Volume X - Annexes 294-373 | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

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166-20230310-WRI-01-10-EN

Parent Document Number

166-20230310-WRI-01-00-EN

Case

166 - Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. R

Date of the Document

Fri, 03/10/2023 - 12:00

Document File

166-20230310-WRI-01-10-EN.pdf

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation)
REJOINDER
Submitted by the Russian Federation
Volume X
(Annexes 294 - 373)
10 March 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME X Annexes 294-373 Annex 294 National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies. Alexander Sych. Thesis “Modern Ukrainian nationalism: political science aspects of paradigm transformation”. Annex 295 A. Sych. The Influence of the National Liberation Struggle of the OUN-UPA on the Militarization of the Modern Ukrainian Nationalist Movement. Annex 296 Unn.com.ua, Financing of terrorism by Rybalka's companies: pre-trial investigation continues, examinations appointed (17 October 2018). Annex 297 Youtube, Victoria Nuland's Admits Washington Has Spent $5 Billion to "Subvert Ukraine" (9 February 2014). Annex 298 Unian.ua, In Lvov activists continue to block the RSA building, "Berkut" bases and internal troops (24 January 2014). Annex 299 DailyLviv.com, Lvov Regional State Administration and "Berkut" and Internal Troops bases are being blocked (24 January 2014). Annex 300 TSN, Map of seizures of regional state administrations in Ukraine: eight regions are under the control of demonstrators (24 January 2014). Annex 301 2000.ua, Mysterious Maidan snipers (14 October 2015). Annex 302 Gazeta.ru, Unheroic justice (11 January 2016). Annex 303 RIA Novosti Ukraine, Never-ending investigation. Four years later, killers of the ‘Heavenly Hundred’ still at large (22 February 2018). Annex 304 RIA Novosti Ukraine, Investigation in all Maidan cases stalled (21 February 2018). Annex 305 RusNext.ru, No one came to commemorate. The Heavenly Hundred and their ‘exploits’ on Maidan devalued (20 February 2018). Annex 306 TASS, How Ukraine imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and entities (20 March 2019). Annex 307 RIA Novosti, Cases of harassment of journalists in Ukraine in 2014-2017 (19 June 2017). Annex 308 Telegram, St. Petersburg Courts Unified Press Service, The Oktyabrsky District Court of St. Petersburg ruled in the suit of Igor Bezler against the Foundation Bellingcat (19 May 2021). Annex 309 RBC, Three Russian soldiers killed in Syria (25 March 2019).
Annex 310 Rostec, Rostec delivered almost 300,000 sets of Ratnik combat equipment (10 December 2020). Annex 311 Magnolia-TV, Nightmare in Kharkov. A chronicle of bloody events (15 March 2014). Annex 312 Censor.net, 14 March 2014 - Ukraine stands up for Kharkov (14 March 2018). Annex 313 Euro.kharkiv.ua, Day of the Volunteer. Anniversary of the defense of Rymarskaya (24 February 2023). Annex 314 SM News, The Armed Forces of Ukraine use MON-50, MON-100 and Claymore on drones (24 December 2022). Annex 315 Tyzhden.ua, Donetsk region has the highest crime rate in Ukraine (11 July 2013). Annex 316 Tyzhden.ua, Moskal: In the first half of the year, police managed to solve only one in five registered crimes (10 July 2013). Annex 317 Nv.ua. "Bandera is our father". Torchlight procession to mark 113th anniversary of Ukrainian nationalist leader held in Kiev - photos, videos (1 January 2022). Annex 318 Gazeta Wyborcza, Forget about Giedroyc: Poles, Ukrainians, IPN (24 May 2008). Annex 319 OUN-UPA, Personalities, Slava Stetsko (14.05.20 - 12.03.03) (1 January 2015). Annex 320 Unian, Hero of Ukraine Yuriy Shukhevich dies (22 November 2022). Annex 321 BBC News Ukraine, National Corps in Faces: Who are these people and where are they from? (11 March 2019). Annex 322 LB.ua. "Svoboda" members suspected of shooting at protesters on Maidan (13 October 2015). Annex 323 Unian, Ministry of Internal Affairs: 130 law enforcement officers hospitalised with gunshot wounds (20 February 2014). Annex 324 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 27 April 2018. Annex 325 Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 806/2014 “On the Day of the Defendant of Ukraine”, 14 October 2014. Annex 326 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 15 June 2018.
Annex 327 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 23 August 2018. Annex 328 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 27 July 2018. Annex 329 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 7 September 2018. Annex 330 Administration of the President of Ukraine, Letter No 12-09/2938, 16 July 2019. Annex 331 Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 46/2010 “On Awarding S. Bandera the title of Hero of Ukraine”, 10 January 2010. Annex 332 Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 965/2007 “On Awarding R. Shukhevych the Title of Hero of Ukraine”, 12 October 2007. Annex 333 Ukrainska Pravda, “Right Sector will not lay down arms until Yanukovych resigns” (21 February 2014). Annex 334 Channel One, In Odessa, radicals chased protesters into building and set fire to it (3 May 2014). Annex 335 Telegram, Denazification of UA. There is no shame in destroying residents of villages near Artemovsk/Bakhmut because they are all "separatists and katsaps" (13 December 2022). Annex 336 Focus.ua, "We are trying to kill more": Kazakhstan protests Ukraine's ambassador for words about Russians (video) (23 August 2022). Annex 337 RBK Ukraine, Igor Klymenko: There is more darkness in Ukraine, but also more police on the streets (13 December 2022). Annex 338 Volynonline.com, Uncensored and "Bez Obmezhen": the third day of "Bandershtat-2021" in photos (9 August 2021). Annex 339 Unian, The 4-day sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" has started in Ternopol region (5 May 2016). Annex 340 Chas.cv.ua, Ukraine's largest sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" will bring together young people from all regions of Ukraine (2 March 2016). Annex 341 TASS, Attempt to “give Ukraine time”: Merkel on Minsk agreements (7 December 2022). Annex 342 Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 699/2022 “On Awarding M. Simchich the Title of Hero of Ukraine”, 14 October 2022. Annex 343 Gazeta.ru, “Do Not Make Tragedy of This”. How Ukraine Shot Down Russian Aircraft (4 October 2021).
Annex 344 Law of Ukraine No. 3551-XII “On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection”, 22 October 1993. Annex 345 Youtube, UPA’s March of Glory: Oleg Tyagnibok's speech / October 14 / Protection / Day of Defenders of Ukraine (17 October 2021). Annex 346 Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 802-VII “On Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”, 27 February 2014. Annex 347 Youtube, 14.40/02.05.2014.Arrest on Alexandrovsky prospect in Odessa (15 July 2015). Annex 348 Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 80\2023 “On awarding the honorary name to the 10th separate mountain assault brigade of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”. Annex 349 YouTube, Turchinov Announced Anti-Terrorist Measures Against Armed Separatists (7 April 2014). Annex 350 Iryna Berezhnaya Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection, Report: Infringement of rights and freedoms in Ukraine (2018). Annex 351 Iryna Berezhnaya Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection, Report: Infringement of rights and freedoms in Ukraine (2019). Annex 352 Irina Berezhnaya Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection, Online environment as an instrument of infringements of human rights and freedoms in Ukraine (2022). Annex 353 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 7 September 2018. Annex 354 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 14 May 2018. Annex 355 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo № 2, 14 May 2018. Annex 356 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 21 May 2018. Annex 357 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Mark Eterington’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 18 January 2019. Annex 358 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 1 June 2018. Annex 359 Administration of the President of Ukraine, Letter No 12-09/2938, 16 July 2019. Annex 360 Australian Federal Police, Report in the Matter of AFR Case Reference No.
5667342 (Operation AVENELLA), July 2015. Annex 361 Expert Report Analyzing Videos from Social Media. Annex 362 Report on Expert Examination of a Video File for Any Signs of Falsification, 7 December 2020. Annex 363 The Dutch Public Prosecution Service, Opening statement and context of the investigation (8 June 2020). Annex 364 OG IT Forensic Services, International Platform Global Right Of Peaceful People, Report, 3 March 2020. Annex 365 CBC News, Malaysia Airlines MH17: Michael Bociurkiw talks about being first at the crash site (29 July 2014). Annex 366 ABC News, IMAGE: MH17 crash site, Ukrainian State Emergency Service employees search for bodies amongst the wreckage of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 (21 July 2014). Annex 367 Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR), Presentation “Damage Investigation MH17”. Annex 368 Getty images, Image “Ukraine Russia crisis Malaysia aviation crash” (25 July 2014). Annex 369 Witness Statement of Mikhail Vadimovich Malyshevskiy. Annex 370 Documents Regarding BUK Missile Delivered to Ukraine in the 1980s. Annex 371 Georgia v. Russia (II), Application No. 38263/08, Open Exhibit for Oral Submissions of the Russian Federation on 23 May 2018. Annex 372 Expert Report on the Applicability of the Triangulation Method of Oleg Rudenko, Boris Goncharenko and Andrei Shurup, 18 May 2021. Annex 373 Dutch National Police, Official Report Concerning the Transport Route, on the Basis of Open Sources, 16 May 2018.

Annex 294 National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies. Alexander Sych. Thesis “Modern Ukrainian nationalism: political science aspects of paradigm transformation” (translation)

Annex 294
1
Excerpt
Translation
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies.
Alexander Sych. Thesis “Modern Ukrainian nationalism: political science aspects of paradigm
transformation”, available at: https://ipiend.gov.ua/spetsializovana-vchena-rada-svr/dysertatsii/.
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies
Qualifying scientific work
on the rights of the manuscript
ALEXANDER MAXIMOVICH SYCH
UDC: 323.1:141.3](=161.2)
С4
DISSERTATION
MODERN UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM: POLITICAL SCIENCE ASPECTS
OF PARADIGM TRANSFORMATION
23.00.01 - theory and history of political science
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Political Science
The dissertation contains the results of my own research. Use of ideas, the results and texts of
other authors are referenced to the appropriate source
O. M. Sych
Scientific consultant: Mykola Mykhalchenko, Doctor of Political Science, Professor,
Corresponding Member of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Kyiv - 2020
Annex 294
135 naturalistic voluntarism, total biology, racism, Nordism, and a separate system of leadership. Ukrainian nationalism defines the nation not by race and blood, but by a common will, idea and political activity." At the same time, he warns that in Ukrainian circles "there should not be blind and uncritical imitation of National Socialism, so as not to fall under the spiritual and later political influence of Germany" [148, p. 131]. Obviously, the successes of fascism and Nazism in the initial stages of their stay in power attracted the attention of political movements in other European countries. Some of them copied this experience, and these were most likely those that did not have their own authentic national movements. Still others, who already had their own organizational models, adapted this experience creatively and fragmentarily to local national conditions. Analyzing these facts, we should realize that fascism and especially Nazism committed mass crimes much later. Therefore, those who adopted their experience of political growth could not foresee the course of history and the future condemnation of these ideologies and political movements. Obviously, with this in mind, T. Snyder noted: "The small nationalisms of interwar Europe, such as Ukrainian, must also be seen in relation to their relationship to larger nationalisms, such as Italian and German" [280, p. 177]. However, the OUN belonged to the category of those political movements that were already based on the considerable experience of their predecessors. That is why it used the experience of the early successes of fascism and Nazism, but did not copy them blindly. This is evidenced by the statement of D. Myron-Orlyk: "Undoubtedly, it is necessary to follow the development of nationalist movements in other countries, in particular to learn from the experience of fascism and national socialism, but everything must be adapted to Ukrainian relations and needs, organically assimilated and melted in the crucible of the Ukrainian spirit and thought" [148, p. 132].
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239 4.4. Influence of nationalist structures on the course of the Revolution of Dignity If we analyze the state of the Ukrainian nationalist movement on the eve of each of the analyzed revolutionary disruptions, it should be noted that during the Revolution on the Brink of 1990 it was embryonic, by the Orange Revolution of 2004, although it had reached a significant level of organizational development, it was in crisis and deconsolidated, and entered the Revolution of Dignity in a much more crystallized form [241]. The parliamentary elections of 2012 clearly placed the accents of influence in the nationalist environment. On the one hand, Svoboda became its undisputed leader. In these elections, the party received 10.44% of the vote in the multi-mandate constituency and 13 of its candidates were elected in single-member districts. Thus, Svoboda managed to form a fairly large parliamentary faction consisting of 38 MPs. On the other hand, by the beginning of the Revolution of Dignity, previously well-known nationalist organizations either ceased to exist (DSU) or became uninfluential in the political process (KUN, UNA-UNSO, Tryzub). In the 2012 parliamentary elections, the KUN participated in a bloc with Nasha Ukraina, and the association received 1.11% of the vote. The partially reunited in 2005 UNA under the leadership of Yuriy Shukhevych received the penultimate result of 0.08%. The OUN-B and OUN-M do not go beyond the scope of public education; the ISC and the National Alliance are exclusively engaged in youth education. Established in 2005, the UNTP transformed within a year into the movement of the "autonomous right," which in turn split into a number of competing groups by 2011. The SNA also failed to become an influential factor in the political process [4, p. 172-178]. The pre-revolutionary level of influence was also reflected in the participation of nationalist forces in the events of the Revolution of Dignity. The dominant positions in it were occupied by Svoboda and the Right Sector (RS) social movement. In particular, Svoboda, together with Batkivshchyna and V. Klitschko's UDAR party, formed the political core of the revolutionary Maidan. Accordingly, its leader O. Tiahnybok and leading members of the party were members of the governing bodies of the revolutionary […]
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241 It is worth noting that the already quite extensive literature on the Revolution of Dignity, both in journalistic and academic literature, tends to overstate the self-organizing potential and downplay the role of organized political structures, and in particular the parliamentary opposition of the time. For example, here are some of them. In particular, R. Balaban states: "Not being organized by political parties, the Maidan as a synergistic force was forced to pass on its political mouthpiece. This "mouthpiece" was taken up not by political parties, but by individuals - A. Yatsenyuk, V. Klitschko, O. Tyahnybok, who, in order to increase their own rating, actualized "Maidan parties" - All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna", "UDAR", All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda". However, the Maidan did not have a single control center and a single force or structure at its core." Although the author recognizes that they acted as "stabilizers" of the Maidan and its "negotiators" [9, p. 127]. The inappropriateness of the statement about the "actualization" of parties that won a fairly significant support of Ukrainian voters in the recent parliamentary elections is striking. Similar statements are made by Y. Potapenko: "The next important feature of Euromaidan, repeatedly emphasized by its participants, experts and scholars, is the indication of the unconstructiveness of the idea that opposition leaders and party functionaries led it and directed the actions of the protesters. Any talk of Maidan's "controllability" and its absolute loyalty to Klitschko, Yatsenyuk, Turchynov and Tyahnybok is completely groundless" [201, p. 9]. While we pay tribute to the self-organizing potential of the revolutionary Maidan, we do not agree with such an unequivocal denial of the role of organized political structures in general and parliamentary parties of the time in particular in its functioning and confrontation with the current political regime. The above facts indicate the opposite. We believe that such statements, on the one hand, are an inertial manifestation of the opposition of the apolitical Euromaidan to the organized political forces, which at the initial stage of the Revolution of Dignity, for their own purposes, technologically subtly organized and
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242 used by the current regime. In this regard, M. Kugutyak and M. Vitenko, analyzing the chronology of the Revolution of Dignity, note: "The media spread the idea that one Maidan was good and the other was bad; one was functioning within the framework of the law, and the other was not. Later it became known that the security forces had introduced their agents into the organizing committees of both camps, who sought information, set up various provocations, and tried to quarrel opposition politicians with student activists" [307, p. 50]. And on the other hand, we believe that such a nihilistic attitude to the role of political parties in the organization of the revolutionary Maidan generally corresponds to the inherent tendency of the postmodern denial of the role and importance of institutions in society [71, p. 211-216]. The official opposition status of Svoboda on the revolutionary Maidan also caused significant image losses. The party and its leader, along with their political partners, were politically responsible for the course of the revolutionary events and the fate of the people involved. In our opinion, the party leader's participation in negotiations with the current government and coordination of her positions with ideologically incompatible partners demonstrated her political maturity and conscious statehood. But at the same time, they sharply discorded with the already formed revolutionary image, "contradicted their earlier rhetoric" [126, p. 6]. In addition, the freedom of action of the party leadership was also limited by European and American diplomats, who demanded that the parliamentary opposition adhere to the exclusively peaceful nature of protest actions and warned against radical actions, threatening to deny the support that the opposition forces desperately needed in the fight against the current regime [19, p. 81-98]. The balanced nature of the actions of the head of the HE "Svoboda did not correspond to the revolutionary mood of the protesters, and this was further exacerbated by the atmosphere of hostility towards the political leaders of Maidan, which was created by provocateurs of the regime's security forces who were massively infiltrated among the participants of the revolution. In our opinion, the violent clashes on Hrushevskoho Street on January 19-24, 2014, were a negative turning point for the party's image.
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243 None of the representatives of the parliamentary opposition could take responsibility for these events, given the established framework of communication with diplomatic circles. In particular, Svoboda could not do so either, although its members took part in those confrontations en masse. "The first person to be arrested on Hrushevskoho Street was also a Svoboda member, by the way. We were forbidden to be there, Tyahnybok said that the party would be banned as an extremist party, but we already had two hundred arrested, then it reached three hundred. It was either us or them. I remember peasants calling: 'Kyrylo, we have folded our party flags, we are taking off our stripes, we are going to Hruscha,'" K. Dolenko later recalled [19, p. 181]. At this stage, the leadership of Svoboda was considering in detail the same scenario of the arrest of its leading members and the very ban of the party that had befallen the nationalist organization Golden Dawn in Greece [290]. In the context of the escalation of the violent confrontation, the party was sinking deeper and deeper into a political image trap. On the one hand, the situation required increased diplomatic efforts to prevent a bloody outcome, but on the other hand, such actions were increasingly destroying its established revolutionary image. At the same time, the greater image losses on the Maidan were suffered by the "The more dynamic nationalist leadership positions in the parliament and in society were occupied by the Right Sector movement. The date of its creation is November 28, 2013, and its name comes from its location in a revolutionary tent camp to the right of the Independence Stele near the monument to the founders of Kyiv. The movement included both well-known nationalist organizations that were in crisis on the eve of the revolution and no longer played a significant role in the political process, and those that had a local impact on socio-political processes. In particular, the revolution gave the former a chance to resuscitate their influence, and the latter the same chance to realize it fully. It is no coincidence that Tryzub is considered to be the initiator of the SAR. It included representatives of two other well-known nationalist structures - UNA-UNSO and Patriot of Ukraine, as well as organizations little known to the general public "The White Hammer, the Black Committee, the Committee for the Liberation of Political Prisoners, the Carpathian
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244 Sich, individual nationalists and football fans. According to the leader of the PS, D. Yarosh, each of these groups consisted of 100-200 people, and the Tryzub itself had about 500-600 members in its ranks in the pre-revolutionary period [19, p. 101-103]. However, after the arson of the Trade Union Building on February 18, the organization "The White Molot decided to change its location and, together with the Committee for the Liberation of Political Prisoners, Patriot of Ukraine and several hundred members of the Self-Defense, moved to the Kyiv City State Administration and created an alternative Right Sector. Later, on March 6, the Right Sector issued a statement that Bilyi Molot had been expelled from the Right Sector. As follows from an interview with the representative of the White Hammer, V. Goranin, the grounds for the split in the SAR appeared much earlier - in the process of joint activities on the Maidan [13]. At the first stage of the revolutionary processes, the SAR was generally unknown to the public. Although, according to some reports, members of organizations that later joined it participated in the protection of students from beatings on the night of November 30, in the seizure of the Kyiv City State Administration and in clashes near the Presidential Administration on December 1. After the organization of the Maidan Self-Defense, the "PS" joined it and was listed as one of the hundreds at number 23 (there were 39 hundreds in total) [288, pp. 127-128]. D. Yarosh even claims that "it was the 'SAR' that organized the first hundreds of the Self-Defense, which later became what it is today". In our opinion, this statement is an exaggeration, since the first Self-Defense units were formed on Mykhailivska Square after the dispersal of Euromaidan and the "SAR" did not exist at that time. After the security forces attempted to clear the Maidan on the night of December 10-11, the RS moved to the 5th floor of the Trade Union Building. All the time, it tried to maintain autonomy in its actions. As the Kapranov brothers note in their study, "'Right Sector' at the beginning of Euromaidan was mainly an agitation and discussion platform, far from the scene both geographically and ideologically" [19, p. 105-106]. However, starting in January 2014, the informal status of the leader of the nationalist movement on the revolutionary Maidan slowly began to be established for the PS. He was not bound by political responsibili
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245 and the diplomatic conventions that limited the actions of the rival Svoboda. The atmosphere of Maidan, by definition, required a revolutionary trend, and this was skillfully used by experienced politicians of UNA-UNSO, Tryzub, and Patriot of Ukraine, which united under the new brand of the Right Sector. The SPS's finest hour came on January 19. On that day, about 500,000 people gathered in Kyiv for a regular assembly, outraged by the adoption of the "dictatorial laws" of January 16. Before it ended, one of the leaders of Automaidan, S. Koba suddenly called from the stage to block the parliament. This seemed to make no sense, as the Verkhovna Rada building was empty on a Sunday afternoon. However, several hundred Automaidan participants headed to European Square. They stopped in front of the checkpoints of the Internal Troops (VTs) at the beginning of Hrushevskoho Street. Gradually, more and more protesters approached this place, and in a few hours their number reached thirty thousand. Suddenly, a group of 30-40 people broke into the space between them and the military and started a fight. According to eyewitnesses, they chanted chants typical of Russian ultras, "Come on, let's go..." [288, с. 172-173]. According to D. Yarosh, the conflict on Hrushevskoho Street was activated by members of the "SPS". "I said to Parubiy: 'Andriy, give me an additional hundred Self-Defense men, and we will be able to make a breakthrough, we won't go far, but the situation can be changed. I am grateful that he gave not one but two hundred, they closed our flanks, and our assault units set fire to the bus and moved forward," he recalls [19, p. 107]. As a result, the confrontation on Hrushevskoho Street became fierce and massive. Regardless of the controversial judgments as to who initiated it and why, it took on the symbolic character of a revolutionary struggle against the current government, which was trying to establish a dictatorial regime in Ukraine with the "laws of January 16". Participants of the revolution, regardless of party affiliation, including members of parliamentary opposition parties, took part in it en masse. Here, O. Strazhnyi is wrong, arguing that neither the activists of
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246 "Neither the Self-Defense nor opposition politicians supported the confrontation on Hrushevskoho Street [288, p. 178]. Even superficial estimates indicate that at that time "The Opposition Party did not have in its ranks the number of people who participated in it. However, due to the above diplomatic conventions, none of the leaders of the opposition parliamentary parties could take responsibility for such actions. At the same time, this was effectively used by the Right Sector and its leader D. Yarosh [203]. A participant in the events recalls: "In February, we were faced with the fact that we were all becoming the Right Sector somewhere in our hearts. Everyone began to lean toward a violent solution to this political conflict" [288, p. 228]. After the active phase of the confrontation on Hrushevskoho Street ended, negotiations between the leaders of the parliamentary opposition and Viktor Yanukovych began. As for the participation of representatives of nationalist structures in them, they left an ambiguous and rather paradoxical imprint on their image. Thus, for the mere fact of participating in such negotiations and even for the fact that the leader of Svoboda, O. Tyahnybok, shook hands with Viktor Yanukovych, he was harshly criticized on the revolutionary Maidan. At least, it seemed that shaking hands during diplomatic talks between opponents was a common protocol. It is characteristic that this criticism was tended to be addressed only to O. Tiahnybok and did not affect other leaders of the parliamentary opposition - A. Yatsenyuk and V. Klitschko. And this, obviously, can be seen as a manifestation of the use of competitive technologies even in such critical conditions. When, after the final stage of negotiations, O. Tiahnybok, responding to the critical public outcry, did not shake hands with V. Yanukovych, the Maidan did not notice this [19, p. 228]. Against O. Tiahnybok as the leader of the VO "Svoboda used this "handshake" to great effect in the 2014 presidential and parliamentary election campaigns. At the same time, his allies A. Yatsenyuk and V. Klitschko and the parties they led received high electoral support. It should also be noted that there were also secret separate negotiations with Yanukovych by his future short-term successor in the status of "acting" O. Turchynov. As A. Mokhnyk recalls, every
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247 negotiations between the opposition leaders and V. Yanukovych took place with the consent of the Maidan, and after they were held, they reported to it on their results. Only O. Turchynov conducted such negotiations without the knowledge of the revolutionary Maidan and its political leaders [288, p. 202; 19, p. 156]. The leader of the "PS" D. Yarosh also had such secret talks with Yanukovych. In our opinion, his actions at that time were generally well-calculated political technology aimed at increasing his own political rating by positioning himself as an alternative to the political leaders of Maidan, and in particular to the rival O. Tiahnybok and Svoboda. For example, on January 1, on the occasion of the birthday of OUN leader S. Bandera, the PS held a separate event from Svoboda [205]. It is noteworthy that at that time it did not resonate on Maidan as much as the mass torchlight procession of Svoboda. When the negotiated lull came after January 25, Yarosh continued to call from the Maidan stage for violent actions against the government (in particular, during the February 10 assembly). When the Maidan Council decided to launch a so-called "peaceful offensive," before it began, D. Yarosh, on the contrary, appealed to the authorities and the opposition to "resume the negotiation process." Instead, after the tragic confrontation on February 18, when the opposition leaders, after a series of fruitless meetings with V. Yanukovych, managed to reach a compromise with him, D. Yarosh voiced a different position on Facebook: "Someone wants to stop the people's uprising by declaring a false truce. I officially declare: "The Right Sector did not sign any agreements and did not negotiate with anyone, so the offensive of the rebellious people must continue." At the same time, he himself held secret talks with Yanukovych [288, p. 198; 205]. And after them and after the signing of the "Agreement on the Settlement of the Crisis in Ukraine", D. Yarosh again made an alternative statement that the "Right Sector" would not lay down its arms until Yanukovych resigned from the presidency and was "ready to take responsibility for the further development of the revolution in Ukraine" [19, p. 162]. When the information about D. Yarosh's secret negotiations with V. Yanukovych became public, it caused some suspicio
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248 among the Maidan participants, but it did not cause him personally and the Opposition Platform as much negative image as the negotiations held with the consent of its participants, but it did not cause him personally and the Opposition Platform as much image damage as the negotiations that took place with the consent of Maidan did to O. Tiahnybok and the Svoboda party. In our opinion, this is also evidence of the use of appropriate technologies in the competitive political struggle, which, surprisingly, did not stop even during the period of the most intense confrontation during the Revolution of Dignity. Once again, members of Svoboda and the Opposition Platform were equally involved in them during the most tragic phase of February 18-20, as they had the most relevant experience, including during their time in paramilitary structures. However, after the elections were over, the rules of political competition came back into play. Already on March 27, less than a month after the establishment of the post-revolutionary government, "The PS picketed the Verkhovna Rada and, among other things, demanded that the former Defense Minister, a member of the Svoboda party, Admiral I. Tenyukh, be put on trial [204] In the end, such competition did not benefit both political forces and the nationalist movement as a whole. As is well known, they and their leaders failed in the early presidential and parliamentary elections. Instead, both political forces significantly influenced the ideological transformation of the revolutionary Maidan and Ukrainian society in general. VO "In addition to participating in the confrontation with the power structures of the regime, Svoboda and the Right Sector were actively engaged in propaganda of their ideas - they published and distributed leaflets, newspapers, appeared on the radio, voiced their ideological principles from the Maidan stage, including on live television. They also carried out actions that had a deeply symbolic ideological significance, such as the overthrow of the Lenin monument in Kyiv and public events honoring the OUN leader S. Bandera. For example, when on December 8, activists of the Svoboda party organized the demolition of the Lenin monument in Bessarabka in Kyiv, it provoked an equally sharp reaction from both representatives of the current government and political partners. This rejection was even expressed by the Maidan's host Ruslana from the stage. The situation was resolved only after a number of European politicians voiced their approval [19, p. 171-172]. At the same time, this action caused a massive […]
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251 The first such revolutionary upheaval in modern Ukrainian society was the Revolution on the Granite in 1990, which coincided with the birth of the first nationalist organizations, such as the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front, the Ukrainian Nationalist Party, and Varta Rukhu. There is no information about their influence on the organization and course of this action, but a number of participants in the student hunger strike were imbued with a nationalist worldview. The second revolutionary upheaval was the Orange Revolution of 2004. By this time, the Ukrainian nationalist movement had gained significant organizational development, was characterized by a developed network of nationalist, political, civic and paramilitary structures, and was in opposition to the current regime. Unlike the 1990 Revolution on the Granite, nationalist structures became a significant factor in the Orange Revolution. The most effective among them were the UNA-UNSO, KUN, Svoboda, and the Bandera Trident. Although V. Yushchenko's election headquarters, actively using the potential of nationalist structures, did not advertise its connection with them for ideological reasons, the revolutionary Maidan itself was largely filled with nationalist content and for the first time it began to raise topics that had previously been the domain of exclusively nationalist discourse. The Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014 was the third revolutionary failure in Ukraine. Our periodization of this event is based on the criterion of radicalization of its participants' moods depending on the escalation of violence against them by the current political regime, and includes the following periods: Period I - apolitical Euromaidan (November 21-30, 2013); Period II - non-violent political protest (December 1, 2013 - January 19, 2014); Period III - escalation of the violent confrontation on Hrushevskoho Street (January 19-24, 2014); Period IV - relative lull in the political confrontation (January 25 - February 18, 2014); Period V - mass shootings of protesters and the victory of the Revolution of Dignity (February 18-21, 2014). The nationalist forces of Svoboda and the Right Sector civic movement played a significant role in the Revolution of Dignity. Having relevant experience in nationalist paramilitary structures, their members contributed to
Annex 295 A. Sych. The Influence of the National Liberation Struggle of the OUN-UPA on the Militarization of the Modern Ukrainian Nationalist Movement (translation)

Annex 295
116
Excerpt
Translation
A. Sych. The Influence of the National Liberation Struggle of the OUN-UPA on the
Militarization of the Modern Ukrainian Nationalist Movement, available at:
http://regionalstudies.uzhnu.uz.ua/archive/16/21.pdf.
№ 16
SECTION 5
THEORY AND HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UDC 94(477)
https://doi.org/10.32782/2663-6170/2019.16.19
THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION
STRUGGLE OF THE UNITED NATIONALIST PARTY ON
THE MILITARIZATION OF THE MODERN UKRAINIAN
NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE
UKRAINIAN UNION ON THE MILITARIZATION OF THE MODERN
UKRAINIAN
NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Sych OM,
D. in History, Associate
Professor, Professor of the Department of Public
Management and Administration
Ivano-Frankivsk National Technical University of Oil and Gas,
Head of Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Council
In the article, the author analyzes the paramilitary structures of the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement from 1990 to the present and the influence of the
armed national liberation struggle of the 40s and 50s of the twentieth century on their formation. Depending on this influence, three categories of paramilitary nationalist
organizations were formed. Those that mainly based their activities in the West and Center of Ukraine were subject to indirect ideological (SNPU, transformed into the All-
Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", and paramilitary organizations that belonged to its sphere of influence) or direct organizational and ideological (Varta DSU and Tryzub named
after S. Bandera) influence of the OUN-B and the traditions of the UPA national liberation struggle. Instead, those of them that have operated and are still operating in the
East and South of Ukraine (UNSO, Patriot of Ukraine, SNA) are not subject to such influence.
Keywords: modern Ukrainian nationalist movement, paramilitary nationalist organizations, OUN-B, national liberation struggle of the UPA, Revolution of Dignity,
Russian-Ukrainian war, volunteer battalions.
In the article, the author analyzes the paramilitary structures of the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement from 1990 to the present day and the influence of the
armed national liberation struggle of the 40s and 50s of the twentieth century on the process of their formation. Those that mainly based their activities in the West and
Center of Ukraine experienced indirect ideological (SNPU, transformed into the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", and paramilitary organizations that belonged to its sphere of
influence) or direct organizational and ideological (Strazha DSU and Trezub named after S. Bandera) influence of the OUN-B and the traditions of the UPA national liberation
struggle. Those of them that have operated in the East and South of Ukraine (UNSO, Patriot of Ukraine, SNA) have no such influence.
Key words: modern Ukrainian nationalist movement, paramilitary nationalist organizations, OUN-B, national liberation struggle of the UPA, Revolution of Dignity,
Russian-Ukrainian war, volunteer battalions.
In the article, the author analyzes the paramilitary structures of the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement from 1990 to the present day and the influence of the
armed national liberation struggle in the 40-50s of the twentieth century on the process of their formation. Three categories of paramilitary nationalist organizations were
formed depending on such influence. Those of them who mainly based their activities in the West and in the Center of Ukraine were subjected to an indirect ideological influence
(SNPU, transformed into "Svoboda", and paramilitary organizations that have belonged to and will continue to belong to its sphere of influence), or direct organizational and
ideological influence ("Warta DSU" and "Tryzub" named after S. Bandera) of the OUN-B and traditions of the national liberation struggle of the UPA. Instead, there are no such
influences on those that have been active and operate in the East and South of Ukraine (UNSO, "Patriot of Ukraine", SNA).
Key words: modern Ukrainian nationalist movement, paramilitary nationalist organizations, OUN-B, national liberation struggle of the UPA, Revolution of Dignity,
Russian-Ukrainian war, volunteer battalions.
Statement of the problem. Since the beginning of the
Russian military aggression in 2014 and in the conditions
of the Ukrainian army destroyed by the political regime
of V. Yanukovych, the volunteer movement has become
aggression. The process of their formation was
largely influenced by Ukrainian paramilitary
nationalist structures, and the experience they
gained during their existence was of great
Annex 295
116 widespread in Ukraine. At the initial stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it was volunteer battalions that played an important role in deterring Russian importance in their combat activities. In view of this, the issue of studying the militarization of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the impact of
Annex 295
117
of the armed national liberation struggle of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) on the formation of
paramilitary structures in the modern nationalist
movement.
Formulation of the objectives of the article
(statement of the task). The author of the article aims
to study the process of formation of Ukrainian
nationalist paramilitary structures during the period of
Ukraine's independence and to identify the influence
of the national liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA
on it. Thus, the object of this study is the modern
Ukrainian nationalist movement, and the subject is its
paramilitary component.
Analysis of recent research and publications. In
modern studies of the modern political history of
Ukraine, the topic of the formation of the nationalist
component of the party-political and public space
remains insufficiently covered. Among others, we can
note the works of V. Kulyk, V. Panchenko, and E.
Adriushchenko's PhD thesis, which also provides a
detailed analysis of the historiography of the problem
[1]. The permanent scientific conference "Ideology of
Ukrainian Nationalism at the Present Stage of
Development of the Ukrainian State" has become a
good scientific platform for intensifying such
research. Within its framework, scientific articles
were written by C. Adamovych, V. Altukhov, V.
Buslenko, B. Halayko, V. Trush, V. Roh, I. Kononov,
M. Molochko, B. Paska.
Highlighting previously unresolved parts of the
overall problem. The paramilitary component of the
modern Ukrainian nationalist movement is even less
studied. The most thorough study to date is the
aforementioned dissertation by E. Andriushchenko,
which includes a review of nationalist paramilitary
structures. At the same time, it does not fully cover all
aspects of the formation of the paramilitary
component of the modern nationalist movement,
including the influence of the armed national
liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA on its formation.
It also reflects quite schematically the changes that
occurred in the nationalist movement in general and
in its paramilitary segment in particular after the
Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014 and in the context
of the Russian-Ukrainian war. This article is dedicated
to the study of these aspects.
Summary of the main material. In the beginning
of this study, the author hypothesizes that the armed
national liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA in the
40s and 50s of the twentieth century had an indirect
impact on the formation of most structures of the
modern Ukrainian nationalist movement and will
focus on the arguments to support it.
This struggle took place in various forms, initiated
by both formations of the once united OUNthe
OUN was divided into the OUN-Melnyk (OUNM)
and the OUN-Bandera (OUN-B). But of course,
the most significant was the more than ten-year-long
two-front underground armed struggle of the UPA
against the armies of Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union. It left the most significant mark on the minds
of Ukrainians and shaped the social atmosphere in
which paramilitary nationalist structures were created
on the eve and after the declaration of Ukraine's
independence [2, p. 28-30].
The first such paramilitary association was the
Varta Rukhu. It was created to protect the public
actions of the People's Movement of Ukraine for
Perestroika (Rukh) during the Soviet regime and was
officially registered in late 1990. The organization's
charter was written in accordance with the
requirements of the legislation of the time, but in fact
did not reflect its real goals and objectives. The
leaders of Varta did not limit them to protecting the
peaceful actions of the Rukh, but were ready to turn
the organization into the core of armed resistance to
the Soviet regime. A well-known Ukrainian dissident
and political prisoner V. Moroz, who considered the
creation of his own armed forces to be the main
condition for Ukraine's independence and advocated
the transformation of Galicia into a kind of "Ukrainian
Prussia," praised the activities of the Rukh Varta:
"This is the first real formation of Ukrainian selfdefense...
this is the first real force." The Centennial
Foundation, which he created in Canada, raised funds
for this Ukrainian paramilitary force. In 1991, Varta
Rukhu became one of the basic organizations for the
newly formed Social National Party of Ukraine
(SNPU). This was the beginning of V. Moroz's
rapprochement with the SNPU, and the leader of the
Varta Rukhu, Y. Kryvoruchko, joined the party's
highest executive body, the Committee of
Commissioners, becoming the ideology
commissioner [1, p. 42; 3, p. 188; 4, p. 58].
After the formation of the SNPU, it took over the
radical methods of the Varta Rukhu. For example, in
1992, the party actively supported the creation of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate
(UOC-KP), and its units took individual church
buildings under protection: The Holy Assumption
Cathedral in Volodymyr-Volynskyi, the Holy Trinity
Cathedral in Lutsk, etc. During the signing of the 1993
Massandra Accords the SNPU, together with the
Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UCRP), the
State Independence of Ukraine (SOU) and other public
and political organizations, participated in the creation
of the Extraordinary Committee for the Salvation of the
Nation and State (NCSNS). At the same time, the party
initiated the formation of a voluntary paramilitary
association, the People's Detachments (PD). Two
hundred volunteers were recruited, including workers
and students. Their members were actively trained by
the founder of the Combat
Annex 295
Regional Studies, 2019 ♦ 118 V. Pilat and his students. And on September 22-24 of that year, clashes between NZ volunteers and law enforcement officers took place in Kyiv. They came to the action in black uniforms, which immediately caught the eye and clearly distinguished them from the "UnSoviets" dressed in camouflage uniforms [5; 4, p. 61; 1, p. 56]. In 1996, the Patriot of Ukraine Society for Assistance to the Armed Forces and the Navy was created under the NPU. Participants in those events claim that at its height, the organization consisted of about three thousand organized and trained young people of military age. At the same time, scholars put the number at a much more modest level, between 300 and 400 people. Since in 1993 Ukrainian legislation introduced criminal liability for the creation and activity of illegal paramilitary groups, the constituent documents of this public organization corresponded to the formal name. However, in reality, Patriot of Ukraine continued the traditions of using radical methods of Varta Rukhu and NZ and participated in street clashes with ideological opponents and law enforcement officials. The most significant of these was a clash on November 7, 1997, in Lviv with supporters of communist ideology who were brought by political opponents from the eastern regions of Ukraine for propaganda purposes. Criminal cases were brought against several members of the party. After the SNPU was transformed into the Svoboda party in 2004, the Patriot of Ukraine was officially disbanded [1, p. 130, 171; 4, p. 67; 3, p. 189]. Thus, analyzing the activities of the paramilitary nationalist structures that were in the sphere of influence of the SNPU, we believe that the Varta Rukhu, People's Detachments and Patriot of Ukraine belong to the same organizational and political tradition. Since the SNPU based its ideological principles on the works of one of the leading figures of the OUN-B, Y. Stetsko, it should be assumed that it was formed under the indirect ideological influence of the OUN-B and the national liberation struggle of the UPA. The Ukrainian People's Self-Defense (UNSO) was the second oldest, but the first influential and most historically rich nationalist paramilitary structure. It was created under the Ukrainian Inter-Party Assembly (UPA) in 1991 in the wake of an attempted coup d'état in the Kremlin. Subsequently, the UNSO carried out its activities without being registered by the state. Already in the same year, the organization clashed with participants of the traditional communist demonstration on November 7 in Kyiv. The following year, the UNSO took part in a "march to Crimea" aimed at "demonstrating strength" local separatists. At the same time, it established cooperation with the UOC-KP and supported it in its struggle for separation from the UOC-Moscow Patriarchate (MP). In July 1995, members of the UNSO took part in mass clashes with the police during the burial of Patriarch Volodymyr Romaniuk of the UOC-KP (the so-called "Black Tuesday"). The next and perhaps the last resonant surge in UNSO activity was its participation in the 2001 political campaign "Ukraine without Kuchma". As a rule, after each such action, UNSO members were subjected to criminal persecution. During its heyday in 1991-1995, the organization, according to researchers, numbered about 5 thousand fighters [1, p. 53, 97, 125]. However, the UNSO became most famous for its participation in foreign armed conflicts. The first of these was the war in Transnistria. About half a thousand UNSO fighters fought on the side of pro-Russian forces. However, in the Abkhazian war of 1993, about 150 of its members took the opposite position, fighting on the side of Georgia against pro-Russian separatists. A much smaller number of them took part in military operations on the territory of Georgia in 1997-2001. The third large-scale military campaign involving members of the UNSO was the First Chechen War. In 1994-1996, about a hundred UNSO members fought on the side of the Chechens. Members of the UNSO also supported Chechen fighters in the fight against Russia during the Second Chechen War, but in much smaller numbers. Small groups of UNSO fighters also took part in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (both on the side of Croatia and Republika Srpska), Nagorno-Karabakh (on the side of Azerbaijan), and Tajikistan [1, pp. 97-101, 110]. In general, for ideology and practice the UNSO was characterized by pan-Slavic motives, which was manifested both in ideological constructions and in the contradictory practice of participating in foreign armed conflicts, either on the side of pro-Russian separatist forces or against Russia itself. Despite the involvement of the son of the UPA Commander-in-Chief Yuriy Shukhevych, it is still possible to talk about the influence of the forms of the UPA national liberation struggle on the UNSO, but not its ideological foundations. The DSU also created its own paramilitary unit in 1993. It operated for several years under the name The "DSU Guard" was also listed in the statutory documents as its "sports reference". The clear ideological position of the party, in particular the interpretation of the nation as an ethnic community, was reflected in its paramilitary structure, in particular, in the meticulous attitude to the nationality of candidates. During the entire period of its existence, the "Varta DSU" had about 200 members, did not demonstrate
Annex 295
Regional Studies, 2019
♦
119
bright pages in its political activity, also declined and
ceased to exist in parallel with the development of
internal conflicts and the decline of the DSU. During
these conflicts, the commander of the DSU Guard, V.
Stadnichenko, left the party [1, p. 50, 97; 6, p. 244].
Another paramilitary association, the S. Bandera
Public Sports and Patriotic Organization "Tryzub"
("Trident"), was created at the initiative of the OUNB.
The date of its creation is considered to be October
14, 1993. The first chairman of the organization was
V. Ivanyshyn, a well-known contemporary ideologist
of Ukrainian nationalism at the time. The organization
was never registered at the state level, although some
of its local units were legalized. "Tryzub expanded its
activities not only in the West of Ukraine, but its
branches were also established in the Center and East.
The peak of the organization's activity is considered
to be 1995, and after that a number of its members
were prosecuted. In 1996, V. Ivanyshyn handed over
his powers as head of the Central Leadership to D.
Yarosh, and in 1998 to Y. Fil. At the same time,
relations between Tryzub and the OUN-B
deteriorated, and in 1999 they were officially severed
[1, p. 58-61; 7].
From the very beginning, Tryzub was assigned
the role of the KUN's power structure. Although its
representatives themselves emphasize that they have
always been subordinated exclusively to the OUN-B
leadership and rely on the "bird theory" propagated by
V. Ivanyshyn. Ivanyshyn's "bird theory," according to
which the OUN was its body, and the KUN political
party and the Trident order organization were its
wings. Researchers believe that in the best years of its
activity (1995-1996), the organization had 2-3
thousand members. The main forms of its activity
were the protection of the events of the KUN, the All-
Ukrainian Brotherhood of the OUN-UPA, the
protection of the buildings of the Ukrainian Greek
Catholic Church (UGCC) during its formation and the
transfer of parishes of the UOC-MP to it, and ensuring
order during nationwide pilgrimages in the village of
Zarvanytsia in the Ternopil region, conducting
propaganda marches and raids, educational work,
physical training, etc. A special resonance among the
public was caused by the Crimean propaganda
campaign led by the then kurinnya D. Yarosh in 1995,
a five-thousand march together with veterans of the
OUN-UPA and the Cossacks in Kyiv on the
Intercession of the Intercession holiday in 1995, and a
similarly large march during the pilgrimage to
Zarvanytsia in 1996 [7].
The author was among the organizers of the All
Ukrainian methodological seminar-training on the
problems of organizing nationalist training for youth
and youth sports and patriotic clubs for active
"Tryzub", which took place on May 13-15, 1994, in
Yaremche, Prykarpattia. It was based on the
experience of organizing nationalist
The author was also involved in the organization of
the "Idea to rank" training for high school boys in
October 1993, and the functioning of the youth sports
and patriotic club "Zvytyaga" in Yaremche in 1993-
1994, which was also created and operated by the
author. At the same time, Tryzub for the first time
publicly demonstrated its paramilitary character by
holding a large and unusual march of its fighters in this
small Carpathian town [8; 9].
Law enforcement officers often detained members
of the
"Tryzub" with weapons, which led to the opening of
criminal cases. The story of an attack by several
members of the organization on a military unit in the
Kharkiv region to seize weapons was a resonant one
at the time. Its members were detained and sentenced
to various terms of imprisonment. The confrontation
between the organization's members and
representatives of criminal structures in
Dniprodzerzhynsk ended in a shootout and a court
case for one of its members. There were also cases of
involvement of Tryzub members in the settlement of
business and commercial relations (protection of the
Chernivtsi machine-building plant and clashes with
law enforcement officers). The organization's
participation in the "Ukraine without Kuchma"
campaign was controversial. At that time, opposition
forces of different ideologies, from the right-wing to
the left, united against the current government.
However, the leadership of Tryzub stated that
blocking with the left was unacceptable and
repeatedly organized attacks on their representatives,
which led to accusations of provocations [1, p. 97,
127-129, 13; 7].
Unlike UNSO, Tryzub did not participate in the
in international armed conflicts. At the same time, he
made attempts to establish cooperation with
Belarusian nationalists. In particular, in 1997, contacts
were established with them, and in 1998-1999, with
the assistance of Tryzub, a Belarusian paramilitary
nationalist structure, the Kray Sports and Patriotic
Organization, was created. Its members were trained
in Trident training camps in Ukraine [1, p. 171].
Given that the OUN-B had a substantive influence
on the creation of the SSU and initiated the creation
of the Trident, it was quite natural that the Varta SSU
and the Trident, among other analyzed paramilitary
structures, adhered to the most verified ideological
line of traditional Ukrainian nationalism in its
interpretation, including inheriting the traditions of
the UPA national liberation struggle.
Since 2005, the Patriot of Ukraine (PU) civic
organization has been operating in a new status. It was
formed in 2005 in Kharkiv, and its leaders declared
continuity with the Patriot of Ukraine of the Lviv
period, which existed under
Annex 295
Regional Studies, 2019 ♦ 120 SNPU, and continued to use the symbols of this party. The organization was officially registered, its leader was the former head of the Kharkiv regional organization of Tryzub, A. Biletskyi, and its ranks were joined by people from Kharkiv cells of the SNPU, Tryzub and UNA-UNSO. E. Andriushchenko believes that the organization's forms of activity were clearly marked by paramilitary and ideological motives, including neo-Nazi and racist ones. A. Soshnikov comes to similar conclusions, believing that the Patriot of Ukraine "develops a racist and general East Slavic (with a strong admixture of paganism) rather than Ukrainian ethnic line" [1, p. 171; 10]. It was on the basis of the latter that the Patriot of Ukraine finally split from the "Svoboda, although until then a number of activists belonged to both organizations simultaneously (such as O. Odnorozhenko, who headed the Kharkiv regional organization of Svoboda and was also an ideological referent of Patriot of Ukraine). On December 15, 2007, an internal party ideological conference "Modern Challenges and Responses: Ideological Foundation and Current Program of Svoboda" was held in Ivano-Frankivsk. The main discussions centered on the issue of the so-called "racial nationalism," from which O. Odnorozhenko based his report. However, it did not receive support from nearly three dozen conference participants representing party organizations in Volyn, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Lviv, Luhansk, Rivne, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv, and several others [11]. On December 17 of the same year, Patriot of Ukraine released a statement in which it "accused the leadership of Svoboda of crimes against the nation" and announced the severance of relations with it. "For a long time, the Patriot of Ukraine has been tied to Svoboda by observers. This was done completely without any reason, given that Patriot of Ukraine and Svoboda are conceptually different structures in ideological, organizational and practical terms," the statement said. By taking this step, its initiators were counting on the creation of their own party. The statement of December 17 read: "By severing all relations with Svoboda, the Patriot of Ukraine Organization understands that it is taking on the entire burden of the struggle for a future social-nationalist Greater Ukraine. The organization "Patriot of Ukraine", which is built on the principle of "party-army", takes a strategic course to create a powerful All-Ukrainian Social-Nationalist Movement, in which the newly formed Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine, together with the combat units of the "Patriot of Ukraine" and social-nationalist trade unions, will take a worthy place" [12]. Indeed, in November 2008, on the basis of the "The Social National Assembly (SNA) was created on the basis of the Patriot of Ukraine. In addition to it, the SNA included several radical civic initiatives: National Action "RiD", Chernihiv right-wing movement "Ukrainian Alternative", Odesa public association "Glory and Honor" (Sich). The Ukrainian National-Trade Party (UNTP), St. Andrew's Cossack Kuren, and the Civic Association "Sober Kyiv". Among the regional divisions of the organizations that were part of the SNA, only one was located in the west - in Ivano-Frankivsk region. However, it did not manifest itself in the local social and political life. The rest were concentrated in the Center (mainly in the Kyiv region) and in the South and East of Ukraine (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Odesa) [10]. They also tried to conduct their actions there, characterized by radical paramilitary methods typical of the Patriot of Ukraine. Ultimately, the SNA failed to become an influential factor in the political process. Analyzing the ideological foundations of the Patriot of Ukraine and the SNA, we can conclude that it was not inherent in them to follow the ideological line of traditional OUN nationalism, and the forms of their activities were not influenced by the history of the UPA's national liberation struggle. The participation of paramilitary nationalist organizations in the revolutionary events of the Independence period is a separate and extensive topic for research. It is beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, we will only note in passing that the use of their potential in the 1991 Revolution on Granite, the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity gradually increased as the nationalist movement itself grew and the revolutionary processes in Ukraine became more dynamic and radicalized. They peaked during the Revolution of Dignity. Its course and victorious conclusion would not have been possible without the paramilitary self-organization of Euromaidan [13]. It was during this revolution that the real, not declarative, capacity of Ukrainian nationalist structures and their participation in this self-organization became apparent. Svoboda, which dominated the nationalist movement at the time, mobilized its members on a massive scale and regularly rotated its "hundreds" to participate in the capital's protests and confront law enforcement agencies. Independent experts point out that among the other parties, Svoboda dominated by the number of members involved both on the central Maidan in Kyiv and on all regional Maidans from Galicia to Crimea. Its participation was also recorded in the percentage of the largest number of protest actions [13, p. 263].
Annex 295
Regional Studies, 2019
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121
In addition to Svoboda, another distinctly
nationalist structure in this revolution was the Right
Sector movement. The date of its creation is
considered to be November 28, 2013, and its name
comes from its location in a revolutionary tent camp.
It included both well-known nationalist organizations
that were in crisis on the eve of the revolution and no
longer played a significant role in the political
process, and those that had a local impact on social
and political processes. For the former, the
revolutionary events of 2013-2014 offered a chance to
revive their influence. The initiator of the Right Sector
is considered to be Tryzub. It included representatives
of two other well-known nationalist structures, UNAUNSO
and Patriot of Ukraine, as well as
organizations such as White Hammer, Black
Committee, Committee for the Liberation of Political
Prisoners, Carpathian Sich, close to Svoboda,
individual nationalists and football fans. Since
January 2014, the Right Sector has been slowly
gaining the informal status of the leader of the
nationalist movement [13, p. 264].
The post-revolutionary atmosphere, and especially
the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, became
a favorable environment for the further development
of the paramilitary movement and the use of military
themes in the political process. Volunteer battalions
were created, new political forces with a paramilitary
bias emerged, and the military theme was actively
exploited in the technologies of early presidential and
parliamentary elections.
The experience of nationalist paramilitary
organizations was particularly valuable in the creation
of volunteer battalions. One of the first to emerge was
the Azov battalion, which included representatives of
the Patriot of Ukraine, the SNA, and
"Automaidan". Its commander was the leader of the
first two nationalist structures, A. Biletsky. The next
one to be initiated by the Right Sector was
"The Volunteer Ukrainian Corps (DUK). It was
headed by A. Stempitsky, who also remained the
commander of the Trident. The Svoboda party, using
its presence in the parliament and the postrevolutionary
government, created the Sich Interior
Ministry battalion under the command of O.
Pysarenko and the Carpathian Sich volunteer battalion
led by O. Kutsyn. The latter was later transferred to
the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine (AFU) as a consolidated assault
company. A volunteer OUN battalion was formed in
the summer of 2014 on the basis of the territorial
defense battalion in Nizhyn without any particular
political force. For some time, it was part of the DUK,
and later it was formed as a separate volunteer
battalion led by a well-known nationalist activist M.
Kokhanivsky. It is worth noting,
that he had no real relation to both OUN formations,
and even more so - after the 2017 shootout in Kyiv
and the criminal case against M. Kokhanivsky, both
traditional OUN-M and OUN-B formations
dissociated themselves from him and called on the
public not to abuse the name of the OUN. A separate
unit was formed by members of D. Korchynskyi's
Brotherhood organization. Initially, it was part of the
Azov battalion, then moved to the Shakhtarsk
battalion, and eventually a special purpose company
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "St. Mary" was
formed on its basis, commanded by D. Linko, who
was later replaced by O. Seredyuk. There was also
information about the creation of a separate unit by
members of the UNSO [1, p. 190-192; 14].
The current situation has created favorable
documents of the UNA and by renaming it conditions
for rebranding and reformatting of those paramilitary
nationalist structures that were in crisis on the eve of
the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014 and ceased to
have a significant impact on socio-political processes.
In March 2014, a social movement was transformed
into a political party on the basis of the constituent
"Right Sector (RS). D. Yarosh was elected its leader,
and the leadership also included representatives of
Tryzub, UNA-UNSO, and Patriot of Ukraine-SNA.
However, the recent revolutionary popularity of the
SPS has not been converted into relevant political
results. During the early presidential elections, D.
Yarosh received only 0.7% of the vote, while the PS
received 1.8% in the same parliamentary elections. At
the end of 2015, D. Yarosh left the party, announcing
the formation of a new political project on the basis of
individual battalions of the Volunteer Ukrainian
Corps - the National Movement
"Yarosh's Statehood Initiative" (Diya). However, so
far little is known about the party's actual activities:
the party's website mainly publishes statements, reports
on the creation of regional organizations, and reports
on military and sports exercises or news from the front
[15].
Soon after the registration of the SAR,
representatives of the UNA-UNSO and Patriot of
Ukraine-SNA left it, trying to resume their own
political projects. In 2015, UNA-UNSO made
unsuccessful attempts to do so, eventually being
denied registration by the Ministry of Justice. The
Patriot of Ukraine-SNA has been much more
successful. Having practically ceased to exist in 2014
and transformed into the Azov regiment and the Civil
Corps NGO, in the spring of 2015 their
representatives returned to the idea of reviving the
party project and created the
"National Corps. However, the process dragged on
until 2016, and the symbolic day of the party's
creation is considered to be a significant date for
Ukrainians
Annex 295
Regional Studies, 2019 ♦ 122 October 14 is the feast of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The party was headed by A. Biletskyi, who was elected to the parliament in the 2014 early elections in the capital's majority constituency No. 217 [15]. Svoboda partially lost its popularity after the Revolution of Dignity, as reflected in the results of the early presidential and parliamentary elections. In the first, its leader O. Tyahnybok received 1.16% of the vote, and the party in the parliamentary elections - 4.71%. At the same time, six members of the party became MPs in single-member majoritarian constituencies. Many party members and supporters perceived these results as a defeat. However, Svoboda continued to fight for its electoral and nationalist niche. Its arsenal of methods included paramilitary traditions: public marches, torchlight processions, internal training, etc. This area of activity was significantly strengthened by the Legion of Freedom, created from participants in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the Sokol public organization, which is under the party's influence and whose many members also took part in the war. In early 2017, three most authoritative nationalist forces of the post-revolutionary period - Svoboda, the National Corps and "Right Sector - announced that they would join forces to achieve their goals together. For this purpose, their leaders O. Tyahnybok, A. Biletskyi and A. Tarasenko signed the "National Manifesto" on March 16, 2017, in the Kyiv City Teacher's House, in which they outlined a further action plan in case of victory in the elections. This political document was also supported by the OUN-M, led by B. Chervak, the KUN (S. Bratsyun) and the C14 organization (S. Mazur). This association significantly increased the cumulative effect of nationalist actions, which was clearly demonstrated by the traditional The "March of Glory of the UPA", which was held jointly by the three political forces on October 14, 2014 in Kyiv for the first time, and according to various sources, it had from 10 to 20 thousand participants [16; 17; 18]. Analyzing the prospects of this nationalist association, a number of experts agree that it has a real chance of entering the Ukrainian parliament, as the nationalist electoral field reaches 7-10% of those citizens who can potentially participate in the next elections. At the same time, on the eve of the 2019 presidential election, the association's members failed to maintain the level of consolidation achieved. Svoboda, with the support of the OUN-M, KUN, Right Sector, and the C14 movement, nominated R. Koshulynskyi, the Deputy Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada in 2012-2014, as a candidate for the presidency. R. Koshulynskyi, who is positioned as the "only nationalist candidate". Instead, the National Corps party, which was whose supporters started a discussion on social media with their opponents from Svoboda about who would be a better candidate for this position - R. Koshulynskyi or their leader A. Biletskyi - ultimately abstained from participating in the election [17; 19; 20]. Since the organizational foundations of these parties, regardless of the rebranding and transformations, are rooted in their or their predecessor organizations' pre-revolutionary activities, their ideological foundations have not undergone significant changes. Obviously, with the clarification that against their will, under the influence of Russian propaganda, which presented all defenders of Ukraine from Russian military aggression as "Banderites," the ideological influence of traditional Ukrainian nationalism and the national liberation struggle of the UPA began to spread to the National Corps as the organizational successor of the Patriot of Ukraine - SNA. A manifestation of this is obviously the fact that the date of the party's foundation is considered to be October 14, which is symbolic for Ukrainian nationalists and, in addition to its religious meaning, is also considered to be the date of the UPA's foundation. Thus, in the modern Ukrainian nation nalist movement since 1989 and until today, a paramilitary component has always been significantly present. The first of these organizations was Varta Rukhu, which later became one of the basic structures for the creation of the SNPU, later transformed into Svoboda. The SNPU-Svoboda took over from Varta Rukhu the tradition of using paramilitary methods of political struggle and constantly used them both independently and through the created party structures: "Narodni Zahony" and the Patriot of Ukraine Society for Assistance to the Armed Forces and the Navy in the 1990s and early 2000s, and the Legion of Freedom and Sokil after the Revolution of Dignity and during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Since the SNPU used the ideological heritage of the leading OUN-b figure Y. Stetsko as its ideological base, all subsequent paramilitary structures genetically related to it also followed this line, and their activities were indirectly influenced by the traditions and methods of the UPA's revolutionary liberation struggle. Direct organizational, resource and The OUN-B, which was involved in the creation of the DSU and initiated the creation of the KUN and the "S. Bandera's Trident. Accordingly, the latter was under the ideological influence of the OUN-B and the traditions of the UPA's national liberation struggle, and this influence was also automatically transferred to the paramilitary parapartisan structure of the DSU - the DSU Guard.
Annex 295
Regional Studies, 2019
♦
123
The most significant Ukrainian nationalist
paramilitary organization during the entire period of
Ukraine's independence was the UNSO. Its history is
full of participation in both domestic political
processes and international military conflicts.
However, despite the involvement of the son of the
UPA Commander-in-Chief Yuriy Shukhevych in its
leadership at various times, the ideological
foundations of this organization differed from the
ideological foundations of traditional Ukrainian
nationalism and were largely based on pan-Slavic
concepts. Accordingly, the influence of the UPA's
national liberation struggle was limited to imitation of
its methods.
The traditional ideology of Ukrainian nationalism
was not inherent in them, and the traditions of the
UPA's national liberation struggle did not influence
the paramilitary nationalist structures that were
organizationally based in Eastern and Southern
Ukraine, such as the Patriot of Ukraine, which was
restored in Kharkiv after the rebranding of the SNPU
and the SNA created on its basis. In addition to pan-
Slavic motives, their worldview was also
characterized by neo-Nazi and racist motives.
The Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014 gave a
chance for political resuscitation to those paramilitary
organizations that had ceased to have a significant
impact on socio-political processes: UNSO, Tryzub,
Patriot of Ukraine-SNA. They joined the Right Sector
public movement, which, along with the prerevolutionary
leader of the nationalist movement, the
Svoboda party, had the greatest influence on the
course of the revolution among other nationalist
structures.
With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war,
the experience of Ukrainian nationalist paramilitaries
The development of civil society organizations had a
decisive impact on the formation of the volunteer
movement, which played a significant role in
deterring Russian military aggression. The Patriot of
Ukraine-SNA created the Azov battalion, the Right
Sector created the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, and
Svoboda formed the Sich Interior Ministry battalion
and the Carpathian Sich volunteer battalion,
D. Korczynski's "Brotherhood" formed the special
purpose company of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
"St. Mary", a volunteer battalion "OUN" was formed
regardless of party influence, etc.
With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war,
military issues became a leading theme in political
processes and party building. It is used by political
forces of different ideological orientations. In
particular, this atmosphere also contributes to the
transformation of a number of paramilitary nationalist
forces. Having practically used the constituent
documents of the UNA, Tryzub transformed into a
party
"Right Sector, and the SNA-Patriot of Ukraine to the
National Corps party.
Under the influence of the military confrontation
with Russia, which propagandistically classified all
defenders of Ukraine as "Banderites," the ideological
influence of traditional Ukrainian nationalism and the
armed national liberation struggle of the UPA on all
nationalist structures analyzed, including the National
Corps as the organizational successor of the Patriot of
Ukraine and the SNA, has increased.
The article opens up the prospect of further
research on the modern nationalist movement, in
particular, the experience gained during the years of
independence and the prospects for consolidation
processes in the Ukrainian nationalist movement.
LIST OF REFERENCES:
1. Andriushchenko E. Ukrainian right-wing radical organizations in the context of socio-political processes (late 1980s - 2015) : PhD thesis for
the degree of Candidate of History: [specialty] 07.00.01 "History of Ukraine" ; Zaporizhzhia National University. Zaporizhzhia, 2015. 284 с.
2. Sych O. The Origins of Ukrainian Nationalism and the Development and Genealogy of the OUN (1891-2005). Galicia. Scientific and cultural
and educational local history journal. 2017. Ч. 29-30. С. 26-35.
3. Paska B. Valentyn Moroz's relations with the Social National Party of Ukraine. Social Policy in the Theory and Practice of Ukrainian
Nationalism: History and Present: in: Proceedings of the VIІ All-Ukrainian Scientific Conference dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the UPA. VIII All-
Ukrainian scientific conference dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the UPA (Ivano-Frankivsk, May 19-20, 2017). Ivano-Frankivsk: Lileia NV, 2017. С.
187-196.
4. Zelik R. History of the SNPU - Svoboda. Fundamentals of nationalism. Course I. Ivano-Frankivsk: Institute of Political Education of the All-
Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", 2008. С. 56-71.
5. History of the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda". URL : http://svoboda.org.ua/party/history/ (accessed August 03, 2017).
6. Trush V. Nationalist organizations of Ukraine during the period of independence: achievements, losses, prospects. The ideology of Ukrainian
nationalism at the present stage of development of the Ukrainian state: materials of the international scientific conference (Ivano-Frankivsk, October
12-13, 2006). Ivano-Frankivsk: Misto NV, 2007. С. 239-247.
7. Suta I. Development of the nationalist movement at the present stage / Ivan Suta. URL : http://banderivets.org.ua/ rozvytoknatsionalistychnogo-
ruhu-na-suchasnomu-etapi.html (accessed on 04.08.2017).
8. Program of the methodological seminar of the commanders of the DUN and similar formations and commandants of youth nationalist
training camps (Yaremche, May 13-15, 1994). Author's archive.
9. "An idea to a rank". Galicia. October 30, 1993.
Annex 295
Regional Studies, 2019 ♦ 124 10. Modern Ukrainian ultra-nationalist groups (regional features). URL : file:///C:/Users/Admin/Downloads/VKhnpu_filos_2012_37_5.pdf (accessed 11.11.2017). 11. Materials of the internal party ideological conference of Svoboda "Modern Challenges and Responses: Ideological Foundation and the Current Party Program". Author's archive. 12. Statement of the Patriot of Ukraine Organization on severing relations with Svoboda. URL : https://www.ar25.org/ article/zayava-organizaciyi-patriot-ukrayiny-pro-rozryv-stosunkiv-z-vo-svoboda.html (accessed on August 03, 2017). 13. Sych O.M. Influence of Ukrainian nationalist structures on the course of the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014. 14. Gilea: scientific herald. Collection of scientific papers. K.: Gilea Publishing House, 2018. Issue 136(9). С. 262-267. 15. We condemn the unauthorized use and appropriation of the name "OUN". URL : http://ukrnationalism.com/ news/officially-oun/2935-zasudzhuiemo-samovilne-vykorystannia-i-prysvoiennia-nazvy-oun.html (accessed 11.11.2017). 16. Radchuk O. The Right is Closing the Flank: Why Are More and More Politicians Tending to Nationalism? URL : https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2016/10/24/infografika/polityka/pravi-zamykayut-flanh-chomu-dedali-bilshe-politykiv- tyazhiyut-do-naczionalizmu (accessed November 28, 2017). 17. Nationalists sign and present the National Manifesto. URL : http://svoboda.org.ua/news/ events/00114270/ (accessed November 28, 2017). 18. Radchuk O. Always right: what will the United Nationalists offer voters? URL : https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2017/03/17/kolonka/aleksandr-radchuk/polityka/zavzhdy-pravi-novoho-zaproponuyut- vyborcyam-obyednani-naczionalisty (accessed July 30, 2017). 19. How the nationalists marched in Kyiv on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the UPA. URL : https://hromadske.ua/posts/marsh- natsionalistiv-u-kyievi (accessed November 28, 2017). 20. All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" nominates Ruslan Koshulynsky, head of the party's secretariat, as a candidate for the post of President of Ukraine. URL : https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-elections/2624422-svoboda- visunula-kosulinskogo-u-prezidenti.html (accessed February 03, 2019). 21. The National Corps political party is not nominating a candidate for the presidency of Ukraine in the March 31, 2019 elections. URL : https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-elections/2627120-nackorpus- ne-bude-visuvati-kandidata-u-prezidenti.html (accessed February 03, 2019).
Annex 296
Unn.com.ua, Financing of terrorism by Rybalka's companies: pre-trial investigation continues,
examinations appointed (17 October 2018)
(translation)

Annex 296
Translation
Unn.com.ua, Financing of terrorism by Rybalka's companies: pre-trial investigation continues,
examinations appointed (17 October 2018), available at:
https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1758010-finansuvannya-terorizmu-kompaniyami-ribalkidosudove-
rozsliduvannya-trivaye-priznacheni-ekspertizi.
Financing of terrorism by Rybalka's companies: pre-trial
investigation continues, examinations appointed
Petr Ivasyuk
KIEV. 17 October. UNN. The Zarechny District Court of Sumy granted the request of the SBU
investigator to conduct a forensic economic examination in the criminal proceedings on the
financing of terrorism involving the company Snack Export LLC, which, in turn, belongs to the
father of people’s deputy from the RPOL (Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko) Sergey Rybalka - Viktor
Rybalka. This is evidenced by the data of the Unified Register of Court Decisions, UNN reports.
In particular, this refers to criminal proceedings No. 22018200000000034 dated 20 March 2018.
Thus, during the pre-trial investigation in the said criminal proceedings, it was established that from
January 2016 to the present (a more precise date has not been established by the pre-trial
investigation), a group of persons, which, in particular, included the deputy director of the
department for foreign economic activity of "Snack Export" LLC (name and surname are not
specified - ed.), acting intentionally and for mercenary motives, by prior conspiracy with a
temporarily unemployed citizen of Ukraine (name and surname withheld - ed.) and officials of "Mir
Piva" LLC (Republic of Belarus), as well as other unidentified individuals and legal entities,
including those operating in the territories controlled by the terrorist organisations "DPR" and
"LPR", carried out activities aimed at financing the said terrorist organisations.
"Realising the goal of the criminal conspiracy and guided by a mercenary motive, a group of
people, which included PERSON_1 (Deputy Director of the Department for Foreign Economic
Activity of "Snack Export" LLC - ed.), together with PERSON_2 and other persons, being aware of
the fact that the terrorist organisations "DPR" and "LPR" were operating in part of the territories of
Lugansk and Donetsk regions, set up illegal supplies of "Snack Export" products to the said
temporarily occupied territories," the document says.
Also, according to the register of court decisions, the criminal scheme consisted in the fact that
"Snack Export LLC", which is part of "SGroup" Corporation on the basis of relevant foreign
economic agreements, "supplies its own products (snacks, crackers, chips, etc.) to "Mir Piva" LLC".
"Subsequently, "Mir Piva" LLC and other companies, in violation of Ukrainian and international
law, under circumstances that are currently being established, on the basis of relevant foreign
economic agreements, supply the said products to the temporarily occupied territory of Donetsk and
Lugansk regions, in particular to legal entities operating in the territories controlled by the terrorist
organisations "DPR" and "LPR", through temporarily blocked checkpoints across the state border of
Ukraine from the Russian Federation, while paying for the interests of the terrorist organisations.
Annex 296
It is also noted that after the actual delivery of the products to the temporarily occupied territory and payment of the so-called "customs duties" to the budget of the "DPR" and "LPR", they are distributed for sale in stores and retail chains that have been arbitrarily seized ("nationalised") by the leaders of terrorist organisations. "Thus, the so-called "customs duties" and "taxes" paid as a result of the hidden transit of goods by "Snack Export" LLC are used to support the activities of these terrorist organisations and their individual leaders and members," the document says. On September 18, 2018, the investigator of the SBU Office in Sumy region conducted a review of the materials of criminal proceedings No. 22018200000000034 dated 20 March 2018. It is reported that during the review of the criminal proceedings, it was established that they contain information relevant to determining the amount of the so-called "customs duties" and "taxes" to be paid to the budgets of the terrorist organisations of the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR. "In order to clarify the circumstances that are essential for the criminal proceedings, for the purpose of a full, comprehensive, impartial investigation of the said criminal proceedings, it became necessary to conduct a forensic economic examination, which requires special knowledge," the document says. The court granted the investigator's request, thereby instructing the experts of the Sumy Scientific Research Forensic Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine to conduct a forensic economic examination in criminal proceedings No. 22018200000000034 dated 20 March 2018. The day before, the Zarechny Court of Sumy delivered a guilty verdict against one of the managers of Rybalka's family company "Snack Export" LLC on the fact of assistance in financing terrorism. Earlier, the leader of the Radical Party, Oleg Lyashko, said that those who trade with some parts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions should be imprisoned. "This issue is currently under investigation. It is being conducted by the Security Service of Ukraine. I'm not interfering yet, because I want everything to be done in accordance with the law. If the facts are confirmed, I don't care what the surname of the person who trades with the occupied territories is. This is a crime. And he must be held accountable. Rybalka himself claims that this is not the case. But I say again that I am not interfering in the situation. I demand that law enforcement agencies investigate this case. And if someone trades with the occupied territories, they should be imprisoned for life. Because such trade is a trade in blood," Lyashko said on one of the Ukrainian TV channels.
Annex 297
YouTube, Victoria Nuland's Admits Washington Has Spent $5 Billion to "Subvert Ukraine"
(9 February 2014)
(translation)

Annex 297
Page 1 out of 4
Transcript
YouTube, Victoria Nuland's Admits Washington Has Spent $5 Billion to "Subvert Ukraine"
(9 February 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2fYcHLouXY.
Transcript
[0:05]
Ladies and gentlemen, it's my great honor and pleasure to introduce to you the Assistant Secretary
of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland. Victoria just recently returned from
Kiev and has an update on the situation there as well as the US’ Government position. Victoria.
[0:40]
Annex 297
Page 2 out of 4 Thank you Roman. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for you being here and for your continued support for the U.S.-Ukraine relationship and thank you for the invitation to speak to you today. [0:53] Still jet-lagged from my third trip in five weeks to Ukraine and my days in Kiev earlier this week. I don't have to tell this crowd that these are historic and challenging times for the people of Ukraine, for the Ukrainian-American relationship, and for people everywhere who care about the future of that great country. [1:20] The world is watching the drama that is unfolding in the center of Kiev. The Euromaidan movement has come to embody the principles and values that are the cornerstones for all free democracies. [1:34] What began on November 24th as a protest against President Yanukovych's decision to pause on the route to Europe has become much deeper and bigger. After blood was spilled by security forces on November 30th the movement also became about justice and civil rights and Ukraine's desire to have a government. [1:55] Ukrainians desire to have a government that respects them, that listens to them, that protects them and that provides for them - a modern democratic government. That was palpable when I made my first visit to the Maidan on December 5th. When Ukrainians say they are European, this is what they mean. And as one very prominent Ukrainian businessman said to me, the Maidan movement’s greatest achievement is that it has proven that the people of Ukraine will no longer support any president... [2:30] …this one or a future one who does not take them to Europe. Throughout this period the United States’ message has been clear and unequivocal: we stand with the people of Ukraine in their search for justice, human dignity, security, a return to economic health, and for the European future that they have chosen and that they deserve. [2:53] As you know and as Roman said I returned to Ukraine for my third visit in five weeks last Tuesday in support of these very goals. This time conducting parallel coordinated high-level diplomacy with EU High Representative Cathy Ashton with all of the key Ukrainian stakeholders. [3:15] Then halfway through our visit, in the wee hours of Wednesday, December 10th, we witnessed the appalling show of force by government forces, who turned riot police, bulldozers, and tear gas on the Maidan demonstrators as they sang hymns and prayed for peace. [3:33] Ukrainians of all ages and backgrounds flooded to the Maidan to protect it. Secretary Kerry wasted no time in expressing the United States’ disgust at this decision of the Ukrainian government and
Annex 297
Page 3 out of 4 by morning the riot police had been forced to retreat. Later that same day I spent more than two hours with President Yanukovych. [3:58] It was a tough conversation but also a realistic one. I made absolutely clear to him on behalf of the United States that what happened on December 10th and more generally what has been happening in security terms is absolutely impermissible in a European State, in a democratic State. But I also made clear that the United States believes there is a way out for Ukraine, that it is still possible to save Ukraine's European future and that that is where we wanted to see the President lead his country. [4:35] And that was going to require immediate steps to de-escalate the security situation and immediate political steps to end the crisis and get Ukraine back into a conversation with Europe and with the International Monetary Fund. As you all know and as I'm sure you just heard from Anders and other colleagues, Ukraine's economy is in a dire state, having been in recession for more than a year and with less than three months’ worth of foreign currency reserves in place. [5:02] The reforms that the IMF insists on are necessary for the long-term economic health of the country. A new deal with the IMF would also send a positive signal to private markets and would increase foreign direct investment that is so urgently needed in Ukraine. Signing the association agreement with the EU would also put Ukraine on a path to strengthening the sort of stable and predictable business environment that investors require. [5:30] There is no other path that would bring Ukraine back to long-term political stability and economic growth. We also commend the EU for leaving the door open on the association agreement and for continuing to work with the Ukrainian government on a way forward. The Ukrainian Parliament has already passed some 18 separate pieces of required legislation in advance of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. [5:56] Although that was a missed opportunity, it would be a huge shame to see five years’ worth of work and preparation go to waste if the AA is not signed in the near future. So, it is time to finish the job. As Vice-President Biden said in remarks last night, President Yanukovych has a choice – he can choose the path that leads to division and isolation or he can take a leap and take immediate tangible steps to defuse his country's crisis and start a genuine dialogue with the opposition and agree on a path that returns Ukraine to economic and political health. [6:38] While these are challenging times in many ways, we also can't lose sight of the fact that this is a time for great optimism as well. You only have to be on the Maidan to feel the energy, to feel the hope of Ukrainians coursing through the center of Kiev and across the country. People are engaging because they know they have a stake in the future of their country. [7:04]
Annex 297
Page 4 out of 4 We see energy, we see optimism that simply didn't exist in Ukraine 20 years ago. People of all ages, of all classes, of all walks of life are taking ownership of their future and coming out into the streets to demand a European future. They're doing so peacefully, with great courage, and with enormous personal restraint. [7:26] Since Ukraine's independence in 1991 the United States has supported Ukrainians as they build democratic skills and institutions, as they promote civic participation and good governance, all of which are preconditions for Ukraine to achieve its European aspirations. We've invested over five billion dollars to assist Ukraine in these and other goals that will ensure a secure and prosperous and democratic Ukraine. [7:51] Today there are senior officials in the Ukrainian government, in the business community, as well as in the opposition civil society and the religious community who believe in this democratic and European future for their country, and they've been working hard to move their country and their President in the right direction. [8:14] We urge the government, we urge the President to listen to these voices, to listen to the Ukrainian people, to listen to the Euromaidan and take Ukraine forward. The support of the people in this room is absolutely essential. [8:31] We thank you for all you are doing, we thank you for your partnership all these years, and we look forward to continuing to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with you as we take Ukraine into the future that it deserves. Thank you very much for the time today. [Applause]
Annex 298 Unian.ua, In Lvov activists continue to block the RSA building, "Berkut" bases and internal troops (24 January 2014) (translation)

Annex 298
Translation
Unian.ua, In Lvov activists continue to block the RSA building, "Berkut" bases and internal
troops (24 January 2014), available at: https://www.unian.ua/politics/875962-u-lvovi-aktivistiprodovjuyut-
blokuvati-budivlyu-oda-bazi-berkutu-i-vnutrishnih-viysk.html.
In Lvov activists continue to block the RSA building, Berkut
bases and internal troops
09:24, 24.01.14
Activists block the gates of a military unit in Lvov
According to a UNIAN correspondent, during the night all the blocking points were calm and
uncrowded, starting from 7.30 am Lvov residents started to come to the blockers, people also
gathered at Lvov Euromaidan.
Currently, there are about 50 activists near the Lvov Regional State Administration, warming
themselves near barrels with a fire. During the night, the protesters erected a barricade near the RSA
building made of bags filled with snow, wooden logs and tires. A stage was also set up, but no one
is currently speaking from it.
People stayed in the building of the regional state administration all night, according to the activists
themselves, there were several dozens of them. A "field canteen" has been set up in the RSA
building, with women preparing sandwiches and hot drinks.
The protesters behaved calmly and made no attempts to break down doors or damage other
property. In the corridors, they pinned leaflets with inscriptions: "Ukraine, get up!".
Annex 298
According to the activists of the "Soten’ samooboroni", they do not plan to leave the RSA building, as "Lvov Regional State Administration is criminal" and express their readiness to keep the siege until the formation of local People's Councils. Also, Lvov residents, including relatives of "Berkut" officers and soldiers, continue to block the bases of the Special Forces and Internal Troops. As of 8:00 a.m., there are about 200 people near the bases, who calmed down after regional police leaders assured them that there are no plans to send special forces to Kiev. No attempts are being made to break through or leave the bases. The situation here is calm, people are warming themselves near barrels with fires, food and drinks and warm clothes are brought to them. As activists of the Lvov Euromaidan told a UNIAN correspondent, today about 600 people left Lvov for Kiev by buses and minibuses, and on the night of January 23-24, about 300 activists left the region for the capital by their own transport and by rail. There are currently about 20 people at Lvov's Euromaidan, clearing snow near the tents. In the headquarters tent, they are sorting warm clothes that are constantly brought here by Lvov residents to send them to Kiev with the next batch of activists who will leave for Kiev today. At the same time, according to "Euromaidan SOS" on Facebook, tonight in Yavorovsky district, Lvov region, people blocked the Lvov-Krakovets road, burning tires and not letting trucks pass. According to anonymous sources, the road was probably blocked in order to prevent the military from leaving the town of Novoyavorovsk. As UNIAN reported, on January 23 in Lvov, protesters seized the building of the regional state administration and forced the governor Oleg Salo to write a letter of resignation. Later, the press service of the governor said that he had written the letter under pressure. Criminal proceedings were opened over the seizure of the Lvov Regional State Administration on the grounds of a criminal offence under Paragraph 1 of Article 341 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (seizure of state or public buildings or structures).
Annex 299
DailyLviv.com, Lvov Regional State Administration and "Berkut" and Internal Troops bases are
being blocked (24 January 2014)
(translation)

Annex 299
Translation
DailyLviv.com, Lvov Regional State Administration and "Berkut" and Internal Troops bases are
being blocked (24 January 2014), available at: https://dailylviv.com/news/polityka/u-lvoviblokuyut-
prymishchenny.
Lvov Regional State Administration and "Berkut" and
Internal Troops bases are being blocked
24 January 2014, 11:14
The protesters behaved calmly, and there were no attempts to break down doors or damage other
property.
According to a UNIAN correspondent, during the night all the blocking points were calm and
uncrowded. Starting from 7:30 am, Lvov residents began to come to the blockade, and people are
also gathering at Lvov's Euromaidan.
Currently, there are about 50 activists near the Lvov Regional State Administration, warming
themselves near barrels with fire. During the night, the protesters erected a barricade near the RSA
building made of bags filled with snow, wooden logs and tires. A stage was also set up, but no one
is currently speaking from it.
People were staying in the building of the regional state administration all night, according to the
activists themselves, several dozen of them. A "field canteen" has been set up in the RSA building,
with women preparing sandwiches and hot drinks.
The protesters are behaving calmly, there have been no attempts to break down doors or damage
other property. In the corridors, they have pinned leaflets with inscriptions: "Ukraine, get up!".
According to the activists of the "Soten’ samooboroni", they do not plan to leave the RSA building,
as "Lvov Regional State Administration is criminal" and express their readiness to keep the siege
until the formation of local People's Councils.
Also, Lvov residents, including relatives of "Berkut" officers and soldiers, continue to block the
bases of the special forces and Internal Troops. As of 8:00 a.m., there are about 200 people near the
bases, who calmed down after regional police leaders assured them that there are no plans to send
special forces to Kiev.
No attempts are being made to break through or leave the bases. The situation here is calm, people
are warming themselves near barrels with fires, food and drinks and warm clothes are brought to
them.
As activists of the Lvov Euromaidan told a UNIAN correspondent, today about 600 people left
Lvov for Kiev by buses and minibuses, and on the night of January 23-24, about 300 activists left
the region for the capital by their own transport and by rail.
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There are currently about 20 people at Lvov's Euromaidan, clearing snow from the tents. In the headquarters tent, they are sorting warm clothes that are constantly brought here by Lvov residents to send them to Kiev with the next batch of activists who will leave for Kiev today. At the same time, as reported by "Euromaidan SOS" on Facebook, tonight in the Lvov region in Yavorovskiy district, people blocked the Lvov-Krakovets Road, burning tires and not letting trucks pass. According to anonymous sources, the road was probably blocked in order to prevent the military from leaving the town of Novoyavorovsk. As UNIAN reported, on January 23 in Lvov, protesters seized the building of the regional state administration and forced the governor Oleg Salo to write a letter of resignation. Later, the press service of the governor said that he wrote the letter under pressure. Criminal proceedings were initiated over the seizure of the Lvov Regional State Administration on the grounds of a criminal offense under Paragraph 1 of Article 341 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (seizure of state or public buildings or structures). Meanwhile, Radio Svoboda journalist Galina Tereshchuk reported the following about the events in Lvov at night: "The premises of the Lvov regional administration were "seized" by Lvov residents. The headquarters of the Maidan People's Council is located in one of the offices here, and people will be on duty all night. A barricade has been set up in front of the building. The protesters also forced the head of the Lvov Regional State Administration, Oleg Salo, to write a letter of resignation, which he later withdrew. On Wednesday morning, several thousand Lvov residents came to Lvov's Maidan, joining the nationwide strike called by opposition representatives. Some of the people marched to the Lvov Regional Administration building, accompanied by local politicians and trade union activists. People rushed to the building's doors, but the guards did not let them in. However, on the instructions of the regional council members and one of its leaders, Lvov residents entered the building. They blocked the door to the reception room of the head of the regional state administration. The head of the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Aleksandr Rudyak, immediately arrived at the administration and had a long conversation with the people, asking them not to commit illegal actions or block the state institution. - "Can you promise that you will not send our sons to Kiev?" - "Who will be responsible for the murders of people? - asked the people of Lvov. The conversation ended with shouts of "Shame" and even a demand that the police chief write a letter of resignation. But he, unlike the head of the regional state administration, Oleg Salo, did not do so. Oleg Salo went out to the street and people forced him to write a letter of resignation.
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"Now we will register it in the office and this statement will be sent to the presidential
administration. Lvov residents came to express their position in view of the atrocities of the
authorities," said Lubomyr Melnychuk, a deputy from the "Svoboda" party. The statement was
registered, but within minutes Oleg Salo withdrew it and explained his action by saving the
employees of the regional state administration, emphasising that he wrote the statement under
pressure from the crowd.
The prosecutor's decision did not stop people
The premises where the RSA is located are communally owned by the local community. The
administration leases only part of the space from the regional council, according to an agreement
that was not renewed on January 1. And the deputies have repeatedly decided to evict officials, but
the prosecutor's office has challenged this.
And this time, a criminal proceeding was registered over the seizure of the LRSA building on the
grounds of a criminal offence under Article 341 of the Criminal Code (seizure of state and public
buildings or structures). Law enforcement officers have launched a pre-trial investigation. Such
illegal actions are punishable by up to three years in prison.
But this decision of the prosecutor's office did not stop Lvov residents. They calmly walked around
the spacious premises, admired the interior and did not damage any of the property.
- "What kind of mass disorder is this, we came here to our building, they live on our taxes. I'm here
for the first time because of the security. This place would be better suited for a hospital than these
officials sitting here.
- It's a horror what is happening in Kiev, people are being killed there. We came here to our
building because it is the people's property, and there are officials here who live off our taxes. They
should remember this.
- This will be a disaster for the entire Ukrainian people, if we don't stand together, it will be the end
of everything.
- No one guarantees anything to anyone, if you are not here, if you do not stand up, then bandits
will come to you, - the people of Lvov could not contain their emotions.
In the evening, local "Svoboda" members and Maidan activists set up a barricade in front of the
RSA building. The headquarters of the People's Council of Maidan, which is supposed to create an
executive committee and take over the powers, is located in the building of the regional
administration.
However, many Lvov residents cannot understand why they should barricade the building where the
administration and council are located if they need to mobilise to Kiev and defend justice and the
future of the country. There is even an opinion that certain forces in Lvov are trying to deliberately
destabilise the situation in order to push the authorities to introduce a state of emergency in the
country. Lvov Mayor Andrey Sadovy warned Lvov residents against provocations in a video
message.

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TSN, Map of seizures of regional state administrations in Ukraine: eight regions are under the
control of demonstrators (24 January 2014)
(translation)

Annex 300
Translation
TSN, Map of seizures of regional state administrations in Ukraine: eight regions are under the
control of demonstrators (24 January 2014), available at: https://tsn.ua/politika/karta-zahoplenoda-
v-ukrayini-visim-regioniv-opinilisya-pid-kontrolem-demonstrantiv-331198.html.
Map of seizures of regional state administrations in Ukraine:
eight regions are under the control of demonstrators
TSN Editorial
In Lutsk and Uzhgorod, regional administrations are under siege.
In the regions, regional councils and regional administrations were seized en masse, according to a
report by "TSN" 19:30.
After several hours of storming, the protesters occupied the Chernovtsy Regional State
Administration, and a little earlier - Ivano-Frankovsk. People are already cleaning up the premises
of the Khmelnytsky regional and Zhytomyr city administrations.
In Lvov, protesters have been holding the administration since yesterday. The uprising has spread to
the districts of Lvov region.
The geography of protests in Ukraine is expanding / Photo: TSN.ua
Protesters are also controlling the Ternopol and Rovno regional administrations and, for two
months now, the Kiev city administration. The regional state administrations in Lutsk and
Uzhgorod are under siege.
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In Cherkasy, the police took back the premises of the previously seized administration from the protesters. The prosecutor's office opened criminal cases over all the facts of the storming.
Annex 301
2000.ua, Mysterious Maidan snipers (14 October 2015)
(translation)

Annex 301
Translation
2000.ua, Mysterious Maidan snipers (14 October 2015), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220125010212/https:/www.2000.ua/specproekty_ru/rassledo
vanie/tainstvennye-snajpery-majdana.htm.
Mysterious Maidan snipers
Yuri LUKASHIN
Special investigation "2000" of mass shooting case: Maidan
rioters and Berkut servicemen point to a third party
Court hearing. Sergey Zinchenko and Pavel Abroskin
Over the past year and a half, against the backdrop of the war in Donbas and the
thousands of dead, maimed, and dispossessed citizens, the Maidan shootings in the winter
of 2014, which claimed the lives of about a hundred and fifty people (from the Maidan and
security forces), may not seem like a significant episode of the giant bloody drama that the
country was plunged into. Nevertheless, it was those first shots and then the mass murders
committed that unfortunate winter by still unidentified snipers that proved to be the
rubicon after which everything that Ukraine has endured and will continue to endure
became possible.
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Who really pulled the trigger first? In whose interest was it done? What direction is the investigation taking and, in general, is it considering any alternative versions of what happened? Presumably, we have long been acquainted with, and know well enough, the official version of the Bankovaya, the Prosecutor General's Office, the Interior Ministry and all those who are now investigating those events on behalf of the authorities. For a year and a half this interpretation of events has been diligently implanted in the ears of the average man. But the further the official investigation progresses, the more new questions and very strange inconsistencies in the official version arise. Why drag out the case According to the Prosecutor-General's Office, investigators have identified 22 members of the Berkut special squad who were part of the so-called "black company" which allegedly carried out the mass shooting of the Heavenly Hundred. At least 17 Berkut officers from this list are wanted. Remarkably, no one knows whether these people are alive at all! The official version indicates that they are simply hiding from the investigation and fled the country. Five Berkut officers are now under arrest. They are: two junior sergeants, Pavel Abroskin and Sergey Zinchenko (who were arrested in March-April 2014 right in their quarters); special company soldiers Alexander Marinchenko and Sergey Tamtura (arrested almost a year after the first suspects on 24 February 2015); and former Deputy Commander of the special police regiment of the Chief Department of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry in Kiev, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Yanyshevsky (arrested 28 June 2015). All those detained at the time of their arrest were still serving in their units. Only the commander of the Berkut special company Dmitriy Sadovnyk suddenly fled from the investigation on 4 October 2014. But he, too, had been arrested for several months at first, and then released by the court under house arrest due to lack of evidence. However, immediately after his disappearance, the Pecherskiy District Court judge Svetlana Volkova, who had changed the form of his pre-trial restriction, was dismissed. A criminal case was then opened against her as well - for issuing a knowingly unlawful ruling. The most high-profile trial in the mystery sniper case involves the first detained Berkut servicemen Pavel Abroskin and Sergey Zinchenko, who are accused by the PGO of shooting at least 39 people. Until July of this year, for a year and a half, the Svyatoshinsky District Court of Kyiv that hears the case, only prolonged the pre-trial restriction (detention in Lukyanovskoye pretrial isolation facility) every few months at the request of the prosecutors. It took many months and a series of judicial deliberations just to assemble a full jury that will sit in court and decide the fate of the defendants together with the judges. The ice has broken It is not hard to foresee that when the criminal cases against the other Berkut officers are sent to court, judges will behave in the same way. After all, no one has presented comprehensive evidence that it was law enforcers who carried out the mass shootings on the orders of either Yanukovych or one of the then heads of the security agencies. In other words, there is still no legally substantiated fact that law enforcers were given the order to shoot, let alone to kill. This means that it is not clear who organised and carried out the shootings and why. On the other hand, it is high time that the courts, prosecutors and, most importantly, our post-Maidan political elite provide society with at least some hard evidence that what
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they have been telling us on TV from the beginning is what really took place on the Maidan in the winter of 2014. Otherwise, the further they go, the more doubts people will have about it. Moreover, several groups of lawyers from the defence side are trying to conduct their own alternative investigation: one after another new facts emerge, which one day may completely dismantle the official version. As a result, the courts handling Berkut cases have come under unprecedented pressure both from the top and Maidan activists, as well as numerous relatives of the dead who, among other things, seek multi-million compensations. The judges cannot simply acquit or release, say, under house arrest any of the other suspects now either. Obviously, this is why we have seen all these long months of strange, to put it mildly, procedural red tape that has prevented the courts from considering the merits of the case. The first developments in the Abroskin and Zinchenko case came only on 16 July of this year, when the court finally started hearing evidence statements of the first group of witnesses and victims. Among them were relatives of the dead Maidan activists: Eduard Grynevych’s mother, Igor Kostenko’s father, Maxim Shimko’s father and Sergey Baidovsky’s father. In the first cross-examination, prosecutors, for the first time, asked similar questions of all the speakers on behalf of the victims: "Did the deceased have weapons? Did they have the intention or opportunity to acquire them? At what time and where were they located at the time of the shooting?" Despite the fact that the parents of the four Maidan participants on 20 February were not near their sons at the time of their murder, their answers were typical: "There was a wooden shield and a stick (plastic/wooden)." The Berkut's lawyers tried to find out from each of the plaintiffs exactly at whom their claims are directed and why they were sure that it was the two defendants who had killed their sons. According to the lawyers, the Berkut officers needed to cover up somehow the retreat and removal of the bodies of their wounded and dead comrades-in-arms. And if the ‘siloviki’ did shoot, they did it not to kill but were shooting in the air and at the ground with Kalashnikovs, which - due to their design and intended use - simply cannot be used for well-aimed sniper fire. The relatives of the victims themselves have stated that, judging by the nature of the wounds, their sons were targeted with sniper shots - in the head, neck (artery), heart - in order to inflict wounds incompatible with life. The suspects' lawyers also drew the court's attention to the fact that hundreds of different people - both protesters and siloviki - were moving around, entering and exiting the perimeter of the street where the plaintiffs' relatives were killed; among siloviki, there were also, besides Berkut, the special groups Alfa, Omega etc. Igor Kostenko, the father of one of the dead, responded: "Abroskin and Zinchenko were part of the shooting group... The prosecutor's office knows the trajectories of the bullets. In Sadovnik's group, Sadovnik himself fired eight shots from his automatic rifle, while there were three shooters. One of them killed my son." But we draw your attention to one of several mysterious videos confirming that there may have been some people in various buildings not under siloviki’s control who could have been the mysterious snipers who fired shots at both sides of the conflict. In this video, some masked men who do not speak Russian or Ukrainian hurriedly leave the Dnipro Hotel immediately after the active shootings, carrying large bags that could well have contained weapons. This video and many similar pieces of photo and video evidence (not even taking into account a lot of small incidents like ‘Pashinskiy's rifle’) should be the subject of the closest investigators' attention.
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At the moment, it is clear that the relatives of the victims in the court hearings are sticking to the version promoted solely by the prosecutors and the lawyers' group of the Heavenly Hundred. And this version is simple. Even if the defendants Abroskin and Zinchenko never shot anyone at all, they were still not far from the scene of the Maidan rioters’ death and should therefore be in jail, because they may be concealing the real culprits, i.e. their former fellow officers. At the same time, our personal contacts with some of the relatives of the dead have shown that even they have good reason to doubt the official version. They even tried to hold several rallies during the Svyatoshinsky court hearings where they demanded that a special investigative commission be set up to oversee the investigation and the courts and prosecutors' handling of the evidence under the auspices of the general public. Zoya Kuzmenko, the mother of Maksim Shimko who had died on the Maidan, told us about a lot of inconsistencies in the official version. Sergeants in the role of scapegoats As part of our journalistic investigation, we managed to talk to the closest relatives of Pavel Abroskin and Sergey Zinchenko. That is what shocked us most of all: they say that practically no Ukrainian TV channels, or other media outlets, show any interest in the position of either the suspects or their lawyers at all. During a series of court hearings that we were able to attend, we were surprised to discover that Ukrainian journalists really do not even try to communicate with the main defendants, their relatives or their lawyers. Yevgeniya, Pavel Abroskin's sister, explains it simply: this is the editorial policy of most domestic media, where an unspoken taboo has been imposed on any version of events that may contradict the official one. Therefore, the few comments that Pavel's and Sergey's relatives tried to give to Ukrainian TV channels were either severely distorted in the process of video editing of the stories or simply did not make it into the newscasts. Speaking with Pavel Abroskin's sister Yevgenia, we managed to find out a lot of curious details - about the behaviour of the investigators, about a number of events during court hearings that have not been made public in the media until now. The relatives of both suspects point out that after Yanukovych had fled, a significant number of the Berkut officers, as well as members of other special units, left as early as March 2014 for Crimea, Russia and the self-proclaimed republics of Donbas. But Pavel and Sergey continued to serve in their unit in the spring of 2014 (disbanded only later). And so, says Mikhail Alekseevich, Pavel Abroskin's father, almost a month after the events on the Maidan, they are suddenly arrested right at work, on the grounds of the allegedly existing photo and video evidence that identified their faces. Thus, according to the investigation, the two young men, aged just over 25, turn out to be the main perpetrators of the Maidan shootings. In particular, Abroskin, according to his relatives who are leading their civilian investigation into the case, was, intentionally or not, mistaken for a man in a Maidan photo who is considerably taller than Pavel. According to relatives, a photo of a well-known internal troops colonel, Sergey Asavelyuk, who is now serving in the ATO zone, may also be used as ‘Pavel’.
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When we visited both the families of Sergey Zinchenko and Pavel Abroskin, we found it even harder to believe that they would be capable - even hypothetically - of mass murder. Both come from well-to-do military families. They are not rich, they are ordinary people like millions all over Ukraine. By the way, Berkut has for many years been considered one of the most elite and prestigious special forces units in Ukraine. It was a dream of thousands of young people from all over the country to get there. In a unit that had in place a polished to perfection mechanism of the most thorough selection of candidates, the probability of there being servicemen capable of shooting people arbitrarily is close to zero. The main evidence against the second Berkut officer, Zinchenko, is that he is left-handed. A left-handed policeman was photographed near Zhovtneviy firing in the direction of the protesters. However, family, friends and fellow officers assure that Sergey only wrote with his left hand, but did everything else with his right since childhood. His sister Tatiana shows photos of him from the service, including some amateur ones in which he is depicted with a submachine gun in his right hand and in a right-handed posture. In the opinion of Zinchenko's family, Sergey and other Berkut officers, despite the lack of evidence, are being put on a show trial. And those who are trying to cover up the tracks of the real snipers, who shot at both the siloviki and the protesters, have chosen the ordinary sergeants as scapegoats. Clear inconsistencies The pictures produced by the prosecution show only some people in uniforms shooting somewhere. There is no video or photo footage showing that any Maidan activists were killed or injured after these particular persons’ shots. Moreover, according to the suspects' lawyer Igor Varfolomeyev, who was acquainted with these photos and videos, the defendants do not bear the slightest resemblance to the people who the investigation claims them to be. The official version of the prosecution says that Abroskin and Zinchenko were part of the so-called ‘black company’ made up of Berkut and Alfa officers and a group of the so-called ‘titushki’, who allegedly had stolen weapons in their units and began to shoot Maidan activists with them. The prosecutor's office affirms that the two main suspects, along with their fellow servicemen, allegedly killed at least 39 people. You may ask: why such a strange version (stolen weapons!), and what could have been the motive of these young soldiers, who are far from big politics and altercations at the top? Why would they shoot the protesters, and why would they use weapons that had been stolen from the warehouse of their own unit? And then, after all the events, including the change of political power, why would they continue to serve in their unit, go on living in their places of residential registration, go to work as if nothing had happened! Politicians and lawyers on the prosecution side can, of course, offer a lot of fancy formulas on the subject. However, over the past year and a half, neither the Prosecutor-General's Office nor the newly-appointed siloviki who are handling the case and have already searched all the archives of the Interior Ministry, SBU, Bankovaya, etc., have been able to provide the court with any documentary evidence that the order to shoot at the Maidan protesters with firearms ever existed. As suspects' lawyer Igor Varfolomeyev explained to us, the investigation has not a single document at all which would confirm that the order to use firearms against the protesters could have been given in writing or verbally by Yanukovych, the Interior Ministry or the Security Service of Ukraine.
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Hence the whole bizarre version about the arrested Berkut servicemen. Moreover, there is no data in the official logs from the weapons depots that any weapons were handed over to these specific defendants on the days of the shootings. Non-lethal weapons (rubber bullet guns, noise and smoke grenades, etc.) these suspected Berkut servicemen may have had on the days of shootings, but the firearms (according to the documents) may have not. This is probably why the investigation claims that the so-called Black Company stole weapons and ammunition from warehouses, then shot Maidan activists with them, and then somehow incomprehensibly disposed of the evidence. Among the arguments of lawyer Varfolomeyev, who urges citizens and the court to exercise elementary logic, is this one: why has there been no comprehensive investigation into the murders of the officers of Berkut and other security forces so far? Neither lawyers nor the public have ever been given full access to the results of ballistics and other expert examinations, so that independent experts could have cross-checked them. Why and where have the trees with bullet holes disappeared, which, according to Varfolomeyev, would have made it possible to assert that sniper fire on both the siloviki and the protesters was carried out from the same positions? In particular, there is ample evidence that shots were fired for some time from the top floors of the Ukraine Hotel, the Philharmonic Hall and other locations that the security forces did not control during the shootouts on the Maidan. There is also a lot of video and other physical evidence that Maidan activists were injured and killed as a result of shots fired not only from the side where the siloviki were stationed. And most importantly, if the so-called 'Black Company' was shooting at everyone, as the official version says, then why was it shooting at representatives of the security forces themselves? Pavel's and Sergey's relatives said that among the dead and seriously injured Berkut officers were many of their close friends and colleagues. Here are excerpts from documents provided to us by Igor Varfolomeyev about the number of injured and dead law enforcers. From the Interior Ministry's latest response to the lawyer's request: "In the period of from 21.11.2013 to 24.02.2014... due to injuries and wounds received in the course of protecting public order in Kiev during this period... medical assistance was sought by 1,270 law enforcers, of which 824 were hospitalized. Of this number, 140 policemen and servicemen suffered gunshot wounds and 13 people of this category died..." And further from the Council of Europe's International Advisory Group (IAG) report of 31 March 2015 (these data are also published on the CoE website): "106. In a submission dated 9 December 2014, the Interior Ministry reports the death of 13 law enforcement officers in Kiev as a result of gunshot wounds. Other sources earlier reported 16 or 17 people killed, although this number could include people from other cities. According to reports from the organization ‘Euro-Maidan SOS’, 15 law enforcers were killed during protests in Kiev, two were killed in Lvov. As for bodily injuries, a list provided by the Kiev prosecutor's office to the Verkhovnaya Rada Commissioner for Human Rights of 15 June 2014 stated that 992 law enforcement officers sought medical assistance, of which 280 suffered gunshot wounds... In the most recent submissions to the Interior Ministry, 919 law enforcers were injured between 30 October 2013 and 23 February 2014. We continue to collect evidence from both sides of the 2014 winter confrontation. Here, for example, is a commentary on the investigation of those events from a well-known Maidan activist with the call sign "Kremen", who was on Institutskaya Street during the most active shootings. "There is some kind of investigation going on, there are some actions that are allegedly being carried out. But I was directly involved there. And I'm not the only one. I survived. But no one contacted me so far... Now I am not interested in it, because I understand: the way we were set up there, it was a method, so that there would be victims...
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The special forces were there. I was there, in the front line... First, we were put down, then we were lifted up. Then there was an unspoken agreement. It wasn't our snipers and it wasn't our special forces... We filmed and photographed it, handed it over to the Maidan headquarters. Where is it all now? Where are these materials? Nowhere! Why? Because someone benefits from it.” Mysterious snipers and other revolutions In any convoluted political provocation (and the use of weapons on the Maidan and everything that followed is an obvious provocation) one should be guided by the old and forensically proven principle: who benefits? Who benefited politically from the mass shootings on the Maidan? How did it turn the political process in our country? What did (or would) these shootings give Yanukovych, who was already in a state of complete panic and who had by then agreed to all concessions except (as we saw on the way out) a wave of accusations of crimes and the shedding of hundreds of people's blood? What but the legitimisation and moral justification for his overthrow, by the protesters themselves justified in that case of using weapons? If the authorities did disperse the Maidan, why did they use precision sniper fire? Why not large-calibre machine guns? After all, if that bloody and criminal government had decided to shoot the protesters, what difference would it have made whether a hundred or a thousand people were killed in the crackdown on the Maidan? Mysterious snipers are by no means a unique case. Similar shooters have repeatedly appeared in many troubled regions of the world, just on the eve of a sharp deterioration in the political situation. After their "work" the situation would finally get out of control, the authorities would always be blamed for the shootings of peaceful demonstrators, and then they would be overthrown by armed people (demonstrators would receive a moral justification to act by force). If this did not work, a civil war would break out in the country. For example, the last such incident that finally radicalized the society's internal political split occurred in Syria, in the summer of 2011 in the city of Hama, where 67 peaceful demonstrators protesting against Bashar Assad's regime were killed by unknown snipers. The bloody civil war in that country continues. The same thing happened in Libya in late February 2011, when the first dozen and a half people were killed by unidentified snipers on the so-called "Day of Rage”. In Libya, Gaddafi, unlike Assad, was toppled relatively quickly, but there is no end in sight for the civil war that has erupted in what was once the richest country in Africa and which has already claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. Mysterious snipers or provocative crowd shooting is a phenomenon that in its time proved to be a key step in coups or deep political crises in the former Yugoslavia (incl. Kosovo), Romania (1989), Moscow (1993), Vilnius (1991), Kyrgyzstan (2010), Yemen (2011), Egypt and Tunisia (2011), Iran (2009) and Thailand (2010). In general, it is not difficult to find variations on the same theme in many other countries and historical episodes. The mystery shooters have never been found. It is true that in Iran and Syria, where regimes have somehow survived, it has subsequently been claimed that traces of mysterious snipers allegedly lead to foreign secret services supporting the local opposition. As for the events in Moscow in the autumn of 1993 or in Vilnius in 1991, there is still an occasional debate in the Russian media and in the expert community about the actual role of the deaths by unidentified snipers in further political processes. To stop or disperse the gigantic masses of people who are taking to the squares to protest against the authorities, they must realise that the authorities are prepared to order the security forces to shoot at them to kill. If the authorities are really ready to disperse
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people by force, it is much more effective to place open fire positions along the perimeter, from where it would be possible to make massive preventive shots in the air or at the buildings. The crowd will never stand under direct fire of large-calibre machine guns, it will simply disperse. The sooner the protesters realise the seriousness of the law enforcers' intentions, the fewer casualties there will probably be. But individual sniper shots, on the other hand, are neither heard nor seen by the crowd. In the moments of sniper shots, nothing happens to them. Simply because they don't notice them. Someone stumbles somewhere, falls over. You never know what happens in large crowds of people! But bodies with bullets in their hearts, necks and heads will immediately be shown on every television channel in the world. And then it will be clear that... the regime has crossed the last line. P. S. At the beginning of last week, 12 October, the flats of VO Freedom members, former deputy prime minister Alexander Sych and former MPs Oleg Pankevych and Igor Yankiv were suddenly searched in connection with their suspected involvement in the shooting of the Heavenly Hundred during the winter events of 2013-2014. This unexpected sensational event was announced on the same day by Alexander Aronets, a member of the Kyiv City Council from Svoboda Party, on his Twitter account, publishing the ruling of the Kiev Pechersky District Court authorizing the searches in the homes of his colleagues. As noted in the document, the Prosecutor-General's Office asked the court to authorize a search of the former Freedom MPs due to the fact that during the pre-trial investigation a video was discovered shot by a British BBC journalist, which shows an open window in room 1132 of the Ukraine hotel on the 11th floor. It was from this window that snipers shot at citizens and law enforcers on the Maidan and Institutskaya Street on 20 February 2014. "It was established that Oleg Igorevich Pankevich occupied room one thousand one hundred thirty-one during the period in question," the court ruling reads.
Annex 302 Gazeta.ru, Unheroic justice (11 January 2016) (translation)

Annex 302
Translation
Gazeta.ru, Unheroic justice (11 January 2016), available at:
https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/01/11_a_8014691.shtml.
Unheroic justice - Gazeta.Ru
The investigation into the death of the so-called "Heavenly Hundred" during the
events of February 2014 in Kiev has reached a deadlock. The masterminds and the real
perpetrators have still not been found. The next court hearing of the two Berkut officers case
will be held this week. The relatives of the victims are unhappy with the way the authorities
are looking for the killers and those who gave the order to shoot at the demonstrators.
February will mark the second anniversary of the tragic events in central Kiev, when
more than 100 people were killed on Institutskaya Street, Independence Square and
Grushevskogo Street. Firearms were used against the demonstrators, who were armed with
wooden shields and sticks. There are still portraits, candles and flowers on Institutskaya
Street, while the masterminds and actual perpetrators of the killing of the protesters have
not yet been found, according to those close to the victims.
For the relatives of those killed in those tragic days, the protracted search for those
responsible is a sign of the authorities' failure. Some attend every hearing of the trial of
Berkut riot police officers Pavel Abroskin and Sergey Zinchenko, who are charged with
murdering nine Maidan activists. And they remain dissatisfied every time. First, the trial
has been going on for more than a year and no results are in sight. Secondly, the two Berkut
officers are the only suspects in the crime that Ukrainian law enforcement agencies have
been able to find.
A new hearing of the Berkut case will be held this week. At the last one, the court left
the defendants in custody until 25 February. The trial has been going on for more than a
year and there are no signs yet of its completion or of a real investigation of the other cases
related to the Maidan killings, including those of law enforcement officers.
Sergey Baidovsky, a 23-year-old resident of Novovolynsk, was killed on the Maidan
by a sniper's bullet on 20 February 2014. His father Roman travels several hundred
kilometres each time from Vinnitsa Oblast to attend the trial. He does not hide his
dissatisfaction with the length of the trial. Apart from Roman Baidovsky, other relatives of
the heroes of the "Heavenly Hundred" attend the hearings, but not all of them. Many of the
victims were from different regions of Ukraine, so it is expensive and time-consuming for
their relatives to travel to the capital to attend the trial. It is compulsory for them to come
only to testify.
When they do come, they do not hold back their emotions and tears.
However, it is not just the 39 families affected by the Abroskin and Zinchenko case that are
feeling the pain and resentment.
According to the Ukrainian Health Ministry, 106 people died as a result of the
Maidan events between 30 November 2013 and mid-April 2014. Almost 80 of them were
killed in the period of 18-20 February, and ten more died under different circumstances
during December and January. None of the murders have been solved so far.
During the last court hearing in the Abroskin and Zinchenko case, relatives of activist
Roman Varenitsa, who was murdered on 20 February 2014, gave their testimonies. His
mother Anna Ivanovna was particularly emotional. "My son, Roman Mikhailovich
Varenitsa, who was only 35 years old, was a kind and vivacious man. He had a peaceful
Annex 302
profession, he was a teacher," she said. Being a teacher herself, she says her son surpassed her as a professional, although due to the existing conditions in the country he was unable to work in his profession, retraining as a construction worker. As every person who lost a relative on the Maidan, she added that her son was unarmed. "He didn’t even have a stick," the woman claimed. Law-enforcement agencies are not particularly shy about admitting their failure. Last November, the head of the Special Investigation Department of the Ukrainian Prosecutor-General's Office, Sergey Gorbatyuk, said that the killers of the first victims - Ukrainian Armenian Sergey Nigoyan, the Belarusian Mikhail Zhiznevsky and the Ukrainian Roman Senyk - were still unknown. "Unfortunately, at this time, we have not identified the individuals who actually committed the murders," he said. And, as if trying to justify himself, he added that the circle of suspects had been considerably narrowed. In November, Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko attended a commemoration ceremony for the heroes of the "Heavenly Hundred" in Kiev and spoke to the families of the dead. Even official reports discreetly noted that relatives complained about the judicial system at the meeting. In personal conversations, the victims do not hide their indignation. The father of the deceased 19-year-old Roman Gurik, Igor, was unhappy that Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin was not present at the meeting, although he, as other relatives of the victims, would have liked to talk to him. "We have many questions to Shokin regarding the investigation," he said.
Annex 303 RIA Novosti Ukraine, Never-ending investigation. Four years later, killers of the ‘Heavenly Hundred’ still at large (22 February 2018) (translation)

Annex 303
Translation
RIA Novosti Ukraine, Never-ending investigation. Four years later, killers of the ‘Heavenly
Hundred’ still at large (22 February 2018), available at:
https://rian.com.ua/analytics/20180222/1032575774/beskonechnoe-sledstvie-nebesnoisotni.
html.
Never-ending investigation. Four years later, killers of the ‘Heavenly
Hundred’ still at large
RIA Novosti Ukraine
Four years after the tragic events on Maidan in February, when over 100 people died, no one has
been punished for their crimes.
The Prosecutor-General's Office accuses the former Ukrainian leadership, led by ex-President
Viktor Yanukovich, and law-enforcement officers, in particular the former Berkut special police
unit, of the crimes. Yanukovich and Berkut officers have denied their involvement in the
murders, RIA Novosti reported.
Ukrainian authorities justify themselves by saying that to date, the investigation of the Maidan
case has been hampered by its complexity and enormous scale, as well as resistance from the
Ukrainian judicial system. Nevertheless, Prosecutor-General Yuriy Lutsenko is confident that the
investigation will soon see a major shift as the main episode of the case accusing Yanukovich of
organizing the shootings will go to trial.
A "quiet" rally was held in central Kiev in honour of the dead Maidan protesters
The official version of the investigation may be questioned by the testimony of a group of
Georgian citizens, who earlier said that they witnessed the shooting of protesters and law
enforcers by hired snipers, who had allegedly been hired by the opposition forces.
Annex 303
Step by tiny step After coming to power, the opposition said it would quickly investigate the crimes, but so far this promise has not been fulfilled. According to the head of the special investigation department of the Prosecutor-General's Office Sergey Gorbatyuk, a total of 78 Maidan protesters were killed and 278 injured during clashes on 18-20 February. The largest number of people, around 50, died on 20 February on Institutskaya Street near Maidan. The investigation established their deaths were caused by gunshot wounds from automatic weapons. In addition, according to Gorbatyuk, 13 law enforcers were killed and 650 of them were injured during the two days of confrontations. Kiev residents bring flowers to the alley of Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred A total of 1,800 people are considered injured parties in the criminal cases related to offences during the Maidan. There are 412 suspects in these cases, against 250 of them the cases have been submitted to courts. As of today, 50 verdicts have been passed, but only one person is serving a real sentence! The prosecutor said that these statistics refer to all the crimes during the protests. He also clarified that 60 people have the status of suspects in the Maidan deaths case, but there have been no verdicts in these cases yet.
Annex 303
"These figures refer to all crimes - from beatings to the drawing up of fake verdicts by law enforcers (about offences by protesters). If we talk about murders, we have more than 60 persons ranging from perpetrators to organizers, who have been notified of suspicion. Regarding the events of 18-20 February, the leadership of law-enforcement agencies and the state have been put on suspicion," Gorbatyuk said in a commentary to the 112 Ukraine TV channel. At the same time, according to Aleksey Donskoy, a representative of the Prosecutor-General's Office, there is progress in the investigation into the death of law enforcers on Maidan, within the framework of which a group of persons has been served notice of criminal prosecution as suspects. "As part of this proceeding, the circumstances of the illegal use of firearms against law enforcers by certain groups of individuals, that is, those facts ... where weapons were illegally used, are being investigated. Certain individuals were put on suspicion," he said. International human rights organizations and the UN have repeatedly pointed out in their reports the lack of results in the criminal investigation into the Maidan deaths. According to human rights organizations, the authorities in Ukraine are not interested in finding those involved in the killings. "The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is concerned that three years after the killings of protesters and law enforcement officers on the Maidan in Kiev, efforts to bring to justice have still not yielded tangible results," said the 18th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine by the Office of the UN High Commissioner, which was made public last summer. The organization noted that despite the efforts of the Prosecutor-General's Office to bring to justice those responsible for the deaths of protesters and others during the Maidan events, not a single former high-ranking official has been punished. The delay in the investigation has also been acknowledged by the Ukrainian authorities themselves. On the current anniversary of the tragic events on the Maidan, President Poroshenko said that the Maidan case is very voluminous and complex, so it takes time to comply with all legal procedures. "I share the public's dissatisfaction with the pace of the investigation. And even more so with the speed of the trials. They should have done more in four years. At the same time, I'm well aware of the scale of the crime, as well as the need for legally flawless evidence and strict adherence to all procedural rules. Evil must be punished," Poroshenko said. He reminded that by law he could not interfere in the investigation and asked Prosecutor-General Lutsenko to analyse what else could be done to help the special investigation department of the Prosecutor-General's Office, which is in charge of the case, to speed up its investigation. At the same time, according to Markiyan Galabala, a lawyer of the families of the Maidan victims, effective investigation into the Maidan case is hindered by the destruction of the evidence base, which, in his opinion, took place in 2014. "The evidence base was largely destroyed immediately after the Maidan victory and destroyed by those individuals who are still in law enforcement agencies in their positions, we are talking about operational cases that were conducted by representatives of the Interior Ministry and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)," the lawyer said in a commentary to 112 Ukraine.
Annex 303
Opposition of courts As of today, the Prosecutor-General's Office continues to investigate the Maidan deaths case; only individual episodes of the case have been sent to court. The most high-profile and public of those is the trial of 5 Berkut special unit officers, who have been on trial for almost two years since May 2016 in Kiev's Solomenskiy district court. The defendants are accused of participating in the shootings of Maidan participants. The main episode of the Maidan case concerns the organisers of the shootings. Viktor Yanukovich, former Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko and former SBU chief Alexander Yakymenko are suspects in the case. In February, the Kiev Pecherskiy district court granted the investigators' request for permission to conduct a pre-trial investigation in absentia against the mentioned individuals. At the same time, Lutsenko accused Ukrainian courts of blocking the consideration of episodes in the Maidan case, which, in particular, concern the prosecution of commanders of the Berkut special unit as well as the former leadership of the law-enforcement agencies and the Kiev prosecutor's office. "I cannot help but mention the system's opposition, the reluctance of the judicial branch of power to recognize these cases as a priority. Suffice it to recall that since 2016, there have been no trials on the Prosecutor General's Office’s recommendation regarding the commander of the second company of Berkut, the deputy commander of the first company of Berkut and the servicemen of this company, the Kiev prosecutor, the deputy head of the Dnepr Interior Ministry department in Kiev, the former SBU deputy head of Kiev Oblast. It is not clear why, since 2016, judges have still not found an opportunity to at least start these hearings," Lutsenko said. Georgian trail Immediately after the deaths on the Maidan in February 2014, opponents of the current Ukrainian authorities voiced the version that a certain third party acted on Maidan, which allegedly fired at radicals and law enforcers to provoke the conflict. The Ukrainian authorities have denied these allegations all along. However, at the end of 2017, a documentary aired on Italian Channel 5, with interviews of three Georgians who claimed to have been sent as snipers to Kiev by former Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili in 2014. One of them claimed that when the confrontations escalated, their squad was ordered to shoot at members of the Berkut unit and protesters, but the Georgian squad took it as a provocation and didn’t shoot. The Prosecutor-General's Office called the film a fake, but promised to check the facts presented in it. Certain citizens of Georgia told RIA Novosti that they allegedly received weapons and an order to fire at people from the current head of Rada Committee on National Security and Defence Sergei Pashinsky, and were instructed by a former US military officer who was introduced to them by former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and his adviser Mamuka Mamulashvili. According to Revazishvili, Pashinskiy and Vladimir Parasyuk were personally involved in the killing of people on Maidan.
Annex 303
Opinion Director of the Ukrainian Institute of Analysis and Policy Management Ruslan Bortnyk believes that the case of mass deaths on the Maidan will be brought to an end, but not under the current government. "Now the government is full of people who were participants in the process on both sides: sat in the corridors of power and manipulated people on the Maidan, so they are interested in getting some political, not legal results. They are interested in speculating on this tragedy rather than seeking justice and legal correctness," Bortnik said. The expert believes that this case, as well as the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze and the tragedy in Odessa on 2 May 2014, will be completed in the next political cycle, if the government changes in Ukraine. "If the government does not change, nothing but political conclusions and political verdicts should be expected, and, unfortunately, there is no hope of justice," he said.

Annex 304
RIA Novosti Ukraine, Investigation in all Maidan cases stalled (21 February 2018)
(translation)

Annex 304
Translation
RIA Novosti Ukraine, Investigation in all Maidan cases stalled (21 February 2018), available
at: https://rian.com.ua/analytics/20180221/1032544002/Ukraine-Maydan-delarasslelovanie.
html.
Investigation in all Maidan cases stalled
RIA Novosti
Evgeniy Strimov, RIA Novosti Ukraine
Ukraine is marking another - fourth - anniversary of the tragic events in central Kiev in
February 2014: between 18 and 20 February, around a hundred people were killed, dozens
went missing and over a thousand were injured. Four years after the Maidan shootings,
there is still no answer to one of the main questions: who shot the protesters?
Old and new suspects
Investigators now have more than 60 suspects in the deaths, but the courts have not
passed a single verdict in the cases. The Prosecutor-General's Office, headed by Yuriy
Lutsenko, accuses the country's former leadership and Viktor Yanukovich personally, as
well as law-enforcement officials, in particular the former Interior Ministry's special unit
Berkut.
Annex 304
Yanukovich and Berkut servicemen deny any involvement in the killings. The authorities say that today the investigation into the Maidan case is hampered by its great complexity and scale, as well as resistance from the judicial system. Testimonies of a group of Georgian citizens about the so-called ‘Georgian snipers’, who allegedly shot at both protesters and law enforcers, and who were allegedly hired by the opposition at the time, could turn the process upside down. ‘There is no statute of limitations’ The head of the Prosecutor-General's Office's special investigations department Sergey Gorbatyuk cited figures: a total of 1,800 people are considered victims/injured parties in the criminal cases related to the Maidan events. There are 412 suspects, and cases against 250 of them have been submitted to courts. Fifty verdicts have been passed, but only one person is serving a real sentence.
Annex 304
Caption: Anniversary of the Heavenly Hundred shooting in numbers. Legend: (from top down) (Title): Anniversary of the Heavenly Hundred shooting in numbers; (Subtitle): On 18-20 February, Ukraine honours the memory of the Heavenly Hundred – people shot up on the Maidan in 2014. Prosecutor-General’s Office speaks of a progress in the investigation, but people who ordered the killings have not yet been punished – 4 years since.
Annex 304
The infographics of RIA Novosti-Ukraine illustrates the results of the investigation. How it was. Killed or died of wounds – 123 (104 Maidan activists, 17 law enforcers) Injured parties – 2,500 people (Boxes, left to right): 1) 18.02.2014 – fire in the House of Trade Unions, Globus Mall. Protesters burned down two water-throwers. Maidan barricades attacked. 2) 10 people killed in on Institutskaya and Grushevskogo Streets, 509 injured (according to PGO of Ukraine) 3) night of 19 February – assault on the Maidan, 16 killed, 206 injured (PGO) 4) 2 people killed in a fire in the House of Trade Unions 5) 20 February 2014 – shooting of protesters on Institutskaya, 43 killed 157 injured, 69 wounded by firearms (PGO) Killed and injured journalists ( acc. to NSJU), November 2013 through February 2014: 271 reporter beaten up; 9 arrests and detentions; 14 attacks on newspaper offices; 31 cases of threats of physical violence; 2 killed in Kiev (Vyacheslav Veremiy, Vesti newspaper, and Igor Kostenko, student and journalist, on the Maidan) (bottom) When will Ukrainians learn the truth about the Maidan massacre? Trials, punishments and investigations of Maidan crimes: 1 – serves time behind bars; 252 cases handed over to courts; 50 verdicts passed; 412 suspects; 100 criminal cases under investigation at PGO; 102 persons wanted; over 3,400 episodes of criminal cases under investigation. In July 2017, Prosecutor-General Yuriy Lutsenko said during a speech in parliament that the investigation into the Maidan events would be completed during the autumn of last year. But there are no results. And President Petr Poroshenko expressed in February 2018 dissatisfaction with the pace and speed of investigations and court hearings into the 2014 shootings of Euromaidan activists. In his opinion, crimes against Maidan have no statute of limitations. "The criminals have crossed the line beyond which comes a curse, and that curse, in the words of Miroslav Popovich, is ‘stronger than courts and prisons.’ And there is no hiding from it even in Russia," said the head of state.
Annex 304
Progress by Lutsenko As of today, the Prosecutor-General's Office says it is investigating over 3,400 episodes of criminal proceedings in the Maidan cases. There are 412 suspects, 100 criminal cases are being investigated by the PGO, and the Prosecutor-General's Office is also searching for 102 people. Prosecutor-General Lutsenko now says that the investigation cannot move forward quickly, otherwise it will not get fair verdicts. He also said that the court has allowed a special pre-trial investigation, and later it will allow conviction in absentia of those suspected of organizing the shooting of the Heavenly Hundred. "Finally, the petitions have been satisfied, and Yanukovich, Zakharchenko, Yakimenko, Totskiy, Ratushnyak, Fedchuk and others will be handed over to court on the basis of the collected 300 volumes of evidence as soon as we complete Yanukovich's treason trial," Lutsenko said. ‘They’ll get them released on the statute of limitations in the end’ In four years we have not seen the results of the investigation at all, Vladimir Golodnyuk, a civic activist and volunteer, told RIA Novosti Ukraine. He is the father of Ustym Golodnyuk, who died on 20 February during the events on Maidan. "No one has been jailed, no one has been punished.... It’s been four years… such an investigation satisfies neither the families nor Ukrainians in general," Holodnyuk said. The investigation as a whole, he is convinced, is in state of total collapse now. "You know that these cases are handed over to the SBI (State Bureau of Investigation). The Prosecutor's Office has been dealing with them for four years. All said, they were already familiar with these cases. Because you have to understand that this is more than 500 volumes. It will take two years to even reread them ... The investigators who handled this at least already knew in which direction to proceed.... We'll wait until all the suspects are released on the statute of limitations. We will end up with a total inability of the state to punish the criminals who shot protesters in the centre of the capital, in broad daylight," the volunteer is disappointed. The ‘old’ cadres get in the way Many Maidan cases are in court, but things are moving very slowly in courts and will continue to do so for a very long time: the specifics of Ukraine's criminal procedure law do not allow for quick consideration of cases, Pavel Dikan, the lawyer of the relatives of the victims - the ‘Heavenly Hundred’ - said in an interview with RIA Novosti Ukraine. "People believe and we believe that, after all, the authorities understand the importance of these investigations and will give them proper attention at some point. In terms of legislative regulation and legislative initiative, or any financial and organisational support. But in these four years we have not yet seen it," the lawyer notes.
Annex 304
He says that the real investigation is being obstructed. "These obstacles are created both, in my view, by the leadership of the Prosecutor General's Office, no matter who is the prosecutors general, and by the legislator, who, as he says, are guided by the best of intentions, but make things worse. The road to hell is paved with good intentions. This is a prime example," Dikan said. A huge number of people who worked under Yanukovich and were involved in organising a plan to suppress the protest movement remain today in the law-enforcement agencies, in the legislature and in the executive branch, the lawyer added. And there are big doubts that those people are interested in an objective and fair investigation. ‘If they wanted to do it, they would have done it a long time ago.’ And according to a political scientist and director of the Information and Analysis Centre ‘Perspective’ Pavel Rudyakov, there is no investigation at all. “What the prosecutor's office and the prosecutor general personally report should be treated, in my opinion, like a weather forecast that never has it right. About the investigation into all those events, Lutsenko said yesterday or the day before that we would now conduct new expert examinations. Or someone on his behalf said it - we will conduct new expert probes and then we will investigate it. These new expert examinations mean that the prosecutor's office intends to level out those previous examinations which were already less than ideal. The repetition of these statements is a revelation of irresponsibility, an absolutely militant deep existential irresponsibility of the prosecutor's office and other security agencies," the expert said. And now, on another anniversary, the prosecutor general and his guys jump out like a bolt from the blue and start reassuring us that ‘we are going to get down to it’ now, says Rudyakov. “It is unlikely they will get down to it. If they wanted to, they would have done it long ago," concluded the political analyst.
Annex 305 RusNext.ru, No one came to commemorate. The Heavenly Hundred and their ‘exploits’ on Maidan devalued (20 February 2018) (translation)

Annex 305
Translation
RusNext.ru, No one came to commemorate. The Heavenly Hundred and their ‘exploits’ on
Maidan devalued (20 February 2018), available at:
https://rusnext.ru/recent_opinions/1519134530.
No one came to commemorate. The Heavenly
Hundred and their ‘exploits’ on Maidan
devalued
The fourth anniversary of the shooting of the Heavenly Hundred passes entirely
unnoticed. There are no red rays of dignity, no rain of rose petals symbolising innocent
blood, and even the top leaders of the state, who have got their hands on the "trough" with
the help of the sotniks, are absent.
Poroshenko is recovering after the Munich conference, and Avakov's press secretary
Artem Shevchenko has gone so far as to demand “honouring the memory of the law
enforcers who died on the Maidan." On the Maidan itself, a bunch of relatives of those who
“died as heroes” roam around dejectedly, along with activists from Galicia and veterans of
the colour revolutions, who came on the legs shot through by the Berkut to remember the
burning tyres and the Berkut four years back. One thing is abundantly clear: the authorities
have ignored the anniversary.
Poroshenko, Avakov, Yatsenyuk and Klitschko no longer need to pretend, stand with
a lamp and make a sad face. At the same time millions of those who demanded the
overthrow of the "bloody Yanukovich gang" have disappeared somewhere. In their place
have appeared disappointed hydnuks, spoiling the party with inappropriate questions, such
as: "Walzman, where are the killers of the Heavenly Hundred?"
In general, the commemoration turned into a banal flash mob "I remember", in which
relatives and friends of the deceased activists took part. Let me repeat again that it was not
a mass event, with no more than 100 people walking through the centre and laying
carnations on the Alley of the Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred.
The participants of the event symbolically recreated a dramatic episode of the Euromaidan -
the moment when activists of the revolution were shot up by ‘siloviki’ on Institutskaya
Street on 20 February 2014. Essentially, the tragedy was turned into a Broadway show with
lights, music and dancing. "A group of people walked up Institutskaya Street and after
‘shots’ mimicked by percussion musicians from a military band, fell to the pavement. Then
‘medical volunteers’ tried to help them, but the ‘Maidan activists’ were already ‘dead’ and
their bodies were covered with sheets," eyewitnesses to the ‘mourning’ described.
After this theatre of the absurd, the flash mob participants moved up the alley,
accompanied by a military band, which performed the Zaporozhtsi March and the
Ukrainian anthem. At the end of the event, relatives of the dead laid flowers at the Heroes of
the Heavenly Hundred memorial to the portraits of their loved ones.
"We, the closest relatives, have no right to forget what happened in 2014, we cannot forget
what our loved ones went to certain death for," said Daria, a family member of Hero of
Ukraine Vladimir Kulchytskiy, who had died on the Maidan, after the rally. Igor, the son of
the "sotnik", this year for some reason declined to recollect the heroism, even though a year
ago he willingly shared his experiences: "On Tuesday 18 February Vladimir Kulchytskiy and
I came to Grushevskogo early in the morning to support the Euromaidan's peaceful
offensive against the Verkhovnaya Rada. Within hours the rally turned into bloody street
battles. He stood on one of the most powerful barricades - on Khreshchatyk on the side of
Annex 305
European Square. It was defended by one or even two companies of the Self-defence, and it was that barricade that was approached by a part of siloviki from the direction of Grushevskogo Street. The barricade was very powerful and well prepared for resistance. We repulsed the first attack and were waiting for the next one. My father and I were in the second line of defence - we were serving stones, Molotov cocktails and tyres," describes a completely peaceful attack on the VR the revolutionary who is now even embarrassed to attend memorial nights. According to the relatives of the "sotniks," "they wanted a better life for our country, they wanted their children, parents, and themselves to live in a European state.” However, the relatives of Ukraine's heroes do not go further than those clichés... Instead, their Facebook buddies rage over total disregard of the anniversary by the nation and its leaders: Leonid Dnepr: The people remember. But the authorities... Eugene Perch: Of course Poroshenko and Avakov remember, that's why he's doing everything to make sure Maidan doesn't happen again.... As you can see, no one from the authorities came...; Andrey Ilchuk: People have been reduced to the level of cattle. They still remember, but they still don't understand. Neither the idea of Maidan, nor the idea of their country Ukraine. How is it possible to really honour the victims and really appreciate the heroes? You can't. But it is happening in Ukraine. Just like the fact that fighting corruption they are trying to bribe the Maidan with a memorial to heroes against the background of the fact that their killers have not been identified and punished. Heroes do not die only when the idea of their feat is known and voiced. Otherwise, the heroes look like a sacrifice to be slaughtered in the name of unvoiced goals. And it is true. After all, it has only been FOUR YEARS, and already we are talking about «remember" or “don’t remember”; Anaboli Metanych: "Looking at the photos - a lump in my throat: dignified people, beautiful faces... God save their souls, and let them rest in peace! But what did they die for? So that these unscrupulous creatures could gain power? Thieves, ‘reformers’, next to whom Janek and Azarov look like altruists and philanthropists? It would be better for these poor people to stay alive, raise children and enjoy life! "The Heavenly Hundred, we remember..." Pathos - and in the end - pain and disappointment... The people are patient". According to analyst Dmitriy Korneichuk, "the current government will do anything to prevent any real investigation into the events of 18 February 2014 on the Maidan, Institutskaya Street, the vicinity of the Verkhovnaya Rada. Years have passed, the investigation drags on, and the public has no answers. And today, most people are not as concerned about this topic as they were in 2014-2015, when the people's hatred for the ‘evil panda’ was at its peak," says the political analyst. When emotions wore off, he noted, Ukrainians began to ask logical questions. For example, about who fired the shots and what provocateurs were working on February 18 outside parliament, when Yanukovich's government and the opposition were negotiating to normalize the situation. In this connection, he added that there was plenty of evidence that someone fired at both security forces and Maidan activists at the same time. But after the new authorities came in, trees were cut down at the site of the shooting, where the bullets got stuck and by which the trajectory of the shots could be traced. Korneichuk points out that the authorities do not want to look for the perpetrators, as the investigation may lead them to themselves. Or "at least come to the conclusion that Yanukovich, in general, had nothing to do with what happened on the Maidan." "So when our politicians are shedding tears and beating their chests, telling us what a tragedy the deaths of people on the Maidan was for them, that it is a matter of honour to find the culprits – all that is a travesty. The authorities, by throwing handouts to the Maidan victims in the form of compensations and benefits, have closed the subject," the expert summed up.
Annex 306 TASS, How Ukraine imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and entities (20 March 2019) (translation)

Annex 306
Translation
TASS, How Ukraine imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and entities (20 March 2019),
available at: https://tass.ru/info/6240919.
How Ukraine imposed sanctions on Russian
individuals and entities
TASS
TASS-DOSSIER.
On 20 March 2019, it became known that Ukraine had imposed sanctions on 294
legal entities and 848 individuals involved in the construction of the Crimean bridge, as well
as elections in the proclaimed Donbas republics. The updated sanctions list also included
those who, according to the Ukrainian authorities, were allegedly involved in the
distribution of print materials with ‘anti-Ukrainian content’.
Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko signed a decree to this effect on 19 March.
TASS-DOSSIER prepared a briefing paper on the history of Ukraine's anti-Russian
sanctions.
Legal grounds
Ukraine started imposing sanctions against Russia in the spring of 2014 in
connection with the reunification of Crimea with Russia and the start of the conflict in
Donbas. They were based on the Law on Sanctions signed by Ukrainian President Petr
Poroshenko on 10 September 2014. The document provides for the possibility of imposing
restrictive measures against Russia: more than 20 types of sanctions, including suspension
of transit of energy resources.
The law came into force on 12 September 2014 and was last amended on 17
December 2017.
According to the document, sanctions can be applied to "protect national interests,
national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, counteract terrorist
activity, as well as prevent violations, restore violated rights, freedoms and legitimate
interests of Ukrainian citizens, society and the state."
Decisions on sanctions are taken by the National Security and Defence Council
(NSDC) of Ukraine, a decision is enacted by a decree of the head of state.
Types of sanctions
Restrictive measures include, but are not limited to:
First sanctions
-blocking of assets (property and accounts of individuals and companies);
-restriction of trade transactions;
-restriction, partial or total cessation of transit of resources, flights and traffic through the
territory of Ukraine;
-prevention of the transfer of capital out of Ukraine;
-termination of trade agreements, joint projects and industrial programmes in certain areas,
in particular in security and defence;
-ban on the transfer of technologies, intellectual property rights;
-visa restrictions; and
-termination of international treaties.
Annex 306
Even before the adoption of the so-called sanctions law, Ukraine had introduced a number of restrictive measures against Russia. Also since 2014, official Kiev has repeatedly joined earlier anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the European Union, the G7, Switzerland and the US. On 16 September 2015, Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko signed the decree “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of 2 September 2015 ‘On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)”’. The document came into force on 22 September 2015. Sanctions were imposed on 388 individuals and 105 legal entities of the Russian Federation and other countries for a period of one year. The list of individuals included Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu, State Duma Speaker Sergey Naryshkin, heads of the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of Agriculture Nikolay Nikiforov and Alexander Tkachev, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, Just Russia leader Sergey Mironov, singer Iosif Kobzon and others. Besides, restrictive measures affected a number of employees of Russian media outlets: Dmitry Kiselev, CEO of Rossiya Segodnya news agency; employees of TASS, Rossiya Segodnya, Izvestiya and Rossiyskaya Gazeta, NTV television company and Channel One. DPR and LPR leaders Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, aa well as more than 100 foreign observers of the Crimean referendum and elections in the DPR and LPR, were also sanctioned. The sanctioned companies include 27 banks, among them Gazprombank, Bank of Moscow (and its Ukrainian BM Bank), Rosselkhozbank, all major Russian carriers (Aeroflot, Transaero, Sibir, Rossiya, etc.), as well as First Cargo Company, Almaz-Antey, Channel One, NTV, VGTRK, Kaspersky Lab, etc. Individuals and legal entities on the list are banned from entering the country, their assets are blocked, and economic and financial obligations are suspended. The decree has been extended several times. Savchenko-Sentsov list On 29 March 2016, Petr Poroshenko put into force the 25 March 2016 decision of the NSDC to impose sanctions on individuals "involved in unlawful actions in respect of Nadezhda Savchenko, Oleg Sentsov and Alexander Kolchenko." The so-called Savchenko-Sentsov list comprised 84 names, including the head of the Russian Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, and the head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, who are banned from entering Ukraine. Restrictive measures also affected employees of the court and prosecutor's office who handled cases against the Ukrainian nationals, and two cameramen of Russian TV channels who were witnesses in the trials. The list was later expanded. Sanctions on Russian media managers On 27 May 2016, personal sanctions were imposed on 17 managers and key employees of a number of leading Russian media outlets who, according to the Ukrainian authorities, posed "real and potential threats to the national interests, national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine" (the presidential decree came into force on 31 May 2016). The restrictive list includes: general director of Channel One Konstantin Ernst, editor-in-chief of Moskovskiy Komsomolets Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of REGNUM news agency Vigen Akopyan, editor-in-chief of Novorus.info website Andrey Surkov, chairman of the board of the Pravda.ru online resource holding Vadim Gorshenin, editor-in-chief of Life.ru online portal Alexander Potapov, editor-in-chief of Rossiyskaya Gazeta Vladislav Fronin, editor-in-chief of Russian Reporter magazine Vitaly Leibin, general director of TASS news agency Sergey Mikhailov, head of the Society and Law Broadcasting Directorate of NTV Channel Andrey Kunitsyn, editor-in-chief of RT TV channel Margarita Simonyan; editor-in-chief of Komsomolskaya Pravda Vladimir Sungorkin, VGTRK general director Oleg Dobrodeyev, former NTV general director Vladimir Kulistikov, host of Sunday Vremya programme on Channel One Irada Zeinalova, general director of Life TV channel Ashot Gabrelianov, and general director of Russia 1 TV channel Anton Zlatopolsky.
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Expansion of the sanctions list in 2016 On 17 October 2016, the Ukrainian president signed a decree adding 335 individuals and 167 legal entities to the sanctions list. The updated list includes Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin, former SVR head Mikhail Fradkov, LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskyy, Russian presidential envoys Oleg Belaventsev and Sergey Menyaylo, Council of Federation speaker Valentina Matviyenko, senators Elena Mizulina and Andrey Klishas, MPs Leonid Slutskiy and Sergey Neverov, and others. Restrictive measures have also been imposed on the entire former and current command of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as on representatives of the Crimean authorities, including the head of the republic Sergey Aksyonov. The list of legal entities was expanded to include Rosoboronexport, Rostec, Izhmash, Kamaz, Rusal, the Ilyushin Aviation Complex, the United Aircraft Corporation, UTair and others. The National Research Centre “Kurchatov Institute” was also put under sanctions. The same decree imposed restrictive measures on the Russian payment systems Zolotaya Korona, Kolibri (Sberbank), Leader, Unistream, Anelik and Blizko. Sanctions on Russian banks On 15 March 2017, Petr Poroshenko put into effect another decision of the National Security and Defence Council. Restrictive measures were imposed for one year on five banks with Russian state capital operating in Ukraine - Sberbank, VS Bank, Prominvestbank, VTB Bank and BM Bank. The sanctions involve, among other things, a ban on the withdrawal of funds out of Ukraine, as well as the payment of dividends, interest, repayment of interbank deposits and loans, funds from correspondent accounts of subordinated debt. The ban also concerns the distribution of profits and capital of those five banks. The sanctions were subsequently extended. Expansion of the list and ban on Russian social networks in 2017 On 15 May 2017, the Ukrainian president approved a decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine to expand the sanctions list onto additional 1,228 individuals and 468 legal entities, including a number of State Duma deputies, journalists, and Constitutional Court judges. The Russian social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, Mail.ru, Yandex and Yandex. Ukraine were banned in Ukraine. The document prescribed "to prohibit Internet providers to provide Internet users with access services" to these resources. The restrictive measures also affected 1C, which specializes in the development and supply of business software, and ABBYY, which develops text recognition and language software and electronic dictionaries. Sanctions 2018 On 9 February 2018, Ukraine introduced additional measures to counter Russia's "information aggression". However, the presidential decree is classified and its contents have not been published. On 14 May, Petr Poroshenko again signed a package of personal sanctions. The measures were imposed on individuals allegedly "involved in information and cyber aggression" against Ukraine, in "illegal actions against Ukrainian citizens that are illegally detained in Russia", as well as against members of the State Duma and members of the Council of Federation. According to the presidential decree, Internet providers have been ordered to restrict access to ria.ru, sputniknews.com, 1prime.ru, rsport.ria.ru, realty.ria.ru, rian.com.ua, rtr- planeta.com, russia.tv, vesti.ru, tvkultura.ru, and digitalrussia.tv. Sanctions on Russian political parties
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On 21 June 2018, six Russian political parties were added to Ukraine's sanctions lists, including United Russia, the CPRF, the LDPR, Rodina, the Democratic Party of Russia, and the Agrarian Party of Russia. The list also includes the Central Electoral Commission and its head, Ella Pamfilova, the Crimean election commission, and members of territorial commissions at various levels. Besides, under sanctions were put the Union of Russian pensioners and the Union of Afghanistan Veterans, the observer corps For Clean Elections, and the public organization Boyevoe Bratstvo (Combat Brotherhood).
Annex307RIA Novosti, Cases of harassment of journalists in Ukraine in 2014-2017(19 June 2017)(translation)

Annex 307
Translation
RIA Novosti, Cases of harassment of journalists in Ukraine in 2014-2017 (19 June 2017),
available at: https://ria.ru/20170619/1496819255.html.
Cases of harassment of journalists in Ukraine
in 2014-2017
2017
On 26 July, it became known that Russian journalist Maria Knyazeva, an employee of the
Rossiya-1 and Rossiya-24 TV channels, was expelled from Ukraine and banned from
entering the country for three years. According to the Security Service of Ukraine, Knyazeva
was engaged in "destructive activities under the pseudonym of 'Saushkina'". It is alleged
that Knyazeva, "using her connections with pro-Russian representatives of the Ukrainian
media and experts", collected information on the situation in the country, the work of top
authorities and security agencies. She then used these data "to provide biased coverage of
the situation in Ukraine".
On 14 July, the Ukrainian media holding Vesti claimed that in its office in the Gulliver
shopping mall in central Kiev the security services were conducting searches, and the work
of the editorial office was blocked. Later, Ukraine's chief military prosecutor Anatoliy
Matios said that law enforcers were conducting more than 180 searches in the premises
located in Gulliver that belonged to former Revenues and Levies Minister Alexander
Klymenko, including the editorial office of Radio Vesti. The Ukrainian Interior Minister
assured that the actions of law enforcers were not related to the work of journalists. On 20
July, the Ukrainian media holding Vesti wrote an open letter to the executive and legislative
authorities demanding to protect the publication from pressure from law-enforcement
agencies and to prevent the allegedly planned attempt to block the work of the holding.
On 7 July, Nataliya Nagornaya, a journalist of the Ukrainian 1+1 TV channel, accused
Ukrainian police officers of using force against her for filming police work at a checkpoint
near Marinka in Donbas. According to the police, the journalists refused to undergo a
standard document check and the camera crew allegedly did not have permission to film the
checkpoint. As Nagornaya told the media, the car with the film crew was on its way to
Donbas for filming following an agreement with the press officer of the Ukrainian military
operation in Volnovakha, but they were stopped by the police near Marinka and their
documents were taken away. Natalia was thrown face down on the ground, a submachine
gun was reloaded over her head with foul language. One of the "interlocutors" snatched the
phone from the journalists and threw it on the ground, trying to smash it. After the
"interaction" with the police, the journalists recorded the beating in hospital.
On 22 June, Igor Guzhva, editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian edition Strana.ua, was detained
in Kiev on suspicion of extortion for non-posting compromising materials
on a current politician. Guzhva considers the case against him a planned provocation. Court
in Kiev arrested the journalist with possibility of hryvnya 544,000 bail (about 21,000
dollars), the editor-in-chief was bailed on 26 June and released from jail. The Kiev
prosecutor's office then filed a complaint against the court ruling, demanding that the bail
amount be increased to 123,000 dollars. The appeals court denied the prosecutor-general's
office request to increase the bail.
Annex 307
On 3 July, Igor Guzhva said that the Security Service of Ukraine launched another criminal case against journalists of the Strana.ua website for "interference in the private life" of MP Anton Gerashchenko. On 7 May, the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper said that two of its journalists, Maria Remizova and Elena Boduen, who were accredited for the Eurovision Song Contest, were not allowed into Ukraine. They were put off the train at the Konotop checkpoint by Ukrainian border guards. On 6 May, the director of the Russia Today news agency's joint directorate for photo information, Alexander Shtol, said that the agency's photo correspondent Ramil Sitdikov accredited for the Eurovision song contest was not allowed to enter Ukraine. He was given an entrance denial document "due to an unconfirmed reason for entry". 2016 On 22 December, the Ukrainian government denied RIA Novosti journalists accreditation to its meetings due to the implementation of the relevant resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada. Press service spokeswoman Iryna Konopatko referred to the available letter with the list of media outlets and said that media outlets with Russian registration could not be present at the meetings. According to her, the only exceptions are Interfax-Ukraine and RBC- Ukraine" as they are registered in Ukraine. In July, the press centre of Kiev's military operation in Donbas asked the Security Service of Ukraine to suspend the accreditation of journalists of the Ukrainian TV channel Hromadske.TV Anastasia Stanko and Konstantin Revutskiy due to a story that allegedly reveals the positions of Ukrainian security forces. On 29 August, journalists Stanko and Revutskiy were given back their accreditation. On 24 April, without any explanation, Ukrainian border guards banned VGTRK special correspondent Daria Grigorova from entering the country for five years, telling her about this decision at the airport. On 30 April, German journalist Saadi Isakov, who travelled to Odessa, was not allowed into Ukraine, the SBU banned him from entering the country. On 26 April, TV presenter Savik Shuster was denied the right to work in Ukraine. On 14 April, four correspondents of MTRK Mir, Belarusian citizens, who planned to make a film in Pripyat to commemorate the anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, were not allowed into Ukraine. After 4.5 hours of waiting at the border, they were given a refusal-of-entry document and escorted to the Belarusian side. On 28 March, the Security Service of Ukraine banned Russian journalist Otar Kushanashvili from entering the country for three years. 2015 On 2 October, Radio Svoboda journalist Natalia Sedletskaya said on her Facebook page that journalist Mikhail Tkach and cameraman Kirill Lazarevich were detained by SBU officers near the SBU building in Kiev. According to the SBU representative, the journalists were not detained; they were invited to a public reception centre for identification, and the matter was resolved after they produced journalist IDs. On the evening of September 24, Yekaterina Voronina, a correspondent of Central TV, was detained by a group of people who did not show any documents at the Ukrainian-Crimean border near the town of Kalanchak. She, together with a Ukrainian stringer, had been
Annex 307
filming a story about the Right Sector's blockade of the peninsula on an assignment from hr editorial office. After many hours of interrogation at the SBU, the journalist was released. On 16 September, Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko issued a decree approving the decision of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council on personal sanctions. The president's official website made public the relevant decree and annexes with full lists of individuals subject to sanctions and other restrictive measures for a period of one year. The list includes 400 individuals and 90 legal entities, among them 34 journalists and seven bloggers from Russia, Kazakhstan, Germany, Israel, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and other countries. On 27 May 2016, Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko approved a decision of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council that lifts the ban on entry into the country for 29 Russian and foreign journalists, including employees of Russia Today and six representatives of Russian media: Olga Kovalenko, head of RIA Novosti in Kazakhstan, Elena Palazhchenko, head of RIA Novosti in Turkey, Yakub Koreyba of Russia Today news agency (Poland), correspondent of the TASS agency South African bureau Alexander Nechaev, TASS correspondent in Washington Andrey Suzhanskiy and TASS station head in Washington Andrey Shytov. Amendments were introduced in the Annex to the decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDCU) of 2 September 2015 "On the application of personal special economic and other restrictive measures sanctions". At the same time, Poroshenko imposed sanctions on RT TV channel and international agency Rossiya Segodnya 's editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, General Director of VGTRK Oleg Dobrodeyev, General Director of First Channel Konstantin Ernst, former head of LifeNews TV channel and Izvestia newspaper Alexander Potapov, director general of the TASS news agency Sergei Mikhailov, the editor-in-chief of Rossiyskaya Gazeta Vladislav Fronin, the former director general of NTV Vladimir Kulistikov, and the hostess of the Vremya Sunday programme of Channel One Irada Zeynalova. On 16 May 2017, it became known that Kiev had expanded the sanctions list against foreign companies and citizens, which was published in an annex to President Petr Poroshenko's decree. The expanded version of the sanctions list includes 1,228 individuals and 468 legal entities. In particular, Ukraine imposed sanctions on a number of Russian media outlets, banned access to social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, Yandex and Mail.ru. The list also includes Bulgarian journalist Tasheva Labova, Polish bloggers David Berezicki and David Hudzec, and Israeli political technologists Avigdor Eskin and David Eidelman, who are banned from entering Ukraine for a year. On 1 July, Channel One correspondent Alexandra Cherepnina stopped coming into contact with the newsroom. The TV channel's cameraman did not find her or her belongings in her flat. Later, Cherepnina contacted the channel and said that she had been detained by the SBU and was accused of falsifying one of her videos. The SBU later said that Cherepnina was banned from entering Ukraine for three years. According to them, the Russian journalist "tried to shoot a fake video which would discredit the Ukrainian authorities". On 2 June, journalists of the Rossiya 24 TV channel were detained on Maidan Nezalezhnosti. Cameraman Maxim Grinevich and journalist Kseniya Kolchina were handed over to SBU officers. After a check by the Security Service of Ukraine, the detainees were released. On 19 March, it was reported that Russian Channel 5 correspondent Leonid Muravyov had been expelled by the SBU for propaganda materials on the conflict in the east of Ukraine. It was also reported that he was allegedly planning to take the post of the editor-in-chief of the programme "Podrobnosti Nedeli" on the Ukrainian TV channel Inter. The journalist is banned from entering Ukraine for five years.
Annex 307
On 26 February, it became known that journalists of the Russian TV channel LifeNews Zhanna Karpenko and Aleksandra Ulyanova were not allowed to leave the transit zone of Boryspol airport in Kiev and were forbidden to use the phone and Skype. On 25 February, SBU officers detained journalists of Channel One Elena Makarova and Sergey Korenev and NTV correspondent Andrey Grygoriev without giving any reasons for their detention. On 26 February, it was reported that all the detainees returned to Moscow. On 25 February, Inna Osipova, a correspondent of the Russian NTV channel's Segodnya programme, was not allowed to enter Ukraine. The journalist arrived on a flight from Moscow at Kiev's Zhulyany airport, but problems immediately arose when she went through security. The staff began to actively inquire about Inna Osipova's identity and eventually she was simply not allowed to leave the airport, claiming that she "could not prove the purpose of her planned stay on Ukrainian territory". On 12 February, it became known that the Security Service of Ukraine detained Russian journalist with Ukrainian citizenship Andrei Zakharchuk in Nykolayev, who cooperated with the Nevskie Novosti news agency. According to Nevskie Vesti, Zakharchuk arrived in Ukraine on 2 February and was arrested by the SBU on 10 February for "improperly covering events in Ukraine". On 21 February, Andrey Zakharchuk was released in the course of a prisoner exchange in the territory of the self-proclaimed Lugansk people's republic. On 8 February, Ukrainian journalist Ruslan Kotsaba was arrested for calling for a boycott of the next wave of mobilization in Ukraine, which took place due to the conflict in Donbas. Court sentences Kotsaba to 3.5 years in prison, finding him guilty of obstructing the activity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. At the same time, the court acquitted the journalist of another article he was charged with - "high treason". On 1 June 2017, the High Specialized Court of Ukraine overturned the acquittal verdict. The court ordered a new hearing of the criminal proceedings under the article "treason against the motherland". On 30 January, LifeNews reporter Yelizaveta Khramtsova and cameraman Nataliya Kalysheva were detained by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in Kiev. According to the channel, the special services said that they wanted to ask the journalists "several questions". On the night of 31 January, the LifeNews journalists were forcibly returned from the territory of Ukraine through the Sinkovka checkpoint on the Ukrainian-Russian border in Chernigov Oblast. They were subsequently banned from entering Ukraine for the next five years. 2014 On 19 November, a film crew of the Russian TV channel REN TV was not allowed into Ukraine. The reason for the deportation from Kiev's Boryspol airport was the fact that according to Ukrainian customs officers, the journalists, who had come to the country as tourists, could not prove that they would spend the entire trip in Kiev. On 3 November, Yevgeniya Zmanovskaya, an employee of the LifeNews TV channel, was detained in Kiev after she was assigned by the editorial office to cover the Slavyanskyy march. While on the job, Zmanovskaya was surrounded by Ukrainian journalists who called a police officer to check her documents. She only had her journalist ID with her, but not her passport, which was the reason for her detention. It later became known that the cameraman of the TV channel brought the documents of her colleague, after which she was released.
Annex 307
On 23 October, Russian journalist Yevgeniy Kiselev, who has hosted political shows on the Ukrainian TV channel Inter for several years, said that he had been deported from Ukraine. According to Kiselev, he was not allowed to cross the border at Kiev's Boryspol international airport and was issued a deportation order. Later, the State Border Service of Ukraine allowed Yevgeniy Kiselev to enter the territory of Ukraine. On 28 August, Novaya Gazeta photo correspondent Yevgeniy Feldman was detained but released after some time by representatives of the Ukrainian National Guard in Marinka (Donetsk Region). On 25 August, Maxim Vasylenko, a freelance photo correspondent of Russia Today news agency and the French news agency Agence France-Presse, and his colleague Yevgeniya Koroleva, a correspondent of the Krymsky Telegraph newspaper, were detained by militants of the Ukrainian Right Sector* in Donetsk Region. On 26 August, it was reported that the journalists were released. On 1 August, the RT TV channel said that Alina Yeprymyan, a journalist of the RT Ruptly video agency, had been deported from Ukraine after erasing all her materials. The official reason for the deportation was the lack of journalist accreditation. On the night of 22-23 July, four journalists, including a freelance correspondent of Russia Today, British national Graham Phillips, and a cameraman of the Anna-News news agency Vadim Aksyonov, went missing in the war zone in eastern Ukraine. The Security Service of Ukraine later said that it had detained Phillips in Donetsk and, after questioning him, announced a decision to forcibly expel him and ban him from entering the country for three years. Aksyonov was released on 24 July. On 22 July, CNN freelance photo correspondent Anton Skiba was detained in southeastern Ukraine. According to the TV company, armed men detained Skiba outside a hotel in Donetsk after he had worked for CNN for only one day. On 26 July, the journalist was released. On 1 July, Ukrainian media reported that representatives of the self-proclaimed Lugansk people's republic had captured Hromadske TV journalist Anastasia Stanko and cameraman Ilya Beskorovayniy. The LPR authorities said that the journalists were detained for spying for the Ukrainian army. On 2 July, Stanko and Beskorovaynyy were released. On 14 June, the Zvezda TV channel reported that its journalists had been detained in Ukraine. Correspondent Yevgeniy Davydov and sound engineer Nikita Konashenkov were detained in Dnepropetrovsk and held by Ukrainian Security Service officers. On 16 June, the journalists were released and took a flight to Moscow. On 6 June, journalists of the Zvezda TV channel Andrey Sushenkov and Anton Malyshev were detained at a checkpoint near Slovyansk. They were accused of observing and collecting information about the checkpoint. The media representatives were handed over to SBU officers. On the night of 9 June, the journalists were released and handed over to the Russian side. On 20 May, Ukrainian law enforcers detained British journalist Graham Phillips in Mariupol, who had collaborated with the Russian TV channel RT. On the night of 22 May, it became known that the journalist had been released. On 18 May, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry said that Russian journalists of LifeNews Oleg Sidyakin and Marat Saichenko had been detained near Kramatorsk. The Ukrainian
Annex 307
authorities accused them of aiding "terrorism" in the east of the country. The journalists were released on 25 May and flew to Grozny, from where they later returned to Moscow. On 16 April, a Rossiya 24 TV crew - correspondent Yevgeniy Reshetnev, cameraman Sergei Truskov and engineer Vadim Klyvanov - were detained near the town of Izyum without any explanation. The group was released on 17 April. In April, Sergey Shapoval, a journalist with the Ukrainian publication VolinPost, disappeared in Donetsk Region of Ukraine; in May, the journalist was found in Donetsk and arrived in Kiev. Shapoval claimed to have spent three weeks in Donetsk, where he was held on the premises of the Donetsk regional state administration, and was released thanks to the intervention of certain politicians. *Extremist organisation banned in Russia.Material prepared on the basis of RIA Novosti information
Annex 308 Telegram,St. Petersburg Courts Unified Press Service, The Oktyabrsky District Court of St. Petersburg ruled in the suit of Igor Bezler against the Foundation Bellingcat,(19 May 2021), available at: https://t.me/SPbGS/8487(translation)

Annex 308
Translation
Telegram, St. Petersburg Courts Unified Press Service, The Oktyabrsky District Court of St.
Petersburg ruled in the suit of Igor Bezler against the Foundation Bellingcat (19 May 2021),
available at: https://t.me/SPbGS/8487.
The Oktyabrsky District Court of St. Petersburg ruled in the suit of Igor Bezler against the
Foundation Bellingcat, the private company Bellingcat, Eliot Higgins and Peter Van Huys to
protect his honour, dignity and good name.
Bezler asked to recognise certain information in the article "Identification of separatists involved
in shootdown of MH17" and the short article "A bird flew to you" as untrue, discrediting Bezler's
honour and dignity (20 points in total). To oblige to publish a refutation. To recover 500,000
roubles in moral damages. The court granted the claims, reducing the moral damage to 340,000
roubles (150,000 from the Foundation, 150,000 from the company, 40,000 from Huys).
t.me/SPbGS/8487
Daria Lebedeva, May 19, 2021 at 18:24

Annex 309
RBC, Three Russian soldiers killed in Syria (25 March 2019)
(translation)

Annex 309
Translation
RBC, Three Russian soldiers killed in Syria (25 March 2019), available at:
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/25/03/2019/5c9924cd9a79477f008a4a3e.
Three Russian soldiers killed in Syria
A vehicle carrying Russian soldiers was attacked by militants in Syria, the Defence Ministry
said. Three servicemen were killed in the attack.
Photo: Omar Sanadiki / Reuters
Three Russian servicemen were killed in an attack by terrorists in Syria, reports RIA
Novosti citing the Russian Defence Ministry.
Three Russian servicemen went missing in Syria back in late February after a
militant attack. According to the Ministry of Defence, the vehicle in which they were
travelling was attacked by a group of terrorists, and the soldiers were killed on the spot.
Their bodies were taken to Russia.
Annex 309
Russian Air Force planes and ground troops involved in the Syrian operation identified and eliminated a group of 30 militants involved in the deaths of the three servicemen. The Defence Ministry stressed that a continuous search had been carried out since the information about the disappearance of the servicemen was received. In early February, the death of 25-year-old Russian soldier Maxim Pletnev was announced. He died on 31 January while on a combat mission in Syria and was buried on 4 February. In January, the media reported the death of Staff Sergeant Andranik Arustamyan in Syria. The deaths had occurred back in November 2018, when the soldier overturned a mine barrier at a checkpoint in the town of al-Shula and four mines exploded. The Defence Ministry did not comment on the deaths of the two men. Last May, the Defence Ministry reported the death of four Russian soldiers and the wounding of three others in the Syrian city of Deir ez-Zor. During the night, militants attacked an artillery battery with the servicemen present - two were killed on the spot and two more died later in hospital from their wounds. The military conflict in Syria has been ongoing since 2011; Russia began fighting on the side of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces in 2015. In December 2017, President Vladimir Putin ordered the withdrawal of troops from Syria and a permanent military group is now stationed in the port of Tartus and at the Hmeimim airbase. In March this year, Sergei Shoigu, head of the Defence Ministry, visited Syria and met with Assad and gave him a message from Putin; the content of the document was not disclosed.
Annex310Rostec, Rostec delivered almost 300,000 sets of Ratnik combat equipment(10 December 2020)(translation)

Annex 310
Translation
Rostec, Rostec delivered almost 300,000 sets of Ratnik combat equipment (10 December
2020), available at: https://rostec.ru/news/rostekh-postavil-pochti-300-000-komplektovboevoy-
ekipirovki-ratnik/.
Rostec delivered almost 300,000 sets of Ratnik
combat equipment
Photo: CNIItochmash
The Central Research Institute of Precision Engineering (CNIItochmash) of Rostec State
Corporation has supplied the troops with almost 300,000 sets of Ratnik combat
equipment over eight years.
The main feature of Ratnik is the ability to adapt the kit to the physical characteristics of the
soldier and the combat tasks performed. In addition to the basic kit, the Institute has
developed a commander's version, kits for snipers, machine gunners and combat vehicle
crews.
"Ratnik is an advanced outfit that enables the successful execution of a wide range of tasks
on the battlefield. It combines more than 60 elements: weapons, sights, personal protective
equipment, autonomous heat source kits, communications equipment and active hearing
protection systems. Today, military specialists are developing the tactical and technical
requirements for the soldier's outfit of the future - the fundamentally new Sotnik kit. We
expect to receive technical specifications for its development as soon as 2021," said Bekhan
Ozdoyev, industrial director of Rostec State Corporation.
Ratnik was developed by CNIItochmash at the end of the noughties and underwent a full
range of military tests, which showed the demand for the equipment and the correctness of
the technical solutions used. After the tests were completed, pilot batches were sent to the
Annex 310
troops, and in 2015 annual serial deliveries of the new outfit began. In 2020, the production and delivery of the combat kits was completed ahead of schedule.
Annex 311 Magnolia-TV, Nightmare in Kharkov. A chronicle of bloody events (15 March 2014) (translation)

Annex 311
Translation
Magnolia-TV, Nightmare in Kharkov. A chronicle of bloody events (15 March 2014), available
at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140321043922/http:/magnolia-tv.com/text-news/2014-03-
15/37376-n-chnii-koshmar-u-kharkov-khron-ka-krivavikh-pod-i
NIGHTMARE IN KHARKOV. A CHRONICLE OF
BLOODY EVENTS
6:41 15.03.2014
23:00 - 00:00:
Clashes with shooting occurred in Kharkov. According to unverified information, there are victims
and wounded as a result of the clashes, local and foreign media report.
In particular, the ITAR-TASS agency reports that the clashes that took place on Rymarskaya Street
are between pro-Russian Kharkov residents and activists of the alleged "Right Sector". There is
information about the use of assault rifles, stun grenades and Molotov cocktails.
In turn, local media report that the clashes have already resulted in two deaths and several injuries.
00:00 - 01:00:
Kharkov Mayor Gennadiy Kernes confirms the media reports of the deaths during the riots on
Rymarskaya Street near the office of the "Patriot of Ukraine" organization.
According to him, two police officers were killed there. He said this by phone to "Mediaport",
referring to the fact that he was under house arrest.
However, at 23:53 he still arrived at the scene. By then, the clashes had already stopped.
"According to the information I have, there are two dead bodies and five injured," he said.
The dead, according to the mayor, are policemen. The injured are being taken to an emergency
hospital.
The police have not yet officially commented on the situation. However, the street is already under
the control of security forces with machine guns.
The head of the "Patriot of Ukraine" organisation and the Kharkov "Right Sector", Andrey Biletsky,
told "Gromadskoye TV" that the attackers shot at the windows of the office. According to him, the
"patriots" repelled two attacks on the building before law enforcement arrived. When asked whether
the defenders of the building had weapons, Biletsky replied: "It doesn't matter now."
The governor of Kharkov region, Igor Baluta, considers the night's events in the center of the
regional center to be a well-planned provocation by pro-Russian chauvinists.
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The head of the Kharkov Regional State Administration said that the conflict area is now completely surrounded by law enforcement officers. The police are detaining separatists. According to Baluta, it all started on Svoboda Square, when a group of pro-Russian protesters were provoked by people from a Volkswagen Transporter minibus. This vehicle with Dnepropetrovsk license plates has been wanted since the previous provocation in Kharkov a few days ago. Passengers of the bus deliberately entered into a conflict with pro-Russian activists, after which they drove to Rymarskaya Street to the "Prosvita" office, where they parked the car in a deliberate, provocative and demonstrative manner. They were followed by pro-Russian activists, who by that time had already called "Oplot" for help. The pro-Russian activists and "Oplot" members tried to storm the building, but were met with resistance from those inside. 01:00 - 02:00 Deputy Head of the Kharkov Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Nikolai Fomenko said that police are working to neutralise a gunman who is firing from one of the nearby yards where clashes between "Right Sector" activists and pro-Russian activists took place. The "Right Sector" said its office was attacked by about 100 pro-Russian activists. A fight broke out between the parties. The pro-Russian activists accused the "Right Sector" of provocation and armed attack with Kalashnikovs. The "Right Sector" called the incident an intervention by pro-Russian forces in an attempt to suppress the position of the Ukrainian patriotic forces and an armed assault on the office of the "Right Sector" ("Patriot of Ukraine"). 02:00 - 03:00: Kharkov law enforcement confirmed the death of two people during the riots on Rymarskaya Street. However, they denied the information previously disseminated by the mayor Gennadiy Kernes that the victims were police officers. "They are civilians," Natalia Zakharova, head of the press service of the regional department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, told "Mediaport". Kharkov prosecutor Evgeniy Popovych confirmed the deaths. According to him, one policeman was wounded. Popovych said that criminal proceedings have been initiated on the facts of organising mass riots, attempted murder of a law enforcement officer and premeditated murder committed by a group of people. Rymarskaya Street is currently blocked by law enforcement officers. Buses with special forces have been brought to the scene. According to Popovych, about 40 people barricaded themselves in the building where the "Patriot of Ukraine" office was located and attacked.
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"Certain agreements have been reached with them. I hope that investigators will soon be able to
start inspecting the scene," said the Kharkov prosecutor.
06:00:
In Kharkov, only in the morning, people who had barricaded themselves in the building at 18
Rymarskaya Street, where the "Patriot of Ukraine" office is located, began to leave the building
after a bloody night and clashes with pro-Russian activists.
About thirty people came out of the building with their hands up. They were put on buses: a police
PAZ bus and a green bus.
The negotiations, which lasted almost all night, were attended by Kharkov City Prosecutor Evgeniy
Popovych, Head of the Kharkov Regional Police Department Anatoliy Dmitriev, Head of the
Kharkov Regional State Administration Igor Baluta and Kharkov Mayor Gennadiy Kernes.
Lawyer Aleksandr Gunchenko explained the appearance of Kharkov Mayor Gennadiy Kernes on
the street. As a reminder, according to the court's decision, the Kharkov mayor should be under
house arrest at home from 9 p.m. to 7 a.m. The mayor's defence lawyer explained that Gennadiy
Kernes had reported the bloody events in Kharkov to the investigator. The investigator took into
account the urgency of the situation and allowed the mayor to leave the place that the court had
assigned him for house arrest. Therefore, according to Aleksandr Gunchenko, Gennadiy Kernes is
staying on Rymarskaya Street, where people had previously barricaded themselves, on a completely
legal basis.
Based on materials from personal sources, as well as domestic and foreign media.

Annex 312
Censor.net, 14 March 2014 - Ukraine stands up for Kharkov (14 March 2018)
(translation)

Annex 312
Translation
Censor.net, 14 March 2014 - Ukraine stands up for Kharkov (14 March 2018), available at:
https://censor.net/ua/resonance/3055537/14_bereznya_2014_ukrayina.
14 March 2014 - Ukraine stands up for Kharkov
Censor.NET
Four years after 14 March 2014, Ukrainian cinemas and lyceums are operating in Kharkov,
Ukrainian police are patrolling the city, and Ukrainian academies of the Ministry of Defense and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs are graduating Ukrainian cadets. The central square no longer has a
statue of Lenin. As before, the city is run by Mayor Gennadiy Kernes. Kharkov residents Nikolai
Kravchenko and Danila Yakovlev recall how Kharkov balanced over a civilizational abyss for
several months.
Nikolai Kravchenko (Kruk)
4 years ago he was an activist of the Patriot of Ukraine NGO, co-founder of the "Azov" Regiment,
and today he is a deputy of the "National Corps" political party and an assistant to people’s deputy
Andrey Biletskiy. His fellow Azov veteran is Danila Yakovlev (Danila).
- March 14 is the Day of the Ukrainian Volunteer. Is it related to the events in Kharkov?
Kruk: On this day, the first groups of volunteers went to form a battalion in Novye Petrovtsi. We
have nothing to do with that formal occasion. But on 14 March 2014, we, the volunteers, fought our
first battle on Rymarskaya Street in Kharkov. The first battle when the enemy suffered losses. Then
we showed that we would kill.
- How did the events in Kharkov develop?
Kruk: Two key events happened in Kharkov before Rymarskaya Street: the night of February 28 to
March 1 the storming of "Oplot" and March 1, the storming of the RSA, which was actually a failed
defence of the RSA on our part.
We came from Maidan in late February. About 100 people. We did not have black uniforms. We
were not yet called the "Black Corps". I was on the Kiev Maidan with the "Patriot of Ukraine", and,
accordingly, I belonged to the "Right Sector". The House of Trade Unions no longer existed. I was
one of those who went in and set up shop on the seventh floor of the Kiev City State
Administration.
Danila: On February 25 Andrey Biletskiy was released from prison.
Kruk: He served two years in prison under Yanukovych for the events that took place on Pervaya
Rymarskaya Street on 23 August 2011.
- What is Pervaya Rymarskaya Street?
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Kruk: It was on Rymarskaya Street in Kharkov that the main center of the nationalist movement was located. It was a building provided in the mid-2000s to the "Prosvita" Society for the Promotion of the Ukrainian Language. Since 2006, the office of the Patriot of Ukraine organisation, headed by Andrey Biletskiy, has been located here. In Kharkov, we had about two hundred activists. On August 23, 2011, a healthy man of 100+ kilograms, about fifty years old, came to our office. He came in and just shot Igor Mikhaylenko, who was later the second commander of the "Azov" Regiment and is now the head of the National Militia, in the neck. -Why? -It was an unconscious "vatnik" who wanted to shoot at nationalists. As a result, our three guys were imprisoned, although Andrey Biletskiy and I arrived after everything had happened. By the time of the Maidan, our entire organisational structure had fallen apart - most of the leaders had been in jail for two and a half years. I was on the national wanted list. I was taken off the wanted list after the "Azov" battalion. On 25 February 2014, a Law on amnesty for political prisoners was passed. Andrey and other political prisoners were released. Danila: I met Andrey Biletskiy near the detention center on Holodnaya Gora in Kharkov. He went home to change his clothes, and in the evening he came to us at the Kharkov Regional State Administration. - Was it already controlled by Maidan activists? Danila: We seized the RSA on February 23, after the separatists' congress was disrupted. - How did it happen? - The Palace of Sports. There was a tight circle of Anti-Maidan around it. But they were surrounded by an even bigger force - 30 thousand pro-Ukrainian activists. The congress was simply canceled. They were afraid! There were clashes, but only local ones. There was some bottle-throwing between Maidan and Anti-Maidan. The police did not interfere. - What happened next, why was the RSA seized? -We came to Svoboda Square in a big march, Lenin was still there. The whole of Kharkov stood on its ears. I was with a stick. We occupied the whole square. But no one knew anyone. Just like on the Maidan. I got a call saying that our guys were being beaten as they were going down to the subway. We take off running. We run to the subway and find that our activists have indeed been attacked by
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"titushky". There are more than 50 of them, they have cars. I see five people with bats, sportsmen,
beating three of them on the head with bats.
We start to attack, and the "titushky " are outnumbered. They run away. They are hiding in the
RSA. We followed them, caught them. Eventually, the "titushky " fled through the back door. We
went in and occupied the RSA. Gepa came and asked us to leave, but we refused.
On 24 March, we settled there. On 25 March, Biletskiy arrived, organised people and set a goal to
seize the "Oplot" base.
- What is Oplot and how was it captured?
Kruk: This is a training base in the city center - Zhilin's sports club. He is no longer among the
living. He was liquidated in Moscow. He was an ordinary criminal. We did not cross paths with him
before these events. They started investing political money in them in 2013.
On February 27, we organised two buses from Kiev's Maidan to Kharkov. Nationalists, Right
Sector, Patriot of Ukraine, Ultras. We arrived and marched from the regional state administration.
About two hundred people, it's hard to count.
They knew that we were coming and that our forces were bigger. There were a few people who
tried to shoot back. They left the building through the back door, but made shots in our direction.
They fled through the Hippodrome. Some of us stayed at "Oplot", others returned to the RSA,
including me and Danya.
- Did you spend the night in the RSA and stay there until the assault?
Danila: At five in the morning, we found a bomb with a clockwork mechanism in the RSA
building. It was thrown into the trash. I asked: "Where is the bomb?" In the middle of the RSA!
Among the things. I said: "Take it out!" And some people just take this package and take it out.
"Where did you take it?" - "Behind a tree!" Two policemen were standing nearby. We called them.
They simply and stupidly took the package in their hands and walked away!
Kruk: We had a conditional group of 100 people who had known each other for three to five days.
We made our first real, normal attempts to organise the structure of a full-fledged volunteer
battalion. Danya and his brother were responsible for the security of the RSA - they were duty
officers, sentries.
There was no coordination within the RSA. In general, some liberal characters from the Self-
Defence were responsible for security. We were coordinated by Biletskiy, but it had nothing to do
with the overall security of the RSA. Parubiy also had no coordination with the hundreds of Self-
Defence members. There was no centralised state. The centralised state was Yanukovych, who was
running away. Avakov was in the same situation as me - wanted, but in Italy.
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The next day, thousands of pro-Russian people gathered near the regional state administration. The entire city was blocked by buses from Belgorod and Voronezh with Russian license plates. The notorious Russian militant Arsen Pavlov-Motorola led the Russian "landing party" of anti-Maidan activists in Kharkov The assault began around 12 o'clock. We were just in the process of institutionalisation. You are asking who was in charge, how, and by whom. Just so you understand, no one and no way. Twenty minutes before the storming, I became the head of the "Right Sector" Kharkov. Andrey Biletskiy went to Yarosh. He said, "Well, now you're in charge of "Right Sector" East. But there was no structure. We started to assemble the structure from Kharkov. I've been in charge for twenty minutes, and then Danya comes running in and says: "We are actually under attack, why are you sitting here?» - Did you surrender the RSA almost without resistance? Kruk: What do you mean, without resistance? There was a fight. But it was short and in the building itself. There were weapons. There were Molotov cocktails. There were pistols, I don't know if they were firearms. Stun grenades and some other gas grenades were flying inside, and they made people sick. Danila: The assault began at five-thirty. They pulled the fence - our metal shields. And then it was on! How many of us were in the RSA? Nobody knows. Well, 200-300. How many were there -
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thousands? They did not know Kharkov, they asked: "Where is Sumskaya Street?", "Where is the
Universytet metro station?"
The Russian flag over the Kharkov regional state administration, put up by collaborators on 1
March 2014
Kruk: We were "in the meat". Cherkas (Igor Mykhaylenko) and I, along with Andrey Biletskiy,
came to the main entrance when the crowd started to tear down the shields. We retreated back to the
RSA. The attackers broke the side windows. Someone started shooting at us through them. Cherkas
was hit in the arm by something, a vein was opened, and a lot of blood poured out. I fired a
traumatic pistol through the window. We tried the firewall, but the water was blocked. We rushed to
the second floor. An SBU officer on the second floor tried to detain us. He said: "You'll break all
the furniture there! What are you doing?" Someone was blocked on the first floor. Someone in a
room, someone in the basement, someone hid in the toilet.
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A pro-Russian crowd in front of the Kharkov regional state administration On the second floor, we were squeezed into a large corridor on both sides. There are up to 15 of us - we closed ourselves with three shields. The only weapons we had were sticks. Cherkas, Biletskiy, Troyan were with us (Vadym Troyan - Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - author). Topaz came running, shouting: "Surrender!" We hit him with a stick. We surrendered to the "Ukrainian" police and the Afghans. We were taken out of the RSA. Troyan managed to escape. He just stepped into the crowd and disappeared. Without the ribbon, you just blended in with the crowd. Andrey Biletskiy did the same. He slapped a guard in the face - an incomprehensible situation arose - and Andrey disappeared into the crowd. Me, Galayda and Cherkas were the first to be taken out of the RSA. I dropped the knife, it was hanging on my chest. But some man noticed the knife, grabbed it and started shouting: "Look, he killed our children!" They tried to force us to our knees. But we resisted. We were led through the crowd. Afghans were driving us away: "They must be punished fairly!" Some women were beating us. Someone shouted: "Beat them!", someone shouted "Don't beat them!" The main thing is that we did not kneel down. Students were dragged after us. They were put on their knees, dragged along the asphalt, doused with mud and brilliant green. We were handed over to the police. They shoved us into their booth. They began to draw up some reports for hooliganism. Cherkas already had a large blood loss. He started to lose consciousness. He was completely white. We called an ambulance, but he just ran away from it.
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The policeman looked at Gal and me and said: "Here are St. George's ribbons - get out of here". So
we did. That day we lost the RSA, and they put a Russian rag on it.
- But you still had "Oplot"?
Kruk: There was a "Vitus" and about two dozen people at "Oplot". All of them had one pumpaction
rifle. The guys seized the bus and retreated to Poltava in an organised manner. Danila and his
brother were brought by a neighbour. "I came to my parents for the first time in two and a half years
(I was wanted!), took off my bloody clothes and went to Poltava as well. At first we were at the
regional state administration in Poltava, then we moved to a children's camp in the suburbs. This is
the place of origin of the "men in black". After three days, we decided to return to Kharkov, to our
home on Rymarskaya Street. And prepare for the war. We were minimally organised.
- Did you return to Rymarskaya Street for the first time since 2011?
Kruk: We returned there on March 6-7. The old ladies from "Prosvita" were there. And we started
building a fortress from Rymarskaya Street. We covered the windows with sandbags and boarded
up the back door. There were water barrels and a fire extinguisher in the rooms. We placed
"cocktail bars" on the roof of our building on both sides. Imagine: the city center, the flag of the
Russian Federation on the Kharkov regional state administration, and sandbags and the flag of
Ukraine in our windows.
We were collecting weapons: traumatic, hunting, shovels, pickaxe handles, Molotov cocktails.
Twenty people were on duty all the time.
We organised a mobilisation center, a mini-headquarters. I was the chief of staff. We started
recruiting people. The first document flow appeared. We made a questionnaire: call sign - contact -
skills.
-How did the storming of Rymarskaya by anti-Maidan activists begin?
Kruk: The main thing was reconnaissance! Our man was living in a tent in the Anti-Maidan. That's
why we knew about the assault a few hours in advance. Rambo was supposed to drive up to Anti-
Maidan and check whether the attack had begun. He was seen and chased by seven motorcyclists.
They shot at him. He managed to barricade himself with us. It was after that that the assault began.
On 14 March, around eight in the evening. We were barricaded by 32 people.
Danila: There were some random people I brought in to fill out a questionnaire. And then the
assault began. There were generally average Maidan activists among us, ready to sing the anthem
when told and stand with a stick wherever they were told. There was a journalist who came to
sympathise with us. We also put them on guard. 25 people were those we were sure of.
The girls had just gone to the store. Katya and Nastya. Katya is still serving in "Azov".
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Kruk: Nastya didn't just come out. She took a bag of documents, our entire first "document flow". She took everything out and burned it. The girls then stood on the street corner and passed us information. Danya was sitting on one of the "cocktail bars". Hal was running between us as a liaison officer, as there were no walkie-talkies. I was responsible for communications and fire safety. I told Gal where to run and what to say. He would run to Danya’s side, and I would run to the other side of the roof. I had people in each room reporting to me. They clearly knew that if a cocktail came in, they had to put out the flames. I think there were a couple hundred people on the other side. It was organised in a similar way to the storming of the RSA. A crowd, and an organised group inside. The crowd is a cover for this group. Someone inside the crowd does something, shoots, throws, and when necessary retreats and gets lost in the crowd, and the crowd then "rakes it up". We had a glass wall near the stairs on one side. They broke it. First they threw stones, then stun grenades. There were explosions, but no serious damage. Our guys immediately took up positions. Someone started shooting, and someone started throwing cocktails. Andrey Biletskiy was coordinating in the central room. - What kind of weapons did they have? Kruk: We don't know what kind of weapons they had, but it sounded like automatic weapons. They were shooting at us. One guy on the second floor, who was wearing a helmet, was hit by a bullet that went tangentially, tore the lining of his helmet, and left a characteristic mark along his head. The collection helmet is a "sphere", 8 kg. It saved his life. - Did you start shooting right away or how did it go? Kruk: Yes. We repelled the first attack, and they immediately received two 200s and five 300s. They retreated, and after that they just shot at us a little bit from the yard.
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They saw that we could kill. To storm a building, you need a lot more people, some professional
assault equipment, and you can still really die. So they took up positions at different ends of the
street and periodically fired automatic weapons. Some were hiding. Some were shooting openly.
One of the pro-Russian militants killed on Rymarskaya Street on the night of March 14, 2014
-Danya, what were you doing during the assault?
Danila: I was on the roof in a "cocktail bar". I didn't have many cocktails. But...
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I remember holding two cocktails and a firecracker with nails. I saw how the "vatniks" tried to attack us. We were walking on the neighbouring roof with shields. But it's hard to get through there. They were standing under the windows, and I threw cocktails at them. Then I threw a firecracker at their feet. It didn't really do anything. It had no serious explosive power. It could scratch you with a nail, but not more. But it was enough to scare them. They got scared. The frenzy started. I was sitting on the roof, looking out over the street. I heard the crowd roaring: "Topaz a f#$@@t give me a command!" A family man was sitting on the second "cocktail bar". He was throwing cocktails, streaming from his phone and shouting: "Valhala! Valhalla!" ("Paradise for Warriors" - an ancient Norse myth - ed.) He really thought that this was the "Last Words" section. By the way, on January 11, 2014, he was the one who used a firewall to drive a "Berkut" away from the Kiev City State Administration. Later he was wounded twice in the war. Now demobilised, he is building a subway. Topaz, a pro-Russian militant who led Kharkov's Anti-Maidan at the time, already had automatic weapons Kruk: They were severely disoriented. First of all, Topaz is an idiot. How can he know what to do? And secondly, don't you know what to do? Shoot, approach slowly. Approach through the roofs. Throw something at the cocktail bar. Our guys were throwing back cocktails only because of their strength of spirit. We had the will to fight. There were also some of our people who joined us on the street. Maidan-AntiMaidan are largely spontaneous phenomena. People began to gather. For example, Cherkas didn't have time to come. He stood in the neighbouring yard and listened to the conversations of the "vatniks".
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The police arrived. One of the wounded was a policeman. The "vatniks" were shooting at us, but hit
him.
We were connected, and I was giving information to journalists at that time. I told them what was
happening.
I finally had a phone! I exchanged phone numbers with my parents for the first time in two years.
They started calling me: "How are you?" I said: "I'm fine. Normal situation". And then there were
explosions: thump, thump, thump.
Danila: My mom calls me: "When are you going home? The last bus is coming soon!" - Did you
eventually agree to negotiate?
Kruk: It ended up with negotiators coming to us. Gepa and the chief of the Kharkov police. We
delayed the negotiations until the morning so that people could come to us for support. At dawn, we
were given an ultimatum: either we surrender to the "Ukrainian police" or we would be stormed by
a special unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We demanded that they take us to Poltava, because
Poltava was not controlled by the vatniks.
Gepa was talking to Biletskiy inside the building. Gepa and the police chief came to us. We were
running out of ammunition.
Then Pidzhak came in. He brings pancakes. He said that if we were going to surrender, we had to
eat! We ate and thought. We also had a pot of pasta left - Pidzhak hid the gun there later.
We started packing. Andrey told us to take everything we might need. The cart driver, for example,
tried to take a sack of potatoes with everything. I burned the documents that were left.
There were no wounded among us.
18 Rymarskaya Street, morning after the assault
Annex 312
The day before, there was unrest in Donetsk. We already had the first dead on our side. On 13 March, Dmitry Chernyavsky was killed. It is important for us that on 14 March in Kharkov we showed that people are killed for separatism here. Danila: Leaving is the most terrifying moment. We get on the buses, and the whole street is packed with pro-Russian activists. We were afraid that they would overthrow the buses, slash the tires, set us on fire, that we would be tied up in a cage among those who had just wanted to kill us. After Rymarskaya, we were taken to the Ordzhonikidze district police station. Vitus gets out of the police car and is immediately beaten by "Berkut" members. The cops launched Topaz to our detained guys. He hit Methan. Methan said to him: "You hit like a woman". Then Topaz hit him again. He came up to me, looked me in the eye, and left. Then he came to Family guy. He took me by the head and slammed me against the curb. At the same time, two "Berkut" guys were holding Family guy's hands. Topaz took him by the head and beat him against the curb. Kruk: I was not beaten. They started punching me, and I had a whole letter against me: I'm wanted, I'm the founder, I'm a former police officer. Andrey was taken to the SBU as an organiser. The police were aggressively wadded up, and the SBU was just confused. Half of their staff ran away, it was not clear where. They were burning documents, they had no time to deal with us. He was given the opportunity to go to the toilet, and he stupidly left the building. They let him escape. The SBU was weaker than the police. When we were sitting in the police station, Stepa and Cherkas brought us a whole crowd to the walls. We thought it was the "vatniks" who came to tear us apart, but later it turned out that they were pro-Ukrainian activists. -I know that there were trials against you… - Yes, the courts were held at 5 a.m. urgently and the decisions were made "under a copy". We were given three to five days for "malicious disobedience to police officers". It was not a case against anyone specifically for murder. They didn't know what to do with us. The police act only on orders. And there was no command. They had no contact with Kiev. Minister Zakharchenko fled. They did not know who to obey. Separatists stole money. They were not paid for any decision. There is no leadership. It seems that they did not care. The courts did not understand what to do either. The system was really falling apart. Only Vitus was left under house arrest with an ankle bracelet, and we were taken to Poltava two days later to be dealt with there. -Why Vitus? Kruk: Vitus was shooting with his own registered gun. He probably killed those "vatniks" vatniks", he had combat experience. Then he took off his bracelet and fled to Kiev.
Annex 312
And two days later, the cops leaked all the information about us online. A neighbour, our supporter,
came to my parents' house: "Your address is already on the Internet! Run away!" I was worried.
- Is this the first combat experience of the volunteers?
- Yes, it was actually the first battle against Russian mercenaries in this war, where they suffered
serious losses. Later, we called ourselves the "men in black" and even recorded a video message to
the Crimean "men in green".
On Rymarskaya Street, we already existed as a unit and were able to repel the enemy's first attack,
inflicting real combat losses on them. Rymarskaya was followed by demoralisation and
disorganisation of the separatists in Kharkov. Kiev finally made a strong-willed decision and
declared the ATO. One of the first acts of the ATO was when a special forces unit from Vinnytsia
raised the flag of Ukraine over the Kharkov Regional State Administration. Our last trip to Kharkov
was on 1 May. Two buses and several cars - about a hundred people. The same uniforms in
balaclavas, with rebar, several guns, injuries. In reality, we looked terrible. They simply canceled
the march on 1 May. In Kharkov, the ultras were already walking in crowds and came up with the
famous chant about Putin.
-How did the "Azov" battalion appear?
- In Kiev, Andrey began to create our unit, and "Azov" officially appeared on May 5. The Ministry
of Internal Affairs issued an order to create our battalion. At first, they (the Ministry of Internal
Affairs) called it "Azovia", after the place of deployment. Later we transformed it into "Azov". And
we started to look further - to Mariupol.
Alena Stadnik-Stefurak, for "Censor.NET"

Annex 313
Euro.kharkiv.ua, Day of the Volunteer. Anniversary of the defense of Rymarskaya
(24 February 2023)
(translation)

Annex 313
Translation
Euro.kharkiv.ua, Day of the Volunteer. Anniversary of the defense of Rymarskaya (24 February
2023), available at: https://euro.kharkiv.ua/den-dobrovolczya-richnyczya-oborony-rym/.
Day of the Volunteer. Anniversary of the defence of
Rymarskaya - Information and analytical center Euro Kharkov
Dear friends, we invite you to attend an event dedicated to the Volunteer Day and the anniversary of
the Rymarskaya Defence this Wednesday, March 14, at 18:00. The event is organised by National
Corps Kharkov. The battle on Rymarskaya Street on March 14 is, in fact, the first armed
confrontation in the Russian-Ukrainian war. It was one of the few cases when Ukrainians did not
act as "punching bags" but gave a worthy rebuff to separatism.
Therefore, for our Movement, this date is doubly important, because that day 4 years ago became a
baptism of fire and gave impetus to the formation of the "Azov" volunteer unit.
In the program of the event:
- photo exhibition
- weapons exhibition
- official part
- awarding of soldiers
- fire show
Constitution Square (near the stele "Glory to Ukraine")
14.03
Annex 313
⏱ 18:00 +380996863359 Come and honour the defenders of Ukrainian Kharkov! The event: https://www.facebook.com/events/225582251337040/?ti=cl The event took place. How was it?
Annex 314
SM News, The Armed Forces of Ukraine use MON-50, MON-100 and Claymore on drones
(24 December 2022)
(translation)

Annex 314
Translation
SM News, The Armed Forces of Ukraine use MON-50, MON-100 and Claymore on drones (24
December 2022), available at: https://sm.news/vs-ukrainy-nachali-ispolzovat-na-bespilotnikaxmon-
50-mon-100-i-claymore-59590-u3t5/.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine use MON-50, MON-100 and Claymore
on drones
Ukrainian Armed Forces start using MON-50, MON-100 and Claymore drones.
December 24 - SM.News agency. According to the "Avia.PRO" news publication, the Ukrainian
Armed Forces have started using drones and directional anti-personnel mines in an unusual way.
The Ukrainian army's large stock of MON-50 and MON-100 type anti-personnel mines and large
supplies of American Claymore mines enable it to use unusual attack tactics. It has become known
that anti-personnel mines are equipped with drones, which turn them into weapons with a kill zone
of up to 160 metres. Such a crossing represents a particular danger. The only downside is the loss of
the drone. It is worth noting that the heavy weight of such mines makes it difficult to use the
weapon received.

Annex 315
Tyzhden.ua, Donetsk region has the highest crime rate in Ukraine (11 July 2013)
(translation)

Annex 315
Translation
Tyzhden.ua, Donetsk region has the highest crime rate in Ukraine (11 July 2013),
https://tyzhden.ua/na-donechchyni-najvyshchyj-v-ukraini-riven-zlochynnosti/.
Donetsk region has the highest crime rate in Ukraine -
Ukrainskiy tyzhden
"We are facing new specific issues that require increased attention. First of all, it concerns crime in
general and its individual types. The crime rate is higher than the national average and amounts to
91.2 criminal offences per 10 thousand people (90.8 in the country). The number of premeditated
murders remained unchanged - 170 (the highest in the country), 11 were not solved," said the regional
prosecutor.
Siusailo noted that the Prosecutor's office has already held a joint board meeting with the Main
Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Donetsk region and the Department of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs on Transport, during which measures were developed that have already contributed
to reducing the level of certain types of crimes. In particular, there is currently a steady downward
trend in the number of premeditated murders.
As a reminder, Gennadiy Moskal, First Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovnaya Rada Committee on
Combating Organised Crime and Corruption, said that 80% of crimes registered in 2013 remain
unsolved by the police.

Annex 316
Tyzhden.ua, Moskal: In the first half of the year, police managed to solve only one in five
registered crimes (10 July 2013)
(translation)

Annex 316
Translation
Tyzhden.ua, Moskal: In the first half of the year, police managed to solve only one in five
registered crimes (10 July 2013), available at: https://tyzhden.ua/moskal-za-pershe-pivrichchiamilitsiia-
spromohlas-rozkryty-lyshe-kozhen-p-iatyj-zarieiestrovanyj-zlochyn/.
Moskal: In the first half of the year, police managed to
solve only one in five registered crimes - Ukrainskiy
tyzhden
According to the Prosecutor General's Office, 413,413 criminal offenses were registered in the first
half of 2013, compared to 254,66 in the same period last year.
Of these, notices of suspicion were served in 95,411 cases, which is 23%, and 83,492 cases were
sent to court with indictments, which is 20%.
"This indicates that 80% of the crimes that have been registered have remained unsolved," Moskal
said.
He notes that the situation is unhealthy with crimes against traffic safety and transport operation.
A total of 11,589 criminal proceedings have been opened, of which 2,667 (23%) have been served
with notices of suspicion, and 2,175 (19%) have been sent to court.
"No decisions have been made at all in 9,137 criminal proceedings," the report says.
In the field of drug trafficking, 18,432 crimes were registered, compared to 25,911 in the same
period last year.
There were 4,560 criminal proceedings opened over premeditated murders, notices of suspicion
were served in 890 cases, which is 19%, and 535 of them were sent to court, which is 11.7%.
The number of crimes committed with the use of firearms was 422; with cold steel - 733; with
explosives - 36.
In total, over the past six months, 4 facts of creating a criminal organisation and 10 facts of banditry
were detected, and 2 terrorist acts were registered.
"However, no one has been served with a notice of suspicion and the materials have not been sent to
court," Moskal said.
According to the international human rights center "La Strada-Ukraine", the Ukrainian police
initiate cases on one third of rape reports: in 9 months of 2012 the police received 1584 reports,
which resulted in 440 criminal cases under Article 152 of the Criminal Code.

Annex 317 Nv.ua, "Bandera is our father". Torchlight procession to mark 113th anniversary of Ukrainian nationalist leader held in Kiev - photos, videos (1 January 2022) (translation)

Annex 317
Translation
Nv.ua, "Bandera is our father". Torchlight procession to mark 113th anniversary of Ukrainian
nationalist leader held in Kiev - photos, videos (1 January 2022), available at:
https://nv.ua/ukr/kiyv/den-narodzhennya-banderi-v-kiyevi-vidbulasya-smoloskipna-hodavideo-
50206090.html.
"Bandera is our father". Torchlight procession to mark 113th
anniversary of Ukrainian nationalist leader held in Kiev - photos,
videos
Editor: Kateryna Denisova
1 January 2022, 19:47
12255
On Saturday, January 1, Kiev hosted the traditional annual torchlight procession in honour of the
113th anniversary of the birth of the leader and ideologist of the Organisation of Ukrainian
Nationalists, Stepan Bandera.
The marchers were scheduled to gather at 17:00 in Taras Shevchenko Park. They marched along the
following route: Volodymyrskaya Street - Taras Shevchenko Boulevard - Kreshchatyk Street -
Independence Square. According to police estimates, 500-600 people took part in the rally.
They were holding torches, Ukrainian flags, revolutionary flags of the OUN and a cloth with
Bandera's image on it. In the middle of the column, the participants carried banners with the image
of the Ukrainian nationalist leader, inscriptions "Glory to Ukraine" and other slogans.
The marchers sang the song "Our Father Bandera, Ukraine is our Mother," which became a trending
song thanks to a flash mob by Ukrainian users on TikTok.
According to "Interfax-Ukraine", on the bridge over Instytutskaya Street, the participants set fire to
flares and chanted patriotic slogans. The convoy arrived at Bankovaya Street, but law enforcement
officers did not allow it to enter the building of the Presidential Office because of the location of the
New Year's fair.
The organisers of the march said that the participants had gathered to demand that the title of Hero
of Ukraine be conferred on Myroslav Symchych, a leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement
and a centurion of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).
The march lasted about two hours and ended with the national anthem. The event took place
without conflict, under police control.
January 1, 2021 marks the 113th anniversary of the birth of Stepan Bandera, leader of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, one of the leading ideologists and theorists of the
Ukrainian nationalist movement of the 20th century.
Annex 317
Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko were the authors of the Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian State, which was proclaimed on June 30, 1941. On July 5, 1941, Bandera was placed under house arrest, and on September 15, 1941, he was imprisoned in the central Berlin prison. From early 1942 to August 1944, he was held in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. In September 1944, Bandera was released and offered to take part in the leadership of the anti-Soviet armed movement in the rear of the Red Army, but he rejected the offer and did not agree to cooperate. Stepan Bandera was killed by KGB agent Boпdan Stashynskyi in Munich on October 15, 1959.
Annex 318
Gazeta Wyborcza, Forget about Giedroyc: Poles, Ukrainians, IPN (24 May 2008)
(translation)

Annex 318
Translation
Gazeta Wyborcza, Forget about Giedroyc: Poles, Ukrainians, IPN (24 May 2008), available at:
https://archive.is/R9ze1.
Forget about Giedroyc: Poles, Ukrainians, IPN
In a letter dated 2 April 1976, Jerzy Giedroyc wrote to the Ukrainian politician and journalist Ivan
Kedrin-Rudnytsky: "There are a lot of issues between Poles and Ukrainians - unpleasant or very
heavy issues. However, I don't think it's right to use inaccurate information. It is probably in the
interests of our peoples to normalise relations, which requires telling the whole truth - but only the
truth - to each other's eyes".
Undoubtedly, Giedroyc had in mind above all the bloody conflict that divided Poles and Ukrainians
in 1943-47.
From Volhynia to the "Vistula" action
Its course was heavily influenced by the Bandera faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian
Nationalists and its subordinate units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. At the turn of 1942/43, the
OUN-B leadership decided, without waiting for the end of the war, to remove Poles from all lands
considered Ukrainian. In Volhynia, the decision was made to physically liquidate the entire Polish
population, and in Galicia to expel them under threat of death. This operation was described in
Ukrainian reports as an "anti-Polish action".
On 9 February 1943, Grigoriy Pereginiak's UPA unit "Dowbeszki-Korobki" slaughtered the first
village - Parośle (Sarny district). In March and April 1943, there were many attacks on Polish
villages - for example, on the night of 22/23 April, around 600 Poles were murdered in Janowa
Dolina. The attacks were most intense on 11 July 1943, when at least 99 villages were attacked
simultaneously - including Kisielin and Poryck. Peasants from the surrounding villages, mobilised
by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and armed only with axes and pitchforks, often took part
in the attacks. Acts of degenerate cruelty were not uncommon.
The Home Army stepped in to defend the population, setting up self-defence bases. In the most
famous of these, in Przebraż, several thousand Poles survived. Home Army partisan units
cooperated with the self-defence bases, forming the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the Home
Army in early 1944. A large group of the Polish population sought rescue in the cities under the
protection of the Germans, 5-7 thousand ended up in the Soviet partisans.
The anti-Polish Ukrainian Insurgent Army's (UPA) campaign in Eastern Galicia began in the early
spring of 1944. Here, too, villages were often destroyed with their entire populations. It was only
after the entry of the Red Army that the UPA command abandoned the purges. The first order to
cease attacks against the defenceless population was issued on 1 September 1944, but still at the
turn of 1944/45 bloody attacks on several dozen Polish villages, including Ihrowica, were carried
out in the Tarnopol Voivodeship.
Annex 318
In July 1944, at a congress of the Ukrainian Main Liberation Council - a body conceived as a supra-party political platform of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army - UPA commander Roman Shuchevych "Taras Chuprynka" admitted that in Volhynia there had been a "liquidation of the Polish population ... which ended in the summer of 1943", and in Galicia "the UPA command gave the order to displace Poles if they did not resettle themselves. The attacks continue". And he added: "We are creating comfortable positions for ourselves, which cannot be achieved at the green tables [of talks]. We will not let ourselves be lied to. The Ukrainian masses in our hands". Poles did not limit themselves to self-defence - there were also bloody reprisal actions. In Volhynia, actions against Ukrainian civilians were carried out primarily by Polish police in German service, created after the Ukrainian police deserted to the UPA. In the Lublin region, Polish partisan units took the offensive in March 1944, burning more than 20 Ukrainian villages, including Sahryń. In turn, between February and April 1945, a number of Ukrainian villages in the strip from Lubaczów to Sanok were burnt down. It was then that several hundred Ukrainians were killed in Pawłokom, where Presidents Lech Kaczyński and Viktor Yushchenko met in 2006 (earlier, in 2003, Presidents Aleksander Kwasniewski and Leonid Kuchma paid tribute to the Poles murdered in Poryck/Pawliwka). A particularly painful event for Ukrainians was the 1947 Operation Vistula. In accordance with a resolution issued on 29 March 1947 by the Political Bureau of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), Ukrainians and Lemkos living in the south-east of Poland were forcibly deported to the western territories and resettled in such a way that they were quickly assimilated. Although this action was justified by the need to liquidate Ukrainian Insurgent Army units operating in Poland, there is no doubt that for thousands of people not connected to the Ukrainian underground, the deportations were undeserved repression. In total, 80-100,000 Poles and 10-20,000 Ukrainians were killed in 1943-47. In Volhynia the account is striking - on the Polish side there were perhaps as many as 50-60 thousand victims, on the Ukrainian side no more than 2-3 thousand. More than a million Poles and around 630 thousand Ukrainians and Lemkos were expelled from their homeland. What was genocide? Such a huge tragedy cannot fail to arouse public emotion. Polish historians generally agree that the Ukrainian purges were barbaric in nature and cannot be justified. However, this does not mean that scholars do not differ profoundly in their assessment of the events. According to some historians supported by the so-called 'national borderland' circles, the actions of the Ukrainians must be contrasted with the crimes committed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. They were a "third genocide", which in fact "far surpasses the German and Soviet genocides", and can only be compared to the Holocaust. It is difficult, in my opinion, to agree with such a radical opinion. The anti-Polish purges were undoubtedly one of the bloodiest Polish episodes of the Second War. However, no matter how one assesses the actions of the OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, its members were citizens of
Annex 318
the Second Republic who acted against their Polish fellow citizens, and not invaders carrying out
brutal external aggression.
The Third Reich and the USSR were subjects of international law, and the OUN a secret terrorist
organisation. The aim of German and Soviet occupation policy was to enslave all of Poland, while
Poles and Ukrainians were divided by a dispute over the future border. Finally, for the Ukrainian
nationalists, the Poles were hated occupiers, while for the Nazis, they were racially inferior
subhumans who had to be turned into a nation of slaves. For the Soviets, on the other hand, Polish
society appeared to be the object of a gigantic social experiment in the course of which all 'class
enemies' had to be destroyed. If one were to look for analogies, one should rather look at the
relations between Croats and Serbs at the time - if only because the Croatian Ushtashe resembled
members of the OUN in many respects.
And that the UPA's crimes did not bear the hallmarks of genocide. The majority of Polish historians
today are inclined to this view. For there is no doubt that in the years 1943-45 the inhabitants of
Volhynia and Eastern Galicia were killed simply for being Poles. The problem is, however, that
some of the actions of the Polish underground may also fulfil the characteristics of genocide. Such
is the conclusion of the findings of the investigation by IPN prosecutors into the murder of several
dozen Belorussians, committed by a branch of the national underground in 1946 in the Bielsk
Podlaski district. And it was a crime similar to those that took place in some Ukrainian villages - for
example, in Wierzchowiny, where a grouping of the National Armed Forces killed almost 200
Ukrainians in June 1945.
It is worth emphasising, however, that one cannot put an equal sign between the planned
extermination of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia and the local reprisal actions in the
Rzeszow and Lublin regions. For on the Ukrainian side, we were dealing with top-down directed
ethnic cleansing, while on the Polish side, we were dealing with the initiatives of local commanders
disobeying instructions coming from above. On the Ukrainian side, therefore, the entire anti-Polish
operation was genocidal, on the Polish side - individual pacifications.
It is precisely the assessment of the retaliatory actions that divides Polish historians the most. Some
scholars, fervently supported by national and borderland circles, consider the problem of Polish
actions against the Ukrainians to be unimportant and try to reduce their scale to a minimum. On the
other hand, they consider the forced displacement of Ukrainians to be, if not even normal, then at
least fully justified. Interestingly, they use methods analogous to those used by some Ukrainian
deniers. For example, the theory, popular in Ukraine at the time, that the first Polish villages were
murdered by Soviet partisans disguised as Ukrainians (and that the Ukrainians only attacked the
Poles when they started burning Ukrainian villages in revenge), is deceptively similar to the attempt
to shift responsibility for the murder in Wierzchowiny from the NSZ to a "bogus unit" created by
the Security Office.
What is striking in the voices of the borderland circles is the undisguised desire to force historians
to present the past from a "merely correct" perspective, whereby any doubt or a simple hint of
sympathy for the suffering of the Ukrainians is treated as a betrayal of the national interest.

Annex 319 OUN UPA, Personalities, Slava Stetsko (14.05.20 - 12.03.03) (1 January 2015) (translation)

Annex 319
Translation
OUN-UPA, Personalities, Slava Stetsko (14.05.20 - 12.03.03) (1 January 2015), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20150101141420/http://oun-upa.org.ua/personalities/.
Slava Stetsko (14.05.20 - 12.03.03)
Anna Muzyka was born on May 14, 1920, in the village of Romanivka, Ternopol region. Higher
education. Lviv Polytechnic, School of Political Science (Munich), conference interpreter.
Specialised in translating from English, French and German. Native in Polish, English, German,
French, Spanish, Italian, Slovak, and Belarusian. Specialisation: sociologist, psychologist, political
scientist. Master's degree.
Member of the OUN since 1938. Co-organiser of the UPA Red Cross, the OUN Women's Network,
and the OUN Youth. In 1943 she was imprisoned by the Germans in Lvov. Head of the OUN press
bureau, editor of the Ukrainian Review quarterly, co-organiser of the European Council for Freedom
(ECF). President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples. After forced emigration, she returned to
Ukraine. Honorary citizen of Lvov (1993).
2000 - Order of Princess Olga, III degree. Until 2001, she was the head of the OUN (b) leadership.
From 1944 to 1991, she lived abroad, where she and her husband Yaroslav Stetsko conducted
underground activities aimed at liberating Ukraine from Soviet occupation. After Ukraine gained
independence, she returned to her homeland.
She has headed the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists since 1992. Member of the Verkhovnaya Rada
of Ukraine from the 89th electoral district of Ivano-Frankovsk region.
Yaroslava Stetsko went to be with the Lord on March 12, 2003, in Munich, where she was undergoing
medical treatment.

Annex 320
Unian, Hero of Ukraine Yuriy Shukhevich dies (22 November 2022)
(translation)

Annex 320
Translation
Unian, Hero of Ukraine Yuriy Shukhevich dies (22 November 2022), available at:
https://www.unian.net/society/umer-geroy-ukrainy-yuriy-shuhevich-novosti-lvova-
12053652.html.
Hero of Ukraine Yuriy Shukhevich dies
Irina Pogorelaya
Yuri Shukhevich was the son of the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),
Roman Shukhevich.
Yuriy Shukhevich dies \ UNIAN photo
Dissident, people’s deputy of the 8th convocation, Hero of Ukraine, son of commander-in-chief of
the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) Roman Shukhevich, Yuriy Shukhevich has died at the age of
89.
This was announced by Lvov mayor Andrey Sadovyy in Telegram.
"At the age of 89, Yuriy Shukhevich - Hero of Ukraine, dissident, member of Ukrainian Helsinki
Group. Eternal memory to the great Ukrainian," he wrote.
According to media reports, Shukhevich died on the night of 22 November. He spent the last
minutes of his life in Germany, where he was undergoing medical treatment.
Who is Yuri Shukhevich
Shukhevich was born on March 28, 1933 in the village of Oglyadov in Lvov region.
He was a well-known Ukrainian political figure, dissident, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki
Group and spent 28 years in prisons and camps of the USSR as a political prisoner.
In 1990 he organised and until 1994 headed UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian
People's Self-Defence).
Annex 320
In August 2006 Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko awarded Yuriy Shukhevich the title of Hero of Ukraine.
Annex 321
BBC News Ukraine, National Corps in Faces: Who are these people and where are they from?
(11 March 2019)
(translation)

Annex 321
Translation
BBC News Ukraine, National Corps in Faces: Who are these people and where are they from?
(11 March 2019), available at: https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-47527045.
National Corps in Faces: Who are these people and where are they from? -
BBC News Ukraine
National Corps in Faces: Who are these people and where are they from?
11 March 2019
Photo by UNIAN
The "National Corps" party and its sister youth organisation, the "National Druzhiny", have
been in the spotlight after clashes with police near the presidential administration and an
attempt to break through to Petr Poroshenko's office in Cherkasy on March 9.
The nationalists, who are united by the so-called "Azov" movement (after the "Azov" National
Guard Regiment), have in recent years formed a party and a civilian youth group that has declared
its mission to "ensure order on the streets of Ukrainian cities."
Some support this movement, but many are now concerned about the National Militias' promise to
use force at polling stations in the event of fraud.
Despite talks that the leaders of the "National Corps" may be connected to the leadership of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Azov" activists have been clashing with the police.
Who are the people who lead the "Azov" movement, which is playing an increasingly important
role in Ukrainian politics?
Annex 321
Andrey Biletskiy, leader of the "Azov" movement and head of the "National Corps" party, people’s deputy This politician was born and studied in Kharkov, and has a degree in history. Photo by UNIAN He spoke out against the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, participated in the "Ukraine Without Kuchma" action and Orange Revolution, founded the nationalist organisation "Patriot of Ukraine", and professed "social nationalist" views. He was imprisoned during the Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity. Biletskiy was imprisoned in 2011. At that time, representatives of nationalist organisations, including the "Patriot of Ukraine", were arrested in Ukraine. In August 2011, there was a shooting at the Patriot office in Kharkov. As a result, several nationalists were injured, including Sergey Kolesnyk, who had come to the right-wing to resolve the conflict. Subsequently, law enforcement officers opened a case over the attack on Kolesnyk, and Andrey Biletskiy was arrested as part of the investigation. He was released on 24 February 24 2014, when the Verkhovnaya Rada passed a resolution to release political prisoners of the time of Viktor Yanukovych. In March and April, Andrey Biletskiy was one of the leaders of the movement against separatists in Kharkov. On 14 March 2014, he was involved in an armed confrontation with pro-Russian activists near the "Patriot of Ukraine" office. Subsequently, the Russian militant "Motorola" admitted that his unit first took part in a combat clash on 14 March 2014, in Kharkov.
Annex 321
In the spring of 2014, Andrey Biletskiy became one of the founders of the battalion, and later the
"Azov" police Regiment, which participated in the ousting of militants from Mariupol and a number
of other operations in Donbass.
During the fighting in the East, the Regiment's commander had a good relationship with the
Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov.
In an interview, he admitted that Arsen Avakov was "a man who, despite all the disadvantages,
really helped create volunteer battalions, who was not afraid to take responsibility for arming them.
He proved to be the most adequate of the country's top leaders in times of war."
He insists that Avakov is not his political ally.
Photo by UNIAN
Photo caption,
In a few years, Andrey Biletskiy managed to create a political force with several thousand activists
In 2014, Andrey Biletskiy was elected to the Verkhovnaya Rada in the Kiev constituency as a selfnominated
candidate. Although he had participated in the "People's Front" election congress the day
before.
In recent years, Andrey Biletskiy has been accused of being coordinated by Arsen Avakov.
However, he denies this and says that this information is being spread by the presidential
administration.
He claims that their communication is actually "reduced to zero".
Some "Azov" fighters, such as Andrey Troyan, have been promoted to senior positions in the
national police.
In the spring of 2015, Andrey Biletskiy founded the "Azov" Civil Corps and then the "National
Corps" party.
Annex 321
Since pre-war times, Andrey Biletskiy was known for his extreme nationalist views, which were criticised by human rights activists. Until 2011, Mr. Biletskiy spoke out in support of a certain confederation with Russia. "We, social nationalists, have completely different views on this issue. We realise that separation from Russia and division is idiotic. Because our idea is a powerful pro-Ukrainian confederation with a center in Kiev. But by no means a single state," Mr. Biletskiy said in 2010. Oleg Petrenko, MP, one of the leaders of the National Corps party Oleg Petrenko, 45, is a member of parliament. He participated in clashes with police in Cherkasy on March 9. Oleg Petrenko was born and raised in Cherkasy, where he was elected to the Verkhovnaya Rada in 2014 in a constituency from the Petr Poroshenko Bloc party. Before the Revolution of Dignity, he was engaged in the tourism business and worked for several years in the Cherkasy City Council. He graduated from Kharkov with a degree in management and economics. Oleg Petrenko participated in the Maidan protests and joined the "Azov" police battalion during the fighting in Donbass. After being elected to the Parliament, he participated in the work of the "Azov" Civil Corps and later the "National Corps" party. In the summer of 2017, Oleg Petrenko officially left the Petr Poroshenko Bloc faction in the Verkhovnaya Rada. The reason for his departure was the delay in signing the law on amnesty for participants in the war in the East by the Ukrainian side. He himself admitted that at that time he was already one of the leaders of the "National Corps" party and did not want to be associated with the presidential Petr Poroshenko Bloc party, which the nationalists criticised. According to him, the decision to leave was made by the "National Corps". In an interview with "Censor", Mr. Petrenko recalled that he had twice wanted to leave the faction before, but was allegedly personally dissuaded by Petr Poroshenko. Oleg Petrenko participates in the most important actions of the "National Corps" alongside Andrey Biletskiy. This was the case during the violent confrontation with the police near the "ATEK" plant in March 2018, as well as the recent events in Cherkasy. Sergey Korotkikh, ex-commander of the "Azov" intelligence unit and one of the speakers of the "National Corps" party He is one of the founders of the NGO "Protection and Reconstruction of the Country" (NGO "Zvezda"), which belongs to the "Azov" movement and is associated with the "National Druzhinas". Sergey Korotkikh (known in the media as "Boatsman" and "Malyuta") was born in Russia, but later moved with his parents to Belarus.
Annex 321
He served in the army there and later studied at a KGB school, from where, according to his own
words to the "Belarusian Partisan", he was "kicked out" in 1996 for participating in the opposition
rally "Chernobyl Way" and clashes with the police.
Later, he participated in the activities of the Belarusian branch of the Russian right-wing radical
movement "Russian National Unity".
In December 2014, Poroshenko made Belarusian Sergei Korotkikh a citizen of Ukraine.
He moved to Russia, where he was also involved in local right-wing radical movements, including
co-founding the "National Socialist Society" organisation.
Korotkikh himself denied any commitment to neo-Nazi ideas and insisted that "we tried to create an
organisation that would promote our vision of the world by absolutely civilised, acceptable
methods, including parliamentary ones."
According to media reports, he worked for a private military company, but he does not confirm this
information.
In April 2014, he moved to Ukraine - "from the first day in Azov".
He fought in Donbass, including commanding a company of scouts. He was near Ilovaisk, from
where the "Azov" fighters retreated until the ATO forces surrounded them.
In late 2014, he received a Ukrainian passport from President Poroshenko.
Later he joined the police; according to his 2015 electronic declaration, he was "the head of the
police department for the protection of strategic objects."
In August 2018, he was appointed vice president for security and development of the Ukrainian
Combat Sambo Federation.
Sergey Korotkikh has gradually become one of the public faces of the "Azov" Movement, regularly
appearing in the media on behalf of the "National Corps" party.
He criticises the government over the corruption scandal in the defence industry.
"The "National Corps" doesn't care who runs [for president]. We want the perpetrators to be
imprisoned, and the Prosecutor General to finally make public the facts of theft in the defence
industry and report on how he imprisons them every week," Sergey Korotkikh said on "ZIK" TV
channel in early March.
Igor Mykhaylenko, commander of the "National Militia"
Igor Mykhaylenko, with the call sign "Cherkas," is an associate of Andrey Biletskiy.
Together with him, he was accused of attempted murder in Kharkov, was held in a pre-trial
detention center, and was released in 2014 after the parliamentary resolution "On the release of
political prisoners."
He fought in Donbass as part of the "Azov" battalion and then Regiment.
After Andrey Biletskiy became a member of parliament, it was Igor Mykhaylenko who took over
the Regiment in the fall of 2014 and commanded it until the end of summer 2016.
Annex 321
Later, as part of a "rotation," he handed over command to another "Azov" member, Maksim Zhorin, and remained his deputy until 2017, when he resigned from the service. At the same time, according to media reports, he became a defendant in a criminal case of armed robbery of cash collectors in Zaporozhye. He denied this himself. "I have never been under investigation in this case. No one has ever taken any explanations from me in this case. The only thing that can be tied to me is that ex-soldiers of the "Azov" regiment were involved in this case," he said in an interview with "Glavkom". In 2018, he became the commander of the "National Druzhinas". On the website of the Cherkasy movement, he is described as a "nationalist, veteran, family man, athlete". In the above-mentioned interview, he said that the idea of creating the "druzhinas" belonged to him and Andrey Biletskiy: "I came to the cities and realised that not quite decent things were happening here in civilian life... In fact, this is a joint idea: mine and Andrey Biletskiy's. We talked about the problems on the streets, and we talked about how it would be better to create an organisation to solve these problems." In a conversation with "the Babel", Igor Mykhailenko said that he is officially an entrepreneur and has "his own security company." "I also have experience in creating volunteer formations and countering hybrid warfare, and I sometimes provide paid consultations. They are very expensive abroad. Soon I have to go to Poland to present my vision of the new territorial defence of Ukraine," Cherkas said. Dmytriy Kukharchuk, head of the regional branch of the "National Corps" in Cherkasy, pro bono assistant to people’s deputy Andrey Biletskiy Dmytriy Kukharchuk was born in June 1990. He holds a bachelor's degree in philosophy from the Bogdan Khmelnytsky National University. The website of the "National Corps" states that he is a member of the ultras movement, "the organiser of the storming of the Cherkasy Regional State Administration, the battles on Hrushevskogo and Instytutskaya streets," and participated in the battles in Donbass as part of the "Azov" regiment. He has the call sign "Slip". Since February 2016, he was a member of the executive committee of the Cherkasy City Council "from the public", but was excluded from its membership by the decision of the city council deputies in February 2017. During this meeting, he had a conflict with the mayor of Cherkasy, Anatoliy Bondarenko. In an interview with "Procherk" in 2017, Dmytriy Kukharchuk said that he had "many entries in his work record book about his service in the National Guard," worked as a freelance journalist for some time, and had a real estate business, but did not want to disclose details. "I would like the things I do, where I get my income, to remain secret so that I cannot be influenced by it," explained Kukharchuk.
Annex 321
In July 2018, he took part in a fight with ATO veterans Aleksandr Borodienko and Oleg Kuznetsov
in an entertainment venue in Cherkasy. In October 2018, he was served with a suspicion notice in
this case.
In an interview with ZMI.ck.ua in December 2018, Dmytriy Kukharchuk said that he works as a
regional head of the all-Ukrainian consulting company Foxtrot 13, and that his work is related to the
protection and legal support of real estate.
"In addition, I am a private entrepreneur. I have a beauty salon where my mother works," he added.
After the interview, Dmytriy Kukharchuk underwent an unofficial polygraph test, which revealed
that he may have given a false or incomplete answer to the question of whether he had unregistered
weapons.
He took part in the clashes in Cherkasy on March 9, 2019, during which he and his supporters
seized the stage where President Petr Poroshenko was speaking after he left the venue.
Detained on March 10, he and another member of the "National Corps" are suspected by the police
of "organising citizens to commit hooliganism and inflict bodily harm on police officers who were
protecting public order."
In an interview with ZMI.ck.ua in December 2018, Dmytriy Kukharchuk denied that the "National
Corps" takes money for organising rallies. "No. There were no such things in Cherkasy and the
region," he said.

Annex 322
LB.ua, "Svoboda" members suspected of shooting at protesters on Maidan (13 October 2015)
(translation)

Annex 322
Translation
LB.ua, "Svoboda" members suspected of shooting at protesters on Maidan (13 October 2015), available
at: https://lb.ua/news/2015/10/13/318362_svobodovtsev_zapodozrili.html.
"Svoboda" members suspected of shooting at protesters on Maidan
Photo: facebook.com/sych.olexander
Yesterday's searches of former "Svoboda" people’s deputy Aleksandr Sych, Oleg Pankevych and
Ihor Yankiv are related to the investigation of the facts presented in the BBC story, people’s deputy
Sergey Leshchenko wrote on his Facebook page.
According to him, the searches were conducted in the case of the Maidan shootings based on a BBC
story published in late February 2014. The shots from the Ukraina Hotel were shown starting from
the seventh minute.
"It has been established that at around 9:30 a.m. on February 20, 2014, BBC journalist Gabriel
Gatehouse was at the entrance to the October Palace among the protesters. At that time, he noticed
an open window of the Ukraine Hotel (No. 1132), from which a shot was fired at some point. He
recorded this window on video, and when he pointed the camera at it again a few moments after the
shot, it was already closed. At that moment, there were only protesters near the October Palace.
Meanwhile, the "Berkut" was shooting from a snow barricade near the Kreshchatyk metro station,
and at 9:30 it moved to concrete blocks," Leshchenko wrote.
According to him, Igor Yankiv, a "Svoboda" deputy, lived in No. 1132. Ex-deputy Yankiv's
neighbors on the 11th floor of the Ukraina Hotel were then "Svoboda" people’s deputies Pankevych
and Sych.
"A detail that few people know about: former people’s deputy Yankiv is a master of sports and a
shooting instructor. For this reason, the three of them were searched," Leshchenko added.
On Monday morning, law enforcement officers searched the homes of three former people’s
deputies at once - Aleksandr Sych in Ivano-Frankovsk, Oleg Pankevych in Brody and Igor Yankiv
in Lvov.
Annex 322
On Tuesday, Aleksandr Sych posted on his Facebook page the court's authorisation for the search.
Annex 322
The document confirms Leshchenko's information.
Annex 322
Annex 323
Unian, Ministry of Internal Affairs: 130 law enforcement officers hospitalised with gunshot
wounds (20 February 2014)
(translation)

Annex 323
Translation
Unian, Ministry of Internal Affairs: 130 law enforcement officers hospitalised with gunshot
wounds (20 February 2014), available at: https://www.unian.ua/politics/887357-vje-130-
pravoohorontsiv-dostavleni-do-medzakladiv-z-vognepalnimi-poranennyami-mvs.html.
Ministry of Internal Affairs: 130 law enforcement officers
hospitalised with gunshot wounds
UNIAN Editorial office
Ministry of Internal Affairs: 130 law enforcement officers have already been taken to medical
institutions with gunshot wounds
The Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine told UNIAN that
since February 18, a total of 565 law enforcement officers have sought medical assistance, 410 of
whom have been hospitalised.
The number of law enforcement officers killed so far is 13.
As UNIAN reported, in the afternoon, the Ministry reported that 30 law enforcement officers had
received gunshot wounds in Kiev today.
"During February 20, more than 50 law enforcement officers have already been taken to medical
institutions, 30 of them have gunshot wounds, three law enforcement officers died," the Ministry
reported.
Annex 323
As UNIAN reported, on February 18, armed clashes between protesters and security forces resumed in Kiev. According to preliminary data, about 30 people were killed, more than a thousand were injured, and hundreds were hospitalised. This morning in Kiev, the confrontation between law enforcement and protesters escalated. Earlier, the press service of "Svoboda" reported that snipers and machine gunners opened fire on people from Instytutskaya Street. The Presidential Administration and opposition leaders accused each other of violating the ceasefire agreement. According to preliminary data from the National Resistance Headquarters, more than 60 protesters were killed today. The Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that it had issued firearms to the police and that they had the right to use them. The Health Department of the Kiev City State Administration informed that as of 15.00 dated 20 February, 551 participants of the mass events in the center of the capital had sought medical care since February 18. 332 people were hospitalised. As of 15.00, 67 corpses were delivered to the Bureau of Forensic Medicine.
Annex 324
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 27 April 2018

Annex 324
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo, 27 April 2018.
The picture was taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian
Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
Original text: “Sich” C14 members entered the centre, sprayed graffiti’s on walls
and broke some exhibition boards… Volunteer Movement “Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists” (OUN) announced days in advance on Facebook to attack
the centre
Russian Cultural Center in Kiev, vandalized by C14 and OUN members on 17
and 18 February 2018
See also OSCE SMM Spot Report: Incidents at Russian Centre for Science and
Culture in Kyiv. Available at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-missionto-
ukraine/372656

Annex 325
The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 806/2014 “On the Day of Defender of Ukraine”,
14 October 2023
(translation)

Annex 325
Translation
The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 806/2014 “On the Day of Defender of Ukraine”, 14 October
2023, available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/8062014-17816.
PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY
Official web portal
DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
UKRAINE No. 806/2014
On the Day of Defender of Ukraine
In order to honor the courage and heroism of the defenders of the independence
and territorial integrity of Ukraine and military traditions and victories of the
Ukrainian people and to promote further strengthening of the patriotic spirit in
society and in support of the public initiative, I hereby decree that:
1. A holiday be established in Ukraine, the Day of the Defender of Ukraine,
which shall be celebrated annually on October 14.
2. Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 202 dated February 23, 1999 be
declared no longer in force.
President of Ukraine P. POROSHENKO
October 14, 2014

Annex 326
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 15 June 2018

Annex 326
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo, 15 June 2018.
The picture was taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian
Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
Original text: Ivano-Frankivsk Monitoring Team
Nationalists’ outrages in Western Ukraine (Carpathian Sich symbolic on the
lower photo), Kiev, the OSCE SMM Headquarters , 15 June 2018

Annex 327
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 23 August 2018

Annex 327
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo, 23 August 2018.
The picture was taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian
Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
Original text: Violence against Roma
Kiev, the OSCE SMM Headquarters, 23 August 2018

Annex 328
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 27 July 2018

Annex 328
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo, 27 July 2018.
The picture was taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian
Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
OSCE SMM slide depicting certain nationalists outrages in Odessa, 2018

Annex 329 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 7 September 2018

Annex 329
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo, 7 September 2018.
The picture was taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian
Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
Kharkov Deputy Major Rudenko thrown in a trash disposal by National Corps
members, 20 June 2018
The information on the National Corps outrages in Kharkov of 18 June 2018 is
also available at: https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/sutichki-u-miskradi-harkova-zastupnikamera-
kinuli-v-smitnik-deputati-zabarikaduvalisya-v-zali-1174242.html

Annex 330
Administration of the President of Ukraine, Letter No. 12-09/2938, 16 July 2019
(translation)

Annex 330
Translation
Administration of the President of Ukraine, Letter No. 12-09/2938, 16 July 2019, available at:
https://dostup.pravda.com.ua/request/51414/response/123805/attach/3/2281..pdf.
Presidential Administration of Ukraine
Main Department for Ensuring Access to Public Information
16 July 2019 No. 12-09/2938
In reply to No. 2281 of 09 July 2019
to Mr. ANATOLY
Dear Mr. Anatoly,
In reply to your request of 9 July 2019, we are sending you Decrees of the President of
Ukraine No. 965 “On Awarding R. Shukhevych the Title of Hero of Ukraine” dated 12
October 2007 and No. 46 “On awarding S. Bandera the Title of Hero of Ukraine” dated
20 October 2010, which are still in force.
Attachment: 1 file.
Sincerely yours,
Head of the Main Department for Ensuring
Access to Public Information,
Presidential Administration of Ukraine S. Kondzelya

Annex 331
The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 46/2010 “On Awarding S. Bandera the Title of Hero of
Ukraine”, 20 January 2010
(translation)

Annex 331
Translation
The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 46/2010 “On Awarding S. Bandera the Title of
Hero of Ukraine”, 20 January 2010, available at:
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/46/2010#Text.
DECREE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
On awarding S. Bandera the title of Hero of Ukraine
{For more details see Resolution of Donetsk District Administrative Court
No. 2а-1219/10/0570 (v0570805-10) dated 02.04.2010}
To honour his unbreakable spirit in defending the national idea and his heroism
and self-sacrifice in the struggle for an independent Ukrainian state, I hereby
decree that:
The title of Hero of Ukraine be conferred upon and the Order of the State be
awarded to Stepan Andriyovych BANDERA, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists (posthumously).
President of Ukraine V. YUSHCHENKO
Kiev, January 20, 2010
No. 46/2010

Annex 332
The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 965/2007 “On Awarding R. Shukhevych the Title of Hero
of Ukraine”, 12 October 2007
(translation)

Annex 332
Translation
The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 965/2007 “On Awarding R. Shukhevych the Title of
Hero of Ukraine”, 12 October 2007, available at:
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/965/2007#Text.
DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
On Awarding R. Shukhevych the Title of Hero of Ukraine
To honour his outstanding personal contribution to the national liberation
struggle for freedom and independence of Ukraine and on the occasion of the 100th
anniversary of his birth and the 65th anniversary of the creation of the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army, I hereby decree that:
The title of Hero of Ukraine be conferred upon and the Order of the State be
awarded to Roman Yosypovych SHUKHEVYCH, Chief Commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent
Army in 1942-1950, General and Standard Bearer (posthumously).
President of Ukraine V. YUSHCHENKO
Kiev, October 12, 2007
No. 965/2007

Annex 333
Ukrainska Pravda, "Right Sector" will not lay down arms until Yanukovych resigns
(21 February 2014)
(translation)

Annex 333
Translation
Ukrainska Pravda, "Right Sector" will not lay down arms until Yanukovych resigns (21 February
2014), available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/21/7015612/.
"Right Sector" will not lay down arms until Yanukovych resigns
Ukrainska Pravda
The "Right Sector" has announced that it will not lay down its arms until President Viktor
Yanukovych resigns and is ready to take responsibility for the further development of the revolution
in Ukraine.
The leader of the organisation, Dmitriy Yarosh, said this from the stage on Maidan Nezalezhnosti.
"Glory to the Ukrainian heroes who died in the battle for freedom, justice and prosperity of our
Motherland, our Ukraine," he began.
"Brothers and sisters, the situation is difficult. Once again, as it has been the case many times
before, the authorities have started to play games. The agreements that have been reached do not
meet our aspirations. "Right Sector" will not lay down its arms. "Right Sector" will not lift the
blockade of any state institutions until our most important demand is fulfilled - the resignation of
Yanukovych," he said.
"Friends and colleagues, I emphasise that all those responsible - Zakharchenko, Berkut
commanders, those who gave the order, the sniper - must be arrested. The "Right Sector" has
always been in favour of the unity of the rebel movement," Yarosh said.
"The "Right Sector" calls on all Maidan participants to continue their joint struggle against the
regime of internal occupation. We are ready to take responsibility for the further development of the
Ukrainian revolution. Glory to Ukraine!" summarised the leader of the "Right Sector".
As you know, on February 21, the leaders of the three opposition factions signed a crisis resolution
agreement with President Viktor Yanukovych, as they explained, to avoid a split in Ukraine and
new bloodshed.
After that, the Verkhovnaya Rada quickly adopted a series of decisions that had been promoted by
the opposition
The Parliament quickly adopted a series of decisions that had been promoted by the opposition: a
return to the 2004 Constitution (with further reforms), the removal of Vitaliy Zakharchenko from
the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the release of activists from punishment, and state
aid to the injured and families of the killed protesters.
In addition, a law was passed that allows for the release of former Prime Minister and leader of the
Batkivshchyna party, Yulia Tymoshenko, from prison.
At the same time, the protesters' demand for Yanukovych's immediate resignation from the
presidency has not been met. Yanukovych has only agreed to hold early elections in December.

Annex 334
Channel One, In Odessa, radicals chased protesters into building and set fire to it (3 May 2014)
(translation)

Annex 334
Translation
Channel One, In Odessa, radicals chased protesters into building and set fire to it (3 May 2014),
available at: https://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-05-03/40826-
v_odesse_radicaly_zadnali_protestuyuschih_v_zdanie_i_podozhgli.
In Odessa, radicals chased protesters into building and set fire
to it. News. Channel One.
Ilya Kostin
In Odessa, clashes provoked by radicals left more than 40 dead, around 200 injured, many in serious
condition. The supporters of federalisation were first shot at, then chased into the building and set on
fire, giving no chance to escape. The nationalists went inside afterwards. Not to help, but to videotape
the whole thing.
The storming of the Odessa Trade Union House by "Right Sector" militants resembled a punitive
operation. People who were begging for help were first barricaded outside. Then they threw Molotov
cocktails at them. Those who tried to escape through the window were shot with firearms.
But the worst began later, when the fire had engulfed almost the entire building. The anti-fascist rally
activists who had taken refuge inside, among them women and the elderly, were actually trapped in
the flames.
"There are only pensioners and two deputies. One deputy is definitely injured. The building is on fire,
they are trying to get out. They are being shot at with traumatisers, beaten up. We do not know how
many people have been killed. But they are definitely killed," says Egor Khlysniuk, coordinator of
the "Kulikovo Pole" movement.
Journalists and bloggers are already calling what happened next a new Khatyn. Back then, during the
Great Patriotic War, the Nazis burned the inhabitants of an entire village alive. History repeats itself
with terrifying accuracy. The neo-Nazis, who surround the building, do not allow medics in.
The wounded who have escaped are beaten right in the street, kicking those who have been burned.
Terrified, people are forced to jump out of windows to escape the fire and massacre. Many of those
gathered below seem only to be enraged by the scene.
What is happening at night in Odessa was filmed by a local cameraman using a flying camera over
the Trade Union House. The fire can be seen rising higher and higher from the lower floors. Smoke
billows from the windows. An eyewitness, filming from a different angle with a mobile phone
camera, can see people who had taken shelter inside climbing out onto the ledge in despair. A few
seconds more and the burning people fall down again.
At the back of the building there are also people on the upper floors. Male and female voices can be
heard. They ask for the fire brigade, which for some reason never arrives.
EuroMaidan @Dbnmjr: "Odessa, I'm proud of you! Tens of thousands of citizens are cleansing their
land from the "colorads". Kiev and all Ukraine with you #Odessa".
Nikolay Zototarev @AdCoolAs: "In Zaporozhye they mixed a pie of separatists and in #Odessa they
baked".
Annex 334
#EuroMaidan @Dbnmjr: "A wasps' nest... was... #Odessa #Ukraine". Firefighters pouring the last pockets of flames. Bodies of suffocated and burned alive everywhere. Someone among those who had just seized the building is rummaging through the personal belongings and pockets of the dead. The way the bodies of the burnt people look is the subject of jokes to the invaders. Someone is trying to count the bodies of the dead, but keeps getting confused, and against this background one can hear the joyful shouts of the Maidan fighters: "Glory to Ukraine - glory to the heroes!" It is easy to guess who is behind this massacre-like special operation. Ukrainian media published an official statement of the nationalist "Right Sector" dedicated to the events in Odessa: "In connection with the emergency situation in Odessa and Odessa Region, "Right Sector" has mobilised and will strictly suppress any destabilising actions by all available methods and means. We officially inform you that any attempt to undermine the situation or carry out any aggressive measures in Odessa that could harm the people of Odessa, the "Right Sector" will suppress according to the law of war". After this bloody drama, the "witch hunt" in Odessa continues. The latest update is that Euromaidan activists have blocked supporters of federalisation in one of the shopping centres.
Annex 335
Telegram, Denazification of UA. There is no shame in destroying residents of villages
near Artemovsk/Bakhmut because they are all "separatists and katsaps"
(13 December 2022)
(translation)

Annex 335
Translation
Telegram, Denazification of UA. There is no shame in destroying residents of villages near
Artemovsk/Bakhmut because they are all "separatists and katsaps" (13 December 2022),
available at: https://t.me/denazi_UA/30820.
There is no shame in destroying residents of villages near Artemovsk/Bakhmut because they are all
"separatists and katsaps". This is the opinion of a creature in the Armed Forces of Ukraine uniform
and she is not ashamed to say so in public.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces are occupiers for every town and village in Donbass, who behave and
speak out as occupiers. And they will be expelled from the entire region, destroyed if they refuse to
flee or surrender.

Annex 336 Focus.ua, “We are trying to kill more”: Kazakhstan protests Ukraine's ambassador for words about Russians (video) (23 August 2022) (translation)

Annex 336
Translation
Focus.ua, "We are trying to kill more": Kazakhstan protests Ukraine's ambassador for words
about Russians (video) (23 August 2022), available at: https://focus.ua/uk/ukraine/526392-
pytaemsya-ubit-bolshe-kazahstan-vyrazil-protest-poslu-ukrainy-za-slova-o-russkih-video.
"We are trying to kill more": Kazakhstan protests Ukraine's
ambassador for words about Russians (video)
FOCUS editorial office
"We are trying to kill more": Kazakhstan protests Ukraine's ambassador for words about
Russians (video)
23 August 2022 at 12:38
10900
Photo: RIA Novosti | Ambassador of Ukraine to Kazakhstan Petr Vrublevskiy
The day before, Petr Vrublevskiy said that the more Russians are killed now, the fewer will have to
be killed by future generations of Ukrainians.
The Ukrainian ambassador to Nur-Sultan, Petr Vrublevskiy, was summoned to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan. He was protested for his words about the need to kill as many
Russians as possible. This is reported by the website of the Kazakh government.
"The Kazakh side has expressed its position on the unacceptability and incompatibility of such
statements with the activities of the ambassador of a foreign state. Such actions should not harm
friendly relations between states," the Kazakh Foreign Ministry said in a statement.
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Petr Vrublevskiy at a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan What preceded this? On August 22, Petr Vrublevskiy gave an interview to Kazakh blogger Dias Kuzairov. Answering a question about the situation in Ukraine, the diplomat said that they are trying to kill as many Russians as possible. He added that the more of them are killed now, the fewer will have to be killed by future generations of Ukrainians. "We are trying to kill as many of them as possible. The more we kill Russians now, the less our children will have to kill. That's all," he said. It should be noted that the fragment of this conversation was not saved on Diaz Kuzairov's YouTube channel, but it went viral. The published video contains a dialog between the diplomat and the blogger about the event dedicated to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and Ukraine. On August 12, Ukraine's Ambassador to the United States Oksana Markarova called on Washington to recognise Russia as a terrorist state. According to her, all Russian banks should be subject to US sanctions. Earlier, on July 20, Ukraine's former ambassador to Germany, Andrey Melnyk, suggested that Saxon Prime Minister Michael Kretschmer put his head in a freezer. Prior to that, the German politician proposed to "freeze" the war and supported the supply of Russian gas.
Annex 337
RBK Ukraine, Igor Klymenko: There is more darkness in Ukraine, but also more police on the
streets (13 December 2022)
(translation)

Annex 337
Translation
RBK Ukraine, Igor Klymenko: There is more darkness in Ukraine, but also more police on the
streets (13 December 2022) available at: https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/igor-klimenko-zarazukrayini-
bilshe-temryavi-1670509562.html.
Igor Klymenko: There is more darkness in Ukraine, but also more
police on the streets
Yulia Akimova
Head of the National Police of Ukraine Igor Klymenko (all photos: Vitaliy Nosach/RBK-Ukraine)
The head of the National Police of Ukraine, Igor Klymenko, told RBC-Ukraine in an
interview about the duties of a Ukrainian police officer, how the National Police establishes
law and order in the de-occupied territories, and what problems it faces.
From the first days of Russia's full-scale offensive against Ukraine, the National Police, like any
law enforcement agency, has been working in an enhanced mode. Some police officers went to the
front, while others serve in the government-controlled and newly de-occupied territories of Ukraine.
Police officers enter the liberated settlements immediately after the military, establish law and
order, and take stabilisation measures. Local residents who have seen the aggressors and what they
bring with them greet the Ukrainian police with applause.
In an interview with RBC-Ukraine, the head of the National Police of Ukraine, Igor Klymenko, told
how the work of the National Police looks like today, what they see on the liberated Ukrainian
lands, how they catch collaborators among civilians and their own colleagues, and how they will
work in the event of a blackout. Below is a shortened text version, watch the full conversation with
the head of the National Police on RBC-Ukraine's YouTube channel.
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- The first day of the war. For every Ukrainian, it has acquired such symbolism. How did you meet it and did you realise that this war would happen? - We often return to February 24. Why do we return to it? Because we evaluate our actions and the actions of the entire National Police system, the actions of the state. Because everyone understood that war was possible, but everyone hoped that it would not happen. The National Police has developed proactive plans for invasion and emergencies. Of course, we, like all citizens, did not expect that there would be an invasion in the direction of Kiev. This information that came to me, as the head of the National Police, at 4 a.m. on February 24, was, on the one hand, expected, and on the other hand, it was emotional: "Has it really started?". And immediately, for five seconds: "What to do?". Of course, we immediately put all the personnel on alert, although the heads of the regional departments had been at work for about a week and our people were on high alert, but by 8 a.m. all the police forces were on the ground and on alert. Because the calls were coming in 24 hours a day. Somewhere we saw and heard that Russian troops were advancing in the Kherson region, and events unfolded very quickly. Of course, near Kiev, there's nothing to talk about, because our police, together with border guards, were on the border areas of the border between Belarus and Ukraine and they were the first to hear these shots from the enemy who had crossed our border. The police retreated, first through Chernobyl to Ivankov, then they took the first battle in the Kiev region, and then the police retreated further. Then you already know - Bucha, Irpen and all the settlements around Kiev. Then there was Brovary district, then Chernigov region, and, of course, we were on duty here. You can't work purely according to plans here, because we are a police structure and we are used to performing police functions, not military ones. But over time, we became semi-military, and some units became fully paramilitary. - You said that you received messages in the first hours and in the first days of the war from different regions, including those regions where Russian troops were coming. What was it like? For example, Kherson, what kind of messages were they? - I can parallel this question with Zaporozhye region. Very quickly, the troops came in and crossed the Crimean Isthmus and moved through the Kherson region, but the Kherson region is usually steppes. And the troops, I think, were moving through towns and villages quickly, at a speed of about 80 kilometers per hour. But when they started to enter Zaporozhye region, they started to quickly enter through Prymorskoe, entered Melitopol and went on to Berdiansk. At the same time, our units in the Kherson region were in the city, waiting for the command of the head of the National Police to act. Yes, we were armed, but we were armed with light weapons, at most - assault rifles, ordinary pistols, and a few machine guns from the Special Forces. It was only when the enemy crossed the Dnepr River and stood on the right bank of Kherson, almost to the city center, that the regional police leadership received the command to withdraw. - From you?
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- Yes, of course, from me. The column that was ready to move moved in the direction of Nikolayev
and Dnepr regions.
- Did they take up their positions there or did they go to other regions?
- Yes, the Main Directorate of the National Police in Kherson region served in Nikolayev region
and performed combat missions in Nikolayev region, along with the Nikolayev regional police.
Some personnel were transferred to Dnepropetrovs'k and Kirovograd regions, where they served at
checkpoints.
At that time, there were several days or several weeks of debate about what a police officer should
do. Who is a police officer in a war? Is he a combatant or not?
- What is your opinion?
- Our police officer takes an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. Our policeman is on duty
with a weapon. And our policeman, as we thought, could be the object of attacks by the occupation
authorities. That is why we decided to leave the temporarily occupied territory. Those who did not
leave, who did not obey the order, were dismissed from the National Police. And today I can say
that none of these people who did not comply with the order will return to service.
- Do you admit that some police officers did not have the physical ability to leave the occupied
territory?
- We gave enough time to those police officers who did not have the physical ability to leave. Some
were in captivity. Some were hiding in the temporarily occupied territory.
- Hiding?
- Yes, they were hiding, unable to leave the temporarily occupied territory, for example, from the
Kherson region, from the left bank of the Dnepr.
- Well, these are the circumstances. Was he also released?
- All those who did not fulfill the order for any reason were dismissed from the National Police.
Some of these people, who were fired, who left, found the strength and ability to leave the
temporarily occupied territory, they were checked by both the Security Service and the Department
of Internal Security, including with the use of a polygraph.
Believe me, there are only a few of these people, and these people, as a rule, indicated where they
kept their weapons and service IDs. Today we are checking the version of those who left these
territories. Those caches that were left in the temporarily occupied territories by the police, we are
now digging them all out and returning the weapons to the National Police.
- You have a doctorate in psychology. How do you think a police traitor differs from a civilian
traitor?
- A law enforcement officer consciously took this step, knowing that he swore an oath to the people
of Ukraine, swore an oath to the state. This person consciously made a decision to work for the
occupier. He probably realized that he may have been underestimated by the National Police or the
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Security Service of Ukraine. Perhaps this is a person with a sense of inferiority and underestimation. These are flawed people, people who didn't work much or had no professional talent, but wanted to hold some kind of position. An example I've already given is when a woman who used to clean the premises of the Kherson Regional TV and Radio Company was made the administrator of the entire company. Similarly, some police officers who held ordinary positions were appointed heads of cities or law enforcement agencies. But such people are few and far between, and thank God that such people had no professional talent or work experience in the first place. And they probably pursued criminal or even mercantile low goals in life, they were not even able to organise the work of their units. That mess and what was done by the occupiers, including the police, the Russian Guard, our collaborators in the police units... They (the units - ed.) are broken and practically destroyed from the inside, how could anyone work in such units... That is, these are people of low culture, people who did not understand the essence and principles of work organisation. They were driven only by the desire to annoy the former leadership, to annoy the people and the Ukrainian authorities. We have identified all these people for the most part, and they will definitely be held accountable before the law. - Is the fact that there were such people in the system at all a flaw in the system? Or was it just that someone on the ground did not quite understand who they were hiring? - It is very difficult to determine whether a person is mentally ill or not mentally ill. If there are no external signs. - Doesn't the police check a person's mental state when they hire them? - No, we do, but when we hire, for example, a district police officer, we check him/her for the position of a district police officer. With limited functionality. If this person is going to be a manager, they are checked for compliance with the position of a manager. That is, if an employee worked as a police sergeant or inspector and wanted to quickly become the head of a law enforcement unit, then... We write in the psychological characteristics, in the service characteristics, what this person is capable of. We have a lot of people who do not want to make a career. They want to be in these positions. Or there are people who want to make a career, but they don't want to do anything for it, they make a lot of mistakes in their work. They have a lot of violations and lack of discipline, among other things. We check such people for possible violations of the law. 217 policemen out of a staff of 130,000 is such a small number, but we had to get rid of this small number as well. - Since the beginning of the war, some police officers decided to go to the front line, to the ranks of the Armed Forces. How many of them and was it their mass decision, or did their superiors do the work? - One of the first to join the Armed Forces of Ukraine was a pilot. From the police aviation. They worked on helicopters of the National Police, but in the past they were military pilots. And on February 26, we had our first casualty - one of the pilots was killed in a military helicopter near Irpen, shot down by an enemy missile, and the president awarded him the title of Hero of Ukraine.
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These were the first such victims. Of course, there were victims on the street in Bucha and Irpen,
our police officers were shot because they were in uniform. And in other regions of the country, our
cars were shot at.
And those people who knew how to shoot with machine guns are now shooting with mortars and
more serious equipment that they learned to use during the war and became experts in.
- Before the war, you talked about a certain "staff shortage" in the police. This was also
discussed in the cities. Now there is a war, as you say, many police officers have gone to the
front, and it takes a lot of effort to enter the de-occupied territories and establish order. How
much has this problem become bigger and what are you doing about it?
- Today we have resumed recruitment to the National Police. First of all, it concerns inspector
positions. I can say that we need patrol police officers, officers of our special unit, we have a need
big enough to recruit staff. Approximately, today we want to recruit about 8-10 thousand people
within the shortage of staff in the National Police of Ukraine.
- It seems to me that this is not a very large figure on the scale of Ukraine.
- I want to give you the figures we have calculated. For example, if we take an ordinary settlement
in Central or Western Ukraine, the number of police officers per 10,000 people is 23. In Kiev, this
number is 41. In Kherson or Kharkov regions, there are 136 police officers per 10,000 people.
Large territories mean complicated communication and a lot of people without communication.
Therefore, it is necessary to saturate the settlements with police officers as much as possible so that
people can find them.
For example, Kherson, which was without power for several weeks and only recently got
electricity. And then the enemy shelled the city again and the light disappeared for some time as
well. There should be police patrols on the streets so that every citizen who has lost contact can go
out, find a police officer and ask for help.
A sense of security - the sooner it returns to citizens, the sooner we will restore order in our cities,
the sooner citizens will return to a more or less peaceful existence. This is our first and foremost
goal, so our employees from Central and Western Ukraine are also working in these de-occupied
regions as part of combined units to help their colleagues from the de-occupied regions to restore
order and help local authorities bring peaceful life to the area as soon as possible.
- I saw you wearing an "Azovstal" bracelet. Is it a symbolic support for your colleagues who
are at the front?
- This is a symbolic support of our colleagues who were held captive and fought at "Azovstal"
together with the military. We kept in touch, as long as it was still possible to do so, with our
employees who are at "Azovstal". And when ten of our police officers were released from captivity,
the entire police force exhaled. But we still have five people who are in captivity, and we hope they
will return home as soon as possible.
- Those who have returned, what is their condition?
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- Now they are in good condition, they have been undergoing treatment for a long time, some of them were injured at "Azovstal", and today they will undergo rehabilitation in Ukraine and outside our country. - Did they get to "Azovstal" as employees of the National Police? - Yes, as employees of the National Police. We are only talking about the National Police. - And what were they doing there? - They defended "Azovstal" with arms in hand, together with units of the National Guard of Ukraine, the Armed Forces and border guards. - And how many of your colleagues from the National Police are currently in captivity or have been in captivity? - There were 219 people in captivity, and now there are 26 active police officers. - What do you see in the de-occupied territories? You are among the first to enter and see what the Russian troops have done. What do you see there? - The first settlement after Irpen and Bucha that we entered, I was there personally, was the village of Andreyevka, Makarov district, on the road to Borodyanka from Makarov. We went there on April 2, the weather was similar, but without snow, and we saw people who had left their homes, usually elderly people. 80% of the residential sector in the village was destroyed. We drove to the bridge, where there was a huge amount of ammunition scattered by the Russians, we saw the Russian positions, the state of their positions, and this picture, it stands before our eyes - of villages, not cities, because cities are a separate category. We have all been to Irpen and Bucha, and we saw what happened there, and in Kharkov, and in Northern Saltovka. We saw what can happen to a city when 10,000 people are left homeless. We are talking about villages in the Kherson region or the de-occupied territory of the Kharkov region. These are villages that have been completely destroyed. If you drive along the highway from Izyum to Lyman, you will see that the villages in the lowlands have been destroyed forever. They cannot be restored. I remember Sviatogorsk, we arrived on the second or third day after the liberation, about 2,500 people lived in the town, and 400 remained. 400 people who were under constant enemy fire. I talked to these people. They are usually elderly people or women who were hiding in basements. Fear completely consumed our people. You talk to them... You have to work a lot with these people. They need time to get over these horrors. - And when you talk to them, what do you get? - You talk to them and you feel how afraid they are, they don't know what will happen tomorrow. Because they feel in danger. I remember the Kherson region, Kiev region, when we were driving through the settlements in the early days, people would come out, either applauding or trying to talk. - When you enter the de-occupied territory, what is your algorithm of actions?
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- First, the Special Forces enter, and we start stabilisation measures. Together with the military, we
start setting up checkpoints and immediately drive around the entire territory of the settlements to
talk to the citizens. This is being done in parallel with the work of explosive experts. Citizens are
reporting that certain objects, either apartments or private buildings, are mined.
First of all, we clear those objects that affect the operation of critical infrastructure so that people
can get gas, electricity and so on. At the same time, investigative task forces consisting of
investigators, forensic experts and operational unit staff arrive. And we immediately start working,
including on collaborators. We interview every person who is in the occupied territory.
- Do people themselves point out collaborators?
- Of course they do.
- How does this happen? Simply, while you are interviewing a person, collecting data, he or
she may be physically present in that locality, or are there fears that there may be a lynching?
- For all these 9 months, as for the Kherson or Kharkov regions, we have been collecting
information on collaborators remotely.
- So you come in and you already know who needs to be detained?
- We know most of them, but, as Kherson shows, such serious, "fat" collaborators went with the
occupation forces to the left side of the Dnepr. Smaller collaborators, for example, teachers or
ordinary law enforcement officers or occupation authorities, are on the ground, people point them
out, we process them, and some of them are handed over to the Security Service of Ukraine.
This is the case with Kharkov region and larger areas of Kherson region. People are also different,
but we knew very well in Kherson region who organised the so-called referendum. We knew these
people very well, and now we are preparing suspicions in absentia for those who left. And for those
who stayed in place, of course, they will not escape responsibility for what they did on the territory
of our state.
- You mentioned mining. Please tell us more, because as far as we know, the Russians do not
neglect to mine everything they can. Where do you find mines?
- In Kherson region, everywhere. In the literal sense of the word. There has never been such a
massive and "smart" mining as in the Kherson region in any de-occupied place in our country.
Because you can simply lift a flowerpot and the entire building will explode. Or those bookmarks
that the occupier made, they are designed for 140-310 hours of operation.
That is, for example, they set the timer for two weeks after the de-occupation, at 10 o'clock in the
morning. This is, for example, a building of a district or city administration, and it will explode. It is
extremely difficult to find these explosive devices, because these explosive devices are hidden
either in the basement or between the wall and the room.
You can open the door and the opposite part of the building will explode. This was the case with the
National Police building in the Kherson region. A small box of TNT was just sitting in the
basement. Following the safety rules, it was not picked up, it was pulled away 20-30 meters away
and we lost several floors of the building.
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- Was there a mine under it? - Not under him. They were all around, and he acted as a detonator, mines were everywhere. In the walls. For example, a table. A table and a chair next to it, where you sit, maybe a slightly thicker seat. A hole is cut out, a mine is placed there and a regular printer is placed on top. What is the desire of a citizen or a military or a police officer? To take this printer and put it on the table. And sit down. At that moment, the explosion occurs. That's why the briefing for all law enforcement agencies, for everyone who enters (the liberated territories - ed.), is at the top of the list. We lost three explosive experts and 14 were wounded. Almost every day, our explosives experts, as well as the State Emergency Service, explosives experts, sappers, face mortal danger. We are not demining so quickly in order to thoroughly examine the buildings that need to be demined first. December 7 In the Kherson region, police officers explode on a cascade of enemy mines during stabilisation activities, killing 4 people. Doctors are fighting for the lives of four more people. - You mentioned the mess the occupiers left behind. Is this their business card? Because it is everywhere. - There was never more garbage than in the police or prosecutor's offices. - Why is that? - As a rule, in our premises, there are often temporary detention centres downstairs. And in these places, places of illegal detention of our citizens, including torture chambers, were created. And it's very convenient when you "work" on the 1-3 floor in the basement or in the neighbouring room, you keep our citizens who are accused of working with the Ukrainian army, or simply our patriotic citizens. They were simply detained and kept there for several days or weeks. There was not a single unit, either in Kherson or in the Kharkov region, that was in a more or less acceptable condition. That is, it is uncultured and piggish. There are rooms where they worked, there are rooms where they lived. There is no difference, everything was thrown into one pile. There is no difference. You realise that in March, April, May, June, July, August, September, you could have removed it in the summer, right? No. The main thing is to write "Police of the Russian Federation" in Russian and that's it. That's all they brought with them. In such conditions, there is no question of any law and order in these regions. - And what did people themselves say about the work of the so-called police under occupation? - They said nothing. Look, we found journals or notebooks in which some crimes were registered. They were registered, and that was it. A district police officer and a traitor cannot solve a crime, let alone investigate it. - And what kind of crimes were there? - There was murder, for example. There was a theft. These were crimes that were registered, but for so many months they only documented themselves and did nothing else.
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A huge amount of equipment was destroyed. About 1,500 cars. Of course, this is a blow for the
police in technical terms, but we will survive this. But they didn't even use this equipment, they
took the wheels off the vehicles, whether they were newer or older, it didn't matter. And vehicle
units. So, if you go directly to the police station, for example, to the yard, to the motor pool, you
will see dozens of cars without wheels, even bald wheels were removed and sent to Russia.
- Back home, back to the house.
- Back home, back to the house. I don't know what they will do with them, perhaps it is such a
curiosity for them that such police cars are beautiful and have appropriate inscriptions. They took
off everything that was on the car - mirrors, everything. In other words, they completely dismantled
it and sent it home, probably. If it was a civilian car, they often smashed it, and if it was a police
car, they dismantled it.
In Kupyansk, we also found several cans of fermented beer. Apparently, they cooked it right away
and drank it to boost their morale.
- How do you think the de-occupation of the territories that have been occupied since the
beginning of the full-scale invasion and the de-occupation that awaits us all, the territories
that were occupied 8.5 years ago, how different will it be?
- Children have already started second grade (in the territories occupied for a long time - ed.). Those
who were born in 14-15 years. People are poisoned by Russian propaganda. Large territories that
have not heard the Ukrainian language for 8.5 years. In which hatred of everything Ukrainian, of
Ukraine, was brought up and propagated. Therefore, the main problem is people.
We will all have to show the citizens who did not participate in illegal armed groups that our
government is legitimate, real and really the best. And the main thing is that this is the territory of
our state - not the Russian Federation, not some "union state", but Ukraine. Therefore, I think that
many people who live there will probably go looking for the "Russian world" on the territory of the
Russian Federation.
- Back to everyday problems. How are the police currently dealing with these blackouts and
do you think the curfew should be reduced?
- The police work in a single mode, both during and after the curfew. Curfews are the prerogative of
the military. They set it, and the military administration understands from what time it should be
set. As for the police, our task is to put police forces on the street in a blackout throughout our
country without losing communication. If it's in the evening, it will be very difficult to gather the
personnel. That is why we have already conducted a number of exercises that allow us to gather all
the personnel on the territory of the unit within a short period of time, and these people will be
deployed to the appropriate unit.
Before the war, we had 1,100 units on duty in the cities. Today, during the blackout period, we are
ready to deploy 5,500 vehicle patrols and 2,500 foot patrols. But this is on the condition that we will
work almost without rest. That is why we are preparing for any scenario.
We even have so-called "anti-looting" groups of criminal police officers who usually work in
civilian clothes to minimise the possibility of burglaries during blackouts. You do realise that when
a person enters a dark entrance, what can they expect?
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Moreover, we have to respond to such everyday issues as, for example, a person getting stuck in an elevator. 21st floor, 25th, 9th or 8th. And the police should also come to the rescue. The police have received instructions on how to find a specialist or a representative of the condominium and rescue the person. Of course, we need a lot of effort. We are working with other agencies, with the State Emergency Service, so that people can find those who will help them. - The crime situation during the blackout. How much has it changed? It is logical that it could have become worse. More darkness, more people who want to do something bad in this darkness. - More darkness, but more police on the streets. The crime rate in Ukraine today has decreased by 13%, and just during the blackout period, Wednesday-Thursday, the crime rate decreased by 16%. The presence of police officers, interaction with the population and unification of communities has yielded results. We understand that we have a lot of challenges ahead of us, and it is the task of the National Police to keep the country safe in terms of crime. This also applies to fraud, which has increased in our country since the beginning of hostilities, as well as property and apartment thefts. We understand how many people have fled their homes and how many reports we have received that these homes have been destroyed by the enemy. In the same Kharkov or Kherson region. Or robbed by the enemy. - Did wartime give the police the opportunity to somewhat accelerate their actions in dealing with crime? - Of course, we talked tough enough with the criminals, and for the most part, the criminals heard us and calmed down a bit. We control all our local groups that existed before the war so that they do not raise their heads. First of all, I mean organised crime, which poses a danger to our citizens and to our country. - Was there organised crime in the occupied territories that joined the Russians? - We will establish this over time, but as a rule, no. It was the kind of petty crime that takes place in any society. - Can your stations be used as so-called "invincibility points" during the blackout? Can people come to you and ask for help? - As of today, we have 903 police stations ready to receive citizens. We are trying to bring this number up to a thousand in a week. People can come here at any time. We mean the premises themselves, the lobby, where chairs will be placed, where water will be available, where people will be able to charge their gadgets, where a generator will work, fuel for the generator, and, of course, people can contact the police. And if there is no connection, the police will be able to help. Or take a sick person to the hospital. For example, if a woman gives birth, we will also come to the rescue. Of course, we will help all citizens who contact us if such a time comes. As for communications, I can say right away that out of these 903 police units, 200 are equipped with "Starlink" satellite communications. I hope that in the next week we will receive enough of this equipment to cover the entire country with Internet connection.
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- How do police officers deal with those who do not want to evacuate from areas where it is
dangerous to stay?
- First, any conversation with a citizen is recorded on a body camera. As a rule, there are several
categories of people. The first one wants to leave, they are ready, they do not need to be persuaded.
There is a category of elderly people who are in hospices, in the so-called nursing homes. Here, we
work together with the authorities. And there are elderly people who do not want to leave under any
circumstances, as they say: "I was born here, I will die here. I have everything here, I have a garden,
a house, an apartment," and so on.
There are people who don't want to leave because they have nowhere to go and no reason to. And
they are satisfied with any government. Unfortunately, there is a category of people we saw in
Lysychansk and Severodonetsk who have remained in these areas. I will not characterize who these
people are. Among them are sick people who stayed and do not want to leave - 70-80 years old. But
there are also young people who lead an antisocial lifestyle who also wanted to stay.
But we are talking about those people whom we have to take out at any cost. These are the people
who have nowhere to go, no relatives in other parts of our country or in other countries. They need
to be persuaded and told where they will live, where we will take them.
- Do the police do this? By persuasion?
- Yes, we say that shops will not work here, everything will be broken or already broken. It's not
safe here. We have managed to get 20,000 people out of Donetsk region alone in recent months
with such persuasion. Very often the police take these people out in their vehicles.
We have a unit called the White Angel, which consists of a doctor, a policeman and a representative
of the State Emergency Service. And under fire, this unit takes people directly to the settlements.
This applies today to the Donetsk region, Bakhmut district and the city of Bakhmut, where there are
about 20 thousand people left, and we understand that every day the enemy shells the city, every
day we have victims.
Moreover, the Bakhmut police unit has already been destroyed, so this affects the deployment of
our personnel. Today, it is very dangerous for our population there, and our employees, no matter
what, take these people out of their homes, put them in cars and take them to a safe city. It is such a
psychological job to persuade a person to leave. It is also dangerous - many of our employees were
injured during such evacuations.
- What do you think will happen to Russia after our victory?
- I think it will be very difficult for this country to recover from what it has done to us. And what
we will do to it.
- What will happen to Ukraine?
- We will be rebuilt, we will return everyone from abroad, our people will believe in the state. We
will bring back our children, we will improve the education system, we will improve the
infrastructure, we will be more tolerant of each other. We will value our independence, our state
and our rights in this state more. We will be strong and we will not allow the enemy to step on our
land anymore.

Annex 338
Volynonline.com, Uncensored and "Bez Obmezhen": the third day of "Bandershtat 2021"
in photos (9 August 2021)
(translation)

Annex 338
Translation
Volynonline.com, Uncensored and "Bez Obmezhen": the third day of "Bandershtat-2021" in
photos (9 August 2021), available at: https://volynonline.com/bez-czenzury-ta-bez-obmezhentretij-
den-bandershtatu-2021-u-foto/.
Uncensored and "Bez Obmezhen": the third day of "Bandershtat-
2021" in photos - Volyn Online
August heat, Zhadan without censorship, a military band, Polozhynsky and "Bez Obmezhen"
on the music stage: this was the final day of the 15th "Bandershtat" Festival of Ukrainian Spirit.
The third day of the festival, August 8, was the hottest. To escape the scorching August sun,
"Bandershtat" residents swam in the Styr River and enjoyed kayaking. Meanwhile, on the literary and
humorous stage, they were waiting for conversations with the longtime mayor of Lvov, Andrey
Sadovyi, civic activist Sergey Sternenko, and the most popular professional fitness trainer in
Ukraine, Viktor Mandzyak. Crowds of "Bandershtat" residents gathered for poetry readings with
Sergey Zhadan.
The music scene on the third day of the festival was rocked by "Tsvyakh", "Flyzzza", and Sasha
Chemerov, and the band "Mad Heads", a band that was born on the same day as Ukraine's
Independence, performed for the first time at the festival.
The band "Zhadan and the Dogs", as announced by Sergey Zhadan, performed uncensored out of
respect for the audience who bought tickets, despite the fact that the performance was broadcast live
on television and the band was asked to censor some of their songs.
Aleksandr Polozhynsky performed both old "Tartak" songs and songs from his two other former
projects, "Buv'ye" and "Ol'Iv'ye". The highlight of his program was the performance of several songs
together with the brass band of the 6th Volyn border guard detachment and the video recording of a
greeting to the military serving in Mariupol together with the audience.
The headliners of the music scene on the third day of the "Bez Obmezhen" festival performed wellknown
hits, as well as the song "To the Heroes", part of which was translated into Belarusian to
support the protests in Belarus.
On the night of August 9, charismatic members of the freak cabaret "Dakh Daughters" performed on
the "Bandershtat" stage.

Annex 339 Unian, The 4-day sports and patriotic game “Gurby Antonivtsi” has started in Ternopol region (5 May 2016) (translation)

Annex 339
Translation
Unian, The 4-day sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" has started in Ternopol region (5
May 2016), available at: https://www.unian.ua/ternopil/1337687-na-ternopilschinirozpochalasya-
4-denna-sportivno-patriotichna-gra-gurbi-antonivtsi.html.
UNIAN Editorial office
A sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" has started in Ternopol region / youtube.com
The event organisers told "UNIAN" that it is dedicated to Vladymyr Garmatiy, a mortar platoon
commander of the 51st Brigade, a member of the "Gurby-Antonivtsi" who died in July 2014 in the
ATO zone in Lugansk region, and Roman Atamaniuk, a longtime member of the "Gurby-
Antonivtsi" who fought with the 93rd Brigade and died in May 2015 near Donetsk airport as a
result of mortar fire.
As part of the competition, a memorial plaque will be unveiled on the facade of Ternopol Economic
University, where Garmatiy studied.
Afterward, the participants will demonstrate a demonstration battle. Also today, there will be a
lecture on the historic battle of the UPA against the NKVD near "Gurby", which took place in April
1944, and a tour of the "Volyn-South" UPA Headquarters Museum, restored the day before by
volunteers participating in the game, and the graves of Ukrainian insurgents.
Tomorrow the teams will start fighting for the flag.
UNIAN's note. The "Gurby-Antonivtsi" i game has been held since 2003 by the All-Ukrainian
Youth Nationalist Congress, a youth public organisation, to promote patriotism, healthy lifestyles,
sports, and national unity.
Each year, the game takes place in a 25-square-kilometer forest near the "Gurby" tract, the site of
the largest battle between the UPA and NKVD units. The game lasts continuously for 60 hours.
Annex 339
The game involves 2 kurens (teams) and a squad of saboteurs. The winner is the kuren that manages to capture the enemy's flag and get the most points - the enemy's "lives".
Annex 340
Chas.cv.ua, Ukraine's largest sports and patriotic game “Gurby Antonivtsi” will bring together
young people from all regions of Ukraine (2 March 2016)
(translation)

Annex 340
Translation
Chas.cv.ua, Ukraine's largest sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" will bring together
young people from all regions of Ukraine (2 March 2016), available at:
https://chas.cv.ua/inform/31224-nayblsha-v-ukrayin-sportivno-patrotichna-gra-gurbiantonvc-
obyednaye-molod-z-ush-regonv-ukrayini.html.
Ukraine's largest sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi"
will bring together young people from all regions of Ukraine -
Ukrainian Newspaper "Chas"
On May 5-8, young people from all over Ukraine will gather in the forest on the border of Ternopol
and Rovno regions at the site of a historic event - the UPA's battle against the NKVD that took place
in April 1944. It is there that the fourteenth largest sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" will
take place, bringing together more than 400 young people every year.
In the month since the start of registration, 300 applications have already been submitted, and 130
people have been approved.
"Traditionally, most participants come from Ternopol, Sumy, Lvov and Kiev regions. But we want
to see representatives of every region at the game, we want to expand the geography: it is not for
nothing that one of the tasks is to unite the country at "Gurby-Antonivtsi", says Ivan Kizyuk, project
manager.
Therefore, the organiser of the event, the "Youth Nationalist Congress", offers the first ten approved
participants from each region a minimum organisational fee.
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In addition, residents of the frontline zone (Crimea, Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Dnepr, Zaporozhye, Kherson) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea have an even smaller fee of 50 grivnas. It is also important that participants from the Left Bank and Southern Ukraine are reimbursed for their travel expenses. According to Ivan Kizyuk, this will further encourage young people to come to "Gurby-Antonivtsi".
Annex 341
TASS, Attempt to “give Ukraine time”: Merkel on Minsk agreements (7 December 2022)

Annex 341
06.03.2023, 13:24 Attempt to ‘give Ukraine time’: Merkel on Minsk agreements - World - TASS
https://tass.com/world/1547141 1/2
UKRAINE CRISIS 7 DEC 2022, 16:18
Attempt to ‘give Ukraine time’:
Merkel on Minsk agreements
She expressed doubt that at that time NATO states would
have been able to support Kiev to the extent that they do now
Angela Merkel
© Jochen Zick/Pool/Getty Images
BERLIN, December 7. /TASS/. The Minsk accords were signed in order to
"give Ukraine time" to make the country stronger, ex-German Chancellor
Angela Merkel (in office from 2005 to 2021) said in an interview with the
Zeit newspaper published on Wednesday.
RUSSIAN NEWS AGENCY
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06.03.2023, 13:24Attempt to ‘give Ukraine time’: Merkel on Minsk agreements - World - TASShttps://tass.com/world/15471412/2"The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give time to Ukraine. Italso used this time to become stronger as can be seen today. The Ukraineof 2014-2015 is not the modern Ukraine," the politician said.According to her, "it was clear to everyone" that the conflict had stalledand the problem had not been resolved "yet this was precisely what gaveUkraine invaluable time." She expressed doubt that at that time NATOstates would have been able to support Kiev to the extent that they donow.Merkel was the German chancellor when the 2014 state coup occurred inUkraine and the Minsk agreements on settling the Donbass conflict wereconcluded with her participation.On February 22, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that followingthe recognition of the DPR and LPR, the Minsk accords did not existanymore yet this was not Russia’s fault. According to him, theagreements were killed by the current Kiev regime long before therecognition of the Donbass republics.TAGSUkraine crisis
Annex 342
The President of Ukraine. Decree No. 699/2022 “On Awarding M. Simchich the Title of Hero of
Ukraine”, 14 October 2022
(translation)

Annex 342
Translation
The President of Ukraine. Decree No. 699/2022 “On Awarding M. Simchich the Title of Hero
of Ukraine”, 14 October 2022, available at:
https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/6992022-44385.
PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY
Official Internet Portal
DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
UKRAINE No. 699/2022
On Awarding M. Simchich the Title of Hero of Ukraine
To honour his heroism displayed in the struggle for Ukraine's independence,
his outstanding personal merits in the formation of Ukrainian statehood, and
many years of his fruitful public activity, I hereby decree that:
The title of Hero of Ukraine be conferred upon and the Order of the Gold Star
be awarded to Myroslav Vasylyovych Simchych, Ukrainian military and public
figure, a centurion of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and political prisoner of
Soviet concentration camps.
President of Ukraine V. ZELENSKY
14 October 2022

Annex 343
Gazeta.ru, “Do Not Make Tragedy of This”. How Ukraine Shot Down Russian Aircraft
(4 October 2021)
(translation)

Annex 343
Translation
Gazeta.ru, “Do Not Make Tragedy of This”. How Ukraine Shot Down Russian Aircraft (4
October 2021), available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2021/10/03_a_14047363.shtml
“Do Not Make Tragedy of This”. How Ukraine Shot Down Russian Aircraft
20 years ago, a Russian Tu-154 plane crashed near Crimea
By Maxim Borisov
© AP/Reuters
On the 4th of October 2001, a Siberia Airlines Tu-154 aircraft flying from Tel Aviv to
Novosibirsk was shot down over the Black Sea. All 78 people on board were killed. The
plane was hit by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile launched from an S-200V SAM system
during the Russian-Ukrainian exercises in Crimea.
A Siberia Airlines Tu-154M aircraft performing flight SBI-1812 from Tel Aviv to
Novosibirsk crashed over the Black Sea at 12:44 (Kiev time) less than 200 km from Sochi.
Subsequently, luggage fragments, aircraft interior decoration parts, dead bodies and oil stains
were found in the sea. All 12 crew members and 66 passengers, including 15 Russians and 51
Israeli citizens, were killed.
The disaster occurred during combat missile launches as part of joint Russian-Ukrainian airdefence
exercises in Crimea. One launched missile was then lost, and that coincidence
immediately seemed suspicious, but it was difficult to believe in a weird tragedy.
On the day of the crash, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that “the weapons used at that
time could not reach the air corridors our aircraft flew in due to their [poor] tactical and
technical characteristics”.
Vladimir Rushailo, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, who was appointed the head of
the commission investigating the Tu-154 crash, also noted that he thought “the Ukrainian
Annex 343
version of the disaster was unlikely”. A terrorist attack was considered as the main version. When the plane disappeared from radars, it flew at an altitude of 11 km. The pilot of the Armenian Airlines An-24 aircraft flying at that time in about the same area saw a kind of flash. The investigation of the crash by the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) resulted in a revision of the main version. The depth of the Black Sea was over 2000 m at the crash site, the sea bottom was trawled and examined by an echo sounder, and fragments of the floor covering were raised, which were found to contain hundreds of shrapnel holes. Mr. Rushailo said items not related to the aircraft’s structure were also found at the site, and “the plane was destroyed as a result of an explosive impact”. Not a single flight recorder was found. After those details had been published, Russian officials and press stopped calling the exercises joint and called them solely Ukrainian. Less than one month later, before the official completion of the investigation, authorities announced that the crash had been caused by an unintentional hit by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile into the aircraft’s body. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma acknowledged those findings and ordered to pay monetary compensations to the relatives of the victims. However, he sharply commended on the accident in late October by saying, “Look at what is happening around in the world and in Europe. We are not the first and not the last ones, you should not make a tragedy of this. Mistakes happen everywhere, and some of them are of a much larger – planetary – scale”. Ukrainian Defence Minister Aleksandr Kuzmuk and several other high-ranking military officers apologised to the relatives of the victims and resigned, but no one was put on trial. “We have drawn a preliminary conclusion that the crash of this aircraft could have been caused by an unintentional hit by an S-200 missile launched during the exercises of the Ukrainian Air Defence Forces. This tragic accident could have occurred as a result of a failure of the anti-aircraft missile system. As a citizen of Ukraine, it pains me to say this. But there is a lot of information supporting this version”, said Yevhen Marchuk, Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security Council. Missile launches at the 31st Test Site at Cape Opuk near Kerch, which was controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defence, began to be considered as the main version. The Tu-154 could have found itself in the centre of the intended firing sector for a training target. Tu-143 “Reis” unmanned aircraft were used as such targets. The Tu-154 had a suitable radial speed and was in a “suitable” place, which resulted in the operator of the S-200B system mistaking it for the main target. The mistake could result from the shortage of time and the increased nervousness caused by the presence of high commanders and foreign guests (the exercises were observed by delegations of seven countries). Like a “Buk” system, an S-200 SAMS uses a guidance system that “illuminates” targets by a powerful ground-based radar so that a missile responds to a signal reflected from the target. Thus, the disaster could be caused not by a miss against a training target located 30-60 km away but by the initially erroneous guidance of the missile by the operator “illuminating” the Tu-154 passenger aircraft at a distance of 250-300 km. Serious troubles arose in determining whose radar – Russian or Ukrainian – could guide the missile to an inappropriate target.
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When the lawsuit brought by Siberia Airlines in 2010 was heard in the court, forensic experts
also called the hit of the aircraft by a Russian air defence system as a possible cause of the
crash. During the work of the commission investigating the disaster near Sochi, the Russian
military did not refute the information that a Russian air defence system on the Black Sea
coast could hit the Tu-154M as a violator of the Russian state border due to a malfunction of
the IFF transponder. In any case, no additional mark confirming the response by the aircraft to
radar requests was seen. In line with this version, President Kuchma could even deliberately
take the blame for the crash on himself for some time upon request of the Russian side.
As a result of all these legal conflicts, Ukraine has never been legally found guilty of the crash
and no claims have been made against it at the international level, and a Ukrainian court later
concluded that no Ukrainian missile could get into the Russian plane at all, despite the IAC’s
conclusions. One of the arguments against the Ukrainian trace was that no reliable radar data
with missile marks in the vicinity of the aircraft had been submitted.
In 2012, the Kiev Commercial Appeal Court dismissed the Russian complaint against the
award of the trial court, and the Supreme Commercial Court of Ukraine upheld that award.
The attorneys for Siberia Airlines (now renamed to S7 Airlines) announced their intent to
appeal before the European Court of Human Rights but did not take that opportunity.
In accordance with the treaty signed by Russia and Ukraine on 26 December 2003, the
Ukrainian government paid $7.8 mln to the relatives of the deceased Russian passengers
without recognising its legal liability “for humanitarian considerations”. The Ukrainian
authorities also paid $7.5 mln to the relatives of the killed Israeli passengers.

Annex 344
Law of Ukraine No. 3551-XII “On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social
Protection”, 22 October 1993
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 344
Excerpt
Translation
Law of Ukraine No. 3551-XII “On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their
Social Protection”, 22 October 1993, available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/3551-
12#Text.
LAW OF UKRAINE
On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of their Social
Protection
(Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 1993, No. 45, p. 425)
{Enacted by Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 3552-XII of 22.10.93, BVR, 1993,
No. 45, p. 426}
[…]
Article 6. Persons Considered to Be Combatants
The following persons shall be recognised as combatants:
[…]
16) persons who participated in any form of armed struggle for the independence of Ukraine
in the XX century as part of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of
Ataman Taras Borovets (Bulba) "Polissya Sich", the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army
(UNRA), the People's Defence Organisation "Carpathian Sich", the Ukrainian Military
Organisation (UVO), or armed units of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and, in
accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Status and Commemoration of Fighters for the
Independence of Ukraine in the XX Century", have been recognised as fighters for the
independence of Ukraine in the XX century. The procedure for granting the status of a combatant
to such persons is established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;
{Clause 16 of part one of Article 6 as amended by Law No. 2325-VIII of 13.03.2018; as
amended by Law No. 2640-VIII of 06.12.2018}

Annex 345
YouTube, Oleg Tyagnibok, UPA’s March of Glory: Oleg Tyagnibok's speech / October 14 /
Protection / Day of Defenders of Ukraine (17 October 2021)
(excerpt, translation)

Annex 345
Transcript
Translation
YouTube, Oleg Tyagnibok, UPA’s March of Glory: Oleg Tyagnibok's speech / October 14 /
Protection / Day of Defenders of Ukraine (17 October 2021), available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=2kCzI6wa4U0.
[…]
[08:45-10:15]
[Oleg Tyagnibok]: Everywhere in Ukraine today, on the occasion of the national
liberation struggle, local authorities are raising red and black flags on the initiative
of the Svoboda faction. Our solutions are about 350 across Ukraine.
Today, on October 14, Bandera's revolutionary red and black flags fly next to the
national flags. This is our ideological victory. Our ideological victory is that there
is no Moskovskyi Avenue in our capital, Kyiv, but rather a Bandera Avenue and a
Shukhevych Avenue, initiated and achieved by the Svoboda faction in Kyiv City
Council and then defended in the courts. These are our collective ideological
victories.
And when the first marches of the UIA took place, I remember that it was in a way
a defense, because the authorities were obstructing them, sending communists with
Moscow flags, with their stupid Leninist slogans.
Later, when the UIA marches became more and more massive year after year, the
authorities tried to ban us through the courts, stopping buses and preventing us
from traveling.
Annex 345
But now it's all a stage of the offensive, the Ukrainian offensive. This is our land. These are our heroes. And we will fight for it. And we will, even if it takes another 30 years. Even if it takes 300 years, we will definitely do it. […]
Annex 346 Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine. Resolution No. 802-VII “On Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”, 27 February 2014 (translation)

Annex 346
Translation
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine. Resolution No. 802-VII “On Formation of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine”, 27 February 2014, available at:
http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/802-VII.
RESOLUTION of
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine
On the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
(Bulletin of the Verkhovnaya Rada (BVR), 2014, No. 12, p.204)
{For more information, see VR Resolutions
No. 1526-VII of 19.06.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 32, p.1149
No. 1660-VII of 02.09.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 40, p. 2022
No. 10-VIII of 02.12.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 52, p.2063
No. 11-VIII of 02.12.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 52, p. 2064}
In accordance with clause 12 of part one of Article 85, part four of Article 114 of the
Constitution of Ukraine, the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine resolves:
{For dismissal of members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, see VR Resolution No. 11-VIII
dated 02.12.2014}
1. Appoint:
{Vitaliy Yarema was dismissed from the post by the Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine
No. 1526-VII of 19.06.2014;
{ Volodymyr Borysovich Groysman was dismissed from office as Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine -
Minister of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine by
Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No. 10-VIII of 02.12.2014};
Aleksandr Maksymovich Sych as Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine;
Arsen Borysovich Avakov as Minister of Internal Affairs;
Dmitry Sergeyevich Bulatov as Minister of Youth and Sports of Ukraine;
Maksym Yuriyevich Burbak as Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine;
Lyudmyla Leontyevna Denisova as Minister of Social Policy of Ukraine;
Sergey Myronovich Kvit as Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine;
Andrey Vladimirovich Mokhnyk as Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine;
Oleg Stepanovich Musiy as Minister of Healthcare of Ukraine;
Yevgeniy Mikhailovich Nyshchuk as Minister of Culture of Ukraine;
Pavel Petrenko as Minister of Justice of Ukraine;
Yuriy Vasylyevich Prodan, Minister of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine;
Ostap Mikhailovich Semerak, Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;
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Ihor Aleksandrovich Shvayka as the Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine; {The resignation of Sheremet Pavlo Mykhailovich as the Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine was accepted in accordance with the Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No. 1660-VII dated 02.09.2014}; Aleksandr Shlapak as Minister of Finance of Ukraine. 2. This Resolution shall enter into force upon its adoption. Chairman of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine O. TURCHINOV Kiev 27 February 2014 No. 802-VII
Annex 346
On the Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of
Ukraine of 27.02.2014 No. 802-VII Wording of
02.12.2014, grounds - 10-VIII, 11-VIII
Permanent address:
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/802-18
Legislation of Ukraine as of 08.03.2023 in force
Publications of the
document
• The Voice of Ukraine of 01.03.2014 - No.
39, / Special Issue /.
• Bulletin of the Verkhovnaya Rada of
Ukraine of 21.03.2014 - 2014, no. 12, pp.
807, Article 204

Annex 347 YouTube, Group of 2nd May, 14.40/02.05.2014. Arrest on Alexandrovsky Prospect in Odessa. (15 July 2015) (translation)

Annex 347
Transcript
Translation
YouTube, Group of 2nd May, 14.40/02.05.2014. Arrest on Alexandrovsky Prospect in Odessa.
(15 July 2015), available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLlqiixAtTQ&list=PL1VsJWkUn2D4c8_U3FffAUJV_
XPjPpt4Z&index=2.
[00:03]
[Voice-over]: Hello, we are located on Alexandrovsky Avenue in Odessa, where pro-Russian
activists gather to prevent a march for Ukrainian unity, scheduled for today. Yeah, I see police
officers taking some of the activists away.
[00:20]
[Voice-over]: You see many people are with helmets, many are with bats.
[0:31]
[Voice-over]: The police officers have detained one man and are taking him to the city police station
next door, follow them.
[…]
[Voice-over]: [0:53]
Annex 347
[Voice-over]: We are by the city police station, we'll have a try to shoot from here.
Annex 348
The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 80/2023 “On awarding the honorary name to the 10th
separate mountain assault brigade of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”, 14
February 2023
(translation)

Annex 348
Translation
The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 80/2023 “On awarding the honorary name to the 10th
separate mountain assault brigade of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”, 14
February 2023, available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/802023-45805.
DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
No. 80/2023
On awarding the honorary name to the 10th separate mountain assault
brigade of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
________________________________________________________________________________
Taking into account the exemplary performance of assigned tasks while protecting the territorial
integrity and independence of Ukraine by the personnel of the 10th separate mountain assault brigade
of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, I hereby decree:
1. To award the 10th separate mountain assault brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine the honorary
name "Edelweiss" and hereinafter it shall be referred to as the 10th separate mountain assault brigade
"Edelweiss" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
2. This Decree comes into force from the day of its publication.
President of Ukraine V. ZELENSKY
14 February 2023

Annex 349
YouTube, Channel “Facts ICTV”, “Turchinov announced anti-terrorist measures against armed
separatists”, 7 April 2014
(translation)

Annex 349
Translation
YouTube, Channel “Facts ICTV”, “Turchinov announced anti-terrorist measures against
armed separatists”, 7 April 2014, available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myjnfelp_V0.
Video Transcript (translated from Ukrainian)
[00:03]
[Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: Compatriots! Yesterday the
second wave of the special operation of the Russian Federation against Ukraine started; its purpose
is to destabilize the situation in the country, to overthrow the Ukrainian authorities, to disrupt the
elections and to tear apart our country.
[00:21]
[Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: Separatist groups that are
coordinated by Russian security services seized the building of the Kharkov Regional State
Administration, the building of the Regional Administration and Security Services in Donetsk, as
well as the SBU building in Lugansk, and what is especially dangerous, took up weapons. All of
this is happening in the context of presence of Russian troops near our border.
[00:46]
Annex 349
[Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: Enemies of Ukraine are trying to play the Crimean scenario, but we will not let that happen. This night anti-crisis headquarters was formed, and antiterrorist measures will be held against those who took up arms. [01:01] [Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: We have strengthened protection of the Eastern border of our country. Taking into account the passive behavior of some local law enforcement agencies, they will be also additionally completed at the expense of the departments from other regions. [01:14] [Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: For coordination of legal structures, we sent to Kharkov the Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov, to Donetsk - the First Vice Prime Minister General Vitaly Yarema, to Lugansk - the Secretary of Council of State Security and Defense Andriy Parubiy, and the Head the Security Service of Ukraine Valentyn Nalyvaichenko. [01:36] [Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: Tomorrow one of the first issues on the agenda in the Verkhovnaya Rada will be the law on harsher punishment for separatism and other crimes against the state. According to Ukrainian legislation, the question will be raised regarding ban of the activities of political parties and public organizations standing on the separatist positions and working for the aggressor country against its own state and its people. [02:04] [Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: I respect various political views including those of our opponents, but separatism and use of weapons against our own country, which has a direct threat to the security and the lives of our citizens, is not politics, it is a serious crime, and we will act adequately and decisively against criminals.
Annex 350 Irina Berezhnaya Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection, REPORT: INFRINGMENT OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN UKRAINE (2018)

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Annex 351 Iryna Berezhnaya Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection, REPORT: INFRINGMENT OF RIGHT AND FREEDOMS IN UKRAINE (2019) (excerpt)

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Annex 352 Irina Berezhnaya Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection, ONLINE ENVIRONMENT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INFRINGEMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN UKRAINE (2022)

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Annex 353
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 30 March 2018

Annex 353
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo, 30 March 2018.
The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation
in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
Civilian properties occupied by UAF in Travnevoye, Donetsk region,
29 March 2018

Annex 354
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 14 May 2018

Annex 354
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo, 14 May 2018.
The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation
in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
2 UAF BMP-1 IFV within Zolotoye (Disengagement Area-2), Lugansk region

Annex 355
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo №2, 14 May 2018

Annex 355
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo №2, 14 May 2018.
The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation
in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
UAF-occupied Civilian house in Zolotoye (Disengagement Area-2), Lugansk
region, 24 April 2018

Annex 356
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 21 May 2018

Annex 356
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo, 21 May 2018.
The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation
in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
UAF command bunker and headquarters within the public school building in
Teploye, Lugansk region

Annex 357 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Mark Eterington’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 18 January 2019

Annex 357
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Mark Eterington’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo, 18 January 2019.
The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation
in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
UAF Surface to Air system close to a civilian house occupied by UAF in
Klinovoye, Donetsk region, 4 December 2018

Annex 358 The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 1 June 2018

Annex 358
The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug’s briefing for the
Diplomatic corps, Photo, 1 June 2018.
The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation
in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).
UAF Surface to Air missiles 52 meters from public school in Tarasovka,
Donetsk region, 22 May 2018

Annex 359
Administration of the President of Ukraine, Letter No 12-09/2938, 16 July 2019
(translation)

Annex 359
Translation
Administration of the President of Ukraine, Letter No 12-09/2938, 16 July 2019, available at:
https://dostup.pravda.com.ua/request/51414/response/123805/attach/3/2281..pdf.
Presidential Administration of Ukraine
Main Department for Ensuring Access to
Public Information
16 July 2019 No. 12-09/2938
In reply to No. 2281 of 09 July 2019
to Mr. ANATOLY
Dear Mr. Anatoly,
In reply to your request of 9 July 2019, we are sending you Decrees of the President
of Ukraine No. 965 "On conferring the title of Hero of Ukraine upon R. Shukhevych"
dated 12 October 2007 and No. 46 "On conferring the title of Hero of Ukraine upon
S. Bandera" dated 20 October 2010, which are still in force.
Attachment: 1 file.
Sincerely yours,
Head of the Main Department for Ensuring
Access to Public Information,
Presidential Administration of Ukraine S. Kondzelya

Annex 360 Australian Federal Police, Report in the Matter of AFR Case Reference No. 5667342 (Operation AVENELLA), July 2015

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Annex 361 Expert Report Analyzing Videos from Social Media

Annex 361
1
Report
We received for analysis a USB flash drive with videos from social media, including original links from
which they were downloaded.
The files with videos were downloaded from social media and are not original videos.
We analysed five videos available through the links set out below.
We used the web browser Internet Explorer 11 for analysing the content of the links.
To obtain extensive data on all files available through the YouTube link, we used the software
youtube-dl, version 2019.09.28 (https://ytdl-org.github.io/youtube-dl/index.html)
1) “The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17 July 2014” («Орудие убийства
малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014»)
Annex 361
2 https://web.archive.org/web/20140717182910/http:/www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlOqhnodT70&gl=US&hl=en Uploaded by the user “Balodya Familyev” Published date: 17 July 2014 It is impossible to use the youtube-dl programme here since this link is an archive and a mirror. We extracted a link to the video file from the page’s source code: https://web.archive.org/web/20140717182911oe/http://r4---sn-jc47eu7r.googlevideo.com/videoplayback?source=youtube&ratebypass=yes&ipbits=0&key=cms1&ip=207.241.237.109&sver=3&expire=1405645200&signature=1ED048BC6D3F6C25759EE327C6FC1517009105DC.7DE8CBD5D9E79BA8D787EBD557BDFFCE20033448&itag=22&id=o-APHyJEkj4LJ366fT0YvQ5m5p6ZsBmyTpsc4Nkbqzwv&upn=2oOfsu1kfbM&fexp=901803%2C902408%2C908584%2C910118%2C913430%2C924213%2C924217%2C924222%2C927622%2C930008%2C931975%2C934024%2C934030%2C941366%2C948110&sparams=expire,id,initcwndbps,ip,ipbits,itag,ratebypass,source,upn&signature=&redirectcounter=1&reqid=93d58e95421a03e4&cmsredirect=yes&ms=tsu&mt=1405621710&mv=m&mws=yes through which the following video file was uploaded: The file size is 4,716,676 bytes, the SHA1 hash sum is “AE8045E87EBDC8BC46228F32BC1AC37A5D9F9DE3”. Information concerning the media file: General Complete name : videoplayback.mp4 Format : MPEG-4 Format profile : Base Media / Version 2 Codec ID : mp42 (isom/mp42) File size : 4.50 MiB Duration : 35 s 270 ms Overall bit rate mode : Variable Overall bit rate : 1 070 kb/s Encoded date : UTC 2014-07-16 16:42:05 Tagged date : UTC 2014-07-16 16:42:05 gsst : 0 gstd : 35548 gssd : B4A7DD4E4HH1405621750567424 gshh : r4---sn-jc47eu7r.googlevideo.com Video ID : 1 Format : AVC Format/Info : Advanced Video Codec
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3
Format profile : [email protected]
Format settings : CABAC / 1 Ref Frames
Format settings, CABAC : Yes
Format settings, Reference frames : 1 frame
Codec ID : avc1
Codec ID/Info : Advanced Video Coding
Duration : 35 s 267 ms
Bit rate : 875 kb/s
Maximum bit rate : 2 192 kb/s
Width : 408 pixels
Height : 720 pixels
Display aspect ratio : 0.567
Frame rate mode : Constant
Frame rate : 15.000 FPS
Color space : YUV
Chroma subsampling : 4:2:0
Bit depth : 8 bits
Scan type : Progressive
Bits/(Pixel*Frame) : 0.199
Stream size : 3.68 MiB (82%)
Tagged date : UTC 2014-07-16 16:42:05
Codec configuration box : avcC
Audio
ID : 2
Format : AAC LC
Format/Info : Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity
Codec ID : mp4a-40-2
Duration : 35 s 270 ms
Bit rate mode : Variable
Bit rate : 192 kb/s
Maximum bit rate : 202 kb/s
Channel(s) : 2 channels
Channel layout : L R
Sampling rate : 44.1 kHz
Frame rate : 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF)
Compression mode : Lossy
Stream size : 827 KiB (18%)
Title : IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011
Encoded date : UTC 2014-07-16 16:42:05
Tagged date : UTC 2014-07-16 16:42:05
The encoded date (16 July 2014) is not consistent with the published date (17 July 2014).
Annex 361
4 The date shown on a Youtube page as being the “published date” is the date on which a video is made public by a user. I have done some experiments with uploading videos and if a video is uploaded as a “private” video and subsequently made public then Youtube displays the latter date as being the “published date”. It is therefore possible for a video to have been uploaded to Youtube before its stated date of publication. As for the “encoded date”, videos on Youtube are encoded as part of the process of uploading by a user. It is possible that some videos are re-encoded at some later point by Youtube. Therefore, there is no sensible explanation for the encoding date being before the point of uploading (and obviously the video cannot be encoded before it the relevant events are filmed). I have seen a thesis entitled “Youtube : Recompression Effects” by Cole Michael Whitecotton1 which explains the relevant data as follows: "The metadata of all video files (including DASH, mp4, etc.) downloaded with youtube-dl also contain date and time information that is related to the date and time each file was originally uploaded and encoded. The new formats that appear after the initial upload have a different time associated with them as they are encoded at a later time”. Every video uploaded to Youtube, regardless of the format of the video which the user has created or converted, will be encoded by Youtube as part of the upload process. The date of encoding therefore indicates when uploading has occurred or some later re-encoding. The encoding date on videos stored on Youtube cannot be before that video was uploaded to Youtube. Turning to the images seen in this video, there are some suspicious artefacts. For example, there are a number of frames (approximately frames 155 to 170) in which the Buk appears to reach a streetlamp and its horizontal dimensions decrease (i.e. the Buk gets shorter). In my view, this is completely unconnected to any potential compression problem or any perspective issue. Compression problems can arise since social media compress images, lower their resolutions and generally reduce their quality. Compression leads to losses (lossy). This compression blurs the boundaries of objects, makes some characteristics of combined images uniform in appearance, and makes such objects unfit for any definitive digital image computer analysis. Such compression artifacts are discussed in the article below: https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:833137/FULLTEXT01.pdf The shortening of the Buk does not appear to be connected with any compression issues because this version of the video has a relatively high quality. Also, any compression artifacts would also affect 1 https://www1.ucdenver.edu/docs/librariesprovider27/ncmf-docs/theses/whitecottonthesisfall2017.pdf?sfvrsn=484e97b82
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5
all moving objects in the video, whereas the issue in relation to the Buk does not affect another
vehicle that can be seen moving in the video. This looks very strange to me.
I also find it suspicious that the video ends just as the Buk reaches a horizontal line at the beginning
of an incline. The horizontal line involves a noticeable shifting in the image, which is not consistent
with a compression artefact because compression artifacts generally affect moving objects and
furthermore this horizontal is not merely visible in a single frame but is instead a consistent feature
throughout the video. This is suspicious. That suspicion is heightened in my mind due to the fact that
the video ends just as the Buk is about to cross that horizontal line.
If the Buk had crossed the horizontal and continued up the incline, the perspective would have
changed.
2) “The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17 July 2014” («Орудие убийства
малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014»).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiI9s-zWLs4
Uploaded by the user “Brown Moses” Published date: 17 July 2014
Using the Youtube DataViewer (citizenevidence.amnestyusa.org) we identified Upload Date and
Time
Video ID: MiI9s-zWLs4
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8 Format : AVC Format/Info : Advanced Video Codec Format profile : [email protected] Format settings : CABAC / 3 Ref Frames Format settings, CABAC : Yes Format settings, Reference frames : 3 frames Codec ID : avc1 Codec ID/Info : Advanced Video Coding Duration : 35 s 267 ms Bit rate : 453 kb/s Width : 408 pixels Height : 720 pixels Display aspect ratio : 0.567 Frame rate mode : Constant Frame rate : 15.000 FPS Color space : YUV Chroma subsampling : 4:2:0 Bit depth : 8 bits Scan type : Progressive Bits/(Pixel*Frame) : 0.103 Stream size : 1.91 MiB (78%) Title : ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Encoded date : UTC 2017-08-14 20:30:49 Tagged date : UTC 2017-08-14 20:30:49 Codec configuration box : avcC Audio ID : 2 Format : AAC LC Format/Info : Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity Codec ID : mp4a-40-2 Duration : 35 s 271 ms Bit rate mode : Variable Bit rate : 126 kb/s Channel(s) : 2 channels Channel layout : L R Sampling rate : 44.1 kHz Frame rate : 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF) Compression mode : Lossy Stream size : 541 KiB (22%) Title : ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Encoded date : UTC 2017-08-14 20:30:49 Tagged date : UTC 2017-08-14 20:30:49
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9
The encoded date (14 August 2017) is not the same as the stated published date (17 July 2014).
However, as noted above, a video can be reencoded after upload. I am not aware of any explanation
by Youtube as to when or why a video may be reencoded. During November 2019, I have found other
videos from 2014 which have not been reencoded i.e. they still show an encoding date in 2014.
The video’s description has the original link – “https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlOqhnodT70”.
No video is available through this link.
The website http://www.military-az.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=1289&start=3920 has the
following post with a link to the video and a part of the title
Having searched by the title “The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17 July 2014”
(«Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014») and sorted videos by date, we can see that
the first available video was uploaded by the user “Brown Moses”.
Annex 361
10 This video also includes some noticeable features. In particular, there are apparent vertical lines when the Buk passes a tree. As noted above, compression can give rise to compression artifacts and it is possible that this is an example of that. Given the other suspicious features of this video, it is possible that this not merely a compression artifact. Due to the compression of this video, it is not possible to state a definitive opinion as to the cause of this vertical line. Image compression (with the image resolution lowered) may be used as a method for hiding indications of tampering with videos. This is especially true when compression is performed multiple times. Video files with a high compression ratio and with a small number of anchor frames for coding and, as a result, with a large number of compression artifacts render it impossible to conclude whether the video was edited or not.
Annex 361
11
Thus, having no originals of a video, it is impossible to give a definitive opinion on the authenticity or
modification of videos taken from social media because they were repeatedly compressed.
3) Title: “AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”. Uploaded by
the user “EuroMaydan”.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkgwxxhJlk4
Published date: 17 July 2014.
Video ID: wkgwxxhJlk4
Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-17
Upload Time (UTC): 18:44:55
Information concerning media files available through the link:
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13
Format profile : [email protected]
Format settings : CABAC / 3 Ref Frames
Format settings, CABAC : Yes
Format settings, Reference frames : 3 frames
Codec ID : avc1
Codec ID/Info : Advanced Video Coding
Duration : 35 s 235 ms
Bit rate : 946 kb/s
Width : 1 280 pixels
Height : 720 pixels
Display aspect ratio : 16:9
Frame rate mode : Constant
Frame rate : 29.970 (30000/1001) FPS
Color space : YUV
Chroma subsampling : 4:2:0
Bit depth : 8 bits
Scan type : Progressive
Bits/(Pixel*Frame) : 0.034
Stream size : 3.97 MiB (88%)
Title : ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.
Encoded date : UTC 2016-08-26 11:59:42
Tagged date : UTC 2016-08-26 11:59:42
Codec configuration box : avcC
Audio
ID : 2
Format : AAC LC
Format/Info : Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity
Codec ID : mp4a-40-2
Duration : 35 s 248 ms
Bit rate mode : Variable
Bit rate : 126 kb/s
Channel(s) : 2 channels
Channel layout : L R
Sampling rate : 44.1 kHz
Frame rate : 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF)
Compression mode : Lossy
Stream size : 541 KiB (12%)
Title : ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.
Encoded date : UTC 2016-08-26 11:59:42
Tagged date : UTC 2016-08-26 11:59:42
The encoded date (26 August 2016) is not consistent with the published date (17 July 2014) which
is presumably attributable to the features of YouTube video hosting since the field Title states that
“ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.”.
Annex 361
14 Having searched by the title “AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne” and sorted videos by date, we can see that the first available video was uploaded by the user “EuroMaydan”. 4)Title: “AA BUK vehicle Pro Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”. Uploaded by the user “ANON EVOL”. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxZhjyZILgU Published date: 14 October 2015. Video ID: YxZhjyZILgU
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16 Duration : 35 s 270 ms Overall bit rate mode : Variable Overall bit rate : 397 kb/s Encoded date : UTC 2015-10-14 22:33:51 Tagged date : UTC 2015-10-14 22:33:51 Video ID : 1 Format : AVC Format/Info : Advanced Video Codec Format profile : Baseline@L3 Format settings : 1 Ref Frames Format settings, CABAC : No Format settings, Reference frames : 1 frame Format settings, GOP : M=1, N=60 Codec ID : avc1 Codec ID/Info : Advanced Video Coding Duration : 35 s 202 ms Bit rate : 299 kb/s Maximum bit rate : 584 kb/s Width : 640 pixels Height : 360 pixels Display aspect ratio : 16:9 Frame rate mode : Constant Frame rate : 29.970 (30000/1001) FPS Color space : YUV Chroma subsampling : 4:2:0 Bit depth : 8 bits Scan type : Progressive Bits/(Pixel*Frame) : 0.043 Stream size : 1.25 MiB (75%) Tagged date : UTC 2015-10-14 22:33:51 Codec configuration box : avcC Audio ID : 2 Format : AAC LC Format/Info : Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity Codec ID : mp4a-40-2 Duration : 35 s 270 ms Bit rate mode : Variable Bit rate : 96.0 kb/s Maximum bit rate : 105 kb/s Channel(s) : 2 channels Channel layout : L R Sampling rate : 44.1 kHz Frame rate : 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF)
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17
Compression mode : Lossy
Stream size : 413 KiB (24%)
Title : IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011
Encoded date : UTC 2015-10-14 22:33:51
Tagged date : UTC 2015-10-14 22:33:51
The published date is consistent with the encoded date. However, the title states “IsoMedia File
Produced by Google, 5-11-2011”. This file has coding settings with 1 frame (“1 Ref Frames”) which
explains a very low resolution of coding of the moving objects.
Having searched by the title “AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne” and
sorted videos by date, we can see that the last available video was uploaded by the user “ANON
EVOL”.
Annex 361
18 5)Title: “Rebels are Driving the Buk to the Russian Border” («Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ»). Uploaded by the user “Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine”. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4HJmev5xg0 Published date: 18 July 2014. Video ID: L4HJmev5xg0 Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-18 Upload Time (UTC): 10:21:11
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21
Codec ID : avc1
Codec ID/Info : Advanced Video Coding
Duration : 13 s 0 ms
Bit rate : 1 232 kb/s
Width : 1 280 pixels
Height : 720 pixels
Display aspect ratio : 16:9
Frame rate mode : Constant
Frame rate : 25.000 FPS
Color space : YUV
Chroma subsampling : 4:2:0
Bit depth : 8 bits
Scan type : Progressive
Bits/(Pixel*Frame) : 0.053
Stream size : 1.91 MiB (90%)
Title : ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 10/10/2017.
Encoded date : UTC 2017-10-11 05:33:26
Tagged date : UTC 2017-10-11 05:33:26
Color range : Limited
Color primaries : BT.709
Transfer characteristics : BT.709
Matrix coefficients : BT.709
Codec configuration box : avcC
Audio
ID : 2
Format : AAC LC
Format/Info : Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity
Codec ID : mp4a-40-2
Duration : 13 s 3 ms
Bit rate mode : Variable
Bit rate : 126 kb/s
Channel(s) : 2 channels
Channel layout : L R
Sampling rate : 44.1 kHz
Frame rate : 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF)
Compression mode : Lossy
Stream size : 200 KiB (9%)
Title : ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 10/10/2017.
Encoded date : UTC 2017-10-11 05:33:26
Tagged date : UTC 2017-10-11 05:33:26
The file size is 4,426,320 bytes. The SHA1 hash sum is
“F3F5A141EFCA3B5E394AECAE02EAC4FD71B49411”. The file with format code 298.
Annex 361
22 Information concerning the media file: General Complete name : Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс 'БУК' до кордону із РФ-L4HJmev5xg0_code298.mp4 Format : dash Codec ID : dash (iso6/avc1/mp41) File size : 4.22 MiB Duration : 13 s 0 ms Overall bit rate : 2 724 kb/s Encoded date : UTC 2017-10-11 05:30:01 Tagged date : UTC 2017-10-11 05:30:01 Video ID : 1 Format : AVC Format/Info : Advanced Video Codec Format profile : [email protected] Format settings : CABAC / 3 Ref Frames Format settings, CABAC : Yes Format settings, Reference frames : 3 frames Codec ID : avc1 Codec ID/Info : Advanced Video Coding Duration : 13 s 0 ms Bit rate : 2 718 kb/s Width : 1 280 pixels Height : 720 pixels Display aspect ratio : 16:9 Frame rate mode : Constant Frame rate : 50.000 FPS Color space : YUV Chroma subsampling : 4:2:0 Bit depth : 8 bits Scan type : Progressive Bits/(Pixel*Frame) : 0.059 Stream size : 4.21 MiB (100%) Encoded date : UTC 2017-10-11 05:30:01 Tagged date : UTC 2017-10-11 05:30:01 Color range : Limited Color primaries : BT.709 Transfer characteristics : BT.709 Matrix coefficients : BT.709 Codec configuration box : avcC
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23
The encoded date (11 October 2017) is not the same as the published date (18 July 2014). As
discussed above, this could be due to reencoding for some reason after the initial upload.
The file shown by default and tagged as “Best” has a lower TBR than the file with format code 298.
Having searched by the title “Rebels are Driving the Buk to the Russian Border” («Бойовики вивозять
ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ») and sorted videos by date, we can see that the first
available video was uploaded by the user “Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine”. There are two
earlier videos with the identical title but a completely different content.
I obtained an archived copy of this video from the link below, with an archiving date of 18 July
2014:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140718111528/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4HJme
v5xg0
Annex 361
24 I obtained the following video link from the source code for that archived page: https://web.archive.org/web/20140718111529oe/http://r3---sn-nwj7knek.googlevideo.com/videoplayback?itag=22&mws=yes&expire=1405706400&ratebypass=yes&signature=7969540F3CF50C841CDB641AF158C352AA70630D.2959749ED53ABACE6D985E35D03F458632166F74&sver=3&fexp=902408%2C922521%2C924222%2C927622%2C927896%2C930008%2C934024%2C934030%2C938645%2C946008&id=o-AI03D7D2XaRQBLYJ9zQFMljPBiL6WsCo0IEywnR4n&mv=m&ipbits=0&key=yt5&sparams=id%2Cinitcwndbps%2Cip%2Cipbits%2Citag%2Cratebypass%2Csource%2Cupn%2Cexpire&ms=au&upn=89eVRxf8GOw&source=youtube&mt=1405682050&initcwndbps=964750&ip=207.241.237.141&signature= The SHA1 hash sum is “E7F6BA155F08BABE3DFBFFAAE95F8CC99443BDF8”. The data associated with that archived video is set out below. General Complete name : videoplayback (3).mp4 Format : MPEG-4 Format profile : Base Media / Version 2 Codec ID : mp42 (isom/mp42) File size : 3.42 MiB Duration : 13 s 48 ms Overall bit rate mode : Variable Overall bit rate : 2 198 kb/s Encoded date : UTC 2014-07-17 10:02:09 Tagged date : UTC 2014-07-17 10:02:09 gsst : 0 gstd : 13095 gssd : B4A7DAAC1HH1405682128843655 gshh : r3---sn-nwj7knek.googlevideo.com Video ID : 1 Format : AVC
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Format/Info : Advanced Video Codec
Format profile : [email protected]
Format settings : CABAC / 1 Ref Frames
Format settings, CABAC : Yes
Format settings, Reference frames : 1 frame
Format settings, GOP : M=1, N=60
Codec ID : avc1
Codec ID/Info : Advanced Video Coding
Duration : 13 s 40 ms
Bit rate : 2 003 kb/s
Maximum bit rate : 2 919 kb/s
Width : 1 280 pixels
Height : 720 pixels
Display aspect ratio : 16:9
Frame rate mode : Constant
Frame rate : 25.000 FPS
Color space : YUV
Chroma subsampling : 4:2:0
Bit depth : 8 bits
Scan type : Progressive
Bits/(Pixel*Frame) : 0.087
Stream size : 3.11 MiB (91%)
Tagged date : UTC 2014-07-17 10:02:09
Codec configuration box : avcC
Audio
ID : 2
Format : AAC LC
Format/Info : Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity
Codec ID : mp4a-40-2
Duration : 13 s 48 ms
Bit rate mode : Variable
Bit rate : 192 kb/s
Maximum bit rate : 202 kb/s
Channel(s) : 2 channels
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26 Channel layout : L R Sampling rate : 44.1 kHz Frame rate : 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF) Compression mode : Lossy Stream size : 306 KiB (9%) Title : IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011 Encoded date : UTC 2014-07-17 10:02:09 Tagged date : UTC 2014-07-17 10:02:09 The encoding date for the video is 17th July 2014. I understand that there have been suggestions that the video was filmed on 18th July 2014. However, those suggestions are not consistent with the encoding date – as explained above. In the archived version of this video (which is the oldest version available), as the Buk passes a lamppost in this video, a vertical line on the lamppost seems to disappear. After the Buk has passed that lamppost, a bird appears to be visible on both sides of that lamppost. It is possible that these are compression artifacts, but it is also possible that they are due to mistakes made when editing or creating the video. These features are absent from one of the later copies of the video. In each version of this video, the vegetation in the foreground is static. Conclusions 1)The video files submitted for analysis: 1.1)The first video above was obtained through the link from the archive https://web.archive.org/web/20140717182910/http:/www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlOqhnodT70&gl=US&hl=en. The video was encoded on 16 July 2014, 16:42:05 UTC, however,
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27
the video was published only on 17 July 2014, with its metadata having the title that states
“IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011”. This video has a fairly high bit rate, and
certain issues with the video do not appear to be due to compression artifacts.
1.2) The next video from this list is titled “The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17
July 2014” («Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014»). It was uploaded by
the user “Brown Moses” and its description contains a link to a certain “original” video
which has already been deleted. Despite the fact that this video is presented as a “repost”,
it is of far worse quality with its average TBR being 453 kbps as compared with 875 kbps,
and its encoded date is 14 August 2017, 20:30:49 UTC. Besides, the video’s published date
is also “17 July 2014”. Further, metadata show that the video’s title is “ISO Media file
produced by Google Inc.”
1.3) The next video from this list is titled “AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from
Torez to Snizhne”. It was published by the user “EuroMaydan” on 17 July 2014. This video
is cropped and encoded with its resolution (from 408*720 to 1,280*720) and frame rate
(from 15 to 29.9) increased. However, it is obvious that optical image stabilisation tools
were applied to the video presumably for the purpose of increasing its quality. The video
was encoded on “14 October 2015, 22:33:51 UTC”. Further, metadata show that the
video’s title is “ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.”
1.4) The next video from this list was published on 14 October 2015 and titled “AA BUK vehicle
Pro Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”. It was uploaded by the user “ANON
EVOL”. The video was encoded on “14 October 2015, 22:33:51 UTC” and its title in
metadata reads “IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011”. This video also appears
to be cropped as compared with the first one, but it has not undergone optical image
stabilisation and has the worst quality (397 kbps, 640*360 pixels).
1.5) The video published on 18 July 2014 and titled “Rebels are Driving the Buk to the Russian
Border” («Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ») by the user
“Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine” is peculiar in terms of its encoded date (11
October 2017) being inconsistent with its published date (18 July 2014); besides, by
default, preference is given to the video of lower quality (1,232 kbps, 25 FPS as compared
with 2,718 kbps, 50 FPS), but this video of lower quality has an audio track. The field Title
states that “ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.”
2) In the videos considered above, I found there to be repeated problems when objects are
passing in front of posts etc. This may be suspicious. In particular, the shortening of the Buk
in the first video discussed above appears to be very strange and not consistent merely with
compression artifacts. I cannot give a reasonable explanation of that appearance.
3) Social media cannot constitute a source of digital evidence in the form of photographs and
videos since social media change and encode them on their own, particularly by lowering their
resolution and even changing and encoding them with the passage of time since publication.
Further, if photographs and videos have already been compressed at the time of publication
Annex 361
28 and are repeatedly compressed by social media (in the case of YouTube, this means that they had been compressed at least three times by 2017), then they cannot be analysed for any traces of computer editing.
Annex 362
Report on Expert Examination of a Video File for Any Signs of Falsification, 7 December 2020

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1
Copy 1
Report on Expert Examination of a Video File for Any Signs of Falsification
Moscow
2020
Annex 362
2AbstractThis expert report was prepared oninstructions from the attorneysof Ivanyan and Partners LawFirm, members oftheSt Petersburg Bar Association andtheMoscow Bar Association.This report ismadeto be furthersubmitted to the European Court of Human Rights in the proceedings brought by Ukraine against the Russian Federation.
Annex 362
3
Contents
1. Experts involved in the examination.…………….…………………..…4
2. Terms and definitions……………………………………………………5
3. Objectives…….…………………………………………………………..6
4. Methods of analysis of digital videos.…………………………………..6
5. General analysis…………………………………………………………7
6. Domain analysis of digital videos ………………………………………28
7. Conclusions………………………………………………………………44
Declaration of the experts…………………………………………………...45
Annex 362
41.Experts involved in the examinationThis report was preparedbya group of experts specializing in the following fields:•special effects;•integral image generation using overlay methods;•online fraud prevention;•development of software for text and video information analysis;•big data and digital image processing.The experts havehigher educationand between 5 and 15 years of work experiencein the relevant fields.
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5
2. Terms and Definitions
The following terms and definitions are used in the report:
• Computer Graphics (CG) – graphics or visual elements generated using the computer
equipment/digital algorithms.
• Digital Video – a sequence of raster digital images presented in a special computer format.
• Digitally Enhanced Video (DEV) – manipulations with digital video using the methods of
digital image processing.
• Principal Component Analysis (PCA) – method of analysis based on data clustering.
• Wavelet Transformations (WA) – method of analysis based on signal decomposition.
• Luminance Gradient (LG) – method of analysis based on the intensity of luminous flux in
a digital image or digital video.
Annex 362
63.ObjectivesTo examine the video material submitted and answer the following questions:•Is the video real, CG-ed or created by digital manipulations?•If the video is real, where and when was it made?•If the video was created by digital manipulations, what did the manipulations involve and how could they becreated?•If the video is CG-ed, how was it created?4.Methods of Analysis of Digital Videos 1.AggregatedAnalysis.Preliminary analysis of the video material submitted,searchfor basic signs of digital manipulation, search for original video and copies online.2.Analysis of the digital video'sformat.Analysis of the containerand streams of the video materials submitted and copies thereof in the Internet.3.Domain analysis of thedigital video. Analysis of the videoin search of the following potential signs of digital manipulation: ••uneven and artificial blurring;••areas of the objects studied where the contrast does not match;••areas of the objectsstudied where shadows do not match;••signs of additional superimposed layers (image decomposition);••unnatural camera movement pattern;••disappearance ofobjects.5.Aggregated AnalysisPrior to commencement of the work, we received the video material showing two moving objects identified by their contoursas vehicles, presumably military equipment. The video is characterized bythe following:•the camera, with which the video was supposedly made, is very shaky;•unusual defocusingof the image;•change ofthe image exposure (change of brightness and contrast).5.1 Onlinesearch forthe video or similar parts of the video The search was conducted in search indexesof the following websites:
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7
• Youtube.com;
• Google.com;
• Yandex.ru;
• Duckduck.com.
The following text queries were entered in each of the indices:
• «Бук снежное» (“Buk snezhnoye”);
• «Бук торез» (“Buk torez”);
• «Орудие убийства Малазийского боинга» (“Weapon of destruction of the Malaysian boeing”).
It should be noted that we found the mention of the video recording in question on Bellingcat.com
where it is referred to as a video material under study
(https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/03/10/a-post-mortem-of-russias-claim-that-crucial-mh17-
video-evidence-was-falsified/).
As at the date of this report, the following video materials were found online:
5.1.1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlOqhnodT70 – Bolodya Familyev, 17 July 2014
5.1.2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiI9s-zWLs4 – Brown Moses
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_rpr10vOZDoa3usiwEFfwQ), 17 July 2014
[Weapon that killed the Malaysians Snezhnoye 17 07 2014]
5.1.3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iE7wEhvYFos - Ukraine@War
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC7dpS3kPo0NGF6CBlJKNNMw), 14.07.2015
Annex 362
8[Weapon that killed the Malaysians Snezhnoye 17 07 2014]5.1.4https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtHkZZnGTlc-Alexander Glasnaroda(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC9xm2psH5ctnGpkf0dRTwJA), 17.07.20149[
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9
[Torez Snezhnoye First footage of the culprit of the death of 300 civilian aircraft passengers appears
watch all! The whole world should know who its prime enemy is! Putin will not escape the
answer!]
5.1.5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VdfEL5yWE7w - Mrachny Molochnik
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCj2XA67QC8HgI-7wb3ugg9w), 17 July 2014
Annex 362
10[Torez –Snezhnoye. “Buk”Surface-to-Air Missile System moving to thearea from which passenger Boeing was downed 17.07.2014Buk Surface-to-Air Missile System moving towards the positions towards the positions in the direction of Saur-Mogila. 17.07.2014 Compilation of facts related to downing of the Boeing. […]
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11
Video was shot on Gagarin street in Snezhnoye. The Ukrainian, Malaysian and foreign
representatives are soon to arrive there. And they will investigate the caterpillar tread marks, weight
of the moving object and much more. You are in trouble. There’s a close up of the exact place
where “Buk” drove through on the map; here are the sources if you are interested: Google map: […]
Russian map: […] To illustrate, here is a pic from that place attached to a Yandex map […] “Buk” is
driving past fir trees planted along the road, which can be seen quite well on the maps shown. […]
the Snezhnoye - Saur-Mogila road […] Given the angle, the video was shot from the multi-story
building on 43 Gagarin Street, Snezhnoye The filming was made southwards, in the direction of
Pervomayskoye. No slag heaps can be seen there. Check it out on the map […].]
5.1.6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OAxpT5AikhQ – torezinfo
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMG5WlxPXlvzjdZttraCgNg), 17 July 2014
[Torez Snezhnoye First footage of the culprit of the death of 300 civilian aircraft passengers appears
Buk system in Torez Disabling comments. Dumbhead pro-Russians only shitstorming the
comments.]
5.1.7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KCcjD_SYISw – Andrey Mipto
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCPhbkbgrBqGPpjOitiFTENg), 22 November 2014
Annex 362
12[Torez Snezhnoye “Buk”Surface-to-Air Missile System moving to the area from which passenger Boeing was downed 17 07 2014]5.1.8.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R9nc8TniujU–DIVAN ONLINE (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCHZJtiXS09_-52lV5hNw0xA), 18 July 201413[
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13
[17.07.2014, BUK system leaving Torez
SUBSCRIBE to the news: http://goo.gl/nHicDg LIKE and SHARE the videos, the world must
know the TRUTH! ------------- For COPYRIGHT issues contact [email protected],
please do not send a STRIKE without notice. ----------- | A T T E N T I O N | -------- Our news
channel does not share the point of view of any party to the conflict. We cover the news from an
apolitical standpoint and avoid hurting the feelings of either side.]
5.1.9. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpDUbnqRATM – Dimitri Palagniouk
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC0EjT-tH178_mvf-iARKyqQ), 17 July 2014
Annex 362
14[“Buk”missile system leaves Snezhnoye village after downing Boeing 777. 17/07/2014The shooting of the Malaysian Boeing over Ukraine by the Russian terrorists using “Buk”system]5.1.10.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xO3FiAXTTG4-Dyadya Petya(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCZ8IGrKrnZPjt_V_W0f4aBA), 17 July 201415[
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15
[BUK driving on the road in Snezhnoye 17.07.2014
BUK driving on the road in Snezhnoye 17.07.2014]
5.1.11https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wx1yQLgpHYM – Georgy Semenets
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC2Hx1H0rGR-dcL5rfA2Z7lA),
18 July 2014
Annex 362
16[“Buk-M1”self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system filmed in Torez on the Boeing downing dayin TorezTorez,presumably, the Gagarin Avenue.BUKSurface-to-Air Missile System movingalong the road accompanied by the rebels. Amateur video shot by a town resident.]5.1.12https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUKMGHXSq4Q-alina bar (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXnbamqmCqxjdFn-9kDvjiw), 18 July 201417[
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17
[Torez footage of BUK system moving across the city
Torez footage of BUK system moving across the city]
5.1.13 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pz2XwDYkHsM - Kyopu
Osaka,(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCBsMma4O2N9cbjETTlU_7TQ), 17 July 2014
Annex 362
18[Russian terrorists transporting BUK Surface-to-Air Missile Systemfrom Torez to SnezhnoyeA video shot by witnesses of the transfer of BUK Surface-to-Air Missile System by pro-Kremlin terrorists (the so-called DPR) from Torez to Snezhnoye. One line of enquiry suggests that itwas used to down the Boeing 777 passenger plane flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.]5.1.14https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLNS8F-zBwU–Andryukha Larionov (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCVIAwv1avPnNZzRjV5hTwuw), 17 July 2014[Rebels' Buk system moving from Torez to Snezhnoye]5.1.15https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ri2zWEnM5jE–Hromadska InformatsiynnaMerezha (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCGXHw6EoJ_o2sL5aL-FM3GQ), 18 July 201419[
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19
[Pro-Russian rebels transporting Buk Surface-to-Air Missile System Snezhnoye town, Donetsk
Region. HD
The video shows the pro-Russian rebels transporting Buk Surface-to-Air Missile System from Torez
to Snezhnoye in Donetsk Region. On 17 July 2014, the pro-Russian rebels downed a Malaysian
Airlines Boeing-777 passenger aircraft near Torez in Donetsk Region. All passengers and aircraft
crew died. 295 people, including 85 children were killed by that atrocious terrorist attack. Debris of
the aircraft and parts of the bodies were scattered across several kilometers. The aircraft was flying
from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. It was shot at 10 000 m.]
5.2 Characteristics of the distinctly similar video materials found
Vid
eo
No.
Youtube
channel
Date of
publica
tion,
accordi
ng to
the data
shown
on the
page
with
the
video,
Numb
er of
video
contai
ners
found
Resolut
ion
corresp
onds to
the
widest
side of
the
video
Conta
iner
forma
t
Au
dio
Date
and
time of
uploadi
ng of
the
video
accordi
ng to
Amnes
ty
Interna
tion
(GMT)
Date
and
time of
coding
of the
video,
accordi
ng to
ffprob
(GMT)
Comme
nts
Codec
Copyrigh
t
(accordin
g to
ffprobe)
Num
ber
of
fram
es
Annex 362
201Bolodya Familyev(Болодя Фамильев)17.07.20141720mp4Yes-16.07.201416:42:05Container tag contains an error, actual date of publication is 17.07.201416:42:09(according toWebarchive)IsoMedia File Produced byGoogle, 5-11-20115292Brown Moses17.07.20143240mp4yes17.07.201418:41:1314.08.201720:21:30-IsoMedia File Produced byGoogle, 5-11-2011529360mp4yes14.08.201720:39:49-ISO Media file produced byGoogle Inc.529720mp4yesN/[email protected]:25:3625.02.201610:03:10-IsoMedia File Produced byGoogle, 5-11-2011529360mp4yes20.08.201601:17:51-ISO Media file produced byGoogle Inc.529480mp4No25.02.2016-Google5292110:
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21
10:03:
29
480 webm no N/a - - 577
720 mp4 no 25.02.2
01
10:04:
06
- - 529
720 webm no N/a - Google 581
720 webm yes N/a - Lavf56.4
0.101
577
1080 webm yes N/a The best
quality
copy of
the
video,
presuma
bly, the
original
video
Google 584
4 Alexander
Glasnarod
a
14.07.2
014
2 360 mp4 Yes 14.07.2
014
19:18:
43
14.03.2
018
17:32:
10
The
margins
are
cropped
as
compar
ed with
the
original
video
ISO
Media
file
produced
by
Google
Inc.
Created
on:
03/04/20
18.
1056
720 mp4 yes 14.03.2
018
17:32:
10
The
margins
are
cropped
as
compar
ed with
the
original
video
ISO
Media
file
produced
by
Google
Inc.
Created
on:
03/04/20
18.
1056
5 Mrachny
Molochni
k
14.07.2
014
2 360 mp4 yes 14.07.2
014
21:21:
20
25.08.2
016
05:26:
50
The
margins
are
cropped
as
compar
ISO
Media
file
produced
by
1054
Annex 362
22ed with the original videoGoogle Inc.720mp4Yes25.08.201605:26:50The margins are cropped ascompared with the original videoISO Media file produced byGoogle Inc.10546torezinfo14.07.20142360mp4Yes14.07.201418:45:2811.11.201901:39:09The margins are cropped ascompared with the original videoISO Media file produced byGoogle Inc. Created on: 11/10/2019.1056720mp4Yes11.11.201901:39:09The margins are cropped ascompared with the original videoISO Media file produced byGoogle Inc. Created on: 11/10/2019.10567Andrey Mipto (Андрей Мипто)22.11.20142360720mp4Yes22.11.201408.48.0621.11.201421:02:12The time tag of the container of the video is older than the time tag of the publication.IsoMedia File Produced byGoogle, 5-11-20111054mp4Yes21.11.201421:00:23IsoMediaFile Produced byGoogle, 105423The
Annex 362
23
The
margins
are
cropped
as
compar
ed with
the
original
video
5-11-
2011
8 DIVAN
ONLINE
(ДИВАН
ОНЛАЙ
Н)
18.07.2
014
2 360 mp4 Yes 18.07.2
014
08:10:
54
26.01.2
020
10:52:
38
The
margins
are
cropped
as
compar
ed with
the
original
video,
also the
video
has
been
rotated
horizont
ally
ISO
Media
file
produced
by
Google
Inc.
Created
on:
01/26/20
20.
1060
480 mp4 Yes 26.01.2
020
11:10:0
7
The
margins
are
cropped
as
compar
ed with
the
original
video,
also the
video
has
been
rotated
horizont
ally
ISO
Media
file
produced
by
Google
Inc.
1060
9 Dimitri
Palagniou
k
17.07.2
014
2 360 mp4 Yes 17.07.2
014
22:51:
47
14.08.2
016
22:01:
35
The
margins
are
cropped
as
ISO
Media
file
produced
by
1174
Annex 362
24compared with the original videoand text has been addedGoogle Inc720mp4Yes14.08.201622:01:35The margins are cropped ascompared with the original videoand text has been added.ISO Media file produced byGoogle Inc.117410Dyadya Petya (Дядя Петя)17.07.20142240mp4Yes17.07.201418:01:4327.01.201414:12:35The earliest video preservedISO Media file produced byGoogle Inc. Created on: 01/27/2020.529360mp4Yes27.01.201414:12:35ISO Media file produced byGoogle Inc. Created on: 01/27/2020.52911Georgy Semenets 18.07.20142360mp4Yes18.07.201421.07.2014The margins are IsoMedia File Produced 105425(
Annex 362
25
(Георгий
Семенец)
09:19:
58
09:32:
58
cropped
as
compar
ed with
the
original
video
by
Google,
5-11-
2011
720 mp4 Yes 07.03.2
018
02:16:
12
The
margins
are
cropped
as
compar
ed with
the
original
video
ISO
Media
file
produced
by
Google
Inc.
Created
on:
03/06/20
18.
1055
12 alina bar 18.07.2
014
1 360 mp4 Yes 18.07.2
014
08:45:
22
17.07.2
014
08:47:
15
The
time tag
of the
containe
r of the
video is
older
than the
time tag
of the
publicat
ion.
The
margins
are
cropped
as
compar
ed with
the
original
video
IsoMedia
File
Produced
by
Google,
5-11-
2011
1055
13 Kyopu
Osak
17.07.2
014
2 360 mp4 Yes 17.07.2
014
21:12:
35
16.07.2
014
21:10:
08
The
time tag
of the
containe
r of the
video is
older
than the
time tag
IsoMedia
File
Produced
by
Google,
5-11-
2011
1056
Annex 362
26of the publication.The margins are cropped ascompared with theoriginal video720mp4Yes14.08.201607:05:14ISO Media file produced byGoogle Inc.105614AndryukhaLarionov (Андрюха Ларионов)17.07.20142360mp4Yes18.07.201402:03:0821.07.201409:32:58The margins are cropped ascompared with the original videoIsoMedia File Produced byGoogle, 5-11-20111054720mp4Yes07.03.201802:16:12The margins are cropped ascompared with the original videoISO Media file produced byGoogle Inc. Created on: 03/06/2018.105515HromadskaInformatsiyna18.07.20142360mp4Yes18.07.201417:20:4017.07.201402:02:45The margins are cropped ascompared with IsoMedia File Produced byGoogle, 5-11-2011105627(
Annex 362
27
(Громадс
ька
Інформац
ійна)
the
original
video
720 mp4 Yes 17.07.2
014
02:02:
59
The
margins
are
cropped
as
compar
ed with
the
original
video
IsoMedia
File
Produced
by
Google,
5-11-
2011
1056
5.4 Summary
1. As at the date of this report, the earliest video preserved dated 16 July 2014 16:42:05 was found
as a result of online analysis. The video was published on “Bolodya Familyev” channel. The link
to the said video was subsequently saved with the Webarchive tool. The best quality version of
the said video (with the highest resolution) was found on Ukraine@War channel and published
on 14 July 2015 18:25:36, almost one year after the date of the first online publication of the said
video material.
2. Further, it should be noted that despite the apparent resemblance of all the videos found, there
are several versions thereof that differ in respect of the following characteristics:
• image orientation (landscape/portrait);
• number of frames;
• duration of the video;
• resolution (quality);
• date of coding;
• date of uploading.
3. In our view, the differences detected by us appear to be quite strange, which raises doubts as to
whether such filming really took place.
The strangest thing is that the coding date of the earliest video is 16 July 2014, whilst the page
saved in Webarchive indices tells us that the video was uploaded on Youtube on 17 July 2014. It
would be more correct to assume that the date of video uploading to Youtube is the date set out in
the mp4 meta-data at the time of its coding. No bug reports in Youtube systems have been found
Annex 362
28as a result of online search for such information.We have found a potential explanation of the discrepancy between the dates published on Bellingcat.com.Having analyzed Bellingcat’sexplanations of the error in the Youtube algorithm, we findthemto be unconvincingfor the following reasons:•The Bellingcatarticle states that there is an error in the implementation of standard ISO/IEC14496-5 libraries,which results in the difference of 86,400 seconds (or one day) between the date of uploading and the date of coding. This statement is not accurate, since we foundvideo files uploaded at different times and having differentdates and dates of coding, such difference being more than 86,400 seconds,items Nos. 14, 15, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 3.•The Bellingcat publication claims that Google recoded all videos after the error (bug) had been discovered in 2019. This statement is also inaccurate because there are many videos with the coding date earlier than 2019, items Nos.15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 7, 5, 4, 3, 2. •Within the framework of preparation of this report,we raised the questionas to whether the difference between the above dates is normal practice before other experts in the relevant fields who were not aware ofBellingcat’s publication and explanations. These experts also noted the fluctuatingdifference in the timingof all copies of the video found, which they consider to be very unusual and rather strange.•It is also worth noting that the Bellingcatpublication contains a screenshot allegedly provingthat oneChristo Grozev (one of Bellingcat authors) had a video recording with approximately the same date asthat of the original video from Bolodya Familyev channel. In support of this fact, Bellingcatrelyonthe time set out in item 1 of image A (the field that can be manually adjustedat any time if the person carrying out such a manipulation with the data so desires), even though Youtube only gives the actual date of the publication in item 2 of Image A, which shows that Bellingcat are tryingto persuade their readers that the said piece of evidence is authentic. To actually find out the date and time of uploading of the video, one has to use the Youtube Video Manager tool in item 3 of Image A. The actual view of Youtube Video Manager with the publication date is shown on Image B.
Annex 362
29
Image А – Screenshot from Bellingcat publication showing the exact date and time of the publication.
Image B – Screenshot of the classic Youtube Video Manager (in 2020, Youtube switched to a new
Youtube Studio tool, which has completely replaced the Video Manager).
4. The highest quality (resolution) video is the material published by Ukraine@war channel.
It should be noted that the said video was published one year after the publication of the first videos,
which confirms that the representatives of the said channel must have the original copy, assuming the
original copy has existed at all.
Annex 362
306 Domainanalysis of the digital video The webm file downloaded from Ukraine@War with the characteristicsset out below was taken as the main video material analyzed:Metadata:encoder : googleDuration: 00:00:35.20, start: 0.000000, bitrate: 4077 kb/sStream #0:0(eng): Video: vp9 (Profile 0), yuv420p(tv), 1088x1920, SAR 1:1 DAR 17:30, 15 fps, 15 tbr, 1k tbn, 1k tbc (default)The analysis of the video was carried out in relation to the following items: ItemNameComments6.1Uneven and artificial blurringBlurring is usedin digital manipulation of the video to create theeffect of naturalness of what is happening in the frame. Currently, there is a wide range of tools available to create such an effect and the signs of blurring can include the following:•tilt varies from frame to frame;•varying intensity;•intensity profile varies from frame to frame (one frame has more and another one has less blurring and the combinations can vary);6.2Areas of the objects studied where the contrast does not matchIn case of apaste-in(superimposition of the layer with the object from another video) the contrast and histogram of such object do not always match6.3Areas of items studied where shadows do not match In case of a paste-in (superimposition of the layer with the object from another video) the shadows, their direction and intensity do not always match those of the objects from the original video.6.4Signs of additional superimposed layers (image decomposition) In case of a paste-in (superimposition of the layer with the object from another video),there may be compression artefacts from another source. Compression algorithms used in the digital video have their unique digital fingerprint which does not correspond with the fingerprint pattern from another digital video.6.5Differences between objects in various versions of the videoIn digital manipulation, there may beerrors that erase objects from or add minor objects to the digital video.
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31
6.1 Checking for uneven artificial blurring
The following frames with the blurring were found in the digital video under study and in many other
similar videos:
• 01:06 (second 1 frame 6) — 01:14 (second 1 frame 14) — duration 8 frames (Image 1).
• 13:00 (second 13 frame 0) – 13:08 (second 13 frame 8) – duration 8 frames (Image 2).
Both of these fragments are blurs with a duration of 8 frames but with a different blurring profile. In
Image 1, you can clearly see the blurring in the left part of the fragment. Image 1.1. illustrates the
blurring gradient, with the maximum blurring shown in white and absence of blurring shown in black,
which could have been superimposed to create the blur effect.
Annex 362
32Image1.–fragment of the digital video with the blur in the left part.
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33
Image 1.1 - the white colour shows the maximum blur whilst the black colour shows the absence of
blurring.
Annex 362
34Image2.–fragment of the video where the blur is used for the entire frame356.2
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35
6.2 Checking for areas of the objects under study where the contrast does not match
Image 3а – a fragment of the digital video where the area with the same depth is highlighted (frame
No. 1)
Image 3b – Presumed location of “Buk” Surface-to-Air-Missile System in the frame shown on
Image 3a.
Annex 362
36Image 3c–Comparison of objects in the frame with the potential place of movement of “Buk”Surface-to-Air-Missile Systemshown on Image 3b. The object in question is a vehicle presumably identified as a “Buk”Surface-to-Air-Missile Systemand it is clearthat the contrast in the highlighted area on Image 3 is even. In other words, the transition from the darkest to the lightestarea is quite even and there ishigh contrast between the lit and shadowed areas. The highlighted area is located atthe same depthas confirmed by the presumed place of movement of “Buk”Surface-to-Air-Missile Systemand the surrounding objects shown on Images 3b and 3c.The “Buk”object in the said fragment looks unnatural,since the transitions between the shadowed areas on the rear side of “Buk”are rather light-colouredin comparisonwith the building located at the same depth that hasa completely different histogram profile.
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37
Images 4а and 4b – the image of “Buk” and the image of the Building in the same light conditions
and at the same depth
Image 5a – histogram of “Buk”
Image 5b – histogram of the building
It is clear from the illustration (Images 4a and 4b) that the image of the building has a lot more contrast
(a larger dynamic range) than the image of “Buk”, which is confirmed by the histograms of the said
objects on Images 5a and 5b accordingly. The histogram of the building has a much larger range of
contrast and brightness than the “Buk” histogram. These discrepancies with high probability indicate
that the “Buk” video was layered on a base (premade background).
Annex 362
386.3Checking for areas of objects under study where theshadowsdo not matchIn the submittedvideo fragmentthere are electric poles alongthe trajectoryof movement of objects (the automobileand “Buk”)as well as trees along the road in the direction of movement of the automobile and “Buk”. The sunlight in the upper right part (as evidenced by the shadows from the trees) is characteristic of this video.However, the domain analysis of the video in question revealed some major discrepancies between the shadows cast by the objects in the video. In particular:•the shadows from homogenousobjects have varying intensity;•the shadows that the poles on the right-hand side ofthe road should cast are missing (Image 6);•there are noshadows from the poles on the side of “Buk” missile system when it passes by these poles (Image 6a).Image6–the shadows from the poles are missing from the frame. The areas in question are highlighted with question marks.All discrepancies found with high probability indicate thatthe videowas subject to deliberate manipulations. These signs look unusual andstrange.
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39
Image 6а – the shadows from the poles in the frame are missing, the profile of the shadows should
have been visible both on the hull-side and on the ground.
6.4 Checking for traces of additional layers superimposed (decomposition of the image)
The artefacts that may indicate the places of paste-ins and superimposition of layers that are not
authentic to the background were found in the video in question. The characteristic signs that indicate
digital manipulations include:
• perfectly straight lines of the shadows on the road that end exactly where the video recording is
cut off. – Image 10.
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40Image7–frame 194of the video fragment with the typical blur on the left-hand side of “Buk”. Image8–frame 276of the video fragment with the typical blur on the left-hand side of “Buk”.Image9–frame 428with the typical blur on the left-hand side of “Buk”.
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41
Image 10 – frame 428 with the potential place of paste-in of layers.
Further, the following characteristics indicating the lack of authenticity of this video material have
been revealed:
- the video ends exactly where “Buk” was to almost completely turn around and face the camera
(Image 11)
Image 11 – the last frame 527 in which “Buk” is moving towards the visible line (that we marked
with red arrows) where it is to make an almost full turn for its rear to face the camera.
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426.6Unnatural disappearance of objects from frame to frame The following discrepancies have been found in the versions of the video materials under study: in the end of the original version of the video(item 1 Bolodya Familyev) there are objects (birds) which are missing from the video material (item 2 BrownMoses), Image 12a and Image 12b.Image12а-Frame523fromthe original video (item 1Bolodya Familyev)–where the bird is highlightedImage12b-Frame523from video item 2 BrownMoses–where there the same spot has no bird
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43
Image 13а - Frame 527 from the original video (item 1 Bolodya Familyev) – where the birds are
highlighted
Image 13b - Frame 527 from the video item 2 Brown Moses – where the birds are highlighted and
the place where there is no bird is marked with a red circle.
These facts look strange. We carry on the verification of the said facts and our research of the video
materials and will further advise when any new artefacts are found.
7. Conclusions
Item Name Assessment
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447.1Uneven and artificial blurring There are characteristic signs, which suggest with high probabilitythatthe video isfake.7.2Areas of objects under study where the contrast does not matchThere are characteristic signs, which suggest with high probabilitythat the video isfake.7.3Areas of objects under study where shadows do not match There are characteristic signs, which suggest with high probabilitythat the video isfake.7.4Signs of superimposition of additional layers (decomposition of the image)There are characteristic signs, which suggest with high probabilitythat the video isfake.7.5Differences between the objects in various versions of the videoThere are characteristic signs, which suggest with high probabilitythat the video isfake.
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45
Declaration of the experts
The group of experts confirms that all matters in relation to which their opinion is expressed
are within their competence and expertise.
The experts confirm that the information and conclusions set out in this expert report are
unbiased, objective and impartial and that these were not influenced by the judicial proceedings or
any party thereto.
7 December 2020

Annex 363
The Dutch Public Prosecution Service, Opening statement and context of the investigation
(8 June 2020)

Annex 363
Opening statement and context of the investigation
Over the next few days the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service will be presenting the
investigation that has been carried out over the past years. The purpose of this explanation is to
enable the court to decide whether or not the investigation has been completed and whether the
case is now ready to be heard. In order to answer that question, the court file is decisive, but a
presentation – including a clarification of that court file - from the Public Prosecution Service
can be helpful. Moreover, such a public explanation is the way in which the Public Prosecution
Service publicly render an account with respect to the investigation so far and the decisions we
took in the course of the investigation.
This is a summary of the speaking notes of the prosecutor. The full presentation can be watched
in the video.
Video Player
We would like to make clear the goal of this explanation is explicitly not to provide an overview
of the available evidence in this case. Furthermore, we shall not draw any conclusions on what
can or cannot be proven. A public overview of the evidence can only be made when the defence
has been given the opportunity to supplement the court file and when the court is ready for the
substantive hearings. Our explanation will, however, provide an insight in the various types of
evidence that have been collected in the investigation. Furthermore, we will address why the
Public Prosecution Service believes that several parts of the investigation have been completed.
In doing so, we refer to findings that have been made publicly by the JIT in the past and which
have been addressed at the previous hearings on 9 and 10 March 2020.
We fully realize that the next of kin and other interested parties have been waiting for a long
time and are eager to learn the findings of the investigation, what conclusions can be drawn and
who is responsible. At this point these questions will not be answered because this criminal trial
should be done in an accurate and precise way. The Public Prosecution Service may however
provide limited information which is needed to address the public call for clarity. This has been
similarly done by the JIT in the past. However, a full and comprehensive overview of the
relevant evidence will only be presented during the substantive court hearing later in this trial.
Today and over the next few days we will provide an explanation on the course of the
investigation. We will start with an outline of the situation in the area where MH17 has crashed
and the parties involved in that situation. This will be followed by a clarification on the
investigation of the various types of evidential sources:
• forensic evidence
• telecommunication
• witnesses
• photographs and videos
• digital sources
• radar data
• satellite images
After this we will explain how, on the basis of these types of evidence, the investigation into the
cause of the crash of MH17 has been conducted. In doing so, several scenarios have been
investigated:
• an explosion from within the aircraft;
• an attack by a fighter jet;
Opening statement and context of the investigation https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...
Стр. 1 из 2 07.03.2023, 16:28
Annex 363
• the use of ground-to-air missile other than a Buk-missile; and• the use of a Buk-missileWith regard to the final scenario we have investigated several possible launch locations. We havealso investigated both Ukrainian and Russian Buk-systems. The research done with respect tothese different scenarios will be presented in the following days.Subsequently we will explain what has been done to provide insight into the operation of theBuk-system. Afterwards we will discuss what has been done regarding the investigation of thesuspects. In this respect, we will explain what has been done to distinguish the individual rolesthe suspects may or may not have had in the commission of the alleged offences. We will thendescribe what has been done to answer the question whether any legal obstacles exist toprosecute them. In the meantime we will explain why we believe that separate parts of theinvestigation have been completed. Finally we will go into the question which furtherinvestigation should be done.Opening statement and context of the investigationhttps://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/prosecuti...Стр. 2 из 207.03.2023, 16:28
Annex 364 OG IT Forensic Services, International Platform Global Right Of Peaceful People, Report, 3 March 2020

Annex 364
INTERNATIONAL PLATFORM
GLOBAL RIGHT OF PEACEFUL PEOPLE
MH17
3rd March 2020
Conway Hall, London
Confidential OG IT Forensic Services 1
www.ogitforensics.com
An Independent Digital Forensic Investigative
Annex 364
DISCLAIMERTheinformationandcontentsofthisdocumentisconfidential.ItisintendedsolelyfortheuseofBonanzaMediaanditsappointedsolicitorandappointedotherprofessionals.Saveandexcepttheforgoinganyphotocopy/extraction/imagingwithoutthepermissionofOGITForensicServicesisstrictlyprohibited.OGITForensicServicesmakesnorepresentationorwarrantieswiththerespecttothecontentsoruseofthisdocument,andspecificallydisclaimsanyexpressorimpliedwarrantiesorusefulnessforanyparticularpurposeofthispublication.OGITForensicServicesreservetherighttochangeorrevisethisdocument,atanytime.IconfirmthecorrectnessofmyexpertreportandunderstandthatingivingmyreportmyoverridingdutyistothecourtandthatIhavecompliedwiththatduty.Confidential OG IT Forensic Services2
Annex 364
DIGITAL AUDIO ACCEPTANCE AS DIGITAL EVIDENCEAny digital audio submission as digital evidence to court of law can only be accepted with below requirement;i. The source of origin media where the digital audio was recorded (Authenticity)ii. The source of origin where digital audio was stored (storage of media) (Authenticity)iii. The audio recording metadata (Details of when audio was recorded) (Authenticity)iv. The acquisition of the audio must be done from the media / storage of the media (Must be preserved)v. The part of audio track can be extracted but it has to be clearly showing the source of origin media, storage and audio details.Confidential OG IT Forensic Services3ISO/IEC 27037.. Digital Forensics standards for good practice methods and processes for forensic capture and investigation of digital evidence.
Annex 364
CAN THE PART OF AUDIO TRACK EXPORTED FROM VIDEO?The part of audio track can be extracted from video’s audio stream. The audio stream does maintain the sound waves, spectrogram and the noise floor which can be used to analyse for tampering. This is regardless what codec has been converted.A spectrogram is a visual representation of the spectrum of frequencies of a signal as it varies with time. When applied to an audio signal, spectrograms/waveform are sometimes called sonographs, voiceprints, or voicegramsIt is important to have the source of origin media, storage and audio details as verification of the audio tracks.“The Video -SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash” (source from uploaded YouTube videos) analysis was focused more on the audio streams as the audio aired in the video was the intercepted recorded audio conversations. Confidential OG IT Forensic Services4SpectogramNoise Floor
Annex 364
VIDEO FILES: VIDEO & AUDIO STREAMInput #0, mov,mp4,m4a,3gp,3g2,mj2, from 'SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4':Duration: 00:02:23.77, start: 0.000000, bitrate: 190 kb/sStream #0.0(und): Video: h264, yuv420p, 480x360, 25 tbr, 25 tbn, 50 tbcStream #0.1(und): Audio: aac, 44100 Hz, stereo, s16 For the audio analysis, the audio stream -Stream #0.1(und): Audio: aac, 44100 Hz, stereo, s16 was taken for analysis into the forensic tool.The audio channel is stereo, 44Khz and the audio code is AAC (Advance Audios Coding). Confidential OG IT Forensic Services50.00.1Any Video FilesContainer
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WHERE IS THE SOURCE OF THE AUDIO TRACK COMING FROM ?It is intercepted by some agencies….This is using special audio interception devices by agencies..There are special device used to intercept live phone calls or any radio transmission.Agencies may have the vast intercept in the air where all the signal can be captured.From my view on these intercepted audio track, I am seeing may background noise of people talking… So this clearly showing that these intercept calls were recorded, stored in a storage and then the specific audio track were filtered with special filtration. The filtration can capture the specific speaker, but it does leave some overlapping voices.. So, the reporting of how the source of audio track was obtain must be shown/documented & presented.Confidential OG IT Forensic Services6
Annex 364
AGENCY BASE AUDIO RECORDINGThe audio recording format may be difference from difference source of intercepting and recording media.. .raw, . mov, .mp4, other formats.. Law enforcement agencies does intercepts calls , so they have many recordings storedSo with many source of audio files, it can be merged & edited and then share/upload into YouTube … In this case of the Video, we see Text Transcription in the video, no voice over the intercepted audio tracks was seen. This makes the audio tracks can be used for tampering analysis.Facts:Exporting files does not change the content, as it compresses the audioExporting files does not change the spectrum, noise floor, etc.. It can be used for analysis.Confidential OG IT Forensic Services7
Annex 364
USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA –YOU TUBEYouTube is a Great platform of Video Sharing -but fact check, and video genuine must be validated.i.Audio Stream of SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014-https://youtu.be/MVAOTWPmMM4Confidential OG IT Forensic Services8
Annex 364
VIDEO PROPERTIES Confidential OG IT Forensic Services9Detail/Videos LabelVideo 1Source Video NameSSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014Source Video URLhttps://youtu.be/MVAOTWPmMM4Uploaded ByСлужба безпеки України (Verified Youtube Channel of Security Service of Ukraine)Date Published18th Jul 2014 -Shown in YouTube Channel URL: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCRxyjhmvBewJIRb2yku5EuQOriginal Type FormatWeBM -audiovisual media file formatMain URL Cloudwww.youtube.comDownloaded File Namey2mate.com -ssu_boeing_777_plane_crash_buk_m1_17072014_MVAOTWPmMM4_360p.mp4Checksum MD5E8C01B5E991832332C5623AF98E0BE4B
Annex 364
SSU, "BOEING-777" PLANE CRASH, "BUK-M1", 17.07.2014 PUBLISHED 18/7/2014 ID is verified Genuine Confidential OG IT Forensic Services10
Annex 364
THE VIDEO PROPERTIES LAST MODIFIED 9THNOV 2018Confidential OG IT Forensic Services11
Annex 364
LAST MODIFIED METADATA ..Confidential OG IT Forensic Services12
Annex 364
~ 6 DIFFERENT AUDIO TRACKS ADDED1234567Confidential OG IT Forensic Services13Duration: 5:58.095Sample Rate: 44100kHzChannels: StereoBit-Depth 32 bit
Annex 364
VIDEO 1-AUDIO TRACKSConfidential OG IT Forensic Services14NoAudio Stream NameTracksFromToDurationSpeakers1SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014Track A0:00.020:42.90:42.7News AnchorTrack 10:46.60:59.450:12.8Oleg and Oreon -MilitantsTrack B1:00.41:27.60:27.2News AnchorTrack 21:34.852:07.900:33.5Khmuryi and Buryat -MilitantsTrack 32:12.152:40.650:28.5Khmuryi and Buryat -MilitantsTrack 42:45.383:04.100:19.2Khmuryi and Sanych -MilitantsTrack 53:08.953:53.50:45.4Khmuryi and DNR -MilitantsTrack C3:53.794:15.800:12News AnchorTrack 64:20.455:25.081:05Khmuryi and Botsman -Militants
Annex 364
AUDIO STREAM IN THE VIDEO: SIX AUDIO TRACKS WERE ADDED Confidential OG IT Forensic Services15123456-No original source of the audio tracks!-Parts of audio which had been filtered!
Annex 364
VIDEO1 –6 AUDIO TRACKSDETAILSConfidential OG IT Forensic Services16Using the spectral formant –the source wave The channel -mono or stereoAudioStart EndDurationSpeakersi. Track 100:46.600:59.5~00:12.8Oleg and Oreon -MilitantsShown: Jul 14, 2014 19:12ii. Track 201:34.902:07.9~00:33.5Khmuryi and Buryat -MilitantsShown: Date: 14.07.2014 09:08iii. Track 302:12.202:40.7~00:28.5Khmuryi and Buryat -MilitantsShown: July 17, 2014 09:22iv. Track 402:45.403:04.1~00:19.2Khmuryi and Sanych-MilitantsShown: July 17, 2014 09:23v. Track 503:08.903:53.5~00:45.4Khmuryiand DNR -MilitantsShown: July 17, 2014 09:54vi.Track604:20.405:25.1~1:05Khmuryiand Botsman-MilitantsShown: July 17, 2014 9:08
Annex 364
VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK1 -SPECTROGRAM Confidential OG IT Forensic Services17
Annex 364
Confidential OG IT Forensic Services18VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK2
Annex 364
Confidential OG IT Forensic Services19VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK3
Annex 364
Confidential OG IT Forensic Services20VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK4
Annex 364
Confidential OG IT Forensic Services21VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK5
Annex 364
Confidential OG IT Forensic Services22VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK6
Annex 364
FINDINGS –TAMPERING DETECTED Confidential OG IT Forensic Services23NoVideo NameTracksTime Frame -TamperedFindings1SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014 (Analysis In Progress)Track 10.51.475 & 0.55.33i. Suspicious merging seen, analysis in progressTrack 22.07.756ii. Cut audio, analysis in progressTrack 3-02:15-02:21i. Different Left and Right channel audioii Spectral Analysis shows the edits of cut and overlaying seen at the minute 02:15iii. Spectral Analysis shows voice over lapping and cut seen at the minute 2:21:0Track 4NASuspicious merging at 2:50.2 –2:52.2Track 5NASuspicious, analysis in progressTrack 6-04:34.8 -04:35.0-04:35.2 -04:36.0-05:19.0 -05:20.0i. Voice was cut down at minute 4:34.8 –4:35.0ii. Voice overlapping is clearly seen between time frame 4:35.2 –4:36.0iii. Voice overlapping is clearly seen at time frame 5:19.0 –5:20.0All audio recordings was taken from multiple sources, no metadata of the audio.. It can be coming from multiple sources. It is basically not genuine.
Annex 364
~7 DIFFERENCE SOURCE OF TRACKS WERE ADDED Confidential OG IT Forensic Services24123456-No original source of the audio tracks!-Parts of audio which had been filtered!ba
Annex 364
FACTS:The audio tracks in the video are in tact –meaning it can be used to identify of the audio was tampered!Using the spectral formant –the source wave for analysis The noise floor for any abnormalityThe channel -mono or stereoIt is showing 8kHz audio, it is telephone or conference call conversation recording normally.Confidential OG IT Forensic Services25
Annex 364
VIDEO1-TRACK1-SUSPICIOUS OVERLAYConfidential OG IT Forensic Services26
Annex 364
VIDEO 1 –TRACK 2 .. CONVERSATION CUT.!!Confidential OG IT Forensic Services27
Annex 364
VIDEO1-TRACK3-TAMPERED –DIFFERENT NOISE FLOOR –2 DIFFERENCE LEFT AND RIGHT CHANNELConfidential OG IT Forensic Services28
Annex 364
VIDEO1 -TRACK3-VOICE OVERLAYConfidential OG IT Forensic Services29
Annex 364
VIDEO1 –TRACK4-SUSPICIOUS MERGINGConfidential OG IT Forensic Services302:50.2 -2:52.2 –Merging sign seen
Annex 364
VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK 6 –CUT AND MERGE SEENConfidential OG IT Forensic Services31
Annex 364
VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK 6 –SUSPICIOUS OVERLAPPINGConfidential OG IT Forensic Services32
Annex 364
VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK 6-SUSPICIOUS OVERLAPPING (DISTROTION) HEARDConfidential OG IT Forensic Services33
Annex 364
FACTS: THE FINDINGS OF AUDIO TAMPERINGBy default, if no source of recording provided and no source origin details, it is a suspicious / bogus conversation …. Until at least the source is provided.Confidential OG IT Forensic Services34
Annex 364
SUMMARYThe audio track is still not genuine as audio tracks were seen tampered (merge, difference noise floor, cut, overlay of audios) , multiple source seen.The Source of Audio track has no authenticity and it is clear showing multiple editing.Export audio just need to mention the raw audio file-The source of recording-The date and time-Chain of Custody-The interception process (high level)Confidential OG IT Forensic Services35~ END~

Annex 365 CBC News, Malaysia Airlines MH17: Michael Bociurkiw talks about being first at the crash site (29 July 2014)

Annex 365
'We've seen horrific things': Canadian MH17 crash
site monitor describes grisly scene | CBC News
CBC News · Posted: Jul 29, 2014 12:13 AM EDT | Last Updated: July 30, 2014
World·Video
Malaysia Airlines MH17: Michael Bociurkiw talks about being first at
the crash site
Ukrainian-Canadian OSCE monitor Michael Bociurkiw talks to CBC News about his emotional
experiences at the grisly crash site of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine.
Michael Bociurkiw was among the very first people to reach the
Malaysian jet's wreckage
OSCE monitor on MH17 disaster
'I don't think there's ever been a crash like this,' says Michael Bociurkiw. 'And it's just something
that will always stay with us.'
A personal handwritten note penned by a passenger reminding themselves to stay on budget
during their vacation. Scientific literature belonging to a passenger en route to a major
international AIDS conference in Australia.
Fighting intensifies near MH17 crash site in eastern Ukraine
'We've seen horrific things': Canadian MH17 crash site monitor descri... https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/malaysia-airlines-mh17-michael-boci...
Стр. 1 из 2 07.03.2023, 14:27
Annex 365
Data recovered from MH17's cockpit voice recorderThese are just a few of the things that Michael Bociurkiw, a Ukrainian-Canadian monitor with theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has seen up close at the crash site ofMalaysia Airlines Flight MH17.Bociurkiw and one other colleague were the first international monitors to reach the wreckageafter the jet was shot down over a rebel-held region of eastern Ukraine July 17. With no other oversight on scene, the two men became the de facto eyes and ears of all those whowatched in horror from around the world. More than ten days later, he's still one of a select groupof individuals who has been to crash site almost daily."Under the hot sun, we've seen horrific things," he told CBC's Susan Ormiston in an emotionalinterview Monday. "Things that we'll never talk about to anyone else.""One of the things that's powered us through this is is knowing that we are doing it for the families.In a conflict zone – where there's no security, where anything could happen – anything we can doto provide some semblance of order and process ... that was really important tous," Bociurkiw said.Although he's only been on the job with the OSCE for three months, Bociurkiw has beenunexpectedly thrust into an international crisis that has no satisfying conclusion within sight. Watch the video above for more of CBC's in-depth interview with Bociurkiw from Ukraine. 'We've seen horrific things': Canadian MH17 crash site monitor descri...https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/malaysia-airlines-mh17-michael-boci...Стр. 2 из 207.03.2023, 14:27
Annex 366 ABC News, IMAGE: MH17 crash site, Ukrainian State Emergency Service employees search for bodies amongst the wreckageofMalaysia Airlines Flight MH17(21 July 2014)

Annex 366
07.03.2023, 14:33 MH17 crash site - ABC News
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-21/ukrainian-state-emergency-service-mh17-wreckage/5612412?nw=0 1/1
IMAGE: MH17 crash site
AFP: Bulent Kilic
Posted Mon 21 Jul 2014 at 10:01am
Ukrainian State Emergency Service employees search for bodies amongst the wreckage
of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. (AFP: Bulent Kilic)

Annex 367
Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR), Presentation “Damage Investigation MH17”

Annex 367
Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR), Presentation “Damage Investigation MH17”, p.21

Annex 368
Getty images, Image “Ukraine Russia crisis Malaysia aviation crash” (25 July 2014)

Annex 368
07.03.2023, 14:55 A picture shows a piece of debris of the fuselage at the crash site... News Photo - Getty Images
https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/picture-shows-a-piece-of-debris-of-the-fuselage-at-the-news-photo/452667890 1/2
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A picture shows a piece of debris of the fuselage at the crash site of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 near the
village of Hrabove (Grabovo), some 80km east of Donetsk, on July 25, 2014. Ukraine sought on July 25 to avoid
a political crisis after the shock resignation of its prime minister, as 􀃘ghting between the army and rebels close
to the Malaysian airliner crash site claimed over a dozen more lives. The Netherlands and Australia, the two
countries that lost the most citizens when the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 was shot down, are seeking a
mandate to deploy troops on the ground, possibly through a United Nations Security Council resolution. AFP
PHOTO/ BULENT KILIC (Photo by Bulent KILIC / AFP) (Photo by BULENT KILIC/AFP via Getty Images)
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Annex 369
Witness Statement of Mikhail Vadimovich Malyshevskiy
(translation)

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Annex 370
Documents Regarding BUK Missile Delivered to Ukraine in the 1980s
(translation)
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of the Title Page of Folder No. 1 of Technical Documentation for Item No. 8868720 Part IICounterpart No. FOLDER No. 1TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATIONFOR ITEM No. 8868720 Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of the List of Technical Documentation for Item No. 8868720
LIST
of
Technical Documentation for the Item
9M38 8868720 (purchased items)
Ser.
No.
DOCUMENT NAME Item No. Quantity of
documents
Note
[…]
4. Summary list of component parts and a
further assembly certification for the item
8868720 1
[…]
Filled in by [к/д] of Shop 130: /Signature/ Trubina 25 December 1986
(family name, signature, date)
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of the Title Page of the Summary List of Component Parts and a Further Assembly
Certification for the Item 9M38, Serial Number 8868720
Summary List
of Component Parts and a Further Assembly
Certification for the Item 9M38
Serial Number 8868720
Total pages 9
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of Page 7 of the Summary List of Component Parts and a Further Assembly
Certification for the Item 9M38, Serial Number 8868720
5. List of Component Parts for the Further Assembly of Item No. 8868720
Ser.
No.
Name Index or drafting
number
M
Position Number Date of issue Summary
certificate
number
Note
[…]
3. Section 3 9D 131.00000 - 8869032 24 December
1986
same
Copy of Page 7 of the Summary List of Component Parts and a Further Assembly
Certification for the Item 9M38, Serial Number 8868720
5. List of Component Parts for the Further Assembly of Item No. 8868720
Ser.
No.
Name Index or drafting
number
M
Position Number Date of issue Summary
certificate
number
Note
[…]
3. Section 3 9D 131.00000 - 8869032 24 December
same
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of the Title Page of Folder No. 2 of Technical Documentation for Item No. 8868720
Counterpart No.
FOLDER No. 2
TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION
FOR ITEM No. 8868720
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of the List of Technical Documentation for the Item 9M38 No. 8868720
FOLDER No. 2
Shop 130
LIST No.
of
Technical Documentation for the Item
9M38 No. 8868720
Ser.
No.
DOCUMENT NAME Item No. Quantity of
documents
Note
[…]
4. Certificate for Unit 9D131.05.000 830113 1
5. Logbook for Unit 9D131 8869032
Filled in by [к/д] of Shop 130: /Signature/ KANUNNIKOVA 24 December 1986
(family name, signature, date)
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of the Title Page of Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the Item 9D 131
Manufacturing Number 8869032
Item 9D131
LOGBOOK
9D131.00.000 FO
Item 9D131
Manufacturing number 8869032
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of Page 4 of Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the Item 9D 131
Manufacturing Number 8869032
2. COMPONENT PARTS OF THE ITEM 9D131 Manufacturing number: 8869032
Line
number
Reference Name Quantity Manufacturing
number / note
[…]
4. 9D131.05.000 Block S 1 No. 830113
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of Page 5 of Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the Item 9D 131
Manufacturing Number 8869032
3. ITEM 9D131 ASSEMBLY CERTIFICATE
The enterprise (PO Box A-7144) assembled the item 9D131, manufacturing number
8869032, as per the drawing requirements (9D131.00.000 SB) and technical specifications
(9D131.00.000 TU).
24 December 1986
(date)
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of Page 6 of Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the Item 9D 131
Manufacturing Number 8869032
4. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE FINAL ASSEMBLY OF THE ITEM 9D131
The item 9D131, manufacturing number 8869032, underwent the final assembly as part of
the item 9M38, No. 8868720, as per the drawing requirements (9D131.00.000 SB, 9M38.000.0000
SB) and technical specifications (9D131.00.000 TU), the final assembly instruction
(9M38.0000000 DZZ).
After Block S (9D131.05.000) was underwent the final installation, the item 9D131 was
tested for leakage.
24 December 1986
(date)
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of Page 7 of Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the Item 9D 131
Manufacturing Number 8869032
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of the Title Page of the Certificate for Block S 9D131.05.000 No. 830113
of the List of Component Parts and a Further Assembly Certification for the Item 9M38,
Serial Number 8868720
CERTIFICATE
for
Block S 9D131.05.000
in 830113
Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Copy of the Title Page of the Accepted Product Record Book for the Item 9М381721701HIGHLY CLASSIFIEDACCEPTED PRODUCT RECORD BOOK FOR THE ITEM 9М38START DATE:END DATE:TranslationCopy of the Title Page of the Accepted Product Record Book for the Item 9М381721701HIGHLY CLASSIFIEDACCEPTED PRODUCT RECORD BOOK FOR THE ITEM 9М38START DATE:END DATE:Translation
Annex 370
Annex 370
Annex 370
Ser. No. INFORMATION ABOUT THE ITEMINFORMATION ABOUT PAYMENTINFORMATION ABOUT COMPONENT PARTSGrounds Information about structural alterationsINFORMATION ABOUT SHIPMENT INFORMATION ABOUT ENHANCEMENTSItem numberComponent parts arrangement Date of manufactureWarranty expiry dateNumber and date of the general noticeNumber and date of the certificateNumber and date of the invoicePayment rate under the invoiceNumber and date of the distribution order (shipping order)Date of shipmentShipment destinationNumber of the railway bill of ladingDocument confirming receipt of the productMeans of transportationLast location74872084737929 December 1986Military unit 20152Certificate of Transfer No.,undated, PO Box 2212s,dated 19 May 1987,ReceiptNo. 1087s dated 4 June 1987Railway200/1500TranslationSer. No. INFORMATION ABOUT THE ITEMINFORMATION ABOUT PAYMENTINFORMATION ABOUT COMPONENT PARTSGrounds Information about structural alterationsINFORMATION ABOUT SHIPMENT INFORMATION ABOUT ENHANCEMENTSItem numberComponent parts arrangement Date of manufactureWarranty expiry dateNumber and date of the general noticeNumber and date of the certificateNumber and date of the invoicePayment rate under the invoiceNumber and date of the distribution order (shipping order)Date of shipmentShipment destinationNumber of the railway bill of ladingDocument confirming receipt of the productMeans of transportationLast location74872084737929 December 1986Military unit 20152Certificate of Transfer No.,undated, PO Box 2212s,dated 19 May 1987,ReceiptNo. 1087s dated 4 June 1987Railway200/1500Translation
Annex 371 Georgia v. Russia (II), Application No. 38263/08, Open Exhibit for Oral Submissions of the Russian Federation on 23 May 2018 (translation)

Annex 371
Georgia v Russia (II)
Open Exhibit for Oral Submissions of
the Russian Federation on
23 May 2018
[Please have available at the Hearing]
1
Annex 371
CourtQuestion1:“Didtheallegedviolations…”2
Annex 371
Who Started the Conflict? -Georgia says Russia•Based on an alleged “intercept”•But –intercept or invention? See Georgia Application 6/02/2009 at para 82 and footnote 653
Annex 371
Who started it?BBC Newsnight:4See RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at paras 243-244 and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYlZvY
Annex 371
BBC Newsnight•Reporter to Shota Utiashvili: [At 9.06]“But despite this apparent evidence, Georgia didn’t mention any Russian invasion when it went to war at the end of that day -the 7th. It didn’t mention any proof until weeks later because, it says now, it mislaid the tape…”5See RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at paras 243-244 and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYlZvY
Annex 371
The Reality: President Saakashvili’sPromise“I admire and respect Ossetianhistory and culture. Every ethnic Ossetianhas been an inseparable part of Georgian history for centuries. We are proud of you and our unity. Georgia is strong for its diversity. Georgia has never been and will never be a mono-ethnic country. Georgia belongs to all of us regardless of our ethnicity.Let’s take care of our country together. Let’s together avoid the violence. Let’s work together for a better future….Georgia is undertaking an immediate, unilateral cease fire. We do not have the will to respond to violence with yet more violence.”6See RF submissions 15/06/2011 at Annex 24
Annex 371
Georgia’s Massive Attack on Tskhinval /Russian Peacekeepers7
Annex 371
8See RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at para 57 et seq. and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYlZvYGeorgia’s Attack on Tskhinval
Annex 371
9See RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at at para 57 et seq. and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYlZvYGeorgia’s Attack on Tskhinval
Annex 371
10See RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at at para 57 et seq. and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYlZvYGeorgia’s Attack on Tskhinval
Annex 371
11See RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at para 57 et seq. and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYlZvYGeorgia’s Attack on Tskhinval
Annex 371
12See RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at para 57 et seq. and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYlZvYGeorgia’s Attack on Tskhinval
Annex 371
Georgia’s War Planswith NATO symbols (2007)13See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 55
Annex 371
HRW:“DuringthedayonAugust8,regularRussiangroundforcesmovedthroughtheRokitunneltowardTskhinvali...BytheeveningofAugust8,Russianauthoritiesdeclaredthatunitsofthe58thArmyweredeployedintheoutskirtsofTskhinvali…Overthenexttwodays,RussianforcescontinuedtomoveintoSouthOssetia…”RF Submissions 30/12/2014at para 71, Annex 68 and e.g. Annex 27 (HRW) at page 23 et seq.A substantial Russian response took time…14
Annex 371
International Independent Fact-Finding Mission Vol1 para20:“[A]nadditionallegalquestioniswhethertheGeorgianuseofforceagainstRussianpeacekeepingforcesonGeorgianterritory,i.e.inSouthOssetia,mighthavebeenjustified.Againtheanswerisinthenegative.TherewasnoongoingarmedattackbyRussiabeforethestartoftheGeorgianoperation.Georgianclaimsofalarge-scalepresenceofRussianarmedforcesinSouthOssetiapriortotheGeorgianoffensiveon7/8AugustcouldnotbesubstantiatedbytheMission.ItcouldalsonotbeverifiedthatRussiawasonthevergeofsuchamajorattack,inspiteofcertainelementsandequipmenthavingbeenmadereadilyavailable.ThereisalsonoevidencetosupportanyclaimsthatRussianpeacekeepingunitsinSouthOssetiawereinflagrantbreachoftheirobligationsunderrelevantinternationalagreementssuchastheSochiAgreementandthusmayhaveforfeitedtheirinternationallegalstatus.Consequently,theuseofforcebyGeorgiaagainstRussianpeacekeepingforcesinTskhinvaliinthenightof7/8August2008wascontrarytointernationallaw.”RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 11-1, p. 2315
Annex 371
Conflict Allegations(1)…thatRussianaircraftbombedGeorgianvillages[withclusterbombs].16
Annex 371
Purported Corroboration by Human Rights Watch:HRW, August 15, 2008“[HRW]researchershaveuncoveredevidencethatRussianaircraftdroppedclusterbombsinpopulatedareasinGeorgia…“Clusterbombsareindiscriminatekillers....saidMarcGarlasco,seniormilitaryanalystat[HRW]…”RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 517
Annex 371
HRW Webpage with Missing Picture(this and the following five slides)RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 518
Annex 371
RF Responses 19/02/2016at Annex 519
Annex 371
RF Responses 19/02/2016at Annex 520
Annex 371
21RF Responses 19/02/2016at Annex 5
Annex 371
22RF Responses 19/02/2016at Annex 5
Annex 371
23RF Responses 19/02/2016at Annex 5
Annex 371
The Missing Picture?“GeorgianslookattheremnantsofanRBK-250clusterbombdroppedbyRussianaircraftonthevillageofRuisi,nearSouthOssetia,Tuesday,Aug.12,2008.HumanRightsWatchhasidentifiedtheweaponasaRBK-250clusterbomb.”24RF Responses 19/02/2016at Annex 5
Annex 371
HRW = Marc Garlasco•HesaidthatremnantsofwhatappearstobeamissilecamefromaRussianRBK250clusterbomb.25RF Responses 19/02/2016at Annex 5
Annex 371
HRW: The Missing Picture26RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 5See the picture available at https://www.hrw.org/ja/news/2009/04/21/236609
Annex 371
Clearly a missile, not a bomb27RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 5See the picture available at https://www.hrw.org/ja/news/2009/04/21/236609
Annex 371
Some context –MrGarlasco’sCV:•Pentagon -Defense Intelligence Agency (6years)•Human Rights Watch (senior military analyst in Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) Emergencies Division)•Resigned from HRW in February 2010 after emergence of his interest in Nazi memorabilia:“That is so cool! The leather SS jacket makes my blood go cold it is so COOL!”RF Submissions 31/03/2016 at Annex 628
Annex 371
Georgia Struck Georgian Villages with Cluster weapons•Georgia bought cluster missiles carrying M85 cluster bombletsfrom Israel•M85 bombletswere found in (at least) Brotsleti, Ditsi, KvemoKhviti, Meghvrekisi, Pkhvenisi, Shindisi, Tirdznisi, ZemoKhviti, and ZemoNikozi•Georgia blamed Russia for these cluster strikes and supported the claim with false witness evidence RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 77 et seq.)RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 27 (p. 64 et seq.)29
Annex 371
False WitnessesHRW: A Dying Practice, April 2009, page 57 fn140:“Ininitialreports,HumanRightsWatchattributedtheM85attacksaroundPkhvenisiandShindisitoRussia,basedupontheaccountsofnearlyadozenwitnesses,interviewedseparately,whosaidthatRussianairstrikesonGeorgianarmoredunitsintheareawerefollowedbyextensiveclustermunitionstrikes…FurtherinvestigationsledHumanRightsWatchtochangethatoriginalattribution.”RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 77 et seq.)30
Annex 371
HRW –A Dying PracticeAt page 57:“Throughthesesources,researchersgatheredevidenceofM85sinornearabandofninevillagesinthenorthoftheGoriDistrict:Brotsleti,Ditsi,KvemoKhviti,Meghvrekisi,Pkhvenisi,Shindisi,Tirdznisi,ZemoKhviti,andZemoNikozi.”RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 77 et seq.)31
Annex 371
HRW –A Dying PracticeAt page 57: “AvillageralsoshowedthemaMk.-4160mmrocketandredM85ribboninVariani,butbecausethetownisfurthersouthanddoesnotfitthegeographicpattern,HumanRightsWatchhasnotdeterminedforcertainifitlandedinthatlocation.”RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 77 et seq.)32
Annex 371
Georgia Admits Using Cluster WeaponsHRW –Up in Flames at page 64:“InalettertoHumanRightsWatchonAugust31,2008,theGeorgianMinistryofDefenseacknowledgedthatithadusedclustermunitionsagainstRussianmilitaryequipmentandarmamentsastheyweremovingsouthfromtheRokitunnel.”RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 2733
Annex 371
Accident?HRW –Up in Flames, page 11:“…Duetoeithermalfunctionorhumanerror,GeorgianclustermunitionslandedinundisputedGeorgianterritoryondayspriortothearrivalofRussianforcesthere,killingatleastonecivilianandwoundingtwoothers…atleastthreepeoplewerekilledandsixwoundedbyclusterdudsthatexplodeduponcontactinthreevillagesinundisputedGeorgianterritory.”RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 2734
Annex 371
Or Intent ? HRW –Up in Flames at page 65: “FirstDeputyMinisterofDefenseBatuKuteliatoldHumanRightsWatchthattheseweapons,boughtfromIsrael,aretheonlyclustermunitionsinGeorgia’spossession….NotwithstandingtheclustermunitionhitsinGoridistrict,KuteliaexpressedsatisfactionwithhowthemunitionsperformedandsaidthattheydelayedRussiantroopadvancesbyseveraldays…”RF Submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 2735
Annex 371
RF Submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 3Georgia’s Bombing Allegations now…Rewitnessproblems,seeConfidentialExhibit.AllegedradarlogsshowingRussianbombingrunsarefabricatedAircraftflyingatimpossiblespeedsRadarpurportstoseethroughCaucasusmountainsThedatashowsaeroplanescrossingthemountainsataconstantheightlowerthanthemountains,andthereforeflyingthroughrock!36
Annex 371
Annex 371
(2)…thatRussiaattackedthecentralsquareinGoriwithanIskandermissile,killingtheDutchjournalist,StanStorimans38
Annex 371
The death of Stan Storimans•InitialPress:MrStorimanswaskilledinGoriinamortarattack.•HRW(Garlasco)1stversion:RBKbomb•HRW(Garlasco)2ndversion:Iskandermissile•DutchInvestigativeMission(“DIM”):Iskandermissile39RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 7RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 5Georgia Submissions 5/03/2015 at Annex 292
Annex 371
Initial Press Reports•Reuters,12August2008“ExplosionsintheGeorgiantownofGorionTuesdaykilledatleastfivecivilians,includingajournalist,andinjuredseveralothers….Astudyoftelevisionfootagefromthesceneshowedthattheexplosionswereprobablycausedbymortarfireandnotbybombsdroppedfromaircraft,aswitnessesinitiallythought…”RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 740
Annex 371
RBK -250HRW, August 15, 2008:“[HRW]hasalsoseenaphotoofthesubmunitioncarrierassemblyandnoseconeofanRBK-250bombinGori.TheGorivideoshowedmorethantwodozensimultaneousexplosionsduringtheattack,whichischaracteristicofclusterbombs.…CratersinGoriwerealsoconsistentwithaclusterstrike.”Semble: Marc Garlasco, again.RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 541
Annex 371
Dutch Investigative Mission (“DIM”)•VisittoGori:29August2008to3September2008•Report:TheHague,20October2008–IskanderMissileGeorgia Submissions 5/03/2015 at Annex 29242
Annex 371
The IskanderChronology•11-12August2008,GeorgianforceswithdrewfromGori(SeeGeorgiaCombatReportssubmitted19/02/2016;GeorgiaSubmissions31/01/2017atAnnex8PartIIat21:50etseq.)•12August2008,allegedattackbyRussiaonsquareinGori(RFResponses19/02/2016atpara79)•15August2008–HRW(Garlasco)saiditwasanRBKbomb(RFResponses19/02/2016atAnnex5)•17-20August2008-Russianwithdrawal•DeploymentofUSStateDepartmentmissionwithphotographers.•25August2008–theHoeftSofaPhotograph(SeeRFSubmissions31/01/2017atAnnex2D(p.3andp.15))•25-27August2008–theHoeftVisitPhotographwithAdobemetadata(SeeRFSubmissions24/11/2017atAnnex13,p.7)•27August2008–newevidenceof“littleholes”(SeeRFSubmissions31/01/2017atAnnex2D(p.25))•29August2008–3September2008–visitbyDutchInvestigativeMission(“DIM”)(SeeGeorgiaSubmissions5/03/2015atAnnex292)•20October2008-DutchFindingsofanIskanderattackbasedonphotographs,video,“littleholes”,indeterminate“littlebullets”andinteractionwithMarcGarlasco.Noinspectionofmissileparts.(SeeGeorgiaSubmissions5/03/2015atAnnex292)See: references in body of slide43
Annex 371
The DIM Report•TheDIMinvestigatorsdidnotseethemissileparts;•Theywereshownpicturesandvideo,includingonepictureofamissilesectiononasofa,said(intheirreport)tohavecomefromtheHALOtrust.•Infact,themostcurrent“sofapicture”wastakenbyaUSNavyphotographeronaStateDepartmentmission.Georgia Submissions 5/03/2015 at Annex 292RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 15) 44
Annex 371
Fake Pictures: The “Sofa” PictureRF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 3) 45
Annex 371
The US Navy46RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 15)
Annex 371
The Caption says ..GORI,Georgia(Aug.25,2008)ARussianmissilelieslargelyintactinthemasterbedroomofahomeinGori….TheDepartmentofDefensedeploymentispartofalargerUnitedStatesresponsetothegovernmentofGeorgiarequestforhumanitarianassistance.ThiseffortisbeingcoordinatedbytheUSDepartmentofStateandtheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment.(U.S.NavyphotobyLtJimHoeft/Released).47RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 15)
Annex 371
Physical Impossibility•Momentum:–The tail section has a mass of several hundred kilograms–It descends vertically at several times the speed of a bullet•It could not enter on one side of a top-floor room and land gently on a sofa on the other side.•It would smash down vertically through the entire building.See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at para 16 et seq.48
Annex 371
CfRTL Documentary/German Missile Scientist –“Investigation in Gori”49Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II
Annex 371
Missile Pieces outside: The “Floating” Missile Piece50Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II
Annex 371
Transparent metal …51Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II
Annex 371
Cf a “Reurters” qualityvideo?See Georgia Submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 8.1 (0:40 et seq.)52
Annex 371
Other internet pictures at this quality show differences –the silver seamRF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 9) 53
Annex 371
A Dimple inthe Tarmac/CfMomentum:RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 13) 54
Annex 371
The Ballast Piecehttp://forums.airbase.ru/2010/06/t70301--iskander-v-gori-voprosy-i-otvety-foto-i-videomaterial.html55
Annex 371
Iskanderhas air-burst sub-munitions, so no Craters:RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 27) 56
Annex 371
The DIM Report:No consideration of:•The alleged missile pieces;•The mass of missile pieces;•The velocity of missile pieces;•Their momentum;•The inevitable damage when they strike a building or the ground; •The fact that the sub-munitions explode in the air and not on the ground; •The inconsistency of craters etc.57Georgia Submissions 5/03/2015 at Annex 292
Annex 371
Alleged Iskander“Bullets”•The only alleged physical evidence•The same kind of “little bullet” was allegedly found in walls and in the body of MrStorimans.58Georgia Submissions 5/03/2015 at Annex 292
Annex 371
Chronology –early pictures and video:Conventional mortar crater and no “little holes” 59RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 27)
Annex 371
MrAkkermans’ Taxi (1) –Supposedlysprayed with “little bullets”60Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II (timing 02:44 et seq.)
Annex 371
No holes in the Taxi (2)Georgia Submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 8.261
Annex 371
No holes in the Taxi (3)Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II62
Annex 371
No holes in the Taxi (4)Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II63
Annex 371
A Rash of Little Holes LaterVideo of 27 August 200864RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 25)
Annex 371
The Autopsy 19 August 2008 (one week later)“Therewerevariousopenskininjurieswhichweresuturedandfixedwhileembalming.Thatiswhyitwasimpossibletoeffectivelyassesstheopeninjuriesandmakepicturesofthem.”RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 4 (p. 52)RF Submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 965
Annex 371
Georgia’s New Offer on Missile Parts:“TheGovernmentalsoinformstheCourtthattheseIskandermissilepieces(asdepictedintherecentphotographsandvideoswhichareenclosedwiththissubmission)areinthecustodyoftheGeorgianauthoritiesandtheycanbeaccessedbytheCourt…”ReferenceistoAnnex14–only3pieces.Georgia Submissions 24/11/2017 at para 1266
Annex 371
Georgia’s Picture of Part N167Georgia Submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 14
Annex 371
Different from the RTL Video68Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II (timing 13:29 et seq.)
Annex 371
And hand-painted !69Georgia Submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 14 (picture GEO_0181)
Annex 371
CfRF Position:•The numbers on the alleged missile parts do not correspond to any missile ever in the Russian inventory.•The pieces fall at great speed: friction would burn off any paint.•The painting presented does not reflect factory production.70
Annex 371
RTL Documentary: “Investigation in Gori”71Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II (timing 12:57 et seq.)
Annex 371
RTL Documentary: Too many parts !72Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II (timing 12:57 et seq.)
Annex 371
The Americans have any supposed “Missile Parts”73Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II (timing 11:48 et seq.)
Annex 371
RTL Documentary: Where?Why?74Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II (timing 11:48 et seq.)
Annex 371
RF Investigative CommitteeReport:75“TheDutchsideseparatelystatesthatphotoandvideomaterials,eyewitnessaccountsandothermaterialsusedtopreparethereportoftheDutchmissionofOctober20,2008toinvestigatethecircumstancesofthedeathofS.Storimans,willnotbeprovidedtotheRussiansideduetothefactthatthisdataconcernsthesovereigntyofGeorgia.Atthesametime,theDutchsidedeclaresthattherelevantmaterialshavealreadybeenhandedovertoRussia(totheMinistryofForeignAffairs).The[InvestigativeCommittee]ofRussiadrawsattentiontotheapparentinconsistencyofthepositionoftheDutchsideandissurprisedbytherefusaloftheDutchsidetotransmitthematerials…”RF Submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 9 (p. 9)
Annex 371
“Digital information, such as photos and videos, must be verified and authenticated and chain of custody must be established. Because online sites such as YouTube strip the metadata –e.g., information about when and where a video was filed –it is often difficult to establish probative value”.https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Digital_fingerprints_interior_cover2.pdf, p. 5Human Rights Center at the UC Berkeley School of Law76
Annex 371
The Snowden Disclosures77See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 57 et seq.) and Annex 2M (p. 16 et seq.)
Annex 371
78Snowden (2)See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 57 et seq.) and Annex 2M (p. 16 et seq.)
Annex 371
79Snowden (3)See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 57 et seq.) and Annex 2M (p. 16 et seq.)
Annex 371
80Snowden (4)See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 57 et seq.) and Annex 2M (p. 16 et seq.)
Annex 371
81Snowden (5)See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 57 et seq.) and Annex 2M (p. 16 et seq.)
Annex 371
82Snowden (6)See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 57 et seq.) and Annex 2M (p. 16 et seq.)
Annex 371
83Snowden (7)See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 57 et seq.) and Annex 2M (p. 16 et seq.)
Annex 371
84Snowden (8)See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 57 et seq.) and Annex 2M (p. 16 et seq.)
Annex 371
Alleged Attacks on Civilians85
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ForproblemswiththeevidenceofallegedcivilianwitnessesseeRFSubmissionsof30December2014atpara291etseq.andtheConfidentialExhibit.86
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See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2J p. 26 and p. 62Unreliability of satellite imagery (I)AAAS analysis based on Digital Globe data.Digital Globe’s main customer is the US government and it provides services to the US military.87
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London institute of space policy and law workshop paper, quoted in part at p. 55-58 of Annex 2J RF Submissions 31/01/2017Unreliability of satellite imagery (II)“6.VERIFICATION,VALIDATIONANDCERTIFICATIONThetechnicalcommunityinparticularregardverification,validationandcertificationaskeytoestablishingreliabilityofinformation.Thisisparticularlyrelevantinlesstransparentcasessuchasradar,wherethemeaningoftheinformationisnotimmediatelyclear.Theneedtointerpretthedataposesotherquestions.Forexample,whetherthereisneedforseveraldatasets,orforadditionalmeansofverification.Easeofmanipulationandchangeofdataneedtobeexamined.Accuracyandtimingmaybeimportant,asmaybetimestampingdata.Theneedforgroundtruthtocomparesatellitedataisafurtheraspectofverificationandvalidationthatmustbeconsidered.Itmayalsobedesirabletohaveacertificationprocessorstandardqualificationsforexperts.Therecontinuestobeastrongargumentforinvestigationofalternativemethodsofcertification,verificationanddatastandards,outliningmeritsanddrawbacks.Anystandardsorcertificationsystemsneedtobeataninternationallevel,notleasttofacilitateuseofdatafromdifferentsystemsforvalidationpurposes.”88
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Unreliability of satellite imagery (III)On the ground verification is vital ‘Hot spot analysis’ leads to large numbers of false positives An example from Europe, in Slokain Latvia, with validation of ground conditions, shows that a single fire produced three false positives elsewhere.Moreover, even when the algorithm accurately discerns fire, it cannot pinpoint the fire with a resolution less than the area covered by a single pixel, which is 1km x 1km.89RF Submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 12
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Alleged Mistreatment of POWs90
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ForproblemswiththePOWevidence,seeAnnex2totheRFSubmissionsof24November2017andtheConfidentialExhibit.91
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No Reliable Evidence of Involvement of Russian forces in Mistreatment of Civilians(or their property) or POWs.92See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 325 et seq.See RF submissions 31/03/2016 at para 34 et seq.RF Submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 2
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Professionalism of Russian soldiers (I)Amnesty International 93See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 38 (AI Report), p. 31
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Professionalism of Russian soldiers (II)AvillagerinZemoNikozitoldtheODIHRinvestigatorsthatRussianforcespreventedOssetiansfromdetainingthe11elderlypeoplewhoremainedinthevillage,escortedthemtoanapartmentandprovidedprotectionforthemuntiltheRussianwithdrawalfromthevillage.Duringtheday,Russiansaccompaniedthemtotheirhousestoallowthemtofeedthechickens.AnothervillagerinZemoNikozimentionedtotheODIHRinvestigatorthataRussiangeneralgaveatelephonenumberwherehecouldbecontactediftheOssetiansshouldstarttoharmthevillagersortheirproperty.AnothervillagerinZemoNikozitoldtheODIHRinvestigatorsthatRussiantroopsbroughtfoodtoachurch.ShesaiditwastheOssetianswhowereresponsibleforthelootingandburningthattookplace.94See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 34 (ODIHR Report), pp. 26 and 36
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Professionalism of Russian soldiers (III)DeputyDirectoroftheGorimilitaryhospitaltoldtheODIHRinvestigatorsthattheRussianstreatedhospitalstafffairlyandthatRussianstransportedinjuredGeorgiancivilianstothehospital.AwomanfromTamarashenirecountedtotheODIHRinvestigatorshowRussiansoldiersaskedifsheneededfoodandbroughtherthreeday’ssupplyofbread,butter,andcannedmeat.AwomaninEredvitoldtheODIHRinvestigatorsthatshewasharassedbyanOssetian,andthataRussiansoldiernearbyintervened,hittheOssetianmanwiththebuttofhisgunandmadehimgoaway.TheODIHRreportrecountshowinCharebi,Russiansoldierscameandremovedanunexplodedbombfromavillager’sgarden.95See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 34 (ODIHR Report), p. 36
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Professionalism of Russian soldiers (IV)SeverallocalresidentstoldHumanRightsWatchthatmanyoftheRussianservicemeninGeorgianterritoriesbehavedinadisciplinedmannerandinsomecasesevenprotectedthecivilianpopulationfromOssetianforces,militiamembers,orlooters.HumanRightsWatchdocumentedoneoccasionwhenRussianforcesintervenedtohelpacivilianwhowasthevictimofacrimeinprogress,andtwodistinctoccasionswhenRussianforcestemporarilysetuproadblockstopreventlooting.SeveralpeopletoldHumanRightsWatchthatRussiangroundforcesingeneraldidnotattacklocalresidentsandinsomecasestriedtoprotectthecivilianpopulationfromOssetianforces,militiamembers,orcriminalelements.96See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 27 (HRW Report “Up in Flames”), pp. 8, 123 and 125
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General Kulakhmetov(Head of the Peace Keepers)“DespitetheextremelydifficultsituationtheRussianarmydidmakesubstantialeffortstopreventcriminalactivityandapprehendcriminals.”Including:(1)Ordersbeingissuedtothetroopstopreventlawlessness.(2)Organisingpatrolsandarrestingwrongdoers.(3)Settingupcheckpointsmannedwithover350men.97See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 23 (para 80)
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The Circumstances (1)Thisincircumstanceswhere:(1)Theaffectedareawasnotsmallandincludedabout150villages,whichmeantthatcriminalswereabletoevadecheckpointsandpatrolseasily.(2)TheRussianarmyhadalsotoprioritisesecuringsupplylinesinthesafetyareaandeliminatingalargenumberofmunitionsdroppedandequipmentleftbehindbytheGeorgiantroops.(Kulakhmetovstatement,paragraph79ofAnnex23toRussia’sDecember2014submission)98See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 23 (para 79)
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The Circumstances (2) MrSanakoyev:99See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 13
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The Circumstances (3)MrSanakoyevon revenge attacks:100See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 13
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The Circumstances (4)HRW on criminal attacks:“Thelooterscomeeveryday.Theytookeverythingvaluablethatwasinmyhouse.Nothingisleft.IkeeptellingthemI’mOssetianandsoismyhusband,butwhatdotheycare?”“ElizavetaDzhioevadescribedtoHumanRightsWatchthatthelooterswere“completelyruthless”andherownandherhusband’sOssetianethnicitydidnotprotectthemfromlooting”.101See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 27 (HRW Report “Up in Flames”), p. 147
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POWs: Medical treatment (I)“TheRussianforcesquestionedthethreemenandthenplacedtheminabasementtogetherwithfiveorsixGeorgiansoldierswhohadbeendetainedseparately.TheRussianforcesdidnotphysicallyill-treatthethree.TheyallowedtheGeorgiansoldierstowash,shave,andrinsetheiruniformsandgavethemfood,waterandsomebasicmedicaltreatment”.102See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 27 (HRW Report “Up in Flames”), p. 193
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POWs: Medical treatment (II)“…aprivate,“Malkhaz”,allegedthathehadbeentakencaptiveon8AugustinTskhinvaliandwasheldtogetherwithfiveothersoldiersforninedaysbyOssetianmilitiabeforebeingtransferredtoRussiancustodyandexchanged.…Atonestage,twoothercaptiveswerealsobroughtin,oneofwhomhemaintainedwasshotinanextdoorroomandlefttolietherefortwodaysbeforeheandhisfellowcaptiveswereforcedtocleantheroomandburyhim.“Malkhaz”reportedbeingtransferredtoRussiancustody,wherehewasgivenmedicaltreatmentbeforebeinghand(sic)overtotheGeorgianauthorities”.103See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 38 (AI “Civilians in the Line of Fire”), p. 46
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POWs: Medical Treatment (III)“AmnestyInternationalrepresentativesmetwithoneoftheGeorgianformerPOWsrecoveringinhospitalinTbilisifrominjuriessustainedinthecourseoftheconflict,whostatedthathehadbeentakencaptivebyRussianforcesandwelltreatedduringhiscaptivity.”104See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 38 (AI “Civilians in the Line of Fire”), p. 46
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Q1. No Effective Control105
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No Effective ControlTroop numbers (I)SeeRFresponses19/02/2016andtheRussia’slettertotheCourtdated29September2017106
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Troop numbers (II)By 8 August Georgia already had around 17,000 personnel, up to 100 tanks, around 70 armouredfighting vehicles, around 30 GRAD-type artillery systems and 280 other items of artillery, up to 9 SU-25 aircraft, up to 12 helicopters and up to 210 air-defence systemsDuring the course of the conflict, Georgia brought up substantial additional reserves including the 2nd Infantry Brigade from Senaki.Georgia tried to regroup and remained a threat for a considerable time. 2,000 of Georgia’s best troops were also repatriated from Iraq on US aircraft. Georgia attempted full mobilisation of its general reserve of 45,000 men.107See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at paras 50 to 56See RF submissions 19/02/2016 at para 138
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https://sputniknews.com/world/20080811115956220/Troop numbers (III)MOSCOW,August11(RIANovosti)-U.S.militaryaircrafthaveflown800GeorgiantroopsandanumberofarmoredvehiclesbackhomefromIraqamidanarmedconflictinbreakawaySouthOssetia,aseniorRussianmilitaryofficialsaidonMonday.NBCreportedonMondaythatU.S.militarytransportplaneshadstartedtobringalltheGeorgiantroopsdeployedinIraqbackhome."U.S.aircrafthavemadeeightflightstobringGeorgiantroopshomefromIraq,"Col.Gen.AnatolyNogovitsynsaid.108
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Allegedly Subordinate Local AdministrationSee RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 159 et seq., RF submissions 19/02/2016 at para 100 et seq.109
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New Red Roofs show destruction in Tskhinval110See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2L (p. 65 and p. 67)
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See the attack on Tskhinval, above and RF submissions RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 159 et seq., RF submissions 19/02/2016 at para 100 et seq.Allegedly Subordinate Local Administration111
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Q3. No Administrative Practice reCivilians112
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No Administrative practice (I)RussianforcesmadegenuineeffortstopreventattacksonGeorgianswheretheycould.TheproblemwasinflamedtensionsnearTskhinvalwheretheconflicthasdevelopedformanyyearsofaggressivepoliciesofGeorgiangovernmentagainsttheOssetianpopulation.ThatandtheruthlessattackonTskhinvalledtorevengeattacksbyOssetiansandcriminalattacksandlootingRussianforceswentbeyondtheTskhinvalregioninSouthOssetia,inparticulartotheboundaryoftheLeningoriregionwithGeorgia.BurningandlootingattacksdidnotextendtothelargeEasternregionofLeningoriandmanyotherareasofSouthOssetia.113See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 291 et seq.
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No Administrative practice (II)MrSanakoyev:114See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 13
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No Administrative practice (III)Leningori:“RussianforcespressedallthewaythroughtheLeningordistricttoprotecttheirflank.”“TherehasbeennodestructionofGeorgianpropertyinthisdistrict(likewiseinmanyotherareasofSouthOssetia).”“ThisagainshowsthatthesituationaroundTskhinvalwastheresultofanoutburstofangerfromthoselivinginthecityandinthesurroundingvillages.Theeffectswerenotfeltfurtheraway,eventhoughtheRussianmilitaryadvancewentbeyondtheseterritoriesandnoGeorgianforceswereleftthereaftertheconflictwasover.Therewascertainlynoanti-GeorgianpolicyorexpulsionofGeorgiansontheterritoryofSouthOssetia.”115See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex 13 (paragraphs 54-56)
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No Administrative practice (IV)There is no reliable identification of Russian forces as involved in or condoning looting and arson (above). Where evidence could be tested at the Evidential Hearing, Georgia’s witnesses collapsed. [See Confidential Exhibit]116See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 291 et seq.
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The Situation Now (I)Borders remain Georgia has not relinquished forceGeorgia refuses to engage on the situation of Ossetianpeople displaced in the 1990sA political solution is neededMeanwhile, some alleviation of border issues has been achieved. 117RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 115 et seq. and para 341 et seq.RF Responses 19/02/2016 at para 103 et seq.
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The Situation Now (II)118TheGovernmentsofAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiahaveestablishedsomesimplifiedproceduresforregionsdenselypopulatedbyGeorgians.AbkhaziahasintroducedaconvenientvisaregimeformostGeorgians.Border crossings are frequent (including by students).RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 117RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 341 et seq.RF submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex14
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The Situation Now (III). South Ossetia119RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annex13-1 (p. 40)
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The Situation Now (IV). South Ossetia120RF submissions 31/03/2016 at Annex8-1
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The Situation Now (V). Abkhazia121RF submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex14(pp. 2-3)Quotation from the Statement of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Abkhazia No. 2221 dated 8 December 2017: “UndertheOrdinanceoftheCabinetofMinistersoftheRepublicofAbkhaziaof10July2012No.87‘OnestablishingthecheckpointsonthestateborderbetweentheRepublicofAbkhaziaandGeorgia’,thecheckpointsonthestateborderbetweentheRepublicofAbkhaziaandGeorgiahavebeenestablished”...“ToensuretherightofmovementacrossthestateborderbetweentheRepublicofAbkhaziaandGeorgia,theOrdinanceoftheCabinetofMinistersoftheRepublicofAbkhaziaof25September2012No.125‘Onapprovalofthe‘ProvisionalListofDocumentsAuthorizingEntryinandExitfromtheRepublicofAbkhaziaAcrosstheStateBorderBetweentheRepublicofAbkhaziaandGeorgia’establishedthelistofvaliddocumentsallowingtherighttocrosstheStateborderbetweentheRepublicofAbkhaziaandGeorgia…”.TheabovedocumentsincludepassportofacitizenofUSSRwithregistrationintheGaldistrictpriorto14August1992,anequivalentidentitydocument(FormNo.9)issuedbytheauthoritiesoftheInteriorMinistryoftheRepublicofAbkhazia,and(forforeigncitizens)passportorbirthcertificatetogetherwithresidencepermit,visaorspecialpermit.ToensuretherightsoftheforeignnationalsbornintheGaldistrictandresidingintheGaldistrict,theLawofRepublicofAbkhaziaof30December2016No.4319-c-VamplifiedthegroundsfortheissueofresidencepermitsoftheRepublicofAbkhazia.InaccordancewiththeaboveLaw,residencepermitsarealsoissuedtoforeignnationalsbornintheGaldistrictoftheAbkhazASSRwhohavepermanentlyresidedintheRepublicofAbkhaziaforatleast10yearssince12October1999andtheirfamilymembers(spouse,minorchildren).
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“In2016,1,085,426casesoflawfulcrossingofthestateborderbetweentheRepublicofAbkhaziaandGeorgiawereregistered.FromJanuary2017to31May2017,534,326crossingswererecorded.In2016,129individualswerepreventedfromcrossingthestateborderbetweenAbkhaziaandGeorgia.Thisnumberissignificantlylowerthanthenumberoflawfulcrossings.”The Situation Now (VI). Abkhazia122RF submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex14(pp. 4)Quotation from the Statement of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Abkhazia No. 2221 dated 8 December 2017:
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Q4. No Exhaustion of Local Remedies123
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Quotation from the Information Memo of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the course and results of investigation of criminal case No. 201/374108-08 (emphasis added)“NocomplaintsaboutcrimescommittedbyRussianservicemenweresubmittedtotheinvestigatorsoftheInvestigativeCommitteeundertheProsecutor'sOfficeoftheRussianFederationintheperiodfrom11to25August2008whiletheinvestigatorswereinSouthOssetia.AccordingtotheinformationfromtheChiefMilitaryProsecutor'sOfficeoftheRussianFederation,thecompetentbodiesofGeorgia(whichisapartytotheConventiononLegalAssistanceandLegalRelationsinCivil,FamilyandCriminalMattersof22January1993)didnotapplytotheRussianmilitaryprosecutor'sofficeswithrequeststoinvestigateanyillegalactionsofRussianservicemeninAugust2008”.SeeRF submissions 26/10/2011 RF submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 9Local Remedies (I). Absence of claims in 2008124
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Quotation from the Information Memo of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the course and results of investigation of criminal case No. 201/374108-08 (emphasis added)“Onlyin2009and2010,afterthehostilitieshadended,didtheInvestigativeCommitteeoftheRussianFederationreceive88applicationsfromvarioushumanrightsorganizationsrepresentingtheinterestsof557GeorgiancitizensinrelationtoallegedcrimescommittedbyRussianservicemenagainstciviliansduringthefulfillmentbytheservicemenoftasksrelatingtoenforcementofthesafetyandprotectionofRussiancitizensresidingintheterritoriesofSouthOssetiaandAbkhaziainAugust2008.SincethosecomplaintslackedinformationsufficienttoestablishthecompetenceoftheInvestigativeCommitteeoftheRussianFederationtoconductapreliminaryinvestigationintothefactsspecifiedinthecomplaints,theInvestigativeCommitteeundertheProsecutor'sOfficeoftheRussianFederationinitiallyforwardedappropriateresponsestotheapplicantsindicatingthelackofcompetenceoftheInvestigativeCommitteeoftheRussianFederationtoconductapreliminaryinvestigation”.Local Remedies (II). Claims of 2009 and 2010 and initial responses given125SeeRF submissions 26/10/2011 RF submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 9
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Quotation from the Information Memo of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the course and results of investigation of criminal case No. 201/374108-08 (emphasis added)“However,havingreceivednumerouscomplaints,theInvestigativeCommitteeoftheRussianFederationmadeadecisiontoturntothecompetentauthoritiesofGeorgiawithrequestsforlegalassistanceinrespectofthecircumstancesofthefiledcomplaintswiththeobjectofverifyingtheargumentssetforthinthesecomplaints.However,asappearsfromtheresponsereceivedfromtheProsecutorGeneral'sOfficeoftheMinistryofJusticeofGeorgiaNo.04/10/2010/53,theGeorgiancompetentauthoritiesrefusedtoprovidelegalassistancetotheRussiansideinthecriminalcaseonfar-fetchedgrounds”.Local Remedies (III). Refusal of the Georgian authorities to cooperate126SeeRF submissions 26/10/2011 RF submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 9
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Quotation from the Information Memo of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the course and results of investigation of criminal case No. 201/374108-08 (emphasis added)“Sincefurthercooperationwithintheframeworkoflegalassistancewasimpossible,inordertoverifytheargumentssetforthinthecomplaintsofGeorgiancitizenstheInvestigativeCommitteeoftheRussianFederationforwardedletterstotheapplicantsinvitingthemtocometotheInvestigativeCommitteeoftheRussianFederationaswitnessesfortheirinterrogationandfortheirrecognitionasvictimsandcivilplaintiffsinthecriminalcase,ifthereweresuchlegalgrounds.Despitesuchguaranteesascompensationforthefullcostsassociatedwiththeirappearance,accommodationandlossofwagesfortheperiodoftimespentinconnectionwiththeirappearancebeforeaninvestigator,aswellasthenecessaryassurancesregardingtheuseofanyinformationandmaterialsobtainedduringtheinterrogationsolelyfortheestablishmentofthetruthinthecriminalcase,noneoftheapplicantshassofararrivedattheInvestigationCommitteeoftheRussianFederationtogivetestimony”.Local Remedies (IV). Invitations sent to the applicants127SeeRF submissions 26/10/2011 RF submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 9
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Letters of 23/7/10 and 1/10/10 Local Remedies (V):RF Investigative Committee seeks help from Georgia. 128See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annexes 126.1, 127.1
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Local Remedies (VI) Georgian Prosecutor Refuses to Cooperate 4/10/10129See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at Annexes 128.1

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Expert Report on the Applicability of the Triangulation Method of Oleg Rudenko, Boris
Goncharenko and Andrei Shurup, 18 May 2021
(translation)

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Dutch National Police, Official Report Concerning the Transport Route, on the Basis of Open
Sources, 16 May 2018

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1
ANNEXE 1 TO APPENDIX 4
OFFICIAL REPORT CONCERNING THE
TRANSPORT ROUTE, ON THE BASIS
OF OPEN SOURCES
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2 Central Unit, National Crime Squad (DLR)OFFICIAL REPORT CONCERNING THE TRANSPORT ROUTE, ON THE BASIS OF OPEN SOURCESMy name is Gerardus Wilhelmus Christiaan THIRY, chief inspector with the National Crime Squad of the Dutch National Police. I have been working as coordinating team leader of the criminal investigation since the start of the investigation into the downing of MH17.I have over 42 years’ experience with combating organised and international crime, gathering criminal intelligence, infiltration, and murder investigations. In addition I have been stationed abroad on several occasions as a liaison officer.The investigation team Ilead consists of investigators and experts with specific skills or knowledge, such as aviation experts, high-tech crime specialists and analysts. In addition, as and when necessary, use was made of experts sworn in by the examining magistrate. On the basis of the findings of the investigation and my knowledge of the facts, I declare as follows:IntroductionDetectives in my team have examined online images and posts that relate to the events of 17 July 2014 in eastern Ukraine. Based on this material theyestablished the route in eastern Ukraine travelled on that date by a convoy that included a Buk TELAR. Most of the posts are in Russian or Ukrainian and have been translated into English and Dutch by interpreters and/or Russian-or Ukrainian-speaking staff who work for my team.1.DonetskOn 17 July 2014 posts on social media mentioned an anti-aircraft system which was stationary between around 09:15 and 09:45 near the intersection of Illicha Avenue and Shakhtobudivnykiv Boulevard in Donetsk. There was also a post saying that a semi-trailer carrying something under a tarpaulin with caterpillar tracks and one gun was seen further away. The anti-aircraft system was referred to by different names in the various social media posts: Smerch, Strela ADMS, Buk and BukM1-M2.1.1Post: ‘Donetsk is Ukraine’One of the first social media posts to mention a Buk TELAR in Donetsk appeared on the social media platform Vkontakte ‘Donetsk is Ukraine’ on 17 July 2014 at 9:40 local Ukrainian time.1Donetsk is Ukraine! Bad news.Ataround 9 o’clock a trailer was seen driving from Makeevka [Makiivka] towardsDonetsk on the Makeevskoye schosse [national highway] with a platform [semi-trailer] carrying a ZRK BUKM1-M2? The ZRK [missile launching complex] in questionwas driven to the intersection with Shakhtostroiteley Boulevard. It was accompanied by the convoy including 1 grey RAV4 ‘parketnik’ [off-road vehicle], a camouflaged UAZ car and a blue Hyundai minibus with tinted (windows). At 09:15 the installation was at the intersection ofShakhtostroiteley [Shakhtobudivnykiv] and Illicha. The rebels got out of the cars and occupied the two leftmost lanes. Apparently to await logistics instructions.1.2Tweets by NECRO MANCER @666_mancerAn individual using the name NECRO MANCER @666_mancer tweeted several times on 17 July 2014 about an anti-aircraft system that was seen on 17 July 2014 around 9:40 in Donetsk. This person 1“Vk.com/wall-67445695_68330”
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was probably basing their tweets on information from others. At 10:11 local Ukrainian time
@666_mancer tweeted the following:2
#Donetsk 30 minutes ago on prospekt Ilicha near the dairy factory something like a ZRK
Strela was being transported on a platform under a tarpaulin, accompanied by 10 passenger
cars #Stopterror.3
Investigation by a member of my team confirmed that there is a bus stop called ‘Dairy factory’ at 103
Illicha Avenue in Donetsk. This is just before the avenue intersects with Shakhtobudi[v]nykiv
Boulevard.
Two minutes later, at 10:13 local Ukrainian time, @666_mancer tweeted the following:4
#Donetsk 25-30 minutes ago somewhere around the Gruzia [Georgia] rayon [district]
something was seen that looked like a Smerch. It was not moving. But it is probably being
transported somewhere. #Stopterror.
Then at 10.31 local Ukrainian time @666_mancer tweeted this:5
#Donetsk < Isn’t a Smerch. 1. Caterpillar tracks. 2. There are no long launch tubes. Visually, it
looks a lot like a Buk. But there were no missiles on it. #Stopterror
1.3 Tweet by @KsistovKosinski
On 17 July 2014 at 10:34 local Ukrainian time, the user @KsistovKosinksi tweeted the following:6
@ostro_v In Donetsk, at the intersection of Ilyich Avenue at 9:15, there was a “Buk” on a
tractor, surrounded by militiamen.
1.4 Tweet by @Buzzing_Rook
On 17 July 2014 at 12:32 local Ukrainian time, a person with the user name @Buzzing_Rook tweeted
the following:7
@Anti_DNR @Citizen_UKR @WowihaY this morning someone wrote that it was on
b.Shakhtostroiteley [Shakhtobudivnykiv] at8 the intersection with Ilyicha [Ilicha] facing the
direction of Makeevka [Makiivka]. By the look of it, they were waiting there…
1.5 Tweet by @luckasfb
On 17 July 2014 at 17:14 local Ukrainian time @luckasfb tweeted the following:9
ZELLO: In Donetsk in the vicinity of Ilyicha – “I saw a big long thing”. The Buk is probably
already in Donetsk. Or is this a dis[information]… #ATO max RT
1.6 Tweet by NECRO MANCER @666_mancer
2 “twitter.com/666_mancer/status/489668680398438400”
3 Interpreter’s note:
• I understand the word ‘platform’ to mean a semitrailer.
• ZRK is a missile launch complex known as a ‘Strela’.
4 “twitter.com/666_mancer/status/489669167352922112”
5 “twitter.com/666_mancer/status/489673636849401856”
6 “twitter.com/KosistovKosinski/status/489674597441105922”
7 “twitter.com/Buzzing_Rook/status/489704260045910016”
9 “twitter.com/lucasfb/status/489775236267905024”
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4 On 17 July 2014 at 10:44 local Ukrainian time @666_mancer tweeted again:10#Donetsk eyewitnesses: the nose [front] of the vehicle looks like it, but further on there was a semi-trailercarrying something under a tarpaulin on caterpillar tracks with 1 gun. #Stopterror.2.MakeevkaThe publication discussed below posits, on the basis of a video, that the Buk TELAR on a low-loader was localised on a satellite image in Makeevka.2.1Stratfor Global IntelligenceOn 13 May 2016 a member of my investigation team saw a publication on the website https://stratfor.com.11Stratfor Global Intelligence, a US organisation, makes use of analysts who previously worked for, inter alia, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US State Department.This publication from 13 May 2016 said that a videohad been posted online, showing a Buk system which had reportedly been spotted in the vicinity of Donetsk in Ukraine. The footage was said to have been taken on 17 July 2014, a few hours before MH17 was shot down by a military missile installation on the ground. Stratfor and its partner AllSource Analysis were prompted by the release of this video to examine satellite images to pinpoint the location of the Buk TELAR that was being transported on a low-loader in the town of Makeevka. According to the publication the footage was used to identify the exact time and place where the Buk in question was located five hours before MH17 would be shot down. According to the publication Stratfor worked with AllSource Analysis, presumably using satellite images from the company DigitalGlobe. According to Stratfor the above-mentioned Buk TELAR can be seen in the satellite photo reproduced below.ImageStratfor publication 10“twitter.com/666_mancer/status/489677010261008384”11‘Examining the Evidence of Russia’s Involvement in a Malaysia Airlines Crash’.
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3. Shakhtarsk
It can be inferred from the tweet below that a Buk drove through Shak[h]tarsk on 17 July 2014.
3.1 Tweet by @spice4russia
On 17 July 2014 at 12:51 local Ukrainian time, the user @spice4russia tweeted the following:12
Shakhtersk [Shakhtarsk], KAMAZ of terrorists, 3 tanks. Before that, a Buk, probably, drove by
covered by a tarpaulin #ATO
4. Torez
It can be inferred from the social media posts below that a missile installation, possibly a Buk, was
observed in Torez around noon on 17 July 2014.
4.1 Tweets by @WowihaY
On 17 July 2014 at 12:07 local Ukrainian time @WowihaY tweeted the following:13
A PVO installation drove past us, going towards the town centre. 4 missiles, they say it’s a
Buk. #stopterror #torez [Torez] heading for #snezhnoe [Snizhne]
On 17 July 2014 at 12:16 local Ukrainian time @Wowiya tweeted:14
A Buk is heading via #torez [Torez] to #snezhnoe [Snizhne]. #stopterror.
4.2 Tweets by @MOR2537
On 17 July 2014 at 12:26 local Ukrainian time the user @MOR2537 tweeted the following:15
A missile installation was transported on a lorry, + two escort [protection] vehicles, via Torez to
Snezhnoe [Snizhne] at 12:10.
On 17 July 2014 at 12:53 local Ukrainian time @MOR2537 posted a photo of a Buk TELAR M1 from a
Russian-language Wikipedia page with the following text:16
It looks like a Buk, the upper part was covered.
4.3 Tweet by @dacoromania
On 17 July 2014 at 13:08 local Ukrainian time, a person with the user name @dacoromania tweeted:17
Given that Russian missiles are already being transported on lorries in Torez, it seems like
something has gone wrong….
4.4 Tweet by @EuroMaydan
On 17 July 2014 at 13:15 local Ukrainian time the user @EuroMaydan tweeted the following:18
In Torez, a “Buk” missile installation is heading in the direction of Snezhnoe [Snizhne]. This
information comes from local residents.
12 “twitter.com/spice4russia/status/489706440899432449”
13 “twitter.com/WowihaY/status/489698009148837888”
14 “twitter.com/WowihaY/status/489700047215685632”
15 “twitter.com/MOR2537/status/489702736766586880”
16 “twitter.com/MOR2537/status/489709431467171841”
17 “twitter.com/dacoromania/status/489713300599746561”
18 “twitter.com/EuroMaidan/status/489715009325658112”
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6 4.5Tweet by @bazashemOn 17 July 2014 at 15:30 local Ukrainian time the user @bazashem tweeted:19In Torez a «Buk» missile installation is being transported in the direction of Snezhnoe [Snizhne]. It is being escorted by cars carrying local terrorists #stopterror4.6Post on VK by Toma GurbanovaOn 17 July 2014 at 17:21 local Ukrainian time a person with the user name Toma Gurbanova posted the following message on the social media platform Vkontakte, in response to a report that an aircraft hadjust been downed in the vicinity of Torez:20An hour ago I was called and told that a missile was being transported in the direction of Torez, later on there was an explosion, but again these are rumours.4.7Torez photoOn 17 July 2014 at 20:55 local Ukrainian time, the following photo was posted on the social media platform Vkontakte ‘overheard in Snizhne’ under the user name Nikolay Yakovlev, with the following text:21Aleksey, here’s the Buk.Photo 1 posted on VkontakteAround two hours later, at 22:56 local Ukrainian time, another photo of the Buk TELAR on the red low-loader was posted on the same Vkontakte page, but taken from a greater distance and in better quality.22 19“twitter.com/WowihaY/status/489749063588257792”20“https://archive.is/uF4fj”21Post:https://vk.com/wall-5698635_18352?reply=18525Original:http://cs620219.vk.me/v620219040/f284/eVIMVZ1ZhHU.jpg22Post:https://vk.com/wall-5698635_18352?reply=18524Photo page:https://vk.com/wall-5698635_18352?reply=18524&z=photo-5698635_333285379%2Fwall-5698635_18524Original:https://pp.vk.me/c616730/v616730703/1a0b0DenEwU0sIM0.jpg7
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Photo 2 posted on Vkontakte
4.8 Facebook page of Anton GERASHENKO
The above photo was also posted on the Facebook page of Anton GERASHENKO on 17 July 2014 at
19:59 (Facebook timestamp).23 Earlier, at 18:20 (Facebook timestamp), the following message was
posted:
The anti-aircraft system BUK as just shot down the civilian plane on route from Amsterdam to
Kuala Lumpur and the system has been provided by Putin. This morning a local patriot had
spotted the transportation of this system from Torez towards Snizhne. The plane was flying at
an altitude of 10.000 meters. 280 passengers and 15 members of the crew were killed. There
is no limit to cynicism of Putin and his terrorists. Europe, USA, Canada and all the civilized
world please open your eyes. Help us with anything you can. This is the war of evil and good.
And here is the video from the crash site. Some bastards were yelling: “How beautiful, it is
burning just beautiful”. They’re not people.
5. Snizhne
The following messages and articles were posted on social media. They show that a Buk TELAR was
observed in Snizhne in the afternoon of 17 July 2014.
6.1 Tweet by @HallaHupS
On 17 July 2014 at 12:53 local Ukrainian time the user @HallaHupS tweeted the following:24
And in the meantime a ZWK “Buk” has appeared in Snezhnoe [Snizhne].
23 facebook.com/anton.geraschenko.7.
24 “twitter.com/HallaHupS/status/489709368427167744”
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8 6.2 Post to OK by Olga PanchenkoOn 17 July 2014 at an unknown time Olga Panchenko (Rudenko) replied to a post on the social media site OK that an aircraft had been shot down.I live next to the highway, today a very crazy installation was transported in the direction of Snezhnoye [Snizhne], self-aiming…that’s what it was shot from.6.3. Snizhne photoOn 17 July 2014 at around 14:27 (Twitter timestamp) the photo below was posted on Twitter by @GirkinGirkin with the following text:25#Snezhnoye [Snizhne] About Russian artillerists and about the ‘Buk’ in Snezhnoye [Snizhne]; ‘this is the house on 50 Years October (street) in it is a “pirka”26[possibly: ‘pyrotechnics’], not far away are charcoal and the Furshet [supermarket chain].Photo of Buk TELAR in SnizhneThe author of the website http://www.koreandefense.com/how-to-find-the-missing-buk-systemhas examined the above photo and the tweet by @GirkinGirkin and concluded that the photo shows the Buk at 13 Karapetyan Street in Snizhne. 25twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/48988406257709465626Note by reporting officer: the interpretersaid that there is actually no such word as pirka. It is an expression which relates to pyrotechnics. Possibly it is a reference to fireworks.
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6.4 Associated Press article
On 25 July 2014 an article was published by Peter Leonard and Yuras Karmanau entitled ‘What
happened? The Day Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 Was Downed’. 27 According to the article, on
Thursday 17 July 2014, before flight MH17 was shot down, an AP journalist saw seven tanks parked
at a petrol station outside Snizhne. The journalist then also saw a Buk driving through Snizhne. The
article goes on to say that AP journalists saw a Buk with four missiles driving in a convoy in Snizhne,
accompanied by two civilian vehicles around 13:05. The convoy stopped, and the journalists were
approached by a man in a sand-coloured uniform, different from the green-coloured uniform the rebels
wore. The man, who spoke with a Russian accent, checked that the journalists had not taken any
photos or videos. Then the convoy continued on its way. The journalists also talked to a number of
local residents who said the Buk had driven into Snizhne around lunchtime. A local resident pointed to
the marks on the asphalt where he had seen a Buk on ‘Karapetyan Street’ in Snizhne. This person
said that the installation was later moved, but he did not know where to.
It is clear from the following tweets that two AP journalists and a driver observed a Buk in Snizhne and
also talked to the crew. On 2 June 2015, nearly a year after the crash of flight MH17, AP journalist
Peter Leonard tweeted:28
Some of my inept note-taking when an AP colleague called me just after midday from near
Snizhne on *JULY* 17#BUK’.
Along with this tweet he posted a photo of handwritten notes (in pen), which read as follows:29
Buk anti-aircraft missiles. Clear sound & Grad. Snizhne – 11 am. Going [illegible] south.
Peter Leonard tweeted a third time on 2 June 2015 at 8:02:30
@hdevreij They *saw* Buk, *heard* Grad. Two different things. Sound of Grad pretty easy to
recognize.
Note by reporting officer: it is not clear from this tweet what time zone the journalist was using. At
11:00 local time the Buk was probably still in the vicinity of Donetsk.
At 17 July 2015 James Miller tweeted the following, under the user name @Millermena:31
MH17 reminded that field reporters matter a lot. @pete_leonard & AP team saw Buk & quickly
reported it, interviewed residents. HUGE (1/2).
On 17 July 2015 at 10:53, Peter Leonard replied to this as follows, under the user name
@Peter_Leonard:32
@Millermena to be exact, *two* AP reporters (and our driver) saw Buk and spoke to its crew,
who stopped to ensure no photos were taken.
6. Buk TELAR driving south
After the white lorry with the Buk TELAR arrived in Snizhne, the Buk was offloaded from the low-loader
and drove, under its own power, to the launch site near Pervomaiskyi. This conclusion is supported by
27 http://bigstory.ap.org./article/what-happened-day-flight-17-was-downed
28 http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/what-you-see-is-all-there-is/
29 https://twitter.com/Peter_leonard/status/605701062226550781
30 https://twitter.com/Peter_leonard/status/605751880757690308
31 http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/what-you-see-is-all-there-is/
32 http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/what-you-see-is-all-there-is/
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10 the video discussed below of the Buk TELAR driving under its own power on a provincial road south of Snizhne and by a social media post.7.1. Snizhne videoOn 23 July 2014 a video with the file name ‘wkgwxxhJlk4 AA ‘BUK’ vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne.mp4’ was secured from the website ukraineatwar.blogspot.com33by a member of my investigation team. This video captured a Buk TELAR driving under its own power in a southerly direction. A smaller, dark-coloured vehicle is seen driving in front of the Buk. When the video was secured, the file displayed the following time: 17 July 2014, 18:44:04 UTC, or 21:44:04 local Ukrainian summer time. This may be the date and time when the video was posted on the website in question. On 4 July 2016 a member of my investigation team secured a higher-quality version of the same video from YouTube.34Below is a screenshot from this video.Screenshot of the video showing a Buk driving under its own power on a provincialroad in SnizhneBelow this image as it appears on the website ukraineatwar.blogspot.com is a satellite photo. The presumed location of the vehicle and the camera with which the video was shot are noted on the photo: provincial road T0522 (GagarinaStreet) in Snizhne and a building that overlooks this road. According to the Russian search engine Yandex the building where Ukraine@war claims the video was shot is located at 43 Gagarina Street in Snizhne. The photo in question is reproduced below. 33http://ukraineatwar.blogspot.com34https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iE7wEhvYFos11
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Image from Ukraine@war
The website also includes the text ‘Link to Google maps’, which clicks through to the following URL:
https://www.google[.]nl/maps/@48.0133916.38.7620665.640m/data=!3m1!1e3. These GPS
coordinates refer to the following location:
This location is approximately the same as the location shown in the image from the website
ukraineatwar.blogspot.com. The location is around 140 metres south, as the crow flies, of the building
designated by Ukraine@war as the building where the video is presumed to have been recorded (red
square) and approximately 50 metres west of the provincial road (Gagarina Street) in Snizhne (red
arrow).
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12 7.2 Post on the VK site ‘heard in Snezhnoye’On 17 July 2014, on the social media platform Vkontakte ‘heard in Snezhnoe’, Nikolay Yakovlev responded to a message posted on 17 July 2014 at 12:04 that concerned a transport of military materiel before the crash of MH17, with the following message:35TODAY I personally saw ZRK “Buk” heading toward Saurovka. Stop lying to people!The town of Saurivka (Saurovka) is approximately 16.5 kilometres southwestof Snizhne, as shown below.7.3 Facebook post by Dmitry TYMCHUKThe following (translated) message was posted to the Facebook account of Dmitry TYMCHUK on 17 July 2014 at 19:19 local Ukrainian time:36According to the operational information from the group ‘Information Resistance’, today around 13:30 a column of terrorists was observed in the vicinity of the town of Snezhnoe [Snizhne]. The column consisted of 3 tanks, 2 BTR [armoured vehicles], a lorry carrying rebels and a lorry with a large-calibre machine gun mounted on it. There was also a tractor unit with a gun carriage,37carrying a ZRK “Buk”. The column was heading in the direction of the town of Dmitrovka.He is likely referring to the town of Dmitrovka in the province of Donetsk, which is around 27 kilometres southeastof Snizhne. According to the Russian search engine Yandex, the quickest route from Snizhne to Dmitrovka runs via the main road T0522 past the towns of Pervomaiske and Pervomaiskyi. For clarification these towns have been highlighted on the map below.Towns of Saurivka and Dmitrovka 35http://vk.com/wall-5698635_1835236“https://www.facebook.com/dmitry.tymchuk/posts/529275897201070”37Amount that supports the gun barrel of an artillery piece13
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8. Satellite photo from the American Embassy in Kyiv
On 22 July 2014 a message was posted on the Facebook page of the US embassy in Kyiv (Ukraine)
along with a satellite image38 with the heading ‘SA-11 Surface-to-Air Missile Shoots Down Malaysian
Airliner MH17’. The accompanying text refers to a pdf document entitled ‘United States Assessment of
the Downing of Flight MH17 and its Aftermath’. This document, which was published on 19 July 2014,
describes why the US embassy in Ukraine believes it is plausible that flight MH17 was brought down
by an SA-11 anti-aircraft missile from separatist-controlled territory in eastern Ukraine.
The image depicts the area where the Buk installation that fired a missile at flight MH17 may have
been located. It also depicts the possible point of detonation and the location where the flight crashed.
Three lines have been drawn on the satellite photo: one (yellow) for the flight path of MH17 and one
(green) for the suspected path of the Buk missile. The point of origin of the green line is the possible
launch site. There is also a straight black line which seems to have been drawn from the possible
launch site, the meaning of which is not explained.
US satellite photo
The Facebook page contains a URL for the website of the US embassy in Kyiv. That site states,
among other things, that the moment when contact was lost with MH17, a launch was observed of a
surface-to-air missile. Nothing is said about the image that was posted on Facebook.
9. Investigation by Bellingcat
The investigative collective Bellingcat also analysed the above satellite photo, and on the basis of their
analysis, it localised the suspected launch site.39 Bellingcat notes that although Snizhne is marked on
the satellite photo as the launch site of the Buk missile, the exact location is not immediately clear due
to the quality of the satellite image. In order to better pinpoint the launch site, Bellingcat performed a
more in-depth analysis of the satellite photo on the basis of visible, recognisable landmarks. On this
basis Bellingcat arrived at an area south of Snizhne. The intersection of the lines drawn by Bellingcat
is a very short distance southwest of the agricultural field that my investigation identified as the launch
38 uk-ua.facebook.com/usdos.ukraine
39 https://www.bellingcat.com/new/uk-andeurope-/2015/01/27/is-this-the-launch-site-of-the-missile-that-shot-downflight-
mh17/
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14 site on the basis of telecommunications, witness statements and satellite photos. The photo below shows this location.Image from the location investigation by Bellingcat‘Uitkomst onderzoek Bellingcat’ = Result of Bellingcat investigation10. Investigative journalist Roland OLIPHANTIn a video recorded on 22 July 2014 Telegraphjournalist Roland OLIPHANT says that he may have found the launch site of the Buk TELAR on the basis of a scorch mark in a wheat field south of Snizhne.40Screenshot from the video by Roland OLIPHANT 40https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10984530/MH17-the-clues-which-may-lead-to-missile-launch-site.html15
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In the video OLIPHANT says the following:
We decided to follow a link we found on the internet where somebody had tried to work out
using photographs where that missile might have come from. That let us here, which is as you
can see a weedfield somewhere south of the town of Sniznoye (fon.), just over there. That’s
north. South, that way, if you take a look down there, you should see a big [inaudible]
monument on the hill. […] We were looking for some kind of burnt ground that might suggest
the blowback from a rocket. We found a patch of burnt land next to a corn field. It’s burnt quite
strange. It doesn’t quite look like it’s part of the routine spring burning of a field, which usually
happens in spring, not at this time of year.
On the basis of information from the landscape as seen in the video, the blogpost on Ukraine@war
determined the probable geolocation of the scorch mark referred to in the video. This geolocation is
approximately: 47.9731238, 38.7593106. A member of my investigation team then entered these
coordinates into both Google Maps and Yandex. (The Yandex map is reproduced below.) The location
of the coordinates is west of Pervomaiskyi, south of Snizhne and north of the Saur Mogila monument.
This is consistent with what OLIPHANT says in the video with regard to the location: ‘That led us here
which is as you can see a wheat field somewhere south of the town of Snezhnoye, just over there.
That’s north. South, that way, you can take a look down there, you should see a big tall monument on
the hill.’
Image of geolocation from Ukraine@war
11. Investigation by NEO
The investigation by the Dutch Safety Board (OVV) and my own investigation showed that flight MH17
was shot down on 17 July 2014 at 16:20 by a Buk missile. Shortly thereafter photos appeared online
of a smoke trail probably left by the Buk missile.
Annex 373
16 Netherlands Geomatics & Earth Observation BV (NEO) was commissioned by the Dutch TV station Radio Television Luxembourg (RTL) to analyse the smoke trail, and on 22 December 2014 it released a report on the subject. The purpose of the analysis was to determine where the smoke trail originated from. NEO did this on the basis of landmarks (P1 to P4 = telephone polesand L1 = possible launch location) that can be seen on photos of the smoke trail and satellite images as shown in the following image from their report.Image from NEO reportPhoto of smoke trailWorldview2 shot from 4 AugustOn this basis NEO plotted out a line ofsight to the base of the smoke trail. NEO concluded the following:Given that the lower part of the smoke plume itself is not visible, the exact location of the possible launch site cannot be determined on the basis of the analysis. The line of sight doeshowever transverse a field that is suspected to be the place from where the Buk could have been launched.Image from the NEO reportFigure 12. Line of sight from telephone polesP1 to P4 to the field L1, ©NEO bv, Amersfoort, Image © 2014 DigitalGlobe17
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12. Findings of the investigation
On the basis of the above findings, it has been concluded that on 17 July 2014 the Buk TELAR was
transported from Sukhodilsk via Donetsk to Snizhne on a red low-loader pulled by a white Volvo lorry.
In Snizhne the Buk TELAR was offloaded and then drove on, under its own power, to a field west of
Pervomaiskyi. This route was confirmed by recorded phone conversations, cell tower locations and
witnesses. The investigation also ascertained that the Buk TELAR that brought down flight MH17
launched a missile from an agricultural field south of Snizhne and west of Pervomaiskyi.
Done as an official report, drawn up under oath of office and concluded and signed by me in
Driebergen on Thursday 16 May 2018.
[signature]
G.W.Chr. Thiry [handwritten]

Document Long Title

Volume X - Annexes 294-373

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