Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Code

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

A certain quantity of monetary gold was removed by the Germans from Rome in 1943. It was later recovered in Germany and found to belong to Albania. The 1946 Agreement on Reparation from Germany provided that monetary gold found in Germany should be pooled for distribution among the countries entitled to receive a share of it. The United Kingdom claimed that the gold should be delivered to it in partial satisfaction of the Court’s Judgment of 1949 in the Corfu Channel case. Italy claimed that the gold should be delivered to it in partial satisfaction for the damage which it alleged it had suffered as a result of an Albanian law of 13 January 1945. In the Washington statement of 25 April 1951, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to whom the implementation of the reparations agreement had been entrusted, decided that the gold should be delivered to the United Kingdom unless, within a certain time-limit, Italy or Albania applied to the Court requesting it to adjudicate on their respective rights. Albania took no action, but Italy made an Application to the Court. Later, however, Italy raised the preliminary question as to whether the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of its claim against Albania. In its Judgment of 15 June 1954, the Court found that, without the consent of Albania, it could not deal with a dispute between that country and Italy and that it was therefore unable to decide the questions submitted.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings (bilingual version)

19 May 1953

Available in:

Bilingual

Written proceedings

English French Bilingual

Order of 3 November 1953

Fixing of time-limit: Written Statement on Preliminary Objection and Written Statements of observations and submissions on Preliminary Objection

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 26 January 1954

Extension of time-limit: Written Statements of observations and submissions on Preliminary Objection

Summary of the Judgment of 15 June 1954

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

The case was brought before the Court by Application by the United States following the occupation of its Embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants on 4 November 1979, and the capture and holding as hostages of its diplomatic and consular staff. On a request by the United States for the indication of provisional measures, the Court held that there was no more fundamental prerequisite for relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies, and it indicated provisional measures for ensuring the immediate restoration to the United States of the Embassy premises and the release of the hostages. In its decision on the merits of the case, at a time when the situation complained of still persisted, the Court, in its Judgment of 24 May 1980, found that Iran had violated and was still violating obligations owed by it to the United States under conventions in force between the two countries and rules of general international law, that the violation of these obligations engaged its responsibility, and that the Iranian Government was bound to secure the immediate release of the hostages, to restore the Embassy premises, and to make reparation for the injury caused to the United States Government. The Court reaffirmed the cardinal importance of the principles of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations. It pointed out that while, during the events of 4 November 1979, the conduct of militants could not be directly attributed to the Iranian State — for lack of sufficient information — that State had however done nothing to prevent the attack, stop it before it reached its completion or oblige the militants to withdraw from the premises and release the hostages. The Court noted that, after 4 November 1979, certain organs of the Iranian State had endorsed the acts complained of and decided to perpetuate them, so that those acts were transformed into acts of the Iranian State. The Court gave judgment, notwithstanding the absence of the Iranian Government and after rejecting the reasons put forward by Iran in two communications addressed to the Court in support of its assertion that the Court could not and should not entertain the case. The Court was not called upon to deliver a further judgment on the reparation for the injury caused to the United States Government since, by Order of 12 May 1981, the case was removed from the List following discontinuance.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Judgments

Judgment of 24 May 1980

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

English French

Summary 1980/1

Summary of the Judgment of 24 May 1980

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 14 April and 5 June 1972, respectively, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany instituted proceedings against Iceland concerning a dispute over the proposed extension by Iceland, as from 1 September 1972, of the limits of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from a distance of 12 to a distance of 50 nautical miles. Iceland declared that the Court lacked jurisdiction, and declined to be represented in the proceedings or file pleadings. At the request of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic, the Court in 1972 indicated, and in 1973 confirmed, provisional measures to the effect that Iceland should refrain from implementing, with respect to their vessels, the new regulations regarding the extension of the zone of its exclusive fishing rights, and that the annual catch of those vessels in the disputed area should be limited to certain maxima. In Judgments delivered on 2 February 1973, the Court found that it possessed jurisdiction ; and in Judgments on the merits of 25 July 1974, it found that the Icelandic regulations. constituting a unilateral extension of exclusive fishing rights to a limit of 50 nautical miles were not opposable to either the United Kingdom or the Federal Republic, that Iceland was not entitled unilaterally to exclude their fishing vessels from the disputed area, and that the Parties were under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their differences.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

14 April 1972

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Interim Measures submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

19 July 1972

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Order of 18 August 1972

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 25 July 1974

Merits

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 May 1973, Australia and New Zealand each instituted proceedings against France concerning tests of nuclear weapons which France proposed to carry out in the atmosphere in the South Pacific region. France stated that it considered the Court manifestly to lack jurisdiction and refrained from appearing at the public hearings or filing any pleadings. By two Orders of 22 June 1973, the Court, at the request of Australia and New Zealand, indicated provisional measures to the effect, inter alia , that pending judgment France should avoid nuclear tests causing radioactive fall-out on Australian or New Zealand territory. By two Judgments delivered on 20 December 1974, the Court found that the Applications of Australia and New Zealand no longer had any object and that it was therefore not called upon to give any decision thereon. In so doing the Court based itself on the conclusion that the objective of Australia and New Zealand had been achieved inasmuch as France, in various public statements, had announced its intention of carrying out no further atmospheric nuclear tests on the completion of the 1974 series.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

9 May 1973

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1973 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 21, 22, 23 and 25 May 1973, President Lachs presiding, and on 22 June 1973, Vice-President Ammoun presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1974 (bilingual version)

Oral arguments on Jurisdiction and Admissibility - Minutes of the public sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 11 July and 20 December 1974, President Lachs presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Order of 12 July 1973

Application by Fiji for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Gros (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Petrén (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Onyeama (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

English French

Summary 1974/3

Summary of the Judgment of 20 December 1974

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 8 July 1991, Qatar filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two States relating to sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit’at Jaradah and the delimitation of their maritime areas. Qatar founded the jurisdiction of the Court upon certain agreements between the Parties stated to have been concluded in December 1987 and December 1990, the subject and scope of the commitment to accept that jurisdiction being determined by a formula proposed by Bahrain to Qatar in October 1988 and accepted by the latter State in December 1990 (the “Bahraini formula”). As Bahrain contested the basis of jurisdiction invoked by Qatar, the Parties agreed that the written proceedings should first be addressed to the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility. After a Memorial of the Applicant and Counter-Memorial of the Respondent had been filed, the Court directed that a Reply and a Rejoinder be filed by each of them, respectively.

On 1 July 1994 the Court delivered a first Judgment on the above-mentioned questions. It took the view that both the exchanges of letters of December 1987 between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Qatar, and between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Bahrain, and the document entitled “Minutes” and signed at Doha in December 1990 constituted international agreements creating rights and obligations for the Parties ; and that by the terms of those agreements they had undertaken to submit to the Court the whole of the dispute between them. In the latter regard, the Court pointed out that the Application of Qatar did not cover some of the constitutive elements that the Bahraini formula was supposed to cover. It accordingly decided to give the Parties the opportunity to submit to it “the whole of the dispute” as circumscribed by the Minutes of 1990 and that formula, while fixing 30 November 1994 as the time-limit within which the Parties were, jointly or separately, to take action to that end. On the prescribed date, Qatar filed a document entitled “Act”, which referred to the absence of an agreement between the Parties to act jointly and declared that it was submitting “the whole of the dispute” to the Court. On the same day, Bahrain filed a document entitled “Report” in which it indicated, inter alia, that the submission to the Court of “the whole of the dispute” must be “consensual in character, that is, a matter of agreement between the Parties”. By observations submitted to the Court at a later time, Bahrain indicated that the unilateral “Act” of Qatar did not “create that jurisdiction [of the Court] or effect a valid submission in the absence of Bahrain’s consent”. By a second Judgment on the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, delivered on 15 February 1995, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute submitted to it between Qatar and Bahrain, and that the Application of Qatar, as formulated on 30 November 1994, was admissible. The Court, having proceeded to an examination of the two paragraphs constituting the Doha Agreement, found that, in that Agreement, the Parties had reasserted their consent to its jurisdiction and had defined the object of the dispute in accordance with the Bahraini formula ; it further found that the Doha Agreement permitted the unilateral seisin and that it was now seised of the whole of the dispute. By two Orders, the Court subsequently fixed and then extended the time-limit within which each of the Parties could file a Memorial on the merits.

Following the objections raised by Bahrain as to the authenticity of certain documents annexed to the Memorial and Counter-Memorial of Qatar, the Court, by an Order of 30 March 1998, fixed a time-limit for the filing, by the latter, of a report concerning the authenticity of each of the disputed documents. By the same Order, the Court directed the submission of a Reply on the merits of the dispute by each of the Parties. Qatar having decided to disregard the challenged documents for the purposes of the case, the Court, by an Order of 17 February 1999, decided that the Replies would not rely on those documents. It also granted an extension of the time-limit for the filing of the said Replies.

In its Judgment of 16 March 2001, the Court, after setting out the procedural background in the case, recounted the complex history of the dispute. It noted that Bahrain and Qatar had concluded exclusive protection agreements with Great Britain in 1892 and 1916 respectively, and that that status of protected States had ended in 1971. The Court further cited the disputes which had arisen between Bahrain and Qatar on the occasion, inter alia, of the granting of concessions to oil companies, as well as the efforts made to settle those disputes.

The Court first considered the Parties’ claims to Zubarah. It stated that, in the period after 1868, the authority of the Sheikh of Qatar over Zubarah had been gradually consolidated, that it had been acknowledged in the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 29 July 1913 and definitively established in 1937. It further stated that there was no evidence that members of the Naim tribe had exercised sovereign authority on behalf of the Sheikh of Bahrain within Zubarah. Accordingly, it concluded that Qatar had sovereignty over Zubarah.

Turning to the Hawar Islands, the Court stated that the decision by which the British Government had found in 1939 that those islands belonged to Bahrain did not constitute an arbitral award, but that did not mean that it was devoid of legal effect. It noted that Bahrain and Qatar had consented to Great Britain settling their dispute at the time and found that the 1939 decision must be regarded as a decision that was binding from the outset on both States and continued to be so after 1971. Rejecting Qatar’s arguments that the decision was null and void, the Court concluded that Bahrain had sovereignty over the Hawar Islands.

The Court observed that the British decision of 1939 did not mention Janan Island, which it considered as forming a single island with Hadd Janan. It pointed out, however, that in letters sent in 1947 to the Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain, the British Government had made it clear that “Janan Island is not regarded as being included in the islands of the Hawar group”. The Court considered that the British Government, in so doing, had provided an authoritative interpretation of its 1939 decision, an interpretation which revealed that it regarded Janan as belonging to Qatar. Accordingly, Qatar had sovereignty over Janan Island, including Hadd Janan.

The Court then turned to the question of the maritime delimitation. It recalled that international customary law was the applicable law in the case and that the Parties had requested it to draw a single maritime boundary. In the southern part, the Court had to draw a boundary delimiting the territorial seas of the Parties, areas over which they enjoyed territorial sovereignty (including sea-bed, superjacent waters and superjacent aerial space). In the northern part, the Court had to make a delimitation between areas in which the Parties had only sovereign rights and functional jurisdiction (continental shelf, exclusive economic zone).

With respect to the territorial seas, the Court considered that it had to draw provisionally an equidistance line (a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of the two States is measured) and then to consider whether that line must be adjusted in the light of any special circumstances. As the Parties had not specified the baselines to be used, the Court recalled that, under the applicable rules of law, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea was the low-water line along the coast. It observed that Bahrain had not included a claim to the status of archipelagic State in its formal submissions and that the Court was therefore not requested to take a position on that issue. In order to determine what constituted the Parties’ relevant coasts, the Court first had to establish which islands came under their sovereignty. Bahrain had claimed to have sovereignty over the islands of Jazirat Mashtan and Umm Jalid, a claim which had not been contested by Qatar. As to Qit’at Jaradah, the nature of which was disputed, the Court held that it should be considered as an island because it was above water at high tide ; the Court added that the activities which had been carried out by Bahrain were sufficient to support its claim of sovereignty over the island. With regard to low-tide elevations, the Court, after noting that international treaty law was silent on the question whether those elevations should be regarded as “territory”, found that low-tide elevations situated in the overlapping area of the territorial seas of both States could not be taken into consideration for the purposes of drawing the equidistance line. That was true of Fasht ad Dibal, which both Parties regarded as a low-tide elevation. The Court then considered whether there were any special circumstances which made it necessary to adjust the equidistance line in order to obtain an equitable result. It found that there were such circumstances which justified choosing a delimitation line passing on the one hand between Fasht al Azm and Qit’at ash Shajarah and, on the other, between Qit’at Jaradah and Fasht ad Dibal.

In the northern part, the Court, citing its case law, followed the same approach, provisionally drawing an equidistance line and examining whether there were circumstances requiring an adjustment of that line. The Court rejected Bahrain’s argument that the existence of certain pearling banks situated to the north of Qatar, and which were predominantly exploited in the past by Bahraini fishermen, constituted a circumstance justifying a shifting of the line. It also rejected Qatar’s argument that there was a significant disparity between the coastal lengths of the Parties calling for an appropriate correction. The Court further stated that considerations of equity required that the maritime formation of Fasht al Jarim should have no effect in determining the boundary line.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

8 July 1991

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2000/5 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Monday 29 May 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2000/6 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 30 May 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 1 July 1994

Jurisdiction and Admissibility

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Vice-President Schwebel

English French Bilingual

Separate opinion of Judge Valticos (translation)

English French Bilingual

Dissenting opinion of Judge Oda

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 15 February 1995

Jurisdiction and Admissibility

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Judgment of 16 March 2001

Merits

English French

Press release 2001/9

16 March 2001

Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) - The Court finds that Qatar has sovereignty over Zubarah and Janan Island and that the low-tide elevation of Fasht ad Dibal falls under the sovereignty of Qatar; it finds that Bahrain has sovereignty over the Hawar Islands and the island of Qit'at Jaradah; and it draws a single maritime boundary between the two States

Available in:

English French

Correspondence

25 September 1997

Correspondence

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 21 August 1995, the New Zealand Government filed in the Registry a document entitled “Request for an Examination of the Situation” in which reference was made to a “proposed action announced by France which will, if carried out, affect the basis of the Judgment rendered by the Court on 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case”, namely “a decision announced by France in a media statement of 13 June 1995” by the President of the French Republic, according to which “France would conduct a final series of eight nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific starting in September 1995”. In that Request, the Court was reminded that, at the end of its 1974 Judgment, it had found that it was not called upon to give a decision on the claim submitted by New Zealand in 1973, that claim no longer having any object, by virtue of the declarations by which France had undertaken not to carry out further atmospheric nuclear tests. That Judgment contained a paragraph 63 worded as follows

“Once the Court has found that a State has entered into a commitment concerning its future conduct it is not the Court’s function to contemplate that it will not comply with it. However, the Court observes that if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute . . .”

New Zealand asserted that this paragraph gave it the “right”, in such circumstances, to request “the resumption of the case begun by application on 9 May 1973”, and observed that the operative part of the Judgment concerned could not be construed as showing any intention on the part of the Court definitively to close the case. On the same day, the New Zealand Government also filed in the Registry a “Further Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures” in which reference was made, inter alia, to the Order for the indication of provisional measures made by the Court on 22 June 1973, which was principally aimed at ensuring that France would refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests at Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls.

After holding public hearings on 11 and 12 September 1995, the Court made its Order on 22 September 1995. The Court found that, when inserting into paragraph 63 the sentence “the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute”, it had not excluded a special procedure for access to it (unlike those mentioned in the Court’s Statute, such as the filing of a new application, or a request for interpretation or revision, which would have been open to the Applicant in any event) ; however, it found that that special procedure would only be available to the Applicant if circumstances were to arise which affected the basis of the 1974 Judgment. And that, it found, was not the case, as the decision announced by France in 1995 had related to a series of underground tests, whereas the basis of the Judgment of 1974 was France’s undertaking not to conduct any further atmospheric nuclear tests. Consequently, New Zealand’s Request for provisional measures and the Applications for permission to intervene submitted by Australia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia as well as the Declarations of Intervention made by the last four States, all of which were proceedings incidental to New Zealand’s main request, likewise had to be dismissed.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

21 August 1995

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Summary of the Order of 22 September 1995

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 28 March 1995, Spain filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Canada with respect to a dispute relating to the Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, as amended on 12 May 1994, to the implementing regulations of that Act, and to certain measures taken on the basis of that legislation, more particularly the boarding on the high seas, on 9 March 1995, of a fishing boat, the Estai, sailing under the Spanish flag. Spain indicated, inter alia, that by the amended Act an attempt was made to impose on all persons on board foreign ships a broad prohibition on fishing in the Regulatory Area of the North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), that is, on the high seas, outside Canada’s exclusive economic zone, while expressly permitting the use of force against foreign fishing boats in the zones that that Act terms the “high seas”. Spain added that the implementing regulation of 3 March 1995 “expressly permit[s] such conduct as regards Spanish and Portuguese ships on the high seas”. The Application of Spain alleged the violation of various principles and norms of international law and stated that there was a dispute between Spain and Canada which, going beyond the framework of fishing, seriously affected the very principle of the freedom of the high seas and, moreover, implied a very serious infringement of the sovereign rights of Spain. As a basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, the Application referred to the declarations of Spain and of Canada made in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. As Canada contested the jurisdiction of the Court, on the basis of its aforementioned declaration, it was decided that the written pleadings should focus initially upon that question of jurisdiction. A Memorial of the Applicant and a Counter-Memorial of the Respondent were filed in that respect. By an Order dated 8 May 1996, the Court decided not to authorize the presentation of a Reply of the Applicant and a Rejoinder of the Respondent.

In its Judgment of 4 December 1998, the Court found that the dispute between the Parties was a dispute that had “ar[isen]” out of “conservation and management measures taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area” and “the enforcement of such measures”, and that, consequently, it was within the terms of one of the reservations in the Canadian declaration. The Court found that it therefore had no jurisdiction to adjudicate in the case.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

28 March 1995

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of the Kingdom of Spain (French version only)

28 September 1995

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

French

Annexes

(bilingual version) Bilingual

Counter-Memorial of Canada (French version only)

29 February 1996

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

French

Annexes

(bilingual version) Bilingual

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 2 May 1995

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 8 May 1996

Decision to not authorize filing of Reply and Rejoinder on question of jurisdiction

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 28 July 1986, Nicaragua instituted proceedings against Costa Rica and Honduras, respectively, alleging various violations of international law for which the two States bore legal responsibility, particularly on account of certain military activities directed against the Nicaraguan authorities by the contras operating from their territory.

Honduras informed the Court that in its view the Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the case and, after a meeting with the President, the Parties agreed that the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility would be dealt with at a preliminary stage of the proceedings. Once the Parties had filed their written pleadings and taken part in hearings devoted to those questions, the Court delivered its Judgment in the case on 20 December 1988. Nicaragua had relied, as the basis of the jurisdiction of the Court, both on Article XXXI of the Inter American Treaty for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (known as the “Pact of Bogotá”) of 1948 and on the declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court made by the Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. The Court found that the Pact of Bogotá conferred jurisdiction upon it. It dismissed the two arguments asserted successively by Honduras in that regard, namely that Article XXXI of the Pact had to be supplemented by a declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction or that it could be so supplemented but need not be. The Court found that the first argument was incompatible with the actual terms of Article XXXI. With regard to the second argument, the Court had to consider the divergent interpretations of Article XXXI that were proposed by the Parties, and set aside the interpretation of Honduras according to which, inter alia, effect should be given to the reservations to Honduras’s acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court that had been introduced into its declaration of 1986. On that point, the Court found that the commitment in Article XXXI of the Pact was independent of the declarations of acceptance of its jurisdiction.

The Court moreover rejected the four objections raised by Honduras to the admissibility of the Application, of which two had a general character and two were derived from the Pact of Bogotá. Subsequently, and after the proceedings on the merits had been initiated and Nicaragua had filed its Memorial, and after the Court, at the request of the Parties, had postponed the date for the fixing of the time limit for the presentation of the Counter Memorial of Honduras, the Agent of Nicaragua, in May 1992, informed the Court that the Parties had reached an out of court agreement and did not wish to go on with the proceedings. On 27 May 1992, the Court made an Order recording the discontinuance of the proceedings and directing the removal of the case from the General List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

28 July 1986

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

English French Bilingual

Order of 31 March 1988

Withdrawal of Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

Judgments

Judgment of 20 December 1988

Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Summary of the Judgment of 20 December 1988

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 April 1984 Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against the United States of America, together with a Request for the indication of provisional measures concerning a dispute relating to responsibility for military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. On 10 May 1984 the Court made an Order indicating provisional measures. One of these measures required the United States immediately to cease and refrain from any action restricting access to Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular, the laying of mines. The Court also indicated that the right to sovereignty and to political independence possessed by Nicaragua, like any other State, should be fully respected and should not be jeopardized by activities contrary to the principle prohibiting the threat or use of force and to the principle of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. The Court also decided in the aforementioned Order that the proceedings would first be addressed to the questions of the jurisdiction of the Court and of the admissibility of the Nicaraguan Application. Just before the closure of the written proceedings in this phase, El Salvador filed a declaration of intervention in the case under Article 63 of the Statute, requesting permission to claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Nicaragua’s Application. In its Order dated 4 October 1984, the Court decided that El Salvador’s declaration of intervention was inadmissible inasmuch as it related to the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings.

After hearing argument from both Parties in the course of public hearings held from 8 to 18 October 1984, on 26 November 1984 the Court delivered a Judgment stating that it possessed jurisdiction to deal with the case and that Nicaragua’s Application was admissible. In particular, it held that the Nicaraguan declaration of 1929 was valid and that Nicaragua was therefore entitled to invoke the United States declaration of 1946 as a basis of the Court’s jurisdiction (Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Statute). The subsequent proceedings took place in the absence of the United States, which announced on 18 January 1985 that it “intends not to participate in any further proceedings in connection with this case”. From 12 to 20 September 1985, the Court heard oral argument by Nicaragua and the testimony of the five witnesses it had called. On 27 June 1986, the Court delivered its Judgment on the merits. The findings included a rejection of the justification of collective self‑defence advanced by the United States concerning the military or paramilitary activities in or against Nicaragua, and a statement that the United States had violated the obligations imposed by customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State, not to use force against another State, not to infringe the sovereignty of another State, and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce. The Court also found that the United States had violated certain obligations arising from a bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956, and that it had committed acts such to deprive that treaty of its object and purpose.

It decided that the United States was under a duty immediately to cease and to refrain from all acts constituting breaches of its legal obligations, and that it must make reparation for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations under customary international law and the 1956 Treaty, the amount of that reparation to be fixed in subsequent proceedings if the Parties were unable to reach agreement. The Court subsequently fixed, by an Order, time‑limits for the filing of written pleadings by the Parties on the matter of the form and amount of reparation, and the Memorial of Nicaragua was filed on 29 March 1988, while the United States maintained its refusal to take part in the case. In September 1991, Nicaragua informed the Court, inter alia, that it did not wish to continue the proceedings. The United States told the Court that it welcomed the discontinuance and, by an Order of the President dated 26 September 1991, the case was removed from the Court’s List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

9 April 1984

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

29 March 1988

Available in:

English

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1984 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 25 and 27 April and 10 May 1984, President Elias presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1984 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on Jurisdiction and Admissibility - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 8 to 18 October and 26 November 1984, President Elias presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1985/17 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on the Merits - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 12 to 20 September 1985 and on 27 June 1986, President Nagendra Singh presiding

Order of 14 May 1984

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial (Jurisdiction and Admissibility)

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 4 October 1984

Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of El Salvador

Procedure(s):Intervention

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 27 June 1986

Merits

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 10 August 1976, Greece instituted proceedings against Turkey in a dispute over the Aegean Sea continental shelf. It asked the Court in particular to declare that the Greek islands in the area were entitled to their lawful portion of continental shelf and to delimit the respective parts of that shelf appertaining to Greece and Turkey. At the same time, it requested provisional measures indicating that, pending the Court’s judgment, neither State should, without the other’s consent, engage in exploration or research with respect to the shelf in question. On 11 September 1976, the Court found that the indication of such measures was not required and, as Turkey had denied that the Court was competent, ordered that the proceedings should first concern the question of jurisdiction. In a Judgment delivered on 19 December 1978, the Court found that jurisdiction to deal with the case was not conferred upon it by either of the two instruments relied upon by Greece : the application of the General Act for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Geneva, 1928) — whether or not it was in force — was excluded by the effect of a reservation made by Greece upon accession, while the Greco-Turkish press communiqué of 31 May 1975 did not contain an agreement binding upon either State to accept the unilateral referral of the dispute to the Court.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

10 August 1976

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1976 (bilingual version)

Oral arguments on the Request for the indication of Interim Measures of Protection - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 25 to 27 August and on 11 September 1976, President Jiménez de Aréchaga presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1978 (bilingual version)

Oral Arguments on Jurisdiction - Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 9 to 17 October and on 19 December 1978, President Jiménez de Aréchaga presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Original Language

Orders

Order of 11 September 1976

Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 18 April 1977

Extension of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

English French

Summary 1978/1

Summary of the Judgment of 19 December 1978

Available in:

English French

English French

Press release 1978/9