INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME XIII OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 455 Security Environment Research Center “Prometheus,” Donbas in Flames
(2017)
Annex 456 Daniel Romein, Identifying Khmuryi, the Major General Linked to the
Downing of MH17, bell¿ngcat (15 February 2017)
Annex 457 Landelijk Parket, JIT Requests for Information About Photograph BUK-Telar,
Openbaar Ministerie (19 October 2017)
Annex 458 Bellingcat Investigation Team, New MH17 Photograph Geolocated to Donetsk,
bell¿ngcat (20 October 2017)
Annex 459 Bellingcat Investigation Team, Russian Colonel General Identified as Key ian
deathMH17 Figure, bell¿ngcat (8 December 2017)
Annex 460 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (12 June 1962)
Annex 461 Minsk Convention on Legal Aid and Legal Relations on Civil, Family and
Criminal Matters of 1993 (22 January 1993)
Annex 462 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delaliü, Zdravko Muciü, Hazim Deliü, Esad Landzo, Case
No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 372, para. 109 (16 November
1998)
Annex 463 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, p. 99,
para. 220 (15 July 1999)
Annex 464 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, paras.
41516 (5 December 2003)
Annex 455
Security Environment Research Center “Prometheus,” Donbas in Flames (2017)
This publication is the result of work of a group of authors of various
competencies: investigative journalism, politology, geography, and history.
Written as a kind of vade mecum, this guidebook will familiarize the
reader with the precursors, problems, terminology, and characteristics
of the war in the Donbas. The book is targeted at experts, journalists,
and representatives of international missions working in Ukraine.
It will also interest a wide range of readers trying to understand and
develop their own opinion on the situation in the east of Ukraine.
The electronic version of this publication can be downloaded from
https://prometheus.ngo/donbas-v-ogni
Donbas In Flames
Lviv, 2017
Editor: Alina Maiorova
Authors: Mykola Balaban, Olga Volyanyuk, Christina Dobrovolska, Bohdan Balaban, Maksym Maiorov
English translation: Artem Velychko, Christina Dobrovolska, Svitlana Kemblowski,
Anna Shargorodskaya, Andrii Gryganskyi, Max Alginin
Design: Lukyan Turetsky
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Content
Foreword. When the truth is the best weapon 5
Chapter 1. Donbas - The panoramic picture 7
Donbas on the Map of Ukraine 7
As Seen by Analysts and Journalists 10
Donbas (Un)Known to the World 14
Chapter 2. Could the War be Avoided? 17
Ukrainian land 17
Rust Belt 20
Voting Rights 25
Unsolicited patronage 26
Chapter 3. Chronicles of War 31
End of February 2014 31
March 2014 32
April 2014 33
May 2014 36
June 2014 38
July 2014 39
August 2014 41
Beginning of September 2014 42
September 2014 - February 2015 42
From February 2015 to this day 44
Chapter 4. Life during wartime 45
Losses and dangers 45
Hybrid charity 48
Internally displaced persons 49
Chapter 5. In the Focus of Mass Media 53
Shock 53
Pushback 55
Inattention 57
Widespread talking points of Russian propaganda 58
Chapter 6. Russian Presence 65
Using the Internet to research the aggression 65
The mechanics of the aggression 67
Russian weaponry in the Donbas 73
Appendixes 84
Toponyms changed in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the process of
War lexicon 91
Acknowledgements of the Russian aggression
by international institutions 92
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
overwhelming proliferation of fake news and public opinion manipulation. Western countries have
to key decision makers.
just becoming aware of the new threats and challenges.
external and internal causes and stages of the war. We also want to steer you away from the models,
illustrate to our readers the hybrid nature of the military and propaganda aggression by the Kremlin,
and outline the ways to counter it.
We would like to thank the InformNapalm volunteer community for providing source material for this
research. We are also deeply grateful to the experts and journalists, who helped us with valuable ideas
and advice during our work.
Foreword. When the Truth Is the Best Weapon
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE 7
Donbas on the Map of Ukraine
Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts are located in the east of Ukraine. They have many common features
of the current Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblasts of Ukraine, as well as a part of
the purposes of improving food provision to the workers of the Donbas, the territories of Pryazovia
were included in Donetsk Governorate. Lengthy reorganizations in the territories belonging to Donetsk
Governorate eventually resulted in the appearance of the current Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
Industrial complexes of the coal basin are the core of these regions. Even the names of some cities
Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts combined.
the borders of the coal basin. Mariupol in Donetsk Oblast and Starobilsk in Luhansk Oblast do not
Chapter 1. Donbas - the Panoramic Picture
Donbas In Flames
established tradition and the practical convenience of calling the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk
Oblasts the Donbas. At the same time, we recognize the logic of alternative approaches.
Siverskyi Donets. In Luhansk Oblast, the Donets became the separation line between the troops of the
Donets coal basin
Chapter 1. Donbas - the Panoramic Picture
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
with a network of highways and railways. The most important roads in the region are international
« The greatest dangers faced by a person in the Donbas are those associated with roads...
Anastasia Bereza, journalist
Population breakdown by the municipality type
(source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2013)
10
Donbas In Flames
Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts hold an important place among the 27 regions of Ukraine. Together
areas, which developed around heavy industry enterprises.
The high level of urbanization in the central parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts also had its
to establish control over the large cities. Storming such cities would have required special training,
locations in densely populated residential areas, as it meant the risk of numerous casualties among
the civilians and the troops. As the result, most of the urban areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
and continue using the old names.
appendix.
As Seen by Analysts and Journalists
reasoned statements from propagandist clichés.
included in the Top 100 list. Together they form the basis of the content and, to a certain extent, help
to understand the Donbas.
11
Chapter 1. Donbas - the Panoramic Picture
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Top 100 words about the Donbas in Ukrainian publications before the war
12
Donbas In Flames
economic conditions as well as the strong attraction to the Soviet past. At the same time, if previously
with problems of integration, safety, reclamation, overcoming, reconciliation, relocation, demarcation,
and improvement of living conditions.
Comprehensive studies of the Donbas could not predict the events happening today. Before the
region of Ukraine with marked social and economic tendencies. Since the beginning of the war, these
Chapter 1. Donbas - the Panoramic Picture
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
see only traces of the related associations, a vague image quickly losing its past attractiveness.
experts, researchers, columnists, politicians, journalists, artists at various times and in various
contexts. So, for our purposes, the Donbas is:
Donbas In Flames
Donbas (Un)Known to the World
to make certain conclusions about the international interest towards the region. The infographics
Google Trends data
steps towards forming a positive international image of the Donbas were made with the development
Chapter 1. Donbas - the Panoramic Picture
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Awards – attracted, as anticipated, wide public attention. Now the stadium that on the day of its
news Donbas, save Donbas, Ukraine war, Donbas map, Donbas people, Donbas facebook, battalion
Donbas, Islamic state of Donbas, and others.
At the same time, the following queries still maintain certain popularity: Donetsk territory, Donbas
Arena stadium, Donbas hockey club, Shakhtar football club, Donbas Palace Hotel, European football
championship of 2012, Industrial Union of Donbass, DonbassAero airlines, and others.
Donbas In Flames
« ...These are the typical problems of an industrial region in a country without economic
reforms. The Donbas continued to depend on the old Soviet industry, which hadn’t
been reformed, hadn’t been modernized, but had been privatized. And this state of
of a completely unique mentality [...] It was absolutely clear that this area would be
marginalized and it would be used by certain groups to establish their dominance.
In these industrial areas a certain group of “lords” always appears, who keep the
local population not just in subservience, but in ideological subservience, and people
begin to believe that this is the model that is best suited to preserve “stability”.
Vitaly Portnikov, political columnist
17
Chapter 2. Could the War Be Avoided?
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Ukrainian land
populated. The steppes to the north of the Sea of Azov were the stage of the frequent clashes between
Empire along the northern coast of the Black Sea. This area ceased to be a dangerous borderland,
territories. Ukrainians immediately became the dominant ethnic group in the region, which was
character of the Donbas.
identify the territories inhabited by the Ukrainian people.
mostly belonged to the eastern outskirts of the Ekaterinoslav and Kharkiv Governorates. Since they
were mostly inhabited by Ukrainians, they were to be included in the Ukrainian autonomy.
Chapter 2. Could the War Be Avoided?
Donbas In Flames
Kharkiv. In the future, the border territories, where Ukrainians were the majority population, were
Transformation of the border between Ukraine and Russia in the Donbas
Chapter 2. Could the War Be Avoided?
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
governed from the same center, so the issue of the border between the two Soviet republics was seen
as an academic question.
industrial region within a newly formed Donetsk Governorate. It included the eastern parts of the
Ekaterinoslav and Kharkiv Governorates, as well as the part of the Donbas that before the revolution
Union.
Governorates, where Ukrainians were in the majority. The issue of changing borders between the
This is consistent with the principles of international law and is enshrined in a number of multilateral
and international agreements, including:
to the Ukrainian Donbas.
20
Donbas In Flames
Rust Belt
The economic development of the Donbas is mostly determined by mineral deposits, primarily coal.
rapid pace. But the decline of heavy industry in the economy and the inability to compete with newly
The typical mindset of the Donbas population was formed in the Soviet period, and it has remained the
champions in production was a signature sign of the Donbas. The most famous of them was Stakhanov
propaganda in the politicization of the Donbas.
working conditions and reviews of company management. The great hope was that the independence
of Ukraine would help resolve social problems. This created the precedent of a powerful political
Contrary to expectations, with independence, the economic problems of Ukraine only deepened. The
production, and painful transition from a planned to a market economy led to the decline of factories
and mines. Unemployment increased sharply. Social problems were compounded by rising crime and
of Ukraine in terms of human development index. Luhansk Oblast was also at the bottom of the list.
21
Chapter 2. Could the War Be Avoided?
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Snapshot of an average resident of the Donbas before the war
22
Donbas In Flames
used by all thermal power plants of the country. Coking coal went to steel production, which, along
with agricultural products, is one of the main exports of Ukraine. Donbas business owners became
The industrial facilities are located in urban agglomerations. Many factories are located in Donetsk,
large industrial complexes. These cities formed the basis of the industry in the region. Company towns,
with a single factory being the foundation of the local economy and a major source of employment,
Vuhledar exists because of nearby coal mines.
Most numerous nationalities
Chapter 2. Could the War Be Avoided?
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
to identify themselves with the Ukrainian political nation, and that was the meaning they associated
Most spoken languages
While Ukrainian is the most common native language in Ukraine, and the share of all citizens claiming
The absolute majority of the population of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, just like in all of Ukraine, is
Donbas In Flames
Composition of the population of Eastern Ukraine in the 2001
census by ethnicity and native language
Nationality
Ukrainians
Native language
Ukrainian
The distribution of religious beliefs in the society can be to a certain extent evaluated on the basis of
in the following proportions:
Religious communities
The proportion of religious organizations in the region is similar to that in all of Ukraine: Orthodox
Christians are the majority.
Chapter 2. Could the War Be Avoided?
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
based on cultural background. On the contrary, there is the tendency towards mutual assimilation and
the possibility for each individual to choose their ethnic, language and religious identity. Therefore, the
in Ulster, Karabakh, or Bosnia
Voting Rights
The level of support for independence in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts was almost the same and rather
political groups at the national level.
Donetsk Oblast holds the top spot in Ukraine by the number of registered voters with approximately
the total number of Ukrainian voters.
mostly supported the winning candidates. Donetsk Oblast favorites won four electoral campaigns,
those of Luhansk Oblast – three campaigns. During the 22 peaceful years, the Presidents of Ukraine
political parties of Ukraine, only 12 were established in the densely populated Donetsk and Luhansk
in Kyiv, rather than local parties. In parliamentary elections, the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk
people« from that region were always properly represented in the parliament of Ukraine. By the end of the 1980s through the beginning of the 1990s, a miner movement was
quite strong in the Donbas, then later - in the 1990s – it was either bought or banned...
Piotr Andrusieczko, journalist
None of the political forces most strongly supported by the voters of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
tradition of Donbas separatism.
Depending on the political situation, political representatives of the Donbas tried either to expand their
Donbas In Flames
of Ukraine, securing the status of regional languages, and generally the right of certain regions to live
Therefore, before the war, the Donbas was always actively involved in the politics at the national level
and was able to have its interests represented in Kyiv.
Unsolicited patronage
political format.
Balancing between the East and the West, Ukrainian governments for quite some time kept to the
bring Ukraine into the Customs Union.
into the Customs Union, Moscow began its military aggression against Ukraine.
in Kyiv. In fact, it was a tool used to blackmail the Ukrainian authorities in order to keep Ukraine within
politicians could have:
27
Chapter 2. Could the War Be Avoided?
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
prevented the consolidation of the Ukrainian society
Moscow had been encouraging outward tendencies in Ukraine for years. And here the Donbas was
« At the History Department of the Donetsk University there was a group under the
lessons to the delicate graduate youth and instilled neo-Eurasian ideas in them...
Taras Shumeyko, journalist
At the same time, several concepts of separating the Donbas from Kyiv were being developed.
“South-East”
promising base for launching the federalization agenda.
the residents of the southern and eastern regions
this vision of Ukraine. This false accusation was never
properly refuted and took root in the views held by many
residents of the Donbas.
Don«bas In Flames
to keep their assets in the Donbas...
Taras Shumeyko, journalist
identity and their history as a part of Ukraine. Moscow declared its readiness to protect the interests of
the population of those territories from Kyiv.
“Donetsk Republic”
The cover of the book
Director of the Ukrainian
branch of the Institute of CIS
Countries Vladimir Kornilov.
In this book, the author
promotes the tradition of
separate governance in the
Donbas, contrasting it against
the rest of Ukraine.
Donbas, and others. The propaganda of these organizations stated that the economy of the Donbas
and not from the signing of the EU Association Agreement.
Chapter 2. Could the War Be Avoided?
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
“Novorossiya”
Novorossiya included, for example, Crimea and Taganrog.
remained marginalized. The gist of their argument was that all credit for the colonization of the steppe
The borders of the historical Novorossiya and Putin’s “Novorossiya”
Don«bas In Flames
in Kharkiv or Odesa, and then we would be trying to understand the characteristics of that
phenomenon too. Of course, it was easier to do in the Donbas for several reasons: there are
Vitaly Portnikov, political columnist
he said that Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa belonged to Novorossiya,
were formed in the particular districts of the corresponding oblasts.
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
to reposition its units at the Strait of Kerch and on the Crimean peninsula in violation of the rules
amendments to some laws of Ukraine regarding the determination of the start date of the temporary
in combining the operations of paramilitary and regular military units. Starting in April, the epicenter
End of February 2014
Chapter 3. Chronicles of War
Donbas In Flames
Ukrainian government was still recovering from the revolutionary turmoil. In Kharkiv, Donetsk,
Antimaidan supporters, riot policemen from Berkut units, who had just recently cracked down on the
warships.
key facilities and communications of Crimea. Ukrainian servicemen barricaded themselves at their
commanders was bold enough to take the responsibility for authorizing the use of weapons.
mainland Ukraine and Crimea.
March 2014
Within one month, all military bases and warships, along with the headquarters of the Ukrainian Naval
Crimea was over. The crew of the Ukrainian Navy minesweeper Cherkasy was the last one to surrender
While the occupation of Crimea was underway, several cities of the East and South of Ukraine
Chapter 3. Chronicles of War
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Aleksandr Kharitonov among them.
April 2014
Donbas In Flames
ultimatum to government authorities.
« There was a really interesting moment in Slovyansk, when we went there with reporters
Girkin, someone of a lower rank. And we asked him, “Who are you all?” And he said, “We
where they all really came from - though I had had no doubts whatsoever, who they were.
Piotr Andrusieczko, journalist
Chapter 3. Chronicles of War
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
The Ukrainian government managed to reverse and stabilize the situation everywhere, with the
exception of Donetsk and Luhansk. Police prevented the mob from seizing the building of the Mykolaiv
The demands of Donbas militants were contradictory and confusing. Calls for the federalization of
all at the same time. It was obvious that Pushilin, Bolotov, and other leaders of the militants did not
want to take the responsibility for further steps. They sat on their hands and waited for Moscow to
repea«t the Crimean scenario in the Donbas. ...In April 2014, we were in Slovyansk ... Everything looked sort of surreal: people
with Shock Worker of Socialist Labor badges were protesting against the Kyiv junta.
sided with the separatists. The local narrative gradually persuaded them…
Taras Shumeyko, journalist
near Sloviansk, during which SBU captain Gennady Bilichenko was killed.
Kramatorsk Airport. Later on, other Army and National Guard units joined them there. In Sloviansk,
tactics. Armed clashes also occurred in Mariupol. Two assault operations aimed at regaining control of
respectively.
Donbas In Flames
separatists managed to capture the entire city of Luhansk and some other cities of Luhansk Oblast,
May 2014
The beginning of May was marred by the bloody events in Odesa. On May 2, during provoked armed
Ukrainian troops took Karachun, the dominant hill between Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Ukrainian
other cities of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
Chapter 3. Chronicles of War
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
astounding rise of Ukrainian civil society. Volunteers came to help the Army and the National Guard:
Dnipro«, Do nbas, Aidar, Azov, and other volunteer battalions joined ATO forces.
Prizrak squad was armed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party…
Taras Shumeyko, journalist
Donbas. The Vostok battalion was created in Donetsk Oblast, with the Cossack National Guard of Great
Photo retrieved from the phone of a militant killed on that date.
Donbas In Flames
by militants seeking to gain control over all the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
and Mariupol. One of the battles took place near the town of Volnovakha on the highway connecting
Armed clashes broke out around Luhansk as well. Expanding to the north, militants seized
they failed capture the northern part of Luhansk Oblast and the western part of Donetsk Oblast.
of territorial claims over other regions of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. The election of the President
part of the Donbas: in the western and northern parts of Donetsk Oblast and in the northern part of
Luhansk Oblast.
June 2014
blockade of Sloviansk. ATO forces took hold of Luhansk and Donetsk airports.
Chapter 3. Chronicles of War
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
buildup. In Donetsk, militants formed two new battalions: Oplot and Kalmius. Tanks and large caliber
July 2014
Donbas In Flames
outskirts of Luhansk and Donetsk. The Ukrainian Army virtually surrounded Horlivka and made
attempts to cut the routes from Luhansk to Izvaryne and Alchevsk. Ukrainian aviation and artillery
Subsequent sieges and assaults of large cities by Ukrainian Army produced no results. Under the
and blockading its individual parts. Ukrainian Sector C troops advanced on Debaltseve from the north
Chapter 3. Chronicles of War
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
August 2014
In early August, it became clear that Ukrainian troops in Sector D could not keep their positions along
the border any more. On August 7, they broke out of the Southern Kettle moving west. Also, Ukrainian
Krasnyi Luch. ATO forces managed to gain control of Ilovaisk and Miusynsk. It was assumed that the
by Border Guard Lieutenant Colonel Oleksandr Demchenko.
Donbas In Flames
and militants to surround and defeat Ukrainian forces. There were some major leadership changes in
Ukrainian Army and Border Guards. During the battles that took place in the last decade of August,
and ammunition to the Donbas.
and approached Mariupol. The command of the Ukrainian units surrounded in Ilovaisk negotiated a
Beginning of September 2014
invasion in the Donbas. Ukrainian units that were holding Lutuhyne and Luhansk Airport retreated north
the Aidar volunteer battalion was ambushed. Several dozen Ukrainian soldiers were killed. The Minsk
September 2014 - February 2015
no longer occurred.
Chapter 3. Chronicles of War
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
https://goo.gl/gSPdbM
attacked ATO forces in Donetsk Airport. Heavy shelling resumed everywhere along the contact line.
Donbas In Flames
10, in order to divert enemy forces from the Debaltseve bulge, Ukrainian Sector M units carried out
an attack towards Novoazovsk. Ukrainian advancement came to a halt near the village of Shyrokyne.
From February 2015 to this day
existe«nce w as not envisaged by the Minsk Agreements. It didn’t become a large scale war, like it was in July or August, with heavy artillery,
Piotr Andrusieczko, journalist
Ukrainian leadership into complying with its agenda. The Battle of Debaltseve was the last notable
Among the major clashes of this period can be mentioned the failed assault by the militants against
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Losses and dangers
« Before a trip to the Donbas, it is necessary to get training for working in
dangerous places, most importantly in tactical medical aid, which should be
Sergiy Karazy, journalist
The entire region has experienced a sharp increase in the number of violent deaths, the deepening
The peace process in the Donbas is governed by the Package of Measures for the Implementation of
the Special Monitoring Mission of the OSCE has been operating in Ukraine, its work is focused on
Chapter 4. Life During Wartime
Donbas In Flames
The parts of the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, which experienced or continue to experience
The ATO zone can be divided into three types of areas:
Donetsk and Luhansk remained occupied, the regional governments were temporarily relocated to
Mariupol, and then were moved to Kramatorsk. The center of Luhansk Oblast has been in Severodonetsk
parts of other raions, where administrative centers are under the control of militants. «
bear in mind that ambulances there might not have dressings. When you are brought to
Anastasia Bereza, a journalist
bodies within the framework of the Antiterrorist Center of the Security Service of Ukraine. They perform
a subset of local government functions. The CMAs, as a rule, operate in the areas adjacent to the
In the areas controlled by Ukraine, humanitarian aid is provided and distributed through the mission of
KfW Development Bank, and Caritas. Ukraine receives the largest amount of aid from the European
Chapter 4. Life During Wartime
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
parts of the Donbas. Most likely, this number is exaggerated and does not take into account all IDPs.
territo«ry of only 10 raions and parts of a few others.
you have, the better are your chances of getting out of the basement even
before the scandal around your detention receives international publicity.
Taras Shumeyko, journalist
their posts. Thus, the participants in the peace process recognize these persons as holding authority
PDDLO administrations.
Missions of international organizations have noted a total regimentation of social processes and
private life of citizens in the occupied territories. Curfew as well as censorship have been imposed,
common practice. « I was going to a meeting in Donetsk, took a photo of the Lenin monument in the
downtown with my phone and suddenly saw that a car without license plates was
following me. The car stopped on the sidewalk and two militants with guns came out
and took me ... One was relatively polite. The second immediately began speaking very
to an hour. I stood there, and they kept asking me questions... Once I was released,
Piotr Andrusieczko, journalist
Donbas In Flames
decline in the economic activity of the region. According to their data, relevant indicators have declined
by half in Donetsk and by two thirds in Luhansk.
Major features of the economic situation in the PDDLO:
Some plants and large enterprises have been shut down, their equipment has been dismantled
Medium and small businesses, especially service businesses
Hybrid charity
The Ukrainian government is trying to meet its social commitments and pay pensions to the persons
residing in the territory of the PDDLO that are able to travel to the territory controlled by Ukraine. An
on both sides of the contact line.
Humanitarian assistance by Ukraine
other communication equipment.
Chapter 4. Life During Wartime
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
tons of cargo. These convoys violate all internationally accepted procedures and standards: the
Internally displaced persons
Donbas In Flames
The problems of the migrants are placing additional strain on the central and local budgets. In the
resettlement of IDPs in the new locations. Many migrants are forced to deal with bureaucratic red tape
at the local level as well as imperfect regulations.
initiatives. Numerous volunteer associations and community organizations provide a variety of
construction.
https://goo.gl/sqFBRS
Chapter 4. Life During Wartime
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Air transportation
Automotive transportation
In Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, it is possible to travel by car, hire a taxi, or use scheduled bus
services. This is true for both the government controlled part of Donbas and the PDDLO. The roads
of the worst roads in Ukraine.
Vehicles and their passengers cross the line of contact according to the SBU regulation titled
car could be done over six road corridors:
1.
2.
« It is always very unpleasant to go through a checkpoint, it is almost always
stressful. Better not to talk more than necessary - just answer questions.
Taras Shumeyko, journalist « We quickly realized that we could not approach any checkpoint (from either the
militants’ side or Ukrainian) not just with cameras on, but even with cameras
Piotr Andrusieczko, journalist
Bypass roads outside the corridors are blocked by the Ukrainian Army. To enter and exit the PDDLO,
citizens of Ukraine and foreigners need to be in possession of a passport and a permit. These permits
can be submitted to the coordination center, a coordination group, or a checkpoint.
Donbas In Flames
There are no scheduled bus routes across the contact line due to the ban issued by SBU. However,
uncontrolled portions of the border.
Railways
In the past, there had been a well developed network of railways connecting Donetsk and Luhansk
railway operations resumed, but the routes and procedures changed.
Currently, the cities in the territory controlled by Ukraine are reachable by rail from Kyiv, Kharkiv,
the line of contact using commuter trains: they run to Avdiivka, Novgorodske, Popasna, Shchastia, and
Stanytsia Luhanska.
Passenger trains do not cross the line of contact. However, freight trains operate through six
checkpoints between the government controlled territory and the PDDLO. They provide the link for the
heavy industry enterprises located in the PDDLO that supply their products to the territory controlled
by Ukraine. Economic ties with such companies in the occupied territories cause mixed reactions in
the Ukrainian society. There are initiatives to blockade the rail freight.
In the PDDLO territory, the commuter rail system also operates. In addition to domestic trains, there
Chapter 5. in the Focus of Mass Media
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
troll factories, talking points, procedures, and divisions of responsibilities were developed well in
advan«ce.
happened before our eyes, one of the British journalists could not help but say:
who sat next to us heard what was said. Perhaps they really felt ashamed…
Taras Shumeyko, journalist
The information war for the Donbas unfolded in several stages. These stages in the form of short
informational pieces of the corresponding periods are listed below.
Shock
Mass media continue monitoring the events in Ukraine where the Euromaidan has just ended. People
Chapter 5. in the Focus of Mass Media
Donbas In Flames
comprehend the situation. The security agencies are disoriented, they have no action plan. In March
gruesome pictures of violence.
Internet – Hundreds of randomly commented amateur videos are posted. The videos show various
Ukrainian mass media – They broadcast stories similar to those that appear on the Internet. Many
News fail to give answers to the multitudes of questions the viewers have, the media show the facts
but give no reasonable explanations. Ukrainians are seized by panic and the total incomprehension of
the ev«ents . Nobody knows what to do. In 2014, we were so shocked that we did not even have time to analyze everything
that was happening. We did not know what would happen next. ... These were
Piotr Andrusieczko, journalist
Russian mass media
the airtime dedicated to the events in Ukraine. «
walking around Donetsk, but Western journalists did not always capture
the nuances - they thought it was really citizens out on the street.
Taras Shumeyko, journalist
Chapter 5. in the Focus of Mass Media
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Western mass media – At the beginning of the war, most of the Western media have no resident
correspondents in Kyiv, let alone in the Donbas. So, the information on the Donbas events is obtained
Pushback
Gradually, bits and pieces of information form a complete picture. It becomes obvious that the unrest,
Antyufeyev, Igor Bezler, Arseny Pavlov, Alexander Mozhayev, and others. Some of them previously
Ukraine. At the same time, large numbers of Ukrainian volunteers travel to the Donbas.
Ukrainian mass media
own, and they also train the militants.
the white trucks mostly carry weapons and ammunition, which is why the vehicles avoid Ukrainian
border checkpoints. Special mention should be given to Ukrainian media coverage of the defense of
Russian mass media
Donbas In Flames
Ukrainian troops, which are allegedly kept secret by the government. The responsibility for shellings
Internet community
groups focused on military operations, displaced persons, and other issues related to the Donbas
talking points of the Kremlin propaganda via social networks and comments to articles and videos.
aggression against Ukraine and take apart propagandist fakes.
This stage is characterized by the overall fatigue with the Donbas war felt by both the West and Ukrainian
border and democratic elections in the PDDLO seem unattainable. Ukraine and its supporters abroad
aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas and its unlawful occupation of Crimea. The International
referred to as the aggressor and the country breaking multiple international norms and commitments.
Russian mass media – They keep insisting that Ukraine is not abiding by the Minsk II agreement. Still
Chapter 5. in the Focus of Mass Media
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
under patriotic and social slogans.
Ukrainian mass media – They keep assuring their audience that the international community still
supports Ukraine, publishing reports on the USA giving Humvees and radar units to Ukraine, the help
from Canada, the Great Britain, Lithuania, and other countries. The accomplishments of the Ukrainian
Western mass media – In the context of the Donbas war, they focus on the requirements for the
Internet community
USA, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and other countries. DDoS attacks become routine for most
systems of Ukrainian power facilities and perform a series of attacks on government organizations of
Ukraine and the Western countries. At the same time, Ukrainian hackers obtain and publish private
the actions aimed at Ukraine.
Inattention
happening in the east of Ukraine, and who was to blame, and the western mainstream opinion was
are unpredictable, uncontrollable, and unscrupulous, and will never stop on their own. Despite these
disheartening conclusions, there are still attempts to resolve the problem with the least amount
constructive track and to persuade it to remove its troops from Ukraine. At the same time, the NATO
Donbas In Flames
and responding to cyberattacks. Conclusions by specialized analytical centers carry more authority
Russian mass media
between Ukraine and Poland. There are strong demands for Ukraine to directly negotiate with the
Ukrainian mass media, Western mass media and Internet community
continuing the same trends as at the previous stage.
Widespread talking points of Russian propaganda
Kremlin’s claim Fact Evidence and sources
There are no regular
in the Donbas
in the Donbas war has been
proven as fact. They all deploy
to Ukraine on the orders of
Ministry of Defense pays their
salaries, and they are regularly
awarded combat decorations.
in the Donbas was published multiple
times by independent analytical centers
Ukrainian intelligence, and journalists.
One of the most complete databases
containing the facts that establish the
been put together by the volunteers of
InformNapalm international community:
are not involved
in recruiting
mercenaries to
by military registration
organizations, which arrange
coordinated deployment of
in the east of Ukraine.
articles on the subject. Detailed
description of the recruitment process
Chapter 5. in the Focus of Mass Media
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Kremlin’s claim Fact Evidence and sources
supply military
equipment,
weapons and
ammunition to
the Donbas
insist that all weapons used
by the militants in the Donbas
have been captured from
the Ukrainian army, there is
from the beginning of the
supplying tanks, artillery,
missiles, electronic warfare
stations, APCs, armored
vehicles, trucks, trailers,
drones, small arms, grenades,
mines, various ammunition,
etc., to the Donbas.
Strong evidence shows the use of
unique weapons that have never been
InformNapalm volunteers have
compiled the database that includes
the east of Ukraine is discussed in
not sponsor the
organizations
The industry in the region has
been destroyed, some of the
factory equipment has been
dismantled and moved to
have been taken apart and
sold as scrap. Money, mostly
cash, is delivered to the
occupied territory by guarded
trains. Also, the Kremlin
uses banks in the occupied
terrorist organizations. Even
the militant leaders have
on more than one occasion.
A lot of evidence exists. The most
notable are the investigations by
the German newspaper Bild
Donbas In Flames
Kremlin’s claim Fact Evidence and sources
Ukraine is
responsible for
the downing of
Investigation Team has
published only the preliminary
investigation results, it has
rejected all the versions
from farmland in the vicinity of
Pervomaiskiy. At that time, the
Team report can be found at
pay salaries to
the militants in
the Donbas
Contrary to these claims, there
of career servicemen and
salaries for their participation
in the Donbas. Even the exact
thousand roubles per month
some special cases, salaries
roubles have been reported.
There are multiple sources for this
information. One of the best known is
in the Donbas were also mentioned
by Vasyl Hrytsak, Head of the
Security Service of Ukraine.
Chapter 5. in the Focus of Mass Media
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Kremlin’s claim Fact Evidence and sources
shelled the territory
of Ukraine across
the border
to use massive shellings
statements, satellite data as
well as photo forensics data.
of Ukraine are mentioned in Atlantic
and militants never
torture prisoners of
war and civilians
There are multiple witness
statements and evidence
of torture of both Ukrainian
servicemen captured by the
in the Donbas and civilians.
capture decided to appeal
to international institutions
about their tortures while
in captivity. Also there are
witness statements and other
evidence of many prisoners
being shot on the spot.
One of the reliable pieces of evidence
of prisoner torture is the documentary
Those Who Survived Hell
containing the statements of people
who were imprisoned in the occupied
territories. The relevant information
can also be found in the report of
Donbas In Flames
Kremlin’s claim Fact Evidence and sources
Human rights
and freedoms
are respected in
the territories
controlled by the
There is documented evidence
of grave violations of the
human rights in the occupied
territory, particularly:
extrajudicial executions,
kidnapping, torture, illegal
arrests and imprisonments,
excessive restrictions of
the freedom of speech. The
right to life is violated due
to accidental and intentional
shellings of residential areas.
property is widespread. In
addition, women and young
girls are kidnapped to be
made sex workers, people
of both genders – for forced
labor. Children are used
speech is highly restricted
in the occupied territories.
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Special
Monitoring Mission of the OSCE
independent international human
rights organizations. In respect to the
involvement of children in combat, in
addition to the reports of the OSCE SMM
and other international organizations,
the summary report on child labor in
in the occupied territories were also
recognized in a resolution of PACE.
There is a large amount of data
concerning extrajudicial executions,
the InformNapalm volunteers
investigated the horrible
execution of prisoners of war:
aggression, and the
had nothing to
do with planning
and organizing
the Donbas war.
are directly involved in the
organization of the military
aggression against Ukraine.
There is evidence against
Vladislav Surkov, an aide
Sergey Glazyev, an adviser
regional economic integration,
is especially interesting
as he is the de facto head
terrorist organizations.
obtained by the hacktivists of the
provided to InformNapalm for analysis:
conversations with the organizers
were made public by the Prosecutor
light on how the beginning of the
war in Ukraine was orchestrated:
Chapter 5. in the Focus of Mass Media
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Kremlin’s claim Fact Evidence and sources
Ukraine violate no
international laws.
UN Charter, the Declaration on
Principles of International Law
Inadmissibility of Intervention
States, the Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention
and Interference in the
Protection of Independence
the Budapest Memorandum
signed between Ukraine,
USA, and the Great Britain,
ensuring sovereignty and
protection of the territorial
By providing support to the
terrorist organizations in
the east of Ukraine and in
the International Convention
for the Suppression of the
on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism
few of the international
invasion into Ukraine and
occupation of its territory.
Texts of the corresponding laws
Donbas In Flames
Kremlin’s claim Fact Evidence and sources
combatants in the
Donbas cannot
be considered
war criminals
International Criminal Court in
the Hague found the evidence
of military crimes in the
a resolution on continuation
documented incidents. Any
violations of law during
the Donbas war may be
considered war crimes if they
violate the Geneva Convention
and the rules of international
humanitarian law – both by
the Ukrainian Army and by
Court on Preliminary Examination
also the texts of the Geneva Conventions
and other international laws.
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Using the Internet to research the aggression
In the modern world, intelligence services of the world powers can use a wide range of sources of
Ukraine were not being made public.
« ...We must organize the evidence of the presence of regular troops (or servicemen
like Vladimir Dyukov, a patriot from Torez, have been doing... Thanks to the
Taras Shumeyko, journalist
InformNapalm international intelligence community has achieved notable success in this regard,
bringing together OSINT researchers, analysts, bloggers, IT specialists, translators, and video and
have become targets of the hybrid warfare, including Belarus, Poland, Czechia, and the states in the
Baltics and the Balkans.
Chapter 6. Russian Presence
Donbas In Flames
https://goo.gl/FKskkT
The reports published by InformNapalm are cited by the mainstream media not only in Ukraine, but also
presentations, which are used as evidence in the decision making process of international institutions.
of InformNapalm investigations at a meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Istanbul. Then on
aggression against Ukraine.
This kind of cooperation of volunteers, diplomats, and international organizations facilitated the
breakthrough in the understanding of the situation in the Donbas by the international community.
gathered by InformNapalm is the largest publicly available resource on this subject. Therefore, it has
Chapter 6. Russian Presence
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
https://goo.gl/U5eaYA
The mechanics of the aggression
military formations..
Donbas In Flames
In its investigations, InformNapalm international volunteer community documented the participation
following list of military units is accurate but likely incomplete.
Detailed list available at
http://russian-presence-in-ukraine.silk.co/
Ground troops
These include infantry, artillery, armored, air defense, and aerial reconnaissance units. Most BTGs
deployed for the war with Ukraine were formed from the assets of infantry units of the Southern
with combat experience gained in operations in the North Caucasus. There are also tactical groups
Airborne troops
Servicemen from 12 military units were recorded. They were involved in the rapid response operations
assault and support groups.
GRU special forces
sabotage operations. They seized administrative buildings, attacked Ukrainian military facilities, and
military equipment.
Chapter 6. Russian Presence
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Navy, including Naval Infantry (marines) and coastal defense
https://goo.gl/Uw4Whf
National Guard (Russian Guard)
groups.
70
Donbas In Flames
Air Force
delivery to the Donbas.
the Arctic, and even Tajikistan. Military units based in the occupied Abkhazia and Crimea as well as
More information is available at
https://goo.gl/RuhNj6
71
Chapter 6. Russian Presence
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
120mm mortar and escaped across the border. Photo provided by Lieutenant
https://goo.gl/eQ9rnw
72
Donbas In Flames
for the village of Logvinove that was the key position during the battle for
Debaltseve. The attribution of the tanks was made based on InformNapalm
https://goo.gl/MjOofE
Chapter 6. Russian Presence
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Russian weaponry in the Donbas
military equipment to the militants. The saturation of the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk
by Ukraine, therefore could not have been captured by the militants. Operation and maintenance of
The following list is accurate, but likely incomplete. The investigations do not answer the question
about the numbers of pieces of each equipment type detected in the ATO zone. Most of the listed
hardware are electronic warfare and signals intelligence systems.
the occupied territory of Ukraine with the legacy weapons from Soviet times, which have also been
repeatedly recorded in InformNapalm investigations. Proving the direct deliveries of these types of
discussion is outside the scope of this report.
List of equipment types
GAZ-233014 Tigr, infantry mobility vehicle
and described in numerous InformNapalm investigations.
GAZ-39371 Vodnik, infantry mobility vehicle
for personnel and cargo transportation. It provides protection
for the crew from small arms. Entered service with the
Donbas In Flames
KAMAZ-43269 Vystrel, infantry mobility vehicle
Luhansk and Luhansk Oblast. More than 10 vehicles of this
type were recorded in Donbas.
BTR-82A, armored personnel carrier
in Luhansk Oblast and described in numerous InformNapalm
T-72B, main battle tank, 1989 model
T-72BA, main battle tank, 1999 model
performed at the Uralvagonzavod factory within an overhaul.
and a distinctive wind sensor on the turret. Never supplied to
T-72B3, main battle tank, 2011 model
Army from 2012. Never supplied to Ukraine. It has been
Chapter 6. Russian Presence
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
T-90A, main battle tank, 2006 model
generation ESSA thermal imaging scope, stabilized in two
T-72S1, main battle tank
Mustang KamAZ-5350 Armored Truck
to Ukraine. Spotted in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. A
vehicle of this type with an additional protection kit and the
Ural-632301, military truck
InformNapalm investigations.
Ural-43206, military truck
Luhansk Oblast in numerous InformNapalm investigations.
Donbas In Flames
2B26 Grad-K, multiple launch rocket system
Modernized version of the Grad multiple launch rocket
9K58 Smerch, multiple launch rocket system
there are no registered facts of the militants capturing this
Kramatorsk.
radar is capable of detecting ground and marine surface
targets as well as artillery shell bursts. The high positioning
accuracy for targets and shell bursts allows for precision
9K330 Tor, 9K331 Tor M-1 and 9K332 Tor M-2, tactical surface-to-air missile systems
airplanes, helicopters, cruise missiles, guided munitions,
phased out from service in Ukraine in 2001. No evidence of
96K6 Pantsir-S1, surface-to-air missile and gun system
of military, industrial and administrative installations against
from air and surface threats. Approved for service by the
77
Chapter 6. Russian Presence
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
P-166-0,5 radio station
on K1Sh1 versatile wheel chassis. Entered service with the
in Debaltseve, Donetsk Oblast.
R-441-OV Liven, radio station
communication for military units and separate objects of
supplied to Ukraine. Spotted in Luhansk.
R-149BMR Kushetka-B, command vehicle
based on K1Sh1 chassis. It is designed to ensure monitoring
to Ukraine. Spotted in Luhansk Oblast.
RB-341V Leer-3, EW system
signals intelligence by detecting emission points of GSM
Ukraine.
R-378B Borisoglebsk-2, EW system
system is designed to jam mobile satellite communication
and navigation systems in an integrated tactical command
and control system. Never supplied to Ukraine. Spotted in
Donbas In Flames
R-934UM, EW system
InformNapalm investigations.
R-330Zh Zhitel, EW system
it also jams portable and mobile ground stations of satellite
cellular communication systems. Never supplied to Ukraine.
Torn, EW system
Never supplied to Ukraine. Spotted by the InformNapalm
investigators in Donetsk.
Rtut-BM, EW system
for the protection of personnel and military equipment
from various types of shells and missiles equipped with
proximity fuses. In addition, the system can be used to jam
communication and radar systems. Was released in 2011.
supplied to Ukraine. Spotted in Donetsk.
RB-636AM2 Svet-KU, EW system
Designed for monitoring of the airwaves and tracking various
radio emitting sources. The system is able to monitor the
radio environment and to protect the data transmitted over
wireless channels against interception. Entered service
Ukraine. Spotted in Luhansk.
Chapter 6. Russian Presence
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Granat-1, UAV
monitoring and relay system, capable of air surveillance by
photo, video and thermal imaging equipment at a distance
an InformNapalm investigation.
Granat-2, UAV
monitoring and relay system, capable of air surveillance by
photo, video and thermal imaging equipment at a distance
an InformNapalm investigation.
Forpost, UAV
Searcher 2 drone. Manufactured at the Ural Works of Civil
Orlan-10, UAV
range is 120 km. The system entered operation in 2010.
Oblast and Amvrosiivka, Donetsk Oblast.
Eleron-3SV, UAV
Olenivka village, Donetsk Oblast by the InformNapalm
investigatiors.
Donbas In Flames
Zastava, UAV
UAV manufactured by IAI. Manufactured at the Ural Works of
Civil Aviation since 2010 Its maximum operating range is 10
supplied to Ukraine. It was shot down by Ukrainian border
guards near Harasymivka village, Luhansk Oblast.
https://goo.gl/JPFPSj
Chapter 6. Russian Presence
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Examples of the Soviet period military equipment
More information is available at
https://goo.gl/iUYYkA
It is used for jamming GSM end user devices, signals intelligence, and
imitation of cell tower operation. It is also used to send text messages.
https://goo.gl/qQ4Dmf
Donbas In Flames
rocket launcher and other weapons. He is suspected of arson and looting.
https://goo.gl/sqFBRS
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Many people participate in the discussions about the Donbas. Far fewer of them actually went there.
The lack of real experts on the region is noticeable. However, the Donbas is now an integral part of the
Maps and historic records present the Donbas as a monolithic conglomeration of legacy industry and a
to the heart of every Ukrainian. The interviews of independent experts tell us about the contradictions
of life in the Donbas and near the border that are typical for the new century (nostalgia and European
that became the pride of the whole nation in the last several years).
It is only in masterfully built political speeches and reports by Russian media where Donbas appears as
The chronicles of the information and real wars, the mechanics of the Russian aggression, new solutions
to opposing it made possible by the Internet, international missions - all of that necessitated the creation
of this guide to the Donbas, a collection of reference points, norms, and the survival rules in the region.
However, during its creation it became obvious that this guidebook can’t pretend to be complete, as long
website, www.prometheus.ngo. The already diverse Donbas, like all militarized zones, is changing and
breaking apart - into the occupied, frontline, and free sections, into the ruined, damaged, and viable
unavoidable on the way to the goal of restoring the mutual trust in the modern post-truth world.
Donbas In Flames
Toponyms changed in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Renamed raions of Donetsk Oblast
New name Old name Occupation
Bakhmut Artemivsk
Boikivske Telmanivske occupied
Lyman Krasnyi Lyman
Manhush Pershotravneve
Nikolske Volodarske
Pokrovsk Krasnoarmiisk
Renamed localities of Donetsk Oblast
Type New name Old name Raion / subordination Occupation
village Azov Dzerzhynske Novoazovsk occupied
town Bakhmut Artemivsk Bakhmut
settlement Balka Snizhne city council occupied
settlement Betmanove Krasnyi Partyzan occupied
village Bilokrynychne Kalinine Boikivske occupied
Blagodatne Voikove Khartsyzk city council occupied
settlement Blahodatne Oktiabr Velyka Novosilka
Boikivske Telmanove Boikivske occupied
Appendixes
Appendixes
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
town Bunge occupied
village Chyrylanske Oktiabrske Boikivske / Michurine village council occupied
town Chystiakove Torez occupied
settlement Dachne Horkoho Toretsk city council
village Debaltsivske Komuna Bakhmut occupied
village Dianivka Kirovske Volnovakha
settlement Dovha Balka Artema Kostiantynivka
village Druzhkivske Chervonozoriane Druzhkivka city council
village Lunacharske Pokrovsk
village Horikhove Petrovskogo Pokrovsk
Hrafske Komsomolskyi Volnovakha
village Hryhorivka Leninske Pokrovsk
village Illinivka Illicha Kostiantynivka
village Ivanivske Krasne Bakhmut
town Kalmiuske Komsomolske Starobesheve occupied
settlement Kalynivka Kalinina Bakhmut
village Kalynivka Kalinine Pokrovsk
village Kalynove Kalinine Volnovakha
settlement Kalynove Kotovskogo Amvrosiivka occupied
village Kamiane Voikove Starobesheve occupied
village Kellerivka Kirove Nikolske
settlement Kermenchyk Oktiabrske Velyka Novosilka
Kholodne Sverdlove Makiivka city council occupied
village Khreshchatytske Krasnoarmiiske Novoazovsk occupied
town Khrestivka Kirovske occupied
settlement Khromove Artemivske Bakhmut
Kopani Voikovskyi Amvrosiivka occupied
village Kostiantynopolske Ostrovskogo Marinka
settlement Kotlyne Dymytrove Pokrovsk
village Krynychky Petrivske occupied
village Krynychne Oktiabrske Nikolske
village Kyslyche Oktiabrske Mospyne city council, Donetsk occupied
village Lavrynove Boikivske occupied
village Liubivka Leninske Starobesheve occupied
town Lyman Krasnyi Lyman Lyman
Lypske Krasnyi Oktiabr Makiivka city council occupied
Donbas In Flames
village Maiachka Oktiabrske Sloviansk
village Maiorove Krasnyi Oktiabr Boikivske occupied
village Malynivka Ulianivka Pokrovsk
settlement Manzhykiv Kut Kalinina Starobesheve occupied
village Molodetske Lenine Pokrovsk
settlement Myrne Dzerzhynske Lyman
village Myrne Karla Marksa Velyka Novosilka
village Myrne Lenina Dobropillia
town Myrnohrad Dymytrov
village Nadiia Artema Dobropillia
Nikolske Volodarske Nikolske
settlement Nova Olenivka Petrivske
council
village Nove Shakhove Dobropillia
village Novoapostolivka Chycherine Volnovakha
village Novoselivka Krasnoarmiiske Sloviansk
village Oleksandrivske Oktiabrske Boikivske / Konkove village council occupied
village Oleksandrivske Novoazovsk occupied
village Oleksandropil
settlement Ozerianivka Pershe Travnia Toretsk city council
village Ozerne Illichivka Lyman
village Pazeno Petrivske Bakhmut
village Petrivka Petrivske
council
village Petrivka Petrivske Dobropillia / Zolotyi Kolodiaz village council
Piatypillia Proletarske Makiivka city council occupied
village Pikuzy Kominternove Volnovakha occupied
Pivdenne Leninske Toretsk city council
Pivnichne Kirove Toretsk city council
town Pokrovsk Krasnoarmiisk Pokrovsk
village Pokrovske Illichivske Manhush
village Prymiske Manhush
village Sadove Novopetrivske Amvrosiivka, Blahodatne village council occupied
village Sarabash Komunarivka Starobesheve occupied
village Shakhove Oktiabrske Dobropillia
village Artemivka Kostiantynivka
occupied
Appendixes
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
village Soniachne Krasnivka Volnovakha
village Sontsivka Krasne Pokrovsk
village Stara Mykolaivka Pravdivka Kostiantynivka
settlement Stepove Petrivske
village Stritenka Oktiabrske Volnovakha
settlement Stupakove Krasnyi Pakhar Bakhmut occupied
village Kirove Bakhmut
village Temriuk Starchenkove Nikolske
town Toretsk Dzerzhynsk
village Ukrainka Chervona Ukraina Manhush
village Uzhivka Leninske Novoazovsk occupied
settlement Verezamske Kirove Starobesheve occupied
village Verkhnioielanchyk Leninske Amvrosiivka occupied
settlement Verkhnioosykove Volodarskogo Amvrosiivka occupied
village Verkhnioshyrokivske Oktiabr Novoazovsk occupied
village Verkhokamianka Vorovske Starobesheve occupied
village Vesna Urytske Dobropillia
village Vidrodzhennia Dymytrova Shakhtarsk occupied
village Vilkhivchyk Novopetrivske Amvrosiivka,Oleksiivske village council occupied
village Vozdvyzhenka Krasnyi Pakhar Bakhmut
village Vorovske Pokrovsk
town Artemove Toretsk city council
Kirovsk Lyman
village Velyka Novosilka
Renamed raions of Luhansk Oblast
New name Old name Occupation
Sorokyne Krasnodon occupied
Dovzhansk Sverdlovsk occupied
Renamed localities of Luhansk Oblast
Type New name Old name Raion / subordination Occupation
village Andriivka Svatove
village Berezove Dzerzhynske Milove
town Vakhrusheve Khrustalnyi city council occupied
Buran Enhelsove Sorokyne city council occupied
Donbas In Flames
village Chapliiivka Krasna Chapliivka Troitske
village Chornohorivka Perevalsk occupied
village Derkulove Komuna Markivka
settlement Dibrova Chervona Dibrova Kreminna
town Dovzhansk Sverdlovsk Dovzhansk occupied
Dubove Komsomolskyi Dovzhansk city council occupied
village Dzherelne Kalinine Troitske
village Dzherelne Svatove
town Holubivka Kirovsk occupied
village Horikhova Balka Sorokyne occupied
village Hrekivka Petrivske Kreminna
Ivanivske Lotykove Slovianoserbsk occupied
town Kadiivka Stakhanov occupied
settlement Kamianyi Plast Komsomolets Lutuhyne occupied
Kartushyne Proletarskyi occupied
Katerynivka Luhansk city council occupied
town Khrustalnyi Krasnyi Luch occupied
village Korzhove Petrivka Svatove
Krynychanske Chervonohvardiiske Holubivka city council occupied
Krynychne Biriukove Dovzhansk occupied
Kundriuche Kalininskyi Dovzhansk occupied
town Kypuche Artemivsk Perevalsk occupied
settlement Lahidne Komsomolskyi Svatove
village Leonove Antratsyt occupied
Liubymivka Dzerzhynskyi occupied
village Lobivski Kopalni Krasnyi Kolos
village Parkhomenko Sorokyne occupied
settlement Malokalynove Sorokyne occupied
village Mamusheve Krasnyi Luch Slovianoserbsk occupied
Mariia Lenina Lutuhyne occupied
village Marivka Karla Libknechta Lutuhyne occupied
village Miasozharivka Artemivka Svatove
settlement Myrne Chervonoarmiiske Bilokurakyne
village Novoiehorivka Sverdlovka Svatove / Raihorodka village council
settlement Nyzhnia Shevyrivka Ordzhonikidze Sorokyne occupied
Petropavlivka Petrivka
town Petrivske Khrustalnyi city council occupied
Appendixes
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
village Pivneve Industrialne Kreminna
village Milove
settlement Seleznivske Perevalsk occupied
Sentianivka Slovianoserbsk occupied
village Shelestivka Milove
town Sorokyne Krasnodon Sorokyne occupied
village Sotenne
settlement Stare Chervonyj Prapor Perevalsk occupied
village Storozhivka Kalynivka Svatove
village Sukhodil Pionerske occupied
Teple Krasnodon Sorokyne city council occupied
village Travneve Pervomaisk Svatove
village Tverdokhlibove Sverdlovka Svatove / Nyzhnia Duvanka village council
Valianivske Leninske Dovzhansk city council occupied
Vedmezhe Volodarsk Dovzhansk city council occupied
village Vestativka Petrivske Svatove
town Voznesenivka Chervonopartyzansk Dovzhansk city council occupied
village Illichivka Troitske
village Chapaievka occupied
settlement Novopskov
village Artema Khrustalnyi city council occupied
settlement Dzerzhynske Luhansk city council occupied
Donbas In Flames
War lexicon
Ukrainian legal acts
International legal acts
of Ukraine
Ukrainian media
International media
media
Appendixes
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Ukrainian Army
separatist groups controlling occupied
territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
occupied territories
government forces
areas controlled by armed groups
of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Ukrainian army
Ukrainian territory outside the
representatives of Donbass
Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts
Donbas In Flames
Acknowledgements of the Russian aggression
by international institutions
NATO-Ukraine Commission
Date Main message
Brussels
and considered a breach of international law.
Brussels
the political and security situation in Ukraine against the
Statement of the
Commission
Brussels
against Ukraine. At the meeting, the NATO member states
aggression against Ukraine.
Statement of NATO
Secretary General
Wales
at the level of Heads of State and Governments with the
participation of President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko.
the fact of participation of the regular units of the Armed
actions are intended and have serious implications for
integrity within its internationally recognized borders and
and stop its military activities along and across the Ukrainian
border, engage in a meaningful dialogue with the Ukrainian
authorities.
Commission at the level
of Heads of State and
Governments
Appendixes
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Brussels
Statement of the
Commission
Brussels
the level of ambassadors.
residential areas of Mariupol. The meeting participants
supplying them with advanced equipment and human
Statement of NATO
Stoltenberg
Antalya
foreign ministers.
violation of international law and its international obligations.
Statement
Warsaw
Heads of State and Governments with the participation of
President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko.
violation of international law. These developments have
serious implications for the stability and security of the entire
state of instability in eastern Ukraine, which has led to
the loss of nearly 10,000 lives in the Donbas and deprived
Ukraine of a considerable part of its economic output.
Commission at the level
of Heads of State and
Governments
Donbas In Flames
UN General Assembly
Date Main message
validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status
Sevastopol.
Territorial integrity of
Ukraine
Sevastopol are found temporary occupied territory.
Situation of human
rights in the
of Crimea and the city of
responsibility for serious violation of human rights in the
of Sevastopol.
Situation of human
rights in the
of Crimea and the city of
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Date Main message
Istanbul
information aggression against Ukraine, and expresses
concern about the persistent failure to implement the Minsk
and Deterrence Posture
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
Date Main message
September 17, 2014
Strasbourg
acknowledged.
Decision of the
Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe
Situation in Ukraine
Appendixes
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
Strasbourg
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine
Declaration
Strasbourg
statement that the security of this continent is gravely
with international rules, principles and values of the Council
supported by mercenaries and the intervention of foreign
troops, is the antithesis of all that the Congress stands for.
Separatist tensions
in Ukraine and
neighbouring countries
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Date Main message
Strasbourg
The Assembly considers that the drive for secession and
cover of a military intervention.
in Ukraine: threats
to the functioning of
democratic institutions
Strasbourg
The Assembly recognizes direct military intervention of
military aid to the insurgents in eastern Ukraine, as well as
any actions that could aggravate the situation in that area.
The progress of the
Strasbourg
The resolution contains a list of requirements of the
of violence in the east of Ukraine, the support of illegal
neighboring countries. The following rights were suspended
the Assembly at the Council of Europe bodies, external
institutions and organizations, to sit on ad hoc committees
on observation of elections, to be appointed rapporteur.
Challenge, on
substantive grounds,
credentials of the
delegation of the
Donbas In Flames
Strasbourg
The resolution contains an important political element in
Ukraine is the cause of the missing persons problem.
Missing persons during
Strasbourg
The Assembly believes that without the strong determination
of all sides to stop this war, a solution to the problem of
in Ukraine is not possible. Therefore, it urges Ukraine, the
occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to
stop all military operations in the east of Ukraine, withdraw
all weapons and restore peace in this region.
The humanitarian
concerns with regard to
people captured during
the war in Ukraine
Strasbourg
and the principles upheld by the Council of Europe, as stated
Legal remedies for
human rights violations
on the Ukrainian
territories outside the
control of the Ukrainian
authorities
Strasbourg
Political consequences
International Criminal Court in the Hague
Date Main message
The Hague
The Prosecution of the International Criminal Court in The
Hague in its preliminary report referred to the events in
within the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol factually
Preliminary report
The situation in Ukraine
Appendixes
GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT ZONE
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
Date Main message
Baku
every one of the ten Helsinki principles in its relations with
Ukraine, some in a clear, gross, and thus far uncorrected
manner, and is in violation with the commitments it
undertook in the Budapest Memorandum, as well as other
upon all participating States to refuse to recognize the forced
Clear, gross and
uncorrected violations
of Helsinki principles by
Helsinki
city of Sevastopol, as well as in certain areas of the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, constitute acts of military
aggression against Ukraine.
The Continuation
of Clear, Gross and
Uncorrected Violations
of OSCE Commitments
and International
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Date Main message
Kyiv
Ukraine remains subject of the military aggression of the
support and equipment of massive terrorist attacks.
On the Appeal of the
Ukraine
Kyiv
aggression from a state guaranteeing its independence
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol – and proceeded with
active destabilization of the southern and eastern regions of
Ukraine. Unsupported by the Ukrainian citizens in the south
On Measures to
Prevent Expansion of
International Terrorist
Supported by the
Donbas In Flames
Kyiv
To recognize the districts, cities, towns, and villages of
Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts where, subject to the Law
the special rules of local administration are introduced, as
temporarily occupied until the withdrawal of all illegal armed
as well as militants and mercenaries, from the territory of
state border of Ukraine.
Particular Districts,
Cities, Towns and
Villages of Donetsk
and Luhansk Oblasts
Kyiv
calls to the international community to enhance the
and supply of weapons to Ukraine in view of the fact that in
protects the united democratic Europe and the rest of the
free world.
On the Statement of
Armed Aggression by
and Overcoming Its
Notes
« This is a concise and excellent guide to the Donbas,
essential reading for anyone interested in understanding
the war-torn region. Highly recommended.
Hiroaki Kuromiya,
Professor at Indiana University (USA),
Author of books on history and politics in the Donbas
Annex 456
Daniel Romein, Identifying Khmuryi, the Major General Linked to the Downing of MH17,
bell¿ngcat (15 February 2017)
Annex 457
Landelijk Parket, JIT Requests for Information About Photograph BUK-Telar, Openbaar
Ministerie (19 October 2017)
6/6/2018 JIT requests for information about photograph BUK-Telar - Openbaar Ministerie
https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@103187/jit-requests-for/ 1/3
English (https://www.om.nl/vaste-onderdelen/zoeken/?zoeken_term=English&Zoe_Clt_TrfIdt=622)
MH17 (https://www.om.nl/vaste-onderdelen/zoeken/?zoeken_term=MH17&Zoe_Clt_TrfIdt=462)
JIT requests for information about photograph
BUK-Telar
19 oktober 2017 - Landelijk Parket
Recently the JIT has received a new photograph of a BUK-Telar. This picture was
probably taken on July 17, 2014 in the town of Makeevka, Ukraine. The JIT presumes
that the picture contains the BUK-Telar which is responsible for downing flight MH17.
The JIT requests anyone who has any kind of information about the picture, the vehicles on it
and the location where the picture was taken to contact the JIT. We will handle your information
with ultimate care. JIT investigators are available to help you in several languages including
Russian and Ukrainian.
Witnesses
Witnesses can contact (https://www.politie.nl/themas/flight-mh17/witness-appeal-crash-mh17.html#Contact) the JIT to provide
information or evidence.
For those concerned about safety, refer to Witness Safety & Protection (https://www.politie.nl/themas/flightmh17/
witness-appeal-crash-mh17.html#Witness).
The criminal investigation
The criminal investigation is aimed at identifying the suspects and is conducted by the Joint
Investigation Team (JIT). Visit the website of the Netherlands Public Prosecutor's Office
(https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/) for the latest information. You can also find the JIT on Vkontakte
(https://vk.com/jitmh17investigation).
Gerelateerd
Update in strafrechtelijk onderzoek MH17-ramp (https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@103182/update/)
Update in criminal investigation MH17 disaster (https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@103183/update-criminal/)
Последние данные уголовного расследования катастрофы авиалайнера Boeing-777 рейса
МН17 (https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@103184/boeing-777-17/)
Narrative conference 24 May 2018 (https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-vliegramp/persbijeenkomst-24/narrative-conference/)
Update in criminal investigation MH17 disaster (https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@103196/update-criminal-0/)
Meer over
6/6/2018 JIT requests for information about photograph BUK-Telar - Openbaar Ministerie
https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@103187/jit-requests-for/ 2/3
Request
The JIT requests anyone who has any kind of information about the picture, the vehicles on it
and the location where the picture was taken to contact (https://www.politie.nl/themas/flight-mh17/witness-appeal-crashmh17.
html#Contact) the JIT.
6/6/2018 JIT requests for information about photograph BUK-Telar - Openbaar Ministerie
https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@103187/jit-requests-for/ 3/3
More information
MH17 crash (https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/)
Annex 458
Bellingcat Investigation Team, New MH17 Photograph Geolocated to Donetsk, bell¿ngcat (20
October 2017)
!"
" # $ $ # %
&'()*+,-./011-234456678.99:;<=>17?,@4?>1.<,+A4B.624&CDE;FD)*+,-.4G
H0IJ/011-234456678.99:;<=>17?,@4K><4HLIJ4G M*22:>/011-234456678.99:;<=>17?,@4K><4M*22:>D);4G
&C+>:;./011-234456678.99:;<=>17?,@4K><4&C+>:;.D);4G
N=1,O.+PQRPQIJ 8A8.99:;<=>1S;T.21:<>1:,;K.>@/L11-23446667O.99:;<=>17=,@4>*1L,+4O.99:;<=>14G
U
VWXYZ[\]^_'_abcd^eW_f_gc'Wh'_i_jW'kl
mjmg'_nWb[opqr[\p'^Ws_tj'ujvWk'tac't_jwWcxysuwzp'^Wi{'g^|fWhgbtxtjcftjvWk'tac't_jtj'_'^W
h_Xjtja_}Ycfc~ktcjtbftjWkfta^'[\yYZ[\z_vWblbctjWpd{nftk^WhcjWXd^_'_abcd^{lq
y^''dk
XXXd_ft'tWjf
'^Wxck
ta^'|x^[\
Xt'jWkk|cddWcf|gbck^|x^[\^'xfcftjWc|'t'fW|tj}_bxc't_j|
cn_{'|d^_'_abcd^|n{l'Wfcbzp'^W{kktcj{lxtkktfWfc{jg^Wb'^c'h_XjWhYZ[\_js{f~[\pqr[{l
qpdbWvt_{kf~thWj'tWhn~Wfftjagc'ck{lqptkcjcj't|ctbgbc}'xtkktfWfc{jg^WbnWf_jatja'_
{kktck{bkl|nckWhbhj't|tbgbc}'YtkktfWbtachWw^WtxcaWk^_Xk'^Wbta^'kthW_}'^W{lp
f_chWh_j'^WbWhf_Xf_chWbujd{nftk^tja'^Wd^_'_abcd^p'^WsuwXb_'W'^c''^Wd^_'_abcd^Xck
db_ncnf~'clWj_js{f~[\pqr[tj'^W'_Xj_}YclWWvlcplbctjWpn{'XWgcjj_Xg_jgf{ktvWf~kc~'^c'
'^Wd^_'_abcd^Xckcg'{cff~'clWjc'\]b_kdWl'uf~g^cpc''^Wtj'WbkWg't_jXt'^^cl^'_k'b_t'WfW~ptj
i_jW'kl
y^''dk
XXXnWfftjagc'g_xz
K+>;29>1:,;23/L11-2344+*7O.99:;<=>17=,@4;,T,21:4*C+>:;.4PQIJ4IQ4PQ4:1D-L,1,D<.,9,=>1.F4G
!"
" # $ $ # %
&'(()*+,,-./012)31'4536'778917(21:4**89;<=,6)4;<1(71(,>)8<:2*,?-./,.-,@ABC/(DD.E<9F)GH
IJKLMNO
P*Q1GR'7;ST:;U<62*<>U;72V7UQW;:(Q<1)8:(X<U=T67:*S72<>UU7:27U*
&'(()*+,,;'7;S=72Q:9<UG,Y788Q1G;:(,)U<F7;(,@Z-,=72Q:,C[Z?H(<;<1(UQY>(7(Q)*U7G:U2Q1G('78<;:(Q<1
<X('Q*)'<(<GU:)'*<(':(67;<>82;<887;(QV783G7<8<;:(7('Q*S73)Q7;7<X7VQ271;7;<1;7U1Q1G('7
2<61Q1G<X\]./9
!"
" # $ $ # %&
'()*+,-).,/*(0).,12(3432,).52.678/*.9):,;<=1-24(>*(),.:?3@),*9/)A4*@.54,()..211*@(,.
43)(,4+=4(02B@:C4..4<)<2@(1-)/54,-4,.[email protected](E.)92/2,4.,1*(A*=2,,-4..4,)F
GHIIJKLMNO
P
Q #
#
R$
ST " $ $
!
#
"
U
%!&&V
$
!"
" # $ $ # %&
'())*+,--./0123*42(5647(889:28)32;5++9:<=>-7*5<=2)82)-?*9=;3+-@./0-/.-3=28)+A8)=?AB;C2;5/:D*EF
GHIJKLMNOOPQRSSTUVKHWSXYZZ[\]^^_\'_a\bccdeMfJKNgTLMNOOPQRSSYJKNgTLVOHhYiSHZjkXee
lmYhnLXQVfJHInh'YWoYNYIZLJXYQpHgnpYZHnpONLqYULLTUYNgpNXYi
MNOOPQRSSXXXVpHHpZLVKHWSWYPQSPZYKLSqYUggTQrULstXiosuHnLOQUosuHnLOQUsvwZYQOosxUJYgnLSy^bVdd]
qYULLTUYgnONLhgJLKOgHnHkuHnLOQUVvnONLPZYOkHJWXYQYmIUqz[q{|}NgQffqG
MNOOPQRSSLnVXgUgPLhgYVHJpSXgUgSGIJkYKL[OH[YgJaWgQQgZLePJHKLLhLhOHONLgnOLJQLKOgHnXgON
GNYUNOHQOJHgOLZLimHIZLTYJh
MNOOPQRSSXXXVpHHpZLVKHWSWYPQSy^bVdd{cb'^oc]Vb__^_'cobbzWShYOY~cWzzLceV}NLQiQOLW
XYQYKKHWPYngLhwiYKHnTHiONYOXYQKHWPHQLhHkzpJYiYT^GxoYKYWHIYpLhxfoYnh
YhYJUwZILtiInhYgTYnXgONOgnOLhXgnhHXQV
¡
¢ £
vwTgHIQZioONLiXLJLXYgOgnpkHJZHpgQOgKYZpIghYnKLV¤
¥?>8B=?+¦8;)?B8+C2)(8*(=)=EB;*(78B8;9+=§C+C¨98C2©==E98ª)B88)«C87;23¬;238®;2=B;>;
C>;E8B4=¦)(8+;>89=<;)C=2¯C2<9?3C2E)(8)7=)B88+C2)(8¦=B8EB=?23¯;E;)8¨828;)()(8°?A±+9=75
9=;38B¯;B=<A28))=)(828;B8+))B88¯;232=)<(8+C2)(8<?B¨¨9=<A+:
²³´´µ¶·¸¹º »
&¼
½$ $
¾
» " #
"
¿
"
" # ½
ÀÁÂÃ
²³´´µ¶·¸¹º
»
!"
" # $ $ # %&
'()*+,-*+.+,/012()3+,/04*()5)6+7)5+7+032//84937:6(,/*)52(+02()6:5;4*(96(
)<=,+903,/*=/3929/0/>6+7)5+/02()?@AB?=962:5)C=96C2*922)5C6/7D<';EFG)3HI
J(22=3KDD2C6/D<';EFG)3HIL
MN922.JOP922.QRRLS62/;)5TQ4TQUF
J(22=3KDD2*922)5C6/7DP922.QRRD32+2:3DVTUEEVEWQUTEXFUWFFY5)>Z356[2*356\R]2>*L
^$_
$
'
_
a
b c b d $b e"f
g "
"
" #h ii jkh
l!&^
l
$
mnoopqrstu v
&^
w$ $
x
v " #
"
y
"
" # w
%zhc
{|}u~trn
vj#
^ _
$ #
"
"
" #l
!%&^
!"
" # $ $ # %
&'$ ( )
*+,-./01234
56789
9
# : ;
<
=:
">#
!?7
? &6 &#
( )
@,--3ABC.4 5
%7
)D<) EF$ ??
G
HE
"'
# "
"
" #D8I#JI
K+/,AL+*+2.A3
5 M#
%%N#
"
" ##O J8
!?%7
!"
" # $ $ # %
&'()*+,-./.,)0/,1+.,-.23,-.415516)*+7180'2)/1*//-16-16/18.(.9:.,')5/8',7-;.,6..*,-.
,610-1,1+2'0-/38'()*+,-./),.612,-9144<2,-.2)*=./,)+',)1*,171*>28,-.+.1517',)1*?
@-,,0/ABBCDEF*:09*-GH96-..5?*.,:*'G//5?718B60G71*,.*,B<051':/BICDEBDCB+',.J+.1517',)1*?K0+L
MNOPQRSTUPVOTWTPNXYZY[\NY]T]VSN]ZST^NP_UV`W_P_NUNa\Vb\VTaNUcd`ZP`]aNUP_Ne`fgYZZY\N\T`]^_NUh
iYW_PQP_NZTgNPjSNVOWTPNXYZY[\NV]k^PV[NUlmnnoVVW\NpPUNNPqYNbVOrUVZSNfPs\\j^_TY]tV]NPZfcufUTY]Nh
vw xy#
z {
!"
" # $ $ # %
&'(()*+,,-./012)31'4536'778917(21:4**89;<=,6)4;<1(71(,>)8<:2*,?-./,.-,1<(;'7*9@)AB
CDEFGHIDJDKLMNOOPQIRFRSTUQIKVFIUFIVWNFTDDXUYZUJFVJS[TUJWIREUJRFIDTFTDDXUZVFFZDTRWNUJ\JRFWIDYVJFID
WMT[XUZZ]UTND\VJTD\^
_VSIFGFIDYU]DZUJ\]UTNYVJ'RRSZDaFTDDFbVDK]UTND\VJTD\^
cdefghijklmkjnlefl
o<2:3p:(87:*(<178<;:8q1r<17(*s*1:))72(6<)'<(<At:)'*ut<=('q**:=78<;:(q<1p:((7=)(q1A(<
;<1vt=<tt7u>(7:A7<8<;:(q<1(<wt<*)7s(x83;':q1;71(t:8r<17(*s9o'7*7)'<(<At:)'*67t7*':t72
<18q17y3z'tq*(<{t<|7}:12~>23<>=:9
# $
"
$ $
!
" #
# #
$
"
" #
!
!"
" # $ $ # %%
& &
$
'()*+,-.)-/012
34 5
6 7
2
34
8# #
95 :;4 2
<
4 $
"
" #97= >?@
'()*+,-.)-/01
2
34
:
# #
4 8# 7
"
" #A
BC&:
!&&5
!"
" # $ $ # %
&'
()* +
,-./01-23
4$ 5$#
67
$ 8 # 5
9
$:
;<$
=
)
4>8+
$
"
;
!%?
$
!"
" # $ $ # %
&'(()*+,,-./012)31'4536'778917(21:4**89;<=,6)4;<1(71(,>)8<:2*,?-./,.-,@>AB;<=):CD*<19E)FG
HIJKLMNOIJ
PD('('D*F7<8<;:(D<1Q671<6':R7)'<(<FC:)'D;7RD271;7<S:*;717(':(6:*C7)<C(72<1@31>=7C<>*
8<;:8*+T>AUU?Q<CDFD1:(D1FSC<=V>**D:W*XUC2Y1(D4YDC;C:S(ZD**D87TCDF:27Q:CCDR72D1[<17(*ASC<=
Z:ADDRA::C<>12\:=<1]>83./Q?-.^Q):CA72:(('7D1(7C*7;(D<1<S_C<*)7A(`83;'::12a':A'(<*(C<D(7873Q
bcdefgchi
j$ k$#
lm
n
o n pq$
o pr
n
#
n ls tuvwn# m#
"t
!x%y
z
$
!"
" # $ $ # %
&''()*++,,,-./012334-035+)&/616+)&/616-(&(7
'()89:8;<8;<,,,-21==>?@0/'-0358;<?1,)8;<A4B/?CB
(18;<;DEF8;<ED8;<;D8;<?1,B5&EFB(&3'3@6/(&B@13=30/'1CBC3?1')48;<G
&''()*++',>''16-035+>?'1?'+',11'7
&''()89:8;<8;<,,,-21==>?@0/'-0358;<?1,)8;<A4B/?CB
(18;<;DEF8;<ED8;<;D8;<?1,B5&EFB(&3'3@6/(&B@13=30/'1CB
1')48;<H'1I'JK1,LMNEFLO&3'3@6/(&LP13=30/'1CL'3LQ3?1')4LR>/L8SD21==>?@0/'G
&''(*++,,,-'A52=6-035+)&/617
HAJ&''()89:8;<8;<,,,-21==>?@0/'-0358;<?1,)8;<A4B/?CB
(18;<;DEF8;<ED8;<;D8;<?1,B5&EFB(&3'3@6/(&B@13=30/'1CB
1')48;<H'JK1,TMNEFTO&3'3@6/(&TP13=30/'1CT'3TQ3?1')4G
5/>='3*7)A2U10'JK1,TMNEFTO&3'3@6/(&TP13=30/'1CT'3
1')4H23CVJW&''()*++,,,-21==>?@0/'-035+?1,)+A4B/?CB1A63(1+;DEF+ED+;D+?1,B5&EFB
3@6/(&B@13=30/'1CBC3?1')4+WG
XYZ[\]Y]^]Y[_X''a[_bY]Z[cdXbZe[\]]Xe[fgc_YZhbcei]j[k'al\X[cdXbZe[\]mc[]'bc_YZXgc_[nY
ocY][ejpq\]rc^]r]Y[nee\cdYnY[\]rXig]'cdsdn[\[\]i\c[ctbXi\]bcu[\]cbntnYX'v_ji\c[c
uXlnYtec_[\ubcrg_n'ZnYtY_rg]bwxp
y\[[iez{{|}w~YZiaY\fad\]]'pY][ZYXfee'plcr{diflcY[]Y[{_i'cXZe{|}w{}|{rXifj_bX\pit
¡
¢
!"
" # $ $ # %&
'()*+),,-.// 012345
67589:;<<5=>??@@@AB788132CD<ACEF?37@=?4GHD3IH74JE57?KLMN?ML?KL?37@HF;MNH5;E<E2JD5;H27E8ECD<7IHIE37<=G?O
J7589<ECEFPMQRNSNTJ7=5E3IU
67589:;<<5=>??@@@AB788132CD<ACEF?37@=?4GHD3IH74JE57?KLMN?ML?KL?37@HF;MNH5;E<E2JD5;H27E8ECD<7IHIE37<=G?O
J7589<ECEFPMQRSLVTJ7=5E3IU
WX*YZ[.\.++*Y]^)Z_)*+*Y]'*/Za
'YZ.-bXc-.()*+),,-.//ZX-.^.*d.)e..f+b,*]./ZXg\.++*Y]^)ZhX/Z/i+*Yf/ZXXh.Y/Xc-^.-./.)-^[)-Z*^+./i)Y,(X-.j
kklX((.YZ/
ZZmno^ZXm.-pqipqkrs[ZZh/atteeejm.++*Y]^)Zj^X(tY.e/tcfn)Y,n.c-Xh.tpqkrtkqtpqtY.en([krnh[XZX]-)h[n].X+X^)Z.,n
,XY.Z/ftu^X((.YZnkvwrxry
zZ*/)Z-c+b)e./X(.h*.^.Xg,.,c^Z*XY)Y,/+.cZ[*Y]jz,X/*Y^.-.+b[Xh.Z[Xc][*Z,X./Y{Z+.),ZXZ[.
h[XZX]-)h[.-m.*Y]hcm+*^+b*,.YZ*|.,jzgZ[.b/.YZ*Z)YXYb(Xc/+bZXZ[.Wz}z{(/c-.Z[.b{d.Z[.*-
-.)/XY/j
~-*^}X+.-no^ZXm.-pqipqkrs[ZZh/atteeejm.++*Y]^)Zj^X(tY.e/tcfn)Y,n.c-Xh.tpqkrtkqtpqtY.en([krnh[XZX]-)h[n
].X+X^)Z.,n,XY.Z/ftu^X((.YZnkvwxqy
}[)Yfgc++biZ[.h[XZX]-)h[e)/Z)f.Yg-X(XcZ/*,.Xg)m.)cZb/)+XYXY)d.-bmc/b/*,.e)+fi)Y,YXZ
)Y)h)-Z(.YZX-)[Xc/.j}[.h[XZXe)/^+.)-+b^-Xhh.,XYZ[./*,./e[.Y*Ze)//cm(*ZZ.,i/XZ[.
e*ZY.//()b[)d.)+-.),b-.(Xd.,*,.YZ*gb*Y]*YgX-()Z*XY)mXcZXZ[.-h.Xh+.sX-[*(t[.-/.+gy*YZ[.
h[XZXj
}X(XY)^XZZno^ZXm.-ppipqkrs[ZZh/atteeejm.++*Y]^)Zj^X(tY.e/tcfn)Y,n.c-Xh.tpqkrtkqtpqtY.en([krnh[XZX]-)h[n
].X+X^)Z.,n,XY.Z/ftu^X((.YZnkvqqvy
Xm.-Z)--b)ZlXY/X-Z*c(.e/e-*Z./*Y[*/
.hZ.(m.-pqkr)-Z*^+.}[.o*^*)+)Y,z(h+)c/*m+._n
kr
^.Y)-*XZ[)ZZ[.^*-^c*ZXc/-XcZ.Z)f.YmbZ[.\cf)YZ*n(*//*+.m)ZZ.-be)/*(h+)c/*m+.b.Z[.Y.d.-
),,-.//./Z[.].X+X^)Z*XYXgZ[.\cfmb\.++*Y]^)ZX-Z[.cZ^[*Yd./Z*])Z*XYcY*Zj.^Xc+,[)d.
!"
" # $ $ # %&
'()*+,-..)/01122234(**56789.38:;16(2/1<=>96?>(<@:)(1ABCD1CB1AB16(2>;-CD>)-:.:7@9)->7(:*:89.(?>?:6(./=1E
@()*+.:8:;FCGHBBGI@(/):6?J
'()*+,-..)/01122234(**56789.38:;16(2/1<=>96?>(<@:)(1ABCD1CB1AB16(2>;-CD>)-:.:7@9)->7(:*:89.(?>?:6(./=1E
@()*+.:8:;FCGHDBCI@(/):6?J
'()*+,-..)/01122234(**56789.38:;16(2/1<=>96?>(<@:)(1ABCD1CB1AB16(2>;-CD>)-:.:7@9)->7(:*:89.(?>
?:6(./=1E@()*+.:8:;FCGHDHKI@(/):6?J
'()*+,-..)/01122234(**56789.38:;16(2/1<=>96?>(<@:)(1ABCD1CB1AB16(2>;-CD>)-:.:7@9)->7(:*:89.(?>?:6(./=1E
@()*+.:8:;FCGHCGBI@(/):6?J
LMNOPQLRSQOTQUOPSVOPWXYZOPSP[O\\LMRZSQ]OQTLTMWQONOMSTTYOPPQUOLPPXOSPL^QUSQNLPXS\ONLTOMZO
LP_XPQRWLMRQWTLPS''OSYabSYY]PLV'\]Wc^XPZSQOPSMTTOdOZQPeUL\OSZZO'QLMRfXPPLSMSZZWXMQPabSYY]
eYLQOPg
hiiaj^QOYQUOklmnoPUWWQmTWeMpeULZUqL\\OTrst'OW'\OpuvVQW\TQUOfXPPLSMRWNOYMVOMQTLT^OSYQUSQ
PWVOUWeWMOW^LQPwO\TW'OYSQLNOPVLRUQUSNOcOOMYOP'WMPLc\OSMTZWMTXZQOTSMLMQOMPLNO
LMNOPQLRSQLWMpLMZ\XTLMRSMLMNOMQWY]W^LQPOxXL'VOMQpZWMZ\XTLMRQUSQS\\LQP[XqVLPPL\OPeOYOSZZWXMQOT
^WYiiy
bSYY]SZZO'QPQUOMSYYSQLNOW^QUOfXPPLSMPeLQUWXQxXOPQLWMXPLMRSMXMLTOMQLwOTPWXYZOzP{zhiauvV
QW\Tiay{a|ULPLPQ]'LZS\W^QUO_WXYMS\LPQLZPQSMTSYTPW^bSYY]eUWQYOSQPQUOfXPPLSMSMT}]YLSM
RWNOYMVOMQPSPZ\LOMQPalOQUOM'YWVWQOPSMXMPXcPQSMQLSQOTZWMP'LYSZ]QUOWY]XPLMRSPLMR\OPWXYZO
SMTQUO^SVL\LSYhiiueSPS\PWQW\Tiiyg
hiiaaueSPS\PWQW\TQUSQSQ\OSPQPWVO~ujSMS\]PQPPUSYOTQUOTWXcQPScWXQfXPPLSvPRXL\QSMTZSVOQW
cO\LONOQUSQQUOklmnoPUWWQmTWeMeSPQUOeWYqW^SYWRXOSMTWXQmW^mZWMQYW\qYSLMLSMQOSVeLQUQUO
'WPPLc\OUW'OQUSQQUOSLY\LMOYeSPSfXPPLSMRWNOYMVOMQ'\SMOYOQXYMLMRbYOPLTOMQ\STLVLYbXQLM^YWV
}WXQUjVOYLZSiiy
bXYOcXMqSMTbSYY]qMWePLQabSYY]LPSMSTNWZSQOalO'YWNLTOPOYWONLTOMZO^WYULPQUOWYLOPWMklnop
cXQQUORWS\LPMvQQUOQYXQUpcXQQW'YWVWQOTWXcQLMQUOLMNOPQLRSQLWMQW'YWQOZQfXPPLSa
WNOYQmZQWcOYrspr
nozUQQ'PgeeeacO\\LMRZSQaZWVMOePXqmSMTmOXYW'Or
non
r
MOemVUnom'UWQWRYS'UmROW\WZSQOTm
TWMOQPqZWVVOMQmno
n{
jRYOOeLQUQUOSMS\]PLPpcXQbSYY]vPSYQLZ\OLP^YWV}O'QOVcOYrsQUpr
nzMWQr
no{
|WVWMSZWQQmZQWcOYrspr
nozUQQ'PgeeeacO\\LMRZSQaZWVMOePXqmSMTmOXYW'Or
non
r
MOemVUnom'UWQWRYS'Um
ROW\WZSQOTmTWMOQPqZWVVOMQmno{
|USMqPauQvPScLROYYWYauZWM^XPOTQUOTSQOeLQUQUO~WMPWYQLXVSYQLZ\OWM}O'QOVcOYopr
nohjOe
lW\OLM}]YLSm}SYLM~OYQSLMQ]ya
jMTYOSmZQWcOYrpr
nozUQQ'PgeeeacO\\LMRZSQaZWVMOePXqmSMTmOXYW'Or
non
r
MOemVUnom'UWQWRYS'UmROW\WZSQOTm
TWMOQPqZWVVOMQmnn
{
uwMTLQjkjuUWeLMSVSQQOYW^UWXYPSMLVSROZSMcOYO\LSc\]\WZSQOTzONOMQWXRU]WXWcNLWXP\]
USTSP'OZLwZYWXQOQWZUOZq{a
|ULPLVSROLPYOS\\]RWWTZSXPOLQPUWePQUO[XqSMTULPTOQSL\PpSMTQUOc\XONSMQWW
jQLVOPQSV'eWX\TUSNOcOOMRYOSQQWWiacXQL^]WXSYOSc\OQWTWnn]WX'YWcSc\]TWMvQMOOTQUO
QLVOPQSV'i
!"
" # $ $ # %&
'()*+,-..)/01122234(**56789.38:;16(2/1<=>96?>(<@:)(1ABCD1CB1AB16(2>;-CD>)-:.:7@9)->7(:*:89.(?>?:6(./=1E
@()*+.:8:;FCGDBHDI@(/):6?J
'()*+,-..)/01122234(**56789.38:;16(2/1<=>96?>(<@:)(1ABCD1CB1AB16(2>;-CD>)-:.:7@9)->7(:*:89.(?>?:6(./=1E
@()*+.:8:;FCGDCKKI@(/):6?J
'()*+,-..)/01122234(**56789.38:;16(2/1<=>96?>(<@:)(1ABCD1CB1AB16(2>;-CD>)-:.:7@9)->7(:*:89.(?>?:6(./=1E
@()*+.:8:;FCLBMHMI@(/):6?J
'()*+,-..)/01122234(**56789.38:;16(2/1<=>96?>(<@:)(1ABCD1CB1AB16(2>;-CD>)-:.:7@9)->7(:*:89.(?>?:6(./=1E
@()*+.:8:;FCLCACKI@(/):6?J
NOPQRSTUVWXPYZPS[\]^[_'OaabcdeefffgZPhhRijklagkWYeiPfcemnUliTUPmSWbPe]^[_e[^e]^eiPfUYO[_UbOWaWjSlbOUjPWhWklaPTU
TWiPacneokWYYPiaU[p_^q_r
sORhPaORcXRTPWTRTiWaTSlfaWWYmkOlaaPiaRWi'tParuaORinRakWialRicliRkPbRPkPWvRivWSYlaRWid
OaabcdeefffgtWmamZPgkWYeflakOwXxbbhyz{|yN|}'OaabcdeefffgtWmamZPgkWYeflakOw
Xxbbhyz{|yN|}r
~mYbaWdp^gNOPVcWhTRPSflclcnPTaWaPhhfOlaOPZPhRPXPcfOlaOlbbPiPTWiaOPTltWvTWfiRij
[_gPTRTiWacltdNOPSPflclznSlRiRli
jOaPSPagPclRTaOlaaOPSPfPSPznSlRiRlicWhTRPScaOla
cPialSWknPaaWflSTc[_gNORcRcaOP
ScaaRYPucPPVbPWbhPcltRijaOlalcmSvlkPUaWUlRSYRccRhPORa
[_gvkWmScPOPfWmhTiWalTYRaaOlaRaflcTWiPZtVWSmccRlibPWbhPliTcWvlSuTWianiWf
fOWaWZhlYPvWSaOPTWfiRij'lhaOWmjOuOlXPliRTPlrgitflt\aOPRYbWSaliabRPkPWvRivWSYlaRWiRc
aOlaPXPiVbPWbhPcltaOla[_flcZSWmjOaTWfiZtlQz{YRccRhPg
WXPSaUVWXPYZPSp\]^[_'OaabcdeefffgZPhhRijklagkWYeiPfcemnUliTUPmSWbPe]^[_e[^e]^eiPfUYO[_UbOWaWjSlbOUjPWhWklaPTU
TWiPacneokWYYPiaU[p_[r
VU]qORaZtlSWknPa\
SPTZtYRhRaRlflclhcWSPbWSaPTZtNdOaabdeealccgSmeYPOTmilSWTiltlU
bliWSlYle[p]^[_'OaabdeealccgSmeYPOTmilSWTiltlUbliWSlYle[p]^[_r~mht[_aO\]^[|[d^|gNOP
caWStkOlijPTfOPiaOPtvWmiTWmaaOlaRaflciWalYRhRalStVU]qg
uhtl{mbSRnUPkPYZPS[]\]^[_'OaabcdeefffgZPhhRijklagkWYeiPfcemnUliTUPmSWbPe]^[_e[^e]^eiPfUYO[_UbOWaWjSlbOU
jPWhWklaPTUTWiPacneokWYYPiaU[|^qr
itPXRTPikP\aOlabOWaWflcSPlhhtalnPiWi[_aO~mhtwitPXRTPikP\RaRciWalTRjRalhYliRbmhlaRWiw
{RYYW{UPkPYZPS[\]^[_'OaabcdeefffgZPhhRijklagkWYeiPfcemnUliTUPmSWbPe]^[_e[^e]^eiPfUYO[_UbOWaWjSlbOU
jPWhWklaPTUTWiPacneokWYYPiaU[|[][r
NOPSPRciWPXRTPikP'WSPtPfRaiPccrWvlitQz{N}ZPRijaOPSPWilitWaOPSTltg
NOPSPRcPXPihPccPXRTPikPWvaOlacbPkR
kmccRliQz{ZPRijaOPSPWilitWaOPSTltg
NOPSPRciWPXRTPikPWvlitTRjRalhYliRbmhlaRWi'iWatPa\iWaZPtWiTkSWbbRijliTSPclXRijrgWvlSlhh
Qz{N}bOWaWceXRTPWccPPYlmaOPiaRkg
slhaPSRaatUlt]\]^['OaabcdeefffgZPhhRijklagkWYeiPfcemnUliTUPmSWbPe]^[_e[^e]^eiPfUYO[_UbOWaWjSlbOU
jPWhWklaPTUTWiPacneokWYYPiaU[_^[r
uaRcYtWbRiRWilcliliRYlaRWiliTkWYbWcRaRijfWSnPS\aOlaaOPSPRccaSWijPXRTPikPaOlaaOP
iROiPXRTPW\mbWifORkOblSaWvaOPQmnhlmikOPSilSSlaRXPRcZlcPT\RchRnPhtlvlnPgivSlYPc
_]'lSWmiT|UcPkWiTcraOPSPRclOlST\caSlRjOa\XPSaRklhPTjPXRTPWlSaPvlkafORkOTPXPhWbcWi
cWYPvWhRljPRivSWiaWvaOPQmnhlmikOPS\liTbSWbljlaPclZWXPaOPvWhRljPliThlmikOPSRiaWaOP
SWlT\liTTWfiZPhWfaOPhlmikOPSaWW\kmaaRijlfltcWYPWvaOPvWhRljPguaRcYtkWiaPiaRWiaOlaaORc
lSaPvlkaRcXPSthRnPhtlbSWTmkaWvfOPSPaOPvWhRljPRiaOPvWWaljPOlcZPPiRcWhlaPTliTTmbhRklaPT
aWkSPlaPlvWSPjSWmiThltPSvWSaOPQmnhlmikOPSaWblccZPORiTg
!"
" # $ $ # %
&'()*+,-./0123(++42131(*5-./*421(/126.7821,+9-,(5'-+:;609-3*5(5'(<-7(29*=(1>*.76+-./
?)*+,+@3652655'(*1(*=261(A6-1(52B(*421(/126.79*=(1>-.5'-+3*+(5'(429-*/(2.5'(.(*1+-7(
245'(12*7CD263*.5'(.09*3(=261)-779(/126.72BE(35>-.5'-+3*+(5'(F6,9*6.3'(1>B('-.75'(
421(/126.79*=(1CG.5'(3*+(8'(1(5'(21-/-.*9+2613(4225*/(-+<-7(2*.75'(3*)(1*HIJ-+
)2<-./>-5-+245(..(3(++*1=52)*.6*99=*.-)*5(5'()*+,02+-5-2.*.7+'*0(245'(421(/126.7
9*=(152(.+61(5'(3211(35*1(*245'(<-7(21()*-.+-.5'(421(/126.7>*5-)(32.+6)-./0123(++C
;2.()(5-36926+9=>5'-+3*.B(K*89(++>B65+-.3(5'-+8*+6092*7(7.2592./*45(15'(LMNO51*/(7=>
321.(1++(()52'*<(B((.365P9-5(1*99=*.7Q/61*5-<(9=R>*.7-.+5(*7240(14(359=365265429-*/(8(
+((*'*17>+51*-/'5)*+,(7/(()(1/(B(58((.41*)(+SS*.7OT>369)-.*5-./-.*9*1/(<(15-3*9365
9-.(*5OT41*)(+PU6+5+'=24S+(32.7+-.525'(4225*/(R245'(<-7(2CG821,-.V45(1WX(35+*9)2+5
(<(1=+-./9(7*=>*.-)*5-./*.732)02+-5-./>*.7G'*<(.(<(1+((.<-7(232)01(++-2.012763(+63'
*<-7(2*15(4*35>*.75'-+*15(4*35-+6.-A6(-.5'-+4225*/(-.B25'-5@++3*9(*.7.*561(>*.7923*5(7
(Y*359=8'(1(8(@7(Y0(3552+((*9-.(3*6+(7B=*02219=*.-)*5(7)*+,9*=(1Z.225'(1(.327-./
*15(4*35245'(<-7(2012763(+*9-.(+2+51*-/'5>.21+292./CG*)4*)-9-*18-5'5'(7-X-3695-(+24
)*+,-./429-*/(2.<-7(24225*/(>*.7245'(*00(*1*.3(2402219=)*+,(79*=(1+>*.75'-+<-7(2
*15(4*35922,+52)(52B(*.*13'(5=0*9(Y*)09(*02219=(Y(365(7421(/126.79*=(1)*+,>76(52-5@+
+51*-/'5(7/(>-5@+()(1/(.3(8-5'5'(3*)(1*)2<()(.5>5'(9*3,24?0*15-*9@0-Y(9+P0-Y(9+*126.7
5'((7/(24*.2BE(355'*5+'*1(5'(32926124*.2BE(35>*.7245'(2BE(35B('-.7-5R*.75'(4*355'*5
-5(Y5(.7+8(990*+55'(2BE(355'*5-+B(-./)*+,(7:-5-+(.5-1(9=32.+-+5(.58-5'*.*.-)*5(7)*+,
(7/(C
&'(1(*1(4615'(1-.5(1(+5-./(9()(.5+245'([.-\'.(<-7(25'*51*-+(A6(+5-2.+522Z(*3'5-)(5'(
F6,0*++(+B('-.7*02+5P*1(9*5-<(9=+-)09(421(/126.79*=(1)*+,-./5*+,*+32)0*1(752429-*/(>
76(525'(+51*-/'5(7/(+24*02+5R>-5@+*./9(<-+-B9=3'*./(+>*+-4-5-+B(-./1(41*35(7B=5'(02+5C
G.5(1(+5-./9=>5'-+?B(.7-./@245'(F6,9*6.3'(1*356*99=23361+-.*4*+'-2.-.32)0*5-B9(8-5'-5@+
3'*./(2402+-5-2.1(9*5-<(525'(3*)(1*:&'(B(.7-+525'(1-/'5>8'(1(*+*.2BE(35)2<-./*8*=
412)5'(3*)(1**92./5'*5)25-2.0*5'82697>-4*.=5'-./>B(.7+9-/'59=525'(9(45>B65
-)0(13(05-B9=2<(15-)(:5'(1-/'5'*.7+-7(245'(9*6.3'(182697/1289(++<-+-B9(*+5'(7-+5*.3(
412)5'(3*)(1*-.31(*+(+>8'(1(*+*1-/'58*17*./9(561.*+8(+((-.5'(<-7(282697-.5'(21=
+'286+)21(245'(1-/'5'*.7+-7(245'(9*6.3'(1C&'((X(35-+B25'-.3211(35-.-5@+7-1(35-2.>*.7
4*1522012.26.3(74215'(7-+5*.3(51*<(99(7B('-.7*.*112802+5CG@<(5(+5(75'-+5'(21=-.]7
+2458*1(6+-./)*07*5*245'(923*5-2.*.75'(600(1(7/(+614*3(*./9(+'-45+525'(9(45*+5'(
2BE(35)2<(+*8*=412)5'(3*)(1*C&'-+3*.B(+((.*5-5@+)2+5012.26.3(7*5^_N+(32.7+>*.7
*/*-.*5*126.7NO+(32.7+C&'(+51*-/'5(7/(245'(F6,9*6.3'(13'*++-+*B2<(5'(51*3,+-+B(.5
1-/'58*17+*+-50*++(+B('-.7(*3'245'(02+5+CH21(/126.7(9()(.5+8'-3')2)(.5*1-9='-7(5'(
2BE(35PF6,9*6.3'(1R012<-7(*32)02+-521*/2272002156.-5=52+'-455'(*./9(210(1+0(35-<(24*.
2BE(35-.32)02+-5-./+2458*1(>(+0(3-*99=-4821,-./8-5'*+5*5-3-)*/(245'(2BE(35A6(+5-2.>-.
5'-+3*+(5'(F6,9*6.3'(1CH12)(Y0(1-(.3(>*3'-(<-./*3361*5(0(1+0(35-<(+'-45+2.*T;9*=(1
2BE(35-.3*9369*5(7];+0*3(-+7-X-3695>*.7-5*00(*1+52)(5'*55'(32)02+-521-.5'-+-.+5*.3(
'*+812./9=-.5(101(5(75'(0(1+0(35-<(>*.7+'-45(75'(F6,9*6.3'(1@+0(1+0(35-<(-.5'(812./
7-1(35-2.6.7(15'(32<(1245'(12*7+-7(029(+CG.5(1(+5-./522>5'*55'(<-7(2+520+E6+5B(421(5'(
F6,82697'*<(52)*,(*561.605'('-99Z5'-+82697B(<(1=51-3,=52728-5'265*7-X(1(.5*./9(
-)*/(245'(F6,>*.77(+0-5(5'(01(+(.3(24*02+552'-7(5'(561.>G72.255'-.,-582697B(
32.<-.3-./:-5826971(A6-1(32.+-7(1*B9=)21(5-)(>*7-X(1(.5*./9(-)*/(245'(9*6.3'(1
32.+-+5(.58-5'5'(25'(1-)*/(>*.75'()21(012426.7*./9(+'-45245'(B(.7*.7-.39-.(82697
1-+,*77-5-2.*9(1121+CI4*77-5-2.*9-.5(1(+5>-+5'*55'(<-7(2-5+(9472(+.@5*00(*152B(IH5'(F6,
!"
" # $ $ # %
&'()*+,--(./0011123'))45678-279:05'1.0;<=85>=';?9('0@ABC0BA0@A05'1=:,BC=(,9-96?8(,=6'9)978-'>=
>95'-.<0D?'()*-979:EBFCGABH?'.(95>I
JKLMKLNKOPQ
PLRSTUKVWVLXUKVYXZOVKZKSTKLOOKLVZX[\KYSTY]KSXLPX[XUKMY]K[^[[XL_K'aSKb[RP]KcOKTXXULXY^
XUKYSXKSXY[SbLZX[dPeLfRgPLRSTUKV]VYMYS_LP[S_LV[L]WXUKfRgb[RP]PLV_KPQ\KP[TLXK]YSXUK
TKSXVKLVKL[^XUKMY]K[ZU[XhOK[OPKXKS]X[gKKOXUK^[TRZ[^LMY]K[X[bLV]ZXUKTKSXVK[^XUK
iajklULXYXYZS[X^RVXUKVZR__KZXZXULXXUKfRgPLRSTUKVbLZL]]K]PLXKVX[LMY]K[ZU[X[RX[^LS
LOLVXeKSX\RYP]YS_bYS][bklUYZPLZXO[YSXYZMKVQTYVTReZXLSXYLPWmnPP_VLSXk
lUYZLPPTLZXZ][R\X[SXUKMKVLTYXQ[^XUYZMY]K[Wb[RP]OV[MY]KLSKcOPLSLXY[S^[VXUKVRZUX[XLgKYX
][bS^V[eo[RXR\K[SpqXUrRPQstpuvYXnZTVKLX[VeLQULMKS[XYTK]XUKYVeYZXLgKw'xMKSLVKPLXYMKPQ
KLZQMY]K[T[eO[ZYXYS_y[\ZRTULZXUYZb[RP]PYgKPQVKzRYVKZKMKVLPU[RVZX[TVKLXKLS]VKS]KV{[SK
eRZXdS]XUKLZZKXZhMY]K[[^XUKP[TLXY[SWYeL_KvZw[^LfRgLXXUKT[VVKTXLS_PKvZwW|]e[XY[SXVLTg
XUK^[[XL_KX[OPLTKXUKVKzRYVK][\yKTXYSTLPTRPLXK]MYVXRLP|}ZOLTKvRZYS_~^XKVxKTXZ|}
TLeKVLXVLTgKV^KLXRVKhiomhmbLZL\PKX[X[ZRTTKZZ^RPPQOKV^[VeL|}TLeKVLXVLTgKVZ[PMKn[S
XUK^[[XL_KWbUYTUYZS[XLPbLQZO[ZZY\PKh~^XKVxKTXZSKK]ZX[\KL\PKX[T[eORXK|}]KOXULS]
YZS[XLPbLQZTLOL\PK[^LZTKVXLYSYS_ZRYTYKSX]LXL^V[e^[[XL_KklUYZb[RP]\K^LVLS]LbLQXUK
KLZYKZXbLQ[^OPLTYS_LS]e[MYS_LfRgPLRSTUKVYSX[|}ZOLTK_YMKSXUKLe[RSX[^TLeKVL
e[MKeKSXwWZRTTKZZ^RPPQT[eO[ZYXKXUKKPKeKSXZWTVKLXK^[VK_V[RS]PLQKVZLS]eLZgXUK^[VK_V[RS]
KPKeKSXZvXUKZXKObUYTULOOKLVZX[ULMK\KKS\[]_K]]RKX[XUKTLeKVLe[MKeKSXwWT[P[RVT[VVKTX
XUKKPKeKSXZX[_PRKnXUKLKZXUKXYTWL]]PKSZ\PRV}KOXU[^iYKP]ZUY^XZWLS]\VY_UXSKZZT[SXVLZX
TULS_KZhSKTKZZLVQYSXUYZMY]K[hLS]dSLPPQVKS]KVLS]ROP[L]XUKMY]K[hmLSXYTYOLXKXUYZb[RP]
XLgKWYSXUKL\Z[PRXK\KZXTLZKZTKSLVY[WLT[ROPK[^U[RVZ^[VLT[eOKXKSX~^XKVxKTXZRZKVW\RX
eRTUPYgKPQe[VKWKMKS_YMKSXUKZKVY[RZeLZgYS_KVV[VYSYXkmn]\KMKVQYSXKVKZXK]X[gS[bY^bK
gS[bYXnZKcLTXROP[L]XYeK[SpqXUrRPQk
mneS[XTPLYeYS_X[ULMKLSZbKVZWLS]XUKVKVKeLYSZLO[ZZY\YPYXQmLebV[S_LS]XULXXUKVKYZZ[eK
[XUKVP[_YTLPKcOPLSLXY[S^[VbULXULZKMKVQLOOKLVLSTK[^LO[[V^[VK_V[RS]eLZgYS_y[\LS]
YST[VVKTXOKVZOKTXYMKTULS_KZW\RXm\KPYKMKXUKZKYZZRKZ]KZKVMK^RVXUKVLXXKSXY[SLS]VK^RXLXY[SWPKZX
XUYZgKQOYKTK[^KMY]KSTKYZPLXKVTULPPKS_K]kmUY_UPQVKT[eeKS]Q[R][bSP[L]XUK^[[XL_KQ[RVZKP^
LS]_[XUV[R_UYX^VLeK\Q^VLeKX[ZKKbULXmVK^KVX[k
o[RVLeK
o[RVx
LYP
vbYPPS[X\KOR\PYZUK]w
!"
" # $ $ # %
&'()*(++,-.. /01234
567,86''-9:;-,-<<<
/3=>0?
@6:)AB'-6AA6**6CD7EF6''-9:.GB-'()*<
@6:)AB'-6A9-CE6.:.GB-'()*<
HIJKLMNONPPJKQRSLTSJPJKQUJVLW
X7G.F,)G-:667,-'()**).::6,-F-)Y-(C--Z*B.-*-F:)696A.:6,)-.E7G*).;-+GB[-**)9\F(:+7,)9\:;-
E,-Y)67.C--Z](*69\C):;*)9Z.:667,A(Y6,):--^('E*-.6A6E-9.67,F-,-.-(,F;(,679+:;-C-G<
_*69\C):;67,E7G*).;-+F69:-9:]C-C)**7E+(:-67,,-(+-,.69-Y-9:.:;(:67,.:('(9+F69:,)G7:6,.
(,-)9Y6*Y-+C):;].7F;(.96:-C6,:;B)9:-,Y)-C.(9+:,()9)9\C6,Z.;6E.<
a;::E.bccCCC<G-**)9\F(:<F6'd
efghiijkllmmmnimoiipqnrstlupvvowxryiz
{fghiij|kllmmmnupvvowxryinrstl}pp~lz
[-**)9\F(:<
')F-
:;],+*66,]@-C(*Z]-)F-.:-,]&
_
!"
" # $ $ # %%
&'()*+,-'./0102/0
345'+6*567
Annex 459
Bellingcat Investigation Team, Russian Colonel General Identified as Key ian deathMH17
Figure, bell¿ngcat (8 December 2017)
Annex 460
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (12 June 1962)
European Treaty Series - No. 30
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
Strasbourg, 20.IV.1959
Preamble
The governments signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe,
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater unity among its
members;
Believing that the adoption of common rules in the field of mutual assistance in criminal
matters will contribute to the attainment of this aim;
Considering that such mutual assistance is related to the question of extradition, which has
already formed the subject of a Convention signed on 13th December 1957,
Have agreed as follows:
Chapter I – General provisions
Article 1
1 The Contracting Parties undertake to afford each other, in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention, the widest measure of mutual assistance in proceedings in respect of
offences the punishment of which, at the time of the request for assistance, falls within the
jurisdiction of the judicial authorities of the requesting Party.
2 This Convention does not apply to arrests, the enforcement of verdicts or offences under
military law which are not offences under ordinary criminal law.
Article 2
Assistance may be refused:
a if the request concerns an offence which the requested Party considers a political
offence, an offence connected with a political offence, or a fiscal offence;
b if the requested Party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice the
sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of its country.
ETS 30 – Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 20.IV.1959
__________________________________________________________________________________
2
Chapter II – Letters rogatory
Article 3
1 The requested Party shall execute in the manner provided for by its law any letters rogatory
relating to a criminal matter and addressed to it by the judicial authorities of the requesting
Party for the purpose of procuring evidence or transmitting articles to be produced in
evidence, records or documents.
2 If the requesting Party desires witnesses or experts to give evidence on oath, it shall
expressly so request, and the requested Party shall comply with the request if the law of its
country does not prohibit it.
3 The requested Party may transmit certified copies or certified photostat copies of records or
documents requested, unless the requesting Party expressly requests the transmission of
originals, in which case the requested Party shall make every effort to comply with the
request.
Article 4
On the express request of the requesting Party the requested Party shall state the date and
place of execution of the letters rogatory. Officials and interested persons may be present if
the requested Party consents.
Article 5
1 Any Contracting Party may, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe, when signing this Convention or depositing its instrument of ratification or
accession, reserve the right to make the execution of letters rogatory for search or seizure of
property dependent on one or more of the following conditions:
a that the offence motivating the letters rogatory is punishable under both the law of the
requesting Party and the law of the requested Party;
b that the offence motivating the letters rogatory is an extraditable offence in the requested
country;
c that execution of the letters rogatory is consistent with the law of the requested Party.
2 Where a Contracting Party makes a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article,
any other Party may apply reciprocity.
Article 6
1 The requested Party may delay the handing over of any property, records or documents
requested, if it requires the said property, records or documents in connection with pending
criminal proceedings.
2 Any property, as well as original records or documents, handed over in execution of letters
rogatory shall be returned by the requesting Party to the requested Party as soon as possible
unless the latter Party waives the return thereof.
ETS 30 – Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 20.IV.1959
__________________________________________________________________________________
3
Chapter III – Service of writs and records of judicial verdicts – Appearance of witnesses,
experts and prosecuted persons
Article 7
1 The requested Party shall effect service of writs and records of judicial verdicts which are
transmitted to it for this purpose by the requesting Party.
Service may be effected by simple transmission of the writ or record to the person to be
served. If the requesting Party expressly so requests, service shall be effected by the
requested Party in the manner provided for the service of analogous documents under its own
law or in a special manner consistent with such law.
2 Proof of service shall be given by means of a receipt dated and signed by the person served
or by means of a declaration made by the requested Party that service has been effected and
stating the form and date of such service. One or other of these documents shall be sent
immediately to the requesting Party. The requested Party shall, if the requesting Party so
requests, state whether service has been effected in accordance with the law of the requested
Party. If service cannot be effected, the reasons shall be communicated immediately by the
requested Party to the requesting Party.
3 Any Contracting Party may, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe, when signing this Convention or depositing its instrument of ratification or
accession, request that service of a summons on an accused person who is in its territory be
transmitted to its authorities by a certain time before the date set for appearance. This time
shall be specified in the aforesaid declaration and shall not exceed 50 days.
This time shall be taken into account when the date of appearance is being fixed and when
the summons is being transmitted.
Article 8
A witness or expert who has failed to answer a summons to appear, service of which has
been requested, shall not, even if the summons contains a notice of penalty, be subjected to
any punishment or measure of restraint, unless subsequently he voluntarily enters the territory
of the requesting Party and is there again duly summoned.
Article 9
The allowances, including subsistence, to be paid and the travelling expenses to be refunded
to a witness or expert by the requesting Party shall be calculated as from his place of
residence and shall be at rates at least equal to those provided for in the scales and rules in
force in the country where the hearing is intended to take place.
Article 10
1 If the requesting Party considers the personal appearance of a witness or expert before its
judicial authorities especially necessary, it shall so mention in its request for service of the
summons and the requested Party shall invite the witness or expert to appear.
The requested Party shall inform the requesting Party of the reply of the witness or expert.
2 In the case provided for under paragraph 1 of this article the request or the summons shall
indicate the approximate allowances payable and the travelling and subsistence expenses
refundable.
ETS 30 – Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 20.IV.1959
__________________________________________________________________________________
4
3 If a specific request is made, the requested Party may grant the witness or expert an
advance. The amount of the advance shall be endorsed on the summons and shall be
refunded by the requesting Party.
Article 11
1 A person in custody whose personal appearance as a witness or for purposes of confrontation
is applied for by the requesting Party shall be temporarily transferred to the territory where the
hearing is intended to take place, provided that he shall be sent back within the period
stipulated by the requested Party and subject to the provisions of Article 12 in so far as these
are applicable.
Transfer may be refused:
a if the person in custody does not consent;
b if his presence is necessary at criminal proceedings pending in the territory of the
requested Party;
c if transfer is liable to prolong his detention, or
d if there are other overriding grounds for not transferring him to the territory of the
requesting Party.
2 Subject to the provisions of Article 2, in a case coming within the immediately preceding
paragraph, transit of the person in custody through the territory of a third State, Party to this
Convention, shall be granted on application, accompanied by all necessary documents,
addressed by the Ministry of Justice of the requesting Party to the Ministry of Justice of the
Party through whose territory transit is requested.
A Contracting Party may refuse to grant transit to its own nationals.
3 The transferred person shall remain in custody in the territory of the requesting Party and,
where applicable, in the territory of the Party through which transit is requested, unless the
Party from whom transfer is requested applies for his release.
Article 12
1 A witness or expert, whatever his nationality, appearing on a summons before the judicial
authorities of the requesting Party shall not be prosecuted or detained or subjected to any
other restriction of his personal liberty in the territory of that Party in respect of acts or
convictions anterior to his departure from the territory of the requested Party.
2 A person, whatever his nationality, summoned before the judicial authorities of the requesting
Party to answer for acts forming the subject of proceedings against him, shall not be
prosecuted or detained or subjected to any other restriction of his personal liberty for acts or
convictions anterior to his departure from the territory of the requested Party and not specified
in the summons.
3 The immunity provided for in this article shall cease when the witness or expert or prosecuted
person, having had for a period of fifteen consecutive days from the date when his presence
is no longer required by the judicial authorities an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless
remained in the territory, or having left it, has returned.
ETS 30 – Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 20.IV.1959
__________________________________________________________________________________
5
Chapter IV – Judicial records
Article 13
1 A requested Party shall communicate extracts from and information relating to judicial
records, requested from it by the judicial authorities of a Contracting Party and needed in a
criminal matter, to the same extent that these may be made available to its own judicial
authorities in like case.
2 In any case other than that provided for in paragraph 1 of this article the request shall be
complied with in accordance with the conditions provided for by the law, regulations or
practice of the requested Party.
Chapter V – Procedure
Article 14
1 Requests for mutual assistance shall indicate as follows:
a the authority making the request,
b the object of and the reason for the request,
c where possible, the identity and the nationality of the person concerned, and
d where necessary, the name and address of the person to be served.
2 Letters rogatory referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5 shall, in addition, state the offence and
contain a summary of the facts.
Article 15
1 Letters rogatory referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5 as well as the applications referred to in
Article 11 shall be addressed by the Ministry of Justice of the requesting Party to the Ministry
of Justice of the requested Party and shall be returned through the same channels.
2 In case of urgency, letters rogatory may be addressed directly by the judicial authorities of the
requesting Party to the judicial authorities of the requested Party. They shall be returned
together with the relevant documents through the channels stipulated in paragraph 1 of this
article.
3 Requests provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 13 may be addressed directly by the judicial
authorities concerned to the appropriate authorities of the requested Party, and the replies
may be returned directly by those authorities. Requests provided for in paragraph 2 of
Article 13 shall be addressed by the Ministry of Justice of the requesting Party to the Ministry
of Justice of the requested Party.
4 Requests for mutual assistance, other than those provided for in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this
article and, in particular, requests for investigation preliminary to prosecution, may be
communicated directly between the judicial authorities.
5 In cases where direct transmission is permitted under this Convention, it may take place
through the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol).
ETS 30 – Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 20.IV.1959
__________________________________________________________________________________
6
6 A Contracting Party may, when signing this Convention or depositing its instrument of
ratification or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, give notice that some or all requests for assistance shall be sent to it through
channels other than those provided for in this article, or require that, in a case provided for in
paragraph 2 of this article, a copy of the letters rogatory shall be transmitted at the same time
to its Ministry of Justice.
7 The provisions of this article are without prejudice to those of bilateral agreements or
arrangements in force between Contracting Parties which provide for the direct transmission
of requests for assistance between their respective authorities.
Article 16
1 Subject to paragraph 2 of this article, translations of requests and annexed documents shall
not be required.
2 Each Contracting Party may, when signing or depositing its instrument of ratification or
accession, by means of a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe, reserve the right to stipulate that requests and annexed documents shall be
addressed to it accompanied by a translation into its own language or into either of the official
languages of the Council of Europe or into one of the latter languages, specified by it. The
other Contracting Parties may apply reciprocity.
3 This article is without prejudice to the provisions concerning the translation of requests or
annexed documents contained in the agreements or arrangements in force or to be made
between two or more Contracting Parties.
Article 17
Evidence or documents transmitted pursuant to this Convention shall not require any form of
authentication.
Article 18
Where the authority which receives a request for mutual assistance has no jurisdiction to
comply therewith, it shall, ex officio, transmit the request to the competent authority of its
country and shall so inform the requesting Party through the direct channels, if the request
has been addressed through such channels.
Article 19
Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual assistance.
Article 20
Subject to the provisions of Article 10, paragraph 3, execution of requests for mutual
assistance shall not entail refunding of expenses except those incurred by the attendance of
experts in the territory of the requested Party or the transfer of a person in custody carried out
under Article 11.
ETS 30 – Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 20.IV.1959
__________________________________________________________________________________
7
Chapter VI – Laying of information in connection with proceedings
Article 21
1 Information laid by one Contracting Party with a view to proceedings in the courts of another
Party shall be transmitted between the Ministries of Justice concerned unless a Contracting
Party avails itself of the option provided for in paragraph 6 of Article 15.
2 The requested Party shall notify the requesting Party of any action taken on such information
and shall forward a copy of the record of any verdict pronounced.
3 The provisions of Article 16 shall apply to information laid under paragraph 1 of this article.
Chapter VII – Exchange of information from judicial records
Article 22
Each Contracting Party shall inform any other Party of all criminal convictions and subsequent
measures in respect of nationals of the latter Party, entered in the judicial records. Ministries
of Justice shall communicate such information to one another at least once a year. Where the
person concerned is considered a national of two or more other Contracting Parties, the
information shall be given to each of these Parties, unless the person is a national of the Party
in the territory of which he was convicted.
Chapter VIII – Final provisions
Article 23
1 Any Contracting Party may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of
ratification or accession, make a reservation in respect of any provision or provisions of the
Convention.
2 Any Contracting Party which has made a reservation shall withdraw it as soon as
circumstances permit. Such withdrawal shall be made by notification to the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe.
3 A Contracting Party which has made a reservation in respect of a provision of the Convention
may not claim application of the said provision by another Party save in so far as it has itself
accepted the provision.
Article 24
A Contracting Party may, when signing the Convention or depositing its instrument of
ratification or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, define what authorities it will, for the purpose of the Convention, deem judicial
authorities.
Article 25
1 This Convention shall apply to the metropolitan territories of the Contracting Parties.
2 In respect of France, it shall also apply to Algeria and to the overseas Departments, and, in
respect of Italy, it shall also apply to the territory of Somaliland under Italian administration.
3 The Federal Republic of Germany may extend the application of this Convention to the Land
of Berlin by notice addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
ETS 30 – Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 20.IV.1959
__________________________________________________________________________________
8
4 In respect of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Convention shall apply to its European
territory. The Netherlands may extend the application of this Convention to the Netherlands
Antilles, Surinam and Netherlands New Guinea by notice addressed to the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe.
5 By direct arrangement between two or more Contracting Parties and subject to the conditions
laid down in the arrangement, the application of this Convention may be extended to any
territory, other than the territories mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this article, of one
of these Parties, for the international relations of which any such Party is responsible.
Article 26
1 Subject to the provisions of Article 15, paragraph 7, and Article 16, paragraph 3, this
Convention shall, in respect of those countries to which it applies, supersede the provisions of
any treaties, conventions or bilateral agreements governing mutual assistance in criminal
matters between any two Contracting Parties.
2 This Convention shall not affect obligations incurred under the terms of any other bilateral or
multilateral international convention which contains or may contain clauses governing specific
aspects of mutual assistance in a given field.
3 The Contracting Parties may conclude between themselves bilateral or multilateral
agreements on mutual assistance in criminal matters only in order to supplement the
provisions of this Convention or to facilitate the application of the principles contained therein.
4 Where, as between two or more Contracting Parties, mutual assistance in criminal matters is
practised on the basis of uniform legislation or of a special system providing for the reciprocal
application in their respective territories of measures of mutual assistance, these Parties shall,
notwithstanding the provisions of this Convention, be free to regulate their mutual relations in
this field exclusively in accordance with such legislation or system. Contracting Parties which,
in accordance with this paragraph, exclude as between themselves the application of this
Convention shall notify the Secretary General of the Council of Europe accordingly.
Article 27
1 This Convention shall be open to signature by the members of the Council of Europe. It shall
be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the
Council.
2 The Convention shall come into force 90 days after the date of deposit of the third instrument
of ratification.
3 As regards any signatory ratifying subsequently the Convention shall come into force 90 days
after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.
Article 28
1 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe may invite any State not a member of
the Council to accede to this Convention, provided that the resolution containing such
invitation obtains the unanimous agreement of the members of the Council who have ratified
the Convention.
2 Accession shall be by deposit with the Secretary General of the Council of an instrument of
accession which shall take effect 90 days after the date of its deposit.
ETS 30 – Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 20.IV.1959
__________________________________________________________________________________
9
Article 29
Any Contracting Party may denounce this Convention in so far as it is concerned by giving
notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Denunciation shall take effect
six months after the date when the Secretary General of the Council received such
notification.
Article 30
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify the members of the Council and
the government of any State which has acceded to this Convention of:
a the names of the signatories and the deposit of any instrument of ratification or
accession;
b the date of entry into force of this Convention;
c any notification received in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 – paragraph 1,
Article 7 – paragraph 3, Article 15 – paragraph 6, Article 16 – paragraph 2, Article 24,
Article 25 – paragraphs 3 and 4, Article 26 – paragraph 4;
d any reservation made in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 1;
e the withdrawal of any reservation in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 2;
f any notification of denunciation received in accordance with the provisions of Article 29
and the date on which such denunciation will take effect.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed this
Convention.
Done at Strasbourg, this 20th day of April 1959, in English and French, both texts being
equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the
Council of Europe. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified
copies to the signatory and acceding governments.
Annex 461
Minsk Convention on Legal Aid and Legal Relations on Civil, Family and Criminal Matters of
1993 (22 January 1993)
Annex 462
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delali, Zdravko Muci, Hazim Deli, Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 372, para. 109 (16 November 1998)
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
UNITED
NATIONS
Case No.: IT-96-21-T
Date: 16 November 1998
International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Original: English
IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER
Before: Judge Adolphus G. Karibi-Whyte, Presiding
Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito
Judge Saad Saood Jan
Registrar: Mrs. Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh
Judgement of: 16 November 1998
PROSECUTOR
v.
ZEJNIL DELALI]
ZDRAVKO MUCI] also known as “PAVO”
HAZIM DELI]
ESAD LAND@O also known as “ZENGA”
JUDGEMENT
The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr. Grant Niemann
Ms. Teresa McHenry
Counsel for the Accused:
Ms. Edina Re{idovi}, Mr. Eugene O’Sullivan, for Zejnil Delali}
Ms. Nihada Buturovi}, Mr. Howard Morrison, for Zdravko Muci}
Mr. Salih Karabdi}, Mr. Thomas Moran, for Hazim Deli}
Ms. Cynthia McMurrey, Ms. Nancy Boler, for Esad Land`o
i
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................1
A. The International Tribunal ............................................................................................................................... 2
B. The Indictment ................................................................................................................................................... 2
1. ESAD LAND@O ............................................................................................................................................. 3
(a) Wilful Killing and Murder.......................................................................................................................... 4
(b) Torture and Cruel Treatment ...................................................................................................................... 4
(c) Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury and Cruel Treatment................................................................5
2. HAZIM DELI] ............................................................................................................................................... 6
(a) Wilful Killing and Murder.......................................................................................................................... 6
(b) Torture and Cruel Treatment ...................................................................................................................... 7
(c) Inhuman Treatment and Cruel Treatment................................................................................................... 7
(d) Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury and Cruel Treatment................................................................8
(e) Unlawful Confinement of Civilians............................................................................................................ 8
(f) Plunder of Private Property......................................................................................................................... 8
3. ZEJNIL DELALI] and ZDRAVKO MUCI]................................................................................................. 9
(a) Wilful Killing and Murder.......................................................................................................................... 9
(b) Torture and Cruel Treatment .................................................................................................................... 10
(c) Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury and Cruel Treatment.............................................................. 10
(d) Inhuman Treatment and Cruel Treatment................................................................................................. 11
(e) Unlawful Confinement of Civilians.......................................................................................................... 12
(f) Plunder of Private Property....................................................................................................................... 12
C. Procedural History........................................................................................................................................... 12
1. Indictment-Related Issues.............................................................................................................................. 14
2. Provisional Release and Fitness to Stand Trial.............................................................................................. 15
3. Matters Relating to the Detention Unit.......................................................................................................... 16
4. Assignment of Defence Counsel ................................................................................................................... 17
5. Matters Relating to Trial Proceedings ........................................................................................................... 18
6. Witness-Related Issues .................................................................................................................................. 21
(a) Protective Measures.................................................................................................................................. 21
(b) Video-Link Testimony.............................................................................................................................. 22
(c) Disclosure of Witness Identity.................................................................................................................. 23
(d) Additional Witnesses and Issuance of Subpoenae.................................................................................... 23
(e) Miscellaneous ........................................................................................................................................... 25
7. Evidentiary Issues.......................................................................................................................................... 26
(a) Disclosure Requirements .......................................................................................................................... 26
(b) Admissibility of Evidence ........................................................................................................................27
(c) Evidence of Prior Sexual Conduct............................................................................................................ 30
8. Miscellaneous Issues Relating to the Regulation of Proceedings.................................................................. 31
9. Defence of Diminished or Lack of Mental Capacity ..................................................................................... 34
10. Judges’ Terms of Office ................................................................................................................................ 34
11. Motion for Judgement of Acquittal ............................................................................................................... 35
12. Sentencing Procedure .................................................................................................................................... 36
D. Structure of the Judgement ............................................................................................................................. 37
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARY FACTUAL FINDINGS......................................38
A. Historical and Geographical Background of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia...................... 39
B. The Concept of All People’s Defence (Total National Defence) ................................................................... 40
C. Disintegration of the SFRY and Emergence of the New States.................................................................... 41
ii
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
D. Role of Military Forces in the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina............................................................. 45
1. The JNA ........................................................................................................................................................ 45
2. The HVO....................................................................................................................................................... 48
3. Paramilitary Groups....................................................................................................................................... 48
E. The Konjic Municipality - Geographical, Demographic and Political Structure ....................................... 49
F. Fighting in Konjic and Existence of the ^elebi}i Prison-camp .................................................................... 52
1. Military Action .............................................................................................................................................. 52
2. The Establishment of the ^elebi}i Prison-camp............................................................................................ 56
3. Description of the ^elebi}i Compound ......................................................................................................... 57
4. The Arrival, Accommodation and Release of Prisoners................................................................................ 58
III. APPLICABLE LAW...............................................................................................................62
A. General Principles of Interpretation .............................................................................................................. 62
1. General Aids to Interpretation ....................................................................................................................... 62
2. Other Canons of Interpretation ...................................................................................................................... 65
3. Differences in Statutory Interpretation Between Systems ............................................................................. 65
4. Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................... 66
B. Applicable Provisions of the Statute ............................................................................................................... 67
C. General Requirements for the Application of Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute ............................................ 68
1. Provisions of Article 1................................................................................................................................... 68
2. Existence of an Armed Conflict .................................................................................................................... 71
3. Nexus Between the Acts of the Accused and the Armed Conflict ................................................................ 74
D. Article 2 of the Statute ..................................................................................................................................... 75
1. Nature of the Armed Conflict ........................................................................................................................ 77
(a) Arguments of the Parties .......................................................................................................................... 77
(b) Discussion................................................................................................................................................. 79
(c) Findings .................................................................................................................................................... 85
2. Status of the Victims as “Protected Persons” ................................................................................................ 89
(a) Positions of the Parties.............................................................................................................................. 89
(b) Discussion................................................................................................................................................. 92
(i) Were the Victims Protected Civilians?................................................................................................. 92
(ii) Were the Victims Prisoners of War? ..................................................................................................100
(c) Findings .................................................................................................................................................. 102
E. Article 3 of the Statute ................................................................................................................................... 103
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 103
2. Arguments of the Parties ............................................................................................................................. 105
3. Discussion ................................................................................................................................................... 109
4. Findings ....................................................................................................................................................... 116
F. Individual Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7(1) .............................................................................. 117
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 117
2. Arguments of the Parties ............................................................................................................................. 118
3. Discussion and Findings.............................................................................................................................. 119
G. Individual Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7(3) .............................................................................. 121
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 121
2. Legal Character of Command Responsibility and its Status Under Customary International Law............. 122
3. The Elements of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under Article 7(3).................................................... 127
(a) Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 127
(b) The Superior–Subordinate Relationship................................................................................................. 128
(i) Arguments of the Parties .................................................................................................................... 128
(ii) Discussion and Findings..................................................................................................................... 130
iii
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
a. The Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors...................................................................................131
b. The Concept of Superior .................................................................................................................... 134
(c) The Mental Element: “Knew or had reason to know”...........................................................................140
(i) Arguments of the Parties .................................................................................................................... 140
(ii) Discussion and Findings..................................................................................................................... 142
a. Actual Knowledge .............................................................................................................................142
b. “Had reason to know”........................................................................................................................ 144
(d) Necessary and Reasonable Measures...................................................................................................... 147
(e) Causation ................................................................................................................................................ 147
H. Construction of Criminal Statutes ................................................................................................................ 149
1. Aids to Construction of Criminal Statutes................................................................................................... 150
2. Interpretation of the Statute and Rules ........................................................................................................ 152
I. Elements of the Offences................................................................................................................................ 153
1. Wilful Killing and Murder........................................................................................................................... 154
(a) Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 154
(b) Arguments of the Parties ........................................................................................................................ 155
(c) Discussion............................................................................................................................................... 158
(d) Findings .................................................................................................................................................. 160
2. Offences of Mistreatment ............................................................................................................................ 161
(a) Introduction to Various Offences of Mistreatment.................................................................................161
(b) Torture .................................................................................................................................................... 163
(i) Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 163
(ii) Arguments of the Parties .................................................................................................................... 163
(iii) Discussion .......................................................................................................................................... 165
a. The Definition of Torture Under Customary International Law........................................................ 165
b. Severity of Pain or Suffering ............................................................................................................. 167
c. Prohibited Purpose ............................................................................................................................. 170
d. Official Sanction ................................................................................................................................ 171
(iv) Rape as Torture .................................................................................................................................. 172
a. Prohibition of Rape and Sexual Assault Under International Humanitarian Law.............................. 172
b. Definition of Rape.............................................................................................................................. 173
c. Decisions of International and Regional Judicial Bodies................................................................... 174
(v) Findings.............................................................................................................................................. 178
(c) Wilfully Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury to Body or Health ................................................. 179
(i) Arguments of the Parties .................................................................................................................... 179
(ii) Discussion .......................................................................................................................................... 181
(iii) Findings.............................................................................................................................................. 182
(d) Inhuman Treatment................................................................................................................................. 182
(i) Arguments of the Parties .................................................................................................................... 183
(ii) Discussion .......................................................................................................................................... 183
(iii) Findings.............................................................................................................................................. 193
(e) Cruel Treatment ...................................................................................................................................... 194
(i) Arguments of the Parties .................................................................................................................... 194
(ii) Discussion .......................................................................................................................................... 195
(iii) Findings.............................................................................................................................................. 196
(f) Inhumane Conditions.............................................................................................................................. 196
3. Unlawful Confinement of Civilians............................................................................................................. 197
(a) Arguments of the Parties ........................................................................................................................ 198
(b) Discussion............................................................................................................................................... 199
(i) Legality of Confinement..................................................................................................................... 199
(ii) Procedural Safeguards........................................................................................................................ 204
(c) Findings .................................................................................................................................................. 205
4. Plunder......................................................................................................................................................... 205
(a) Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 205
(b) Arguments of the Parties ........................................................................................................................ 206
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 207
IV. FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS.................................................................................211
iv
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
A. The Nature of the Evidence Before the Trial Chamber.............................................................................. 211
B. Burdens of Proof............................................................................................................................................. 212
1. Burden of Proof on the Prosecution............................................................................................................. 213
2. Burden of Proof on the Defence .................................................................................................................. 214
C. Superior Responsibility of Zejnil Delali ..................................................................................................... 215
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 215
2. The Indictment............................................................................................................................................. 216
3. Arguments of the Parties ............................................................................................................................. 216
(a) The Prosecution ...................................................................................................................................... 216
(i) Status Prior to 18 May and as a Co-ordinator from 18 May to 11 July 1992 ..................................... 218
(ii) Status as Commander of Tactical Group 1 from 11 July to November 1992..................................... 220
(iii) Knowledge ......................................................................................................................................... 222
(iv) Failure to Act...................................................................................................................................... 223
(b) The Defence............................................................................................................................................ 225
(i) Status Prior to 18 May and as Co-ordinator from 18 May to 30 July 1992........................................ 226
(ii) Status as Commander of Tactical Group 1 from 30 July to November 1992..................................... 228
(iii) Knowledge ......................................................................................................................................... 230
(iv) Failure to Act...................................................................................................................................... 230
4. Discussion and Findings.............................................................................................................................. 231
(a) Preliminary Issues................................................................................................................................... 231
(b) Analysis of the Activities of Zejnil Delali and the Concept of Superior Responsibility....................... 233
(i) Before 18 May 1992........................................................................................................................... 234
a. Seizure of the elebii Barracks and Warehouses............................................................................. 235
b. Authorisation of 2 May 1992 ............................................................................................................. 236
c. Authorisation of 9 May 1992 ............................................................................................................. 236
d. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 237
(ii) 18 May to 30 July 1992: Zejnil Delali and the Role of Co-ordinator .............................................. 237
a. Appointed Co-ordinator – Meaning and Functions ........................................................................... 237
b. The Gajret Ceremony......................................................................................................................... 241
c. Participation in the Bori Operation as Co-ordinator......................................................................... 241
d. Superior of the elebii Prison-Camp ............................................................................................... 242
e. Issue of Orders to Institutions by Zejnil Delali ................................................................................ 243
f. Zejnil Delali and the Power to Make Appointments ........................................................................ 245
g. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 249
(iii) Zejnil Delali as Commander of Tactical Group 1............................................................................. 249
a. The Meaning of “All Formations” .....................................................................................................249
b. Nature of Tactical Group 1 ................................................................................................................ 251
c. Not a Regional Commander............................................................................................................... 253
(c) The Vienna Documents .......................................................................................................................... 255
(i) Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 255
(ii) The Authenticated Exhibits ................................................................................................................ 256
(iii) Exhibits 117, 130, 131, 132, 144, 147A............................................................................................. 257
(iv) Exhibits 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 133, 143, 145, 146, 147B, 147C ........... 258
(v) The Videos ......................................................................................................................................... 259
(vi) Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................... 260
5. Conclusion................................................................................................................................................... 261
D. Superior Responsibility of Zdravko Muci.................................................................................................. 262
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 262
2. The Indictment............................................................................................................................................. 262
3. Arguments of the Parties ............................................................................................................................. 263
(a) The Prosecution ...................................................................................................................................... 263
(b) The Defence............................................................................................................................................ 265
4. Discussion and Findings.............................................................................................................................. 266
(a) The Status of Zdravko Muci as a Commander...................................................................................... 267
(b) Knowledge of the Accused..................................................................................................................... 276
(c) Failure to Act.......................................................................................................................................... 277
5. Conclusion................................................................................................................................................... 278
v
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
E. Superior Responsibility of Hazim Deli ....................................................................................................... 279
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 279
2. Arguments of the Parties ............................................................................................................................. 280
(a) The Prosecution ...................................................................................................................................... 280
(b) The Defence............................................................................................................................................ 282
3. Discussion and Findings.............................................................................................................................. 285
F. Factual and Legal Findings Relating to Specific Events Charged in the Indictment............................... 290
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 290
1. Killing of Šepo Gotovac - Counts 1 and 2................................................................................................. 290
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 291
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 291
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 292
3. Killing of Željko Miloševi - Counts 3 and 4.............................................................................................. 294
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 294
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 295
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 295
4. Killing of Simo Jovanovi - Counts 5 and 6................................................................................................ 297
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 297
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 298
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 298
5. Killing of Boško Samoukovi - Counts 7 and 8 .......................................................................................... 300
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 301
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 301
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 302
6. Killing of Slavko Šuši - Counts 11 and 12................................................................................................. 303
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 304
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 304
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 304
7. Various Murders in Paragraph 22 of the Indictment - Counts 13 and 14 .................................................... 307
(a) Murder of Milorad Kuljanin ................................................................................................................... 307
(a) Murder of Željko eez..........................................................................................................................309
(c) Murder of Slobodan Babi...................................................................................................................... 311
(d) Murder of Petko Gligorevi.................................................................................................................... 313
(e) Murder of Gojko Miljani ...................................................................................................................... 314
(f) Murder of Željko Klimenta..................................................................................................................... 315
(g) Murder of Miroslav Vujii.................................................................................................................... 317
(h) Murder of Pero Mrkaji .......................................................................................................................... 318
(i) Responsibility of the Accused ................................................................................................................ 319
8. Torture or Cruel Treatment of Momir Kuljanin - Counts 15, 16 and 17 ..................................................... 320
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 321
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 321
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 322
9. Torture and Rape of Grozdana eez - Counts 18, 19 and 20..................................................................... 324
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 324
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 325
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 327
10. Torture and Rape of Witness A - Counts 21, 22 and 23 .............................................................................. 329
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 330
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 331
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 332
11. Torture or Cruel Treatment of Spasoje Miljevi - Counts 24, 25 and 26 .................................................... 335
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 336
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 336
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 336
12. Torture and Cruel Treatment of Mirko Babi - Counts 27, 28 and 29......................................................... 339
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 339
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 339
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 340
13. Torture or Cruel Treatment of Mirko ori - Counts 30, 31 and 32 ......................................................... 342
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 343
vi
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 343
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 343
14. Responsibility of Superiors for Acts of Torture - Counts 33, 34 and 35 ..................................................... 345
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 346
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 346
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 346
(d) Responsibility of the Accused ................................................................................................................ 348
15. Wilfully Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury to, and Cruel Treatment of, Nedeljko Dragani -
Counts 36 and 37................................................................................................................................................... 349
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 349
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 350
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 350
16. Responsibility of Superiors for Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury - Counts 38 and 39................. 351
(a) Mirko Kuljanin ....................................................................................................................................... 352
(b) Dragan Kuljanin ..................................................................................................................................... 354
(c) Vukašin Mrkaji ..................................................................................................................................... 355
(d) Duško Beno .......................................................................................................................................... 357
(e) Responsibility of the Accused ................................................................................................................ 358
17. Inhumane Acts Involving the Use of Electrical Device - Counts 42 and 43 ............................................... 359
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 359
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 359
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 360
18. Responsibility of Superiors for Inhumane Acts - Counts 44 and 45............................................................ 362
(a) Forcing Persons to Commit Fellatio with Each Other ............................................................................363
(b) Forcing a Father and Son to Slap Each Other Repeatedly......................................................................364
(c) Responsibility of the Accused ................................................................................................................ 365
19. Inhumane Conditions - Counts 46 and 47 ................................................................................................... 365
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 366
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 368
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 369
(i) Atmosphere of terror .......................................................................................................................... 369
(ii) Inadequacy of Food ............................................................................................................................ 372
(iii) Lack of Access to Water..................................................................................................................... 374
(iv) Lack of Proper Medical Care ............................................................................................................. 376
(v) Inadequacy of Sleeping Facilities....................................................................................................... 377
(vi) Inadequacy of Toilet Facilities ........................................................................................................... 379
(d) Legal Findings ........................................................................................................................................ 380
(e) Responsibility of the Accused ................................................................................................................ 382
20. Unlawful Confinement of Civilians - Count 48........................................................................................... 384
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 384
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 385
(c) Discussion and Findings ......................................................................................................................... 386
(d) Responsibility of the Accused ................................................................................................................ 390
21. Plunder of Private Property - Count 49 ....................................................................................................... 391
(a) Prosecution Case..................................................................................................................................... 391
(b) Defence Case .......................................................................................................................................... 393
(c) Findings .................................................................................................................................................. 394
G. Diminished Responsibility .............................................................................................................................395
1. Burden of Proof on the Defence in Relation to Diminished Mental Responsibility.................................... 400
2. Factual Findings .......................................................................................................................................... 400
V. SENTENCING.......................................................................................................................406
A. Applicable Provisions..................................................................................................................................... 406
1. Applicable SFRY Penal Code Provisions on Sentencing ............................................................................ 411
2. General Principles Relevant to Sentences Imposed by the Tribunal ........................................................... 415
(a) Retribution.............................................................................................................................................. 421
(b) Protection of Society............................................................................................................................... 422
(c) Rehabilitation.......................................................................................................................................... 422
(d) Deterrence............................................................................................................................................... 422
vii
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
(e) Motives for the Commission of Offences............................................................................................... 423
B. Factors Relevant to Sentencing in Respect of Each Accused......................................................................423
1. Zdravko Muci ............................................................................................................................................ 424
2. Hazim Deli................................................................................................................................................. 429
3. Esad Landžo ................................................................................................................................................ 434
VI. JUDGEMENT........................................................................................................................440
1. Concurrence of Sentences ........................................................................................................................... 450
2. Credit for Time Served................................................................................................................................ 450
3. Enforcement of Sentences ........................................................................................................................... 451
ANNEX A - Glossary of Terms.....................................................................................................453
ANNEX B – The Indictment.........................................................................................................461
ANNEX C – Map of the Bosnian Municipalities (Exhibit 44) ...................................................477
ANNEX D – Plan of the elebii Prison-Camp (Exhibit 1).......................................................478
ANNEX E – Photographs..............................................................................................................479
1
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
I. INTRODUCTION
The trial of Zejnil Delali}, Zdravko Muci}, Hazim Deli} and Esad Land`o (hereafter “accused”),
before this Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereafter “International Tribunal” or “Tribunal”), commenced on 10 March
1997 and came to a close on 15 October 1998.
Having considered all of the evidence presented to it during the course of this trial, along with the
written and oral submissions of the Office of the Prosecutor (hereafter “Prosecution”) and the
Defence for each of the accused (hereafter, collectively, “Defence”), the Trial Chamber,
HEREBY RENDERS ITS JUDGEMENT.
2
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
A. The International Tribunal
1. The International Tribunal is governed by its Statute (hereafter “Statute”), which was adopted
by the United Nations Security Council on 25 May 1993,1 and by its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (hereafter the “Rules”), adopted by the Judges on 11 February 1994, as subsequently
amended.2 Under the Statute, the Tribunal has the power to prosecute persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991.3 Articles 2 through 5 of the Statute further confer upon the International
Tribunal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Article 2);
violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3); genocide (Article 4); and crimes against
humanity (Article 5).
B. The Indictment
2. The Indictment against the four accused (hereafter “Indictment”) was issued on 19 March
1996 by Richard J. Goldstone, being, at that time, the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, and
was confirmed by Judge Claude Jorda on 21 March 1996.4 Four of the original forty-nine counts
were subsequently withdrawn at trial, at the request of the Prosecution.5 The Indictment is set forth
in full in Annex B to this Judgement. At the time of the alleged commission of the crimes charged
therein, the accused were citizens of the former Yugoslavia and residents of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.6
3. The Indictment is concerned solely with events alleged to have occurred at a detention facility
in the village of ^elebi}i (hereafter “^elebi}i prison-camp”), located in the Konjic municipality, in
central Bosnia and Herzegovina, during certain months of 1992. The Indictment charges the four
accused with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, under Article 2 of the Statute, and
1 S/RES/827 (1993).
2 The Rules have been successively amended on 5 May 1994, 4 Oct. 1994, 30 Jan. 1995, 3 May 1995, 15 June 1995,
6 Oct. 1995, 18 Jan. 1996, 23 April 1996, 25 June and 5 July 1996, 3 Dec. 1996, 25 July 1997, revised 20 Oct. and
12 Nov. 1997, 9 and 10 July 1998.
3 Article 1 of the Statute.
4 Review of the Indictment, Case No. IT-96-21-I, 21 March 1996 (RP D282-D284).
5 Counts 9 and 10, and counts 40 and 41 of the original Indictment were withdrawn on 21 April 1997 (RP D3254-
D3255) and 19 Jan. 1998 (RP D5385-D5386) respectively.
358
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
1045. The Trial Chamber notes, however, that there is no allegation in the Indictment with respect
to the incidents recounted by these witnesses. Conversely, the Prosecution has presented no
evidence in relation to the alleged placing of a burning fuse cord around the genital area of
Duško Beno. As discussed above, where evidence has been led at trial in relation to alleged
criminal acts not specified in the Indictment, the Trial Chamber, in fairness to the accused, does not
consider the unspecified acts to form part of the charges against the accused. In the instant case, the
Prosecution has failed to present any evidence in support of the acts specifically alleged in the
Indictment. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber must conclude that the present charge of wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and cruel treatment, as alleged in the
Indictment, has not been proven.
(e) Responsibility of the Accused
1046. Under the counts of the Indictment here under consideration, Zejnil Delali, Zdravko Muci
and Hazim Deli are charged with responsibility as superiors pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute.
As set out above, Zejnil Delali and Hazim Deli have been found not to have exercised superior
authority over the elebii prison-camp. For this reason, the Trial Chamber finds Zejnil Delali
and Hazim Deli not guilty of wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health
and cruel treatment, as charged in counts 38 and 39 of the Indictment.
1047. The Trial Chamber has above established that Zdravko Muci was in a de facto position of
superior authority over the elebii prison-camp. It has further found that Zdravko Muci, in this
position, knew or had reason to know of the violations of international humanitarian law committed
in the elebii prison-camp, but failed to prevent these acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. For
this reason, and on the basis of the finding made above, the Trial Chamber finds that
Zdravko Muci is responsible pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute for wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health to, and cruel treatment of, Dragan Kuljanin and
Vukašin Mrkaji, and the inhuman treatment and cruel treatment of Mirko Kuljanin. On the basis
of the finding made above, the Trial Chamber finds that Zdravko Muci is not responsible for the
acts alleged in the Indictment in respect of Duško Beno.
1048. In his position as a superior, Zdravko Muci is further responsible for wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health to, and cruel treatment of, Nedeljko Dragani, as
alleged in Paragraph 30 of the Indictment, and found proven by the Trial Chamber above.
359
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
17. Inhumane Acts Involving the Use of Electrical Device - Counts 42 and 43
1049. Paragraph 33 of the Indictment states that:
Sometime beginning around 30 May 1992 and continuing until the latter part of
September 1992, Hazim DELI used a device emitting electrical current to inflict pain on
many detainees, including Milenko KULJANIN and Novica ÐORÐI.
In relation to this factual allegation, Hazim Deli is charged as direct participant as follows:
Count 42. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(b)(inhuman treatment) of the
Statute of the Tribunal; and
Count 43. A Violation of the Laws or Customs of War punishable under Article 3 of
the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by Article 3(1)(a) (cruel treatment) of the
Geneva Conventions.
(a) Prosecution Case
1050. In seeking to prove these counts of the Indictment, the Prosecution relies upon the evidence of
the following witnesses: Stevan Gligorevi, Novica ordi, Witness P, Witness B,
Milenko Kuljanin and Witness R. The Prosecution alleges that, during the months of July and
August 1992, Hazim Deli frequently used a painful device which emitted an electrical current,
upon a great number of detainees in the elebii prison-camp including Milenko Kuljanin and
Novica ordi. It contends that the shocks that this device emitted were so severe that victims
suffered convulsions and burns. In addition, it submits that Hazim Deli derived pleasure from the
use of this device. On the basis of the foregoing, the Prosecution submits that Mr. Deli inflicted
severe pain, suffering and indignity, out of proportion to the treatment expected of one human being
of another.
(b) Defence Case
1051. Hazim Deli is the only accused charged as a direct participant in the acts alleged in this
section of the Indictment. In the Motion to Dismiss, his Defence submits that the Prosecution has
360
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
failed to satisfy the general requirements of Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute.925 In his interview with
Prosecution investigators, on 19 July 1996, Mr. Deli claimed that there never was an electrical
device such as that described in the elebii prison-camp.926 However, apart from general attempts
to impeach the credibility of Prosecution witnesses, no other direct factual allegations have been
specifically made by the Defence in respect of these counts.
(c) Discussion and Findings
1052. The Trial Chamber is persuaded by the volume and consistency of the Prosecution evidence
in relation to these counts. It finds that, during the months of July and August 1992, Hazim Deli
used a device which emitted an electrical current and inflicted pain and injury upon detainees in the
elebii prison-camp.
1053. The device used by Mr. Deli, which emitted electric shocks, was variously described as “an
electric prod for cattle”,927 “a device used …when cattle were slaughtered”,928 “a device for horses
… it produces strong electrical shocks”,929 “a gadget which produced electric shocks”,930 and “a
device that causes electrical shocks”.931 Witness P described the device as an electric stick about
the size of two cigarette packets, with a button. Milenko Kuljanin, upon whom this device was
used, described it in the most detail and stated that it was an electrical device in the form of a packet
of cigarettes but much larger, with two wires on the top that were connected to a button.
1054. The Trial Chamber finds that this device was used on both Milenko Kuljanin and
Novica ori. On one occasion Mr. Deli walked into Tunnel 9 and gave Milenko Kuljanin two
electric shocks on his chest just below his neck. On another occasion, Mr. Deli took prisoners
from Tunnel 9 outside and selected Novica ori, who was made to sit on a stone block, naked
from the waist up, while Deli applied the device to his chest, despite his pleas for mercy. After the
shock, the victim fell off the block whereupon Mr. Deli caught him by the leg and kept the device
on his chest for a prolonged period of time.
925 Motion to Dismiss, RP D5528-D5527.
926 Exhibit 103-1, p. 93.
927 T. 7782, Witness R.
928 T. 4560, Witness P.
929 T. 4197, Novica \or|i}.
930 T. 1455, Stevan Gligorevi}.
361
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
1055. In addition, Witness B stated that Hazim Deli had used the device upon him.
Stevan Gligorevi and Witness R testified that he had used it upon Davor Kuljanin and
Novica ori stated that the device was inflicted upon Vukašin Mrkaji. Witness P, testified of its
use by Mr. Deli upon Risto @u`a. Milenko Kuljanin also stated that Deli used this device on five
named detainees from Tunnel 9. This was supported by the evidence of Witness B, who said that
Mr. Deli used the device on many prisoners; Novica ori, who testified that Mr. Deli used the
device on most of the prisoners in Tunnel 9; and Witness R, who stated that Mr. Deli had
developed a habit or custom of placing it against the shoulder or neck of prisoners and turning it on.
Thus, the evidence before the Trial Chamber consistently shows that Hazim Deli inflicted this
electrical device on numerous prisoners, primarily from Tunnel 9, and on numerous occasions in
the elebii prison-camp.
1056. The electric shocks emitted by the device caused pain, burns, convulsions and scarring, and
frightened the victims and other prisoners. Novica ori testified that the device inflicted a small
burn, like the burn from a cigarette, but that the electrical charge was very high and would frighten
the victim to the point where he felt he would not be able to survive. In relation to the occasion
when the device was used on Novica ori, the victim testified that Hazim Deli kept the device
on his skin for a long time. This caused a large burn, which subsequently became infected and as a
result of which he bears a scar. Milenko Kuljanin also stated that the device caused horrible and
terribly unpleasant pain, convulsions and twitching, and that he suffered a burn and scarring as a
result of its use on him. In addition, Witness B testified that when Mr. Deli used the device on
prisoners, they would go into spasms. This is supported by Witness P, who testified that when
Mr. Deli used the device on Risto @u`a he had a spasm and was thrown into the corner of
Tunnel 9.
1057. The evidence further establishes that Hazim Deli derived sadistic pleasure from the use of
this device. Novica ori, stated that it was like a “toy” for Mr. Deli932 and Witness B testified
that Deli found the use of this device “very amusing”.933 Milenko Kuljanin testified that when
Mr. Deli was using the device on him, he laughed and found it funny. In addition, he stated that
931 T. 5047, Witness B.
932 T. 4197.
933 T. 5047.
362
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
when Deli was using the device on some of the other prisoners he,
talked during this and laughed at them as he was applying the device. Some of them
begged him as they were in pain and unpleasant pain not to torture them, not to maltreat
them, but he even hit some of them when they begged him to cease torturing them. He
merely laughed.934
1058. The Trial Chamber finds that Hazim Deli deliberately used an electric shock device on
numerous prisoners in the elebii prison-camp during the months of July and August 1992. The
use of this device by Mr. Deli caused pain, burns, convulsions, twitching and scaring. Moreover,
it frightened the victims and reduced them to begging for mercy from Mr. Deli, a man who derived
sadistic pleasure from the suffering and humiliation that he caused. Accordingly, the Trial
Chamber finds that Mr. Deli, by his acts, intentionally caused serious physical and mental
suffering, which also constituted a clear attack upon the human dignity of his victims.
1059. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber finds Hazim Deli guilty of inhuman treatment, under
count 42 of the Indictment and of cruel treatment, under count 43 of the Indictment, with respect to
the use of a device emitting an electrical current on Milenko Kuljanin and Novica ori.
18. Responsibility of Superiors for Inhumane Acts - Counts 44 and 45
1060. Paragraph 34 of the Indictment contains the following factual allegations:
With respect to the incidents of inhuman acts committed in elebii camp, including
forcing persons to commit fellatio with each other, forcing a father and son to slap each
other repeatedly, and including those acts described above in paragraph thirty-three, Zejnil
DELALI, Zdravko MUCI and Hazim DELI knew or had reason to know that
subordinates were about to commit those acts or had done so, and failed either to take the
necessary or reasonable steps to prevent those acts or to punish the perpetrators.
In connection with the foregoing allegations, Zejnil Delali, Zdravko Muci and Hazim Deli are
charged as superiors as follows:
Count 44. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(b)(inhuman treatment) of the
Statute of the Tribunal; and
934 T. 5455 (Emphasis added).
363
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
Count 45. A Violation of the Laws or Customs of War punishable under Article 3 of
the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by Article 3(1)(a) (cruel treatment) of the
Geneva Conventions.
1061. The Trial Chamber’s findings as to the offences described in paragraph 33 of the Indictment,
as charged here, are set out above. Further, as discussed above, the Trial Chamber restricts itself to
addressing the specific allegations in the Indictment and therefore will not consider the other
numerous acts of ill-treatment alleged to have occurred at the elebii prison-camp, but not
specifically alleged in the Indictment. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber here limits itself to
considering the factual allegations as they relate to the incidents wherein persons were forced to
commit fellatio with each other and where a father and son were forced to slap each other
repeatedly.
(a) Forcing Persons to Commit Fellatio with Each Other
1062. The Indictment alleges that, on one occasion, certain of the detainees were forced to perform
fellatio on each other. In order to establish the facts in relation to this count, the Prosecution relies
on the testimony of eleven witnesses, in addition to the testimony of the accused, Esad Landžo.
Vaso ori gave an account of the incident, whereby Esad Landžo allegedly forced him and his
brother to commit fellatio with each other in Hangar 6 in full view of the other detainees. The
Prosecution submits that this account is supported by the testimony of various other witnesses,
including Witness N, Mladen Kuljanin, Witness R, Rajko Dragani, Dragan Kuljanin,
Mirko ori, Witness M, Witness B, Witness F and Risto Vukalo. In addition, the Prosecution
relies on the admission of the accused, Esad Landžo, that he forced the ori brothers to commit
fellatio with one another and that he put a burning fuse around their genitals. The Prosecution also
relies on the testimony of Esad Landžo and the supporting testimony of Rajko Dragani to prove
that Hazim Deli was present during the incident, giving instructions to Esad Landžo.
1063. The Defence notes that the accounts of the Prosecution witnesses are inconsistent as to the
date on which this incident is alleged to have occcurred.
1064. The Trial Chamber finds the testimony of the victim and the supporting evidence of Witness
F, Witness N, Dragan Kuljanin, Witness B, Risto Vukalo, Rajko Dragani, Witness R and
Mirko ori to be trustworthy as regards the act of forcing two brothers to commit fellatio as
alleged in these counts. This incident is alleged to have taken place insider Hangar 6, and as such,
364
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
many of the former detainees who testified were able to observe the incident from their vantage
point inside the Hangar. Further, Esad Landžo, provided a full confession as to his participation in
this incident in his testimony before this Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber has previously stated
that it finds the testimony of Esad Landžo to be generally unreliable. However, in relation to the
present count, where his testimony is consistent with that of so many additional witnesses, the Trial
Chamber accepts Mr. Landžo’s admission.
1065. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that, on one
occasion, Esad Landžo ordered Vaso ori and his brother, Veseljko ori, to remove their
trousers in front of the other detainees in Hangar 6. He then forced first one brother and then the
other to kneel down and take the other one’s penis into his mouth for a period of about two to three
minutes. This act of fellatio was performed in full view of the other detainees in the Hangar.
1066. The Trial Chamber finds that the act of forcing Vaso ori and Veseljko ori to perform
fellatio on one another constituted, at least, a fundamental attack on their human dignity.
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that this act constitutes the offence of inhuman treatment
under Article 2 of the Statute, and cruel treatment under Article 3 of the Statute. The Trial
Chamber notes that the aforementioned act could constitute rape for which liability could have been
found if pleaded in the appropriate manner.
(b) Forcing a Father and Son to Slap Each Other Repeatedly
1067. The Prosecution alleges that, on one occasion, a father and son, Danilo and Miso Kuljanin,
were forced to slap each other repeatedly. In order to establish the facts in relation to this count, the
Prosecution relies on the testimony of Mirko ori.
1068. The Defence has made no submissions in relation to this factual allegation in the Indictment.
1069. The Trial Chamber finds the testimony of Mirko ori in relation to this count to be
trustworthy. Accordingly, it finds that, on one occasion, Esad Landžo came into Hangar 6 and
ordered a father and son, Danilo and Miso Kuljanin, to get up and start hitting each other.
Esad Landžo then ordered them to hit each other harder and so, for a period of at least ten minutes,
Mr. Kuljanin and his son were forced to beat each other.
365
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
1070. The Trial Chamber finds that, through being forced to administer a mutual beating to one
another, Danilo and Miso Kuljanin were subjected to serious pain and indignity. Accordingly, the
Trial Chamber finds that the deliberate act of forcing Danilo Kuljanin and Miso Kuljanin, father
and son, to beat one another repeatedly over a period of at least ten minutes constitutes inhuman
treatment under Article 2 of the Statute and cruel treatment under Article 3 of the Statute.
(c) Responsibility of the Accused
1071. Under the counts of the Indictment here under consideration, Zejnil Delali, Zdravko Muci
and Hazim Deli are charged with responsibility as superiors pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute.
As set out above, Zejnil Delali and Hazim Deli have been found not to have exercised superior
authority over the elebii prison-camp. For this reason, the Trial Chamber finds Zejnil Delali
and Hazim Deli not guilty of inhuman and cruel treatment, as charged in counts 44 and 45 of the
Indictment.
1072. The Trial Chamber has above established that Zdravko Muci was in a de facto position of
superior authority over the elebii prison-camp. It has further found that Zdravko Muci, in this
position, knew or had reason to know of the violations of international humanitarian law committed
in the elebii prison-camp, but failed to prevent these acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. For
this reason, and on the basis of the findings made above, the Trial Chamber finds that
Zdravko Muci is responsible pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute for inhuman treatment and
cruel treatment of Vaso Ðori, Veseljko Ðori, Danilo Kuljanin and Miso Kuljanin. In his
position as a superior, Zdravko Muci is further responsible for inhuman treatment and cruel
treatment of Milenko Kuljanin and Novica Ðori, alleged in paragraph 33 of the Indictment and
found proven by the Trial Chamber above.
19. Inhumane Conditions - Counts 46 and 47
1073. Paragraph 35 of the Indictment sets forth the following factual allegation:
Between May and October 1992, the detainees at elebii camp were subjected to an
atmosphere of terror created by the killing and abuse of other detainees and to inhumane
living conditions by being deprived of adequate food, water, medical care, as well as
366
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
sleeping and toilet facilities. These conditions caused the detainees to suffer severe
psychological and physical trauma…
In connection with this factual allegation, Zdravko Muci, Hazim Deli and Esad Landžo are
charged with responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute for having directly participated in
creating the alleged conditions. In addition, Zejnil Delali, Zdravko Muci and Hazim Deli are
charged with responsibility as superiors, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute. The accused are
charged in these capacities as follows:
Count 46. A Grave Breach punishable under Article 2(c)(wilfully causing great
suffering) of the Statute of the Tribunal; and
Count 47. A Violation of the Laws or Customs of War punishable under Article 3 of
the Statute of the Tribunal and recognised by Article 3(1)(a) (cruel treatment) of the
Geneva Conventions.
(a) Prosecution Case
1074. In support of the allegation contained in the Indictment, the Prosecution relies on a large body
of evidence given by former detainees who, in their testimony before the Trial Chamber, described
the conditions under which they were detained in the elebii prison-camp. Based upon this
evidence, the Prosecution, in its submissions, more specifically identified the following factors,
which it alleges contributed to the inhumane conditions that have prevailed in the elebii prisoncamp.
1075. According to the Prosecution, a fundamental aspect of the inhumane conditions in the prisoncamp
was the all-pervasive atmosphere of terror to which the detainees were constantly subjected.
In this respect, it is submitted that, even when not themselves subjected to such treatment, detainees
frequently witnessed the mistreatment or killing of other prisoners. The Prosecution contends that
ample evidence demonstrates that this atmosphere of terror was purposely maintained, and that this
element by itself, even without the other inadequacies in the conditions prison-camp, would be
sufficient to constitute inhumane conditions.
1076. With respect to the alleged deprivation of food and water, the Prosecution notes that many
witnesses testified about the inadequacy of the food provided to the detainees, and that there were
some protracted periods in which no food was provided at all. Similarly, it is submitted that the
evidence demonstrates that, while there was no shortage of water, prisoners were denied access to
367
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
drinking water in sufficient quantities. It further notes that, according to some witnesses, the
detainees were forced to drink non-potable water. It is contended that, as a result of these
conditions, many detainees suffered serious weight loss and a weakened physical state during their
detention.
1077. According to the Prosecution, the testimony from the detainees further demonstrates that there
was little medical care provided in the prison-camp. It submits that, although the prison-camp had a
makeshift infirmary, it was very poorly equipped and was clearly inadequate to meet the substantial
medical needs of the detainees. Further, the Prosecution contends that the evidence demonstrates
that the detainees were often denied access to the limited medical facilities that were in fact
available.
1078. The Prosecution further alleges that the sleeping conditions provided for the detainees were
seriously inadequate. More specifically, it submits that the evidence demonstrates that the
detainees imprisoned in Hangar 6 sat and slept in their assigned positions, on a concrete floor.
They were not provided with beds or mattresses, and blankets were scarce. It is contended that the
situation in Tunnel 9 was even more difficult and that conditions there were so cramped that it was
almost impossible for the detainees to lie down. As in Hangar 6, no bedding was provided.
1079. The Prosecution also asserts that the detainees’ access to toilet facilities was limited and,
more generally, that the standard of hygiene in the prison-camp fell seriously below acceptable
standards. In this respect, it submits that the evidence shows that the toilet facilities available to the
detainees in Hangar 6 consisted of an outside septic tank and a ditch, to which the detainees were
allowed only restricted access during the day. It is further noted that, at some stage at least, one or
two buckets were provided for the detainees to use as toilet facilities during the night, the capacities
of which were clearly inadequate. As to the conditions in Tunnel 9, it is submitted that the evidence
shows that the detainees were forced to relieve themselves at the bottom of the tunnel, with some of
the prisoners being compelled to sit in the rising tide of excrement.
1080. The Prosecution further maintains that the arguments raised by the Defence cannot provide
any defence to the charges of inhumane conditions. It thus submits, as a matter of law, that a
detaining power which is not in a position to comply with the minimum standards of detention as
prescribed by international humanitarian law, is under an obligation to release some, or all, of the
prisoners in order to allow humane conditions to be created for those detained. Furthermore, it
submits that the evidence contradicts the Defence claim that the conditions in the elebii prison368
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
camp were in fact the best that could be provided at the time. In this respect it notes that no
justification based on lack of resources could possibly be provided for the constant physical abuse,
the refusal to allow the detainees to avail themselves of the existing water supply, or the failure to
provide acceptable toilet and hygiene facilities.
(b) Defence Case
1081. In response to the allegations made in the Indictment, the Defence contends that a State may
lawfully detain individuals under conditions which fall below the minimum requirements of
international humanitarian law, provided that a good faith effort is made to ensure that the
conditions of detention are as humane as possible under the circumstances. It accordingly asserts
that if, in view of the available resources, the conditions of confinement are the best that can be
provided, no criminal liability can attach to the individuals who act on behalf of the detaining State.
On this basis, the Defence contends that the standard by which the acts of the accused should be
measured is whether they acted reasonably in providing food, shelter and other facilities to the
detainees in the elebii-prison-camp. Noting the very difficult conditions which prevailed in the
Konjic municipality at the time, it submits that the Prosecution has failed to demonstrate that the
quantities of food supplied to the detainees of the elebii prison-camp, or the physical facilities
available to them, could reasonably have been increased or improved at the time the prison-camp
was in operation.
1082. With respect to the actual conditions of confinement in the elebii prison-camp, the Defence
notes that several witnesses testified to the efforts made to ensure that the detainees were properly
fed, despite the extremely difficult situation which existed in Konjic in 1992. The Defence relies in
this respect on the evidence of Šefkija Kevri, the assistant commander of logistics in the Municipal
TO staff in Konjic, Zlatko Ustali, a driver who delivered food to the elebii prison-camp, and
Emir Džaji, a driver for the MUP who was stationed in the prison-camp in May and June 1992. In
particular, the Defence observes that, according to the latter of these two witnesses, food for the
staff and detainees of the elebii prison-camp was delivered three times a day. According to the
Defence, the two groups ate the same food, which for breakfast consisted of tea, coffee with milk,
some eggs and for a while some honey. For lunch there were such things as lentils and beans.
Further, it submits that each detainee received one quarter loaf of bread per day, and that the food
supplies delivered to the prison-camp also included rice, macaroni and tins of meat.
369
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
1083. In response to the allegation that the health care provided for the detainees in the prison-camp
was inadequate, the Defence observes, inter alia, that an infirmary was established in the elebii
prison-camp. This was situated in Building 22 and was staffed by two doctors, Dr. Petko Gruba
and Witness P. The Defence further submits that the logistics body of the Municipal TO in Konjic
provided the prison-camp with medicine. This was done through the Health Centre in Konjic,
which Hazim Deli personally visited once a week to collect medication and bandages for the
infirmary.
1084. More generally, the Defence notes that the elebii barracks were not designed to
accommodate a large number of people. This complex of bindings was intended as a storage
facility, manned by a relatively small number of troops and, consequently, had only a limited
number of toilets, showers and other facilities. Relying on the testimony of Emir Džajic and
Nurko Tabak, the Defence submits that, despite these limitations, conditions in the camp were not
of the character alleged by the Prosecution. Thus, the Defence contends that the detainees in the socalled
infirmary in Building 22 and the women in Building A used the toilet facilities in Building
22, and that the toilet facilities outside Hangar 6 and Tunnel 9 were similar to field toilets used in
the military. It submits that there was a sufficient supply of clean water in the prison-camp, and
that the same water was supplied both to the personnel and the detainees. Similarly, it asserts that
the sleeping facilities for the detainees were not crowded. With reference to the conditions in
Tunnel 9, the Defence asserts that the detainees there had blankets, food and water, and were
permitted to use the toilet upon request. In addition, it is contended that family members were
allowed to visit the prison-camp three times a week to bring food and clothing to the detainees.
(c) Discussion and Findings
1085. The Indictment characterises the conditions prevailing in the elebii prison-camp as
“inhumane“ and alleges that the exposure of the detainees to these conditions constitutes the
offences of wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and cruel treatment.
The Trial Chamber here considers the different aspects of these alleged conditions in turn.
(i) Atmosphere of terror
1086. During the course of these proceedings, the Trial Chamber was presented with extensive
evidence regarding the physical and psychological abuse to which the detainees in the elebii
370
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
prison-camp were continually subjected. This evidence clearly demonstrates that those individual
acts specifically alleged in the Indictment, and found proven by the Trial Chamber, in no way
represent the totality of the cruel and oppressive acts committed against the detainees in the
elebii prison-camp. However, from the evidence reviewed above, it is already clear that the
detainees in the elebii prison-camp were continuously witnessing the most severe physical abuse
being inflicted on defenceless victims. This evidence further demonstrates how the detainees in
crowded conditions of detention were obliged to helplessly observe the horrific injuries and
suffering caused by this mistreatment, as well as the bodies of detainees who had died from the
abuse to which they were subjected. In his testimony, Mirko Ðori gave the following description
of how he was in this way confronted with the lifeless body of Željko eez, who had died as a
result of the ill-treatment to which he was subjected: “We were all shivering with fear. We didn’t
dare even look, because few of us had contact with dead people. We are [sic] afraid of corpses. He
lay there in our midst for three or four hours, maybe even longer”.935
1087. It is clear that, by their exposure to these conditions, the detainees were compelled to live
with the ever-present fear of being killed or subjected to physical abuse. This psychological terror
was compounded by the fact that many of the detainees were selected for mistreatment in an
apparently arbitrary manner, thereby creating an atmosphere of constant uncertainty. For example,
Witness M, when asked whether he was generally given a reason as to why he had been selected for
mistreatment responded: “Sometimes yes, sometimes no.”936 Similarly, Witness N, who in his
testimony described how he repeatedly was subjected to severe physical abuse, declared that he had
no knowledge as to why he, in particular, was subjected to this kind of mistreatment.937 Further,
Branko Sudar, in his evidence, explained that “[t]he guards beat us to tell you the truth. They beat
us, it depended. Sometimes somebody would go out and get hit, someone else would not get hit. It
all depended.”938
1088. Many of the former detainees testified directly as to the fear they had experienced during their
detention in the elebii prison-camp on account of the frequency with which ill-treatment was
arbitrarily meted out. In his evidence, Witness F; stated: “I was afraid of everyone down there.
Whoever walked in, I was afraid of them, and prayed to God not to be taken out, because I was not
935 T. 4780-T. 4781.
936 T. 4901.
937 T. 1902.
938 T. 558.
371
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
sure that I would come back alive if I were taken out”.939 This witness further testified that
whenever the detainees in Hangar 6 heard the voice of Esad Landžo they grew terrified: “When he
[Esad Landžo] was speaking outside, we knew immediately that he was coming, and we were
already in fear”.940 Witness N provided supporting testimony as to the fear inspired amongst the
detainees by Esad Landžo: “I just know that he [Esad Landžo] beat people, that he came, that he
was there during that period non-stop. We were all afraid.”941 Similarly, Mirko Babi, speaking of
Hazim Deli’s daily visits to Hangar 6, testified that when Hazim Deli entered the Hangar
“everybody was in fear. Almost - your heart would almost burst”.942 Grozdana eez and
Risto Vukalo also gave accounts of the fear experienced during their detention, the latter declaring
that he was “terrified and thinking only how I could avoid beatings”.943
1089. The evidence further demonstrates that the guards in the elebii prison-camp would often
threaten to kill the detainees, thereby aggravating their sense of physical insecurity and fear. For
example, Witness M stated: “I was mistreated and threatened with death, that I would be sentenced
to death.”944 Similarly, Risto Vukalo testified to one occasion on which he and Damir Gotovac
were called out of the hangar. He described how he
saw Damir there, Zenga [Esad Landžo] was hitting him and he fainted and fell to the
ground. Then Zenga told me to kill him, I mean to beat him to death. I said I could not do
that. Let him kill me. Then they started hitting me, Zenga was there and Osman Dedic as
well. They started hitting me and then they ordered Damir to kill me.945
Novica Ðori described one occasion on which he went to collect food for the detainees in
Tunnel 9 and where he lost consciousness after being kicked by a guard. He further testified: “I
couldn’t fully comprehend that this was happening and the guard threatened to kill me if I didn’t get
up.”946 A further example of such threatening behavior was provided by Witness R who, in his
testimony, described how, when confronted with a request for medical care by a detainee,
Hazim Deli would respond “sit down, you have to die anyway, whether you are given medical
assistance or not”.947
939 T. 1348.
940 T. 1378.
941 T. 2038.
942 T. 281.
943 T. 6371.
944 T. 4902.
945 T. 6285.
946 T. 4150.
372
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
1090. The atmosphere of terror which pervaded the elebii prison-camp, is further demonstrated
by evidence showing that the detainees were afraid to report or complain about the mistreatment
they received. Thus, Witness J described how he and other detainees, during the visit to the prisoncamp
by a delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, denied having been
subjected to beatings: “[A]s soon as we saw them [the ICRC delegation], we all went numb. We
were terrified, because we thought it would have been better if they had not come, because we
thought we would be beaten again”.948 In his evidence, Witness N similarly described how
detainees would be beaten if they complained about their treatment, and how as a result “nobody
dared say that they were beaten up to anyone”.949 This account is consistent with the testimony of
Miro Golubovi and Milovan Kuljanin, who both described how they, when asked by
Zdravko Muci, were too afraid to identify those who had mistreated them.950 Further, Witness P,
who worked as a doctor in the so-called infirmary, testified how his fear of mistreatment affected
his ability to fulfill this role: “I was unable to do any X-rays. That was not allowed, because I too
was a detainee, and if I asked for anything, I would get beaten more, so that I had to protect myself
too”.951
1091. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber finds that the detainees in the elebii prison-camp were
exposed to conditions in which they lived in constant anguish and fear of being subjected to
physical abuse. Through the frequent cruel and violent deeds committed in the prison-camp,
aggravated by the random nature of these acts and the threats made by guards, the detainees were
thus subjected to an immense psychological pressure which may accurately be characterised as “an
atmosphere of terror”.
(ii) Inadequacy of Food
1092. Many of the witnesses who appeared before the Trial Chamber provided testimony
concerning the inadequacy of the food provided to the detainees in the elebii prison-camp.
Although it appears from this evidence that the size and quality of the rations varied somewhat
during the relevant time-period, the Trial Chamber has been left in no doubt that the food supplied
to the detainees fell far short of any acceptable standard. In their consistent testimonies, Witness F,
Grozdana eez, Witness R, Milenko Kuljanin, Stevan Gligorevi, Mirko Ðori, Branko Gotovac,
947 T. 7774.
948 T. 7501.
949 T. 1900.
950 T. 2123, T.7120.
373
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
Mirko Kuljanin, Mladen Kuljanin, Witness J, Nedeljko Dragani and Risto Vukalo, all variously
described how the food given to the detainees mostly consisted of small amounts of bread, with one
loaf being divided between as many as 15 to 17 persons. This was complemented by small
quantities of thin soup, vegetables or other cooked food of inferior quality. It is clear that the
absence of adequate food was further aggravated by the lack of acceptable facilities for eating. As
described by Witness R: “Occasionally we would get some cold soup, which would be several days
old, but the problem was how to eat the soup in Hangar number 6 in which there were between 250
and 270 prisoners; there were only five spoons”. Similarly, Mirko Babi testified that,
there were five spoons for the 250 of us [the detainees in Hangar 6]. Five would go and
eat. Sometimes it was something cooked, and this meal took about two hours. Somebody
would take a little more. Then the next person had nothing. There was very little bread.
We were all hungry.952
These accounts are further supported by the evidence of Stevan Gligorevi and Nedeljko Dragani.
1093. On the basis of the evidence on record, it is further clear that, on at least one occasion, no
food at all was provided to the detainees for a period of several days. In their testimony,
Mirko Babi, Milojka Anti, Stevan Gligorevi, Mirko Ðori, Witness J, Nedeljko Dragani and
Dr. Petko Gruba all recalled having experienced an incident where there was no food for about
three days. In this regard, Milojka Anti described how “[f]or three days we did not eat anything.
So that I was completely weakened, and I was unable to stand up on my feet. Grozda
[Grozdana eez] had to take me to the toilet”.953 Similarly, Stevan Gligorevi stated that
“[p]eople turned into skeletons. You could hardly recognise them. Many could not even stand up.
They had to lean against something, and if they stood up against something, they would fall
down”.954 This evidence is further consistent with the evidence of Vaso Ðori, who recalled
several occasions upon which the detainees were forced to go without food for two days in a row.
1094. The effects of this insufficient diet were described by a number of witnesses who, in their
testimony, gave consistent accounts of the weight loss and weakened physical states suffered by
themselves and other detainees. According to the testimony of Witness J, “the conditions were
poor, so that we almost starved. We could not even move in the end. I weighed 95 kilos when I
951 T. 4536.
952 T. 274.
953 T. 1798.
954 T. 1440.
374
Case No.: IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998
was brought in and then, when I finally left the camp, I weighed 58 kilos, so it was terrible”.955
Similarly, Witness B testified that his weight was 90 kilograms before the war, and some
50 kilograms when he was released from the prison-camp. This witness also described the
detainees as “living corpses”, and stated that many were so weakened by the lack of food that they
would faint when they got up to go to the toilet.956 In their evidence, Grozdana eez and
Branko Sudar provided similar accounts, and stated that they lost around 30 kilograms in weight
during their detention.
1095. In light of the consistent evidence of these witnesses, the Trial Chamber cannot accept the
accounts given by Defence witnesses, Šefkija Kevri, Zlatko Ustali and Emir Džaji concerning
the quantity and type of food provided to the detainees in the elebii prison-camp. Further, to the
extent that the Defence is arguing that the unsatisfactory diet provided by the prison-camp
authorities was sufficiently compensated by the fact that family members were permitted to bring
food to the detainees, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence is to the contrary. In this respect,
the evidence of Witness F, Witness P and Grozdana eez indicates that such food did not always
reach the intended recipients. In any event, the evidence on record clearly demonstrates that any
such extra supplies that in fact were made available in this way to the detainees, were insufficient to
ensure that they received adequate nourishment during their detention in the prison-camp.
1096. Based upon the evidence reviewed above, the Trial Chamber accordingly finds that the
detainees in the elebii prison-camp were deprived of adequate food.
(iii) Lack of Access to Water
1097. The Trial Chamber heard compelling evidence from numerous witnesses as to the restrictions
placed on the detainees’ access to water inside the elebii prison-camp. Witness R, a former
detainee in the elebii prison-camp, testified that, although at first people were allowed to keep
water in plastic bottles inside Hangar 6, after a while this practice was abolished. He further
testified that, thereafter, access to water was increasingly restricted until it reached a stage where
“under threat of heavy beatings and even death, not a drop of water could be brought in without the
knowledge and permission of the deputy commander Hazim Deli.”957 Mirko ori testified that
during this latter period, water was distributed to the detainees in Hangar 6 twice or three times a
955 T. 7445.
956 T. 5037.
Annex 463
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, p. 99, para. 220 (15 July
1999)
UNITED
NATIONS
International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991
Case No.: IT-94-1-A
Date: 15 July 1999
Original: English
IN THE APPEALS CHAMBER
Before: Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Presiding
Judge Antonio Cassese
Judge Wang Tieya
Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia
Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba
Registrar: Mrs. Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh
Judgement of: 15 July 1999
PROSECUTOR
v.
DU[KO TADI]
JUDGEMENT
The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr. Upawansa Yapa
Ms. Brenda J. Hollis
Mr. William Fenrick
Mr. Michael Keegan
Ms. Ann Sutherland
Counsel for the Appellant:
Mr. William Clegg
Mr. John Livingston
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
i
I. Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 1
A. Procedural background................................................................................................... 1
1. The Appeals ................................................................................................................ 2
(a) Notices of Appeal .................................................................................................. 2
(b) Filing of Briefs....................................................................................................... 3
2. Applications for Admission of Additional Evidence under Rule 115 ........................ 4
3. Contempt proceedings................................................................................................. 6
B. Grounds of Appeal ......................................................................................................... 7
1. The Appeal against Judgement ................................................................................... 7
2. The Cross-Appeal........................................................................................................ 7
3. The Appeal against Sentencing Judgement................................................................. 8
C. Relief Requested............................................................................................................. 9
1. The Appeal against Judgement ................................................................................... 9
2. The Cross-Appeal...................................................................................................... 10
3. The Appeal against Sentencing Judgement............................................................... 11
D. Sentencing Procedure................................................................................................... 11
II. First Ground of Appeal by the Defence:
Inequality of Arms Leading to Denial of Fair Trial......................................................... 13
A. Submissions of the Parties............................................................................................ 13
1. The Defence Case ..................................................................................................... 13
2. The Prosecution Case................................................................................................ 16
B. Discussion..................................................................................................................... 18
1. Applicability of Articles 20(1) and 21(4)(b) of the Statute....................................... 18
C. Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 25
III. Third Ground of Appeal by the Defence:
Error of Fact Leading to a Miscarriage of Justice.......................................................... 26
A. Submissions of the Parties............................................................................................ 26
1. The Defence .............................................................................................................. 26
2. The Prosecution......................................................................................................... 27
B. Discussion..................................................................................................................... 27
C. Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 29
IV. The First Ground of Cross-Appeal by the Prosecution:
the Trial Chamber’s Finding That It Had Not Been Proved
That the Victims Were “Protected Persons” Under Article 2
of the Statute (On Grave Breaches)................................................................................ 30
A. Submissions of the Parties............................................................................................ 30
1. The Prosecution Case................................................................................................ 30
2. The Defence Case ..................................................................................................... 32
B. Discussion..................................................................................................................... 33
1. The Requirements for the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute.......................... 33
2. The Nature of the Conflict ........................................................................................ 34
3. The Legal Criteria for Establishing When, in an Armed Conflict
Which is Prima Facie Internal, Armed Forces May Be Regarded
as Acting On Behalf of a Foreign Power, Thereby Rendering
the Conflict International .......................................................................................... 35
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
ii
(a) International Humanitarian Law.......................................................................... 35
(b) The Notion of Control: The Need for International Humanitarian
Law to Be Supplemented by General International Rules Concerning
the Criteria for Considering Individuals to be Acting as
De Facto State Organs ........................................................................................ 39
(c) The Notion of Control Set Out By the International Court of Justice
in Nicaragua........................................................................................................ 40
(i) Two Preliminary Issues .................................................................................... 41
(ii) The Grounds On Which the Nicaragua Test Does Not
Seem To Be Persuasive................................................................................... 47
a. The Nicaragua Test Would Not Seem to Be Consonant With
the Logic of the Law of State Responsibility................................................. 47
b. The Nicaragua Test is at Variance With Judicial and State Practice............ 51
4. The Factual Relationship Between the Bosnian Serb Army
and the Army of the FRY.......................................................................................... 62
5. The Status of the Victims.......................................................................................... 72
(a) The Relevant Rules.............................................................................................. 72
(b) Factual Findings .................................................................................................. 74
C. Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 75
V. The Second Ground of Cross-Appeal by the Prosecution:
the Finding of Insufficient Evidence of Participation in the Killings in Jaski}i.............. 76
A. Submissions of the Parties............................................................................................ 76
1. The Prosecution case................................................................................................. 76
2. The Defence Case...................................................................................................... 77
B. Discussion..................................................................................................................... 78
1. The Armed Group to Which the Appellant Belonged Committed the Killings........ 78
2. The Individual Criminal Responsibility of the Appellant for the Killings ............... 80
(a) Article 7(1) of the Statute and the Notion of Common Purpose ......................... 80
(b) The Culpability of the Appellant in the Present Case ....................................... 106
3. The Finding of the Appeals Chamber..................................................................... 107
C. Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 108
VI. The Third Ground of Cross-Appeal By the Prosecution:
the Trial Chamber’s Finding That Crimes Against Humanity
Cannot Be Committed For Purely Personal Motives.................................................... 109
A. Submissions of the Parties.......................................................................................... 109
1. The Prosecution Case.............................................................................................. 109
2. The Defence Case ................................................................................................... 111
B. Discussion................................................................................................................... 111
1. Article 5 of the Statute ............................................................................................ 112
2. The Object and Purpose of the Statute.................................................................... 114
3. Case-law as Evidence of Customary International Law ......................................... 115
C. Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 121
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
iii
VII. The Fourth Ground of Cross-Appeal By the Prosecution:
the Trial Chamber’s Finding That All Crimes Against Humanity
Require a Discriminatory Intent ………………………………………………..……123
A. Submissions of the Parties.......................................................................................... 123
1. The Prosecution Case.............................................................................................. 123
2. The Defence Case ................................................................................................... 124
B. Discussion................................................................................................................... 125
1. The Interpretation of the Text of Article 5 of the Statute........................................ 126
2. Article 5 and Customary International Law............................................................ 128
3. The Report of the Secretary-General ...................................................................... 131
4. The Statements Made by Some States in the Security Council .............................. 132
C. Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 135
VIII. The Fifth Ground of Cross-Appeal by the Prosecution:
Denial of the Prosecution’s Motion for Disclosure of
Defence Witness Statements ...................................................................................... 136
A. Submissions of the Parties.......................................................................................... 136
1. The Prosecution Case.............................................................................................. 136
2. The Defence Case ................................................................................................... 138
B. Discussion................................................................................................................... 139
1. The Reason for Dealing with this Ground of the Cross-Appeal ............................. 139
2. The Power to Order the Disclosure of Prior Defence Witness Statements............. 140
C. Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 143
IX. Disposition .................................................................................................................... 144
X. Declaration of Judge Nieto-Navia…………………………………………….………..146
XI. Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen………………….……………..…………..150
ANNEX A - Glossary of Terms…………………………………………………………...169
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Procedural background
1. The Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (“International Tribunal” or “Tribunal”) is
seised of three appeals in relation to the Opinion and Judgment rendered by Trial Chamber
II1 on 7 May 1997 in the case of The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-T
(“Judgement”)2 and the subsequent Sentencing Judgment of 14 July 1997 (“Sentencing
Judgement”).3 With the exception of the Appeals Chamber’s judgement in
The Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemovic4 where the accused had entered a plea of guilty, this is
the first time that the Appeals Chamber is deciding an appeal from a final judgement of a
Trial Chamber.
2. The Indictment (as amended) charged the accused, Duško Tadic, with 34 counts of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal. At his initial appearance before
the Trial Chamber on 26 April 1995, the accused pleaded not guilty to all counts. Three of
the counts were subsequently withdrawn at trial. Of the remaining 31 counts, the Trial
Chamber found the accused guilty on nine counts, guilty in part on two counts and not
guilty on twenty counts.
3. Both Duško Tadic (“Defence” or “Appellant”) and the Prosecutor (“Prosecution” or
“Cross-Appellant”) now appeal against separate aspects of the Judgement (“Appeal against
Judgement” and “Cross-Appeal”, respectively).5 Additionally, the Defence appeals against
the Sentencing Judgement (“Appeal against Sentencing Judgement”). Combined, these
appeals are referred to as “the Appeals”.
1 Composed of Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (Presiding), Judge Ninian Stephen and Judge Lal Chand
Vohrah.
2 “Opinion and Judgment”, The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II, 7 May
1997. (For a list of designations and abbreviations used in this Judgement, see Annex A – Glossary of
Terms).
3 “Sentencing Judgment”, The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II, 14 July
1997.
4 “Judgement”, The Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemovic, Case No.: IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber, 7 October
1997.
5 It should be observed that Du{ko Tadi} in the present proceedings is appellant and cross-respondent.
Conversely, the Prosecutor is respondent and cross-appellant. In the interest of clarity of presentation,
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
2
4. Oral argument on the Appeals was heard by the Appeals Chamber on 19, 20 and 21
April 1999. On 21 April 1999, the Appeals Chamber reserved its judgement to a later date.
5. Having considered the written and oral submissions of the Prosecution and the
Defence, the Appeals Chamber,
HEREBY RENDERS ITS JUDGEMENT.
1. The Appeals
(a) Notices of Appeal
6. A notice of appeal against the Judgement was filed on behalf of Duško Tadic on
3 June 1997. Subsequently, on 8 January 1999, the Defence filed an amended notice of
appeal (“Amended Notice of Appeal against Judgement”).6 Leave to amend the notice of
appeal was granted, in part, by the Appeals Chamber in an oral order made on
25 January 1999.7
7. On 6 June 1997, the Prosecution filed a notice of appeal against the Judgement
(“Notice of Cross-Appeal”).8
8. After the notices of appeal against the Judgement were filed, proceedings continued
before the Trial Chamber in relation to sentencing, and on 14 July 1997 the Trial Chamber
delivered its Sentencing Judgement. Sentences were imposed for each of the 11 counts on
which the Appellant had been found guilty or guilty in part, to be served concurrently. On
11 August 1997, the Defence filed a notice of appeal against the Sentencing Judgement.
The Prosecution has not appealed against the Sentencing Judgement.
however, the designations “Defence” or “Appellant” and “Prosecution” or “Cross-Appellant” will be
employed throughout this Judgement.
6 “Amended Notice of Appeal”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 8 January 1999.
7 Transcript of hearing in The Prosecutor v Duško Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 25 January 1999, p. 307 (T.
307 (25 January 1999). (All transcript page numbers referred to in the course of this Judgement are from the
unofficial, uncorrected version of the English transcript. Minor differences may therefore exist between the
pagination therein and that of the final English transcript released to the public).
8 “Notice of Appeal”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 6 June 1997.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
3
(b) Filing of Briefs
9. As set out in further detail below, the present proceedings were significantly delayed
by repeated applications for extension of time in relation to an application for admission of
additional evidence first made by the Defence on 6 October 1997.9 In January 1998, the
Appeals Chamber suspended the timetable for filings in the Appeals until the determination
of the Appellant’s application.10 Following the Appeals Chamber’s decision of 15 October
1998 on the matter,11 the normal appeals sequence resumed. In view of the rather
complicated pattern formed by the parties’ briefs on the Appeals, it is useful to refer to the
written submissions filed by the parties.
10. The Defence filed separate briefs for the Appeal against Judgement (“Appellant’s
Brief on Judgement”) and the Appeal against Sentencing Judgement (“Appellant’s Brief on
Sentencing Judgement”). These briefs were filed on 12 January 1998.12 The Prosecution
responded to the briefs of the Appellant on 16 and 17 November 1998 (“Prosecution’s
Response to Appellant’s Brief on Judgement” and “Prosecution’s Response to Appellant’s
Brief on Sentencing Judgement”, respectively).13
11. As a consequence of filing an Amended Notice of Appeal against Judgement, the
Defence filed an Amended Brief of Argument (with annexes) on 8 January 1999
(“Appellant’s Amended Brief on Judgement”).14 This subsequent brief was accepted by
order of the Appeals Chamber on 25 January 1999.15
12. Alongside the filings in relation to the Appellant’s Appeal against Judgement and
Appeal against Sentencing Judgement, both parties filed written submissions in relation to
the Prosecution’s Cross-Appeal. The Prosecution’s brief in relation to the Cross-Appeal
9 “Motion for the Extension of the Time Limit”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 6 October 1997.
10 T. 105 (22 January 1998).
11 “Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time-limit and Admission of Additional
Evidence”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 15 October 1998.
12 “Appellants Brief on Appeal Against Opinion and Judgement of 7 May 1997”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A,
12 January 1998, with accompanying appendices separately filed; “Appellant’s Brief on Appeal Against
Sentencing Judgement” Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 12 January 1998.
13 “Cross-Appellant’s Response to Appellant’s Brief on Appeal against Opinion and Judgement of May 7,
1997, Filed on 12 January 1998”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 17 November 1998; “Response to Appellant’s Brief
on Appeal Against Sentencing Judgement filed on 12 January 1998”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 16 November
1998.
14 “Amended Brief of Argument on behalf of the Appellant”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 8 January 1999.
15 T. 308 (25 January 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
4
was filed on 12 January 1998 (“Cross-Appellant’s Brief”).16 A response to the
Prosecution’s brief was filed by the Defence on 24 July 1998.17 The Prosecution filed a
brief in reply on 1 December 1998 (“Cross-Appellant’s Brief in Reply”).18 The Defence
subsequently filed a further response to the Cross-Appellant’s Brief (“Defence’s Substituted
Response to Cross-Appellant’s Brief”).19 The filing of this further brief was accepted by
order of the Appeals Chamber on 4 March 1999.20
13. Skeleton arguments consolidating and clarifying the parties’ respective positions in
relation to the Appeals were filed by both parties on 19 March 1999.21
2. Applications for Admission of Additional Evidence under Rule 115
14. A confidential motion for the admission of a significant amount of additional
evidence was filed by the Defence on 6 October 1997.22 In the motion, as supplemented by
subsequent submissions, the Defence sought leave under Rule 115 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal (“Rules”) to present additional
documentary material and to call more than 80 witnesses before the Appeals Chamber.23 In
addition, or in the alternative, the Defence requested that the motion be considered as a
16 “Brief of Argument of the Prosecution (Cross-Appellant)”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 12 January 1998 and
accompanying “Book of Authorities”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 22 January 1998. (See also “Corrigendum to
Prosecutor’s Brief of Argument filed on 12 January 1998 and Book of Authorities filed on 22 January 1998”
Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 9 September 1998).
17 “The Respondent’s Brief of Argument on the Brief of Argument of the Prosecution (Cross-Appellant) of
January 12, 1998”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 24 July 1998.
18 “Prosecution (Cross-Appellant) Brief in Reply”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 1 December 1998.
19 “The Respondent’s Brief of Argument on the Brief of Argument of the Prosecution (Cross-Appellant) of
January 19, 1999”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 19 January 1999.
20 “Order Accepting Filing of Substitute Brief”, Case IT-94-1-A, 4 March 1999. (See also “Opposition to the
Appellant’s 19 January 1999 filing entitled ‘The Respondent’s Brief of Argument on the Brief of Argument of
the Prosecution (Cross-Appellant) of 19 January, 1999 (sic)’”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 21 January 1999;
“Submission in relation to Appellant’s ‘Substitute Brief’ filed on 19 January 1999”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A,
24 February 1999).
21 “Skeleton Argument – Appellant’s Appeal Against Conviction”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 19 March 1999
(“Skeleton Argument – Appellant’s Appeal Against Conviction”); “Skeleton Argument – Appeal Against
Sentence”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 19 March 1999; “Skeleton Argument of the Prosecution”, Case No.: IT-94-
1-A, 19 March 1999 (“Skeleton Argument of the Prosecution”). See also “Skeleton Argument – Prosecutor’s
Cross-Appeal”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, originally filed by the Defence on 19 March 1999 and subsequently
re-filed on 20 April 1999 (“Defence’s Skeleton Argument on the Cross-Appeal”).
22 “Motion for the Extension of the Time Limit”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 6 October 1997.
23 Rule 115 provides:
“(A) A party may apply by motion to present before the Appeals Chamber additional evidence which
was not available to it at the trial. Such motion must be served on the other party and filed with the
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
5
motion for review of the Judgement on the basis of a “new fact” within the meaning of Rule
119 of the Rules.24
15. The proceedings in relation to the motion continued for just under twelve months. A
substantial number of extensions of time was sought by both parties.25
16. By decision of the Appeals Chamber on 15 October 1998 and for the reasons stated
therein, the Defence motion for the admission of additional evidence was dismissed
(“Decision on Admissibility of Additional Evidence”).26 Considering the motion under
Rule 115 of the Rules, the Appeals Chamber expressed its view that additional evidence
should not be admitted lightly at the appellate stage. Construing the standard established by
this Rule, it was noted that additional evidence is not admissible in the absence of a
reasonable explanation as to why the evidence was not available at trial. The Appeals
Chamber held that such unavailability must not result from the lack of due diligence on the
part of counsel who undertook the defence of the accused before the Trial Chamber.
Commenting further on the second criterion of admissibility under Rule 115, it was
considered that for the purposes of the present case, the interests of justice required
admission of additional evidence only if (a) the evidence was relevant to a material issue,
Registrar not less than fifteen days before the date of the hearing. (B) The Appeals Chamber shall
authorise the presentation of such evidence if it considers that the interests of justice so require.”
24 Rule 119 provides:
“Where a new fact has been discovered which was not known to the moving party at the time of the
proceedings before a Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber, and could not have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence, the defence or, within one year after the final judgement has been
pronounced, the Prosecutor, may make a motion to that Chamber for review of the judgement.”
25 “Motion to Extend the Time Limit”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 10 September 1997; “Motion for the Extension
of the Time Limit” (Confidential), Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 6 October 1997; “The Motion for the Extension of
Time”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 17 March 1998; “Application for Extension of Time to File Additional
Evidence on Appeal”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 1 May 1998; “Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply to
Cross-Appellant’s Response to Appellant’s Submissions since 9th March 1998 on the Motion for the
Presentation of Additional Evidence under Rule 115”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 15 June 1998; “Request for an
Extension of Time to File a Reply to the Appellant’s Motion Entitled ’Motion for the Extension of the Time
Limit’”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 9 October 1997; “Request for a Modification of the Appeals Chamber Order of
22 January 1998”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 13 February 1998; “Request for a Modification of the Appeals
Chamber Order of 2 February 1998”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 7 May 1998. The following orders were made in
relation to these applications: “Scheduling Order”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 24 November 1997; “Order
Granting Request for Extension of Time”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 23 March 1998; “Order Granting Requests
for Extension of Time”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 13 May 1998; “Order Granting Extension of Time”, Case No.:
IT-94-1-A, 10 June 1998; “Order Granting Extension of Time”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 17 June 1998; “Order
Granting Request for Extension of Time”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 9 October 1997; “Order Granting Request
for Extension of Time”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 19 February 1998; “Order Granting requests for Extension of
Time”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 13 May 1998.
26 “Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time-limit and Admission of Additional
Evidence”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 15 October 1998.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
6
(b) the evidence was credible, and (c) the evidence was such that it would probably show
that the conviction was unsafe. Applying these criteria to the evidence sought to be
admitted, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfied that the interests of justice required that
any material which was not available at trial be presented on appeal.
17. Further motions for the admission of additional evidence pursuant to Rule 115 were
made by the Defence on 8 January and 19 April 1999.27 By oral orders of 25 January and
19 April 1999, the motions were rejected by the Appeals Chamber.28
3. Contempt proceedings
18. In the course of the appeal process, proceedings were initiated by the
Appeals Chamber against Mr. Milan Vujin, former lead counsel for the Appellant, relating
to allegations of contempt of the International Tribunal.29 These allegations are subject to
proceedings separate from the Appeals.
19. A hearing on the contempt proceedings commenced on 26 April 1999. The matter is
currently pending before the Appeals Chamber.
27 “Appellant’s Second Motion to Admit Additional Evidence on Appeal Pursuant to Rule 115 of the
Tribunal’s Rules”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 8 January 1999; “Motion (3) to Admit Additional Evidence on
Appeal Pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, Case No.: IT-94-1, 19 April 1999.
28 T. 307-308 (25 January 1999); T. 20 (19 April 1999).
29 See “Scheduling Order Concerning Allegations against Prior Counsel”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 10 February
1999. At the outset of the appellate process, Mr. Milan Vujin acted as lead counsel for the Defence, with the
assistance of Mr. R. J. Livingston. By a decision of the Deputy Registrar on 19 November 1998,
Mr. Milan Vujin was withdrawn as counsel for the accused and replaced by Mr. William Clegg as lead
counsel (See “Decision of Deputy Registrar regarding the Assignment of Counsel and the Withdrawal of Lead
Counsel for the Accused”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 19 November 1998).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
7
B. Grounds of Appeal
1. The Appeal against Judgement
20. As set out in the Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal against Judgement and
Appellant’s Amended Brief on Judgement, the Defence advances the following two grounds
of appeal against Judgement:
Ground (1): The Appellant’s right to a fair trial was prejudiced as there was no "equality of
arms" between the Prosecution and the Defence due to the prevailing circumstances in
which the trial was conducted.30
Ground (3): The Trial Chamber erred at paragraph 397 of the Judgement when it decided
that it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant was guilty of the murders of
Osman Didovic and Edin Be{i}.31
21. The Defence sought leave to amend its Notice of Appeal to include a further ground
of appeal (“Ground 2”), alleging that the Appellant’s right to a fair trial was gravely
prejudiced by the conduct of his former counsel, Mr. Milan Vujin.32 Leave to amend the
Notice of Appeal to include this ground was denied by the Appeals Chamber on 25 January
1999,33 thus leaving only Grounds 1 and 3 in the Appellant’s Appeal against Judgement.
2. The Cross-Appeal
22. The Prosecution raises the following grounds of appeal against the Judgement:
Ground (1): The majority of the Trial Chamber erred when it decided that the victims of the
acts ascribed to the accused in Section III of the Judgement did not enjoy the protection of
30 Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal against Judgement, paras. 1.1–1.4; Appellant’s Amended Brief on
Judgement, paras. 1.1-1.12.
31 Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal against Judgement, paras. 3.1–3.6; Appellant’s Amended Brief on
Judgement, paras. 3.1-3.11.
32 Amended Notice of Appeal, paras. 2.1-2.4.
33 T. 307 (25 January 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
8
the grave breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as recognised by
Article 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal (“Statute”).34
Ground (2): The Trial Chamber erred when it decided that it could not, on the evidence
before it, be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had played any part in the
killing of any of the five men from the village of Jaskici, as alleged in Counts 29, 30 and
31 of the Indictment.35
Ground (3): The Trial Chamber erred when it held that in order to be found guilty of a
crime against humanity, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused not only formed the intent to commit the underlying offence but also knew of the
context of a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population and that the act was
not taken for purely personal reasons unrelated to the armed conflict.36
Ground (4): The Trial Chamber erred when it held that discriminatory intent is an element
of all crimes against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal.37
Ground (5): The majority of the Trial Chamber erred in a decision of 27 November 1996 in
which it denied a Prosecution motion for production of defence witness statements
(“Witness Statements Decision”).38
3. The Appeal against Sentencing Judgement
23. The Defence raises the following grounds of appeal against the Sentencing
Judgement:
Ground (1): The total sentence of 20 years decided by the Trial Chamber is unfair.39
(i) The sentence is unfair as it was longer than the facts of the case required or demanded.40
34 Notice of Cross-Appeal, p. 2; Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 2.1-2.88.
35 Notice of Cross-Appeal, p. 2; Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 3.1-3.33.
36 Notice of Cross-Appeal, p. 3; Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 4.1-4.23.
37 Notice of Cross-Appeal, p. 3; Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 5.1-5.28.
38 Notice of Cross-Appeal, p. 3; Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 6.1-6.32 with reference to “Decision on
Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness Statements”, Case No.: IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II,
27 November 1996.
39 T. 306 (21 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
9
(ii) The Trial Chamber erred by failing to take into account the general practice regarding
prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia, as required by Article 24 of the
Statute of the International Tribunal. Under this practice, a 20-year sentence is the longest
sentence that can be imposed, but only as an alternative to the death penalty.41
(iii) The Trial Chamber paid insufficient attention to the personal circumstances of Duško
Tadi}.42
Ground (2): The Trial Chamber erred by recommending that the calculation of the
minimum sentence should commence “from the date of this Sentencing Judgement or of the
final determination of any appeal, whichever is the latter”.43
Ground (3): The Trial Chamber erred in not giving the Appellant credit for the time spent
in confinement in Germany before the International Tribunal requested deferral in this
case.44
C. Relief Requested
1. The Appeal against Judgement
24. In the Appeal against Judgement the Defence seeks the following relief:45
(i) That the decision of the Trial Chamber that the Appellant is guilty of the crimes proved
against him be set aside.
(ii) That a re-trial of the Appellant be ordered.
(iii) In the alternative to the relief sought under (i) and (ii) above, that the decision of the
Trial Chamber at paragraph 397 of the Judgement that the Appellant is guilty of the murders
of Osman Didovic and Edin Be{i} be reversed.
40 T. 303 (21 April 1999).
41 Appellant’s Brief on Sentencing Judgement, pp. 4–6; T. 304 (21 April 1999).
42 Appellant’s Brief on Sentencing Judgement, pp. 9-10; T. 305 (21 April 1999).
43 Sentencing Judgement, para. 76. See Appellant’s Brief on Sentencing Judgement, p. 10.
44 Ibid., p. 14.
45 Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal against Judgement, p. 3.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
10
(iv) That the sentence of the Appellant be reviewed in the light of the relief sought under
(iii) above.
2. The Cross-Appeal
25. In the Cross-Appeal the Prosecution seeks the following relief:
(i) That the majority decision of the Trial Chamber at page 227, paragraph 607 of the
Judgement, holding that the victims of the acts ascribed to the Appellant in Section III of
the Judgement did not enjoy the protection of the prohibitions prescribed by the grave
breaches regime applicable to civilians in the hands of a party to an armed conflict of which
they are not nationals (which falls under Article 2 of the Statute of the Tribunal), be
reversed.46
(ii) That the finding of the Trial Chamber at page 132, paragraph 373 of the Judgement, that
it could not, on the evidence before it, be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
Appellant had played any part in the killing of any of the five men from the village of
Jaskici, be reversed.47
(iii) That the decision of the Trial Chamber at pages 252-253, paragraph 656 of the
Judgement, that in order to be found guilty of a crime against humanity the Prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant not only formed the intent to
commit the underlying offence but also knew of the context of the widespread or systematic
attack on the civilian population and that the act was not taken for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the armed conflict, be reversed.48
(iv) That the decision of the Trial Chamber at page 250, paragraph 652 of the Judgement,
that discriminatory intent is an ingredient of all crimes against humanity under Article 5 of
the Statute, be reversed.49
(v) That the Witness Statements Decision be reviewed.50
46 Notice of Cross-Appeal, p. 3.
47 Ibid., p. 4.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
11
3. The Appeal against Sentencing Judgement
26. By the Appeal against Sentencing Judgement, the Defence would appear to seek the
following relief:
(i) That the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber be reduced.
(ii) That the calculation of the minimum sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber be altered
to run from the commencement of the Appellant’s detention.
(iii) That the Appellant be given credit for time spent in detention in Germany prior to the
request for deferral made by the International Tribunal in this case.
D. Sentencing Procedure
27. The Appeal against Sentencing Judgement was the subject of oral argument by the
parties. However, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, that appeal may be conveniently
considered in connection with the appeal by the Prosecution relating to certain counts of the
Indictment in respect of which the accused was acquitted. Both the Prosecution and the
Appellant agreed that, if the Appellant were found guilty on those counts, there should be a
separate sentencing procedure relating thereto. As will appear below, the Appellant is
found guilty on those counts, with the consequence that there will have to be a separate
sentencing procedure in relation to those counts. The Appeals Chamber considers that its
decision on the Appeal against Sentencing Judgement should correspondingly be deferred
to the stage of a separate sentencing procedure.
28. An earlier procedure provided for a sentencing hearing to take place subsequent to
conviction; that procedure was replaced, in July 1998, by Sub-rule 87(C) of the Rules,
which provides for sentence to be imposed when conviction is ordered. The earlier
procedure was applied when the Appellant was originally sentenced and was in force when
the Appeals were brought. In respect of the change, Sub-rule 6(D) provides as follows:
50 Ibid.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
12
An amendment shall enter into force seven days after the date of issue of an official
Tribunal document containing the amendment, but shall not operate to prejudice the
rights of the accused in any pending case.
In the particular circumstances of the case, the Appeals Chamber considers that the rights of
the Appellant would be prejudiced if his appeal were to be determined under the new Rule.
The Appeals Chamber will therefore follow the previous procedure in respect of the counts
on which the Appellant was acquitted by the Trial Chamber but on which he is now found
guilty. Correspondingly, the Appeal against Sentencing Judgement will be determined at
the separate sentencing stage.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
13
II. FIRST GROUND OF APPEAL BY THE DEFENCE: INEQUALITY
OF ARMS LEADING TO DENIAL OF FAIR TRIAL
A. Submissions of the Parties
1. The Defence Case
29. In the first ground of the Appeal against Judgement, the Defence alleges that the
Appellant’s right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the circumstances in which the trial was
conducted. Specifically, it alleges that the lack of cooperation and the obstruction by
certain external entities -- the Government of the Republika Srpska and the civic authorities
in Prijedor -- prevented it from properly presenting its case at trial.51 The Defence contends
that, whilst most Defence witnesses were Serbs still residing in the Republika Srpska, the
majority of the witnesses appearing for the Prosecution were Muslims residing in countries
in Western Europe and North America whose governments cooperated fully. It avers that
the lack of cooperation displayed by the authorities in the Republika Srpska had a
disproportionate impact on the Defence. It is accordingly submitted that there was no
“equality of arms” between the Prosecution and the Defence at trial, and that the effect of
this lack of cooperation was serious enough to frustrate the Appellant’s right to a fair trial.52
The Defence therefore, requests the Appeals Chamber to set aside the Trial Chamber’s
findings of guilt and to order a re-trial.53
30. Citing cases decided by both the European Commission of Human Rights
(“Eur. Commission H. R.”) and the European Court of Human Rights (“Eur. Court H. R.”)
under the provision in the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”)
corresponding to Article 20(1) of the Statute, the Defence submits that the guarantee of a
fair trial under the Statute incorporates the principle of equality of arms.54 The Defence
51 Appellant’s Amended Brief on Judgement, paras. 1.1-1.3; T. pp. 35-40 (19 April 1999).
52 Appellant’s Amended Brief on Judgement, para 1.11.
53 Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal against Judgement, p. 6.
54 Dombo Beheer B.V. v. The Netherlands, Eur. Court H. R., judgement of 27 October 1993, Series A, no. 274;
Neumeister v. Austria, Eur. Court H. R., judgement of 27 June 1968, Series A, no. 8; Delcourt v. Belgium,
Eur. Court H. R., judgement of 17 January 1970, Series A, no. 11; Borgers v. Belgium, Eur. Court H. R.,
judgement of 30 October 1991, Series A, no. 214; Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium, Eur. Court H. R.,
judgement of 10 February 1983, Series A, no. 58; Bendenoun v. France, Eur. Court H. R., judgement of
24 February 1994, Series A, no. 284; Kaufman v. Belgium, Application No. 10938/84, 50 Decisions and
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
14
accepts the Prosecution’s submission that there is no case law which would support the
inclusion of matters outside the control of the Prosecution or the Trial Chamber within the
ambit of the principle of equality of arms.55 However, the Defence argues that this principle
ought to embrace not only procedural equality or parity of both parties before the Tribunal,
but also substantive equality in the interests of ensuring a fair trial. It is accordingly
submitted that the Appeals Chamber, when determining the scope of this principle, should
be guided by the overriding right of the accused to a fair trial. 56
31. Relying on the same cases decided under the ECHR, the Defence further claims that
the principle of equality of arms embraces the minimum procedural guarantee, set down in
Article 21(4)(b) of the Statute, to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the
defence. It contends that the uncooperative stance of the authorities in the Republika Srpska
had the effect of denying the Appellant adequate time and facilities to prepare for trial to
which he was entitled under the Statute, resulting in denial of a fair trial.
32. In support of its submissions, the Defence cites paragraph 530 of the Judgement to
show that the Trial Chamber was aware that both parties suffered from limited access to
evidence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The Defence acknowledges that the
Trial Chamber, recognising the difficulties faced by both parties in gaining access to
evidence, exercised its powers under the Statute and Rules to alleviate the difficulties
through a variety of means. However, it contends that the Trial Chamber recognised that its
assistance did not resolve these difficulties but merely “alleviated” them. The Defence
alleges that the inequality of arms persisted despite the assistance of the Trial Chamber and
the exercise of due diligence by trial counsel, as the latter were unable to identify and trace
relevant and material Defence witnesses, and potential witnesses that had been identified
refused to testify out of fear. It submits that the lack of fault attributable to the Trial
Chamber or the Prosecution did not serve to correct the inequality in arms, and that under
these circumstances, a fair trial was impossible. 57
Reports of the European Commission of Human Rights (“DR”) 98; X and Y v. Austria, Application No.
7909/74, 15 DR 160.
55 T. 30-31 (19 April 1999).
56 T. 31 (19 April 1999).
57 Appellant’s Amended Brief on Judgement, paras. 1.4-1.6; T. 29-31, 40, 45-48 (19 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
15
33. The Defence contends that the Appeals Chamber should adopt the following
two-fold test to determine whether, on the facts, a violation of the principle of equality of
arms, broadly construed, has been established.
1) Did the Defence prove on the balance of probabilities that the failure of the civic
authorities in Prijedor and the government of the Republika Srpska to cooperate with the
Tribunal led to relevant and admissible evidence not being presented by trial counsel,
despite their having acted with due diligence, because significant witnesses did not appear
at trial?
2) If so, was the imbalance created between the parties sufficient to frustrate the
Appellant’s right to a fair trial?
34. With respect to the first branch of this test, the Defence asserts that the Appeals
Chamber in its Decision on Admissibility of Additional Evidence recognised that certain
Defence witnesses were intimidated into not appearing before the Trial Chamber. While
acknowledging that the Appeals Chamber denied the admission of the evidence in question
on the ground that it found that trial counsel did not act with due diligence to secure
attendance of those witnesses at trial, it contends that what is important is that the Appeals
Chamber accepted the allegations of intimidation. It adds that the Appeals Chamber in this
decision also accepted that there were witnesses unknown to trial counsel during trial
proceedings, despite counsel having acted with due diligence in looking for witnesses.
From this the Defence draws the conclusion that, had there been some measure of
cooperation, trial counsel could have called at least some of these witnesses. Thus, it is
argued that relevant and admissible evidence helpful to the case for the Defence was not
presented to the Trial Chamber. It is further asserted that the reason why so many witnesses
could not be found was due to lack of cooperation on the part of the authorities in the
Republika Srpska.58
35. As regards the second branch of the test, the Defence contends that this is a matter
of weight and balance. While recognising that not every inability to ensure the production
of evidence would render a trial unfair, it submits that, on the facts of the case, the volume
58 T. 38-41 (19 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
16
and content of relevant and admissible evidence that could not be called at trial was such as
to create an inequality of arms that served to frustrate a fair trial.59
36. Finally, the Defence contends that the fact that trial counsel did not file a motion
seeking a stay of trial proceedings should not be held to prevent the Defence from raising
the matter of denial of a fair trial on appeal. In this respect, the Defence maintains that trial
counsel might have been unaware of the degree of obstruction by the Bosnian Serb
authorities in preventing the discovery of witnesses helpful to the Defence case.60 It is
further pointed out that lead trial counsel in his opening statement emphasised that the
prevailing conditions might frustrate the fairness of the trial. Defence counsel opined that
trial counsel’s decision not to seek an adjournment of the proceedings could be attributed to
the wish not to prolong the extended period of the Appellant’s pre-trial detention.61
2. The Prosecution Case
37. The Prosecution argues that equality of arms means procedural equality. According
to the Prosecution, this principle entitles both parties to equality before the courts, giving
them the same access to the powers of the court and the same right to present their cases.
However, in its view, the principle does not call for equalising the material and practical
circumstances of the two parties. Accordingly, it is contended that the claim of the Defence
that it was unable to secure the attendance of important witnesses at trial does not
demonstrate that there has been an inequality of arms, unless that inability was due to a
relevant procedural disadvantage suffered by the Defence. It is asserted that while the
obligation of the Trial Chamber is to place the parties on an equal footing as regards the
presentation of the case, that Chamber cannot be responsible for factors which are beyond
its capacity or competence.62
38. The Prosecution does not deny that in certain circumstances it could amount to a
violation of fundamental fairness or “manifest injustice” to convict an accused who was
unable to obtain and present certain significant evidence at trial. In its view, however, this
59 T. 52-53 (19 April 1999).
60 T. 50-51 (19 April 1999).
61 T. 45-49(19 April 1999).
62 Prosecution’s Response to Appellant’s Brief on Judgement, paras. 3.8–3.16, 3.30.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
17
is a matter that goes beyond the concept of “equality of arms” as properly understood, and
requires examination on a case-by-case basis. It is submitted that on the facts, no such
injustice existed in the instant case.63
39. In the view of the Prosecution, the issue raised by the present ground of appeal is
whether the degree of lack of cooperation and obstruction by the authorities in the
Republika Srpska was such as to deny the Appellant a fair trial.64 It submits that the
Defence must prove that the result of such non-cooperation was to prevent the Defence
from presenting its case at trial, and contends that the Defence has failed to meet this
burden. It maintains that the Defence had a reasonable opportunity to defend the Appellant
under the same procedural conditions and with the same procedural rights as were accorded
to the Prosecution, and that it indeed put forward a vigorous defence by presenting the
defences of alibi and mistaken identity.65 In addition, it is noted that the Defence was
helped by the broad disclosure obligation on the Prosecution under the Rules, which extends
an obligation upon the Prosecution to disclose all exculpatory evidence of which it is aware.
Furthermore, it is submitted that, whereas the Defence received some measure of
cooperation from the authorities in the Republika Srpska, the Prosecution in fact received no
such cooperation at all.66 Finally, it is alleged that the Defence has not substantiated its
claim that any lack of cooperation substantially disadvantaged the Defence as compared to
the Prosecution.67
40. The Prosecution further argues that the standard which the Defence advocates for
establishing a violation of the principle of equality of arms or the right to a fair trial is set
too low. It claims that the Defence does not prove a violation of this principle merely by
showing that relevant evidence was not presented at trial. In its view, a higher standard is
called for, according to which the burden is on the Defence to prove an “abuse of
discretion” by the Trial Chamber. The Prosecution maintains that the Defence has not
satisfied this burden, as it has not shown that the Trial Chamber acted inappropriately in
proceeding with the trial.68
63 Prosecution’s Response to Appellant’s Brief on Judgement, paras. 3.21-3.23; T. 88-89 (20 April 1999).
64 T. 90-91 (20 April 1999).
65 T. 97 (20 April 1999).
66 T. 90, 98-99 (20 April 1999).
67 Skeleton Argument of the Prosecution, para.10; Prosecution’s Response to Appellant’s Brief on Judgement,
paras. 3.29, 6.9.
68 Skeleton Argument of the Prosecution, para. 6.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
18
41. In contrast to the view put forward by the Defence, the Prosecution denies that the
Decision on Admissibility of Additional Evidence supports the position that the Appellant
did not receive a fair trial. It notes that the majority of the proposed additional evidence
was found by the Appeals Chamber to have been available to the Defence at trial.
Furthermore, with respect to that portion of the proposed additional evidence which was
found not to have been available at trial, it notes that the Appeals Chamber, after careful
consideration, found that the interests of justice did not require it to be admitted on appeal.
Thus, in the Prosecution’s view, rather than showing a denial of fair trial, this decision is
consistent with the view that the rights of the Appellant in this respect were not violated by
any lack of cooperation on the part of the authorities of the Republika Srpska.69
42. The Prosecution further emphasises that Defence counsel failed to make a motion
for dismissal of the case on the basis that a fair trial was impossible because of lack of
cooperation of the authorities of the Republika Srpska. It notes that, by not doing so, the
Defence failed to give the Trial Chamber the opportunity to take additional measures to
overcome the difficulties faced by the Defence. It is submitted that this omission by the
Defence further provides an indication that it did not believe that the Appellant’s right to a
fair trial had been violated.70
B. Discussion
1. Applicability of Articles 20(1) and 21(4)(b) of the Statute
43. Article 20(1) of the Statute provides that “the Trial Chambers shall ensure that a
trial is fair and expeditious …”. This provision mirrors the corresponding guarantee
provided for in international and regional human rights instruments: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (“ICCPR”),71 the European Convention on
69 T. 96 (20 April 1999).
70 T. 100 (20 April 1999).
71 Article 14(1) of the ICCPR provides in part: “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In
the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law. ….”
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
19
Human Rights (1950),72 and the American Convention on Human Rights (1969).73 The
right to a fair trial is central to the rule of law: it upholds the due process of law. The
Defence submits that due process includes not only formal or procedural due process but
also substantive due process.74
44. The parties do not dispute that the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Statute
covers the principle of equality of arms. This interpretation accords with findings of the
Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) under the ICCPR. The HRC stated in
Morael v. France75 that a fair hearing under Article 14(1) of the ICCPR must at a minimum
include, inter alia, equality of arms. Similarly, in Robinson v. Jamaica76 and
Wolf v. Panama77 the HRC found that there was inequality of arms in violation of the right
to a fair trial under Article 14(1) of the ICCPR. Likewise, the case law under the ECHR
cited by the Defence accepts that the principle is implicit in the fundamental right of the
accused to a fair trial. The principle of equality of arms between the prosecutor and accused
in a criminal trial goes to the heart of the fair trial guarantee. The Appeals Chamber finds
that there is no reason to distinguish the notion of fair trial under Article 20(1) of the Statute
from its equivalent in the ECHR and ICCPR, as interpreted by the relevant judicial and
supervisory treaty bodies under those instruments. Consequently, the Chamber holds that
the principle of equality of arms falls within the fair trial guarantee under the Statute.
45. What has to be decided in the present appeal is the scope of application of the
principle. The Defence alleges that it should include not only procedural equality, but also
substantive equality.78 In its view, matters outside the control of the Trial Chamber can
prejudice equality of arms if their effect is to disadvantage one party disproportionately.
The Prosecution rejoins that equality of arms refers to the equality of the parties before the
Trial Chamber. It argues that the obligation on the Trial Chamber is to ensure that the
72 Article 6(1) of the ECHR provides in part: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
73 Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights provides in part:
“Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of
any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and
obligations of a civil, labour, fiscal or any other nature.”
74 T. 29-35 (19 April 1999).
75 Morael v. France, Communication No. 207/1986, 28 July 1989, U.N. Doc. CCPR/8/Add/1, 416.
76 Robinson v. Jamaica, Communication No. 223/1987, 30 March 1989, U.N. Doc. CCPR/8/Add.1, 426.
77 Wolf v. Panama, Communication No. 289/1988, 26 March 1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/11/Add.1, 399.
78 T. 29-35 (19 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
20
parties before it are accorded the same procedural rights and operate under the same
procedural conditions in court. According to the Prosecution, the lack of cooperation by the
authorities in the Republika Srpska could not imperil the equality of arms enjoyed by the
Defence at trial because the Trial Chamber had no control over the actions or the lack
thereof of those authorities.
46. The Defence contends that the minimum guarantee in Article 21(4)(b) of the Statute
to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence at trial forms part of the
principle of equality of arms, implicit in Article 20(1). It argues that, since the authorities in
the Republika Srpska failed to cooperate with the Defence, the Appellant did not have
adequate facilities for the preparation of his defence, thereby prejudicing his enjoyment of
equality of arms.
47. The Appeals Chamber accepts the argument of the Defence that, on this point, the
relationship between Article 20(1) and Article 21(4)(b) is of the general to the particular. It
also agrees that, as a minimum, a fair trial must entitle the accused to adequate time and
facilities for his defence.
48. In deciding on the scope of application of the principle of equality of arms, account
must be taken first of the international case law. In Kaufman v. Belgium,79 a civil case, the
Eur. Commission H. R. found that equality of arms means that each party must have a
reasonable opportunity to defend its interests “under conditions which do not place him at a
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent”.80 In Dombo Beheer B.V. v. The
Netherlands,81 another civil proceeding, the Eur. Court H. R. adopted the view expressed by
the Eur. Commission H. R. on equality of arms, holding that “as regards litigation involving
opposing private interests, ‘equality of arms’ implies that each party must be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present his case – including his evidence – under conditions that
do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent”.82 The Court decided
in a criminal proceeding, Delcourt v. Belgium,83 that the principle entitled both parties to
full equality of treatment, maintaining that the conditions of trial must not “put the accused
79 Kaufman v. Belgium, 50 DR 98.
80 Ibid., p. 115.
81 Dombo Beheer B.V. v. The Netherlands, Eur. Court H. R., judgement of 27 October 1993, Series A, no. 274.
82 Ibid., para. 40.
83 Delcourt v. Belgium, Eur. Court H. R., judgement of 17 January 1970, Series A, no. 11.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
21
unfairly at a disadvantage.”84 It can safely be concluded from the ECHR jurisprudence, as
cited by the Defence, that equality of arms obligates a judicial body to ensure that neither
party is put at a disadvantage when presenting its case.
49. There is nothing in the ECHR case law that suggests that the principle is applicable
to conditions, outside the control of a court, that prevented a party from securing the
attendance of certain witnesses. All the cases considered applications that the judicial body
had the power to grant.85
50. The HRC has interpreted the principle as designed to provide to a party rights and
guarantees that are procedural in nature. The HRC observed in B.d.B. et al. v.
The Netherlands,86 a civil case, that Article 14 of the ICCPR “guarantees procedural
equality” to ensure that the conduct of judicial proceedings is fair. Where applicants were
sentenced to lengthy prison terms in judicial proceedings conducted in the absence of
procedural guarantees, the HRC has found a violation of the right to fair trial under Article
14(1).87 The communications decided under the ICCPR are silent as to whether the
principle extends to cover a party’s inability to secure the attendance at trial of certain
witnesses where fault is attributable, not to the court, but to an external, independent entity.
51. The case law mentioned so far relates to civil or criminal proceedings before
domestic courts. These courts have the capacity, if not directly, at least through the
extensive enforcement powers of the State, to control matters that could materially affect
the fairness of a trial. It is a different matter for the International Tribunal. The dilemma
faced by this Tribunal is that, to hold trials, it must rely upon the cooperation of States
84 Ibid., para. 34.
85 In Kaufman v. Belgium, 50 DR 98, the Eur. Commission H. R. held that equality of arms did not give the
applicant a right to lodge a counter-memorial. In Neumeister v. Austria, Eur. Court of H. R., judgement of 27
June 1968, Series A, no. 8, the Court decided that the principle did not apply to the examination of the
applicant’s request for provisional release, despite the prosecutor having been heard ex parte. In Bendenoun v.
France, Eur. Court H. R., judgement of 24 February 1994, Series A, no. 284, the Court ruled that an applicant
who did not receive a complete file from the tax authorities was not entitled thereto under the principle of
equality of arms because he was aware of its contents and gave no reason for the request. In Dombo
Beheer B.V. v. The Netherlands, Eur. Court H. R., judgement of 27 October 1993, Series A, no. 274, the Court
held that there was a breach of equality of arms where the single first hand witness for the applicant company
was barred from testifying whereas the defendant bank’s witness was heard.
86 B. d. B et al. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 273/1989, 30 March 1989, U.N. Doc. A/44/40, 442.
87 Nqalula Mpandanjila et al. v. Zaire, Communication No 138/1983, 26 March 1986, U.N. Doc. A/41/40,
121.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
22
without having the power to compel them to cooperate through enforcement measures.88
The Tribunal must rely on the cooperation of States because evidence is often in the custody
of a State and States can impede efforts made by counsel to find that evidence. Moreover,
without a police force, indictees can only be arrested or transferred to the International
Tribunal through the cooperation of States or, pursuant to Sub-rule 59bis, through action by
the Prosecution or the appropriate international bodies. Lacking independent means of
enforcement, the ultimate recourse available to the International Tribunal in the event of
failure by a State to cooperate, in violation of its obligations under Article 29 of the Statute,
is to report the non-compliance to the Security Council.89
52. In light of the above considerations, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that under
the Statute of the International Tribunal the principle of equality of arms must be given a
more liberal interpretation than that normally upheld with regard to proceedings before
domestic courts. This principle means that the Prosecution and the Defence must be equal
before the Trial Chamber. It follows that the Chamber shall provide every practicable
facility it is capable of granting under the Rules and Statute when faced with a request by a
party for assistance in presenting its case. The Trial Chambers are mindful of the
difficulties encountered by the parties in tracing and gaining access to evidence in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia where some States have not been forthcoming in
complying with their legal obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal. Provisions under the
Statute and the Rules exist to alleviate the difficulties faced by the parties so that each side
may have equal access to witnesses. The Chambers are empowered to issue such orders,
summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes
of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial. This includes the power to:
(1) adopt witness protection measures, ranging from partial to full protection;
(2) take evidence by video-link or by way of deposition;
(3) summon witnesses and order their attendance;
88 See “Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II
of 18 July 1997”, The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Bla{ki}, Case No.: IT-95-14-AR108bis, Appeals Chamber,
29 October 1997, para. 26.
89 Ibid., para. 33.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
23
(4) issue binding orders to States for, inter alia, the taking and production of
evidence; and
(5) issue binding orders to States to assist a party or to summon a witness and order
his or her attendance under the Rules.
A further important measure available in such circumstances is:
(6) for the President of the Tribunal to send, at the instance of the Trial Chamber, a
request to the State authorities in question for their assistance in securing the
attendance of a witness.
In addition, whenever the aforementioned measures have proved to be to no avail, a
Chamber may, upon the request of a party or proprio motu:
(7) order that proceedings be adjourned or, if the circumstances so require, that they
be stayed.
53. Relying on the principle of equality of arms, the Defence is submitting that the
Appellant did not receive a fair trial because relevant and admissible evidence was not
presented due to lack of cooperation of the authorities in the Republika Srpska in securing
the attendance of certain witnesses. The Defence is not complaining that the Trial Chamber
was negligent in responding to a request for assistance. The Appeals Chamber finds that the
Defence has not substantiated its claim that the Appellant was not given a reasonable
opportunity to present his case. There is no evidence to show that the Trial Chamber failed
to assist him when seised of a request to do so. Indeed, the Defence concedes that the Trial
Chamber gave every assistance it could to the Defence when asked to do so, and even
allowed a substantial adjournment at the close of the Prosecution’s case to help Defence
efforts in tracing witnesses.90 Further, the Appellant acknowledges that the Trial Chamber
did not deny the Defence attendance of any witness but, on the contrary, took virtually all
steps requested and necessary within its authority to assist the Appellant in presenting
witness testimony. Numerous instances of the granting of such motions and orders by the
Trial Chamber, on matters such as protective measures for witnesses, approving the giving
90 T. 47 (19 April 1999); Judgement, para. 32 (“Following a recess of three weeks after the close of the
Prosecution case to permit the Defence to make its final preparations, the Defence case opened on 10
September 1996 ….”).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
24
of evidence via video-conference link from Banja Luka in the Republika Srpska, and
granting confidentiality and safe conduct to several Defence witnesses are set forth in the
Judgement of the Trial Chamber.91 Indeed, the Decision on Admissibility of Additional
Evidence, by which the Defence was precluded from presenting additional evidence, was
based on the fact that the Defence had failed to establish that it would have been in the
interests of justice to admit such evidence. This indicates that the fact that it could not
present such evidence did not detract from the fairness of the trial.
54. A further example of a measure of the Trial Chamber which was designed to assist
in the preparation and presentation of the Defence case is that the Trial Chamber’s Presiding
Judge brought to the attention of the President of the International Tribunal certain
difficulties concerning the possible attendance of three witnesses who had been summoned
by the Defence.92 She requested the President of the International Tribunal to send a letter to
the Acting President of the Republika Srpska, Mrs. B. Plavsic, to urge her to assist the
Defence in securing the presence and cooperation of these Defence witnesses.
Consequently, on 19 September 1996, the President of the Tribunal sent a letter to
Mrs. Plavsic. In this letter, he made reference to obstacles encountered by the Defence in
securing the cooperation of these witnesses. In view, inter alia, of the accused’s right to a
fair trial, Mrs. Plavsic was therefore enjoined to “take whatever action is necessary
immediately to resolve this matter so that the Defence may go forward with its case.”93
55. The Appeals Chamber can conceive of situations where a fair trial is not possible
because witnesses central to the defence case do not appear due to the obstructionist efforts
of a State. In such circumstances, the defence, after exhausting all the other measures
mentioned above, has the option of submitting a motion for a stay of proceedings. The
Defence opined during the oral hearing that the reason why such action was not taken in the
present case may have been due to trial counsel’s concern regarding the long period of
detention on remand. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Rules envision some relief in
such a situation, in the form of provisional release, which, pursuant to Sub-rule 65(B), may
be granted “in exceptional circumstances”. It is not hard to imagine that a stay of
proceedings occasioned by the frustration of a fair trial under prevailing trial conditions
91 Judgement, paras. 29-35.
92 T. 59, 60 (20 April 1999).
93 Letter from President Cassese to Mrs. B. Plavsic of 19 September 1996, referred to by Judge Shahabuddeen
during the hearing on 20 April 1999 (ibid.).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
25
would amount to exceptional circumstances under this rule. The obligation is on the
complaining party to bring the difficulties to the attention of the Trial Chamber forthwith so
that the latter can determine whether any assistance could be provided under the Rules or
Statute to relieve the situation. The party cannot remain silent on the matter only to return
on appeal to seek a trial de novo, as the Defence seeks to do in this case.
C. Conclusion
56. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Appellant has failed to show that the protection
offered by the principle of equality of arms was not extended to him by the Trial Chamber.
This ground of Appeal, accordingly, fails.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
26
III. THIRD GROUND OF APPEAL BY THE DEFENCE: ERROR OF
FACT LEADING TO A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
A. Submissions of the Parties
1. The Defence
57. The Trial Chamber made the factual finding that the Appellant was guilty of the
murder of two Muslim policemen, Edin Besi} and a man identified at trial by the name of
Osman, based on the testimony of only one witness, Nihad Seferovi}. The Defence
contends that the Trial Chamber erred in deciding that it was satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that he was guilty of the two murders because the Chamber relied on the
uncorroborated evidence of Mr. Seferovi}. The Defence maintains that Mr. Seferovi} is an
unreliable witness because he was introduced to the Prosecution by the government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, a source which the Defence alleges the Trial Chamber found to be
tainted for having planted another Prosecution witness, Dragan Opaci}. The latter was
found to be untruthful at trial and, consequently, withdrawn by the Prosecution.
58. The Defence argues that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on the evidence of
Mr. Seferovi} because it is implausible. Mr. Seferovi}, a Muslim who lived in an area
under bombardment by Serbian paramilitary forces, fled to the mountains for safety. He
testified at trial that he was so concerned about the welfare of his pet pigeons that he
returned to town to feed them while the Serbian paramilitaries were still there. On his
return to town, he saw Mr. Tadi} kill two policemen. Defence counsel contended at trial
that the witness was never in town at the time of the killings.
59. The Defence maintains that the Appeals Chamber, in reviewing the factual finding
of the Trial Chamber, is entitled to consider all relevant evidence and can reverse the
Chamber’s finding if it is satisfied that no reasonable person could conclude that the
evidence of Mr. Seferovi} proved that the Appellant was responsible for the killings.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
27
60. The Defence asks the Appeals Chamber to reverse the Trial Chamber’s finding that
the Appellant is guilty of the murders of Edic Besi} and the man identified by the name of
Osman.94
2. The Prosecution
61. The Prosecution argues that the Appeals Chamber, being an appellate body, cannot
reverse the Trial Chamber’s findings of fact unless it were to conclude that the Defence has
proved that no reasonable person could have come to the conclusion reached by the Trial
Chamber based on the evidence cited by it.95
62. The Prosecution claims that the Defence misrepresented the Trial Chamber’s
findings with respect to Dragan Opaci} in order to taint Mr. Seferovi} by association as an
unreliable witness. Having lied about his family situation, Mr. Opaci} had clearly aroused
the Prosecution’s fears about his credibility. Consequently, he was withdrawn as a witness
as a precautionary measure. The Trial Chamber asked the Prosecution to investigate this
matter and, having examined the situation, the Prosecution found that the investigation did
not support the Defence allegation that Mr. Opaci} was planted by the Bosnian government.
63. The Prosecution submits that the attempt to taint Mr. Seferovi}’s credibility by
assimilating his position to that of Mr. Opaci} fails because the Trial Chamber concluded
that the circumstances surrounding the testimony of the latter were unique to him. The
situation of Mr. Seferovi} was not similar to that of Mr. Opaci}. There was no need to
require corroboration of his testimony because the Trial Chamber concluded that he was a
reliable witness.
B. Discussion
64. The two parties agree that the standard to be used when determining whether the
Trial Chamber’s factual finding should stand is that of unreasonableness, that is, a
94 In its submissions, the Defence refers to the victim identified by the Trial Chamber only as one “Osman”, by
the name “Osman Didovic”. The Appeals Chamber is not here called upon to determine whether the name
thus given by the Defence is accurate.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
28
conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. The task of hearing, assessing
and weighing the evidence presented at trial is left to the Judges sitting in a Trial Chamber.
Therefore, the Appeals Chamber must give a margin of deference to a finding of fact
reached by a Trial Chamber. It is only where the evidence relied on by the Trial Chamber
could not reasonably have been accepted by any reasonable person that the Appeals
Chamber can substitute its own finding for that of the Trial Chamber. It is important to note
that two judges, both acting reasonably, can come to different conclusions on the basis of
the same evidence.
65. The Appeals Chamber notes that it has been the practice of this Tribunal and of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)96 to accept as evidence the testimony
of a single witness on a material fact without need for corroboration. The Defence does not
dispute that corroboration is not required by law. As noted above, it submitted that, as a
matter of fact, the evidence of Mr. Seferovi} cannot be relied on in the absence of
corroboration because he was introduced to the Prosecution by the same source, the
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which introduced another witness, Mr. Opaci},
who was subsequently withdrawn as a witness by the Prosecution for being untruthful. The
Appeals Chamber finds that Mr. Seferovi}’s association with the Bosnian government does
not taint him. The circumstances of Mr. Seferovi} and Mr. Opaci} are different.
Mr. Opaci} was made known to the Prosecution while he was still in the custody of the
Bosnian authorities, whereas Mr. Seferovi}’s introduction was made through the Bosnian
embassy in Brussels. Mr. Seferovi} was subjected to strenuous cross-examination by
Defence counsel at trial. Defence counsel at trial did not recall him after learning of the
withdrawal of Mr. Opaci} as a witness. Furthermore, Defence counsel at trial never asked
that Mr. Seferovi}’s testimony be disregarded on the ground that he, like Mr. Opaci}, was
also a tainted witness. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber did
not err in relying on the uncorroborated testimony of Mr. Seferovi}.
66. The Defence alleges that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on the evidence of
Mr. Seferovi} because it was implausible. Here, it is claimed that the Trial Chamber did not
95 Prosecution’s Response to Appellant’s Brief on Judgement, para. 2.14.
96 More fully, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide
and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
29
act reasonably in concluding from the evidence of Mr. Seferovi} that the Appellant was
responsible for the killing of the two policemen. The Appeals Chamber does not accept as
inherently implausible the witness’ claim that the reason why he returned to the town where
the Serbian paramilitary forces had been attacking, and from which he had escaped, was to
feed his pet pigeons. It is conceivable that a person may do such a thing, even though one
might think such action to be an irrational risk. The Trial Chamber, after seeing the witness,
hearing his testimony, and observing him under cross-examination, chose to accept his
testimony as reliable evidence. There is no basis for the Appeals Chamber to consider that
the Trial Chamber acted unreasonably in relying on that evidence for its finding that the
Appellant killed the two men.
C. Conclusion
67. The Appellant has failed to show that Nihad Seferovi}’s reliability as a witness is
suspect, or that his testimony was inherently implausible. Since the Appellant did not
establish that the Trial Chamber erred in relying on the evidence of Mr. Seferovi} for its
factual finding that the Appellant killed the two men, the Appeals Chamber sees no reason
to overturn the finding.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
30
IV. THE FIRST GROUND OF CROSS-APPEAL BY THE
PROSECUTION: THE TRIAL CHAMBER’S FINDING THAT IT HAD
NOT BEEN PROVED THAT THE VICTIMS WERE
“PROTECTED PERSONS” UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE STATUTE
(ON GRAVE BREACHES)
A. Submissions of the Parties
1. The Prosecution Case
68. In the first ground of the Cross-Appeal, the Prosecution challenges the Appellant’s
acquittal on Counts 8, 9, 12, 15, 21 and 32 of the Indictment which charged the Appellant
with grave breaches under Article 2 of the Statute. The Appellant was acquitted on these
counts on the ground that the victims referred to in those counts had not been proved to be
“protected persons” under the applicable provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.97
69. The Prosecution maintains that all relevant criteria under Article 2 of the Statute
were met. Consequently, the Trial Chamber erred by relying exclusively upon the
“effective control” test derived from the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States)98 in order to determine the
applicability of the grave breach provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention. The
Prosecution submits that the Chamber should have instead applied the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions and the relevant principles and authorities of international
humanitarian law which, in its view, apply a “demonstrable link” test.
70. In distinguishing the present situation from the facts in Nicaragua, the Prosecution
notes that Nicaragua was concerned with State responsibility rather than individual criminal
responsibility. Further, the Prosecution asserts that the International Court of Justice in
Nicaragua deliberately avoided dealing with the question of which body of treaty rules was
applicable. Instead the Court focused on the minimum yardstick of rules contained in
97 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949
(“Geneva Convention IV” or “Fourth Geneva Convention”).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
31
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which in the Court’s view applied to all
conflicts in Nicaragua, thus obviating the need for the Court to decide which body of law
was applicable in that case.
71. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erred by not applying the provisions
of the Geneva Conventions and general principles of international humanitarian law to
determine individual criminal responsibility for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
In the Prosecution’s submission, these sources require that there be a “demonstrable link”
between the perpetrator and a Party to an international armed conflict of which the victim is
not a national.
72. The Prosecution submits that the “demonstrable link” test is satisfied on the facts of
the case at hand. In its view, the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina/Republika Srpska (“VRS”) had a “demonstrable link” with the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (“FRY”) and the Army of the FRY
(“VJ”); it was not a situation of mere logistical support by the FRY to the VRS.
73. In addition, the Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that the
only test relied upon in Nicaragua was the “effective control” test. The Court in Nicaragua
also applied an “agency” test which, the Prosecution submits, is a more appropriate standard
for determining the applicability of the grave breach provisions.
74. Were either the “effective control” test or the “agency” test to be adopted by the
Appeals Chamber, the Prosecution submits that in any event both tests would be satisfied on
the facts of this case. To support this contention, the Prosecution looks to the fact, inter
alia, that after 19 May 1992, when the Yugoslav People’s Army (“JNA”) formally
withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina, VRS soldiers continued to receive their salaries
from the government of the FRY which also funded the pensions of retired VJ soldiers who
had been serving with the VRS. The Prosecution looks to a number of additional factors in
support of its contention that there was more than mere logistical support by the FRY after
19 May 1992. These factors include the structures and ranks of the VRS and VJ being
identical, as well as the supervision of the VRS by the FRY after that date. From those
98 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)
(Merits), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1986), p. 14 (“Nicaragua”).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
32
facts, the Prosecution draws the inference that the FRY was exercising effective military
control over the VRS.
2. The Defence Case
75. The Defence asserts that the Trial Chamber was correct in applying the “effective
control” test derived from Nicaragua and submits that the “demonstrable link” test is
incorrect. The Defence formulates the test which the Appeals Chamber should apply as
“were the Bosnian Serbs acting as ‘organs’ of another State?”99
76. The Defence submits that it is misleading to distinguish Nicaragua on the basis that
the decision is concerned only with State responsibility. The Defence further argues that
the Court in Nicaragua was concerned with the broader question of which part of
international humanitarian law should apply to the relevant conduct.
77. On the facts of the present case there is no evidential basis for concluding that after
19 May 1992, the VRS was either effectively controlled by or could be regarded as an agent
of the FRY government. The Defence’s submission is that the FRY and the
Republika Srpska coordinated with each other, solely as allies. For this reason, the VRS
was not an organ of the FRY.
78. The Defence submits that the “demonstrable link” test is not the correct test to be
applied under Article 2 of the Statute. The Defence argues that the test has no authority in
international law and submits that it should also be rejected for policy reasons. If the
Appeals Chamber were to accept the “demonstrable link” test, this could result in the
undesirable outcome of a State being held responsible for the actions of another State or
entity over which the State did not have any effective control. Further, the Defence submits
that the test at issue introduces uncertainty into international law as it is unclear what degree
of link is necessary in order to satisfy the test.
99 See Defence’s Substituted Response to Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 2.6.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
33
79. The Defence concedes that if the correct test were the “demonstrable link” test, on
the facts of this case the test would be satisfied.100
B. Discussion
1. The Requirements for the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute
80. Article 2 of the Statute embraces various disparate classes of offences with their
own specific legal ingredients. The general legal ingredients, however, may be categorised
as follows.
(i) The nature of the conflict. According to the interpretation given by the Appeals
Chamber in its decision on a Defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction in the
present case,101 the international nature of the conflict is a prerequisite for the applicability
of Article 2.
(ii) The status of the victim. Grave breaches must be perpetrated against persons or property
defined as “protected” by any of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. To establish
whether a person is “protected”, reference must clearly be made to the relevant provisions
of those Conventions.
81. In the instant case it therefore falls to the Appeals Chamber to establish first of all (i)
on what legal conditions armed forces fighting in a prima facie internal armed conflict may
be regarded as acting on behalf of a foreign Power and (ii) whether in the instant case the
factual conditions which are required by law were satisfied.
82. Only if the Appeals Chamber finds that the conflict was international at all relevant
times will it turn to the second question of whether the victims were to be regarded as
“protected persons”.
100 See Defence’s Substituted Response to Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 2.1 – 2.18; T. 219-220 (21 April
1999).
101 See “Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction”,
The Prosecutor v. Du{ko Tadi}, Case No.: IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995 (“Tadi}
Decision on Jurisdiction”), paras. 79-84 (Tadi} (1995) I ICTY JR 353).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
34
2. The Nature of the Conflict
83. The requirement that the conflict be international for the grave breaches regime to
operate pursuant to Article 2 of the Statute has not been contested by the parties.
84. It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between two
or more States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the
territory of a State, it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be
international in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes
in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the
internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.
85. In the instant case, the Prosecution claims that at all relevant times, the conflict was
an international armed conflict between two States, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BH”)
on the one hand, and the FRY on the other.102 Judge McDonald, in her dissent, also found
the conflict to be international at all relevant times.103
86. The Trial Chamber found the conflict to be an international armed conflict between
BH and FRY until 19 May 1992, when the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and
Herzegovina.104 However, the Trial Chamber did not explicitly state what the nature of the
conflict was after 19 May 1992. As the Prosecution points out, “the Trial Chamber made
no express finding on the classification of the armed conflict between the Bosnian Serb
102 See para. 2.25 of the Cross-Appellant’s Brief:
“?Theg SFRY/FRY is a Party to an international armed conflict with … BH on the basis that the Trial
Chamber found that until 19 May 1992 the JNA was involved in an international armed conflict with
the BH, and that thereafter the VJ was directly involved in an armed conflict against the BH.
Consequently, it is submitted that the only conclusion that can be drawn is that an international armed
conflict existed between the BH and the FRY during 1992.” (emphasis added).
103 See para. 1 of Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article
2 of the Statute, The Prosecutor v. Du{ko Tadi}, Case No.: IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II, 7 May 1997
(“Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald”) where she held: “I find that at all times relevant to
the Indictment, the armed conflict in opština Prijedor was international in character …”.
104 See Judgement, paras. 569-608:
“569. ... ?Igt is clear from the evidence before the Trial Chamber that, from the beginning of 1992
until 19 May 1992, a state of international armed conflict existed in at least part of the territory of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was an armed conflict between the forces of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina on the one hand and those of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), being the JNA (later the VJ), working with sundry paramilitary and Bosnian Serb forces,
on the other. ....
570. For evidence of this it is enough to refer generally to the evidence presented as to the
bombardment of Sarajevo, the seat of government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in April
1992 by Serb forces, their attack on towns along Bosnia and Herzegovina’s border with Serbia on the
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
35
Army (VRS) and the BH after the VRS was established in May 1992”.105 Nevertheless, it
may be held that the Trial Chamber at least implicitly considered that after 19 May 1992 the
conflict became internal in nature.106
87. In the instant case, there is sufficient evidence to justify the Trial Chamber’s finding
of fact that the conflict prior to 19 May 1992 was international in character.107 The question
whether after 19 May 1992 it continued to be international or became instead exclusively
internal turns on the issue of whether Bosnian Serb forces – in whose hands the Bosnian
victims in this case found themselves – could be considered as de iure or de facto organs of
a foreign Power, namely the FRY.
3. The Legal Criteria for Establishing When, in an Armed Conflict Which is Prima Facie
Internal, Armed Forces May Be Regarded as Acting On Behalf of a Foreign Power,
Thereby Rendering the Conflict International
(a) International Humanitarian Law
88. The Prosecution maintains that the alleged perpetrator of crimes must be
“sufficiently linked to a Party to the conflict” in order to come under the jurisdiction of
Article 2 of the Statute.108 It further contends that “a showing of a demonstrable link
between the VRS and the FRY or VJ” is sufficient.109 According to the Prosecution,
“?sguch a link could, at most, be proven by a showing of a general form of control. This
Drina River and their invasion of south-eastern Herzegovina from Serbia and Montenegro ….”
(emphasis added).
105 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 2.5.
106 See Judgement, paras. 607-608.
107 In addition to the evidence referred to in para. 570 of the Judgement, reference may also be made to the
facts cited by Judge Li in his Separate Opinion to the Tadi} Decision on Jurisdiction (paras. 17-19), for
example BH’s Declaration that it was at war with the FRY and the reports of various expert bodies suggesting
that the conflict was international. Moreover, in three Rule 61 Decisions involving the conflict between the
Serbs and the BH Government (Nikolic, Vukovar Hospital, and Karad`ic and Mladic), Trial Chambers have
found the conflict to have been an international armed conflict. (See “Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule
61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli}, Case No.: IT-94-2-R61,
Trial Chamber I, 20 October 1995, para 30 (Nikoli} (1995) II ICTY JR 738); “Review of Indictment Pursuant
to Rule 61”, The Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksi} et al., Case No.: IT-95-13-R61, Trial Chamber I, 3 April 1996,
para. 25; “Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules Procedure and Evidence”,
The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karad`i} and Ratko Mladi}, Case No.: IT-95-18-R61, Trial Chamber I, 11 July
1996, para. 88)).
108 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 2.31.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
36
legal standard finds support in the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the jurisprudence
of the trials that followed the Second World War, the Tribunal’s decisions, the writings of
leading publicists, and other authorities.”110
89. The Prosecution also contends that the determination of the conditions for
considering whether Article 2 of the Statute is applicable must be made in accordance with
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the relevant principles of international
humanitarian law. By contrast, in its opinion the international law of State responsibility
has no bearing on the requirements on grave breaches laid down in the relevant Geneva
provisions. According to the Prosecution “?igt would lead to absurd results to apply the
rules relating to State responsibility to assist in determining such a question” (i.e. whether
certain armed forces are sufficiently related to a High Contracting Party).111
90. Admittedly, the legal solution to the question under discussion might be found in the
body of law that is more directly relevant to the question, namely, international
humanitarian law. This corpus of rules and principles may indeed contain legal criteria for
determining when armed forces fighting in an armed conflict which is prima facie internal
may be regarded as acting on behalf of a foreign Power even if they do not formally possess
the status of its organs. These criteria may differ from the standards laid down in general
international law, that is in the law of State responsibility, for evaluating acts of individuals
not having the status of State officials, but which are performed on behalf of a certain State.
91. The Appeals Chamber will therefore discuss the question at issue first from the
viewpoint of international humanitarian law. In particular, the Appeals Chamber will
consider the conditions under which armed forces fighting against the central authorities
of the same State in which they live and operate may be deemed to act on behalf of another
State. In other words, the Appeals Chamber will identify the conditions under which those
forces may be assimilated to organs of a State other than that on whose territory they live
and operate.
109 Ibid., para. 2.30.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., paras. 2.21-2.23.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
37
92. A starting point for this discussion is provided by the criteria for lawful combatants
laid down in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.112 Under this Convention, militias or
paramilitary groups or units may be regarded as legitimate combatants if they form “part of
the armed forces” of a Party to the conflict (Article 4A(1)) or "belong ...” to a “Party to
the conflict" (Article 4A(2)) and satisfy the other four requirements provided for in
Article 4A(2).113 It is clear that this provision is primarily directed toward establishing the
requirements for the status of lawful combatants. Nevertheless, one of its logical
consequences is that if, in an armed conflict, paramilitary units “belong” to a State other
than the one against which they are fighting, the conflict is international and therefore
serious violations of the Geneva Conventions may be classified as “grave breaches”.
93. The content of the requirement of “belonging to a Party to the conflict” is far from
clear or precise. The authoritative ICRC Commentary does not shed much light on the
matter, for it too is rather vague.114 The rationale behind Article 4 was that, in the wake of
World War II, it was universally agreed that States should be legally responsible for the
conduct of irregular forces they sponsor. As the Israeli military court sitting in Ramallah
rightly stated in a decision of 13 April 1969 in Kassem et al.:
In view, however, of the experience of two World Wars, the nations of the world found it
necessary to add the fundamental requirement of the total responsibility of Governments
112 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (“Geneva
Convention III” or “Third Geneva Convention”).
113 These four conditions are as follows:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly; and
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
It might be contended that these conditions, which undoubtedly had become part of customary international
law, may now be considered to have been replaced by the different conditions set out in Article 44(3) and
43(1) of Additional Protocol I (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), 1977). This
contention should of course be premised on the assumption – for which proof is required - that these two
Articles have already been transformed into customary international rules.
Be that as it may, the requirement in Article 43(1) of "?beingg under a command responsible to a party ?to the
conflictg for the conduct of its subordinates" has not replaced that of "belonging to a Party to the conflict"
provided for in Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. See generally the International Committee of
the Red Cross (“ICRC”) Commentary on the Additional Protocols (Yves Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on
the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, International
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 1987), pp. 506-517, paras. 1659-1681.
114 Jean Pictet (ed.), Commentary: III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1960, First reprint, Geneva, 1994, p. 57:
“?Tghere should be a de facto relationship between the resistance organisation ?or militia or volunteer
corpsg and the party ?...g which is in a state of war, but the existence of this relationship is sufficient. It
may find expression merely by tacit agreement, if the operations are such as to indicate clearly for
which side the resistance organisation ?or militia or volunteer corpsg is fighting”.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
38
for the operations of irregular corps and thus ensure that there was someone to hold
accountable if they did not act in accordance with the laws and customs of war.115
94. In other words, States have in practice accepted that belligerents may use
paramilitary units and other irregulars in the conduct of hostilities only on the condition that
those belligerents are prepared to take responsibility for any infringements committed by
such forces. In order for irregulars to qualify as lawful combatants, it appears that
international rules and State practice therefore require control over them by a Party to an
international armed conflict and, by the same token, a relationship of dependence and
allegiance of these irregulars vis-à-vis that Party to the conflict. These then may be
regarded as the ingredients of the term “belonging to a Party to the conflict”.
95. The Appeals Chamber thus considers that the Third Geneva Convention, by
providing in Article 4 the requirement of “belonging to a Party to the conflict”, implicitly
refers to a test of control.
96. This conclusion, based on the letter and the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, is
borne out by the entire logic of international humanitarian law. This body of law is not
grounded on formalistic postulates. It is not based on the notion that only those who have
the formal status of State organs, i.e., are members of the armed forces of a State, are duty
bound both to refrain from engaging in violations of humanitarian law as well as - if they
are in a position of authority - to prevent or punish the commission of such crimes. Rather,
it is a realistic body of law, grounded on the notion of effectiveness and inspired by the aim
of deterring deviation from its standards to the maximum extent possible. It follows,
amongst other things, that humanitarian law holds accountable not only those having formal
positions of authority but also those who wield de facto power as well as those who exercise
control over perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law. Hence, in
115 Military Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmud Kassem et al., 42 International Law Reports 1971, p. 470, at p. 477.
The court consequently held that the accused, members of the PLO captured by Israeli forces in the territories
occupied by Israel, did not belong to any Party to the conflict. As the court put it (ibid., pp. 477-478):
“In the present case ... no Government with which we are in a state of war accepts responsibility for
the acts of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Organisation itself, so far as we know,
is not prepared to take orders from the Jordanian Government, witnessed by the fact that the
Organization is illegal in Jordan and has been repeatedly harassed by the Jordanian authorities.”
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
39
cases such as that currently under discussion, what is required for criminal responsibility to
arise is some measure of control by a Party to the conflict over the perpetrators.116
97. It is nevertheless imperative to specify what degree of authority or control must be
wielded by a foreign State over armed forces fighting on its behalf in order to render
international an armed conflict which is prima facie internal. Indeed, the legal
consequences of the characterisation of the conflict as either internal or international are
extremely important. Should the conflict eventually be classified as international, it would
inter alia follow that a foreign State may in certain circumstances be held responsible for
violations of international law perpetrated by the armed groups acting on its behalf.
(b) The Notion of Control: The Need for International Humanitarian Law to Be
Supplemented by General International Rules Concerning the Criteria for Considering
Individuals to be Acting as De Facto State Organs
98. International humanitarian law does not contain any criteria unique to this body of
law for establishing when a group of individuals may be regarded as being under the control
of a State, that is, as acting as de facto State officials.117 Consequently, it is necessary to
116 See also the ICRC Commentary to Article 29 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Jean Pictet (ed.),
Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958, First Reprint, 1994, p. 212):
“It does not matter whether the person guilty of treatment contrary to the Convention is an agent of the
Occupying Power or in the service of the occupied State; what is important is to know where the
decision leading to the unlawful act was made, where the intention was formed and the order given. If
the unlawful act was committed at the instigation of the Occupying Power, then the Occupying Power
is responsible; if, on the other hand, it was the result of a truly independent decision on the part of the
local authorities, the Occupying Power cannot be held responsible.”
117 The Appeals Chamber is aware of another approach taken to the question of imputability in the area of
international humanitarian law. The Appeals Chamber is referring to the view whereby by virtue of Article 3
of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907 and Article 91 of Additional Protocol I, international humanitarian law
establishes a special regime of State responsibility; under this lex specialis States are responsible for all acts
committed by their “armed forces” regardless of whether such forces acted as State officials or private
persons. In other words, whether or not in an armed conflict individuals act in a private capacity, their acts are
attributed to a State if such individuals are part of the “armed forces” of that State. This opinion was
authoritatively set forth by some members of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) (Professor Reuter
observed that “it was now a principle of codified international law that States were responsible for all acts of
their armed forces” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1975, vol. I, p. 7, para. 5). Professor
Ago stated that the IVth Hague Convention of 1907 “made provision for a veritable guarantee covering all
damage that might be caused by armed forces, whether they had acted as organs or as private persons” (ibid.,
p. 16, para. 4)). This view also has been forcefully advocated in the legal literature.
As is clear from the reasoning the Appeals Chamber sets out further on in the text of this Judgement, even if
this approach is adopted, the test of control as delineated by this Chamber remains indispensable for
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
40
examine the notion of control by a State over individuals, laid down in general international
law, for the purpose of establishing whether those individuals may be regarded as acting as
de facto State officials. This notion can be found in those general international rules on
State responsibility which set out the legal criteria for attributing to a State acts performed
by individuals not having the formal status of State officials.
(c) The Notion of Control Set Out By the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua
99. In dealing with the question of the legal conditions required for individuals to be
considered as acting on behalf of a State, i.e., as de facto State officials, a high degree of
control has been authoritatively suggested by the International Court of Justice in
Nicaragua.
100. The issue brought before the International Court of Justice was whether a foreign
State, the United States, because of its financing, organising, training, equipping and
planning of the operations of organised military and paramilitary groups of Nicaraguan
rebels (the so-called contras) in Nicaragua, was responsible for violations of international
humanitarian law committed by those rebels. The Court held that a high degree of control
was necessary for this to be the case. It required that (i) a Party not only be in effective
control of a military or paramilitary group, but that (ii) the control be exercised with respect
to the specific operation in the course of which breaches may have been committed.118 The
Court went so far as to state that in order to establish that the United States was responsible
for “acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law” allegedly perpetrated by the
Nicaraguan contras, it was necessary to prove that the United States had specifically
“directed or enforced” the perpetration of those acts.119
determining when individuals who, formally speaking, are not military officials of a State may nevertheless be
regarded as forming part of the armed forces of such a State.
118 Nicaragua, para. 115. As the Court put it, there must be “effective control of the military or paramilitary
operations in the course of which the alleged violations ?of international human rights and humanitarian lawg
were committed”.
119 Ibid., para. 115:
“All the forms of United States participation mentioned above, and even the general control by the
respondent State over a force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean,
without further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts
contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State.”
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
41
101. As is apparent, and as was rightly stressed by Trial Chamber II in Rajic120 and
restated by the Prosecution in the instant case,121 the issue brought before the International
Court of Justice revolved around State responsibility; what was at stake was not the criminal
culpability of the contras for serious violations of international humanitarian law, but rather
the question of whether or not the contras had acted as de facto organs of the United States
on its request, thus generating the international responsibility of that State.
(i) Two Preliminary Issues
102. Before examining whether the Nicaragua test is persuasive, the Appeals Chamber
must deal with two preliminary matters which are material to our discussion in the instant
case.
103. First, with a view to limiting the scope of the test at issue, the Prosecution has
contended that the criterion for ascertaining State responsibility is different from that
necessary for establishing individual criminal responsibility. In the former case one would
have to decide whether serious violations of international humanitarian law by private
individuals may be attributed to a State because those individuals acted as de facto State
officials. In the latter case, one would have instead to establish whether a private individual
may be held criminally responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
amounting to “grave breaches”.122 Consequently, it has been asserted, the Nicaragua test,
while valid within the context of State responsibility, is immaterial to the issue of individual
criminal responsibility for “grave breaches”. The Appeals Chamber, with respect, does not
share this view.
104. What is at issue is not the distinction between the two classes of responsibility.
What is at issue is a preliminary question: that of the conditions on which under
international law an individual may be held to act as a de facto organ of a State. Logically
these conditions must be the same both in the case: (i) where the court’s task is to ascertain
whether an act performed by an individual may be attributed to a State, thereby generating
120 See “Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”,
The Prosecutor v. Ivica Raji}, Case No.: IT-95-12-R61, Trial Chamber II, 13 September 1996, para. 25.
121 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 2.14-2.17.
122 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 2.16-2.17; Cross-Appellant’s Brief in Reply, para. 2.19.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
42
the international responsibility of that State; and (ii) where the court must instead determine
whether individuals are acting as de facto State officials, thereby rendering the conflict
international and thus setting the necessary precondition for the “grave breaches” regime to
apply. In both cases, what is at issue is not the distinction between State responsibility and
individual criminal responsibility. Rather, the question is that of establishing the criteria for
the legal imputability to a State of acts performed by individuals not having the status of
State officials. In the one case these acts, if they prove to be attributable to a State, will give
rise to the international responsibility of that State; in the other case, they will ensure that
the armed conflict must be classified as international.
105. As stated above, international humanitarian law does not include legal criteria
regarding imputability specific to this body of law. Reliance must therefore be had upon the
criteria established by general rules on State responsibility.
106. The second preliminary issue relates to the interpretation of the judgement delivered
by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua. According to the Prosecution, in that
case the Court applied “both an ‘agency’ test and an ‘effective control’ test”.123 In the
opinion of the Prosecution, the Court first applied the “agency” test when considering
whether the contras could be equated with United States officials for legal purposes, in
order to determine whether the United States could incur responsibility in general for the
acts of the contras. According to the Prosecution this test was one of dependency, on the
one side, and control, on the other.124 In the opinion of the Prosecution, the Court then
applied the “effective control” test to determine whether the United States could be held
responsible for particular acts committed by the contras in violation of international
humanitarian law. This test hinged on the issuance of specific directives or instructions
concerning the breaches allegedly committed by the contras.125
123 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 2.56.
124 According to the Prosecution (Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 2.58), the Court applied the “agency” test
when considering whether the contras engaged the responsibility of the United States. The Prosecution has
pointed out that in this regard the Court “did not refer to the need for effective control, but rather” – to quote
the words of the Court cited by the Prosecution – “whether or not the relationship ?…g was so much one of
dependency on the one side and control on the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal
purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of that Government”
(Nicaragua, para. 109).
125 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 2.57-2.58.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
43
107. The Appeals Chamber considers that the Prosecution’s submissions are based on a
misreading of the judgement of the International Court of Justice and a misapprehension of
the doctrine of State responsibility on which that judgement is grounded.
108. Clearly, the Court did use two tests, but in any case its tests were conceived in a
manner different from what is contended by the Prosecution, and in addition they were to a
large extent set out along the lines dictated by customary international law. Admittedly, in
its judgement, the Court did not always follow a straight line of reasoning (whereas it would
seem that a jurisprudential approach more consonant with customary international law was
taken by Judge Ago in his Separate Opinion).126 In substance, however, the Court first
evaluated those acts which, “in the submission of Nicaragua, involved the responsibility of
the United States in a more direct manner”.127 To this end it discussed two categories of
individuals and their relative acts or transactions. First, the Court established whether the
individuals concerned were officials of the United States, in which case their acts were
indisputedly imputable to the State. Almost in the same breath the Court then discussed the
different question of whether individuals not having the status of United States officials but
allegedly paid by and acting under the instructions of United States organs, could legally
involve the responsibility of that State. These individuals were Latin American operatives,
the so-called UCLAs (“Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets”). The Court then moved to
ascertain whether the responsibility of the United States could arise “in a less direct
manner” (to borrow from the phraseology used by the Court). It therefore set out to
determine whether other individuals, the so-called contras, although not formally officials
of the United States, acted in such a way and were so closely linked to that State that their
acts could be legally attributed to it.
109. It would therefore seem that in Nicaragua the Court distinguished between three
categories of individuals. The first comprised those who did have the status of officials: the
members of the Government administration or armed forces of the United States. With
regard to these individuals, the Court clearly started from a basic assumption, which the
same Court recently defined as “a well-established rule of international law”,128 that a State
incurs responsibility for acts in breach of international obligations committed by individuals
126 See Nicaragua, pp. 187-190.
127 See Nicaragua, para. 75.
128 See the Advisory Opinion delivered by the ICJ on 29 April 1999 in Difference Relating to the Immunity
from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, para. 62.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
44
who enjoy the status of organs under the national law of that State129 or who at least belong
to public entities empowered within the domestic legal system of the State to exercise
certain elements of governmental authority.130 The other two categories embraced
individuals who, by contrast, were not formally organs or agents of the State. There were,
first, those individuals not having United States nationality (the UCLAs) who acted while
being in the pay, and on the direct instructions and under the supervision of United States
military or intelligence personnel, to carry out specific tasks such as the mining of
Nicaraguan ports or oil installations. The Court held that their acts were imputable to the
United States, either on account of the fact that, in addition to being paid by United States
agents or officials, they had been given specific instructions by these agents or officials and
had acted under their supervision,131 or because “agents of the United States” had
“participated in the planning, direction, support and execution” of specific operations (such
as the blowing up of underwater oil pipelines, attacks on oil and storage facilities, etc.).132
The other category of individuals lacking the status of United States officials comprised the
129 Customary international law on the matter is correctly restated in Article 5 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility adopted in its first reading by the United Nations International Law Commission: “For the
purposes of the present articles ?of Chapter II: The ‘Act of the State’ under International Lawg, conduct of any
State organ having that status under the internal law of that State shall be considered as an act of the State
concerned under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question”
(Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Forty-Eighth Session (6 May-26 July 1996),
U.N. Doc. A/51/10, p. 126).
Article 5, as provisionally adopted by the ILC Drafting Committee in 1998, is even clearer. It provides
(International Law Commission, Fiftieth Session, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.569, p. 2):
“1. For the purposes of the present articles, the conduct of any State organ acting in that capacity shall
be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State,
and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, an organ includes any person or body which has that status in
accordance with the internal law of the State.” (emphasis added).
130 See Article 7 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law
Commission on first reading. It provides:
“1. The conduct of an organ of a territorial governmental entity within a State shall also be considered
as an act of that State under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the
case in question.
2. The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the formal structure of the State or of a
territorial governmental entity, but which is empowered by the internal law of that State to exercise
elements of the governmental authority, shall also be considered as an act of the State under
international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question”.
See the First Report on State Responsibility by the Special Rapporteur J. Crawford (22 July 1998), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/490/ Add.5, pp. 12-16. See also the text of the same provision as provisionally adopted by the ILC
Drafting Committee in 1998 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.569, p. 2). The text of Article 7, as provisionally adopted
by the ILC Drafting Committee in 1998, provides:
“The conduct of an entity which is not an organ of the State under article 5 but which is empowered by
the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of
the State under international law, provided the entity was acting in that capacity in the case in
question”. (ibid.)
131 See Nicaragua, paras. 75-80.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
45
contras. It was primarily with regard to the contras that the Court asked itself on what
conditions individuals without the status of State officials could nevertheless engage the
responsibility of the United States as having acted as de facto State organs. It was with
respect to the contras that the Court developed the doctrine of “effective control”.
110. At one stage in the judgement, when dealing with the contras, the Court appeared to
lay down a “dependence and control” test:
What the Court has to determine at this point is whether or not the relationship of the
contras to the United States government was so much one of dependence on the one side
and control on the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal purposes,
with an organ of the United States government, or as acting on behalf of that
Government.133
111. The Prosecution, and Judge McDonald in her dissent, argue that by these words the
Court set out an “agency test”. According to them, the Court only resorted to the “effective
control” standard once it had found no agency relationship between the contras and the
United States to exist, so that the contras could not be considered organs of the United
States. The Court, according to this argument, then considered whether specific operations
of the contras could be attributed to the United States, and the standard it adopted for this
attribution was the “effective control” standard.
112. The Appeals Chamber does not subscribe to this interpretation. Admittedly, in
paragraph 115 of the Nicaragua judgement, where “effective control” is mentioned, it is
unclear whether the Court is propounding “effective control” as an alternative test to that of
“dependence and control” set out earlier in paragraph 109, or is instead spelling out the
requirements of the same test. The Appeals Chamber believes that the latter is the correct
interpretation. In Nicaragua, in addition to the “agency” test (properly construed, as shall
be seen in the next paragraph, as being designed to ascertain whether or not an individual
has the formal status of a State official), the Court propounded only the “effective control”
test. This conclusion is supported by the evidently stringent application of the “effective
control” test which the Court used in finding that the acts of the contras were not imputable
to the United States.
132 Ibid., para. 86.
133 Ibid., para. 109 (emphasis added).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
46
113. In contrast with what the Prosecution, in following Judge McDonald’s dissent, has
termed the “agency” test, the Court’s agency test amounts instead to a determination of the
status of an individual as an organ or official (or member of a public entity exercising
certain elements of governmental authority) within the domestic legal order of a particular
State. In this regard, it would seem that the Separate Opinion of Judge Ago relied upon by
Judge McDonald134 and the Prosecution135 does not actually support their interpretation.136
114. On close scrutiny, and although the distinctions made by the Court might at first
sight seem somewhat unclear, the contention is warranted that in the event, the Court
essentially set out two tests of State responsibility: (i) responsibility arising out of unlawful
acts of State officials; and (ii) responsibility generated by acts performed by private
individuals acting as de facto State organs. For State responsibility to arise under (ii), the
Court required that private individuals not only be paid or financed by a State, and their
action be coordinated or supervised by this State, but also that the State should issue
specific instructions concerning the commission of the unlawful acts in question. Applying
this test, the Court concluded that in the circumstances of the case it was met as far as the
UCLAs were concerned (who were paid and supervised by the United States and in addition
acted under their specific instructions). By contrast, the test was not met as far as the
contras were concerned: in their case no specific instructions had been issued by the United
States concerning the violations of international humanitarian law which they had allegedly
perpetrated.
134 Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, para. 25.
135 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 2.58.
136 See the Separate Opinion of Judge Ago in Nicaragua, paras. 14-17. Judge Ago correctly stated that it fell
to the Court first to establish whether the individuals at issue had the status of national officials or officials of
national public entities and then, where necessary, to consider whether, lacking this status, they acted instead
as de facto State officials, thereby engaging the responsibility of the State. For the purpose of establishing the
international responsibility of a State, he therefore identified two broad classes of individuals: those having the
status of officials of the State or of its autonomous bodies, and those lacking such a status. Clearly, for Judge
Ago the issue of deciding whether an individual had acted as a de facto State organ arose only with respect to
the latter category. Furthermore, Judge Ago characterised the CIA and the so-called UCLAs in a manner
different from the Court (see para. 15).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
47
(ii) The Grounds On Which the Nicaragua Test Does Not Seem To Be Persuasive
115. The “effective control” test enunciated by the International Court of Justice was
regarded as correct and upheld by Trial Chamber II in the Judgement.137 The Appeals
Chamber, with respect, does not hold the Nicaragua test to be persuasive. There are two
grounds supporting this conclusion.
a. The Nicaragua Test Would Not Seem to Be Consonant With the
Logic of the Law of State Responsibility
116. A first ground on which the Nicaragua test as such may be held to be unconvincing
is based on the very logic of the entire system of international law on State responsibility.
117. The principles of international law concerning the attribution to States of acts
performed by private individuals are not based on rigid and uniform criteria. These
principles are reflected in Article 8 of the Draft on State Responsibility adopted on first
reading by the United Nations International Law Commission and, even more clearly, in the
text of the same provisions as provisionally adopted in 1998 by the ILC Drafting
Committee.138 Under this Article, if it is proved that individuals who are not regarded as
organs of a State by its legislation nevertheless do in fact act on behalf of that State, their
acts are attributable to the State. The rationale behind this rule is to prevent States from
escaping international responsibility by having private individuals carry out tasks that may
137 Judgement, paras. 584-588.
138 Article 8 of the Draft provides:
“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered as an act of the State under
international law if:
a) it is established that such person or group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of that State; or
b) such person or group of persons was in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in
the absence of the official authorities and in circumstances which justified the exercise of those
elements of authority” (U.N. Doc A/35/10, para. 34, in Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1980, vol. II (2)).
See also the First Report on State Responsibility by the Special Rapporteur J. Crawford (U.N. Doc. A/CN.
4/490/Add.5, pp. 16-24).
The text of Article 8 as provisionally adopted by the ILC Drafting Committee in 1998 provides:
“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of the State under international
law if the person or group of persons was in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or
control of, that State in carrying out the conduct” (A/CN.4/ L.569, p. 3).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
48
not or should not be performed by State officials, or by claiming that individuals actually
participating in governmental authority are not classified as State organs under national
legislation and therefore do not engage State responsibility. In other words, States are not
allowed on the one hand to act de facto through individuals and on the other to disassociate
themselves from such conduct when these individuals breach international law. The
requirement of international law for the attribution to States of acts performed by private
individuals is that the State exercises control over the individuals. The degree of control
may, however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each case. The Appeals
Chamber fails to see why in each and every circumstance international law should require a
high threshold for the test of control. Rather, various situations may be distinguished.
118. One situation is the case of a private individual who is engaged by a State to perform
some specific illegal acts in the territory of another State (for instance, kidnapping a State
official, murdering a dignitary or a high-ranking State official, blowing up a power station
or, especially in times of war, carrying out acts of sabotage). In such a case, it would be
necessary to show that the State issued specific instructions concerning the commission of
the breach in order to prove – if only by necessary implication – that the individual acted as
a de facto State agent. Alternatively it would be necessary to show that the State has
publicly given retroactive approval to the action of that individual. A generic authority over
the individual would not be sufficient to engage the international responsibility of the State.
A similar situation may come about when an unorganised group of individuals commits acts
contrary to international law. For these acts to be attributed to the State it would seem
necessary to prove not only that the State exercised some measure of authority over those
individuals but also that it issued specific instructions to them concerning the performance
of the acts at issue, or that it ex post facto publicly endorsed those acts.
119. To these situations another one may be added, which arises when a State entrusts a
private individual (or group of individuals) with the specific task of performing lawful
actions on its behalf, but then the individuals, in discharging that task, breach an
international obligation of the State (for instance, a private detective is requested by State
authorities to protect a senior foreign diplomat but he instead seriously mistreats him while
performing that task). In this case, by analogy with the rules concerning State responsibility
for acts of State officials acting ultra vires, it can be held that the State incurs responsibility
on account of its specific request to the private individual or individuals to discharge a task
on its behalf.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
49
120. One should distinguish the situation of individuals acting on behalf of a State
without specific instructions, from that of individuals making up an organised and
hierarchically structured group, such as a military unit or, in case of war or civil strife,
armed bands of irregulars or rebels. Plainly, an organised group differs from an individual
in that the former normally has a structure, a chain of command and a set of rules as well as
the outward symbols of authority. Normally a member of the group does not act on his own
but conforms to the standards prevailing in the group and is subject to the authority of the
head of the group. Consequently, for the attribution to a State of acts of these groups it is
sufficient to require that the group as a whole be under the overall control of the State.
121. This kind of State control over a military group and the fact that the State is held
responsible for acts performed by a group independently of any State instructions, or even
contrary to instructions, to some extent equates the group with State organs proper. Under
the rules of State responsibility, as restated in Article 10 of the Draft on State Responsibility
as provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission,139 a State is internationally
accountable for ultra vires acts or transactions of its organs. In other words it incurs
responsibility even for acts committed by its officials outside their remit or contrary to its
behest. The rationale behind this provision is that a State must be held accountable for acts
of its organs whether or not these organs complied with instructions, if any, from the higher
authorities. Generally speaking, it can be maintained that the whole body of international
law on State responsibility is based on a realistic concept of accountability, which
disregards legal formalities and aims at ensuring that States entrusting some functions to
139 Article 10, as adopted on first reading by the International Law Commission, provides:
“The conduct of an organ of a State, of a territorial governmental entity or of an entity empowered to
exercise elements of the governmental authority, such organ having acted in that capacity, shall be
considered as an act of the State under international law even if, in the particular case, the organ
exceeded its competence according to internal law or contravened instructions concerning its activity”.
(Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-second session (5 May–25 July
1980), U.N. Doc. A/35/10, p.31).
See also the First Report on State Responsibility by the Special Rapporteur J. Crawford, U.N. Doc.
A/CN./490/Add.5, pp. 29-31. The text of article 10, as provisionally adopted in 1998 by the ILC Drafting
Committee, provides:
“The conduct of an organ of a State or of an entity empowered to exercise elements of the
governmental authority, such organ or entity having acted in that capacity, shall be considered an act of
the State under international law even if, in the particular case, the organ or entity exceeded its
authority or contravened instructions concerning its exercise” (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ L.569, p. 3).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
50
individuals or groups of individuals must answer for their actions, even when they act
contrary to their directives.140
122. The same logic should apply to the situation under discussion. As noted above, the
situation of an organised group is different from that of a single private individual
performing a specific act on behalf of a State. In the case of an organised group, the group
normally engages in a series of activities. If it is under the overall control of a State, it must
perforce engage the responsibility of that State for its activities, whether or not each of them
was specifically imposed, requested or directed by the State. To a large extent the wise
words used by the United States-Mexico General Claims Commission in the Youmans case
with regard to State responsibility for acts of State military officials should hold true for
acts of organised groups over which a State exercises overall control.141
123. What has just been said should not, of course, blur the necessary distinction between
the various legal situations described. In the case envisaged by Article 10 of the Draft on
State Responsibility (as well as in the situation envisaged in Article 7 of the same Draft),
State responsibility objectively follows from the fact that the individuals who engage in
certain internationally wrongful acts possess, under the relevant legislation, the status of
State officials or of officials of a State’s public entity. In the case under discussion here,
that of organised groups, State responsibility is instead the objective corollary of the overall
control exercised by the State over the group. Despite these legal differences, the fact
140 This sort of “objective” State responsibility also arises in a different case. Under the relevant rules on State
responsibility as laid down in Article 7 of the International Law Commission Draft, a State incurs
responsibility for acts of organs of its territorial governmental entities (regions, Länder, provinces, member
States of Federal States, etc.) even if under the national Constitution these organs enjoy broad independence or
complete autonomy. (See footnote 130 above).
141 The United States claimed that Mexico was responsible for the killing of United States nationals at the
hands of a mob with the participation of Mexican soldiers. Mexico objected that, even if it were assumed that
the soldiers were guilty of such participation, Mexico should not be held responsible for the wrongful acts of
the soldiers, on the grounds that they had been ordered by the highest official in the locality to protect
American citizens. Instead of carrying out these orders, however, they had acted in violation of them, in
consequence of which the Americans had been killed. The Mexico/United States General Claims Commission
dismissed the Mexican objection and held Mexico responsible. It stated that if international law were not to
impute to a State wrongful acts committed by its officials outside their competence or contrary to instructions,
“it would follow that no wrongful acts committed by an official could be considered as acts for which his
Government could be held liable”. It then added that:
“[s]oldiers inflicting personal injuries or committing wanton destruction or looting always act in
disobedience of some rules laid down by superior authority. There could be no [international State]
liability whatever for such misdeeds if the view were taken that any acts committed by soldiers in
contravention of instructions must always be considered as personal acts” (Thomas H. Youmans
(U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, Decision of 23 November 1926, Reports of International Arbitral
Awards, vol. IV, p. 116).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
51
nevertheless remains that international law renders any State responsible for acts in breach
of international law performed (i) by individuals having the formal status of organs of a
State (and this occurs even when these organs act ultra vires or contra legem), or (ii) by
individuals who make up organised groups subject to the State’s control. International law
does so regardless of whether or not the State has issued specific instructions to those
individuals. Clearly, the rationale behind this legal regulation is that otherwise, States
might easily shelter behind, or use as a pretext, their internal legal system or the lack of any
specific instructions in order to disclaim international responsibility.
b. The Nicaragua Test is at Variance With Judicial and State Practice
124. There is a second ground – of a similarly general nature as the one just expounded -
on which the Nicaragua test as such may be held to be unpersuasive. This ground is
determinative of the issue. The “effective control” test propounded by the International
Court of Justice as an exclusive and all-embracing test is at variance with international
judicial and State practice: such practice has envisaged State responsibility in circumstances
where a lower degree of control than that demanded by the Nicaragua test was exercised.
In short, as shall be seen, this practice has upheld the Nicaragua test with regard to
individuals or unorganised groups of individuals acting on behalf of States. By contrast, it
has applied a different test with regard to military or paramilitary groups.
125. In cases dealing with members of military or paramilitary groups, courts have
clearly departed from the notion of “effective control” set out by the International Court of
Justice (i.e., control that extends to the issuance of specific instructions concerning the
various activities of the individuals in question). Thus, for instance, in the Stephens case,
the Mexico-United States General Claims Commission attributed to Mexico acts committed
during a civil war by a member of the Mexican “irregular auxiliary” of the army, which
among other things lacked both uniforms and insignia.142 In this case the Commission did
not enquire as to whether or not specific instructions had been issued concerning the killing
of the United States national by that guard.
142 See United States v. Mexico (Stephens Case), Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. IV, pp. 266-
267.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
52
126. Similarly, in the Kenneth P. Yeager case,143 the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
(“Claims Tribunal”) held that wrongful acts of the Iranian “revolutionary guards” or
“revolutionary Komitehs” vis-à-vis American nationals carried out between 13 and
17 February 1979 were attributable to Iran (the Claims Tribunal referred in particular to the
fact that two members of the “Guards” had forced the Americans to leave their house in
order to depart from Iran, that the Americans had then been kept inside the Hilton Hotel for
three days while the “Guards” manned the exits, and had subsequently been searched at the
airport by other “Guards” who had taken their money). Iran, the respondent State, had
argued that the conduct of those “Guards” was not attributable to it. It had admitted that
“revolutionary guards and Komiteh personnel were engaged in the maintenance of law and
order from January 1979 to months after February 1979 as government police forces rapidly
lost control over the situation.” It had asserted, however, that “these revolutionaries did not
operate under the name ‘Revolutionary Komitehs’ or ‘Revolutionary Guards’, and that they
were not affiliated with the Provisional Government”.144 In other words, the “Guards” were
“not authentic”;145 hence, their conduct was not attributable to Iran. The Claims Tribunal
considered instead that the acts were attributable to Iran because the “Guards” or
“Komitehs” had acted as de facto State organs of Iran. On this point the Claims Tribunal
noted that:
many of Ayatollah Khomeini’s supporters were organised in local revolutionary
committees, so-called Komitehs, which often emerged from the ‘neighbourhood
committees’ formed before the victory of the revolution. These Komitehs served as local
security forces in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. It is reported that they made
arrests, confiscated property, and took people to prisons. …
Under international law Iran cannot, on the one hand, tolerate the exercise of
governmental authority by revolutionary ‘Komitehs’ or ‘Guards’ and at the same time
deny responsibility for wrongful acts committed by them146
127. With specific reference to the action of the “Guards” in the case at issue, the Claims
Tribunal emphasised that the two guards who had forced the Americans to leave their house
143 See Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports, 1987, vol. IV,
p. 92).
144 Ibid., para. 23.
145 Ibid., para. 37.
146 Ibid., paras 39, 45. The Claims Tribunal went on to note that:
“while there were complaints about a lack of discipline among the numerous Komitehs, Ayatollah
Khomeini stood behind them, and the Komitehs, in general, were loyal to him and the clergy. Soon
after the victory of the Revolution, the Komitehs, contrary to other groups, obtained a firm position
within the State structure and were eventually conferred a permanent place in the State budget” (ibid.,
para. 39; emphasis added).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
53
were “dressed in everyday clothes, but ?woreg distinctive arm bands indicating association
with the new Government, and ?wereg armed with rifles”.147 With reference to those who
had searched the Americans at the airport, the Claims Tribunal stressed that “they were
performing the functions of customs, immigration and security officers”.148 Clearly, those
“Guards” made up organised armed groups performing de facto official functions. They
were therefore different from the Iranian militants who had stormed the United States
Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979, with regard to which the International Court of
Justice noted that after the invasion of the Embassy they described themselves as “Muslim
Student Followers of the Imam’s Policy”.149 Be that as it may, what is notable is that the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal did not enquire as to whether specific instructions had
been issued to the “Guards” with regard to the forced expulsion of Americans.150 The
Claims Tribunal took the same stance in other cases.151
147 Ibid., paras. 12, 41.
148 Ibid., para. 61.
149 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1980), p. 13, para. 17.
150 The Claims Tribunal stated the following:
“The Tribunal finds sufficient evidence in the record to establish a presumption that revolutionary
‘Komitehs’ or ‘Guards’ after 11 February 1979 were acting in fact on behalf of the new government, or
at least exercised elements of governmental authority in the absence of official authorities, in
operations of which the new Government must have had knowledge and to which it did not specifically
object. Under those circumstances, and for the kind of measures involved here, the Respondent has the
burden of coming forward with evidence showing that members of ‘Komitehs’ or ‘Guards’ were in fact
not acting on its behalf, or were not exercising elements of government authority, or that it could not
control them”. (Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports,
1987, vol. IV. p. 92, at para. 43).
The Claims Tribunal went on to say:
“... Rather, the evidence suggests that the new government, despite occasional complaints about a
lack of discipline, stood behind them the Komitehs. The Tribunal is persuaded, therefore, that the
revolutionary ‘Komitehs’ or ‘Guards’ involved in this Case, were acting ‘for’ Iran.” (para. 44).
The Tribunal then concluded that:
“nor has the Respondent established that it could not control the revolutionary ‘Komitehs’ or
‘Guards’ in this operation namely, forcing foreigners to leave the country. Because the new
government accepted their activity in principle and their role in the maintenance of public security,
calls for more discipline, phrased in general rather than specific terms, do not meet the standard of
control required in order to effectively prevent these groups from committing wrongful acts against
United States nationals. Under international law Iran cannot, on the one hand, tolerate the exercise of
governmental authority by revolutionary ‘Komitehs’ or ‘Guards’ and at the same time deny
responsibility for wrongful acts committed by them” (para. 45).
151 See William L. Pereira Associates, Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 116-1-3, 5 Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal 1984, p. 198 at p. 226. See also Arthur Young and Company v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
Telecommunications Company of Iran, Social Security Organization of Iran, Award No. 338-484-1, 17 Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports, 1987, p. 245). Here the Claims Tribunal found that in the circumstances of the
case Iran was not responsible because there was no causal link between the action of the revolutionary guards
and the alleged breach of international law. However, the Claims Tribunal held that otherwise Iran might
have incurred international responsibility for acts of “armed men wearing patches on their pockets identifying
them as members of the revolutionary guards” (para. 53). A similar stand was taken in Schott v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, Award No. 474-268-1, 24 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports, 1990, p. 203 at para. 59.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
54
128. A similar approach was adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in
Loizidou v. Turkey152 (although in this case the question revolved around the possible
control of a sovereign State over a State entity, rather than control by a State over armed
forces operating in the territory of another State). The Court had to determine whether
Turkey was responsible for the continuous denial to the applicant of access to her property
in northern Cyprus and the ensuing loss of control over the property. The respondent State,
Turkey, denied that the Court had jurisdiction, on the grounds that the act complained of
was not committed by one of its authorities but, rather, was attributable to the authorities of
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (“TRNC”). The Court dismissed these arguments
and found that Turkey was responsible. In reaching the conclusion that the restrictions on
the right to property complained of by the applicant were attributable to Turkey, the Court
did not find it necessary to ascertain whether the Turkish authorities had exercised
“detailed” control over the specific “policies and actions” of the authorities of the “TRNC”.
The Court was satisfied by the showing that the local authorities were under the “effective
overall control” of Turkey.153
129. A substantially similar stand was recently taken in the Jorgic case by the
Oberlandesgericht of Düsseldorf in a decision of 26 September 1997.154 With regard to
crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Bosnian Serbs, the Court held that the
Bosnian Serbs fighting against the central authorities of Sarajevo had acted on behalf of the
FRY. To support this finding, the court emphasised that Belgrade financed, organised and
equipped the Bosnian Serb army and paramilitary units and that there existed between the
JNA and the Bosnian Serbs “a close personal, organisational and logistical interconnection
?Verflechtungg”, which was considered to be a sufficient basis for regarding the conflict as
In Daley, on the other hand, the Claims Tribunal held Iran responsible for the expropriation of a car, for the
five Iranian “Revolutionary Guards” who had taken the car were “in army-type uniforms” at the entrance of a
hotel which had come “under the control of Revolutionary Guards” a few days before. (Daley v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, Award No. 360-1-514-1, 18 Iran-U.S Claims Tribunal Reports, 1988, 232 at paras. 19-20).
152 Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), Eur. Court of H. R., Judgement of 18 December 1996 (40/1993/435/514).
153 In its judgement, the Court stated the following on the point at issue here:
“It is not necessary to determine whether, as the applicant and the Government of Cyprus have
suggested, Turkey actually exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of
the “TRNC”. It is obvious from the large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus
... that her army exercises effective overall control over that part of the island. Such control,
according to the relevant test and in the circumstances of the case, entails her responsibility for the
policies and actions of the ‘TRNC’ ...” (ibid., para. 56).
154 2 StE 8/96 (unpublished typescript; kindly provided by the German Embassy to the Netherlands and on file
with the International Tribunal’s Library).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
55
international.155 The court did not enquire as to whether or not the specific acts committed
by the accused or other Bosnian Serbs had been ordered by the authorities of the FRY.156
130. Precisely what measure of State control does international law require for organised
military groups? Judging from international case law and State practice, it would seem that
for such control to come about, it is not sufficient for the group to be financially or even
militarily assisted by a State. This proposition is confirmed by the international practice
concerning national liberation movements. Although some States provided movements
such as the PLO, SWAPO or the ANC with a territorial base or with economic and military
assistance (short of sending their own troops to aid them), other States, including those
against which these movements were fighting, did not attribute international responsibility
for the acts of the movements to the assisting States.157 Nicaragua also supports this
155 The Court stated the following:
“The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was an international conflict for the purposes of Article 2 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention. Owing to the declaration of independence and the referendum of 29
February and 1 March 1992 and to international recognition on 6 April 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina had
become an autonomous State, independent from Yugoslavia.
The armed conflict that took place on its territory in the following period was not an internal clash
(conflict), in which an ethnic group was trying to break with the existing State of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and which as a consequence had no international character. The expert witness Fischer pointed out
that, by using the term international humanitarian law applicable to this conflict, the United Nations
Security Council has used the term usual in international terminology to refer to the law applicable to
international armed conflicts. This according to the expert witness showed that the Security-Council
considered the conflict to be international. The expert witness Fischer cited the following
circumstances as indicia of an international conflict according to the prevailing view in international
law: the participation of organs of a State in a conflict on the territory of another State, e.g. the
participation of officers in the clashes, or the financing of and provision of technical equipment to one
party to the conflict by another State; the latter at least when it is combined with the aforementioned
interconnection Verflechtung between personnel. According to this Chamber’s findings, these criteria
are met in the case at hand. The Chamber has found that at the beginning of May officers of the JNA,
which at that time was purely Serb, began taking Doboj and the surrounding villages. There can,
therefore, be no doubt regarding the existence of an international armed conflict at that point in time.
However, this Chamber has further found that after 19 May 1992, when the JNA officially withdrew
from Bosnia-Herzegovina, officers of the JNA continued to be employed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
paid by Belgrade, and that at the end of May matériel, weapons and vehicles were still being brought
from Belgrade to Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a consequence, a close personal, organisational and
logistical interconnection Verflechtung of the Bosnian-Serb army, paramilitary groups and the JNA
persisted. The headquarters of the Bosnian-Serb army maintained a liaison office in Belgrade.”
(ibid., pp. 158-160 of the unpublished typescript; unofficial translation).
156 The Judgement of the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal was upheld on appeal by the Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof) by a judgement of 30 April 1999 (unpublished). The appeal was based, inter alia, on a
misapplication of substantive law. This ground also included the question of whether the conflict was
international in character. The Bundesgerichtshof did not address the matter specifically, thus implicitly
upholding the judgement of the Düsseldorf Court. (See, in particular, pp. 19-20 and 23 of the German
typescript (3 StR 215/98), on file with the International Tribunal library).
157 See e.g., the debates in the U.N. Security Council in 1976, on the raids of South Africa into Zambia to
destroy bases of the SWAPO (see in particular the statements of Zambia (SCOR, 1944th Meeting of 27 July
1976, paras. 10-45) and South Africa (ibid., paras. 47-69); see also SC resolution no. 393 (1976) of 30 July
1976)); see also the debates on the Israeli raids in Lebanon in June 1982 (in particular the statements of
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
56
proposition, since the United States, although it aided the contras financially, and otherwise,
was not held responsible for their acts (whereas on account of this financial and other
assistance to the contras, the United States was held by the Court to be responsible for
breaching the principle of non-intervention as well as “its obligation ?…g not to use force
against another State.”158 This was clearly a case of responsibility for the acts of its own
organs).
131. In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be
proved that the State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and
financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its
military activity. Only then can the State be held internationally accountable for any
misconduct of the group. However, it is not necessary that, in addition, the State should
also issue, either to the head or to members of the group, instructions for the commission of
specific acts contrary to international law.
132. It should be added that courts have taken a different approach with regard to
individuals or groups not organised into military structures. With regard to such
individuals or groups, courts have not considered an overall or general level of control to be
sufficient, but have instead insisted upon specific instructions or directives aimed at the
commission of specific acts, or have required public approval of those acts following their
commission.
133. The Appeals Chamber will mention, first of all, the United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran case.159 There, the International Court of Justice rightly found that
the Iranian students (who did not comprise an organised armed group) who had stormed the
United States embassy and taken hostage 52 United States nationals, had not initially acted
Ireland (SCOR, 2374th Meeting of 5 June 1982, paras. 35-36) and of Israel (ibid., paras. 74-78 and SCOR,
2375th Meeting of 6 June 1982, paras. 22-67) and in July-August 1982 (see the statement of Israel, SCOR,
2385th Meeting of 29 July 1982, paras. 144-169)); see also the debates on the South African raid in Lesotho in
December 1982 (see in particular the statements of France (SCOR, 2407th Meeting of 15 December 1982,
paras. 69-80), of Japan (ibid., paras. 98-107), of South Africa (SCOR, 2409th Meeting of 16 December 1982,
paras. 126-160) and of Lesotho (ibid., paras. 219-227)).
Although there does not seem to exist any international practice in this area, it may happen that a State simply
providing economic and military assistance to a military group (hence not necessarily exercising effective
control over the group) directs a member of the group or the whole group to perform a specific internationally
wrongful act, e.g. an international crime such as genocide. In this case one would face a situation similar to
that described above, in the text, of a State issuing specific instructions to an individual.
158 See Nicaragua, paras. 239-249, 292(3) and 292(4).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
57
on behalf of Iran, for the Iranian authorities had not specifically instructed them to perform
those acts.160 Nevertheless, Iran was held internationally responsible for failing to prevent
the attack on the United States’ diplomatic premises and subsequently to put an end to that
attack.161 Later on, the Iranian authorities formally approved and endorsed the occupation
of the Embassy and the detention of the United States nationals by the militants and even
went so far as to order the students not to put an end to that occupation. At this stage,
according to the Court, the militants became de facto agents of the Iranian State and their
acts became internationally attributable to that State.162
134. The same approach was adopted in 1986 by the International Court itself in
Nicaragua with regard to the UCLAs (which the Court defined as “persons of the
nationality of unidentified Latin American countries”).163 For specific internationally
wrongful acts of these “persons” to be imputable to the United States, it was deemed
necessary by the Court that these persons not only be paid by United States organs but also
act “on the instructions” of those organs (in addition to their being supervised and receiving
logistical support from them).164
159 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1980), pp. 3 ff.
160 The Court stated the following:
“No suggestion has been made that the militants, when they executed their attack on the Embassy, had
any form of official status as recognised ‘agents’ or organs of the Iranian State. Their conduct in
mounting the attack, overrunning the Embassy and seizing its inmates as hostages cannot, therefore, be
regarded as imputable to that State on that basis. Their conduct might be considered as itself directly
imputable to the Iranian State only if it were established that, in fact, on the occasion in question the
militants acted on behalf of the State, having been charged by some competent organ of the Iranian
State to carry out a specific operation. The information before the Court does not, however, suffice to
establish with the requisite certainty the existence at that time of such a link between the militants and
any competent organ of the State” (ibid., p. 30, para. 58; emphasis added).
161 Ibid., pp. 30-33 (paras. 60-68).
162 The Court stated the following:
“The policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, of maintaining the occupation of the Embassy
and the detention of its inmates as hostages for the purpose of exerting pressure on the United States
Government was complied with by other Iranian authorities and endorsed by them repeatedly in
statements made in various contexts. The result of that policy was fundamentally to transform the legal
nature of the situation created by the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic and
consular staff as hostages. The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other
organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the
Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State. The militants, authors of the invasion
and jailers of the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian State for whose acts the State itself
was internationally responsible ….” (ibid., p. 35, para. 74; emphasis added).
163 See Nicaragua, para. 75.
164 Ibid., para. 80.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
58
135. Similar views were propounded in 1987 by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
in Short.165 Iran was not held internationally responsible for the allegedly wrongful
expulsion of the claimant. The Claims Tribunal found that the Iranian “revolutionaries”
(armed but not comprising an organised group) who ordered the claimant’s departure from
Iran were not State organs, nor did Ayatollah Khomeini’s declarations amount to specific
incitement to the “revolutionaries” to expel foreigners.166
136. It should be added that State practice also seems to clearly support the approach
under discussion.167
137. In sum, the Appeals Chamber holds the view that international rules do not always
require the same degree of control over armed groups or private individuals for the purpose
of determining whether an individual not having the status of a State official under internal
legislation can be regarded as a de facto organ of the State. The extent of the requisite State
control varies. Where the question at issue is whether a single private individual or a group
that is not militarily organised has acted as a de facto State organ when performing a
165 Alfred W. Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 312-11135-3, 16 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Reports 1987, p. 76).
166 After finding that the acts of the revolutionaries could not be attributed to Iran, the Claims Tribunal noted
the following:
“The Claimant’s reliance on the declarations made by the leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah
Khomeini, and other spokesmen of the revolutionary movement, also lack the essential ingredient as
being the cause for the Claimant’s departure in circumstances amounting to an expulsion. While these
statements are of anti-foreign and in particular anti-American sentiment, the Tribunal notes that these
pronouncements were of a general nature and did not specify that Americans should be expelled en
masse.” (ibid., para. 35).
167 For examples of State practice apparently adopting this approach to the question of attribution, see for
instance the relevant documents in the Cesare Rossi case (an Italian antifascist staying in Switzerland who was
lured by two other Italians acting on behalf of the Italian authorities into crossing the border with Italy, where
he was arrested: see 1 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1929, pp. 280-294); the
Jacob Salomon case (a German national was kidnapped by another German national in Switzerland and taken
to Germany: see the relevant documents mentioned in 29 American Journal of International Law 1935, pp.
502-507, 36 American Journal of International Law 1936, pp.123-124). See further the Sabotage cases
decided by the United States-Germany Mixed Claims Commission (Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., Agency of
Canadian Can and Foundry Co., Ltd., and various underwriters (United States) v. Germany, Reports of
International Arbitral Awards, vol. VIII, pp. 84 ff. (especially pp. 84-87) and pp. 225 ff. (especially 457-460).
In these cases, in July 1916 some individuals, at the request of the German authorities intent on bringing about
sabotage in the United States, had set fire to a terminal in New York harbour and to a plant of a company in
New Jersey.
Mention can also be made of the Eichmann case (Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf
Eichmann, 36 International Law Reports 1968, pp. 277-344): see for instance Security Council resolution
4349 of 23 June 1960 and the debates in the Security Council; see in particular the statements of Argentina
(SCOR, 865th Meeting of 22 June 1960, paras. 25-27), of Israel (SCOR of the 866th Meeting on 22 June
1960, para. 41), of Italy (SCOR of the 867th Meeting of 23 June 1960, paras. 32-34), of Ecuador (ibid., paras.
47-49), of Tunisia (ibid., para. 73) and of Ceylon (SCOR of the 868th Meeting of 23 June 1960, paras. 12-13).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
59
specific act, it is necessary to ascertain whether specific instructions concerning the
commission of that particular act had been issued by that State to the individual or group in
question; alternatively, it must be established whether the unlawful act had been publicly
endorsed or approved ex post facto by the State at issue. By contrast, control by a State
over subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary units may be of an overall
character (and must comprise more than the mere provision of financial assistance or
military equipment or training). This requirement, however, does not go so far as to include
the issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each individual operation.
Under international law it is by no means necessary that the controlling authorities should
plan all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific
instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and any alleged violations of
international humanitarian law. The control required by international law may be deemed
to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a
role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in
addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group.
Acts performed by the group or members thereof may be regarded as acts of de facto State
organs regardless of any specific instruction by the controlling State concerning the
commission of each of those acts.
138. Of course, if, as in Nicaragua, the controlling State is not the territorial State where
the armed clashes occur or where at any rate the armed units perform their acts, more
extensive and compelling evidence is required to show that the State is genuinely in control
of the units or groups not merely by financing and equipping them, but also by generally
directing or helping plan their actions.
139. The same substantial evidence is required when, although the State in question is the
territorial State where armed clashes occur, the general situation is one of turmoil, civil
strife and weakened State authority.
140. Where the controlling State in question is an adjacent State with territorial ambitions
on the State where the conflict is taking place, and the controlling State is attempting to
In many of these cases, the need for specific instructions by the State concerning the commission of the
specific act with which the individual had been charged, or the ex post facto public endorsement of that act,
can be inferred from the facts of the case.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
60
achieve its territorial enlargement through the armed forces which it controls, it may be
easier to establish the threshold.
141. It should be added that international law does not provide only for a test of overall
control applying to armed groups and that of specific instructions (or subsequent public
approval), applying to single individuals or militarily unorganised groups. The Appeals
Chamber holds the view that international law also embraces a third test. This test is the
assimilation of individuals to State organs on account of their actual behaviour within the
structure of a State (and regardless of any possible requirement of State instructions). Such
a test is best illustrated by reference to certain cases that deserve to be mentioned, if only
briefly.168
142. The first case is Joseph Kramer et al. (also called the Belsen case), brought before a
British military court sitting at Luneburg (Germany).169 The Defendants comprised not
only some German staff members of the Belsen and Auschwitz concentration camps but
also a number of camp inmates of Polish nationality and an Austrian Jew “elevated by the
camp administrators to positions of authority over the other internees”. They were inter
alia accused of murder and other offences against the camp inmates. According to the
official report on this case:
In meeting the argument that no war crime could be committed by Poles against other
Allied nationals, the Prosecutor said that by identifying themselves with the authorities
the Polish accused had made themselves as much responsible as the S.S. themselves.
Perhaps it could be claimed that by the same process they could be regarded as having
approximated to membership of the armed forces of Germany.170
143. Another case is more recent. This is the judgement handed down by the Dutch
Court of Cassation on 29 May 1978 in the Menten case.171 Menten, a Dutch national who
was not formally a member of the German forces, had been accused of war crimes and
crimes against humanity for having killed a number of civilians, mostly Jews, in Poland, on
168 These cases, although they concern war crimes (the notion of “grave breaches” had not yet come into
existence at the time), are nevertheless relevant to our discussion. Indeed, they provide useful indications
concerning the conditions on which civilians may be assimilated to State officials.
169 Trial of Joseph Kramer and 44 Others, British Military Court, Luneberg, 17th September-17th November,
1945, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes
Commission, Published for the United Nations War Crimes Commission by His Majesty’s Stationary Office,
London 1947 (“UNWCC”), vol. II, p. 1.
170 Ibid., p. 152 (emphasis added) (the Austrian civilian, Schlomowicz, was not found guilty). See also ibid.,
p. 109. Most of the accused civilians were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment. It is clear from this
case that according to the court, by acting as de facto members of the German apparatus running the Belsen
concentration camp, the Polish civilians could be assimilated to German State officials.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
61
behalf of German special forces (SD or Einsatzkommandos). The court found172 that
Menten in fact behaved as a member of the German forces and consequently was criminally
liable for these crimes.173
144. Other cases also prove that private individuals acting within the framework of, or in
connection with, armed forces, or in collusion with State authorities may be regarded as de
facto State organs.174 In these cases it follows that the acts of such individuals are attributed
to the State, as far as State responsibility is concerned, and may also generate individual
criminal responsibility.175
171 Public Prosecutor v. Menten, 75 International Law Reports 1987, pp. 331 ff.
172 The court stated the following:
“Since Menten, on the orders of the Befehlshaber of the Sicherheitspolizei in Poland, was dressed in the
uniform of an under-officer of this branch of the German police when he was dem Einsatzkommando
als Dolmetscher zugeteilt assigned to the Special forces as interpreter, the District Court of
Amsterdam in its judgement of 14 December 1977 was justified in assuming that his position in the
Einsatzkommando and his performance in within it of a more or less official character. Thus the
relationship to the enemy in which Menten rendered incidental services was of such a nature that he
could be regarded as a functionary of the enemy.” (ibid., p. 347. The English translation has been
slightly corrected by the Appeals Chamber to bring it into line with the Dutch original, which can be
found in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1978, no. 358, p. 1236).
The court concluded that:
“from the above-mentioned evidence, taken together with the other evidence that in July 1941 Menten,
dressed in a German uniform and in company with a number of other persons also so dressed, came to
Podhorodce ... and was present at the killings, it can be inferred that he was there with members of
the German Staff and that he rendered services to this Staff at the time of and in connection with these
killings.” (ibid., p. 348).
173 Menten was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment by the District Court of Rotterdam (Judgement of 9 July
1980, ibid., p. 361). It should be pointed out that the Dutch Court of Cassation had been obliged to investigate
whether Menten was "in military, state or public service of or with the enemy" as this was an ingredient of the
relevant Dutch law (ibid., p. 346). The Appeals Chamber holds, however, that the Menten case is in line with
the rules of general international law concerning the assimilation of private individuals to State officials.
174 See, e.g., the Daley case, where the Iran U.S. Claims Tribunal attributed international responsibility to Iran
for acts of five Iranian “Revolutionary Guards” in “army type uniforms” (18 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Reports, 1988, p. 238, at para. 19).
175 In this connection mention can be made of the Stocké case brought before the European Commission of
Human Rights. A German national fled from Germany to Switzerland and then to France to avoid arrest in
Germany for alleged tax offences. He was then tricked into re-entering Germany by a police informant and
was arrested. He then claimed before the European Commission of Human Rights that he had been arrested in
violation of Article 5(1) of the ECHR. The Commission held that:
“in the case of collusion between State authorities, i.e. any State official irrespective of his
hierarchical position, and a private individual for the purpose of returning against his will a person
living abroad, without consent of his State of residence, to the territory where he is prosecuted, the
High Contracting Party concerned incurs responsibility for the acts of the private individual who de
facto acts on its behalf. The Commission considers that such circumstances may render this person’s
arrest and detention unlawful within the meaning of article 5(1) of the Convention” (Stocké v. Federal
Republic of Germany, Eur. Court H. R., judgement of 19 March 1991, Series A, no 199, para. 168
(Opinion of the Commission).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
62
145. In the light of the above discussion, the following conclusion may be safely reached.
In the case at issue, given that the Bosnian Serb armed forces constituted a “military
organization”, the control of the FRY authorities over these armed forces required by
international law for considering the armed conflict to be international was overall control
going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces and involving also
participation in the planning and supervision of military operations. By contrast,
international rules do not require that such control should extend to the issuance of specific
orders or instructions relating to single military actions, whether or not such actions were
contrary to international humanitarian law.
4. The Factual Relationship Between the Bosnian Serb Army and the Army of the FRY
146. The Appeals Chamber has concluded that in general international law, three tests
may be applied for determining whether an individual is acting as a de facto State organ. In
the case of individuals forming part of armed forces or military units, as in the case of any
other hierarchically organised group, the test is that of overall control by the State.
147. It now falls to the Appeals Chamber to establish whether, in the circumstances of the
case, the Yugoslav Army exercised in 1992 the requisite measure of control over the
Bosnian Serb Army. The answer must be in the affirmative.
148. The Appeals Chamber does not see any ground for overturning the factual findings
made in this case by the Trial Chamber and relies on the facts as stated in the Judgement.
The majority and Judge McDonald do not appear to disagree on the facts, which Judge
McDonald also takes as stated in the Judgement,176 but only on the legal interpretation to be
given to those facts.
149. Since, however, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber applied an
incorrect standard in evaluating the legal consequences of the relationship between the FRY
Although these cases concerned State responsibility, they may be relevant to the question of the criminal
responsibility of individuals perpetrating grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, inasmuch as they set out
the conditions necessary for individuals to be considered as de facto State organs.
176 See Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, para. 1: “I completely agree with and share in
the Opinion and Judgment with the exception of the determination that Article 2 of the Statute is inapplicable
to the charges against the accused.”
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
63
and Bosnian Serb forces, the Appeals Chamber must now apply its foregoing analysis to the
facts and draw the necessary legal conclusions therefrom.
150. The Trial Chamber clearly found that even after 19 May 1992, the command
structure of the JNA did not change after it was renamed and redesignated as the VJ.
Furthermore, and more importantly, it is apparent from the decision of the Trial Chamber
and more particularly from the evidence as evaluated by Judge McDonald in her Separate
and Dissenting Opinion, that even after that date the VJ continued to control the Bosnian
Serb Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is the VRS. The VJ controlled the political and
military objectives, as well as the military operations, of the VRS. Two “factors”
emphasised in the Judgement need to be recalled: first, “the transfer to the 1st Krajina
Corps, as with other units of the VRS, of former JNA Officers who were not of Bosnian
Serb extraction from their equivalent postings in the relevant VRS unit’s JNA
predecessor”177 and second, with respect to the VRS, “the continuing payment of salaries, to
Bosnian Serb and non-Bosnian Serb officers alike, by the Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”.178 According to the Trial Chamber,
these two factors did not amount to, or were not indicative of, effective control by Belgrade
over the Bosnian Serb forces.179 The Appeals Chamber shares instead the views set out by
Judge McDonald in her Separate and Dissenting Opinion, whereby these two factors, in
addition to others shown by the Prosecution, did indicate control.180
151. What emerges from the facts which are both uncontested by the Trial Chamber and
mentioned by Judge McDonald (concerning the command and control structure that
177 Judgement, para. 601.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid., paras. 601-602.
180 As Judge McDonald noted:
“the creation of the VRS after 19 May 1992 was a legal fiction. The only changes made after the 15
May 1992 Security Council resolution were the transfer of troops, the establishment of a Main Staff of
the VRS, a change in the name of the military organisation and individual units, and a change in the
insignia. There remained the same weapons, the same equipment, the same officers, the same
commanders, largely the same troops, the same logistics centres, the same suppliers, the same
infrastructure, the same source of payments, the same goals and mission, the same tactics, and the same
operations. Importantly, the objective remained the same … The VRS clearly continued to operate as
an integrated and instrumental part of the Serbian war effort. … The VRS Main Staff, the members
of which had all been generals in the JNA and many of whom were appointed to their positions by the
JNA General Staff, maintained direct communications with the VJ General Staff via a communications
link from Belgrade. … Moreover, the VRS continued to receive supplies from the same suppliers in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) who had contracted with the JNA,
although the requests after 19 May 1992 went through the Chief of Staff of the VRS who then sent
them onto Belgrade.” (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, paras. 7-8).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
64
persisted after the redesignation of the VRS and the continuous payment of salaries to
officers of the Bosnian Serb army by the FRY) is that the VRS and VJ did not, after May
1992, comprise two separate armies in any genuine sense. This is further evidenced by the
following factors:
(i) The re-organization of the JNA and the change of name did not point to an
alteration of military objectives and strategies. The command structure of the JNA
and the re-designation of a part of the JNA as the VRS, while undertaken to create
the appearance of compliance with international demands, was in fact designed to
ensure that a large number of ethnic Serb armed forces were retained in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.181
(ii) Over and above the extensive financial, logistical and other assistance and
support which were acknowledged to have been provided by the VJ to the VRS, it
was also uncontested by the Trial Chamber that as a creation of the FRY/VJ, the
structures and ranks of the VJ and VRS were identical, and also that the FRY/VJ
directed and supervised the activities and operations of the VRS.182 As a result, the
VRS reflected the strategies and tactics devised by the FRY/JNA/VJ.
181 In the light of the demand of the Security Council on 15 May 1992 that all interference from outside Bosnia
and Herzegovina by units of the JNA cease immediately, the Trial Chamber characterised the dilemma posed
for the JNA by increasing international scrutiny from 1991 onwards in terms of the way in which the JNA
could:
“be converted into an army of what remained of Yugoslavia, namely Serbia and Montenegro, yet
continue to retain in Serb hands control of substantial portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina while
appearing to comply with international demands that the JNA quit Bosnia and Herzegovina. … The
solution as far as Serbia was concerned was found by transferring to Bosnia and Herzegovina all
Bosnian Serb soldiers serving in JNA units elsewhere while sending all non-Bosnian soldiers out of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This ensured seeming compliance with international demands while
effectively retaining large ethnic Serb armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina“ (Judgement, paras.
113-114).
Additionally, the U.N. Secretary-General, in commenting on its purported withdrawal from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, concluded in his report of 3 December 1992 that “though JNA has withdrawn completely from
Bosnia and Herzegovina, former members of Bosnian Serb origin have been left behind with their equipment
and constitute the Army of the ‘Serb Republic’” (Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. Doc. A/47/747, para. 10).
182 Judgement, para. 115:
“?Tghe VRS was in effect a product of the dissolution of the old JNA and the withdrawal of its non-
Bosnian elements into Serbia. However, most, if not all, of the commanding officers of units of the old
JNA who found themselves stationed with their units in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 18 May 1992,
nearly all Serbs, remained in command of those units throughout 1992 and 1993 …”.
See further ibid., para. 590: “The attack on Kozarac was carried out by elements of an army Corps based in
Banja Luka. This Corps, previously a Corps of the old JNA, became part of the VRS and was renamed the
‘Banja Luka’ or ‘1st Krajina’ Corps after 19 May 1992 but retained the same commander.” See also ibid.,
paras. 114-116, 118-121, 594.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
65
(iii) Elements of the FRY/VJ continued to directly intervene in the conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina after 19 May 1992, and were fighting with the VRS and
providing critical combat support to the VRS. While an armed conflict of an
international character was held to have existed only up until 19 May 1992, the Trial
Chamber did nevertheless accept that thereafter “active elements” of the FRY’s
armed forces, the Yugoslav Army (VJ), continued to be involved in an armed
conflict with Bosnia and Herzegovina.183 Much de facto continuity, in terms of the
ongoing hostilities,184 was therefore observable and there seems to have been little
factual basis for the Trial Chamber’s finding that by 19 May 1992, the FRY/VJ had
lost control over the VRS.185
(iv) JNA military operations under the command of Belgrade that had already
commenced by 19 May 1992 did not cease immediately and, from a purely practical
point of view, it is highly unlikely that they would have been able to cease overnight
in any event.186
183 Ibid., para. 118 (“Despite the announced JNA withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 1992,
active elements of what had been the JNA, now rechristened as the VJ … remained in Bosnia and
Herzegovina after the May withdrawal and worked with the VRS throughout 1992 and 1993”) and para. 569
(“… the forces of the VJ continued to be involved in the armed conflict after that date”).
184 See in particular ibid., para. 566:
“The ongoing conflicts before, during and after the time of the attack on Kozarac on 24 May 1992 were
taking place and continued to take place throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina between
the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
the Bosnian Serb forces, elements of the VJ operating from time to time in the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and various paramilitary groups, all of which occupied or were proceeding to occupy a
significant portion of the territory of that State.”
See also para. 579: “?Tghe take-over of opština Prijedor began before the JNA withdrawal on 19 May 1992
and was not completed until after that date”. See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald who noted
“?tghe continuity between the JNA and the VRS particularly as it relates to the military operations in the
Opština Prijedor area ….” (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, para. 15).
185 Moreover, it is interesting to observe that while concluding that by 19 May 1992 effective control over the
VRS had been lost by the JNA/VJ, the Trial Chamber simultaneously observed that such control nevertheless
did not appear to have been regained by the Bosnian authorities. In particular, the Trial Chamber found that
the “Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina … faced … major problems … of defence,
involving control over the mobilization and operations of the armed forces” (Judgement, para. 124, emphasis
added).
186 In and of itself, the logistical difficulties of disengaging from the conflict and withdrawing such a large
force would have been considerable. With regard to the extent and depth of the involvement of the large
number of JNA forces engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ongoing nature of their activities beyond
19 May 1992, see ibid., paras. 124-125: “By early 1992 there were some 100,000 JNA troops in Bosnia and
Herzegovina with over 700 tanks, 1,000 armoured personnel carriers, much heavy weaponry, 100 planes and
500 helicopters, all under the command of the General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade. … On 19 May 1992 the
withdrawal of JNA forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced but the attacks were continued by the
VRS.”
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
66
The creation of the VRS by the FRY/VJ, therefore, did not indicate an intention by
Belgrade to relinquish the control held by the FRY/VJ over the Bosnian Serb army. To the
contrary, in fact, the establishment of the VRS was undertaken to continue the pursuit of the
FRY’s own political and military objectives, and the evidence demonstrates that these
objectives were implemented by military and political operations that were controlled by
Belgrade and the JNA/VJ. There is no evidence to suggest that these objectives changed on
19 May 1992.187
152. Taken together, these factors suggest that the relationship between the VJ and VRS
cannot be characterised as one of merely coordinating political and military activities. Even
if less explicit forms of command over military operations were practised and adopted in
response to increased international scrutiny, the link between the VJ and VRS clearly went
far beyond mere coordination or cooperation between allies and in effect, the renamed
Bosnian Serb army still comprised one army under the command of the General Staff of the
VJ in Belgrade.188 It was apparent that even after 19 May 1992 the Bosnian Serb army
continued to act in pursuance of the military goals formulated in Belgrade. In this regard,
clear evidence of a chain of military command between Belgrade and Pale was presented to
the Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber accepted that the VRS Main Staff had links and
regular communications with Belgrade.189 In spite of this, and although the Trial Chamber
acknowledged the possibility that certain members of the VRS may have been specifically
187 See in particular ibid., para. 116 (citing the 1993 publication of the former Yugoslav Federal Secretary for
Defence, General Veljko Kadijevi}, entitled My view of the Break-up: an Army without a State (Prosecution
Exhibit 30)):
“?Tghe units and headquarters of the JNA formed the backbone of the army of the Serb Republic
(Republic of Srpska) complete with weaponry and equipment … ?Fgirst the JNA and later the army of
the Republic of Srpska, which the JNA put on its feet, helped to liberate Serb territory, protect the Serb
nation and create the favourable military preconditions for achieving the interests and rights of the Serb
nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina…”.
See also para. 590:
“The occupation of Kozarac and of the surrounding villages was part of a military and political
operation, begun before 19 May 1992 with the take-over of the town of Prijedor of 29 April 1992,
aimed at establishing control over the opština which formed part of the land corridor of Bosnian
territory linking the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with the so-called
Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia.”
188 While the relationship between the JNA and VRS may have included coordination and cooperation, it
cannot be seen as limited to this. As the Trial Chamber itself noted: “In 1991 and on into 1992 the Bosnian
Serb and Croatian Serb paramilitary forces cooperated with and acted under the command and within the
framework of the JNA.”(ibid., para. 593; emphasis added).
189 Ibid., para. 598:
“The Trial Chamber has already considered the overwhelming importance of the logistical support
provided by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the VRS. … In
addition to routing all high-level VRS communications through secure links in Belgrade, a
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
67
charged by the FRY authorities to commit particular acts or to carry out particular tasks of
some kind, it concluded that “without evidence of orders having been received from
Belgrade which circumvented or overrode the authority of the Corps Commander, those
acts cannot be said to have been carried out ‘on behalf of’ the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”190
153. The Appeals Chamber holds that to have required proof of specific orders
circumventing or overriding superior orders not only applies the wrong test but is also
questionable in this context. A distinguishing feature of the VJ and the VRS was that they
possessed shared military objectives. As a result, it is inherently unlikely that orders from
Belgrade circumventing or overriding the authority of local Corps commanders would have
ever been necessary as these forces were of the same mind; a point that appears to have
been virtually conceded by the Trial Chamber.191
154. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber, noting that the pay of all 1st Krajina Corps officers
and presumably of all senior VRS Commanders as former JNA officers continued to be
received from Belgrade after 19 May 1992, acknowledged that a possible conclusion with
regard to individuals, is that payment could well “be equated with control”.192 The Trial
Chamber nevertheless dismissed such continuity of command structures, logistical
organization, strategy and tactics as being “as much matters of convenience as military
communications link for everyday use was established and maintained between VRS Main Staff
Headquarters and the VJ Main Staff in Belgrade ….”
190 Ibid., para. 601.
191 The Trial Chamber noted that:
“?igt is clear from the evidence that the military and political objectives of the Republika Srpska and of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were largely complementary. …g The
… political leadership of the Republika Srpska and their senior military commanders no doubt
considered the success of the overall Serbian war effort as a prerequisite to their stated political aim of
joining with Serbia and Montenegro as part of a Greater Serbia. … In that sense, there was little need
for the VJ and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to
attempt to exercise any real degree of control over, as distinct from coordination with, the VRS. So
long as the Republika Srpska and the VRS remained committed to the shared strategic objectives of the
war, and the Main Staffs of the two armies could coordinate their activities at the highest levels, it was
sufficient for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the VJ to provide the
VRS with logistical supplies and, where necessary, to supplement the Bosnian elements of the VRS
officer corps with non-Bosnian VJ or former JNA officers, to ensure that this process was continued”
(ibid., paras. 603-604).
192 Ibid., para. 602. On this point, the Trial Chamber noted, further, that:
“given that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had taken responsibility for
the financing of the VRS, most of which consisted of former JNA soldiers and officers, it is a fact not
to be wondered at that such financing would not only include payments to soldiers and officers but that
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
68
necessity” and noted that such evidence “establishes nothing more than the potential for
control inherent in the relationship of dependency which such financing produced.”193 In
the Appeals Chamber’s view, however, and while the evidence may not have disclosed the
exact details of how the VRS related to the main command in Belgrade, it is nevertheless
important to bear in mind that a clear intention existed to mask the commanding role of the
FRY; a point which was amply demonstrated by the Prosecution.194 In the view of the
Appeals Chamber, the finding of the Trial Chamber that the relationship between the
FRY/VJ and VRS amounted to cooperation and coordination rather than overall control
suffered from having taken largely at face value those features which had been put in place
intentionally by Belgrade to make it seem as if their links with Pale were as partners acting
only in cooperation with each other. Such an approach is not only flawed in the specific
circumstances of this case, but also potentially harmful in the generality of cases. Undue
emphasis upon the ostensible structures and overt declarations of the belligerents, as
opposed to a nuanced analysis of the reality of their relationship, may tacitly suggest to
groups who are in de facto control of military forces that responsibility for the acts of such
forces can be evaded merely by resort to a superficial restructuring of such forces or by a
facile declaration that the reconstituted forces are henceforth independent of their erstwhile
sponsors.
155. Finally, it must be noted that the Trial Chamber found the various forms of
assistance provided to the armed forces of the Republika Srpska by the Government of the
FRY to have been “crucial” to the pursuit of their activities and that “those forces were
almost completely dependent on the supplies of the VJ to carry out offensive operations.”195
Despite this finding, the Trial Chamber declined to make a finding of overall control. Much
was made of the lack of concrete evidence of specific instructions. Proof of “effective”
control was also held to be insufficient,196 on the grounds, once again, that the Trial
Chamber lacked explicit evidence of direct instructions having been issued from
existing administrative mechanisms for financing those soldiers and their operations would be relied on
after 19 May 1992….” (ibid.).
193 Ibid.
194 See in this regard the testimony of the expert witness Dr. James Gow, transcript of hearing in The
Prosecutor v. Du{ko Tadi}, Case No.: IT-94-1-T, 10 May 1996, pp. 308-309; ibid., 13 May 1996, pp. 330-338.
195 Judgement, para. 605.
196 It was deemed insufficient by the Trial Chamber that the VJ “‘made use of the potential for control
inherent in that dependence’, or was otherwise given effective control over those forces …” (ibid.; emphasis
added).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
69
Belgrade.197 However, this finding was based upon the Trial Chamber having applied the
wrong test.
156. As the Appeals Chamber has already pointed out, international law does not require
that the particular acts in question should be the subject of specific instructions or directives
by a foreign State to certain armed forces in order for these armed forces to be held to be
acting as de facto organs of that State. It follows that in the circumstances of the case it was
not necessary to show that those specific operations carried out by the Bosnian Serb forces
which were the object of the trial (the attacks on Kozarac and more generally within opština
Prijedor) had been specifically ordered or planned by the Yugoslav Army. It is sufficient to
show that this Army exercised overall control over the Bosnian Serb Forces. This showing
has been made by the Prosecution before the Trial Chamber. Such control manifested itself
not only in financial, logistical and other assistance and support, but also, and more
importantly, in terms of participation in the general direction, coordination and supervision
of the activities and operations of the VRS. This sort of control is sufficient for the
purposes of the legal criteria required by international law.
157. An ex post facto confirmation of the fact that over the years (and in any event
between 1992 and 1995) the FRY wielded general control over the Republika Srpska in the
political and military spheres can be found in the process of negotiation and conclusion of
the Dayton-Paris Accord of 1995. Of course, the conclusion of the Dayton-Paris Accord in
1995 cannot constitute direct proof of the nature of the link that existed between the
Bosnian Serb and FRY armies after May 1992 and hence it is by no means decisive as to the
issue of control in this period. Nevertheless, the Dayton-Paris Accord may be seen as the
culmination of a long process. This process necessitated a dialogue with all political and
military forces wielding actual power on the ground (whether de facto or de iure) and a
continuous response to the shifting military and political fortunes of these forces. The
political process leading up to Dayton commenced soon after the outbreak of hostilities and
was ongoing during the key period under examination. To the extent that its contours were
shaped by, and thus reflect, the actual power structures which persisted in Bosnia and
197 The Trial Chamber noted that:
“the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), through the dependence of the VRS on
the supply of matériel by the VJ, had the capability to exercise great influence and perhaps even control
over the VRS … ?Howeverg there is no evidence on which this Trial Chamber can conclude that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the VJ ever directed or, for that matter,
ever felt the need to attempt to direct, the actual military operations of the VRS …” (ibid.).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
70
Herzegovina over the course of the conflict, the Dayton-Paris Accord provides a particular
insight into the political, strategic and military realities which prevailed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina up to 1995, and including May 1992. The fact that from 4 August 1994 the
FRY appeared to cut off its support to the Republika Srpska because the leadership of the
former had misgivings about the authorities in the latter is not insignificant.198 Indeed, this
“delinking” served to emphasise the high degree of overall control exercised over the
Republika Srpska by the FRY, for, soon after this cessation of support from the FRY, the
Republika Srpska realised that it had little choice but to succumb to the authority of the
FRY.199 Thus, the Dayton-Paris Accord may indirectly shed light upon the realities of the
command and control structure that existed over the Bosnian Serb army at the time the VRS
and the VJ were ostensibly delinked, and may also assist the evaluation of whether or not
control continued to be exercised over the Bosnian Serb army by the FRY army thereafter.
158. The Appeals Chamber will now turn to examine the specific features of the Dayton
Accord that are of relevance to this inquiry.
159. By an agreement concluded on 29 August 1995 between the FRY and the Republika
Srpska and referred to in the preamble of the Dayton-Paris Accord, it was provided that a
unified delegation would negotiate at Dayton. This delegation would consist of six persons,
three from the FRY and three from the Republika Srpska. The Delegation was to be chaired
198 See Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia on the establishment and commencement of operations of an International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), S/1994/1074,
19 September 1996, p. 3, where it is noted that as of 4 August 1994, the Government of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ordered, inter alia, the breaking off of political and economic
relations with the Republika Srpska and the closure of the border between the Republika Srpska and the FRY
to all transport towards the Republika Srpska, except food, clothing and medicine. International observers
were deployed to monitor compliance with these measures, and it was reported by the Co-Chairmen that the
Government of the FRY appeared to be “meeting its commitment to close the border between the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces.” (Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the state of implementation of the border closure
measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),
S/1994/1124, 3 October 1994, pp. 2-3).
199 As outlined below, this process culminated in the agreement of the Republika Srpska to be represented at
the Dayton conference by the FRY (below, at paragraph 159). This appears to have been in spite of intense
opposition, within the Republika Srpska, to the peace settlements proposed by the international community, as
is evidenced by the overwhelming rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the international community’s peace plan
for Bosnia and Herzegovina in a referendum which took place in Bosnian Serb-held territory on 27 – 28
August 1994 (See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UNGAOR, 49th sess.,
supp. no. 1 (A/49/1), 2 September 1994, p. 95).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
71
by President Milo{evi}, who would have a casting vote in case of divided votes.200 Later
on, when it came to the signing of the various agreements made at Dayton, it emerged again
that it was the FRY that in many respects acted as the international subject wielding
authority over the Republika Srpska. The General Framework Agreement, by which Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY endorsed the various annexed Agreements and
undertook to respect and promote the fulfilment of their provisions, was signed by President
Milo{evi}. This signature had the effect of guaranteeing respect for these commitments by
the Republika Srpska. Furthermore, by a letter of 21 November 1995 addressed to various
States (the United States, Russia, Germany, France and the United Kingdom), the FRY
pledged to take “all necessary steps, consistent with the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to ensure that the Republika Srpska fully
respects and complies with the provisions” of the Agreement on Military Aspects of the
Peace Settlement (Annex 1A to the Dayton-Paris Accord).201 In addition, the letter by
which the Republika Srpska undertook to comply with the aforementioned Agreement was
signed on 21 November 1995 by the Foreign Minister of the FRY, Mr. Milutinovi}, for the
Republika Srpska.202
160. All this would seem to bear out the proposition that in actual fact, at least between
1992 and 1995, overall political and military authority over the Republika Srpska was held
by the FRY (control in this context included participation in the planning and supervision of
ongoing military operations). Indeed, the fact that it was the FRY that had the final say
regarding the undertaking of international commitments by the Republika Srpska, and in
addition pledged, at the end of the conflict, to ensure respect for those international
commitments by the Republika Srpska, confirms that (i) during the armed conflict the FRY
exercised control over that entity, and (ii) such control persisted until the end of the conflict.
200 This agreement stipulated that the delegation of the Republika Srpska was to be “headed by the President
of the Republic of Serbia Mr. Slobodan Miloševic” (Article 2). Pursuant to this agreement, the leadership of
the Republika Srpska agreed “to adopt the binding decisions of the delegation, regarding the Peace Plan, in
plenary sessions, by simple majority. In the case of divided votes, the vote of the President,
Mr. Slobodan Miloševic, shall be decisive” (Article 3). That Mr. Miloševic was head of the joint delegation
was confirmed by Mr. Miloševic himself in his letter of 21 November 1995 to President Izetbegovi}
concerning Annex 9 to the Dayton-Paris Accord. (Agreement on file with the International Tribunal’s
Library).
201 This letter had been signed by Mr. Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the FRY, following a request of 20
November 1995 of the three members of the “Delegation of Republika Srpska” to Mr. Miloševic.
202 See the texts of the Dayton-Paris Accord (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, initialled by the parties on 21 November 1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/790, S/1995/999, 30 November
1995).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
72
161. This would therefore constitute yet another (albeit indirect) indication of the
subordinate role played vis-à-vis the FRY by the Republika Srpska and its officials in the
aforementioned period, including 1992.
162. The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that, for the period material to this case
(1992), the armed forces of the Republika Srpska were to be regarded as acting under the
overall control of and on behalf of the FRY. Hence, even after 19 May 1992 the armed
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Bosnian Serbs and the central authorities of
Bosnia and Herzegovina must be classified as an international armed conflict.
5. The Status of the Victims
163. Having established that in the circumstances of the case the first of the two
requirements set out in Article 2 of the Statute for the grave breaches provisions to be
applicable, namely, that the armed conflict be international, was fulfilled, the Appeals
Chamber now turns to the second requirement, that is, whether the victims of the alleged
offences were “protected persons”.
(a) The Relevant Rules
164. Article 4(1) of Geneva Convention IV (protection of civilians), applicable to the
case at issue, defines “protected persons” - hence possible victims of grave breaches - as
those "in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals". In other words, subject to the provisions of Article 4(2),203 the Convention
intends to protect civilians (in enemy territory, occupied territory or the combat zone) who
do not have the nationality of the belligerent in whose hands they find themselves, or who
are stateless persons. In addition, as is apparent from the preparatory work,204 the
203 Article 4(2) of Geneva Convention IV provides as follows:
“Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a
neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent
State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal
diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are”.
204 The preparatory works of the Convention suggests an intent on the part of the drafters to extend its
application, inter alia, to persons having the nationality of a Party to the conflict who have been expelled by
that Party or who have fled abroad, acquiring the status of refugees. If these persons subsequently happen to
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
73
Convention also intends to protect those civilians in occupied territory who, while having
the nationality of the Party to the conflict in whose hands they find themselves, are refugees
and thus no longer owe allegiance to this Party and no longer enjoy its diplomatic protection
(consider, for instance, a situation similar to that of German Jews who had fled to France
before 1940, and thereafter found themselves in the hands of German forces occupying
French territory).
165. Thus already in 1949 the legal bond of nationality was not regarded as crucial and
allowance was made for special cases. In the aforementioned case of refugees, the lack of
both allegiance to a State and diplomatic protection by this State was regarded as more
important than the formal link of nationality.205 In the cases provided for in Article 4(2), in
addition to nationality, account was taken of the existence or non-existence of diplomatic
protection: nationals of a neutral State or a co-belligerent State are not treated as “protected
persons” unless they are deprived of or do not enjoy diplomatic protection. In other words,
those nationals are not “protected persons” as long as they benefit from the normal
diplomatic protection of their State; when they lose it or in any event do not enjoy it, the
Convention automatically grants them the status of “protected persons”.
166. This legal approach, hinging on substantial relations more than on formal bonds,
becomes all the more important in present-day international armed conflicts. While
previously wars were primarily between well-established States, in modern inter-ethnic
armed conflicts such as that in the former Yugoslavia, new States are often created during
the conflict and ethnicity rather than nationality may become the grounds for allegiance.
Or, put another way, ethnicity may become determinative of national allegiance. Under
these conditions, the requirement of nationality is even less adequate to define protected
find themselves on the territory of the other Party to the conflict occupied by their national State, they
nevertheless do not lose the status of “protected persons” (see Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of
Geneva of 1949, vol. II, pp. 561-562, 793-796, 813-814).
205 See also Article 44 of Geneva Convention IV:
“In applying the measures of control mentioned in the present Convention, the Detaining Power shall
not treat as enemy aliens exclusively on the basis of their nationality de jure of an enemy State,
refugees who do not, in fact, enjoy the protection of any government.”
In addition, see Article 70(2):
“Nationals of the Occupying Power who, before the outbreak of hostilities, have sought refuge in the
territory of the occupied State, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or deported from the
occupied territory, except for the offences committed after the outbreak of hostilities, or for offences
under common law committed before the outbreak of hostilities which, according to the law of the
occupied State, would have justified extradition in time of peace.”
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
74
persons. In such conflicts, not only the text and the drafting history of the Convention but
also, and more importantly, the Convention’s object and purpose suggest that allegiance to a
Party to the conflict and, correspondingly, control by this Party over persons in a given
territory, may be regarded as the crucial test.
(b) Factual Findings
167. In the instant case the Bosnian Serbs, including the Appellant, arguably had the
same nationality as the victims, that is, they were nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
However, it has been shown above that the Bosnian Serb forces acted as de facto organs of
another State, namely, the FRY. Thus the requirements set out in Article 4 of Geneva
Convention IV are met: the victims were “protected persons” as they found themselves in
the hands of armed forces of a State of which they were not nationals.
168. It might be argued that before 6 October 1992, when a “Citizenship Act” was passed
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nationals of the FRY had the same nationality as the
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely the nationality of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Even assuming that this proposition is correct, the position would
not alter from a legal point of view. As the Appeals Chamber has stated above, Article 4 of
Geneva Convention IV, if interpreted in the light of its object and purpose, is directed to the
protection of civilians to the maximum extent possible. It therefore does not make its
applicability dependent on formal bonds and purely legal relations. Its primary purpose is
to ensure the safeguards afforded by the Convention to those civilians who do not enjoy the
diplomatic protection, and correlatively are not subject to the allegiance and control, of the
State in whose hands they may find themselves. In granting its protection, Article 4 intends
to look to the substance of relations, not to their legal characterisation as such.
169. Hence, even if in the circumstances of the case the perpetrators and the victims were
to be regarded as possessing the same nationality, Article 4 would still be applicable.
Indeed, the victims did not owe allegiance to (and did not receive the diplomatic protection
of) the State (the FRY) on whose behalf the Bosnian Serb armed forces had been fighting.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
75
C. Conclusion
170. It follows from the above that the Trial Chamber erred in so far as it acquitted the
Appellant on the sole ground that the grave breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 did not apply.
171. The Appeals Chamber accordingly finds that the Appellant was guilty of grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions on Counts 8, 9, 12, 15, 21 and 32.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
76
V. THE SECOND GROUND OF CROSS-APPEAL BY THE
PROSECUTION: THE FINDING OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF
PARTICIPATION IN THE KILLINGS IN JASKI]I
A. Submissions of the Parties
1. The Prosecution case
172. The Prosecution’s second ground of cross-appeal is:
The Trial Chamber, at page 132 para 373 [of the Judgement], erred when it decided that
it could not, on the evidence before it, be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused had any part of the killing of the five men or any of them, from the village of
Jaski}i.206
173. The Prosecution fully accepts the findings of fact of the Trial Chamber,207 but makes
two submissions. First, it submits that, on the basis of the said facts, the Trial Chamber has
misdirected itself on the application of the law on the standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Secondly, it contends that in determining that the Prosecution did not meet the
burden of proof, the Trial Chamber misdirected itself on the application of the common
purpose doctrine.208
174. In relation to the first error, the Prosecution submits that the only reasonable
conclusion to be drawn from the facts found by the Trial Chamber is that of guilt.209 The
test for proof beyond reasonable doubt is that “the proof must be such as to exclude not
every hypothesis or possibility of innocence, but every fair or rational hypothesis which
may be derived from the evidence, except that of guilt.”210 According to the Prosecution,
the Trial Chamber’s hypothesis that it was a “distinct possibility that the killing of the five
victims may have been the act of a quite distinct group of armed men”211 is not fair or
206 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 3.6.
207 T. 169 (20 April 1999).
208 T. 170 (20 April 1999).
209 T. 176 (20 April 1999).
210 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 3.12.
211 Judgement, para. 373.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
77
rational.212 The use of such terms as “bare possibility”213 and “could suggest”214 indicates
the misapplication of the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt.215
175. As to the second error, the Prosecution submits that the gist of the common purpose
doctrine is that if a person knowingly participates in a criminal activity with others, he or
she will be liable for all illegal acts that are natural and probable consequences of that
common purpose.216 The Trial Chamber found that the Appellant’s participation in the
attack on Sivci and Jaski}i was part of the armed conflict in the territory of Prijedor
municipality between May and December 1992. A central aspect of the attack was a policy
to rid the region of the non-Serb population by committing inhumane and violent acts
against them in order to achieve the creation of a Greater Serbia. According to the
Prosecution, the only conclusion reasonably open from all the evidence is that the killing of
the five victims was entirely predictable as part of the natural and probable consequences of
the attack on the villages of Sivci and Jaski}i on 14 June 1992.217 It is the Prosecution’s
submission that this policy of ethnic cleansing was carried out throughout opština Prijedor
against non-Serbs by various illegal means, including killings.218 In this regard, the
Appellant’s actions and presence did directly and substantially assist that policy. It follows
that, regardless of which member or members of the Serb forces actually killed the five
victims, the Appellant should have been found guilty under Article 7(1) of the Statute.219
2. The Defence Case
176. The Defence submits that, in light of its finding that nobody was killed in Sivci on
14 June 1992, the Trial Chamber correctly found that it was a possibility that the five
victims in Jaski}i were killed by another, distinct group of armed men, especially as nothing
212 Skeleton Argument of the Prosecution, para. 42.
213 Judgement, para. 373: “The bare possibility that the deaths of the Jaski}i villagers were the result of
encountering a part of that large force would be enough … to prevent satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused was involved in those deaths.”
214 Ibid., para. 373: “The fact that there was no killing at Sivci could suggest that the killing of villagers was
not a planned part of this particular episode of ethnic cleansing of the two villages, in which the accused took
part ….”
215 T. 172 (20 April 1999).
216 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 3.19.
217 Ibid., paras. 3.24, 3.27.
218 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 3.27-3.29; T. 179-180 (20 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
78
is known as to who shot the victims or in what circumstances.220 Accordingly, the standard
of proof beyond reasonable doubt was correctly applied.221
177. In relation to the Prosecution’s common purpose submission, the Defence contends
that it would have to be shown that the common purpose in which the Appellant allegedly
took part included killing as opposed to ethnic cleansing by other means.222 On the basis of
the distinction between the operation in Jaski}i and the operation in Sivci where nobody
was killed, the Trial Chamber was correct in concluding that it was not possible to find
beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant was involved in a criminal enterprise with the
design of killing.223
B. Discussion
1. The Armed Group to Which the Appellant Belonged Committed the Killings
178. The Trial Chamber found, amongst other facts, that on 14 June 1992, the Appellant,
with other armed men, participated in the removal of men, who had been separated from
women and children, from the village of Sivci to the Keraterm camp, and also participated
in the calling-out of residents, the separation of men from women and children, and the
beating and taking away of men in the village of Jaski}i.224 It also found that five men were
killed in the latter village.225
179. In support of its finding that there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
Appellant had any part in the killing of the five men, the Trial Chamber stated:
The fact that there was no killing at Sivci could suggest that the killing of villagers was
not a planned part of this particular episode of ethnic cleansing of the two villages, in
219 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 3.29.
220 Defence’s Substituted Response to Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 3.8-3.10; Defence’s Skeleton Argument
on the Cross-Appeal, para. 2(c).
221 T. 251 (21 April 1999).
222 Defence’s Substituted Response to Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 3.19; Defence’s Skeleton Argument on
the Cross-Appeal, para. 2(d).
223 Defence’s Substituted Response to Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 3.9-3.10; Defence’s Skeleton Argument
on the Cross-Appeal, para. 2(d).
224 Judgement, paras. 369, 373.
225 Ibid., paras. 370-373.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
79
which the accused took part; it is accordingly a distinct possibility that it may have been
the act of a quite distinct group of armed men, or the unauthorized and unforeseen act of
one of the force that entered Sivci, for which the accused cannot be held responsible, that
caused their death.226
180. In relation to the possibility that the killings may have been carried out by another
armed group, the Trial Chamber found the following. An armed group of men, including
the Appellant, entered Jaski}i. The group separated most of the men from the rest of the
villagers, beat and then forcibly removed the men to an unknown location. The Appellant
played an active role in the activities of this violent group. The group fired shots as they
approached and left the village.
181. It has already been pointed out that the Trial Chamber also found that five men were
found killed in Jaski}i after the armed group had left; four of them were shot in the head.
Nothing else as to who might have killed them or in what circumstances was known. The
Trial Chamber referred, however, to the large force of Serb soldiers, of which the Appellant
was a member, that invaded the nearby village of Sivci on the same day, without any
villager there being killed. It then stated that the:
bare possibility that the deaths of the Jaski}i villagers were the result of encountering a
part of that large force of Serb soldiers that invaded Sivci would be enough, in the state
of the evidence, or rather, the lack of it, relating to their deaths, to prevent satisfaction
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was involved in those deaths.227
182. The Trial Chamber did not allude to any witness suggesting that another group of
armed men might have been responsible for the killing of the five men. In fact, none of the
witnesses suggested anything to that effect.
183. In the light of the facts found by the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber holds
that, in relation to the possibility that another armed group killed the five men, the Trial
Chamber misapplied the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the facts found, the
only reasonable conclusion the Trial Chamber could have drawn is that the armed group to
which the Appellant belonged killed the five men in Jaski}i.
184. In the light of the above finding, the Appeals Chamber need not consider the second
possibility advanced by the Trial Chamber, namely, that the killing of the five men in
226 Ibid., para. 373.
227 Ibid.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
80
Jaski}i could have been the “unauthorized and unforeseen act of one of the force that
entered Sivci”.
2. The Individual Criminal Responsibility of the Appellant for the Killings
(a) Article 7(1) of the Statute and the Notion of Common Purpose
185. The question therefore arises whether under international criminal law the Appellant
can be held criminally responsible for the killing of the five men from Jaski}i even though
there is no evidence that he personally killed any of them. The two central issues are:
(i) whether the acts of one person can give rise to the criminal culpability of another
where both participate in the execution of a common criminal plan; and
(ii) what degree of mens rea is required in such a case.
186. The basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national
systems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability:
nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not
personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa). In national
legal systems this principle is laid down in Constitutions,228 in laws,229 or in judicial
decisions.230 In international criminal law the principle is laid down, inter alia, in Article
7(1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal which states that:
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in
the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime. (emphasis added)
This provision is aptly explained by the Report of the Secretary-General on the
establishment of the International Tribunal, which states the following:
228 An example is provided by Article 27 para. 1 of the Italian Constitution (“La responsibilità penale è
personale.” (“Criminal responsibility is personal.”) (unofficial translation)).
229 See for instance Article 121-1 of the French Code pénal (“Nul n’est responsable pénalement que de son
propre fait”), para. 4 of the Austrian Strafgesetzbuch (“Strafbar ist nur, wer schuldhaft handelt” (“Only he
who is culpable may be punished”) (unofficial translation)).
230 This rather basic proposition is usually tacitly assumed rather than explicitly acknowledged. For an
example of where it was expressly stated, however, see, for Great Britain, R. v. Dalloway (1847) 3 Cox CC
273. See also the various decisions of the German Constitutional Court, e.g., BverfGE 6, 389 (439) and 50,
125 (133), as well as decisions of the German Federal Court of Justice (e.g., BGHSt 2, 194 (200)).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
81
An important element in relation to the competence ratione personae (personal
jurisdiction) of the International Tribunal is the principle of individual criminal
responsibility. As noted above, the Security Council has reaffirmed in a number of
resolutions that persons committing serious violations of international humanitarian law
in the former Yugoslavia are individually responsible for such violations.231
Article 7(1) also sets out the parameters of personal criminal responsibility under the
Statute. Any act falling under one of the five categories contained in the provision may
entail the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator or whoever has participated in the crime
in one of the ways specified in the same provision of the Statute.
187. Bearing in mind the preceding general propositions, it must be ascertained whether
criminal responsibility for participating in a common criminal purpose falls within the ambit
of Article 7(1) of the Statute.
188. This provision covers first and foremost the physical perpetration of a crime by the
offender himself, or the culpable omission of an act that was mandated by a rule of criminal
law. However, the commission of one of the crimes envisaged in Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the
Statute might also occur through participation in the realisation of a common design or
purpose.
189. An interpretation of the Statute based on its object and purpose leads to the
conclusion that the Statute intends to extend the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal to
all those “responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law” committed in
the former Yugoslavia (Article 1). As is apparent from the wording of both Article 7(1) and
the provisions setting forth the crimes over which the International Tribunal has jurisdiction
(Articles 2 to 5), such responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law
is not limited merely to those who actually carry out the actus reus of the enumerated
crimes but appears to extend also to other offenders (see in particular Article 2, which refers
to committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
Article 4 which sets forth various types of offences in relation to genocide, including
conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity).
231 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N.
Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993 (“Report of the Secretary-General”), para. 53 (emphasis added).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
82
190. It should be noted that this notion is spelled out in the Secretary General’s Report,
according to which:
The Secretary-General believes that all persons who participate in the planning,
preparation or execution of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the
former Yugoslavia are individually responsible for such violations.232
Thus, all those who have engaged in serious violations of international humanitarian law,
whatever the manner in which they may have perpetrated, or participated in the perpetration
of those violations, must be brought to justice. If this is so, it is fair to conclude that the
Statute does not confine itself to providing for jurisdiction over those persons who plan,
instigate, order, physically perpetrate a crime or otherwise aid and abet in its planning,
preparation or execution. The Statute does not stop there. It does not exclude those modes
of participating in the commission of crimes which occur where several persons having a
common purpose embark on criminal activity that is then carried out either jointly or by
some members of this plurality of persons. Whoever contributes to the commission of
crimes by the group of persons or some members of the group, in execution of a common
criminal purpose, may be held to be criminally liable, subject to certain conditions, which
are specified below.
191. The above interpretation is not only dictated by the object and purpose of the Statute
but is also warranted by the very nature of many international crimes which are committed
most commonly in wartime situations. Most of the time these crimes do not result from the
criminal propensity of single individuals but constitute manifestations of collective
criminality: the crimes are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of
a common criminal design. Although only some members of the group may physically
perpetrate the criminal act (murder, extermination, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, etc.), the participation and contribution of the other members of the group is often
vital in facilitating the commission of the offence in question. It follows that the moral
gravity of such participation is often no less – or indeed no different – from that of those
actually carrying out the acts in question.
192. Under these circumstances, to hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only the person
who materially performs the criminal act would disregard the role as co-perpetrators of all
232 Ibid., para 54 (emphasis added).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
83
those who in some way made it possible for the perpetrator physically to carry out that
criminal act. At the same time, depending upon the circumstances, to hold the latter liable
only as aiders and abettors might understate the degree of their criminal responsibility.
193. This interpretation, based on the Statute and the inherent characteristics of many
crimes perpetrated in wartime, warrants the conclusion that international criminal
responsibility embraces actions perpetrated by a collectivity of persons in furtherance of a
common criminal design. It may also be noted that – as will be mentioned below –
international criminal rules on common purpose are substantially rooted in, and to a large
extent reflect, the position taken by many States of the world in their national legal systems.
194. However, the Tribunal’s Statute does not specify (either expressly or by implication)
the objective and subjective elements (actus reus and mens rea) of this category of
collective criminality. To identify these elements one must turn to customary international
law. Customary rules on this matter are discernible on the basis of various elements: chiefly
case law and a few instances of international legislation.
195. Many post-World War II cases concerning war crimes proceed upon the principle
that when two or more persons act together to further a common criminal purpose, offences
perpetrated by any of them may entail the criminal liability of all the members of the group.
Close scrutiny of the relevant case law shows that broadly speaking, the notion of common
purpose encompasses three distinct categories of collective criminality.
196. The first such category is represented by cases where all co-defendants, acting
pursuant to a common design, possess the same criminal intention; for instance, the
formulation of a plan among the co-perpetrators to kill, where, in effecting this common
design (and even if each co-perpetrator carries out a different role within it), they
nevertheless all possess the intent to kill. The objective and subjective prerequisites for
imputing criminal responsibility to a participant who did not, or cannot be proven to have,
effected the killing are as follows: (i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one aspect
of the common design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim, or by
providing material assistance to or facilitating the activities of his co-perpetrators); and (ii)
the accused, even if not personally effecting the killing, must nevertheless intend this result.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
84
197. With regard to this category, reference can be made to the Georg Otto Sandrock et
al. case (also known as the Almelo Trial).233 There a British court found that three Germans
who had killed a British prisoner of war were guilty under the doctrine of “common
enterprise”. It was clear that they all had had the intention of killing the British soldier,
although each of them played a different role. They therefore were all co-perpetrators of the
crime of murder.234 Similarly, in the Hoelzer et al. case, brought before a Canadian military
court, in his summing up the Judge Advocate spoke of a “common enterprise” with regard
to the murder of a Canadian prisoner of war by three Germans, and emphasised that the
three all knew that the purpose of taking the Canadian to a particular area was to kill him. 235
198. Another instance of co-perpetratorship of this nature is provided by the case of
Jepsen and others.236 A British court had to pronounce upon the responsibility of Jepsen
(one of several accused) for the deaths of concentration camp internees who, in the few
weeks leading up to the capitulation of Germany in 1945, were in transit to another
concentration camp. In this regard, the Prosecutor submitted (and this was not rebutted by
the Judge Advocate) that:
If Jepsen was joining in this voluntary slaughter of eighty or so people, helping the
others by doing his share of killing, the whole eighty odd deaths can be laid at his door
and at the door of any single man who was in any way assisting in that act.237
233 Trial of Otto Sandrock and three others, British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, held at the
Court House, Almelo, Holland, on 24th-26th November, 1945, UNWCC, vol. I, p. 35).
234 The accused were German non-commissioned officers who had executed a British prisoner of war and a
Dutch civilian in the house of whom the British airman was hiding. On the occasion of each execution one of
the Germans had fired the lethal shot, another had given the order and a third had remained by the car used to
go to a wood on the outskirts of the Dutch town of Almelo, to prevent people from coming near while the
shooting took place. The Prosecutor stated that “the analogy which seemed to him most fitting in this case
was that of a gangster crime, every member of the gang being equally responsible with the man who fired the
actual shot” (ibid., p. 37). In his summing up the Judge Advocate pointed out that:
“There is no dispute, as I understand it, that all three Germans knew what they were doing and had
gone there for the very purpose of having this officer killed; and, as you know, if people are all present
together at the same time taking part in a common enterprise which is unlawful, each one in their (sic)
own way assisting the common purpose of all, they are all equally guilty in point of law” (see official
transcript, Public Record Office, London, WO 235/8, p. 70; copy on file with the International
Tribunal’s Library; the report in the UNWCC, vol. I, p. 40 is slightly different).
All the accused were found guilty, but those who had ordered the shooting or carried out the shooting were
sentenced to death, whereas the others were sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment (ibid., p. 41).
235 Hoelzer et al., Canadian Military Court, Aurich, Germany, Record of Proceedings 25 March-6 April 1946,
vol. I, pp. 341, 347, 349 (RCAF Binder 181.009 (D2474); copy on file with the International Tribunal’s
Library).
236 Trial of Gustav Alfred Jepsen and others, Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial held at Luneberg, Germany
(13-23 August, 1946), judgement of 24 August 1946 (original transcripts in Public Record Office, Kew,
Richmond; on file with the International Tribunal’s Library).
237 Ibid., p. 241.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
85
In a similar vein, the Judge Advocate noted in Schonfeld that:
if several persons combine for an unlawful purpose or for a lawful purpose to be effected
by unlawful means, and one of them in carrying out that purpose, kills a man, it is murder
in all who are present […] provided that the death was caused by a member of the party
in the course of his endeavours to effect the common object of the assembly.238
199. It can be noted that some cases appear broadly to link the notion of common purpose
to that of causation. In this regard, the Ponzano case,239 which concerned the killing of four
British prisoners of war in violation of the rules of warfare, can be mentioned. Here, the
Judge Advocate adopted the approach suggested by the Prosecutor,240 and stressed:
... the requirement that an accused, before he can be found guilty, must have been
concerned in the offence. To be concerned in the commission of a criminal offence
… does not only mean that you are the person who in fact inflicted the fatal injury and
directly caused death, be it by shooting or by any other violent means; it also means an
indirect degree of participation …. In other words, he must be the cog in the wheel of
events leading up to the result which in fact occurred. He can further that object not only
by giving orders for a criminal offence to be committed, but he can further that object by
a variety of other means ….241
Further on, the Judge Advocate submitted that while the defendant’s involvement in the
criminal acts must form a link in the chain of causation, it was not necessary that his
participation be a sine qua non, or that the offence would not have occurred but for his
participation. 242 Consonant with the twin requirements of criminal responsibility under this
category, however, the Judge Advocate stressed the necessity of knowledge on the part of
the accused as to the intended purpose of the criminal enterprise.243
238 Trial of Franz Schonfeld and others, British Military Court, Essen, June 11th-26th, 1946, UNWCC, vol. XI,
p. 68 (summing up of the Judge Advocate).
239 Trial of Feurstein and others, Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial held at Hamburg, Germany (4-24 August,
1948), judgement of 24 August 1948 (original transcripts in Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond; on file
with the International Tribunal’s Library).
240 The Prosecutor had stated the following:
“It is an opening principle of English law, and indeed of all law, that a man is responsible for his acts
and is taken to intend the natural and normal consequences of his acts and if these men … set the
machinery in motion by which the four men were shot, then they are guilty of the crime of killing these
men. It does not – it never has been essential for any one of these men to have taken those soldiers out
themselves and to have personally executed them or personally dispatched them. That is not at all
necessary; all that is necessary to make them responsible is that they set the machinery in motion which
ended in the volleys that killed the four men we are concerned with” (ibid., p. 4).
241 Ibid., summing up of the Judge Advocate, p. 7.
242 In this regard, the Judge Advocate noted that: “of course, it is quite possible that it the criminal offence
might have taken place in the absence of all these accused here, but that does not mean the same thing as
saying … that the accused could not be a chain in the link of causation …” (ibid., pp. 7-8).
243 In particular, it was held that in order to be “concerned in the commission of a criminal offence,” it was
necessary to prove:
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
86
200. A final case worthy of mention with regard to this first category is the
Einsatzgruppen case.244 With regard to common design, a United States Tribunal sitting at
Nuremberg noted that:
the elementary principle must be borne in mind that neither under Control Council Law
No. 10 nor under any known system of criminal law is guilt for murder confined to the
man who pulls the trigger or buries the corpse. In line with recognized principles
common to all civilized legal systems, paragraph 2 of Article II of Control Council Law
No. 10 specifies a number of types of connection with crime which are sufficient to
establish guilt. Thus, not only are principals guilty but also accessories, those who take a
consenting part in the commission of crime or are connected with plans or enterprises
involved in its commission, those who order or abet crime, and those who belong to an
organization or group engaged in the commission of crime. These provisions embody no
harsh or novel principles of criminal responsibility ….245
“that when he did take part in it he knew the intended purpose of it. If any accused were to have given
an order for this execution, believing that it was a perfectly legal execution, that these four soldiers had
been sentenced to death by a properly constituted court and that therefore an order for the execution
was no more than an order to carry out the decision of the court, then that accused would not be guilty
because he would not have any guilty knowledge. But where … a person was in fact concerned, and
… he knew the intended purpose of these acts, then that accused is guilty of the offence in the
charge” (ibid., p. 8).
The requisite knowledge of each participant, even if deducible only by implication, was also stressed in the
Stalag Luft III case, Trial of Max Ernst Friedrich Gustav Wielen and Others, Proceedings of the Military
Court at Hamburg, (1-3 July 1947) (original transcripts in Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond; on file with
the International Tribunal’s Library), which concerned the killing of fifty officers of the allied air force who
had escaped from the Stalag Luft III camp in Silesia. The Prosecutor in his opening remarks stressed that:
“everybody, particularly every policeman of whatever sort it may be, knew quite well that there had
been a mass escape of prisoners of war on the 25th March 1944 … such that every policeman knew
that prisoners of war were at large. I think that is important to remember, and particularly with regard
to some of the minor members of the Gestapo who are charged before you that is important to
remember because they may say they did not know who these people were. They may say they did not
know they were escaped prisoners of war but in fact they all knew …” (ibid., p. 276).
Furthermore, in two cases concerning an accused’s participation in the Kristallnacht riots, the Supreme Court
for the British zone stressed that it was not required that the accused knew about the rioting in the entire Reich.
It was sufficient that he was aware of the local action, that he approved it, and that he wanted it “as his own”
(unofficial translation). The fact that the accused participated consciously in the arbitrary measures directed
against the Jews was sufficient to hold him responsible for a crime against humanity (Case no. 66, Strafsenat.
Urteil vom 8 Februar 1949 gegen S. StS 120/48, p. 284-290, 286, vol. II). See also Case no. 17, vol. I, 94-98,
96, where the Supreme Court held that it was irrelevant that the scale of ill-treatment, deportation and
destruction that happened in other parts of the country on that night were not undertaken in this village. It
sufficed that the accused participated intentionally in the action and that he was “not unaware of the fact that
the local action was a measure designed to instil terror which formed a part of the nation-wide persecution of
the Jews” (unofficial translation).
244 The United States of America v. Otto Ohlenforf et al., Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, United States Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1951, vol. IV, p. 3.
245 The tribunal went on to say:
“Even though these men Radetsky, Ruehl, Schubert and Graf were not in command, they cannot
escape the fact that they were members of Einsatz units whose express mission, well known to all the
members, was to carry out a large scale program of murder. Any member who assisted in enabling
these units to function, knowing what was afoot, is guilty of the crimes committed by the unit. The
cook in the galley of a pirate ship does not escape the yardarm merely because he himself does not
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
87
201. It should be noted that in many post-World War II trials held in other countries,
courts took the same approach to instances of crimes in which two or more persons
participated with a different degree of involvement. However, they did not rely upon the
notion of common purpose or common design, preferring to refer instead to the notion of
co-perpetration. This applies in particular to Italian246 and German247 cases.
202. The second distinct category of cases is in many respects similar to that set forth
above, and embraces the so-called “concentration camp” cases. The notion of common
purpose was applied to instances where the offences charged were alleged to have been
committed by members of military or administrative units such as those running
concentration camps; i.e., by groups of persons acting pursuant to a concerted plan. Cases
illustrative of this category are Dachau Concentration Camp,248 decided by a United States
court sitting in Germany and Belsen,249 decided by a British military court sitting in
Germany. In these cases the accused held some position of authority within the hierarchy of
brandish a cutlass. The man who stands at the door of a bank and scans the environs may appear to be
the most peaceable of citizens, but if his purpose is to warn his robber confederates inside the bank of
the approach of the police, his guilt is clear enough. And if we assume, for the purposes of argument,
that the defendants such as Schubert and Graf have succeeded in establishing that their role was an
auxiliary one, they are still in no better position than the cook or the robbers’ watchman” (ibid., p. 373;
emphasis added).
In this connection, the tribunal also addressed the contention that certain of the commanders did not
participate directly in the crimes committed, noting that:
“with respect to the defendants such as Jost and Naumann, … it is … highly probable that these
defendants did not, at least very often, participate personally in executions. And it would indeed be
strange had they ?who were persons in authorityg done so. … Far from being a defense or even a
circumstance in mitigation, the fact that ?these defendantsg did not personally shoot a great many
people, but rather devoted themselves to directing the over-all operations of the Einsatzgruppen, only
serves to establish their deeper responsibility for the crimes of the men under their command” (ibid.).
246 See for instance the following decisions of the Italian Court of Cassation relating to crimes committed by
militias or forces of the “Repubblica Sociale Italiana” against Italian partisans or armed forces: Annalberti et
al., 18 June 1949, in Giustizia penale 1949, Part II, col. 732, no. 440; Rigardo et al. case, 6 July 1949, ibid.,
cols. 733 and 735, no. 443; P.M. v. Castoldi, 11 July 1949, ibid., no. 444; Imolesi et al., 5 May 1949, ibid.,
col. 734, no. 445. See also Ballestra, 6 July 1949, ibid., cols. 732-733, no. 442.
247 See for instance the decision of 10 August 1948 of the German Supreme Court for the British Zone in K.
and A., in Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische Zone in Strafsachen, vol. I, pp. 53-56;
the decision of 22 February 1949 in J. and A., ibid., pp. 310-315; the decision of the District Court
(Landgericht) of Cologne of 22 and 23 January 1946 in Hessmer et al., in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, vol. I,
pp. 13-23, at pp. 13, 20; the decision of 21 December 1946 of the District Court (Landgericht) of Frankfurt
am Main in M. et al. (ibid., pp. 135-165, 154) and the judgement of the Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht)
of 12 August 1947 in the same case (ibid., pp. 166-186, 180); as well as the decision of the District Court of
Braunschweig of 7 May 1947 in Affeldt, ibid., p. 383-391, 389.
248 Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and thirty-nine others, General Military Government Court of the United
States Zone, Dachau, Germany, 15th November-13th December, 1945, UNWCC, vol. XI, p. 5.
249 Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 others, British Military Court, Luneberg, 17th September-17th November,
1945, UNWCC, vol. II, p. 1.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
88
the concentration camps. Generally speaking, the charges against them were that they had
acted in pursuance of a common design to kill or mistreat prisoners and hence to commit
war crimes.250 In his summing up in the Belsen case, the Judge Advocate adopted the three
requirements identified by the Prosecution as necessary to establish guilt in each case:
(i) the existence of an organised system to ill-treat the detainees and commit the various
crimes alleged; (ii) the accused’s awareness of the nature of the system; and (iii) the fact
that the accused in some way actively participated in enforcing the system, i.e., encouraged,
aided and abetted or in any case participated in the realisation of the common criminal
design.251 The convictions of several of the accused appear to have been explicitly based
upon these criteria.252
203. This category of cases (which obviously is not applicable to the facts of the present
case) is really a variant of the first category, considered above. The accused, when they
were found guilty, were regarded as co-perpetrators of the crimes of ill-treatment, because
of their objective “position of authority” within the concentration camp system and because
they had “the power to look after the inmates and make their life satisfactory”253 but failed
to do so.254 It would seem that in these cases the required actus reus was the active
250 See Dachau Concentration Camp case, UNWCC, vol. XI, p. 14:
“It seems, therefore, that what runs throughout the whole of this case, like a thread, is this: that there
was in the camp a general system of cruelties and murders of the inmates (most of whom were allied
nationals) and that this system was practised with the knowledge of the accused, who were members of
the staff, and with their active participation. Such a course of conduct, then, was held by the court in
this case to constitute ‘acting in pursuance of a common design to violate the laws and usages of war’.
Everybody who took any part in such common design was held guilty of a war crime, though the nature
and extent of the participation may vary”.
251 The Judge Advocate summarised with approval the legal argument of the Prosecutor in the following
terms:
“The case for the Prosecution is that all the accused employed on the staff at Auschwitz knew that a
system and a course of conduct was in force, and that, in one way or another in furtherance of a
common agreement to run the camp in a brutal way, all those people were taking part in that course of
conduct. They asked the Court not to treat the individual acts which might be proved merely as
offences committed by themselves, but also as evidence clearly indicating that the particular offender
was acting willingly as a party in the furtherance of this system. They suggested that if the Court were
satisfied that they were doing so, then they must, each and every one of them, assume responsibility for
what happened.” (Belsen case, UNWCC, vol. II, p. 121.)
252 In particular, the accused Kramer appears to have been convicted on this basis. (See ibid., p. 121: “The
Judge Advocate reminded the Court that when they considered the question of guilt and responsibility, the
strongest case must surely be against Kramer, and then down the list of accused according to the positions
they held.” (emphasis added).
253 Ibid., p.121.
254 In a similar vein, the Case against R. Mulka et al. (“Auschwitz concentration camp case”) can be
mentioned. Although the court reached the same result, it nevertheless did not apply the doctrine of common
design but instead tended to treat the defendants as aiders and abettors as long as they remained within the
framework provided by their orders and as principal offenders if they acted outside this framework. This
meant that if it could not be proved that the accused actually identified himself with the aims of the Nazi
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
89
participation in the enforcement of a system of repression, as it could be inferred from the
position of authority and the specific functions held by each accused. The mens rea element
comprised: (i) knowledge of the nature of the system and (ii) the intent to further the
common concerted design to ill-treat inmates. It is important to note that, in these cases, the
requisite intent could also be inferred from the position of authority held by the camp
personnel. Indeed, it was scarcely necessary to prove intent where the individual’s high
rank or authority would have, in and of itself, indicated an awareness of the common design
and an intent to participate therein. All those convicted were found guilty of the war crime
of ill-treatment, although of course the penalty varied according to the degree of
participation of each accused in the commission of the war crime.
204. The third category concerns cases involving a common design to pursue one course
of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the common
design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that
common purpose. An example of this would be a common, shared intention on the part of a
group to forcibly remove members of one ethnicity from their town, village or region (to
effect “ethnic cleansing”) with the consequence that, in the course of doing so, one or more
of the victims is shot and killed. While murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged
to be part of the common design, it was nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of
civilians at gunpoint might well result in the deaths of one or more of those civilians.
Criminal responsibility may be imputed to all participants within the common enterprise
where the risk of death occurring was both a predictable consequence of the execution of
the common design and the accused was either reckless or indifferent to that risk. Another
example is that of a common plan to forcibly evict civilians belonging to a particular ethnic
group by burning their houses; if some of the participants in the plan, in carrying out this
regime, then the court would treat him as an aider and abettor because he lacked the specific intent to “want
the offence as his own” (see in particular the Bundesgerichtshof in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, vol. XXI,
pp. 838 ff., and especially pp. 881 ff). The BGH stated, p. 882:
“The view that everybody who had been involved in the destruction program of the KZ Auschwitz
and acted in any manner whatsoever in connection with this program participated in the murders and is
responsible for all that happened is not correct. It would mean that even acts which did not further the
main offence in any concrete manner would be punishable. In consequence even the physician who
was in charge of taking care of the guard personnel and who restricted himself to doing only that,
would be guilty of aiding and abetting murder. The same would even apply to the doctor who treated
prisoners in the camp and saved their lives. Not even those who in their place put little obstacles in the
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
90
plan, kill civilians by setting their houses on fire, all the other participants in the plan are
criminally responsible for the killing if these deaths were predictable.
205. The case-law in this category has concerned first of all cases of mob violence, that
is, situations of disorder where multiple offenders act out a common purpose, where each of
them commit offences against the victim, but where it is unknown or impossible to ascertain
exactly which acts were carried out by which perpetrator, or when the causal link between
each act and the eventual harm caused to the victims is similarly indeterminate. Cases
illustrative of this category are Essen Lynching and Borkum Island.
206. As is set forth in more detail below, the requirements which are established by these
authorities are two-fold: that of a criminal intention to participate in a common criminal
design and the foreseeability that criminal acts other than those envisaged in the common
criminal design are likely to be committed by other participants in the common design.
207. The Essen Lynching (also called Essen West) case was brought before a British
military court, although, as was stated by the court, it “was not a trial under English law”. 255
Given the importance of this case, it is worth reviewing it at some length. Three British
prisoners of war had been lynched by a mob of Germans in the town of Essen-West on 13
December 1944. Seven persons (two servicemen and five civilians) were charged with
committing a war crime in that they were concerned in the killing of the three prisoners of
war. They included a German captain, Heyer, who had placed the three British airmen
under the escort of a German soldier who was to take the prisoners to a Luftwaffe unit for
interrogation. While the escort with the prisoners was leaving, the captain had ordered that
the escort should not interfere if German civilians should molest the prisoners, adding that
they ought to be shot, or would be shot. This order had been given to the escort from the
steps of the barracks in a loud voice so that the crowd, which had gathered, could hear and
would know exactly what was going to take place. According to the summary given by the
United Nations War Crimes Commission:
way of this program of murder, albeit in a subordinate position and without success, would escape
punishment. That cannot be right.” (unofficial translation).
255 Trial of Erich Heyer and six others, British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, 18th-19th
and 21st-22nd December, 1945, UNWCC, vol. I, p. 88, at p. 91.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
91
when the prisoners of war were marched through one of the main streets of Essen, the
crowd around grew bigger, started hitting them and throwing sticks and stones at them.
An unknown German corporal actually fired a revolver at one of the airmen and
wounded him in the head. When they reached the bridge, the airmen were eventually
thrown over the parapet of the bridge; one of the airmen was killed by the fall; the others
were not dead when they landed, but were killed by shots from the bridge and by
members of the crowd who beat and kicked them to death.256
208. The Defence laid stress on the need to prove that each of the accused had the intent
to kill. The Prosecution took a contrary view. Major Tayleur, the Prosecutor, stated the
following:
My friend the Defence Counsel has spoken to you about the intent which is necessary
and he says that no evidence of intent to kill has been brought before you. In my
submission there has been considerable evidence of intent to kill; but even if there were
not, in my submission to prove this charge you do not have to prove an intent to kill. If
you prove an intent to kill you would prove murder; but you can have an unlawful
killing, which would be manslaughter, where there is not an intent to kill but merely the
doing of an unlawful act of violence. A person might slap another’s face with no intent
to kill at all but if through some misfortune, for example that person having a weak skull,
that person died, in my submission the person striking the blow would be guilty of
manslaughter and that would be such killing as would come within the words of this
charge. In my submission therefore what you have to be satisfied of – and the onus of
proof is of course on the prosecution – is that each and everyone of the accused, before
you can convict him, was concerned in the killing of these three unidentified airmen in
circumstances which the British law would have amounted to either murder or
manslaughter.257
The Prosecutor then went on to add:
the allegation of the prosecution is that every person who, following the incitement to the
crowd to murder these men, voluntarily took aggressive action against any one of these
three airmen is guilty in that he is concerned in the killing. It is impossible to separate
any one of these from another; they all make up what is known as lynching. In my
submission from the moment they left those barracks those men were doomed and the
crowd knew they were doomed and every person in that crowd who struck a blow is both
morally and criminally responsible for the deaths of those three men.258
Since Heyer was convicted, it may be assumed that the court accepted the Prosecution
arguments as to the criminal liability of Heyer (no Judge Advocate had been appointed in
this case). As for the soldier escorting the airmen, he had a duty not only to prevent the
prisoners from escaping but also of seeing that they were not molested; he was sentenced to
imprisonment for five years (even though the Prosecutor had suggested that he was not
criminally liable). According to the Report of the United Nations War Crimes Commission,
256 Ibid., p. 89.
257 See transcript in Public Record Office, London, WO 235/58, p. 65 (emphasis added; copy on file with the
International Tribunal’s Library).
258Ibid., p. 66 (emphasis added).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
92
three civilians “were found guilty [of murder] because every one of them had in one form or
another taken part in the ill-treatment which eventually led to the death of the victims,
though against none of the accused had it been exactly proved that they had individually
shot nor given the blows which caused the death”. 259
209. It would seem warranted to infer from the arguments of the parties and the verdict
that the court upheld the notion that all the accused who were found guilty took part, in
various degrees, in the killing; not all of them intended to kill but all intended to participate
in the unlawful ill-treatment of the prisoners of war. Nevertheless they were all found
guilty of murder, because they were all “concerned in the killing”. The inference seems
therefore justified that the court assumed that the convicted persons who simply struck a
blow or implicitly incited the murder could have foreseen that others would kill the
prisoners; hence they too were found guilty of murder.260
210. A similar position was taken by a United States military court in Kurt Goebell et al.
(also called the Borkum Island case). On 4 August 1944, a United States Flying Fortress
was forced down on the German island of Borkum. Its seven crew members were taken
prisoner and then forced to march, under military guard, through the streets of Borkum.
They were first made to pass between members of the Reich’s Labour Corps, who beat
them with shovels, upon the order of a German officer of the Reichsarbeitsdienst. They
were then struck by civilians on the street. Later on, while passing through another street,
the mayor of Borkum shouted at them inciting the mob to kill them “like dogs”. They were
259 UNWCC, vol. 1, p. 91. In addition to Heyer and the escort (Koenen), three civilians were also convicted.
The first of the accused civilians, Boddenberg, admitted to have struck one of the airmen on the bridge, after
one of them had already been thrown over the bridge, knowing “that the motives of the crowd against them
the airmen were deadly, and yet he joined in” (Transcript in Public Record Office, London, WO 235/58, p.
67; copy on file with International Tribunal’s Library); the second, Kaufer, was found to have “beaten the
airmen” and taken “an active part” in the mob violence against them. Additionally, it was alleged that he tried
to pull the rifle away from a subordinate officer to shoot the airmen below the bridge and that he called out
words to the effect that the airmen deserved to be shot (ibid., pp. 67-68). The third, Braschoss, was seen
hitting one of the airmen on the bridge, descending beneath the bridge to throw the airman, who was still alive,
into the stream. He and an accomplice were further alleged to have thrown another of the airmen from the
bridge (ibid., p. 68). Two of the accused civilians, Sambol and Hartung, were acquitted; the former because
the blows he was alleged to have inflicted were neither particularly severe nor proximate to the airmen’s death
(comprising one of the earliest to be inflicted) and the latter because it was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt that he actually took part in the affray (ibid., pp. 66-67, UNWCC, vol. I, p. 91).
260 The charge, in a strict legal sense, was the commission of a war crime in violation of the laws and usages of
war for being “concerned in the killing” of the airmen rather than murder as this was “not a trial under English
law” (ibid., at p. 91). For all intents and purposes, however, the charge appeared to be treated as a murder
charge, as it appeared to have been accepted in the course of the proceedings that “as long as everyone realised
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
93
then beaten by civilians while the escorting guards, far from protecting them, fostered the
assault and took part in the beating. When the airmen reached the city hall one was shot
and killed by a German soldier, followed by the others a few minutes later, all shot by
German soldiers. The accused included a few senior officers, some privates, the mayor of
Borkum, some policemen, a civilian and the leader of the Reich Labour Corps. All were
charged with war crimes, in particular both with “wilfully, deliberately and wrongfully
encouraging, aiding, abetting and participating in the killing” of the airmen and with
“wilfully, deliberately and wrongfully encouraging, aiding, abetting and participating
in assaults upon” the airmen.261 In his opening statement the Prosecutor developed the
doctrine of common design. He stated the following:
It is important, as I see it, to determine the guilt of each of these accused in the light of
the particular role that each one played. They did not all participate in exactly the same
manner. Members of mobs seldom do. One will undertake one special or particular
action and another will perform another particular action. It is the composite of the
actions of all that results in the commission of the crime. Now, all legal authorities agree
that where a common design of a mob exists and the mob has carried out its purpose,
then no distinction can be drawn between the finger man and the trigger man (sic). No
distinction is drawn between the one who, by his acts, caused the victims to be subjected
to the pleasure of the mob or the one who incited the mob, or the ones who dealt the fatal
blows. This rule of law and common sense must, of necessity, be so. Otherwise, many
of the true instigators of crime would never be punished.
Who can tell which particular act was the most responsible for the final shooting of these
flyers? Can it not be truly said that any one of the acts of any one of these accused may
have been the very act that produced the ultimate result? Although the ultimate act might
have been something in which the former actor did not directly participate , every time
a member of a mob takes any action that is inclined to encourage, that is inclined to give
heart to someone else who is present, to participate, then that person has lent his aid to
the accomplishment of the final result.262
In short, noted the Prosecutor, the accused were “cogs in the wheel of common design, all
equally important, each cog doing the part assigned to it. And the wheel of wholesale
murder could not turn without all the cogs”. 263 As a consequence, according to the
Prosecutor, if it were proved beyond a reasonable doubt “that each one of these accused
what was meant by the word 'murder’ for the purposes of this trial, there … was ?nog difficulty” (ibid.,
pp. 91-92).
261 See Charge Sheet, in U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publications, I (on file with the International
Tribunal’s Library).
262 Ibid., p. 1186 (emphasis added). See also p. 1187.
263 Ibid., p. 1188. See, further note 240 and accompanying text, with regard to the comments made regarding
causation in the Ponzano case.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
94
played his part in mob violence which led to the unlawful killing of the seven American
flyers, … under the law each and every one of the accused was guilty of murder”.264
211. It bears emphasising that by taking the approach just summarised, the Prosecutor
substantially propounded a doctrine of common purpose which presupposes that all the
participants in the common purpose shared the same criminal intent, namely, to commit
murder. In other words, the Prosecutor adhered to the doctrine of common purpose
mentioned above with regard to the first category of cases. It is interesting to note that the
various defence counsel denied the applicability of this common design doctrine, not,
however, on principle, but merely on the facts of the case. For instance, some denied the
existence of a criminal intent to participate in the common design, claiming that mere
presence was not sufficient for the determination of the intent to take part in the killings.265
Other defence counsel claimed that there was no evidence that there was a conspiracy
among the German officers,266 or they argued that, if there had been such a plot, it did not
involve the killing of the airmen. 267
212. In this case too, no Judge Advocate stated the law. However, it may be fairly
assumed that in the event, the court upheld the common design doctrine, but in a different
form, for it found some defendants guilty of both the killing and assault charges268 while
others were only found guilty of assault.269
213. It may be inferred from this case that all the accused found guilty were held
responsible for pursuing a criminal common design, the intent being to assault the prisoners
of war. However, some of them were also found guilty of murder, even where there was no
evidence that they had actually killed the prisoners. Presumably, this was on the basis that
the accused, whether by virtue of their status, role or conduct, were in a position to have
predicted that the assault would lead to the killing of the victims by some of those
participating in the assault.
264 Ibid., p. 1190 (emphasis added). See also pp. 1191-1194.
265 See e.g. ibid., pp. 1201, 1203-1206.
266 See ibid., pp. 1234, 1241, 1243.
267 See ibid., pp. 1268-1270.
268 The accused Akkerman, Krolikovski, Schmitz, Wentzel, Seiler and Goebbel were all found guilty on both
the killing and assault charges and were sentenced to death, with the exception of Krolikovski, who was
sentenced to life imprisonment (ibid., pp. 1280-1286).
269 The accused Pointner, Witzke, Geyer, Albrecht, Weber, Rommel, Mammenga and Heinemann were found
guilty only of assault and received terms of imprisonment ranging between 2 and 25 years (ibid.).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
95
214. Mention must now be made of some cases brought before Italian courts after World
War II concerning war crimes committed either by civilians or by military personnel
belonging to the armed forces of the so-called “Repubblica Sociale Italiana” (“RSI”), a de
facto government under German control established by the Fascist leadership in central and
northern Italy, following the declaration of war by Italy against Germany on 13 October
1943. After the war several persons were brought to trial for crimes committed between
1943 and 1945 against prisoners of war, Italian partisans or members of the Italian army
fighting against the Germans and the RSI. Some of these trials concerned the question of
criminal culpability for acts perpetrated by groups of persons where only one member of the
group had actually committed the crime.
215. In D’Ottavio et al., on appeal from the Assize Court of Teramo, the Court of
Cassation on 12 March 1947 pronounced upon one of these cases. Some armed civilians had
given unlawful pursuit to two prisoners of war who had escaped from a concentration camp,
in order to capture them. One member of the group had shot at the prisoners without
intending to kill them, but one had been wounded and had subsequently died as a result.
The trial court held that all the other members of the group were accountable not only for
“illegal restraint” (sequestro di persona) but also for manslaughter (omicidio
preterintenzionale). The Court of Cassation upheld this finding. It held that for this type of
criminal liability to arise, it was necessary that there exist not only a material but also a
psychological “causal nexus” between the result all the members of the group intended to
bring about and the different actions carried out by an individual member of that group. The
court went on to point out that:
indeed the responsibility of the participant (concorrente) […] is not founded on the
notion of objective responsibility […], but on the fundamental principle of the concurrence
of interdependent causes […]; by virtue of this principle all the participants are
accountable for the crime both where they directly cause it and where they indirectly cause
it, in keeping with the well-known canon causa causae est causa causati.270
270 See handwritten text of the (unpublished) judgement, p. 6 (unofficial translation; kindly provided by the
Italian Public Record Office, Rome; on file with the International Tribunal’s Library). See also Giustizia
penale, 1948, Part II, col. 66, no. 71 (containing a headnote on the judgement).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
96
The court then noted that in the case at issue:
[t]here existed a nexus of material causality, as all the participants had directly cooperated
in the crime of attempted “illegal restraint” […] by surrounding and pursuing two prisoners
of war on the run, armed with a gun and a rifle, with a view to illegally capturing them.
This crime was the indirect cause of a subsequent and different event, namely the shooting
(by d’Ottavio alone) at one of the fugitives, resulting in wounding followed by death.
Furthermore, there existed psychological causality, as all the participants had the intent to
perpetrate and knowledge of the actual perpetration of an attempted illegal restraint, and
foresaw the possible commission of a different crime . This foresight (previsione)
necessarily followed from the use of weapons: it being predictable (dovendo prevedersi)
that one of the participants might shoot at the fugitives to attain the common purpose (lo
scopo comune) of capturing them. 271
216. In another case (Aratano et al.) the Court of Cassation dealt with the following
circumstances: a group of RSI militiamen had planned to arrest some partisans, without
intending to kill them; however, to frighten the partisans, one of the militiamen fired a few
shots into the air. As a result the partisans shot back; a shoot-out ensued and in the event
one of the partisans was killed by a member of the RSI militia. The court held that the trial
court had erred in convicting all members of the militia of murder. In its view, as the trial
court had found that the militiamen had not intended to kill the partisans:
[I]t was clear that [the murder of one of the partisans] was an unintended event (evento non voluto)
and consequently could not be attributed to all the participants: the crime committed was more
serious than that intended and it proves necessary to resort to categories other than that of voluntary
homicide. This Supreme Court has already had the opportunity to state the same principle, where it
noted that in order to find a person responsible for a homicide perpetrated in the course of a
mopping-up operation carried out by many persons, it was necessary to establish that, in participating
in this operation, a voluntary activity also concerning homicide had been brought into being (fosse
stata spiegata un’attività volontaria in relazione anche all’omicidio) (judgement of 27 August 1947
in re: Beraschi).272
217. Other cases relate to the applicability of the amnesty law passed by the Presidential
Decree of 22 June 1946 no. 4. The amnesty applied among other things to crimes of
“collaboration with the occupying Germans” but excluded offences involving murder. In
Tossani the question was whether the law on amnesty covered a person who had taken part
in a mopping-up operation against civilians in the course of which a German soldier had
killed a partisan. The Court of Cassation found that the amnesty should apply. It emphasised
that the appellant participating in the operation had not taken any active part in it and did
not carry weapons; in addition, the killing was found to have been “an exceptional and
271 See handwritten text of the (unpublished) judgement, pp. 6-7 (unofficial translation; emphasis added).
272 See handwritten text of the (unpublished) judgement, pp. 13-14 (kindly provided by the Italian Public
Record Office, Rome; on file with the International Tribunal’s Library). For a headnote on this case see
Archivio penale, 1949, p. 472.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
97
unforeseen (imprevisto) event”, for during a search a civilian had escaped to avoid being
detained and had been shot at by the German soldier.273 A similar position was taken by the
same court in Ferrida. The appellant had participated, “only in his capacity as a nurse,” in a
mopping-up operation in the course of which some partisans had been killed. The court
found that he was not guilty of murder; the law on amnesty was therefore applicable to
him.274 In Bonati et al. the appellant argued that the crime of murder, not envisaged by the
group of persons concerned, had been perpetrated by another member of that group. The
Court of Cassation rejected the appeal, holding that the appellant was also guilty of murder.
Although this crime was more grave than that intended by some of the participants
(concorrenti), it “was in any case a consequence, albeit indirect, of his participation”. 275
218. In these cases courts indisputably applied the notion that a person may be held
criminally responsible for a crime committed by another member of a group and not
envisaged in the criminal plan. Admittedly, in some of the cases the mens rea required for a
member of the group to be held responsible for such an action was not clearly spelled out.
However, in light of other judgements handed down in the same period on the same matter,
although not relating to war crimes, it may nevertheless be assumed that courts required that
the event must have been predictable. In this connection it suffices to mention the
judgement of the Court of Cassation of 20 July 1949 in Mannelli, where the court explained
the required causal nexus as follows:
The relationship of material causality by virtue of which the law makes some of the
participants liable for the crime other than that envisaged, must be correctly understood from
the viewpoint of logic and law and be strictly differentiated from an incidental relationship
(rapporto di occasionalita’). Indeed, the cause, whether immediate or mediate, direct or
indirect, simultaneous or successive, can never be confused with mere coincidence. For there
to be a relationship of material causality between the crime willed by one of the participants
and the different crime committed by another, it is necessary that the latter crime should
constitute the logical and predictable development of the former (il logico e prevedibile
sviluppo del primo). Instead, where there exists full independence between the two crimes,
one may find, depending upon the specific circumstances, a merely incidental relationship
(un rapporto di mera occasionalita’), but not a causal relationship. In the light of these
criteria, he who requests somebody else to wound or kill cannot answer for a robbery
perpetrated by the other person, for this crime does not constitute the logical development of
273 Judgement of 12 September 1946, in Archivio penale, 1947, Part II, pp. 88-89.
274 Judgement of 25 July 1946, in Archivio penale, 1947, Part II, p. 88.
275 See handwritten text of the (unpublished) judgement of 5 July 1946, p. 19 (kindly provided by the Italian
Public Record Office, Rome; on file with the International Tribunal’s Library). See also Giustizia penale,
1945-46, Part II, cols. 530-532.
For cases where the Court of Cassation concluded that the participant was guilty of the more serious crime not
envisaged in the common criminal design, see Torrazzini, judgement of 18 August 1946, in Archivio penale
1947, Part II, p. 89; Palmia, judgement of 20 September 1946, ibid.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
98
the intended offence, but a new fact, having its own causal autonomy, and linked to the
conduct willed by the instigator (mandante) by a merely incidental relationship (emphasis
added).
276
219. The same notion was enunciated by the same Court of Cassation in many other
cases.277 That this was the basic notion upheld by the court seems to be borne out by the
fact that the one instance where the same court adopted a different approach is somewhat
conspicuous.278 Accordingly, it would seem that, with regard to the mens rea element
required for the criminal responsibility of a person for acts committed within a common
purpose but not envisaged in the criminal design, that court either applied the notion of an
attenuated form of intent (dolus eventualis) or required a high degree of carelessness
(culpa).
220. In sum, the Appeals Chamber holds the view that the notion of common design as a
form of accomplice liability is firmly established in customary international law and in
addition is upheld, albeit implicitly, in the Statute of the International Tribunal. As for the
objective and subjective elements of the crime, the case law shows that the notion has been
applied to three distinct categories of cases. First, in cases of co-perpetration, where all
participants in the common design possess the same criminal intent to commit a crime (and
one or more of them actually perpetrate the crime, with intent). Secondly, in the so-called
“concentration camp” cases, where the requisite mens rea comprises knowledge of the
nature of the system of ill-treatment and intent to further the common design of illtreatment.
Such intent may be proved either directly or as a matter of inference from the
nature of the accused’s authority within the camp or organisational hierarchy. With regard
to the third category of cases, it is appropriate to apply the notion of “common purpose”
only where the following requirements concerning mens rea are fulfilled: (i) the intention to
276 See Giustizia penale, 1950, Part II, cols. 696-697 (emphasis added).
277 See e.g. Court of Cassation, 15 March 1948, Peveri case, in Archivio penale, 1948, pp. 431-432; Court of
Cassation, 20 July 1949, Mannelli case, in Giustizia penale, 1949, Part II, col. 906, no.599; Court of
Cassation, 27 October 1949, P.M. v. Minafò, in Giustizia penale, 1950, Part II, col. 252, no. 202; 24 February
1950, Montagnino, ibid., col.821; 19 April 1950, Solesio et al., ibid., col. 822. By contrast, in a judgement of
23 October 1946 the same Court of Cassation, in Minapò et al., held that it was immaterial that the participant
in a crime had or had not foreseen the criminal conduct carried out by another member of the criminal group
(Giustizia penale, 1947, Part II, col. 483, no. 382).
278 In the Antonini case (judgement of the Court of Cassation of 29 March 1949), the trial court had found the
accused guilty not only of illegally arresting some civilians but also of their subsequent shooting by the
Germans, as a “reprisal” for an attack on German troops in Via Rasella, in Rome. According to the trial court
the accused, in arresting the civilians, had not intended to bring about their killing, but knew that he thus
brought into being a situation likely to lead to their killing. The Court of Cassation reversed this finding,
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
99
take part in a joint criminal enterprise and to further – individually and jointly – the criminal
purposes of that enterprise; and (ii) the foreseeability of the possible commission by other
members of the group of offences that do not constitute the object of the common criminal
purpose. Hence, the participants must have had in mind the intent, for instance, to ill-treat
prisoners of war (even if such a plan arose extemporaneously) and one or some members of
the group must have actually killed them. In order for responsibility for the deaths to be
imputable to the others, however, everyone in the group must have been able to predict this
result. It should be noted that more than negligence is required. What is required is a state
of mind in which a person, although he did not intend to bring about a certain result, was
aware that the actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless
willingly took that risk. In other words, the so-called dolus eventualis is required (also
called “advertent recklessness” in some national legal systems).
221. In addition to the aforementioned case law, the notion of common plan has been
upheld in at least two international treaties. The first of these is the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, adopted by consensus by the United
Nations General Assembly through resolution 52/164 of 15 December 1997 and opened for
signature on 9 January 1998. Pursuant to Article 2(3)(c) of the Convention, offences
envisaged in the Convention may be committed by any person who:
[i]n any other way other than participating as an accomplice, or organising or directing
others to commit an offence contributes to the commission of one or more offences as
set forth in paragraphs 1 or 2 of the present article by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim
of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned.
The negotiating process does not shed any light on the reasons behind the adoption of this
text.279 This Convention would seem to be significant because it upholds the notion of a
holding that for the accused to be found guilty, it was necessary that he had not only foreseen but also willed
the killing (see text of the judgement in Giustizia penale, 1949, Part II, cols. 740-742).
279 The Report of the Sixth Committee (25 November 1997, A/52/653) and the Official Records of the General
Assembly session in which this Convention was adopted made scant reference to Article 2 and did not
elaborate upon the doctrine of common purpose (see UNGAOR, 72nd plenary meeting, 52nd sess., Mon. 15
December 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/PV.72). The Japanese delegate during the 33rd meeting of the Sixth
Committee nevertheless noted that “some terms used ?in the Conventiong such as … ‘such contribution’
(Article 2, para. 3(c)) were ambiguous” (33rd Meeting of the Sixth Committee, 2 December 1997, UNGAOR
A/C.6/52/SR.33, p. 8, para. 77). He concluded that his Government would therefore “interpret 'such
contribution’ … to mean abetment, assistance or other similar acts as defined by Japanese legislation” (ibid).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
100
“common criminal purpose” as distinct from that of aiding and abetting (couched in the
terms of “participating as an accomplice in an offence”). Although the Convention is not
yet in force, one should not underestimate the fact that it was adopted by consensus by all
the members of the General Assembly. It may therefore be taken to constitute significant
evidence of the legal views of a large number of States.
222. A substantially similar notion was subsequently laid down in Article 25 of the
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by a Diplomatic Conference in Rome
on 17 July 1998 (“Rome Statute”).280 At paragraph 3(d), this provision upholds the doctrine
under discussion as follows:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person …
(d) In any other way other than aiding and abetting or otherwise assisting in the
commission or attempted commission of a crime contributes to the commission or
attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
i. Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of
the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or
ii. Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.
223. The legal weight to be currently attributed to the provisions of the Rome Statute has
been correctly set out by Trial Chamber II in Furund`ija.281 There the Trial Chamber
pointed out that the Statute is still a non-binding international treaty, for it has not yet
entered into force. Nevertheless, it already possesses significant legal value. The Statute
was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the States attending the Rome Diplomatic
Conference and was substantially endorsed by the Sixth Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly. This shows that that text is supported by a great number of States and
may be taken to express the legal position i.e. opinio iuris of those States. This is consistent
See also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December
1996, UNGAOR, 52nd sess., 37th supp., A/52/37.
280 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998.
281 “Judgement”, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No.: IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber II, 10 December
1998, para. 227.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
101
with the view that the mode of accomplice liability under discussion is well-established in
international law and is distinct from aiding and abetting.282
224. As pointed out above, the doctrine of acting in pursuance of a common purpose is
rooted in the national law of many States. Some countries act upon the principle that where
multiple persons participate in a common purpose or common design, all are responsible for
the ensuing criminal conduct, whatever their degree or form of participation, provided all
had the intent to perpetrate the crime envisaged in the common purpose. If one of the
participants commits a crime not envisaged in the common purpose or common design, he
alone will incur criminal responsibility for such a crime. These countries include
Germany283 and the Netherlands.284 Other countries also uphold the principle whereby if
persons take part in a common plan or common design to commit a crime, all of them are
criminally responsible for the crime, whatever the role played by each of them. However,
in these countries, if one of the persons taking part in a common criminal plan or enterprise
perpetrates another offence that was outside the common plan but nevertheless foreseeable,
those persons are all fully liable for that offence. These countries include civil law systems,
such as that of France285 and Italy.286
282 Even should it be argued that the objective and subjective elements of the crime, laid down in Article 25 (3)
of the Rome Statute differ to some extent from those required by the case law cited above, the consequences
of this departure may only be appreciable in the long run, once the Court is established. This is due to the
inapplicability to Article 25(3) of Article 10 of the Statute, which provides that “?ngothing in this Part shall be
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes
other than this Statute”. This provision does not embrace Article 25, as this Article appears in Part 2 of the
Statute, whereas Article 25 is included in Part 3.
283 See Para. 25(2) of the Strafgesetzbuch: “Begehen mehrere die Straftat gemeinschaftlich, so wird jeder als
Täter bestraft (Mittäter)”. (“If several persons commit a crime as co-perpetrators, each is liable to punishment
as a principal perpetrator.” (unofficial translation)). The German case law has clearly established the principle
whereby if an offence is perpetrated that had not been envisaged in the common criminal plan, only the author
of this offence is criminally responsible for it. See BGH GA 85, 270. According to the German Federal Court
(in BGH GA 85, 270):
“Mittäterschaft ist anzunehmen, wenn und soweit das Zusammenwirken der mehreren Beteiligten auf
gegenseitigem Einverständnis beruht, während jede rechtsverletzende Handlung eines Mittäters, die
über dieses Einverständnis hinausgeht, nur diesem allein zuzurechnen ist”. (“There is co-perpetration
(Mittäterschaft) when and to the extent that the joint action of the several participants is founded on a
reciprocal agreement (Einverständnis), whereas any criminal action of a participant (Mittäter) going
beyond this agreement can only be attributed to that participant.” (unofficial translation)).
284 In the Netherlands, the term designated for this form of criminal liability is “medeplegen”. (See HR 6
December 1943, NJ 1944, 245; HR 17 May 1943, NJ 1943, 576; and HR 6 April 1925, NJ 1925, 723, W
11393).
285 See Article 121-7 of the Code pénal, which reads:
“Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité
la préparation ou la consommation. Est également complice la personne qui par don, promesse,
menace, ordre, abus d’autorité ou de pouvoir aura provoqué à une infraction ou donné des instructions
pour la commettre”. (“Any person who knowingly has assisted in planning or committing a crime or
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
102
They also embrace common law jurisdictions such as England and Wales,287 Canada,288 the
United States,289 Australia290 and Zambia.291
offence, whether by aiding or abetting, is party to it. Furthermore, any person who offers gifts, makes
promises, gives orders or abuses his position of authority or power to instigate a criminal act or gives
instructions for its commission is equally party to it.” (unofficial translation)).
In addition to responsibility for crimes committed by more persons, the Court of Cassation has envisaged
criminal responsibility for acts committed by an accomplice going beyond the criminal plan. In this
connection the Court has distinguished between crimes bearing no relationship to the crime envisaged (e.g. a
person hands a gun to an accomplice in the context of a hold-up, but the accomplice uses the gun to kill one of
his relatives), and crimes where the conduct bears some relationship to the planned crime (e.g. theft is carried
out in the form of robbery). In the former category of cases French case law does not hold the person
concerned responsible, while in the latter it does, under certain conditions (as held in a judgement of 31
December 1947, Bulletin des arrêts criminels de la Cour de Cassation 1947, no. 270, the accomplice “devait
prévoir toutes les qualifications dont le fait était susceptible, toutes les circonstances dont il pouvait être
accompagné” (”should expect to be charged on all counts that the law allows for and all consequences that
might result from the crime” (unofficial translation)). See also the decision of 19 June 1984, Bulletin, ibid.,
1984, no. 231.
286 The principles of common purpose are delineated, in substance, in the following provisions of the Codice
Penale:
“Article 110: Pena per coloro che concorrono nel reato.- Quando più persone concorrono nel
medesimo reato, ciascuna di esse soggiace alla pena per questo stabilità, salve le disposizioni degli
articoli seguenti.” (“Penalties for those who take part in a crime.- Where multiple persons participate
in the same crime, each of them is liable to the penalty established for that crime, subject to the
provisions of the following Articles.” (unofficial translation)); and
“Article 116: Reato diverso da quello voluto da taluno dei concorrenti.- Qualora il reato commesso sia
diverso da quello voluto da taluno dei concorrenti, anche questi ne risponde, se l’evento e conseguenza
della sua azione od omissione.” (“Crimes other than that intended by some of the participants.- Where
the crime committed is different from that intended by one of the participants, he too shall answer for
that crime if the event is a consequence of his act or omission.” (unofficial translation)).
It should be noted that Italian courts have increasingly interpreted Article 116 as providing for criminal
responsibility in cases of foreseeability. See in particular the judgement of the Constitutional Court of 13 May
1965, no. 42, Archivio Penale 1965, part II, pp. 430 ff. In some cases courts require so-called abstract
foreseeability (prevedibilità astratta) (see e.g., instance, Court of Cassation, 3 March 1978, Cassazione
penale, 1980, pp. 45 ff; Court of Cassation, 4 March 1988, Cassazione penale, 1990, pp. 35 ff); others require
concrete (or specific) foreseeability (prevedibilità concreta) (see e.g., Court of Cassation, 11 October 1985,
Rivista penale, 1986, p. 421; and Court of Cassation, 18 February 1998, Rivista penale, 1988, p. 1200).
287 See R. v. Hyde ?1991g 1 QB 134; R. v. Anderson; R. v. Morris 1966 2 QB 110, in which Lord Parker CJ
held that “where two persons embark on a joint enterprise, each is liable for the acts done in pursuance of that
joint enterprise, than that includes liability for unusual consequences if they arise from the execution of the
agreed joint enterprise”. However, liability for such unusual consequences is limited to those offences that the
accused foresaw that the principal might commit as a possible incident of the common unlawful enterprise,
and further, the accused, with such foresight, must have continued to participate in the enterprise (see Hui Chi-
Ming v. R. 1992 3 All ER 897 at 910-911).
288 Criminal Code, Section 21(2) reads that where:
“two or more persons form an intention to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other
therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each one of
them who knew or ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable
consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence.”
It should be noted that despite the fact that the section refers to an objective foreseeability requirement, this
has been modified by the Supreme Court of Canada which held that: “in those instances where the principal
is held to a mens rea standard of subjective foresight, the party cannot constitutionally be convicted for the
same crime on the basis of an objective foreseeability standard” (R. v. Logan 1990 2 SCR 731 at 735).
Hence, a subjective standard is applied in the case of offences such as murder. See also R. v. Rodney 1990 2
SCR 687.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
103
225. It should be emphasised that reference to national legislation and case law only
serves to show that the notion of common purpose upheld in international criminal law has
an underpinning in many national systems. By contrast, in the area under discussion,
national legislation and case law cannot be relied upon as a source of international
principles or rules, under the doctrine of the general principles of law recognised by the
nations of the world: for this reliance to be permissible, it would be necessary to show that
most, if not all, countries adopt the same notion of common purpose. More specifically, it
would be necessary to show that, in any case, the major legal systems of the world take the
same approach to this notion. The above brief survey shows that this is not the case. Nor
can reference to national law have, in this case, the scope and purport adumbrated in general
terms by the United Nations Secretary-General in his Report, where it is pointed out that
“suggestions have been made that the international tribunal should apply domestic law in so
far as it incorporates customary international humanitarian law”. 292 In the area under
discussion, domestic law does not originate from the implementation of international law
but, rather, to a large extent runs parallel to, and precedes, international regulation.
226. The Appeals Chamber considers that the consistency and cogency of the case law
and the treaties referred to above, as well as their consonance with the general principles on
criminal responsibility laid down both in the Statute and general international criminal law
289 E.g., in Maine (17 Maine Criminal Code § 57 (1997), Minnesota (Minnesota Statutes § 609.05 (1998)),
Iowa (Iowa Code § 703.2 (1997)), Kansas (Kansas Statutes § 21-3205 (19997)), Wisconsin (Wisconsin
Statutes § 939.05 (West 1995)). Although there is no clearly defined doctrine of common purpose under the
United States’ Federal common law, similar principles are promulgated by the Pinkerton doctrine. This
doctrine imposes criminal liability for acts committed in furtherance of a common criminal purpose, whether
the acts are explicitly planned or not, provided that such acts might have been reasonably contemplated as a
probable consequence or likely result of the common criminal purpose (see Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90 L. Ed. 1489 (1946); State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32; 630 A.2d 990 (1993); State
of Connecticut v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 679 A. 2d 902 (1996)).
290 Under Australian law, when two parties embark on a joint criminal enterprise, a party will be liable for an
act which he contemplates may be carried out by the other party in the course of the enterprise, even if he has
not explicitly or tacitly agreed to the commission of that act (McAuliffe v. R. (1995) 183 CLR 108 at 114).
The test for determining whether a crime falls within the scope of the relevant joint enterprise is the subjective
test of contemplation: “in accordance with the emphasis which the law now places upon the actual state of
mind of an accused person, the test has become a subjective one, and the scope of the common purpose is to
be determined by what was contemplated by the parties sharing that purpose” (ibid.).
291 Article 22 of the Penal Code states:
“When two or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction
with one another, and in the prosecution of such purpose an offence is committed of such a nature that
its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose, each of them is
deemed to have committed the offence.”
292 See Report of the Secretary-General, para. 36 (emphasis added).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
104
and in national legislation, warrant the conclusion that case law reflects customary rules of
international criminal law.
227. In sum, the objective elements (actus reus) of this mode of participation in one of
the crimes provided for in the Statute (with regard to each of the three categories of cases)
are as follows:
i. A plurality of persons. They need not be organised in a military, political or
administrative structure, as is clearly shown by the Essen Lynching and the Kurt Goebell
cases.
ii. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves
the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute. There is no necessity for this plan,
design or purpose to have been previously arranged or formulated. The common plan or
purpose may materialise extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality of
persons acts in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise.
iii. Participation of the accused in the common design involving the perpetration of one
of the crimes provided for in the Statute. This participation need not involve commission of
a specific crime under one of those provisions (for example, murder, extermination, torture,
rape, etc.), but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the
common plan or purpose.
228. By contrast, the mens rea element differs according to the category of common
design under consideration. With regard to the first category, what is required is the intent
to perpetrate a certain crime (this being the shared intent on the part of all co-perpetrators).
With regard to the second category (which, as noted above, is really a variant of the first),
personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment is required (whether proved by express
testimony or a matter of reasonable inference from the accused’s position of authority), as
well as the intent to further this common concerted system of ill-treatment. With regard to
the third category, what is required is the intention to participate in and further the criminal
activity or the criminal purpose of a group and to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise
or in any event to the commission of a crime by the group. In addition, responsibility for a
crime other than the one agreed upon in the common plan arises only if, under the
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
105
circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by
one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk.
229. In light of the preceding propositions it is now appropriate to distinguish between
acting in pursuance of a common purpose or design to commit a crime, and aiding and
abetting.
(i) The aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by another
person, the principal.
(ii) In the case of aiding and abetting no proof is required of the existence of a common
concerted plan, let alone of the pre-existence of such a plan. No plan or agreement is
required: indeed, the principal may not even know about the accomplice’s contribution.
(iii) The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or
lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination,
rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial
effect upon the perpetration of the crime. By contrast, in the case of acting in pursuance of
a common purpose or design, it is sufficient for the participant to perform acts that in some
way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose.
(iv) In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the
acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific crime by the
principal. By contrast, in the case of common purpose or design more is required (i.e., either
intent to perpetrate the crime or intent to pursue the common criminal design plus foresight
that those crimes outside the criminal common purpose were likely to be committed), as
stated above.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
106
(b) The Culpability of the Appellant in the Present Case
230. In the present case, the Trial Chamber found that the Appellant participated in the
armed conflict taking place between May and December 1992 in the Prijedor region. An
aspect of this conflict was a policy to commit inhumane acts against the non-Serb civilian
population of the territory in the attempt to achieve the creation of a Greater Serbia.293 It
was also found that, in furtherance of this policy, inhumane acts were committed against
numerous victims and “pursuant to a recognisable plan”. 294 The attacks on Sivci and Jaski}i
on 14 June 1992 formed part of this armed conflict raging in the Prijedor region.
231. The Appellant actively took part in the common criminal purpose to rid the Prijedor
region of the non-Serb population, by committing inhumane acts. The common criminal
purpose was not to kill all non-Serb men; from the evidence adduced and accepted, it is
clear that killings frequently occurred in the effort to rid the Prijedor region of the non-Serb
population. That the Appellant had been aware of the killings accompanying the
commission of inhumane acts against the non-Serb population is beyond doubt. That is the
context in which the attack on Jaski}i and his participation therein, as found by the Trial
Chamber as well as the Appeals Chamber above, should be seen. That nobody was killed in
the attack on Sivci on the same day does not represent a change of the common criminal
purpose.
232. The Appellant was an armed member of an armed group that, in the context of the
conflict in the Prijedor region, attacked Jaski}i on 14 June 1992. The Trial Chamber found
the following:
Of the killing of the five men in Jaski}i, the witnesses Draguna Jaski}, Zemka [ahbaz
and Senija Elkasovi} saw their five dead bodies lying in the village when the women
were able to leave their houses after the armed men had gone; Senija Elkasovi} saw that
four of them had been shot in the head. She had heard shooting after the men from her
house were taken away.295
The Appellant actively took part in this attack, rounding up and severely beating some of
the men from Jaski}i. As the Trial Chamber further noted:
293 See Judgement, paras. 127-179, which outlines the background to the conflict in the op{tina Prijedor.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
107
[t]hat the armed men were violent was not in doubt, a number of these witnesses were themselves
threatened with death by the armed men as the men of the village were being taken away. Apart from
that, their beating of the men from the village, in some cases beating them into insensibility, as they lay
on the road, is further evidence of their violence.296
Accordingly, the only possible inference to be drawn is that the Appellant had the intention
to further the criminal purpose to rid the Prijedor region of the non-Serb population, by
committing inhumane acts against them. That non-Serbs might be killed in the effecting of
this common aim was, in the circumstances of the present case, foreseeable. The Appellant
was aware that the actions of the group of which he was a member were likely to lead to
such killings, but he nevertheless willingly took that risk.
3. The Finding of the Appeals Chamber
233. The Trial Chamber erred in holding that it could not, on the evidence before it, be
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant had any part in the killing of the five
men from the village of Jaski}i. The Appeals Chamber finds that the Appellant participated
in the killings of the five men in Jaski}i, which were committed during an armed conflict as
part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. The Appeals Chamber
therefore holds that under the provisions of Article 7(1) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber
should have found the Appellant guilty.
234. The Appeals Chamber finds that this ground of the Prosecution’s Cross-Appeal
succeeds.
294 Judgement, para. 660.
295 Ibid., para. 370.
296 Ibid.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
108
C. Conclusion
235. In light of the Appeals Chamber’s finding that Article 2 of the Statute is applicable,
the Appellant is found guilty on Count 29 (grave breach in terms of Article 2(a) (wilful
killing) of the Statute) and Article 7(1) of the Statute.
236. The Trial Chamber’s finding on Count 30 is set aside. The Appellant is found guilty
on Count 30 (violation of the laws or customs of war in terms of Article 3(1)(a) (murder) of
the Statute) and Article 7(1) of the Statute.
237. The Trial Chamber’s finding on Count 31 is set aside. The Appellant is found guilty
on Count 31 (crime against humanity in terms of Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute) and
Article 7(1) of the Statute.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
109
VI. THE THIRD GROUND OF CROSS-APPEAL BY THE
PROSECUTION: THE TRIAL CHAMBER’S FINDING THAT CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY CANNOT BE COMMITTED FOR PURELY
PERSONAL MOTIVES
238. In the Judgement, the Trial Chamber identified, from among the elements which had
to be satisfied before a conviction for crimes against humanity could be recorded, the need
to prove the existence of an armed conflict and a nexus between the acts in question and the
armed conflict.
239. As to the nature of the nexus required, the Trial Chamber found that, subject to two
caveats, it is sufficient for the purposes of crimes against humanity that the act occurred “in
the course or duration of an armed conflict”.297 The first caveat was “that the act be linked
geographically as well as temporally with the armed conflict”.298 The second caveat was
that the act and the conflict must be related or, at least, that the act must “not be unrelated to
the armed conflict”.299 The Trial Chamber further held that the requirement that the act
must “not be unrelated” to the armed conflict involved two aspects. First, the perpetrator
must know of the broader context in which the act occurs.300 Secondly, the act must not
have been carried out for the purely personal motives of the perpetrator.301
A. Submissions of the Parties
1. The Prosecution Case
240. The Prosecution submits that there is nothing in Article 5 of the Statute which
suggests that it contains a requirement that crimes against humanity cannot be committed
for purely personal motives. In the submission of the Prosecution, no such requirement can
be inferred from the requirement that the crime must have a nexus to the armed conflict. In
297 Judgement, para. 633.
298 Ibid.
299 Ibid., para. 634.
300 Ibid., paras. 656-657.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
110
fact, to read the armed conflict requirement as requiring that the perpetrator’s motives not
be purely personal “would ?…g transform this merely jurisdictional limitation under Article
5 into a substantive element of the mens rea of crimes against humanity”.302
241. The Prosecution concedes that this finding did not affect the verdict against the
Appellant. However, it submits that the finding involves a significant question of law that is
of general importance to the Tribunal’s jurisprudence and should therefore be corrected on
appeal.303
242. The Prosecution argues that the weight of authority supports the proposition that
crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal reasons and that the sole
authority relied on by the Trial Chamber in support of its finding in fact suggests that, even
where perpetrators may have been personally motivated to commit the acts in question, their
conduct can still be characterised as a crime against humanity.304 Subsequent decisions of
the United States military tribunals under Control Council Law No.10 and of national courts
are also consistent with the view that a perpetrator of crimes against humanity may act out
of purely personal motives.305
243. Finally, the Prosecution contends that the object and purpose of the Tribunal’s
Statute support the interpretation that crimes against humanity may be committed for purely
personal reasons, arguing that the objective of the Statute in providing a broad scope for
humanitarian law would be defeated by a narrow interpretation of the category of offences
falling within the ambit of Article 5. Furthermore, if proof of a non-personal motive was
required, many perpetrators of crimes against humanity could evade conviction by the
International Tribunal simply by invoking purely personal motives in defence of their
conduct.306
301 Ibid. paras. 658-659.
302 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 4.9.
303 Skeleton Argument of the Prosecution, para. 26.
304 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 4.11; T. 150 (20 April 1999).
305 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 4.15 – 4.18.
306 Ibid. paras. 4.22; T. 152 (20 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
111
2. The Defence Case
244. In contrast to the Prosecution’s Cross-Appeal, the Defence argues that the
Trial Chamber’s ruling that a crime against humanity cannot be committed for purely
personal reasons is correct. Although it concedes that Article 5 of the Statute does not
expressly stipulate that crimes against humanity cannot be committed for purely personal
reasons, in its submission, the Trial Chamber nevertheless interpreted Article 5 correctly
when it found that crimes against humanity cannot be committed for purely personal
motives.307
245. The Defence contests the interpretation given to the applicable case law by the
Prosecution, arguing that in all the cases cited, the defendants were linked to the system of
extermination which formed the underlying predicate of crimes against humanity, and
therefore did not commit their crimes for purely personal motives.308 In other words, the
activities of the defendants were linked to the general activities comprising the pogroms
against the Jews and thus the Defence submits that the acts of the defendants were not acts
committed for purely personal reasons.
246. The Defence also contests the Prosecution’s submissions regarding the object and
purpose of the Statute of the International Tribunal, arguing, to the contrary, that policy
suggests that it would be unjust if a perpetrator of a criminal act guided solely by personal
motives was instead to be prosecuted for a crime against humanity.309
B. Discussion
247. Neither Party asserts that the Trial Chamber’s finding that crimes against humanity
cannot be committed for purely personal motives had a bearing on the verdict in terms of
Article 25(1) of the Tribunal Statute.310 Nevertheless this is a matter of general significance
for the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. It is therefore appropriate for the Appeals Chamber to set
forth its views on this matter.
307 Appellant’s Amended Brief on Judgement, para. 4.9; T. 227 (20 April 1999).
308 Appellant’s Amended Brief on Judgement, para. 4.12; T. 229 (20 April 1999).
309 Appellant’s Amended Brief on Judgement, paras. 4.17 – 4.18.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
112
1. Article 5 of the Statute
248. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that there is nothing in Article 5
to suggest that it contains a requirement that crimes against humanity cannot be committed
for purely personal motives. The Appeals Chamber agrees that it may be inferred from the
words “directed against any civilian population” in Article 5 of the Statute that the acts of
the accused must comprise part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed
against a civilian population311 and that the accused must have known that his acts fit into
such a pattern. There is nothing in the Statute, however, which mandates the imposition of a
further condition that the acts in question must not be committed for purely personal
reasons, except to the extent that this condition is a consequence or a re-statement of the
other two conditions mentioned.
249. The Appeals Chamber would also agree with the Prosecution that the words
“committed in armed conflict” in Article 5 of the Statute require nothing more than the
existence of an armed conflict at the relevant time and place. The Prosecution is, moreover,
correct in asserting that the armed conflict requirement is a jurisdictional element, not “a
substantive element of the mens rea of crimes against humanity”312 (i.e., not a legal
ingredient of the subjective element of the crime).
250. This distinction is important because, as stated above, if the exclusion of “purely
personal” behaviour is understood simply as a re-statement of the two-fold requirement that
the acts of the accused form part of a context of mass crimes and that the accused be aware
of this fact, then there is nothing objectionable about it; indeed it is a correct statement of
the law. It is only if this phrase is understood as requiring that the motives of the accused
(“personal reasons”, in the terminology of the Trial Chamber) not be unrelated to the armed
310 Article 25(1) of the Statute reads as follows: “The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons
convicted by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor on the following grounds: (a) an error on a question
of law invalidating the decision; or (b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice”.
311 This requirement had already been recognised by this Tribunal in the Vukovar Hospital Rule 61 Decision:
“Crimes against humanity are to be distinguished from war crimes against individuals. In particular,
they must be widespread or demonstrate a systematic character. However, as long as there is a link with
the widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime
against humanity. As such, an individual committing a crime against a single victim or a limited
number of victims might be recognised as guilty of a crime against humanity if his acts were part of the
specific context identified above.”(“Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence”, The Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksi} et al., Case No.: IT-95-13-R61, Trial
Chamber I, 3 April 1996, para. 30).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
113
conflict that it is erroneous. Similarly, that phrase is unsound if it is taken to require proof of
the accused’s motives, as distinct from the intent to commit the crime and the knowledge of
the context into which the crime fits.
251. As to what the Trial Chamber understood by the phrase “purely personal motives”, it
is clear that it conflated two interpretations of the phrase: first, that the act is unrelated to the
armed conflict, and, secondly, that the act is unrelated to the attack on the civilian
population. In this regard, paragraph 659 of the Judgement held:
659. Thus if the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive, that these acts
were occurring on a widespread or systematic basis and does not commit his act for
purely personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population,
that is sufficient to hold him liable for crimes against humanity. Therefore the
perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the civilian population, know that his act
fits in with the attack and the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons unrelated
to the armed conflict. (emphasis added)
Thus the “attack on the civilian population” is here equated to “the armed conflict”. The two
concepts cannot, however, be identical because then crimes against humanity would, by
definition, always take place in armed conflict, whereas under customary international law
these crimes may also be committed in times of peace.313 So the two – the “attack on the
civilian population” and “the armed conflict” – must be separate notions, although of course
under Article 5 of the Statute the attack on “any civilian population” may be part of an
“armed conflict”. A nexus with the accused’s acts is required, however, only for the attack
on “any civilian population”. A nexus between the accused’s acts and the armed conflict is
not required, as is instead suggested by the Judgement. The armed conflict requirement is
satisfied by proof that there was an armed conflict; that is all that the Statute requires, and in
so doing, it requires more than does customary international law.
252. The Trial Chamber seems additionally to have conflated the notion of committing an
act for purely personal motives and the notion that the act must not be unrelated to the
armed conflict. The Trial Chamber appears to have viewed the proposition that “the act
must not be unrelated to the armed conflict”314 as being synonymous with the statement that
312 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 4.9.
313 On the issue of whether the Statute exceeds customary international law in requiring that there be an armed
conflict, see the Tadi} Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 141.
314 Judgement, para. 634.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
114
the act must “not be done for the purely personal motives of the perpetrator”.315 These two
concepts, neither of which is a prerequisite for criminal culpability under Article 5 of the
Statute, are, in any case, not coextensive. It may be true that if the act is related to the
armed conflict, then it is not being committed for purely personal motives. But it does not
follow from this that, if the act is unrelated to the armed conflict, it is being committed for
purely personal reasons. The act may be intimately related to the attack on a civilian
population, that is, it may fit precisely into a context of persecution of a particular group,
and yet be unrelated to the armed conflict. It would be wrong to conclude in these
circumstances that, since the act is unrelated to the armed conflict, it is being committed for
purely personal reasons. The converse is also true; that is, merely because personal
motivations can be identified in the defendant’s carrying out of an act, it does not
necessarily follow that the required nexus with the attack on a civilian population must also
inevitably be lacking.
2. The Object and Purpose of the Statute
253. The Prosecution has submitted that “the object and purpose of the Statute support
the interpretation that crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal
reasons”. The Prosecution cites the Tadi} Decision on Jurisdiction, to the effect that “the
‘primary purpose’ of the establishment of the International Tribunal ‘is not to leave
unpunished any person guilty of a serious violation of international humanitarian law,
whatever the context within which it may have been committed’”.316 This begs the
question, however, whether a crime committed for purely personal reasons is a crime
against humanity, and therefore a serious violation of international humanitarian law under
Article 5 of the Statute.
254. The Appeals Chamber would also reject the Prosecution’s submission concerning
the onerous evidentiary burden which would be imposed on it in having to prove that the
accused did not act from personal motives,317 as equally question-begging and inapposite.
It is question-begging because if, arguendo, under international criminal law, the fact that
315 Ibid.
316 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 4.20.
317 Ibid., para. 4.23.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
115
the accused did not act from purely personal motives was a requirement of crimes against
humanity, then the Prosecution would have to prove that element, whether it was onerous
for it to do so or not. The question is simply whether or not there is such a requirement
under international criminal law.
3. Case-law as Evidence of Customary International Law
255. Turning to the further submission of the Prosecution, the Appeals Chamber agrees
that the weight of authority supports the proposition that crimes against humanity can be
committed for purely personal reasons, provided it is understood that the two
aforementioned conditions – that the crimes must be committed in the context of
widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and that the accused
must have known that his acts, in the words of the Trial Chamber, “fitted into such a
pattern” – are met.
256. In this regard, it is necessary to review the case-law cited by the Trial Chamber and
the Prosecution, as well as other relevant case law, to establish whether this case-law is
indicative of the emergence of a norm of customary international law on this matter.
257. The Prosecution is correct in stating that the 1948 case cited by the Trial Chamber318
supports rather than negates the proposition that crimes against humanity may be committed
for purely personal motives, provided that the acts in question were knowingly committed
as “part and parcel of all the mass crimes committed during the persecution of the Jews”. As
the Supreme Court for the British Zone stated, “in cases of crimes against humanity taking
the form of political denunciations, only the perpetrator’s consciousness and intent to
318 Decision of the Supreme Court for the British Zone (Criminal Chamber) (9 November 1948), S. StS 78/48,
in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen vol. II, pp. 498-499. The Accused, Mrs. K. and P., had denounced P’s Jewish
wife to the Gestapo for her anti-Nazi remarks. The defendants’ sole purpose was to rid themselves of Mrs. P.,
who would not agree to a divorce, and the Accused saw no other means of so doing than by delivering Mrs. P.
to the Gestapo. Upon her denunciation, Mrs. P. was arrested and brought to Auschwitz concentration camp
where she died after a few months due to malnutrition. The Court of First Instance convicted K. and P. of
crimes against humanity. (See Decision of Schwurgericht Hamburg from 11 May 1948, (50). 17/48, in Justiz
und NS-Verbrechen, vol. II, pp. 491-497). The Accused appealed to the Supreme Court of the British Zone
which dismissed their appeal and confirmed their convictions, stating that both the physical and the mental
elements of a crime against humanity were met. (See Decision of the Supreme Court for the British Zone
from 9 November 1948, S. StS 78/48, in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, vol. II, pp. 498-499 at p. 499). According
to the Supreme Court, the findings of the Court of First Instance had sufficiently proved that the accused
fulfilled this mental requirement.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
116
deliver his victim through denunciation to the forces of arbitrariness or terror are
required”.319
258. The case involving the killing of mentally disturbed patients, decided by the same
court and cited by the Prosecution, is also a persuasive authority concerning the irrelevance
of personal motives with regard to the constituent elements of crimes against humanity.320
259. The Prosecution’s submission finds further support in other so-called denunciation
cases rendered after the Second World War by the Supreme Court for the British Zone and
by German national courts, in which private individuals who denounced others, albeit for
personal reasons, were nevertheless convicted of crimes against humanity.
260. In Sch., the accused had denounced her landlord solely “out of revenge and for the
purpose of rendering him harmless” after tensions in their tenancy had arisen. The
denunciation led to investigation proceedings by the Gestapo which ended with the
landlord’s conviction and execution. The Court of First Instance convicted Sch. and
sentenced her to three years’ imprisonment for crimes against humanity.321 The accused
appealed against the decision, arguing that “crimes against humanity were limited to
participation in mass crimes and … did not include all those cases in which someone took
action against a single person for personal reasons”. The Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal, holding that neither the Nuremberg Judgement nor the statements of the Prosecutor
319 Ibid., p. 499.
320 OGHBZ, Supreme Court for the British Zone (Criminal Chamber) (5 March 1949), S. StS 19/49, in
Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische Zone I, 1949, pp. 321-343. The Accused, Dr. P
and others, were medical doctors and a jurist working in a hospital for mentally disturbed patients. Pursuant to
Hitler’s directive which ordered the transferral of mentally ill persons to other institutions (where the patients
were secretly killed in gas chambers), the Defendants in a few cases participated in the transfer of patients. In
most cases, however, they objected to these instructions and tried to save their patients’ lives by releasing
them from hospital or by classifying them in categories which were not subject to Hitler’s directive. The
Defendants, charged with aiding and abetting murder, were acquitted by the Court of First Instance because it
could not be proven that they had acted with the requisite mens rea with regard to participation in the killing
of the patients. The Court of First Instance did not take into consideration whether the Defendants’ behaviour
could constitute a crime against humanity. This was criticised by the Supreme Court for the British Zone,
which ordered the re-opening of the trial before the Court of First Instance to ascertain whether the Accused
could be found guilty of a crime against humanity. The Supreme Court stated that a “perpetrator of a crime
against humanity is indeed also anyone who contributes to the realisation of the elements of the offence,
without at the same time wishing to promote National Socialist rule, … but who acts perhaps out of fear,
indifference, hatred for the victim or to receive some gain. This is because even when one acts from these
motives (“Beweggründe”), the action remains linked to this violent and oppressive system
(“Gewaltherrschaft”)” (ibid., p. 341). The Defendants, ultimately, were not convicted of crimes against
humanity for procedural reasons unrelated to the definition of the offence.
321 Decision of Flensburg District Court dated 30 March 1948 in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, vol. II, pp. 397-
402. See this decision for the findings of the District Court to the effect that the denunciation was made for
personal reasons.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
117
before the International Military Tribunal indicated that Control Council Law No. 10 had to
be interpreted in such a restrictive way. The Supreme Court stated:
The International Military Tribunal and the Supreme Court considered that a crime
against humanity as defined in CCL 10 Article II 1 (c) is committed whenever the victim
suffers prejudice as a result of the National Socialist rule of violence and tyranny
(“Gewalt- oder Willkürherrschaft”) to such an extent that mankind itself was affected
thereby. Such prejudice can also arise from an attack committed against an individual
victim for personal reasons. However, this is only the case if the victim was not only
harmed by the perpetrator – this would not be a matter which concerned mankind as such
– but if the character, duration or extent of the prejudice were determined by the National
Socialist rule of violence and tyranny or if a link between them existed. If the victim was
harmed in his or her human dignity, the incident was no longer an event that did not
concern mankind as such. If an individual’s attack against an individual victim for
personal reasons is connected to the National Socialist rule of violence and tyranny and if
the attack harms the victim in the aforementioned way, it, too, becomes one link in the
chain of the measures which under the National Socialist rule were intended to persecute
large groups among the population. There is no apparent reason to exonerate the accused
only because he acted against an individual victim for personal reasons.322
261. This view was upheld in a later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H.
H. denounced his father-in-law, V.F., for listening to a foreign broadcasting station,
allegedly because V.F., who was of aristocratic origin, incessantly mocked H. for his low
birth and tyrannised the family with his relentlessly scornful behaviour. The family
members supposedly considered a denunciation to be the only solution to their family
problems. Upon the denunciation, V.F. was sentenced by the Nazi authorities to three years
in prison. V.F., who suffered from an intestinal illness, died in prison. Despite the fact that
H.’s denunciation was motivated by personal reasons, the Court of First Instance sentenced
H. for a crime against humanity, stating that “it can be left open as to whether … H. was
motivated by political, personal or other reasons”. Referring to the established jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court for the British Zone,323 the Court of First Instance held that “the
322 Decision of the Supreme Court of the British Zone dated 26 October 1948, S. StS 57/48, in Entscheidungen
des Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische Zone, Entscheidungen in Strafsachen, vol. I., pp. 122-126 at
p. 124 (unofficial translation). The essence of this statement was reiterated in the Decision of the Supreme
Court dated 8 January 1949 against G. (S. StS 109/48, ibid., pp. 246-249). G., a member of the SA
(Stormtroopers), had participated in the mistreatment of a political opponent for apparently purely personal
motives, namely personal rancour between his family and the family of the victim. Nevertheless, G. was
found guilty of a crime against humanity. The Supreme Court dismissed G.’s appeal against his conviction,
stating that the motive for an attack was immaterial and that an attack against a single victim for personal
reasons can be considered a crime against humanity if there is a nexus between the attack and the National
Socialist rule of violence and tyranny (ibid., p. 247).
323 The Court of First Instance referred to the Decision of the Supreme Court of the British Zone dated 17
August 1948, S. StS 43/48, ibid., pp. 60-62 and Decision dated 13 November 1948, S. StS 68/48, ibid., pp.
186-190. See also Decision of the Supreme Court of the British Zone dated 20 April 1949, S. StS 120/49,
ibid., pp. 385–391, at p. 388.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
118
motives (“Beweggründe”) prompting a denunciation are not decisive (nicht
entscheidend)”.324
262. A further example is the V. case. In 1943, Nu. denounced Ste. for her repeated
utterances against Hitler, the national-socialist system and the SS, made in Nu.’s house in
1942. Ste. was the natural mother of Nu.’s adoptive son. In fact, Nu. had denounced Ste. in
the hope of regaining her son who had become increasingly estranged from his adoptive
parents and had developed a closer relationship with his natural mother. Upon the
denunciation, a special court sentenced Ste. to two years in prison. This court had
envisaged her eventual transfer to a concentration camp, but she was released by the allied
occupation forces before the transfer took place. In prison, Ste. suffered serious bodily
harm and lost sight in one eye. After the war, a District Court sentenced Nu. to six months’
imprisonment for her denunciation of Ste.. Although Nu.’s act of denunciation was
motivated by personal reasons, the court considered that her denunciation constituted a
crime against humanity.325
263. Turning to the decisions of the United States military tribunals under Control
Council Law No. 10 cited by the Prosecution,326 it must be noted that they appear to be less
pertinent. These cases involve Nazi officials of various ranks whose acts were, therefore,
by that token, already readily identifiable with the Nazi regime of terror. The question
whether they acted “for personal reasons” would, therefore, not arise in a direct manner,
since their acts were carried out in an official capacity, negating any possible “personal”
324 Decision of the Braunschweig District Court dated 22 June 1950, in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, vol. VI,
pp. 631-644, at p. 639. Note, in particular, the findings of the District Court to the effect that the denunciation
was motivated by personal concerns. Mention can also be made of the Decision of Schwurgericht Hannover,
dated 30 November 1948, in the B. case, S. StS 68/48 (in Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes für die
Britische Zone, Entscheidungen in Strafsachen, vol. I, pp. 186-190). B., an inspector of state church offices,
informed his superior that one of his colleagues, P., had repeatedly expressed his doubts about the political
situation in Germany and voiced his disapproval of the persecution of the Jews, the official propaganda,
cultural policy and anti-clerical attitude of National Socialism. This information reached the Gestapo, who
arrested P. A special court sentenced P. to one year and three months in prison. B., charged with crimes
against humanity, was acquitted at first instance because the verdict of the Court of First Instance
(Schwurgericht Hannover), having extensively examined the accused’s motives (“Beweggründe”), could not
determine whether the denunciation had been motivated by politics or religion. The Supreme Court for the
British Zone dismissed the judgement of the District Court, stating that “it was erroneous and in contradiction
to the consistent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court” to consider the motives of the accused as important.
(ibid., p. 189).
325 Decision of the Supreme Court for the British Zone dated 22 June 1948, S. StS 5/48, in Entscheidungen des
Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische Zone, Entscheidungen in Strafsachen, vol. I, pp. 19-25. The decision
of the Supreme Court did not directly concern the accused Nu., but a co-accused of hers. Nu. had been
sentenced by the District Court of Hamburg for committing a crime against humanity.
326 See Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 4.15, 4.16.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
119
defence which has as its premise “non-official acts”. The question whether an accused
acted for purely personal reasons can only arise where the accused can claim to have acted
as a private individual in a private or non-official capacity. This is why the issue arises
mainly in denunciation cases, where one neighbour or relative denounces another. This
paradigm is, however, inapplicable to trials of Nazi ministers, judges or other officials of
the State, particularly where they have not raised such a defence by admitting the acts in
question whilst claiming that they acted for personal reasons. Any plea that an act was done
for “purely personal” motives and that it therefore cannot constitute a crime against
humanity is pre-eminently for the defence to raise and one would not expect the court to
rule on the issue proprio motu and as obiter dictum.
264. The two sections of the Ministries case, referred to by the Prosecution,327 are also
not strictly relevant, as those sections re-state the law of complicity – “… he who
participates or plays a consenting part therein is guilty of a crime against humanity” – rather
than dealing with the importance or otherwise of whether the accused acted from personal
motives. Equally, in the Justice case,328 the defendants do not appear to have raised the
defence that they acted for personal motives.
265. The Prosecution also refers to the Eichmann and Finta cases. The Eichmann case is
inappropriate as the defendant in that case specifically denied that he ever acted from a
personal motive, claiming that he did what he did “not of his own volition but as one of
numerous links in the chain of command”.329 Moreover the court found Eichmann, who
was the Head of the Jewish Affairs and Evacuation Department and one of the persons who
attended the infamous Wannsee Conference, to be “no mere ‘cog’, small or large, in a
machine propelled by others; he was, himself, one of those who propelled the machine”.330
Such a senior official would not be one to whom the “purely personal reasons”
consideration could conceivably apply.
327 U.S. v. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
under Control Council Law No. 10, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1951, vol XIV,
pp. 611, 470-471, cited in Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 4.15.
328 U.S. v. Altstoetter et al., Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control
Council Law No. 10, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1951, vol. III.
329 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 International Law Reports 1968,
p. 323.
330 Ibid., p. 331.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
120
266. The Finta case331 is more on point, not least since the accused was a minor official, a
captain in the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie. He was thus better placed than senior
officials to raise an issue as to his exclusively “personal” motives. That case is indeed
authority for the proposition that the sole requirements for crimes against humanity in this
regard are that:
… there must be an element of subjective knowledge on the part of the accused of the
factual conditions which render the actions a crime against humanity. … ?Tghe mental
element of a crime against humanity must involve an awareness of the facts or
circumstances which would bring the acts within the definition of a crime against
humanity.332
267. According to Finta, nothing more seems to be required beyond this and there is no
mention of the relevance or otherwise of the accused’s personal motives.
268. One reason why the above cases do not refer to “motives” may be, as the Defence
has suggested,333 that “the issue in these cases was not whether the Defendants committed
the acts for purely personal motives”. The Appeals Chamber believes, however, that a
further reason why this was not in issue is precisely because motive is generally irrelevant
in criminal law, as the Prosecution pointed out in the hearing of 20 April 1999:
For example, it doesn’t matter whether or not an accused steals money in order to buy
Christmas presents for his poor children or to support a heroin habit. All we’re concerned
with is that he stole and he intended to steal, and what we’re concerned with … here is
the same sort of thing. There’s no requirement for non-personal motive beyond
knowledge of the context of a widespread or systematic act into which an accused’s act
fits. The Prosecutor is submitting that, as a general proposition and one which is
applicable here, motives are simply irrelevant in criminal law.334
269. The Appeals Chamber approves this submission, subject to the caveat that motive
becomes relevant at the sentencing stage in mitigation or aggravation of the sentence (for
example, the above mentioned thief might be dealt with more leniently if he stole to give
presents to his children than if he were stealing to support a heroin habit). Indeed the
inscrutability of motives in criminal law is revealed by the following reductio ad absurdum.
Imagine a high-ranking SS official who claims that he participated in the genocide of the
Jews and Gypsies for the “purely personal” reason that he had a deep-seated hatred of Jews
and Gypsies and wished to exterminate them, and for no other reason. Despite this
331 R. v. Finta, ?1994g 1 SCR 701.
332 Ibid., at p. 819, majority judgement delivered by Cory J..
333 Defence’s Substituted Response to Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 4.16.
334 T. 152-153 (20 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
121
quintessentially genocidal frame of mind, the accused would have to be acquitted of crimes
against humanity because he acted for “purely personal” reasons. Similarly, if the same
man said that he participated in the genocide only for the “purely personal” reason that he
feared losing his job, he would also be entitled to an acquittal. Thus, individuals at both
ends of the spectrum would be acquitted. In the final analysis, any accused that played a
role in mass murder purely out of self-interest would be acquitted. This shows the
meaninglessness of any analysis requiring proof of “non-personal” motives. The Appeals
Chamber does not believe, however, that the Trial Chamber meant to reach such a
conclusion. Rather, the requirement that the accused’s acts be part of a context of largescale
crimes, and that the accused knew of this context, was misstated by the Trial Chamber
as a negative requirement that the accused not be acting for personal reasons. The Trial
Chamber did not, the Appeals Chamber believes, wish to import a “motive” requirement; it
simply duplicated the context and mens rea requirement, and confused it with the need for a
link with an armed conflict, and thereby seemed to have unjustifiably and inadvertently
added a new requirement.
270. The conclusion is therefore warranted that the relevant case-law and the spirit of
international rules concerning crimes against humanity make it clear that under customary
law, “purely personal motives” do not acquire any relevance for establishing whether or not
a crime against humanity has been perpetrated.
C. Conclusion
271. The Trial Chamber correctly recognised that crimes which are unrelated to
widespread or systematic attacks on a civilian population should not be prosecuted as
crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are crimes of a special nature to which a
greater degree of moral turpitude attaches than to an ordinary crime. Thus to convict an
accused of crimes against humanity, it must be proved that the crimes were related to the
attack on a civilian population (occurring during an armed conflict) and that the accused
knew that his crimes were so related.
272. For the above reasons, however, the Appeals Chamber does not consider it
necessary to further require, as a substantive element of mens rea, a nexus between the
specific acts allegedly committed by the accused and the armed conflict, or to require proof
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
122
of the accused’s motives. Consequently, in the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, the
requirement that an act must not have been carried out for the purely personal motives of
the perpetrator does not form part of the prerequisites necessary for conduct to fall within
the definition of a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the Tribunal’s Statute.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
123
VII. THE FOURTH GROUND OF CROSS-APPEAL BY THE
PROSECUTION: THE TRIAL CHAMBER’S FINDING THAT ALL
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY REQUIRE A DISCRIMINATORY
INTENT
A. Submissions of the Parties
1. The Prosecution Case
273. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that all crimes
against humanity must be committed with a discriminatory intent. It is the submission of the
Prosecution that the requirement of a discriminatory intent applies only to
“persecution type” crimes and not to all crimes against humanity. 335
274. The Prosecution notes that Article 5 of the Statute contains no express requirement
of a discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity. The requirement for such an
intent is present in Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR. The absence of a similar provision
in Article 5 of this Tribunal’s Statute implies a contrario that at the time of drafting the
Statute of this Tribunal, there was no intention to include a similar requirement.336
275. A requirement of discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity is also absent
from customary international law. The Prosecution notes that the Nuremberg Charter and
Control Council Law No. 10, upon which Article 5 is based, distinguish between
“murder type” crimes such as murder, extermination, enslavement, etc., and
“persecution type” crimes committed on political, racial, or religious grounds.
Discriminatory intent need only be shown in relation to “persecution” crimes. The
Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erred in relying upon a statement in paragraph
335 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 5.5; T. 161 (20 April 1999).
336 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 5.6; T. 162 (20 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
124
48 of the Report of the Secretary-General337 and statements made in the Security Council by
three of its fifteen Members to conclude that Article 5 of the Statute was to be interpreted as
requiring that all crimes against humanity be committed with a discriminatory intent. In the
Prosecution’s submission, these sources do not purport to reflect customary international
law and thus should not be given undue, authoritative weight in interpreting Article 5.338 It
is the view of the Prosecution that Article 5 does not contain any ambiguity. Thus, to
accord weight to these sources to resolve an ambiguity which, in the Prosecution’s
submission, does not exist, would lead to considerable uncertainty with regard to the scope
and content of Article 5 of the Statute.339
276. The Prosecution submits that the rules of statutory interpretation also militate
against requiring a discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity. If discriminatory
intent were required for all crimes against humanity, the Prosecution submits that this would
relegate the crime of “persecutions” under Article 5(h) to a residual provision and make
“other inhumane acts” in Article 5(i) redundant. The Prosecution submits that the Statute
should be interpreted in order to give proper effect to all of its provisions.340
277. Finally, the Prosecution submits that the requirement of discriminatory intent for all
crimes against humanity is inconsistent with the humanitarian object and purpose of the
Statute and international humanitarian law. The Prosecution argues that requiring a
discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity would create a significant normative
lacuna by failing to protect civilian populations not encompassed by the listed grounds of
discrimination.341
2. The Defence Case
278. The Defence submits that the Trial Chamber’s decision that all crimes against
humanity require a discriminatory intent should be upheld.
337 The statement reads as follows: “Crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature
… committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, ethnic,
racial or religious grounds.”
338 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 5.7, 5.8; T. 162, 163 (20 April 1999).
339 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 5.20, 5.22.
340 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 5.24; T. 165 (20 April 1999).
341 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 5.26; T. 165 (20 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
125
279. The inclusion of discriminatory intent in the ICTR Statute does not indicate that
discriminatory intent need not be shown in order for Article 5 of the Statute of this Tribunal
to apply. Rather, the Defence submits that it shows the intention of the Security Council to
embrace discriminatory intent as a requirement for crimes against humanity.342
280. The Defence submits that the silence in Article 5 as to whether discriminatory intent
is required for crimes against humanity creates an uncertainty. To resolve this uncertainty,
the Appeals Chamber should look to sources such as the preparatory work of the Statute as
it interprets Article 5 of the Statute. Thus, the Defence submits that the Trial Chamber was
correct in looking to the Report of the Secretary-General and to statements of members of
the Security Council in determining that discriminatory intent must be shown in respect of
all crimes under Article 5 of the Statute.343
B. Discussion
281. The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that all crimes
against humanity enumerated under Article 5 require a discriminatory intent. It alleges,
further, that because of this finding, the Trial Chamber “restricted the scope of persecutions
under subparagraph (h) only to those acts not charged elsewhere in the Indictment rather
than imposing additional liability for all acts committed on discriminatory grounds. In
doing so, it would appear that the sentence against the accused was significantly
reduced.”344 However, the Prosecution does not appeal the sentence imposed by the Trial
Chamber in respect of the crimes against humanity counts, or seek to overturn the Trial
Chamber’s verdict or findings of fact in this regard. Thus, this ground of appeal does not,
prima facie, appear to fall within the scope of Article 25(1).345 Nevertheless, and as with
the previous ground of appeal, the Appeals Chamber finds that this issue is a matter of
general significance for the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. It is therefore appropriate for the
Apppeals Chamber to set forth its views on this matter.
342 T. 231-232 (21 April 1999).
343 T. 236 – 239 (21 April 1999).
344 Skeleton Argument of the Prosecution, para. 32.
345 See Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 7.1(4), where the Prosecution requests the Appeals Chamber to “reverse
the decision of the Trial Chamber, at page 250 paragraph 652, that discriminatory intent is an ingredient of all
crimes against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute.”
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
126
1. The Interpretation of the Text of Article 5 of the Statute
282. Notwithstanding the fact that the ICTY Statute is legally a very different instrument
from an international treaty, in the interpretation of the Statute it is nonetheless permissible
to be guided by the principle applied by the International Court of Justice with regard to
treaty interpretation in its Advisory Opinion on Competence of the General Assembly for
the Admission of a State to the United Nations: “The first duty of a tribunal which is called
upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to endeavour to give effect to them
in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur”.346
283. The ordinary meaning of Article 5 makes it clear that this provision does not require
all crimes against humanity to have been perpetrated with a discriminatory intent. Such
intent is only made necessary for one sub-category of those crimes, namely “persecutions”
provided for in Article 5 (h).
284. In addition to such textual interpretation, a logical construction of Article 5 also
leads to the conclusion that, generally speaking, this requirement is not laid down for all
crimes against humanity. Indeed, if it were otherwise, why should Article 5(h) specify that
“persecutions” fall under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction if carried out “on political, racial and
religious grounds”? This specification would be illogical and superfluous. It is an
elementary rule of interpretation that one should not construe a provision or part of a
provision as if it were superfluous and hence pointless: the presumption is warranted that
law-makers enact or agree upon rules that are well thought out and meaningful in all their
elements.
285. As rightly submitted by the Prosecution, the interpretation of Article 5 in the light of
its object and purpose bears out the above propositions. The aim of those drafting the
Statute was to make all crimes against humanity punishable, including those which, while
fulfilling all the conditions required by the notion of such crimes, may not have been
perpetrated on political, racial or religious grounds as specified in paragraph (h) of
Article 5. In light of the humanitarian goals of the framers of the Statute, one fails to see
why they should have seriously restricted the class of offences coming within the purview
of “crimes against humanity”, thus leaving outside this class all the possible instances of
serious and widespread or systematic crimes against civilians on account only of their
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
127
lacking a discriminatory intent. For example, a discriminatory intent requirement would
prevent the penalization of random and indiscriminate violence intended to spread terror
among a civilian population as a crime against humanity. A fortiori, the object and purpose
of Article 5 would be thwarted were it to be suggested that the discriminatory grounds
required are limited to the five grounds put forth by the Secretary-General in his Report and
taken up (with the addition, in one case, of the further ground of gender) in the statements
made in the Security Council by three of its members.347 Such an interpretation of Article 5
would create significant lacunae by failing to protect victim groups not covered by the
listed discriminatory grounds. The experience of Nazi Germany demonstrated that crimes
against humanity may be committed on discriminatory grounds other than those enumerated
in Article 5 (h), such as physical or mental disability, age or infirmity, or sexual preference.
Similarly, the extermination of “class enemies” in the Soviet Union during the 1930s
(admittedly, as in the case of Nazi conduct before the Second World War, an occurrence
that took place in times of peace, not in times of armed conflict) and the deportation of the
urban educated of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge between 1975-1979, provide other
instances which would not fall under the ambit of crimes against humanity based on the
strict enumeration of discriminatory grounds suggested by the Secretary-General in his
Report.
286. It would be pointless to object that in any case those instances would fall under the
category of war crimes or serious “violations of the laws or customs of war” provided for in
Article 3 of the Statute. This would fail to explain why the framers of the Statute provided
not only for war crimes but also for crimes against humanity. Indeed, those who drafted the
Statute deliberately included both classes of crimes, thereby illustrating their intention that
those war crimes which, in addition to targeting civilians as victims, present special features
such as the fact of being part of a widespread or systematic practice, must be classified as
crimes against humanity and deserve to be punished accordingly.
346 ICJ Reports (1950), p. 8.
347 See paragraphs 294-300 below.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
128
2. Article 5 and Customary International Law
287. The same conclusion is reached if Article 5 is construed in light of the principle
whereby, in case of doubt and whenever the contrary is not apparent from the text of a
statutory or treaty provision, such a provision must be interpreted in light of, and in
conformity with, customary international law. In the case of the Statute, it must be
presumed that the Security Council, where it did not explicitly or implicitly depart from
general rules of international law, intended to remain within the confines of such rules.
288. A careful perusal of the relevant practice shows that a discriminatory intent is not
required by customary international law for all crimes against humanity.
289. First of all, the basic international instrument on the matter, namely, the London
Agreement of 8 August 1945, clearly allows for crimes against humanity which may be
unaccompanied by such intent. Article 6 (c) of that Agreement envisages two categories of
crimes. One of them is that of “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population”, hence a category for which no
discriminatory intent is required, while the other category (“persecutions on political, racial,
or religious grounds”) is patently based on a discriminatory intent. An identical provision
can be found in the Statute of the Tokyo International Tribunal (Article 5 (c)).348 Similar
language can also be found in Control Council Law No. 10 (Article II (1) (c)).349
290. The letter of these provisions is clear and indisputable. Consequently, had customary
international law developed to restrict the scope of those treaty provisions which are at the
very origin of the customary process, uncontroverted evidence would be needed. In other
words, both judicial practice and possibly evidence of consistent State practice, including
national legislation, would be necessary to show that customary law has deviated from
treaty law by adopting a narrower notion of crimes against humanity. Such judicial and
other practice is lacking. Indeed, the relevant case-law points in the contrary direction.
348 Article 5 (c) of the Statute of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East provides:
“Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”
349 Article II (1) (c ) of Control Council Law No. 10 provides:
“Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
129
Generally speaking, customary international law has gradually expanded the notion of
crimes against humanity laid down in the London Agreement. With specific reference to
the question at issue, it should be noted that, except for a very few isolated cases such as
Finta,350 national jurisprudence351 includes many cases where courts found that in the
civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation
of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.”
350 The Supreme Court of Canada held that:
“With respect to crimes against humanity the additional element is that the inhumane acts were based
on discrimination against or the persecution of an identifiable group of people.” (R. v. Finta, 1994
1 SCR 701, at p. 813, majority judgement delivered by Cory J.).
351 In this regard, mention can be made of some further cases: Ahlbrecht, decided by the Dutch Special Court
of Cassation on 11 April 1949 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1949, no. 425, pp. 747-751); J. and R., decision
of the German Supreme Court for the British Zone, judgement dated 16 November 1948, S. StS 65/48 in
Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische Zone, vol. I, pp. 167-171; Enigster, decided by
the District Court of Tel Aviv. As the District Court of Tel Aviv rightly stressed in the Enigster case, some
crimes against humanity do not require a persecutory intent. In its Decision of 4 January 1952, the court
stated the following:
“As to crimes against humanity, we have no hesitation in rejecting the argument of the Defence that
any of the acts detailed in the definition of crime against humanity have to be performed with an
intention to persecute the victim on national, religious or political grounds. It is clear that this
condition only applies when the constituent element of the crime is persecution itself. The legislator
found it necessary to separate persecution from the other types of action by a semi-colon and to precede
the word ‘persecution’ with the words ‘and also‘, thus clearly establishing that persecution stands by
itself, and that it alone is subject to that condition.” (18 International Law Reports 1951, p. 541).
It should be noted, however, that the Court was clearly wrong as far as the question of the famous semi-colon
was concerned; it is well known that in actual fact the Protocol of 6 October 1945 replaced the semi-colon
with a colon. (For the text of the Protocol see Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. I, pp. XVI-XIX).
Reference can also be made to some cases decided by the German Supreme Court for the British Zone. The
Appeals Chamber will briefly mention three of them: R., P. et al. and H.
In a Decision of 27 July 1948 (S. StS 19/48), the court pronounced on the case of R. In 1944, a member of the
NSDAP (the German National Socialist Worker’s Party) and the NSKK (National Socialist Motor Vehicle
Corps) had denounced another member of the NSDAP and of the SA (Stormtroopers) for insulting the
leadership of NSDAP; as a result of this denunciation the victim had been brought to trial three times and
eventually sentenced to death. (The sentence had not been carried out because the Russians had occupied
Germany in the interim). The Court held that the denunciation could constitute a crime against humanity if it
could be proved that the agent had intended to hand over the victim to the “uncontrollable power structure of
the Nazi party and State”, knowing that as a consequence of his denunciation the victim was likely to be
caught in an arbitrary and violent system (Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische Zone,
vol. I, pp. 45-49 at p. 47).
In a Decision of 7 December 1948 (S. StS 111/48), in the P. et al. case, the same court gave a very liberal
interpretation to the notion of crimes against humanity as laid down in Control Council Law No. 10, extending
it among other things to inhumane acts committed against members of the military. During the night after
Germany’s partial capitulation (5 May 1945) four German marines had tried to escape from Denmark back to
Germany. The next day they were caught by Danes and delivered to German troops, who court-martialled and
sentenced three of them to death for desertion; on the very day of the general capitulation of Germany, i.e. 10
May 1945, the three were executed. The German Supreme Court found that the five members of the courtmartial
were guilty of complicity in a crime against humanity. According to the Supreme Court, the glaring
discrepancy between the offence and the punishment constituted a clear manifestation of the Nazis’ brutal and
intimidatory system of justice, which denied the very essence of humanity in blind reference to the allegedly
superior exigencies of the Nazi State; there was “an intolerable degradation of the victims to mere means for
the pursuit of a goal, hence the depersonalisation and reification of human beings.” (Entscheidungen des
Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische Zone, ibid., vol. I, pp. 217-229 at p. 220). Consequently, by
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
130
circumstances of the case crimes against humanity did not necessarily consist of persecutory
or discriminatory actions.
291. It is interesting to note that the necessity for discriminatory intent was considered
but eventually rejected by the International Law Commission in its Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.352 Similarly, while the inclusion of a
discriminatory intent was mooted in the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (PrepCom),353 Article 7 of the Rome Statute embodied the
drafters’ rejection of discriminatory intent.354
292. This warrants the conclusion that customary international law, as it results from the
gradual development of international instruments and national case-law into general rules,
does not presuppose a discriminatory or persecutory intent for all crimes against humanity.
sentencing the marines to death the members of the court-martial had inflicted an injury upon humanity as a
whole.
The same broad interpretation of Control Council Law No. 10 may be found, finally, in a Decision of 18
October 1949 (S. StS 309/49) in the H. case (Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische
Zone, vol. II, pp. 231-246). There, the court dealt with a case where a German judge had presided over two
trials by a naval court-martial (Bordkriegsgericht) against two officers of the German Navy, a submarine
commander, charged in 1944 with criticising Hitler, and the other a lieutenant-commander of the German
naval forces, charged in 1944 with procuring two foreign identity cards for himself and his wife. The Judge
had voted for sentencing both officers to death (the first had been executed, while the sentence against the
second had been commuted by Hitler to 10 years’ imprisonment). The Supreme Court held that the Judge
could be found guilty of crimes against humanity even if he had not acted for political reasons, to the extent
that his action was deliberately taken in connection with the Nazi system of violence and terror
(Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische Zone, ibid., vol. II, pp. 233, 238).
352 See for instance ILC 1996 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of
the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th session May 6-July 26, 1996, UNGAOR 51st sess.,
supp. no. 10 (A/51/10), pp. 93-94.
353 While some delegates argued that a conviction for crimes against humanity required proof that the
defendant was motivated by a discriminatory animus, others argued that “the inclusion of such a criterion
would complicate the task of the Prosecution by significantly increasing its burden of proof in requiring
evidence of this subjective element.” These delegates further argued that crimes against humanity could be
committed against other groups, including intellectuals, social, cultural or political groups, and that such an
element was not required under customary international law as evidenced by the Yugoslav Tribunal’s Statute.
(See Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During the Period March 25-April 12, 1996,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1 (May 7, 1996), pp. 16-17).
354 Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute provides: “For the purposes of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’
means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) murder ….” Article 7(1) of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court thus articulates a definition of crimes against humanity based solely upon the
interplay between the mens rea of the defendant and the existence of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
131
3. The Report of the Secretary-General
293. The interpretation suggested so far is not in keeping with the Report of the
Secretary-General and the statements made by three members of the Security Council
before the Tribunal’s Statute was adopted by the Council. The Appeals Chamber is
nevertheless of the view that these two interpretative sources do not suffice to establish that
all crimes against humanity need be committed with a discriminatory intent.
294. We shall consider first the Report of the Secretary-General, which stated that the
crimes under discussion are those “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”.355
295. It should be noted that the Secretary-General’s Report has not the same legal
standing as the Statute. In particular, it does not have the same binding authority. The
Report as a whole was "approved" by the Security Council (see the first operative paragraph
of Security Council resolution 827(1993)), while the Statute was "adopt?edg" (see operative
paragraph 2). By "approving" the Report, the Security Council clearly intended to endorse
its purpose as an explanatory document to the proposed Statute. Of course, if there appears
to be a manifest contradiction between the Statute and the Report, it is beyond doubt that
the Statute must prevail. In other cases, the Secretary-General’s Report ought to be taken to
provide an authoritative interpretation of the Statute.
296. Moreover, the Report of the Secretary-General does not purport to be a statement as
to the position under customary international law. As stated above, it is open to the Security
Council - subject to respect for peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) - to
adopt definitions of crimes in the Statute which deviate from customary international law.356
Nevertheless, as a general principle, provisions of the Statute defining the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal should always be interpreted as reflecting customary
international law, unless an intention to depart from customary international law is
expressed in the terms of the Statute, or from other authoritative sources. The Report of the
Secretary-General does not provide sufficient indication that the Security Council did so
intend Article 5 to deviate from customary international law by requiring a discriminatory
intent for all crimes against humanity. Indeed, in the case under consideration it would
355 Report of the Secretary-General, para. 48.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
132
seem that, although the discrepancy between the Report and the Statute is conspicuous, the
wording of Article 5 is so clear and unambiguous as to render it unnecessary to resort to
secondary sources of interpretation such as the Secretary-General’s Report. Hence, the
literal interpretation of Article 5 of the Statute, outlined above, must necessarily prevail.
297. Furthermore, it may be argued that, in his Report, the Secretary-General was merely
describing the notion of crimes against humanity in a general way, as opposed to stipulating
a technical, legal definition intended to be binding on the Tribunal. In other words, the
statement that crimes against humanity are crimes “committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds” amounts to the observation that crimes against humanity as a matter of
fact usually are committed on such discriminatory grounds. It is not, however, a legal
requirement that such discriminatory grounds be present. That is, at least, another possible
interpretation. It is true that in most cases, crimes against humanity are waged against
civilian populations which have been specifically targeted for national, political, ethnic,
racial or religious reasons.
4. The Statements Made by Some States in the Security Council
298. Let us now turn to the statements made in the Security Council, after the adoption of
the Statute, by three States, namely, France, the United States and the Russian Federation.
299. Before considering what the legal meaning of these statements may be, one
important point may first be emphasised. Although they were all directed at importing, as it
were, into Article 5 the qualification concerning discriminatory intent set out in
paragraph 48 of the Secretary-General’s Report, these statements varied as to their purport.
The statement by the French representative was intended to be part of “a few brief
comments” on the Statute.357 By contrast, the remarks of the United States representative
356 For instance, the express requirement in Article 5 of a nexus with an armed conflict creates a narrower
sphere of operation than that provided for crimes against humanity under customary international law.
357 He stated the following: “With regard to Article 5, that Article applied to all the acts set out therein when
committed in violation of the law during a period of armed conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia,
within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population for national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious reasons” (U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3217, p.11).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
133
were expressly couched as an “interpretative statement”; furthermore, that representative
added a significant comment: “We understand that other members of the Council share
our view regarding the following clarifications related to the Statute”358 including the
“clarification” concerning Article 5.359 With regard to the representative of the Russian
Federation, his statement concerning Article 5 was expressly conceived of as an
interpretative declaration.360 Nevertheless, this declaration was made in such terms as to
justify the proposition that for the Russian Federation, Article 5 “encompasses” crimes
committed with a “discriminatory intent” without, however, being limited to these acts
alone.
300. The Appeals Chamber, first of all, rejects the notion that these three statements - at
least as regards the issue of discriminatory intent - may be considered as part of the
“context” of the Statute, to be taken into account for the purpose of interpretation of the
Statute pursuant to the general rule of construction laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of the Treaties.361 In particular, those statements cannot be
regarded as an “agreement” relating to the Statute, made between all the parties in
connection with the adoption of the Statute. True, the United States representative pointed
out that it was her understanding that the other members of the Security Council shared her
views regarding the “clarifications” she put forward. However, in light of the wording of
the other two statements on the specific point at issue, and taking into account the lack of
any comment by the other twelve members of the Security Council, it would seem difficult
to conclude that there emerged an agreement in the Security Council designed to qualify the
358 See U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3217, p. 15.
359 On Article 5 the United States representative said that: “It is understood that Article 5 applies to all acts
listed in that Article, when committed contrary to law during a period of armed conflict in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia, as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national,
political, ethnic, racial, gender, or religious grounds” (U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3217, p.16).
360 He said the following: “While believing that the text of the Statute addresses the tasks that face the
Tribunal, and for that reason supporting it, we deem it appropriate to note that, according to our
understanding, Article 5 of the Statute encompasses criminal acts committed on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia during an armed conflict - acts which were widespread or systematic, were aimed against the
civilian population and were motivated by that population’s national, political, ethnic, religious or other
affiliation” (U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3217, p. 45).
361 Article 31(1) and (2) provide:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty;
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
134
scope of Article 5 with respect to discriminatory intent. In particular, it must be stressed
that the United States representative, in enumerating the discriminatory grounds required, in
her view, for crimes against humanity, included one ground (“gender”) that was not
mentioned in the Secretary-General’s Report and which was, more importantly, referred to
neither by the French nor the Russian representatives in their declarations on Article 5.
This, it may be contended, is further evidence that no agreement emerged within the
Security Council as to the qualification concerning discriminatory intent.
301. Arguably, in fact, the main purpose of those statements was to stress that it is the
existence of a widespread or systematic practice which constitutes an indispensable
ingredient of crimes against humanity. This ingredient, absent in Article 5, had already
been mentioned in paragraph 48 of the Secretary-General’s Report.362 In spelling out that
this ingredient was indispensable, the States in question took up the relevant passage of the
Secretary-General’s Report and in the same breath also mentioned the discriminatory intent
which may, in practice, frequently accompany such crimes.
302. The contention may also be warranted that the intent of the three States which made
these declarations was to stress that in the former Yugoslavia most atrocities had been
motivated by ethnic, racial, political or religious hatred. Those States therefore intended to
draw the attention of the future Tribunal to the need to take this significant factor into
account. One should not, however, confuse what happens most of the time (quod
plerumque accidit) with the strict requirements of law.
303. Be that as it may, since at least with regard to the issue of discriminatory intent those
statements may not be taken to be part of the “context” of the Statute, it may be argued that
they comprise a part of the travaux préparatoires. Even if this were so, these statements
would not be indispensable aids to interpretation, at least insofar as they relate to the
particular issue of discriminatory intent under Article 5. Under customary international law,
as codified in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention referred to above, the travaux constitute
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
362 The Trial Chamber in its Judgement of 7 May 1997 has also correctly emphasised that the phrases
“widespread” and “systematic” are disjunctive as opposed to cumulative requirements (see Judgement, paras.
645-648). See also the Nikolic Rule 61 Decision, (“Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli}, Case No.: IT-94-2-R61, Trial Chamber I, 20
October 1995) (Nikoli} (1995) II ICTY JR 739).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
135
a supplementary means of interpretation and may only be resorted to when the text of a
treaty or any other international norm-creating instrument is ambiguous or obscure. As the
wording of Article 5 is clear and does not give rise to uncertainty, at least as regards the
issue of discriminatory intent, there is no need to rely upon those statements. Excluding
from the scope of crimes against humanity widespread or systematic atrocities on the sole
ground that they were not motivated by any persecutory or discriminatory intent would be
justified neither by the letter nor the spirit of Article 5.
304. The above propositions do not imply that the statements made in the Security
Council by the three aforementioned States, or by other States, should not be given
interpretative weight. They may shed light on the meaning of a provision that is
ambiguous, or which lends itself to differing interpretations. Indeed, in its Tadi} Decision
on Jurisdiction the Appeals Chamber repeatedly made reference to those statements as well
as to statements made by other States. It did so, for instance, when interpreting Article 3 of
the Statute363 and when pronouncing on the question whether the International Tribunal
could apply international agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict.364
C. Conclusion
305. The Prosecution was correct in submitting that the Trial Chamber erred in finding
that all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent. Such an intent is an
indispensable legal ingredient of the offence only with regard to those crimes for which this
is expressly required, that is, for Article 5 (h), concerning various types of persecution.
363 See Tadi} Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 75, 88 (where reference was also made to the statements of the
representatives of the United Kingdom and Hungary).
364 See ibid., para 143 (where reference was made to the statements of the representatives of the United States,
the United Kingdom and France).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
136
VIII. THE FIFTH GROUND OF CROSS-APPEAL BY THE
PROSECUTION: DENIAL OF THE PROSECUTION’S MOTION FOR
DISCLOSURE OF DEFENCE WITNESS STATEMENTS
A. Submissions of the Parties
1. The Prosecution Case
306. Ground five of the Cross-Appeal by the Prosecution is as follows:
The majority of the Trial Chamber, composed of Judge Ninian Stephen and
Judge Lal Chand Vohrah, erred when it denied the Prosecution motion for production of
witness statements.365
This ground of appeal arose out of the Decision on Prosecution Motion for Production of
Defence Witness Statements of the Trial Chamber delivered on 27 November 1996. By a
majority (Judge McDonald dissenting), the Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s motion
for disclosure of a prior statement of a Defence witness after he had testified. This decision
was reached on the basis that such statements are subject to a legal professional privilege,
which protects the Defence from any obligation to disclose them. The Prosecution submits
that the Trial Chamber erred in the application of the substantive law in the Witness
Statements Decision.366
307. The Prosecution submits that a Trial Chamber has the power to order the production
of prior statements of Defence witnesses pursuant to Rule 54, unless they are protected by
some express or implied privilege in the Statute or Rules.367 This power ensures that a Trial
Chamber, entrusted with the duty of making factual findings on the evidence adduced, is
presented with evidence which has been fully tested.368 It is submitted that a Trial Chamber
should have the benefit of weighing any inconsistencies between statements made by
witnesses in arriving at its determinations.369
308. According to the Prosecution, if regard is had to Article 21(4)(g) of the Statute and
to Sub-rules 70(A), 90(F) and 97 of the Rules, no express privilege exempts Defence
365 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 6.3.
366 Ibid., para. 6.6; T. 190 (20 April 1999).
367 Ibid., paras. 6.6-6.24.
368 T. 186 (20 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
137
witness statements from disclosure.370 The privilege adopted by the International Tribunal
in Rule 97 of the Rules does not cover third party statements given to Defence counsel, at
least not once the Defence decides to present evidence by calling a particular witness.371
Once the Defence calls a witness, that evidence should be subjected to the same scrutiny as
that of the Prosecution.372
309. The Prosecution also submits that no implied privilege exempting Defence witness
statements from disclosure can be inferred from the Rules (as Judge Stephen found, with
Judge Vohrah concurring). In its view, there is no ambiguity in the Rules in this regard, and
Judge Stephen’s reference to the legal professional privilege found in national jurisdictions
is incorrect.373 The Prosecution submits that, even if an ambiguity exists, it is incorrect to
resolve it by referring to the most common practice in adversarial jurisdictions, despite the
obvious influence of adversarial systems on the Rules.374 Sub-rule 89(B) of the Rules
expressly requires the application of “rules of evidence which will best favour a fair
determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the
general principles of law”. In line with this provision, the Trial Chamber should have
favoured an interpretation allowing it to order disclosure of Defence witness statements
“where it considers that this would enable it to reach a verdict based on all pertinent
evidence”.375 The Prosecution relies in particular upon the restrictions set out by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Nobles.376
310. The Prosecution also submits that the disclosure of prior statements of Defence
witnesses is not otherwise inconsistent with the principles of a fair trial.377 In particular, the
principle of equality of arms does not require that the Defence be allowed to call witnesses
under conditions more favourable than those afforded to the Prosecution.378 If the Defence
369 T. 186 (20 April 1999).
370 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 6.7-6.14.
371 T. 187 (20 April 1999).
372 T. 187 (20 April 1999).
373 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 6.15-6.18.
374 Ibid., para. 6.20.
375 Ibid., para. 6.21.
376 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
377 Cross-Appellant’s Brief, paras. 6.25-6.31.
378 Ibid., para. 6.31.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
138
decides to call a witness at trial, that witness should in principle be subject to the same
scrutiny as Prosecution witnesses.379
2. The Defence Case
311. The Defence submits that the Trial Chamber’s Witness Statements Decision was
correctly decided.
312. The Trial Chamber was correct in holding that the Statute and Rules do not
specifically deal with the problem at issue.380 The Defence also submits that, in light of the
essentially adversarial system under which the Tribunal operates, the term “the general
principles of law” in Sub-rule 89(B) should be interpreted as meaning “the general
principles of law emerging from adversarial systems”.381
313. The Defence submits that the general principles referred to may be summarised as
follows. To begin with, the burden of proving the allegation is on the Prosecution. The
Prosecution must inform the accused of the charges and the evidence against him. The
accused has the right to remain silent and to require the Prosecution to prove its case. There
is no duty similar to that imposed on the Prosecution for the Defence to disclose its
evidence, and the privilege attaching to Defence witness statements is not waived when the
witness in question gives evidence.382
314. It is also submitted that to allow such disclosure would increase the inequality of
arms between the parties.383 Furthermore, the Defence emphasises that because privilege
can be claimed for communications between the client and third parties when litigation is
ongoing in most adversarial jurisdictions, such disclosure would be incorrect.384 The
Defence also submits that such a disclosure requirement might deter witnesses from
379 Ibid.
380 Defence’s Substituted Response to Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 6.3; Skeleton Argument of the
Prosecution, para. 5(b).
381 Defence’s Substituted Response to Cross-Appellant’s Brief, para. 6.13; Skeleton Argument of the
Prosecution, para. 5(d).
382 Skeleton Argument of the Prosecution, paras. 5(f)-(g).
383 T. 275 (21 April 1999).
384 T. 275, 278 (21 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
139
testifying because of a loss of confidentiality, which in turn would impact on the right of a
defendant to call witnesses.385
B. Discussion
1. The Reason for Dealing with this Ground of the Cross-Appeal
315. While neither party asserts that the Witness Statements Decision had a bearing on
the verdicts on any of the counts or that an appeal lies under Article 25(1),386 they both
agree that this is a matter of general importance which affects the conduct of trials before
the Tribunal and therefore deserves the attention of the Appeals Chamber. The Prosecution
further submits that the Witness Statements Decision, as it stands, remains persuasive
authority that the Defence cannot be ordered to disclose prior witness statements.387
316. The Appeals Chamber has no power under Article 25 of the Statute to pass, one way
or another, on the decision of the Trial Chamber as if the decision was itself under appeal.
But the point of law which is involved is one of importance and worthy of an expression of
opinion by the Appeals Chamber. The question posed as to whether or not a Trial Chamber
has the power to order the disclosure of prior Defence witness statements after the witness
has testified, must be placed in its proper context. Further, it is the view of the Appeals
Chamber that this question impinges upon the ability of a Trial Chamber to meet its
obligations in searching for the truth in all proceedings under the jurisdiction of the
International Tribunal, with due regard to fairness. The judicial mandate of the
International Tribunal is carried out by the Chambers, in this case a Trial Chamber, as this is
a matter that arose during the trial process.
317. It is therefore necessary that the Appeals Chamber clarify the context in which the
question posed is discussed. This is a matter that touches upon the duty of a Trial Chamber
to ascertain facts, deal with credibility of witnesses and determine the innocence or guilt of
385 Skeleton Argument of the Prosecution, para. 5(h).
386 Article 25(1) provides: “The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted by the Trial
Chambers or from the Prosecutor on the following grounds: (a) an error on a question of law invalidating the
decision; or (b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”
387 T. 185 (20 April 1999).
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
140
the accused person. However, before answering the question posed, it is desirable to
examine the implications of disclosure.
2. The Power to Order the Disclosure of Prior Defence Witness Statements
318. The Appeals Chamber is of the view that the Defence witness statement referred to
would be a recorded description of events touching upon the indictment, made
and, normally, signed by a person with a view to the preparation of the Defence case.
319. There is no blanket right for the Prosecution to see the witness statement of a
Defence witness. The Prosecution has the power only to apply for disclosure of a statement
after the witness has testified, with the Chamber retaining the discretion to make a decision
based on the particular circumstances in the case at hand.
320. The power of a Trial Chamber to order the disclosure of a prior Defence witness
statement relates to an evidentiary question. Strictly speaking, the principle of equality of
arms is not relevant to the problem. Also, since the Statute and the Rules do not expressly
cover the problem at hand, the broad powers conferred by Sub-rule 89(B) may come into
play.388 The question to be addressed is whether those powers include the power of a Trial
Chamber to order the disclosure of a prior Defence witness statement.
321. The mandate of the International Tribunal, as set out in Article 1 of the Statute, is to
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the former Yugoslavia. To fulfil its mandate, a Trial Chamber has to ascertain
the credibility of all the evidence brought before it. A Trial Chamber must also take
account of the following provisions of the Statute: Article 20(1), concerning the need to
ensure a fair and expeditious trial, Article 21 dealing with the rights of the accused, and
Article 22, dealing with the protection of victims and witnesses. Further guidance may be
taken from Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights389 and
388 Sub-rule 89(B) provides:
“In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply Rules of evidence which will
best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and
the general principles of law.”
389 Article 14 provides in part:
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
141
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights,390 which are similar to Article 21
of the Statute.
322. With regard to the present case, once a Defence witness has testified, it is for a Trial
Chamber to ascertain the credibility of his or her testimony. If he or she has made a prior
statement, a Trial Chamber must be able to evaluate the testimony in the light of this
statement, in its quest for the truth and for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial. Rather than
deriving from the sweeping provisions of Sub-rule 89(B), this power is inherent in the
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, as it is within the jurisdiction of any criminal
court, national or international. In other words, this is one of those powers mentioned by
the Appeals Chamber in the Bla{kic (Subpoena) decision which accrue to a judicial body
even if not explicitly or implicitly provided for in the statute or rules of procedure of such a
body, because they are essential for the carrying out of judicial functions and ensuring the
fair administration of justice.391
323. It would be erroneous to consider that such disclosure amounts to having the
Defence assist the Prosecution in trying the accused. Nor does such disclosure undermine
the essentially adversarial nature of the proceedings before the International Tribunal,
“(1) All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ….
(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law.
(3) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following
minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him; …; (c) to be tried without undue
delay; (d) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance …;
(e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; …;
(g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. ….”
390 Article 6 provides in part:
“(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. ….
(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law.
(3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed
promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him; …; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ….”
391 See “Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II
of 18 July 1997”, The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Bla{ki}, Case No.: IT-95-14-AR108bis, Appeals Chamber,
29 October 1997, para. 25.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
142
including the basic notion that the Prosecution has to prove its case against the accused.
Although this provision was not in force at the time relevant to the present enquiry, it is
worth noting that Sub-rule 73ter(B) provides that should a Pre-Defence Conference be held:
… the Trial Chamber may order that the defence, before the commencement of its case
but after the close of the case for the prosecution, file the following:
…;
(iii) a list of witnesses the defence intends to call with:
(a) the name or pseudonym of each witness;
(b) a summary of the facts on which each witness will testify;
…
This Sub-rule does not require that the Defence file its witness statements. But the
substance is not far removed: the provision has been designed to assist a Trial Chamber in
preparing for hearing the Defence case, and the Prosecution in preparing for crossexamination
of the witnesses.
324. As stated above, once the Defence has called a witness to testify, it is for a Trial
Chamber to ascertain his or her credibility. If there is a witness statement, in the sense
referred to above, it would be subject to disclosure only if so requested by the Prosecution
and if the Trial Chamber considers it right in the circumstances to order disclosure. The
provisions of Rule 68 are limited to the Prosecution and do not extend to the Defence.
Disclosure would follow only once the Prosecution’s case has been closed. Even then, Subrules
89(C),392 (D)393 and (E)394 would still apply to such a disclosed witness statement, with
the consequence that a Trial Chamber might still exclude it. Furthermore, the provisions of
Sub-rule 90(F) relating to self-incrimination would of course apply.
325. The Appeals Chamber is also of opinion that no reliance can be placed on a claim to
privilege. Rule 97395 relates to lawyer-client privilege; it does not cover prior Defence
witness statements.
392 Sub-rule 89(C) provides: “A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative
value.”
393 Sub-rule 89(D) provides: “A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.”
394 Sub-rule 89(E) provides: “A Chamber may request verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained out
of court.”
395 Rule 97 provides in part: “All communications between lawyer and client shall be regarded as privileged,
and consequently not subject to disclosure at trial ….”
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
143
C. Conclusion
326. For the reasons set out above, it is the opinion of the Appeals Chamber that a Trial
Chamber may order, depending on the circumstances of the case at hand, the disclosure of
Defence witness statements after examination-in-chief of the witness.
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
144
IX. DISPOSITION
327. For the foregoing reasons, THE APPEALS CHAMBER, UNANIMOUSLY
(1) DENIES the first ground of the Appellant’s Appeal against Judgement;
(2) DENIES the third ground of the Appellant’s Appeal against Judgement;
(3) RESERVES JUDGEMENT on the Appellant’s Appeal against Sentence until such time
as the further sentencing proceedings referred to in sub-paragraph (6) below have been
completed;
(4) ALLOWS the first ground of the Prosecution’s Cross-Appeal, REVERSES the
Trial Chamber’s verdict in this part, AND FINDS the Appellant guilty on Counts 8, 9, 12,
15, 21 and 32 of the Indictment;
(5) ALLOWS the second ground of the Prosecution’s Cross-Appeal, REVERSES the
Trial Chamber’s verdict in this part, AND FINDS the Appellant guilty on Counts 29, 30 and
31 of the Indictment;
(6) DEFERS sentencing on the Counts mentioned in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above to a
further stage of sentencing proceedings;
(7) HOLDS that an act carried out for the purely personal motives of the perpetrator can
constitute a crime against humanity within the meaning of Article 5 of the Tribunal’s
Statute relating to such crimes;
(8) FINDS that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that all crimes against humanity require
discriminatory intent and HOLDS that such intent is an indispensable legal ingredient of the
offence only with regard to those crimes for which it is expressly required, that is, for the
types of persecution crimes mentioned in Article 5(h) of the Tribunal’s Statute;
Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999
145
(9) HOLDS that a Trial Chamber may order, depending on the circumstances of the case at
hand, the disclosure of Defence witness statements after examination-in-chief of the
witness.
Done in both English and French, the English text being authoritative.
_____________________ _____________________ ____________________
Mohamed Shahabuddeen Antonio Cassese Wang Tieya
Presiding
______________________ ________________________________
Rafael Nieto-Navia Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba
Dated this fifteenth day of July 1999
At The Hague,
The Netherlands.
Judge Nieto-Navia appends a Declaration to this Judgement.
Judge Shahabuddeen appends a Separate Opinion to this Judgement.
[Seal of the Tribunal]
146
X. DECLARATION OF JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA
1. I am appending a declaration because it is, in my view, necessary to say a few
words about Article 25 of the Statute which provides the Prosecution or a convicted
person the right to appeal on an error on a question of law invalidating the decision or an
error of fact occasioning a miscarriage of justice. It would appear that the Prosecution’s
appeals against the acquittals on Counts 8, 9, 12, 15, 21 and 32, constituting ground 1 of
the cross-appeal, and on Counts 29, 30 and 31, constituting the second ground of crossappeal,
fall within the ambit of Article 25. The civil law principle of non bis in idem,
according to Black’s Law Dictionary, means that the accused “shall not be twice tried
for the same crime”. The corresponding common law principle of double jeopardy
entitles the accused “not to be twice ‘put in jeopardy’for the same offence”. On the
face of it, it would appear that Prosecution appeals against acquittals, though permissible
under Article 25, might be in contravention of the legal tenet ofnon bis in idem. My
concern is two-fold: (1) is non bis in idem a general principle of law; and (2) if so, is
Article 25 consistent with the principle?
2. It is notable that the International Tribunal’s own Statute recognises the maxim
of non bis in idem. Article 10 protects a person tried by the Tribunal from subsequent
prosecution by a national court. The corollary is also true: a person tried by a national
court may not be tried subsequently by the International Tribunal unless the original
charge was classified as a common crime, or the national court proceedings did not
conform to the fundamental principles of criminal law (that is, the court proceedings
were not independent and impartial, or were conducted to shield the accused from
international criminal responsibility, or the charge was not prosecuted diligently).
3. Can a general principle of law be discerned from the practice of domestic courts?
In the United States, the Supreme Court has interpreted the double jeopardy clause of
the Fifth Amendment1 to mean that the Prosecution cannot appeal against a verdict,
whether on an error on a question of law or fact.2 This finality accorded to criminal
judgements is intended to protect the acquitted or convicted person against “prosecution
oppression”. Double jeopardy does not bar the convicted person from appealing
because he/she chooses to put himself/herself at risk once more.
1 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads: “nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”.
2 See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904);
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
147
4. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the application of the double jeopardy
principle precludes the Prosecution from appealing against acquittals, except where the
appeal challenges an acquittal tainted by bribery, threats or other interference with a
witness or juror,3 or where the appeal is from acquittal in the magistrates’court by case
stated to the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division on the ground that it was
rendered in error of law or in excess of jurisdiction.
5. Thus, it seems that the common law gives special weight to acquittals. In the
United Kingdom, the Prosecution does not have the right to appeal although appeals are
allowed in certain clearly circumscribed instances. In the United States, there is a
complete bar on appeals against acquittals.4
6. I turn now to examine the position adopted by countries in the civil law tradition.
Civil law generally allows appeals against decisions at first instance. However,
decisions rendered by the second-tier courts can be appealed by way of cassation only
on errors of law. In France, the Prosecution may lodge a pourvoi en cassation to
challenge procedural irregularities, which inter alia, include an error in law made by the
lower court.5
7. In Germany, Prosecution appeals against acquittals are not considered to violate
non bis in idem because the judgement at trial is not seen to constitute the end of the
criminal proceeding.6 It seems that, in the German legal system, jeopardy attaches with
the criminal charge and continues through all proceedings that arise from the original
charge.7 Hence, a Prosecution appeal from acquittal is seen as another step in the
criminal proceedings.
8. This brief survey of domestic practice, though far from comprehensive, reveals
that no general principle of law can be drawn from domestic practice. Unlike the Anglo-
American common law system, the civil law system does not construe Prosecution
appeals against acquittals to compromise the principle of non bis in idem.
3 See s. 54 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
4 See supra, note 2.
5 See Dadomo, Christian and Farran, Susan, The French Legal System (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 1996), 220.
6 See ss. 312 and 333 of the German Criminal Code.
7 Justice Holmes, dissenting in Kepner v. United States, advocated the adoption of the concept of
“continuing jeopardy”. He argued that “a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy on the
same cause, however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning
to the end of the cause.” The majority, concluding that the verdict at trial terminated the initial jeopardy,
rejected Justice Holmes’argument.
148
9. From the foregoing, I must conclude that there is no general principle of law that
would prohibit Prosecution appeals against acquittals. Therefore, it is unnecessary to
analyse whether Article 25 is consistent with non bis in idem.
10. It seems to me that this conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the rationale
which underpins the common law’s vigorous approach is absent in the context of
prosecutions before the International Tribunal. The impetus for the special weight given
to acquittals is the desire to prevent the government, with its vast superior resources,
from abusing its power to prosecute accused persons by re-prosecuting them until it
manages to obtain convictions.8 In the International Tribunal, while the Prosecution
prosecutes on behalf of the international community, it is not supported by a
governmental apparatus with abundant resources. Like the Defence, it too must rely on
the co-operation of external entities. Moreover, Articles 20(1) and 21(4) guarantee to
each party equality of arms.
11. I accept that Prosecution appeals against acquittals conform to the requirements
of Article 25. However, I think that the Appeals Chamber should analyse, at the
sentencing stage, whether a successful Prosecution appeal should put the person in a
worse position than that at the end of trial (“reformatio in pejus”).
12. With respect to the fourth ground of cross-appeal, on the question of whether
there exists a crime against humanity where the accused acted out of purely personal
motives, I join in the reasoning and conclusion offered by my learned colleague, Judge
Shahabuddeen, in his separate opinion. I would add only the following to elaborate my
own position. The reason that a crime against humanity under Article 5 cannot be
committed for purely personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on a civilian
population is that, being a crime under international law, there must be a proximate
connection between the underlying act(s) and the surrounding armed conflict. An
unlawful act perpetrated in the context of an armed conflict, but unrelated to the
hostilities, is a common crime under national law. The fact that such a crime was
committed in the context of an armed conflict does not render it subject to international
humanitarian law.
13. On the question of whether the Prosecution has a right to the production of
Defence witness statements, constituting the fifth ground of cross-appeal, I agree with
8 See Green v. United States, supra note 2.
149
the decision of the Appeals Chamber for the reasons set out in Judge Shahabuddeen’s
separate opinion.
Done in both English and French, the English text being authoritative.
______________________
Rafael Nieto-Navia
Dated this fifteenth day of July 1999
At The Hague,
The Netherlands.
150
XI. SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN
1. Some time ago, yet not far from where the events in this case happened, a
"breakdown of law and order" occurred. There "were savage and pitiless actions into
which men were carried not so much for the sake of gain as because they were swept
away into an internecine struggle by their ungovernable passions". The turmoil saw "the
ordinary conventions of civilised life thrown into confusion". Sadly, it seems, people
took "it upon themselves to begin the process of repealing those general laws of
humanity which are there to give a hope of salvation to all who are in distress, instead of
leaving those laws in existence, remembering that there may come a time when they,
too, will be in danger and will need their protection”. 1
2. That last reflection of a great thinker of antiquity was later expressed in the
saying by Westlake "that the mitigation of war must depend on the parties to it feeling
that they belong to a larger whole than their respective tribes or states, a whole in which
the enemy too is comprised, so that the duties arising out of that larger citizenship are
owed even to him".2 The development of a sense of that "larger citizenship" has been
disappointingly slow. Since the ancient chronicler spoke of the "general laws of
humanity", then lacking legal force but still recognisable, it has taken over two thousand
years for those "laws" to assume the shape of binding norms applying world-wide. To
what extent did they govern in this case? And, with what consequences?
3. I agree with the conclusions reached by the Appeals Chamber, and very largely
with its arguments, subject to reservations on some aspects (including the relationship
between the Rome Statute and the development of customary international law). I
propose to explain my position on some of the points on which my reasoning may not be
the same.
A. Whether There Was an International Armed Conflict
4. As is observed in paragraph 83 of the judgement of the Appeals Chamber, the
"requirement that the conflict be international for the grave breaches regime to operate
1 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, tr. Rex Warner (Middlesex, 1961), p. 211, speaking of the island
of Corcyra.
2 The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law, ed. L. Oppenheim (Cambridge,
1914), p. 274.
151
pursuant to Article 2 of the Statute has not been contested by the parties". That point is
not being considered.
5. As to the points which are being considered, I agree with the Appeals Chamber,
and with Judge McDonald, that there was an international armed conflict in this case. I
also appreciate the general direction taken by the judgement of the Appeals Chamber,
but, so far as this case is concerned, I am unclear about the necessity to challenge
Nicaragua (I.C.J Reports 1986, p. 14). I am not certain whether it is being said that that
much debated case does not show that there was an international armed conflict in this
case. I think it does, and that on this point it was both right and adequate.
1. The Issue
6. The issue in this branch of the case is whether, after 19 May 1992, there was an
"armed conflict" between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
(“FRY”) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BH”) within the meaning of Article 2, first
paragraph, of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War ("Fourth Geneva Convention"). The provision states that "... the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties ...". There was no state
of declared war. If also there was no "armed conflict" as between the FRY and BH (as
the majority of the Trial Chamber seemingly thought), the Fourth Geneva Convention
did not apply, and the question whether victims were protected persons within the
meaning of Article 4, first paragraph, of the Convention did not arise, a question which
the majority nevertheless answered. Persons could only be protected by the Convention
if the Convention in the first instance applied to the armed conflict by which they were
affected.
2. Nicaragua Shows That There Was an Armed Conflict Between the FRY, Acting
Through the VRS, and BH
7. Ex hypothesi, an armed conflict involves a use of force. Thus, the question
whether there was an armed conflict between the FRY and BH depended on whether the
FRY was using force against BH through the Bosnian Serbian Army of the Republika
Srpska ("VRS"). So, I turn to this question.
152
8. Nicaragua is not easy reading. Many issues were involved, and interpretations
differ. A general understanding is that the Court said that the United States had no
responsibility for delictual acts committed by the contras because, in its view, the
former lacked the requisite degree of control over the latter. However, the Court was
careful to say that this "conclusion … does not of course suffice to resolve the entire
question of the responsibility incurred by the United States through its assistance to the
contras". (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 63, para. 110). One part of this unresolved question of
responsibility was whether, as claimed by Nicaragua, "the United States, in breach of its
obligation under general and customary international law, has used and is using force
and the threat of force against Nicaragua". (Ibid., p. 19, para. 15(c)). In so far as it was
sought to support this part of the claim by reference to funds being supplied by the
United States to the contras, the Court held that "the mere supply of funds to the
contras, while undoubtedly an act of intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, ...
does not in itself amount to a use of force". (Ibid ., p. 119, para. 228).
9. By contrast, the Court considered that, as distinguished from the mere supplying
of funds, the United States had committed other acts in relation to the contras which
amounted to a threat or use of force against Nicaragua. In paragraph 228 of its
judgement, the Court put it this way:
As to the claim that United States activities in relation to the contras constitute a
breach of the customary international law principle of the non-use of force, the Court
finds that, subject to the question whether the action of the United States might be
justified as an exercise of the right of self-defence, the United States has committed a
prima facie violation of that principle by its assistance to the contras in Nicaragua,
by 'organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands ...
for incursion into the territory of another State', and 'participating in acts of civil
strife ... in another State', in terms of General Assembly resolution 2625(XXV).
According to that resolution, participation of this kind is contrary to the principle of
the prohibition of the use of force when the acts of civil strife referred to 'involve a
threat or use of force'. In the view of the Court, while the arming and training of the
contras can certainly be said to involve the threat or use of force against Nicaragua,
this is not necessarily so in respect of all the assistance given by the United States
Government.
The Court then mentioned "the mere supply of funds to the contras" as a form of
assistance which did not amount to a use of force, although it amounted to intervention.
Subject to that kind of exception, the Court considered that the arming and training of
the contras in the circumstances of the case amounted to a use of force.
10. The Court adhered to this view in its formal disposition of the case. In paragraph
292(3) of its holding, it decided that the United States, by "training, arming, equipping,
financing, and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and
aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua" intervened in the
153
affairs of Nicaragua. Then, in paragraph 292(4), it held that the United States, "by those
acts of intervention referred to in subparagraph (3) hereof which involve the use of
force, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under
customary international law not to use force against another State". The acts of
intervention which involved a use of force included the arming and training of the
contras, the Court having explicitly held that "the arming and training of the contras can
certainly be said to involve the threat or use of force against Nicaragua".
11. This is consistent with the Court's statement, in paragraph 238 of its judgement,
that the United States, having no legal right to use force in the circumstances of the case,
"has violated the principle prohibiting recourse to the threat or use of force ... by its
assistance to the contras to the extent that this assistance 'involves a threat or use of
force' (paragraph 228 above)". Paragraph 228, to which the Court referred, is set out in
relevant part above.
12. The contras were not using force exclusively on behalf of the United States; the
case makes it clear that they were also using force on their own behalf against the
Government of Nicaragua. This must be borne in mind in considering the following
statement of the Court:
The conflict between the contras’forces and those of the Government of Nicaragua
is an armed conflict which is ‘not of an international character’. The acts of the
contras towards the Nicaraguan Government are therefore governed by the law
applicable to conflicts of that character; whereas the actions of the United States in
and against Nicaragua fall under the legal rules relating to international conflicts.
(Ibid., p.114, para.219).
I do not think anything in this passage is opposed to the conclusion that the United
States was using force through the contras against the Government of Nicaragua, a
finding which the Court in fact made as, I think, the Appeals Chamber in this case
recognises (see para. 130 of the judgement). To judge whether that finding is applicable
here, it is necessary to consider the facts of this case.
13. The Trial Chamber accepted that, having been itself in direct armed conflict with
BH through the Yugoslav People's Army ("JNA"), the FRY established the VRS, trained
it, equipped it, supplied it and maintained it. The establishment was done by the FRY,
on 19 May 1992, by leaving in BH part of the JNA to function as the VRS, and doing
that just days after the Security Council had called on the FRY to withdraw from BH.
Senior military officers from the FRY were members of the staff of the VRS. The FRY
paid the salaries (and pensions after retirement) of officers of the VRS who came over
from the JNA. The headquarters of the VRS had a link with the headquarters of the
154
Yugoslav Army, or VJ, as the Yugoslav portion of the old JNA was now known. The
VRS was engaged in carrying out the FRY's plan of ethnic cleansing and of carving out
territory of BH to be ultimately added to that of the FRY so as to realise the FRY's
ambition to create a "Greater Serbia".
14. Thus, the FRY did more than provide general funds to the VRS. On the basis of
Nicaragua, I have no difficulty in concluding that the findings of the Trial Chamber
suffice to show that the FRY was using force through the VRS against BH, even if it is
supposed that the facts were not sufficient to fix the FRY with responsibility for any
delictual acts committed by the VRS. The FRY and BH were therefore in armed conflict
within the meaning of Article 2, first paragraph, of the Fourth Geneva Convention, with
the consequence that the Convention applied to that armed conflict.
3. The Position Taken by the Majority of the Trial Chamber
15. Citing Nicaragua, the majority of the Trial Chamber (Judge Stephen and Judge
Vohrah) held that the test as to whether there was an international armed conflict was
whether the FRY had effective control over the VRS, which it considered meant
command and control. (Judgement of the Trial Chamber, paras. 598 and 600). It found
that the FRY did not have command and control over the VRS and so did not have
effective control over the VRS; in its opinion, the relationship between them was one of
coordination and cooperation as between allies (as to the legal implications of which I
reserve my opinion). Consequently, in the view of the majority, the FRY was not a party
to the armed conflict in BH after 19 May 1992. In effect, after that date, that conflict was
not international.
16. With respect, it is too high a threshold to insist on proof of command and control
for the purpose of determining whether a state was using force through a foreign military
entity, as distinguished from whether the state was committing breaches of international
humanitarian law through that entity. In Nicaragua, the Court held that the United States
was using force through the contras by reason of the fact that, in the circumstances of
that case, it was arming and training the contras. The Court did not say that these facts
amounted to command and control; if they did, they should have given rise to state
responsibility for breaches by the contras of international humanitarian law, which the
Court said was not the case.
155
4. The General Question of State Responsibility for the Delictual Acts of Another
17. On the question whether the United States was responsible for the delictual acts
of the contras, the Appeals Chamber considered that Nicaragua was not correct and
reviewed the general question of the responsibility of a state for the delictual acts of
another. It appears to me, however, that that question does not arise in this case. The
question, a distinguishable one, is whether the FRY was using force through the VRS
against BH, not whether the FRY was responsible for any breaches of international
humanitarian law committed by the VRS.
18. To appreciate the scope of the question actually presented, it is helpful to bear in
mind that there is a difference between the mere use of force and any violation of
international humanitarian law: it is possible to use force without violating international
humanitarian law. Proof of use of force, without more, does not amount to proof of
violation of international humanitarian law, although, if unlawful, it could of course give
rise to state responsibility. Correspondingly, what needs to be proved in order to
establish a violation of international humanitarian law goes beyond what needs to be
proved in order to establish a use of force. This is important because, under Article 2,
first paragraph, of the Fourth Geneva Convention, all that had to be proved, in this case,
was that an "armed conflict" had arisen between BH and the FRY acting through the
VRS, not that the FRY committed breaches of international humanitarian law through
the VRS.
19. The foregoing may be borne in mind in considering the Court’s holding in
Nicaragua that, by arming and training the contras in the circumstances of that case, the
United States had used force. The Court did not declare the nature of any underlying
theory. I should not be surprised, however, if it applied a test of effective control, but on
the flexible basis that control which is effective for one purpose need not be effective for
another, and would interpret the decision that way. Thus, in holding that the United
States had used force in arming and training the contras, the Court did not rely on
specific instructions, something on which it otherwise laid stress where state
responsibility was sought to be founded on the delictual acts of another. In this case, the
test of effective control, flexibly applied (as I believe the Court intended it to be), shows
that the FRY was using force through the VRS against BH, even if such control did not
rise to the level required to fix the FRY with state responsibility for any breaches of
international humanitarian law committed by the VRS.
156
20. On the more general question whether Nicaragua was correct in its holding on
the subject of the responsibility of a state for the delictual acts of a foreign military
force, it may be that there is room for reviewing that case. The case may be interpreted
to mean that a state could be using force through a foreign military entity without being
responsible for any delictual acts committed by that entity otherwise than on the specific
instructions of the state. In opposition to a theory based on the need for proof of specific
instructions, it may be useful to consider whether there is meriti n the argument that, by
deciding to use force through an entity, a state places itself under an obligation of due
diligence to ensure that such use does not degenerate into such breaches, as it can.
However, I am not persuaded that it is necessary to set out on that inquiry for the
purposes of this case, no issue being involved of state responsibility for another’s
breaches of international humanitarian law.
21. For these reasons, although I appreciate the general tendency of the judgement of
the Appeals Chamber, I would respectfully reserve my position on the new test
proposed.
5. The Position of the Prosecution on the Applicability of Nicaragua
22. The prosecution argues that Nicaragua is not relevant. It makes two points. First,
it says that Nicaragua was concerned with the responsibility of a state for delictual acts
of third parties, and not with the criminal responsibility of the individual. I am of the
view, however, that, whatever the context, what constitutes a use of force (a necessary
element of an “armed conflict”) is so fundamental as to require constancy of principle.
The distinction between the responsibility of a state and the criminal responsibility of
the individual is interesting; but it is not of assistance on the question what constitutes a
use of force. That is a concept of common currency in international law.
23. Second, the prosecution submits that Nicaragua did not enquire into whether the
conflict was internal or international for the purposes of the Geneva Conventions of
1949. In its view, the Court found it unnecessary to do so, considering that, by virtue of
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the issues were determinable by reference
to customary international law relating to the applicability of minimum humanitarian
principles to the use of force, whether in the course of an international armed conflict or
in the course of an internal one. That was so, with the consequence that it was not
necessary for the Court to determine whether the Geneva Conventions, as such, were
157
inapplicable by reason of a United States exclusion of multilateral conventions as set out
in its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the Statute of the Court. (I.C.J.
Reports 1986, paras. 217-220 and 255; and see I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 421, para. 67).
24. But this does not mean that the Court did not have to consider whether there was
a use of force, for, altogether apart from the question whether there was a breach of the
Geneva Conventions, Nicaragua, as has been seen, had claimed that "the United States,
in breach of its obligation under general and customary international law, has used and
is using force and the threat of force against Nicaragua..." ( I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 19,
para. 15(c)). That is the point involved here. In Nicaragua, the Court did not have to
determine whether the conflict was internal or international; but it did have to determine
whether the United States was using force against Nicaragua through the contras, and,
on my interpretation, it did decide that there was such a use of force. If there was such a
use of force by one state against another, ex definitione the conflict was international,
whether or not it was necessary for the Court to decide that it was.
6. The Demonstrable Link Test Proposed by the Prosecution
25. As mentioned in paragraph 69 of the judgement of the Appeals Chamber, the
prosecution submitted that the answer to the question whether the FRY was in armed
conflict with BH through the VRS hinged on whether the conflict involved a
"demonstrable link" between the VRS and the FRY or VJ, meaning, I believe,
something less stringent than either of two tests which were discussed, namely, the
agency test and the effective control test. The prosecution accepted that there was no
authority to support the idea but thought that general jurisprudence would. In aid of the
submission, recourse could be had to the character of the reference in Article 2, first
paragraph, of the Fourth Geneva Convention to "all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties... ".
As it has been often observed, the expression "armed conflict" is a factual one, not
intended to become burdened with legal technicalities: one respected commentator refers
to it as "a de facto concept".3
26. That is true. However, there is a difference between saying that the question
whether there is an armed conflict between states is a factual one and saying that, for
that reason, it is not necessary to determine whether there is an armed conflict between
158
states. Factual as the criterion may be, it remains necessary to determine whether there is
an armed conflict between states. This question is not a generalised one as to whether an
armed conflict has become "internationalised" in any broad sense of the ter;m nor is it to
be determined by reference to criteria of unmanageable plasticity. The question is a
precise one as to whether there is an "armed conflict ... between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties ..." to the Fourth Geneva Convention. Barring a "declared war"
between them, it is only if there is such a conflict that the Convention appli.esBut
whether or not there is such a conflict turns ,ex hypothesi, on whether one state is using
force against the other. A demonstrable link test has to result in showing whether or not
force was being used by a state. If the test premises that it is not necessary to prove that
a state was using force, it is not persuasive.
27. More pertinently, if the proposed test is meant to show whether or not force was
being used by a state through a foreign army, it has to have the effect of connecting the
state with the use of force by the foreign army; and I do not see how it can do this unless
it has a degree of specificity commensurate with the gravity of a finding that one state
was using force against another and with the serious implications of such a finding for
individual criminal responsibility, for, if the Convention applies, the individual becomes
liable to conviction for certain serious crimes to which he would not otherwise be
exposed. If the test has the requisite degree of specificity,I do not see the advantage
which it possesses over the other tests concerned. Whatever may be said about the latter,
they appear to have that quality. Thus, the proposed test is either unnecessary or
inadequate.
7. The Test of Appellate Intervention
28. The Appeals Chamber is intervening in this part of the case because it holds that
the Trial Chamber applied the wrong legal criterion. In another part of the case (and, in a
sense, in this part also), the question of evaluation of facts is concerned. It may be
convenient to say a word on the basis on which, I believe, the Appeals Chamber acts.
29. Assessment of facts is primarily a matter for the Trial Chamber. But appeals to
the Appeals Chamber are by way of rehearing, though not involving a hearing de novo
3 J.S.Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims (Leyden, 1975), p. 50.
159
in the Appeals Chamber. Thus, the Appeals Chamber is also a judge of fact, although it
must take account of its disadvantage in that, unlike the Trial Chamber, it cannot assess
the witnesses first hand. Further, the Appeals Chamber is in as good a position as the
Trial Chamber to decide on the proper inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or
from facts which, being disputed, are established by the findings of the Trial Chamber.
30. However, where there is a difference in assessments of facts, the Appeals
Chamber will not simply substitute its assessment for that of the Trial Chamber. As it
was said by Brierly, "different minds, equally competent, may and often do arrive at
different and equally reasonable results"4. Similarly, it has been remarked that "two
reasonable persons can perfectly reasonably come to opposite conclusions on the same
set of facts without forfeiting their title to be regarded as reasonable ... Not every
reasonable exercise of judgment is right, and not every mistaken exercise of judgment is
unreasonable"5. In these repects, I agree with the corresponding remark made by the
Appeals Chamber in paragraph 64 of the judgement.
31. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber will intervene where it can see that no
reasonable person would have taken the view taken by the Trial Chamber. But, of
course, the Appeals Chamber can also intervene if the Trial Chamber did not take into
account relevant facts, or if it took account of irrelevant ones, or if it applied the wrong
legal criterion to the determination of the legal significance of the facts.
32. With respect, I think that, as regards another part of this case (concerning
Jaski}i), the decision of the Trial Chamber is not sustained by the criterion of
reasonableness. More particularly, however, I consider that, as regards the question
whether there was an international armed conflict, the wrong legal criterion was used.
B. Whether There is a Crime against Humanity Where the Accused Acted out of
Purely Personal Motives
33. Motive is important to punishment. It is always relevant as evidence. In
exceptional cases, not including this, it could be an element of the offence charged, as, in
some countries, in the case of a prosecution for libel. But, more generally, it is not.
4 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and C.H.M.Waldock (eds.),The Basis of Obligation in International Law and
Other Papers by the Late James Leslie Brierly, 1958, p. 98.
5 In re W. (An Infant), [1971] AC 682, HL, p. 700, per Lord Hailsham.
160
Therefore, if the Trial Chamber meant that the existence of personal motives excluded
the possibility of a crime against humanity being committed if the elements of the crime
were proven, I should have difficulty in supporting that. But I respectfully agree with the
Appeals Chamber that the Trial Chamber did not mean to sayso. What the Trial
Chamber said, in paragraph 659 of its judgement, was this:
Thus if the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive, that these acts
were occurring on a widespread or systematic basis and does not commit his act for
purely personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population,
that is sufficient to hold him liable for crimes against humanity. Therefore the
perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the civilian population, know that his
act fits in with the attack and the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the armed conflict.
34. There are difficulties in the passage, but, read as a whole and in the context in
which it occurred, I do not think it meant that, if the accused "knows that his act fits in
with the attack", that attack being one "on the civilian population", the mere
circumstance that he acted out of personal motives sufficed to exclude the commission
of the crime. "Denunciation" type cases, in which the accused sought to avail himself of
the arrangements relating to the attack on the civilian population in order to advance his
personal motives, are crimes against humanity. And rightly so, for those are cases in
which, however personal were the motives, the act fitted in with the attack on the
civilian population, within the contemplation of the phrase used by the Trial Chamber.
35. What, I apprehend, the Trial Chamber had in mind was a distinguishable
situation in which, although the accusedk new of the attack on the civilian population, he
did not in fact intend to link his act to the attack but acted "forp urely personal motives
completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population".6 Thus, in the period of an
attack on a certain civilian population, a jealous husband, being a member of the
aggressor group, might kill his wife, being a member of the attacked civilian population,
for exactly the same reasons, and no other, for which he would have killed her had she
been a member of his own group. It does not appear to me that the mere fact that he
knew of the attack on the civilian population could serve to classify his act as a crime
against humanity in the absence of proof that he intended that his act should fit in with
the arrangements for the attack. That proof is apparent in "denunciation" type cases.I t is
absent in the example suggested; the arrangements relating to the attack on the civilian
population played no part in the commission of the act. Were the law as submitted by
6 (Emphasis added). “The intent (or motive) of the perpetrator in ‘murder’… must be linked to carrying out
the ‘state action or policy’”. See Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal
Law (Dordrecht, 1992), p.292.
161
the prosecution, whereas the killing of the wife, who was a member of the aggressor
group, would always be simple murder, that of the wife, who was a member of the
attacked civilian population, would always be a crime against humanity.
36. The hypothesis of the murder of the wife, who was a member of the attacked
civilian population, is accommodated by the necessity for the prosecution to prove, as an
element of a crime against humanity, that the murder was "directed against any civilian
population" as is required by the chapeau of Article 5 of the Statute. Such a murder
would not have been directed against the civilian population. Where the evidence is of
that kind, the prosecution has failed to prove that element of a crime against humanity.
37. The Trial Chamber seems to have regarded the non-existence of personal reasons
as being itself an element of the crime to be proved by the prosecution. With respect,
that was a mistake. The prosecution does not have to prove negatively that there were no
personal reasons; it has to prove affirmatively that the crime was directed against the
civilian population. However, the evidence may show that the act was not directed
against the civilian population for any of several reasons, and one of these may be that it
was done for purely personal reasons completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian
population, as discussed above. That possibility may be disclosed either by the evidence
for the prosecution or by that for the defence. If that is the evidence, failure by the
prosecution to overcome it means that the prosecution has failed to prove a required
element of a crime against humanity, namely, that the act was directed against the
civilian population.
38. That is a far cry from suggesting, as the Trial Chamber seems to have done, that
it is an element of the crime, having to be proved by the prosecution, that the act of the
accused was not dictated by purely personal motives. But I do not think that the Trial
Chamber was wrong in taking the position that, where the act was dictated by purely
personal motives which were completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian
population, no crime against humanity was committed, even if the accused was aware of
that attack.
162
C. Whether the Prosecution has a Right to Disclosure of Defence Witness
Statements
39. I respectfully agree with the decision of the Appeals Chamber on this point but
would add something on the reasoning out of the matter and the scope of the result.
40. The provisions of the Statute of the Tribunal relating to evidence are sparse. That
suggests that there is room for fashioning the rest of the needed system under Article 15
of the Statute and Rules 54 and 89(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Barring
amendment of the Rules, how far can the Chambers now go?
41. Rule 90(E) provides for a privilege against self-incrimination, and Rule 97
provides for a lawyer-client privilege7. It may be argued that, by implication, these
express provisions exclude what is called a litigation privilege, which would have the
effect of denying to the prosecution a right of access to defence witness statements. The
exclusion of that privilege would leave a Chamber free to order disclosure of such
statements in pursuit of its search for truth. But the sparsity of the provisions relating to
evidence counsels caution in adopting that approach.
42. I do not think that protection from disclosure is provided by Rule 70(A), which
states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 66 and 67, reports, memoranda or other
internal documents prepared by a party, its assistants or representatives in connection
with the investigation or preparation of the case, are not subject to disclosure or
notification under those Rules.
It could be argued that the last phrase contemplated the pre-trial stage only; but I think
that a better view is that the provision (as set out in the scheme of the Tribunal’s Rules)
was seeking, in part, to cancel out the effect of previous provisions which themselves
assumed that, to the extent that such previous provisions did not control, “reports,
memoranda or other internal documents” would not be subject to disclosure at any stage
of the case. It would be odd if the protection afforded by Rule 70(A) was confined to the
pre-trial stage, with the material being open to disclosure at any stage thereafter. No
doubt, a similar provision is differently understood elsewhere. But it is good to recall
that the transposition of a municipal text to the international plane does not necessarily
take with it the technical environment in which the original text had its life. Otherwise,
7 The Rules are referred to as they then stood.
163
one runs into those difficulties which are created "when a rule is removed from the
framework in which it was formed, to another of different dimensions, to which it
cannot adapt itself as easily as it did to its proper setting8". On balance, I agree with the
prosecution that the protection referred to by Rule 70(A), as this provision occurs within
the framework of the Tribunal’s Rules, is to be regarded as extending throughout the
case.
43. The question remains, however, as to what are the categories of material to
which the protection provided by Rule 70(A) attaches. The opening words of the
provision are not "Save as excepted in the provisions of Rules 66 and67 ...". The
"notwithstanding" formula used means that, "notwithstanding"the provisions of Rules
66 and 67, "reports, memoranda or other internal documents ... are not subject to
disclosure ...". If those categories include witness statementsa,n d thus deny the defence
access to prosecution witness statements, a conflict exists with Rule 66(A)(ii), under
which copies of prosecution witness statements must be made available to the defence.
The particularity of Rule 66(A)(ii) suggests that witness statements are not included in
the general reference to "reports, memoranda or other internal documents" in Rule
70(A). In the result, defence witness statements are not protected against disclosure by
virtue of Rule 70(A).
44. But what of the arrangements for reciprocal inspection of materials? Under Rule
66(B), at the request of the defence, the Prosecutor is required to
permit the defence to inspect any books, documents, photographs and tangible
objects in his custody or control, which are material to the preparation of the defence,
or are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial or were obtained from or
belonged to the accused.
If the defence avails itself of this right, the Prosecutor has a reciprocal right under Rule
67(C), reading:
If the defence makes a request pursuant to Sub-rule 66(B), the Prosecutor shall be
entitled to inspect any books, documents, photographs and tangible objects, which
are within the custody or control of the defence and which it intends to use as
evidence at the trial.
45. These provisions refer to real evidence, not to proofs of testimonial evidence
which is expected to be given by a witness. A larger meaning may be suggested by the
words "which are material to the preparation of the defence", but those words occur in
8 Reparation Case, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 215, dissenting opinion of Judge Badawi Pasha.
164
Rule 66(B) and do not recur in Rule 67(C). Accordingly, even if they bear that larger
meaning, those words do not operate to entitle the prosecution to inspect defence witness
statements.
46. The prosecution is obliged to furnish the defence with copies of prosecution
witness statements and with any exculpatory evidence. Thus, so far as this kind of
material is concerned, the defence does not need to invoke reciprocity to gain access to
the material.
47. It may seem odd and unbalanced that the defence has a unilateral right to receive
copies of prosecution witness statements under Rule 66(A)(ii). But that, I think, is the
transmuted equivalent of the right of an accused person, under many legal systems, to be
apprised beforehand, in one way or another, of the evidence for the prosecution. Also, it
has to be remembered that, altogether apart from the question whether he is guilty or not
guilty, a man has a right not to be charged without just cause9. Fairness requires this
kind of unilateralism. A man who has been indicted, with the prospect of loss of liberty,
has a right to know what is the evidence on the basis of which he is being put through
the judicial process. The prosecution does not stand on that ground and has no similar
basis for demanding access to the evidence of the defence.
48. In my opinion, the reciprocity provisions of Rule 67(C), read with Rule 66(B,)
do not enable the prosecution to have access to defence witness statementsM. ore
importantly, it appears to me that, a contrario, those provisions imply that the
prosecution stands excluded from such acces:s materials to which the prosecution may
have access, and then only on a reciprocal basis, are specified, and they do not include
defence witness statements.
49. A new Rule 73ter(B), not in force at the relevant time, empowers a Trial
Chamber to order the defence to file, between the close of the case for the prosecution
and the opening of the case for the defence, "a summary of the facts on which each
(defence) witness will testify".10 That goes some way in the direction of the submissions
of the prosecution in this case, but not all the way: it implies that the prosecution has no
right of access to defence witness statements.
9 See the reference by Lord Parker CJ to the impermissibility of "an accusation of crime without cause" in
R. v. Martin [1961] 2 All ER 747.
10 See Richard May and Marieke Wierda, "Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo,
The Hague and Arusha", Col. J. of Trans. L, Vol. 37, 1999, No. 3, p. 761.
165
50. That is in keeping with the litigation privilege or the work product doctrine. The
right is lost only where it is waived by the defence. It is waived where the defence itself
puts a defence witness statement in issue by relying on it for one purpose or another.
Such was the case of Nobles, 422 U.S. 244. There, defence counsel, in cross-examining
two prosecution witnesses, sought to impeach their credit by reference to oral statements
which they had allegedly made to a defence investigator as preserved in the latter's
"report" to defence counsel - something in the nature of a witness statement. In the view
of the United States Supreme Court, the trial judge had power, in those circumstances, to
order the defence to make the "report" available to the prosecution after examination-inchief
of the investigator by the defence. That, with respect, was right; for the "report",
having been relied on by the defence in cross-examining the two prosecution witnesses,
was a factor which would obviously enter into the assessment of the truth.The “report”
was thus put in issue by the defence itself.
51. On a similarly limited basis, a Trial Chamber has power to order the defence to
make a defence witness statement available to the prosecution. I speak of a "limited
basis" because I do not support the view that the prosecution has an unlimited right to
see a defence witness statement after the witness has testified. The "cards on the table"
approach favoured in some thinking on the subject has not reached that point under the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal. Nor, generally speaking, has that point
been reached in the global common law system or in the global civil law system as they
relate to criminal procedure. The right to protection is not spent at the point at which the
witness has testified in chief.
52. I respectfully agree with the Appeals Chamber that a Chamber may order
disclosure of a defence witness statement only where it is satisfied that in the particular
circumstances disclosure would assist it in determining the truth. Disclosure by way of a
fishing expedition is not correct. It is difficult to see how a defence witness statement is
to be used by the prosecution otherwise than as a fishing expedition if it were the law
that the prosecution has an automatic right to disclosure on completion of the
examination-in-chief of each defence witness. At the point of disclosure, the prosecution
will have no basis for suspecting that there is any variance between oral testimony and
written statement; it will be only "fishing" for a variance.
53. However, it is not clear that this limited and conditional right of access to a
defence witness statement is inconsistent with the position taken by the majority of the
166
Trial Chamber in the relevant Decision of 27 November 1996. In the first paragraph of
the separate opinion which he appended to that Decision, Judge Vohrah said, "I fully
agree with the views expressed by my brother Judge Stephen, for the reasons he has
given". In the second paragraph of hiso wn separate opinion, Judge Stephen said:
The witness statement had not been in any way referred to in the witness' evidencine
chief nor had anything emerged in cross-examination regarding it other than that, in
answer to a question about what the witness had said when he made that statement,
which was objected to by Defence counsel but was allowed, the witness said that he
had “talked about, how can I put it, the truth and only the truth, how long I have
known Du{ko Tadi}”.
Clearly, the defence had not sought in any way to place reliance on the particular
defence witness statement. Thus ,the conclusion reached by the majority that defence
witness statements were not accessible to the prosecution was not intended to apply
where a defence witness statement had been in some way referred to in the evidence-inchief
of the witness or otherwise relied upon by the defence. The situation with which
the majority was dealing was one in which what was being asserted by the prosecution
was an unqualified right to see a defence witness statement provided only that the
witness had given evidence-in-chief –even if the statement was not referred to in that
evidence. It is not so clear to me that the majority intended to deny that special
circumstances could warrant disclosure.
54. There is one other matter. The parties were agreed that nothing in the reliefs
prayed for by either side turned on a determination of the above-mentioned point. They
were nevertheless also agreed that the importance of the point justiiefd a pronouncement
by the Appeals Chamber. The position was similar in respect of the issue whether
discriminatory intent has to be proved in respect of all crimes against humanity under
Article 5 of the Statute.
55. Were the parties right in theposition which they took? I think they were. The
principle is conveniently stated thus:
Appellate courts determine only matters actually before them on appeal, and no
others, and will not give opinions on controversies or declare principles of law which
cannot have any practical effect in settling the rights of the litigants. They consider
only those questions that are necessary for the decision of the case and do not attempt
further 'to lay down "a rule of guidance or precedent to the bench and bar of the
state"'. Questions not directly involved in an appeal, or not necessary or relevant to,
or material in, the final determination of the cause, will not be considered or decided
by an appellate court, unless, it has been held, they are affected with a public interest
167
or are of moment to the profession, or unless some useful result will follow
decision.11
56. That approach is consistent with the Tadi} Decision on Jurisdiction, at
paragraph 139. There, the defence had raised an argument before the Trial Chamber
concerning an element of a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute of the
Tribunal. The defence did not pursue the argument on appeal. Nevertheless, the Appeals
Chamber observed, "Although before the Appeals Chamber the Appellant has forgone
the argument ...., in view of the importance of the matter this Chamber deems it fitting to
comment briefly on the scope of Article 5".
57. In my view, when the importance of the point in question irse garded, the parties
were correct in agreeing that the Appeals Chamber could competently pass oint.
D. Conclusion
58. These remarks concern some elements of the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber.
On certain points of law, I hold different views, which I desire to preserve. But I agree
with the disposition of the case as set out in today’s judgement .
Done in both English and French, the English text being authoritative.
______________________
Mohamed Shahabuddeen
Dated this fifteenth day of July 1999
At The Hague,
The Netherlands.
168
169
ANNEX A – GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Additional Protocol I Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I), 1977.
Amended Notice of
Appeal against Judgement Amended Notice of Appeal, Case No.: IT-94-1-A,
8 January 1999.
Appellant Du{ko Tadi}.
Appellant’s Amended Brief
on Judgement Amended Brief of Argument on behalf of the
Appellant, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 8 January 1999.
Appellant’s Brief on Judgement Appellant’s Brief on Appeal Against Opinion and
Judgement of 7 May 1997, Case No.: IT-94-1-A,
12 January 1998.
Appellant’s Brief on Sentencing
Judgement Appellant’s Brief on Appeal against Sentencing
Judgement, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 12 January 1998.
BH Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Claims Tribunal Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
Cross-Appellant Office of the Prosecutor.
Cross-Appellant’s Brief Brief of Argument of the Prosecution (Cross-
Appellant), Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 12 January 1998.
Cross-Appellant’s Brief in Reply Prosecution (Cross-Appellant) Brief in Reply,
Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 1 December 1998.
Dayton-Paris Accord General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled by the parties
on 21 November 1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/790,
S/1995/999, 30 November 1995.
Decision on Admissibility
of Additional Evidence Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension
of the Time-limit and Admission of Additional
Evidence”, The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic , Case
No.: IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, 15 October
1998.
170
Defence’s Skeleton Argument
on the Cross-Appeal Skeleton Argument – Prosecutor’s Cross-Appeal,
Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 20 April 1999.
Defence’s Substituted Response
to Cross-Appellant’s Brief The Respondent’s Brief of Argument on the Brief
of Argument of the Prosecution (Cross-Appellant)
of January 19, 1999”, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 19
January 1999.
DR European Commission of Human Rights,
Decisions and Reports.
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights.
Eur. Commission H.R. European Commission of Human Rights.
Eur. Court H.R. European Court of Human Rights.
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro).
Geneva Convention III
(Third Geneva Convention) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
Geneva Convention IV
(Fourth Geneva Convention) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,
1949.
HRC Human Rights Committee.
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross.
ICRC Commentary on
Additional Protocols Yves Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, International
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1987.
ICRC Commentary on
Geneva Convention III Jean Pictet (ed.), Commentary: III Geneva
Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of
War, International Committee of the Red Cross,
Geneva, 1960, First Reprint, 1994.
171
ICRC Commentary on
Geneva Convention IV Jean Pictet (ed.), Commentary: IV Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, International Committee
of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958, First Reprint,
1994.
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and
other such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and
31 December 1994.
ICTY JR International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Judicial Reports, Kluwer Law
International, The Hague.
ILC International Law Commission.
International Tribunal International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.
JNA Yugoslav People’s Army.
Judgement Opinion and Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Duško
Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II, 7
May 1997.
Nicaragua Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgement, I.C.J Reports
(1986), p. 14.
Notice of Cross-Appeal Notice of Appeal, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 6 June
1997.
Prosecution’s Response to
Appellant’s Brief on Judgement Cross-Appellant’s Response to Appellant’s Brief
on Appeal Against Opinion and Judgement of May
7, 1997 Filed on 12 January 1998, Case No.: IT-
94-1-A, 17 November 1998.
Prosecution Response to
Appellant’s Brief on Sentencing
Judgement Response to Appellant’s Brief on Appeal Against
Sentencing Judgement filed on 12 January 1998,
Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 16 November 1998.
172
Report of the Secretary-General Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993.
Rome Statute Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 17 July 1998.
Rules Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Tribunal.
Sentencing Judgement Sentencing Judgment, The Prosecutor v Duško
Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II, 14
July 1997.
Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge McDonald Opinion and Judgment – Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the
Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute, The
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-T,
Trial Chamber II, 7 May 1997.
Skeleton Argument –
Appellant’s Appeal Against
Conviction Skeleton Argument – Appellant’s Appeal against
Conviction, Case No.: IT-94-1-A, 19 March 1999.
Skeleton Argument
of the Prosecution Skeleton Argument of the Prosecution, Case No.:
IT-94-1-A, 19 March 1999.
Statute Statute of the International Tribunal.
T. Transcript of hearing in The Prosecutor v. Duško
Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1-A. (All transcript page
numbers referred to in the course of this Judgement
are from the unofficial, uncorrected version of the
English transcript. Minor differences may exist
between the pagination therein and that of the final
English transcript released to the public).
Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, The Prosecutor v. Du{ko
Tadi}, IT-94-1AR72, Appeals Chamber, 2 October
1995 (Tadi} (1995) I ICTY JR 353).
Third Geneva Convention Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
173
Tribunal The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.
TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
UNWCC Law Reports of Trial of War Criminals, Selected
and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes
Commission, Published for the United Nations
War Crimes Commission by His Majesty’s
Stationary Office, London 1947.
VJ Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
VRS Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina/Republika Srpska.
Witness Statements Decision Decision on Prosecution Motion for Production of
Defence Witness Statements, The Prosecutor v.
Duško Tadic , Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber
II, 27 November 1996.
Annex 464
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 41516 (5 December
2003)
UNITED
NATIONS
Case No. IT-98-29-T
Date: 5 December 2003
International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Original: English
IN TRIAL CHAMBER I
Before: Judge Alphons Orie
Judge Amin El Mahdi
Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia
Registrar: Mr. Hans Holthuis
Judgement Of: 5 December 2003
PROSECUTOR
v.
STANISLAV GALI]
JUDGEMENT AND OPINION
The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr. Mark Ierace
Mr. Chester Stamp
Mr. Daryl Mundis
Ms. Prashanthi Mahindaratne
Mr. Manoj Sachdeva
Counsel for the Accused:
Ms. Mara Pilipovi}
Mr. Stéphane Piletta-Zanin
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................5
II. APPLICABLE LAW ....................................................................................................................7
1. Prerequisites of Article 3 of the Statute ...................................................................................7
2. Attack on Civilians as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War........................................8
(a) Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 8
(b) First and Second Tadi} Conditions .......................................................................................... 8
(c) Third Tadi} Condition............................................................................................................ 12
(d) Fourth Tadi} Condition.......................................................................................................... 13
(e) Material and Mental Elements ............................................................................................... 14
(i) Arguments of the Parties..................................................................................................... 14
(ii) Discussion.......................................................................................................................... 16
(f) Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 26
3. Terror Against the Civilian Population as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War .......26
(a) Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 26
(b) Consideration of the Arguments of the Parties ...................................................................... 27
(i) Prosecution ......................................................................................................................... 27
(ii) Defence .............................................................................................................................. 30
(c) Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 33
(i) Preliminary remarks............................................................................................................ 34
(ii) First and Second Tadi Conditions.................................................................................... 35
(iii) Third Tadi Condition ...................................................................................................... 39
(iv) Fourth Tadi Condition..................................................................................................... 40
(v) Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 49
B. OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF THE STATUTE .........................................................50
1. Prerequisites of Article 5 of the Statute .................................................................................50
2. Crimes Alleged under Article 5 of the Statute.......................................................................53
(a) Murder.................................................................................................................................... 53
(b) Inhumane acts ........................................................................................................................ 53
C. CUMULATIVE CHARGING AND CONVICTIONS .............................................................................54
1. Cumulative Charging.............................................................................................................54
2. Cumulative Convictions ........................................................................................................55
(a) Article 3: The Test Applied to Count 1 and Counts 4 and 7.................................................. 55
(b) Articles 3 and 5: Cumulation for War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity....................... 56
(c) Article 5: The Counts of Murder and Inhumane acts............................................................. 56
D. THEORIES OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 7 OF THE STATUTE...........................................56
1. Individual Responsibility under Article 7 (1) of the Statute..................................................57
2. Article 7 (3) of the Statute .....................................................................................................60
III. FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS ....................................................................................61
A. GENERAL REMARKS ON TERMINOLOGY AND EVIDENCE ............................................................61
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................61
2. Definitions of “Campaign” and “Sniping” ............................................................................62
(a) Campaign ............................................................................................................................... 62
(b) Sniping ................................................................................................................................... 62
3. Evaluation of Evidence ..........................................................................................................64
B. EVENTS LEADING TO THE MILITARY ENCIRCLEMENT OF SARAJEVO IN 1992.............................65
1. Break-up of the SFRY ...........................................................................................................65
2. Sarajevo: Armed Conflict and Military Encirclement ...........................................................67
(a) April 1992: Armed Conflict Erupts in Sarajevo..................................................................... 68
(b) May 1992: Further Attacks in Sarajevo and Establishment of a Bosnian-Serb Army........... 68
(c) June/September 1992: Intensification of Attacks in Sarajevo and Further Deployment of
UN forces.............................................................................................................................. 71
C. WAS THERE A CAMPAIGN OF SNIPING AND SHELLING BY SRK FORCES AGAINST CIVILIANS? ...72
1. General Evidence of Sniping and Shelling at Civilians in ABIH-held Areas of Sarajevo
during the Indictment Period...............................................................................................74
2. Sniping and Shelling of Civilians in Urban ABiH-held Areas of Sarajevo...........................80
(a) General Grbavica Area........................................................................................................... 80
(i) Scheduled Sniping Incident 5 ............................................................................................. 90
(ii) Scheduled sniping incident number 24.............................................................................. 93
(b) Hrasno Area ........................................................................................................................... 96
(i) Scheduled Sniping Incident 10 ........................................................................................... 99
(ii) Scheduled Sniping Incident 15 ........................................................................................ 101
(iii) Scheduled Sniping Incident 20 ....................................................................................... 104
(iv) Scheduled Sniping Incident 27 ....................................................................................... 107
(c) Alipašino Polje Area ............................................................................................................ 109
(i) Ne|ari}i and the School for the Blind .............................................................................. 109
(ii) Scheduled Sniping Incident 13 ........................................................................................ 112
(iii) Scheduled Sniping Incident 21 ....................................................................................... 115
(iv) Scheduled Sniping Incident 23 ....................................................................................... 117
(v) Scheduled Sniping Incident 25 ........................................................................................ 121
(vi) Scheduled Sniping Incident 26 ....................................................................................... 123
(vii) Shelling incident in Alipa{ino Area............................................................................... 126
(viii) Scheduled Shelling Incident 3 ...................................................................................... 128
(d) Dobrinja Areas ..................................................................................................................... 136
(i) Orthodox Church and School of Theology....................................................................... 137
(ii) Scheduled Sniping Incident 6 .......................................................................................... 139
(iii) Scheduled Sniping Incident 18 ....................................................................................... 141
(iv) Scheduled Sniping Incident 22 ....................................................................................... 144
(v) Shelling Attacks on Civilians in Dobrinja Area .............................................................. 148
(vi) Scheduled Shelling Incident 1 ........................................................................................ 150
(vii) Scheduled Shelling Incident 2 ....................................................................................... 160
(viii) Scheduled Shelling Incident 4 ...................................................................................... 165
(e) Sarajevo Airport ................................................................................................................... 174
(f) Briješko Brdo Area............................................................................................................... 176
(i) Scheduled Sniping Incident 16 ......................................................................................... 177
(ii) Scheduled Sniping Incident 17 ........................................................................................ 182
(g) Stari Grad Area .................................................................................................................... 183
(i) Old City Centre................................................................................................................. 183
(ii) Scheduled Shelling 5 ....................................................................................................... 185
a. Description of the Incident ............................................................................................ 185
b. Investigations of the Causes of the Incident.................................................................. 186
i. Local Investigative Team........................................................................................... 187
Sabljica Ballistic Report........................................................................................................ 187
Ze~evi} Ballistic Report......................................................................................................... 188
ii. UN Investigative Teams............................................................................................ 190
iii. Expert Report of the Defence .................................................................................. 193
c. Non-technical evidence concerning the source of fire .................................................. 195
d. Presence of Military Targets in the Area of Markale Market ....................................... 196
e. Arguments of the Parties ............................................................................................... 197
f. Conclusion on the Cause of the Explosion and Casualties ............................................ 198
g. Conclusion on the Source of Fire .................................................................................. 199
i. Direction of Fire......................................................................................................... 199
ii. Range of Fire Related to the Angle of Descent ........................................................ 200
iii. Non-technical Evidence in relation to the Source of Fire........................................ 205
h. Conclusion on Deliberateness of the Attack ................................................................. 206
(h) Koševo Area......................................................................................................................... 206
3. Sniping and Shelling of Civilians in Rural ABiH-held Areas of Sarajevo..........................213
(a) Sedrenik Area....................................................................................................................... 213
(i) [picasta Stijena ................................................................................................................. 213
(ii) Scheduled Sniping Incident 3 .......................................................................................... 215
(iii) Scheduled sniping incident number 8............................................................................. 217
(iv) Other Evidence of Targeting of Civilians from [picasta Stijena.................................... 219
(b) [irokaa Area....................................................................................................................... 221
(i) Mount Trebevi} and Baba Stijena .................................................................................... 221
(ii) Scheduled sniping incident number 2.............................................................................. 224
(iii) Scheduled sniping incident number 11........................................................................... 226
(c) Vogoša Area ....................................................................................................................... 228
(i) Orahov Brijeg ................................................................................................................... 228
(ii) Scheduled Sniping Incident 4 .......................................................................................... 229
(iii) Scheduled Sniping Incident 9 ......................................................................................... 232
(iv) Scheduled Sniping Incident 14 ....................................................................................... 234
(v) Other Evidence of Targeting of Civilians from the area of Kobilja Glava...................... 235
4. Pattern of Fire into ABiH-held Areas of Sarajevo...............................................................237
5. Were Sniping and Shelling Attacks on Civilians in ABiH-held Areas of Sarajevo
Committed with the Aim to Spread Terror?......................................................................239
6. Number of Civilians Killed or Injured in ABiH-controlled Parts of Sarajevo during the
Indictment Period ..............................................................................................................244
7. Conclusion on Whether there was a Campaign of Sniping and Shelling in Sarajevo by
SRK Forces .......................................................................................................................246
D. LEGAL FINDINGS......................................................................................................................251
1. Offences under Article 3 of the Statute................................................................................251
2. Offences under Article 5 of the Statute................................................................................251
IV. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF GENERAL GALI]..................................................252
A. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................252
1. General Gali}’s Personal Background .................................................................................252
2. The Command Position Held by the Accused Throughout the Relevant Period.................253
3. The Role of General Gali} ...................................................................................................254
B. WAS GENERAL GALI} IN EFFECTIVE COMMAND OF THE SRK FORCES THROUGHOUT THE
RELEVANT PERIOD? ...............................................................................................................255
1. The Chain of Command.......................................................................................................255
(a) The Structure of the SRK..................................................................................................... 255
(b) The Reporting and Monitoring Systems of the SRK ........................................................... 258
(c) Was the SRK Personnel under Strict Control?..................................................................... 261
(i) Procedure for Instructions and Orders .............................................................................. 261
(ii) Control over Sniping Activity ......................................................................................... 263
(iii) Control over Shelling Activity ....................................................................................... 266
(iv) Control over SRK Weaponry.......................................................................................... 272
(d) Was General Gali} in a Position to Punish his Subordinates? ............................................. 273
2. Conclusions about the Effectiveness of the Command and Control of the Chain of
Command ..........................................................................................................................274
C. DID GENERAL GALI} KNOW OF THE CRIMES PROVED AT TRIAL? ............................................275
1. Introduction..........................................................................................................................275
2. Protests Delivered in Person to General Gali}.....................................................................276
3. General Gali}’s Responses to Protests.................................................................................279
4. Protests Delivered to General Gali}’s Subordinates............................................................282
5. Media Reports......................................................................................................................286
6. Artillery Assets ....................................................................................................................287
7. Conclusions about General Gali}’s Knowledge of Criminal Activity of the SRK..............288
D. DID GENERAL GALI} TAKE REASONABLE MEASURES UPON HIS KNOWLEDGE OF CRIME? ......290
1. Prevention of Crimes and Punishment of Perpetrators thereof............................................290
2. Conclusions..........................................................................................................................292
E. DID GENERAL GALI} AND HIS SUBORDINATES ACT IN FURTHERANCE OF A PLAN?..................294
F. CONCLUSION: DOES GENERAL GALI} INCUR CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 7(1)
OF THE STATUTE?...................................................................................................................296
1. Introduction..........................................................................................................................296
2. Did General Gali} Order the Commission of Crimes Proved at Trial? ...............................297
V. SENTENCING ..........................................................................................................................303
A. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES .................................................................................................303
B. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS AND SENTENCING PRINCIPLES .........................................................304
C. DETERMINATION OF GENERAL GALI}’S SENTENCE..................................................................306
VI. DISPOSITION.........................................................................................................................309
VII. SEPARATE AND PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA ...311
VIII. ANNEXES.............................................................................................................................312
A. INDICTMENT AGAINST GENERAL GALI} ........................................................................................I
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE ..........................................................................................IV
1. The Indictment and the Accused.............................................................................................iv
2. Stages of the Proceedings .......................................................................................................vi
(a) Pre-Trial Stage......................................................................................................................... vi
(b) Preparation of Prosecution case .............................................................................................. vi
(c) Change in Composition of Trial Chamber .............................................................................. vi
(d) Stipulated Facts ...................................................................................................................... vii
(e) Preparation of Defence Case .................................................................................................. vii
3. Trial Stage..............................................................................................................................vii
(a) Issues Related to Witnesses................................................................................................... viii
(i) Protective measures ........................................................................................................... viii
(ii) Rule 70................................................................................................................................ ix
(iii) Video-Link......................................................................................................................... ix
(iv) Summons ........................................................................................................................... ix
(v) Safe Conducts ..................................................................................................................... ix
(vi) Concerning the Possibility of the Accused as Witness....................................................... x
(vii) Expert Witnesses ............................................................................................................... x
(viii) Rule 92 bis Statements .................................................................................................... xi
(b) Issues Related to Disclosure and Documentary Evidence ..................................................... xii
(i) Order for Production of Documents ................................................................................... xii
(ii) Reciprocal Disclosure........................................................................................................ xii
(iii) Notification during Trial.................................................................................................. xiii
(iv) Documentary Evidence Admitted from Bar Table .......................................................... xiii
(c) Issue of Visit to Sarajevo ...................................................................................................... xiii
(d) Amicus Curiae....................................................................................................................... xiv
4. Motion to Disqualify Presiding Judge ...................................................................................xv
5. Late disclosure of Material ....................................................................................................xv
C. GLOSSARIES......................................................................................................................... XVI
1. Glossary - Legal Citations ....................................................................................................xvi
2. Glossary - Main Abbreviations.............................................................................................xix
D. MAPS ....................................................................................................................................... XXI
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Trial Chamber I of the International Tribunal (the “Trial Chamber”) is seized of a case
which concerns events surrounding the military encirclement of the city of Sarajevo in 1992 by
Bosnian Serb forces.
2. The Prosecution alleges that “The siege of Sarajevo, as it came to be popularly known, was
an episode of such notoriety in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that one must go back to
World War II to find a parallel in European history. Not since then had a professional army
conducted a campaign of unrelenting violence against the inhabitants of a European city so as to
reduce them to a state of medieval deprivation in which they were in constant fear of death. In the
period covered in this Indictment, there was nowhere safe for a Sarajevan, not at home, at school, in
a hospital, from deliberate attack”.1
3. In the course of the three and a half years of the armed conflict in and around Sarajevo, three
officers commanded the unit of the Bosnian-Serb Army (“VRS”) operating in the area of Sarajevo,
the Sarajevo Romanija Corps (“SRK”). The second of those three officers, Major-General Stanislav
Gali}, is the accused in this case (“the Accused”). He was the commander for the longest period,
almost two years, from around 10 September 1992 to 10 August 1994. The Prosecution alleges that
over this period he conducted a protracted campaign of sniping and shelling against civilians in
Sarajevo. Two schedules to the Indictment “set forth a small representative number of individual
incidents for specificity of pleading”.2 At the end of the Prosecution case and pursuant to Rule 98
bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal, the Trial Chamber decided
upon the Defence Motion for Acquittal that the Prosecution had failed to prove some of these
scheduled sniping incidents.3
4. The Prosecution alleges that General Gali} incurs individual criminal responsibility under
Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute for his acts and omissions in relation to the crime of terror
1 Prosecution Opening Statement, T. 562-3.
2 The First Schedule refers to sniping incidents allegedly committed against civilians by forces under the command and
control of the Accused. The Second Schedule lists a number of shelling incidents allegedly committed against civilian
targets by forces under the command and control of the Accused, Indictment, para. 15.
3 See Decision on Acquittal (details of that decision are mentioned in Annex B of this Judgement).
(count 1), attacks on civilians (counts 4 and 7), murder (counts 2 and 5) and inhumane acts (counts
3 and 6) committed against civilians in the city of Sarajevo.4
5. The Trial Chamber’s task is to decide whether the Prosecution’s allegations that SRK
personnel committed the criminal acts alleged in the Indictment have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It must then decide what, if any, criminal responsibility General Gali} incurs for
any such criminal acts committed by SRK personnel.
6. This Judgement is rendered by a majority of the Trial Chamber’s judges.5 Judge Nieto-
Navia, partly dissenting, appends his opinion to this Judgement. Portions of this Judgement where
he dissents are mentioned as that of the Majority of the Trial Chamber (or the “Majority”).
7. This Judgement is divided into eight Parts. Part I consists of this Introduction. Part II
provides a legal framework for the making of legal findings on the facts to be set out in the
following part. In this part, the Trial Chamber considers the legal elements of violations of the laws
or customs of war and of crimes against humanity, then determines under what circumstances an
accused can be convicted for more than one crime based upon the same set of facts, and lastly
examines the principles affecting the attribution of criminal responsibility. The factual findings of
the Trial Chamber are contained in Part III, beginning with general observations concerning
terminology and evidence; they continue with a narrative overview of the events leading to the
virtually complete encirclement of the ABiH-held parts of Sarajevo; the facts of the present case
follow, in order to establish whether a campaign of sniping and shelling against civilians was
conducted in Sarajevo by SRK-forces during the Indictment Period and whether it aimed at
spreading terror as alleged by the Prosecution; finally, the Trial Chamber sets out its legal findings,
namely whether the facts found, if any, constitute crimes. In Part IV of this Judgement, the Trial
Chamber states its legal findings as to the criminal responsibility of the Accused. Part V addresses
matters relating to sentencing and Part VI sets forth the disposition. Part VII set forth the separate
and dissenting opinion of Judge Nieto-Navia. Finally Part VIII contains four Annexes: the
Indictment against General Gali}, the procedural history of the case, a glossary of terms and cases,
and a set of two maps which are not authoritative and do not necessarily reflect any finding of the
Trial Chamber but are attached exclusively in order to assist readers to better orient themselves.
4 See the Indictment in Annex A. General Gali} is charged with four crimes against humanity (murder and inhumane
acts) under Article 5 of the Statute and with three violations of the laws or customs of war (inflicting terror on civilians
and attacks on civilians) under Article 3 of the Statute.
5 Rule 98 ter (C): the judgement shall be rendered by a majority of judges.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
8. In this second part the Trial Chamber examines elements of the crimes charged in the
Indictment under Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute.
1. Prerequisites of Article 3 of the Statute
9. For a crime to be adjudicated under Article 3 of the Statute (violation of the laws and
customs of the war) the Trial Chamber must determine that a state of armed conflict existed at the
time the crime was committed and that the crime was “closely related” to the armed conflict.6
According to the Appeals Chamber, an “armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a State”.7
10. In the Tadi} Jurisdiction Decision, the Appeals Chamber held that “Article 3 is a general
clause covering all violations of humanitarian law not falling under Article 2 or covered by Articles
4 or 5”8 and that it “functions as a residual clause designed to ensure that no serious violation of
international humanitarian law is taken away from the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal.”9
Article 3 thus refers to a broad category of offences, providing a merely illustrative list in the article
itself.10
11. According to the same Appeals Chamber Decision, for criminal conduct to fall within the
scope of Article 3 of the Statute, the following four conditions (“the Tadi} conditions”) must be
satisfied:
(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian
law;
(ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required
conditions must be met;
(iii) the violation must be “serious”, that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule
protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the
victim; and
(iv) the violation must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual
criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.11
6 Tadi} Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94.
7 Id., para. 70.
8 Id., para. 89.
9 Id., para. 91.
10 Tadi} Jurisdiction Decision, para. 89; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 401; Furundzija Trial Judgement, paras 131-
133.
11 Tadi Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94.
The Tadi conditions limit the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to violations of the laws or customs of
war that are at once recognized as criminally punishable and are “serious” enough to be dealt with
by the Tribunal.
12. The Indictment charges the Accused with violations of the laws or customs of war under
Article 3 of the Statute, namely with one count of “unlawfully inflicting terror upon civilians”
(Count 1) and with two counts of “attacks on civilians” (Counts 4 and 7) pursuant to Article 51 of
Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
These offences are not expressly listed in Article 3 of the Statute. Starting with the crime of attack
on civilians, the Trial Chamber will determine whether the offence can be brought under Article 3
of the Statute by verifying that the four Tadi} conditions are met. The Trial Chamber will also
inquire into the material and mental elements of the offence. It will then repeat this exercise for the
crime of terror.
2. Attack on Civilians as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War
(a) Introduction
13. Count 4 of the Indictment reads:
Violations of the Laws or Customs of War (attacks on civilians as set forth in Article 51
of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949) punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal.
14. The paragraph introducing Count 4 alleges that the Accused, General Gali, as commander
of the SRK, “conducted a coordinated and protracted campaign of sniper attacks upon the civilian
population of Sarajevo, killing and wounding a large number of civilians of all ages and both sexes,
such attacks by their nature involving the deliberate targeting of civilians with direct fire weapons.”
15. Count 7 of the Indictment is in terms identical to Count 4, except that the paragraph
preceding Count 7 alleges that the Accused “conducted a coordinated and protracted campaign of
artillery and mortar shelling onto civilian areas of Sarajevo and upon its civilian population. The
campaign of shelling resulted in thousands of civilians being killed or injured.”
(b) First and Second Tadi} Conditions
16. Counts 4 and 7 of the Indictment are clearly based on rules of international humanitarian
law, namely Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II. Both
provide, in relevant part, that: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall
not be made the object of attack.” The first Tadi} condition, that the violation must constitute an
infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law, is thus fulfilled.
the attack, including the information available to the latter, that the object is being used to make an
effective contribution to military action.
52. “Attack” is defined in Article 49 of Additional Protocol I as “acts of violence against the
adversary, whether in offence or in defence.” The Commentary makes the point that “attack” is a
technical term relating to a specific military operation limited in time and place, and covers attacks
carried out both in offence and in defence.97 The jurisprudence of the Tribunal has defined “attack”
as a course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence.98 In order to be punishable
under Article 3 of the Statute, these acts have to be carried out during the course of an armed
conflict.
53. In light of the discussion above, the Trial Chamber holds that the prohibited conduct set out
in the first part of Article 51(2) is to direct an attack (as defined in Article 49 of Additional Protocol
I) against the civilian population and against individual civilians not taking part in hostilities.
54. The Trial Chamber will now consider the mental element of the offence of attack on
civilians, when it results in death or serious injury to body or health. Article 85 of Additional
Protocol I explains the intent required for the application of the first part of Article 51(2). It
expressly qualifies as a grave breach the act of wilfully “making the civilian population or
individual civilians the object of attack”.99 The Commentary to Article 85 of Additional Protocol I
explains the term as follows:
wilfully: the accused must have acted consciously and with intent, i.e., with his mind on
the act and its consequences, and willing them ('criminal intent’ or 'malice aforethought’);
this encompasses the concepts of 'wrongful intent’ or 'recklessness’, viz., the attitude of
an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it
happening; on the other hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is not covered, i.e.,
when a man acts without having his mind on the act or its consequences.100
The Trial Chamber accepts this explanation, according to which the notion of “wilfully”
incorporates the concept of recklessness, whilst excluding mere negligence. The perpetrator who
recklessly attacks civilians acts “wilfully”.
55. For the mens rea recognized by Additional Protocol I to be proven, the Prosecution must
show that the perpetrator was aware or should have been aware of the civilian status of the persons
attacked. In case of doubt as to the status of a person, that person shall be considered to be a
97 ICRC Commentary, para. 4783.
98 Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para. 54; Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 415.
99 See Article 85(3)(a) of Additional Protocol I.
100 ICRC Commentary, para. 3474.
civilian. However, in such cases, the Prosecution must show that in the given circumstances a
reasonable person could not have believed that the individual he or she attacked was a combatant.
56. In sum, the Trial Chamber finds that the crime of attack on civilians is constituted of the
elements common to offences falling under Article 3 of the Statute, as well as of the following
specific elements:
1. Acts of violence directed against the civilian population or individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities causing death or serious injury to body or health within the
civilian population.
2. The offender wilfully made the civilian population or individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities the object of those acts of violence.
57. As regards the first element, the Trial Chamber agrees with previous Trial Chambers that
indiscriminate attacks, that is to say, attacks which strike civilians or civilian objects and military
objectives without distinction, may qualify as direct attacks against civilians.101 It notes that
indiscriminate attacks are expressly prohibited by Additional Protocol I.102 This prohibition reflects
a well-established rule of customary law applicable in all armed conflicts.103
101 Other Trial Chambers have found that attacks which employ certain means of combat which cannot discriminate
between civilians and civilian objects and military objectives are tantamount to direct targeting of civilians. For
example, the Bla{ki} Trial Chamber inferred from the arms used in an attack carried out against the town of Stari Vitez
that the perpetrators of the attack had wanted to target Muslim civilians, since these arms were difficult to guide
accurately, their trajectory was "irregular" and non-linear, thus being likely to hit non-military targets. Bla{ki} Trial
Judgement, paras 501, 512. In the Marti} Rule 61 proceedings, the Trial Chamber regarded the use of an Orkan rocket
with a cluster bomb warhead as evidence of the intent of the accused to deliberately attack the civilian population. The
Chamber concluded that “in respect of its accuracy and striking force, the use of the Orkan rocket in this case was not
designed to hit military target but to terrorise the civilians of Zagreb. These attacks are therefore contrary to the rules of
customary and conventional international law”. The Trial Chamber based this finding on the fact that the rocket was
inaccurate, it landed in an area with no military objectives nearby, it was used as an antipersonnel weapon launched
against the city of Zagreb and the accused indicated he intended to attack the city, Marti} Rule 61 Decision, paras 23-
31. It is relevant to note that the International Court of Justice has stated, with regard to the obligation of States not to
make civilians the object of attack, that “they must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing
between civilian and military targets”, ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
ICJ Report 1996, para. 78.
102 Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I prohibits indiscriminate attacks and provides the first conventional definition
of indiscriminate attacks. Paragraph (5) of the same provision provides examples of attacks considered to be
indiscriminate. The Kupre{ki} Trial Chamber held, with regard to the prohibition of launching indiscriminate attacks,
that “it is nevertheless beyond dispute that at a minimum, large numbers of casualties would have been interspersed
among the combatants. The point which needs to be emphasised is the sacrosanct character of the duty to protect
civilians … Even if it can be proved that the Muslim population of Ahmici was not entirely civilian but comprised
some armed elements, still no justification would exist for widespread and indiscriminate attacks against civilians”.
Kupre{ki} Trial Judgement, para. 513. See also Blaski} Trial Judgement, paras 509-10.
103 As recognized by the Appeals Chamber, among the customary rules that have developed to govern both international
conflicts and non-international strife is the protection of the civilian population against indiscriminate attacks. Tadi
Jurisdiction Decision, para. 127. The Trial Chamber observes that, already in 1922, the Air Warfare Rules enunciated
the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, by providing that “where military objectives were situated so that they could
not be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the aircraft must abstain from the
bombardments.” (Article 24 (3), Air Warfare Rules). These rules impose further limits to bombardments by providing
in Article 24(4) that “in the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces, the bombardments of cities,
towns and villages, dwellings or buildings is legitimate provided that there exists a reasonable presumption that the
military concentration is sufficiently important to justify such bombardments, having regard to the danger thus posed to
58. One type of indiscriminate attack violates the principle of proportionality.104 The practical
application of the principle of distinction requires that those who plan or launch an attack take all
feasible precautions to verify that the objectives attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects,
so as to spare civilians as much as possible.105 Once the military character of a target has been
the civilian population”. Although these rules were never adopted in legally binding form, they are considered to be an
authorative interpretation of the law. (See, e.g., L. Oppenheim, International Law vol II, 7th ed, 1960). The IX Hague
Convention concerning Bombing of Naval Forces in Time of War of 1907 also recognized in its Article 12 that
collateral civilian casualties might result and urged that precautions be taken to avoid or minimize them. In March 1938,
during the Spanish Civil War, the British Prime Minister explained the protest of his country to General Franco over the
bombing of Barcelona to members of the House of Commons by stating that “The one definite rule of international law,
however, is that direct and deliberate bombing of non-combatants is in all circumstances illegal, and His Majesty’s
Government’s protest was based on information which led them to the conclusion that the bombardments of Barcelona,
carried on apparently random and without special aim at military objectives, was in fact of this nature.”(House of
Commons Debates, vol. 333, 23 March 1938, col. 1177). In June of that year, in reference to the same conflict, the
Prime Minister affirmed before the House of Commons the existence of a rule or principle of international law
prescribing that “reasonable care must be taken in attacking….military objectives so that by carelessness a civilian
population in the neighbourhood is not bombed.” (House of Common Debates, vol. 337, 21 June 1938, cols 937-8). In
1938, the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations both condemned attacks carried out without sufficient
precautions to safeguard the civilian population. The Assembly of the League of Nations expressed the concern that the
civilian population be bombarded through negligence by stating, inter alia, that “any attack on legitimate military
objectives must be carried out in such a way that civilian population in the neighbourhood are not bombed through
negligence”. In this same sense, the Council of the League of Nations also adopted a resolution condemning inter alia
as “contrary to the conscience of mankind and to the principles of international law air attacks by the insurgents
directed “by negligence’ against civilian population.” In its already cited Resolution 2444 (1968), the UN General
Assembly affirmed that among the principles applicable to all armed conflicts was that “a distinction must be made at
all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter
be spared as much as possible.” (G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Session, Supp. No. 18 U.N. Doc A/7218(1968)).
Resolution 2675(1970) also stated that “in the conduct of military operations, every effort should be made to spare the
civilian populations from the ravages of war, and all necessary precautions should be taken to avoid injury loss or
damage to the civilian populations.” (G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Session, Supp. No. 28 U.N. Doc A/8028
(1970).
104 The principle of proportionality, inherent to both the principles of humanity and military necessity upon which the
law of conduct of hostilities is based, may be inferred, inter alia, from Articles 15 and 22 of the Lieber Code and from
Article 24 of the 1924 Hague Air Warfare Rules. This principle was codified in Article 51(5)(b) and Article 57(2)(a)(iii)
and (b) of Additional Protocol I. It should be noted that these provisions do not make explicit reference to the term
“proportionality” but speak of “excessive” incidental civilian losses.
Article 51(5) of Additional Protocol I provides that “among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered
as indiscriminate: … (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”
Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I states that: “(2). With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
(a) … (iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject
to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”
105 See Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I. The precautions required by Article 57(2)(a) must be “feasible” and, in
this context, “feasible” means that which is practicable or practically possible. The French version of this paragraph
reads: “faire tout ce qui est pratiquement possible…” (emphasis added). Italy stated in a declaration submitted upon
ratification of Additional Protocol I that “feasible” must be understood to mean that which is “practicable or practically
possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations”.
(See Statements of Understanding made by Italy (27 February 1986)). Several states have submitted similar declarations
pertaining to Additional Protocol I, with no objections raised by other state parties. (See Statements of Understanding of
Belgium (20 May 1986), The Netherlands (26 June 1987), Spain (21 April 1989), Canada (20 November 1990),
Germany (14 February 1991), Australia (21 June 1991), and Egypt (9 October 1992).
In another context, the European Commission and Court of Human Rights examined a case of “armed clash” in which a
woman, standing in the doorway of her home, had been killed in the course of a supposed ambush operation carried out
ascertained, commanders must consider whether striking this target is “expected to cause incidental
loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objectives or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”106 If such
casualties are expected to result, the attack should not be pursued.107 The basic obligation to spare
civilians and civilian objects as much as possible must guide the attacking party when considering
the proportionality of an attack.108 In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is
necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual
perpetrator,109 making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have
expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.110
against members of an alleged armed group. Regarding the obligation to avoid incidental civilian losses, the
Commission considered that the planning and control of the operation needed to be assessed “… not only in the context
of the apparent targets of an operation but, particularly where the use of force is envisaged in the vicinity of the civilian
population, with regard to the avoidance of incidental loss of life and injury to others” (Ergi v. Turkey No. 23818/94,
Decision on admissibility of 2 March 1995, 80 D&R 157, Commission Report of 20 May 1997). The Court explicitly
noted that the responsibility of the State “may also be engaged where the security forces fail to take all feasible
precautions in the choice of means and methods of security operation mounted against an opposing group with the view
to avoiding, or at least, minimising incidental loss of civilian life” (Ergi v. Turkey, Judgement of 28 July 1998, para.
79).
106 See Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I. The travaux préparatoires of Additional Protocol I indicate that the
expression “concrete and direct” was intended to show that the advantage must be “substantial and relatively close”,
and that “advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the long term should be
disregarded”. ICRC Commentary, para. 2209. The Commentary explains that “a military advantage can only consist in
ground gained or in annihilating or in weakening the enemy armed forces”. ICRC Commentary, para. 2218. Australia
and New Zealand stated at the time of ratification, in almost identical wording, that “the term “concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated’, used in Articles 51 and 57 of Additional Protocol I, means bona fide expectation that
the attack will make a relevant and proportional contribution to the objective of the military attack involved”. (See
Statements of Understanding made by New Zealand (8 February 1988) and Australia (21 June 1991)).
107 See Article 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I.
108 The ICRC Commentary acknowledges that “the disproportion between losses and damages caused and the military
advantages anticipated raises a delicate problem; in some situations there will be no room for doubt, while in other
situations there may be reason for hesitation. In such situations, the interests of the civilian population should prevail”.
ICRC Commentary, para. 1979.
109 The Trial Chamber notes that the rule of proportionality does not refer to the actual damage caused nor to the
military advantage achieved by an attack, but instead uses the words “expected” and “anticipated”. When ratifying
Additional Protocol I, Germany stated that “the decision taken by the person responsible has to be judged on the basis
of all information available to him at the relevant time, and not on the basis of hindsight”. (See Statements of
Understanding made by Germany (14 February 1991)). Similar declarations were also made by Switzerland (17
February 1982), Italy (27 February 1986), Belgium (20 May 1986), The Netherlands (26 June 1987), New Zealand (8
February 1988), Spain (21 April 1989), Canada (20 November 1990), and Australia (21 June 1991). No other party to
Additional Protocol I has raised objections to these declarations.
110 Military manuals provide guidance as to the practical application of this test. The Canadian Law of Armed Conflict
at the Operational and Tactical Level, Section 5, para. 27 (1992) indicates, for example, that “consideration must be
paid to the honest judgement of responsible commanders, based on the information reasonably available to them at the
relevant time, taking fully into account the urgent and difficult circumstances under which such judgements are usually
made” and indicates that the proportionality test must be examined on the basis of “what a reasonable person would do”
in such circumstances. The Australian Defence Force, Law of Armed Conflict – Commander’s Guide (1994), at p. 9-10,
and the New Zealand Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, at para. 515(4), contain a similar provision. See also,
e.g., Yugoslav Regulation on the Application of international Laws of War in the Armed Forces of the SRFY, para. 72
(1988).
59. To establish the mens rea of a disproportionate attack the Prosecution must prove, instead of
the above-mentioned mens rea requirement, that the attack was launched wilfully and in knowledge
of circumstances giving rise to the expectation of excessive civilian casualties.111
60. The Trial Chamber considers that certain apparently disproportionate attacks may give rise
to the inference that civilians were actually the object of attack. This is to be determined on a caseby-
case basis in light of the available evidence.
61. As suggested by the Defence, the parties to a conflict are under an obligation to remove
civilians, to the maximum extent feasible from the vicinity of military objectives and to avoid
locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas.112 However, the failure of a
party to abide by this obligation does not relieve the attacking side of its duty to abide by the
principles of distinction and proportionality when launching an attack.
(f) Conclusion
62. The Trial Chamber finds that an attack on civilian can be brought under Article 3 by virtue
of customary international law and, in the instant case, also by virtue of conventional law and is
constituted of acts of violence wilfully directed against the civilian population or individual
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities causing death or serious injury to body or health within
the civilian population.
3. Terror Against the Civilian Population as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War
(a) Introduction
63. This section of the Judgement expresses the view of the Majority of the Trial Chamber.
Judge Nieto-Navia attaches a dissenting opinion.
64. The first count of the Indictment reads:
Count 1: Violations of the Laws or Customs of War (unlawfully inflicting terror upon
civilians as set forth in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949) punishable under Article 3 of the Statute
of the Tribunal.
65. The paragraph introducing Count 1 alleges that the Accused, General Gali, as commander
of the SRK, “conducted a protracted campaign of shelling and sniping upon civilian areas of
Sarajevo and upon the civilian population thereby inflicting terror and mental suffering upon its
111 See Article 85(3)(b) of Additional Protocol I.
112 See Article 58 of Additional Protocol I.
civilian population.” This introductory paragraph is headed “Infliction of terror”. The remaining six
counts are divided into two groups which are headed, respectively, “Sniping” and “Shelling”. These
are evidently descriptive categorizations of the counts, to which the Majority attaches no particular
legal significance. Moreover, it will transpire in the course of the Majority’s discussion that
“Infliction of terror” is not an appropriate designation of the offence considered here because actual
infliction of terror is not a required element of the offence. The Majority will henceforth refer to the
offence charged in Count 1 as “the crime of terror against the civilian population”, or simply “the
crime of terror”, a purported violation of the laws or customs of war.113
66. The charge, as such, of terror against the civilian population is one that until now has not
been considered in a Tribunal judgement, although evidence of terrorization of civilians has been
factored into convictions on other charges.114 This is also the first time an international tribunal has
pronounced on the matter.115 After considering the arguments of the Parties, the Majority will
examine in detail the legal foundations and other essential characteristics of the charge.
(b) Consideration of the Arguments of the Parties
(i) Prosecution
67. In its Pre-trial Brief the Prosecution explained its position that the character of the armed
conflict in Sarajevo as international or non-international was “irrelevant” to the charges against the
Accused.116 This was said to be because the 22 May Agreement117 made Article 51 of Additional
113 The Prosecution refers to it as “the offence of terror”: see, for example, Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 25.
114 In the elebii case, acts of intimidation creating an “atmosphere of terror” in prison camps were punished as grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions (torture or inhuman treatment) and as violations of Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions (torture or cruel treatment): elebii Trial Judgement, paras 976, 1056, 1086-91, and 1119. In the
Blaški case “the atmosphere of terror reigning in the detention facilities” was part of the factual basis leading to the
Accused in that case being convicted for the crimes of inhuman treatment (a grave breach) and cruel treatment (a
violation of the laws or customs of law): Blaški Trial Judgement, paras 695, 700, and 732-3. Blaški’s additional
conviction for “unlawful attack” on civilians was based in part upon the finding that his soldiers “terrorised the civilians
by intensive shelling, murders and sheer violence” (id., para. 630; also paras 505, 511). And in the Krsti case, General
Krsti} was accused of persecutions, a crime against humanity, on the basis of his alleged participation in “the terrorising
of Bosnian Muslim civilians”: Krsti Trial Judgement, para. 533. The Trial Chamber found that a “terror campaign”
was in existence: “Numerous witnesses gave evidence that, during Operation Krivaja 95, the VRS shelled the
Srebrenica enclave intensively with the apparent intent to terrify the populace” (id., para. 122). Moreover: “On 12 and
13 July 1995, upon the arrival of Serb forces in Potocari, the Bosnian Muslim refugees taking shelter in and around the
compound were subjected to a terror campaign comprised of threats, insults, looting and burning of nearby houses,
beatings, rapes, and murders” (id., para. 150). The Trial Chamber in Krsti characterized “the crimes of terror”, and the
forcible transfer of the women, children, and elderly at Potocari as constituting persecution and inhumane acts (id., para.
607; see also paras 1, 41, 44, 46, 147, 153, 292, 364, 517, 527, 537, 653, 668, 671, 677). See also Marti Rule 61
Decision, paras 23-31 (use of rocket was not designed to strike a military target but to terrorize the civilian population
of Zagreb contrary to the rules of international law); and Nikoli Sentencing Judgement, para. 38.
115 The Special Court for Sierra Leone has issued several indictments containing counts of “acts of terrorism”
(“terrorizing the civilian population”) brought pursuant to Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and to
Additional Protocol II; see <http://www.sc-sl.org>.
116 Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 132.
117 P58.
Protocol I applicable to the conflict irrespective of its character.118 Thus the Prosecution did not
concentrate in this case on proving the character of the conflict.
68. The Trial Chamber has found that Article 51 was indeed part of the law regulating the
conduct of the parties and that it was brought into operation at least by the 22 May Agreement.
Since the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I can be extended by agreement to any
given conflict, and since the 22 May Agreement was not conditioned upon the Sarajevo conflict
having, or assuming, a certain character (international or non-international), the Prosecution’s
position, as set out above, is correct.
69. The Prosecution further maintained that the prohibition against terrorizing the civilian
population amounts to a rule of customary international law applicable to all armed conflicts. In
support of this the Prosecution cited certain rules on aerial warfare prepared in the 1920s but not
finalized, two UN resolutions from 1994 condemning atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, and the
Spanish penal code from 1995.119 As will be made clear in later discussion, the Majority does not
take a position in respect of this question.
70. The Prosecution submitted that the following elements constitute the crime of terror:
1. Unlawful acts or threats of violence.
2. Which caused terror to spread among the civilian population.
3. The acts or threats of violence were carried out with the primary purpose of spreading
terror among the civilian population.
In addition, according to the Prosecution’s proposal, there must be a nexus between the acts or
threats of violence and the armed conflict, and the Accused must bear responsibility for the acts or
threats under Article 7 of the Statute.120
71. The Prosecution submitted that the first element in the list above, which is part of the actus
reus of the offence, is “broad”, because it encompasses both acts and threats of violence.121 The
Prosecution sees the acts of violence in the present case as consisting of systematic shelling and
sniping of civilians. The Prosecution’s case is thus limited to these acts. As for “threats”, the alleged
shelling and sniping of civilians created, according to the Prosecution, a constant threat that more
118 Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 136.
119 Id., para. 141. The Prosecution Final Trial Brief (para. 8, fn. 5) simply referred back to the submissions in the Pretrial
Brief.
120 Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 142. These elements were repeated without change in the Prosecution Final Trial
Brief (para. 8).
121 Prosecution Pre-trial Brief, para. 144.
such acts would be perpetrated at any moment.122 The “threats” in the present case are said to be of
a kind implicit in the acts of violence. The Trial Chamber is thus not called upon to determine
liability for threats that are not implicit, in the Prosecution’s sense.
72. The “special intent requirement” (element 3) is, according to the Prosecution, the
distinguishing feature of the crime of terror.123 The Prosecution has interpreted “primary purpose”
as requiring that “the infliction of terror upon the civilian population was the predominant purpose
served by the acts or threats of violence. It need not be established that the broader campaign in the
Sarajevo theatre had this as its sole or only objective.”124 Where the special intent, or mens rea,
cannot be proven directly, it may be “inferred from the nature, manner, timing, frequency and
duration of the shelling and sniping of civilians.”125
73. “As an element of the offence of terror ... it must ... be established that terror was in fact
caused”.126 In addition to proof of actual infliction of terror, the Prosecution requires a causal
connection between the first and second elements (“2. Which caused...”). That is, there must have
been not only unlawful acts and actual terror experienced by the population, but also a causal link
between the acts and the terror. “The offence of unlawfully inflicting terror ... is distinguished
also by its effect, which in the present case was the profound psychological impact on the
population”.127 The Prosecution does not cite any authority for these submissions.
74. “Population”, according to the Prosecution, does not just mean any number of Sarajevo
civilians: “the unlawful shelling and sniping campaigns had the result that much of the civilian
population lived in a state of terror”.128 The implication that “population” is to be understood to
mean the majority of the population, or at least a large segment of it, is found also in the following:
“The requirement that terror be spread among the civilian population is satisfied even if certain
civilians, or sectors of the population, were not so affected.”129
75. In its preliminary submissions the Prosecution did not provide a legal definition of “terror”
(i.e. of the emotional effect which figures in the purported second element of the offence), except to
refer in a footnote to a dictionary definition of the word as “extreme fear”.130 In the course of trial,
122 Id., para. 144.
123 Id., paras 143, 148.
124 Id., para. 149.
125 Id., para. 150.
126 Id., para. 25 (emphasis added).
127 Id., paras 142-3 (emphasis added).
128 Id., para. 145 (emphasis added).
129 Id., para. 147.
130 Id., footnote 109.
when the Prosecution’s expert on terror (a psychologist) was heard, terror was again rendered as
extreme fear. The Prosecution later explicitly adopted its expert’s definition.131
76. The Prosecution’s legal theory concerning the crime of terror was not elaborated or
modified in later submissions.132 Except for the Additional Protocols, the Prosecution did not cite
an authority for the three elements which, in its view, define the offence. The Majority makes the
preliminary observation that the language of the prohibition common to the Additional Protocols,
that “Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population are prohibited”,133 does not on its face support the Prosecution’s second element, that the
acts or threats of violence must have caused terror to spread among the civilian population.
(ii) Defence
77. The Defence in its preliminary submissions termed the Prosecution’s stand on the applicable
law “unacceptable”, but did not dismiss outright the availability of the charge. It acknowledged that
Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which prohibits (in the Defence’s words) “illegal terror inflicted
on civilians”, was binding upon the parties to the conflict.134
78. The Defence stated that the intent to inflict terror must be demonstrable: “If the Prosecution
is charging General Gali with having conducted a long-lasting shelling and sniping campaign
designed to terrorize the civilian population ... it must be established that there existed the intent
to inflict terror on the civilian population by shelling and sniping.”135 Lastly, the Defence did not
take issue with the actus reus element “of the criminal act of inflicting terror, as the Prosecution has
qualified it”, namely acts of violence causing civilian casualties.136
79. Thus, from the beginning of the case, the Defence joined the Prosecution in understanding
that the scope of the actus reus of terror would be limited to the acts underlying Counts 4 and 7 of
the Indictment (killing or severe injury of civilians through unlawful attacks), and that “threats”
would not be a significant factor. The Defence’s only comment on threats was on a theoretical
plane, when it stated that for threats of violence to come within the offence of terror they had to be
131 Response to Acquittal Motion, para. 16.
132 As mentioned above, para. 8 of the Prosecution Final Trial Brief simply reverts to the submissions in the Pre-trial
Brief.
133 Art. 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and Art. 13(2) of Additional Protocol II.
134 Defence Pre-trial Brief, paras 8.11, 8.23, 8.24.
135 Id., para. 8.20.
136 Id., para. 8.20.
specifically directed against the civilian population. “The threat must be serious. It must be real.
And it must be capable to cause terror or spread terror among the civilian population.”137
80. The Defence’s concern about Count 1 appears to have been limited to the question of
multiplication of offences referenced to one and the same set of acts.138 (This is taken up by the
Trial Chamber in its discussion of the law of cumulative convictions.) The implication is that the
Defence did not contest the existence of a crime of terror.
81. The Defence’s final written submissions on Count 1 repeat the submissions in its Pre-trial
Brief.139 However, in another part of its Final Brief, the Defence notes the Prosecution’s position
that “the civilian population was the subject of illegal attacks and terror etc.”,140 and then states:
In order to accept the above mentioned, unfounded Prosecution’s conclusions, the
Defence’s viewpoint is that the Prosecution must prove the following:
a) The exact military actions that were conducted against the illegal targets and by which
means (i.e. shelling or sniping), including the exact time and place,
b) That, as part of these illegal actions, there was intention of targeting the civilians with
the aim to terrorize,
c) That the intention to kill the civilians existed,
d) That the intention to inflict injuries, other than killings existed.141
The difference between this list (which may or may not have been intended by the Defence as an
alternative definition of the offence) and the Prosecution’s definition of the elements of the crime of
terror is that the Defence does not seem to require proof that the civilian population did, in fact,
experience terror (the second element in the Prosecution’s list), but does require proof of the
perpetrator’s intent to kill or injure civilians.
82. In yet another part of the Final Brief, however, the Defence does demand proof of actual
infliction of terror, as well as a causal link between actual terror and unlawful violent acts:
The prosecutor should have proven several things:
1. that there was terror
2. that this terror was not simply the result of war in an urban theatre, led in a legitimate
way
137 Defence Closing Arguments, T. 21807.
138 Defence Pre-trial Brief, paras 8.21-8.24.
139 See Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 1097-104.
140 Id., para. 445.
141 Id., para. 446.
3. that this terror was the result of illegitimate acts
4. performed by troops commanded by the Accused
5. following his orders
6. (alternatively) that the Accused was aware of the facts and (if he had not given the
orders himself) that he had not punished them
7. finally that the result was hoped for as such within the scope of a global plan.142
If this was meant as a definition of the crime of terror, the Defence did not cite any authority for it.
83. On the experiential aspect of terror, the Defence said: “It is underestimating the meaning of
‘terror’ to say that if an individual (or individuals) feels ‘extreme fear’ he feels terror.”143 Later, in
its oral submissions at the trial’s end, the Defence asserted: “Inflicting of terror as an element of a
criminal offence ... cannot be causing of any kind of terror or causing terror of any intensity ... It
has to be of the highest intensity. It has to be long term. It has to be direct. And it has to be capable
of causing long-term consequences.”144
84. As noted in the preceding section, by the end of the trial the Defence seemed to have
changed its position on the applicability of Additional Protocol I. In its Final Brief it wrote that the
conflict had “the character of civil war ... it is quite clear that regulations of Additional Protocol II
have to be applied”.145 It submitted that Additional Protocol I is limited in its applicability to
international conflicts by operation of Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions.146 Moreover,
in oral submissions on the last day of trial, the Defence expressed “some doubt” as to the status of
the 22 May Agreement.147
85. The Trial Chamber has already found that the 22 May Agreement was in effect during the
relevant period, which confirms that the parts of Additional Protocol I referred to therein were
operative during that period.148 Thus the Defence’s final position on the applicability of Additional
Protocol I is of no consequence to the discussion of the crime of terror.149 The Majority notes that,
142 Id., para. 888.
143 Id., para. 584.
144 Defence Closing Arguments, T. 21810.
145 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 977.
146 Id., paras 971-2.
147 T. 21966-73.
148 See supra, paras 23-4.
149 It should be noted, however, that the Defence’s submissions on the constraining effect of Article 2 common
(“Common Article 2”) to the Geneva Conventions on the applicability of Additional Protocol I are not accurate. While
it is true that the scope of that Protocol’s application is given in Article 1 of the protocol as corresponding to the
situations referred to in Common Article 2 – namely “to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties”, as well as “to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party” – clearly this does not have the effect of limiting the application of the
Conventions and the Protocol to the cases mentioned above. Thus a unilateral declaration pursuant to Article 96 of
in any case, the Defence unequivocally accepted the applicability of Additional Protocol II, which
contains the same prohibition against terror as the first Protocol.
(c) Discussion
86. While the Parties have not raised the question of jurisdiction ratione materiae, the Majority
will consider it ex officio, for it is fundamental to the exercise of competence.
87. The Majority must decide whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the crime of terror
against the civilian population, but only to the extent relevant to the charge in this case. That is to
say, the Majority is not required to decide whether an offence of terror in a general sense falls
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, but only whether a specific offence of killing and wounding
civilians in time of armed conflict with the intention to inflict terror on the civilian population, as
alleged in the Indictment, is an offence over which it has jurisdiction.150 While the Tribunal may
have jurisdiction over other conceivable varieties of the crime of terror, it will be for Trial
Chambers faced with charges correspondingly different from Count 1 of the present Indictment to
decide that question.
Additional Protocol I by the representative authority of a people “fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination” may be enough to bring into
force the Conventions and the Protocol, even though the authority is not a state power. More pertinently, Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions enables parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force all or part
of the Conventions and, by extension, all or part of Additional Protocol I supplementing the Conventions.
150 The Majority is aware that several international instruments exist outlawing “terrorism” in various forms. The
Majority necessarily limits itself to the legal regime that has been developed with reference to conventional armed
conflict between States, or between governmental authorities and organized armed groups, or between such groups
within a State. In other words, the Majority proceeds on the understanding that the present case will have a basis, if at
all, in the legal regime of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols and not in international efforts directed
against “political” varieties of terrorism. The Majority would also note that “terrorism” has never been singly defined
under international law. The first international attempt at codification of “terrorism” was the 1937 League of Nations
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 19 LNOJ 23 (1938), which however did not receive
sufficient ratifications and was not pursued. Since that time the international community has followed a thematic
approach to the characterization of international terrorism, with subject-specific conventions such as the 1963 Tokyo
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 2 ILM 1042 (1963); the 1970 Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 860 UNTS 105; the 1971 Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 974 UNTS 177; the 1973 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 13 ILM
41 (1974); the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 18 ILM 1460 (1979); 1997 International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 37 ILM 249 (1998); 1999 International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 39 ILM 270 (2000); and Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism (in process of negotiation), UN Doc. A/C6/53/L4, Annex I (1998). This incomplete list of relevant global
instruments also does not include regional anti-terrorism agreements. Related resolutions of the UN General Assembly
include the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60, and the 1995
Measures to Eliminate Terrorism, UN Doc. A/RES/50/53 (“that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state
of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other
nature that may be invoked to justify them”). The prohibition of terror against the civilian population in times of war,
which (as discussed below) is given expression in Geneva Convention IV and the Additional Protocols, is another
example of the thematic, subject-specific, approach to “terrorism”.
88. The Majority wishes to emphasize that nothing said below should be taken to limit the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal in other cases.151
89. As noted in the preceding section, in the Tadi decision on jurisdiction the Appeals
Chamber said that four conditions (“the Tadi conditions”) must be met for an offence to be subject
to prosecution under Article 3 of the Statute (violations of the laws or customs of law): (i) the
violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law; (ii) the rule
must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required conditions must be met; (iii)
the violation must be serious, that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important
values and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim; and (iv) the violation must
entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person
breaching the rule.152
90. The discussion below begins with preliminary remarks on the Majority’s approach to treaty
interpretation and the paramount importance of the nullum crimen sine lege principle. The Majority
will then consider each of the Tadi conditions. The elements of the crime of terror are developed
as part of the discussion of the fourth Tadi condition.
(i) Preliminary remarks
91. The Majority will instruct itself on two related matters of principle. In its interpretation of
provisions of the Additional Protocols and of other treaties referred to below, the Majority will
apply Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, namely that “A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”153 No word in a treaty will
be presumed to be superfluous or to lack meaning or purpose.
92. The Majority also acknowledges the importance of the principle found in Article 15 of the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states, in relevant part: “No one
shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was
committed. … Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for
151 As will be seen, one of the Majority’s conclusions is that proof of actual infliction of terror is not a legal element of
the crime under any interpretation of Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I. This finding does not, of course, amount to
a narrowing of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction; on the contrary, the Majority’s rejection of this supposed element proposed
by the Prosecution leads to a broader definition of the offence.
152 Tadi} Jurisdiction Decision, para. 94.
153 Reprinted in 8 ILM 679 (1969).
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the
general principles of law recognised by the community of nations.”154
93. The principle (known as nullum crimen sine lege) is meant to prevent the prosecution and
punishment of a person for acts which were reasonably, and with knowledge of the laws in force,
believed by that person not to be criminal at the time of their commission. In practice this means
“that penal statutes must be strictly construed” and that the “paramount duty of the judicial
interpreter is to read into the language of the legislature, honestly and faithfully, its plain and
rational meaning and to promote its object.”155 Moreover:
The effect of strict construction of the provisions of a criminal statute is that where an
equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable doubt of its meaning which
the canons of construction fail to solve, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the
subject and against the legislature which has failed to explain itself.156
(ii) First and Second Tadi Conditions
94. The Indictment is not explicit as to which part of Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, or
which part of Article 13 of Additional Protocol II, Count 1 is referenced to. Article 51 is an
extensive provision in Part IV of the Protocol concerned with the protection of the civilian
population. Yet it is clear from the submissions in this case that the intended reference of Count 1 is
to sub-paragraph 2 of Article 51, which states:
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of
attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among
the civilian population are prohibited.
The second sentence of this excerpt will henceforth be referred to as the “second part” of the second
paragraph of Article 51, or simply as the “second part of 51(2)”.
95. The quoted passage is identical to sub-paragraph 2 of Article 13 of Additional Protocol II.
Since the Trial Chamber has found that certain parts of Additional Protocol I, including Article 51
thereof, applied to the armed conflict in Sarajevo during the relevant time, the Majority takes
Additional Protocol I to be the basis of Count 1. It is not necessary to decide whether Additional
Protocol II was also applicable to the conflict. Moreover, the Majority is not called upon to decide
whether Additional Protocol I came at any time into effect in the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina
154 999 UNTS 171.
155 elebii Trial Judgement, para. 408.
156 Id., para. 413. On the principle of legality see also Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 126-7 (“the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege ... does not prevent a court, either at the national or international level, from determining an
issue through a process of interpretation and clarification as to the elements of a particular crime”); and Vasiljevi Trial
Judgement, para. 193 (“the Trial Chamber must further satisfy itself that the criminal conduct in question was
through fulfilment of the Protocol’s inherent conditions of application (Article 1 of the Protocol).
The implementing instrument, on the evidence in this case, was the 22 May Agreement (as
discussed in the preceding section).
96. Thus the first two Tadi conditions are met: Count 1 bases itself on an actual rule of
international humanitarian law, namely the rule represented by the second part of the second
paragraph of Article 51 of Additional Protocol I. As for the rule’s applicability in the period
covered by the Indictment, the rule had been brought into effect at least by the 22 May Agreement,
which not only incorporated the second part of 51(2) by reference,157 but repeated the very
prohibition “Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
civilian population are prohibited” in the agreement proper.158
97. The Majority emphasizes that it is not required to pronounce on whether the rule in question
is also customary in nature. As stated above, it belongs to “treaty law”. This is enough to fulfil the
second Tadi condition as articulated by the Appeals Chamber. Nevertheless, the Majority will
proceed with additional caution here to avoid any possible misunderstanding of its position on this
important question.
98. The Appeals Chamber has said “that the International Tribunal is authorised to apply, in
addition to customary international law, any treaty which: (i) was unquestionably binding on the
parties at the time of the alleged offence; and (ii) was not in conflict with or derogating from
peremptory norms of international law, as are most customary rules of international humanitarian
law.”159 In relation to the first point, the Majority understands that it stems from the unqualified
imperative of respect for the nullum crimen sine lege principle. The fact that the 22 May Agreement
was binding on the parties to the conflict, and that certain provisions of Additional Protocol I had
thereby undoubtedly been brought into effect, means that in this general sense there is no affront to
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege by the Majority’s determination. In relation to the Appeals
Chamber’s second point, this raises the question of whether the second part of 51(2) in any way
conflicts with, or derogates from, peremptory norms of international law. In the Majority’s view, it
does not. What the second paragraph of Article 51, read as a whole, intends to say is that the
sufficiently defined and was sufficiently accessible at the relevant time for it to warrant a criminal conviction and
sentencing under the criminal heading chosen by the Prosecution”).
157 See P58 (22 May Agreement), para. 2.5.
158 Id., para. 2.3.
159 Tadi Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 143. This was also the view of Security Council members. Speaking at a
meeting of the Council on 25 May 1993, at which the Tribunal’s Statute was adopted, France’s representative
commented that “the expression ‘laws or customs of war’ used in Article 3 of the Statute covers specifically, in the
opinion of France, all the obligations that flow from the humanitarian law agreements in force on the territory of the
former Yugoslavia at the time when the offences were committed” (UN Doc. S/PV.3217, p. 11). The representatives of
the United States and the United Kingdom expressed the same view (id., pp 15 and 19, respectively).
prohibition against terror is a specific prohibition within the general prohibition of attack on
civilians.160 The general prohibition is a peremptory norm of customary international law.161 It
could be said that the specific prohibition also shares this peremptory character, for it protects the
same value. However, to reiterate, the Majority is not required to decide this question. What is clear
is that, by exemplifying and therefore according with the general norm, the rule against terror
neither conflicts with nor derogates from peremptory norms of international law.
99. The following considerations are also relevant. The Additional Protocols were debated and
finalized at the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference under the auspices of the ICRC. A summary
record of the proceedings has been preserved.162 The ICRC’s delegate to the committee to which
Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I was assigned in draft form163 said that the rule “merely
reaffirmed existing international law”, without making a distinction between the provision’s first
and second parts.164 This was the consistent attitude at the Conference. States’ concerns were for the
most part limited to whether the object of the prohibition against terror should be the actor’s intent
or the capacity of the methods employed to spread violence.165 Several States simply put on record
their approval of the draft provision without proposing changes.
100. To illustrate the insignificant level of controversy, the Majority mentions the committee’s
summary of its first-session discussions of what was to become Article 51(2): “Some delegations
had proposed an interpretation of ‘methods intended to spread terror’ going beyond the attacks
referred to in the first sentence of the paragraph. Specific reference was made in this connexion to
propaganda. The language of ‘intended to’166 also gave rise to some controversy. Some delegations
suggested that the substantive element of intent would be too difficult to determine and that
methods that in fact spread terror should be prohibited. Other delegations emphasized the problem
of imposing responsibility for acts that might cause terror without terror having been intended.”167
160 See ICRC Commentary, para. 4785: “Attacks aimed at terrorizing are just one type of attack, but they are
particularly reprehensible. Attempts have been made for a long time to prohibit such attacks, for they are frequent and
inflict particularly cruel suffering upon the civilian population.” (Emphasis added.) While the second part of 51(2) uses
the expression “acts or threats of violence”, and not “attacks”, the concept of “attack” is defined in Article 49 of
Additional Protocol I as “acts of violence”.
161 See the discussion in the preceding section on the crime of attack on civilians. See as well ICRC Commentary, para.
1923. The Trial Chamber also notes that in a 1995 decision on the applicability of Additional Protocol II to the conflict
in Colombia, the Constitutional Court of Colombia accepted the customary-law status of Article 13 of the Protocol,
including the prohibition against terror: Ruling No. C-225/95, excerpted in translation in M. Sassòli and A. A. Bouvier
(eds.), How Does Law Protect in War? (Geneva: ICRC, 1999), p. 1366 (para. 30) (henceforth “Sassòli & Bouvier”).
162 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 17 vols. (Geneva: ICRC, 1974-77) (henceforth “Records”).
163 The draft provision was then numbered 46.
164 Records, vol. XIV, p. 36.
165 Id., vol. XIV, pp 48-75.
166 The original formulation of the second part was: “In particular, methods intended to spread terror among the civilian
population are prohibited.”
167 Records, vol. XV, p. 241.
101. In the report on its second session, the committee stated: “The prohibition of ‘acts or threats
of violence which have the primary object of spreading terror’ is directed to intentional conduct
specifically directed toward the spreading of terror and excludes terror which was not intended by a
belligerent and terror that is merely an incidental effect of acts of warfare which have another
primary object and are in all other respects lawful.”168 What little disagreement there was about the
draft provision was thus put to rest.169
102. Article 51 of Additional Protocol I was adopted by the plenary of the Diplomatic
Conference on 26 May 1977 with 77 in favour, one against, and 16 abstentions.170 France, the only
state voting against, explained that it objected, for various reasons, to the provisions of paragraphs
4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article 51 (but not of paragraph 2).171 The concerns of the abstaining States were
also confined to paragraphs 4, 5, 7, and 8.172
103. Explicit reference to the terror clause is found twice in the States’ explanations of their votes
on Article 51. In both cases the endorsement of the prohibition is strong and unqualified. The
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic noted the “criminal” character of conduct which the
prohibition aimed to counteract:
Also very important from the standpoint of increasing the protection afforded to the
civilian population is the provision in Article 51 concerning the prohibition of the use of
force or threat of the use of force for the purpose of intimidating the civilian population.
Intimidating peaceful citizens and spreading terror among the civilian population is well
known to be one of the infamous methods widely resorted to by aggressors seeking to
attain their criminal ends at whatever price.173
104. The plenary adopted Additional Protocol I in whole by consensus on 8 June 1977.174
Following this, many States provided further explanations of their positions, but there was no
further reference to the terror clause of Article 51(2).175 There were no treaty reservations of any
relevance to this provision. A perusal of the travaux préparatoires of the Diplomatic Conference
thus satisfies the Majority that all participating States condemned the strategy of terrorizing
civilians as, in Byelorussia’s words, an “infamous method” of warfare.176
168 Id., vol. XV, p. 274.
169 Id., vol. XV, pp 328-31.
170 Id., vol. VI, p. 163.
171 Id., vol. VI, pp 161-2; see also vol. VII, p. 193.
172 Id., vol. VI, pp 164-8, 187-8 (FRG).
173 Id., vol. VI, p. 177. See also the comments of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, id., vol. VI, p. 201.
174 Id., vol. VII, pp 194 and 205, respectively.
175 Id., vol. VII, pp 191-251.
176 By 1992, when there were around 191 countries in the world, 118 States had ratified Additional Protocol I and five
had signed the treaty without ratifying it. The State of Bosnia-Herzegovina succeeded to the Protocol on 31 December
1992. This information is available at the ICRC’s web site: <http://www.icrc.org>.
testified to seeing three injured people on his way to the clinic, and more at the clinic, but he did not
witness where they were or what they were doing prior to the explosion.
408. The allegation as to the second and third shell explosions has been made out. The most
likely sequence is that the first of these struck the north-western edge of the playground bounded by
buildings to the east of Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. The playground at the time was being used as
a trading ground for essential civilian goods. The evidence establishes that the people gathered there
ran for cover after hearing the explosion in Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. Several minutes later,
after they had emerged to retrieve their goods, the second shell (which was the first shell to strike
the playground) exploded. This was the shell that caused most of the casualties. After a short while
another shell exploded at the foot of an apartment block to the south of the playground. The Trial
Chamber accepts the forensic evidence that the latter two shells were 120 mm calibre and flew in
from the east and from east-northeast, respectively. Each of these shells left impact marks on the
ground that were longer to the east of the crater and strongly elliptical, indicating that the angle of
descent in each case was not steep. The Trial Chamber thus rejects the claim of the Vilii Shelling
Report that one of these shells could have been fired from a distance of only 300 metres, which
would have resulted in a near-vertical angle of descent and near-circular impact traces.
409. A 120 mm mortar fired at the first increment charge at an angle close to 45 degrees has a
range of 1,574 metres, according to the Vilii Report.1442 It is not known in this case what level of
charge was used. Since the Trial Chamber has determined that the confrontation line east of the site
of the incident was no more than 600 metres away, whatever the charge used the projectile would
have been carried, at a gentle elevation angle, a distance greater than 600 metres. Therefore the
Indictment’s allegation that the origin of fire was SRK-held territory has been made out in relation
to the two shells that were investigated in detail.1443 It can reasonably be assumed that the first shell
to strike formed part of the same attack and therefore also originated in SRK territory. This
conclusion is not affected by any reasonable margin of error applied to the investigators’ estimation
of the direction of fire. The Trial Chamber finds that the three shells struck civilians engaged in
peaceful activities. No military personnel were seen in the vicinity at the time of the attack. The
Trial Chamber rejects the suggestion that the office of the Territorial Defence mentioned by
Sabahudin Ljusa and Eldar Hafizovi was the target of the attack. The sequence of shell explosions
tended away from its supposed location, not closer to it, and there is no evidence that the office was
damaged in the attack. There is no reasonable explanation of why both the second and third shells
would land significantly short of the first shell if the first shell was directed at the Territorial
1442 Vilii Shelling Report, Table 2, p. 5.
1443 See P3727 which indicates a range of possible firing positions bounded by dotted lines converging from the west on
Alipašino Polje.
Defence office. The Trial Chamber does not see any merit in the other Defence submissions, which,
as noted above, are of a general nature.
410. The Trial Chamber thus finds that the fourth scheduled shelling incident constituted an
attack that was, at the very least, indiscriminate as to its target (which nevertheless was primarily if
not entirely a residential neighbourghood), and was carried out recklessly, resulting in civilian
casualties.
(e) Sarajevo Airport
411. The Trial Chamber considers the situation at the airport to be complex. The SRK had given
up the airport to the UN for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and related purposes.
UNPROFOR was therefore to control the use of the airport. UNPROFOR used it also to
communicate with the rest of the world1444 and as a meeting point for brokering negotiations among
the belligerents.1445 SRK troops were positioned on both sides of the airport runway, especially on
the south-east.1446
412. Notwithstanding the airport agreement, the BiH authorities permitted some people to cross
the runway, and even issued permits to allow civilians through it.1447 In some periods, between 80
and 300 people each night crossed the runway.1448 ABiH troops dressed as civilians used to cross
the runway with military supplies for the city.1449 In fact, the Presidency seemed to allow the use of
the airport, inter alia, for military purposes.1450
413. The SRK, therefore, repeatedly complained that, during the night, the airport area was used
by people to leave Sarajevo and by the ABiH to allow military personnel and supplies into the
city.1451 On 3 April 1993, following these protests, an official order was issued by the commander
of the SRK 4th Light Artillery Regiment to prevent by use of force any movement across the
airport.1452 UNPROFOR battalions entrusted with the implementation of the airport agreement used
1444 In|i}, T. 18595; 18661-2; Tucker, T. 9931; Witness W, T. 9538; Mole, T. 11040-42.
1445 Kupusovi}, T. 674; Witness W, T. 9646 (closed session).
1446 DP35, T. 17600; Karaveli}, T. 11878. The SRK also held some areas around the airport itself, such as Neari}i and
the Airport Settlement, Witness DP4, T. 14147; Abdel-Razek, T. 11654-5; Carswell, T. 8359; Witness Y, T. 10872-3.
1447 Witness Y, T. 10869-70.
1448 Cutler, T. 8939.
1449 Witness Y, T. 10870. In many cases, soldiers intercepted while crossing the runway and found to be armed would
have their weapons confiscated by UNPROFOR, Witness W, T. 9700.
1450 Witness Y, T. 10870; 10972.
1451 Tucker, T. 9931; Briquemont, T. 10052-4; Thomas, T. 9308; Pashchenko, T. 17363. According to witness W, a
military in charge of the forces at the airport, crossing became a major problem in November 1992, T. 9696-9700.
1452 D1491 (Order issued by the commander of the 4th Light Artillery Regiment. Before shooting, however, the order
apparently required SRK soldiers to file an oral protest to UNPROFOR about the presence of unauthorized people in
the airport), Witness DP35, T. 17595-17606. The witness, relying on the assumption that no night-vision device was
available to SRK troops around the airport, admitted that the order was to shoot indiscriminately at any type of detected
movement.
to patrol the airport at night to stop such crossing:1453 weapons found were seized and destroyed.1454
However, the patrolling was not very effective; people were still able to cross, and, at the
beginning, some people were able to bring weapons into the city due to mistakes by UNPROFOR
or tricks devised by the ABiH.1455
414. Regardless of the patrolling by UNPROFOR, General Abdel-Razek, UNPROFOR
Commander of Sector Sarajevo from August 1992 to February 1993, stated that “every day we
received reports, telling us that a lady was killed with her child while she was trying to cross.”1456 In
particular, between November 1992 and March 1993,1457 many civilians were killed or injured each
night on the airport’s runway.1458 UN personnel were also victims of fire.1459 On some occasions, at
least up to January 1994,1460 the airport was also shelled, both from SRK- and from ABiHcontrolled
territory.1461
415. The Trial Chamber is convinced by the evidence that SRK soldiers shot without knowing
whether the movements they saw on the runway were caused by civilians or by soldiers dressed as
civilians.1462 UN officials protested to the SRK command against such indiscriminate fire.1463
416. The Trial Chamber finds that the SRK was well aware that civilians crossed the runway.
The Accused stated that he intended to stop such movement “by all means”; that statement implies
that he agreed that attacks would be carried out indiscriminately, thus also against civilians.
However, the Prosecution has not presented decisive evidence to identify shooting locations around
1453 Carswell, T. 8360.
1454 Witness W, T. 9715.
1455 Witness W, 9700-6.
1456 Abdel-Razek, T. 11594-6.
1457 Witness W, T. 9699; Witness Y, T. 10869; Abdel-Razek, T. 11596-7 (referring to the end of his period in Sarajevo).
This was highlighted by many witnesses as the period with more attempts to flee Sarajevo, especially through the
airport, due to the cold and the lack of food that greatly affected the morale of the civilian population in the city,
Tucker, T. 9931.
1458 UNPROFOR personnel seized the documents from the bodies and ascertained that both civilians and soldiers tried
to cross the airstrip, Witness Y, T. 10870. See also Witness W, T. 9584 (closed session; tape of previous interview).
The vast majority of the people trying to cross the airstrip, however, were civilians, Karaveli}, T. 11877 (99% were
civilians).
1459 Briquemont, T. 10052-4; Tucker, T. 9932; Abdel-Razek, T. 11595.
1460 Thomas, T. 9308-9, referring to P2064, UNPROFOR SitRep situation report covering 4 and 5 January 1994.
1461 Briquemont, T. 10095-7 and P2082, protest letter from Briquemont to Karadzi} (regarding a shelling on 5 January
1993); Witness W, T. 9556-7 (“not much firing of Serb origin on the airport”, while more on the Bosnian areas in the
vicinity of the airport); Cutler, T. 8937, 9008, stating that on one occasion in February 1993 it was concluded that
rounds probably came from an ABiH mortar position. According to DP35, the tower of the airport was hit by ABiH fire
from Igman, DP35, T. 17504.
1462 DP35, T. 17606; Witness Y, T. 10872-5; Abdel-Razek, T. 11594-6; Bukva, T. 18467-73. Also, DP35, in response to
a question on how the SRK would have distinguished civilians from soldiers on the runway, stated that he did not know,
and that it would have been the responsibility of the local brigade commander to tell his subordinates how to make the
distinction, DP35, T. 17602. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that SRK troops surrounding the airport did have at
their disposal night-vision devices, Carswell, T. 8362-4. According to Tucker, too, the firing against civilians at night
happened through “night-sights”, Tucker, T. 9932. No evidence was however led at trial on their number, quality and
availability.
1463 Abdel-Razek, T. 11596. See also T. 11600-1, 11644.
the airport, to address the issue of visibility of people crossing the runway at night, to show the
possible impact of night-vision devices on the ability of the SRK to target specific objects on the
runway, or to ascertain the presence or intensity of nearby combat activity.1464 The Trial Chamber is
aware that, when there is doubt whether a person is a civilian or a military, that person is not a
legitimate military target. Due to the considerations above, however, the Trial Chamber is not able
to point to any specific death or injury as representative of the campaign charged in the Indictment.
It nevertheless finds the episodes of indiscriminate firing against people crossing the runway
relevant to establishing that indiscriminate fire against civilians by SRK forces was an accepted and
known fact.
(f) Briješko Brdo Area
417. Witnesses testified that, throughout the armed conflict, the residential area around Briješko
brdo Street, presently named Bulbulistan Street and which belongs to the local commune of
Marinka Bradovica, Novi Grad municipality,1465 was continuously attacked by shooting and
shelling from the SRK side,1466 although it was far from the confrontation lines.1467 Houses in that
neighbourhood, situated on a hill named Briješko brdo and controlled by the ABiH during the
conflict,1468 were badly damaged by frequent shelling and shooting.1469
418. Rasema Menzilovi, a resident of that area, testified that she lived in the basement of her
house for a long time in order to protect herself from SRK shooting and shelling attacks.1470 She
would get up at night to do chores - such as drawing water, tilling land, repairing the roof damaged
by shelling – because she feared being targeted during the day.1471 She also explained that the
fetching of water was dangerous. Residents of the neighbourhood around Briješko brdo Street, left
without running water,1472 fetched water from a well at a spring located about 50 metres from the
1464 Witness W, T. 9594-9595.
1465 Kundo, T. 5969.
1466 Kova}, T. 956-57; Ramiza Kundo, T. 5938; Menzilovi, T. 7006, 7009-12, 7023; P3673, Witness Statement of
Ramiza Kundo, p. 3.
1467 Ramiza Kundo, T. 5938; Menzilovi, T. 6982, 7010.
1468 Kova}, T. 924, 971; Hamill, T. 6182. The area of Briješko brdo was under the control of 2nd Vitez (or Viteska)
Brigade of the 1st Corps of the ABiH; Kova}, T. 947. On the other side of the confrontation line, the Brije{}e Company
(also called the 1st Company) of the Rajlovac Brigade of the SRK was positioned around the field area; Kova}, T. 957;
Sinisa Krsman, T. 19033, 19047.
1469 Menzilovi, T. 6998, T. 7006, T. 7010-11. Ramiza Kundo stated that her house was quite badly damaged by
shelling and there were shots coming through the wall at all hours; P3673, Witness Statement of Ramiza Kundo, pp. 2-
3.
1470 Menzilovi, T. 7006.
1471 Menzilovi, T. 6982, 6999, 7011-12, 7041.
1472 Ramiza Kundo, T. 5938-39; Menzilovi, T. 6981.
Volume XIII - Annexes 455-464