Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras) - Judgment of the Court

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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

I'eacc:Pallice, 2517 KJ The Hague. Tel. (0-92 44 41). Cables:intc-1-co~t,heHague.

Tsleflix(070- 6499 28).Telex 32323.

Communiqué
rinofficial

for immediate release

No. 88/25
20 December 1988

Borderand Transborder ArmedActions
(Nicaragua v. Honduras)

Judgmentof the Court

The followinginfalrmatio is communicated to the Pressby the
Registryof the Interna.tiona Courtof Justice:

In the Judgmentdeliveredtoday 20 December 1988,
the International
Courtof Justicefinds, unanimously that it has jurisdiction to
entertain the Application filedby Nicaraguaand, unanimouslyt ,hat that
Application is admissible.

The completetextof the overativeclauseof the Judgmentis as
follows :

"THECOURT,

(1)Unanimously,

Findsthat it has jurisdiction underArticleXXXI of

the Pact ofBogothto entertaintheApplication filedby
the Government of the Republicof Nicaraguaon
28 July 1986;

(2)Unanimously,

Findsthat thle Application of Nicaraguais admissible." The Courtwas coniposds follows: PresidentRuda;
Vice-PresidenMbaye; J-udgeLachs,Elias, Oda, AgoSchwebel,
Sir RobertJennings,Bedjaoui,Ni, EvensenTarassov,Guillaumeand
Shahabuddeen.

JudgeNagendraSingh,who diedunexpectedlon 11 December 198(see
Communiqué88/23)had participated fulirithe caseup to the date of
his death.

Judge Lachsappends a declaratiand JudgesOda, Schwebeland
Shahabuddeenappendseparateopinionsto the Judgment.

Intheseopinions theJudgesconcernedstateand explainthe
positionthey adoptedin regardto certainpoints deawith inthe
Judgment. A briefsummaryof theseopinions mabe foundin the annex
hereto.

The printed texof the Judgmentand of the opinionswill be
availablein a fewweeks'time. (Orders anenquiries shoulde
addressedto the Distributiand Sales SectionOfficeof the
United Nations1211Geneva10; the Sales Section, United Nations,
New York,N.Y. 19916; or any specializdookshop.)
An analysisof the Judgments attachedfor the use of the Press.
It in no way involvesthe responsibilyf the Court. It cannotbe
quoted against theextof the Judgmentof whichit doesnot constitute -
an interpretation. Analysisof theJudament

Proceedings and Submissionsof the Parties(paras.1-15)

The Court begins by reeapitulatt ing variousstages inthe

proceedings, recallin that thepresentcaseconcerns adisputebetween
Nicaragua andHondurasregarding the allegedactivities of armed bands,
said to be operating from Honduraos, the borderbetween Hondurasand
Nicaraguaand in Nicaraguanterritory. Atthe suggestionof Honduras,
agreedto byNicaragua,the presentphaseof the proceedings is devoted,
in accordancewith an Ordermade by the Couro tn 22 October1986,solely
to the issuesof the jurisdiction ofthe Court and theadmissibilityof
the Application.

Burdenof Proof (para.16).

1. The Question ofthe Jurisdictionof the Court
to Entertainthe Dispute(paras.17-48)

A. The two titlesof jurisdictionreliedon (paras.17-27)

Nicaraguarefers,as the basisof the jurisdiction of the Court,to

"theprovisionsof ArticleXXXI of the Pactof Bogotaand to
the Declarationsmade bythe Republicof Nicaragua andby the

Republicof Hondurasrespectively, acceptit nge jurisdiction
of the Courtas provided forin Article36, paragraphs 1 an2d,
respectivelyof the Statute"

Article XXXIof the Pact of Bogotaprovidesas follows:

"Inconformit:wyithArticle36, paragraph2, of the
Statuteof the InternationalCourtof Justice,the High
ContractingPartie8dseclarethat theyrecognize,in relationto
any other American Statethe jurisdictionof the Courtas
compulsory ipsofa8-, withoutthenecessityof any special
agreementso longas the present Treatyis in force,in al1

disputesof a juriidicanlaturethatariseamongthem concerning:

(a) the interpretationf a treaty;

any questionof international law;

(C) the existencelofany factwhich, ifestablished,would
constitutethe breachof an international obligation;

Ioy the natureor (extenof t'hereparationto be made forthe
breachof an internationao lbligation."

The otherbasisof jurisdiction reliedon by Nicaraguais
constitutedby the declarationsof acceptanceof compulsoryjurisdiction
made bythe PartiesunderArticle 36 of the Statuteof the Court.Nicaraguaclaimsto be entitledto foundjurisdiction on a Honduran
Declaration of 20 February1960, while Honduraassertsthat that

Declarationhas beenmodified by a subsequent Declaration,om nade
22 May 1986and depositew dith the Secretary-Generoal the
United Nations prio to the filingof theApplication bNyicaragua.

Since in relations betweetnhe States partieso the Pactof Bogota,
thatPact is governing ,he Courtfirst examinetshe question whetheirt
has jurisdictionunderArticleXXXI of the Pact.

B. The Pactof Boaota(paras. 28-47)

Hondurasmaintains in its Memorialthat thePact "doesnot provide
any basis for thejurisdiction ofthe ...Court"and putsforwardtwo
seriesof argumentsin supportof that statement.

(i)Article XXXI of the Pactof Boaota(paras.29-41) 'cir

First,its interpretatio of ArticleXW(1 of the Pact is that, foa
Statepartyto the Pact which has mada e declaratiounnderArticle36,
paragraph2, of the Statute,the extentof thejurisdiction of the Court
underArticle XXXI of thePact is determinecby thatdeclaration, and by
any reservations append edit. It alsomaintainsthatany modification
or withdrawalof sucha declaration whic hs validunderArticle36,
paragraph2, of the Statuteis equally effectiveunderArticleXXXI of
the Pact. Honduras has, however,giventwo successive interpretatio onfs
Article XXXI,claiminginitially thatto affordjurisdiction it mustbe
supplemented by a declarato ifoacceptanceof compulsory jurisdiction
and subsequentlythatit canbe sosupplementeb dut need notbe.

The Court considertshat the firsitnterpretation advanced by
Honduras - thatArticle XXXImustbe supplementeb dy a declaration- is
incompatiblewith the actual termsof theArticle, As regards the second
Honduraninterpretationt ,he Courenotesthe tworeadingsof Article XXXI
proposed by the Parties: as a treatypravision conferring jurisdiction
in accordancewithArticle36, paragraph 1, of the Statuteor as a 'iiiI
collectivedeclaration of acceptanceof compulsory jurisdictiuonder
paragraph 2of that Article.Evenon the latter interpretation, however,
the declaration, havin been incorporated into tPhectof Bogota,can
onlybe modifiedin accordance with the rulesprovidedfor in the Pact
itself. However,ArticleXXXI nowhere envisagesthat theundertaking
enteredinto by the partie tso thePactmightbe amendedby meansof a
unilateraldeclaration madesubsequentlyunderthe Statute,
and the
referenceto Article36, paragraph 2, of theStatuteis insufficient in
itselfto have thateffect.

The factthat thePact defineswith precisionthe obligations of the
partieslendsparticular significant cethe absenceof any indicationof
thatkind. The commitment in Article XXXI appliesrationemateriaeto
the disputesenumerated in thattext; it relatesrationeDersonaeto the
AmericanStatespartiesto the Pact; it remainsvalidrationetemporis
for as longas thatinstrument itself remai insforcebetweenthose
States. Moreover, some provisionsof theTreaty(Arts.V, VI andVII)
restrict thescope ofthe parties'commitment.The commitmentinArticleXXXI can onlybe limitedby meansof reservations to the Pact
itself,underArticleLV thereof. It is an autonomous commitment,
independentof anyothejwhich the parties mayhave undertaken oray
undertakeby depositing with the United Nations Secretary-General a
declaration ofacceptanceof compulsoryjurisdictionunderArticle36,
paragraphs 2and 4, of the Statute.

Furtherconfirmationof the Court'sreadingof ArticleXXXI isto be
foundin the travaux~réparatoireosf the BogotaConference.The text
whichwas to become Article XXX Ias discussed atthemeetingof the
CommitteeIII of the Coriferenceeld on 27 April 1948. It was there
accepted that,in their relationwsith the other partieto the Pact,
States whichwishedto niaintairneservationsincludedin a declarationof
acceptance ofcompulsor~ rurisdiction wouldave to reformulatethemas
reservations to thePact:.That solutionwas not contestedin the plenary
session,and ArticleXXXIwas adoptedby the Conferencewithoutany
amendments on the point.,That interpretation, moreover, correspotods
the practiceof the partiesto the Pact since1948. Theyhave not, at
any the, linked together Article XX anId thedeclarationsof acceptance

of compulsoryjurisdictionmade underArticle 36, paragraph 2sand 4, of
the Statute.

Under thesecixcumstancest,he Courthas to concludethat the
commitmentin ArticleXXXI of the Pact is independenof such
declarationsof acceptanlcof compulsoryjurisdictionas may have been
made underArticle36, plaragrap2h, of the Statute. The Honduran
argumentas to the effectof the reservationto its 1986 Declaration on
its commitmentunderArticleXXXI of the Pact therefore cannobte
accepted.

(ii)Article XXXII of the Pactof Bonota(paras. 42-47)

The secondobjectionof Hondurasto jurisdictionis basedon
ArticleXXXII ofthe Pact of Bogoti,whichreadsas follows:

"Whenthe conciliation procedure previously establi inhed
the presentTreatyor by agreementof the partiesdoesnot lead
to a solution,and thesaidpartieshave notagreedupon an
arbitral procedure, eith erthemshallbe entitledto have
recourseto the Int'ernationaCourtof Justicein themanner
prescribedin Artic.le0 of the Statutethereof. The Court
shall havecompu1so:rjurisdictionin accordancewith
Article36, paragralph, of the saidStatute."

It is the contentioof HondurasthatArticleXXXI and XXXIImustbe
read together.The firstis said to definethe extentof the Court's
jurisdictionand thesecondto determinethe conditions underwhich the
Court maybe seised. Accordingto Hondurasit followsthat theCourt
could onlybe seisedunderArticleXXXI if, in accordance with
ArticleXXXII,there hadbeen a priorrecourseto conciliation and lack
of agreementto ar'bitratwe,ich is not the situationin the present
case. Nicaraguaon the other handcontendsthatArticleXXXI and
Article XXXII aretwo autonomous provisions, eaofhwhichconfers
jurisdiction uponthe Courtin the casesforwhich it provides. Honduras'sinterpretatioonf ArticleXXXIIruns counter to the terms
of that Article.Article XXXII make so referenceto ArticleXXXI;
underthat text the partih esve,in generalterms,an entitlement to
have recourse to thCeourtin cases wheretherehas been an unsuccessful
conciliation. It is, moreovequiteclear from the Pact that the
purposeof the AmericanStatesin draftingit was to reinforcetheir

mutualcommitments with regardto judicialsettlement.This is also
confirmed by the travaux préparatoo iresheBogotaConference: the
Sub-Committeewhichhad prepared th erafttook theposition"that the
principal procedure ft ore peaceful settlemenof conflicts betweetnhe
American Stateshad to be judicialprocedurebeforethe International
Courtof Justice9'.Honduras'sinterpretation would howev imrply that
the commitment, at firs stghtfirmand unconditional, sef torthin
ArticleXXXI would,in Pact,be emptiedof al1 contentif, forany
reason, the disput were notsubjectedto priorconciliation.Sucha
solutionwouldbe clearly contrart yo both the objectand the purposeof
the Pact. In short,Articles XXXI andXXXII providefor two distinct
ways by whichaccess maybe had to the Court. The first relatesto cases

in whichthe Court can be seised directlaynd the secondto thosein
which the partiesi-riitialrlysortto conciliation.In the present case,
Nicaraguahas relieduponArticleXXXI, notArticleXXXII.

C. Finding(para.48)

ArticleXXXI OP the Pact of Bogotathusconfersjurisdiction upon
the Courtto entertainthe dispute submittet do it. For thatreason,the
Courtdoesnot need to considerwhetherit mighthave jurisdiction by
virtueof the declarationo sf acceptanceof compulsory jurisdictibon
Nicaraguaand Hondurasreferredto above.

II. The Ouestionof theAdmissibilitv of
Nicaragua'sAp~iication (paras.49-95)

Four objectionshave beenraisedby Honduras to the admissibilityof
the NicaraguanApplication,two of whichare general in natureand the
remainingtwo presented on thebasisof the Pactof Bogota. j

The first round of inadmissibilit(yparas. 51-54p)ut forwardis
that the Application"is a politicallyinspired,
artifical reques thich
the Court shoulndot entertain consistentwlyth its judicial
character".As regardsthe alleged political inspiratioof the
proceedingsthe Court observesthat it cannotconcern itselwfith the
political motivatio whichmay leada Stateat a particular time ,r in
particularcircunnstances to choose judicialettlement.As to
Honduras'sview that theoverallresultof Nicaragua's actionis "an
artificial and arbitrary dividu ingof the general conflictxistingin
CentralAmerica",the Courtrecallsthat,whilethereis no doubtthat
the issuesof which the Courthas beenseisedmay be regardedas part of
a wider regionalproblem,"no provisionof the Statuteor Rules
contemplates thatthe Courtshoulddecline to take cognizan ofeone
aspectof a dispute merelybecausethatdisputehas other aspects,however important" as the Court observein the case concerning
UnitedStatesDi~lomatil acnd Consular Staffn Teheran(I.C.J.Reports
1980, p. 19, para.36).

The secondnroundcsfinadmissibilit( yparas.55-56)put forwardby
Hondurasis that "theApplication is vagueand the allegationcsontained
in it are not properlyparticularized".The Court findsin thisrespect
thatthe Nicaraguan App:licationn thepresentcase meetsthe
requirementsof the Statuteand Rulesof Court, thatan Application
indicate"thesubject O€thedispute",specify"theprecisenatureof the

claim",and in support thereof givneo more than "a succinct statement of
the factsand grounds on whichthe claimis based.

Accordinglynone of theseobjectionsof a generalnatureto
admissibilitycan be accepted.

The third~r0undoieinadmissibilit( yparas.59-76)put forwardby
Honduras is baseduponArticleII of the Pactof Bogotawhichreads:

"TheHigh contractingParties recogniztehe obligatioto
settleinternational controversi bysregionalpacific
procedures beforreeferring them tthe Security Counciolf the
UnitedNations.

Consequently, itnhe event that controversyarises
betweentwo or more signatory Stateshich,in the opinionof
the parties[inthe Frenchtext"de l'avisde l'unedes
parties"],cannotbe settledby direct negotiations through the
usualdiplomatic charnels,the partiesbind themselvesto use
the proceduresestriblishein the present Treaty,n the manner
and underthe conditionpsrovided for itnhe following
articles,or, alte~mativelys,uchspecialprocedures as, in
their opinion,will permitthemto arriveat asolution."

The submissionof Hondurason the applicatioof Article IIis as
follows:

"Nicaraguahas failedto showthat,in the opinion of the
Parties,the disputlcannot besettledby direct negotiations,
and thusNicaraguafailsto satisfyan essential precondition
to the use of the procedureestablished by tPact of Bogota,
which includereferenceof disputesto the Internationa lourt
of Justice."

The contentionof Hondurasis thattheprecondition to recourseto the
proceduresestablishedby the Pact is not merelythatboth partiesshould
hold theopinionthatthe disputecouldnot be settledby negotiation,
but that theyshouldhave "manifested" tha opinion.

The Courtnotes adliscrepancbyetweenthe fourtexts(English,

French, Portuguesaend Spanish)of Article IIof the Pact,the reference
in the Frenchtextbeing,to the opinionof one of the parties. The Court
proceedson thehypothe~~i thatthe stricter interpretation shob uld
used,i.e.,thatit would benecessaryto considerwhether the "opinion"
of both Partieswas that it was notpossibleto settlethe disputebynegotiation. For this purposethe Courtdoesnot considerthat it is
bound by themere assertionof the one Partyor theotherthat its
opinionis to a particulas effect: it must, in the exerciseof its
judicialfunction, be freeto make itsown determinationof that question
on the basisof such evidenceas isavailableto it.

The criticaldate for determiningthe admissibilitof an
application is the date on which it is filed(cf.SouthWestAfrica,
Preliminarv 0b.jections..C.J.Revorts1962,p. 344),and in thiscaseis
thus28 July 1986.

To ascertainthe opinionof the Parties,the Court is boundto
analysethe sequenceof eventsin theirdiplomatic relations; it first
findsthat in 1981and 1982the Partieshad engagedin bilateral
exchanges atvariouslevelsincluding thao tf the Headsof States.
Broadlyspeaking, Nicaragua sought a bilateral understan while
Hondurasincreasingly emphasized theregionaldimensionof the problem
and held outfor a multilateral approach, eventuallyroducinga planof
internationalizatio whichled to abortive Nicaragua nounter-proposals.
The Court then examinesthe developmentof whathas becomeknownas the iJ
Contadora process; it notesthata draftof a "Contadora Act fo Peace
and Co-operatioinn CentralAmerica"was presentedby the Contadora Group
to the CentralAmerican Stateson 12-13September1985. None of the
CentralAmerican States fully accepted thdraft,but negotiations
continued,to breakdom in June1986.

The Courthas to ascertainthenatureof the procedure followed a,nd
ascertain whetherthe negotiationisn the contextof the Contadora
process couldbe regardedas direct negotiations throu tghe usual
diplomatic channel withinthe meaning of ArticleII of the Pact. While
therewere extensive consultatioa nsd negotiations betwee1983and
1986,in different formsb ,oth among the Centralmerican States
themselves andbetweenthoseStatesand thosebelongingto the Contadora
Group, thesewere organized andcarriedon withinthe contextof
mediationto which theywere subordinate.At thistime,the Contadora
processwas primarily a mediation in whichthirdStates,on theirown
initiative, endeavourt ed bringtogether theviewpointsof the States
concerned bymakingspecific proposals t tohem. That process therefore,
which Hondurashad accepted,was as a resultof the presenceand action .Crr

of thirdStates,markedly different from"d airectnegotiationthrough
the usualdiplomaticchannels". It thusdid not fa11withinthe relevant
provisionsof ArticleII of the Pact ofBogoti. Furthermore,no other
negotiation whicwhould meet the conditions laidom in that text was
contemplatedon 28July 1986,the date of filingof theNicaraguan
Application. Consequently Hondu couldnot plausiblymaintainat that
date that the dispute between itsealfd Nicaragua,as definedin the
NicaraguanApplication, was at thattime capableof being settledby
direct negotiatiotnhroughthe usual diplomaticchannels.

The Court therefore considetrsatthe provisionsof ArticleII of
the Pact ofBogotareliedon by Hondurasdo notconstitute a bar to the
admissibilityof Nicaragua'sApplication.

The fourthnroundof inadmissibilit( vparas. 77-94put forwardby
Honduras is that: "Havingaccepked the Contadop rrocessas a 'special
procedure'withinthemeaningof ArticleII of the Pact of
Bogoti, Nicaraguais precluded bothby ArticleIV of the Pact
and by elementary consideratio onsgood faithfrom commencing
any other proceduri:or pacificsettlementuntilsuch timeas
the Contadora proces has been concluded; and thattimehas
not arrived."

ArticleIV of the Pact of Bogota,upon which Hondurarselies, readsas
follows

"Onceany pacfficprocedure has been initiated,whetherby
agreementbetween the partiesor in fulfillmentof the present
Treaty ora previous pactn ,o other procedure maye commenced
until thatprocedureis concluded."

It is commongroundbetweenthe Partiesthat the present proceedings
beforethe Court are a "'pacifipcrocedure"as contemplated bythe Pact of

Bogota,and that therefori ef any other"pacificprocedure" underthe
Pacthas been initiatedand not concluded, the proceedingswere
instituted contrar to A.rticlIV and must therefor be found
inadmissible.The disagreement betweenthe Partiesis whetherthe
Contadora processis or is not a procedure contemplated by ArtiI cle

It is clearthat th.equestion whetheorr notthe Contadora process
can be regardedas a "specialprocedure" or a "pacificprocedure"within
the meaningof ArticlesII and IV of the Pactwouldnot haveto be
determinedif such a procedure hadto be regardedas "concludedWby
28 July 1988,the date of filingof the Nicaraguan Application.

For the purposesof ArticleIV of the Pact,no forma1act is
necessary beforea pacific procedur can be said to be "concludedw.The
procedurein questiondoesnot haveto havefailed definitively before a
new procedurecan be commenced. It is sufficientif, at thedate on
whicha new procedureis commenced, the initial procedh ure come toa
standstillin such circumstancesthatthereappearsto be no prospectof
its being continue or resumed.

In orderto decidethis issue in the presentcase,the Courtresumes
its surveyof the Contadoraprocess. It considersthat from this survey
it is clearthat theContadora procesw sas at a standstillat the date on
whichNicaraguafileditsApplication.This situation continueduntil

the presentatioinn February1987of theAriasPlan and theadoptionby
the five CentralAmericanStates ofthe Esquipulas II Accord, which in
August1987set intrainthe procedure frequently referr todas
Contadora-Esquipula II.

The questiontherefore arises whether this latter procedure should
be regardedas havingensured the continuationof the Contadora process
withoutinterruption, or whetheron 28 July 1986thatprocess should be
regardedas having "concluded"for the purposesof ArticleIV of the Pact
of Bogoti,and a processof a different natureas havinggot underway
thereafter.This questionis of crucial importancs e,nceon the latter
hypothesis, whateve ray have beenthenatureof the initial Contadora

processwith regardto ArticleIV, thatArticle would not haveconstituted abar to the commencemenof a procedurebeforethe Court on
thatdate.

After noting the viewexpressedby thePartiesas to the continuity
of the Contadora procesws,ichhowevercouldnot be seenas a
concordanceof viewsas to the interpretatio of the term"concluded",
the Court findtshatthe Contadora process ,s it operatedin the first
phase, is differen trom the Contadora-EsguipuI laprocessinitiated in
the secondphase. The two differwith regardboth to theirobjectand to
theirnature. The Contadora procesi snitially constitutaedmediation in
whichthe Contadora Grou and SupportGroupplayeda decisive part. In
the Contadora-EsquipulaII process,on the otherhand,the Contadora
Groupof Statesplayeda fundamentally differer ntle. The five

countries of CentralAmericaset up anindependentmechanism of
multilateral negotiation,n whichthe roleof the Contadora Grou was
confinedto the taskslaid down in the Esquipulas II Declaratiaon,has
effectivelyshrunkstillfurther subsequently Moreover,it shouldnot
be overlookedthat therewas the gap ofseveralmonthsbetweenthe endof
the initial Contadora proceassd thebeginningof the
Contadora-Esquipulas II process;and it was duringthisgap that
Nicaraguafiledits Applicatiot no the Court.

The Courtconcludesthat the procedures emploi yedthe Contadora
processup to 28 July 1986,the dateof filingof theNicaraguan
Application,had been l'concluded"i,thinthemeaningof ArticleIV of
the Pactof Bogota,at thatdate. Thatbeingso, the submissions of
Hondurasbasedon ArticleIV of the Pactmust berejected, and it is

unnecessaryfor the Courtto determine whethetrhe Contadorprocesswas
a "specialprocedure" or a "pacificprocedure" fotrhe purposeof
ArticlesII and IV of the Pactand whetherthatprocedure had thesame
objectas thatnow in progressbefore the Court.

The Courthas also todealwith the contention,made in the fourth
submissionof Hondurason the admissibilitoyf the Applicationt,hat
Nicaraguais precludedalso "by elementaryconsiderationosf good faith"
from commencinagny otherprocedure fopracificsettlement untisluch
timeas the Contadora proces has been concluded.In this respect,the
Court considertshat theeventsof June/July1986constituted a
"conclusion1of the initial procedubreth for purposesof ArticleIV of
the Pactand in relationto any other obligatioto exhaustthat
procedurewhichmighthave existed independento lythe Pact.

In conclusionthe Courtnotes,by referencein particularto the
termsof the Preambleto successivedraftsof the Contadora Act,that the
Contadora Group dindot claim any exclusive role forpt rocessit set
in train. Annexto PressCommuniaué 88/25

Summarvof theDeclaration and Opinions
apvendedto theJudpmentof the Court

Declarationof JudneLam

Judge Lachsin his declaration emphasizes the importo ance
procedural decisions and pointsout thatin the presentcase the Parties
retaintheirfreedomof action,and full possibilitie of fiding
solutions.

SevarateOpinionof Judne Oda

Judge Oda hasvotedin favourof the Court'sJudgmentbut with some
reluctance.He suggeststhat,in view of the context of the Pact of
Bogoti,an alternative interpretatio tno,the effect thatrticlesXXXI

and XXXII areessentially interrelated and t thetconciliation
procedureprovided for in Article XXXIis a prerequisiteto judicial
recourse,may alsobe tenable. The difficulty in confidently
interpretingthe Pact flowsfromthe ambiguoustermsin which it was
drafted.

Judge Oda,in the lightof the backgrountdo the 1948Bogota
Conferenceand of thetravauxpréparatoiress ,howsthattheAmerican
States whichparticipatedin the BogotaConferencehad no demonstrable
intentionof makingthe Pact intoan instrument whichwould confer
jurisdictionupon the Courtin accordancewithArticle36, paragraph1,
of the Statute,or woulicomprisea collective declarationof acceptance
of compulsory jurisdictiounderparagraph 2 of that Article.

In conclusion,JudgeOda emphasizes the paramount importo anthe
intentionof the Partiesto accept theCourt'sjurisdictionw ,hich is
invariably require for itto entertaina case,and expresses his doubt
as to whetherthe Courthas giventhis particulap rointal1 the weight
due to it.

SeparateOvinionof JudneSchwebel

JudgeSchwebel Statesthathis most substantial reservatio ansut
the Judgmentflowfrom the Court'streatment of the problemof the"serial"natureof applications brought by Nicarai guthree
inter-related cases,thatagainsttheUnited States in 1984and those
againstHondurasand Costa Ricain 1986.

In 1984,Nicaragua maintaine tdhatit made "no claimof illegal
conduct byany StateotherthantheUnited States" and thatit sought"no
relief ... from any otherState". Nevertheless, in 1984,it made grave

accusations not only againsttheUnited Statesb ,ut against Honduras,
CostaRica and El Salvador. For itspart,theUnited Statesw ,hich
claimedto be actingin collective self-defence of thosethreeStates,
maintained that theywere indispensable partii eswhoseabsencethe
Court should not proceed.

The Court hadrejected that contention,and also rejected,
inconsistentlw yith theStatuteand Rulesof Court,the requestfor
intervention of El Salvador. Hondurasand Costa Rica showendo
disposition to interveneand couldnot have been encouragedto do soby
the Court'streatmentof El Salvador. Nevertheless, Nicaraguw a,ich
made suchseriouscharges against them, couldhave requiredHondurasand
CostaRica to be defendantsin Courtsincein 1984theyboth adhered
unreservedly to the Court'scompulsoryjurisdiction.It did not.

Promptly after Judgmen camedom againsttheUnitedStateson
27 June 1986,Nicaragua discovered after all, contt rarits 1984
pleadings,that it did have legal claims againsHtondurasand
CostaRica. If the current case shouldreachthe stageof themerits,it
is to be expected thaNticaraguawill invoke against Honduraa s, it
alreadyhas, the factualand legal findingo sf the Court'sJudgment of
27 June 1986.

In response, the Court whilerejecting the consequent objectionof
Honduras,rightlyemphasized that,

"In any event,it is for the Partiesto establishthe
factsin the present case takingaccountof the usualrulesof

evidence, withouitt beingpossibleto relyon considerations
of res judicatain another casenot involving thesameParties
(see Art.59 of the Statute)."

It followsthat if, at the stageof the merits, aPartyto the instant
caseshould endeavout ro relyon findingsof factof the Judgment of
27 June 1986,the Courtwill notacceptsuch reliance. Whilethisis no
more thanwhat Article59 requires,it is important tha the Court says
it and still moreimportantthat it giveseffectto what it says.

In JudgeSchwebel's view,it is importantfor an extraordinary
reason. To applycertain ofthe findingsof factof the Court's Judgment
of 27 June 1986 to the currencase wouldbe themore prejudiciab lecause
certainof thosefindingsdo notcorrespond to the facts. And to apply

certainof the Court'sconclusions of law in thatcase to this casewould
be no lessprejudicial becausecertainof thoseconclusions are in error.

Se~arateO~inionof JudneShahabuddeen

Judge Shahabuddeecnonsidersthat theJudgmentof the Court(with
whichhe agrees)couldbe strengthened on three points relatin to
jurisdictionand on two relatingto admissibility.He also thinks that
theseaspectsadmitof more specific treatmea ntd of someaccountbeing

takenof the regionalliterature citedby both sides.