire soulevée par l'Australie et qu'il m'incombe
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de défendre.
Dans son exposé écrit, Nauru insiste, avec une certaine emphase, sur le problème des "parties
indispensables" ("indispensable parties") bien que, pour sa part, l'Australie n'ait pas employé
l'expression et que je sois assez enclin à partager la conclusion théorique de Nauru selon laquelle
"There is no 'indispensable parties' rule in international law" ce qu'indique son exposé écrit, page 87.
Encore faut-il s'entendre sur le sens exact de cette forte affirmation.
Elle n'est, en réalité, acceptable que du fait de la portée particulièrement large, et même
laxiste, que Nauru confère à cette pseudo-règle. Telle que Nauru la conçoit, elle pourrait, je crois,
s'énoncer de la manière suivante :
"La Cour doit s'abstenir de statuer au fond dès lors que les Etats tiers, intéressés par la
solution du litige, ne sont pas parties à l'instance."
Et, sous cette forme bien trop générale, il ne peut y avoir aucun doute : cette prétendue règle n'existe
pas.
Oh, bien sûr, Monsieur le Président, Nauru se garde bien d'indiquer formellement ce qu'elle
entend par "règle des 'parties indispensables'", et la formulation que je viens d'en proposer ne figure
nulle part dans son exposé écrit. Mais elle peut assez facilement en être déduite. Et, sous cette
forme excessive, je le répète, il est vrai que cette "pseudo-règle" ne relève pas du droit positif.
Mais, en l'espèce, ce n'est pas sur cette règle que l'Australie s'appuie, mais sur un autre
principe qui n'est, pour sa part, guère susceptible de contestation, celui du consentement à la
juridiction internationale. J'y viendrai précisément dans un second temps après avoir montré, dans
une première partie, que la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Royaume-Uni partagent entièrement avec
l'Australie la prétendue responsabilité des manquements qui sont attribués par Nauru à l'Australie
seule.
Ce qui a valu "sur le terrain", concrètement, dans le cadre du régime de la tutelle et plus
spécialement en ce qui concerne l'exploitation des phosphates, vaut tout autant devant la Cour, qui
ne peut dissocier ce que la Société des Nations puis les Nations Unies ont uni, pas davantage qu'elle
ne peut se prononcer sur la responsabilité d'Etats qui ne sont pas présents à la présente instance. On
ne peut s'y tromper : l'Australie n'est qu'un bouc émissaire sur lequel Nauru espère attirer les foudres
- 40 -
de la justice internationale, faute de pouvoir s'en prendre aux trois Etats qui constituaient
conjointement l'autorité de tutelle.
4. J'en viens donc tout de suite, Monsieur le Président, si vous le voulez bien, à mon premier
point : les responsabilités de l'Australie, si responsabilités il y a, sont indissociables de celles des
deux autres gouvernements participant à la tutelle.
La démonstration de cette proposition fondamentale ne paraît pas constituer une tache
herculéenne tant cette indissociabilité relève de l'évidence dès lors que l'on examine avec tant soit peu
d'attention le fonctionnement du mandat et de la tutelle successivement confiés par la SdN et par les
Nations Unies aux trois gouvernements.
Le fait est patent si l'on examine le problème sous l'angle politique et administratif, ce que je
ferai dans un premier temps. Et les choses sont plus claires encore si l'on centre l'analyse sur le
mécanisme d'exploitation des terres à phosphates, question qui est l'objet même de la requête de
Nauru et à laquelle je m'attacherai ensuite.
5. Intéressons-nous donc d'abord, à la tutelle dans son acception la plus large, au "régime
international de tutelle pour l'administration et la surveillance" de certains territoires, que régit le
chapitre XII de la Charte des Nations Unies.
Je ne nie pas, Monsieur le Président, que ce régime a été précédé d'un autre puisque, après la
Grande Guerre, le Conseil de la Société des Nations a confié à "Sa Majesté britannique"
"l'administration, sous le régime du mandat" de l'île de Nauru, pour reprendre les termes de
l'article premier du mandat du 17 décembre 1920. Mais, pour l'essentiel, au moins quantitativement,
les faits que Nauru reproche à l'autorité administrante ont eu lieu pendant la période de tutelle. En
outre, et c'est cela surtout qui importe au point de vue juridique, le régime de tutelle sur Nauru se
présente expressément comme la continuation du mandat.
Si bien que sauf à me répéter inutilement, il me paraît raisonnable de présenter, en un exposé
unique, les grandes lignes du fonctionnement et du mandat et de la tutelle, en mettant l'accent sur la
seconde.
6. Monsieur le Président, les analystes les plus autorisés du régime international de tutelle ont
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été frappés par un trait particulier de la tutelle exercée sur Nauru et qui ne se retrouve nulle part
ailleurs : son caractère collectif qu'ont relevé aussi bien sir Hersch Lauterpacht dans la septième
édition du traité d'Oppenheim (International Law, Longmans, Londres, vol. I, p. 208), Hans Kelsen
(The Law of the United Nations, Stevens, Londres, 1951, p. 601 et 609) ou Goodrich et Hambro
(Charter of the United Nations, Stevens, Londres, 1949, p. 440) ou Maître Nicolas Veicopoulos
(Traité des territoires dépendants, Sirey, Paris, t. 1, 1960, p. 144), M. Charles Rousseau (Droit
international public, t. II : Les sujets de droit, Sirey, Paris, 1974, p. 404) ou bien d'autres.
Il n'y a pas à chercher bien loin pour constater le caractère collectif qui sous-tend la rédaction
des sept brefs articles de l'accord de tutelle pour le territoire de Nauru, que l'Assemblée générale des
Nations Unies a approuvés le 1
er novembre 1947. L'article 2 de cet accord désigne "conjointement"
(le mot y est) "les Gouvernements de l'Australie, de la Nouvelle-Zélande et du Royaume-Uni ...
comme l'autorité qui exercera l'administration du territoire". Et les cinq articles suivants confèrent
des droits et des obligations exclusivement à l'"autorité chargée de l'administration" composée de
cette manière et ceci est vrai, qu'il s'agisse
- de l'administration au sens strict du territoire et de la réalisation des "fins essentielles"
de la tutelle concédée, ceci en fonction de l'article 76 de la Charte (article 3 de l'accord
de tutelle);
- de la paix, de l'ordre, de la bonne administration et de la défense (article 4 de l'accord de
tutelle);
- de la coopération avec le Conseil de tutelle et de la manière de traiter les habitants
(art. 5);
- du respect des traités et de l'application éventuelle des recommandations des institutions
spécialisées (art. 6) ou
- des dispositions à prendre pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales (art. 7).
Oui, Monsieur le Président, tout cela relève, en vertu de l'accord de tutelle lui-même, de la
compétence de l'autorité chargée de l'administration, c'est-à-dire, conjointement, des trois
Gouvernements de l'Australie, de la Nouvelle-Zélande et du Royaume-Uni.
- 42 -
7. Il y a lieu à cet égard de s'arrêter un bref instant sur un argument avancé aux pages 100
et 101 de l'exposé écrit de Nauru. Si j'ai bien compris, cet argument consiste à affirmer qu'une
"autorité administrante" dans le cadre du régime de tutelle ne constitue pas une personne juridique
distincte de l'Etat ou des Etats qui la composent. Faute de quoi, nous dit-on, il serait impossible de
rechercher la responsabilité d'une autorité administrante une fois la tutelle ou le mandat dissout et, en
particulier, la responsabilité de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie. Horresco referens.
C'est un faux débat, Monsieur le Président.
L'Australie ne prétend pas et n'a jamais prétendu que les mandataires et les autorités de tutelle
constituent ou aient constitué un nouveau sujet du droit des gens; et, bien sûr, elle convient qu'il ne
s'agit que d'Etats ayant des droits et des obligations particuliers. Simplement, en la présente espèce,
ces droits et ces obligations appartiennent conjointement, comme le précise l'article 2 de l'accord de
tutelle, aux trois "gouvernements", terme ici synonyme d'"Etats".
Il y a là, certes, une particularité très remarquable mais, je le rappelle en passant, il ne s'agit
nullement d'une invention ex nihilo de l'accord de tutelle; il s'agit tout simplement d'une application -
la seule application d'ailleurs - d'une possibilité expressément envisagée par l'article 81 de la Charte :
l'autorité chargée de l'administration "peut être constituée par un ou plusieurs Etats".
Ici donc, plusieurs Etats. Et plusieurs Etats que l'accord de tutelle place sur un pied de
parfaite égalité.
8. Cette égalité n'est pas remise en cause par la seconde phrase de l'article 4, dont la partie
nauruane fait pourtant grand cas. Il n'est peut-être pas inutile que je relise cet article 4.
Après avoir indiqué que l'"autorité chargée de l'administration [c'est-à-dire les trois
gouvernements] répondra de la paix, de l'ordre, de la bonne administration et de la défense du
territoire", l'article 4 poursuit :
"A cette fin, en vertu d'un accord conclu entre les Gouvernements de l'Australie, de la
Nouvelle-Zélande et du Royaume-Uni, le Gouvernement de l'Australie continuera à exercer
dans ledit territoire pleins pouvoirs législatifs, administratifs et judiciaires, au nom de
l'autorité chargée de l'administration, à moins que les trois Gouvernements susmentionnés en
décident autrement et jusqu'au moment où une décision en ce sens interviendrait."
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L'Australie donc apparaît ici, en effet, comme le "bras séculier" de l'autorité administrante et il
est vrai que, sur le terrain, elle représente l'autorité administrante exactement comme
M. James Murray avait fait remarquer qu'au temps du mandat, Nauru "had been administered jointly
by the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia ..., the latter State acting as day-to-day
mandatory" (James N. Murray, The United Nations Trusteeship System, the University of Illinois
Press, Urbana, 1957, p. 75). Mais sur quels fondements juridiques reposait cette administration au
jour le jour ?
Une lecture plus attentive ou plus complète que celle que fait Nauru de l'article 4 que je viens
de lire permet de dégager trois éléments essentiels :
1) les fonctions dévolues à l'Australie le sont "en vertu d'un accord"
conclu entre les trois gouvernements;
2) en vertu de cet accord, l'Australie agit "au nom de l'autorité chargée
de l'administration" (au nom donc des trois gouvernements "on (their) joint behalf"; et
3) cette situation durera jusqu'au moment où les trois gouvernements (et
eux seuls) viendraient à en décider autrement.
C'est très clair, Monsieur le Président. L'Australie est appelée à jouer un rôle particulier dans
le domaine couvert par l'article 4 (pas dans ceux faisant l'objet des six autres articles de l'accord de
tutelle, soit dit en passant), mais dans le cas de l'article 4 elle joue un rôle particulier mais seulement
à titre de représentant de l'autorité chargée de l'administration, c'est-à-dire encore et toujours des
trois gouvernements.
9. Dans le cadre d'une analyse strictement juridique, l'accord conclu entre les trois
gouvernements, dont fait état l'article 4, ne présente d'ailleurs aucun intérêt particulier. Les
Nations Unies en prennent note, mais cet accord est pour elles res inter alios acta et, par avance, les
Nations Unies donnent leur bénédiction aux trois gouvernements dans l'hypothèse où ils décideraient,
eux, eux seuls, de le modifier. De leur côté, les Nations Unies ne connaissent que l'autorité chargée
de l'administration et, encore une fois, cette autorité chargée de l'administration, ce n'est pas
l'Australie.
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Arrêtons-nous tout de même un instant à "l'accord conclu entre les Gouvernements de
l'Australie, de la Nouvelle-Zélande et du Royaume-Uni" le 2 juillet 1919 et modifié le 30 mai 1923,
dont les Nations Unies acceptent, sans l'imposer, la pérennisation dans le cadre de la tutelle.
Comme l'Australie l'a indiqué dans ses exceptions préliminaires (p. 15), cet accord traite de
deux catégories de questions : d'abord les questions relatives à l'exploitation des phosphates,
problème sur lequel je reviendrai, je pense, demain; et ensuite, les questions portant sur
l'administration de Nauru qui, seule, pour l'instant, nous intéresse. Les deux aspects sont d'ailleurs
soigneusement distingués puisque, par l'article 13 de l'accord de 1919 :
"les trois gouvernements s'engagent à ne pas intervenir dans la direction, la gestion ou le
contrôle des opérations d'exploitation, d'expédition ou de vente des phosphates",
opérations qui sont confiées aux British Phosphate Commissioners, les "BPC", et qui font l'objet de
la plus grande partie du traité dont seuls les deux premiers articles concernent l'administration de
l'île.
L'article 2 pose le principe de l'autosuffisance financière et ne nous concerne pas, au moins
dans l'immédiat. Quant à l'article 1er, il confère à un administrateur : "le pouvoir de prendre des
ordonnances pour la paix, l'ordre et le bon gouvenement de l'île dans le respect des termes du présent
accord"; et il précise en outre que :
"Le premier administrateur doit être désigné pour une période de cinq ans par le
Gouvernement australien; par la suite l'administrateur sera désigné de la manière fixée par les
trois gouvernements."
En fait, et bien que ce ne fût pas expressément prévu, des consultations ont toujours eu lieu entre les
trois gouvernements préalablement à la nomination des administrateurs. Ce n'est pas moi qui le dis,
mais un auteur que Nauru affectionne particulièrement, M. Barrie Macdonald (In Pursuit of the
Sacred Trust, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Papers n° 3, 1988, p. 21).
10. Le Conseil de la SdN a peu après, le 17 décembre 1920, confié le mandat sur Nauru à
"Sa Majesté britannique", en application de la décision prise lors de la conférence de la paix. Les
limites, bien françaises, de mon esprit d'analyse m'incitent à ne pas aventurer une interprétation de
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l'expression "Sa Majesté britannique". Il y a là du Commonwealth cette "énigme enveloppée de
mystère", comme le disait Churchill, qui défie tout à fait l'analyse cartésienne. Je me bornerai par
conséquent prudemment à remarquer que le mandat n'est en tout cas pas confié à l'Australie seule,
car si "Sa Majesté britannique" est aussi australienne, ce n'est pas, je crois, faire injure à l'Australie
que de dire qu'elle n'est pas seulement australienne. Et si l'on avait entendu remettre à l'Australie le
mandat sur Nauru, rien n'eut été plus simple que de le dire, comme d'ailleurs la Société des Nations
l'a fait le jour même pour la Nouvelle-Guinée, placée sous mandat australien le 17 décembre 1920
également.
11. Le mandat une fois acquis par "Sa Majesté britannique" donc, et non par l'Australie, une
nouvelle négociation s'engagea au sein de l'Empire britannique en vue de préciser les rapports de
l'administrateur de Nauru avec le gouvernement qui le nommait, d'une part, et les rapports des trois
gouvernements participants entre eux, d'autre part.
Déjà, le 8 septembre 1922, Bruce, premier ministre australien, avait rappelé devant le
Parlement que, bien que l'Australie ait nommé le premier administrateur, elle consultait et informait
les deux autres gouvernements.
"It cannot be said, then, [concluait-il] that the administration of the island is exercised
by the Australian Government to the exclusion of the other two Governments." (Exceptions
préliminaires, annexe 1.)
Mais l'accord de 1919 était trop général et trop flou et il fallait préciser les choses. Tel a été l'objet
de l'accord complémentaire du 30 mai 1923.
Il comporte, comme je l'ai dit, deux parties.
Les paragraphes 1 et 2 explicitent le principe déjà sous-jacent à l'article 1er de l'accord
de 1919 de la subordination de l'administrateur au "gouvernement contractant qui l'a désigné". Pour
leur part, les paragraphes 3 et 4 concernent surtout les rapports entre les trois gouvernements; le
paragraphe 3 impose au gouvernement qui a nommé l'administrateur de communiquer aux deux
autres gouvernements participants les proclamations et directives prises par l'administrateur et le
- 46 -
paragraphe 4 concerne les relations du mandataire avec la SdN.
Ce paragraphe 4 constitue une disposition importante :
"Tout rapport qui doit être soumis au Conseil de la Société des Nations ... doit être
adressé par l'administrateur agissant par l'intermédiaire du gouvernement contractant qui l'a
désigné au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à Londres, pour présentation au Conseil au nom de
l'Empire britannique en qualité de mandataire."
C'était reconnaître, Monsieur le Président, et de la manière la plus claire qu'au plan du droit
international, le seul qui importe dans cette enceinte qui lui est consacrée, il n'y avait qu'un seul
responsable : "l'Empire britannique, en qualité de mandataire", et non pas le gouvernement qui avait
désigné l'administrateur. Nauru ne s'y est pas trompée : dans le très bref passage de son exposé écrit
qu'elle consacre à l'accord de 1923 (p. 102) elle analyse les paragraphes 1 à 3 qui, considérés
isolément, peuvent être interprétés de manières assez diverses. Mais Nauru se garde bien de souffler
mot du paragraphe 4 qui, lui, lève tous les doutes que l'on pouvait avoir : pour des raisons évidentes
de commodité, un gouvernement administre Nauru au jour le jour; mais il le fait au nom des trois
gouvernements et, au plan international, c'est l'ensemble que ces trois gouvernements constituent qui
seul apparaît en plein jour, qui seul assume la responsabilité de cette administration. Avec les
adaptations qu'ont imposées la transformation du mandat en tutelle et les évolutions internes de
l'Empire britannique - adaptations réalisées par la pratique mais qu'aucun texte à ma connaissance
n'a consacrées - ce sont ces dispositions de l'accord de 1919 et de celui de 1923 qui sont restées en
vigueur jusqu'en 1965. A cette date, un nouvel accord a consacré la plus grande autonomie du
peuple nauruan et a abrogé pour l'avenir l'article premier de l'accord de 1919 et l'arrangement de
1923. Elle l'a modifié dans un sens d'ailleurs favorable à l'Australie (qui se voit reconnaître le droit
exclusif de nommer l'administrateur, celui-ci perdant au surplus certains de ses pouvoirs théoriques
au profit du gouverneur général du Commonwealth d'Australie). Mais peu importent ces
modifications: en réalité, outre que le nouveau mécanisme n'est resté en vigueur que 26 mois, il a été,
lui aussi, mis en place par un accord entre les trois gouvernements qui, conformément à l'accord de
tutelle - ceci est précisé dans l'accord de 1965 - se sont réservé le droit de le modifier, le cas échéant.
12. Il est bien vrai, Monsieur le Président, que l'administrateur de Nauru a toujours été nommé
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par le Gouvernement australien, même si c'était en consultation avec les deux autres gouvernements.
Et il est bien vrai que cet administrateur a, dès lors, reçu ses instructions du Gouvernement
australien. Mais ceci résulte d'arrangements purement internes à l'Empire britannique, arrangements
perpétués au sein de l'autorité collective chargée de l'administration après 1947. Et, en vertu des
mêmes arrangements, et ce qui est plus important encore, des accords conclus successivement avec
la "communauté internationale organisée", la SdN d'abord et les Nations Unies ensuite, en vertu donc
de cet ensemble de traités, les trois gouvernements acceptent ensemble, conjointement,
collectivement, la responsabilité de cette administration au plan international.
Et cela se vérifie, dans les faits, tout au long de l'existence du mandat et de la tutelle. Il serait
très long et il serait très lassant de procéder à une énumération complète de tout ce qui atteste de
ceci. Il suffit d'en donner quelques exemples.
Ainsi, un analyste fort peu bienveillant pour l'Australie - toujours Monsieur MacDonald - a
relevé que des représentants de la Nouvelle-Zélande et du Royaume-Uni ont, comme ceux de
l'Australie, toujours participé aux débats de la Commission permanente des mandats de la SdN (In
Pursuit of the Sacred Truth, op. cit., p. 21). Il en fut de même aux Nations Unies, et tout
particulièrement à la Quatrième Commission et au Conseil de tutelle. Du reste, la Nouvelle-Zélande
a continué de siéger au sein du Conseil de tutelle jusqu'en 1968, au titre de l'article 86, paragraphe 1
a), de la Charte, c'est-à-dire en tant que membre chargé d'administrer un territoire sous tutelle, alors
que le seul territoire sous tutelle exclusivement néo-zélandaise, le Samoa occidental, avait accédé à
l'indépendance en 1962.
C'est aussi systématiquement à l'autorité administrante que sont adressées les
recommandations faites par le Conseil de tutelle et l'Assemblée générale. Et à cela, il n'y a, à ma
connaissance, aucune exception. Jamais ces organes ne visent individuellement l'un ou l'autre de ces
trois Etats. Et il n'y a pas davantage d'ambiguïté sur ce que les Nations Unies entendent par
"autorité administrante": ce n'est pas l'Australie, ce sont bien les trois gouvernements; certaines
résolutions précisent d'ailleurs que ces trois gouvernements agissent "en qualité d'autorité
administrante" (c'est le cas, exemples parmi d'autres, des résolutions 2347 (XXII) de l'Assemblée
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générale ou 2149 (S-XIII) du Conseil de tutelle).
Destinataires des résolutions des Nations Unies en tant que composants de l'autorité
administrante au même titre que l'Australie, la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Royaume-Uni ont eux aussi
pris une part active aux discussions qui ont mené aux tranformations successives du régime
administratif effectivement appliqué, et ces deux Etats ne se sont nullement laissé dicter leur conduite
par l'Australie.
13. Je ne reviens pas sur la période du mandat. Mais il faut rappeler que le projet d'accord de
tutelle lui-même a été présenté conjointement par les gouvernements des trois Etats après de très
âpres discussions. De même, en ce qui concerne l'accord du 26 novembre 1965, l'annexe 2
reproduite dans le volume III du mémoire de Nauru donne une vue tout à fait inexacte de la manière
dont les choses se sont passées. En effet, seul est reproduit le long compte-rendu des négociations
qui eurent lieu du 31 mai au 10 juin 1965, entre la délégation représentant le conseil de gouvernment
local de Nauru et les représentants officiels australiens de l'autorité administrante - the "Australian
Officials representing Administering Authority", comme le précise très nettement le compte-rendu
officiel des négociations. Mais la position des trois gouvernements avait auparavant été arrêtée de
façon précise au cours d'une réunion qui avait eu lieu en avril (voir exceptions préliminaires, p. 32)
et les négociateurs australiens représentant l'autorité administrante restèrent en contact avec les
représentants des deux autres gouvernements.
Monsieur le Président, je ne m'arrête pas pour l'instant à la négociation de l'accord de 1967,
qui appelle le même genre de remarques mais qui concerne plus précisément, plus directement,
l'exploitation des phosphates, problème sur lequel je reviendrai demain. En revanche, il faut dire un
mot des conditions dans lesquelles il a été mis fin à la tutelle, et qui sont également tout à fait
éloquentes.
Le 31 janvier 1968, Nauru accéda à l'indépendance, mais cette indépendance ne fut pas
octroyée par l'Australie; elle résulte de longs pourparlers entre les représentants du peuple nauruan
d'une part, et ceux des trois gouvernements de l'autre. Certes, l'Australie a, d'une manière générale,
été leur porte-parole, mais jamais elle n'a agi en son nom propre. Ainsi,
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- l'Australie tenait son mandat de négociations de l'autorité administrante, une position commune
étant précisément arrêtée au cours de réunions tripartites, préparatoires aux rencontres avec les
Nauruans; tel a été le cas en particulier de réunions tenues du 27 au 30 avril 1966, et du 7 au 9
mars 1967;
- si la discussion s'engageait sur un terrain qui excédait les termes de ce mandat de négociations, les
négociateurs faisaient savoir aux Nauruans qu'ils leur fallait consulter les trois gouvernements et, à
plusieurs reprises, la nécessité d'une concertation entre les gouvernements participants à l'autorité
administrante imposa de suspendre les négociations avec les Nauruans; les écritures des parties
donnent maints exemples de ce phénomène (voir notamment les exceptions préliminaires, p. 43-54);
- au surplus, la délégation de l'autorité administrante a toujours été composée de représentants des
trois gouvernements, - sauf dans certains groupes de travail purement techniques qui en référaient
aux négociateurs "politiques"; du reste, la délégation de l'autorité administrante s'est toujours
présentée comme une délégation conjointe, jamais comme "délégation australienne";
- pour sa part, la délégation nauruane s'est constamment adressée aux "Gouvernements participants",
sans d'ailleurs que cela l'empêche de tenter d'ouvrir des brèches dans le "front commun" présenté par
les trois gouvernements comme le montre ici encore M. Barrie Macdonald (cf. In Pursuit of the
Sacred Trust, op. cit. p. 47-57).
Et les Nauruans de s'efforcer de négocier en privé avec chacun des trois gouvernements, notamment
la Nouvelle-Zélande, isolément (voir ibid., p. 56); ceci montre au moins une chose intéressante, c'est
que les représentants de Nauru avaient bien conscience d'avoir à faire non pas à un, mais à
trois gouvernements, ceux-ci, en tant que membres de l'autorité administrante, ayant l'obligation
d'aboutir à une position commune que Nauru essayait évidemment de rendre plus difficile;
- du reste, les Gouvernements britannique et néo-zélandais ne se sont nullement dérobés à leur
responsabilité et le discours prononcé par le représentant du Royaume-Uni à la
Quatrième Commission de l'Assemblée générale, M. Luard, le 6 décembre 1967, à la veille de
l'indépendance est tout à fait éclairant; il reconnaît d'abord le rôle positif joué par l'Australie; puis il
souligne :
"que les trois autorités administrantes ('the three administering Governments') ont contribué à
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cette évolution et ont participé aux négociations qui ont abouti à l'indépendance" (A/C.4/SR.
1739, par. 28 - exceptions préliminaires, vol. II, annexe 30),
revendiquant ainsi une responsabilité propre pour son pays et la Nouvelle-Zélande.
14. Ainsi, Monsieur le Président, le mandat était conjoint; la tutelle était conjointe. L'un et
l'autre ont été confiés, collectivement, aux trois gouvernements participants. Ce sont ces trois
gouvernements qui étaient, ensemble, les seuls interlocuteurs des Nauruans aussi bien, d'ailleurs, que
des organismes internationaux, chargés de contrôler le respect de leurs obligations de mandataire ou
d'autorité administrante, la Société des Nations puis l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Ces trois
gouvernements en ont constamment assumé, collectivement, la responsabilité au plan international
prenant, ensemble, toutes les décisions concernant le fonctionnement du mandat ou du régime
international de tutelle, modifiant ensemble ce mécanisme d'un commun accord, négociant ensemble
avec les Nauruans et les organes de contrôle jusques et y compris la fin de la tutelle.
Certes, l'Australie administrait au jour le jour. Mais elle s'acquittait de ces fonctions en vertu
d'un mandat que les trois gouvernements lui avaient conféré. Ce faisant, elle n'a jamais agi en son
nom propre mais toujours au nom de l'ensemble des trois gouvernements qu'elle représentait. Encore
cette "représentation" était-elle, si l'on peut dire, exclusivement "de terrain" et n'avait-elle aucune
portée internationale, ou, plus exactement peut-être, cette représentation était purement "endogène",
interne à l'autorité administrante. Dans les rapports avec l'extérieur, ce n'est jamais l'Australie qui
apparaissait en tant que telle, mais l'autorité administrante, qui "endossait" la responsabilité de tout
ce qui avait été fait en son nom.
15. Il est donc, Monsieur le Président, à peine besoin d'avoir recours à la théorie de la
représentation en droit international. Toutefois, il faut bien voir que, quand bien même les trois
gouvernements n'auraient pas, expressément, endossé cette responsabilité, celle-ci ne leur
incomberait pas moins.
Certes, si l'on raisonne dans le cadre de la représentation, la Nouvelle-Zélande et le
Royaume-Uni auraient pu, en ce qui les concerne, mettre en cause la responsabilité de l'Australie - le
sujet représentant - ils auraient pu le faire s'ils avaient estimé que l'Australie ne s'était pas acquittée
correctement de ses obligations de représentant. Mais ceci n'est plus vrai lorsque la responsabilité
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est invoquée par des entités extérieures à l'autorité administrante qu'il s'agisse d'autres Etats, du
peuple nauruan ou d'organisations internationales.
Selon la définition soigneusement élaborée par M. Riad Daoudi, qui s'est inspiré de celle,
classique, de Sereni, ("La responsabilité en droit international", RCADI, 1948, vol. 73, p. 75-76), la :
"représentation s'analyse juridiquement en droit international en la substitution d'un sujet de
droit [ici l'Australie] à un autre sujet de droit [ici l'ensemble formé par les trois Etats] dans
l'exercice d'une compétence internationale propre au sujet représenté vis-à-vis de tiers" (ici, les
compétences découlant de la tutelle) (R. Daoudi, La représentation en droit international
public, Pédone, Paris, 1980, p. 72).
Il en découle que les actes accomplis par le représentant (l'Australie) doivent être considérés
bien évidemment comme accomplis par le représenté lui-même; ceci avait déjà été très fortement
souligé par Anzilotti, au tout début de ce siècle ("La responsabilité internationale des Etats à raison
des dommages soufferts par des étrangers", RGDIP, 1906, p. 11; voir aussi R. Daoudi, ibid.,
passim, notamment p. 73). Il en est de même dans tous les systèmes de droit interne, et l'on peut
considérer qu'il y a là un véritable principe général de droit. Qui fecit per alium fecit par se.
Il existe quelques applications jurisprudentielles de ce principe - je pense en particulier à
l'affaire Liwschitz dans laquelle un ressortissant autrichien tenait le Danemark pour responsable de
la perte d'une somme d'argent qu'il avait remise au ministère des affaires étrangères de ce pays.
Mais le requérant a été débouté par le tribunal danois qu'il avait saisi car le Danemark avait agi, en
l'occurrence, pour le compte de l'Autriche-Hongrie (Annual Digest of International Law Cases,
1925-1926, n° 165, p. 226). On trouve d'autres illustrations, sinon du principe, du moins de l'idée
qui l'inspire, dans la pratique internationale; par exemple, les missions spéciales communes à
plusieurs Etats engagent simultanément l'ensemble de ces Etats (voir le commentaire de M. Bartós,
rapporteur spécial du projet sur les missions spéciales à la CDI, ACDI, 1967, vol. II, p. 55). On
peut peut-être aussi considérer que l'idée même d'une responsabilité propre des organisations
internationales procède de la même notion, de la même idée générale, même s'il s'agit d'une institution
juridique autonome, etc.
Ceci, Monsieur le Président, pour dire une chose simple, mais de très grande portée dans notre
affaire : dans toute la mesure où l'Australie aurait représenté l'autorité administrante c'est celle-ci
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- c'est-à-dire les trois Etats ensemble et non l'Australie seule - qui, en tout état de cause, serait seule
responsable des manquements éventuels au droit international commis par l'Australie.
Mais il est inutile de s'appesantir : en la présente occurrence, les trois gouvernements ont, par
leur comportement constant, montré qu'ils se tenaient pour collectivement responsables de la tutelle
et, au plan international, ce sont, en effet, eux et eux seuls, qui ont agi ensemble.
Mr. President, although I am absolutely ready to go on, I suggest that this could be a good
time to stop for today since I will now turn to a slightly different topic; but I am, of course, in your
hands.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Pellet. I think that would be a good place to break for the
morning and we will resume tomorrow at 10 o'clock.
The Court rose at 12.45 p.m.