lNTERNATIONACOURTOF JUSTICE
I'LEADINGS. ORARGUMENTS,DOCUMENTS
CASE CONCERNING THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF
COUR IN'I~EKNATIODE JUSTICE
MÉMOIRES.PL41DOIRIET DOCUhIENTS
AFFAIRE
DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
I~'~NISIE/JARIAHIARABE LIBYENNE)
VOLUMI!IXORAL ARGUMENTS ON THE APPLICATION
FOR PERM ISSION TO 1NTERVENE
MINUTES OF THEPUBLIC SITTINGS
held thePcace PalacTheHague.
firn 19 r23Marchandon 14 Apri/198/,
PresideSirHumphrey Waldockpresiding
PLAIDOIRlES RELATIVES À LA REQUÊTE
À FIN D'INTERVENTION
PROCÈS-VERBAUX DESAUDIENCESPUBLIQUES
iejiiutpulaideIn Paix,Lo Haye,
d~r101123marsetle14uvri1981.
sous la prc<side>iHutr~pzqvWaldock,Presiderit FIRST PUBLIC SITTING(1 9 III81, 10a.m.1
Preserir;PrrsidentSir Humphrey WALDOC KVice-Presider~~LIAS Jtidges
GROS, LACHS , OROZOV N,AGENDR AINCH, RUDA M,OSLER , DA,AGO, EL-
ERIAN, SETTE-CAMAR EAL,-KHANI S,CHWEBEL J; dges ad hoc EVENSEN,
JIMENE ZE ARPCHAGA ;RegislrarTORRE SERNARDEZ.
For rheGovernrnenr ofMalla :
Dr. Edgar Mizzi,Attorney-General of Maltaas Agerrtarid Colirzsel:
H.E. Mr. EmanuelBeuina, Arnbassador of Matta to the Netherlands.os
CO-Asetil;
assisted by
Sir Gerald FitzmauriceG.C.M.G.,Q.C., as Corisulrairrarid Co-ordirtu;or
and by
Professor PierrLalive,Professor at the FacultyLaw of the University of
Geneva, and at theGraduate lnstitutof lnternational Studi;sMember ofthe
Geneva Bar.
Mr. M. E. Bathurst,C.M.G.,C.B.E.,Q.C.,
Mr. E. LauierpacQ h.C,.as Courisel;
and
Mr. M. C. Tynan, Solicitor(Bischoffand CO.).
For t/rr Govrrrirnerirofthe Libyaii Arab Jarnahi:(va
H.E. Mr. Kamel H. El Maghur, Ambassador, us Age~ir;
Dr. Abdelrazeg El-Murtadi Suleiman, Professor of lnternational Law,
University of Garyounis,as Counsel;
Sir Francis A. Vallat, K.C.M.G., Q.C.,
Professor Antonio Malintoppi, Professoof lnternational Law, Rome Uni-
versity,
Mr: Keith Highet, Member of the DistriofColumbia and New York Bars,
as Cou~ise lridAdvocurrs ;
and
Mr. Walter D. Sohier,
Mr. Rodrnan R. Bundy,
Mr. Richard Meese,
Mr. Michel Vode, asCoume/.
For fhe GoverirrnenfofTunisia:-
H.E. Mr. Slim Benghazi, Ambassador of Tunisia to the Netherlands,as
Agettt;
Professor Sadek BelaïdProfesseitage'gc;, Faculof Law, Political Science
and Economics, University of Tunis,as Co-agrrii orid Couris;l
Professor R.Y. Jennings, Q.C., Whewell Professor of lnternationaLaw,
University of Cambridge,as Corrnsel;
Mt. Abdelwahab Cherif, Counsellor at the Tunisian Ernbassy theNether-
lands,.
Mr. Samir Chaffai, Secretary at the Tunisian Ernbassy to the Netherlands. OPEKIKC OF 'I'l.IORAI, PROCEEDINCS Oh' THE APPLICATION
FOR PERMISSION?'O 1NTERVE:NE
The PRESIDENT :The Coiirt meets today to examine the application of the
Government of the Republic of Malta for permission to intervene in the case
concerning the Cotirit~airuIS/ielf, between the Tunisian Republic and the
Socialist People'sLibyan Arab Jamahiriya.
The proceedings in the case were instiliited by the notification to the Court
on I December 1978 ofa Special Agreement (sec 1,pp. 3-27)signed on fOJune
1977 between the Republic of Tunisia and the Socialist People's LibyanAcab
Jamahiriya. which provided for the submission to the Court of a dispute
concerning the question of the continental shelf between the two countries.
Sincc the Court did not include upon the bench a judge of either Tunisian or
Libyan nationality. both the Parties to the case proceeded to exercise the right
conferred on them by Article 3l of the Statute of the Court to choose a judge
ut/ Iioc to sit in the caOn. 14 February 1979 the Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya
designated hlr. Eduardo Jiménezde Aréchaga, aformer judge and President of
this Court.and on 1I December 1979,Tunisia designated Mr. Jens Evensen. a
former Norwegian minister for the Law of the Sea and head of the Norwegian
delegalion to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Judges ad
Iioc are required by Articl20 and 31, paragraph 6, of the Statute to make a
solemn declaration that they will exercise their powers impartially and cons-
cientiously. and under Articl8of the Rules of Court this declaration is to be
made at a piiblic sitting in the case in which the judlioc is participating.
This being the first such public sitting in the Coii~iri~vitaSl1shall now
cal1on the two judgeud /roc.in the ordet of precedence laiddown by Article 7
of the Rules. to make their solemn dedarations.
I invite al1present in the Hall of Justocstand while the declarations are
made. Judge Evensen.
Judge EVENSEN :1solemnly declare that 1 will perform my duties and
exercise my powers as judge honourably. faithfully. impartially and conscien-
tiously.
The PRESIDENT :Judge Jiménezde Arechaga.
Judge JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA : 1solemnly declare that 1will perform
. my duties and exercise my powers as judge honourably. faithfully. irnpartially
and conscientiously.
The PRESIDENT: I place on record 'the solemn declarations made by
Judges Evensen and Jiménez de Aréchaga as Judges of the Court for the
Cori~iit~titulSlielf case between the Republic of Tunisia and the Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. duly appointed in conformity with Article
31of the Statute of the Court.
On 30 January 1981 the Government of the Republic of Malta filed in the
Registry of the Court an Application (see pp257-262, s~rpra).dated28 Jan-
, uary 1981, for permission to intervene in these proceedings under Ar62cof
the Statute of the Court, and Articleofthe Rulesof Court. As prescribed by
paragraph 1 of Article83 of the Rules, certified copies of the Application OPENING OF THE ORAL PROCEEDINGS 28 1
were communicated forthwith to the Parties to the case, who were invited to
fiirnish written observations within a tirne-limit fixed by the President of the
Court :and the notifications required by paragraph I of that Article were duly
effected.On 26 Febriiary 1981.each of the two Parties filed written observa-
tions tsee pp. 265-267 and 268-275,si~pru)on the Application for permission
to intervene. inwhich they set out their respective reasons Corcontending that
the Application does not satisfy the conditions laid down by the Statute and
Riiles of Court. The present sitting is therefore being held in order that the
Court may hear the State seeking to intervene and the Parties to the case, in
accordance wirh Article 84.paragraph 2,of the RiilesofCourt. before deciding
whether or not to grant the permission to intervene requested by h9alta.
By a letter of2 March 1981. received in the Registry on 4 March 1981(see
\'. Correspondence, No. 63).the Government of Malta notilied the Court that
in reliance on Article31,paragraph 3,of the Statiitofthe Court. it nominated
a judge ud /roc"for the purpose of the intervention proceedings". and raised
certain other questions concerning the application of that Article and in
particular the participation of Judges Jiménezde Arcchaga and Evensen in the
intervention proceedings. On 7 March 1981 the Court observed that at the
present stage of the proceedings the rnatters which were the siibjectof the letter
from the Government of hiIaltado not, on their face. fall ulithin the arnbit of
Article 3 1of the Statiite of the Court. It decided thata State which seeks to
intervene under Article 62 of the Statute has no other right than 10 siibmit a
reqtiest to be permitted to intervene. and has yet to establish any status in
relation to the case:and that pending consideration and decision of a request
for permission to intervene the conditions under which Article 31 of the
Statute rnay become applicable do not exist.The Government of Malia waç
therefore informed that, the letter o2 March 198 1being in the circiimstances
premature. the matters to which it referred could not be taken under conside-
ration by the Court al the present stage of the proceedings.
Jiidge Forster is unable. for family reasons. to be present for these hearings.
and will thusnot be participatingin the decision on the Application of Alalta to
intervene.
I note the presence in Coiirt of the Agents and other represet~tativesof the
Kepiiblic of Matta which is seeking to intervene and of the two Parties to the
case. After consulting the Parties and the Repiiblic of Malta. the Court will
hear the representatives of the three States concerned in the present pro-
ceedings in the following order : first, the representatives of the Rep~rblicof
Malta :secondly. the representatives of the Socialist People's Libyaii Arab
Jamahiriya ;and thirdly, the representatives of the Republic of Tunisia. ARGUiM ENTOF DR. M IZZI
AGENT FORTHE GOVERNMENT OF MALTA
Dr. MIZZI : Mr. President and Members of the Court. it is a traditional
opening courtesy to say how honoured and privileged one feels to appear
before this eminent Tribunal. It is indeed a great honour and a privilege for me
to represent my country befo~ this Court. But in these proceedings such
staternent is rnuch more than a simple courtesy. Before 1say why this is so
however, Mr. President, 1wish to remove any misunderstanding that rnay
arise from the fact that we are sitting on the right side of the rostrum, next to
one of the two States which are Partiestothe main case. We are silting there
only as a matter dictated by the seating arrangements allocated to us. We side
with neither of those two States. Having said that, 1may now corne to the
reasons why my opening statement was not pure courtesy.
Malta is a small State, and for the small States of our world this Court has a
special importance. Malta is in every way a small State. Srnall in extent, small
in population, small in econornic and financial rneans and, above al1 in
financial resources. It is also small in the physical, industrial and political
power or influence it can hope to exercise. Nevertheless, relative to Oursize we
have had a long and eventful history of which any country could be proud.
In the particular context of the law of the sea Malta is well known for the
initiative it took in 1967 when it proposedto the world that the sea-bed and
subsoil beyond national jurisdiction shouldbe treatedas the common heritage
of mankind.
In paragraph 5 of Our written application for permission to intervene we
drew particular attention tothe situation ofMalta as an island State without
natural resources, and therefore as possessing a specialand vital interest in any
questions affecting the extent and limits of its continental shelf and of the
resources of that shelf, and it is not necessary for me to enlarge upon them.
But, if Malta is a small State, the principle of the equality of al1States. great
and srnatl, before the law, entails that smadoes not mean diminished. Malta
is entitled to the full extentilsrightsas a State.
Here 1ought perhaps to deal with a possible misconception concerning the
differences in regard to continental shelf rights between the position of an
island which is itselfa State and a metropolitan territory, and toftan island
which. though not geographically part of a larger piece of territory, is politi-
cally part of it. There are islands which are not themselves m$ropolitan
territory but belong to or are dependent on, such a territory, whether situated
off or near those coasts, or possibly off, or near, the coasts of another orate
again out on their own in the deep ocean. These are al1dependent islands and
whatever rnay be the continental shelf rights in respect of th-mas to which
1 say nothing here, one way or the other - the continental shelf rights of an
island which is itselfa State and a metropolitan territory, that is to say a State
which happens also to be an island, are exactly the sarne in principle as those
of a State which is not an island. An island State is entitled to the same
continental shelf rightsas a continental State. But in the case of an island
which is both a State and very small, there may be dangers of confusion and
this is why 1haveventured to mention this point. The fact is that sizas such
has nothing to do with the matter. Ifthis were not so, where would one draw ARGUMENT OF DR. MlZZl '283
the line among the island States of greatly varying sizes. Even Australia is an
island State ;so are Sri Lanka and Fiji, Malagasy and Mauritius, Cuba and
Barbados ; and so are several other island States.
Mr. President and Members of the Court, for the small States of this world
your Court - together with the United Nations Organization of which it isan
integral part - represents not only the most important and the best, but
almost the only forum to which they can refer their problems in the expecla:
tion that these will receive a sympathetic hearing and a justsolution. Malta's
problems over the extent of ib continental shelf in the Mediterranean Sea are
of very long standing.This isat Ieastpartly due to the fact that its geographical
situation places ias itwere at the hub of a number of other States and islands
whose continental shelf areas are liable to impinge on ,one another, and to
impinge on Malta's. as Malta's rnay impinge on theirs. These are eminently
matters which, in the absence of agreement between the States concerned, cal1
for resolution by an impartial body ;and since, in the context of continental
shelf boundaries, they involve questions predominantly, if not almost exclu-
sively, of a juridical character, this Cour1 is most clearly the appropriate body
for the purpose.
Ibelieve it is well known that Malta has accordingly, for some time, been
making considerable efforts io refer its continental shelfproblems to this Court
without, up to the present, any definite result. Then came the Lib~~a/T~ciiisia
case. Malta isgeographically situated on what isessentially the same continen-
tal shelfas Libya and Tunisia ;and there can be little doubt that the Libyol
Tutrisia case, considered in legal and physical terms, meshes closely with the
continental shelf interests of the Republic of Malta. In these circumstances
what was Malta to do ?Could we reasonably have been expected to stand by
and iee the Court decide that case without rnaking any attempt to put
ourselves in a position to acquaint the Court with our views about a region
which is as rnuch a Maltese as a Libyan or Tunisian concern ?The problem is
one that existed and still exists whether or not Malta has any prospect of
herself engaging Libya or Tunisia in independent proceedings before the
Court, for these must necessarily be later in time than the present Lib~ta/
T~r~~isiparoceedings. Thus the only way in which Malta can malceits position
known to the Court is by means of the intervention process contemplated by
Article 62 of the Statute.
It may beasked - indeed has been asked by both Libyaand Tunisia - why
then did wenot present our request sooner ?The technical answer is that we
were in no way bound to do so. Unless the Court extends the tirne. the rule
allows up to the date of the closure of the written proceedings in the case. We
have never actually known what that date in the Libva/Tutrisia case was ; nor
indeed,whelher the written proceedings have yet been closed at all. However.
for safety we decided 10lodge Ourrequests by thedate fixedfor the filingof the
last Counter-Mernorial in the Libya/Trrriisia case, which was 2 Febrùary last,
and we sent in our request on 30 January.
But of course there were more substantial reasons for the delay, if delay it
was. Malta believed that a request for permission to intervene which had to be
based on the existence of a legal interest liable to be affecteby the Court's
decision in the case, should be founded on a knowledge of what was king
contended for in that case, - something that could only be derived from the
relevant pleadings. Indeed, the very fact, that prima facie, a request for
permission to intervene need not be lodgedbefore the date of the closure of the
written proceedings impiied the relevance of those proceedings for deciding
whether to request permission to intervene or not ;and in the affirmative for284 CONTINENTAL SHELF
the framing of the actual request. Accordingly, acting under Article 53 of the
Rules, Malta, as far back as August of last year, made a forma1 request for
copies of the written pleadings in the case. No reply was received until
November. and it was a refusal. Malta then had to do her best to draft her
intervention application without sight of those pleadings, and in the circum-
stances I submit that no undue delay can be said to have occurred by reason of
the fact that Malta'sapplication was not lodged until 30 January.
1now corne to what is for Malta one of the cardinal points on the subject of
her request for intervention. In view of this point 1do not propose to pursue
any further the rnatters about which 1 have just been speaking. Nor do 1
propose now to enlarge upon or burden the Court with the history of those
efforts which were in part rnentioned in Malta's earlier application for copies
of the written pleadings in the LibvalT~iriisia case - the application which
the Court did not see fit to grant. Nor. equally, will 1 ernbark upon a
description of the steps which, in the light of recent events, Malta has îelt
compelled to take before the Security Council of the United Nations.
The reason for this forbearance, if 1might so term it - a compelling reason
of logic and good faith - is a very simple one. It is that the Government of
hlalta. in its present application for permission to intervene in the Libyol
Tlriiisiaproceedings now current before the Court, is not seeking to appear as a
plainiiffor claimant against either of those States. o10 assert any specificright
against either of thern as such. lndeed my Government notes that Libya and
Tunisia do not themselves in their case before the Court stand in the strict
relationship to each other of plaintiffand defendant - a fact,the,implications
of which for the jurisdictional and other procedural aspects of the case for
intervention, we shall develop later. In any event, we ourselves seek to
intervene sirnply as interveners for the protection of Malta's own legal rights
and interests.
In broad terms - my colleagues will develop the details later - the precise
object of blalta's intervention can be quite easily stated. Malta's geographical
situation in the central Mediterranean. and in relation to a number of surroun-
ding States and islands, so places her, that almost any pronouncement by this
Court - at least any pronouncement of principle - regarding the legal and/
or equitable considerations governing the delimitation of continental shelf
areas and boiindaries in that region. or the methods applicable to such delimi-
tation. will be certain to affect or have repercussions upon Malta'sown rights
and legalinterests whenever - as is highly likely to be the case- those rights
and interests are similar or analogous to those, or some of those, upon which
the Court has pronounced. In this connection there are two points 1would like
particularly to emphasize.
First - although, as 1have said. Malta'sobject in seeking to intervene is not
to make a specificclaim, or assert any specificlegal righi as against either Libya
or Tunisia as SLIC~,her object and interest in intervening does relate to the
general area in which those two States also claim continental shelf rights. 'As
was duly stated in Our earlier application for copies of the written pleadings
therefore. our inlerest is ernphatically not- "merely that ofa State which . . .
might be seeking information out of a general interest in the law of the sea
questions, or because of some hypothetical issue which it might possibly
become involved in at a f~~turetime . ..". hlalta's interest, in other words, is not
in the nature of what is known in English parlance as a general "fishing"
interest- an enquiry made simply in the hope of eliciting something useful.
Of course al1States have an interest in continental shelf matters and al1of
them will have an interest in any judicial pronouncements this Court may ARGUMENT OF DR. MlZZl 285
rnake in that context.Unlike our opponents in these intervention proceedings,
1would not care entirely to discount the possibility that this alone might suffice
to entitleaStateto intervene in a specjficdispute between two other States. But
this isa question on which 1will not now venture an opinion, for it is not
necessary for me to do so. Malta's situation is quite different. She is plined
the very area to which the LibyalTunisia dispute relates, sothatowing to the
geographicalconfiguration of the area, there isa high degree of probability-
certainly of possibility- that any pronouncement made by the Court in the
LibyafTunisiu context must prove relevant in one way or anotber, and in
measurabledegree, to Maltas own legal situation.notonly"may",as Article
62 of the Statute provides: it inescapably must affect that situation.
The second point 1want to make, and Ishall do this iamoment, arises out
of the danger for Malta of seeing her rightas it were foreclosed and her legal
interests shulout.by pronouncements of the Court - atleastof principle, or
relating to situations analogous to Maltais. AH such pronouncements are
bound to have the status of authoritative declarations of the law, almost
automatically applicable to any comparable situation, and will certainly be
viewed as such. This would happen without Malta having had any opportu-
nity of presenting argument to the Court, despite her physical presence in the
affected region, so that any argument that Malta might subsequently present
- whether to this Court or inany other forum - would tend to come, or at
least might corne, tm late.
That is why, Mr. President, and 1would ask the Court particularly to note
this, one of the principal arguments advanced by Our opponents in these
intervention proceedings is beside the point. This argument - though we
could not of course know of it, not having been allowed to see the written
pleadings - is to the effect thMalta's situation cannot be afkted because
the LibyalTunisia proceedings are so conceived that any delimitation of the
continental shelf boundary lines of those two States will be suspended at the
point where it might impinge on those of other States in the region. Here 1
might ask,in parenthesis, how will it be known when that point is reached
without entering upon the question of Malta's continental shelf entitlernent ?
But in any event this is notwhat Malta is primarily concerned about. The
decision of the Court in the Libyaf Tunisiacasecould not in any event, having
regard to Article 59of the Statute,be directly binding on, or have any direct
operative effect for Maita. It is the pronouncements and grounds of law on.
which such a decision would be based, with special referenceto the region,
that could very materially affect Malta's future legal situation.
1can now make my second point, which is that the pertinence of Malta's
request for intervention can in no way be affected by the possibili-yand it is
still no more than that - that Malta might appear before this Court as a
principalparty in parallel proceedings against Libya or possibly also Tunisia if
either of those States agreed to this, or took Malta before the Court unilaterally
by invoking our latest Declaration, dated23January d this year, accepting the
Court's obligatory jurisdiction under paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute.
This situation arises from the fact that any decision given in such proceedings
(Malta being a principal party to them) would be boiind to berendered later in
date - considerably later - than that in the current Libyivalunisiacasenow
before the Court.
Moreover, it would be possible to go still further than this, and askwhether,
given Malta's geographical situation in the Mediterranean, relative to Libya
and Tunisia, it would be proper for the Court to give any decision at all, even
in the current Libyal Tunisia case now before it, without hearing Malta. The286 CONTINENTALSHELF
principle involved iscomparable to that which caused theCourt some 27 years
ago to decline jurisdiction is the Monetary Gold case. on the grounds that
Albania was not before the Court and had not asked to intervene. That case
also has important implications for the jurisdictional question that arises in the
present case by reason of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 2 of Article 81 of the
Court's Rules. But this, my colleagues will deal with fater.
To sum up. Malta's interest as a potential intervener in the current Libyal
Tunisia proceedings rnust therefore persist whatever the outcome of our
endeavours to bring ourown dispute with Libya before theCourt. Having said
this however. I mustreiterate that Malta'sobject as an applicant for permission
to intervene in this case is not. by indirect means. to prosecute a dispute with
either of the Parties to it. but only to apprise. the Court of Our views on the
continental shelf questions that rnay - on account of hlalta's geographical
situation - imrnediately affect her legal interests in consequence of the
decision of the Court in the presentLibyal Tunisia case - andtodo this before
itis. or rnay be, too late.
That concludes what 1 have to say on this aspect ,ofthe purpose .of Our
application to intervene. other aspects of which will be developed later by my
tearned friends Professor Pierre Lalive and Mr. Lauterpacht. 1must however
end this part of my statement with a caveat. From the facts that 1have just
outlined as to the broad purpose for which Matta wants to intervene. it must
not for a moment be assumed that we in any way contend that this is the only
sort of purpose that willjustify a request for intervention. It isan essential part
condition of the grant of permission to intervene ise one and the solejuridical
Article 62 of the Statute - as provided for by
- the existence of "an interest of a legal character
which rnay be affected by the decision in the case" - that is to Say, by the
decision in the current proceedings to which the application for intervention
relates. But interests of a legal character rnay be very diverse in their nature.
and there rnay be many different. legitimate.objects in citing them as reasons
for requesting intervention. My colleague Professor Lalive will show later that
the faculty of intervention is a common feature of mature legal systems : and
he will show in particular what assistance rnay be derived in the interpretation
of Article 62 of the Statute, from the general theory of procedure and from the
experience of domestic systems of procedural law. with which international
law has rnany valid analogies.
To put Our contention in a nutshell - and I would ask the Court to
particularly note this - we say that ifa legat interest of the kind specified in
Article 62 of the Statute exists. that is to say one that "may be affected by the
decision in the case". then the protection of that interest, whatever rnay be the
ultimate purpose of doing so. constitutes in itself a sullicient ground for the
request to intervene. and a sulficient reason for granting it.
In this the second and final part of my present statement. 1wish to address
myself to two questions which Malta considers to be of outstanding impor-
tance. no1 only in the irnmediate context of Our present Application, but
generally in regard to what 1will cal1the faculty of intervention under Article
62 of the Statute. These questions are. first. the rationale and intention of
Article 62. and secondly. the correct view of the relationship of Article 8 I of
the Court's Rules to Article 62 of the Statute.
The only absolute right embodied in Article 62 of the Statute is the right of
any State to request permission to intervene ina current case before the Court
if itconsiders "that it has an interest aflegal nature which maq'be affecred by
the decision [ofthe Court] in the case". The grant of the request, however. ARCUSTENT OF DR. MtZZl 287
and consequently the exercise of the îaculty to intervene. is subject to the
decision or the Court; and intervention may therefore be regarded as being in
the nature of what I believe is characterized jurisprudentially as an imperfect
right.
II must, however. al leasi be assumed that the underlying intention of
Article 62 (for otherwise why incorporate itin the Statule at alIlwasthat the
request would in fact begranted whenever the requisite conditions appear to
be îulfilled. In short. 1suggest that the Court would be taking up an unduly
restrictive attitude- contrary to the spirit and true intention of Articl62 - if
it were to take the view lhat there exists some sort of presumption against the
admissibility of intervention, or that any specially heavy burden of proof rests
upon the Applicant. If this is correct, then what would be the reasonable
conditions under which Article 62 could be invoked ?
Article62 isa peculiarly open provision. It applies to al1States. and these are
not limited to any particular class or category of States. as are certain other
provisions of the Rules and Statute. Nor does it comprise any limitations as to
the class or category of case. dispute. or topic which is to form the object of the
proposed irirervention. It does not require the requesting State at that stage to
dernonstrate that the interest of a legal nature which it considers to exist wiin
fact be affected by the decision to be given in the case. So far as the English text
of the Article is concerned. it suffices that it may be so affected. The French
text proceeds from a different drafting approach. but. I submit. the same
notion of the tentative or potential, rather than of the definitive. is implicit in
the words "Lorsqu'un Etat estime (qu'un). .. interétd'ordrejuridique est pour
lui cn cause". for on tharbasis. it suffices that the State considers its legal
interest to be "en cause" in the case. that is capable of being affected by its
outcomè. or in short. regards its interests as being at risk.
Naturally. and in spite ofthe oblique and indirect character of the language
used in Article 62 - inboth the English and the French tex& - it may be
argued that a prima facieexistence of a legal interest liable tbe affecteciby the
Court's decision must be a condition of the grant of the right tointervene. But,
if this is the correct conclusion. it immediately leads to. and entails. another
conclusion. equally correct and equally important : namely that no other
condition than the existence of a legal interest of this kind can be regarded as
being imposed by Article 62. in the sense of constituting a sit~equa non of the
grant of permission to intervene. For in these circumstances how could it be
legitimate. or even possible. lo postulate or readinto the Article conditions -
other than the contemplated legal interest - not alluded to in the Article at
al1?In our submission. - and 1am going to state this quite starkly - nothing
can be regarded as being properly a condition of the grant of permission to
intervene that does not either figure expressly as such in Article 62 or ariseas
ü necessary inference from it:. and no such requirementis derivable from
Article 62 other than the existence of a legal interest liableto be affected by the
Court's decision in the case. This of course has a direct bearing on the
interpretation to be placed on subparagraph(c1 of paragraph 2 ofArticle 8 1of
the Rules of Court, with which rny colleague Mr. Bathurst will be especially
dealiiig.But before 1corne to that. I must complete what 1have to say on what.
in Malta's submission. is the correct view that ought to be taken as to the
intention and significance of Article 62 of the Statute.
I have already had occasion to draw attention to the noticeably open and
unrestricted character of this provision. its lack of any limitation as to either
the category of State qualified to intervene. or the class of case in which
intervention may be sought. or'as to the reason for it.other than the esistence288 COSTINENTAL SHELF
of a specific kind of legal interest. I will now venture to point to a further
respect in which this Article isan open one. namely inasmuch as itcontains no
condition or requirement calling for the existence of any particular relation-
ship. jurisdictional or otherwise. belween the State applying to intervene and
the States already parties to the case. No rcquirement coming under that head
figures in Article 62. Indeed it is clear that the original philosophy of interven-
tion in the days of the former Permanent Court was quite a broad one. and
there is material in the records to support this view. as my colleagues will
show. Itseems that intervention was contemplated as possible even on the
basis of only a general international law interest in the case. In other inter-
national jurisdictions it occurs quite frequently. Any predisposition against
intervention would therefore be misplaced.
We therefore submit that the intention of Article 62 is to provide a facility.
analogous to that existing under most systems of private law. and necessary
for the good administration of justice. whereby. siibject to the duty of the
Court to asceriain that the proper conditions exist. States can intervene in any
type ofcase before the Court. for the protection ofa legalinterest that might be
affected by the Court's decision. This is a valuable and necessary facility in any
system of law. of which Statesshould not be deprived by the play oftechnicali-
ties ;and as we shall show later. there is much in the original drafting history
of Article 62 to support the view that the intention was to provide a generally
available remedy, and that any serious restrictions on it would have been fell
as unacceptable. Even the specific.although as we have seen oblique reference
to the existence of a legal interest seems to have been due in part to the desirc to
make it quite clear that the possibility of intervention on polifical as opposed to
legal grourids,should be excfuded.
It is in the light of these considerations that the effect ofany provision of the
Court's Rules lhat has reference to Article 62 of the Statute. and in particular,
in the present context. Article 81of those Rules. falls to be interpreted.
To begin with then. 1want to submit a few observations as to the general
relationship between the Court's rule-making function and the provisions of
the Statute. No doubt it isan inherent power of any court - irnplicitin the fact
that itisa court - that it can make the rules requisite to enable it tooperatc as
a court. but necessarily such a power cannoi be an unlimited one. It cannot
extend beyond the purpose for which it exists. To take an obvious example. it
could not validly be employed to enable a tribunal to confer upon itself a
jurisdiction exceeding in scope that provided for by its basic constitution.
In the case of the International Court. however. recourse to inherent powers
is neither necessary nor appropriate; since its rule-making power is both
coiiferred. and also defined. by Article 30 ofthe Court's constitution itself -
that is to Say by the Statute - and must accordingly be exercised within the
limits of that definition. The relevant paragraph of Article 30 or the Stat~ite
reads as follows :"Thecourt shall frame rules forcarrying out its functions. In
particular. it shall lay down rules of procedure." From this language. two
broad conclusions can be drawn. first that the principal object of the rule-
making power is to frame rules of procedure. which in praciice would mean
rules for the conduct of proceedings of one kind and another before the Court.
rules such as figure in Parts III and IV of the Court's actual Rules; and
secondly. to make rules not immediately concerned with the actual process of
litigation or of advisory cases. but relating for instance to the composition and
interna1 functioning of the Court and ils Registry as a judicial entity, such as
appear in Parts 1 and II of ihe present Rules. No doubt in al1 this the
boundaries will be a littleblurred. a certain amount of elasticity will be inorder ARCUhlENT OF DR. hl1221 289
and. in general. what in a different context has corne to be known as a
reasonable margin of appreciation concerning what the Court legitimately can
sr cannot do by means ofits rule-making power. mus1be ailowed for.
What is in any event quite certain isthat however much giveand take may.
within liniits. be permissible. what never could be permissible. and theCourt
never would sanction or 1am sure even conten~plate.would be the exercise of .
s rule-making power in a manner inconsistent with or in contravention of a
provision of the Statute. or for the purpose of introducing into such a provi-
sion. whether directly or by way of interpretation. a condition or requiremenl
3f substance no1 contained as clearly implied by it. Thcre rnust therefore .
always be an absolute presumption. that is a presumption of law, that the
Coun did not and does not. intend this. Rules may legitimatelybe made for the
purpose of givinp effectto the substantive provision of the Statute. but not for
that ofaltering. adding to*or qualifying the substance of those provisions. In
this context. few things are more striking than the fact that President Loder in
the administrative deliberations of the Coun in 1922. on this very question of
intervention. refused even to put to the vote a proposal made by one of his
colleagues. and based his refusal on the consideration that the effect of the
proposal wouldbe "io lirnil the right of interventio(asprescribed by hrti-
cle 62)fa si~cliStatesas had accepred cot~tpulsorjulrisdiction";and he went
on to say thai this "would be contrary to the Statute" (1922,P.C./J.. Srries D.
ivo.2,p. 96).
Equally. the factthat paragraph 2of Article 62 vests in the Court the power
to decide upon a request for permission to iniervene. does not in any way
mean. as out opponents in these present proceedings seem to think. that the
Court is thcreby entitled to create itsown conditions forgranting or refusing. It
rnust. in granting or refusing. act within the substantive limits of paragraph 1
of Article 62 which. as 1havc said. contemplates as the only requirement. and
that in a very indirect Fashion.the existence 01a legal interest. ln the Wiinble-
doircase (1923, P.C.IJ., SeriesA. No. 1. p. 12)the Permanent Court was very
definite on this question and said that intervention was:
"based on an interest of a legalnature advanced by the intervening Party.
and the Court should only admit such intervention if. in its opinion.the
existence of this interest is suficiently demonstrated".
The Court did not supgest that anything else than the existence of a le.gal
interest needed tobe demonstrated.
I now pass to Rule 8 1 itself. In the lightof the considerations I havc
ventured to place before the Court. how isthis Rule. or rather the particular
part or it that may be especially relevant to the present connection, to be
interpreted ?The details of this will be developed by my colleagues,and 1shall
only offer a few remarks of principle that follow fogically Tromwhat 1have
already said. Admittedly the Rule as such. and indeed as a whole. is not new.
But in its presenl form it was only introduced as recently as some three years
ago. and paragraph 2 of it, which is the only one 1shall deal with. calls Tor
certain comments.
Previous successive revisions of the Rules, including that of IOMay 1972.
had Leftthis paragraph virtually unchanged in substance from how it stood in
, the days of the Permanent Court. Under that régimethe three standard
requirements which the request for permission to intervene had to set out.
were : a specification or description of the caaestatement of thelaw and faci
justifying intervention in it, and a listof the relevant documents supporting the
application. and these hadto be attached.The presentversion ofparagraph 2290 CONTINENTALSHELF
of Rule 81. as issued on 14 April 1978. retains the last of these requirements
concerning supporting documents. but. for the first two. substitutes two
others. perhaps. though 1am not sure. intended to have the same practical
effect but differently worded. and then adds a third requirement. lnstead of
calling for a description of the case and a statement of law and fact justifying
intervention. the paragraph now requires (01 a statement of the legal interest
involved. and (6 ) statement of the "precise object of the intervention".
In substance there is nothing new in the requirement that the nature of the
legal interest involved should be stated by the Applicant. since this merely
refiects Article 62 of the Statute. and resulted equally frorn the previous
requirement of a statement of law and fact justifying the intervention. In the
present case. the nature of hqalta'slegal interest. involving law of the sea and
continental shelf questions. will be developed by hfr. Lauterpacht :and his
staiement will 1beljeve demonstrate that this inferesl, liable tobe affecied by
the Court's decision in theLibya/Tuiiisio case. is both clear and evident. and
fully adequate to support Malta's application for permission to intervene in
that case.
The second requirement of the present paragraph 2 of Rule 8 1. namely a
statement of the precise object of the intervention. can perhaps also be regar-
ded as implied in the former notion of a statement of law and factjustifying the
intervention. But. and here is the difference, unlike the legal interest question.
there is nothing at al1 in Article 62 of the Statute about the object of the
intervention. or at least nothing about any object separate from and indepen-
dent of the legal interest involve: and nothing requiring that the intervention
should be motivated by any particular object other than the implication that it
will be for the protection of the legal interest liable to be affected. Understood
in that sense. and within those limitsI have already indicated in a general way
whai the objeci of our intervention is. and further aspects of it will be
developed by my colleagues. If. however. the notion of the object of the
intervention. as expressed in subparagraph (b)of paragraph 2 of Article 81. is
to beinterpreted in the present connection as relating to an object beyond. and
unconnected with, Malta's legal interest. then it can be stated at once that
Malta has no such object. But it would also have to be noted that such an
interpretation would involve viewing Malta's application for permission to
intervene in the light of a new requirement not apparently to be found in
Article 62 ofthe Statute.
This aspect of the matter. of something in the Article not derivable from a
corresponding provision of the Statute. will be more conveniently considered
in connection with the next. and quite new, requirement of paragraph 2 of
Article 81. namely that ernbodied in subparagraph(c1 to which 1now corne.
This requirement is to the effect that the State applying to intervene must sel
out in its Application "any basis of jurisdiction which is claimed to exist
between that State and the parties io the case". that is to say the case in which
intervention isbeing sought. In paragraph 25 of our Application we have done
this. but this does not in any way imply. asour opponents here have sought to
contend, that Malta admits the necessity for a basis ofjurisdiction. Malta does
not admit that : for we have also pointed out. paragraph 24 of our Application.
that since. as1have already mentioned. Malta is not seeking any substantive or
operative decision against either Libya or Tunisia, is not making any claim or
callinp for any remedy. as the object for intervention. the question of a basis
or jurisdiction as between herself and either of those two States is
irrelevant : it cannot and does not arise. But Our contention is even more
fundamental than what would be.involved by any matter of simple irrele- ARGUMENT OF DR. MIZZI 291
vance. lt involves the whole issue which is rnost clearly and strikingly raised
by ~ubparagraph (c)of paragraph 2 of Article 81.
The requirement embodied in this subparagraph (cl.which is entirely new.
renects nothing ihat is contained in Article 62 of the Statutor even remotely
to be derived from its language. Irthe existence of a basis of jurisdiction as
between the State seeking to intervene and the parties to the case. had to be
considered as a condition of the grant of permission to intervene. it would rank
as a condition of substance. not rnerely of procedure. a condition not imposed
by the Statute. However. for the reasons which I have already submitted to the
Court. it cannot be so considered. for in that event it would "becontrary to-the
Statute" as President Loder said. speaking on this very question of a basis of
compulsory jurisdiction.
Hence this new subparagraph Tc)cannot be regarded or interpreted as being
intended to create a new condition of substance governing the grant of
permission to intervene. in the sense that if no basis ofjurisdiction were found
to exist between the Applicant and the Parties to the case. the Application
would have ID be refused. or the Court would bejustified in rejecting it on that
ground alone. On the contrary - in order to give effect to the presumption to
which I have referred. namely that no inconçistency between Article and
Statute can be intended. and in order to reconcile this subparagraph (c) with
Article 62 of the Statute. which must prevail. and which neither contains nor
implies any such restrictive requirement as subparagraph (clmentions. but
rather by its generatity. tends to excludeil- it must follow that the require-
ment of subparagraph (c) must be viewed as a purely presentational one.
auaching to the rnaking of the request. but not the grant or the refusal of it.
This would be a perfectly adequate and understandable role for this sub-
paragraph to play. for it can easily be recognized that the Court may have an
interest in knowing whether there does. or does not. in Cactexist a basis of
jurisdiction between the appkicant State and the Pariies involved. and in the
affirmativewhat that basis is. To view it as implying inore. as being capable of
having a substantive and decisive bearing on the actual grant or refusal of
intervention would. in Oursubmission. be to set up a conflict between Statute
and Rule. which must not exisi.and in no way needs to. on a correct
interpretation of this part of Article 1.
It is not only that Article 62 contains nothingto suggest any necessity forthe
existence ofa basis of jurisdiction between the States concerned :it isnot only
that. as hlr. Bathurst will show later. such a condition would give rise to
serious difficultieof application. especially inacase like the preseni one :it is
also that such a condition. regarded as a condition sirle quaiioiof the grant of
permission to intervene. would be wholly inconsistent with the spirit and
intention of Article 62. It would at once narrow down the possjbility of
intervention to the comparatively small number of instances in which a
jurisdictional link does exist between the States concerned. But these are
precisely the cases in which the need for intervention is least likely to be felt.
white on the other hand il is precisely where no such basis of jurisdiction
between the States concerned exists. that the need and the justification for
intervention will be felt more strongly. At one stroke rnost of the value of
Article 62 would be destroyed. or else itsscope would be confined within such
narrow limits as to be of little practical worth. Furthermore, given the sort of
jurisdictional basis postulated by ouf opponents in these intervention proceed-
ings. the real effect would be to rnake the possibility of intervention depend in
practice on the consent of the Parties to the case. instead of that of the Court as
Article 62 of the Statute clearly contemplates. 292 COiLrCINENTALSHELF
In conclusion, therefore. although Malta contends that in fact a basis of
jurisdiction does exist between herself and Libya and Tunisia. she also
contends - firstthat there is nothing in the Statute to require the existence of
any basis ofjurisdiction as a condition of the grant of permission to intervene :
and secondly. that whatever ils precise object and effect. subparagraph (c)of
paragraph 2 of Rule 81 cannot be interpreted or applied as a requirement of
substance creative of such a condition.
These conclusions apply equally. mutatis mutandis. to the requirement
of subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 of Rule 81. if that requirement should be
held to relatetoand cal\ for an object of intervention nol resulting from Article
62 of the Statute - that is to say. in practice. an object not connected with. or
which goes beyond. the legal interest intended to be protected by the interven-
tion.
There is one rurther observation which 1should perhaps make as a sort of
appendix to the rest of my remarks. which I am about to conclude. We have
not failed to note that our opponents in these intervention proceedings seek to
place us on the horns of a dilemma. If we contend - as we do - that the
object of Our intervention is not to make a claim or seek an operative decision
or remedy against Libya or Tunisia then. so they Say, we have no greater legal
interest in the rnatter than any other State rnight have.Ifon theother hand we
do have a greater interest than that. a specificinterest in the result of the Libyal
Tirrrisiacase or of the grounds for it. then a basis of compulsory jurisdiction
between Malta. Libya and Tunisia is called Tor.Our answer to the second of
these propositions is that such a basis of jurisdiction isnoi called for by the
Statute and cannot be created by the Rules. As to the first proposition. 1believe
1have already dealt with it. but when the Court has heard kir. Lauterpacht I
hope it will be convinced that hlalta's geographical situation and the relation-
ship of her continental shelf areas to those of Libya and Tunisia. do give her a
very real and very specific interest. liable to be affected. "which.may be
affected". by the Court's decision in the LibyalTunisia case - and this isal1
that Article 62 of the Statute requires. ARGUMENTOF MR.LAUTERPACHT
COUSSEL FOR THE COVERNXIENT OF MALTA
The PRESIDENT: Mr. Lauterpacht,before you begin : 1think that your
@ rnap is meant for purposes of illustration and not as a further document.
Mr. LAUTERPACHT : blr. President. that is correct.
The PRESIDENT :)'ou have made available.copies 10 the other Parties to
the case so that they can follow your argument.
Mr. LAUTERPACHT :Copies have been given to both the Libyan and the
9s Tunisian delegations. The purpose of this map which 1have next to me is only
O (o.enable me toidentify for the Coun points which the Court will lind on the
srnaller versions of the same map which have been distributed to the Coun.
hlay it please the Coun. hfr. President and Membersof thecourt. Ason the
previous occasions on which 1have appeared before this high tribunal, 1am
deeply conscious of the privilege of participating in the proceedings of this
Court and honoured to be involved in the fundamental mission which it
performs. 1 am egually conscious of the obligations of such participation -
obligations to theCourt to assist it as an advocate in such humble way as I may
to see that justice is do:obligations'to the Government 1have the honour to
represent to endeavour to ensure that the novelty of the present form of
proceedings does not obscure the importance of recognizing and giving effect
to the serious. significant and extended legal interest which Maltahas in the
case between Libya and Tunisia. '
It is my task to present to the Court the considerations on the basis of which
the Court will be able to identify- and here 1use the words of Article 62.
paragraph 1. of the Statute - "an interest ofa legal nature which may be
aîfected by the decision" in the Libynl/Tunisia case. My.concern will be.
therefore. first to point to the substantive connection between the issues in the
Libj~/Tuiiisia case and the legal interest of hlalta: secondly. 1shall seek to
show how that legal interest rnay be affected by the decision in the Libyal
Tuuisia case. ln oiher words. Mr. President. my subject will be the delimitation
of the continental shelr of klalta'and its relationship to the delimitatitheof
continental shelves of Libya and Tunisia.
But, and 1must stress this,I shall no1be attempting to argue the merils of
the respective claims of Libya, Malta and Tunisia. Maltaisnot seeking to take
sides in the Libj~u/T~,~riiase. Knowing nothing about the issues in that case
hlalta could not know which side, if either, to support, and indeed the
possibility exists that were it to know the issues it might wish toadopt some of
the views of one side and some of the views of the other side. so there could be
no clear-cut identification between blalta and either Party.
Nor is Malta seeking ro obtain frorn the Couri a decision on the continental
shelf boundary between jtself and Libya and Tunisia. The Government of
h4alta is fully aware that such a determination at this stage would not be the
proper object either of the present application or of the intcrveiitioitwere
allowed.
What Malta is concerned about is simply (his: here is a case involving the
delimitation of a particular continental shelf. Not any continental shelany-
where. but one particular continental shelf which is shared not by Libya and294 CONTINENTALSHELF
Tunisiaalone, but by Malta also. and for most of the relevant area is not shared
by any other State.
Now continental shelf cases are peculiar, as 1 need hardly suggest to the
Court. To some extent they turn upon general propositions of law applicable to
al1States with continental shelves, But to a greater extent, indeed the greatest
extenl. they turn upon their particular facts - for example. the geographical
configuration of the coast. the geographical relation of the coasts of each of the
contending States, the identification of the material coasttine, the assessment of
the role of islands, the geology and geornorphology of the sea-bed. These are
jus1 a few of the principal and special factors that must affect the determination
of the continental shelf boundary in any particular case.
So the determination of the boundary must involve at least three stages :
first, there is the stage of laying down the applicable general principles and the
rules of international law ;second,there is the identification and assessment of
local or regional factors such as the ones 1have just listed ;and third, there is
the stage of pulting the factors together in such a way that they lead rationally
to the choice of a particular fine.
ln the present situation Malta is not concerned about the first and the third
of these stages. Itisno1concerned with the laying down of generat principles
as between Libya and Tunisia. Nor is it concerned with the choice of the
particular line between Libya and Tunisia. To the extent that the Court lays
down general concepts these are generally applicable to al1States and must be
accepted as such, and as to the particular boiindary that isa matter for the two
States to determine in the light of the indications which the Court gives to
them, and that is a matter for those two States, provided, of course, that the
areas which they daim on the basis of that line do not trespass upon Malta's
proper area of continental shelf.
What worries Malta is the second of théstages - the stage in which the
Court looks at the local or regional factors. It seems pretty evident that the
importance of a regional or local factor may not be exhausted sirnply because it
has been identified and applied as between two States. The possibility clearly
remains that the view which the Court rnay take of particular features of, Say,
the Tunisian or Libyan coast, or the effect which the Court rnay accord to the
grant of concessions, could directly affect the role which these same features
may play in a subsequent delimitation as between Malta and Libya or Mal!a
and Tunisia respectiveiy. In other words, Mr. President, to say that the
situation which exists between Libya and Tunisia is not the sarne as that
between Malta and Libya and Malta and Tunisia, which is what the Libyan
observation suggests, is not the equivalent of saying that they are different in
every respect, which iswhat must be shown if the Maltese application is to fail.
In such circumstances, it would not be prudent for Malta simply to sit by
while matters are litigated which could so closely affect its vital interests. It is
of course conceivable that the Court might, without the intervention of Malta,
give a decision which is in no way prejudicial to Malta's interests. It is
conceivable that elernents in the decision could even work in favour of Malta.
But there is no way in which Malta can know that now : no way in which
Malta can even atternpt an informed assessment of the prospects - because
she is not entitled to seeand has not seen the pleadings in the case. Under these
conditions, what is a responsible governrnent to do ?The only course open to
it is to seek to intervene in the proceedings so that the Court may, first, be
made aware of the elernentsin the situation whjch could adversely affectMalb
and, second, so as to inform the Court of the position of Malta on those
elements with a view to ensuring that the interesis of Malta are protected to the ARGUMENTOF MR. LAUTERPACHT 29 5
2xtent that awareness and understanding of them can lead to their protection.
Enough has. 1hope. now been said - albeit in summary terms. - in reply
10 the observations of Tunisia and Libya. for the purpose of showing the
rollowing points :
First, why it is that Malta hasan interest which is distinct from. and more
specific than. the interests of other Stat:s
Secondly. why it is meaningless for Libya and Tunisia to suggest that
Malta's interests are safeguarded by the limitation which Libya and Tunisia
have placed upon the scope ofthe Court's decision. This is a limitation which
those two States Saywill restrict the operation of the Court's decision to those
areas which appertain to Libya and Tunisia and will not allow the judgment of
the Court to extend to an area appertaining to a third State:and
Thirdly. 1 hope 1 have said enough to show why there is no merit in the
proposition that Article 59 of the Statute of the Court sulliciently safeguards
hlalta's position. Because in this application Malta is not concerned with the
formal operative part of the decision of the Court which isthe matter to which
Article 59 relates. Maltais concerned with the substantive content of the
decision. the elements which lead up to the formal operative part : elements
which though perhaps not inform must incontent inevitably have an impact
upon subsequent relations between Malta and Libya and Tunisia.
1 now turn to the substance of what 1 have ta Say. Leaving to my learned
friend. Professor Lalive. the question of what is meant by the words "an
interest of a legal nature". That legal question will be dealt with by him. My
concern is to identify the character of Malta'sinterest and the manner in which
a prospective decision may affect that interest.
The Couri will, I am sure, forgive me if in thcourse of my argument 1state
a nurnber of facts and develop some legal propositions with which the Court
may already be familiar by virtue of their appearance in the pleadings in the
Libyal Tunisia case.
There are. however. two comments which 1 must make on this prospect of
overlap between my argument and those of Libya and Tunisia in the principal
case.
The first comment is that even if Malta were fully acquainted with al1the
details of the Libyan and Tunisian pleadings in the main case. it would still be
neccessary iorMalta ta referta manyof the facts because theyare lhemselves
directly relevant to the problem of delimiting hlalta'sown continental shelf.
Indeed. as the Court will see, perhaps the most important element in Malta's
contention that it shouldbe allowed to intervene is that the Court's determina-
tion of certain facts and elements for the purposes of the Libya/Tunisia case
will inevitably have a direct bearing on Malta's boundary negotiations with
Tunisia and Libya respectively. In other words. thevery fact that the statement
of elements rnaterial to the LibyadTunisian situation hs to be repeated in the
context of the Maltese application - that very fact itself provides cogent
suppofl for the existences of blalta's legal interest in the main action.
The second comment. on the possible repetition of statements of fact and of
legalconsiderations which may appear in the Libyan and Tunisian pleadings is
that Malta has no choice in the rnatter. It cannot by reference incorporate into
its statementof its own position comparable statements which may have been
made byLibyaandTunisia.For reasons whichhave already been stated by the
learned Attorney-General ol Malta the content of the Libyan and Tunisian
pleadings remains for Malta entirely a matter of speculation.,lt is true that a
person who has given the matter some thought may believe that he can 296 CONTINENTAL SHELF
identify what are likelyto be the main points in the Libyan and Tunisian cases.
Butthis can neverbe more than enlightened guesswork. Inthe nature of things
the Government of Malta cannot know al1the particular facts upon which
Libya and Tunisia have lavished many months of thought and careful re-
search. Nor can the Government of Malta know what use Libya and Tunisia
have made of the facts.The Government of Malta cannot know what line the
legal argument ofthese two parties has taken.
1 rnust, thereforeask the Court's indulgence in respect of unavoidable
repetition of facts and legal considerations. The Courtl, 1am sure, under-
stand that the Governrnent of Malta has no choice but to support its applica-
tion in this way.
Mr. President and Members of the Court, it is convenient to begin by
@ exarnining the rnap and to note certain fairly obvious but nonetheless essential
geographical fa&, and 1respectfully invite the Court to look at the rnap with
me. This rnap is a reduction of a Britishiralty Chart. The details relating
to boundaries and concessions havebeen added in the Hydrographic Ortice of
the Government of Malta.
The Court adjourriedfmt?t11.24 a.niio 11.40a.ni.
Beforethe break, 1was just bringing the Court to the rnap wita view to
demonstrating certain essential geographical facts.said that the rnap is a
reductionof a BritishAdrniralty chart but that the detailson ibeenadded
by the Government of Malta Hydrographic Office, that is to say the details
relating to concession areas, boundaries and so The full-simap ison the
easel besideme and 1shall use it only for the purpoofassisting the Court to
finditsway on the Court's owncopies ofthe map to the various placeswhich 1
identify.
This rnap shows the sector of the Mediterranean Sea stretching frorn Cape
@ Bonin Tunisia, in the north-west corner of the rnap, to Creece and Crete in the
north-east corner.alta, Gozo and the small island of Filflawhich constitute
the archipelago ofalta are to be found just to the east of the interseofion
the lines of 36ON latitude and 14OE longitude, where my finger points.$
Opposite Malta, to the West and the south-west on the mainland of North
Africais the coast of Tunisia. This stretches from Cape Bon in the north to Ras
Ajdir, where the land boundary with Libya mets the coast. My finger isthere
now. From Ras Ajdir eastwards the coast is that of Libya and runs eastward
round the Gulf of Sirto the point at which the land boundary between Libya
and Egypt reaches the coast, somewhere off the rnap on the eastern side.
The length of the Tunisian coastline from Cape Bon Ras Ajdir is approxi-
mately 405 miles. The length of the Libyan coastline from Ras Ajdir to Egypt
is about 970 miles.
The nearest point toalta on the Tunisian coast is Ras Kaboudia,just here,
the cape approximately halfway down the east-facing Tunisian coast. The
distance from there to Malta is 155 nautical miles.
The distance from Malta, taking the Filfla Islaas the base point, to Ras
Ajdir, the coasial terminus of the Libyan/Tunisian land boundary, is 211
nautical miles.
The nearesi point to Malta on the Libyan coast is near Tripoli, where the
distance fromMalta is 184 nautical miles. The distance from Malta to Beng-
hazi, on the easternde of the Gulf of Sirte,352 nautical miles.
To the north ofhlalta. rny finger is on Malta, to the north of hlalta lies the ARGUSIEhT' OF hlR. LAUTERPACHT 297
Italian island of Sicilyand the minimum distance between the Maltese island of
Gozo and the southern shore of Sicily is 44 nautical miles.
Now a word about the other islands in the area.
First, the ltalian islands other than Sicily.
To the west-northwest of Malta on the direct line between Malta and Cape
Bon lies Pantelleria. This is 11nautical miles from Gozo. As will be seen, this
island has alrnost no effect on the delimitation with which the Court is
concerned.
Almost due West of ,Valta lies Linosa, at a distance of 64 nautical miles.
Twenty-three miles south-west of Linosa liesLampedusa and IO nautical miles
west of Lampedusa lies Lampione. Again Lampione will be seen to have little
relevance to the present problem.
Now 1turn from the Italian islands to the Tunisian islands. These are al1
relatively close to the Tunisian coast. lf we start from Cape Bon ai ihe northern
end of the peninsula and move southwards along the east coast we corne first
to two small islands, Juzur and Kuriate. They also are of no present relevance.
Further south we corne to the larger cluster of islands collectively called the
Kerkennah Islands. Due south of the Kerkennah Islands, just beyond the bend
which is called the Gulf of Gabes is the island of Djerba, very close to the
shore. indeed 1believe even connected to it by a causeway.
While referring to the Kerkennah Islands 1shoüld add that Tunisiaclaims to
draw a series of straight base lines round them. These lines start just to the
south-east of Ras Kaboudia, which isthe point on the Tunisian shore closest to
Malta, and run in a south-easterly direction to a point abou23 nautical miles
east of the most eastern point of the Kerkennah Islands, approximately here
where my finger points, and then the lines turn to run very roughly in a south-
westerly direction back towards the Gulf of Gabes.
Then those straight base lines at their south-western terminus join a straight
line riinning almost due south for a distance of about 45-nautical-miles to Ras
Taguerness on the north-eastern corner of the island of Djerba. This 45-
nautical-mile straight line is a closing line for the Gulf of Gabes, landward of
which al1the waters are claimed by Tunisia as interna1 waters. There are no
Libyan islands.
The only other geographical features that require mention are the two Gulfs.
One is Tunisian, the Gulf of Gabes which 1have jus1 mentioned, the other is
Libyan. About 120 miles to the east of Tripoli, this isTripoli here, 120miies to
the east of it is the Gulf of Sirte stretching as far eastwaras approximately
Benghazi. As regards this gulf, Libya claims that south of a line drawn along
latitude 3SD30' N, which is this black line across here, soiith of that line the
gulf isa part of Libyan territory and fallsunder Libyan sovereignty. Malta has,
since 1974, refused to recognize thisclaim and maintains that the base lines for
the delimitation of Libyan territorial waters and continental shelf are those
recognized as applicable prior to October 1973.
Finally. as regards the geography of the area we may observe that although
the wasts of Libya and Tunisia in the immediate proximity of Ras Ajdir, this
point where the land boundary meets the coast, although at that point, or in
that area, thecoasts are marked by a quality of adjacency. they begin to lose
this quality as one rnoves westward following the coast of the Gulf of Gabes as
it turns to the north and north-east and then extends northwards up to the
Tunisian peninsula. And the same is true, though at a greater distance, as one
moves eastward along the Libyan coast following the shore ofthe Gulf ofSirte
as far as Benghazi. The result is that at the two extremes of Cape Bon in the
north-west and Benghazi in the south-east the coasts of Tunisia and Libya298 CONTINE~TALSHELF
respectively are opposite to each other rather than adjacent. that is to Saythey
are separated from each other by an area of water in which the respective
coasts are facing each other. In this respect. in this quality of being opposite
each other. the relationship ofTunisia and Libya cannot easily be distinguished
from that between hialta and any part of Tunisia and Libya respectively.
1emphasize this because in the Tunisian observations reference is made to
the difference in geographical relationships between on the one hand Libya
and Tunisia and on the other hand Malta and Tunisia and MaIta and Libya.
The way in which the Tunisian observations on this point refer to the decision
of this Court in the iVorrliSru CoritirieniulSlirtfcases may suggest a rather
clearer and firrner disiinction between adjacent and opposite States than the
Court'actually drew. And the absence of rigid distinction between the two
situations has been clarified by the words of the Arbitral Tribunal in the U/ii,rd
Kir~gdorii-FreficliCu~ititi~rrlltelfcase. The tribunal in thatcase said, refer-
ring expressly to the relevant passage in the Judgment of this Court in the
North Sea case.the Arbitral Tribunal said :
"lt is also clear that the distinction drawn by the Court between the
two geographical situations is one derived not from any legal theory but
from the very substanceof the difference between the two situations." (54
Irlierrza~iorialLaw Rcporrrs,p66.)
"From the very substance of the difference between the two situations"; and
my point is that the substance of the relationship between Libya and Tunisia,
at any rate in that dimension. isas rnuch an opposite State situation asis the
relationship between Malta and Tunisia in this direction and Malta and Libya
in thal or that direction.
So much for the relevant land areas and their principal coastal and asso-
ciated features. M'e must now turn to the impact of the land areas upon the
contiguous and adjacent marine areas.
It is of course unnecessary forme to mention to the Court the elementary
rules which attribute adjacent sea areas to coastal States. The territories of
Libya. h.lalta and Tunisia. as well as the ltalian islands. each generate a
territorial sea.a continental shelf and an exclusive economic zone. Of the
territorial sea 1needsay no more as 1have already referred to the straight base
line clairns of both Libya and Tunisia. Nor need anything more be said about
the economic zones since at this stage of the proceedings they appear to have
no relevance.
As regards the continental shelf, each of the four States clairns one. The
Court is fully aware of the nature of Libya'sand Tunisia's claims.al any rate in
relation to each other. As to their claims vis-à-vis Malta. I shall come to that
later. Italy's claims to a continental shelf go back to 1965. Malta's clairn to a
continental shelf goes back to its continental shelf legislation of 1966 and has
been maintained in diplomatic negotiations and by the grant of concessions
and 1shall be referring to those in more detail presently.
There clearly exists a basis in law for dividing the sea-bed between Italy.
Libya. Malta and Tunisia in the area of the Mediterranean Sea which lies
roughly between IO0 E longitude and 19' E longitude and 30° N latitude and
37" IVlatitude. It is true that as continental shelf the area may not satisfy that
part of the definition in the1958 Geneva Convention which refers to a depth
of not more than 200 metres since there are parts of the area which are over
3,000 metres deep. Wowever.there are large parts ofthe area which satisfy the
other criteria for the definition of continental shelf. namely that of exploita-
bility. In any event. the whole of the area falls within the definition of the ARGUMENT OF LIR. LAUTERPACHT 299
continental shelf which now appears in Article 76 of the draft convention on
the Law of the Sea (Informal Text) which was produced on 22 Septem-
ber 1980. This text may be taken as the latest reflection of "recent trends
admitted at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea".this quoiation being
from the words of the comproinis in the principal action between Libya and
Tunisia. Article 76 of the 1980 Law of the Sea draft provides as follows :
"The continental shelfof a coastal Statecomprises the sea-bed and subsoil
of the submarine areas that esiend beyond its territorial sea throughout the
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin. or to a distance of 200 riautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorialsea is measured where the outer cdge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance."
ln'other words there isa 200-nautical-mile minimum continental shelf deemed
to adhere to every coastal State. And there is no evidence that any of the four
States denies to any pari of the area the quality of continental shelf.
Although the area which 1have mentioned falfsto be divided between the
CourStates. ltaly. Libya, Xlalla and Tunisia. division has so far proceeded only
slowly. There has been only one agreement, the one made between ltaly and
Tunisia on 20 August 1971 which entered into force on 6 December 1978.
(The text and an illustrative rnap are printed in US Department of State,Limits
in ihe Seas, No. 89. Continental Shelf Boundary : Italy-Tunisia Oanuary
19801.)
The principal provision of thjs Agreement is as follows :
"Article 1. The boundary of the continental shelf between the two
countries shall be the median line. every point of which isequidistant
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadths of the
Italian and Tunisian territorial seas are measured. taking into account
islands. islets and low-tide elevations with the exception of'Lampione.
Lampedusa. Linosa and Pantelleria."
The special provisions regarding Lampione. Lampedusa. Linosa and Pantel-
leria are illustrated by the line on the map. These lines were constructed by a
Tunisian-ltalian Technical Commission established pursuant to Article III of
the Agreement. Ascan be seen. these lines reflect the attribution to the islands
of a continental shelf iimited to a belt of territorial sea 12 miles in width. round
each island. plus. with the exception of Lampione. I-mile width of continental
shelf beyond the territorial sea. So the line. according to the Italian-Tunisian
Agreement begins at point 25 in the north-western part of the upper circle and
then moves anti-clockwise following the circle round Linosa first, then round
Lampione. continuing round Lampedusa and then starting again and going
round Linosa as far as point 30 on the map. That is the agreed Italian-Tunisian
boundary line. I shall return in due course to the significance of this Agree-
ment between Italy and Tunisia. For the moment I refer to it as being the only
agreement delirniting any continental shelf boundary between any of the four
States in the area.
The claims of the four States and their retationship to one another in respect
of the area can best be described in two parts. First, by reference to the
concessions that the States haveawarded ;second, by reference to the diploma-
tic exchanges beiween them. Wiih your leave, Mr. President, Istart with the
concession position and here again I niust invite the Court to look at the map.
The concessions have no1been rnarked in detail on the map. What has been
rnarked have been the limits. the outer limits.of some of them in so faras those300 CONTINENTAL SHELF
limits are relevant to the points which 1am seeking to make. For example, the
concessions awarded by ltaly between Sicily and Malta have not been marked
in. nor have the concessions which were awarded by ltaly round the various
Italian islands but within the limits prescribedby the Italian-Tunisian Agree-
ment been marked in. But as the Court wili see when we come to look at the
diplomatic negotiations. ltaly hasawarded concessions up to 500 metres north
of the equidistance line between Sicily and hlalta. while h,lalta has done the
sarne on its side of the equidistance line falling short by 500 metres of the
equidistance line.Thus in that area Italy and hlalta have. by a policy of mutual
restraint. established a kind of de facto continental shelf boundary. The posi-
tion as regards relations between Malta and Tunisia. and Malta and Libya. is
different.
May 1ask thecourt firstto examinethe position of hlalta. It isconvenient to
begin by looking at the line with which hlalta has depicted her continental
shelf boundary. This falls into two parts.
First. thereisthe equidistance line constructed between hlalta and Italy in
the north. Libya in the south-east and south. and Tunisia in the West and
south-west.
Second. there is the area which is affected by the presence of the ltalian
islands of Linosa and Lampedusa. As the Court will already have seen. inthe
Italian-Tunisian continental shclf agreement of 197 1these islands were accor-
ded a continental shelf I mile wider than the 12-mile belt of territorial waters
surrounding them. As smaHand detached dependencies of Italy thissolution to
the question of the width of continental shelf to be attributed to these islands
seems to hlalta to be entirely equitable. Accordingly. hlalta has adopted the
same approach in determining the boundary between herself and the islands.
and that is why one sees this curved line drawn round Linosa to its north and
north-east and con~inuingon down to point 3 on Malta'sequidistance boun-
dary.
So. ifthe Court will start at the extreme western point of the Maltese area as
depicted on the map. a point identified as point 5. and will follow the straight
line due south topoint 4. just a short segment. it will find that the solid straight
line intersects the circular line around Linosa. the pecked line round Linosa.
The Court may disregard for present purposes the southern and southwes-
tern parts of that pecked line. They represent again the agreed Italian-Tunisian
boundary. But if the Court will follow that pecked lineclockwise from point 4
it will firsof'al1see a small section between point 4 and point 25. This is
regarded by hlalta as part of the boundary between the Maltese continental
shelr and the ltalian continental shelf round Linosa. It isalso regarded by
Tunisia and ltaly as part of the agreed boundary of the continental shelf
between Italy and Tunisia around Linosa.
The clockwise continuation of the pecked line from point 25 to point 30
represents hlalta's view of the boundary between the continental shelf or
Linosa and the continental shelf of hlalca. From point 30 the continuation of
the pecked line to point3 once again servesthe double function of representing
the boundary of the Linosa and Lampedusa continental shelf in terms both of
the agreed Italian-Tunisian lineand of the lineclaimed by Malta. Then. at point
3 the circular line reaches the Maltese equidistance line and runs south-east
from point 3 to point2 to point 1 and straight on to point 6.
The Court will note that there lietothe north-east ofthat straight line point
3-2-1-6. which is Malta'sconstruction of the Maltese-Tunisian equidistanceline,
another straight line. very roughly parallel to it. which stam at point 30 on the
circular lineround Linosaand passesthrough points 3 1 and 32. This ispart of the ARGUMENTOF MR. LAUTERPACHT 301
agreed Italian-Tunisianline. Another pari of that same line projects to the north-
Westof the circular boundary around Linosa from point 25 ta point24 and then
interçectsthe Maltesestraight equidistancelineatpoint 5.This is a smallsector.
25-24-5which liesto the north-west of the linearound Linosa.
TheCourt will observe that there isan overlap between the areas claimed by
Tunisia under the Italian-Tunisian Agreement and the areas claimed by hlalta
under the combination of equidistance and the acceptance of the equitable
restriction of the continental shdf apperiaining to Linosa and Lampedusa. In
the north-west corner there is a small triangle of overlap between point 5 on
the hlaltese equidistance line. point 5. point 4 and then point 25 on the circular
line around Linosa. To the south-east of Linosa and east of Lampedusa there is
a substantial area ofoverlap lying between these two straighl line:the Italian-
Tunisian line between the points 30 and 32 and the Maltese equidistance line
between points 3 and 6.
In each of these areas of overlapTunisia has granted concessions. The outer
lines of these concessions are marked by yellow lines in the area. identified by
the words in the box "outermost lirnits of concessions granted by Tunisia".
There isan arrow connecting the box to the yellow line which marks the outer
lirnits of concessions u'hich at one time or another have been granted by
Tunisia. Some of these concession areas have already been surrendered by the
concessionaires back to Tunisia. But this doeç not affect the fact that at one
time or anolher Tunisia has granted concessions up to the yellow iine.
It is necessary next to concentrate more closely on this southern section of
the hlaltese area. Frorn point32. the southern terminus of the agreed Italian-
Tunisian boundary. the yellow line of the outer lirnits of the Tunisian conces-
sions continues south-eastwards and reaches the hlaltese equidistance line
beiween points 1and 6.The continuation southwards of the Tunisian conces-
sion limirs into the area. presurnably in dispute between Libya and Tonisia in
the main proceedings. have not been rnarked on the map. But enough isshown
on the map to demonstrate clearty the way in which Tunisia's claims extend
cven beyond the agreed Tunisian-ltalian boundary south-eastwards into
h.alta's equidistance area.
At this point we are naturally brought to a consideration of the position as
bctween hialta and Libya. As the Court will see. Malta's equidistance line
continues from point 6 al the south-west corner of the area. south-east and east
through points 1. 2.3.4 and so on as faras point 12 in theextremeeast, before
turning north-west towards point 9. 8 and sa on on the leg of the line that
moves back towards Italy.
hlalta opened part of this area for exploration in 1973. The part so opened
consists of 16blocks indicated by thin black lines. Eight of these blocks are @lso
marked by diagonal hatching. Within this group of blocks 2,3. 4.9, 10, 11. 14
and 16. the ones marked by the hatching, have been granted as concession
areas in 1974.This group of blocks in the southern part of the Maltese area
should not be confused with the group of blocks immediately around the
islands of hlalta and Gozo thernselves. which are slightly to the north and West
of the btocksofwhich I am speaking.
Now. as the Court will immediately see. Libya has atso granted concessions
in the same area. north of the Mattese equidistance line. The outer lirnitsof the
Libyan concession area are marked in green. If1may start at the Libyan Coast.
the green line begins in the south-east just near Benghazi. It'movesdue north.
then west. ihen nonh. then Westand north and west again and norîh and West
and once again north, crossing the Maltese equidistance line between points 10
and I1.It continues north inside the Maltese area and then turns Westand then 302 CONTINENTALSHELF
south again and recrosses the hlaltese line before turning Westonce more and
then turning north again to cross back into the hlaltese area just to the east of
point 7. lt continues northwards in the Maltese area to approximately the
Medina Bank, turns westward and once again southward and recrosses the
Maltese equidistance line just to the east of point5.There it turns West for a
short distance. moves slightlyto the north and then follows along towards the
Westby a series of small changes of direction untilitends up as depicted on the
map before the Court with a question mark. and this question mark is placed
there because. like the LibyanfTunisian boundary itself.the end of the Libyan
concession claims must be in issue in the current proceedings between Libya
and Tunisia.
It is in this area that 1must invite the Court's closest attention to the situ-
ation. In this area the claims and inter& of Libya, Malta and Tunisia meet
and quite clearly overlap. Equally clearly the question placed before the Court
by Libya and Tunisia in the specialagreement is expressed in terrns which
extend to this area. Tunisia, in its observations, refers to statements in both the
Libyan and Tunisian pleadings inthe main proceedings to the effect that the
delimitation between Tunisia and Libya must extend only to the point where it
would meet the continental shelf area appertaining to other States. With al1
respect to the Tunisian observations and to the pleadings which they reflect,
statements of this kind simply skate over the issue with which the Coun is
now concerned. This issue is : does Malta have a legal interest which may be
affected by the decision in the proceedings ? One cannot avoid giving the
answer "yes" by pretending that the line which will emerge as a result of the
main proceedings will not extend to the area in dispute with Malta. For there
will always be a question ;where should the Libyan-Tunisian line stop if it is
to avoid trespassing into Malta'sarea ? Moreover, this is very important, even
if this question could be answered definitefy now it would still not dispose of
Malta'sconcern, which 1elaborated before the break. that specificlocal factors
which the Court might treatas relevant to the determination of the Libyan-
Tunisian boundary could also be invoked by Tunisia and Libya in respect of
theirboundaries with Malta. In short, the very question in issuebetween Libya
and Tunisia involves. in part. an area in which Malta prima facie has asmuch
of an interestas Libya and Tunisia prima facie have. 1say prima facie because
it is not for the Court to consider now the substance of the claims of the three
States. Nor, indeed, will it be for the Court in the main action between Libya
and Tunisia to wnsider the substance of the claims of either against. Malta.
That is an entirely separate matter. At this point, the sole task ofthe Court isto
. identify an interest oa legal nature possessed by Malta which may be affected
by the decision in the main case.
We may now move further east in Our examination of the map. It is
important not to lose sight of the massive extension of Libya'sclaims north of
hlalta's equidistance line. This is shown first by the outer limits of Libya's
concession areas of which the most northerly line is situated on the hledina
Bank. in BIock4 of the Maltese concession area. hloreover. Libya'sclaims:go
even further. This is shown by the boundary which Libya proposed to hlalta
in.1973. much further to the north and which it appears never to have
abandoned. Unfortunately. I failed to have that line marked on to the maps
which have been distributed to the Court. But it has been marked on this large
chart in heavy red ink and it can be seento lie well to the north of the hlaltese
equidistance line and. in fact, parts of it are as close as ab20tnautical miles
to the island of hlalta and at furthest about 28 nautical miles from the island of
Malta. I will corne back to that matter later. As thecourt will no doubt know. ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUERPACHT 303
in AugustlSeptember 1380,a Libyan warship forced a drillingship operaring
on behalf of a licensee from the Governmeni of Malta to withdraw from a
location in Block 3 north of the most northerly Libyan concession claims and
nearly half-way between Malta's equidistance line and the island of Malta
itself. The exact location in Block 3 is marked on the map and is notedin the
inscription on the map. I shall return as I said tothe Libyan daim of 973
when Jcorne io describe the diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.
So much for the facts relating to the respective concession claims of Libya.
Malta and Tunisia. Enough has. 1suggest. been said to show that this elernenl
alone is sufficient to distinguish Xlalta's.legalinterest in the area from ofat
any other Sial iethe wortd. But if there should beany roorn for doubt on this
poiiit a sumrnary description - 1emphasize summary - of the diplomatic
- exchanges between ,Malta.Libya and Tunisia should rnake it plain that Libya
and Tunisia clearly regard Malta as in a position relative to their clairns to the
continental shelf quite different from al1other States.The negotiations berween
the countries show several things :
First. they'show that the boundaries between Malta and her neighbours are
still unsettled. These boundaries are. therefore. still open to be influenced by
assertions and arguments related to physically proximate areas. arguments
which may be buttressed by observations of the Court in the LibyalT1ttiisia
case. kir. President. 1emphasize the words "physically proximate". In doing so
1seek to stress the points that the elements which theCourt finds as relevgni io
the practical specification of the boundary between Libya and Tunisia are
almost certain to arfect the practical specificationof the line between klalta and
Libya and Malta and Tunisia. The concept of practicai specification is. of
course. drawn directly from the second paragraph of the first Article of the
Special Agreement submitting the Li6)lorilTunisiari case to the Court. The
Court will recallthat in addition to being asked to speciîy the general principles
and rules of international law applicable. it is further requested to specify
precisely the practical way in which the aforesaid principles and rules apply in
this situation so as to enable the experts of the two countries to delimit those
areas without any difficulties. With al1respect,inmy submission, this provi-
sion requires îrom the Court a fairly high degree of specificityin the judgment
which it musi undoubtedly render between Libya and Tunisia. and it is just
rhat degree of specific consideration of local factors in an area physically
proximate to klalta which isthe cause of Malta's concern and the justification
for its request to intervene in these proceedings.
Now may 1turn to the diplomatic exchanges between the countries. I said
that one reason for looking at them is that they show that the boundaries are
unsettled and the second reason for looking at Lhemis that they rnay show
some of the arguments which have been used by Malta'smaritime neighbours
in their consideration of the boundary line with Malta. The Court will. no
doubt, compare these arguments with those which are advanced in the Lib-va/
T~r/risicase. Libya has suggested in paragraph 30 of ils observations that the
issue in the main case "will in every likelihood differ in the Libya/Tunisia
context îrom the issues in the MaltaILibya context". TheCourt will. 1am sure.
note the proper caution which marks this statement by Libya. The words "in
every likelihood". not the words "will for certain"be different. but they will
"in every likelihood"be different. The. is herea recognition that at any rate
some of the issues may be similar or even identical. In other words, the
possibility that some of the issues will differ does not exclude the possibility
that some of the issues will be the same and it is this latter possibility of the
identity of the issues that matters in the present proceedingbecause identity304 CONTINENTALSHELF
necessarily leads to interaction - that is the crucial word. the prospective
interaction of the determination by the Court orthe Libyanl Tunisiori case with
prospective delimitations of the hlaltese boundaries with Libya and Tunisia.
Once that possibility and interaction. however small it may be. is recognized.
Malta has, 1subrnit, shown the existence of the legal interest.
There isa third reason why it isdesirable to look at the negotiations, and this
is that the very fact and nature of the activity. of this diplomatic activity, serves
to show that vis-à-vis Libyaand Tunisia, Malta is in a quite different position
from other States which have a continental shelf. Tunisia and Libya cannot
point to a comparable relationship, in continental shelf delimitation terrns,
with anyother Sbte - with the exception, of course, of their relationship with
each other or possibly with their maritime neighbours in different directions,
for exarnpte Tunisia with Italy or Libya with Egypt. ln the face of discussions
and correspondence of the kind which 1am about to describe, it verges on the
absurd for Libya and Tunisia to suggest, as they do in their observations, that
Malta'sbsition cannot bedistinguished frorn that of other States generalIy and
that Malta does not have a specificlegalinterest in the very continental shelf in
which Libya and Tunisia are seeking to find a boundary between thernselves.
The description of the relationship with Italy is primarily to cornplete the
circle of information regarding Malta's relations with her ring of three neigh-
bours.
I should add by way of explanation of the descripiion of the diplornatic
exchanges which follows, that it has'been drawn in part from the text of
diplomatic notes and in part frorn summary, and sometimesvery brief records
of meetings kept by oîricials of the Government of Malta. 1hope that what 1
am about to Say will not give ris. to any serious disagreement regarding facts,
but if any such disagreement does arise and the Court so requires. the
Government of hlalta will of course be willing to place before the Court the
relevant material ' in its possession.
And so. I pass now to look at each of the three sets of relationships.
The PRESIDENT :Mr. Lauterpacht, the question of these documents. are
they available to al1the Parties ?
Mr. LAUTERPACHT: They have not been made available to al1 the
Parties. hlr. President.
The PRESIDENT :1hope that if they wish to see them they willbe available
at once.
Mr. LAUTERPACHT :They can be made available very rapidly.
The PRESIDENT :1reserve the position of theCourt on this matter. Imean
asto whether we shall'also want to look at them.
hlr. LAUTERPACHT : 1quite appreciate that and 1am not trying to place
the Court in a position in which it will be embarrassed. Itis merely that I am
seeking to give the Court a summary description of an extended set of
negotiations. extended in the sense of extended over a period of tirne, to give
the Court a sense of those negotiations not because the actual content of the
negotiations rnatters so much as the fact that the negotiations took place.
However. as 1Say.ifthere isany problern at al11am surethat these documents
can be made available rapidly.
' Not reproduced. ARGUMENT OF hlR. LAUTERPACHT 305
It will be convenient tstartwith the relationshipwith Libya. Discussions
started in July 1972 when a Maltese delegation proposedto Libya a draft
agreement based on the equidistance concept. No counter-propasal was
offered by Libya and no agreement was reached. Nearly sevenmonths later,
on 7 February 1973,at a meetingwith the PrimeMinister ofMalta,a Libyan
minister suggested that the length of the median line should bear same
relationship to the length of the wastlines of the two countries. This Libyan
propositionwas more fullydevelopedin April1973when a Libyandelegation
visisted Malta and tabled a draft agreement drawn up on that basis. The
Libyan delegation expfained thar the relevant section ofLibyancoastlinewas
defined by Libya as extending from the Tunisian border to Misurata - the
Tunisian barder at this pointon the map to Misurata which is jus1 near the
point where the Gulf of Sirte begins to bend southwards from the Libyan
coastline. The distance between Malta and Libya yas divided in the same
proportion that the coastline betweenthe Tunisian boundary and Misurata
bore to the coastline ofMalta. The result of thisproposal, or this system, is
riothingshort of astounding.Unfortunately,as 1saidearlier.1failedto arrange
to have the line marked on to your maps, but it is here on the large map
marked in red. As you willsee,the lineatitsnearestpointto Malta isabout 20
milesfromthecoastand at itsmostdistantpoint.about28milesfromthecoast.
The Line would cut Malta offfromanenormoussection of iîcontinentalshelf.
If one is to presume continuity in the Libyan approach to corltinentalshelf
delimitation, and the concession claims and the gun-boat episode of 1980,
Libya,in itsown mind al any rate, seeksto dividewith Tunisiamust include a
verysubstantialpart of what on a moretraditionalview,and traditionalI must
Sayissomethingof a mildeuphemism, whal on a more traditionalviewofthe
matter would be regarded as Maltesecontinental shelf.Quite understandably
the Prime Minister of Malta, in April 19'73.sent a message directto the
Chairman ofthe RevolutionaryCommandCouncil ofthe LibyanArab Repub-
licslating that the Libyanproposalwas completelyunacceptableto Maltaand
indicatingthat tenders would now be invited for areas delimitedby reference
to the provisionalrnedian line proposedby Maltato Libyain 1972.
Sincethis episodeisrather importantas sheddinglighton the way inwhich
Libya'scontinental shelf boundary with Tunisia rnay affectMalta, 1ought to
pause to offerone or two comments on it.
Firsrit rnay beobserved that the selectionby Libyaof the stretch of coast
fromthe border withTunisiato Misurata asking oppositeto Maltaappearsto
be an exercise of an enlirely arbitrary characier. There may, however, bea
reason for this which is developed in the Libyan pleadings in the main
proceedings. Should this be so, and should the relevance, the length, the
direction or the weight of Libya'scoastlinebe in issue in theLib+~~a7/Tutzisia
case,it isclear that whalever the Court maysay inthe main proceedings, Le.,
inthe Libya/Ttnrisiacase,isbound tohavea direct impacton theuseto which
Libya rnayput itscoastlinein itselationshipwith Matta.
Sc.ro/ldin so far as the identification ofthe relevant Libyan coastlineis'not
an arbitrary matter, it rnabe noted that it begins at the Tunisian boundary,
thus suggestingthat in some way the point at which Libya mets Tunisia is
material to Malta'sinterest.
Tlrirdone rnayobserve theeffectofconstructinga triangle,or quadrilateral,
which has as itspointsthe Tunisian border. Misurataand the two extremesof
the Maltesecoast. In particular, a straight linefrom the borreithTunisia al
RasAjdirdrawn to Maltatreatsasan area of'tibyan continentalshelf relevant306 1 CONTINENTALSHELF
to the delimitation with Malta a sugstantial part of what must surely be the
area now in dispute between Libya pnd Tunisia. 1have not drawn that line,
but if 1place my sheet ofpaper very roughly like that to reflecta straight 1ine:in
the direction frorn Ras Ajdir to Mafta, the Court will see that Libya is clairning
continental shelf as being relevantt the delimitation of its areas with Malta
that extends right up to here and t , erefore up to a point which must un-
doubtedly be in issue in the proceedings between Libya and Tunisia. How can
it be asserted in such circumstances that the delimitation of the boundary
between Libya and Tunisia does not fffect an area in which Malta has a legal
interest ?
1return now to the course of the Libyan/Maltese exchanges. Early in July
of the same year, 1973, a Libyan delegation came to Malta and once again
referred to the criterion of the length of the coastline. Malta maintaineditsat
case was founded on paragraph 85 of the decision of this Court in the Norrh
Seo CoriiineiiialSlie/f cases. Malta insisted that the Libyan proposals were
inequitable and maintained that a clear distinction was to be drawn between
islands which were the territory of sovereign States and those which were
rnerely dependencies. Nothing came of this meeting.
Then in January 1974 Malta handed to Libya a memorandum reasserting
the justness of the equidistance concept and seeking an assurance that Libya
would not raise any objection to Malta granting oil exploration concessio,ns
based on the median line as the dividing line.
Further discussions took place in April 1974 between the Prime Minister,of
Malta and Mr. Ben Amer, a represeritative of Libya. The latter proposed that
both sides should abandon their positions and compromise. The Prime Minis-
ter of Malta pointed out that this proposal had been previously made and was
not acceptable, and 1 may point out, that for both of the Parties to abandon
their positions and compromise would of course have meant that Malta was
abandoning the relatively restrained!claim to an equidistance line, i.e., was
prepared to compromise on something less than equidistance, and Libya was
going to abandon this vast claim and compromise on something more than
equidistance. That rnay not have in it much in the way of an element of true
compromise. It was then agreed that a draft agreement for the submission of
the dispute to arbitration should be prepared.
Later in the same rnonth of April 1974 there was a meeting in Tripoli
between the Prime Minister of Malta and the then Prime Minister of Libya at
which the latter said that Malta could proceed to arbitration, but the Prime
Minister of Libya was rerninded that agreement was needed on the part of
Libya if Malta was to proceed. In the course of June 1974 Libya requested a
copy of Malta's concession to Texaco. Malta declined to supply it and Libya
expressed itreservation towards the grant. In July, Libya renewed its request
for details of seismic surveys and for a map showing the concessions granted
by Malta. To this request Malta replied in August 1974identifying the location
of the seismic operationsas lying north of the equidistance line separating the
submarine areas of Malta and Libya. At the same time Malta slated that it
could .nol accept Libya's reservation made on 30 June 1974 regarding the
Maltese concession to Texaco. A map of the area was attached to the Maltese
note. Malta also took the opportunity to state that it could not accept or
recognize the Libyan claim that the Gulf of Sirte soiith oa line drawn along
latitude 32O30'N was subject to Libyan sovereignty.
On 24 October 1975 Libya sent a note to Texaco, Malta's concessionaire,
alleging that the area within which it was operating was part of the Libyan
continental shelf.
I ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 307
Then, in January 1976,Libyasent to Maltaa draft agreement to submit to
this Court a request for a statement of the pinciplesof international law to be
applied for.determinin$ the continental shelf areas, and the economic zone
areas. belonging to Libya and Malta respectively. An agreement was con-
cluded along those lineson 23 May 1976and for reasons which have already
been rnentionedthis agreement has not yel corne into force. In the meantime.
in 1978-1980,there has been correspondence between the two Governments
on the subject, in the course of which each hasreiterated its positio: in the
caseof Malta. itscornmitment to the equidistanceline ;in the caseofLibya. its
daim to unspecifiedareas of continental shelf north of the equidistance line.
As a result of the intervention of the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations
in the latter part of 1980,Libya agreedthatilwould proceedto ratificationof
the agreement for subrnissionof the disputeto thisCourt and to participate in
the joint notification ofthe agreement to the Court. However, the ratifica-
tions have yet to be exchangedand the agreement has yet to benotifiedto the
Court.
1cornenow 10the negotiationsbetween MaltaaiidTunisia.Thesehavebeen
much more lirnitedthan those between Malta and Libya. Some prdiminary
discussion took place in the course of an officialvisit by the Prime Minister
of Malta to Tunisia in March 1973. The first significant Note is dated
8April 1974,when Malta wrote to Tunisia referring to the grants of conces-
sions by Tunisia "in an offshore area which the MalteseGovernment consi-
ders . ..appertains to Malta". Maltastated that in the absence ofan agreed
dividing line,the Tunisian authorities should refrain from allowing oil com-
paniesto undertake work programmes in any offshoreareawhich fallson the
Maltasideof the median line between Maita and Tunisia.
The Tunisian Reply of 9May 1974 was to the effectthat the concessions
granted to AMOCO.CFP and ACIPwere situated in a zone delimited on a
provisional basis. The Note said that a date for further discussions wouldbe
proposed later.
It appears from an examination of the location of the concessions that
Tunisia may have beenafTectedin itsinitialdetermination ofthe boundary by
two factors :
Firstitlooksas ifthe Tunisian boundary linehas beenconstructed asa line
of equidistancebasedon Tunisia and Sicily,givingno weight to Malta.
Second, it ispossiblethat Tunisia may have relatedthe extent of itsclaim to
the 200-metre isobath, wilhout reference to any possiblyopposing claim by
Maita.
Later in 1974 Maltatwice informed Tunisia of its intention to hold a
regionaiseismicsurvey betweenlatitudes 34O 26'S and 36O20'and longitudes
f 3O and 'lSO,covering a section of the area in which the Government of
Tunisia had provisionallygranted offshoreconcessions. No replywas received
from the Governrnent of Tunisia.
By an undated Note, but probably of 18May 1976, the Government of
Tunisia conveyed to the Mal- Ambassador. for his information, a copy ofa
Notesent byTunisia to Libyaon 13 May 1976,protestingagainstthe location
by Libya of four buoys in what Tunisia regarded as its area of continental
shelf. And by a further Note dated 18 May 1976the Government of Tunisia
conveyedto the.Government of Malta, for its information, a copyof another
Tunisian Note to Libya regarding the delimitation of the Tunisian/Libyan
continentalshelfboundary. This Note isimportant in relation to the boundary
beyond the 50-metre isobath, for its insistenceon the application of equidis-
tance. 1quote a short passagefrom the Note :308 COhTlNENTALSHELF
"Examination of the maps shows that the general configuration of the
Tunisian and Libyan coasts is simple and presents no difliculty regarding
the application of the criteria,ules of law and international usages. The
delimitation of the continental shelf between Tunisia and Libya, beyond
the 50m isobath, should be based on the equidistance line, traced, in
accordance with international law, taking account of geographical
considerations and zones of economic interest of which the reality and
importance are attested by long usage."
Why - it must be asked - why should Tunisia have sent copies of these
Notes to Maita if it were not in recognition of Malta's special interest in
delimitation of the continental shelf in the area and the factors relevant
thereto ?Why ?
Two more years passed without action. Then, on 10 August 1978, the
question of delimitation was touched on in discussions between the Prime
Ministers of Tunisia and Malta respectively. The Tunisian Priine Minister
invited Maltato submit its views in writing. This Malta did by a Note of 25
August 1978 in which Malta proposed the division of the continental shelf
between the two countries on the basis of equidistance, treating the Italian
islands as res interdios. This proposal was, on 8 November 1978, flatly
rejected by Tunisia, which in itsturn merely suggested further talks based on
the spirit offriendship and good neighbourliness. Since then there appears to
have been no further correspondence.
And so, 1 come lastly, and for the purpose of completing the picture, to
relations with Itaiy. Italy declared its rights over its continental shelf in 1965.
In 1965 and 1969 it addressed certain enquiries to the Governrnent of Malta
and in 1969 proposed boundary talks. The Government of Maita replied in
October 1969 that it had not yet completed the preparations necessary to
enabfe it to enter into fruitful discussions. In July 1970 the Government of
Malta indicated to ltaly that it wasin a position to starttalks and at about the '
same time, on 17July 1970, the Governriient of Malta issued a notice in the
Malta Government Gazerreindicating that the area between Malta and Sicily as
far as 500 metres on the Maltese side of the median line was open for tenders.
By a note of 14 August 1970 the ltalian Government indicated that it would
adopt the sarne course to the north of the median line, subject to any adjusl-
ments that rnight bemade in subsequent negotiations, and this is a confirma-
tion of thedeyacro situation which 1referred to earlier in my argument.
No further exchanges Lookplace between Malta and Italy until 1975. In
particular, Italy did not inform Malta of the negotiation and conclusion with
Tunisia of the boundary agreement relating to the area to the south-west of
Malta and covering the position of the Italian islands of Pantelleria, Lampe-
dusa, Linosa and Larnpione. But eventually Malta became aware of this
agreement from other sources.
At this point1should just interpose a few words about the Italian-Tunisian
continental shelf agreement of 197 1.Ratifications were not exchanged until
6 December 1978, and the agreement only entered into force on that date.
Maltadoes not accept the validity ofthat part of the délimitation betweenItaiy
and Tunisia which brings within the area of the Tunisian continental shelf .
parts of the sea-bed which fall within the area of Maltais continental shelf as
delimited on the basis of the principle of equidistance. This principle would be
applied in the present case - the principle of equidistance - in Malta's view
- would be appiied in the present case by rneasuring from the island of Malta,or Filfla. the islet just off its coast. to the island of Kerkennah. al1owing.a
12-niile belt of territorial sea pllis a 1-mile belt of continental shelf around the
Italian islands of Pantelleria. Linosa and Lampedusa. As can be seen from the
map, the areas claimed by Tunisia encrmch significantly on the area of Malta's
claim. while the area claimed by Italy does soto a lesserdegree.
So. to return to the cour.= 'of negotiations with Italy. in 1975 upon the
initiative of Xjalta talks took place between the two countries in the course of
which illalta presented adraft agreement for the division of the shelf between
the two countries on the basis ofequidistance..with the exception orthe islands
of Linosa and Lampedusa. As regards these islands. they were to be accorded a
belt ofcontinental shelfor 13-nautical mile radius. as 1havejust indicated. This
proposal echocd the solution adopted in respect of the islands in the Italianl
Tunisian Agreement of 1971.
At a meeting on 19 June 1975 the Italian Government rejected the proposal
of Malta regarding the islands. claiming that the islands were entitled to a full
share of the continental shelf lying between them and hlalta on a basis or
equidistance. hlalta insisted that rhere was a cleat distinction to be drawn
between the jsland of Malta. the metropolitan territory of a State. and the
ttalian islands. which were no more than distant dependencies ofthe molher
States.
That same meeting is important in another respect. The representative of
Italy explained that the special treatment accorded to the islands in the Italian/
Tunisian Agreement reflected in part the fact that the islands were Sittingon
the extension seawards of the Tunisian land mass - a factor to which he
attached importance. Evidentiy this may also bea factor to which Tunisia
attaches importance in the Lib.ilalT~rriiscase. and if that shouldbe so, Mr.
President. i[ would seem that anything that the Court may Sayon this topic in
the main case would'have same direct hearing on the relationship between
MalARer this meeting, three years passed without action on either side. unt25
August 1978,when hlalta urged ltaly to renew negotiations. Further Notes -
îrom hlalta followed on 25 September 1978 and 6 Novernber 1978. but have
not been answered by lialy. And so we corneio the condusion of the narrative
of the relations between klalta and its maritime neighbours. Nothing - but
nothing - could illustrate more vividly the interconnection of the four
countries in the Mediterranean continental shelf and. in particular. with
specific reference to the proceedings now before you. the common interest of
h,ialta. Libya and Tunisia in a single continental shelf area.
TlteCo~irl rose ut12.59p.m. SECOND PUBLIC SITTING (19 II81 1,3 p.m.1
Presenr :[See sitting ol 19 1181, a.m.1
Mr. LAUTERPACWT :Mr. Presidentand Members of the Court 1am sors.
to have had to burden you with-an oral presentation going into so great a
degree of detail as did my exposition this morning. It was, however, more than
a necessary survey of the situation, iwas an unavoidable one. My task is to
satisfy you that Malta has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected
by the decision in theLibya/Tunisia case. 1do no1contend that Maita has an
interest in the case simply by vû-tueof the fact that it has a continentalshelf. If
that were the sole basis of Malta's request to be allowed to intervene Malta
would be in a position no different from that of any other Slate with a
continental shelf and with a general interest in the judicial devefopment of the
law on that subject. But a mere general interest in the continental shelf is not, 1
emphasize, the sole basis of Malta'srequest. The foundation of the present
request is something rnuch more specific, sornething which distinguishes in
kind the position of Malta vis-à-vis theLibyalTunisia case from that of any
other State. Malta's specific and unique interest in the course of theLibyal
Tunisia proceedingsarises out of the involvement of Malta inthe facts of the
LibyajTunisio case by virtue basically of Maltais geographical location vis-à-
vis the two litigants. And it isthat background, that geographical background,
that 1have necessarily had to describe in some detail to Courtas essentialto
the fmt stage of my submissions.
This morning you asked me whether 1had reached the conclusion of rny
submissions. I said that regrettably 1had not, because Ihave now to develop
my argument regarding the relationship of the facts which 1described to the
very issues in the LibyalTunisia case in so far as an outsider can perceive
them.
May 1begin by inviting the Couri to look at the situation from Malta'spoint
of view. In the main proceeding Libya and Tunisia have requested the Court to
do two things :first. the Court is requested to identify the principles and rules
of international law that should be applied to the delimitation of continental
shelf areas appertaining respectively to Libya and Tunisia. In so doing the
Court isasked to take account of equitable principles and the relevant circums-
tances which characteruethe area as well as the recent adrnitted trends at the
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Second, and one must aiways remember the second, the Court is asked to
specify precisely the practical way in which the aforesaid principles and rules
apply in this particular situation, sas to enable the experts of Tunisia and
Libya to delimit their respective areas of continental shelf without any difi-
culties.
Al1that is in ArticlIof theCompromi sin paragraph 1the reference to the
general principles ;in paragraph 2 the reference to the specific and practical
application of the princjples.
But there is more. One also has to rd1 ArticleIII,which deals with the
problem of what happens if the experts cannot agree on the delimitation
within a relatively short period. Should that happen, the two parties shall
together go back to the Court and request such explanations or clarificatioas ARCUhlENi OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 31 1
may facilitate the task of the two delegations to arrive at the line separatingthe
two areas of the continental shelf, and the two parties shall comp1y with the
judgment of the Court and with its explanationsand clarifications.
That is going alrnostas far as onecas in asking the Court todraw the line
but at the same time not actually to put it on paper. The Court is asked to be
very precise in the indicationswhich it gives. .
Now this second stage, reflected in the second paragraph of Article 1of the
Compromi snd in Article IIImust necessarily involve the Court in a detailed
consideration of al1 the elements which specifically affect the delimitation in
this panicular situation. Now it is Malta's contention that by virtue of its
geographical position the elements in this particular situation, that is to say the
situation between Libya and Tunisia, are also elernents in Malta's own situa-
tion as regards Libya and Tunisia 'respectively.
Obviously the elements will not be absolutely identical but the likelihood is
that there will be a substantial overlap.Even the Libyan observations acknow-
ledge that possibility, as 1sha11presentiy indicate to the Court in some detail.
And it is that prospect which makes Malta'ssituation unique in compaiison
with every other State in the world. A situationunique for its relationshipwith
Libya and Tunisia. It is the State which is closest to the area of the Libyan/
Tunisian dispute. Itis the Statewhich shares the same continentnt shelf as
Libya and Tunisia are seeking io divide.
Therefore. the basis on which the shelf isdivided between Libya and Tunisia
will inevitably affect the manner in which the remainder of the shelf is to be
divided between Malta and Libya and Tunisia.
The exposure of Maltato this feature of the Libya/Tunisia proceedings is
made even greater by virtue of the fact that the Libya/Tunisia agreement sets
no northern terminus to the process of delimitation. The agreement, 1 am
speaking of the Compromis, the special agreement, does notsay how far norîh,
or in the we of Tunisia how far east, the areas of continental shelf apper-
taining to each State extend, and it will evidently be in the intereofeach of
the contestingStates ifeach ofthem were to presentitscase in such a way as to
secure the approval of the Court for elements which could subsequently be
invoked in a continental shelf delimitation or litigation with Malta.
1shall therefore, Mr. President, with your leave, now turn to the potential
substantive impact upon Malta's position of the Court's determination of the
kind of specific issues which we can perceive as likely to be considered in
connection with the LibyalTunisia case ; not for the purpose of arguing the
rnerits of those issues but merely for the purpose of showing that any decision
on those substantive issues is bound to touch the position of Malta in its
relations with Libya and Tunisia respectively.
Itisnot necessary for me 10 make any extended submission to the Court
regarding the general law likely tobe applied in the main proceedings. Neither
Libya nor Tunisia has ratified th1958 convention on thecontinentalshelf. in
consequence its provisions regarding the delimitation of continental shelf
boundaries are not, as such, applicable. The latest staternent of the recent
trends admitted at the third Law of the Sea Conference is to be found in the
draftconvention of September 1980. The relevant provision is in Article 83,
paragraph 1, which 1shall read :
"The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite
or adjacent coasts shall be eîfected by agreement in conformity with
international law. Such an agreement shall be in accordance with equi-
table principles,employingthe median or equidistance line, where apprd- 312 CONTINENTAL SHELF
priate, and taking account of al1 circumstances prevailing in the area
concerned."
Now this is not the place for the Government of Malta to express its
adherence or non-adherence to this text as a staternent of the relevant rule of
contemporary international law on the delimitation of the continental shelf
and the Government of Malta formally reserves itsposition in this regard.
But in referring to the concepts of equitable principles, equidistance and
prevailing circumstances in the area, the current law of the sea text provides a
convenienl peg on which to hang an analysis ofthe situation.
Basicallylhere are two concepts. One is the concept of equidistance which is
objective, technicallyeasy to apply and relatively predictable. The olher is the
concept of equitable principles, or special circumstances. Although these last
two ideas may not be identical they are similar in that their application
involves a signifiant exercise of judicial discretion and its outcorne in any
particular case is not easy to predict. Nonetheless, many of the factors which
may be taken into consideration can be identified and it is with these that we
shallbe concerned. The convenient rnethod of approach is to apply each
standard in turn with a view to seeing how the determination of the Libya/
Tunisia case could affectany subsequent delimitation between, on the one
hand, Malta and, on the other hand, Libya and Tunisia respectively.
We rnay startwith the equidistance approach. This is the one upon which
Malta has hitherto based the delimitation of its continental shelf. It is evident
that the application of the equidistance approach can be affected by a nurnber
of factors.
First, there isthe base fine.The equidistance method necessarily involves the
use of base points or base lines, otherwise there would be nothing from which
the boundary line coutd be equidistanl. In the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf the base line was described in Article6,paragraph 1,as the
base line "from which the breadthof the territorial sea of each State is
measured". The sarne phrase appears in the definition of the continental shelf
in Article 76, paragraph 1, of the draft convention on the Law of the Sea of
September 1980.
The normal way of drawing an equidistance line between Malta, Libya and
Tunisia would be on the following basis. As regards Malta, the base line would
be thelow-water mark on the coast line of the main islands of Malta and Gozo,
including therein the low-tide elevation of Filfla.
As regards Libya, the baseIinewould be the Iow-water markof the coast line,
from Ras Ajdir in the west to approximately SidiSueichereast of Benghazi.
As regards Tunisia. the base line would be the low-water mark of the coast
linefrom RasMostet, at the norlh-eastern point of the Tunisian peninsula, to
Ras Ajdir, rnaking allowance for the relevant part of the coast lines of the
, Kerkennah Islands and Djerba Island.
If, for any reason, Libya and Tunisia establish valid grounds for clairning
base lines seawards of those which I have just set out, the effect on the
equidistance fine with Malta will be to move that line closer to Malta.
Now, it is in the nature of the case between Libya and Tunisia that each
Party will, in al1likelihood, be wanting to claim for itself the most seaward
possible base line, while at the same tirne pressing for the most landward
possible line for its opponent. Libya will wish to push its line seaward and
Tunisia's line landward. Tunisia will wish to push its line seaward and Libya's
line landward. The point may beillustrated by two examples - one frorn the
Libyan, the other frorn the Tunisian,Coast line. ARGUMENTOF MR.LAUTERPACHT 313
As 1 have already indicated, ~ibya claims to close the Gulf of Sirte by a
straight base line along the lineof latitude32"30'. This black line across the
map here. This claim is contested by Malta. If Libya validates its claim to close
the Gulf of Sirte in its relationship with Tunisia, then that will also havan
impact upon the validity of the closureof the Gulf ofSirie in Libya'srelations
with Malta. It will have a direct effet on one basic ingredjent ofthe equidis-
tance line ktween Libya and Malta. The effect ofa straight closing line across
the Gulf of Sirte is to push the equidistance line between Malta and Libya
northwards towards Malta by 35 nautical miles. A very significant impact in
this area.
As an example of a disputable feature of the Tunisian base line we rnay
recail the system of straight base lines claimed by Tunisiaaround the Kerken-
nah Islands. 1have already described the almost triangular rnanner in which
this system of straight base lines projects into the Mediterranean Sea. Unless
the selection of the most seaward points in the system of straight base lines can
be justiliedas a low-tide elevation within 12 nautical miles of the Tunisian
Coastline, the generaldirection of the system of straighbase lines around the
Kerkennah Islands isopen to question. If Tunisia establishes the valjdity of iLs
straightbase lines in relation to Libya, thiwiil &O have an effect upon the
prospective boundary line with Malta by pushing the equidistance line ap-
proxirnately sixnautical miles towards Malta.
Having given these illustrations of theffëctwhich certain factors affecting
the application of the equidistanceapproach asbetween Libya and Tunisia can
have upon the boundaries between Libya and Tunisia on the one hand, and
Malta on the other, Imust next turn to perform a similar exercise in relation to
the application by the Court of ad approach involving equitable principles or
special circumstances.
Before doing this, however, it necessary to add thatthevery identitication
in the cù.curnstances of this case- in the very identification of the circum-
stances in which such equitable factors will be taken into consideration - is
bound to have an effect upon the choice between, on the one hand the
equidistance approach, and on the other hand the equitable principles or
specialcircumstancesapproach, on any subsequent discussion between Malta,
Libya and Tunisia. If that choice, between the application of equidistanceand
the application of equitable principles and special circumstances, is expressed
in general legal terms, the effect may not be great.But if the Court were to
specify with some particularity what are the features. geographical featuresfor
example, which led itto theview that itcouldresolve thematter simply by the
application of equidistance, but rnust take into consideration the specialcir-
cumstances or'equitable principles, that choice would be dependent upon
factors peculiar to the region, and thus would necessarily affect Malta, in -
Malta's future relations with theIwo Parties.
In saying this, 1must be careful on one point, and that is1must notleave
with the Court the impression that Malta absolutely rejects the applicationof
equiîable principles or special circumstances to the determination of the
continental shelf boundary between it, and Tunisia and Libya. Malta firmly
believes that the straightforward application of the equidistance principle by
using the actual coasts of Libya and Tunisia as baselines is the best way to
achieve a delimitation which corresponds with equitable principles. At the
same tirne, Malta is far frorn coriceding that an approachbased primarily, or
even exclusively, upon equitable principles or special circumstances must
necessariiy lead to Malta getting less than it would under an equidistance
approach. This is not the occasion for Malta to develop its contentions regar-314 CONTINENTAL SHELF
ding the operation of the concepts of equitable principles and special circum-
stances. But when thal occasion arises, Malta will be free to contend that the
proper application of those concepts may well lead to a boundary line more
favourable - more f'avourable - to Malta than a line of strict equidistance.
This said, I now turn to consider the impact which a determination by the
Court of some of the factors involved in the equitable principles or special
circumstancesapproach may have upon the future position of Malta. Again. it
is not for me to canvass the detailed application of these concepts as between
Libya and Tunisia, but it is appropriate for me to identify some possible
considerations - in full ignorance, it must be recalled. of what Libya and
Tunisia have actually argued in their written pleadings.
1begin with a reference to one consideration which may be derived from
Libya's own communications to Malta. This is the contention that in some
way the area of a State'scontinental shelf should be proportional to the length
of its coast line. In its relations with Libya Malta is bound emphatically to
repudiate this proposition. But. as 1have already said, the possibility remains
thal in some way this proposition may have been invoked by Libya in its
arguments with Tunisia. If that should be the case, Malta would be clearly
greatly interested in the manner in which the Court is called upon to accept, to
reject, or partially to apply the concept.
Another possibility is that one facet of the concept of the length of coast line
might be advanced in a less radical form. This is the idea that coastal fronts.
representing the general direction of the coast,may influence the line of the
boundary. This could have some bearing on a dispute between two countries
in the physical positions of Libya and Tunisia. Yet, if expressed by the Court
without a sufficient awareness of its possible impact upon Malta, it rnight have
a rnarkedly detrimental effect upon Malta'ssubsequent negotiating or litigating
position.
Again, there might be some discussion of the weight to be given to such
Tunisian islands as the Kerkennah Islands or Djerba Island. Ifthese islands are
not to be given full weight, then any reduction in their effect would need to be
justified in terms of equity or special circumstances related to their particular
character and geographical location. Clearly. there are important and funda-
mental distinctions to be drawn between those islands and an island, such as
Malta. which forms the sole territory of a State,as has already been pointed
out by the learned Attorney-General. Nonetheless, an expression of opinion by
the Court upon the position of islands in that part of the Mediterranean Sea
could again have a direct impact upon Malta's position.
1 come now to other features of the situation in the Mediterranean Sea
between Malta, Libya and Tunisia. It seems likely, that in developing their
arguments regarding the direction of the boundary line, Libyaand Tunisia will
each have closely considered the nature and effect of the geology and geomor-
phology of the sea-bed in the disputed area. Should any such examination have
taken place, it can only have been in the context of an argument based upon
equitable principles and special circumstances, since evidently such a study can
have no bearing on the concept of equidistance. Or,possibly. such an exarnina-
tion may have forrned the basis forcontentions regarding the very existence of
one or the other's rights in the sea-bed. It might have been alleged, for example,
that one or the other State'sclairned area did not, for physical reasons, truly
constitute a natural prolongation of the landrnass. Alternatively, it rnight have
been said that although a continuation of the landmass, certain physical
elernents suggested that the area was a continuation more of one country's
landmass than of the other country's. ARGUMENTOF MR. LAUTERPACHT 315
If such arguments have been developed by either side, there is a strong
probability that the information on which they rest is pertinent also to the area
of sea-bed claimed by Malta. When the area affected by the dispute between
Libya and Tunisia is looked at as a whole, itcan be seen that it is not a very
large area and that the part of the sea-bed claimed by Malta is integrally a part
of the sea-bed area lying between the three States ;and certainly the Libyan
claims to a lineso dose to Malta make it clearthat Libya shares this view. So,
one may suggest that there is simply not enough room in thearea for the Court
to make findings on the structure of the sea-bed, and its bearing upon the
claims of Libya and Tunisia, without the Court. at the same time, saying
something which touches thearea in which Malta is interested, and doing so in
a manner which may affect Malta's subsequenl position in its negotiations
wiih Libya and Tiinisia.
Moreover, this risk is markedly increased by the fact, which though 1have
mentioned it before, cannot be too much ernphasized, that in their submission
to the Court, Tunisia and Libya have not placed any seaward limit upon the
boundary which they asked the Court to help them delimit. It is, of course,
possible that the Court may find that it can describe the practical way of
apptying the relevant principles and rules in such a manner that the boundary
line can be conceived of as following a particular bearing. and I invent a
quotation "until it reaches theouter limitof the continental shekfofMalta".
This might be seen as a formula which would not prejudice the eventual
determination of the outer line of the Libyan and Tunisian claim. But that is
only a possibility. It has equally to be contemplated that theCourt might find it
impossible to express itsguidance in terms which would lead to a single
straight line. Instead, the Court mightaspart of the practical indication which
it may give, which it will give, have to contemplate a line which changes
direction at certain points, and if the Court did contemplate such a line which
changes direction at certain points, the Court would presumably give reasons
for indicating why at such-and-such apoint the linedoes change direction, and
if the Court did that the reason given for the direction of the line at a point
close to the coasts of Libya and Tunisia might not be the same reason
controlling a change of direction further out in thseaand therefore nearer the
area of Malta's claim. in such circumstancesthe statement of reasons affecting
the direction of the ouier pan of the line could later have a highly material
bearing upon Malta's relations wiih Libya and Tunisia.
So far I have been identifying physjcal features whjch might affect the
equities of the situation or constitute special circumstances. But it is necessary
to contemplate other elements, elements of a non-physical character, which
may affect the situation. There is nothing in the judicial or other preceden-s
but particularly the judicial precedents, the decision of this Court in Norrh
Seo Cutrli~renralSlrefcase or of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Ut~irKingdom-
Fre~rcl iorifi~teiirSltev case- there is nothing in those precedents to suggest
that the equities are limiteta physical equities. It is fully to be contemplated
that in relation toa sea-bed area in respect of which physical features might
give little aid to the determination of the direction of the line, the Court might
find that special significance attached to more general considerations such as
the-nature and extent of the economic reçources of the State, the size of its
population, the gross national product, the pet-capitaincome,and sa on. The
Court will remember a passage which 1read from a Note which Tunisia sent
to Libya, and of which a mpy was sent to the Governrnent of Malta, in which
Tunisia itselfinvoked the relevanw of "zones of economic interest of which the
reality and importance are attested by long usage". To the extent that recourse316 CONTINENTALSHELF
to such elenlents 01.equity was necessitated by the physical circumstances or
the area in dispute. the manner in which the considerations were presented to.
or expressed by. the Court would certainly touch on hlalta's interests.
1think that I have said enough to show the many important points at which
in the specific context of the Libya/Tunisia proceedings the Court might
express itself in a way which could affect the interests of Malta. not generally.
as it might affect other continental shelfcountries. but specifica:and 1stress
specifically. In this case we are talking about a single. relatively small area of
continental shelf which cannot properly be approached on a bilateral basis
without awareness of and concern for the interesrs of the other State in the
immediate vicinity.
And this last point may be quite tellingly illustrated by recalling once again
the terms of the Italian-Tunisian Agreement on the boundary around and
adjacent to the Italian islands of Pantelleria, Linosa and Lampedusa. This
Agreement bas evidently ben concfuded without due consideration of the
position of Malta. This isstrikingly true asregards the line drawn to the south-
east of Linosa, the line from 30through 31 to 32. This last point- point 32 -
appean to be equidistant from Linosa. Lampedusa and the Coastof Malta. Yet
Malta can properly ask: why, if these islands were not deemed to carry
sufficient weight toentitle them to equidistance rights as against Tunisia, why
should they be assumed to carry sufficient weight to entitle them to equidis-
tance rights as against Malta ? Yet that dilferentiation has been made by Itaty
and Tunisia and a line has been drawn on the map to the obvious disadvantage
of Malta.True, it is only a linedrawn on a map by two States,and ktis there-
fore entitled to no more authority thancornes from the circumstanŒs in which
it was drawn and having regard to Malta'sobvious reservation of its position.
But the position is likelto be dinérent when a line is drawn. iTnot by the
Court at any rate on the basis of specifiçguidance given by the Court. for then
the lineand the elements in it havethe authority of the Court behind them. and
that authority will inevitably shape the attitude of the Court'in later litigation
inwhich issues relating to the same area may arise ;and it will no doubt be
accorded great weight in the organs of the international community.
It is not enough in these conditions to sa- as do the observations of Libya
and Tunisia - ihat the position of Malta will besafeguarded by the terms of
Article 59 of the Statute of the Court, to the effect that decisions of the Court
are binding only between the parties and in that case. Here. as 1suggested to
the Court earlier in the day. we are concerned not so much with the formal
decision of the Court between Libya and Tunisia as with the effective decision
contained in the Court's reasoning. Obviously if the Courr were to give an
unmotivated decision h,Talta'sdimcuItie$ might be reduced. But a decision of
the International Couri ofJustice without reasons is not to be conternplated. In
fact it-is excluded by the terms of the Libyan/Tunisian submission to the
Court'sjurisdictiori. The decisianofthe Court on any aspect of the law relaiing
to the continental shelf will have a clear defacto influence. It will be treated.
properly treated, with the greatest respect. TheCourt will in al1likelihood itself
adhere in fater litigation to the substance of what it has already stated after due
deliberation. Other tribunals will pay heed to the Court's views. as the U~lited
Kitrgdoln-Frei~cliCottlinental Sheg Arbitration Tribunal followed to a large
extent'the line indicated by the Court in the NorthSea CoiztitieitfalSlie!fcases.
This being so. it is to be.concluded that the only way in which hlalta's
interests are to be safeguarded iby givirig Malta an opportunity to present to
the Court the considerations which Malta deems to be relevant. hlalta is not
seeking a decision against either Tunisia or tibya. It is not seeking to litigatc ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 317
with Tunisia and Libya about the appropriate boundaries between hlalta and
Libya and Tunisia in the guise of an intervention in the Libyan/Tunisian
proceedings. hflalta merely wishes to have an opportunity to ensure that the
Court is aware that the elements in the LibyalTuiiisia case. as seen from
hlalta's point of view. are not resolved in a rnanner which causes specific
prejudice ta fvtalta'slegat interest in the preservation of her sovereign right to
explore and exploit the full extent of her continental shelf.
I appreciate greatly the patience with which the Court has heard this
detailed recitation of factsand this attempt to relate the factsta what Ican only
suppose to be issues in theLib.~alT~riiisicase. But factsare at the centre of this
Application. and facts also provide an answer to the question of jurisdiction
thai has been raised in the observations both of Libya and Tunisia. The
question of jurisdiction is one which will be dealt with by hlr. Bathurst aRer
Professor Lalive has dealtwith the general legal aspects of intervention under
Article 62.
But there is orle aspect- and it rnay be a controlling aspect- there is one
aspect of the question of jurisdiction whiçh grows quite naturally out of the
argument which 1have been present'ingto you. and therefore. with your leave.
I would like fora moment to pursue il.
The facts which 1have described to the Court show how in effet Libya and
Tunisia are asking the Court to carve up a.continental shelf of which part
belongs to h-Ialta.When Isay "asking the Coun to carve up" that continental
shelf of course I appreciarethat the Couri is only being asked to give specific
directions as to how that isto be done. But nonetheless the Court isbeing asked
to participate in a process which must necessarily culminate in the splitting up
of a continental shelf in which, on the basis of what 1have been saying to the
Court earlier in the day. inevitably includes an element of hlalta's rights.
kir. President and hlernbew of the Court. if 1may make so bold as to invite
you to look at the problem from the point of view of a layman. The layman
will say : "ik'ait a minute. you are carving up my continental shelf. You.
Tunisia and Libya. are carving up a continental shelf of which 1. Malta. am
eniitled to a part. And then. corning to the Court to ask the Court to assist you
in doing that you turn round - you. Tunisia and Libya - turn round to me.
h,lalia.and say'Oh. No. Yau can't intervene in these proceedings because you
cannot establish any jurisdictional link with either of us'- or 'both of us'as
they both .-y."
My answer to that arises directly out of the facts which 1 have been
presenting to the Court today. My answer to that plea of lack ofjurisdiction is
that the Court has jurisdiction, a jurisdiction conferred upon it by Tunisia and
Libya together coming to the Court with their Special Agreement and asking
the Court to decidethe case. That Special Agreement expressly conferred upon
the Court jurisdiction between those two States.
But. italso impliedly conferred jurisdiction upon the Court as regards an
intervention by hlalta. Thejurisdiction ofthe Court arose out of the conduct of
thase two States. hlembers of the Court will of course be familiar with the
approach which the Court adopted in the Corfu Chanirel case to the question of
jurisdiction when the Couit held that Albania had by its conduct created
jurisdiction in the Court by means of the concept of aforum prorogarum. Iam
not saying that this case is identical with that. 1am saying that this case is
analogous to that.
Itis possible fora State. by its oonduct, to confer jurisdictioon the Court.
Whenever two States conclude the kind of agreement which Tunisia and
Libya have concluded. they thereby implicitly confer upon the Court jurisdic-318 CONTINENTAL SHELF
rion to deal with intervention by a State which claims. as Malta does so
strikingly. that its legal interests are affected. That jurisdiction may besaid to
arise out of waiver or by implication or byforutn prorogarutn. or by a kind of
estoppel. It does not really matter which word one uses to describe what is
essentially a common sense analysis of the situation. Two States cannot come
to this Court and.say to the Court "please carve up territory as between us"
when there is a third State that may be akted. without implicitly acknow-
ledging the right of that third State to corne in to the Court and intervene.
It is not possible. as the jurisprudence of the Court has shown. for two or
more States by their specialagreement to frame the jurisdiction of the Court in
such a way as to exclude the rights of third States that may be affected. The
Court will recall ilsown decision in thecase of the Mot?erarjGold when the
Court. in effect said to Great Britain, ltaly and the United States
"you States cannot by your agreement between you come to this Court
and ask us to dccide an issue which. although on the faceof it. only arises
between the three of you. surely involves a determination of the rights of
a State which is not before this Court".
Iam saying that when two States try to do that. as Libya and Tunisia have
tried to do it. they ain effect accepting that the Court must have jurisdiction
to deal wiih an intervention.
The United States Supreme Court in a case called the NuliottalCi»!Batik v.
TheRepublic of Cftitia decided in 1955. a case about State immunity. used a
phrase which has stuck in my mind. The court there spokeabout "the ultimate
thrust of the consideration of fair dealing" as being a consideration which
justified the court finding that the National City Bank was entitled to rnake a
counter-claim against China, a plaintir which would otherwise have been
eniitled to invoke immunity. The situation is of course not ideniicawith the
present situation but the undertying elernents are thsame.
And it would not befairthat. having regard to the factswhich I have been ai
such pains to e.xpound.the Coun should decide upon the issues between Libya
and Tunisia without giving Malta a chance to be heard. 1 have said that Malta
is not asking Toran Order against either side. Itcannot ask for an Order
because it does not know8what either side is seeking. Malta merely wishes to
have an opportunity to ensure that justice isdone to itselr.that no decision is
taken affecting its rights without hlalta being heard on the subject.
In terms of the law relating to intervention and the terms of Article 62. this
is a perfectly proper request. My learned friend. Professor Lalive. will develop
the arguments along that line. So. hlr. President and blembers of the Court.
may I again ihank you for the patience with which you have received this
statement and ask whether you would be good enough to cal1on my distin-
guished colleague. Professor Lalive. PLAIDOIRIE DE:M. LALIVE
CONSEIL DU COUVERKEMEN'I' Ut. hlALTE
h.1.LALIVE : hlonsieur le President. Messieurs de la Cour. la tâche qui
m'incombe aujourd'hui - je devrais dire le privilège - est celle de vous
présenter les vues du Gouvernement de h.lalte sur l'objet et la nature de sa
requêtea fin d'intervention. a la luniiéredu Statut de la Cour.
Au .seuilde cet exposéje ne puis m'empêcher - et la Cour voudra bien me
le pardonner - d'avoir une penséeémuepour la niémoirede celui aux côtés
duquel j'avais déjàl'honneur voici quelque vingt ans d'êtreprésentdans ceiie
même salledevant la Cour :j'ai nommémon maitre et colléguele professeur
Maurice Bourquin. a la memoire duquel vous qe permettrez d'associer celle
des membres de la Cour internationale de cette époque.
hlonsieur le Président.ma présentationse composera - avec votre permis-
sion - des trois parties suivantes. d'inégaleslongueurs :la premikre. la plus
longue des trois. sera consacrée a I'intervention telle qu'elle est prevue par le
Statut de laCour. a son objet. a sa nature, a ses conditions- tels que l'on peut
et l'on doit les délerrninerd'aprèsles sources disponibles. notamment d'après
les travaux préparatoires du Statut de la Cour permanente et les rares. trop
rares cas ou la Cour. ou certains de ses membres. ont eu l'occasion. sinon
d'appliquer. du moins de faire allusion à l'article62 du Statut.
Dans une seconde partie assez brève. je tenterai de dégager les enseigne-
ments qui peuvent êtretires de la théorie généralede la procédure et. en
particulier. du droit comparé. Ceci pour éclairer les diverses questions non
résolues que pose. aujourd'hui encore. l'interprétation des dispositions du
Statut relativea l'intervention.
Enfin. dans une troisième etdernière partie. il s'agira pour nous d'appliquer
a la présenteespèceles principes et lesnotion dségagés dans lesdeux premières
parties de mon expose. c'est-à-dire d'examiner si la requètedu Goiivernement
de Malte répond bien, conirne nous en sommes persuades. aux conditions et
aux buts envisages par le Statut de la Cour - et ceci de l'examiner au regard
des observations deposé- par les Parties a l'instance.
Avant d'entrer dans le vif du sujet. il nous faut constater un fait- qui est
notoire :l'institution de l'intervention. dans leprocèsinternational. est fort mal
connue. I'une des plus mal connues qui soient - et peut-être aussiI'une des
plus mal comprises !
Ce n'est pas que les textes du Siaiut. les article62. 63. soient particuliére-
ment obscurs ni qu'ilsmanquent en eux-mêmesdeclarté.c'esttout simplement
que I'article63 n'a reçu que de trèsrares applications et que l'article62. ici en
cause. n'ajamais encore étéappliqué!
IIs'agit donc. sije puis m'exprimer ainsi. d'une « première )>dans l'histoire
de lajurisprudence internationale. d'un cas prirlzaeiiwprcssioiiiscornme on dit
dans certains systèmes.et il résultede ce faitplusieurs conséquences pratiques :
IIen résulletout d'abord. me semble-t-il, une responsabilitéparticuliere pour.
tous ceux qui ont aujourd'hui l'honneur de s'adresser à votre Cour et tout
spécialement.bien entendu. pour lesreprésentantsdu Gouvernement de hlalte.
demandeur en intervention.
IIen résulteaussi. sans doute. pour la Cour. une responsabilité particulière320 PLATEAUCONTINENTAL
- vu l'autorité etle retentissement que sa décisionne manquera pas d'avoir -
mais aussile droit d'attendre, de notre part à tous, le maximum d'assistance.
Lesreprésentantsdu Gouvernement de Malte, en ce qui lesconcerne, n'enten-
dent pas se dérober a leur responsabilité,si lourde puisse-t-elle être dansles
contraintes de temps qui ont été les leurs, t pour ma part je voudrais dans cette
première partiede mon expose procéder a un examen attentif des dispositionsdu
Statut sur l'intervention- cecien m'efforçantde m'en tenir a l'essentiel.
Messieurs les juges, la nécessitéd'un examen particulièrement attentif dé-
coule donc d'abord de notre obligation d'assister votre Cour dans l'analyse
d'une question jamais encore tranchée. Elle s'impose aussi par l'étatlacunaire
et confus des sources doctrinales disponibles sur l'intervention dans .le procès
international. Elle s'impose enfin, los^bu1ttot leasf, pour la raison quece qui
est en cause ici même - comme vous l'a indiqué ce matin M. IAlforney-
Getieral de Malte - ce sont les intérêtvitaux d'un petit pays du tiers monde.
Lorsqu'il s'adressaita la Cour permanente, ici même,au nom du Gouver-
nement français, le professeur Jules Basdevant, dans l'affaire du Wimbledon
G~;rieC. /IO3, p. 119), constatait d'abord que la requêtepolonaise se fondait
sur un double motif d'intervention)> - lesarticles62 puis 63 - et ilobservait:
t<Pour ce qui est de l'artic62, leprobleme d'une intervention apparait
comme étant plus complexe et plus délicat, et la Cour, dans I'établisse-
ment de son règlement de procédure, a déjàrencontré les dinicultésdu
probleme. »
Pour tenter d'assister la Courdans {asolution de ce que le futur président
Basdevant appelait un problème ((complexe et délicai»,je voudrais, avec votre
permission, Monsieur le Président, regrouper mes observations en trois cha-
pitres - pour la clartéde l'exposé :
Dans un premier chapitre et dans une perspective que jbserai appeler
(<historique >)je rechercherai les éléments d'interprétationque l'on peut trou-
ver : 1)dans les travaux préparatoires duStatut de la Cour permanente et du
Règlement; 2) dans la pratique de ces deux Cours ;et 3) dans la doctrine
internationale.
Sur la base des donnéesainsi recueillies,j'aborderai ensuite letexte mêmede
l'articl62 du Statut et les conditions généralesposées a l'intervention.A cette
occasion, il y aura lieu de voir si lecontexte, et tout spécialementl'artic63du
Statut. commande de nuancer, voire de corriger les indications recueiilies
précédemment.
Enfin, dans un troisièmechapitre, j'aurai areprendre quelques points parti-
culiers, pour lesexaminer de manière plus approfondie. 11s'agira notamment
de la notion, tout a fait centrale, d'intérêt d'oruridique et des problèmesqui
peuvent se poser a son propos, compte tenu de la nature et de l'objet de
l'intervention.
Enfin, en conclusion de cette première partie, nous verrons s'il est possible
de dégagerde ce premier examen des conclusions tout au moins provisoires,
ou bien s'ildemeure un certain nombre de questions incertaines, non résolues,
au sujet desquelies il faudrait alors chercher ailleursdes élémentsde solutjon,
ce qui sera l'objetde notre deuxième partie.
Monsieur le Président, Messieursde la Cour, il est superflu, il serait singu-
lier, qu'un conseil du Gouvernement de Malte entreprenne de faire devant
vous un historique détailléde f'élaborationdu Statut de la Cour permanente
par lecomitédejuristes choisi par le Conseil de la Société des Nations en 1920.
hlais il est indispensable cependant, pour une bonne compréhensiondes choses - et sans remonter a ce que j'appellerai la prchistoire du Statut, c'est-à-dire
auxconventionsde La Haye de 1899et de 1907 - il est indispensable dis-j-
de faire reference aux travaux préparatoires. On ne saurait saisir. je crois. la
portée des articles62 et 63 et le progrès considérablequ'ils représentent dans
l'histoire de la justice internationale. un progrès.qui,futa l'époquereconnu et
saluécomme tel. on ne saurait les comprendre si lon faisait abstraction des
travaux accomplis par leseminents jurisconsultes réunis a La Haye du 16juin
jusqu'au 24 juillet 1920.
On ne saurait d'ailleurs bien comprendre ces travaux eux-mêmessi l'on ne
tenait pas compte des documents. des projets. des mémoires dont ce comitéde
juristes étaitsaisi ou du contexte généraldans lequel il travaillait et. enfin. des
modèlesque ses membres avaient présents a l'esprit.
Jetons donc un coup d'Œil sur les travaux du comité de juristes sur la
question de I'intervention - question qui fut discutéelors de sa vingt-huitiéme
séance.
A l'origine. le seul texte soumis au comite concernait. a l'instar des disposi-
tions des deux conventions de La Haye que je viens de citer. ce qui est devenu
l'article63 du Statut.
Désle commencement du débat.l'insuffisancedu texte proposéest signalée
par lord Phillimore et par d'autres orateurs. Et le président du comité de
jlirisconsultes, le baron Descamps. souligne que le cas de l'actuelarticle 63 -
l'interprétation desconventions - n'est pas le seul aspect de l'institution et
qu'il fautadmettre l'intervention dans d'autres cas. M. Fernandes. lejuriscon-
sulte brésilien.propose alors la formule selon laquelle le droit d'intervention
doit ètre reconnu « aux Etats ayant un intérètlégitime, soit d'assisterune des
parties en cause, en raison d'un droii conjoint, soit d'exclure le demandeur ou
le défendeur». Et comme l'observe. peu après. ,un commentateur quasi
contemporain. M. Farag. (tcette proposition donne a I'intervention unchamp
d'action aussi vaste que celui que lui reconnait généralementlaplus libéraledes
législationsinternes D.
Le jurisconsulte norvégien Hagerup propose alors au comite de juristes la
forniule de l'article2I du projet des pays scandinaves :
(<lorsqu'une affaire soumise a la Cour porte sur l'interprétation d'une
convention internationale générale ouuniverselle. ou si elle concerne
d'une autre manière les intérètsd'un Etat tiers. ce dernier aura le droit
d'intervenir dans i'affaireM.
On observera en passant que ce document. le projet des pays scandinaves. ne
distingue pas entre les cas d'interventions. pas plus qu'il nedistingue entre les
Etats hlembres de la Sociétédes Nations et les Etats non membres.
Eh bien. nous savons que si le texte qui est devenu l'article 63 du Statut.
concernant l'interprétationd'un traitécollectif. fut adopte al'unanimitéet très
facilement. l'actuelarticle 62 donna lieu a plus de difficultés. Nonpas sur son
principe : l'unanimité régnait quant a la nécessite et a I'opportunite d'une
admission généralede I'intervention.
Citons. ici aussi. une monographie contemporaine [Farag) ;
« Tout le monde était d'accord qu'il fallait ajouter une disposition
reconnaissant le droit d'intervention aux Etats tiers dans des cas autres
que celui de l'article adopté. c'est-a-dire l'article63. ,Celui-là meme qui
s'étaitdéclaré formellementopposéau principe de la compétenceobliga-
toire de la Cour. M. Ricci Busatti. n'a pas soulevk lamoindre objection a
cet égard.II fallait seulement trouver le texte qui convint...>)322 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
Je m'en voudrais d'infligera la Cour une analyse détaillée de ce débat - fort
intéressant au demeurant - débat dont on peut résumer l'essentielen trois
constatations qui concernent respectivement :
- la formule de I'uintérêd t'ordre juridique » :
- la formule de l'alinéa2 de l'article62 :<<la Cour décide» :
- et enfin la position adoptéesur l'intervention face a l'article36 du Statut.
Premiereconstatarion : Le comitéde juristes s'estpartagé.quant a la redac-
tion. en deux ou trois tendances : d'une part. il y avait lespartisans de lasimple
référenceaux intérêts )>d'un Etat tiers. Ainsi. M. Loder. des Pays-Bas. lord
Phillimore et le jurisconsulte japonais Adatci. Dans le mêmesens allait I'ar-
ticle 48 du projet des cinq puissances neutres : lorsqu'un différendsoumis a
la Cour touche les intérêts d'un Etat tiers, celui-cia le droit d'intervenir dans le
procès >p..
D'autre part, le président Descamps proposa. en cours de débat. un texte
prévoyant : <<Lorsqu'un Etat estime que dans un différendil peut être porté
atteinte a ses droits n. ce n'est plus I'interét.c'est ledroit. Et entre les deux
tendances. si l'on peut dire. se situepar exemple lejuriste brésilienFernandes.
favorable a un texte reconnaissant .le droit d'intervention en cas. disait-il.
da<i<nterèt légitime )p.
Une formule de compromis fut finalement trouvéepar le baron Descamps.
Cette formule de compromis c'est la référence a I'«intérêd t'ordrejuridique )>:
c'est le texte actuel de l'article62 du Statut.
Deuxièmeconsrararion : Quant au rôle de la Cour et a la position de I'Etat
tiers. les jurisconsultes de La Haye étaient egalement partagés : la majorité
d'entre eux envisageait un véritable droit pour I'Etat tiers d'intervenir. un
véritabledroit d'intervention. par exemple lorsque I'Etat tiers estimait que le
différendsoumis a la Cour touchait ses intérêtsT .el était le sens.nous l'avons
vu, du projet des cinq puissances neutres et du projet des Etats scandinaves.
Une autre tendance. représentéepar tord Phillimore - bien dans la tradition
judiciaire anglaise. je crois - accordait au juge international un très large
pouvoir d'appréciation.voire un pouvoir discrétionnaire illimitépour appre-
cier l'admissibilitéde l'intervention. Le texte propose par lord Phillimore est
tout a fait instructif a cet égard:
« Lorsqu'un Etat tiers pense qu'un différendsoumis a la Cour touche
ses intérêts. cetEtat peut former une requêteaux fins d'admission a
l'intervention : et la Cour. si bon lui semble. y fera droit. ))
Mais la majorité des jurisconsultes de La Haye. nourrie de la tradition
juridique continentale. ne pouvait pas accepter une pareille formule. et l'on
s'arrétadonc finalement au texte actuel : (<la Cour décide » - texte sur lequel
nous aurons a revenir dans un instant.
Troisième corisraratioii:Toutes les observations que l'on peut faire. quant
aux travaux préparatoires. quant aux intentions des auteurs du Sta!ut. pour:
rait-on m'objecter. seraient incomplètes ou fragiles si aucune allusion n'était
faite au contexte et,surtout. a l'important changement opérépar le Conseil de
la Société des Nations dans l'avant-projet du comitéde juristes. IIs'agit.on l'a
compris. du renversement des priorités entre le principe de la compétence
obligatoire de la Cour. prévupar l'avant-projet desjuristes. et le principe de la
compétencefacultative. posépar l'actuelarticle 36 du Statut.
Je suis donc obligéd'en dire quelques mots a ce stade de mon exposé. mais
quelques mots seulement. puisque mon confrère hl. hlaurice Bathurst aura
l'occasionde traiter la question dans son ensemble. PLAIDOIRIE DE M. LALIVE 323
II iiie sufira de dire ici que I'etiide des travaus préparatoires conduit a
exclure l'hypothèse selon laquelle le comité de juristes. apres la décisiondu
Conseil de la Societédes Nations qui a conduit a l'article 36 actuel. aurait
oubliéde modifier ses textes relatifsa I'intervention. L'hypothèsed'une erreur
de rédaction est tout simpiement inconcevable déjàen raisonde lanature
mirne de I'instilution de l'intervention et de son importance considérablepour
tous les Etats admis a se présenter devant la Cour. qu'ils soient ou non
h.iernbres de la Société des Nations.Et je crois qu'il n'est pas sans intérêdte
remarquer a ce propos que les Etats membres du Conseil de la Sociétédes
Nations qui s'etaient montres a l'époqueles plus opposes au principe de la
juridiction obligatoire. telles l'Angleterre. I'ltalie,ceux qui. tout au cours
de l'élaboration duStatut. ont insiste et lutte pour une large admission de
l'intervention.
En ayant termine avec les travaux préparatoires. pour l'instant du moins.
j'en arrive maintenant au deuxieme des quatre élémentsque je me suis proposé
de passer en revue dansune recherche. que l'on pourrait appeler<historique >).
des élenients d'appréciation qui pourraient contribuer a l'interprétation du
texte du Statut.
Ce deuxieme élémentne nous retiendra pas longtemps car il faut bien dire
qu'ilapporte beaucoup plus de doutes que de certitudes :ce wnt lesdiçcussions
au sein de \aCour permanente lors de l'élaborationde son premier-Règlement.
Par exemple. la question que je viens d'évoquer - celle de la juridiction
obligatoire - fut fortement débattue. Elle révélades opinions fort diErentes.
tres partagées. etelle fut finalement laisskeouverte. hl.I~aonlej~-Gat~er~i de
hlalte vous l'adit ce matin.le PrésidentLoder - qui partageait l'avisde juges
comme hlM. Oda. Moore. lord Finlay - ne jugea pas pouvoir soumettre au
vote l'insertion dans le Réglernentd'une telle limitation. insertion. à son avis.
contraire au Statut de laCour.
D'une manière générale.la session préliminaire de la Cour permanente
révéla un assez grand nombre de difficultésd'interprétationde l'article62 et la
Cour permanente décida finalement.nous le savons tous, <(de ne pas trancher
ces problémes et de les résoudre au fur et a mesure que se présenteraient
devant elle des cas concrets >t(G. Guyomar. Le Règlet~zo~ de la CIJ. p.378.)
On ne peut que rendre hommage a lasagesse de cette décision - quand bien
mémeil faut avouer qu'elle nenous facilitepas beaucoup. aujourd'hui. latâche
qui incombe à la fois a nos honorables contradicteurs et A nous-mêmeset qui
est égalementcelle de la Cour.
Laissons donc de côtéle Règlementde la Cqur. J'aid'autant moins de raison
de m'yattarder que. comme vous l'indiquaitce matin hl. I'Aitoniey-Geiieralde
Malte. nous n'y pourrions pas trouver. compte tenu de la hiérarchie des
normes. d'indications contraires au texte du Statut.
Permettez-moi. par conséquent.d'en venir au troisièmeélémentd'interpreta-
tion. tres irnponant celui-l: la pratique de la Cour.
L'audienceest susper~drtede 16 h 16 à 16 h 30
Comme je l'aidit tout a l'heure je vais donc entamer un rapide survol de la
pratique de la Cour. dont tout le monde sait qu'elle n'estpas tres abondante et
je commence bien entendu par la célèbre affaire duWirnblrdon.la première a
être soumise a la Cour permanente. Dans cette affaire laCour permanente n'a
guère eu l'occasion. on le sait. d'interpréter les dispositions du Statut sur324 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
l'intervention dès lors que la requéte de la Pologne n'avait suscité aucune
opposition véritablede la pari des Parties au litige.
Seul le Gouvernement britannique. par la voix de sir Cecil Hurst. fit
observer qu'àson avis ilserait préférableque la requête polonaisefut présentée
en vertu de I'articl63. Et leGouvernement polonais. par esprit de conciliation,
modifia en conséquence la base de sa requête.
II y aurait beaucoup a dire sur certaines des considérations énoncéesdans
cette affaire par l'agentdu Gouvernement britannique. considérations dont les
commentateurs s'accordent en générala penser qu'elles s'inspirent essentielle-
ment du droit anglais et qu'elles m&cunnaissentle sens de l'article 62. tel que
voulu par les auteurs du Statut. auteurs qui. selon un auteur contemporain :
« loin de s'inspirer du droit anglais en cette matiére s'en sont écartésen
adoptant les principes du droit continental ».
c'est-a-dire sur le terrain de I'intervention -
Sur le terrain procédural -
une importante leçon me parait se dégagerde la décisionde la Cour dans
I'affaire du Wir~bledon, une leçon qui. assez curieusement. parait avoir
échappé a la plupart des commentateurs : c'est que la Cour a parfaitement
admis - et a pleine raison. ai-je besoin de le dire - la transformation de la
requète polonaise. d'une demande d'intervention fondéesur I'article62 en une
demande d'intervention fondée sur I'article 63. Et d'ailleurs rien n'aurait
empéché.soit dit en passant. que la requète fût fondéesur les deux articles ala
fois.
Deuxièmeespèce :l'affaireHaya de lu Torre.
Cette affaire concerne. on le sait. I'artic63 du Statut et non pas I'article62.
Mais cependant il parait permis et même utile d'en tenir compte puisque, pour
les auteurs du Statut et pour la doctrine dominante. voire unanime. I'article63
loin de s'opposer a l'article62 n'estqu'un cas particulier de l'article62 et n'est
qu'une partie de l'institution généralede I'intervention :par conséquent. la
pratique de la Cour dans fafiaire Noya de la Torre est susceptible de nous
éclairer.
A ce stade préliminairede mon expose. je retiendrai seulement deux indica-
tions intéressantes:
Premièreindication : malgréles diversesobjections soulevéespar leGouver-
nement du Pérou. la Cour a considérécomme recevable la demande d'inter-
vention de Cuba.
Deuxièmement. I'intervention a étéjugée recevableessentiellement sur la
base des explications données en plaidoirie par l'agent du Gouvernement de
Cuba intervenant. alors que. dans sa présentation initiale (celle de la requête
d'intervention et du mémoirey annexé).il semble bien que la requêteelit été
irrecevable.
Et enfin j'en arrive A l'affaire la plus récente. l'affairedite des Essais
ttaicléaireset a la demande d'intervention de Fidji sur laquelle je m contente-
rai; a ce stade. de trois brèves observations:
La premièrec'estque la décision delaCour consacre un principe général. un
autre principe généralde procédure. principe indiscutableen matière d'inter-
vention. C'est le principe sel011lequel dans tout procès - qu'ilsoit internatio-
nal ou interne - I'intervention doit nécessairement porter sur une instance
deja pendante et encore pendante. .c'est-à-direqu'elle doit avoir un objet. Et la
Cour a estime que la demande n'avait plus d'objet pour,les raisons que vous
connaissez. Au-delà de l'affirmation dece principe général,la Cour ne s'est
donc pas prononcée sur l'institution etla procédure de l'intervention si bien PLAIDOIRIEDE hl. LALlVE 325
qu'il est impossible,à notre avis, de tirer de I'affairedes Essais ~iircl~~airedses
enseignements valables dans la présente espece.
Au demeurant, ilauraitété extrêmementmalaiséa la Cour de se prononcer
sur d'autres conditions de recevabilitéde I'intervention. cela d'autant plus qiic
Fidji n'avait pasou pas encore fait valoir ses vues sur cette procédure, n'avait
pas précisél'objetet la nature exacts de sa requête.
Cela m'amene a ma deuxième observation : c'est que Fidji, selon une
interprétation possible, voulait appuyer la thèsede certains Etats parties contre
d'autres. Donc, dans une telle interprétation, ilse serait agi apparemmentdece
type bien déterminéd'intervention que l'on appelle en procédurel'intervention
« accessoire )>ou « adhésive )>.
Mais, selon une autre interprétationpossible. Fidji aurait en réalicherché.
non pas à <intervenir >>a proprement parler, mais a s'immiscer dans le proces
pendant comme une véritable partie,ati sens fort ci plein dri terme.
Et dans les deux cas, que l'on adopte l'uneou I'aulre de ces deux interpreta-
tions. le résultaestle même en ce qui nous concerne car ilsaute aux yeux q~ic
la requêtede Fidji esttotalement différentede I'intervention duGouvernement
de hlalte dans le cas présent.
Cela m'amene a ma troisième et dernière observation : c'est donc par ilne
erreur manifeste. a mon avis, que les observadons dit Gouvernement libyen
s'appuient, et s'appuient fort longuement, sur les intéressantesobservations et
déclarations faites par certains membres de la COLId ^ans l'affaire des Essuis
irucli~ircs.Or ces observations et ces déclarationsvisent une situation procé-
durale. un contexte procédural qui - en fait comme en droit - est entiére-
ment différentde celui de la présenteespèce.
J'ai d'autant moins de raison de m'attarder àcette affaire que mon confrkre
Mc Maurice Bathurst s'y r&fereradans son exposésur la question de compe-
tence.
Voila pour la pratique de la Cour. Laissons donc, pour le moment. cette
pratique pour jeter un coup d'Œila la doctrine internationale.
Lorsqu'on aborde la doctrine, lorsqu'on parcourt la doctrine en matière de
procédure internationale,on ne peut s'empêcherd'être frappepar deux caracté-
ristiques générales.
la première c'estqiie les monographies, les étudesspécialiséesc,onsacrées 5
l'intervention sont inexistantesOLI rarissimes et généralementtrès anciennes.
Dans letemps - il est vrai limité- qui nous a etéaccordépour préparer nos
explications, je crois avoir lu, sinon tout, du moins une grande partie de la
production doctrinale en la matière et je n'ai guère trouve que deux mono-
graphies de 1927 et 1933. l'une d'un juriste sans doute égyptienécrivanten
français, M. Farag, l'autre d'un savant allemand, M. Friede.
Ce qu'on trouve leplus souvent, ce ne sont pas des monographies, ce sont
quelques paragraphes isoles, quelques phrases éparses. souvent méme des
notes en bas de page, sur les articles 62et 63 du Statiit. dans des étudesplus
générales consacrée s u bien aI'activitede la Cour dans son ensemble ou bien
a tel outelsujet particulier comme les exceptions préliminairesdevant laCour
ou les effets desjugements de celle-ci.
Première constatation donc : l'extraordinaire pauvreté quantitative des
sources doctrinales existunl en matière d'intervetltion. Et cette pauvretés'ex-
plique, à l'évidence.par la rareté des cas pratiques. nul n'ignorant en effet
que la présente espéce(je me suis permis de l'indiquer en commen~ant) est
la première dans laqiieflela Cour se voit donner l'occasion de s'exprimer sur
l'article62.326 PLATEAU COXTINEKTAL
La seconde constatation préliminaire nést pas moins importante que la
première : si l'on examine tout ie matériel doctrinal qu'il est possible de
rassembler. on ne peut manquer d'êtrefrappe par les incertitudes. les contra-
dictions. les lacunes qu'ilrévèle.Lesconfusions, lesflottements sont constants ;
ce'qui frappe. cést aussi et surtout l'extrêmeprudence qui caractérise les
quelques commentaires des auteurs, parmi les plus éminents.
Et ici encore je crois que l'explication s'impose : l'absence presque totale
d'expériencepratique de l'institution de l'intervention en procédureinternatio-
nale. Cette absence presque totale d'expériencepratique n'aévidemmentguère
stimulé I'intéretdes juristes et ne leur a pas fourni la ((matiere première »
indEn outre un savant peut êtreun trés grand internationaliste et fort mal
connaitre le droit de procédure.donc s'y sentir trésmal a l'aise.et voila peut-
ètre une autre raison des hésitationsdes auteurs.
C'estdire aussi l'importance exceptionnelle que revêtla présenteespèce.non
seulement. nous l'avons dit. pour I'Etat requérant. non seulement pour le
développement du droit international mais aussi. subsidiairement sans doute.
pour les progrès de la science du droit international. de cette doctrine des
publicistes les plus qualifiés dans laquelle le Statut a vu si justement un
<<moyen auxiliaire de'déterminationdes règlesde droit H.
Quelles conclusions provisoires, quelles indications est-il permis de tirer
quant a l'interprétationde I'article61. de notre examen des travaux prépara- ,
toireç. de la pratique de la Cour. a la lumièrede ce qu'il existe de doctrine ?
C'est ce que je voudrais essayer de résumer maintenant en quelques breves
propositions. dans ce deuxième chapitre avant d'analyser plus en détaildans un
troisième et dernier chapitre de cette première partie quelques points particu-
lien qui me paraissent mériterune analyse plus approfondie.
Premièreproposiiiori : Les articles 62 et 63 du Statut ne visent pas deux
institutions differentes. mais deux formes différentesd'une mêmeinstitution.
En réalitéI'article 63 - et sur ce point au moins la doctrine parait quasi
unanime - n'estqu'un cas particulier de l'institution prévuepar I'article62.
D'ailleurs. comme il Tut observe au sein de la Cour permanente lors de
I'elaboration de son Règlement. rien n'empécheque. dans certains cas. les
articles 62 et 63 du Statut trouvent simultanement leur application et on en
trouverait une confirmation. s'ilen était besoin.dans I'afîairedu ,Wiinbledortet
dans les observations. que j'ai citées. du professeur Basdevant. agent du
Gouvernement français. sur ce qu'il appelaittrèsjustement le « double motif
d'intervention >>de la Pologne.
Deuxieniepropositiotr :L'article62 du Statut vise. englobe. permet plusieurs
formes d'intervention et le fait que le texte parle seulement da(< intervention >)
au singtilier n'y change absolument rien. On ne saurait prétendre, etd'ailleurs
nul ne prétend a ma connaissance. y voir le signe que les auteurs du Statut
n'auraient eu en vue qu'un seul type d'intervention et. soit dit en passant. le
droit français de l'époque.qui a incontestablement exercéune forte influence
sur lecomitédejuristes de La Haye. neconnaissait lui aussi qu'un texte pariant
de l'intervention au singulier alors qu'aussi bien lajurisprudence française que
la doctrine française distinguaient nettement et continuent a distinguer plu-
sieurs types d'intervention volontaire.
IIne fait donc absolument aucun doute que l'article62du Statut a admis. de
lamaniere la plus large. plusieurs formes d'interventions. Cela ne résultepas
seulement de ce que j'appellerai la nature des choses. de la diversitd des
situations procéduralesqui peuvent se présenterdans tout litige.de l'expérience
acquise par toutes les nations en rnatiere de procédure.Cela est confirmé. sans PLAIDOIRID EE M. LALlVE
discussion possible,par lestravaux préparatoires.J'aidéjàcitéI'interventiondu
jurisconsulte brésilienFernandes. Citons encore le rapporteur du Comité des
jurisconsultes,M. de Lapradelle :
<<Trois cas peuvent se présenter: une partie peut vouloir se ranger, soit
près du demandeur, soit présdu défendeur.Une partie peut faire valoir
certainsdroitsqui lui sont propres. Une partie peut demander que l'undes
deux Etats en cause disparaisse parce qu'iln'estpas le véritabledomiltus
du droit qu'ilrevendique. Dans ce cas I'intervention tenda l'exclusio...))
Sije me suis quelque peu étendusur cettedeuxièmeproposition, c'est-à-dire
sur la pluralité des formes de I'intervention, c'est que l'on ne saurait tr?p
souligner, me semble-t-il,un aspect aussi essentiel du Statut;or, il s'agitd'une
véritéqui, assez curieusement, est constamment méconnue. Faute d'avoir
conscience de cette véritéf ,aute de tenir compte ds distinctions élémentaires
du droit de procédure en cette matière, on se condamne nécessairement a
commettre lesconfusions et leserreurs qui émaillent tantd'écritsdedoctrine, et
qui caractérisent aussi,il faut bien ledire iciavec respectavant dele démontrer
par la suite,une bonne part desobservationsqui ont été soumises a laCour au
sujet de notre requête.
Ma ~isièmeproposition se réduiraà un simple rappel. L'article62 a un sens
naturel, qu'ilest permis de juger(<clair» ;il ne prévoitaucune autre condition
que celle qu'exprime son texte :il faut qu'un Etat (estime que, dans un
dimerend,un intérêd t'ordre juridique est pour lui en caus».
Le sens d'un pareil texte peut êtredéterminesans dificulté exceptionnelle,
sans recourir a l'hypothèse tout a fait hasardeuse d'un «oubli » et sans
insertion de conditions implicitescomme celle de I'existenced'une compétence
obligatoire.Et ilfaut ici,selon l'excellent conseildonne par sir CecilHurst dans
l'affairedu Wimbledotr, suivre (<d'aussi près que possible le texte même des
articles» et cela <<en raison de la façon minutieuse dont furent rédigesles
articles62 et 63 du Statut )).
Quatriètne proposiliott:On a vu a la suite de quelles discussions au sein du
comitéde juristes le texte de l'article 62, alinéa 2. a été adopté :<(La Cour
décide. »Je n'yreviens pas, sinon pour signalerque cela neveut en tout cas pas
dire qu'elle déciderait«comme bon lui semble », selon la formule envisagée
par lord PhiIlimore, ou a sa «discrétion >>au sens françaisdu terme, mais tout
simplement en s'assurant, en vérifiantque les conditions légale sont bien
réalisées. J'ryeviendrai touta l'heure.
Cinquième et dernièreproposition : Elteconcerne la nature de l'intervention
devant la Cour. On lit par exemple, dans votre arrêtdu 13 juin 1951, dans
l'affaireHaya de la Torre, page 76 : <la Cour rappelle que toute intervention
est un incident de procédure D.
« Toute intervention. )k caractèreincident de l'interventiondevant la Cour
internationale ne peut en effet faire l'objetd'aucun doute et il étaitdu reste ex-
pressément signalé s,uf erreur dema part, par l'article59du Règlement de 1926.
C'est d'ailleurs de la mêmefaçon que l'intervention est définie dans le
Dictionnai d efa rermiria/ogiedu droit i~zterttatiot~préfacepar le président
Jules Basdevant, et par la doctrine dans son ensemble.
Ce caractère incident ,de I'intervention peutavoir un râle capital et ses
conséquencessont importantes a divers égards,dans le procès international
aussi bien que dans k procès interne. Je me bornerai a indiquer a ce stade
qu'aucune intervention, quel que soit son objet, quelle que soit sa forme du
point de vue du tiers intervenant, ne saurait étre considéréecomme une
demande introductive d'instance ;il est évident, parconséquent, qu'uneinter-328 PLATEAU CO~TINENTA L
vention n'a pas 5 ëtre soumise aux mêmesconditions. notamment de compé-
tence. que la demande. Je me bornerai a citer ici l'adagebien connu, le brocard
bien connu :(<Lejuge de l'action est jugede l'exception. »
J'en arrive maintenant au troisième chapitre de cette première partie oii il
s'agira d'examiner de plus près,sur ce que j'appellerai la « toile de fond I>ainsi
tisséepar cette introduction. quelques notions. quelques élémentsessentiels de
I'article62. c'est-à-dire:1)la notion d'intérêdt'ordrejuridique : 2)ce qu'il faut
entendre par les termes ëtre en cause )>ou <<may be affected )):et enfin 3) le
controle de la Cour quani a ces divers éléments.
Ces trois thèmes. ces trois éléments.il convient de les examiner successive-
ment pour la clartédu debat.mais sans perdre de vue bien entendu leur liaison
intime, voire leur interdépendance.
Et tout d'abord une remarque préliminaire: des conditions requises du
Gouvernement de la Républiquede kialte pour intervenir. en I'espke. il faut
bien entendu distinguer lesconditions généralesde toute action devant lejuge.
qu'il soit du reste international ou interne. telles la qualitépour agir ou la
capacité d'ester en justice. Je crois vraimeni superflu de m'y arrêter et je
ni'adresserai donc a la condition spécifiqueposée par l'article62 en matière
d'intervention.
A vrai dire. quand je dis la condition spécifique.je ne suis pas certain de
parler correctement. A proprement parler. le teltte de l'article62 ne pose pas ce
que l'on peut appeler une «condition » ou en tout cas pas clairement. Mais
raisons abstraction. pour simplifier. de ces nuances de teste et admettons aux
fins de la discussion qu'il s'agit bien. enpratique. sinon au sens technique du
terme. d'une condition. la seule. nous l'avons vu. qui soit prévuepar le Statut.
On me permettra. pour la clarté deschoses. de lire en entier les deux textes de
I'article62. bien qu'ilssoient parfaitement connus de tous :
« 1. Lorsqu'un Etat estime que. dans un différend. un intérê dt'ordre
juridique est pour lui en cause. ilpeut adresser a laCour une requête.a fin
d'intervention.
2.La Cour décide. ))
« 1. Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature
which may beafTectedby the decision in the case. itmay submit a request
to the Court to be permitted [O intervene.
2.It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request. )>
Je voudrais me permettre d'attirer respectueusement l'attention de la Cour
sur quelques éléments d'interprctationqui concernent tout d'abord la notion
rnèmedB«intérêt d'ordre juridique )>.
II n'est pas dans mes intentions de disserter longuement sur la notion
d'<cinterèt >)ou sur les termes d'«ordre juridique n. On pourrait. a ce propos.
être tentéd'évoquerpar exemple la convention de La Haye de 1899 ou encore
I'article36. alinéa2. du Statut.
Ce n'est. à mon avis. ni nécessaire ni utile en l'espèce. Onpeut d'ailleurs
laisser ouverte; aux fins de la présente discussion.la question de savoir si. et
dans quelle mesure. il serait légitimeou mêmepossible de transposer sans
autre. sur le terrain procédural de l'intervention. des indications recueillies
dans d'autres domaines ou d'autres contextes.
II est a peine besoin de rappeler tout d'abord que. en insérant les termes
d'«ordre juridique >> s.ivant la formule de compromis proposéepar le baron
Descamps, les auteurs du Statut se sont montrésun peu plus restrictifs que les
systèmes juridiques internes dont ils s'inspiraient, systèmes qui souvent se
contentent d'un <<intkrètv tout court. un intérëtde l'intervenant. De même.je PLAIDOIRIE DE M. LALIVE 329
n'insisterai pas sur l'opposition classique entre l'intérêjturidique et I'intérét
politique ou moral.
Prise en elle-même. cette condition de l'intérêt ne peugtuère susciter de
grandes djfficultes :en principe, tout Etat est juge de ses propres intérêtsd ,ont
il est mieux a mime que tout autre d'apprécierla réalité.Constatons donc
d'abord que, selon la lettre du texte, il faut, et il suffit, sous réservede ce que
nous allons voir tout a l'heure a propos des deux autres thèmes, qu(( un Etat
estime ou considere » qu'if a. comme le précisete texte anglais, un intérêt
d'ordre juridique en cause dans un differend. On peut tirer de cette lecture la
conclusion qu'en a tirée la Cour dans l'affaire Hoya de ILI Z~we, c'est que
l'intervention doit réellement « avoir traitu,en anglaisccrelliic IOil,a ce qui est
l'objetde l'instance encours. Et tout ceci nous conduit déjàinévitablementau
deuxième thème, a Ladeuxième question, c'est-à-dire l'interprétationdes mots
((en cause ..dans un diffei'end W.Mais avant d'y revenir, si vous le permette,
je dois faire encore une observation, non pas sur ce que l'article 62 prévoit,
mais sur ce qu'il ne prévoit pas.En effet le texte parle dans les deux langues
cl'«un >)intérétet,dés lors que cet intérètest d'ordre juridique. il semble bien
qui( un » intérêt, uninterétquelconque. suflit, sous réserveévidemmentde ce
qui va suivre :« La Cour décide. >)Que cet intérês toit direct ou indirect, qu'il
soit immédiat ou médiat, qu'il soitimportant ou rninime, peu importe. Il faut
que 1'Etatconsidere qu'il a un intérêt.
On pourrait penser que cesconstatations sont superflues autant quëlémen-
taires. mais. s'agissant d'une « rédaction minutieusement élaborée ». comme
disait sir Cecil Hurst. il serait dificile de voir. dans l'absencede fouie qualifica-
tion quelconque apportCe au mot intérêt.le résultat d'une inadvertance des
auteurs du Statut. le résultatd'une sone d'incapacitélégislative.le resul~atd'un
oubli. Laclaire volonté desauteurs du Statut a étén . ous l'avonsvu. d'admettre
tres largement l'institution de l'intervention. de la prendre du droit commun
comme disait le président Descamps. Dans ces conditions. on comprend que
personne ne semble avoir envisage de demander a la Cour de vérifier par
exemple le degréd'importance. le caractère plus ou moins direct. le caractère
plus ou moins personnel de l'intérêt en :ause. Non. lorsqu'un Etat estime.
considere qu'il a <( un » interet et que cet intérêt es t<en ause N dans un
différend,cela surfit. sous réservequ'il soit d'ordre juridique el que la Cour
décide.Nous allons y venir. Mais cela surfit. On voit du reste assez mal que le
contr8le prévu parl'alinéa 2 puisse vraiment porter sur l'intérêt etn ant que tel.
En revanche leStatut a prévu ce contrôlesur un autre objet et d'un autre point
de vue. ce qui m'amène au deuxiéme thème deces quelques observations.
En effet l'itrlérerd'ordre juridique doir erre el1cause dalis le di@ére~id
pendant devant la Cour ou, comme l'exprime un peu plus précisémentle texte
anglais. il faut que cet (itrrerestof a fegal tiaiure . . . Inay be affected bjailre
decision i~ithe case i>.
J'aidéjadit. mais ilfaut peut-ètre le rappeler. que le rail que. selon l'arti-
cle 62. I'intérédtoit êtreen cause dans un dimerend a conduit la COUT adéduire
que l'intervention elle-menle devait «avoir trait » a ce qui est l'objet de
l'instance.trrelate IO)).
Quant aux termes irêtreen cause ib.on remarquera d'abord leur caractère
extrêmementgénéral.neutre. tres large. II semble bien en être de même du
krme anglais rtaflected ii.
Voila un langage extrêmementlarge. extrèmement général.et ce fait mérite
peut-étred'être relevé s. rtout si l'oncompare lestermes du Statut avec ceux de
certaines législationsou jurisprudences internes qui. on lesait,étaientextréme-
ment présents dans l'esprit des juristes de La Haye. membres du comitéde330 PLATEAU COXTINEhTAL
1920. En effet on trouve. dans plusieurs droits internes, comme une condition
de l'.intervention. cette exigence que I'interèt de l'intervenant risque d'être
négativement affecté, i~npaired.compromis, rrida~igered.Rien de semblable
dans le texte du Statut.
Pour l'article62. il suff~tque l'intérêstoit en cause. on dirait aujourd'hui
concerne. c'est-à-dire.pour traduire exactement le texte anglais, qu'il suffitque
l'intérêt puisseetre affecte. puisse ètre touché de n'importe quelle manière.
défavorablebien sur. mais touche directement, indirectement. immediatement.
médiatement, profondément.légèrement.par la decision qui sera rendue entre
les parties à l'instance pendante devant la Cour.
.
hlais I'important n'est peut-ètre pas la. L'important. c'estque, de par'la
nature des choses. il est absolument impossible au moment de I'iniervention.
au moment du dép8t de la requêteet même au moment de la décisionsur
l'admissibilitéde la requête d'intervention.de savoir ce que sera la décision
dans le procèsen cause. Par conséquent il est tout aussi impossible de dire ce
que pourront êtreles répercussionséventmlles sur l'intérêd t'ordre juridique
que I'Etat intervenant estime êtreen cause.
Dans sa requéte.au paragraphe 4. le Gouvernement de Malte a fait remar-
quer que. pour cette raison.
« it... cannot be known whether any legal interest of hlalta will in fact
be affected by that decision. or not. This must thereîore be a matter of
possibilities - as Article 62 of the Statute recognizes by its use of the
phrase "which may be affected")I.
A titre d'ilIustration je voudrais respectueusement attirer l'attention de la
Cour sur quelques décisionsde juridictions internationales sur ce point là. par
exemple et d'abord sur celledes tribunaux mixtes qui. aprèsla premièreguerre
mondiale. ont étéinstituéspar lestraitésde paix et qui siégeaient.ce n'est peut-
etre pas sans importance ni intérêd te le noter au passage. a l'époquemèmedes
débuts dela Cour permanente de Justice internationale.
Premier esemple : le tribunal arbitral miste franco-allemand. dans une
décision du27 mai 1921. sous la présidence dugrand juriste néerlandaisAsser,
dans une affaire S.A. dtr Charborii~ageFréderic-Henri c. Etat allernattd.
Dans cette affaire le tribunal arbitral mixte applique son règlement de
procédure. dont l'article20 reconnaissait le principe de l'intervention :« toute
personne qui prétend faire valoir unintérêtlégitimedans une instance peut
intervenir au procés n.hlais l'important n'est pas la. Se rondant sur.« les faits
contenus dans la'requète en intervention ». des faits allégués maisnullement
prouves encore bien entendu. le tribunal a constaté que lesrequérants en
intervention <<pouvaient >>avoir un intérêta intervenir. Et il a pris cette
décisionmalgré l'oppositiond'une des parties,a cette demande d'intervention. II
a pris cette décisionpour Linmotif extrêmementsignificatif qu'il me parait utile
de citer intégralement :
<(il suffit de constater quedarisI'lt~~porlièque les faits alléguépar les
requerants soient exacts. ceux-ci peuvent avoir un intérétdans I'ins-
tance. lajustification de ces faits devant étreré.wrvépour la discussion
du rond n.
Décisionparfaitement justifiée.parfaifernent correcte.
Je signale en passant un tout petit détail. c'estque dans la décisionimprimée
dans le recueil officiel,lemots« dans l'hypothèse)>sontimprimes en italiques.
Le tribunal a voulu insister sur les mots « dans l'hypothèse ou les faits
allégiiéspar les requérants seraient exacts. Deuxième exemple : tribunal arbitral mixte germano-belge. décision du
22 décembre 1 921,Compagrlie internaliot~aldes wagons-lirsc. Elai allemand.
blêmeattitude de ce tribunal que dans l'affaireprécédente : il admet I'inter-
vention malgrél'opposition d'une des parties et constate que I'intervenant (<a.
incontestablement. le plus grand intéret )a intervenir car. dit la décision<(il
est a craindre » que l'intervenant subisse un préjudice.
Mieux encore. pour arriver a cette conclusion. le tribunalse fonde. non pas
mêmesur des faits prouves ni méme des faits allégués.mais sur certaines
circonstances que, dit-il. on ne pourrait mèmeimaginer O.
Troisième exemple ;mémejurisprudence toujours de la part du tribunal
arbitral mixte hungaro-tchécoslovaque. dans une 'séried'arrêts, par exemple
dans une décision du 23 juillet 1927.affaire Comte A~ndrass cy. Em! rch&~oslo-
vaque. o~i,je passe sur les détails.le tribunal considèreque I'intervenant n'avait
pas de droit et qu'il n'avaitqu'un espoir. mais que cet espoir. cetteexpectative.
peut constituer un intérêt légitime.
On pourrait multiplier les citations. Quant à la commission arbitrale des
biens, droits et intéretsen Allemagne. elle est beaucoup plus récenteet put-
êtremoins intéressantepour évoquer l'étatd'esprit contemporain desdébuts de
la Cour permanente. Sajurisprudence est inévitablementun peu difirente sur
certains points. ce qui s'explique deja par le fait que son règlement de procé-
dure se bornait a admettre le principe de l'intervention maissans fixer aucune
condition. Par conséquent. elle n'avait pas a sa disposition un texte comme te
Statut de la Cour.
IIest cependant intéressantde noter ici aussi l'attitudeouverte a I'interven-
tion et lajurisprudence constante de la commission arbitrale qui admet I'inter-
vention. qui y voit un principe généralementadmis pour autant. dit-elle.qu'un
interetIégiiimepuisse étreaffecté. C'estainsi. pour me contenter d'un exemple.
que. dans une aifaire Royolin~ede Grèceet aulres c. République fédérale
d'Allemap~e.décision no42 du II mars 1959. des requérants nommés Ram-
mos avaient demandé a étreadmis comme parties intervenantes. La commis-
sion arbitrale a admis leur intervention pour le motif que :« IIsemble que (les
requérants) aient un intérêtlégitimequi pourra étre affectépar'la décision
devant être prisedans la présente affaire. H
Ce que l'on peut donc rassembler de la jurisprudence internationale sur les
conditions de I'intervention. etje viens d'en citer quelques échantillonsassez
caractéristiques. permet je crois. de résoudre. et de résoudreen plein accord
avec \'esprit du Statut de LaCour. une questicih.de procédure que le texte de
l'articl62. a sen tenir a la lettre. laisse indécise.Cette question, c'est celle de
savoir si le requérant en intervention a une preuve a apporter et. si oui.
laquelle ?
A strictement parler. le texte de I'anicle 62. et hl. Ijlrtorney-General de
Malte y a deja fait allusion ce matin. n'exige pas cette preuve :mais peu
importe. Admettons pour les besoins de la discussion que. mêmesichaque Etat
est en principejuge. et meilleur juge. de l'existencede son intérét.il devra tout
de mërne rendre vraisemblable l'existence d'un intérét. e btien s6r d'un intérêt
d'ordre juridique ; mais notre discussion actuelle ne porte pas sur ce point-la.
Ce que je voudrais mettre ici en évidence, c'estla leçon qui se dkgage de
l'expériencedes tribunaux arbitraux mixtes et autres-juridictions internatio-
nales, une lecon qui est confirméepar la nature des choses. par la nature du
problème procédural qui se pose et. mais j'anticipe un peu. par l'expérience
généraledes systemes de procédure.Cette leçon on peut la résumerainsi très
simplement.
Peu importe en réalitéque les regles qui régissenttelle ou telle juridiction332 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
internationale précisentexpressément ou pas que l'intervenant doit prouver
l'existence d'unintéritpouvant êtreaffectéou que. comme cest le cas pour le
Statut de la Cour. il ne demande pas cette preuve. Dans les deux cas, la
juridiction internationale est nécessairementamenée. par la force des choses
pourrait-on dire. a se contenter d'uneallégation etd'une vraisemblance concer-
nant l'existencede l'intérê jtridique qui est en cause. Car ce qui est décisif.ce
n'est pas seulement que l'intérêv traisemblable ou justifiéprima furie comme
disent les juristes anglo-saxons. justifié d'une façon suffisante. soit d'ordre
juridique et pas politique:mais c'estencore que cet inlerit.etc'estfaléssentiel.
soit en cause dans le différend. Qu'il puisseètreaffecté.qu'ilpuisse itre touché
par la décisionqui sera rendue. c'estcela le point cardinal, c'est cela l'essentiel.
c'est celala difficulté principale.
Or on constate ici. partout. la mémeexpériencejudiciaire. Lejuge interna-
tional. en ce qui concerne cet élément-lac ,et élémentde preuve. ou si l'onveut
cette condition. secontente d'une simple possibilité.Pourquoi ? Parce qu'il ne
peut pas faire autre chose ! II ne peut exiger ni la preuve de répercussions
imprévisibles.ni la preuve de l'effetqu'aura la décision a rendre. ni mêmela
preuve de la probabilitéou de la vraisemblance !
Le juge international doit nécessairement.s'il ne veut pas risquer de dénier
justicea l'intervenant. se conténterd'une pure et simple possibilité. Etmême,le
cas échéant. d'unepossibilitélointaine.
J'ai cité quelques décisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes. Ce qui. est
frappant. c'est d'y retrouver les termes comme crainte v.« espoir.>>. expec-
tative H,((lrypoihèse i).et autres termes semblables. On y voit donc que des
répercussions simplement possibles suffisent a justifier I'intérét,ien entendu
sous réservede l'abus de droit et de Lamauvaise foi.
IIsuffit mémeque le juge international puisse imaginer des circonstances
dans lesquelles la décisionqui sera rendue pourrait avoir un effet. a l'heure
qu'il est.imprévisible.Des lors qu'un effet de la décision arendre sur un intérêt
d'ordre juridique du demandeur en intervention ne peut pas êtreexclu. I'inter-
vention doit êtreadmise.
En résume.on ne saurait attendre du requérant,par la force deschoses, qu'il
fournisse la preuve que l'intérê jtridique qu'ilallègue sera touchéou affecté.
On pourrait penser que tout cela va de soi, on pourrait penser que ces
principes ne méritent guèred'étreprécisésici et que je suis en train, qu'on me
pardonne l'expression. <d'enfoncer des portes ouvertes )).Mais je ne le crois
pas car. dans ce domaine si mal connu de la procédure internationale. les
confusions ne sont pas rares a cet égardet on en trouve un récentmais clair
témoignagedans les observations du Gouvernement libyen au sujet de ce que
I'Etat intervenant. je cite le paragraphe 25 des observations libyennes. « doit
établir ,>ou sur ce que le Gouvernement libyen appelle. je cite le para-
graphe 31, fe <(niveau de précision nécessairepour qu'une intervention soit
admise >>.
De ces confusions au sujet de ce qu'il estpermis d'attendre du requerant en
intervention. permettez-moi, pour en terminer sur ce sujet. de vous soumettre
encore deux illustrations supplémentaires. I'une tirée desdébatsde la Cour
permanente et l'autre de lajurisprudence des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes.
Pour commencer par cette derniére.je me réréreraitrès brièvement a,une
décision du tribunal arbitral mixte hungaro-tchécoslovaque. du 27 février
1927. UtrgarisclreLandescetiirolSparkassa, etc. c. Eiai de Tchecoslovaquieet
Malteriefratico-suisse. Dans cette affaire. I'unedes parties soulevait une excep-
tion d'irrecevabilitkpour s'opposer a la demande d'intervention. Ceci au motif
que I'intervenanl n'avait pasprouvél'existence deI'intéréjturidique alléguéet PLAIDOIRIE DE M. LALIVE 333
iiisistait siIr le faqu'a son avis I'intéré < doit ètre fonde juridiquement et
mordlenient b).Le tribunal arbitral mixte a écarté cette exception. IIa admis
l'intervention. et avec pleine raison conime l'observe tres justement un juriste
tunisien. hl. Mabrouk. dans son ouvrage Lcs c~cc,p/irir.septpoc.cic/lrL/i~i3uiir
/cs~iiioi~, ~IJ~II~IIJ/J (Paris 1966).avec une préfacede hl"" Suzanne
Basrid :
<<Exciper de l'absenced'un <<intérét >« ronde juridiquement et morale-
nient )>pour opposer l'irrecevabilitéd'une intervention. équivaut a repro-
cher à l'intervenant de n'avoir pas prouve un droit lui appartenant. Une
telle exception ne saurait ètre accueilli...>>
Et plus loin :
« L'appréciationde l'intérêptour agir n'estpas enferméedans un cadre
trop étroit: I'intéretse déduitselon lescirconstances. illui est confére« un
sens sulîlsamment large. >r
On ne peut qu'approuver le commentaire de cejuriste tunisien.
La mêmeconclusion logique se dégagedes discussions survenues au sein de
la Cour permanente lors de l'élaborationde son premier Règlement.
La discussion portait sur le droit de regard du demandeur en intervention
sur les piécesde procédure présentéespar les parties. La Cour permanente
avait. dans un premier stade. adopté un texte proposé par hl. Altamira. qui
n'accordait le droit de regard a 1'Etaitiers qu'avec deux ordres de lirniialion.
Première limitation. qui ne nous intéresse.pas ici. mais que je cite tout de
même :ledemandeur en intervenlion ne pouvait consulter que les mémoireset
les contre-mémoires et non pas jouir d'une faculté plus étendue. comme
l'auraient souhaitéle PrésidentLoder et tord Finlay. Deuxième limitation. plus
iniéressanieici. prévue par M. Altamira :seul auraii eu un droit de regard un
Etat : «qui aurait jlisf~It;devant la Cour de sa faculté d'intervention dans
l'affaire. en vertu de l'article6>>,etc.
Or. comme l'écritun commentateur contemporain. h4.Farag :
<<Le droit de regard sur les piécesn'a comme raison d'étreque de
donner aux tiers la possibilitéde connaître s'il y a pour eux un intérêt
d'ordre juridique en cause dans un litige entre d'autres Etats et de savoir
éventuellements'ilsdoivent intervenir en vertu de cet intérétS . oumettre le
droit de regard a lajustification préalablede l'intervention équivaudrait a
rendre ou bien impossible l'intervention. ou bien inutile le droit de
regard. >)
On ne saurait mieux dire et la Cour ,permanente l'a bien compris car, suite
aux observations de son comitéde rédactioncompose du PrésidentLoder. de
h.1.Weiss et de lord Finlay. elles'estaperçue du <caractere tout a fait illusoire
de la facultéqu'accordait aux tiers letexte de M. Altamira 1et elle a modifie sa
premièredécisionpour adopter ce qui étaitalors l'article36 de son Reglement.
La question du. droit de consulter ou de recevoir copie des pièces de la
procédure n'est pas du tout l'objetde la presente discussion. mais l'épisode est
tres significatif et il méritait.je crois. d'êtrau minimum'par analogie. pour
démontrer le caractère falIacieux. relevant véritablement du cercle vicieux. de
l'objectionqui serait opposéeà une requête d'interventionau motif que I'inter-
venant n'aurait pas établi.comme dit leGouvernement libyen. ou fait la preuve
que son intervention était bien fondée.alors que, comme on vous l'a dit ce
matin. il n'a pas pu prendre connaissance du dossier !
J'en arrive au dernier point particulier de ce passage de mon expose. qui334 PlATEAU CONTINENTAL
concerne le role et les pouvoirs de la Cour, c'est-à-dire a l'article 62. para-
graphe 2.
J'en arrive a un élémentessentiel. a un élémentcapital. mais il ne me
retiendra pas longtemps. Le paragraphe 2 prévoitque : La Cour décide. OA
ce sujet vous me permettrez de soumettre a la Cour trois petites observations
sur un texte qui appelle tout de meme une certaine interprétation puisque.
apres tout. il ne dit pas expressément comment et sur quelle base la Cour
décide.
Prelliièreobservatioti, qui est purement linguistique : II n'est peut êtrepas
tout a fait superflu de signaler d'embtéel'équivoquetres fréquente dans la
doctrine qui nous menace en cettë matière et dont la source pourrait bien être
liée a ce que les spécialistesde la traduction et de l'interprétation appellent
parfois les <<faux amis du traducteur )>.Vous savez qu'il s'agitde ces mots
apparemment semblables dans deux langues. mais qui ont ou peuvent avoir
des sens tres différents ou partiellement diffërents. Un bon exemple en est le
mot discrrtioti anglais et le mot « discrétion>)en français.
Or. on lit souvent dans la doctrine et meme chez d'excellentsauteurs - et
c'est peut êtreliéa cette confusion linguistique - que le pouvoir de la Cour
dans lecadre de l'article63 serait nul ou quasiment nul, alors que dans lecas de
l'article 62 il serait total. II serait «aodiscretionary character )p.II y aurait
donc. si l'onsuit cette ligne de penséeune opposition totale entre les articles62
et 63 et ce genre d'observation revient fréquemment.je m'enexcuse auprès de
mes confrères de langue anglaise. dans les écrits de la doctrine d'origine
américaineou anglaise.
Or. il me semble qu'il y a ici un danger de malentendu. Ei ce malentendu
semble ètreapparu des les délibérationsdu comitédejuristes de 1920 et des les
délibérationsde la premièreCour permanente au sujet de son Règlement. Cela
est assez curieux puisque les mots discretion ou pouvoir discre~iotrttairene
figurent,nulle part dans les article62 et 63.
La raison de tout cela est que le risque d'équivoquen'est pas liéseulement a
une question de langue mais bien entendu. et j'en arrive a ma deuxième
observation. au fond du problème.
Deuxi6nieobservaiioii : Sur le fond du problème. quelle a étél'intention des
auteurs du Statut ? Je rappellerai ici deux élémentsdécisifsdes débats de La
Haye sur ce point. D'abord. je t'ai dit. Fidèlea une conception semble-t-il
anglaise. iord Phillimore avait proposéun texte que j'ai cite et selon lequel la
Cour décide.si bon lui semble. d'admettre ou dene pas admettre l'intervention.
Cette formule a étérejetée.La majorité des jurisconsultes de La Haye. sans
aucun doute influencés par ce qu'on peut appeler en abrégéla <iconception
continentale )>n'envisageaient nullement d'accorder au juge in,ternational une
pareille libertéd'action, la liberté d'être un jugee l'opportunité.
Tout dcmontre en effet qu'ils ont voulu confier au juge international.
conformément a cette conception générale continentale.le droit et le devoir de
vérifiersi les conditions légalesdu paragraphe 1 étaient rempliesdans un cas
concret. mais non celui. pour normal qu'ilpuisse peut-êtreparaitre a un juriste
de la tradition decomrnoirlaw, de rejeter la demande d'intervention quand bien
meme les conditions légalesseraient réalisées.
Trriisii.tiih.sc.ri~u/i:fiLapratique desjuridictions internationales conlirme
ce principe généralde procédure. Voir par exemple. la jurisprudence des
tribunaux arbitraux mixtes. Quant tajurisprudence de laCour. le peu qu'il cn
existe me parait confirmer aussi cette interprétation. On liien effet dans la
première decision rendue Ic 28 juin 1923 par la Cour pernianeiite sous la
présidencede hl. Loder. page 12. que l'une des inierventions prlvucs par le PLAIDOIRIE DE hl. LALIVE 335
Statut de la Cour, celle de l'article 62, a « pour fondement, l'intérêd t'ordre
juridique allégué par l'intervenant ;et ilappartient a la Cour de ne l'accueillir
que si l'existence de cet intérêtlui parait suffisamment justifié». La Cour
constate ensuite que le Gouvernement polonais, <<renonçant à suivre la voie
exclusive dans laquelle il avait paru s'engager en premier lieu, entend au-
jourd'hui se prévaloir du droit que lui confère l'article 63 du Statut », etc. Et
j'en arrive au point qui m'intéresseici :ce qui. poursuit l'arrêt.<(dispense Ia
Cour d'examiner et de vérifiersi vraiment l'intervention de la Pologne dans le
litige soumis a son jugement est justifiéepar un intérit d'ordre juridique. au
sensde I'article62 du Statut >>.IIme parait donc certain que. au sens du Statut.
la Cour peut et doit vérifier sila condition poséepar l'article62. paragraphe 1.
est réalisée. Etcela implique en pratique - nous l'avons indiqué - que la
Cour vérifiele caractère d'ordre juridique de l'intérêt allégup ér,obablement
aussi la vraisemblance de l'existence d'unintérêt. queist un élémentnécessaire-
ment lié.lajurisprudence internationale le montre. a la pure et simple possibi-
litéque cet intérêt puisse êtretouché, puisse êtreaffecté par fa décision a
rendre.
En conclusion, il est permis de penser que. au sens de l'article 62 du Statut.
des lors qu'elle a constaté le caractère d'ordre juridique de I'intérètallégué.
rendu vraisemblable par le reauérant, des lors qu'elle a constatéla possibilité
que cet interètsoit éventuellementtouché parla décisionqui sera rendue el que
nul ne peut prévoir. la Cour doit admettre l'intervention et a I'obljgatjon
juridique de la déclarerrecevable.
De ceite conclusion on trouve une confirmation très nette - j'alfais dire
pour uni fois - dans les débats de la Cour permanente a propos de son
premier Règlement. En effet la Cour a rejetéla thèse du juge Beichmann qui
prétendaitque la condition envisagéepar l'article62 n'était pas nécessairement
la seule. Pour lejuge Beichmann. il ne suffisait pas que la Cour soit d'avisque
le requéranta justifie un intérêd t'ordre juridique. etc.:« SiLa Cour estime que
cette condition est remplie. la Cour pourra refuser de donner suite a la
demande. )rVoila la proposition Beichmann. et cette thésea étérejetée.Cette
thése. peut-êtreassez.proche de la proposition anglaise déjà rejetéepar les
auteurs di Statut, ne fut pas retenue. Les malentendus et les préjugésayant la
vie dure. la'mèmethèse - inutilement d'ailleurs- étaitencore évoquée.vous
le savez. pai'l'agent du Gouvernement britannique dans l'affairedu Wi~nble-
d0tl.
Enlin, je suistentéd'ajouter une toute dernière remarque en ce qui concerne
13 vkrification par la Cour de l'existence d'un intérê d'tordre juridique pouvant
êtreen cause dans la présenteespèce. Sil'onfait abstraction un instant. pour les
besoins de l'analyse. des conditions particulières prévuespar le Statut pour le
cas de I'intervention. on sera enclin a admettre que la condition de t'intérê nte
peut &irequ'unexemple. certes un exemple particulier. mais un exemple quand
meme, d'une exigence plus générale du droit international - et d'ailleurs du
droit interne aussi - qui exige non seulement de I'intervenant mais du
demandeur en justice qu'ilait un intérêt asa demande.
Je me permets de citer ici une fais de plus le PrésidentWiniarski dans son
opinion dans l'affairedu Sud-Ouestafricain. Le President Winiarski. citant un
ouvrage néerlàndais. disait ceci : (<Pourquoi. le préceptevaudrait-il unique-
ment pour I'intervenant et non pas pour le demandeur ? )> II s'agissait du
précepte selonlequel il faut avoir un intérêp tour agir.
Et le Président Winiarski poursuivait :(<C'est un principe de droit inter-
national qui lui est commun avec les ordresjuridiques nationaux. »
En examinant les demandes qui lui sont soumises aujourd'hui par la Libye336 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
et par la Tunisiedans un compromis qui fixecomme sa toute première mission
la détermination ou l'indication de certains principes, de certaines règles, de
certaines tendances. la Cour ne manquera pas de se poser, dans ce contexte
aussi, la question de l'intérêt,on pas quant a l'intervention mais quant a la
demande. Or les Parties a l'instance ont allégué,ne fût-ce qu'implicitement,
l'existence d'un intérêtà la détermination par la Cour des principes, règles,
tendances, etc., concernant la détermination du plateau continental, sa délimi-
tation dans une certaine régionde la Méditerranée.
Mais dors peut-on sérieusement imaginer, comme semblent pourtant le
faire nos estimés contradicteurs, peut-on imaginer un instant qu'un juge
international puisse simultanément, et surtout aprèsavoir entendu aujourd'hui
les plaidoiries de mon confrère MCLauterpacht, admettre l'intéréd tes parties a
l'instanceprincipale et refuser d'admettre l'intéretde l'intervenanàla determi-
nation de ces principes ?
J'aborde la seconde partie de mon expose.
Les sources que nous avons passées en revue jusqu'ici, le texte du Statut, les
travaux préparatoires, les délibérationsde la Cour permanente sur son premier
Règlement, la pratique de la Cour ou ce qu'il en existe, ces sources laissent
donc sans solution, il faut bien le dire, un grand nombre de questions du droit
international de procédure. Ces sources ne fournissent pas, ou guère, d'indica-
tions, par exemple, sur les diverses catégorieset sous-catégoriesd'interven-
tions. ou sur la position procéduraleexacte,dans chacune de ces catégories,de
Ilintervenant par rapport aux parties a I'instance pendante, ou encore sur les
efiets du jugement qui sera rendu dans une instance en cas d'intervention.
Toutes ces questions-là restent a vrai dire indécises,non résolues.
Cela étant il convient de rechercher si d'autres sources permettraient d'ap-
porter des édaircissemenb complémentaires, éclaircissements indispensables.
Il convient donc dejeter maintenant un coup d'Œilen particulier sur la théorie
générale dudroit de procédure.C'est ceque je me propose de faire dans cette
seconde partie qui sera sensiblement plus courte que la premiere.
Premier point, pourquoi se tourner vers la théoriegénéralede la procédure?
Est-ilvraiment besoin de justifier, dans les conditions que nous connaissons, le
recours aux enseignements de la pratique et de la science de la procédure
interne. S'ilest un casoii cette référeilceapparaît - je ne dis pas seulement
utile-, mais indispensable, c'est bien cecas ou il s'agit d'interpréter pour la
première fois dans l'histoire l'article 62 du Statut. Si je suis convaincu qu'il
convientde consulter ici les principes générauxet les notionsfondamentales de
la prooédurecivile interne c'esten résumé, pourdeux raisons, l'une négative,
l'autre positive.La raison négative est toute simple ; c'est dans le caractère
lacunaire, le caractère encore très peu développé,il faut le dire, du droit
prwedural international qu'on trouve cette raison.
La seconde raison, positive, est double. Elle est double parce qu'elle est la
fois générdeet spéciale.Elte est généraleen ce sens qu'elie touche l'ensemble
de laprocédure internationale. Et elle est spécialeen ce sens qu'elle est toua
fait particulière à l'institulioii de l'intervention dans un pro&.Expliquons-
nous en deux mots :du point de vue général, quand bien mêmele procés
international sur divers points présente des caractères spécifiques incontes-
tables et incontestés,il n'en demeure pas moins qu'il offre aussi des analogies
multiples et des analogies frappantes avec le procés interne. Ce qui sufit
d'ailleursa expliquer le nombre tout a fait remarquable de réferences aux
principes de la procédure interre que l'on trouve sous la plume des juges de la
Cour permanente et desjuges de la Cour internationale, qu'ilss'expriment dans
leur activitéjudiciaire ou qii'ilss'expriment dans une activité scientifique. PLAIDOIRIE DE M. LALIVE 337
J'épargneraià la Cour des citations bien connues. Devant un certain embar-
ras de richesse a cet égard,je me bornerai a un seulexemple, à une seule
réferenceempruntée à I'un des très grands spécialistesde la procédure inter-
nationale, a I'un des éminents représentants de la science juridique italienne
dont on connaît l'importante contribution qu'elle a fournie en particulier au
développement du droit procédural international, j'ai nommé M. Gaetano
Morelli, alors proksseur, dans un cours a l'Académiede La Haye sur « La
théorie généraledu procès international )).
Dans un chapitre sur la nature juridique du procès international, le profes-
seur Morelli distingue dans l'activitédes Etats ce qu'il appelle« deux mo-
ments » ;un premier moment constitutionnel et normatif (c'estla création soit
d'un tribunal arbitral, soit de la Cour) et un second moment. le moment du
proces proprement dit.
M. Morelli écritce qui suit:
<Dans le second moment, c'est-à-dire en ce qui concerne le procés
proprement dit, les Etatsapparaissent comme parties dans le procès dans
la mêmeposition que celle des parties entre elles dans le procèsinterne)>
Les Etatsapparaissent comme parties dans le procèsdans la mêmeposition
que celle des parties entre elles dans le procès interne. Voila en bref pour la
raison que j'ai appelée générale.
D'autre part, une raison positive spéciale justifietout particulièrement en
l'espèce,et suffiraia elle seule à justifier, que l'interprète de l'art62ldu
Statut s'appuie sur les renseignements de la théoriegénéralede ia procédure
interne et sur les expériencesde la procédure comparée.Je me permets, pour
éviter unmalentendu,de signaler au passage que cette démarche,qui consiste a
s'appuyer sur les enseignements de la théorie généralede la procédure, sur les
expériencesde l'analysecomparative, est une demarche plus large que celle qui
se ramènerait seulement a rechercher l'existence des principes générauxde
droit reconnus par les nations civiliséesdans les législationsinteraussens de
t'articl38 (paragraphe 1 c))du Statut de la Cour. Cette raison spéciale c'est
tout simplement que les auteurs du Statut, les éminents jurisconsultes du
comité consultatif réunis à La Haye en 1920, représentant la pluparl des
systèmesjuridiques du monde, se sont appliquéssans contestation possible, a
introduire, diaprés un commentateur contemporain. «dans la justice jnter-
nationale les principes de la justice inte>>.
Dans son rapport au Conseil de la Sociétdes Nations sur l'avant-projet du
comité dejuristes, le rapporteur, M. Léon Bourgeois, s'exprimait de la façon
suivante :
«Vous dûtes remarquer avec quel soin les juristes de La Haye ont
essayé de rapprocher l'organisation et le fonctionnement de la Cour
nouvelle des conditions habituelles de l'administration de la justice
interne.))
Etje cite à nouveau le même commentateur, M. Farag :
<<Pour se rendre compte de ce qu'il faut appeler l'intimitéqui régne
entre le droit international et le droit interne en cette matiere [en matiere
d'intervention], il suffit de jeter un regard sur le procès-verbal de la
28c séance du comitéde juristes de La Haye ou furent élaboresles deux
articles sur l'intervention, les art62let 63 du Statut.t)
Je ne multiplierai pas les citations, j'en ai déjàfait quelques-unes, mais je
tiensa ajouter tout de meme l'observation du président ducomitédejuristes, le338 PLATEAUCONTINENTAL
baron Descamps,jurisconsulte beige,selon qui :<<La solutionde la question de
I'intervention doit être empruntée au droit commun n, ce qui améne le
présidentDescamps a proposer le texte qu'il a rédigé sur la base de cettethèse,
un texte qui fut unanimement adopté par le comitéet qui fut conservédans la
rédactiondéfinitivedu Statut.
Tout cela, on peut le dire, me paraît absolument essentiel si l'on veut
comprendre la notion de l'intervention dans le Statut.
Avant d'entamer un survol, ce ne sera guère qu'un survol, de la théorie
généralede la procédure,tàche ingrate s'ilen est, iln'est peut-êtrepas superflu
que je tente de prévenirdeux malentendus éventuels.
Prernierpoitit:En évoquant ici quelques notions ou questions de procédure
interne je n'entends nullement affirmer, ni mêmesous-entendre, que toutes ces
questions vont se poser ou se poseront ici.Je n'en sais rien, nous ne le savons
pas ou, plus exactement, nous ne le savons pas encore et nous pouvons
d'autant moins le savoir avec certitude que le Gouvernement de Malte n'est
que fort imparfaitement renseigné,on vous l'adit, sur les positions exactes des
Parties a l'instance actuellement pendante. Il se peut donc qu'un certain
nombre des questions que je vais brièvement évoquerne se posent finalement
pas. II est possible que la Cour puisse parvenir a la décisionsur la requête
d'intervention sans prendre explicitement partie sur l'une ou l'autre de ces
questions. Mais cette incertitude qui est toua fait liaela nature des choses et
a laquelle nous ne pouvons rien, ne saurait nous dispenser, me semble-t-il, du
devoir de fournir a la Cour le maximum d'éléments d'appréciatiod nont elle
aura besoin pour résoudre ce que, je dois le rappeler, placédans une situation
comparable a la nôtre en l'affairedu Witnhlcdon, le futur présidentBasdevant,
représentant le Gouvernement français, appelait si justement un problème
complexe et délicat.
Deuxietne observarioil: En invitant respectueusement la Cour a se référer,
dans la mesure ou elle l'estimera nécessaire,à des notions eta des principes
généraux de procédure interneje ne songe pas un instant a suggérer - et
j'essaie de couper court ici à une confusion classique - je ne sais quelle
transposition automatique, ni a méconnaître les différencesde structures entre
la sociétéinternationale et lessociétesinternes. Il s'agiticidetout autre chose, il
s'agit ici tout simplement de respecter le sens véritable de l'article 62, de
respecter la nature de cette institution telle que l'avoulue le comitéde juristes
de La Haye.
Dans un autre contexte, celui de l'article 59 du Statut, dans le contexte
procédural de la notion classique de la chose jugéeet des limites de la chose
jugée, le célèbre juge et grand juriste italien Anzilotti, dans son opinion
dissidente aI'arretno 11,énonçaitdesconsidérationsqui me paraissent s'appli-
quer parfaitement. et je dirai presquea fortiori, a l'institution de l'intervention.
Ce qu'il disaitde la notion procedurale de la force de la chose jugéeme parait
s'appliquer admirablement a la notion procédurale de l'inte~ention et c'est
pourquoi je me permets de citer en entier le passage de cette opinion. Après
quoi, si vous levoulez bien,ce pourrait êtreun moment convenabled'interrup-
tion, mais encore une foisje suis tout a fait prêa continuer.
Anzilotti disait, après avoir donné son opinion fondéesur des principes
internes :
« Si, pour arrivera ce résultat,je me suis fondésur des principes tirés
de laprocédurecivile, c'estparce que je me croyaisautorisé a le faire grâce
aux considérationssuivantes ..le Statut de la Cour,dansson article 59se
référeclairement a une théorietraditionnelle et généralementadmise sur PLAIDOIRIE DE M. LALIVE 339
leslimites matériellesde lachosejugée :il n'étaitdoncque naturel des'en
tenir aux élémentsessentiels et aux données fondamentalesde cette
procédure,sauf indication contraire que je ne trouve nulle part, soit du
Statut lui-mêmes ,oit du droit internationalEn second lieu, il me semble
que s'il ya un cas dans iequel il est justifie d'avoir rmurs, faute de
conventions et de coutumes. aux « principesgénéraux de droit reconnus
par lesnations civiliséesn,dont parle le no3 de l'article38 du Statut. ce
cas est assurémentlenôtre. ))
Ce que ce grand juristedisait dans cet autre contexte surlaforce de ch&e
jugée me paraitje le répète.'appliquer admirablement a l'institutionprocedu-
rale de l'intervention.
Laudience es kvee à 17 /57 THlRD PUBLIC SITTING (20 11181, IO a.m.)
Prc*sc~i:r[See sitting of 111181. Judge Schwebel absent.]
The PRESIDENT :Beforecalling on Counsel for Malta, 1 have to announce
that Juge Schwebel is unfortunately indisposed and will therefore not be able
to be present at today's hearings.
M. LALIVE :hlonsieur,le Président,Messieurs lesmembres de la Cour, a la
fin de l'audience d'hierj'ai doncentame sur.votre invitation la deuxieme partie
de mon expose dont l'objet,je me permets de le rappeler, est le suivant:
Devant le silence des textes et des sources internationales sur.une sériede
questions qui peuvent se poser ici, quant au droit de procédurede I'interven-
lion, ilapparait utile et indispensable de rechercher ailleurs leséclaircissements
nécessaires ;c'est-à-dire dans les principes généraux du droitde procédure.
dans l'esprimême du Statut, dans lessources directesd'inspiration des auteurs
du Statut et dans la théorie générale du droite procédure. Pourjustifier cette
méthode.j'aiévoquerapidement des raisons généraleset spéciales,notamment
la raison spécifiqueà l'institution de I'intervention, qui est une institution
empruntée « au droit commun >),jecite ici leprésidentDescamps, president du
comité dejuristes de La Haye. .
El enfin. comme vous vous en souvenez, je me suis réclaméde-Dionisio
Anzilotti pour qui il était tout natureldse fonder sur les principes tirésde la
procédurecivile, dans un cas de ce genre, sauf, disait-il. indications contraires
du Statut. et ces indications contraires sont, non seulement inexistantes ici,
mais elles sont mêmeinconcevables puisqu'il s'agitprécisémentd'une institu-
tion du Statut qui est empruntée au droit interne.
Monsieur le Président,au moment d'entamer la substance de cette deuxieme
partie qui ne sera pas trop longue, je dois vous avouer une crainte. Malgré la
tres grande attention que la Cour a bien voulu apporter à mes explications
d'hier el malgrél'encouragement que je peux trouver dans les déclarationsde
h.1 Anzilotti, du Président Winiarski. de nombre de juges de4a Cour qui se
sont référéa sux principes du droit interne et, notamment, de la procédure
interne:je suis tres conscientsurce chapitre. de la difficultétoute particulière
de ma tache.
En effet il ne s'agitvraiment pas ici d'inviter la Cour. comme le faisait hier
avec brio mon confrère MCLauterpacht, a un beau voyage sur les eaux de la
Méditerranée,il s'agit'bien plus de demander a la Cour de pénétrer avecmoi
dans ce qu'il,faut bien appeler les terres arides et rocailleuses du droit de
procédureet. cela, dans un secteur d'une assez mauvaise réputation, le secteur
de I'intervention. Permettez-moi d'endonner un tout petit exemple un peu
anecdotique en passant.
Avant de venir a La Haye,j'aieu la curiositéde voirce que, à l'universitéde
Genève.mes colleguesprocessualistespouvaient bien dire de I'interventionà nos
étudiants.Je trouve dans un polycopiéde droit judiciaire. sous la plume de mon
collègue le recteur Thorens de l'université de Genève, la phrase révélatrice
suivante a lapage 140 : IIs'agitd'unedes questions les plus délicatesetlesplus
dificiles de tout le droit processuel.N'y a-t-il pas la une convergence de plus
entre le droit interne et le droit international on se souvient de ce que le PLAIDOIRIEDE M. LALIVE 341
professeur Basdevantdisaita la Cour permanente dans l'affaireduWimbledon ?
C'estpourquoi je voudrais solliciter l'indulgencetoute particulièrede la Cour
avant de méngager maintenant dans l'examen de quelques principes généraux .
de droit en matiere d'intervention. Ces principes ont étédégagésau cours de
sièclesd'expériencejudiciaire de toutes les nations. ils ont étémis a l'épreuve
par la pratique, analyses par la science de tous les processualistes de tous les
pays. Je m'attacherai, bien entendu, spécialementaux principes de procédure
généralementadmis a l'époqueou les jurisconsultes de La Haye, en 1920,
élaboraient le Statut de la Cour permanente. Ces.principes ne contredisent
d'ailleurs en rien ceux qui sont valables aujourd'hui encore.
Pour dégagerces notions et ces principes généraux.une étude comparative
était.de toute évidence, indispensableLe Gouvernement de Malte l'ademan-
dtk a un représentant particulierement éminent de la science juridique alle-
mande. dontles travaux fontautorité en la matière,leprofesseurWalterHabs-
cheid. professeur aux Universitésde Wurzburg et de Genève, ancien recteur de
l'universitéde Würzburg, directeur de l'Institutde droit procedural; national et
étranger.de son université,membre de l'Institut international de droit procédu-
ral, présidentde l'Associationscientifique pour les droits proceduraux interna-
tional et comparé,etj'en passe;le professeur Habscheid étaittout spécialement
qualifiépour mener a bien, dans des délaisfort brefs, l'enquêteet l'analyse
comparatives qui lui étaientdemandées(ci-aprèsp. 459-4841.
La Chur m'en voudrait avec raison de mettre sa patience a l'épreuveen
entrant dans ledétail, ouen citant textuellement des pages de la consultation
du professeur Habscheid. Je ne le ferai pas. Cetle consultation eitla disposi-
tion. cela va de soi, de la Cour et des honorables représentantsdes Partiesa
l'instance dans un nombre suffisant d'exemplaires. A moins que vous ne
'souhaitiez que j'en donne ici lecture, je me contenterai de la déposer.comme
une annexe a ma plaidoirie, d'en signaler quelquespoints sailfants, etdén
résumerbrièvement les conclusions.
Le professeur Habscheid examine dans sa consultation ledroit de procédure
d'un grand nombre de pays, regroupés, selonla méthodeclassique des compa-
ratistes, en systèmes ou familles juridiques.En examinant a chaque fois la
législation,la jurisprudence et la doctrine, il passe ainsi en revue d'abord le
groupe de ce qu'ilappelle« les pays romanistes)).Dans ce groupe, sont étudies
tour a tour les droits de procédure de la France,de l'Italie, de l'Espagne, du
Portügal. du Brésilet d'autres pays encore, parmi lesquels il est intéressantde
signaler aussi I'Egypte,la Tunisie et la Libye.
Un deuxieme volet de l'étudecomparativeporte sur lespays germaniques et
le Japon, un troisièmesur l'Angleterre et les E~ats-Unis.Dans une quatrième
section. on trouve enfin une analyse détailléedes textes en vigueur et de la
pratique en matière d'intervention. ainsi que de la doctrine. dans les pays
socialistes!
URSS. Républiquedémocratiqueallemande, Hongrie, etc.
Dans un deuxieme chapitre. intitule « Analyse de droit comparé »,le profes-
seur Habscheid conclut, en résume, a l'admission toutafait générale, ans tous
les systèmes de procédure civile considérés,de l'institutionde l'intervention
volontaire, sous diverses formes.II met en lumière les remarquables coriver-
gences existantes, au-delà des modalitéstechniques d'expression, convergences
quant a la justificatioau fondement, au but des diverses formes d'interven-
tion.
Ce qui frappe d'emblée, a lire l'étudede mon savant collègue allemand,c'est
qu'elleaboutit - un peu plus de cinquante ans plus tard - a des conclusions
touta fait identiques à celles auxquelles parvenaient les premiers commenta-
teurs de l'institution, et je pense aux auteurs des deux monographies que j'ai342 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
citéeshier, MM. Farag et Friede. dans leursouvrages sur I'intervention devant
la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, en 1927 et en 1933.
Permettez-moi de citer ici. rapidement, le premier qui vers 1927 s'exprime
ainsi :
<(II est des institutions juridiques qui, quoique d'une importance indé-
niable, ne trouvent pas le mémeaccueil aupres des différentes législations,
pas mème aupres de celles qui remontent à une source commune ...II en
est d'autres, telles que la tutelle, le droit de défense en justiceet làutorité
de la chose jugée,qui ont reçu une consécrationuniverselle plus ou moins
uniforme ..On ne risquerait pas trop de s'éloignerde la vérité si l'on faisait
rentrer dans cette dernièrecatégoriel'institution de I'intervention du tiers
en justice. On trouve cette institution, partout, a peu présla mémedans
son ensemble et avec peu de variations dans les détails. ))
Un demi-siècleplus tard, le professeur Habscheid parvient a une conclusion
semblable et, cela on le notera en passant, après avoir élargi son enquète
comparative, bien au-delà du cercle des pays considéréspar le premier auteur,
et par exemple à l'Amériquelatine, au Japon. a I'URSS et aux autres pays
socialistes.
Ce qui m'amèneà la premièredes six propositions par lesquellesje voudrais
résumerles leçons, lesimportantes leçons qui se dégagent.à notreavis,de cette
magistrale analyse comparative .
Pret~iii.rcpropositiutr: Qu'elles datent des années 1920 ou qu'elles datent
d'aujourd'hui, les études comparatives en matière de procédure démontrent
donc l'existence universelle.dans tous les systèmes modernes, de l'institution
de I'intervention. 11ne fait guèrede doute qu'on pourrait voir la. méme si les
articles62 et 63 n'existaient pas,un principe généralde droit reconnu par les
nations civilisées» au sens du Statut de la Cour.
Je viens de parler des (<systèmes modernes 0 de procédure. En réalité
I'intervention estune institution fort ancienne, puisqu'elle étaitconnue déjàen
droit romain. Elle a étéreprise et développéepar le droit ecclésiastique ; elle
était enfinconnue, troisiémeexemple. par l'anciendroit français qui reconnais-
saitde la fapn la plus large aux tiers le droit d'intervenir dans un procéstoutes
les fois qu'ilsavaient intérêta le faire. On voit que l'institution est ressentiea
travers lesâges et a travers les sociétés lslus diverses. comme répondant aun
besoin fondamental de justice et que cette institution s'estdéveloppéea travers
une expériencemillénaire.
De~txiCirtcpro/~osi/ioti: Le professeur Habscheid constate l'existence d'une
tendance généraledes droits modernes de procédure a élargir et libéraliser
l'institution de l'intervention, dans l'intérêdt'une saine administration de la
justice et de l'économie procédurale.Il voit des illustrations de celte tendance
dans diverses réformes récentes, parexemple en France, aux Etats-Unis, etc.
Troisiètnepmposilioti :L'étudedu droit comparé révefe'l'admission géne-
tale de plusieurs formes d'intervention et non pas seulement celles des deux
grandes figures que sont l'intervention dite « principale ))et l'intervention dite
« accessoire » ou comme dit mieux la terminologie italienne « adhésive p.Des
nécessitéspratiques, la nature deschoses. la variété des situations et da conflits
d'intérètsont entrainépartout la création, souvent par la voiejurisprudentielle.
de sous-catégories etde variantes de ces deux grandes formes.
QiiurriCtiie prripasitio~: Le principe de l'autoritéde la chose jugée, dont
l'articl59 du Statut est une illustration, ce principe connait partout, dans tous
les systèmesjuridiques. plusieurs exceptions et il n'estnulle part admis comme PLAIDOIRIE DE M. LALIVE 343
un motif d'exclure l'intervention. Parmi les exceptions se trouve le cas des
jugements constitutifs et partout se faitjour la tendance grandissante, en droit
moderne, a admettre l'idéeréaliste de ce que la terminologie allemande
nomme Reflex- Wirkurig, l'effet réflexe.Le réalismeconduit en effet les sys-
tèmesmodernes, souvent jurisprudentiels, admettre l'intérêa intervenir pour
prévenirl'effet possiblequ'aura defacto lejugement a rendre, compte tenu de
sa force de véritélégaleet de son autorité au moins morale.
Au surplus, il ne faut pas perdre dvue que divers systèmesde procédure -
par exemple appartenant a la famille que Ibn peut appeler<(française n,dont
on sait l'influence qu'elfea eue sur le Statut de la Co-rattribuent la force de
la chose jugéenon seulement au dispositif proprement dit mais aussi en fiaison
avec lui aux motifs décisifs essentielsde cette décision.
Cinquième proposifion : Partout, dans tous les systèmes de procédure in-
ternes, te droit d'intervention, quelles que soient ses modalitéset formulations
techniques, repose en définitivesur des motifs, sur une ratio legis semblables,
sur un double motif a la foismoral et de politique juridique, les impératifs
d'une saine administration de la justice, le respect des droits de tous les
intéresses etnotamment du droit d'êtreentendu.
Sixième eldeniièreproposilion : Dans tous lessystèmesétudiésl,eprofesseur
Habscheid relkve comme un exempletraditionnel et véritablement classiquedu
droit d'intervenirlasituation du tiers qui prétend des droitssur un objet ou
sur un terrain en litige entreles deux parties au procès. A cet égard,je dois
attirer l'attention de la Cour,pour conclure cette deuxième partie, sur deux fort
intéressantes décisionsde cours fedérales des Etats-Unis, décisionsque cite le
professeur Habschtid et qu'il discute en détailà la finde sa consultation. Il
s'agit des causes State of Cal$ornia v. United States de 1950 (180 F 2d 596,
cerfiorari denied 340 US 826), et surtout de la cause Atlatrtis Develop~nenV.
UrtitedStotes (379 F 2d 8 18(1967)).
Ces deux cas présentent des analogies tout a fait frappantes avecleprésent
litigeLe premier concerne une demande d'intervention de 1'Etatde Californie,
qui alléguait un titrejuridique propre sur l'eaudisputédans un procèsentre les
Etats-Unis et une sociétéconcessionnaire. Je ne m'yarrèterai pas, le professeur
Habscheid la discute en détail.
Le second cas. l'affaire Atlantis. concerne un litige relatif au plateau
continental des Etats-Unis. Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis étaitdemandeur
dans une instance contre la sociétéAcme et voulait clarifier la question dses
titres juridiques sur le plateau continentetsur les iies relevanason avis,du
outer contiireiital shev of the United States. Devant ce procès, la société
Atlantis, craignant de voir ses droits méconnus, a demandé aintervenir.
Je me bornerai i signaler ici deux points tout particulièrement intéressants
dans la décisionde la Cour fédérafeq , ui a admis l'intervention au motif que
l'intérêdet l'intervenantne pouvait faireaucun doute, et ceci sur la base de
deux critères d'appréciation.
Premièrement. la Cour fédéralea examiné si lesintérêtsde I'intervenant
étaientdéjàreprésentéset défendus d'une manière adéquateet suffisante par
l'uneou l'autre des parties au liti-ecéstune méthodequ'on pourrait appeler
« classique n,et sa réponsea éténégative:
Deuxieme point, plus intéressantencore :la Cour fédérale s'esdtemandée,et
s'est demandée seulement, s'il pouvait y avoir une atteinte a l'intérêtde
l'intervenant, si cette atteinte était possible dans cas où I'intervention ne
serait pas admise. On voit que cettedémarche,cette méthodeintellectuelle, est
semblable, identique, a celle des juridictions internationales, comme les tribu-
naux arbitraux mixtes que j'ai cites hier[a.Cour fedéralea admis en outre la344 PLATEAU COh71NENTAL
possibilitéd'une telle atteinte au motif extrêmementsignificatif que des ques-
tions de droit tout a fait nouvelles devaient être tranchéesdans le cadre de
l'instance en cours. Par conséquent,la décisionsur ces questions auraitou bien
force de précédent,ou en tout cas une tres grande autorité par rapport aux
mêmes questionsde droit qui seraient soulevées ultérieurement dans une
procédure analogue. Si une telle procéduredevait avoir lieu ultérieurement, a
conclu la Cour fédéralei.l serait pratiquement des plus invraisemblables qu'un
tribunal en vienne a écarterou à ne pas suivre une décisionde ce genre.
Pratiquement donc, dit la Cour, si l'intervention était rejetée. la société
intervenante ne pourrait plusjamais défendreses intérêtd se la méme manière.
Elle ne serait plus jamais dans la méme positionpour faire valoir ses droils.
Jén ai ainsi terminé sinon avecla théorie générald ee la procédure. du moins
avec ma deuxième partie, et ilm'appartient maintenant. dans la troisième et
dernière partie de cette présentation. de vous exposer le point de vue du
Gouvernement de Malte quant a l'application enla présente espècedu Statut,
des principes et des notions que nous avons passes en revue au cours des deux
premièresparties, et nous devons envisager cetteapplication. bien entendu. a la
lumièredesobservations que lesGouvernements tunisien et libyenont remises
a la Cour. Quand je dis <<a la lumière ))c'est peut-etre une manière de parler.
car on ne saurait affirmer sans exagération que ces observations projettent
beaucoup de clartésur notre sujet et nous allons voir pour quelles raisons.
Certains regretteront sans doute que les Parties à l'instance - et tout
spécialementleGouvernement libyen - ne se soient pas inspiréesde l'exemple
donne par les Etatsparties a l'affaire du Wii~ihledoii,qui ont soit reconnu de
bonne grice la recevabilitéde l'intervention polonaise,soit s'ensont rapportés
a lajustice. D'autress'enféliciteront.puisque lesobjections qui nous sont faites
vont permettre a la Cour de se prononcer sur desquestions nouvelles et qu'elles
favorisent ainsi, indirectement, la clarification du droit international.
Quoi qu'il en soit, les doutes et les objections exprimés ont ce mérite
commun de nous donner l'occasion bienvenue de dissiper des malentendus
évidents, et de relever des erreurs véritablement « classiques )>au sujet de
l'intervention entant qu'institution procédurale consacrée par le Statut de la
Cour.
On me permettra de ne pas m'arrêterau premier grief formulécontre notre
requête. celuid'aimprécision ». qui ne résiste pas uninstant a l'examen ; et
pour s'enconvaincre il sufîtt par exemple de comparer la requete de Malte a la
requête d'intervention de la Pologne dans I'anàire du Wi~trhlerlo~rrequête
fondéesur l'article62 du Statut et qui tient en une petite page.
Ce grief formel. je dirai méme ultraformaliste, me paraît trèssurprenant. En
effet.a supposer méme qu'il y ait dans notre requêteun élémentd'imprécision
quelconque, il serait la conséquenceobligéed'une décisionde la Cour - qui
n'a pas cru pouvoir accéder a la demande du Gouvernement de Malte de
prendre connaissance des mémoires échangéspar les Parties. Nous nous
bornerons donc a constater qu'il résultede cette décisionde la Cour, necessai-
rement. certaines conséquencesqu'il suffirad'indiquer ici rapidement :
PrcriiiCreco~istQüei~c :rc'estque dans l'appréciationdu niveau de précision
requis a son avis. laCour ne manquera pas évidemmentde tenir compte du fait.
que le Gouvernement de Malte n'a pas eu la possibilitéd'êtreexactement
informe de l'objet,des limites, de la nature du litige et des positions des Parties.
Sc~ciiiidc~irsc;qlreri:ilest tout aussi évidentque les Gouvernements libyen
et tunisien jouissent d'une supériorité indiscutablelorsqu'ils'agit d'émettredes
jugements quant à la précisionplus ou moins grande de te!le ou telle explica- PLAIDOIRI E E M. LALIVE 345
tion. Ilsconnaissent parfaitement, eux, lesdonnéesdu litigesoumis à la Couret
leursarguments respectifs, alors que Malte les ignore. Or il me parait difficile
d'imaginer que devant la Cour les Parties a l'instance puissent êtreadmises a
exploiter une pareille inégalitéde situation,
'. ""nsieur le Président,la principale des objections qui sont opposéesà notre
requête a fin d'intervention - et de tres loin laplus importante puisqu'elletient
'a peu présles deux tiers desobservations libyennes - est fondéesur l'absence
de !lienjuridictionnel. Je ne traiterai pas cette question devant vous puisque
c'est mon confrère, M. Bathurst, qui exposera a ce sujet le point'de vue du
Gouvernement de Malte, mais je dois tout de même en dire deux mots a ce
stade sous peine de fausser l'équilibredema démonstrationet d'exposercelle-ci
au soupçon d'avoir étévolontairement incornplete. Mon sentiment acet égard
'peut tenir en deux propositions tres simples :
I I
~remjèremen!, letexte de l'article62 ne contient, on l'a vu, aucune trace
quelconque de cette prétenduecondition.
Deuxièmerneiif.pareille condition n'a aucune place dans le système de
l'intervention selon les articl62 et 63 du Statut ;elle ferait un véritablenon-
-sensde cette institution, qui doit ëtre qualifd'<cncident deprocédure ».D'ou
il découle, nécessairement,que la question de lienjuridictionnel ne se pose ici
;en lucune manière.
En réalité,toutes les objections qui nous sont opposéesa cet égard reposent
sur la mêmeerreur fondamentale, sur une confusion entre intervention » et
« demande en justice ».Toutes ces discussions portent donc, a mon avis, sur ce
qu'jl faut bien appeler un faux problème.
Cependant, pour ne laisser aucune zone d'ombre, aucun doute dans ce
débat, le Gouvernement de Malte n'entend aicunement esquiver une discus-
sion complète et approfondie de ce sujet, puisque les Parties a l'instance
semblent y tenir tellement. C'est la raison pour laquelle, et en quelque sorte ex
abtndanii caurela, mon confrere, bf.Bathurst, traitera tout a l'heurelaques-
tion devant vous.
+la étant précise, je voudrais ici, dans cette troisième et dernière partie,
traiter quatre points:le premier, c'estce que j'appeilerai la deuxième objection,
la deuxième critique qui nous est faite, selon laquelle notre requête seraiten
qucique sorte une demande d'avis consultatif dkguisée.Le deuxième point,
c'et la nature procedurale exacte de notre intervention. Le troisième point,
c'est l'objection tiréedu principe de la relativitéde la force de la chose jugé;
enfin, le quatrième, ce sont les objections que l'on peut appeler les objections
d'opportunité.
Premjer point :Le deuxième grief qui nous est opposé d'aprésles observa-
tions du Gouvernement libyen (par. 33): <la requéte de Malte confond
pratiquement l'intervention dans une aiTairecontentieuse avec la comparution
dans une affaire consultative au titre de l'articl66 du Statut ,r.Que faut-il
penser de cette objection ? Je crois inutile de la réfuter en détail et je me
contenterai de vous soumettre trois brèves observations.
La première observation c'est qu'il est bien vrai qu'il y a des analogies,
certaines, entre la procédure d'intervention et la demande d'avis consultatif.
Cette constatation n'est pas nouvelle certes ; elle avait déjàétéfaite, si ma
mémoireest bonne, lors des travaux préparatoires du Statut de la Cour. Mais
ces analogies n'empêchentpas des différencesimportantes, des différencesdont
.on peut dire, peut-êtrepour simplifierqu'ellesont leur centre dans une notion,
celle d'intérêptropre de l'intervenant.346 PLATEAU CO~INENTAL
Si bien qu'en réalité.lorsqu'on critique notre prétendue « confusion ravec
Iüprocédured'avis consultatif. on ne fait que reprendre sous une autre forme
et en d'autres termes l'allégationsurprenante selon laquelle Malte n'aurait
pas d'interétpropre B la décisionde la Cour. Telle est ma premiere observa-
lion.
La seconde est d'un ordre un peu différent.Par leur compromis notifiéle
terdécembre 1978.les deux Parties a la présente instanceont suivi. tout en le
modifiant. ce qu'on peut appeler le modèledes compromis dans I'afrairedu
Plateau cotr~inenta le la mer du Nord et elles ont demandé a la Cour une
certainesorte de jugement.
On peut interpréter de diverses manières la nature procédurale de ce genre
dejugement. Peu importe. puisclue.de toute façon. le résultatest le rnémeen ce
qui concerne la question de t'intervention. Dans toutes les hypothèses. la
demande d'intervention doit se rapporler. ou « avoir trait>>comme disait la
Cour dans l'affaire Haya de la Torre. a I'instanceen cours. a l'instance telle
qu'elle a étédéfinie,par d'autres. En effet ce n'est pas le Gouvernement de
Malte qui a rédigele compromis entre la Libye et la Tunisie et ce n'est pas le
Gouvernement de Malte qui a choisi de définir etde limiter la mission de la
Cour.
Si donc. en raison de la nature et de l'objetde l'instance pendante devant la
Cour. certains croient voir dans la requêtedu Gouvernement de Malte, a tort
ou a raison. certains aspects qui rappelleraient la procédure d'avis consulatif,je
suis tentéde répondre tout simplement :(<A qui la faute,?jr
Avant.de poursuivre notre examen critique des objections variéesqui sont
raitesa la requete, il est nécessaire jecroisde s'arrêterun instant et d'attaquer,
si je puis dire. de front un problème fondamental que la Cour se posera
probablement ou peut-être.mais en tout cas qu'elle pourrait s'étonnerde nous
voir éviter.La Cour pourrait s'étonnerde ce que nous n'ayons pas lecourage
de l'aborder. de l'attaquer de front. Le courage. pourquoi ? Parce qu'il s'agit
d'un probléme procédural indiscutablement difficile. nouveau. complexe et
délicat.comme disait le PrésidentBasdevant.
Ce problème est celui de fa nature juridique exacte de I'intervention de
Malte. Nous avons donc vu qu'avec l'article62 le Statut a voulu permettre
plusieurs formes diverses d'ihterventions, et je n'y reviens pas. Mais il reste.
cela étant.a se demander quelle est la nature juridique exacte du point de vue
procédural du genre d'intervention demandépar hlalte..
Sur ce point. la seule conclusion qui peut êtretiréede façon certaine d'une
analyse du Statut et des travaux préparatoires est une conclusion surtout
négative.IIest manifeste que I'intervention de hlalte nèst pas une intervention
accessoireou adhésive :elle ne vise en aucune manière a appuyer ou soutenir
les prétentions d'une Partiecontre l'autre.
Donc I'intervention maltaise estune intervention principale. Fort bien, mais
de quel type ? A quel genre.i quelle((sous-catégorie » faudrait-il la'rattacher ?
La-dessus. hlessieurs. les textes sont muets. Les travaux préparatoires et la
pratique internationale. ou ce qu'il en existe. nepermettenta peu prèsaucune
conclusion. Force est donc de se tourner. comme l'ont fait avani nou,s tant
d'iltustresjuges internationaux en descirconstances plus ou moins analogues.
vers les enseignements de la théorie générale de laprocédure.
Un exemple typique de I'intervention principale en droit comparéest le cas
suivant. ei je m'excuse d'emblée d'agivrraiment d'une manière un peu profes-
sorale .
A intente contre B une action en revendication d'une chose. Un tiers C. PLAIDOIRIE DE M. LALIVE 347
pensant que ta chose lui appartient ou pourrait lui appartenir, intervient dans
une action qui est dirigéeala fois contre A etB pris comme consorts.
II y a ce que la terminologie latine appelle le litis corisortiurn.
En droit de procédure, l'action deC est une action, mais elle a une double
nature :en tant qu'elle est dirigéecontre le possesseur de la chose B. c'estune
action en revendication ;en tant qu'elleest dirigéecontre A, c'estune action en
conslatation de droit. Donc c'est une action d'une double nature ou, si l'on
veut, cést une action adeux branches.
Dans tous les cas dece genre. ou il a consorite des défendeurs,l'actionest
une malgrésa double nature, mais elle n'a pas nécessairement ettoujours une
double nature.
IIse peut aussi que les deux branches de I'intervention soient de même
nature. Tel est le cas dans l'exemple suivant, un exemple dont on saisira
immédiatement les analogies avec la présente instance :
Un certain A actionne un certain B, mais seulement en constatation de ses
droitssurune chose - mobiliéreou immobiliére.Un tiers C estime que 1ebien
lui appartient et il intervient dans le pro& en cou;il forme une intervention
principale.
Son intervention est donc dirigéecontre A et contrB, pris comme consorts.
Ici aussi. il s'agit d'une intervention unique,a double branche, mais à la
diîTerencedu premier cas les deux branchessont exactement de même nature.
Céstici l'une des formesbien connues, et qu'on peul appeler mêmetypi-
ques, de l'intervention principale, ainsique le montre le professeur Habscheid
dans sa consultation en ce qui concerne par exemple la France (ci-aprés'p.461)
et, avec des modalités dimerentes, l'Allemagne (p.466-467 1ays dont les
systérnesproceduraux respectifs ont eu, chacun le sait, untrésforte influence
dans de nombreux autres pays européens et extra-européens, y compris la
Libye et la Tunisie.
L'analogieest évidenteavec la situation procedurale que nous trouvonsdans
la présente espèce, et il es1je crois superflu de rappeler a des juristes de la
qualitéde nos estimes contradicteurs en quoi consiste la notion de I'analogie.
qui ne signifie nullement identitéde situations.
11se peut cependant qu'on songe a nous objecter que le litige soumis a la
Cour ne peut ètre identifie a un procès en revendication quant a sa nature
juridique. Cela est parfaitement exact sur le plan procedural- encore que le
bon sens populaire ne manquerait pas de retenir le fait qu'il n'y aurapas de
litige devant la Cour, quelle que puisse en êtrela nature formelle, si la Libye et
la Tunisie ne revendiquaient pas les mêmesportions du plateau continental.
Du point de vue du droit de procédure, il est donc vrai que la présente
instance, si elaedes analogiesavec le procésen.revendication, en diffèreaussi
a plusieurs égards.En revanche I'analogieest beaucoup plus frappante, beau-
coup plus forteavec le second exemple typique d'intervention principale OU
toutes les partiese limitent a demander une constatation de droit. En un tel
cas, le tiers qui intervient veut prévenir une constatation de droit qui pourrait
produire pour lui des efiets défavorables. Sondroit d'intervenir est universelle-
ment reconnu. Cette reconnaissance universelle correspond a un besoin fonda-
mental de justice et d'equite et il a lieu d'yvoir un « principe généralde
droit ); ceci aussi bien si l'on donne a ces termes le sens étroit de principe
reconnu iiJoro doin~stico,selon l'expression de lord PhiIlimore. ou si on leur
donne un sensplus large et plus proche de l'idéede principes générauxdu droit
international.
En l'absenced'indications claireset expresses du Statut. c'estsansdoute dans 348 PLATEAU CONTINEMAL
les systemes processuels français et apparentés que I'onpeut trouver la (<clé >>
du probléme. si probleme il y a. J'ai montré combien les auteurs du Statut
avaient'étéinfluencéspar les procéduresde l'Europe continentale. tout particu-
-1ierement par le droit français. J'ai cite déjàles déclarations du président du
comité dejuristes de La Haye. le baron belge Descamps, le projet des pays
scandinaves. le rapport d'Albert de Lapradelle. rapporteur du comité. les
déclarations de hl. Léon Bourgeois.rapporteur a la Société des Nations.etc.
Tout démontre.on l'avu. l'influencedominante du droit continental et surtout
du droit 'françaisdans la conception des articles 62 el 63 du Statut.
Or. dans les systèmes continentaux. et spécialement dans les systemes de
procédure français et inspires du modèlerrançais. parmi lesquels il faut ranger
entre autres ceux de I'Egypte. de la Libye. de la Tunisie. l'in.ervention est
considérée essentiellementcomme un incident de procédure.
IIen résulteque l'intervention. jugée recevable.va donner lieu a un procès
non pas entre trois parlies. mais entre trois participants. ou. pour êtreplus
exact encore mais pour employer une image. je dirais presquea deuxpartici-
pants trois quarts ou a deu~ participants et demi. En effet. danscette concep-
tion fondamentale. il ne s'agit nullement de reconnaitre a la ((partie interve-
nante 1sur pied de totale égalitéle statut d'une véritable <(partie>).
Tout a l'heure, aprèsavoir suggéréune méthode qui pourrait éventuellement
permettre a laCour. dans le silence total du Statut, d'éluciderleprobleme de la
nature procédurale exacte de notre intervention. je me suis permis d'ajouter
tcsi probleme il y a !>>Pourquoi ?
Eh bien il est possible qu'une telle analyse. pour scientifique qu'ellesoit. ne
soit pas indispensable au règlementde cet tcincident de procédure » - des lors
qu'il me parait tout a fait évident que l'article 62 a prévu une pluralité de
formes'd'intervention et que la requêtede hlalte tombe indiscutablement dans
le cadre large ainsi trace.
Cependant, s'ilm'aparu utile de chercher a préciserla nature procédurale-de
notre intervention. c'estau fond pour deux raisons. La premièrec'estque nous
sommes en quelque sorte condamnés par les faits a naviguer a l'aveugle, à
naviguer au juge. puisque nous ignorons la situation procédurale exacte des
Parties et les donnéescomplètes de leur procés. Maisla seconde raison c'est
qu'un malentendu complet semble bien exister a cet égardentre les Parties a
l'instance et leGouvernement de Malte.
Ce gouvernement avait cru deson devoir de préciserdans sa requëte qu'il ne
cherchait aucunement a prendre la place d'une partie à la présente instanceet
que. par conséquent. il ne cherchait pas a bénéficierde I'arrétqui serait rendu
entre les Parties de lamême manièreque ces dernièreset. siI'onpeut dire. ((sur
pied d'égalité avec elles>>.
LeGouvernement de la Républiquede Malte a voulu faire comprendre qu'il
ne cherchait pas autre chose que la position procédurale d'un <(participant » a
titre d'intervention, selon l'article 62, c'est-à-dire ce qu'on peut appeler une
partie intervenante )t dans cette procédure particulière introduite par les
Gouvernements tunisiens et libyens aux termes de leur compromis.
Monsieur le Président.césouci du Gouvernement de Malte n'a pas étébien
compris. me semble-t-il, par les auteurs des observations qui vous ont été
soumises.
II n'a pas étébien compris et j'en trouve plusieurs témoignages dans les
textes qu'ont rédiges nos estimes contradicteurs. par exemple. dans les passages
suivants :
Selon le Gouvernement libyen (ci-dessus. observations. p. 273, par. 29): PLAIDOIRID EE M. LALIVE 349
ccL.'iriterveiitiondans une aflàirc contenrieusc devrait pourtant avoir un autre
objet que <<d'cxposcrdcs vues ..r>et plus loin. au paragraphe 32, notre requete
est citéecomme précisantque :(<L'intervention n'a pas pour objet d'aboutir a
kinc dbcision dc rond ou iiilne décision 'obligatoirecontre l'une ou l'autre
Partie. J(Ei c'est parF~itcnieiite.xaci!)
Mais' le Gouvernement libyen en tire la conclusion surprenante que la
demande d'intervention de Fvlaltene procéderait en réalitéd'aucun interkt
d'ordrejuridique pouvant ètremis en cause et ceci nieme dans l'hypothèse.dit-
il. oh laCour décideraiqtu'elle pourrait intervenir. Cette critique est encore
développceau paragraphe suivant (no 33). ou il est soutenu que :
<<hetaltedeviendrait essentiellement une <<quasi-partie ». Elle aurait le
droit d'êtreentendue. dkxprimer ses vues ... mais serait égalementauto-
.riséeà prétendre que ses propres droits ne sont pas et ne peuvent être
aKectés par la décisionde la Cour. H
Faisons abstraction du caractere tendancieux de ces observations et repre-
nons trèsbrièvement quelques-uns de leurs élémentsprincipaux sur le fond :
1) D'abord. présenter notre demande d'intervention commeayant pour seul
et unique objet r<d'exposer des vues » dans une affaire contentieuse est ou bien
un pur artifice verbal. ou lesigne d'un sérieux malentendu.On me permettra a
cet égardde me référersimplement a mes explications précédentessur l'objet
procedural de notre intervention et sa nature juridique exacte. On percevra
sans peine alors Inerreurd'interprétationcommise dans ces observations.
2) Ensuite il me paraita la foisconfus. scientifiquement erronéet contradic-
toire d'affirmer que Malte chercherait d'une part a devenir une « quasi-partie
et d'autre part confondrait sa position avec la comparution dans une affaire
consultative. C'est rigoureusement contradictoire.
Sur les deux branches de cette critique. je crois m'être déjàclairement
expriméet ma réponsepeut se résumeren une phrase : le Gouvernement de
Malte ne cherche nullement a devenir une partiedans le procès en cause. il
demande a intervenir au sens de l'article 62 du Statut. Et ceci compte tenu
nécessairementde la nature spécifique del'instanceen cours, telle que détermi-
néepar le compromis.
J'en arrivea mon avant dernier point qui est l'objectiontiréede l'article59 et
de la relativitc de la chosejugée. SelonleGouvernement libyen, Malte n'aurait
aucun intérêd t'ordrejuridique à intervenir pour diverses autres raisons tenant
essentiellement au principe de la relativitéde la chose jugée.
klonsieur le President. iine réfuration détailléem'apparait d'autant plus
superflue qu'elle résulte enquelque sorte d'elle-menle. ipsofacto d.es deux
premiéres partiesde mon exposé.c'est-à-direde mon analyse du Statut et de la
pratique internationale. d'une part, et de la theorie généralede la procédure.
d'autre-part. Vous me permettrez donc de prier respectueusement la Cour de
bien vouloir s'y référer - ce qui me mettra en mesure de me contenter de
quelques commentaires.
Prernière~neriiil, m'apparaît qu'un certain nombre de remarques des auteurs
des observations qui nous sont opposées procèdentd'uneconfusion entre deux
domaines. qu'il convient de distinguer soigneusement en matiére d'interven-
tion :celui de la recevabilitéde la requéte d'interventionet celui de son bien-
fondé.
Deuxièrnei)~eiid~a.ns leur souci de démontrer que notre requ-etene rempli-
raii pas les conditions du Statut. plus celles qu'ils jugent opportun d'y ajouter
bien entendu. nos estiméscontradicteurs ne distinguent pas. ou pas sufisam-350 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
ment. premièrement ce qui relèvede la preuve d'un prkjudice, deuxièmement
ce qui releve de la vraisemblance d'un préjudiceet troisièmement cequi relève
de la simple possibilitéd'un préjudice.Le titre donnéà la troisième partie des
observations libyennes :(<Absence déflet possible H, ne change absolument
rien a cette'constatation. Le sens de l'articl62 - nous i'avons vu hier - est
qu'il suflit que la possibilitéd'un effet de la décision ne puisse pasêtreexclue.
Or en fait. après l'exposéque vous ont fait hier mes confrères, qui pourrait
sérieusementdouter que la démonstrationdu Gouvernement de Malte est allée
bien au-delà de ce qu'exigeait l'article62 du Statut.
Troisie~neinetitI'argument essentiel que nous oppose. par exemple, le Gou-
vernement libyen est parfaitement exposé au paragraphe 28 de ses observa-
tions, qui mérite d'être cit:
« L'instance entre la Libye et la Tunisie représenteun cas parfaitement
normal dans lequel les intérêtsd'Et& tiers sont protégéspar les limita-
tions juridiques, subjectives et objectives, inhérentesa la force obligatoire
de toute décisionjudiciaire - autrement dit la chose jugée. Aucune
protection particulière n'est nécessaire,comme ceHequi résulteraita titre
exceptionnel d'une intervention. Par conséquentla thèse maltaise suivant
laquelle un intérétd'ordre juridique serait pour elle en cause en l'espèce
n'estpas plausible et s'effondre d'elle-même. »(Ci-dessus p.273.)
Cette déclaration est tressignificative;elle fournit une excellente illustration
de cequ'ilfa.utbien appeler une totale méconnaissancedu droit deprocédure et
en particulier une totale méconnaissance de'l'institution de l'intervention dans
la procédurede la Cour. Céstceque je voudrais montrer par lessixremarques
suivantes :
1. Vous aurez notéd'abord les mots a titre exceptionnel ». Avec eux, on
voit apparaitxe, selon l'expression bienconnue, « le bout de l'oreill». L'inter-
vention serait donc quelque chose qu'il faut limiter et réduire par tous Les
procédéspossibles, par exemple, en l'assortissant d'une multitudedeconditions
impticites. Or, les auteurs du Statut ont voulu, nous le savons, admettre
l'intervention de la manière la plus large. Tandis que le Gouvernement libyen
voudrait, lui. récrirele Statut, le réduirea rien, supprimer le<rprogrèsconsidé-
rable >)qu'ont réalisé en1920, consciemment et a l'image du droit commun
interne, tant le comitéde juristes de La Haye que le Conseil de la Sociétédes
Nations.
2. Pareille thèse, il esta peine besoin d'y insister, heurte le sens clair des
textes et contrevient, entre autres, au principe de l'interprétation effective.
3. Quant a l'argument tire de la relativitéde la force de la chose jugée,il est,
peut-on dire, vieux comme le monde. Il a étéconstamment utilisépar les
parties qui voulaient s'opposer une intervention. Et il a, non moins constam-
ment, été rejetépar ies tribunaux de tous les pays pour la tres simple raison
qu'il n'a aucune valeur quelconque. S'il avait une valeur, il n'y aurait pas
d'institution de l'intervention.IIest véritablement absurde d'imaginer que les
auteurs du Statut eûssent pu y insérerles articles 62 et 63 s'ilétaitpermis a un
Etat d'invoquer l'article 59 el la relativitéde la chose jugéepour en paralyser
l'application,et ce n'estpas moi seul qui le dis.
Permettez-moi de citer un passage tres pertinent d'une étudeparue ily a cinq
ans dans l'ouvrage collectif publié a New York par Lm Gross :Tf~eFliture of
[/teI~tternarioiialCorrrtofJia~ice, avec une préfacede Philip Jessup et Edvard
Hambro. On lit,ala page 556 de l'étude consacrée a l'intervention par John T.
Miller, ce qui suit, qui mérited'être cit: 351
PLAIDOIRI EE M. LALIVE
« Theoretically, the Court could so narrowly construe its authorityas
to hold that no State can qualify because Article 62 contemplates an
interest which .may be affected by the Court's decision and Article 59
specifically provides that the 'decision ofthe Court has no binding effect
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case'. There-
fore, a non-intervening State cannot have an interest of a legal nature
affected by litigation before the Court to which it is not a Party. [C'esttrès
exactement l'argument libyen. Et cet auteur continue :] But such an
interpretation would lead to the nonsensical conclusion that the States
which drafted the Statute had an intention to create a meaningless cause
for intervention and an unavailable remedy. D
A nonsensical.conclusion indeed.
4. L'argument libyen, Monsieur le Président, meconnait totatement, non
pas seulement l'institution de l'intervention, mais aussi la rédes choses, les
circonstances de la présente espèceet la portée desdécisionsde la Cour :
u) il méconnait d'abordla réalitédes choses, car,comme l'établirait, s'il en était
besoin, la magistrale étudede mon collègue leprofesseur Habscheid, tous
lessystèmesjuridiques admettent I'intervention, etsous diverses formes. Ils
l'admettent tous précisément parceque, pas plus que la tierce opposition
(qui vient aprèscoup, qui vient trop tard), la relativitéde la chose jugée ne
peut suffire a protéger les intérêts destiers. C'est lecas, en matière de
jugement constitutif; c'est le cas danlessystèmes ou lejugeme,nt a valeur
de précédent (principesrarc decisis; c'est lecasencoredans lessystemes de
iype français ou, si je suis bien inforrné,,la chosjugéene comprend pas
seulement le dispositif du jugement,-mais aussi les motifs essentiels- ce
que les processualistes appellent le trervus se~ll~iiia~.C'est le cas enfin,
d'une manière généralec ,haque foisque, par sa force de véritéIégaleou par
son autoritémorale, un jugement est susceptibled'avoir des effets pratiques.
primaires ou secondaires, sur des tiers.
b) La thèse libyenne méconnaîtensuite les particularitésde la présenteespéce,
particularitésdues au compromis et au caractère à certains égardsabstraits
dece qui est demandé par les Parties a la Cour.
c) La thèse libyenne méconnaît enfinsurtout, et gravement, faportéeréelledes
décisionsde la Cour - portéeréelledont soit dit en passant les auteurs du
Statulavaient été parfaitementconscients. On se reportera ici, par exemple,
a la déclaration Balfour, au rapport de M.L. Bourgeois a la Sociétédes
Nations, ou encore, par exemple, a la fameuse décisionde la Cour perma-
nente dans l'affairedeClrorzbw sur le fond ou la Cour a juge, vous vous en
souvenez, qu'elle ne saurait se départir de l'avis qu'elleavait donnéprécé-
demment, etc, On pourrait multiplier les citations et les exemples.
L'objection qui nous est faite ignore, ou feint d'ignorer, la très grande
autoritégénéralequ'aura la décisionde la Cour dans la présenteespèceet je ne
pourrai rien ajouter a cet égardaux observations qui ont étéprésentéesici par
mes confrères sur les effets qui peuvent en résulter, qui en résulteront pour
Malte.
5. On nous oppose encore (paragraphe 28 des observations libyennes)
qu'a aucune protection particulière ne serait « nécessaire» en l'espèc>>. 'est
la une affirmation purement gratuite et qui heurte la vraisemblance. En
l'espèce,ilest àpeine besoin deconstater qu'aucune des Parties n'est enmesure
- dans l'hypothèseoli elle en aurait l'intenti-n de protégerles intérêtdse la
Républiquede Malte. Et ceci, déjà,pour la simple et bonne raison que, pour352 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
protégerles interets de la Républiquede hqalte. il faudrait nécessairement les
connaiire. en 61reparfaitement informe et a mêmedelesapprécier exactement.
6. Enfin la mêmeconstatation de bon sens suflit a disposer de l'argument
tunisien et libyen selon lequel une intervention serait inutile parce que la Cour.
d'oflice. seraita mêmede protéger les intérêtsde 1'Etat intervenant. Pareil
argument. s'il était exact. aurait rendu totalement superflue l'institution de
l'intervention - aussi bien dans les procéduresinternes que dans la procedure
internationale - et on ne parviendrait absolument pas a s'expliquer son
admission universelle. Ai-je besoin de dire que ce qui est en cause ici. ce n'est
évidemmentpas la volontéde la Cour ou d'un tribunal de protégerles intérêts
du tiers, c'est sa possibilitéde le faire. en l'absence de l'intervenant et sans le
concours de I'intervenant? Je m'excuse de devoir rappeler ici. dans cette
enceinte. des véritésaussi élémentaires.
J'en arrive a mon dernier point avant de conclure. Que reste-t-il des objec-
tions multiples qui ont été opposées a notre requêted'intervention ?
II reste quelques arguments de pure opportunité. La requêtecréerait des
retards et entrainerait d'importantes compiications ou perturbations. etc.. si
bien que. nous est-il dit. si laCour arrivaala conclusion que lesconditionsde
l'articl62 sont bien remplies en l'espèce.elle devrait. malgré tour. rejeter la
requête duGouvernement de Malte.
h2a réponsea ce sujet pourra être extrëmement brève. Cesarguments sont
manifestement mal fondés.dans la mesure ou ils ne sont pas tout simplement
irrecevables.
Tout d'abord ils procèdent d'une erreur que j'ai déjàconstatée. textes a
l'appui. quant a la portéede l'article62. paragraphe 2: « La Cour décide n.et
quant aux intentions des rédacteurs du Statut. La volonté évidente desjuristes
réunisa La Haye au comitéconsultatif et celle du Conseil de la Sociétédes
Nations qui a approuvé leur projet. cette volonté évidente a étéde confiera la
Cour la mission de contrôler si la condition posée par le paragraphe I était
réalisée.Elle n'a pas étéde lui confier un pouvoir discrétionnaire ou quasi
discrétionnaire. au sens français du terme. de décider selondes considérations
d'opportunité. Mais ceci est a mon sens sans aucune portéepratique tant les
arguments invoqués sont insignifiants. L'intervention. si elle était admise.
serait source de retard dans fa procédure. La réponsesaute aux yeux.
Bien entendu toute intervention - comme n'importe quel autre incident de
procédure - est de nature. par la force des choses. a créercertains retards.
hlais, premièrement. ces retards seront contrôlés par la Cour et. deuxiéme-
ment. en tc.i!tétatde cause il n'a pas. il ne saurait y avoir aucune commune
mesure entre. d'une part. ces ëventuels retards et. d'autre part. les intérets
supérieurs d'une bonne administration de lajustice et I'intérèdt e la Cour elle-
même a pouvoir entendre les vues de tous les intéresses et apermettre a
l'intervenant de faire valoirses intérêtsd'ordre juridique. a éviter des litiges
ultérieursdont on pourrait parfaitement faire l'économie et aéviterenfin des
contrariétéséventuellesde décisions.
Quant aux prétendus troubles. aux prétendues complications qui résulte-
raient - a en croire les considérations complémentaires libyennes - d'une
admission de l'intervention de Malte. l'argument, il faut ledire. est dépourvu de
sérieux. IIrévèleau demeurant une très singulière défianceenvers la Cour.
deriance envers sa volonté etsa capacitéde diriger la procédureconformément
aux exigences d'une sainejustice. dans teplein respect de l'égalité dteraitement
et des droits respectifs des Parties l'instance etde I'intervenant.
Tout cela - disons-le pour terminer - relèved'une tactique traditionnelle : PLAIDOIRI DEE bl. LALlVE 353
la tactique bien connue qui consiste a (<peindre le diable sur la muraille »..On
vous a dit. on vous dira peut-etre encore. qu'une admission de la requëte de
hlalte va bouleverser le role et l'horaire de la Cour. créer des situations
inextricables. préjudiciablesau prestige de la justice internationale. etc. On
vous dira peut-êtreaussi que. si la requêtede hlalte étaitjugéeadmissible. les
ecluses seraient ouvertes devant un flot. un raz de marée d'interventions
surgissant de toutes parts. de tous les points de la planète.
Quelle juridiction. et surtout quelle juridiction internationale. serait suscep-
tible d'être impressionnée par des considerationsde ce genre ?
J'en arrive à ma conclusion.
hlonsieur le Président.Messieurs de la Cour. je suis ainsi parvenu au terme
de cette présentation du droit de l'intervention selonle Siaiul de la Cour -
présentation dans laquelle j'ai tentéd'éclairerl'objet et la nature exacte de la
requéteque vous a soumise le Gouvernement de hlalte.
Veuillez croire que j'ai conscience des lacunes de cet exposé. pourtant assez
long déjà. etdu caractere non seulement complexe mais quelque peu aride des
problèmes poséspar l'article62 du Statut.
D'une part. la nouveauté du sujet en procédure internationale et I'impor-
tance vitale des intérêtsen cause nous,faisaient un devoir particulier - je l'ai
dit en commençant - de fournir a laCour le maximum d'élémentd s'apprécia-
tion. hlais. d'autre part. i! fallait évidemment choisir.s'entenira l'essentiel-
aiirisque de négliger.qui sait. de bons arguments.Quoi qu'ilen soit. nous nous
sommes efforcésde traiter.1~problème d'une faqon claire et objective.
Et qu'a révéln éotre examen attentif des textes du Statut ?Un examen fait à
la lumièredes travaux-préparatoires. de la pratique de la Cour. de lajurispru-
dence et de la doctrine internationales - un examen complétépar l'analyse
comparative. par le recours aux principes gérierauxet a la théorie générale de
la procédure.
L'examen de toutes ces sources. de tous ces élémentsdivers révèle. en finde
compte. une étonnante. une remarquable harmonie. La raison en est. sans
doute. que l'institution de l'intervention enprocédure - internationale comme
interne - répond partout aux mimes besoins fondamentaux de justice. de
saine économiejudiciaire et. disons-le. de bon sens.
Le Gouvernement de h,laltepense avoir largement démontre - et bien au-
delà de ce aquoi ileût étéstrictement tenu selon lestextesapplicables - que sa,
requete a fin d'intervention réponden tous points aux exigences du Statut. i sa
lettre comme a son esprit. L'intéretd'uordre juridique )),ei mêmeles inrcrèts
vitaux de Malte. sont indiscutablement i<en cause >>en l'espèce.c'est-a-dire
sont. atout le moins. susceptibles d'ëtre affectés.On vous I'trésabondamment
montre hier et toutes les subtilites juridiques du monde. toules les conslruc-
tions formalistes qu'on pourrait nous opposer n'affaiblirontjamais la force de
cette évidence.
Pour une multiplicitéde raisons conjuguées.dedroit et de fait - des raisons
dont je serais tente de dire avec le p&te que <<Chaque est sufisante seule » -
la requéte du Gouvernement de Malte m'apparaît comme si entièrement
justifiée qu'un critique tant soit peu sévèrepourrait presque penser que la
solution de cet « incident de procédure » est toute simple et qu'elle va en
définitive de soi. que les représentants du Gouvernement de Malte ont peut-
êtreexagérédans leur démonstration et. pour employer une expression popu-
laire. qu'ils on« uiilisk un marteau-pilon pour casser unenoisette x.
hlais. s'ilest un cas ou un Etat tiers. de par saposition spécifique.se trouve
trésdirectement affecte et concerné. cést bien celui-ci. S'ilest un cas ou I'ar-
ticle 62 a un sens et doit être applique.c'estbien celui-ci. Et j'auralacandeur354 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL ,
de m'étonnerde la vigueur. du peude nuances, du caractère catégoriquede
certaines au moins des objections qui ont été opposéesau désirdu Gouverne-
ment de Xlalte de faire entendre sa voix dans ce débatqui le touche de si près,
comme si sa voix étaitsi redoutable devant la justice internationale.
On a dit souvent que l'homme n'apprécievraiment le prix de sa libertéque
lorsqu'ilest menacéde la perdre.
Faudra-t-il dire deméme de la facultéd'intervention prévue parl'article 62
du Statut de la Cour, un article si peu utilisejusqu'ici etdont l'existencméme
se voit aujourd'hui menacée pardes thèsesqui - sous couleur d'ccinterpréta-
tion » - réduiraient cette institutiona rien et entraineraient un recul dépto-
rable. un retour en arrière inadmissible ?)Maisle risque heureusement est bien
théorique. Par leur exces mème, par leurs outrances et leurs confusions. les
objections qui nous ont étéopposéesapportent en réalité a la requétede hlalte.
involontairement. le soutien d'une sorte de ccontre-épreuve n. d'une dérnons-
tration par l'absurde. Ellesconfirment que notre analyse de l'article 62 est
correcte et correspond seule au texte et a l'espritdu Statut. a la volontéde ses
auteurs, tout comme au sentiment élémentairede lajustice et aux besoins de la
juridiction internationale.
Permettez-moi. a ce propos et en concluant, hlonsieur le Président.I'expres-
sion d'un sentiment personnel. En tant que ressortissant d'un petit pays. très
attache traditionnellement a la cause de la juridiction internationale. j'avoue
étreparticulièrement sensible a la situation qui est aujourd'hui celle du reque-
rant en intervention. ta Républiquede hlalte. un tout petit pays au riche passé.
un petit pays du tiers monde qui, comme vous le disait si bien hier son
Arronley-Ge~ierol.tente de faire entendre sa voix alorsque deux grands voisins
s'apprëtent a se partager - j'allais dire<(le gàteau >).non ! - le plateau
continental de la région.
C'est dire l'immense valeur d'exemple. pour la communauté internationale
tout entiére certes. mais au premier chef pour Lespetits pays; qu'aura. a n'en
pas douter. la décisionde la Cour.
hlonsieur le Président.hlessieurs lesjuges. vous avez bien voulu accorder a
mon exposé votre très patiente attention. Permettez-moide vous en dire ici. en
terminant. ma vive gratitude. ARGUMENT OF MR. BATHURST
COUNSELFORTHEGOVERNMENT OF MALTA
Mr. BATHURST :Mr. President,Membersof the Court.
I share with my colleagues who repreent the GoYernment of Malta the
honour and the privilege of appearing before this Court. hly task is to present
to the Court h4alta.ssubmissions on that subparagraph of Article8 1of the
Rules of Court which refers to the requirernent that an application for permis-
sion to intervene in a case must state "any basis" ofjurisdiction claimed to exist
between the Applicant and the Parties to the case. that is A81.paragraph
2. subparagrGh (cl.Libya and Tunisia. in their respective observations on
hlalta's Application. see this requirement of the Rules ofasomeaning that
Malta must "prove.' twhich isTunisia's word) must prove that there exista
"valid jurisdictional Iink" (and those are Libya's words) between Malta and
Libya and between hlalta and Tunisia. hlalta submits that it is the Statute of
the International Court of Justice that must govern the matter. and that the
Statute nejther prescribes nor supportsany such requirement.
1begin by reminding the Court that intervention by a State in proceedings
pending in the Court may be either as of right under Article 63 of the Statute.
or with liermission given by the Court under Article 62. In both types of
intervention. of course. certain conditions must exist before it isallowed. I will
deal with only one aspect of those Articles and will not repeat what my learned
friend Professor Lalive has said about thern.
Article 6of the Court's Statute provides for intervention as of right. Itdeals
with intervention in litigation between parties to a case which puts "in
question"tas the wordsare)the consiruciion of aconvention.by which States
other than the parties to thcase are also bound. either as signatories or as
acceding States. The latter. being parties to the convention but not parties to
the case. havea right to intefvene in the proceedings. If they do, they will be
bound by the construction given in the Court's judgment on the issue between
the Parties to the case.
Certain features of these provisions are wonhy of notice. Under Article 63.
the intervening State need notbea hlember of the United Nations. and so
bound by the provisions of the Charter'on the jurisdiction of the Court. The
intervening State need not be a party to the Statute of this Court. The
convention. the construction of which is before the Cour! in such a case. need
not includea provisionwhereby the parties to the convention have consented
in advance to the exercise of jurisdictian by this Court when a point of
construction is in dispute. The convention may perhaps beconcluded betwen,356 COhTINEhTAL SHELF
three States only. the parties to the penaing case and the intervening State.
Between them there is the international obligation arising from the conven-
tion's provisions, whatever they may be. but there may not be, and there need
not be.any jurisdictional link between them. and - State, otherwise a stranger
to this Court, still has the right to intervene.
Article62 of the Court's Statute provides for intervention a case when. in
certain circumstances. the Court gives its permission. Some of those circum-
stances have been discussed by my learned friends appearing for Malta. But the
first words of paragraph I of Article 62 of the Statute should be noted :
"S/irilildu S~olrconsider that it has an interest of a legal nature which mbe
arected by a decision" in the pending case. "Should a State" - this wording
may becontrasted with that of Anicle 66 of the Statute which. in the context
of advisory opinions;speaks of "States entited toappear before the Court". As
in Article63, so with Article 62. the'state seeking to intervene need not be
either a member of the United Nations or a party to the Statute of this Court.
Yet. say Libya and Tunisia. there must be a valid jurisdictional link between
the Applicant State seeking to intervene and both of the parties to'the case, or
wiih al1of the parties to the case. if there are more than two of them. If sach
jurisdictional link were necessary, i~~circumstancesin which a State which is
not a party to the Charter or to,theStatute was seeking to intervene. onlyodls
IIOLa.reement made with each, or all,of the parties to the case would provide
that link. in the absence of a pre-existing treaty link between thernSo then,
Mr. President. in result it woulbe the parties to the case which would be ina
position to decide whether. or not jntervention should be permitted. And it
would not necessarily be both, or all, of the parties to the case which would
hold this power of decision. One of the two parties to the case might agree to
forge ajurisdictional link by rnaking an aAw agreement with the intervening
State :the other could refuse to do likewise. Then, according to Libya and
Tunisia, intervention could not be permitted by the Court because, in the
absence of a link between the intervener and one of the two parties to the case,
the Court. it is said. has no.power to decide to grant the request to intervene.
Throughout my submissions I ask the Court. with respect, to keep in mind
the consequences of any.ruling which would in effect transfer from the Court
to a party or the partitoa casethe power of decision which is,beyond doubt,
given to the Court hy Article62. paragraph 2, of the Statute. which states in
unambiguous language :"it shall befor the Court to decide" upon the request
for permission to intervene.
Ariicle 62 i&elfis'silenon the subject of any jurisdictional link between an
intervening State and the parties(O the case in which intervention is soughl.
and it contains no requirement of that kind. Until the adoption of the current
Rules of Court on 14 April 1978. the Rules of Court were also silent on this .
subject. This Court haç not had to give a decision involving Article 62 - the
only previous application to the Court for permission to intervene in a case
having Iapsed when the case itselfbecame moot. Nor did the Permanent Court
have occasion to clarify this issue. Nor. so as available records show, did
revisions of the Rufesin1926, 193 1. 1936.1946 and 1972cast any light upon
the problem. The "Background Note" issued by the Registry on the 1978
Revision of the Rules of Court merely cornrnented that the new Rule 81
covered "the sameground" as did its predecessor but wjth different wording.
This suggests thal it was not intended to presage any changes ofsubstance in
the conditions for the grant of permission to intervene.
In the year 1981one has to look back nearly 60 years. to the year 1922. in
orderto find the reason for the silence over the yea:and one must look to the ARGUhlENT OF hlK. BATHURST 357
cases, more recently. between Australia and France and between New Zealand
and France on NIIC/L,U TI.J,(I.C.J.Kcyor1.s/Y74.p. 253(Australialand p. 457
(New Zealand)) to discern. perhaps. why the silence was broken on 14 April
1978.
Lmking back to the year 1922. one must lirst recall that the Permanent
Court was available to States which were not rnembersof the League of
Nations (Statute, Arts. 34 and 35) . rticle62 of that Court'sStatute dealt with
intervention with the Court's permission and it also opened with the words :
"Should a State." Should a State. Not necessarily a Member of the League of
Nations. As my learned friend Professor Lalive has rnentioned. when the
Permanent Court met in January onwards in 1922to draft ilsfirst set of rules.
the Members of the Court discussed this very issueof a possiblejurisdictional
link of the Applicani intervener with the parties to a case. The records reveal
an instructive exchange of views(P.C.I.J.,Sc~ricsD. No.2 (1922).pp. 89-9 1and
95-96). The President was Judge Loder of the Netherlands. Lord Finlay was
the British Judge and Dr. John Bassett Moore was the Arnerican Judge. The
President is recorded. and 1quote frorn the record(p.89).as having "thought it
was impossibleto withhold the right of intervention from Stateswhich had not
accepted the cornpulsory jurisdiction of the Court". Lord Finlay - again Icite
the record (p. 901 - "agreed with the President that ir was impossible to
maintain that intervention should only take place in suits between two Sta{es
which had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction ofthe Court. or that this right
should only be exercised by a State which had acceptedthe same jurisdiction".
That is what Lord Finlaysaid. Judge Moore - again Iquote (p. 91) - "could
not see how the condition of reciprocity in regard to compulsory jurisdiction
could nullily theprovisions of an Article of the Statute. i.e.. Arti62". Later
Judge Moore added this (p.95) - "theproposais made - those for instance of
hl. Beichmann {M. Beichmann was the Norwegian Judge. Mr. Presidentj
(p. 95 :Ann. 55, p. 349) - arnounted io a proposal for the amendrnent of
Article 62 of the Slaiule. the effectof which.wouldbeto lirnitilsapplication to
States which had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court - a
suggestion which seerned to be quite inadmissible". Those are the words of
Judge hloore.
Then. in due course. ihe President ended the discussion in this way. accor-
ding to the record (p.961.by saying "he could not take a vote upon a proposal
the efïect of which would bc to limit the right of intervention (as prescribed by
Art. 62)IO such States as had acceptedcornpulsoryjurisdiction. Ifa proposal in
thissense were adopted. it wouid be conrrary to the Statute."
Ittherefore appears that klembers ofihe Permanent Court. in administrative
session ai the ouiset of their work in applying the Statute of their Court. gave
consideration to this very problem of thejurisdictional link. They did son the
basis of a Statute which did not prescribe general obligatory jiirisdiction'as
between States. but or1the basis that the provisions of Article 62 had to be
applied in a régime of the optional clause. whereby some States rnight. and
some States mighi not. accept the compulsory jurisdjction of the Court on
terms of reciprocity.
The submission of Malia is that the then President ofthe Permanent Court
and those of his colleagues who were of like mind were correct in their view
ihai a Rule of Court which purported to limii intervention to Srales thal had
accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on a reciprocal basis would be
contrary to the provisions of the Couri'sStattite. then. as now. Article 62. Such
a Rule would. in Malia's submission. be 111ii.oi.ii.the rule-making power
given to the Court. CONTINENTALSHELF
1hasten to add that Malta does not take the view that this Court intended to
make, or made, a Rule having any sitch effect when, in 1978, it enacted for
future cases the provisions which we see as Article 81, paragraph 2, subpara-
graph fc), of the current Rules of Court. It must be a presurnption - a
presurnption of law - that the Court did not intend to act ultra vires, and the
Rule should be interpreted in the light of that presurnption. Only Libya and
Tunisia suggest an effect of that sub-Rule which would render it contrary to
Article 62 of the Statute.
In Article 62 of the Statute there is neither expressly nor by necessary, or
even on its language. possible, implication, according to any acceptable canons
of interpretation. any justification for a Rule which would add to the con-
ditions for the grant of permission to intervene beyond those in the Article
itself and require a jurisdictional link - for in truth there is only one
requirement, the existence of a fegalinterest that may be affected. Nor does the
Rule, Article 81, 2(c),attempt to do this, as itslanguage shows. That sub-Rule
requires an application for permission to intervene in a pending case to "set
out" (those are its words) some information. Itdoes not cal1 for "proof', as
Tunisia's observations suggest ;it does no1 cal1for proof of anything at all.
That sub-Rule equally does not ask for information on rhe basis ofjurisdiction
claimed to exist between the intending intervener and the parties 10the case in
which intervention is sought. It asks information on "any"basis of such ju-
risdiction. It asks, if one may put it this way, for "the information, iJar1.v. .",
on jurisdiction relevant as between the States involved ; or in other words, it
asks for information concerning such jurisdictional links as 1na.vhappen to
exist without making it a condition that they must exist. The French text of the
sub-Rule in itsuse of the words "ionie base" isto likeeffect.This sub-Rule calls
for that information asrespects the Applicant and every party to the case,
whether the party is Plaintiff or Respondent and whether or not the inter-
vening State would wish to make common cause with either one party or the
other or with neither.
Such information on jurisdiction, assessed in the light of the terrns of the
Application for permission to intervene, might be of assistance to the Court in
reaching its decision whether or not to allow intervention for the fotlowing
reasons.
IV
Ilmight appear from the information supplied to the Court in the Applica-
tion that the Stateseeking to intervene could itself initiate its own proceedings
in the Court against either one of the States, parties to the pending case - for
example. where al1 three States had accepted the oplional clause in terms
which applied to the particular circumstances. Or it might be that the State
applying for permission to intervene could itseif create the opportunity to
initiatea case between itselfand either one of the parties to the case rnerely by
accepting the optional clause in terms suitabIe to match the already existing
acceptances of cornpulsory jurisdiction by those others.
i,might even be apparent from al1the information given in the Application
for permission that the applicant State saw its legal interesl in the pending
litigation as requiring it 10 side with the plaintiff in the case and to clairn
against the respondent the like relief or redress as that plaintin itself was
seeking from the Court. In such circumstances, Mt. Prwident. it might be ARGUMENTOF MR. BATHURSi 359
argued 1ha.tthe applicant State would be seeking, by the route of intervention.
to,enter the case as a third party in the fullestsense of the term. as a co-plaintiff
against the respondent. and notas an intervening party :and that to attempt to
use intervention in lhat way would violate the consensual character of the
Court'sjurisdiction. It may be significant that throughout its lifethe Permanent
Court was working under Article 62 of ilsStatute in terms which stated (in the
English tex0 thal the application for permission to intervene was to intervene
"os a titird parij~The French text of the Statute of the Permanent Court had
no equivalent of the words "as a third party". This discrepancy beiween the
English and the French texts of the former Statute has a certain significance for
the present Court in this application. for when at Washington and at San
Francisco it was a matter of drafting the Statute of the present Court on lines as
close as possible to those of.the Permanent Court's Statute. the negotiators
chose to delete the words "asa third pany" from the English text rather than to
add an equivalent phrase to the French text of that Article. perhaps realizing
that the words "third party" are an arnbiguous description of an intervener.
The Nuclear Tesrs cases would seem to afford examples of a case in w hich
some of the judges ofthis Court thought that an attempt was being made to use
intervention for a purpose alien to its nature. Australia. a complainant againsl
France. had accepted the cornpulsory jurisdiction of the Court. So had New
Zealand. the complainant in the other case. also against France. France had
also accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Cou- in terms which sugges-
ted reciprocity with both Australia and New Zealand. Australia and New
Zealand. on the one side. and France on the okher. stood itirese in a clear
relationship of plaintiffs and defendant. Fiji. which sought to intervene. had
not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court either before seeking
leave to intervene or at any tirne thereafter. Fiji manifestly sought to intervene
as a partisan on the side of Australia and New Zealand and against France.
Thus Fiji sought the opportunity to enter the case as a CO-plaintiff.but to do so
by way of intervention without the consent of France. If the Application fited
by Fiji for permission to intervene did not at first readingmake this purpose
clear. some hlembers of the Court commented on what they saw as the true
nature of Fiji'sApplication. 1need only quote the words of Judge Jiménez de
Aréchaga : this is what he said: "in my view. in order to be entitled to
intervene under Article 62 of the Statute" - and 1emphasize these significant
words of the learned Judge - "for the purpose of asseriing a right against ihe
respondent a Sthte must be in a position in which it could itself bring the
respondent before the Court" (I.c.J.Reporfs 1974. p. 533). The learned Judge
also pointed out :"ln circumstances like those in the present case". those were
his words.that is of the case between Australia or New Zealand on the one
side and France on the other. with Fiji seeking to intervene on the sideof the
plaintifïs. there must be presumed tobe a requirement. and 1take up his words
again - "of establishing an independent jurisdictional link between intervenor
and respondent" (ibid.).
The Application by Fiji stated (English version. p. IO)that "legal considera-
tions" similar 10 those aflectingNew Zeaiand affect FijiS position. and this
statement when read with Fiji's description of New Zealand's case as being
that France's conduct "constitutes a violation of New Zealand's rights under
international law"(English text. p. 4)..ihis made clear to some Members of the
Court the real character of that Application to intervene. JudgeGros observed
that Fiji'sApplication could not "in any way be regarded as a requestto be
permitted to intervene within the rneaning of" Article62 (I.c.J.Reports 1974,
pp. 326. 356). hlay 1again remind the Court of the Haya de 10 Torre case.360 CONTINENTAL SWELF
which arose out of the earlier proceedings in the Asyiuni case between Colom-
bia and Peru. When in the Haya de la Torre case the Court was at first
disposed to reject Cuba's requestto intervene on the ground that the request
dealt aln~ostentirely with issues covered by therlsyluni casejudgment with the
authority of res judicata. the Court saw the request as failing to "satisfy the
conditions of a genuine intervention" (I.CJ. Reports 1951, p. 71 at p. 77 :
Asylrii~icase. I.C.J. Reports 1950. p. 266). There seerns possibly to'be a
common factor in the treatment of Fiji'sApplication in thelVuclear Tesls cases
in the .la of the learned judges of this Court. and that of the Court itself in
respect of Cuba's Application in theffaya de 10Torre case. namefy. the search
for rhe real purpose of the Application to intervene.
The present case is very different frdm those cases. hfalta's application for
permission to intervene has quite another purpose. different from that of Fiji in
the one case. and that of Cuba in the other.
In the present case. the circumstances are such that earlier pronouncements
by Members of the Court in judicial proceedings cannot, in hlalta's submis-
sion. be called in aid by Libya and Tunisia in order to seek to veto Malta's
application for permission to intervene because they related to a different
situation.
In the present case. when one looksat the Special Agreement. the Cornpro-
rilisbetween Libya and Tunisia one sees there is no plaintiff: there is no
respondent. Neither Libya nor Tunisia assumes the posture of complainant
against the other. So neither is respondent. Even if. prima facie. the case
appears as contentious proceedings. il is its formal guise: both Parties. Libya
and Tunisia, corne to the Court jointly. both put the same question to the
Court. and both request the Court to answer that question. and no other
question. In this case Malta does not seek to intervene in order to make
cornmon cause with either Party to the case against the other. Malla does not
seek to intervene in order to obtain from the Court relief or redress against
either of the Parties to the case. Malta does not intervene "for the purpose of
asserting a right as against" either Party to the case. Malta does not seek to
intervene in order to invite the Court to make a declaration or to reach a
decision on any questions that may exist. or rnay arise in the future. as
between herself and Libya. or as between herself and Tunisia. irlalta'sapplica-
tion has the very lirnited but very important purpose of putting hlalta's views
to the Court before the Court reaches a decision in the case between the
Parties.in regard to a region that affects hlalta's vital interests.
That is. it is submitted. one of the purposes envisaged for intervention by
Article 62 of the Statute. It calls for no reciprocity of obligation as between the
intervening State and the Parties to the case.
Nor do other'forms of intervention necessarily require the existence of the
jurisdictional link between the intervener and party when the application is. 1
use the Court's words again. for "genuine intervention".
One may recall here. briefly. the ïacls of the Monetary Gold case (I.C.J.
Reports 1954, p. 19)and the Court's attitude in that case towards the absence
of Albania. France. the United Kingdom and the United States. acting under
standing inter-allied agreements for.the restitution of monetary gold ihat had
been removed from Germany during the Second World War. were defending
a claim by ltaly for the return of certain gold. The gold was originally Albanian
and it had been removed from Rome in 1943. This gold was atso claimed by ARGUMENT OF h4R. BATHURST 361
the United Kingdom in lieuof the unpaid damages awarded against Albania in
favour of the United Kingdom in the CorfuChannel case 0.C.J. Reports I9b8.
p. 15 :1.C.J.Reporls 1949. pp. 4. 244).The Albanian Government was noba
party to the proceedings in the Mone~nry Gold case in this Court. Nor had
Albania applied to intervene in that case. Nor was there any suggestion or
indication that Albania might do so. Nor was there.any suggestion or indica-
tion that Albania might accept the cornpulsory jurisdiction of the Court. But it
was never suggested that. because of this. Albania could trotintervene in the
case.
On the contrary, the Court proceeded to hold that because Albania did not
intervene. the case could not continue. [n consequence the Judgment of the
Court concluded as follows on this point :
"Albania has not submitted a request to the Court to be permitted to
inlervene.In the present case. Aibania'slegal interests would not only be
affected by a decision. but would forrn the very subject-matter of the
decision. In such a case. the Statute cannot be regarded. by implicationas
authorizing proceedings to be continued in the absence of Albania." (/.Cd.
Reports 1954. p. 32.)
In my submission that passage inthe Court's Judgmenr makes sense onfy on
the assumption that. had Albania applied to intervene as a claimant to the gold.
the application would have beenagranted. despite the total absence of any
jurisdictional link and despite the fact that Albania would have been opposing
the claims of the other three countries concerned. 1 further submit that the
Monetary Goid case. tothat extent. afîords avery telling illustration of the view
that there could be a variety of cases in which justice would require interven-
tion to be permitted despite the absence of a jurisdictional link. and that Arti-
cle 62. by the generality of its wording, was intended to allow of that. which
was evidently the view taken in 1922. from the start, by sorne eminent judges
of the Permanent Court.
Mow very dinerent isthe result contended for by Libya and Tunisia in their
observations submitted to the Court on ivialta'sApplication Torpermission to
intervene.
Tunisia. perhaps somewhat tentatively. says "itseems" that it would be
necessary for Maltato "prove".abasis ofjurisdiction between it andthe Parties
(p. 3. sub.(CI).
Libya makes the samepoint :
"The intervention. however, cannot be admitted unless the Court is
satiçfied that there exists a validjurisdictional link between the Parties to'
the praceedings and the intervening State." (Siipiv.p. 269. para. 6.)
Then Libya tellstheCourt what it rnust hold before it allows intervention in
this case. assuming that the otherconditions for intervention are found to exist.
Paragraph 11 of Libya'sObservations (Eng. text) states :
"For this purpose nothing will sufice short of
(i) adherence by al1three States to one specjal agreement or to more than
one. but identical. specialagreements or to the same treaty or conven-
tion: or362 CONTINEhTAL SHELF
(ii) accepiance by al1 three States of Article 36 (2)of the Staiute of the
Court wiihout reservations affecting the case : or
(iii) acquiescence by Ttinisia and Libya in the intervention by Maha. .."
and then Libytt adds to this third item these words : "even though a problem
would still then exist as to the limitation on the subjcct-matter as described in
Article 1 of the I-ibya1Tunisia Special Agreenient".
l'hese words making this qualification to the third itcm. rnust. we suppose.
refer to the fact ihat, no1 surprisingly. the Special Agreement between Libya
and Tunisia only rctates in terms to questions concerning the areas of the
continental shclf appertaining respectively 10 those Iwo States. but as my
learned friend. kir. La~iterpacht. has submitted. that does not exclude ivfalta
from claiming an interest of a legal nature in the case between the Parties.
On the second of Libya's suggestions. acceptance by al1 three States of
Article 36. paragraph 2.of the Statute. without reservations. I can but remind
the Court that h,lalta has done this. by reference io ihe appropriate subject-
matter of the case. in its Optional Clause Declaration dated 2January of this
year. \Vithout coriceding the need for a jurisdictional link of any kind, as
suggested by Libya. R,lallahas offered to both Parties to the case the jurisdic-
tional link. The Parties to the case demand a jurisdictional link :klalta does al1
thai is within ivlülta'spower :Xlalta offers. to both. thatlink :but it has yet io
be accepted by either of the Parties to the case.
But may 1again remind the Court that the powcr to grant or withhold
permission to intervene is vested in the Court and in no one else. Yet this
second item of Libya's listingorso-called essential links would. in erfect, give
the power of veto IO either of the Parties. Letone suppose that Tunisia. which
has confessed IO a feelingofsome sympathy with the reasons for R,lalta'sdesire
to intervene. were subsequenily to accept Article 36. paragraph 2. in terms of
reciprocity sumcient to forge a cornpulsory jurisdictional link with Aialta. if
such a link were required ai all. Libya could then exercise the veto. by
declining to do likewise. In those circumstances. the powcr of decision in
respect of intervention would be with one of the three States concerned with
the case. and not with the COLI^ as.Article 62 clearly says it is.
The same considerations apply. i~iutatisniiitatidisto the first item of Libya's
desiderata - a tripartile special agreement or the equivalenl international
instrument. If. for c.xaniple. Xlalta and Tunisia were to adopt this Libyan
suggestion. Libya'srefusal to do likewise would. on Libya's view ofArticle 62
of the Statule - Torit is the Statiite and not the Rules that governs - exclude
the possibility of the Court's granting permission for intervention by klalta.
Butifone were to suppose lhat al1three States.the two I'arlics to the case and
the intending intervencr. were to enter into such a tripartite agreement. that
would not be an arrangement to permit intervention by the intervener in the
Parties'case :it would be the basis of jurisdiciion for contentious proceedings
between the three States. one on the one side. the others in opposition. The
case would then no1be a true case or intervention.
Thtii; the rcal 1-ibyan position is reveated. There is according io Libya's
observations no jurisdictional difference between the right of a State to bring
another Staie conipulsorily to ihis Couri in contentious proceedings and the
right of a State to be permitted by the Court to interveiie in a case inw hich that
other State is one orthe parties. According to Libya. boih for intervention in a
pending case and for initiation of contentious proceedings. there mus1 be one
or Libya'salternative jurisdictional links existing between the States involved.
But the position. as seen by Libya.goes even further. It is this. There must also ARGUMENT OF MR. BATHURST 363
beone of those links with the other party to the litigation as weIl. And this in
al1cases of intervention - not merely in the very dirîerent case of the Fiji type
of application.
The observations of Libya in these respects. suggesting as they do the need
for a link of compulsory jurisdiction. equally for intervention as for conten-
tious proceedings. must derive from a misconception that there was some sort
of relationship belween Article 62 of the Statute and the notion of a régimeof
universal compulsory jurisdiction for the Permanent Court and now for the
International Court. Libya's observations seem to be based on a theory that
Article 62 would never have been adopted in the form in which il was agreed
unless ii had been supposed that this régimeof universal compulsory jurisdic-
tion woiild be instituted. or that Article62 was only adopted on that assump-
tion.
This suggestion. or theory, does not - it is submitted - seem to be borne
out by the record ;indeed it seems that the records actually negative any such
idea.
I will not take up the time of the Court with a lot of detail on this. Briefly
then. it appears that the idea of universal compulsory jurisdiction. enthusiasti-
cally put forward as a worthy ideal. which of course it was and indeed still is.
never really got off the ground. Itvery soon proved to be highly controversial
and a non-starter. As soon as it reached the Council of the League of Nations
from the Committee of Jurists that had prepared the first diaft of the Statute, it
was not only eliminated. it was rejected with~something approaching irrita-
tion. as being totally impracticable:and the jurisdictional provision eventually
adopted was that which corresponds to Article 36 of the Statute.
At no time. so far as we have been able to lind. was Article 62 of the Statute
seriqusly linked with any idea of universal compulsory ,jurisdiction for the
Court. Nor again. when that idea was dropped. was any suggestion put
forward for introducing a jurisdictional requirement in10Article 62.
During the 18 months or so that elapsed before the Statute of the Permanent
Court was finalized and adopted in its definitive form, no proposai for chan-
ging the substance of Article 62 was made. That Article of the Statute seerns
no1to have been then the sÜbjectof any real controversy. although it was, as I
have mentioned. the subject ofdiscussion during the later Rule-making process
in 1922. As my learned friend Professor Lalive has already said. we submii
therefore that any attempt to read a jurisdictional requirement into Article 62
on the ground that such a requirement was intended as a condition of in-
tervention. but was inadvertently omitted, or failedto be inserted because of an
oversight. must be totally unwarranted.
This conclusion we submit must also automatically dispose of sny sugges-
tion. which rnight also have been Ihe basis of Ljbya'sobservations on this
question. to the effect that Article 62 must be regarded as having always been
subject toan impliedjurisdictional requirement and that it must be interpreted
and applied as being still subject to that implied condition:or. in other words.
the suggestion that subparagraph (c)of paragraph 2 of Article 8I of the Rules
of Court involves nothing new but rnerely, 60 years on. reflects an unex-
pressed, but implied. requiremenl of Article 62 of the Statuie. ln our subrnis-
sion, no such extrerne conclusiorl can properly be reached on such a fragile
and speculative basis.
Indeed. the drafting of Article 62. which 1have only touched upon in very3 64 COMINEMAL SHELF
brief outline. justifies quite the opposite conclusion. Originally drafted. as my
learned friend the Attorney-Ceneral has described to the Court, in a noticeably
open and unrestricted form - apart frorn the one necessary requirement of the
existence of a legal interest - and therefore clearly intended to provide a
generally available facility. re-rnains.as it has remained. without change affec-
ting that evident purpose.
Finally, it is no1 only the records that fail to support the point of view of
Libya and Tunisia on this matter. The literature of the subject. scanty though it
is and in any case contradictory. confused and inconclusive. equally fails to do
so. by reason of those very deficiencies - so much so that. unless those who
oppose Malta'sApplication bring forward any point on which we feelwe must
reply. 1do not propose to trouble the Court with citations or excerpts from the
literature Ihat are of no real assistance to the Court in coming to a conclusion
on the matter to which I am directing my submissions on behalf of Malta.
On the other hand there exists another field far more authoritative than that
of the literature of the subject, namely the practice of States in the field of
intervention in judicial and arbitral proceedings. It is. we submit. quite evident
that in the days of the Permanent Court. and particularly in the period of the
1920s. great importance was attached. both by jurists and by governments. to
the concept of intervention. This attitude is abundantly reflected in the treaties
of the period. The concept of intervention was not even new ; in the series of
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the one on the Pacific Settlement of
Disputes contains a provision on intervention. It is a provision on the same
subject as Article 63of the Court's Statute. namely intervention by a thirdState
in a case between others raising questions of construction of a convention to
which the third State is also a party. lt is, however. significant that in 1907
(Art. 84) the 1899 Convention's requirernent of consent by the parties to the
case to the intervention by another party to the convention in the former's
case. was deleted from the relevant article. This was. as we know. followed by
Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute of the Permanent Court and. yet again. in
1928. by the General Act for the Pacific Seillement of International Disputes
(LNTS. Vol. 93. p. 343). which contained provisions on intervention which
were retained in the Revised General Act of 1949 adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations(UNTS. Vol. 71. p. 103).These provisions are.
in my submission. of considerable interest in these present proceedings. Three
Articles of the General Act are relevant : Articles 35, 36 and 37.
Paragraph I of Article 35 States that the General Act shall be applicable
between the parties to it "even though a third Power. whether a party to the
Act or not. has an interest in the dispute". So this conternplatesproceedings in
which there is a third Power. possibly not a party to the Act. having an interest
in a dispute. 1leave aside for the moment the second paragraph of Article 35 of
the General Act and turn at once to Article 36. which is concerned with
judicial and arbitral proceedings. Paragraph 1 oc Articte36 reads as fottows :
"In judicial or arbitral procedure, afthird Powershould consider that
ithas an interest ofa legal nature which may be affected by the decision
in the case, il may submit tothe Permanent Court of Internationai Justice
[of course the 1928 Act here referred to the Permanent Court] or to the
Arbitral Tribunal a request to inteniene as a third Party." ARGUMENT OF MR. BATHURST 365
Those are words which. astheCourt will readily see.are more than rnerely
reminiscent of the language of Article 62 of the Statute with necessary adapta-
tions :they have been taken [rom that Aqicle. This is alscitrue of paragraph 2
of the Act'sArticle 36 :"It will be for theCourt or the tribunal to decide upon
this iequest."
Ishould add. forcompleteness. that alsa Article 37 of the Act corresponds to
Article 63 of the Statute in almost the same language about intervention in a
case involving the interpretation of a Convention.
There is thus close identity between the Act and the Statute.
Now. it is with the terms of the second paragraph of Article 35 of the
General Act that I invite the Court to compare these provisions of Anicle 36,
paragraph 1, which, as 1 mentioned. deal with intervention in judicial or
arbitral proceedings. Paragraph 2 of Article35 is concerned with conciliation.
a prrkedure for which the Act alsoprovides. as contrasted with the judicial or
arbiîral settlement of disputes. This is what that paragraph says :"in concilia-
tion'procedure, the parties may agree to invite such third Power to intervene."
That is. a third Power. whether or not a pany to the Act. which has a legal
interest which rnight be affected by the decision. So. in conciliation. the
invi<ationof the parties is a prerequisite of interventio: in judicial or arbitral
proteedings no such invitation. no such consent of the parties isrequired. lt is
for the Court or Tribunal to decide upon the request to intervene.
These provisions of the General Act of 1928 not only remain unaltered in
substance in the revised Act of 1949 - they were also reproduced or reflected
in a strikingly large number of bilateral treaties of the period. These treaties are
Iisted in Volume I of the United.Natians Suniey of TreatiesJar the Pacijic
Sel~lemeni of Disputes, and an explanatory note summarizes their virtual
identity with thecorresponding provisions of the General Act. The existence of
this large body of treaties shows. we subrnit. IWO things. First. that there was
at the time. and this would extend back to the date of the adoption of the
Statute of the Permanent Court. a general preoccupation with the concept of
intervention, and a general desire to render the faculty of intervention possible
withbut undue restrictions. Secondly. we submit that the Act and the treaties
copying it make clear that there was absolutely no question in anybody's mind.
at the time. of ajurisdictional link between the intervener and tlie parties to the
case in judicial or arbitral proceedings. If those concerned were prepared to
aliow intervention on the part ofany third Power. it is inconceivable (batihey
coutd have had it in their minds to restrict this to third Powers between whom
and the parties to the dispute there existed a link of rnutual compulsory,
consensual jurisdiction. and let it be borne in mind. klr. President, 1ask with
respect. that the relevant clauses in the Act and in those treaties were framed
on exactly the same lines as Article 62 of the Statute of the Court.
So important is this for the decision on the present Application that Imake
no excuse for reniindinp the Court again, in surnrnary form. of theconclusions
to be drawn from these provisions of the General Act.
First.of all. they make a clear distinctiori between conciliation procedures
and judicial and arbitral proceedings. Intervention by a third Power in the
former - in conciliation - is by invitalion of the parties. It is with their
express consent. In judicial and arbitral proceedings no such invitation or
consent is required : intervention isfor the Court or the Tribunal to decide on
the basis of whether or not the applicant third Power has an interest of a legal
nature which may be affèctedby the decision in the case. As the parties are not
required to invite intervention or to consent to it in judicial or arbitral
proceedings. clearly no jurisdictional link between them. or either of them. and366 CONTINENïAL SHELF
the intervening third Power is called for. since such a link would depend on
their consent.
Secondly, as Article 36 of the General Act and the bilateral treaty provisions
which copied that Article 36 were evidently inspired by Article 62 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court. the latter Article must have been taken by
those who drafted those provisions as not entailing any consent by the parties
to intervention by a third State. which would have been so if the parties to the
case had to have agreed to be taken compulsorily to the Court by the inter-
vening State.
Thirdly. the term "third Power" in Articles 35 and 36 of the General Act
clearly includes in the context States not party to the,General Act - thus
evidencing the intention of the,drafters to create a wide-open opporkunity of
intervention in the interests of al1States.
I hope that the Court will bear with me if in conclusion I refer to two or
three points in the observations of Libya and Tunisia that rnay not have been
entirely covered by what 1have already said or what was said by the learned
Attorney-General. These are minor points. but they have their Çignificance and
importance. and Iwili deal with them more or less in the order in which they
occur.
First, it is suggested that Malta. by making her second. and additional.
Declaration in January of this year on cornpulsory jurisdiction. under Aiti-
cle 36. paragraph 2, ofthe Statute. has admitted. by implication, that a jurisdic-
tional link of some kind is requisite for intervention under Article 62 of the
Statute.
This is. of course. incorrect. Malta maintains that no jurisdictional link at al1
is needed between herself and either Libya or Tunisia in order to sustain
Malta's Application for permission to intervene in this pending case. But, in
addition to the considerationsmentioned in the Application. namely. assisting
the initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations relating to ratifica-
tion of the SpecialAgreement,between Malta and Libya. Malta in planning this
Application to intervenehad to takeaccount of the possibifity,however remote
it might seem - and remote it seems to Malta - that the Court might hold
otherwise :in the uncertain state of the law and practice on A'pplicationsto
intervene it would have been unwise to ignore that rernote possibility. Malta's
additional Optional Clause Declaration makes the oîfer of a clearjurisdictional
link with Libya and Tunisia relevant to the subject-matter of the case pending
between them.
Furthermore, Malta maintains that that additional Declaration, even stan-
ding alone without corresponding Declarations from Libya and Tunisia.
would be a sufficientjurisdictional act to fulfilany requirement that the Court
might see to be necessary as a prerequisite to the grant of the particular
Application now under consideration by theCourt.
To require not only that a State requesting intervention should beable to be
brought. cornpulsorily. to the Court by the parties to the case in respect of the
particular subject-matter of the case. but also that each of the parties tothe case
should beable to be taken compulsorily by the intervening State to the Court
- when in truth they are already there - would in practice reduce Article 62
to vinually nil. and go far to emasculating the whole concept of intervention. If
al1such reciprocal jurisdictional links wereto exist between the parties and the
applicant for intervention. intervention proteedings would in the majority of ARGUMENT OF hlR. BATHURSi 367
cases be iinnecessary. It is precisely where those links do not exist that
intervention offers the only means of avoiding prejudice and injustice.
Secondly - and here I refer. for an example. to paragraph 6 of the Libyan
observations - it seems to be suggested that the second paragraph of Article
62 of the Statute. which provides that it shall be for thecourt to decide on the
request Corpermission to intervene. somehow enables the Court to create its
own conditions for granting the request. This cannot be so. according to the
language of the paragraph nor. as Professor Lalive has shown from his study
of thetroilor,xprepararoires in the context of the Applicant's legalinterest. was
it the intention of those who drafted the provision. Of course it is for thecourt
to decideupon the request. But when the Court decides. itdecides whether the
conditions which are required by the Slatute for the grant of permission to
intervene are fulfilledin the circumstances of the case:the Court cannot decide
on the basis of conditions which the Stalute neither prescribes nor implies. 1
have already ernphasized the point that the parties 10 a case mus1 not be
allowed by claiming to consent or to withhold consent to intervention. to
arrogate to themselves that power of decision. so that in result paragraph 2 of
Article 62 woiild refer to no more than the Court's performing the empty
formality or endorsing' what the parties have seen fit to permit or seen fit to
deny by their actions or by their inaction.
Thirdly. and consequential to what 1 have just been saying. we find in
paragraph 10 of the Libyan observationswhat seems to be a completemiscon-
ception - at least in the context of intervention- of the effect of paragraph I
of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court which provides that the jurisdiction of
the Court comprises ail cases which the parties refer to it.
Here again the underlying thought of the observations seems to be that
intervention proceedings require the consent of the parties to the case in which
intervention is sought. But. in the nature of the case. the parties to a pending
case do not and cannot themselves refer to the Court an intervention Applica-
tion by a third State. Itisthe very nature of an Application for permission to
intervene in a case that it mus1be made unilaterally and ex parte by the State
seeking to intervene. Article36 is. broadly speaking. irrelevant in that contexi.
It is a context governed by Article 62. and by Article 62 alone.
h,lr.President. 1intend no discourtesy to those who oppose Malta'sApplica-
tion when 1Sayin conclusion that of the remaining points on thejurisdictional
question contained in the Libyan and Tunisian observations. some. we submit.
are repetitive and others merely question-begging. while the remainder have. I
believe, been covered in one way or another by my earlier remarks and by
those ofmy learoed colleagues who preceded me on behalf orthe Government
of Malta.
TheCourt rose at 12.45 a.m. FOURTH PUBLIC SITTING (21 III 81, 10 a.m.1
Present :[Seesitting of 1III 81.]
ARGUMENTOF MR. EL MAGHUR
AGENT FOR THE COVERNMENT OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHlRlYA
Mr. EL MAGHUR : Mr. President and honourable Members of the Court.
It ia great honour and pleasure for me to represent rny country today before
this honourableCourt, particularly since 1have not had this privilege before. 1
shall be very brief, for the issues before you in this matter involve legd
questions of a procedural nature, and they will be dealt with fewaminutes
by rnycolleagues.
It would have been easier for me today to address the Court imy native
language, Arabic. But 1note that none of the other Agents is using his native
tongue. And if 1were to rnake my observations in Arabic 1must confess 1
would not bebrief and 1rnight betempted to stray into irrelevant matters. For
example, 1 might have wanted to explain to the Court rnyviews as to the
meaning and scope of intervention under Libyan and comparative Arab and
Islamic law. But this is not a seminar and, more important, Iam not a
professor. For this reason,.I ask your indulgence to bear with me in the English
language.
1assure the Court that we shall avoid irrelevancies in putting forward the
views of Libya. Nor shall we deal with the questions of intervention in its
generalitiesWe shaU focus Our attention on the specificase of whether the
Application of Malta to intervene in this case rnay be granted. And we shall
attempt not to use, in the words of distinguished counsel of Malta "a sledge-
hammer to crack a nut".
It is the policy of Libya to support peaceful settlement of disputes between
States within the existing international legal framework and in accordance
with international legal principles and rules. Thecase presentiy before the
Court involves the very important issuesof legalp~ciplw and rules applicable
to the delimitation of the continental shelf asbetween Libya and Tunisia. The
two Parties, by submitting these questions to the InternationalCourt of Justice
pursuant to Special Agreement, have put themselves in the forefront of States
willing to bring such matters before the Court. Libya is proud of the part it is
playing in this way in supporting the role of the Court in the peaceful
settlement of international differences.
Itisa good ornen indeed that States are ready to bring their disputes to this
Coürt - a legal not a politicai forum - andit is important to al1 States
interested in protecting this means of settling international disputes that the
procedures for utilizing this forumbe scrupulously foUowed. When States
choose this legal forum they are necessarily agreeing to be bound by its
procedures as contained in both the Statute and the Rules of Court.
Libya isvery consciousof the importancethat otherStatesmay attach to the
principles and rules of law that will be stated by theCourt in this casein ARGUMENT Of MR. EL MAGHUR
369
connection with the delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to Libya
and to Tunisia. 1should hardly need to add that the settlement of differences
involving the continental shelf are of importance to States regardless of whe-
(her they are large or small. rich or poor. In this respect Libya understands
well the interest and concern of hlalta as to these matters. It looks forward to
the participation of hlalta at the appropriate tirne. and in the appropriate
nianner. in proceedings before this Court with respect to the legal principles
and rules applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to
Libya and Malta. pursuant to Special Agreement between them.
tlowever. Libya does not beljeve that the Statute and the Rules of Court
permit an intervention in the present case before the Court such as that
reqiiested by hlalia. There is no rnultilateral treaty involved here. The issues
arc between Libya and Tunisia alone. The Special Agreement between these
two States contains specilic provisions agreed to by them after their own
bilateral negotiations for the settlement of this matter by the Court. that in no
way contemplate the intervention of a third State.
1should add that in listeningtadistinguished counsel of Malta. 1noted what
seemed to be three. no1 necessarily consistent. aspects of their request 10
intervene. First. Malta would like the opportunity to express its views as to
some or al1of the matters before the Court in the pending case. brought by
Libya and Tunisia. but not to be bound by the decisions of the Court.
Secondly. hlalta has gone to considerable lengths to artempt to show the
substantial nature of its interest that might be affected, anithas alleged that
this intercst is unique IO hlalta and is not an interest that other States con-
cerned with continental shelf delimitation could assert. 1 should say here,
Ur. President. thai I heard no example given by counsel to Malta that would
noi be of interest to another maritime State. And third. it was asserted by
distinguished counsel 10 hlalta that only- to repeat the assertion in French-
"un intérêt - direct ou indirect - immédiat ou médiat - important ou
minime" is required to bealleged by a State in order to qualjfy a State for
iiiiervention. This third point left one wondering why the second point.
relating to the allegedsubsiantial and unique interest of Malta. was made at ail.
In any event. the test of merely "un intérêtw" ould open the door of interven-
tion to practically any State.
It is clear that hlalta has a number of international forums in which ta
express its views. Regarding Malta's own specific situation. the same route
ptiwued by Libya and Tunisia to submit a specific case of delimitation to this
Court by Special Agreement has already been adopted. On the more general
plane. there are other ways in which a State such as hlalta canmake its views
known. 1 mention here the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea as an
example. not to speak of other international -forumsand conferences. And I
should note the distinguished roie played by Ambassacior Pardoof Maha in
çonnection with the creation of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea.
If the legal procedures in this case were to be stretched so as to permit a third
State in the position of hlalta to intervene. the inhibitive effect upon use of the
International Court of Justice for the peaceful settlement of these kinds of
disputes referred to theCourt by special agreement must beconsidered closely.
And the other day counselfor Malta seeniedto extend an invitation toa fourth
State (O intervene in the pending case. Would States not tend to seek other
means Torsettlement of disputes ifthere .were the riskthat the specjfic and
precisely drawn terms of a special agreement should suddenly be widened to
permii the jnterveniion of third parties ?
It is to avoid such a deterrent to the submission of matters to the Court that370 CONTINENTAL SHELF
Libya feels impelled to oppose the application to intervene by Malta without
the appropriate jurisdictional link.
I make this staiment to the Couri without the slightest reservation. since it
reflectsthe facts of international lire.hloreover, Libyadoes not subscribe to the
view that intervention is required if Malta is to be protecfrom the effecof a
decision in the case presently before the Court. We do noi believe the Couri
lacks the means to render its judgment in one case involving two States but
having ramifications for other States in such a way as to leave the interests and
rights of such other States unaffected.
Beforeconcluding. 1would like to place on record the fact that ~ibya. being
brief. reserves ail its rights in respect to any facts or points of law introduced
into these proceedings. Our silence with regard to any such points. which in
many cases we may have regarded as irrelevant. in no way irnplies the
acquiescence of Libya.
1mentioned earlier. it is not my purpose to go further into the legal reasons
why Libya considers that Malta should not be permiited to intervene in the
present case. I am accompanied by learned counsel who will develop our oral
observations. kly colleagues Sir Francis Vallat. and Professor Antonio hlalin-
toppi. who need no introduction to this Court. as well as my colleague. Keith
Highet. who has appeared before you in the past. I have asked Sir Francis
Vallat to.take the lead and to outline to you, hlr. President. the rnanner in
which our observations will be presented. ARGUMENT OF SIR FRANCISVALLAT
COUKSEL FOR THE GOVERNLlEKT OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAhlAHIRlYA
Sir Francis VALLAT: Mr. President and hfembers of the Court. May 1
associate myself. in the customary manner. with the Agent for the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya. Ambassador blaghur. in expressing my sense of honour and
pleasure in having an opportunity to address this honourable and distin-
guished Court. May 1 be perrnitted also to add a personal expression of
pleasure in appearing before the Court in its present composition.
As the Agent for Libya has already indicated. we do not appear so much in
opposition to the Application for permission to intervene submitted by the
Government of Malta as to try to place before the Court considerations that
may assist it in reaching a proper decision on that Application.
hlay 1.at this point, alssay a word about brevity. Time is short and 1 am
omitting general remarks about the arguments on behalfoîMalta that 1might
have made with more tirneat my disposal and if it appears that my remarks are
to some extent abbreviated and cryptic. it isin no way out ordisrespect for the
Court but. on the contrary. itisin rny desire to facilitate the task of the Coutî.
If1may. 1should like to begin by indicating the wayin which we intend. as
counsel. to present the oral observations an behalfof Libya+
First.1plan to make some remarks of a general character on the nature of
the matter or questions now before the Court. Then the main observations on
behalf of Libya will be linked to Article 81. paragrap2.of the Rules ofcourt.
The broad division of Our work wiil correspond to the subparagraphs of
paragraph 2 and will be given in the same order. This does. incidentally. have
the advantage offollowing the order of the written observations submitted on
behalf of Tunisia. So. my task will be to comment on :
'Ya(ctl)e interest of a legal nature' which the State applying to intervene
considers rnay be affected in the case:
my colleague. hlr. Highet. will follow with observations on :
'Yb) the precise object of the intervention;
and my colleague, Professor Malintoppi. will conclude our oral presentation
by dealing with the queslion of the jurisdictional link or. in the words of
subparagraph (c.;
'fc) anybasis of jurisdiciipn which isclaimed to exist as between the State
applying to intervene and the parties to the case".
It is apparent that the various aspects to whichi have referred are linked.
they are closely related. and perhaps the çeparation is somewhat artificial.
flence there may besome slight overlap in our statements. although we have
done Our best to eliminate these.
There are perhaps questions that could be raised about the cornpliance of
the Application with the Rules. especially regarding subparagraph (cl of
paragraph 2 and the submission of documents. but it is not Our intention to
mske any objection to the Application on that kind of ground.
IfImay now come to the substance of the matter. First. as to the nature of
the questions before the Court.372 CONTINENTAL SHELF
The Application by Malta raises certainly some basic and, in fact, novel but
cornparatively simple issues concerningintervention in proceedingsbefore the
International Court of Justice.The issues are novel in the sense that there has
been no previous decision either of this Court or of its predecessor concerning
the application of Article 62 of the Statute.These issues include the nature of
the legal interest of an applicant under Articl62 and its relation to the subject-
matter of the proceedings. The Maltese Application aiso raises the question :
What is meant by the words "affected by the decision in the case" ? One
underlying problem, which should be examined together wilh those that 1
have just rnentioned, is the nature of.intervention inlproceedings before the
Court. What does intervention signify, and what are its implications ?
There is also, 1submit, the basic principle of consent as the very foundation
of the ju-risdictionof the Court linked to questions of reciprocity and questions
of equality of arms, a principle with which 1know the Members of the Court
are'very famifiar, so familiar indeed that 1think there is absolutely no need to
expand on them at this juncture, and I do no more than to cal1to mind the
relevance of fundamental principles of this kind.
The.Maltese application isof course made under Article 62 of the Statute. It
could not be made under Article 63 because the present case between Tunisia
and Libya does not concern in any way, as far as1know, the construction of a
-convention - so that,Ithink, eliminates Article63.Thepresentcaseconcerns
and what 1am about tosay is, 1think, almost at the hart of the matter before
the Court, it concerns the determination of the principles and rules of inter-
national law that may be applied for the delimitation of the areas of the
continental shelf appertaining to each of the Parties respectively and the
.clarification of the practical method for the application of the principles and
rules in this specific situation. So we are concerned in the proceedings before
the Court with a limited area and with a specificsituation. According to Article
I of the Special Agreement between Libya and Tunisia,the express purpose of
the clarification is to enable the experts of the two countries to delimit those
areas without any difficulties. So the Special Agreement relates to areas of
continental shelf appertaining to Libya and Tunisia and not to any areas of
continental shelf appertaining to Malta.
Accordingly, on the face of the Special Agreement,'it is made plgin that no
legal right or interest of Malta is involved in the present proceedings. More-
over, by Articles1 and 2 of the Special Agreement,the actual delimitation +- 1
think that this is absolutely clea- the actuai delimitation is not to be decided
by the Court, but is leR to be settied by agreement between the Parties
themselves. So there is another limitation on the scope of the forthcoming
judgment of the Court in this case. This would seem to remove any possibility
that any legql interest of Malta couidbe affected by the decision of the Court.
I have ventured to repeat certain provisions of the Special Agreement
because; in-my submission, the grounds for the applicationfor permission to
intervene must be found in the Special Agreement itself. I believe that this is
irnplicitly admitted in paragraph 6 of the Application, but with. a tone of
complaint, repeated indeed during the oral hearing, because Malta fias not
been furnished with copies of the written pleadings.
However, may 1suggest that this situation is, in the light of the Statute and
the Rules of Court, normal, not abnorrnal. As is well known, in accordance
with Article 53 of the Rulw, it requires the permission,of the Court, or of you,
Mt. President, if the Court is not sitting, for copies of the pleadings and
documents annexed to be made available to aState which isentitledto appear
before it. Now normally the pleadings, as in this case, are not provided to third ARGUMENT OF SIR FRANCIS VALLAT 373
States - it is not frequently done. Paragraph 2 of Article 53. on the other
hand. does indeed make it possible for the Court. after ascertaining the views
of the parties. to decide that copies of the pleadings and documents shall be
made.accessible to the public on or after the opening of the oral proceedings.
that isto Say.well after the written pleadings are closed. Well. al that stage. il is
clearly too late for a State to apply for permission to intervene. although
perhaps this might be allowed in very exceptional circumstances. This follows
from Article 81 of the Rules which requires that (apart rrom exceptional
circurnstances) an application for permission to intervene has to be filed as
soon as possible and not later than the closure of the written proceedings. As I
have said. in a normal case the written pleadings will not be available to a State
that wishes to intervene. The logic of the situation is made even more clear by
Article 85. paragraph 1.of the Rules of Court which provides that if a State is
given permission to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute the intervening
State shall be supplied with copies ofthe pleadings and documentsannexed. So
it is implicit that al that stage. normally the pleadings will not have been
provided to the State applying to intervene. In principle. 1suggest that this is
right. because the Special Agreement itself will show whether or no1 the
decision. and 1ernphasize the word decision. of the Court in the case. which
will fiow from it. may or maynot affect a legal interest orthe State applying to
intervene.
Well. with these remarks of a general nature, may 1now turn to one of the
essential questions in this case. namely, whether having regard to the provi-
sions of the Special Agreement any legal interest of Malta could be affected by
theCourt's decision. As alrcady indicated, it isdiFcult to see how this could be
possible. But the question is in this case somewhat blurred by paragraphs 3
and 4 of the Application. These paragraphs are clear in themselves. but they
seem IO pu1the questions on to the wrong foot. Itdoes not. in reality. carry the
matter one step forward for Malta's request for permission to intervene to
assert. asisdone in paragraph 3. that klalia has salished the only condiiiol'or
iiiukiii~u rrqr~c>./y stating that "Malta considers that ithas 'an interest ofa
legal nature which may be affectedby the decision' to bepiven by the Courl in
the f.i~?i~ulT~iriicase". Itisclearly one thing for a State io make a request.il
is quite another Torthe Court to give permission to that State to intervene.
1 funher submit that the question before the Court is not just a matter of
bare possibilities.as isalleged in paragraph 4 of the ApplicationNor is il irny
submission "sufficient to demonstrate the existence OC reasonable grounds for
thinking that the decision. whatever it is. may have such an effect". as also
alleged in paragraph 4. This may indeed be sufficient to justify the submission
of the request but it does not begin in any meaningful sense to satisfy the
requirements of Article 62.
The view of Article 62 that 1would ask the Court Ioadopi is Ihaithe legal
interest rnust be related legally to the subject-mattof the proceedings so that
whichever way the decision of the Court rnay go the legal interest will be
affecteciby thai decision. That isto Say.either in a positive or a negative sense.
This is perhaps. so far as the legal interestsideof this present Application is
concerned. the key question that has to be considered. Aquestion which has to
same exlenl been minimized by counsel for Malta. They have also minimized
the importance of the word "decision" in Article 62 by asking to have a chance
to influence - and 1am now referring to the Application. I will return to this
point later - the findings of law and fact providing a basis for the decision
and not the decision itselr- of course 1 am now referring ta the language of
paragraph 1 of Article 62.374 CONTINENTAL SHELF
Now. 1am well aware that the word "decision" is in itself a term that is
ambiguous but terms. as we well know. have to be interpreted in their
ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear. Words which I quote
from memory but 1think are familiar - very familiar - to the hlembers of
this distinguished Court. 1suggest that the word "decision" in the context of
intervention in Article 62 of the Statute clearly is referring to the decision as
such on the claim put forward by one of the parties in the dispute before the
Court. It does not refer intrinsically to the. as it were. consideranda of the
judgment. and I would in this connection for this purpose distinguish between
the reasoning leading up to the decision and the decision itselfHow orher~jise
can the interest be in a legal sense affected by the decision of the Court.
Now. as I have already indicated I would not for a moment deny to Malta
the right to make this Application but that is very far frorn being the same as
gaining the permission of the Court to intervene. In my submission the essence
of the matter in this respect is tlie graiit of permission to intervene. As
paragraph 2 of Article 62 of the Statute says. "It is for theCourt to decide". On
this I believe that our learned friends representing Malta are really in ngree-
ment wiih us. Iris not sufficient. I suggest. for a State merely to show some
possibiliiy that it has a legal interest that rnay beaffected by the decision. This
is necessary but not enough. and it isfor the Court to decide on this question.
Both the Application and counset for hlalta have not unnaturally tended to
focus attention exclusively on paragraph I of Article 62. thus tending to ignore
ihe words "by the decision" and the whole of paragraph 2 of the Article. But. if
I rnay be forgiven for repeating. it is for the Court to assess. having regard to
the provisions of the Special Agreement. whether the alleged interest is of a
legal nature that rnay be affected by the decision in the case.
I would go further than this. and I would submit that on an Application for
permission to intervene the Couri can and should take into account questions
of jurisdiction. cornpetence and admissibility. and indeed - and this perhaps
in some ways is most important - the good administration of justice, or if 1
rnay borrow the words used by Judge Eduardo Jiménezde Aréchaga in his
Gilberto Amado hlemorial Lecture of 15June 1972. "the orderly and expedi-
tious administration of justice". Those words admirably express the idea that t
am trying to express.
Now if t rnay turn to Article 81. paragraph 2.of'the Rules of Court (read
with Article 62 of the Statute) we there find the rnatters which at leastare to be
taken into account by thecourt in deciding whether or not to grant permission
to intervene. It surely cannot be assumed that the Court has decided to ask for
the information indicated in paragraph 1 of Article 81 just as a matter of
intellectual interest. On the contrary. it niubeassumed that these are matters
of vital concern to be taken into consideration by the Court for the purpose of
arrivtng nt its decision on an application to intervene.
Paragraph 2 of Article 8 1 is perhaps not exhaustive of the matters to be
taken into, account by the Court. but it does at least indicate the essential
matters on which the Court requires to be satisfied if it is to decide to grant
permission to intervene.
As I have said. 1 leave subparagraph (b) and subparagraph (cl to my
colleagues. 1should now like. if I rnay Mr. President. to add someobservations
on subparagraph(o) which. oîcourse..in terms reflects Article62. paragraph 1.
of the Statute.
Two questions arise. First, has hlalta shown an interest of a legal nature
within the meaning of Article 62 ? Secondly. is it an interest which rnay be
affected by the decision in the case ?As we are dealing with judicial proceed- ARGUMEhT OF SIR FRANCE VALLAT 375
ingçconcerning legalrights I submit that as a matter of principle the interest of
a legal nature must have some legal involvement in the proceedings in ques-
tion. and there must be a possibility that the interest will be affected in a legal
sense by the decision in the case.
hlalta's alleged legal interest for the purposes of its Application is an interest
in the delimitation of prospective MaltaILibya and Malta/Tunisia continental
shelf boundaries. Now 1 make no comment on the substance of this alleged
legal interest but. given that this isunquestionably a legal interitabstracto.
it is not involved in any way in the present proceedings and could not in any
legal sense be affected by the decision concerning the Tunisial Libya delimita-
tion. which is the subject of the present proceedings.
It isof course possible. as counsel for the Appficant have done, to argue that
the findings of law and of fact by the Court in one case may be relied upon by
States in other caes and may well have a persuasive influence. But this is a
characteristic of the international legalsystern which isof significance not just
to hlalta but to other States. and perhaps in particular States in the Mediter-
ranean area such as Italy. Yugoslavia, Greece. Albania. Egypt, but not so
much because they are Mediterranean littoral States but because they are
members of the international community of States. So far as having a legal
interest involvedin the present proceedings goes. Malta does not really stanin
a different legal position from other States.
Indeed. this situation seems to be recognized by the Application itself.
Paragraphs 10to 14 of hlalta's Appiication arnouni to a requesi to be allowed
to try to influence the Court on questionsof law and factactually involved in
the present case without its being bound with respect to a future case with
Libya or possibly Tunisia. It is a very remarkable proposition. Mr. President,
when dealing with judicial proceedings. I am not going to trouble the Court by
exarnining the details setout in paragraphs IOto 14of the Application, but 1do
feelbound lo referloparagraph 22. By that paragraph Malla virtuallyadmits
that it has no interesof a legal nature which is involved in the proceedings or
could be affected by the decision of the Court. Malta expressly renounces "any
object. by way, or in course. of intervention in the LibyaITunisia case. to
obtain any forrn of ruling or decision from the Court concerning itscontinental
shelf boundaries with either or both of those countries". so that the very legal
interestwhich is alleged is not to formthesubjectof the proposed intervention.
What is hlalta asking? hlalta is asking to be allowed to interfere - and 1
use the word "interfere" deliberately - in the ordinary course of the judicial
process as between Tunisia and Libya. and to express its views inan attempi to
influence the Coun in those proceedings without in any way akting in a
legal sense the alleged legal interest on which it relies for the purposes of the
Application. It really is. hlr. President and hlembers of the Court. a most
remarkable proposition.
Now in this context my good f'riendand-distinguished advocate. Professor
Lalive has referred to a number of cases and sources. 1will not go through al1
of them. partly because 1think it isquite unnecessary and partly because it has
been physically impossible to consult al1 his references in the middle or the
night. The sources simply have not been available. But 1would refer to one or
two.
He menlioned the case ofMonela0 GoldRernoved from Rome ir1943 0.C.J.
Reports 1954. p. 79). hly colleague. Professor hqalintoppi. will be discussing
some aspects of the case with which I am not concerned. The oniy point 1 want
to make here is this :that if ever there was a case in which the interest of a
State. namely Albania, was involved in the very subject-matter of the litiga- CONTINENTAL SHEW
tion, it was the caseof Monetary Gold Removedfrom Rome in 1943 ;so 1do
not see how in this respect - and indeed 1do not seehow in any respect -
the case concerning'Moneiary Gold Removedfrom Rome in 1943 furthers the
case of the Applicant - if anythirig, quite the reverse.
If one looks at the other cases before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, for
example, Ihave not found a case - there may be one, but 1do not know of it
- 1have not found a case where there has been intervention unless ther'ehas
really been a legal interest of the interveningState in the subject-matter of the
litigation. Now it may be that my learned friendshave some cases. but 1do not
think they have produced them so far.
For example, the well-known case of Compagnie Internationale des Wa-
gons-lits against Gerrnany (Recueil des décisions des tribunaux arbitraux
mixtes, 1922, p. 873) - if 1may refer to the photocopy that 1have here of the
report on that. the headnote (heaven forbid that 1should ever refer to a
headnote, being an English barrister, but Iwill do so just foronce )
"Intervention of a third party can be admitted when the intervening
party has a separate interest from that of the defendant whether a title of
property or of mere ownership."
Now that does represent the essence of the matter in this case. Because, as the
record goes on to show, the question was this, whether the interest of the
Company, which was not the same as that of Germany, should make it
possible for intervention by the Company. Now the interest of the Company
was, in the words of the French text "de conserver ses wagons", which
'perhaps might be loosely translated "to protect its wagons-lits". The interest of
Germany, on the other hand, in the same subject-matter was reaiiy to obbin
.indemnification or compensation, but the subject-matter of the litigation was
the same for the interveningparty as it was for the German Government. How
very different from the type of case with which we are faced here.
If onelook again - and I'm afraid 1have to taketime just to refer toone of
'the other cases which has corne to my hand this morning, the case of the
'Hungaro-Czechoslovak Tribunal of 22 February 1927 (Recueil des décisions
des tribunaux arbirraux mixtes, 1928, p. 591,also a Mixed Tribunal case,
where it was admitted by the Parties that there was a material interest of the
intervening party in the subject-matter of the litigation. If 1 may quote the
French : "l'existence matériellede l'intérêt n'étants contestée etne pouvant
pas l'être". Wellnow, here we do contest the legal interest of Malta in the
subject-matter of the litigation by Special Agreement between Tunisia and
Libya.
1have also glanced at the rernarkablememorandum on intervention in civil
proceedings by Dr. Habscheid, to which reference was made yesterday. 1am
not going to take the time of the Court to gothrough that, but in the references
to the common law system it is quite clear that once more it is involvement of
the interwts of the interveningparty in the very subjq-matter of the litigation
that is the important point. It is put very briefly by Jowett. which is quoted on
page 30 of the copy of the memorandum that 1 have. "any person may
intervene who can show that he has an interest in the rnatter in dispute". There
the interesting point is that the emphasis is put on "matter in dispute". If one
looks, as no doubt Members of the Court will, at what follows it will be seen
that there is the same line of approach in thecase of the United Statesjurisdic-
tion as in the case of the English jurisdiction, and 1 may say in passing,
that, frankly, 1cannot imagine an English court allowing a party to intervene ARCUhlENT OF SIR FRANCIS VALUT 377
in litigation merety to express iLsviews. which is.what isasked in this case. 7'0
my mind this is quite unthinkable.
IVcllnow. if 1may pas on 1wcdd like to refer also (O my learned friend
hlr. Lautcrpacht's dcvelopment of paragraphs 10-14of the Application. by his
fascinating exposition of the facts concerning hlalta's claims to continental
shelf arcas. if 1may say so al1round the compass, but espcciallyvis-à-vis Malta
and Libya. Now. please don't be upset with me. 1am no! going to follow the
expedition iiito the fücts.particularly the factsof the delimitation- the future
delimitations
- of the continental shelf of Malta. but 1 rnight observe in
passing that perhaps wc have been given a foretasie of Malta's concept of
interveniion in the presenl case. The point I do wani to make is lhat this
excursion routid the Mediterranean did not esiablish any inierest of a legal
nature ihar would actuallg be atTected by the decisic-nof the Court in the
present proceedings. ILled. 10rny way of thinking ai any rate. tothe inescapa-
a ble conclusion that the deliniitation of con[inental shelf areas isessentiaily. and
in the normal case. a bilateral matter to be settled by agreement between the
pairs of States concerricd. I do not exclude the theoretical possibility of a
muliilateral conferencc where you would have al1the States meeting together,
but that is no1the normal practice. One has to look at the State practice. There
are now alrnost cndless bilateral agreements dealing with the delimitation
betwecn pairs ofstatcs. and there is. in my subniission. no reason to see why
that practice should bc dcparted from in the present case.
I am afraid at this point. Mr. President, t find it necessary to do what I
dislike doing, thatis roread from the record of Thursday morning's proceed-
ings. but l thinkil is the shortest and most efficient way of really seeing what
was the centralpoint being put forward by htr. Lauterpacht. I am referring10
page 294. .sii/)rcof the rranscript. the provisional texi. for Thursday morning.
1think for ihis purpose 1need to read about one and a half paragraphs. With
your indulgence. Alr. President. 1will do this. because 1think itvery important
in the presentation of the case on behslf of hlülta, Xly learned friend.
hlr. Lauterpacht said :
"So the determination of the boundary must involve rit least thrce
stages : rirst. thereisthe stage of laying down the applicable general
principles and the roles of international law :second. there isthe identifi-
crition and assessment of local or regional factors such as the ones I have
just liste: aiid third. there isthe stage of putting the factors together in
such a way that thcy lead ratioilally to the choice ofü pariicular line."
Now. if I may inrerpose. it is not with the ai~alysisas such thai Iquarrel. buit
is to whai follows thai I really do.
"ln the present situation Xlatta is no1concerned about the Tirs1and the
third orthese stages. Ii is rioi concerned with the laying down ofgeneral
principles as between Libya and Tunisia. Nor is it concerned with the
choice of the particular line between Libya and 7'~iriisia."
The necessary implication of these remarks - as I linderstand them.
perhaps 1 niisundcrstand their implication. but the nccessary implication of
these remarks scenls to be that h.laltaisreally only concerned with the facts in
the Lib~ul T~iirisicase and that what ilwanis io do is IO inlervene on the facts
in that dispute. as ilwere to upset the normal proccss or litigation. without
being bound by the findings of fact by the Court. Now if there comes a -
question of the exercisc of judicial discretion. qiiite ripart (rom any other378 CONTINENTALSHELF
consideration. 1would ask the Court to refuse this application on that ground
alone.
I would only add the observation that while the real purpose of the
application has now been revealed. hlalta has not. in Cact. amended her
Application, but that's a trivial remark.
Before proceeding further. may lsay a very few words about the nature of
intervention. Jf a State is given permission to intervene to protect a legal
interest. it does seem that. in justice. the State should be bound by the decision
of thecourt ai least to the extent of the interest for the protection of wilis
given permission to intervene. This seems to me to bean elementary principle
of what 1might cal1judicial logic.
According io Anicle 63of the Statute the construction of a convention given
by a judgment isexpressly stated to be binding upon the intervening State. It is
true. there is no such correspondingstatement in Article 62. But it does seem to
be a necessary incident of the judicial process thaa State participating before
the Court in contentious proceedings should. at least to the extent of the precise
object of its intervention, be bound by the judgrnent of the Court. There are
also indications that this was the intention when Article 62ofthe Statute was
draïted but. as I have said. this is inherent in the nature of i~tervention to
protect a legal interest whether interventioisadhesive, accessory or principal.
But I beg leave to return to this point a littlelater, when discussing the travaux
préporutoio rfehe Statute. because 1will avoid repetition this way.
But now 1should liketo comment on a few of the arguments - one or two
of thearguments perhaps - put forward by Professor Laliveon the interpreta-
tion of Article 62.U nfortunately. even aftea lapse of sorne 60 years we have
very littleguidanceon the scope or the meaning of Article 62 of the StatuteAs
Professor Lalive said. no application made under Article 62 has ever been
granted by this Court or by its predecessor. As he also said. we have no direct
help from the cases on the interpretation of Articl62. But in connection with
the question of the interest of a legal nature that may be affected by the
decision of theCourt. Ishould like io try to dispel some misapprehension that
may have arisen from hisexamination of them. 1am afraid I am now forced to
go into a certain amount of detail. the first contentious case before the
Permanent Court of Internaiional Justice was indeed 1heS.S. "Wimbledon" in
1923 (P.C.IJ..SeriesA, No. 1,1923).
As the facts of this case are sowell known. il is unnecessary to state them.
but the history of the Polish Government's application to intervene is not so
well known and. with the indulgence of the Court, I should like to examine
that history in a little detail.
By an application dated 22 hlay 1923 (seeP.C.I.J., Third Public Sitting.
25 June 1923. Annex 12).the Polish Governrnent. relying on Article 62 of the
Statute of the Court. applied for permission to intervein the casebroughr to
the Court by an application on behalf of Great Britain. France. Italy and Japan
against Germany with regard to the refusal of the German authorities on
21 March 1921 to allow the British S.S. Wimbledon chanered by a French
Company. free access to the Kiel Canal. The application for permission to
intervene recited that the S.SWimbledon was bound for Danzig with a cargo
of military material destined for the Polish Government. so the Polish Govern-
ment had a direct interest in the cargo of the ship. if not in the ship itself. and
that the German Covernment justified its refusal to allow passage to the S.S.
Wimbledonon the grounds ~hat. the Treaty of Peace not having then been
ratifiedastate of war existed between Poland and Russia and that the German
regulations with regard to neutrality prohibited the transit of war material ARGUMENT OF SIR FRANCIS VALLAT 379
through German territory to these two countries. Poland also relied on the
facts that it was one of the parties to the Treaty of Peace of Versaillesand that
the refusal in question constituted a violation of the rights and material
advantages guaranteed to Poland by Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles. 1
mention these details which 1have taken from the application because they
indicate what happened, what the implication of the stepsthat followed weje.
The application then presented to the Court was presented in agreement
with the Governments of Great Britajn, France, Japan, and Italy and it re-
quested leave for permi&ion to intervene on the side of those other States in
the case of the S.S. Wimbledon. Well, of course, itis well knawn that by
Article 386 of the Treaty of Versailles it was provided that any party to the
Treaty had the right to applyto the Court in the event an allegedviolation of
Articles380-386, sothere was clearly a basis of jurisdiction of the Court in that
case. Now, for the purposes of its application under Articl62 of the Statute,
the Polish Government was apparently relying on its right ta receive military
material which, as I have said,was clearly involved in the decision as to
whether or not Germany was entitled to prohibit passage of the S.S. Wimble-
don through the Kiel Canal.
Neverthelas, written observations Gbid., Annex 13) were submitted on
behalf of the British Government signed by Sir Ceci lurst,as he then was,
which pointed out that Poland was entitled as of right to intervene in the
proceedings inaccordance with Article 63 of the Statute, but raised certain
doubts about Article 62 as a bais for the application.The observations said,
first, that the application wanot one "for permission to intervene as a third
party as provided in Article 62, but is anapplication tobe ailowed to inter-
vene on the side of the British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments";
secondly,if 1rnay bepermitted to quote from the observationsagain,they sai:
"Article 62 relates only to States alleging an interest of a legal nature
(un inrérde'ordre juridique)which rnaybe affected by the decision in the
case. Apart from the general Polish interestin the interpretation of the
Treaty of Versailles,itisnot clear that the Polish Government possesses
any interest oa legalnature in the rnattew at issue in theS.S. Wimbledon
case. Indeed, the Polish application itselfstatesthe grounds of the applica-
tion in a way which showsthat it isbased merely on the injury which the
Polish Government would suffer from any restriction of its rights under
Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles. It is therefore submitted that an
application of this nature woulvery properly be made under Article 63."
Now there are two obseivations 1would likéto make on this statement on
behalf of the British Government. The first is it clearly contemplates thal
Article 62 would apply where an interest ofa legal natureisinvolved in the
decision. Why do 1say this ? Because Su Cecil Hurst goes on to say that iis
not clear that the interest will beof that character because itconcernsthe cargo
whereas the realnub of the matterwas the interpretation ofa provision of the
Treaty of Versailles. Yet, in that case, the interest of the Polish Government
was obviously much more closely related in law to the subject-matter of the
dispute than is the interest claimed by Malta in this case.
Beforecontinuing with the very brief history, may 1bepermitted to refer to
Sir&il Hurst's observations. 1am not going to read the whole of them. Ihave
no doubt that Members of the Court will satisfy themselves of the teas it is.
But the observations concluded by saying :
"As the position which will be enjoyed by a State allowed to intervene
under Article 62 appears tobe identical in al1respects with that of a State 380 CONTINENTAL SHELF
which intervenes under Anicle 63 so far as concerns the binding nature
of the final decision given by the Court, it is submitted that it would be
preferable that the intervention of the Polish Government in the 'Wimble-
don' case should take place under Article 63 and not under Article 62."
This touches a nerve point in this case on which counsel for Malta are, 1
suspect, rather sensitive because it touches on the question of the binding
nature of the final decision given by the Court. As 1said, if the intervening
party is not going to be bound by the decision what is the character of the
"intervention".
Now, just to complete the history very quickly ;after theother observations
had been made on behalf of the other applicant States briefly supporting or
acquiescing in intervention under Article 63 rather than Article62. and the
Polish Government had indicated that it did not ask the Court to rely on its
arguments supporting the application under Article 62,but was content for the
Court to accept intervention under Article 63,the Court, not unnaturally, by a
judgment of 28 June 1923 decided that it was unnecessary to consider and
satisfy itself whether Poland's intervention was justified by an interest of a
legal nature within the meaning of Article 62 of the Statute and in effect
accepted the intervention of Poland in the exercise of the right conferred upon
it by Article63.
1have taken a little time to go through this history, but it seemed to me that
the presentation by my distinguished colleague, Professor Lalive, did not quite
give the exact nature of the procedure and bring out the full flavour of the
observations by Sir Cecil Hurst which are, 1think, very important. He was
near to the drafting of the Statute and I think he understwd very well the
'essence of what was contemplated. Well, like my learned friend Professor
Lalive, the only other caseswe have found concerning intervention in cases
before the Court are the declaration by Cuba to intemene under Article 63 in
the Haya de lu Torrecase U.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 71)and the application of Fiji
under Article 62 for permission to intervene in the Nucleur Tesrs cases.
Mr. President you will be relieved to hear that as my colleague, Professor
Malintoppi, will be referring to the latter case, 1shaH leave it to him, so rny
remarks will be short. However, there is one short passage in the judgrnent of
the Court in the Haya de la Torre case which again, it seemed to me. counsel
for Malta did not bring out very clearly. The Court observed, and this is at
.page 76 of the Judgment :
"that every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case ; it
follows that a declaration filed as an intervention only acquires that
character in law, if it actually relates to the subject-matter of the pending
proceedings".
This rernark is directed to the charactof an intervention. Now. although the
declaration of Cuba was one made under Article 63, the observation of the
Court is, 1 suggest, equally applicable to an application to intervene under
Article 62. In fact 1will go further and say a forrioirtmust apply toa case
under Article 62.
Finally, as regards the nature of intervention, I think that it is worth
referring to the record of the 28th meeting of the famous Committee of Jurisls
which was drafting the Statute of the Permanent Court which was held at the
Peace Palaceon 20 July 1920(see Procès-verbal, 28th meeting (private)). Now
this was during discussion of what was then draft Article 23. Lord Phillirnore
explained the right of intervention as existing in English lHe.emphasized in ARGUMENT OF SIR FRANCIS VALUT 381
particular the fact that in England an intervening party could only associate
itself with the defendant. Now I am not saying whether Lord PhiIlimore was
right or wrong in making that assertion. but the point isthat he was referring
to the Engiish common law.
hlr.Lcder explained that Dutch law allowed intervention both on the side
of the plaintiff and of the defendant. Subsequently the President of the Com-
mittee said that he thought that the solution of the question of intervention
should be drawn liorn common law and the wording of the draits which he
then suggested for what is now Article 62 of the Statute. was substantially the
same as the text of that Article as it now appears in lhe Statute.
hly researches may be deficient but so far as my researches have disclosed
anything. this strictly speaking was the end or the Iravaux prépararoires of
Article 62. 1 need not elaborate on the fact that the discussion among the
judges in drafting the Rules may be part of the travaux prépararoires of the
Rules but does not form part of the lravauxpréparatoires of Article 62 itself,
because of the very nature of travaux pr¶toires. We then get perhaps - 1
say with great doubt - into the realm of subsequent practice. but ! hardly
need emphasize this point to the Members of this particular Court.
What Ifind so interesting about this is that. whatever was the understan-
ding of common Law of those who were taking pan in the Committee of
Jurisls. they thought. to say the least. that they were reflecting the common
law concept of intervention in Article 62 of the Statute.
Now 1would think that they probably had in mind that lhis would mean. as
is the case normally in the common law. that the intervener - as ilwere -
becornes a pany. a third party possibly. in the proceedings,and this is the
thought that is reflected. of course. in Sir Cecil Hurst's observations.
Well. we are all well aware of the danger of relying on ~ruiiauxprepara~oi-
res. I would not go as far as my distinguished predecessor Sir Eric Becket in
this respect. but one always has to handle them with care so that J do not put
forward the point on the travaux préparatoires as being a major point in my
argument but it isvery interesting and, so far as thefravaux do throw light on
the situation. 1suggest that they indicate quite clearly that Article62 of the
Statute was based on the background of the common law's concept of inter- .
vention and that the worldwide ranging investigation of Professor Lalivereally
has very little to do with the case which isnow before us.
Now briefly. and I am corning to the end of rny remarks. 1hope I have kept
more or less to the hour that 1 had promised in the circumstances. Briefly l
maintain that in the present case hlalta does not have a legal interest suffi-
ciently related to the subject-rnatter of the proceedings to sustain its application
for intervention and that even if it had such an interest there is no risk of the
legal interest being affected by the decisjon of the Couri.
Quite apart [rom the express limitation contained in the Special Agreement,
any interest of Malta in any further delimitation which' Malta might be
involved is, we believe, adequately protected by Article 59 of the Statute. But
above that. one knowsperfeclly well fromthe way in which thesecases have
been previously dealt with. that the interests of Malta will be protected by the
judicial wisdom of the Court.
In any event, may 1ask. having regard the state of the case and the object
of the intervention. would permission to intervene in this case be in the
interests of thgood administration ofjustice ? I would subrnit, not. But at this
point. I begin to trespass on hlr. Highet's field and he will continue the
presentation of the observations on behaliof Libya. ARCUhlEh'T OF MR. tilGHET
COUNSEL FOR THE COVERNMENT OF THE LlBYAN ARA3 JAMAHIRIYA
Mr. HIGHET :May it please the Court. Mr. President and Members of the
Court, permit me first to associate rnyself with the remarks of our Agent.
Arnbassador Maghur. and those of my colleague. Sir Francis Vallat. It is
indeed a great privilege tobe able to appear before this honourable Court in
order toaddress it upon certain aspects of the application of the Government of
Malta for permission to intervene in the case pending between Libya and
Tunisia concerning the delimitation of their respective continental shelves.
1am to address rnyself to considerations relating to the requirement expres-
sed in Article81,subparagraph 2 (b).of the Rules of Court, to the effect that an
application to intervene under Anicle 62 of the Statute: "shall set out the
precise object of the intervention". Article 69, paragraph 2. of the now
supersedecl Rules of Court had only indicated that "application shall contain a
staternentof law and of fact justifying intervention". Perhaps as a resuli of its
experience in the ~VircIcurTestscases the Court found it appropriate to make
clear that as part of such a statement of law and fact the intervening State
should in the future expound what the precise object ofits intervention rnight
be.
In a significant part of his address on Thursday, the distinguished Attorn-y
General of Malta commented on this provision of the 1978 Rules. He said :
"there is nothing at alin Anicle 62 of the Statute about the object of the
intervention, or at least nothing about any object separate from and
independent of the legal interest involved. . ." (sirpro,290).
And yet, Mr. President. Malta cannol be clear about what its object rnight be.
We have already mentioned their insistence on the submission of views, and
have pointed out to the Court that submitting views alone cannot be an object
or an end in itself.Although Malta may well have as a purpose the obtaining of
an opportunity of submitting views. its precise object for intervention mustbe
something else. lt must be.as we have tried to.make clear.the protection of an
alleged interest of a legal nature against something. And we have not yet been
able to understand what it is against which such an interest of Malta is
required to be protected inconnection with these proceedings.
To get right to the point it is our position that il is not an intervention at al1
which Malta seeks within the rneaning of Article 62 of the Statute. It is
somelhing quite different. For want of a better word it is a quasi-intervention
and the Statute and the Rules of Court contain no mention of such a concept.
Malta apparently would seek an advisory role in contentious proceedings.
Indeed, what Malta has requested is in effect no more and no less than a
watching brief. or a position more or les$in the nature of atiiicii.~cirriue.
The problern is that our colleagues on the Maltese side can point to no
provision of the Statute of the Court. which has in this regard rernained
completely unchanged since itsiïrst adoption,which contemplates a procedure
of this type. There is no provision for semi-advisory proceedings before the
Court, for quasi-intervention.or for status as otriiclrsciiriur.
Reading the rrailarrxprc;puraroiresof the Cornmittee of Jurists one under- ARGUMENT OF MR. HICHET 383
stands full well why this might be so. Inthe clear and. if 1rnay Say, eloquerit
words of Judge Yovanovich in 1922 :
"The jurisdiction of this Court is always dependent upon agreements
concluded between States, that is to Say, agreements by which States
mutually undertake to submit a particular dispute or certain classes of
disputes to the jurisdiction of this Court. This agreement is to be found in
every case, both in the case ofa special agreement (compromis) regarding
a dispute already in existence and in the case of specialtreaties in forc. . .
and finally in the case of the optional claux instituting the compulsory
jurisdiction. provided for in Article 36 of the Statute.
The question of intervention in proceedings before the Court must be
regarded from this standpoint.
A State which is already a party toa case before thekourt is not bound
to accept the intervention of a third State unless it has undertaken as
regards that State to accept the jurisdiction of our Court in disputes which
may arise between them." (P.C.1.J..Series D, No. 2. p. 381.)
1do not propose here, to go into a detailed recitation on the element of
jurisdiction, as Professor Malintoppi will address that point. But 1do, however,
wish to statea fundamental Iruth, and that is that it is a cornmonplace that
jurisdiction in international law isinextricably linked to the consent ofStates to
submit to that jurisdiction by one means or by another. My point isthis. If
States wish to provide for anomalous or innovative forms ofjurisdictional title,
thenlet them, by express pmvision to that effect,consent thereto. For exarnple,
it would not be difficult for States to agree to permit other States to effect the
type of anornalouç intervention sought by Maltain this proceeding. Libya and
Tunisia rnight have done so, agreeing to permit Malta or any third State access
to the Court "tosubmit iLsviews" - in the words of Malta's Application (para.
20) - on any issue raised in the real proceedings. They might have gone even
further. They could have conceded to third States the right to intervene. or
interpose, or perhaps interfere on certain points of interest in the litigation as so
far then developed. and then to offer cool observations on issuesoffact or law.
without being engaged in the cornmitment of any decision. or captured by any
form of resjridicato .
But they did not do so. Instead. Libya and Tunisia executed. ratified. and
notilied to this Court a special agreement which asked the Court to consider
certain very specific issues as between Libya and Tunisia, and them alone.
Under these circurnslances Malta's proposed intervention can serve no con-
ceivable purpose. It would bedisruptive, not helpful. confusing. not clarifying,
and it is baMing to the real litigants in tcase at hand. In short, none of this
can possibly be helpful to the orderly or expeditious administration of justice
by this Court.
Permit me, Mr. President, one more introductory comment. It is with no
sense of enthusiasrn that we feelconstrained to indicate the lack of merit of the
Maltese position. Asour Agent has eloquently put it earlier today, we feelthat
it isessential that the positive development of international law be fostered and
encouraged by States,provided however that they act within the orderly
existing procedures and the principles and rules of international law.
In our view. the propriety of an exceptional procedure such asintervention
should beested by exarnining the purpose or object forwhich such procedure
is sought.as well as the efïect it will have on existing prooeedings, the rights of
other third parties. and the orderly administration of justice. It is this relatively
simple precept which is expressed. itrrerdia, by Article 8 1(2)(b)of the Rules384 COhTlNENTAL SHELF
of Court. As the Court is well aware. this provision requires the application to
"set out . ..[among other things](b) the precise object ofthe intervention". We
would not wish to imagine that our learned friends on the hlaltese side also
consider this subparagraph. as well as subparagraph(c) to be supererogatory or
unsupported by statutory command. To the contrary. it expresses a simple and
concise riileof common sense. Why does a State wish to make an intervention.
and precisely why ?
This requirement can hardly be satisfied by a bald assertion or assertions.
such as isthe only reason actually given by hlalta that "the precise object of
klalta's intervention . . .would be to enable klalta to submit its views to the
Court on the issues raised in the pending case . . ." (para. 20). We find this a
thin or flimsyjustification for an intervention. The precise object must be more
than merely to submit views on issues. Why ? Because the submission of
views isa means. a method. a means to an end. And yet Article 81(2)(b)or the
Rules calls Toran end. Itcalls for an object : it calls Tora purpose to the
intervention.
One need only look to the sister provisions of ArticIe'63 of the Statute to
discover the reasons which may well be involved. In Article 63. as of course
the Court is aware. a Siaie possesses an unqualified right of intervention
whenever the construction of a convention to which it isa party is in question.
In that instance the Rules do not require the intervener to indicate the "precise
object of the intervention". Such an object of course would already be obvious
by the very terms of Article 63 - the construction or a convention - and
need not be recited in any greater detail than that required by Article 82 of the
Rules. However, in the more far-reaching context of Article 62. a better
indication of purpose is called for by the Rules in order to justily intervention
in such a case. The intervener must state the precise object. the purpose. of its
intended action and not merely the means by which it intends to achieve that
object. Of course Iam fully mindful of the fact thai itisArticle 62. paragraph 2.
of the Statute which indicates that theCourt wilI decide. and that the Rules do
not themselves contain any more than an indication of the considerations
which should be provided to. and examined by. the Court.
In our view. the requirement that the "precise object" be set forth is
intirnately related to the very nature and limitations of intervention. For
intervention is an exceptional procedure. and in the present proceedings il is
proposed to be superimposed or grafted upon a pending proceeding which is
itself. in another manner of speaking. also an exceptional procedure. By this I
refer, ofcourse. to the fact that the pending case has been brought by special -
and 1 stress special- agreement between Libya and Tunisia. '
A State. moreover. should not be permitted to intervene forjust any reason
at all. The reason must be substantive. There milst be a concrete purpose. This
purpose. we would subniit. must be al1 the more compelling when it is a
proceedifig brought by sprcial agreement in which intervention issought. lt is
for these reasons. I subrnit. that Article 8l (Z)(blof the Rules obligates a State.
or instructsa State. applying to intervene. to indicate its "precise object" in
doing so. But ihat isprecisely what the Alalteseapplication railsto do. h'hy ?It
rails in the context of this case to set out a precise objeci. It is not a real
intervention which is being requested. It is some forni ofwatching brief which
provides klalta with the luxury of comment. together with the freedom from
any decision and for which the Statute. quite wisely. has never made provi-
sion. It is respectfully submitted that the Court should not decide to give its
permission for intervention of this sort and in this instance.
hfr. President. permit me to develop this point along a slightly different line. ARCUMEhT OF MR. HIGHET 385
In his address on Thursday. the learned Attorney-General confirmed some
very inieresiing concessions concerning Rlalta'sproposed position in these
proceedings. The Attorney-General said :
"the Government of Malta . . .is no1seeking 10üppear as a plaintiff or
claimant against eithcr of those States [Tunisia or Libya].or io assert any
specific right against either of them as such" (p. 284.slrpt).
Now the Court will undoubtedly recall paragraphs 22 and 24 of h,lalta's
Application. which also contain similar reservations as to hlalta's "object" in
jntervening. Paragraph 22. 1may remind the Court. Statesquite openly ihat :
"ii musi be siressed that it is not hlalta's object. . . . to obtain any form or
ruling or decision from the Court concerning its continental shelf boun-
daries with either or both of those countries".
And paragraph 24 of the Application reiteraies this, and then adds that "the
intervention would no1 seek any substantive or operative decision against
either party . . .".
It is therefore clear that blalta is not and cannoi be asserting any rights
against either Tunisia or Libya. It follows that Malta of course is not asserting
rights against any other State such as, for example, Italy which. allhough
mentioned io considerable extent in the address of hlr. Lauterpacht. is of
course no1a party io these proceedings. Thus. by ilsown mncession. h,!altais
no1 aserting righ~sagainst any State. The question thcn becomes : is klalla
asserting any rights at al1? And the answer. I submit. is plain. But. hlr.
President and h.femberi;orthe Court. if hlalta isno1asserting any rights againsi
any State. what right or interesi or a legal nature is hlalta trying to protect ?
Put another way. what is the object of the proposed intervention. and in ihe
light of the requirement ofArticle 62 of the Statute.we askagain. what interest
of a legal nature may bc affected. could possibly be alTected.by the decision in
this case ?il'ith respect. klr. President. do we no1havea compleie paradox ?It
is a situation where klalta. on the one hand. is argiiing vehemently to the
Court ihat ilpossesses an interest of a legal nature which rnay be affecied by
the decision. - but yci. on the other hand. is adopting a posture where in
effect blalta is sccking to assert no rights al all against either Party in the case.
How can one right. asa matter OC pure logiç. be protected ifanothcr righisnot
asserted ? How cana Staceçlairn an inierest of a legal nature which might be
affecied by a decision in a case. and then retreai fron~asscrting it?
If1 may carry this paradox one step further. what isthe proceeding in which
Xlalia fears that its leg~lright or interest will be afrected ?Surelilcannot bc
the pending case? For. if it werc. Xlalia would have to assert soine rorm of
claim againsi ai least one of ihe Parties. \ilcll. hlalia cannot asaeright oran
interest ai large. By way of analogy. noihing crin be more concreie and more
susceptible ofsolid appreciation than an interest or a right irealproperty. and
we would urge that an interest in one'scontinental shelf isjiist as concrete. Biii
this isprecisely the right or interesi which is not being asserted.
Let us go further and ask why has h,laltagone to such lengths to stress that it
is asseriing no rights againsl Libya or Tunisia. no clainis. Could it be becatisc
thcre is no basis of jurisdictioninthis cüsc. on which siich rights or interests
may be determincd '! The Parties io this case - both ofwhich are opposed to
ihis form or intervention by hlalta - have selecied this honourable iribunal
Torthe determinaiion of their case. and their case alone. And beçause there is
noj'urisdiction for intervention in ihis cas- ~ireqtiirement which is thereforc 386 CONTINENTALSHELF
stated to be irrelevant by Malta - Malta is constrained to maintain that she
seeks to assertno right against either Party in the case.
This contains, quite obviously a fatallacur~aor gap in the fogic.Ifthere is no
jurisdiction, and if Malta is asserting no righl and defending no interest in this
proceeding. how can this proposed intervention serve any useful purpose
whatever ?To phrase the question differently, how can the interest of a legal
nature, which Malia contends may be affected by the decision in this case, be
protected unless some right or interest js in fact asserted ?
'In a nutshell, we suggest that Malta cannot cause the Court to protect any
right of Maltawithout Malta'sasserting a claim against a Party in this case. For
example, it is not enough to allege, asMr. Lauterpacht, with respect, has done,
"the elements which the Court finds as relevant to the practical specification
of the boundary between Libya and Tunisia are almost certain to affect
the'practical specification of the lin,: between Malta and Libya and Malta
and Tunisia" (p. 303, supra) ? Nor can the matter be resolved by a conten-
tion that :"In this area the claims and interests of Libya, Malta and Tunisia
meet and quite clearly overlap." Vbid.,p. 302.) For what can the Court con-
ceivably do with regard to such boundaries or such area of alleged overlap
which would not result in an assumption of jurisdiction, or stated altern-
alively, in the effective assertion of the rights ofonas against the rights of the
other ?
Although 1do not wish to engage in thisaddress at al1in a detailed rebuttal
of what the distinguished representatives of Malta have said, it is necessary at
least to react to the distinguished Attorney-General's point on Thursday mor-
ning that our argument is "beside the point" (p.285,supra). ln the words of the
Attorney-General, the argument which was beside the point was that : "any
delimitation of the continental shelf boundary lines of. .." Libya and Tunisia
"will be suspendeciat the point where it might impinge on those of other States
in the region". Then the Attorney-General continued to ask :"in parentheses,
how will it be known when that point is reached without entering upon the
queStion of Malta's continental shelf entitlement ?"(Ibid.) !.
With great respect to the Attorney-General, it does not require a view of the
pleadings or submissions in this case to understand that the Court has no
jurisdiction to indicate where such a point rnight be. Is it not obvious that any
indication of such a point could not even be entertained? For, as Malta is
surely aware,the drawing of a line of delimitation has been left to the Parties
- that is to Libya and Tunisia - and to their experts. Thus, it cannot possibly
be known where that point is, and the question of Maltese continental shelf
entitlement could not possibly be determined in the context of these proceed-
ings.
But the matter does not end there. Even if the Court were being asked to
draw a line - which 1 subrnit it is not - and even if the Court were to
indicate a point at which that line should stop - which 1respectfully again
submit it could not and would not do - stillthere issomething missing. Now,
,that point was very well brought out by the extensive exposition by
Mr. Lauterpacht of the various diplomatic exchanges between Malta and
Tunisia, on the one hand, and Malta and Libya on the other. What was
rnissing ?Therewould have to be agreement between the three pairs of States,
or conceivably amongst al1three States, to reach the famous point at which
paragraph 1Oof Malta'swritten Application says that "the boundaries between
al1three States converge". In the context of this proceeding between Libya and
Tunisia that statement is fallacious. It is fallacious simply because the boun-
daries do not exist and will not in fact converge until it has been coinpetentlyagreed by each of the three Statesconcerned. first that they are boundaries, and
then that they do in fact converge.
Butthe Attorney-Gerieral'scomment isimportant toconsiderjust a slight bit
f~irther.Unless or until the three States concerned have agreed in parailel, or in
tandem. or arnongst one another, as to what distance from each the hypotheti-
cal suspense point is. he will have an even worse quandary. Consider the
following. When the Court indicates. in the future,' principles and rules in
accordance with OurSpecial Agreement with Tunisia, and the experts and the
Parties establish thereafter a line of delimitation between Libya and Tunisia.
unless theCourt has in fact indicated to both Parties the suspense point of the
line in its course toward kialta (which it. in rny submission. could not do) it
will be a matter for each Party 10 determine for itself. And thus one could
imagine an agreed line of delimitation (agreed. following the experts and
everything else foreseen in the Special Agreement) proceeding frorn the edge of
the territorial seas, but this line could only separate the areas of Tunisian shelf
Cromthe areas of Libyan shelf. Both Libya and Tunisia might very well have
différentor differing ideas as to each of their respective shelf rights as against
hlalta. or on either respective side of thai agreed line of delimitation between
them. And indeed from what uze heard on Thursday that would already
appear 10be the case. atleasl in the past. and 1mention only the reference to
baselines to prove the point.
Thiis. purely c.v~r~po/lic~si.e must conclude. I would submit. that a line of
determination between Libya and Tunisia can logically have no effect what-
soever as to hlalta. since the delimitation (if any) between Malta and either
Libya or Tunisia will probably occur in different rnanners. at different distan-
ces. and for different reasons, on two different sides of a LibyalTunisia
delimitation line. h4alta coiild noi care about the identity of the Stace wiih
which it is to share any given part of the continental shelf. whether with one.
or wjth another. or with both.
There is a point which probably does not even require to be mentioned. but
to place this matter in the proper perspective I should perhaps touch upon it.
None of this argument which I have just made concerning points or lines or
similar matters is designed or intended to trench upon details or on the rnerits
of these proceedings or with respectto any other proceedings.This discussion
is only intended to elaborate an aticnipt ai a logical analysis of. in rny
submission. the illogical position which Malta has adopted in these proceed-
ings. narnely. that itisimpossible to say - and this is hlalta's position- it is
impossible to say wherethe point isai which a delimitation line between Libya
and Tunisii should termi.nate.and then and therefrom to imply that such a line
will probably have some sort of emect upon areas of Maltese shelf. Our
argument, and it is purely ana\ytic. isthat ilmakes no differencewhatsoever to
hilaltii in any event where that hypothetical point might be. since it hardly
represents the establishment of a transverse line ofdelimitation by either or of
both States as against Malta.
And hlalta's own counsel - perhaps inadvertently - has coniïrmed this
point by saying on Thursday that hlalta is not "concerned with the choice of
the particular line between Libya and Tunisia" (p.294,slipru).
Now concluding on this point : this analysis, I may add, confirms the
correctness of my colleague Sir Francis \'allatS statement earlier this morning
to the effect that al1of the delimitations in question are essentially matters. by
State practice. by logic. for bilateral agreement unless there is a rnultilaterai
agreement by some chance between the States concerned.
In following Our line of argument. I do not find it necessary, of course. to 388 CONTINENTALSHELF
repeat points which have been so ably put by my colleague Sir Francis. But 1
rnust,again stress, however, that the absence of an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected - and Iemphasize the word "affected - is dir~ctiy
refated to Malta'sinability to set forth a proper purpose, or a precise object: for
ils proposed intervention.
We maintain that this is directly related tothe fact thaMaltais not seeking
relief as such, a ruling,resjudicata, in this case, but rather some ambiguous
or paradoxical form of consideration or reassurance which is completely
outside, and possibly goes against. the spirit and the letter of Arti62e of the
Sbtute. Now it is not hard to understand why Malta should avoid seeking
binding relief. It borders on the absurd to imagine Malta becoming the
beneficiary of a binding determination, following a hypothetical intervention
'in this case, as to the principles and rules which should be applied in deter-
mining the continental shelves of two other States.
Malta is irnpelled, rather than fencing with this dilemma, to disavow res
;udicata, and inso doing, Malta has been forced to paper over the very reason
why it rnight hypothetically have sought to assertthe existenceof an interest of
a legal nature in the first plac:to justify an intervention in order to protect
that interest by an adjudication capable of protecting it.
1would now like to turn briefly to Malta'sexpressed desire (1refer you and
the Court to paragraphs 10through 12of the Application) toaddressthe Court
on principles and rules of international law which, albeit applicable to the
Libya/Tunisia delimitation, are nonetheless considered by Malta (and 1quote
para. 10)to be "bound to be relevant to the delimitation of" Malta'sboundaries
with Libya and Tunisia. In support of this contention, Malta Statesthat these
principles and rules will be "cited and appealed to" in any dispute involving
Malta as a State with a Mediterranean continental shelf.
We must confess to a certain degree of puzzlement at a toially contrary
representation made on Thursday by Maltais counsel, who indicated with
great persuasion and even greater clarity (p. 294, supra) : 'TMaltal is not
coricerrirdwith the laying dowri oj general principles as between Libya ar~d
Tur~isiu"(emphasis added). My colleague Sir Francis Vallat alluded a few
minutes ago to this apparent change of position, and 1note it here only for the
record and for the interest of the Court, in determining what the precise object
of Malîa (if any) can possibly be.
Even assurning that Malta is still in fact preoccupied wilh principles and
rules, which may or rnay not be applicable to it, the question then arises
nwhether this prmupation alone can be considered as being a proper or
suficient justificationfor intervention under Article 62 ? Again, we submit
not. Malta has still seen fitto raise concepts such as the role of proportionality,
equidistance, consideration of baselines and other matters as being issues on
which she would like to comment. But is this reaily the proper forum for such
comment? And, rnoreover, how then would any other maritime State in the
world, which might have a potential dispute concerning shelf delimitation
with its neighbour, be excluded from intervening in this case ?Or any other
case ? Only, one rnight Say, because of the physical .proxirnity of Malta to
Libya and Tunisia. But what of other Mediterranean States in the same or
similar positions ?What does proximity, in reality, in law, have to do with it,
since it is in any event for the parties by their agreement to draw the line, or
reach the "single,as yet undetermined. point" where the three lines some day
rnight in fact merge ? As mentioned in our written observations any coastal
State in the world could be entitled to intervene ifMalta isentitled to intervene
in this proceeding. ARGUMENT OF MR. HICHET 389
In this connection. itis useful to recall to the Court.if 1 may. the'cogent
observationsmade by Judge Anzilotti during the 1922preliminary sessions for
the drafting of the Rules of the Permanent Court. I quote from the Minutes of
the Sixteenth Meeting of the Preliminary Session. held on 23 February 1922 :
"Mr. Anzilotti ... thought that. according tothe terms of Article62 of
the Statute. the right of intervention could only exist either in virtue of an
agreement between the two original parties or when the parties to the
case. as well as those who desired to intervene. had accepted the optional
clause with regard to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. He pointed
out thar the legal grounds on which his view was based were reinforced
by practical considerations :States would hesitate to have recourse to the
Court ifthey had reason to fear ihat third parlies would iniervene in their
cases."
We share the same practical concern and in particular in the context of the law
of the sea and the continental shelf. Sea frontiers join many States who would.
on such a theory as now espoused by Malta. be eager to intervene at al1times
in order to safeguard their rights. however vague or unspecified those rights or
interests could be seen to be. And what is more, on Malta's theory of'
intervention. States would intervene while maintainiiig a status as quasi-
parties to the subject-matter of the intervention. They would assert that there
would be no "substantive or operative decision" - and Iam quoting the
Application - or "ruling or decision . . .concerning" their actual shelf
boundaries. and no resjudicaro which might affect them unfavourably.
1would respectfully propose that to permit this type of interference. which
is in our respectful submissiona conceptquite differentfromgenuine inierven-
tion and more in the role of an advisory office. would be to open a box of
which even Pandora would have been proud.
In addition. how could Malta be'certain. were its intervention permitted. as
to the subjects or points which might be considered important ?Would not its
natural inclination be - or of any like-rninded or similarly-placed ather
intervener be, since as1have afready indicated there really is no interventional
object here at all - to seek out its own targeis and priorities, targets ol
opportunity. its own preoccupations as to fact and law. debating points as to
which it would desire to submit its views to the Court (para. 20)? And how
could the Court itself regard or evaluate the expression of such views ? What
weight would they have? And at the end of the day how difficult or easy
would it be for the Court Io untangle quasi-submissions from real submissions.
statements of fact on the one hand andon the other. the intervener's argument
from thearguments of the parties, the points and issues on which rulings were
requested from those where a decision was ostensibly withheld ?
lnstead we are of the view that ifa State applies for permission to intervene
in proceedings instituted by special agreementbut cannot satisfy theCourt that
the precise object of its intervention is meaningful. and involves the protection
or a real interest of a legal nature which rnay actually be affected by the
decision in this case. then that request should and must be rejected under
Article 62. paragraph 2. of the Statute.
This result is al1 the more cornpelling when the proceedings have been
brought under the exceptional régime of special agreement and when. as my
colleague Professor Malintoppi will elaborate in a few minutes. there exists no
jurisdictional link between the State applying to intervene and the Parties to
the existing case.390 CONTINENTALSHELF
hlr.'~residentanMembers of this honourable Court, my remarks have
now been completedIam mostgratefulforthecourteouspatiencewith which
you have heardmy observations. andI would once again exprmys deep
personal appreciationand professional pride at having been accordedthe
privilegeof addressingyou. PLAIDOIRIEDE M. MALINTOPPI
hl. b1ALINTOPPI :hlonsieur le Président. Messieurs de la Cour. c'est la
quatrième fois que j'ai l'honneur de plaider devant votre haute juridiction :
c'esttoujours avec lamême émotion, toujours avec le mèmesentiment d'admi-
ration.
hlonsieur le Président.sir Francis Vallat vous a démontréque le gouverne-
ment cherchant a intervenir n'a pas fait la preuve de l'intérêdt'ordre juridique
qui serait pour luien cause dans la présenteaffaire. M. Keith Highet. pour sa
part. vous a montré pourquoi la demande de Malte n'a pas précisénon plus
l'objet de l'intervention ainsi qu'il est prévu par les règlesapplicables en la
matière.Il m'appartient de complétera mon tour nos-argumentations en vous
soumettant quelques observations concernant la question de compétence. II
s'agit.en particulier. de donner une réponseau point desavoir si laCour. pour
admettre la demande en intervention de Malte. doit s'assurer au préalablequ'il
existe. en l'espèce,un lienjuridictionnel entre les Etats initialement part1ela
procédure et 1'Etatcherchant a intervenir.
Nous sommes ici.en pleine humilité,pour essayer d'assister laCour dans les
limites de nos forces, avec toutes nos incertitudes et les petites certitudes qui ne
découlent parfois. hélas.que de notre propre présomption. Dans cet esprit.
nous avons commencé par nous demander - et par demander a la Cour - si
un système quelconque de protection judiciaire saurait admettre des actes de
procédure sans que \'on ait établi si.et dans quelles limites. le juge est
compétenta cet égard.Ainsi. par exemple. l'article62, paragraphe 2.du Statut
confère a la Cour compétencepour se prononcer quant a l'admissibilitéde la
demande d'intervention. Mais assurément cette disposition ne vise que son
propre objet et n'attribue dès lors gvère de compétencea la Cour en ce qui
- concerne son pouvoir de connaître d'une procédure élargie al'intervenant.
C'est cette deuxième forme de compétence que I'on pourrait qualifier de
cornpetence sur le fond de l'intervention pour la distinguer de la compétence
relative a l'admissibilitéde l'intervention.
La question que nous nous étions posee de 'notre c8téde la barre - la
question de savoir si I'on peut avoir des actes de procédure sans règles
attribuant au juge la compétence y affërente - étaitde toute évidence une
question de pure réthorique. Elle l'étaitd'autant plus que dans notre cas
I'artict81. paragraphe 2 c). du Règlement de la Cour exige que I'Etat cher-
chant a intervenir spkifie'dans sarequêtetoute base de compétencequi. selon
ce mêmeEtat. existerait entre lui et les parties. Cet article du Règlement
interprète correctement I'articte62 du Statut comme exigeant qu'un lien juri-
diciionne) soit établipour que la Cour puisse connaître du fond de I'interven-
tion.
Ce qui nous semblait une constatation élémentairea cependant étéconteste
avec acharnement par les conseils du Gouvernement de Malte. Ils ont déployé
a cet égard beaucoup de talent et beaucoup de fantaisie. Ils ont par contre
démontreune cohérence toute relative vu que chwue conseil a cru nécessaire
de s'occuper de la question de lacompétencetout enjugent aussi nécessairede
le faire'en soutenant des thèses différenteset parfois contradictoires entre elles.392 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
Pour ma part. je me propose d'aborder le sujet briévement.car on assiste la
COUPmémepar la brièvetéde ses interventions. et .de la façon suivante.
D'abord je me propose de montrer pourqyoi,nous avons la faiblesse de
croire que la Cour a correctement interprété I'drticle62 du Statut et qu'elle ne
s'estnullement trompéeni n'a mêw excédé sespouvoirs lorsqu'elleadopta en
1978 I'article81.paragraphe 2 cl.du Règlement.
El1deuxietne lieu je tacherai de montrer pourquoi nous ne pourrions pas
souscrire ala première des thèsessoutenues par leGouvernement de Malte. Je
me réfereici a des remarques du professeur Lalive mais surtout a la thése
reprise par hfCBathurst. au cours de l'audience d'hier. thèsed'après laquelle
aucun lien de juridiction ne saurait ëtre requis en relation avec I'intervention
prévue aI'article62 du Statut.
Eiitroisiè ieu je m'occuperai de la thèse brillamment amorcée par mon
collègue etami MC Lauterpacht. d'aprèslaquelle la compétencequant au fond
de I'intervention enI'espécedécouleraitde la conduite des Parties initiales a la
procédure.
Finalemeirrj'aurais quelques mots a dire au sujet de la nouvelle déclaration
d'acceptation de lajuridiction obligatoire de laCourqui a éténotifiéepar Malte
au Secrétaire général des Nations Uniesle 2 janvier dernier.
SiI'on examine la requête a fin d'intervention présentéepar le Gouverne-
ment de Malte. I'on est frappé par le fait que la question concernant la
compétencedelaCour y est confinéeen satroisième section.La question. ilest
vrai, n'y est pas ignorée, cequi devrait suflire pour montrer qu'elle nesaurait
l'etre. hlais elle est en quelque sorte surto<dégradée )du plan statutaire a
celui du Règlement de la Cour. vu que la troisième section de la requête est
formellement et précisément consacrée a l'article1 du Règlement.
C'est dans ces conditions que la requète du Gouvernement maltais se
préoccupede souligner. au paragraphe 23.que la disposition de l'alinéc) de
l'article81.paragraphe 2.du Règlementen vigueur u ne figurait sous aucune
lormedans les versions précédentes duRèglement... ».Mais 1'Etatcherchant a
intervenir dans la présente affaire s'empresse également de préciser - et
l'affirmationa étéreprise tout au long des plaidoiries- que :u Bien entendu,
cette disposition ne saurait avoir imposéune nouvelle condition de fond pour
que l'intervention soit autorisée.>>et que. des fors. l'indication demandée par
le Règlementactuellement en vigueur aurait pour objet d'informer laCour de
tout lienjuridictionnel éventuel entre lestats intéressé».
Aucune indication n'est donnée par le Gouvernement de Malte quant au
sens de cet adjectif« éventue>>qui. d'aprèslui. qualifierait lelienjuridictionnel
dont il est question a l'article précdu Règlement. Mais le but de l'argument
est évident :dans l'esprit de la requêtemaltaise, il s'agirait d'une indication
surabondante. superflue.
L'argument developpédans la requête(par. 23) nes'arrêtecependant pas la.
L'on arrive a conclure carrément que <<I'intervention en tant que telle ne
dépend pas de l'existenced'une base .de compétence entre 1'Etatcherchant a
intervenir et les partiea l'instanc». L'aflirmation revient tellement de fois
dans les discussions orales que je peux me dispenser de toute citation a cet
égard. En d'autres termes. pareille conclusion semble impliquer que s'it est
établique I'Etat demandant a intervenir fait la preuve de son-intérêtd'ordre
juridique la Cour devrait autdriser I'intervention. sans mémese demander s'il PLAIWIRIEDE M. MALINTOPPI 393
,
existe. oui ou non. un lien valable de juridiction entre I'Etat cherchant a
intervenir et les Etatdéjhparties a la procédure.
Je ne crois pas que l'onpuisse souscrirea pareil argument. IIest frappe par
plusieurs vices logiques qu'ilconvient de signaler séparément.Je me propose
aussi. ce faisant. d'esquisser les lignes fondamentales de notre interprétation de
la question. .
Tout d'abord, il convient de rappeler que les intervenants ne sont pas. en
principe. des privilégiesqui ne devraient pas justifier d'un titre decompétence
pour qu'ils puissent participer au procès international dans lequel ils deman-
dent a intervenir. Ce principe a une portée tellement généralequ'il trouve
apptication même dans les systèmes juridiques internes des Etats. qui sont
poiirtant caractérisespar l'organisation institutionnelle de l'administration de la
justice - ce qui n'est ccrtes pas le cas du système juridique international.
Ainsi. par exemple et pour se limiter a un seul pays dont la législation etla
jurisprudence en ont certainement influence beaucoup d'autres. le professeur
hlorel fait observer. dans la deuxième éditionde son Trailéc;Ieineir~air dee
procédurecivilejrançaise (Paris. 1949. p. 300-3 10).que :
« La demande en intervention doit êtrede la compétence du tribunal
saisi de la demande principale. sauf la prorogation légalede juridiction
dans les cas ou elle est admise»
De mime, Robert indique avecautorité qu'en matière d'arbiiragqeui -
on voudra bien l'admettre - présente des afinites singulières avec la proce-
dure internationale :
(<Llnterveniionvolontaireétantincompatible avec lecaractérecontrac-
tuel du compromis. les parties ou une seule d'entre elles peuvent s'y
opposer. L'intervention volontaire n'estdonc possible que si toutes les
parties l'acceptent» (Reper~oirede procédurecivile ercominerciale. t. 1.
1955. no 200.)
En vous soumettant cesdeux citations. j'ai suivi bien volontairement I'exern-
ple de mon contradicteur et ami. le professeur Lalive,qui a également accorde
sa préférenceaux données de la procédurefrançaise.
Cela dit. je m'empresse d'ajouter que. pour ma part. je n'ai pas la moindre
intention de suivre mon éminent collèguedans la direction du droit compare.
Je me bornerai a exprimer toute mon admiration a l'égarddes connaissances
dont ila fait étalagesans épargne. voiremème .sanspitié.En réalitéj.e ne crois
pas qu'en matiere de procèsil y ait réellementde véritablesprincipes généraux
communs aux différents droits internes qui auraient exerce. en tant que tels.
une influence marquéesur le développement du procès international. Je n'ai
aucune peine a admettre que les choses en sont autrement en ce qui concerne
les règlesde fond ou l'influence des principes générauxdes droits internes et
notamment du droit privé a été considérable. J'ai beaucoup admire. acet égard.
le passage de L'opiniondissidente du juge Anzilotti, a l'arrètno I1.concernant
la nature et les caractéres deslimites de la chose jugée. Qu'il me soitaussitôt
permis d'observer que la chose jugée estune notion qui relève essentiellement
du droit civil- c'est-à-direde règlesde substance. de fond - et non pas du
dr.oit de la procédure. L'institution de la chose jugée demeure. quinze siècles
après. telle qu'elle avait étédéfiniedans le Digc~sre Justinien :Re.s,jirrli~aru
pro i~rriraleirahrtur. M. Anziloiti s'est donc limite a examiner certaines
conséquencesd'ordre processuel d'une institutiontiré.eu droit civil. 394 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
a En réaliié.il faut eviter une confusion toujours possible entre certaines
notions de base qui sont propres a toutes les grandes branches du droit et les
véritablesprincipes generaux du droit interne dont il est question a l'articl38.
paragraphe I cl. du Statut de la Cour. Sans doute. il faut reconnaitre qu'il y a
certaines idéesélémentairesqui constituent le tissu structural de tout phéno-
mènejuridique et de tout système de procédure.telles que la notion de partie.
de droit d'action. de qualitépour agir. d'ordonnance. de jugement.
IIs'agitici.je le répéte, es outilsde base comme la notion de sujet. de droit
subjectif. voire mêmede règlejuridique. Mais des que I'oncherche a aller plus
loin eta individualiser ces principes communs au sens véritablede l'expression.
I'on est aussit8t en dificulte. Force est-il de penser immédiatement a la
distinction entre juridiction et compétencequi est caractéristique de certains
systemes nationaux et qui. par contre. est totalement ignorée par d'autres
systemes. Peut-on réellement.dans ces conditions, songer a utiliser des préten-
dus principes genérauxdu droit interne pour déterminer cequ'est lajuridiction
en droit international. alors que ce dernier ne connait mémepas de distinction
entre juridiction etcompétence?
A vrai dire, le recours aux principes genéraux du droit interne devrait
toujours êtreréalisecuin grano salis. avec toutes les précautions nécessaires.
C'est seulement a cette condition que I'on éviterait de confondre entre des
principes de ce genre et l'illusionde voir de tels principes la ou, en réalitéi,l n'y
a que la transposition involontaire de la formation culturelle de l'interprètesur
un plan qu'il prétendêtre plus général. seulement parcequ'il lui est plus
familier.
Ur. en matière d'intervention, et notamment en ce qui concerne la question
de la compétence en matière d'intervention, il n'y a mème pas besoin de
rechercher s'il y a vraiment des principes genéraux communs aux différents
systemes juridiques de droit interne. Peu importe :vu qu'en réalité c'eslte
problème de lajuridiction en tant que tel qui se pose différemment selonqu'il
s'agit du droit international ou d'un droit interne quelconque. Point n'est
besoin d'insister ici pour rappeler en quoi consiste cette différencecapitale. En
droit interne. la fonction juridictionnelle est institutionnalisée, centralisée,
confiéea des structures superposéesaux sujets.alors qu'en droit international
c'est le volontarisme qui l'emporteet ce sont lessujets eux-mémesqui détermi-
nent de par leur propre volonté si, et dans quelles conditions, la solution d'un
litige déterminé doitêtre confiéeau juge. Ainsi que la Caur permanente
l'affirma dès le début,dans l'affairede 1'Usitie de Cltorzhu+ (co/>tpke~ice ,rrd
1i1'8,192 7,C'P. .J./.sc;riCtir9. p. 19) :(<la juridiction de la Cour est toujours
une juridiction limitéen'existant que dans la mesure ou les Etats l'ont ad-
mise... >>ou. si I'on préfère.dans l'affaire des Cortces.xia~iM s uvro~il)iiu~ieli
Pu/e,s~i~t(ccirre11"2, 1924, C.P.J.I. sciriA 11" 2. p. 16) : « sa juridiction est
limitée...'>parce qu'uelle se fonde toujours sur leconsentement du demandeur
et ne saurait subsister en dehors des limites dans lesquelles ce consentement a
étédonne U.
Nous nous approchons ainsi du cŒur mêmedu problème.Assurément. ilest
inutile d'ajouter toute autre citation. qu'elle soittiréede lajurisprudence de la
Cour permanente ou de votre haute juridiction. Le principe du fondement
volontaire de lajuridiction de la Cour est un principe dotit la validité nesaurait
êtremise en discussion. La question essentielle est ici plutôt celle de savoir si.
en matiére d'intervention. la compétence de la Cour est régiepar les régles PLAIWIRIE DE M. MALINTOPPI 395
générales énoncéep sar l'articl36 ou bien si, exceptionnellement. l'on est en
présenceici d'une compétenceétablied'une maniere directe par le Statut de la
Cour lui-méme.
Sans doute. le Statut connaît des hypothèses dans lesquelles la compétence
de la Cour est déterminéepar le Statut lui-même.L'exemple leplus immédiat
nous est fournit par le paragraphe 2 de l'article62. Bien entendu, mêmeici. le
fondement de la compétence de la Cour résidetoujours dans la volonté des
parties. La différenceentre ce caset lescas visesa l'article 36 découle du fait
que lorsque la compétencede la Cour est établie directement par le Statut, les
Etats ont manifesté lavolontk de la lui conférerau moment 06 ilssont devenus
parties au Statut.
Quoïqu'il en soit. le paragraphe 2 de l'article 62 n'a pour objet. de toute
évidence,que la competence de laCour pour se prononcer sur la demande en
intervention. Celle-ci. on l'a vu, doit etre autorisée par la Cour. ce qui est
précisémentl'objet de la présente procédure incidente. hlais la competencc
découlant de l'article 62. paragraphe 2. ne s'étend nullement au-delà du
prononcé sur l'autorisation a intervenir. II s'ensuit que'l'arti62,ne confère
aucuriement a la Cour. d'une maniere expresse. la competence pour connaitre
du fond de la demande de 1'Etatintervenant. a supposer que l'intervention ait
été autorisée.
Dans ces conditions. le Gouvernement de hlalte n'aurait évidemment d'au-
tre possibilitéque de soutenir que la compétence de la Cour. pour connaitre
d'une procédureétendueau tiers intervenant. serait implicite dans le système
de I'article62. Nous nous attendions donc a des efforts désespéréd sans cette
direction.a Lalumière notamment de la réferencecontenue dans la requête. a
l'innovation que constituerait l'artic81. paragraphe 2 cl.du Règlement par
rapport aux versions précédentes.Ces efforts sont venus au cours de la
procédure orale - bien que sousune forme quelque peu étonnante - maisje
crois qu'il sumra de mieux préciser certains points de I'interpretation des
travaux préparatoires des textes de la Cour pour rétablirla réalitédes choses.
Nous nàvons aucune dificulté a admettre. de ce côté de la barre. qua
I'occasionde la préparation dupremier Règlement.celui du 24 mars 1922. les
opinions des membres de la Cour permanente etaient relativement partagées
quant a la question de savoir si l'intervention devaitetre subordonnée 5 la
présence d'un lien juridictionnel entre les parties a l'instance et les tiers
cherchant a intervenir.
Mais ce qui est de loin beaucoup plus important, c'estde rappeler pourquoi
un certain nombre de juges de la Cour permanente estimaient que I'article 62
du Statut de cette cour - passésans changement dans le Statut de votre Cour
- devait etre interprétéde faconapermettre. dans les motsde lord Finlay. aux
Etats d'accepter le Statut de la Courcavec la conviction que, si une question
touchant leurs intérêtvsitaux se présentaitdevant laCour, ilsseraient appelésa
communiquer leur opinion )>(C.P.J.Isc;riCD 11"2. p.90). En réalité. etainsi
que M. Anzilotti le faisaiobserver immédiatement après. selon lord Finlay
l'articl62 viserait<lescas présentantun intérëtau point de vue du droit inter-
national » (ihid.).
En d'autres termes. les divergences de vues au sein de la Cour découlaient
surtout des tendances généreusesde la périodeantérieure a la premièreguerre
niondiale en vue de I'etablissernent d'un système judiciaire de solution des
différendsinternationaux. Si ces tendances avaient étéoubliées par une opi-396 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
nion publique bouleversée par la première guerre mondiale, elles demeuraient
encore, et parfois intactes, au niveau culturel dans l'esprit des savants. L'idée
mêmede la Sociétédes Nations s'inspirait d'ailleurs de ces principes, qui
n'étaientpas aussi morts que M. Bathurst aimerait le faire croire pour les
besoins de sa cause. Et c'est ainsi que M. Altamira pouvait a juste titre faire
« observer que le projet des juristes de 1920 étaitfondésur le principe de la
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour >)et que « lorsque ce principe fut modifiépar
l'Assemblée,on a malheureusement omis de faire concorder letexte decertains
articles avec le nouveau principe qu'on a introduit n. C'est-à-dire, avec le
principe du fondement volontaire de la juridiction de la Cour. Dans ces
conditions, l'oncomprend pourquoi lesvéritablescaractei'esde lajuridiction de
la Cour n'avaient pas encore été pleinementdégagesparmi certains membres
de la Cour permanente.
Par contre. une opinion a la fois lucide et complète dans ses prémissestout
autant que dans ses conséquencesest celle du juge Anzilotti. qui :
(<croit qu'aux termes de I'article,62du Statut. le droit d'intervention peut
seulement exister. soit en vertu d'unaccord entre les deux parties initiales.
soit lorsque ces parties aussi bien que celles qui désirent intervenir. ont
acceptéla disposition facultative concernant la juridiction obligatoire de la
Cour triillid.p. 87 ).
Ainsi donc. dans l'espritde M. Anzilotti, I'intervention viséepar l'article62
déduitde l'article 36 lesconditions du procèsen ce qui concerne lacompétence
pour connaitre d'une instanceélargieau tiers intervenant. En d'autres termes,
l'article62 ne contient aucune règlesur la compétence,sauf celle.extrèmement
limitée.qui porte sur l'admissibilitéde la demande en intervention. Mais lejuge
Anzilotti ne se limita pas a indiquer le principe. II s'empressa d'en préciserla
iufio :<(les Etats hésiteraient a s'adresser a la Cour s'ils avaient a craindre
I'intervention, dans leur procès, d7Etatstiers >Ifihid.).
En réalitéi,lest évidentque s'il n'enétaitpas ainsi et si tout Etat. du fait de
s'êtreengagé dans une procédure judiciaire a l'égardd'un Eiat donné, se
trouvait exposé a I'intervention de tout Etat tiers dont les intérêtjsuridiques
seraient mis en cause. le fondement volontaire de la juridiction de la Cour en
serait considérablement affecté.
II est pourtant vrai que d'aprésun autre juge non moins connu. et aussi
éminentque Dionisio Anzilotti. John Bassett Rloore, I'intervention des Etats
tiers aurait 'd~iétrefacilitéesurtout lorsqu'il s'agirait des grandes puissances.
Ainsi qu'il est égalementrelatédans les travaux préparatoiresde 1922 :
<<En relevant le faitqu'aucune grande Puissance n'a jusqu'ici accepté la
disposition facultative. M. Moore déclare qu'ilest d'autant plus désirable
de donner a ces Puissances[grandes Puissances].ledroit de venir devant la
Cour dans des procès introduits par de petites Puissances. afin d'obtenir
ilne décisionde celles-cistir les grands principes de droit. I)flbid..p. 91.)
Ainsi'la Cour étaitpartagéeentre une sorte de <(doctrine Anzilotti >).quali-
fiéepar le réalismede son auteur et par le souci de placer tous les problèmes
concernant la juridiction de la Cour dans le cadre rigou'reux de sa nature
volontaire et'réciproque. et une sorte de <<doctrine hloore )>qui tendait par
contre a créerles prémissespour une organisation institutionnelle de la justice
internationale. Bien entendu. Anzilotti et hloore se plaçaient t'un et l'autre. en
pleine bonne foi. dans l'optique du moment. hlais les temps n'étaientguère
ravorables a des élansvers l'extension maximale de lajuridiction obligatoire.
La lettre de l'article62 ne donne certes pas trop d'espace a des élans dece PLAIDOIRIE DE M. MALINTOPPI 397
genre. et I'on comprend aisément pourquoi. Toutefois. bien que l'opinion
dBAnzilottiétait également partagéepar d'autres juges et notamment par les
juges telsque h1h.l.h,lax Huber et Negulesco. I'on finitpar se ralliera lasagesse
de M. Anzilotti qui proposa lui-meme de laisser a la pratique de laCour le soin
de résoudre la question au fur et a mesure dans les cas qui se présenteraient
devant elle.
Lors de la revision du Règlement en 1935 - celle qui devait aboutir au
Règlement du 1I mars 1936 -. le juge ~nzilotti posa de nouveau dans des
termes fort précisla question de la juridiction de lCour : NSi deux Etats.oni
signé un compromis. sont-ils toujours tenus d'accepter l'intervention d une
tierce Puissance ?»en ajoutant que :« La mémequestion se pose d'ailleurs au
sujet d'une affaire introduite par requête>)(C.PJ.1.sérieD, rroisièrnadderi-
dum au ,t02, p.306). La Cour. une fois de plus. préférade ne pas aborder le
sujet et se borna a maintenir la solution adoptée par le Réglementantérieur.
c7est-a-dire.le silence sur la questide la juridiction.
D'autrepart. une telletendancc au renvoi de la question n'avaitcertes pas été
entravée par le comportement des Etats devant la Cour. Sans doute. une
demande d'intervention fut présentéeaussitôt dans la première affairedont la
Cour permanente fut saisie. celle du Vapeur Wimbledon. Mais I'Etatcherchant
a,intervenir. la Pologne. qui avait en premier lieu demandé à intervenir en
venu de I'arricle62. fut amenépar la Cour elle-mémea sefonder plutoi sur
l'artic63. Et la Cour le constata dans son arrétdu 17 août 1923.
La Cour permanente n'eut donc pas d'occasion de se pencher sur ces (<cas
spéciaux» qui. selon la formule indiquée par le juge Anzilotti lors de la
rédaction du Règlement originaire de 1922. aurait dù lui permettre de se
prononcer sur la portéede l'article62 au point de vue de sajuridiction (C.P.J.1.
sériD e ti02, p. 90).
La Cour actuelle. àson tour. n'a pas étéen mesure de profiter de I'interven-
tion de Cuba dans I'affaireHqva de la Torre. vu que celle-ci relevait. elle aussi.
de l'article63 (C.IJ. Recueil 1951. p. 76-77).Ce n'estdonc qu'a la suite de la
re;luète d'intervention du Gouvernement fidjien dans les affaires des Essais
riucléoiresque LaCoura ete finalement saisie d'une demande fondée sur
l'article62. 11est bien vrai que par ses deux arrêtsdu 20 décembre 1974 la
Cour dit que les demandes, respectivement. de l'Australie et de la Nouvelle-
.Zélandeétaient désormaissans objet et qu'iln'y avait déslors pas liea statuer.
IIest aussi vrai que le mêmejouret par voie d'ordonnance la Cour dit que. par
conséquent.la demande d'intervenir tombait et qu'iln'yavait plus aucune suite
à lui donner(C.1.J. Recueil 1974, p. 535 et suiv.).Néanmoins. la question était
desormais sur le tapis. C'est pourquoi ladite décisionconstitue. dans le pro-
bleme qui nous occupe. un véritabletournant.
Nous avons déjà examiné. dans nos observations écrites. la décision en
question et notamment les déclarationsqui l'accompagnent. Dans un souci de
brièveté.je crois donc pouvoir me reporter tout simplement audit exposé.
d'autant plus que plusieurs des auteurs de ces déclarations siègent encore.
aujourd'hui. sur le banc de la Cour. J'aurai beaucoup d'hésitationavant de
suggéreraux éminents membres de cette Cour une interprétation quelconque
de leur propre penséeou de la penséedes autres juges non moins éminentsqui
étaient leurs collèguesen 1974.398 PLATEAU CONTINENAL
Les travaux préparatoires de ce dernier Règlement ii'ontpas encore été
publiés.Au surplus. iciencore il me serait particulièrement dificile d'exprimer
devant votre haute juridiction des opinions quelconques ;ice sujei vu qu'un,
temps très court s'est écoulédepuis I'adopiion dudit Réglcment. Dans ces
conditions. je voudrais plutôt me limiter a deux considerations qui seroni
cependant. à mon avis. sufisantes pour montrer qu'en adoptaiit l'article 81.
paragraphe 2 d. du nouveau Reglemcni la Cour a inicrpretf correctement
l'article62 du Statut sans y introduire aiiciin elcnicnt nouveau.
[in réalitél.ors de la dernière revision du Réglement.la COLITa.ppelee par la
décisionde 1974 i concentrer l'attention sur l'article 62 du Statut. a pu en
ménietemps profiter de I'esperience acquise le long d'un demi-siècleen ce qui
concerne le rondement. ta nature el les limites qui caracteriseni sa propre
compétence. L'on ctait dksorrnais bien loin. en 1978. de certaines idées -
oserais-je dire. de certaines illusions généreuses - qui étaientencore présentes
5 plusieurs esprits en 1922. Entre 1 922 el 1978. en d'autres termes. la Cour a
bien précise le sens dans lequel sa compétence constitue une compétence
(qvolontaire >). A cet égardje pourrais retenir trois anirmations et précisions
contenues dans lajurisprudence de la Cour :
1. <(La Cour. en considérationdii fait que sa juridiction est liniitée.qu'elle se
fonde totijours sur leconsentement en dehors des limites dans lesquelles ce
consentement est donne ..)) (Coricessiu~iM s arrroi?riiiaricJ1lPulrs~i~rea.rrri
tr02, 1924, C.P.J.1.serie A it?, p. 16) :
2. (<La juridiction de la Cour est toujours une juridiction limitée.n'esistant
que dans la mesure ou les Etats l'ont adniise ..)) (Usirie de Cliorzow~,
coiripe'i:reiiarri.1 iioX, 1927. C.P.J.I.shir A i1"9,p. 32) :
3. Et s~irtoui : (<Statuer siIr la responsabilitéinternationale de l'Albanie sans
son conwntenient serait agir A l'encontre d'un principe de droit internatio-
nal bien etabli el incorpore dans le Slatui. ;isavoir que la Cour ne peLit
esercer sajuridiction a l'égardd'un Iztatsi ce n'estavec leconsentement de
ce dernier )>(Oriiio~it;fairperis à Ro~iic CI? 194-3. arrei, C.I.J.RL>CLI1 L954I.
p. 31).
Si l'onconsidèreces afirmations typiqiies sur le rondement de lajuridiction
de la Cour. ilest aisé des'apercevoir qiiecc sont en réalité l'objeett l'étenduede
la volonte d~i dkfendeur qui déterminentla mesure de taconipftencede laCour
dans une instance déterminée.1.ajiiridiction décoiileen effet de la volonté des
parties. c'csl-i-dire de la conibinaison des nianifestations iiidividiielles de
volonté des différentesparties ati prods. Or. dans le cris de I'interveniion. la
deniande de I'Eiaicherchant 1 iniervenir vise précisénient klargir le doniaine
subjectif de la proced~irc.
IIest vrai que les distinguésconseils dti Gotivernenient de Xlalteont essaye
de se tirer de celte inipasse en soutenant qiic dans le sysleriicde l'article62 du
Stattii I'Etalintcrvcriant ne sera pas cn rt'alitéilne <<partie n vbritabte. niais une
((quasi-partic )OLI niéme.selon la foriiiiile toiiie no~ivellcdti professeur Lalive.
lin <<participant J>.hlais - ainsi qiic nies confrères. et noninient hl. Kcith
IIighei, l'on dénionirece matin - le gouvernenient cherçhaiit Pintervenir se
heurie ici ri lin dileninie inévitable :ou bien I'Itat cherchani ri iniervenir iie
(q demande )Jrien au sens juridique el forniel de l'espression. ci son iiitervcn-
lion ne sa~iraitalors étreautorisée : OLIbien ce nienie Etai <(deniande )>quelqlie
chrise. niénie ;i Lire des remarques. et il devient des lors dans ces finiiles. si
I'iniervention est adniise. un sujet au sens formel de la procidiire.
[)ans ccs conditions, et en ce qui concerne le Statiit de la Cour. ils'agitdoiic
d'~ineinierveniioii dans laq~iellcle tiers cherchant i intervenir est iiiiveritablc PLAIDOIRIE DE M. MALINTOPPI 399
dcniandcur et par rapport i laquelle lesparties initialesa l'instance sont des
défendeurs au sens propre de l'expression. II s'ensuit que c'est le résultat
cuniulatif de la volontéde I'uneet de l'autre des parties initiales combinéeavec
lavolontédu tiers irltervenant qui donne. en droit international. la mesure de
.la conipetence nécessairepour décidersur une instance élargieau tiers interve-
nant. Point n'est-il besoina ce stade. de rappeler que Malte n'est pas partie au
compromis conclu entre la Libye et la Tunisie et qu'il n'y a pas d'autre lien
jtiridictionnel qui soit cornniun aus tr0.i~Etats.
La derisieme constatation à faire au sujet de la solution adoptee par le
Reglenient de 1978.cést que la Cour. a juste titre. aexclu que l'intervention
viskepar l'article62 soit l'objetde I'unedes formes dejuridiction <<incidente ))
OU <<inhérente » ou (<accessoire » ou <<jmplicitement obligatoire »prévues par
le Stattit de la Cour.
De toute évidence. il nést point nécessaired'examiner ici dans lesdétails
I'ensembtedes problèmes poses par lajuridiction dite <iincidente )de la Cour.
IIs'agit.d'aprèsles opinions doctrinales courantes. de la competence viséepar
des dispositions duStatut telles que lesarlicles 36.paragraphe 6. 41,53.60.61,
62 et. en ce qui concerne la recevabilitéde la demande, 63 et 64.
.1\cet égard.je me bornerai a renvoyer aux exposéssystématiquesde mes
savants collègueset amis. les professeurs Briggs (((La compétence incidentede
la Cour internationale de Justice en tant que competence obligatoire n.dans
Revue gérleralede droit interiiatioianp/ublic, 1960.p. 2 17 etsuiv.) et Starace
(La coirtperettzadella Corre interiiationoledi giustiziairtmuteria conlenziosa.
Naples. 1970. p.249 et suiv.).
Ce qu'il fautcependant souligner ici. c'estque. dans le système du Statut de
la Cour. la competence incidente est l'exception et non la règle. La règleest
celle de la compétence volontaire. telle qu'elle ressort de I'articl36 du Statut.
L'ensemble des normes qui établissent la competence incidente est constitue
par conséquentpar des règlesd'interprétation stricte.Ainsi. si la Cour qui ne
pouvait encore laisser subsister. après sadécisionde 1974 sur la demande en
intervention de Fidji. I'equivoquedu Règlementde 1922. si la Cour - disais-je
- avait interprétéen 1978 l'article 62 comme impliquant ipso jure une
juridiction obligatoire et incidentequant au fond. elle aurait en réalitéapporte
une modification a l'article 62du Statut et. plus généralement.au systèmequi
est a la base meme de sa juridiction. Mais laCour n'a pasinnové.En adoptant
en 1978 l'article 8 1. paragraphe 2 c). du nouveau Règlement, elle a tout
simplement interpreté. et de la façon la plus correcte. le sens et la portéede
l'article62 du Statut pour résoudre ce que le juge Anzilotti appelait justement
((la question de la juridiction >PEn d'autres termes, la Cour a précisément
résolula question en accordant a ce que je me suis permis de qualifier comme
la <(doctrine Anzilotti )> la préférence a celle,que j'ai nommé la «doctrine
ktoore u.
+
J'en ai ainsi terminéavec la première partie - et. rassurez-vous. de loin la
plus longue - de mon intervention. En effet je crois vous avoir montre
pourquoi I'articte 62 exige qu'un lien juridictionnel entre tous les sujets soit
etabli pour que la demande en intervention puisse être admise.Je crois vous
avoir égalementmontréque l'article62 ne constitue pas de par lui-mêmeun
titre de juridiction etque c'estdoncdans l'articl36 qu'il faut.dans ce cas aussi.
rechercher le fondement de lajuridiction de la Cour. II me reste donc a faire
quelques remarques en ce qui concerne les trois versions qui caractérisent laposition du Gouvernement de hlalte et de ses conseils a ce sujet. Je leferai aussi
brièvement que possible.
Nos distingués contradicteurs soutiennent d'abord que I'article62 n'exige
nullement un lien juridictionnel. Et puisque toujours d'après nos éminents
collègues. I'article62 ne constituerait pas non plus. en soi. un titre de juridic-
tion. hP Bathurst - je ne merefere pour l'instant qu'a lui. vu que leprofesseur
Lalive et hlC Lauterpacht ont été beaucoup plusprudents - MCBathurst,
disais-je. semble impliquer qu'en ce qui concerne I'intervention visée par
I'article62 la juridiction descendrait du ciel.
Les arguments qui devraient étayer cette thèse sont essentiellement au
nombre de trois. Tout d'abord. on vous a fait observer que I'intervention visée
a I'article63 - je dis bien a l'article63- serait ouverte aux Etats parties au
Statut de la Cour et aux Etats qui. tout en étant parties a la convention
multilatéraleque la Cour est appeléea interpréter. ne seraient pas parties au
Statut de laCour. L'onserait tente de répondretout simplement que laquestion
dont la Cour est actuellement saisie relèvede I'article 62 et non pas de l'ar-
ticle 63. hlais je n'ai aucune dificulte a me placer sur le terrain évoquépar
mon éminent contradicteur.
L'octroid'un droit d'intervention a un Etat qui, selon I'article63. est paraie
une convention multilatérale tout en n'étantpas partie au Statut de la Cour
n'est la manifestation ni d'un universalisme juridictionnel ni de l'absence de
tout titre de juridiction. Les Etats qui sont, parties au Statut de la Cour
confèrent par la voie de l'articl63 B tout Etat qui est membre d'une conven-
tion multilatéralesans êtrepartie au Statut le droit d'intervenir lorsque I'inter-
prétationde cette convention est en cause devant la Cour. L'article63 contient
a cet égard une disposition octroyant un droit a un Etat tiers dans le sens
actuellement prévu à l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le
droit des traités. En exerçant ce droit. I'Etat tiers contribue. en ce qui le
concerne. a établirle fondement consensuel de la compétencede la Cour en
l'espèce.
En deuxième lieu, on nous a opposé que si I'article 62 exigeait un lien
juridictionnel entre les parties initialeset I'Etatcherchaatintervenir, le Statut .
-aurait transféré.de la Cour aux parties au litige. le pouvoir d'autoriser I'inter-
vention. L'argument peut êtreaisémentet totalement renverse. Si l'article 62
n'exigeait aucune base de juridiction pour que I'intervention soit admise. les
Etats parties au litige seraient privés du droit, que leur confère l'arti36edu
Statut, de fonder sur leur propre consentement la compétence de la Cour.
En troisièmelieu, il n'est pasexact non plus que si un lienjuridictionnel était
requis I'intervention prévue par I'article 62 se réduiraita néant, puisque si
I'Etat tiers avait un lien juridictionnel a l'égarddes parties initiales a la
procédure.ilaurait tout interet à introduiredevant laCour une instance directe
plutot qu'a demander a intervenir. Une telle thésemeconnait cependant qu'un
Etat ne peut exercer un droit d'action que s'il est partie à un différend
déterminéet que, par contre, l'intérêta intervenir peut subsister mêmelorsque
son titulaire n'estpas partie au differend déjàsoumis a la Cour.
Permettez-moi de saisir cette occasion pour une très courte remarque au
sujet de la citation concernant l'affairedel'Or monétaire.puisque mon distin-
gue contradicteur se méprenda cet égard.Je vous prie de croire. Monsieur le
Président,que je ne peux pas évoquercette affaire sans une profonde émotion.
parce qu'il s'agitd'une affaire qui a étéplaidéedevant votre haute juridiction
par mon maitre vénéré Tomaso Perassi. IIn'ajamais été questiondans l'affaire
de l'Or monétuired'une tcintervention » au sens propre de l'expression. Les
Etats-Unis. le Royaume-Uni et la France. par le traitéde Washington. avaient PLAIDOIRI DEE hl. MALINTOPPI 401
allouéa l'un d'entre eux l'orde la Banque d'Albaniequi avait Etépilléà Rome.
Le traitéde Washington invitait cependant I'ltalieet l'Albanie.qui n'y avaient
pas participe, a saisir la Cour siellesvoulaient contester ladécision prise par les
trois puissances. La Cour fut saisie par L'Italie.mais non pas par l'Albanie.
Dans ces conditions I'ltalielit observer, dans une question qui n'était pasune
exception préliminaire au sens formel, que I'afîaire ne pouvait étreconsidérée
comme étantdu ressort de la compétencede la Cour. si l'Albanie ne prenait
pas. elle aussi. part au procès.D'oucette expression (4intervenir »,dans lesens
de <<prendre part au procès parune introduction d'instance >>,ui fut employée
par la Cour. La Cour. cependant, accepta la thèsedu Gouvernement italien par
une majorité&rasante. Et la Cour déclina sa compétenceprécisémentdu fait
que l'affaire qui lui avait étésoumise ne pouvait pas flre jugéesi l'Albanie ne
l'avait pas, elle aussi. saisiJe ne crois pas que I'onvoudrait prétendre ici que
la Cour ne saurait connaitre de l'affaire viséepar lecompromisentre la Libyeet
la Tunisie parce que Malte n'apas étéinvitce par cesdeux Etats a participer a la
procédure,
En conclusion. si les argunicnts déployéspar Mc Bathurst lemoigneni
assurknient de sa iritrcsr~~i.lest néanmoinsvrai qu'ilsrelèventde ce I'onpeut
qualifier d'arguments de circonstances. Ils n'ont aucun fondement en droit.
niais ils visent a Doserdes oroblèmes de iustice ou de morale vositive aui en
réalitéri-existentpas. Ils se iraduisent notaninieni par de véritables rideauxde
funiéequi essaieni de cacher leprincipe fondamental du procèsinternational. a
savoir le principe qui se iraduil par la formule « pas de juridiction sans
coiiscnlenient >).
1.e professeur Lalive. qiiaiit ii lui. a essiiyL'de se placer sur un terrain
bcaiicoup plus îaniilier. niais eii dt.finitive non nioins glissant. D'après mon
éminent collegue di1 Lenian. la question de la juridiction ne serait qu'un falis
problenie. parce que I'iiitcrveniion se tradiiirait par Linincident de procédure.
hfais ila o~rbliéde voiis dire quel est le biit caractérise de cet incident. II a
noianinient èvitéde VOLIS dire q~i'iinedeniande en intervention vise 1 intro-
duireun nouveau sujet dans Laprocédure. IIa, il esvrai. essayéd'esquiver ce
pctit ditail ei~allégiiantqitc l'iniervenant neserail pas une partie véritable 5 la
procidiirc. ii'empèchcqiie l'intervenant - que je considère.pour ma part. une
partie aLisens propre de la procedure - est en tout cas un sujet dans le cadre
de la procedure parce qiic s'il n'en étaitpas ainsi il ne pourrait mémepas y
prendre la parole. Dés lors.1'Eiatintervenant ne saurait échapperau principe
fc,ndünientaldu procèsin~crnaiional :<*pas dejuridiction sans consentement 1).
Clne fois de plus les pretendiies analogies avec le droit processuel interne sont
riillacieuses.vii que le droit international n'est pas doliéd'une adniiiiistration
de lajustice insiitutionnalisee et siiperpode aux 13tats.
XICI.aiiterpacht. qui connait fort bien lescaracteristiques de la communauté
iiiternationale et de son droit. n'a pas coniniis cette erreur. La thèse d'après
liiq~iellel'article 62 n'esigerait aucun lien de juridiction a dik. toutefois. lui
paraître quelque peu excessive. \'oili pourquoi il s'estempresse aussitôt d'affir-
mer. ait coursde l'audience de jeudi après-midi. que la condition de la
juridiction aurait bel et bien étéréaliséeen l'espèce.Elle l'auraitete du fait que
tes P:irties initialasla procédure.c'est-a-direla Libye et laTunisie. se seraient
rendu compte. lors de la conclusion du compromis. du lien inextricable
q~i'a~irüistubsistéentre le litige qui les opposait el les intérêtde h4alte. De ce
ft~iiIccornproniis ne pouvait pas ne pas impliquer litie attribution de juridic-402 PLATEAUCONTINENTAL
tion a la Cour a l'égardde Malte. Des lors. la juridiction de la Cour pour
connaitre du fond de la demande d'intervention de Malte découlerait du
comportement des Parlies initiales ala procédure.
Cette thèseest nouvelle et surprenante. Elle n'a d'ailleurspa&té reprise ni
par leprofesseur Lalive ni par MeBathurst. L'onpourrait se limiter a répondre
qu'il y ala le cas le plus typique d'un procès d'intention. hfais il vaut peut-être
mieux tâcher de suivre lesequilibrismes qui entachent cette thèse.ne fit-ce que
pour montrer jusqu'ou I'onpeut arriver en désespoirde cause.
De toute évidence.les Partiesau compromis. a savoir la Libye et laTunisie.
n'ont certes pas envisage. dans leur accord. d'attribaela Cour la compétence
pour connaître du fond d'unedemande d'intervention de lapart de Malte. Mais
hl. Lauterpacht n'a pas de dificulté a suggérer qu'a défaut de précision
expresse lecompromis entre la Libye et laTunisie aurait confere a laCour une
juridiction spécifiquea l'égardde hlalte. quece soit par voie de renonciation.
d'implication. deforuin prorogaium ou d'estoppel.
II n'estpas aiséde comprendre ce que serait l'hypothèsede la renonciation
(uloiver)dans un contexte pareil. En réalité.il ne saurait s'agir que d'une sorte
de renonciation préventive au droit d'exciper le défautde compétence de la
Cour. S'ilen était ainsi.I'onne nous a pas fourni la moindre preuve d'une telle
renonciation préventive. A-t-on besoin de rappeler que le fardeau de la preuve
incombe au gouvernement demandeur ?
II ne saurait s'agir non plus d'une attribution implicite de compétence.Urie
rois.de plus. I'on serait ici en présenced'un accord conférant un droit a un
tiers: un accord. en d'autres termes. qui devrait prévoirde la maniere la plus
claire cette attribution de droitsa un tiers conformément aux indications
codifiéespar l'articl36 de la convention de Vienne de 1969.
Quant a la possibilitédu forum prorogatum. il s'agit probablement d'un
moment de distraction de mon éminent ami. Leforum prorogatum suppose
une instance introduite par un demandeur et l'acquiescement de la partie
défenderessequi plaide au fond sans soulever la question de juridiction. Ici. il
s'agirait d'unJorum prorogatum a rebours. Un acquiescement avant la lettre.
un suicide procedural des parties initialasla procédure.
La derniere suggestion a étécelle de Iésloppel.A-t-on réellement besoinde
continuer ? Lestoppel est une institution de lacornmonlaw. dont l'existence en
droit international est trèscontroversee.
Mais enfin tout cetargument se ramène a ceci ;lecomportement des parties
au compromis. la Libye et laTunisie. n'aurait pas accordéa hlalte unfuirdeal
si elles n'avaient octroyé implicitementa la Cour la compétence nécessaire
pour attribuera Malte ledroitde s'immiscerdans le litigesoumis alaCoursans
que cet Etat tiers soit aucunement liépar la conclusion de cette procédure.
c'est-à-dire par lejugement de la Cour. L'argument ne porte évidemmentpas,
mais ce qu'il y a de piquant c'est que MCLauterpacht se livrea un effort bien
hardi pour trouver atout prix un consentementquelconque de la Libyeel de la
Tunisie à l'intervention de Malte. alors que leprofesseur Lalive.etMCBathurst.
quant a eux. voudraient plutôt se passer de tout consentement en l'espèce.
II me reste a examiner une toute derniere question. hlalte. on le sait, a
communiqué au Secrétaire général deN s ations Unies. le2 ja~?vier1981, une
nouvelle communication pour élargirla portéede son acceptation de lajuridic-
tion obligatoire de la Cour contenue dans la première déclaration d6 décem-
bre 1966. L'on adéjàsouligne a cetégard.dans nos observations écrites.que le
faitmême d'avoir dû recourir a cette déclaration nouvelle montre combien PLAIDOIRIE DE M. MALlNTOPPl 403
Malte a eu, des le début,et pour cause, assez peu de confiance danç sa thèse
principale quanta l'absence de toute règleexigeant un lien de juridiction en
matiered'intervention. Au cours des discussions oraleMC Bathurst s'estélevé
contre une telle constatation. Malte, nous a-t-ildit, réaffirme en tous points la
validitédesa thèseprincipale quant a l'absencde toute règleexigeant un tien
juridictionnel en matiere d'intervention sur la base de l'ar62. La nouvelle
-déclarationde Malte aurait étéforméedans l'hypothk OU la Cour ne voudrait
pas accepter la thèse principale de Malte. Si donc la Cour devait exiger,
hypothèse très lointaine pourMC Bathurst, un lien quelconque de juridiction,
elle n'aurait qu'a prendre acte de cette déclarationde Malte pour lui accorder le
droit d'intervenir.
La Cour connait fort bien l'histoiredela clause facultativeLa clause qui
figurea l'articl36,paragraphe 2,vient en réalitéde plus loin. Ainsi qu'est
relatépar l'éminent jugequi fut aussi le premier présidentde la Cour perma-
.nente, M. Loder («The Permanent Court of International Justice and Compul-
sory Jurisdiction »,dans The BritishYear Book oflnternational Law. 1921-
1922, p.6 et suiv.), la clause en questiontire son origine de la conféreLaede
.Hayede 1907. Le systèmeque l'onenvisageait a l'époqueavait évoluéau cours
de la conférencevers une solution prévoyant desacceptations réciproques,, d.
la part des Etats,de l'obligation de soumettre a l'arbitrage des catégories
déterminéesde diffkrents internationaux. C'est cette solution est a labase ,
du texte qui figure dans le Statut de la Cour 1920.
Or, laN réciprocité» dont il est question ici est inhérentela clause elle-
même. Selonla formule de l'article 36. paragraphe 2,la reconnaissance de la
juridiction obligatoire ne produit d'effetal'égard de touautreEtat acceptant
la mêmeobligation ». Par conséquent,la volontémanifestéepar un Etat déter-
miné dese soumettre a lajuridiction de la Cour par la voie de la déclaration*
prévueà l'article 36, paragraph2,ne peut se combiner qu'avecdes manifesta-
tions de volontérendues par d'autres Etatspar lamême voie etsous la même
forme.Par contre, la volonté résultantd'unedéclaratidece genre ne sauraise
combiner avec un titre'de juridiction d'une autre nature, tel que celui résultant
d'uncompromis, d'une clause cornpromimire ou d'un traitgénéral d'arbitrage.
Et puisque ni la Libye ni la Tunisie n'ont déposdesdéclarationsen vertu de
l'artic36.paragraphe 2, leGouvernemen de Malte ne sauraitinvoquer pareille
basedejuridiction pour étayersa demandeen intervention.
La déclarationde Malte demeure, par conséquent,ce qu'elleest :une « offre
de juridictio»,ou, si l'on préfère, une invitation a la valse qui suppose que le
partenaire, ou plutôt, dans notrecas, les partenaires soient disposéa s'en
prévaloir.Tel n'estcertepas lecas en relatioavecla demande en intervention
dont la Cour est qctuellement saisLa.Libye est toutafait prêteàréglerpar la
voiejudiciaire te différendconcernanlesprincipes à appliquer dans la délimi-
tation du plateau continentalappartenant, respectivement, Malte et a la Libye
elle-même.Mais elle estdisposéea le faire au moment opportun et dans une
,instanceréservé aux deux Etatsintéressésacettedélimitation.11n'ya aucune
raison pour transformer des questions d'ordre bilatéralen un règlement judi-
ciaire ouvertiiune série presque indéterminée d'Etats.En d'autres termes, la
Libye voit avec sympathie l'invitatioa la valse, mais elle verrait par contre
avec beaucoup moins d'enthousiasme toute tentative de Malte de l'entraîner
dans une danse a trois ou mêmedans un quadrille.
L audience est levéeà 13 h I5 Presetits:[Voiraudience du 19 III 81.]
DECLARATIONDE M. BENGHAZI
AGENT DUGOUVERNEMENT DE LA TUNISIE
M.BENGHAZI : Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour, c'estpour
moi un grand honneur et un privilègeque de paraître devant vous, comme
agent de mon gouvernement,etje voudrais vous exprimer mesremerciements
de me donner l'occasion depouvoir exposer le point de vue de la Tunisie sur
certains points de la requêtemaltaise.
Mes éminentscollègues,,le professeur Robert Jennings et le professeur
Sadak Belaïdauront, avec votre permission,l'opportunitéd'exposerà la Cour,
par lasuite,d'une manière&aucoup plusdétailléleapositiondema délégation
sur d'autres aspects légaux ejturidiques decetterequê,t ce,ala lumièredes
déclarationsfaitespar les honorables représentantsde Malte.
La requêtemaltaisea éti:enregistréeau Greffedela Cour le 30janvier 191
et lesParties ont présentéleurs observations écritesdans le délafixépar la
Cour, c'est-à-direle 26 février1981.
tesdeux'parties ayant faitobjection,toutes les deux, a la requêtedeMalte,
la Cour a decidéla tenuedei présentesaudiencesconformémenta l'article84,
paragraphe 2, du Règlementde la Cour.
La Cour a successivemententendu les représentants de la Républiquede
Malte et ceux de la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne.
La Tunisie,A son tour, va s'efforcerdans toutelamesure de ses moyens,
d'apporter sa contributionau débat,en présentantun certain nombre d'obser-
va tions complémentajre Ascellesqu'ellea respectueusement soumises a la
Cour par lettreen date du 25 février1981.
Je voudrais signalertout d'abordque la Tunisieest tout a faitconsciedue
souci de Malte d'avancer dans la déterminationdes limites de son plateau
requête.tal, souci exprimépar Malte notamment au paragraphe 5 de sa
Nonobstant cette compréhension, laTunisie estime devoir s'opposer a la
requêtemaltaise,pour des raisons qui lui semblenttout àfaitsérieuseset qui
sont lessuivantes:
En premier lieu, la Tunisie est d'avisque la requêtea find'intervention
maltaise n'est pas fondéeen,droit.Ce point sera particulièrementdéveloppé
ultérieurementpar MM. lesprofesseursJennings et Belaïd.
Celaquant au fond.
Par ailleurs, l'exposéque nous avons entendu qui a étéfait au nom du
Gouvernement de Malte souligne certaines autres complexitésdu problème.
Par exemple la complexitéde la zone caractériséepar ce qu'ona qualifi« an
overlapping of claims ».Si la Cour a notre avis était amenéea prendre en
considérationcette situation'complexeavant de trancher le différendentre la
Tunisie et la Libyeilen résulterait semble-t-il,inévitablement, unerépercus-sion négativesur le cours normal de la procédureet une prolongation injusti-
fiée .tcertainement tresdommageablepour les Parties.desdélaisdans lesquels
la Cour devrait normalement. raisonnablement rendre son arrét.
L'éminent agent de Malte, M. I'Airr~rii~~-G~~ici-oMl izzi. au cours de son
intervention est alle jusqu'A affirmer ce qui suit (ci-dessusp.285) :
,(it would be possible . . . and ask whether, given Maita's geographical
situation in the bledilerranean. relative toLibya and Tunisia. it would be
proper for the Court to'give an). decisionat all. even in thecurrent f.i/?ivri/
T~iirisicasenow before.it, without hearing Malta ».
J'ignore comment la Cour envisagerait la suite de la procédure si cet
argument devait etre retenii. maisje medoisde vous rairepart. tresrespecttrcu-
scment. desvives prEoccupationsde mon gouvernement üce sujet.
La Cour n'ignore certainement pas les circonstances dans lesquelles a kt6
signé lecompromis tuniso-libyen du 10juin 1977. en vertu duquel la Tunisie
et la Libyeont saisila Cour de leur differend.
Je ne suis nullement habilité,cela va sansdire. a parler au nom d'un aulre
gouvernement que le mien. hlais je peux affirmer que le Gouvernenient
tunisien. en ce qui Ic concerne. lurait certainement hîsi~é a s'engagerdans la
voie d~icompromis du IOjuin 1977qui intéresseun problème considtréde Iü
plus estrémeimportance pour laTunisie. si mon gouvernement avait pu croire
que desEtats tiers pouvaient intervenir dans I'afCairesoumise a laCour sur des
bases juridiq~ies aussi impréciseset aussi peu restrictives que celles sur les-
quelles R.lalteprétendjustifier sa requéle.
La position de hlalte en elfe1ne tend. en dernière analyse. rien moins qu'a
soutenir qu'il existe un droit pour n'impone quel Etat rt'intervenir. el sans
aucune conséquencepour lui. dans tout litige porté devant la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice. au seul motif qu'il considère posséderun interet quelconqiie
d'ordre juridique. si faibleet si hypothétiquesoit-il. Or. ceci nous semblegrave
et nous semble s'opposer l'exigenced'une administration rapide et ordonnée
de la justice.
Je ne voudrais pas. h'lonsieur le Présideni.m'étendresur ce point qui sera
developpépar lesorateurs qui me suivront.
Parcontre. ily a unequestion sur laquellej'aimcrais. avecvotre perniissicin,
attirer respectueusementl'attention de la Cour.
Gcneralement. lorsqu'un dirferend surgit entre deus ou plusieurs Etats. ces
derniers n'ont pas recours ininiédiatementail règlementjudiciaire. Ilsessaient
dans une première phaseet dans laplupart des casde trouver une solution a
leu^differend par la voie de négociations.
1-erecours au règlenientjudiciaire constitue. quand il arrive. une rcconnais-
sance iniplicite de l'échecdes négociationsengagées.lesqiiclles nkgociations
d'ailleurs doivent selon lesexigencesde la Cour avoir i'tk nienirs de telle raqoii
qit'elle(<aient un sens )>.
Vans le domaine particulier de la délimitation du pjoteaii conliiienlal il
existe.on le sait. une condition prévuetant par l'article 6 de la convcntioii dc
Gcneve de 1958 qiie par les diïférents textes de la troisienie conféreiicedcs
Naiions Unies sur le droit de la mer. 5 savoir q~ic la dt.liniitatioi1 doil Ctrc
crfcctute « par voie d'accord )i.
C'estseulementdans lecüs ou desnégociationsdc boiiiie Coietqui <<aientiiii
seiis}>n'ont pu aboutir 6 lin accordque lesEtats peuvciit envisagerlerecour3
iin règlementjudiciaire.
l.'un des distingues avocats de hialte s'est longueiiient étendu. daiis son
intervention dejeudi dernier. siir le fait qu'iyaiirait e~idesncgociationscnirc406 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
les Parties. II a invoqué particulièrement l'échangede notes diplomatiques
intervenu a dirfkrentes dates entre hlalte. d'une part. et la Tunisie. la Libye et
I'lhlie. d'autre part.
Je tiensa réserverd'ores etdéjà.expressément.la position de mon gouverne-
ment quant a l'interprétation abusivequ'a voulutirer le distingué représentant
de hlalte de cet échange.
II n'y a rien dans les correspondances entre Malte et la Tunisie qui puisse
valablement ètreconsidéréfût-cecomme une simple amorce de négociationset
d'ailleurs on pourra aisément le vérifieren consultant ces documents que le
Gouvernement de hlalte s'estengage a produire.
II y a un autre point que j'aimerais signaler. II s'agit des deux notes
tunisiennes dont des copies ont été adressées a La Valette en mai 1976 et au
sujet desquelles l'éminentavocat de hlatte a déclaré :
<(why should Tunisia have sent copies of these notes to Malta ifit were
no1 in recognition of hlalta's special interest in delimitation of the
continental shelf in the area and the factors relevant thereto >)
Je ne voudrais pas sur ce point décevoirle distingue représentant de Malte,
mais l'explicationest tout autre que cellea laquelle il a pensé.
En effet copies de ces notes ont étécommuniquées. et communiquées pour
information. a toutes les missions diplomatiques accréditées aTunis. dont celle
de Malte bien entendu. et cela pour des raisons invoquéesdans le mémoire
tunisien. notamment au paragraphe 1.25.'auquel. la Cour est respectueuse-
ment priéede bien vouloir seréférer.
hlonsieur le Président. Messieurs de la Cour. avant de laisser. avec votre
permission la parole au professeur Jennings. qu'il me soit permis de faire une
dernière observation.
En présentant sa requete a la Cour. hlalte a tenu a souligner que l'objet
précisde son intervention était « de lui permettre d'exposer sesvues a la Cour
sur les points soulevésdans l'instanceavant que la Cour ne sesoit prononcée >)
(par. 20).
L'un des distingues avocats de Malte. dans son intervention. a explicitéce
point en fixant deux objets a la requëte maltaise :
Premièrement. que la Cour puisse prendre conscience des élémentsde la
situation qui pourraient avoir des effets préjudiciablespour Malte.
Deuxièmement. que la Cour puisse ètreinforméede la position de Malte sur
lesdits éléments.11me semble que sur ces deux points le Gouvernement de
hlalte a reçu satisfaction. Parce qu'il estindéniableque hlalte. au cours des
présentes audiences. a eu toute latitude pour exposer longuement et en détail
les aspects essentiels de ce qu'elle considérecomme étantses intérêts dans la
région. Bien plus. on peut estimer qu'elle est allée au-delà de ses objectifs
déclarés en procédant al'exposéde questionsqui semblent déborderlargement
l'objet mêmede la requéte. De ce rait, il nous semble que Malte pourra.
dorénavant. difficilement soutenir que la Cour pourrait rendre son arrët dans
la méconnaissancede la position de ce pays par rapport a l'affaire duPlareau
coir~iiieti~~lTuttisielJamahiriyaarabe libyenne).
Ce fait constitue de l'avis de ma délégation un motifsupplémentaire justi-
fiant notre demande de rejet de la requéte maltaise. ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR JEh'h'IiïCS
COUNSELFORTHEGOVERNMENTOF TUNISlA
Professor JENNINGS :Mr. President and Members of the Court, perhaps 1
rnight be allowed to begin by expressing my sense of honour and pleasure al
the opportunity 1now have to address you Sir and this distinguished Court on
behalf of the Republic of Tunisia. And 1shall, with the Court's permission.
consider brieny the legalproblems and difficulties which Tunisia seesarising in
regard to this application by Malta. And then my friend, Prolessor Belaïd,Co-
agent and Counsel for Tunisia will put to tha Coufl some considerations
arising from the way in which the proposed intervention. which is ofparticu-
lai concern to Tunisia. would in Our view touch and prejudice Tunisian
interest. We believe that the Court may wish to have these considerations in
mind when making itsdecision on the present application.
The Court has heard this morning the submissionson behalf of Libya ; and
in what 1have to Say.there could sometimes be a certain overlap with some df
the things that the Court has already heard and forthis I must ask théCourt's
indulgence because. though 1shall try to avoid it as far as possible and be as
brief as possible. there are of course some things that have to be said. even if
twice. on behalf oTTunisia because. whatever hlalta may sometimes seem to
have thought. the two Parties in this case before the Court at present are ina
different interest.
And it so happens that my remarks are rather differently directed from those
of Libya's representatives. Whereas they. as it were. spoke frorn the Rules of
Court and especially of Article 81 (2)of the Rules orcourt. in my submissions
14shallbe concerned primarily at any rate with the Statute of the Court. So it
will be convenient first to consider the requirements of the Statute and in this
we would include the question of jurisdiction. and then finally 1 shall turn to
consider one of the matters raiçed specifically in Article 81 of the Rules of'
Court. namely "the precise object of the intervention".
Let me say. klr. Presidcnt. at once. that Tunisia has no sort of quarrel with
the proposition put forward more than once by hlalta that the Rules of Court
cannot of themselves add a requirement that is not to be round in the Statute.
That must beso ofcourse. ButTunisia does not believe that the 1978edition of
the Rules added anything beyond a certain desirable clarification.
The requirements of the Rules are accordingly important. both because'they
reflect accurately the requirements of the Statute. inOur view. and of general
principle :and because it is quite clear. if Article 62 of the Statute is read as a
whole and not insnippets. that the Court has compeience to decide whether to
give or whether to deny permission for an intervention under that Article.
even though an interest of the kind indicated in Article 62 (1has been shown.
And it is for this reason that the Court needs. we take it. to know the nature
and object of the propowd intervention. as well as whether it ruIfils the
requirements of Article 62 (1). because it is the Court that has ultimately to
make the decision.
Article 62 of the Statute provides. as the Court weli knows :
"1. Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature408 CONTINENTALSHELF
which may be affected by the decision in the case. it may submit a request
to the Court to be permitted to intervene.
2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request."
What else could those words mean but that the Court decides whether to
say yes or no to the request. The Court would hardly have a full hearing of this
kind merely in order to appreciate whether the applicant State was really in a
position to consider ilself as having a right that was touched by the possible
decision. That would be nonsense. So that is our first point : that we believe
that on a proper interpretation the Court has a complete discretion whether or
not to grant the request under Article 62.
Turning to Article 62 (1 ).there are of course two elements to consider :(il
has Malla in the actual terms of its request demonstrated an interest of a legal
nature. which (ii) may beaffected by the decision in the case.
Perhaps the first point to make about Article 62 (1) is that these two
requirements. interest of a legal nature. and liability to be affected by the
Court's decision. need always to be considered together. Because it is the
second element that qualifies and gives precise meaning to the first. As this
Court itself said in the Haya de la Torre case :
"every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case ;it follows
that a declaration filed as an intervention only acquires that character in
law. if iactually relates to the subject-matter of the pending proceedings"
(1:C.J.Reports 1951. p. 76).
So one must begin by asking what is meant by the "decision in the case" for
this purpose? The' French text oc the Statute is instructive. lt expresses the
thought in a rather different way ; "est pour lui en cause", but the essential
meaning is the same precisely and the essential element of the decision must
surely be the scope of thedispositifof thejudgment :that which constitutes the
res judicara "between the Parties and in respect of that particular case". to
quote the words of Article 59 of the Statute. Sorne confirmation might perhaps
be.lound in Article 94 of the Charter of the United Nations, by which each
hlember of the United Nations undertakes to comply "with the decision of the
International Court of Justice in any case to which itis a party". and in the
Article that undertaking is described later as "the obligations incumbent on [a
partyl under a judgment rendered by the Court".
Thus. Tunisia would submit that what is intended by the term "affected by
the decision in the case" in Article 62 is certainly not the reasoning, certainly
not the exposition of the applicable law. It is the possible scopeof the decision
as.it directly afïects the rights. obligations and legal position of the particular
Parties to the case :il is not. and could notbe the judgment as it may be used in
strbsequent cases. early or late. as "a subsidiary rneans for the ascertainment of
the law". to use the words of Article 38.
And indeed how could it beotherwise. since theCourt has to décideon the
application to intervene before it has heard the final oral arguments of the
Parties ?The Court knows now. from the Special Agreement. what the scope
of its decision isgoing to be and must be. It cannot yet know which way it will
decide and it cannot know the reasons for its eventual decision : nor can it
know yet what it will say about the rneaning of the applicable law.
Consequently. in the subrnission of Tunisia. there should not be any ques-
tion. under the terms of Article 62, of a State intervening merely because it has
an jnterest of a legalnature which may beaffected by the view of the law taken
by the Court. ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR JENNINGS 409
Of course the ekct of the view taken by the Court in ilsjudgment of what
the law is niay beofvery great importance to any thjrd State. The exposition of
the principles and rutes of law concerning continental shelî boundaries made
bythis Court in 1'969in the NorilrSeu casesjudgment. that exposition was of
great. even decisive importance. for most. possibly al1 coastal States. That
jydgment has affected interests of a legal nature undoubtedly of many of those
States. and no1 least the two States that now appear before this Court as
parties. But the Court would find itselî in an impossible position ifevery State
with an interest of a legal nature of this generalsort were to be encouraged to
suppose that this might come within the terms of Article 62. and that it could
accordingly seek a permission to intervene in a case between other States
which was likely. or seemed likely possibly. to raise points of law affecting the
intervening State's interests.
Nor can thisobjection be overcome by referring the importance ofthe law.
which theCourt will espound in itsjudgment. to hlalta's particular geographi-
cal position and the position of itsown continental shelf. For it is very easy at
the present moment to think of several States. some near to the area of the
present case. some far distant from it. which have clear. even speciîic.
continental shelî interests of a legal nature that may be touched by the legal
reasoning of the CourtS judgment when itis eventually given in the present
case. and those interests may bejust as important to them as any possible effect
on hlalta's interests. I have been told. hlr. President. that a large number of
governments have already requested copies of the pleadings in this case. That
in itselfis testimony to the breadth of interest which governments feel in what
will eventually be incorporated in the judgment of this Court in its view of the
laW.
Sa it may be readily conceded that hlalta. incomrnon with several other
States uphichcorne readily to mind and probably many others. has possibly an
interest, or interests. oa legal nature thatmaybe touched by the judgment in
this case. But that is no1the question now to be resolved by the Court. in Our
submission. The question is whether hlalta has an interest of a legalnature that
might.be affected by the actual decision, in the proper meaning of the terrn.
between the two Parties in this case ;and the burden io show that is.ofcourse.
on the would-be intervening State. The Permanent Court of International
Justice in S.S." Wiinbledor i .when it dealt with Poland's requestto intervene.
and referring to the difference between intervention under Article 62 and
intervention under Article 63. said :
"The first . .. is based on an interest of a legal nature.and the Court
should only admit such intervention if in ils opinion, the existence of ihis
interesi is svlliciently demonstrared.(P.C.I.J.,Sel-iesA, IV'O., p. 2.)
Now. ai that point the next step must clearly be to establish the scope of the
decision which the Court will make, and since we have the Special Agreement
and the terms of it. we know what thai will be. For it is that instrument. the
Special Agreement, that defines and Limits the issues before the Court in the
case. thus in turn definiiig and limiting the eventual decision of the Court.
Article 1 of the Special Agreement of June 1977 between the two Parties
asks the Court to state the principles and rules of international law which may
be applied for the delimitation of the Tunisian and Libyan areas of continental
shelf :and goes on lo ask the Court to take account in its decision of equitable
principles the relevant circumstances which characterize the area. and recent
trends admitled at .the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. Thus. the
cornpromis limits the cornpetence of the Court to the problem how to delimit4 10 CONTINENTAL SHELF
the boundary between the Tunisian and Libyan areas of continental shelf. So
clearly the Court simply cannot, within the terms of this Special Agreement,
venture upon any question of the delimitation of the respective continental
shelf areas appertaining to Malta or Tunisia, or Malta and Libya. The relevance
or irrelevance of continental shelf areas other than those of the two Parties to
this case - and one would here have to consider more than Malta - the
relevance is one of the questions which my friend Professor Belaïd will be
considering in more detail. Suflice it here to say that it is,after all, normal and,
alrnost invariable in fact, in the practice of neighbouring States for respective
continental shelf delimitations t3 be settled by stages. lndeed it is doubtful
whether any other procedure is really practicable. It cannot be either right in
principle, or manageable in practice, that a Court should find itself asked to
consider large issues beyond what is strictly submitted ta itsjurisdiction in the
agreement on which the case before it is founded.
But in any event it is obvious that the Court itself cannot go outside the
terms of the Special Agreement, which clearly and expressly do not permit it to
adjudicate upon the extent of the continental shelf boundaries of any third
State.
Of course, the problem of third State continental shelves is noa new o'ne.It
has arisen in both major decisions on the question of the continental shelf so
far :the decision of this Coun in the NortfiSeo cases, andof the Anglo-French
Arbitration Court in the 1977 Award.
In the North Sen cases in the dispositifitwas said, paragraph 1 O i (Dl(31,
which deals with factors to be taken into account and especially with propor-
tionality. it refers :o
"the etement of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimita-
tion carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring
about between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the
coastal State and the length of its Coastmeasured in the general direction
of the coastline, account being taken forthis purpose of the effects, actual
or prospeclive, of any other continental shelf delimitations between adja-
cent States in the same region" (1.C.J.Reports 1969, p. 54).
But this is not a matter upon which the Court made any decision in that
case. It was reciting the factors which the Parties, in their prospective further
negotiations. might need to take into account. In the present case it may well
be that the existing delimitation for example between Tunisia and Italy, will
need to betaken some account of, but nobody would pretend that it could be
affected by the decision in the case.
The relevance of prospective delimitations with third States. and also of a
possible tripoint,was adverted to by the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-
French Award in paragraphs 24-27 particularly. .
The United Kingdom had contended that some account should be taken in
the Atlantic region of a prospective delirnitation with the Republic of Ireland,
since the United Kingdom, it was said. was "compressed" between the shelf
areas of France and 1reland.
And the Court itselfput certain questions to the Parties during the hearings,
one of which concerned the possibility of the continental shelves of France,
lreland and the United Kingdom meeting at a tripoint ;and the competence of
the Court of Arbitration to delimit this boundary at al1if it touched upon the
interests or claims of a third State (para25 of the Award).
France. in its answer tothe question, observed that the Court could not base
its decision on conjecture as to the course of the boundary between the United ARGUMENT OF PROFESSORJENNINCS 411
Kingdom and Ireland ;only France and the United Kingdom could be bound
by the Award :and any third State mus1then proceed to settle the rnatter with
the United Kingdom or France as the case might be. The United Kingdom
noted that it had in February 1977 accepted the Irish proposal to refer the
delimitation of their respective areas of shell to some forrn of judicjal settle-
ment ; a position not dissimilar from that in which Libya now finds itself in
regard to Malta.
Now the Court took the view thal, although the Parties had not ruled out
the iripoini possibility. the courof the boundary did not depend"on any nice
calculations of proportionality based on conjectures as to the course of a
prospective boundary between the United Kingdom and the Republic of
Ireland" (para. 27); nor would it be open to the Court to pronounce on the site
of a tripoint.
"The Court's sole task in the present decision is. in conformity with
Article2(1 )of the Arbiiralion Agreement, to delimit the continental shelf
boundary between the French Republic and the United Kingdom in
accordancewith the applicable rules of international law. and to delimit it
'asfar as the 1.000-metre isobath'."(lhid.1
And the Court's conclusions on this particular crux in paragraph 28 are so
relevant. it seems to us.to this question of the tripoint and the neighbouring
boundaries raised by Malta. that with your indulgence 1will read the para-
graph which is a little long but every word seems to be relevant :
"Even so. the Coun thinks it appropriate at the same time formally to
state that both its reasoning and its conc~usions in this Decision are
directed exclusively to the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary
between the Parties to the present proceedings. It follows that no inferen-
ces may be drawn from this Decision as to the views of the Court
concerning the prospective course of the continental shelf boundary still
to be delimited between the United Kingdom and the Republic of lreland
nor concerning the legaland factual considerations relevant to the delimi-
tation of that boundary. The Court's Decision, it scarcely needs to besaid.
will be binding only as between the Parties to the present arbitration and
will neither be binding upon nor create any rights or obligations for any
third State, and in particular for the Republic of Ireland, for which the
decision will be riJ.siritulios ucra. In so far as there may be a possibility
that the two successive delimitations of continental shelf zones in this
region, where the three States are neighbours abutting on the same
continental shelf, may result in some overlapping of zones, it is manifestly
outside the cornpetence of this Court to decide in advance and hypotheti-
cally the legal problem which rnay then arise. That problem would
normally iïnd its appropriate solution by negotiations directly between
the three States concerned. negotialions which may indeed be called':for
by the prolongation of their maritime zones beyond the 1,000-metre
isobath to 200 nautical miles." (Para. 28.)
Now. the jurisdiction of thisCourt in the present caseis ,imitarly, founded
on the Special Agreement, alone ;its decision can only bind the two Parties
and it cannot involve any ruling as to the extent of Malta'sshelf or a10 where
a tripoint might be. This limitation if inherent. It makes no dikrence to this
whether Malta intervenes or not, since the intervention proposed by Malta
could in no sense enlarge the existing scope of the subject-matter'of the Court's
jurisdiction and Malta does not suggest 'that it could do so, and indeed412 CONTINENTALSHELF
expressly seeks to deny the Court opportunity to give "any form of ruling or
decision . . . concerning its continental shelf boundaries with either of the
Parties". That is stated in paragraph 22 of the Application.
Itfollows that the only specilic "interest of a legal nature" that Malta could
have, exists outside the permissible scope of this case, and is a matter for
determination between Malta, on the one hand, and Tunisia and Libya as the
case may be, on the other.
This position of Malta in respect of the present case,brought under a Special
Agreement which itselfexcludes the possibility of the Court sitting injudgment
on Malta's continenlal shelf rights, this case may usefulfy becontrasted with
the attempted intervention by Fiji in the Nr~cleurTe.51.scase in 1974 0.C.J.
Reports 1974, p. 253).
The Court - this Court - in the end did not have to decide on that
proposed intervention. But as far as concerns the possible scope ofa judgment
of the Court in that case, in the terrns asked for by Australia in its application,
there can be no doubl that Fiji could, perhaps, have shown an interest of a
legal nature which might beaffected by the decision. For Australia was asking
(the Court to consider the legality of atmospheric nuclear weapon tests "in the
South Pacific Ocean" (p. 2561 ,nd there are many States other than Australia
abutting onto, or in, the South Pacific Ocean, and a glance at the map shows
that the position of Fiji in that rnatter fell plumb in the middle of the area
described in the Australian application.
Or again, the position of Malta in regard to the Special Agreement in the
present case may be contrasted with the Motrelary C'old case V.C.J. Reporrs
1954, p. 18) - it has already been mentioned before the Court several times
today - where, had Albania been willing and able to intervene, there was a
classic caseofwhat may be described in the very words of the procès-verbalof
the 1920 Cornmittee of Jurists, page 745. when lhey say as one example of
intervention : "or a pany may request that one of the two contesting States
should withdraw on the ground that it is not the real doi~ii~iitsof the right
w hich it claims".
Butthis case isentirely different from that. Having regard to the terms of the
Special Agreement there is no possibility here, theoretically or practically, of
the decision of theCourt "affecting" a Malteseinterest in her own continental
shelf or continental shelf boundaries ;moreover, if it did appear in any way to
do so, Malta is, ifshe does not intervene at least, amply protected by Article 59
of the Statute.
Tunisia is not suggesting, Sir, that in order to have a good case to be
permitted to intervene, a State must always show an interest of a legal nature
that cornes prccisely within the issueas it isput before the Court in the terms of
the cc~ittprun~is,r application. TheCor-i Cliatiirrlcase (Merits)U.C.J.Rc,ports
1949, p. 41,though not a case where actual intervention was in fact sought.
demonstrated how a third State rnight find its legal interests directly implica-
ted ;in that case, the suggestion that the offending mines could have been laid
by Yugoslav naval vessels. But in fact the Cur-r Clruiirrrlcase also shows that.
even an interest of a third State of soimportant a character could be safeguar-
ded within the procedures of this Court, without the need for Yugoslavia
actually to intervene.
h,lalta does now appear most of the time to have resiled from what seemed
at one tirne io be her posi~ion,that ils quite general and admittedly immediaie.
iiiterest in the development of the law of the coniinental shelrwould suffice to
justify an intervention :though the distinguished Agent for Alalta did actually
say (p. 285. sifpi,u) that he would still "not care enrirely io discount the ARGUMENTOF PROFESSORJENNlNGS 413
possibility that this alane rnight suffice". And Mr. Lauterpacht said (p.316,
supra) "we are concerned not so much with the formal decision of the Court
between Libya and Tunisia as with the effective decision contained in the
Court's reasoning". But with occasional lapses it does seem that most of the
tirne, if not all, it isaccepted by Malta that something more specificis required
besides a general interest in the development of the law.
And it is in her endeavour, accordingly, to concretize the idea of the legal
interest on which she relies that Malta has run into great diflicultie;difficul-
ties which are perhaps characteristic of a case which arises frorn a Special
Agreement referring specifically to the continental shelf boundary between
two of a number of neighbouring States. As Mr. Lauterpacht told us,
"continental shelf case are peculiar" (p. 294, supra). The diffculty rnay aptly
be illustrated first in general terms by reference to Mr. Lauterpacht's very clear
map. That showed a line which indicated apparently the likely outer lirnit of
Malta'spossible continentalshelfclaims. And the trouble, of course,that Malta
finds herself in is that any Maltese proper interest inside that line is both
outside the Court's present competence in the Special Agreement, and Malta is
protected in thnt area by Article59 ofthe Court's Statute ;further, in that area
inside that line, even Malta clearly fears, and righlly, whatever she may
sometimes Say,that a jurisdictional link would be required if she were to ask
the Court to do or decide anything in that area. inside the line. But,of course,
any concern of Malta outside that line is likely to take the form of a mere
vested interest in the development, in general terms, of the law ofthe con-
tinental shelf, which is shared by al1 States including even non-coastal
ones.
The dislinguished Attorney-General for Malta concluded his address on the
first morning (p. 292,supra), by saying that Malta had not failedto noticethat
"our opponents in these intervention proceedings seek to place us on the horns
of a dilemma". But indeed, Mr. President,the dilemrna is not of the making of
Tunisia, nor 1 think, of Libya. It is, as Malta well knows, inherent in the
position in which she finds herself.
Mr. Lauterpacht, in his address to the Court, recognized, I think, this
difficufty, and he first succumbedto the temptation to avoid it by describing
the task of delimitation as a division, a sort of carving-up, he called it, ofa
common area. But this, of course is precisely the German argument about the
equitableallocation of a comrnon resource that this Court so decisivelyrejected
in 1969. Sensing this perhaps, he next took us on a most instructive tour of
what he called "specific issueswhich we can perceive as likelyto be considered
in connection with the Lib~va/Trinisia case ;not . . .he said, "not for the
purpose of arguing the merits of those issues but merely for the purpose of
showing that any decision on those substantive issues is bound to touch the
position of Malta in itsrelations with Libya and Tunisia respectively" (p. 311,
strpra).These specific issues consisted of rules, equitable principles, factors,
physical and non-physical Features, including even economic and financial
resources, in an endeavour to find a sort of neutral zone where he might rest
safe from either horn of thedilemma. But al1such factors, equities and the like,
are relative; and what is found to be true of the relationship between Tunisia
and Libya will certainly not necessarily be true of the relationship between
Tunisia and Malta.
This dificulty, in which Matta finds itselfis accurately reflected in the
Application, which contains an element of contradiction arising from the
uncertainty and ambivalence of Malta's attempt to identify a legal interest
within the meaning of Article 62 (11.In paragraph 4 of that Application, it is4 14 - COWINENTAL SHELF
said that the possibility of a Maltese interest being affected by the Court's
decision is contingent, since "it cannot be known what.the decision of the
Court .. .will be", and it speaks in terms of "a matter of possibiiities; yet in
Part Il of the Application it assens without qualification that the decision "not
only could, bu1must, affect the question of Malta'scontinental shelf rights and
boundaries".
For this difficultyOf identifying a legal interest whichmay truly be affected
by the Court's decision has meant that Malta has tried hard to explain the
situation by complaining that it has had to rely entirely on the ierms of the
Special Agreement of 10June 1977. for the indication of what it calls "the
character of the case", since it has not been permitted to see the written
pleadings of the Parties.
Butjustification forintervention surely shoutd not be sought in the "charac-
ter of the case" put by the Parties in the pleadings. It mube round in the limits
of the issue put to the Court in the Special Agreement. It is not the arguments
in the pleadings that can have an effect, in the meaning of Article 62 (1 1.on a
legal interesi of Malta; itis,according to the express terms of Article 62. only
the decision of the Court that can have such an effect.
In fact Malta's Application really amounts to this :that the Court's exposi-
tion of the principles and rules of law to be applied could affect theposition of
Malta in regard to itscontinental shelf, and this is no doubt true. But the effect
ol a decision by the Court on the principles and rules of international law
concerning continental shelf boundaries, cannot of itself be a good reason for
intervention. As the late Professor Hudson put it in his great book on the
Permanent Court of International Justice 1943 edition, page 420 : "the precise
character of the interest of a legat nature to be established for intervention
under Article 62 is uncertain ;it would seem to require a special interest, in
addition to a State's general interest in the devrlopment of international law"
(Hudson, Tlie P~r~iioriwilCour1 of I~itrnioiio~ialJnstic~. New York, 1943,
p. 420 : see also P.C.I.J.Seri~iiD. No.2. pp. 86-91).
Otherwise, if it were not so, and as has already been mentioned, the
contentious jurisdiction of the Court would virtually be assirnilated to that for
advisory opinions. Many States al1 over the world with continental shelf
boundary problems found their legal interest mightily affected by the Court's
Judgment in the NorrliSW cases. But to say that, therefore, they would have
had a right to intervene in that case, would be for the Court to importa wholly
unpredictable and potentially unmanageable element into its contentious pro-
cedure.
Malta in her pleadings in this oral hearing has recognized, 1think, the need
to make the alleged link more specific by references to elernents of the Special
Agreement other than principles and mles of law : reference to equitable
principles, relevant circumstances, recent trends and so on.
Of equitable principles and relevant circumstances, Malta is only able to
assert, in paragraph IOof the Application, that there is "a substantial proba-
bility" that many of the relevant circumstances afîecting the boundary between
Tunisia and Libya would also be relevant to the determination of Malta's
boundaries with those two States.
But the "substantial probability" in fact is ihat they would not apply in the
same way. What is a relevant circumstance is a relative question : relative to
the actual boundary in issue. It would indeed bedificult to think ofa situation
more different than that of two mainland continental States, Tunisia and
Libya, with a common boundary. and the position of a small island State, 200
miles and more from these mainland States. As to the recent tendencies at the ARGUMENTOF PROFESSOR JENNtNGS 415
Law of the Sea Conference, these must in their nature be part of the general
law of thecontinental shelf and ifan interest in these tendencies besufficient to
justify intervention, it is difticult to see whether any of the States participating
in the Conference could be kept out of the case if they desired to corne in.
But there is alrnost no need to argue this point because Malta virtually
concedes it in paragraph 9, when it says :
"ln conternporary international law relating io coniinental sheHboun-
daries, it is impossible to draw any hard and fast distinction between the
legal principles and rules, or the equitable principles that respectively
apply to the situations of States in different geographical relationships
with one another."
Th& is precisely why such a fegal interest in the relevant "legal principles,
rules, or the equitable principles" - or for that matter recent tendencies -
cannot be a reason for intervention, because on Malta'sown assertion there is
no hard and fast distinction to be drawn based on different geographical
relationships.
The Maltese Application spells out the diilïculty in plain terrns in paragraph
12. where it says :
"Malta therefore has to conternplatethat whatever principles and rules,
legal or equitable, and the practical rnethods,of their application, are laid
down by the Court (and even recognition of any special circums(ances
characterizing the area) willbe cited and appealed to in any dispute that
exists or subsequently develops regarding Malta'ssituation as a State with
a Mediterranean continental shelf in the sarne general region ,asthose of
Libya and Tunisia."
This is undoubtedly so. But itis certainly not confined to those with a
Mediterranean continental shelf; though even if this were conceded, there
would still be more than a handful of Stateswith an equal interest in this case.
The list of "specific issuesetout in paragraph 13of Malta'sApplication. and
amplified by Mr. Lauterpacht in his address. serves only to confirm the
position. This, of course m.ust be why the Ruts of the Court ask for an
indication of the "precise" object ofthe intervenlion. An ardent or even urgent
interestin the law regarding continental shelf boundaries will not do.
At the sarne time Malta apprises the Court, in paragraph 22, in unarnbi-
guous terrns, that it is not Malta's object "to obtain any forrn of ruling or
decision frorn the Court concerning its continental shelf boundaries with each
or both of those countries". Its only interest, in short, is to take part in the
Tunisial Libya argument whilst al the same time apparently wishing to insu-
late its own case from those rulings, as well as frorn the decision of the Court.
It is doubtful whether such a privileged position should be possible. even if
Malta were able to point tospecific interests possibly aîfectby the decision.
Malta States quite frankly what is its object in the intervention (para20) :
"to enable Malta to subrnit its views to the Court on the issues raised in the
pending case,kfore the Court hasgiven its decision in thatcase". And il then
refers again to the points - essentially pointsof general law and equity -
menlioned in paragraphs 10- 14.
This in the view of Tunisia is a very rernarkable request. It is a request to
intervene in acase in order to argue points of general law, simply because the
resulting judgrnent may form an important precedent as "a subsidiary means
for the ascertainment of the law". And at the sarne tirne Malta is not proposing
to be bound in any way by that precedent. Presumably. if her point of view. if416 CONTINENTAL SHELF
she intsrvened, were not reflected ultimately in the judgment, she would feel
able to argue it afresh and ah iriifwhen her own case against Libya cornes
along. This would be a charter for third-State intervenfion in another party's
cases, asopportunity arose, and whenever the would-be intervener had a legal
axe it felt some interest in grinding before the Court.
If there were. as Malta's request must claim, any common elements in these
two cases, the present one before the Court and the future one between Malta
and Libya, the Court would wish also to consider, doubtless. whether it would
be right, in the terms ofequality. that Malta should be enabled to appear twice
before the Court on the same legal issues. It is true that the Libya/Malta
cuntpro~iiisis apparently not registered as yet with the Court. But that could
not conceivably be relevant to the issue of intervention. A Statecannot use
Article 62 simply to make a case before the Court which it is not yet able,
though expecis eventually to beable, to bring under Article 36. That is a
proposed abuse of the purpose of intervention. Nor clearly is it the Court's
business to compensate Malta for its failure to get its case properly before the
Court as yet under Article 36. Were Malta permitted in effect to make a start
on another case in the course of the present one, some very remarkable
innovations in the jurisdiction of the Court might become possible.
Now I turn to the question of the possible requirement of the basis of
jurisdiction, and a great deal has ben said about that requirernent already, and
1 have only the briefest comment5 to add to the material already before the
Court. And of course my task is made very much easier by the magisterial
analysis of the material on that subject this morning by Professor Malintoppi.
And here, nevertheless there are some extra points to be made I think, and it
will be necessary in my submission to look both at Article 62 and Article 63 of
the Statute.
Now first let ibe said that Tunisia was certainly under the impression that
both these Articles 62 and 63 were drafted in the first place in anticipation of
some rneasure of compulsory jurisdiction. There is, 1believe,a common belief
arnong international lawyers to that effect. Mr. Bathurst was at pains to
suggest that the proposal for compulsory jurisdiction was exploded so quickly
that nobody noticed it had ever been made. But one observer al the time did
notice it, and that was of course Judge Altamira. who said during the Perma-
nent Court's discussion in 1922of its procedures - and this was already cited
this morning :
"the scheme of the Jurists of1920 was based on the principle of compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Court. When this principfe was modified by the
Assembly, the text of certain articles had unfortunately not been broughl
into line with the new principle which had been introduced." (P.C.I.J..
Series D. No. 2,p. 89.)
Sothe question may still be :what to make of an Article 62 which perhaps
omits any reference to jurisdiction or reciprocity, or the need for some ju,risdic-
tional link, because iwas assumed that jurisdiction would exist anyway ?
1confess to having been astonished at the suggestion made by our colleagues
representing Malta, the'suggestion thai Article 62 could. even should appar-
ently. be interpreted literally and in isolation. That is not, in my submission,
the proper way to Iind the meaning of an article which is a part of a treaty
called a Stalute. And in panicular. of course. it must be read subject to the ARGUMENT OF PROFESSORJENNINGS 417
provisions of Articl36 governing the jurisdiction of the Court. And one thing
thatseems clear is that the failure to mention jurisdiction in Ar62ccannot
be interpretedas ofitselfdispensing with the need forabasis ofjurisdiction, if
such a basis is required in principle, or required insome other part of the
Statute. Nor, certainly, can the matter be disposed of by suggestinas Malta
does in paragraph 23 of its Request, thata statement ofany basis ofjurisdiction
is required by Articl81 of the Court's Rules "as a rnatter of information". It
may reasonably be assUmed that the Court's Rules do not demand irrelevant
information, but arethe~e to secure the fuifilmentof the requirements of the
Statutes - not of the Statute necessarily, but of the Statutes.
The problem did not escape the attention of the Permanent Court in its 1922
meetings, and Maltahas made much of material from those meetings. But it
should be remembered that most possible points of view were mentioned in
that recordin one place or another, and the result is incondusivebecause no
decision was taken. Tunisia had chosen its own little extracts. The first, Sir,
you have heard, 1think, al least twice today, from Judge Anzilotti, and 1shall
not attempt to read it again,except thaIwauld like to read again on behalf of
Tunisia,as it were, the last part of that statement by Judge Anzilott: "He
pointed out that the legal grounds owhich his view was based" - that some
basis of jurisdiction was required- "were reinforced by practical considera-
tions;Stateswould hesitate to have recourse tothe Court ifthey had reason to
fearthat third parties would intervene in their cases." (P.C.I.J.,SD,iNo.2,
p. 87.)
And the other citation from that record which we wanted tocal1 to the
attention of the Court is from no less a mernber than Judge Max Huber, who
was of the opinion that : "a State which was not. bound by the reciprocity
clause could not be allowed to intervene in a case between States which had
accepted it" and "He did not think that intervention under the terms of Article
62 should be admitted in cases where no actual concrete right was at stake"
(ibid.,p. 87).
We do not pretend to have proved anything by these extracts. As I have
already said, from these extracts it is possible to extract quotations representing
almost any view. But 1would suggest that the attemptby Malta to extract from
.this material somethingconclusive is misguided. Many other opinionsare to be
found in the material.
The problem, of course, arose before this Court in the attempted interven-
tion by Fiji in theNuclear Tests cases, where several judges expressed the view
that in the circumstances of.that case at least, some basis of jurisdiction and
reciprocity was required.
That of course - the N~tcleor Tesis cases - was one arising from an
Application ;and the would-be intervener was attempting to range itseif with
the applicant State against the respondent.
There isno reason of principle why the position shoufd be any different in a
casebegun by a Special Agreement. Logically, indeed, the requirement of a
basis ofjurisdiction and of reciprocity would be more stringent, that isto Say,it
should requiresurely a basis ofjurisdiction in respect of both the Statesparties
to the Special Agreement.For when the intervening Stateranges itselfwith the
applicantState, the applicant State may tacitly waive any objection in regard to
jurisdiction. The same result, of course, could happen in a case begun by
SpecialAgreement where one, orboth Stateswaived the objection. But where,
ashere, both Statesparties to the Special Agreement, possibly or even probably
for different reasons, do object to the intervention, then the quesofanbasis
of jurisdiction bas to be examined. And that iscertainly the position here.418 CONTINENTALSHELF
This is the conclusion of Judge Hudson, where he says in his book :"If two
Statesare before theCourt by reasons of declarations made under paragraph 2
of Article 36 of the Statute" - the optional clause - "it would seem to be a
derogation from the condition of reciprocity in their declarations to allow
intervention by a third State which has made no sirnilar declaration ;the
situation". saysJudge Hudson, "is not essentially different, however, when
two States are before the Court under a Special Agreement and it allows
intervention by a third State which is not a party to the agreement."
Now the question may be asked :if a basis and link of jurisdiction is
necessary, in al any rate some cases under Article 62. how is this to be
reconciled wiih the "right" which isspoken of to intervene in Article 63 ?
Now the "right" referred to in Article 63 refers, 1 would subrnit, not to
jurisdiction but to the irrebuttable presumption created in that article that, in
the case of a comrnon treaty provision, there is a right which may be affected
by the decision, and there is no need for the would-be intervening State to
demonstrate that there isa legal right which may beaffected by the decision in
the case. But that the Court can, even then, in an Application under Article 63,
refuse a request for intervention appears clearly from the Haya de lu Torre
case. The intervention was perrnitted there eventually, but there were objec-
tions, possible objections,to the admission, which the COURwas at .pains to
point out and emphasize.
But there is another point. An intervention brought strictly under the terms
of Article 63 refers iany case only to the "construction" of a treaty provision.
Of course, a jurisdictional link would be required if the intervener were
concerneci with more than the construction of the convention. IIis irnplicit in
the S.S. "Winihledori" case, where Poland sought to intervene, first under
Article 62, but eventually under Article 63 ; but did not ask for any special
damages from Germany, and this was noted by the Court in its Judgment
(P.C.I.J., eriesA. No. 1,pp. 11-14). Had specialdarnages been sought, then the
question ofjurisdiction might well have been relevant.
Now if,as Malta seems almost to have argued, Article 62 could have a sort
of parallel function to Articl63. and cornprehend an intervention to arguethe
construction of principles and rules of customary law, one would have the
absurd and unreasonable result that the permitted intervention over a point of
customwould not result in the intervening State being eventually bound by the
ruling of the Court on that point, but the intervener as of right over a point of
treaty construction would bebound by the Court's ruling. Such an inexplicable
discrimination cannot have been the intended consequenw of the two Articles.
The language of Article 62, and its contrast with Article 63, suggests that
intervention to argue the construction of rules of customary law was never
contemplated by the Statute at all.
In this rnatter it is instructive go back again to the proci.s-verbal of the
Court's debate in 1922 of the Permanent Court of International Justice where
Mr. Huber ;
"went on to emphasize the difference between Articles 62 and 63 ;
according to the terms of'the latter. a right of intervention existed;but
there was no corresponding provision in Article 62, in which it was. in
the last instance, for the Court to decide whether intervention should be
permitted. He did not think that intervention under the terms of Artic62
should be admitted in cases where no actual concrete right was al stake."
(P.C.I.J.,Series C. No.2, p. 87.)
The question then arises whether every intervention under Article 62 ARGUMENï OF PROFESSOR JEMVINGS 419
requires a basis of jurisdictio;or whether it applies only to certain kinds of
intervention under Article 62 ?Here again one turns inevitablyto the terms of
the Special Agreement or the Application by which the issues in the case are
defined. 1t follows from the overriding principle of international law that
jurisdiction isbased upon consent, that a basis ofjurisdiction must always be a
requirement of intervention when the Stateseeking to interveneseeks thereby
in any way to affect or change the outcorne of the issue between the parliesas
it isdefined in the Special Agreement or the application as thecase may be.
The same rnust also betrue where the would-be intervening Stateisseeking
to bring a case parallel to that defined as the issuin the original case,aswas
the position in the Fijiapplication. In all these caseitwould seem essential to
have a basis of jurisdiction to support the intervention. Were khis not so, it
would follow, would it not, for example, that in the BarcelotiuTraction case,
Canada might have intervened once Belgium had got the case on its feel. And
the door would be opened to a process of plaintiff-shopping by would-be
litigants, anddefeat the whote consensual basis of.jurisdiction.
But indeed the need for a basis ofjurisdiction, at least where the intervening
State wishes in any degree to be a party, is irnpliedly conceded by .Malta. ln
paragraph 24 of the Request, it is said that since "itisnot the object of the
intervention . ..to obtain from the Court any ruling or decision conwrning
Malta'scontinental shelf boundaries", and since therefore :
"the intervention would not seek any substantive or operative decision
againsleither party, it would appear that no question ofjurisdiction in ttie
strictsense of the word could arise asbetween Maltaand the parties to the
Libya/Tu~lisiu case - for,where relevant atal1in the context of interven-
tion, jurisdictional questions could beso only in different circumsiances".
The implication of this statemenl isthat there would be a need for a jurisdic-
tional link in any inierveniion which soughl theCoun 10 make any decision.
or do sornething, or decide sornething al the behest of the intervening State.
Nevertheless, whether or not the Maltese request falls into this broad
category of cases manifestly requiring a basis of juridiction isnot easy t0 çay
with certainty. For the Request, drafted as it is so as to mention several
dihrent and not always entirely rnutually compatible reasons for the request,
it is very dificult to pin il down.anywhere. But the consequence of such
ambivalence should obviously be to prejudice the Request ;it is for Malta
positively to show cause, as the Permanent Court in the S.S. "Witnhlrdo~i"
case made clear.
Yet the very lack of any specificity in Malta's Request must place it in a
dilemma frorn which its argument has failed to extract it. If, and in so far as.
the purpose ofthe Request might be to enable Malta to rnakerepresentalions to
the Court regarding those parts of the Mediterranean sea-bed and subsoil
where the Malta claims might meet and even overlapthe claims of Tunisia or
Libya or both, then itis surely obvious that there must besome bas& of
jurisdictional link in regard to both Tunisia and Libya. Whatever may be the
position of Libya, there iscertainly no such basis in regard to Tunisia. And in
any event the position of Malta is more than amply safeguarded by a number
of considerations if she is not allowed to intervene:(1)the facl that the Special
Agreement confines the issues before the Couri strictly to those between
Tunisia and Libya only ; (2) the fact that, as recalled in Tuhisia's written
observations, the written pleadings of both Parties expressly ask the Court not
Ioventure into the region of Malta'scontinental shelf ;and (3)and finally, but
conclusively, the effect of Article 59 of the Court'sStatute.420 CONTINENTAL SHELF
On the other hand, if iisnot the intention of Maita'sRequat to intervene in
regard to a specific interest in a speciarea of sea-bed and subsoil,and if the
purpose, as indeed would seem to be the caseafter al1the huftïng and puffing
of the Application, if the real purpose is to seek the opportunity to make
observations in regard to the principles and rules of law governing the
continental shelf, and in regard to equitable principles, in regard to relevant
circurnstances, and in regard to recent trends at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, ïest any of these rnatters might corne up
again in the case against Libya, and presumablyalso in later negotiationswith
Tunisia ;ifthis is the purpose of the interventiodoes it even then r-uire any
basis ofjurisdictionai link in regard to each of the twParties ?
Well probably not. The question then isa prior one : since there is no
reliance on specificlegalinterests that rnigbe diredly affectedby the decision
of the Court, whether what is contemplated isinterirention at al1in any sense
hitherto envisaged, isthe question. For in tahg such care toask for a form of
relief which would avoid the possible need for a basis of jurisdiction, Malta
seernsto have gone to the other extreme and pitched the description of the legal
interest she is seeking to protect at such a high level of generality and
abstraction, and with such a broad sweep, asto takeit right outside anything
that could have ken contemplated by the draftsmen of Article 62. It is
practically coming full circle. Malta is expressing an interest in the entire
applicable law of the case, which would be appropriate to a partyto the case.
But of course she, at the same time, is not prepared to assume any of the
corresponding liabilities.
Mr. President, lest this summary of the position may be thought to contain
an elernent of exaggeration, let me remind the Court of the passages in the
Maltese Application which put the position in perhaps even plainer terms :
paragraph 4 :
"Since, at the present stage,itcannot be known what the decision of
the Court in the above-mentioned case will be, it equally cannot be
known whether an) legal interest of Malta will in factbe affected by that
decision, or not."
And then paragraph 20 :
"The precise object of Malta'sintervention in the LibyalTunisia case
would be to enable Malta to submit itsviews to the Court on the issues
raised in the pending case, before theCour tas given ilsdecision in that
case."
Article85 of the Rules of Court provides that :
"3. The intervening State.shall be entitled, in the course of the oral
proceedings, to submit its observationswith respect to the subject-matter
of the intervention."
Itwasctearly never contemplated that the "subject-matter of the intemen-
tion" would be virtually the entire applicablelaw in the.principcase,and that
the intervening State mightadopt, as it were, the role of aamicus curiae, with
a wide and roving brief and an acknowledged ulterior motive. Such an
intervention must introduce,moreover, egregiousdelays which would amount
10a gross injustice to the actual Parties to the case.
The Court adjoun~edfroni 4.41p.m. io4.56 p.m. ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR JENNINGS 421
Mr. President. I now turn to the finalpan of rny address which deals first
wiih one of the requirements stated in Anicle 81 of the Rules of Court
and raises the question of the object and purposes of Malta's Application to
intervene.
Article 81of the Court's R'ulesrequire the Applicant to set out the "precise
object" of the intervention. This is in strict accord with the Statute, Article 62,
which, as Ihave said, in our submission. gives the Court a discretion whether
or not to permit an intervention,even if the request has shown a right of a legal
nature that might be affected by the decision.
The question of the object and purpose of the proposed intervention is
crucial. boih in regard to thesatisfaction of the conditions laid down in Article
62, therefore. and also in regard to the very important question of the way the
Court should exercise its discretion. What then is the precise purpose of the
Application to intervene ?There are many descriptions. some of which 1have
already mentioned, but for this purpose may ILakethe description by Mr.
Bathurst, where he said the objeci of the intervention had "the very limitedbut
very important purpose of putting Malta'sviews to the Court before the Court
reaches a decision in the case between the Parties. in regard to a region that
affects Malta's vital interests" (p. 3slrpra).
If this is indeed the precise object of the Application to intervene, it does
seem to Tunisia that Malta has surely already achieved its object in these very
hearings. Malta has chosen io ernploy these hearings to explain to the Court a
very broad range of Maltese preoccupations. points of view, complaints.
theories. claims. hopes and fears concerning sea-bed areas to which she might
lay claim. and one isleît wondering what more could bejuslified in the way of
intervention - interference it was called this morning - in a case between
other parties.
Malta has been anxious to argue that it was "meaningless". it was said
(p. 295.sirp.). to say that Malta's interests are safeguarded by the limitation
which the Special Agreement placed on the Court's decision. How will it be
known. asked Dr. Miui (p. 285, slrpra)when that point isreached without
entering upon the question of Malta's continental shelf entitlement ? Well,
whether or not that was right when the learned Attorney-General spoke, it is
not so now. All the Court needs to do in answer to the question where it
should stop is surely to lqok at Mr. Lauterpacht's map and read his ample
commentary an the extent and the reasons for the Maltese claims and the
reasons for the rejection of the claims of the two Parties. Mr. Lauterpacht was
quite specificabout al1the areas where, as he put it (p. 30slipru)"the claims
and interests of Libya. Malta and Tunisia rneet and quite clearly overlap". He
not only described thern but illustrated them on the map. "For", said
Mr. Lauterpacht, "there will always be a question: where should the Libya-
Tunisia line stop if it is to avoid trespassing into MaltaS are?" But he toid
us where, in the clearestpossible termî,where, in the view of Maita,it should
stop.
So Tunisia feels really very strongly that for a State which is asking to
intervene, without any mrresponding binding obligation, but merely to
explain its preoccupation with some of the aspects of this principal case, Malta
has in effect had its chance already and has taken it with both hands. To hear
even more of the Malta position in the case between Tunisia and Libya, would
be to transform thaicase and to distort it into something utterly diîîerent from
what either Party had in mind when they decided in their Special Agreement
to submit their case to this Court.
Counsel for Malta several tirnes psed a logical dilemma :if Article 62422 CONTINENTAL SHELF
means that the intervening State must have a legal interest which will be
akted by the Court's decision, he said, and yet Article 59 provides that the
decision of the Court is binding only on the Parties. then Article 62 must be
meaningless. Professor Lalive cited(p. 350, sirpra)a passage from the mono-
graph by John T. Miller in Tlie Fiiriiw of rlrcI~r~c~r~iafioC ~rilrrqfJirslic~~
pubfished in New York in 1976 (ed. Leo Cross) where at page 556 this
dilemma was posed.
MT.Miller pointed out that "theoretically, the Court could so narrowly
construe its authority as to hold that no State can qualify" under Articte 62.
Well il is not entirely clear that this must always be m. One supposesthat Fiji
possibly felt that it had an interest which was not altogether protectable by
Article 59. But however that may be, Tunisia is no1 asking the Court so
narrowly to circumscribe the effect to be given by itto this Article; nor dws
Tunisia subscribe to the notion that Article 62 can have the broad meaning at .
the other extreme attributed by Malta - what Mr. Bathurst called "a wide-
open opportunity of intervention in \he interests of ail States" (p. 366.sidpro).
In making decisions under Article 62. it is submitted that the Court has to
balance the interests involved.
The reasonable answer to the problem put by Malta surely lies not in one
extreme view or in another. The Court has to balance the Applicant'sassertion
that the decision in the case rnay affect a legal interest of that State. with the
need to do fair and expeditious justice in the principal case. This is the very
purpose of the discretion given to the Court by Article 62.2 of the Statute.
Now in the present instance. hlalta. in a long and thorough argument. has
been able to do no more than to point to possibilities and assorted apprehen-
sions. And this the Court has to balance against the need now to carry the
present case smoothly to judgment. and the danger that the arguments and
issues put to it might, if the intervention is permitted further, become so
involved as to dereat that aim.
Finally..Tunisia believes that it is necessary to say a word about the possible
repercussions of unbridled intervention on the prospects and future of inter-
national litigation.
Professor Lalive. in his address, sought to persuade the Court that even the
rnere possibility of an effect, existing only in the realm of hypothesis, might be
sunicient to pround an intervention ùnder Article 62. And Mr. Lauterpacht
has already shown how very broad and comprehensive could be the sweep of
such a right of intervention.
it is most respectfully submitted. that when considering these arguments.
the Court should alço consider the effect of intervention on governments
weighing whether or not to submit their disputes by Special Agreement lo this
Court. For it is welt to remernber that a Special Agreement is in many respects
akin to what is, in a sense. also itscornpetitor, namely submissioq by conrpri)-
!vis toud lioc arbitration. Could States realistically be expected to submit their
disputes by Special Agreement to this Court. if there were alwaysthe risk that
a third State might intervene, on the flimsiest ground. into the case ? And if
Malta's thesis of the possible grounds of intervention were accepted. this
would surely be the case.
We believe that States which come together to this Court with their dis-
putes. do so in the expectation of a reasonably expeditious clarification and
settlement of their dispute, and certainly not with the expectation of interven-
tion, maybe on hypothetical grounds. by States. not parties to the Special
Agreement. That is why we believe that it isvital that the Court safeguard the
discretion that, in our view.itis plainly given in Articl62.2. ARGUME~T OF PROFESSORJENNINGS 423
Now, Mr. Pres,identif 1might very briefly summarize the conclusions, we
would submit :
1. Malta has failed to dernonstrate anyspecilic interestor interestsof a legal
nature that might be affectedby the actual'decisionof this Court regarding the
issuessubmitted to it by the Partiesunder ihe SpecialAgreement.
2. We believe that Malta has been wholly unable to point to any basisof
jurisdiction in regard to Tunisia. which basiswould be neededto support an
intervention regarding specific interestsconcerning any of theissuesactually
submitted to ihis Court in the SpecialAgreement.
3. Malta's specific inierestsare in any event fiiHy protected in the circums-
tancesof the prcsentcase by Article 59of theCourt's Statute,which protection
must be forfeit. or should be forfeii, to the extent of any Malteseintervention.
4. Malta has cndeüvouredio escape from the requirements of a valid
intervention. or intervention asnormal1y rccognized. by asking in effecl not for
permission to inicrvcne in theordinary senscofthe word. but rather for access
to the Court in ordcr IO argue generally about the principtes and rules of law
and equity. reccnt tcndencies.and so on. concerning continental shelf boun-
daries.
5. Itis submitied thatso broad and yet so generaland unspecific aground
of intervention is irreconcilable with the words ol' Article 62. with the Rulesof
Court. and with the Co~ir1.jsurisprudenw hithcrto on thesubject or interven-
tion.
6. If hlalta were alluwed to intervencon the terms setout in its request.the
certain result would be unreasonabledelay in the completion of the present
case,and also presurnably in the timely conclusion of itsown casewith Libya.
7. Finally.itis the subrnissionof Tunisia that hfalta has failed both to fullil
the requircments of Article 62. and of ihc procedural requirements of the
Court's Rulesintended to give effecl to those requiremenis. and ii issubmiiied
that permission should not be grantcd becauscthosc requirements have not
been fulfilled. PLAIDOIRIEDE M. BELA~D
COAGENT DU GOUVERNEMENT DE LATUNISIE
M. BELAÏD: Monsieur le Président, Messieursles membres de la Cour,
permettez-moi tout d'abord de dire combien je suis sensiblel'honneur et au
privilège de comparaitre devant cette honorable Cour pour participer au-
jourd'hui a la présentation desobservations du Gouvernement tunisien au
sujet de la requêteà fin d'intervention de Malte dans I'aiTairedu Plateair
coi~iinerualentre la Libyeet la Tunisie.
Tout a l'heure, Son Exc. l'ambassadeur Benghazi,agent du Gouvernement
tunisien,a tracé le cadre dans lequel, du point de vue de la Tunisie, cette
demande d'intervention devaitêtreexaminée et a apporté des précisionset
éclaircissementssur la position du Gouvernement tunisien a cet égard. Poursa
part, mon éminent collègue et maître, le professeur Jennings, conseil du
Gouvernement tunisien, a exposéune sériede considérationsjuridiques qui,
du point de vue de la Tunisie, devraient conduire adéclarer irrecevablela
requête duGouvernement maltais.
Ma tache consistera maintenant, si la Cour veut bien me le permettre, a
exposer quelques observations complémentairesqui confirment et complétent
les observations présentées par mes prédécesseurs.
Pour la commodité del'exposé,je regrouperai ces observations autour de
troisthèmesdifférents,quej'envisageraisuccessivement. Ce faisant,je m'effor-
cerai, compte tenu de l'étatd'avancement des débats,d'êtreaussi bref que
possible.
1
Premier point donc de mon intervention. LeGouvernement tunisien souhai-
terait en premier lieu attirer l'attention de la Cour sur le caractère tardif du
dépôtde la requêtede Malte.et sur iesconséquencesqui en découleraientsi
ladite requëte venaatétreadmise dans ces conditions.
i Malte, on le sait, a enregistrésa requêteauprèsdu Greffe de la Cour a la
date du 30janvier 1981, c'est-à-diretout juste trois jours avant la dfixée
pour l'échangedes contre-mémoiresentre la Libye et la Tunisie fixépour le
2février198 1.Cette date du2février198 1pouvait coïncider aveclaclôture de
la procédureécrite,qui est évidemmentle délai limiteprévupar le Règlement
de la Cour pour ledépôtdeséventuelles requêteas fui d'intervention, ainsique
le prévoitl'artic81,paragraphe I,du Règlementde la Cour.
L'opiniondu Gouvernement tunisien estque, en procédant ainsi,leGouver-
nement maltais n'a paspleinement respectédans leur lettre ni dans leur esprit
lesdispositions pertinentes du Règlementde la Cour, quitendent précisémeat
éviterles retards excessifsdans le dépôt des éventuelles requêasfin d'inter-
vention.
a) Dans sa version actuelle,le Règlementde la Cour inviten effet leEtats
désireux d'interveniadéposer leur requételeplris topossible(an.8 1,par. 1).
Cette expression le plus rotpossible n'existaitpas lessversions antérieures
du Règlement. Ainsique le précise lanote du Greffe sur le Règlementrevisé
en 1978, « la disposition concernant les délaispour le dépôtde la requête a
été modifiée» (p. 14). En insérant ainsi cette nouvelle disposition dans le PLAIDOIRIEDE M. BELAID 425
Règlementrevisé,la Cour a manifestemententendu éviterles retards excessifs
et lesconsequencespréjudiciablespour l'affaireprincipale,qui peuvent decou-
ler d'un dépôt tardif dela requêtea fin d'intervention. Ce souci d'éviterles
retards excessifsapparaît d'une manièreaussiclaire dans d'autres dispositions
du Règlementrelatives àla matière.Il en estainsinotamment du paragraphe 2
de l'article85 qui implique que la requête doit êtrd eéposée sulTisammenttôt
pour que,dans I'hypothése deson admission,lesdélaiscoïncidentavecceux du
dépôtdes piècesécritespourla procédureprincipale.Ce souci de contenir les
délais dansdes limites raisonnablesse justifie en tout premier lieu par le fait
que l'interventionest essentiellementune procédureincidente etque, en tant
que telle,elle ne doit pas provoquer de retards injustifiablesdans le règlement
de l'affaireprincipale.Notons,cependant,que cesoucidépasselecasspécifique
de la procédure de l'interventionet que, d'une manière générale l, Cour a
toujours veilléa éviterlesprolongationsinutilesde délaisdans leslitigesqui lui
sont soumis. Ce souci étaitdéjàprésent dansles travaux préparatoiresdu
comitédu RèglementdefaCour permanente deJusticeinternationaleen 1926.
L'un des membres dececomité,M. de Bustamante,observaiten efïet :
(It would be better clearly to slate that a partwas not entitled 10
intemene, if, in doing so, it compelled the other parties to begin again
proceedingsalreadycommenced.IfaStatehas allowedthe right moment
to intervene to pass, it must take the consequences. )>(C.P.1.J.Truva~ix
préparatoires,23 jui/fel1926, sérieD, uddendum au no2.)
De même,dans son arrêtrelatif A l'affaire delaBarcelono Traction la Cour
déclarenotamment :
« LaCour demeurecependantconvaincuequepour préserverl'autorité
delajustice internationaleet dans l'intérêt dsen bon fonctionnement,les
affairesdevraient êtreréglées sans retard injustifi» (arrêt, .I.J.Rectieil
1970, par. 27).
En vérité, c'eslt une sageprécautioncarelleconstitueune garantiesérieuse
pour les Etats qui décidentde soumettre a la Cour un litigequi les oppose et
pour lesquels le facteur « temps )) constitue une donnée importante,surtout
lorsqu'il s'agit- c'est le cas dans la présente affaire- d'un litige dont la
solution n'apas été obtenue aprèsde longuesannéesde négociations.
b) Dans la présente instance,le Gouvernement maltais semble lui-même
reconnaître qu'il ne s'estpaspleinement oonforrné a toutes Lesdispositions
pertinentes du Règlement,puisqu'ila cherchéa s'en expliquer, en quelque
sorte, par avance ;dans sa requête,eneffet,on lit :
« larequdten'apas étésoumiseauparavant parce que, avant de décider si
elle demanderait finalement a êtreautorisée à intervenir. Malte désirait
disposer,dans Lamesure du possible, d'exemplairesdes Piècesécrites de
procédureen l'affaireet avoir le temps de lesétudier fi(par. 17).
Ces explications ne nous semblent cependant pas convaincantes. Si l'on
devaitsuivre dans sa logiquele Gouvernement maltais etcommuniquer a tout
Etat les pib écritesd'uneprocedure afin qu'ilpuisse déciders'il <(demande-
raitfuialement a êtreautoriséa intervenir » (requétemaltaise. par. 171,on
imagine aisémentles graves inconvénients qu'unetelle conception pourrait
entraîner pour les litigesqui sont soumisa une juridiction internationale.
D'unautre côté, ilesta peine besoinde dire que le Gouvernement maltais
n'avait en réalitépas besoin de recevoir communication des pièceskrites
libyenneset tunisiennes pour déciders'ildoit ou non déposerune requêtea fin' . 426 PLATEAU COEITINEEITAL
d'intervention. Le Statut de la Cour l'autorisea présenterune telle requêtedes
l'instant ouil« estime »(article 62 du Statut) que. dans le présent différendu,n
intérêjturidique est pour lui en cause. Ainsi que l'aexcellemment explique le
professeur Lalive, cette expression « lorsqu'un Etat estime t) implique que
1'Etatintervenant peut tenir compte de toute considérationqui lui semblera
pertinente : une telle ~ossibilitéaussi la-gement ouverte constitue...oUr1'Etat
qui désireintervenir, Ûne protection appréciablecontre « le mauvais vouloir »
des Etats en litige aui refuseraient éventuellementde lui donner accèsaux
piècesécritesdeÏa procédure. Or,dans le présent cas, on peut penser que le
Gouvernement maltais étaiten mesure dC<estimer >>s'il avait un intéréten
cause depuis au moins Ladate du ICr décembre1978,date de la saisine de la
Cour - il y a maintenant plus de deux ans. C'est d'ailleurs ce que semble
admettre leGouvernement maltais lui-mème. Cedernier reconnait en effetque
pour prendre sa décision :
<<il s'est fonde exclusivement sur les indications que l'on peut tirer à ce
sujet des termes du compromis entre la Libye et la Tunisie en date du
10juin 1977, tel qu'ila étépublié ».
Cela est tout à fait juste. Ainsi que l'a excellemment expliquéle professeur
Jennings, lajustification de lademande d'intervention doit êtretrouvéenon pas
nécessairementdans les piècesécritesdéposée psar lesParties mais dans letexte
du compromis qu'ellesont signéet dans la mission que les Etats signataires de
ce compromis ont ainsi entendu assigner a la Cour.
Dans un autre passagede sa requête,le Gouvernement de Malte admet aussi
clairement - mais non sans quelque contradiction - que les considérations
susceptiblesdejustifier a ses yeux l'introductiond'une requêtea fin d'interven-
tion pouvaient êtreformuléesen dehors de la connaissance préalable despièces
écrites desParties. 11a, a cet effet, mentionne dans sa requéte un certain
nombre de questions qui, selon lui :
(<arecteraient nécessairementl'intérêjturidique de Malte et influence-
raient presque certainement toute décisionultérieureau sujet des limites
du plateau continental de Malte D.
On peut dèslors s'interrogersur les raisons réellesqui ont pousséle Gou-
- vernement maltaisa différer sa demanded'interventionjusqua un moment aussi
.tardifde la procédure écrite.Quellesquesoient ces raisons. cependant,il resteque
le retard excessifet injustifié risquede perturber gravementle déroulementde la
:procédureactuellement ouverte devant la Cour et de porter ainsi gravement
préjudiceaux intérêts des Etats qui ont soumis leur litigea la Cour.
2) D'un autre coté, lademande d'intervention de Malte, si ellevenait a être
admise, pourrait donner lieu a d'autres complications encore. Elle risque en
effet de provoquer, dans un stade ultérieur, des demandes d'intervention
d'autres Etats, pouvant ainsi entraver gravement la procéduredans l'affaire
principale. La solution de cette affaire n'interviendra alors qu'aprèsdes délais
beaucoup plus longs que ceux que les Parties au litige ou la Cour pouvaient
prévoir.
Ces risques se trouvent encore aggravéspar les conceptions particulières .
développéespar le Gouvernement maltais déjàdans sa requête maisencore
plus amplement dans les observations orales et relatives aux conditions j'uri-
diques de la mise en Œuvre de I'intervention,fondéesur l'article62. '
a) Selon la thèse défendue par le Gouvernement maltais, l'intervention
constituerait un droit dont lamise en Œuvre serait en quelque sorte autorna-
tique, chaque foisqu'un Etat <(estime n, sans autres conditions, que ses intérêts peuvent êtreaffectéspar la décisionque prendra la Cour dans une affaire qui
lui est soumise. L'intervention serait automatique des lors qu'un intérêt
(comme I'apréciséhier le professeur Lalive)existe, quelle que soit la nature ou
l'importance de cet intérêt. Le professeur Lalive est alléjusqu'a suggérerque
la Cour devrait à cet égard s'inspirerde Lajurisprudence u libérale>>des tribu-
naux arbitraux mixtes qui ont pris en considération a cet égard mêmeles
« risques lointains >)les ((craintes »,les « espoirs >),les<<expectatives n. les
« hypothèses ».
On voit tous lesespoirs qu'une telle conception peut comporter. IIestévident
que si les Etats disposent d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire,j'entends ici arbitraire,
ils peuvent étretentésde l'utiliser pour retarder sinon bloquer le règlement
d'un litige que les Etats parties ont décide de soumettre a une juridiction
internationale. IIesta peine besoin au surplus de noter que,dans une conjonc-
ture déterminée,l'utilisation habiled'une telle possibilitépeut être transformee
en un moyen de pression redoutable vis-à-vis de l'un des Etats litigants.
b) D'un autre côté, le Gouvernement maltais croit trouver une justification
valable et suffisante a I'intervention automatique dans le fait que Malte est
situéeen face du mémeplateau continentai que la Libyeet la Tunisie et que la
délimitationentre ces deux pays affecte automatiquement sespropres droits.
On voit cependant les dangers d'upe teile conception. En raison de l'évolution
récente dudroit de la mer et de l'extension considérable desdroits desEtats sur
les plateaux continentaux qui leur sont adjacents. rares sont les cas ou la
délimitation d'un plateau continental intéressera seulement deux Etats. II
s'ensuivrait que, selon lth& défenduepar le Gouvernement maltais, si deux
Etats viennent de bonne foi à soumettre a la Cour internationale un litige de
delimitation qui les oppose, tous les Etats adjacents a ce plateau continental
auraient un'droit automatique d'intervenir dans ce litige;chaque intervention
d'un Etat entrainant un retard déterminé auquels'ajoutera le retard provoque
par l'intervention suivante d'un autre Etat; l'intervention d'un Etat entraînant
I'inteniention d'autres Etats, légitimementsoucieux de préserverleurs droits. Si
une telle hypothèsepeut faire lebonheurdes spécialistes,elle ne peut guère
plaire aux Etats. intéressés, soucieuxeux d'aboutir a un règlement de leurs ,
litiges aussi équitable mais aussi rapide que possible. Une telle hypothèse ne
peut non plus plaire ala juridiction saisieen raison du faitque cette juridiction
se trouvera progressivement en face d'une affaire de plus en plus dificile a
dominer.
c) Enfin. il a été suggér.éau nom du Gouvernement maltais que, dans un
litige soumisa la Cour internationale, les Etats partiesa ce litige doivent être
considérésavoir implicitement admis, par leur compromis même, les Etais
tiers qui«estiment ,avoir un intérê tn cause dans leur differend 1 intervenir
automatiquement dans ce litige. Il s'agirait la d'une sorte de présomption de
fonitn prorogarurn, implicitement consentie par les Etats litigants au profit des
Etats tiers intéressés.
Je citeraisa propos de cette nouvelle institution que le droit international ne
connaît pas encore, un passage de l'intervention de M. Lauterpacht qui estime
que le.compromis tuniso-libyen <(also impliedly conferred jurisdickion upon
the Court as regards an interventi0n.b~ Malta )>etM. Lauterpachl d'ajouter
plus loin:
ccWhenever two States conclude the kind of agreement which Tunisia
and Libya have concluded. they thereby irnplicitly confer upon the
Court jurisdiction.to deal with intervention by a State which claims as
Malta does so strikingly, that its legal interests are affected. »428 PLATEAUCONTINEMAL
On doit cependant se demander si les auteurs d'une telle conception aussi
audacieuse ont mesuré tous les dangers qu'elle comporte en fait. Une telle
présomptionaurait en effetun effet inhibitif sur lesEtats qui décidentdebonne
foi de soumettre leurs litigesa la Cour internationale.
Finalement, la conception défendue ace sujet par le Gouvernement maltais
présente inévitablementdeux effets négatifsau moins :
- D'un côté,premier effet négatif,la pénalisation desEtats qui soumettent
leurs litigesa la Cour intern.ationale, puisqu'ils se trouveront constamment
sous la menace d'une intervention imminente qui reportera a des dates de plus
en plus lointaines le règlementde leurs litiges.
- D'un autre ciité,une telle conception exercera sur lesautres Etats un effet
non moins négatif. un effet de dissuasion ; avertis des complications que
peuvent entrainer des interventions qu'ils ne prévoyaient pas mais contre
lesquelles ils ne peuvent rien. ils préfereront se tourner vers des modes de
règlement présentant plusde sécuritéet de rapidité.
Quoi qu'en aient dit hier les conseils du Gouvernement maltais, ces deux
risques, pénalisation des Etats litigants, dissuasion des autres Etats, existent
réellementet ils sont de nature a peser lourdement dans'la décisiondes Etats
qui sont désireux ou qui se trouveront amenés a recourir a la juridiction
internationale pour résoudreleurs litiges.
Hier, au nom du Gouvernement maltais, il a étérappelé à juste titre que la
présenteaffaire sera la première occasion de l'application de l'article 62 du
Statut et que la décisionqui sera prise par la Cour a ce sujet constituera, en la
matière. un important précédent,qui attirera l'attention detous les Etats.Cela
est indiscutable. Mais il est aussi indiscutable que si la Cour suit le Gouverne-
ment maltais dans la voie qu'illuisuggère,un,grand dommagesera occasionne
au systèmede règlementjuridictionnel dezdifférendsinternationaux ;les Etats
auront tendance à se détourner de ce système de règlement qu'ilsne prisaient
guère déjà et. faute de trouver un moyen sur de régler leurs litiges, ils
préfererontse tourner vers d'autres moyens ou mime se résigner a laisser ces
problèmes sans solution aucune.
Qu'il soit enfin clairement dit ici qu'en exprimant ses réservesquant a la
conception de )'intervention défenduepar le Gouvernement maltais. le Gou-
vernement tunisien n'entend nullement, comme semble le penser l'un des
représentantsdu Gouvernement de Malte, partager le gâteau - ou leplateau
continental - avec le pays voisin>>en ignorant les droits d'un Etat tiers - si
petit soit-i; le Gouvernement tunisien, pour sa part, tout au contraire s'est
adressé a la plus haute juridiction internationale. qu'il a invita déciderdans
une instance pablique et sur la base du droit jusqu'ou peuvent s'étendre ses
droits sur le plateau continental vis-à-vis de la Libye, sans empiéter sur les
droits des Etats tiers, ainsi qu'ila été expressément entionnédans les conclu-
sions de ses plaidoiries écrites.Le Gouvernement maltais ne peut de ce fait
trouver une meilleure garantie de ses droits.
Monsieur le Président. avec votre autorisation, je voudrais maintenant
aborder un autre thème concernant cette fois-ci l'objetde la demande d'inter-
vention.
LeGouvernement tunisien voudrait ici attirer l'attention de la Cour sur le
fait que la requ6te du Gouvernement de Malte ne répond pas a l'une des
conditions essentielles prévues par te Règlementde la Cour, qui dispose dansson article 81,paragraphe 2 b),que la requête à find'intervention doit spécifier
« I'objetprécisde l'intervention ».Ayant manquéde remplir ces conditions, la
requète maltaise ne semble pas devoir étreadmise.
Pour notre démonstration, nous procéderons a une analyse, très breve, des
dispositions pertinentes du Statut de la Cour et de son Règlement,pour dégager
la signilicatjon précisede cette condition- l'objetprécisde l'intervention- et
les conséquencesqui doivent en découler pourla question qui nous préoccupe
ici.
A. Ce retour aux textes, fort clairs au demeurant, s'impose en raisan de
I'interpréîationerronée, a notre sens, qui ena étédonnée parle Gouvernement
maltais, quant ala condition de la définitionde l'objetde l'intervention.
Selon le Gouvernement maltais, il existerait une seule condition pour I'ad-
missibilite d'une demande d'intervention :hliexistenced'un intérêd t'ordre juri-
dique pouvant êtreaffecté.Tel serait I'objet.l'unique objet, de l'article 62 du
Statut de la Cour. Se trouvant cependant confronté avec la disposition de
l'article 81, paragraphe 2 b), du Règlement, relative a « I'objet précis de
I'inteniention u,le Gouvernement maltais soutient qu'une telle condition n'est
pas conforme a l'article 62 du Statut, qui doit étreconsidéréici comme la
disposition contrôlant la matière.Ledistinguéagent du Gouvernement maltais
a ainsi déclare :
« Unlike the legal interest question, there is nothing at al1in Article 62
of the Statutc about the object of the intervention, or al least nothing
about any objecl separate from and independent of the legal interest
involved. r(Ci-dessus p. 290.)
Et.dans la conclusion de son exposé. le distingué agent reprend les mêmes
aftirmations. en soumettant a cet égard au meme traitement l'alinéahl et
l'alinéac,.du paragraphe 2 de Iàrticle8 1du Règlement.
JIn'est pasde notre intention d'ouvrir ici un débatsur cette matière,tant les
choses nous paraissent claires par elles-mêmes. Notons cependant la tendance
du Gouvernement maltais. dans ce domaine, à écarter les dispositions du
Règlement qui le gênent.en les déclarant d'une manière péremptoire non
cnnformes au Statut de la Cour et. de ce fait. non susceptibles d'étre :« inter-
preted or applied as a requirement of substance creative of such a condition ,>
(plaidoirie deM. l'agentdu Gouvernement de Malte. ci-dessus p.292).
Pour notre pari, nous nous limiterons a observer qu'il n'estpas de notre
ressort d'apprécier la constitutionnalité s d'un Règlement que leStatut lui-
mêmea habilitéla Cour a établiren vue de déterminer <<lemode suivant lequel
elle [la Cour] exerce ses attributions » e(<règlesa procédure )>(article 30 du
Statut).
h?ais, si on laisse de côtéce débatet que l'onexamine la question d'un point
de vue tout a faitthéorique,on aboutira ala conclusion quedans le.domaine de
l'intervention la désignationde l'objet de cette intervention occupe une place
centrale dans cette institution, pour la raison qu'elle constitue a la, fois un
critère d'appréciation de la recevabilitéde la demande d'intervention et un
élémentimportant pour l'exercicepar la Cour de son pouvoir de (<décider »,
qui lui est conférépar l'article62 du Statut.
Sur le premier point,pour qu'une intervention soitjustifiée,il ne suffit pas
notre avis que I'Etat intéresséanirme l'existence d'unintérétou que cet intérêt
puisse êtreaffectépar l'affairesoumise a la Cour internationale. II faut encore
que, sur la base de considérationsqu'il appartient a cet Etat de déterminer -
que ces considérations soient fondéesou non fondées - . I'Etat formule les430 PLATEAU CONTINEhTAL
rnoyeiis qui lui sembleni les plus appropriés pour remédier à un éventuel
dommage. Il faut qu'il formuleune demande ou encore qu'ildéfinisseI'objetde
I'interveniion. Car I'intervention. qui est par essence. el ains~que l'aexcellem-
meiit di( le professeur Lalive. une procédure incidente. ne doit perturber le
cours d'un procès,sur lequel elle vient se greffer.que s'ily a des motifs sérieux
à cela. Autrement, elle serait le moyen facilepar le biais duquel des Etats tiers.
n'ayant par hypothese aucun intérétparticulier défendre.viendront se meler.
sans conséquence pour eux. de litiges qui ne les concernent ni ne les affectent.
C'estprécisémentpour contrder la réalité etl'importance de l'intérêetn cause,
el aussi I'adéquatioiidu moyen de droit invoquéa la protection de cet intérét en
question. quc le droit international a depuis longtemps exigéla formulation de
l'objet de I'intervention. Dans le Règlement de 1972, cette condition. selon
l'observation pertinente du distingué agent du Gouvcrncment maltais.
((can .. be regarded as implied in the rormer notion of a staiement of iaw and
factjustifying the intcrvention t1(ci-dessus p. 2901.Lcnicrite du Règlementde
1978est précisémentd'avoir explicitécette condition puisqu'ildispose mainte-
nant que la demande d'inierveniion doit <spbcilier J)(1I'objetprf is de I'inter-
vention u.
Ainsi que le montre cette citation, le Règlement exige non seulement que
I'Etat intervenant <<spécifie))I'objetde I'intervention. mais encore qu'il doit
s'agir d'un objet «précis O. L'insistance sur la précision de I'objet par les
expressions « spécifie ))et objet « précis » a sa raison d'être : cette condition
définit et justifie lepouvoir dévolu a la Cour de <<décider )>(art. 62)du sort de
la demande d'intervention. II a été soutenu au nom du Gouvernement maltais
qu'ilsuffit d'invoquer l'existence d'un« intérêt d'ordre juridique » pouvant être
affectépour que lejuge soit oblige d'accueillirla demande d'intervention, sous
la réservebien sûr de la vérificationde l'existenceet de la nature ((juridique )>
de I'intéréetn cause. Le juge aurait, selon cette thèse, une simple « compétence
liée».
En réalité, le jugea plus qu'une compétence liée.dans ce domaine. 11a
d'abord le pouvoir de vérifier la réalité et la nature juridique de I'intérée tn
cause bien sur. Mais il aencore le droit de vérifier,dans le différendspécifique
qui luiest soumis, lacorrélationentre cet intérêt ec nause et lesmoyens propres
à le protéger.C'estpour cela que l'intervenant doit indiquer I'objetet même,dit
le Règlement de 1978, I'objet <(précis>> de son intervention. Au niveau de
chacun de ces éléments,le juge dispose d'un largepouvoir d'appréciationqui
doit lui permettre de décider v. S'il se révèleque l'intérêt en cause est
inconsistant ou n'estpas de nature juridique, lejuge a normalement le pouvoir
de rejeter I'intervention. Sid'un autre côtéils'avèreque I'objetde I'intervention
n'a aucune relation avec le différendspécifiquequi lui est soumis ou qu'il n'a
aucune relation avec I'intérët encause dans ce différend.il a, a notre avis, le
mSme pouvoir de rejeter la demande d'intervention.
Ainsi qu'on levoit, la notion d'<o<bjet précis»de I'intervention esttout à fait
distincte de la notion d'intérêjturidique «en cause » et elle joue un rôle bien
déterminédans la mise en Œuvre de la procédure de I'intervention. C'est du
reste ce que reflètel'actuellerédactionde l'article 81, paragraphe 2. du Règle-
ment qui traite dans deux paragraphes distincts et successifs de ces deux
notions :
a) l'intérêdt'ordre juridique ;
h) l'objetprécisde I'intervention.
Ce paragraphe 2, notons le pour mémoire,ajoute une troisième condition
fondamentale. la base de la compétence, sur la légitimitéde laquelle tout à l'heure leprofesseur Jennings a donnélesexplications lesplus autorisées.Nous
n'y reviendrons pas.
B. Qu'en est-ilmajntenant de la demande d'intervention maltaise. au regard
de la condition préciseque nous venons d'étudier,« l'objet précisde I'interven-
tion )?
1 Lathèseque nous soutenons est que la demande en question ne remplit pas
lesconditions prévuespar lesdispositionsdu Règlement etqu'ily a là un motif
suffisantpour déclarercette requête irrecevable.
I) L'objetde l'intervention de Malte. présentédans la requêteet réitérédans
les observations orales. es1(de lui permettre déxposer ses vues a la Cour sur
les points soulevésdans l'instanceavant que la Cour ne se soit prononcée m.
Dans ses observations orales, le Gouvernement maltais a encore préciséses
intentions. M. Lauterpacht a déclaré à ce sujet:« Malta is not concerned with
the forma1operative part of the decision of the Court., which is the rnatter to
which Article 59 relates>(ci-dessusp. 295).Mais si Malte n'estpas concernée
par la décisionau sens formel qui sera rendue par laCour dans l'affairetuniso-
libyenne. sa demande. a priori, n'a plus de raison d'etre. pour le motif que
I'intervention vise précisémenta protéger lesintérêts desEtatstiers pouvant
etre affectéspar la décisiondans l'affaireconsidérée, pour reprendreles ex2res-
sions de l'article 62 du Statut. C'est ce qui ressort de l'article 62 du Statut
auquel le Gouvernement maltais s'est référs éi souvent.
Malte répliquealors que ce qui lapréoccupe.ce n'est pas la décisionelle-
mime, entendue dans le sens strict. dans le sens formel, mais les considéra-
tions, les motifs ou encore leIierili.s'~~~L'IIL q~iusce.rvent de fondement a la
décision qui sera prise dans L'affairetuniso-libyenne. Pour citer a nouveau
M. Lauterpacht a cet égard :
c<Malta is concerned with the substantive content of the decision, . . .
elements which, though perhaps not in form. mus1in content inevitably
have an impact upon subsequent relations between hlalta. Libya and
Tunisia. +(lhicl.1
C'est la mêmeopinion qui est défenduepar le distingué agent du Gouverne-
ment maltais qui dklare que ce qui préoccupeMalte. c'estle risque de voir :
« her rights as it were foreclosed and her legal interests shut out, by
pronouncements of the Court - at least of principle, or relating to
situations analogous to Malta's. All such pronouncements are bound to
have the slatus of authoritative declarations of the law, almost automati-
cally applicable[Oany comparable situation. and willcertainly be vviewed
assuch. H (Ci-dessus p. 285.)
II est vrai qu'ilaune forte probabilitéque l'arretqui sera rendu dans l'araire
du Platea~r coiirit~er~i~Tririisi~;/Ju11ial1ir1aabe li.~~tirir)aura cet impact,
comme cela étaitlecas pour l'arrêtde 1969dans lesaffaires de lamer du Nord.
Mais cela est dans la nature deschoses et dépasselecas tuniso-libyen. L'impact
de l'arrêttiendra moins aux particularitésde I'affairede I'espke qu'a l'autorité
de lajuridiction qui l'aura émis.IIne peut constituer a lui seul une justification
valable pour une demande d'intervention. Autrement. rien n'interdirait à
d'autres Etats situésou non les uns par rapporl aux autres dans une position
géographiqueanalogue a cellede Malte par rapport a laTunisie et à laLibyede
demander a intervenir. A cet égard, le Gouvernement tunisien ne peut que
confirmer les réservesdéjàclairement expriméesdans sesobservations écrites.
ou on lit notamment :432 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
«Si un tel intérêdtans lesprincipes et règlesjuridiques discutéesdevant
la Cour pouvait constituer une base suffisante pour une intervention, il
serait dificile de voir comment tout Etat partie aun différendpourrait se
voir refuser la possibilitéd'intervenir dans une affaire susceptible de
donner application aux mêmesprincipes et règlesjuridiques. )>
A l'instar de Malte, plusieurs autres Etats peuvent bien ètre hautement
intéresséset mêmeplus directement touchés par les principes et règles qui
seront dégagéspar la Cour dans le litige tuniso-libyen. Cela ne peut constituer
pour autant, pour ces Etats, un motif suffisant pour intervenir aux termes
mêmes de ['article 81, paragraphe 2 b), du Règlement, qui exige que I'Etat
intervenant (spécifie )l'objet précisde I'intervention.
Il est vrai que le Gouvernement maltais tire argument de la situation
géographique particulière et unique de cet Etat vis-à-vis de la Tunisie et de la
Libyeet aussi vis-à-visdu plateau continental dans la région.Cette observation
d'ordre géographique est certes pertinente. On ne voit cependant pas en quoi
elle peut constituer une justification particulière pour l'intervention compte
tenu des termes précisdans lesquels 1elitige est soumis a la Cour et compte
tenu également des termesdans lesquels cette dernière prendra sa décision.En
ce qui concerne le premier point. il suffit de rappeler que le compromis tuniso-
libyen de 1977 invite la Cour a dire quels sont les principes et règlesde droit
international applicables pour la<<délimitationde la zone du plateau continen-
tal relevant de la Jamahiriya arabe tibyenne populaire et socialiste » et de la
« zone du plateau continental relevant de la Républiquetunisienne )>.Rien de
plus. La question posée a la Cour concerne et se limite aux seuls rapports
réciproquesentre la Tunisie et la Libye. C'est ce qui du reste apparait claire-
ment dans les conclusions que les deux Parties ont déposéesdans l'affaire
principale. On ne voit plus déslors quel peut êtrel'objet précisde la demande
d'intervention de Malte, dans un litige intéressant d'unemanière aussi spéci-
fique exclusivement la Libye et la Tunisie.
En ce qui concerne le deuxième point. le Gouvernement maltais sait perti-
nemment que la mission de la Cour et la portée de i'arrht qu'elle rendra
s'inscrivent dans tecadre précisdu principe de la relativitéde la chosejugée.Le
rappel des termes de l'article 59du Statut de la Cour nous parait touta fait utile
a cet égard etnous permet de nous passer de tout commentaire. L'article 59
dispose : « La décisionde laCour n'estobligatoire que pour lesparties au litige
et dans lecas qui a étédécidé» . Aux termes de cet article, ilest clair que, sur les
deux plans envisagésdans lecompromis tuniso-libyen, c'est-à-direla définition
du droit applicable et la définitionde la manière pratique d'application de ces
principes au cas précisde la Tunisie et de la Libye, l'arrêtde la Cour demeure
vis-à-vis de Malte res itifcaliosacta .
2) Par ailleurs, leGouvernement maltais préciseque l'objetdeson interven-
tion se limitea lui permettre d'exposer ses vues sur un litige dont nous venons
de voir qu'ilne le regarde pas et aussi que, en demandant a ce faire, il n'entend
pas devenir partie a ce litige. II a en effet déclaréque(l'intervention n'a pas
pour objet d'aboutir a une décisionde fond »ni encore moins ({d'obtenir ..un
prononcé ou une décisionquelconque de la Cour au sujet des limites de son
plateau continental par rapport à ces deux pays ou a l'un d'eux n.
Une telle attitude n'estcependant pas conforme au Statut ni a la mission de
la Cour dansses fonctions contentieuses. La mission de laCour est définiepar
l'article36, paragraphe 1, du Statut qui dispose que : <<La compétenc de la
Cour s'étend P toutes les affaires que les parties lui soumettron)>et aussi par
l'article38 de ce Statut qui dispose aussi clairement : « La Cour, dont la mission est de réglerconformément au droit international lesdifférendsqui lui
sont soumis... ))
L'attitude du Gouvernement maltais est encore moins conforme a un prin-
cipe fondamental du droit international. que la présenteCour a toujours veille
a faire respecter.IIs'agitdu principe de l'égalitédes pariies dans une instance
contentieuse. Dans Ia présenteaffaire. la Cour a devant elle. d'un côté,deux
Etats litigants acceptant de bonne foi toutes les obligations prévues par le
compromis qu'ilsont signéet par leStatut de laCour et. de l'autre coté.un Etat
tiers qui demande. en somme. étreofficiellement présent en l'instance . étre
autorisé a exposer ses vues sans cependant se trouver lie par la décisionde la
Cour. Une telle position. si elle peut être attrayanre pour le Gouvernement de
klalte. par son confort. est cependant difficilement défendablepour la raison
simple niais suffisante qu'elle n'est pasconforme au Statut de la Cour et qu'elle
constitue de surcroit une atteinte grave au principe d'égalité précédemment
mentionné.
Troisième et dernier point de mon expoçé.Monsieur le Présideni.Le Gou-
vernement maltais a déclare que ce qui le préoccupe dans l'affaire tuniso-
libyenne est.le faitque lesprincipes et règlesde droit international applicablesa
cette espèce et les circonçtances géographiques et autres qui seront prises en
considération par la Cour a cet eNet auront inévitablementun impact sur les
inlérétsmaltais et seront <(.necessairementpertinents pour la délimitationentre
Malte et la Libye et entre hlalte et laTunisie))Dans la requete maltaise. on lia
cet égard :
« Malte doit donc s'attendre que tous principes et règles,juridiques ou
équitables, ainsi que la manière pratique de les appliquer. qui seront
définispar la Cour ...seront citéset invoqués dans tout difféyendexistant
ou qui surgirait par la suite au sujet de la situation de hlalte comme Etat
ayant un plateau continental méditerranéendans le meme secteur que la
Libye et la Tunisie.>i
Dans les plaidoiries orales. le Gouvernement maltais par la bouche de son
agent et ses conseils. notamment hl. Lauterpacht. a encore développé cette
manière de voir. Dans son exposé. hl. Lauterpacht a insisté.cartes a l'appui.
sur le fait que la définition des principes du droit applicable. les méthodes
éventuelles utiliséespour leur mise en aruvre pratique dans le cas tuniso-
libyen. la définition des circonstances pertinentes qui seront prises en considé-
ration et lepoids respectif qui sera attribue a ces circonstances pertinentes. tous
ces facteurs auront un impact direct sur les droits de hlalte sur le plateau
continental adjacent a ses cotes. II en est ainsi pour ne donner .que deux
exemples seulement - si la Cour veut appliquer la méthode - non pas le
principe - de l'équidistanceou les principes équitablesou encore les données
(4geographiques. géologiques.géomorphologiques.etc. »(requête maltaise).
A ce stade de la procédure.il ne nous semble pas possible. ni qu'il soit utile
pour la Cour. de nous lancer dans un débatsur ces diverses questions : notre
intention n'est pas non plus de nous laisser entraîner par le Gouvernement
maltais dans un débatsur le fond. la ou en réalitél'ondoit se limiter a une seule
question de procédure, celle de la recevabilite de lrequête a firi d'intervention
présentéepar le Gouvernement de Malte. A cet égard. le Gouvernement
tunisien ne peut que reserver ses droits vis-à-visde ta presentation deséléments434 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
de fait ou de droit que le Gouvernement maltais a cru pouvoir avancer
l'appui de,sa requète.
Cela étantdit. et mime si l'ondoit laisser de côtéle débatsur les éIemcnLs de
fond. ildemeure que les questions soulevéespar leGouvernement de klalte ne
peiiveni en aucune maniere militer en faveur de la recevabilitéde sa requête.
1) En premier lieu. en effet. les consideraiions de drok évoquéespar le
Gouvernement de hlalte ne peuvent justifier une telle requête.Le Gouverne-
ment maltais. en se référanta l'article I du compromis tuniso-libyen. affirme
que itles principes et règlesjuridiques, les principes équitables )>et les« ten-
dances récentesadmises a la conférence sur le droit de la nier )Pqui seront
appliquéspar laCour dans lecas tiiniso-libyen. auront un impact sur les droits
de hlalte sur son propre plateau continental. Cette affirmation demande. en
redite. a êtrenuancée.S'ils'agitdu contenu génkralde ces principes et règles.
leur formulation par laCour aura un impact sur lesdroitsde Malte.comme sur
les droits de tous autres Etats se trouvant 'dans la mêmesituation géogra-
phique. II ne peut en être autrement.ainsi que d'ailleurs l'aadmis M. Lauter-
pacht dans ses observations orales déjàcitées.Lorsqu'ildéclare : <To the extent
thai the Court lays dowii general concepts ihese are generally applicable to al1
Siates and must be accepted as such. . . )>(ci-dessusp. 294).
Xlaisdans la mesure où il s'agitde l'application de ces principes et règlesau
cas particulier tuniso-lihyen et dans les rapports réciproquesde ces deux pays
exclusivement. il est évident que cela ne concerne pas le Gouvernement de
Xlalte ni ne peut porter atteinte ii ses droits ni. par voie de conséquence.
jiistifier une demande d'intervention de sa part. II en est de mêmepour les
méthodesde délimitationapplicables dans la présenteespèce. Le choix de ces
niéthodes est gouverné et conditionne par les circonstances géographiques
propres aux Etats litigants :lechoix de ces méthodesest. pourrait-on dire, taille
a la mesure du cas auquel ces methodes s'appliquent et la portéede ce choix se
limite a ce cas d'espèce. C'estla un principe généralementadmis et que le
tribunal arbitral franco-britannique a rüppelk. a la suite de la Cour, dans les
termes suivants :
<<ThisCourt considers lhat the appropriateness of the equidistance
method or any other mcthod Torthe purpose of effecting an equitable
delimitation is a function or reflection of the geographical and other
relevant circumstances orcach particular case. )>
I)e niême.enlin. pour les circonstances geographiques ou géomorphologiques
applicables a l'espèce.FI. Lauterpacht a exposé.par exemple. au sujet de ces
donnéesgéornorphologiquesceci :
(<in developing their arguments regarding the direction of the boundary
line. Libya and Tunisia will each closely consider the nature and effeci oT
the geology and geo-morphology of the sea-bed in the disputed area P(ci-
dessus p. 3 14).
Si te1est effectivement le cas. il.est évidentque les données avancéespar les
deux Parties ne sont pertinentes ni ne seront prises en considération par la
Cour que dans la limite des relations réciproques de la Tunisie et de la Libye.
[.aencore. la jurisprudence internationale est claire a ce sujet et, pour ne pas
allonger inutilement le débat.je me permets de renvoyer a I'arrètde la présente
Cour dans lesaffaires du Plairau coiiri~reiitalde la merdu Nord de 1969 et a la
sentence arbitrale du tribunal îranco-britannique de 1977.
Toutes ces considérations. si elles montrent quelque chose. montrent que
dans ce domaine complexe - et qui: peut-être. deviendratréscompliqué - de PLAIDOIRIE DE M. BELAID 435
la délimitationdes espaces marins et sous-marins, le principe fondamental est
que cette opération dedélimitationest toujours et ne peut étreeffectuéeque sur
la base et compte tenu des données propres a chaque cas d'espèce etcompte
tenu des rapports réciproquesspécifiquesaux Etats parties au litige. C'est ce
que nous nous permettrons d'appeler les principes de hilutc~iufilr;-dans le
rapport des Etats concernés - et dercdu~iili~- dans le rapport des situations
géographiqueset autres propres a chaque cas déspéce - principes qui doivent
gouverner le domaine de délimitationet qui nous semblent pertinents pour le
problème pose ici, celui de la recevabilitéde l'intervention de Malte. 11 est
évidentque le litige actuellement soumis a la Cour est un litigebilatéraldans le
sens qu'il concerne les rapports Libye-Tunisie exclusivement, el aussi que ce
litigeest relatif dans le sens qu'ilporte sur la seule zone de plateau continental
qui sera déterminéecomme relevant de ces deux pays seulement et'enfinque ce
litige doit étreréglésur la base des seules donnéespertinentes propres à ce cas
d'espke. Dans ces conditions. il n'y a aucune raison que l'intervention d'un
autre Elai vienne bouleverser les donnéespromes àce litige, formulédans des
termes aussi précis.
2) LeGouvernement maltais objecte cependant qu'en raisonde la proximittr
géographique des trois pays les limites des plateaux continentaux des trois
Etais <(convergent en un point unique qui reste Bdéterminer V. C'est la. en
réalité,une affirmation difficilea soutenir. La Tunisieet la Libyeont demandé
a la Cour. par le compromis de 1977. de les aider à définir leur frontière
commune sur le plateau continental. hlalte et la Libye ont aussi signé un
compromis ayant un objectif analogue. pour définir et délimiterleurs plateaux
conrinenraux respectifs. IIest évident que la détermination d'un point de
convergence tripartite. s'ilen existeun. ne peut ètreeffectuéequ'une fois que.
dans des rapports bilatéraux. le litige entre la Tunisie et la Libye ei entre la,
Libye et Malte sont régléset qu'enfin le plateau continental entre Malte et la
Tunisie est lui-mêmedélimité. Ceci est valable dans la mesure oii il n'y a que
trois Etats intéressés etu'il n'existepas de quatrième partie au litige:car dans
cecas. il ne s'agiraplus d'un poinl de convergence tripartite. mais d'un pointOLI
d'une zone de convergence quadripartite. Mais évidemmentle probleme reste
le meme.
Ce n'est pas le lieu ni le moment d'envisager ces problémes impliquant
plusieurs Etats qui ne sont pas parties.8 la présente instance. II sufit de
constater que dans les rapports de hlalte. de la Libye et de la Tunisie. la
question est poséeen termes bilatérauxe.uclusivementet que le Gouvernement
maltais a contribué a ce qu'il en soitainsi. Si. aujourd'hui. il entend poser le
probleme en des termes trilateraux. ilfaut ou bien que les deux autres Etats
intéressésacceptent cette maniere de voir ou bien que le juge international
reqoive. par un compromis trilateral exprès.un telmandat. Or. on sait qu'un tel
cas ii'exis(cpas pour le moment: dans la présente instance.
Au terme de cet expak. Monsieur le Président. klessieurs de laCour, il
convient de résumer mon expose dans les trois conclusions suivantes :
- Premièrement. la requete a fin d'intervention de h9alte a été présentée
avec un retard excessif et injustifiéau regard des dispositions pertinentes du
Règlementde laCour et ce retard est de nature a porter gravement préjudice au
règlement de l'affaire (uniso-libyenne soumise actuellement a la Cour inier-
nationale depuis le ICrdécembre 1978.436 PLATEAUCONTINEhTAL
- Deuxièmement. la requète a fin d'intervention de Xlalte n'a pas pleine-
ment respectéles conditions prévues par le Statut et leReglement de la Cour
quant Bla définitionde l'objetprecis de l'intervention. et de ce Taitelle doit être
df laréenon recevable.
- Troisiemement. la requètea fin d'intervention de h4altcn'a pas respecte
les dispositions pertinentes du Statut et du Règlement de la Cour relatives a
I'intcrétd'ordre juridique qui peut. pour elle. êtreen cau)idans la présente
affaire i~iniso-libyennesoumise a laCour. et dece faitelle ne pciit ktre déclarée
recevable.
The PRESIDENT : The Agent of the Government of X.laltawhiçh had the
task of prcsenting itsobservations to the Court in the preseni proceedings has
cxpressed rhe wish to have an opportunity to present some comments on the
subsequent observaiions subrniiied by the Government of the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya and by Tunisia. TheCourt will therefore sit on hlonday. at IO a.m.
to hear those comments.
The Court has been greatly assisted by the observations which have ken
prcscnted to it by the Agents of the three States concerned in ihe present
proceedings. and by their learned counsel. If it should wish to seek some
Tiirtherclarilications on any point, it may put a questionto the Agents of the
States concerned at the sitting on hlonday. SIXTI-tPUBLIC SITTING(23 11181. 10 a.m.1
Prrseirt: [Seesitting of 19 11181.]
STATEM EiVT BYDR. MIZZI
AGENT FORTHE COVERNhlEFI'TOF hlrZLTA
Dr. hllZZI : hlr. President. hlembers or the Court. 1 thank you for the
opportunity of addressing you once more. and 1beg the Court's indulgence if
we prolong the hearing beyond the dates originally set lor it.
ll'e would not have done so if our opponents had not misrepresented -
unwilfully -of course - some parts of hlalta's tipplication and some of the
submissions we have made to the Court in the course of the hearing. We shall.
however. be brief. and we shall limit Ourcornments toonly a few of the points
made by nur opponents in these proceedings. Rte do this because wc believe
that in the submissions ivemade during Thursday and Friday of last week we .
anticipated niost. if not all. of the objections which were in fact raiscd on
Saturday.
M'ebelieve we have suflïciently shown that those objections cannot inhibit
the Coun from acceding to Malta's request and grant itspermission for Malta
to intervene in the LibyalT~iiiisiCoritit~rri~alheucase now before theCourt.
There are. however. some observations or statements made. or conclusions
reached. by Our opponents that cal1for comment.
Before 1do this 1wish to convey Professor Lalive'sapologies for not being
with us today. He has been obliged to return to Ceneva to honour a commit-
ment which he had already postponed to be able to be present for this hearing
and which he could not delay any further.
'ïhfoughout the whole sitting last Saturday Our opponents repeatedly made
the accusation that Malta wants to have her cake and eat it. that hlalta does not
really want to intervene. but only to submii her views and. above all. that
Xlalta is not prepared to be bound by the decision of the Court even ir itwere
allowed to intervene.
As to some of the views referred to by Libya or Tunisia or both. concerning
the question of the precise object of klalta's intervention. my learned friend
hlr. Lauterpacht will comment in some detail and will. 1am convin~d. show
the Court - if this is still necessa-y that h'lalta'srequest for permission to
intervene has a very precise object and a very important one. 1simply wish to
make this comment :hlalta's application and aur submission on klalta'sbehalf
have been quoted several times to show that hlalta's sole object was a mere
wish to express views and that klalta's interest was more academic than legal.
They have fallen into this error because their quotations have always rallen
short of the whole of hlalta's submisçions. Every time our opponents quoted
the words "hlalta wishes to have an opportunity to be heard". they have
convenienify ignored the reason for which hlaltanotoniy wishes but needs io
intervene and be heard. and to do rhat before it is. or may be. too late. Malta
needs to be heard ta protect her specific interests that could be - indeed are
likely to be - affectcd by the Court's dccision in the Lib~~a/Tiriiisicase.438 CONTINEhTALSHELF
But the unkindest statement of al1isthat Malta does not want to be bound or
to abide by the decisions of the Court.
\Ite have never said this. nor do we say it now. Indeed. if we were to Sayit.
it would - ifput in ihose words - have no legal value whatsoever. If. atlaw.
an intervening State,is bound by the decisions ofthe Court. or by some ofthose
decisions. that legal position cannot be changed by the State's non-acceptance
of it. Whether the intervening State accepts it or not. whether it likes it or not,
the legal position is what it is. and it is not within the power of the intervening
State to alter it. By its application to intervene Malta submits itself to al1the
consequences and effects of intervention - whatever these may be.
Our opponents have drawn the conclusion that hlalta does not accept to be
bound by the decisions of the Court from hlalta's insistence that it does not
seek any ruling or decision of the Court against either Libya or Tunisia
concerning the continental shelf boundary with either of these States.
Malta has emphasized the exclusion of that objective to make il abundantly
clear that its application to intervene was a requestfora genuine intervention.
Malta isnot seeking a settlement of its delimitation issueswith either Libya or
Tunisia lhrough the back door of intervention. Malta is genuinely concerned
that the Court may. or more likely would. in the course of the LibyafTunisia
proceedings decide specilic issues directly concerning the region in which
Malta isplaced and thereby affect one or more of her interests of an un-
doubtedly legalcharacter.
But if it is an inevitable legal consequence of intervention that those deci-
sions would have a binding effect on Malta it would serve no purpose
whatsoever for us today to Say.which we do not. that kIalta does not wish to
be bound.
Our opponents have tried to distinguish between cases in which the parties
have accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of reciprocity
and cases where the jurisdiction of the Court isconferred upon ilby a Special
Agreement. They have argued that if the Court were to allow intervention in
ihe latter cases. States would be discouraged from submitting their disputes to
the Court by Special Agreement.
As the Court well knows. this may have been a good political argument at
the time the Statute was being drawn up for limiting intervention as is now
being proposed by our opponents. But it certainly cannot be used today as a
legal argument in support of the view that Article 62 or the Statute does not
apply where the jurisdiction of the Court derives from a Special Agreement.
forthis isin eiTectwhat the argument leads to. My collcagiies will have further .
comment to make on this point.
What I wish to add is sirnply this. If interventiori co~ildbe denied on the
ground only that the dispute before the Court has been brought by Special
Agreement. States parties to that Agreement could. by submitting a dispute to
the Court. affect the legal interests of a third State in the knowledge that that
third State would not be in a position to protect those interests by rneans of
intervention. They could also so bring their case before the Court as to ensure
that their case. and therefore alsoany decision in it. willprecede the settlement
of any dispute that may exist with a third State. They could in this way
prejudge the issue, without the third State being effectively in a position to
protect its interests.
11 ,his respect. J wis10 place on record that the Libyan/h,lalteseAgreement
to refer the continental shelf dispute was signed in May 1976. The Special
Agreement between Libya and Tunisia referring ihat dispute to the Court was
signed in June 1977 and yet the latter case has been before thecourt for about STATEMENT BY DR. MlZZi 439
two years whereas the hlalta/Libya Agreement has yet to be deposited with
this Court. 1mention these facts only 10 show how a State could behave if it
knew that no other State could intervene in cases brought by Special Agree-
ment and for no other reason.
The last point 1 wish lo touch upon concerns the kind of interest that is
required by Article 62 of the Statute. One ofour opponent's propositions. and I
do not quote the exact words. is to this effect :that Article 62 of the Statute
involves that the intervening State's interest should be so linked to the subject-
matter of the dispute that whichever way the decision in the case goes. that
interest will be affected.
One needs only to enunciatc ihat proposilion in order to sec how obviously
lacking in al1validityilmusi bc. Article 62 only requires that the legal interest
involved "may be" afîected. or in the French text that it shall be"en cause".
The nature of the decision itselfcannot conceivably be known ai that stage. All
that Article 62 can require is that Malta should show the existence of a legal
interest in the subject-matter of the dispute. and show that this interest is of
such a character that ilwill beliable to be anéctedby at leas1one. or possibly
more. of the characteristics which that decision might have and which cannot
be known. At the most. what Malta had to show was that there is not even a
strong likelihood, but that ihere is an appreciable risk of its being affecied. This
Isubrnir. Malta has done and amplydone, and I do not think there isanything
we could usefully add in this respect to the demonstration of ilgiven by Xlr.
Lauterpacht the other day.
In $isconnection Iask the Court to notice that Our opponents have not
made the smallest attempt to controvert any of the facts or descriptions given
by hlr. Laùtërpacht. Indeed. they have implicitly adrnitted the correctness of
1hese:for ihey'say thal Mr. Lauierpachtweni much further ihan wës needed
to esiablish Malta's legal interesi. and that he virtually staked out Malta's
continenial shelf claim - so niuch so that any intervention on her pari has
now becme unnecessarv.
Except that this really concedes hlalta's case. I submit that it is a wholly
inadmissible line of argument :il is a sort of "heads 1win, tails you lose" kind
orargument. Obviously. in order to establish the existence orher legal interest.
hlalta has to go fairly rully into at least çome of the salient relevant factsand
considerations. Unless she does this. her opponents will imrnediately Say"your
case is very thin ; you have not shown that any real interest exists". Yet the
moment Malta does that our opponents say that we have done it so compre-
hensively that intervention is no longer necessary. that the Court now knows
our case and will take care of it.
This amounts to saying that intervention is rendered unnecessary by the
very process - by the mere fact - of telling the Court why Malta considers
that intervention is necessary. The self-serving. not to say. absurd nature of
this type of argument hardly needs pointing out. and 1ask theCourt to accord
itno weight whaiçoever.
hlr. President and hlembers of theCourt. 1said at the beginning we shall be
very brief in our comments. Ithereforeend my intervention. Before t do tha! I
again thank the Court for the attention and patience with which it has listened
to what we had tosay in support of hlalta's Application. 1also wish. with your
permission. hlr. President. to thank the distinguished agents and counsel that
have appeared for the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and of the
Republic of Tunisia for the loyal and the fair way in which they have
conducted their case. and 1hope. of course. that 1have not spoken too early. ARGUMENTOF MR. LAUTERPACHT
COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERKhIENTOF hl ALTh
hlr. LAUTERPACHT : Mr. President and Members of the Court. I shall
limit myself in this speech to brief observations upon onla few of the points
raised by our distinguished opponents which lie within the scope of my
original speech. 1shall therefore refer to the following matters.
First. the suggestion that in some way Malta is improperly seeking to avoid
becoming bound by a judgment of the Court.
Second. the question of the object of Malta'sintervention.
Third. the two associated matters closely associated with each other of
hlalta's special interest in the case and the rnanner in which this interest may
be affected by the Court's decision.
If 1do no1give a reference forevery allusion which 1make to the arguments
of learned counsel for Libya and Tunisia. it is partly because some of the
arguments were repeated several times and partly because time has not
permitted me to check every.point against the record.
1begin with a matter which has been given a prominent place in the Libyan
and Tunisian arguments. The Court has been several times presented with the
contention - expressed in a variety of ways - that Malta seeks to secure the
advantageof an intervention without accepting an obligation to be bound.
The argument is completefy misconceived.
The first and most obvious reason.as the learned Attorney-General hasjust
said. but I shall not be sirnply repeating what hehas said. is that hlalta has
never asserted that it will not bebound by the decision ofthe Court. At no tirne
have those representing Libya and Tunisia ever pointed to any statement.
whether in the Maltese Application or in the speeches of those representing
hlalta. in which it has been said that Malta declinesto be bound by the decision
of the Court.
Wrhat hlalta has said is that it does not,çeek an orderior a rernedy against
Libya and Tunisia. But that is not the same thing as saying that hfalta will not
be bound by the decision of the Court. The distinguished Attorney-General.
and Agent for hfalta. with al1the authority of his position. has already made it
plain that klalta acknowledges that whatever are the consequences in law of.
'the Court's decision they must apply to hfalta. Obviously. it is impossible for
hlalta to say now what those consequences exactly will be. They must
necessarily depend upon the terms of the decision of the Court - upon what
thecourt actually says in the main body of thejudgment on the merits as well
as upon the dispositifThere is nothing evasive aboutthe position of Malta in
this regard. Whatever the Court may in due course Saywill be the consequen-
ces of the intervention. No statement. hqr. President. coulbe more forthright
than that.
The views expressed by Libya and Tunisia on this matter call. nonetheless,
for two sets of comments.
First. hlalta is bound to observe that the observations made by Libya and
Tunisia upon the position reflect a technical and narrow approach to the
binding effect of decisions of the Court which appear indeed to verge on the
unprincipled. ihat is in the sense of abandoning fundamental legal principles.
There is. of coursea formal distinction to be drawn between the reasoningiiithe body ofthe jiidgnieiir of the C'OLI~ aIiid the fornial coriclusioiis siüted in
the disposirif Bu1 whcn .trticlc 61. paragraph l .rcfers to thc dcçision OSthe
Co~irtin the expression "iiitei'cstoTn legal iiaitire which tiiriybcaffected by the
decisiciil".it docs no1rcfcr to dccisioii in the nari.oiv seiiseof the di.spusiiif.and
iiis iiot only the disposii~f'ivhichis biiidiiigiiia rüse. .\rticle hl. paragrriph 1.
refers to the decision of the C'oiirt. the substaiitive dccisiciiieilibraciilg the
i-casoiiiiigand thc di.~posit(/:
Several itiiportaiit coiisidcratioiis support ihis vicw.
First. it is tieccssary to look rit the laiigiiaof .Article61. püragraph 1. iiot
onlg IIIthe Eiiglish biit also iiithe French test. NOW itis sigiiilivant ihat the
French test coiiiaiiis iio words at all to reflect the English csprcssion "the
decisicinin the case". The 1:reiichtext says :
"Lorsqu'iin Etat estinie qiie. dans lin diîfkreiid.ii 11iniérétd'ordre
jiiridiqiie est poliIiien cütise. ilpeiit adresser alaCciiiriiiic rcqiiete. i fin
d'inierveiitioi~."
And iî I niay iniposc oti the Court niy own literal iiiterprctation of ihose
ivords. what I undcrstand the French text to be süyiiig is ihis :when a Stale
coiisiders thai in a disp~itean interest of a legal character is for ii an issue or is
alfecied. that State niay address to ihc Court a reqiicst wilh a view lo
intervertrion.
h'o words whatsoevcr to rencct the English e.xprcssioii."the dccisioii in the .
case .
1do not assert that the French tut prevails. but 1do subniit that the French
test niay be iised as an aid to the interpretation of the f'nglish text. If the idea
involved ln the words rroni the official English teat "the decision in the case"
were so signiiïcant. so precise and so narrow as Libya and Tiinisia now
contend. is ii no1unlikely thal the French test would have becn worded in a
manner to reflect that degree or significance.
11may. I believe. be cogentty urged that simply on ü propcr iiitcrpretation of
the lirst paragraph oî.~\rticle62. the phrase. "the decision in the case" mist be
read in a large sense as reïerring to those utterances of the Couri which have
the force oflaw. And so WC come to the question of what has the rorce oftaw.
For this purpose il is quite unnecessary to be concei'ned abolit the role or
Article.59 though I shall come to thai pre.sently. Nor need wc be concerned
abolit the question of whether the scope of Article 59 is liniited to the disposi~iJ
or estends as a*ellto the rcasoning of thejiidgment and the incidental but often
critically iniportant fiiidings or law contained in the rcasoning. IVhat makes
the content of ajiidgment. reasoning as well as dispasiiij. bbidinp,in law is ihat
it contains an authoritaiivc siaiemeni of law : and what the Co~irtsays is the
law is binding because it is the Law. Il is unnecessary ta look 10 any outside
source to attribiite legally binding quality to the law. For that reason. the
undertaking given by hlernbers of the United Nations in Article 94 of the
Charter. to comply with the decisions of this Court to which thcy are a Party.
though important no doubi as a gerieral declaration of loyalty 10 the Court. is
reallg superfluous. Xlernbersor the United Nations are rnerely tindertaking to
comply wiih legal obligations which already esist.
The forfe of this point is brought out by comparing decisions in contentious
cases with decisions in advisory cases.
There is .nothing in the Slatuic which sap that an advisory opinion is
binding. And in fornial terms ilappears no1to be. ltis mercly an advice to an
international organization which the latter is in theory free to accept or reject.
Altho~ighthe advisory opinion has a dispnsiiifat its end. ihere is no distinction442 CONTINENTAL SHELF
in biiiding quality or non-binding qtiality betwccn the main par1of the opinion
aiid the disposil6 Yet. an advisory opinion cannot be disn~issedas lacking
binding force. 1t is a declaration of the law and the law as stich is what is
binding. otherwise it would not be law. Those who represent Libya and
Tiinisia sccni to have overlooked that.
Now. for this proposition that the content of an advisory opinion is binding
as a statenient of law. I need hardly cite authority. but the point has been put
w ith such clarity. forceand elegance by one of the klembers ofthe Court that I
believe it will be helpful to recall the terms of that statenient. In the course of
his declaration in the Westeri~Saliara case. Judge Gros had the following to
say :
"1 shall merely recall that when theCourt gives an advisory opinion on
a question oîlaw. it states the law. The absence of binding force does not
transform the judicial operation into a legal consultation. which niay be
niade use of or not according to choice. The advisory opinion determines
the law applicable to the question put : it is possible for the body which
sought the opinion not to Followit in its action. but that body is aware
that no position adopted contiary tothe Court's pronouncement will have
any cffectiveness whatsoever in the legal sphere." V.C.J.Reporis 1975.
p. 73.)
And what the distinguished Judge said about an advisory opinion cannot
apply with any the las force to a contentiousjudgment.
What the distinguished Judge said about advisory opinions represents
htalta's position entirely. Ii isthe esplanation of why hlalta seeks to intervene
and it is the siaienient of the erfect of the intervention upon hialta.
But that. it seems. is not enough for Libya and Tunisia, and so here 1 come
to my second comment on the position which they have taken. Tunisia and
Libya seeni to want hlalta io commit itself to something more. The question
ihat they never approach is, what is that something more? And they are wise
to avoid it. for those that live in glasshouses should never throw Stones. In
determining whether there is any relevance in the Libyan and Tunisian
suggestion that ivlaltashould "bind" itself insome unspecified way, the Court
should consider in what way or to what hlalta could ai thisstage bind herself.
and for this purpose the Court miist consider to what. if anything. Libya and
Tunisia have bound themselves. A lot has been said in these hearings about the
fact that Libya and Tunisia have come (Othe Court by Special Agreement. So.
hfr. President. with your leave. let us look again at that Agreement to see what
itis that they have bound themselves (o. Now the well-nigh incredible thing -
bearing in mind the apparent self righteousness with which Libya and Tunisia
have charged klalta with "interfering" in their case- taking an advaiitage. so
they said. without accepting a burden - the incredible thing isthat Libya and
Tiinisia thcmselves expressly deny to the Coiirt the power to give a decision
with binding force in any sense greater than that acknowledged by h.Ialta.
Libya and Tunisia absolutely do not ask the Court to decidea case between
them. They ask. what are the applicable principles and rules of international
law ? They ask theCourt to specify precisely the practical way in which the
principles and rules apply in this parlicular situationso that others. others-
the expertsof the two countries - can decide whatthe line will be. And Libya
and Ttinisia maintain that position to the end. Even in Article 3 of the Special
Agreement - which contemplates a failure of the experts to agree - the
Parties only go back to the Court "torequest such explanation and clarification
as may Facilitatethe task of the iwo delegations". ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 443
ln my earlier speech Icontended that ifthe Court were to comply with the
request of the Pdrties. it would - as I theii put it - have to enter in10a high
degree of "specificity". so that the Court would in fact be deciding on many
points of law. But Idid not say, and I could not say. that the Court would be
deciding the boundary Iine. And my learned friend Mr. Highet agreed - as
can be seen from page 386. sliliru- for there Mr. Highet said :"Even if the
Court were being askedto draw a line - n31iiclsiihi~~iiriï iiii. ."and 1end
the quote there since the rest of the sentence is not relevant.
So what do Libya and Tiinisia say that Malta is avoiding that they are not
avoiding theniselves ? The Parties are asking the Court to tell them what the
law is. not to decide the boundary. Whai the Couri says ihe law is will be
binding on them (or at least I hope that they will regard itas so binding). But
klalta has no doubts. What the Court says the law is. is the law and il will bind
Malta.
Obvioiisly. jus1 as there are likely to be sonle points in the jiidgnient of the
Lourt'which hlalta considers may affect its position in relation io I..ibya and
Tiinisia. so ihere will also be points which rnay noi aiTecl klalta'i; position. It
siands to reason that the range of niatters concerning hlalta will iiot coincidc
exüctly with the range of matters to be decidcd in relation to Libya and
Tunisia. But that does not weaken in any way the binding force for hlalta of
whai the Court says the law will be. And in so far as the Court süys what the
law will be in relation to the continental shelf feattireofthe central hlediterra-
nean Sea. hlalta has a legal interest which specially and iiniquely will be
affccted by the Court's decision. Really. can anything more beaskedof hlalta ?
Or. to put ianother way. can Libya and Tunisia really ask Xlalta to bc bo~ind
in some way to which they are not prepared to be bound thenisclvcs? Thai
woiild be a procedural irnpossibility.
Before leaving this point. il rnay be helpfiil to ideniify why it is Ihat Libya
and Tunisia are so insistent thai the refcrencc to the word "decision" in the
English iext or Article 62. paragraph 1.isonly to the dispositifand thai itis the
dispositif alone that binds.
What oiir oppotients are really trying to do is to say in advance that the
dispositifof the decision. whatevcr il rnay bc. cannor possibly affect hlüllü for
ihe siniple reason that it will be rendered only as between Libya and Tiiiiisia
and. coupled with that. that by virtiie of Article 59 of the Statule. the dispositif
w il1be binding only as between L.ibya and Tunisia.
But. if this is triie. il is irue and would be irueof every single decision the
Court ever gave or cotild give. If this line of argument is correct ilwould
automaiicülly est-lude. froni the beginning. al1possibility of intervention Linder
Article 62 ofihc Statute on thea priori groiind that the decision in a casc can
on14 bind the parties to itand can never bind any third Staie. This is 10piil nn
inipossibly narrow intcrpretation. not only on the word "decision". but also on
the word "affect", and on the very concept ofaffeciing. That is why. carlier in
this speech, i set Article 59 aside as not being relevant. It would erodc the
concepl of intervention to the point ordisappcarance.
1 corne. now to the next major point which requires coniment - the
qiiestion of the object of the intervention. In triiih. the solution orthis qiicstion
follows vety directly from what Ihave jus1 said about the binding chüracier of
the decision of the Court.
It is. aI understand it.comnion'ground between Libya and Tunisia. on the
one hand. and itlalta. on the other. that an intervention takes place ulithin the
franiework ofan existing proceeding. Thus. the object of the intervention nlust
be liniited by the scope or the niain action. For example; in a claini for444 COKïINENTAL SHELF
damages Tor denial of justice by State A against Slale B. Staie C cannot
intervene against Stale B seeking, say, resrirtrrio iri irircgrtriit in respect of a
quite unrelated claim arising out of an expropriation. And. ~i,/i)rriorL,State C
cannot inlervene against Slate A (the PlaintifTlon an unconnected matter. The
intervention must fall within the scope of the main proceedings.
So. in the prcscni casc. ihc objeci or klülta's iiiicrvcniion rnLisi be limited by
the object of the principal case. I was about to say. niusl be liniited by the
object or Libya's casc againsi T~inisia or 'l'iinisia'scasc against 1-ibya. But. l
realized in tinic that ihcre is oTcourse no case by l..iby:t against 'runisia or by
Tiinisia against Libya. l'his is niade vcry plain in thc dociimentation of the
Court regarding the casc : for esaniple. the printed version of the application of
hlalia. or the iiile page of the coiripre rrt~dtr. The formal tiile of the case is
Ti~iiisiufLibj'uti Arub J~t~i~lîiri~~ui.icither Siate is siiing the other. Neither
State is clainiing an order againsl the other. Keiiher State is seeking a remedy
or enforcement againsi ihe other. hly leariicd fricnd hlr. klighet was quite
wrong when he described ihe Special .-\greenlent as asking "the Court to
consider ccriain vcry spccitic. issiics as beiwccii L.ibya aiid Tunisia" (p. 383.
siipi'ir).The Spccial 12grccniciii docs noihiiig or the kiiid. 11docs 1101 refer io
üny issue. Icialonc ccriairi spccific iss~ics. Itdocs no inorc thaii ask ihe Court IO
lay dou'n ihc applicable principles aiid r~ilcs ol'iiiicriiaiioiial law and specify
ihc prücrical way iii which ihosc priilçiplcs aiid riiles üpply in the particular
situaiiori. Ii ccrtainly ducs nui identitj. arig spccitic isstrcor ask the Courr to
providc any rciiicdy iiircliiiicin10 any ~illegaiioiiof'thc cxistciicc of ü righi.
Pcrhrips issiics inay bc idenrilicd in ihc plcadiiigs. biit ihai is ü difkreiii niatter.
\j.e cünnoi know about that. fiiaiiy case. as cotiilscl 1Dr-t'iiiiisiahas iold 11s.ii
is to the Spccial ,\grccniciit. iiot io thc plcadiiigs. ihai wc iniisi lookfor ihc
idcn~iiicüiion of'the casc iiiw hich hialta sccks io itircrvcnc.
The Caciis. we are hcre coiifroiiied by aiiothcr iiiiscoii,cepiiiin esprcssed on
behalf of ihe I..ibyaiiGuveriiiiictit. Coiiiiscl for I.iby;i said thai Xlalia seeks "an
advisory role in çoiiieniio~is proccedings" (p. 382. sri/ii.lrl.and then a Cewlines
laicr goes on to ';üyrhat iherc is "no provisioii for senii-advisory proceedings
before ihc C'o~iri".In iritih. ihe proctu.diiigs beiwecii Libya and Tiinisia are
esacily ihai :senii-advisory proccedirigs. Boih the prcseiii proceedings bcfore
the Couri aiid the carlier criiiiparablc pi-oçcediiigs in ihc i\'~~i.li c*rciases. have
been ideniified iii~ich in thosc icriiis hy ailoihcr disiirigtiishcd Llenibcr of this
Court. Thus. Judge \loslet. iri\r.ritiilg of: "'Phc Iiiteri~aiioiial Couri of Justice'
at its preseril stage of'dcvelripiiic~ii"iiiihe Il~illiiii~sic/.~[tii../c~itll' 1979.said
of the advaniagcs tifspccial agrceiiiciiis. siich as ihc ciiinou. behre the Court.
tlie followiiig :
"'l'herc iiiay bc dispiiies of a legal charactcr in regard io which the
States coiiccrncd do iioi nfüiit i» rLinthe risk of ni1~inLivo~irablcbinding
judgiiieiit.but which they cannot subrnii IO ihc Court ns n reqiiesr for an
advisory opiiiioii. ~hispi'occd~irebeiiig rcscrvcd iri organs or inieri~aiional
rirgariiza~iotis." (D~llioirsi~Lu~~~J~)ttr~~u 1l9.79. p565.)
..\iid \vc rcspcctfiilly adopi ihat percepiive assessnieni of the character of the
Libyaii/l~unisiaii pi.occediiigh. They are proceedings. ihc vcry objecl of which
isIO seaire a siatcniciii frotii the COLI~L OCnvhat thc appropriale law is -
iiolhing iiiore thaii thüt - iio declaratioii oc righis. iio r~~stitiitiiriNrlt>gri~t~i.
iio daiiiagcs. iio remedy. rio ordcr of thai hind.
To identiry ihc Lib~~u/Trt~iisiacase in thesc teriiis is iiot io coiidenin it. Far
froni ihül. Ii sho~ild not bc \vorrying io aiiybody that ihere is no express
pi-ovisiciiiiiihc St~ii~iicfor ikis kind of Special .\greciiiciil. Thc innovation is ARGUMENT OF klR.LAUTERPACHT 445
indeed much to be welcomed becauseit opens up for the Court a ncw way 10
contribuie to the settlement of disputes by the exercise of its judicial function
and such a procedure docs not appear to be excluded by the Stat~ite.But. and
this point is relevant to what cornes later. it is a procedure which must take
place within the confines of the Statute. It is a procedure which cannot give
rise to adefucto amendment of the Statute by the deletion of Article 67.
But coming back to niy main point. once the Libyir/ T~~riiscaseis identified
for what it is - as a quasi-advisory case - what possible justification can
there be for suggesting that the object oriilaltain seeking to intervene niust be
niore exact. more precise. niore operative in Sormalternis than the object of the
original Parties.
And so we conre to the q~iestion of the precise objecl of the Rlaltese
intervention. As already stated. the object of an intervention cannot go beyond
theobjects orthe two original parties.They seekthe identification ofprinciples
and rules ofiniernatjonal law and the precise specilication of the way in which
those principles and rules are to be applied in the delimitation of their respec-
tive areas of coiitincntal shelf. They do no( ask the Colirt to delimit the
boundary .
Now. against that backgroiind. what in theory are the possible objects
which hlalta as sn intervener co~ild seek ? I emphasize the words iriil~eorjt
because. as will bc secn. sonie of the possible objects are clearly inappropriate
in the circiimstances. This is a question which has not been approached by
Libya or Tunisin for the rcason. I would suggest.that no answcr can be given
to il which supports thcir contention that Rlalta has inadequatcly stated the
object of its intervention.
Let me take the firsi theoretical possibility. It is that hlalta could have
applied to intervene with a view to obtaining from the C'o~~ra t specific decisiori
regarding its boundaries with Libya and Tunisia and the deliniitation thereof.
This would clearly have been an inadmissible object. since it would be asking
for more against each original Party than either original Party was seeking
against the other.
A second possibility is that hlalta might have applied to intervene on the
basisthat by so doing it could have obtained from the Court. to paraphrase the
terms of Article I of the LibydTunisia Agreement. a decision regarding the
principles and rules of international law applicable to the dcliniitation of ils
continental shelf relative to Libya and Tunisia. aswell asa precisespecificalion
of the practical way in which the experts of the three çoiintries might apply
those principles and rules. But, kvhereasthe firsi part of this possibjliiy - the
request for the declaration ofprinciples - might have beenadniissible if Libya
and Tunisia had asked the Court actually to determine the bouiidary line. it
surely niust be inadniissible where the role OS the Court is not e.xtendedto the
complett: settlement of ihe dispute. The intervener cannot inlpose upon the
original Parties the obligation to negotiate with the intervener on the basis of
thejudgment. since ~heonly obligation tonegotiate which they accepted in the
Special Agreement was that of negotiating between theniselves alone. True.
the judgment could operüte in any event as a declaration or law. but Xlalta
could not by its intervention create for the original Parties in relation to itself
the specific dulies çonrained in r\rticles2 and 3 al the Speçiül Agreement
belween Libya and Tunisia.
And so one cornes to the third theoretical possibility. namely that hlalta
should have identified in the Application the specific questions involved in the
Libj~o/Tt~riisiacase which might affect its continental shelf. and on which il
sought a decision froni thc Court. But that possibility assunics that i\lalta knew446 CONTINENTAL SHELF
what specific questions were being discussed in the Libjlaf T~~riisicase. and
from this it wüs cul or by the very fact that it could no1 have access to the
pleadings.
And so we corne lastly to the fourth theoretical possibility. which is the
course which hlalta actually adopted - to ask in general terms for leave to
intervene and make its submissions "on the issues raised in the pending case"
(Application. para. 20). Kow perhaps that phrase might have been better
franied : perhaps Rlalta should have sdid that it wanted to make its submis-
sions on those issues in the case which subscquent cxamination of the plea-
dings might indicate could affect hlalta's interests.But thiselaboration js surely
irnplicit in what was said in the rest of the relevant section of the Application.
hlalta did not need to spell out the implications of the subrnission of its views
because. as rnust be evideiii from ihe basis on which the Special Agreement
rcsts. a statcment of principles and rules by the Court is a statement of law
binding on ail States.
Paragraphs I I to 15of the t\pplicaion show clearly that h,lalta'saction was
founded on the view - which itmaintains - ihat a decisionby the Court on
poinis oflaw relating to the speciric features of the area which could over-spill
into the relations between Xlalta and Libya and hlalta and Tunisia, would
inevitably bind hlalta in her relations with Libya and Tunisia simply as a
siarement of law. So klalta's object was stated as specificallyas it could be in
the'circunistances. to hear the subniission of Xlalta. before deciding in a
manner possibly adverse to klalta. issues of law which could affect hlalta's
interests.
If RIaltaisallowed to intervene and isthus given an opportunity to study the
pleadings. it will be able more particularly to specify the issues on which it
wishes to concentrate ils submissions. The last thing that hlalta wants to do is
to indulge in a roving. or academic conimentary on the whole range of issues
examined by Libya and Tunisia. hlalta is concerned only with such specific
issues as it may identify as bearing on itscontinental shelf delimitation with iis
two neighbours - the kind of issiies which I sought to demonstrate at length
in iny first speech.
This brings me to the third main point which requires some reaction - the
nature of Xlalta'sintcrest. Tirne and again the Coun has heard it said by Libya
and Tunisia that hlalta's interest is no different from that of any other State
with a continental shelf. kly learned friend ProfessotJennings. as part of his
atiempts to indiçate that Alalta'sinterest in ihis specificarea ofcontinental shelf
was no greater than that oîany other State. said - as iCto reinforce this point
- that a large number of States have already applied for copies of the
pleadings.
What would the Court regard as a large number of States - suîîiciently
large, thai is. effectivcly.to dilute by an admixture of comparable concern the
clear evidence of Malta's special interest in the matter arising out of its
immediate proximity to Libya and Tunisia ? In fact only six States. of which
Malta was one. have asked for the pleadings. Six States out,of a possible 100
States that have continental shelf interests. And who were the other five ? Not
- if the suggestions made elsewhere in the speeches of Libya and Tunisia are
tocarry their fullweight of terror 7 not Italy, not Greece. not Yugoslavia. not
Albania. noi Egypt. no1Cyprus - noi any of the States in the Mediterranean
area : but the Netherlands. Canada. the United States, Argentina and Vene-
zuela. These are ihe large nurnber of States that, in the words of Professor
Jennings. have "clear. cven specific interests. that may betouched".
No doubt they are al1continental shelf States with delimitation problems. ARGUXlENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 447
But. how are they going to be touched in as precise. immediate and substantial
a manner as Xialta will be by findings of law on such specificpoints as I dealt
with the other day - points like the erfect of Libya'sdaim to draw a straight
line across the Gulf of Sirtc :or the effect of Tunisia's straight baseline system
round the Kerkennah Islands :or the eifect of the special features of the sea-
bed in the area. both in itsetfand as the seaward prolongation of the land mass
of Tunisia and Libya :and. perhaps most important of all. the treatment of the
areas of continental shelf included in Libya's and Tunisia's very substantial
overlapping claims with ~llalta. And these are only .wme of the local and
controlling legal elements which one may suppose must play a'significant. if
not dominating part in the dispute between Libya and Tunisia.
So 1submit. first thai it is exaggeration bordering on nonsense to suggest
that the interests of continental shelf States ai large. or even of those States
which asked for the pleadings. are in any significant sense comparable to the
interest which Malta has in the Libya/ Ttrriisia case.
Secondly. I venture to observe that what really matters. what is really
striking. is that no-one representing Libya and Tunisia made any serious
attempt to suggest that these features which Ihave enumerated - the Gulf of
Sirte. straight baselines. the configuration and direction of the coasts, the
overlapping orclaims - nobody suggested that they woufd not specially afrect
the extent of hlalta's continental shelf.
Still. some other points were made. and two cal1 for comment. The first is
the suggestion that Libya and 'Tunisiaby limiting their request to the Court to
determine the principles and rules applicable to the area of shelr appertaining
to each of them. were thereby excluding any determination by thecouri of the
area of shelfappertaining to klalta. and thus could no1affect hlalta's interests.
The Court will. 1am sure. not wish me to pursue a purely semantic point. and
I won't. Whakmatiers iskhatneilher Libya nor Tunisia denied ihai the shelves
of Libya and Tunisia must meet and run with the limits of the shelf ofh,lalta ai
a certain point and along certain lines. Now there isobviously a range of
possible degrees of contact between the shelves of the three States. ranging
rrom large to srnall. At this moment it is impossible to tell. and no-one is
entitled to assume. that it will be small any more than that it will be large.
Obviously. the more that the Malta shelf sticks out into the Mediterranean
Sea, the less shelf there is for Libya and Tunisia to divide between them, and
vice versa. If the Court is to do more than limit: its specific discussion
of the problem to the line nearest the Libyan-Tunisian land boundary, it is
impossible for the Court, or Libya, or Tunisia, to Say when that prospec-
tive continental shelf boundary will touch Malta's shelf. There is simply no
escaping this fact.
But Professor Jennings attempted to escape from it by saying that hlalta
itselfhad set the southern limit to ils claims by drawing an equidistance line. In
so doing. my learned friend overlooked the important - indeed. perhaps
crucial - reservation made by me in my speech to the effect that if h*lalta's
neighbours sought the rejeciion of equidistance as the proper measure of
hlalta's continental shelf in favour of the application ofequitable principles or
special circunistances. "hlalta will be fre to contend that the proper applica-
tion of those concepts". that isof equitable principles and special circumstances-
"may well lead to a boundary line more favourable to hlalta than a line of
strict equidistance". !n other words. h.laltais reserving the prospect of claiming
south of the equidistance line if the issiie becorres one not of equidistance but
of the application of equitable principles and special circurnstances. And so
hfalta has not - indeed, not - set the limits to its claims in suca way as to448 COhTiNENTALSHELF
enable Libya and Tunisia to pretend that the determination of their cornmon
boundary can be completed without trespassing on hlalta's righ'ts.
hiore than that. the Court should not lose sight of the fact that. as demons-
irated by me on the map. both Libya and Tunisia have asserted claims to
substantial areas of hlalta's continental shelf on ivlalta'ssideofthe equidistance
line. They must. therefore. surely be precluded from pretending that those
claims have not been made. or must not be heeded by the Court when
determining what Libya andTunisia mean when they use expressions such as
"the arca or continental shelf appertaining" to their respective countries.
And so 1corne to my second comment on this question of hialta's interest.
Professor Jennings referred the Court to passages in the Aiiglo-Freitch
Coiititic~iilulielJcase for the purpose of showing how the question of a third-
party interest may be dealt with.
Now before commenting on his substantive point. 1think that one may in
passing observe the method. Professor Jennings made qiiite a play with the
authority. Flere. he was in eFTectsaying. we have a prccedent as to how todeal
with the problem of third parties. Fair enough - though 1shall show in a
moment why it isnot much of a precedent on this point. But what matters as
to method is that Professor Jennings isusing the Award as a precedent against
hlalta as aflecting. if I rnay put it that way. the law to be applied in relation to
Malta. hlr. President. he is no1using the dispositif: he is using a passage from
the reasoning in the case.And yet. at thesame time. he and counsel for Libya
as well are sayingthat the elementç in the reasoning of the Court in the much
more closeiy related case between Libya and Tunisia cuiiiioaffect relations
between hialta. Libya and Tunisia. As Professor Jennings' use of precedeni
shows. Libya and Tunisia are being quite unrealistic in suggesting thar deci-
sions in rnattcrsiii puri i~iu~cricannot affect the interestsoflater litigants-
and the closcr the pariiy, by viriueof physical proxirnity, thegreater the degree
10which the interests are affecied. Werethey arc likely 10 be affected in the
utmost degrec.
And now to the use of the precedent itself. Certainly il shows that in the
Atiglo-Frriiclicase the tribunal considered how to protect the position of
Ireland. But there was no alternative. The proceedings were arbitral proceed-
ings. Ireland was not a par'tyand lreland could not have intervened. It is in the
nature of an arbitration that it is limited to the States that have signed the
coiitproaiisunless in their compron~is they have accorded to third States the
facilityor faculty ofintervening. The perfectly proper aitempt ofthe tribunal in
the Ai~glo-Fwiicli case to qualify its decision so as not to affect lreland is
thcrcfore no precedent to justtfy a ref~isalby this Court to permit intervention
ccfhereintervention is not only procedurülly possible but is also specifically
requested. The discussion in the Award isinteresting. but it has no relevance in
a case before this Court.
I hope that these few observations will be responsive to the needs of the
Court in the light of the arguments which have been presented on behalf of
Libya and Tunisia - ai any rate on those parts or the case which fall within
the sections cavered by my opening speech. ARGUMENTOF MR. BATHURST
COUNS[<LFOR THE COVERNhlENTOF XIALTA
hlr. BATHURST :hlr. President. hlembers of the Court. 1have only a few
remarks to address to theCourt today and 1will present them in the following
order. on the fcllowing topics :
Firsr. the discussions in1922 on the Court's Rufes.
Secorid. the jurisdictional link.
Tlrird. Article 6of the Statute.
Fourtlr. the question or discretion. And finally and
Fifttlcompulsory jurisdiction.
The I~U~~UIIXl~i.c;pui.u/oiof,he original Rules promulgated by the Perma-
nent Court have been the subject of several references during the hearings.
Counsel for Malta were the first to refer to the 1922 discussions without. I
should Say, attempting to show. as Professor Jeiinings suggested (p. 417.
.supru),"something conclusive". told the Court of the views expressed by
some of the Judges at the time. from which it was apparent that. arnong the
Judges. opinionson the jurisdictional aspects of intervention were divided. My
learned friend. Professor h,lalintoppi. quoted 10 the Court words of Judge
Anzilotti and of oihers whose views appeared to support Libya'scase. 1 have
quoted others ofthe Judges whose views wereexpressed in ierms contrary to
those of Judge Anzilolli. Irisno1a worthwhile exercise 10attenipt an asseçs-
ment of the relative values of'the two schools of thought so represenied. Of
course, what any of those Judges of the Permanent Court said in 1922 is not
the law. any more than is what Sir Cecil Hursi - niuch quoted by Libya -
wrote on behalf of the British Governnient in the S.S. "Witiihl~ln~r"case.
The important feature. Mr. President. of thosc discussions in 1922 is their
ending. to which 1 referred (p. 357.s~~pi-uT)he President of the Court. Judge
Loder of the Netherlands. ended the discussions by saying that he could not
take a vote upon a proposal the effect of which would be to limit the right of
interveniion. as pracribed by Article 62. 10 such States as had accepted
compulsory jurisdiction. And President Loder added these words :"If'apropo-
sa1 inthis sense were adopted. it would becontrary to the Statute."
Now. hialta's submission is that there is still today no Rule of Court which
is contrary to the Statute, but that it isthe submissions of Libya and Tunisia
ihat invite the Court so to construe and apply Article 81. paragraph 2.
subparagraph (c}as to make that Rule contrary to the Statute.
When States which are parties to the Statute of the Court. asof course both
Libya and Tunisia are. bring their case to the Court whether by Special
Agreement or by Application supported by the optional clause. they must cake
the Court as they find it. They have agreed to the Statute ;and they find the
Court exercising itsjudicial powers under the terms of the Statute. The Statute
includes Article 62 in full force andeflectin every case. It avails those parties
nothing to complain that when they made and liled their Special Agreement
they did not contemplate intervention by a third State and that. faced with an
Application for permission to intervene. they are thereby exposed to the risk of
interference in their own supposedly eliclusive resort to the Court.
ft must be remembered that States parties to the Statute may not. by450 COhTINEhTAL SHELF
agreement made between thernselves to refer their case 10the Couri. contract
out of provisons of the Court's Statute. For example. they could not agree
between thernselves that a judgment of the Court must be by unanimity. Nor
coutd they agree between themselves that Article 62 of the Statute shall not be
applicable to their proceedings. That isa constitutional featureofthe operation
of theCourt. It isthe policy of the Statute not to allow consensual amendments
of it by parties to a case.
I now turn to the jurisdictionat link. One of the counsel opposing Malta's
Application has said that even if the object of Malta's intervention were not to
make a claim of any kind against either Party to the pending case. but only to
influence the outcome of the case. there is still the requirement of links of
compulsory jurisdiction between Xlalta and Libya and between hlalta and
Tunisia.
This issurely carrying the notion of the need for a jurisdictionat link to such
exaggerated lengths that it would virtually deprive the possibility ofinterven-
tion ofany real scope - and that must. on any reasonable view. becontrary to
what the framers of the Statute certainly intended.
But in the present case there is more than that to the association of the
notion of the jurisdiciional link with the so-called outcome of the case. The
outcome of the case will not be constituted. in any direct sense. by the
enunciation by the Court in its judgment of the principles and rules of
international law and of the equitable principles about which Article I of the
LibyafTunisia Special Agreement enquires. Nor will the outcome be the
identification by the Court of the relevant circurnstances which characterize
the area. Nor will the outcorne be the identification and the assessrnent of the
merisure of acceptance of recent trends in the Law of the Sea Conference. Nor
will the Court's view on the practical way of applying the principles. and so
on. have any such final eifect.
The outcome of the case wilt be constituted by the delimitation to beenècted
on the basis of what theCourt says by the experts of the Iwo countries. and by
other possible steps that rnay have to be taken under the Special Agreement.
hlahadoesnot seek in any way to influence this delimitation or those other
steps as such - that would wholly exceed her proper place in the matter.
except, of course. in so far as a delimitation, when it happens. purported to
attribute to Libya or to Tunisia areas that were properly hlalla's.
hlalta's legal interest liesprimarily in the principles and rules to be enuncia-
ted by the Court. in the light of the relevant circumstances which characterize
the area. but which will not. as such. constitute the outcome of the case. Malta
wishes. for the protection of that interest. to have the same possibility of
presenting arguments to the Court as Libya and Tunisia themselves will have
- as indeed they already have - in respect of the sarne stretch of continental
shelf lying between hlalta and the North African Coast as the one in which
those two countries also have interests. In that continental shelf, hlalta. Libya
and Tunisia. ail three. have ipso jure and ab iriiii(to take words from the
Nortli Seo Coritiizett~alIle!fcases). sovereign rights of exploraiion and exploi-
tation of natural resources. Libya and Tunisia do not know over what areas
each of them is enlitled to exercise those rights as against each other and as
against other States - so they corne to this Court to get. as a first step to
identifying such areas. an answer to the question set out in their Special
Agreement. hlr. President, ifone looks. at it were. through the question to the
real subject-matter of the pending case. it is the entire continental shelf
throughout the region ihat isthe subject-matter of the case. foex lzypothesi no
one yet knows which area is Libya's. which area is Tunisia's or. for that ARGUMENT OF MR. BATHURFi' 451
matter. which area is hlalta's. In that ultimate "subject-matter" of the case.
hlalta has an undoubted legal interest. Malta maintains that her request for
permission ta intervene has therefore the support of fundamental considera-
tions of natural justice and that the question of a link of compulsory jurisdic-
tion between herself and the two parties to the case is irrelevant.
1turn to Article 62 of the Statute.
Professor Malintoppi rcminded the Court that its jurisdiction may. in some
cases,be determined by the Statute itself(p. 395, sirpru).
He gave as an example Article 62, paragraph 2,itself.
The jurisdiction of the Court to Lakea decision under thar paragraph on an
application for permission to intervene derives. according to him. from the
consent of the parties, lu itr11oh.Yporfirs. He then expfained the difîerence
between jurisdiction so conferred directly by the Statute itself and that envi-
saged by Article 36 of the Statute. He said that when jurisdiction isestablished
directlyby the Statute.States had given their consent to that jurisdiction at
the lime when they becarne parties to the Statute. Then. later (ibid.. p. 400).
Professor Malintoppi developed this theme with respect to Article 63 of the
Statute.He suggested that States parties to the Statute. by consentintoArticle
63, have conferred upon every State. which is a party to a multilateral
convention without being party to the Statute, the right to intervene when the
interpretation of that convention is in issue before the Court.
If States parties to the Staiute consented to the jurisdiction exercised by the
Court under Article 62. paragraph 2. and'to that exercised under Article 63,
when they became parties to the Statute, how is it that they did not also
consent to the consequences of the application of Article 62, paragraph I'!
Furthermore. il seems to have been suggested that States which bring their
case to the Court by virtue of a special agreement concluded between thern
have taken some "exceptional" course which entitles them io claim the atren-
lion of the Court to the exclusion of al1others. Indeed. it was no slip of the
tongue when counsel for those who oppose hlalta's application referred.more
than once. to Malta wishing no[ merely to intervene in their case but to
"interfere" in the case. Malta5 proposed intervention was even described in
uncharitable anticipation(p. 383.srrpru)as "disruptive. not helpful. confusing.
not clarifying" and as"'baming to the real litigants in the case ai hand", and it
was characterized by Professor Jennings (p. 422,s~~pru )s "unbridled interven- .
tion".
1would like to add to this part of my remarks, a few words about the S.S.
"Wimbledon" case. In an article in the Revue politique et parlei~retitairNo.
138 of the year 1929(at p. 109).hlaitre Paul Bastidexplained that the remarks
ofsir Cecil Hurst to the Court. on behalf ofthe BritishGovernment. in theS.S.
"Wimbledon" case. were partly inspired by a special feature or English law
which allowed intervention only on the sideof a defendant and not on the side
of a plaintiff; and the Court will recall that Sir Francis mentioned the same
point as having been made by Lord Phillimore. Maitre Bastid commented that
such a consideration had no place in the presence of the general (erms of the
Court's Statute. etrprgsencedes termes gé,zéruux du Sfarur. and he expressed ,
his opinion that the report of the Comrnittee of Jurists in 1920 foresaw
intervention in wider terms and that in his view. Poland. having surered
damage contrary to the Treaty. "étaittrèscerraitiefnet~ futisiecas de /'article
62 ". SO.Sir Cecil Hurst's views on behalf on the British Covernment are
somewhat unreliable.
Shortly before the case of theS.S. "Witnbledor i.a Danish ship. the Dorrif.
had also been prevented from going through the KielCanal. The Conrerence of452 CONTINENTAL SHELF
Ambassadors protested against the action ofGermany. but the case was not
pursued. Dr. Farag. whose work has already been cited(L'Itiiervrtifiotidevulil
la C.P.J.I.,Paris. 1927).commented in this way on the incident. Heasked, and
I translate the question :"Could one have opposed the intervention of the
Danish Government in acase ifone had been brought against Germany by the
illlied Powers ?" He answered in this way :
"Nous ne le croyons pas. pourtant le Danemark n'étaitpas partie au
Traite de Versailles et n'avait pas.par conséquence le droit d'invoquer
d'autres textes que celui de l'Article62 du Statut." (P. 129.)
Denrnark could have recourse only to Article 62.
Mr. President. a very few words on discretion.
My learned friend Professor Jennings, for Tunisia. stated the first point in
his argument as that "on a proper inlerpretation the Court has complete
discretion whether or not to grant the request under Article62"(p. 408,s!lpru).
The same learned counsel for Tunisia iater said :"the. very purpose of the
discretion given to theCourt by Article 62. paragraph 2. of the Statute" was
the need. and Ipick up his words again, "to balance the Applicant'sassertion
that the decision in the case may affect a legal interest of that State, with the
need to do fair and expeditious justice in the principal case" (p.422, sripru).
That isthe end of his quotation.
All this isdistilled from the words of Article 62. paragraph 2. ofthe Statute.
They are clear words. The Court knows them well. They saythat theCourt
shall decide upon the request to intervene. lfthese words - "lt shall be for the
Court to decide . .." - give a "complete discretion". what other completely
discretionary powers are given to international tribunals by such a simple
formula ?Article 36. paragraph 6. of the Statute of the Court says this:"In the
event'of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction. the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the Court." The Court shall decide. It has never been
suggested that Article 36. paragraph 6. of the Statute allowed theCourt any
element of discretion in reaching a decision on its own jurisdiction under that
provision.
1pause only IO reflect. with some sadness. that the disciplesof the late and
highly respected Judge Anzilotti are unlikely to follow the present Whev~ell
Professor of International Law at the University ofcambridge'into the wilder-
ness ofcomplete discretionary jurisdiction of international tribunals. So much
for complete discretion. except to Say this. that if the Court were to consider
that it has a discretion. that discretion should be exercised in favour of Malta in
her interest and the interests of justice.
I finish with words on compulsory jurisdiction.
Professor Malintoppi referred to "irtidoticesgcitit'rrusesde ii pc;riadeutir~;-
rielireà lu pret~iikreguerre iiro~rdiot~(". 395, supra 1when there were those
with, as he says, "cprfuiriesillusiotis gtjitt;rnrses ':the illusion of universal
compulsory jurisdiction for the Court. That era he contrats with the present
time when, 60 years later, the Court has corne to realize.as he would suggest.
that the search for a consensual jurisdiction must guide itsevery act and inspire
its every Rule.
!,intend no'discourtesy to him when 1say how disconcerting it is to reflect
that. when in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the Security
Council so much effort has been devoted to the furtherance of the judicial
settlement OFinternational disputes, such a stultifying philosophy should be
preached by 'so distinguished an international lawyer. Full exercise of the
Court's jurisdiction in accordance with a sensible interpretation of its Statute ARGUMENT OF MR. BATHURST 453
must be in the interestofthe progressivedevelopmentof internationallaw
and of internationaljusticeOf courseone musi strivefor - inthose noble
words alreadycited io the Coun - "theorderlyand expeditious administra-
tion ofjustice":orderliness.expeditionand justice,but thegreatestof al1of
theseisjustice. CLOSINGOF THEORAL PR~CEEDINGS ON APPLICATION
FOR PERMlSSION TO INTERVENE
The PRESIDENT :1/ha& the Agent and counsel of Maltafor the further
assistance they have gi\jen the Court this rnor1repeat what 1said on
Saturdayevening,that thCour tas beenvery greatlyassistbythe observa-
tions which have bedn!presented to itby the Agents of the three States
concernedin the present proceedings,aby their learnedcounsel.The Court
itselfdoes not find it neessarysyk any further clarificationof any point,
through any questions put to tAgents of the Parties.Tfiereforethe Court,
after consulting with tPartieof the three Statesconcerned is in a position
when the President ma?bringthe proceedingsto a close..
Therefore1 shalldeclarenow the sitting closed1shallofcourse also ask
the Agentsof the three Statesconcerned to rematthe dispcisalof Court
for any information thal they might Indthey wish to h1now.declarethe
sittingclosed.
The Court rme at 11.56a.m. SE\'EKTI.l PLIBLIC SITTING (14 11'81.4 p.nd
READING OFTHEJUDGMENTON THE APPLICATIONBY MALTA
FOR PERMISSIONTO INTERVENE
The PRESIDENT : The Court meets today to announce its decision on the
Application by the Republic of Alalta to intervene tinder Article62 of the
Statute in ihe case concerning iheC'oliiitir~rllielbetween the Rcptiblic or
Tiinisia and the Socialisi People's Libyan Arab Janiahiriya.
Certain judges. who have participated in the proceedings and caçt rheir votes
on the judgmeni. are prevenied from attending the preseni sitting.
1shall now read the Judgment oîthe Court. The opening recitals. which. in
accordance with the ~isiial practicc1shall not read. set oiit the procedural
hislory of the caseso Taras relevant to the ,-lpplication of hlalta.
The Judgment then cohtinues :
[The President reads priragraphs I I t27 of the Judgment '.]
1shallnow ask the Registrar to read the operative clause of theJudgment in
French.
[The Registrar reads paragraph 37 in French l.1
Judges Xlorozov. Oda and Schwebel append separate opinions to the Judg-
ment.
The prinied edition of the Judgment will become available in about two
weeks' tirne.
The sitting is clowd.
(Sigiled)Humphrey WALDOCK.
President.
(Sig~irdlSantiagoTo~~~s BERKARUEZ.
Registrar.
I.C.JReports 1981, pp.7-20.
Ibid., 20.
Oral Arguments on the Application for Permission to Intervene - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 19 to 23 March and on 14 April 1981, President Sir Humphrey Waldock, presiding