Volume V - Annexes 16-20

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation)
REJOINDER
Submitted by the Russian Federation
Volume V
(Annexes 16 - 20)
10 March 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME V
Annexes 16-20
Annex 16 Witness Statement of Tatyana Anatolyevna Manezhina, 7 March 2023.
Annex 17 Witness Statement of , 6 March 2023.
Annex 18 Expert Report of Alexei Stanislavovich Avtonomov, 28 February
2023.
Annex 19 Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel, 28 February 2023.
Annex 20 Expert Report of Viktor Viktorovich Merkuryev, 1 March 2023.

Annex 16
Witness Statement of Tatyana Anatolyevna Manezhina, 7 March 2023
(translation)

Annex 16
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
WITNESS STATEMENT
OF TATYANA ANATOLYEVNA MANEZHINA
7 MARCH 2023
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1. I, Tatyana Anatolyevna Manezhina, present this witness statement in connection with the
dispute “Ukraine v. Russian Federation” before the International Court of Justice.
2. As part of my witness statement, I provide information on the measures taken by the
Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea (hereinafter the “Ministry of Culture”) to
support the culture of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian peoples on the Peninsula.
3. My statement is based on the information known to me due to my current position of the
Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, professional experience of many years of
work in the field of culture. All my practical activities since 1989 have been related to the
development of culture and social life in Crimea. In 2011, I was appointed Deputy
Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, and before that I had held the job of First
Deputy Minister of Youth Affairs. After Crimea's reunification with the Russian
Federation, I was First Deputy Minister from 2017 and Minister of Culture of the
Republic of Crimea since 16 December 2021.
4. I am aware that the Ministry of Culture has already provided extensive information
reports on mass-scale literary, artistic and musical events held since 2014, broadcasts of
films and other programmes in the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages, museums and
exhibitions dedicated to the history, culture and art of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
peoples.1 I would like to offer some additional information to what is already known to
the Court.
A. ORGANISATION OF EVENTS POPULARISING CRIMEAN TATAR AND UKRAINIAN
CULTURE
5. One of the tasks of the Ministry of Culture is to support and promote the culture of all the
peoples living on the Peninsula and to educate the public about the unique aspects of their
life and history.
6. Before 2014, it was not possible to carry out those functions in full, as in most cases the
Ukrainian authorities did not provide funds for activities and restoration of cultural
1 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Information note on measures taken to implement the Decree
No. 268 of the President of the Russian Federation and other activities aimed at promoting cultures of the Ukrainian
and Crimean Tatar peoples, Annex 498 to the Counter-Memorial.
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heritage sites, or provided them at the lowest priority in an catastrophically limited
amount.
7. After 2014, the situation as I see it has changed tremendously due to the state policy of
the Russian Federation in the field of culture. The Ministry of Culture has provided
assistance in organising hundreds of contests, exhibitions and festivals in support of the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian culture on the Peninsula, which has already been reported
by the Ministry of Culture for this international dispute.2 I will mention but a few of the
events organised in Crimea in the last six months what is illustrative of the common
practice of implementation of state policy in the field of culture:
(a) Dozens of events in museums across Crimea to mark National Unity Day.3
One of such events organised by the Republican Crimean Tatar Library n.a.
Ismail Gasprinsky featured a display of national costumes and a
performance by the Yildizlar Crimean Tatar children's dance studio; at the
Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage visitors took
part in a master class in traditional Crimean Tatar goldwork embroidery. An
artist of the Qirim Crimean Tatar folklore ensemble performed for the
museum guests, playing various folk instruments.
(b) The celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Museum of Ukrainian
Embroidery named after Vera Roik, organised jointly with the RPO
(regional public organization) “Ukrainian Community of Crimea”, where
songs in Ukrainian were performed;4 and a memorial night in honour of the
111th anniversary of Vera Roik’s birth held on the basis of the Centralised
Library System of Simferopol.
2 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Information note on measures taken to implement the Decree
No. 268 of the President of the Russian Federation and other activities aimed at promoting cultures of the Ukrainian
and Crimean Tatar peoples, Annex 498 to the Counter-Memorial, pp. 3-12.
3 Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, Republican Cultural and Art Institutions Held Over 120 Events
Dedicated to National Unity Day (7 November 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov ru/ru/article/show/10312
(Exhibit A).
4 Crimean Newswire, Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery Celebrated Its 10th Anniversary (26
December 2022), available at: https://crimea-news.com/culture/2022/12/26/1005338.html (Exhibit B).
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(c) Celebration of the anniversary of the Crimean Tatar poet Bekir Chobanzade;
5 celebration of events in honour of the 110th anniversary of the
Crimean Tatar classic of national literature, writer, publicist, and public
figure Shamil Alyadin;6 organization of historical and literary event “Strolls
in the Rose Garden of Khans” dedicated to the 250th birth anniversary of a
Crimean Khan, poet and classic of Crimean Tatar literature Halim Geray
Sultan;7 events of the Inspiration literary association promoting creative
heritage of outstanding Crimean Tatar writers and public figures;8
(d) Readers’ folk fairytale marathons, including Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian,
held on the basis of the Centralised Library System of the Bakhchisaray
District;
(e) Concert by the Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble;9 hosting of a
concert “Prosperity in Unity”, which comprised songs and poems about love
for the homeland in the Crimean Tatar language; 10 organization of
presentation of the documentary drama “Sabriye” dedicated to the life and
work of the great master of the Crimean Tatar singing art Sabriye
Eredzhepova; 11 presentation of the inclusion of the Crimean Tatar
Zinadinov family ensemble from Michurinskoye Village of the Belogorsk
5 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Annual Cycle of Thematic Events Dedicated to Bekir Choban-zade’s Birthday
Anniversary Opened (26 January 2023), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10633 (Exhibit C).
6 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday Anniversary Evening Held (14 July 2022),
available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9837 (Exhibit D); Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Shamil
Aladin’s Benefit Performance Held as Part of Interregional Cooperation (1 June 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9596 (Exhibit E). Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Series of Events
Dedicated to Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday Anniversary Were Completed (24 November 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10386 (Exhibit F).
7 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and Literary Event
Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan (13 September 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10045
(Exhibit G).
8 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library Continues Cycle of
Events by “Inspiration” Literary Association (1 December 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10420 (Exhibit H).
9 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, “Krym” Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble’s Concert Programme Presented
(16 January 2023), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10583 (Exhibit I).
10 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery” Held in Saki (14
October 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10203 (Exhibit J).
11 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre Opens Its 34th Season
(30 September 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov ru/ru/article/show/10133 (Exhibit K).
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District and the Feodosia Karaites holiday Aga-Dumpa in the federal project
“Anthology of Folk Culture ”;12
(f) Organisation of a visit by the Crimean Tatar Academic Theatre troupe to the
Khan’s Palace in Bakhchisaray to prepare for the performance of the drama
“The Fountain of Bakhchisarai”;13
(g) Hosting of All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and
Prospects of Development of Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean
Tatars;14
(h) Celebration of the anniversary of the scholar Emirasan Kurtmollayev, where
students of one of the schools made acquaintance with literature in the
Crimean Tatar language; 15 organization of the “10th Bakhchisaray
Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky” conference dedicated
to the Crimean Tatar historian;16
(i) Organisation of the exhibition “From the Origins to Perfection” at the
Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage displaying old
Crimean Tatar handicrafts of the late 19th to early 20th centuries;17
(j) Exhibition “Khan's Palace as Open-Air Museum” at the Museum of History
and Culture of the Crimean Tatars of the Bakhchisaray Museum-Reserve;18
12 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Aga-Dumpa Feodosian Karaite Fest to
Represent Crimea in “Anthology of Folk Culture” Federal Project (18 November 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10365 (Exhibit L).
13 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” Premiere Took Place at Crimean Tatar
Academic Theatre (23 December 2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov ru/ru/article/show/10524 (Exhibit M).
14 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and Prospects of
Development of Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean Tatars Held (16 December 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10492 (Exhibit N).
15 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan Kurtmollayev’s 120th Birthday
Anniversary (9 December 2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10453 (Exhibit O).
16 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Historians, Archaeologists, Ethnologists, Art Historians and Language
Experts Participated in Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky (13 October 2022),
available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10201 (Exhibit P).
17 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage Presents New
Exhibition (30 November 2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10413 (Exhibit Q).
18 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, “Khan’s Palace as Open-Air Museum” Exhibition Presented in Bakhchisaray
(1 December 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10416 (Exhibit R).
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organisation of student excursions to the Bakhchisaray Museum to get
acquainted with the history, traditions and customs of the Crimean Tatars;19
(k) Organisation of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture Day “Rich Palette of
National Heritage”;20
(l) Exhibition on the material and spiritual culture of the Russian and Ukrainian
peoples “At Native Sources” at the Sudak Fortress Museum-Reserve; 21
(m) Exhibition of traditional Crimean Tatar costumes, where Afize Kasara,
soloist of the Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble of the Crimean State
Philharmonic, performed folk songs of Crimean Tatars;22
(n) Preparation of the exhibition of Crimean Tatar culture and art in the
framework of the XII Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia’s
Peoples;23
(o) Presentation about the origins and celebration of Derviza (a traditional
harvest festivity) by Crimean Tatars to students of the Crimean boarding
school for gifted children as part of a folk crafts fair;24
(p) A conference on the ethnography of the peoples of Crimea; 25
19 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Crimean Tatar History and Culture Museum Hosted Thematic Event Called
“Bakhchisaray: The History Is Near” (30 June 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9760
(Exhibit S).
20 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Republican Library Holds Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture Called
“Rich Palette of National Heritage” (10 November 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10323 (Exhibit T).
21 Preserve Museum “Sudak fortress”, At Native Roots (22 June 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9596 (Exhibit U).
22 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, “Return to the Origins” Exhibition Displays over 20 Old Traditional
Costumes, Including New Ones Sewn by Modern Crimean Designers Pattern-Shaped to 19th Century Samples (30
September 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov ru/ru/article/show/10134 (Exhibit V).
23 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural Heritage at Festival of
Culture and Sports of Southern Russia’s Peoples (26 September 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10105 (Exhibit W).
24 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, “Sketches from Derviza” Folk Crafts Fair Held as Part of Cultural Heritage
Year (23 September 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10103 (Exhibit X).
25 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference on Crimean
Ethnography of 19th -21st Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural Processes Will Be Held (20 September 2022),
available at: https://mkult.rk.gov ru/ru/article/show/10075 (Exhibit Y).
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(q) Hosting of a library forum in Kerch and the Crimean Tatar Book Forum in
Sevastopol, at which Crimean Tatar Great Patriotic War warriors were
remembered, information from Elmira Osmanova's book “Yolshashirma:
the Crimean Tatar Traditional Embroidery Technique” presented, Crimean
Tatar songs played and interaction between national autonomies
discussed;26
(r) Organisation of “Obzhinki” festival of Ukrainian culture with songs and
poems in the Ukrainian language;27
(s) Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival "Derviza;"28 and other activities.
8. Consequently, the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian cultures in the Crimea are currently
receiving unprecedented help and support.
B. SUPPORT FOR THE UKRAINIAN CULTURE IN CRIMEA
9. The Ministry of Culture is monitoring the situation with restoration of the Lesya Ukrainka
house-museum in Yalta.
10. The museum building is at least a hundred years old, and it needed repair and restoration
as early as in the nineties. Nevertheless, in 1991-2014 no systematic protection, repair or
restoration works were made to the Museum’s building, and only minor ongoing repairs
were carried out in order to maintain the Museum’s availability for excursions. Those
were solely superficial repairs aimed at maintaining the external looks of the building but
failing to care for load-bearing structures, structural elements, roof, walls, etc. No
comprehensive restoration was undertaken.
26 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum Organised for Kerch Library Professionals
(7 September 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10018 (Exhibit Z); Ministry of Culture
of the Crimea, Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Library Holds “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum in Sevastopol
(26 June 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9754 (Exhibit AA).
27 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Crimean Central Library Hosted “Obzhinki” Ukrainian Cultural Festival
(30 August 2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov ru/ru/article/show/9984 (Exhibit AB). Government of the
Republic of Crimea, State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea: Crimea Celebrates
Popular Fest Called “Obzhinki” (29 August 2022), available at: https://rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/16927 (Exhibit
AC).
28 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, “Derviza” Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival Winners Announced
(31 May 2022), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9585 (Exhibit AD).
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11. Now a number of septs aimed at preparing for reconstruction have been implemented.
Specifically, in 2016 the museum was included on the list of Russia’s cultural heritage.
In that same year over 9 million roubles from the municipal budged allotted by the Admi
striction of the City of Yalta were spent on research and development resulting in
elaboration of a complete plan of the museum building’s restoration with the total cost of
130.95 million roubles. At the moment the Ministry of Culture is searching for funding
sources for that restoration, both within the framework of national project “Culture”, and
within the city program “Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea
and the City of Sevastopol”.
12. Alas, the Lesya Ukrainka Museum is just one of the many examples of the disastrous
consequences of the Ukrainian authorities’ unwillingness to finance maintenance of
cultural institutions in Crimea before 2014. After Crimea’s reunification with the Russian
Federation, one of the tasks of the Ministry of Culture was to prioritise objects that had
to be restored or renovated. Therefore after careful deliberations it was decided to give
priority to the restoration of cultural facilities in the hinterland of the Peninsula, i.e. rural
clubs, which in many small settlements are the only centre of attraction for residents. A
Herculean effort has been made in this area which has born its fruits. In rural areas, major
repairs have been carried out on 94 cultural institutions, at a total cost of 2.3 billion
roubles (around 31.5 million dollars at current exchange rate).
13. Below are photos of the village club in Novokrymskoye (Dzhankoy District), clearly
showing the results of the restoration:
Stairs to the second floor of the building – before and after
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Events hall – before and after
Hall – before and after
Façade of the building – before and after
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14. I am also attaching photos with the results of restoration works in the clubhouse in the
village of Maryino, Chernomorsky District:
Façade of the building – before and after
Condition of the interior decoration – before and after
Events hall – before and after
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15. Therefore, the first priority was given to the full-scale restoration of cultural life in the
countryside, where, inter alia, many Crimean Tatars live, and now the efforts have
switched to cultural sites in major cities, including Yalta.
16. Nevertheless, the Lesya Ukrainka Museum is still within the attention of the Ministry of
Culture. It further significantly hindered its restoration that it used to have a tenant that
had been unrelated to the Museum.
17. Only in 2018, after a series of trials in courts of different instances initiated after
reunification of Crimea with the Russian Federation, and the termination of the lease
agreement, the tenant who had occupied part of the premises for more than 10 years was
evicted from the right wing of the Museum building. Thanks to the actions of the Yalta
Historical and Literary Museum administration and local self-government bodies of the
city of Yalta, the historical and cultural integrity of the memorial building has been
restored, and the area of the renovated Museum will now cover 771.2 sq. m.
18. The museum exhibits have been transferred to the Yalta History and Literature Museum
for preservation, and are periodically displayed at the exhibition “Yalta. The 19th
Century” and at temporary exhibitions during cultural and educational events dedicated
to anniversaries and commemorations of Ukrainian cultural figures.
19. Various events in memory of Lesya Ukrainka continue to be held in Crimea. A series of
events throughout Crimea marked the 150th anniversary of the poetess’s birth:
(a) A temporary exhibition dedicated to Lesya Ukrainka was opened at the Lesya
Ukrainka Museum on her birthday;
(b) In 2021, a literary night in memory of Taras Shevchenko and Lesya Ukrainka was
held at the Kerch Central Library System (CBS);
(c) In 2021, the exhibition “Strings of Lesya's Soul” was opened in the Soviet District
CBS;
(d) In 2021, the Sudak CBS held an exhibition called (in Ukrainian) “Kvitka na
Dolonіvіchnostі” in honour of the 150th anniversary of Lesya Ukrainka’ birth;
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(e) In 2021 an exhibition dedicated to the poetess was opened in the Yevpatoriya CBS,
with a virtual quiz “The Sun of Crimea Shines in Her Verse";
(f) An exhibition “In Memory of Lesya Ukrainka” was opened in the Dzhankoy
Central District Library; the Dzhankoy CBS held an exhibition and a talk about
Lesya Ukrainka on the topic “I have something in my heart that doesn’t die”.
(g) The Ismail Gasprinsky Crimean Tatar Republican Library also delighted visitors
with a thematic exhibition.
20. The Museum’s staff continues working and organizing exhibitions and events devoted
to distinguished Ukrainian individuals, such as Lesya Ukrainka, ethnographer Kliment
Kvitka, Stepan Rudanskiy, Taras Shevchenko, Mikhail Kotsyubinsky and others.29
21. Besides, exhibitions dedicated to various aspects of Ukrainian culture continue to operate
throughout Crimea:
29 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Letter No. 3096/10-11/4, 3 February 2023 (Exhibit AE).
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Vera Roik Ukrainian Embroidery Museum exposition room
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Ukrainian culture corner in the Bakhchisarai District, Crimea
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Ukrainian culture corner in the village of Zavetnoye, Sovetsky District
22. Thus, national traditions of the Ukrainian people, are cherished and preserved in Crimea.
C. ON THE UKRAINIAN CULTURE CENTRE
23. The “Ukrainian Culture Centre” has not been active in promoting Ukrainian culture and
has not been in contact with the Ministry of Culture officials regarding the organisation
of any cultural events.
24. I have heard that that activists of the “Ukrainian Culture Centre” were involved in the
publication of the Krymskiy Teren “newspaper”. However, as far as I know, there were
only 2 or 3 printed issues of the “newspaper”, it was printed on an amateur basis with the
circulation so small that there are no copies left now even in the archives of the largest
Crimean library, i.e. Library n.a. Ivan Franko.
25. As mentioned above, with regard to initiatives to promote Ukrainian culture, the Ministry
of Culture cooperates with and takes into account the opinion of the RPO “Ukrainian
Community of Crimea", which, in particular, organises the annual festival of Ukrainian
culture “Obzhinki”. 30
30 See above, ¶7(r). See also ¶7(b).
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Obzhinki Festival
D. KHAN’S PALACE
26. The Ministry of Culture attaches great importance to the restoration of the Khan’s Palace.
Unfortunately, before 2014 that unique monument of Crimean Tatar heritage received
little attention and little funding for repairs.
27. The currently ongoing restoration of the Khan’s Palace is a project that involves not only
restoration works but also an archaeological survey of the areas adjacent to the palace
complex. Specialists conduct a thorough archaeological reconnaissance to make sure that
the planned repair work will not damage the buildings of the complex and also investigate
the objects never previously investigated:
(a) Thus, by the Order of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea dated
16.02.2022 No.32-okn a land plot on the palace grounds where ruins of a graveyard
of German soldiers dating back to the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 were
located was included on the list of objects of historical heritage. As of now, in
course of renovation of the Khan’s Palace territory, representatives of the
Association of International Military Memorial Cooperation “Military Memorials”
which under the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation dated
24.09.2010 No.1615-r is authorized to search and exhumated graveyards of foreign
servicemen, have exhumated and re-buried around 100 remains of German soldiers.
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(b) Besides, archaeological excavations near one of the buildings of the complex
revealed the ruins of another ancient structure, presumably also belonging to the
palace ensemble. To be sure, such historical discoveries slow down the works to a
certain extent, but at the same time they give confidence that quality work is being
done and that foundation is being laid for the study of new aspects of the Crimean
Tatar culture.
28. To date, the federal and regional authorities have allocated 3.6 billion roubles for the
restoration works31. In this regard, the arguments that a “campaign of destruction” is being
carried out in relation to the Khan’s Palace are unfounded.
29. Employees of the Ministry of Culture and I personally visit the Khan’s Palace in
Bakhchisaray on a monthly basis to monitor the repair and restoration works at the site.32
Moreover, the Head of the Republic of Crimea, at the initiative of the Crimean Muftiyat,
has established a Public Expert Council for the restoration of the Khan’s Palace, whose
purpose is to conduct independent monitoring and to inform the population about the
progress of the restoration works. The Public Expert Council consists of specialists in
architecture, restoration, and public representatives; it also includes ethnic Crimean
Tatars.
30. I hereby confirm that, to the best of my knowledge and understanding, the information
provided in this witness statement is true.
Witness
31 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Letter No. 3096/10-11/4, 3 February 2023 (Exhibit AE).
32 Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Tatiana Manezhina Visited Conference to Review Progress of Repair and
Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace (18 January 2023), available at: https://mkult rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10597
(Exhibit AF); Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Tatiana Manezhina Visited Bakhchisaray to Review Progress of
Repair and Restoration Work in Khan’s Palace (23 August 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9964 (Exhibit AG); Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Previously
Unknown Painting Fragments Discovered during Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace Inspected (22 September
2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov ru/ru/article/show/10086 (Exhibit AH)
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[Signature]
Tatyana Anatolyevna Manezhina
Simferopol, 7 March 2023
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Annex 16
LIST OF EXHIBITS
Number:
Exhibit A
Exhibit B
Exhibit C
Exhibit D
Exhibit E
Exhibit F
Exhibit G
Exhibit H
Exhibit I
Exhibit J
Name of exhibit:
Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, Republican Cultural and
Art Institutions Held Over 120 Events Dedicated to National Unity Day (7
November 2022).
Crimean Newswire, Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery
Celebrated Its 10th Anniversary (26 December 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Annual Cycle of Thematic Events
Dedicated to Bekir Choban-zade’s Birthday Anniversary Opened (26
January 2023).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday
Anniversary Evening Held (14 July 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Shamil Aladin’s Benefit Performance
Held as Part of Interregional Cooperation (1 June 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Series of Events Dedicated to Shamil
Aladin’s 110th Birthday Anniversary Were Completed
(24 November 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Republican Crimean Tatar Library
Holds Historical and Literary Event Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan (13
September 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean
Tatar Library Continues Cycle of Events by “Inspiration” Literary
Association (1 December 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Krym” Crimean Tatar Folklore
Ensemble’s Concert Programme Presented (16 January 2023).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest
“Stages of Mastery” Held in Saki (14 October 2022).
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Exhibit K
Exhibit L
Exhibit M
Exhibit N
Exhibit O
Exhibit P
Exhibit Q
Exhibit R
Exhibit S
Exhibit T
Exhibit U
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Tatar Academic Music and
Drama Theatre Opens Its 34th Season (30 September 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Aga-
Dumpa Feodosian Karaite Fest to Represent Crimea in “Anthology of Folk
Culture” Federal Project (18 November 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray”
Premiere Took Place at Crimean Tatar Academic Theatre (23 December
2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, All-Russian Scientific Conference on
Topical Issues and Prospects of Development of Cultural and Historical
Heritage of Crimean Tatars Held (16 December 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan
Kurtmollayev’s 120th Birthday Anniversary (9 December 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Historians, Archaeologists,
Ethnologists, Art Historians and Language Experts Participated in
Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky (13
October 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and
Historical Heritage Presents New Exhibition (30 November 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Khan’s Palace as Open-Air Museum”
Exhibition Presented in Bakhchisaray (1 December 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Tatar History and Culture
Museum Hosted Thematic Event Called “Bakhchisaray: The History Is
Near” (30 June 2022).
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Republican Library Holds Day of
Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture Called “Rich Palette of National
Heritage” (10 November 2022).
Preserve Museum “Sudak fortress”, At Native Roots (22 June 2022).

Exhibit A
Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, Republican Cultural and Art Institutions Held
Over 120 Events Dedicated to National Unity Day (7 November 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit A
The programme of events was arranged with the assistance of the Ministry of
Culture of Crimea
Republican institutions of culture and arts held over 120 events dedicated to the Day of National
Unity, including as part of the All-Russian “Night of Arts”. The programme of events was
arranged with the assistance of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea.
In the Year of Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Russia, the programme of events was aimed
at popularising folk arts and preserving cultural traditions, historical and cultural monuments,
ethno-cultural diversity and the cultural identity of the peoples and ethnic communities of the
Russian Federation. It was intended to inspire everyone to search for their creative niche in a
variety of opportunities opened up by arts.
For example, the Ivan Franko Crimean Republican Universal Scientific Library offered a
historical hour called “We Are Strong with One Spirit”, an exhibition of books and periodicals,
a roundtable discussion on “Unity in Harmony” with participation of the regional national and
cultural autonomy Ukrainian Community of Crimea and students of the Crimean University of
Culture, Arts and Tourism, an event called “The Future of Russia is in the Unity of the People”,
a biblio-interactive event, a bibliographic review titled “Where There Is Unity, There Is
Victory”, various illustrated book and virtual exhibitions, a concert, a literary and folklore
performance featuring artists of the art studio Modus Operandi of the Crimean State
Philharmonic, an opening day of the Alexander Mikhalyants anniversary exhibition, and a
variety of master classes, virtual games, ethnic trips and contests.
The Crimean Republican Library for Youth presented a historical sketch “We Are Strong with
One Spirit”, exhibitions of works of art by the Guild of Artists and Masters of the Cimmerian
Land and the creativity studio “Wise Workshop”, performances by young Crimean poets and
musicians, and various master classes.
The Vladimir Orlov Crimean Republican Children’s Library held a series of various events,
including performances, a creative workshop, and a biblio-journey.
The Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library presented a living room named “All
Peoples Visit Us...” presenting its project developed in conjunction with Millet TV to digitise
the collection of records of its department of rare books, archival materials and manuscripts.
The guests attended a show of stylised national costumes featuring teachers and students of the
Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University, took part a toy-making
master class and enjoyed the poems, songs and choreographic compositions performed by
pupils of the Crimean Tatar Children’s Dance Studio “Yildizlar”.
The Simferopol Art Museum offered sightseeing tours, master classes, performances by soloists
of the Crimean State Philharmonic, the performance of a play titled “The Importance of Being
Earnest”, and various exhibitions.
The Crimean Movie and Media Centre offered a video lecture “Cinema as Life” and various
master classes, and the Yalta Movie Studio screened the domestic films “From Sorrow to Joy”
and “Once Upon a Time”.
The Crimean Tatar State Academic Music and Drama Theatre invited schoolchildren, pupils of
theatrical studios and students to take part in an interactive performance, learn to create masks
Annex 16 Exhibit A
for the Theatre’s productions, make excursions around the Theatre’s backstage, and attend a
ballet performance. The Theatre’s foyer accommodated an exposition of objects of national
colour and a photo area. On the Theatre’s main stage, directors, artists and guests staged an
excerpt from a play titled “Those Who Do Not Appreciate Time Are Close to Oblivion”.
On its cultural and educational evening, the Crimean Academic Puppet Theatre presented the
exhibitions “Theatrical Posters” and “Theatrical Dolls” accommodated in a small area. An
introductory conversation about the history of the Theatre by public relations specialist Natalia
Vasilieva was full of interesting facts from the life of the Theatre’s company and its
achievements of recent years. Students of the Vladimir Vernadsky Crimean Federal University
held a master class on how to make advertising products. At the end of the event, all those
present watched a farce performance “What Happened to the Crocodile?” based on the play by
Marina Moskvina and Sergei Sedov.
The State Academic Musical Theatre of the Republic of Crimea presented a photo area imitating
theatrical stages, an exhibition of theatrical costumes, master classes by decorators, hairdressers
and make-up artists, various quizzes and video lectures, and an exhibition of children’s
drawings named “Dance of the Soul”.
The Ismail Gasprinsky Memorial Museum hosted a thematic event called “Art Unites”,
complemented by performances by students of the Bakhchisaray Children’s Music School.
The Sudak Fortress Museum Reserve offered a rich programme of events, including talks,
exhibitions, assemblies, musical and literary living rooms, and theatrical performances.
The East Crimean Historical and Cultural Museum Reserve presented an exhibition titled “The
Science of Victory”, a theatrical excursion, and a concert of students and teachers of the local
children’s music school.
Students and teachers of the Crimean University of Culture, Arts and Tourism prepared various
creative projects. The exhibitions of decorative paintings and clay dolls, and the premiere
performance of a play titled “An Opera for Three Roubles” based on Bertolt Brecht’s “The
Threepenny Opera” aroused a keen interest among the visitors.
The Maximilian Voloshin House Museum offered a guided tour of the exhibition “The Worlds
and Miracles of Voloshin’s September”, presented a play titled “Your Love Is Like the Milky
Way...”, and screened a feature movie “At the Beginning of Glorious Days”.
The Museum of Marina and Anastasia Tsvetaeva met the guests with a literary and musical
performance. Feodosia schoolchildren took part in a master class on how to make traditional
knot dolls and enjoyed a presentation of a collection of coiled dolls in costumes of the peoples
of Russia. A thematic excursion “The Earthly Journey of the Star Ariadne” arouse great interest
among the visitors.
The Literary and Art Museum of the Town of Staryi Krym held an hour called “This Country
Is Famous for Its Unity”, telling the guests about the wedding traditions of the peoples of the
Crimea, and the Konstantin Paustovsky House Museum offered a literary quest called “You
Need to Live a Life of Wandering” and an evening meeting titled “The Art of Seeing the
World”.
Annex 16 Exhibit A
The Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage held a number of events,
including temporary and permanent exhibitions. An artist of the Crimea Crimean Tatar Folklore
Ensemble played musical compositions on various folk instruments. Embroidery enthusiasts
took part in master classes on “Traditional Crimean Tatar Gold Embroidery” and “Urban
Landscapes on Graphic Drawings”.
The Museum of the Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Amet-Khan Sultan in Alupka hosted a
literary evening.
The Museum of History and Archaeology (in Staryi Krym) told the visitors about the history of
the medieval town of Solkhat and its culture, demonstrating unique exhibits. As part of the
creative meeting with masters of decorative and applied arts, master classes on “myklama” gold
sewing, beading and clay modelling were held.
The Andrey Beketov Estate Museum invited the guests to visit free excursions “Life and Work
of Andrey Beketov” and “Museum Exhibits Tell”. On the veranda of the old house, the visitors
were introduced to a poster exhibition “35 years of the Museum: History, Traditions, and
Projects”. They were told about the history of the architectural monument of the late 19th
century, which is no less interesting than the Museum’s collection. The Museum’s exhibition
halls presented a personal exhibition of paintings by Nikolai Dudchenko, “Inspiration and
Forms. Painting and Graphics”. The Museum’s music lounge pleased all those present with the
sounds of classical music performed by a teacher of the Alushta Children’s Music School.
The Centre for Folk Arts of the Republic of Crimea located in the building of the I.Y. Franko
Crimean Republican Universal Scientific Library housed an exhibition of dolls titled “Tales of
Crimean Masters”, and the department of culture and folk crafts presented an exhibition of
works by Remeslo Crimean Creative Association, a master class on decorative and applied arts
named “Khokhloma Paintings”, and a master class by Nikolai Barsky on “Production of
Wooden Painted Souvenirs Based on Ornaments and Patterns of the Peoples of Russia”. In
addition, a festival marathon was held on the Centre’s official website and on VKontakte.
The guests of the Livadiya Palace Museum visited a thematic tour of “Yalta-45. A New World
Was Created Here” presenting some interesting facts about the Crimean Conference of the
leaders of the three allied powers of the Anti-Hitler Coalition – the USSR, the United States,
and the UK. In conjunction with the members of the Yalta Historical Reconstruction Club, the
Museum’s scientific staff managed to recreate the atmosphere of the historical events. The
cultural programme continued with a theatrical excursion “An Italian Palazzo for the Russian
Empress”. Together with a traveller in time – a lady of the Renaissance, the visitors could
plunge into the atmosphere of Tsar’s Livadiya of 1911 by visiting a ball in the White Hall,
meeting people from the close circle of the imperial family and learning more about the
architectural features of the Livadiya Palace. The evening ended with a multimedia project
“Diplomacy at the Dining Table”, which introduced the audience to the culinary preferences of
the parties to the Crimean Conference and was broadcast on the Museum’s official pages on
social networks.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit B
Crimean Newswire, Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery Celebrated Its 10th
Anniversary (26 December 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit B
Translation
Crimean Newswire, Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery Celebrated Its 10th
Anniversary (26 December 2022), available at: https://crimeanews.
com/culture/2022/12/26/1005338.html.
Crimean Newswire
Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery Celebrated Its
Tenth Anniversary
26 December 2022 at 05:50 PM
Culture
The Crimean Ethnographic Museum
hosted the “Pattern on Canvas” event
dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the
Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian
Embroidery. The event was held
jointly with the Ukrainian Community
of Crimea regional civil society
organisation.
Lyudmila Naumenko, the host of the
event and Deputy Director of the
Crimean Ethnographic Museum, welcomed the audience pointing out how important it had
been to establish the Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery.
The event began with a musical greeting from the Poyuschie Serdtsa [Singing Hearts] vocal
band (led by Alexander Dudorov) who performed songs in Russian and Ukrainian.
Sergey Patrushev, Head of the Department of Museums, Libraries and Cultural Education,
spoke on behalf of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea stressing the significant
role of the Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery in preserving the history and culture of Ukrainians
in Crimea.
Ruslan Yakubov, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the
Republic of Crimea, made a welcoming speech and congratulated the museum and the
Ukrainian community, noting the community’s active efforts in preserving and popularising
Ukrainian culture in the region.
The event was continued by Natalia Filippova, Head of the Museum’s Research Department,
who told how the collection of Ukrainian culture objects was put together in 2018-2022.
Anastasia Gridchina, Chairwoman of the Ukrainian Community of Crimea regional civil
society organisation, made a welcoming speech, thanked the museum staff for their fruitful
cooperation, and awarded certificates of honour to the Crimean Ethnographic Museum and
members of the local and regional Ukrainian community of Crimea. The museum was donated
some interesting exhibits that would make a great addition to the museum’s permanent and
Annex 16 Exhibit B
temporary exhibitions: a bandura, a spinning wheel, and textile items.
Nadezhda Ryndych, Deputy Chairwoman of the Ukrainian community of Crimea, read some
of her own poetry.
At the end of the event, the Kumushki vocal band (led by Galina Navrotskaya) performed
traditional Ukrainian and Russian folk songs.
FOR REFERENCE: The Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery was established in 2012 as part of
the Crimean Ethnographic Museum on the basis of a collection of Ukrainian culture objects
held at the Ethnographic Museum and a collection of embroidery items by Vera Roik.
The Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery currently has three exhibition areas: the hall
titled “The History of Ukrainian Embroidery – from the Creation of a Canvas to the Finished
Product”, the celebrated embroiderer’s memorial room, and an exhibition of works by modern
Crimean embroiderers.
The Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery has become the spot where events related to
the popularization of decorative and applied arts of the Eastern Slavs are held, such as: the
Vera Roik Republican Biennale of East Slavic Folk Embroidery “Patterns on Canvas”, the
“Towel for T. Shevchenko’s 200th birthday anniversary” project, and various thematic events
dedicated to the life of and work of Vera Roik.
Press office of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit C
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Annual Cycle of Thematic Events Dedicated to Bekir Chobanzade’s
Birthday Anniversary Opened (26 January 2023)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit C
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Annual Cycle of Thematic Events Dedicated to Bekir
Choban-zade’s Birthday Anniversary Opened (26 January 2023), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10633.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
Official Resources
MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
1 February, Wednesday
ONLINE RECEPTION
Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Annual Cycle of Thematic Events Dedicated to Bekir Choban-zade’s Birthday Anniversary
Opened
Annual Cycle of Thematic Events Dedicated to Bekir Choban-zade’s
Anniversary Opened
Annex 16 Exhibit C
2023 will mark the 130th anniversary of the birthday of Bekir Choban-zade, a
classic of Crimean Tatar literature and an outstanding Turkologist, teacher and
public figure.
2023 will mark the 130th anniversary of Bekir Choban-zade, a classic of Crimean Tatar
literature and an outstanding Turkologist, teacher and public figure. To mark the anniversary of
the great poet and as part of the Year of Teachers and Mentors, the Ismail Gasprinsky
Republican Crimean Tatar Library, with support from the Ministry of Culture of the Republic
of Crimea, plans to hold a library panorama “Bekir Choban-zade’s Word” throughout the year.
It should be noted that two libraries in the Crimea bear the name of the famous scientist and
writer: the Bekir Choban-zade Crimean Tatar Library Branch No. 32 of the Belogorsk
Centralised Library System, and the Bekir Choban-zade Library Branch No. 16 of the
Simferopol Centralised Adult Library System.
The grand opening of the thematic cycle was attended by employees of the republican libraries
and centralised library systems of the Crimea, creative intellectuals, public figures, admirers of
the writer’s work, and the laureates of the Bekir Choban-zade International Prize.
Welcoming the guests, Gulnara Yagyaeva, Director of the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican
Crimean Tatar Library, noted that the opening of the library panorama is the beginning of the
events initiated by her institution in the year of Bekir Choban-zade’s birthdate anniversary.
Various writers, artists and librarians spoke about the life and talents of Bekir Choban-zade and
the need to popularise his creative heritage. A review of the exhibition-portrait titled “The
Heritage of Bekir Choban-zade” was held, and an exposition of paintings by Crimean honoured
artists Zarema Trasinova and Irfan Nafiyev called “The Poet’s World” was presented. Some of
the poetic and prosaic works by the classic as well works as created in his honour were read
aloud at the event.
HISTORICAL INFORMATION. A classic of Crimean Tatar literature, a Turkologist, a teacher
and a public figure, Bekir Sydkiy Choban-zade was born on the 15th of May (27th of May
according to New Style) 1893 in Karasubazar (currently known as Belogorsk) and died on the
13th of October 1937 in Baku).
From 1909 to 1914, he studied at the Galatasaray Lyceum in Istanbul. In 1914, he graduated
from the university courses of Arabic and French languages. He has also graduated from the
Faculty of History and Philology of the University of Budapest. In 1919, he defended his thesis
on “Apparent Synharmonic Inconsistencies in Codex Cumanicus and the Issue of the
Articulatory Basis in Turkic Languages”.
Bekir Choban-zade has written about 200 publications, including over 120 scientific ones. His
literary heritage includes about 80 pieces of poetry, two poems, and eight stories. He was a
Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, a full member of the Azerbaijani Branch of the USSR Academy
of Sciences, and a member of the Paris Linguistic Society. In addition to Crimean Tatar, he
also spoke Azerbaijani, Arabic, Hungarian, Kazakh, Karachay-Balkar, Kumyk, German,
Persian, Russian, Turkish, Turkmen, Uzbek, and French. In 2006, the Bekir Choban-zade
International Prize was established.
From 2012 to 2018, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library held literary
soirees named “The World of Bekir Choban-zade”.
Exhibit D
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday Anniversary Evening Held
(14 July 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit D
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday Anniversary Evening
Held (14 July 2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9837.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
Official Resources
MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
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VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED
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Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday Anniversary Evening Held
The Republican Crimean Tatar Library continues familiarising its visitors with
the various facets of the classical writer’s heritage
Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday Anniversary Evening Held
Annex 16 Exhibit D
With support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Ismail Gasprinsky
Republican Crimean Tatar Library continues its series of events in the memory of outstanding
figures of culture and arts. More specifically, it held an evening called “High Service” dedicated
to the 110th birthday anniversary of Shamil Aladin, a classic of Crimean Tatar national
literature, a writer, a publicist, a public figure, and a participant of the Great Patriotic War.
The event was attended by Shamil Aladin’s colleagues, students, and relatives as well as
scientists and readers who shared their memories of the writer and told the audience about the
specific features of his works.
The Library conducted a review of a portrait exhibition named “Yuksek Khyzmet” based on its
collections. The guests were presented with a movie named “Nefaset” (“Elegance”) filmed for
Shamil Aladin’s anniversary. They listened to archival audio recordings of some pieces of his
poetry, including “Adzhizlik Ile Chatyshuv” (“Struggle against Helplessness”) featuring his
live voice and “Ana” (“Mother”) recited by playwright Gani Murad, and a song titled “Kel,
Guzelim” (“Come, the Beauty”) based on his lyrics (with the music written by Ilyas Bakhshish).
The Library will continue familiarising its users with the various facets of the classic’s works
as part of its creative gallery.
HISTORICAL INFORMATION. Shamil Seitovich Alyadinov (who wrote under the pen name
“Shamil Aladin”) was born on the 12th of July 1912 in the village of Makhuldur in the Kuibyshev
District (currently known as Nagornoye in the Bakhchysarai District). He received his primary
education at the local school and then continued his studies at a Bakhchisaray seven-year
school. From 1928 till 1931, he studied at the Simferopol Pedagogical College and later
graduated from the correspondence department of the Moscow Literary Institute. Shamil Aladin
has authored dozens of literature collections.
Şamil was a member of the USSR Union of Writers (1939) and Board Chairman of the Union
of Soviet Writers of Crimea (1939-1941). Following his people, he was deported from Crimea.
In Uzbekistan, he was a member and Head of the Section of Crimean Tatar Writers under the
Uzbekistani Union of Writers. He was awarded the titles of “Honoured Cultural Worker of the
Uzbek SSR” (1973) and “Honoured Artist of the Uzbek SSR” (1982). He returned to Crimea in
1994 to stay in Simferopol. Shamil Aladin passed away on the 21st of May 1996.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit E
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Shamil Aladin’s Benefit Performance Held as Part of
Interregional Cooperation (1 June 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit E
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Shamil Aladin’s Benefit Performance Held as Part of
Interregional Cooperation (1 June 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9596.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
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MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
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Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Shamil Aladin’s Benefit Performance Held as Part of Interregional Cooperation
Shamil Aladin’s Benefit Performance Held as Part of Interregional
Cooperation
Annex 16 Exhibit E
The project is dedicated to the 110th birthday anniversary of the Crimean Tatar
classical writer
With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea and as part of
interregional cooperation, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library hosted a
benefit performance of Shamil Aladin.
The “High Service” event was held in a hybrid format with about 60 libraries from the Southern
and North Caucasus Federal Districts and the Krasnodar Territory taking part.
Dedicated to the 110th birthday anniversary of Shamil Aladin, a classic of the Crimean Tatar
literature, a publicist, a public figure and a participant of the Great Patriotic War, the event was
arranged as the information and literary online dialogue “The Literary Caucasus: Hear the Fiery
Words of Wisdom...”.
The Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library presented a virtual exhibition named
“Excerpts from the Writer’s Front-Line Diary”. Teachers and students of the Institute of
Philology of the Vladimir Vernadsky Crimean Federal University spoke at the event. Shamil
Aladin’s poetic works “Pre-Dawn Nightingale” and “In the Trench” were performed in the
Crimean Tatar and Russian languages as recorded by the author and read aloud by students of
the Crimean Boarding School for Gifted Children. The song “I Fell in Love with You” based
on Shamil Aladin’s lyrics was also presented to the audience.
Annex 16 Exhibit E
During the benefit performance, the Ismail Gasprinsky Crimean Tatar Library presented its
creative gallery that will continue to acquaint its users with various facets of Shamil Aladin’s
talent throughout the current year.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit F
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Series of Events Dedicated to Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday
Anniversary Were Completed (24 November 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit F
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Series of Events Dedicated to Shamil Aladin’s 110th
Birthday Anniversary Were Completed (24 November 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10386.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
Official Resources
MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
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VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED
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Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Series of Events Dedicated to Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday Anniversary Were Completed
Series of Events Dedicated to Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday
Anniversary Were Completed
Annex 16 Exhibit F
During the thematic cycle, the users of the Republican Crimean Tatar Library
familiarised themselves with various facets of the classical writer’s heritage
With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea and as part of the cultural
and local history project called “The Crimea Where We Live”, the Ismail Gasprinsky
Republican Crimean Tatar Library completed its series of anniversary events as part of its
single-writer creative gallery named “High Service” dedicated to the 110th birthday anniversary
of Shamil Aladin, a classical writer of Crimean Tatar national literature, an essayist, a public
figure and a participant of the Great Patriotic War.
During the thematic cycle, the users familiarised themselves with various facets of the classical
writer’s heritage.
The Library presented a literary view on “The Writer’s Spiritual World” with participation of
teachers and students of the Institute of Philology of the Vladimir Vernadsky Crimean Federal
University. The event focused on the writer’s special role in the Crimean Tatar literature.
Specialists of the Library conducted a review of the virtual exhibition dedicated to certain stages
of Shamil Aladin’s life and work.
The guests of the anniversary cycle’s final event – a literary review called “The Prose Writer’s
Talented Pen” – included writers, philologists, and journalists.
The participants shared their personal memories of Shamil Aladin and spoke about the artistic,
linguistic, cultural and historical features of his works forming part of the golden fund of
Crimean Tatar literature.
HISTORICAL INFORMATION. Shamil Seitovich Alyadinov (who wrote under the pen name
“Shamil Aladin”) was born on the 12th of July 1912 in the village of Makhuldur in the Kuibyshev
District (currently known as Nagornoye in the Bakhchysaray District). From 1928 through
1931, he studied at the Simferopol Pedagogical College and later graduated from the
correspondence department of the Moscow Literary Institute.
He is the author of poetic and prose collections titled “The Earth Smiled, the Sky Smiled”
(1932), “Songs of the Chervony Cossack” (1935), “Life” (1940), “If You Love” (1961, 1962,
and 1964), “Girl in Green” (1969), “Lanterns Burn until Dawn” (1969, 1970, and 1982),
“Elmaz” (1972), “Iblisnin Ziyafitetine Davet” (1979), “Teselli” (1985), “Springs” (1987), and
“I am Your King and God” (2004), as well as books “High Service” (1983), “Drillers” (1991),
etc. His works have been translated into many languages.
Shamil Aladin was a member of the USSR Union of Writers (1939) and Board Chairman of the
Union of Soviet Writers of Crimea (1939-1941). On 26 June 1941, he volunteered to go to the
front. After being wounded, he participated in the guerrilla movement. Later, he was deported
from Crimea.
In Uzbekistan, he was a member and the head of the Section of Crimean Tatar Writers under
the Uzbekistani Union of Writers. He was directly involved in the establishment of the
newspaper Leninskoye Znamya, the magazine Yildiz, the ensemble Haytarma, and a radio
editorial office.
Shamil Aladin has been awarded the titles of “Honoured Cultural Worker of the Uzbek SSR”
(1973) and “Honoured Artist of the Uzbek SSR” (1982).
He returned to Crimea in 1994 to stay in Simferopol. Shamil Aladin passed away on the 21st of
May 1996.
Exhibit G
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and
Literary Event Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan (13 September 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit G
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and
Literary Event Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan (13 September 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10045.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
Official Resources
MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
1 February, Wednesday
VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED
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Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and Literary Event Dedicated to Halim
Geray Sultan
Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and Literary
Event Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan
Annex 16 Exhibit G
The event was arranged by the Inspiration Association
With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic Crimea, the Ismail Gasprinsky
Republican Crimean Tatar Library hosted a historical and literary event called “Walks in the
Khans’ Rose Garden”, which was arranged by the Inspiration Literary Association and
dedicated to the 250th birthday anniversary of Halim Geray Sultan, a Crimean Khan, a poet, and
a Crimean Tatar classiсal writer.
The Library’s user service section conducted a review of a book titled “Gulbyun-i Khanan”
(“The Khans’ Pink Flower Garden, or the History of Crimea”), which describes the biographies
of the 44 Crimean Khans. The review was supplemented by excerpts from the book and pieces
of poetry written by Halim Gerai in the 18th century.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit H
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library
Continues Cycle of Events by “Inspiration” Literary Association (1 December 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit H
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library
Continues Cycle of Events by “Inspiration” Literary Association (1 December 2022),
available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10420.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
Official Resources
MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
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Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library Continues Cycle of Events by
“Inspiration” Literary Association
Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library Continues
Cycle of Events by “Inspiration” Literary Association
Annex 16 Exhibit H
The meetings with readers are aimed at popularising the creative heritage of the
outstanding Crimean Tatar writers and public figures
With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Ismail Gasprinsky
Republican Crimean Tatar Library continues its series of events prepared by the “Inspiration”
Literary Association.
The meetings with readers are aimed at popularising the creative heritage of the outstanding
Crimean Tatar writers and public figures.
During the loud readings called “Humorous Stories”, dedicated to the 105th anniversary of
Yakub Zekka, the guests got acquainted with the writer’s biography and works, items of the
Library’s collections, and the stories titled “Knock off a Bottle between Three”, “Magic
Deception” and others.
Annex 16 Exhibit H
The readings were attended by Seyyare Medzhitova, a poetess and journalist, Alie Seitumerova,
one of the first members of the literary club, and readers. To make Yakub Zekka’s works more
readily available to a wider audience, the Library’s official website presented “Cheat Sheet”
and “Football as a Passion”, which were read aloud out by Elvira Kapnist, a poetess, and Sevile
Gafarova, a regular reader.
The Library held an event named “Sorrowful Memories of the Poet” dedicated to the 95th
anniversary of Idris Asanin, a poet, a writer, a public figure and a participant in the Crimean
Tatar national movement.
Annex 16 Exhibit H
The writer’s archive stored in the Library’s department of rare books, manuscripts and archival
materials contains documents about the history, literature and culture of the Crimean Tatars as
well as rich illustrative materials.
The guests and participants of the meeting shared their memories of the poet and recited his
works. The speakers included students of the Crimean Boarding School for Gifted Children as
well as Crimean poets. The event was complemented by presentations and an exhibition
revealing all facets of the activities of the outstanding writer and public figure.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit I
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Krym” Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble’s Concert
Programme Presented (16 January 2023)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit I
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Krym” Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble’s Concert
Programme Presented (16 January 2023), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10583.
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> Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble’s Concert Programme Presented
The Ensemble performed traditional dances that make up the classics of folk
choreography.
Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble’s Concert Programme
Presented
Annex 16 Exhibit I
On the stage of the Simferopol Cultural and Leisure Centre, the Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore
Ensemble of the Crimean State Philharmonic presented its concert programme called “Sound,
My Crimea”, which has absorbed all the best created by the Crimean Tatar national culture and
brightly and emotionally reflected its past and present.
The programme was written by Server Kakura, Artistic Director of the Ensemble and Honoured
Artist of Ukraine, the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Crimea. Nazire Emir, Honoured
Artist of the Republic of Crimea, was the programme’s choreographer.
Both young and venerable performers and masters of folk song, including Yunus Kakura, Afeze
Kasara, Asie Saale, Mamet Kharhara, and Arsen Bekirov, Honoured Artist of the Republic of
Crimea and the Republic of Tatarstan, took part in the concert.
The Ensemble performed traditional dances that make up the classics of folk choreography:
Tym-tym, Agyr ava ve haytarma, Choban oyuny, Yavluk avasy, Yigitler, and Khoran. A
colourful musical and choreographic action recreating the “Bride Colouring Evening” from the
traditional Wedding Rite, the performance was filled with warmth and tenderness.
Maye Anafiyeva, Honoured Artist of the Republic of Crimea, presented a solo choreographic
composition in the folk style “If I Was a Bird” made in the best traditions of Selima
Chelebiyeva, a legendary folk dancer.
A piece called “Tunes of the Motherland”, which was masterfully performed by an instrumental
ensemble, left a vivid impression.
Elmar Ablayev, Honoured Artist of the Republic of Crimea, an actor, a theatre and film director,
and a screenwriter, acted as the host of the concert programme and an elocutionist.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit J
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery” Held in
Saki (14 October 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit J
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery”
Held in Saki (14 October 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10203.
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> All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery” Held in Saki
All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery” Held in Saki
Annex 16 Exhibit J
Creative collectives presented their concert programme named “Prosperity in
Unity”
As part of the All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery”, local creative collectives
presented their concert programme named “Prosperity in Unity” at the Yuri Bogatikov
Children’s Music School in Saki.
Nadezhda Latysheva, Director of the Museum of Local Lore and the History of Mud Therapy,
conducted for the guests and the jury of the project a tour of an exhibition of products of
decorative and applied arts and artistic creativity made by Saki masters.
The concert programme included songs and poems about love for the Motherland in the Russian
and Crimean Tatar languages. The folk Cossack ensemble of songs and dances “Free Wind”
united all those present with its dance “Friendship of Peoples”. A cheerful hytarma was also
performed.
The All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Steps of Mastery” will last until the end of this year.
Alushta will become the next region to present its concert programme. Performances of vocal
and choreographic collectives and individual performers will take place on the 8th of November.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit K
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre Opens Its
34th Season (30 September 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit K
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre
Opens Its 34th Season (30 September 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10133.
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> Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre Opens Its 34th Season
Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre Opens Its 34th
Season
Annex 16 Exhibit K
The Theatre premiered a drama named “Sabriye” dedicated to the life and work
of Sabriye Eredzhepova, a great master of the Crimean Tatar art of singing
The Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre opened its 34th season.
As part of the start of the new theatrical season, the Theatre premiered a drama named
“Sabriye”. The play is dedicated to the life and work of Sabriye Eredzhepova, a great master of
the Crimean Tatar art of singing. The touching performance stroke a chord of every spectator.
The following friends who lived next door to Sabriye Eredzhepova in Tashkent actively assisted
in writing and producing the play: Lilya Dzhemileva and her daughter Gulnara Murtazayeva;
Sabriye Apte, a friend of Sabriye Eredzhepova’s family; Rustema Memetova, Gulizar Bekirova
and Zarema Khanum, colleagues of Sabriye Eredzhepova; Zarema Trasinova (who helped
clarify the biographical details of Sabriye Eredzhepova); and Prof. Ibrahim Kerimov (who
provided consultations on her creative work).
In addition, in this October, the Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre will present
its performances “Sunny Friend” based on the play by Renat Bektashev, “Amet Khan, the
Heavenly Sultan” describing the life and exploits of Amet-Khan Sultan, a native Crimean, a
legendary ace and twice Hero of the Soviet Union, and “Eki Asyr Arasynda” depicting the main
milestones of the biography, creativity and journalism of Ismail Gasprinsky, a famous
enlightener, and its concert programme named “By the Road of Good”.
The Theatre plans to give those performances in Simferopol, its home city, and as field shows
in a variety of other Crimean cities, towns and villages. Spectators will be able to visit those
performances by presenting their Pushkin Cards.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit L
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Aga-Dumpa Feodosian
Karaite Fest to Represent Crimea in “Anthology of Folk Culture” Federal Project
(18 November 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit L
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Aga-Dumpa Feodosian
Karaite Fest to Represent Crimea in “Anthology of Folk Culture” Federal Project (18
November 2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10365.
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> Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Aga-Dumpa Feodosian Karaite Fest to Represent Crimea in
“Anthology of Folk Culture” Federal Project
Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Aga-Dumpa Feodosian Karaite Fest
to Represent Crimea in “Anthology of Folk Culture” Federal Project
Annex 16 Exhibit L
The presentation of the federal project “Anthology of Folk Culture” became the key event
of the international forum of the CIS and Baltic countries “Folk Cultures in the 21st
Century: Traditions and Innovations”
The presentation of the federal project “Anthology of Folk Culture” became the key event of
the international forum of the CIS and Baltic countries “Folk Cultures in the 21st Century:
Traditions and Innovations” in St. Petersburg. The project includes 100 objects of the intangible
cultural heritage of the Russian peoples. The Crimea is represented by the Zinadinov Family
Ensemble from the village of Michurinskoye in the Belogorsk District and the Aga-Dumpa
Feodosian Karaite.
The forum was founded by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and organised by
the Vasily Polenov State Russian House of Folk Art.
The international forum is intended to form a uniform cultural space, disseminate knowledge
about national cultures, and draw the attention of both governmental authorities and the general
public to the issues of intangible cultural heritage.
Professionals and specialists from 40 regions of Russia as well as Kazakhstan and Belarus took
part in the forum. During the plenary session, discussion platforms and round tables, the
participants discussed how to study and popularise Russia’s ethno-cultural heritage. Experts
from the houses of folk arts and centres of traditional culture unveiled their scientific,
methodological and educational releases.
Olga Chernikova, Director of the Centre of Folk Arts, took part in the forum on behalf of the
Republic of Crimea.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit M
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” Premiere Took Place at
Crimean Tatar Academic Theatre (23 December 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit M
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” Premiere Took Place at
Crimean Tatar Academic Theatre (23 December 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10524.
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> “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” Premiere Took Place at Crimean Tatar Academic Theatre
The play was based on the famous poem by Alexander Pushkin.
“The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” Premiere Took Place at Crimean Tatar
Academic Theatre
Annex 16 Exhibit M
The Crimean Tatar State Academic Music and Drama Theatre premiered a drama titled “The
Fountain of Bakhchisaray”.
For almost three months, the Theatre’s artists, directors, props, painters, and composers have
worked hard to stage Oedipus Emir’s script based on the famous poem by Alexander Pushkin.
The play has been directed by Yuri Khadzhinov.
While working on the stage performance, the company visited the Khan’s Palace in
Bakhchisaray to immerse themselves more deeply into the roles and atmosphere of the epoch
of the Crimean Khanate. The bellicose scenes performed by the ballet dancers and the gentle
voices of the vocalists in the episodes showing the harem’s life undoubtedly added depth and
dynamism to the play. Khan Giray’s tragedy, Maria’s thoughts of retribution, and Zarema’s
unconditional love for her homeland and the Khan have all convolved together in the Crimean
Tatar Theatre’s new drama named “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” (Bağçasaray Çeşmesi).
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit N
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and
Prospects of Development of Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean Tatars Held
(16 December 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit N
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and
Prospects of Development of Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean Tatars Held (16
December 2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10492.
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> All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and Prospects of Development of
Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean Tatars Held
All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and Prospects of
Development of Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean Tatars
Held
Annex 16 Exhibit N
The scientific forum was dedicated to the memory of Noman Chelebijihan, Mufti
of the Crimean Muslims and a famous socio-political figure.
With support from the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Crimean Tatar
Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage hosted an All-Russian Scientific Conference with
International Participation on Topical Issues and Prospects of the Development of the Cultural
and Historical Heritage of the Crimean Tatars dedicated to the memory of Noman Chelebijihan,
Mufti of the Crimean Muslims and a famous socio-political and literary figure, and to the 105th
anniversary of the First Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar People.
The conference was arranged for by the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical
Heritage in conjunction with the editorial board of the newspaper “Crimea’s Voice New” and
the Spiritual Direction of Muslims of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol to discuss topical
issues related to the preservation, study and popularisation of the Crimean historical and cultural
heritage.
Safiye Eminova, Director of the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage,
opened the event by expressing gratitude to those present for their participation in the
conference.
Raim Gafarov, Deputy Mufti of the Spiritual Direction of Muslims of the Republic of Crimea
and Sevastopol, made a welcoming speech.
Annex 16 Exhibit N
The conference included speeches by representatives of the scientific community, public
organisations and educational institutions as well as museum experts.
Annex 16 Exhibit N
The final plenary session summed up the results of the scientific forum. At the end of the event,
exhibitions prepared by the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage were
presented to the audience.
Annex 16 Exhibit N
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit O
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan Kurtmollayev’s 120th
Birthday Anniversary (9 December 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit O
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan Kurtmollayev’s
120th Birthday Anniversary (9 December 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10453.
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Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan Kurtmollayev’s 120th Birthday Anniversary
Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan Kurtmollayev’s 120th Birthday
Anniversary
Annex 16 Exhibit O
The events were arranged for as part of the project “Enlightenment” by the Ismail
Gasprinsky Crimean Tatar Library
With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea and as part of the cultural
and educational project “Enlightenment”, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar
Library arranged for a series of events dedicated to the 120th birthday anniversary of Emirasan
Kurtmollayev, an outstanding linguist and teacher.
For example, a biblio-lesson named “Philological Scientist Emirasan Kurtmollayev” was held
on the premises of Secondary School 22 in Simferopol. Library experts told the students about
Mr. Kurtmollayev’s scientific works and presented some pieces of literature in the Crimean
Tatar language.
The Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library hosted an hour of science named “A
Scientist Deeply Worried about His Native Language”. The event was attended by employees
and students of the Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University, creative
intellectuals, journalists, and relatives of the scientist. The participants noted the contribution
made by Emirasan Kurtmollayev to the development of Crimean Tatar linguistics and national
language studies and shared memories of his life.
As part of the event, a thematic exhibition of books and documents from the library collections
was presented.
HISTORICAL INFORMATION. Emirasan Kurtmollayev was born on 7 December 1902 in the
village of Buyuk-Ozenbash (currently known as Schastlivoye) in the Bakhchisaray District. He
graduated from the Totaikoy Pedagogical College (1926) and the Faculty of the Crimean Tatar
Language and Literature of the Mikhail Frunze Crimean Pedagogical Institute (1930). After
completing his postgraduate studies at this University in 1933-1941, he taught at an institute
and worked as a senior researcher at the Pushkin Research Institute of Tatar Language and
Literature. He participated in the Second and Third All-Crimean Scientific Conferences on the
Crimean Tatar Language (in 1929 and 1934). He has authored/co-authored and edited many
textbooks for schools. “Spelling Dictionary of the Crimean Tatar Language” prepared by a
team of scientists including Mr. Kurtmollayev was reprinted four times from 1936 through
1941.
During the Great Patriotic War, he served in the rank of lieutenant and participated in the
partisan movement in Crimea. During the deportation years, he taught in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan and had his articles published in Leninskoye Znamya.
He passed away on the 11th of April 1973 in the city of Alma-Ata.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit P
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Historians, Archaeologists, Ethnologists, Art Historians and
Language Experts Participated in Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein
Bodaninsky (13 October 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit P
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Historians, Archaeologists, Ethnologists, Art Historians
and Language Experts Participated in Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of
Usein Bodaninsky (13 October 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10201.
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> Historians, Archaeologists, Ethnologists, Art Historians and Language Experts Participated
in Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky
Historians, Archaeologists, Ethnologists, Art Historians and Language
Experts Participated in Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory
of Usein Bodaninsky
Annex 16 Exhibit P
The reports presented found a very receptive audience
With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, a conference named “X
Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky” was held in the
Bakhchisaray Historical, Cultural and Archaeological Museum Reserve.
More than 40 professionals and researchers in the fields of history, archaeology, ethnology, art
history, and linguistics from Crimea and other regions of Russia took part in the event dedicated
to the 145th birthday anniversary of historian, artist, art historian and ethnographer Usein
Bodaninsky. The reports presented found a very receptive audience.
The conference made it possible to achieve the key goals set by its organiser – to create an
intellectual discussion platform and enable a free exchange of information and practical
experience, and establish direct contacts between scientists, museum researchers and other
interested parties.
The participants familiarised themselves with the exhibitions of the Ismail Gasprinsky
Memorial Museum.
Summing up, the importance of holding such scientific events both for society in general and
for science and culture, in particular, was noted.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit Q
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage
Presents New Exhibition (30 November 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit Q
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical
Heritage Presents New Exhibition (30 November 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10413.
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> Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage Presents New Exhibition
Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage Presents
New Exhibition
Annex 16 Exhibit Q
The exhibition named “From the Origins to Perfection” describes the history,
traditions and culture of the Crimean Tatars
With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Crimean Tatar
Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage presented an exhibition named “From the Origins
to Perfection”.
The exhibition showcases ancient handmade items dated back from the late 19th century to the
early 20th century from the Museum’s collections as well as works by modern masters,
including embroideries, weavings, clothes, ceramic vessels and dishes, felt products, copper
dishes, etc., introducing the visitors to the history, traditions and culture of the Crimean Tatars.
The works by jeweller Eldar Islamov, coppersmiths Rustem and Nuri Dervish, ceramists Eldar
Gusenov, Abdyulya Seit-Ametov, Edem Ganiyev, Aziz and Anifa Velillyaev, and Bekir Musa,
felt masters Niyara Memetova and Elmas Appazova, master of artistic and gold embroidery
Khalide Kipchakova and costume designer Venera Kurmaeva, who are also the founders and
teachers of Steps School, and their students, as well as embroiderers Venera Bekirova, Zore
Ziyadinova and Emine Mustafaeva demonstrate original and diverse arts and crafts, traditions
being guarded and preserved, and the continuity of generations being secured.
During the presentation of the exhibition, Safiye Eminova, Director of the Crimean Tatar
Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage, as well as a master of artistic and gold embroidery
Khalide Kipchakova and embroiderers Zore Ziyadinova and Venera Bekirova delivered their
speeches.
The event was accompanied by folk songs performed by Yunus Kakura, a vocalist of the
Crimean Tatar folklore ensemble “Crimea” of the Crimean State Philharmonic.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit R
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Khan’s Palace as Open-Air Museum” Exhibition Presented in
Bakhchisaray (1 December 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit R
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Khan’s Palace as Open-Air Museum” Exhibition
Presented in Bakhchisaray (1 December 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10416.
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> “Khan’s Palace as Open-Air Museum” Exhibition Presented in Bakhchisaray
“Khan’s Palace as Open-Air Museum” Exhibition Presented in
Bakhchisaray
Annex 16 Exhibit R
The exhibition showcases stylised interiors of workshops, a student class and
private rooms as well as the finds discovered during archaeological research and
restoration works.
The Museum of History and Culture of the Crimean Tatars of the Bakhchisaray Museum
Reserve presented an exhibition named “The Khan’s Palace as an Open-Air Museum”.
The exhibition introduces the visitors to the history of Bakhchisaray, the Khan’s Palace and its
inhabitants.
The exhibition showcases stylised interiors of craft workshops, a student class and private
rooms of the Palace. The finds discovered during the archaeological research and restoration
works in the territory of the Khan’s Palace are also demonstrated, including decorative
sheathing elements, tiles, fragments of pottery pipes and ceramic floor tiles, a fragment of a
marble slab, forged nails, fragments of plaster with paintings, and a copy of a stained-glass
window.
The Palace’s buildings, the large Khan’s mosque, the family cemetery of the rulers of the
Crimean Khanate, archaeological sites, numerous fountains, parks, and gardens – a survey of
the entire complex of the Khan’s Palace combined with a display of items in show windows
will help the visitors to immerse themselves in the historical past.
The exhibition will be open until the 20th of December.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit S
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Tatar History and Culture Museum Hosted
Thematic Event Called “Bakhchisaray: The History Is Near” (30 June 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit S
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Tatar History and Culture Museum Hosted
Thematic Event Called “Bakhchisaray: The History Is Near” (30 June 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9760.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
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> Crimean Tatar History and Culture Museum Hosted Thematic Event Called “Bakhchisaray:
The History Is Near”
Crimean Tatar History and Culture Museum Hosted Thematic Event
Called “Bakhchisaray: The History Is Near”
Annex 16 Exhibit S
The Bakhchisaray Museum Reserve presented the participants with
commemorative gifts – self-published catalogues of the items from the Museum’s
collection
The Museum of the Crimean Tatar History and Culture hosted a thematic event called
“Bakhchisaray: The History is Near”. During the event, students of the School Academy of
Bakhchisaray visited the Museum’s historical exposition describing the traditions and customs
of the Crimean Tatars.
Annex 16 Exhibit S
An employee of the Museum’s excursion section told the young visitors about the history of
Bakhchisaray, the construction phases of the Khan’s Palace, and the monuments located in the
Museum’s territory.
At the end of the event, the Museum presented the participants with commemorative gifts –
self-published catalogues of the items from the Museum’s collection.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit T
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Republican Library Holds Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and
Culture Called “Rich Palette of National Heritage” (10 November 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit T
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Republican Library Holds Day of Crimean Tatar Writing
and Culture Called “Rich Palette of National Heritage” (10 November 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10323.
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> Republican Library Holds Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture Called “Rich Palette of
National Heritage”
Republican Library Holds Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture
Called “Rich Palette of National Heritage”
Annex 16 Exhibit T
The event was held as part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of
Russia and dedicated to 145th birthday anniversary of Usein Bodaninsky
With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Ismail Gasprinsky
Republican Crimean Tatar Library arranged for the Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture
called “The Rich Palette of National Heritage”.
The event was held as part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Russia and
dedicated to 145th birthday anniversary of Usein Bodaninsky, an outstanding Crimean
ethnographer, archaeologist, artist and museology enthusiast.
Facsimile publications based on books from the rare collection of the Ismail Gasprinsky
Republican Crimean Tatar Library were presented as part of its joint project with the
Mediacentre n.a. I. Gasprinsky. During the event, research fellows of the Bakhchisaray
Historical, Cultural and Archaeological Museum Reserve and the House of Peoples’ Friendship
delivered their speeches. Specialists of the Library conducted a review at the portrait exhibition
named “Usein Bodaninsky: a Local Lore Researcher, Historian, Ethnographer, Archaeologist,
and Historian”.
Students of the Pyotr Tchaikovsky Simferopol Musical College and Crimean creative
collectives also performed.
The events were attended by representatives of the State Committee for Interethnic Relations
of the Republic of Crimea, the Mediacentre n.a. I. Gasprinsky, the House of Peoples’
Friendship, library and museum professionals, young people, and library readers.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit U
Preserve Museum “Sudak fortress”, At Native Roots (22 June 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit U
Translation
Preserve Museum “Sudak fortress”, At Native Roots (22 June 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9596.
􀁅􀀜􀁴􀁞
July 22, 2022
􀀄􀁤 􀁅􀀄􀁤􀀯􀁳􀀜 􀁚􀁋􀁋􀁤􀁞
On July 22, through the joint efforts of the SBI RC "Preserve Museum "Sudak fortress"
and the SBI RC "Historical and Archaeological Preserve Museum "Kalos Limen" with the
support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, a new inter-museum project
"At Native Roots" was opened.
The life of the Slavic people encompasses customs, traditions and rituals that have
evolved over the centuries. The Slavs have always been known for their industriousness
and taste for beauty. Carved and woven things combined practicality and elegance of
forms. Girls and women decorated their clothes and towels with wonderful embroidery.
The potters' skills were handed down from parents to children and became a family craft.
The exhibition features museum items from the collection of the preserve museums
“Sudak Fortress” and “Kalos Limen”, telling about the material and spiritual culture of
the Slavic peoples.
In keeping with folk tradition, guests were welcomed with folk tales and cool kvass.
Opening the exhibition, the director of the preserve museum "Sudak Fortress" Svetlana
Emets noted the relevance of the exhibition against the background of the culture of
rejection of everything Russian reigning in hostile countries.The museum objects on
display help to better understand the deeper meaning of Slavic identity. Svetlana
Grigoryevna gave the example of outstanding sons of Russia: Pushkin, Lermontov,
Mendeleev, Suvorov. They were all proud of their Russianness.
Olga Panasevich, a chief curator of the historical and archaeological preseve museum
"Kalos Limen", thanked her Sudak colleagues for the new joint project and expressed
hope for further fruitful cooperation.
Svetlana Neklyasa, a researcher at the “Kalos Limen” preserve museum, took a creative
approach to guide visitors through the new exhibition. The museum worker, dressed in
folk costume, spoke about the exhibits with inspiration and using metaphors, and
concluded the tour with a performance of a Ukrainian folk song.
The first visitors walked around the exhibition hall and looked with interest at unique
hand embroidery on women's clothes, towels, tablecloths, pillowcases and curtains;
curious everyday objects of the late XIX - early XX centuries: cast iron and coal irons,
wooden fluted flat ironing boards, coal samovars, stoves, true works of art - spinners and
spindles, traditional Slavic utensils, earthenware and wooden dishes. The reconstruction
of a part of a Russian or Ukrainian hut (which did not differ from each other in Crimea)
with its essential attribute - Russian stove and old exhibits has created an idea about the
peculiarities of Slavic dwelling space organization.
Annex 16 Exhibit U
The opening of the new inter-museum project was broadcasted online at the official page
of the preserve museum "Sudak Fortress" in the social network "Odnoklassniki"
(https://ok.ru/live/4202150174612).
The exhibition will be on display until September 22, 2022 in the Historical Museum
(former Funk Mansion) at 11 Naberezhnaya Street, Sudak city.
Exhibit V
Ministry of Culture of Сrimea, “Return to the Origins” Exhibition Displays over 20 Old
Traditional Costumes, Including New Ones Sewn by Modern Crimean Designers Pattern-Shaped
to 19th Century Samples (30 September 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit V
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Return to the Origins” Exhibition Displays over 20 Old
Traditional Costumes, Including New Ones Sewn by Modern Crimean Designers Pattern-
Shaped to 19th Century Samples (30 September 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10134.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
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> “Return to the Origins” Exhibition Displays over 20 Old Traditional Costumes, Including
New Ones Sewn by Modern Crimean Designers Pattern-Shaped to 19th Century Samples
“Return to the Origins” Exhibition Displays over 20 Old Traditional
Costumes, Including New Ones Sewn by Modern Crimean Designers
Pattern-Shaped to 19th Century Samples
Annex 16 Exhibit V
The exhibition is part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Russia
The Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage, with support of the Ministry
of Culture of the Republic of Crimea and as part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of the
Peoples of Russia, presents an exhibition named “Return to the Origins”. The items displayed
include both works enriched with artistic ornaments dated back to the period from the late 19th
century to the early 20th century and works by today’s masters who have preserved the
continuity of traditions. The exhibition displays more than 20 traditional costumes, including
both old and new ones, the latter having been sewn by modern Crimean designers patternshaped
to the samples of the 19th century.
Nurie Gemedzhi, Deputy Director of the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical
Heritage, opened the event by expressing her gratitude to the organisers and participants of the
exhibition as well as noting the high professionalism of the modern masters and their creative
approach to their work.
Lera Asanova, head of the student fashion laboratory “SeLyaM” of the Fevzi Yakubov Crimean
Engineering and Pedagogical University representing the Simferopol city administration,
delivered a welcoming speech. Zure Pinka, a methodologist of the Crimean Tatar Museum of
Cultural and Historical Heritage, told the audience about the features of ancient and modern
samples of clothing.
Afiza Kasara, an Honoured Artist of Crimea and a soloist of the Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore
Ensemble of the Crimean State Philharmonic, performed Crimean Tatar folk songs.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit W
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural Heritage at
Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia’s Peoples (26 September 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit W
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural
Heritage at Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia’s Peoples
(26 September 2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10105.
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> Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural Heritage at Festival of Culture and Sports
of Southern Russia’s Peoples
Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural Heritage at
Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia’s Peoples
Annex 16 Exhibit W
A Crimean creative delegation led by Andrey Tereshchenko, Deputy Minister of
Culture of the Republic of Crimea, took part in the events
Crimea’s unique historical and cultural heritage was presented at the XII Festival of Culture
and Sports of the Peoples of Southern Russia in the city of Grozny, Chechen Republic.
A Crimean creative delegation led by Andrey Tereshchenko, Deputy Minister of Culture of the
Republic of Crimea, took part in the Festival’s events.
The XII Festival of Culture and Sports of the Peoples of Southern Russia was held by the
Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Sports of the Russian
Federation. The cultural programme was arranged by Rosconcert. Part of the Demography
National Project, the Festival is intended to facilitate the preservation of traditional cultures and
national sports, strengthen friendship, and further develop interethnic relations among the
peoples of Russia.
The Crimea presented its thematic platform: the national crafts of the local peoples reflect
Crimea’s centuries-old history, ancient traditions, and craftsmanship passed down from
generation to generation. For example, an exposition of the Crimean Tatar culture and arts
displayed traditional crafts: ceramics, felting, caracul dressing, copper articles, and traditional
embroidery (by Khatidzhe Yunusova). Master classes were held in the area of blacksmithing
(by Raim Minayev), a traditional metal processing or metalware making craft that uses forging
or stamping. An exhibition of historical ceramics (by Alexander Cheremisov) revealed the
relationship between drawings, symbols, forms and techniques of ceramics making, on the one
hand, and the peoples and nationalities inhabiting the Crimean Peninsula, on the other hand. An
exposition of Slavic culture and arts (by Svetlana Sergeyeva) presented traditional crafts,
including embroidery, weaving from natural materials, ceramics, folk dolls, belt weaving, lace
weaving, and painting.
In addition, national costumes of the local peoples and models of some of Crimea’s famous
sightseeing places such as the Juma-Jami Mosque in Yevpatoria, the Swallow’s Nest palace
and castle on the rock of Cape of Ai-Todor, the Armenian Church in Yalta, the Stamboli Dacha
in Feodosia, and the Bridge of Lovers in Sevastopol were demonstrated.
Andrey Tereshchenko, Deputy Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, acquainted
Lyudmila Sirotkina, Head of the Section of Musical and Folk Arts of the Department of State
Support of Arts and Folk Arts of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, Musa
Dadayev, Minister of Physical Culture and Sports of the Chechen Republic, Rustam Milkiyev,
Deputy Minister of Culture of the Chechen Republic, and the heads of state authorities in the
fields of culture and sports of the regions of the Southern Federal District and the North
Caucasus Federal District of Russia with the work of the “courtyard”, a Crimean creative
platform.
The Crimean delegation took part in the all-Russian forum of national creative collectives called
“Multinational Russia”, a significant event of the Festival.
Also, the Festival’s concert programme featured Elmira Nalbantova, a People’s Artist of the
Republic of Crimea and an Honoured Artist of Ukraine, and the Crimean Tatar dance ensemble
“Atesh” (led by Midat Khalilov), a laureate of numerous festivals.
Annex 16 Exhibit W
We may recall that the Festival of Culture and Sports of the Peoples of Southern Russia has
been held annually since 2010. Over those years, it has become an authoritative and
representative platform for wide discussions and demonstrations of outstanding achievements
in culture and sports. In 2021, the Festival was held in Alushta, Republic of Crimea.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit X
Ministry of Culture of Сrimea, “Sketches from Derviza” Folk Crafts Fair Held as Part of
Cultural Heritage Year (23 September 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit X
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Sketches from Derviza” Folk Crafts Fair Held as Part of
Cultural Heritage Year (23 September 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10103.
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Government of the Russian Federation
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> “Sketches from Derviza” Folk Crafts Fair Held as Part of Cultural Heritage Year
“Sketches from Derviza” Folk Crafts Fair Held as Part of Cultural
Heritage Year
Annex 16 Exhibit X
The event took place in the Republican Crimean Tatar Library
As part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Russia, the Ismail Gasprinsky
Republican Crimean Tatar Library held a fair of folk crafts named “Sketches from Derviza”.
Gulnara Yagyaeva, Director of the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library,
addressed the guests with a welcoming speech and congratulated all those present at the harvest
festival Derviza.
At the fair, students of the Crimean Boarding School for Gifted Children were introduced to the
origin and celebration of Derviza among the Crimean Tatars. In addition, they took part in
interactive games and received valuable gifts.
The Library prepared an exhibition named “We Invite You to Derviza!” including stock books
and other materials. A musical performance by the Crimean Tatar ensemble “Dzhemile” was
in the limelight of everyone’s attention.
The “Rodnichok” Centre for Crimean Tatar Children’s Readings prepared and held a festive
programme for the kids.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit Y
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference on
Crimean Ethnography of 19th -21st Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural Processes Will Be
Held (20 September 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit Y
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference on
Crimean Ethnography of 19th -21st Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural Processes Will
Be Held (20 September 2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10075.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
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Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference on Crimean Ethnography of 19th -21st
Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural Processes Will Be Held
Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference on Crimean
Ethnography of 19th -21st Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural
Processes Will Be Held
Annex 16 Exhibit Y
An exhibition from the Vologda State Museum Reserve’s collections will also be
presented on the 21st of September.
On the 21st of September, Simferopol will host the V International Scientific and Practical
Conference on the Crimean Ethnography of the 19th through 21st Centuries and Modern Ethno-
Cultural Processes, which is dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Crimean
Ethnographic Museum.
The Conference will cover the following key topics:
• Ethnography of the Crimean Peoples: Sources and Study History;
• Issues of the Ethnic History of the Crimea and Adjacent Territories;
• Traditional Occupations, Crafts, and Decorative and Applied Arts of the Peoples of the
Black Sea Region;
• Spiritual Traditions, Rituals and Folklore of the Crimean Peoples;
• Ethno-Confessional Processes in the Crimea: History and Modernity;
• Today’s Theories and Practices of Ethnological Research: Domestic and Foreign
Experience;
• Ethnographic Museums: The History of Concepts and Collections; and
• Crimea’s Ethno-Cultural Heritage and Its Use in Tourism.
Speeches will be made at the Conference by 43 scientists, local lore specialists, historians and
museologists from Simferopol, Yevpatoria, Bakhchysarai, Feodosia, Sevastopol,
St. Petersburg, Kazan, Moscow and Omsk.
The Conference will begin at 10:00 AM in the Crimean Ethnographic Museum.
As part of the event, an exhibition named “Islands of Traditions” from the Vologda State
Museum Reserve’s collections will be presented at 6:30 PM on the same day.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit Z
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum Organised for Kerch Library
Professionals (7 September 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit Z
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum Organised for Kerch
Library Professionals (7 September 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10018.
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> “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum Organised for Kerch Library Professionals
Crimean Tatar Book Forum Organised for Kerch Library
Professionals
Annex 16 Exhibit Z
The cultural and educational project has been implemented for five years
With support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Ismail Gasprinsky
Republican Crimean Tatar Library arranged for and held a library forum named “Crimean Tatar
Book” for professionals of the Kerch Library System. The Library has been implementing this
cultural and educational project over the past five years.
Opening the event, Elmira Kurtmemetova, Head of the Department of Culture of the Kerch
Administration, noted the importance of events intended to study and popularise the local lore
knowledge as well as the literary and cultural heritage. Leilya Kadyrova, Deputy Director of
the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library, and Lyudmila Popova, Director of
the Kerch Centralised Library System, addressed the audience with greetings.
Vladimir Polyakov, Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor at the Department of History
of the Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University, shared the results of
his research and publishing projects about the Crimean Tatars who took part in the Great
Patriotic War, including those born in Kerch.
As part of the creative platform named “Literature Space: Opinions, Representations, and
Expectations”, the Ismail Gasprinsky Media Centre presented an overview of the “portfolio” of
national periodicals.
An autograph session was held in a bright and emotional way where Venera Ryabchikova
(writing under the pen name of “Yulduz”), a member of the Union of Writers of the Republic
of Crimea, a poet, a translator, and a theatre critic, presented her new collection of poems and
translations titled “The Cool Light of the Autumn Moon”, and Valery Basyrov, an Honoured
Arts Worker of the Republic of Crimea, a poet, a prose writer, a translator, and a book publisher,
presented his book “I Was Not a Guest on Earth...”.
During the Librarian’s Open Workshop, professionals of the Republican Library presented a
video chronicle of the forum, a slide review titled “Kerch: People and Destinies”, and a creative
review named “Point of Growth – People’s Culture” based on Elmira Osmanova’s book titled
“Yol Shashyrma: the Crimean Tatar Traditional Embroidery Technique”. A methodologist of
the Vissarion Belinsky Central City Library shared information on best librarian practices to
promote national books and cultures of the peoples living in Crimea. The project was musically
illustrated by an ethnic composition performed by the dance collective “Varirach” and the
performances by the vocal ensemble “Lyale” and the vocal and instrumental ensemble
“Khydyrlez” of the Yuri Bogatikov Kerch Culture and Leisure Centre.
The participants were pleased with the useful and constructive atmosphere of the event and
noted that it created new opportunities for working with readers in the areas mentioned above.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit AA
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Library Holds “Crimean Tatar
Book” Forum in Sevastopol (26 June 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit AA
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Library Holds “Crimean
Tatar Book” Forum in Sevastopol (26 June 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9754.
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Government of the Russian Federation
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> Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Library Holds “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum in Sevastopol
Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Library Holds “Crimean Tatar Book”
Forum in Sevastopol
Annex 16 Exhibit AA
The project is intended to increase the prestige of the national literature and
actualise the municipal libraries’ local lore research efforts
Since 2018, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library has been arranging for
the Crimean Tatar Book Library Forum in the Crimean regions, which is intended to increase
the prestige of the national literature and actualise the municipal libraries’ local lore research
efforts.
The event was held for library professionals of the Regional Information and Library System
(a state budgetary cultural institution of Sevastopol). Elena Volkova, Director of the System,
stressed the importance of libraries for promoting the national books in the multicultural space
of the region.
As part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of Russia, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican
Crimean Tatar Library presented a review named “Sevastopol: People and Destinies” and a
cultural research project called “The Song: The Folk Identity Code” (the history of the folk
song “Aqyar”, which is the Crimean Tatar name for Sevastopol). Cooperation with national
autonomies and prospects for providing libraries with books in native languages were also
discussed.
The Ismail Gasprinsky Media Centre traditionally participated in the event. It presented
periodicals (the newspapers Meraba and Yany Dyunya, and the first youth magazine My!).
Venera Kurmayeva, President of the Prof. Sabri Izidinov Sevastopol Foundation for the Revival
of the Crimean Tatar Culture, spoke on the Foundation’s project activities in response to social
needs.
The performance of the Crimean Tatar folk dance “Tym-Tym” by the girls of the kids’
choreographic ensemble “Kyrym Yildyzlary” became a musical illustration for the event.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit AB
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Central Library Hosted “Obzhinki” Ukrainian
Cultural Festival (30 August 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit AB
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Central Library Hosted “Obzhinki” Ukrainian
Cultural Festival (30 August 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9984.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
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> Crimean Central Library Hosted “Obzhinki” Ukrainian Cultural Festival
Crimean Central Library Hosted “Obzhinki” Ukrainian Cultural
Festival
Annex 16 Exhibit AB
Traditionally dedicated to the end of the harvest period, the festive event is held as
part of the Days of the Ukrainian Culture in Crimea.
The Ivan Franko Crimean Republican Universal Scientific Library hosted a regional festival of
Ukrainian culture called “Obzhinki”. Traditionally dedicated to the end of the harvest period,
this festive event is held as part of the Days of the Ukrainian Culture in Crimea.
The annual event involved various creative collectives. In accordance with ancestral traditions,
the festival featured a ceremony where the hostess was given the last sheaf cut on a field as a
symbol of prosperity.
The performances by the vocal and instrumental ensemble “Singing Hearts” and the vocal group
“Kumushki” became a musical gift for the guests. During the event, pieces of poetry in Russian
and Ukrainian associated with the festival were also read aloud.
Annex 16 Exhibit AB
Obzhinki has become one of the favourite festive events for the residents and guests of the
Crimean Peninsula. The fun contests, Ukrainian flavour, pleasant souvenirs as well as cheerful
songs and dances appealed to every guest.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit AC
Government of the Republic of Crimea, State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the
Republic of Crimea: Crimea Celebrates Popular Fest Called “Obzhinki” (29 August 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit AC
Republic of Crimea.
In the Republic of Crimea, a popular fest called “Obzhinki” was celebrated. The event held in
the town of Saki was arranged for by the public organisation “Ukrainian Community of
Crimea”, House of Peoples’ Friendship (a state budgetary institution of the Republic of Crimea)
and the Saki town administration with support from the State Committee for Interethnic
Relations of the Republic of Crimea.
Ruslan Yakubov, First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of
Annex 16 Exhibit AC
the Republic of Crimea, noted that this holiday in the Crimea serves as a clear example of the
efforts to preserve the national traditions, customs and culture of the Ukrainian people while
creating a friendly atmosphere and uniting people of different nationalities and religions.
The event was attended by Elizaveta Glushchenko, Deputy Minister for Internal Policy,
Information and Communications of the Republic of Crimea and Head of the Ministry’s
Domestic Policy Department, and Ivan Shonus, Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Public
Diplomacy and Interethnic Relations of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea and
Chairman of the public organisation “Regional National and Cultural Autonomy of the Greeks
in the Republic of Crimea ‘Taurida’”. Mr. Shonus extended his congratulations and presented
gratitude by the State Council to a member of the Ukrainian community of Crimea for his
significant contribution to the strengthening of the Ukrainian culture in the Republic of Crimea
as well as his activity, conscientious work, and professionalism.
As part of the festival, a festive concert was held, including folk sports, contests, and a theatrical
performance with elements of the traditions and customs of the peoples of Crimea.
Press Service of the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit AD
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Derviza” Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival Winners
Announced (31 May 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit AD
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Derviza” Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival Winners
Announced (31 May 2022), available at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9585.
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Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> “Derviza” Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival Winners Announced
Over 250 creative collectives and soloists took part in the qualifying rounds
“Derviza” Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival Winners Announced
Annex 16 Exhibit AD
The winners of the Fifth Derviza Crimean Tatar Art Competition Festival were announced. The
key goal of the creative project is to preserve and promote the performing arts and traditions of
the Crimean Tatar people. The Competition Festival was organised by the Centre of Folk Arts
of the Republic of Crimea with support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea.
The Crimean Tatar State Academic Music and Drama Theatre hosted the final of the
Competition Festival. The competent jury selected up to five professional and amateur
participants of the final round in the areas of “Vocal Art”, “Choreographic Art”, “Musical and
Instrumental Art” and “Conversational Genre”.
The jury (chaired by Nikolay Antyufriyev, an Honoured Artist of Ukraine, an Honoured
Cultural Worker of the Republic of Crimea, and Deputy Director of the Centre for Folk Arts of
the Republic of Crimea) decided the grand prix winners, the winners in nominations, and the
winners in age categories (whose names were published on the organiser’s website). This year,
over 250 creative collectives and soloists took part in the qualifying rounds.
The award ceremony with a gala concert will take place in September 2022.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit AE
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Letter No. 3096/10-11/4, 3 February 2023
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit AE
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Letter No. 3096/10-11/4, 3 February 2023.
Republic of Crimea
Council of Ministers
Ministry of Culture
Tel/fax <…>
e-mail: <…>
web: http:// mkult.rk.gov.ru
03.02.2023 No. 3096/10-11/4
To No.1637/dp dated 31.01.2023
To: M.Y. Galuzin,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Dear Mikhail Yurievich!
The Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea considered your request for information
about the identified archaeological heritage site "The urban development site of Ak-Mosque,
XVII-XVIII centuries (the possible location of the palace of Kalga Sultan)" and the progress of
repair and restoration works on the cultural heritage site of federal importance "Khan’s Palace" in
Bakhchisaray, Republic of Crimea.
With regard to the identified archaeological heritage site "Site of urban development of
Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII cc.” please be informed of the following:
According to Articles 16.1, 45.1 of the Federal Law of 25.06.2002 No. 73-FZ "On Objects
of Cultural Heritage (Monuments of History and Culture) of the Peoples of the Russian
Federation", FGBUN "RAS Institute of Archaeology of Crimea " provided to the State Committee
for the Protection of Cultural Heritage of the Republic of Crimea (hereinafter - the ‘State
Committee’) information about the identified archaeological heritage site " Site of urban
development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (the location of the Palace of Kalga Sultan)"
(hereinafter – the ‘Site’).
Archaeological fieldwork to identify the Site were carried out in accordance with permit
(open list) No. 2355 of 30.10.2017 issued by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation in
the name of E.I. Seidaliev.
By Order No. 41 of 27.03.2018, the State Committee included the Site in the list of
identified archaeological heritage sites located in the territory of the Republic of Crimea. The same
order approved the boundaries of the Site area of 1.369 hectares.
According to the results of additional examination of a part of the territory of the identified
object of archaeological heritage "Site of the urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII
centuries (place of possible location of the palace of Kalga Sultan)" conducted in 2019, FGBUN
"RAS Institute of Archaeology of Crimea" developed research and design documentation (reports
on the conducted research). According to the conclusions contained in the reports, there is no
archaeological cultural layer on the land plots with cadastral numbers 90:22:010223:118 and
90:22:010223:590.
Annex 16 Exhibit AE
In this regard, on the basis of paragraphs 18, 20 of the Procedure for approving the
boundaries of the territories of objects of cultural heritage located in the Republic of Crimea,
approved by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No. 398 dated
18.07.2019, the State Committee prepared and issued orders No. 196 dated 21.08.2019 and No.
426 dated 09.12.2019 in amendment of Order of the State Committee No. 41 dated 27.03.03.2018
"On inclusion of the identified object of archaeological heritage in the list of identified objects of
cultural heritage of the Republic of Crimea and on approval of borders and regimes of its territory
use" and excluded the aforesaid land plots from the territory of the identified object of archaeology.
According to clause 12 of Article 45.1 of the Federal law No. 73-FZ dated 25.06.2002 "On
objects of cultural heritage (monuments of history and culture) of the peoples of the Russian
Federation”, if as a result of carrying out archeological field works registration data of object of
archeological heritage (object area, protected items and other data) have changed, the physical
person who has received the permit (open sheet) is obliged, within thirty working days from the
date of completion of archeological field works, to inform in writing the executive body of the
Russian Federation authorised in the sphere of cultural heritage protection of such changes. The
boundaries of the territory of the identified object of archeology "Site of urban development of
Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (place of probable location of palace of Kalga Sultan)" have
been changed by the exclusion of the land plots owned by citizens, in connection with the receipt
of the mentioned reports on archeological research on the land plots.
The archaeological fieldwork was carried out by Vyacheslav Vadimovich Masyakin, an
employee of the Federal State Budgetary Scientific Institution " Russian Academy of Sciences
Institute of Archaeology of Crimea " on the basis of permit (open list) No. 0600-2019 dated
31.05.2019, issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Culture for the right to conduct
archaeological fieldwork on the territory of the identified object of archaeological heritage "Site
of the urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (probable location of the palace
of Kalga-sultan)" (specifically, the right to conduct archaeological exploration with the
implementation of local excavations in the specified territory in order to identify archaeological
heritage sites, clarify information about them and plan activities to ensure their preservation).
In 2022, on the basis of documentation about the identified object of archaeological
heritage on the territory of Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, received from the General Director of
LLC "Crimean Regional Centre for Archaeological Research" A.V. Sharapa (permit (open list)
No. 0198-2022 of 28.03.2022 issued by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation in the
name of V.Yu. Kononov), order of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea No. 525-
OCN dated 08.09.2022 "On approval of the boundaries of the territory, modes of land use within
the boundaries of the identified object of archaeological heritage ‘Site of the urban development
of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries. (site of the Palace of Kalga Sultan), XVII-XVIII centuries’
located at the address: Republic of Crimea, Simferopol" approved the boundaries of the territory
and the regime of land use within the boundaries of the site, namely in connection with the
discovery of new sites containing the archaeological cultural layer, the area of the said object was
increased.
Thus, the identified archaeological heritage site "Site of the urban development of Ak-
Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (possible location of the palace of Kalga Sultan)" is under state
protection.
We also hereby inform that there are no immovable property within the boundaries of the
territory of the identified object of archaeological heritage "Site of the urban development of
Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (the place of possible location of the palace of Kalgasultan)",
including any orthodox church buildings.
Annex 16 Exhibit AE
According to Art. 5.1(1)(1) of Federal Law No. 73-FZ of 25.06.2002 "On Objects of
Cultural Heritage (Monuments of History and Culture) of the Peoples of the Russian Federation",
capital construction and enlargement of existing objects of capital construction on the territory of
a monument or an ensemble are prohibited, including land, building, reclamation or any other
works, except works for the conservation of the cultural heritage object or its individual
components.
According to Article 5.1(5) of Federal Law No. 73-FZ of 25.06.2002 "On Objects of
Cultural Heritage (Monuments of History and Culture) of the Peoples of the Russian Federation",
the special regime for the use of the land plot within whose boundaries the archaeological
heritage object is situated, provides for the possibility of carrying out archaeological
fieldwork in the manner prescribed by this Federal Law, excavation, construction,
reclamation, economic and other works, subject to ensuring the conservation of the
archaeological heritage site included in the Unified State Register of Cultural Heritage Sites
(historical and cultural monuments) of the peoples of the Russian Federation, or the identified
archaeological heritage site, as well as ensuring public access to the aforesaid sites.
We also hereby inform that no violations of the mandatory requirements of current
legislation in the field of protection of cultural heritage sites have been recorded.
We also report that a draft order by the Head of the Republic of Crimea is under
development to carry out historical and bibliographic research and archaeological work at the site
"Spiritual, cultural and historical complex ‘Kalga Sultan Palace’ at the address: Republic of
Crimea, Simferopol by 31.12.2028 in order to prevent damage, destruction or demolition and to
preserve Muslim places of worship, subject to the allocation of funding for this purpose.
Regarding the repair and restoration works on the cultural heritage object of federal
importance "Khan’s Palace" in the city of Bakhchisaray of the Republic of Crimea (hereinafter -
the "Khan’s Palace"), we report that these works are carried out under the State Program of the
Russian Federation "Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and
Sevastopol" (hereinafter - the State Program). Previously, the total cost of the facility was 1.98
billion rubles.
In the light of the research and design documents approved by Rosgosexpertiza, an increase
in the cost of the restoration from the amount originally set in 2018 is required. The necessary
additional funds have now been agreed and are provided for in the Federal Budget for 2023-2025
in the amount of 1.6 RUB bn.
Thus, the total cost of the project implementation will be RUB 3.6 bn.
With the confirmed possibility of additional funding only being available in 2024, work on
the entire Khan’s Palace complex is scheduled to be completed in 2024.
The customer is the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea's subordinate
organization. i.e. the Directorate for Centralised Servicing and Development of Cultural
Institutions.
As of today, a full-scale repair and restoration process has been launched for the entire
Khan’s Palace ensemble, involving 225 people, and this number is getting bigger by the day.
During the peak period, more than 250 people are involved in the restoration work.
Repair and restoration works are being carried out both in the Khan’s Palace ensemble area
and on specially equipped production sites outside the museum complex, where restoration work
is being carried out on some of the architectural elements.
The Khan’s Palace ensemble is the only example of palace and garden architecture of the
Crimean Tatar people.
Annex 16 Exhibit AE
Funding limits for the Facility:
2018 г. – RUB 113.38 mln
2019 - RUB 158.00 mln
2020 г. – RUB 129.92 mln
2021 - RUB 288.06 mln
2022 – RUB 808.09 mln (including RUB 26.9 mln released to the customer in December)
2023 - RUB 452.95 mln (RUB 427.4 mln contracted)
2024 - RUB 1,642.60 mln.
The Khan’s Palace cultural heritage site complex comprises 16 sites.
For the current period, the work has been completed in full at 7 sites, namely:
- North Dürbe Tomb;
- South Dürbe Tomb;
- Dürbe Dilyarı Bıkec Tomb;
- "Sary-Guzel Bath";
- "Tombstone Rotunda;
- "Embankment with three bridges" (refusal to accept the completed work);
- "Catherine's Mile" (acceptance of the completed work is in progress).
At this stage, renovation and restoration works are underway at 9 sites, namely:
Contractor: RSC Gefest Ltd.
Earl's (secular) Building
Stable Building
Library Building
Khan's Kitchen
Falcon Tower
Contract terms: 25.12.2019 - 30.12.2023.
Contract amount: RUB 291,832,920.
Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 270,279,780 (93%)
Technical readiness (customer data): 75%
Contractor FAU RosCapStroy:
Khan Mosque (Phase II)
Contract terms: 29.04.2022 - 30.11.2023.
Contract amount: RUB 90,631,900.
Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 63,870,800 (70%)
Technical readiness (customer data): 51%
Harem
Annex 16 Exhibit AE
Contract terms: 18.04.2022 - 01.11.2023.
Contract amount: RUB 74,687,610.
Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 36,179,700. (48%)
Technical readiness (customer data): 31%
Main Building
Contract terms: 18.04.2022 - 01.11.2023.
Contract amount: RUB 588,406,470.
Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 242,711,420 (41%)
Technical readiness (customer data): 31%
Gardens and park facilities
Contract terms: 29.04.2022 - 01.11.2023.
Contract amount: RUB 382,795,410.
Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 146,416,930 (38%)
Technical readiness (customer data): 31%
Contractor NST Ltd:
Embankment with three bridges
Contract terms: 24.12.2020 - 31.05.2022.
Contract amount: RUB 183,983,960.
Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 160,161,990 (87%)
Technical readiness (customer data): 100%
Regarding Lesya Ukrainka Museum (hereinafter - the ‘Museum’), we inform you that at
present it is a structural unit of the Municipal Budget Institution of Culture "Yalta Historical and
Literary Museum" and the only museum of the Ukrainian writer Lesya Ukrainka in the Russian
Federation. The founder and owner of the Museum is the Yalta City Administration.
The idea to create the museum was born in 1971, when the centenary of the famous novelist
and playwright Lesya Ukrainka (real name - Larysa Petrovna Kosach, 1871-1913) was
commemorated worldwide according to the Resolution of UNESCO. In connection with that, a
decision was made to create a museum of Lesya Ukrainka in Yalta as a branch of the Crimean
Local History Museum. The first floor of the building No. 8 Litkensa Street (now Ekaterininskaya
Street) was allocated for the future literary-memorial museum of Lesya Ukrainka. The same year
a memorial plaque was installed on the building, in memory of Lesya Ukrainka, a Ukrainian writer,
who stayed there in 1897. In 1972 a monument to Lesya Ukrainka was erected in front of the
building.
The general exposition of the new department was opened to the visitors on December 24,
1977, on the 60th anniversary of the Soviet power establishment in Ukraine, including the section
devoted to Lesya Ukrainka. The room where Ukrainian poetess Lesya Ukrainka (Larysa Petrovna
Kosach) lived in 1897 was recreated here.
The exhibition lasted a little more than a year and was closed for repairs on 01.01.1979 due
to the poor condition of the building. By 1990, the main repair work was completed, and on 6
March 1990 the section "The Progressive Russian and Ukrainian literature and culture of Yalta
pre-revolutionary period" was renamed "The Culture of Yalta XIX - early XX century", and there
Annex 16 Exhibit AE
was also prepared a draft design of anniversary exhibition "Lesya Ukrainka and Crimea", opened
25 February 1991 for the 120th anniversary of the birth of the poetess within the section of "The
Culture of Yalta XIX - early XX century".
On 10 September 1993, Yalta City Council of People's Deputies of the Republic of Crimea
adopted Resolution No.639 "On the creation of Lesya Ukrainka Museum as a section of the Yalta
United Historical and Literary Museum" on the basis of the aforesaid exposition.
The century-old mansion located at 8A Ekaterininskaya Street has survived wars; it was
built in 1886 by architect P.K. Terebenev in the style Tavrida Romanticism then popular on the
southern coast of Crimea.
Despite repairs between 1979 and 1991, the roof of the building was leaking in several
places, and reports were systematically written about it.
Attempts to repair the roof locally were unsuccessful. As a result of years of leaks, the
wooden ceiling beams became rotten and needed repair.
During the period from 1991 to 2014, no comprehensive repair and restoration works were
carried out in the Museum building; minor current repairs aimed at maintaining the Museum
building in a condition suitable for excursions were carried out. It was of an external nature, aimed
at maintaining the exterior appearance and did not affect the load-bearing structures and structural
elements, roof, walls, etc. No deep and complex restoration was carried out. At the same time, a
part of the building (right wing) was leased to Technoprom Ltd. in 2001 (since 2011 - Travel
Planet Ltd.) and was used as a mini-hotel.
On 01 November 2011, in the exhibition hall of the Lesya Ukrainka Museum at the cracks
that went spider-like on the ceiling, tell-tales were installed. Acts were also drawn up for a crack
in the ceiling above the front staircase to the first floor to the Lesya Ukrainka Museum section
where plaster later collapsed from the ceiling with the collapsed area of 1m2 by 0.8m2 at a height
of approximately 6m.
On 15 January 2016, the OHSE engineer drew up a prescription stating that due to an
emergency situation in the exhibition hall No. 2 of the Lesya Ukrainka Museum section, which
arose due to peeling plaster on the ceiling and cracks that tore the tell-tales and reached the
chandelier, which threatened to collapse of plaster over a large area. On this basis, exhibit hall No.
2 was closed to museum staff and visitors (Order No. 9 of 15 January 2016 "Termination of visitor
access"). Later on 08 February 2016, the staff, on coming to work, discovered a 2.0-2.5 m2 dump
in Exhibit Hall No. 2. In this regard, an order was issued to close the Lomikamen exhibition of the
Lesya Ukrainka Museum section (Order No. 12 of 08 February 2016) to ensure the safety of
visitors, and all the exhibits of the exhibition were moved to the funds of the head museum (Yalta
Historical and Literary Museum MBUK) to ensure normal storage conditions.
In 2016, the Yalta City Administration carried out research and survey work using funds
allocated from the municipal budget (more than RUB 9 mln), which led to the development of a
complete restoration project for the museum building.
Based on the conclusion of the state construction expertise to verify the reliability of the
estimated cost, the total cost of the repair and restoration work is RUB 130,953,540.
A number of renovation and restoration measures are planned as part of the project:
- Reinforce the foundations by injection of concrete into masonry joints.
- Clean the façades of cement plaster.
- Repair masonry walls in areas of weathering and deterioration.
- Carry out grouting and capping of cracks in masonry walls using indirect reinforcement
with basalt-plastic rebar.
Annex 16 Exhibit AE
- Treat the masonry walls with a hydrophobic agent or varnish.
- Carry out repair and restoration work to reinforce the ceilings above the basement and
ground floor.
- Replace emergency ceilings above the first floor.
- Reinforce the rafters to prevent the transmission of tension to the masonry walls, by
installing overlays, tightening the rafters, and repairing damaged elements.
- Perform replacement of purlins and roofing with plastic sheeting the roof is covered with
eaves and ridge venting.
- Re-establish an organised outdoor drainage system with gutters, downspouts and inlets.
- Replace the wooden staircase.
- Carry out repair and restoration work to eliminate chips and cracks in the steps and
landing of the stairs.
At the end of 2018, after a series of court proceedings in courts of different instances
initiated after 18 March 2014, and termination of the lease agreement, a tenant, who had occupied
part of the premises (mini-hotel) for more than 10 years, was evicted from the right wing of the
Museum building. Thanks to the actions of the Yalta Historical and Literary Museum MBUK
administration and local authorities of Yalta, the historical and cultural integrity of the memorial
building was restored, thanks to which the area of the Museum has now increased to 771.2 sq. m.
The design and estimate documentation created in 2016 was prepared taking into account the
additional space, and after the restoration activities, the exposition of the Museum and the "Culture
of Yalta of the XIX - first quarter of the XX centuries" section will be expanded.
At present, the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea is searching for possible
sources of funding for the restoration work, both as part of the national project "Culture", and as
part of the state programme of the Russian Federation "Social and Economic Development of the
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol". After approval of the necessary funding, the
developed scientific and design documentation for the project "Restoration of the building of the
branch of the Historical and Literary Museum at 8, Ekaterininskaya Street, Yalta" will be
additionally updated.
After the Museum's exhibition halls were closed, its staff continued their work as usual. In
2016 a preliminary concept for a new exhibition of the Museum "In the Land of Eternal Sunshine
/ In the Land of Eternal Flux" was written and approved. Every year, on February 25 (Lesya
Ukrainka's birthday), a traditional event "Seven Strings", in which Yalta schoolchildren, students
and public organisations take part, is held by the staff at the "Culture of Yalta in the 19th and early
20th centuries" exhibition, which is located in the same building on the ground floor.
In 2017, the main exhibition "The Culture of Yalta in the 19th - First Quarter of the 20th
Century", a department of the Yalta Historical and Literary Museum, housed in the same building
on the ground floor, was supplemented with exhibits telling about the life and stay on the South
Coast of Crimea of poetess Lesya Ukrainka, poet and first Yalta city doctor Stepan Rudansky,
writer and agronomist Mikhail Kotsyubinsky.
In 2018, the Museum's staff prepared and held events dedicated to the anniversaries and
commemorations of Ukrainian cultural figures M.M. Kotsyubinsky and S.V. Rudansky.
In 2019 the staff held events for the 185th anniversary of the poet, city doctor of Yalta S.V.
Rudansky (January 6); holiday "We feel you, Kobzar, through the century..."March 9); art meeting
"Such Days Only Happen in Crimea" to the 155th anniversary of M.Kotsyubinsky together with
the M.M.Kotsyubinsky Museum in Simeiz (September 17).
Annex 16 Exhibit AE
On 25 February 2020, the museum staff held a traditional event "The Seven Strings" to
mark the 149th anniversary of the birth of the Ukrainian writer Lesya Ukrainka and the 140th
anniversary of the birth of ethnographer Klyment Kvitka.
The staff of the Museum prepares and organizes temporary exhibitions which are exhibited
in the main exhibition "Culture of Yalta of the XIX - the first quarter of the XX cc." section of
Yalta Historical and Literary Museum; hold lectures in educational institutions and public
organizations of Yalta; write information and popular science articles on anniversaries and
memorable dates of figures of Ukrainian culture; study and select items related to life and everyday
life of Yalta residents, with Ukrainian culture and ethnography, to further replenish the funds of
Yalta Historical and Literary Museum in accordance with the law.
Before the closure of the rooms in critical condition in 2016, the Museum had more than
300 museum objects in its main exhibition. These included:
- lifetime editions of Lesya Ukrainka's works;
- belongings, pictures belonging to the Kosach family;
- Photos from the personal archive of the winemaker N.S. Okhremenko, who was taught
by Lesya Ukrainka as a child;
- pre-revolutionary photographs and postcards with views of Yalta and other Crimean
towns visited by Lesya Ukrainka;
- lifetime editions of works by Ukrainian writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries associated with the works of Lesya Ukrainka;
- pre-revolutionary periodicals in which Lesya Ukrainka's works were published;
- Anniversary editions of works, gramophone records with Lesya Ukrainka's voice (records
of 1908-1909);
- Ukrainian national costumes and embroidery from the 19th and early 20th centuries;
- Typical items and furniture of a Yalta mansion from the early 20th century;
- copies of manuscripts of Lesya Ukrainka's works and letters.
All these items after closure of the emergency premises of the Museum are fully moved to
the funds of the Yalta Historical and Literary Museum and are preserved taking into account all
normative requirements according to the current legislation. The access to this collection is
provided by organizing temporary exhibitions on the basis of the main exposition of the "The
culture of Yalta in the 19th - first quarter of the 20th centuries" section and cultural and educational
events dedicated to anniversaries and commemorations of the Ukrainian cultural figures.
The most part of the mentioned museum items belongs to the main collection of the Yalta
Historical and Literary Museum and is a non-state part of the Museum Fund of the Russian
Federation, the rest are scientific and auxiliary funds of the institution. Inclusion of items
belonging to the main collection of the Yalta Historical and Literary Museum MBUK, in the State
Catalogue of the Museum Fund of the Russian Federation is carried out at the present time and in
accordance with Federal Law dated No. 357-FZ 3 July 2016 "On Amendments to the Federal Law
"On Museum Fund of the Russian Federation and Museums in the Russian Federation" will be
completed by 31 December 2025.
Please also note that the list of experts certified by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian
Federation is available on the official website of the Ministry of Culture Russian Federation at
https://opendata.mkrf.ru/opendata/7705851331-certified_experts.
Regarding the preservation of memorial items of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian culture,
history and architecture, we report the following.
Annex 16 Exhibit AE
As part of the federal target programme "Social and economic development of the Republic
of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol until 2025" in 2015-2017, priority anti-damage measures
were carried out at the objects of cultural heritage of federal importance "Dervish monastery, XIVXV
centuries" at the address: Republic of Crimea, Evpatoria, Karaeva street, 18, letters A, B, B,
C and "Mosque and madrasah" 1314 at the address: Republic of Crimea, Stary Krym, 5. 5
Chapaeva Lane, Stary Krym, Republic of Crimea.
In addition, a draft regulation by the Head of the Republic of Crimea is being drawn up to
prevent damage, destruction or demolition and to preserve Muslim places of worship, namely
- The Dervish monastery, XIV - XV centuries, located at: Republic of Crimea, Evpatoria,
Karaeva street, 18, lit. A, B, B, C;
- Mosque (ruins), XIV - XV centuries, located at: Republic of Crimea, Simferopol district,
rural settlement Dobrovskoye, s. Pionerskoye, 2, Eski-Dzhami str;
- Beibars Mosque (ruins), late XIII century, located at the address: Republic of Crimea,
Kirovsky district, Stary Krym, Krasnoarmeiskaya str. 59;
- The spiritual, cultural and historical Kalga Sultan Palace complex at the address: Republic
of Crimea, Simferopol. Simferopol.
In addition, we inform you that in 2022 a draft concept for the development of the historical
and archaeological complex Salachik in the city of Bakhchisaray, Republic of Crimea has been
developed.
Annex in electronic form.
Respectfully, T. Manezhina
Minister T . MANEZHINA
Ex. by <…> tel: <…>

Exhibit AF
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Tatyana Manezhina Visited Conference to Review Progress of
Repair and Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace (18 January 2023)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit AF
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Tatyana Manezhina Visited Conference to Review
Progress of Repair and Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace (18 January 2023), available
at: https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10597.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
Official Resources
MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
1 February, Wednesday
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Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Tatyana Manezhina Visited Conference to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Works
in Khan’s Palace
Tatyana Manezhina Visited Conference to Review Progress of
Repair and Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace
Annex 16 Exhibit AF
The works are being carried out in the territory of the Bakhchisaray Museum
Reserve and on special remote sites where individual architectural elements are
being restored
Tatyana Manezhina, Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, held a visiting conference
to review the progress of the repair and restoration works being carried out on federally
significant cultural heritage sites of the Khan’s Palace.
The conference was attended by representatives of the Bakhchisaray administration, the
Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, including its Department for State Protection of
Cultural Heritage Sites, the Directorate for the Centralised Service and Development of Cultural
Institutions (an autonomous state institution) (who is the customer for the works), the
Bakhchisaray Historical, Cultural and Archaeological Museum Reserve (a state budgetary
institution of the Republic of Crimea) (who is the asset holder), and the contractors involved in
the project. The participants discussed problematic issues and ways to solve them.
The Minister strictly pointed out the need to comply with the current laws applicable to works
on cultural heritage sites.
As of today, full-scale repair and restoration works have been launched on the entire compound
of the Khan’s Palace, involving more than 200 people. During the peak period, about 250 people
are engaged in the restoration works.
The repair and restoration works are being carried out in the territory of the Bakhchisaray
Museum Reserve and on specially equipped remote sites where individual architectural
elements are being restored.
On some sites where the works lag behind the schedule, contractors have taken steps to attract
more workers and increase their performance capabilities in order to reduce the backlog as soon
as practicable.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit AG
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Tatyana Manezhina Visited Bakhchisaray to Review Progress of
Repair and Restoration Work in Khan’s Palace (23 August 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit AG
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Tatyana Manezhina Visited Bakhchisaray to Review
Progress of Repair and Restoration Work in Khan’s Palace (23 August 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9964.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
Official Resources
MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
1 February, Wednesday
VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED
ONLINE RECEPTION
Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Tatyana Manezhina Visited Bakhchisaray to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Work
in Khan’s Palace
Tatyana Manezhina Visited Bakhchisaray to Review Progress of
Repair and Restoration Work in Khan’s Palace
Annex 16 Exhibit AG
The works are being carried out as part of the State Programme for the Socio-
Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol
Tatyana Manezhina, Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, visited Bakhchisaray
to review the progress of repair and restoration works to preserve the federally significant
cultural heritage sites of the Khan’s Palace.
The works are being carried out as part of the Russian Federation State Programme for the
Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.
During her meetings with the contractor’s representatives, she focused her attention on
checking if the completion deadlines are met for the works in the Stable Building, the Library
Building and the Falcon Tower and measures to preserve the Count (Secular) Building.
When inspecting the premises of the Harem and the Khan’s Mosque where restoration works
are being carried out, she told the contractor’s and customer’s representatives that they should
make additional efforts to detect and preserve those paintings not previously mentioned in the
design documentation.
Anna Kilesa and Andrey Rostenko, Deputy Ministers of Culture of the Republic of Crimea;
representatives of the Ministry’s Department for State Protection of Cultural Heritage Sites;
Ilya Alymchev, Head of the Directorate for the Centralised Service and Development of
Cultural Institutions; and contractors’ representatives also took part in the working conference.
Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea
Exhibit AH
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Previously Unknown Painting Fragments Discovered during
Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace Inspected (22 September 2022)
(translation)

Annex 16 Exhibit AH
Translation
Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Previously Unknown Painting Fragments Discovered
during Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace Inspected (22 September 2022), available at:
https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10086.
Government of the Republic of Crimea
Head of the Republic of Crimea
Government of the Russian Federation
Official Resources
MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
1 February, Wednesday
VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED
ONLINE RECEPTION
Government of the Republic of Crimea > Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea > News
> Previously Unknown Painting Fragments Discovered during Restoration Works in Khan’s
Palace Inspected
Previously Unknown Painting Fragments Discovered during
Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace Inspected
Annex 16 Exhibit AH
Instructions were given to develop measures to restore the unique paintings and
submit them for review by a scientific and methodological council under the
Ministry of Culture of Crimea.
Representatives of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea in conjunction with
members of its scientific and methodological and expert councils, as well as representatives of
the Spiritual Direction of Muslims of Crimea and the public, visited Bakhchisaray to review the
progress of the repair and restoration works to preserve the federally significant cultural heritage
sites of the Khan’s Palace. They inspected the previously unknown fragments of paintings dated
back to the late 17th century and the early 18th century that were discovered on the walls of the
Khan’s Mosque, a federally significant cultural heritage site, during the restoration works.
The repair and restoration works are being carried out as part of the Russian Federation State
Programme for the Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol.
The design supervision and contractor’s teams were instructed to develop additional measures
to restore the monument’s unique paintings and submit them for review by the scientific and
methodological council under the Ministry of Culture of the Crimea.
In the course of the inspection, Ayder Ismailov, Deputy Mufti of the Crimean Muslims, said
the Spiritual Direction of Muslims of Crimea would fully support efforts to discover and
preserve the Mosque’s religious interior design.
Annex 17
Witness Statement of , 6 March 2023
(translation)

Annex 17
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
WITNESS STATEMENT
OF
6 MARCH 2023
Annex 17
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Annex 17
Page 4 out of 18
were subsequently occupied by their families. In that manner, entire ethnic settlements
were formed.1
6. To discuss the land issue and other problems, which were not resolved by Ukrainian
authorities the Crimean Tatars have revived the Qurultay — a congress of delegates of
the Crimean Tatar people.
7. The Qurultay consists of 250 delegates. The delegates are elected for five years. The
delegates are usually nominated by Crimean Tatars and members of their families through
Crimean Tatar public and political organisations and their blocs, or they participate by
self-nomination.
8. The Qurultay established bodies responsible for conducting its sessions and implementing
its decisions: the Presidium, Secretary, Drafting Committee of the session; Mandate,
Counting, Audit and Central Electoral Commissions, Chairman of the Mejlis and the
Mejlis itself.
9. All of the above bodies are rotation-based, accountable to the Qurultay and operate under
the regulations approved by it. According to the Regulation of the Qurultay, all its
decisions are obligatory for the delegates, bodies formed by it and the whole system of
national representation and self-government of the Crimean Tatar people: the Mejlis,
regional and local Mejlises, committees for the assistance in repatriation, their
subdivisions and bodies created by them, as well as representatives of the Mejlis in other
countries.2 Therefore, actions that contradict Qurultay’s decisions are prohibited.
B. MEJLIS
10. Mejlis, as executive body of the Qurultay, was supposed to ensure the implementation of
Qurultay’s decisions and be accountable to it.
1 Government of the Republic of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov Held a Meeting on Squatting in Crimea (2 October
2014), available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20160812144422/http:/rk.gov.ru/ru
s/index html/news/286834 htm (Exhibit A).
2 Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, Rules of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, 12 September 2004,
available at: http://web.archive.org/web/20140726221726/http://qtmm.org/public/images/ckeditor/file/quickfolder/
01_reglament_kurultaya.doc (Exhibit B), Article 2.2.
Annex 17
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11. Mustafa Dzhemilev, former leader of the Organisation of Crimean Tatar National
Movement (OCTNM) had served as the Chairman of the Mejlis for many years. In 2013,
Refat Chubarov was elected Chairman of the Mejlis.3
12. The political leadership of the Mejlis (in particular Mustafa Dzhemilev) did not seek legal
status for the Mejlis (its official registration as an organisation). For this reason, internal
discussions and agreements on concrete measures of assistance to the Crimean Tatars
were not subordinated to a strict procedure and often turned into political “squabbles”.
As a result of such wrangles, those who were louder and tougher, and not those who were
more constructive, were often found to be right, while unwanted members of the Mejlis,
as far as I know, were squeezed out of its membership. Thus, for example, media gave a
wide publicity to the situation, when in 1996 Dzhemilev managed to expel his critics from
the Mejlis following internal conflict. The critics had earlier indicated that Dzhemilev’s
fund misappropriated state money allocated to improve housing conditions of Crimean
Tatars.4 Yury Bekirovich Osmanov, the founder of the movement for protection of the
rights of rehabilitated Crimean Tatars, publicly opposed the position of Dzhemilev and
the Mejlis itself. Yury Bekirovich did not accept the position of Mustafa Dzhemilev on
the preparation for squatting land in the Crimea and opposition to the governmental and
law enforcement authorities. In November 1993, Osmanov was severely beaten and died
in hospital. Many believe that his death was not the result of a hooligan attack, but a
political “order”, since he actively opposed the Mejlis as such, however, the investigation
was not carried out properly.
13. The “informality” of the Mejlis often manifested itself in the way it interacted with the
Crimean and Ukrainian authorities to achieve its goals. The top leadership of the Mejlis,
which was supposed to primarily address the problems of Crimeans, was not shy about
issuing political ultimatums to the authorities and sometimes directly announcing riots in
the streets if the demands put forward by the Mejlis were not met.5
3 Interfax, Chubarov Was Elected Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars (27 October 2013), available at:
https://www.interfax ru/world/337277 (Exhibit C).
4 ZN.UA, Authoritarian Democracy (26 December 1997), available at: https://zn.ua/politcs_archive/avtoritarnaya
_demokratiya html (Exhibit D).
5 In 2013, Mustafa Dzhemilev threatened to “block […] roads”, “paralyse [...] traffic”, “at least in Simferopol, and
perharps ... in other regions of the autonomy” if events on 18 May were obstructed. At the same time, Dzhemilev
openly announced plans to hold actions demanding “the resignation of the government” and stated that Crimean
Tatars are “angered” by the policies pursued against them and their mood “is obviously not going to be very
Annex 17
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14. Such actions could not but arouse apprehension among the Tatars themselves, which on
the one hand intimidated Crimean Tatars, and on the other, caused a negative attitude
towards our people among Crimean residents of other nationalities.
15. Local authorities, apparently out of fear that protests could actually turn into clashes and
cause victims, sometimes made formal concessions to the demands of the Mejlis’s
leadership. However, while there may have been some concessions on paper, these were
isolated cases of solutions in respect of individual appeals. In respect of the global issues
facing Crimean Tatars, the Mejlis has never been able to establish an effective dialogue
with the Crimean and Ukrainian authorities (not least, I believe, because of the
provocative behaviour of Mustafa Dzhemilev and his associates).
16. As previously mentioned, the main problem of the Crimean Tatar people was the lack of
proper living conditions. To address this problem, members of the Mejlis repeatedly
collected money from the Crimean Tatars, in particular through Dzhemilev’s charitable
foundation. However, the Mejlis did not achieve any significant results in this area.
17. As of 2013, many Crimean Tatars, more than 20 years after their return to their homeland,
did not receive any land from Ukraine, had no housing or lived in self-made structures
that in reality were barely livable. In squatter settlements, people could not obtain
documents to legalise their houses and continued to live without light, gas, water,
sewerage and other proper conditions.6 Objectively, since 1991, neither the Mejlis nor
Ukrainian government has not solved housing problems of the Crimean Tatars, and it is
therefore unclear how the funds collected from the people were spent.
18. Besides, public activists and journalists repeatedly accused Mustafa Dzhemilev of
misappropriation of humanitarian aid received from abroad (in particular, from Turkey
and the United States). Every month, several million hryvnias worth of aid were sent to
organizations controlled by Mustafa Dzhemilev’s family. However, instead of using that
peaceful”. See RISU, Crimean Tatars Threaten the Authorities with Revolt If They Prevent the Commemoration
of the Deportation Victims (28 February 2013), available at: https://risu.ua/ru/krymskie-tatary-ugrozhayut-vlastibuntom-
v-sluchae-prepyatstvovaniya-chestvovaniyu-pamyati-zhertv-deportacii_n61760 (Exhibit E).
6 Livejournal, Respublika News, Enver Abduraimov: “The Mejlis is driving our people into opposition. People
don't benefit from it” (27 February 2013), available at: https://respublika-news.livejournal.com/186618 html
(Exhibit F).
Annex 17
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aid for the benefit of the Crimean Tatars, he re-sold the goods. The money received thus
remained in possession of Mustafa Dzhemilev and his associates from the Mejlis.7
19. I am aware that members of the Mejlis, in particular, Mustafa Dzhemilev, have also been
accused of inefficient and arbitrary use and spending of budgetary funds allocated under
the programme for the return and settlement of the Crimean Tatar people, in particular
for addressing housing issues.
20. For a long time, budgetary funds in support of Crimean Tatars were transferred to a
current account at Imdat-Bank, whose main founder was Dzhemilev through the Crimea
Foundation.
21. Three times members of the Mejlis decided to open a current account in another bank,
but Dzhemilev refused to comply, as he was withdrawing large sums of money through
Imdat-Bank.8 In 1996, the Audit Commission of the Qurultay confirmed the facts of
embezzlement and misuse of budgetary funds. As of the end of 1997, the debt for
embezzled funds exceeded 2 million hryvnias9 (which at that moment amounted to 1
million US dollars).
22. The Imdat-Bank incident was not the only one in which Mustafa Dzhemilev refused to
implement the decisions of the Mejlis and the Qurultay. For example, it was reported that
he opposed the appointment of Ziya Khalikov to the post of Chairman of the Republican
Committee for Nationalities and Deported Citizens, in whose favour members of the
Mejlis voted at a meeting on 8 June 1997.10 Also, Mustafa Dzhemilev led negotiations
with opposition factions of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Crimea behind the
back of the Qurultay faction, of which he was a member.11
7 Milli Firka, How Dzhemilev Ripped Off Three Orphans (12 October 2013), available at: http://millifirka.
org/как-джемилев-трех-сирот-обокрал/ (Exhibit G).
8 FLB, Dzhemilev's Profitable Struggle (3 April 2014), available at: https://flb ru/infoprint/57704.html
(Exhibit H).
9 Milli Firka, “Imdat Bank” and the Crisis in the Mejlis (25 March 2011), available at: http://millifirka.
org/«имдат-банк»-и-кризис-в-меджлисе/ (Exhibit I).
10 L. Arifov’s co-report to the semi-annual report of Mejlis chairman M.A. Dzhemilev for the period from July
1996 to December 1997, see ibid.
11 Ibid.
Annex 17
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23. These incidents show that, as I indicated above, when the Mejlis took decisions that were
unfavourable to him, Mustafa Dzhemilev would sabotage its work, refusing to sign off
its decisions, even those taken by the majority, threatened to disrupt the work of the
Mejlis.12 This approach to governance created a deep crisis within the Mejlis, beginning
as early as from the II convocation of the Qurultay.
24. The events described above characterise the significance of the conflict within the Mejlis
itself, as Mustafa Dzhemilev acted to pursue personal benefit and in opposition to the
opinion of the Mejlis, causing great damage to the interests of the Crimean Tatars.
Already in the late 1990-s, there emerged certain individual supporters of Dzhemilev who
approved his initiatives, which over time acquired more and more radical forms.
C. EVENTS SURROUNDING CRIMEA'S ACCESSION TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
25. The events of February-March 2014 required certain legal and political actions from the
Crimean Tatar community. An extraordinary second session of the Qurultay of the VI
Convocation was convened to discuss them and form a unified agenda for further
representation of the interests of the Crimean Tatar people after Crimea’s reunification
with the Russian Federation. It was held on 29 March 2014.13 I participated in the session
and was a member of its Presidium.
26. In his speech, Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov declared that the Mejlis was
ready to solve the problems of the Crimean Tatar people under the actual circumstances
in which they found themselves, with the participation the Russian authorities.14 Thus,
the Mejlis studied Russian laws in order to form a position regarding the protection of the
interests of the Crimean Tatars, proposals of the Mejlis and the Qurultay were conveyed
12 E. Muedinov, Report of the Chairman of the Audit Commission of the III Qurultay (Avdet newspaper, No.
23(186) 31 December 1997, see Milli Firka, Who and How Ripped Off the People in the Mejlis (25 March 2011),
available at: http://milli-firka.org/кто-и-как-в-меджлисе-обворовывал-народ/ (Exhibit J).
13 Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Extraordinary 2nd session of the 6th convocation of the Qurultay of the
Crimean Tatar people opened in Bakhchisaray (29 March 2014), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140728221035/http://qtmm.org/новости/4401-в-бахчисарае-открыла-работу-
внеочередная-2-ая-сессия-курултая-крымскотатарского-народа-vi-созыва (Exhibit K).
14 Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov: We are tired of looking for
our place in the relationship between the two countries (30 March 2014), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140728201656/http://qtmm.org/новости/4412-замглавы-меджлиса-нариман-
джелялов-мы-устали-искать-свое-место-в-отношениях-между-двумя-странами (Exhibit L).

Annex 17
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D. RADICALISATION OF THE POLICY OF THE MEJLIS
29. I cannot say what was the main reason for the radicalisation of Refat Chubarov, Mustafa
Dzhemilev and their supporters. Perhaps they were hoping to give themselves more
political weight and were afraid that with an effective state policy of the Russian
authorities people would realise how ineffective the actions of the Mejlis had been for
more than 20 years. Perhaps they were afraid of losing control over the financial flows
for the improvement of the life of Crimean Tatars and discovery of their unlawful use of
monetary funds, or probably they were acting with the aim of building a political career
in Ukraine. One way or another, some time after the reunification of Crimea with Russia,
Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev returned to the tactics of blackmail and political
ultimatums with obviously unenforceable demands to the Russian authorities. In doing
so, Refat Chubarov called for a boycott of the decisions of the Russian authorities, which
directly contradicted the earlier Qurultay’s decision.
30. Thus, on 3 May 2014, Refat Chubarov organised a rally in support of Mustafa Dzhemilev
and blocked the Kherson-Kerch highway, which Dzhemilev used to illegally cross the
border in violation of the ban on his entry into the Russian Federation. During the rally,
the participants used physical force against police officers and border guards of the
Russian Federation, seized the checkpoint and held it for about five hours.
31. In addition, at Chubarov’s instigation, rallies were organised on behalf of the Mejlis on
other highways, e.g., near Belogorsk, Bakhchisaray, and Sudak, as well as in Leninsky,
Sovetsky and other districts of Crimea.
32. As I have already indicated, such methods had caused resentment and apprehension on
the part of the Ukrainian authorities in the past. The Russian authorities also became
aware that the actions of the Mejlis were radical and dangerous for the residents of the
peninsula. For this reason, Crimean prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaya served Refat
Chubarov with a warning about the inadmissibility of performing extremist activities.20
20 Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Crimean prosecutor reads warning to Mejlis chairman on inadmissibility
of extremist activities (4 May 2014), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140729102618/http://qtmm.org/новости/4474-прокурор-крыма-зачитала-
предупреждение-председателю-меджлиса-о-недопустимости-осуществления-экстремистской-
деятельности (Exhibit P).
Annex 17
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33. Seeing actions undertaken by Refat Chubarov and his supporters, I tried to warn them
against the consequences they could lead to, particularly for Crimean Tatars. Such radical
actions clearly could not benefit the Crimean Tatar community. They only harmed it and
discredited the Crimean Tatars in the eyes of Russian citizens and the authorities.
34. I continued to follow the decision of the extraordinary second session of the Qurultay and
hoped that only constructive and diplomatic interaction between Crimean Tatars and the
Russian authorities could bring results. However, I was expelled from the Mejlis on 23
August 2014 for such interaction. Refat Chubarov single-handedly decided that my
actions had a detrimental effect on the Tatars and allegedly exacerbated their
disempowerment. However, in my opinion, it was obvious that it was exactly Refat
Chubarov’s actions that cast a shadow over Crimean Tatars.
35. Radical supporters of the Mejlis also pointed out at the time of my expulsion that I
allegedly did not follow the rules and norms of the Regulation of the Qurultay and the
Mejlis By-Laws. However, it was Refat Chubarov himself and his supporters who
violated these internal documents, as they did not follow the decision of the extraordinary
second session of the VI convocation of the Qurultay and expelled a member of the Mejlis
while only Qurultay delegates could do so.
36. Despite the fact that the Mejlis was only an executive body of the Qurultay and was
obliged to implement all its decisions, Refat Chubarov once again neglected his duties.
All this resulted in an even greater rift in the Mejlis. It became obvious that the Mejlis
was no longer representing the interests of the Crimean Tatars.
E. UKRAINE'S SUPPORT FOR CRIMEAN TATARS
37. In all the time the Mejlis has been active, not even the most acute problems of the Crimean
Tatars have been resolved. It was only after Crimea reunified with the Russian Federation
that the Ukrainian authorities started to actively support Dzhemilev and Chubarov. It was
obvious that the motivation for this was not to help Crimean Tatars, but to use radical
members of the Mejlis and Crimean Tatars for Ukraine’s purposes to aggravate the
situation in Crimea.
38. A rather illustrative example of such dual Ukrainian policy is the consideration of the
drafts of the Law “On Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds”
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by the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine. Over the course of 10 years, numerous drafts of
such a law initiated by the Mejlis were considered. For example, Mustafa Dzhemilev
submitted one such draft laws to the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine in March 200421 and
a majority voted in its favour, but it was never adopted due to a veto by the Ukrainian
President Leonid Kuchma.22 Its reconsideration was unsuccessful, and as a result it was
withdrawn by the Cabinet of Ministers in late 2009.23 A similar bill was submitted to the
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine on 24 February 2010.24 However, this draft law was not
adopted either. It was only after the reunification of Crimea with Russia that the bill
introduced on 12 December 2012 was approved by a majority in the Ukrainian
parliament. It came into force on 13 August 2014.
39. Thus, the Ukrainian authorities were initially reluctant to address issues related to the
restoration of Crimean Tatars’ rights, providing them with land and livelihood, until
Crimea reunified with the Russian Federation, in spite of the fact that many organisations
advised them to do so. Such a rapid adoption of this law in early 2014 was merely a PR
stunt by the Ukrainian authorities.
F. ORGANISING BLOCKADES OF CRIMEA
40. For the Crimean Tatars themselves, it became apparent that the Mejlis had ceased to care
about their interests after the blockades of Crimea: (a) water blockade, by blocking the
North Crimean canal,25 (b) food blockade, by impeding the passage of goods-loaded
21 Maidan.org.ua, The Law "On restoration of rights of persons deported" in the Rada (2 March 2004), available
at: https://maidan.org.ua/arch/oldkrym/1075827192 html (Exhibit Q).
22 Maidan.org.ua, Kuchma Imposes Veto on Law on the Deported (23 July 2004), available at:
https://maidan.org.ua/arch/oldkrym/1090559805.html (Exhibit R).
23 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea,
Ukraine, August 2013, p. 4, available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/a/104309.pdf.
24 Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, Draft Law on the Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic
Grounds, 24 February 2010, available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20220306151430/https://w1.c1 rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_2?pf3516=5515&
skl=7 (Exhibit S).
25 RIA Novosti (Crimea), How Crimea was hardened: five blockades in the peninsula's modern history (28
February 2019), available at: https://crimea.ria.ru/20190228/1116152860.html (Exhibit T).

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blockades were harmful to all the people in Crimea, including Crimean Tatars
themselves.33
44. I also condemned the use of Crimean Tatar national symbols during the blockades: the
flag, the coat of arms and the anthem. Putting a Crimean Tatar flag on a blown-up
transmission tower put innocent people, which was not involved in that act, in bad light.
In my opinion, Dzhemilev and Chubarov had no right to use the symbols representing the
united and peace-loving Crimean Tatar people at their own discretion and for personal
objectives.
45. Dzhemilev and Chubarov subsequently moved forces, with the help of which they had
organised the blockades, to the Kherson oblast. They also hired Turkish military
instructors, natives of the Caucasus and militants who had fought during the Syria conflict
on the side of ISIS,34 and encouraged Crimean Tatars to join them.
46. All those actions by Dzhemilev and Chubarov were aimed at discrediting Crimean Tatars
in Crimea. It finally became obvious that Dzhemilev and Chubarov’s actions had long
been dictated by no concern for the Crimean Tatars; these personalities have their own
goals, which run counter to the interests of their people.
47. Crimean Tatar mothers also complained about that and organised a forum of Crimean
Tatar women in Simferopol on 5 March 2016 entitled “Take Care of Mothers’ Hearts”.
About 500 Crimean Tatar women attended the forum. They called on international
organizations to condemn the activities of Refat Chubarov, Mustafa Dzhemilev, Lenur
Islyamov, as well as members of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, stating that they
discredit the entire Crimean Tatar people:
“Our people worked painstakingly to create institutions of national selfgovernment,
and now they have been discredited by the extremist and destructive
activities of pseudo-leaders. Once again, they are trying to use us as a bargaining
chip [...].”35
33 RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Tatars Want to Meet Chubarov and Dzhemilev at the Border (17 September
2015), available at: https://crimea.ria.ru/20150917/1101007975 html (Exhibit AB).
34 RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Authorities Speak Out About Turkish Military Instructors in Ukraine (5 March
2016), available at: https://ria ru/20160305/1385199067 html (Exhibit AC).
35 RG.ru, Crimean Tatar mothers call on UN to punish Mejlis leaders (5 March 2016), available at:
https://rg.ru/2016/03/05/reg-kfo/krymskotatarskie-materi-prizvali-nakazat--medzhlis html (Exhibit AD).
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48. Thus, Chubarov and Dzhemilev’s efforts turned the Mejlis into a criminal community
which often acted as told by Ukrainian authorities, hiding behind the interests of Crimean
Tatars to justify its activities and form a negative attitude of Crimean Tatars towards the
Russian authorities.
G. RECOGNITION OF THE MEJLIS AS AN EXTREMIST ORGANISATION
49. All of the aforementioned activities of the Mejlis were bound to lead to a reaction from
the authorities in Crimea. The Crimean Prosecutor was repeatedly requested to respond
to the illegal acts of the Mejlis, in particular by Crimean Tatar civil society organisations.
50. The requests were caused by months spent under the blockade of the peninsula. I also
shared the view of the Crimean Tatars, seeing all the damage that the Mejlis was inflicting
on the peninsula and, above all, on the interests of the Crimean Tatars. I was convinced
that the Mejlis had lost the right to be called “Crimean Tatar”, because the blockades it
had organised were crimes against people living in Crimea.
51. For this reason, I advocated putting an end to activities of the Mejlis and believed that its
recognition as extremist was an adequate response to the blatantly criminal activities of
Dzhemilev and Chubarov and their associates from the Mejlis.
36
,37 since we could not allow extremist acts, which actually
crossed the line of terrorist activity, to continue to take place in Crimea.
52. Upon considering the case, on 26 April 2016 the Supreme Court of Crimea recognised
the Mejlis as an extremist organisation. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
checked validity and legality of this decision in September 2016.
H. POSITIVE CHANGES IN CRIMEA AFTER 2014
53. Since Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation, I have seen great progress in
resolution of Crimean Tatars’ problems. Besides, I was also involved in their resolution
36
37 RIA Novosti (Crimea), The Crimean Inter-Ethnic Committee Will Support the Prosecution of the Mejlis (31
March 2016), available at: https://ria ru/20160331/1400577129 html (Exhibit AE); RIA Novosti (Crimea),
Crimean Authorities Call Judgement on Mejlis “a Deliverance from Disgrace” (29 September 2016), available
at: https://ria ru/20160929/1478161775.html (Exhibit AF).
Annex 17
Page 16 out of 18
during my tenure as
.
54. Already since the spring of 2014, the conditions of Crimean Tatars significantly changed
for the best. On 21 April 2014, the President of the Russian Federation signed the Decree
“On measures aimed at rehabilitation of Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and
German peoples and state support for their revival and development”,38 and on 11 March
2014, the Crimean parliament signed the Resolution “On guarantees of the restoration of
rights of the Crimean Tatar people and their integration into the Crimean community”,39
on 22 December 2016, amendments to the Law of Crimea “On measures of social support
for rehabilitated persons and persons who have suffered from political repression” were
adopted,40 as well as other acts granting Crimean Tatar the status of the state language,
guaranteeing its study, as well as providing for other benefits and allocations to support
Crimean Tatars, their culture and, above all, decent living conditions.
55. In spite of the fact that a certain number of Crimean Tatar NGOs representing Crimean
Tatar interests has acted (and continues to act) in Crimea,41 their interests are also
protected at the Republican level, as evidenced, in particular, by the establishment in 2018
of
Several meetings took place between the President of the Russian
Federation and representatives of the Crimean Tatars; constant contact was established
with the Crimean authorities, in particular with the Head of the Republic of Crimea
Sergey Aksyonov; certain Crimean Tatars joined the Council under the President of the
38 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 268 “On measures aimed at rehabilitation of Armenian,
Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state support of their revival and development”,
21 April 2014. See Counter-Memorial (CERD), Annex 63.
39 Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Resolution “On Guarantees of the Restoration of the
Rights of the Crimean Tatar People and Their Integration into the Crimean Community” No. 1728-6/14, 11 March
2014. See Counter-Memorial (CERD), Annex 789.
40 Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 218-ZRK “On measures of social support for rehabilitated persons and
persons who have suffered from political repression”, 18 February 2016. See Counter-Memorial (CERD), Annex
101.
41 For example, “Crimea”, the “Inkishaf” Crimean Tatar Society, the Committee of Crimean Tatar Mothers, a
number of youth organisations, etc.
42 Decree of the Head of the Republic of Crimea No. 93-U “On establishing the Council of Crimean Tatars under
the Head of the Republic of Crimea”, 29 March 2018. See Counter-Memorial (CERD), Annex 112.

Annex 17
Page 18 out of 18
representative bodies of ethnic groups (as it was in Ukraine) is a sign of an unhealthy
system, in which ethnic groups are sometimes forced to seek protection from structures
with no clear legal status due to a total denial of their rights. The rights of ethnic groups
(Crimean Tatars being such) in a normal country can and should be protected by state
authorities, in accordance with the democratic principle of equal treatment of all citizens.
59. In general, as a Crimean Tatar living in Crimea, I have not experienced any measures that
could be considered discriminatory. of the State Committee for
Inter-Ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, I can say that Russia’s policy in Crimea
is aimed at supporting the Crimean Tatars and other peoples.
Witness
[Signature]
Simferopol, 6 March 2023
Annex 17
LIST OF EXHIBITS
Number: Name of exhibit:
Exhibit A Government of the Republic of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov Held a Meeting
on Squatting in Crimea (2 October 2014).
Exhibit B Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, Rules of Qurultay of the Crimean
Tatar People, 12 September 2004.
Exhibit C Interfax, Chubarov Was Elected Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatars (27 October 2013).
Exhibit D ZN.UA, Authoritarian Democracy (26 December 1997).
Exhibit E RISU, Crimean Tatars Threaten the Authorities with Revolt If They Prevent
the Commemoration of the Deportation Victims (28 February 2013).
Exhibit F Livejournal, Respublika News, Enver Abduraimov: “The Mejlis is driving
our people into opposition. People don't benefit from it” (27 February
2013).
Exhibit G Milli Firka, How Dzhemilev Ripped Off Three Orphans (12 October 2013).
Exhibit H FLB, Dzhemilev's Profitable Struggle (3 April 2014).
Exhibit I Milli Firka, “Imdat Bank” and the Crisis in the Mejlis (25 March 2011).
Exhibit J Milli Firka, Who and How Ripped Off the People in the Mejlis
(25 March 2011).
Exhibit K Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Extraordinary 2nd session of the 6th
convocation of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people opened in
Bakhchisaray (29 March 2014).
Exhibit L Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman
Dzhelyalov: We are tired of looking for our place in the relationship
between the two countries (30 March 2014).

Annex 17
Exhibit Z Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a
blockade of Crimea (14 January 2016).
Exhibit AA RIA Novosti (Crimea), Nimetullayev: The Blockade of Crimea Is Targeting
Crimean Tatars in Ukraine (17 September 2015).
Exhibit AB RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Tatars Want to Meet Chubarov and
Dzhemilev at the Border (17 September 2015).
Exhibit AC RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Authorities Speak Out About Turkish
Military Instructors in Ukraine (5 March 2016).
Exhibit AD RG.ru, Crimean Tatar mothers call on UN to punish Mejlis leaders (5
March 2016).
Exhibit AE RIA Novosti (Crimea), The Crimean Inter-Ethnic Committee Will Support
the Prosecution of the Mejlis (31 March 2016).
Exhibit AF RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Authorities Call Judgement on Mejlis “a
Deliverance from Disgrace” (29 September 2016).
Exhibit AG SK Consol-Stroy, Bakhchisaray Celebrates Commissioning of a New
Residential Building for Repatriates (21 April 2015).
Exhibit AH RIA Novosti (Realty), 90 Crimean Tatar Families in Simferopol Receive
Keys to New Flats (12 December 2016).
Exhibit AI RIA Novosti (Crimea), How the Process of Allocating Land to the
Participants of “Protest Glades” in Crimea Is Going (23 January 2020).
Exhibit AJ Government of the Republic of Crimea, The Ministry of Property of the
Republic of Crimea Informs Citizens Participating in the “Glades of
Protest” about the allocation of land plots free of charge for ownership (24
August 2021).
Exhibit AK TASS, In Crimea Kindergartens and a Residential Building for Previously
Deported Citizens Have Been Built in Five Years (18 May 2020).

Exhibit A
Government of the Republic of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov Held a Meeting on Squatting in
Crimea (2 October 2014)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit A
Translation
Government of the Republic of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov Held a Meeting on Squatting in Crimea
(2 October 2014), available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20160812144422/http:/rk.gov.ru/ru
s/index.html/news/286834.htm.
Sergey Aksyonov Held a Meeting on Squatting in Crimea -
Government Portal of the Republic of Crimea
Sergei Aksyonov held a meeting on squatting in Crimea
2 October 2014
Acting Head of the Republic of Crimea - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Crimea Sergey Aksyonov held a meeting on the unauthorised seizure of land plots in the territory of
the Republic of Crimea.
“Today’s meeting is dedicated to one of the problems that characterised Crimea during its
membership of Ukraine. It is the presence on the territory of our Republic of mass squatting of land
for various purposes. This phenomenon is not contributing to the development of our investment
climate. We understand that we must solve this issue in the interests of all Crimean people, regardless
of nationality. I believe that after Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation, we must resolve this
issue legally and prevent similar phenomena in the future,” Aksyonov said.
The deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Nikolay Yanaki, has
made a report on the issue of squatting in Crimea.

Exhibit B
Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, Rules of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, 12
September 2004
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit B
Excerpt
Translation
Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, Rules of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, 12
September 2004, available at:
http://web.archive.org/web/20140726221726/http://qtmm.org/public/images/ckeditor/file/quic
k-folder/01_reglament_kurultaya.doc.
RULES
of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People
Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people, the national congress, is the highest representative
competent body of the Crimean Tatar people (hereinafter - Qurultay).
At the Qurultay the Crimean Tatar people are represented by delegates, elected by the Crimean
Tatars and members of their families, regardless of nationality, permanently residing in Ukraine, and
Crimean Tatars and members of their families - citizens of Ukraine, regardless of place of residence.
The term of powers of the Qurultay is 5 years.
I. General provisions
1.1. The Rules of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people (hereinafter - the Rules of Qurultay)
determines the powers and procedure of activity of Qurultay and its bodies.
1.2. The Rules of Qurultay shall be approved by 2/3 of the votes of the delegates present.
Amendments and supplements to the Rules of the Qurultay shall be made at the sessions of the
Qurultay and shall be adopted by not less than 2/3 of the votes of the delegates registered at the
session.
1.3. The official language of Qurultay shall be the Crimean Tatar language.
II. Powers of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people
2.1. Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people
takes decisions on all significant issues of socio-political, socio-economic, cultural and other aspects
of the life of the people;
approves the Qurultay Rules and the Provisions:
on the status of the Qurultay delegates;
on the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people (Qyrym Tatar Milli Mejilisi);
on the Review Committee of Qurultay;
on the election of the delegates to Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people;
determines the main directions and forms of activities of the Mejlis and other bodies of Qurultay,
makes decisions on their formation and dissolution;
elects the Working Bodies of the Qurultay session: Presidium, Secretariat, Drafting Commission,
Counting Commission; Chairman of Mejlis and the permanent bodies of Qurultay: Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar people, the Review Committee of Qurultay, Mandate Commission and Central
Electoral Commission;
makes changes in the composition of: the Mejlis, the Review Committee of Qurultay, the Central
Electoral Commission for the election of the Qurultay delegates and other bodies formed by it;
сonfirms the powers of the Chairman of the Mejlis, the Chairman of the Review Committee of
Qurultay;
hears reports of its elected bodies and evaluates their activities and, if necessary, takes decisions on
them;
approves the authority of newly elected delegates and decides on the termination of the delegate's
powers.
2.2. Decisions of Qurultay are binding upon its delegates, the bodies formed by it and the whole
system of national representation and self-government of the Crimean Tatar people: Mejlis of the
Annex 17 Exhibit B
Crimean Tatar people (hereinafter - Mejlis), regional and local Mejlises, committees for the return of
Crimean Tatars, their subdivisions and bodies created by them, representatives of Mejlis in other
states.
2.3. Only the Qurultay itself or the persons and bodies authorised by the Qurultay may make
statements and perform any actions on behalf of the Qurultay.
III. Rules of procedure of Qurultay sessions
3.1. Sessions of Qurultay are called by Mejlis at least once every 2.5 years.
3.2. Sessions of Qurultay are also called upon written request of not less than 1/3 of the list of
delegates, and the Mejlis shall call this session of Qurultay not later than 2 months from the date of
the request.
3.3. The decision on the time of calling the session shall be announced one month before its
opening. The delegates of the Qurultay shall be notified in writing, and the draft agenda and order of
work of the announced session of the Qurultay approved by the Mejlis shall be brought to their
attention not later than 15 days in advance.
3.4. For the preparation of the session of Qurultay the Mejlis forms an organisational entity,
which after the election of the Presidium of the session of Qurultay is subordinated to it until the
completion of its work. The organisational entity shall ensure the conduct of the session of the
Qurultay and carry out the instructions of the Presidium of the session of the Qurultay.
3.5. Qurultay is recognised as competent if not less than 2/3 of the list of delegates have
registered by the beginning of the session.
3.6. The Crimean Tatar national anthem and the national anthem of Ukraine shall be played at
the opening and closing sessions of the Qurultay.
3.7. The work of the first session of the new convocation of the Qurultay until the election of
the Presidium of the session of the Qurultay shall be led by the chairman of the Central Electoral
Commission.
3.8. Meetings of the session of the Qurultay shall be open and public.
3.9. Representatives of state bodies, political parties and public organisations, foreign guests
may be invited to the session meetings of the Qurultay by the Mejlis. Representatives of the media
are accredited for the session meetings in accordance with the procedure established by the Mejlis.
3.10. A closed session meeting may be held by the decision of the Qurultay.
3.11. Qurultay establishes a time limit for speakers and debaters, which shall be observed by
the Presidium of the session of Qurultay. Persons who do not comply with the time regulations or
allow unethical expressions in relation to the attendees, may be deprived of the floor by the presiding
officer. A participant of the Qurultay, who offends the Qurultay and its delegates with misbehaviour,
may be removed from the session meeting only by a majority decision of the delegates of the Qurultay
present.
3.12. The session of Qurultay finishes its work when the agenda is exhausted or earlier by the
decision of the delegates of Qurultay.
3.13. At the closing session of Qurultay the working bodies of the session are dissolved.
[…]
Exhibit C
Interfax, Chubarov Was Elected Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars
(27 October 2013)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit C
Translation
Interfax, Chubarov Was Elected Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars (27 October
2013), available at: https://www.interfax.ru/world/337277.
Chubarov Was Elected Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars
Simferopol. October 27. INTERFAX.RU - Refat Chubarov, who previously held the post of first
deputy head of the Mejlis, has been elected the new chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
people.
On Sunday, at the 1st session of the VI Qurultay (congress) of the Crimean Tatars taking place in
Simferopol, 126 Qurultay delegates voted in favor of R. Chubarov, while his rival - deputy
chairman of Mejlis Remzy Ilyasov - received 112 delegates' votes during a secret ballot. Two
ballots were declared invalid.
Currently, the Qurultay is holding a nomination of candidates who can be elected members of the
Mejlis.
R. Chubarov is the first deputy head of Mejlis since 1991, since 2009 he is also the president of the
World Congress of Crimean Tatars. Since November 2010 - the deputy of the Supreme Council of
Crimea, Head of deputy fraction “Qurultay-Rukh”. The deputy of Supreme Soviet of the Autonomy
in 1994-1998. The People's Deputy of Ukraine from 1998-2002, 2002-2006, and from 2006-2007
convocations of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine.

Exhibit D
ZN.UA, Authoritarian Democracy (26 December 1997)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit D
Translation
ZN.UA, Authoritarian Democracy (26 December 1997), available at:
https://zn.ua/politcs_archive/avtoritarnaya_demokratiya.html.
AUTHORITARIAN DEMOCRACY
Nikolai Semena
The split in the Crimean Tatar national movement at the Qurultay
has not been overcome, but has only worsened, its veterans believe…
Last week in Simferopol an extraordinary session of the third Qurultay of the Crimean
Tatars considered the crisis in the Mejlis. Addressing the Qurultay sixteen of its
delegates raised the issue that "a group of unscrupulous businessmen is trying to turn
the Mejlis into a "political cover" for their illegal operations related to the
embezzlement of budgetary funds allocated for the Program for the Return and
Settlement of the Crimean Tatar People". Even after the Qurultay, Lenur Arifov stated
that "reaction and authoritarianism have settled in the Mejlis" and that the Mejlis and
the Qurultay "have turned into bodies serving the interests of one person and persons
close to him." "Now what young Mustafa once fought against, he is implementing in
the body he heads," L. Arifov concluded.
People sympathetic to the Crimean Tatars took the news of the split with pain. After
all, the Crimean Tatar national movement has been fighting for the ideals of
democracy for the last several decades of its history. So what happened? Aisha
Seitmuratova, a veteran of the movement, described the incident as "Stalinism,"
telling a correspondent of "Zerkalo Nedeli" and other journalists the following:
"Mustafa is our national hero. He stood up to the pressure of the authorities and KGB,
this terrible machine. Not everyone stood up to it. But Mustafa - alas! - is not a leader,
with all my respect to him. Not every hero can be a leader and not every leader can be
a hero...". According to her, in her New York office (Ayshe Hanum is an American
citizen) there's a letter written in 1989 by Izzet Hairov, a member of the movement
who was expelled from the Mejlis during this Qurultay: "Mustafa is no longer the one
for whom we fought. I do not understand what happened to him. Mustafa will lead
the people to a precipice, from which we all the people will not get out...". Naturally,
not everything in this story is as straightforward as it seems at first glance. All the
more so because we are talking about quite influential people in Crimea. According to
the poll, conducted by the Crimean independent center of political researchers and
journalists, Mustafa Dzhemilev was the tenth most influential person in the past year,
Lilya Budzhurova - the 18th and Lenur Arifov - the 22nd. However, Refat Chubarov
shared 3-4th place, and Nadir Bekirov - 19th-20th. To understand the problem, let's
listen to both sides of the argument…
Crisis, Split or Revolt?
Sixteen delegates, ideologically led by the Deputy Prime Minister of the autonomy,
one of the leaders of the national faction in the Crimean parliament Lenur Arifov and
journalist Lilya Budzhurova, stated that "the Mejlis chairman with all his authority
and direct actions created the conditions in which these embezzlements were possible.
The economic and financial instruments of embezzlement of budgetary funds were
Imdat Bank and the "Crimea" Public Fund... the president of which is the chairman of
the Mejlis...". Sixteen delegates of the Qurultay stated that "the Fund "Crimea",
Annex 17 Exhibit D
having received 800 thousand grivnas from the state budget to help individual
developers - our compatriots, has been keeping this money in its "pockets" for more
than two years, condemning many hundreds of people to live in dugouts or unfinished
houses. And this is just one example..."
In the report, which Lenur Arifov was not allowed to read to the end, he stated that
having discovered the embezzlement, members of the Mejlis demanded that the
account of the Capital development administration of State Committee on Interethnic
Relations of the Republic of Crimea, where the money was transferred by Kiev, be
transferred to another bank. But contrary to their expectations, Mustafa Dzhemilev
not only did not agree to this, but refused to sign and hindered the implementation of
the decisions made by the majority of the Mejlis. And the shortage of funds in the
Imdat Bank account at the beginning of the outgoing year was already about 2 million
grivnas and continued to grow. Lenur Arifov drew a clear scheme according to which
the bank, the State Committee on Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea and
commercial structures acted - the budget funds from the accounts of the Capital
development administration were transferred to the accounts of the "Crimea" Fund,
the "Torshe" Private Entrepreneurship, the "RED" Private Enterprise, the "Sinan"
Private Enterprise and the "Oasis" Cooperative, which, according to Arifov, are "the
property of private firms, behind which stand several specific individuals, Crimean
Tatars by nationality". Arifov states that the image of Imdat-Bank as a national
Crimean Tatar financial institution is a myth, because it has never been under the
control of the Mejlis, it has always been managed by only one person - Mustafa
Dzhemilev.
The opposition called such a state of the Mejlis a crisis, outside observers called it a
split, while Mustafa Dzhemilev himself and his colleagues tried to present the
opposition's actions at the Qurultay as a revolt in the Mejlis itself. Let's listen to the
arguments of the second side for full objectivity. In his report, Mustafa Dzhemilev
categorically denied the "information" about his personal accounts and involvement in
the ownership of commercial structures. He claimed that the money received by the
firms were not embezzled, but used as loans and had to be returned. According to
Mustafa Dzhemilev, one cannot "classify all debtors as thieves and embezzlers," even
if "it is unlikely that these firms will be able to repay debts in the near future. He also
recalled that it was the "Crimea" Fund that invested a lot of money donated by the
Tatar diaspora in the Imdat Bank. He rejected accusations of authoritarianism, saying
that "if even in such situations the chairman of the Mejlis cannot make volitional
decisions, then why does the Mejlis need a chairman at all?" He accused journalist
Lilya Budzhurova of "using standard methods of exposure," in which on television
they compared the "good" houses of some Crimean Tatars with the unfinished houses
of others.
In short, the Qurultay created a situation where, as it were, "two rights" collided. It
would have been correct, however, under one condition - if the opposition was given a
decent and normal voice. But Arifov was booed and the microphone was taken away
from Budzhurova. Democracy can not be limited; it either exists or it doesn't exist. It's
good and easy to be a democrat when you have nothing. It turned out that if a
manager gets to manage at least one bank and a fairly significant amount of money in
it, it is almost impossible to dispose of them so that everyone was happy.
Naturally, for Mustafa Dzhemilev to let the question "about the crisis" go on its own,
meant, perhaps, to be removed from politics today, when, in his opinion, this should
not be allowed at all - he is included tenth in the election list of Rukh, which almost
guarantees the former dissident and the leader of long-suffering people election to
Annex 17 Exhibit D
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine. Of course Mustafa Bey could not take the risk, but he
was afraid to trust the people (more precisely, the Qurultay delegates) and to hold, as
it should be, closed voting about prolongation of his powers. As a result, voting was
conducted in a usual and primitive way from the point of view of democracy - each
delegate had to stand up and say - "for", "against" or "abstained", under the gaze of
tough "guards".
As a result, the events have not gone at all according to the scheme expected by the
opposition. The Qurultay took tough measures, but not to the "commercial and
banking structures" that the rebellious delegates accused of machinations, but to
themselves - all sixteen were expelled from the Mejlis, three - Lenur Arifov, Lilya
Budzhurova and Nariman Abdureshitov - were recalled from the deputy fraction in
the Supreme Soviet of Crimea, the decision "About the Crimean Tatar mass media"
was made, which replaced the entire editorial board of the "rebellious" newspaper
"Avdet"; the national editorial board on the Crimean television is ordered to have "a
public council from the representatives of the Mejlis, as well as the Crimean Tatar
culture, science and education"; a "concept of development of the Crimean Tatar
journalism for the implementation of a common information policy" will be
developed (?). Its former chairman Enver Muedinov was recalled from the revision
commission. The Qurultay confirmed the authority of Mustafa Dzhemilev, the
chairman of the Mejlis, and gave him additional rights - to withdraw without
discussion one third of the nominated candidates (although he asked for only one
tenth of them) when electing the members of the Mejlis, to veto its decisions and
others. If we take into account that the veto can be overridden by only two-thirds of
votes, and the chairman has the right to withdraw one third of votes even without
discussion, Mustafa Dzhemilev can be congratulated - practically he has received the
right of absolute veto, which actually gives him the rights of khan. If Kirsan
Ilyumzhinov can be, as they write, a "democratic khan," why can't Mustafa
Dzhemilev be one?
The delegates also confirmed the decision of the Mejlis on the participation of the
Crimean Tatars in the elections to the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine in the bloc with
Rukh and adopted several other documents - an appeal to the OSCE, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, President of Ukraine and the Verkhovnaya Rada of
Ukraine "On the continuation of discrimination of the Crimean Tatar people and the
need for urgent measures to protect their rights" and the appeal to the leadership of the
country "On consideration of the interests of the Crimean Tatar people in the
privatization process in Ukraine", which, however, in connection with the issue of the
Mejlis crisis are kind of in the shadow.
What Is the Result?
Mustafa Dzhemilev, in terms of overcoming the crisis, considers the Qurultay to have
"achieved its goals." The opposition, hoping that the Qurultay would calmly listen to
them and delve into the problem, left the congress.
And yet the losses from the Qurultay were probably greater than the gains. First of all,
the movement practically lost its image as a democratic movement, and accusations of
authoritarianism poured in against the head of the Mejlis. Secondly, the movement
has now completely lost its unity, which even before was questioned by the presence
of the Crimean Tatar National Movement and the disagreement with the official line
of the Mejlis of some representatives of the movement in Moscow, Krasnodar, and
Annex 17 Exhibit D
other regions. Such "fragmentation" in the near future will take away a lot of power
for internal discord, which could have been spent with greater benefit.
Thirdly, Mustafa Dzhemilev must clearly realize that a significant part of the veterans
of the movement are against him, and in time their archives, scattered today all over
the world, will be opened, where you'll probably find even more sudden letters than
quoted by Aisha Seytmuratova. As a politician, he apparently understands that it is
time that will paint his final image for history, and he doesn't care what that portrait
will be. This Qurultay added a lot of unflattering material for him...
Exhibit E
RISU, Crimean Tatars Threaten the Authorities with Revolt If They Prevent the Commemoration
of the Deportation Victims (28 February 2013)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit E
Translation
RISU, Crimean Tatars Threaten the Authorities with Revolt If They Prevent the
Commemoration of the Deportation Victims (28 February 2013), available at:
https://risu.ua/ru/krymskie-tatary-ugrozhayut-vlasti-buntom-v-sluchaeprepyatstvovaniya-
chestvovaniyu-pamyati-zhertv-deportacii_n61760.
Crimean Tatars Threaten the Authorities with Revolt If
They Prevent the Commemoration of the Deportation
Victims
Religious Information Service of Ukraine
The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people is ready to take thousands of Crimean Tatars
to the streets if the authorities prevent the traditional commemoration of the victims of
the deportation, which takes place on May 18.
The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people is ready to take thousands of Crimean Tatars
to the streets if the authorities prevent the traditional commemoration of the victims of
the deportation, which takes place on May 18. This was stated to the Radio
“Svoboda” by the chairman of the Mejlis, People's Deputy of Ukraine Mustafa
Dzhemilev in connection with the fact that the day before the Simferopol city
authorities rejected his request for assistance to the Mejlis to hold appropriate events
in the central square of the city. This is reported by Ukrainian Independent
Information Agency of News (UNIAN)
M. Dzhemilev called the “provocation of the authorities” the refusal of officials of the
Simferopol City Executive Committee to agree upon the traditional events proposed
by the Mejlis on the Day of Mourning. According to him, the Mejlis regarded this as
an attempt to remove the representative body of the Crimean Tatars from the
organisation of mourning events and provoke unrest. “We will do what we have been
doing for the last 23 years in a row. And they, if they want something different, they
will see the result,” M. Dzhemilev noted.
According to his data, the authorities plan to involve members of the Council of
Representatives of the Crimean Tatar people under the President of Ukraine, who are
hostile to the Mejlis and its leaders in these events, and to demonstrate the support of
this structure by the population they are going to bring in state employees from the
regions. “But the Crimean Tatars will not be silent either. They will come in columns
Annex 17 Exhibit E
from five sides and fill the square. And if they are not allowed - the roads will be
blocked, the traffic will be paralysed, at least in Simferopol, and perhaps this will
spread to other regions of the autonomy. A very dangerous game. It can lead to bad
consequences. And that's why we will draw the attention of international
organisations to this provocation,” stressed the Chairman of the Mejlis.
According to M. Dzhemilev, the current government of the autonomy has recently
pursued a tough anti-Crimean Tatar policy, and this greatly irritates Crimean Tatars
and stimulates protest moods. “Now the situation has become so aggravated that a lot
of people are angered because of the policy that is being pursued against the Crimean
Tatars. So the mood of people is obviously not going to be very peaceful. We will, of
course, try to keep it all peaceful. But we should not rule out some kind of opposition
to the mourning events, some actions, peaceful actions, of course, but with demands
for the resignation of the government,” he said.
Dzhemilev put the responsibility for a possible escalation of the ethno-political
situation in Crimea on the central authorities of Ukraine and personally on the Prime
Minister of the autonomy Anatoliy Mogilev. He said that ‘people like Mogilev, with
such caveman views, who claim that Stalin did the right thing in his time by deporting
the Crimean Tatars, and not only the Crimean Tatars, but other peoples as well - such
people cannot be in power, occupy any government positions’.
At the same time, Radio ‘Svoboda’ refers to the government press service, which
distributed the comment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea A. Mogilev where he said that the provocations on
the eve of the Day of Deportation of the Crimean Tatars, about which the Mejlis
claims, are “far-fetched,” the informational situation around is “artificially inflated,”
and accusations by "individual Crimean Tatar politicians" against the leadership of
the country and Crimea of “insufficient attention to the restoration of the rights of
deported peoples and non-compliance with the rights and freedoms of citizens are
unfounded”.
The statement also says that such accusations from “individual figures” are
“purposeful” in order to “divert the attention of the Crimean Tatars from the solution
of urgent problems that have arisen in the Crimean Tatar national movement on a
wave of negativity”.
A. Mogilev also noted that the leadership of the country and the authorities of the
autonomy “are always open to cooperation and constructive coordination to solve the
problems of the deported peoples, and they expect the same approach from politicians
who represent the society of Crimea”.
Exhibit F
Livejournal, Respublika News, Enver Abduraimov: “The Mejlis is driving our people into
opposition. People don't benefit from it” (27 February 2013)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit F
Translation
Livejournal, Respublika News, Enver Abduraimov: “The Mejlis is driving our people into
opposition. People don't benefit from it” (27 February 2013), available at:
https://respublika-news.livejournal.com/186618.html.
Enver Abduraimov: “The Mejlis is driving our
people into opposition. People don't benefit from it”
Interview by Vadim Nikiforov
photos: Yuri Lashov
Enver Abduraimov is a Crimean Tatar politician who is gaining his popularity and one
of the main opponents of the Mejlis leadership. A week ago, the Supreme Council of
Crimea appointed him head of the commission on interethnic relations. Abduraimov
was appointed despite the protests of the Crimean Tatar deputies, who demanded that
Remzi Ilyasov, loyal to the leadership of the Mejlis, continue to lead the commission.
Abduraimov met with "Respublika" in his new, not yet furnished office and told us about the
reasons for his disagreement with the Mejlis, his hobbies and his family.
"The Mejlis has not solved a single problem of the Crimean Tatars."
- You knew that Remzi Ilyasov, your colleague from the Qurultay-Rukh political group
in the parliament, was already working as head of the commission. Didn't that confuse
you?
- I was offered this post back in 2010, when the current convocation of Parliament was just
getting to work. I told the leadership of the Mejlis about this offer, but faced with their
misunderstanding. Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov were indignant: how is it that the
leaders of the autonomy contacted me directly and did not address them on this personnel
issue? As a result, they (the leadership of the Mejlis - "R") said that if Remzy Ilyasov is not
appointed to this position - then let any other deputy head this commission, but not me. Then
Annex 17 Exhibit F
I decided not to argue and agreed with their decision, since those were my first steps in
politics at this level. But regarded their position as wrong.
- What was wrong?
- The fact is that by then the relationship between the leadership of the Mejlis and
representatives of the ruling party had reached the highest level of confrontation. And I was a
new person in politics and could become an intermediary in a dialogue with the authorities.
But as I understood, the Mejlis does not seek to conduct a dialogue with the authorities at all.
It is headed by people who have always been in opposition. They are just used to it - getting
into the parliament from opposition parties. It is easier for them to solve their personal issues
this way. But for the Crimean Tatar people such a policy is unacceptable. How can you
demand that the government solve the problems of the people if you are constantly staying in
conflict with it?
- So you suggested supporting Yanukovych in the presidential election?
- Yes, or at least not to support anyone in the first round, not to make loud statements. Then
everyone would take thought that the Crimean Tatar people are about 100 thousand voters
who have not yet decided on their political preferences. The people could have benefited
from this situation. And what we have is that one or two seats in the Verkhovnaya Rada - for
Dzhemilev and Chubarov - are put above the interests of the whole people.
- At the session of the Supreme Soviet, protesting against your appointment, your
fellow political group members talked a lot about your lack of experience...
- How many enterprises have the leaders of the Mejlis created? How many jobs have they
created, how many taxes have they paid to the budget? I've worked as a manager all my life,
I've set up several companies. Hundreds of people work there - they earn money, feed their
families.
It will be possible to criticise me for my actions when it will be seen whether there is a result
or not. But the Mejlis has been working for more than 20 years, and it hasn't achieved any of
its goals. Many Crimean Tatars, 24 years after their return to their homeland, still haven't
received any land plots here and don't have any housing. People live in compact settlements
without light, gas, water or sewerage. There is no law on the status of the deported. The
presidents and governments of Ukraine and Crimea change, but the problems stay the same.
Maybe the cause is not in the government?
"I know how to pilot small planes"
- You have little experience in the civil service. You are better known in Crimea as a
successful businessman. Who will handle your business now?
- I do have a few businesses. I am their founder and receive dividends, but I haven't been
working for them for a long time. In 2002 I became a deputy of Simferopol City Council.
Since then, all of my companies are run by managers - I trained them myself and completely
trust them. As for me, I made a choice in favour of socially useful work.
- You have won several major poker tournaments. Are you really good at playing
cards?
- I got into poker relatively recently: in 2010 a friend suggested that I play in a tournament.
By the way, my political opponents are now trying to portray this hobby in a negative light. I
answer to Mr. Chubarov and others: I do not play in casinos and I do not play in some
"katrans" (in poker parlance "katran" is a place where professional poker players gather -
"katalas" - "E"). I participate in tournaments. Yes, there's a prize pool, which is drawn
between the participants. Just like in other sports. I don't see anything wrong with it.
- Do you have any other hobbies?
Annex 17 Exhibit F
- I used to go in for light aviation, I can fly small planes, for example, Yak-52. I used to jump
with parachute for several years. But I'm not stuck on one hobby. I try to take as much from
life as possible. I want to learn more and more new things.
- Do you have time for your family?
- I try to spend every free minute with my family. My wife Sevil and I have been together for
20 years, and we have been married for 18 years. We have four children: a daughter and
three sons. The elder one, Emil, is graduating from high school this year. He studies in the
physics and mathematics class. Recently he won the Olympiad run by Tavrida National V.I.
Vernadsky University (TNU), and he was enrolled in the mathematics department without
exams. I am proud of my family, and I try to live my life in such a way that my children will
be proud of their father.
Profile
Enver Elimdarovich Abduraimov
39 years old.
Has three degrees. In 1999, he graduated from Tavrida Institute of Business and Law, in
2007, from the National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine,
and in 2010, from the International Management Institute in Kiev.
He ranks among the most successful Crimean Tatar businessmen. He founded several
companies, including Elim, a plant producing metal-plastic products.

Exhibit G
Milli Firka, How Dzhemilev Ripped Off Three Orphans (12 October 2013)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit G
Translation
Milli Firka, How Dzhemilev Ripped Off Three Orphans (12 October 2013), available at:
http://milli-firka.org/как-джемилев-трех-сирот-обокрал/.
How Dzhemilev Ripped Off Three Orphans
Information about Mustafa Dzhemilev's financial fraud has been appearing in the media since the
1990s. However, all these years, Dzhemilev's supporters were quick to dismiss all the
"insinuations", demanding documentary confirmation of the accusations.
This has always been more difficult as the process of moving money or material assets in
circumvention of existing laws and regulations bypassing existing laws and regulations from one
owner to another usually takes place without witnesses and without signing any papers.
But even the with the documented facts of Mustafa Dzhemilev's financial scams he has time and
again gotten away with it. The Mejlis leader is protected by his popularity "behind the scenes" and
parliamentary immunity.
For example, in 1997 the chairman of Audit commission of the II Qurultay Enver Muedinov
prepared a report in which he highlighted the results of the audit of financial activities of the
"Crimea" Fund, the accounting department of Mejlis and the commercial "Imdat-Bank" supervised
by M. Dzhemilev, through the accounts of which the budgetary funds allocated by Ukraine for the
accommodation of the Crimean Tatars passed.
E. Muedinov's report uncovered the facts of colossal financial abuses, indicated the machination
schemes and named the counterparties to whom the budgetary funds were transferred in
circumvention of the law.
However, M. Dzhemilev's specially organised team of "loudmouths and whistleblowers" did not
allow the speaker to make a report at the Qurultay.
But the report of the head of Qurultay Auditing commission was published in the newspaper
"Avdet" №23(186) of 31.12.1997 and after all became known to public, supervisory and law
enforcement agencies - but there was no reaction from Finance Ministry, Treasury or Economic
Crimes Unit.
Annex 17 Exhibit G
On the other hand, there was an immediate reaction from Dzhemilev: Chairman of the Revision
Commission Enver Muedinov was immediately removed from the Qurultay.
After such a frank carte blanche of the authorities to embezzle people's funds, the number of those
wishing to catch M. Dzhemilev by the hand has sharply decreased...
And this is only with regard to budgetary funds. As to the humanitarian aid, which fall into the
hands of Mustafa Dzhemilev, the head of Mejlis never reported to anyone, neither to the people, nor
to Qurultay.
According to various foreign data, the total amount of material assistance of the international
community to the Crimean Tatar people for two decades is from one to one and a half billion US
dollars!
Thus, for example, the former ambassador of Turkey in Ukraine Ahmed Byulent Merich in one of
his speeches confirmed that Turkey alone transferred for the needs of the Crimean Tatar people
more than 20 million dollars.
The way M. Dzhemilev distributes the money that fall into his hands is evidenced by the recent
financial scandal related to the charitable assistance to Crimean Tatars by a well-known
businessman from Turkey, chairman of the Federation of Crimean Societies and Society of Culture
and Mutual Aid of the Crimean Tatars of the city of Kocaeli Ibraim Araci.
The essence of the scandal is as follows.
Twice, in November and December 2011, Ibraim Araci transferred 50,000 US dollars each to the
account of the "Crimea" Fund, whose founder is Mustafa Dzhemilev. This was his contribution for
organising the II World Congress of Crimean Tatars in Turkey, in Eskisehir.
Annex 17 Exhibit G
However, the Mejlis flatly refused to hold the congress in Turkey.
Later, on 4 May 2013, a meeting of representatives of the Crimean Tatar diaspora abroad was
organised in Crimea to discuss where and when to hold the Second World Congress of the Crimean
Tatars.
It was decided to hold it only in Crimea.
Ibraim Araci was also present at this meeting. He did not agree with the decision and left the
meeting without waiting for the end of the event.
And suddenly, in violation of all the agreements, in the autumn of 2013 the head of the Mejlis'
Foreign Relations Department Ali Khamzin spread information that the II Congress would be held
not in Crimea and not even in Turkey, but in Romania (?!), which caused a sharp negative reaction
from the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey, which invested a lot of effort and money into the
preparation of the II Congress.
One of the manifestations of this reaction was the quite reasonable question of the fate of the
$100,000 transferred to the accounts of the Dzhemilev’s "Crimea" Fund.
Mustafa Dzhemilev habitually decided to remain silent...
Here are the texts of two letters addressed to Mustafa Dzhemilev by Ibraim Araci regarding the fate
of the 100,000 dollars he sent to the head of the Mejlis.
Letter 1:
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013
Dear Mustafa Dzhemilev.
As you know, on May 4, 2013 we took part in a meeting at the restaurant "Ayshe" in Simferopol at
your invitation.
Annex 17 Exhibit G
After that meeting, you wanted the Ankara General Centre and especially dear Mukremin Şhahin,
the chairmen of the societies belonging to our federation (e.g. dear Ergin Batur) to confirm that the
money I sent you, you allegedly returned to me.
However, the people mentioned could not have been informed in any way concerning this subject.
I personally have never spread the word about the money given to charity. I have never demanded
or wanted the return of cash and non-cash funds invested in Crimea. I sent that money to support
my compatriots, to help the people. I would like to remind you that I did not demand the return of
funds. But if you did send the funds, I DID NOT RECEIVE them and they WERE NOT RETURNED.
Please provide details of where you said you returned the funds you received in the amount of
100,000 (one hundred thousand) dollars. Details of the $100,000 income are given in the annex
below.
Out of the funds which you are very well aware of, I ask you to allocate to the Rector of KIPU
(Crimean State Engineering and Pedagogical University), Fevzi Yakubov the sum of $20,000
(twenty thousand) dollars on my behalf. If you do not need the remaining amount, please let me
know and we will distribute this money to the people.
All the best.
V. Ibraim Araji
Chairman of the Federation of Crimean Societies and Society of Culture and Mutual Assistance of
the Crimean Tatars of Kocaeli.
Letter 2:
V. İbrahim ARACI
Sent: 30 September 2013
Dear Mr. Mustafa Dzhemilev.
I want to inform you that I have not received a response to the email dated 23 September 2013.
As you know, there are three orphans of our tribesmen living in Saki. I ask you to allocate $20,000
from this amount for their purchase of a house.
I would like to ask you to provide information about the amount of these funds allocated for charity
on the holiday of Oraza Bayram from the Kocaeli Society of Crimean Tatars.
All the best.
According to a Turkish source, Ibraim Araci has not yet received a response from Mustafa
Dzhemilev.
Also, neither the three orphans from the city of Saki nor the rector of the KIPU, Fevzi Yakubov,
have received financial assistance.
* * *
Annex 17 Exhibit G
The above case is just one small episode of Mustafa Dzhemilev's more than 20 years of
"haymaking" in the fat field of foreign charitable aid to the Crimean Tatar people.
What conclusions can be drawn from the described situation?
Firstly, it's time for the Crimean Tatar public, and first of all the Qurultay delegates, to demand
from the Mejlis head and heads of the organisations accountable to him - "Crimea" Fund, "Crimea
Development Fund", "League of Crimean Tatar women", "Maarifchi" Association and others,
participating in receiving and distributing humanitarian and charitable aid - a full and public report
about the amount of humanitarian aid received in recent years, as well as about its distribution and
final recipients.
Second, the Crimean Tatar community needs to establish an effective system for receiving and
distributing charitable aid, with mandatory monthly public reports by the recipients and distributors
of humanitarian and charitable aid on the amount of aid received and its distribution to those in
need, as well as on the principles and criteria for selecting candidates and projects to receive such
aid.
Thirdly, the Crimean Tatar public should publicly call on the international community, charitable
foundations and the Crimean Tatar diaspora to ensure transparency and openness in sending
humanitarian and charitable aid to the Crimean Tatar people and its distribution in Crimea. And to
ensure that these principles are strictly adhered to.
Without this, embezzlement and abuse will continue in the future, no matter who is at the helm of
the Mejlis, inevitably leading the people to further impoverishment and degradation...
Milli Firka Press Service

Exhibit H
FLB, Dzhemilev's Profitable Struggle (3 April 2014)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit H
Translation
FLB, Dzhemilev's Profitable Struggle (3 April 2014), available at:
https://flb.ru/infoprint/57704.html.
􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀁚􀄞􀆐􀄞􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀀄􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀇇 􀍾􀇁􀇁􀇁􀍘􀀦􀀾􀀑􀍘􀆌􀆵􀍿
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄨􀅝􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀅐􀅐􀅯􀄞
􀀦􀀾􀀑􀍗 􀁴􀅚􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀆉􀅝􀆐􀅽􀄚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀏭􀏬􀏬 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄚􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘
􀎗􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅵􀄂􀇌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅐􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀄨􀅝􀅐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀇁􀄂􀇇􀆐 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀅬􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀄂
􀅯􀅝􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀍲􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀄨􀆵􀆐􀆐􀍘 􀀄􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀄨􀅝􀅐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀎖􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀆐
􀅽􀄨􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀆐􀍘 􀀦􀅽􀆌 􀄞􀇆􀄂􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍕 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍕 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶
􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅶􀅝􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀇇􀄞􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀄨􀆵􀆐􀆐 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀁴􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄂􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄂􀆌􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀄂
􀄐􀄞􀆌􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀎗􀀄􀄐􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀅶􀅽􀅶􀍲􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀎗􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀅽􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄂􀅯
􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆐􀅬􀇇􀍲􀅚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀍘
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀇀􀅝􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕􀎗 􀄏􀆵􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅶􀆚􀅝􀍲􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀆌􀅬􀆐􀍕 􀄞􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇
􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀆚 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀄐􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅶􀅽 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀅚􀅝􀄏􀅝􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆚􀅽 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀁄􀅝􀅐􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀁞􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀅽 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀅝􀆚􀍕􀎗 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆐􀆵􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀍲 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀅝􀆐 􀄂 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁳􀄞􀆌􀅬􀅚􀅽􀇀􀅶􀄂􀇇􀄂 􀁚􀄂􀄚􀄂 􀅽􀄨
􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀎗􀀑􀄂􀆚􀅬􀅝􀇀􀆐􀅚􀄐􀅚􀇇􀅶􀄂􀎗 􀍲 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆌􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀆉􀆉􀅽􀅶􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚
􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂 􀍲 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄂􀆉􀅝􀄚􀅯􀇇 􀅯􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅶􀄂􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅯􀆵􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁴􀄞􀆐􀆚􀍘 􀀯􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀅶􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀆐􀄞􀅯􀇀􀄞􀆐 􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄞􀄞􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶
􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀆐􀄞􀅯􀇀􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄂 􀎗􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎗􀍘
􀀄􀅐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄞􀅶􀄞􀅵􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀇁􀄂􀇇􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀄨􀄂􀆌
􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀆚􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄏􀆵􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀅝􀅵􀍘 􀁴􀄞􀅯􀅯􀍕 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄂􀅐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍕
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀅯􀄚 􀅚􀆵􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅯􀄂􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀀄
􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀅚􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀆌􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀯􀆐􀅯􀄂􀅵􀅝􀄐 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀀬􀅝􀇌􀄏
􀆵􀆚􀍲􀁤􀄂􀅚􀆌􀅝􀆌 􀍾􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚􀍕 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀎗􀄏􀅯􀄂􀄐􀅬 􀅯􀅝􀆐􀆚􀎗 􀅽􀄨 􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍿􀍘 􀁞􀅽􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 people’s 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍕 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇
􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀅽􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚􀍕 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍕 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀎗􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅐􀅝􀄐
􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗􀍘 􀎗􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄐􀄂􀅶
􀄏􀄞 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀀯􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀀬􀅝􀇌􀄏 􀆵􀆚􀍲􀁤􀄂􀅚􀆌􀅝􀆌􀍕􀎗 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀
􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚􀍘 􀎗􀀺􀆵􀄚􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄏􀇇 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀄚􀆐􀍕 􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽 􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀅯􀅝􀅵
􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀆵􀅶􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀇁􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄞􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆋􀆵􀄂􀄐􀇇 􀅝􀅶 􀅵􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀇌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀇁􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅐􀅽􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀅚􀅝􀅵􀍘 􀀄􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀍕 􀅚􀄞􀎖􀆐 􀄂 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀅯􀅝􀅵 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀍕 􀆐􀅽 􀅯􀄞􀆚 􀀄􀅯􀅯􀄂􀅚 􀅩􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀍕􀎗 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀀬􀅝􀇌􀄏 􀆵􀆚􀍲􀁤􀄂􀅚􀆌􀅝􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀀦􀄂􀇌􀅝􀅯 􀀄􀅵􀇌􀄂􀄞􀇀􀍕 􀅽􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍘 􀀑􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀎗􀀬􀅝􀇌􀄏 􀆵􀆚􀍲􀁤􀄂􀅚􀆌􀅝􀆌􀎗 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅩􀅽􀆵􀆌􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀍲 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀅯􀇇 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄏􀆵􀅝􀅯􀄚 􀄂
􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆉􀅚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀅯􀅝􀅵􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄂 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆌􀇇􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀄂􀆌􀄞
􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀄞􀅶􀅐􀄂􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆉􀅽􀆉􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅝􀇌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀅯􀅝􀅵 􀇁􀄂􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀅯􀅝􀄨􀄞􀍘 􀍾􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄏􀄂􀄏􀅯􀇇 􀇁􀅚􀇇􀍕 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆌􀄞􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄚􀆵􀅵􀍕 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀅯􀅝􀅬􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀄏􀆌􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀄞 􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀇇􀍕
􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅯 􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀄨􀅝􀄞􀅯􀄚􀍿􀍘
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀀯􀅶􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯 􀁚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚
􀁴􀄞􀅯􀅯􀍕 􀆚􀅽 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅚􀇇 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅶􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀅶􀅐
􀄐􀅽􀍲􀆌􀄞􀅯􀅝􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀄞􀅶􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅽 􀅯􀅽􀅽􀅬 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀁋􀅶􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬 􀆚􀅽 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏬􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀅽
􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍘 􀀬􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀅚􀅽􀇁 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀆵􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀆐 􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉 􀎗􀁗􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆐􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏬􀍘 􀎗􀀄 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚 􀄂􀅐􀅽 􀀯 􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀆐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄏􀆵􀅝􀅯􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶 􀁞􀅝􀅵􀄨􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄏􀇇 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍕􀎗 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀅚􀆵􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆐􀆚 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀅬 􀀑􀄞􀅶􀍲􀁅􀄂􀅝􀅵􀍘
􀎗􀁋􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀁳􀄂􀆐􀅝􀅯􀇇 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍕
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄨 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄨􀅽􀆌
􀆐􀆚􀆵􀄚􀇇􀍘 􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀅝􀅯􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀅶 􀁞􀅚􀅵􀅝􀄚􀆚􀄂 􀁞􀆚􀆌􀄞􀄞􀆚􀍕 􀏮 􀅝􀅶 􀁞􀅝􀅵􀄨􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯􀍕 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄞􀄚
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀁋􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀎗􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚
􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚􀍕 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀀺􀆵􀆐􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍕 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎗 􀍲 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀆵􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆐􀆚􀍘
􀎗􀀯􀅶 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀄞 􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀅝􀅯􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆌􀄞􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁗􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀁋􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀄂 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅝􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀅝􀅵􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁋􀁅􀀾􀁺 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀎗 􀍲
􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀀑􀄞􀅶􀍲􀁅􀄂􀅝􀅵􀍘
􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀅝􀅵􀍕 􀎗􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀾􀄂􀇁 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀎗􀁋􀅶
􀀄􀆐􀆐􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀅝􀆚􀅝􀇌􀄞􀅶􀆐􀎗 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅯􀇇 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀅚􀅝􀄏􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀅶􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐
􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀄚􀆐􀍕 􀄂 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅝􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅽􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀆵􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀆵􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄨􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀄏􀄞􀅯􀅝􀄞􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚
􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍘 􀀬􀄞 􀍲 􀄏􀄞􀅯􀅝􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀍲 􀄏􀇇 􀄨􀆌􀄂􀆵􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀄂􀅯􀆐􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀅵􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆉􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀆌􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅚􀄂􀄚
􀆉􀆌􀄞􀇀􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐􀅯􀇇 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀇇􀍘
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀆐􀄐􀅚􀄞􀅵􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀀄􀆌􀄐􀅚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄞􀇇􀄞􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐
􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅶􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀄞􀆉􀅝􀆐􀅽􀄚􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆌􀅽􀅽􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀏵􀏬􀎖􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐
􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆌􀆵􀅶􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅚􀅝􀅐􀅚 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀆵􀅝􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄞􀆚 􀁨􀅶􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀎗􀁞􀀜􀀑􀀄􀁤􀎗 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇁􀆐􀆉􀄂􀆉􀄞􀆌 􀎗􀀄􀇀􀄚􀄞􀆚􀎗 􀁅􀅽 􀏮􀏯 􀍾􀏭􀏴􀏲􀍿 􀅽􀄨 􀏯􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶
􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀄐􀆋􀆵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆌􀄂􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀆚􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀎗􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀯􀀯􀀯 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀀜􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀁄􀆵􀄞􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅽􀇀􀎗􀍘
􀎀􀍘􀍘􀍘􀎁 􀀄􀆵􀄚􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅝􀄐 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀏭􀏬 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆌􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀆵􀆚􀍘 􀀯 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯
􀄚􀄞􀆐􀄐􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀆵􀄚􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀅯􀅽􀇁􀍘 􀎀􀍘􀍘􀍘􀎁
􀎀􀍘􀍘􀍘􀎁 􀀯 􀄏􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅝􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀆐􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚
􀅐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄨􀆵􀅯 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄏􀅯􀄞􀅵􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀅵􀆉􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀇀􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘
􀁞􀅽 􀄨􀄂􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀆐􀅝􀆌􀄞 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀇁􀄂􀆐􀅚 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆵􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀅯􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀆌
􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀅶􀄞􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆚􀅽
􀇁􀄂􀆐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀅶 􀄂􀆐 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀆚􀅚 􀇁􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀅶􀎖􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀅚􀅝􀄞􀇀􀄞 􀆵􀅶􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀅝􀄚􀄂􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀅵􀅽􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍕 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶
􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄞􀄂􀄏􀅯􀇇 􀆐􀅚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇􀍘
􀁞􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀅯􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀆐􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄏􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨
􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅵 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀁚􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁞􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀁗􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀎗􀅐􀆵􀅝􀅯􀆚􀎗 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀆉􀅚􀄞􀅶􀅽􀅵􀄞􀅶􀄂 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞
􀅚􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅵􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐􀍘
􀀘􀅝􀆐􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀄨􀆌􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀅽􀄨􀍍
􀀄􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲 􀆚􀅽 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄞􀅶􀄐􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅵 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶
􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅝􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅚􀅝􀆉 􀄏􀄞􀆚􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞
􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀏲 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀆐􀍘
􀀘􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀇁􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀅚􀅽􀇁 􀄂􀅶 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅯􀅝􀆐􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅵􀄂􀅬􀄞
􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀅚􀅽􀇁 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐
􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏯 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁
􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀍘 􀁴􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄂 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄨􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄞􀇆􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆚􀄞 􀄂􀄚􀅽􀆉􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀅝􀅶􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘
􀀜􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆌􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐
􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀄞􀅯􀅝􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀅚􀄞􀅶􀅽􀅵􀄞􀅶􀄂􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆌􀇇􀍕 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐
􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀄞􀄞􀆉􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀆚􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀅝􀅶􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅐􀅽􀆌􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀍗 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀆚􀅽 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄏􀇇 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍕 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐
􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆉􀍗 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶 􀅝􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁􀅶 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘
􀁴􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆉􀍕 􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀇁􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀅯􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘 􀀬􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅝􀆚 􀄐􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀆚􀅽
􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀆌􀄞􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘
􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄚􀅽􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄚􀅽 􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚
􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆐􀅽 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅶􀅐􀅯􀇇􀍍
􀁴􀅚􀇇 􀄚􀅽􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅯􀇇 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀆵􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀄞􀄨􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀄞􀆚 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚 􀍲
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀅝􀅶􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍍
􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯􀍕 􀅽􀆌 􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀆐􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇
􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅵 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍕 􀅝􀅶
􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀅬􀄞􀄞􀆉 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄂􀄨􀅯􀅽􀄂􀆚􀍘
􀀄􀆚 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆌􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯
􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆐􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚
􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀁄􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅝􀆐 􀅚􀅝􀄚􀄚􀄞􀅶 􀄏􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅵 􀎗􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀆌􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆌􀄞􀆚􀎗􀍘 􀁅􀅽 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀅶
􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆌􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍘
􀀯􀅶 􀁋􀄐􀆚􀅽􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏱􀍕 􀄏􀇇 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀄂 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀅽 􀄨􀄂􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘
􀀯􀅶 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀅯 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆵􀄚􀅝􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆌􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀀼􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅬􀅽􀇀􀍕 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀇀􀅝􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆵􀄚􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀅵􀄂􀅬􀄞 􀄂 􀄐􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀅝􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍘
􀁄􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀄚􀆵􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍘
􀀯􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀅽 􀆵􀅶􀄞􀇆􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅯􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀅝􀄚􀄞
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆉􀄞􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀆌􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆵􀆉 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀅯􀄞􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀄂􀇀􀄞
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍘
􀁞􀅽 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀆌􀄞􀇀􀄞􀄂􀅯􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀅝􀄚􀄞􀍍
􀀬􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄂 􀄨􀄞􀇁 􀄞􀇆􀄐􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆚􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍗
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀅽􀅯􀇀􀄞􀅶􀄐􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘􀍘􀍘 􀅝􀅶 􀇀􀅝􀅽􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆌􀄞􀆋􀆵􀅝􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁅􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅯􀄞􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀀺􀄂􀅶􀆵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀍲􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌
􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏰􀍕 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞􀄚 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅽􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀏳􀏮􀍘􀏯􀏬􀏯 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘 􀍾􀅬􀄂􀆌􀄏􀅽􀇀􀄂􀅶􀄞􀆚􀆐􀍿􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀄂􀆚
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆵􀅶􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄨􀅝􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅯􀇇􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌
􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄂􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀇀􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞
􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄂 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄂􀅯􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀆵􀆚􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀄞􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚
􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍘
􀀄􀆐 􀄂 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀄐􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀅽􀄂􀆌􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍕 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗
􀅝􀅶􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀏭􀏳􀏴􀍘􀏳􀏬􀏯 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘 􀍾􀅶􀅽􀅶􀍲􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅐􀆵􀄂􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄞􀄚 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐􀍕
􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀅯􀅯 􀄂􀆐 􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍿􀍘
􀀘􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀆐􀄞􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆐􀄂􀅯􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅵􀆉􀅯􀅽􀇇􀄞􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀍲 􀏭􀏱􀐹 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍘
􀀯􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄞􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞
􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀆌􀆵􀆉􀆚􀄐􀇇􀍘 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄞􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀅽􀄂􀆌􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀄂􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀄚
􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀁋􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀅝􀅶 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏰􀍕 􀏱 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄞􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀀑􀅽􀄂􀆌􀄚 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀀯􀅶 􀄂􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂 􀄐􀅽􀆌􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅽􀅶􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀄􀅯􀅯􀍲􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀁅􀄞􀇁􀆐􀎗􀍕 􀁚􀍘 􀀼􀄞􀅶􀅩􀄞􀍕 􀄂 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀀑􀅽􀄂􀆌􀄚􀍕 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀆐
􀄂􀅶 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀅝􀅶􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅯􀅝􀄞􀍘 􀁴􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀄂 􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀄚􀅽􀄞􀆐 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀅩􀆵􀆐􀆚􀅝􀄨􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍍
􀁚􀍘 􀀼􀄞􀅶􀅩􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀇁􀆌􀅝􀆚􀄞 􀄂 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀅝􀍘􀄞􀍘 􀅝􀅶 􀁋􀄐􀆚􀅽􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏱􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀏱􀏯􀆌􀄚 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀄚􀅽􀆉􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀁚􀍘 􀀼􀄞􀅶􀅩􀄞 􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀅯􀅯􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅶􀅽 􀅽􀅶􀄞
􀄞􀇆􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄂􀅐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀅝􀆚􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀄂􀆉􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀏱􀏯􀆌􀄚 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅝􀅶􀆵􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀏮􀏰 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚
􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀄂􀇁􀄂􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅬􀄞􀆉􀆚 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄏􀇇 􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅚􀅝􀆉 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀁅􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞
􀄏􀆵􀆐􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄏􀅯􀄞􀅵 􀍲 􀅚􀅽􀇁 􀆚􀅽 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅯􀄞􀅶􀅝􀆐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀄚􀆵􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀅶􀅽􀅶􀍲
􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄏􀅽􀆚􀅚 􀇁􀄂􀇇􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶􀆐􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶
􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅵 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀁞􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀁗􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆵􀄂􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀅝􀄨 􀅶􀄞􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄂􀆌􀇇􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨
􀆉􀅚􀇇􀆐􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀇀􀅝􀅽􀅯􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄨􀅝􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀅵􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐
􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍕 􀄨􀅯􀅽􀇁􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄞􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀆌􀆐
􀅽􀄨 􀇀􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅬􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀅚􀅝􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄏􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚
􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀅝􀆐 􀅐􀆌􀄂􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀆉􀅚􀄂􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁞􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀁗􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍘
􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇 􀄐􀄂􀆐􀅚 􀄐􀅽􀇁􀍕 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄞􀇆􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁 􀄞􀅯􀆐􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀄏􀄞 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀅯􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄂 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀏴􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯
􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏱􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚􀍕 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌
􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀁅􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍕 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅽
􀅝􀅶􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗
􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄞􀅶􀅐􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀅽􀄨 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀇀􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀄏􀇇 􀄂 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀅵􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍘
􀀯􀅶 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀅐􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆌􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀅯􀄞􀅐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄂􀄐􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀏴􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯
􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀄞􀆚􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀎗􀀧􀄞􀅽􀆐􀎗 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀄􀆌􀆐􀄞􀅶􀍲􀄏􀄞􀇇􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀅝􀅯􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏲􀏯􀍕􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀏭􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀅯􀇇􀍕
􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀏳􀍕􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄂
􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀅯􀄞 􀅬􀄂􀆌􀄏􀅽􀇀􀄂􀅶􀄞􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅚 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀅝􀅯􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀄚􀄞􀅯􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀁴􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀆐􀆉􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍍 􀁴􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀎗􀀧􀄞􀅽􀆐􀎗 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀄􀆌􀆐􀄞􀅶􀍲􀄏􀄞􀇇􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀄏􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌
􀆉􀆌􀅽􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘
􀁄􀅽􀆌􀄞􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀄞􀅶􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀇀􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀏲􀏯􀍘􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘 􀎗􀀧􀄞􀅽􀆐􀎗􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆐􀍗
􀏭􀍘 􀎗􀁿􀅽􀄚􀅝􀄂􀄐􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀏵􀍘􀏵 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘
􀏮􀍘 􀎗􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀍲􀀼􀆌􀇇􀅵􀎗 􀀾􀀾􀀒 􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘
􀏯􀍘 􀎗􀁚􀀜􀀘􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏳 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘
􀏰􀍘 􀎗􀁞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄂􀎗 􀀾􀀾􀀒 􀏰􀍘􀏲􀏮 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘
􀏱􀍘 􀎗􀀜􀄐􀅽􀆚􀄞􀄐􀅚􀎗 􀀾􀀾􀀒 􀏰􀍘􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘
􀏲􀍘 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀆵􀇌􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀏰􀍘􀏳 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀏳􀍘 􀎗􀀄􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄂􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀏰􀍘􀏲 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘
􀏴􀍘 􀎗􀀼􀆌􀇇􀅵􀇌􀄞􀅵􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅝􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀏰􀍘􀏲 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘
􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀄􀆌􀆐􀄞􀅶􀍲􀄏􀄞􀇇􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀍕 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀄞􀅶􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀏭􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍕
􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀎗􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄂􀆚􀍲􀏵􀏰􀎗 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏮􀍕􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀇇 􀅝􀅶 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀄂􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆌􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀆚􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀎗􀀧􀄞􀅽􀆐􀎗
􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆌􀄞􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅐􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀆵􀇌􀇌􀅯􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀇁􀅽􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍗 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅚􀇇 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌
􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀆐􀍍
􀀦􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀏭􀏮􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲 􀆚􀅽 􀀺􀆵􀅯􀇇 􀏭􀏱􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲 􀎗􀁚􀀜􀀘􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀏮􀏱 􀏮􀏭􀏵
􀏱􀏲􀏱 􀏬􀏬􀏬 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘􀍕 􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆵􀆉 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀆐 􀄂 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀅶􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄨􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀄂 􀅯􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁚􀀜􀀘􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚
􀅽􀄨 􀏮􀏱 􀏮􀏭􀏵 􀏱􀏲􀏱 􀏬􀏬􀏬 􀀼􀆌􀄏 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀧􀄞􀅽􀆐􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀍘
􀁞􀍘 􀁤􀅽􀅬􀅚􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀘􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁚􀀜􀀘􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀅽􀄂􀆌􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲
􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄏􀄂􀄏􀅯􀇇 􀄐􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄏􀄞􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅚􀅝􀆉 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀆚􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆚􀆐 􀅯􀅝􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀄏􀆌􀅽􀄂􀄚 􀆚􀅽
􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅯􀄞􀅶􀅝􀆐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀎖􀆐 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀀦􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀍕 􀎨􀏯􀏭􀍕􀏰􀏵􀏳 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀁞􀍘 􀁤􀅽􀅬􀅚􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄐􀇇 􀄞􀇆􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍘
􀀦􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀇆􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀁞􀍘 􀁤􀅽􀄐􀅚􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀 􀄐􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀧􀄞􀅽􀆐􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀧􀄞􀅽􀆐􀎗
􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀏱􀏴􀏭􀏬􀏳 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀄂􀆐 􀄂 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀅽􀄨
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍘 􀀯􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄂􀄏􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄚􀍍 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀄂􀇇 􀅽􀄨􀄨 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅽
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁 􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀅚􀅽􀅽􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅶􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀄂 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀍍 􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐􀍕􀎗􀀧􀄞􀅽􀆐􀎗
􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄚􀆵􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚 􀄂􀆐􀅚􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀄞􀅶􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇
􀁞􀁄􀀜 􀎗􀁚􀀜􀀘􀎗 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄐􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚􀍘 􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀎗􀀧􀄞􀅽􀆐􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞
􀆌􀄞􀄚􀆵􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀎗􀁚􀀜􀀘􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄐􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀎗􀁚􀀜􀀘􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀧􀄞􀅽􀆐􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚
􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀅽􀄨 􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍕 􀏯􀏰􀏳􀍘􀏳􀏳􀏲 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀏱􀏬 􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞
􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀄞􀄚􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏰􀍕􀏱􀏮􀏮􀍕􀏮􀏯􀏰 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀏱􀏬 􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆐􀍘
􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀏴􀏬 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚
􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀏰􀏱 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆐
􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁗􀅽􀅝􀆐􀅬􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁚􀀜􀀘􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀍘 􀀄 􀆚􀅽􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀏴􀍘􀏵 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅬􀆌􀄏􀍘 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀅵􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆉􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀆌􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁤􀅽􀆌􀅝􀄂􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀏳􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀇌􀄞􀅶􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀄚􀅽􀇌􀄞􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀀦􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆵􀆚􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀅝􀆚 􀆐􀄞􀄞􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀆚 􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄚􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀎗􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀅬􀆐􀎗 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚􀍕 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀅐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆉􀆐 􀆚􀅽
􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅵􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀀒􀄂􀄏􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆐􀅽􀅯􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀁅􀅽 􀏰􀏬􀏭 􀅽􀄨 􀏬􀏯􀍘􀏬􀏰􀍘􀏵􀏲􀍕
􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄏􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅽
􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅽􀅯􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄏􀄞􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀏭􀏱􀍘􀏬􀏱􀍘􀏵􀏲􀍘 􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀍕 􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀅯􀅯 􀄂􀆐
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀍕 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽
􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀇀􀅝􀅐􀅽􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀅽􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕 􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀁄􀍘
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁚􀍘 􀀼􀄞􀅶􀅩􀄞􀍕 􀄂 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀁞􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄞􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯􀍘
􀀄􀆚 􀄂 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇
􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀅬􀄞􀄞􀆉 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯
􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘
􀁴􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀆚 􀄂􀆚 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀅚􀄞􀅯􀄚 􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆌􀄞􀆚 􀅶􀄞􀅐􀅽􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀀄􀍘 􀀘􀄞􀅵􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀅬􀅽􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁗􀄞􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀁳􀍘
􀀼􀅝􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍘 􀀄􀆐 􀄂 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀅐􀅽􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍕 􀄂 􀅯􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀁗􀍘􀀯􀍘
􀀾􀄂􀇌􀄂􀆌􀄞􀅶􀅬􀅽􀍘 􀀯 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀇆􀄐􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅯􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍗
􀎗􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄞􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄞􀆌 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄨􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨 􀅝􀅶 􀅵􀅝􀆐􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀍕 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐􀅯􀇇
􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀆐􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇁 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀅽􀄂􀆌􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅽􀅯􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍕
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀆵􀄚􀅝􀆚 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁞􀅝􀅵􀄨􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏮􀍕􀏳􀏳􀏮􀍕􀏮􀏭􀏴 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀏴􀏱 􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄂􀅯􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀅯􀄞
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄐􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅝􀆐 􀏭􀍕􀏮􀏬􀏬􀍕􀏬􀏳􀏰 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐􀍘
􀁤􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀅽􀅯􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅝􀆐 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁞􀆵􀆉􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀀑􀅽􀄂􀆌􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇􀎗 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀁞􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄞􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀀯 􀄂􀆐􀅬 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅝􀆚
􀄂􀆉􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀆌􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅐􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅝􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀆵􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀇌􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄨􀅽􀆌
􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀀑􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅽 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍘»
􀀬􀅽􀇁 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀅽􀇁 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀇁􀅶
􀄂􀄏􀅽􀇀􀄞􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁 􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀇁􀄞 􀅚􀅽􀆉􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅚􀅝􀆉 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀇁 􀄂 􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨
􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀅝􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀆵􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄂􀅯 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅶􀅽􀇁 􀅝􀅶 􀄂 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍘
􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅯􀄞􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀆚 􀄂 􀅚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞􀍘 􀀘􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀄨􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯
􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆉􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏮􀏬􀏱􀍕􀏮􀏳􀏴 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀏮􀏳 􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀅯􀄞
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀏱􀏰􀍕􀏲􀏭􀏬 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀏲􀏲 􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀎗􀀼􀆌􀇇􀅵􀍲􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚􀎗 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏱􀏬􀍕􀏲􀏲􀏳 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀏲􀏭 􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄨􀅝􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚
􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀄞􀅶􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀄏􀄞􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍕 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶 􀏯􀏲􀏮 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀆵􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀅯􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅶􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘
􀁞􀅽 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀄚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀅐􀄞􀆚􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀅝􀆚􀍍
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀆐􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀄏􀄞 􀅐􀅝􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀆵􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚
􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀆚􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀄏􀆌􀅽􀄂􀄚􀍕 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀆌􀄞
􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄨􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀅚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀍲􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀁄􀍘
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍘 􀁋􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄞 􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆋􀆵􀄂􀅶􀆚􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀀜􀀑
􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆐􀄂􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀆚􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚
􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆵􀆐􀍘
􀀬􀄂􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀄂􀅝􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄞􀅯􀅝􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶
􀄂􀄚􀄚􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀄨􀄨􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶
􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀆵􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀄂􀄚􀄚􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌
􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅯􀇇 􀄞􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇁
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀅐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘
􀀄 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀅐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍕 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀄂 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚
􀀜􀅶􀅶􀄂􀅶􀅽􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀄚􀄂􀄐􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀁞􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀆚􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆌􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀅝􀅶􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀄚􀄂􀄐􀇇􀍕
􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀀜􀅶􀅶􀄂􀅶􀅽􀇀 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀄐􀅚􀅝􀄞􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀄂􀅯 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆚􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄏􀇇 􀄂 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀇀􀅽􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐
􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄂􀆐􀍘
􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀅽􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅐􀅽 􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀄞􀍕 􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀆐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀀬􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀅯􀅯 􀄂􀇁􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀁚􀆵􀅯􀄞􀆐 􀄚􀅽 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀄞 􀄂 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅐􀅽􀄞􀆐
􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐􀍲􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅵 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀆐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆚􀅽 􀅐􀅽 􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀏮􀍲􀏯 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚􀆐􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄨􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀅝􀅶􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀆐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀆵􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀦􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐
􀀘􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀁚􀍘 􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀 􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅯 􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇􀍘
􀀬􀄂􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅐􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀄞􀍕 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀆚􀄞􀅶 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀅚􀅝􀆐
􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀆚􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆚􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄚􀅽 􀆐􀅽 􀅽􀄨􀆚􀄞􀅶 􀄏􀄞􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞􀍘
􀁤􀇁􀅽 􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅬􀆐 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀄂􀆚 􀄂 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀁚􀍘􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄂 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆉􀅚􀇇􀆐􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇
􀆵􀅶􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄏􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀆵􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀁞􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄞􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐
􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀆐􀅬􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅯􀅝􀄞􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀆵􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘
􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀍘􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀆵􀅶􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀄂􀆐 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐
􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀇁􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀅚􀅽􀅯􀅝􀄚􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀆵􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀅐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀄚
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀅚􀅝􀅵 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀀄􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽
􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬 􀅝􀅶 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄐􀅝􀆌􀄐􀆵􀅵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀆐􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀄚􀅝􀅯􀄞􀅵􀅵􀄂􀍗 􀅚􀅽􀇁 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅬 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀍕 􀅚􀅽􀇁 􀆚􀅽 􀆵􀅶􀆚􀄂􀅶􀅐􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆚􀄂􀅶􀅐􀅯􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄨􀆵􀅯 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄏􀅯􀄞􀅵􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀄂 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅚􀅝􀆉 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄚􀆌􀄞􀇁 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀍕
􀄂􀅐􀅐􀆌􀄂􀇀􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘
􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅐􀅽 􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆌􀆵􀅯􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄐􀄞􀄚􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘
􀀄􀆚 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄂 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀅵􀅽􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆉􀆵􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀇁􀄂􀆌􀄚􀍗 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄏􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞
􀄏􀅽􀄚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀁄􀆌 􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄞
􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆉 􀄚􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀄂􀆐 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀆵􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀁚􀄞􀆐􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀀄􀄏􀅯􀄂􀄞􀇀 􀅽􀅶 􀄂 􀆚􀄞􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆌􀄂􀆌􀇇
􀄏􀄂􀆐􀅝􀆐 􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅯 􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇􀍘
􀀒􀅽􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅵􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀀯 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅯􀅝􀅬􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀅽􀆉􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄂􀅐􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀄂 􀄏􀄂􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀅶􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆐􀍘 􀀯 􀅚􀅽􀆉􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀇇􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅐􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐
􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆵􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄞􀅶􀅐􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀇇􀆐􀆚􀄞􀅵 􀅽􀄨
􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀄚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍘
􀀯􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀇇􀅽􀆵􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄐􀅚􀅽􀅽􀆐􀄞􀍘
􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀇁􀄞 􀅵􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅵􀄞􀆌􀄐􀄞􀅶􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀄏􀇇 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞
􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀍲 􀇁􀅚􀅽􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀅵􀄞􀆌􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍘
􀁺􀅽􀆵 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄂 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀅵􀄂􀅬􀄞􀍕 􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆵􀅶􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄚􀍘
􀀯 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅬 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆐􀆚􀅝􀄐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄏􀆵􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨
􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄚􀍘
􀀜􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀁄􀁨􀀜􀀘􀀯􀁅􀁋􀁳􀍕 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀄞􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀯􀀯􀀯 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀍾􀁞􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀍗 􀎗􀀄􀇀􀄚􀄞􀆚􀎗 􀅶􀄞􀇁􀆐􀆉􀄂􀆉􀄞􀆌􀍕
􀁅􀅽 􀏮􀏯􀍾􀏭􀏴􀏲􀍿 􀏯􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳􀍿􀍘
􀎎􀎎􀎎
􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀍲 􀀾􀄞􀅶􀆵􀆌 􀀄􀆌􀅝􀄨􀅽􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀅵􀅵􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐
􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀄚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀀺􀆵􀅯􀇇 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲 􀆚􀅽 􀀘􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳􀍘
􀎗􀀦􀅽􀆌 􀄂 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂 􀅚􀄂􀅯􀄨􀍕 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅯􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀄂􀄚􀅽􀆉􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀆵􀄏􀆐􀄞􀆋􀆵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅯􀇇 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄨􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀆐 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀆵􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞
􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀅬􀄞􀄞􀆉 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲
􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀁴􀅚􀇇􀍍 􀁴􀅚􀇇 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅬 􀆉􀅯􀆵􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀄂 􀄚􀄞􀄞􀆉 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀄂 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀍲􀆐􀅽􀍲
􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅝􀆉􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅽􀅬􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀄞
􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂 􀅶􀄞􀇁 􀅽􀄏􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅚􀅝􀆉 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀆐􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀅯􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀎖􀆐 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅝􀄐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀆌􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀍾􀅶􀅽􀇁
􀎗􀀼􀆌􀇇􀅵􀍲􀁺􀆵􀆌􀆚􀎗􀍿􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀍕 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘 􀍾􀁚􀅝􀇌􀄂 􀁞􀅚􀄞􀇀􀅬􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀘􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌
􀀧􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀦􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍿􀍘 􀀬􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀍕 􀄏􀄞􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀀯􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀅵􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁􀅶 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀆚 􀆐􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀆵􀆉 􀆐􀆚􀆵􀄐􀅬 􀅝􀅶 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀄞􀅯􀆐􀄞􀎖􀆐
􀆉􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄞􀆚􀆐􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀀒􀅽􀅶􀄐􀄞􀆌􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀇀􀄂􀅝􀅯􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅯􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐
􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄏􀅯􀄞􀅵􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆌􀄂􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀅝􀆵􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀀺􀆵􀅯􀇇 􀏮􀏲 􀅽􀄨 􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍘
􀀯􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀀯􀅯􀅵􀅝 􀁨􀅵􀄞􀆌􀅽􀇀􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀀘􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀁗􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍘 􀁤􀇁􀅽 􀄐􀅝􀆌􀄐􀆵􀅵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀄏􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚
􀅽􀆵􀆚􀍕 􀄏􀅽􀆚􀅚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆵􀆚􀆐􀄞􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐
􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍘 􀀑􀄞􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀇁􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍕 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅬􀄞􀄞􀆉 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍲􀅵􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞􀍘 􀀯􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌
􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀅽􀅐􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬 􀅝􀆚 􀅽􀆵􀆚􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀅯􀅯􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘 􀀦􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀆉􀆵􀆚
􀄨􀅽􀆌􀇁􀄂􀆌􀄚 􀄂􀄏􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄚 􀄂􀆌􀅐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅯􀆵􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀆐􀅝􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞
􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀎗􀇁􀄂􀆐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀎗 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅝􀆌􀄐􀆵􀅵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀅝􀆌􀄐􀆵􀅵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅝􀅵􀅵􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀄞􀄞􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅽􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞
􀅶􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀄨􀄨􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀄨􀄞􀇁 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀍕 􀄂 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄐􀄞􀆉􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅐􀆌􀄂􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄞􀅵􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞
􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅝􀄐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀆚 􀅽􀆌 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶
􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀇇􀆚􀅚 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆐􀆉􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀄏􀅽􀆚􀅚 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀅶
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄞􀅶􀇀􀅝􀆌􀅽􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘
􀁗􀄂􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅽􀇆􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀄐􀄂􀆵􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀆵􀆉 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀇇􀆚􀅚 􀄂􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅯􀆵􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀅬􀄞􀄚 􀆌􀆵􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄨􀆌􀄂􀆵􀄚􀍕 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀅵􀆉􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯
􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀄨􀅝􀄞􀆌􀄐􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇 􀄞􀇆􀄐􀆵􀆐􀄞
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆚􀄞􀇆􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀄞􀅯􀄂􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀄂 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇
􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶􀍕 􀆐􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆚􀄂􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀇇 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞􀍘
􀀦􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀅝􀆵􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲
􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄂􀆌􀅝􀄂􀄏􀅯􀇇 􀆌􀄂􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀏭􀏱
􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀏭􀏳 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚
􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍘 􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀅯􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀄏􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀄨 􀄂􀆚 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆚 􀄂 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆌􀄚 􀍾􀅝􀍘􀄞􀍘
􀄞􀅯􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀍿 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀍘 􀀄 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅚􀄞􀅯􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀏮􀏰
􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍘 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆌􀄞􀄨􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅽􀅯􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀄂􀄚􀅽􀆉􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅽􀅯􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗
􀏭􀍘 􀁤􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀆚􀅽 􀅽􀅶􀄞
􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀆐 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀆚􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶 􀏭􀏬 􀄚􀄂􀇇􀆐􀍘
􀏮􀍘 􀍘 􀍘􀍘􀍘􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀆵􀅶􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀅽􀅶􀄂􀄏􀅯􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏱􀍲􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚
􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀏯􀍘 􀀦􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄂􀅵􀄂􀅐􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄞􀆌
􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍕 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂
􀀼􀄞􀅶􀇌􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆐􀅚􀄂􀆚􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘
􀀄􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇆􀆚 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀍾􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏳􀍲􀏴􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍿 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀘􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀏮􀏰􀍘 􀀄􀆐 􀄂 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀄂 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉
􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆐􀄞􀆚 􀆵􀆉 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀄂􀆐􀅬􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂 􀄚􀆌􀄂􀄨􀆚 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉 􀄨􀄂􀅵􀅝􀅯􀅝􀄂􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀄨􀄨􀄂􀅝􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀆚 􀀯 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀍾􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆵􀆐􀄞
􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀆵􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀄏􀅽􀄂􀆌􀄚􀍿􀍖 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀅵􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇
􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀎗􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄞􀆐􀎗 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲
􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀍾􀄂 􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅵 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀆐􀄞􀅯􀇀􀄞􀆐􀍿􀍖 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄞􀅶 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀄏􀅽􀄂􀆌􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅯􀇇􀇌􀄞􀄚
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄂 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇􀍘 􀍾􀀯􀆚 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀄏􀄞 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀄞􀄚
􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶
􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉􀍿􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀇌􀇌􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲
􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄨􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄞􀄚􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀄞􀆉􀅝􀆐􀅽􀄚􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀀺􀄂􀅶􀆵􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀏭􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀏭 􀅵􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀏳􀏳􀏬􀍘􀏬􀏲􀏯 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀏱􀏬 􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆐􀍘 􀀒􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚
􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄞􀇆􀄐􀄞􀄞􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀏮 􀅵􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀄚􀆵􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀄞􀇆􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀆚􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞
􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀄞􀆉􀅝􀆐􀅽􀄚􀄞􀆐􀍘
􀀜􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀆵􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇀􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀇇􀅶􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅵 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀅵􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚
􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀆉􀅝􀆐􀅽􀄚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅐􀅝􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀆵􀆚
􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏱 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯
􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀏴􀏬􀏬 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀄏􀄞􀆚􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄏􀆵􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯
􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀅯􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁􀅶 􀆵􀆉 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅽􀇁􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐
􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅐􀆵􀄂􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀎖􀆐 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀆚􀆐
􀅽􀇁􀅶􀍘 􀁄􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶 􀄨􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅚􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀄨􀄂􀅵􀅝􀅯􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅯􀅯􀍕 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀅶􀅽􀆚
􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀎖􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄞􀆉􀅝􀆐􀅽􀄚􀄞 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀏴􀏲􀏲􀏳􀏭􀏵 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀄨
􀏭 􀀺􀄂􀅶􀆵􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳􀍘 􀁤􀅽􀄚􀄂􀇇 􀅝􀆚 􀄞􀇆􀄐􀄞􀄞􀄚􀆐 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅵􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐􀍘
􀀄􀅶􀆐􀇁􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀅚􀅽􀇁 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆐􀆵􀅵􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀄚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚
􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅯􀇇􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀇀􀄂􀅝􀅯􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄂􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀄞􀄚
􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄂 􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅽􀅶􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀯 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀅽􀅶
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄨 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞
􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀍘
􀀒􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇀􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀀯􀄨 􀅶􀄞􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄂􀆌􀇇􀍕
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀇀􀅝􀅽􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀆵􀅯􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅝􀅶
􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀆐 􀍾􀁚􀄞􀆐􀅽􀅯􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁅􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀁅􀅽􀏭􀏭􀏳 􀅽􀄨 􀏯􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏬􀍘􀏵􀏯􀍿􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨
􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄐􀅚􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀄐􀄂􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚􀍗 􀀜􀇆􀄞􀆌􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐
􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀄐􀅚􀅝􀄞􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅶􀇇
􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬 􀅽􀆌 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚􀍘 􀀦􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇􀍕 􀅝􀅶
􀇀􀅝􀅽􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚􀍕 􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀇀􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐
􀅽􀆌 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀅵 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀍾􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀅶􀄂􀅵􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀆌 􀆐􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯
􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍿 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅝􀄐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅯􀆵􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄞􀅯 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶
􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀆵􀆚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀀄 􀅶􀅽􀄚􀄂􀅯 􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆉􀅯􀄂􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀇀􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚
􀄨􀄂􀇀􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀇌􀇌􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄨􀆌􀄂􀆵􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅵 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀁚􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁞􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘
􀀬􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀄂 􀆋􀆵􀅽􀆚􀄞 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆚􀅽 􀎗􀀧􀅽􀅯􀅽􀆐 􀀼􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄂􀎗 􀍾􀁅􀅽􀏰􀏳􀍕 􀏮􀏴􀍘􀏭􀏭􀍘􀏵􀏳􀍿􀍗 􀎗􀀄􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌
􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀀯 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄚􀍕 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅝􀆚􀎖􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅝􀆚􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚
􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄏􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨
􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀎗􀍘
􀀬􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀄞􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀍲 􀄏􀇇 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀍘 􀀯􀄨 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀆵􀆚􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀄏􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅯􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐
􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘
􀀯􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅚􀅝􀅵 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀄐􀅽􀍲􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀅚􀄞
􀅚􀅝􀅵􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀅚􀄂􀅯􀄨􀍕 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀆉􀆵􀆐􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀎖􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽
􀅽􀆉􀄞􀅶 􀄂 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀅝􀆐
􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅯􀆵􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀇇􀄞􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀄞􀄚􀍘 􀀯􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍕 􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗
􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀄚􀄞􀅯􀄂􀇇􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀍘
􀁞􀅽 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍍 􀀦􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆵􀆚􀆐􀄞􀆚􀍕 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀆐􀍕 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀄂 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎖􀆐 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍕 􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀀄􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶􀍕
􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀄞􀅯􀆐􀄞􀎖􀆐 􀄞􀄨􀄨􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄂 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆐􀆉􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀄐􀅝􀆌􀄐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅵􀇇􀆚􀅚 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅝􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀅶􀅝􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀅽
􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀄂􀇀􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆉􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍘 􀀜􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯
􀅯􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀍲􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀇇􀆚􀅚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀅯􀄂􀅝􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅝􀆐 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯
􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇􀎗 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅶􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀀄􀆚 􀅶􀅽 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄂
􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀅯􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇􀎗 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶
􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀆌􀄞 􀄞􀇆􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀀄􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆌􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅝􀆐 􀄂 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎖􀆐 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀅯􀆐􀄞􀍘
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅝􀆐 􀄂 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀆌􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀇌􀄞􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍘
􀀯􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀅝􀍘􀄞􀍘􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀄏􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀄂􀆌􀄞
􀆐􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐 􀅝􀅶􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀆐􀍕 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀄏􀇇 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍘 􀁋􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚
􀍾􀏯􀏬􀐹 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀆵􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍿􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄂 􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌
􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆵􀆌􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀅶􀅽 􀇁􀄂􀇇 􀅵􀄂􀅬􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀆚 􀄂 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍕 􀅩􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀺􀄞􀇁􀅝􀆐􀅚 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀇁􀅶􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨
􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀆌􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄚􀅽􀄞􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅵􀄂􀅬􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄂 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀀺􀄞􀇁􀅝􀆐􀅚 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀅯􀅝􀅬􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞
􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀆌􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀆵􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆌􀇇 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅝􀅶
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀇁􀅶􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅯􀇇 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀇁􀅶􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘
􀀬􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀄂 􀇀􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄚 􀅝􀅯􀅯􀆵􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀀺􀄂􀅶􀆵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀍲􀁄􀄂􀇇 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍕 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯
􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀄂􀆌􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀆚􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀎗􀀼􀆌􀇇􀅵􀍲􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚􀎗 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀎗􀀼􀆌􀇇􀅵􀍲􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚􀎗 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏱􀏰􀍕􀏲􀏭􀏬 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀏲􀏲 􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆐
􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐􀍘 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏮􀏬􀏱􀍕􀏮􀏳􀏴 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀏮􀏳 􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀆵􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨
􀏭􀏱􀏬􀍕􀏲􀏲􀏳 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀏲􀏭 􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄂 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄨􀅝􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀅯􀇇 􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄨􀅝􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄞􀇆􀄐􀄞􀄞􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅯􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄨􀅝􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀼􀆌􀇇􀅵􀍲􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚􀎗􀍘 􀀦􀆌􀅽􀅵
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅯 􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄨􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅯􀇇 􀇀􀄂􀅯􀅝􀄚􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀄂 􀆌􀅽􀄏􀄏􀄞􀆌􀇇􀍘 􀁄􀅽􀆌􀄞􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀎗􀀼􀆌􀇇􀅵􀍲􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚􀎗􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀆌􀅽􀄏􀄏􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀇇􀆚􀅚 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀄂 􀎗􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀆌􀅽􀅽􀄨􀎗􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅚􀄂􀄚􀅽􀇁 􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀅶􀅝􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀆚􀅽 􀅵􀄂􀅬􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀎗􀄚􀄞􀄂􀅯􀆐􀎗 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀆌􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄏􀇇 􀆵􀅶􀆐􀄐􀆌􀆵􀆉􀆵􀅯􀅽􀆵􀆐
􀄏􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅵􀄞􀅶􀍘
􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀆌􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁅􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀀺􀄂􀅶􀆵􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀏮􀏬􀍕
􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏰􀍘 􀁋􀅶 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏭􀏰􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍗 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀍾􀏯􀏬􀍘􀏲􀏵􀐹􀍿􀍕 􀄂 􀆐􀅵􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞
􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀎗􀁤􀅽􀆌􀆐􀅚􀄞􀎗 􀍾􀏮􀏮􀍘􀏰􀏴􀐹􀍿􀍕 􀄂 􀆐􀅵􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀄐􀅽􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀎗􀁚􀀜􀀘􀎗 􀍾􀏮􀏴􀍘􀏬􀏱􀐹􀍿􀍕 􀄂 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀇇
􀎗􀁞􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀎗 􀍾􀏵􀍘􀏯􀏮􀐹􀍿 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁋􀄂􀆐􀅝􀆐􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀍾􀏳􀍕􀏳􀏬􀐹􀍿􀍘 􀀬􀅝􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄏􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍕
􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅝􀄚􀄚􀅯􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏰􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀄐􀄞􀄞􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀅽􀄏􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀁗􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞
􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀀜􀍘 􀁿􀇀􀇇􀄂􀅐􀅝􀅯􀆐􀅬􀅝􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅶􀄞􀅯 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅵􀅵􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁞􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄞􀅯􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅯􀄂􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆚 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀅯􀄂􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀏳􀆚􀅚 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲 􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏱 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀏴􀏵 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀀑􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀏴􀏵 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐􀍘 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀆚 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀅶􀆐􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐
􀄞􀆉􀅝􀆐􀅽􀄚􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄞􀇁 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀧􀅽􀅯􀅽􀆐 􀀼􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄂􀎗􀍘 􀁙􀆵􀅽􀆚􀄞􀍗 􀎗􀍘􀍘􀍘􀀯 􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀄂􀅯􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐
􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍕 􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀄞 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀇀􀅝􀅽􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇁 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀍘 􀀯􀆚
􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀆌􀅝􀆚􀄞􀍲􀅽􀄨􀄨 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆋􀆵􀅝􀆚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅯􀍘􀍘􀍘􀎗 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍕 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄨􀄂􀅝􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄨􀆵􀅯􀄨􀅝􀅯 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄏􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀁋􀅶 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀏳􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲
􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅐􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄂 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏴􀏵
􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐􀍕 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇆􀆚 􀄚􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀏴􀍕 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀁤􀅽􀆌􀆐􀅚􀄞􀎗 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀍕 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀍲 􀄂􀄚􀇀􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞
􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄐􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀁅􀅽􀏮 􀅽􀄨 􀀄􀆵􀅐􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀏳􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀄏􀅯􀅝􀅐􀄞􀄚
􀆚􀅽 􀄞􀅶􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀎗􀁤􀅽􀆌􀆐􀅚􀄞􀎗 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀍘 􀀯􀅶􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍲􀆚􀇁􀅽
􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁􀅶 􀄏􀇇 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎖􀆐 􀀑􀅽􀄂􀆌􀄚
􀀄􀍘􀀧􀄂􀅯􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀄂􀇇 􀅽􀄨􀄨 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀏭􀏱􀍘􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏵􀏱 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀏭􀏴􀍘􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏵􀏱􀍘
􀏳􀍕􀏰􀏵􀏲 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅝􀆚􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨 􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀅽􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵
􀀘􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏱 􀆚􀅽 􀀺􀆵􀅶􀄞 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀏰􀏵􀍕􀏱􀏬􀏬 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁚􀀜􀀘􀎗
􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀁤􀅽􀆌􀆐􀅚􀄞􀎗 􀄂􀆐 􀄂 􀆚􀄞􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆌􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀏴 􀀦􀄞􀄏􀆌􀆵􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳􀍘 􀀄􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄂 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀄏􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚􀍗 􀎗􀁤􀅽 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀆚􀅽 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀆐 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁅􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍘
􀀜􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇀􀅽􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀏭􀏭 􀇀􀅽􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀆵􀆐􀍕 􀅽􀅶 􀀦􀄞􀄏􀆌􀆵􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀏴􀍕
􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄨􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀇀􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀀦􀄞􀄏􀆌􀆵􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀏮􀏰􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏲􀍘
􀀄􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀄞􀅶 􀄚􀄂􀇇􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀅝􀆵􀅵 􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀍕 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅯􀅝􀇌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀆚 􀄂􀆐 􀄂 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀅚􀅽􀅯􀅝􀄚􀄂􀇇 􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅯
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇆􀆚 􀆐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇􀍘 􀀄 􀄨􀄞􀇁 􀄚􀄂􀇇􀆐 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀅽􀅶 􀀦􀄞􀄏􀆌􀆵􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀏮􀏮􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳 􀄂 􀅶􀄞􀇁 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀅚􀄞􀅯􀄚􀍕 􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄨􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀀄􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀎖􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅽􀍲􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀄏􀆐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀄞􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇆􀆚 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀏭􀍕
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳􀍘 􀀄􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀅯􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶 􀆵􀅯􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄂􀆚􀆵􀅵 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍗 􀄞􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀅯􀆐 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀆐 􀆋􀆵􀅝􀆚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀇀􀄞􀄂􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘 􀀯􀆚 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀇁􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅶􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀄂􀆚 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆚
􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀄞􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀆌 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅐􀅽􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀅶 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀄞􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯 􀅵􀅽􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀎖􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀆵􀄏􀄏􀅽􀆌􀅶 􀅽􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅵􀄂􀅩􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬 􀄂 􀎗􀁞􀅽􀅯􀅽􀅵􀅽􀅶’􀆐􀎗 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍗
􀎗􀏯􀍘 􀁤􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂
􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶 􀄂 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚 􀍾􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀏭 􀆚􀅽 􀏯􀏭 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳􀍿 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍕 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅶􀅽 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀄏􀆵􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲
􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀄚􀍘
􀏰􀍘 􀁚􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆚􀆉􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀏭􀏴􀍘􀏬􀏮􀍘􀏵􀏳􀎗􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆵􀅵 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄚􀆌􀄂􀅐􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚􀆐 􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅯 􀀺􀆵􀅶􀄞
􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀅐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆉􀅯􀄂􀄐􀄞􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚
􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀄚􀅯􀇇 􀄏􀇇􀍘 􀀯􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚
􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀅯􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀄏􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀀦􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀁤􀄂􀇆 􀀄􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀅝􀅶
􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀅬􀄞􀄞􀆉􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀆚 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀀯􀅶
􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅽􀅶􀆐􀄞􀍕 􀄂 􀅯􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀁄􀄂􀇇 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀀦􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀇇 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀅶􀅽 􀅽􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀆵􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁗􀆌􀅽􀅐􀆌􀄂􀅵􀅵􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁞􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅯􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅐􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄨􀄂􀅝􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀄞􀇆􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀄂􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅽􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀍘 […􀎁
􀎀􀍘􀍘􀍘􀎁 􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅯􀇇 􀅝􀅶􀇀􀅽􀅯􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅶􀄞􀅐􀅽􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀆚􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀅶􀄞􀇁 􀅐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅝􀅶
􀀦􀄞􀄏􀆌􀆵􀄂􀆌􀇇􀍲􀁄􀄂􀇇 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀄚􀄞􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅯
􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀄂􀆚 􀄞􀄂􀄐􀅚 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀅝􀆵􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅬􀄞􀇇 􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄞􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀅝􀆵􀅵 􀅽􀆌 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀅐􀅽􀆚 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨
􀇀􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅯􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀅯􀇇 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀅝􀆵􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀘􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀅽􀄨
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀁚􀍘 􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀀾􀍘 􀀄􀆌􀅝􀄨􀅽􀇀 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀁄􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀇀􀅝􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵 􀅽􀆌
􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍘 􀁋􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀇁􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄐􀅽􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀄏􀆐􀅽􀅯􀆵􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀅶􀄞􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄞􀇆􀄐􀄞􀆉􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚
􀄏􀄞 􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆚􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀅝􀆚 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀄐􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀄞􀅐􀅽􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵 􀍾􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀆉􀆌􀅽􀍲
􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀎗 􀁺􀍘􀁗􀅽􀄚􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄂􀇇􀄞􀇀 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁳􀍘􀀼􀅯􀇇􀄐􀅚􀅶􀅝􀅬􀅽􀇀 􀅝􀅶 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆌􀍿 􀄏􀄞􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀁋􀅶
􀀄􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅯 􀏭􀏱􀍕 􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳 􀅽􀅶 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀅝􀆵􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀁄􀍘􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆵􀅶􀄞􀇆􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇀􀄂􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀅽􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇 􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀁺􀍘 􀁗􀅽􀄚􀅬􀅽􀆉􀄂􀇇􀄞􀇀 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁳􀍘 􀀼􀅯􀇇􀄐􀅚􀅶􀅝􀅬􀅽􀇀􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀆉􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀅽􀆚􀅚 􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄞 􀁞􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄞􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀄂􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆉􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀅐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚
􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀁄􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄂􀅶􀆚􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀅝􀆚 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄐􀅽􀆌􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅽􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀄂􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄐􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀄂
􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀄨􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚 􀆐􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀅐􀅽􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅽􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀎖􀆐
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀆐
􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀀯􀄨 􀇁􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅯􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇
􀀄􀍘􀀘􀄞􀅵􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀅬􀅽 􀅝􀅶 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀇌􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀄚􀍕 􀅝􀆚 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀆐 􀄐􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚
􀄏􀅽􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘 􀎀􀍘􀍘􀍘􀎁 􀀾􀄞􀅶􀆵􀆌 􀀄􀁚􀀯􀀦􀁋􀁳􀍕 􀁞􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀍗
􀁅􀄞􀇁􀆐􀆉􀄂􀆉􀄞􀆌 􀎗􀀄􀇀􀄚􀄞􀆚􀎗􀍕 􀁅􀅽 􀏮􀏯􀍾􀏭􀏴􀏲􀍿 􀏯􀏭􀍘􀏭􀏮􀍘􀏭􀏵􀏵􀏳􀍘
􀀒􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆚
􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆚􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅐􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐
􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍘 􀀬􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀅚􀅽􀇁 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀼􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄂􀎗 􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀅶􀆐􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵
􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬 􀅝􀅶 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏯􀍘
􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞’􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍕 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅽􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏮 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀏯􀏳􀏯􀍕􀏰􀏳􀏲
􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄨􀄂􀅵􀅝􀅯􀇇 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀄨􀄞 􀁞􀄂􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆌 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀄂 􀍲 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀏭􀏭􀍕􀏵􀏳􀏰
􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀄞􀄚􀍗 􀇁􀄂􀅐􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀆉􀄂􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅝􀅶
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅵􀆉􀅯􀅽􀇇􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚 􀍲 􀏮􀏬􀏳􀍕􀏰􀏴􀏳 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐􀍘 􀁋􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀇇􀆉􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀍲 􀏭􀏲􀏱􀍕􀏵􀏴􀏵 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀀬􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀇁􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯 􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀍗 􀄂 􀄨􀅯􀄂􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆌􀄞􀄂 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏭􀏭􀍘􀏰 􀆐􀆋􀆵􀄂􀆌􀄞
􀅵􀄞􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀆐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶 􀁞􀅝􀅵􀄨􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆌􀄞􀄂 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏲􀍘􀏵 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀏱􀏬 􀆐􀆋􀆵􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀄂􀄚􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕
􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄂 􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀀑􀄂􀅬􀅚􀄐􀅚􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆌􀄂􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆌􀄞􀄂 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏴􀏬 􀆐􀆋􀍘􀅵􀍘 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂 􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆉􀅯􀅽􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏲􀏬􀏬
􀆐􀆋􀍘􀅵􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀁗 􀅽􀇁􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀁤􀅽􀇇􀅽􀆚􀄂 􀀒􀄂􀅵􀆌􀇇 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀆵􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀏮􀏬􀏬􀏯 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀏮􀏬􀏬􀏴􀍘 􀀄􀄚􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀄂 􀏮􀏬􀏬􀏰 􀁞􀅬􀅽􀄚􀄂
􀁋􀄐􀆚􀄂􀇀􀅝􀄂 􀅝􀆐 􀅯􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅯􀄂􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀇁􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀄨􀄂􀅵􀅝􀅯􀇇 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘
􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀇇􀄞􀇀 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀏲􀏰􀍕􀏬􀏬􀏬 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐􀍘 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀄨􀄞􀎖􀆐 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞
􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅯􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅯􀄂􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄨􀅝􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀏮􀏴 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏯􀍘

Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀀾􀄞􀆚􀎖􀆐 􀆚􀆌􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀄨􀅝􀅐􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀎗􀄨􀄂􀅵􀅝􀅯􀇇􀎗 􀅐􀄞􀆚􀆐 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀅶􀅽 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅬
􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀅵􀄂􀄐􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀄚􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅽􀄚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀄨􀄂􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀎗 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆐􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄂􀅯􀅽􀆵􀆐􀅯􀇇 􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅶􀅽 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌 􀄞􀇆􀅝􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀎗􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎖􀆐􀎗 􀎗􀀯􀅵􀄚􀄂􀆚􀍲􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬􀎗􀍘 􀀜􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐
􀄚􀅽􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀇇􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀅯􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀍘
􀁋􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀅚􀅝􀄚􀄚􀄞􀅶 􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀆵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵
􀄂􀄏􀆌􀅽􀄂􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄚􀄚􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀇌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀎗􀄨􀄂􀅵􀅝􀅯􀇇􀎗􀍗 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁄􀄂􀄂􀆌􀅝􀄨􀄐􀅚􀅝􀎗
􀀄􀆐􀆐􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀀜􀄚􀆵􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅽􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀾􀄞􀄂􀅐􀆵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀁴􀅽􀅵􀄞􀅶􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁄􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀀒􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌
􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀘􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀁗􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎗􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆉􀅝􀆌􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀅯 􀀄􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀅯􀅝􀅵􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀄞􀆚􀄐􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀇌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀅵􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅐􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅶􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅚 􀅽􀄨 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕 􀄨􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍕
􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀄞􀆋􀆵􀅝􀆉􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚􀍘
􀁞􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀄞􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀁞􀀄 􀍾􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀀼􀅝􀇌􀅝􀅯􀄂􀇇􀅝􀀄􀆚􀄂􀄐􀆐􀅽􀅬􀍕 􀀼􀅝􀇌􀅝􀅯􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀀄􀅶􀅬􀄂􀆌􀄂􀍕 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀅝􀇇􀄞􀍖
􀀯􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀁞􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀀒􀅽􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀏭􀏲􀏮􀏵 􀀼 􀁞􀆚􀆌􀄞􀄞􀆚􀍕 􀁞􀆵􀅝􀆚􀄞 􀏱􀏬􀏮􀍕 􀁴􀄂􀆐􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆚􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀀘􀍘􀀒􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏬􀏬􀏲􀍕 􀁨􀁞􀀄􀍿􀍘 􀁄􀅽􀆌􀄞
􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀇁􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀆐 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍕 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀄏􀄞 􀄨􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚
􀅚􀆵􀅐􀄞 􀅚􀆵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅝􀄚􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄏􀅯􀄞􀅵􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀆚􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆚􀆐􀍕
􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀇁􀄞􀅯􀅯􀍲􀄏􀄞􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀄞 􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆚􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀅚􀆵􀅵􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆚􀄂􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀄚
􀅝􀅶 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀅵􀄂􀆌􀅬􀄞􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐􀍘
􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀁅􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀅶 􀀒􀇇􀆉􀆌􀆵􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀀺􀆵􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚
􀁞􀄞􀅯􀄂􀅵􀅝 􀀼􀄂􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄂􀅬􀍕 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀅝􀆐􀅚 􀀾􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆌 􀀑􀄂􀅶􀅬 􀄏􀆌􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅚 􀅝􀅶 􀁅􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀅶 􀀒􀇇􀆉􀆌􀆵􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀄞􀄚 􀅚􀅝􀆐
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀁨􀁞 􀄚􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀆵􀅵􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄂 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀀯􀆚
􀅵􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀄏􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄨􀅝􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀆉􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀅝􀄨 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀄨􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀆵􀇇 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄂 􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄞􀍕􀎗 􀍲
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇁􀆐􀆉􀄂􀆉􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂 􀆉􀅝􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄞􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀅝􀆐􀅚 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅯
􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚􀎖􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏯􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄂􀅯 􀅝􀅶􀇀􀅽􀅯􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀅶􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀄞􀇇
􀄏􀆌􀅽􀅬􀄞 􀅽􀆵􀆚􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀇇 􀀦􀅝􀆌􀅬􀄂 􀍾􀁅􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀁗􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀍿􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀁗􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎖􀆐 􀀦􀆌􀅽􀅶􀆚􀍕
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀅽􀄨 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆉􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀆵􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀄞􀇇 􀍾􀀼􀅝􀀘􀀦􀍿􀍕 􀀯􀄏􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅵 􀁳􀄞􀄨􀄂 􀀄􀆌􀄂􀄐􀅝􀍕 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀄂 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅝􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀇌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆐􀄞􀆚 􀆵􀆉 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀍕
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀎗􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐􀍘􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀎗􀍕 􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀀜􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁗􀄞􀄚􀄂􀅐􀅽􀅐􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀁨􀅶􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅝􀆚􀇇
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀅽􀆌􀆉􀅚􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀆵􀇇 􀄂 􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀁞􀄂􀅬􀅝 􀅽􀆌 􀁞􀄂􀅬􀅝
􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀆚􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀎗􀁄􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝 􀀦􀅝􀆌􀅬􀄂􀎗 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘 􀎗􀁤􀇁􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀀘􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏭􀍕 􀀯􀄏􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅵 􀀄􀆌􀄂􀄚􀇌􀅚􀅝 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀎨􀏱􀏬􀍕􀏬􀏬􀏬 􀄞􀄂􀄐􀅚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗 􀀦􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍕
􀇁􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅝􀆐 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄏􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀯􀀯 􀁴􀅽􀆌􀅯􀄚
􀀒􀅽􀅶􀅐􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀄞􀇇􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀀜􀆐􀅬􀅝􀆐􀄞􀅚􀅝􀆌􀍘 􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀄨􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅯􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀄨􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀀒􀅽􀅶􀅐􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀄞􀇇􀍘 􀀾􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀅽􀅶 􀏰 􀁄􀄂􀇇 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏯􀍕 􀄂 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌
􀄚􀅝􀄂􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀄂 􀄂􀄏􀆌􀅽􀄂􀄚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀇌􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆵􀆐􀆐􀄞􀄚􀍗 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅽
􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀯􀀯 􀁴􀅽􀆌􀅯􀄚 􀀒􀅽􀅶􀅐􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀀯􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄚 􀅝􀆚 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘
􀀯􀄏􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅵 􀀄􀆌􀄂􀄚􀇌􀅚􀅝 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘 􀀬􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄂􀅐􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘
􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀆵􀄚􀄚􀄞􀅶􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀇀􀅝􀅽􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀆵􀅵􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀎖
􀀦􀅽􀆌􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅶 􀁚􀄞􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀀘􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀀄􀅯􀅝 􀀼􀅚􀄂􀅵􀇌􀅝􀅶 􀆐􀆉􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀯􀀯 􀀒􀅽􀅶􀅐􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀄏􀄞
􀅚􀄞􀅯􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀄞􀇇􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀁚􀅽􀅵􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄂 􀍾􀍍􀍊􀍿􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀆐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀆉 􀅶􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞
􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀄚􀅝􀄂􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀄂 􀅝􀅶 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀄞􀇇􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀅯􀅽􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀄞􀄨􀄨􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀯􀀯 􀀒􀅽􀅶􀅐􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀍘 􀁋􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄨􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆋􀆵􀅝􀆚􀄞
􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀅽􀅶􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀏭􀏬􀏬􀍕􀏬􀏬􀏬 􀄚􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀀦􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗􀍘 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀅚􀄂􀄏􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄐􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶 silent…
Annex 17 Exhibit H
􀀬􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀅯􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀄚􀄚􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀀯􀄏􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅵 􀀄􀆌􀄂􀅩􀅝 􀆚􀅽 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀏭􀏬􀏬􀍕􀏬􀏬􀏬 􀄚􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀍘
􀀾􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀏭􀍗 􀁞􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍗 􀁄􀅽􀅶􀄚􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏮􀏯􀍕 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏯
􀀘􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍘
􀀄􀆐 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍕 􀅽􀅶 􀁄􀄂􀇇 􀏰􀍕 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏯 􀇁􀄞 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀄂 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆵􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀎗􀀄􀇇􀆐􀅚􀄞􀎗 􀅝􀅶 􀁞􀅝􀅵􀄨􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯 􀄂􀆚
􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀇀􀅝􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀀄􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍕 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀇁􀄂􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀅶􀅬􀄂􀆌􀄂 􀀧􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀀒􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄞􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀄂􀆌
􀁄􀆵􀅬􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅶 Şhahin, 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄞􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄞􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀄨􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀍾􀄞􀍘􀅐􀍘 􀄚􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀀜􀆌􀅐􀅝􀅶 􀀑􀄂􀆚􀆵􀆌􀍿
􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄨􀅝􀆌􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀀯 􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀇇􀅽􀆵􀍕 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄞􀄚􀅯􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅵􀄞􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀇇 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀄏􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍘
􀀯 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀆉􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀄚 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀅐􀅝􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍘 􀀯 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀄚􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚
􀅽􀆌 􀇁􀄂􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀄂􀆐􀅚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀅶􀍲􀄐􀄂􀆐􀅚 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀇀􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀀯 􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚
􀅵􀇇 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀆚􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀄞􀅯􀆉 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍘 􀀯 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅯􀅝􀅬􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀀯 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄚􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀅽􀄨
􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍘 􀀑􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀄨 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀆐􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐􀍕 􀀯 􀀘􀀯􀀘 􀁅􀁋􀁤 􀁚􀀜􀀒􀀜􀀯􀁳􀀜 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀁴􀀜􀁚􀀜 􀁅􀁋􀁤 􀁚􀀜􀁤􀁨􀁚􀁅􀀜􀀘􀍘
􀁗􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅯􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨
􀏭􀏬􀏬􀍕􀏬􀏬􀏬 􀍾􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅚􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀍿 􀄚􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀀘􀄞􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅯􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎨􀏭􀏬􀏬􀍕􀏬􀏬􀏬 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅐􀅝􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀅶􀄞􀇆
􀄏􀄞􀅯􀅽􀇁􀍘
􀁋􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇 􀇁􀄞􀅯􀅯 􀄂􀇁􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀍕 􀀯 􀄂􀆐􀅬 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀀼􀀯􀁗􀁨
􀍾􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀀜􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁗􀄞􀄚􀄂􀅐􀅽􀅐􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀁨􀅶􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍿􀍕 􀀦􀄞􀇀􀇌􀅝 􀁺􀄂􀅬􀆵􀄏􀅽􀇀 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀎨􀏮􀏬􀍕􀏬􀏬􀏬
􀍾􀆚􀇁􀄞􀅶􀆚􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀍿 􀄚􀅽􀅯􀅯􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀅵􀇇 􀄏􀄞􀅚􀄂􀅯􀄨􀍘 􀀯􀄨 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀄚􀅽 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀍕 􀆉􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀆚 􀅵􀄞
􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄏􀆵􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍘
􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀆐􀆚􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit H
В. 􀀯􀄏􀆌􀄂􀅚􀅝􀅵 􀀄􀆌􀄂с􀅝􀍕 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁞􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄞􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀼􀅽􀄐􀄂􀄞􀅯􀅝 􀁞􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄞􀆚􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌
􀀒􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁄􀆵􀆚􀆵􀄂􀅯 􀀄􀆐􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘
􀀾􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀏮􀍗 􀁳􀍘 İbrahim 􀀄􀁚􀀄􀀒􀀯
􀁞􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍗 􀏯􀏬 􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏯
􀀘􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀁄􀆌􀍘 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍘 􀀯 􀇁􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀀯 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅽􀅶􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀇇􀅽􀆵􀆌
􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅯 􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏮􀏯􀍕 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏯􀍘 􀀄􀆐 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀆉􀅚􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄏􀄞􀆐􀅵􀄞􀅶 􀅯􀅝􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶
􀁞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀍘 􀀯 􀄂􀆐􀅬 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀎨􀏮􀏬􀍕􀏬􀏬􀏬 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀆉􀆵􀆌􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄞􀍘 􀀯 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅯􀅝􀅬􀄞 􀆚􀅽
􀄂􀆐􀅬 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀄨􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅚􀅽􀅯􀅝􀄚􀄂􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁋􀆌􀄂􀇌􀄂 􀀑􀄂􀇇􀆌􀄂􀅵 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀼􀅽􀄐􀄂􀄞􀅯􀅝 􀁞􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄞􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀆐􀆚􀎗􀍘
􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀄂 􀁤􀆵􀆌􀅬􀅝􀆐􀅚 􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀍕 􀀯􀄏􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅵 􀀄􀆌􀄂􀄐􀅝 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀇇􀄞􀆚 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅽􀅶􀆐􀄞 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀆐􀅽􀍕 􀅶􀄞􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀆉􀅚􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁞􀄂􀅬􀅝 􀅶􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀼􀀯􀁗􀁨􀍕 􀀦􀄞􀇀􀇌􀅝
􀁺􀄂􀅬􀆵􀄏􀅽􀇀􀍕 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀆐􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍕􀎗 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀄚􀍘»
􀏮􀏯􀍘􀏬􀏰􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰
Exhibit I
Milli Firka, “Imdat Bank” and the Crisis in the Mejlis (25 March 2011)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit I
Translation
Milli Firka, “Imdat Bank” and the Crisis in the Mejlis (25 March 2011), available at: http://millifirka.
org/«имдат-банк»-и-кризис-в-меджлисе/.
“Imdat Bank” and the Crisis in the Mejlis
Today everyone is aware of the rapid decline in the authority of the Mejlis among compatriots and,
first and foremost, of its leaders, M.Dzhemilev and R.Chubarov. The first attempt to "cleanse the
Mejlis from within" was undertaken in 1997 by a "group of 16" members of the Mejlis at the time,
who were outraged by financial machinations around budgetary funds through the scandalously
known and no longer existing "people's" Imdat Bank.
The protest by fighters for truth and democracy in the Mejlis was crushed, and the troublemakers
were severely obstructed, finding themselves "out of the business" of the Qurultay-Mejlis. MFInform
decided to return to those events, after which the processes of internal degradation of the
Mejlis could no longer be hidden from the public.
We bring to your attention materials of newspaper "Avdet" #23(186) 31.12.1997, which disclose
only small part of what and how Mustafa Jemilev and his today's closest surrounding started to fall
"from pedestal". I give the floor to Professor Lenur Arifov, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical
Sciences.
Crisis in the Mejlis
Lenur Arifov's supplemetary report to the report
of the Chairman of the Mejlis M.Dzhemilev
for the period from July 1996 to December 1997.
Esteemed delegates, the reporting period is 1.5 years - the time of the Mejlis formed by the 1st
session of the 3rd Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people. From the very beginning there has been a
confrontation between the majority of Mejlis members and its Chairman on the assessment of the
expediency and effectiveness of spending the budgetary funds allocated for the Programme for the
Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatars through the commercial "Imdat-Bank".
The Chairman had the support of approximately one third of the Mejlis on this issue. Over time, the
confrontation deepened, spilling over into other areas and, above all, into personnel appointments.
Annex 17 Exhibit I
New features in the style and methods of leadership of the Mejlis also became increasingly
apparent. If the Chairman's views differed from those of most members of the Mejlis, he refused to
sign Mejlis decisions, refused to implement them and, moreover, took actions contrary to and
contrary to the decision of the Mejlis. Persistently and persistently, the Chairman tried to introduce
an authoritarian style to the leadership of the Mejlis. The spirit of democracy and collegiality was
increasingly disappearing. This is the main reason for the deep crisis into which the initial,
seemingly not-so-principled confrontation developed.
There have been occasions before, in the previous Mejlis, when on some political and
organisational issues the opinion of the President did not coincide with that of the majority. This is
the natural and normal state of any collegial body such as the Mejlis. And never before had such
cases been perceived by anyone as a lack of confidence in the President. Moreover, these cases
were in fact, and were perceived by the members of the Mejlis (and by the Chairman himself) as
evidence of the free expression of opinion by each member of the Mejlis. The majority decision was
binding on every member of the Mejlis, including the Chairman. The Chairman had to sign (and did
sign!) the majority decision of the Mejlis, had to give effect to (and did give effect to!) the decision
of the Mejlis.
What happened this time, then, and why did a seemingly insignificant issue on the scale of the
national movement about the transfer of the Capital development administration of Republican
Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea current account from "Imdat Bank" to another
become a national issue? The chairman had to take a step whose consequences are difficult to
predict: he tried to pervert the very essence of the Crimean Tatar representative body - to turn it
from a collegiate body into an authoritarian one. Why?
For a year and a half, Mustafa Dzhemilev persistently contrary to the decision adopted and
subsequently confirmed three times by the majority of the Mejlis, continued to take specific actions
to keep the current account of the Capital development administration in "Imdat-Bank". Why? Why
did the Chairman risk plunging the Mejlis into a deep crisis over a not-so-principled issue and
provoke the convening of an extraordinary session of the Qurultay for the sole purpose of obtaining
a new obedient membership of the Mejlis.
The answer lies in the chairman's personal interest in two economic and financial structures - the
public organisation "Crimea" Fund and the Crimean commercial bank "Imdat-Bank" (now "Krym-
Yurt"). In the first, "Crimea" Fund, he is the President. (Riza Shevkiev is the Director General of
the Foundation). He actually controls the second structure, being the main founder of "Imdat-bank".
It is through these two structures that large sums of money are withdrawn from the budget, which
are aimed at settling Crimean Tatars, but end up stuck in someone else's pockets.
Concerned by the available information about the illegal diversion of part of the budgetary funds to
service the financial problems of "Imdat-Bank", members of Mejlis raised the question for the first
time at the closed meeting of Presidium of Mejlis on July 26 of last 1996.
It was initiated by Ilmi Umerov, then Deputy Prime Minister. Two circumstances should be pointed
out, both from the outset and thereafter, that have characterised the discussion on everything
concerning the "Imdat-Bank". The first one. Being aware of their responsibility, members of the
Mejlis tended to keep the discussion and decision-making on this issue in private. It was only later
that the logic of events took it outside the walls of the Mejlis. First and foremost, those who put
forward absurd arguments about the influence of the intelligence services or the desire of some
members of the Mejlis to "wash their dirty linen in public" should remember this circumstance.
The second circumstance. The Chairman immediately took the position of seeking to remove the
issue of "Imdat-Bank" or the "Crimea" Fund from the control of the Mejlis. In reality, they were
Annex 17 Exhibit I
never under the control of the Mejlis. But through the efforts of a few members of the Mejlis and
some parties in interest, a public perception has gradually emerged in recent years that these
economic and financial structures are under the control of the Mejlis, are subordinate to it or even
are structures of the Mejlis. This myth has become widespread both among Crimean Tatars and in
the external environment.
Paradoxically, many members of the Mejlis have also been caught up in this myth and, under the
influence of leaked rumours of financial fraud, have attempted to implement their alleged control
over "Imdat-Bank". But they faced a fierce reaction from the chairman, who used every excuse and
pretext to delay the discussion of the "Imdat-Bank" issue and, when a decision was finally taken,
sabotaged it in every way possible.
For three meetings of the Presidium of the Mejlis during the month, the question of the "Imdat-
Bank" was invariably raised, but the decision to convene the Mejlis was never taken. Then 15
members of Mejlis applied for calling an extraordinary closed meeting of Mejlis on 17 August
1996. According to the Rules, the President is obliged to convene the Mejlis if at least a third (i.e.
eleven) of the members of the Mejlis demand it. A closed meeting of the Mejlis was held on 24
August 1996. M. Dzhemilev refused to preside over this meeting and to sign the Mejlis resolution
adopted by the majority of members. The following is an extract from the said resolution:
1. To recommend the Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to transfer the
current account of the Capital development administration from the "Imdat-bank" to one of the
banks entitled to conduct operations with budgetary funds within 10 days.
2. . ...to take measures on return of the funds unreasonably withdrawn in 1995-1996 and used not
for their target purpose to the current account of the Capital development administration.
3. For the damage caused to the interests of the Crimean Tatar people to propose the former
member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea
Kenzhe Reshat, in accordance with the commitments he made, to resign his deputy powers.
At the next meeting of Mejlis (September 7-8, 1996) the Chairman of Mejlis initiated the revision
of the Decision of Mejlis of August 24. As a result of a long and heated discussion, a working group
of Mejlis members was set up and tasked with preparing a draft decision for the Mejlis.
The working group familiarised itself with the state of affairs at I "Imdat-Bank" (including the use
of an official statement on "Imdat-Bank", its founders and the statutory fund, provided by the
chairman of the bank's board); with the documented facts of the diversion of large sums of money
from the Capital development administration account to cover the financial "holes" of the "Imdat-
Bank" (a term used by the bankers themselves); and the group also interviewed the chairmen of the
bank's board and the bank's council and the general director of the "Crimea" Fund, analyzed the
data they had collected and came to conclusions that were signed by all members of the working
group and the chairman of the Review Committee of the Qurultay. (It should be noted that the
Chairman of the Review Committee of the Qurultay took part in all activities undertaken by the
working group).
The facts of embezzlement and misuse of budget funds through the "Crimea" Fund and "Imdat-
Bank" were confirmed. In three episodes alone, the debt to the Capital development administration
on January 1, 1997 was 1 million 770.063 grivnas 50 kopecks. Currently, that debt has exceeded 2
million grivnas due to inflation indexation. And this is only one part of it. There are other episodes.
Especially outrageous and vividly demonstrating the cynicism and immorality of the Crimean Fund
leaders is an episode connected with the allocation of funds from the budget for giving out financial
Annex 17 Exhibit I
assistance to to individual developers in dire need. In August 1995 the Capital development
administration transferred 800 thousand grivnas to the "Imdat-bank" account of the "Crimea" Fund,
which according to the contract between the Capital development administration and the "Crimea"
Fund should have been distributed by the "Crimea" Fund to the individual developers according to
the special lists drawn up for all districts and towns of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The
financial security of the contract was guaranteed by the "Imdat-bank".
However, most of the "Crimea" Fund's money was used for completely different purposes of its
own. More than five hundred Crimean Tatar families have still, more than two years later, not
received this money. The "Crimea" Fund's debt for this episode amounted to 866719 grivnas as of 1
January 1997. Today it exceeds one million grivnas.
Answering the question of how such large budgetary sums of money could have been diverted from
their intended purpose, and analysing the available data, the Mejlis working group concluded that a
special instrument had been created, two components of which were the I "Imdat-bank", on the one
hand, and the staff in the Capital development administration and Republican Committee of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, on the other.
Current accounts are opened at the bank for individuals and various companies, including the
companies of the bank's founders, or those controlled by the bank's founders. If necessary, accounts
are opened even in violation of the rules on opening current and budgetary accounts in banks
(Resolution of the National Bank of Ukraine No117 of 31.10.93). The current account of Capital
development administration is in "Imdat-bank".
The scheme of financial transactions in most cases is simple enough: Exerting pressure on officials
of Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea achieve the conclusion of a contract with a controlled company for the performance of any
work or provision of services and transfer of money from the account of Capital development
administration on the account of this company under the contract. From then on, the money, in
violation of the contract, is diverted to various accounts at the same bank on internal bank orders or
on the orders of companies controlled by the bank.
The essence of the mechanism is that the same persons (not Mejlis, namely one or several persons)
control the economic and financial structures of the "Crimea" Fund and "Imdat-bank" and influence
the personnel in the Capital development administration and the Republican Committee of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea. A nodal point is the current account of the Capital development
administration placed in "Imdat-bank". All the above mentioned created favourable conditions for
embezzlement and financial fraud with the budget funds allocated for the Program for Return and
Settlement of Crimean Tatars.
Here is a quote from the interview of M. Dzhemilev to "Golos Krima" (No47, 28.11.97): "Another
point of view on the issue of the bank, which I also hold, is that it's not about the bank itself, but
about the people who work there and the officials who sign the orders on the distribution of funds".
Here M. Dzhemilev precisely formulates this particular instrument with two elements - the bank
and the "Crimea" Fund on the one hand and the officials in the Capital development administration
on the other - by which the money was taken from the budget. If M. Dzhemilev was an outsider,
drawing conclusions from his observations, but he is directly related to this instrument.
It was him - the President of the "Crimea" Fund and the main co-founder of "Imdat-bank", he
himself and on his behalf, under cover of the Mejlis, pushed through the government's decision to
open a current account of the Capital development administration in "Imdat-bank". And his
influence on officials is yet to be discussed. It was M. Dzhemilev, as the President of the "Crimea"
Annex 17 Exhibit I
Fund, who delayed the payment of aid to the Crimean Tatar individual developers for two years and
four months, and it is unclear when this money will be returned to them.
So what is the "Imdat-bank"? From the outset, some individuals, including the Chairman of the
Mejlis, have insisted that it is a people's bank, or the national bank of the Crimean Tatars. Again,
through someone else's efforts, this idea has become public. The widespread circulation of the myth
about the Crimean Tatar national "Imdat-bank" is beneficial and convenient for those who have
created favourable conditions for the manipulation of budgetary funds. Even the official letters of
high-ranking officials use this myth and claim that the"Imdat-bank" is under the control of the
Mejlis and the Qurultay faction of the Supreme Council of Crimea. The "Qurultay" faction has
never controlled and could never control the "Imdat-bank". At no meeting of the faction, not a
single decision on the "Imdat-Bank" was taken by the "Qurultay" faction and could not have been
taken during the entire existence of the faction.
Assertions that the "Imdat-bank" is a national or people's bank of the Crimean Tatars are false.
"Imdat-bank" is a private commercial bank. There are dozens of such banks in Crimea and Ukraine.
It is the property of its founders, i.e., the property of several private companies, behind which are
several specific individuals, Crimean Tatars by nationality. One of its founders is the "Crimea"
Fund (30% of the bank's statutory fund). The fact that the founders are a group of Crimean Tatar
entrepreneurs in no way makes it a national bank, just as the Jewish nationality of the owner of any
other commercial bank does not make that bank a national Jewish bank. And like any private
commercial bank "Imdat-bank" carries out and will continue to carry out financial operations in the
interests of its owners, and primarily in the interests of its owners.
Here is a vivid illustration. In January-May 1996, "Imdat-bank" granted loans to Capital
development administration, arranging them through inter-bank loans between "Krym-credit" and
"Imdat-bank". "Imdat-bank" transferred to "Krym-credit" the amount of 54,610 grivnas 66 kopecks
for interest on the loans. Capital development administration also transferred to "Imdat-Bank" the
amount of 205,278 grivnas 27 kopecks for interest on loans. Thus, the difference in the amount of
150,667 grivnas 61 kopecks made a profit of the "Imdat-bank" and the budget accordingly lost this
amount. The profit of "Imdat-bank" exceeded almost three times the profit of "Krym-credit". From
the legal point of view, the operation is perfectly valid, but in fact it is a robbery. Moreover, it is
"Imdat-bank", not "Krym-credit", that is robbing the Crimean Tatars in this operation.
The myth about the national "Imdat-bank" was needed in order to turn the Mejlis and the interests
of the Crimean Tatars into a "political roof", in the shadow of which it is more convenient to make
those "deals" that have already been made and will still try to be made by unscrupulous
businessmen.
Commercial Bank "Imdat-bank" was registered by the National Bank of Ukraine on January 20,
1994. On November 14, 1996 its main founders were: the "Crimea" Fund (30.69%), a small private
enterprise "Torshe" (22.48%), a small cooperative enterprise "RED" (28.05%), a private company
"Sinan" (9.32%) and the "Oasis" enterprise (7,70%). Hiding behind the interests of Crimean Tatars,
in the middle of 1994, the founders succeeded in obtaining an order from the Acting Prime Minister
of Ukraine E. Zvyagilskiy to channel budgetary funds for the Programme for the Return and
Settlement of Crimean Tatars through the "Imdat-bank".
The instrument was created and elaborate operations were launched to divert money from the
budget in the interests of the bank's founders. The last operation of diverting money that was
launched on August 7th of 1996 ended on November 5 of 1997 with a withdrawal of 89 thousand
grivnas from the the account of Capital development administration.
Annex 17 Exhibit I
By the way, about 89 thousand grivnas. M. Dzhemilev found it possible to answer only on this
episode in the same interview to the "Golos Krima". Quote: "...I specifically dealt with this incident,
as we were talking about the alleged violation by the new management of the bank. It turned out
that the write-off was quite legal..." M. Dzhemilev's understanding of this incident was not good,
because the bank failed to fulfil its obligation to the account holders. On August 7, 1996 "Imdatbank"
gave a credit to the Capital development administration in the amount of 89 thousand
grivnas, on the next day, August 8, Capital development administration ordered the bank to transfer
this amount to the account of "Torshe" enterprise, stating the purpose - advance payment for cable
supply, according to the contract No2 of August 7, 1996. The Bank was obliged to ensure that
"Torshe" would use the money for the designated purpose. Instead, thirty-two thousand grivnas of
this amount were withdrawn by order of the Chairman of the Bank's Board A.Galagan to pay off
debts of this company for loans dated 15.12.95 and 18.12.95.
7,496 grivnas were transferred to the account of the bank itself as interest on the loans from
December 1995 to June 1996, and 49,500 grivnas were transferred to the account of the "RED"
enterprise by the order of "Torshe" as a temporary financial assistance.
The Mejlis returned to the discussion on the transfer of the Capital development administration
account on 8 February 1997. After a long and heated discussion on the materials submitted by the
Mejlis working group it was decided: "To transfer the current account of the Capital development
administration from "Imdat-bank" to one of the banks authorised by the National Bank of Ukraine.
Eighteen members of the Mejlis voted for this decision and 11 voted against. Thus, on February 8,
1997, the Mejlis confirmed its previous decision of February 24, 1996.
After only ten days the Mejlis Chairman at the Presidium again initiated the revision of Mejlis and
at the same time announced his intention to actually resign, formalizing it as a long holiday until the
next session of Qurultay. A few days later, on February 22, 1997 a new meeting of Mejlis was held,
on which the majority of Mejlis again confirmed the decision on transfer of the settlement account
of Capital development administration. At the same time the Mejlis took note of the Chairman's
statement about the so-called leave of absence and set the next meeting for March 1, 1997. At this
meeting, the Chairman actually delivered an ultimatum to the Mejlis: either the Chairman resigns or
the Mejlis cancels its decision on "Imdat-bank".
This meeting is quite revealing. It shows that none of the members of the Mejlis wanted, at least at
that time, either his resignation or his going on extended leave. And most members of the Mejlis did
not understand the real motives behind the Chairman's stubborn opposition to the majority of the
Mejlis over the "Imdat-bank" account.
The Mejlis therefore took a "Solomon’s" decision:
"3. To recommend to the Capital development administration of Republican Committee of Crimea
not to take any action within a month (from 1 to 31 March 1997) regarding the closure of current
account at the "Imdat-bank", provided that no financial abuses are committed by the "Imdat-bank"
during this period.
4. Recommend to Chairman of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev to postpone consideration of his application
dated 18.02.97".
The moratorium imposed by the Mejlis on its decision dragged on for three months until June 1997,
when changes in the Crimean government were taking place. All this time the Mejlis did not return
to the issue of the "Imdat-bank". But the Chairman did not stand idly by. It was in March that he
organised letters from the leaders of Crimea to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Minister of
Finance of Ukraine and the Chairman of the State Tax Administration of Ukraine in support of
keeping the current account of Capital development administration at "Imdat-bank". In response, a
Annex 17 Exhibit I
letter was received in May 1997 from the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine stating that the Ministry
had no objection to the "Imdat-bank" continuing to service the financing of the Programme for the
Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatars. This letter gave "Imdat-bank" the reason for later
failing to execute the instructions of the head of the Capital development administration to close its
current account.
Meanwhile, the President's confrontation with the Mejlis majority has spilled over into the sphere of
personnel appointments. Here are some of the most striking cases:
1. In late May/early June of this year, the situation in the Crimean Supreme Soviet and government
was ripe for the formation of a new government. On June 8, 1997, a meeting of the Mejlis discussed
the candidates for the posts of chairpersons of the Republican Committee on Nationalities and
Deported Citizens. Republican Committee on Housing and Communal Services and Minister of
Labour and Social Protection. After discussing the candidates by secret ballot it was decided to
recommend Z.Khalikov's candidacy to the Qurultay faction for the post of Chairman of the
Republican Committee. He received 17 votes in favour and 11 against. The alternative candidacy of
E. Gafarov did not get the necessary number of votes. The Chairman did not like this decision and
at the next Mejlis on 15 June he initiated a second vote. The Mejlis, by secret ballot, again
confirmed its previous decision. Nevertheless, not taking into account the decision of the Mejlis
majority and contrary to the decision of the Mejlis, the Chairman tried to push E. Gafarov's
candidacy through negotiations in the Supreme Council of Crimea.
2. For several months, from February to May 1997, the political situation in Crimea was very
difficult. A struggle broke out between various forces for changing the composition of the
Presidium of the Supreme Council of Crimea, on the one hand, and the Crimean government, on the
other. I remind that on February 7, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea V. Kiselev
resigned, and on February 13, A. Gritsenko was appointed to this post. At the same time, the
"Qurultay" faction managed to get four seats in the Presidium for its representatives. After the
change of the leadership of the Supreme Soviet, the question of the resignation of the previous
government and the appointment of the new chairman of the Council of Ministers and the new
composition of the Council of Ministers arose in a very acute form. The situation was highly
ambiguous and multi-component. Many forces came into play, both in Crimea and in Kyiv. At
times the situation escalated to the point of losing control. Part of the deputies used extreme
methods, up to and including open-air hunger strikes in winter conditions.
No one can deny that the deputy faction "Qurultay", despite its small number, had a worthy place in
the Supreme Soviet of Crimea. In the period from the summer of 1996 to the spring of 1997 it was
quite a significant force. Due to our faction's position, the government of Demidenko remained in
power at that time. At this time the faction managed to lead in such composition of the Supreme
Council two legislative acts: on March, 26th, 1997 - the Decision of the Supreme Council of Crimea
"About recognition invalid and suspension of some decisions of the Crimean regional Council of
People Deputies, its executive committee. On April 9, 1997 - the Decision of the Crimean Supreme
Soviet "On the alphabet of the Crimean Tatar language". Both were carried out in pursuance of
instructions from the Qurultay.
In February - May 1997 M.Dzhemilev was directly involved in the complicated negotiation process
between the factions of the Supreme Council of Crimea on the issue of formation of a new
government in February-May 1997. And not only through the faction. Although the faction
informed in detail about the situation in the Supreme Council at each meeting of the Presidium of
the Mejlis and meetings of the Mejlis and decisions on the key points were made either at the
Presidium or at the meetings of the Mejlis, the Mejlis Chairman also got into personal contacts with
the leaders of various factions of the Supreme Council of Crimea. And this was normal. The only
request that was repeatedly made at the Presidium of Mejlis by the Deputy Chairman of the
Annex 17 Exhibit I
Supreme Council of Crimea R. Chubarov and the faction leader L. Arifov was that M. Dzhemilev
should invite them or one of them for his personal contacts with the leaders of other factions.
Otherwise the coordination of actions, which was absolutely necessary at that exceptionally difficult
time, would be lost.
However, it became clear that M.Dzhemilev was negotiating with them (the leaders of "pro-Russian
faction" Y.Podkopayev and V.Klychnikov in particular) behind the back of the faction. On April
15, 1997 on Presidium of Mejlis M.Dzhemilev unexpectedly offered the variant of agreement with
opposition side which was already signed by Y. Podkopayev and V. Klychnikov. This option
undermined both our position in the Supreme Soviet and our ability to participate in government
formation. Most importantly, it did not correspond to the real balance of political forces. In a
situation where the Chairman of the Mejlis can afford to conduct separate negotiations with the
opposition factions without informing the Qurultay faction, it is impossible to lead the faction's
actions. The leader of the faction announced at the same Mejlis meeting that he had resigned as
chairman of the Qurultay faction.
If we compare this fact with the Mejlis decision on the issue of "Imdat-bank" and letters signed by
A.Demidenko in support of "Imdat-bank" organized in the same period, it becomes clear that the
interests of "Imdat-bank" for Mejlis Chairman were above the general interests associated with both
the activity of the faction and the formation of the government.
3. Only the desire to introduce an authoritarian regime into the work of the Mejlis can explain the
subsequent actions of the Chairman within the Mejlis to remove inconvenient to him persons from
the governing bodies of the Mejlis - Deputy Chairmen of the Mejlis Presidium and heads of the
Mejlis departments. On 26 July 1997, he announced the abolition of the institution of deputy
chairmen, which he had introduced on 6 June 1996 with the support of the majority of the Mejlis. It
took three meetings of the Mejlis to form a new Presidium after multiple re-votes. The previous
structure of the Mejlis was abolished and a new one could not be formed because the President was
not in agreement with the majority.
4. In such an important issue as the participation of the Crimean Tatar people in the elections to the
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, M. Dzhemilev once again proved to be an authoritarian leader.
Without consulting the Mejlis, he agreed on the people's participation in the election campaign
together with the Rukh of Ukraine, and even sent a letter to the Rukh indicating specific individuals
to be included in the Rukh's list. Only after this was the issue brought to a meeting of the Mejlis.
A lot of energy, energy and time during the reporting period was taken up by internal problems in
the Mejlis. It took eight meetings of the Mejlis and six meetings of the Presidium of the Mejlis to
discuss the "Imdat-bank" issue alone. This is the main reason, although not the only one, why many
of the most important problems in the lives of our people have been overshadowed. The Mejlis was
very sluggish or did not work at all on such defining bills as the status of the Crimean Tatar people
in Ukraine, the law on indigenous peoples, representation of people in the legislative and executive
branches of power in Ukraine and in Crimea, forms of self-determination of the people; the law on
rehabilitation, etc.
From autumn 1995 to summer 1996, work on all these questions was quite lively at all levels.
However, the proposed drafts, some of which are now at the Verkhovnaya Rada, cannot satisfy us.
Control over their very drafting process has been lost. Sufficient attention has been paid to the
citizenship of our compatriots, but there is no acceptable solution. Numerous meetings with
representatives of international organisations, roundtables, seminars and other organisational
activities are certainly necessary and make a positive contribution, taking the process of finding a
solution to the next level. However, this is clearly not enough.
Annex 17 Exhibit I
Virtually no attention has been paid to analysing ways of reuniting the people. The natural return of
Crimean Tatars to their homeland could take dozens of years.
The situation is somewhat better in the field of education. Several new Crimean Tatar-language
schools have been opened and the number of pupils has doubled this year, reaching 2,500. There is
hope that this process is reaching the state level of solution. Besides the already mentioned decision
of the Crimean Supreme Council "On the alphabet of Crimean Tatar language" the Decision of the
Council of Ministers No. 260 dated 26 August 1997 "On the Program of Development of the
Network of Educational Institutions, Classes with Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar Language of Study,
Schools and Classes with Two Languages of Study" and the Decree of the Council of Ministers No.
466-r dated 20 October 1997 "On creation of the Republican Interagency Commission on
Coordination and Control of the Transfer of the Crimean Tatar Language into Latin Script". The
funds of the international "Vozrozhdeniye" Fund have been attracted for the publication of
textbooks and manuals in the Crimean Tatar language. This year, projects for publishing textbooks
and manuals of 12 titles have been approved and will be financed.
Esteemed delegates! Every single one of us is responsible for maintaining the most important
achievement of the national movement - the representative bodies of the Crimean Tatar people
Qurultay and its elected Mejlis. They are currently the life-supporting bodies of the people. Only in
the way of democratic forms of their functioning are they able to bring good to our people.
Lenur ARIFOV
(Avdet Newspaper, No.23 (186) 31 December 1997)
MF-inform

Exhibit J
Milli Firka, Who and How Ripped Off the People in the Mejlis (25 March 2011)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit J
Translation
Milli Firka, Who and How Ripped Off the People in the Mejlis (25 March 2011), available at:
http://milli-firka.org/кто-и-как-в-меджлисе-обворовывал-народ/.
Who and How Ripped Off the People in the Mejlis
Today everyone is aware of the rapid decline in the authority of the Mejlis among compatriots and, first
and foremost, of its leaders, M. Dzhemilev and R. Chubarov. The first attempt to "cleanse the Mejlis from
within" was made in 1997 by a "group of 16" members of the Mejlis at the time who were outraged by
financial machinations around budgetary funds perpetrated by the Mejlis leaders through the notorious
and no longer existing "people's" "Imdat-Bank".
The protest by fighters for truth and democracy in the Mejlis was crushed, and the troublemakers were
severely obstructed, finding themselves "out of the business" of the Qurultay-Mejlis. "MF-Inform"
decided to return to those events, after which the processes of internal degradation of the Mejlis could no
longer be hidden from the public.
We bring to your attention materials of newspaper "Avdet" No.23 (186) dated 31 December 1997 which
are opening just a little part of what and how Mustafa Dzhemilev and his today's closest surrounding
started to fall "from pedestal". I give the floor to Enver Muedinov.
Report of Enver Muedinov,
Chairman of the Review Committee of Qurultay
Dear Qurultay delegates!
Annex 17 Exhibit J
In its activities, the Review Committee was guided by the Regulations on the Review
Committee, approved by the Qurultay. During the reporting period after the first session of the
III Qurultay the Review Committee held 12 meetings where there was always a quorum for
taking decisions. During this period the Review Committee has considered about 20
applications.
The essence of many applications boiled down to almost one thing: to assist in solving the
housing problem. Besides, there were applications from inhabitants of Ukrainka village about
doubts in the results of elections of the chairman of Mejlis of Ukrainka village and applications
from delegates of Kirov regional conference about violations during the conference.
All the applications were checked, the results of checks were discussed at the meetings of the
Review Committee and decisions were made.
Audits of the financial and economic activities of the "Crimea" Fund for 1996, accounting
department of the Mejlis for 1996, and 10 months of 1997 were conducted. I will elaborate on
the results of the audits below.
The Review Committee attended all the meetings of the Mejlis during the reporting period.
Annex 17 Exhibit J
The Review Committee of the Qurultay several times made statements and initiated meetings of
the Mejlis and consideration of such issues as:
- on the activities of commercial bank "Imdat-Bank" and the transfer from this bank of the
Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea account;
- on the activities of the deputy faction "Qurultay" in the Supreme Soviet of Crimea.
At the request of the Mejlis Chairman, the Qurultay Review Committee checked the reasons for
the disruption of the Mejlis meeting in Foti Sala village.
The Review Committee, carrying out its work in a rather difficult environment, carried out the
functions entrusted to it by the Qurultay.
The crisis in the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people could not but affect the Qurultay's Review
Committee.
Until recently, there was no particular disagreement in the Review Committee. I, as the
Chairman of the Review Committee, trying to comply with the principles of democracy, obeyed
the decisions taken, although I didn't always agree with the decision. But when some members of
the Review Committee tried to act as censors to forbid me to speak about negative phenomena
discussed in the sessions of Mejlis, I refused to obey. This ended with the Review Committee
meeting deciding to remove me from my position by expressing distrust of me, which only the
Qurultay can do.
Thus, some members of the Review Committee in their eagerness to silence everyone who is
unwanted are even exceeding their authority and violating the regulation on the Review
Committee of the Qurultay. I have informed you about this in detail in my statements to the
media.
Only the Qurultay may assess the activities of the Review Committee and hence my work as the
Chairman of the Review Committee elected at the Qurultay, so I am submitting to your judgment
a report on the work done by the Review Committee of the Qurultay.
I bring to your attention the report compiled without embellishing the facts, but also without
glossing over the painful problems, the attempt to solve which led to the crisis in Mejlis.
So far, the desire not to wash dirty linen in public has worked for us while discussing these or
those questions. But in order to understand the reasons of the created crisis it is necessary to
wash this dirty linen as long as without telling the truth we won't achieve unity and solidarity of
the national movement, without this it will be difficult to gain trust of the people, which has been
noticeably shaken lately.
Some members of the Mejlis and the Review Committee are trying to blame for the crisis
situation on those members of the Mejlis who sought to bring order to the Mejlis and in the
distribution of funds allocated under the Program for Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatar
People. All the "guilt" of these members of the Mejlis is that they made public the negative
phenomena that were happening with the funds allocated under the program. And the Chairman
of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev and his supporters are against publicising these facts.
Disclosure of which facts are the Chairman of Mejlis and his supporters afraid of?
Annex 17 Exhibit J
At the Mejlis meetings from August 1996 to March 1997 the questions about the efficiency of
the use of budgetary funds allocated under the Program for the return and settlement of the
Crimean Tatar people and the principles of the relationship between the Mejlis and "Imdat-bank"
were considered 6 times.
During this time, we witnessed how Mejlis commission was established to make
recommendations on the activities of "Imdat-Bank", how extraordinary meetings of the Mejlis
were initiated at the request of 13 members of the Mejlis and at the decision of the Review
Committee in order to cancel the decisions made. We also faced such a fact as the refusal of the
Mejlis chairman to sign and execute adopted decisions without taking into account the opinion of
the majority of Mejlis members.
Even then, the first signs of the impending crisis appeared, but the Chairman of Mejlis M.
Dzhemilev did nothing to eliminate the crisis phenomena, but on the contrary, did everything
possible to deepen it.
The opinion of the majority of Mejlis members was categorical: to transfer the budget account of
the capital development administration from "Imdat-bank" to one of those authorised by the
national bank of Ukraine to service budget funds, thereby expressing distrust in the activities of
"Imdat-bank" and its management.
The Mejlis Chairman, realising that he could not change the mind of the majority of the Mejlis
members, went to an extreme step: it was stated that the Mejlis Chairman would resign if the
budget account of the capital development administration was withdrawn from the "Imdat-bank".
With this step, M. Dzhemilev went to the political blackmail of the Mejlis. He made it clear to
everyone that he would reject any decision to withdraw the capital development administration
account from the "Imdat-Bank".
What does the Chairman of the Mejlis and his supporters actually stand for, and what do most
members of the Mejlis oppose so strongly?
Why does the Chairman of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev persistently continue to defend his pet project -
"Imdat-bank" without taking into account the opinion of the majority of Mejlis members?
And everything turns out to be in the control, or rather, in the uncontrolled spending of
budgetary funds allocated under the Program for the return and settlement of the Crimean Tatar
people, in order to keep "Imdat-bank" afloat.
At one time, when "Imdat-Bank" was organised, it was entrusted with the functions of control
over the efficient spending of funds allocated under the Program through the Public Fund
"Crimea", which is one of the founders of the bank.
Much in the activities of "Imdat-bank" is hidden behind the term "commercial secret". No one
can learn anything about the activities of the bank without the consent of all the founders of the
bank.
In October 1995, by order of the Chairman of the Mejlis, a commission of the Mejlis conducted
the first and so far the only partial inspection of "Imdat-Bank".
In parallel with this inspection by the commission, an audit of the "Imdat-Bank" activity was
carried out by the specialists of an independent financial expertise from Kharkov, at the
invitation of the Chairman of the Mejlis. The main purpose of the audit was to make a clear
picture of the bank's activities.
Annex 17 Exhibit J
Much about the activity of "Imdat-bank" became known due to the results of these inspections.
Inspection reports were presented to the Chairman of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev. But the results of the
inspections were so unexpected and overwhelming even for M. Dzhemilev that he decided to
hide the acts of inspection under the carpet and, rolling up his sleeves, takes decisive measures to
save the bank.
So what did the inspections on the activity of "Imdat-Bank" reveal, and what results of the
inspections did the Chairman of the Mejlis decide to hide?
Here are a few excerpts from the act of inspections:
The bank's insolvency was caused by the fact that the bank's management... in violation of the
requirements of the National Bank of Ukraine, regulating lending activities, in January-
September 1994, issued loans totaling 72.303 billion krb. (karbovanets), which have not been
repaid even at the time of the inspection. The issuance of unprofitable loans was made without
analysing their recoverability and security.
The most serious mistake of the bank officials mentioned above is that credit resources were
provided to a number of companies that already had outstanding loans and fees for using credit
resources in this bank.
As a result of the inactive credit policy of the Council and the Board of the Bank, "Imdat-Bank"
incurred losses amounting to 178.703 billion krb. (non-repayment of issued and guaranteed
loans, lost income, as well as losses from interbank credit operations).
Despite the created situation, when the bank incurred losses, the Council of the Bank set the
salary for the employees of the bank - 15% of the income received by the bank.
Incompetence of the management of "Imdat-bank" led to the fact that the bank was on the verge
of bankruptcy. Changing the chairmen of the Board of "Imdat-bank", one after another, they
tried to save the situation. Only in 1994, 5 chairmen of the bank's Board changed.
In an interview with a correspondent of the "All-Ukrainian News", R. Kenje, a former chairman
of the bank's Board, stated that he had not worked at the bank when it was suffering losses. This
is an impertinent lie. What can you expect from a man who does his best to justify these actions?
R. Kenje was forced to write a notice of resignation from the post of Chairman of the Bank
during the inspection of "Imdat-bank" by the Commission of the Mejlis, i.e. in October 1995.
The 53rd meeting of the Mejlis adopted a decision in relation to R. Kenje as well, but no one
executes this decision because of the disagreement of the Chairman of the Mejlis with it.
The tape recording of the 53rd meeting of the Mejlis and the minutes of the meeting of 24
August 1996, where the decisions on the account of the capital development administration in
the "Imdat-Bank", on the bank officials were taken away and are kept personally by M.
Dzhemilev.
The leadership of the Mejlis, the Imdat-Bank and the State Committee on National Security were
busy with one problem - how to find funds to replenish the hole that had formed due to nonrepayment
of loans. They found both ways and means.
These were the budgetary funds of the Capital development administration of Republican
Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea under the Program for the Return and
Settlement of the Crimean Tatar People. They used persuasion and, if necessary, threats of
Annex 17 Exhibit J
physical violence in order to use the budget funds to the benefit of the bank founders and the
managers of some companies. Through these companies and small businesses the budget funds
intended for the arrangement of the Crimean Tatar people, flowed into the pockets of managers
of various ranks, and the people began to be openly deceived, hiding behind the assurances that
official Kiev is gradually phasing out funding for the Program of Return and Settlement of the
Crimean Tatar People.
Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, its budget account in the "Imdat-bank" was the very cash cow, from the funds of which
the bank still existed.
How else can be explained such a fact that the allocation of 80 billion krb. by the Capital
development administration of the "Crimea" Fund in August 1995, which, according to the order
of the State Committee of National Security, were intended for the payment of financial aid to
individual developers for the completion of houses, were used by the President of the "Crimea"
Fund M. Dzhemilev for strengthening the financial position of the "Imdat-bank", for the
repayment of debts on loans previously taken by a number of small enterprises and companies.
In order to give the appearance of legitimacy of use of 80 billion krb. received from the Capital
development administration, the contracts were concluded between the "Crimea" Fund and the
"Geos" and "Arsen-bey" enterprises for the supply of building materials, and the money was
transferred to these enterprises in the amount of 63,0 billion krb. and 10 billion krb. respectively,
leaving 7,0 billion krb. on the current account of the "Crimea" Fund. But in those two years not a
single karbovanets worth of building materials has been delivered.
Where was the money spent? With this money "Geos" and "Arsen-bey" enterprises bought their
promissory notes in the "Imdat-bank".
Moreover, at the expense of the above mentioned 63.0 billion krb. "Geos" enterprise repaid the
debts of the following enterprises:
1. "Zodiac" enterprise 9.9 billion krb.
2. "Turk-Krym" LLC 10.0 billion krb.
3. "RED" enterprise 12.7 billion krb.
4. "Sparta" LLC 4.62 billion krb.
5. "Ecotech" LLC 4.0 billion krb.
6. "Cruz" enterprise 4.7 billion krb.
7. "Avesta" enterprise 4.6 billion krb.
8. "Krymzemstroi" enterprise 4.6 billion krb.
And the "Arsen-bey" enterprise, at the expense of the public fund "Crimea" received 10 billion
krb, has repaid debts of the enterprise "Marat-94" in the amount of 2,0 billion krb.
The way in which after some time the appearance of payment of a part of debts between "Geos"
enterprise and Fund "Crimea" was created refers to the category of puzzles and when solving
them one starts to wonder: who took credits after all and why one enterprises pay debts of other
enterprises and what source was chosen for repayment of debts?
Annex 17 Exhibit J
From March 12, 1996 to July 15, 1996 "RED" enterprise transferred to the Fund "Crimea" 25
219 565 000 krb., drawing up payment orders as a repayment of accounts payable. But in the
accounting documents in the Fund "Crimea" there is no confirmation of the document on the
presence of such debt, but there is a letter from the "RED" enterprise that the transferred amount
of 25 219 565 000 Krb is the payment of the debt of "Geos" enterprise.
S. Tokhtarov was the Director of the "RED" enterprise and the Chairman of the Board of "Imdatbank"
at that time, and he probably chose budgetary funds as the source for paying the debt.
The events that happened after that belong to those that are called incredible. The leadership of
the "Crimea" Fund decided to use part of the funds coming from compatriots living abroad to
replenish the Fund's current account in the "Imdat-Bank". For this purpose, $31,497 was
allocated and handed over to S. Tokhtarov for currency exchange and crediting to the current
account of the "Crimea" Fund.
For the execution of this operation S. Tochtarov chose the "Geos" enterprise. The "Geos"
enterprise transfers 58107 grivnas to the "Crimea" Fund by issuing a payment order, as a return
of accounts payable. Is this not absurd? The funds of the "Crimea" Fund are used to pay off debts
to the "Crimea" Fund.
How can one think of choosing a partner to credit funds to a company that has been indebted to
the "Crimea" Fund for more than one year? According to the accounting documents, "Geos"
enterprise reduced its debt ashes to the "Crimea" Fund at the expense of the funds received by
SME "RED" and for the currency received. According to accounting documents, "Geos"
enterprise reduced its debt to the "Crimea" Fund through funds received by "RED" enterprise
and for the currency received.
All the funds received from "RED" enterprise and "Geos" enterprise the management of the
Fund "Crimea" decided to direct for payment of material aid to individual developers for the
completion of houses. In 1996, 347.776 grivnas 50 kopecks was allocated for payment of
financial assistance to the developers, and to date the indebtedness of the "Crimea" Fund to the
developers in the amount of 4,522,234 grivnas 50 kopecks remains.
But what happened with 80 billion krb. is not the only thing that happened with the budget funds.
In the same way, 45 billion brb. was used to repay the debts of some enterprises through the
"Poisk" enterprise and the "RED" enterprise. A total of 8.9 billion krb. was misappropriated
through the "Toria" enterprise on August 7, 1996. And there are dozens and dozens of such facts.
From the outside it seemed that official Kiev did not notice, to put it mildly, "these tricks" of the
"Imdat-bank" management. But, to its credit, the Ukrainian government has taken steps to
streamline the budget. In accordance with Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No 401 of 03.04.96,
enterprises and organisations financed from the state budget were obliged to transfer accounts to
authorised banks determined by this resolution before 15.05.96. However, this decree, as well as
the decisions of the Mejlis taken in accordance with this decree, have not been implemented to
date.
The most vigorous opposition to the withdrawal of the Capital development administration
account from "Imdat-Bank", following the decision taken at the Mejlis meeting, came from M.
Dzhemilev and R. Kenje, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea and former chairman of the
bank's Council.
Annex 17 Exhibit J
At a time when one part of the Mejlis members were trying to bring order to the use of budgetary
funds, another part was actively working to keep the budgetary account of the Capital
development administration in the "Imdat-Bank".
Without discussing it at meetings of the Mejlis, they held secret negotiations with the Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, A. Demidenko, and the
Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
V. Kiselev. As a result of these negotiations, a letter was initiated to the Prime Minister of
Ukraine P.I. Lazarenko. I will read an excerpt from this letter:
"The incompetence of the former management, which manifested itself in misconduct, seriously
complicated and worsened the financial situation of the bank, the new composition of the
Council and the Board of the bank are taking measures to resolve the crisis situation. In these
conditions, the control and audit department and the state treasury department of Simferopol
charged the amount of 2,772,218 grivnas 85 kopecks on the balance of budgetary funds with
penalties, while the authorised capital of the bank is 1,200,074 grivnas.
Taking into account the role of "Imdat-bank" which activity is under constant control of the
Supervisory Board and the "Qurultay" faction of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea, I ask to consider
it appropriate to withdraw the collection orders and give it the status of an authorized bank for
servicing the funds sent from the State Budget of Ukraine, to finance the return and settlement of
the Crimean Tatar people."
How they controlled, and how they wanted to control the use of budgetary funds, we have shown
above.
How can we hope that the leadership of "Imdat-bank" will finally begin to show a sense of
compassion for their people if they continue to steal from the Capital development
administration, but now in a different way.
Imdat-bank's management takes inter-bank loans and lends them to the Capital development
administration at a higher interest rate. During the first five months of 1996, the Capital
development administration paid "Imdat-bank" interest of 205,278 grivnas and 27 kopecks,
while "Imdat-bank" transferred 54,610 grivnas 66 kopecks for interbank credits to "Krym-credit"
bank. The difference in the amount of 150,667 grivnas 61 kopecks is the profit of "Imdat-bank"
received at the expense of the Capital development administration.
The "Crimea" Fund, being the founder of the bank, has more than 362 thousand grivnas in the
"Imdat-bank" statutory fund, but has not received a single penny of dividends for these years.
So who do the resources of the fund work for and who gets dividends from it?
The answer to this question can only be given by the management of the "Crimea" Fund and
"Imdat-bank".
The funds invested in the "Imdat-Bank" statutory fund by the management of the "Crimea" Fund
are the funds collected on the donations of compatriots abroad, for the improvement of the entire
nation, and not for the profits of a number of high-ranking leaders.
The funds for the operation of the "Crimea" Fund are allocated by the President of the Fund M.
Dzhemilev. Only M. Dzhemilev knows the true sources and quantity of the incoming funds. The
Crimean Republic can not say anything about it. Therefore, the verification covers that part of
the documents which were provided to us.
Annex 17 Exhibit J
Having failed to eliminate the contradictions that led to the confrontation in the Mejlis when
addressing the issue of the effectiveness of the use of budgetary funds, the Mejlis Chairman
continued to rely on the support of the majority of the Mejlis members when addressing other
issues. This was particularly evident in the discussion of candidates for nomination to the new
Crimean government
A majority of Mejlis members did not support the candidates for the Crimean government
proposed by the Mejlis chairman. But M. Dzhemilev, without a decision of Mejlis, considered
that Ennanov's candidacy for the post of Minister of Social Protection was the best one, and
disregarding the opinion of the majority of Mejlis members, who rejected this candidacy,
supported Ennanov and achieved his approval in this post.
The Mejlis chairman understood that decisions in Mejlis meetings are made by a majority vote of
the Mejlis members, but he also understood that he could not persuade the majority of the Mejlis
members to support his ideas.
And so, in this difficult situation, the Chairman of the Mejlis decided to go on leave, until the
Qurultay session.
He was well aware that the Mejlis Rules do not foresee a situation where the Mejlis chairman
goes on long-term leave on his own initiative before the Qurultay session.
The Mejlis meeting offered M. Dzhemilev to go on leave for 2-3 months, but he refused and
insisted on taking leave until the Qurultay session.
And then the Mejlis meeting was forced to assign the duties of Mejlis chairman to the First
Mejlis Deputy Chairman R. Chubarov until an extraordinary session of the Qurultay.
Having gone on leave, M. Dzhemilev became more active and began to meet more often with his
compatriots in different regions of Crimea, which he did not do so often before.
Two weeks later, at a meeting of the Mejlis, R. Chubarov made a statement that he was
physically unable to combine his duties as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea and
acting deputy chairman of the Mejlis, and asked to be relieved of his duties as chairman of the
Mejlis.
But the real reason of R. Chubarov's unwillingness to act as Mejlis Chairman is that though
Mejlis Chairman M. Dzhemilev went on holiday, he continued active work and all questions
were agreed with him without taking into consideration Acting Mejlis Chairman, and that he is
not willing to work in such circumstances.
The members of the Mejlis faced a dilemma: how to break the deadlock, how to untangle the
tangle of painful problems in a situation when the Mejlis leadership withdrew from solving them,
aggravating the crisis in the Mejlis.
All members of the Mejlis understood that any decision taken by the Mejlis would go against the
rules of procedure of the Mejlis.
At such a critical moment when the issue was put forward: should the Mejlis be the
representative body of the people, the majority of Mejlis members accepted Mr Chubarov's
statement that he would step down as Mejlis chairman and hand his duties over to Reshat Ablaev
on a temporary basis until an extraordinary session of the Qurultay.
Annex 17 Exhibit J
Concluding my report I would like to hope that the delegates of the Qurultay will have the
courage to assess in a balanced and objective manner the activity of the Mejlis and its President
and moreover, to assess the causes of the crisis. I hope that Qurultay will find the ways of getting
out of the crisis and create opportunities for strengthening the positions of the system of
representative bodies of Qurultay and Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people.
It will depend on you, the Qurultay delegates, what composition of the Mejlis you will choose.
But we must not allow the authority of the Mejlis to be used for mercenary purposes, by people
with impure intentions - whoever these people are, whatever merits they have before the people.
You have a difficult decision to make, on which the unity of the people will depend.
I think Qurultay decisions will be realistic and their realisation will contribute to the restoration
of rights of our people, their return and settlement on their native land.
Enver MUEDINOV
Newspaper "Avdet" No.23 (186) dated 31 December 1997
MF-inform
Exhibit K
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Extraordinary 2nd session of the 6th convocation of the
Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people opened in Bakhchisaray (29 March 2014)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit K
Translation
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Extraordinary 2nd session of the 6th convocation of the
Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people opened in Bakhchisaray (29 March 2014), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140728221035/http://qtmm.org/новости/4401-в-
бахчисарае-открыла-работу-внеочередная-2-ая-сессия-курултая-
крымскотатарского-народа-vi-созыва.
News
Extraordinary 2nd session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people of the 6th convocation
opened in Bakhchisaray on 29 March 2014.
The extraordinary 2nd session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people of the 6th
convocation opened its work in Bakhchisaray on March 29, 2014.
Opening the session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people of the 6th convocation, the
Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov said that 236 delegates of
the Qurultay are registered in the hall.
The Presidium of the extraordinary 2nd session of Qurultay consisted of: Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar people Chairman Refat Chubarov, his Deputies Akhtem Chiygoz, Zaur Smirnov, Aider
Adzhimambetov, Nariman Jelyal, Mufti of the Crimean Muslims Hajji Emirali Ablaev and the
Chairman of the Qurultay Review Committee Ali Ozenbash.
President of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov and head of the Council of Muftis of Russia Ravil
Gaynutdinov were present at the Qurultay session.
The session opened with the singing of the Crimean Tatar national anthem "Ant Etkenmen". ("I
have sworn»).
Mufti of Muslims of Crimea Hajji Emirali Ablaev gave the traditional blessing of Qurultay.
Delegates of the Qurultay proceeded to the election of the working bodies of the Qurultay.
Elvedin Chubarov, Nariman Dzhelyal, Bekir Mamutov, Teyfuk Gafarov and Shevket
Kaybullayev were appointed to the Drafting Commission.
The delegates of the national congress also approved the composition of the Secretariat of the
session, which included Dilyaver Akiyev, Shefikha Abduramanova, Murat Yazydzhiyev, Dinara
Seitgaziyeva and Gayana Yuksel.
Annex 17 Exhibit K
The delegates of the extraordinary 2nd session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people of
the 6th convocation approved the agenda of the session.
The draft agenda was taken as a basis and included the issue "On the socio-political situation in
Crimea and tasks of the national self-government bodies of the Crimean Tatar people».
After the approval of the agenda, the head of the Mejlis Refat Chubarov made a report on the
socio-political situation in Crimea and the tasks of the national self-government bodies of the
Crimean Tatar people.
Addressing the delegates of Qurultay of the 6th convocation the Head of Mejlis Refat Chubarov
underlined that the draft resolution of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people "On the realisation
by the Crimean Tatar people of the right to self-determination on its historical territory - in
Crimea", which is proposed to discuss and adopt today, Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people
announces all the parties about "the beginning of political and legal procedures on establishing
national and territorial autonomy of the Crimean Tatar people on its historical territory - in
Crimea".
Exhibit L
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov: We are tired
of looking for our place in the relationship between the two countries (30 March 2014)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit L
Translation
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov: We are tired
of looking for our place in the relationship between the two countries (30 March 2014), available
at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140728201656/http://qtmm.org/новости/4412-замглавы-
меджлиса-нариман-джелялов-мы-устали-искать-свое-место-в-отношениях-между-
двумя-странами.
Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov: We are tired of looking for our
place in the relationship between the two countries
􀏯􀏬 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰
On Saturday, 29 March, Bakhchysaray hosted the first session of the Qurultay of the
Crimean Tatar people since the start of the Russian occupation.
Focus talked to the deputy head of the Crimean Tatar People's Majlis, Nariman
Dzhelyalov, about the most important decisions and their possible consequences.
- What are the main decisions taken at the extraordinary session of Qurultay of the
Crimean Tatar people on March 29 and today's meeting of the Mejlis?
Today the Mejlis discussed issues related to the instructions of yesterday's Qurultay. It was
decided to continue the work on preparation of bullet points, which will enable us to make
appointments and negotiate with international organisations, governments of different
countries. A certain group of people will be allocated for that. We have some blueprints, now
we have to specificate them.
We also handed Mustafa Dzhemilev - he is now in New York - the texts of Qurultay decisions
and asked him to voice them at the UN Security Council meeting. This is about the right of
the Crimean Tatar people to self-determination.
As for interaction with the Crimean authorities, the Qurultay discussed this issue and
instructed the Mejlis to make a final decision. It will be adopted next Tuesday, 1 April, in the
morning.
- So will the Mejlis cooperate with the Crimean authorities?
There is no final decision yet, as I said. But the Qurultay voted for the Mejlis to recommend
people who would join the Crimean government to protect the interests and rights of
Crimean Tatars.
- Can you name these people?
We were just discussing and have not yet made a particular decision on the candidates.
- During the Qurultay meeting Lenur Islyamov, owner of the ATR channel, said that
he was ready to take the post of deputy prime minister in the Crimean government.
Was he among the possible candidates?
Today various candidates were discussed: those that were announced yesterday and
others. But no decision has been made.
Annex 17 Exhibit L
- The Qurultay has decided to establish a national territorial autonomy of the Crimean
Tatar people on its historical territory - in Crimea. Could you decipher what this means
in practice?
It is about the recognition of the Crimean Tatar people as an indigenous people in the
fundamental documents of the autonomy - first of all, in the Constitution. It is the guaranteed
participation of Crimean Tatars in the administration of the territory of this autonomy. We are
not talking about 100% of our people in the authorities, we are talking about adequate and
guaranteed participation. These are issues concerning the preservation, use and
development of the Crimean Tatar language, the development of culture and everything
related to these areas. There is no such experience in Ukraine, but there is in Russia - in
the constitutions of Tatarstan and Udmurtia. This is what we are aiming at.
- Do you want to achieve autonomy within Ukraine or in the Russian Federation?
So far we do not know the exact answer to this question. But we are tired of looking for our
place in relations between the two states. So we were concerned, first of all, with protecting
the interests of our own people. We declared and clearly stated in the decision of the
Qurultay our intention to enter into relations with Governments and Parliaments of different
countries. Mejlis Chairman Refat Chubarov said it could be Ukraine, Russia and other
countries. But of course, first of all, those who are directly related to the fate of Crimea.
- Do Crimean Tatars recognise Crimea as part of Russia?
Here we are not talking about recognition of Russia, but about recognition of the fact that
Crimea remains de jure part of Ukraine - the General Assembly vote showed that, de facto
Russian troops are here, Russian laws are in force, Russian roubles are in circulation and
many other things are still going on. In fact, we are proceeding from what exists in reality at
the moment.
- Are Crimean Tatars demanding half the seats in the government?
Some members of the Mejlis talk about half. But only some. Officially we gave a figure of
33%.
- However, Crimean officials say the new Crimean constitution will not contain a
provision on national quotas because this is not stipulated by Russian law...
The Qurultay instructed us to talk to the national government, not to representatives of the
subject of the federation, as they are now calling themselves. After we talk with the Russian
leadership, that is when we will make final conclusions about quotas for Crimean Tatars.
- What issues will Refat Chubarov discuss at the meeting with Russian President
Vladimir Putin that was announced the other day?
Exclusively those issues that concern the right of the Crimean Tatar people to selfdetermination.
We have already discussed at the Qurultay points about national-territorial
autonomy, we are still finalising them, and they will be offered for discussion to Mr. Putin,
the authorities of Ukraine and the leadership of international organisations. And we want to
hear answers to our proposals.
- Whose proposals - those of Ukraine or Russia - are more acceptable to the Crimean
Tatars, which side is more willing to engage in dialogue?
Annex 17 Exhibit L
Proposals have come from both sides. However, so far only Ukraine has offered specific
solutions. I am referring to the resolution of the Ukrainian parliament a week ago on the
recognition of the Crimean Tatar people as an indigenous people of Crimea. On the Russian
side, there have been no written decisions of this kind so far. There have only been
proposals voiced by Putin, before the signing of the famous treaty and federal constitutional
law on the annexation of Crimea. There has been no concrete discussion. In this case, I
cannot say that any side is more willing to engage in dialogue. There is a reality, and no
matter what statements we make, we have to accept the realities.
The problem is that the Ukrainian authorities' decisions on the territory of Crimea are not
realisable. Ukraine does not have the capacity, the strength, perhaps the desire, to enforce
its decisions in Crimea. At the same time the decisions of Russian authorities are being
actively implemented.
- How do you assess the possible effect of the law "on the occupied territories"
adopted by the Ukrainian parliament - will it do more harm or good?
I do not see any benefit for the residents of Crimea in this draft law. First of all, it is the way
it understands collaborationism; secondly, it is a ban on economic activities for Ukrainian
citizens in Crimea. As for the implementation of a special regime for entry and exit, this can
still be accepted. But some of the parameters would actually lead to us ending up in our
homeland in the status of outcasts, people unable to feed their families, or worse, as
criminals. For this reason, I cannot in any way welcome the adoption of such a law in the
form it has been proposed.
- How does the Qurultay propose to solve the problem of obtaining/not obtaining a
Russian passport?
We have not made a final decision. We are trying to find an intermediate solution. In order
not to lose contact with Ukraine, we call not to give up the Ukrainian passport and not to
lose our citizenship. But we are forced in the realities we have in Crimea to accept Russian
citizenship. Otherwise we will remain foreigners in our native land. This applies not only to
Crimean Tatars but also to many Crimean residents of other nationalities.
- The absence of the leader of the Crimean Tatar people Mustafa Dzhemilev at the
Qurultay gave rise to speculation that the Qurultay is being held against his will. Is
this true?
I will comment on this very simply. Modern means of communication allow Mr. Dzhemilev to
address the Qurultay delegates even though he is physically very far away. Yesterday we
were ready to provide such communication. There is no reason to claim that the Qurultay
made decisions contrary to the will of Mr. Dzhemilev.
- How do you generally assess the reaction of the international community to the
annexation of Crimea?
We have already come to terms with the fact that the reaction of the international community
does not appear as quickly as the Crimean Tatars in particular expect. We understand that
this is due to many factors. And we are very grateful to our leader Mustafa Dzhemilev for
seeking to ensure a positive response for the Crimean Tatars. Today, he is actually fulfilling
the task of ensuring that the international community, first, publicly and openly recognizes
the Crimean Tatar people as the indigenous people of Crimea, and second, takes measures
to ensure the right of the Crimean Tatar people to self-determination. On Monday, Mustafa
Annex 17 Exhibit L
Dzhemilev plans to take part in a meeting of the UN Security Council, where he will make a
report on the situation in Crimea.
- What statements will he be making?
You understand that it is not customary in global diplomacy to make demands at once. First
the situation is announced, then the reaction is listened to. However, Mustafa Dzhemilev
has repeatedly said that the right of the Crimean Tatar people to self-determination must be
secured. In what form and with what tools is the second question. The main thing is to reach
agreement in the UN on the main issue. Negotiations on more specific issues will follow.
- On the eve of the referendum, fears were expressed about misconduct by the socalled
"self-defence" in Crimea and possible provocations and so on. Do the Crimean
Tatars feel safe now?
The Crimean Tatars feel uncomfortable and anxious. The "self-defense" units have not gone
anywhere. There is a huge set of questions and problems to which neither we nor the
Crimean authorities have an answer so far. And these questions are facing all the residents
of Crimea. These include the issues of citizenship, education and property rights. Until at
least interim solutions are found, one cannot speak of any peace and confidence in
tomorrow.
- In the comments on yesterday's Qurultay, there are accusations of "capitulation" by
Crimean Tatar leaders to the Russian occupiers. How can you comment on this?
Every individual citizen as an individual can afford any maximalist reaction. As a
representative body designed to ensure and protect the rights and interests of our people,
we have no right to assess the situation in black and white. We are not proceeding from
popular solutions but from protecting our people so that there will be no victims, people will
be safe and their rights will be protected. Talking about capitulation, especially to Ukrainian
officials who are withdrawing their troops from the territory of Crimea, is at the very least
unethical.
FOCUS
Vitaly Atanasov
Exhibit M
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Head of Mejlis: When we see that there is a need for a clear
demonstration of the will of the Crimean Tatar people, we will hold a referendum
(29 March 2014)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit M
Translation
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Head of Mejlis: When we see that there is a need for a clear
demonstration of the will of the Crimean Tatar people, we will hold a referendum (29 March 2014),
available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140728205431/http://qtmm.org/новости/4403-
глава-меджлиса-в-том-случае-когда-мы-увидим-что-потребуется-демонстрация-
четкой-ясной-воли-крымскотатарского-народа-мы-будем-проводить-референдум.
Head of Mejlis: When we see that there is a need for a clear demonstration of the
will of the Crimean Tatar people, we will hold a referendum
􀏮􀏵 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰
This was stated by Refat Chubarov at a briefing during a break of the 2nd session of the
Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people on 29 March 2014.
Refat Chubarov also said that the draft Decision of the Qurultay "On the right of the Crimean
Tatar people to self-determination in their historical territory - in Crimea" is based on
international law and on many fait accompli and precedents in some states, including the
Russian Federation.
"We have done nothing more than any people would do in a situation when their land has
become the subject of great discussions regarding sovereignty and rights to this land," the
Mejlis head continued. - We have asserted our right to self-determination on this land.
Therefore, all parliaments and states that proceed from the fundamental documents of the
UN, first of all the UN Charter, have only one way out - to share the right of self-determination
of the Crimean Tatar people on their land".
Annex 17 Exhibit M
The head of the Mejlis stressed that the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people proceeds
from the fact that the Crimean Tatars' right to self-determination is indisputable and is based
on international documents. "We are waiting for the reaction of the parliament and the
governments of the states. I have no doubt that one of the first to respond to our document
should be the Ukrainian parliament," Chubarov concluded. - I do not know whether the
Russian parliament will react and I do not know whether the parliaments of other
neighbouring states will react".
Furthermore, the head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov voiced his
intention to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin.
"We actually outlined a number of issues a week ago which, from our point of view, require
outlining the processes that are taking place in and around Crimea and to discuss them I
proposed to initiate such a meeting. Because according to international treaties, the country
that acted as Russia is responsible for all the processes here, even though others are
challenging its right to be in this status of territory. This side is responsible for all the
processes on which people's lives depend and what will happen tomorrow, even if others
are disputing its right to be on this territory. Who to negotiate it with but the president of the
country that established its legal field here", - believes Refat Chubarov.
Exhibit N
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Mejlis chairman meets Russian Ombudsman (17 May 2014)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit N
Translation
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Mejlis chairman meets Russian Ombudsman (17 May 2014),
available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140728214824/http://qtmm.org/новости/4484-
председатель-меджлиса-встретился-с-омбудсменом-рф.
Mejlis chairman meets Russian Ombudsman
News
Mejlis Chairmen met with the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation on 17 May 2014.
On 17 May 2014, the central office of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people hosted a meeting
between the Mejlis Chairperson Refat Chubarov and the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation Ella
Pamfilova.
The meeting was also attended by the Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyal, Head of the Secretariat
Dilyaver Akiev and Head of the Department of Education in Crimean Tatar language and
implementation of Crimean Tatar language in all spheres of state and public life of Crimea Emine
Avamileva, Head of Legal Department Teyfuk Gafarov.
The Chairman of the Mejlis informed the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation
about the situation regarding the Crimean Tatar people in different periods of history as well as about
the work of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people.
Speaking about the attitude of the Crimean Tatars to the changes that have taken place in Crimea,
Refat Chubarov stressed that "the main thing in today's reality is the safety of people, and in order to
ensure it, the basic principles that guarantee Crimean Tatars their rights must be fulfilled. We also
want to be a part of the people who have rights and take responsibility. We would like to participate
in organising the government, but the Crimean Tatars are only 300 thousand and they live dispersed.
This makes it very difficult to elect our representatives to the authorities".
Refat Chubarov stressed that Crimean Tatars would like to have such an electoral system that would
enable them to delegate their representatives elected by Crimean Tatar people themselves to
governmental authorities.
Also during the meeting he expressed his position that all 3 state languages should be equally studied
in the schools of the Republic of Crimea.
"We are very apprehensive about the schools. Look. Vladimir Putin speaks and emphasises the three
languages. The Constitution has written down the equality of the 3 languages, but we need an
implementation mechanism to make it work," said Refat Chubarov. - A declaration will not help
anything. We talked to educators, we told them that it is necessary to make it mandatory to study
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages in schools with Russian language».
"I will now talk about today's reality. No one, neither you nor I, can change it anymore. In the current
situation we need to think about how we can help people. What should we do to solve the problems
that arise," said Ella Pamfilova.
She also noted that now the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people should use all means to inform the
country's leadership in Moscow, because even though the leadership is informed by representatives
of the Crimean authorities and law enforcers, it happens to be one-sided information.
Annex 17 Exhibit N
"Of course, it is necessary to definitely use all the possibilities in the legal field. Russian President
Vladimir Putin is now, to a certain extent, going along with it. It seems to me that we should use all
the chances. I think information should come from you as well. I'm ready to be an intermediary
between you and the president of the Russian Federation," Pamfilova said.
The issue of banning the events on May 17 and 18 was also touched upon in the course of the
meeting. Refat Chubarov noted that for the first time in all these years, a mourning rally on May 18
was banned and stressed that people were going to go to Simferopol.
Ella Pamfilova, speaking about this, noted that she was "categorically against the banning of such an
event. "Another thing is if they have any serious concerns that there might occur provocations," the
ombudsman said.
She also stressed that her main role is to be the person who will try to ease the tension in society as
much as possible and "give answers to the problems that concern the residents of Crimea and the
Crimean Tatar people. There are so many issues that require daily work".
Exhibit O
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people has delegated to
Mejlis the right to identify candidates for republican authorities (29 March 2014)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit O
Translation
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people has delegated to Mejlis
the right to identify candidates for republican authorities (29 March 2014), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140728204613/http://qtmm.org/новости/4406-курултай-
крымскотатарского-народа-делегировал-меджлису-право-определить-кандидатов-для-
работы-в-республиканских-органах-власти.
Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people has delegated to Mejlis the right to identify
candidates for republican authorities
􀏮􀏵 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰
􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄨􀇇 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀇀􀅽􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄏􀇇 􀏭􀏱􀏳 􀁙􀆵􀆌􀆵􀅯􀆚􀄂􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀏮􀏵 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀏮􀅶􀄚
􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅐􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀍘
􀁋􀅶 􀏯􀏬 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍕 􀄂 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀅯􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞􀍘

Exhibit P
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Crimean prosecutor reads warning to Mejlis chairman on
inadmissibility of extremist activities (4 May 2014)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit P
Translation
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Crimean prosecutor reads warning to Mejlis chairman on
inadmissibility of extremist activities (4 May 2014), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140729102618/http://qtmm.org/новости/4474-прокурор-
крыма-зачитала-предупреждение-председателю-меджлиса-о-недопустимости-
осуществления-экстремистской-деятельности.
Crimean prosecutor reads warning to Mejlis chairman on inadmissibility of
extremist activities
􀏬􀏰 􀁄􀄂􀇇 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰
On 4 May 2014, at 7 pm, Crimean prosecutor Nataliya Poklonskaya read out a warning to
Mejlis Chairman Refat Chubarov "on the inadmissibility of extremist activities" at the office
of the Crimean Tatar People's Mejlis.
________________________________________________________________________
________
WARNING
on inadmissibility of extremist activities
City of Simferopol 3 May 2014
On 03.05.2014 the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people
Chubarov R.A. in violation of the requirements of Articles 4-5 of the Federal Law "On
assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, marches and pickets" of 19.06. 2004 No. 54-FL
planned, prepared and organized a public event in the city of Armyansk of the Republic
Annex 17 Exhibit P
of Crimea and led the citizens he invited to the event, representing the interests of the
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people in the number of about 1500 people.
Accordingly, on 03.05.2014 at about 10 a.m. the convoy consisting of 100 cars,
2 buses and 2 minibuses, containing the citizens of Crimean Tatar origin, total number
of about 1500 people, entered the territory of Armyansk.
These citizens, on the instructions of R.A. Chubarov, blocked the Kherson-
Kerch road near the road sign "115" km and subsequently took part in a rally organized
by R.A. Chubarov, who publicly spoke there in support of the unofficial leader of the
Crimean Tatar people, people’s deputy of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine M.
Dzhemilev.
Dzhemilev M. is banned from entering the territory of Russia by the authorised
agencies.
The protesters were formed into a column by R.A. Chubarov and with Crimean
Tatar national flags marched towards the border checkpoint "Turecky Val", where, in
violation of the requirements of federal legislation on the procedure for crossing the
state border of the Russian Federation, R.A. Chubarov and part of the protesting
citizens in the number of about 500 people crossed the Russian Federation border with
Ukraine near the above mentioned border checkpoint and walked to the border post
from the Ukraine to meet with M.Dzhemilev.
At the same time, Chubarov R.A. and the aforementioned citizens under his
leadership in an organized manner, including the use of physical force and despite the
verbal protests of the authorized officials serving at the "Turecky Val" post, drove
police officers and Russian Federation border guards from the post, effectively seized
the "Turecky Val" border crossing and held it for about 5 hours, namely from 12 to 17
hours on 03 May 2014 until the arrival of law enforcement authorities.
Chubarov R.A., Dzhemilev M. and the protesters after negotiations with them
refused to vacate the border crossing point "Turecky Val" and stop their illegal actions,
thus preventing the legitimate activities of state authorities.
Thus, the actions of Mr. Chubarov, Mr. Dzhemilev and the citizens from the
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people that have not yet been identified are seen as
violations of the Federal Law "On assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, marches and
pickets" of 19 June 2004, No. 54-FL and the Federal Law "On Combating Extremist
Activity" of 25 July 2002, No. 114-FL.
The actions of Mr. Chubarov, Mr. Dzhemilev and unidentified citizens who
took part in the public event in question actually caused mass disorder in the city of
Armyansk, obstructed the lawful activity of the State authorities and involved violence
and threats of violence.
Moreover, on behalf of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Chubarov R.A.
organised and prepared the said illegal actions, and publicly urged citizens arriving
with him in Armyansk to carry them out.
Besides, in violation of the requirements of Articles 4-5 of the Federal Law "On
assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, marches and pickets" dated 19.06.2004 N° 54-F3,
Chubarov R.A. organized other illegal public events related to the protest actions in
support of Dzhemilev M. on 03.05.2014, expressed in the blocking of roads by
Crimean Tatar nationals representing the interests of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
Annex 17 Exhibit P
people in settlements in the area of Belogorsk, 95 km. of the highway Simferopol -
Kerch, Bakhchisaray, village Amurskoye of Krasnogvardeyskiy district of Sudak city,
Strogonovka village on the Alushta-Yalta highway, as well as in Leninsky, Sovetsky
and other districts of the Republic of Crimea.
Illegal public events on behalf of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people in the
territory of the Republic of Crimea continue.
Based on the above mentioned, being guided by Article 7 of the Federal Law
"On Combating Extremist Activity" of 25.07.2002 No. 114-FL,
I WARN:
Chubarov Refat Abdurakhmanovich, Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar people on the inadmissibility of extremist activities.
I demand the immediate cessation of extremist activities.
I clarify that if the violations of the federal legislation indicated in the warning
are not eliminated, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people will be liquidated in the
order established by the Federal Law "On Combating Extremist Activity" of
25.07.2002 No. 114-FL and its activity on the territory of the Russian Federation will
be prohibited.
Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea,
Senior Adviser of Justice [signature] N.V. Poklonskaya
The warning has been issued to me, its essence and the right to appeal in court
have been explained to me.
__________________________
(signature of the person to
whom the warning is issued)

Exhibit Q
Maidan.org.ua, The Law "On restoration of rights of persons deported" in the Rada
(2 March 2004)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit Q
Translation
Maidan.org.ua, The Law "On restoration of rights of persons deported" in
the Rada (2 March 2004), available at:
https://maidan.org.ua/arch/oldkrym/1075827192.html.
The Law "On restoration of rights of persons
deported" in the Rada
02 March 2004
A draft law “On restoration of rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds” has been
submitted to the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine.
A draft law “On restoration of rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds” has been
submitted to the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine. The document establishes a clear legal
concept of deportation, its characteristics, designation of the territory from which a
citizen was deported and other legal criteria according to which a person can be
considered subject to deportation. This was stated by the chairman of the State
Committee for Nationalities and Migration, Gennadiy Moskal, during a meeting with
Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Kunitsyn. According to Moskal, this is an extremely
important legal document, as many legal aspects of the problem related to the forced
relocation of large ethnic groups and the Crimean Tatar people remain unresolved in
Ukraine until now. To date, Gennadiy Moskal noted, the very concept of "deportation"
has been interpreted according to Dal's dictionary.
During the meeting, the sides exchanged views on improving the mechanism of
building and buying secondary market housing for the repatriate families. Proposals to
simplify the scheme for financing housing buyouts have been submitted to the Cabinet
of Ministers of Ukraine, the chairman of the State Committee on Interethnic Relations.
The scheme will be shorter, the number of intermediate links will be reduced, and the
role of local authorities, who will hold meetings of tender committees directly in the
cities and districts, will be increased. The Crimean government, said Sergey Kunitsyn,
is considering the possibility of merging the Capital development administration of the
Council of Ministers of the republic with a similar structure in the Republican
Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. According to the Prime Minister,
this option will make it possible to save and manage budget funds more rationally.
The chairman of the Republican Committee on Nationalities and Deported Citizens
Server Saliev and Assistant to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Crimea
Shevket Memetov participated in the meeting.

Exhibit R
Maidan.org.ua, Kuchma Imposes Veto on Law on the Deported (23 July 2004)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit R
Translation
Maidan.org.ua, Kuchma Imposes Veto on the Law on the Deported (23 July 2004), available at:
https://maidan.org.ua/arch/oldkrym/1090559805.html.
Kuchma Imposes Veto on the Law on the Deported
23 July 2004
Chubarov explains Kuchma's veto on Law on the Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported by
lawyers' objections.
President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma vetoed the Law "On the Restoration of Rights of the Persons
Deported on Ethnic Grounds" due to the fact that the legal department of the Presidential
Administration had objections to a number of provisions of this document. This opinion was
expressed by one of the authors of the law, people’s deputy of Ukraine Refat Chubarov, "Context-
Media" reports.
"Lawyers of the Presidential Administration have a number of questions regarding certain articles,
they believe that the people’s deputies should reconsider them," Chubarov said. In particular,
according to him, the lawyers questioned the article of the law which provides land to repatriates who
return to the countryside. According to Chubarov, the lawyers justify their objection with the fact that
issues of land allocation are regulated by the Land Code of Ukraine.
"I cannot agree with all the objections that we have," the deputy said. - Some of them, from my point
of view, may not have been voiced".
We shall remind you that on 19 July Leonid Kuchma returned to the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine
the Law "On the Restoration of Rights of the Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds" adopted by the
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine on 24 June.

Exhibit S
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, Draft Law on the Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported
on Ethnic Grounds, 24 February 2010
(translation)

Exhibit T
RIA Novosti (Crimea), How Crimea was hardened: five blockades in the peninsula's modern
history (28 February 2019)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit U
Translation
RIA Novosti (Crimea), How Crimea was hardened: five blockades in the peninsula's
modern history (28 February 2019), available at:
https://crimea.ria.ru/20190228/1116152860.html.
􀀬􀅽􀇁 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀆌􀄚􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚􀍗 􀄨􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀅵􀅽􀄚􀄞􀆌􀅶 􀅚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇
􀏬􀏳􀍗􀏮􀏰 􀏮􀏴􀍘􀏬􀏮􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏵
© 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀀄􀅶􀄚􀆌􀄞􀅝 􀁞􀆚􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶
􀀜􀇀􀅐􀄞􀅶􀅝􀇇􀄂 􀁄􀄂􀆌􀆚􀇇􀅶􀄞􀅶􀅬􀅽􀍕 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄐􀅽􀆌􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅽􀅶􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚
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􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅝􀄐􀍕 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀍕 􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀅐􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀍘 􀁋􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀇀􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐􀄂􀆌􀇇
􀅽􀄨 􀆌􀄞􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀍕 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅯􀅝􀅬􀄞􀍘
􀀯􀆚 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀁞􀅝􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂 􀅶􀄞􀇁 􀅐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅯􀅝􀆐􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶
􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘
􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀆚􀆌􀆵􀅵􀆉 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀄚􀆐􀎗 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇
􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀄏􀆵􀆚􀎗 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀍲 􀅝􀅵􀅵􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀄂􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂
􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀍕 􀄂 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀁨􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅯 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍕 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆵􀆉 􀆚􀅽 􀏴􀏱􀐹 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅚 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁅􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀘􀅶􀄞􀆉􀆌 􀁚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀆌􀆌􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀄨􀄂􀆌􀅵􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄚􀍘
􀀄􀆉􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇆􀅝􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆌􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀼􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄨􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞
􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅯􀍘 􀀄􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀆐􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀎗􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀇁􀄂􀇇
􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀄞􀅶􀅚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆚􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀄􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁅􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶
􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀅝􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀇀􀆌􀅝􀇇􀆐􀅬 􀍾􀀼􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅬􀄂􀇇􀄂 􀁋􀄏􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚 􀍲 􀄞􀄚􀍘􀍿 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅯􀅽􀅽􀄚􀍲􀅐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐
􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀆌􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆌 􀅶􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅯􀅽􀇁 􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀅚􀄂􀆐
􀆉􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀀯􀅶 􀁄􀄂􀇇 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍕 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄞􀅵􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄂 􀄚􀄂􀅵 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀀼􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀁋􀄏􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇆􀅝􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀏭􀏱 􀅬􀅵 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀀄􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍕 􀎗􀄞􀇆􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀎗 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀅯􀄂􀄐􀅬 􀁞􀄞􀄂 􀅐􀆵􀅯􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆐􀍕 􀄚􀆌􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆵􀆉 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅶􀄞􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁅􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅯􀍘 􀀄
􀄐􀅽􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄚􀄂􀅵 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀄏􀆵􀅝􀅯􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆐􀅯􀆵􀅝􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅵􀄞􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀄐􀄂􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨
􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅯􀄞􀇀􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀅐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘 􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞
􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅶􀅽 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀅶􀄞􀅐􀅽􀆚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀍲 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆐􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀆚􀆐
􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀅝􀆚􀆐􀄞􀅯􀄨 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅶􀅽 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍘
© 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀍘 􀀼􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀅯􀄂􀄏􀅽􀇀
􀎗􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄏􀅯􀄞􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀇁􀄂􀇇􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍕
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄚􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆋􀆵􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀅯􀄞􀇀􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅐􀅽􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁅􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆵􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅽
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀅶􀅽􀇁 􀇁􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄨􀆵􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀄂􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀆐􀆵􀄞􀆐􀍕􀎗 􀁞􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀇇 􀁤􀆐􀄞􀅬􀅽􀇀􀍕 􀄂
􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀀒􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀀯􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀀄􀄨􀄨􀄂􀅝􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀄂
􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘
􀀯􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄏􀆐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀘􀅶􀄞􀆉􀆌 􀁚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀄂􀅐􀆌􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚
􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐􀍗 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆌􀄞􀄂 􀅽􀄨 􀅝􀆌􀆌􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆐􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀅐􀆌􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄂􀅯
􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌 􀆐􀇁􀅝􀆚􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀆌􀅝􀆉 􀅝􀆌􀆌􀅝􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀄚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍲􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆉􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆉􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀄂􀄏􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅽􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅯􀆚􀅽􀅐􀄞􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀍘
􀀄 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅝􀅶
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀀦􀅽􀆌 􀄞􀇆􀄂􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀍕 􀅝􀅶 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍕 􀅚􀇇􀄚􀆌􀄂􀆵􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀄞􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄏􀆵􀅝􀅯􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄨􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁅􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀑􀄞􀅯􀅽􀅐􀅽􀆌􀆐􀅬 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁤􀄂􀅝􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅽􀅝􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀀑􀅝􀇇􀆵􀅬􀍲􀀼􀄂􀆌􀄂􀆐􀆵 􀁚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄞􀅶􀅐􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕
􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀍕 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍘
􀀯􀅶 􀄂􀄚􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀁅􀅝􀇌􀅚􀅶􀄞􀅐􀅽􀆌􀆐􀅬 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀅽􀇇
􀄚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀍲 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀅐􀆌􀅝􀅐􀅽􀆌􀇇􀄞􀇀􀆐􀅬􀇇􀍕 􀁅􀄞􀇌􀅚􀇇􀅶􀆐􀅬􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁗􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀅶􀄞􀅶􀆐􀅬􀇇 􀍲 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀁋􀄐􀆚􀅽􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀅩􀄞􀄐􀆚􀍕 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂 􀆚􀅽􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀄐􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀍘􀏮 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆌􀅽􀆵􀄏􀅯􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀄞􀅶􀇀􀅝􀆐􀄂􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀄚􀆌􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀏭􀏮 􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶
􀇁􀄞􀅯􀅯􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀏭􀏭􀏬 􀆚􀅽 􀏭􀏴􀏬 􀅵􀄞􀆚􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀄞􀆉 􀄂􀆚 􀄞􀄂􀄐􀅚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀄞􀅯􀅯􀆐
􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽
􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀏮􀏬􀏬 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀜􀄂􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘
© 􀁗􀅚􀅽􀆚􀅽􀍗 􀀯􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀁗􀅽􀅯􀅝􀄐􀇇 􀀘􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀀯􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂
􀀄􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅵􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀏯􀏬 􀇁􀄞􀅯􀅯􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞
􀄚􀆌􀅝􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄞􀆋􀆵􀅝􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀏯􀏬 􀅯􀅽􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀄂 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀇀􀅝􀅯􀅯􀄂􀅐􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀏭􀏱􀍲􀏮􀏬 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀄂 􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀍲
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀍲􀄐􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅯􀅝􀆐􀅚􀄞􀄚􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀄐􀄂􀆌􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄏􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅬 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍖 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆌􀇇􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀅵􀆉􀆚􀅯􀇇 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀅵􀄞􀄞􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇁􀅯􀇇􀍲􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶
􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀎗􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀄞􀅶􀄞􀅵􀅝􀄞􀆐
􀅚􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀆉􀅽􀆉􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅐􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄚􀅽􀅵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀄐
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄚􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀄨􀆵􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀅵􀄞􀆚􀍕􀎗 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀁞􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀇇 􀀄􀅬􀆐􀄞􀅶􀅽􀇀􀍕 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀍕 􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀅶􀆵􀄂􀅯 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀎖 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏴􀍘 􀍲 􀀯􀅶
􀄨􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶 􀏭􀏳􀏯 􀅵􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄐􀆵􀄏􀅝􀄐 􀅵􀄞􀆚􀆌􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀎖􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅽􀅝􀆌􀆐􀎗􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀄨􀄨
© 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀍘 􀀘􀄞􀅶􀅝􀆐 􀁗􀄞􀆚􀆌􀅽􀇀
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀆐􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀄞􀄨􀄨􀄞􀄐􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅝􀆚􀆐
􀅶􀄞􀇆􀆚 􀅵􀅽􀇀􀄞􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀎗􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀎗 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀅽􀄚
􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍘
􀁋􀅶 􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏴􀍕 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁳􀄞􀆌􀅬􀅚􀅽􀇀􀅶􀄂􀇇􀄂 􀁚􀄂􀄚􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀎗􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎗􀎎 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁚􀄞􀄨􀄂􀆚 􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚􀍘
􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀄞􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆉 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀄞􀄚
􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄂 􀆐􀅽􀍲􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀎗􀆉􀄞􀄂􀄐􀄞􀄨􀆵􀅯 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀎗 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀄏􀄞􀆚􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅶
􀀼􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀁚􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀄂􀆚􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆵􀆌􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅩􀅽􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀀄
􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅬 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶􀍲􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀁚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀎎 􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀆐
􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀅩􀅽􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆵􀆉􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀍘 􀀾􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀼􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀄞􀅶􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅯􀄂􀇁 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆚􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀁴􀅚􀅝􀅯􀄞 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀅵 􀅝􀅶 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀅯􀇇 􀎗􀆉􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀄚􀎗 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚
􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀅚􀄞􀅯􀆉 􀆚􀅽 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅽􀍲􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀎗􀅽􀄐􀄐􀆵􀆉􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀎗􀍕 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶
􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀆐􀅽􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆵􀆚􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅯􀄚􀍘 􀀒􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚
􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬
􀄂 􀄚􀆌􀄂􀆐􀆚􀅝􀄐 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀍲 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀄨􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶
􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅽􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅵􀅵􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀆐􀄂􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄂􀄨􀆌􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞
􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵􀆐􀄞􀅯􀇀􀄞􀆐 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀄏􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀄨 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘
􀎗􀁺􀅽􀆵 􀄚􀅝􀄚􀅶􀎖􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀄂 􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇 􀆐􀅵􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆚􀅽 􀅐􀅽 􀄂􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀅝􀆚􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀄚􀅝􀄚
􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀆵􀆐 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄚􀆵􀄐􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍘 􀀜􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀅐􀆌􀄞􀇁 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌
􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀇀􀄞􀅐􀄞􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀄨􀆌􀆵􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄚􀆵􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀆌􀅬􀄞􀆚􀍘 􀀦􀅽􀆌 􀆵􀆐􀍕 􀅚􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆋􀆵􀅝􀄐􀅬􀅯􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅯􀄂􀄐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀅵􀄂􀆌􀅬􀄞􀆚􀍕􀎗 􀁞􀄞􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅽􀆌 􀁞􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀇇 􀁤􀆐􀄞􀅬􀅽􀇀 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀆌􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅽􀅶 􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆐􀄞 􀍘 􀀄􀆚 􀅶􀅽􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀏮􀏬 􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌
􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀆌􀄞􀆚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂 􀆚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄐􀄂􀅵􀆉 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀆚 􀆵􀆉 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀅽􀅶􀅐􀄂􀆌 􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀆵􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂
􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅩􀅽􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀄐􀅝􀇀􀅝􀄐
􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀇀􀅽􀅯􀆵􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄞􀆌 􀄏􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀄂􀄐􀅝􀆚 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀄐􀄞􀍘
􀀾􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆌􀅽􀄂􀄚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅚􀄂􀆉􀅯􀇇􀅶􀅬􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀀼􀄂􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅬 􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄞􀄚􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞
􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆌􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽
􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄐􀅯􀄂􀆐􀅚􀄞􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀆚􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀅬􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐􀍘 􀁗􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀇀􀄞􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅯􀄞􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇
􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅵􀆉􀄞􀄚􀄞􀄚􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀁚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐􀎎 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽
􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀅯􀅯􀍕 􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄂􀆚􀄂􀄏􀄂􀆐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀄂􀅯􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀄏􀆐􀅝􀆚􀄞 􀎗􀁄􀅝􀆌􀅽􀆚􀇀􀅽􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆐􀎗􀍘
􀀯􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶􀍕 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀅝􀅯􀄞 􀆵􀆉 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆋􀆵􀄞􀆵􀄞􀆐 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆌􀄞􀄚􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞
􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅬 􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆐􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀆐􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀄚􀄂􀅵􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚
􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄨􀄞􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅝􀆚􀅽􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄚􀎗􀍘 􀀦􀅽􀆌 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚􀍕 􀁗􀄞􀆚􀆌 􀁗􀅽􀆌􀅽􀆐􀅚􀄞􀅶􀅬􀅽
􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅚􀄞􀅯􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀎗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅶􀆚􀇇 􀄂􀆐 􀆐􀅽􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀆐 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀎎􀍕 􀁚􀄞􀄨􀄂􀆚 􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀􀍕 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀅐􀅽􀄂􀅯 􀅽􀄨
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀄞􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀎗􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅯􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂 􀅵􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀆉􀄂􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆵􀆉􀅬􀄞􀄞􀆉 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆵􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅯 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀄚􀆌􀄂􀇁􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀎗
© 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀍘 􀁄􀄂􀅬􀆐 􀁳􀄞􀆚􀆌􀅽􀇀
􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀄐􀄂􀅯􀄐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄞􀍘 􀀦􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀎖􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞
􀄂􀅯􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇 􀄨􀆵􀅯􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆉􀅯􀄞􀅶􀆚􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅚􀅽􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵􀍘 􀁞􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀄚􀄂􀇇􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶 􀏯􀏬 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅯 􀄐􀅚􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅶􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄂􀅶􀄚􀆵􀅵 􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀅝􀅵􀅝􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀄐􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀀯􀅶
􀄂􀄚􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀄐􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀎗 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚
􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅶􀄞􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀼􀄞􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀇇 􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘 􀀘􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀅽􀇇􀄐􀅽􀆚􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀄂 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀆵􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀄚
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀄏􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆐
􀇀􀅝􀄂 􀄚􀄞􀆚􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀍲 􀄏􀇇 􀆐􀅚􀅝􀆉􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇􀍘
􀀜􀇆􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀅯􀅝􀄞􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅝􀄐 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀅵􀆉􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀅐􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄞􀄨􀄨􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀄚􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆐􀅚􀄂􀆌􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀍘 􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀅵􀆉􀆚 􀄨􀄂􀅝􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀄚􀄞􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆚􀍕
􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀆵􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀅐􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀅯􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆌􀆵􀅝􀅶􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀆚
􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄚􀆵􀄐􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀆐􀆵􀄨􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀄞􀅶􀅽􀆌􀅵􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀍘 􀀄􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀆐􀄞􀆚􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀍕 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀆉􀅯􀄂􀇇􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚 􀎗􀄐􀄂􀆌􀄚􀎗 􀍲 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁳􀄞􀆌􀅬􀅚􀅽􀇀􀅶􀄂􀇇􀄂 􀁚􀄂􀄚􀄂 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀄚􀆌􀄂􀄨􀆚 􀅯􀄂􀇁 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆚􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀀘􀅽􀅶􀄏􀄂􀆐􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅽􀄐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆚􀄞 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅯􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀄨􀆌􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄏􀆵􀆐
􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀆌􀅬􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇆􀆚 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀁅􀅽 􀆉􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄨􀅯􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅶􀅽 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐
© 􀀄􀁗 􀁗􀅚􀅽􀆚􀅽􀍬􀁞􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀅝 􀀧􀆌􀅝􀆚􀆐
􀀯􀅶 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀆚􀍕 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆐􀄂􀇁 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅶􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬 􀅝􀅶 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏰􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶
􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆵􀅶􀅝􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀅚􀄂􀅯􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐 􀄂􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘
􀁗􀄂􀆐􀆐􀄞􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀆌􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆚􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀀼􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀁚􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀄏􀄞􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄐􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅯􀇁􀄂􀇇 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕
􀎗􀁨􀅬􀆌􀇌􀄂􀅯􀅝􀇌􀅶􀇇􀆚􀆐􀇇􀄂􀎗􀍕 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀅯􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀄞􀅶􀆐􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆐􀄞􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀄂􀄨􀄞􀆚􀇇􀍘
􀀘􀅝􀆌􀄞􀄐􀆚 􀆐􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅝􀆌 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅬􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀆚􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀄏􀆌􀅽􀄂􀄚 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆌􀆵􀆉􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚
􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀄨􀅯􀇇 􀄂􀄏􀆌􀅽􀄂􀄚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅝􀆌􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆌􀆐
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀇁􀅶􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀆵􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀅯􀄞􀆚􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆉 􀆐􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐
􀆚􀅝􀄐􀅬􀄞􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆌􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆐􀄞􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀄏􀆵􀆐 􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄚
􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀆵􀆐 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶
􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆚􀄞 􀅝􀆐􀅽􀅯􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀅚􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄚 􀄨􀅽􀆌
􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀅶􀍘 􀀯􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄐􀅚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅚􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆌􀇇􀍕
􀄂􀅯􀄏􀄞􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍗 􀄏􀇇 􀄚􀆌􀅝􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌
􀆐􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀄏􀇇 􀄐􀄂􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀅽􀅽􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀆉 􀆚􀅽
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬􀆉􀅽􀅝􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄏􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀅽􀇁􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘 􀀾􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀄂 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀇀􀄞􀅶􀅝􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀇁􀅝􀆐􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀅽 􀆐􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅐􀄞􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄏􀇇 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞
􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀆌 􀆵􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆉􀆌􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀄚􀆌􀅽􀇀􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆐
􀅽􀆌 􀅵􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄏􀆵􀆐􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀆋􀆵􀅝􀄐􀅬􀅯􀇇 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀆉􀆵􀅯􀄂􀆌 􀄂􀅵􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀅽􀆚􀅚 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐
􀄂􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀄨􀄂􀅵􀅝􀅯􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀆌􀅝􀄞􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀄏􀅽􀆚􀅚 􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍘 􀁤􀄂􀇆􀅝 􀄚􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅯􀅯
􀅵􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀄞􀇇 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄂􀇇 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀆋􀆵􀅝􀄐􀅬􀅯􀇇
􀎖􀆚􀅽􀅽􀅬 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀎖 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆐􀄞􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀄐􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍘 􀁞􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐
􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅽􀅽􀍕 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄨􀄨􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀􀎖􀆐 􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀅵􀆉􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀄨􀄨 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀁞􀅝􀇆 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄏􀅯􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅽􀆵􀆚
© 􀁚􀀜􀁨􀁤􀀜􀁚􀁞􀍬 􀁞􀆚􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆌􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀆐􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀄂 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍘
􀀄􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀆉􀅚􀄞􀅶􀅽􀅵􀄞􀅶􀅽􀅶 􀆵􀅶􀆉􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀅵􀅽􀄚􀄞􀆌􀅶 􀅚􀅝􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀇇􀍗 􀄂
􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉 􀅽􀄨 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄏􀅯􀄞􀇁 􀆵􀆉 􀄞􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇
􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀼􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅯􀄞􀄨􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀆌􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚
􀄞􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍘
􀀄􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀅐􀇇 􀆐􀇇􀆐􀆚􀄞􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀄚􀄞􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶
􀇀􀅽􀅯􀆵􀅵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀄞􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄨􀅯􀅽􀇁􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨
􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀅚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀍲􀇀􀅽􀅯􀆚􀄂􀅐􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐 􀎗􀁄􀄞􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯 􀍲 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀅽􀇇􀎗􀍕 􀎗􀀼􀄂􀅬􀅚􀅽􀇀􀅬􀄂 􀍲
􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀅽􀇇􀎗􀍕 􀎗􀀼􀄂􀅬􀅚􀅽􀇀􀅬􀄂 􀍲 􀁋􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅽􀇀􀆐􀅬􀅽􀄞􀎗􀍕 􀎗􀀼􀄂􀅬􀅚􀅽􀇀􀅬􀄂 􀍲 􀁤􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅶􀎗􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀅐􀇇
􀄚􀄞􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅚􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀍘 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅶􀅽 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀅶
􀏮􀏬􀍲􀏮􀏱􀐹􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀄐􀅝􀆌􀄐􀅯􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄨􀄂􀅝􀅯 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞 􀄂􀄚􀇀􀄂􀅶􀆚􀄂􀅐􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀍘
􀁋􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁋􀄐􀆚􀅽􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏲􀍕 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱􀍕 􀆵􀅶􀅬􀅶􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄚􀄂􀅵􀄂􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀅚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀍲􀇀􀅽􀅯􀆚􀄂􀅐􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀄞 􀅽􀄨
􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀄞􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀀄􀆚 􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚
􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀎗􀎎 􀄚􀄞􀅶􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀇀􀅽􀅯􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀆚 􀎗􀄂 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀆚
􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀎗􀍘 􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌
􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐􀎎􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅝􀆐 􀅶􀅽􀇁 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀍕
􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀎗􀀘􀅶􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀅐􀅽􀎗 􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀅝􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌􀍘
􀀯􀅶 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀇀􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅚􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞
􀄏􀄞􀅐􀄂􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀄨􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬 􀆚􀅽 􀀼􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀁚􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀁚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀁞􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀎗􀎎
􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅝􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀎗􀆌􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅽􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄚􀆵􀄞
􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀎗 􀅝􀅶 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍘 􀁋􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀏮􀏬 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀄂 􀅐􀆌􀅽􀆵􀆉
􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀄏􀅯􀄞􀇁 􀆵􀆉 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁄􀄞􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯􀍲􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀅽􀇇 􀅚􀅝􀅐􀅚􀍲􀇀􀅽􀅯􀆚􀄂􀅐􀄞
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀀼􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀁚􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅶􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞
􀀼􀄂􀅬􀅚􀅽􀇀􀅬􀄂􀍲􀁤􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁄􀄞􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯􀍲􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀅽􀇇 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌􀍘 􀁤􀅽
􀄐􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅝􀄨􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅝􀆌􀄐􀆵􀅵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀀜􀅶􀄞􀆌􀅐􀇇 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆌􀇇 􀆐􀄞􀆚 􀆵􀆉 􀄂􀅶 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯
􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚􀆋􀆵􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘
􀀄 􀄚􀄂􀇇 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀎗􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀅐􀅽􀎗 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄚􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆉􀄞􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀄞􀇆􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆚􀆐
􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚 􀄚􀄂􀅵􀄂􀅐􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐􀍗 􀄂 􀄐􀆌􀄂􀄐􀅬 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄐􀆌􀄞􀆚􀄞
􀆉􀅽􀅯􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀼􀄂􀅬􀅚􀅽􀇀􀅬􀄂􀍲􀁋􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅽􀇀􀆐􀅬􀄂 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄚􀄂􀅵􀄂􀅐􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅵􀄞􀆚􀄂􀅯 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀎗􀀼􀄂􀅬􀅚􀅽􀇀􀅬􀄂 􀍲 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄂􀅶􀅬􀅽􀇇􀎗 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀇇􀅯􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅽􀍲􀄐􀄂􀅯􀅯􀄞􀄚
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀅽􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀄞􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀅝􀆌 􀆚􀄞􀄂􀅵􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄂􀅵􀄂􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅯􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅯􀄂􀆐􀅚􀄞􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚
􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄐􀄞􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀄂􀆌􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄐􀄞􀅶􀄞􀍘
􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇆􀆚 􀅶􀅝􀅐􀅚􀆚􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀆉􀅯􀆵􀅶􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀄂􀆌􀅬􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀍲 􀅽􀅶
􀁅􀅽􀇀􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏮􀏮􀍕 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀆐􀄞􀆚􀆚􀅯􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀄨􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌
􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀆵􀆉􀍕 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅶􀄞􀄂􀆌􀅯􀇇 􀏮 􀅵􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇􀍘 􀀾􀄞􀅶􀆵􀆌 􀀯􀆐􀅯􀇇􀄂􀅵􀅽􀇀􀍕 􀄂 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄞􀆌 􀁄􀅽􀆐􀄐􀅽􀇁 􀄏􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀅵􀄂􀅶 􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀅝􀆐
􀅶􀅽􀇁 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆌􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀅵􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆚􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆚 􀄏􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄂􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀄂􀆌􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆚􀆵􀆌􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆚􀅽 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀅯􀍕 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀆉􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅽􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄂􀄐􀅬􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁞􀄞􀇀􀄂􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐
􀅝􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅽􀄚􀆵􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄞􀅵􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀇇􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀆐􀅽􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀅝􀅵􀅵􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇
􀆐􀇁􀅝􀆚􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀆌􀇀􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀄐􀄞􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅚􀆵􀅶􀄚􀆌􀄞􀄚􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀄚􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄚􀅝􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅯 􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅽􀆌 􀆐􀄞􀆚􀆐
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄨􀆵􀄞􀅯 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀅶􀅽 􀅚􀆵􀆌􀆌􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀅽􀇁􀅶 􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄐􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀎖􀆐 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀆐􀍕 􀆐􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀅚􀄂􀄚
􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀄐􀄐􀄞􀅯􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅽􀇁􀄞􀆌 􀄏􀆌􀅝􀄚􀅐􀄞􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀅚􀄂􀄚 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌
􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆐􀅝􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀀄􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅯 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱 􀆚􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅶􀄞􀄐􀆚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅶􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀀜􀅶􀄞􀆌􀅐􀇇 􀁞􀇇􀆐􀆚􀄞􀅵 􀅽􀄨
􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅝􀆌􀆐􀆚 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅯􀄂􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀄞􀄂􀆌􀅯􀇇 􀀘􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀏮􀏬􀏬 􀁄􀁴 􀅽􀄨
􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀅯􀄞􀄐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀇁􀄞􀄞􀅬􀆐 􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀅽􀅶 􀀘􀄞􀄐􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀏭􀏱􀍕
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆌􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀀄􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅯 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀍘 􀁋􀅶 􀏭􀏭 􀁄􀄂􀇇 􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏲􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀅐􀇇 􀄏􀆌􀅝􀄚􀅐􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀆚
􀄨􀆵􀅯􀅯 􀄐􀄂􀆉􀄂􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀍲 􀅝􀅶 􀄂 􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅽 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍕 􀁗􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀁳􀅯􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅵􀅝􀆌 􀁗􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅶 􀅯􀄂􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚􀍕
􀄨􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆚􀅚 􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀅐􀇇 􀄏􀆌􀅝􀄚􀅐􀄞 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀀼􀆌􀄂􀆐􀅶􀅽􀄚􀄂􀆌 􀁚􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘
􀁋􀅶 􀏭􀏴 􀁄􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀄞􀅵􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀇇 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅯􀅝􀄨􀆚􀄞􀄚􀍘 􀀄􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅽􀄨
􀄞􀅵􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀅶􀄐􀇇 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀆐􀅽 􀅯􀅝􀄨􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀆌􀅽 􀄐􀅝􀆚􀇇 􀅽􀄨 􀁞􀄞􀇀􀄂􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀄂􀄐􀅬􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀅝􀄐􀅚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀇆􀆚􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯􀆐􀍕
􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅯􀅵􀅽􀆐􀆚 􀆐􀅝􀇆 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆚􀅽􀆌􀎖􀆐 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀄂 􀄐􀆌􀅝􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄐􀄂􀆐􀄞
􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚 􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄞􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀄂􀅵􀄂􀅐􀄞 􀄐􀄂􀆵􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀄏􀇇 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀄞􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀆚
􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀏮􀍘􀏱 􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆌􀅽􀆵􀄏􀅯􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀆐􀅝􀇆 􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆚􀅚􀆐 􀇁􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀄂 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀆚􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶􀆐􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚􀆐􀆚􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀅶􀄞􀆌􀅐􀇇 􀆐􀅚􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄂􀅐􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚
􀅚􀅽􀅶􀅽􀆵􀆌􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀀯􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅐􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅵􀄞
© 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀍘 􀁳􀄂􀆐􀅝􀅯􀅝􀇇 􀀑􀄂􀆚􀄂􀅶􀅽􀇀
􀀄􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀜􀆵􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅶
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁨􀁞 􀄂􀆵􀆚􀅚􀅽􀆌􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀆐􀅽􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀅝􀆚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅯􀄚􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀆵􀆐􀍕 􀄂 􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀍲􀆐􀄐􀄂􀅯􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀇁􀅯􀇇􀍲
􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄞􀄚 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂 􀍲 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁞􀄞􀇀􀄂􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯􀍘
􀀯􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀅵􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄂 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄞􀅶􀇀􀅝􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀅶􀄐􀇇 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀎗􀅚􀅽􀆌􀆌􀅽􀆌􀆐􀎗 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀎗􀅽􀄐􀄐􀆵􀆉􀅝􀄞􀄚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀎗􀍘 􀀄 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄏􀅽􀇇􀄐􀅽􀆚􀆚 􀅽􀄨
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍕 􀆐􀄞􀄐􀆵􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀅬􀅝􀅶􀄚􀆐 􀅽􀄨
􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍘
􀀬􀅽􀇁􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀄚􀄞􀆐􀆉􀅝􀆚􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞􀍲􀆐􀄐􀄂􀅯􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀍕 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀀜􀆵􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅶􀆐
􀄚􀄞􀄐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀄐􀅚􀄞􀄐􀅬 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍘
􀁞􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄂 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆚􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀄂􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞
􀄚􀄞􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍘
􀀯􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄂􀆐􀆚 􀆚􀇁􀅽 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀏭􀏬􀏬 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅶 􀄚􀄞􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀍕 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀀧􀄞􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅶􀇇􀍕 􀀦􀆌􀄂􀅶􀄐􀄞􀍕 􀁅􀅽􀆌􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀀑􀆵􀅯􀅐􀄂􀆌􀅝􀄂􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀁞􀀄 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌
􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅶􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆉􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆚􀍕 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚
􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀆉􀄞􀄂􀄐􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀀄􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆐􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀄂􀄚􀅵􀅝􀆚􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀅝􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞
􀆉􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀅵􀄂􀅶􀇇 􀁴􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶 􀅵􀄞􀄚􀅝􀄂 􀅽􀄨 􀇁􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀅝􀆐 􀄨􀄂􀆌 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆚􀇇􀍕
􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄞􀄂􀄐􀅚 􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆚 􀄏􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌􀄞􀅝􀅐􀅶 􀅐􀆵􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅵􀄂􀅬􀄞􀆐 􀄂 􀆐􀅝􀅐􀅶􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄏􀆵􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘
􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆉􀅽􀅯􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅝􀅶 􀀜􀆵􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄂􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀄏􀇇 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀁄􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀅽􀄨􀆚􀄞􀅶􀍕 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅐􀅶􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀆵􀆐 􀅽􀄨
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀆌􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀍕 􀄏􀆵􀆚 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀅽
􀅚􀅽􀅯􀄚 􀆐􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀀜􀆵􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅶
􀆉􀄂􀆌􀅯􀅝􀄂􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀅵􀅽􀅶􀆐􀆚􀆌􀄂􀆚􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀀜􀆵􀆌􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅐􀆌􀄂􀄚􀆵􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅐􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀄂􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅯􀅝􀄨􀆚 􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅝􀄐 􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚
􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀆌􀅵􀄨􀆵􀅯 􀆚􀅽 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍘
© 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀍘 􀀄􀅯􀄞􀅬􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄚􀆌 􀁗􀅽􀅯􀄞􀅐􀄞􀅶􀅬􀅽
􀎗􀀯􀅶 􀄨􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀅝􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄏􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀅽􀄏􀇀􀅝􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆐􀄂􀅶􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄂􀆚􀆚􀄞􀅵􀆉􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀅝􀆐􀅽􀅯􀄂􀆚􀄞
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀅯􀄞􀆚􀄞􀅯􀇇 􀄨􀄂􀅝􀅯􀄞􀄚􀍘 􀁄􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄚􀅝􀆚 􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀆵􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎖􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀆉􀅯􀅽􀅵􀄂􀄐􀇇􀍘 􀀾􀄂􀆐􀆚
􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅚􀅝􀆉 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀁄􀅝􀅶􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀅽􀄨􀄨􀅝􀄐􀅝􀄂􀅯 􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀁞􀇇􀆌􀅝􀄂􀍕 􀀒􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄂􀍕
􀀄􀆌􀅵􀄞􀅶􀅝􀄂􀍕 􀁞􀅽􀆵􀆚􀅚 􀁋􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆚􀅝􀄂􀍕 􀀄􀄏􀅬􀅚􀄂􀇌􀅝􀄂􀍕 􀀾􀄂􀅽􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀘􀅽􀅶􀄞􀆚􀆐􀅬 􀁗􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎖􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀍘 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂
􀅚􀅽􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀏮􀏱 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀄂􀅯􀅽􀅶􀄞􀍕 􀍲 􀎗􀁞􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀇇 􀀄􀅬􀆐􀇇􀅽􀅶􀅽􀇀 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀅶􀆵􀄂􀅯
􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁞􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀀒􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅝􀅯􀍘 􀍲 􀀯􀅶 􀅩􀆵􀆐􀆚 􀄨􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀇇􀄞􀄂􀆌􀆐􀍕 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀄞􀅶􀆚􀄂􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄂􀆚 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀆐􀆚 􀅚􀄂􀅯􀄨 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅯􀄚􀎖􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀎖􀆐 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅝􀄨 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀇀􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆚􀄂􀅬􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀅽
􀄂􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆵􀅶􀆚􀍕 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀅽􀆵􀆌􀆐􀄞􀍕 􀄞􀇀􀄞􀅶 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞􀎗􀍘
􀎗􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅝􀅐􀅐􀄞􀆐􀆚 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄨􀄂􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀆐 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍘 􀀜􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀄏􀄞􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄚􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅽􀇇􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀍲 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀇇􀍕 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀆌􀄂􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀍕 􀄂􀅐􀆌􀅝􀄐􀆵􀅯􀆚􀆵􀆌􀄞􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀆐
􀅚􀄂􀆉􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂􀅐􀄂􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀄂􀄐􀅬􀄚􀆌􀅽􀆉 􀅽􀄨 􀄐􀆌􀄞􀄞􀆉􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕􀎗 􀁞􀄞􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅽􀆌 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀁞􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀇇 􀁤􀆐􀄞􀅬􀅽􀇀 􀆚􀅽􀅯􀄚 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀍲 􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄏􀅝􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀄞􀄚
􀆵􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄨􀆵􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀄐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆉􀆵􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀆵􀆐 􀄂􀄨􀆚􀄞􀆌 􀆌􀄞􀆵􀅶􀅝􀄨􀅝􀄐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶
􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍘 􀁞􀅽 􀅵􀆵􀄐􀅚 􀆐􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀇁􀄞 􀄚􀅝􀄚 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄐􀄞􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀄂􀆐 􀅽􀆵􀆌
􀅵􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄚􀍕 􀇁􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆐􀅝􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀆚 􀅵􀅽􀆌􀄞 􀄂􀆐 􀄂 􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆉􀅵􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀅶 􀅝􀆚 􀄂􀆌􀆌􀄂􀅶􀅐􀄞􀄚 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞
􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆵􀆐􀍕 􀇁􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀆉􀄞􀄚 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅵 􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇 􀆐􀆵􀄐􀄐􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄨􀆵􀅯􀅯􀇇􀍘 􀀄􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀄞􀄚 􀆵􀆐 􀆚􀅽
􀆋􀆵􀅝􀄐􀅬􀅯􀇇 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀇀􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄏􀅯􀄞􀅵􀆐 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆐􀅽􀅯􀇀􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀆉􀆌􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅝􀆉􀅯􀄞􀎗􀍘
􀎎􀁋􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀄏􀄂􀅶􀅶􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂

Exhibit U
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimea is ready for a possible food blockade — Aksyonov
(8 September 2015)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit U
Translation
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimea is ready for a possible food blockade — Aksyonov (8
September 2015), available at: https://crimea.ria.ru/20150908/1100924823.html.
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀅝􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄂 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀅽􀄚
􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 — 􀀄􀅬􀆐􀇇􀅽􀅶􀅽􀇀
􀏭􀏱􀍗􀏭􀏵 􀏬􀏴􀍘􀏬􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱
© 􀀄 􀄚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀀦􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄂􀅯 􀁞􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀄐􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀁳􀄞􀆚􀄞􀆌􀅝􀅶􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁗􀅚􀇇􀆚􀅽􀆐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆚􀄂􀆌􀇇 􀁞􀆵􀆉􀄞􀆌􀇀􀅝􀆐􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀅽􀄨 􀀑􀆌􀇇􀄂􀅶􀆐􀅬􀄂􀇇􀄂 􀁋􀄏􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀁞􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀇇 􀀄􀅬􀆐􀇇􀅽􀅶􀅽􀇀 􀅚􀄂􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀅵􀅝􀆐􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀄏􀇇 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 people’s
􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀁚􀄞􀄨􀄂􀆚 􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀇇􀄞􀇀 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀄂 􀄨􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄏􀇇
􀎗􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐􀎗􀍘
􀁞􀀯􀁄􀀦􀀜􀁚􀁋􀁗􀁋􀀾􀍕 􀏴 􀁞􀄞􀆉 􀍲 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀍾􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍿􀍘 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀅝􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄂 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀍕 􀅝􀅶􀄐􀅯􀆵􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄂
􀄨􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀍕 􀄏􀇇 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀄂􀄚 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕 􀁞􀄞􀆌􀅐􀄞􀇇 􀀄􀅬􀆐􀇇􀅽􀅶􀅽􀇀􀍕 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀆚 􀄂
􀄏􀆌􀅝􀄞􀄨􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶 􀁞􀅝􀅵􀄨􀄞􀆌􀅽􀆉􀅽􀅯􀍕 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅽􀅶 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀆐 􀄏􀇇 􀄂 􀅶􀆵􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀁄􀁗􀆐 􀅽􀅶 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅶􀄞􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽
􀅝􀅵􀆉􀅽􀆐􀄞 􀄂 􀄨􀆵􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍕 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀍾􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍿 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀆐􀍘
􀎗􀁴􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀇁􀄂􀇇􀆐 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀇁􀄞 􀄚􀅽 􀅶􀅽􀆚 􀇁􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀆌􀄞􀄂􀅬 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐􀆐􀆚􀄂􀅶􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀄞􀄐􀅽􀅶􀅽􀅵􀅝􀄐
􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀆚􀅚 􀄏􀆵􀆐􀅝􀅶􀄞􀆐􀆐􀄞􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍘 􀀜􀇀􀄞􀆌􀇇􀅽􀅶􀄞 􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀅶􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄞􀄚 􀅝􀅶 􀅵􀄂􀅬􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆐􀄞 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞
􀅶􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀇁􀄂􀅶􀆚 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀅽 􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞􀆚􀅚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄏􀄂􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀅽􀆵􀆌 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀆵􀄏􀅯􀅝􀄐􀍘 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀅝􀆐 􀄂􀅯􀇁􀄂􀇇􀆐 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇􀍕 􀇁􀅚􀄞􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯
􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬 􀅽􀆌 􀅶􀅽􀆚􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞􀆌􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀄞 􀅶􀅽 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄏􀅯􀄞􀅵􀆐􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀅵􀇇 􀅽􀆉􀅝􀅶􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀇇 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆐􀅚􀅝􀄞􀅯􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀄐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀇌􀄞􀅶􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵
􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆉􀅽􀆐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀇀􀄞 􀅝􀅶􀄨􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀄏􀅽􀆵􀆚 􀅯􀅝􀄨􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀆚􀅽 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄐􀅚 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞􀍕􀎗 􀀄􀅬􀆐􀇇􀅽􀅶􀅽􀇀 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚􀍘
Annex 17 Exhibit U
􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀅝􀅵􀍕 􀅯􀄂􀆌􀅐􀄞 􀁚􀆵􀆐􀆐􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀄐􀅽􀅵􀆉􀄂􀅶􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀄐􀆵􀆌􀆌􀄞􀅶􀆚􀅯􀇇 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀇁􀅽􀆌􀅬 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀄂􀄚􀇇 􀆚􀅽
􀄨􀆵􀅯􀅯􀇇 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀇀􀅝􀄚􀄞 􀄨􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀆐􀆵􀆉􀆉􀅯􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘 􀀯􀅶 􀄂􀄚􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀼􀄞􀆌􀄐􀅚 􀁞􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅝􀆚 􀄨􀄞􀆌􀆌􀇇 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀄞
􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀆉􀄞􀆌􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅶􀅽􀆌􀅵􀄂􀅯􀅯􀇇􀍕 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀅐􀅽 􀄨􀅯􀅽􀇁 􀅝􀆐 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀎗􀁴􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀅶􀅽 􀄨􀄞􀄂􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞􀅝􀆌 􀄐􀅯􀄂􀅝􀅵􀆐 􀄂􀆚 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀍘 􀁴􀄞􀎖􀇀􀄞 􀄏􀄞􀄞􀅶 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄂􀆌􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀄂 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄐􀅝􀆚􀅝􀇌􀄞􀅶􀆐
􀅚􀄂􀇀􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅝􀅶􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆋􀆵􀄂􀆚􀄞 􀄂􀆚􀆚􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄚􀄞 􀆚􀅽􀇁􀄂􀆌􀄚􀆐 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀆌􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀄚􀄞􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄏􀅝􀅯􀅝􀆐􀄞 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀅝􀆚􀆵􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄏􀅽􀆌􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅝􀅶
􀆐􀅽􀅵􀄞 􀇁􀄂􀇇􀍘 􀁄􀅽􀆌􀄞􀅽􀇀􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀅝􀆐 􀅝􀆐 􀄚􀅝􀆐􀄂􀄚􀇀􀄂􀅶􀆚􀄂􀅐􀄞􀅽􀆵􀆐 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀀼􀅚􀄞􀆌􀆐􀅽􀅶 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁅􀅝􀅬􀅽􀅯􀄂􀄞􀇀 􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐􀍕
􀇁􀅚􀅽 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀄚􀅝􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀄂􀅯 􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀅵􀄂􀆌􀅬􀄞􀆚 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀄚􀆵􀄐􀆚􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕􀎗 􀀄􀅬􀆐􀄞􀅶􀅽􀇀 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚􀍘
􀁋􀅶 􀁤􀆵􀄞􀆐􀄚􀄂􀇇􀍕 􀏴 􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌􀍕 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞’􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀁄􀆵􀆐􀆚􀄂􀄨􀄂 􀀘􀇌􀅚􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅯􀄞􀇀 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁚􀄞􀄨􀄂􀆚 􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀
􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀄂􀆚 􀄂 􀆉􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆐 􀄐􀅽􀅶􀄨􀄞􀆌􀄞􀅶􀄐􀄞 􀅝􀅶 􀀼􀅝􀄞􀇀 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀄂 􀎗􀆉􀄞􀄂􀄐􀄞􀄨􀆵􀅯 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀎗 􀅽􀄨 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀄏􀄞 􀅚􀄞􀅯􀄚 􀆚􀅽
􀆐􀆚􀅽􀆉 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚 􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅬􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆐􀆵􀆐􀆉􀄞􀅶􀄚 􀅵􀄂􀆐􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀅯􀅝􀇀􀄞􀆌􀅝􀄞􀆐 􀅽􀄨 􀄨􀅽􀅽􀄚 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀅽􀆚􀅚􀄞􀆌 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂􀍘
Exhibit V
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Chubarov: Crimea blockade will begin on 20 September at noon
(16 September 2015)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit V
Translation
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Chubarov: Crimea blockade will begin on 20 September at
noon (16 September 2015), available at:
https://crimea.ria.ru/20150916/1100997459.html.
􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀􀍗 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀄞􀅐􀅝􀅶 􀅽􀅶 􀏮􀏬
􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀆚 􀅶􀅽􀅽􀅶
􀏭􀏮􀍗􀏮􀏬 􀏭􀏲􀍘􀏬􀏵􀍘􀏮􀏬􀏭􀏱
© 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀍘 􀁤􀄂􀆌􀄂􀆐 􀀾􀅝􀆚􀇀􀅝􀅶􀄞􀅶􀅬􀅽
􀀄􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀆌􀅽􀄂􀄚􀆐 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀄞􀅶􀅝􀅶􀆐􀆵􀅯􀄂 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀄞 􀄐􀅯􀅽􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀅬􀆐􀍘
􀀒􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆉􀄞􀄚􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄂􀅶􀆐 􀄂􀆌􀄞 􀆉􀆌􀅽􀅵􀅝􀆐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅽 􀄏􀄞 􀄂􀅯􀅯􀅽􀇁􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀅽􀆵􀅐􀅚 􀆵􀅶􀅚􀅝􀅶􀄚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚􀍘
􀁞􀀯􀁄􀀦􀀜􀁚􀁋􀁗􀁋􀀾􀍕 􀏭􀏲 􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀍲 􀁚􀀯􀀄 􀁅􀅽􀇀􀅽􀆐􀆚􀅝 􀍾􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍿􀍘 􀁤􀅚􀄞 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞 􀅽􀄨
􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀆐􀆚􀄂􀆌􀆚 􀅽􀅶 􀁞􀆵􀅶􀄚􀄂􀇇 􀄂􀆚 􀅶􀅽􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞’􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀁚􀄞􀄨􀄂􀆚
􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀􀍕 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀄞􀆌 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆵􀅶􀆌􀄞􀅐􀅝􀆐􀆚􀄞􀆌􀄞􀄚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀁄􀄞􀅩􀅯􀅝􀆐 􀅽􀆌􀅐􀄂􀅶􀅝􀆐􀄂􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚
􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀅽􀆐􀆚􀆌􀆵􀅵 􀅽􀄨 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅝􀄂􀅶 􀆉􀄂􀆌􀅯􀅝􀄂􀅵􀄞􀅶􀆚􀍘
􀎗􀁋􀅶 􀏮􀏬 􀁞􀄞􀆉􀆚􀄞􀅵􀄏􀄞􀆌 􀄂􀆚 􀏭􀏮 􀅶􀅽􀅽􀅶􀍕 􀇁􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬 􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆚􀅚􀆌􀄞􀄞 􀆌􀅽􀄂􀄚􀆐 􀅯􀄞􀄂􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵
􀅵􀄂􀅝􀅶􀅯􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂 􀄨􀅽􀆌 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀅶􀆐􀆉􀅽􀆌􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍕􀎗
􀀒􀅚􀆵􀄏􀄂􀆌􀅽􀇀 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚􀍘
􀀄􀄐􀄐􀅽􀆌􀄚􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀆚􀅽 􀅚􀅝􀅵􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆐􀆚􀆌􀅝􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶􀆐 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄂􀆉􀆉􀅯􀇇 􀅽􀅶􀅯􀇇 􀆚􀅽 􀆚􀆌􀆵􀄐􀅬􀆐 􀆚􀆌􀄂􀇀􀄞􀅯􀅯􀅝􀅶􀅐 􀄨􀆌􀅽􀅵
􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀍘 􀁗􀄂􀆐􀆐􀄞􀅶􀅐􀄞􀆌 􀄐􀄂􀆌􀆐 􀄂􀅶􀄚 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞 􀇁􀅝􀅯􀅯 􀄏􀄞 􀄂􀄏􀅯􀄞 􀆚􀅽 􀅵􀅽􀇀􀄞 􀄨􀆌􀄞􀄞􀅯􀇇􀍘 􀀄􀆚
􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆐􀄂􀅵􀄞 􀆚􀅝􀅵􀄞􀍕 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀆉􀄞􀅽􀆉􀅯􀄞’􀆐 􀄚􀄞􀆉􀆵􀆚􀇇 􀆐􀄂􀅝􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀅽􀅶 􀇁􀅽􀆵􀅯􀄚 􀄏􀄞 􀅯􀅽􀅶􀅐􀍲􀅯􀄂􀆐􀆚􀅝􀅶􀅐􀍘
􀁴􀄞 􀆐􀅚􀄂􀅯􀅯 􀆌􀄞􀅵􀅝􀅶􀄚 􀇇􀅽􀆵 􀆚􀅚􀄂􀆚 􀀒􀆌􀅝􀅵􀄞􀄂􀅶 􀁤􀄂􀆚􀄂􀆌 􀄂􀄐􀆚􀅝􀇀􀅝􀆐􀆚􀆐 􀅝􀅶 􀁨􀅬􀆌􀄂􀅝􀅶􀄞 􀅚􀄂􀇀􀄞 􀆌􀄞􀆉􀄞􀄂􀆚􀄞􀄚􀅯􀇇
􀄂􀅶􀅶􀅽􀆵􀅶􀄐􀄞􀄚 􀆚􀅚􀄞 􀅯􀄂􀆵􀅶􀄐􀅚 􀅽􀄨 􀄂 􀅐􀅽􀅽􀄚􀆐 􀄏􀅯􀅽􀄐􀅬􀄂􀄚􀄞􀍘

Exhibit W
RBC, Shutdown in Crimea: The Threat of an Energy Blockade to the Republic
(22 November 2015)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit W
Translation
RBC, Shutdown in Crimea: The Threat of an Energy Blockade to the Republic (22 November
2015), available at: https://www.rbc.ru/society/22/11/2015/5651b8cf9a79474f3a9e0f59.
Shutdown in Crimea: The Threat of an Energy Blockade to
the Republic
(Photo: Alexei Pavlishak/TASS)
The power supply to Crimea from Ukraine has been cut off due to the undermining of power
transmission towers by unknown assailants. It will take up to two days to restore it if Crimean
blockade activists do not obstruct repairs
Outdoor concession stand in one of the walking tunnels in Stroganovka village, Simferopol district
Shutdown in two days
Crimea's maximum demand for electricity is 1,200 MW per day. About 30% of this capacity is
provided by its own generation (thermal, solar, and wind power plants), and from 500 to 900 MW,
depending on the time of the day, is delivered by transmission lines from Ukraine. Energy
purchases there, as well as from Crimean producers, are handled by the Settlement Implementation
Centre, a subsidiary of Russia's "Inter RAO". It was allocated a budget subsidy of 10 billion roubles
for 2015, of which 8.8 billion had been spent as of 1 November.
The scheme suffered its first failure on Friday. On the morning of November 20, the poles of two
power transmission lines (PTL) were blown up by unknown assailants: Melitopol - Dzhankoy
(330KW) and Kakhovskaya - Titan (220KW). The remaining two transmission lines took over the
supply of electricity to the Crimean peninsula at this point: Kakhovskaya-Ostrovskaya (330KW)
and Kakhovskaya-Dzhankoy (330KW). The second failure occurred on Saturday at 23:20 (00:20
Moscow time on Sunday), when "Ukrenergo", the Ukrainian energy company, received a signal that
these two lines were also down.
Annex 17 Exhibit W
The Crimean energy system
© RBC, 22 November 2015 The source "Ukrenergo" The map: openstreetmap.org
On Sunday morning, the Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that electricity supplies to consumers
on the Crimean peninsula had been completely cut off. In addition, according to its estimates, there
is a risk of disconnection of up to 40 percent of consumers in Kherson and Nikolaev regions.
"Household consumers of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (about 1.9 million
people) were left without electricity supply. The capacity of the disconnected consumers is 673
MW," the Russian Energy Ministry reported on Sunday.
No one has claimed responsibility for undermining the pylons. In late September, one of the
initiators of the civil blockade of Crimea from the Ukrainian side, people’s deputy of Verkhovnaya
Rada Refat Chubarov, promised to de-energise the peninsula. Since 20 September, Crimean Tatar
activists, supported by the representatives of the "Automaidan" movement, "Right Sector" (an
organisation banned in Russia), and other Ukrainian organisations have been blocking the
movement of Ukrainian commercial vehicles into the peninsula.
One of the leaders of the Crimean Tatars, people’s deputy Refat Chubarov, wrote in his Facebook
account on Saturday that participants in the Civil Blockade of Crimea demanded that the authorities
take effective measures aimed at protecting the rights of Ukrainian citizens "living in the
temporarily occupied territory of Crimea". "As such a measure... appears to be the
termination/restriction of electricity supplies from mainland Ukraine to occupied Crimea,"
Chubarov wrote. According to "Interfax-Ukraine" news agency, activists of the Civil Blockade of
Annex 17 Exhibit W
Crimea movement posted photos of the fallen pylons on social media on Sunday morning, but did
not claim any involvement in the incident, suggesting that it was "the work of saboteurs".
In an interview with "Interfax-Ukraine", one of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar movement,
people’s deputy Mustafa Dzhemilev, said that on Saturday he discussed with Ukrainian President
Petr Poroshenko "the incident between participants in the "blockade of Crimea" and law enforcers".
The latter demanded that energy workers be allowed to access the damaged power lines in order to
ground them, but blockade activists did not allow the repairmen to the pylons.
President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk have not yet commented on the situation.
Internal Affairs Minister’s adviser and people’s deputy Anton Gerashchenko said that he believed it
was necessary to discuss the energy blockade of Crimea in parliament, but so far there have been no
official statements on the issue.
The Ukrainian side did not give an exact deadline for eliminating the accident and restoring power
supply on Sunday. The management of "Ukrenergo" said that it had started negotiations with the
participants in the Crimean energy blockade "on the possibility of carrying out repair works".
Dmitriy Marunych, co-chairman of the Ukrainian Energy Strategy Foundation, told RBC that two
days would be enough to repair the blown-up power line poles if the activists do not block the
repairs. According to Marunych, the poles of the power lines, which supply electricity to Crimea,
will be restored in any case, as they also supply Ukrainian regions.
According to "Ukrenergo", in order for the situation in Crimea to normalise, it is enough to restore
one of the transmission lines that feeds Crimea with a capacity of 330 kilowatts; then the peninsula
will be able to receive 500-550 megawatts per day through it. For now, the Ukrainian energy sector
has promised to notify the buyer of electricity, a subsidiary of "Inter RAO", about the force
majeure.
Crimean Deputy Energy Minister Evgeniy Demin told "RIA Novosti" that fuel reserves for mobile
power plants in Crimea will last for 25 days. In 2014, Russian Emergencies Minister Vladimir
Puchkov reported that his ministry had sent about 1,400 mobile stations to the peninsula. In
addition, nine large mobile gas turbine power plants (GTPPs) with a total capacity of 241 MW have
been sent to Crimea from Sochi. "Currently, all reserve power sources are engaged in Crimea, all
social infrastructure is connected, but it is impossible to increase the number of mobile stations and
diesel generators - the peninsula's entire demand cannot be covered this way," a source in the
republic's Energy Ministry told RBC.
No boilers and no fridge
The peninsula authorities have decided that street lighting will not work during dark hours "for the
sake of economy". Crimean head Sergey Aksyonov also warned the region's residents about
possible disruptions in the work of mobile communications and the Internet. Simferopol authorities
said, that rolling blackouts in the city might last for up to nine hours. The Crimean capital has also
turned off heating, however city head Gennadiy Bakharev said that this was due to the warm
weather: the city recorded a temperature of plus 18 degrees on Sunday.
Crimean Industrial Policy Minister Andrei Skrynnik said Sunday afternoon that "according to
operational monitoring, most retail businesses as well as retail markets continue to operate and have
sufficient stock to meet consumer demand in full, despite restrictions on electricity supplies."
Natalya Kashcheyeva, a spokeswoman for the agency, later noted that many retailers "are finding a
way out by connecting to backup power sources".
Annex 17 Exhibit W
The association "Assistance to Trade of Crimea" estimates are more pessimistic: according to its
data, more than half of the chain shops in Crimea - at least 50 outlets - are without electricity. "Of
these, only 5% are now operating on backup power supplies," says association chairman Sergei
Makeyev. - But it is too early to talk about any serious losses for retailers: everyone has freezers, so
that everyone can make it through the day. The general mood among the population is calm, there is
no panic, no one is asking to go back to Ukraine. We do not notice an increase in demand for any
goods".
Of the 13 shops of the "Yabloko" grocery chain, only two in Simferopol are not operating at the
moment, director of the chain, Tatyana Pikalova, told RBC. "Two shops - one in Kerch and one in
Evpatoria - are running on diesel. In Simferopol we have eight shops, only two are not working
because the others are in areas where there is electricity," she said. - We have stored all the goods in
freezers and will be able to keep them cold for the next eight to nine hours," she said. Authorities
have kept us informed of the current situation. We are promised that within today the situation will
improve and a schedule of rolling blackouts will be drawn up."
"At night we had power outages, now everything is working," Yanina Pavlenko, general director of
Massandra winery, told RBC. - We will adjust our work to the blackout schedule. Ukraine has cut
off our electricity supply before, so we are used to it".
Cable from Russia
The only way to make Crimea independent of Ukrainian energy supplies is to connect the peninsula
to the Russian energy system. It was reported in July that the Energy Ministry had signed a state
contract on the construction of a power bridge to Crimea. The total cost of the project (it includes
four cable lines and the construction of two power plants in Crimea) exceeds 47 billion roubles,
including value added tax. In 2015, 9.5 billion roubles was allocated to the project. The client is the
Russian Energy Agency (part of the Ministry of Energy), and the main contractor is the
"Engineering and Construction Management Centre of the Unified Energy System", a subsidiary of
the Federal Grid Company.
How the energy bridge works
Four cable lines with a length of 13.5 km each will be laid on the bottom of the Sea of Azov. The
cables will be laid at a depth of 8-18 m. The total area of the corridor in the water area of the strait
will be 202.5 ha.
At the same time, the United Power Grids of the South will be prepared to serve the Crimean
energy system. It is a question of building 500KW high-voltage lines Rostovskaya-Andreyevskaya-
Vysheblyevskaya (Taman) and Kubanskaya-Vysheblyevskaya. The 500KW Kubanskaya substation
will also be expanded and the 500KW Vyshebliyevskaya substation will be built.
The construction of the energy bridge is being carried out in two stages. The first phase of the work
should be completed by early 2016, Crimean Deputy Energy Minister Evgeniy Demin told reporters
in October, and it will provide the peninsula with 300-400 MW of energy. "The cable for the power
bridge has almost been laid, but in order to launch it, the infrastructure around it is still needed, so
the urgent commissioning is out of the question now," a source close to the Ministry of Energy
familiar with the details of the project told RBC.
The second stage, as the official said in an interview with kerch.com.ru a month ago, will be
completed in the summer of 2016 (the deadline may be pushed back to 2017. - RBC) and will make
it possible to supply a total of 600-800 MW to Crimea. The additional generation is to be provided
by Rostov Atomic Power Station. Once the two new thermal power plants with a total capacity of
Annex 17 Exhibit W
about 900 MW start operating (the first stage is scheduled for 2017), the peninsula will become
energy-independent from Ukraine.
With the participation of Polina Khimshiashvili

Exhibit X
Vgorode, “Right Sector” Joins Crimean Blockade (23 September 2015)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit X
We shall remind you that roads for cargo coming from Ukraine to Crimea have
been blocked since 􀍴􀍲 September􀇡 the 􀌶Krym Media􀌶 agency has reported􀇤
Exhibit Y
Voicesevas.ru, “Right Sector” announces that “Azov” has joined Crimean blockade
(1 October 2015)
(translation)

Exhibit Z
Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a blockade of Crimea
(14 January 2016)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit Z
Translation
Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a blockade of Crimea (14
January 2016), available at: https://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/01/14/poroshenko-priznalsyachto-
koordiniruet-blokadu-kryma.html.
Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a blockade of Crimea
Photo: Natalia Gubernatorova
Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a blockade of Crimea
At his first press conference of the year, the Ukrainian President revealed to whom he had handed
over his factories
In his first press conference of the new year, President Petr Poroshenko admitted that he was
coordinating the actions of the organisers of the Crimea blockade.
"When we say that the blockade of Crimea is currently enforced by civic activists, we have to admit
that they are doing their very important job. I meet regularly with representatives of the Crimean
Tatar people - both Mustafa Dzhemilev and other activists - not just to support, but to coordinate
actions. That is why the Russian government decided to ban the movement of trucks".
The president also made the Ukrainians feel happy: he finally made a decision on his chocolate
business. According to Poroshenko, he signed an agreement to transfer his stake in Roshen to an
independent trust. This trust will be managed by a respectable foreign bank, which will own, control
and manage the assets. Poroshenko recalled that "blind trust" standards are used by US and
European politicians in similar situations. According to him, this is the only tool for eliminating
conflicts of interest, moreover, the "blind trust" obtains the authority to sell the corporation if it
finds a worthy buyer. If you translate what Petr Alekseyevich said from the ornate to the simple
language - the Roshen corporation may never be sold in four years. And then Poroshenko will
return to managing his property. In the meantime, according to his explanations, Poroshenko has no
right to sign the corporation's documents. But the President forgot to say that this does not mean
that he will not receive dividends from its business activity.
However, the President also promised some categories of Ukrainian citizens to improve their
financial well-being. In particular he promised a 7 thousand salary (in grivnas) to the soldiersdefenders
of the Motherland. Those who are at the front line will receive an additional three
minimum wages per month in addition to this sum. The year before last, presidential candidate
Poroshenko, as you may recall, was talking about a thousand grivnas a day during the campaign
rounds. To everyone. But journalists could not find at least one ATO fighter, who actually received
this money.
To the rest, Poroshenko has promised that there will eventually be no free medicine in the country.
The President did not say what will replace it. And he should have said, considering that one third
of Ukrainian families are unable to survive without subsidies.

Exhibit AA
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Nimetullayev: The Blockade of Crimea Is Targeting Crimean Tatars in
Ukraine (17 September 2015)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AA
Translation
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Nimetullayev: The Blockade of Crimea Is Targeting Crimean Tatars in
Ukraine (17 September 2015), available at: https://crimea.ria.ru/20150917/1101007412.html.
Nimetullayev: The Blockade of Crimea Is Targeting Crimean Tatars in
Ukraine
SIMFEROPOL, 17 September - RIA Novosti (Crimea). Crimea’s goods blockade will only affect
Crimean Tatars living in Ukraine. This was stated by the head of the regional public organisation
“Kyrym Birligi” and the Public Council of the Crimean Tatar people Seytumer Nimetullayev at the
press conference at the multimedia press centre of the “Russia Today” news agency in Crimea, a
correspondent of RIA Novosti (Crimea) reports.
“We have toured all the shops and counters in Simferopol and nearby areas, there are no problems
with food in Crimea, more than 90% of the products are Russian-made. The action that the Mejlis
wants to carry out today will only affect Crimean Tatars living in Ukraine. I worked as a collective
farm chairman for over 20 years and I know what life is like for Crimean Tatars in Ukraine. The main
business is vegetable growing, they grow, sell and that is what their families live on. Growing
vegetables is just a part of the job, the main task is to sell them and feed their families”, Nimetullayev
said.
According to him, residents of Kherson Region, who sell most of their products on the peninsula, are
strongly against the blockade. Part of the Crimean Tatars who left for Ukraine after the referendum
and settled in Novoalekseevka, according to Nimetullayev, “will never support this action”.
“The Crimean Tatars, who have been living in Ukraine since 1967 until today did not support the
Mejlis. Only 3-5 percent supported it and ran for office. The population of Kherson oblast itself has
never been for it, did not support its policies, did not govern the Crimean Tatars either then or now",
stressed the head of the Public Council.
“This statement by Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov is provocative in nature and deeply
cynical, because if we talk about interrupting the supply of occupant troops, as they believe, then I
am deeply confident that Russia will provide its troops, if necessary anywhere on earth, anytime. And
the statement itself is directed against their own Crimea, Crimeans and their own people, which is
based on the principle "let me stop feeding you and you will start loving Ukraine for it”, the deputy
head of the Crimean Tatar Public Council, Enver Kantemir-Umerov, added.
According to Kantemir-Umerov, some Crimean Tatars who were disappointed with the policies of
Ukrainian leaders returned to the peninsula. This was also facilitated by the fact that the heads of the
unregistered organisation Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian authorities did not fulfil the
promises they made to the Tatars who moved to Ukraine. Nimetullayev stressed that the majority of
Crimean Tatars still have not found a solution to the problem of housing and employment.
“Promising something does not mean actually doing it. No building is given, nothing. Today they
live in the state institutions where there used to be tabors, people without flats, without employment”,
- said Nimetullayev.
According to the leaders of the Crimean Tatar Public Council, “all Crimean Tatars have the road
home”.

Exhibit AB
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Tatars Want to Meet Chubarov and Dzhemilev at the Border
(17 September 2015)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AB
Translation
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Tatars Want to Meet Chubarov and Dzhemilev at the Border (17
September 2015), available at: https://crimea.ria.ru/20150917/1101007975.html.
Crimean Tatars Want to Meet Chubarov and Dzhemilev at the
Border
13:34 17.09.2015
© РИА Новости . Mikhail Mokrushin
Crimean Tatars living in Crimea have expressed a wish on social media to travel to the border
with Kherson Oblast and personally express their outrage at the food blockade to Refat
Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev.
SIMFEROPOL, 17 September - RIA Novosti (Crimea). Crimean Tatars living in Crimea intend
to go to the Kherson region and personally express their opinion to Refat Chubarov and Mustafa
Dzhemilev, who are the initiators of the goods blockade of Crimea. This was announced on Thursday
at a press conference in Simferopol by Remzi Ilyasov, chairman of the “Kyrym” movement and
deputy speaker of the Crimean parliament, RIA Novosti (Crimea) reports.
“I know that there are a lot of different statements on this topic in social networks, with which it is
difficult to disagree. A person is free to make his or her own choice as long as he or she does not
break the law. If people really go there, I support this action. Why not go and tell them to their faces
(Chubarov and Dzhemilev - ed.) that we do not need them and do not have to decide for us”, Ilyasov
said.
He also urged Crimeans to remain calm.
Annex 17 Exhibit AB
“I appeal to all residents of Crimea in connection with the planned so-called food blockade, to remain
calm, order and respect each other, regardless of nationality, with the understanding that Crimea is
our common home,” Ilyasov stressed.
Exhibit AC
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Authorities Speak Out About Turkish Military Instructors in
Ukraine (5 March 2016)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AC
Translation
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Authorities Speak Out About Turkish Military Instructors in
Ukraine (5 March 2016), available at: https://ria.ru/20160305/1385199067.html.
Crimean Authorities Speak Out about Turkish Military
Instructors in Ukraine
SIMFEROPOL, 5 March - RIA Novosti. Crimean Deputy Prime Minister Ruslan Balbek has said
that specially trained Turkish military instructors are in Kherson Region of Ukraine, whose task is to
train mercenaries for combat operations.
“We have reliable information that quite a few military instructors from Turkey have arrived in the
Kherson region of Ukraine. As of today, they are trying to set up a training ground there for
mercenaries to conduct combat operations both in open terrain and urban conditions”, Balbek told
RIA Novosti.
The hosts, according to the Deputy Prime Minister, are leaders of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis. “The
task is to create a capable combat unit under the Mejlis”, Balbek noted.
According to him, today the Kherson region, in fact, has become “a place of attraction for
international terrorists”. “Radicals from Turkey represented by the extremist group Grey Wolves are
brought in, as well as fighters who took part in the war in Syria on behalf of ISIS and in the coups in
Egypt and Libya, as well as militants from the Caucasus who are on the federal wanted list,” the
Crimean deputy prime minister said.
According to Balbek, Turkish forces in Ukraine are playing an independent game secretly from the
Ukrainian authorities, as they are interested in destabilising the internal political situation. “Given the
existing collusion between the Mejlis and disgraced Ukrainian oligarchs, including Igor
Kolomoyskiy, it is possible that the militants could be turned against the Ukrainian authorities
themselves to organise a new Maidan and a new coup d’état,” Balbek told the news agency.
Mejlis is the executive body of the Qurultay, which is a national congress, the highest representative
plenipotentiary body of the Crimean Tatar people. Delegates of the Qurultay are elected every five
years. The leaders of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Ukrainian politicians Refat Chubarov and Mustafa
Dzhemilev, opposed Crimea’s reunification with Russia and left the peninsula. They were banned
from entering Russia for five years in 2014 because of extremist statements inciting national discord.

Exhibit AD
RG.ru, Crimean Tatar mothers call on UN to punish Mejlis leaders (5 March 2016)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AD
Translation
RG.ru, Crimean Tatar mothers call on UN to punish Mejlis leaders (5 March 2016), available at:
https://rg.ru/2016/03/05/reg-kfo/krymskotatarskie-materi-prizvali-nakazat--medzhlis.html.
Crimean Tatar mothers call on UN to punish Mejlis leaders
Ilya Izotov
“We support the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in calling on Kiev to
investigate human rights violations during the blockade of Crimea and arrest their organisers”, the
document reads. - We, Crimean Tatar mothers, believe that the blockade of Crimea organised by
fugitive Mejlis radicals is a genocide against all Crimeans, and demand that the international
community do not allow the Ukrainian authorities to avoid punishing criminals fairly. We ask that
they be forbidden to form illegal armed units, which are created on ethnic and religious grounds and
are intended for combat operations on the territory of the Republic of Crimea.
Crimean Tatar mothers disassociated themselves from the leaders of the unregistered Mejlis, which
speaks on behalf of one of the peninsula's indigenous peoples. Through their irresponsible actions,
the mothers say, these politicians are discrediting the entire Crimean Tatar people.
“The organisers of the war urge Crimean Tatar men to leave Crimea and join a punitive battalion”,
the resolution reads. - But this is a call for the destruction of families. Isn’t the destruction of the
traditional Crimean Tatar family their real aim? It is precisely the calls to leave one's home and join
some battalions that have stained themselves with the blood of civilians that show the true aims of
the organisers of the blockade of Crimea.”
The presidium members of the forum condemned the actions of radicals in Kherson and Zaporozhye
regions who are forcibly recruiting Crimean Tatars into punitive battalions. According to the
resolution, sensible Crimean Tatar men do not succumb to this agitation, which is why radicals and
militants from Turkey and Syria, who pretend to be Crimean Tatars, are now being actively brought
to Ukraine.
“Our people worked painstakingly to create institutions of national self-government, and now they
have been discredited by the extremist and destructive activities of pseudo-leaders. Once again, they
Annex 17 Exhibit AD
are trying to use us as a bargaining chip. For whom and why should we fight? We value the lives of
our loved ones. We do not want to mourn our sons, brothers and husbands who were killed for obscure
slogans.
- We will not give up our children and we will not let grief into our homes. The mothers of Crimea
are against such calls. No to war, no to terrorism!”, said a member of the presidium of the forum
Aliye Finenko.
About 500 Crimean Tatar women from different cities and regions of Crimea took part in the forum.
We shall remind you that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has published
in Geneva the 13th UN report on the situation of rights and freedoms in Ukraine. The document
covers events in the country from 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016. Its authors note that as a
result of Kiev's blockade of goods, as well as the bombing of power lines by nationalists in November
2015, the rights of the most vulnerable segments of the peninsula's population have been infringed
upon. The report also states that the “civil blockade” of Crimea was carried out by activists “who
illegally performed law enforcement functions”. The summary calls on the authorities in Kiev to
investigate allegations of human rights violations committed during the so-called blockade of Crimea.
Exhibit AE
RIA Novosti (Crimea), The Crimean Inter-Ethnic Committee Will Support the Prosecution of the
Mejlis (31 March 2016)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AE
Translation
RIA Novosti (Crimea), The Crimean Inter-Ethnic Committee Will Support the Prosecution of the
Mejlis (31 March 2016), available at: https://ria.ru/20160331/1400577129.html.
17:59 31.03.2016
The Crimean Inter-ethnic Committee Will Support the Prosecution of
the Mejlis
© RIA Novosti / Sergey Malgavko
The actions of the Mejlis to blockade Crimea and organise armed and extremist illegal groups
do not give it the right to be called Crimean Tatar, the head of the Committee for Inter-Ethnic
Relations and Deported Citizens of Crimea, Zaur Smirnov, has said.
SIMFEROPOL, 31 March - RIA Novosti. The State Committee for Inter-Ethnic Relations
and Deported Citizens of Crimea will support the prosecution side in court in the case to recognise
the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people as an extremist organisation and ban it on Russian territory,
the head of the Committee, Zaur Smirnov, said.
The Supreme Court of Crimea has moved to consider the merits of an administrative lawsuit to
recognise the Mejlis an extremist organisation and ban it on the territory of the Russian Federation.
The lawsuit was filed by the republic’s prosecutor, Nataliya Poklonskaya. To a large extent, the
statements and actions of the leaders of the Mejlis Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev were the
basis for the lawsuit. The defendant is First Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis Nariman Dzhelyal, who
represents the interests of the association in Crimea.
In doing so, the court brought in the State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens
of Crimea as a new party to a case.
Annex 17 Exhibit AE
“We will fully support the prosecution side, we are preparing all materials. I believe that the Mejlis
has lost the right to be called Crimean Tatar,” Smirnov said at a meeting with Crimean head Sergey
Aksyonov.
In his opinion, the actions to blockade Crimea and organise armed and extremist illegal formations
with the participation of the Mejlis have long given it no right to be called Crimean Tatar. “I am sure
that such an organisation in Crimea and in the Russian Federation should be banned, we will stand
up for this point in court,” Smirnov said.
The Mejlis is the executive body of the Qurultay (national congress), which identifies itself as the
representative plenipotentiary body of the Crimean Tatar people. The leaders of the Mejlis, Ukrainian
politicians Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev, opposed Crimea’s reunification with Russia and
left the peninsula. They were banned from entering Russia for five years in 2014 because of extremist
statements inciting national discord. Both politicians have also organised goods and energy blockades
of the peninsula.
Exhibit AF
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Authorities Call Judgement on Mejlis “a Deliverance from
Disgrace” (29 September 2016)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AF
Translation
RIA Novosti (Crimea), Crimean Authorities Call Judgement on Mejlis “a Deliverance from
Disgrace” (29 September 2016), available at: https://ria.ru/20160929/1478161775.html.
18:55 29.09.2016
Crimean Authorities Call Judgement on Mejlis “a Deliverance
from Disgrace”
© РИА Новости / Владимир Сергеев
Crimea has finally got rid of the disgraceful phenomenon called the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
people, which is linked to sabotage and crimes against Crimeans, Crimean government member
Zaur Smirnov claimed.
SIMFEROPOL, 29 September - RIA Novosti. Crimea has finally got rid of the disgraceful
phenomenon called the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, which is linked to sabotage and crimes
against Crimeans, Crimean government member Zaur Smirnov told RIA Novosti.
Russia’s Supreme Court on Thursday ruled that the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People is an extremist
organisation and banned its activities in Russia.
“Crimea has finally got rid of the disgraceful phenomenon represented by the Mejlis, which Crimeans
associate exclusively with extremism, sabotage, energy, goods and transport blockades”, Smirnov
said.
Furthermore, he said, the decision to ban is shared by the majority of Crimean Tatars who do not
want to be associated with the “criminal Mejlis”.
Annex 17 Exhibit AF
“Today is a landmark day, because the Crimean Tatars will no longer be identified with a criminal
organisation that has solely taken on the right to speak on behalf of the entire nation,” Smirnov
stressed.
“The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people” has been recognised as an extremist organisation and
banned in Russia in April this year by a decision of the Crimean Supreme Court. The ban was initiated
by Crimean prosecutor Nataliya Poklonskaya, who accused Mejlis leaders of organising an energy
blockade of Crimea through sabotage.
Exhibit AG
SK Consol-Stroy, Bakhchisaray Celebrates Commissioning of a New Residential Building for
Repatriates (21 April 2015)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AG
Translation
SK Consol-Stroy, Bakhchisaray Celebrates Commissioning of a New Residential Building for
Repatriates (21 April 2015), available at: consolstroy.ru/news/news_post/noviy-dom-dlayrepatriantov.
SK Consol-Stroy | Bakhchisaray Celebrates Commissioning of
a New Residential Building for Repatriates
Bakhchisaray celebrates commissioning of a new residential building for repatriates.
In Bakhchisaray, on 21 April 2015, on the first anniversary of the Day of the Revival of the
Rehabilitated Peoples of Crimea, the keys to the flats in the new 70-apartment residential building at
5 Mira Street were solemnly handed over.
The event was attended by the Head of the Government of the Republic of Crimea - Sergey Aksyonov,
Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea - Vladimir Konstantinov, as well as Deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea - Ruslan Balbek, Deputy Chairman
of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea - Remzi Ilyasov, Chairman of the State Committee on
Inter-Ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens of the Republic of Crimea - Zaur Smirnov, Head of
Bakhchisaray District Council - Refat Derdarov, Head of Bakhchisaray City Administration -
Vladimir Verkhovod.
Welcoming the happy owners of the keys to the new flats, Sergey Aksyonov reminded of the Decree
of the President of the Russian Federation “On measures for the rehabilitation of the Armenian,
Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state support for their revival and
development” signed exactly one year ago.
“Today's event proves that the Crimean Tatar people together with Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians,
Greeks, Bulgarians and Germans in our multinational Crimea have returned to their historical
homeland - Russia, to their home, where the country takes care of its people, its citizens. This is the
first initiative - a home for the deportees, for those who have been on the waiting list for a long time,
desperate for housing: these are families with many children, in dire need of housing. And now,
finally, justice has been served,” said the Head of the Republic.
According to his information, in pursuance of the presidential decree on the rehabilitation of citizens
deported on ethnic grounds, which was signed on 21 April 2014, 112 million roubles were allocated
from the national budget to put the apartment building into operation.
Annex 17 Exhibit AG
The Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea, Vladimir Konstantinov, congratulated
those present and said: “We have occupied 18 flats today. In total there are 70 flats in the building.
The rest are drawing up documents, dealing with the queue. The house will be inhabited within one
month,” he added: “This is social housing, nevertheless, the level is decent. So that people can live
and not need anything. Getting a flat is a very important event in everyone's life, especially if one has
been waiting for years.”
According to him, the construction and commissioning of the house meant for the repatriates is only
the beginning of a big journey: “Today we are presenting not so much the house as the implementation
of the programme, which costs 10 billion roubles. It will make it possible to solve the problems of
settling the deported citizens and provide them with housing”.
“This is the first, by no means the last, house commissioned in Bakhchisaray” - assured Vladimir
Konstantinov. Recall that the house was built and put into operation in execution of the Decree of the
President of the Russian Federation and within the framework of the development programme, for
which 10 billion rubles were allocated until 2020.
The Head of the State Committee of Crimea on Interethnic Relations and Deported Citizens Zaur
Smirnov reported that in the nearest future 160 Crimean Tatar families, who have been on the waiting
list for 25 years, will receive keys to new flats in Simferopol and Bakhchisaray. This will close the
housing needs of the repressed peoples by 70%.
After the welcoming speeches of the responsible persons and the ribbon-cutting ceremony, the keys
to the flats were handed over to the Crimean Tatar families. Sergey Aksyonov and Vladimir
Konstantinov handed over the keys to the coveted flats to the rehabilitated citizens registered in the
city
Exhibit AH
RIA Novosti (Realty), 90 Crimean Tatar Families in Simferopol Receive Keys to New Flats
(12 December 2016)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AH
Translation
RIA Novosti (Realty), 90 Crimean Tatar Families in Simferopol Receive Keys to New Flats (12
December 2016), available at: https://realty.ria.ru/20161212/408195455.html.
09:29 12.12.2016
90 Crimean Tatar Families in Simferopol Receive Keys to
new flats
© РИА Новости / Сергей Мальгавко
The keys to 90 flats in a multi-storey building in Simferopol have been handed to Crimean
Tatars, who have been on the waiting list for decades as victims of deportation, the
newcomers were congratulated by the head of the Crimean republic, Sergey Aksyonov, and
the head of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, Igor Barinov.
SIMFEROPOL, December 12 - RIA Novosti, Maxim Groznov. The keys to 90 flats in a multistorey
building in Simferopol have been handed to Crimean Tatars who have been on the waiting
list for decades as victims of deportation, the newcomers were congratulated by the head of the
Crimean Republic, Sergey Aksyonov, and the head of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, Igor
Barinov.
"This programme - on the rehabilitation of the deportees is operated by presidential
decree. The state provides people with flats free of charge under the program. Today
90 families are receiving flats," Aksyonov said.
The flats are free of charge; they come with finish work and everything needed for living. If any
flaws or defects are found in the finishing works of the new housing, the Crimean leader
Annex 17 Exhibit AH
recommended the new residents to contact the state authorities and promised an immediate
appropriate response. The newcomers at the ceremony applauded the commissioning of the house.
A total of 180 families have received housing under the programme this year in Crimea, and 450
families have received housing since the start of the programme in 2014, the Crimean leader said.
However, there are about seven thousand families in Crimea as a whole on the waiting list for
housing under the programme, the republican authorities said.
"People have been waiting for this for many years, for instance, a woman said - 18 years. Crimea
has received some problems from the past. Presenting people with flats is realisation in practice of
promises that the state made to those who suffered from deportation," Igor Barinov, head of the
Russian Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, said at the ceremony to present the keys to the flats.
Ten billion roubles will be allocated to implement the programme in 2020. The money will be used
to build housing, linear and social facilities, and infrastructure.
Exhibit AI
RIA Novosti (Crimea), How the Process of Allocating Land to the Participants of “Protest
Glades” in Crimea Is Going (23 January 2020)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AI
Translation
RIA Novosti (Crimea), How the Process of Allocating Land to the Participants of “Protest Glades”
in Crimea Is Going (23 January 2020), available at: https://crimea.ria.ru/20200123/Kak-idetprotsess-
vydeleniya-zemli-uchastnikam-polyan-protesta-v-Krymu-1117887486.html.
How the Process of Allocating Land to the Participants
of “Protest Glades” in Crimea Is Going
19:46 23.01.2020
© RIA Novosti Crimea. Aleksandr Polegenko
SIMFEROPOL, 23 January - RIA Novosti Crimea. The process of allocating land plots to
participants of the so-called "protest glades" in Simferopol and the Simferopol district is almost
complete, the chairman of the state committee for interethnic relations, Albert Kangiyev, said at a
press conference at the multimedia press centre of the “Russia Today” news agency in Simferopol.
“Regarding the ‘protest glades’ today, the issue has been practically resolved for Simferopol and the
Simferopol district, except for the protest glade near General Vasiliev Street. A solution to the
problem has not been found there yet,” the head of the State Committee on Interethnic Relations of
the Republic of Crimea said.
According to Kangiyev, this year the authorities plan to "start active actions" to provide land to
participants of the "protest glades" on the South Coast of Crimea.
"The issues there are much more complicated. There are 13 protest glades in Bolshaya Yalta alone,
and due to the lack of available land there is nowhere to move them and no alternative land plots
can be offered. Nevertheless, we are aiming at solving this problem," he said.
Annex 17 Exhibit AI
At the same time, the head of the agency found it difficult to say how many participants in the
"protest glades" have already received alternative land plots.
Exhibit AJ
Government of the Republic of Crimea, The Ministry of Property of the Republic of Crimea
Informs Citizens Participating in the “Glades of Protest” about the allocation of land plots free
of charge for ownership (24 August 2021)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AJ
Translation
Government of the Republic of Crimea, The Ministry of Property of the Republic of Crimea
Informs Citizens Participating in the “Glades of Protest” about the allocation of land plots free of
charge for ownership (24 August 2021), available at: https://rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/13015.
The Ministry of Property of the Republic of Crimea Informs Citizens
Participating in the “Glades of Protest” about the Allocation of Land
Plots Free of Charge for Ownership
The orders are ready for 203 applicants
The Ministry of Property and Land Relations of the Republic of Crimea informs citizens participating
in the "protest glades" about the allocation of land plots owned by the state of the Republic of Crimea
free of charge for individual residential development.
The relevant decisions of the Ministry of Property of Crimea were taken in respect of 203 applicants.
“We are talking about the issue of extracts from the corresponding order to the citizens, who had
previously applied with the necessary list of documents, and in respect of whom the Council of
Ministers of the Republic of Crimea made a decision to determine the plots of land that are in state
ownership of the Republic of Crimea to be provided to citizens for free ownership for individual
residential development. The land plots are located on the territory of Kamyshinka village of
Chistenskoye rural settlement of Simferopol region”, - said the Minister of Property and Land
Relations of the Republic of Crimea Larisa Kulinich.
The documents are issued at the following address: Simferopol, Sevastopolskaya Street, 17, from
Monday to Friday from 9.00 to 18.00 (break from 13.00 to 14.00). Please call +7978 9139380 or 8
(3652) 550-724 to check the readiness of your documents.
We also remind you that on the basis of received documents, citizens need to carry out the state
registration of ownership in accordance with current legislation.
Earlier, extracts from the order of the Ministry of Property were ceremoniously received by 8 citizens
participating in the protest.
According to the press service of the Ministry of Property and Land Relations of the Republic of
Crimea

Exhibit AK
TASS, In Crimea Kindergartens and a Residential Building for Previously Deported Citizens
Have Been Built in Five Years (18 May 2020)
(translation)

Annex 17 Exhibit AK
Translation
TASS, In Crimea Kindergartens and a Residential Building for Previously Deported Citizens Have
Been Built in Five Years (18 May 2020), available at: https://tass.ru/obschestvo/8496051.
In Crimea Kindergartens and a Residential Building for
Previously Deported Citizens Have Been Built in Five Years
SIMFEROPOL, 18 May. /TASS/. Kindergartens for more than 1,000 places, 72-apartment
residential buildings, over 70 km of gas, electricity and water supply networks have been built for
the formerly deported citizens in the Republic of Crimea over five years. The republic also
publishes books in native languages - more than 130 books have been published since the
peninsula's reunification with Russia, Elmar Mambetov, First Deputy Chairman of the Republic's
State Committee for Interethnic Relations, told TASS.
The Day of Remembrance of the Deported Peoples is celebrated in Crimea on May 18. It was
established in 1994 by regional law to commemorate the beginning of the forced relocation of
Crimean Tatars from the peninsula in 1944.
“As of 1 April 2020, construction and installation works have been completed on 17 objects: this is
the construction of a 72-apartment residential building in Kerch, as well as the construction of four
pre-school educational organisations for 260 places each in the districts of Fontany, Lugovoye,
Khoshkeldy of Simferopol City, as well as in the Molodezhnoye settlement of Simferopol District,”
Mambetov said.
According to him, 9 kilometres of gas pipeline, over 28 kilometres of gas supply networks, over 38
kilometres of electricity networks, and 10.6 kilometres of water supply and sewerage networks have
also been built in the Molodezhnoye settlement in Simferopol City and in settlements in Sudak,
Belogorsk and Simferopol districts.
By the end of 2020 it is planned to complete the construction of 18.3 km of paved roads in four
microdistricts in Yevpatoriya, Simferopol and Simferopol district.
In 2021, the construction of a memorial complex in the Bakhchisaray District, which began to be
constructed in 2016 at the Siren station, where the first trains carrying deported Crimean Tatars left
on 18 May 1944, is expected to be completed. One of the centrepieces of the complex will be a
mock-up of a “teplushka” wagon, similar to the ones used to transport people from the peninsula.
The complex also includes an Orthodox chapel and a Muslim mosque. The total cost of the complex
is about 378.2 million roubles.
Unity Date
The Crimean authorities will continue to provide assistance to formerly deported peoples and resist
attempts to use the deportation tragedy to incite hatred, the republic's head, Sergey Aksyonov, said
on his VKontakte page on Monday.
“Today is Memorial Day for the victims of the deportation. This commemorative date unites all
Crimeans regardless of nationality. We condemn the deportation of peoples as one of the greatest
crimes. We grieve for those who have not lived to return to their homeland and express our deep
Annex 17 Exhibit AK
sympathy to all our fellow countrymen who have been subjected to repression, their relatives and
loved ones. We will continue to resolutely and firmly resist the attempts of the enemies of Crimea
to use the tragedy of the deportation to incite hatred and hostility,” Aksyonov wrote.
According to him, the Crimean government continues to work to implement the decree and
republican programmes aimed at ensuring interethnic unity. According to the results of last year,
Aksyonov noted, the construction of a number of important social facilities, including three
kindergartens, has been completed. Energy and transport infrastructure facilities have been built,
people have received the keys to new flats, financial assistance to complete individual housing and
improved their living conditions.
Aksyonov noted that a number of socially significant projects in the sphere of settling the
representatives of the rehabilitated peoples, despite the situation with the coronavirus, will be
implemented this year as well.
The First One in 100 Years
In Crimea, books in native languages have begun to be actively published. Since 2014, according to
Mambetov, 136 books have been published with a total circulation of 54,600 copies in Crimean
Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Bulgarian and Greek.
“The number of publications and the volume of books published increases every year. While in
2015 11 books were published with a total circulation of 5,700 copies, in 2019 there are already 36
books with a circulation of 15,500 copies,” he said.
"The Dictionary of the Crimean Tatar Language of 1916" is being prepared for publication for the
first time this year. One of its compilers, Doctor of Philological Sciences Ismail Kerimov, who is
director of the research centre for the Crimean Tatar language, literature, history and culture at the
Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University named after F. Yakubov, told TASS that the 520-
page dictionary consists of more than 14,000 words.
“What makes it interesting is that it is the first edition of a dictionary of the Crimean Tatar language
in Arabic. There really was no such dictionary. They tried to publish it in 1916 and later, but didn't
succeed,” Kerimov said. The fact is that until 1928, all books in the Crimean Tatar language were
published in Arabic script. From 1928 to 1938, the Crimean Tatar alphabet was converted to the
Latin alphabet, and from 1938 to the present day the Cyrillic alphabet has been used.
In 2020, the republic also plans to publish 30 books in Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian and
Armenian languages with the total circulation of 10,800 copies at the expense of the budget. Among
them there is a photo album about twice Hero of the Soviet Union, pilot Amet-Khan Sultan,
collections “Crimean Tatar Women in the Great Patriotic War”, “Contribution of the Repressed
Peoples of the USSR to the Victory in the Great Patriotic War”, “Crimean Tatar Music of
Professional Composers” and others.
Main Mosque
A Cathedral Mosque is under construction in Simferopol and is expected to open next year. Deputy
Mufti of Muslims of Crimea Aider Ismailov told TASS that the exact deadline for the mosque's
completion has not yet been set due to the coronavirus situation. The mosque is 85% ready.
Annex 17 Exhibit AK
Preparations for the painting are underway: framings (mukarnas), niches in the walls (mihrabs) and
other elements are being installed. Turkish specialists are involved in the works for stone, marble
and further painting.
According to the project, the mosque will have a total area of 5.7 thousand square meters, and a
capacity of 2.6 thousand people. The structure consists of two parts - the main building with a dome
and a courtyard with colonnades and a place to perform ablution before performing namaz.
Construction of the mosque began in October 2016. Its opening is one of the most anticipated
events for Crimean Muslims.
According to the Spiritual Administration of Muslims, four to five mosques have been opened
annually in Crimea since 2014. If six years ago there were 304, now there are 354. Old mosques of
the 17th-19th centuries are also being restored.
Aid to Crimea
In addition to assistance programmes for rehabilitated peoples, the region is implementing the
federal targeted program for the socio-economic development of Crimea and Sevastopol, which was
adopted in 2014. It is designed to modernise engineering, transport and social infrastructure. Its
total financing, taking into account recent adjustments, amounts to 961.2 billion roubles.
In 2020, a total of 242 facilities are planned to be implemented under the federal targeted program
in Crimea. This is a major repair of houses of culture, public roads in Kerch, reconstruction and
overhaul of two collectors of deep outlet in Alushta, Rybachie, Alupka and Partenit, the
development of urban planning documentation totaling more than 77 billion roubles.
Earlier, in March, the head of the republic, Sergey Aksyonov, reported that the amount of funds for
road repairs in the Crimea, following an order from Russian President Vladimir Putin, has increased
to about 20 billion roubles, which will bring more than half of all roads in the region to normal
condition by 2022.
On deportation
From 1941 to 1944 more than 200,000 Crimean Tatars, Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians
and Italians were deported from the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. In 1989, the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR declared illegal and criminal the repressive acts against the peoples who had been
forcibly resettled in the regions of Siberia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
According to the State Committee on Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, 268,700 of
the deported (rehabilitated) peoples of Crimea live in the region, including Crimean Tatars -
260,100, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Germans - 8,600.
The news has been amended (09:27 Moscow time) - details have been added in paragraphs 7-10.

Annex 18
Expert Report of Alexei Stanislavovich Avtonomov, 28 February 2023

Annex 18
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
EXPERT REPORT OF
ALEXEI STANISLAVOVICH AVTONOMOV
28 FEBRUARY 2023
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 5
B. Are common political purposes and loyalties attributes of an ethnicity? ......................... 7
C. The requirement of proving "Systematic campaign of racial discrimination" in this case
under the ICERD ............................................................................................................. 12
D. Can there be limitations of human rights under the ICERD? Is the practice of other
international bodies constituted under different treaties relevant in the context of the ICERD?
......................................................................................................................................... 14
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A. INTRODUCTION
1. I am the Vice-rector of the Institute for International Law and Economics named after
Alexander Griboedov and a head of its International Law Chair. I have a degree in Law
equivalent to LLD received from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations in
1984 and a degree equivalent to Doc. Hab. received from Institute of State and Law (Russian
Academy of Science) in 1999 (confirmed by the Higher Attestation Commission in 2000), a
degree of Professor of Law in Russia from the State University of Humanitarian Sciences in
2003 and a degree of Professor of Law in Kazakhstan from the Academy of Law named after
Dinmukhamed Kunaev. I am an author of more than 390 publications in Russia, Canada,
Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Romania.
2. I worked in the Moscow Institute for International Relations, Institute of State and Law
(Russian Academy of Science), Higher School of Economics, Institute for Legislation and
Comparative Law Studies, a guest professor at the Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada,
1994), at the Kazakh National University named after Al-Farabi (Almaty, Kazakhstan,
2012).
3. I am attorney-at-law since 2011.
4. I have been a member of various international bodies in the field of international human
rights promotion and protection: 2003-2020 – member of the Committee on Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (hereinafter – the “CERD”) (within the International Convention on
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter – the “ICERD”)); 2004-
2008, 2010-2012, and 2014-2020 – member of the working group on early warning and
urgent measures procedure (2014-2016 – chairperson of the working group); 2008-2010, and
2014-2016 – vice-chairperson; 2012-2014 chairperson; 2016-2018 – rapporteur; 2016-2020
– member of the working group on individual communications (which performed also
functions of the working group on inter-states communications since 2018); 2014-2015 –
Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Racism,
Xenophobia and Discrimination, Focusing also on Intolerance Against Christians and
Members of Other Religions (Switzerland-2014, Serbia-2015); 2014-2022 – an expert of the
OSCE Moscow Mechanism; 2021-2022 – a member of the Advisory Committee on the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
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5. I am also a member of Russian national bodies in the field of domestic human rights
promotion and protection: 2015-now – member of the Civic Collegium on Mass Media
Complaints; 2017-now – member of an Expert Scientific Council of the Commissioner on
Human Rights of Russian Federation.
6. In this Report, I would like to review the Ukraine’s Memorial and Reply in the case
concerning application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism and ICERD, as well as the experts reports by Professor Robert Magocsi
(Second Report), Professor Sandra Fredman and Professor Martin Scheinin annexed thereto,
and address the following issues of international human rights law:
(a) Are common political purposes and loyalties attributes of an ethnicity?
(b) The requirement of proving “systematic comparing of racial discrimination” in this
case under the ICERD.
(c) Can there be limitations of human rights under the ICERD? Is the practice of other
international bodies constituted under different treaties relevant in the context of the
ICERD?
7. In this Report, based on the study of the ICERD and other documents related to practice of
its application, as well as on a comparison with some other international human rights
instruments, I am going to show that a common political purpose or political loyalty is not a
characteristic of an ethnic group. The position of the ICERD in this regard is clear-cut. I am
going to demonstrate that replacing the research of the ICERD with the study of other
international human rights instruments leads Professor Fredman and Professor Scheinin to
the wrong conclusions, as they constantly stray from the consideration of such a specific
phenomenon as racial discrimination to a discussion of general problems of human rights or
approaches typical for other branches of international law (for international criminal law, for
example), but distinct from approaches characteristic for the international law of human
rights in the field of elimination of racial discrimination. I am going to show that in this case
the establishment of “systematic campaign discrimination” is required. I am going to clarify
that the ICERD requires limitations of certain human rights, such as the freedom of speech,
the freedom of assembly etc., in order to halt and prevent racial (including ethnic)
discrimination and to promote anti-discrimination struggle.
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B. ARE COMMON POLITICAL PURPOSES AND LOYALTIES ATTRIBUTES OF AN ETHNICITY?
8. In paragraph 48 of her First Report, Professor Fredman suggests that “a common political
purpose might be an aspect of ethnicity”1. But she does not support her conclusion with any
quotations. In a footnote on page 21, she cites some general comments that ethnic minorities
should be able to participate in the development and adoption of decisions that affect them.
But in this point there is a substitution of concepts: since access to participation in politics
and in government, which is the right of any person, regardless of ethnicity, differs from
political monolithic identity by analogy with cultural identity, which is one of the
characteristics of an ethnic group (the analogy between cultural identity and political identity
as a sign of an ethnic group is drawn by Professor Fredman in paragraph 45). Any social
group – youth, women, carpenters, farmers, entrepreneurs, children, sailors, persons with
disabilities, engineers, etc. – should have the right to participate in politics, especially in
development and adoption of decisions affecting them, but it does not mean that all these
social groups are ethnic.
9. I am not aware of any case in the CERD practice of an individual or a group of individuals
claiming certain ethnicity on the basis of his/her or their common political goals or common
political views. There is no case of the CERD’s recommendations recognizing any group as
an ethnic one in accordance with this group’s common political goals.
10. Professor Fredman cites the UN Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities2, which provides for the right of those persons
to set up an association, and believes that it is equal to political identity as a feature of an
ethnic group. But an association may be created by any social group. An association is not
the same organization as a political party3.
11. An association promotes certain relatively narrow interest and as such can affect some
policies within the scope of its activity by lobbying, for example, while a political party has
a global vision of problems and challenges and in case of coming to power should govern
1 First Expert Report of Professor Sandra Fredman, p. 20, ¶48. See Memorial, Annex 22.
2 Ibid., p. 6, fn. 14.
3 F. Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (United Nations Publication, 1979), p. 35, ¶209, available at: https://documentsdds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL7/903/66/PDF/NL790366.pdf?OpenElement.
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taking into account interests of sundry social groups, including ethnic groups, expressed by
various associations.
12. Quite in opposite of what Professor Fredman says, the CERD considers a situation of
concern if political parties are based on ethnic belonging. For instance, in its Concluding
Observations of 2009 on a periodic report of Ethiopia, the CERD states: “The Committee
notes that political parties in the State party are largely structured on ethnic lines. The
Committee is concerned that the above arrangements, in the specific circumstances of the
State party, have the potential to contribute to an increase in ethnic tension”4.“The
Committee recommends that the State party encourage the development of integrationist
multi-racial organizations, including political parties, in line with the provisions of article 2,
paragraph 1 € of the Convention”5. Earlier, in 1994, members of the CERD “welcomed
Senegal’s obvious commitment to human rights”6 upon having received information from
Senegal that “article 3 (1) of the Constitution stated, inter alia, that no political party or
association was allowed to identify itself with a particular race, ethnic group, sect, language
or religion”7. The CERD is equally concerned about ethno-territorial entity. In its
Concluding Observations of 2007 on Ethiopia’s periodic report, “the Committee is
concerned that the decentralized system of ethnic federalism adopted by the State party
through its constitution could lead to the displacement of persons, as well as increase
tensions between ethnic groups in regions where ethnic coexistence is a demographic
feature”8. In this connection “the Committee recommends that the State party ensure that the
system of ethnic federalism serves to protect the rights of all ethnic groups and promote
peaceful coexistence amongst them. The CERD further recommends that the State party
provide information on the measures taken to combat racial prejudices and intolerance
4 CERD, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding
observations No. CERD/C/ETH/CO/7-16, 7 September 2009, ¶13, available at:
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FC%2FETH%2FCO%2F7-
16&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
5 Ibid.
6 CERD, Report No. A/49/18, 19 September 1994, ¶335, available at:
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=A%2F49%2F18&Lang=en.
7 Ibid., ¶334.
8 CERD, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding
observations No. CERD/C/ETH/CO/15, 20 June 2007, ¶16, available at:
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FC%2FETH%2FCO%2F15&Language=E&DeviceType=
Desktop&LangRequested=False.
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between ethnic groups”9. So, the CERD, according to its long-standing position, does not
accept ethnically monolithic parties or States.
13. The CERD disregards requests by certain non-governmental organizations in their
alternative reports, which suggest that the CERD should recommend, in its concluding
observations, to a relevant State Party to lift the legislative prohibition of mono-ethnic parties
(for instance, in 2008, while dealing with a periodic report of Moldova).
14. In reality people belonging to one ethnic group may join different political parties or might
be apolitical, and this does not affect their ethnic belonging. People of the same ethnic origin
may live in different countries and be loyal to those countries where they live. The most
obvious example is the Republic of Korea and Korean People’s Democratic Republic. There
are two States, but the people living in both States are the same people, – Koreans. The
CERD does not distinguish between Koreans, coming to Japan from different countries,
recommending that their rights as ethnic immigrants be respected without distinction of the
State of their origin, namely the Republic of Korea or the Korean People-Democratic
Republic. In its Concluding Observations of 2018 on a periodic report of Japan, the CERD
refers to Koreans as such without specifying the State of their origin10. In particular, the
CERD recommends that Japan “eliminate the permit requirement prior to departure for some
permanent residents so that they may enter and exit the country in the same manner as other
permanent residents”11. Previously, when there were two German States: the German
Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and both were States Parties to
the ICERD, and the CERD never put under question belonging of the majority of population
of each of these States to the same German ethnos, while distinguishing the distinct political
identity of citizens of each of the abovementioned States, in particular bearing in mind the
differences between the socialist country (the German Democratic Republic) and the nonsocialist
one (the Federal Republic of Germany). Thus, in 1981, by analyzing a periodic
report of German Democratic Republic members of the CERD “expressed satisfaction at the
replies given in the report to questions raised during the consideration of the previous report
9 Ibid.
10 CERD, Concluding observations No. CERD/C/JPN/CO/10-11 on the combined tenth and eleventh periodic reports
of Japan, 26 September 2018, ¶21-22, available at:
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FC%2FJPN%2FCO%2F10-
11&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
11 Ibid., ¶34(f).
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and at the ample information on internal and international measures aimed at combating
racism and racial discrimination” but “pointed out, however, that the report placed too much
emphasis on ideological considerations”12. Considering a periodic report of Federal
Republic of Germany in 1981, members of the CERD “noted with satisfaction that the report
had been prepared in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Committee and
represented a serious effort to reply to questions raised in connexion with previous periodic
reports and to give effect to the provisions of the Convention”13, but “the facts showed that
both the membership and the number of groups engaged in terrorism and adherence to neo-
Nazi ideas had increased”14. The CERD gave distinct recommendations to each mentioned
State in order to assist to resolve their problems resulted from different political, social and
economic orders of those States, with which their citizens were identified, not challenging
the common ethnic identity of the majority of citizens of the States concerned.
15. There are a lot of other, probably, less obvious examples. Thus, Quechua and Aymara live
predominantly in Bolivia, Peru, and partially in certain neighbouring countries. In 2010, the
Government of Bolivia decided to construct a highway through a territory of indigenous
peoples and national park under the name in Spanish of Territorio Indígena y Parque
Nacional Isiboro Sécure (hereinafter – the “TIPNIS”). The Government planned to improve
the transport communication between certain regions of territorial department of Beni and
Cochabamba. However, communities of indigenous peoples (Chimán, Yuracaré, and
Moxeño) living there strongly opposed it. In 2011, there were organized political
manifestations and rallies, a march to La Paz, clashes between police forces and protesters
took place. Two ministers of the Government, who belonged ethnically to indigenous
peoples, resigned to demonstrate their support of indigenous communities of the TIPNIS.
Finally, a law (No. 180 of 24 October 2011) was adopted prohibiting the construction of a
highway thorough this territory15. But then the Government organized direct consultations
with the TIPNIS communities of indigenous peoples. It appeared that many members and
12 CERD, Report No. 18, No. A/36/18, Report of German Democratic Republic, ¶135, available at:
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=A%2F36%2F18%28SUPP%
29&Lang=en.
13 Ibid., Report of Federal Republic of Germany, ¶326.
14 Ibid., Report of Federal Republic of Germany, ¶331.
15 L. Farthing, B. Kohl, Evo’s Bolivia: Continuity and Change in JOURNAL OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES (University
of Texas Press, 2014), p. 52-54.
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even leaders of a considerable number of communities were not against in principle of that
highway construction. They had certain fears, doubts and hesitations, but they were not
absolute opponents. During the mentioned consultations the fears were allayed, the doubts
and hesitations were overcome and, meantime, construction plans were corrected and
adjusted to meet the wishes of communities’ members. As a result of the consultations, 55
of 65 communities residing in the TIPNIS consented to the construction of a highway
through this territory16. In 2017, a Law No. 969 “On the Protection, Integral and Sustainable
Development of the Territory of the Indigenous Peoples of the Isiboro Sekure National Park”
(Ley de Protección, Desarrollo Integral y Sustentable del Territorio Indígena Parque
Nacional Isiboro Sécure) of 13 August 2017 was approved, lifting the unequivocal ban for
this highway construction. Meanwhile, a group of irreconcilable opponents of this
construction remained. So, it appeared that persons belonging to the TIPNIS indigenous
peoples had in reality different opinions regarding the decision of the Government.
Meanwhile, the hard-line opposition to the highway construction was supported by a number
of environmentalists, who were not members of the TIPNIS indigenous communities’
members. Therefore, the same political purpose has divided the indigenous communities of
the TIPNIS.
16. Accordingly, I find that the Professor Magocsi’s study of the Ukrainian nationalist
movement and their allegedly common desire to live within a separate political state
(however illuminating that study is) completely irrelevant to the process of defining ethnicity
within application of the ICERD, for such “common” political purpose can never serve as a
characteristic of any ethnic group.
17. Conclusion. Based on the above, the position of the CERD is that a common political
purpose is not a characteristic of an ethnic group, and political loyalty as well as a common
political purpose does not serve a ground for an ethnicity. This position is clear and generally
accepted.
16 Ibid.
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C. THE REQUIREMENT OF PROVING "SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION"
IN THIS CASE UNDER THE ICERD
18. In paragraph 6 of the Second Report, Professor Fredman seeks to deny the requirement of
proving a “systematic campaign of racial discrimination” in the case under consideration. In
the Professor Fredman’s view, it somehow follows from the fact that “Article 1(1) of the
ICERD defines "racial discrimination" as a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
based on race which has "the purpose or effect" of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment of
rights and freedoms”17. This approach is misleading, since allegations of violations of Article
1 maybe of different nature. Some allegations pertain to individual instances of violations
others refer to systematic campaigns. According to the ICERD and CERD the former are
subject to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, while the latter are exempt from such
a rule. The requirement to prove “systematic campaign” follows from the CERD’s practice.
19. In the case Qatar vs. the United Arab Emirates18, the CERD stated the following:
“The Committee notes that the allegations of the Applicant State refer to
measures, "undertaken as part of a policy ordered and coordinated at the highest
levels of government, represent a generalized policy and practice". To
substantiate their conflicting views on the requirement of the exhaustion of
domestic remedies, the States parties concerned invoke a multitude of factual
elements which can only be verified at the stage of the examination of merits of
the communication. Moreover, the Committee considers that exhaustion of
domestic remedies is not a requirement where a "generalized policy and
practice" has been authorized.”
20. The same approach was taken in the case State of Palestine vs Israel19, where the CERD
stated the following:
“Against this background, the Committee considers that the allegations of the
applicant refer to measures taken as part of a policy ordered and coordinated at
the highest levels of government, which may amount to a generalized policy and
practice with regard to a range of substantive issues under the Convention. The
Committee considers that exhaustion of domestic remedies is not a
requirement where a generalized policy and practice has been authorized. In
17 Second Expert Report of Professor Sandra Fredman, ¶7. See Reply, Annex 5.
18 Qatar v. the United Arab Emirates, Document No. CERD/C/99/4 on Admissibility of the Inter-state communication
submitted by Qatar against the United Arab Emirated, 30 August 2019, ¶40, available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CERD/CERD-C-99-4.pdf.
19 State of Palestine v. Israel, Document No. CERD/C/103/4 on Inter-State communication submitted by the State of
Palestine against Israel: decision on admissibility, 17 June 2021, ¶63, available at:
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FC%2F103%2F4&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&
LangRequested=False.
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line with the jurisprudence of regional human rights commissions and courts, the
Committee considers, however, that it is not sufficient that the existence of such
a generalized policy and practice is merely alleged; rather, prima facie evidence
of such a practice must be established.”
21. As I understand, a “systematic campaign of racial discrimination”, has been alleged in this
case and on the basis of this allegation the rule of the exhaustion of the local remedies
therefore has not been applied. In accordance with the rules of treaty interpretation, as
reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties the words
“systematic” and “campaign” are to be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary
meaning. To understand the meaning of the mentioned words, it is necessary to refer to
dictionaries.
22. The term “systematic” in the Webster New World Dictionary has two meanings: “1 of a
system” and the second belongs to the field of physiology and, therefore is not relevant for
the present Report. So, in the same Dictionary “system” is defined as follows: “1 a set or
arrangement of things so related or connected as to form a unity or organic whole [a solar
system, school system, system of highways] 2 a set of facts, principles, rules, etc. classified
or arranged in a regular, orderly form so as to show a logical plan linking the various parts
3 a method or plan of classification or arrangement 4a) an established way of doing
something; method; procedure b) orderliness or methodical planning in one’s way of
proceeding 5a) a body considered as a functioning organism b) a number of bodily organs
acting together to perform one of the main bodily functions [the digestive system] 6 a related
series of natural objects or elements, as cave passages, rivers, etc.”20; seventh meaning
relates to chemistry, eighth to crystallography, ninth to geology and thus are not relevant for
the present Report. Oxford Student’s Dictionary of Current English gives such a definition
of “system”: “1 group of things or parts working together in a regular relation: the nervous–
; the digestive–; a railway–. 2 ordered set of ideas, theories, principles, etc.: a – of
government; a computer–. 3 organization: You mustn’t expect good results if you work
without–”21. So, both dictionaries show that “systematic” derived from “system” means
nothing more than something organized, arranged, and when carried out by humans or their
organizations, then in accordance with a logical plan (therefore, with a certain goal and
20 V. Neufeldt, D. Guralnik, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
1988), p. 1359.
21 A. Hornby, OXFORD STUDENT’S DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH (OUP, 1984), p. 665.
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intention) from linked or connected or related components (parts) to form a unity or an
organic whole.
23. The term “campaign”, according to the Webster New World Dictionary, signifies “1 a series
of military operations with a particular objective in a war 2 a series of organized, planned
actions for a particular purpose, as for electing a candidate”22. Oxford Student’s Dictionary
of Current English defines “campaign” as follows: “1 a group of military operations with a
set purpose, usually in one area. 2 series of planned activities to gain a special object: an
advertising–”23. So, any campaign to be recognized as such, as a campaign, should be a
series of planned, i.e. organized with a specific target and intention, actions to achieve a
particular purpose.
24. Thus, a word “systematic” underlines the purposefulness of linked and intentional series of
actions making a campaign, which itself is a set of interrelated actions built in accordance
with the plan, united by a single aim and intention. Therefore, based upon meaning of the
words “systematic” and “campaign”, any systematic campaign (including a systematic
campaign of racial discrimination) can be assessed and recognized as such in case of
detection and proof of intentionality of linked actions planned and arranged to achieve a
specific purpose (for example, to discriminate against a particular ethnic group). Scattered
actions, regardless of their number, according to the meaning of the words “systematic” and
“campaign” shown above, cannot be a systematic campaign, unless the interconnection of
such actions organized and arranged according to a single plan with a specific purpose and
intention is not established and proven.
D. CAN THERE BE LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE ICERD? IS THE PRACTICE OF
OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES CONSTITUTED UNDER DIFFERENT TREATIES RELEVANT IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE ICERD?
25. The arguments and reasoning of Professor Martin Scheinin and the data he cites do not
correspond to his conclusions.
22 V. Neufeldt, D. Guralnik, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
1988), p. 201-202.
23 A. Hornby, OXFORD STUDENT’S DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH (OUP, 1984), p. 84.
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26. Thus, Professor Scheinin states that “[t]he concept of ‘national security’ is recognized in
international human rights law as a legitimate aim that may justify necessary and
proportionate restrictions upon many human rights” (he refers to Articles 12, 13, 14, 19, 21
and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). “Other per se legitimate
aims of public order, (public) health or morals, or the rights of others appear in varying
constellations in the limitations clauses of various ICCPR” – Articles 12(3), 14(1), 18(3),
19(3)(a)-(b), 21 and 22(2)24.
27. Then Professor Scheinin argues that the context of counter-terrorism “constitutes a prima
facie legitimate invocation of national security as a legitimate aim under item (5) of the
permissible limitations test”, adding that “[t]here is a large number of international
conventions and protocols that impose upon States international legal obligations in the field
of counter-terrorism”25. After having explained all this, Professor Scheinin suddenly writes
that “even assuming that Russia could demonstrate that its measures meet all other
requirements of the permissible limitations test except compliance with other human rights
(item 7 in the list presented in paragraph 22 above), Russia’s argument still fails, because a
reference to national security or another per se legitimate aim cannot justify a deviation from
the ICERD and its absolute prohibition against racial discrimination”26.
28. What does he mean? Does he mean that a mere reference of any person to the fact that he or
she belongs to an ethnicity (and everyone belongs to this or that ethnicity) permits the
mentioned person to violate human rights of other persons, especially those who belong to
other ethnicities, to undermine national security, to commit terrorist acts, etc.? Does he mean
that the ICERD as a result of its absolute prohibition against discrimination nullifies all other
international human rights instruments?
29. Professor Scheinin believes that “[t]here is no derogations clause or limitations clause in the
Convention”27, speaking about the ICERD. It is not true, as Article 5b of the ICERD
establishes “the right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or
bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual, group or
24 Expert Report of Professor Martin Scheinin, pp. 12-13, ¶24, fn. 22-23. See Reply, Annex 7.
25 Ibid., p. 13, ¶25.
26 Ibid., p. 14, ¶28.
27 Ibid., p. 14-15, ¶29.
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institution”28, which restricts any person or group or organization to violate the right to
security of other people. This provision echoes Article 29.2 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which stipulates that “in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone
shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due to recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting
the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society”29. Article 29.3 adds that “these rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”30. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, whose principles are developed in the ICERD, is directly referred to in its
Preamble and Article 4, according to which “States Parties condemn all propaganda and all
organizations which are based on ideas and theories of superiority of one race or group of
persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred
and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures
designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination”31. Further, Article 4a
insists that to this end States Parties “shall declare an offence punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial
discrimination, as well as all acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or
ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the
financing thereof”32. The use of the modal verb “shall”, which grammatically signifies and
even emphasizes the existence of an obligation, testifies to the duty of States to impose
appropriate limitations and restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of association.
30. Bearing in mind the cited above provisions of the ICERD, the CERD in its General
Recommendation No. 35 (2013) “Combating racist hate speech” advised States Parties: “13.
As article 4 is not self-executing, States parties are required by its terms to adopt legislation
to combat racist hate speech that falls within its scope. In the light of the provisions of the
Convention and the elaboration of its principles in general recommendation No. 15 and the
28 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, THE CORE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES (United Nations, 2006), p. 61, available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/coretreatiesen.pdf.
29 Ibid., p. 7.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 60.
32 Ibid., p. 60-61.
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present recommendation, the Committee recommends that the States parties declare and
effectively sanction as offences punishable by law:
(a) All dissemination of ideas based on racial or ethnic superiority or hatred, by whatever
means;
(b) Incitement to hatred, contempt or discrimination against members of a group on
grounds of their race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin;
(c) Threats or incitement to violence against persons or groups on the grounds in (b)
above;
(d) Expression of insults, ridicule or slander of persons or groups or justification of hatred,
contempt or discrimination on the grounds in (b) above, when it clearly amounts to
incitement to hatred or discrimination;
(e) Participation in organizations and activities which promote and incite racial
discrimination”33.
31. So, the CERD encourages States Parties to introduce criminal liability for above mentioned
deeds, which are, in fact, limitation of the freedom of speech in order to achieve the goals of
the ICERD.
32. Absolute prohibition of racial discrimination means that each human being independently of
her or his “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin” (Article 1.1 of the ICERD) has
the same rights, freedoms, obligations, responsibilities as any other human being
independently of his or her “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”. In terms of
responsibility that means that if any person independently of her or his “race, colour, descent,
or national or ethnic origin” individually or collectively (along with other persons) commits
an offense against the law such a person will be liable to the law in proportion to her or his
guilt, as any other person, and won’t be exempted from liability solely on the ground of a
particular “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”. If there are allegations that a
person or a group of persons are on trial and are convicted because of his/her or their specific
33 CERD, General recommendation No. 35 on Combating racist hate speech, No. CERD/C/GC/35, 26 September
2013, p. 4, ¶13, available at: https://documents-ddsny.
un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/471/38/PDF/G1347138.pdf?OpenElement.
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“race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin” such allegations cannot be presumed, but
must be supported by facts.
33. Professor Sheinin in his Report, on the one hand, cites cases of the application of the Russian
anti-extremism statute (Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 “On Combating Extremist
Activities”), which relate to organizations set up by people of different ethnic origin in
different parts of Russia, on the other hand, among many organizations created by Crimean
Tatars could find the only one prohibited judicially while enforcing the anti-extremism
statute. Therefore, he failed to prove that the application of this law discriminates against a
concrete ethnic group within the framework of the ICERD.
34. Professor Scheinin in his Report (paragraph 34) recognizes that “[t]he word ‘extremism’ has
gradually made its way into international policy documents, usually in the qualified form of
‘violent extremism’ or, more complete formulation, ‘violent extremism which can be
conductive to terrorism’ or ‘violent extremism that can lead to terrorism’ (footnotes
omitted)”34. But in reality, the term ‘extremism’ in various word combinations is intensively
used in the 21st century at the level of international organizations and at the national level.
It is possible to add some examples to only two mentioned by Professor Scheinin. Thus, on
12 February 2016 the UN Secretary-General presented to the UN General Assembly the Plan
of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. This Plan of Action was welcomed by the UN
General Assembly in its Resolution A/70/674. In the same year, on 7-8 April, the Geneva
Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism – The Way Forward was held35. At the UN
General Assembly (Seventy-Fifth Session, 89th Meeting) on 6 July 2021 (GA/12344)
speakers stress need to address root causes of terrorism, violent extremism amidst fallout
from pandemic, as General Assembly continues debate on global strategy36. The Sixteenth
Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to International Peace
and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Member States in
Countering the Threat reads (1 February 2023): “The United Nations and the African Union
organized two meetings of a joint technical working group on preventing violent extremism
conducive to terrorism and countering terrorism to strengthen coherence, coordination and
34 Expert Report of Professor Martin Scheinin, p. 18, ¶34. See Reply, Annex 7.
35 United Nations, Office of Counter-Terrorism, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, available at:
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/plan-of-action-to-prevent-violent-extremism.
36 United Nations, Meetings Coverage of the seventy-fifth session, 89th meeting, No. GA/12344, 6 July 2021, available
at: https://press.un.org/en/2021/ga12344.doc.htm.
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cooperation, inform joint analysis and develop recommendations to address the threat of
terrorism in Africa”37.
35. It is noted on the Website of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (dated
back to March 2019) with the reference to the UN Security Council that “states have an
obligation under international human rights law to protect individuals from terrorist acts and
incitement of such acts motivated by extremism and intolerance”, complying simultaneously
with the international human rights standards38. Experts also use the term ‘extremism’ in the
international context: for instance, article by Louis Rene Beres “Religious Extremism and
International Legal Norms: Perfidy, Preemption, and Irrationality”39, by Aisha Javed
Qureshi “Understanding Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism. A National Issue Within a
Global Context” (“In the United States, terrorists are usually associated with one of the six
most commonly known ideologies: right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism,
environmental extremism, nationalist/separatist extremism, religious extremism, and singleissue
extremism. Further, the nature of radicalization and types of extremist attacks are
dynamic, changing from year to year and from decade to decade”)40, by Heather Ashby “Far-
Right Extremism Is a Global Problem. And it is time to treat it like one” (“Over the course
of the 2000s, right-wing extremist ideas were mainstreamed as they permeated political
parties and influenced politicians”; analysis of the roots and consequences of several attacks
including of Breivik’ attack in Norway in 2011, racist attacks in South Carolina, US in 2015
and in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019, etc.)41. These are just some examples that show
an understanding at the international level of the importance of preventing extremism and
combating extremism.
37 CERD, Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General No. S/2023/76 on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to
international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the
threat, 1 February 2023, p. 12, ¶58, available at:
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2023%2F76&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangReq
uested=False.
38 K. Lavery, ANTI-EXTREMISM LAWS (US Commission on International Religious Freedom, March 2019), p. 1,
available at: https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Legislation%20Factsheet%20-%20Extremism_0.pdf.
39 L. Beres, Religious Extremism and International Legal Norms: Perfidy, Preemption, and Irrationality in CASE
WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Volume 39, Issue 3, 2007-2008, p, 709-730, available at:
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1317&context=jil.
40 A. Qureshi, Understanding Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism, a National Issue Within a Global Context in
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE JOURNAL, 14 August 2020, available at:
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/understanding-domestic-radicalization-and-terrorism.
41 Foreign Policy, Far-Right Extremism Is a Global Problem (15 January 2021), available at:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/far-right-extremism-global-problem-worldwide-solutions/.
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36. In paragraph 39 of his Report42, Professor Scheinin finally turns to the document directly
connected to the ICERD, to the CERD’s Concluding Observations of 2017. But he touches
upon these Concluding Observations superficially. Paragraph 11 of the CERD’s Concluding
Observations of 2017 does not support conclusions of Professor Scheinin: although
Concluding Observations describe the legal definition of extremist activity as “vague and
broad” the concern is expressed “that such broad definitions can be used arbitrarily”43,
nevertheless, the use of the modal verb “can” emphasizes ability, but not certainty. The
CERD does not advise repealing the Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activities”. So,
the CERD does not assess the Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activities” in whole
as a problematic and proposes only to make corrections in the wording of the definition of
extremism connecting it directly with Article 4 of the ICERD, and as it was mentioned “the
Committee recalls the mandatory nature of article 4, and observes that during the adoption
of the Convention, it ‘was regarded as central to the struggle against racial discrimination’44,
an evaluation which has been maintained in Committee practice”45.
37. Professor Scheinin makes an unfounded conclusion that the assessment of Russia’s antiextremism
law by the CERD in paragraph 11 of Concluding Observations of 2017 “provides
further support to conclude that, since 2014, the law had become a tool for suppressing
protest and dissent by Crimean Tatars and members of the Ukrainian ethnic community in
Crimea”46. However, neither Crimean Tatars, nor members of the Ukrainian ethnic
community are mentioned in paragraph 11 of the CERD’s Concluding Observations of 2017,
nor is Crimea mentioned in paragraph 11. The CERD never hesitates to indicate in its
concluding observations a specific ethnic community or group, which, in the CERD’s
opinion, is considered to be discriminated against. Since the CERD did not designate
42 Expert Report of Professor Martin Scheinin, p. 22-23, ¶39. See Reply, Annex 7.
43 CERD, Concluding observations No. CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24 on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth periodic
reports of the Russian Federation, 20 September 2017, ¶11, available at:
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FC%2FRUS%2FCO%2F23-
24&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
44 General recommendation XV on Article 4 of the Convention (1993) in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty No. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.8, 8 May 2006, p. 248, ¶1,
available at:
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=HRI%2FGEN%2F1%2FRev.8&Language=E&DeviceType=Deskto
p&LangRequested=False.
45 CERD, General recommendation No. 35, No. CERD/C/GC/35, 26 September 2013, p. 3-4, ¶10. Available at:
https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FC%2FGC%2F35&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop
&LangRequested=False.
46 Expert Report of Professor Martin Scheinin, pp. 22-23, ¶39. See Reply, Annex 7.
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Crimean Tatars members of the Ukrainian ethnic community (in Crimea) as discriminated
against in paragraph 11 of Concluding Observations of 2017, which is also devoted to the
Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activities”, it means that the CERD did not detect
the use of the Russia’s anti-extremist statute to discriminate against Crimean Tatars and
members of the Ukrainian ethnic community in Crimea. That is why the above-mentioned
conclusion of Professor Scheinin is unfounded.
38. Professor Scheinin in his Report gives three examples of decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights, in which the Court found the violation of provisions of the 1950 European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by Russia through applying the
anti-extremist statute47. Firstly, it should be noted that three cases, where a court find some
fault in a particular instance of the application of the law does not prove anything beyond
those particular cases. Secondly, two of these cases – Yefimov & Youth Human Rights Group
v. Russia (ECtHR App. Nos. 12385/15 & 51619/15, Judgment [Merits] 7 December 2021)
and Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia (ECtHR App. No. 1413/08 & 28621/11,
Judgment [Merits] 28 August 2018) – deal with religious matters and as such are not relevant
to the ICERD, in particular the CERD in its Opinion on individual communication No
37/2006 “recalls that the Convention does not cover discrimination based on religion alone,
and that Islam is not a religion practised solely by a particular group, which could otherwise
be identified by its ‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’”48.
39. The third example given in Professor Scheinin’s Report is the case Mukhin v. Russia (ECtHR
App. No. 3642/10). The Judgment on the merits was adopted by the European Court of
Human Rights on 14 December 2021 and a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR on the
freedom of expression was found, despite the fact that the newspaper “Duel” closed by a
Russian court decision had regularly disseminated anti-Semitic publications. In these
publications a pejorative name for Jews – Yids (жиды) – was used. The Judgment of the
ECtHR contains some excerpts from those publications. One of such examples is as follows:
“The media regulator commissioned a report from a panel of linguists about the
material published on 4 July 2006. On 9 April 2007 the panel concluded that the
following parts of D.’s text constituted calls for undermining the national
47 Ibid., p. 23, fn. 40.
48 A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark, Opinion No. CERD/C/71/D/37/2006 of 8 August 2007, Communication No. 37/2006, ¶6.3,
available at:
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2F71%2FD%
2F37%2F2006&Lang=en.
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security of the Russian Federation; statements aimed at inciting ethnic and
religious discord (рознь) as well as social discord combined with calls to
violence; statements aimed at debasing the dignity of the Russian nation
(русская нация); statements calling for the full destruction of the Russian State
and people of Jewish and Russian ethnicity: ‘All those people are corrupt, went
crazy, became morons, chauvinists and patriotic bourgeois ... All fully support
and actively strengthen their bastard Yid (жидовская) army of Russian slaves
and Jewish generals, their bloody dogs of cops and FSB officers; their frantic
‘Israeli’-type patriotism, their rotten church of Satan and Antichrist (Russian
Orthodox Church) with its Yid priests and Yid bishops and so on. Only a bunch
of nationalists of the Russian blood argue for the total destruction of the Jewish
Russia. Russia is a Satanist Russia as even the atheist Limonov stated. It should
be fully destroyed. In the name of God and the Aryan Russian nation’”49.
40. As one can notice at the end of this citation Aryan Russian nation is mentioned, which is an
obvious connotation with Nazi and neo-Nazi terminology.
41. The CERD also has experience dealing with cases in which freedom of expression and racist
(in particular, anti-Semitic) statements collide. One of these cases is the Jewish community
of Oslo et al. v. Norway, the Opinion of 15 August 2005. In this case, several Jewish and
human rights organizations complained that under the pretext of protecting freedom of
speech the Supreme Court of Norway exempted from liability persons disseminating racist
statements and appeals. In particular, on 19 August 2000, during a neo-Nazi group march its
leader Mr Terje Sjolie (Sjølie) pronounced as follows: “While we stand here, over 15,000
Communists and Jew-lovers are gathered at Youngstorget in a demonstration against
freedom of speech and the white race. Every day immigrants rob, rape and kill Norwegians,
every day our people and country are being plundered and destroyed by the Jews, who suck
our country empty of wealth and replace it with immoral and un-Norwegian thoughts. …Our
dear Führer Adolf Hitler and Rudolf Hess sat in prison for what they believed in, we shall
not depart from their principles and heroic efforts, on the contrary we shall follow in their
footsteps and fight for what we believe in, namely a Norway built on National
Socialism…”50 The Committee considered
49 Mukhin v. Russia, No. 3642/10, Judgment of 14 December 2021, ¶26, available at:
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-213867%22]}.
50 The Jewish community of Oslo et al. v. Norway, Opinion No. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 of 15 August 2005,
Communication No. 30/2003, ¶2.1, available at: https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD67/CERDC-
67-D-30-2003-En.pdf.
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“these statements to contain ideas based on racial superiority or hatred; the
deference to Hitler and his principles and ‘footsteps’ must in the Committee’s
view be taken as incitement at least to racial discrimination, if not to violence”51.
“As to whether these statements are protected by the ‘due regard’ clause
contained in article 4, the Committee notes that the principle of freedom of
speech has been afforded a lower level of protection in cases of racist and hate
speech dealt with by other international bodies, and that the Committee’s own
General recommendation XV clearly states that the prohibition of all ideas based
upon racial superiority or hatred is compatible with the right to freedom of
opinion and expression. The Committee notes that the ‘due regard’ clause relates
generally to all principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, not only freedom of speech. Thus, to give the right to freedom of speech
a more limited role in the context of article 4 does not deprive the due regard
clause of significant meaning, all the more so since all international instruments
that guarantee freedom of expression provide for the possibility, under certain
circumstances, of limiting the exercise of this right. The Committee concludes
that the statements of Mr. Sjolie, given that they were of
exceptionally/manifestly offensive character, are not protected by the due regard
clause, and that accordingly his acquittal by the Supreme Court of Norway gave
rise to a violation of article 4, and consequently article 6, of the Convention”52.
42. It is noteworthy that Professor Scheinin in his Report, which is expected to be devoted to the
analysis of the ICERD), is based predominantly on instruments and acts not relating directly
to the ICERD. Professor Scheinin in his Report (paragraph 22) writes that his analysis
focuses on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “due to its close
interrelationship with the ICERD”53.
43. I dare to quote so extensively from the CERD’s Opinion on Communication No. 30/2003
(The Jewish community of Oslo et al. v. Norway) just to show that although international
human rights bodies act in harmony, their attitudes to limitation of certain human rights,
correlation between human rights, which are to be protected, do not coincide completely.
That is why conclusions about a particular human rights international instrument cannot be
primarily based on a study of the text and practice of applying other human rights
international instruments.
51 Ibid., ¶10.4.
52 Ibid., ¶10.5.
53 Expert Report of Professor Martin Scheinin, p. 10, ¶22. See Reply, Annex 7.

Annex 19
Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel, 28 February 2023
(translation)

Annex 19
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
EXPERT REPORT
OF VALERY VIKTOROVICH ENGEL
28 FEBRUARY 2023
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 5
A. First Report ....................................................................................................................... 5
B. Qualifications of the Expert .............................................................................................. 7
C. Structure of This Expert Report ........................................................................................ 8
II. COMBATING EXTREMISM CAN BE A LEGITIMATE GROUND FOR RESTRICTING RIGHTS
WITHOUT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ............................................................................... 9
III. INVALIDITY OF THE THESIS ON DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION'S ANTI-EXTREMIST LEGISLATION IS SUPPORTED BY INTERNATIONAL
PRACTICE ....................................................................................................................... 10
A. Countering Extremism Is a Universally Recognised Challenge, while Models of
Countering Extremism May Differ ................................................................................. 10
B. The Model of Countering Hateful Extremism Is Used in Both the “European” and
“Shanghai” Definitions ................................................................................................... 13
C. Russian Anti-Extremist Legislation Conforms with the Generally Accepted Model of
Countering Hateful Extremism ....................................................................................... 21
IV. COMBATING “HATEFUL” EXTREMISM IS A LEGITIMATE GOAL RELATED TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER ICERD ................................................... 25
V. ETHNICITY DOES NOT INCLUDE POLITICAL BELIEFS RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
TERRITORIES .................................................................................................................. 29
VI. THE PROTECTION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY UNDER RUSSIAN LAW DOES NOT
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ANY ETHNIC GROUP EITHER IN PURPOSE OR IN EFFECT
WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 1.1 OF ICERD. ..................................................... 30
VII. PROHIBITING EXTREMIST AND TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS HAS NOTHING TO DO
WITH RACIAL DISCRIMINATION EITHER IN PURPOSE OR IN EFFECT .......................... 35
VIII. BANNING EXTREMIST ORGANISATIONS IS NOT A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ........................................................................................... 42
IX. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................. 47
X. EXPERT DECLARATION .................................................................................................. 50
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. I, Valery Viktorovich Engel, have previously prepared an expert report on the issues
raised in the dispute with Ukraine in the case concerning the application of the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(hereinafter the “First Report”).
A. FIRST REPORT
2. The First Report dealt with an assessment of current threats posed by extremism and
radicalisation of society, and how to counter those threats, including in Crimea. In the
First Report I came to the following conclusions, in particular:
(a) Although there are different views on extremism in different countries, there is
consensus on its main feature as an activity based on extreme views aimed at
destroying the basic values of society and dismantling existing social and political
systems. There is also consensus that extremism exists in two forms – violent and
hateful. Some countries have criminalised only violent extremism (the so-called
“American” model), while others have criminalised both violent and hateful
extremism, i.e. not only terrorism and everything related to it, but also the
incitement of hatred and spreading hateful views (the so-called “European” and
“Shanghai” models of countering extremism). The latter include such countries as
Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, all the countries of the former Soviet Union,
and a number of other countries in Europe and Asia. They proceed from the premise
that inciting hatred against certain social groups leads to the radicalisation of the
population, which leads to violent extremism and terrorism. This viewpoint is
gaining popularity worldwide, as evidenced by recent scientific research.
(b) The main actors in extremist manifestations are extremist communities and
individual extremists who do not belong to any community.
(c) All of the countries we have monitored have similar methods of countering
extremism. These include preventive and precautionary measures, which are
generally implemented by law enforcement agencies with the involvement of civil
society institutions, social, educational and medical services; measures to thwart
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extremist crimes (if they could not be prevented) and protect infrastructure
facilities; and measures to deal with their consequences.
(d) Security requirements over the past 20 years have led to stricter anti-extremist
legislation in most countries around the world. All of the countries we have
monitored have enacted legislation expanding the scope of such legislation to
varying degrees, increasing penalties and extending the powers of special services
in combating extremism, including control over the Internet. Besides, immigration
rules have also been tightened. Russian lawmaking in that sense has evolved in line
with the general trend.
(e) An analysis of law enforcement practices in countering extremism shows that they
have also evolved in the direction of tightening in all monitored countries. In
general, it implied more active and frequent application of controls over the
activities of radical organisations in online and offline environments, as well as
measures to suppress extremist activity, including arrests and detentions, banning
religious, non-governmental organisations and political parties affiliated with
extremist groups.
(f) An analysis of the ideology, strategy and tactics of the activities in Crimea of the
three organizations banned in the Russian Federation, namely Tablighi Jamaat
(recognized in Russia as an extremist organization in 2009), Hizb ut-Tahrir
(recognized in Russia as a terrorist organization in 2003) and the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People (recognized in Russia as an extremist organization in 2016),
has shown that their prohibition is justified not only under the Russian antiextremist
legislation, but also under international law, as they either seek to destroy
the existing socio-political system (dismantling the secular state and replacing it
with a religious Islamist state) or support and use blatantly violent terrorist methods
to achieve their political goals.1
3. This Expert Report supplements the First Report and also provides an assessment of some
of Ukraine's arguments regarding extremist legislation and law enforcement practices in
the Russian Federation as set out in Ukraine's Reply to the Russian Federation’s Counter-
1 Expert Report of Valery Victorovich Engel, ¶¶456-479. See Counter-Memorial (CERD), Annex 22.
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Memorial (hereinafter, “Ukrainian Reply”) and in the Expert Report by Professor Martin
Sheinin annexed to the Ukrainian Reply (hereinafter, “Sheinin Report”).
B. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE EXPERT
4. I, Valery Viktorovich Engel, am Candidate of Science (History), a specialist in human
rights in international relations, and Head of the Centre for the Study of Extremism and
Radicalism attached to the Moscow Institute of Economics. I am also a Senior Researcher
at the Centre for the Analysis of Right-Wing Radicalism in London (FRAN) and Director
of the Institute for the Study of National Policy and Interethnic Relations (Russia), which
specialises in research of xenophobia and radicalism within the OSCE area. I am also an
Honorary Doctor of the Department of Hebraic Studies at the Sorbonne II University in
Paris (1994) and a member of the Global Research Network (GRN) of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) of the United Nations Security
Council.
5. I also lead an international research team that has been preparing reports on the state of
xenophobia, radicalism, extremism and minority rights violations in Europe since 2012,
and have participated in regular expert meetings on right-wing radicalism since 2018 at
the invitation of the UNHRC. In 2021-22, I provided advice on anti-Semitism and
xenophobia to the Section for Combating Racial Discrimination, Rule of Law and
Equality against Racial Discrimination of the UN Human Rights Office.
6. I have extensive personal experience of working with ethnic and religious groups, as I
have long worked in various Jewish organizations, was a member of the executive
committee of the World Jewish Congress from 1990 to 1995, was vice-president of the
Federal Jewish National Cultural Autonomy of Russia, served as executive vice-president
of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia, where I was engaged, among other
things, in combating anti-Semitism and xenophobia, as well as in issues of cooperation
with religious organizations and ethnic unions.
7. I have also authored and co-authored 10 monographs and over 60 articles dedicated to
minority rights, xenophobia, extremism and radicalism, and analysis of legislative and
law enforcement trends in countering those phenomena.
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C. STRUCTURE OF THIS EXPERT REPORT
8. Having analysed Ukraine’s arguments, I come to the following conclusions regarding
contemporary international law and law enforcement practices relating to extremism in
this Report:
(a) In Section II, I refute the Ukrainian expert Prof. Sheinin’s assertion that national
security and other legitimate aims, including combating extremism, cannot
constitute grounds for restricting rights that exclude racial discrimination.
(b) In Section III, I show that, contrary to the claims of Ukrainian expert Prof. Sheinin,
countering extremism is a universally accepted goal and justifiable objective that is
legitimate from the perspective of the international community. Although there is
some divergence between different models of countering extremism, so-called
“hateful extremism” is recognized as a threat both in the West (“European model”)
and in the East (“Shanghai model”).
(c) In section IV, I argue that combating “hateful extremism” is a legitimate goal
stemming from, among other things, obligations under ICERD, and refute the
highly dubious position of Prof. Sheinin that, allegedly, the promotion of interracial
and interethnic discord can somehow be an integral part of ethnic origin, and that
combating that phenomenon allegedly constitutes “racial discrimination”.
(d) In Section V, I note that ethnicity does not include political beliefs, including those
concerning the statehood of a territory. That issue is discussed in more detail in
Prof. Avtonomov's report.
(e) In Section VI, I demonstrate that the protection of territorial integrity under the
Russian law does not discriminate against any ethnic group either in purpose or in
effect in the sense of Article 1.1 of ICERD.
9. In section VII I show that banning extremist and terrorist organisations has nothing to do
with racial discrimination in purpose or effect, and in section VIII - that such a ban does
not constitute a restriction of the right to freedom of association.
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II. COMBATING EXTREMISM CAN BE A LEGITIMATE GROUND FOR
RESTRICTING RIGHTS WITHOUT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
10. First of all, I would like to dispel the unfounded assertion by the Ukrainian expert, Prof.
Sheinin, that any reference by the Russian Federation to national security interests or any
other legitimate aims, including the fight against extremism, “cannot justify a deviation
from ICERD and its absolute prohibition against racial discrimination.” The Ukrainian
expert has substituted concepts: the very existence of racial discrimination, according to
its definition in Article 1 of the Convention, depends on whether there has been
“distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.” If human rights have been restricted not because of the above differentiation
on racial grounds, but because of legitimate measures taken to protect public interests
such as national security, public order and the protection of human rights (which includes
combating extremism), then there was no racial discrimination ab initio.
11. The text of the Convention confirms the existence of exceptions to the regime it
establishes; and Prof. Sheinin himself recognizes this in his report.2 The Ukrainian side
has also recognised in its Memorial that differential treatment does not constitute racial
discrimination where there is an “objective and reasonable justification”3 and has
included national security, public order, prevention of crime, protection of public health
and protection of the rights and freedoms of others among the possible justifications.4
12. Thus, contrary to Prof. Sheinin’s assertion, the above-mentioned legitimate aims, which,
as I prove in my conclusions, include the fight against extremism, can constitute a ground
for restricting rights without racial discrimination. Moreover, as will be shown below, in
some cases such measures are necessary precisely in order to combat racial discrimination
and implement obligations under ICERD.
2 Reply, Annex 7, ¶12.
3 Memorial, ¶574.
4 Memorial, ¶482.

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intolerance, “in the light of the rise in electoral support for parties inspired by racist
ideas”,9 as well as Muslim fundamentalism. 10
17. The “Shanghai” definition is similar to the “European” one, but contains a number of
distinguishing features. It was formulated on 15 June 2001 at the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) conference in the Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism
and Extremism signed by the participating countries, and then updated in the SCO
Convention on Countering Extremism on 9 June 2017. The Shanghai model views
extremism as a “violent and unconstitutional” way of resolving “political, social, racial,
national and religious conflicts”. In contrast to the European definition, the Shanghai
model designates as extremism not only the incitement of racial, ethnic and religious
hatred, but also political and social discord.
18. The high likelihood of Prof. Sheinin being a proponent of the “American” model of
countering extremism in no way makes other models non-existent and not widely spread
around the world. Each model has its advantages and disadvantages. The “American”
model focuses on violence but overlooks activities that lead up to it, i.e. spread hatred.
The “European” model differs in its broader definition of extremism, which includes
“hate speech”, the criminalisation of which prevents the situation from escalating to direct
physical violence. The “Shanghai” model of extremism does not differ much from the
“European” model, the difference being in the protected groups and the presence of the
principle of “constitutionality”, which is interpreted differently in each country depending
on the specifics of national legislation.
19. Prof. Sheinin’s attempt to present the American model exclusively as the only one that
“enjoy[s] legitimacy in the eyes of the international community” is bewildering. Even the
“European” model is adopted in more states and by larger population than the “American”
one; while the “Shanghai” model is the most widely spread in terms of population and
territory. The fact that Prof. Sheinin denies billions of people the legitimacy of their legal
regulation testifies to the blatant bias of his approach.
9 PACE Resolution 1454 (2010), ¶2, available at:
https://pace.coe.int/pdf/53f0236cc815b3e4910d3adf1628681fc418a4620b2a2ca7da2cb9ee27a8e2af/resolution%
201754.pdf.
10 Ibid, ¶3.
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B. THE MODEL OF COUNTERING HATEFUL EXTREMISM IS USED IN BOTH THE
“EUROPEAN” AND “SHANGHAI” DEFINITIONS
20. Countries that take these approaches to countering extremism include all former Soviet
republics, including the Baltic States and Ukraine itself, the SCO countries, France, Italy,
Germany, Britain (Scotland), Spain and others. These countries are moving away from a
model of countering exclusively violent extremism, criminalizing incitement and
dissemination of hatred, although they often do not use the term “extremism” as such.
This is a given, confirmed by my, and not only my, many years of research, which I cite
in the First Report.11 Prof. Sheinin denies those facts, but provides no evidence of other
tendencies.
21. As already indicated in the First Report, the position of the aforementioned countries was
most clearly expressed by Ms. Sarah Khan, the British government's Independent Advisor
on Extremism, who introduced the term “hateful extremism” into legal circulation. In
2019, she set forth her findings in a report entitled “Challenging Hateful Extremism”, in
which she characterised it as behaviours:
(a) that can incite and amplify hate, or engage in persistent hatred, or equivocate about
and make the moral case for violence;
(b) that draw on hateful, hostile or supremacist beliefs directed at an out-group who are
perceived as a threat to the wellbeing, survival or success of an in-group;
(c) that cause, or are likely to cause, harm to individuals, communities or
wider society.12
22. Significantly, in support of the need for a broad interpretation of the term “extremism”,
the British Commission on Countering Extremism has determined that examples of
incitement of hatred against others may include active hate propaganda against minorities
“from far right demonstrations in Sunderland or activists from Hizb ut-Tahrir spreading
11 See V. Engel, J. Camus, et al., XENOPHOBIA, RADICALISM AND HATE CRIMES IN THE UN REGION 2018-2020
(Moscow Economic Institute, European Center for Democracy Development, 2021), available at: https://civicnation.
org/pan-european-report/Report_radicalism_2018_2020.pdf; E. Bleich, The FREEDOM TO BE RACIST? HOW
THE US AND EUROPE STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE FREEDOM AND COMBAT RACISM (OUP, 2011), Chapter 5, pp. 85-
105, available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739684.003.0005.
12 GOV.UK, Independent advisor calls for overhaul of extremism strategy (7 October 2019), available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/independent-advisor-calls-for-overhaul-of-extremism-strategy
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hate-filled views about LGBTQ+ people.”13 In other words, the issue is not about threats
to individual persons, which would fit well with the “American” model of violent
extremism, but about provoking hatred against social groups (and not only along ethnic
lines). In fact, this is the main difference between the two models.
23. Accordingly, all anti-extremist legislation in countries adopting the “European” or
“Shanghai” concept of extremism is built precisely on protecting the rights and freedoms
not only of individuals, but also of social groups, as this creates an opportunity to prevent
violent crimes against individuals.
24. The “European” model of countering extremism differs from the “American” model in
that it includes preventive law enforcement measures, which, as I pointed out in my First
Report, include actions to stop the spread of hatred and radicalisation of citizens in online
and offline environments. I also gave examples from EU law enforcement practices there,
which were not taken into account by the opponents.
25. As already indicated, the “Shanghai” model of extremism in that sense does not differ
much from the European model. Its concept of extremism comprises infringement on the
constitutional order, which is also considered to be a crime against the state in Western
countries, but does not include among the protected groups minorities characterized by
gender, age and sexual orientation, and criminalises incitement of discord based on sociopolitical
grounds.
26. Anyway, both the European and Shanghai models are models based on the theory of
hateful extremism, when at issue is a social group rather than an individual, and not a
specific physical threat, but instigation of hatred against that group.
27. There exist a number of examples of European legislation based on that model. For
example, legislation in Scotland was supplemented in March 2021 with the “Hate Crime
and Public Order Act”,14 which criminalised a new separate offence of “Intentionally
stirring up hatred” against social groups characterised by age, disability, race, colour,
nationality (including citizenship), ethnic or national origin, religion or perceived
religious affiliation, sexual orientation, transgender identity and variations of sex
13 Ibid.
14 Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021, available at:
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2021/14/enacted/data.pdf.
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characteristics.15 The law contains many general terms that allow for judicial discretion,
such as “prejudice”, “malice”, “reasonable person's” opinion and “ill-will”, which are not
specified in the law.
28. The fact of prejudice is determined here by the victim's affiliation with one of the
protected groups. That was characteristic of the British law and of the Anglo-Saxon law
in general even before. However, while previously this was an aggravating circumstance
for offenders committing crimes against persons belonging to minorities (hate crimes),
now the list of such crimes in Scotland has been supplemented with “racially aggravated
harassment” or a situation where “it would appear to a reasonable person” that racially
motivated harassment, or “stirring up hatred” against a particular social group is taking
place.
29. Another example is France. In that country exists Article 212.1 of the Internal Security
Code (as amended 24 August 2021), which is directed against organisations that
propagate “discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group of persons”. In
particular, it provides for the prohibition of activities of those associations and unions
(a) that provoke armed demonstrations or violent acts against people or property;
(b) that resemble combat groups or private militias by their uniform and organisation;
(c) whose goals or actions are aimed at undermining the integrity of the national
territory or attacking the republican form of government by force;
(d) whose aim is either unification of those found to have collaborated with the enemy,
or glorification of such collaboration;
(e) that either incite, or promote through their actions, discrimination, hatred or
violence against a person or group of persons on the grounds of their origin, gender,
sexual orientation, gender identity or their true or supposed affiliation or nonaffiliation
with an ethnic group, nation, supposed race or religion, or the promotion
15 Ibid., ¶1.
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of ideas or theories aimed at justifying or encouraging such discrimination, hatred
or violence.16
30. As we can see, here, too, there exist a number of provisions which can be interpreted quite
broadly. For example, “cooperation with the enemy”, “glorification of this cooperation”,
“actions which promote discrimination”. At the same time, according to Article 212-1-1,
to charge an entire organisation with such unlawful acts, which the law equates to crimes
against the state power,17 the actions of one or several persons belonging to that
organisation will be sufficient.18
31. The French law, as well as legislation of some other countries that follow the model of
countering hateful extremism, provides for criminal penalties for such offences. For
example, Article 24 of Law No. 2012-1432 “On Security and Combating Terrorism,”
criminalised in 2019, prescribes punishment of one year in prison or a €45,000 fine for
persons who “have provoked discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group
of persons on the grounds of their origin or their affiliation or non-affiliation with an
ethnic group, nation, race or a particular religion. ”19
32. Paragraph 85 (violation of the ban on forming an association) of the German Criminal
Code provides for up to 3 years’ imprisonment for participating in the activities of a
banned public organisation or political party.20 Paragraph 90a provides for the same
punishment for insulting or “maliciously humiliating” the Federal Republic of Germany
or one of its lands, or their constitutional system. All of these formulations are also of a
general nature and subject to interpretation.
16 French Internal Security Code, ¶L212-1, available at:
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000025503132/LEGISCTA000025505187/#LEGIS
CTA000025508342.
17 French Penal Code, Chapter I: Crimes against Peace, ¶¶431-1 - 431-30, available at:
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000006070719/LEGISCTA000006136046/#LEGIS
CTA000006136046.
18 French Internal Security Code, ¶L212-1, available at:
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000025503132/LEGISCTA000025505187/#LEGIS
CTA000025508342.
19 LOI No. 2019-222 on 2018-2022 programmes and justice reforms, 23 March 2019, ¶71, available at:
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/LEGIARTI000038262626/2019-03-25/.
20 German Criminal Code, Section 85, available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__85 html.
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33. Interestingly, although Ukraine does not have a specific legal act on extremism, it can be
inferred from its legislation that it also follows a model of countering hateful extremism.
Part 1 of Article 161 of the Criminal Code of that country reads as follows:
“Intentional acts aimed at inciting national, racial or religious enmity and
hatred, humiliating national honour and dignity or insulting the feelings of
citizens in relation to their religious beliefs, as well as direct or indirect
restriction of rights or establishment of direct or indirect privileges for
citizens on grounds of race, colour, political, religious or other beliefs, gender,
disability, ethnic and social origin, property status, place of residence,
language or other characteristics -
shall be punishable by a fine of from two hundred to five hundred untaxable
minimum incomes of citizens or by restriction of liberty for up to five years,
or by deprivation of liberty for up to three years with or without deprivation
of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to
three years.”21
34. As we can see, that Article is also replete with opportunities for various broad
interpretations of its provisions such as “inciting enmity”, “humiliation of national honour
and dignity”, “insulting religious feelings” and limiting the rights of citizens “on other
grounds”.
35. In addition, the term “extremism” is contained in certain legal acts of Ukraine, primarily
in decisions of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDCU) and texts
of court decisions.
36. For instance, the NSDCU decision of 4 November 2014 instructed the State Television
and Radio Committee of Ukraine to “intensify work to counter propaganda of separatism,
extremism and radicalism.”22 Approved by the NSDCU on 15 October 2021 and enacted
by Decree of President V. Zelensky No. 685/2021 of 28 December 2021, the “Information
Security Strategy” blames the Russian Federation for “provoking manifestations of
extremism in Ukrainian society.”23 In the National Security Strategy of Ukraine,
approved by the NSDCU on 14 September 2020 and enacted on the same day by
21 Criminal Code of Ukraine, Special Part, Section 5, Article 161, available at: https://urst.com.ua/ru/uku/st-161.
22 Decision of the NSDCU “On urgent measures to ensure state security” (4 November 2014), available at:
https://zakon rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0014525-14#Text.
23 President of Ukraine Decree No. 685/2021 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of
Ukraine of 15 October 2021 ‘On Information Security Strategy” (28 December 2021), available at:
https://zakon rada.gov.ua/laws/show/685/2021#Text.
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Presidential Decree No. 392/2020, the term “extremism” is used three times among
relevant threats.24
37. In October 2017, the Verkhovnaya Rada adopted Law No. 2165-VIII “On Amendments
to the Law of Ukraine ‘On Artistic Touring’ Dealing with Certain Peculiarities of Holding
Artistic Touring Events with the Participation of Citizens of the Aggressor State”. It
prohibited “propaganda of war, terrorism, extremism, separatism, communist and/or
national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and their symbols” during concerts.25
38. The annual Ukraine-NATO national cooperation programme for 2013, approved by
Presidential Decree No 371/2013 of 5 July 2013, envisaged information exchange with
the Alliance on “international extremist and terrorist organisations”.26
39. The Unified State Register of Court Decisions of Ukraine has 365 court decisions
(including 64 on criminal cases) that refer to the concept of “extremism” and 910
(including 82 on criminal cases) that use the adjective “extremist”.
40. Ukraine’s internal affairs bodies, at least as of the summer of 2014, had departments for
“combating ethnic organised crime and extremism”.27
41. Ukrainian criminal law doctrine, including textbooks for training law enforcement
officers, refers to extremism in the general context of hate crimes and discrimination.28
24 President of Ukraine Decree No. 392/2020 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of
Ukraine of 14 September 2020 on the National Security Strategy of Ukraine” (14 September 2020), available at:
https://zakon rada.gov.ua/laws/show/392/2020#Text.
25 Law No. 2165-VIII “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On Artistic Touring’ Regarding Peculiarities of
Artistic Touring Events Involving Citizens of the Aggressor State” (5 October 2017), available at:
https://zakon rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2165-19#Text.
26 President of Ukraine Decree No. 371/2013 “On Approval of the Annual National Cooperation Programme
Ukraine-NATO for 2013” (5 July 2013), available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/371/2013#Text.
27 See: Determination of the Stryi District Court of Lvov Oblast of 15 August 2014 on case No. 456/3188/14-k.
Available at: https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/50872739; See also the Ruling of the Lutsk City Court of the
Volyn Oblast of 8 August 2014 on case No. 161/12742/14-k. Available at:
https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/48267276.
28 See: A.A. Grinchak. COUNTERING RACISM, XENOPHOBIA AND EXTREMISM. Kiev. 2018. p.150. Available at:
https://nlu.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/phd_5_copy-1.pdf; See also: COUNTERING MANIFESTATIONS OF
TERRORISM, SEPARATISM, EXTREMISM AND ILLEGAL MIGRATION IN MODERN CONDITIONS. CONFERENCE
MATERIALS, DNEPR (28 October 2016), available at: https://dduvs.in.ua/wpcontent/
uploads/files/Structure/library/student/20161103.pdf.
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42. Thus, countries that follow a model of countering hateful extremism use broader language
in their legislation, which is also reflected in their criminal law, which criminalises the
spread of hatred, including through the participation of citizens in the activities of banned
organisations and public events.
43. The criticism of the Ukrainian side also suggests that, as Prof. Sheinin writes, “[t]here is
a fundamental difference between countering terrorism and countering ‘extremism’, as
there is a large number of international conventions and protocols that impose upon States
legal obligations in the field of counter-terrorism.”29 He refers to the fact that the Shanghai
Convention “is not an instrument comparable to global conventions and protocols against
terrorism.” It is not quite clear on what grounds Prof. Sheinin proposes to make such a
comparison. It is an obvious fact that states regularly conclude regional conventions on
issues that have not yet been the subject of universal conventions; in no way does it detract
from their importance.
44. Besides, in addition to the Shanghai Convention, there are a number of international
documents that prescribe the countering of hate extremism. It is not only the Convention
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on Combating Extremism (whose importance,
incidentally, was noted by the Venice Commission),30 which criminalises incitement of
political, social, racial, national and religious hatred; propaganda of exclusivity,
superiority or inferiority of a person on the basis of his/her political, racial, national and
religious affiliation; public calls to commit the above acts; as well as mass production,
storage and distribution of extremist materials for the purpose of extremist propaganda.
45. It is also worth mentioning Article 13 of PACE Resolution 1344 (2003) “Threats Posed
to Democracy by Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe” which I have already
cited, as well as PACE Resolution 1754 (2010). In the latter, PACE reiterated its call on
member states to introduce provisions in their criminal legislation “against incitement to
racial hatred or hate speech”;31 to ensure the systematic and consistent application of anti-
29 Martin Sheinin Expert Report, Part V, ¶33. See Reply, Appendix 7.
30 Venice Commission, Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Combating
Extremist Activity (20 June 2012), ¶12, available at:
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)016-e.
31 PACE Resolution 1454 (2010), ¶13.6, available at:
https://pace.coe.int/pdf/53f0236cc815b3e4910d3adf1628681fc418a4620b2a2ca7da2cb9ee27a8e2af/resolution%
201754.pdf.
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extremist legislation to all forms of extremism, and to “enforce the penalties foreseen by
their legislation against public incitement to violence, racial discrimination and
intolerance... ”.32
46. Note also the Venice Commission’s Report on the Relationship between Freedom of
Expression and Freedom of Religion (2008), which explicitly states that a person who
incites hatred cannot enjoy the protection afforded by Article 10.1 of the ECHR, as “hate
speech thus justifies criminal sanctions”.33
47. The Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 2009
adopted a model law “On Countering Extremism”, which defines extremism as follows:
“Extremism is an infringement on the foundations of the constitutional order
and the security of the state, as well as a violation of human and civil rights,
freedoms and legitimate interests carried out through the denial of legal
and/or other generally accepted norms and rules of social behaviour;
Extremist activity: the activity of a public or religious association, the media
or another organization or individual in planning, organizing, preparing or
committing acts aimed at
- forcible alteration of the foundations of the constitutional order and violation
of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state;
- public justification of terrorism or public calls for terrorist activities;
- inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred;
- propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person (social
group) on the grounds of his social, racial, national, ethnic, religious or
linguistic affiliation or attitude towards religion;
- violation of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of a person and a
citizen on the grounds of his social, racial, national, ethnic, religious or
linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;
- obstructing the exercise by citizens of their voting rights and the right to
participate in a referendum or violating the secrecy of the vote by violence or
the threat of violence.”34
48. Thus, there are not only international conventions and protocols that impose legal
obligations on states to counter terrorism, but also documents that prescribe countering
32 Ibid., ¶13.5.
33 Venice Commission, Report No. 406 / 2006 “On the relationship between freedom of expression and freedom
of religion: the issue of regulation and prosecution of blasphemy, insults to religion and incitement to religious
hatred” (23 October 2008), available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDLAD(
2008)026-e.
34 CIS IPA Resolution No. 32-9 (14 May 2009), available at: https://base.spinform ru/show_doc fwx?rgn=30827.
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extremism, including the spread of hatred. In other words, the concept of hateful
extremism is becoming increasingly widespread around the world. Moreover, the
legislation of the Russian Federation is in line with global trends in combating extremism.
The opponents’ references to the fact that there exist more documents related to
combating terrorism and violent extremism in the world than to combating hateful
extremism is no proof that states are limited in adopting and enforcing such legislation.
C. RUSSIAN ANTI-EXTREMIST LEGISLATION CONFORMS WITH THE GENERALLY
ACCEPTED MODEL OF COUNTERING HATEFUL EXTREMISM
49. Countering hateful extremism is generally driven by objective reasons. The model is
mostly used in those countries that have been severely affected by domestic terrorism.
Russia, which from the collapse of the USSR until 2013 experienced an exponential
increase in extremist crime, including serious terrorist attacks, separatist conflicts and
sharp spikes in right-wing radical and Islamist crime, is also among them. 35
50. As in other countries, the Russian Federation's anti-extremist legislation aims to protect
certain social groups. According to Article 1 of the Federal Law on Combating Extremist
Activity No. 114 FZ, as well as Article 282 of the Criminal Code, such groups include:
races; ethnic groups; religious groups; linguistic groups; social classes; gender groups;
and origin groups.
51. As can be seen, the list of social groups protected by Russian legislation partially includes
groups protected by countries adhering to the “European” model of countering
extremism. Besides, based on the “Shanghai” model, Russia considers as extremist acts
violent alteration of the foundations of the constitutional system; violation of territorial
integrity, justification of terrorism; incitement of social, racial, national or religious
discord; propaganda of exclusivity on the grounds of social, racial, national, religious or
linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; violation of human rights on the same grounds;
violation of electoral rights; obstruction of activities of state bodies, electoral
commissions or public and religious organizations; use of Nazi insignia and symbols;
35 Ria, Russia's Largest Terrorist Attacks in 2000-2007. Synopsis (4 August 2008), available at:
https://ria.ru/20080804/150102309 html.
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financing of the abovesaid; and public and consciously false accusation of state officials
of extremist crimes.
52. Prof. Sheinin, in support of his position, refers to Opinion of the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) No. 660/2011 “On the Federal Law
on Combating Extremist Activitiey.” However, the Venice Commission (VC) does not
say anywhere in its opinion, as Prof. Sheinin tries to suggest, that the law “On Combating
Extremist Activity” is discriminatory towards ethnic or racial minorities or aims to
diminish their rights.
53. In his conclusion, Prof. Sheinin argues that the provision of the law relating to incitement
to social, racial, national or religious discord is formulated in a way that “represents
intended or at least likely application of the clauses to restrict the peaceful ways through
which groups based on their ethnic origin express their ethnic identity and their
commitment to maintaining it.”36 Prof. Sheinin makes such bold statements without
supporting them with any citations or arguments.
54. I think that he does not take into account the fact that such wording in the Russian law is
common in other countries which are guided by the model of countering hateful
extremism. It is difficult to understand how the wording of the Russian law “On
Combating Extremist Activity” quoted by him is any better than the wording given, for
example, in the Scottish law “The Hate Crime and Public Order Act” to describe offences
involving incitement to hatred: “A person commits an offence if he or she behaves in a
manner that a reasonable person would consider to be threatening, abusive or insulting ...
in doing so, the person intends to stir up hatred against a group of persons based on the
group being defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship), or
ethnic or national origins, …or a reasonable person would consider the behaviour … to
be likely to result in hatred being stirred up against such a group.”37
55. On the contrary, the Venice Commission recognises the “legitimate efforts” of the
Russian authorities “to combat extremism and related threats” and notes that the PACE
“expressed its concern over the challenge of fighting extremism and its most recent forms
36 Ibid.
37 Hate Crime and Public Order Act (Scotland) 2021, Part 2, available at:
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2021/14/enacted/data.pdf.
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and encouraged the member States of the Council of Europe to take resolute action in this
field”.38
56. The Commission only saw a certain flaw in this law in its lack of a violent element as the
only characteristic of extremism. In other words, the VC assumed that extremism can
only be violent.
57. In particular, paragraph 36 of the above-mentioned document states that “The Venice
Commission is of the opinion that in order to qualify ‘stirring up of social, racial, ethnic
or religious discord’ as ‘extremist activity’, the definition should expressly require the
element of violence.” 39
58. That approach reflects the realities of 2011/12, when the Opinion was prepared. At that
time, most countries were indeed guided by the “American” model of violent extremism,
but this is in no way characteristic of today's realities, where there is a clear trend away
from this model. Thus, the Commission refers to the Shanghai Convention on Combating
Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (SCO, 2001) definition of extremism, but naturally
does not take into account the changes that were later reflected in the 2017 Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation Convention on Countering Extremism. Nor does it take into
account the changes in anti-extremist legislation that have taken place in countries such
as France, Italy, Britain (Scotland), Latvia, Lithuania and many others.
59. If these realities are not taken into account, the same questions should be addressed to
other countries that adhere to the model of hateful extremism. They, as already indicated,
include not only the states mentioned above, but also Germany, Poland, Spain, Ukraine,
other countries of the former Soviet Union, etc.
60. The same applies to the conclusions of the Venice Commission that “to proclaim as
extremist any religious teaching or proselytising activity aimed at proving that a certain
worldview is a superior explanation of the universe, may affect the freedom of conscience
or religion of many persons.”40 This position is also no longer relevant, since Article 3.1
38 Venice Commission, Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Combating
Extremist Activity (20 June 2012), ¶73, available at:
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)016-e.
39 Ibid, ¶36.
40 Ibid., ¶38.
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was added to the Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activity” on 23 November 2015,
according to which “the Bible, the Koran, the Tanakh and the Ganjur, their contents and
quotations therefrom cannot be recognised as extremist materials.”41 Besides, the
legislator in the explanatory note referred to Article 28 of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation that guarantees “freedom of conscience, freedom of religious beliefs,
including the right to profess individually or jointly with others any religion or not to
profess any,” as well as to the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Associations.”
61. The VC's criticism also concerned the singling out of public officials from the entire body
of citizens of the Russian Federation, knowingly false accusations of whom of extremist
crimes are considered to be extremism,42 while the same acts committed against private
individuals are not considered to be such. Interestingly, this provision of Russian law
practically echoes §90b of the German Criminal Code, which prescribes up to 5 years
imprisonment for persons who “denigrate the legislative body, government or
constitutional court of the FRG or one of its members in that capacity in a manner which
endangers the reputation of the state.”43
62. It was exactly the threat to the reputation of the State from deliberately false fabrications
disseminated in the social environment and groundlessly provoking unrest, thereby
endangering public order, that gave rise to this subclause in Article 1.1 of the Federal Law
“On Combating Extremist Activities.”
63. Considering that the element of violence in defining extremist activity is no longer a
mandatory criterion, the issue remains of the broad interpretation of the law’s provision
by the Russian legislator. In other words, the Russian law delegates the interpretation of
a number of formulations to law enforcement bodies under the supervision of the
judiciary. As far as I am aware, that concern of the Commission has largely been rendered
41 Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On Combating Extremist Activity” (23 November 2015), Art. 3.1, available at:
https://base.garant ru/12127578/802464714d4d10a819efb803557e9689/.
42 Venice Commission, Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Combating
Extremist Activity (20 June 2012), ¶43, available at:
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)016-e.
43 German Criminal Code, Section 90b, available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__90b html.
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moot by the serious attention that the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has been
giving to the application of anti-extremist legislation.44
IV. COMBATING “HATEFUL” EXTREMISM IS A LEGITIMATE GOAL
RELATED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER ICERD
64. As one of his main arguments, Prof. Sheinin states that Federal Law No 114-FZ allegedly
“carries clear signs of the intended or likely use of its framework to target with adverse
effect groups characterized by their ‘race, colour, … or national or ethnic origin.’”45 In
his conclusion, Prof. Sheinin argues that the provision of the law relating to incitement to
social, racial, national or religious discord is worded in a way that “constitutes an
intentional or at least likely use of these provisions to limit the peaceful ways in which
groups based on ethnicity express their ethnic identity and commitment to maintaining
it.”46 Prof. Sheinin makes such bold statements without supporting them with any
citations or arguments.
65. That statement by Prof. Sheinin is not just surprising, but truly shocking. One gets the
impression that the Ukrainian expert has either not read the Russian law on combating
extremism, or deliberately misleads his readers. Since Prof. Sheinin is an authoritative
scholar, the first assumption is clearly implausible; hence, the second one remains.
66. The issue is that the phrase he quotes from Art.1.1 of the Law is taken out of context.
Prof. Sheinin does not cite the relevant provision in full, and in reality it reads as follows:
“(1) Extremist activities (extremism):
Propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person on the
grounds of his/her social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or
attitude to religion;
Violation of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of persons and
citizens on the grounds of their social, racial, national, religious or linguistic
affiliation or attitude to religion.”
44 Resolutins of the Plenum of the Supreme Court No. 11 of 28.06.2011, No. 41 of 03.11.2016, No. 32 of
20.09.2018 and No. 32 of 28.10.2021.
45 Martin Sheinin Expert Report, Part V, ¶44. See Reply, Appendix 7.
46 Ibid.
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67. Thus, the wording that Prof. Sheinin declares discriminatory is, on the contrary, aimed at
combating discrimination, and specifically at implementing Article 4 of ICERD, which
reads as follows:
“States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based
on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one
colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred
and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and
positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such
discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth
in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group
of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any
assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all
other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination,
and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an
offence punishable by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local,
to promote or incite racial discrimination.”
68. It is striking that Prof. Sheinin blatantly neglects to conduct a comparative analysis of this
provision of the Russian law and the legislation of other countries. It is easily explained
by the fact that, as a matter of fact, the wording of the Russian law is common to the other
countries that follow the model of countering hateful extremism. It is difficult to
understand, for example, how the wording of the Russian law “On Combating Extremist
Activity” quoted by him is better than the wording given, for example, in the “Hate Crime
and Public Order (Scotland) Act” to describe offences involving incitement to hatred:
“4. Offences of stirring up hatred
(1) A person commits an offence if-
(a) the person-
(i) behaves in a manner that a reasonable person would consider to be
threatening, abusive or insulting, or
(ii) communicates to another person material that a reasonable person would
consider to be threatening, abusive or insulting, and
(b) eitherAnnex
19
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(i) in doing so, the person intends to stir up hatred against a group of persons
based on the group being defined by reference to race, colour, nationality
(including citizenship), or ethnic or national origins, or
(ii) a reasonable person would consider the behaviour or the communication
of the material to be likely to result in hatred being stirred up against such a
group.” 47
69. Prof. Sheinin ignores even the opinion of the CERD Committee, which specifically
recommended that Russia, in the application of the Extremism Law and Article 282 of
the Criminal Code, focus on combating extremist organizations and members thereof that
are involved in activities motivated by racial, ethnic or religious hatred:
“The Committee recommends that the State party give primary consideration
to combating extremist organisations, and their members, engaging in
activities motivated by racial, ethnic or religious hatred or enmity, when
applying the Law on Combating Extremist Activities as well as article 282 of
the Criminal Code.”48
70. The Ukrainian side's assumptions are based on the fact that provisions of Russian antiextremist
legislation have been used to suppress the activities of organisations whose
membership included ethnic Crimean Tatars. However, in my First Report, I show that
organisations such as the Mejlis, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat are extremist not
only according to the Russian Federation Criminal Code, but also according to
international practice.49 The fact that these groups include, for example, Crimean Tatars
is explained both by their objectives (Mejlis) and by the ethnic composition of Crimean
Muslims, as far as the latter two religious organisations are concerned. At the same time,
the principle of equality before the law, declared in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Article 19 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 4
of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, prohibits unequal treatment of persons
who have committed a criminal or administrative offence based on their affiliation with
a particular social group, including ethnic, religious and racial communities.
71. If we follow Prof. Sheinin's logic, we should recognise that, for example, banning French
Muslims from participating in the activities of banned Salafist organisations such as the
47 Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021, Part 3, available at:
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2021/14/enacted/data.pdf
48 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination regarding the Russian
Federation, CERD/C/RUS/CO/19 (20 August 2008), ¶17.
49 See, for example, Expert Report of Valery V. Engel, ¶¶407-420. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 22.
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Collectif contre l'islamophobie en France (CCIF) in France, Ansaar International in
Germany or any of the banned “radical” mosques in France or Austria is an obstacle to
the expression of their ethnic identity by the Arab or Turkish population of those
countries.
72. The same can be said about the prohibition in the Russian Federation of right-wing radical
nationalist organizations, which unite in their ranks, among others, ethnic Russians, such
as: Religious group Krasnodar Orthodox Slavic community “Vek RA” (Vedic Culture of
Russian Aryans) of Scythian Vesi Rasseniya, Ryazan City Public Patriotic Organization
“Russian National Unity”, International Public Association “National Socialist Society”,
Primorye Regional Human Rights Public Organization “Union of Slavs”, Interregional
Public Movement “Slavic Union”, Interregional Public Association “Rus Spiritual
Kindred State” and others.
73. In 2022, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to ban the Ukrainian
paramilitary nationalist association “Azov” (“Azov Regiment”) from operating in the
country came into force.
74. The Azov Regiment's ultranationalist ideology has repeatedly been the subject of
criticism both inside Ukraine and from Western countries. For example, in October 2019
a group of 40 congressmen - members of the US Democratic Party - sent an appeal to the
State Department demanding that Azov be recognized as a terrorist organization. The
statement notes that Azov openly invites neo-Nazis into its ranks, and “in the relatively
short history of this group, the UN has documented human rights violations and cases of
torture.” The congressmen also pointed out in the appeal that Brenton Tarrant, who had
shot 50 people in a New Zealand mosque in March 2019, was linked to Azov and trained
at their base.50 The UN and human rights organisations have repeatedly informed about
the kidnapping, torture and rape of civilians by Azov servicemen.51
50 Strana.ua, The link between Azov and terrorist attacks in America is obvious. Why the US wants to equate
Ukraine's National Guard regiment with ISIS (October 22, 2019), available at: https://strana.today/news/229127-
azov-khotjat-vnesti-v-spisok-terroristov-ssha-chto-eto-oznachaet.html.
51 OHCHR, Report No. A/HRC/34/CRP.4 “On Sexual Violence Related to Conflict in Ukraine” (from 14 March
2014 to 31 January 2017), available at:
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwici5r
p86j9AhVE4qQKHR LDZsQFnoECBEQAw&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2F
files%2FHRBodies%2FHRC%2FRegularSessions%2FSession34%2FDocuments%2FA_HRC_34_CRP.4_E.doc
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75. Consequently, the mere fact that an extremist organisation has members of particular
ethnic groups does not mean that banning the group would be racially discriminatory.
76. Overall, the conclusion of this subsection is that Russian anti-extremist legislation is in
line with similar legislation in countries that follow the model of countering hateful
extremism. It means that it criminalises not only violent extremism, but also the
dissemination of hatred towards social groups in order to prevent violence. This approach
has its justification in international documents such as ICERD (Article 4), the 2017
Shanghai Convention, PACE resolutions 1344 (2003) and 1754 (2010), etc.
77. It does not discriminate against ethnic minorities due to ethnic affiliation of activists of
such banned extremist groups, because the activities of such groups were terminated not
because of the presence of individual members therein, but due to threats of violence or
incitement to hatred against other social groups.
V. ETHNICITY DOES NOT INCLUDE POLITICAL BELIEFS RELATING TO
THE STATUS OF TERRITORIES
78. One of the main arguments of Prof. Sheinin is that ethnicity is somehow inextricably
linked to certain political beliefs regarding the status of a particular territory. It is on the
basis of this assertion that Prof. Sheinin attempts to justify the allegedly discriminatory
nature of the anti-extremist legislation. I will not argue why Prof. Sheinin is wrong in this
basic premise of his position - my colleague, the expert Prof. Avtonomov, has already
done it well enough in his Report.
79. In essence, Prof. Sheinin ascribes some innate political qualities and attitudes to ethnic
groups, which in fact is not much different from racist ideas about the innateness of other
qualities in individual races.
80. Moreover, Prof. Sheinin's assertion in that context that the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
ethnic groups have anti-Russian sentiments and the Russian group has anti-Ukrainian
sentiments is objectively provoking interethnic discord, and not only in Crimea.
x&usg=AOvVaw0A14l-HsImtLVfbd2GyWcL; OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16
February to 15 May 2016), available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraine16May-15Aug2019_EN.pdf.
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81. Having outlined this general position, I will further elaborate in my conclusion on a
specific aspect - that the protection of territorial integrity, in particular, does not constitute
a discriminatory factor in terms of the Convention.
VI. THE PROTECTION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY UNDER RUSSIAN LAW
DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ANY ETHNIC GROUP EITHER IN
PURPOSE OR IN EFFECT WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 1.1 OF
ICERD.
82. Ukraine's Reply states that Russia allegedly uses Article 1.1. of the Law “On Combating
Extremist Activity” and Article 280.1 of its Criminal Code, which establishes liability for
public calls for actions aimed at violating territorial integrity of the country, to
discriminate against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea, who it believes are
entirely in favour of the return of the peninsula to Ukraine.
83. Our opponents argue that the legislation in question, in their view, contains “clear signs
of the purported or enabled use to target groups characterized by their `race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin’.”52
84. Prof. Sheinin explains that position in his Report by stating that the legislation in question
was applied to “the inhabitants of Crimea, including upon persons belonging to the
distinct ethnic communities of Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea.”53 He
further writes that “[w]hile many Russian-speakers or persons with a Russian ethnic
identity may have felt loyalty towards Ukraine, even more so members of the Ukrainian
ethnic community and of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea would naturally have had a moral
obligation of loyalty towards Ukraine.” 54
85. Here, Ukraine and Prof. Sheinin use a false argument about the existence of separate
ethno-political communities in Crimea, one part of which (Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians) support the return of the peninsula to Ukraine, while the other (Russians)
oppose it.55 Consequently, by applying the above article in Crimea, Russia, in their view,
52 Martin Sheinin Expert Report, Part V, ¶37. See Reply, Appendix 7.
53 Ibid., ¶38.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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again demonstrates a “discriminatory purpose” and a “discriminatory effect” on the
Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians living there.56
86. However, Prof. Sheinin does not substantiate his claims that all Ukrainians and Crimean
Tatars are allegedly in favour of Crimea being part of Ukraine, and vice versa - that all
Russians have the opposite viewpoint. It should also be mentioned that there exist a
number of independent sociological studies which prove that there is no
compartmentalisation of ethnic groups on the peninsula, let alone political contention
between them, including on the issue of the territorial affiliation of Crimea.57
87. Meanwhile, most UN member states have a prohibition in their legal systems against
activities aimed at violating the territorial integrity of their countries. For example, Article
212.1 of France's Internal Security Code prohibits the activities of any organisation and
criminalises participation in its activities if their “goals or actions are aimed at
undermining the integrity of the national territory or attacking the republican form of
government by force”:58
(a) Article 241 of the Italian Criminal Code provides for a minimum of 12 years
imprisonment for committing violent acts aimed at undermining the unity of the
state.59
(b) Paragraph 82 of the German Criminal Code (high treason) provides for 1 to 10 years
imprisonment for persons who violate the territorial integrity of the state by force
or threat of force,60 and Paragraph 83 (preparation of high treason) provides for 1
to 10 years imprisonment for preparing such acts.61
56 Ibid.
57 See for example: G. Sasse, TERRA INCOGNITA - SOCIAL THINKING IN CRIME (ZOiS, no. 3, November 2017),
available at: https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/terra-incognita-the-public-mood-in-crimea.
58 French Internal Security Code, ¶L212-1, available at:
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000025503132/LEGISCTA000025505187/#LEGIS
CTA000025508342.
59 Criminal Code of the Italian Republic, 19 October 1930, no. 1398, ¶241, available at:
https://www.brocardi.it/codice-penale/libro-secondo/titolo-i/capo-i/art241.html#google_vignette.
60 German Criminal Code, Section 82, available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__82 html.
61 German Criminal Code, Section 83, available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__83 html.
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(c) Article 110 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine also provides for three to five years'
imprisonment with confiscation of property for “deliberate acts committed to
change the territorial boundaries or the state border of Ukraine.”62 Moreover, that
article does not mention violent actions, as does, for example, the German
legislation. Consequently, public calls for the violation of territorial integrity also
fall under the category of “deliberate acts.”
(d) Article 308 of the Criminal Code of Georgia provides for 10 to 15 years’
imprisonment for “actions against Georgia aimed at the transfer to a foreign state
of all or part of the territory of Georgia, or separation from the territory of Georgia
of a part thereof.’ The law does not specify what kind of “actions’ are meant.
88. In the Russian Federation, Article 13.5. of the 1993 Constitution prohibits “the forcible
change of the foundations of the constitutional order and violation of the integrity of the
Russian Federation.” Besides, Article 20.3.2. of the Code of Administrative Offences
(CAO) provides for administrative liability for public calls for actions aimed at violating
the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, while Article 280.1. of the Criminal
Code provides for criminal liability and punishment for repeat offences from a fine of
RUB 200,000 to 4 years' imprisonment.
89. In other words, following the logic of combating hateful extremism (see above), Russia,
like Ukraine, Georgia and France, has also criminalised non-violent actions aimed at
violating the country's territorial integrity.
90. Interestingly, Ukraine easily accuses the activists of national minority movements on its
territory of separatism and violation of territorial integrity. This is the case, for example,
with the Ruthenians, who make up the majority of the population of Transcarpathia. For
over 30 years Ukraine has refused to recognise this group as a separate national minority,
despite recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (2008), decisions and appeals by the Transcarpathian Regional Council in
1992, 2002 and 2007 to the Ukrainian central authorities, etc. At the same time Ukraine
accuses Ruthenians of separatism and attempts to violate the territorial integrity of the
62 Criminal Code of Ukraine, Article 110, available at: https://urst.com.ua/ru/uku/st-110.
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country.63 In fact, the Ruthenians for the most part demand national-cultural autonomy -
opening of Ruthenian schools, a department of the Ruthenian language and literature at
Uzhgorod University, as well as granting the region the status of self-governing territory
according to the will of Transcarpathians at the referendum back in 1991. 64
91. Those Ruthenian organizations that lost faith that Ukraine can grant them nationalcultural
autonomy and recognize them as a national minority and bring the Ruthenian
question into the legal framework, and declare the need to recreate Ruthenian statehood
(e.g. the Trans-Carpathian Association of Ruthenian Organizations “Sojm Podkarpacki
Rusyns”), are subjected to persecution and their leaders to reprisals. For example, the
chairman of Sojm, Archpriest Dmitriy Sydor, was sentenced to three years in prison in
2012. He was accused exactly of calling for a change in state borders.65
92. Yet Ukraine has not raised the issue of racial discrimination against the Ruthenians, it has
simply refused to consider them a national minority. For Ukraine, those people are
ordinary separatists.
93. The same applies to Ukraine's actions in the territories of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts
that decided to secede from it in 2014. Ukraine did not simply fail to recognise these
decisions, but used military force to suppress them.
94. The arguments of Ukraine and Prof. Sheinin that criminal prosecution for violation of
Art. 280.1 in Crimea allegedly constitutes racial discrimination are based, as already
explained, on the erroneous thesis that the ethnic groups of Ukrainians and Crimean
Tatars live separately in Crimea and that they share the same political views on the
territorial affiliation of the peninsula due to their ethnic origin, which is not true. This
approach is based on the chauvinist paradigm of its authors, and is in itself discriminatory
against both ethnic Russians living in Crimea and ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars,
to whom certain political views are attempted to be ascribed based on their ethnic origin.
63 Today, The Whole Truth About Ruthenians and Separatists (9 December 2008), available at:
https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/vcja-pravda-o-rucinakh-i-ceparatictakh-144213 html
64 Trud ru, Stanislav Prokopchuk, I was, am and will be a Ruthenian (26 January 2006), available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20070328031640/http://www.trud.ru/trud.php?id=200601260121101.
65 Vesti.ru, Orthodox priest found guilty of encroaching on Ukraine's integrity (21 March 2012), available at:
https://www.vesti ru/article/1960029.
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95. Thus, Prof. Sheinin has not answered the question of how Russian legislation differs from
similar legislation in other countries on the issue of territorial integrity and what the basis
for the accusations of its discriminatory nature is (see above).
96. In an attempt to prove Russia's violation of ICERD, Ukraine, as already pointed out,
artificially draws a non-existent element of ethnicity into the socio-political processes
taking place in Crimea. The same purpose is served by Prof. Sheinin's thesis that it is the
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars who allegedly resist en masse the incorporation of Crimea
into the Russian Federation (without providing any evidence),66 while ethnic Russians
obstruct that by trying to create ideological grounds for hostility. Meanwhile, there are
cases of participation of ethnic Russians in the protest movement in Crimea, and there is
mass participation of ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in the political processes of
integration of Crimea into Russia.67 Therefore, the conclusion that allegedly all
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, due to their ethnic origin, do not recognise the accession
of Crimea to Russia, blatantly contradicts the reality.68
97. Moreover, the results of the 2014 referendum show that the overwhelming majority of
the population of Crimea supported the peninsula’s accession to Russia. I emphasise that
we are not talking here about the legality or illegality of the 2014 referendum,69 but about
the political sentiments of Crimean residents at the time, with no confirmed data on mass
falsification of the referendum results available to the expert community.
98. The legislation of the Russian Federation protects the territorial integrity of the State. The
practice of the Russian Federation in this respect does not differ from that of other
countries.
99. In any case, I hope that Prof. Sheinin does not advocate the position that belonging to an
ethnic group should be a mitigating or aggravating factor in the application of
administrative and criminal law. As has already been pointed out, attempts to introduce
the principle of ethnicity into the legislative and law enforcement practice of any country
violate the most important principle of democracy reflected in Article 7 of the Universal
66 Martin Sheinin Expert Report, Part V, ¶43. See Reply, Annex 7.
67 First Expert Report by Dmitriy Frank, ¶16. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 21.
68 Ibid, ¶15.
69 Ibid, ¶17.
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Declaration of Human Rights, namely, the principle of equality of all citizens before the
law. The principle of equality before the courts and all other organs administering justice
is also protected by Article 5(a) of ICERD. This principle is also protected by
constitutional (Article 19 of the Constitution) and criminal (Article 4 of the Criminal
Code) law of the Russian Federation which prohibits unequal treatment of citizens who
have committed crimes on the basis of their “gender, race, nationality, language, origin,
property and official status, place of residence, attitude towards religion, beliefs,
membership of public associations, and other circumstances.”70
100. Thus, the assertions of Ukraine and Prof. Sheinin that Russian anti-extremist legislation,
including provisions on the protection of territorial integrity, does not comply with
international standards, and that this legislation itself is an instrument of racial
discrimination, are untenable and therefore cannot be an argument in the system of
evidence. On the contrary, this legislation protects ethnic minorities from manifestations
of racism, as reflected in Article 1.1. of Law No. 114-FZ and Article 282 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation.
VII. PROHIBITING EXTREMIST AND TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS HAS
NOTHING TO DO WITH RACIAL DISCRIMINATION EITHER IN PURPOSE
OR IN EFFECT
101. Ukraine believes that restrictions on the activities of members of extremist and terrorist
organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
People based on national security interests “are based on no grounds at all” and violate
Crimean Tatars’ right to equal treatment before courts and other justice bodies, right to
personal security, and political and civil rights guaranteed by Article 5 of ICERD both in
the purpose of such restrictive measures and in their consequences.
102. As already indicated, there is a wealth of law enforcement practice from around the world,
both within and outside the EU, relating to the prohibition of both terrorist and extremist
organisations of Islamist or nationalist nature. Such practice meets the requirements of
Art. 4. of ICERD, which states that member states “shall declare illegal and prohibit
organisations, and also organised and all other propaganda activities, which promote and
70 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Article 4, available at:
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/ca44f5ca7fe63fad08f66b87e34e9a2c91b7d329.
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incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organisations or
activities as an offence punishable by law”.
103. In my First Report71 I elaborate and prove that even without reference to the Russian law,
the activities of Tablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut-Tahrir correspond to those of international
extremist and terrorist groups, since they are aimed at destroying the basic values of
society. In particular, the ideology of these organizations involves the destruction of the
secular state and its institutions, replacing it with a religious Islamic state - the “World
Caliphate”. At the same time, they allow violent methods of struggle. Both organizations
have preached religious exclusivity and intolerance and ignored the human rights
standards that European countries ensure under the international law, in particular the
European Convention on Human Rights.72
104. Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat are banned not only in Russia, but also in a number
of other countries. Thus, Tablighi Jamaat is recognised as an extremist association in
Uzbekistan (2004), Tajikistan (2006) and Kazakhstan (2013). In December 2021, the
movement was banned in Saudi Arabia, which declared it “one of the gates of terror”,
indicating that its goals and means are far removed from those of Islam.73 Hizb ut-Tahrir,
in turn, has been banned in Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and many
Arab countries.74 The fact that those organisations operate legally in Ukraine is no
excuse.
105. Since Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat are Muslim organisations and 99% of Muslims
in Crimea are Crimean Tatars, their prevalence among the convicted is understandable
exactly for that reason, and not because of racial bias of Russian law enforcement
agencies.
106. The thesis about the discriminatory effects of restrictive measures cannot be considered
valid in this case either, because it would imply unequal treatment of a particular ethnic
group in comparison to other ethnic groups. The argument cannot be accepted because
71 Expert Report of Valery V. Engel, ¶¶93-136. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 22.
72 Ibid., ¶¶328-422.
73 Kazislam.kz, Saudi Arabia bans Tablighi Jamaat (December 20, 2021), available at:
https://kazislam.kz/saudovskaya-araviya-zapretila-deyatel-nost-tabligi-dzhamagat/#:~:text=Saudi Arabia has
banned Tablighi, ‘one of the gates of terrorism’.
74 Ibid., ¶387.
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there is no evidence of such unequal treatment of ethnic groups in Crimea. As mentioned
above, Prof. Sheinin considers the only “evidence” of such unequal treatment to be the
measures applied to limit the negative effect of the propaganda of extremist political
beliefs that provoke conflicts based on ethnic, religious or racial hatred. Political beliefs
are not an element of racial discrimination under ICERD. In any case, there are no
restrictions on the activities of Islamic organizations in Crimea. Nor are there any
restrictions on the activities of non-Islamic religious organizations, with the exception of
extremist religious groups. Thus, in my First Report I wrote that 7 non-Islamic religious
groups are banned in Russia, including the “Administrative Centre of Jehovah's
Witnesses”, where the overwhelming majority is representatives of Slavic ethnic
groups.75 However, except for extremist and terrorist organisations banned in the Russian
Federation, other religious communities operate legally in Crimea.
107. As stated in the IEA RAS Expert Report, “the Ministry of Justice of the Russian
Federation reports that as at 1 October 2015 there were 335 religious organisations
registered in the territory of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol”;76 Imam training
courses were opened.77 Besides, 150 additional mosques had been built in Crimea by July
2016, with their number growing 50 percent as a result.78 At the same time, there still
exist up to two dozen so-called “independent” Islamic communities in Crimea, which are
not subordinate to the main Muslim religious organization on the peninsula - the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol (DUMKS). For the most part, they
are affiliated with the Spiritual Administration of Muslims “Tavrida Muftiyat”.
108. In other words, Muslims in Crimea have an alternative to the two religious organisations
that are banned in Russia as extremist or terrorist. To argue otherwise would be similar
to someone insisting that banning ISIS, which also aims to create a “World Caliphate”,
but by blatantly military-terrorist means, discriminates against Arabs, Turks, the same
Crimean Tatars and other members of ethnic groups that traditionally practice Islam.
Hence, arrests of people supporting Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat do not mean
racial discrimination of Crimean Tatars, as well as arrests of people supporting ISIS do
75 Ibid., ¶251.
76 Dimitriy Frank Expert Report, ¶146. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 21.
77 Ibid., ¶150.
78 Ria, The number of mosques in Crimea has increased by half since joining Russia (29 July 2016), available at:
https://ria.ru/20160729/1473218518 html.
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not mean racial discrimination of ethnic Arabs, representatives of Central Asian ethnic
groups, Crimean Tatars and representatives of other ethnic groups who could be activists
of that terrorist organisation. As we know, not just arrests but also physical elimination
of the “Islamic State” leaders, as well as leaders of other extremist organisations, are
carried out all over the world.
109. Speaking of prosecuting members of extremist groups, several examples come to mind.
For example, following the murder of teacher Samuel Pati in October 2020, the French
police questioned several hundred people, arrested 15, conducted 80 investigations into
online hate speech, and opened 51 cases to dissolve non-governmental organisations
belonging to the ethnic Muslim community.79 Again, no one accused the French
authorities of racially discriminating against Arab adherents of Islam living in France.
110. In March 2017, the German authorities banned the activities of the German-speaking
Islamic Circle in Hildesheim (DIK). Raids followed, in which police searched a number
of business premises, the homes of eight people associated with the group, and a mosque
belonging to the association. At the time, the Minister of the Interior of Lower Saxony
and Social Democrat (SPD) Boris Pistorius said that in banning the DIK “a hotspot of the
radical Salafist scene in Germany had been shattered”, but was “not directed against the
many Muslims who live peacefully here.”80
111. Interestingly, the opponents do not deny that detentions of Crimean Tatars were mainly
related to their activities for Hizb ut-Tahrir or Tablighi Jamaat, rather than to their ethnic
origin. Moreover, they also indirectly confirm that arrests also involved members of other
ethnic groups affiliated with religious organisations recognised as extremist under the
Russian law, such as the aforementioned Administrative Centre of Jehovah's Witnesses,81
among which there are virtually no Crimean Tatars, but many ethnic Russians, Ukrainians
and representatives of other non-Muslim ethnic groups.
79 France 24, French police conducted dozens of raids on suspected extremism after beheading of teacher (19
October 2020), available at: https://www france24.com/en/europe/20201019-additional-police-operations-underway-
over-beheading-of-french-teacher.
80 Deutsche Welle, German police raid Islamists (14 March 2017), available at: https://www.dw.com/en/germanpolice-
carry-out-raids-on-islamists-in-hildesheim/a-37923597.
81 Reply, Chapter 12, ¶513.
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112. The same applies to the “Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people”. The Ukrainian side insists
that the 2016 ban on the Mejlis as an extremist organisation had nothing to do with
legitimacy, but was “punitive measures directed explicitly at the Crimean Tatar
community which have the indisputable effect of sharply curtailing that community’s
civil rights and entrenching racial discrimination.”82
113. I would like to remind that in my First Report I elaborated on the reasons why the Mejlis
can be considered an extremist organisation that resorts not only to hate speech but also
to violent extremism, in the sense that phenomenon is assessed by international legislative
and law enforcement practice, the rightfulness of which Prof. Sheinin does not deny.83
Let me remind that according to international practice, the Mejlis is an extremist
organisation because:
(a) Its strategic goals and practices were inherently separatist, aiming to create an
independent Crimean Tatar national state in Crimea. Separatist manifestations were
clearly present in its activities both before and after 2014.
(b) The Mejlis has used violent means both during the Ukrainian and Russian
jurisdictions in Crimea. At times this has led to armed clashes. For example, mass
events in Alushta in 1992 resulted in riots across Crimea: in Simferopol - the
Prosecutor's Office building was vandalised, crowds of thousands stormed the
building of the Supreme Soviet (the legislative body) of Crimea and beat up police
officers; in 1995, mass disturbances resulted in vandalisation of petrol stations and
car parks in Sudak and Feodosia; in 1998, Mejlis activists blocked railway tracks
and highways, there were direct clashes with the police at the railway station in
Simferopol. In 1998, Mejlis activists blocked railway tracks and motor roads and
clashed directly with police at the railway station in Simferopol.84
(c) The actions of the Mejlis in connection with the food and energy blockade of
Crimea were clearly extremist in nature, since violent actions, including sabotage
of livelihood facilities, were aimed at intimidating and coercing the authorities and
82 Reply, Chapter 11, ¶471.
83 Expert Report of Valery V. Engel, ¶¶441-446. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 22.
84 Pravda ru, Inna Novikova, The Crimean War (29 April 2005), available at: https://www.pravda.ru/world/50927-
crimea/.
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civilian population to take certain political decisions, which is consistent with the
international understanding of violent extremism.
114. The opponents’ claim that the Mejlis did not make any collective decision to initiate,
organise or participate in the blockade of Crimea, or to undermine power lines, and “[t]he
Mejlis members who did participate, namely Mr. Chubarov and Mr. Dzhemilev, did so
in their individual capacities”,85 does not stand up to criticism. The organisation could
have dissociated itself from the statements and actions of the leaders, but it did not.
Similarly, one could justify ISIS saying that the murderers responsible for hundreds of
hostage executions had no official authorisation from the collective leadership of the
terrorist organisation. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in its
appeal ruling, refuted arguments that the actions of the individuals in question were
carried out by them in their personal capacity and not on behalf of the Mejlis, as confirmed
by numerous video recordings.86
115. If we turn to examples from international law enforcement practice, it is worth recalling
Spain's struggle, supported by France, with the separatists of the Basque organisation
ETA (“Basque Country and Liberty’), which seeks independence for the Basque Country,
a region situated in northern Spain and south-western France. In September 2015, for
example, the police of the two countries arrested two of the organisation's leaders, Iratxe
Sorzabal and David Pla. It happened despite the fact that the group had announced a
cessation of violence and armed struggle back in 2011. The arrested were accused of
“management of ETA’s remaining arms stash”.87 Concurrently, massive police raids and
searches were carried out in the homes of Basques suspected of belonging to the
organisation. However, no one accused Spain or France of racial discrimination in this
connection.
116. There are numerous examples related to the banning of such organisations. For example,
in 2019-2020, the German security services conducted a series of raids and searches in
the homes of members of certain extremist groups under the general name “Citizens of
the Reich”. Representatives of the network of such often unconnected organizations (the
85 Reply, Chapter 11, ¶492.
86 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Appeal Decision No. 127-APG 16-4.
87 Reuters, Spain, France arrest leaders of Basque separatist ETA militants (22 September 2015), available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-spain-arrests-eta-idUKKCN0RM1ZW20150922.
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Free State of Bavaria, the Himgau Community, the Free German Republic, the United
German Nations and Tribes and others) believe that the “Third Reich” did not cease to
exist after Germany had capitulated in 1945. They do not recognise the FRG as a
legitimate state. Some groups print their own “passports” and “banknotes” and hold
“elections” for “deputies” to the self-proclaimed “Reichstag”. Demonstrations, rallies and
other actions are staged.
117. Among estimated 19,000 “Reichsbürgers”, 950 were identified by the German law
enforcement as right-wing extremists.88 In March 2020 alone, the FRG conducted 21
searches in the flats of the leaders of those organizations by 400 police officers.89
Moreover, those activities took place at a time when the organisations in question did not
resort to violence.
118. Recent events have shown that those measures were quite justified and even insufficient:
on 7 December 2022, the German police reported an attempted coup d’état prepared by
“Reich citizens”. In raids across the country, “the German police arrested 25 suspected
members and supporters of [this] far-right group who were allegedly seeking to overthrow
the state by force.” Around 3,000 officers conducted raids on 7 December 2022 at 130
sites in 11 German federal lands against supporters of this movement. 90
119. Claims that it is impossible to ban an organisation that does not exist de jure do not stand
up to criticism either, as many extremist organisations that have been banned in various
countries did not have any state registration. For example, the neo-fascist Revolutionary
Nationalist Youth group was banned in France in 2013, as was the Third Way group, none
of them being legally registered.91 The same concerns the majority of the banned Islamist
organisations in the world.
88 Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, Verfassungsschutzbericht, Fakten und Tendenzen, 2019,
available at: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/sicherheit/vsb-2019-
kurzfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.
89 Frankfurter Allgemeine, Very dangerous spinners (19 March 2020), available at:
https://www.faz net/aktuell/politik/inland/verbotene-reichsbuerger-gruppe-rechtsextrem-und-hochgefaehrlich-
16686793 html
90 Aljazeera, Germany arrests 25 people in connection with alleged far-right group conspiracy (7 December 2022),
available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/7/germany-arrests-25-people-accused-of-planning-armedcoup.
91 Le Figaro, Christophe Cornevin, Extremist groups: the headache of disintegration (7 June 2013), available at:
https://www.lefigaro fr/actualite-france/2013/06/07/01016-20130607ARTFIG00606-groupes-extremistes-lecasse-
tete-de-la-dissolution.php.
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120. The conclusion is that the Mejlis was banned for objective reasons that allow its activities
to be classified as violent extremism in terms of global legislative and law enforcement
practice.
121. Attempts to portray restrictions on the activities of extremist organisations, including
terrorist organisations, as racial discrimination are contrary to the letter and spirit of the
international law.
VIII. BANNING EXTREMIST ORGANISATIONS IS NOT A VIOLATION OF THE
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
122. Obviously, the attempt to present the Mejlis, which engaged in extremist activities as
defined by all relevant norms of the international law, as a legal and sole representative
institution of Crimean Tatars is not only legal nonsense, but also a very dangerous
precedent in the arguments of Ukraine and Prof. Sheinin and in effect a justification of
violent extremism.
123. History has seen a number of cases in which extremist organisations, including terrorist
ones, have claimed representation on behalf of ethnic or religious groups. Such
organisations include the already mentioned Basque group ETA, the Kurdistan Workers’
Party – a Kurdish separatist group operating mainly in northern Iraq and southeastern
Turkey,92 and a number of others. Mention should also be made of the terrorist
organisation “the Islamic State”, which, with its goal of establishing a “World Caliphate”,
clearly claimed to be the sole representative body of all Muslims. At the same time, the
international community in its majority condemns such organisations for violence and
propaganda of extremist views, does not recognise their representative status and seeks
to build relations with other, alternative, legal groups representing the same ethnic or
religious communities. Countries around the world where such organisations operated
have generally banned their activities and those of affiliated groups. For example, the
Batasuna party, ETA’s political wing, was banned in Spain in 2003.93
92 Amikam Nahmani, THE KURDISH CHALLENGE, July 2003. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719063701.003.0003
93 E. Foruria, THE PROHIBITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN SPAIN (THE BATASUNA CASE) (University of the Basque
Country, 2015), pp. 6-7, available at:
https://bibliotecadigital.tse.jus.br/xmlui/bitstream/handle/bdtse/2718/2015_foruria_banning_political_parties.pdf
?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
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124. Above, as well as in my First Report, I have shown that the Mejlis is an organisation
which pursues violent extremist tactics in its activities in accordance with international
law. I point out in the First Report that the Mejlis has never been a legally established
organisation as it has never attempted to register as a legal entity under either the
Ukrainian or the Russian law, although both Ukrainian and Russian authorities have
repeatedly suggested that it do so. 94
125. Ukraine argues that “the Mejlis, a body indirectly elected by the entire Crimean Tatar
population, has long been recognized as the community’s authentic voice.”95 The OSCE
High Commissioner on National Minority Rights document “The integration of formerly
deported people in Crimea, Ukraine” of August 2013 is cited as evidence.96 In its Reply,
Ukraine points out that “[a]ccording to a 2013 needs assessment for the OSCE’s High
Commissioner for National Minorities, the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People “is
regarded by most Crimean Tatars as their representative body,” with turnout in the early
phases of the 2013 Qurultay elections ranging between 57 and 68 per cent of the Crimean
Tatar electorate.”97 At the same time, it is worth noting that it is the representative nature
of the Qurultay and not the Mejlis that is at issue here. Moreover, the High
Commissioner's report contains ample evidence that the Mejlis was not the only
universally recognised representative of Crimean Tatars even under Ukrainian
jurisdiction:
(a) The OSCE report states that “[s]ome, including the [Ukrainian] authorities, claim
that Crimean Tatar support for the Mejlis is waning and cite evidence such as a
recent decision by the Qurultay to lower the quorum for Crimean Tatar participation
to one-third.”98
(b) The OSCE report stated that in 1989 the National Movement of the Crimean Tatars
(NMCT), founded in 1956, “was transformed into the ‘Organization of the Crimean
Tatar National Movement’ (OCTNM), headed by Mustafa Dzhemilev. OCTNM
94 Expert Report of Valery V. Engel, ¶¶423. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 22.
95 Reply, Chapter 11, ¶476.
96 High Commissioner on National Minorities, Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine:
Needs Assessment (August 2013), available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/a/104309.pdf.
97 Reply, Chapter 11, ¶477.
98 High Commissioner on National Minorities, Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine:
Needs Assessment (August 2013), available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/a/104309.pdf.
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advocated for immediate, large-scale return and national self-determination, while
the minority faction of the NMTC that did not join the OCTNM preferred a more
gradual approach in close co-operation with the then Soviet authorities. This
division still exists within the Crimean Tatar community and has become more
pronounced since, with some groups advocating for an even more radical approach
while others prefer to work on establishing closer links with the authorities.”99
(c) The same OSCE report states that “to avoid a split Crimean Tatar vote in Ukraine’s
winner-take-all electoral district system, Qurultay delegates are prohibited from
running against candidates proposed by the Mejlis, upon penalty of expulsion from
the Qurultay.” “This constraint on internal political pluralism,” the report stresses,
“is sharply criticized as undemocratic by opponents of the Mejlis. As a result,
several opposition groups such as ‘Milli Firqa’, the Sebat association of land
squatters and other groups that have recently allied themselves in the ‘Crimean
Tatar National Front’ (CTNF) fiercely challenge the Mejlis for the right to represent
the interests of the Crimean Tatar people. This internal competition within the
Crimean Tatar community is a source of constant tensions and is sometimes
instrumentalized by the Crimean [Ukrainian] authorities.”100
(d) The OSCE report points out that already President Yushchenko stopped convening
the Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People on a regular basis, it
being of the same composition as the Mejlis – a pragmatic decision by President
Leonid Kuchma in 1999 due to the Mejlis' refusal to officially register as an NGO.
Moreover, the document points out that “[the Council’s] composition was altered
unilaterally by President Yanukovych in 2010, who reduced its membership from
33 to 19. Out of these, eight were also members of the Mejlis and 11 were selected
from the Crimean Tatar opposition.”101
126. Thus, the Mejlis did not represent the entire Crimean Tatar people even during the period
of Ukrainian control of Crimea. It was confirmed by activists of the Crimean Tatar
national movement, among others. Back in 2011, the President of the “Fund for Research
99 Ibid., p. 19.
100 Ibid., p. 20.
101 Ibid.
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and Support of Indigenous Peoples of Crimea” Nadir Bekirov said that “Milli Mejlis is
far from being the entire Crimean Tatar national movement. Moreover, even by their own
figures, they represent less than a third of the Crimean Tatar people. That is, there is no
consolidated leadership of the Crimean Tatar people or even the movement, although the
Milli Mejlis tries to claim this, hiding, in general, from everyone it can, that it is a smaller
part of the movement.”102
127. As can be seen, both representatives of the Crimean Tatar national movement and the
Ukrainian authorities did not share the Mejlis' claim to sole political representation of the
Crimean Tatars. Representation of various Crimean Tatar organizations, including those
led by leaders opposed to the Mejlis, was supported by the authorities until 2014.
128. Overall, we can state that the Mejlis itself created conditions for its decline in popularity:
first, by the clear disregard for democratic procedures in its work, including in the election
process (see above), and second, by active participation of its leaders in Ukrainian
political life on the side of one of the political forces. As a rule, those were liberal
parties,103 which made the Crimean Tatars hostage to the political ambitions of the Mejlis
leadership and created problems when interacting with representatives of other forces in
parliament, especially when they were in power. After all, the support of the Mejlis for
liberals gave the outward impression that all Crimean Tatars supported them, even though
many of them voted for other parties. It caused discontent among many of them.104 Third,
the Mejlis' use of violent methods and involvement in the energy and food blockade of
Crimea and in the blowing up of power lines, which left large residential areas, including
the Crimean Tatar population, without electricity, further undermined its influence within
that ethnic group. 105
102 Political News Agency, Nadir Bekirov: Crimean Tatars have only themselves to rely on (17 January 2011),
available at: https://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=23544.
103 For example, Dzhemilev has in recent years been a member of the Ukrainian parliament from the Batkivshchyna
and European Solidarity parties - author's note.
104 Political News Agency, Nadir Bekirov: Crimean Tatars have only themselves to rely on (17 January 2011),
available at: https://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=23544.
105 Gazeta ru, Alexandra Ippolitova, Crimea announces reward for catching organizers of water blockade (17
March 2022), available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2022/03/17/17437141.shtml.
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129. Thus, the Mejlis has never functioned as a representative body of Crimean Tatars. Its
credibility has fallen over the past few years, especially after it became involved in
extremist activities.
130. Ukraine in its Reply claims that “Russia’s reference to some ‘other public organizations
that continue to represent the Crimean Tatars in Crimea’ that purportedly ‘enjoy[] very
high degrees of representativeness and legitimacy’ is without basis.”106 However, as we
can see, the entire previous history of the Mejlis shows that there have always been
alternative organisations in Crimea that were supported by both the authorities and a
significant part of the Crimean Tatar people. The situation has not changed today.
Ukrain’s Reply mentions, for example, the “extraordinary session of the extended
Qurultay of the Muslims of Crimea”, which took place on 17 February 2018 and at which
the Council of the Crimean Tatar People was elected, or the “Shura” led by the Crimean
Muslim Mufti Emirali Ablayev, whom the Ukrainian side calls an “renegade.”107
However, he enjoys the trust and respect of many tens of thousands of Crimean Tatars
today. 108
131. At the same time, the Shura is by no means the only organisation of Crimean Tatars in
Crimea today. Under Federal Law No. 74-FZ “On National Cultural Autonomy”,109 every
minority ethnic community in the Russian Federation may form a cultural autonomy at
the local, regional or federal level. Such a body has been officially established by Crimean
Tatar organizations in Crimea. It is the “Regional National Cultural Autonomy of the
Crimean Tatars of the Republic of Crimea”, which was registered on 19 April 2016 in
Simferopol.110 Thus, there are a number of NGOs and religious organizations
representing Crimean Tatars, which have different socio-political and cultural
preferences, programmes and interests. They are the Regional Public Organization
“Adalet - Justice”, the Crimean Republican Public Charitable Organization “Association
of victims of illegal political repressions of the peoples of Crimea”, the Interregional
106 Reply, Chapter 11, ¶484.
107 Ibid., ¶482.
108 Primamedia ru, Emirali Ablaev elected Mufti of Muslims for the fifth time (27 October 2018), available at:
https://primamedia.ru/news/753444/
109 Federal Law No. 74-FZ “On National Cultural Autonomy”, 17 June 1996, available at:
http://kremlin ru/acts/bank/9578/page/1.
110 Rusprofile, OOO RNKA Crimean Tatars of the Republic of Crimea, available at:
https://www.rusprofile ru/id/10445522.
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Public Movement of the Crimean Tatar People “Qirim”, the Crimean Regional Public
Organization of Social and Cultural Development “Milli Firka”, the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol (DUMKS), the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims “Tavrida Muftiyat”, etc.
132. Thus, there are quite a few alternative Crimean Tatar organisations in Crimea. While one
can agree that the Mejlis remains an émigré organisation representing the interests of a
small group of Crimean Tatars opposed to Russia and its presence in Crimea, one cannot
today claim that it is a legitimate representative of the entire Crimean Tatar people living
on the peninsula.
133. The conclusion of this section is that the prohibition of extremist, including terrorist,
ethno-religious organisations is not a violation of the right to freedom of association for
such groups, as the vast majority of people in the ethnic group, in this case Crimean
Tatars, do not share extremist ideas, and because there are a sufficient number of
alternative non-governmental and religious organisations that can function as their
legitimate representation.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
134. I have shown in this Report, why the claims by the Ukrainian side and its expert Prof.
Sheinin that the Russian anti-extremist legislation is allegedly incompatible with the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination are erroneous,
misleading and fundamentally contradictory to the Convention itself.
135. First of all, I have proved the groundlessness of Prof. Sheinin's claim that countering
hateful extremism is allegedly not, in itself, a legitimate goal and not seen as “legitimate
in the eyes of the international community”. On the contrary, combating hateful
extremism is a universally recognised legitimate goal, and the need to counter not only
“violent” but also “hateful” extremism is recognised by numerous states around the world
comprising billions of people.
136. Moreover, countering “hateful” extremism is an obligation of states under ICERD. Prof.
Sheinin's assertion that “groups based on their ethnic origin express their ethnic identity”
by advocating exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person and violating their rights,
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freedoms and legitimate interests on the basis of their social, racial, national, religious or
linguistic affiliation or attitude towards religion, is discriminatory and inherently racist.
137. Further, I have demonstrated that protecting territorial integrity is not discriminatory, and
a number of states, including Ukraine and EU countries, have legislation to this effect.
138. Besides the (“American”) model of countering violent extremism, there are other models
that criminalise not only terrorism and everything related to it, but also the spread of
hatred. A growing number of countries have resorted to the model of countering hateful
extremism, guided, among other factors, by international treaties. I am not advocating
any particular model of countering extremism; I have only identified the global trends in
countering this phenomenon.
139. According to Article 4 of ICERD, Article 13 of PACE Resolution 1344 (2003), PACE
Resolution 1754 (2010), Article 10.2 of the ECHR and in line with the Venice
Commission’s recommendations in its Report on the Relationship between Freedom of
Expression and Freedom of Religion (2008), incitement to hatred in itself already justifies
criminal sanctions. Consequently, violence is not a necessary feature of extremism today.
Its absence is quite legitimate, not only on the basis of a number of international
documents cited, but also on the basis of the already extensive experience of the
legislative and law enforcement practices of a growing number of countries around the
world, which include many countries in Europe and Asia, such as Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, the Baltic States, the United Kingdom (Scotland), China, as well as the former
Soviet Union, among others.
140. Accordingly, the Russian Federation's anti-extremist legislation is in line with these
global trends. Moreover, the Russian law “On Combating Extremist Activity” mentions
race, ethnicity, religious and linguistic groups as protected social groups. The presence of
linguistic groups in the list of protected groups indicates that Russian legislation is aimed
at protecting ethnic groups in the broadest sense.
141. Thus, Russian anti-extremist legislation does not prioritise issues of national security over
the rights of ethnic minorities, because the spirit and letter of that legislation is aimed
precisely at protecting those rights, and not vice versa. In other words, respect for the
rights of the aforementioned minorities is one of the goals of the Russian Federation's
anti-extremist policy. Consequently, there are no contradictions between the interests of
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national security and those of ethnic and religious groups in Russia, which is natural for
such a multi-ethnic country.
142. In line with the principles of countering hateful extremism, Russia, like countries such as
France, Georgia, Ukraine and others, has criminalised repeated calls to change borders
and violate the territorial integrity of the country. None of the ethnic groups living in
Crimea is exempt from the law, so those of them who violate the relevant norms of
administrative or criminal law are subject to liability on an equal basis.
143. Different approaches to crimes committed by members of the ethnic majority and an
ethnic minority are not acceptable, as this violates the most important democratic
principle - the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, and contradicts the
Russian and international law.
144. Prosecution for actions related to the violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation is carried out under the law and on the same grounds as in other countries of
the world without distinction as to the ethnic, religious or other origin of the offender.
Ethnic groups in Crimea are not isolated or opposed to each other on the basis of political
views.
145. Banned organisations (Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat, Mejlis) are extremist not only
under the Russian anti-extremist legislation, but also according to the international law
and international law enforcement practices, given the goals of those organisations and
methods they employ.
146. The predominance of Crimean Tatars among the members of those organisations can be
explained by the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat (recognised as extremist
organisations in the Russian Federation) are organisations that admit only Muslims,
which in Crimea are mostly Crimean Tatars; while the Mejlis is an organisation
established in the 1980s, which initially admitted only people related to the Crimean Tatar
ethnic group.
147. It has nothing to do with discrimination, as there is no unequal treatment of one ethnic
group compared to another: religious and non-religious organizations that include
members of a wide range of ethnic groups operate legally in Crimea. In a similar way are
banned other extremist groups unrelated to ethnic Muslims.
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148. Besides, the “Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People”, which is declared by Ukraine to be a
“legitimate representative organization of the Crimean Tatars”, was not such even during
Ukraine's control of Crimea, as it has never, de jure or de facto, represented all Crimean
Tatars on the peninsula. In today's Crimea there are a number of Crimean Tatar NGOs
that claim to have such representation. There are more than 150 legal religious Islamic
and several hundred non-governmental organizations that comprise Crimean Tatars,
representing them in varying degrees by virtue of their specialisation.
149. In accordance with Russian legislation, a “Regional National Cultural Autonomy of the
Crimean Tatars of the Republic of Crimea” was established in Crimea. The interests of
Crimean Tatars are represented by the Council of the Crimean Tatar People, or “Shura”,
elected by the Qurultay of Muslims of Crimea in February 2018, the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol and dozens of other nongovernmental
organisations, each with its own specific goals and objectives.
X. EXPERT DECLARATION
150. I confirm that all issues on which I have given my opinion are within my competence and
professional knowledge.
151. I understand that it is my duty to assist the International Court of Justice in resolving
issues dealt with in this Report. I have discharged that responsibility and will continue to
do so in the future.
152. I confirm that the conclusions I have reached in this Report are unbiased, objective and
impartial; they have not been influenced by the proceedings or by any of the parties to the
proceedings.
Expert
[Signature]
Valery Viktorovich Engel
Moscow, 28 February 2023
Annex 20
Expert Report of Viktor Viktorovich Merkuryev, 1 March 2023
(translation)

Annex 20
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
EXPERT REPORT OF
VIKTOR VIKTOROVICH MERKURYEV
1 MARCH 2023
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. Qualifications .................................................................................................................... 3
B. History of Russian legislation on countering extremist activity ....................................... 4
C. Application of the law on countering extremist activities ................................................ 8
D. Statistics on state activity against extremism show no discrimination ........................... 14
E. Federal Law on Countering Extremist Activities was adopted on the basis, and is applied
within the framework, of the human rights and freedoms provisions of the Constitution
of the Russian Federation and international legal instruments ....................................... 18
F. The judicial system of the Russian Federation guarantees respect for human rights in the
implementation of legislation on combating extremist activities ................................... 21
G. Development of anti-extremist legislation in Russia is in line with international efforts
........................................................................................................................................ 24
H. Professor Sheinin's criticism of Russian law is unfounded ............................................ 28
I. Expert declaration ........................................................................................................... 34
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A. QUALIFICATIONS
1. My name is Viktor Viktorovich Merkuryev. I have been working in the procuracy system
since 2008, first as a leading researcher, then as head of the department for issues of
countering organised crime, terrorism and extremism. Since 2018, I have been head of
the department for scientific support of procuratorial supervision and the strengthening
of legality in the sphere of federal security, interethnic relations and countering extremism
at the Research Institute of the University of Procuracy of the Russian Federation. I hold
the rank of Senior Counsellor of Justice. Prior to joining the procuracy service, I was head
of the criminal law and criminology department and deputy head of Vladimir Law
Institute of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FPS of Russia).
2. In 1993, I graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod Higher School of the Russian Ministry
of Internal Affairs (MIA of Russia), qualifying as a lawyer. From 1995 to 1998, I took
postgraduate studies as an adjunct at Ryazan Institute of Law and Economics of the MIA
of Russia and in 1998 defended my Candidate of Sciences thesis on the topic of
‘Necessary Defence: Criminal Law and Criminological Aspects’ there. In 2007, I
defended my Doctor of Sciences thesis at the Academy of Law and Management of the
FPS of Russia on the topic of ‘Theoretical and methodological problems of the criminal
law support of a person’s right to civil self-defence.’ On 15 October 2008, I was awarded
the academic title of professor at the department of criminal law and criminology. I am a
member of the Dissertation Council D 170.001.02 at the University of Procuracy of the
Russian Federation since 2012.
3. The main areas of my research are terrorism, extremism, organised crime, organised
resistance to countering crime, necessary defence and criminal law instruments of civil
self-defence, national security, interethnic relations and penitentiary crime. I have
published over 250 scientific works, including 10 monographs (some of them coauthored),
5 textbooks, 10 study guides, 4 commentaries to the Criminal Code and the
Penal Enforcement Code of the Russian Federation.
4. This Report provides an analysis of the legislative history of the Russian Federation and
law enforcement practice on countering extremism and assesses their compliance with
international human rights standards. In addition, I have considered Professor Sheinin’s
statements regarding the abovementioned legislation.
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B. HISTORY OF RUSSIAN LEGISLATION ON COUNTERING EXTREMIST ACTIVITY
5. Acknowledgement of special danger of extremist threats and recognition of counteraction
to extremism as one of important directions of state law enforcement activity was first
reflected in Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 310 dated 23 March
1995 ‘On measures of providing coordinated actions of state authorities in countering
manifestations of fascism and other forms of political extremism in the Russian
Federation.’ In particular, the Decree stated that
‘Incidents of dissemination of fascist ideas have become more frequent in the
Russian Federation.[...].
The activities of political extremists, many of whom openly claim ideological
affinity with National Socialism and use fascist or similar slogans, insignia
and symbols, deeply offend the memory of the victims of the Great Patriotic
War and the feelings of veterans cherished by Russians. In the year of the
50th anniversary of Victory over Hitler's Germany, such actions are
particularly provocative[...].
There is little response from the state and local authorities to these processes,
which threaten the constitutional order.
The norms that provide the legal basis for a real fight against this
phenomenon, and above all the provision of Article 13 of the Constitution of
the Russian Federation prohibiting the establishment and activities of
associations whose aims or actions are unconstitutional, are hardly ever
applied.’
6. The idea of anti-extremist legislation was thus prompted by a desire to halt the spread of
fascist ideology, which is unacceptable to the Russian society, and to provide real
counteraction to incitement to social, racial, national and religious enmity, since such acts
clearly constitute a serious threat to the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional people of the
Russian Federation.
7. Presidential Decree No. 1143 of 27 October 1997 set up the Commission for Countering
Political Extremism in the Russian Federation. It comprised representatives of law
enforcement agencies, the Presidential Administration and the State Duma of the Russian
Federation. The Commission had an Expert Council headed by O.E. Kutafin, a wellknown
Russian legal scholar and one of the developers of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation. The Commission came to the conclusion that it was necessary to draft federal
laws aimed at countering extremism in the country.
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8. In 1999, the Government of the Russian Federation submitted the draft Law “On
Countering Political Extremism” to the State Duma.1 On 9 February 2001, parliamentary
hearings were held in the State Duma of the Russian Federation to discuss the problems
of countering political extremism and banning the dissemination of Nazi symbolism in
the Russian Federation. Participants in the hearings noted, in particular, that the creation
of illegal armed units, security services and self-defence units attached to certain
extremist movements increased the violent potential of political extremism, which made
it urgent to amend the Russian legislation so as to make it possible to combat extremist
manifestations and their causes.2
9. In the process of considering the draft law “On Countering Political Extremism”, it was
decided to include not only political extremism but also other types of extremism in its
subject matter. As a result, Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 “On Countering
Extremist Activity” was adopted, defining extremism and setting out the direction and
principles for countering the same. Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 was
subsequently amended to reflect the evolution of extremist threats, and currently covers:
(a) Forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional order and/or violation of
the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,
(b) Public justification of terrorism,
(c) Incitement to social, racial, national or religious strife; propaganda of exclusivity,
superiority or inferiority of a person on the grounds of his/her social, racial,
national, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;
(d) Violation of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of a person and citizen on the
grounds of his/her social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or
attitude towards religion;
1 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 855-r of 4 June 1999 “On draft Federal Laws “On
Countering Political Extremism” and “On Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Legislative Acts in
Connection with the Adoption of the Federal Law “On Countering Political Extremism”, available at:
https://www.szrf ru/szrf/doc.php?nb=100&issid=1001999024000&docid=1877.
2 State Duma of the Russian Federation, Information and Analytical Materials of the State Duma, available at:
http://iam.duma.gov.ru/node/1/4170.
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(e) Obstructing citizens from exercising their electoral rights by violence or threat of
violence;
(f) Obstruction of lawful activities of state bodies and religious associations or other
organisations, combined with violence or threat of violence;
(g) Use of Nazi insignia or symbols,
(h) Mass dissemination of manifestly extremist materials, as well as their production
or possession for the purpose of mass distribution;
(i) Consciously false public accusation against a person holding a public office of the
Russian Federation.3
10. As stated in the preamble to Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002, its purpose is to protect
human and civil rights and freedoms and the foundations of the constitutional order and
to ensure the integrity and security of the Russian Federation by providing a legal and
organisational basis for countering extremist activities and establishing liability for the
performance thereof.
11. Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002 was adopted as a further development of the
constitutional provisions and corresponding international legal norms that are part of the
legal system of the Russian Federation. Thus, Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002 has
become a conventional and framework law incorporating the provisions of the Shanghai
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of 15 June 2001 ratified
by the Russian Federation.4
12. It should be noted that Russian legislation to combat extremist activity has evolved in line
with and at the same time as international efforts in this area. The first official definition
of the term ‘extremism’ was formulated in the above-mentioned Shanghai Convention of
3 Federal Law No 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 “On Countering Extremist Activity” (translation into English), Arti. 1,
available at: https://legislationline.org/sites/default/files/documents/f6/Russian_Federation_Law_Counter_Extre
mism_2002_am2020.pdf.
4 Russia has ratified that document (Federal Law No. 3-FZ of 10 January 2003 “On the ratification of the Shanghai
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, available at:
http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102079694).
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15 June 2001. That convention and the definitions contained in it had a significant impact
on the formation of Russian anti-extremist legislation, as will be discussed below.
13. As will be shown below, the application of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002,
within the framework of the constitutional requirements for the protection of human
rights, which in turn reflect corresponding norms of international law, is made more
specific by individual sectoral laws, in particular the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation and the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) of the Russian Federation,
as well as in the court practice. Thus, the development of sectoral anti-extremist
legislation has resulted in a range of legal norms providing for both criminal and
administrative liability for unlawful acts related to extremism, which in practice makes it
possible to combat manifestations of extremism more effectively. Considerable attention
in application of the Law is paid to preventive measures.
14. It should also be noted that a very significant recent trend in Russian law-making is
decriminalisation of anti-extremist legislation.
(a) Thus, in order to exempt persons whose actions do not pose a serious threat to the
constitutional order of the Russian Federation from criminal liability, Federal Law
No. 519-FZ of 27 December 2018 ‘On Amendments to Article 282 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation’ significantly limited the scope of Article 282 of
the Criminal Code (incitement of hatred or hostility, as well as humiliation of
human dignity) by introducing a mechanism of administrative prejudice: first-time
committers of incitement of hatred or hostility, as well as humiliation of human
dignity, bear administrative liability (Article 20.3(1) of the CAO), while criminal
liability (Article 282 of the Criminal Code) is established only in case of repeated
commission of the said unlawful act within a year or in the presence of aggravating
circumstances. Thus, the legislator has decriminalised a significant portion of acts
falling under Article 282 of the Criminal Code;
(b) Federal Law No. 421-FZ of 02 December 2019 ‘On amendments to Article 6 of the
Federal Law “On the Commemoration of Victory of the Soviet people in the Great
Patriotic War of 1941-1945” and Article 1 of the Federal Law “On countering
extremist activities”’ lifted the absolute ban on the use of Nazi insignia and
symbols. Its use is now permitted on condition that a negative attitude towards the
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ideology of Nazism is formed and there is no indication of propaganda or
justification of Nazism. In 2020, a note of similar content was added to Article 20.3
of the CAO of the Russian Federation.
15. Thus, the anti-extremist legislation of the Russian Federation was adopted after the
collapse of the USSR many years before the reunification of Crimea with Russia. Its
adoption was caused by manifestations of fascism and other forms of political extremism,
has no connection with the reunification of Crimea with Russia and was developed in
conjunction with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Federal Law No. 114-
FZ of 25 July 2002 is a framework law and, as will be shown below, is specified in the
norms of the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian
Federation.
C. APPLICATION OF THE LAW ON COUNTERING EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES
16. Pursuant to Article 3 of Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002, the main areas of antiextremist
activity are as follows:
(a) Preventive activities aimed at eliminating circumstances and factors contributing to
the development of unlawful extremist behaviour;
(b) Identification and prevention of the extremist activities of specific individuals and
entities.
17. Extremism is currently countered through a range of general and specific mechanisms
based on relevant international and domestic laws and regulations. A comprehensive
approach to countering extremism is ensured through a combination of precaution,
prevention and suppression, as well as inter-agency cooperation with active participation
of a number of authorised state bodies of the Russian Federation (Prosecutor's Office,
Investigative Committee, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Federal
Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring), Federal Service for Supervision of
Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor), etc.) under
the key role of courts.
18. Judicial review is undoubtedly the most effective way of protecting the rights, freedoms
and legitimate interests of individuals and citizens, since judicial proceedings, regardless
of their form, involve compliance with the principles of independence of judges,
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adversariality, equality of the parties, transparency and openness, while criminal
proceedings, in addition, involve the presumption of innocence, free qualified legal
assistance and the right to protection against unwarranted prosecution, which ensures
objectivity and legality and excludes unwarranted prosecution.
19. Thus, Article 9 of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 provides procuratorial bodies
with the authority and legal means to apply to the courts to declare organisations extremist
and prohibit their activities (or, in case they have organisational and legal status, to
liquidate them) in order to suppress and prevent offences against State and public security.
In order to ensure the protection of rights and freedoms, the final decision in such cases
is taken solely by the courts; procuratorial bodies can only initiate this process.
20. In accordance with article 13 of Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002, it is prohibited to
disseminate extremist materials in the Russian Federation or to produce or store such
materials for the purpose of dissemination. This provision of the Law is applied in
accordance with Article 10 of Federal Law No. 149 of 27 July 2006 ‘On information,
information technologies and protection of information,’ which provides that
dissemination of information in the Russian Federation can be done freely on condition
of compliance with requirements set by the law of the Russian Federation. The
dissemination of information aimed at war propaganda or inciting ethnic, racial or
religious hatred or enmity is prohibited, as is the dissemination of other information
punishable under criminal or administrative law.
21. Information materials are recognised extremist by a federal court at the place of
discovery, dissemination or location of the organisation having produced such materials,
based on a procurator's application or in the corresponding administrative, civil, or
criminal proceedings (Art. 265.8 of the Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure). The
court also rules to confiscate information materials at the same time as it rules to declare
them extremist. A copy of a decision that enters into legal force is sent by the court within
three days to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, as the federal authority
for state registration, which enters them in the Federal Register of Extremist Materials
within 30 days. The procedure for maintaining the Register is strictly regulated and
approved by Order of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation No. 289 dated 11
December 2015 ‘On the Procedure for Maintaining the Federal Register of Extremist
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Materials.’ The Register itself is available on the Internet on the official website of the
Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation; it is also subject to publication in the media.
22. Thus, an exclusively judicial procedure for declaring materials extremist is contemplated.
A mandatory prerequisite for such a decision by the court is linguistic expert examination
with a positive conclusion that the materials contain extremist features.
23. In accordance with Article 15.3 of Federal Law No. 149-FZ of 27 July 2006 ‘On
information, information technologies and protection of information,’ competent
authorities have the right to request Roskomnadzor to restrict access to information
materials of organisations whose activities have been recognised as extremist, and also to
information containing substantiation and/or justification of extremist activities.
24. That administrative procedure includes a number of steps to ensure compliance with the
law. Thus, an authorised body initiates such procedure on the basis of inspection materials
only as a last resort, when all other possibilities have been exhausted, or when the relevant
actors do not respond to prescriptions and warnings. In order to block a website containing
prohibited information, it is first entered into the relevant register. The grounds for this
can be either a decision by Roskomnadzor,5 a court decision, or an order from a bailiff.
Then the relevant hosting provider is identified and notified. The provider, in turn, must
inform the owner of the website of the requirement to remove the prohibited information.
If the website owner ignores that notification, the hosting provider will restrict access to
the website. If the provider fails to comply, access to the site will be restricted by the
telecom operator. In any case, all decisions by state authorities in this matter can be
challenged in court.6
25. On 23 November 2015, in order to avoid any contradictions in the interpretation of
provisions of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 with the constitutional right to
freely choose, have and disseminate religious and other beliefs,7 Federal Law No. 314-
FZ made amendments to the aforesaid Federal Law, according to which the main sacred
5 Regulation on the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technologies and Mass
Media (approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 228 of 16 March 2009) article
5.1.7.1, available at: http://pravo.gov ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102128289.
6 Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure of the Russian Federation, Article 218, available at:
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_176147/98b69fee6357343965f5b57193fcaaa54b0f21e4.
7 Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 28, available at:
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_28399/69de606a34754e42f0767090ca6c640885cdf63d.
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texts of Christians, Muslims, Jews and Buddhists may not be recognised as extremist. The
Law applies to the full texts and quotations from the Bible, the Koran, the Tanakh and the
Ganjur.
26. The current Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation No. 195-FZ of
30 December 2001 contains a number of special norms prescribing liability for various
manifestations of extremism:
(a) Article 13.15(2) of the CAO - for disseminating information about a public
association or other organisation on the published list of public and religious
associations and other organisations in respect of which there is an enforceable
court decision to liquidate or ban their activities on grounds prescribed by Federal
Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 ‘On Countering Extremist Activities’;
(b) Art. 13.37 of the CAO - for distribution of information with extremist content by
the owner of an audio-visual service;
(c) Article. 20.3 of the CAO - for propaganda or public display of Nazi, extremist and
other legally prohibited insignia or symbols;
(d) Art. 20.3(1) of the CAO - for incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation
of human dignity;
(e) Art. 20.3(2) of the CAO - for public calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation;
(f) Art. 20.3(3) of the CAO - for public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation protecting the interests of the Russian
Federation and its citizens, maintaining international peace and security, or the
exercise by state bodies of the Russian Federation of their powers for such purposes;
(g) Art. 20.29 of the CAO - for the production and distribution of extremist materials.
27. At the same time, the sanctions of these norms provide for a combination of an
administrative fine and confiscation of the instrument or object of the administrative
offence, which allows not only to prosecute the offenders, but also to seize, for example,
materials of extremist content, equipment suitable for their production and distribution,
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etc. The legislator’s focus with such offenders is, to a greater extent, on influencing them
through material losses.
28. Criminal liability is an extreme and exceptional form of coercion. At the same time, the
application of criminal law measures for the commission of extremist crimes is regulated
in detail and is based on the recognition of and respect for human rights and freedoms.
29. In each specific case, it must be established that the person who posted the extremist
material was aware that the act was aimed at violating the foundations of the
constitutional order and that it was intended to incite hatred or enmity or to disparage a
person or group on the grounds of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to
religion or membership of a social group. 8
30. A person’s intention to incite hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity,
is evidenced, in particular, by the use of extremist materials in combination with
statements justifying and/or asserting the need for genocide, mass repression, deportation
or the commission of other illegal acts, including the use of violence, against members of
a nation or a race, or adherents of a particular religion.9
31. Criminal prosecution is generally only permissible following administrative prosecution
for similar acts, i.e. when there is a repeat commission of an extremist act (Arts. 280.1 ,
280.3 , 282, 282.4 of the Criminal Code), which follows from paragraph 14.
32. For example, liability under Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code is incurred if public calls
for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation are made
by a person within one year of being held administratively liable for a similar act under
Article 20.3.2, paragraph 1 or 2, of the CAO. This circumstance allows the courts to
impose punishment only on persons with persistent extremist convictions.
33. The aforesaid provision of the Criminal Code is applied uniformly throughout the Russian
Federation regardless of the nationality of the person being criminally prosecuted, and
one should note that courts rarely convict the guilty party to actual deprivation of liberty.
8 Resolution No. 11 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 28 June 2011 “On judicial
practice in criminal cases involving extremist offences”, ¶8, available at:
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_115712.
9 Ibid., ¶7.
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For example, the following persons have been criminally prosecuted under Article 280.1
of the Criminal Code:
(a) V. Zavarkin - for calling for the secession of the Republic of Karelia from the
Russian Federation; sentenced to a fine;10
(b) Y. Avdoshkin - for calling for the secession of the Republic of Komi from the
Russian Federation; sentenced to compulsory labour;11
(c) A. Nikolaev - for calling for the secession of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) from
the Russian Federation; sentenced to compulsory labour;12
(d) V. Melnikov - for calling for the secession of the Kotelnikovo District of Volgograd
Oblast from the Russian Federation; sentenced to compulsory labour;13
(e) O. Bystrukhina - for calling for the secession of Siberia from the Russian
Federation; sentenced to a suspended sentence of imprisonment, without actually
serving time in prison.14
It follows from the above that the Federal Law on Countering Extremist Activities is concretised
and applied through the provisions of the Criminal Code and the CAO. The law enforcement
agencies’ efforts in implementing the Law are aimed at preventing crimes. The rights of persons
involved in unlawful acts are restricted on the basis of court decisions. As a rule, criminal
prosecution is allowed only after administrative liability has been incurred for similar acts, i.e.
when an extremist act has been repeatedly committed.
10 RAPSI, Karelian Deputy Is Fined at 30 Thousand Roubles for Separatism Calling (27 November 2015),
available at: https://rapsinews.ru/judicial_news/20151127/274990719 html
11 Sentence of Syktyvkar City Court of the Republic of Komi of 03 June 2015 in case N 1-502/2015, available at:
https://sudact.ru/regular/doc/SfcvVdxvC0dv/.
12 Sentence of the Mirny District Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) of 08 July 2020 in case N 1-110/2020,
available at: https://mirny--
jak.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=case&case_id=60395772&case_uid=e8854d
dd-ee1e-445b-b7dd-3b4e105538cc&delo_id=1540006.
13Sentence of the Kotelnikovo District Court of Volgograd Region of 23 August 2017 in case No. 1-64/2017,
available at: https://kotel--
vol.sudrf ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=case&case_id=359610435&case_uid=f8ee32
aa-d64d-4005-b9ae-7378190a91d9&delo_id=1540006 .
14 Sentence of Choi District Court of the Republic of Altai dated 17 Ferbuary 2017 in case No. 1-13/2017, available
at: https://choisky--
ralt.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=case&case_id=51588231&case_uid=7220b1
b8-ef29-402c-aa71-a8d6455780ac&delo_id=1540006 .
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D. STATISTICS ON STATE ACTIVITY AGAINST EXTREMISM SHOW NO DISCRIMINATION
34. As of 17 February 2023, the list of extremist organisations includes 101 public or religious
organizations.15 Analysing the list, one can see that ethnic or religious orientation of such
organisations is different and does not give grounds to deduce the discriminatory nature
of the legislation, at the very least due to the fact that, out of all organisations included in
the above list, an owerwhelming majority (77) belong to the organisations of pseudoreligious16
and pseudo-Russian nationalist nature17 not related to the peoples living on the
15 Website of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, List of Public Associations and Religious
Organisations, in respect of which a court has made an enforceable decision to liquidate or ban their activities on
the grounds provided by Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25.07.2002 'On Counteracting Extremist Activity'
(25.11.2022), available at: https://minjust.gov ru/ru/documents/7822/.
16 Religious Group Krasnodar Orthodox Slavic Community ‘VEK RA’ (Vedic Culture of Russian Aryans) of
Scythian Vesi Rassenia (Judgment of Krasnodar Regional Court dated 05.10.2006 to prohibit activity); Local
religious organisation Asgard Slavic Community of Spiritual Administration of Asgard Vesi Belovodya of Ancient
Russian Yngliist Church of Orthodox Starover-Ynglings (Judgment of Omsk Regional Court dated 30.04.2006 to
liquidate); Local religious organisation Slavic Community of the Temple of Veda of Perun of Spiritual
Administration of Asgard Vesi Belovodya of Ancient Russian Yngliist Church of Orthodox Starover-Ynglings
(Judgment of Omsk regional court of 30.04.2004 to liquidate), Religious Organisation Men Religious Seminary
Religious Institution of Professional Religious Education Ancient Russian Yngliist Church of Orthodox Starover-
Ynglings (Judgment of Omsk Regional Court of 30.04.2004 to liquidate), Religious Group of O.V.Sokolov, V.V.
Russkikh and A.G. Petin, confessing, cultivating and disseminating the ideas of the doctrine of the Ancient Russian
Yngliist Church of Orthodox Starover-Ynglings (Judgment of the Maikop District Court of the Republic of
Adygea of 12.12.2008), the Orthodox religious group ‘In honor of the Icon of the Mother of God ‘Derzhavnaya’
(Judgment of the Tula Regional Court of 25.07.2016 and the Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for
Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 21.03.2017) (date of posting: 01.08.2018),
Local religious organisation Jehovah's Witnesses ‘Taganrog’ (Judgment of the Rostov Regional Court of
11.09.2009 and Ruling of the Judicial Board for Civil Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of
08.12.2009), Religious Group ‘Noble Order of the Devil’ (Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Mordovia of 27.12.2010), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses in Samara (Judgment of the
Samara Regional Court of 29.05.2014 and Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Russian
Federation Supreme Court of 12.11.2014) (date of posting: 20.03.2015), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's
Witnesses of Abinsk (Judgment of the Krasnodar Regional Court of 04.03.2015 and Ruling of the Judicial Board
for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 05.08.2015) (date of posting:
11.12.2015), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses of Stary Oskol (Judgment of the Belgorod
Regional Court of 10.02.2016 and Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation of 16.06.2016 (date of posting: 13.09.2016), Local Religious Organisation of
Jehovah's Witnesses of Belgorod City (Judgment of Belgorod Regional Court dated 11.02.2016 and Appeal Ruling
of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 09. 09.2016)
(date of posting: 13.09.2016), The local religious organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses of Elista (Judgment of the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Kalmykia of 25.02.2016 and the Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for
Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 07.07.2016) (date of posting:
30.11.2016), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses ‘Oryol’ (Judgment of the Oryol Regional Court
of 14.06.2016 and the Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation of 18.10.2016) (date of posting: 23.12.2016), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's
Witnesses in the city of Birobidzhan (Judgment of the Court of the Jewish Autonomous Region of 03.10.2016 and
Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of
09.02.2017) (date of posting: 06.04.2017), Religious organisation ‘Administrative Centre of Jehovah's Witnesses
in Russia’ and local religious organisations (395 branches) that are part of its structure;
17 Ryazan city public patriotic organisation ‘Russian national unity’ (in absentia judgment of Ryazan Railway
district court of 12.02.2008 and ruling of Ryazan Railway district court of 24.12.2009), the Tatarstan regional
Annex 20
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territory of the Republic of Crimea, and only 8 of them, i.e. less than 10%, are Ukrainian
extremist organisations.
35. Similarly, the vast majority of banned extremist materials (which are audio-visual
materials18 as well as a small number of printed publications19) are pseudo-religious and
openly Nazi in nature, and no more than 0.5% of banned extremist materials could be
attributed to Ukrainian or Crimean-Tatar oriented materials.20
36. While before 2017, there was a tendency for the number of registered extremist crimes to
grow, in subsequent years the situation reversed. In 2018 a tendency of annual growth of
extremist crimes stopped with a decrease recorded in 2018.21 In 2018 and 2019, 1,265
branch of the all-Russian patriotic movement ‘Russian national unity’ (Judgment of the Supreme Court of the
Republic of Tatarstan of 21.05.2003), the Inter-regional association ‘Russian nationwide union’ (decision of the
Vladimir regional court of 30.05.2011 and Ruling of the Judicial Board for Civil Cases of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation of 06.09.2011), Public association (movement) ‘Omsk organisation of public political
movement ‘Russian national unity’ (Judgment of Omsk regional court of 10.10.2002), Community of Native
Russian people of Shchelkovsky district of Moscow region (Judgment of Shchelkovsky city court of Moscow
region of 25.02.2014) (date of posting: 20.08.2014), Interregional Public Association ‘Ethnopolitical Association
‘Russians’ (decision of the Moscow City Court of 28.10.2015 and Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for
Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 11.05.2016) (date of posting:
26.08.2016); The Regional Public Association ‘Russian National Association ‘Ataka’ (decision of the Moscow
City Court of 11.08.2016) (date of posting: 24.10.2016), Community of Native Russians of Astrakhan Oblast
(decision of the Sovetskiy District Court of Astrakhan city) (date of posting: 24.10.2016), Community of Native
Russians of the city of Astrakhan, Astrakhan Oblast (Judgment of the Sovetskiy District Court of Astrakhan city)
(date of posting: 30.11.2016), Interregional Public Association ‘Russian Republic of Rus’ (Judgment of the
Moscow City Court of 20.05.2020) (date of posting: 24.08.2020), Regional Public Association ‘Russian Patriotic
Club-Novokuznetsk/RPC’ (Judgment of the Central District Court of Novokuznetsk in the Kemerovo Region of
07.12.2020 and Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Kemerovo Regional Court of
04.03.2021) (date of posting: 02.07.2021);
18 For example, the audio file of the performer Christ the Saviour and Mother Earth Ensemble entitled: ‘You are
Banned’, lasting 2 minutes and 43 seconds, beginning with the words ‘You are banned from war and victory...’
and ending with ‘F.. king beat, burn and hang’, available on the Internet (Judgment of the Central District Court
of Krasnoyarsk of 27.07.2021) or a video recording titled ‘William Pearce - truth about Kikes,’ 14 minutes 51
seconds long, beginning with ‘Hello, at the end of another radio interview’ and ending with ‘because there are still
those who deny the Holocaust’, posted on the Internet (Judgment of the Maikop city court of the Republic of
Adygeya of 19.08.2021);
19 For example, Joseph Goebbels' work entitled ‘Nazi-Soci: Questions and Answers for the National Socialist’,
consisting of 24 sections, starting with the section ‘The 10 Commandments of the National Socialist’, ending with
the section ‘German Freedom’, beginning with the words ‘Motherland is the main driving force of your life. Never
forget that!’ ending with ‘Then we will form a new Germany - a nationalist, socialist Third Reich!’ (Judgment of
the Central District Court of Barnaul dated 03.03.2022);
20 Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, Extremist Materials, available at:
https://minjust.gov.ru/ru/extremist-materials/.
21 Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, Legal Statistics Portal, available at:
http://crimestat.ru/offenses_chart.
Annex 20
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and 585 of such crimes were recorded, respectively.22 Thus, in 2019 there was more than
a twofold reduction in absolute numbers.
37. In addition, it should be noted that the reunification of Crimea with Russia did not lead
to an increase in the number of recorded crimes of the category under review; on the
contrary, in the year of reunification the growth rate of this type of crimes even slowed
down. Thus, in 2013 it was a 28.7% growth, in 2014 (the year of Crimea's reunification
with Russia) – just half of that - 15.4%, in 2015 - 28.5 % (lower than in 2013) and in 2016
- 9.1% (three times lower than in 2013).23 In other words, there was no spike in crime
related to extremist activities during the reunification of Crimea with Russia, which
testifies that there is no discrimination on the part of the Russian Federation in relation to
various kinds of public organisations operating in the Republic of Crimea.
38. Since 2020, extremist crime has been characterised by a growing trend, driven by
increased activity of members of international extremist and terrorist organisations
against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was affirmed, among others, by
the UN Secretary-General in December 2020.24
39. In the structure of crime as a whole, the share of extremist crimes remains insignificant.
For example, in 2022 the share of such crimes was less than 0.08% (1,566 out of
1,966,795).25
40. A majority of extremist crimes are recorded in the Central Federal District. The Moscow
region traditionally accounts for the highest proportion of such crimes. In 2022, the
highest numbers of extremist crimes among the federal subjects of the Russian Federation
were recorded in Moscow (280), Stavropol Krai (60) and the Republic of Dagestan (56)
(see figure 1).
22 Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, Legal Statistics Portal, available at:
http://crimestat.ru/offenses_chart.
23 Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, Legal Statistics Portal, available at:
http://crimestat.ru/offenses_chart.
24 UN News, Taking Advantage of Pandemic Difficulties, Terrorists and Extremists Are Increasingly Active (11
December 2020), available at: https://news.un.org/ru/story/2020/12/1392252
25 Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, Legal Statistics Portal, available at:
http://crimestat.ru/offenses_table.
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Figure 1 - Number of recorded extremist crimes by federal district in 2022
Legend:
(left column, top to bottom) Central Federal District – 492/31.4% (Moscow – 280, Moscow Oblast – 30, Belgorod Oblast –
21); Southern Federal District – 185/11.85% (Republic of Crimea – 47, Rostov Oblast – 42, Krasodar Krai – 23); Northern
Caucasus Federal District – 167/10.7% (Stavropol Krai – 60, Rep. of Dagestan – 56, Kabardino-Balkar Rep. – 18); North-
West Federal District – 87/5.6% (St. Petersburg – 31, Rep. of Komi – 13, Kaliningrad Oblast – 10);
(right column, top to bottom): Privolzhsky Federal District – 239/15.3% (Saratov Oblast – 36, Samara Oblast – 31, Perm
Krai – 21); Ural Federal District – 56/3.6% (Kurgan Oblast – 47, Sverdlovsk Oblast – 13, Chelyabinsk Oblast – 13); Siberian
Federal District – 173/11% (Krasnoyarsk Krai – 42, Kemerovo Oblast – 33, Novosibirsk Oblast – 22); Far-Eastern Federal
District – 115/7.3% (Primorsky Krai – 32, Khabarovsk Krai – 23, Amur Oblast – 15)
41. At the same time the Republic of Crimea, whose population numbers about 2.5 million
people, accounted for just 47 such crimes, which is only 3% of all registered extremist
crimes. This is proportion-wise less than, for example, in the capital of Russia - Moscow,
where 280 extremist crimes were registered per 13 million population, i.e. about 17.9%
of extremist crimes registered in the entire territory of Russia in 2022. Thus, with a 5
times larger population, the number of extremist crimes in Moscow is almost 6 times
higher, which indicates absence of any disproportionality as regards Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians.
42. For extremist crimes, predominantly non-custodial sentences are imposed. In 2021, 101
persons were sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment.26
43. Finally, due to the fact that the activities of certain extremist organisations banned in
Russia was permitted in Ukraine (Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat), law enforcement
authorities granted Crimean residents a transition period of application of anti-extremist
26 Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Judicial Statistics Data, ‘Report on the
number of persons convicted and types of criminal punishment’, available at:
http://www.cdep ru/userimages/Statistika_zameni/10.1-svod-2021.xls.
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legislation, i.e. did not prosecute them for at least 1 year for participating in the activities
of such extremist organisations and did not seize extremist literature from them.27
44. It follows from the abovesaid that organisations carrying out their activities on the
territory of the Republic of Crimea have not been subjected to discriminatory persecution
by the Russian Federation. Extremist crimes constitute an insignificant part of all crimes
committed in the Russian Federation. Such crimes are fought with throughout the entire
territory of Russia. The highest number of crimes is recorded in the Moscow region. The
reunification of Crimea with Russia did not have a significant impact on the number of
extremist crimes on record.
E. FEDERAL LAW ON COUNTERING EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES WAS ADOPTED ON THE BASIS,
AND IS APPLIED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK, OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
45. Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002 was adopted to develop the constitutional provisions
and corresponding norms of international law that are part of the Russian legal system.
Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002 became a conventional and framework law that,
inter alia, implements the Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism
and Extremism, ratified by the Russian Federation.
46. The Constitution of the Russian Federation, establishing that the individual, his rights and
freedoms are of supreme value and recognising ideological diversity as one of the
foundations of the constitutional order, guarantees everyone freedom of conscience,
freedom of religion, including the right to profess individually or collectively any religion
or not to profess any, to freely choose, have and disseminate religious or other beliefs and
act in accordance with them; freedom of thought and speech; the right to seek, receive,
transmit, impart and disseminate religious or other beliefs and act in accordance with
them; freedom to seek, obtain, produce and disseminate information by any legal method
(Arts. 2, 13(1), 28.1 and 29(1), 29(4)), and other rights and freedoms, including the right
to association and freedom of public association activities (Art. 30(1)); said freedoms
determining the meaning, content and application of laws, activity of legislative and
27 As far as I understand, this practice of law-enforcement authorities is described in A.G. Zhafyarov witness
statement.
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executive powers, and local self-government, and are ensured by the judicial system (Art.
18).
47. The Constitution of the Russian Federation, taking into consideration the importance of
promoting civil peace and harmony, preserving the historically established state unity and
ensuring the well-being and prosperity of the present and future generations of the multiethnic
people of Russia (Preamble), proceeds from the principle that the exercise of
human and civil rights and freedoms must not violate the rights and freedoms of others
(Art. 17(3)).
48. The Constitution of the Russian Federation prohibits the establishment and activities of
public associations whose goals or actions are aimed at a violent change in the
foundations of the constitutional order and violation of the integrity of the Russian
Federation, undermining the security of the State, setting up armed formations and
inciting social, racial, ethnic or religious enmity (Art. 13(5)).
49. Also prohibited is any form of restriction of the rights of citizens on social, racial,
national, linguistic or religious grounds (Article 19(2)); propaganda or agitation inciting
social, racial, national or religious hatred and enmity, and propaganda of social, racial,
national, religious or linguistic superiority (Article 29(2)).
50. The aforesaid constitutional provisions conform with Articles 18, 19 and 29(2) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10
December 1948), Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (adopted on 16 December 1966 by Resolution 2200 (XXI) at the 1496th plenary
session of the UN General Assembly), Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted in 1965 by the UN General Assembly and
entered into force on 01 January 1969) and other international legal acts.
51. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifies that any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence should be prohibited by law.
52. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
in Article 5, imposes an obligation on states that have adopted it to prohibit and eliminate
discrimination in all forms.
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53. According to Article 15.4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, international
treaties of the Russian Federation are an integral part of its legal system. Such a
conclusion follows not only from Article 15, but also from the content of other norms of
the Russian Constitution. For example, Article 17 of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, devoted to the protection of human and civil rights and fundamental
freedoms, recognises and guarantees such rights in accordance with the universally
recognised principles and norms of international law and in accordance with the
Constitution.
54. In accordance with Resolution No. 8 of 31 October 1995 of the Plenum of the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation ‘On certain questions concerning the application by the
courts of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in the administration of justice,’ in
administering justice the courts must proceed from the fact that the commonly recognised
principles and norms of international law, contained in international agreements,
conventions and other instruments (in particular, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and international treaties of the
Russian Federation, are, pursuant to Article 15(4) of the Constitution, a constituent part
of its legal system.
55. The above provisions of the Constitution and international legal instruments have been
reflected in the Federal Law ‘On Countering Extremist Activities.’
56. Thus, Article 2 of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002, setting out the basic
principles for countering extremist activity, gives priority to the principle of recognition,
respect and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms and the legitimate interests
of organisations. Among others, that norm provides for such principles as legality,
transparency and cooperation of the State and public and religious associations, other
organisations and citizens in countering extremist activities.
57. Article 17 of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 prohibits the activities of public
and religious associations and other non-profit organisations of foreign States and their
subdivisions whose activities are deemed extremist under international legal documents,
and provides for cooperation between the Russian Federation and foreign States, their law
Annex 20
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enforcement agencies and special services, and international organisations engaged in
countering extremism.
58. Thus, the anti-extremist legislation in force in the Russian Federation has been adopted
on the basis of international legal acts and the Constitution of the Russian Federation and
fully complies with international standards of human rights protection.
59. The judicial system of the Russian Federation, in turn, guarantees the implementation in
practice of these legal provisions, as will be shown below.
F. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION GUARANTEES RESPECT FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATION ON COMBATING EXTREMIST
ACTIVITIES
60. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, human and civil
rights and freedoms are recognised and guaranteed in the Russian Federation in
accordance with the generally recognised principles and norms of international law.
61. Article 19 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees the equality of human
and civil rights and freedoms regardless of gender, race, nationality, language, origin,
property or official status, place of residence, attitude to religion, beliefs, membership of
voluntary associations or other circumstances; all forms of restrictions on the rights of
citizens on social, racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious grounds are prohibited.
62. The Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees everyone state protection of his
rights and freedoms, including judicial protection. The right to judicial protection is
directly applicable and is recognised and guaranteed in accordance with the generally
recognised principles and norms of international law and in accordance with the
Constitution of the Russian Federation.
63. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in its Resolution of the Plenum No. 55 of
29 November 2016 ‘On Court Sentence’ stresses that evidence can only form the basis of
the court's findings after it has been checked and assessed under the rules set out in
Articles 87 and 88 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (CPC),
including in terms of credibility of information constituting its content. The substantiation
of a sentence with reliable evidence ensures the veracity of conclusions contained therein
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on the main issue of the criminal case - the guilt of the defendant for the crime charged
against him.
64. In providing clarification to the courts, the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation in paragraph 1 of Resolution No. 11 of 28 June 2011 ‘On judicial practice in
criminal cases involving extremist crimes’ specifically states that, when considering
criminal cases involving extremist crimes, ‘the courts must, on the one hand, ensure
protection of public interests (the foundations of the constitutional order, integrity and
security of the Russian Federation), and on the other hand - the protection of human and
civil rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Russian Constitution: freedom of conscience
and religion, freedom of thought, expression, mass media, right to freely seek, obtain,
transmit, produce and disseminate information by any legal means, right to assemble
peacefully and without arms, hold meetings, demonstrations, marches and events.’
65. Furthermore, the attention of the courts is drawn to the norm that ‘freedom of thought and
expression guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and international
legal instruments, as well as the right to freely seek, receive, transmit, produce and
disseminate information by any lawful means may only be restricted in exceptional cases
expressly provided for by a federal law to the extent necessary in a democratic society
for the protection of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights and lawful interests
of others, to ensure the defence of the country, state security, public order and territorial
integrity.’
66. Furthermore, in paragraph 2.1 of the Resolution, the Plenum draws the courts’ attention
to the requirement that, when considering appeals against decisions to initiate criminal
proceedings for extremist offences, courts ‘must carefully verify not only whether there
is a reason, but also the basis for instituting proceedings, which requires the submission
to the court of materials containing sufficient data containing elements of relevant
crimes.’ Thus, for example, with regard to offences under Articles 280, 280.1 and 282 of
the Criminal Code, the courts must proceed ‘not only from the mere fact of the posting on
the Internet or another network of text, images, audio or video files containing indicia of
calls to extremist activities or actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation, inciting hatred or enmity, or disparaging a person or group, but also
other information indicating the social danger of the act, including intent and motives of
Annex 20
Page 23 out of 34
committing such actions by a person, which are also subject to mandatory proof’ (Art.
73(1)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation).
67. For the purpose of preventing political censorship, the Plenum of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation stated that
‘The [extremist] offences referred to in articles 280, 280.1 and 282 of the
Criminal Code are committed only with direct intent and with the
intention to incite others to carry out extremist activities, commit acts
aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, or incite
hatred or enmity, or disparage an individual or a group on the grounds of
gender, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or membership
of any social group.
The posting by a person on the Internet or other information and
telecommunications network, particularly on his or her own page or the pages
of other users, of a material (video, audio, graphic or text) created by him or
herself or another person, including information previously recognised by a
court as extremist material, may constitute a crime under Articles 280, 280.1
or 282 of the Criminal Code only if it is established that the person posting
the material was aware that the act was aimed at the disruption of the
constitutional order and had the intent to incite others to commit
extremist activities or actions directed at the violation of the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation, or the purpose to incite hatred or enmity,
humiliate dignity of a person or a group of persons on the grounds of gender,
race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or affiliation with any
social group.
In determining whether or not a person has the direct intention and
intent to incite others to carry out extremist activities, commit acts aimed
at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation or incite hatred
or enmity, or disparage human dignity by posting material on the Internet or
another information and telecommunications network, the court should
proceed from the totality of the circumstances of the offence and take into
account, in particular, the form and content of the posted information, its
context, the presence and content of the person’s comments or other
expressions of attitude, whether the person personally created or borrowed
the relevant audio, video, text or image, the content of the person’s entire
page, information about the person's activities before and after posting, in
particular actions aimed at increasing views and widening the user audience,
information about his/her identity (for example, commitment to radical
ideology, participation in extremist associations, previous administrative or
criminal convictions for extremist offences), the size of the information,
frequency and duration of posting thereof, intensity of updates etc.
It is not an offence under Article 280, 280.1 or 282 of the Criminal Code to
state judgments or deductions based on facts about interethnic,
interconfessional or other social relations in academic or political
discourse or texts, and not connected with the intention to incite others
to extremist activities or actions directed at the violation of the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation, or with the purpose to incite hatred or
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enmity, humiliate dignity of a person or a group of persons on the grounds of
gender, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or affiliation
with any social group.’ 28
68. Thus, the Plenum drew attention to the fact that, when deciding on the aim of a person to
commit an extremist crime, it is required to prove direct intent and intention to induce to
the performance of extremist activity precisely as a subjective (mental) element, i.e. the
full awareness of a person of the nature of his/her actions. The Plenum emphasizes that
the expression of opinions that objectively involve facts of interethnic, interconfessional
and other social relations, but are not connected with the intent to incite to extremist
activity, does not fall under that category of crimes.
69. Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 32 of 20
September 2018 ‘On Amendments to Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation No. 11 of 28 June 2011 “On Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases
on Extremist Crimes”’ provided clarifications aimed at streamlining (essentially limiting)
the application of criminal liability for reposting, statements in mass media and social
media.
70. Thus, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in its function of interpreting and
ensuring uniform application of the law throughout the Russian Federation, pays serious
attention to the implementation of anti-extremist legislation and the protection of human
rights in the course of its application.
G. DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-EXTREMIST LEGISLATION IN RUSSIA IS IN LINE WITH
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
71. There is currently no common understanding of the term 'extremism' around the world.
One can speak of the definitions adopted by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe (PACE).
72. The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism
(Shanghai, 16 June 2001) defines extremism as act aimed at violent seizing or keeping
28 Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 11 ‘On Judicial Practice in
Criminal Cases Involving Extremist Crimes’, 28 June 2011, ¶8, available at:
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_115712.
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power, and violently changing the constitutional system a State, as well as a violent
encroachment upon public security, including organization, for the above purposes of
illegal armed formations and participation in them.
73. Following up on the provisions of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism,
Separatism and Extremism of 15 June 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Convention on Countering Extremism29 was signed in Astana on 09 June 2017, which
did not abolish the 2001 Convention, but was concluded in its development and created
a single (within a regional international organisation) international legal framework to
counter extremism for the first time in the practice of international relations. The new
Convention also contained a new definition of extremism as ‘an ideology and practice
aimed at resolving political, social, racial, national and religious conflicts through
violent and other unconstitutional actions.’
74. Thus, extremism, according to the SCO Convention on Countering Extremism signed on
09 June 2017, is an unconstitutional way of resolving political, social, racial, national and
religious conflicts; while the phrase ‘other unconstitutional actions’ covers not only
violent, but also other, non-violent, actions.
75. Another key element of the 2017 SCO Convention is the definition of an ‘extremist act’,
which includes, in addition to the acts specified in the 2001 Shanghai Convention, also
‘inciting political, social, racial, national or religious enmity or discord; propaganda of
exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person on the grounds of his political, social,
racial, national or religious affiliation; public calls to commit such acts; mass production,
storage and distribution of extremist materials for the purpose of extremist propaganda.’30
76. Similar provisions were included in the Russian Law on Counteracting Extremism even
earlier - in 2007, long before Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation.31
29 In addition to Russia, the Convention has been signed by: the Republic of Kazakhstan (population over 19.5
million), the People's Republic of China (population over 1.4 billion), the Kyrgyz Republic (population over 6.7
million), the Republic of Tajikistan (population over 10 million) and the Republic of Uzbekistan (population over
36 million).
30 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Convention on Countering Extremism (9 June 2017), Article 2(1)(3),
available at: http://publication.pravo.gov ru/Document/View/0001201910280036.
31 See Federal Law No. 211-FZ of 24 July 2007 “On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation
in Relation to Mastering Public Governance in the Sphere of Countering Extremism”, Article 8, available at:
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_52146.
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77. The anti-extremist legislation of SCO member states has evolved in line with the
‘Shanghai’ definition, but each state has introduced its own specific features into its
domestic legislation.
78. Thus, the original ‘Shanghai’ definition, which formed a foundation for the definition of
extremism in the original wording of Art. 1 of Federal Law No. 114-FZ dated 25 July
2002, in contrast to the PACE definition, which will be reviewed below, did not consider
a threat to democratic values to be the main characteristic of extremism, the latter being
understood as a threat to the constitutional order only. However, as noted above, over
time, the concept of extremism has also come to include ‘hateful extremism’, which is a
threat to human rights.
79. The notion of ‘extremism’ was also enshrined in Resolution 1344 (2003) of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ‘On Threats to Democracy by
Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe’ of 2003.32 That resolution defines
‘extremism’ as ‘a form of political activity that overtly or covertly rejects the principles
of parliamentary democracy and very often bases its ideology and its political practices
and conduct on intolerance, exclusion, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and ultranationalism.’
Hence, the PACE recognizes threats to democratic values as a
distinguishing feature of extremism. The resolution also recommends establishing
proportionate penalties for public calls for violence, racial discrimination and intolerance,
and applying measures to disband organisations that carry out and encourage such
activities.
80. A definition of extremism was also developed in 2009 within the CIS framework. Thus,
the model law of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly ‘On Countering Extremism’
adopted at the 32nd plenary session of CIS IPA (Resolution No. 32-9 of 14 May 2009)
defines extremism as ‘an infringement on the foundations of the constitutional system and
state security, as well as violation of human and civil rights, freedoms and legitimate
interests carried out as a result of the negation of legal and/or other generally accepted
rules and norms of social conduct.’33 The model law also contains a definition of
32 PACE Resolution No. 1344 (2003) on ‘Threats to Democracy by Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe’,
¶3, available at: https://www.coe.int/t/r/parliamentary_assembly/%5Brussian_documents%5D/%5B200
3%5D/%5BSept_2003%5D/Res%201344%20Rus.asp.
33 CIS IPA Resolution No. 32-9 (14 May 2009), available at: https://base.spinform ru/show_doc fwx?rgn=30827.
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'extremist activity', which includes, among other things, the following acts covering
'hateful extremism':
(a) inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred;
(b) propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person (social group) on
the grounds of his social, racial, national, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation
or attitude towards religion;
(c) violation of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of a person and citizen on the
grounds of his social, racial, national, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or
attitude to religion.34
In 2012, the CIS IPA approved recommendations for the improvement of legislation of CIS
member states in the field of countering extremism).35
81. The issue of combating extremism, although not so comprehensively, is also a subject of
discussion at the UN and the OSCE. Thus, the latest UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Review36 condemns not only violent extremism but also incitement to terrorism and calls
for countering radicalisation. In turn, OSCE Decision No. 5/07 on Public-Private
Partnerships in Countering Terrorism (2007) contains recommendations for enhancing
cooperation between state authorities and civil society institutions to counter violent
extremism and radicalisation that lead to terrorism.
82. Among other things, the UN Security Council has called on states to counter specific
forms of extremism (for example, UN Resolution No. 1624 of 2005, paragraph 1 of which
calls on all states to take steps to prohibit incitement to commit terrorist acts by law, and
to deny asylum to any persons with respect to whom there is credible information that
they have been involved in incitement to terrorism).
34 Ibid, Article 1.
35 Recommendations for the improvement of legislation of CIS member states in the field of countering extremism
(Adopted by CIS IPA Resolution No. 38-16 (23 November 2012), available at:
https://iacis ru/baza_dokumentov/modelnie_zakonodatelnie_akti_i_rekomendatcii_mpa_sng/rekomendatcii/60.
36 The Resolution A/RES/72/284 adopted by the General Assembly on 26 June 2018, available at:
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1632770?ln=ru.
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83. The aforementioned list of international legal instruments important for countering
extremism is not exhaustive. Many other international legal instruments address issues
related to countering racial, national and other intolerance.
84. The problem of combating extremism is a legitimate task facing States, and it is attracting
growing attention of the international community. The current lack of a unified definition
of extremism does not diminish in any way the sovereign right of States to regulate such
activity through their national legislation.
85. According to the Russian law on extremism, the possible victim of extremist activity can
be not only the state, which is generally common in SCO countries, but also a social
group, which is in line with the PACE definition. The definition of extremist activity is
also consistent with the Model Law adopted by the CIS IPA. In its approach to the
definition of extremism, the Russian Federation seeks to use all available best practices
and experience in the field of countering extremism, as confirmed by the Federal Law
‘On Countering Extremist Activities,’ the provisions of which are consistent with
international practice of combating extremism.
H. PROFESSOR SHEININ'S CRITICISM OF RUSSIAN LAW IS UNFOUNDED
86. In support of his claims against Russian legislation on extremist activity, Professor M.
Sheinin relies on Opinion of the Venice Commission No. 660 / 2011 CDL-AD(2012)016
dated 20 June 2012 about Federal Law No. 114-FZ, which asserts that the latter defines
some notions in a good way, but other notions are wide an can be interpreted by the
authorities differently, and result in practice in the application of harsh anti-extremist
measures based on Federal Law No 114-FZ and the Russian Criminal Code, and draws
far-reaching conclusions that the (Russian) legislation on countering extremism is
discriminatory in nature.
87. Professor Sheinin is misleading as to the opinion of the Commission, which never reached
such conclusions.
88. The Commission does not question the right of the state to regulate at national level the
fight against extremism. Moreover, the Commission refers to the opinion of PACE, which
‘has expressed concern about the challenge of combating extremism and its most recent
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forms and calls on Council of Europe member states to take decisive actions in this
area.’37
89. The Commission recognises the ‘legitimate efforts’ of the Russian authorities ‘to counter
extremism and related threats.’ The Commission “is aware of the challenges faced by the
Russian authorities in their legitimate efforts to counter extremism and related threats.”
The Commission recognises the relevance of the Shanghai Convention on Countering
Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism signed on 15 June 2001.38
90. The Commission's conclusions do not mention the incompatibility of the law with
international law, let alone its discriminatory nature, as Sheinin attempts to suggest. The
Venice Commission in its report raises certain issues and makes recommendations,
including those related to the wording of the law, which may be subject to broad
interpretation. Those issues have been analysed in detail by the Russian Federation in the
course of its interaction with the Commission on the Report.
91. As can be seen from the aforesaid, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation closely
monitors law enforcement practice in the area of combating extremist activity and
provides guidance to lower courts aimed at interpreting the law correctly in light of the
protection of human rights and freedoms (see paragraphs 63-70 of this Report).
92. It should be noted that the Venice Commission, according to its 2002 Statute, ‘is an
independent consultative body which cooperates with member States of the Council of
Europe, as well as with interested non-member States and interested international
organisations and bodies’39. Cooperation with the Commission is purely voluntary, even
for member states of the Council of Europe. The opinion of this body is therefore purely
recommendatory and is given to a State so it could take it into account in its legislative
work.
93. Russia voluntarily engaged in a dialogue with the Commission which resulted in a series
of recommendations which are very far from the conclusions Professor Sheinin is trying
37 Venice Commission, Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law on Countering Extremist Activity of the
Russian Federation, (20 June 2012), ¶73, available at::
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)016-e
38 Ibid.
39 Statute of the Venice Commission (21 February 2002), Article 1, available at:
https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/default.aspx?p=01_01_Statute&lang=RU.
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to make. The Commission itself mentions this dialogue in its conclusions: ‘The Institute
for Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation
provided comments on the law under consideration (CDL(2012)024), which were duly
taken into account in the preparation of the Opinion. Some additional clarifications were
provided by the representatives of the Russian authorities during a meeting held in Paris
on 27 April 2012.’
94. Below I will provide some comments on the conclusions of the Venice Commission to
which Professor Sheinin refers.
95. Professor Sheinin refers to the conclusion in paragraph 7 of the Venice Commission
Opinion that the Russian legislation allegedly does not contain a clear notion of
‘extremism’. However, Russia clarified that the law did not clearly define the notion of
‘extremism’ due to the fact that at the time when the draft law was under consideration,
international practice did not comprise a uniformly understood notion of
‘extremism’/extremist activity’ either. In this regard the legislator, based on Art. 29 and
Art. 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation,40 decided to provide a list of
extremist acts (already illegal under existing legislation), so as not to make different
illegal acts fit a single concept. On the contrary, it allows legislation to be more responsive
to the interests of protecting human and civil rights and freedoms from manifestations of
extremist activity.
96. Professor Sheinin then criticizes provisions of the anti-extremist legislation on the breach
of territorial integrity. In doing so, Professor Sheinin ignores the position repeatedly
expressed by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, namely, that the
provisions of the Law ‘On Countering Extremist Activity’, which impose a ban not only
on violent actions infringing upon the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, but
also on appeals to such actions, are consistent with the constitutionally relevant purposes
of such restrictions and are conditional upon the obligation of the state to establish legal
arrangements, in the utmost degree contributing to public security, prevention and
40Article 29 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation prohibits propaganda or agitation inciting social, racial,
national or religious hatred and enmity. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic superiority
shall be prohibited.
Article 55 (3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation allows human and civil rights and freedoms to be
restricted by federal law only to the extent necessary for the protection of the constitutional order, morality, health,
rights and lawful interests of other persons or for the defence of the country and of State security.
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thwarting crimes, averting their negative consequences for human and civil rights and
interests protected by law. In the exercise of the right to freedom of thought and speech,
the right to freedom of expression, the right to hold and disseminate beliefs and to act in
accordance with them, a person can only be held liable according to the law in the event
of a socially dangerous and unlawful violation of the rights and freedoms of others.41
97. Moreover, it should be noted that the provisions of the Law on Countering Extremism
and the position of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation are nothing more
than an implementation of the norms enshrined in international legal acts, according to
which:
(a) the exercise of rights and freedoms may be subject to certain restrictions as
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, in particular in the interests
of national security, territorial integrity or public order, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or of the rights of others;42
(b) irrespective of its nature, extremism is a form of political activity that overtly or
covertly rejects the principles of parliamentary democracy and is based on
ideologies and practices of intolerance, exclusion, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and
ultra-nationalism, and the tendency of some extremist movements to seek
justification for their actions in religion carries a twofold danger: on the one hand
it fosters intolerance, religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, and on the other it
41 Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 27 October 2015 No 2450-O ‘On refusal to
accept for consideration the complaint of citizens Kolpakidi Alexander Ivanovich and Nikolaev Sergey
Vasilyevich on violation of their constitutional rights by paragraph 3 of Article 1 and Article 13 of the Federal
Law ‘On countering extremist activities’, available at:
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_189000/; Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation of 2 July 2013 No 1053-O ‘On refusal to accept for consideration the complaint of citizen Kochemarov
Vladislav Sergeyevich on violation of his constitutional rights by the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article
1 and part three of Article 13 of the Federal Law ‘On countering extremist activity’, available at:
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_149425/; Opinion of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation of 16 March 2020 N 1-Z ‘On conformity with the provisions of Chapters 1, 2 and 9 of the Constitution
of the Russian Federation of the provisions of the Law (not yet in force) of the Russian Federation on Amendment
of the Constitution of the Russian Federation ‘On improving regulation of certain issues of organisation and
functioning of public authorities,’ and also on the conformity with the Constitution of the Russian Federation of
the procedure for entry into force of Article 1 of said Law in connection with the inquiry of the President of the
Russian Federation”, available at: http://www.consultant ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_347691.
42 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948), Articles 18, 19 and 29(2), available at:
https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/declhr.shtml; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (16 December 1996), Article 19, available at:
https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/pactpol.shtml; Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950), Articles 9, 10, available at:
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_rus.pdf.
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leads to the isolation of entire religious communities because of certain individuals
who abuse universal values of religion.43
98. The criticism by Professor Sheinin and the Commission of the failure to include violence
as a necessary element of extremism is also unfounded. Of course, extremist acts can and
often are accompanied by elements of violence. A certain part of acts described as
extremist activity in the Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 does not include
violence as a mandatory component. In that regard, Russia follows the ‘hateful’ model of
countering extremism, which is characteristic of a number of countries.44 The Shanghai
Convention on Countering Extremism also follows that model and envisages cooperation
in combating not only violent but also hateful extremism. Article 4 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination also requires
criminal prosecution for the dissemination of ideas of racial superiority, hatred and
incitement to racial discrimination, without including the element of violence in the
definition of such prohibited activities. For example, the Russian law, pursuant to the
Convention, prohibits the display of Nazi insignia, which is an important element in the
dissemination of ideas of racial superiority.
99. The comments in respect of designating religious and other materials as extremist, to
which Professor Sheinin refers, are also unfounded. First, the Commission acknowledged
that judicial decisions of this kind ‘[are] based on prior expert review and may be
appealed against in court’. Besides, the Commission admitted that it had no information
on how exactly the list of extremist materials was formed, which makes it difficult to
consider its conclusions fully viable, completely and accurately reflecting reality. As
stated above, the sacred texts of the world’s major religions are exempt from the scope of
application of anti-extremism measures.45
100. The main criterion for designating certain materials as extremist is not their affiliation to
a religion or social organisation, but calls for extremist activity contained therein,
substantiation or justification of extremist activity. It should be noted, once again, that all
43 PACE Resolution 1344 (2003) on ‘Threats to Democracy by Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe’, ¶¶3-
4, available at: https://www.coe.int/t/r/parliamentary_assembly/%5Brussian_documents%5D/%5B2003%5
D/%5BSept_2003%5D/Res%201344%20Rus.asp.
44 As far as I understand, this issue has been covered in detail in the expert report of V.V. Engel.
45 See above, ¶25.
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court trials in such cases are open and adversarial, with the possibility of appeal to higher
court authorities.
101. Examples of extremist materials include, for example, the writings of the National
Socialist Workers' Party of Germany, which substantiate national racial superiority,
justify the commission of war crimes or other crimes aimed at the extermination of an
ethnic, social, racial, national or religious group. With regard to religious organisations,
prohibited are certain materials that advocate the rejection of certain types of medical care
or provide an extremist interpretation of peace-loving doctrines. An example would be
the Wahhabis' declaration of ‘jihad’ (holy war) against infidels; materials of that sort are
extremist not because their authors are Muslims, but because they justify the use of
violence.
102. As for the definition of an ‘extremist organization,’ the Commission's comments on
imperfect legislative technique and ‘looping’ of the definition do not indicate any
violations on the part of State authorities either. On the contrary, the fact that the main
criterion for designating an organisation as extremist is the existence of a court decision
which has entered into force banning the activities of, or liquidating, such an
organisation due to its extremist activities, underlines the fact that the activities of such
an organisation are investigated by a court in an adversarial process that determines
whether the organisation has committed acts that are extremist. At the same time, persons
leading such organisations have the opportunity to present and defend their position and
to appeal against the court's decision to higher instances.
103. Finally, with regard to Professor Sheinin's reference to paragraph 66 of the Commission’s
conclusions on the duty of the organisers of assemblies to suppress extremist activities
and liability for breach of that duty, it should be noted that such requirements are
established in the federal legislation on rallies. If the organiser takes no steps to prevent,
for example, the display of Nazi insignia at his/her event, he is deemed accomplice to the
crime and must incur the corresponding liability under the Russian Criminal Code.
104. Hence, Professor Sheinin’s conclusions are not based on facts and are misleading as to
the content and application of the Russian Federation's anti-extremism legislation. The
professor also fails to take into account the fact that Russian legislation in this area is
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developing within the framework of the regional cooperation mechanisms of the SCO
and CIS.
I. EXPERT DECLARATION
105. I confirm that all issues on which I have given my opinion are within my competence and
professional knowledge.
106. I understand that it is my duty to assist the International Court of Justice in resolving
issues dealt with in this Report. I have discharged that responsibility and will continue to
do so in the future.
107. I confirm that the conclusions I have reached in this Report are unbiased, objective and
impartial; they have not been influenced by the proceedings or by any of the parties to the
proceedings.
Expert
Viktor Viktorovich Merkuryev
Moscow, 1 March 2023