INTERNATIONALOFJUSTICE
PLEADINORALARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS
AEGEAN SEA
CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE
(GREEilTURKEY1
~
COUR INTERNATDEJUSTICE
AFFAIRE
DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
DE LA MER ÉGÉE
(GR~c.TURQUIE) ORALARGUMENTSON THE REQUEST
FOR THE INDICATION
OF INTERIM MEASURESOF PROTECTION
MINUTESOFTHE PUBLIC SIïTINGS
held filPeacePalace, TheHague,
fruin5ro27 AbrguundotiIISep~en~br976.
Prc.sidJitnetide recliaga prcsiding
PLAIDOIRIESRELATIVES À ÇA DEMANDE
EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES
PROCES-VERB DAUSAUDIENCESPUBLIQUES
eni iaapalais de la PaiHave,
du 25au27aout eIrIIsepietiihre 1976.
souslpr@si&t~dcM Jiti,nze r&cliagu,Prksident FIRST PUBLICSITTING(25 VI1176, 10 a.m.1
Presenr:PresidentJIM~NE DE ARCCHAG Avice-PrcsidenNAGENDR AENG:H
Judges FORSTE GRR,OSL,AÇHS,DILLARD M,OROZOS VI,RHUMPHRE WYALDOCK,
RUDA, Mmt~u, ELIAST , ARAZ ;Judge ad hoc S~nssr~owu~o s Registrar
AQUARQNE.
For rheGovernmentof Greece :
H.E. Mr. Nicolas Karandreas,Ambassador ofGreece, as Agent;
Mr. Constantine Eustahiades, ProfessoofPublic InternationLaw in the
University of Athens, Head of the Legal Department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,as AgentAdvocaleand Counsel;
ProfessorD. P. O'Connell, Member ofthe English, Australian anNew
Zealand Bars,Chichele Professor of InternationLaw in the University of
Oxford,
Mr. Roger Pinto, Professor in the University of Paris,
Mr. Georges Vedel, Professor in the UniversityParis,
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor in the University of Paris,
Ms. Richard Baxter, ProfessorHarvard University, Member of the Bar of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Mr. DimitriosEvrigenis, Professoin the University of Salonica, Member
of theChamberof Deputies,
Mr. Elias Krispis,Professor in the University of Athens,
Mr. Constantine Economides, Special Legal Adviser to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Emmanuel Roucounas, Professor in the University of Athens, as
Counsel ;
Vice-Admiral (retd.Patrocks Conialis, Hellenic Navy,
Mr. ChristosMacheritsas,SpecialAdviser to the Legal Departmentofthe
Ministryof Foreign Affahs,
Mr. J. O.Small, Geophysiçist, as ExpeAdirisers OPENING OF THE ORAL PROCEEDlNGS
The PRESIDENT :The Court meets today to constder the requwt for the
indicationof interim measures of protection, under Article41 ofthe Statuteof
the Court and Article 66 of the Rules of Court, filedby the Government of
Greeceon 10August 1976 in the case concerning theAegean Seo Continental
Sheybrought by Greece against Turkey.
The Application (see pp. 3-60, sicpro)instituting proceedings in this case,
which invokes Article 17 of the General Act for the Pacific Setdement of
International Disputes of 1928, read together with Articles 36, paragraph 1,
and 37 of the Statute of theCourt, and ajoint communique issued atBrussels
on 3 1May 1975, was fded in the Registryon 10August 1976.1shall ask the
Registrar to read from the Application the si'aternentof what the Greek
Government seeks from the Court.
The REGISTRAR : Inits Application, the Government of Greece requests
the Court to adjudge and declare the following :
"(ilthatthe Greek Islands referkd to in the Application, as part of the
territory of Greece,are entitledto the portion of the continental sheif
which apperbins to them according to the applicable principles and
rules of internat~onallaw;
(iiii)what is the course of the boundary (or boundaries) between the
portions of the continental shelfppertaining to Greece and Turkey
in the Aegean Sea in accordance with the principles and rules of
international law whicb the Court shall determine tobe applicable
to thedeiimitation of the continental shelf in the aforesaid areas of
the Aegean Sea ;
(iii)that Greeceisentitled to exercisover itscontinental shelf sovereign
and exclusive rights for the purpose of researching and exploring it
and exploiting its natural resource;
(iv) that Turkey is not entitleto undertake any activitieson the Greek
continental shelf,hether by exploration, exploitation, research or
otherwise, without the consent of Greece ;
(v) that the activitiesof Turkey describein [the Application]constitute
infringements of the sovereign and exclusive rights of Greece to
explore and exploit its continental shelf orIo authorize scientific
research respecting the continental shel;
(vil that Turkey shaii not continue any further activities as described
above in subparagraph (iv)within the areas of the continental shelf
which the Court shall adjudge appertain to Creeçe."
The PRESIDENT :On 1OAugust 1976,the same dayas that on which the
Application was filed, Greece filed a request(see pp. 53-66, supra) under
Article4 1of the Statute and Article 66 of the Rules of Court for the indication
of interim measures of protwtion. 1shall ask the Registrar to read from that
request thestaternent ofThemeasures which the Governrnent of Greece asks
theCourt to indicate.
The REGISTRAR .
"Greece . .requests the Court to direct that the Governments of both
Greece and Turkey shall :
--A-- - OPENING OF THE ORAL PROCEEDlNGS 81
(1) unless with the consent of each other and penéingthe finaljudgment
of the Court in this case. refrain from al1exriloralion activitanvr
scientificresearch, with respect to the continental shelf are& within
whiçh Turkey has granted such licencesor permits or adjacent to the
Islands,or otherwise in dispute in the present cas;
(2)refrain from rakuig further military measures or actions which may
endanger their peaceful relations."
The PRESIDENT :Copies of the Application and the request for interim
rneasures ofprotection were, on 10 August 1976Eseep. 57 1,infra), handed by
the Regisnrarof the Court to the Ambassador of Turkey to the Netherlands,
the channel of communication which had been norninated by the Govern-
ment of Turkey for communications addressecito that Government by the
Court under the Statute and Rules.
The Court is bound, on receipt of a request for interim measures of
protection,toproceed in accordancewith itsStatuteand Rules to çonslder as a
matter of urgency whether measures should beindicated,and for that purpose
tu give the parties an opportunity of presenting their observations on the
subject. Accordingly, the Parties were informed orally on 18 August and
in writing on 19 August (seep. 574, infrol that, pursuant to Article 66,
paragraph 8,of the Rules of Court, the Court would hold public:hearings,
opening on 25 August at t0 am., to afford the Parties the opportunity of
presenting their observations on the Creek request for the indication of
interim measures of protection.
The Coun in the present case includes upon the Bench no judge of the
nationalityofthe Parties. On this basis,the Government of Greecenotified the
Court on 4 August 1976 (seep. 573, infra)rhat itconsidered that irpossessed
and intended to exercise the righi to chooseajudge ud hoc under Article 31
of the Statute, and that person chosen was His Excellency Mr. Michel
Stassinopoulos, ex-President of the Hellenic Republic, ex-President of the
Councilof State.No sirnilar notification ofthe exerciseof the right to çhoose a
judse ad hoc has been received from Turkey. Within the time-limit fied
under Article 3 of the Rules of Court for the views of the Turkish
Government on the appointment byGreece of a judge ad hoc to be subrnirted
to theCourt ,o objection to this appointmentvirasreceivedfrom the Turkish
Government.
1shall therefore cal1 upon Mr. Stassinopoulos to make the solemn de-
claraCionrequired by Article 20 of the Statute of the Court.
M. STASSINOPOULO S Je déclare solennellementque j'exercerai tous
mes devoirs et attributions de juge en tout honneur et dévouement,en pleine
et parfaite impartialité etenute conscience.
The PRESIDENT :1 place on record the declaration made by Mr. Stas-
sinopoulosand declare him duly installed asjudge ad hoc in the presentcase.
Judges Ignacio-Pinto and de Castro are unable to be present today. Judge
Ignacio-Pintois convalescingafter aserious illnessand is nwtyet permitted by
his medicaladvisers totake part inthe work of the Court ;Jridgede Castro is
also ill, and it is unlikely that he will be able to participate in the present
' proceedings.
When the Court convened to wnsider the procedure tu be followed in the
presentcase, Judge Oda informed me by letter that he considered that, subjeçt
to the decision of the Court, he oughtnot to take partinthe decision ofthis
case.1therefore consulted the Court, which decided that Judge Uda's view82 AECEAN SEA
was entirelyproper.Accordingly,Judge Oda will nottake partin Chedecision
of thepresentcase.
I notethe presencein Court oftheAgentandcounsel of Greece and declare
the oral proceedingsopen on the requestof Greece for the indicationof
interirn measuresof protection. DÉCLARATION DE M. KARANDREAS
AGENT DU GOUVERNEMENTGREC
M. KARANDREAS : Monsieur le Président, Messieursles membres de la
Cour, je voudrais d'abord dire combien je suis honoréd'avoir le privilègede
paraitre devant la Cour internationalde Justice pour présenterl'affaire du
Plateauconlinenta!de 11 mer Egke.C'estun grand honneur pour la délégation
helléniqueet pour moi-méme.
Le Gouvernement hellénique appréci eautement le r6le de la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice comme organe judiciaire principals Nations Unies, la
plus haute instance judiciaire internationaune instance qui a toujours fart
preuve d'indépendance etd'impartialitken tant qu'organe le plus compétena
résoudreles différendsjuridiquesentre leEtats.
C'estvraiment regrettable que la Cour internationale de Justice ne soit pas
saisieplusfrkquernment de différendsjuridiques internabonaux envue de les
réglerpacifiquement.
La politiqueconstante de la Gréceatoujoursété derecourir aux moyens de
règlements pacifiques tels qu'ilssont aujourd'hui prévus par laharte des
Nations Unies.
C'estpour cela que laGréce aproposé a la Turquie que les divergences au
sujet de la délimitation duplateau continental de la mer Esoien soumises
a la Cour internationale de Justice.
Laquestion de la délimitation du plateaucontinental de la Egée est une
question purement juridique qui, a ce titre, relève entièrement de votre
juridiction.
En effet, le droit international contient des règlesconcernant le plateau
continental, coutumières et conventionnelles, dont votre Cour a déja eu
l'occasion,pour certaines d'entreelles, préciserla portée.
Bienque leGouvernement turc ait accepte la proposition du Gouvernement
helléniquetendant a saisir conjointement la Cour internationale de Justice
du diffërendsur la délimitationdu plateau continentalde la mer Egee, le
Gouvernement turc, par ses atermoiements au cours des négociations
prolongées, afait obstacla cette procédure.
Le 6 août 1976, un navire de recherche turc a commencéa se livrerides
activitésd'explorationsismique dans des secteurs du plateau continentalla
mer Egéerelevant de la Gréce.Malgréles protestations, les démarcheset
réclamations politiques,les explorations sismiqiies dans des secteurs du
plateau continental de la mer Egee relevant de certaines ilesgrecques
continuent.
Jusqu'a maintenant laGréce a évite,en cequi concerne ses relations avec la
Turquie, toute provocation eta garde une attitude modéréeet pacifique en
respectant les lois internationales. Grece, fid& i la Charte des Nations
Unies, souhaitant et espérantla solution pacifique du problkme, soumet a la
Cour internationale de Justice uneequéteintroduisant une instance au nom
de la Gréce contre la Turquie en l'affaire de la délimitation du plateau
continentalde la mer Egee, ainsi qu'une demande tendant a ce que la Cour
internationale de Justice énonceou indique atitre provisoire des mesures
conservatoires pour protégerles droits de la Greneattendant l'arretdéfinitif
ou l'issuede l'instance.84 MER PGÉE
Monsieur le Présidentde laCour j'aieu l'honneur de communiquer A la
Cour internationale dJusticela listdes agents,des avocats-conseils et des
conseillers-experts qui représenterontmon gouvernement en l'affaire du
PIareauconlinenta1 de lamer Egée.
Je vous prie, Monsieur le Président,debien vouloir donner maintenant la
parole a M. le professeurEustathiades qui feraune brèveprésentation de
l'affair;ensuite jevous prie,Monsieur le Président,de donner la parolea
M. le professeur O'Connel1 et ensuite àM. le professeurPinto, qui vont
développer leschefs de la demande hellénique. PLAIDOIRIE DE M. EUSTATHIADES
CONSEILDU GOUVERNEMENTGREC
M. EUSTATHEADES :Monsieur le Président, Messieurs lesmembres de la
Cour, c'estun grand honneur pour moi de présenterbrievernent la demande
soumise par la Grécedevant la plus haute juridiction internationale.
CeGouvernement hellénique a introduit devant la CouA la date d10 aoùr
1976une requete relative au plateau continental desÎlesde la meEgee. Cette
requête, soumiseconformement l'articl36,paragraphe I,et l'article37 du
Statut de laour est fondéesur la compétenceattribuée alaCour en vertu de
l'article 17 de l'Acte généralde Geneve pour le reglement pacifique des
différends de 1928 ;elleestde plus fondéesur le communique conjoint des
premiers ministres de la Grece et de la Turquie signéà Bruxelles le 31 mai
1975, attribuant égalementà la Cour cette compétence.
Lademande, à lameme date, en rndication de mesures conservatoires, afin
que soient protégésentre autres lesdroits souverains exclusifsde la Grèceaux
fins de la recherche, de l'explorationet de l'exploitationdu plateau continental
de laGrece et adjacent aux ilesgrecques de I'Egk, fut présenpar mon pays
dans des circonstances qui, loin de s'êtreentre-temps améliorées, risquentde
devenir encore plus graves.
Le Gouvernement hellénique, convaincu qu'il contribue au règlement
pacifique de la situation dans cette région névralgique, a fait appel à la
fonction judiciaire pacificatrice de la Cour, fonction qui est exercke unr
jugement et, dans des cas d'urgence, par l'indication de mesures conserva-
toires.
L'exerciceen la présente affairedu pouvoir que la Courosséded'indiquer
des mesures conservatoires pourra etre de nature a contribuer,en même
temps que la préservationdesdroits desparties en vue de l'examendu fond de
l'affaire,u maintien de relations pacifiquesentre pays voisins.
Cepouvoir spkcifiquede la Cour,sans êtrecomplètementindependant de sa
compétence de connaître de l'affaire quant au fond, présente néanmoins
plusieurs traits caractéristiquesqui luifkrent un caractère propre.
De par sanature même, l'exercicede ce pouvoir, je dirpar définitiondu
concept des mesures conservatoires, ne préjugepasla décision finale dela
Cour quant a sa cornp&tenceet quant au fond de l'affaire.
D'autre part, pour l'indication de mesures conservatoires, il suffit que,
l'incompktencequant au fond ne soit pas manifeste.
Cette condition,comme il vous sera démontrétout a l'heure,est cer-
lainernent remplieen la présente affaire.
Dans ces limites, il appartient & la Cour d'apprécierlibrement lescir-
constances qui exigeraient que des mesures conservatoires soient indiquées.
L'étendue de cette liberté d'appréciation est illpar le raitqu'en attendant
que la Cour se reunisse et se prononce Aleur suj(le Présidentprend, s'ily a
lieu, les mesures qui lui paraissent nécessairesafin de permettre à la Cour de
statuerutilement i(art.66, par.3,du Règlementde la Cour).
Cela souligne en même temps le fait que l'urgence des mesures
conservatoires à prendre constitue un élémentpa~-ticulierernentimportant
pour l'exercicedu pouvoir de la Cour d'indiquer de tellesmesures. De plus le
Statut et le Règlementconfèrentàla Cour le pouvoir d'indiqueméme d'office86 MER EG~E
des mesures conservatoires. C'estencore t'urgence qui estretenue ici comme
facteur déterminant l'exercicedu pouvoir de la Cour d'ordonner des mesures
conservatoires.
Tous cestraits caractéristiques, quisedegagentde lajurisprudence de votre
Cour et qui témoignentde sa libertéd'appréciatidn,se rattachenta la nature
mèmeet au but des mesures conservatoires. En effet, on sait que pour parer
aux lenteursde la procédurejudiciaire, qu'ellesoitinternationale ou interne, et
pour faire face a des cas d'urgence, ce sont les mesures conservatoires qui
feront le pont, en permettant d'éviterdes inconvénients qui existeraientsans
elles et qui empêcheraientque le tribunal puisse statuer utilement et que les
droits des parties que l'arsetpourrait reconnaître puissent êtrepréserves.
L'urgence a prkserver les droits apparait notamment lorsque le dommage
sera irréparableet il en sera ainsi lorsque, entre autres, il n'estpas susceptible
d'êtreréparé iimoyennant le versement d'une simpie indemnitéou par une
autre prestation matérielleu.
Dans le cas présent, en plus d'autres dommages de cette nature, quel
dommage serait-ilplus irréparableque celui résultantde l'atteintea des droits
souverains ?Or c'estjustement a des droits souverains de la Grècequ'a été et
continue a étreportéatteinte par les activitésde la Turquie.
Il s'agitd'activitésqui, de l'aveudu Gouvernement turc, sont des adivites
de recherche et d'explor'ationet qui, de l'aveude ce même gouvernement,ont
pour but de contester les droits souverains qui appartiennenta la Gréce.
Ne s'agit-ilpaen plus d'uneaction répétée visant ausà sila modificationdu
droit existant?
A part l'urgence dictéepar le besoin d'empêcherqu'un dommage irré-
parable soit cause a l'une des parties, il ya aussi urgence lorsqu'on peut
raisonnablement songer a l'aggravationet a l'extensiondu differend soumis a
la Cour. Lors du différendanglo-iranien, aussi bien le Présidentde la Cour
dans son message auGouvernement de l'Iran que laCour elle-même dans son
ordonnance ont fait pour les parties un devoir d'empêcher itout acte, de
quelque nature qu'ilsoit,qui pourraitaggraver ou étendrele différend soumis
la Cour i)et on sait queceprécédent n'esptas le seul.
Dans la prksente affaire, la sortie du navire turc Sismik I marque
l'échelonnementd'une &rie d'actesbien prépareset planifies de la pari de la
Turquie consistant notamment a l'octroide permis d'explorationde pétrole,a
la contestation réitéréedes droits souverains de la Grece sur son plateau
continental des îles d'Egée, a la proclamation du déplacementprofond des
limitesoccidentates de l'espaceaériencontrble par la Turquie coincidant en
genkral avec les limites desrégionds u plateau continental de la Grèce pour
lesquelles elle illicitementoctroyédes permis d'exploration.
Ainsi, l'aggravation ou l'extensiondu différend en la prksente affaire, loin
de relever du domaine des suppositions, constitue un danger réelau milieu
d'un climat de relations très tendues et de dispositions militairesde part et
d'autre.
En effet, faceaux activitésdu navire de rechercheturc et en présencedu fait
aggravant que ce dernier fut escortépar des unitéisde guerre aérienneset
navales, la moindre deschoses que la Grke aurait pu faireétait la surveillance
desagissements du navire turc. D'autrepart, faceaux déclarationssuccessives
turques qu'ily aurait une réactionarméeimmédiateau cas ou la Grèceferait
usage de son droit de policesurson plateau continental de la mer Egee et face
a la mobilisation des forcesarméesturques, la Grkce n'avait d'autrechoix que
de prendre, elleaussi, desmesures militaires appropriées.
Dans ces conditions, si la fermete et le sang-froid du Gouvernement PLAIDOIRIE DE M. EUSTATHIADES 87
helléniquejusqu'à présent aempêché I'empirement de la situation, il n'est
point exclu que mêmedescontroverses ou malentendussurviennent, avecdes
conséquencesimprévisiblespour la paix dans cette région. Maismêmesans
cela, le cas présent estbien caractéristiqued'un différenddont le maintien en
étatd'effervescence peut aggraver ou étendreles conséquenceset compro-
mettre la mission de la Cour dejuger utilement.
En terminant, qu'ilme soitpermis d'attirer l'attentionsur le faitque la Cour
a cru nécessaired'indiquer des mesures conservatoiresdans des affaires où le
danger d'aggravationdu différend étaim t oins évident etdont l'objetétaitpeut-
êtrela préservation de droits moins importants que les droits souverains
exclusifsd'un Etat.
Monsieur le Président, Messieursles membres de la Cour, en rappelant
quelques données de la jurisprudence de votre juridiction suprême,j'ai
simplement voulu montrer comment fut forméela conviction du Gouverne-
ment helléniqueque, bien que cetteCour ait de largespouvoirs d'appréciation
en matièrede mesures conservatoires, la présente affaireentre dans lecadre de
votre juridiction même enapplication de critèresrestrictifs.
Les insignesde ce palais de la Paix sont Justitia er Pace. Rendre justice est
l'apanagede cette Cour. Elle aura la satisfaction de servir en même temps de
façon plus directe la paix. ARGUMENTOF PROFESSOR O'CONNELL
COUNSELFORTHE GOVERNh,lENTOFGREECE
Professor O'CONNELL : Mr. President and Members of the Court. On
opening the address to the Court on the grounds for the request for interim
measures made on behalf of the Government of Greece, 1 should like to
express my respects to the Court and indicate the sense of honour which 1
experience in appearing before it again. 1begin by indicating what are the
areas of the Aegean under dispute.
If Members of theCourt will be good enough to look at the rnap which has
been submitted in addition to the Application (Annex 1,see p. 13, supra) they
will see in general the areas in dispute. Members of the Court will find, 1
believe, photocopies of these maps in their dossier, and 1 would seek their
indulgenceto consult these. 1Saythey will see in general the areas which are
in dispute because the rnap indicates the areas where the Turkish Government
has granted permits, and part of these permits cover what Greece claims to be
her continental shelf.
Now with the indulgence of the Court 1 would seek the assistance of
Admiral Conialis who will help me to turn over the maps to which 1 shall
refer.
The Application seeks a decision on the merits concerning whether the
Greek islands which are mentioned in paragraph 29 of the Application have
appurtenant continental shelf areas or not. If Members of the Court would
again be good enough to consult the rnap they wiil see the location of these
islands and Admiral Conialis will point them out.
Beginning from north to south, they are Samothrace, Limnos, Aghios
Eustratios, Lesbos, Chios, Psara, Antipsara, Samos, Ikaria, Patmos, Leros,
Kalimnos, Kos, Nisiros, Tilos, Simi, Chalki, Rhodes and Karpathos, with their
attendant small islands and islets.
The territorial sea between Greece and Turkey has been delimited by
Article 5 of the Treaty of 4anuary 1932. This treaty was made between Italy
and Turkey and covered the Dodecanese group. It was, of course, succeeded
to by Greece when she took the cession of the islands in 1947.Members of the
Court may notice that there is a slight discrepancy in places between the
indication of the extent of the Turkish territorial sea in the Dodecanese area
and the line on the rnap which indicates the line of delimitation. That
discrepancy arises from the fact that the Turkish territorial sea limit is six
miles whereas the Treaty of 1932 provided for al1rocks and islets on either
side of that line to fall respectively to Turkey and Italy.
Members of the Court will see the Turkish territorial sea indicated on the
rnap in red and the Greek territorial sea indicated on the rnap in blue. There is
no territorial sea boundary agreement between Greece and Turkey other than
in the Dodecanese area which 1have referred to. Greece in 1936 declared a
six-mile territorial sea and a translation of that law has been deposited with
the Court (Greek Oflcial Gazette, Vol. No. 450, 13 October 1936).The same
limit was prescribed in Article 139 of a Greek decree of 3 October 1973, a
translation of which has also been deposited with the Court. Greece has not
adopted a straight baseline system. There is no Greek legislation on the ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOROCONNELL 89
continental shelf other than Law No. 169 of 1969 which provides for
licensing.
Turkey adopted a six-mile territorial sea in 1914 by Act of the Sublime
Porte for al1 Ottoman waters (J. No. 5417199). This was affumed for the
Aegean in 1964 by Law No. 476 and that law also adopted a system of
straight baselines on the Anatolian coast. These baselines are also shown on
the map. When this system of straight baselines was adopted Greece
questioned its validity. However, for the purposes of the present hearing this
issue can be put on one side because the infringement of Greek rights which is
the occasion of the hearing has occurred in areas which Greece claims are
hers however the territorial sea is measured. The difference is indicated in
green between the limits which, according to the Greek view, Turkey is
entitled to claim, as territorial sea drawn from the low-wate: mark and drawn
from the straight baselines system. It wiii be noted that the discrepancy
indicated in green is not great but it obviously affects the question of the
delimitation of the continental shelf.
From the Exchanges of Notes and the records of the bilateral negotiations
which are contained in the Application, it appears that Turkey denies that the
islands which 1have mentioned are entitled to continental shelf rights. She
appears to Saythat the boundary in the continental shelf should be drawn half-
way across the Aegean Sea, whereas Greece says that it should be drawn
between the islands and the Turkish coast or Turkish islands. We ask the
Court to resolve that question.
The Application then asks the Court to decide what is the course of the
boundary between Greece and Turkey in the seabed. At this stage of the case
it is unnecessary to Say more about this. We are required only to show that
prima facieGreece has rights which are threatened. The actual location of the
boundary is a matter of detail to be gone into after the question has been
decided whether the islands generate continental shelf rights or not.
The Application then asks the Court to declare that Greece is entitled to
exercise over iîs continental shelf sovereign rights and exclusive rights for the
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. The word
"exclusive" is emphasized because Turkey appears to say that seisrnic testing
is not an infringement of sovereign rights anyway, whereas we say that
Greece is exclusively entitled to authorize seisrnic testing. So the Application
goeson to ask the Court to declare thatTurkey isnot entitled to undertake any
activities on the Greek continental shelf, whether by way of exploration,
exploitation, research or otherwise, without the consent of Greece.
This reference to exclusivity in the matter of research is made because
Turkeyappears to be saying that seismicactivity isscientific research and does
not require Greece's consent. It is unclear what is the legal basis of this
apparent contention, whether it is because scientific research is said to be a
freedom of the high seas which has been restricted only by Article 5 (8)of the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, to which Turkey is not a Party,
or because Turkey says that she is free to act howevershe pleases because the
area is disputed. Either way we oppose this contention, and ask the Court
now to indicate interim measures restraining al1 activity in respect of the
continental shelf pending a definitive order that Turkey shaii not continue
further exploration activities within the areas of the continental shelf which
the Court shall adjudge appertain to Greece.
Before 1proceed further 1should like to remove from Ourminds one notion
which the Goverpment of Turkey has been propagating and which may have
had the effect, whatever be the intention, of suggesting that Greece has been90 AECEAN SEA
claiming that the Aegean isa Greek sea. Greece has done no such thing. In aU
of the diplomatic exchanges which have occurred Greece has scrupulously
maintained the basic legal distinction between the high seas and the
continental shelf. Greece concedes al1of the rights to which Turkey or any
other country is entitled in the high seas. She does not deny their freedom
under international law as it exists today to conduct oceanographical
research, to fish or to navigate. What she does contest is Turkey's liberty to
conduct seismic activity in relation to the continental shelf which Greece
claims.
Mr. President, my learned friend, Mr. Pinto, will address the Court in detail
on the facts relating to the dispute. Let me, therefore, very briefly advert to the
main events.
On 1 November 1973 the Government of Turkey granted exploration
licences in the Aégeanfollowing the discovery of oil by Greece off the island
of Patmos, which Members of the Court will see liesoffthe Coastof northern
Greece.
Greece reserved her rights with respect to the areas in question and began a
dialogue. The areas in question will be indicated on the attachment to the map
and will also be indicated in a subsequent map on a larger scale in a moment '.
Turkey however on 18 July 1974 granted other exploration licences west of
the Greek islands. Again Greece reserved her rights and continued the
dialogue and the second set of exploration licence areas are also indicated on
the map. In February 1975 both parties had reached the position where they
had stated that the question between them should be settled peacefully. Bythis
time there were in fact two questions. The first was that relating to the
continental shelf and the second was a question relating to air space where a
boundary line drawn by Turkey was remarkably coincidental with the limits
of the seabed claimed by Turkey. That line is shown in red on the map down
the middle of the Aegean and east of that line Turkey claimed exclusive rights
of notification for air navigation purposes. That isnot an element of dispute in
the case but it did suggest from the apparent coincidence between a claim to
exclusive control of the airspace and a claim to be able to grant exploration
permits in the seabed that it was not Greece that was extending the issue in the
dispute from the seabed into superjacent jurisdictional areas but rather it was
Turkey that gave the appearance of doing so.
The undertaking between the parties with respect to peaceful settlement
was amplified in February 1975 by acceptance of the principle that the
continental shelf question should be submitted to this Court. That principle
was affirmed by the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers when, on 31 May
1975,they agreed to submit the matter to the Court. That was the proper and
sensible thing to do but thereafter Turkey steadfastly declined to take any steps
whatever to implement that agreement. Since May 1975 experts from the two
countries have met three times. At these meetings Greece has sought to have a
compromis drawn up. At al1of them the Turkish delegation said "No, let us
talk". They have sought to make out an argument that international law
requires that seabed disputes be settled by negotiations and not by other
means, but, whereas Greece has frankly stated her legal case she remains
uninformed as to what principles of law Turkey would anticipate would be
applied in the negotiations. This is so, despite the fact that Turkey in her Note
of 27 February 1974, which is in Annex II,No. 2, to the Application (see
p. 23,supra), referred to the Geneva Convention.
' Not reproduced.92 AEGEAN SEA
definition by Turkey of anairzone in the Aegean largely oolncidingwith the
exploration areas.
In the sober atmosphere of the Court it may indeeseem surprising thata
threat ofwar could arise outofthe seisrnicactivitiesafsingle vessel.Butthe
Court will not be unaware of the background to thewhole affair. During the
Qprus crisisthe Turkish air force made a strike upandestroyer which was
believedto be Greek and which was inthe areaof Cypnis.There was no state
of war between Greece and Turkey to warrant this. The destroyer was sunk
with heavy loss of life.The fact that it happened to be Turkish, tragic for the
Turkish families affected by this rnistakhas done nothing to allay Graek
disquiet at the implications of Turkish intentions.
The disquiet isonly increasedby the factthat Turkey at that time used legal
argument ts support her actions in respect tQprus. Turkey invoked the
Treaty of Guarantee of 1969. This, of course, guaranteed the existence an
independent Cypnis and itsConstitution. It permitted unilateral action only to
re-eslablish the basic features of the State in the event of these being upset.
Two years later Turkey occupies40 per cent. of the island. The Cyprus crisis
has given new çonsistency to latent apprehensions with regard to the true
intentionsof the Turkish Government.
In theNote of Turkey of 15March 1 976, which is in Annex V (see p.44,
supra), there is a statement about the dispute concerning the continental shelf
upsetting the delicate balance of the Treaty of Lausanne. This is a totaily
mlsleading statement. The Treaty of Lausanne confirmed the cession to
Greece of the islands, other than the Dodecanese of course. The Turkish
reference tothe Treaty of Lausanne seemsto have certain implications for the
broadening of the dispute.
The Treaty of Lausanne, like the Treaty of Paris of 1947, rnay,however,
have some bearingon Greece'stitle to the wntinental shelf.This isbecause the
fundamental doctrine ofthe continental shelf- that itisipso fado and ab
inih attributed to the adjacewastal State- yieldstheconclusion for the law
of Statesucession that continental shelf rights were transferred to Italy by
Turkey and then from Italy to Greece,dong with territorialsea rights, in the
respective treatiesThe elaboration of this matter is, of courseone for the
merits.
At this stage 1 merely draw attentiontothe façt that in Articl12 of the
Treaty of Lausanne Turkey renouncd "a tous droits et titres, de quelque
nature que ce soit" in respectfthe ceded territories.
The case which we now present concerns the areas of continental shelf in
the Aegean Sea which belong respectively to Greece and Turkey. 1 stress ar
the outset that it wncerns areas. If 1 used the expression "boundary" or
"delimitation" 1would distract attention from what is the central principle at
issue, namely the allocation of the seabed. Delimitation is a subordinate
question, dependent upon the ascertainment that there are two areas to be
divided or to havea boundary between thern.To speak of delimitation alone
would be to confuse the major and minor questions.
What Turkey seems to be saying is that in the eastern half of tAegean
Sea Greece has no "area of' continental shelfwhatever.That isa proposition
atonce so extreme and politicallyinsensitivsoas to invite immediate dissent,
yet that, simply put, appearsto be it. So the questionnot,in Turkjsh eyes,
one of delimitation at al], but oof outright denial of any entitlement. The
delimitation that Turkey would seem to envisage would be one which would
mur only afterGreece conceded that the only area of continental shelf
appertaining to Greece is thatin the western half of the Aegean Sea. The94 hECEAN SEA
At the merits stage of the case we shaU cail eminent expert evidence to
elaborate more technically upon these geological facts, so 1 shaI1,with the
Court's indulgence, leave it there and go on with the question of law which
arises korn an association oftwo fack of quite different order, onfactbeing
the location ofthe islands on this submerged land mass, the other being the
fact of the politicalcharacter ofe islandsas part ofGreece.
When the Turkish Government says that the islands are protuberances of
the Turkish continental shelf, they cannot possibly mean that they are this
merely because they ernerge from the seabed and not vice versa. If they did
mean this, and merely this, they would be denying that an island which is
not also a continent, such as Australia or Madagascar, could ever have a
continental shelf. The Caribbean islands could not;Mauritius could not ;Fiji
could not.That would be a manifest absurdity which 1am confident the Court
would noE fora moment countenance. ClearIythen Turkey means something
else and, under the pretence of revealing mere geophysical facts, Turkey is
introducing politicafactorsas qualificationsand then trying to make these the
intrinsic link between the geophysics and the law. To be fair to the Turkish
Government, il has not specifiedthe politicalfactorsJOwe can only speculate
as to what they might be. What, then, could they be ?
Well, one factor which would distinguish the Aegean islands from, Say,
Trinidad and Tobago, which are geographical analogieswhich cannot escape
one'sattention,would be the political factthatrinidad and Tobago constitute
a Smte in themselves. On that basis alone, then, Turkey might admit what
seems to be obvious to al1 the world, that Trinidad and Tobago have a
legal continental shelf, although these islands could be describeci as mere
protuberances of the South American continental margin which they un-
doubtedly are, unlike for example, the Windward Islands.But that conclu-
sion that Trinidad and Tobago had a continental shelf in the legal sense,
would obviously involve a departure from the simple equation of law and
geophysics which itpurports to be.
On the same basis,presumably the United Kingdomand Ireland, which are
mere protuberances of the continent ofWestern Europe, are entitled to seabed
rights.b ita question of scale or of political identity that wauid yield that
conclusion ?
But what isthe case when the islands are separated both geophysicallyand
as political dependencies from the metropolis, and are protuberances of the
continental shelf ofanother continent,such as St.Pierreand Miquelon ?Well,
we do not have to enter into that distinction because oursaIcase where we
say the islands are both upon a seabed thae is geophysicallycontinuoris with
the land mass andare partof the metropolitan territory politically. If they are
not to have seabed areas attributed to them in these circumstances, which
islands would have ? Could the islands of Denmark, which are part of the
rnetropolitan territory which includes a part of continental Europe ? Ah, it
might be said, but the capital of Denmark is on an island. Well, what if the
capital of Greece happened to be Mytilene, would that make ail that much
legal difference?And what of the Aaland Islands ?They are protuberances of
the seabed between Swedenand Finland, although, bathymetricaily, perhaps,
lessobviously linked with Sweden. Do they have no seabed entitlement ?
What of the Shetland and Orkney Islands, or the Faroes ? Are they no1
mere protuberances ? Are they not island parts of a metropolis ? They are
closer to other national than to foreign territory which certainly distinguishes
them from the Greek islands, but isthat the distinguishing factor ?
1mention these cases, notbecause 1expect the Court to consider them, but ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR O'ÇONNELL 95
only to demonstrate the implausibility of the proposition that islands do not
have adjacent seabedareasunless itcan besaid in a geologicalsens- asit can
be saidof Australia- that the seabed is the natural prolongatioofthe land
mass and not vice versa.
Intheir negotiations with the Greek Government, the Turkish Government
has sought to draw inferences from what this Court said in the North Sea
Conlinenta[Shelfcase about "natural prolongation" and these inferences we
submit are erroneous. "Natural prolongation" played an important role in the
Court's Judgment in that case,and is unquestionably a valid concept. But it
was used in the case in a ver- restricted çontext, namely to indicate the
general scope and direction of the area of the seabed tu which a concave
coastlinewas entitled in relation to the situation of adjacent StateasAthe
Court pointed out in paragraph 44, even then the concept of "natural
prolongation" was interpreted by the parties in the case in quite different
ways.
Subsequent speculation about the implications of the Court's Judgment
have, however, carried the notion of natural prolongation beyond what was
in issue in the NorthSeaCon rinentalSliewcase.
One important and central implication which has baen drawn, and which,
we submit,correctly so, relatesto the distanceover which the sovereign rights
of coastal Statesmight extendIIIthe caseofacontinent which fronts upon an
ocean, "natural prolongation" would have the conceptual effect ofndicating,
as the terminus of coastal State rights, the full extent of the continental
margrn. To this extent,"natural prolongation" resolvesthe ambiguity in what
is called the "exploitability criterion" in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention,
and it has virtually eliminated the bathymetric device for determining the
extent of the continental shelf, which was the 200-metre isobath.
Natural prolongation has also played a role in thedetermination of the
respectiveareas ofthe seabed to be attributed to opposite States,as waslto
adjacent States,namely the point where the respective natural prolongations
meet and overlap.
But to say that "natural prolongation" can be used to deny that the
sovereign of land areas has any entitlement whatever to the areas of the
seakd, merely because the land areas rise from the seabed rather than the
seabed extending from them, is obviouslya complete rnisinterpretation of the
Court's doctrine which can only be productive of mischievous consequences.
And this is so even when the island areas in question arise fromtheseabed
which, in a geological sense,is the extension of a continent under another
political sovereignty.
We in fact do not concede that this is the case in the Aegean, that tais is
case of islands arisinfrom the seabed ofa continent which is under another
sovereign. It isjust as misleading to say that the seaofdthe Aegean is the
natural prolongation of Anatolia as to say it is the natural prolongatioof
Greece. It is the natural prolongation, ifone wantoput it that way, of them
both, because there isa geophysically continuous structure linking the land
masses. The problem is one of deterrnining the areas to which Greece and
Turkey are respectively entitled, whereas Turkey appears to be saying that
there isno problem at ah because Greece has no areas to which it isentitind
the eastern Aegean.
The truth about the matter geologically,of course, isthk aimisnomer to
speak ofthe seabed of the Aegean as continental shelf at all, juas itis a
misnomer to speak of the Baltic or the Persian Gulf as continental shelves.
Members of the Court will recalithat this problem of nomenclature was96 AEGEAN SEA
alrnost the first to bother the International Law Commission in 1950. If legal
rights were to be limited toseabeds which were continental shelves in the
strictly geographical sense, then only those countries which fronted upon the
oceans could have seabed entitlernenis. That would have ben an absurd
conclusion, because in fact oil was kingabslracted from submerged areas
that were not within the continental margin at all,such thePersian Gulf. So
the concept of the continental shelfwas deliberately broadened in order to
encompass places which the geographers wouid not have described as
continentalshelves.
It is for this reason that the concept of "natural prolongation", sovalid and
useful insome contexts, may have no relevane ta the particular question in
thiscase,because we are not dealing here with the marginofa continent at all
but with a submerged basin likethe Adriatic or CheBlackSea. If Members of
the Court care to consult their maps they will see that the declivity which
çowld be said to be the terminus of Europe is south of Crete and natural
prolongation really has relevance to that feature but that is not the matter in
issue.
The Court adjournedfrom 11.15 to 11.40a.m
1have begun by dissecting,in a preliminaq way, the Falseprojaction of the
concept of "natural prolongation" which the Turkish Government has relied
upon in its negotiations with Greece,andIsubmit that Ihave shown that it is,
to put it at the least, questionable. This so,nitis, submit, clear that there
is a dispute between Greece and Turkey on the most basic question of all,
namely, whether Greek territory has any seabed entitlement whatsoever. At
the stage of preliminary measures it is nonecessary forme to nail once and
for al1 the fallacy in the Turkish rnisuse of the concept of "natural pro-
longation".
So I now turn to the positive element in our case. Articl1of the Geneva
Convention on the Continental ShelfStatesthat the term is usedtorefer to the
çeabedand subsoil of submarine areas adjacent tothe coast but outside the
area of the territorial sea a"tothe seabed and subsoil of sirnilar submarine
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands". There is, of course, no definition of
"islands" in the Convention but we say thai there is an impliedreference to
the definition of "island" in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
ConCiguousZone, which is a naturally formed area ofland, dry at al1tides.
We say, too, that thiisa definition in customay law sothat we do not have
to rely upon the contention that Articl1is expressive of customary law.But
we still say that it is expressive of it.
In theNorrh Sea ConrinentalSheIfcase (I.Ç.JReporrs 1969,p. 11,theCourt
referred three times to the customary law character of the basic conceptsof
the continental shdf as they are enshrined in the f~st three articles of the
Convention. In paragraph 22 it referred ta the most fundamental ruleof aü,
the ruleof law relating to the continental shelf>namely, natural prolongation,
as "enshrined in Article2 ;though quite independent of it".Both Greece and
Turkey agree with that, although we say that Turkey is seeking to turn the
inference insideout when itcornes toIdands.Then in paragraph 63, the Court
said of the f~stthree articles that these were ones "which, it is clear, were
then regarded as reflecting. orascrystallizing, received or at least emergent
rulesof customary international law relative to the continental sheIft'.And in
paragraph 100 it said that the régimeof the continental shelf "furnishesan ARGUhlEhTOF PROFESSORO'CONNELL 97
example of a legal theory derived from a particular source that has secured a
general following".
Of course it is easy to point out that these three passages have not
necessarily endorsed al1aspects of the first three articles as customary law,
including the matter of islands, or to quibble over the expression "at least
emergent rules of customary international law". But prima facie these
statements of the Court, 1submit, cover the Greek contention that islands do
have continental shelves, and that nothing has been shown which could make
an exception of the Greek islands to this general rule. Judge Padiüa Neno had
no doubt about it. On page 96 he said that "The first three articles of the
Convention were igend_ed-to be broadly declaratory of existing customary
international law .. .". Judge Tanaka on page 173 described the Convention
"as a kind of law-making treaty" and added at page 179 that Articles 1to 3,
"constitute the fundamental concept of the continental shelf '.
If our contention is correct that every island has its entitlement to a portion
of the seabed, then there is a clear presumption that the islands of the Aegean
benefit from this rule. This being so, the question left would be the
subordinate one of delimitation or boundary futing. That should be the issue
in this case. It is not, because Turkey denies the major premise altogether, and
makes a dispute out of the fundamental question whether islands have seabed
areas appertaining to them.
Had Turkey in her negotiations with Greece been less ambitious in her legal
propositions we might have had something more concrete to dispute about.
But Turkey has not said that the existence of the islands is a special
circumstance as envisaged in Article 6 of the Convention. She has probably
avoided that contention because Article 6, consistently with the doctrine in
the North Sea Continental Slleifcase, would not apply as such ;and because
"special circumstances" in that Article is clearly a legislative interpolation
without support in customary law. Sowe say that even if Turkey did attempt
to make a case based upon special circumstances, this would not be a case of
special circumstances.
But the dispute is not about such details.There isnoargument about special
circumstances. The case is about the broadest of al1 possible proposi-
tions - have the islands seabed entitlements beyond the territorial sea or not ?
The Turkish Government says that they have not because they emerge from
the seabed and not vice versa. We Saythe opposite because, even though they
may emerge from the seabed, the legal criterion is the exercise of political
authority over the land to which the seabed is adjacent.
That is what the dispute is about. It could not be a more simple issue to
state,although it may not be so simpleto resolve. Once that fundamental issue
is decided in favour of the islands having an entitlement to areas of seabed,
then will arise the subordinate question of delimitation. We do not know
what the Turkish attitude wiU be to that subordinate question because they
have steadfastly resisted being persuaded from their one and only contention
that the islands are to be altogether discounted for seabed purposes.
At this stage we are obliged only to make out a prima facie case, and 1
submit that 1have done so with respect to the main issue in dispute. Indeed, 1
would only need, 1submit, to adduce Article 1 of the Geneva Convention and
indicate the islands to which we say that applies to havemade out such a case.
If Turkey did not object to that proposition, it would be a case valid and
accepted by al1the world. Turkey does take issue with it, but that is not to
displace what is prima facie authentic about our case. So 1propose to leave
that aspect until the hearing on the merits.98 AEGEAN SEA
But before 1depart from it altogether, 1feelthat 1should emphasize what is
centrai to the legal conception as distinct from the geophysical conception of
the continental shelf, and that isthe exercise of political authority. This Court,
in the North Sea Continental Sheifcase, made the point in several passages,
and thereby gave the notion of "natural prolongation" a specificaüy legai as
distinct from a geophysical character. It said that the coastal State exercises
sovereign rights over the seabed by virtue of two things, which it called twin
factors. One of these was the natural prolongation but the other was
"sovereignty over the land". The continental shelf is "a prolongation or
continuation of the land territory or domain, or land sovereignty of the coastal
State". Here territory and political authority march hand in hand, the one an
aspect of the other. You cannot have one without the other. The basic idea,
the Court said, is of something already possessed. And possession, of course,
is a political not a geophysical notion.
So it is the fact that sovereignty is exercised upon the dry land to which the
seabed is adjacent that is the critical factor. The sovereignty of Greece
pervades the islands. The seabed in dispute is geophysically linked with them
and nearer to them than it is to the areas of land which are under Turkish
sovereignty. Surely that is the central criterion. But the Court's understanding
of the matter is further evidenced, 1 submit, by what it said about the
territorial sea. It referred to the attribution of the seabed to the land mass by
virtue of the outflow of sovereignty from the land into the territorial sea. The
quality of the coastal State's rightsmay differ when this emanation of political
authority goes beyond the limits of the territorial sea into the seabed, soas to
become "sovereign rights" rather than sovereignty, but that is a matter of
degree rather than of intrinsic entitlement. If the coastal State is entitled to
territorial waters it is entitled, upon the same principles, to continental shelf,
where a continental shelf exists.
That, apparently, is what Turkey aims to deny. Why does not Turkey deny
that Greece is entitled to territoiial'sea rights because the islands are pro-
tuberances of Turkish soi1? No. international law attributed the territorial
sea to them and Turkey admits this in agreeing upon a common territorial sea
frontier around the Dodecanese. Why then should not international law
authorize the further emanation of political power that reposes in the
continental shelf doctrine ?We are not told. We have never been told. But it
does not matter for irnmediate purposes of this case because 1submit that we
have made out a prima facie case.
At issue in this case is the basic question whether the doctrine of natural
prolongation achieves an exact equation between legal and geological
premises or not. 1have given reasons why we say this cannot be so for al1
purposes and for aii aspects, among them the fact that the legal régimeapplies
in areas which are not continental margins in the geophysical sense. 1 now
conclude the point by drawing attention to what the Court said in the North
Sea Continental Sheifcase at paragraph 94. It said:
"In balancing the factors in question it would appear that various
aspects must be taken into account. Some are related to the geological,
others to the geographicai aspect of thesituation,others again to the idea
of the unity of any deposits."
That, 1submit, indicates a certain flexibility in the articulation of the link
between law and geophysics. But then the Court goes on to emphasize the
basic reasons why one must start with the notion of political authority over ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR O'CONNELL 99
the land in orderto reach out for politicaiauthority over the seabed. It is said
at paragraph 96 :
"The doctrine of the continental shelf i..encroachment on maritime
expanses .. . the principle is applied that the land dominates sea . . .
the land is the legalsource of the power whichaState may exerciseover
territorial extensions to seaward . . ."
When Turkey tries to distinguish between the territorial sea and the
continental shelf- conceding the former but not the latter to the Creek
islands- she drives a wedge into what in the Court's view is an integrated
expanse of political authority. The Court said in paragraph 96 that "the
contiguous zone and the continental shelf are in this respeconcepts of the
same kind". Does Turkey deny Greece a contiguous zone as well ? But how
could Turkey do thiswhen at paragraph 43 the Court xaid, as part of its
statement of the fundamental principles, that the continental shelf is a
prolongation "via the bed of iis territorial seIfthe territorial sea is validly
claimed, so must the contiguous zone be. But if this is thcase,why not the
continental shelf too ?
There remains one more point about the issues in dispute. The Greek case is
that this is a matter of oppositStates.To that extent it is different from the
NorthSea Continental Shrlfcase which was a matter of adjacent StatesInthe
case of oppositeStatesthe areasof apportionment to whjch each are entrtledis
indicated by the respective areas of natural prolongation. The subsidiary
process of delimitation follows upon the determination of the portions to be
delimited, and is a matter then of details. Turkey, by denying that there is
anything to apportion at all,seeks to alter the whole question - making
delimitationrelate tothe median line between mainland Greece and Anatolia.
If,as we contend, that is fallacious, then the respective opposite coasts are
those of the Greek islands and Anatoiia.
Inthe North Sea Continental Shefcase the Court said at paragraph57 :
"The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite Statecan be
claimed by each of them to lxa natural prolongation of its territory.
These prolongations meet and overlap, and can therefore only be
delimited bymeans of a median line;and, ignoring the presence of islets,
rocksand, minor coastal projections, the disproportionally distorting
effectof which can be elirninatedby othermeans, such a line must effect
an equal divisionof the particuiararea involved."
The distinction between the cases of opposite andadjacent States is then
pursued in the following paragraph.
1shall now make submissions as to the legal requirements for the ordering
of interim measures by the Court, leaving further consideration of thesub-
stanceof the dispute to the stageof the merits.
With respectto interim rneasuresthere isa general position in international
law and a special position under Article41 of the Court'sStatute and Article
33 of the General Act. 1begin with the general position because the Coiirtwill
nodaubt have this in mind when it interprets the specifk powers under these
two Articles.The importance of this general position is that, ifthe existencein
customary international law of an inherent power in international tribunals to
indicate interirn measures were overlooked, and the purpose for which such
an inherent power exists were neglected, there rnight be established more
stringent limitationsas to the occasions and circumstances wherein such
measures could be ordered than international iaw warrants. This is the100 AEGEAN SEA
thought behind the staternent of Judge Hudson in his work Inrernu~ional
TribunulsPas1and Furüre in1944.He said :
"Whilea proceeding is pending before an international tribunal, good
faithwould seem to require that neither of the parties should attempt to
alter the situation existinsuch a way asto add to the difficultofthe
tribunal."(P.96).
In support of this staternent he quoted frampassageof theJudgment of the
Permanent Court in the Elmriciry Company f Sofiaatid Buigariucase : -
'The parties to a case musr abstain from any measure capable of
exercisinga prejudiçial effectin regard to the executofthe decisionto
be given and, in general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken
which mighr aggravate or extend the dispute". (P.C.I.J,SerieA IB, No.
79, p. 199.)
Mr. President,1pause here tu emphasize this sratement of the Courtinthe
ElectricityCompany ofSoJa and Bulgaria casebecause it isthe decisionupon
which we take OUI standW . hen it is analysed It yrelds the following
propositions :Firstly, there is a generlonsideration underlying the right to
order interim rneasures, namely, not allow any step to be taken which might
aggravate or extend the dispute. Secondlysuch step isa step "oany kind". In
other words, al1 actions ofthe parties which might aggravate or extend the
dispute fa11under the jurisdiction the Court. Thirdly, this general power to
order interim measures ta avoid aggravation or extension of the dispute is
separable from and not merely another way of phrasing the ideathat interim
measures are intended to avoid prejudice in regard to the execution of the
decisionlaterto be given.
My submission isthat there are here twa broad and separate grounds for
the Court's authority to order interirn measures. One ground is that actions
should not be taken which would prejudicethe exeçution ofthe decision,and
the other ground isthat actions shoukdnotbe taken which might aggravateor
extend the dispute. These are clearly independent grounds for the Court's
intervention, but they are alsoofcourse, Iinked inasmuch as aggravation or
extension of the dispute may of itselfmake it more difficult for various
reasons to carry a decision of the Court into effect. So ansense the word
"prejudice" covers both of these independent grounds and is not used in the
very technical senseof it being impossibleto execute the judgment because,
for example, the product which is the subject of the dispute may have been
consumed in the meanwhile or, as in the Nuclear Tesls cases, harm may have
ben caused to people and territory in the meanwhile.
This is clearly what Judge Hudson had in mind when he referred to the
provisions empowering tribunals zotake interim measures for the protection
of the parties as reinforcing this principle.The principle itselfhas been
enunciated by the Third Chamber of the Arbitral Commission on Property
Rightsand Interests in Germany. It said:"We have no doubt ofour inherent
power to issue such orders asmay be necessary to conserve the respective
rights of the parties(ILR, 1958-1,Vol. 25, at p.523.1
Now in the present case we contend that there are two separate and
independent grounds for an award of interim measures, although they are
obviously linkedby the embracing notion of prejudiceinasmuch as the whole
process of judicial settlement in thecaseis likely to be undermined if the
politicalsituation should gravely deteriorate. These two grounds a:e ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR WCONNELL
(a)First, the specificground is that Grme's rights would be prejudiced if the
Turkish Gaveniment were free, pending the Court's judgment, to
continue with itsseismic activities, the subject-matter of our cornplaint.
Supposing bhat the Court upholds Greece's contentio tnat she has
exclusiverights over the seabed which is in dispute, then her exclusiviis
prejudiced by Turkey's acquisitionof knowledge ahut the geophysics of
thearea. 1shall elaborate upon thia littlelate;1mention it here inbroad
terms.
(B) The second isthe generalground and this isthat continued seismicactivity
on Turkey's part in the disputed area threatens international peace and
security. In that sense there would be aggravation or extension of the
dispute. The gravity of this should not be underestimated. My learned
friend Professor Pinto will address the Couri on the facts relating tthis
situation.1 shall confie rnyself to pointing out the link between the
Court'sdwtrine in the Eleariçiry Company ofSoJia and BuIgariacaseand
the Court's role within the United Nations systern respecting peaceful
settlement. Ithere isan independent source ofthe Court's cornpetenceto
order inkrim measures in order to prevent aggravation or extension of a
dispute, there isalsoa specific source for it in the tenor, purposes and
principlesofthe United Nations Charter, which can be used to amplify the
sparse wording of Article 41 of the Court's Statute.
So 1now turn to Article 41 specificaliy.First, it should be nokd that that is
the same asArticle 41 of the Statute of the Permanent Court. Therefore the
statement of the Court in the EIectrici~Company of SofiaandBulgarta caseis
not a peculiarity of the doctrinof the old Court.
Secondiy, Article 41, while it speaks in terms of a power conferred upon
the Court, must clearly be construed in the light of the inherency of the
authority to order interirn rneasuresas a power coupled with a duty, that is
a duty to exercise a judicial discretion to prevent either of the two types
of injury ar deterioration to which I have referred. It is notin any sense
an uncontroiled discretion. Where the circumstances exist which warrant
interirn rneasures, 1 submlt that the Lourl has a duty ta indicate those
provisional measures which the Court thinks are appropriate to preserve the
rights of a party likely tobe prejudiced. That is the significance which, I
submit, is attachableto the word "may" in Article 41.
1 now turn to Artide 33 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes. ThisIs remarkable inasmuch as ituses the expression
"aggravate or extend the dispute". The Article is divided into three
paragraphs. The second deals with proceedings of conciliation and is
irrelevant. The fmt reads as follows:
"1. In al1 cases where a dispute forms the object of arbitration or
judicial proceedings,and particularly ifthe question on which the parties
differarises out of acts already committed or on the point of being
committed, the Permanent Court of International Justice, acting in
accordance with Article 41 of its Statute,orthe Arbitral Tribunal, shall
lay down within the shortest possibletime the provisional rneasuresto be
adopted. The parties to the dispute shdl be bound to accept such
measures."
The third paragraph reads :
'The parties undertake to abstain from aH measures iikely to react
prejudicially upon the execution of the judicial or arbitral decisioor AHGUME~TOF PROFESSORXONNELL 103
and only if the Court should fiod that the General Act was stiilnlforce, did
Australia also rest its request for provisional measures on Article 33. Also,
that the Court would be entîtledto indicate interim measures of protection on
the basis of Article 33 if the Court were satisfied that it was not manifestly
without jurisdiction under that Act. But, in view of the dire urgency of the
matter, it was wished that there would be no delay in granting interirn
measures by reason of the fact that the Court might find itnecessary to go
beyond what was needed to justify the indications of interim measures under
Aflicle41 .
The Court, in its Order of22 June 1973, adverted to this reply, and then
went on in paragraph 19of page 103 to say :
"Whereas the Court is notin aposition to reachafinal wnclusion on
this point [that is Article 331at the present stage of the proceedings, and
willtherefore examine the reguest for the indicatioofinterirn measures
only in the context of Article1of the Statute."
The question now arises of the submission that Greece makes with respect
to Article 33. Becauseofthe urgency of the case for rnterim measures, Greece
cannot kke any other position than to say that if the question of interim
measures had toawait a final decisionon the General Act then Greece would
not wish that delay ro occur.
But Greece subrnits that the question of indicating interirn measures under
Article 33 needsto be reopened and, to that extent, Greece relieupon it.
The grounds for this areas follows :fust,in the Nuclear Tests cases there
was, at the stage of interim rneasures, a wider spectrum of doubt as to
whether the General Act was in forcethan there could posslblybe today. This
is because the Court went on in the Nuclear Testscases to a hearing on the
jurisdiction. The result of that hearing will be recalled. The majority of the
Court held that supervening events had terrninated the dispute, anso it was
unnecessary to givejudgment. But the rninority which dissentedon that point
did go ahead to write opinionson the question ofjurisdiction, anso we have
sixjudges holding the General Actto be in force in terms so definiteand with
arguments so plausible that the whole status of the General Act has been
transformed since the frst hearing in thNuclear Tesrs cases. Whereas aEthat
time the Coun found thatprima facie the General Act was in force, now we
have a very strong judicial opinion that indeed it is in forcwhich, if not
exactly a finding, must rankas the most cogent statement of judicial opinion
short ofan actual majority judgment in the Court's history. The status of the
General Act, 1submit, has been raised from the levelof the prima facieto the
levelof the presumptive.
This beingso, surely Greece is entjtled to the benefit ofArticle 33,for if she
is to be denied this, then she is to be denied the benefit of participatioa in
treaty which is presumptively in force, 1submit, and which this Court, we
subrnit, should hold to be in force.
Let me put it thisway :suppose the Court were to say to us, you cannot
tely on Article 33 to bind both parties untwe havedecided that the General
Act is in force between you becaus teat would be to apply the treaty when
we may, theoreticaiiy, decide that it is not applicable.chit s an argument
that can be turned the other way around.IfGreece ha rights under Article 33
and is not to benefit from them until the last doubt about thGeneral Act is
removed by ajudgment, and that judgment, asseernslikely, is that the treaty
is in force,then Greece has been denied the knefits of these rights, perhaps ta
her great detriment.104 AEGEAN SEA
Surely this avoidance of detrimenisthe very purpose of Article 33. Surely
the general principles ofw about presumptions rnust operate so asto avoid
so unfortunate a consequence. 1 think thal the pointisunprecedented, so 1
must seek to reinforce it by oblique means.
On the specificsubject of treatiIssubmit that the notion of presumptive
effect runs rhroughout the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Ar-
ticl42, dealing with the impeachment oftreaties, reflem it.The whole thrust
of Part V isin favour of the applicability of treaties which were oslensibly
in force.I draw attention speçificallyto Article 18. Thsays that a State is
abliged torefrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
a treaty when it hassigned the treaty but the treaty is not yet binding upon
it. Surely the conversmust be aJorrio rhi.remust be an obligationto re-
frain from acts which would defeat the object and purposeof atreaty when
the treaty is ostensiblinforce but issubjeci toa challenge. This converse
of Article 18 is essentially whai Article 33 aiat- namely, the prevenlion
of acts which woufd defeat the object and purpose of the General Act.
This, so far,has been an argument that the Court should, because Ar-
ticle 33 ispresurnptively in force, utilizArticle.But ifthe Court is unpre-
pared to acceptthe logicof this, there is anather associated argument 1would
wish to make as to the relevanceof Article33.
This is that the Court's inherent powerto indicate interim measures, which
givesit an alternative source of power to Article 41, woseem to authorize
the Court to make an order equivalenin conlext to an order under Article 33,
even if that Article is not treated asthe soofcthatpower. Furthermore, if
the source of the Court's power is an inherency derived from the general
principles of law and customary internationallaw, theCourt, while relying
upon Article 41, could pick up the content of an undertaking which is
presumptively in force, namely Article 33, and enunçiate its indicationof
provisional measures in those terms, becausethe presurnptivity would be a
product of the general principles of law.
Fhave dealt with the authentisourcesof the Court's power withrespectto
interirn measures in thicase. now turn to the conditions for the making of
an order ofinterim measures. Ofcourse, ifArticle 33 io be applied,then the
Court has no discretion about the matter once the conditions are fulfiiled.If
the Court decides to rely upon Article 41 only, then the conditions must be
such as to require an exerciseofjudicial discretion in the indication of interim
measures. The conditions are thesame. The question is whether they must be
more stringent inthe caseof Article 41 thaninthe caseof Article 33.
It rnay be useful at the outset to review the cases in which requesfor
interim measures were accepted by the Court and itspredecessor. There are
11instances altogether. An order for interim rneasureswas made 5nof these
cases and rejected in 6 of them. But it is significant that of the 6 there
were special reasons for refusal which had no bearing upon thefactsin the
present case.
lnthe Fastoryar Chorzowcase (P,C.I.J.,SeriesANo. 1.21G,ermany sought
an interim payment and the Court saidrhat this was tantamount to sekingan
interim judgment :the question ofdarnages was one for the merib. In the
Legal Starus oftheSouth-Easter Ternfot ofGreenland case (P.Ç.I.JSeries
A /B, No.48, at p. 284),the Court said that the incidentscomplained of could
not affect the existencer value of the sovereign rights clairnby Norway
over the territory. In the Prince vonPlrssAdminisrrario~rca(PC..I.J.,Series
AIB. No. 541,interim rneasures were inappropriate because of undertakings
which had been given. In the PolishAgrurian Reform andGerrnan Minoriiy ARGUMENT OF PROESSOR O'CONNELL 105
case (P.C.1J, Series AJB,No. 581,it wm said thar interirn rneasures would
result in a general suspension of the programme of agrarian reform. That
referred to future rather than past expropriations and hence went beyond the
rights claimed and so did not fail under Artic4e1,and would not therefote be
regarded as solely designed to protect the subjecl-matter of the dispute :in
the 1t11erhandt.cIase IIC.J. Reports 1957, p. los), interim rneasures were
inappropriate because the United Stares said that it intended no action that
would prejudice the stuation ;and in the case concerning the TriaI of Pakis-
tani Primners of Wur (I.Ç.JReports 1973, p. 238),the element of urgency
wasremoved because the Applicant had requested a postponement.
Of these cases, only the fustwo, the Factoryar Chorzow case and the Lrgal
Statusof rheSouth-EasternTerritoryof Greenland casewould seem to call for
comment at all. In the first of thern, tCourt at page 284 expressly avoided
deciding whether measures of protection would be granted for the "sole
purpose of preventing regrettable events and unfortunate incidents". In the
present case the prevention of regrettable events and ~infortiinateincidents is
one aim we have in requesting interlm measures, but it is not the sole one. But
even ifiwere the sole one,the fact thar tCourt deliberately leftthe question
open is indicativeof the fact that Article 41 does not obviously preclude the
making of an order in that situation.
The second of these cases, the Legal S~atusof tkrSourh-EasfernTerri,or,v
of Greenlandcase, rnight at first glance appear to have afinities with the
present case, since itwas a territorial dispute and interim measures were
sought - although, unlike this case, sought solely for the purposof avoiding
regrettable incidents. But a threat to the peace, as clearly exists in the presenr
case, cannot be described in the banal terms of "regrettable incidents", The
facts in the LegaSrafus of the South-EasrernTerritov ofGr~enlandcase are
totaiiy different and really trivial. Thereweaefew Norwegian hunters in the
area, one of them invested with police powers, and there were a relatively
large number of Danes. There was a vague apprehension that Norwegians
and Danes might meet and provoke "regrettable incidents". This would have
no bearing upon the rights of eitheParty with respeFtto the territory and that
was not even pleaded In any event, Denmark çontended that Norway had
not established that there was a real possibility of such incidents occurring.
The Court at page 284 expresxly avoided deciding whether Article 41 gave it
power to indicate interirn measures of protection for the sole purpose of
preventing regrettable events and unfortunate incidents.
So, the cases in which interim measures were not indicated are al1cases
bearing little analogy to the present one. Hence we must concenrrare on the
five cases in which interim measures were ordered. These are the De-
nunciafionof rhe Treaty 0x2 November 1865 bcrween China and Belgiurn
case (P.C.I.J.,Series A, No. ;)the Elertricity Conipanyof Sofia and Bulgaria
case (P.C 1J, S~ries AJB, No. 791, the Atigln-IrnnianOil Co. case CIC.J.
Reports 1951, p. 89) ;the Fisheriu Jurisdiction case (I.C.J. Reports 1972,
p. 123and the Nuclear Trsn cases (1.CJ. Rrporrs 1973, pp. 99 and 135).The
first twoof these do not callfor comment. In the remaining three the Court
has developed a doctrine which calls for analysis.
In the Anglo-lruniunOil Co.case the Court sajd :
"Whereas the object of interim measures of protecrion providedfor in
the Statuteisto preserve the respective rights of the Parties pending the
decisionof the Court,and whereas . . . it follows thatthe Court must be
concerned to preserve by such measures the rights which may be106 hEGEAN SEA
subsequently adjudged bythe Court to belong either to the Applicant or
to the Respondent." (1.Ç.JRepor~s 1951,p. 93 .)
In the FisheriesJurisdictiotr case, the Court sa:d
"21. Whereas the right ofthe Court to indicate provisional measures
as provided for in Article5of the Statute has as itsobject to preserve the
respective rightsof the Parties pending the decision of the Court, and
presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights
which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings and that the
Court'sjudgment should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative
regarding the measures which are in issue ;
22. Whereas the immediate implementation by Iceland of its
Regulations would, by anticipating the Court'sjudgment, prejudice the
rights clairnedby the United Kingdom and affect the possibility oftheir
full restoration in the event of a judgment in its favour." (I.C.J.Reports
1972, p. 16.)
And in the ~Vuclea rests casesthe Court repeated the words it had used in
the FisheriesJ~risdicrioncase (1.C.S.Reports 1973,p. 103,para. 20). Later in
paragraph 24,the Court said that:
"Whereas by the terms of Article 41 of the Statute the Court may
indiçate inter& measures of protection only when it considers that
circumstances so require in order to preserve the rights of either party."
Lest there be any misinterpretation of this passage, may 1point out that the
adverb "only", "onlywhen it considers", qualifiesthe verb "considers" in the
temporal clause beginning "when", and doesnot relateto thephrase "inorder
to preseme the rights ofeither party''.That is quite clear from the context. So
the Court is not saying that it is restricted to cases where the rights of the
parties, in the narrow technical sense of the subject-matter of the dispute, are
in need of preservation,but the cases where the "circumstances so require".
In the operative past of the Order in the Nuclear Tests cases the Court
adopted the language of the Elecrriciry Company oJ SoJia and Bulgarin
case- "aggravation or extension of the disputem- as well as the formula
"prejudjce" to the rights of either Pady. That theare alternative injunctions
is clear from the word "or" before the word "prejudice". The Court said that
the Parties:
"Should each ofthem ensure Chatno action of any kind istakenwhich
might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Court or
prejudice the rights of the other Party in the carrying out of whatever
decision the Court may render inthe case,"
Sofar as the first of these alternative injunctionsisconcerned - that of
aggravation or extension ofthe dispute - my learned friend Professor Pinto
will establish the grounds for interim measures.1 shall confine myselfto the
second of them - prejudice to the rights of the parties.
Now the key expressions here are obviously "irreparable prejudice", "the
Court's Judgment should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative re-
garding the measures which are at issue", "prejudice the rights dairned by
the Applicant and affect thepossibilityof their full testoralion". Those are the
three expressions used. In al1threecases to which 1 have referred the Court
had before it an allegation that actior conternplated action on the part of
the Respondent would make it diffcult to give full effmt to a judgment in108 AEGEAN SEA
eignty lncludes the total discretion to formulate a national energy policy.
Such a policy can only be forrnulated on the basis of knowledge as to the
availability of resources, extent and locatiof reserves, the likely economics
of extraction, etc. The existence or otherwise of known geologicalfactorisan
essential element in this national process.
We al1know that oil companies are highly secretive and jealous as to the
knawledge they acquire of the fieldswhich they are exploiting, andthey have
good reason for cherishing their knowledge. These include the suppression of
competitron and the diversification of programmes. Governments have the
same motives as those whom they license to exploit. Their total discretion is
impaired if sorneone elseha access to the knowledge without their consent. If
n foreign country has that knowledge, whether or not the claimant to the
continental shelf has it in fact or not, it is shared knowledge available for
economic and political exploitation.
Once the genie of knowledge isout of the oil lamp itcannot be put back.
Let me point to one practical consequence of this :if the Government of
Turkey aquim knowledge of the geology of an area which the Courtsub-
sequently holds tobelong to Greece, and suppose that this knowledge were
to be indicative of the unlikelihood of oil being present there, and suppose
Turkey published that information or otherwise conveyed it, the bargaining
power of the Governrnent of Greece when negotiating with foreign explor-
ation companies to explore the area would obviously lx adversely affected.
It rnight have no applicants at alfor its licences, whereas dherwise it might
have had a queue of them ; or it might be unabie to extract high fees,whereas
otherwise there mlght have been somany applicants that Greece might have
auctioned the rights.
This is one obvious way in which rights expressed in Article 2 of the
Continental Shelf Convention involve exclusivity and why breach of these
tighrs is irreparable prejudice, and does anticipate the Court's judgment, and
does make restoration of the Full righîs impossible. In other words, the
conditions Forexercise of theCourt's powers under Article41 are fullymet by
the fact of seismic activity occurring.
At this point 1shall dealwith the possible argumentthat there hasbeen no
breach of Greece'srights at all, because the açtiviofthe:ship Sismik I would
not be classifieas exploration, which isa rnatrer of the sovereign rights of the
coastal State, but scientific research, which it migbe said wasnot so. Well,
at the outset 1repudiate the distinction's relevance for the very reasons 1have
given, namely the exclusivity of knowledge. It does not rnatter how one
characterizes seismicactivity, as exploration or research, the resulthe same
and that iswhat counts. Indeed, the distinction ionly aplay upon words. The
coastal State still has exclusivity with respect to knowledgofthe geophysics
of the area of sovereign rights.
The distinction between exploration and scientific researchisvery difficult
if not impossible to maintain in practice when seismicactivity takepslace.If I
am not mixing rny metaphors when discussing the search for oilthe proof of
the pudding isonly in the eating. Only after investigation has beenmade and
the results have been published is it possible to say whether the adion is
exploration or scientific research. The distinction between the two only arises
because Article 1 of the Geneva Convention refers to exploration and Article5
says in paragraph 1 that exploration of the continental shelf and exploitation
of its resources musc not result in any interference with fundamental
,oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the intention of
open publication ; and adds in paragraph 8 that the consent of the coastal110 AEGEAN SEA
any seisrnic or other relevant activity, whether it is called exploration or
scientificresearch.
The Turkish foreign minister has madeit explicitiyclear that the purpose of
SismikI'isto exploreand locateresovrces within and under areasof the Greek
continental shetf.Thus, in his statement of 24 July 1976, which will befound
in Annex VIII, No. 2, in the Application, hesays :
"According to Mr. Ecevit,the most important thing isto determine the
resources of the sea in the areas of the Aegean claimedby Turkey. Sis-
mik I wiilcarry out preciselythis important mission. It will even be able
to carryout its mission notonlyin the areasof the Aegean where rights
are claimed as Mr. Ecevit says, but also in al1the areas of the Aegean
outsidethe territorial water of Greece.Seismicresearch has no other goal
and purpose than to determine resources belowthe sea. And this is what
will be done."
In this context, it becomes almost farcical to debate about "scientific
research". The foreign rninister's statement manifests a clear intention to
violate Greekrights and to create byfair accompli Turkish rights in the Greek
continental shelf.
What the ciraftinghistory of Articles 2 and 5 of the Geneva Convention
clearly confirms is the inirinsic exclusivity of the coastal State with restoct
this appraisal of activitiesaseisrnicnature. The starting point isthe rights of
the coastal State as against other States, and not vice versa. This general
background understanding is now represented in a consensus at the Third
Law of the SeaConference. The provisions of Article5 have ben dropped in
the Revised Single NegotiatingText and draft Article 73 says forthrightly:
"The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of any research
concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there." Custornary law, 1
subrnit, clearly indicates the rightsof Greece to objectto seisrnic activity.
These rights needprotection while the dispute issubject iojudicialsettlement.
Surely itis inadmissibleof Turkey to say thatthere are no rightbecause lhere
is a dispute. That would make nonsense of Article 41, of Article 33 of the
Generai Acs,and of every canon of relevant law.
1 would like to add a few words on the technical aspis of seismic ex-
ploration. As 1 understand it, the lengrhof the cable towed behind the ship
is indicative of the degree of penetration of thsound waves into the earth's
crust. My information isthat a cableof the length of 3,800 metres, such as the
length of the cable streamed by Sisinik1 according to the Notice of Mariners
(see pp. 183,578, itifru)1s indicative of an intention tose+ ed waves
deeply intothe crust of the earth. 1am also informed that the question of the
depth of penetration is in ratio with the intention toseek the existence of
natural resources or merely for scientificresearch The deeper the penetration,
the more likely it is that the objective is to explore for oil. Explosions are set
off which cause echoes to rebound from the various geological interfaces
below the surface of the seabed. There is iherefore no question but thai the
activitiesofSisi7iikIinvolve a probing intothe area which is claimed as the
Greek continental shelf.
1now turn to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court. In a request for
provisional rneasures the Court, as is stated in paragraph 13 of the Nucleur
TestsOrder of 22 July 1973 (1C J Reporrs1973, p. 101):
". . . need not, before indicating them, finally satisfy itself that it has
jurisdictionon the merits of the case, and yet ought not ta indicate such measures unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima
facie, to afforda basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
founded".
Judge Gros inhis dissenting opinion adopted a more rigorous test. In due
course 1shallcompare the presenl casewith the two standards laid down, that
of the Court and that of Judge Cros.
The procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court does not contemplate an
extended argument on the question of jurisdiction in order to satisfy this
requirement of a prima faciecase. There isnothing in Article65, paragraph 1,
which requires this of the requesting party. Furthermore, since paragraph 2
speaks of "a rnatter of urgency"itwould be inappropriate to delay the Court
further than is necessary. 1shall, then, avoid rrying the Court's patience with
arguments more complex than seem to be required at this stage.
In this case ;werely upontwo independent grounds ofjurisdiction. The first
in orderof statement inthe Application,though not necessarilyin the order of
logicalpriority, is Anicle 17 of the General Act for thePacificSettlement of
International Disputes, 1928,read together urith Articles36 (1)and 37 of the
Statute of the Court. The second is the joint communiquéof the Greek and
Turkish Prime Ministers of 31 May 1975, which we submit is a joint and
several acceptance of the Court'sjurisdictionas required by Article 36 (1) of
the Court's Statute.
My learned friend Professor Pinto will address the Court on the second of
these Iwo grounds ofjurisdiction, namely the joint çomrnunjque. 1shall, then,
merely prefacewhat he will haveto say by pointing out the significanceof the
expression "joint and several" as used in the Application. The consensus
results fromthe coincidence of the undertakings of Greeçeand Turkey. In the
NuclearTests cases(I.C.J.Reporss 1974, p.25 1)the Court consideredthe legal
effectof unilateral statements of policy made by the President of France and
Ministers of France. These urere made at a press conference, on Erench
television, and in an address to the United Nations General Assembly. In
these statements it was said that the current round of atmospheric testing
would be the las%a ,nd that it was possible to continue testing underground.
The Court drew the following conclusions from these statements : ". . . the
Çourt findsthat France made public its intention to cease the conduct of
atmospheric nuclear tests . . ." (I.C.J.Repor1974, p.267, para. 4 1).
"lt is well recognizedthat deciarations made by way of uniiaterai acts,
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating
legal obligations Declarations of this kind rnay be, andoften are, very
specific.When it isthe intention of the State making the declaration that
it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on
the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being
thenceforth iegaIlyrequiredto followa course of conduct consistent with
the declaration.An undertaking of this kind, ifgiven publicly, and with
an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of
international negotiations, is binding(lbi ,para. 43.)
"One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance
of legalobligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith.
Trust and confidence ore inherent in international co-operation, in
particular in an age when this CO-operationin rnany fields is becoming
increasingly essential.Just as thvery rule ofpacra sunr swvanda in the
law of treatiesisbased on good faith, so alsoisthe binding character of114 AEGEAN SEA
definition of the dispute were not wntested ;fmally, the right of the
Applicant States which was protected by the Orders was recognized as
king a right currently exercised, whereas the clairn of Iceland mm-
tituteda modification of existing law."(I.C.J.Reports 1973,p. 1 22.)
The situation in the Nuclear Testscases, he said, was the reverse,
". . .since the Applicants standupon a claim to the modification of
existlng positive law when they ask the Court to recognizethe existence
of a nile forbidding the overstepping ofathreshold of atomic pollution"
fibid).
In other words, Judge Gros's test Einkedjurisdiction, as a "circurnstance",
with the merits of the dispute asa "circurnstance*'under Article 41, and his
restrictivetestis that interim rneasuresshould be refused when this aggre-
gation of circumstances induces a certain degree of doubt.
Now we do not haveto take Ourstand upon the Nuclear Tests casesrnerely
because it was then that the Court held that the Generai Act prima facie
conferred jurisdiction. All we rely upon from that case is that, despite the
doubts as to the admissibility of the claim, the Court did order interim
measures on the basiç of prima facie jurisdiction. The present case is very
much stronger, and akin to the Fisheries Jurisdicrion case.We submit that it
satisfieseven Judge Gros's test :there must be an awareness of jurisdiction
because ofthe standing of the General Act in the eyes ofsomany Mernbers of
the Court ;there is urgency ;there is no contest as to the reality and the
precise definition of the dispute; and the merits relate not to a clairn toa
modification of existing positive law but to a clear questionof the scope of
what is unquestionably existing positive law.
So, taking the most restriaed position possible, which ismuch more res-
trictive than the majority doctrine of the Court, we submit that the condi-
tions for interim measures are met.
Oneof the factors in the Court's consideration of when intetim measures
ought to be granted is theinconvenience to the parties which such an order
might occasion. If one balances the equities in this case, one seesthat
continued seismic activity would be harmful in the ways 1have suggested,
whereas if that activity were to be discontinued, and Sismik P divertecl
elsewhere or Paid up for a time, the inconvenience to Turkey would be
accounted trivial.The preponderance of legalbenefit is clearly in favour of the
indication of interim measures than otherwise.
There remains only one further point to cornpiete the prima facie case
cancerning jurisdiction, and Chisis the Zransfeofjurisdiction, iI may so put
it,from the Permanent Court to this Court. It will be recalledthat Artic17of
~heGeneral Act confers jurisdiction upon the Permanent Court. The present
Court acquiresthat jurisdiction byvirtue of Artic37 of the Couri's Statuteas
it was construed in the Barcelona Trocrion, Light and Power Company,
Lirnitedcase. This point was not in issue in the NucieaTesrscases,apparently
because it was beyond controversy, but it was dealt with by the minority
judges in paragraphs 40 and following of their opinion, and that is sufficient
to constitute a prima faciecase,so Ileave it at that.
TheCourr rosearI p.m. SECOND PUBLIC SIïTING 126VI11 76, 10 a.rn.1
Preseirl:[Seesitting of25 VI11 76.1
ProfessorO'CONNELL :Me. President and Memkrs of theCourt, before 1
sum up 1believe it might be appreciated if 1alluded to several implications
of the present case going beyond the strict issue of the delimitationof the
continental shelf in the Aegean Sea.
The case reaches the Court at a fortuitous moment, for there are many
lessons tobe drawn from the fact that it reaches tCourt al all. The moment
is opportune because the principles of boundary-making in the sea, which
prescind from the Judgment of the Court in the North Sea Coirtii~eiirSheu
cases should be elaborated by the tribunal which is central to the whole
mechanism and system of international law, and not done piecemealin other
places.
But the fact that the case reachestheurt at al1isindicativeof a point that
is al1too often overlookecî,particularlyat international conferences which
propose methods of settlement of disputes other than through this Court. The
point is that the very viability of international law depends in the last resort
upon the unique role that this Court was intended to play under the United
Nations Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security. No
other tribunal is linked with the machinery of the United Narions as is this
Court. Article 33 of the Charter.to which the Court drnws attention very
rightly in the NorrliSeoCoiitir~errlhelfcases, and about which 1shail have
to say more in my submissions in a moment, particularly envisages resori to
the Court within the system of peaceful settiement of disputes.
This is not a case concerned only with a technical question, as perhaps
the NorrliSea Conritiet7ralSlwlf cases were. Tt is rathercase wherein the
technical question submitted to thCourt has already generateda great deal of
political tension and agreat excitation of public feeling and alarm. These
circumstances have an important bearing upon the need for interim measures.
Mr. President and Members of the Court, let me now sum up. At this stage
of the case we must establish the following thing:
First that the Court prima faciehas jurisdiction. 1submit th1thave done
so with respectto theGeneral Act, and Professor Pinto ina few minutes will
make his subrnissions on the alternative ground. 1 would only add this
comment on the question of jurisdiction. When the General Actwas invoked
in theNuclear Tests cases it was perhaps pardonable tosuppose that people
were taken by surprise. The General Act suddenly came alive, very much
dive, became the subject ofa great deal of diplornatic s~rutinyand activity. it
was open for denunciation very recently. Turkey has taken no action with
respect to it. Turkey cannot be said to have been taken by surprise. As this
Court reminded us in the Anglo-Notwegian Fishesirs case,ifa government
failsto react to legal action the consequences of its omission are its res-
ponsibility.
Secondly, we must establish that prima facie Greece has rights which
appear to faIlwithin the purview of the Court's jurisdiction. 1submit that 1
have done this by demonstrating that international law considers that ARGUMENT OF PROFESSORD'CONNELL 117
arein disputeand &cause Tuskeyis resistingnotdelimitationwhichis what
negotiation should babout, buteven the existenceof Greekcontinentalshelf
rights. What Turkeywants isforGreece tonegotiateaway rightswhich she
zlaims to be hers- compromise, not sotution - surrender,not consensus.
That iswhy thematter is beforetheCourttoday, theonly properforumforit. QUESTION BYJUDGE RUDA
The PRESIDENT: 1 will cali upon Judge Ruda, who wishes to put a
question to counsel. Of course the Agent and counsel are not expected To
answer that question immediately, but perhapswe can have an answer in a
hearing tomorrow (sec p. 139,irifra).
JudgeRUDA :I would ask the assistance of the Greek delegation on the
following point:
The Greek Government has submitted to the Court, asAnnex IX ta the
Application instituting proceedings (see p. 59, supru), the instrument of
accessionof Greece, subjecttosome reservations, tothe Generd Act of 1928.
Paragraph(b) of this instrument includes the phrase : "and in particular
disputes relating to the terrhtorial stof Greece". 1.would like to ask the
Greek delegation:what isthe effect, if any, of this reservationin relatoon
the present case ? PLAIDOIRIEDE M. PINTO
CONSElL DUGOUVERNEMENTGREC
M. PINTO : Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les juges de la Cour
internationale de Justice, j'ai l'honneur de présenter ces observations, en
qualité de conseil du Gouvernement grec, demandeur en indication de
mesures conservatoires.
La Grkce a une longue tradition de confiance en la juridict notr-
nationale. Elle a apportéau reglement arbitral et judiciaire entre Eiats une
contribution que l'on peut qualifier d'exempIah-e.Il étaitdonc naturel que le
Gouvernement grec propose au Gouvernement turc de soumettre leur
différend,en ce qui concerne les problémesdu plateau continental en mer
Egée,a ladécisionde votre Cour ;et que, cet acaord obtenu, aprésavoir
épuisétoutes les possibilitésde règlement diplomatiqueau moins jusqu'a ce
jour, la Grece sisisse la Cour comme elleI'afait.
Oserai-jedire, me projetant enun unique instant sur le devant de la scéne,
queje ressensun honneur tout particulier de plaider devant la Cour. Comme
de nombreux juristes de ma génération,marque par le maître ouvrage de
Nicolas Politis,j'ai placé dans la justice internationale un espoir que les
vicissitudes des relations internationales, au cours du dernier demi-siécle,
n'ont jamaisaboli.
Aussi la délégationgrecque et celui qui vous parie personnellement
regrettent sinoirement l'absence,cificielleau moins, de la Turquie, son dkfaut
devant la Cour. Et nous la regrettons d'autant plus que la représentationde
la Turquie n'aurait préjugéen rien des exceptions d'incompétence ou
d'irrecevabilitque 1'Etatdkfendeurpeut faire valoir au cours de la procédure
principale.Nous la regrettons d'autant plusque,comme vous l'avezentendu,
Messieurs de la Cour, les mesures provisoires qui sont soiiicit&s par le
Gouvernement grec sont destinées aprotégernon seulement les droits de la
Grèce mais aussi les droits de la Turquie, c'est-à-direles droits de chacun.
La Cour me permettra sans doute de rappeler solennellement en cette
audience publique qu'elle est un organe principal de l'organisation des
Nations Unies, au meme titre que l'Assembléegénérale etque le Conseii de
sécurité.Dans le cadre de sesfonctions etbe ses responsabilirésparticulières,
laCour a le devoir, wmme les autres organes principaux des Nations Unies et
tous les autres,e réaliserles buts et les principes de 1Drganisation. Et sans
doute les textes queje vais me permettre de vous citer sont dans toutes les
mémoires,mais ne convient-il pas de les rappeler à tout moment ?
« Nous, peuples des Nations Unies, ..
A rriclepremier
Les buts des Nations Unies sont les suivants:
1. Maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales... réaliser,par des
moyens pacifiques, conformémentaux principes de la justiceet du droit
international, l'ajustementou lerèglementde difirends ou de situations,
de caractère international susceptiblesdemener à unerupture dela paix;
[Et l'articl2,paragraphe 4,porte :] 4. Les Membres de I'Oganisation s'absliennent, dans leurs relations
internationales, de recourira la menace ou à l'emploi de la force, soit
wntre l'intégrité territoriale l'indépendancepolitique de tout Etat, soit
de toute autre manièreincompatible avecles buts des Nations Unies.
Maintien de la paix, interdiction du recours a la force armée dans les
relations internationales: sous, cet aspect j'oserai dire que la demande en
indication de mesures conservatoires présentéepar le Gouvernement grec
prend une dimension dramatique.
Il s'agiten effet, et le spectacledu monde nous le montre assez,de paix ou
deguerre. Mais lesbruits du monde ne s'arrgtentpas aux portes de la Cour. La
Cour est trop avertie de la situation dans cette régionparticuliOUe se situe le
diffërend pour qu'il soit besoin de lui rappelelesdangers qui, sans qu'on les
veuille ni les accepte, peuvent surgir d'un incident od'un simple accident.
En dressant devant elle le tableau réalistede ces risques, certes je ne serai
pas infidéleBla vkriteMais je voudrais que la briévetéde nospropos à cesujet
soit le témoignagedu caractéresérieux etgrave de la situation.
Comment cependant ne pas évoquer le risque trop réeld'un rapproche-
ment, d'une fusion de ces foyers si proches, et au-delà de ces conflits armés
localisksdéjàincontr0lables, d'un embrasement généra? l L'urgence estdonc
extrême!
LaGréce et la Turquie sont Membres desNations Unies. Ellessont parties
ce titre au Statut de la Cour, étémentintégrant de la Charte. L'objet du
différend qui les oppose est clairement reconnu et définipar les deux Etats,
dans les notes diplomatiques échangées ed tans lescommuniques unilateraux,
communs ou conjoine, qui ont et&publies.
Mais au-dela de ce diffërend sur la délimitationdu plateau continental en
mer Egee seprofile la menace apportéeau maintien du slalu quo dans cette
région.Cette menace a kt4évoquéepar le ministre des affaires étrangeresde
Grèce devant le Conseil de sécurité etje crois savoir que la Cour est en
possession des documents du Conseil de sécurité,et en particuliede celui que
je vais citer, le procès-verbalde la réunion du 13 aoüt 1975 (S/PV. 1950,
p. 27-28].
Au cours de cette séance,le ministre des affairesétrangères de Grècea cite
des sources gouvernementales turques trèsélevkes - je reprends ses propres
paroles - et je cite les propos qu'alrapportés comme venant de ces hautes
autorit& de Turquie. De M. Gunes, ministre des affaires étrangéres : <<Le
plaieaucontinental de la mer Egéeconstitue [leprolongement]la continuation
de l'Asiemineure ainsi que les îlesen question. iiDe M. Demirel, premier
ministre, le8 juin 1974 :
(Le désaccords'est manifestéen raison du fait que les îles qui se
situent tout prés de la Turquie appartiennent à la Gréceet pas à la
Turquie. Ces iles, à lafinde la deuxièmeguerre mondiale, n'apparte-
naient pas a la Gréce.Les ilesforment une partie de l'Asiemineure et
depuis des sikles elles appartenaient a I'Etat qui dominait l'Asie
mineure. >i
De M. Irmac, premier ministre, le 18 janvier 1375 : (La Turquie ne fait
aucune concession en mer Egée. La moitiénous appartient. M
De M. Sencar,ministre de la défense,le 20 janvier 1975 :
(En mer Egéel,'équilibrepencheclairement vers laTurquie, ceciàun
tel point que les regards et les penséesdes Turcs, anciens habitants PLAIDOIRIE DE M. PINTO 121
des îles, restent fixes sur les terres situéesà quelques milles des côtes
turques dans l'espoirde pouvoir s'y rkétablirun jour. »
M. Demirel, dans une interview a un périodiqueparisien du 5 juillet1475,
déclare :
((Regardez la carte. Est-ce que la mer Egée a l'air d'un lac grec ?
D'ailleurs, l'enseignementde l'histoire renforce celui de la géographie.
Jusqu'a cesderniers temps,lesîie de la mer Egeeont toujours appartenu
i celui qui possédaitl'Anatolie.»
Enfin e, c'estla dernièrecitation quM. le ministre des affaires etrangeres
de Grece présentait au Conseil de sécurité, M. Turkes, vice-présidentdu
Gouvernement turc, a dit le 30 mars 1976 :
(cLe groupe d'îles situées prèsdes côtes turques, y compris le
Dodécanése,doit appartenir a la Turquie, Parmi ces fis, citons
Samothrace, Lemnos, Chio, Samos, Cos, Rhodes et toutes autres petites
et grandes îlessituées une distance de 50 kilornétresi>
J'aitermine la citation de l'exposédu ministre des affaires étrangéresde
Gréceetj'en conclus, sur leplan qui estle mien, que le règlement étabi ar les
conventions internationales, qui ont étrappeléespar mon confrèreet ami le
professeur O'Connell, conventions internationales solennellement garanties
par les Puissances, risquent d'être misesn cause par rupture imminente des
procédurespacifiquesrequises et par lejeu de la force pure.
Messieursde la Cour, il vousa étéexposé - et je ne reviendrai pas sur ces
points, d'autant plus que vous lesconnaissezmieux que nous - que le Statut
confère a la Cour compétence a l'effetd'indiquer des mesures conservatoires.
Il lui attribue mêmele pouvoir exceptionnel de prendre spontanément,
d'office,de telles mesures. L'examendes mesures conservatoires ala priorité
sur toutes autresaffairesAucune exception préliminairedecompetence ou de
recevabilité nepeut suspendre la procéduresur les mesures conservatoires.
Ces exceptions n'ont donc en aucun cas le caractère de ce que les juristes
français appellent des questions prkalables autorisant un sursis à statuer.
D'ailleursilest prévuque la Cour doit statuer d'urgencetellenous en fournit
encore un exemple par l'audience qu'ellenous aaccordée si rapidement.
Ni le Statut ni le Règlement de la Cour ne prévoient ainsiun examen
préalable de la compétence. La jurisprudence de la Cour a justement
détermine les conditions de recevabilitéd'une demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires et le me réfèretout naturellement a cet égard aux
observations qui ont étéprésentees par le professeur O'Connell.
Je rappelle simplement que selon la jurisprudence constante de la Cour
l'indication demesures conservatoires ne préjugeen rien la decision que la
Cour pourrait être amenée a prendre sur une exception àsa compétence siune
telle exceptionétaitprésentée parI'Etatdéfendeur.
Parmi les dispositions gui ont étéindiquees à titre a la fois alternatif et
cumulatif - comme l'a rappelé le professeur O'Connel1 -, parmi ces
dispositions qui ontété invoquks par le Gouvernement grec pour justifier la
competence de la Cour, se trouve l'accord intervenu entre les premiers
ministres de Grèced de Turquie le 31 mai 1975.
La Cour doit étre assurée,suivantles formules mèmesde ses arrêis,que cet
accordconstitue prirnaJacir une base sur laquellesacompétencepourraitktre
fondéeet il m'appartient, comme son auxiliaire temporaire, de tenter de lui
donner cette assurance. Mes observations concernent donc en premier lieu la portéede cet accord
intervenu le 31 mai 1975entre les deux vremiers ministres. Les termes de cet
engagement, énoncédans un communiqué conjoint, commun, sont les
suivants - il est nubliédans les documentssoumis a la Cour. maisie le lis
partir du communique qui aété remis à la presse par la direchon de
I'informationdu ministéredes affairesétrangèresde Turquie le 31mai 1975,a
la date méme ou ce communiqué a étéprésentépar les deux premiers
ministres a la presse grecque, turque et mondiale. Ce document d'ailleurs
pourrait êtreauthentifiêsi la Cour estime qu'ellenkst pas en possession d'un
document suffisamment authentique :
rtAu cours de leur rencontre [indique ce communiquéde la direction
générale de l'informationdu ministèredes affairesétrangèresde Turquie
sous le titre «Comrnuniquti conjoint turco-grec D] les deux premiers
ministres ont eu l'occasion de procéder l'examen desproblkmes qui
conduisirent a la situation actuelle les relations de leurs pays.
Ils ont décidéque ces problkmes doivent étrerêsoluspacifiquement
par la voiedes négociationset concernant leplateau continental de la mer
Egk par la Cour internationale de La Haye. Ils ont définiles lignes
générales sur labase desquellesauront lieu les rencontres prochaines des
représentantsdes deux gouvernements.
A cet égardilsont décidéd'accélérelra rencontre d'expertsconcernant
la question du plateau continental de la mer Egée, ainsique celle des
experts sur la question de i'espaceaérien.»
(Le reste du cornmuniqui: est,si vous le voulez, une sorte d'appel a des
relations amicales entre les deux Etais en'apas la méme pertinence que Ies
passages que je viens de vous lire.)
L'existencede cecommuniquén'estpaset ne pourrait êtrecontestk. 11a été
présentépar lesdeux premiers ministres au cours d'uneconfkrence de presse.
II a&tepublié,comme je viens de ldire,parlessous du ministèreda affaires
étrangères de Turquie. Ilaet& publié égalemend tans lesjournaux de Turquie
- j'en ai deux sous lesyeux- ,dans lesorganesde la presseinternationale -
j'ai sous leyeux Le Moide du 3 juin 1975 - et par conséquentil me semble
que son existence ne saurait êtremise en doute.
Ce communiqué commun est dépourvu d'ambiguite. 11 constate une
obligation internationalenon équivoque.Il s'agit,Messieurs de la Gour, selon
ses propres termes, d'une décisionprise par tes deux premiers ministres qui
sont en meme temps des chefsde gouvernement.
Les premiers ministres décidentde saisir la Cour du différend quioppose
leurs deux Etats. A la lecture de ce texte, les termes employésmarquent
clairement qu'il ne s'agit pasd'une simple obligationde négocier,de mener de
bonne foi des négociationsen vue d'accepterla juridiction de la Cour,ce que
la doctrine appelle - vous le savezMessieurs de la Cour - des pactes de
cort~ruheiidoou de ~iegociarrdo.
A cet égardje me permets de placer sous les yeux de la Cour une sentence
arbitrale dans une affaire déjaancienne qui opposait le Chili et le Pkrou,
l'affairede Tactla-Arica, sentence arbitrale 4umars 1925 ;jeme permets de
placer cette sentence sous les yeux de la Cour parce que l'on y trouve une
bonne dtfinition,me semble-t-il,dece genre d'accord, de cegenre de pacte,
qui nous permettra de constater la clifferenceavec l'accordqui est intervenu le
3 1 mai 1975. Cette sentence arbitrale du 4 mars 1925 est signee par le
président des Etats-Unis,arbitre chef d'Etat, mais elleest contresignéepar sonsecrétaired'Etat,Charles Evans Hughes, un éminentjuriste qui devait devenir
prksident de laCour suprêmedes Etats-Unis.
La sentence note que !*accordentre le Chfi et le Pérou,le traitéd'Ancon de
1883, prévoyaitdans son article 3 (qu'un accord spécialqui sera considéri
comme partie intégrante du présent traitedéterminera la manière dont le
plébiscitesera réaliséiEt en effer,l'accord,le traite d'Anconplaçait la région
contestéede Tacna-Arica sous l'administration chiliennependant une periode
de dix annéesau terme de laquelle la population devait être consulteepar
plébiscitepour savoir si elle entendait étre maintenue sous la souveraineté
péruvienneou au contraire semaintenir dans la dépendance chilienne.Cette
sentence est rapportée au volume IIdu Reciieil des seti~ciicesürbirrulesde
l'Organisuriord?es Nulions Utiirs,page 921.
A la page 929, la sentence définitainsi la portéede l'acco:d
(iComme les parties se sont mises d'accord pour se lier par un
protocole spécial,mais n'en ont pas îïxéles termes,leurobligation était,
en substance,de négocierde bonne foi a cette finD
Mais la lecture que je me suis permis de faire une nouvelle fois du
communiquéconjoint du 31 mai 1975, qui a exprime l'accordentre les deux
premiers ministres turc et grec révèleque, dans ce cas particulier, dans cet
accord intervenu, aucun accord spécial,aucun protocole spécial,n'aétéprévu
et n'était nécessaireour la mise en Œuvre de la décision selon laquelleles
problkrnes concernant le plateau continental de la mer Egee doivent être
résoluspar la Cour.
Donc il y a une différencefondamentale entre un accord de ce type,
véritable pactede cotitraherrdo,et l'accorddont vous êtessaisis etque nous
vous demandons de consacrer, Messieurs de la Cour. C'est qu'en réalité
chaque accord de cegenre doit Etreexaminédansson texte pour que sa portée
puisse 6tre appréciée et déterminée.
Etje me permettrai alors de citer une autre sentence arbitrale rendue dans
l'affaire duLac Lairouxentre la France et l'Espagnele 16 novembre 1957 et
qui est rapportéeau Recueil des sertleticesarbitrales de /Ut-gai~isatiodes
Naiioris Utzies,page28 1.
Dans ses considérations d'ordre généra slr ce type d'accord, la sentence
dans l'aîfaireduLac Laiiouxs'exprime ainsi:
rOn a ainsi parlé, quoique souvent d'une manière impropre,de
« l'obligationde négocierun accord ». En réalitiles engagements ainsi
pris par les Etats prennent des formes trèsdiverses el ont une portéequi
varie selon la manière dont ils sont définis et selon les procédures
destinées a leur mise en muvre ; mais la réalité desobligations ainsi
souscrites ne saurait êtrecontestée etpeut etre sanctionnée))
Et la sentence indique les modalitésd'une sanction internationale possible
juridiquement, sanction juridique dans le casdVunpacte de cotrrrahet~do.
Ainsi,meme un accord en nie de négocierpeut être sanctionneaux termes
de cette jurisprudence arbitrale que j'ai rappelée et impliquedes obligations
internationales dont la réaliténe peut êtrecontestée. A plus forte raison,
Monsieur lePrésident, Messieursde la Cour, lorsque l'obligation mêmeest
précisée par I'accorden cause, comme je crois pouvoir le constater, l'accord
conclu entre les deux premiers ministres, chefs de gouvernement, se suffit à
lui-meme.
Bien entendu, l'existencede l'accord du3 1 mai 1975 n'eyluait nullement
qu'avant de saisir la Cour les deux Etats s'efforcent de tenter par voie denégociationd'une part de résoudre leurdinérendsur lesproblémesdu plateau
continental de la mer Eg& et d'autre part de rédiger s'ils lepouvaient un
compromis spécialpour porter t'ensembledu différenddevant la Cour. Mais
cette poursuite des négociationsne modifuit pasle consentement donnéa la
juridiction de la Cour ene modifiait pasnon plus l'obligation internationale
assurnée en conséquence et constatée par ce communiqué conjoint du
31 mai 1975.
Je voudrais citer un document qui est annexé 6 la requête du
Gouvernement grec. C'estune note verbale du 2 octobre 1975 qui se trouve
imprimée ci-dessus a la page 38 de cette requéteet dans laquelle 2eoctobre
1975leGouvernement grec commente ainsi la portéede l'accorddu 31 mai de
cette mêmeannie :
« Lorsque les premiers ministres des deux pays se sont rencontrés a
Bruxelles le 3i mai 1975, il a étéconvenu que la question serait tout
d'abordofficiellementsoumise à laCour internationale et qu'iln'étaitpas
exclu que desconversations aient lieu en vue de parveniaun accord sur
une solution. Que les deux premiers ministres aient étéd:'accord pour
saisir la Cour internationale afin de régler lelème de la délimitation
du plateau continental ressort sans aucune équivoquedu communique
conjoint qu'ilsont publié.))
et suit le texte du communique conjoint.
Vous trouverez également, Messieursde la Cour, aux pages 41 à 42 ci-
dessus, la note turque en réponsea cette note grecque du2 octobre 1975. La
note verbale turque porte la date du 18 novembre 1975. Elle ne conteste pas
I'interprktationdonnéepar leGouvernement grec dans la note dont j'ai donné
lecture l'obligationassumee. La note verbale turque,a la page 41 ci-dessus,
soutient que des negociationsdiplomatiques préalablespour le r@glernenrdu
litige au fond doivent avoir lieu avant que la Cour ne soit saisie et jeme
permettrai de donner lecture de latraduction des deuxiemeet troisième alinéas
de la page 41ci-dessus :
«Etant donne cequi préctde, le Gouvernement turc ne partagepas
l'interprétationgrecque suivant laquelle les partiessont déji convenues
de soumettre le differend a la Cour internationale de Justice, sans
négociations préalables. Pour cette raison même, les nombreuses
citations partiellde communications turques antérieuresfigurant dans
la note grecque du 2 octobre 1975, no F.6143.15/190/AS 3780, ne
donnent pas une idéecomplètede leur contexte ainsi que de celui de la
déclarationfaitepar l'ancienpremier ministredeTurquie et de ce dont les
deux pays sont convenus aux réunionsde Rome et de Bruxelles.
Le Gouvernement turc croit indispensablede rappeler une foisde plus
quV son avis lesquestions quise posent entre la Turquie et la Grèceau
sujet du plateau continental de la mer Egee doivent être résolusar des
négociationsbilatérales..ik
Et cesnégociationsbilatérales,comme je le disaistout a l'heure, n'excluent
nuilement l'obligationassuméed'allerdevant la Cour. Nous sommesdonc en
prksence, et telleestla thèse du Gouvernement grec, dans ce communique
conjoint du 3 1 mai 1975 d'un acte juridique international: le communiqué
conjoint, le communiqué commun - acte juridique international créateur
d'obligations juridiques internationales. Cescomrnuniqukscommuns ont deja
leurs titres d'anciennetMais leur fréquence estun phénomènerécent.Leur PLAl1XllR DiE hl. PINTO 125
théoriejuridique authentique, si elle a ktépréparéepar lajurisprudence de la
Cour, reste à faire. Ce sera épalementla l'Œuvrede votre haute juridiction.
Si j'osais, je diraia la Cour que le communiquéconjoint analysju éri-
diquement apparaît comme la juxtaposition dans un mêmeinstrument de
deux déclarations unilatéralesimmédiatementacceptéesde part et d'autre.
Comme l'a d'ailleurs indique récemment la Cour en examinant des
déclarationsrevitant la forme pure d'actes unilatkraux dans J'arrètdéjàcite
par mon confrère,le professeur O'Connell,mals je crois qu'il n'estpas inutile
de citera nouveau, en français :
<<Quand 1'Etatauteur de la déclaration entend êtrleiéconformément a
ses termes, cette intention confèa sa prise de position le caractere d'un
engagement juridique, 1'Etatintéresséétantdésormaistenu en droit de
suivre une ligne de conduite conforme a sa déclaration.Un engagement
de cette nature, exprimk publiquement et dans l'intention de se lier,
mime hors du cadre de négociations internationales, a un effet
obligatoire.»(C.I.J.Recueill974, p. 267, par. 43.)
L'arrêt souligneque la forme n'est pas décisive:(<Qu'une declaralion soit
verbale ou écrite, cela n'entraine aucune différence essentielle. >> (Ibid.,
par. 45.)C'estune citation de votre arrkt.
La Cour cite kgalement,en lesapprouvant, les motifs qu'elleadonnes dans
son arrêtde 1961, dans l'affairdu Temple de PréahVihéar. La citation de
cette affairestainsi donnée :
« c'estgénéralementle cas en droit iriternatjonakqui insiste particuliére-
ment sur les intentionsdesparties, lorsque la loi ne prescrit pas de forme
particulière,lesparties sont librede choisir celle qui leur plaît, pourvu
que leur intention en ressorte clairement (G.I.J.Recueil 1961, p.3 1).
Etla Cour, en 1974, cite égalementle passage suivant de l'arrêtrendu dans
l'affaire duTemple de Prkah Vihgar : <cla seule question pertinente est de
savoir si laédacti omnployéedans une déchrationdannéerévèleclairement
l'intention..»(C.I.J.Recueil 1961, p. 32). En mêmetemps, dans cet arrétsur
lesEssais iiucléairesde 1974,la Cour rappelle, comme dle l'arappelétant de
foWet comme je suppose les Cours internationales a venir le rappelleront
souvent, ce ne: sera jamais inutile, le principe fondamental qui rkgit les
relations internationales- le principe de la bonne foi:
(L'un desprincipes de base qui présidenta la créationet a l'exécution
d'obligationsjuridiques,gueflequ'en soit la source, est celuide la bonne
foi.
La confiance réciproque estune condition inhérente de la coopération
internationale, surtouta une epoque ou, dans bien des domaines, cette
coopérationest de plus en plus indispensable. Tout comme la régledu
droit des traites pactsuizrservaizda elle-mime, le caractere obligatoire
d'un engagement international assumépar déclaration unilatéralerepose
sur la bonne foi.
h Etais intéresséspeuvent donc tenir compte des déclarations
unilatéraleset tabler sur elle;ils sont fondésà exiger que I'oblipaçion
ainsi cr&&soit respectée.i>(C.I.J. Recuei1974, p. 268, par. 46.1
A plus forte raison, dirai-je,leprincipe debonne foi exigeque soit respectée
l'obligationjuridique crééepar une déclarationconjointe, par une déclaration
commune à deuxEtats.
Lesrègles du droit international et la jurisprudence de Cour Queje viensde rappeler nous enseignent que leconsentement ainsi donnén'exigeaucune
forme particuliére.Dans le cas du communiqué conjoint des deux premiers
ministres le consentement a lajuridiction de la Cour est donne par décision
expresse. Mais ce Consentement aurait pu ètre tacite* La jurisprudence
particuliere concernant l'acceptationde la juridiction de la Cour confirme et
conforte ces réglesgénérales.
Que la Cour m'autorise a citerun ceriain nombre des motifs au'elle a
donnes dans ses arrGts, acet égard.Dans son arrêtdans l'affairedes Droits de
mitioritéseiiHaure-Silesie, la Cour a dit pour droit:
tL'acce tation par un Etat de la juridiction dela Cour dans un cas
panicuiieiyet nous sommes bien dans un cas particulier] n'estpas, selon
le Statut, soumise 1certains termes, comme par exemple l'établissement
d'un compromis formel prkalable. >)(Arrér il012, 19.78,sérieA il015,
p. 93.)
La Cour actuelle, dans son arrkt du 25mars 1948, dans l'affairedu Défrair
de Corfou,a citécette jurisprudence de l'arret sur les Droit de tnitiorireeti
Haute-Silksic*pour l'approuveret ainsi la consolider dans les termes suivants:
rAlors que le consentement des parties confère juridiction a laCour,
ni le Statut ni le Règlement n'exigent que ce consentement s'exprime
dans une forme determinée... IC II. Recueil 1947-1948,p. 27-28.)
Comme l'a ditla Cour permanente de Justice internationale, dans son arrkt
no 12 (et ici encore la Cour dans son arrétde 1948 reprend laformule des
trente annéesqui avaient prkedé, oui des trente années qui avaient précédé)
<(L'acceptation, par un Etat, de la juridiction de la Cour dans un cas
particulier, n'estpas, selon leStatutsoumisa certaines formes,comme, par
exemple, l'établissementd'un compromis formel préalable. » (ArrcjrirolZ,
du 26 avril 1928, p. 23.)
De même,dans l'affairede l'Or morrétafrepris Rome eir 1943, arrêtdu
15juin 1954, la Cour adit ceci:
«La Cour ne peut trancher ce differend sans le consentement de
l'Albanie [c'estle principe]. Mais il n'aésourenu par aucune des Partres
que l'Albanieait donnéson consentement en I'espece,ni expressément,
ni implicitement. >i(C.I.J.Recueil 1954, p. 32.)
Dans l'affairequi vous est maintenant soumise, la Turquie a explicitement
et formellement donne ce consentement. Ce consentement est irrévocable.
Certes,lesdeux Etats ont continuéleurs négociationsbilatéralespour tenter
d'aboutir a un reglement transactionnel et parallèlement pour prkparer un
compromis mais ces négociationsn'avaient ni pour but ni pour effet de
modifier, d'oblitérer,de faire disparaître l'obligationlibrement consentie par
les deux premiers ministres de faire trancher les problémesconcernant le
plateau continental en mer Egke par la Cour.
Elestconstant que, au moment ou la Grécesaisit la Cour, ces negociations
ont abouti a une impasse. Cet échec, 1 ce moment-là, estmanifeste et a cet
égardles résuIratsde la derniéreconfërence d'experts tenue a Berne les 19 et
20 juin 1976 ne permettaient le moindre doute (ci-aprés p. 159-1 66) Tant sur
lesprincipesjuridiques applicables la délimitationdu plateau continental que
sur les limites du plateau continental de chaque Etat en mer Egée,les Etats
étaient l'&poque en désaccordcomplet. PLAIDOIRIE DE M.PINTO 127
En mêmetemps, le Gouvernement turc s'est systématiquement refuse B
rkdjgeren commun un compromis spécial.
Les échanges de notes, les entretiensdiplomatiques et les conférences
d'expertsmontrent qu'au moment où laGrècesaisit laCour le Gouvernement
turc sedérobe toutenégociationsignificativeet a pour objectifde temporiser.
Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement grec étaiten droit de faire jouer
l'obligation principaleassuméepar les deux Etats et de porter, comme il l'a
fair, ledifferend devant la Cour.
Le31 mai 1975en effet les deux gouvernements ont retenu, pour résoudre
pacifiquement le differendsur leplateau continental en mer Egee, un mode de
règlement déterminép , armi tous les modes de règlement disponibles ; ce
rkglementdéterminéc'estle réglernent judiciairepar la Cour internationalede
Justice. Ils auraient pu en choisir un autre mais c'est sur celui-lque leurs
volontés concordantes se sont rencontrées. Ce choix, trés précis et trés
conscient, prend tout son reliefsion le compare aux rnodalitkschoisiespour
résoudreles autres problémes,dans le meme communiqué, qui separent les
deux pays et qui ne comportent pas la saisine de la Cour.
Il est décidé,je le rappelle, énonce le communiqué conjoint, que les
problémes doiventétrerésoluspacifiquement par la voie des négociations et
concernant le plateau continental de la mer Egéepar la Cour internationale de
Justice.On ne saurait êtreplus clair.
Il s'agit 11,comme je l'ai dit a la Cour, d'unaccord de fond qui engage
définitivement et irrévocablemenltes deux gouvernements, moins naturelle-
ment d'un accord nouveau en faveur d'un autre mode de solution. Mais c'est
par la voie du réglernentjudiciaire que le différendsur le plateau continental
de la mer Egée doit êtrefinalement tranche. La rédaction spécialed'un
compromis «au cours de réunions d'experts ii ne constitue pas une des
conditions énoncéespar le communiqué conjoint.Son accomplissement ou
son non-accomplissement ne peut réagirsur la décisionde fond prise par les
deux gouvernements.
Lesobstacles mis par l'unedesparties - en l'occurrence la Turquie - soit
au réglernentde fond du diffërend soita la rédactiond'un compromis speciai
ne sauraient porter atteinte au caractéredéfinitifde ladécision prise par les
deux gouvernements le 31 mai 1975. La Turquie n'estpas en droit, saus peine
de violer ses engagements et de méconnaître le principe de bonne foi,de
remettre en cause undateralement, fût-ce de maniéreindirecte, l'accord du
31 mai 1975.
Parla sui11servai~da,certes, celui du 1mai 1975 comme tous les autes.
11 apparaît donc - et mes observations complétent ainsi celles du
professeur O'Connel1 - ,que le Gouvernement grec est recevableprima Jacie
a demander a la Cour d'indiquer des mesures conservatoires.
En ce qui concerne ces mesures conservatoires, mon coiiéguele professeur
O'Connel1a présenté le premier volet de la requéte grecque.Ilm'appartient,en
second volet, d'exposer iila Cour les droits dont la conservation serait a
assurer et les mesures conservatoires dont l'indication estproposée.
La Grèceprie en effetla Cour de prescrire aux Gouvernements turc et grec:
<(2) [ce sont les conclusions de la requkte]de s'abstenir de prendre de
nouvelles mesures militairesou de selivrer à des actions.au* ~ourraient
mettre en danger leurs relations pacifiqueii.
Il s'agit la,dans cette demanden indication de mesures conservatoires, et
laCour le sait mieux que moi, d'une mesure conservatoire classique, dont sa
jurisprudence fournit des exemples constants. Elle tenda obteni des partiesà128 MER CG~E
un differendqu'elless'abstiennentde tout ce qui risquerait del'aggraverou de
l'étendre.
Suivant, la formule souvent citée de la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale dans l'affaire de laCompagtiie d'éleclricitede Sofia et de
Bulgarie (1939, Ç.P.J.I.sérieA IB iio79, p. 199) qui a d'ailleurs étédéjà
rappeléepar le professeur O'Connel1 :
« lesparties en cause doivent..., en général,ne laisserprocédaraucun
acte,de quelque nature qu'il soit,susceptibled'aggraver ou d'étendrele
diffërendi>,
Dans ses ordonnances du 17 août 1972 (affaires de la Campéteilceerz
mulière de pécheries(Royaume- Utli cIslatrdd(R~publiqueJule d'Allrmu-
giiec. Islaiide)), la Cour reprend trèsexactement la formule d939 :<(éviter
tout acte qui risquerait d'aggraver ou d'étendrele differend dont la Cour est
saisie1)(C.I.JRecueil 1972, p.17 et 351.
Ainsi en priant la Cour d'inviterlesdeux gouvernements à s'abstenir de
toutes mesures militairesou actions qui risqueraient de mettendanger leurs
relations pacifiques,la Grèce suitun chemin dkjatrack depuis longtemps.
La mesure conservatoire sollicitéetenda assurer la conservation dans les
zones en cause, d'une part, du droit de la Grkce $ l'exercice paisiblede ses
compétences territoriales exclusiveset, d'autre part, du droit la Grèce au
maintien de la paix et de la sécuridans ces mêmes zones.
Mais ces mesures sont destinéesà protéger égalementles droits de la
Turquie. Ces mesures sont destinéesaux deux gouvernements et sont donc
protectrices aussi bien desdroits de la Turquie que ceux de la Gr&.
Toutefois, avant de présentermes observations sur ces deux aspects des
droitsa protéger,l'exercice paisibledes compétences territorialesexclusives, le
droitau maintien de la paix et de la sicuritédalazoneen cause,je demande
a la Cour la permission d'exposer briévementl'origineet la portédees droits
de souveraineté exercespar la Grècs eur leplateaucontinental en mer Egée.
L 'audietiresuiiperrduà II h II).estrepriseù I1 h 35
Le professeur O'Connel1a évoquéles traités quiont transfëréa laGrtce la
souverainetésur Ies iles. Je voudrais souligner que les droits inhérentala
souveraineté er qui ont étainsi transferks par les traités n'ontpas en quelque
sorteété figés,cristallisés, gesansleurcontenu et leurportée,àl'kpoquedu
transfert de souveraineté.
La Gréce,en sesubstituant notamment a la souverainetéottomane sur les
iles,ena reçu la plénitudavec toutesses virtualitks.Ainsi, ce qui concerne
le contenu économique de la souveraineté, la souverainetétransférkedoit
permettre à 1'Etatgrec de mettre en euvre, s'il le souhaite, dans la partie
insuraire de son territoire, les principenouvel ordre économique.
On ne pourrait passouccnir que la Turquie, Etat successeur de l'Empire
ottoman serait recevable a prétendre que la souverainetésur les îles n'a été
transféréeque dans les limites du concept juridique qu'elle recouvrait a
l'époquedu transfert et qu'en conskquence, sous cet aspect économique, la
nationalisation d'entreprises devrait ëtre soumise aux regles du droit
international publicen vigueur ala fin duXIXe sikle etau débutdu XXe.
La souveraineté a été transféree par la Turquie dans tous ses éléments
actuetset virtuelsLes droitssouverains exclusifsultérieurementreconnus sur
le plateau continental s'incorporent naturellement et de plein droit a la
souverainetéexerckepar la Grece sur les iles. PLAIWIRIE DE M PINTO 129
Le differend sur la délimitationn'ouvre pas à la Turquie le droit d'exercer
sur l'ensemblede la zone grecque du plateau continental de ta mer Egéeles
compétencesexclusivesreconnues par le droit international aux Etatssur leur
plateau continental - sous prklexte qu'aucune délimitationn'a eu lieu.
Telle estcependant la doctrine du Gouvernement turc, exposéenotamment
dans sa note diplomatique du 10 août 1976, qui a étkmise en muvre, et qui
doit 1'6treencore, par la campagne du Sismik 1.
La nore du ministèredes affaires étrangères de Turquiedu 10 août 1976,
publiéeparmi les documents du Conseil de securitk 5112172 a la date du
11 août 1976, porte qu'il convient d'avoirprksent à l'esprit le faitque le
plateau continental de la merEgée n'a pas encore ét&délimitéet poursuit :
{On doit déslors considéreraue la ~ositionarecaue est fondée sur de
simples allégations.IIconvient de rappeler de~dklarations ou des
allégationsunilatérales ne sauraient constituer un fondement iuridiaue
ce qui est de l'établissementde droits souverains sur léplat&u
continental. »
Devant le Conseil de skcurite, le 13 août 1976, le ministre des affaires
etrangéresde Turquie a déclaré :« Jusqu'B ce que soit délimitéle plateau
continental, lesrevendications respectivesde laTurqute et dela Grèceont une
validité égale.i(S/PV. 1950, p. 6.}
Or, le fondementjuridique premier de la Grècesur leplateau continental est
distinct du titre conférépar le droit international public relatif à ce plateau
continental, tel qu'il s'estétabliaujourd'hui.
Ce fondement juridique premier résulte,comme je l'ai rappelé tout B
l'heure, du transfert de souverainetépar conventions internationales sur les
iles, avec tous les droits inhérentsa cette souveraineté, actuelsmais aussi
virtuels.
Dans la mesure donc ou, en dehors du differend relatif à la délimitation
proprement dite, la Turquie revendiquerait, en tout ou partie, des zones du
plateau continental relevant dela souverainetésur lesiles,cette revendication
constituerait un differend distinct. Mais, dansce cas, il s'agit non pas d'un
simple différendde délimitationmais d'un differend portant sur l'exercicede
droitssouverains en rnatiérede plateau continentalsut un ensemble de zones
du plateau continental de la mer Egée. Tant que cette revendication sur le
plateau continental en mer Egéen'apas étéconsacréeen droit et par justice la
Turquie a l'obligationde s'abstenir de tout exercice unilatéralde compétence
dans les zones du plateau continental revendiquées.
En d'autres termes, il me semble qu'ilfaut bien distiriguerla revendication
des zones du plateau continental ou s'exerceront des droits souverains d'une
past et d'autre part la délimitation d'unplateau continental dont il est rKonnu
qu'il doit êtrereparti entre les deuEtats.
Il s'agit là - cette obligation d'abstention, lorsqu'on revendique un
ensemble de droits souverains sur deszones du plateau continental, a la
difference d'un simple litige sur la délimitatio- il s'agit 18du respect que
1'Etaten cause doit marquer a l'égardde I'Etat vis-à-vis duquel il exprime
cette revendication. Ce respectest fondésur un principe fondamental du droit
international contemporain :ce principe bien établi selonlequel provision est
due au titre. cette obligation de respectle srarlrq~ioa &té tout récemment
réaffirméepar la conférence sur la sécurité elta coopératioen Europe
L'acte finalsigne le le' aoùt 1975par les représentantsde la Grècewmme
de la Turquie et par trente-deux autres Etab, dont la Suisse, la Suède, lesEtats-Unis, le Canada, les Etats membres de la Communautéeuropéenne,la
Yousgoslavie,l'Union soviétique,sans compter une haute autoritémorale, le
Saint-Siège, l'actefinal de la conference d'Helsinki porte que les Etats
participants rappellent et énoncentdes principes conformes a la Charte des
Nations Unies. En effet,lesarticlespréliminairesde la Charte quej'aiévoqués
au débutde mes observations le montrent bien :il s'agit d'un rappel, d'un
énoncé d'uneprécision. Les Etats participants a la confërence dnelsinki
déclarentqu'ils sont résolus respecter eta mettre en pratique ces principes
conformes a la Charte des Nations Unies.
Or, parmi cesprincipes pertinents pour l'indication desmesures conserva-
toires aui sont sollicitées.la Cour me ~ermettra de relever les vrincines
suivan&. Ils sont inscrits dans la partie he l'acte finalintitu«é~uestions
relatives à la sécuritken EuropD.
Le chapitre premier de cette partie contient sous la lettre a)une déclaration
sur les principesrégissantles relations mutuelles desEtats participa-tetje
rappelle que la Turquie et la Grècesont des Etat sarticipants- et sous la
lettre6)les questions concernant Ia miseen pratique de certains desprincipes
enonch ci-dessus.
Parmi les principes énoncéssous la lettrea)de l'article1,le paragraphe2
vise le non-recours a la menace ou à l'emploi de la force. Et je citerai
notamment le paragraphe suivant :
4~lesEtatsparticipants s'abstiennentde tout acte constituant une menace
d'emploide la force ou un recours direct ou indirecala force contreun
autre Etat participant. De meme fiss'abstiennent de toute manifestation
de forcevisant àfairerenoncer un autre Etat participant au plein exercice
de ses droitssouverains.
Aucune menace ou aucun emploide la forcedece genre ne sera utilise
comme moyen de résoudreles différends ...»
Et sous la lettre -) questions concernant la mise en pratique de certains
des principes énoncésci-dessus -, au paragraphe il ,armi donc les
déclarationsrelatives la mise en pratique dece principe d'Helsinki,la Cour
me permettra de souligner que lesEtats participantsse déclarent résolus((
s'abstenirde toute manifestation de Force visant 1 faire renoncer un Etat
participantau plein exercicede ses droits souverain>>
Voila donc la foisdans lesprincipes et leur miseen Œuvre la réaffirmation
qu'un Etat participant doit s'abstenirde toute manifestation de force visBnt
faire renoncer un Etat participant au plein exercicedsesdroits souverains.
Je croispouvoir dire que l'appelaux principes du droit international public
général,la reaffirmation de ces principes par l'acte final de la conférence
d'Helsinki suffisent à fonder te droit dla Grèce i la protection provisoire
qu'elle sollicite.
Mais le titre grec résultantdu transfert de souverainetésur les îIesest au
surplus conforte par la jurisprudence de la Cour dans l'affaire du Plaleau
coilliiietide la mer du Nord et ceci ayant étédéveloppepar le professeur
O'Connel1je me permettrai de nepasy revenir. Ilen résulten toutcas que les
zones du plateau continental de la mer Egk se trouvant a l'ouestdes îles
grecques ou entre ces ile elèventen dehors de toute délimitationdes droits
souverains et exclusifde la Grkce.Toute mesure, etA plus forte raison action,
ou opération de recherche, d'exploration, d'exploitationentreprise par la
Turquiedans ces zonesdu plateau continental qui reléventinconstestablement
des droits souverains de laGréce, constitue une violation de plein droit des
droits de souverainetéexclusifs de la Grécedansces zones. PLAIDOIRI EE M PINTO 131
De son côté,la Gréceest fondée Aexercer paisiblement dans ces zones du
plateau continental, outre les compbtences rappeles par le professeur
O'Connel],les compétencesde police que lui reconnaît le droit international
public. En particulier, elle est en droit d'exigerque des navires étrangers
livrant sans autorisatioa des recherches ou explorations dans ces zones du
plateau continental qu'ils répondent aux rnjonctions des autorités navales
grecques de surveiilance, cessent leurs activitésou se retirent et, cas de
refus, les autoritésgrecques de surveillancet le pouvoir de diriger le navire
en étatd'infraction versun port grec.
Or préckkment l'exercice paisible de ces compétencesde police sur ie
plateau continental est menacé par lesdklarations et les actions turques.
Je me référeici, sans qu'il m'apparaisse nécessaire delesrelire, aux don-
néesde fait que la requêtedu Gouvernement grec expose la Cour,en parti-
culieraux pages 7, 8 et 9 ci-dessus.II s'agit des communiqués pubtiésau
lendemain des réunions duconseil national dekcurité de Turquie, le 13juillet
1976, et qui indiquent bien que la Turquie entend faire obstaclea l'exercice
paisible de ces droits de police. Il s'agitégalementde déclarationsqui ont été
publiéesdans la presse turque par le ministre de l'énergiequa,une question
relativea une réactionde la Turquie en cas d'intervention auprès du navire
Sismik 1, répondait. « En pareilcas, 1'Etat turc donnera la réponse qui
s'impose ;d'ailleurs larégiondans laquelle aiiront liedes recherches est en
sécurite.bJ'ajouterai simplement icipour compléter cettedémonstrationqui
tend a faire apparaître que le Gouvernement turc s'opposeiice que la Grèce
exerce ses droits de police sur le plateau continental, que dans sa note
divlomatiaue du 8aoUt 1976 q.i a..araît parmi les documents du Conseil de
sicuritéet'publi& dans cesdocuments le Gouvernement turc met en garde la
Grèce contre tout acte de provocation susceptible de gênerles activités de
re~her~hedu Sbmik damla mer Eg&.
Alors, Messieurs, quelle est la signification ces avertissements, deces
mises en garde ?En d'autres termes,le Gouvernement turc entend interdire
la Grèced'exercer ses compétences depolice sur le plateau continental de la
mer Egee dans des zone s u plateau continental gui, en dehors mémedetoute
délimitation, relèvent incontestablementdes droits souverains et exclusifs de
la Grèce.
Danssa note du 10 août 1976, publiée également comme document du
Conseil desécuritéS/12172(édition française :p. 41,le Gouvernement turc a
préci& sapensée :
<<LeGouvernement turc souhaiterait appeler l'attentiondu Gouverne-
ment grec sur le fait que, depuis le 6 ao1976, le navire de recherche
turc MTA-Sismik Iest soumis au harcèlement denavires et d'aéronefs
appartenant a la flotte et à l'aviation grecqueLe Gouvernement turc
élèv uene protestation vigoureusecontrecesactes illégaux etdemandeau
Gouvernement grec de mettre fin a ces activité5)
J'êidemandéau commandement des forces arme= grecques de faire un
inventaire des mesures militaires prises tant par la Turquie que par Grèce
depuis le 16 juillet1976. Cet inventaBe a probablement été fait avec une
certaine discrétion,compte tenu du secret militaire, le secret de ldéfense
nationale.
Voici ce que rapporte, suivant ces observations, le commandement des
forcesarméesgrecques.
Depuis cette période etdu côtéturc, trois divisions d'infanterie sesont
déployéelse long du fleuve Evros, en Thrace orientaie. Lesquartiers générauxdu quatrièmeet du cinquièmecorps d'armée deThraceorientale ont progresse
vers l'ouest et l'ensemble de ses unités se trouve en etat d'alerte. Les
permissions du personnel de la premièrearméesont annulées.Sur le littoral
ouest, les unitésde la quatrième arméesont mises en étatde vigilance. La
flottede débarquementd'Yzmirest renforcéepar desunités de débarquement
et decombat. A l'embouchuredes Dardanelles,on constate un rassemblement
de navires de guerre.
Du cotégrec, les indications fournie psr le commandement des forces
arméesgrecques lui-mêmeau cours de cette mêmepériode indiquent que des
mesures de protection parallélesont étéprises. En Thrace occidentale. Ies
unitésd'infanterie s'avancent sur des lignes de champs de déploiementprks
des camps militaires. Des unités de réserve sont mises en etat d'alerte
préventif.
Ainsi, les deux arméesse font facedans cette région.
En mer Egée, en ce qui concerne la Grece, la surveillance de l'espace
maritime est assure par un ensemble renforcéde navires de guerre.a moitié
de la forcedecombat navale de la Grèceeffectueau cours de cette pkriode des
exercices en merMyrteenne et en mer de Créte.
CeGouvernement turc lui aussi a fait état par ailleurs de quinze incidents
qui se sont produits entre le juillet et 11aoiit1976, incidentsa caractère
militaire qu'ii dkcrit comme constituant des actions de harassement et
d'intimidation. Ces quinze incidentsonttkrapportésdans un document dont
la Cour a connaissance.IIs'agitdu document SI 12175 du 13aoiit 1976. C'est
une lettre du représentant permanent de la Turquie auprésdes Nations Unies
adressée au Secretaire général es Nations Unies et qui donne la liste de ces
incidents.
Cette escalade des mesures militaires prises de pari et d'autre a créé
incontestablement une menace, une situation dangereuse pour la paix. Et,
puis-je dire,a la menace dirigke contre le droit de la Grece d'exercer
paisiblement,sur son plateau continental ener Egée,lescompétencesqui lui
sont reconnues par le droit international, s'ajoute unemenace contle droit
de la Grkceau maintien dans la régionde la paix de la sécurité,roit garanti
par la Charte des Nations Unieset rappelédans les termes que j'evoquais par
l'actefinalde la conférenced'Helsinki.
Sans pour aurant 6tre d'accordsur les causes de cette escalade des mesures
militaires, les ministres desaffaires étrangéresdeGréceet de Turquie ont l'un
et l'autreconstate l'existencede ce grave ktat de tension en mer Egée.
Evoquant, devant le Conseil de sécurité,l12 août 1976,cette tension, le
ministre desaffaires etrangéresde Grke declarait:
<Iilest faciled'imaginercombien la tension va s'accroîtredans les eturs
lessemaines qui viennent.La présencedans la régionde forces navales et
aériennes des deuxpays ne devrait pas non plus étreoubliée.Dans ces
circonstances, un simple accident &rait suffire pour quel'on perde
toutcontrble de la situatiJe.ne pense pasdevoir insister la-dessuspour
montrer a quel point la situation est vraiment dangereu>(S/PV. 1949,
p. 13.1
De son ciité,le ministre des affaires étrangères deTurquie indiquait le
13août 1976, au Consei desécurité:
i(S'ilexisteactuellement une tension dans la mEgée si une situation
dangereuse a étécrééedans la région,cela estdu au faitque la Grèa eu
recours, sans aucun droit légitime, a des harassements militaires à l'encontre d'un navire civil turc qui est en train de conduire des
recherches en dehors des eaux territoriales de laGréce.Ces harcèlements
ont prislaforme de vols d'avionsa bassealtitude au-dessusdu navire, de
tentativesen vue d'intimiderce navire avec des navires de guerre et en
vue d'entraverses mouvements. » (SIPV. 1950,p. 6.1
<(Si la paix est menacéedans la région,cela provient directement de
l'action militaireentreprise par la Greca l'encontred'un navire non
arme dans une régionOUelle n'a aucun droit de souveraineté. >iVbid.,
p. 18-20,)
Répondant, ce mkme 13 août 1976,le ministre des affaires étrangeresde
Grece déclaraitau Conseil de sécuriti:
«[Les T]urcs, [qui] ne voient pas d'objection pour eux-mêmes a
concentrer des forces navales etaériennessur la côte d'Anatolie,faceaux
iles grecques. Ces forcescomprennent - et cen'estcertainement pas une
coincidence - un très grand nombre d'engins de débarquement ;je
rkpète:des engins de débarquement. i>(Ibid., 17.)
Cette situation appelle incontestablementdesmesures destinées éviterque
le pire ne se produise : la protection des droits que j'ai tenté de définir,
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, A savoir le droit l'exercice
paisible des compktences reconnues par le droit international, le droit au
maintien de3apaix et dela skcuritécontretoute atteinte paun autre Etat. Ces
droits doivent êtreprotégéspar des mesures intérimaires.
Dans un espirt de bon voisinage, dans l'inter&de la paix, la Grece, sans
préjudice de sesdroits, accepte que 1~ mesures indiquées par la Cour
s'appliquent i elle, en rnème temps qu'h la Turquie et sous réserve de
reciprocite.
Ainsi sont protégésc,omme le prévoit l'article41 du-Statut de la Cour, les
droits de chacun. Encore faut-il que la Cour estime, selon les termes de ce
meme article 41 du Statut, que les circonstances exigent des mesures
conservatoires.
Dans ce domaine de l'exercice paisible, par chaque Etnt, de ses
compétences,dans ce domaine du maintien de lapaix, toute menace n'estelle
pas en soi irrémédiablesi on lui laisproduire seseffets.
Il ne s'agitpas simplement ici,comme l'écrivaitleprofesseur Guggenheim,
dans lerecueildescours de l'Académie(RÇADI, 1932-11,p. 6931 , de prévenir
des occurrences regrettables etdes événements fàcheux ».
Le risque que j'ai évoqué devant vous, Messieurs de la Gour, des qu'il
existe, Iepeser minutieusementserait tl~p dangereux. La prkvention s'impose.
Puis-je évoquerce qui se passe depuis plusieurs semainesen Guadeloupe.
Le volcaii de la Saufriire menace. comme lors du désastrede la montagne
Pelée,en Martinique, au début de ce siècle, de faire explosion. Malgré
l'incertitude dessavants et l'apaisementsoudaint irrégulierdesgrondements,
des mesures préventives sont prises etmaintenues.
Le maintien de relations internationales paisibles entre deux Etats -
presque au bord de I'abime - exigerait-ilune moindre attention ?
Dans les Essais iiucléaires,la Cour a indiquédes mesures conservatoires
dans des cir~onstanoes ou la santé et peut-étre la vie de populations
paraissaient menacéespar des retombées radioactivessur le territoire de
I'Australie.Or, le caractéreinfinitésimal ce danger n'étaitpas contestk.
M. Guy de Lachasriére,directeur des affaires juridiques au ministéredes
affaires étrangèresfrançais, a pu écrire dans 1'Aiirrucrifrurtçais de droitinfernalional de 1973, page 244 :{(L'Australie ... ne nie pas ... que l'apport
français dans I'irradiationartificielletotale, de toutes sources, a laquelle sont
soumis les Australiens ne soit trks faible))
Il indiquait que 1'Austratie et la Nouvelle-Zélande subissaient une
irradiation, d'origine naturelle etartificielle,de l'ordre de 1a0E50 millirems
par an. Or, les expériences nucléaires françaises n'apportaiend tans ce total
qu'une irradiation de 0,2 millirem.
Dansses ordonnancesdu 22 juin 1973, sij'ose lesinterpréter,mais la Cour
les interprétera mieuxque moi, j'ai l'impression que la Cour n'a entendu ni
peser ni détaillerla menace. IIluia suffi que lesrenseignements qui lui ont été
soumis, y compris lesrapports du comitéscientifiquedesNations Unies pour
l'étudedes effetsdes rayonnements ionisants :
(<n'excluentpas qu'on puisse démontrer[laCour n'a pasdit démorrrreiir
mais ri'excluerr~pas qu'on puissedémoi~trer] que le dépoten territoire
australien de substances radioactives provenant de ces essais cause un
préjudiceirréparable a l'Australie))(C.I.JRrcueii 1973,p. I05).
Si un préjudice irréparable résultandte retombées radioactivesn'étaitpas
exclu dans l'affaire des Essai ~srucle'airesi,1semble évident,qua plus force
raison encore, un tel préjudiceirrkparable existe ici.
Le préjudiceirréparableatteindraitaussi bienla Grkceque la Turquie, dans
lavie de leuw populations detoutes générations,dans la desiruclion des forces
économiquesvives desdeux nations,
Je voudrais évoqueren terminant l'opiniondel'undes membres de la Cour.
Bien qu'expriméedans un dissentiment, elle ne peut, me semble-t-il, que
recueillir,dans son principe, l'assentimentde tous :
<(Le juge international a toujours - et le plus souvent seulement -
un rôle préventif ..Ceci saulkve la question gknkraledesrapports entre
deux modes de reglement pacifique des différendsinternationaux - la
négociationet le rkglementjudiciaire...il me suffira de direque lejuge ne
devrait pas, selon moi, ètretrop influencédans l'exercicede sa fonction
par le déroulement de l'autre mode, la nkgociation. w (Ibid.,p. 308.)
Et la suite de cette opinion montre bien que la saisine de la Cour n'est pas
incompatible avec la poursuitede nkgociationset que les partiespeuvent venir
a tout moment devant la Cour pour adapter la procédure a leurs négociations.
Sije reviens au plan des mesures consematoires, je dirai en concluant que
sans doute la saisine de la Cour, la saisine de votre juridiction suprémea
suspendu dans l'instant et pour I'instanr le risque de conflit armé.Mais ce
répitpourrait étreillusoiredevant le refus de laCour d'avertir solennellement
les parliesde leurs devoirs face la communauté internationale tout entière,
devant le refus de la Cour d'indiquer les mesures susceptiblesde maintenir la
treve actuelle et de faire disparaitre lmenaces la paix.1 QUESTION BY THE COURT
The PRESIDENT :1 have to putto the Greek delegationa question on
khalf of the Couri. Will Agentof Greece pleasbe good enough toinform
the Couri whether in the view oftheir Government the Security Councii
resolution adopted by consensuon 25 August 1976 tresolucion 395 (1476))
concerning the presen dfisputeisa circumstance to be taken intocon-
sideration by the Courtfor the purposes of the present proceedings. Of
course it nor expectedthai ihis question is to be answered now. It could be
answered in the hearings of tomorro(seep. 137,itifra). DECLARALI DOENM. KARANDREAS
AGENT DUGOUVERNEMENT GREC
M. KARANDREAS :Monsieur lePrésident,au nom de mon gouverne-
ment j'ai l'honneur de portea la connaissancede la Cour que la Grèce
maintient les conclusions contenues danssa requete du 10août 1976 en
indicatione mesures conservatoire(ci-dessup. 63-66)a savoir qu'elleprie
laCour de prescriraux Gouvernements grec et turc:
unless with the consent of each other and pending the finaljudgments of
theCourt inthis case, refrfrom al1exploration activityor any scientific
research, with respect to the continental shelf areaswithin which Turkey
has granted such licences or permits or adjacent to the Islands, or
orherwise in disputinthe presentcase;
(2)refrain from taking further military measures or actions which may
endanger their peaceful relations.
Làudieiiceestleu&=a I.2h 20 TROISIEMEAUDIENCE PUBLIQUE 127VI1176, 15h 30)
Présena:[Voir audiencedu 25 VIII76.1
M.URANDREAS :Monsieurle Président, Messieurlses membres dela
Cour, en ce quiconcerne laquestionposk par la Cour lorde l'audiencedu
26 août 1976 (ci-dessusp1351,j'ai l'honneude porter.i votreconnaissance
que les agentde laGrèceont l'honneurde vous fairesavoirque,de l'avide
leurgouvernement, les deux procédures, auConseil de sécurieczilaCour
internationaldeJustice,sont distinctesl'ude l'autre.
LarésolutionduOnseil de sécurité,doptéepar consensus l25 août1976,
n'ernpiéteas surla mission delaCour aux finsde laprésenteprocédure.
Enconséquenclee Gouvernementgrecmaintientlesconclusionsprtsentbes
dans sademandeet réitkreelsors de l'audiencedu 26 août 1976. ARGUMENT OF PROFESSORO'CONNELL
COUNSEL FORTHE COVERNMENT OF GREECE
Professor O'CONNELL :Mr. President and Members of the Court, 1have
the honour to replyta the question put by Jiidge Ruda (seep. 118,supra) on
the subjectof the Greek reservation to its accession to the General Act forthe
PacificSetdement of International Disputes of 1928.
A reservation has effectonly in relation to questions which it expressly
and IileraZIyexcludes. Nothit~g in the Crcck reservationscauld bring the
continental shelf within its Lerms.There are four reservations. The first
concerns anterior disputes and is clearly inapplicable. The second concerns
domesticjurisdiction. Clearly the matter of questions which international law
leaves to the exclusivecornpetenceof States isnot the matter here, so we can
put that to one side.Turkey, along with most partiesto the General Act, made
a similar reservation.
Thethird concerns disputes relating to the territorial status of Greace. The
expression "territorialtatus" has of coursea precise rneaning. It concerns the
juridicai régimeof territory as thai term is used in international law. But the
continental shelf isnot territory in.that sense. It is an extra-territorial area
within which the coastal State exercises sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploration and exploitation of the natural resources.hat isa purpose which
is stricclyand deliberately limited, and the drafting history of the expression
"sovereign rights"reveaIsthat the intention was to invest the continental shelf
with a specificcompetenw that did not amount to territorial sovereignty.
For example,the whole of the coastalState'scriminal law does not apply to
the continental shelf as it does to the national territory. Onlaw regulating
activitiesrelatingtoexploration and exploitation of natural resources Mn be
validly made for the continental shelf. There is a decision of the French
Conseiid'Etatholding that the continental shelf is not paof French territory,
and Iwould citeto the Court the reports of thatcase in theJournaI du droit
internarioira1 (Clunelfor 972 at page 572.
Nothing that I have said is altered by the idea of natural prolongation
becausethat envisagesonly contiguity of the continental shelfto territory, and
cannot confer upon it the status of territory.
In short, the continental shelf is of itsjuridical nature extraterritasiis
the contiguous zone even in the case of the territorial sea which is invested
with sovereignty as distinct from sovereign rights. There is a great and
continuing controversy as twwhether this ispartof the national territory ois
extraterritorial. 1have convenientiy surnmarized the debate and the Court's
decisions in my article "TheJuridicai Nature of the Territorial Sea" in the
Brilish YearBook of In(ernurionu1Law, Volume 46, page 303, and 1 takethe
libertyof mentioning this to the Court. ButsinceIwrote that article important
judicial decisionshave beenhanded down in the highest courts of the United
States and of Australia, holding that the territorial sea is extraterritorial.
(Unite Statesv. Moine et QI.S upremeCourt, No. 35, Orig. 1915 ;NewSotifh
Wales v. Con~i~iunu~eai At~,fralianLUM Jui(riia1Vol. 50, 1976, p. 2 18.)A
fortiorithe continental shelf is extraterritorial. As for the fourth reservation
relating to ports and lineof communication - this again has no relevance,
because il concerns circulation, normally on the surface, whereas the140 AEGEAN SEA
continental shelf doctrine is concerned with the exploration and exploitation
of economic resources in the subsoil.
As a matter of literal construction then the Greek reservation has no
relevance to the presentcase, But that conclusion is also verifiable from the
travaux prgparaloir ofetshe reservation, which revealthat in a strictly limited
purpose,in a strictly iirnited and land-bound context. The question arose
when Greece, in 1928, was considering making a declaration under the
optional clause. Professor Politis,o9September 1928,addressed a letter(see
pp. 186, 577, itgrato the Greek Foreign Minister in which he suggested that
Greece should make certain reservations in acceding to Article 36 of the
Statute of the Court in order to safeguard Greece "against an eventual
application of Bulgaria" on matters related to Greece'sterritorial status, the
access of Bulgaria to the Aegean and the protection of Bulgarian-speaking
minorities in Greece.
It willbe recalled thal at that time there were frontier questions with
Bulgaria, leît over from the Balkan wars, hcluding allegatbns of Bulgarian
sightsover Greek territoryto Greek ports.Politisdrafted three reservations to
cover these three aspects in mailers in issue with Bulgaria. It will be recalted
that in thesame year he was the draftsman of the General Act, and with the
aim of safeguardingGrûece in respect of these same matters he secured the
incorporation in Article 39 of the General Act of a right of reservation
respectingthe samematters. Greace took advantage of this in her accession te
the General Act to make the same reservarions and for the same specific
purpose as the reservation she made lo herdeclaration to the optional clause.
The term "territorial status" has been employed inArticle of the General
Act to cover special matters subject to reservation. The question of territorial
status was familiar at the time in Memel,Saar and Danzig, etc. The fact that
Greece hm employed this rerm ina 5pe~ificsense was shown by the
explanation given in the same resemation as the régime of ports and
communications.
So,the record discloses that Greece's intentioninmaking the reservalion
was to provide for the possibility of avoiding the Court' sompulsory
jurisdiction in a stridly limited situation where territorial status referred to
land territory and boundary nghts and was not intended to cover any
question of maritime jurisdiction. The exerciseof sovereign rights over the
continental shelf ia matter of jurisdiction,not of territory, and theris no
question of a continental shelf beina matter of territorial status.
Inshort, one would not describe the dispute over the extent or delimitation
of the territoriseaas a dispute over the territoristatusof a country. That
would be a misuse of language. The continental shelf, likethe territorial sea,
and the contiguous zone is a matter of appurtenant right, not of territorial
status.
It would have been possible for Greece, acting under Article 49 of the
General Act, tu have abandoned all, or part of their reservations by simple
declaration, that is,by a letttothe Secretary-General of the United Nations
- who, it wiIl be recalled, has suddenly becorne very active in exercising bis
depositary functions under this instrument - before the Application was
made. Greece is so confident of the precise content and application of this
reservation that no such actionwas decided upon.
Mr. President, whle I have occasion to address the Court t occurs to me
that Members of the Court rnight be assisted ifI stated quite sharply and ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR WONNECL 14 1
preciselywhat are the areas which Greece would seekto have covered by the
Court's order respecthg interim measures. As I have indicated, Greec claims
as Greek continental shelf the seabed extending from the mainland of Greece
to the median line between the islands which are rnenüoned in the
Application and the Turkish coast of Anatolia and Turkish islands offthe
coast of Anatolia. The whole of this area is obviously not in dispute. Since
Turkey has not specified what she considers to be the western limits of her
continental shelfclairns, Greece can assume that there is a dispute at present
only in the areas wherein Turkey ha, by taking action, indicated a general
clairn to the area. Turkey has taken two sortsof action in respectof theareas
which Greece claims to be her continental shelf.
One is the grant of exploration permits and the other is seismic activity
which has occurred outside of the areas covered by the exploration permits,
namely the recent aciivity of Sismik Iin the area between Chios and Samos.
In the request we have asked the Court tu indicate interim measures with
respect to Ihe continental shelf areas within which Turkey has granted
exploration permits, or the areas adjacent to the islands or otherwiçe in
dispute in the present case.The reasons for this phrasing will beobvious from
whai 1have said.The areas covered by exploration permits are definableareas
in dispute. The other aras corne into dispute when Turkey takes action
therein and thereby indicates a general claim to the area. Between the date of
the filing of the request and the date of the indication of interim rneasures
seismicactivity rnight have occurred inareas claimed by Greece butoutside of
the limits of the exploration permits. 11 did in fact occur when Sismik 1
engaged in seisrnic activity between 20 and 22 August 1976. It might occur
again before the indication of interim measures in additional areas. So we
propose that the overallareas to be covered by an order for interim measures
should be defined as follows :
On the western side, the western CO-ordinatesof the exploration areas
specifiedin the Turkish Gazerre of 18July 1974and shown as a green line on
the map ',plus straight lines connecting the western CO-ordinates of these
areas. Now if the Court will allow me the indulgence, 1shall read into the
record the CO-ordinatesof this comprehensive western indication of the areas
in disputeas follows :
Lat.40 4Q N - Long. 2556 E
,, 40 43' ,, - , 2552' 5" ,,
. ,, 40 34 5",, - ,, 25 13' ,,
,, 40 1 1' ,,- ,, 24 46' ,,
,, 39 34' ,,- ,, 24 29' ,,
,, 38 48' ,,- ,, 24 54 ,,
,, 37 52 ,,- ,, 2543' ,,
,, 37 a ,,- ,, 26 24 ,,
,, 37 *,- ,, 263U ,,
,, 37 4 5',, - ,, 26 37 ,,
,, 36 57 ,,- ,, 26 3a 7' ,,
,, 36 46' ,,- ,, 26 33'5' ,,
., 36 1U ,,- ,, 27 7 Y' ,,
,, 35 34' ,,- ,, 28 14' ,,
These western lirnitsmay sound complicated but they are reaHyquite simple.
I They are the existing lines on the rnap linked by straight lines.142 AEGEAN SEA
So Far as the eastern limits of the areas in dispute are concerned, these
depend upon the ascertainment of the median line which is sornetingthat can
only be done at the stageof boundary making. The matter is complicated by
the differencebetween the limitsof Turkish territorial sea as measured from
the low-water mark and from straight base-lines. This inherent uncertainty
conoerning the eventual precise eastern limits of the Greek continental shelf
does nat affect the precision that can be given to the application of an Order
for interim measures because we are asking the Court to make the Order
applicable toboth parties. It follows, that for the tirne being neither Turkey
nor Greece would be free to engage in seismicactivityin any part of the areas
which are not presently and incontrovertibly subject to their respective
nationaljurisdictions. This willean that there willbeno great exploration or
research activity eastward of the lineof the western limits indicated by the
co-ordinates which 1 have rad out, exoept in the Greek territorial sea
appurtenant to the islands and there will be no Turkish exploration or
research between that lineof the western limits and the Turkish territorisea
as calculated frorn the low-water mark plus the continental shelf between the
limits of the Turkish territorial sea as so calculated and the median line
between the Greek islands and the Turkish coast ar islands;lhat line in either
case being calculated by reference to the low-water mark.
Parts ofthe median line are indicatedin the two charts hubmitted to the
Courtshowing the actual violations which occurred between 6 and 14 August
and 20 and 22 August 1976 respactively.
There is presently no dispute respecting the lateral boundary in the
continental shelf adjacent to the coast of Thrace, where Greece and Turkey
share a land boundary sa that no element of adjacent State situation enters
into the matter. The phrasing ofthe request concerning areas adjacent to the
islands covers the parts of the oomprehensive area in dispute, as1 have just
outlined it, which lie outside of the Turkish permit areas. Really it is only
island and not Greek mainland areas where the question arises. The phrasing
in the request concerning areas otherwise in dispute was intended tocover
two things. First, the areas represented by the difference between Turkish
territorial sea drawn from the low-water mark or from straight base lines.
And, secondly, the possibility that before the hearing Turkish activity might
occur in some area or areas additional to the areas which 1have described, for
exarnple,off the rnainland coast of Greece,perhaps ofThrace. It isnot capable
of giving the Courtthe power to indicate interirn measures against con-
thgencies which may mcur in the future in such additional areas. Should
Turkey now engage in exploration or research activity in such additional
areas, Greece would be free to seekfurther interirn measuses. Butat the close
of our case the geographical areas presently to be covered are now indicated
with as much precision as is possible.
Thr Courr adjourizedft-on?4 to4.40 p.m.
' Not reproduced.I
PLAIDOIRIE DE M. PINTO
CONSEIL DU GOUVERNEMENTGREC
The PRESIDENT :The Court understands that certain documents which
were referred to by Professor O'Connel1in his statement concerning in
particulara letter from Mr. Politis,documents which have not ben produced
beforehand, will be furnished to the Court as soon as possible.
M. PINTO :Monsieur le Président, Messieurs lesjuges de la Cour.
Mes observations vont s'adresser audocument que M. le Greffier de la
Cour a bien voulu communiquer aux agents de la Grèce, c'est-à-dire
une lettre du rninistere des affaireétrangéres de Turquie du 25 août 1976
accompagnant un document que cette lettrequalifie - et vous me pardonnerez
&indiquer cet intitule danssalangue originale, l'anglai:<<Observations of the
Turkish Government on the Request of the Government of Greece for
provisional measures. n (Voir ci-dessus p. 69-76.)
Ainsi parait se réaliser leveu quej'avaisexprime personnellement au cours
de mon intervention premihre de voir la Turquie seprésenterdevant la Cour.
Messieursde laCour, la question peut pourtant seposer de savoir quelle est
la portéeprocéduraleexacte des observations présentéep sar le Gouvernement
turc.
La Turquie est-elledevenue partie ala procédureincidente ou ne l'est-elle
pas ?Est-elleprésenteou est-elleabsente ?Nous ne pouvons nous défendrede
l'impressionque la Turquie cherche en vérité a ktre les deux à la fois.
Dans le sens de sa présence, on peut invoquer, d'une façon qui paraît très
pertinente, la qualification que la Turquie a donnéeelle-m&meau document
qu'elle a adressé au Greffe de la Cour. Elle intitule en effet ce document,
commeje l'airappelé,«Observationsdu Gouvernement turc sur la requêtede
la Grèce i).
Et par là merne, le Gouvernement turc se place dans le cadre de l'articl1,
paragraphe 8, du Réglernent de la Cous, aux termes duquel : '
<(La Cour n'indique des mesures conservatoires qu'aprésavoir donne
aux partieslapossibilitede faire entendre leurs observations a ce suje>i
(Règlementde la Cour, art. 6 f, par.8.)
L'anglaisdit <tpresenting i>et le document dit en effet, dans son intitulé,
trobservations presented D, sijene me trompe pas.
Ainsi, non seulement la possibilitéde présenterdes observations a-t-ellekt&
donnéeàla Turquie, mais la Turquie vient précisémentd , ans la lettre qu'eale'
adresséeà la Cour et dans ce document, faire usage de cette possibilitéde
présenterdes observations.
D'autre part, tout en demandant la radiation de l'affairedu rôle de la Cour,
le document turc conclut en mime temps au rejet de la demande grecque.
Et a l'appui de cette conclusion (que la demande grecque soit rejetée,trbe
dismissed ii)nous constatons que le Gouvernement turc ne se borne pas à
contester la compétence prirnu Jacir de la Cour, mais il présente une
argumentation détaillée sur le bien-fonde des mesures conservatoires qui ont
été demandks par la Créceet meme sur certains aspects touchant au fond du
différendentre les deux Etats.144 MER EGEE
Enfin et toujours dans ce sens, nous pouvons constater qu'8 la différence
de ce qui s'estproduit dans des affaires rkcentes, la Turquie n'a,dans aucune
partie desesobservations, fait connaître formellement son intention de rester
en dehors de l'instance.Tout ce qu'elaefait, c'estde résemerses droits en ce
qui concerne la compétencede la Cour :
((. . . the presentation of the attached observations [c'est15,je m'excuse
d'avoircru trouver dans l'intituléles termes mémesdu RkgIement de la
Cour, c'est dans cette citation, ccthe presentation of the attached
observations », que l'on retrouve cette formule qui est inscrite dans le
Réglement]do not imply any cornmitment by the Turkish Government
as to the jurisdiction of the Coi),
ce qui d'ailleurs va de soi, conformémenta la jurisprudence constante de la
Cour que je m'étais permisde lui rappeler hier.
Ainsi ilexiste des raisons de penser, des raisons qui portpenser, que la
Turquie est présentedans cette phase de la procédure.
Il est vrai, Monsieur le Président, Messieursde la Cour, qu'en sens inverse
on n'estpas pleinement assuréque le Gouvernement turc ait mesure la portée
de la communication adressée A la Cour et ait tiré toutes les conséquences
juridiques qui pouvaient résulterdesadémarche.
En effet,commeje l'aiindiquétout a l'heure, parallèlementaux condusions
de rejet de la demande grecque, le Gouvernement de la Turquie n'hésitepas a
conclure a laradiation de l'affairedu role de la Cour, cequi évidemmentest se
placer en dehors de laproddure normale.
D'autre part, le Gouvernement turc n'a pas procedea la nomination d'un
agentet, de ce fait, il ne donne pala Cour la possibilitéde poser Aceagent
des questions al'occasiondes audiences qui se déroulentactuellement. Nous
nous rendons bien compte qu'il est souvent nécessairepour les membres de
votre Cour de poser de tellesquestions. Il n'y a pas dhgeentdu Gouvernement
turc pour y répondre.
Mais leGouvernement grec necroit pas utile de s'attarder davantage sur ce
probléme ainsiposé.
C'est que nous ne sommes pas sûrs que la question présente un inthet
pratique décisif.En effet,lajurisprudence de la Cour ne parait pas, en matière
de mesures conservatoires, attachera l'absenceou a la prksence de la partie
défenderesseles conséquences procédurales que cette position particulière
comporte, notamment et certainement, dans les instances contentieuses sur le
fond.
Le fait que la Cour n'ait pas cru utile, au moins dans le passe, de se placer
sur le terrain de l'articlede son Statut, alors meme que le défendeurn'était
pasprésent a l'audience, ou mémen'avait pasprésentéses observations sur
une demande d'indication de mesures conservatoires, parait tout à fait
kvélateur a cet égard.
Mais il existe peut-ktre une raison plus simple et plus determinante encore
pour que, a ce point des audiences qui nous sont accordéespar la Cour, nous
n'entrions pas dans un débatsur la qualification juridique et sur la nature
procéduraledu document turc.
C'estqu'en effet le contenu mêmede ce document n'est pas de nature a
modifier la position grecque telle qu'ellea étéexposéehier, avant-hier et
encore aujourd'hui par mon confrèrele professeur O'Connell,qu'il s'agissedu
terrain de lacompétenceprima focie de la Cour en matièred'indication de
mesures conservatoiresou qu'ils'agissedu bien-fondéde la demande grecque
en indication dmesures conservatoires. PLAIWIRIE DE M PINTO 145
Que la Turquie soit présenteà la proddure incidente dont vous ètessaisis
ou qu'elle ne le soitpas, les pouvoirs de la Cour sont identiques en ce qui
concerne sa compétencea ce stade de la procédure. Ce sera ma premiére
observation.
Dans les deux cas - nous l'avons exposé -, présenceou absence, la Cour
n'a pas àétablirsacompétencepar un arrêtpréalable.Il lui suffit de constater
que, prima fuciee,lle a compétence.
La jurisprudence de la Cour me parait constante sur ce point. Elle l'a
confuméedans les deux arrêtsrécents quiont été déjàcités: les affaires de la
Comp6tetice et1matière depécheries(1 9721,les affaires deEs5ais ilucléaires
(1974).
Or surce premier point il nous sembleavoir démontré asufisance de droit
que cette compétence prima facie existe bien. Et, au surplus, notre
démonstration est confirmée en quelque sorte par les observations du
Gouvernement turc. Ces observations ouvrent une discussion de droit, trés
fouilléequi fait bien apparaître que l'absence de juridictin'estpas du tout
évidente. Ellesmontrent par la meme qu'au stade actuel de la procédure ou
seule doit ètre démontréeune compétenceapparente de'votre juridiction, la
Court est fondéeàexercer sonpouvoir d'indiquer desmesuresconservatoires.
Eta cetégard - c'esle deuxikmepoint de mes observations - Ia néoessité
urgente des mesures conservatoires teUesqu'ellessont sollicitéespar la Grèce
demeure.
Sans doute les observations du Gouvernement turc affirment que la
Turquie s'abstient et s'abstiendra detoute menace contre la paix. Mais
précisément cet objectif de paix serairtenforcé par l'indication de mesures
conservatoires tendant ien assurer la pleine rkalisation
Depuis ledébut dudifférend,la Grèces'estspontanément abstenue - fût-ce
de recherches scientifique- dans la zone du plateau continentalou a opéréet
doit encore opkrer le Sisrni1 C'estqu'en effet il s'agitessentiellement d'une
zone a délimiteret sur cette délimitation lesdeux Etats ne sont pas d'accord. Si
la Grèceabserve de son plein gré,d'ores etdeja,les mesures conservatoires
dont elle sollicite l'indicationdans le poi1tde sa requête,elle est fondéea
s'adresser E la Cour pour lui demander d'indiquer que de telles mesures
devront êtreprises aussi bien pas la Gréceque par la partie adverse.
D'ailleurs,leNantilus auquel les observations turques font allusion (ci-
dessusp. 69-70, par. 8) esun navire océanographique ethydrographique ;il
n'effectue aucune mission de recherche ou d'exploration sur le plateau
continental.
Enfin, comme nous l'avons noté,les observations turques vont même au-
dela de la procédure actuellement pendantedevant votre juridiction. Les
observations turques abordent en effet des questions qui sont étrangèresi
cetteprocédure incidente : compétencede la Cour pour statuer, en l'état,au
fond, et même questionsde fond. A cet égard,la Grécerépondra en son temps
et au cours de la procédurequi doit se poursuivre devant la Cour, mèmesiles
parties - comme je l'avais deja fait remarquer dans mon intervention
précédente - recherchent en même temps unreglement nigocié de leur
différend.
Telies sont, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de laCour, les remarques
portant sur les observationsdu Gouvernement de la Turquieque la délégation
grecque souhaite soumettre a l'appréciation dela Cour. CLOSING OF THE ORALPROCEEDINGS
The PRESIDENT : 1 thank the Agents and counsel of Greece for the
assistancethey have given the CourI now declarethe hearings cloxdon the
Greek request forthe indicatioof interim measuresofprotection,subjed to
the usualreservationthat the Agent ofGreece isrequested to remain at the
disposaiof thCourt wieh a view to furnishing any furthinformationjtmay
require. The decision of tCourt onthe requestforinterim measures will be
made known in due course in theform of an Orderof the Court.
The Court rose ar 5p.m. FOURTH PUBLIC SITTING (1 1IX 76, 12 noon)
Present :[Seesitting of 25 VIll 76, Judges Grosand Dillard absent.]
READINGOFTHE ORDER
The PRESIDENT :The Court meets today to announce its decision on the
request for the indication of interim measures of protection submitted by
Greece on 10 August 1976 (see pp. 61-66, supra) in the proceedings
concerning the Aegean Sw Cor~titletltalSheV which Greece had instituted
against Turkey by an application. filed on the same date (see pp. 1-60,
stipra).
It will be recalled that certain Members of the Court, namely Judges
Ignacio-Pinto, de Castro and Oda, have been unable to participate in the
current proceedings, for reasons which 1 explained at the opening of the
public hearings on 25 August. I should now also mention that Judges Gros
and Dillard, who have participated fully in the proceedings and in the voting
of the Order which 1 am about to read, are unable to be present at today's
sitting.
1 shall now read the Order of the Court of today's date, omitting as is
customary the preliminary formal recitais.
[The President reads paragraphs 16 to 46 of the Order '.]
1shall now cal1upon the Registrar to read the French text of the operative
clause of the Order.
[The Registrar reads the operative clause in French 2.]
1 myself append a separate opinion to the Order, as do Vice-President
Nagendra Singh and Judges Lachs, Morozov. Ruda, Mosler. Elias and Tarazi.
Judge ad hoc Stassinopoulos appends a dissenting opinion to the Order.
In view of the need for the Court to make known its decision on a request
for interim measures of protection as speedily as possible, the Order is read
today from a stencil-duplicated copy,and the usual translations of the separate
and dissenting opinions, prepared by the Registry, are not appended to the
text. The usual printed copies of the Order, including the translations of the
opinions, will be available in approximately one week's time.
The sitting is closed.
(Sigried) E. JIMENE DZEARECHAGA.
President.
(Sigrled)S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.
' I.C.J.Reporfs1976, pp.7-13.
Ibid p.,14.
Oral arguments on the Request for the indication of Interim Measures of Protection - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 25 to 27 August and on 11 September 1976, President Jiménez de Aréchaga presiding