Counter-Memorial Russian Federation CERD

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation)
COUNTER-MEMORIAL ON THE CASE CONCERNING APPLICATION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Submitted by the Russian Federation
9 August 2021

As the Russian Federation repeatedly noted, Ukraine’s Application to the International Court of
Justice of 16 January 2017 is formally directed jointly against alleged violations of the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. It actually concerns two entirely separate
cases which have in common only the use of the Court’s forum in an attempt to stigmatise Russia
for alleged aggression against, and violation of sovereignty of, Ukraine. Accordingly, Russia
submits two Counter-Memorials dealing separately with each of these cases.
The present Counter-Memorial deals with the case concerning the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1
I. Nature and Scope of Ukraine’s Claim...................................................................................... 1
II. Ukraine’s Artificial Case-Construction and Evidential Flaws ................................................. 2
A. Ukraine’s Exclusive Focus on Crimea Evidencing Its Sovereignty Dispute .......................... 2
B. Unsupported Statements and Inconsistencies Artificially Conflating Ukraine’s Claims ........ 3
C. Claims Alleging the Wrongfulness of Domestic Judicial Decisions ....................................... 5
D. Misplaced Reliance on, and Erroneous Construction of, OHCHR Reports ........................... 6
III. Outline of the Present Counter-Memorial ............................................................................... 7
THE REAL CONTEXT OF UKRAINE’S CLAIMS ..................................................... 9
I. Ukraine Has Long Been Subverting the Interests of Minorities .............................................. 9
A. Measures Taken by Ukraine against Crimean Tatars ............................................................ 10
B. Measures Taken by Ukraine against Ethnic Russians ........................................................... 12
II. Crimean Tatars and Ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea Have Been Supported by Russia ............. 21
THE CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE COURT’S PREVIOUS
DECISIONS IN THE PRESENT CASE ........................................................................................... 30
The Court’s Findings on Plausibility at the Stage of Provisional Measures .......................... 30
The Clarification and Limitation of the Subject-Matter and Scope of Ukraine’s Claims ...... 32
A. The Systematic Nature of the Alleged Discrimination.......................................................... 34
B. The Disproportionate Effect of the Alleged Discrimination on Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
Communities as Compared to Others ........................................................................................ 35
C. The Intentional Nature of Ukraine’s Allegations................................................................... 37
The Court Took No Position on the Interpretation and Scope of the Specific Rights Invoked
by Ukraine under CERD ................................................................................................................ 38
THE PROPER DEFINITION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER CERD .. 41
THE BAN ON THE MEJLIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION ........................................................................................................................... 51
No Right under the Convention to a Representative Body .................................................... 52
A. No Right to a Representative Body under Article 5(c) of CERD ......................................... 52
B. No Right to a Representative Body under Article 5(d) of CERD ......................................... 56
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C. No Right to a Representative Body under Article 5(e) of CERD ......................................... 56
The Measures Taken Against the Mejlis Were Adopted for Legitimate Reasons .................. 57
A. The Applicable Legal Framework ......................................................................................... 57
B. The Extremist and Violent Activities of the Mejlis ............................................................... 60
The Factual Basis of the Russian Court Decisions Declaring the Mejlis an Extremist
Organization and Banning Its Activities ................................................................................ 60
The Continuing Extremist Conduct of the Mejlis ........................................................ 67
C. Ukraine’s Claims Are Unfounded ......................................................................................... 69
Other Measures Related to Mejlis Members Were Adopted for Legitimate Reasons ............ 73
A. Alleged Restrictions on the Movements of Crimean Tatar Leaders ...................................... 73
Allegations concerning Mr Mustafa Dzhemilev .......................................................... 73
Allegations concerning Mr Refat Chubarov ................................................................ 75
Allegations concerning Mr Ismet Yuksel ..................................................................... 76
Allegations concerning the Controls over Messrs Eskender Bariiev, Sinaver Kadyrov,
and Abmedzhit Suleimanov ................................................................................................... 77
Allegations concerning Mr Ali Ozenbash .................................................................... 79
Allegations concerning Mr Dzhelyalov and Mr Smedlyaev ........................................ 79
B. Accusations of Oppression of the Mejlis ............................................................................... 80
C. Alleged Retroactive Prosecutions and Convictions Related to Demonstrations of
26 February 2014 ....................................................................................................................... 82
D. Arrest, Detention, and Trial of Mr Ilmi Umerov ................................................................... 85
The Ban of the Mejlis Does Not Constitute Racial Discrimination Against the Crimean Tatar
Community ..................................................................................................................................... 87
A. The Existence of Multiple Organizations Representing Crimean Tatars in Crimea ............. 88
B. Lack of Representativeness or Legitimacy of the Mejlis ...................................................... 93
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 97
NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO EDUCATION .................. 99
I. Preliminary Clarifications ...................................................................................................... 99
II. CERD Does Not Provide for a Right to Education in a Minority Language ....................... 103
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III. The Access to Education in a Native Language in Crimea is Afforded by Domestic Law
subject to Legitimate Qualifications ............................................................................................ 108
IV. The Absence of Any Decrease of Students Studying in Crimean Tatar ............................... 110
V. The Decrease of Students Studying in Ukrainian Has Nothing to Do with Racial
Discrimination .............................................................................................................................. 112
A. Factors Explaining the Decline in the Demand for Education in Ukrainian Language in
Crimea ...................................................................................................................................... 113
Relevant Statistics ...................................................................................................... 113
The Relevant Factors Have Nothing to Do with Racial Discrimination.................... 116
B. Russia Maintained the Availability of Education in the Ukrainian Language in Crimea ... 118
VI. There Is No “Artificial Shortage” of Teachers in Crimea .................................................... 122
VII. Education in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Is Provided on Non-Discriminatory Basis ...... 125
VIII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 132
UKRAINE’S OTHER ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ARE
UNFOUNDED ................................................................................................................................. 133
No Enforced Disappearances, Murders, Abductions and Torture Directed at the Crimean
Tatars and Ukrainians on Racial Grounds .................................................................................... 133
A. No Breach of CERD with Respect to Alleged Enforced Disappearances, Murders,
Abductions and Torture ............................................................................................................ 134
B. Issues of Attribution ............................................................................................................ 135
No Racial Discrimination with respect to Law Enforcement Measures (Detentions and
Searches) ...................................................................................................................................... 136
A. Ukraine’s Flawed Approach to Its Burden of Proof ............................................................ 136
B. Ukraine’s Allegations Are Not Established as a Matter of Fact .......................................... 137
C. The Legitimate Basis of the Alleged Measures of Enforcement ......................................... 139
D. The Non-Discriminatory Nature of the Alleged Enforcement Measures ............................ 140
The Nature of the Measures and of the Groups of Persons Affected by Them ......... 140
The Absence of Any Difference of Treatment ........................................................... 143
III. No Racial Discrimination with respect to Citizenship ......................................................... 144
A. Restrictions Based on Citizenship Do Not Fall under CERD ............................................. 144
Restrictions Based on Citizenship Do Not Fall under CERD .................................... 144
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Ukraine’s IHL Claims Are Outside The Jurisdiction of the Court ............................. 146
B. Russian Citizenship Is Not Conferred on a Discriminatory Basis ...................................... 147
IV. No Racial Discrimination with respect to Organization of Public Rallies and Protests ...... 148
A. The Relevant Legal Framework .......................................................................................... 148
B. The Relevant Facts Do Not Evidence Racial Discrimination ............................................. 149
V. No Racial Discrimination with respect to Media ................................................................. 150
A. Mass Media in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Are Available in Crimea .............................. 151
B. Registration Applications of Media Cited by Ukraine Were Returned, and Law-Enforcement
Measures Were Taken, on Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Basis .......................................... 152
VI. No Racial Discrimination with respect to Preservation of Cultural Heritage ...................... 153
A. The Restoration of the Khan’s Palace Does Not Evidence Any Racial Discrimination ..... 154
B. Alleged Harassment and Closure of Ukrainian Cultural Institutions .................................. 155
SUBMISSION ................................................................................................................................. 157
APPENDIX A...................................................................................................................................167
APPENDIX B...................................................................................................................................190
APPENDIX C...................................................................................................................................216
APPENDIX D...................................................................................................................................242
APPENDIX E...................................................................................................................................270
APPENDIX F...................................................................................................................................308
INDEX OF ANNEXES....................................................................................................................327
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INTRODUCTION
1. On 16 January 2017, Ukraine introduced an Application against the Russian Federation
(hereafter “Russia”) formulating grave accusations under the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) (I). As will be shown in the present
Counter-Memorial, the said allegations present major flaws heightened by Ukraine’s attempt to
disguise its territorial claim over Crimea as a case of systematic racial discrimination (II). Russia is
confident that the Court will protect the integrity of CERD and dismiss these artificial allegations
(III).
I. Nature and Scope of Ukraine’s Claim
2. The Court has identified the subject-matter of the present dispute and limited the scope of its
jurisdiction to an alleged systematic campaign of ethnic discrimination in violation of CERD,
following Ukraine’s own characterisation of its claims.1
3. In order to succeed, Ukraine must thus prove the following cumulative elements:
(i) The disputed acts are attributable to Russia;
(ii) The disputed acts constitute a violation of CERD, namely that each alleged act
constitutes:
- a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference,
- based on race or ethnic origin within the meaning of the Convention,
- that impairs or nullifies the recognition, enjoyment or exercise,
- on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
- that has no objective and reasonable justification;
(iii) The disputed acts form part of a systematic campaign or policy, which in turn requires
Ukraine to establish that these acts, taken together as a composite whole, constitute:
- a “policy”, a “campaign” directed against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian ethnic
groups in Crimea, targeting them as such;
- a discriminatory intent, as evidenced by the consistent use by Ukraine in its
Application and pleadings of terms such as “policy”,2 “campaign”,3 “systematic”,4
1 See below, Chapter II.
2 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Application instituting proceedings, 16 January 2017 (“Ukraine’s Application of 16 January 2017” or “Application”),
paras. 5, 36, 86, 98, 110, 114, 118, 119, 131, 133, 137, and 138; Memorial of Ukraine, 12 June 2018 (“Memorial” or
“MU”), paras. 3, 22, 27, 345, 383, 453, 532, 589, 593, 594, 597, 598, 603, 653(f), and various chapter titles; Written
Statement of Observations and Submissions on the Preliminary Objections of the Russian Federation, 14 January 2019
(“WSU”), paras. 260, 298, 305.
3 Application, paras. 5, 14, 15, 81, 92, 93, 97, 115, 118, 123, 133, 137; MU, paras. 15, 27, 28, 341, 342, 347, 348,
349, 363, 375, 382, 383, 384, 388, 389, 390, 391, 413, 419, 420, 421, 453, 477, 587, 593, 601, 640, and various section
titles.
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“coordinated”,5 “concerted”,6 “strategy”,7 “goal”,8 “target”,9 “aim”,10 “sponsor”,11
“punish”,12 etc.; and
- a violation of the Convention that is committed on a widespread scale and in a
systematic manner.
II. Ukraine’s Artificial Case-Construction and Evidential Flaws
4. Pursuant to the Court’s established case law, “claims against a State involving charges of
exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive”; in other words, “the Court
requires proof at a high level of certainty appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation.”13 A claim
that a State is involved in a systematic campaign of racial discrimination and cultural erasure is
indeed exceptionally grave. Accordingly, the Court must, in the present case, “be fully convinced
that the allegations made in the proceedings […] have been clearly established. The same standard
applies to the proof of attribution for such acts”.14 Yet, Ukraine’s claims are fraught with a number
of telling omissions (A), as well as inconsistencies and significant evidentiary flaws (B), with
specific consequences regarding claims alleging the wrongfulness of domestic judicial decisions
(C). These flaws cannot be overcome by its misplaced reliance on, and misconstruction of OHCHR
Reports (D).
A. UKRAINE’S EXCLUSIVE FOCUS ON CRIMEA EVIDENCING ITS SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE
5. Ukraine’s claims focus exclusively on the alleged systematic campaign or policy of racial
discrimination against Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea.15 Ukraine says nothing of
the numerous Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians living in other parts of Russia. In fact, the
4 Application, paras. 137(a), 93, 115, 123; MU, paras. 22, 27, 341, 388, 389, 392, 455, 477, 485, 587, 593, 597;
WSU, paras. 260, 280, 281, 303, 308, 370, 378 and 386; CR 2019/10, p. 53, para. 5, p. 54, para. 7, p. 58, para. 11, p. 59,
para. 14, p. 66, para. 3, and p. 75, para. 37; CR 2019/12, p. 12, para. 3, and p. 16, para. 14.
5 MU, paras. 421 and 601.
6 MU, para. 595.
7 MU, paras. 346, 413, 505, and 533.
8 MU, paras. 346, 375, 534, and 597.
9 MU, paras. 347, 365, 390, 391, 392, 393, 399, 413, 426, 437, 443, 444, 450, 452, 507, 514, 518, 533, 595, 602,
607, and 608.
10 MU, paras. 27, 28, 390, and 619.
11 MU, paras. 592, 610, and 653(g).
12 Application, paras. 14, 81, 93, 102; MU, paras. 15, 412, 495, 598; WSU, paras. 273, 286, 305. In these
occurrences Ukraine refers at times to “collective punishment”.
13 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 129-130, paras. 209-
210, referring to Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 17.
14 Ibid., p. 129, para. 209.
15 See e.g. MU, para. 477, concerned that such alleged campaign “raises the specter of the total erasure of these
distinct cultures from the Crimean peninsula”.
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number of ethnic Ukrainians living elsewhere in Russia is much higher than the number of those
living in Crimea.16 Ukraine does not explain why a systematic campaign or policy of discrimination
carried out by a State and allegedly targeting specific groups based on racial or ethnic grounds
should stop at the administrative limits of one constituent unit of the State. This silence is
compelling and reflects Ukraine’s attempt to disguise its sovereignty dispute with Russia over
Crimea under the ill-fitting clothes of racial discrimination.
B. UNSUPPORTED STATEMENTS AND INCONSISTENCIES ARTIFICIALLY CONFLATING UKRAINE’S
CLAIMS
6. To support the charge of exceptional gravity made against Russia, Ukraine’s Memorial
repeatedly relies on unsubstantiated allegations.17
7. Ukraine merely asserts the existence of a policy or campaign and attributes discriminatory
intent to Russia without submitting anything other than pure assumptions as to the existence of an
overarching concerted plan18 it yet has the burden of proving.19 This fact is, in and by itself, fatal to
Ukraine’s case.
8. At best, Ukraine attempts to artificially create an accumulation effect of individual claims in
order to suggest a widespread scale and systematic nature of the charges. In particular,
(i) Ukraine alleges that the impugned measures have caused “hundreds of thousands” of
victims across Crimea,20 without providing any element at all to substantiate such an
extraordinary allegation.
(ii) Less excessively, but yet unconvincingly, Ukraine refers, in Section A of Chapter 9 of
its Memorial, on alleged disappearances, murders, abductions and torture, inflicted to
13 individual alleged cases, in the period from 2014 to 2017 and covering both ethnic
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars.21 No reasonable observer could possibly infer any
pattern from such sparse and disparate alleged cases.22
16 President of the Russian Federation official website, “Meeting with representatives from Crimean ethnic groups’
public associations”, Yalta, 17 August 2015 (Annex 460): Ethnic Ukrainians constitute “the third largest ethnic group in
Russia after ethnic Russians and Tatars. We have five million Tatars residing in Russia and three million ethnic
Ukrainians, without counting those who are here temporarily and are Ukrainian citizens – we have another 3 million
people who fit that description”.
17 See e.g. MU, para. 378 which constitutes empty speculations without any supporting evidence.
18 MU, para. 595, alleging a “broad assault on political and civil rights […] designed to shut down opposition to the
annexation. This assault has been both comprehensive and concerted.”
19 See above, para. 4 and below, para. 92 et seq.
20 WSU, para. 378, as well as para. 16 and para. 386 in fine; CR 2019/12, 7 June 2019, p. 53, para. 34 (Gimblett).
21 MU, paras. 392-411.
22 Ukraine even seems to consider that the disappearance of 4 individuals in unrelated circumstances constitutes a
pattern: see MU, para. 397, referring to the disappearances described at paras. 395-396.
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(iii) Moreover, it is striking that the names of the same few individuals keep being repeated
in various sections of its Memorial, while forming a single and very limited set of
facts.23 The truth is that Ukraine’s case of an alleged systematic campaign or policy of
racial discrimination against entire ethnic communities is premised on the conduct of a
small circle of agitators, violent activists, extremists and criminals who know each
other well. These persons do not reflect the situation of the Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian
communities in Crimea generally.
(iv) Ukraine’s strategy is otherwise to assemble a series of vague allegations – many of
them logically or causally unrelated with each other – in order to suggest a narrative
rather than demonstrate facts attributable to Crimean authorities or otherwise to
Russia. As an illustration, Ukraine contends that “[t]he walls and gates of Crimean
Tatar houses were marked with crosses on their doors, a chilling reminder of a practice
used by the Soviet authorities in 1944 to round up members of that people for
deportation.”24 Instead of identifying the authors of the alleged acts, Ukraine makes
speculative parallels with the deplorable events of 1944, which Russia has expressly
and unequivocally condemned.25
9. While Russia has used its best efforts to identify where possible the significant number of
Ukraine’s unspecified individual allegations,26 it is compelled to reserve its rights to complete its
submissions and present further evidence should this prove necessary at any further stage of the
proceedings. As to the limited number of specific cases, the assessment of the relevant facts made in
the present Counter-Memorial confirms that none of Ukraine’s individual claims constitutes an
instance of racial discrimination.
10. Another flaw in Ukraine’s case points to a logical deficiency as well as confused or
inconsistent statements.27 For instance, Ukraine contends that the attack allegedly carried out by
Russia on educational rights affects both the ethnic Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar communities,
whereas in its own words the number of students receiving education in the Crimean Tatar language
“has remained relatively steady” since 2014,28 which is an understatement given that this number
has in fact increased.29
23 This small circle of persons includes in particular Refat Chubarov, Mustafa Dzhemilev, and Lenur Islyamov. See
further below, paras. 167, 187-192 and Appendix E.
24 MU, para. 372.
25 See notably the 2014 Decree of the President of Russia on rehabilitation of formerly oppressed peoples referred to
below, paras. 56-62.
26 See e.g. Ukraine’s allegations relating to home searches of Crimean Tatars, MU, paras. 444-445.
27 See e.g. CR 2019/10, 4 June 2019, p. 61, para. 23 (Koh), referred to below, para. 115.
28 MU, para. 544.
29 See below, para. 289.
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C. CLAIMS ALLEGING THE WRONGFULNESS OF DOMESTIC JUDICIAL DECISIONS
11. Besides, a significant part of Ukraine’s claims takes issue with Russian domestic judicial
decisions which cannot be reviewed by the Court. Obvious examples of this include Ukraine’s
claims of political suppression and the ban on the Mejlis, claims in relation to law-enforcement
measures, public events, or the media. However, at all material times the Russian judicial system
has provided an appropriate and accessible forum for the resolution of any complaint against such
measures. It is uncontroversial that, as a matter of international law, States are to be presumed to act
in good faith and in compliance with their obligations.30 This presumption applies to the assessment
of Russia’s conduct in the present case, including the conduct of the Russian judiciary. It is for the
Claimant to rebut that presumption of good faith – and not by mere inferences and conjectures, “but
by clear and convincing evidence which compels such a conclusion”.31
12. The fact that Ukraine’s claims turn on the wrongfulness of judicial conduct has a further
important consequence. It is well-established that international law allows national judicial systems
to self-correct where they may have erred,32 and that the Court is not an appeal jurisdiction in
respect of the soundness of decisions of national courts. It follows that where, as here, a claim arises
out of judicial conduct, the recourse to available local redress and the exhaustion of local remedies,
or alternatively the establishment that such recourse would have been futile, is a pre-condition of
any finding of responsibility, as a material element of the wrongful conduct.33 As to the standard of
review of judicial conduct, Ukraine has itself correctly argued before an international tribunal that
the applicable test is as follows: “Where tribunals were called upon to review judicial decisions,
they had concluded that state courts provide appropriate legal protection […] when the court’s
rulings on those rights are legally tenable and made in good faith.”34
30 See for instance Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), Award, 16 November 1957, UNRIAA, vol. XII, p.
305, para. 9, available at https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol XII/281-317 Lanoux.pdf (in French); Nuclear Tests
(Australia v. France), Judgment, 20 December 1974, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 268, para. 46, and p. 271, p. 56; WTO,
European Communities – Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Original Complaint by the
United States, Recourse to arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Decision by the
Arbitrators, 12 July 1999, WT/DS26/ARB, para. 9, available at:
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/DS/26ARB.pdf&Open=True.
31 Arbitration on the Tacna-Arica Question (Chile/Peru), Award, 4 March 1925, UNRIAA, vol. II, p. 930, available at
https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol II/921-958.pdf; Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment, 5 December 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 685, para. 132.
32 ILC, Second Report on State Responsibility submitted by James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/498 (1999) at para. 75, in ILC Yearbook 1999, vol. II(1), p. 26, available at
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a cn4 498.pdf, noting that systematic considerations come into play
when establishing the breach of certain types of obligations, such as the obligation to provide a fair and efficient system
of justice: “an aberrant decision by an official lower in the hierarchy, which is capable of being reconsidered, does not
of itself amount to an unlawful act.”
33 Jan Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 90 and 100.
34 OAO Tatneft v. Ukraine, PCA Case No. 2008-8, Award, 29 July 2014, para. 341, available at
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8622.pdf.
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13. Accordingly, to the extent Ukraine’s claims arise out of court-approved law enforcement
measures and other court decisions, Ukraine must demonstrate that recourse to local remedies have
proved to be futile or that the rulings rendered by courts acting in last resort were not reasonably
and legally tenable or were not adopted in good faith. Yet, Ukraine has not even attempted to
engage in that analysis. The truth is that Ukraine does not claim that at least some of its allegations
of racial discrimination have been formulated before domestic courts and does not provide any
example of a complaint raised before domestic courts for racial discrimination against Crimean
Tatars or Ukrainians.
D. MISPLACED RELIANCE ON, AND ERRONEOUS CONSTRUCTION OF, OHCHR REPORTS
14. In the Memorial, as previously at the provisional measures phase, Ukraine heavily relies on
OHCHR reports to support its allegations of systematic racial discrimination in relation to law
enforcement measures.35 These reports do not however evidence Ukraine’s claims under CERD.
15. First, it is important to stress that the OHCHR reports on which Ukraine relies do not
establish, or even say that there exists, systematic racial discrimination in Crimea. Actually, none of
the OHCHR reports concludes or mentions that Russia committed racial discrimination in Crimea,
let alone a campaign of systematic violation of CERD.
16. Second, the reports cannot assist Ukraine in supporting its allegations in the present case.
They only relate to a few individual cases. The samples used by the OHCHR are always very
limited, only covering some individual cases, sometimes even only one or two cases. The reports do
not rely on any statistical data, or statistical samples of sufficiently large dimension to enable the
drawing of any meaningful conclusion in terms of racial discrimination. Likewise, the OHCHR did
not engage in any comparison with the treatment of other ethnic groups. In addition, the reports
have been drafted without the benefit of first-hand evidence as no representative of the OHCHR
visited Crimea, despite Russia having expressed its readiness to host a mission to Crimea.36 The
OHCHR reports do not suggest otherwise. Moreover, the standard followed by the OHCHR in
preparing its reports by no means satisfies the standard required to establish facts before a Court of
law, which the OHCHR does not claim to do either. As is clear from Russia’s factual account of the
same alleged events in the present Counter-Memorial, the OHCHR reports referred to by Ukraine
did not explore or address significant factual elements in relation to specific events. In previous
cases, the Court has declined to take into account United Nations reports in similar situations.37
35 MU, para. 444-446 and fns. 940-947, paras. 447-448 and fns. 949-951, para. 449 and fn. 954, para. 450 and fns.
956-958.
36 Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, 74th session, Summary record of the 45th meeting, 14 November
2019, UN Doc. A/C.3/74/SR.45, Statement of the Russian Federation (Mr. Kuzmin), at para. 64. See also TASS,
“Crimea is ready to welcome UN representatives in the Republic”, 21 March 2014 (Annex 897).
37 See for instance Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 225, para. 159.
7
17. Third, and in any event, the picture that Ukraine intends to draw on the basis of selective
quotes from the OHCHR reports does not bear any resemblance whatsoever with what the actual
record shows, as will be demonstrated in the present Counter-Memorial.
18. The artificiality of Ukraine’s case-construction permeates its claims which lack both legal
and factual merits. It should be kept in mind by the Court when assessing the present Counter-
Memorial.
III. Outline of the Present Counter-Memorial
19. As Ukraine has recalled, at the adoption of CERD in 1965, the UN Secretary General noted
that the Convention was “a most valuable instrument” in helping the United Nations eradicate racial
discrimination.38 Indeed the Convention today counts among the universal core instruments on
human rights and a common heritage of mankind. This is an additional reason for the Court to
firmly reject Ukraine’s claims. As the guardian of this common good that is international law, the
Court should not tolerate any attempts of misuse of it, in particular when it comes to such an
essential instrument as CERD.
20. It is obvious that the existence of a systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination
attributable to Russia and directed at the Crimean Tatar and ethnic Ukrainian communities in
Crimea as a means of political and cultural suppression is an invention by Ukraine for the purpose
of securing this Court’s jurisdiction and is unsupported by its own case, as confirmed by the
assessment of both the law and the relevant facts.
21. This Counter-Memorial will establish the absence of any racial discrimination at all under
CERD with respect to all of Ukraine’s claims. Russia firmly stands by its statement to the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD Committee”) that “[p]ersons
living in the territories of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol enjoy all the human
rights and freedoms, on an equal footing and without any discrimination, that are guaranteed by the
federal Constitution and by Russian law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation.”39
22. As Russia will show in this Counter-Memorial, each of Ukraine’s allegations under CERD
is unfounded and Ukraine’s claim must be thus rejected by the Court.
23. As a preliminary and necessary contextual point however, Russia will bring to light the real
context of Ukraine’s claims in Chapter I. It will denounce some of Ukraine’s threatening policies
towards certain ethnic groups living on its territory, which show that Ukraine is far from being the
38 MU, para. 342, referring to U.N. General Assembly, 20th Session 1406th Plenary Meeting, Official Records, U.N.
Doc. A/PV.1406, para. 135 (21 December 1965) (Annex 782 to MU).
39 CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth periodic reports of the Russian
Federation, Addendum: Information received from the Russian Federation on follow-up to the concluding observations
(received by the Committee on 29 March 2019), 21 May 2019, UN Doc. CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24/Add.1, para. 5.
8
fierce advocate of the fight against racial discrimination it pretends to be. Ukraine’s policies and
claims stand in stark contradiction with the reality prevailing in Russia who has specifically adopted
a series of practical measures for the benefit of the Crimean Tatar and/or ethnic Ukrainian
communities in Crimea.
24. Chapter II exposes the conclusions to be drawn from the Court’s previous rulings in the
present case. While the scope of Ukraine’s claims has been precisely and limitedly defined, several
issues relating to the scope of CERD are still to be considered by the Court at the merits stage and
thus remain undecided at this juncture. This is the case of the definition of ethnic groups protected
under CERD, which will be addressed in Chapter III, as well as of the interpretation of their
specific rights, which will be further developed in light of the merits examined in the remaining
chapters.
25. Chapter IV focuses on the ban on the Mejlis. The ban is based on security reasons, has no
racial or ethnic considerations and does not constitute racial discrimination, let alone a part of a
systematic campaign thereof. As already explained in the preliminary objections, the Convention
does not provide for a right of minorities to have and maintain a representative body. In addition,
the ban was taken following due process, which is justified by the extremist, violent nature of Mejlis
leaders’ activities that have been condemned by Crimean Tatars themselves. The ban therefore is
based on an objective and reasonable justification.
26. Chapter V concerns the absence of racial discrimination, a fortiori a systematic campaign
thereof, with respect to education. As a matter of law, CERD does not provide for a right to
education in a minority native language, and this reality is not affected by the status of State
language granted to the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages in Crimea under Russian domestic
law. This notwithstanding, the allegation of a systematic campaign of cultural erasure through
discrimination is clearly inconsistent with the numerous supporting measures that Russia has
implemented for the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in this field. In reality, the decrease
in education in the Ukrainian language is explained by considerations that have nothing to do with
racial discrimination, and education in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages is provided on a
non-discriminatory basis.
27. Chapter VI, together with the relevant Appendices,40 evidence the unfounded character of
all the remaining allegations of Ukraine, which the Court found to be implausible at the provisional
measures stage and which obviously do not constitute acts of racial discrimination prohibited under
CERD, let alone a systematic campaign or policy thereof.
40 Appendices A to F.
9
THE REAL CONTEXT OF UKRAINE’S CLAIMS
28. The picture portrayed by Ukraine is distorted not only since, as will be shown in the
following Chapters, it is manifest that no wrongful conduct under CERD can be attributed to Russia
in Crimea; but also because it is markedly both biased and partial.
29. At the outset, Russia considers it important to alert the Court to a sad irony: despite
Ukraine’s stance as a strong promoter of the fight against racial discrimination, it has long been
subverting the interests of minorities (I). Its policy regarding the rights of the ethnic groups living
on its territory actually stands in stark contrast with that prevailing in Russia that, since the spring
of 2014, has adopted a series of practical measures to enhance the rights and welfare of the Crimean
Tatar community, as well as of other parts of the Crimean population, including ethnic Ukrainians.
The existence of such positive measures, taken collectively and individually, is simply incompatible
with Ukraine’s claim of a systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination specifically aiming
at political and cultural erasure of the Crimean Tatar and ethnic Ukrainian communities in Crimea
(II).
30. Ukraine’s allegations against Russia must be appreciated against this dual background which
makes them all the more baseless.
I. Ukraine Has Long Been Subverting the Interests of Minorities
31. Russia deems it necessary, as a matter of context, to present to the Court in the present
Section Ukraine’s wrongful policies for the peaceful coexistence of various ethnic groups. In
particular, Ukraine has threatened and discriminated against both the Crimean Tatar community it
now purports to protect (A), and the ethnic Russians living on its territory (B) – not to mention the
violations affecting Roma and Jews which have similarly been an enduring issue.41
41 See notably Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 90th session, Concluding observations on the
twenty-second and twenty-third periodic reports of Ukraine, 23 August 2016, UN Doc. CERD/C/UKR/CO/22-23,
paras. 13, 19-22; Congress of Ethnic Communities of Ukraine and National Minority Rights Monitoring Group,
Xenophobia in Ukraine in 2018, Annual Monitoring Report, 2019,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/Submissions/UKRAINE Annex2.pdf; United Jewish Community of
Ukraine, “Anti-Semitism in Ukraine”, Report 2018, https://jewishnews.com.ua/DOCS/Report%20Anti-
Semitism%20in%20Ukraine%202018%20(UJCU%20REPORT).pdf; Minority Rights Group, “Roma in Ukraine – A
Time for Action: Priorities and Pathways for an Effective Integration Policy”, May 2019, pp. 26-27 (timeline on major
attacks), https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MRG Rep Ukraine EN Apr19.pdf; OHCHR, Report
on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 August 2020 to 31 January 2021,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/31stReportUkraine-en.pdf, paras. 85-86.
10
A. MEASURES TAKEN BY UKRAINE AGAINST CRIMEAN TATARS
32. The sincerity of Ukraine’s declared concern for Crimean Tatars appears questionable in light
of its failure to address the difficulties of this community, coupled with the measures actually taken
against it throughout the post-Soviet period until today.
33. Many concerns in respect of issues that Ukraine now artificially invokes before this Court as
accusations against Russia have in fact been repeatedly expressed over the years by various UN
treaty bodies and international organizations, as well as by the parties concerned, with regard to
Ukraine’s own behaviour, as illustrated by the following non-exhaustive examples.42
34. In 1998, the CERD Committee expressed its concern about the difficulties “experienced by
members of minority groups, including the Crimean Tatars, who were deported decades earlier and
are now returning to resettle in Ukraine, in acquiring [Ukrainian] citizenship”.43
35. In 2006, the CERD Committee also observed “that Crimean Tatars reportedly remain
underrepresented in the public service of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (arts. 5 (c) and 2
(2))”.44 The Committee further expressed its concern about reports that only 20 per cent of Crimean
Tatars “obtained plots of land, mainly in areas considered undesirable by them.” It noted “with
concern that most Crimean Tatars have been excluded from the agrarian land privatization process
[…] and that many Crimean Tatars live in settlements which lack basic infrastructure (art. 5 (d) (v)
and (e) (iii)).”45
42 See also CERD Committee, 90th session, Concluding observations on the twenty-second and twenty-third periodic
reports of Ukraine, 23 August 2016, UN Doc. CERD/C/UKR/CO/22-23, paras. 23-24; Appeal of the interregional
Crimean Tatar civil movement Kyrym to the United Nations General Assembly and the European Parliament for the
recognition of the declaration of independence (secession) of the Republic of Crimea and its free association with the
Russian Federation, for compliance by States Members of the United Nations with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and for the lifting of sanctions against and an end to the blockading of the Russian Federation, the Republic of
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, 10 December 2016, annexed to UN Doc. A/71/769, p. 3; Qirim Birligi, “Restoration
of the Rights of the Crimean Tatars and Creation of Conditions for their Revival and Development as Part of the
Integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation”, Report submitted to CERD Committee, 93rd session, 31 July – 25
August 2017, doc. INT/CERD/NGO/RUS/28092, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/
RUS/INT CERD NGO RUS 28092 E.doc. See also Application of the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections of the Russian Federation, 12 September 2018
(“Preliminary Objections” or “PORF”), para. 299. For a fuller list, see “International organizations on the situation with
the Crimean Tatars in the ‘Ukrainian’ period (1992-2014)”, in Documents submitted to the Registry of the ICJ by the
Russian Federation in connection with Ukraine’s Request for the indication of provisional measures and Judges’ Folder
submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures, 6-9 March 2017 (Annex 1267), pp. 46-
62.
43 CERD Committee, 52nd session, Concluding observations on the 13th and 14th periodic reports of Ukraine, 18
March 1998, UN Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.48, paras. 11 and 15.
44 CERD Committee, 69th session, Concluding observations on the 17th and 18th periodic reports of Ukraine, 17
August 2006, UN Doc. CERD/C/UKR/CO/18, para. 14.
45 Ibid., para. 15.
11
36. In 2011, the CERD Committee reiterated its strong concern over “difficulties experienced by
Crimean Tatars who have returned to Ukraine”. The Committee drew attention to insufficient
possibilities for studying their mother tongue, hate speech against them, and access to justice. It
recommended to Ukraine to ensure the restoration of political, social and economic rights of
Crimean Tatars in Crimea, in particular the restitution of property including land or the
compensation for its loss.46
37. The Council of Europe had also repeatedly pointed at the “discrimination suffered by
Crimean Tatars in all areas of life, including in access to employment, housing and land” prior to
2014 and had urged Ukraine to take action, in vain.47
38. In a 2013 report, the OSCE concluded, among other serious concerns, that “[t]he lack of a
comprehensive legal and political agreement on the restoration of rights of the [formerly deported
peoples] has presented formidable obstacles to their full integration into public and socio-economic
life.”48
39. Ukraine’s lack of concern for the interests and rights of the Crimean Tatars has also been
deplored by representatives of this community.49
40. After the change of status of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine decided to interrupt the delivery of
water to the peninsula, supported the so-called civil blockade and adopted additional embargo
measures on food products, which had a dramatic impact on the humanitarian situation of the
people it purports to protect in the present case.50 It also turned a blind eye to, and effectively
46 CERD Committee, 79th session, Concluding observations on the 19th to 21st periodic reports of Ukraine, 29
August 2011, UN Doc. CERD/C/UKR/CO/19-21, para. 17.
47 Council of Europe, Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Ukraine (fourth
monitoring cycle), adopted on 9 December 2011, doc. CRI(2012)6, para. 86, https://rm.coe.int/fourth-report-onukraine/
16808b5ca5. The report noted the absence of meaningful progress in the overall situation of Crimean Tatars
since the previous report (para. 92).
48 OSCE, The integration of formerly deported people in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs assessment, 16 August 2013, p. 30,
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/a/104309.pdf.
49 See for instance Qirim Birligi, “Restoration of the Rights of the Crimean Tatars and Creation of Conditions for
their Revival and Development as Part of the Integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation”, Report submitted to
CERD Committee, 93rd session, 31 July – 25 August 2017, p. 2-4, doc. INT/CERD/NGO/RUS/28092,
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/RUS/INT CERD NGO RUS 28092 E.doc;
Statement of
50 See Decree No. 1035 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 16 December 2015 on restriction of supply of certain
goods (works, services) from the temporarily occupied territory to the other territory of Ukraine and/or from the other
territory of Ukraine to the temporarily occupied territory, and the appended list of embargoed basic food products,
reproduced in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings
on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 65-66; Report to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe by
Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann on his human rights visit to Crimea (25-31 January 2016), contained in doc.
SG/Inf(2016)15 rev of 11 April 2016 (Annex 825 to MU), para. 58; OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in
Ukraine, 16 August to 15 November 2016, para. 13 (Annex 773 to MU). See also Regnum, “Poroshenko said that the
12
approved of the sabotage of power transmission lines from Ukraine to Crimea organized by Mejlis
associates with support of its leaders, which led to a blackout in the whole of Crimea, as is
explained further below.51 Indeed Ukraine did nothing to prevent what may properly be described
as an act of terrorism, which was committed from its territory, in the Kherson region.
B. MEASURES TAKEN BY UKRAINE AGAINST ETHNIC RUSSIANS
41. Since 2014, Ukraine’s wrongful policies have focused on threatening the interests of the
ethnic Russians living on its territory, notably through the suppression of the Russian language in
all spheres of life defining the Russian identity, the incitement of hate speech directed at members
of ethnic minorities and other acts of ethnic hatred, together with the persecution of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church. Most of these issues have already been raised by Russia both before and since
the Application of Ukraine in the present case,52 but unfortunately to no avail. In parallel, Crimean
Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians living in Crimea have been instrumentalised by Ukraine in its
disguised attempt to put forward its sovereignty dispute with Russia for which the Court lacks
jurisdiction in the present case. It is to be further noted that the following is without prejudice to the
way Russia might elect to frame and solve its dispute against Ukraine in the future on these matters.
42. During the Soviet era as well as after its independence in 1991, Ukraine has been a deeply
bilingual society, with ethnic Russians and Ukrainians peacefully coexisting on its territory for
centuries. The Russian language has always been widely used in Ukraine and until the coup
d’État,53 it was effectively recognised as a medium of instruction at all levels of education; by
administrative and judicial authorities; by radio and television programmes as well as newspapers;
in all aspects of economic and social life and in cultural activities. In fact, nearly one third of the
population of Ukraine – 29.6% according to the last census in 2001 – consider their native language
to be Russian – with 2.9% indicating other minority languages as their native tongues.54 In addition
to identity aspects, a significant part of the population still uses Russian in everyday life. As a
aim of the blockade is the return of Crimea to Ukraine”, 22 September 2015, in Documents from the Dossier and
Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 166.
51 See para. 167. Interfax Ukraine, “Dzhemilev after talking to Poroshenko: The incident in the area of the power
transmission line in the Kherson Region was caused by a misunderstanding, and we will solve this issue”, 21 November
2015 (Annex 937).
52 As regards languages, see Statement of the State Duma regarding the violation of fundamental human rights in
Ukraine following new bans on the use of the Russian language, annexed to the letter of 12 February 2021 from the
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc.
A/75/751. As regards ethnic hatred, see in particular Note Verbale No. 14500-n/dgpch of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow, 30 December 2016 (Annex 518). As regards
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, see notably Note Verbale No.13091-n/dgpch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation to the Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow, 28 November 2016 (Annex 515) and Note Verbale No.
14453-n/dgpch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow, 29
December 2016 (Annex 517).
53 See below, para. 43.
54 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, “The language structure of Ukraine, according to the All-Ukrainian census
data”, 2001, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language.
13
matter of fact, according to an all-Ukrainian poll conducted in 2019, less than half of the population
(i.e. 46%) actually speak only or mostly Ukrainian – while the amount of Russian speakers
remained relatively stable (i.e. 28.1% speaks mostly or only Russian and another 24.9% speaks
Ukrainian and Russian in equal proportion).55 The question of languages thus arises in a radically
different way as compared to virtually monoethnic countries. It is particularly worth noting that
following Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence on 24 August 1991, the special status of the
Russian language was protected by the Declaration on the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine
adopted on 1 November 1991,56 by Ukraine’s Constitution57 and its legislation,58 thus clearly
indicating Ukraine’s intention at the time to work to promote harmony in inter-ethnic relations in
the country and to promote the cultural development of all national minorities. It is against this
background that the right to linguistic self-determination has also been included in the Package of
Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements.59
43. Soon after the coup d’État, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities insisted
that, “[w]hile maintaining Ukrainian as the State language, the specific role of the Russian language
in Ukraine should be clearly recognized in the legal framework”.60 But not only did Ukraine repel
the legislative protection of Russian,61 it has also incrementally limited the use of that language, in
55 The all-Ukrainian public opinion poll was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) from
28 February to 11 March 2019, see “Thoughts and views of the population on teaching the Russian language in
Ukrainian-speaking schools and granting autonomy as a part of Ukraine to the uncontrolled territories of Donbas:
March 2019”, 15 March 2019, at http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=832&page=1; see also the Concept of
the State target social program of national and patriotic education for the period until 2025, approved by the Order of
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1233-r, 9 October 2020 (Annex 758), pp. 2-3.
56 Article 3: “The Ukrainian State guarantees the right of its citizens to freely use the Russian language. In regions,
where several national groups live compactly, along with the state Ukrainian language, a language acceptable to the
entire population of the area may function.” Declaration № 1771-XII of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine,
1 November 1991 (Annex 744).
57 Article 10 provides that “the free development, use, and protection of Russian, and other languages of national
minorities of Ukraine, shall be guaranteed” – it specifically identifies Russian, whereas other minority languages are
referenced collectively and generically, see Constitution of Ukraine, 28 June 1996 (Annex 747). See also Article 11, the
non-discrimination clause in Article 24(2), as well as the guarantee of acquired rights in Article 22(3) and other
minority rights in Article 53(5).
58 See Law of Ukraine No. 5029-VI “On the principles of State language policy”, 3 July 2012 (Annex 750) (the
“2012 Law”). In accordance with Article 7, the Russian language was recognized as a regional language in nine regions
of Ukraine as of 2016 – see European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Third periodical report presented to
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in accordance with Article 15 of the Charter (Ukraine), 12 January
2016, p. 6, https://rm.coe.int/16806f0f08. Articles 5, 7 and 20 in particular required the application of the principle of
plurilingualism and defined measures aimed at the use of Russian, among others, as a right in the sphere of education,
mass media, State and municipal bodies, economic activities, as well as in social life.
59 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2202 (2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2202 (2015), Annex I “Package of
Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements”, 12 February 2015, measure 11 and fn. i.
60 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Human Rights Assessment Mission in Ukraine, 12 May 2014,
p. 124, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/3/118476.pdf.
61 See the first attempt of the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) to repeal the 2012 Law in the aftermath of
the Euromaidan protests, on 23 February 2014, RT, “Canceled language law in Ukraine sparks concern among Russian
and EU diplomats”, 27 February 2014, https://www.rt.com/news/minority-language-law-ukraine-035/ (Annex 894), and
Decision N° 2-р/2018 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (Annex 798) finally ruling the law unconstitutional on a
procedural basis on 28 February 2018.
14
an attempt to eventually entirely suppress it. Concerns among institutions such as the Venice
Commission62 were raised in particular with regard to Ukraine’s Law No. 2145-VIII “On
education”,63 hastily adopted on 5 September 2017 with “no real consultation” with the
representatives of national minorities in Ukraine64 (the “2017 Law”); and Law No. 2704-VIII “On
supporting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the State Language”65 of 25 April 2019 (the
“2019 Law”).
44. The 2017 Law aims at the disappearance of freestanding minority language schools. In
addition, after primary school, “it will no longer be possible for speakers of languages of [certain]
minorities – […] very significantly, Russian – to receive any education […] through the medium of
their language.”66 What is especially problematic is that the 2017 Law places Russian speakers “at a
disadvantage”67 compared, first, with the previous linguistic regime68 and, second, with other
categories of Ukrainian citizens whose respective languages remain protected.69 Indeed, indigenous
peoples will keep the right to study in their language throughout their education;70 and national
minorities speaking an official language of the European Union may be taught at least some
disciplines in their language.71
45. Unsurprisingly, the 2017 Law aroused “serious concerns […] on a number of legal issues”72
among Ukraine’s neighbouring States,73 NGOs74 and international organizations. In particular, the
62 See below, paras. 45 and 49.
63 Law of Ukraine No. 2145-VIII “On education”, 5 September 2017 (Annex 753), the Law entered into force on 28
September 2017.
64 See Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 2189 (2017) on “The new Ukrainian law on
education: a major impediment to the teaching of national minorities’ mother tongues”, 12 October 2017,
https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=24218&lang=en (English) and http://semanticpace
net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbncveG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHI
uYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0yNDIxOCZsYW5nPUZS&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYv
WFJlZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTI0MjE4 (French), para. 2 (hereinafter
“PACE Resolution 2189 (2017)”); Venice Commission, Opinion No. 902/2017 on “The provisions of the Law on
Education of 5 September 2017, which concern the use of the State Language and Minority and other Languages in
Education”, CDL-AD(2017)030, 11 December 2017, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDLAD(
2017)030-e (English) and https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2017)030-f (French),
para. 53 (hereinafter “Opinion No. 902/2017”).
65 Law of Ukraine No. 2704-VIII “On supporting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language”,
25 April 2019 (Annex 755).
66 Venice Commission, Opinion No. 902/2017, para. 48 (emphasis added).
67 Ibid.
68 See above, para. 42. See also PACE Resolution 2189 (2017), para. 9: “the new law entails a strong reduction in the
rights previously conferred […] this is not conducive to ‘living together’.”
69 See in particular Venice Commission, Opinion No. 902/2017, paras. 106-107.
70 Article 7(1) of the 2017 Law.
71 Article 7(4) of the 2017 Law. See also Article 48(3) of the Law of Ukraine No. 1556-VII “On higher education”,
1 July 2014 (Annex 751).
72 PACE Resolution 2189 (2017), paras. 3 and 6.
73 Press release of the Embassy of Hungary in Kiev, “Protest against the new Ukrainian education law”, 5 September
2017 (Annex 810), https://kijev mfa.gov.hu/eng/news/tiltakozas-az-uj-ukran-oktatasi-toerveny-ellen. See also
15
Venice Commission issued an opinion according to which, “[t]aking into account the particular
place of the Russian language in Ukraine”, its “less favourable treatment” is “not justifiable in the
light of the principle of non-discrimination”.75 Yet, this discriminatory approach was repeated by
Law No. 463-IX “On complete general secondary education” of 16 January 2020,76 which raised
some concerns even among domestic parliamentary committees.77 Obviously, the purpose of these
laws is to infringe on the interests of the Russian-speaking minority who already suffer acutely from
the impact of these changes.78
46. This policy of eradicating the Russian language from the Ukrainian education system is
progressively achieving its objectives: during the academic year 2010/2011, almost 700,000
students were educated in Russian in 1,240 institutions; in 2019/2020, the numbers had dropped to
approximately 281,000 students in 129 institutions, while the ratio for other minorities languages
remained practically stable.79
47. Ukraine’s attempt at suppressing the Russian language was crowned by the 2019 Law. This
allows a radical change on short notice80 of the previous language regime, towards a system focused
Hungarian Government official website, “Ukraine has stabbed Hungary in the back by amending its education act”, 8
September 2017, available at: https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-foreign-minister-ukraine-stabbed-hungary-back-
79260/. See also Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website, “The position of the MFA on the promulgation
of the Law on Education in Ukraine”, 26 September 2017, https://www.mae.ro/en/node/43365; “Teodor Melescanu on a
visit to Chernivtsi: ‘Until concrete solutions are identified, Romania will keep the subject of the Education Law on the
agenda of the bilateral talks’”, 11 January 2018, https://www.mae ro/en/node/44635.
74 See notably Institute for the Study of National Policy and Interethnic Relations, European International Tolerance
Centre, Centre for Monitoring and Comparative Analysis of Intercultural Communications (Moscow Institute of
Psychoanalysis) and European Centre for Democracy Development, Annual Report, “Xenophobia, Radicalism, and
Hate Crime”, 2018, p. 26, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/e/395336.pdf describing the Law as “[t]he most
aggressively discriminatory legislation […] stripping millions of Ukrainian citizens of their basic human rights.”
75 Venice Commission, Opinion No. 902/2017, paras. 112, 114 and 124. See also para. 109.
76 Law of Ukraine No. 463-IX “On full general secondary education”, 16 January 2020 (Annex 757).
77 Conclusions of the Main Scientific Expert Department of the Verkhovna Rada on the draft law of Ukraine "On full
general secondary education", 15 May 2019 (Annex 801), p. 1, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/
webproc34?id=&pf3511=66333&pf35401=491403.
78 See notably MFA of Russia official website, “Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE
Alexander Lukashevich’s remarks on Ukraine’s education law delivered at a meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council,
Vienna, 28 September 2017”, https://www mid.ru/en/foreign policy/humanitarian cooperation/-
/asset publisher/bB3NYd16mBFC/content/id/2879370; MFA of Russia official website, “Comment by the Information
and Press Department on information about transitioning Russian-speaking schools in Ukraine to the State language of
education starting September 2020”, 7 October 2019, https://www.mid.ru/en/kommentarii/-
/asset publisher/2MrVt3CzL5sw/content/id/3836711; MFA of Russia official website, “Permanent Representative of
Russia to the OSCE Alexander Lukashevich’s remarks at a meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council about Ukraine’s
Law on Education, Vienna, 17 May 2018”, https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign policy/news/-
/asset publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3230080. See also Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media,
Report, “The new Ukrainian law on education: a major impediment to the teaching of national minorities’ mother
tongues”, 10 October 2017, para. 6, https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTMLen.
asp?fileid=24125&lang=en.
79 See Ukrainian Institute of Politics, “Dynamics of the number of schools and students by language of instruction”,
5 June 2020 (Annex 836).
80 See the final and transitional provisions under Section IX (Annex 755). See also the statement in October 2019 of
the Ukrainian Minister of Education and Science, Anna Novosad, that as of September 2020, Russian-speaking schools
16
on the mandatory use of the Ukrainian language by all citizens and in all spheres of life,81 on a daily
basis, with exceptions discriminating again between different categories of languages. The 2019
Law extends the problematic differential treatment from education82 to other areas, including
scientific publications83 and computer software84 (which shall be “in the State language, English
and/or other official languages of the European Union”, to the exclusion of Russian). It also
imposes stringent requirements on foreign-language book distribution (except for books in the
official languages of the EU and “specialised bookstores”),85 as well as in print media (which
however do “not apply to the print mass media published exclusively in the Crimean Tatar
language, other languages of indigenous peoples of Ukraine, in the English language or another
official language of the European Union”).86 In particular, the 2019 Law makes it a requirement for
Russian-language media to have Ukrainian-language versions, which involves large financial costs
that some traditional media are not able to bear. In sum, here again, the considerable Russianspeaking
minority is deprived of the protection granted to the speakers of other languages.
48. Discrimination issues are coupled with restrictions in the enjoyment of the right to freedom
of expression as the provisions regarding broadcasting tighten the language quota requirements and
leave very little room for the use of minority languages.87 This adds to a very charged context
regarding the treatment of Russian-speaking media which includes numerous bans on broadcasting
and distribution;88 refusals to provide accreditation;89 as well as forcible expulsions, systematic
in Ukraine would switch to the State language, in Gordon, “Novosad: From September 2020, Russian-language schools
will switch to the Ukrainian language of instruction”, 4 October 2019 (Annex 1010).
81 See notably 2019 Law (Annex 755), Preamble para. 3, Article 1(7). In its decision No. 10-rp/99 of 14 December
1999, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (referred to in para. 3 of the Preamble to the Law) stated that “[t]he public
spheres in which the State language is used primarily cover the spheres of exercise of powers of the legislative,
executive and judicial authorities, other State and local self-government bodies (the language of work, acts, records and
documentation, the language of relations between these bodies, etc.)”. See Decision of the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine No. 10-rp/99 on the official interpretation of the provisions of Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine
regarding the use of the state language by the state authorities, local self-government bodies and its use in the
educational process in educational institutions of Ukraine (case on the use of the Ukrainian language), 14 December
1999 (Annex 770). Section V of the 2019 Law specifically prescribes the rules of use of Ukrainian in the following
“public spheres”: employment, education, science, culture, TV and radio distribution, print media, book publishing,
public events, healthcare, communications, transport, etc.
82 See above, para. 44 and Article 21 on the State language in the field of education.
83 See Article 22 on the State language in the field of science, paragraph 2.
84 See Article 27 on the State language in the field of computer software and website user interfaces, paragraph 1.
85 See Article 26 on the State language in the field of book publishing and distribution, paragraph 2.
86 See Article 25 on the State language in the field of print mass media, paragraph 5.
87 Articles 9 and 10 on the State language in the field of television and radio broadcasting. See, in the same line, the
Law of Ukraine No. 2054-VIII “On amendments to certain laws of Ukraine regarding the language of audio-visual
(electronic) mass media”, 23 May 2017 (Annex 752), which came into full force on 13 October 2017 and obliges the
national channels to broadcast at least 75% of their content in the Ukrainian language.
88 See notably Lenta.ru, “Ukrainian authorities banned the broadcast of the Russian-speaking Euronews”, 14 August
2014 (Annex 911); BBC News Russian Service, “Russian TV channel ‘Dozhd’ banned from broadcasting in Ukraine”,
12 January 2017 (Annex 966); Committee to Protect Journalists, “Ukraine bans Russia’s independent Dozhd TV
station”, 13 January 2017, https://cpj.org/2017/01/ukraine-bans-russias-independent-dozhd-tv-station.php; Committee
to Protect Journalists, “Ukraine bans Russian media outlets, websites”, 17 May 2017, https://cpj.org/2017/05/ukraine17
harassment and “increasingly violent attacks” against Russian journalists which, coupled with
“systemic impunity”, “fuel[] intolerance and discrimination”.90
49. These concerns from the perspective of non-discrimination were also shared by the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which recommended reviewing the 2017 and
2019 Laws to ensure compliance with the Covenant, “particularly with regard to the different
treatment of the languages” of Ukraine’s minorities.91
50. Russia does not deny the right of any country to identify the language that is to be
compulsory in official and educational matters. However, the purpose of the laws at issue is
different;92 it is actually not the advancement of the Ukrainian language, but the forced change of
linguistic identity of ethnic Russians as an impermissible retaliation for the reunification of Crimea
with Russia. As shown below, Ukraine’s policy regarding the rights of minorities stands in stark
contrast with that prevailing in Russia, including in Crimea where the Ukrainian and the Crimean
Tatar languages have been promoted to State language status and are largely offered as educational
languages, and where there is no discrimination between the various non-Russian languages.93
bans-russian-media-outlets-websites.php; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Ukraine extends ban on Russian news
agencies, journalists”, 24 May 2018, https://cpj.org/2018/05/ukraine-extends-ban-on-russian-news-agencies-journ.php.
89 See notably BBC News Russian Service, “Moscow called ‘discrimination’ the decision of the Rada on media”, 17
February 2015 (Annex 913); OSCE Press Release, “OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media meets with
Ambassador of Ukraine”, 3 February 2021, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/477451; OSCE
Press Release, “OSCE media freedom representative reiterates that foreign media outlets as such should not be included
on sanctions lists”, 25 May 2021, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/382522.
90 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 August to 15 November 2018,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/24thReportUkraineAugust November2018 EN.pdf, paras. 11, 114.
See also Appeal of Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,
United Nations, 23 May 2014, http://eng.ombudsmanrf.org/upload/files/int docs/announce 4 rtf; Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation official website, “Criminal case opened against head of Ukrainian Security
Service Valentin Nalyvaichenko”, 19 December 2014, https://en.sledcom.ru/news/item/886715/?print=1; Reporters
without borders, Summary of attacks on media, 31 August 2015, https://rsf.org/en/news/summary-attacks-media; Note
Verbale No. 5787-n/dgpch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Embassy of Ukraine in
Moscow, 27 May 2016 (Annex 513); OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15
November 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport16th_EN.pdf, para. 105; OHCHR, Report
on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 2018 to 15 February 2019, UN Doc. A/HRC/40/CRP.3, para. 12;
OHCHR, Report on Civic space and fundamental freedoms ahead of the presidential, parliamentary and local elections
in Ukraine in 2019-2020, 21 March 2019, UN Doc. A/HRC/40/CRP.4, para. 1; MFA of Russia, official website,
“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at the opening of the plenary session of the Conference on Media Freedom
in Russia and the OSCE Region, Moscow, November 6, 2019”, 6 November 2019,
https://www mid.ru/en/foreign policy/rso/osce/-/asset publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/3887099.
91 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of
Ukraine, UN Doc. E/C.12/UKR/CO/7, 2 April 2020, para. 48.
92 See in this sense Venice Commission, Opinion No. 960/2019 “On the Law on supporting the functioning of the
Ukrainian Language as the state language”, CDL-AD(2019)032, 9 December 2019,
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2019)032-e, para. 44.
93 Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea, 11 April 2014 (Annex 62). See below, Chapter V(III).
See also Qirim Birligi, “Restoration of the Rights of the Crimean Tatars and Creation of Conditions for their Revival
and Development as Part of the Integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation”, Report submitted to CERD
18
51. In downgrading the status of the Russian language through specific discriminatory
legislation, Ukraine has clearly targeted ethnic Russians, thus fostering inter-ethnic tensions. Since
the entry into force of the new legislation, the OHCHR, which also recommends amending the laws
on State Language, on Education, and on Secondary Education, has observed a wave of threats and
acts of hatred towards members of national minorities and individuals who openly criticize the
Laws, express positive views about the Russian language, or simply speak Russian.94 Ukraine’s
legislation, combined with both censorship95 and an aggressive anti-Russian-language campaign,
indeed have grave consequences for ethnic Russians who not only see their rights to speak Russian
freely and use it in the public domain severely impeded, but also risk stigmatisation, if not violent
attacks.96
52. In Ukraine, the “alarming spread of ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, and hate speeches are
seriously underestimated, if not ignored.”97 The Ukrainian authorities tolerate and condone, if not
incite, ethnic hatred. This is so, on the one hand, through their failure to prevent, investigate and
prosecute the persons responsible for promoting discrimination and committing violence against
members of national minorities98 – and in particular ethnic Russians. On the other hand, Ukraine’s
policy not only legitimizes theories of racial supremacy and glorifies Nazi collaborators,99 it also
Committee, 93rd session, 31 July – 25 August 2017, doc. INT/CERD/NGO/RUS/28092, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/
Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/RUS/INT CERD NGO RUS 28092 E.doc.
94 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 August 2020 to 31 January 2021,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/31stReportUkraine-en.pdf, paras. 11, 84, 91-92. See also the
“Myrotvorets” (Mirotvorets) website, denounced by the Letter of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the Registrar
of the International Court of Justice, 16 March 2020 (Annex 496).
95 See notably Lenta.ru, “Ukrainian TV channels banned from speaking about the protection of the Russian-speaking
population”, 14 January 2021, available at: https://lenta.ru/news/2021/01/14/otake/ (Annex 1039).
96 See notably Remarks by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE Alexander Lukashevich
at the online meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council on the violation by the Ukrainian authorities of minority rights,
Vienna, 4 June 2020, https://special mid ru/en/web/guest/foreign policy/rso/osce/-
asset publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/
id/4149023, denouncing “forced Ukrainization” and “open Russophobia”, leading notably to disruptions of peaceful
rallies and harassment of teachers.
97 IADL, Statement on human rights in Ukraine presented at UN Human Rights Council, 29 September 2015,
https://iadllaw.org/2015/09/iadl-statement-on-human-rights-in-ukraine-presented-at-un-human-rights-council/. See also
Note Verbale No. 14500-n/dgpch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Embassy of
Ukraine in Moscow, 30 December 2016 (Annex 518).
98 See notably OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 November 2018 to 15 February 2019,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraine16Nov2018-15Feb2019.pdf, para. 94, and OHCHR,
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 August 2020 to 31 January 2021,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/31stReportUkraine-en.pdf, paras. 8, 72, 92.
99 See notably Open Letter from Scholars and Experts on Ukraine Re. the So-Called “Anti-Communist Law”, April
2015, https://krytyka.com/en/articles/open-letter-scholars-and-experts-ukraine-re-so-called-anti-communist-law; IADL,
Statement on human rights in Ukraine presented at UN Human Rights Council, 29 September 2015,
https://iadllaw.org/2015/09/iadl-statement-on-human-rights-in-ukraine-presented-at-un-human-rights-council/. See also
the resolutions of the Verkhovna Rada to celebrate at State level the anniversary of some of Nazi collaborators, in
particular Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 325-IX concerning the celebration of commemorations
and anniversaries in 2020, 3 December 2019 (Annex 756), and related reaction by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Israel, The Israeli Embassy in Ukraine Protests Against Recommendation to Honor Nazi Collaborators, 9 December
2019 (Annex 811).
19
actively supports radical nationalist groups100 which the CERD Committee has denounced as
“promot[ing] activities that amount to incitement to racial hatred and racist propaganda” and as
being “responsible for racially motivated violence against persons belonging to minority groups that
has not been always punished (arts. 2 and 4).”101
53. Against the background of the growth of anti-Russian sentiments in Ukraine, there is also an
increase in intolerance and attacks based on religion.102 While religious discrimination is not
covered by CERD,103 the various actions taken against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (“UOC”)
since 2014 actually form part of Ukraine’s policy to discriminate against ethnic Russians and
clearly aggravate their isolation. The actions include legislative measures such as the mandatory
renaming of the UOC to associate it with the so-called occupation denounced by Ukraine,104 or
fabricated investigations into allegations of incitement to religious hatred.105 At the same time,
attacks on the UOC faithful and the clergy,106 violent seizures of churches,107 acts of vandalism,108
100 Instead of publicly and unambiguously condemning ethnic hatred and declaring racist organizations illegal, the
Ukrainian Ministry of Justice has officially registered as political parties Ukrainian ultra-nationalist movements, such as
the Right Sector on 22 May 2014, see notably Interfax Ukraine, “Right Sector registered as official party”, 22 May
2014 (Annex 906); Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, Register of Ukrainian political parties (Annex 804). For its part, the
Azov Battalion, an ultra-nationalist militia that openly welcomes neo-Nazis into its ranks and engages in terrorism, was
incorporated into Ukraine’s armed forces on 12 November 2014, see notably The Nation, “Neo-Nazis and the Far Right
Are On the March in Ukraine”, 22 February 2019 (Annex 998). As regards funding, see notably, HRW, “Ukrainian
Court Penalizes News Outlet for Calling Far-Right Group ‘Neo-Nazi’”, 8 August 2019,
https://www hrw.org/news/2019/08/08/ukrainian-court-penalizes-news-outlet-calling-far-right-group-neo-nazi;
Hromadske, “Far-Right Group C14 Wins Funding From Ukrainian Government”, 14 June 2018,
https://en hromadske.ua/posts/far-right-group-c14-wins-funding-from-ukrainian-government (Annex 1318); Gordon,
“A project of the leader of nationalists from S14 received state funding”, 14 June 2018 (Annex 985); UNIAN, “Baloha
admits involvement in funding Right Sector”, 23 July 2015, https://www.unian.info/politics/1104268-baloha-admitsinvolvement-
in-funding-right-sector html (Annex 1317).
101 CERD Committee, 90th session, Concluding observations on the twenty-second and twenty-third periodic reports
of Ukraine, 23 August 2016, UN Doc. CERD/C/UKR/CO/22-23, para. 15. See also Note Verbale No. 14500-n/dgpch of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow, 30 December 2016
(Annex 518).
102 A. Semenov, CIS-EMO Political Analyst, Discrimination on the basis of religion and the problem of hate speech
in Ukraine, HDIM.NGO/0161/2018/EN, 13 September 2018, https://www.osce.org/odihr/394283?download=true.
103 See below, paras. 127-128.
104 See Law of Ukraine No. 2662-VIII "On amendments to Article 12 of the Law of Ukraine “On Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Organizations” regarding the names of religious organizations (associations) that are
integrated into the structure (are part) of any organization (association), management center (administration) of which is
located outside Ukraine in the state recognized by law as having committed military aggression against Ukraine and/or
temporarily occupied part of the territory of Ukraine", 20 December 2018 (Annex 754), Article 1. This law has no
practical effect but to target UOC communities; see the concerns expressed in the Written statement submitted by
Public Organization “Public Advocacy” (a non-governmental organization with special consultative status) to the
Human Rights Council, “On the victimization law on forcible renaming of 12 000 communities of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church”, 30 May 2019, UN Doc. A/HRC/41/NGO/26; OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in
Ukraine, 16 November 2018 to 15 February 2019,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraine16Nov2018-15Feb2019.pdf, para. 92.
105 See, e.g., UNIAN, “SBU searched the senior priest of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra Pavel: details”, 30 November 2018
(Annex 993); OHCHR, Civic space and fundamental freedoms ahead of the presidential, parliamentary and local
elections in Ukraine in 2019-2020, 21 March 2019, UN Doc. A/HRC/40/CRP.4, p. 9, para. 31.
106 See, e.g., Union of Orthodox Journalists, “ROC: There’s real persecution against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church”,
1 March 2018, https://spzh news/en/news/51756-rpc-v-ukraine-samyje-nastojashhije-gonenija-na-ukrainskuju20
or interference in, as well as disruption of, religious services109 are neither prevented nor
investigated or repressed by Ukraine. In certain cases, law-enforcement agencies even actively
support and participate in such acts.110 Information campaigns releasing hundreds of false and
biased publications in various mass-media outlets111 are other straightforward examples of
harassment. Measures against the UOC are effectively directed against ethnic Russians, which form
a huge majority of its followers.
54. All of the above violations shed a relevant light on Ukraine’s artificial accusations in the
present case: they show that Ukraine in fact does not care about the values underlying CERD, its
implementation and States’ adherence to its principles, nor about the protection of ethnic groups;
rather the sole purpose of its claims, which are baseless as will be shown in the next chapters, is to
put before the Court the change of status of Crimea and effectively assert its sovereignty over it.
pravoslavnuju-cerkovy; TvZvezda.ru, “Supporters of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine beat parishioners and a priest of
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church”, 17 March 2019 (Annex 1000).
107 See, e.g., Moscow Patriarchate official website, “Speech by Metropolitan Onufriy of Kiev and All Ukraine at the
Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, 2-3 February 2016”, 2 February 2016 (Annex 946); Legal
department of the UOC official website, Map of UOC church seizures, https://law.church.ua/; Statement by
Mr Alexander Lukashevich, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, at the 1235th meeting of the OSCE
Permanent Council on violations by the Ukrainian Government of religious rights and persecution of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church in Ukraine, 12 July 2019, C.DEL/863/19, https://www.osce.org/permanentcouncil/
428258?download=true; NGO Public Advocacy, Statement on violation of the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church communities in Ukraine, 1 October 2015, https://www.osce.org/odihr/188076.
108 See, e.g., MFA of Russia, White book on violations of human rights and the rule of law in Ukraine, November
2013 – March 2014, transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by a letter from the Permanent Representative of the
Russian Federation to the United Nations of 12 May 2014, UN Doc. A/68/875–S/2014/331, p. 62,
https://www mid.ru/documents/10180/7172cfd9-6ec2-48a7-98dd-fe371fd69b26?t=1406667601566 (hereinafter “White
Book”); OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018 (Annex 779
to MU), para. 95; Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation at the 1235th meeting of the OSCE
Permanent Council, 12 July 2019, C.DEL/863/19, https://www.osce.org/permanent-council/428258?download=true.
109 See e.g., White Book, p. 61, https://www mid ru/documents/10180/7172cfd9-6ec2-48a7-98ddfe371fd69b26?
t=1406667601566; NGO Public Advocacy, “Chudnytsia village, Hoshcha district, Rivne region”,
https://www.protiktor.com/38hrcsession/all-cases/chudnytsia-village/; NGO Public Advocacy, “Badyvka village,
Ostroh district, Rivne region”, https://www.protiktor.com/38hrcsession/all-cases/badyvka-village/; OHCHR, Report on
the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 November 2018 to 15 February 2019,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraine16Nov2018-15Feb2019.pdf, para. 92. See also above,
fn. 52.
110 See e.g., NGO Public Advocacy, “Facts, evidence and claims regarding violations of the rights of believers and
religious organizations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 2014-2016. Collection of information materials and
documents”, https://sb8511b05c8a21905.jimcontent.com/download/version/1530605303/module/6756821863/name/
Ukraine%20Orthodox%20Report%202016.pdf; OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February
to 15 May 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraine16Feb-15May2019 EN.pdf,
paras. 86-87.
111 S. Mudrov, “The autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church: a new dividing line for Ukraine?”, Journal of
Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 2019, Vol. 27, Nos. 2-3, p. 272. Over three years from 2015, nearly 700
negative news pieces about the UOC were published in various media, according to Public Advocacy (see
https://golos.ua/i/590663).
21
II. Crimean Tatars and Ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea Have Been Supported by Russia
55. Ukraine’s claims are completely divorced from the reality on the ground. When Crimea
became part of Russia, one of the immediate priorities was to take adequate measures for the
rehabilitation of historically oppressed peoples, including the Crimean Tatars, and to ensure full
protection of their rights on an equal footing with the rest of the Crimean population. This took the
form of special measures, which is authorized under Article 1(4) of CERD.
56. As early as 11 March 2014, the Parliament of Crimea, anticipating a result favourable to a
change of status for Crimea in the upcoming referendum, adopted a Resolution aimed at developing
and protecting the rights of Crimean Tatars as a historically disadvantaged community, to be
guaranteed in Crimea’s future Constitution.112 The planned measures included: (i) promoting the
Crimean Tatar language as Crimea’s State language alongside the Russian and Ukrainian
languages; (ii) ensuring the proportional representation of Crimean Tatars in the Crimean
Parliament and within the executive organs of the future Crimean Government, with a guaranteed
minimum threshold of 20%;113 (iii) recognition of Crimean Tatar ethnic self-government organs,
including the Qurultay and organs formed thereunder (thus including the Mejlis); (iv) establishing
Crimean Tatar development plans and securing financial resources therefor, solving land, financial
and organizational issues facing Crimean Tatars as part of their resettlement in Crimea; (v)
preserving Crimean Tatar culture and historical heritage; (vi) ensuring education in the Crimean
Tatar language; (vii) restoring previous place names that had been modified after the 1944
deportation; (viii) fostering the development of electronic and print media outlets in the Crimean
Tatar language; (ix) and ensuring religious equality. This resolution obviously pointed to issues that
had not been settled or rights that had not been protected or ensured when Crimea was under
Ukrainian control. It also provided for an agenda of reforms that Russia, including the Crimean
local authorities, have been carrying out since 2014.
57. Shortly after Crimea’s accession to Russia, on 21 April 2014, the President of Russia
adopted Decree No. 268 “On measures aimed at rehabilitation of Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek,
Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state support of their revival and development” (the
“Rehabilitation Decree”).114 This text forms the basis for the development of a series of measures
and institutional initiatives aimed at promoting the rehabilitation of historically oppressed
minorities, including Crimean Tatars and other formerly deported minorities, developing and
112 Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Resolution No. 1728-6/14 on guarantees of restoration
of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people and their integration into the Crimean community, 10 March 2014 (Annex
789).
113 It should be recalled that at the 2014 census, Crimean Tatars accounted for 10.2% of the Crimean population –
Federal Service of State Statistics of the Russian Federation, Results of the Population Census of 2014 in the Crimean
Federal District, 2015 (Annex 440), p. 108. In this regard, a 20% guaranteed representation threshold is particularly
favourable to the Crimean Tatar community.
114 See Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 268 “On measures aimed at rehabilitation of Armenian,
Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state support of their revival and development” (as
amended on 12 September 2015), 21 April 2014 (Annex 63).
22
ensuring protection of their human rights and gradually bringing these communities to a position of
equal footing with other segments of the population in Crimea. The key provisions of the Decree
confirm Russia’s obvious intent to adopt positive measures on restauration aimed at supporting the
Crimean Tatars and improving their legal, political, economic, social and spiritual situations115 –
there is no equivalent in the period under Ukrainian sovereignty.
58. Through the Decree, the President of Russia directs the Russian Government, together with
the competent authorities of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, to define and carry
out a series of measures of redress. The first provision of the Decree, contained in Article 1(a), first
paragraph, is of general scope and potentially far-reaching. The competent authorities shall
“adopt measures on restoration of historical justice, political, social and spiritual revival of
the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German Peoples, who suffered
illegal deportation and political repressions on ethnic and other grounds”.
59. This general principle provides the basis for the adoption of more specific measures of
application in various fields, as is shown further below. This general measure refers to peoples – as
a whole – that have been exposed to deportation and other repressions; as the application measures
confirm, this refers not only to members of the targeted communities who have survived the
deportation period, but also any of his or her relatives, including his or her offspring. Therefore, the
Decree applies to the Crimean Tatars and other communities as a whole.
60. Article 1(b) directs the competent authorities to
“determine the peculiarities of application of the Federal Law […] ‘On introduction of
changes to some legislative acts of the Russian Federation on registration in a simplified
procedure of the rights of citizens on certain real estate units’ on the territories of the
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol with regard to the necessity to provide
protection of human rights and legitimate interests of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek,
Italian, Crimean Tatar, German and other peoples”.
61. This provision specifically addresses the Crimean Tatars’ longstanding difficulties – that
have only piled up in the Ukrainian period – to lawful access to land and real estate property upon
their return to Crimea.
62. Article 1(c) of the Decree provides that the federal target program of social-economic
development of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol should include measures aimed
at the national-cultural and spiritual revival of the targeted peoples and the social development of
115 See Article 1(a), first paragraph of the Decree, directing the competent authorities to adopt such measures. See
also in this sense the statement of the President of the Russian Federation during “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin”,
annual interview, Moscow, 17 April 2014, http://en.kremlin ru/events/president/news/20796 (Annex 51 to MU), p. 43:
“We certainly need to do everything we can to rehabilitate and restore the legitimate rights and interests of the Crimean
Tatar people”. See in the same line the announcement of the rehabilitation process made in the Address by the President
of the Russian Federation to the State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil
society representatives, 18 March 2014, http://en.kremlin ru/events/president/news/20603.
23
the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, and should determine the sources or financing of the
program accordingly. Article 1(d) encourages the creation and development of cultural autonomies
and other associations and organizations to provide ethnic communities with the means to preserve
their identity, and guarantees basic general education in the languages of the targeted peoples. It
also reflects Russia’s recognition of the issues faced by Crimean Tatars and other formerly
repressed peoples, a policy consistently carried out by Russia not only in Crimea.116
63. The Rehabilitation Decree sets general orientations that are implemented in Crimea by local
legislation.117 For example, the Crimean Law of 31 July 2014 No. 38-ZRK 118 provides for a
simplified transitional procedure for registration/legalization of land and real property in order to
address the core problems encountered before 2014 by Crimean Tatars, who may not always
possess official documents proving their ownership title to a land plot. The transition period for the
116 President of the Russian Federation official website, “Meeting of the Commission for rehabilitation of victims of
political repressions”, 28 October 2015 (Annex 461).
117 Implementing acts include, among others, Order of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No. 436-r
“On approval of the Action Plan for the implementation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 21
April 2014 No. 268”, 27 May 2014 (Annex 68); Order of the Government of Sevastopol No. 578 “On approval of the
Set of Measures for the restoration of historical justice, political, social and spiritual revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian,
Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples, who were illegally deported and politically repressed on ethnic and other
grounds, for 2014-2016 in Sevastopol”, 31 December 2014 (Annex 79); Order of the Council of Ministers of the
Republic of Crimea No. 227-r “On approval of the Event Plan for the implementation in the Republic of Crimea of the
Set of Measures for the restoration of historical justice, political, social and spiritual revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian,
Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples, who were illegally deported and politically repressed on ethnic and other
grounds, for 2015-2016 years”, 23 March 2015 (Annex 85); Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Crimea No. 451-r “On approval of the Event Plan for the implementation in the Republic of Crimea of the set of
measures for the restoration of historical justice, political, social and religious revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian,
Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples, who were illegally deported and politically repressed on ethnic and
other grounds, for 2016”, 5 May 2016 (Annex 104); Order of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No.
968-r “On the Event Plan for the implementation in the Republic of Crimea of the Set of Measures for the restoration of
historical justice, political, social and religious revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and
German Peoples, who were illegally deported and politically repressed on ethnic and other grounds, for 2017-2019”, 29
August 2017 (Annex 110). For a detailed account of the implementation of the Decree in Crimea, see Information Note
on measures taken for the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 268 in Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Crimea, Information note on measures taken to implement the Decree No. 268 of the President of the Russian
Federation and other activities aimed at promoting cultures of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar peoples, as attached to the
Letter No. 1/01-46/8775/3/1, 5 June 2020 (Annex 498), pp. 84-138. Another critical basis for supporting measures in
Crimea is the Federal Constitutional Law No. 6-FKZ “On the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian
Federation and the formation of new constituent entities of the Russian Federation: The Republic of Crimea and the
federal city of Sevastopol”, 21 March 2014 (Annex 888 to MU).
118 See Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 38-ZRK “On the specifics for the regulation of property and land relations
in the territory of the Republic of Crimea”, 30 July 2014 (Annex 71), together with its subsequent amendments,
including the Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 221-ZRK/2016 “On introducing amendments into the Law of the
Republic of Crimea ‘On specifics of regulation of property and land relations in the territory of the Republic of
Crimea’”, 17 February 2016 (Annex 100) and Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 573-ZRK “On introducing
amendments into Article 13 of the Law of the Republic of Crimea ‘On the specifics of regulation of property and land
relations in the territory of the Republic of Crimea’”, 5 March 2019 (Annex 116).
24
regularization of property titles has subsequently been extended, confirming the authorities’ concern
not to leave any community behind with the recognition and exercise of their rights.119
64. Over the period of 2016-2017 more than 4,000 rehabilitated persons have benefited from a
decision to allocate parcels of land to them.120 Free registration procedures of real estate and
substantial discounts on the cost of permitting documents for the supply network (i.e. electricity,
water and sewerage, gas and communication lines) have also been granted.121
65. In addition, many other measures aimed at improving the life of Crimeans – including
Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, regardless of whether they have obtained Russian citizenship –
have been adopted both at the federal122 and local123 levels since 2014.
66. Local civil society, including public associations of Crimean Tatars, are encouraged to
participate in the implementation of the Rehabilitation Decree, with the financial support of the
State.124 There are about 30 Crimean Tatar organizations in Crimea that represent about 20,000
members.125
67. Russia has further created means enabling direct communication between the authorities and
the Crimean Tatar community. For instance, the Council of Crimean Tatars,126 composed of senior
figures of the Crimean Tatar community, is tasked to analyze the specific problems faced by the
Crimean Tatars, propose measures to solve these, and assess their due implementation as part of the
work towards “restoring historical justice, political, social and spiritual revival of the Crimean
119 See for example Federal Constitutional Law No. 3-FKZ “On introducing amendments into Article 12-1 of the
Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the formation of
new constituent entities within the Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol’”,
25 December 2018 (Annex 114).
120 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Information note on measures taken to implement the Decree No.
268 of the President of the Russian Federation and other activities aimed at promoting cultures of Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar peoples, as attached to the Letter No. 1/01-46/8775/3/1, 5 June 2020 (Annex 498), pp. 75-76.
121 Ibid.
122 Federal Law No. 421-FZ “On specifics of the legal regulation of relations pertaining to the provision of social
protection (support) measures, as well as compulsory social insurance payments to certain categories of citizens living
in the territories of the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol”, 22 December 2014 (Annex 76).
123 Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 35-ZRK/2014 “On measures of social support for certain categories of citizens
and persons living in the territory of the Republic of Crimea, 17 December 2014 (Annex 75).
124 See the Fund for presidential grants (Annex 1411). See also President of the Russian Federation official website,
“Meeting with representatives from Crimean ethnic groups’ public associations”, Yalta, 17 August 2015 (Annex 460),
http://en kremlin ru/events/president/news/50140.
125 Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision of 26 April 2016 of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea concerning the
appeal of the ban of the Mejlis (Annex 913 to MU), p. 4 and 20; Case No. 127-APG16-4, Decision of 29 September
2016 of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation concerning the appeal of the ban of the Mejlis (Annex 915 to
MU), p. 7. See further below at Chapter IV(IV)(A).
126 Decree of the Head of the Republic of Crimea No. 93-U “On establishing the Council of Crimean Tatars under the
Head of the Republic of Crimea”, 29 March 2018 (Annex 112). See further below, paras. 232-235.
25
Tatars”.127 In doing so, the Council is empowered to consult with all relevant stakeholders, public
and private.128
68. Among organs involved in supporting measures are the Council for Inter-ethnic Relations
under the President of the Russian Federation,129 the representative of the President of Russia in the
Southern Federal District,130 the State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of
Crimea,131 the Commission of the Republic of Crimea on the restoration of the rights of
rehabilitated victims of political repression.132 Substantial financial resources have been budgeted
yearly for the socio-economic development of the targeted peoples as part of their rehabilitation
under the Federal Target Program for the period till 2025 (from 10.36 million rubles in 2015 to
2.497 billion rubles in 2018 and 3.473 billion rubles in 2022).133
69. Improvements in the field of housing include an active construction and acquisition process
of facilities for the needs of formerly deported people, including Crimean Tatars. For instance:
a. In 2016-2017, 4,355 land plots were allocated to citizens included in the register of
citizens who had chosen a land plot for individual housing construction by actually
occupying it prior to the adoption of Federal Constitutional Law No. 6-FKZ “On the
127 Ibid. (Annex 112), Appendix 2, Articles 1.1, 2.1.
128 Ibid. (Annex 112), Appendix 2, Article 3.2.
129 Created by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 776 “On the Council for Inter-ethnic Relations
under the President of the Russian Federation”, 5 June 2012 (Annex 57); Official website:
https://sovetnational ru/sovet/. See also Witness Statement of Chingiz Fevzievich Yakubov, Rector of Fevzi Yakubov
Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University (Annex 8), paras. 32-33.
130 Official website: http://ufo.gov.ru/.
131 Official website: https://gkmn rk.gov.ru/ru/index. See also Letter of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the
Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 18 January 2019 (Annex 483), paras. 62-65. The State Committee is an
active actor in adopting and implementing supporting and rehabilitation measures in Crimea, see for example the State
Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea official website, “Report on the activities of the State
Committee for 2016” (Annex 470).
132 Resolution of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea No. 379-1/14 “On formation of the Commission of the
Republic of Crimea on the restoration of the rights of rehabilitated victims of political repressions”, 24 December 2014
(Annex 77).
133 Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 790 adopting Federal Target Program “Social and
economic development of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol until 2020”, 11 August 2014 (Annex 72),
p. 84 of Appendix 3. This Program is expressly mentioned in Article 1(c) of Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation No. 268 (Annex 63), and the Decree is expressly referred to in the Program as a legal basis therefor. The
Program has been amended since its initial adoption. Its various versions (in Russian) may be consulted at
https://fcp.economy.gov ru/cgi-bin/cis/fcp.cgi/Fcp/ViewFcp/View/2020/429. For figures see Federal Target Program,
budgetary allocations on measures aimed at national, cultural and spiritual revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Italian,
Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and on social infrastructure development of the territories of the Republic of
Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, June 2021, https://faip.economy.gov ru/cgibin/
uis/faip.cgi/G1/ObjectHistory/51204252206082 (Annex 509).
26
admission of the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol into the
Russian Federation” of 21 March 2014.134
b. in 2018 an apartment block of 72 apartments and a preschool for 260 children were
completed, along with construction of elements of gas, electricity and water supply
infrastructure to provide services to 1100, 750 and 400 families, respectively.135
c. In 2019, local authorities acquired 47 housing properties for the rehabilitated people,
and provided 161 persons one-time financial assistance to complete construction of
their individual housing.136
70. Overall, 623 families from among the rehabilitated peoples of Crimea were provided with
their own housing over the course of 2015-2019, and 600 individuals received financial support for
home construction.137
71. As part of social and health improvement measures, it should be noted that over the past 5
years 4,625 persons who had suffered from political repressions (including Crimean Tatars)
received documents confirming their right to a social safety net.138 With respect to health, a
Consultative and Diagnostic Center for the Needs of Deported Peoples and two specialized old
people’s homes for Crimean Tatars operate in Simferopol.139
72. Russia has further taken diverse measures and regulations in relation to education in native
language.140 For example, in 2015-2016, 46,686,300 rubles from the Crimean budget were allocated
for the translation and printing of over 63 textbook titles and in 2018, about 49,747,200 rubles were
allocated for the translation and printing of further 36 textbook titles, mainly printed in the Crimean
Tatar language, but also including the Ukrainian language.141 Higher educational programs have
134 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Information note on measures taken to implement the Decree No.
268 of the President of the Russian Federation and other activities aimed at promoting cultures of Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar peoples, as attached to the Letter No. 1/01-46/8775/3/1, 5 June 2020 (Annex 498), p. 66 et seq.
135 Information from the official website of the State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens of
the Republic of Crimea on activities of the Committee in 2018,
https://gkmn.rk.gov.ru/uploads/gkmn/attachments//d4/1d/8c/d98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/phpOnX3ms_2.pdf (Annex
486), p. 4.
136 State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, Report on implementation of the State
Program of the Republic of Crimea on strengthening the unity of the Russian Nation and ethnocultural development of
the peoples of the Russian Federation “The Republic of Crimea - the territory of inter-ethnic harmony” for 2019 (Annex
485), p. 2.
137 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Information note on measures taken to implement the Decree No.
268 of the President of the Russian Federation and other activities aimed at promoting cultures of Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar peoples, as attached to the Letter No. 1/01-46/8775/3/1, 5 June 2020 (Annex 498), p. 70.
138 Ibid.
139 Consultative and Diagnostic Center for the Needs of Deported Peoples at https://mcdep ru/, and Nursing home for
old people and persons with disabilities from among Crimean Tatars, http://geriat ru/о-филиале, both in Simferopol.
140 See Chapter V below.
141 See Chapter V below. Also see List of textbooks prepared and published in 2015-2016, List of textbooks supplied
to educational institutions of the Republic of Crimea in 2018, and List of textbooks supplied to educational institutions
27
been developed to offer, among others, “Crimean Tatar language and literature” and “Ukrainian
language and literature”. They also provide students with the possibility to prepare candidate and
doctoral theses on Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages issues.142 A Youth Centre of Multi-
Ethnic Culture, for the benefit of all Crimean ethnic groups, including Ukrainians and Crimean
Tatars, is being constructed as part of the federal program.143 The Centre is planned to be an
international scientific, cultural, and educational platform for students. The Centre should consist of
living facilities, sports forum, classes for workshops and a library. The Centre will operate under the
auspices of the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University in Simferopol.
73. Additionally, and more generally, for the past seven years, hundreds of ethnic and cultural
events have been held in Crimea on an annual basis, among them art contests, festivals and concerts
aimed at the preservation, multiplication, popularization of the cultural heritage of the Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian peoples.144 The authorities have taken steps to officially recognize Crimean
Tatar public holidays, among others, and provide for their observance.145
74. In relation to the media, the Crimean authorities have been taking various initiatives to
develop the capacities of Crimean Tatar TV and radio channels and to support the activities of
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian media outlets in Crimea, as explained elsewhere in the present
Counter-Memorial.146
75. When it comes to permanent residency and citizenship,147 on the accession of Crimea to
Russia, a transitional period enabled Crimeans to opt for the citizenship or citizenships of their
of the Republic of Crimea in 2019, in Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No.
01-15/1294, 24 June 2021 (Annex 450).
142 Witness Statement of
Annex 10), para 29; See also Taurida Academy of the Vernadsky Crimean Federal University,
Student newspaper, Issue No. 11, 2016 (Annex 1062), pp. 4-5.
143 Witness
(Annex 8), para. 29.
144 In 2018 alone, more than 300 ethnic and cultural events were held – see Information from the official website of
the State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens of the Republic of Crimea on activities of the
Committee in 2018, https://gkmn rk.gov.ru/uploads/gkmn/attachments//d4/1d/8c/d98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/
phpOnX3ms_2.pdf (Annex 486), p. 5-6; Table of some cultural events held in the Republic of Crimea as part of the
work to promote, develop and preserve the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian cultures for 2014-2021 (Annex 501); Council
of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Information note on measures taken to implement the Decree No. 268 of the
President of the Russian Federation and other activities aimed at promoting cultures of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
peoples, as attached to the Letter No. 1/01-46/8775/3/1, 5 June 2020 (Annex 498), pp. 1-12, 23-66, 82-116.
145 Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 55-ZRK “On public holidays and memorable dates in the Republic of Crimea”,
29 December 2014 (Annex 78). It notably officially consecrates 18 May as the day of memory of victims of
deportation, obviously referring to the date of the Sürgün in 1944. See also the Crimean Tatar national holiday
“Hidirlez” held annually in May: Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University official website,
“Hidirlez - all-Crimean spring holiday!”, 10 May 2017 (Annex 1069).
146 See Appendix E, para. 25-26; see examples of media available in the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages in
Crimea: Arzy, No. 13-14, 2020 (Annex 1117); Yildiz, No. 1 (259), 2021 (Annex 1153); Krymskiy visnik, No. 1, 2020
(Annex 1118); Krym syogodni, No. 1 (4), 2021 (Annex 1163); see also the Ukrainian and Russian languages Internet
Portal “Pereyaslavska Rada 2.0” (http://pereyaslavskayarada.com/).
147 See Chapter VI(III) and Appendix C(I).
28
choice, including acquiring or relinquishing Russian citizenship, and retaining or relinquishing
Ukrainian citizenship. This regime secured the position of persons who were otherwise unable to
produce the relevant documentation and benefited those Crimean Tatars who had resettled in
Crimea without Ukraine properly addressing their situation.
76. In respect of cultural heritage, Ukraine’s claim purporting to describe the restoration of the
Khan’s Palace as cultural erasure is fundamentally a supporting measure to the Crimean Tatar
community. Russia recognized the Palace, together with some other Crimean sites, as cultural
heritage of federal significance,148 thus providing them with the same level of protection as other
renowned Russian sites like the Kremlin.149 In light of this, the decision to call for and to finance
the renovation of the site (benefiting from an allocation of almost 2 billion rubles)150 can hardly be
seen as reflecting an intent to destroy it or to discriminate against Crimean Tatars. Rather, it was a
supporting measure aimed to ensure efficient preservation of the site after Ukraine failed to do so
for 23 years.151
77. Similarly, Russia has supported Crimean Tatars’ endeavours – which Ukraine had stalled for
the last two decades – to build the Simferopol Cathedral Mosque, which is planned to be the largest
in the region, accommodating around 4,000 people.152 At its construction site, the three flags –
Russian, Crimean and Crimean Tatar – wave side by side as a demonstration of respect and unity.153
78. The above-mentioned description of supporting measures is by no means exhaustive.154 It
suffices, however, to show how unfounded Ukraine’s allegations are and reflects the strong
commitment of Russia to protect and care for all citizens and communities in Crimea without any
racial discrimination and to secure the advancement of Crimean Tatars as well as ethnic Ukrainians.
148 Order of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 2073-r approving the List of cultural heritage sites of
federal significance located in the territory of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, 17 October 2015
(Annex 92).
149 See Information from the Unified State Register of Cultural Heritage Sites (Historical and Cultural Monuments) of
the Peoples of the Russian Federation, entries for the “Moscow Kremlin” and the “Khan’s Palace” (Annex 1319). Both
complexes are classified as objects of cultural heritage of federal significance, the highest level of protection and
significance under Russian law.
150 TASS, “Palace of the Crimean Khans in the Crimean Bakhchisaray will be restored in 2022”, 6 December 2020
(Annex 1035).
151 Witness statement of ,
, 9 June 2021 (Annex
20), paras. 22-26.
152 Witness Statement of , 9 June 2021 (Annex 19), paras. 35-38. For further supporting
measures in the religious field, see OSCE Human dimension implementation meeting (Warsaw, 16-27 September
2019), Written Contribution by the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Crimea, HDIM.CS/0404/19/EN, 24 September
2019 (Annex 835).
153 See Witness Statement of (Annex 19), para. 38, photograph 2.
154 For additional examples of measures, see for instance CERD Committee, 93th session, Summary record of the
2553rd meeting held on 4 August 2017, UN Doc. CERD/C/SR.2553, para. 24 (Lukiyantsev); Statement by Mr
Alexander Lukashevich, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, at the 1186th meeting of the OSCE
Permanent Council, “On the anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars”, Doc. PC.DEL/630/18, 17 May 2018
(Annex 481).
29
79. Ukraine fails to explain how Russia could possibly since 2014 adopt and implement such
numerous supporting measures that specifically benefit the Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians
while in parallel (supposedly) plan and carry out a systematic campaign or policy of political and
cultural erasure through racial discrimination that targets the very same groups. The obvious
conclusion is that the two simply did not, and could not, both be taking place.
80. In contrast to Ukraine’s attempt to present a falsified picture of the situation, the measures
taken by Russia have been praised by Crimean Tatars throughout Crimea, who for the first time feel
that their voice is being heard and that their core problems (including for example integration,
access to land, means to preserve their identity) are being taken into account.155
81. In fact, when placed in the perspective of the recent decades, the series of supporting
measures is unprecedented and represents a huge improvement for these communities. By contrast,
Ukraine even denied at times that CERD was applicable to the situation in Crimea, including to the
situation of Crimean Tatars living there.156 In light of this, Ukraine’s spectacular U-turn on the
relevance of CERD for purposes of the present case appears quite extraordinary. Thanks to the
supporting measures carried out by Russia, the welfare, prosperity, development and standard of
living of Crimean Tatars and of the population as a whole have increased in Crimea since 2014
much more than what they were for 23 years under Ukrainian sovereignty. In that context, the
Mejlis’s and Ukraine’s propaganda alleging Crimean Tatars’ fear of living under Russian
sovereignty and of a new Sürgün, is obviously false and offensive.
155 RIA Novosti Krym, “Crimean Tatars named important results of the rehabilitation decree”, 20 April 2019 (Annex
1004). See also various Statements of representatives of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities at pp. 167-179
of the Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on
Provisional Measures (Annex 1267). In particular, in his Statement made during the OSCE Human dimension
implementation meeting (Warsaw, 19-30 September 2016), deputy mufti of Crimea Ayder Ismailov described some of
the supporting measures taken by the Russian Federation and observed: “In the last 23 years in the Ukrainian times no
laws on rehabilitation or restoration of the indigenous peoples, the Crimean Tatars, were adopted in Ukraine” (see ibid.,
at pp. 179-180).
156 See below, para. 112.
30
THE CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE COURT’S
PREVIOUS DECISIONS IN THE PRESENT CASE
82. Russia’s position on the merits in the present proceedings is formulated by reference to the
Court’s findings on plausibility at the stage of provisional measures (I) and the scope of the Court’s
jurisdiction as established in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections which clarified and limited the
subject-matter and scope of Ukraine’s claims (II). On the other hand, the Court took no position on
the interpretation and scope of the specific rights invoked by Ukraine under CERD, which thus
remains a matter to be addressed at the present stage of the proceedings (III).
The Court’s Findings on Plausibility at the Stage of Provisional Measures
83. Examining Ukraine’s claims at the stage of provisional measures on the basis of a large
number of materials submitted by both Parties, the Court found Ukraine’s allegations to be largely
implausible. With regard to the (only) two allegations in respect to which it indicated provisional
measures, namely the banning of the Mejlis and the alleged restrictions on the educational rights of
ethnic Ukrainians, the Court merely stated that “it appears that [these acts] fulfil th[e] condition of
plausibility.”157 As results from this finding, all other claims do not even have the appearance of
plausibility.
84. This is the case in particular of Ukraine’s request that “[t]he Russian Federation shall refrain
from any act of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons, or institutions in the
territory under its effective control, including the Crimean peninsula” and that “[t]he Russian
Federation shall take all necessary steps to halt the disappearance of Crimean Tatar individuals and
to promptly investigate those disappearances that have already occurred”.158 Nor did the Court
indicate any provisional measure with respect to education in the Crimean Tatar language.159 This
shows a fortiori that Ukraine had made no plausible claim that a campaign of systematic racial
discrimination is attributable to Russia.
85. Even the two limited provisional measures indicated by the Court are not identical to those
requested by Ukraine and were not granted on the same basis. The Court indeed concluded that
“having considered the terms of the provisional measures requested by Ukraine and the
157 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 104 (“Order of 19 April 2017”), para. 83
(emphasis added).
158 Ukraine’s Request for the indication of provisional measures of 16 January 2017, para. 24(b) and (d); Order of 19
April 2017, para. 14(b) and (d).
159 While Ukraine did not request the Court to order a provisional measure in this regard, it nevertheless made a claim
that the Russian Federation allegedly “suppressed educational rights” of Crimean Tatars, see Order of 19 April 2017,
para. 34.
31
circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the measures to be indicated need not be identical to
those requested”.160 Such discrepancies are not without consequences on the plausibility of each of
these claims.
(i) First, whereas Ukraine requested the Court to order that “[t]he Russian Federation
shall cease and desist from acts of political and cultural suppression against the
Crimean Tatar people, including suspending the decree banning the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People and refraining from enforcement of this decree and any similar
measures, while this case is pending”,161 the Court only indicated that Russia must,
in accordance with its obligations under CERD, “[r]efrain from maintaining or
imposing limitations on the ability of the Crimean Tatar community to conserve its
representative institutions, including the Mejlis”.162 This measure ordered by the
Court did not uphold Ukraine’s description of the ban of the Mejlis as being part of a
series of acts of “political and cultural suppression against the Crimean Tatar
people”.
(ii) Second, while Ukraine requested the Court to order that “[t]he Russian Federation
shall cease and desist from acts of political and cultural suppression against the
ethnic Ukrainian people in Crimea, including suspending restrictions on Ukrainianlanguage
education and respecting ethnic Ukrainian language and educational rights,
while this case is pending”,163 the Court limited its Order to indicating that Russia
must “[e]nsure the availability of education in the Ukrainian language”.164 Again,
this does not amount to, and is very far from, a finding of plausibility of the
existence of an alleged systematic campaign or policy of political and cultural
suppression.
86. While plausibility is not the standard to assess a case at the merits stage, Ukraine’s
Memorial brings no new convincing evidence that could advance Ukraine’s case beyond the
position at the stage of provisional measures. Ukraine’s claims do not correspond to, and are
manifestly not supported by, the relevant facts as will be confirmed by Chapters IV to VI below.
160 Order of 19 April 2017, para. 101.
161 Ukraine’s Request for the indication of provisional measures of 16 January 2017, para. 24(c); Order of 19 April
2017, para. 14(c).
162 Order of 19 April 2017, para. 106(1)(a).
163 Ukraine’s Request for the indication of provisional measures of 16 January 2017, para. 24(e); Order of 19 April
2017, para. 14(e).
164 Order of 19 April 2017, para. 106(1)(b).
32
The Clarification and Limitation of the Subject-Matter and Scope of Ukraine’s Claims
87. The Court has identified the subject-matter of the present dispute and defined the scope of
its jurisdiction as regards Ukraine’s claims on two occasions.
88. First, in its Order on Provisional Measures of 19 April 2017, the Court noted that “Ukraine
contends that, following the purported annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014, the
Russian Federation has used its control over this territory to impose a policy of Russian ethnic
dominance, ‘pursuing the cultural erasure of non-Russian communities through a systematic and
ongoing campaign of discrimination’.”165
89. Second, the Judgment on Preliminary Objections of 8 November 2019 confirmed that “the
case before the Court is limited in scope”.166 It is limited
(i) ratione temporis to events that occurred “from the spring of 2014”,167 onwards;
(ii) ratione loci to “the situation in Crimea”;168 and
(iii) ratione materiae to an alleged systematic campaign of ethnic discrimination in
violation of CERD. The Court stressed in particular that “Ukraine’s claims are
based solely upon CERD”169 – to the exclusion, therefore, of any rules of
international law enshrined in other treaties or customary international law such as
rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) – and it concluded that “the subjectmatter
of the dispute […] is whether the Russian Federation breached its
obligations under CERD through discriminatory measures allegedly taken against
the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea.”170
90. More specifically, the question now to be addressed by the Court at the merits stage of the
proceedings is limited to “whether the Russian Federation has actually engaged in the campaign of
racial discrimination alleged by Ukraine”.171 The narrow but grave subject-matter of the dispute is
also expressed through equivalent allegations noted by the Court, such as “a campaign directed at
depriving the Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea of their political, civil, economic,
social and cultural rights”,172 a “campaign of cultural erasure”173 and a “systematic campaign of
165 Order of 19 April 2017, para. 33.
166 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019, p. 558 (“Judgment of 8 November 2019”), para. 23.
167 Ibid. See also para. 130.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid., para. 32.
171 Ibid., para. 131 (emphasis added). See also paras. 88, 126, 130.
172 Ibid., para. 26.
33
racial discrimination”,174 or “a policy and practice of racial discrimination against those
communities”.175
91. The Court’s Judgment in this respect reflects the description of the dispute as described in
Ukraine’s Memorial – which presents its claim as having three limbs as set out in Chapter 8 entitled
“The Russian Federation’s Campaign of Cultural Erasure in Crimea”, Chapter 9 entitled “The
Russian Federation’s Policy of Discrimination in Political and Civil Affairs” and Chapter 10
entitled “The Russian Federation’s Policy of Cultural Discrimination and Suppression”. Equally,
inter alia,
paragraph 3 of Ukraine’s Memorial accuses Russia of leading a “policy of racial
discrimination and cultural erasure directed against those ethnic communities that
dared to oppose its purported annexation of the peninsula”;
paragraph 15 alleges “an open campaign of discrimination and cultural erasure directed
against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities”; or
paragraph 22 denounces “systematic breaches of [Russia’s] obligations under […]
CERD” and “a systematic policy of racial discrimination”.176
92. The seriousness of these accusations, which the Court has taken note of in its Judgment of 8
November 2019, has consequences both on the nature of the alleged wrongful acts to be established
by Ukraine177 and on the required standard of proof.178
93. To constitute such a campaign or policy of systematic racial discrimination, the measures
allegedly taken by Russia must constitute intentional acts of racial discrimination of a systematic
nature. As the Court noted, “[i]t is the Applicant’s position that these measures were principally
aimed against the ethnic groups of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea and had
the ‘purpose and/or effect’ of disproportionately affecting these communities less favourably than
other ethnic groups in Crimea.”179 All these elements, combined with the requirements of Article
1(1) of CERD,180 must be cumulatively proven, namely:
(1) the systematic nature of “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin” (A),181
173 Ibid., para. 88.
174 Ibid., paras. 27 and 126.
175 Ibid., para. 26. See also notably para. 88.
176 See also MU, paras. 27, 341, 347, 388, 389, 392, 587.
177 See below, section II(A) to (C).
178 See above, para. 4.
179 Judgment of 8 November 2019, para. 88.
180 See below, para. 109.
181 Article 1(1) of CERD.
34
(2) the disproportionate effect on Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities (as compared
to persons of other ethnic origin or other residents in a similar situation) (B),
(3) as a result of the intent to specifically and “directly target” these communities “as
such”182 (in other words, the victims must be “targeted by reason of their membership”183 in a
national or ethnic group) (C).
A. THE SYSTEMATIC NATURE OF THE ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION
94. In the present case, Ukraine does not – and cannot, both on the facts and because of issues of
admissibility – challenge individual instances of alleged racial discrimination. This is so for an
obvious reason: the absence of exhaustion of local remedies would have barred as inadmissible such
claims in the present case. Ukraine must accordingly now prove a “pattern of conduct of the
Russian Federation”,184 that is, “the non-accidental repetition of similar […] conduct on a regular
basis”,185 engaged into as part of a campaign, that is “an organized course of action to achieve a
goal”.186 Indeed, such an alleged intentional pattern is the reason why the Court dismissed Russia’s
preliminary objection regarding the application of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies. After
noting
“that, according to Ukraine, the Russian Federation has engaged in a sustained campaign
of racial discrimination, carried out through acts repeated over an appreciable period of
time starting in 2014, against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea[,
t]he Court also notes that the individual instances to which Ukraine refers in its
submissions emerge as illustrations of the acts by which the Russian Federation has
allegedly engaged in a campaign of racial discrimination. It follows, in the view of the
Court, that, in filing its Application under Article 22 of CERD, Ukraine does not adopt the
cause of one or more of its nationals, but challenges, on the basis of CERD, the alleged
pattern of conduct of the Russian Federation with regard to the treatment of the Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea. In view of the above, the Court concludes that
182 See CERD Committee, A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark, Communication No. 37/2006, CERD/C/71/D/37/2006, 8 August
2007 (Annex 799 to MU), para. 6.2.
183 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 2 August 2001
(Annex 993 to MU), para. 561.
184 Judgment of 8 November 2019, paras. 126 and 130 (emphasis added).
185 ECCC, Case 002-02, Judgment of 16 November 2018, para. 303; ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges of
30 September 2008, para. 397; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Appeals
Chamber, Judgement of 12 June 2002, para. 94, upholding Trial Judgement of 22 February 2001, para. 429; ICTR,
Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment of 21
May 1999, para. 123; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment of 2
September 1998, para. 580.
186 Oxford Dictionary, Definition of “campaign” at https://www.lexico.com/definition/Campaign.
35
the rule of exhaustion of local remedies does not apply in the circumstances of the present
case.”187
95. In the words of the International Law Commission (ILC), and as follows from its ordinary
meaning, “the term ‘systematic’ excludes isolated or unconnected acts”188 which are “not
committed as part of a broader [preconceived] plan or policy”;189 or put positively, “[t]o be regarded
as systematic, a violation would have to be carried out in an organized and deliberate way”;190 thus,
“evidence of a pattern or methodical plan”191 to carry out the violations must be adduced.
96. Therefore, to assess Ukraine’s claims on the merits, the Court must consider, and Ukraine
must evidence, the existence of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous
and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or
system. This requires the Court to determine in particular the scope and number of measures, their
primary object and their circumstances, their occurrence in several locations, whether or not they
are interconnected, the means and methods used, the gravity of their consequences, the participation
of officials or authorities whose actions can be attributed to Russia, the number of victims, as well
as the intent to violate the norm.192 At the same time, the existence of an objective or reasonable
basis for individual measures constitutes evidence that such measures do not form part of a
discriminatory pattern.
B. THE DISPROPORTIONATE EFFECT OF THE ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION ON CRIMEAN TATAR AND
UKRAINIAN COMMUNITIES AS COMPARED TO OTHERS
97. Furthermore, Ukraine must establish “a differentiation of treatment” on the one hand and
“an unjustifiable disparate impact” upon an ethnic group as such on the other hand for the
187 Judgment of 8 November 2019, para. 130.
188 Draft articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity with commentaries, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2019, vol. II, Part Two, A/74/10, p. 33, para. (15) of the commentary to Article 2.
189 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II, Part Two, p. 47, para. (3) of the commentary to Article 18.
190 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 113, para. (8) of the commentary to Article 40.
191 Draft articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity with commentaries, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2019, vol. II, Part Two, p. 33, para. (15) of the commentary to Article 2. See also Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1991,
vol. II, Part Two, p. 103, para. (3) of the commentary to Article 21; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a “Dule”,
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgment of 7 May 1997, para. 648.
192 See in this sense the factors taken into account to establish the “widespread or systematic” element of crimes
against humanity and to explain the expression “directed against” in ICTY, Kunarac et al., Appeal Judgement of 12
June 2002, paras. 91 and 95; as well as the factors to establish a systematic breach in Draft articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001,
vol. II, Part Two, p. 113, para. (8) of the commentary to Article 40.
36
provisions of the Convention to apply.193 Indeed, the comparability test lies at the heart of the
principle of non-discrimination.194 This, in particular, is the reason why reliable statistical data have
been important in the work and practice of the CERD Committee195 and the same, of course, holds
true for enabling the Court to decide on Ukraine’s allegations. Still, as the Court put it in its 2021
Judgment on Preliminary Objections in the Qatar v. UAE case, CERD “was clearly not intended to
cover every instance of differentiation between persons” but to “condemn[] any attempt to
legitimize racial discrimination by invoking the superiority of one social group over another”.196
Accordingly, it is not sufficient to claim, as Ukraine does, that members of an ethnic group have
been affected by the alleged measures;197 nor is the mere identification of a disproportionate effect
of measures on an ethnic group sufficient to establish Ukraine’s case. Rather, Ukraine “must
identify an appropriate comparator”198 and establish that Russia has adopted measures which
discriminate against Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities as a distinct social group as
compared to persons of other ethnic origin or other residents that find themselves in a similar
situation. In other words, it falls on Ukraine to carry out a genuine comparative exercise in respect
of each allegation in order to establish the existence of an unjustified differential treatment in
comparison with the rest of the population or other relevant sections thereof in comparable
circumstances. In the context of diplomatic relations, the Court recently applied a similar test to
determine whether a State acted in a “discriminatory manner” and it concluded that the claimant
had failed to demonstrate the existence of such conduct by the respondent.199
98. In addition, inasmuch as a measure can be reasonably justified or deemed legitimate, it does
not qualify as discriminatory.200 Possible justifications include, among others, reasonable
limitations to human and/or civil rights as may be necessary in a democratic society, provided for
under applicable law and subject to due process, in order to protect public order from acts such as
193 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14, para. 2 (Annex 788 to MU). See also for instance, mutatis
mutandis, ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia, No. 55707/00, Judgment (GC), 18 February 2009, para. 81: “discrimination
means treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in similar situations.”
194 See L. Hennebel, H. Tigroudja, Traité de droit international des droits de l’homme, Pedone (Paris), 2016, pp. 757
et seq.
195 See L.-A. Sicilianos, “L’actualité et les potentialités de la Convention sur l’élimination de la discrimination
raciale”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, Vol. 2005(61), 2005, p. 873.
196 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 4 February 2021, para. 87.
197 CERD Committee, A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark, Communication No. 37/2006, Opinion, UN Doc.
CERD/C/71/D/37/2006, 8 August 2007, para. 7 (Annex 799 to MU). See also CERD Committee, General
Recommendation No. 14, para. 2 (Annex 788 to MU).
198 I. Diaconu, Racial Discrimination, Eleven International Publishing, 2011, p. 33.
199 See Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), merits, Judgment, 11 December 2020,
para. 115.
200 See fn. 193. See also CERD Committee, 66th session, Sefic v. Denmark, Communication No. 32/2003, Opinion,
UN Doc. CERD/C/66/D/32/2003, 7 March 2005, para. 7.2 (referring to “reasonable and objective grounds”).
37
terrorism, extremism, etc.201 In fact, enabling the undermining of the public order could generate
ethnic tensions. Further, special measures taken for the advancement of certain ethnic groups are
not forbidden by the Convention.202 In the present case, Russia has never pursued racial
discrimination, let alone a campaign of racial discrimination. On the contrary, it has provided
support for the Crimean Tatar and other communities in Crimea who suffered from repression
during the Soviet time such as economic incentives, as well as various other kinds of supporting
measures, like social and cultural support for all ethnic groups, including Ukrainians.203
C. THE INTENTIONAL NATURE OF UKRAINE’S ALLEGATIONS
99. Despite Ukraine’s affirmation that the definition of racial discrimination “does not require
that discrimination be intentional”,204 Ukraine’s case, by its very nature and as correctly recorded by
the Court in the Judgment of 8 November 2019, is based on the existence of a specific intent or
purpose. In fact, as noted above,205 any alleged “systematic” “campaign” or “policy” “aimed” or
“directed against” the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities – a vocabulary ingrained all over
Ukraine’s Memorial206 – cannot be conducted without an underlying intent. The intent that Ukraine
seeks to attribute to Russia is actually two-fold: specifically, Ukraine contends that “[t]he desired
end result is as transparent as it is abhorrent to the multi-ethnic heritage of Crimea: the cultural
erasure of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities on the peninsula”;207 and more generally,
Ukraine’s whole case – including the submissions relating both to ICSFT and to CERD – is based
on the assumption of the existence of an overarching policy strategy or plan aiming at Russia’s
hegemony in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.208
100. Russia notes that Ukraine’s Memorial also includes some sparse, vague and unspecified
references to the expression “purpose or effect” of Article 1(1) of CERD, but with no attempt to
connect such to the facts.209 Even its allegations of pretextual measures210 assume the existence of
201 See for instance CERD Committee, 83rd Session, General Recommendation No. 35 on combating racist hate
speech, UN Doc. CERD/C/GC/35, 26 September 2013, para. 26: “The right to freedom of expression is not unlimited
but carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but only if they
are provided by law and are necessary for protection of the rights or reputations of others and for the protection of
national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.”
202 CERD, Article 1(4).
203 See above, Chapter I(II).
204 MU, para. 566 (emphasis added). See also Expert Report of Professor Sandra Fredman (Annex 22 to MU), para. 4
(inter alia).
205 At para. 93.
206 See in particular the quotes above at paras. 3 and 90-91.
207 MU, para. 346.
208 See ibid.: “[f]ollowing its unlawful occupation of Crimea, the Russian Federation now seeks to entrench Russian
dominance there”. See also MU, para. 8; Application, paras. 1-5.
209 MU, paras. 343, 566 and 587.
210 See e.g. MU, paras. 30, 426, 446, 449, 454, 511, 513, 595, 608, 619, 621 and 639.
38
direct discrimination, because the pretext is meant to hide a discriminatory intent. What is at issue
in Ukraine’s allegations is not the mere existence of “collateral or secondary effects”211 on the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities, but the alleged (disguised) intent behind these measures
that are considered by Ukraine as forming part of a systematic campaign of racial discrimination.
101. In addition, each of the specific acts of discrimination alleged by Ukraine (and listed by the
Court in its 2019 Judgment) require, by their nature, that Ukraine establish intent to commit them as
part of a systematic policy. This is so in respect to:
“targeted murders and acts of torture; forced disappearances and abductions; arbitrary
searches and detentions; the imposition of Russian citizenship on the residents of Crimea;
and the ban on the Mejlis […] imposing restrictions on Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian media
outlets; the degradation of their cultural heritage; the suppression of culturally significant
gatherings of these communities; and the suppression of minority rights relating to
education, and in particular restrictions placed on education in the Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian languages.”212
102. The Court must thus decide the case on the basis of the alleged “intentional or purposeful
discrimination”213 as put forward by Ukraine itself, not more, not less. Indeed, in accordance with
the principle ne ultra petita notably affirmed by the Court in the Asylum (Request for
Interpretation) case, “it is the duty of the Court not only to reply to the questions as stated in the
final submissions of the parties, but also to abstain from deciding points not included in those
submissions”.214 Ukraine framed its case as a case of intentional or purposeful discrimination which
thus forms the exclusive subject-matter of its Application and of the dispute as defined by the Court
in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections of 8 November 2019. It is therefore the only question
pending before the Court. Yet, as will be more precisely shown in the following Chapters, there is
no evidence at all of the requisite intent or purpose in the present case.
The Court Took No Position on the Interpretation and Scope of the Specific Rights
Invoked by Ukraine under CERD
103. The Judgment of 8 November 2019 did not consider all the questions relating to the scope of
CERD as set out in Russia’s Preliminary Objections at paragraphs 294 to 359. The Court’s
determination of its jurisdiction ratione materiae under the Convention consists of just three
paragraphs specifying what it did and did not need to do at the jurisdictional stage of the
211 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 4 February 2021, para. 112.
212 Judgment of 8 November 2019, para. 88; see MU, paras. 600-641.
213 MU, para. 566.
214 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru),
Judgment, 27 November 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402.
39
proceedings. Importantly, paragraph 94 of the Judgment implies that at the merits phase the Court
will
“need to satisfy itself that the measures of which Ukraine complains actually constitute
‘racial discrimination’ within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD [… and …]
need to establish whether, and, if so, to what extent, certain acts [are] covered by Article 1,
paragraphs 2 and 3, of CERD. Both determinations concern issues of fact, largely
depending on evidence regarding the purpose or effect of the measures alleged by Ukraine,
and are thus properly a matter for the merits”.215
104. Indeed, the 2019 Judgment limited itself to asserting that “taking into account the broadly
formulated rights and obligations contained in the Convention […] and the non-exhaustive list of
rights in Article 5, […] the measures of which Ukraine complains […] are capable of having an
adverse effect on the enjoyment of certain rights protected under CERD”,216 without further
analysis.
105. As pointed out by Judge Donoghue,
“[the] Judgment does not set out the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of CERD on
which the Applicant relies. The rejection of the preliminary objection in relation to CERD
does not mean that the Court has accepted the interpretations of that treaty advanced by the
Applicant. The question whether the acts of which the Applicant complains give rise to
violations of CERD will depend on interpretations of CERD to be made when the Court
addresses the merits, as well as the Court’s conclusions on the evidence.”217
106. As regards the interpretation of the specific rights invoked by Ukraine, Russia refers the
Court to, and reiterates, its argumentation in its Preliminary Objections,218 in particular to the points
which the Judgment summarises as follows (without drawing any conclusions or providing any
answers):
“81. [… T]he claims that [Russia] discriminated between citizens and non-citizens[219] are
beyond the scope of CERD, in so far as they are incompatible with Article 1, paragraphs 2
and 3, of the Convention, which expressly excludes from its scope ‘distinctions,
exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between
citizens and non-citizens’, and does not affect ‘in any way the legal provisions of States
Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization’.
82. [… A] number of rights invoked by Ukraine are not protected under CERD. […]
Ukraine’s argument that Article 5 of CERD includes a right ‘to return to one’s country’,
215 Judgment of 8 November 2019, para. 94.
216 Ibid., para. 96 (emphasis added).
217 Ibid., Separate opinion of Judge Donoghue, para. 26. See also Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka, paras. 13-14.
218 See in particular PORF, paras. 323-331. See also further, Chapters IV to VI and Appendices A to F.
219 MU, paras. 455-476, 612, 616-618, 624, or 626.
40
allegedly breached by Russian citizenship laws, was only made to circumvent Article 1 of
the Convention, since such a right is not protected under CERD unless the person
concerned is subject to racial discrimination within the meaning of the Convention. On this
basis, […] the alleged imposition of Russian citizenship in Crimea could not be a breach of
CERD.
83. In relation to the ban on the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, […] the political right
of the Crimean Tatars to retain their representative institutions is not protected under
Article 5, paragraphs (c) and (e), of CERD, as those provisions protect only individual and
not collective, political rights.
84. [… T]he right to education and training, to which Article 5, paragraph (e) (v), of
CERD refers, does not guarantee an absolute right to be educated in one’s native language,
since this provision only aims to ensure the right of everyone to have access to a national
educational system, irrespective of ethnic origin.[220]”221
Russia will further develop these points below in Chapters IV to VI and Appendices A to F in light
of the merits.
107. In this regard, it is worth recalling that according to the CERD Committee,
“Article 5 of the Convention, apart from requiring a guarantee that the exercise of human
rights shall be free from racial discrimination, does not of itself create civil, political,
economic, social or cultural rights, but assumes the existence and recognition of these
rights. The Convention obliges States to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in the
enjoyment of such human rights”.222
108. In conclusion, at the present stage of the proceedings, the Court will need to address both the
interpretation of CERD and the evidence on the facts.
220 See also in this sense Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
16 December 1966, UNTS, vol. 993, p. 3 and Article 5.1(c) of the Convention against Discrimination in Education,
14 December 1960, UNTS, vol. 429, p. 100.
221 Judgment of 8 November 2019, paras. 81-86.
222 CERD Committee, 48th session, General Recommendation No. 20 (48) on Article 5 of the Convention,
UN Doc. CERD/48/Misc.6/Rev.2, 1996, para. 1.
41
THE PROPER DEFINITION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER CERD
109. CERD does not protect human rights in general, in and by themselves. Its application is
limited to racial discrimination in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
According to Article 1, paragraph 1:
“In this Convention, the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean [(i)] any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference [(ii)] based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin [(iii)] which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, [(iv)] on an equal footing, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of
public life”.
110. It is for Ukraine to establish, in support of its allegations of systematic racial discrimination,
that each of the criteria listed in this provision are met with respect to each instance of alleged
systematic violation of CERD.223
111. While Russia refers the Court back to its Preliminary Objections dealing with the scope of
CERD, it wishes again to emphasize the second criteria relating to ethnicity and the fact that the list
of grounds of discrimination is exhaustive. In its 2021 Judgment on Preliminary Objections in the
Qatar v. UAE case, the Court confirmed that the “elements of the definition of racial discrimination,
as set out in Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention” – in particular “national or ethnic origin” –
are “characteristics that are inherent at birth”,224 and it accordingly concluded that measures based
on nationality or “declarations criticizing a State or its policies cannot be characterized as racial
discrimination within the meaning of CERD”.225 Also excluded are factors such as religion or
“political opinion”.226
112. From the outset, Russia wishes to make absolutely clear that it firmly condemns religious
discrimination or political persecution and does not condone or practice it either. However, these
matters do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case, which concerns
exclusively the application of CERD in Crimea. It is worth noting that Ukraine itself, embracing
223 See notably in this sense Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010,
para. 162: “in accordance with the well-established principle of onus probandi incumbit actori, it is the duty of the party
which asserts certain facts to establish the existence of such facts”. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1984, para. 101; UNHCR, Bordes and Temeharo v. France, Communication No. 645/1995, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995, 22 July 1996, para. 5.5; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez-Rodríguez v.
Honduras, Judgement on the Merits, 29 July 1988, para. 123; Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle
Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, para 45; Article 24(1) of the Rules of the
Iran–US Claims Tribunal.
224 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 4 February 2021, para. 81.
225 Ibid., para. 112. See also para. 105.
226 See below, paras. 119-122.
42
this distinction, has attempted in the past to exclude from scrutiny under CERD the situation in
Crimea before the Committee, arguing that the status of Crimean Tatars “was based not on issues of
nationality or race, but rather on political conflicts and that therefore it did not come within the
scope of the Convention.”227
113. As the Court noted in its Judgment of 8 November 2019, “both Parties agree that Crimean
Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea constitute ethnic groups protected under CERD.”228
However, it is apparent that, on its own terms, Ukraine’s case is not actually framed or substantiated
as a case of racial discrimination against Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities as an ethnic
group protected under CERD.
114. In fact, Ukraine wrongly attempts to import political opinions and the legal status of Crimea
in the definition of “ethnic groups” within the meaning of CERD. In particular, Ukraine defines the
Ukrainian community as an ethnic group in Crimea “encompassing both Ukrainian speakers and
others who self-identify as Ukrainian on civic grounds”,229 and who have “a shared outlook with
regards to Crimea remaining part of Ukraine’s sovereign territory and the importance of defending
individual freedoms”.230 In other words – still the words of Ukraine, “a key part of [their] identity
rests on the conception of Crimea as part of Ukraine”.231 Similarly, Ukraine contends that “[f]or the
community identifying as of Ukrainian ethnicity, such social identity and political beliefs may
include, since March 2014, the conviction that Crimea is part of Ukraine, and that the Russian
occupation of the peninsula is unlawful.”232 Ukraine also asserts that “[t]he Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian communities are, in part, defined by their loyalty to the principle that Crimea is part of
Ukraine’s sovereign territory and that Russia’s purported annexation of the peninsula is therefore
illegitimate”.233
115. The artificiality of Ukraine’s definition of ethnicity and racial discrimination is also apparent
from its allegation that Russia adopted “a policy of racial discrimination and cultural erasure
directed against those ethnic communities that dared to oppose its purported annexation of the
peninsula”,234 or that the alleged acts “were based on a racial or ethnic distinction, in that they
targeted members of the two communities known to oppose Russia’s annexation of Crimea, with
227 United Nations General Assembly, 48th Session, Official Records, Supplement No. 18, Report of the CERD
Committee on Ukraine’s 11th and 12th reports submitted under Article 9 of the Convention, UN Doc. A/48/18, 15
September 1993, para. 57, answering a concern by Members “that the human rights of the population of Pridnestrovye
had been violated and that the Crimean Tartar [sic] problem had not yet been solved” at para. 47.
228 Judgment of 8 November 2019, para. 95.
229 MU, para. 583. See also paras. 576 and 579.
230 Ibid., para. 584.
231 Ibid., para. 365.
232 Ibid., para. 585.
233 Ibid., para. 596.
234 Ibid., para. 3.
43
the purpose and/or effect of intimidating those communities into submission”.235 Ukraine further
insisted during the hearings on preliminary objections that what it has “alleged is that Russia is
collectively punishing the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities based on Russia’s
identification of these ethnic communities as a whole as hostile to annexation”, although it then
immediately seemed to concede that political (and religious) reasons cannot serve as a basis for
discrimination prohibited under CERD.236 All this confirms Russia’s point: Ukraine’s claims are not
based on race or ethnicity but on political opposition to the change of status of Crimea, which is
beyond the scope of the Convention.
116. Specific measures in respect of certain members of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
communities are also presented by Ukraine as motivated by their political opinions, while pro-
Russian sympathizers are purportedly protected. Ukraine offers no evidence of any other factors for
its accusations. This is particularly obvious in respect of all the measures described in Chapter 9 of
Ukraine’s Memorial, entitled “The Russian Federation’s Policy of Discrimination in Political and
Civil Affairs”,237 and the case, for instance, of Mr Umerov who Ukraine claims to have been the
victim of a violation of CERD, stating that he
“remained a strong voice for Crimean Tatars after Russia’s military intervention, giving
numerous interviews in which he forthrightly described the occupation and purported
annexation of the peninsula by Russia as a violation of international law. Given his
outspokenness on this issue of evident sensitivity to the Russian occupation authorities, it
is perhaps unsurprising that he became a target of their repressive tactics”.238
117. The materials put forward by Ukraine, including the OHCHR reports,239 nowhere refer to
alleged acts of “racial discrimination” nor to alleged breaches of CERD, but allege for instance that
“Most affected by these restrictions were individuals opposed to the March 2014
referendum or criticizing Russian Federation control of Crimea, such as journalists,
bloggers, supporters of the Mejlis, pro-Ukrainian and Maidan activists, as well as persons
with no declared political affiliation but advocating strict compliance with the tenets of
Islam, who are often accused of belonging to extremist groups banned in the Russian
Federation, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir”.240
235 Ibid., para. 393.
236 Hearings on Preliminary Objections, 4 June 2019, CR 2019/10, pp. 61-62, para. 23 (Koh) (emphasis in the
original).
237 See notably the case of Mr Chiygoz and the trial of “six other Crimean Tatar activists” (Witness Statement of
Akhtem Chiygoz, Annex 19 to MU, para. 22 – emphasis added), addressed below at Chapter IV, paras. 208-216.
238 MU, para. 437 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). See further examples in PORF, para. 352.
239 As to the limited value of the OHCHR reports in the present case, see above paras. 14-17.
240 OHCHR, “Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol (Ukraine)”, 25 September 2017 (Annex 759 to MU), para. 9 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted); see
also Witness Statement of Andriy Shchekun (Annex 13 to MU), paras. 13-17. See further PORF, para. 352.
44
118. In sum, Ukraine’s self-serving definition of ethnic groups that are to be identified by their
position on the status of Crimea is meant to dress up claims related to the status of Crimea as
constituting violations under CERD.
119. In its Memorial, Ukraine does not establish that under CERD ethnicity can be based on the
sharing of the same political opinions or that political opposition can seek protection under CERD.
The expert report attached to its Memorial does not point to any relevant State practice or case law
that would support this claim.241 Ukraine’s logic would stretch the scope of application of CERD
well beyond the ordinary meaning of the text of the Convention, the intent of its drafters and the
object and purpose of the Convention since it would result in converting any claim related to
political disputes into instances of racial discrimination. There is no doubt that the Convention
would not have received so many ratifications if such had been the understanding of the States at
the time of exercising their sovereign decision to become Parties to the Convention. Clearly,
ethnicity is not equivalent to political opposition.
120. As circumscribed by the Court in the Qatar v. UAE case, ethnicity is an “inherent”
characteristic, “a person’s bond to [an …] ethnic group at birth”.242 That excludes by definition any
relationship with political considerations. The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law accordingly characterises ethnicity as “a social status that permits the classification of groups
on the basis of cultural characteristics associated with particular communities”;243 or in the words of
the UN Working Group on Minorities, it “is generally defined by a broad conception of culture,
including a way of life”.244 The ICTR for its part, affirms that “[a]n ethnic group is generally
defined as a group whose members share a common language or culture”.245 And according to the
CERD Committee, ethnic characteristics are “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origins”,
but also “mother tongues, languages commonly spoken or other indicators of ethnic diversity”.246
Ukraine itself recognises that the “objective factors” that – in its view – usually define ethnic groups
are the “sharing [of] a common culture, religious affiliation, and physical appearance”.247 Nothing
in international law suggests that ethnicity and its defining objective factors can be based on
241 Expert Report of Professor Sandra Fredman (Annex 22 to MU), paras. 48-51.
242 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 4 February 2021, para. 81. See also above para. 111.
243 A. Dundes Renteln, “Ethnicity”, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 2011, para. 2, see also
para. 11, available at https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1849?prd=OPIL.
244 UN Working Group on Minorities, Commentary on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2, 4 April 2005, para. 6.
245 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment of 2 September 1998
(Annex 988 to MU), para. 513.
246 CERD Committee, Guidelines for the CERD-Specific Document to be Submitted by States Parties under Article 9,
paragraph 1, of the Convention, UN Doc. CERD/C/2007/1, 13 June 2008, para. 11.
247 MU, para. 578.
45
political views; on the contrary the definition of ethnicity results from factors that do not include
political considerations248 – and this is also true as regards self-identification in the present case.249
121. It is necessary to go back to the first occurrence of the concept of ethnicity in an
international instrument to unveil its intended scope. It was added at a late stage during the drafting
of the Genocide Convention in order to better define the type of groups protected and ensure that
the term “national” would not be understood as encompassing political groups.250 While the latter
are “based on a body of theoretical concepts”,251 which one joins through individual voluntary
commitment252 and which thus lack homogeneity and permanency, ethnic groups are bound
together by “sentiment or tradition”253 and relatively stable “cultural, physical and historical
characteristics”,254 and their membership is “not challengeable by its members”.255 The categories
could thus not be more different and, as already underlined by the case-law of the ICTR –
misinterpreted by Ukraine,256 “it is particularly important to respect the intention of the drafters of
the […] Convention, which […] was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent
group”,257 to the exclusion of “mobile” groups.258 Similarly, general definitions of minorities –
248 Expert Report of Dmitry Anatolievich Funk, Roman Alexandrovich Starchenko, Valery Vladimirovich Stepanov
and Sergey Valeryevich Sokolovsky (Annex 21), Addendum 1.
249 See below, paras. 123-124. As regards the importance of self-identification, see in particular CERD Committee,
38th session, General recommendation No. 8 concerning the interpretation and application of article 1, paragraphs 1 and
4 of the Convention, 21 August 1990 in United Nations General Assembly, 45th Session, Official Records, Supplement
No. 18, UN Doc. A/45/18, p. 79.
250 See the 73rd and 74th meetings on 13 and 14 October 1948, 6th Committee, General Assembly, 3rd session, UN
Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 and A/C.6/SR.74, during which the Swedish representative, Mr Petren, proposed to add the word
“ethnical” after the word “national” in the list of protected groups as a distinct category from political groups since their
inclusion met strong opposition. See also United Nations General Assembly, 3rd Session, 6th Committee Report to the
General Assembly, UN Doc. A/760, 3 December 1948, showing that their inclusion was thoroughly debated and
eventually rejected.
251 Ad hoc Committee on Genocide, Summary Record of the 13th meeting, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, 20 April 1948,
p. 2 (statement of the Rapporteur). See also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide to the UN Economic and
Social Council, From 5 April to 10 May 1948, UN Doc. E/794, 24 May 1948, p. 13. For discussions in the Sixth
Committee, see Summary Record of the 69th meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69, 7 October 1948, p. 57 (Amado, Brazil), p.
59 (Raafat, Egypt), p. 61 (Wikborg, Norway); Summary Record of the 74th meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.74, 14 October
1948, p. 99 (Abdoh, Iran); Summary Record of the 75th meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/ SR.75, 15 October 1948, pp. 110-111
(Lachs, Poland).
252 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment of 6 December 1999,
para. 57; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trail Chamber I, Judgment of 2 September
1998 (Annex 988 to MU), para. 511.
253 Ad hoc Committee on Genocide, Summary Record of the 13th meeting, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.13, 20 April 1948,
p. 2 (statement of the Rapporteur).
254 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 3rd session, Summary Record of
the 48th Meeting, E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.48, 16 January 1950, para. 16 (statement of the Chairman). See also Study on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities by F. Capotorti (Special Rapporteur),
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, 1979, p. 34, paras. 196-197.
255 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trail Chamber I, Judgment of 2 September 1998
(Annex 988 to MU), para. 511.
256 Expert Report of Professor Sandra Fredman (Annex 22 to MU), paras. 14-15.
257 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trail Chamber I, Judgment of 2 September 1998
(Annex 988 to MU), para. 516.
46
often used in reference to ethnic groups259 – do not include political views as a component
element.260
122. Accordingly, there is no basis to import political opinions under the terms “national or
ethnic origin”; they are “obviously outside” the scope of CERD which “only deals with racial
discrimination”.261 The elimination of political discrimination – whether generally or in certain
respects only – is specifically addressed in other instruments, including the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,262 the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education263 or
the European Convention on Human Rights264 – which Russia complies with, but this is not the
question in the present proceedings because the Court lacks jurisdiction over these.
123. In the present case, not only is Ukraine’s attempt to depict political identification as an
objective criterion of an ethnic group wrong as a matter of the correct interpretation of the
Convention, but there is in any event no proof that Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars actually selfidentify
on the basis of political views as a matter of fact.265 There is however evidence that, on the
one hand, Russia is adopting supporting measures in favour of those ethnic groups266 and, on the
other hand, members of these ethnic groups hold different political views, with a number of them
258 Ibid., para. 511.
259 See notably A. Dundes Renteln, “Ethnicity”, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International, 2011, para. 7;
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th
Session, Report: Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving
minorities by Special Rapporteur Mr Asbjørn Eide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, 10 August 1993, paras. 4, 9, 35,
88, 116 with the apparent understanding that minorities are to be understood as including minority ethnic groups.
260 See notably UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities by F. Capotorti, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Add.1–7, 1977; Council of Europe, Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of
Minorities, prepared by the European Commission for Democracy through Law, CDL (91) 7 (1991), 8 February 1991;
I. Diaconu, Racial Discrimination, Eleven International Publishing, 2011, p. 87. It should also be noted that none of the
many States that acceded to the Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and made declarations defining the
latter term referred to political opinions (see Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No. 157 - Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/157/declarations?p auth=8CaEGkZo).
261 N. Lerner, The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Brill/Nijhoff, 2015,
p. 36 (emphasis added).
262 Article 26: “the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.”
263 Article 1(1): “For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘discrimination’ includes any distinction, exclusion,
limitation or preference which, being based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in
education”.
264 Article 14: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”. For a general prohibition of political
discrimination – as opposed to the above provision limited to discrimination in the enjoyment of rights guaranteed by
the Convention – see Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR.
265 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), paras. 15-23, Addendum 1.
266 See above, Chapter I(II).

48
Mr Eyvaz Umerov,276 head of the former Crimean Regional National and Cultural
Autonomy of Crimean Tatars, also regularly highlights that Crimean Tatars have seen
considerable improvements since the reunification with Russia.277 In parallel, he has
long criticised, together with Mr Lenur Usmanov,278 a representative of the Crimean
Tatar community of Sevastopol, and many others, the activities of the Mejlis who are
clearly not representative of all of the Crimean Tatar people.279
For his part, ,280
, describes
how many problems and issues of the Crimean Tatar people were solved after the
integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation.281 A former member of the Mejlis
and a former Chairman of the Committee on Ethnicities and Deportees of the Republic
of Crimea, Mr Zaur Smirnov,282 insists that Crimean Tatars are well represented in all
spheres of the political, social and cultural life.283 Moreover, it should be recalled that
Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians are represented in the state organs of the Republic of
Crimea.284
125. Following Ukraine’s logic, all these individuals should have to be considered, against their
will, to have changed their ethnicity by supporting Russia’s policy in Crimea.
126. In addition to being inaccurate, Ukraine’s approach constitutes a breach of the right of
people to have their own opinion and would result in the disqualification of a significant part of the
membership of these communities from being ethnic Crimean Tatars or Ukrainians and,
accordingly, if the Court were to follow Ukraine’s logic and argumentation, to their being denied
protection under the Convention. That clearly cannot be right.
127. Ukraine also seeks to include religion within the scope of CERD and claims that Crimean
Tatars are being targeted based on allegations of religious Muslim extremism.285 In so doing, it
93rd session, 31 July – 25 August 2017, doc. INT/CERD/NGO/RUS/28092, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/
CERD/Shared%20Documents/RUS/INT CERD NGO RUS 28092 E.doc.
276 Website “Mirotvorets”, page dedicated to Mr Eyvaz Umerov, 20 September 2015 (Annex 1261).
277 Vesti Krym, “Crimean Tatars told how their life changed in Russia”, 4 November 2020 (Annex 1034).
278 Website “Mirotvorets”, page dedicated to Mr Lenur Usmanov, 29 March 2015 (Annex 1259).
279 SEVAS, “Lenur Usmanov: Crimean Tatars have been used as a club against Russia for the last 20 years”, 26
February 2014 (Annex 893); Regnum, “Lenur Usmanov: ‘Participation of the majority of Crimean Tatars in the
referendum on 16 March is a deliberate step towards Russia’”, 12 April 2014 (Annex 903).
280 Website “Mirotvorets”, page dedicated to (Annex 1237).
281 Witness Statement of 9 June 2021 (Annex 19), paras. 28-38.
282 Website “Mirotvorets”, page dedicated to Mr Zaur Smirnov, 29 April 2014 (Annex 1250).
283 RIA Novosti, “Smirnov: No one is going to play the Crimean Tatar card in Crimea any more”, 24 April 2016
(Annex 953).
284 Hearings on Provisional Measures, 7 March 2017, CR 2017/2, p. 57, para. 15 (Lukiyantsev). See also Expert
Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), paras. 174-176.
285 MU, paras. 391, 447, 595, 602, 608, 640.
49
again misconstrues CERD. It is well known that the process of elaboration of CERD was launched
by the Economic and Social Council’s recommendation to the General Assembly to adopt a draft
resolution on “Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance”.286 After
the adoption of this resolution, a draft resolution on the preparation of an international convention
on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination was suggested. In the discussion of the draft,
it was proposed that the instrument deal with both racial and religious discrimination. The Third
Committee of the UN General Assembly eventually adopted two separate resolutions, similarly
worded, one asking for the preparation of a draft declaration and a draft convention on the
elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, and one on the preparation of a draft declaration
and a draft convention on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance.287 This shows that
the United Nations intended to deal with racial discrimination and religious discrimination in
separate instruments and that CERD was not intended to encompass discrimination on religious
grounds. This is in line with the subsequent practice of the General Assembly which distinguishes
between religious discrimination and racial discrimination.288
128. It is true that in General Recommendation No. 32, the CERD Committee said that religious
considerations could be relevant in cases of discrimination on multiple grounds.289 But the
Committee made it clear that the primary ground of discrimination must always be within the scope
of Article 1 of CERD, and confirmed that religion as a freestanding ground of discrimination was
not covered by CERD:
“The Committee recognises the importance of the interface between race and religion and
considers that it would be competent to consider a claim of ‘double’ discrimination on the
basis of religion and another ground specifically provided for in article 1 of the
Convention, including national or ethnic origin. However, this is not the case in the current
petition, which exclusively relates to discrimination on religious grounds. The Committee
recalls that the Convention does not cover discrimination based on religion alone, and that
Islam is not a religion practised solely by a particular group, which could otherwise be
identified by its ‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.’”290
286 See the Report of the 13th Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/815, 1961. See further Resolution 1779 (XVII) of 7 December
1962 on “Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance”, A/RES/1779(XVII). On the same
day, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1780 (XVII) by which it requested the “Preparation of a draft declaration
and a draft convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination”, A/RES/1780(XVII).
287 See N. Lerner, The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Brill/Nijhoff, 2015,
pp. 3-4, quoting UNGA Resolutions 1780 (XVII) and 1781 (XVII).
288 See notably Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981, which does not mention CERD, but
the ICCPR.
289 MU, para. 565 and fn. 1177, referring to Annex 790 to UM: CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32,
para. 7.
290 CERD Committee, A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark, Communication No. 37/2006, CERD/C/71/D/37/2006, 8 August
2007, para. 6.3 (Annex 799 to MU). The Committee further observed: “The Travaux Préparatoires of the Convention
50
129. This fully applies in the present case: Ukraine cannot base its accusations of “racial
discrimination” exclusively on religious grounds (or on political opposition for that matter). Instead,
it must establish that the specific criteria in Article 1 of CERD are met.
130. To conclude, Russia wishes to make clear again that it plainly rejects the factual allegations
made in Ukraine’s Application and Memorial (and addresses the relevant facts in considerable
detail in Chapters IV to VI and Appendices A to F below). But even if these allegations were true
(quod non), the relevant point is that on their own terms, Ukraine’s claims and allegations do not
qualify as instances of racial discrimination under CERD. They relate instead to alleged political
opposition to the change of status of Crimea and religious extremism by a number of persons of
different origins.
reveal that the Third Committee of the General Assembly rejected the proposal to include racial discrimination and
religious intolerance in a single instrument, and decided in the ICERD to focus exclusively on racial discrimination”.
51
THE BAN ON THE MEJLIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
131. To support its accusation that the Russian Federation has been orchestrating and conducting
a systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination targeting the Crimean Tatars as such,
Ukraine relies on the ban on the Mejlis, or more exactly the ban on the activities of its members.
According to Ukraine, this ban violates the ability of the Crimean Tatar community to conserve its
representative institutions and thus constitutes a breach of the rights protected by CERD.291
132. The ban of the Mejlis, however, does not support in any way Ukraine’s accusation under
CERD.
133. The decision at issue was adopted and upheld by the Russian courts in 2016, following a
thorough investigation and a series of warnings served on the Mejlis and its members over the two
preceding years. The decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea has been confirmed
by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, on the basis of a thorough and detailed reasoning
that confirmed the legitimate nature of the ban, which has nothing to do with racial discrimination.
The justification for the ban, that is to say the fight against extremist activities that pose a threat to
national security, to citizens’ rights, public order and other legitimate considerations, is an objective
and reasonable ground that, moreover, reflects a general practice in all democratic States.
134. Ukraine chooses to ignore the relevant facts, and in particular to omit the crucial elements
that are dispositive for explaining the adoption of the said measures. In light of the applicable rules
and the relevant facts, it is manifest that Ukraine’s case based on the ban on the Mejlis does not
support a case of racial discrimination, let alone an alleged campaign or policy of systematic racial
discrimination.292
135. First, as a matter of applicable law, CERD does not include any right of minority groups to
establish and maintain their own representative institutions (I). Therefore, Ukraine’s case fails on
that ground alone.
136. Second, and in any case, the measures adopted against the Mejlis and its leading members
were based on security reasons, i.e. a valid ground under the applicable rules, both domestic and
international. As a result, there is no sound basis for the contention that the enjoyment of individual
rights has been affected in the present case under Article 5 of CERD. The measures taken by Russia
against the Mejlis (II) and some of its members (III) were based on objective and reasonable
grounds and have nothing to do with racial discrimination.
137. In any event, Ukraine did not evidence any discrimination, let alone racial discrimination, in
the enjoyment of the said rights. The truth is that there is today, and there has been since Crimea’s
291 See, inter alia, MU, para. 606.
292 MU, para. 412. The same can be observed at para. 416 where Ukraine asserts without a shred of evidence a link
between individual bans and an alleged increase in the vulnerability of the community.
52
accession to the Russian Federation, no impediment to the representation of the Crimean Tatar
Community, which is represented by many organisations and associations in Crimea, while the
Mejlis has discredited itself due to its violent and subversive activities. Among the organizations
that purport to represent Crimean Tatar interests in Crimea, the Mejlis, because of its extremist
activities, has been the only one to be banned, for legitimate reasons (IV).
No Right under the Convention to a Representative Body
138. As Russia pointed out in its Preliminary Objections, there is no right under CERD for ethnic
groups to have representative bodies.293 Therefore, Ukraine’s claims related to the so-called right of
the Crimean Tatar people under CERD to have and conserve its representative institutions does not
fall within the scope of the Convention. Actually, during the hearings on preliminary objections,
Ukraine no longer claimed that such a special right exists.294 In addition, it has never officially
recognised the Mejlis as a representative body at any material time between 1991 and 2014.295
A. NO RIGHT TO A REPRESENTATIVE BODY UNDER ARTICLE 5(C) OF CERD
139. Article 5(c) of CERD only provides for a general right to political participation on an equal
basis for all. This right is a right of individuals belonging to all racial groups to participate in the
domestic political life of the State, which is usually understood as including the right to participate
in elections and to run for elections, to apply to government and administrative positions, or to
establish and become a member of political parties. It does not provide for a “political right” of
national minorities to establish and maintain their own representative institutions.296 The use of the
term “everyone” in Article 5(c) confirms the individual character of the rights concerned. Such
interpretation is not only in conformity with the general rule of treaty interpretation under
customary international law, as reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. It is also confirmed by the travaux préparatoires of CERD.297
293 PORF, para. 328.
294 CR 2019/10, 4 June 2019, p. 62, para. 24 (Koh).
295 CR 2017/2, 7 March 2017, p. 60, para. 33 (Lukiyantsev).
296 See also Order of 19 April 2017, separate opinion of Judge Skotnikov, I.C.J. Reports 2017, pp. 222-223, para. 2.
297 At early stages of the travaux the Sub-Commission working group agreed that the provisions of the Convention
should apply to the rights set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”), see Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 16th session, summary record of the 423rd meeting, 24
January 1964, E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.423, pp. 4-5 (Mr Ketrzynski). A proposal by Mr Ivanov to introduce a reference to
group rights in respect of participation in governance processes was opposed by Mr Ferguson who feared that “the
proposal departed from the sphere of individual rights” and was eventually not adopted (E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.423, p. 7). At
a later stage, before the Commission on Human Rights, the term “everyone” in Article 5 replaced the initial reference to
“citizen” that was contained in a proposal put forward by Poland. An alternative proposed by Ecuador but not
eventually adopted tended to replace “citizen” by “person” (Commission on Human Rights, 20th session, summary
record of the 796th meeting, 4 March 1964, E/CN.4/SR.796, p. 9 (Lebanon), p. 10 (Ecuador), p. 11 (Italy)). All these
alternatives clearly point to a shared understanding that the Convention was to cover individual rights only. The term
“everyone” was adopted and included in the final text of the Convention.
53
140. What is more, CERD does not protect human rights in general.298 As established by Article
5, it seeks to protect the equality before the law in the exercise of human rights protected under
other instruments. No such instruments provide for the right to representative institutions for ethnic
groups that Ukraine alleges in the Memorial, including in particular the 1966 International
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 1992
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities,299 or the European Convention on Human Rights, despite most of these
instruments having been adopted after CERD.300
141. This is understandable, as the contrary would endanger the public order within States and
their stability, in particular in multi-ethnic societies. This in turn would have dire repercussions on
the maintenance of international peace and security. This risk had been anticipated by Francesco
Capotorti, in his famous Study on minority rights:
“The fact of granting rights to minorities and thus endowing them with legal status might
increase the danger of friction between them and the State, in so far as the minority group,
as an entity, would seem to be invested with authority to represent the interests of a
particular community vis-à-vis the State representing the interests of the entire population.
Moreover, the freedom of each individual member of a minority to choose between
voluntary assimilation with the majority and the preservation of his own distinctive
characteristics might be disregarded by the organs of the entity formed by the minority
group, in its concern to preserve the unity and strength of the group.”301
142. The Capotorti Study played a significant role in the preparation of the 1992 UN Declaration
and the latter is largely based on this basic understanding of minority rights as essentially consisting
of individual rights, to be exercised in community with others. Before preparing this Study, Mr
Capotorti, an eminent human rights specialist, had also participated in the travaux préparatoires of
CERD. Therefore, he cannot be suspected of not being aware of the impact of his statement on the
potential scope of CERD with respect to its beneficiaries. As the Russian Federation previously
298 This is confirmed by the travaux préparatoires; see for example Commission on Human Rights, 20th session,
summary record of the 796th meeting, 4 March 1964, E/CN.4/SR.796, p. 15 (Netherlands): “the purpose of the article
was not to proclaim that the rights which it enumerated must be fully respected, but merely to prohibit racial
discrimination with regard to their enjoyment”; Third Committee, 1306th meeting, 15 October 1965, A/C.3/SR.1306,
para. 16 (Ghana): “the Convention was intended to eliminate racial discrimination and not to grant rights which might
not yet be recognized in certain countries”.
299 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, annexed to Resolution 47/135 of the UN General Assembly of 18 December 1992.
300 See also CR 2019/9, 3 June 2019, p. 73, para. 23 (Forteau); Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, 4 April 2005, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2, paras. 38-50 (commentary to Article 2.3), and para. 51.
301 Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, Study on the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 1979, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, p. 35, para. 209. See also CR 2019/9, 3 June 2019, p. 72, para. 22 (Forteau).
54
recalled, no so-called right of minorities to establish and maintain their representative institutions
has been recognized by the CERD Committee either.302
143. The very danger Mr Capotorti warned against materialized precisely with the Mejlis’
conduct as early as 1991, and Ukraine then reacted in the very same manner that it now holds
against the Russian Federation. Indeed, right from the start when it was established under Ukrainian
rule, the Mejlis’ clear objective was to achieve secession from Ukraine and establish an independent
State in Crimea.303 While Ukraine admits this in its Memorial, it carefully omits to add that before
2014 this agenda and conduct led the Crimean Parliament to declare the Qurultay
unconstitutional.304 This stands in marked contrast with Ukraine’s current characterization of the
Mejlis’ activities in the pre-2014 period as an expression of healthy democracy.305
144. In fact, the Mejlis’ sponsoring and condoning of violent actions was clear from its early
times.306 For example, the mass riots organized by the Mejlis in Simferopol in October 1992 led the
Crimean authorities to declare these activities to be anti-constitutional and to take firm measures to
bring the Mejlis to responsibility.307 The 1992 riots, incited and condoned by the Mejlis in relation
to law-enforcement measures against illegal occupation of land, were notably violent. Lawenforcement
officers were severely beaten and injured by protesters acting under the influence of
the Mejlis, including with stones and knives, and M. Dzhemilev called for the formation of a selfdefence
unit and for the defection of Crimean Tatars serving in the Ukrainian army to support the
action, and blackmailed the local authorities into freeing the authors of the incident.308 Other violent
302 CR 2019/9, 3 June 2019, p. 72, para. 21 (Forteau).
303 Declaration of national sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar people, 28 June 1991 in Documents from the Dossier and
Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 77-
78; Extract from the Mejlis Presidium Statement “On situation in Crimea”, 19 February 1992 in Documents from the
Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex
1267), p. 80.
304 Ruling of the Supreme Council of Crimea “On the gathering (qurultay) of the Crimean Tatar representatives”, 29
July 1991 (extract) in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the
Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 79.
305 MU, para. 358.
306 See various excerpts from Crimean newspapers: Krymskaya Pravda, Yuzhnaya Stolitsa, Alushtinskiy vestnik,
Krymskie izvestiya, 1992 in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation
for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 81-83. See also further article excerpts from Krymskaya
Pravda, Regnum, Novoross, Novy Den, and Areket in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by
the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 91-113.
307 Decree of the Supreme Council of the Crimean ASSR, 8 October 1992 in Documents from the Dossier and
Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 180.
The extremist groups of persons representing Mejlis’ violent and unlawful conduct during this episode was also
condemned by the then Ukrainian president himself, see “Meeting of President of Ukraine L. M. Kravchuk with
Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Crimea N. V. Bagrov”, Krymskiye izvestia, No. 201, 14 October
1992 in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on
Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 183.
308 “Black Echo of Krasny Rai” and “The Government Betrayed Us!”, Yuzhnaya Stolitsa, 9 October 1992 in
Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional
Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 81-82; Supreme Council of the Republic of Crimea, Minutes of the Plenary Meeting No.
19 of the Ninth Session of the First Convocation, 8 October 1992 (extracts) in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’
55
episodes involving members of the Mejlis that happened during the Ukrainian period included
beating Ukrainian and Russian journalists who tried to report on the Mejlis illegal seizure of land
near the village of Simeiz;309 invading a local bar in Simferopol with knives, threatening its
visitors310 and then leading violent protests when the perpetrators of the bar incident were
undergoing trial;311 the use of firebombs to protect illegally constructed commercial attractions for
tourists near the Ai-Petri mountain;312 violent clashes in Bakhchisaray when the government refused
to accede to the Mejlis’ demands to relocate a market.313
145. As the Russian Federation has previously explained, the Mejlis did not purport to be a public
association (or a national-cultural autonomy) and to operate along the lines of classical political
representation in a democratic society, or even within the legal order of the State:
“Both the Qurultay and the Mejlis consistently opposed themselves to [Ukrainian] State
authorities. One of the consequences of this position was that they have never registered
under the laws of Ukraine. That tactic was clearly chosen to avoid responsibility and
maintain a self-awarded status of “alternative authorities”. That way, its members were
also able to carry out and condone violent and unlawful actions with the Mejlis as an
organization remaining mostly out of reach of the authorities’ sanction.[314] Ukraine never
recognized the Mejlis as a representative organ”.315
Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 84-86. The
Mejlis’ violent activities continued unabated, see for example the Requests of Mr Oleg Rodivilov, Deputy of the
Verkhovnaya Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 21 June 2006 and 19 November 2007 in Documents from
the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures
(Annex 1267), p. 112.
309 Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel (Annex 22), para. 435. See also Appendix D, para. 49 and footnote
121.
310 See Appendix D, para. 49 and footnote 121.
311 Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel (Annex 22), para. 435; Judgment of the Zheleznodorozhniy District
Court of Simferopol in the case of Zair Sitbellyalovich Smedlyaev, 30 January 2012 (extracts) in Documents submitted
to the Registry of the ICJ by the Russian Federation in connection with Ukraine’s Request for the indication of
provisional measures and Judges’ Folder submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional
Measures, 6-9 March 2017 (Annex 1267), pp. 87-88.
312 Press reports: events on the Ai-Petri mountain, 2007, in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as
submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 97-104.
313 Press reports: events around the Bakhchisaray Central Market, 2006, in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’
Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 105-108.
314 See for instance the Judgment of the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of Simferopol in the case of Zair
Sitbellyalovich Smedlyaev, 30 January 2012 (extracts) in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted
by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 87-88. The Ukrainian
authorities have remained largely inactive to combat the violent activities of this unregistered organization, effectively
granting it an exception from the local laws. Local members of parliament attempted to investigate the activities of the
Mejlis and protested against various illegalities, but that had no impact: see Requests of Mr Oleg Rodivilov, Deputy of
the Verkhovnaya Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 21 June 2006 and 19 November 2007 in Documents
from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures
(Annex 1267), p. 112.
315 CR 2017/2, 7 March 2017, p. 60, para. 33 (Lukiyantsev). See also in this vein Supreme Council of the Republic of
Crimea, Minutes of the Plenary Meeting No. 19 of the Ninth Session of the First Convocation (extracts), 8 October
56
146. Such position did not change in Crimea’s new legal environment after 2014 and the Mejlis
never registered with the Russian authorities under any legal form of association or sought to
acquire the now claimed representative status.316
B. NO RIGHT TO A REPRESENTATIVE BODY UNDER ARTICLE 5(D) OF CERD
147. There is similarly no such right of minority groups to establish and maintain their own
representative bodies under Article 5(d), in particular under Article 5(d)(ix) on the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and association, and certainly not a right to use violent means in this
endeavour. In fact, the Mejlis’ radical political agenda as well as the violent methods and statements
of its leaders and close associates confirm that it could not fall under this provision.
148. In relation to the scope of the protection extended under Article 5(d)(ix), the CERD
Committee has highlighted that demonstrations ought to be “peaceful” and “respect[…] the human
rights of others”.317 This undoubtedly applies to all conduct and statements of assemblies,
associations and other groupings. It is thus evident that the protection of Article 5(d)(ix) does not
extend to assemblies, associations or other groupings that carry out violent activities. As will be
confirmed below, under no circumstances can the activities and statements of the Mejlis, its leading
members, and the persons associated therewith that formed the basis for the ban be qualified as
“peaceful”. Quite to the contrary, the two decisions of Crimea’s and Russia’s Supreme Courts show
that such violent conduct undoubtedly falls within the definition of extremism as provided for in
Russian law318 and within the meaning of the word that is commonly accepted in many countries.319
C. NO RIGHT TO A REPRESENTATIVE BODY UNDER ARTICLE 5(E) OF CERD
149. In addition, to the extent Ukraine alleges such a right as part of cultural rights, Article 5(e)
of CERD only extends to the “right to equal participation in cultural activities”. As confirmed by
the examination of the Mejlis’ violent and radical activities both before 2014 and in the period
leading up to its ban, Ukraine’s invocation of cultural rights in that context does not reflect the
situation of the Mejlis.
1992, Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on
Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 84-86, in particular statements by A.S. Danelyan and K.D. Apostolidi.
316 Letter of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 7 June 2018
(Annex 483), para. 22; Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016
(Annex 913 to MU).
317 CERD Committee, 75th session, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 14th to 17th periodic reports of
Peru, UN Doc. CERD/C/PER/CO/14-17, 24 August 2009, para. 15.
318 See below, para. 178.
319 Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel (Annex 22), paras. 1-37.
57
The Measures Taken Against the Mejlis Were Adopted for Legitimate Reasons
150. Even if Ukraine’s claims in relation to the measures taken against the Mejlis could qualify as
falling under the scope of CERD, quod non, such measures do not evidence racial discrimination,
nor a fortiori do they form part of a policy of racial discrimination, as Ukraine claims. To the
contrary, the measures are based on objective and reasonable grounds.
151. There is no doubt that, “[w]hatever is the legal basis for the exercise of control and
jurisdiction in the territory of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the applicability of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Russian
Federation must be able to take measures necessary to ensure public order and safety.”320 The
relevant facts leave no doubt about the existence of legitimate security concerns raised by the
activities of the Mejlis and its leading members that led up to the decision of the Supreme Court of
Crimea, confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, to declare the Mejlis as an
extremist organization and to uphold the ban of its activities.
152. On the basis of the applicable legal framework (A), the Russian Federation will in the
present section rebut in turn each of the unfounded allegations articulated in Ukraine’s Memorial in
relation to the measures taken against the Mejlis to show that the measures are based on objective
and reasonable grounds (B and C).
A. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
153. As the CERD Committee stated, “a differentiation of treatment will not constitute
discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the objectives and purposes of
the Convention, are legitimate or fall within the scope of article 1, paragraph 4, of the
Convention.”321 Thus, imposing a legitimate limitation to the exercise of a right does not qualify as
discrimination, let alone racial discrimination under the Convention.
154. As has been noted, individual rights are “not unlimited.”322 The principle that legitimate
limitations may be placed to human rights in certain specific circumstances is a well-established
principle of international law and forms an intrinsic component of these rights. Such limitations
may be legitimately placed on the exercise of human rights for instance in cases of threat to
essential interests pertaining to national security, public safety, public order, health and morals, or
the free exercise of other citizens’ human rights and fundamental freedoms.323 Legitimate
320 Order of 19 April 2017, declaration of Judge Peter Tomka, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 153, para. 7.
321 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14, para. 2 (Annex 788 to MU).
322 Order of 19 April 2017, declaration of Judge Peter Tomka, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 151, para. 5.
323 See e.g. Articles 29(2), 29(3), and 30 of the UDHR, 1948; Articles 5(1), 19(3), 20, 21, 22(2), and 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 1966; Articles 4 and 5(1) of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), 1966. See also Human Rights Committee, General comment No.
10: Article 19 (Freedom of opinion), 1983, para. 4, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Opinion/CCPRGeneralCommentNo10.pdf; General comment No. 11: Article 20 (Prohibition of propaganda for
58
limitations also contribute to the protection of the human rights and freedoms of others. Since
legitimate limitations placed on the exercise of human rights do not entail a violation, impairment or
nullification of such rights, it follows that – to the extent that such legitimate limitations give rise to
a differential treatment – they constitute an objective and reasonable justification that excludes by
definition any discriminatory treatment under CERD.
155. On that basis, the two decisions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea and of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on the ban on the Mejlis are entirely lawful and
appropriate in light of the relevant facts. These two decisions refer both to international law and
Russian law as providing for limitations applicable in the case of the Mejlis. The Constitution of the
Russian Federation recognizes and protects universal human rights, including the right of
association. It prohibits, however, “propaganda or agitation inciting social, racial, national or
religious hatred or hostility, propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic superiority,
as well as the creation and activities of public associations whose objectives or actions are directed
at changing the foundations of the constitutional order and violating the integrity of the Russian
Federation, undermining the security of the state, creation of armed militias, inciting social, racial,
national and religious hatred”.324 Article 55(3) of the Russian Constitution provides the legal basis
for legitimate limitations in Russian law: “Human and civil rights and freedoms may be limited by
federal law only to the extent necessary for the protection of the foundations of the constitutional
order, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other people, the defence of the country
and the security of the state.” The Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea referred to this
provision as reflecting in particular Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR.325
156. The existence and activities of “public associations” are governed by Federal Law of 19
May 1995 No. 82-FZ, which allows for the winding up of an association and the prohibition of its
activities on the grounds of and in accordance with the procedure provided by the Federal Law “On
counteracting extremist activities”.326 As part of the definition of extremism it provides, Federal
Law of 25 July 2002 No. 114-FZ “On counteracting extremist activities” lists a series of specific
activities that are deemed extremist and ought to be prohibited.327
157. The Law on counteracting extremist activities also provides for a mechanism to end such
activities once they have been identified. Article 7(1) provides:
war and inciting national, racial or religious hatred), 1983, para. 2, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/
Opinion/CCPRGeneralCommentNo11.pdf; General comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of opinion and expression),
2011, CCPR/C/GC/34, paras. 21-36; General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights
and the right of equal access to public service (Art. 25), 12 July 1996, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, para. 27.
324 Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1993, Articles 13, 29, 30, 34 (as described in Supreme Court
of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU), p. 8).
325 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
p. 9.
326 Federal Law No. 82-FZ “On public associations”, 19 May 1995 (Annex 30), Article 44(6).
327 Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On counteracting extremist activities”, 25 July 2002 (Annex 876 to MU), Article
1(1)(1).
59
“In the event of the uncovering of facts pointing to the presence of characteristics of
extremism within their activities, including in the activities of a single one of their regional
or other structural sub-divisions, a public or religious organisation or other organisation
shall be served with written notice of the inadmissibility of such activity, with an indication
of the concrete grounds for serving the notice, including the violations committed. In the
event of it being possible to take steps to eliminate the violations committed, the notice
shall also set a time limit for eliminating those violations, of no less than two months from
the date on which notice was served.”
158. The notice – or warning – may be challenged before the courts. Under Article 7(4), if the
notice is not challenged or if the court validates it, and if the notified organization fails to eliminate
the violation that provided the basis for the notice within the specified deadline, or if new facts
pointing to the presence of characteristics of extremism within its activities are uncovered within 12
months following the date on which the notice was served, the public or religious association or
other organization concerned shall be wound up according to the procedure defined in the Law and
the activity of the respective public or religious association that is not a legal entity shall be banned.
159. Under Article 9(2),
“[i]n the event provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 7 of the present Federal law
or in the event of the carrying out by public or religious associations or other organisations
or their regional or other structural sub-divisions of extremist activity resulting in a
violation of human and civil rights and freedoms, damage to an individual, citizens’ health,
the environment, public order, public safety, property, the lawful economic interests of
physical individuals and/or legal entities, society and the State or creating a real threat of
causing such damage, the corresponding public or religious association or other
organisation may be wound up and the activity of the respective public or religious
association that is not a legal entity may be banned by decision of a court on the basis of an
application by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation or the respective
prosecutor subordinate to them.”
160. It should be noted that, as a preventive act, a warning served to an individual does not entail
the criminal liability of its addressee. A warning provides an opportunity to cease or correct
identified and proscribed conduct before any further, judicial step is taken. Such mechanism of
monitoring forms part of the preventive aspect of the legal framework combating extremism, which
places upon the authorities an obligation to take appropriate measures in order to detect and prevent
manifestations of extremism.328 The warning procedure exists not only in respect of the activities of
individuals or public organizations and associations,329 but also regarding the prevention of the
broadcasting of extremist materials and content by media outlets.330
328 Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On counteracting extremist activities”, 25 July 2002 (Annex 876 to MU), Articles 2, 3
and 5.
329 Ibid., Article 7.
330 Ibid., Article 8. See also Appendix E, para. 69.
60
161. The limitations provided for in Russian law comply with the principle of legality in
international law: the applicable domestic law offers a clear and specific understanding of the
targeted offences. As will be seen below, the conduct of the Mejlis, its members and close
associates that provided the basis for the ban undoubtedly fall within the category of conduct that
gives rise to legitimate limitations, and the argument that the law has been applied in a
discriminatory or arbitrary fashion is untenable. To Mejlis’ members the ban was a fully predictable
outcome when they deliberately opted to engage in their violent conduct.
162. In reaching their conclusion to declare the Mejlis an extremist organization and to ban its
activities, both Supreme Courts relied on the above-described Russian domestic legal framework
and relevant international instruments.331 They also verified that the limitation did not infringe on
the Crimean Tatars’ legitimate interests and rights and was not contrary to supporting measures
such as the 2014 presidential Rehabilitation Decree.332
163. On the other hand, the Mejlis did not claim in the course of these domestic proceedings that
the ban constituted racial discrimination. Only Ukraine did in the present proceedings. In addition,
Ukraine refers to the ban on the Mejlis and measures against other related acts by Mejlis members
and like-minded activists as “political suppression of Crimean Tatars”.333 Such accusation, on its
own terms, does not relate to racial discrimination. In any case, it does not correspond to what the
record and relevant materials actually show.
B. THE EXTREMIST AND VIOLENT ACTIVITIES OF THE MEJLIS
The Factual Basis of the Russian Court Decisions Declaring the Mejlis an Extremist
Organization and Banning Its Activities
164. To support its claims related to the ban on the Mejlis,334 Ukraine only refers, in vague terms,
to “alleg[ations] that the Mejlis was an ‘extremist’ organization because, among other reasons, it
had organized a pro-Ukraine rally on 26 February 2014”.335 That does not correspond at all to the
relevant evidence submitted to the competent domestic courts. As their decisions made clear, the
331 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
p. 9-10, 19; Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 127-APG16-4, Decision, 29 September 2016 (Annex
915 to MU), p. 2-3, 8-9. International instruments expressly referred to, sometimes in detail, include the 1948 UDHR,
the 1950 ECHR, the 1966 ICCPR, the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the 2001 Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism and
Extremism, the Resolution 1344 (2003) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the threat posed to
democracy by extremist parties and movements in Europe, and the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.
332 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
pp. 20-21; Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 127-APG16-4, Decision, 29 September 2016 (Annex
915 to MU), pp. 7-8.
333 MU, paras. 412-441, and title of subsection B.
334 MU, paras. 425-427.
335 MU, para. 425.
61
ban was based on the invocation of anti-extremism laws in a context of combating violent political
activities that have gone as far as jeopardizing the electric infrastructure of the whole Crimea,
impeding the functioning of State organs in Crimea and putting the health and welfare of the whole
Crimean population at risk, relating both to electricity and food procurement.
165. The 13th OHCHR report on the situation of human rights and freedoms in Ukraine pointed in
explicit terms to the illegal character of the blockade of Crimea organized by the Mejlis in 2015 and
urged the investigation of allegations of human rights violations committed during the blockade.336
In such a case, a ban is plainly legitimate, contrary to what Ukraine alleges.
166. Contrary to Ukraine’s allegations, the judgment of 26 April 2016 of the Supreme Court of
Crimea relied on an abundant series of extremist actions attributable to Mejlis members, stretching
over an extensive period of time, usually in connection to contesting Crimea’s change of status.
167. As a determining feature of the case it is essential to recall the chronology of critical factual
elements that form part of the violent and subversive activities undertaken by the Mejlis and its
close associates in the autumn and winter of 2015. A number of these facts have already been
submitted to the attention of this Court at the provisional measures phase, but Ukraine failed to
address any of them in its Memorial. While in no sense exhaustive,337 the chronological account of
violent conduct associated with the Mejlis up to its ban includes in particular the following acts –
bearing in mind that at no point in time the Mejlis claimed, nor even suggested, that the measures
taken against them in relation to these acts constitute racial discrimination.
- The Mejlis’ violent activities started as early as 1992, in Krasny Rai. In 2004 the Mejlis had
organized a campaign to destroy property of the Orthodox Holy Dormition Monastery in
Bakhchisaray, and later continued with violent clashes at Ai-Petri, Simferopol and other localities in
Crimea.338 Since 2008, still during the Ukrainian period, the Mejlis had organized a number of
actions to block the activities of district and city councils, district police departments and the
prosecutor’s office.339
- On 26 February 2014, the Mejlis organized an unauthorized event before the Crimean
Parliament, during which around 80 persons were wounded and 2 were killed, and property of the
Parliament was damaged and destroyed. The crucial role of Mejlis members in raising the level of
tension and inciting participants to commit acts of violence during the event was later
336 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016 (Annex 314 to
MU), paras. 197-200.
337 For further actions, see Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Information on the outcomes of the
analysis of arguments set out in the letter of the Permanent Delegation of Ukraine to UNESCO, 23 October 2015
(Annex 911 to MU), p. 4-8.
338 See above, para. 144. Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016
(Annex 913 to MU), p. 1; Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 127-APG16-4, Decision, 29 September
2016 (Annex 915 to MU), p. 1.
339 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
p. 1-2.
62
acknowledged by the Central district Court of Simferopol in decisions predating the ban of the
Mejlis.340
- On 2 May 2014 the Mejlis decided to organize an unauthorized event the next day to meet
Mr Mustafa Dzhemilev who was to attempt to illegally cross the border back from Ukraine.341 On 3
May 2014, the Mejlis held this unauthorized gathering near Armyansk which transformed into a
violent riot with the use of physical force in which participants violently forced the members of the
Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation and the police from the border crossing, captured
and held it for about 5 hours until the arrival of additional law enforcement forces. Refat
Chubarov’s public calls and citizens joining him on the ground led to riots on the territory of
Armyansk as well as the blocking of roads in several districts and localities in Crimea. Taken
together with the violent riots of 26 February 2014, these incidents led the Prosecutor of Crimea to
issue 17 warnings on the impermissibility of Mejlis members’ unlawful activities.342 A warning was
served on 3 May 2014 to Mr Chubarov, in his capacity as Chairman of the Mejlis.343 Mr Chubarov
did not challenge it under applicable statutory law. The warning explicitly put Mr Chubarov on
notice that the Mejlis could be banned and its activities prohibited should such extremist conduct
continue in the future. The circumstances of these violent riots also gave rise to a series of criminal
cases against participants who were sentenced by the Armyansk City Court for use of violence
against Russian state officials.344
- Since new signs of extremism had arisen during the two-month period following the second
warning served to Mr Chubarov on 3 May 2014, on 5 July 2014 the Prosecutor’s Office in Crimea
again served a new warning to Mr Chubarov in his capacity as Chairman of the Mejlis, against the
340 Judgment of the Central District Court of Simferopol in the case of Mr Eskender Nebiev, 12 October 2015, and
Judgement of the Central District Court of Simferopol in the case of Mr Talyat Yunusov, 28 December 2015, in
Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional
Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 115-126. It is to be noted that the Mejlis’ inflaming discourse and confrontational attitude
towards the authorities has been happening both before and after 2014 (see Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel
(Annex 22), para. 446).
341 Website of the Mejlis, Resolution of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people “On the situation regarding the
Russian official travel ban for Mustafa Dzhemilev, prohibiting Dzhemilev from entering his native land — Crimea”,
2 May 2014 (Annex 1251), para. 4.
342 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
p. 2.
343 Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea, Warning issued to Mr Refat Chubarov, Chairman of the Mejlis, on the
impermissibility of carrying out extremist activities, 3 May 2014 (Annex 523). Another warning had been served to him
shortly before, see Acting Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea, Warning issued to Mr Refat Chubarov, Chairman of
the Mejlis, on the impermissibility of violating the law, 23 April 2014 (Annex 522).
344 For examples of such cases, which also contain further details on the unfolding of events and the unlawful acts
committed, see for instance Armyansk City Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 1-78/2015, Decision, 28 May
2015 (Annex 238); Armyansk City Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 1-112/2015, Decision, 3 August 2015
(Annex 243); Judgment of the Armyansk City Court in the case of Mr Edem Osmanov, 7 December 2015, Case No. 1-
113/2015, and Judgment of the Armyansk City Court in the case of Mr Tair Smedlyaev, 10 December 2015, Case No.
1-114/2015, in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the
Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 127-143. See also Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case
No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU), p. 12; Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case
No. 127-APG16-4, Decision, 29 September 2016 (Annex 915 to MU), p. 5.
63
conduct of extremist activities.345 The warning explicitly put again Mr Chubarov on notice that the
Mejlis would be banned and its activities prohibited should the impugned illegal conduct continue
in the future. Mr Chubarov did not challenge this new warning either.
- On 1 April 2015, Mr Chubarov gave an interview to Ukrainian TV Channel 5 in Kiev and
said: “for us the war is over only when Crimea is in the Ukrainian State.” He also stated: “Ukraine
should prepare for a full-scale military conflict with Russia”, “I am one of those who urged to
prepare for the worst – open war with Russia.”346
- On 8 September 2015 at a press conference in the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre in Kiev the
leaders of the Mejlis, including Mr Chubarov and Mr Dzhemilev, as well as Mr Islyamov, a close
associate and financial contributor of the Mejlis, declared the so-called “people’s (civilian) blockade
of Crimea” which consists in attempting to block all roads and communications between Crimea
and Ukraine.347 In particular, this included blocking of roads for freight transportation and
disconnecting power supply, affecting the whole population of the peninsula. This action was
designed to have a significant impact on power and food supply of the whole population on the
peninsula. On 14 September 2015, Mr Chubarov gave a statement at Ukraine’s Parliament in Kiev
to call for supporters to join the civilian blockade, and on 18 September 2015, he held a meeting of
the council in Genichesk, Kherson region, to organize the “blockade of Crimea” and determine the
campaign sites. Mr Chubarov also confirmed that the organizer of the energy blockade of the
peninsula, Mr Lenur Islyamov, acted under his and the Mejlis’ instructions.348
- The blockade started on 20 September 2015, involving the organization of protest actions
near the border by Mejlis members and the Ukrainian extremist organization “Right Sector”, which
was and remains banned in the Russian Federation.349 The blockade took the form of blocking
transport communications and all three border crossing points of Kalanchak, Chaplinka and
Chongar between Ukraine and Crimea.350 On 20 September 2015, the day the unauthorized protest
345 See para.190; Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea, Warning (repeated) to Mr Refat Chubarov, Chairman of the
Mejlis, on the impermissibility of carrying out extremist activities, 5 July 2014 (Annex 527).
346 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
p. 13.
347 Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Civil blockade of Crimea: how it will be, available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RBS9FgXCBtg, transcript of the video record , 8 September 2015 (Annex 1220);
Senior operative officer on High-Priority Cases of the Counter-Extremism Centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for
the Republic of Crimea, Record of observing the Internet-source, 11 February 2016 (Annex 268). This resulted in the
opening of a criminal investigation, see Appendix E, para. 84.
348 Interfax Ukraine, “Crimean Tatars to block administrative border with Crimea on Sept 20-21 - Chubarov”, 14
September 2015 (Annex 930).
349 Banned by Decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 17 November 2014, Case No. AKPI14-
1292C; see Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, List of public associations and religious organisations in
respect of which the court has taken a legally effective decision to liquidate them or ban their activities on the grounds
provided for by Federal Law of 25 July 2002 No. 114-FZ “On counteracting extremist activities”, as at 7 April 2021
(Annex 503).
350 The organization and participation of the Mejlis and the Right Sector in the blockade was acknowledged and
encouraged by the Ukrainian President, see “Poroshenko said that the aim of the blockade is the return of Crimea to
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actions started, Mr Chubarov gave a public statement in the Genichesky district, inciting people to
participate in the actions aimed at forced return of Crimea to Ukraine:
“Our goal is to unoccupy Crimea and restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine […]. We
understand that this objective will be achieved by our actions to be established step by step
and other steps will follow, step by step, in September, October. Dear friends, today we
start the first steps. We do not pass a single car, truck with any cargo, which wants to cross
the administrative border to Crimea. To avoid any inconveniences associated with traffic
jams and congestion, we do not pass any truck; we do not pass unloaded trucks, if any. At
each point we will have senior people who will be coordinating our activities. This is very
important; this is the way it was on the Maidan in Kiev and other cities of Ukraine.”351
- In his interview of 16 October 2015, Mr Chubarov stated that the blockade should be
comprehensive and that it should include cutting off electricity supply.352
- On 20 November 2015 four pylons supporting electricity transmission lines from Ukraine to
Crimea were targeted by explosives, resulting in the destruction of two pylons and serious damage
to two other pylons. On 21 November 2015 the staff of trunk lines of the South Energy System was
blocked by the protesters led by Mr Islyamov at a distance of 500 metres from the scene. On 22
November 2015, the remaining two pylons were downed by further explosive detonations; Mr
Lenur Islyamov, an associate of the Mejlis, was found guilty by the Russian court for organising this
further attack.353 In the following weeks Mejlis members blocked representatives of Ukrenergo –
Ukraine”, Regnum, 22 September 2015, Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian
Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 166. Ukraine took no steps to prevent and
repress the organization and implementation on its territory of the so-called civilian blockade and electric blockade. For
the complicity and support from the Ukrainian authorities, see also “Trade blockade? Ukrainian activists block food
trucks on checkpoints to Crimea”, Russia Today, 20 September 2015, in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’
Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 63.
Ukraine’s inaction against extremist groups such as the Right Sector was pointed and deplored by the CERD Committee
(Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the twenty-second and twentythird
periodic reports of Ukraine, 90th session, 23 August 2016, UN Doc. CERD/C/UKR/CO/22-23, para. 15).
351 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU), p.
2-3 and 15.
352 Letter of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 21 June 2018
(Annex 483), p. 3. See also further statements in Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016,
Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU), p. 16.
353 On 10 December 2020, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea found L. Islyamov guilty of organising a
sabotage, creating an illegal armed formation, and publicly calling for violating the territorial integrity of Russia (crimes
under paras. a, b of Part 2 of Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Part 1 of Article 208 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (as amended by Federal Law No. 130-FZ of 5 May 2014), Part 2 of Article
280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). See, Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 1-
11/2020, Decision, 10 December 2020 (Annex 430), p. 94. On 8 April 2021, the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of
the Third Court of Appeal of General Jurisdiction upheld the sentence of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea
in respect of L. Islyamov regarding the sabotage and the creation of the illegal armed formation. As for charges under
Part 2 of Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (public calls for violating the territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation using the mass media), the sentence was quashed in view of decriminalization of this offence
committed for the first time within a period of a year. See Third Court of Appeal of General Jurisdiction, Case No. 55-
116/2021, Appellate Decision, 8 April 2021 (Annex 432), pp. 20-21. “Destruction of the Remaining Electric Power
Line Poles in Ukraine Led to Blackout in Crimea”, RBC, 22 November 2015 in Documents from the Dossier and
65
the then Ukrainian state enterprise exercising operational and technological control over the
Ukraine power systems and interstate transmission lines – from repairing the transmission line.354
- During the electric blackout the Crimean authorities declared the state of emergency and
companies had to interrupt activities in order to save electricity,355 which provoked economic
disruptions. On 22 November 2015, Mr Islyamov stated: “We are blocking, staying where we are,
strengthening our positions here. We accept new patriots who come here. Now, a whole bunch of
people are coming here on buses, so we now place them, they arrive, we install more tents here and
wait for further decision of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People.” As the Acting Director of
Ukrenergo, Mr Kovalchuk, said at his press conference, representatives of the so-called “Crimean
Blockade” conditioned access of the repair team to the pylons by assurances of non-delivery of
electricity to Crimea until a number of political issues raised in connection with their act are
resolved.356 Another similar explosion occurred again at the end of December 2015.357
- In 2015 Crimea’s power supply was mainly dependent on four electricity lines supplying
electricity to the Peninsula from Ukraine. As a result of these explosions, Crimea was left without
electricity supply, and had to use backup generators for the most important facilities (hospitals,
schools, etc.), while the local population mostly survived without any source of energy. For about
three weeks, the interruption of energy deliveries to Crimea caused widespread disruptions,
affecting daily life on the peninsula, notably food conservation, public transportation and economic
activity, as reported by Ukraine’s own evidence.358 The humanitarian situation thus created was all
the more difficult for the population as winter was coming with its hard weather and low
temperatures. Electric supply from Ukraine to Crimea has never resumed to this day; instead, since
December 2015 the only power supply to Crimea has been provided from the Krasnodar region
(mainland Russia).
Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 70-
71. See also: “Islyamov on blowing up the pylons: Crimean Tatars are tired of waiting”, Hromadske TV, 20 October
2015, available in Ukrainian at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxwUFjSk80U in Documents from the Dossier and
Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 145;
“Initiator of the Crimean Blockade Lenur Islyamov put forward the demands to Russian authorities”, News One, 22
November 2015, available in Russian at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wac9WEUWVyc (at 0:05), in Documents
from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures
(Annex 1267), ibid.: “We want at least one political prisoner for one pylon”.
354 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU), pp.
16-17; Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 127-APG16-4, Decision, 29 September 2016 (Annex 915 to
MU), p. 5.
355 “Ukraine Gave Some Light to Crimea”, RIA, 8 December 2015 in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder
as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 72.
356 RIA Novosti, “Participants of the blockade of Crimea stated the conditions for admission of power engineers to
power lines”, 23 November 2015 (Annex 939).
357 “Aksyonov Called the Blasting of the Pole of Electric Power Supply Line in Kherson Region A Terrorist Attack”,
Lenta.ru, 31 December 2015 in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation
for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 75.
358 See for instance OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2015 to 15 February
2016 (Annex 314 to MU), para. 185.
66
- On 7 December 2015, Mr Islyamov was reported to declare: “We have passed repairmen
according to the decision of the leaders of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People. We, as activists,
as the Mejlis, created a humanitarian catastrophe in Crimea.”359 It confirms that the Mejlis
orchestrated the blockade but also was fully aware of its dire consequences on the whole Crimean
population. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea found in particular that in the period
from November to December 2015 the Mejlis directly participated in organising a blockade of
repair works – aimed at restoring the pylons supporting electricity transmission lines – by
representatives of Ukrenergo.360 The activists only announced the end of the civilian blockade on 17
January 2016 after the Ukrainian government had partially acceded to their demands by adopting a
decree on 18 December 2015 that imposed strict restrictions on the delivery of goods, services, food
and personal belongings to and from Crimea,361 thus openly confirming its complicity with the
organizers of the blockade.
- In the aftermath of the electric blockade in December 2015, Mr Islyamov established a
Crimean Tatar armed unit, the so-called Noman Çelebicihan battalion. The declared goal of the
battalion is to compromise the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation by means of guerilla
warfare aiming at effecting Crimea’s secession from the Russian Federation through the use of
violence.362 On 10 December 2020, Mr Islyamov was found guilty of creating an illegal armed
formation (prohibited by Article 208(1), paragraphs “a”, “b” of the Russian Criminal Code).363
- In a speech delivered on 26 February 2016, eleven days after the Prosecutor of Crimea
applied for the ban on the Mejlis, Mr Chubarov declared: “At a meeting of the National Security
and Defense Council on Crimea in 2014, I would have encouraged all to declare a state of war with
Russia”.364 On 17 March 2016, Mr Chubarov gave an interview to Radio Liberty in Prague and
said: “during the occupation, the first to enter will be the military, they will ensure public order.
Russia will leave Crimea, together with it those will run whom we call collaborators etc”.365
168. In the period from 23 April 2014 to 16 February 2015, the Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea
served no less than 11 warnings to prevent acts of extremism in relation to the illegal activities of
359 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU), p.
18.
360 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
p. 18.
361 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016 (Annex 314 to
MU), para. 197.
362 Komsomolskaya Pravda, “Inglorious extremists: How a runaway businessman wanted to ‘advance to Crimea’ but
failed”, 14 January 2020 (Annex 1015).
363 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 1-11/2020, Decision, 10 December 2020 (Annex 430), p. 94;
Third Court of Appeal of General Jurisdiction, Case No. 55-116/2021, Appellate Decision, 8 April 2021 (Annex 432),
pp. 20-21.
364 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
p. 14; see also Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 127-APG16-4, Decision, 29 September 2016 (Annex
915 to MU), p. 7.
365 Ibid., p. 14 (Annex 913 to MU).
67
the leaders of the Mejlis, including planning and organizing provocative unsanctioned rallies. The
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea does not mention that any such warnings had been
challenged, despite the possibility to do so being provided for under statutory law.366
169. The Mejlis did not contest the reality of the statements or acts submitted by the Prosecutor.
In addition, it did not complain of – nor even suggested that there had been – racial discrimination.
170. In reaching its decision based on the above-listed offences, the Supreme Court of Crimea
noted that “the nature of violations made by the public organization, as well as their effects are so
significant that the restoration of the rule of law is only possible by banning its activities.” It added
that “[t]he balance of the rights to freedom of assembly and association and the coercive measures
aimed at safeguarding interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of the
persons is respected.”367
The Continuing Extremist Conduct of the Mejlis
171. Despite the declaration of the Mejlis as an extremist organization and the ban on its activities
in 2016, the Mejlis and its leaders did not put an end to their extremist rhetoric inciting to violence.
They continued to take actions aimed at destabilizing Crimea and its population at any cost, that is,
in line with their endorsement of violent methods and with Mr Chubarov’s stated goal of waging an
open war with Russia. As is shown below, the Mejlis continued in particular to incite to violence
against the constitutional foundations of the Russian Federation and its territorial integrity, to
violate other citizens’ human rights, and to use or threat to use or advocate for violence to create
impediments in the work of government authorities. In addition, Mr Chubarov, who became a
member of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s Parliament), established in Kiev a so-called “Council of
the Mejlis”, consisting of 9 members residing in Ukraine’s capital. In 2016, this organization
received 60 million Ukrainian grivens – equivalent to more than 2 million USD – from the state
budget of Ukraine.368
172. The continuation of the Mejlis’ and its leaders’ unlawful activities in breach of the Russian
courts’ decisions is greatly facilitated by the fact that the Mejlis leaders mostly involved in such
violent actions have relocated in Kiev. They benefit from the complicity and active support of the
366 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
p. 14.
367 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
p. 20.
368 “Prime-Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk declared that the Government is for the first time planning to
allocate 60 million grivens to finance the needs of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people. According to the website
“Business Media”, Mr Yatsenyuk announced such a measure this Sunday, on 27 December, at a “10 minutes with the
Prime-Minister” programme” (Business Media, “Yatsenyuk: 60 million Ukrainian hryvnias allocated to the Mejlis from
the state budget”, 27 December 2015 (Annex 944)). See also Letter of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the
Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 21 June 2018 (Annex 483), p. 4.
68
Ukrainian authorities, which finance them and which do not take any action to bring their violent
actions to an end, despite the fact that most of such actions (like the 2015 blockades) have been
committed or prepared on Ukrainian territory. On the contrary, the Mejlis’ leaders participate in
meetings of various international organizations and other fora as representatives of Ukraine, or
serve as members of parliament. Mr Chubarov himself is a Member of the Ukrainian Parliament
and is part of Ukraine’s delegation in the present case, as “Adviser” of the Applicant State.369 It
shows that Ukraine condones the violent conduct and strategy of the Mejlis, which is indeed
effectively acting today as an instrumentality of the Government of Ukraine and not as a
representative institution of the Crimean Tatars living on the peninsula.
173. In this regard, it is also telling that the website of the infamous “Mirotvorets [Center]”370
controlled and sponsored by Ukraine371 blacklists respected Crimean Tatar community leaders,
some of them being former members of the Mejlis or Qurultay or individuals cooperating with the
local authorities in Crimea, based on their political opinions, thus putting their security and even
lives at risk.372 Such practice of publicly listing designated enemies and their personal information
is known to have led to assassinations of individuals.373 As the Court will recall, the Mirotvorets
[Center] has gone as far as publicly listing Agents and Counsel of the Russian Federation before the
ECtHR and the ICJ on its website as traitors and enemies of Ukraine, thus threatening their security
and attempting to intimidate them in these proceedings.374 The respective outcomes of these grave
incidents before both Courts amply confirmed that Ukraine is exercising control over the activities
of this infamous extremist organization, whatever it stated in this respect.
174. The Russian Federation has previously pointed to the Court some examples of violent acts
attributable to the Mejlis and its leaders since the ban.375
175. In addition, Mr Chubarov has repeatedly stated that all Russian nationals currently living in
Crimea – and those who intend to move to Crimea – would be expelled from the peninsula.376 In its
369 See the official list of the representatives of Ukraine as it appears in the verbatim records of the Hearings on
Preliminary Objections (CR 2019/9 to CR 2019/12, 3 to 7 June 2019) and in the Court’s Judgment on Preliminary
Objections (I.C.J. Reports 2019, p. 562).
370 Website of the “Myrotvorets.center” (“Mirotvorets”) (Annex 1286).
371 RNS, “Ukrainian website ‘Mirotvorets’ announced termination of its activities”, 10 December 2019 (Annex 1012);
Facebook page of Anton Gerashchenko, former Deputy of Verkhovna Rada, "I, as well as many well-known
journalists...", 16 December 2014 (Annex 1255); RIA Novosti, “Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine promised to
create new resources similar to Mirotvorets website”, 13 May 2016 (Annex 956); RBC, “Politician involved with the
‘Mirotvorets’ was appointed Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine”, 25 September 2019 (Annex 1009). To be
sure, the organization is still active.
372 See Chapter III above, para. 124.
373 Strana.ua, “Murder of Buzina and calls for ISIS. Story of Mirotvorets”, 12 May 2016 (Annex 955). See also Letter
of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 16 March 2020 (Annex
496), p. 2.
374 Letter of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 16 March 2020
(Annex 496) with annexes 1 to 5.
375 Letter of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 21 June 2018
(Annex 483), p. 5.
69
appeal of 12 March 2018 to the Crimean Tatars and the Crimean population in general, the Mejlis
declared that it would “continue to take all measures to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine over
the Crimean peninsula, and restore the status of Crimea on the basis of the right of Crimean Tatar
people to self-determination as an indigenous people of Ukraine.”377 It should be highlighted that in
this statement, Mr Chubarov deliberately used the expression “any measures”, not “any legal
measures” or “any peaceful measures”. For any objective observer the use of this expression
undoubtedly reflects its author’s intention to include violent conduct and the use of force in the
measures referred to.
C. UKRAINE’S CLAIMS ARE UNFOUNDED
176. In light of the above, Ukraine’s claim that the measures against the Mejlis constitute a
racially oriented “oppression” is patently baseless.
177. As examined above,378 the two domestic judicial decisions banning the Mejlis as an
extremist organization and prohibiting its activities in 2016 relied on a detailed examination of the
publicly available record of the conduct of the organization, its members and close associates and
concluded that such conduct was of an extremist nature.
178. A consideration of the general practice of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
indicates that the decision to ban the Mejlis, taken by this Court on 29 September 2016 in
confirmation of the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea of 26 April 2016, was
fully in line with such general practice and therefore did not reflect any arbitrary or discriminatory
application of relevant domestic law against extremism. Under the Court’s general practice, “[a]
gross breach of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws
or other regulations, committed by an association of citizens, may be in the form of actions aimed at
denying the fundamental democratic principles, rights or freedoms recognized by the Constitution
of the Russian Federation, generally recognized principles and rules of international law, treaties of
the Russian Federation, federal laws and other regulations; aimed at war propaganda or stirring up
national, race or religious hatred, calls for discrimination, hatred or violence.”379 As seen above,
376 Crimean News Agency QHA, “Chubarov told how to ‘cleanse’ Crimea after de-occupation”, 16 June 2017 (Annex
974). He again recalled that Russians would have to leave Crimea in his interview on “5th Channel” (Ukraine) on 10
March 2018 (See 5th Channel, “Time. Daily Round-up”, Interview with Mr Refat Chubarov, 8 March 2018 (Annex
1227).
377 Website of the Mejlis, "Appeal of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people", 12 March 2018 (Annex 1270).
378 See paras. 164-170 above.
379 Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 64 of 27 December 2016 on certain
matters arising when Courts review cases on the suspension of activities or liquidation of non-commercial
organizations, and on the ban on activities of public or religious associations which are not legal entities, in Information
on the implementation by the courts of the Russian Federation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination prepared in connection with the examination of the 23rd and 24th reports of the Russian
Federation by CERD Committee, August 2017 (Annex 477), p. 25, italics in the original.
70
the activities of the Mejlis relied on to ban this organization fully fall within this description of the
Court’s general practice.
179. The decision of the Russian Supreme Court to ban the Mejlis is also in line with that Court’s
general practice in understanding of extremism generally, as relying both on Russian constitutional
and statutory law and on relevant instruments of international law.380 As is evident from the facts
analysed above, the conduct of the Mejlis’ leaders undoubtedly meet the criteria of extremism that
are uniformly applied by the Supreme Court in all cases without distinction.381
As results from the above and the Russian courts’ 2016 decisions, declaring the Mejlis
an extremist organization and banning its activities was warranted, adequate,
proportionate and necessary to ensure the preservation of legally-protected rights and
interests of other citizens and the State.
In addition, it results from the balancing exercise required by the application of
legitimate limitations that the ban does not breach any of the Crimean Tatars’ rights and
certainly not under CERD. The extent and gravity of the identified extremist activities,
their extensive negative impact on the free exercise by other citizens of their human
and lawfully guaranteed rights and the threat to the constitutional order and the
integrity of the Russian Federation, the fact that the activities were performed or
condoned by the leading members at the highest level of the organization, including its
Chairman and Deputy Chairman, thereby being attributable to the organization as a
whole, the persistent repetition of such conduct during an extended period despite
repeated warnings from the authorities, all these elements compelled the ban on the
activities of the Mejlis as a whole and its qualification as an extremist organization.
The facts stated above clearly meet any threshold that may be required to establish the
existence of extremist activities and a breach of the law, including under the most
restrictive possible approaches. The accumulation of repeated conduct despite
warnings, the tolerant approach of the authorities – involving multiple warnings before
taking action382 –, the clear and unambiguous language used by Mr Chubarov, other
leaders and close associates, the gravity of the blockade and of the destruction of
380 Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 11 of 28 June 2011, as amended on 3
November 2016, on Court practice of criminal cases of an extremist nature, in Information on the implementation by
the courts of the Russian Federation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination prepared in connection with the examination of the 23rd and 24th reports of the Russian Federation by
CERD Committee, August 2017 (Annex 477), pp. 26-27.
381 Ibid.
382 Russia served no less than 11 warnings between 23 April 2014 and 16 February 2015 in connection with illegal
activities of the Mejlis: Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016
(Annex 913 to MU), p. 14. The Russian Federation only took action to ban the Mejlis after more than two years had
elapsed since Crimea’s accession, which confirms that the Mejlis had been left with ample and repeated opportunities to
change course and renounce violence before the ban.
71
electric transmission lines as well as their negative economic383 and humanitarian384
impact on the entire population of the peninsula in terms of power and food supply
leave no doubt about it.
180. Ukraine contends that the ban was a “political measure directed at the Crimean Tatar
community as a whole”385 and relies on a report of the Council of Europe to claim that a ban on the
Mejlis “would indicate a new level of repression targeting the Crimean Tatar community as a
whole”. However, in relying on what constitutes a political statement made prior to – and without
the benefit from – the ban decisions, Ukraine carefully omitted to quote the paragraph that precedes
the sentence it refers to, which reads: “the perception of the [human rights] delegation [of the
Council of Europe] is that the cases of repression, as severe as they may be, seem more targeted
against individual opponents, whether they are Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians or others, rather than
reflecting a collective repression policy against the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group.”386
181. Ukraine’s position also overlooks the important fact that the Application of Crimea’s
Prosecutor that led to the ban was partly based on a request by members of the Crimean Tatar
community. On 2 February 2016, the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea had received a
letter from several Crimean Tatar organizations, including “Qirim Birligi”, the “Committee of
Crimean Tatar Youth” and “The Council of Elders of Crimean Tatars”, requesting a ban of the
Mejlis and accusing its leaders of participating in the blockade of Crimea.387 In so doing, the
applicants strongly dissociated themselves from the Mejlis’ violent, subversive and self-interested
agenda.
182. Ukraine is also elusive on the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
issued on the Mejlis’ appeal. In fact the decision confirmed all material findings of the first
judgment.
183. In this context, Ukraine cannot pretend to be surprized that the ban was enforced against
eight Mejlis members, including fines, for illegally holding a Mejlis meeting at the home of one of
383 In Simferopol only, the economic loss for enterprises in this period was reported to be over 1,3 billion Russian
rubles, see “Bakharev: Blackout Caused Over a Billion in Damages to Simferopol Enterprises”, RIA Novosti Krym, 11
May 2016 in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings
on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 144.
384 Council of Europe, Report to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe by Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann
on his human rights visit to Crimea (25-31 January 2016), 11 April 2016 (Annex 825 to MU), para. 57.
385 MU, para. 426 and footnote 894, citing Council of Europe, Report to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe
by Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann on his human rights visit to Crimea (25-31 January 2016), 11 April 2016 (Annex
825 to MU), p. 4.
386 Council of Europe, Report to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe by Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann
on his human rights visit to Crimea (25-31 January 2016), 11 April 2016 (Annex 825 to MU), p. 4. To be sure, the
Russian Federation disagrees with the report’s allegation of severe cases of repression.
387 Appeal from the representatives of 5 Crimean Tatar organizations to the Office of the Prosecutor of the Republic
of Crimea, 2 February 2016 in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation
for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 146-147.
72
them, Deputy Chairman Ilmi Umerov,388 as this was in breach of the Prosecutor’s decision to
suspend the Mejlis’ activities pending the final decision in the matter.389 Ukraine specifically refers
to the two individual cases of Mr Shevket Kaybullayev, who was fined 500 rubles (about USD
8.00),390 and Mr Mustafa Maushev, who was fined 750 rubles (about USD 11.60).391 As confirmed
in the court judgment for Mr Maushev, Mr Umerov himself, the vice-chairman of the Mejlis who
hosted the meeting at his home, confirmed that he had been indeed organizing a Mejlis meeting
there, as opposed to merely receiving friends’ private visits. As reported by the Court, Mr Umerov’s
explanations leave no doubt as to the character of the meeting.392
184. As part of factual elements that are supposed to establish an alleged “strategy targeting the
Crimean Tatar community as a whole” through individual measures,393 Ukraine also relies on a
statement attributed to Mr Alexander Formanchuk, Co-chair of the Association of political
scientists of Crimea and former Deputy Chairman of the Civic Сhamber of the Republic of Crimea
(currently – Chairman of the Civic Сhamber of the Republic of Crimea). This is but another of
Ukraine’s attempts to re-write events.
According to Ukraine, in substance Alexander Formanchuk allegedly publicly
identified the Crimean Tatar community as the main obstacle to the integration of
Crimea into the political and legal space of the Russian Federation.394 However, the
context of the whole excerpt contained in the relevant Annex confirms that what
Mr Formanchuk actually said was very different from Ukraine’s distorted account of it.
In fact, Mr Formanchuk, who spoke as a political scientist and not as a State official
commenting on a specific policy or decision, was only making the point that Crimean
Tatars faced challenges in terms of integration in Crimea, both under Ukrainian and
then Russian sovereignty. He was also pointing to the confrontational and separatist
trends of the Mejlis – as opposed to the Crimean Tatar community – as part of the
problem to this integration. Thus, this statement does not support, but to the contrary
contradicts, Ukraine’s allegations.
388 MU, para. 427.
389 Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea, Decision on suspension of activities of the Mejlis, 12 April 2016 (Annex
272); Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, Order No. 595-r “On the inclusion of a public association into the
List of public associations and religious organisations whose operation is suspended in view of their extremist
activities”, 18 April 2016 (Annex 466).
390 MU, para. 427, and Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-1591/2016, Ruling,
4 October 2016 (Annex 916 to MU).
391 MU, para. 417, and Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-1588/2016, Ruling, 23
November 2016 (Annex 917 to MU).
392 Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-1588/2016, Ruling, 23 November 2016
(Annex 917 to MU), p. 2; Mr Ilmi Umerov’s written explanation, 27 September 2016 (Annex 297) confirming that the
meeting held at his home on 22 September 2016 was aimed at resolving organizational issues of the Mejlis.
393 MU, para. 413.
394 MU, para. 413 and fn. 866, referring to extracts of a press article: Kommersant, “The Crimean Tatar Ego”, 23
March 2015 (Annex 1050 to MU).
73
The understanding of the Mejlis as a radical organization prone to inflaming tensions
was shared at large in Crimea prior to its ban, as confirmed by a meeting that President
Putin held with local community leaders at the time. At this meeting, held on 17 August
2015 in Yalta, the Mejlis and Mr Chubarov were already mentioned several times by
local community leaders themselves, including the leader of Crimean Tatar movement
“Qirim” (himself a former member of the Mejlis), as the main problem standing in the
way of peace and development on the peninsula.395 Given Mr Formanchuk’s position
as an adviser to Mr Aksyonov who has been initiating many measures in favour of the
Crimean Tatars,396 it is not possible to read any discriminatory intent into his statement,
contrary to Ukraine’s assertions.
Other Measures Related to Mejlis Members Were Adopted for Legitimate Reasons
185. Besides the ban of the Mejlis and in light of the same relevant factual context, Ukraine’s
other related claims are also manifestly unfounded, including allegations concerning restrictions of
movement of Mejlis leaders (A), specific allegations of oppression of the Mejlis (B), prosecutions
and convictions related to the demonstrations of 26 February 2014 (C), and the arrest and detention
of Mr Ilmi Umerov (D).
A. ALLEGED RESTRICTIONS ON THE MOVEMENTS OF CRIMEAN TATAR LEADERS
186. Ukraine claims that a number of measures restricting the movement of Crimean Tatar
leaders constitute racial discrimination under CERD. Here again, Ukraine’s allegations are baseless
and have nothing to do with racial discrimination.397 Actually, none of the individuals concerned
complained of racial discrimination in respect of those sets of facts. In addition, Ukraine’s
allegations either overlook the objective and reasonable basis as well as legal ground for the
impugned measures, or rely on a misleading factual account. The present section will deal with each
of these cases in turn.
Allegations concerning Mr Mustafa Dzhemilev
187. With regard to the bans from entering Crimea imposed on Mr Dzhemilev in April 2014 and
on Mr Chubarov in July 2014, Ukraine contends that these measures are another illustration of the
395 President of the Russian Federation official website, “Meeting with representatives from Crimean ethnic groups’
public associations”, Yalta, 17 August 2015 (Annex 460).
396 See elsewhere in this Counter-Memorial and the present Chapter, para. 233. See also footnote 117. In particular,
supporting measures under the authority of Mr Aksyonov include, inter alia, the creation of the contact group on
disappearances in October 2014, and the creation of the Council of Crimean Tatars under the Head of the Republic of
Crimea on 29 March 2018 (consisting of the members of the Shura elected by the extraordinary Qurultay of Muslims of
Crimea on 17 February 2018). He also has authority over the State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic
of Crimea.
397 MU, paras. 414-420.
74
Russian Federation’s systematic campaign of racial discrimination targeted at the Crimean Tatar
community as a whole.398 However, Ukraine completely omits to mention the relevant context and
the reason for such measures.
188. Mr Dzhemilev’s 5-year entry ban to Crimea was served to him on 22 April 2014 based on
applicable statutory law allowing competent authorities to deny to foreign citizens and stateless
persons entry to the territory of the Russian Federation in specific circumstances, including among
others “ensuring the defense capability or security of the state or public order”.399 Mr Dzhemilev’s
judicial challenge of the ban was unsuccessful. While he failed to initiate such challenge within the
statutory time-limit, the Court nevertheless proceeded to a full examination of the arguments and
evidence put before it, together with the applicable legal framework. Against this analysis the Court
confirmed the legitimate character of the ban as determined by the competent authorities.400 In
particular, the Court confirmed that Mr Dzhemilev, a Ukrainian citizen, had not acquired Russian
citizenship because his permanent residence in Crimea as of 18 March 2014 had not been
established. Thus, this episode falls outside of the purview of CERD, which does not govern
distinctions between citizens and non-citizens.401 In any event, his appeal of the decision before the
Russian Supreme Court was dismissed.402 Indeed, both the competent authorities and Russian
courts had every reason to consider that Mr Dzhemilev might pose a tangible threat to public order
and the State’s security as he had been recently using his status as former leader of the Mejlis to
make explicit public threats in this regard.403 As the Ukrainian Prime Minister publicly admitted
shortly after Mr Dzhemilev’s entry ban and the 3 May 2014 riots, Ukraine and Mr Dzhemilev
actively cooperated to set up a plan and program with the objective of returning Crimea to
Ukraine.404 Thus it is only natural that such public radical statements and activities drew the
attention of Russian authorities in charge of public safety protection and lead to an appropriate and
legitimate response.
398 MU, para. 414.
399 Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On the procedure for exit from the Russian Federation and entry into the Russian
Federation”, 15 August 1996 (Annex 33) (“Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 15 August 1996”), Article 27(1).
400 Moscow City Court, Сase No. 3a-0836/2016, Decision, 20 May 2016 (Annex 275).
401 See paras. 380-382 below.
402 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 5-APG16-81S, Appellate Decision, 14 December 2016
(Annex 303).
403 UNIAN, “Dzhemilev promises to ‘surprise’ the occupants if they don’t let him enter Crimea”, 22 March 2014
(Annex 898): “'For now, my actions in case I’m not allowed in there will remain a secret and surprise for the occupation
government. We will not give them the opportunity to prepare”; Censor.NET, “War with Ukraine will mark the
beginning of the end for Russia and lead to the country’s collapse, – Dzhemilev”, 14 March 2014 (Annex 895),
suggesting that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia will lead to the downfall of the latter; Website of the Mejlis,
“Mustafa Dzhemilev: Crimean Tatars will hold their own referendum to determine the future of Crimea”, 27 March
2014 (Annex 1247), announcing that Mr Dzhemilev was planning to hold its own referendum regarding the status of
Crimea.
404 iPress.ua, “Yatsenyuk re-assured that he works on a plan to return Crimea”, 8 August 2014 (Annex 910): “We are
currently looking for funding, and together with Mustafa Dzhemilev, we are working on a stage-by-stage plan and
programme to return Crimea”.
75
189. In these circumstances, Mr Dzhemilev’s attempt to cross the border on 3 May 2014 was a
blatant deliberate provocation and an illegal act since the entry ban against him was already in
force. The provocative character of his act is all the more obvious that he had already
unsuccessfully attempted to enter the Russian Federation the day before, having been blocked at the
border control of Sheremetyevo airport after disembarking from a flight from Kiev.405
Mr Dzhemilev’s attempt to violate the entry ban issued against him resulted in the opening of a
criminal case, pursuant to applicable law.406
Allegations concerning Mr Refat Chubarov
190. Under the same circumstances, the entry ban that followed on Mr Chubarov,407 who had
organized the 3 May 2014 violent action and who had been publicly expressing radical views and
inflamed tensions, was justified and would have been expected. This 5-year ban from entering the
territory of the Russian Federation was served to him on 5 July 2014.408 As clarified in a Letter
from the Federal Migration Service to Mr Chubarov of 8 January 2015 that is submitted by Ukraine
itself, Mr Chubarov’s expulsion is “necessary to ensure the defense or security of the state, public
order, or public health” under Article 27(1) of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 15 August 1996, which
governs restrictions to entry of foreign citizens and stateless persons on the territory of the Russian
Federation.409 Here again, Mr Chubarov’s entry ban falls outside the purview of CERD, which does
not prohibit distinctions between citizens and non-citizens as long as they do not discriminate
against any particular nationality. The entry ban would have been all but unexpected: since March
2014 and up to it, Mr Chubarov had, in his capacity as Mejlis Chairman, already been served with at
least three warnings from the Crimean Prosecutor on the impermissibility of extremist activities.410
405 Moscow City Court, Сase No. 3a-0836/2016, Decision, 20 May 2016 (Annex 275).
406 Border Control Department of the Federal Security Service of Russia in the Republic of Crimea, Criminal Case
No. 2014818017, Resolution on initiation of the criminal case, 11 August 2014 (Annex 167). The case was later
suspended due to the absence of Mr Dzhemilev, who currently resides outside Russia: Senior Forensic Investigator of
the Investigative Department of the Directorate of the Federal Security Service of Russia for the Republic of Crimea
and the city of Sevastopol, Criminal Case No. 2014818017, Resolution on suspension of preliminary investigation,
8 April 2016 (Annex 271). See also RIA Novosti Krym, “Russian Investigative Committee finished the investigation of
the case of Dzhemilev, ex-leader of the Mejlis*”, 5 May 2020 (Annex 1022).
407 MU, para. 414.
408 Kryminform, “Poklonskaya warns Chubarov on the possibility of declaring the Mejlis an extremist organisation
(VIDEO)”, 8 July 2014 (Annex 908).
409 MU, para. 414, footnote 868, referring to Letter from Federal Migration Service to R. Chubarov, 8 January 2015
(Annex 849 to MU), and Letter from FSB to R. Chubarov, 13 March 2015 (Annex 858 to MU).
410 See para. 167 above; Acting Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea, Warning issued to Mr Refat Chubarov,
Chairman of the Mejlis, on the impermissibility of violating the law, 23 April 2014 (Annex 522); Prosecutor of the
Republic of Crimea, Warning issued to Mr Refat Chubarov, Chairman of the Mejlis, on the impermissibility of carrying
out extremist activities, 3 May 2014 (Annex 523); Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea, Warning (repeated) to Mr
Refat Chubarov, Chairman of the Mejlis, on the impermissibility of carrying out extremist activities, 5 July 2014
(Annex 527).
76
191. When he was served with the entry ban when attempting to cross the border checkpoint from
Ukraine, Mr Chubarov was returning from a Mejlis meeting held in the Kherson region on 4 July
2014 and discussing the implementation of a Qurultay decision “on the realization of the right of the
Crimean Tatar people to self-determination”.411 This followed similar acts and statements,
including a call for boycotting elections to the State Council of Crimea made only a few days earlier
at the occasion of the celebration of Crimean Tatar flag day, on 26 June 2014.412
192. Mr Chubarov did not challenge the entry ban before the competent courts. Instead, he
continued conducting activities aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation, such as giving public speeches through the media calling for extremism and as one of
the key actors of the so-called “people’s (civilian) blockade of Crimea” that blocked all roads and
communications between Crimea and Ukraine in 2015, as described above.413 Thus the competent
authorities had every reason to impose and maintain a ban on Mr Chubarov’s entry to the country to
ensure the defence or security of the state, public order, or public health under Article 27(1) of
Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 15 August 1996.
Allegations concerning Mr Ismet Yuksel
193. Mr Yuksel was the general coordinator of the Crimean Tatar media outlet QHA and an
adviser to the Mejlis. On 30 June 2014, Mr Yuksel was banned from entry in Crimea for a 5-year
period by an FSB decision. He was notified of this decision while he unsuccessfully attempted to
enter Crimea on 10 August 2014. Ukraine takes issue with this measure and claims that it
“increased the political vulnerability of the Crimean Tatar community”.414 As in other cases, the
decision was lawful and based on legitimate reasons. A Turkish citizen living in Crimea, Mr Yuksel
was denied entry into Crimea based on the same provisions of Russian domestic law as in the case
of the entry bans against Mr Dzhemilev and Mr Chubarov, which provide for the possibility for
competent authorities to deny foreign citizens and stateless persons entry into the territory of the
Russian Federation in certain circumstances, including inter alia “ensuring the defense capability or
security of the state or public order”.415 Once again, Mr Yuksel’s case falls outside of the scope of
CERD, which does not apply to distinction between citizens and non-citizens.
411 Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea, Warning (repeated) to Mr Refat Chubarov, Chairman of the Mejlis, on the
impermissibility of carrying out extremist activities, 5 July 2014 (Annex 527).
412 Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea, Warning (repeated) to Mr Refat Chubarov, Chairman of the Mejlis, on the
impermissibility of carrying out extremist activities, 5 July 2014 (Annex 527).
413 See para. 167 above.
414 MU, para. 416.
415 Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On the procedure for exit from the Russian Federation and entry into the Russian
Federation”, 15 August 1996 (Annex 33), Article 27(1); Head of the Department of the Federal Security Service in the
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Letter of response No. Yu-1329/Yu-1336 on consideration of the request
of I. Yuksel, 29 October 2014 (Annex 198).
77
194. Mr Yuksel challenged the decision before the Moscow City Court, which rejected his
request on 14 May 2015 based on a thorough examination of the arguments and evidence put before
it as well as the applicable legal framework.416 He then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation, which rejected it on 18 November 2015, on the basis of legitimate
reasons.417 The Supreme Court confirmed that “the temporary restrictive measures applied by the
Russian Federal Security Service against Yuksel Ismet pursue a legitimate goal, are proportional
and necessary, and do not violate his rights.” It is evident that the authorities’ concern was similar
to that later underlying the ban on the Mejlis. Like in the two 2016 Mejlis decisions, a key provision
relied on by the Court was Article 55 of the Russian Constitution whereby “human and citizen
rights and freedoms may be limited by federal legislation only to the extent necessary, including to
ensure the country’s defense and security.”418 As with the 2016 decisions that followed, the
Supreme Court referred to applicable international instruments, such as the ECHR and the ICCPR.
Allegations concerning the Controls over Messrs Eskender Bariiev, Sinaver Kadyrov, and
Abmedzhit Suleimanov
195. Ukraine’s and Mr Bariiev’s portrayal of the episode of the check and alleged detention of
Mr Bariiev, Mr Sinaver Kadyrov and Mr Abmedzhit Suleimanov on 22-23 January 2015 as they
were attempting to cross the border, are also deeply misleading.419 The law enforcement authorities
conducted an investigation for inciting to hatred or enmity and for establishing a non-commercial
organization for such purposes. Contrary to what Mr Bariiev alleges, no criminal charges were
raised against any of these three individuals in connection with this episode: in fact, one month
later, on 24 February 2015, the investigating officer decided to close the investigation and declined
to raise formal criminal charges, concluding that the collected evidence did not support such
charges.420
196. Nevertheless, Mr Bariiev alleges having learnt that criminal charges had been raised against
him by consulting a webpage published on the website of the Office of the Prosecutor of the
Republic of Crimea on 29 January 2015.421 This statement is not credible.
First, as a rule criminal charges are communicated to an accused by way of formal
delivery of the act of accusation, not through the posting of a mere press release on the
416 Moscow City Court, Case No. 3-247/2015, Decision, 14 May 2015 (Annex 231).
417 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling No. 5-APG15-110s, 18 November 2015 (Annex 912 to MU).
418 Ibid., p. 2.
419 MU, para. 417; Witness Statement of Eskender Bariiev, 6 June 2018 (Annex 15 to MU), paras. 32-33.
420 High-Priority Cases Investigator of the First Investigative Department for the Investigation of High-Priority Cases
of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation in the Republic of
Crimea, Inquiry material No. 15pr-15, Resolution on refusal to initiate a criminal case, 24 February 2015 (Annex 218).
See also Acting Head of the General Investigative Office of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation of
the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Letter No. Ishsk. 201-08-2020/9779, 20 April 2020 (Annex 422).
421 Witness Statement of Eskender Bariiev, 6 June 2018 (Annex 15 to MU), para. 33.
78
Prosecutor’s website. Tellingly, Mr Bariiev submits no copy of such formal
notification, nor could he do so.
Secondly, far from supporting Mr Bariiev’s accusations, the relevant press release
published on the website of the Office of the Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea
actually does not mention his name once. Instead, it contains a general statement made
by the Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea in the context of a meeting of a working
group on the fight against extremism.422 The statement mentioned six ongoing
investigations – without disclosing any names – covering five discrete heads of
charges. The Prosecutor did not say that all five heads of charges cited by M. Bariiev
related to any of these particular cases, and certainly not to Mr Bariiev’s case423; nor
did the Prosecutor say that formal criminal charges had been raised in relation to any of
these investigations. Thus, that Mr Bariiev could have read the opening of non-existent
criminal proceedings against him into such general communication is simply not
credible.
Nothing in this episode suggests any arbitrary or discriminatory application of the law,
contrary to Ukraine’s contention.424 The distinct administrative proceedings raised
against Mr Kadyrov upon the episode of 22-23 January 2015 relate to an entirely
different matter, namely the violation of migration laws, as is examined elsewhere.425
197. Based on the above, it is extraordinary for Ukraine to contend that “Mr. Bariiev was
ultimately forced to relocate to Kyiv with his wife and two sons after the Russian occupation
authorities brought fabricated criminal charges against him of engaging in and funding extremist
activity, organizing public disturbances, and compromising the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation.”426 Such criminal charges were never raised. Besides, nowhere does Ukraine attempt to
engage in a genuine examination of the facts that gave rise to the investigation against him. In this
regard, it is useful to recall that Mr Bariiev was already within the inner circle of suspected persons
who were apprehended and home searched by the authorities in September 2014 in connection with
the criminal investigation relating to the violent riots of 3 May 2014.427
422 Crimean Prosecutor’s Office official website, “Natalia Poklonskaya: any destructive activities will be suppressed”,
29 January 2015 (Annex 454).
423 As mentioned, the investigation relating to Mr Bariiev, Mr Kadyrov and Mr Suleimanov were only conducted in
respect of two material heads of charges under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, namely inciting to hatred
or enmity (Article 239.2) and establishing a non-commercial organization that infringes on the person and rights of
citizens (Article 282.2).
424 As an example, with respect to Mr Kadyrov Ukraine alleges a discriminatory application of the law at paras. 417
and 473 of MU, but it makes no attempt to establish it.
425 See Appendix C, section II(I), paras. 65-66.
426 MU, para. 418.
427 See Appendix B, paras. 31-33.
79
Allegations concerning Mr Ali Ozenbash
198. Ukraine also reports that “Mr. Ali Ozenbasha [sic], Chairman of the Audit Committee of the
Qurultay of Crimean Tatars and a member of the Mejlis”, was removed from a train while
attempting to cross the border into Ukraine for medical treatment, on or about 11 September
2014.428 As Ukraine eludes but the OSCE confirms, he was eventually able to cross the border into
Ukraine.429 Ukraine provides no further element or explanation as to why it alleges that this act
should point to racial discrimination.
199. As for the inconveniences that Mr Ozenbash experienced during the border control
procedures, his identification data as checked at the initial control matched the data of another
person wanted by the Russian authorities. As a consequence, additional verifications by the Border
Guard Service of the FSB of the Russian Federation were required in order to resolve the issue and
clarify that Mr Ozenbash was not the person wanted by the authorities. He was then left free to
continue his journey. The Border control department of the FSB Border Guard Service clarified this
in its response to Mr Ozenbash’s subsequent request and also indicated that border control officials
are instructed to minimize delays generated by such situations as far as possible.430 Nothing is
discriminatory in such border checking procedures, which apply to everyone.
Allegations concerning Mr Dzhelyalov and Mr Smedlyaev
200. According to Ukraine, “[a]bout a year later, several prominent Mejlis leaders were
prevented from leaving Crimea to attend the World Congress of Crimean Tatars”. It said: “The
Crimean leaders who were prevented from attending this event included some of the most senior
members of the Mejlis and the Qurultay, namely first deputy chairman [of the Mejlis] Nariman
Dzheljalov and chairman of the central electoral commission of the Qurultay [and former Head of
the Secretariat of the Mejlis], Zair Smedlyaev.”431 Ukraine does not provide any detailed
information on this allegation, including on the context and the manner in which the two men were
allegedly prevented from leaving Crimea. In support of its claim Ukraine only refers to a passage of
an OSCE report that states that these persons had been summoned for questioning by the Russian
intelligence services in Crimea on 1 August 2015.432
428 MU, para. 419.
429 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Based on Information Received as of
18:00 (Kyiv time), 11 September 2014 (Annex 809 to MU), p. 4, referred to in MU, fn. 880.
430 First Deputy Head of the Border Control Department of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Letter No.
21/7/3/O-577 to Ozenbash A.A., 17 March 2015 (Annex 223).
431 MU, para. 419.
432 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National
Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015), 17 September 2015
(Annex 812 to MU), para. 155 (referred to in MU, para. 419 and fn. 883).
80
201. What the record shows is different. Mr Dzhelyalov and Mr Smedlyaev had indeed been
summoned to provide testimony as witnesses on 1 August 2015 in a criminal case on the violent
riots of 26 February 2014, which involved in particular Mr Chiygoz, among others. They did testify
on that date before the competent department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian
Federation for the Republic of Crimea in Simferopol433 without any coercive procedural measures
being applied upon them. By that time, the investigation was in an active phase and many witnesses
were interrogated on or around that date. Besides, the witnesses had obviously been aware of the
date of the summon in advance. Under Article 188(3) of the Russian Criminal Procedural Code, a
summoned person shall appear for an interrogation at the scheduled terms or notify the investigator
in advance of his/her reasons for failure to appear. However, neither Mr Dzhelyalov or
Mr Smedlyaev made an attempt to inform the summoning authorities of their possible existing
plans on the summon date and to request the testimony to be re-scheduled at a different date.
202. The Russian authorities imposed no formal restrictions of movement over Messrs
Dzhelyalov and Smedlyaev preventing them from exiting Crimea. They were not subjected to any
enforcement actions as witnesses. Therefore, Ukraine’s accusations of “a campaign of
discriminatory political suppression against Crimean Tatars [that] has affected […] their ability to
leave”434 are baseless, to say the least.
B. ACCUSATIONS OF OPPRESSION OF THE MEJLIS
203. Ukraine’s accusations of oppression of the Mejlis prior to its ban are also manifestly
unfounded.435 While the previous examination of the two judicial decisions banning the Mejlis is
dispositive of the matter, it is necessary to put the record straight on a series of factual
misrepresentations relied upon by Ukraine to support its forged allegation of “a coordinated
campaign on the part of the Russian occupation authorities to put this representative institution (and
through it the entire Crimean Tatar community) under maximum pressure.”436
204. The building that de facto hosted the Mejlis in Simferopol was searched on 16 September
2014 and vacated to be placed under seizure on the following day pursuant to an order on interim
433 High-priority cases investigator of the First Investigative Department for the Investigation of High-Priority Cases
of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of
Crimea, Criminal Case No. 2014467091, Record of additional interrogation of witness (Dzhelyalov N.E.), 1 August
2015 (Annex 241); High-priority cases investigator of the First Investigative Department for the Investigation of High-
Priority Cases of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the
Republic of Crimea, Criminal Case No. 2014467091, Record of additional interrogation of witness (Smedlyaev Z.S.),
1 August 2015 (Annex 242).
434 MU, para. 419.
435 MU, paras. 421-431.
436 MU, para. 421.
81
measures of protection from the Simferopol central district court of 15 September 2014.437 The
building was occupied by the Crimea Foundation, which is presented as the Mejlis’ charitable
foundation, as well as the Mejlis and the media outlet Avdet. The order on interim measures was
taken as part of ongoing proceedings initiated by the Prosecutor of Crimea before the same Court
against the Crimea Foundation for non-compliance with applicable law relating to public
organizations and associations. In particular, and as the Court would eventually rule,438 the Crimea
Foundation, an organization registered under Ukrainian law but not registered in Russia, had
Mr Dzhemilev among its directors, a situation which was illegal since Mr Dzhemilev, a Ukrainian
citizen, had been banned from entry in the Russian Federation a few months earlier due to the threat
posed to the State security by his extremist activities in relation to the status of Crimea.439 The
Court ordered the Crimea Foundation to remedy the violation by taking necessary measures to
remove Mr Dzhemilev from his directorship.
205. In this context, interim measures of protection were aimed at preventing the risk that the
assets and resources of the Crimea Foundation might be used by Mr Dzhemilev, a then declared
undesirable in Russia, in the service of his subversive political activities, which was a real
possibility as long as he remained a director of the organization. To be sure, the order merely
temporarily froze the Crimea Foundation’s exercise of its property rights in respects of its assets
pending final execution of the Court’s decision; it did not permanently divest the Foundation
therefrom. The ordered measures were obviously based on the Crimea Foundation’s noncompliance
with the law rather than any ethnic or racial ground. Their continuation was
subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea as the condition for their
lifting had not been met, namely the Crimea Foundation had not submitted credible evidence that it
had fulfilled its obligation to remove Mr Dzhemilev from its directors.440
206. Ukraine also briefly mentions the situation of a distinct building that had been occupied by
the Bakhchisaray regional mejlis,441 and that bears no relation to the previous episode. The building
was not the property of the mejlis. It was in fact leased by the Bakhchisaray local authorities to a
non-commercial organization, the Council of Teachers, which in turn let the Bakhchisaray regional
mejlis occupy it. Rather than being based on ethnic or racial motives or targeting the regional mejlis,
as Ukraine artificially alleges, the authorities’ actions were determined by a number of contract-
437 Central District Court of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2-1688/14, Ruling on interim measures,
15 September 2014 (Annex 185); Central District Court of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2-1688/14,
Writ of Execution No. 011913686, 15 September 2014 (Annex 186). See MU, paras. 422 and 424.
438 Central District Court of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2-1688/14, Decision, 29 September
2014 (Annex 194).
439 Federal Law No. 7-FZ “On non-profit organizations”, 12 January 1996 (Annex 31). Article 15(1.2) provides that a
director (or founder) of such organizations cannot be a foreign citizen or stateless person whose presence or residence
on the territory of the Russian Federation has been banned pursuant to applicable law.
440 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 33-1258/2017, Appellate Decision, 15 February 2017 (Annex
309).
441 MU, para. 424.
82
related breaches on the Council of Teachers side. The Council of Teachers, the lease tenant, had not
paid the contractual rent for 6 months despite enjoying particularly favourable terms and did not
insure the property, in violation of the lease agreement, which in particular contained a clause
providing for its lapse in case of non-payment of the rent for three months.442 In light of these
circumstances it should be no surprise that the Bakhchisaray authorities decided to terminate the
lease agreement, to which the Bakhchisaray regional mejlis was not even a party.443 At this occasion
the Bakhchisaray mayor clarified that the same treatment applied to all organizations alike without
distinction of any kind and vigorously rejected any accusations that the authorities were specifically
targeting the Crimean Tatar community.444
207. Nor is Ukraine’s reliance on Mr Chubarov’s and Mr Bariiev’s communications and
applications with various State organs of the Russian Federation in relation to the ban on the
Mejlis445 of any assistance to its claims since the record confirms that they were rejected on
procedural grounds and that they were not precluded from curing such defects.446
C. ALLEGED RETROACTIVE PROSECUTIONS AND CONVICTIONS RELATED TO DEMONSTRATIONS OF
26 FEBRUARY 2014
208. Ukraine also accuses the Russian Federation of conducting retroactive prosecutions and
convictions related to demonstrations of 26 February 2014447 in order to exert pressure on Mejlis
leaders.
209. According to Ukraine, “the Russian Federation has resorted to politically-motivated
prosecutions of those Mejlis leaders who remained in Crimea.”448 Under this unilateral and
misleading labelling Ukraine in fact refers to prosecutions for extremist activities, which, again,
have nothing to do with racial discrimination.
442 Kryminform, “Authorities of Bakhchisaray decided to return the premises occupied by the regional mejlis”, 30 July
2014 (Annex 909); SEVAS, “A new ‘resident’ in the Bakhchisaray mejlis’ building”, 3 April 2015 (Annex 920).
443 Lease agreement No. A-46/12, 28 September 2012 (Annex 1245); Economic Court of the Republic of Crimea,
Case No. А83-944/2014, Decision, 25 September 2014 (Annex 193); Twenty First Arbitrazh Court of Appeal, Case No.
A83-944/2014, Decision, 17 March 2015 (Annex 224).
444 Kryminform, “Authorities of Bakhchisaray decided to return the premises occupied by the regional mejlis”, 30 July
2014 (Annex 909).
445 MU, paras. 429-430.
446 Letter from Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to R. Chubarov, 9 August 2017 (Annex 866 to MU); Letter of 27
September 2017 to R. Chubarov from the Prosecutor of Crimea, 27 September 2017 (Annex 867 to MU); Supreme
Court of the Republic of Crimea, case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 21 July 2017 (Annex 922 to MU).
447 MU, paras. 432-435.
448 MU, para. 432.
83
210. Ukraine points to charges faced by the Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, Mr Akhtem Chiygoz,
as well as other individuals, with respect to offences committed during the demonstrations of 26
February 2014 before the Crimean Parliament building.449
211. The Crimean Supreme Court found that Mr Chiygoz’s guilt in organizing mass riots on 26
February 2014 accompanied with violence, physical injuries, deaths and destruction of property was
proved by 12 direct testimonies of witnesses. In particular, the Court established that protesters
from the Mejlis, following Mr Chiygoz’s instructions, initiated an open confrontation with the pro-
Russian demonstrators, began to force them out of the yard, initiated a brawl, beat them with
flagpoles and sprayed gas.450 In any event, criminal prosecution against the leaders of the mass riot
in front of the Crimean Parliament building on 26 February 2014 cannot be regarded as politically
motivated – and certainly not racially discriminatory –, considering the dramatic consequences of
this event: destruction of property, deaths of two persons and injuries suffered by numerous
participants – over 80 persons.
212. Contrary to Ukraine’s and Mr Chiygoz’s unsupported allegations,451 the record confirms that
Mr Chiygoz’s treatment in detention was lawful and not discriminatory, that he was treated with
respect for his rights and provided with all necessary facilities prescribed under Russian law, on
equal terms with other detainees.452 During his pre-trial detention Mr Chiygoz never claimed or
filed any petition on the allegedly horrible conditions of his confinement and on alleged “special”
attitudes towards him. He repeatedly confirmed the absence of such claims.453
213. Neither does the record support Ukraine’s allegation of long-term solitary confinement
imposed on Mr Chiygoz.454 Instead, he spent one single day in a solitary cell as a disciplinary
penalty for repeated gross violations of the internal regulations of the pre-trial detention facility.455
Еvery solitary and joint cell was kept in accordance with the sanitary rules, including the cell
occupied by Mr Chiygoz.456
449 MU, para. 432 and fn. 911.
450 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Criminal Case No. 1-1/2017, Decision, 11 September 2017 (Annex
342).
451 MU, paras. 434-435, and Witness Statement of Akhtem Chiygoz, 4 June 2018 (Annex 19 to MU), paras. 13, 15.
452 Head of the Department of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia in the Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol, Information note on the arguments of Ukraine about alleged violations of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21.12.1965 on the territory of the Russian Federation
concerning conditions of Mr. Chiygoz’s pre-trial detention, 8 December 2020 (Annex 429).
453 Mr. Chiygoz’s Explanatory Statements on the absence of claims on the conditions of the detention (Annex 210).
454 MU, para. 434, relying on Witness Statement of Akhtem Chiygoz, 4 June 2018 (Annex 19 to MU), paras. 8 and
12.
455 Information on Mr. Chiygoz’s disciplinary penalty during the period of the pre-trial detention (Annex 230).
456 Head of the Department of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia in the Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol, Information note on the arguments of Ukraine about alleged violations of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21.12.1965 on the territory of the Russian Federation
concerning conditions of Mr. Chiygoz’s pre-trial detention, 8 December 2020 (Annex 429).
84
214. It is no secret that after his liberation Mr Chiygoz has remained an activist and has carried
out spreading extremist messages about the need to take violent action for the “deoccupation of
Crimea”.457 Moreover, in an interview in 2020, he confirmed in unequivocal terms his involvement
in clearly extremist activities in February 2014:
“I handed [Mustafa Dzhemilev] these lists of 3,000 people [who were ready to fight
against Russia in Crimea] in February 2014. And when they searched for these lists in my
house during a raid, they even searched for them under the floor. Then Mustafa came from
Kyiv. […] He said that the issue of weapons from mainland Ukraine was being resolved,
and in one day we made a list of people who were ready to fight — there were about three
thousands of them. I did not make copies of the list, I handed over the original one to
Dzhemilev, and he took it to Kyiv, so they didn’t find anything during the raid. In those
days, by the way, we were actively working on the creation of Crimean Tatar national selfdefense
units. All men began to guard populated localities and places of compact residence
of Crimean Tatars. For example, Bakhchysarai was completely cordoned off by our guys.
[…] So, if even one [Ukrainian] military unit had begun armed resistance, tens of
thousands would have stood with them in the trenches.”458
215. In relation to the alleged retroactive nature of these proceedings that apply Russian law to
events that occurred prior to 18 March 2014,459 Ukraine considers that Crimean Tatars and ethnic
Ukrainians have been targeted and thereby discriminated by such retroactive proceedings because
no ethnic Russians would have been subject to similar proceedings.460
216. Under Russian law, the criminality and punishment of acts committed in the territories of the
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol before 18 March 2014 are determined on the basis of
the criminal legislation of the Russian Federation as brought into application in Crimea under
Federal Law No. 91-FZ of 5 May 2014.461 However, Article 2 of this Law contains a prohibition of
reformatio in pejus, whereby the application of the new law would place an accused in a worse
position than that of the previous law. In light of this, application of Russian criminal law should
follow the rules governing retroactivity, as provided in Article 10 of the Russian Criminal Code,
ensuring that the situation of a person cannot be aggravated and the principle of nulla poena sine
457 Ukrinform.net, “Akhtem Chiygoz, Deputy Chairman of Mejlis of Crimean Tatar People: Time has come to form
international platform for de-occupation of Crimea”, 1 August 2018 (Annex 986), also available at
https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/2509723-akhtem-chiygoz-deputy-chairman-of-mejlis-of-crimean-tatarpeople.
html.
458 Ukrinform, “Akhtem Chiygoz, former political prisoner, deputy chairman of Mejlis of Crimean Tatar people: I
handed Dzhemilev the lists of 3,000 people who were ready to fight in Crimea”, 26 February 2020 (Annex 1019), also
available at https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/2884876-akhtem-chiygoz-former-political-prisoner-deputychairman-
of-mejlis-of-crimean-tatar-people html.
459 MU, para. 433.
460 MU, para. 433.
461 Federal Law No. 91-FZ “On the application of the provisions of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and
the Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation in the territories of the Republic of Crimea and the federal city
of Sevastopol”, 5 May 2014 (Annex 65). See also V.M. Lebedev (ed.), Commentary to the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation, Vol. 1, General Part, Urait, Moscow, 2017 (Annex 1202).
85
lege is complied with. The Russian Constitutional Court has found this legislation to comply with
the Constitution and the principles of criminal law.462 Moreover, this legislation does not provide
for exceptions to the retroactive application of the Criminal Code, thus extending no basis for
discrimination. Finally, there is no aggravation of Mr Chiygoz’s position as a result of the
application of Russian criminal law since the Criminal Code of Ukraine equally criminalizes the
organization of a mass riot, and provides a definition thereof and sanctions therefor similar to those
found in the Russian Criminal Code.463
D. ARREST, DETENTION, AND TRIAL OF MR ILMI UMEROV
217. Ukraine also considers that the arrest, detention, and trial of Mr Ilmi Umerov, a Deputy
Chairman of the Mejlis since April 2015 and one of its founding members since June 1991,
constitute racial discrimination.464 On 12 May 2016, Mr Umerov was charged with undermining the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation under Article 280(1) of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation465 in relation to the content of an interview calling for violence he had given in
Kiev on 19 March 2016 and broadcast by ATR TV. On the same day, he was arrested and his home
was searched. Having carefully examined the factual circumstances of the case, witness statements,
video footage and other evidence, the competent court found him guilty of publicly calling for
actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation on 27 September
2017.466
218. As reported by Ukraine, Mr Umerov claims that the enhanced security measures taken to
arrest him and the search of his home was a “show of unnecessary force” which pointed to “an
attempt to intimidate the wider Crimean Tatar community”.467 This is clearly not true. The security
measures undertaken by Russian authorities were adequate and necessary to preserve public order
due to the fact that Mr Umerov’s escorting could potentially provoke mass riots, as it had occurred
in Mr Dzhemilev’s case, which had resulted in the violent riots of 3 May 2014. As the record and
Mr Umerov himself confirm, his escorting and the interrogation were carried out according to due
process and with his voluntary cooperation.468
462 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 1707-О, Ruling, 19 July 2016 (Annex 287), para. 2.1.
463 Criminal Code of Ukraine, 5 April 2001 (Annex 748).
464 MU, paras. 436-441.
465 Decree for the Initiation of criminal proceeding and Pre-trial Investigation, 12 May 2016 (Annex 932 to MU). See
also Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Department of Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia in the
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Decision to Prosecute as Defendant, 19 May 2016 (Annex 934 to MU).
466 Simferopol District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Criminal Case No. 1-171/17, Decision, 27 September 2017
(Annex 350).
467 MU, para. 438 and Witness Statement of Ilmi Umerov, 6 June 2018 (Annex 20 to MU), para. 15.
468 Witness Statement of Ilmi Umerov, 6 June 2018 (Annex 20 to MU), paras. 9-10; Investigator of the Investigation
Department of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol, Protocol of Interrogation of the Suspect, 12 May 2016 (Annex 933 to MU).
86
219. Ukraine and Mr Umerov contend that the charges raised against him relied on an inaccurate
Russian translation of his statement pronounced in the Crimean Tatar language.469 While Russia
rejects such allegation, whatever the linguistic version endorsed, the overall meaning of the relevant
parts of his statement still conveys a call to as many persons as possible to help Mejlis members
who remain in Crimea to reach a position where they can influence the situation towards a
withdrawal of the Russian Federation from Crimea and a reestablishment of Ukraine’s sovereignty
over it. Therefore, Ukraine’s linguistic argument is immaterial. On the other hand, what this episode
shows again is that Ukraine’s allegations have in fact nothing to do with racial discrimination.
220. Mr Umerov’s allegation that the criminal proceedings conducted against him by the Russian
Federation reflected “attempts to frighten the Crimean Tatars as a people”,470 is clearly unfounded.
Ukraine itself, which admits that Mr Umerov was ultimately released, points to what is in its view
“the political nature of the charges against him”,471 therefore conceding that its claims have in fact
no relation to racial discrimination under CERD.
221. With regard to Mr Umerov’s psychiatric assessment as part of the proceedings raised against
him,472 Ukraine’s selective account is once again erroneous and misleading. The investigating
officer took the decision to commit Mr Umerov to preliminary psychiatric examination pursuant to
standard procedure on the basis of information on Mr Umerov’s health-condition that his defence
counsel expressly asked to be entered into his case file.473 Mr Umerov’s multiple health problems
revealed by this information prompted the investigator to order a check of Mr Umerov’s mental
condition in order to assess whether he was at all relevant times mentally fit, fully understanding
and controlling his actions. Obviously a finding that Mr Umerov was mentally impaired and not
responsible for his acts at the time of his impugned acts would have altered his ability to stand trial.
Therefore, in order to preserve Mr Umerov’s own rights, his psychological state had to be verified
prior to further investigation.474
222. The investigator’s decision of 16 June 2016 committed Mr Umerov to psychiatric
examination on an ambulatory (outpatient) basis, meaning that the assessment would be made upon
a simple appointment with the medical expert and that no stay in a psychiatric hospital was
469 MU, para. 440 and Witness Statement of Ilmi Umerov, 6 June 2018 (Annex 20 to MU), para. 20. See also
Excerpts of Hearing Transcript of Umerov, 1 January 2018 (Annex 935 to MU).
470 Witness Statement of Ilmi Umerov, 6 June 2018 (Annex 20 to MU), para. 23.
471 MU, para. 441.
472 MU, para. 439.
473 Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Federal Security Service Directorate of Russia for the Republic
of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, case No. 2016427026, Resolution on outpatient forensic psychiatric examination,
16 June 2016 (Annex 281).
474 According to Article 196(3) of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation appointment and
execution of a court examination shall be obligatory if it is necessary to establish the mental or physical state of the
accused where doubts arise concerning their sanity or ability to independently defend their rights in the criminal
proceedings: see Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40).
87
required.475 Based on medical experts’ advice,476 recalling that mental health checks of an accused
do not require the accused’s consent, and since Mr Umerov had failed to present himself to the
appointment for ambulatory examination, the investigating officer subsequently requested that
Mr Umerov be instead committed to an inpatient psychiatric examination in a designated
hospital.477 This motion was granted by the court.478 It should be noted that Mr Umerov has never
been detained as part of these proceedings and, apart from his short stay in the hospital for
psychiatric assessment pursuant to standard procedure, he remained free until the guilty verdict.
Mr Umerov also confirmed that he found the conditions of his stay at the hospital to be
satisfactory.479
The Ban of the Mejlis Does Not Constitute Racial Discrimination Against the Crimean
Tatar Community
223. The fact that among all existing institutions, organizations, and associations that purport to
defend the interests of the Crimean Tatar community, including the Qurultay, the Mejlis was the
only one to be banned confirms that the ban was not directed at the Crimean Tatar community as
such, and was not part of a campaign designed to eradicate, as Ukraine contends, the said
community for ethnic motives.
224. The absence of any racial discrimination directed at the Crimean Tatar community is
confirmed by the mere fact that since the ban of the Mejlis, the Crimean Tatar community has never
been deprived of representative institutions. To the contrary, there are a number of other public
organizations that continue to represent the Crimean Tatars in Crimea, some of them enjoying very
high degrees of representativeness and legitimacy (A). In contrast to the Mejlis, these public
organizations reject violent methods. This explains why the Mejlis is rejected today by wide
sections of the Crimean Tatar community and is the only one to have been banned (B).
475 Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Federal Security Service Directorate of Russia for the Republic
of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, case No. 2016427026, Resolution on outpatient forensic psychiatric examination,
16 June 2016 (Annex 281).
476 Record of Questioning of G.M. Kushnir by the Investigator of the Investigative Office of the Department of the
Federal Security Service of Russia in the Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol, case No. 2016427026, 5 August
2016 (Annex 291); Record of interrogation of S.A. Krasnovskiy by the Investigator of the Investigative Office of the
Department of the Federal Security Service of Russia in the Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol, case No.
2016427026, 10 August 2016 (Annex 293). Both specialists confirmed that the Parkinson disease, which had been
diagnosed to Mr Umerov, may cause psychiatric troubles, thus warranting a psychiatric examination.
477 Investigator of the Investigative Office of the Department of the Federal Security Service of Russia in the
Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol, case No. 2016427026, Ruling on filing a motion to put an accused person
(not in custody) in an inpatient psychiatric hospital for a forensic psychiatric examination, 8 August 2016 (Annex 292).
478 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, case No. 3/5-4/2016, Ruling on putting a person in an inpatient hospital for
a forensic psychiatric examination, 11 August 2016 (Annex 294).
479 Komsomolskaya Pravda.Krym, “Ilmi Umerov, who is being ‘moulded’ into a second Savchenko: I am not a
political prisoner!”, 2 September 2016 (Annex 958).
88
A. THE EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING CRIMEAN TATARS IN CRIMEA
225. Ukraine refers to the Mejlis as allegedly the only truly legitimate representative institution of
Crimean Tatars endowed with quasi-executive functions.480 However, the Mejlis is not the only
organization that purports to protect the rights and represent the interests of the Crimean Tatar
community. The Court referred in the Order on Provisional Measures to the Crimean Tatars’
“representative institutions, including the Mejlis”.481 Among these “institutions”, only the Mejlis,
for the reasons set out above, was banned in Crimea. The other “institutions” have all been
operating in Crimea without any impediment since 2014. Moreover, as indicated above, the
application to ban the Mejlis originated, inter alia, from a request sent by Crimean Tatar
organizations to the Prosecutor of Crimea.482
226. As confirmed by the two 2016 judicial decisions banning the Mejlis, at the time the
decisions were rendered there were about 30 such Crimean Tatar organizations in Crimea
representing about 20,000 members.483 Under the last census conducted in 2014, Crimean Tatars
number 232,340 out of 2,284,769 inhabitants in Crimea – 10.2%.484 The Qurultay of the Crimean
Tatar people had 250 members and the Mejlis was composed of 33 members, while regional and
local mejlises totalized a membership of about 2,500 people,485 which points to a total of less than
2,800 members for the whole Qurultay/Mejlis system. This represents less than 14% of Crimean
Tatars who are involved in representative public organizations, and less than 1.2% of the whole
Crimean Tatar population living in Crimea. In light of these figures, it is blatantly not true to claim
that the Mejlis is “the central self-governing institution of Crimean Tatar life”486 with an unequalled
level of legitimacy and representativeness.
227. As Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky explain in their expert report, in the
1991-2014 period several organizations following various ideological sensibilities developed in
parallel, an important dividing line being endorsement or rejection of violent and confrontational
methods and demands.487 Among the numerous public organizations representing Crimean Tatar
480 See MU, paras. 412 and 478, inter alia.
481 Order of 19 April 2017, p. 140, para. 106(1)(a) (emphasis added).
482 See para. 181.
483 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU), p. 4
and 20; Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 127-APG16-4, Decision, 29 September 2016 (Annex 915
to MU), p. 7.
484 Federal Service of State Statistics of the Russian Federation, Results of the Population Census of 2014 in the
Crimean Federal District, 2015 (Annex 440), p. 108. The census was conducted on 14 October 2014.
485 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 August –15 November 2016) (Annex 773 to MU),
para. 169.
486 CR 2017/1, 6 March 2017, p. 30, para. 18 (Koh).
487 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), paras. 84-87, 90-91. See also
below paras. 239 -240. As the report confirms, the Organisation of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OCTNM,
led by Mustafa Dzhemilev) “adopted an uncompromising stand toward the official authorities”, while the National
Movement of Crimean Tatars (NMCT, led by Yury Osmanov) “was willing to engage in a dialogue with them”. Later
on, Mustafa Dzhemilev continued the policy of the OCTNM being the leader of the Mejlis, whereas the close associates
89
rights and interests,488 the largest and most dynamic at different points in time were “Milliy Firqa”,
“Interregional Public Movement of the Crimean Tatar People “Qirim”,489 the “Regional Public
Organization to Promote the Revival of the Crimean Tatar People “Qirim Birligi”,490 the “Regional
public organization Society of Crimean Tatars “Inkishaf”,491 and others.492 Crimean Tatars have
also created several local Crimean Tatars cultural-national autonomies, including for example in
Simferopol, Sevastopol and Sudak.493
228. To focus only on one example, “Milliy Firqa” was created in 2006,494 registered under
Ukrainian law in 2007495 and then re-registered under Russian law on 23 July 2014.496 Its
Chairman, Mr Vasvi Abduraimov, was a former Vice-President of the Council of Representatives
of the Crimean Tatar People under the President of Ukraine between 2013 and 2014. As shown in
its establishing Charter, its purpose is “to protect the legitimate rights and realize social, cultural,
artistic, economic, sports and other common interests of the Crimean Tatars”, among others, a
purpose that is served by various activities.497
229. The difference between “Milliy Firqa” and the Mejlis in the context of their relationship
with the authorities in Crimea is not so much about their respective agendas, as “Milliy Firqa” is
also critical of the authorities and has also advocated for Crimean Tatar sovereignty.498 The key
of Yury Osmanov after his murder established another Crimean Tatar organisation - “Milliy Firqa” which struggled for
“a statutory rehabilitation of the repressed Crimean Tatar people, their organised return to the ancestral homeland, their
settlement and development in multi-ethnic Crimea” without referring to violent methods.
488 List of Crimean Tatar Non-Governmental Organizations in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as
submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 31.
489 Website: http://qirimtat.ru, available via archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20180314072734/http://qirimtat.ru/.
See also its declared goals and objectives contained in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by
the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 36-37.
490 Website: http://www.qirimbirligi.ru/; Charter of the Regional public organization to Promote the Revival of the
Crimean Tatar People “Qirim Birligi”, 9 June 2014, contained in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as
submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 38-39; Qirim Birligi,
“Restoration of the Rights of the Crimean Tatars and Creation of Conditions for their Revival and Development as Part
of the Integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation”, Report submitted to CERD Committee, 93rd session, 31 July
– 25 August 2017, doc. INT/CERD/NGO/RUS/28092, p. 10-11,
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/RUS/INT CERD NGO RUS 28092 E.doc.
491 Website: https://www.facebook.com/inkishaff; Charter of the Regional Non-Governmental Organisation “Society
of Crimean Tatars ‘Inkishaf’”, 2014 (Annex 826).
492 Witness Statement of , 9 June 2021 (Annex 19), para. 27; Letter of the Agents of the
Russian Federation to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 18 January 2019 (Annex 483), pp. 9-10.
493 Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, Federal register of non-commercial organisations, List of national
and cultural autonomies of Crimean Tatars, as at 3 June 2021 (Annex 510).
494 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), para. 90.
495 Ibid. Website: http://milli-firka.org/.
496 Milliy Firqa website, Russia recognised Milliy Firqa, 31 July 2014 (Annex 1311).
497 Charter of the Crimean regional public organization for social and cultural development “Milli Firqa”, Simferopol,
2014, Article 2, in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the
Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 35.
498 “Crimean Tatars, 21st Century Strategy – Milliy Firqa Programme (extracts)” and “Examples of Information
contained on the website of “Milli Firka” public organization”, in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as
90
difference is about their respective methods: while the Mejlis endorses violence as a means of
action and commits to act outside the established legal order, “Milliy Firqa” rejects violent means of
action and commits to place its activities within the established legal order. It confirms that the ban
which was imposed only on the Mejlis has nothing to do with racial discrimination.
230. In its intervention before the Supreme Court of Crimea in the case of the Mejlis, the State
Committee on Inter-ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens of the Republic of Crimea (currently -
State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea) pointed to the diversity of
Crimean Tatar representative organizations and commented that, in contrast to the Mejlis’
promotion of violence, confrontation and exclusion,
“since 2014, the Crimean Tatar society has seen a significant increase in the activity of
public associations of the Crimean Tatar people, registered in accordance with the laws of
the Russian Federation, with the main objective being the protection of the rights of the
Crimean Tatar people on the basis of a constructive attitude in cooperation with public
authorities”.499
231. In its reasoning the Supreme Court of Crimea relied specifically on the opinion of the State
Committee as “a state authority whose jurisdiction includes the implementation of the state policy
and functions in the sphere of interethnic relations, as well as the rehabilitation of the repressed
peoples of the Republic of Crimea”.500 The Court provided substantial weight to the State
Committee’s material description of the number of organizations and of the activities of some of
them. This information was decisive in the Court reaching the conclusion that the ban on the Mejlis
“would not entail violation of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people to the political, economic,
social and cultural development”.501
232. Subsequent to the emergence of the above-mentioned organizations and the 2016 decisions
on the ban of the Mejlis, a series of initiatives led to further developments in the representation of
the rights and interests of the Crimean Tatar community in Crimea. On 17 February 2018, at the
extraordinary session of the extended Qurultay of the Muslims of Crimea, the “Council” – “Shura”
– was elected.502 The main goal of the Shura is to facilitate interaction between the Crimean Tatar
community and state bodies of the Republic of Crimea. The Shura consisted of 14 most prominent
persons in relevant fields (religion, culture, education, and others), including an Olympic champion
Mr Rustem Kazakov and the Chief Doctor of the Inkerman Hospital Mrs. Gaide Degirmendgi,
submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 28-30 and 32-34,
respectively.
499 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU),
p. 4.
500 Ibid., p. 20.
501 Ibid., p. 21.
502 See Letter of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 7 June
2018 (Annex 483), para. 14; Letter of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the Registrar of the International Court of
Justice, 18 January 2019 (Annex 483), para. 6.
91
, among other high profile community members.503
233. Following the meeting with members of the Shura on 26 February 2018 and upon their
proposal, the Head of the Republic of Crimea Mr Sergey Aksyonov adopted on 29 March 2018 a
decree establishing the “Council of Crimean Tatars under the Head of the Republic of Crimea” (the
“Council of Crimean Tatars”), and determining its functioning and membership.504 As
explains, the body created by the decision of the Qurultay of Muslims of Crimea thus “becomes
secular and cooperates with all Crimean Tatars irrespective of their religious affiliation”.505 All of
the Shura’s members elected by the Qurultay were integrated into the newly-established Council
headed by Mr Aksyonov with Hajji Emirali Ablaev appointed as a deputy head.506 The main goal of
this Council is to contribute to the restoration of historical justice, political, social and spiritual
revival and development of Crimean Tatars who suffered from deportation and political repressions.
Indeed, the participation of public organizations in consultative councils or otherwise cooperation
with the authorities in decision making relating to measures that affect them is an established
tradition and common cooperation format between minorities and the authorities in the Russian
Federation.507
234. The Council of Crimean Tatars is active in the areas of religion, culture, education and
others, with a specific member of the Council being responsible for each of them. Before the
introduction of measures aimed at preventing the spread of the coronavirus infection (2019-nCoV)
in Crimea, the Council met in person on a monthly basis. The agenda is formed based on Crimean
Tatars’ requests. The Crimean Tatar people can refer their concerns to the Council personally or by
email.508
503 See Letter of the Agents of the Russian Federation to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, 7 June
2018 (Annex 483), para. 14; Witness Statement of (Annex 19), para. 22.
504 Decree of the Head of the Republic of Crimea No. 93-U “On establishing the Council of Crimean Tatars under the
Head of the Republic of Crimea”, 29 March 2018 (Annex 112). See also Witness Statement of
(Annex 8), para. 31.
505 As explains, immediately after the ban several former Mejlis members and leaders of the existing
organizations attempted to unite the Crimean Tatar people under one banner, but there were too many competing voices
and “the Mejlis’ destructive and clearly provocative activities and narratives of its former members made most people
repulse that initiative”. However, the Mufti, Hadji Emirali Ablaev, a former member of the Mejlis and the long-time
spiritual leader of the Crimean Tatars suggested that the Qurultay of Muslims of Crimea could elect prominent members
of the community that could compose a new representative council. Because the vast majority of Crimean Tatars are
Muslim, the religious Qurultay has broadly the same audience and is able thus to represent the same interests as the
secular Qurultay. See, Witness Statement of (Annex 19), footnote 8 and paras. 20-23.
506 Decree of the Head of the Republic of Crimea No. 93-U “On establishing the Council of Crimean Tatars under the
Head of the Republic of Crimea”, 29 March 2018 (Annex 112).
507 See for example the Civic Chamber of the Republic of Crimea, which is a body established by law and providing
inter alia for dialogue between government organs and civil society actors, the latter being empowered to provide
recommendations to the authorities in terms of law making and the adoption of measures. Official website:
www.opcrimea.ru.
508 Witness Statement of (Annex 19), paras. 24-25. According to , the Council’s headquarters is
located in the centre of Simferopol and its address is widely known among the population.
92
235. The Council cooperates with the State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic
of Crimea, which is the executive organ of the Crimean government in charge of implementing the
policy of ensuring inter-ethnic harmony and fulfilling functions in the sphere of inter-ethnic and
inter-religious relations, as well as the rehabilitation of oppressed peoples of Crimea.509 The
cooperation between these two bodies includes discussing measures to implement the longwaited510
2014 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On measures aimed at
rehabilitation of Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state
support of their revival and development”.511
236. In compliance with the Rehabilitation Decree, as described in detail by
numerous measures have been implemented in the Republic of Crimea to support the revival and
development of the Crimean Tatar people. These measures include reconstruction of one of the
landmark sites for Crimean Muslims, the Seit-Settar Complex,512 assistance in the organisation of
the Hajj,513 construction of an overwhelmingly important site for Crimean Tatars and Muslims, the
Cathedral Mosque, the decision on its construction dating back to early 2000s.514 Notably,
according to , in May 2015, the Spiritual Directorate received for its use the building of a
Muslim spiritual school that forms part of the Zincirli Madrasa complex. After restoration of the
complex, it is planned to open there a higher Islamic education institution.515
237. As a part of Crimean Tatars rehabilitation campaign books and albums dedicated to their
contribution to the Victory in the Great Patriotic War are being published and distributed in Crimea.
For instance, in 2017, a photo album titled “Crimean Tatars during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–
1945”516 was published with participation of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea and
509 Website: gkmn.rk.gov.ru. See also Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No. 159 “On
approval of the regulations on the State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations and Formerly Deported Citizens of the
Republic of Crimea”, 27 June 2014 (Annex 70). The State Committee’s activities include, among others, taking
measures to implement the 2014 presidential Rehabilitation Decree (see Information from the official website of the
State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens of the Republic of Crimea on activities of the
Committee in 2018,
https://gkmn.rk.gov.ru/uploads/gkmn/attachments//d4/1d/8c/d98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/phpOnX3ms_2.pdf (Annex
486), pp. 1-5; State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, Report on implementation of the
State Program of the Republic of Crimea on strengthening the unity of the Russian Nation and ethnocultural
development of the peoples of the Russian Federation “The Republic of Crimea - the territory of inter-ethnic harmony”
for 2019,
https://gkmn.rk.gov.ru/uploads/txteditor/gkmn/attachments//d4/1d/8c/d98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/php8jVTXs_%D0
%9E%D1%82%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%82.pdf (Annex 485), pp. 1, 3-4.
510 Witness Statement of (Annex 19), para. 28.
511 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 268 “On measures aimed at rehabilitation of Armenian,
Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state support of their revival and development” (as
amended on 12 September 2015), 21 April 2014 (Annex 63).
512 Witness Statement of (Annex 19), paras. 29-31.
513 Witness Statement of (Annex 19), paras. 32-34.
514 Witness Statement of (Annex 19), paras. 35-38.
515 Witness Statement of (Annex 19), paras. 41-42.
516 Participation of Crimean Tatars in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: Photo Album, compiled by G.A.
Sichaeva, Tarpan, Simferopol, 2017 (Annex 1066).
93
the State Budgetary Institution of the Republic of Crimea “Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and
Historical Heritage”. In celebration of the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War,
the Gasprinsky Media Centre published a book titled “Contribution of the Repressed Peoples of the
USSR to the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945” which – relying on a vast amount of
archival, field documents and material, accounts of witnesses – shows what contribution the five
repressed peoples of the former USSR (Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks of Crimea
and Meskhetian (Ahiska) Turks) made to the victory over Nazi Germany, and highlights the heroics
of the Muslim clergy of the USSR and the believers.517 The above printed publications aim to
preserve the culture and history of the Crimean Tatar people and to impart them to the younger
generation.
B. LACK OF REPRESENTATIVENESS OR LEGITIMACY OF THE MEJLIS
238. The assertion by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that “none can be
considered to have the same degree of representativeness and legitimacy as the Mejlis and
Kurultai”518 does not refer in support to any specific materials. The Court’s reliance on this
statement in its Order on provisional measures519 is not determinative for the purpose of the merits,
since it was only made prima facie. The record shows that it does not correspond to the existing
situation in Crimea.
239. As shown above, the Mejlis is far from enjoying the position it claims in respect of
legitimate representation of the rights and interests of the Crimean Tatar people. In this regard, it
has certainly never been officially recognized as an official representative body of Crimean
Tatars.520 In addition, whatever the degree of public support the Mejlis might have enjoyed in a
distant past, this had weakened in the eyes of Crimean Tatars already before 2014 because of the
ruthless self-interested policies, propensity to violence and subversive activities of the Mejlis.521
The increase in the number of public organizations representing Crimean Tatar interests confirms
the demise of the Mejlis and its leaders within the Crimean Tatar community itself. In this context,
the emergence of rival organizations was bitterly opposed by the Mejlis, and its claim to have the
exclusive right to speak for the Crimean Tatars came to express itself in more and more radical
517 Contribution of the Repressed Peoples of the USSR to the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, Vol. 2,
compiled by S. Akkieva, Simferopol, Gasprinsky Media Centre, 2020 (Annex 1123).
518 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 August –15 November 2016) (Annex 773 to MU),
para. 169.
519 Order of 19 April 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 138, para. 97.
520 CERD Committee, 93rd session, Summary record of the 2553rd meeting held on 4 August 2017, UN Doc.
CERD/C/SR.2553, para. 45 (Lukiyantsev).
521 See for example “Lentun Bezaziyev: Majlis has Never Been Engaged in Creation”, Krymskaya Pravda, 13 March
2013 in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on
Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 148-157; “Crimean Tatars, 21st Century Strategy – Milli Firqa Programme
(extracts)” in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings
on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 29-30 (developing on the current lack of legitimacy of the Qurultay and the
Mejlis).
94
forms, inevitably decreasing its level of legitimacy and increasing the level of tension and
violence.522
240. For example, pursuant to Mr Yuri Osmanov’s words,523 “the Mejlis was meant to inflame
the non-Tatar population in Crimea by hysterical, openly provocative and absolutely useless
‘physical’ campaigns and scandals. All of these campaigns were risky undertakings that have been
played out exclusively for the empire’s own interests or the plans for great national and political
intrigues… The Mejlis is trade and arrangement of business affairs on the plight of the people”.524 Mr
Osmanov was a human rights defender as well as founder and head of the National Movement of
Crimean Tatars (NMCT) in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, a rival organization to the Mejlis that
embraced a more moderate line and was supported by many Crimean Tatars.525 While prior to 1991
there were already two competing Crimean Tatar movements, namely the NMCT and the
Organisation of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OCTNM, led by Mr. Dzhemilev), only
members of the OCTNM became members of the Mejlis. Criticizing the results of the 1991
Qurultay Mr Osmanov said that “the [OCTNM] created the Qurultay according to the party’s lists,
with the Qurultay forming the Mejlis, thereby staging an election process. And on behalf of 400
people (the entire composition of the [OCTNM]) declared it (that is, themselves) ‘the highest,
plenipotentiary, and the only representative of the people”.526 A harsh critic of the Mejlis’ violent
methods, Mr Osmanov had played a key role in development of the Declaration “On Declaring
Repressive Acts against the Forcibly Resettled Peoples to be Illegal and Criminal and on the
Observance of their Rights” and the Resolution “On Conclusions and Proposals of the Committee
for Problems of Soviet Germans and the Crimean Tatar People” that recognized the Crimean
Tatars’ legal right to return to Crimea. Besides, he became the first Head of the Committee for
Affairs of the Deported Peoples of the Crimean Regional Executive Committee.527
241. As reports dating from the Ukrainian period show, the Mejlis had long been trying to coerce
Crimean Tatars who did not adhere to it to do so, practising economic racket and attempting to
522 Regarding confrontation between the Mejlis and Milliy Firqa see Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko,
Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), paras. 90-91. See also Statement of Alexander Makar, presenter of the TV
channel “Krym”, in “Arria Formula” VTC of the member States of the UN Security Council on Crimea, 21 May 2020
(available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dh5qqqLVrB0 at 31:51 to 32:25).
523 The time when the above statement was made is enlightening. Mr Osmanov cannot be suspected of complacency
toward the new authorities in Crimea, as he was killed in 1993. The political motive behind that murder was never
officially confirmed, however, as described by Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky, many people
suspected OCTNM to be behind it. See Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex
21), para. 86.
524 Milliy Firqa website, “Who was and remains the real leader of Crimean Tatars”, 22 February 2016 (Annex 830).
525 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), paras. 84-86.
526 Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel (Annex 22), paras. 425-426, citing Yuri Osmanov in Krymskie
Izvestiya, “Yuriy Osmanov: People won’t bow to adventurists”, No. 201 (210), 14 October 1992 (Annex 838). Factual
elements also point to the procedural deficiency of that election (Expert Report of V.V. Engel (Annex 22), ibid.).
527 Civic Chamber of the Republic of Crimea official website, “Crimea celebrated the 80th anniversary of the birth of
Yury Osmanov”, 8 April 2021 (Annex 1045).
95
influence the authorities in order to secure impunity for its members.528 In 1997 the Mejlis even
sustained a major split as a significant range of its members were increasingly dissatisfied with
Mr Dzhemilev’s autocratic leadership style and corrupt practices. Sixteen of its 33 members
expressed their grievances in a letter addressed to the Qurultay.529 The Qurultay reacted by squarely
expelling the dissenting members.530
242. In 2011, veterans of the National Movement of Crimean Tatars announced an impeachment
to the Chairman of the Mejlis, Mr Dzhemilev, and the Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, Mr
Chubarov, who were “denied the right to represent the interests of the Crimean Tatar people in
Ukraine and elsewhere in the world”.531 In 2013, Mr Ruslan Balbek, a Crimean Tatar who later
became a member of the Russian State Duma, stated that fighters of the Mejlis actually act against
the Crimean Tatars, that they did nothing positive for Crimean Tatars “apart from making the
entourage of the Mejlis’ leader richer”.532
243. The Mejlis and its leaders continued to be criticised among members of the Crimean Tatar
community and the wider Crimean community after 2014.533
244. In August 2018, in relation to the development of local racket on transporters organized by
the Mejlis in the Kherson oblast in Ukraine, Mr Rustem Nimetullayev, the Head of the Crimean
Tatar organization “Qirim Birligi”, declared: “Every day we receive applications from Crimean
Tatars living in Ukraine, and they ask us to somehow influence the situation that has developed in
the Genichesky district [in the Kherson oblast, Ukraine] today. People are frightened, there are now
528 See for instance Statement of the Informational Working Group of the National Movement of Crimean Tatars, 20
February 1998 (extracts), Information Bulletin of the National Movement of Crimean Tatars (Areket), No. 2 (67),
March 1998, in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the
Hearings on Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), p. 111.
529 Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel (Annex 22), para. 440.
530 Resolution of the 2nd (Extraordinary) Session of the 3rd Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People “On measures to
overcome the crisis in the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People”, in Website of the Mejlis, Documents of the 2nd
(Extraordinary) Session of the 3rd Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, 19-21 December 1997 (Annex 1314).
531 Milliy Firqa website, “The world learnt about the impeachment of the Mejlis’ leaders”, 17 November 2011 (Annex
822), p. 2.
532 Taurica, “Dzhemilev’s opponent is delegated to the board of the Republican Committee of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea for Inter-ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens”, 20 February 2013 (Annex 882). See also Witness
Statement of (Annex 19), paras. 10-12.
533 See for instance Statement by Chairman of the Russian Community of Crimea Sergei Tsekov at President of the
Russian Federation official website, “Meeting with representatives from Crimean ethnic groups’ public associations”,
Yalta, 17 August 2015 (Annex 460), pp. 6-7. Lenta.ru, “Crimean Tatars forbade the Mejlis to speak on behalf of the
people”, 19 December 2015 (Annex 943). The resolution adopted by the congress of the “Qirim” movement of Crimean
Tatars in Simferopol in 2015 states that “The slipping of Dzhemilev, Chubarov and Islyamov into cooperation with
extremist groups that are pursued all over the progressive world has deprived them of the right to represent the Crimean
Tatars. From now on, all their statements in any forum must qualify as speeches of private individuals” see Lenta.ru,
“Crimean Tatars forbade the Mejlis to speak on behalf of the people”, 19 December 2015 (Annex 943). Supreme Court
of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex 913 to MU), p. 5. See also National
News Service, “Crimean mothers against the leaders of the Mejlis. How will the UN help?”, 5 March 2016 (Annex 950).
96
many groups, various armed formations” and added that most Crimean Tatars in Ukraine do not
support the rhetoric of the Mejlis.534
245. In May 2018, Mr Ruslan Balbek, commenting on the leadership of Mr Lenur Islyamov in
organizing the electric blockade of Crimea in November-December 2015, observed that “[u]sing his
influence on corrupt Kherson officials, he is going to monopolise the transport market between
Crimea and Kherson region”. He added: “They are going to be deprived of their only income. We
receive complaints from the local population about the outrages being committed by Islyamov’s
radicals”.535 Mr Balbek is very well informed about the situation of Crimean Tatars in Crimea as he
served as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Crimea between May 2014 and October
2016. In that capacity, while informing local authorities at municipal level of the ban, he explained
that the ban of the Mejlis was a consequence of the extremist activities of its leaders, and that the
Mejlis had lost any connection with Crimea and Crimean Tatars because of its leadership in the
organization of the blockade and since its leaders took the initiative of forming illegal armed groups
on the territory of Kherson oblast (Ukraine), which involve not only Mejlis members but also
members of international religious terrorist groups.536
246. The above clearly shows that the Mejlis is far from being the model of rectitude Ukraine
describes in its submissions. It has a history of violent action and corruption and, in the years
leading up to the ban, had seen the degree of support it initially enjoyed weakening, due to its
subversive activities and tendency for evicting and discrediting any Crimean Tatar that attempted to
oppose it. The rejection of the Mejlis and its leaders by Crimean Tatars both before and after the
ban is crucial given that all of Ukraine’s alleged individual cases under this chapter exclusively
relate to Mejlis senior members and close associates, by definition all involved in the Mejlis
extremist and violent conduct. Ukraine’s artificial case is essentially built on the allegations of this
non-representative minority which is clearly involved in violent and subversive political activities
as established by the relevant domestic Courts. Ukraine’s case does not relate to the Crimean Tatar
community as such.
247. Ukraine contends that the low number of delegates attending the consultative conference of
the Qurultay held in Kiev on 12 November 2018 was caused by the Russian Federation putting
pressure on delegates coming from Crimea in order to deter them from crossing the border.537 The
competent Russian authorities, however, provided no instructions to block any exit from Russia by
delegates and are unaware of any attempt to prevent any delegates from crossing the State border
towards Ukraine in order to attend the gathering of the Qurultay, which in any event is not
534 RIA Novosti Krym, “Nimetullaev: the Mejlis* usurped the Kherson region”, 15 August 2018 (Annex 988).
535 RIA Novosti Krym, “Combat wings of the ‘Mejlis’*. Who is taking power from Kiev in the south of Ukraine?”, 30
May 2018 (Annex 984).
536 Letter of Mr Ruslan Balbek, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, to the heads
of municipal administrations, No. 1133/01-04, 13 May 2016 (Annex 572), p. 1.
537 Letter of the Agent of Ukraine to the President of the International Court of Justice, 18 January 2019 (Annex
1321), pp. 2-3.
97
concerned by the ban on the Mejlis. This is confirmed by the Qurultay’s own admission that the
conference was attended by members who travelled from Crimea.538 The record also shows that,
contrary to Ukraine’s distortion of the facts, a significant part of Crimean Tatars, including former
members of the Mejlis or Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people, have simply gathered around new
civil society and institutional initiatives in Crimea, rejecting violence as a means of communication
and action in defending the interests of the community.539
248. In addition, the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people decided, on request of the Mejlis
itself, to expel those members who “collaborate with the aggressor”, namely those who accept
government positions within the Russian administration, including in Crimea.540 This decision, that
in effect punishes the defecting delegates themselves, is hardly compatible with Ukraine’s
allegation that these delegates were victims of Russian pressure that impeded their efforts to attend
the gathering. With this decision, the Qurultay in fact admitted that the absence of so many
delegates at its 2018 gathering in Kiev is best explained not by pressure placed on delegates from
Crimea or difficulties to cross the State border, but instead by their preference to turn to other actors
and institutions to represent and defend the interests of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea. That confirms
that Ukraine’s assertion that the Mejlis is “the central self-governing institution of Crimean Tatar
life”541 is simply not true. A majority of Crimean Tatars in Crimea desires peace and stability for
their homeland, not violent confrontation that can only bring chaos. That desire underlies the
various bodies and organizations in Crimea that defend the rights and interests of the Crimean Tatar
community. As Mr Nimetullayev observed: “We, living in our Crimea, in our state, are losing in the
info space. We must cover in the media the situation of Crimean Tatars living in Crimea as widely
as possible. And our situation is like this: the people have become uninhibited, […] people are
working, doing business, schools are being built, the Cathedral Mosque is being built.”542
Conclusion
249. The legitimate and non-discriminatory character of the measures against the Mejlis, Mejlis
leading members and close associates is clear. These measures taken against the extremist and
538 See interview of Mr Ali Ozenbash, Chairman of the Audit Committee of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people
in Krym.Realii, “In emergency mode: what the delegates of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People discussed in
Kiev”, 13 November 2018 (Annex 992).
539 Witness Statement of (Annex 19), paras. 20 and 22.
540 In August 2014 the Mejlis suspended the membership of Mr Smirnov Zaur, Mr Gafarov Teyfuk and Ilyasov Remzi
for accepting positions in the authorities of the Republic of Crimea (see Decision of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
people No. 21 "On a member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, the Head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
people, Smirnov Zaur", 23 August 2014 (Annex 1253); Decision of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people No. 22 "On
a member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, the Head of the Legal Department of the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar people, Gafarov Teyfuk", 23 August 2014 (Annex 1254); Decision of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people No.
24 “On a member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Ilyasov Remzi”, 23 August 2014 (Annex 1252)).
541 CR 2017/1, 6 March 2017, p. 30, para. 18 (Koh).
542 RIA Novosti Krym, “Public activist called for the media to cover more the situation of Crimean Tatars”, 15 August
2018 (Annex 987).
98
violent conduct of the Mejlis constitute legitimate limitations permissible in a democratic society
for the purpose of protecting the State’s essential interests of national security, public order and
safety, other citizens’ lawfully protected rights and interests as well as the integrity and
constitutional order of the Russian Federation. These grounds are provided under the Russian
Federation’s domestic law and comply with international law. Since they are based on an objective
and reasonable justification, these measures cannot constitute discrimination in comparison with
standard practice. In addition, they do not suggest any racially-oriented discriminatory or arbitrary
application of the legal framework – let alone a campaign of systematic racial discrimination. The
measures that the Russian Federation has adopted against the Mejlis and its leaders manifestly do
not come under nor violate CERD.
250. Ukraine never recognized before 2014 the Mejlis as a representative organization of the
Crimean Tatar community. To the contrary, it declared the Mejlis to be unconstitutional.543 Its new
characterization of the Mejlis as the sole legitimate representative institution of the whole Crimean
Tatar people544 and its claim that the measures taken against it constitute racial discrimination
should be seen for what it is: a self-serving move, which exclusive purpose is to put before the
Court a case which has nothing to do with racial discrimination.
543 CR 2017/2, 7 March 2017, p. 60, paras. 32-33 (Lukiyantsev).
544 Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukraine No. 1140-VII "On the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine on Guaranteeing the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People in the State of Ukraine", 20 March 2014 (Annex 793).
99
NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO EDUCATION
251. Ukraine contends that the Russian Federation “suppresses” “minority rights” relating to
education, in particular by supposed “restrictions placed on education in the Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian languages”.545 According to Ukraine, Russia is responsible for “[a] strategy of cultural
erasure [through …] measures to prevent the target culture being passed on to future generations
through the educational system”.546 Ukraine claims that the “apparent goal” of the said alleged
measures is “erasing non-Russian cultures from Ukraine’s history”, as part of a general policy of
systematic racial discrimination.547
252. As will be shown in the present Chapter, nothing supports Ukraine’s allegations that Russia
had the intent to “erase non-Russian cultures” in Crimea and that it violated “minority rights
relating to education” in Crimea. Ukraine’s claims are also surprising given the intolerant language
policy towards minorities that it has adopted recently, as is explained in Chapter I of this Counter-
Memorial.548
253. In light of Ukraine’s misleading allegations, it is important to begin by making a number of
preliminary clarifications to address the erroneous assumptions that affect Ukraine’s whole case on
educational rights in Crimea (I). It will then be shown that CERD does not provide for a right to
education in the native language of national minorities and that therefore, Ukraine cannot, as a
matter of jurisdiction and applicable law, claim that the Russian Federation has violated “minority
rights in relation to education” under CERD in respect of Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in
Crimea (II). In any event, none of Ukraine’s allegations is founded on the merits. First, Russian
domestic law is more protective than international law with regard to the access to education in a
native language (III). Second, there has been no decrease (to the contrary) in the number of students
who receive education in the Crimean Tatar language (IV). Third, the decrease in the number of
students who receive education in the Ukrainian language has nothing to do with racial
discrimination (V). Fourth, there has been no artificial shortage of teachers in and of Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar (VI). Finally, the relevant facts confirm that education in Crimea is provided on a
non-discriminatory basis and that there is no racial discrimination in relation to education in
Crimea, let alone a systematic intent to erase non-Russian cultures, as Ukraine asserts (VII).
I. Preliminary Clarifications
254. Ukraine’s case concerning education rights is built on several erroneous assumptions that
need to be addressed as a preliminary matter.
545 Judgment of 8 November 2019, para. 88.
546 MU, paras. 533 et seq.
547 Ibid., para. 534.
548 See paras. 43-52.
100
255. First, Ukraine argues that the reorientation of the Crimean educational system towards that
of the Russian Federation is unlawful in and by itself because it is contrary to international
humanitarian law.549 However, the argument goes nowhere. A State does not commit racial
discrimination under CERD merely by subjecting a population to its education system. In any
event, as explained elsewhere, Ukraine’s CERD claims premised on international humanitarian law
fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction.
256. Second, Ukraine’s case on education is predicated on the incorrect assumption that
minorities should have specific educational rights in addition to the one conferred on the population
as a whole.550 This statement finds no basis in CERD. Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians are
subject to the same treatment as the one applicable to the whole population.
257. Third, contrary to Ukraine’s accusations, Russia’s domestic legal system in relation to
minority groups in fact goes beyond its international obligations. As will be seen further below, the
Crimean education system provides extensive mechanisms to preserve and promote various ethnic
and linguistic identities in the Russian multi-ethnic society, and it provides in particular Crimean
Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians with ample opportunities to receive education in, and study, the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages. There is thus absolutely no basis to claim that Russia has
committed a systematic campaign of racial discrimination in relation to education in Crimea in
violation of CERD.
258. In that regard, it is necessary to recall that the Russian Federation is one of the most multiethnic
States in the world. The last Russian census conducted in 2010 reports no less than 144 main
ethnic and national origins among the Russian population, but the actual number of identities by
ethnic or national origin is higher because most of these registered identities are clustered into
smaller communities, other origins were regrouped in a miscellaneous category and a number of
persons did not answer the question.551
259. In Crimea itself, among a permanent population of less than 2,300,000, the 2014 census
identified 23 main groups of ethnic or national origin, without mentioning additional, smaller
groups.552 The domestic legal order of the Russian Federation recognizes and protects this diversity
and is premised on multi-ethnic, multinational, multicultural and multilingual principles. In
549 See e.g. MU, paras. 554-556. As with other parts of Ukraine’s Memorial and for reasons repeatedly explained
herein (see paras. 89, 383-387), the Russian Federation reiterates its general rejection of allusions to the applicability of
international humanitarian law as well as terms such as “annexation”, “occupation” or “aggression” made by Ukraine as
part of its claim relating to education (MU, paras. 533-559, inter alia). Such allegations do not fall within the scope of
the dispute and of CERD as identified by Ukraine and the Court, and their determination falls outside of the Court’s
jurisdiction ratione materiae. See actually WSU, para. 277.
550 See for instance MU, para. 627.
551 Federal Service of State Statistics of the Russian Federation official website, “National composition of the
population”, as part of the results of the All-Russian Population Census, vol. 4, Table 1, 2010 (Annex 438).
552 Federal Service of State Statistics of the Russian Federation, Results of the Population Census of 2014 in the
Crimean Federal District, 2015 (Annex 440), p. 108. The census was conducted on 14 October 2014.
101
particular, Article 3 of the Russian Constitution recognizes that “[t]he bearer of sovereignty and the
sole source of power in the Russian Federation shall be its multinational people”. Article 19
prohibits any form of discrimination based in particular on national or ethnic origin or race, while
Article 26 protects the right of every citizen to declare his or her national origin, use his or her
native language, and choose language of communication, upbringing, education and creative work.
Finally, Article 72 places the protection of the rights of national minorities as well as the protection
of the traditional way of life of small ethnic communities, among other fields, within the joint
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its constituent entities. Not all States have elected, as
Russia does, to follow the path of expressly recognizing and protecting ethnic and national groups
as such in various fields of individual and social life, including education, even if not bound to do
so under international law.553
260. Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians benefit in particular from an extensive protection of
their language of education by the Russian system, which is more protective of local identities and
languages than many other educational systems in the world, including the Ukrainian system.554 In
that context, as will be shown below, the measures taken within its education system with respect to
education in, and teaching of, the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages are not only objective,
reasonable and proportionate to the difference of situation of these communities as compared to the
rest of the population; they also constitute special measures that secure these ethnic groups adequate
advancement and protection. In particular, Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians have been
enjoying a particularly favorable treatment since 2014 because their languages have been
recognized as State languages of Crimea. This is an unprecedented measure that Ukraine had never
taken before,555 even though the same ethnic groups were already present and the sole official
language in Crimea (Ukrainian) was only native to a small minority. This new official status secures
Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians a more significant protection than Crimean Tatars and ethnic
Russians enjoyed before 2014. This drastically contrasts with Ukraine’s unfounded allegations that
Russia is responsible of a policy of “cultural erasure” of non-Russian ethnic groups in Crimea and a
campaign of systematic racial discrimination against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians.
261. Fourth, Ukraine’s definition of ethnic groups is based on oversimplification and fails to
accurately account for the complex sociological situation and peculiar circumstances in Crimea.
Russian and Ukrainian identities in Crimea have always been more fluid and intermingled than, say,
553 As is visible from reports to the CERD Committee, a number of States do not recognize the ethnic identity or
national origin of their citizens: see for example CERD Committee, Combined twenty-second and twenty-third periodic
reports submitted by France under article 9 of the Convention, due in 2017, UN Doc. CERD/C/FRA/22-23, 9 May
2019, para. 7.
554 See paras. 43-46 above.
555 UNESCO, Executive Board, 195th Session, Follow up of the Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
(Ukraine), 195 EX/5.INF.5, 21 October 2014, available at https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000230360, p. 10
(quoting H.E. Mr Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation).
102
in Kiev or in Moscow.556 In particular, the discrepancy between native language and ethnicity with
respect to these identities is significant in Crimea. Under the 2014 census, only 20.3% of persons
who self-identified as ethnic Ukrainians (and these represented 15.1% of the Crimean population)
reported Ukrainian as their native language, while 79.7% of these declared Russian as their native
language.557 Therefore, 3.3% of the Crimean population declared Ukrainian as their native
language. Similarly, in the 2001 census, 24.3% of Crimeans had declared themselves as Ukrainians
while only 10.1% declared Ukrainian as their native language.558 Moreover, even those who declare
Ukrainian as their native language usually also speak Russian with the same level of fluency, which
questions Ukraine’s suggestion of individuals necessarily having one single native language.559
Besides, some of those who identify themselves as ethnic Ukrainians do not even speak the
Ukrainian language at all, which questions the relevance of language as a systematic marker of
ethnicity in Crimea.560 Indeed the role of language as a marker of ethnic identity may at times be
merely symbolic, as it is even the case that a certain number of Crimeans identifying Ukrainian as
their native language have no command thereof,561 and only speak Russian. Under the 2014
Crimean census, only 44.6% of those who declared Ukrainian as their ethnic identity spoke the
Ukrainian language, while 99.8% of them spoke Russian.562 More generally, 99.8% of the Crimean
population speaks Russian.563
262. In light of these statistics, Ukraine has no basis to claim that “[i]t is hard to imagine a more
brutal choice than to either leave your child uneducated or to allow him or her to be entirely
indoctrinated into a foreign culture”.564 To the extent Ukraine purports to portray Russian and
Ukrainian cultures in Crimea as being radically different, quod non, in any event Russian culture
has never been a foreign culture in Crimea, neither for Crimean Tatars nor for Ukrainians. A telling
example is s observation that even within Feodosia School No. 20 that offers
complete primary and basic general education in Ukrainian and where she works as a primary
school teacher, “students themselves speak Russian out-of-class, during breaks, and in everyday
life”, they occasionally answer in Russian when questioned in class, basic everyday life steps such
556 See for example Expert Report of Dmitry Anatolievich Funk, Roman Alexandrovich Starchenko, Valery
Vladimirovich Stepanov and Sergey Valeryevich Sokolovsky (Annex 21), paras. 5-10, 136-138, 187.
557 Federal Service of State Statistics of the Russian Federation, Results of the Population Census of 2014 in the
Crimean Federal District, 2015 (Annex 440), p. 118.
558 Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, “Annexed” Education in Temporarily Occupied Crimea,
Monitoring Report, 2015 (Annex 944 to MU), p. 22.
559 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), para. 183: “In fact, Crimean
residents quite often have two native languages, especially Ukrainians who named Ukrainian as their native language
during the census, whereas most of them speak Russian which is their second native language.”
560 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), paras. 121-123, 130 , 183-184;
Witness Statement of of School No. 20 of Feodosia (Annex 5), para. 22.
561 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), paras. 5, 119, 123, 129-131.
562 Federal Service of State Statistics of the Russian Federation, Results of the Population Census of 2014 in the
Crimean Federal District, 2015 (Annex 440), p. 119.
563 Ibid.
564 MU, para. 559.

104
“The establishment or maintenance, for religious or linguistic reasons, of separate
educational systems or institutions offering an education which is in keeping with the
wishes of the pupil’s parents or legal guardians, if participation in such systems or
attendance at such institutions is optional and if the education provided conforms to such
standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities, in particular for
education of the same level”.
265. The mere existence of that provision confirms the absence of any right to benefit from a
separate educational system. To the contrary, it is the establishment of such separate educational
systems by a State that needs to be justified.
266. With regard to what national minorities can do on their own initiative, Article 5(1)(c)
provides:
“It is essential to recognize the right of members of national minorities to carry on their
own educational activities, including the maintenance of schools and, depending on the
educational policy of each State, the use or the teaching of their own language, provided
however:
(i) That this right is not exercised in a manner which prevents the members of these
minorities from understanding the culture and language of the community as a whole and
from participating in its activities, or which prejudices national sovereignty;
(ii) That the standard of education is not lower than the general standard laid down or
approved by the competent authorities; and
(iii) That attendance at such schools is optional”.572
267. Under Articles 1, 2 and 5(1)(c) of the CADE read together, the State has thus no obligation
to guarantee education in minority native languages and the failure to provide such guarantee does
not constitute, as a matter of principle, discrimination under Article 1 of the CADE. The education
of national minorities in native language is a matter for the minorities themselves to organize, and is
subject to the State policy in matters of education.
268. Similarly, Article 2(2) of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”)573 provides for language as a basis for discrimination prohibited under this
article and Article 13 provides for the right to education for individuals. They do not on the other
hand oblige States to accord to minorities their own educational system.
572 As part of the follow-up measures on the implementation of the Convention, States Parties have reported as good
practice devising policies to facilitate the teaching of the national official language to members of minorities. See e.g.
UNESCO, General Conference, 39th Session, Summary of the reports received from member States on the measures
taken to implement the 1960 Convention and recommendation against discrimination in education, 39 C/24,
23 October 2017, available at https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000259737, Annex I, paras. 11 and 23
(refugees and migrants), and para. 15 (indigenous peoples).
573 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS, 3. Both the
Russian Federation and Ukraine (then as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic, respectively) have ratified the Convention, which entered into force for them on 3 January 1976.
105
269. In the same vein, while General Comment No. 13 of the Committee on ESCR574 has
clarified the scope of the provisions of Article 13 on the right to education, it has not consecrated
any absolute right to education in a minority native language or any positive obligation for the State
to provide for such education, and certainly not an obligation of result in this respect.
270. To the contrary, in its Concluding Observations concerning France, the Committee
recommended “that the State party adopt all appropriate measures to reduce the significant
disparities in terms of school performance between French pupils and pupils belonging to racial,
ethnic or national minorities in the field of education, inter alia by intensifying the provision of
French-language courses for those students who lack adequate French-language proficiency”.575
This approach echoes the above-mentioned good practice reported by States pursuant to the CADE.
It is also recommended and regarded as good practice by the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human
Rights Council on the right to education.576
271. The 1995 Framework Convention on the protection of minorities, which has been ratified by
39 States,577 is in line with the previous instruments. Article 12 provides:
“1. The Parties shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields of education and
research to foster knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of their national
minorities and of the majority.
2. In this context the Parties shall inter alia provide adequate opportunities for teacher
training and access to textbooks, and facilitate contacts among students and teachers of
different communities.
3. The Parties undertake to promote equal opportunities for access to education at all levels
for persons belonging to national minorities.”
272. Article 13 provides:
“1. Within the framework of their education systems, the Parties shall recognise that
persons belonging to a national minority have the right to set up and to manage their own
private educational and training establishments.
2. The exercise of this right shall not entail any financial obligation for the Parties.”
574 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: Article 13: The Right to
Education, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999.
575 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc.
E/C.12/FRA/CO/3, 9 June 2008, para. 49 (emphasis added). See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Concluding Observations: Liechtenstein, UN Doc. E/C.12/LIE/CO/1, 9 June 2006, para. 36. On this point, see
Ben Saul, David Kinley, Jacqueline Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Commentary, Cases, and Materials, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 1132-1134.
576 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, UN Doc. A/73/262, 27 July 2018, paras. 78 and 92.
577 Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1 February 1995, ETS
No. 157 (to which Ukraine and Russia are parties; entered into force for them on 1 May 1998 and 1 December 1998,
respectively).
106
273. Article 14 provides:
“1. The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national minority
has the right to learn his or her minority language.
2. In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in
substantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as
far as possible and within the framework of their education systems, that persons belonging
to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language or
for receiving instruction in this language.
3. Paragraph 2 of this article shall be implemented without prejudice to the learning of the
official language or the teaching in this language.”578
274. Of particular importance is the condition, highlighted in the second paragraph of this article,
that there should be “sufficient demand” for education in a given minority language. This provision
also recognizes that in such cases the State’s conduct is subject to reasonableness and available
resources, as well as compliance with domestic law.
275. Commenting on the above instruments, it has been observed that “[t]his international legal
framework highlights a number of issues related to the right to education for minorities and
indigenous groups which are reflected in the work of the CESCR. In particular, it indicates that the
rights of minorities in relation to education include both the right to establish their own private
educational and training establishments, and the right to access, and profit from, mainstream
education on the basis of equality”.579 Again, it does not include any obligation for States to provide
minorities with their own educational system.
276. In the Belgian Linguistics case decided in 1968 and subsequently confirmed, in particular in
Skender v. Macedonia,580 the ECtHR also denied that the right to education in a native language
should be secured by each State to everyone within its jurisdiction. It held in particular:
“3. […] the first sentence of Article 2 (P1-2) does not specify the language in which
education must be conducted in order that the right to education should be respected. […]
However the right to education would be meaningless if it did not imply in favour of its
beneficiaries, the right to be educated in the national language or in one of the national
languages, as the case may be.
[…]
11. In the present case the Court notes that Article 14, even when read in conjunction with
Article 2 of the Protocol […], does not have the effect of guaranteeing to a child or to his
578 Emphasis added.
579 Ben Saul, David Kinley, Jacqueline Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 1131.
580 ECtHR, Skender v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, No. 62059/00, Partial decision on admissibility,
22 November 2001.
107
parent the right to obtain instruction in a language of his choice. The object of these two
Articles […], read in conjunction, is more limited: it is to ensure that the right to education
shall be secured by each Contracting Party to everyone within its jurisdiction without
discrimination on the ground, for instance, of language. […] [T]o interpret the two
provisions as conferring on everyone within the jurisdiction of a State a right to obtain
education in the language of his own choice would lead to absurd results, for it would be
open to anyone to claim any language of instruction in any of the territories of the
Contracting Parties.”581
277. The above-mentioned international human rights materials confirm the following points.
278. First, the prohibition of discrimination in relation to education refers to “the right of
everyone regardless of ethnic origin to have access to a national educational system without
discrimination.”582 In Crimea, all students are treated equally before the law and Ukraine does not
claim otherwise. Statutory law governing education takes into account all circumstances that place
different communities in different situations, so their members may exercise their rights on an equal
footing. Ensuring equality before the law is precisely what the Crimean education system does, as
will be illustrated further below.
279. Second, the right to education does not include a right of persons belonging to minorities to
education in their native language. This is understandable for obvious practical, capacity and
feasibility reasons. Indeed, no State would be in a position to guarantee and secure the proper
exercise of such a right. The consequences of creating such a right would be unreasonably onerous
for States, which have not accepted to include such right into an internationally binding instrument.
For this reason, no provision mentioned above could plausibly be interpreted as including an
obligation for all the States parties to CERD to protect and guarantee a right to education in one’s
native language for all citizens.
280. Third, some of these instruments insist on the fact that education is meant to prepare proper
integration of children into the society they live in and to prepare them for their later professional
life. In this regard, they emphasize the need for all to know the majority language and that teaching
in minority native languages must not come at the expense of knowledge of the majority language.
Thus, the preservation of minority language and culture should not result in isolating minority
groups from the society they live in and come at the expense of their integration therein.
281. Fourth, securing education in a minority native language is generally regarded in these
instruments as a mere possibility open to the State, not an obligation.583 In addition, these
581 ECtHR, Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium v.
Belgium (Merits) (“Belgian Linguistics case”), No. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64,
Judgment, 23 July 1968, Section B, paras. 3 and 11.
582 PORF, para. 329 (emphasis added).
583 See also Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 5 November 1992, ETS
No. 148, Article 8; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, 18 December 1992, UN Doc. A/RES/47/135, Article 4(3).
108
instruments take full account of the constraints and limited capacities of States in face of such an
onerous burden, and they subject the possibility to provide education in native language to such
capacity limits.
282. Fifth, even when they contemplate specifically the question of education in minority native
language within the general right to education, these instruments are very cautious and specify that
it is for the communities themselves to remain free to organize such community education, not a
State obligation to provide for such education. Therefore, there is no basis to claim that under
international law minorities have a general right to receive education in their native language, and
there certainly is no unqualified right thereto.
III. The Access to Education in a Native Language in Crimea is Afforded by Domestic Law
subject to Legitimate Qualifications
283. As shown above, there is no obligation under international law for States to provide minority
groups with a right to education in their own languages. Therefore, the Court does not have
jurisdiction to entertain Ukraine’s claim on “Suppression of Minority Education Rights.”
284. In any event, international law does not preclude States from qualifying or restricting such a
right when they provide it in their domestic system. When a State goes beyond its international
obligations and affords a more protective regime than the one resulting from international law, it is
non-sense to argue, as Ukraine does in the present case, that the State, in applying its domestic
rules, commits racial discrimination under CERD.
285. Even if Russia’s responsibility were to be assessed before the Court as a matter of domestic
law, which would not fall within the Court’s jurisdiction and functions, the relevant domestic rules
have in any case been complied with in Crimea.
286. The right to education in a native language provided for under Russian law – including local
regulations in Crimea – is qualified by a series of limitations that reflect the concerns mentioned
above with respect to the onerous implications that an absolute and unqualified right would entail
for the State and the risks for equal treatment of all citizens, peace and stability. Such concerns are
particularly acute in States endowed with a highly multi-ethnic society and a large territory, like the
Russian Federation.584
At federal level, education is governed by Federal Law of 29 December 2012 No. 273-
FZ “On education in the Russian Federation” (“Federal Law on Education”).585
584 In the Russian Federation, 277 languages and dialects are spoken, of which 97 languages are used within the
education system, including 24 as teaching languages in the education system, and 73 being taught as a subject: A.S.
Ablyatipov, Crimea: Education in Native Languages, Dolya Publishing House, Simferopol, 2018 (Annex 1078), p. 16.
585 Federal Law No. 273-FZ “On education in the Russian Federation”, 29 December 2012 (Annex 58). See also
Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1993 (Annex 28), Articles 26(2) and 43.
109
In particular, the right to receive education in one’s native language in the Russian
Federation in general, and in Crimea in particular, cannot be exercised to the detriment
of the knowledge of the State language of the Russian Federation, which is Russian,
and which is the basic language of education for all citizens alike.586
The right only extends to those languages that are recognized as languages of the
peoples of the Russian Federation.587
According to Article 14 of the Federal Law on Education and Article 9(2) of the Law
“On the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation”, every Russian citizen has
a right to receive preschool, initial and basic general education – up to the 9th year at
school – in their native language subject to the capacity of the educational system.588
This is an important qualification: the right to receive education in one’s native
language is subject to the capacities of the educational system and should be exercised
within these limits.589 It certainly does not entail for the State an obligation of result to
provide for education in each and every native language that may exist on its territory.
The situation is similar at the level of Crimea. The Constitution of the Republic of
Crimea recognizes Russian, Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian as the State languages of
Crimea590 and provides for the right to receive education in one’s native language.591
The Crimean Law on Education provides for education in native language, naming
expressly within them Russian, Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages, and also
provides that this right shall be exercised within the limits of the possibilities provided
by the education system.592 There is no basis to contend in the present case that Russia
did not comply with these domestic rules.
287. Under Russian domestic law, the recognition of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian as State
languages of Crimea does not entail any additional level of protection for these languages in terms
of education vis-à-vis any other languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation. The republican
state languages (Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian) can be used alongside the state language of the
Russian Federation (Russian) in various spheres of life, including in the field of education, where
teaching and learning of these languages can be introduced as mandatory (without prejudice to
teaching and learning of the state language) in accordance with the republican legislation,593
586 Federal Law No. 273-FZ “On education in the Russian Federation”, 29 December 2012 (Annex 58), Article 14(3).
587 Ibid., Article 14(4).
588 Ibid., Article 14; Law of the Russian Federation No. 1807-1 “On the languages of the peoples of the Russian
Federation”, 25 October 1991 (Annex 25), Article 9(2).
589 Federal Law No. 273-FZ “On education in the Russian Federation”, 29 December 2012 (Annex 58), Article 14(4).
590 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea, 11 April 2014 (Annex 62), Article 10(1).
591 Ibid., Article 19(2).
592 Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 131-ZRK/2015 “On education in the Republic of Crimea”, 6 July 2015
(Annex 91), Article 11(2).
593 Law on Education (Annex 58), Article 14(3).
110
although without creating corresponding individual right. At present the Crimean legislation does
not envisage such mandatory teaching and learning of Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian, while learning
in, and study of, these languages at the general education level is available on a voluntary basis and
depending on the local capacities, and the study of these languages has been made part of the
educational programme for students at the State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher
Education of the Republic of Crimea “Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical
University”.594 However, of itself such local measure of promoting Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian as
state languages in Crimea, while being aimed at promotion of the official languages of the
Republic, does not augment or otherwise affect the right to receive education in the native language.
IV. The Absence of Any Decrease of Students Studying in Crimean Tatar
288. As regards education in Crimean Tatar, Ukraine admits in the Memorial that there has been
no drop of students and that, at a minimum, “the number of students receiving education in Crimean
Tatar schools has remained relatively steady since [2014]”.595 This admission blatantly contradicts
Ukraine’s allegation that Russia had the intent to, and did, erase non-Russian cultures in Crimea,
including the Crimean Tatars.
289. In fact, the number of students receiving education in the Crimean Tatar language has even
increased, which is explained both by the natural growth of the population and the continued
interest of Crimean Tatars to receive education in their language and to study it.596
Consistent with Ukraine’s own statistics, the number of students receiving education in
the Crimean Tatar language had been stable since the 2001-2002 academic year,
fluctuating between 5,390 and 5,964. In the year 2013-2014, the number was 5,551,597
which accounted for 3.1% of the Crimean students.598 That year, education in the
Crimean Tatar language was provided in 15 schools, covering 182 classes and 3,092
students, as well as in 202 classes among 48 schools with two or three languages of
education, covering 2,459 students.599
594 Witness Statement of
(Annex 12), para. 17; Witness Statement of
Annex 9), para. 9.
595 MU, para. 544.
596 Witness Statement of
Annex 12), para. 15; Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Briefing note
“On the study of native languages and education in native languages in the general educational institutions of the
Republic of Crimea” as attached to Decision of the Collegium of the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the
Republic of Crimea No. 4/2, 23 May 2018 (Annex 482), Section II.
597 Education Statistics from Ministry of Education of Ukraine, 2018 (Annex 735 to MU).
598 A. Ablyatipov, “Republic of Crimea: Instruction in native languages”, International Affairs Journal, No. 12, 2019
(Annex 1097).
599 Ibid.
111
In the 2017-2018 academic year, more than 5,600 students received education in
Crimean Tatar, which represents about 3% of the total number of students that year.600
In that academic year, education in Crimean Tatar was provided in 15 Crimean Tatar
schools, covering 202 classes or 3,753 students, as well as in 133 classes disseminated
among 31 schools with two or three languages of education and covering 1,879
students.601 In addition, the number of students who study the Crimean Tatar language
as a subject or Crimean Tatar literature, either as part of their curriculum or as an extracurricular
activity, has remained stable between 2014 and 2018 with 21,400 and 21,600
students, respectively, with fluctuations in-between.602
In the 2019-2020 academic year, the number of students receiving education in
Crimean Tatar had risen to 6.4 thousand,603 and a new Crimean Tatar school was
opened, bringing the number of those institutions to 16.604
In the 2020-2021 academic year, the number of students receiving education in
Crimean Tatar is 6.7 thousand with an increase of 14 classes (344 students) over the
previous 2019-2020 academic year.605
These statistical elements are clearly incompatible with Ukraine’s accusation that the
Russian Federation is responsible of a “strategy of cultural erasure” consisting in taking
“measures to prevent the target culture being passed on to future generations through
the educational system”.606
600 Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea official website, Briefing note “On the
situation with education in the state (Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian) languages and the study of native languages in
educational institutions of the Republic of Crimea in the 2017/2018 academic year”, available in Russian at
https://monm rk.gov.ru/file/Обучение на родных языках(1)(1).docx, in Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of
the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-15/1294, 24 June 2021 (Annex 450).
601 Ibid.
602 Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Briefing note “On the study of native
languages and education in native languages in the general educational institutions of the Republic of Crimea” as
attached to Decision of the Collegium of the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea No.
4/2, 23 May 2018 (Annex 482), Section II.
603 See Briefing note “On the instruction in and studying of languages of the Republic of Crimea, 1st half of the
2019/2020 academic year” in Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-
15/1294, 24 June 2021 (Annex 450), also available at the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of
Crimea official website: https://monm.rk.gov ru/uploads/txteditor/monm/attachments/d4/1d/8c/
d98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/phpWOhNyX %D0%A1%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%8C%20%D0%BD%D0%B0%20%
D1%81%D0%B0%D0%B9%D1%82.docx.
604 Ibid., see also Witness Statement of
(Annex 8), para. 34.
605 See Briefing note “On the situation with education in the state (Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian) languages and the study
of native languages in educational institutions of the Republic of Crimea in the 2020/2021 academic year” in Ministry
of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-15/1294, 24 June 2021 (Annex 450), also
available at the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea official website:
https://monm rk.gov.ru/uploads/txteditor/monm/attachments//d4/1d/8c/d98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/phpuhSs1y На
сайт (2).docx.
606 MU, para. 533.
112
V. The Decrease of Students Studying in Ukrainian Has Nothing to Do with Racial
Discrimination
290. With regard to education in the Ukrainian language in Crimea, the Court indicated in 2017
that the Russian Federation must, as a provisional measure, “[e]nsure the availability of education in
the Ukrainian language” [in the French, authoritative text of the Order, “[f]aire en sorte de rendre
disponible un enseignement en langue ukrainienne”].607 The Court relied on two sentences included
in two reports, one of the OSCE Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6 to 18 July 2015),
and one of the OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine (16 August to 15
November 2016), to state that “[t]hese reports show, prima facie, that there have been restrictions in
terms of the availability of Ukrainian-language education in Crimean schools.”608 These two
sentences, which are not specifically reasoned, are of course not conclusive at the merits phase,609
and, as will be shown below, are not supported by the relevant facts.
291. In addition, the wording employed by the Court confirms that it was not referring to a right,
let alone an unqualified right, to education in native language. Indeed, “ensuring the availability”
means making the said education available when requested. It is not a requirement to maintain the
number of schools and classes that had been providing such education before 2014 at the price of
empty classes. In other words, since Ukraine does not deny that education in, and of, the Ukrainian
language is still being provided in Crimea, “ensuring the availability of education in the Ukrainian
language” is not incompatible with a decrease in the corresponding facilities and programmes, such
decrease being itself the direct consequence of a declining demand.610
292. As will be explained below, the decrease in the number of students receiving general
education in the Ukrainian language since 2014 neither evidences nor results from racial
discrimination, let alone a systematic campaign or policy of “cultural erasure”. It is explained by
other factors (A). Due to these factors, the authorities have to adapt the capacities to the declining
demand. At the same time, they have taken measures that confirm their efforts to maintain
opportunities for ethnic Ukrainians to receive education in their native language (B).
607 Order of 19 April 2017, para. 106(1)(b).
608 Ibid., para. 97.
609 See ibid., para. 105.
610 Witness Statement of (Annex 2),
paras. 7-8 and 24; Witness Statement of (Annex 6), para. 9;
Witness Statement of (Annex 1), paras. 11 and 12;
Witness Statement of (Annex 3), para. 17;
Witness Statement of , 1 April 2021 (Annex 4),
paras. 5 and 6; Witness Statement of (Annex 17),
para. 6.
113
A. FACTORS EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN THE DEMAND FOR EDUCATION IN UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE
IN CRIMEA
293. Ukraine alleged that the decrease in the number of students receiving education in the
Ukrainian language since 2014 would constitute proof of a policy of systematic racial
discrimination.611 Such a decrease, that Russia does not dispute as a matter of fact (1), results
however from a series of factors that bear no relation whatsoever with racial discrimination and
with Ukraine’s grave accusation (2).
Relevant Statistics
294. In the 2013-2014 academic year before Crimea’s change of status, out of the 176,419
students receiving general education in Crimea, 158,174 students received education in the Russian
language, or 89.7% of Crimean students, while 12,694 students received education in Ukrainian, or
7.2% of the students.612 Education in the Ukrainian language was provided to 2,230 students in 103
classes within 7 Ukrainian schools, namely schools using exclusively this language as teaching
language, and to 10,460 students in 726 classes among 161 schools that otherwise use other
teaching languages.613
295. The number of students receiving education in Ukrainian had not been constant over the
previous years but, according to Ukraine’s statistics, had decreased slightly between 2010 and
2013.614 Therefore, contrary to what Ukraine advances, there was no “increasing demand for
minority language teaching” in Crimea before 2014.615 Besides, under the Ukrainian system, it was
compulsory for all students to learn Ukrainian as the official, national language of Ukraine.616 The
situation in relation to national and minority languages was thus very different to what it is now in
Crimea since the change of status of the peninsula.617 In addition, it is important to recall that the
great majority of Crimean Ukrainians – nearly 80% – identify Russian, not Ukrainian, as their
native language, while virtually all of them speak Russian with the same fluency.618
296. Since 2014, the numbers are as follows:
611 See in particular MU, paras. 540-543.
612 A. Ablyatipov, “Republic of Crimea: Instruction in native languages”, International Affairs Journal, No. 12, 2019
(Annex 1097). See also Witness Statement of Ayder Serverovich Ablyatipov (Annex 13), para. 21; and Education
Statistics from Ministry of Education of Ukraine, 2018 (Annex 735 to MU).
613 A. Ablyatipov, “Republic of Crimea: Instruction in native languages”, International Affairs Journal, No. 12, 2019
(Annex 1097), p. 3.
614 Education Statistics from Ministry of Education of Ukraine, 2018 (Annex 735 to MU).
615 MU, para. 537.
616 Witness Statement of (Annex 10), para. 7; Witness Statement of Mr Ablyatipov (Annex 13), para. 21;
Witness Statement of (Annex 16), para. 5.
617 Witness Statement of (Annex 10), para. 10.
618 See para. 261.
114
In the 2014-2015 academic year, which was the first academic year after Crimea’s
change of status, 1,990 students received education in Ukrainian, accounting for 1.1%
of the 184,869 students receiving general education in Crimea that year.619 This number
fell to 894 during the 2015-2016 academic year, and to 371 in the 2016-2017 academic
year.620
In the 2017-2018 academic year, out of the 208,174 students receiving general
education in Crimea, 318 students opted for receiving education in Ukrainian,621 which
represents about 0.1%. Of these 318 students, 146 studied in 9 classes open in one
educational institution,622 while other students opted for receiving education in
Ukrainian classes in schools which otherwise provide education in the Russian
language.
In the year 2018-2019, 249 students received education in Ukrainian in one Ukrainian
school (144 students in 9 classes) and in 8 Ukrainian classes among 5 schools
otherwise providing education in Russian (105 students).623
In the year 2019-2020, 206 students opted for receiving general education in the
Ukrainian language in Crimea, including 152 students in 9 classes within one
Ukrainian school,624 as well as 54 students forming 3 classes in one school that
otherwise provides education in Russian language.625
Finally, in the year 2020-2021, 214 students received general education in Ukrainian
language in one Ukrainian school, School No. 20 of Feodosia (162 students in 9
classes) and in 3 Ukrainian classes in the Simferopol Academic Gymnasium (52
619 Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Briefing note attached to Decision of the
Board of the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea No. 4/2 (Annex 482), Section II.
620 Ibid.
621 Ibid.
622 School No. 20 of Feodosia, Information on students studying between the 2008/2009 academic year and the
2020/2021 academic year (Annex 730).
623 See Briefing note “On the situation with education in the state (Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian) languages and the study
of native languages in educational institutions of the Republic of Crimea in the 2018/2019 academic year” in Ministry
of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-15/1294, 24 June 2021 (Annex 450), also
available at the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea official website:
https://monm rk.gov.ru/uploads/monm/attachments/d4/1d/8c/d98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e/phpFIkuR2 %D0%BE%D
0%B1%D1%83%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8%D0%B8%D0%B7%D1%83%D1%87%D0%B5%
D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8.docx.
624 See Briefing note “On the situation with education in the Republic of Crimea in the 1st half of the 2019/2020
academic year” in Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-15/1294, 24 June
2021 (Annex 450); School No. 20 of Feodosia, Information on students studying between the 2008/2009 academic year
and the 2020/2021 academic year (Annex 730).
625 See Briefing note “On the situation with education in the Republic of Crimea in the 1st half of the 2019/2020
academic year” in Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-15/1294, 24 June
2021 (Annex 450).

117
Ukrainian language was compulsory anyway, opting to receive general education in Ukrainian
could have appeared for some as the rational choice to make, especially for those who planned to
move to the then mainland Ukraine, since most higher education institutions in Ukraine provided
higher education in the Ukrainian language. It was also an obvious choice to make for those who
contemplated professional and career opportunities in Ukraine. Even in Crimea where Russian was
spoken by the majority, knowledge of the Ukrainian language was a requirement for every person
wishing to pursue a career in the public sector as a civil servant.638
301. After 2014, it became rational for these students to continue or opt to receive general
education in Russian, which they know perfectly and that will be the most useful for higher
education and for career opportunities.639 Indeed, the Crimean education system has been reoriented
towards that of the Russian Federation since 2014, and under federal law, higher education is in
principle only guaranteed in the State language of the Russian Federation.640 Such arrangement is
common in many States in the world, including in Ukraine.641
302. Besides, any student wishing to pursue higher education in Ukraine met with utmost
difficulties given that, since 2014, Ukraine itself does not accept certificates issued by Crimean
schools.642 Students who used to receive general education in Ukrainian before 2014 but consider
both languages and cultures as native were no doubt particularly receptive to the above-mentioned
powerful rationale or pragmatic considerations. This trend is confirmed by headmasters, who are
acquainted in detail with the situation in the education sector in Crimea both before and since 2014,
and have a first-hand experience of students’ and their parents’ choices and motives.643
638 Witness Statement of (Annex 1), paras. 4-5; Witness Statement of (Annex 9),
para. 5; Witness Statement of (Annex 3), para. 7.
639 As explained before, the use of the Ukrainian language in Crimea generally has been significantly low both before
and after 2014: see para. 261.
640 Federal Law No. 273-FZ “On education in the Russian Federation”, 29 December 2012 (Annex 58), Article 14.
641 Education in native language as regarded in international instruments usually does not concern higher education,
and for obvious practical and capacity reasons no State can reasonably be expected to extend a multilingual education
system to higher education generally or other non-mandatory curricula. This is especially the case in federal States like
the Russian Federation where the use of a national State language is crucial.
642 According to information from the official website of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, diplomas
and other educational documents issued in Crimea are not recognized and have no legal force in Ukraine: “The Ministry
of education and science of Ukraine reminds that diplomas and other educational documents issued in the temporarily
occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea are not recognized and
have no legal force either in Ukraine or in other countries of the world. The Ministry provides a corresponding
explanation in response to numerous appeals from citizens on this issue”, see Ministry of Education and Science of
Ukraine official website, "Ukraine does not recognize any educational documents issued in the occupied territories -
explanation of the Ministry of Education and Science", 9 April 2018 (Annex 799). See also Witness Statement of
(Annex 5), para. 9.
643 Witness Statement of (Annex 1), paras. 7 and 12-13; Witness Statement of
(Annex 17), paras. 6 and 8; Witness Statement of (Annex 4), para. 10; Witness Statement of
(Annex 3), para. 15; Witness Statement of (Annex 5), paras. 9-10; Witness Statement of
(Annex 6), paras. 12-13. The professional careers of these
headmasters and teachers in Crimea cover both the Ukrainian period and the current situation, which provides an
invaluable historical and comparative insight.
118
303. Another factor that accounts for the fall in the number of students who received general
education in Ukrainian after 2014 lies in the policy carried out by Ukraine before 2014, which
consisted in forcibly imposing Ukrainian language on students in education programmes.644 Prior to
2014, Ukrainian was the only State language in Crimea and learning Ukrainian language at school
was mandatory, while ethnic Ukrainians only accounted for a demographic minority. The
promotion of Ukrainian as Ukraine’s State language in an environment where this language did not
reflect the linguistic identity or preferences of a great part of the population eventually led to an
overvalued position of this language in Crimea to the detriment of the Russian language, which was
otherwise spoken by the vast majority of the Crimean population.645 At the same time, education in
the Russian language was always preferred by the Russian-speaking majority of the Crimean
population before 2014,646 and a general lack of interest in studying Ukrainian and in Ukrainian was
clearly noticeable, especially where students and their parents were provided with a choice after
2014.647 With the Ukrainian language to a material extent being imposed on students, many of
whom did not all regard it as their native or preferred language, the natural realignment after 2014 is
unsurprising: the demand for studying Ukrainian and in Ukrainian declined objectively while
demand for studying Russian and in Russian (which has been widely spoken in Crimea historically)
naturally increased.
304. In addition, some ethnic Ukrainians left Crimea after March 2014, mostly for Ukraine. For
example, in her witness statement mentions that 10 out of the 34 students in the class
she was heading as a teacher at the Simferopol Academic Gymnasium moved to Ukraine – mostly
children of military servicemen and public officials who relocated due to professional reasons after
Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation.648
B. RUSSIA MAINTAINED THE AVAILABILITY OF EDUCATION IN THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE IN CRIMEA
305. The decline in the demand for education in Ukrainian in Crimea does not in any event
constitute a breach of CERD since the Crimean system of education has been maintaining the
possibility to receive general education in the Ukrainian language for everyone at all material times
since 2014.
644 As an example in higher education, see Witness Statement of (Annex 10), paras. 20-21. See also Witness
Statement of (Annex 11), para. 7; Witness Statement of
(Annex 6), para. 4.
645 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), paras. 121-135; Witness
Statement of (Annex 6), paras. 3-4 (noting that education in
Ukrainian was only introduced in this school in 2004, and not even for reasons due to any particular demand).
646 Witness Statement of Mr Ablyatipov (Annex 13), para. 21.
647 Witness Statement of (Annex 3), para. 17; Witness Statement of (Annex 5), paras. 9-
10; Witness Statement of (Annex 11), paras. 7-8.
648 Witness Statement of (Annex 2), para. 9. See also Witness Statement of (Annex 5),
paras. 5 and 8.
119
306. The Crimean authorities follow a demand-driven approach in order to allocate their
resources in the most sensible way and in the best interest of the population, as will be seen
below.649 In this regard, the Crimean authorities proactively and closely monitor the needs in terms
of education and the wishes expressed by students’ parents in order to adapt the teaching offer and
capacities to the demand, by either opening additional classes or schools with the needed language
of teaching, or by closing the unneeded facilities.650 While State resources are not unlimited, and
while no State may be expected to build or maintain capacities that are not justified by education
needs and demand, the Russian Federation makes genuine efforts to maintain an education system
in Crimea that provides Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians who express a wish to receive
education in their native language and to study it, a reasonable opportunity to do so.
307. As an illustration of the Russian Federation’s commitment to secure education in native
language, including in Ukrainian, teachers and headmasters have confirmed that their schools are
ready to provide education in Ukrainian should a demand arise.651 Pursuant to their mission under
statutory law, the Crimean authorities have been closely monitoring the state of the needs and
wishes expressed by parents and students in terms of language of education and studying of a native
language.652 The local authorities and the Crimean educational institutions as confirmed by
numerous Witness Statements have endeavoured to maintain at all times the necessary capacities to
cover the demand expressed by parents and students and to provide everyone who wishes it with the
opportunity to study in Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar.653
308. This is exemplified by the procedure for selecting the desired language of education. Each
year, parents are required to complete and submit to the authorities, through education institutions, a
request specifying the language in which they wish their child to receive general education as well
as the desired language to be studied as a subject.654 The free character of the choice is confirmed
by school headmasters and teachers, who have a first-hand knowledge of the process.655 The
649 See paras. 307-308 below.
650 Witness Statement of Mr Ablyatipov (Annex 13), para. 32.
651 Witness Statement of (Annex 1), para. 11; Witness Statement of (Annex 6), paras. 8-
9 (confirming that her school would be able to accommodate even one single request from a student’s parents for
studying Ukrainian as a subject, should such a request arise); Witness Statement of (Annex 4), para. 6;
Witness Statement of (Annex 3), para. 17.
652 Witness Statement of Mr Ablyatipov (Annex 13), paras. 29-32.
653 An example of this is the creation of a separate discipline entitled “State languages of the Republic of Crimea”
within the university Bachelor programme at the Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University; see
Witness Statement of (Annex 12), para. 17; Witness Statement of (Annex 9), para. 9. The
Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University also implements programmes for training of
preschool and primary school teachers with a right to teach schoolchildren in classes with Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar
as the languages of instruction and to teach the Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar languages as elective courses, see Witness
Statement of
(Annex 7). This obviously aims at maintaining and developing teaching capacities in the Russian, Ukrainian, and
Crimean Tatar languages.
654 Witness Statement of Mr Ablyatipov (Annex 13), paras. 29-30.
655 Witness Statement of (Annex 1), paras. 8-9; Witness Statement of (Annex 2),
paras. 4 and 8; Witness Statement of (Annex 5), para. 14.
120
authorities then examine applications and take expressed wishes into account in planning the next
school year. The authorities closely monitor the implementation by the schools of the right to
education in native language, and provide them with regular instructions in this respect.656 For
example, in 2017, the authorities shared with school directors a roadmap that provides them
guidance for guaranteeing and implementing the constitutional right to education in one’s native
language; in particular the roadmap recalls the applicable law and contains model forms to be
used.657
309. It should be highlighted that Crimean schools do not have strict regulations on minimum
number of applications required in order to open a class in a specific language. Within the limits of
the capacities available to them, they endeavour to meet the requests and wishes of students and
their parents. If needs be, students may be regrouped in multi-grade classes. As for learning native
languages, Crimean schools (if they have capacity) can provide courses on an extracurricular basis
or as part of tutorial activities even for one student.658
310. As this system reflects the authorities’ policy and legal domestic obligations to maintain as
far as possible adequate capacities to meet the demand of education in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
by monitoring, anticipating and adjusting the capacities, it is evident that the decrease in the number
of classes providing general education in the Ukrainian language is the result, not the cause, of the
decrease in the number of students who express desire for it.659 A confirmation of this is the
increase in the number of students receiving education in the Crimean Tatar language, which was
accompanied by a development of further teaching capacity – one additional Crimean Tatar school
was opened since 2014.660
311. Ukraine suggests however in the Memorial that parents’ requests were ignored or that they
were pressured into not choosing Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian as teaching languages.661 This
allegation is not only rebutted by the measures explained above; it is also unsupported by Ukraine’s
evidence.
656 See for example Letter No. 01-14/382 of N.G. Goncharova, Minister of Education, Science and Youth of the
Republic of Crimea to directors of educational institutions “On the choice of language of education”, 25 June 2014
(Annex 892 to MU), recalling that the respect for the right to education in one’s native language depends on a “free,
voluntary and informed choice” offered to the parents or students; Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the
Republic of Crimea, Recommendation on the application of legislative provisions with regard to ensuring the possibility
to receive education in the native languages as attached to the Letter of the Deputy Head of the Department for State
Policies in the Field of General Education No. 03-510, 20 December 2018 (Annex 484); Ministry of Education, Science
and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-14/3417 to the heads of city, district education authorities, state
budgetary educational institutions, 18 November 2019 (Annex 491).
657 Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-14/4442 “On the roadmap for
choosing the instruction (studying) language in the educational institutions of the Republic of Crimea”, 28 December
2017 (Annex 479).
658 Witness Statement of (Annex 6), paras. 8-9.
659 See for example Witness Statement of (Annex 17), para. 6; Witness Statement of
(Annex 2), para. 24; Witness Statement of (Annex 3), para. 11.
660 Witness Statement of (Annex 8), para. 34.
661 MU, para. 538.
121
For example, the passage of Ms Tyshchenko’s Written Statement quoted by Ukraine is
not credible: she cites no source and she expressly acknowledges that she relies on
“reports” and “stories”, namely hearsay or second hand sources that are not supported
by any evidence.662 As the Court previously confirmed, “[n]or is testimony of matters
not within the direct knowledge of the witness, but known to him only from hearsay, of
much weight”.663
The same lack of probative value may be observed with respect to the passage of the
NGO report that Ukraine refers to, a document co-authored by Ms Tyshchenko, a pro-
Ukrainian activist, and that contains no supporting reference for this factual
allegation.664
The third and last source on which Ukraine relies, an OSCE report, relies itself on the
same NGO and on an interview with Mr Shchekun, who also provided a statement in
the present case.665 This is a manifestly circular approach to evidence.
312. The contention that applications for Ukrainian were systematically rejected666 is also
contradicted by statistics. Such an alleged systematic rejection is incompatible with the fact that a
number of schoolchildren continue to receive education in the Ukrainian language in Crimea.
Moreover, many witnesses working in the Crimean schools confirm that the Ukrainian language
and literature have been studied either as part of the curriculum or as an extra-curricular activity up
to this day667 and that their institutions are ready to accommodate the demand irrespective of the
number of students applying for that.668
313. In addition, when individual school directors observe that the Ukrainian language does not
open as many higher education and career opportunities as Russian language in today’s system in
Crimea, it is a mere description of a factual reality that is an obvious consideration to take into
account when deciding on the desired language of education; it is absurd to portray this as pressure
662 Witness Statement of Yulia Tyshchenko, 6 June 2018 (Annex 17 to MU), paras. 25-27.
663 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 42, para. 68.
664 Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, “Annexed” Education in Temporarily Occupied Crimea,
Monitoring Report, 2015, p. 23 (Annex 944 to MU).
665 OSCE, Report on the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17 September 2015),
para. 190 (Annex 812 to MU).
666 Witness Statement of 6 June 2018 (Annex 17 to MU), para. 25.
667 Witness Statement of (Annex 5), para. 13; see also School No. 20 of Feodosia, Information on
students studying between the 2008/2009 academic year and the 2020/2021 academic year (Annex 730); Witness
Statement of (Annex 11), paras. 5 and 7; see also Crimean Boarding Gymnasium for Gifted Children,
Information on the study of languages between 2011 and 2021 (Annex 733); Witness Statement of
(Annex 17), paras. 4 and 9; see also Collegium School of Alushta, Curriculum for 2020/2021 academic year (Annex
738); Collegium School of Alushta, Statistical data on number of students studying between 2012/2013 academic year
and 2020/2021 academic year (Annex 736); Witness Statement of
(Annex 2), para 8.
668 Witness Statement of (Annex 1), para. 11; Witness Statement of (Annex 6), para. 9.
122
on parents, as Ukraine does.669 Moreover, Ukraine does not specify in which context these
observations were made.
314. The allegation of systematic rejection is in any case baseless. The truth is that the authorities
made every effort to accommodate the expressed wishes of students and their legal representatives,
which they did successfully in almost all cases.670 Complaints are rare. In any event, should any
such complaints arise, parents may apply to the Ministry of Education for settlement. As the above
example shows, the authorities are committed to react swiftly and solve any capacity issues that
may arise locally so as to fully satisfy parents’ requests in relation to education language. That
parents’ choice of education language is natural, genuine and not subject to pressure is confirmed
by parents’ general unresponsiveness to some teachers’ active encouragements to continue having
their children learn Ukrainian.671
315. Relying in particular on Ms Tyshchenko’s opinion, Ukraine takes issue with the decision
made by the authorities in 2014 to retrain 300 Ukrainian language teachers to teach Russian and
contends that this provides evidence of the Russian Federation’s alleged true “purpose” to racially
discriminate.672 However, the order that Ms Tyshchenko invokes as support for this claim actually
points to the opposite explanation and confirms the demand-driven approach of the Crimean
authorities. Indeed the order expressly mentions that the decision was taken “in connection with the
integration of the educational system of the Republic of Crimea into the educational system of the
Russian Federation and changes in the labour market”.673 All other references relied on by
Ukraine674 do not contradict the demand-driven approach followed by the authorities in assessing
the need for maintaining education capacities in the Ukrainian language. As explained by Mr
Ablyatipov in his Witness Statement, the Crimean authorities proactively and closely monitored the
needs in terms of education and the wishes expressed by parents in order to adapt the teaching offer
and capacities to the demand. Thanks to the timely decision, Ukrainian language teachers were able
to keep their jobs, teaching both Ukrainian and Russian in schools since then.675
VI. There Is No “Artificial Shortage” of Teachers in Crimea
316. Ukraine accuses Russia of “ending” certain teacher-programmes in Crimea. In particular,
Ukraine refers to (i) the alleged “closing” of the Ukrainian Philology Faculty of the Taurida
669 MU, para. 538; Witness Statement of , 6 June 2018 (Annex 17 to MU), paras. 25-26.
670 See for example Witness Statement of (Annex 5), para. 14; Witness Statement of
(Annex 6), para. 8; Witness Statement of Mr Ablyatipov (Annex 13), para. 32.
671 Witness Statement of (Annex 6), para. 11.
672 MU, para. 548, relying in particular on Witness Statement of Yulia Tyshchenko, 6 June 2018 (Annex 17 to MU),
para. 20.
673 Order of the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of Crimea No. 116, 6 August 2014 (Annex 893 to MU).
674 MU, fns. 1150-1151.
675 Witness Statement of Mr Ablyatipov (Annex 13), para. 24; see also Witness Statement of (Annex
3), para. 13.

125
attended Crimean Tatar linguistic groups and 93 children attended Ukrainian linguistic groups at
preschool educational institutions of Crimea.688
323. To sum up, there is clearly no basis at all to claim that Russia breached CERD. CERD does
not provide for a right of national minorities to receive education in their native language. In any
event, the Russian education system provides, beyond what international law requires, for
reasonable opportunities of education for all its citizens. In particular, as has been amply
demonstrated above, the Russian Federation ensures as a matter of domestic law the availability of
education in the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages in Crimea as well as the opportunity to
learn Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages and literature, and has always done so at all material
times since 2014. While the right to education in native language in Russian domestic law is
qualified, and in particular is subject to the available capacities, the Russian Federation has been
taking continued efforts in good faith to ensure that the capacities match the demand in terms of
language of education.689
VII. Education in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Is Provided on Non-Discriminatory Basis
324. In addition to its claim on the alleged suppression of education in minority languages,
Ukraine formulates a series of accusations suggesting that education in Crimean Tatar and in
Ukrainian languages, as well as the learning thereof, is provided on a discriminatory basis. These
allegations are also unfounded.
325. First, Ukraine attempts to portray the landscape of native language education in Crimea
before 2014 as an ideal world in which multilingualism was on a steady rise.690
However, Ukraine’s own statistical data points to a very different reality.691 Ukraine
contends that “[b]efore February 2014, numerous programs for multi-ethnic and multilingual
education were developed and implemented in Crimea”.692 In fact the part of
Ms Tyshchenko’s witness statement that Ukraine relies on shows that there has never
really been multilingual education in Crimea under Ukraine.693 Indeed, Ms Tyshchenko
admitted that in September 2013, only six months before the events of March 2014, the
Ministry of Education of Crimea had merely adopted a decision to try to experiment
688 See Briefing note “On the situation with education in the Republic of Crimea in the 2020/2021 academic year” in
Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-15/1294, 24 June 2021 (Annex
450).
689 Witness Statement of Mr Ablyatipov (Annex 13), paras. 11, 30, 32, 35, inter alia.
690 MU, paras. 535-536.
691 Education Statistics from Ministry of Education of Ukraine, 2018 (Annex 735 to MU).
692 MU, para. 536.
693 Witness Statement of Yulia Tyshchenko, 6 June 2018 (Annex 17 to MU), paras. 4-17, referred to in MU,
para. 536.
126
multilingual education, and the experiment itself only started in early 2014.694 In other
words, Ukraine merely launched a programme of pilot school in the school year 2013-
2014.
To the extent that Ms Tyshchenko refers to students’ desire to learn languages and
cultures of other Crimean communities, the Russian system in Crimea provides for
exactly that, including the study of two or more languages.
In any event, multilingual education has nothing to do with the claims put forward by
Ukraine in this case, which relate to the availability of education in native language and
of studying one’s native language as a subject.
For the rest of the cited passage, Ms Tyshchenko only describes various activities of
her NGO and cooperation with the authorities, unrelated to language or history
teaching. Her activities and observations bear no relation with State policy and with
Ukraine’s claim.
More importantly, she indicates that “[b]efore […2014], instruction in Crimean schools
was mostly done in Russian; Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar, as languages of instruction,
were virtually exceptions to the general rule”.695
326. Second, Ukraine misleadingly portrays as an “assault” the point made in a Letter of the
Crimean Ministry of Education that studying the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages “must not
be conducted at the expense of instruction and study of the official language of the Russian
Federation”.696
This is however nothing more than a reminder of what applicable federal law
provides,697 which echoes international law instruments.698
It is customary for the Ministry to share directives or guidelines with educational
institutions and other actors under its mandate and to remind them of their legal
obligations.699
Russian is the vernacular language in the whole country, but this situation does not
harm local languages, which are sometimes, like Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian,
recognized as official languages in Republics. Instead of announcing an “assault”, the
Minister was pointing to the need to prevent situations where Russian language is not
694 Ibid., para. 6.
695 Ibid., para. 11.
696 MU, para. 537.
697 See para. 286 above.
698 See paras. 266 and 271 above.
699 See for example at the federal level: Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Letter No. TS-
945/08 “On the exercise of the rights of citizens to receive education in their native language”, 9 October 2017 (Annex
478).
127
taught at all locally. This is exactly what is indicated in the letter cited by Ukraine,700
which otherwise expressly guarantees the right to education in native language.
As confirmed by Ms Tyshchenko herself, Ukraine adopted the very conduct it now
holds against the Russian Federation. To recall, in Russian schools in Crimea before
2014 it was compulsory to study Ukrainian language and literature as a subject.
327. Third, Ukraine alleges a decrease in the “quality” of the teaching in the Crimean Tatar
language, by referring to an alleged lack, and biased content, of textbooks.701
It is difficult however to understand what Ukraine means when it refers to “the Russian
Federation’s biased teaching of history”,702 and Ukraine provides no evidence to
support this allegation.
Neither does Ukraine establish how a “reorientation” of the national history – which is
what it seems to refer to – should qualify as racial discrimination under CERD.
Besides, the education programmes approved by the Russian Federation include the
teaching of Russian history as well as world history, which includes Ukraine.703
Further, since 2014 the Russian Federation has taken measures for the publication of a
significant number of textbooks in the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages for
general education needs in Crimea, covering many teaching disciplines.704 However, as
700 Republic of Crimea, Ministry of Education, Science and Youth, Letter No. 01-14/ 382, 25 June 2014 (Annex 836
to MU), cited in MU, fn. 1127.
701 MU, para. 544.
702 MU, para. 550.
703 Witness Statement of (Annex 11), paras. 10-11.
704 The issuance of new textbooks is being supervised by the Crimean Ministry of Education in order to comply with
the standards of education issued by the Federal Ministry of Education. In 2015-2016, 46,686,300 rubles from the
Crimean budget were allocated for the translation and printing of over 63 textbook titles: see List of textbooks prepared
and published in 2015-2016 in Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-
15/1294, 24 June 2021 (Annex 450). In 2018, further 36 textbook titles were provided to Crimean schools on
preparation of which 49,747,200 rubles were allocated: see List of textbooks supplied to educational institutions of the
Republic of Crimea in 2018 in Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-
15/1294, 24 June 2021 (Annex 450). In 2019, 15 textbook titles, on preparation of which 34,999,700 rubles were
allocated, were delivered to Crimean schools: see List of textbooks supplied to educational institutions of the Republic
of Crimea in 2019 in Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 01-15/1294, 24
June 2021 (Annex 450). See also Witness Statement of Mr Ablyatipov (Annex 13). As examples of textbooks and study
guides published in Crimean Tatar in 2016 and 2017 see A.A. Danilov, L.G. Kosulina, History of Russia in the XIX
Century, 8th Grade, Textbook for general educational institutions with instruction in the Crimean Tatar language,
Prosveshchenie, Moscow, 2016 (Annex 1055); A.A. Danilov, History of Russia in the XX – Early XXI Century, 9th
Grade, Textbook for general educational institutions with instruction in the Crimean Tatar language, Prosveshchenie,
Moscow, 2016 (Annex 1054); A. Memetov, L.A. Alieva, E. Akmallaev, Crimean Tatar Language (Native), 8th Grade,
Study guide for general educational institutions with instruction in Crimean Tatar and Russian, Prosveshchenie,
Moscow, 2017 (Annex 1081); A. Kokieva, Crimean Tatar Literature, 8th Grade, Study guide for general educational
institutions with instruction in Crimean Tatar and Russian, Prosveshchenie, Moscow, 2017 (Annex 1082). As examples
of study guides published in Ukrainian see N.M. Borisyuk, Ukrainian language (Native), 4th grade, Study guide for
general educational institutions with instruction in Ukrainian and Russian, Prosveshchenie, Moscow, 2018 (Annex
1333); O.M. Kostikova, M.S. Lisenko, Literature Reading, 4th grade, Study guide for general educational institutions
128
such new textbooks could not be prepared instantly, the Ministry took the decision to
continue using the previous Ukrainian textbooks on a temporary basis pending the
publication of the new ones.705
Moreover, as evidenced by school headmasters and teachers in their Witness
Statements, Crimean schoolchildren study the history of the Crimean Peninsula or the
history of ethnic groups such as Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars. For instance, at School
No. 20 of Feodosia, students have the course on “Crimean studies” which covers topics
on the history, geography and culture of Crimea and of the peoples of the peninsula,
including the cultural heritage of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar peoples.706
328. Fourth, with respect to the alleged discriminatory searches of Crimean Tatar schools,707
Ukraine does not establish that these searches were discriminatory. The materials cited by Ukraine
indicate that the operations took place mainly in religious schools and that the law enforcement
authorities were looking for extremist literature.708 This is unsurprising as part of the preventive
strategy against extremist religious organizations active in Crimea.709 In this regard, the experience
of the Russian Federation in combating extremism indicates that schools are proven and particularly
targeted places of dissemination of extremist literature and messages. As explained by
representatives of Crimean schools, including the boarding school for gifted children at the village
of Tankovoe, Bakhchisaray district, in their Witness Statements, schools hold various events aimed
at combating extremism and terrorism and other socially dangerous phenomena and school
curriculum addresses such issues as anti-extremist thinking and anti-terrorist behaviour and
conscious compliance with safety regulations. Besides, it is a standard practice that in compliance
with instruction in Ukrainian and Russian, Prosveshchenie, Moscow, 2018 (Annex 1332). See also School No. 20 of
Feodosia, Photographs of study guides on the Ukrainian language and literature published by the Russian publishing
house “Prosveshchenie” (Annex 1147); Collegium School of Alushta, Photographs of textbooks on the Ukrainian
language and literature published by the Russian publishing house “Prosveshchenie” (Annex 1150).
705 Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 0114/2911 on the use of
textbooks on the Crimean Tatar language and literature and Ukrainian language and literature published in Ukraine, 18
August 2016 (Annex 467); Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Information on the outcomes of the
analysis of arguments set out in the letter of the Permanent Delegation of Ukraine to UNESCO, 23 October 2015
(Annex 911 to MU), p. 16. As reports, Simferopol Academic Gymnasium also uses Ukrainian language
and Ukrainian literature textbooks published by Ukrainian printing houses as teaching materials, which is permitted by
the Crimean Ministry of Education: see Witness Statement of (Annex 2), para. 12. See also Witness
Statement of (Annex 5), para. 16, attaching photographs of textbooks published in Ukraine, see School
No. 20 of Feodosia, Photographs of textbooks on the Ukrainian language and literature published by Ukrainian
publishing houses and used in class in grades 5 to 11 (Annex 1148).
706 Witness Statement of (Annex 5), para. 17. For other examples of the teaching of courses with a
regional component, such as history, geography, culture of Crimea and its peoples, see also Witness Statement of
(Annex 4), para. 11; Witness Statement of (Annex 2), para. 14; Witness Statement of
(Annex 11), para. 11; Witness Statement of (Annex 6), para. 14.
707 MU, para. 549.
708 Council of Europe, Report by Nils Muiẑnieks following his mission in Kyiv, Moscow, and Crimea from 7 to
12 September 2014 (27 October 2014) (Annex 822 to MU), para. 21.
709 See paras. 370, 373 below and Appendix B(I)(B). See also Witness Statement of (Annex 19), paras. 47-
48.
129
with the Russian legislation on countering extremist activity, schools’ library collections are subject
to a periodic reconciliation with the federal list of prohibited extremist materials.710 As
said, “everyone treats this as a necessary routine event, aimed,
first of all, at preventing the involvement of our students into extremist, terrorist and other radical
organisations, which is becoming more and more relevant in our time”.711 Ms. Tyshchenko’s
misleading portrayal of such episode at the Tankovoe boarding school as a “raid” is inapposite.712
329. Fifth, when it comes to the examples of creative writing contests for Crimean students that
Ukraine alleges “are also russified”,713
Ukraine takes these events out of their contexts and omits to specify that students’
participation in such creative writing contests is not compulsory but instead on a
voluntary basis,714
Ukraine also omits to specify that these are only a few examples of existing creative
writing contests and that there are also other contests with different topics, conferences
and other public events aimed at promoting language and cultures of peoples living in
Crimea and development of a multicultural environment and inter-ethnic harmony on
the peninsula. Such events are also generally open to voluntary participation in all
native languages, including for example in the context of the International Mother
Language Day, and some of which have been organized on a yearly basis since before
2014.715 Schools but also higher education institutions participate in such events and
initiatives under various formats, including extracurricular activities, aimed at
promoting the study and knowledge of native languages and cultures.716 Teachers and
headmasters reject the contention that they organize events or contests of a political or
propagandistic nature as part of their education programmes and insist for clarity that
students’ participation is entirely free.717
710 Witness Statement of (Annex 4), para. 19; Witness Statement of (Annex 6), para. 16;
Witness Statement of (Annex 2), para. 23.
711 Witness Statement of (Annex 11), paras. 17-20.
712 Witness Statement of , 6 June 2018 (Annex 17 to MU), para. 22.
713 MU, para. 553.
714 Witness Statement of (Annex 4), para. 15; Witness Statement of (Annex 5), para. 18;
Witness Statement of (Annex 6), para. 15.
715 See among others Witness Statement of (Annex 17), paras. 15-17; Witness Statement of
(Annex 2), paras. 13 and 15-19; Witness Statement of (Annex 5), paras. 19-20; Witness
Statement of (Annex 3), para. 16.
716 Witness Statement of (Annex 12), paras. 18-19; Witness Statement of (Annex 9),
paras. 12-13 and 16; Witness Statement of (Annex 8), paras. 23-27; Witness Statement of
(Annex 10), paras. 17-18 and 31-32.
717 See e.g. Witness Statement of (Annex 1), para. 16; Witness Statement of (Annex 2),
para. 22; Witness Statement of (Annex 6), para. 15.
130
330. Sixth, Ukraine’s allegations with respect to the CERD Committee are also unfounded.718
While the Russian Federation obviously agrees with the Committee that “[s]upport for education
with an ethnic focus plays a major role in preserving ethnic identity”, this is exactly what Russia
does with respect to the protection of the identity of the numerous ethnic groups that compose the
Russian people, including by attempting to provide, as much as possible, opportunity for education
in native language. As has been developed above, the Russian education system grants – beyond
what international law requires – a significant place to the preservation and expression of various
ethnic identities, including through subject courses of regional components.719 They also celebrate
cultural and traditional events of national minorities, including Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars.720
At the same time, as a large multicultural, multi-ethnic and multilingual society, the Russian
Federation cannot be blamed for maintaining an education system that seeks to preserve social
cohesion and prevent separatism, or social instability or tensions. That is precisely the meaning of
the quote from the 2012 Report submitted by Russia to the CERD Committee that Ukraine relies
on.
331. Seventh, Ukraine’s allegations with respect to the reorientation of the Crimean educational
system towards the Russian education system are also misplaced.721 Such reorientation is only
natural and logical in light of the majority’s desire to pursue higher education and a professional
career in Russia. On the other hand, this does not preclude Crimean students who so wish from
pursuing higher education abroad, just like students from other parts of the Russian Federation.
Contrary to Ukraine’s allegation, the adoption of the Russian system in Crimea does not prevent
students from pursuing studies in Europe or Ukraine if they so desire.722 In fact, since 2014 Ukraine
is blocking Crimean students from pursuing higher education in Ukraine, as Ukrainian higher
education institutions generally have not been accepting education certificates issued by Crimean
schools.723
332. Eighth, Ukraine obviously misunderstands the Concept of Patriotic, Spiritual and Moral
Upbringing of the Population in the Republic of Crimea adopted by Crimea in December 2014724 by
718 MU, para. 554.
719 See para. 326 above.
720 See among others Witness Statement of (Annex 6), para. 15; Yalta Secondary School No. 15,
Photographs from cultural events held at school between 2014 and 2021 (Annex 1233); Alushta 24, “‘Kalina – Nasha
Bereginya’ festival was held at the Municipal Educational Institution Collegium School of the city of Alushta”, 27
October 2017 (Annex 979); Witness Statement of (Annex 2), paras. 14-21; Simferopol Academic
Gymnasium official website, “Anniversary of Amet-Khan Sultan”, 25 October 2020 (Annex 1137); Simferopol
Academic Gymnasium official website, “Day of Remembrance for the victims of the deportation of the peoples of
Crimea (PHOTO)”, 18 May 2015 (Annex 1059) (numerous various courses and events, including the yearly
commemoration of the deportation of the peoples of Crimea).
721 MU, paras. 555-559.
722 MU, para. 556.
723 See para. 302 above. See also Witness Statement of (Annex 5), para. 9; Witness Statement of
(Annex 8), para. 30.
724 MU, para. 557, referring to Decree of the Head of the Republic of Crimea, Approving the Concept of Patriotic,
Spiritual and Moral Upbringing of the Population in the Republic of Crimea, 18 December 2014 (Annex 894 to MU).
131
attempting to portray it as a single-minded nationalistic propaganda programme. The Concept’s
objective is to extend to Crimea policies that are applied in the whole territory of the Russian
Federation. Therefore, it entails the exact opposite of discrimination. Moreover, the Concept aims in
particular at preserving ethnic diversity as well as the cultural and historical heritage of all
ethnicities of the peninsula,725 including Crimean Tatar culture and history.726 Preservation for
ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity has been expressly recognized by the President of the
Russian Federation, who observed that “Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples’ cultures and
traditions. This makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has been lost
over the centuries. Russians and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and people of other ethnic groups have
lived side by side in Crimea, retaining their own identity, traditions, languages and faith.”727
333. Ukraine’s and Ms Tyshchenko’s unsupported allegations of school teachers being
encouraged to report Crimean Tatar children who are absent from school on 18 May728 are also
meritless in view of the authorities’ active support for the yearly commemoration of the Sürgün, as
is explained elsewhere.729
334. Finally, Ukraine alleges that the Russian Federation has violated Article 7 of CERD by
implementing measures “that can only have the effect of increasing the prejudice that leads to racial
discrimination” and accuses it of abandoning Ukraine’s alleged efforts towards multiculturalism in
Crimea before 2014.730 However, when it comes to multiculturalism, Ukraine provides no credible
evidence that it had established a more advanced system in Crimea in this respect. By contrast, as
has been amply shown above, multiculturalism is a core part of the educational system of the
Russian Federation, including in Crimea. Therefore, bold statements such as “the Russian
Federation has set up its own culture as superior to those of other ethnic groups in Crimea”731 are
either the product of Ukraine’s deep misunderstanding of the Russian educational system, or
another illustration of accusations that only aim at casting the opprobrium on Russia for purely
political reasons.
725 Decree of the Head of the Republic of Crimea, Approving the Concept of Patriotic, Spiritual and Moral
Upbringing of the Population in the Republic of Crimea, 18 December 2014 (Annex 894 to MU), Appendix, Part I.
726 Ibid., Appendix, Part II.
727 Address by President of the Russian Federation to State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of
Russian regions and civil society representatives, 18 March 2014, available at
http://en.kremlin ru/events/president/news/20603. See also Witness Statement of (Annex 8), para. 32.
728 MU, para. 558, relying on Witness Statement of Yulia Tyshchenko, 6 June 2018 (Annex 17 to MU), para. 22.
729 See Appendix D, paras. 25-29. See also Witness Statement of (Annex 8), para. 25; Fevzi Yakubov
Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University official website, “CEPU honours the memory of the victims of the
deportation”, 22 May 2017 (Annex 1070); Simferopol Academic Gymnasium official website, “Day of Remembrance
for the victims of the deportation of the peoples of Crimea (PHOTO)”, 18 May 2015 (Annex 1059).
730 MU, paras. 637-638.
731 MU, para. 639.
132
VIII. Conclusion
335. Ukraine’s allegations of discrimination with respect to education rights and opportunities are
unfounded, as demonstrated in this Chapter. As a matter of law, there is no right to education in
minority native language under CERD. Nor could such absolute right be brought under its purview
through the provisions of Russian domestic law since these provisions strictly qualify and restrict
such right. In any event, the Russian Federation has not restricted the opportunities for Crimean
Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians to receive education in their native language. To the contrary, the
education in Crimean Tatar did not drop but instead increased since 2014. So far as the education in
Ukrainian is concerned, the decrease of students is explained by factors that have nothing to do with
racial discrimination. The Russian Federation has always endeavoured to maintain adequate
capacities to meet the education demand. Such conduct hardly points to any racial discrimination or
violation of CERD, let alone a systematic campaign or policy thereof directed at the cultural erasure
of Crimean Tatars or ethnic Ukrainians.
336. With respect to the quality of education, Ukraine’s claims are unsupported and seem instead
to amount to little more than an attempt to bring the question of the status of Crimea through the
backdoor of education issues. In any event, as has been confirmed above, education programmes in
Crimea are obviously not biased, truncated or discriminatory.
337. For all these reasons, Ukraine’s claims with respect to education rights and opportunities do
not establish any breach of CERD and a fortiori do not support its grave accusation on the existence
of a systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination allegedly conducted by the Russian
Federation against Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians and aiming at their cultural erasure.
133
UKRAINE’S OTHER ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ARE
UNFOUNDED
338. As demonstrated above, Ukraine’s claims of systematic racial discrimination with respect to
the ban on the Mejlis and to educational rights, the only claims that the Court considers as appearing
to be plausible at the stage of provisional measures, are clearly unfounded when checked against the
relevant facts. The remainder of Ukraine’s allegations, that the Court did not even consider
plausible prima facie at the provisional measures phase, are also totally unfounded and bear no link
at all with CERD. In the Application and Memorial, Ukraine artificially portrays as cases of racial
discrimination a series of sporadic and unrelated episodes concerning alleged disappearances,
murders, abductions and torture (I), law-enforcement measures (detentions and searches) (II),
citizenship issues (III), public events (IV), operation of the media (V), and preservation of cultural
heritage (VI). Putting the record straight, this Chapter and the related appendices will show that
Ukraine’s allegations manifestly do not qualify as racial discrimination. Since these allegations are
manifestly implausible, the present Chapter will only deal with them in a cursory way. It will
provide in appendices, for the sake of completeness, more detailed information on each.
No Enforced Disappearances, Murders, Abductions and Torture Directed at
the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians on Racial Grounds
339. In its Application, Ukraine alleges that “[t]he Russian occupation régime has further
persecuted the Crimean Tatar community by instigating, or at least tolerating and encouraging, a
pattern of disappearances and murders.”732 Likewise, in its Memorial Ukraine contends that “Russia
and its agents targeted activists from those communities with extreme violence, including
abduction, torture, disappearance and murder. The apparent purpose and certain effect of these
heinous offenses against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians was to intimidate and silence inconvenient
critics and to warn others in those communities not to resist the Russian takeover.”733
340. This grave allegation – which, on its own words, conflates the allegation of racial
discrimination with the real dispute over the status of Crimea – is utterly unfounded, both factually
and legally. First, Ukraine’s case is but a disparate set of unsubstantiated allegations that bear no
link at all with CERD, as is amply shown in Appendix A, which also establishes that the Russian
Federation did properly investigate the incidents (A). Second, Ukraine articulates no serious case on
the issue of attribution of any alleged SDF conduct to the Russian Federation (B).
732 Ukraine’s Application of 16 January 2017, para. 103.
733 MU, para. 392. See also para. 393.
134
A. NO BREACH OF CERD WITH RESPECT TO ALLEGED ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES, MURDERS,
ABDUCTIONS AND TORTURE
341. None of the acts alleged by Ukraine constitute racial discrimination in violation of CERD,
let alone form part of a systematic campaign or a policy thereof.
342. First, it is striking to note that nowhere in the Application or the Memorial did Ukraine
articulate that the acts it complains of constitute “enforced disappearances”, “murders”,
“abductions” and “torture” under the applicable rules of international law. Ukraine does not
articulate for instance on which grounds the acts it complains of constitute “torture” under CERD.
Similarly, Ukraine does not articulate any concrete claim with regard to enforced disappearances
under international law, nor does it elaborate at all on the legal definition and regime of enforced
disappearances under customary international law.734 Ukraine uses these words (enforced
disappearances, torture, abductions, murders) as if they would not carry any legal meaning and as if
their existence could be simply asserted by using these words, without any further legal and factual
assessment of their existence in a given concrete case.735
343. Second, even if such allegations were established by Ukraine, CERD does not provide in
any case a cause of action for any alleged breach of individual rights. CERD only applies if the
alleged acts fall under its provisions, i.e. constitute racial discrimination, including by targeting
specific ethnic groups as such or by taking measures that disproportionally affect an ethnic group
absent any objective and reasonable justifications. This is clearly not the case so far as Ukraine’s
claims are concerned.
344. As is examined in further details in the relevant Appendix of the Counter-Memorial,736 none
of the claims advanced by Ukraine in respect of alleged enforced disappearances, murders,
abductions and torture can plausibly constitute acts of racial discrimination and a consequential
violation of CERD by the Russian Federation. In brief,
First, Ukraine partly relies on incidents that allegedly occurred prior to the accession of
Crimea to the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014. They are thus not within the
Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis as defined in the Court’s judgment on preliminary
objections in this case.737
734 Ukraine became a party to the UN Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance in
August 2015. Russia is not a party to the Convention and it did not sign it.
735 For instance, Ukraine repeatedly claims in the Application and Memorial that “disappearances” took place, while
international law addresses enforced disappearances only.
736 See Appendix A, section I.
737 See Appendix A, paras. 3-4.
135
Second, the relevant circumstances of the alleged facts do not point at all to acts of
racial discrimination. In addition, Ukraine fails to establish the necessary intent and
pattern to support its claim of systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination.738
Third, with respect to investigations into the incidents, contrary to Ukraine’s
allegations, these were not conducted in a selective, arbitrary or discriminatory manner,
let alone on racial grounds. On the contrary, the Russian Federation complied with its
obligation to investigate.739
B. ISSUES OF ATTRIBUTION
345. Ukraine also fails to establish that the alleged acts relied on in its Application and Memorial
are attributable to the Russian Federation under the applicable rules of the law of State
responsibility. In particular, it does not even seek to establish that the alleged cases of enforced
disappearances of Crimean Tatar and ethnic Ukrainian activists at paragraphs 394 to 398 of its
Memorial are attributable to the Russian Federation. For the cases it refers to, i.e. those of Mr
Reshat Ametov, Mr Timur Shaimardanov, Mr Leonid Korzh, Mr Seiran Zinedinov, Mr Ervin
Ibragimov, Mr Vladislav Vaschuk, Mr Ivan Bonariets and Mr Vasyl Chernysh, Ukraine limits to
alleging their disappearance or kidnapping without ever attempting to provide the slightest evidence
of the attribution to the Russian Federation of the alleged acts. In particular, Ukraine does not
attribute to anyone the alleged disappearances of Crimean Tatars. Insofar as Crimean Ukrainians are
concerned, Ukraine contends that “Ukrainians also suffered similar harassment and violence at the
hands of Russian forces”740 but this allegation is not based on any credible evidence and Ukraine
does not articulate its claim further.
346. As an alternative scenario, Ukraine seeks to hold the Russian Federation responsible for
instigating, encouraging, or tolerating the said acts.741 This calls for two observations. First, these
allegations are also not supported by concrete evidence. Second, toleration, condoning,
encouragement, or incitement are hardly compatible with investigations that were, and are being,
thoroughly carried out, as shown in the relevant appendix.742
347. The truth is that the assessment of the individual cases advanced by Ukraine that is
incorporated in Appendix A of the present Counter-Memorial743 shows that in fact, none of the
alleged individual acts of enforced disappearances, murders, abductions, and torture is attributable
to the Russian Federation. A fortiori these acts cannot evidence a systematic campaign of racial
discrimination engineered and implemented by the Russian Federation and targeting Crimean
738 See Appendix A, paras. 5-12.
739 See Appendix A, paras. 13-39.
740 MU, para. 398.
741 MU, paras. 27, 393, 404, and 610.
742 See Appendix A, paras. 13-39.
743 See Appendix A, paras. 43-58.
136
Tatars and Ukrainians. In addition, no act allegedly committed prior to Crimea’s accession to the
Russian Federation on 18 March 2014 may be attributed to the Russian Federation under Article 4
of the ILC Articles on State responsibility because the Russian Federation was not the authority in
charge in Crimea prior to that date, which is undisputed even by Ukraine. Besides, as demonstrated
above, the Russian Federation had no direction or control over the alleged acts, nor had it
acknowledged and adopted them as its own.
No Racial Discrimination with respect to Law Enforcement Measures (Detentions and
Searches)
348. Ukraine accuses the Russian Federation of having conducted arbitrary searches and
detentions as part of its alleged systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination targeting the
Crimean Tatar community as such.744 Ukraine’s accusation is unfounded on several grounds. First,
Ukraine’s general approach to its burden of proof is, at best, flawed (A). Secondly, most of
Ukraine’s factual allegations are not established or are incorrect (B). Thirdly, the alleged law
enforcement measures are based on a lawful and legitimate basis (C). Finally, these measures are
manifestly non-discriminatory and have nothing to do with racial discrimination (D).
A. UKRAINE’S FLAWED APPROACH TO ITS BURDEN OF PROOF
349. Throughout Chapter 9(C) of its Memorial, Ukraine takes issue with a number of
unconnected law enforcement measures which, the argument goes, demonstrate a “campaign of
discrimination” against people of Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian background (the “Law Enforcement
Claim”).
350. The Law Enforcement Claim, for the most part, comprises short assertive paragraphs on a
number of administrative and criminal proceedings. The presentation of these episodes follows a
similar pattern: First, Ukraine singles out and describes a law enforcement measure in no more than
a paragraph or two; Second, Ukraine identifies a small number of individuals (sometimes
anonymous), allegedly of Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian origin, who were supposedly affected by the
law enforcement measure in question; and, lastly, Ukraine unilaterally labels these measures as
“racial discrimination”.
351. It is to be noted that Ukraine has not adduced the procedural record of the impugned
proceedings, nor does Ukraine appear to have even consulted those materials before advancing its
claims. Yet, based on submissions which are almost entirely bereft of primary evidence and built on
hearsay, Ukraine expects the Court to find that these measures constitute racial discrimination,
individually and as part of an alleged systematic campaign directed against Crimean Tatars.
744 MU, paras. 442-454.
137
352. This claim is unsubstantiated on its face. But even if Ukraine’s factual allegations were
taken at face value, there would still be no evidence of any racial discrimination. That is because a
showing of racial discrimination towards targeted groups presupposes a showing of differentiation
in treatment in the first place. That case has not been made out here.
353. It is incumbent upon the party who alleges a differentiation to demonstrate its existence.745
Ukraine contests the lawfulness of searches and detentions conducted by the Russian Federation’s
law enforcement authorities746 but offers no evidence whatsoever to establish that the manner in
which such alleged measures were pursued, or the fact that they were pursued, differed, to any
extent, from the practice of Russian authorities in other cases, because of racial grounds. Ukraine’s
claims are therefore incapable of triggering CERD.747
354. In its submissions, Ukraine often invokes grievances of individuals whose racial, national or
ethnic origin is left entirely unclear. In those instances, Ukraine omits not only to identify the
comparator but even the compared element, which is required for the purpose of establishing a
“racial discrimination claim”. Ukraine also artificially conflates groups such as Crimean Tatars,
Muslims and extremists in order to sustain its far-fetched theory of pretextual law enforcement
measures.
355. Even where Ukraine alleges the aggrieved individuals to be of Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian
origin, it is often not specified on what basis Ukraine itself has made this classification.748 There is
no evidence to suggest that such individuals identify themselves as Crimean Tatars or ethnic
Ukrainians. Absent such identification, claims of racial discrimination fail on their own terms.749
356. As has been explained above,750 to the extent Ukraine’s Law Enforcement Claim arises out
of court-approved law enforcement measures and other court decisions, Ukraine ought to
demonstrate that recourse to local remedies have proved to be futile or that the rulings rendered by
courts acting in last resort were not reasonably or legally tenable or were not adopted in good faith.
Yet, Ukraine did not even deign to engage in that analysis, which per se is fatal to its Law
Enforcement Claim in its entirety.
B. UKRAINE’S ALLEGATIONS ARE NOT ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF FACT
357. The foregoing, even without further elaboration, should be the end of the matter in respect of
the Law Enforcement Claim. That being said, Ukraine’s Law Enforcement Claim is not simply
745 ECtHR, Chassagnou and others v. France, Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, Judgment (GC), 29 April
1999, paras. 90-92.
746 MU, paras. 444-454.
747 PORF, paras. 340-359.
748 See e.g. MU, para. 446, referring to “ten Crimean Tatars”.
749 ECtHR, Chassagnou and others v. France, Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, Judgment (GC), 29 April
1999, paras. 90-92.
750 See paras. 11-13.
138
unsubstantiated, but also rests on false factual allegations. The Russian Federation maintains that
the impugned measures were entirely legitimate, and evidence no wrongdoing on the part of the
authorities, let alone racial discrimination. As will be shown further below, Ukraine systematically
distorts or omits relevant factual and legal circumstances of its alleged cases that do not fit, and in
fact disprove, its narrative of systematic campaign of racial discrimination against the Crimean
Tatars.751
358. Materials relied on by Ukraine lack probative value. This is the case of the OHCHR reports,
for reasons that have been explained above.752 Ukraine also relies on NGO materials. The Court has
had the occasion to highlight that similar unconfirmed reports lack weight and are unconvincing.753
Such is clearly the case with regard to the ones which Ukraine relies on.
359. For instance, in support of its allegation of “a broader policy and practice carried out by the
Russian occupation authorities in Crimea”,754 Ukraine relies on three statements emanating from
activist NGOs that contain a selective, if not distorted, account of the relevant facts.755 The cited
document from the Crimean Tatar Resource Center is particularly telling: the choice of narrative is
clearly biased as it is deliberately very succinct, if not silent, on the reasons for the searches, only
insisting on an alleged rude behaviour by the law enforcement authorities, allegations that are not
supported by evidence in Ukraine’s Memorial.756
360. In a similar vein, Ukraine heavily relies on press articles and reports as “evidence” of its
allegations. But these documents are manifestly fraught with deficiencies. Such media articles often
build their narrative on one or few assertions attributed to persons who are close to those searched
or detained, and who often have an understandable but subjective tendency to defend them; the
articles are also generally succinct or elusive about lawful and legitimate reasons for the measures
and about the explanations of the law enforcement authorities.
361. For instance, in relation to the incident involving the search at a café on 23 November 2017
and the detention of four men, the article allegedly reports Mr Nariman Dzhelalov’s comment that
“[t]he Turkish man ‘tried to get out of it, and the security services used the situation to apply
751 See subsections C and D below.
752 See paras. 14-17.
753 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2005, para. 136 and para. 159; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, para. 239.
754 MU, para. 453.
755 Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Security officers conducted regular searches in the houses of the Crimean Tatars
in Crimea (23 January 2018) (Annex 969 to MU); Crimean Human Rights Group, Statement on Unlawful searches and
detainments of Crimean Tatar national movement activists and veterans in Crimea (24 November 2017) (Annex 965 to
MU); Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies (14 November 2017) (Annex 964 to
MU).
756 Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Security officers conducted regular searches in the houses of the Crimean Tatars
in Crimea (23 January 2018) (Annex 969 to MU).
139
pressure on this group of activists’”.757 But this is a mere assertion based on a subjective opinion,
and Mr Dzhelalov does not elaborate on any objective element that supports his view that the law
enforcement authorities used the situation to apply pressure on the group – described as a group of
“activists”, not as an ethnic group. Furthermore, the article only describes him as a Crimean Tatar
activist and does not specify who he is, in which capacity he speaks, and whether he attended the
scene or not. The record actually shows a different story than the one alleged by Ukraine.758
362. With respect to the death of Ms Vedzhie Kashka, an 82-year-old Crimean Tatar activist who
was present during a meeting in a café in Simferopol on 23 November 2017,759 Ukraine once again
relies on materials of no probative value.760 One of the highlights within the article asserts in
sensationalist terms that “they have come for our elders”,761 while the record shows that Ms
Kashka’s regrettable passing is in fact not attributable to the Russian Federation.762
C. THE LEGITIMATE BASIS OF THE ALLEGED MEASURES OF ENFORCEMENT
363. In instances where Ukraine’s claims correspond to measures of law enforcement by State
authorities, the said measures were based on objective and reasonable grounds and taken in
accordance with applicable domestic law, excluding any possibility of racial discrimination under
CERD. These elements are addressed in detail in the relevant Appendix of the present Counter-
Memorial.763 They confirm that Ukraine’s claims have clearly nothing to do with racial
discrimination.
364. The lawful character as well as objective and reasonable grounds for these law-enforcement
measures is evident. In particular, as has been specified before,764 legitimate limitations to human
rights constitute a standard of international human rights law. The fight against extremism,
including but not limited to religious extremism, constitutes one of these legitimate limitations.
While Ukraine takes issue with the Russian Federation’s fight against extremism and terrorism, and
in particular its ban of organizations such as Hizb-ut Tahrir or Tablighi Jamaat, these constitute
justified measures and legitimate limitations, not racial discrimination.765 In particular, the
European Court of Human Rights has found the ban imposed by the Russian Federation on Hizb-ut
757 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Veteran Crimean Tatar Activist Dies As Associates Detained By Russia” (23
November 2017) (Annex 1071 to MU), p. 2.
758 See Appendix B, paras. 64-66.
759 MU, para. 454.
760 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Veteran Crimean Tatar Activist Dies As Associates Detained By Russia (23
November 2017) (Annex 1071 to MU); Human Rights Watch, Another Day, Another Tragedy in Crimea (27 November
2017) (Annex 966 to MU).
761 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Veteran Crimean Tatar Activist Dies As Associates Detained By Russia (23
November 2017) (Annex 1071 to MU), p. 2.
762 See Appendix B, paras. 64-66.
763 See Appendix B(II).
764 See paras. 153-154 above.
765 See Appendix B, paras. 8-25.
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Tahrir to be legitimate, a measure that was taken long before Crimea’s accession to the Russian
Federation.766 Contrary to Ukraine’s allegation, there is no basis thus to claim that the fight against
Hizb-ut Tahrir and similar terrorist organizations as well as against Tablighi Jamaat and similar
extremist organizations constitute racial discrimination against Crimean Tatars.
D. THE NON-DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF THE ALLEGED ENFORCEMENT MEASURES
365. In addition, as is demonstrated below, the measures complained of by Ukraine did not
evidence a difference of treatment, let alone a discrimination based on race and a fortiori a
campaign of systematic violations of CERD.
366. With respect to measures to fight against extremist or terrorist religious activities, which
form the core of Ukraine’s accusations with respect to law enforcement measures, Ukraine’s
allegation of “disproportionate affection” of Crimean Tatars relies on a confusion between Muslims
and Crimean Tatars combined with a total obfuscation of the reasons for the measures, the
legitimacy of which have been largely accepted, including by the European Court of Human Rights.
Such confusion is not in line with CERD Committee practice (1). In any event, Ukraine has not
established the discriminatory nature of the application of the impugned measures in comparison
with the application of the same measures in similar situations involving other ethnic groups and
indeed the rest of the Crimean and Russian population. Here like elsewhere, a proper comparative
exercise is lacking. Actually, as a matter of fact, no unjustified disproportionate impact on Crimean
Tatars exists (2). As the Russian Federation already pointed out, the proportion between the annual
numbers of crimes that were considered committed in Crimea by individuals from various ethnic
group grossly reflects the general proportion between these ethnic groups among the Crimean
population.767 Ukraine did not challenge in the Memorial these figures, which are fatal to its case.
The Nature of the Measures and of the Groups of Persons Affected by Them
367. As explained previously, detentions and searches are part of the legal framework that applies
to all suspected extremist activities and banned organizations. It is applied in the same way to
everyone, including non-Crimean Tatar individuals and organizations that are banned or suspected
of extremist activities.
368. In addition, the CERD Committee clarified that differential treatment will “constitute
discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and
766 See Appendix B, para. 20.
767 Statistical information on the number of crimes committed by ethnic groups in Crimea between 2014 and 2016,
contained in Letter from N. Vodorezov, Deputy Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian
Federation to the Crimean Federal District, to A. D. Viktorov, Director of the Department for Humanitarian
Cooperation and Human Rights of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, No. A-80-1313, 26 April
2016, in Documents from the Dossier and Judges’ Folder as submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on
Provisional Measures (Annex 1267), pp. 5-6.
141
purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to
the achievement of this aim”.768 On the contrary, “a differentiation of treatment will not constitute
discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the objectives and purposes of
the Convention, are legitimate or fall within the scope of article 1, paragraph 4, of the
Convention”.769
369. In the present case, Ukraine bases its discrimination claim exclusively on the fact that some
of the searched and detained people are Muslims and/or Crimean Tatars. That is obviously not
enough to substantiate a claim of racial discrimination.
As is shown under Appendix B, extremist activities or organizations that are
legitimately prohibited in Russia, including in Crimea, are far from being limited to
Crimean Tatar or Muslim activities or organizations, and searches in Crimea are far
from affecting only Muslims or Crimean Tatars. They affect all types of profiles and
ethnic backgrounds.
In addition, the alleged measures were not based on the ethnic background of the
persons concerned, but on their activities.
Given that members of Hizb ut-Tahrir are Muslims by definition and that virtually all
Crimean Tatars in Crimea are Muslim,770 law enforcement authorities will obviously
investigate individuals suspected of involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir among the
Muslim community and the chances are high that most of the individuals suspected of
Muslim extremism will also incidentally be Crimean Tatars. But it does not mean of
course that these individuals have been targeted by law enforcement measures on
ethnic grounds. This flawed syllogism is precisely what Ukraine attempts to suggest
but does not substantiate at all. These specific individuals are affected as a result of
their suspected extremist or terrorist activities, not of their ethnicity.
370. Ukraine’s fallacious picture of Crimean Tatars being targeted as an ethnic group under
pretextual allegations of Muslim extremism is rebutted by basic considerations. For example, antiterrorist
measures against the banned organization Hizb ut-Tahrir and anti-extremist measures
against the banned organization Tablighi Jamaat are being carried out in all relevant parts of the
territory of the Russian Federation and against all suspects regardless of their ethnic background.771
768 CERD Committee, 65th session, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination against non-citizens, 2004 in
United Nations General Assembly, 59th Session, Official Records, Supplement No. 18 (A/59/18), p. 94, para. 4.
769 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14, para. 2 (Annex 788 to MU). See also CERD Committee,
General Recommendation No. 32, para. 8 (Annex 790 to MU). See also Patrick Thornberry, The International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2016,
p. 112.
770 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), para. 92. See also Witness
Statement of , 9 June 2021 (Annex 19), para. 22.
771 By way of reference, see for 2015: RIA Novosti, “Alleged members of Tablighi Jamaat will be tried in Siberia”, 15
June 2015 (Annex 925), 74.ru, “Hizb-ut Tahrir adherents arrested in the South Urals for recruiting activists”, 5 October
142
Both organizations were banned in the Russian Federation years before Crimea’s accession.
Besides, the only relevant consideration in all cases is whether the suspected individuals conducted
activities in relation with Hizb ut-Tahrir or another similar banned organization.
371. Extremist organizations are proscribed regardless of religion, ethnicity, etc.772 Moreover, the
Federal list of extremist materials, established and maintained under Federal Law No. 114-FZ of
25 July 2002, contains inter alia religious materials – relating for example to the sect of
scientology, the sect of the Jehovah Witnesses, Islam, Falun Gong – but also political materials –
such as publications of the leadership of the Italian fascist party, of the leadership of the German
Nazi party or of Russian ultranationalist parties or movements –, musical publications – with radical
or racist messages –, or publications or books by individual authors – that include for example
racist, holocaust denial, anti-Semitic, radical nationalistic messages, etc.773
372. Based on the foregoing, the fact that most of suspects in the impugned measures in Crimea
happened to be Crimean Tatars774 does not point to discriminatory treatment or disproportionate
impact in relation to measures to combat specific organizations that carry out extremist or terrorist
Muslim activities. It is only a reflection of the fact that Muslims in Crimea happen to be mostly
Crimean Tatars, not ethnic Russians or ethnic Ukrainians.
373. In its Memorial Ukraine takes specific issue on law enforcement measures against suspected
members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat and it lists several such cases. But as is shown with
the factual review under Appendix B, these are measures taken in the field of the fight against
2015 (Annex 932) (Chelyabinsk region), RIA Novosti, “Investigation asks Moscow court to arrest the head of Hizb ut-
Tahrir cell”, 23 October 2015 (Annex 935) (Moscow), TASS, “Member of terrorist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir
sentenced to 5 years in penal colony in Saint Petersburg”, 17 August 2015 (Annex 928) (Saint Petersburg); for 2016:
Kommersant, “Hizb-ut Tahrir member Erik Karmatsky detained in the capital”, 11 May 2016 (Annex 954) (Moscow/the
Republic of Tatarstan), Sputnik, “A native of Tajikistan convicted for involvement in terrorist organisation”, 29
September 2016 (Annex 962) (Moscow); for 2017: TASS, “Eight members of Hizb ut-Tahrir terrorist organization
detained in Tatarstan”, 18 October 2017 (Annex 978) (the Republic of Tatarstan), RAPSI, “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami
members sentenced to 15-18 years in penal colony”, 15 June 2017 (Annex 973) (Moscow), RBC, “FSB detain leader of
Hizb ut-Tahrir ‘female cell’ in Saint Petersburg”, 24 November 2017 (Annex 981) (Saint Petersburg). See also Expert
Report of Ilshat Amirovich Mukhametzaripov on Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat associations, 30 June 2021
(Annex 23) at pp. 34-44 and 87-88. In the Memorial Ukraine refers only to one case of law-enforcement measures being
applied to Tablighi Jamaat members (para. 447). For prosecution of members of this banned organization in other
regions of Russia see, by way of reference, RIA Novosti, “Alleged members of Tablighi Jamaat will be tried in Siberia”,
15 June 2015 (Annex 925) (Novosibirsk Region), RIA Novosti, “Members of Tablighi Jamaat, banned in Russia, were
detained in Tatarstan”, 20 October 2016 (Annex 964) (the Republic of Tatarstan), RIA Novosti, “Criminal case is
opened against the detained extremists from Tablighi Jamaat*”, 14 November 2017 (Annex 980) (Moscow), RIA
Novosti, “Islamist cell exposed in four Volga regions”, 17 June 2020, available at:
https://ria ru/20200617/1573060506.html (Annex 1026) (Nizhny Novgorod, Penza, Saratov and Ulyanovsk Regions).
772 See Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, List of public associations and religious organisations in respect
of which the court has taken a legally effective decision to liquidate them or ban their activities on the grounds provided
for by Federal Law of 25 July 2002 No. 114-FZ “On counteracting extremist activities”, as at 7 April 2021 (Annex
503).
773 See Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, Excerpts from the Federal list of extremist materials in
accordance with Federal Law of 25 July 2002 No. 114-FZ “On countering extremist activities” (List as at 8 June 2021)
(Annex 511).
774 See MU, para. 444, inter alia.
143
religious extremism, including suspected involvement in extremist or terrorist organizations, the
prohibition of which is public knowledge, is viewed as legitimate by the European Court of Human
Rights, and predates the impugned measures by years.775 In this regard, the individual suspects
could not have been unaware that the organizations they took part in had been banned as extremist
or terrorist organizations.
374. Ukraine’s narrative of racial discrimination carefully selects only cases in which the
individuals searched and detained happen to be Crimean Tatars. It does not confirm, and even less
demonstrate, that no similar measures have been taken with respect to non-Crimean Tatar
individuals suspected of involvement in the same or other Muslim or non-Muslim extremist
religious prohibited organizations.
The Absence of Any Difference of Treatment
375. Ukraine alleges a campaign of home searches affecting Crimean Tatars in August and
September 2014 but bases this allegation on a total of 13 home searches and 2 detentions, as
reported in the cited OHCHR report.776 As is explained elsewhere,777 most of these cases were
based on suspicions relating to extremist or otherwise illegal activities as part of criminal
investigations. Ukraine does not establish that no similar measures have been conducted with
respect to suspects of extremist activities with other ethnic backgrounds.
376. Ukraine maintains that “[t]he occupation authorities have also raided public places such as
markets, mosques, cafés, restaurants, or theaters. In these raids, like the searches of private homes,
Crimean Tatars have particularly been targeted”.778 However, no comparative exercise is offered to
establish the alleged disproportionate impact on Crimean Tatars or to explain why any such
disproportionate impact should reflect racial discrimination, as opposed to measures resting on
legitimate reasons. The same goes for the measures allegedly connected to the search of a café in
Pionerskoe on 1 April 2016 that Ukraine alleges in the same paragraph, and in respect to which no
comparative exercise or explanation are provided.779
377. Similarly, with respect to the strategic operational exercise “Barrier 2015”,780 Ukraine is
unable to substantiate its allegations of arbitrary targeting of and discriminatory treatment against
Crimean Tatars, in particular through a genuine comparative exercise. This would be particularly
775 See Appendix B, paras. 16-18.
776 MU, para. 444, referring to Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the
Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 September 2014) (Annex 765 to MU).
777 See Appendix B(II).
778 MU, para. 450.
779 MU, para. 450. On this episode, see Appendix B, paras. 53-57.
780 Ukraine fails to mention that it was nothing more than an exercise. See MU, paras. 451-452. Ukraine misleadingly
refers to “arbitrary searches”, “random checks”, and “blockades and searches”.
144
warranted though, given that Ukraine only echoes biased or uninformed materials and makes mere
assertions based on subjective feelings and accounts rather than objective criteria.781
III. No Racial Discrimination with respect to Citizenship
378. Ukraine claims that measures taken by Russia in Crimea in relation to the conferral of
citizenship form part of the alleged policy and campaign of systematic racial discrimination. Such a
claim is without any merit, as a matter of jurisdiction, law and facts.
A. RESTRICTIONS BASED ON CITIZENSHIP DO NOT FALL UNDER CERD
379. With regard to jurisdiction, at the preliminary objections stage, the Court did not “establish
whether, and, if so, to what extent, certain acts may be covered by Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of
CERD”,782 and left this issue to be determined at the merits stage. As Russia already
demonstrated783 and will develop below, restrictions based on citizenship784 do not fall under
CERD. This is obviously so whether such restrictions are considered against CERD on a selfstanding
basis (1), or as part of Ukraine’s position that colludes citizenship conferral and
international humanitarian law, the latter having clearly been excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction
(2).
Restrictions Based on Citizenship Do Not Fall under CERD
380. The Russian Federation categorically rejects any accusation that its conferral of citizenship
upon the inhabitants of Crimea discriminates against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians or was later
used to discriminate against these ethnic groups. But in any event, discrimination on grounds of
citizenship is excluded from the scope of CERD by virtue of Articles 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 of the
Convention. Restrictions based on citizenship as well as discrimination between citizens and noncitizens
are expressly excluded indeed from CERD by these provisions. This has been
unequivocally confirmed in Qatar v. United Arab Emirates in which, after interpreting the relevant
781 See paras. 6-10 above.
782 Judgment of 8 November 2019, para. 94.
783 See in particular PORF, paras. 324-326 and 343.
784 Notwithstanding nuances that are sometimes made between the terms “nationality” and “citizenship”, in the
context of CERD and in the present Counter-Memorial these terms refer to the same phenomenon of “legal bond” that
denotes “the existence of reciprocal rights and duties” between an individual and the State conferring nationality
(Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment, 6 April 1955, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 23), which is excluded from
the scope of CERD (in this regard, see the wording of Articles 1(2) and 1(3) of CERD). This is without prejudice to the
fact that, from the perspective of Russian domestic law, the expression “nationality” (“национальность”) may also
refer to “ethnicity”, or may have a close or similar meaning thereto, depending on the circumstances.
145
provisions of CERD, the Court concluded that “the measures complained of by Qatar [...] which are
based on the current nationality of its citizens, do not fall within the scope of CERD”.785
381. It is clear from Ukraine’s own case that with respect to conferral of citizenship and alleged
subsequent citizenship-based discrimination, Ukraine alleges discrimination based on nationality or
citizenship, not national origin.786 The impugned measures concern Crimean Tatars’ and ethnic
Ukrainians’ citizen rights based on the change effected to their present nationality situation.
Ukraine’s claims concern in particular alleged harm suffered by Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in
the exercise of civil rights as a result of having received Russian citizenship787 or having opted out
of it.788 As is clear from the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 1, read in their context and in
the light of the Convention’s object and purpose, as confirmed by the travaux préparatoires789 and
by members of the Court,790 nationality and national origin are not synonymous concepts and cover
distinct legal fields for the purpose of CERD. Ukraine’s claims do not fall thus within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
382. Subsidiarily, and in any event, the conditions referred to by the Committee in General
Recommendation No. 30 for a difference of treatment between citizens and non-citizens to be in
conformity with CERD791 are met, as is abundantly confirmed in Appendix C. In particular, at all
material times persons living in Crimea have enjoyed the ability to opt for retaining exactly the
citizenship or citizenships of their choice, namely only Russian citizenship, only Ukrainian
citizenship (or any other foreign citizenship for that matter), or both (or multiple) citizenships.
Besides, Russian measures and immigration laws do not discriminate against any particular
nationality, and certainly not against Ukrainian citizens.
785 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 4 February 2021, para. 105.
786 The Court has confirmed that “the term ‘national origin’ in Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention does not
encompass current nationality” (Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 4 February 2021, para. 105).
787 MU, paras. 464-469.
788 MU, paras. 470-476.
789 The heated debate over the various understandings of the expressions “national origin” and “nationality” within
the Third Committee led to the adoption of the distinction between paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 1 in the final text:
United Nations General Assembly, 1304th meeting of the Third Committee, 14 October 1965, A/C.3/SR.1304, paras. 9,
10, 13, 15, 21; 1305th meeting, 14 October 1965, A/C.3/SR.1305, paras. 9, 12, 26, 29, and 44; 1306th meeting, 15
October 1965, A/C.3/SR.1306, paras. 12 and 28; 1307th meeting, 18 October 1965, A/C.3/SR.1307, paras. 1, 24, 27, 28
and 30; Report of the Third Committee, 18 December 1965, A/6181, p. 11-14, paras. 28-37.
790 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 July 2018, Joint declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja and
Gevorgian, I.C.J. Reports 2018, p. 436, paras. 3-4; Dissenting opinion of Judge Crawford, p. 475, para. 1; Dissenting
opinion of Judge Salam, p. 481-483, paras. 3 and 5-7.
791 CERD Committee, 65th session, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination against non-citizens, 2004 in
United Nations General Assembly, 59th Session, Official Records, Supplement No. 18 (A/59/18), p. 94, para. 4.
146
Ukraine’s IHL Claims Are Outside The Jurisdiction of the Court
383. Ukraine refers in the Memorial to international humanitarian law and allegations of Russian
occupation in Crimea to support its allegations related to citizenship. However, the Court made
clear in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections that international humanitarian law is excluded
from its jurisdiction. This finding is res judicata.
384. Ukraine’s position with respect to the place of international humanitarian law in this case
has fluctuated since the beginning of the proceedings. Ukraine initially sought to exclude the
application of Articles 1.2 and 1.3 of CERD based on international humanitarian law
considerations. In its Memorial, it held the view that “Russia may not invoke Articles 1(2) or 1(3)
of CERD in defense of this conduct because any distinction in this regard between citizens and noncitizens
is predicated on an underlying violation of IHL”.792 Its reasoning was that these provisions
could not be applicable in the case of Crimea because the Russian Federation illegally occupied
Crimea.
385. Ukraine’s approach radically changed during the preliminary objections stage of the case. In
its Written Statement and Submissions on the Preliminary Objections, Ukraine contended that any
reference to the status of Crimea, “occupation” or to international humanitarian law in the context
of Crimea was only contextual or atmospheric and was not part of its claims per se. In particular,
Ukraine claimed:
“Russia cannot point to a single place in Ukraine’s Application or Memorial where, in
connection with its CERD claims, Ukraine asks the Court to rule on or grant relief for
violations of international law by the Russian Federation other than the breach of its
obligations under the CERD. Neither the substance of this case nor the relief requested
concern the status of Crimea, even if Russia’s unlawful intervention there is a necessary
part of the story in explaining the roots of the subsequent campaign of racial discrimination
against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities”.793
386. Further, according to Ukraine, “Ukraine’s description of Russia’s conduct in 2014 as
unlawful does not change the substance of its CERD claims, because Ukraine does not seek relief in
this proceeding for Russia’s prior acts of aggression”.794 Ukraine adds that “[a] determination that
Russia is violating CERD does not require any determination, implicit or otherwise, about the
legality of the occupation”.795 These observations clarify that references to international
humanitarian law are not intended to play any material role in its claims in this case, and in fact are
792 MU, para. 625 (in relation to Article 5(c)), inter alia. See also PORF, paras. 321-322.
793 WSU, para. 277 (footnotes omitted).
794 WSU, para. 278.
795 WSU, para. 279.
147
not part of them. This clarification had been noted by the Court.796 It is controlling for the present
stage of the proceedings.
387. Moreover, in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections, the Court did not accept Ukraine’s
argument that international humanitarian law trumps the Russian Federation’s position that Articles
1.2 and 1.3 of CERD apply, thus excluding discrimination based on nationality from the scope of
the Convention. As the Court confirmed, “[w]ith regard to the situation in Crimea, Ukraine’s claims
are based solely upon CERD”.797 It is subject to this qualification that the Court further held that it
does not “need to establish whether, and, if so, to what extent, certain acts may be covered by
Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of CERD. Both determinations concern issues of fact, largely
depending on evidence regarding the purpose or effect of the measures alleged by Ukraine, and are
thus properly a matter for the merits, should the case proceed to that stage”.798 The Court thus
decided to examine the applicability of Articles 1.2 and 1.3 at the merits stage independently of the
questions concerning the status of Crimea and the applicability of international humanitarian law,
which are not part of the case and that it has no jurisdiction to rule on. Therefore, references to
international humanitarian law, “occupation” or the status of Crimea are detached from Ukraine’s
claims, are not within the Court’s jurisdiction, and are irrelevant for the purpose of the present case.
Thus, Ukraine’s hopeless attempt to bring such claims through the backdoor of “setting the context”
of its case is to be rejected.
B. RUSSIAN CITIZENSHIP IS NOT CONFERRED ON A DISCRIMINATORY BASIS
388. Even if distinctions or restrictions based on nationality or citizenship were to be considered
as falling within the scope of CERD, quod non, the detailed review under the relevant Appendix of
the present Counter-Memorial of the measures alleged by Ukraine in the present case confirms in
any event that Ukraine’s claim that such measures are discriminatory is supported by no evidence at
all.799
389. In light of the above, Ukraine’s allegations of forced citizenship and subsequent
discrimination are thus to be rejected.
First, citizenship-based measures are excluded by Articles 1.2 and 1.3 of CERD, and
thus fall outside the scope of the Convention and of the jurisdiction of the Court.
Second, even if the Court were to have jurisdiction (quod non), Ukraine does not
establish, and there is no ground to claim that the relevant Russian law on citizenship is
in itself discriminatory or has been applied selectively, arbitrarily or in a discriminatory
manner.
796 Judgment of 8 November 2019, para. 93.
797 Judgment of 8 November 2019, para. 23. See also para. 29.
798 Judgment of 8 November 2019, para. 94.
799 See Appendix C.
148
Third, Ukraine’s allegation that the application of Russia’s nationality, residency and
immigration laws in Crimea “leads to disproportionate enforcement of these laws
against members of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea” as such,
and thus “constitutes racial discrimination within the meaning of the Convention”,800 is
supported by no evidence at all.
A fortiori, Ukraine’s claims related to nationality and citizenship do not evidence any
policy or campaign of systematic racial discrimination in Crimea.
IV. No Racial Discrimination with respect to Organization of Public Rallies and Protests
390. Ukraine accuses the Russian Federation of carrying out a systematic campaign of
discrimination with respect to the organization of public gatherings, rallies and protests.801
According to Ukraine, this alleged campaign “raises the specter of the total erasure of these distinct
cultures from the Crimean peninsula”.802 To substantiate these accusations, Ukraine contends that
the Crimean authorities apply the law on public gatherings arbitrarily and discriminatorily in order
to suppress culturally significant gatherings for Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians.803 This accusation
is unfounded, as will be amply confirmed below.
391. The following explanations are subject to an important caveat. As explained in other
chapters of the Counter-Memorial, Ukraine’s references to international humanitarian law and the
“annexation” or “occupation” of Crimea do not form part of this case. Ukraine itself and the Court’s
Judgment on Preliminary Objections confirmed that Ukraine bases its claims exclusively on CERD
and that therefore IHL does not form part of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae.804 This
caveat applies to Ukraine’s case in general; it also applies in particular with respect to Ukraine’s
claims on public gatherings. Ukraine cannot claim in the present proceedings, as it does,805 that the
Russian Federation has no right to apply its laws in Crimea because such application would
allegedly violate IHL. Similarly, all allegations related to developments that happened prior to
Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation fall outside of the Court’s jurisdiction.806
A. THE RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
392. In the Memorial, Ukraine addresses cursorily only and very partially the legal framework
applicable to the holding of public events and gatherings in Crimea. By so doing, it misconstrues
800 MU, para. 476.
801 MU, paras. 480-504.
802 MU, para. 477.
803 For such general assertions, see MU, paras. 485, 495 and 503.
804 Judgment of 8 November 2019, paras. 23, 29, 93.
805 See MU, paras. 481, 483, 484, 485, 486, 495, 504 and title to subsection 1, above para. 482 (“unlawful”), inter
alia.
806 See supra, paras. 89, 344(a).
149
the applicable rules that are decisive to establish whether or not there has been racial discrimination
in their application to concrete cases. In the relevant Appendix,807 the Russian Federation presents
comprehensively the relevant legal framework.
393. As described in Appendix D, the Russian legal framework governing the holding of public
events in Crimea relies on a system of prior notification of intended events by their organizers to the
competent authorities. The holding of a notified public event may be refused, and the holding of a
public event may be suspended or terminated. Reasons for refusing, suspending and terminating a
public event are provided for by statutory law. They constitute legitimate limitations on the exercise
of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, and imposing such legitimate limitations does not
constitute a violation of this human right.
B. THE RELEVANT FACTS DO NOT EVIDENCE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
394. Based on Ukraine’s own case, its allegations with respect to public events are limited to
public events of cultural dimension.808 They are not to be assessed thus under any right to political
representation. As is shown in the relevant Appendix, Ukraine has not established that in relation to
these public events, the law has been applied discriminatorily or arbitrarily against any ethnic group
in Crimea,809 including the Crimean Tatars810 and ethnic Ukrainians811 in comparison to ethnic
Russians,812 let alone as part of a systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination against
these groups.
395. No such discriminatory or arbitrary application of the law occurred with respect to the
individual incidents relied on by Ukraine. In each and every case, the conduct of the Russian
authorities regarding the holding of public events was based on objective and reasonable grounds
based on criteria provided for by law.
396. When it comes to evidence, Ukraine refers in the Memorial to a few individual cases only,
that besides refer exclusively to Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian applicants. On the other hand,
Ukraine does not conduct any proper comparative exercise. In particular, Ukraine does not even
seek to establish that no applicants from Russian or any other ethnic backgrounds have also
received a refusal from the authorities in response to their notice for the holding of a public event or
807 See Appendix D(I).
808 MU, para. 479 and title to section A. This labelling notwithstanding, the individual cases relied on by Ukraine are
governed by the legal framework on public events described under Appendix D, as is shown by the factual record.
809 See Appendix D, paras. 5-19.
810 See Appendix D(II), paras. 20-43.
811 See Appendix D(III), paras. 44-54.
812 See Appendix D(IV), paras. 55-60.
150
that the authorities have taken no measures based on public order and safety reasons in their respect.
As is confirmed in the relevant Appendix, such cases are in fact very numerous.813
397. Neither does it establish that refusal, suspension or termination were specifically based on
the ethnic identity of the organizer or the participants. On the contrary, the facts confirm that such
measures were based on an objective and reasonable justification, were legitimate and lawful, and
bear no link at all with racial discrimination. In these circumstances, there is no ground to claim, as
Ukraine does, that racial discrimination occurred and that Russia’s intent would be to “expung[e]
the[…] ethnic cultural identity” of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians.814
V. No Racial Discrimination with respect to Media
398. Ukraine’s accusations of “media restrictions and harassment”815 are no more founded than
its other allegations against the Russian Federation.
399. At the outset, the Russian Federation recalls that in Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, the
Court confirmed that “the Convention concerns only individuals or groups of individuals” and that
legal entities such as media corporations fall outside its scope.816 Ukraine does not establish that
measures taken against media corporations were in fact specifically directed at the Crimean Tatar
and Ukrainian communities as such. These claims thus fall outside of the Convention.
400. According to Ukraine’s claim, “[t]he Russian Federation has followed a similar strategy to
that used to restrict Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian public gatherings to limit those communities’
opportunities to use print and broadcast media to nourish and invigorate their respective
cultures”.817 However, as will be shown further below, this allegation relies on pure speculations
concerning the Russian Federation’s motives when applying its laws.
401. Ukraine fails, and in fact does not even seek, to establish that the legal framework applicable
to the activities of the media in Crimea is discriminatory or that it has been applied arbitrarily or
discriminatorily, on racial grounds, against members of the Crimean Tatar and ethnic Ukrainian
communities because of their belonging to these ethnic groups. The relevant facts assessed under
Appendix E confirm that this is not the case. A fortiori, Ukraine does not establish that the alleged
measures Ukraine complains of would form part of a systematic campaign or policy of racial
discrimination specifically targeted at these communities as such.
813 See Appendix D, para. 62.
814 MU, para. 388.
815 MU, paras. 505-521.
816 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 4 February 2021, para. 108.
817 MU, para. 505.
151
402. Ukraine’s portraying of the Russian legal framework governing the activities of the media as
being extraordinarily burdensome and allowing for the persecution of political opponents is
unfounded. The truth is that mass media in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages are available in
Crimea with many registered in the Russian Federation (A). Besides, the individual measures
challenged by Ukraine in its Memorial are based on objective and reasonable grounds, including
procedural non-compliance with the law which can be corrected at any time, and extremist activities
of some media outlets and their owners or journalists (B). They have nothing to do with racial
discrimination.
403. In the section of its Memorial dedicated to the media, Ukraine once again relies quite
extensively on international humanitarian law, as well as allegations of “aggression”, “annexation”
or “occupation” and other considerations related to the question of sovereignty over Crimea.818
These allegations, which the Russian Federation considers to be without any merits, do not form
part of the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case, as confirmed by the Court’s Judgment on
Preliminary Objections.819 Thus they will not be addressed in the present section nor in the
corresponding Appendix.
A. MASS MEDIA IN CRIMEAN TATAR AND UKRAINIAN ARE AVAILABLE IN CRIMEA
404. To evidence a campaign of systematic racial discrimination, Ukraine must establish the
existence of a generalized pattern of racial discrimination. Ukraine does not do it in the Memorial,
for a very simple reason: mass media in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian are available in Crimea, as
the Russian Federation already had the opportunity to show during the proceedings on provisional
measures.820 Besides, none of Ukraine’s individual claims constitutes, even plausibly, racial
discrimination.
405. Ukraine portrays a distorted picture of the general situation of the media in Crimea by
proceeding through a limited number of so-called “examples”821 and by selecting a small number of
individual cases, which do not reflect this general situation, and whose treatment is in any case
lawful and legitimate under the applicable rules, as will be shown below (see infra, B). Moreover,
Ukraine frames its claims on media outlets in terms of repression of political opposition, which in
and by itself confirms that Ukraine’s case is not, even taken at face value, about racial
discrimination against ethnic groups covered by CERD.822 To be sure, the Russian Federation
rejects any accusations of political repression.
818 See for instance MU, paras. 505, 506, 509-510, 512, 516, 518, inter alia.
819 Judgment of 8 November 2019, paras. 23, 29, 93.
820 CR 2017/2, 7 March 2017, p. 73, para. 32 (Forteau).
821 See for instance MU, paras. 508 or 511.
822 PORF, para. 352 (d), (e), (f), and (g), and para. 353.
152
406. Due to Ukraine’s erroneous portrayal of Russian law governing media activities, the said
legal framework needs to be accurately presented, which the Russian Federation does in the
relevant Appendix.823 The same Appendix then presents the general situation of the media in
Crimea, which is diverse and provides full space for Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian media, in
particular in terms of registration and language of broadcasting, contrary to Ukraine’s false
accusations.824
B. REGISTRATION APPLICATIONS OF MEDIA CITED BY UKRAINE WERE RETURNED, AND LAWENFORCEMENT
MEASURES WERE TAKEN, ON LEGITIMATE, NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS
407. Not only is the legal framework reasonable and non-discriminatory as reflected by an
inclusive and vibrant media scene in Crimea, but as will be shown below, the individual cases relied
on by Ukraine in the Memorial do not evidence any hint at discrimination, let alone a systematic
campaign or practice of racial discrimination targeting Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians as
such in violation of CERD. Indeed, none of the impugned measures bears any relation to racial
discrimination. Many media outlets were able to register successfully since 2014, including
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian media outlets. Some of them might have seen their applications
initially returned to them and might have needed several attempts because of their first contact with
the new Russian procedure, but they eventually succeeded. As explained elsewhere, a return to the
applicant of its application without consideration does not constitute a definite rejection of the
application or a refusal by the administration to register the media outlet; it is merely a procedural
defect that may be cured by a resubmission of the application.825
408. By contrast Ukraine builds its whole case of systematic racial discrimination on a few
outlets only, which did not pursue the procedure of registration after their first administrative
returns. As is shown in the relevant Appendix, all returns of applications Ukraine refers to were
justified on procedural grounds under applicable law, and were therefore objectively justified, as
were the registering authorities’ consideration of information received from law enforcement
authorities and pointing to extremist activities of the applicants’ founder.826
409. Moreover, warnings sent to media outlets and measures taken with respect to media
executives and journalists were legitimate limitations and again based on statutory legal grounds, in
particular extremist activities or the prohibited publication of materials that qualify as extremist
under statutory law.827 In international human rights law, the fight against extremism is a standard
limitation to the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the media (actually, the Russian
823 See Appendix E, section I.
824 See Appendix E, section II.
825 See Appendix E, section I.
826 See Appendix E, section III(B).
827 See Appendix E, section III(C).
153
legal framework governing media activities that Ukraine criticizes is similar to Ukraine’s own legal
framework).
410. With regard to extremist activities, Ukraine totally overlooks the fact that Roskomnadzor,
the registering body, has a dual mission of both an administrative agency and a watchdog that
participates in oversight of media activities and their compliance with applicable law, including on
the fight against extremism.828 Indeed, the Media Law that provides the legal basis for the
registration of media outlets does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it applies in the wider context of
Russian domestic law, in combination with other legislative acts, including anti-extremism
legislation, among others. Thus, there is nothing unusual that other State organs at times
communicate requests and information to Roskomnadzor as part of a continuous coordination
process among various State agencies for law enforcement purposes.
411. In any case, none of the impugned measures constitutes instances of racial discrimination; a
fortiori, Ukraine’s allegation of a strategy of media erasure as part of a systematic campaign or
policy of racial discrimination targeted at Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians is manifestly
unfounded and Ukraine presents no shred of evidence to support such accusations.
412. Ukraine’s complaint related to journalists and media outlets confirms the political nature of
its case, which concerns Crimea’s status, and not racial discrimination. Ukraine itself presents its
claims as allegedly attesting to political repression and censorship, not as measures based on ethnic
identity. Nowhere in the relevant subsection of the Memorial does Ukraine even seek to establish
that the alleged measures were inspired by ethnic motives. The fact that no claim of racial
discrimination has been put before domestic courts in relation to these measures confirms the
artificiality of Ukraine’s claims.
VI. No Racial Discrimination with respect to Preservation of Cultural Heritage
413. As part of the alleged all-encompassing plan or systematic campaign of racial discrimination
specifically targeting Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians, Ukraine finally contends that “[t]he
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities have […] suffered a more general assault on their
respective cultural heritage”.829 This accusation is, like others, without any merit.
414. As for the alleged degradation of Crimean Tatar cultural heritage, Ukraine’s allegation of
destruction of the Khan’s Palace (and specifically the Khan Mosque), the only case it relies on, is
without any basis as a matter of fact. The relevant facts confirm that the restoration of the Khan’s
Palace (i.e. the Khan Mosque as one of its sites) is unrelated to racial discrimination (A). Ukraine’s
claim of degradation of Ukrainian cultural heritage is also remarkably odd. What Ukraine presents
828 Statute of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media,
approved by the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 228, 16 March 2009 (Annex 51); Expert
Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel (Annex 22), paras. 272-273.
829 MU, paras. 522-532.
154
as “[h]arassment and [c]losure of Ukrainian [c]ultural [i]nstitutions”830 consists of a disparate
patchwork of allegations, some of them unrelated to cultural heritage, that are unfounded (B). As is
made clear in Appendix F, none of these allegations, which amount to little more than speculation,
relate to racial discrimination.
A. THE RESTORATION OF THE KHAN’S PALACE DOES NOT EVIDENCE ANY RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
415. The fallacy of Ukraine’s case is perhaps nowhere as evident as with respect to the Khan’s
Palace.831 Ukraine purports to portray what is a supporting measure to the Crimean Tatar
community as reflecting an intent to erase their cultural heritage and as being an element of the
Russian Federation’s alleged systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination targeting
Crimean Tatars. Far from having been “destroyed”, as Ukraine surprisingly claims,832 the Khan’s
Palace still stands today as a vibrant cultural symbol and historical treasure of the Crimean Tatar
community and the Crimean population at large. It continues to be used in the service of the
Crimean Tatar community, including for cultural events, and it is open to the public for visits, as it
had been before 2014.
416. As the assessment of relevant facts under Appendix F shows,833 works in the Palace had
been rendered necessary by Ukraine’s inability to take much needed steps in order to maintain the
complex in good state during the preceding period.834 As the Russian Federation observed at the
UNESCO with respect to cultural heritage in Crimea generally, “under the Ukrainian jurisdiction,
the objects of cultural-historical heritage in the territory of Crimea were falling into disrepair due to
systematic underfunding. The authorities which maintained and supervised these objects were not
taking necessary steps to restore them or to mitigate the destructive effects of natural phenomena.
Some objects of cultural heritage were illegally privatized and also partly transferred to the
Presidential Affairs Department of Ukraine or to individuals who were closely associated with the
Ukrainian senior government officials”.835
417. After Crimea’s change of status, the Russian Federation has taken unprecedented steps to
actively support and ensure the adequate protection of Crimea’s cultural heritage. A Federal Law
adopted in February 2015 brought Crimean cultural heritage under the Russian regime of protection
830 MU, title of subsection 2, above para. 527.
831 MU, paras. 523-526.
832 MU, title of subsection 1, above para. 523: “Destruction of the Khan’s Palace”.
833 See Appendix F, paras. 2-20.
834 The poor condition of the roof of the Khan Mosque was recorded by the Ukrainian Special Scientific Restoration
Design Institute “Ukrproektrestavratsiya” back in 1989, to which Ukraine itself refers to in Annex 1030 to UM (see
Witness statement of
9 June 2021 (Annex
20), para. 21).
835 Permanent Delegation of the Russian Federation to UNESCO, Information on the Situation in the Republic of
Crimea (the Russian Federation) within the Scope of UNESCO Competence as of April 8, 2015 (14 April 2015) (Annex
785 to MU).
155
of cultural heritage, namely placed Crimea’s cultural heritage under the protection of the State.836
Moreover, in October 2015 the Khan’s Palace, together with many other sites, including significant
sites for Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian cultures, were recognized as cultural heritage sites of federal
significance and entered into the register of objects of cultural heritage (historical and cultural
monuments) of the peoples of the Russian Federation.837 While under statutory law cultural heritage
sites may also be declared of municipal or regional significance, the status of sites of federal
significance represents the highest level of significance, which highlights the express recognition
that the Russian Federation extended to the Khan’s Palace, and its declared intent, and legal
obligation, to provide adequate protection as required under statutory law.
418. In relation to the Khan’s Palace, Ukraine does not establish the alleged failures in the
priority emergency works and the subsequent repair and restoration works that it portrays, as the
Russian Federation shows in the relevant Appendix.838 It also fails to demonstrate the
discriminatory character of the above works because it does not conduct any comparative exercise
in relation to other comparable cases of repair and restoration.839 Ukraine does not either
demonstrate that the conduct of the priority emergency works and the subsequent repair and
restoration works or whatever damage that might have happened during them (which is in any case
a matter of domestic tort law regarding the conduct of a private company, not a case of State
responsibility), reflect any specific intention of the Russian Federation to fail the repair and
restoration and through it to culturally suppress Crimean Tatars.840 In any event, the record flatly
contradicts Ukraine’s allegations of defective repair and restoration, which are wholly
unsupported.841
B. ALLEGED HARASSMENT AND CLOSURE OF UKRAINIAN CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS
419. Ukraine’s claims relating to alleged “harassment and closure of Ukrainian cultural
institutions” are also unfounded.842 Once again, the serious accusations of Ukraine, namely that
836 Federal Law No. 9-FZ “On specifics of legal regulation of relations in the field of culture and tourism in
connection with the admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the formation of new
constituent entities within the Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol”, 12
February 2015 (Annex 84), Article 2(1). Related provisions are also contained in Federal Law No. 73-FZ “On cultural
heritage sites (historical and cultural monuments) of the peoples of the Russian Federation”, 25 June 2002 (Annex 45);
Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 68-ZRK “On cultural heritage sites in the Republic of Crimea”, 11 September 2014
(Annex 73).
837 Order of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 2073-r approving the List of cultural heritage sites of
federal significance located in the territory of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, 17 October 2015
(Annex 92), pp. 2-4.
838 See Appendix F, paras. 4-20.
839 See Appendix F, paras. 21-25.
840 See Appendix F, paras. 26-27.
841 See Appendix F, paras. 2-20.
842 MU, paras. 527-532.
156
“Ukrainian culture in Crimea is under siege across the board”,843 do not stand scrutiny. Each of
Ukraine’s allegations are addressed in turn under the relevant Appendix.844
420. As shown there, Ukraine’s factual allegations are incorrect, selective, distorted and taken out
of context, among other flaws. This is particularly visible with the cases of Mr Kuzmin’s and the
Ukrainian Cultural Center’s activities, the repair and restoration of the Lesya Ukrainka Museum in
Yalta, the closure of the children’s drama studio “Svitanok” in Simferopol, or Ukraine’s attempt of
depicting an imagined climate of social fear in Crimea based on unverifiable “reports” of
Hromadske International, a proven hardline pro-Maidan propagandist media. Moreover, Ukraine’s
reliance on Mr Shchekun’s witness statement amounts to little more than pure extrapolation from
what the statement actually states.
421. As Appendix F shows, Ukraine’s allegation that “[t]he stigmatization of the Ukrainian
language and speakers of it indicates the extreme pressure that Ukrainian identity is under in
Crimea as a result of the Russian Federation’s discriminatory policies”845 is, here again, pure
invention.
843 MU, para. 527.
844 See Appendix F, paras. 28-43.
845 MU, para. 532.

158

160
APPENDICES A - F
162
163
APPENDICES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A NO ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES, MURDERS, ABDUCTIONS AND
TORTURE DIRECTED ON RACIAL GROUNDS AT THE CRIMEAN TATARS AND
UKRAINIANS, LET ALONE A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN THEREOF.................................. 167
I. No Breach of CERD ............................................................................................................. 167
A. Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis .............................................................................................. 167
B. No Discrimination Based on Race ........................................................................................ 168
C. Investigations of Disappearances ......................................................................................... 171
D. Evidence Issues .................................................................................................................... 183
II. Ukraine’s Mischaracterizations and Issues of Attribution .................................................... 185
A. Alleged Enforced Disappearances and Murders .................................................................. 185
B. Alleged Abductions and Torture .......................................................................................... 186
APPENDIX B NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
MEASURES (DETENTIONS AND SEARCHES), LET ALONE A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN
THEREOF ........................................................................................................................................ 190
I. Factual and Legal Relevant Elements ................................................................................... 190
A. The Existence of Muslim Radicalism in Crimea Before 2014 ............................................. 191
B. The Bans on Hizb Ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat ............................................................... 192
II. The Lawful, Objective, and Reasonable Grounds of the Measures Ukraine Complains of 198
A. Alleged Searches of Homes of Crimean Tatars ................................................................... 198
B. Alleged Raids in Public Spaces Targeting Crimean Tatars .................................................. 208
APPENDIX C NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO CITIZENSHIP, LET
ALONE A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN THEREOF ..................................................................... 216
I. Russian Citizenship Law and Practice in Crimea Is Not Discriminatory ............................. 216
C. Ukraine’s Accusations .......................................................................................................... 216
D. The Applicable Russian Legal Framework .......................................................................... 216
164
E. The Liberal Approach of Russian Law and Russian Courts Regarding the Evidence of
Permanent Residence for the Purpose of Obtaining Russian Citizenship ................................. 223
F. The Absence of Pressure on Crimeans’ Choice of Citizenship ............................................ 225
II. Ukraine’s Individual Claims Do Not Evidence Any Discrimination ................................... 227
A. Ukraine’s Allegations in Respect of the Application of the Citizenship Regime ................ 227
B. Position of Those Who Did Not Opt Out and Who Became Russian Citizens .................... 229
C. Military Service and Military Obligations ............................................................................ 230
D. The Case of Detainees and Prisoners ................................................................................... 231
E. The Case of Transfer of Prisoners Serving Their Sentence From One Penitentiary Facility to
Another ...................................................................................................................................... 232
F. The Case of Mr Oleg Sentsov ............................................................................................... 232
G. The Case of Mr Chiygoz ...................................................................................................... 234
H. The Position of Crimeans Who Did Not Become Russian Nationals .................................. 234
I. The Case of Mr Sinaver Kadyrov .......................................................................................... 236
J. The Second Case Invoked by Ukraine ................................................................................... 237
K. Ukraine’s Allegations with respect to the Right to Participate in Elections and Take Part in
the Government under Article 5(c) of CERD ........................................................................... 238
L. Ukraine’s Allegations with respect to the Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence
within the Border of the State and the Right to Leave and Return to One’s Country under
Articles 5(d)(i) and (ii) of CERD .............................................................................................. 239
M. Ukraine’s Allegations with respect to the Right to Nationality under Article 5(d)(iii) of
CERD ........................................................................................................................................ 239
N. Ukraine’s Allegations with respect to the Right to Work and Free Choice of Employment
under Article 5(e)(i) of CERD................................................................................................... 240
O. Ukraine’s Allegations with respect to the Right to Public Health, Medical Care, Social
Security and Social Services under Article 5(e)(iv) of CERD .................................................. 241
APPENDIX D NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC EVENTS AND
CULTURAL GATHERINGS, LET ALONE A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN THEREOF ........... 242
I. Peaceful Assembly under Russian Law ................................................................................ 243
II. No Racial Discrimination in Respect of Cultural Gatherings and Public Events of the
Crimean Tatar Community ........................................................................................................... 248
165
A. General Observations ........................................................................................................... 248
B. Specific Allegations .............................................................................................................. 252
III. No Evidence of Racial Discrimination in Respect of Cultural Gatherings and Public Events
of the Ukrainian Community ........................................................................................................ 260
IV. No Favourable Treatment Accorded to the Russian Community on Racial Grounds ...... 265
APPENDIX E NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO MEDIA, LET ALONE A
SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN THEREOF ....................................................................................... 270
I. The Russian Legal Framework Governing Media Activities ............................................... 270
A. The Relevant Legal Framework in the Russian Federation ................................................. 270
B. The Ukrainian Legal Framework.......................................................................................... 275
C. The Strong Similarity between the Russian and Ukrainian Legal Frameworks ................... 276
D. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 277
II. The General Situation of the Media in Crimea: A Diverse and Vibrant Activity ................ 277
A. The General Landscape ........................................................................................................ 277
B. Avdet ..................................................................................................................................... 280
C. Satellite and Internet Broadcasting ....................................................................................... 281
III. Ukraine’s Specific Allegations in Relation to The Media ................................................ 283
A. Allegations of Oppression and Forced Closure of Media Outlets ........................................ 283
B. Treatment of Registration Applications................................................................................ 287
C. Warnings and Law Enforcement Measures Against Media Outlets on Basis of Extremist
Activities ................................................................................................................................... 296
APPENDIX F NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO PRESERVATION OF
CULTURAL HERITAGE, LET ALONE A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN THEREOF ................ 308
I. The Restoration of the Khan’s Palace Does Not Evidence Any Racial Discrimination ....... 308
A. Ukraine Does Not Establish Its Allegations of Destruction With Respect to the Renovation
Works of the Khan’s Palace ...................................................................................................... 308
B. Ukraine Does Not Conduct a Proper Comparative Exercise ................................................ 316
C. Ukraine Does Not Evidence Any Specific Discriminatory Intent ........................................ 318
166
II. Alleged Harassment and Closure of Ukrainian Cultural Institutions ................................... 319
A. Alleged Crack-Down on Crimea-based NGOs, Activists And Media Outlets .................... 319
B. The Case of the Ukrainian Cultural Centre and Krymsky Teren ......................................... 320
C. The Case of the Lesya Ukrainka Museum in Yalta .............................................................. 322
D. The Case of the Drama Studio “Svitanok” in Simferopol .................................................... 323
E. Other Unspecified Allegations .............................................................................................. 324
167
APPENDIX A
NO ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES, MURDERS, ABDUCTIONS AND TORTURE
DIRECTED ON RACIAL GROUNDS AT THE CRIMEAN TATARS AND UKRAINIANS,
LET ALONE A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN THEREOF
1. As has been shown in Chapter VI1 and as confirmed below, the allegations of enforced
disappearances, murder, abductions and torture made by Ukraine do not evidence racial
discrimination, let alone a systematic campaign thereof. The record shows that, for those allegations
that fall within the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis, the Russian Federation committed no
racial discrimination and fulfilled its duty to investigate (I). Ukraine’s accusations are also
presented in a misleading or factually erroneous way or relate to acts that do not constitute enforced
disappearances, murders, abductions or torture or bear no links with the Russian Federation
whatsoever. In any event, Ukraine does not advance a serious case on attribution (II).
I. No Breach of CERD
2. None of Ukraine’s allegations constitute instances of racial discrimination under CERD.
A fortiori, these individual allegations cannot, taken together, reflect a systematic campaign or
policy of racial discrimination carried out by the Russian Federation and directed at Crimean Tatars
and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea. Not only do some of Ukraine’s claims fall outside the scope of the
Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis (A); nothing in the record suggests that Ukraine’s allegations
constitute discrimination based on race (B). Besides, while none of the incidents are attributable to
the Russian Federation, Ukraine’s claim that the Russian Federation failed to comply with its duty
to investigate in respect of disappearances is unfounded and relies in particular on a misled
understanding of this duty and of the factual record. As will be shown in this regard, the Russian
Federation has complied with its duty to investigate (C). Finally, Ukraine’s flawed approach to
evidence negates the very plausibility of its allegations (D).
A. JURISDICTION RATIONE TEMPORIS
3. As the Court confirmed in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections as part of defining the
subject-matter of the dispute, “[t]he present proceedings were instituted by Ukraine following the
events which occurred in eastern Ukraine and in Crimea from the spring of 2014”.2 Indeed, the
critical date for these events is 18 March 2014, the day when Crimea and Sevastopol acceded to the
Russian Federation.3 From this date, the Russian Federation’s obligations based on CERD extended
1 Counter-Memorial, Chapter VI, paras. 338-347.
2 Judgment of 8 November 2019, p. 575, para. 23.
3 Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to
the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014
(Annex 24), Article 10.
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to the territory of Crimea and this date delimits the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis in the
present case.
4. Many of the incidents alleged by Ukraine had occurred prior to this critical date, at a period
when Ukraine had sovereignty over Crimea. This is so with respect to the allegations concerning
Mr Reshat Ametov whose body was found on 15 March 2014 bearing signs of violent death,
Mr Vladislav Vaschuk and Mr Ivan Bonariets who allegedly disappeared on 7 March 2014,
Mr Vasyl Chernysh who was reported missing on 15 March 2014, Mr Myhailo Vdovchenko who
was allegedly abducted on 11 March 2014 (and released on 21 March 2014), Mr Andrii Shchekun
and Mr Anatoly Kovalsky who were allegedly abducted on 9 March 2014 (and released on 20
March 2014).
B. NO DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE
5. The allegations of enforced disappearances, murders, abductions, and torture that Ukraine
advances in support of its claim of systematic campaign of racial discrimination do not point to any
discrimination, let alone any discrimination based on race. In addition, commenting on the whole
set of alleged incidents, Ukraine expressed the view that “[t]hese acts of violence and the physical
harm that has resulted were based on a racial or ethnic distinction, in that they targeted members of
the two communities known to oppose Russia’s annexation of Crimea, with the purpose and/or
effect of intimidating those communities into submission”.4 As the Russian Federation has
developed before, evidence of an unambiguous intent is clearly necessary in order to establish the
existence of a systematic campaign or policy. While Ukraine nominally refers at times to the
“purpose or effect” distinction made in CERD, it admits that its claim is based on the existence of
such an alleged intent: “[k]nowing in advance that its plan to annex Crimea would face opposition
from those who self-identified as Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian, Russia and its agents targeted
activists from those communities with extreme violence.”5 However, Ukraine provides no materials
to support the contention that Russia had the intent to target Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian ethnic
groups for racial motives.
6. To summarize Ukraine’s claims relating to enforced disappearances, murders, abductions,
and torture as presented in its Memorial,6 Ukraine refers to 13 individual cases that allegedly affect
two ethnic groups and that stretch over a period of three and a half years, form March 2014 to
September 2017.
7. Ukraine fails to address the elements that need to be established to conclude that these
allegations, if proven, constitute racial discrimination, and even more a systematic campaign of
discrimination. It is not sufficient to rely on isolated individual cases to establish discrimination. An
4 MU, para. 393.
5 MU, para. 392.
6 MU, paras. 392-411.
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essential element of discrimination, including racial discrimination, is comparison: there is
discrimination when, and only when, different groups of people that are in the same situation are
treated differently.7 To establish such a difference of treatment in the present case, it is necessary in
particular to look at available statistical data on criminal acts that Ukraine complains of and that
cover the whole population of Crimea, namely all ethnic groups. Ukraine did not do it.
8. Statistical data confirms that Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians are not the only victims of
kidnappings and murders in Crimea, and are not disproportionately affected by comparison with
persons belonging to other ethnic groups. Criminal statistics shows that cases of disappearances of
Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians remained an absolute minority of the total number of such cases in
Crimea throughout the entire period from 2014 to the first half of 2020. In both 2014 and 2015 over
70 % of the disappeared persons in Crimea were Russians, and they have continued to form the
absolute majority of the disappeared persons in Crimea during the 2016-2020 period.8 When
compared to the ethnic composition of the Crimea population under the 2014 census, the trend over
the period from 2014-2020 actually shows that ethnic Russians are generally overrepresented while
ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars tend to be underrepresented among cases of disappearances.
These rates evidence no discrimination, and certainly not a campaign or policy of systematic racial
discrimination targeting Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians. They also flatly belie Ukraine’s
unsupported allegation that 90 % of persons who disappeared or are still missing in Crimea are
either Crimean Tatars or Ukrainians.9
9. During the bilateral discussions on CERD implementation that took place between the
parties before Ukraine submitted its Application to the Court in this case, the Russian Federation
had already drawn Ukraine’s attention on the need to substantiate its allegations with concrete
data.10 The importance of proper statistical data for the purpose of the comparative exercise in
determining whether discrimination has taken place has also been highlighted by the CERD
Committee, which generally insists that States submit statistical data in their reports, and which has
specifically pointed to Ukraine’s failure to do so.11
7 See Counter-Memorial, Chapter II, para. 97.
8 Main Directorate of International and Legal Cooperation of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian
Federation, Note on missing person cases opened by the internal affairs bodies in 2014-first half of 2020, 9 September
2020 (Annex 636).
9 MU, para. 398 and footnote 825. This assertion by Ukraine also relies on a flawed understanding of the OHCHR
report it cites (MU, Annex 759, para. 102). Ukraine extrapolates this general assertion from a specific sample of 10
individual (unspecified) cases that the OHCHR referred to and that stretched over three years.
10 Note Verbale No. 5774-n/dgpch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Embassy of
Ukraine in Moscow, 27 May 2016 (Annex 57 to PORF, p. 2). By contrast the Russian Federation readily provided
statistical data during the discussion: Note Verbale No. 72/22-194/510-2006 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 17 August 2015, Annex 56, p. 4 (p. 568 of vol.
II); Note Verbale No. 72/22-194/510-1973 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, 18 August 2016 (Annex 58 to PORF, p. 5).
11 See e.g. CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the 19th to 21st periodic reports of Ukraine, 79th session,
29 August 2011, CERD/C/UKR/CO/19-21, para. 7.
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10. Instead, Ukraine mostly relies on OHCHR reports. But these are of no avail to Ukraine for
purposes of the comparative exercise. Indeed, these reports do not purport to establish as such the
existence of racial discrimination (an expression that is absent from these reports) and their authors
did not conduct any comparative exercise. They do not offer a full-scale statistical analysis of the
reported cases in comparison with other ethnic groups and the whole population in Crimea. Instead,
they are limited to mentioning allegations that have been reported to them, either directly or through
second-hand sources. As a telling example that the OHCHR reports do not support a conclusion that
racial discrimination occurred, as Ukraine misleadingly presents them to do, one of the reports
makes the following specific and contextual statement: “OHCHR documented 10 cases of persons
who disappeared and are still missing: six Crimean Tatars, three ethnic Ukrainians and one Russian-
Tatar – all men. Seven went missing in 2014, two in 2015 and one in 2016.”12 Citing this paragraph
of the report, Ukraine makes the allegation that “90 percent of persons who have disappeared and
are still missing are either Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian”.13 This is highly misleading, to say the least.
The only conclusion that could be drawn, at best, from the OHCHR report would be that 90 percent
of the cases reported to it (which number is small) concern individuals who are Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians.
11. In addition, Ukraine’s allegations of enforced disappearances, murders, abductions and
torture mentioned in the Memorial are not presented by Ukraine as based on racial grounds. Ukraine
alleged that they are based on political motivations. Ukraine’s claims, whatever their own merits,
thus have nothing to do with racial discrimination. As a clear indication of how Ukraine frames its
claims, it is worth noting that the relevant titles in the Memorial purport to present “Disappearances
of Crimean Tatar and ethnic Ukrainian activists” and “Abduction and torture of Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian activists”. Moreover, the 13 cases concern alleged political activists presented by Ukraine
itself as being opponents to Crimea’s change of status.
12. As an illustration, a document produced by Ukraine reports one of Mr Shchekun’s and
Mr Kovalsky’s lawyers saying, while commenting on their alleged detainment: “There is no
question why they were targeted. Both men are well-known activists, who organized local
Euromaidan protests in Simferopol from the very beginning. They had received anonymous threats
before.”14 Notwithstanding that these words reflect nothing more than the lawyer’s personal
opinion, admitting for the sake of reasoning that there was any targeting, such targeting would be
political. No claim was made on the other hand that the alleged act constitutes racial discrimination.
12 OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017) (Annex 759 to MU), para. 102.
13 MU, para. 398 and fn. 825.
14 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces, 14 March 2014 (Annex 938 to MU),
p. 4.
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C. INVESTIGATIONS OF DISAPPEARANCES
13. Ukraine accuses the Russian Federation of refusing to investigate and delays in
investigations with respect to alleged disappearances15 in spite of their forming a “pattern of
ethnically-targeted disappearances”.16 This is factually false. Not only have investigations been
carried out in the alleged cases, moreover for all cases the decision whether to open an investigation
has been taken in an objective, non-discriminatory manner based on legally prescribed standards
and usual practice. In addition, as will be shown later, in many cases Ukraine does not establish that
the alleged disappearances are enforced disappearances, while this distinction is obviously decisive
in legal terms (see below, paras. 15 and 40-43).
1. Obligation to Investigate Is an Obligation of Conduct and the Relevant Record Does Not
Support Allegations of Discrimination in respect of Investigations
14. Although the nature and degree of scrutiny necessary in order to satisfy the minimum
threshold regarding an investigation’s effectiveness depends on the circumstances of each case,
there is a minimum standard for the investigation of disappearances, as established and supported
by both ECHR case-law and Russian criminal procedural law.17 Such minimum standard requires
competent authorities to carry out a number of reasonable steps that are necessary to secure relevant
evidence, including, inter alia and where possible or appropriate, interviewing eyewitnesses,
gathering forensic evidence, performing an autopsy, and performing other acts as may be necessary
according to the circumstances of each case. According to this standard established by the ECHR, a
proper criminal investigation is a matter of legal due process rather than achieving a particular
result. Thus, the existence of an unsolved case is not indicative of a violation of the aforementioned
standard as long as the relevant authorities have undertaken an investigation and used reasonable
measures available to them in an attempt to solve the case.18 As will be shown further below, the
Russian Federation has satisfied this standard of conduct in relation to the cases pointed by Ukraine,
and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the corresponding conduct of the Russian
Federation evidences a campaign of racial discrimination in Crimea.
15. Investigations are subject to procedures provided for in Russian law. This is the case in
every State. In Russian law, it is crucial for the investigation authorities to establish whether signs
of crime are present in each case of disappearance in order to take further action to repress the crime
15 MU, paras. 399-404.
16 MU, para. 399.
17 See e.g. ECtHR, Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy, Application No. 23458/02, Judgment (GC), 24 March 2011, para.
301; ECtHR, Jaloud v. the Netherlands, Application No. 47708/08, Judgment (GC), 20 November 2014, para. 186;
ECtHR, Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey, Application No. 24014/05, Judgment (GC), 14 April 2015, para. 173;
ECtHR, Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, Application No. 36925/07, Judgment (GC), 29 January 2019,
para. 219. See also Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40),
Articles 176-183, 187, 195, which provide for a variety of investigatory and other actions available to the investigator or
inquiry officer, including those mentioned by the ECtHR among the most crucial.
18 Ibid.
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and to pursue an investigation if necessary. Indeed, not every case of disappearance involves acts of
kidnapping or the unlawful deprivation of liberty. Russian legislation sets out a number of criteria
for consideration when determining whether or not a disappearance is the result of some form of
criminality.19 When these criteria are met, a criminal case is opened and an investigation undertaken
by Investigative Committee officers.20 When these criteria are not satisfied, the investigation
continues as a missing-person case and is conducted by Ministry of Internal Affairs (“MIA”)
officers.21
16. Russian legislation allows for any person or legal entity to report a crime or incident and
every crime report is mandatory for review.22 An investigation can be also initiated by a State
official absent any report of a crime where there are other indications that a crime has occurred (for
example if a mass media article mentions a crime that has not been officially reported).23
Irrespective of the source of information regarding a possible crime, if there is sufficient evidence
suggesting that a crime has been committed, then a criminal investigation is initiated.24 With regard
to cases of disappearance the presence of any criteria mentioned in paragraph 15 and footnote 19
above can be regarded as sufficient to initiate a criminal case.
17. The suspension or termination of investigations are always based on an objective reason that
is provided for in law.25 In particular investigations may be suspended or terminated for lack of
19 Most notably, see Joint Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (No. 38), the Prosecutor
General’s Office of the Russian Federation (No. 14), the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (No. 5)
“On approval of the Instruction on the procedure for considering applications, crime reports and other information on
incidents related to disappearance of persons”, 16 January 2015 (Annex 80) (came into force on 3 April 2015), paras.
10-10.20, which set out possible indications that a person has disappeared against his/her own will, including, but not
limited to the following: (1) the individual in question has a high-risk profile – for instance, a minor, law enforcement
officer or a person who engages in prostitution or criminal activity, (2) the absence of any information regarding the
disappeared person for at least 3 days; or (3) other circumstances, which could suggest that a crime had occurred.
20 Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40), Article
151(2)1)(a).
21 See Joint Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (No. 38), the Prosecutor General’s
Office of the Russian Federation (No. 14), the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (No. 5) “On approval
of the Instruction on the procedure for considering applications, crime reports and other information on incidents related
to disappearance of persons”, 16 January 2015 (Annex 80) (came into force on 3 April 2015), para. 16; see also
formerly: Joint Order of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation (No. 70) and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of the Russian Federation (No. 122) “On the adoption of the Instruction on the procedure for considering
applications, reports of crimes and other information on incidents related to disappearances of citizens”, 27 February
2010 (Annex 53), para. 10. While generally providing the same criteria as set out above, the Former Instruction
stipulated that the absence of any information regarding the disappeared person for “a long time” may suggest that the
disappearance occurred against the individual’s own will (Former Instruction, para. 5). The current Instruction refers
instead to a period of 3 days.
22 Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40), Articles 141,
144(1).
23 Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40), Articles 140,
143.
24 Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40), Article 140(2).
25 Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40), Articles 24-
28.1, 208, 212.
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evidence or result after a legally defined period has elapsed. This is quite a common principle in
many countries as no State can be expected to keep forever all unsolved investigations open. In
particular, the investigation of a criminal case shall be suspended where circumstances set forth by
law exist, which temporarily impede further investigation or trial of the criminal case.26 Likewise, a
number of circumstances provided by law command the termination of the criminal investigation
without the criminal case being successfully solved.27
18. While all criminal investigation systems are perfectible, the Russian procedure applied in
Crimea is effective, and Ukraine has not established that this is not the case. The competent
investigative authorities will only open an investigation when several elements are met, such as a
serious claim. An investigation may be suspended or terminated for lack of evidence or after a
certain period subject to statutory criteria. This system is not discriminatory, and Ukraine does not
claim that it is. Moreover, it was not applied discriminatorily in the specific cases alleged by
Ukraine.
2. No Evidence of Discriminatory Investigation with respect to Individual Incidents Relied
on by Ukraine
19. Contrary to Ukraine’s assertions, the document Ukraine refers to in its Memorial confirms
that there was indeed no pattern to discern in relation to Ukraine’s claims, even less a systematic
campaign of racial discrimination directed at Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians.28 In his
statement delivered as he was visiting the parents of missing persons,29 Mr Aksyonov referred to
four cases of disappearance of Crimean Tatars but also to other cases of disappearance of persons
“of Slavic appearance”. He denied that disappearances reflected a “mass phenomenon”, and further
assured: “In some cases there are doubts as to whether there were instances of kidnapping. In some
cases there were people who fought in Syria. The investigative authorities are doing all of the work
necessary to determine the causes of what has happened” and “[w]e cooperate with all Crimean
Tatar organizations and we have a very constructive relationship with the mufti”.
20. As to investigations in individual cases, as of 12 September 2017, the OHCHR had
“documented 10 cases of persons who disappeared and are still missing: six Crimean Tatars, three
ethnic Ukrainians and one Russian-Tatar - all men. Seven went missing in 2014, two in 2015 and
26 For instance, if the accused has not been identified; the suspect or accused fled from the investigation authorities,
or their whereabouts have not been established for other reasons; there is no real opportunity for the suspect or accused
to participate in the criminal case even if their whereabouts have been established etc. Criminal Procedural Code of the
Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40), Articles 208, 238.
27 For instance, investigation of the criminal case shall be terminated in case of absence of the event of the crime or
corpus delicti; expiry of the criminal liability limitation period etc. Criminal case trial shall also be terminated if the
prosecutor waives charges against the accused in court. Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-
FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40), Articles 24-28.1, 239.
28 Interfax, “Head of Crimean Acknowledges Disappearance of Crimean Tatars on Peninsula”, 15 May 2018 (Annex
1048 to MU).
29 Ibid.
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174
one in 2016.”30 “Of the 10 disappearances mentioned, criminal investigations were still ongoing in
only one case as at 12 September 2017. They were suspended in six cases due to the inability to
identify suspects, and in three cases no investigative actions have been taken as the disappearances
were allegedly not reported.”31 This certainly does not point at all to instances of racial
discrimination or of tolerating, encouraging or instigating acts of enforced disappearances of
Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians. What the OHCHR report reflects is a mere description of the
normal operation of domestic law in relation to investigation of alleged disappearances (and not
alleged “enforced” disappearances in the meaning of international law). In such cases, there is
obviously no basis to claim State responsibility.
a. The case of Mr Reshat Ametov
21. In the case of Mr Reshat Ametov, the fact that the investigation has yielded no result so far
and was suspended at some point as Ukraine contends,32 does not trigger Russian Federation’s
responsibility. Not only did the Russian Federation have no involvement in Mr Ametov’s
kidnapping and murder, but it has done everything in its power in order properly to investigate this
crime, find those responsible and bring them to justice.
22. Sources Ukraine refers to acknowledge that the Russian investigative authorities have done
a lot in order to solve Mr Ametov’s case. According to the data provided by Ukraine itself, more
than 270 witnesses have been questioned and over 50 forensic analyses and 50 examinations have
been carried out.33 In Ukraine’s own admission, “the individuals shown abducting him were
initially interrogated as witnesses to the abduction, they were later released and the investigation
was suspended, allegedly because Mr Ametov’s suspected murderer was no longer in Crimea.”34 In
fact the Russian investigative authorities have checked 143 persons with regard to their potential
involvement in committing the crime in question while also adopting other comprehensive
measures in order to solve the case.35 This points to the existence, rather than the absence, of
investigative efforts by the State.
23. The investigation of Mr Ametov’s case has in fact stalled not least because of the lack of
cooperation from Ukraine, which up to this date has been refusing to provide the Russian authorities
with information in its possession and that is essential for the investigation. In particular, Russian
investigative authorities issued a request for mutual legal assistance asking Ukraine to provide them
30 OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017) (Annex 759 to MU), para. 102.
31 Ibid., para. 103.
32 MU, paras. 395 and 400.
33 OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017) (Annex 759 to MU), para. 81.
34 MU, para. 400.
35 Deputy Head of the Directorate for Investigation of High-priority cases of the Main Investigative Directorate of
the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea - Head of the First Investigative
Department, Note regarding criminal case No. 2014417004 on murder of R.M. Ametov (Annex 417).
Appendix A
175
with dial-up connections and mobile phone location data, an information that is crucially needed in
order to find the crime suspect and that is available exclusively to Ukrainian mobile network
operators.36 However, this request was rejected by Ukraine without any proper motivation.37
Generally speaking Ukraine has repeatedly been declining to cooperate with Russian investigative
authorities and to provide them with any data on grounds that Ukraine considers these authorities to
be “illegitimate”.38 Had Ukraine really been concerned with a proper conduct of the investigation
and with addressing the legitimate requests of Mr Ametov’s relatives, it would certainly have
promptly provided such critical information that is in its possession instead of deliberately
obstructing the procedure and directly contributing to its suspension.
24. As for Ukraine’s allegation that the Russian investigators refused to allow Mr Ametov’s
brother to read any case files,39 this accusation is also based on a distorted and selective factual
account, and is ultimately without merit. In 2014 the victims in Mr Ametov’s criminal case,
including Mr Ametov’s brother, Mr Refat Ametov, waived the opportunity to read the case files.
These refusals were made in written form and have been admitted as part of the criminal case file.40
In 2017, which is the only episode that Ukraine refers to, the case files could not be provided to
Mr Ametov’s brother for review because the preliminary investigation into the criminal case had
been suspended, as was explained in the Investigative Committee’s response.41 Pursuant to Article
42(2)(12) of the Russian Criminal Procedural Code the victim in a criminal case may only read the
case files after the preliminary criminal investigation has been completed.42 Ukraine cannot expect
the Russian Federation to bypass applicable procedures and violate its own domestic law to show
positive willingness to investigate. Once the suspension of the criminal case was lifted,
Mr Ametov’s brother was allowed to read the case files.43 In his petition dated 16 February 2018
36 Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of
Crimea, Request for legal assistance No. 201-04-2017/23765 addressed to the competent authorities of Ukraine, 15
December 2017 (Annex 519).
37 Letter No. 14/1/1-24474-18 of the Department of International Legal Cooperation of the Prosecutor General’s
Office of Ukraine to the Main Directorate of International Legal Cooperation of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the
Russian Federation, 23 April 2018 (Annex 521).
38 Letter No. 14/3-48vykh-15 of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine to the Prosecutor General of the Russian
Federation, 20 November 2015 (Annex 512).
39 MU, para. 401.
40 Statement of waiver of Ametova Z.E., Сriminal сase No. 2014417004, 17 April 2014 (Annex 137), in which
Ms Ametova refuses to read the files of criminal case No. 2014417004; Statement of waiver of Ametov R.M., Сriminal
сase No. 2014417004, 28 October 2014 (Annex 197), in which Mr Ametov refuses to read the files of criminal case
No. 2014417004.
41 Letter from the Central Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia in the Republic of
Crimea to E.M. Kurbedinov, 24 July 2017 (Annex 865 to MU).
42 Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40), Article
42(2)(12).
43 Senior Investigator of the First Investigative Department for Investigation of High-priority cases of the Main
Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Criminal Case No. 2014417004,
Letter No. 201-11-2014/15223, 6 August 2018 (Annex 404).
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176
Mr Ametov’s brother refers to specific materials of the criminal case, thus himself acknowledging
that he had familiarized himself with the case files.44
b. The case of Messrs Shaimardanov and Zinedinov
25. With respect to the disappearances of Mr Shaimardanov and Mr Zinedinov in May 2014,
Ukraine contends that the Russian Federation failed to open an investigation within a reasonable
time.45 Again, Ukraine only speculates that the explanation for this alleged state of affairs can only
be related to racial discrimination and a violation of CERD, without investigating into the
particulars of each case in regard to statutory procedural law. The existence of an unsolved case is
not indicative of a violation of the minimum investigation standard as long as the relevant
authorities have undertaken an investigation and used reasonable measures available to them in an
attempt to solve the case. As is confirmed below it is precisely what happened in this case, which
shows nothing distinctive or unique that would be constitutive of, or even suggest, racial
discrimination.
26. The competent authorities have taken Mr Shaimardanov’s case very seriously and have
actively investigated from the moment his disappearance on 26 May 2014 was first reported by his
ex-wife two days later.46 This included multiple questioning of potential witnesses,47
communication with other competent agencies from the Ministry of Internal Affairs,48 requests for
information with local medical facilities,49 and scheduling other necessary preliminary investigative
activities.50 The time-period for conducting these preliminary checks required an extension, based
44 Petition filed by R.M. Ametov to Investigator of High-priority Cases at the First Investigative Office of the
Directorate for Investigation of High-Profile Cases with the Central Investigative Directorate of the Investigative
Committee, 16 February 2018 (Annex 1112 to MU).
45 MU, para. 402.
46 Record on acceptance of oral statement on crime of Olga Shaimardanova on Mr Shaimardanov’s disappearance,
28 May 2014 (Annex 139); Operative Duty Officer of the Central District Department of the Simferopol City
Directorate of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Crimea, Report on the
detection of an offence, 28 May 2014 (Annex 140).
47 Operative Officer of the Special Investigations Division of the Central District Department, Explanation of O.V.
Shaimardanova, 28 May 2014 (Annex 141); Operative Officer of the Special Investigations Division of the Central
District Department, Explanation of Belashova K.A., 28 May 2014 (Annex 142); Operative Officer of the Special
Investigations Division of the Zheleznodorozhny District Department of the Simferopol City Directorate, Explanation
of Shaimardanova O.V., 30 May 2014 (Annex 143); Operative Officer of the Special Investigations Division of the
Zheleznodorozhny District Department of the Simferopol City Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the
Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Explanation of Chernyakova E.S., 31 May 2014 (Annex 144).
48 Deputy Acting Head of the Zheleznodorozhniy District Department of the Simferopol City Directorate of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 49/3-6598 with schedule
of recipients, 4 June 2014 (Annex 150).
49 Operative Officer of the Police Station No. 1 “Zheleznodorozhny” of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Russia for Simferopol, Report, 31 May 2014 (Annex 145).
50 Senior Investigator of the Investigative Department of Police Station No. 1 “Zheleznodorozhny” of the Directorate
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Crimea for Simferopol, Order No. 242so-2014 on carrying out
certain investigative activities, 19 June 2014 (Annex 153); Head of Police Station No. 1 “Zheleznodorozhny” of the
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea for Simferopol,
Letter No. 49/3-7852, 3 July 2014 (Annex 157).
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177
on applicable provisions of Russian criminal procedural law,51 as additional time was needed in
order for the above-mentioned steps to yield results, including attempts at tracing
Mr Shaimardanov’s potential location. Based on the results of these preliminary inquiries,52 on 9
July 2014 the authorities eventually opened a criminal case because Mr Shaimardanov had not been
found by that time.53
27. The investigation in Mr Zinedinov’s case unfolded along similar lines. Between 31 May
2014, the day when his disappearance a day before was reported to the competent authorities,54 to
the opening of a criminal case on 24 July 2014,55 the authorities actively conducted their
preliminary inquiry and took various acts to gather information from different sources, which could
help to determine Mr Zinedinov’s whereabouts.56 During this stage of the investigation the Crimean
Prosecutor’s Office also provided several answers to the requests of various social, political and
other organizations regarding the course of the inquiry, confirming continuation of preliminary
investigation activities.57 The case was later suspended due to the fact that the person subject to
prosecution as accused has not been identified.58
51 Deputy Head of the Police Department of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the
Krasnogorsky District, Resolution on Filing of a Motion on the Extension of the check time-period relating to the crime
report, 1 June 2014 (Annex 148); Senior Investigator of the Investigative Department for the Zheleznodorozhny District
of Simferopol of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the
Republic of Crimea, Resolution on filing of motion on the extension of the check time-period relating to the crime
report, 12 June 2014 (Annex 152); Senior Investigator of the Investigative Department for the Zheleznodorozhny
District of Simferopol of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia for the Republic
of Crimea, Resolution on filing of motion on the extension of the check time-period relating to the crime report, 19 June
2014 (Annex 154).
52 Criminal Investigator of the Criminal Investigative Department of Police Station No. 1 “Zheleznodorozhny” of the
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Simferopol, Report, 3 July 2014 (Annex 158).
53 Senior Investigator of the Investigative Department for the Zheleznodorozhny District of Simferopol of the Main
Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia for the Republic of Crimea, Criminal Case No.
2014487098, Resolution on the initiation of a criminal case, 9 July 2014 (Annex 160).
54 Statement of L.A. Tokchi on disappearance of S.S. Zinedinov, 31 May 2014 (Annex 146); Assistant to the Head -
Operational Duty Officer of the Kievskiy District Department of the Simferopol City Directorate of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of the Republic of Crimea, Report, 31 May 2014 (Annex 147).
55 High-Priority cases Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Kievsky District of Simferopol of the Main
Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Criminal
Case No. 2014477184, Resolution on the initiation of a criminal case, 24 July 2014 (Annex 162).
56 High-Priority cases Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Kievsky District of Simferopol of the Main
Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Order
No. 02-40-2014 On carrying out certain operative search activities, 27 June 2014 (Annex 156); High-Priority cases
Investigator of the Investigative Department for the Kievskiy District of Simferopol, Order No. 02-40/746-2014 on
carrying out certain operative search activities, 3 July 2014 (Annex 159); High-Priority cases Investigator of the
Investigative Department for the Kievskiy District of Simferopol, Order No. 02-40-2014 on carrying out certain
operative search activities, 14 July 2014 (Annex 161).
57 See, for instance, Acting Head of the Department of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, Letter
15/1-224-2014/ON582-14 to E. Ablaev, 24 June 2014 (Annex 155); Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No.
15/1-228-2014/On2440-14 to the International Committee of Red Cross, 24 September 2014 (Annex 192).
58 Head of the Third Investigative Department (for the investigation of past years crimes) of the High-priority cases
Directorate of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the
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28. The criminal investigations into the disappearances of Messrs. Shaimardanov and Zinedinov
were merged in a single criminal case, in the course of which officers of the Investigation
Committee of the Russian Federation conducted numerous procedural actions, questioned more
than 50 witnesses, checked and verified alibi of 8 potential suspects, inspected places of living of
the missing persons, carried out 2 genetic examinations.59 At the same time, just as in Mr Ametov’s
case, the investigation of Timur Shaimardanov and Seyran Zinedinov was in fact stalled not least
because of the intractability of Ukraine, which up to this date has been refusing to cooperate with
the Russian Federation’s request for mutual legal assistance, which is essential for the
investigation.60
c. The allegation in respect of Mr Leonid Korzh
29. Ukraine also alleges en passant the disappearance of a certain Mr Leonid Korzh, described
as a 24-year-old pro-Ukrainian activist, and implies that it may be linked to that of
Mr Shaimardanov.61 However, Ukraine provides no explanation beyond this mere assertion, and for
understandable reasons. While the competent authorities have never received any report from
relatives or from any other reliable source in respect of Ukraine’s alleged disappearance of
Mr Korzh, they did nevertheless carry out an in-depth investigation in response to, inter alia, the
publication, on 28 May 2014 on the website of the Center of Investigative Journalism, of a post
alleging the disappearance of two Ukrainian House activists, Simferopol residents Shaimardanov
and Leonid Korzh.62 In the course of the investigation the authorities ascertained that no such 24-
year-old activist named Leonid Korzh was registered as living in Crimea.63 Individuals identified as
Republic of Crimea, Note regarding criminal case No. 2014487098 concerning missing persons T.D. Shaimardanov and
S.S. Zinedinov (Annex 418), p. 4.
59 Head of the Third Investigative Department (for the investigation of past years crimes) of the High-priority cases
Directorate of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the
Republic of Crimea, Note regarding criminal case No. 2014487098 concerning missing persons T.D. Shaimardanov and
S.S. Zinedinov (Annex 418), p. 3.
60 Letter No. 14/1/1-24294-18 of the Department of International Legal Cooperation of the Prosecutor General’s
Office of Ukraine to the Directorate for International Cooperation of the Investigative Committee of the Russian
Federation, 3 March 2018 (Annex 520).
61 MU, para. 396; Website of Human Rights Watch, “Crimea: Enforced Disappearances”, 7 October 2014 (Annex
942 to MU); OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 15 June 2014 (Annex 764 to MU).
62 Criminal Investigator of the Criminal Investigative Department of Police Station No. 3 “Tsentralny” of the
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Simferopol, Inquiry Material No. 5201, Resolution on the
refusal to initiate a criminal case, 30 July 2015 (Annex 240).
63 Head of the Duty Unit of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Sevastopol, Note
Regarding Citizen Leonid Korzh, born in 1989 and (or) 1990 (Annex 425), confirming that the disappearance of
Mr Korzh has not been reported to the MIA for Sevastopol city by anyone during the period from 18 March 2014 to 12
August 2020; Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic
of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Note regarding receipt of reports on disappearances of citizens (Annex 637),
concerning Mr Leonid Korzh; Criminal Investigator of the Criminal Investigative Department of Police Station No. 3
“Tsentralny” of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Simferopol, Statement of Residence, 30
August 2014 (Annex 173), Head of the Migration Directorate of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
the Russian Federation for Sevastopol, Address certificate No. 2968.8 concerning Leonid Korzh, born in 1990, 12
August 2020 (Annex 424), confirming the absence of any registration data in relation to anyone called ‘Leonid Korzh’
who would be born in 1990; Head of the Crimean Republican Institution Bureau of Forensic Medical Examination,
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having the same name were unrelated to the activist alleged by the Center for Investigative
Journalism, which is otherwise known for publishing untrue, unverified information and extremist
content.64 Based on these conclusions, the investigating authorities declined to open a criminal case
because no criminal act had been identified.65
d. The case of Mr Ervin Ibragimov
30. With respect to the investigation into Mr Ervin Ibragimov’s disappearance, it is misleading
to state, as Ukraine does, that when Mr Ibragimov’s father attempted to file a complaint, “the FSB
office in Simferopol turned him away”.66 The document that Ukraine relies on to support its
allegations points actually to the contrary, i.e. that an investigation was opened.67
31. Indeed, the competent investigative authorities opened a criminal case on Mr Ibragimov’s
disappearance on 26 May 2016, the very next day after his father reported him missing at the
Bakhchisaray police station and indicated having found his son’s car abandoned at the roadside near
their neighbourhood.68 After the criminal case was opened Mr Ibragimov filed another complaint,
this time with the FSB office, in order to draw again the authorities’ attention on his son’s
disappearance.69 However, this request could not lead to any particular procedural result because a
criminal investigation had already been initiated by the competent investigative authority and
because the investigative jurisdiction of the FSB does not extend to cases of disappearances or
abductions.70
Letter Ref. No. 01-1788, 30 October 2014 (Annex 199) confirming the absence of any data in relation to anyone called
‘Leonid Korzh’ who would be born in 1990.
64 Criminal Investigator of the Criminal Investigative Department of Police Station No. 3 “Tsentralny” of the
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Simferopol, Inquiry Material No. 5201, Resolution on the
refusal to initiate a criminal case, 30 July 2015 (Annex 240); see also Appendix E, paras. 88-92.
65 Ibid.
66 MU, para. 403.
67 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2016) (Annex 772 to MU),
para. 154.
68 Senior Investigator of the Investigative Department for the Bakhchisaray District of the Main Investigative
Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Criminal Case No.
2016627042, Resolution on the initiation of a criminal case and proceedings, 26 May 2016 (Annex 277); Senior
Investigator of the Investigative Department for the Bakhchisaray District of the Main Investigative Directorate of the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Notification No. 16-2016627042/489,
26 May 2016 (Annex 278); Explanation of U.O. Ibragimov on the circumstances of the disappearance of his son E.U.
Ibragimov, 25 May 2016 (Annex 276).
69 Directorate for written appeals of Citizens and Organisations of the Administration of the President of the Russian
Federation, Letter No. A26-16-7216411, 24 January 2018 (Annex 391) with attached letter of Mr Ibragimov’s father to
the President of the Russian Federation with a list of his requests to different Russian authorities, including Crimean
office of the FSB.
70 Pursuant to the Russian Criminal Procedural Code, such investigations fall within the investigative jurisdiction of
the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation, which conducted the investigation of Mr Ibragimov’s criminal
case. See Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, No. 63-FZ, 13 June 1996 (Annex 32), Article 126; Criminal
Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, No. 174-FZ, 18 December 2001 (Annex 40), Article 151.
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32. Officers of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation conducted numerous
procedural actions as part of the investigation, including questioning over 500 potential witnesses,
conducting various inspections and examinations, including the technical examination of the
videotape of the kidnapping recorded by the CCTV camera in order to determine registration plate
of the kidnappers’ minibus as well as the identification and checking of 156 vehicles, conducting at
least 7 searches and seizures, and performing at least 5 expert examinations.71 Besides,
Mr Ibragimov’s father successfully exercised his right to participate in the criminal case.72
Moreover, replying to an NGO’s request for information on the status of the investigation, the
Crimean Prosecutor’s Office confirmed that the Russian authorities were actively attempting to
determine Mr Ibragimov’s whereabouts.73 The criminal investigation was suspended in September
2017 pursuant to applicable procedural law because no suspect had been identified and all acts
possible absent a suspect had been accomplished.74
e. The cases of Messrs Bondarets, Vaschuk and Chernysh
33. In respect of Messrs Bondarets, Vaschuk and Chernysh to whom Ukraine refers very
allusively,75 despite the fact that their alleged disappearance has not been reported by any relatives
or any other reliable source,76 the Russian investigative authorities did conduct a proper
investigation with regard to these individuals, based on the assertion of their disappearance made by
a pro-Euromaidan activist and published on a news website on 11 July 2014. According to the
results of this investigation, there is no evidence of presence of Messrs Bondarets, Vaschuk and
71 Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 15/3-2140-16, 27 April 2017 (Annex 333) on the course
of Mr Ibragimov’s criminal case; Deputy Head of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of
the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 224-4-18, 23 November 2018 (Annex 406), Acting
Deputy Head of the First Investigative Department of the High-priority Cases Directorate of the Main Investigative
Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. Otsk201-
08-2017/13581, 19 July 2017 (Annex 335) on the course of Mr Ibragimov’s criminal case; Head of the Third
Investigative Department (for the investigation of past years crimes) of the Department for the Investigation of High-
Priority Cases of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the
Republic of Crimea, Note Regarding Criminal Case No. 2016627042 on disappearance of E.U. Ibragimov (Annex 419).
72 Mr Ibragimov’s father submitted several motions to this effect, which were granted: Senior Investigator of the
Investigative Department for the Bakhchisaray District of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Resolutions on satisfying of motions, 30 May 2016
(Annex 279).
73 Head of the Directorate for Supervision of Criminal Procedural and Operative Search Activities of the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 15/1-382-2016/On4261-2017, 29 August 2017 (Annex 339).
74 Deputy Head of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for
the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 224-4-18, 23 November 2018 (Annex 406).
75 MU, paras. 398 and 403 and footnote 839.
76 Senior operations officer of the Activities Coordination Department of the Internal Affairs Bodies on the search
for persons of the Criminal Investigative Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea,
Report, 17 September 2014 (Annex 187) confirming the absence of any data in relation to the disappearance of Messrs.
Bondarets, Vashchuk and Chernysh; Duty Unit of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for
Sevastopol, Note Regarding citizens Ivan Bondariets, born 1990, Ivan Bondarets, born 1990, Vladislav Vaschuk, born
1985, and Valery Vaschuk, born 1985 (Annex 426), Duty Unit of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Russia for Sevastopol, Note Regarding citizens Vasiliy Chernysh, born 1978, Vasil Chernysh, born 1978 (Annex 427),
which confirm the absence of reports on the disappearances of Messrs. Bondarets, Vashchuk and Chernysh.
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Chernysh on the territory of Crimea in March 2014 and no evidence of their disappearance.77 All
possible leads were eventually discarded. On the other hand, official data of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine indicate that Mr Chernysh disappeared not in Crimea but in the city of Donetsk,
in Ukraine, on 14 March 2014.78
f. The cases of Messrs Mykhailo Vdovchenko, Andrii Shchekun and Anatoly Kovalsky
34. The Russian Federation also conducted an investigation into the alleged disappearances of
Messrs Mykhailo Vdovchenko, Andrii Shchekun and Anatoly Kovalsky.79 Messrs Shchekun and
Kovalsky allegedly went missing on 9 March 2014 and, according to Ukraine, they could be last
seen at Simferopol’s railway station, where they had come to pick up a parcel from Kiev which
contained Ukrainian flags.80 However, as part of the initial steps of the investigation carried out by
Ukrainian authorities, the Ukrainian police officers who were on patrol on that day and who were
questioned confirmed that their department did not detain anyone at the railway station on 9 March
2014.81 In addition, two other witnesses declared having seen two persons, potentially Messrs
Shchekun and Kovalsky, among a group of other men dressed in camouflage passing through the
parking zone in front of the railway station – these witnesses denied having seen any signs of
violence or coercion towards these two persons.82 Without more, mere camouflage dressing, which
is available to anyone on the open market, tells nothing of the identity of their wearers.
35. The criminal investigation originally initiated by the Ukrainian authorities with regard to the
above-mentioned allegations was subsequently transferred by the Russian Prosecutor’s Office to the
Investigative Committee department in Simferopol in order to be continued.83 The investigators
checked, inter alia, the issue of possible involvement of Russian military officers in the alleged
incident84 and ascertained that no such involvement had taken place as it was reasonably established
77 Senior operations officer of the Activities Coordination Department of the Internal Affairs Bodies on the search
for missing persons of the Criminal Investigative Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of
Crimea, Resolution on the refusal to initiate a criminal case, 19 September 2014 (Annex 189).
78 Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine official website, Information on disappearance of V.V. Chernysh in
Donetsk, 14 March 2014 (Annex 792).
79 MU, paras. 405-407. See also paras. 4, 12 above.
80 MU, para. 407.
81 Prosecutor’s Office of Zheleznodorozhniy District of Simferopol, criminal proceedings No.
1201401041000000898, Record of witness interrogation of S.V. Grishchenko, 9 March 2014 (Annex 787); Prosecutor’s
Office of Zheleznodorozhniy District of Simferopol, criminal proceedings No. 1201401041000000898, Record of
witness interrogation of V.V. Guzhva, 9 March 2014 (Annex 788).
82 Investigative Office of the Linear Department on the Simferopol railway station, criminal proceedings No.
1201401041000000898, Record of witness interrogation of I.N. Kot, 14 March 2014 (Annex 790); Investigative Office
of the Linear Department on the Simferopol railway station, criminal proceedings No. 1201401041000000898, record
of witness interrogation of V.V. Serdyukov, 14 March 2014 (Annex 791).
83 Prosecutor of the Zheleznodorozhny District of Simferopol, Check Material No. 1201401041000000898,
Resolution on transferring materials on the crime report from one preliminary investigation body to another, 24 July
2014 (Annex 163).
84 Investigator of the Investigative Department of Zheleznodorozhny District of Simferopol of the Main Investigative
Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Resolution on transferring a crime report in
accordance with the investigative jurisdiction, 27 July 2014 (Annex 164).
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182
that no Russian forces were present in Simferopol city as of 9 March 2014.85 Considering the lack
of evidence pointing to the commission of the alleged crime, the investigating officer decided not to
open a criminal case.86
36. Regarding the case of Mr Vdovchenko’s purported kidnapping,87 as in the previously
addressed cases of Messrs Shchekun and Kovalsky, the Russian investigative authorities spared no
efforts in attempting to find individuals involved in this incident, but this yielded no results.88 Such
individuals were not identified.
37. In addition, the investigators requested information from various sources in order to gather
relevant evidence that may help establish the factual commission of the crime.89 For example,
Crimean medical facilities were asked whether Mr Vdovchenko sought medical attention during
March 2014 and none of these requests received a positive response.90 Authorities from the
Ministry of Internal Affairs ascertained that no police officers were on patrol near the café where
Mr Vdovchenko was allegedly kidnapped on 11 March 2014.91 Likewise, the Self Defence Forces
(Crimean People’s Militia) were asked whether individuals affiliated to them were patrolling in the
vicinity of the alleged crime scene92 but their involvement was not established due to the fact that
the organization was found not to have been in existence at the relevant time.93 The Investigation
authorities also requested additional information from the Military Commissariat of the Republic of
Crimea as Messrs Vdovchenko, Shchekun and Kovalsky had allegedly been detained in the building
hosting its office in Simferopol. However, this allegation could not be confirmed either due to the
85 Senior Investigator of the Military Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee for Abakan garrison,
Resolution on transferring the Crime Report (re Shchekin and Kovalsky), 16 August 2014 (Annex 168).
86 Investigator of the Investigative Department of Zheleznodorozhniy District of Simferopol of the Main
Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea,
Resolution on the refusal to initiate a criminal case, 17 September 2020 (Annex 428).
87 MU, para. 407; Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces, 14 March 2014
(Annex 938 to MU), p. 7. See also para. 4. above.
88 Senior Investigator of the Military Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee for Abakan garrison,
Resolution on transferring the Crime Report (re Vdovchenko), 16 August 2014 (Annex 169). Investigator of the
Investigative Department of Zheleznodorozhniy District of Simferopol of the Main Investigative Directorate of the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Resolution on the refusal to initiate a
criminal case, 17 September 2020 (Annex 428).
89 Senior Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Zheleznodorozhny District of Simferopol of the Main
Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Order
No. 1002-17 on carrying out certain investigative activities, 17 August 2017 (Annex 337).
90 Chief Medical Officer of the Simferopol Clinical Hospital of Emergency Medical Care No. 6 of the Republic of
Crimea, Letters No. 1499/01-11, 29 August 2017 (Annex 340).
91 Head of the Police Station No. 1 “Zheleznodorozhny” of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for
Simferopol, Letter No. 49/3-24575, 21 September 2017 (Annex 349).
92 Senior Investigator of the Investigative Department of Zheleznodorozhny District of Simferopol of the Main
Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia for the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 1001-17, 17
August 2017 (Annex 338).
93 The organised self-defence force that currently exists was established much later, in July 2014. Head of the
Crimean Republican Headquarters of the People’s Militia – the People’s Guard of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No.
02-04/823, 29 August 2017 (Annex 341).
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183
fact that the above-mentioned regional department of the Ministry of Defence occupied this
building only since 5 September 2014.94 Finally, investigators were unable to find any witnesses of
the incident who could shed some light on the circumstances of Mr Vdovchenko’s alleged
disappearance.95
38. To sum up, while Ukraine contends that “[t]he failure to investigate such egregious crimes
undermines protection against similar abuses in the future because it leads would-be perpetrators to
assume that they can abduct, torture and kill with impunity”,96 it has not established any
wrongdoing or irregularities by the investigative authorities. As has been confirmed above, the
alleged lack of investigation or unjustified delay in the same is without basis. In each case pointed
to by Ukraine, the authorities have done what they were able to do in the circumstances and subject
to the applicable legal and procedural framework. Inquiries into all disappearances have been
conducted, some of them have been successful, and the other cases could not be solved for objective
reasons and the investigations have complied with due process requirements. The procedural rules
relating to investigations were not applied in a selective or discriminatory manner, let alone on
racial grounds.
39. In any event, at no point in the Memorial Ukraine engages in the discussion on whether or
not its specific allegations constitute racial discrimination under the meaning of CERD. As a result,
Ukraine’s contention that “the Russian Federation has either directly engaged in acts of physical
violence against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, or it has encouraged and tolerated such acts
carried out by its agents”97 is manifestly without any basis. In each individual case pointed to by
Ukraine that the Russian Federation has become aware of, the authorities have duly investigated,
therefore there can be no question of tolerance or incitation of enforced disappearances by the
authorities. The evidence on investigation does not point to discriminatory exercise of investigation
or a lack of efforts to investigate from the State.
D. EVIDENCE ISSUES
40. Ukraine’s flawed approach to evidence as described previously is particularly visible in the
case of alleged enforced disappearances, murders, abductions and torture. As a general approach,
Ukraine claims that these incidents affect Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea
disproportionally in relation to the rest of the population, but it only cites a total of 13 individual
cases in support of this allegation, that is supposed to point to a systematic campaign or policy of
racial discrimination. The individual cases Ukraine points to remain low in number, stretch over a
period of several years, involve different types of incidents affecting various individual profiles, are
94 Military Enlistment Office of the Republic of Crimea of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Letter
No. 2304, 14 September 2017 (Annex 347).
95 Operative Investigator of the Criminal Investigation Department of Police Station No. 1 “Zheleznodorozhny” of
the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Simferopol, Report (Annex 304).
96 MU, para. 404.
97 MU, para. 393.
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not even always presented by Ukraine itself as a breach of an individual right (a disappearance for
instance is not necessarily an enforced disappearance) and, as has been shown above, have in any
case manifestly nothing to do with a systematic campaign of racial discrimination. As already
mentioned, no statistical data is offered to conduct a proper comparative exercise.
41. When it comes to supporting evidence, there is moreover an obvious gap between what
Ukraine claims and what the documents it cites in support in fact indicate. In its Application
Ukraine alleges a “pattern” of disappearances and murders that has allegedly been described by
“numerous international observers”.98 However the four materials it relies on do not substantiate
this allegation: the cited OHCHR report mentions the term “pattern” in relation to Crimea only
twice and not in relation to racial discrimination (which is in fact not addressed as such by the
reports).99 Neither do the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues or Resolution 71/205
of the UN General Assembly refer to a “pattern” or mention the point at all. In its Memorial
Ukraine likewise alleges that “numerous international observers have reported a pattern of
disappearances and murders directed against members of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
communities.”100 However, the paragraph of the OHCHR report it purports to rely on does not echo
such claim at all.101 Instead, it merely refers to ten individual cases of unresolved disappearances
involving three ethnic groups and that occurred over an extended period of three years. The report
provides no information on the reasons for those disappearances and does not claim that they relate
to racial discrimination or that they constitute enforced disappearances that are attributable to the
Russian Federation.
42. Ukraine’s claim is essentially based on sophisms to suggest discriminatory targeting by
resorting to abusive syllogisms, speculative suggestions and juxtaposition of unrelated phrases,
short of any serious demonstration. A good example of this may be found with Ukraine’s
presentation of Mr Shaimardanov’s case: “Mr. Shaimardanov was a leader of a local activist group,
and disappeared on 26 May 2014 – the day after he spoke about the disappearance of another
activist, Leonid Korzh, a few days previously.”102 In this sentence, nowhere does Ukraine
demonstrate that Mr Shaimardanov’s activism or his mention of Mr Korzh were indeed the reason
explaining his disappearance, or that there are indeed any links between these alleged facts, or that
it is a case of enforced disappearance. Ukraine only suggests this to the reader’s mind. The same
can be observed with Ukraine’s following statement: “another Crimean Tatar activist, Seiran
Zinedinov, disappeared after trying to locate Shaimardanov”, and again here: “All three activists
98 Ukraine’s Application of 16 January 2017, para. 103.
99 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2016) (Annex 771 to MU),
para. 190 in relation to the retroactive application of the law in several cases, and para. 192 with respect to alleged
violations of the right to peaceful public assembly.
100 MU, para. 394.
101 OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017) (Annex 759 to MU), para. 102.
102 MU, para. 396.
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185
were members of the pro-Ukrainian group, Ukrainian House.”103 No causal link is in fact
demonstrated; instead, the Russian Federation and the Court are left with grave accusations that are
nothing more than pure speculations. And once again, none of these allegations are even presented
by Ukraine as related to racial discrimination.
II. Ukraine’s Mischaracterizations and Issues of Attribution
A. ALLEGED ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES AND MURDERS
43. Disappearances of individuals is a phenomenon with many possible explanations and that is
not unique to the Russian Federation,104 including in Crimea.105 Yet for allegations of
disappearances to be relevant to Ukraine’s claims of racial discrimination, Ukraine must first
establish that they constitute cases of enforced disappearances, which in turn presupposes to show
that the abduction itself is attributable to the Russian Federation, or that the Russian Federation has
failed to investigate such abduction. The same goes for deaths of individuals. As is shown below,
Ukraine fails to do so. A fortiori, Ukraine’s claims of systematic campaign or policy of racial
discrimination in this regard totally fail.
44. In the case of the disappearance and murder of Mr Reshat Ametov, Ukraine states that he
was kidnapped by “uniformed men”106 on 3 March 2014 in Simferopol and found dead on 15 March
2014 with signs of torture on his body. However, according to the document that Ukraine itself
relies on to support its allegations, Mr Ametov was released shortly after he had been led away from
the square where he was holding a one-man picket by men who are not even described as Russian
officials.107 The facts as alleged by Ukraine thus simply do not evidence any act attributable to the
Russian Federation and are contradicted by the active efforts made by the Russian Federation to
identify the perpetrators during the investigation that followed.108
45. Ukraine then refers briefly to the disappearances of Mr Timur Shaimardanov, Mr Leonid
Korzh and Mr Serian Zinedinov, all in May 2014.109 But Ukraine does not mention any information
103 MU, para. 396. See also at para. 397 regarding the case of Mr Ibragimov: “Like other Crimean Tatar individuals
who have disappeared, Mr. Ibragimov was a prominent member of the community”.
104 See for example in respect of the United Kingdom: The Independent, “The missing: Each year, 275,000 Britons
disappear”, 23 October 2011 (Annex 879), available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/missingeach-
year-275-000-britons-disappear-1801010.html.
105 Main Directorate of International and Legal Cooperation of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian
Federation, Note on missing person cases opened by the internal affairs bodies in 2014-first half of 2020, 9 September
2020 (Annex 636). As this document shows, Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians do not account for a disproportionate part
of the overall number of missing persons.
106 MU, para. 395.
107 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Accountability for Killings in Ukraine from
January 2014 to May 2016 (Annex 49 to MU), paras. 119–120, referred to in MU, para. 372, footnote 777.
108 See paras. 21-24 above.
109 MU, para. 396.
Appendix A
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about the identity of the alleged abductors. In such circumstances it is difficult to see how such acts,
to the extent they would amount to enforced disappearances under international law, could be
attributable to the Russian Federation whatsoever.
46. The disappearance of Mr Ervin Ibragimov on 24 May 2016, as reported by Ukraine, is no
different. In this case, Ukraine identifies Mr Ibragimov’s abductors as “a group of men”,110 without
any further specifying on which grounds it could be attributed to Russia under international law.
47. Further allegations of harassment and violence relate to ethnic Ukrainians. But again,
Ukraine only refers in sweeping terms to several disappearances “under suspicious
circumstances”.111 All Ukraine could say about the identity of the alleged abductors in mentioned
individual cases was that Mr Vladislav Vaschuk and Mr Ivan Bonariets “disappeared together” on 7
March 2014 in Simferopol” and that Mr Vasyl Chernysh “was reported missing” on 15 March
2014.112 Ukraine is not even consistent on these persons’ names.113 In any event, to the extent
Ukraine purports to attribute these disappearances to the SDF, which it has clearly not established,
they occurred before the critical date of 18 March 2014 and if their acts were to be attributable to a
State, they would therefore be attributable to Ukraine as the SDF constituted one of these voluntary
and spontaneous squads authorized and organized under Ukrainian domestic law.
B. ALLEGED ABDUCTIONS AND TORTURE
48. With regard to allegations of abduction and torture of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian activists,
Ukraine cites the case of Mr Mykhailo Vdovchenko, allegedly abducted days before the March
2014 referendum and released on 21 March 2014.114 In this regard, Ukraine alleges that his case,
like the following cases, is an example of intimidation efforts that is unilaterally attributed to “the
Russian Federation and its agents”.115 Ukraine also refers to his detention as “Russian captivity”.116
Again, these vague allegations are not supported by evidence. Whereas Ukraine keeps the identity
of the authors of the kidnapping vague, using purposefully the ambiguous expression “Russian
captivity”, the documents Ukraine cites in support suggest that the abduction and detention were
conducted by militants of the SDF.117 Such act thus cannot be attributable to Russia as there is
nothing in the record that establishes that it was conducted by an organ of the Russian Federation or
110 MU, para. 397.
111 MU, para. 398.
112 MU, para. 398.
113 Ukraine mentions the allegedly disappeared persons as Vasyl Chernysh, Vladislav Vaschuk and Ivan Bonariets
(MU, para. 398) while the document it refers to, which also mentions their respective years of birth, refers to them as
Vasily Chernysh, Valery Vashchuk and Ivan Bondarets (See Sergey Zayets (Regional Center for Human Rights) et al.,
The Fear Peninsula: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea (2015), p. 66 (Annex 976 to
MU), p. 66).
114 MU, para. 406.
115 MU, para. 405.
116 MU, para. 406.
117 Mike Eckel, A Cry from Crimea, World Policy Journal (2014-2015), 30 September 2014 (Annex 1019 to MU).
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that the authors acted under the direction or control of the Russian Federation when allegedly
carrying out this specific conduct. Ukraine also does not highlight the facts that the abduction
allegedly took place before 18 March 2014 and that the release took place very shortly thereafter.
49. With regard to Euromaidan activists Andrii Shchekun and Anatoly Kovalsky, as Ukraine
reports, they were abducted in Simferopol on 9 March 2014 and released on 20 March 2014. In the
paragraph concerning this case Ukraine identifies no specific author of the alleged acts
whatsoever.118 Ukraine fails to establish that these alleged acts are attributable to the Russian
Federation. The absence of any links whatsoever with the Russian Federation in relation to
Ukraine’s allegations concerning Messrs Vdovchenko, Shchekun and Kovalsky was also confirmed
by the investigation that was carried out by competent authorities in these cases.119
50. Being unable to substantiate its claims by factual evidence of the alleged attribution to the
Russian Federation, Ukraine merely suggests it to the reader’s mind by relying on fallacious
insinuations. For example, Ukraine relies on Mr Shchekun’s statement, which includes the
following assertion: “[s]ome of my captors spoke with Russian language accents that differ from the
accents common in Crimea. In particular, some of my captors appeared to be from either the
Caucasus region or Chechnya.”120 One would need to be very experienced in various Caucasian
accents to be able to identify specifically the Chechen accent in Russian. In any event, the Chechen
accent, even if correctly discerned, does not identify the abductors. Here like elsewhere, Ukraine
relies on subjective and unverifiable assertions and falls short (to say the least) of meeting the
burden of proof that falls upon any applicant State that formulates grave accusation against a
respondent State.
51. Equally ungrounded are the rest of Ukraine’s accusations. The cases of Mr Aleksandr
Kostenko and Renat Paralamov as misleadingly portrayed by Ukraine are factually wrong. The
relevant inquiries undertaken by Russian law-enforcement agencies did not establish signs of torture
or abduction.
52. Mr Kostenko’s was charged with premeditated infliction of light bodily injuries while being
driven by hatred or enmity towards a social group and with illegal possession of a firearm’s major
component, which constitute crimes under Article 115(2)(b) and Article 222(1) of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation, respectively.121
53. Having studied Mr Kostenko’s testimony, the factual circumstances of the case, witness
statements, video footage and other evidence, the courts found Mr Kostenko guilty of the
aforementioned offences, to which he had expressly or indirectly confessed, and convicted
118 MU, para. 407.
119 See paras. 34-37 above.
120 Witness Statement of Andriy Shchekun, 4 June 2018 (Annex 13 to MU), para. 23.
121 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, No. 63-FZ, 13 June 1996 (Annex 32), Articles 115(2)(b) and 222(1).
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Mr Kostenko to 3 years and 6 months imprisonment.122 Based on the evidence resulting from the
investigation the courts established in particular that, on 18 February 2014, Mr Kostenko, who was
affiliated with the nationalist party “Svoboda”, participated in violent riots in Kiev and physically
confronted the law enforcement authorities mandated with preserving order, in particular throwing a
stone at law enforcement officer Mr Polienko and injuring him. It was also established that
Mr Kostenko stored a firearm’s major component illegally. As the courts pointed out, the criminal
prosecution of Mr Kostenko was conducted to protect the rights and lawful interests of the victim –
a Russian citizen – and thus fell within the jurisdiction of the Russian authorities in accordance
with applicable Russian criminal law.123
54. Russian investigative authorities have also conducted two preliminary inquiries in response
to allegations made by Mr Kostenko’s counsel and in the media that he had been tortured while
being in custody. Both inquiries established the absence of evidence suggesting that Mr Kostenko
had been tortured or had suffered physical violence and the absence of corpus delicti in Russian
officials’ actions. Most importantly, in both cases Mr Kostenko’s own testimony, which does not
support what Ukraine alleges, was taken into account.124
55. Likewise, Ukraine’s account of the case of Mr Renat Paralamov is simply wrong.125
Mr Paralamov was suspected of being involved in activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is listed as a
terrorist organization in the Russian Federation. The investigative authorities had substantial
grounds, reviewed and approved by the court, to conduct an inspection, at Mr Paralamov’s home,
for any elements that may bear a link with the terrorist activity, including weapons and other items
forbidden on the territory of the Russian Federation.126 The home inspection took place on 13
September 2017127 and he was taken to the FSB for questioning that day. During the questioning
Mr Paralamov himself revealed his involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir, and disclosed a place in a
forest near the Simferopol Reservoir where he had hidden ammunition and explosives,128 which
122 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 1-213/2015, Decision, 15 May 2015 (Annex 232); Supreme
Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 22-2258/2015, Appellate Decision, 26 August 2015 (Annex 245); Presidium
of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 44U-27/2016 (4U-284/2015), Decision, 24 February 2016
(Annex 269).
123 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 1-213/2015, Decision, 15 May 2015 (Annex 232); Supreme
Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 22-2258/2015, Appellate Decision, 26 August 2015 (Annex 245); Presidium
of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 44U-27/2016 (4U-284/2015), Decision, 24 February 2016
(Annex 269); Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, No. 63-FZ, 13 June 1996 (Annex 32), Article 12.
124 Senior Forensic Investigator of the 534th Military Investigative Department of the Military Investigative
Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Black Sea Fleet, Resolution on the refusal
to initiate a criminal case, 18 April 2015 (Annex 228); Investigator of the First Investigative Department for
Investigation of High-Priority cases of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian
Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Resolution on the refusal to initiate a criminal case, 25 May 2015 (Annex 235).
125 MU, paras. 409-410.
126 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, Case No. 444/2017, Ruling authorizing the inspection
of R.R. Paralamov’s house (Annex 343).
127 Record of inspection of R.R. Paralamov’s house, 13 September 2017 (Annex 344).
128 Record of R.R. Paralamov’s questioning, 13 September 2017 (Annex 345); Record of R.R. Paralamov’s
questioning, 14 September 2017 (Annex 346).
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189
were indeed seized at the place designated by Mr Paralamov.129 These circumstances gave rise to
the opening of a criminal case against Mr Paralamov on 28 September 2017.130
56. On 17 October 2017, the 534th Department of Military Investigation Committee received
claims from Mr Paralamov’s lawyer regarding Mr Paralamov’s alleged abduction. Contrary to
Ukraine’s meritless arguments, the preliminary inquiry, conducted by the authorized investigative
authorities, established the absence of any evidence of crime allegedly committed by FSB officers.
During the course of the inquiry initiated by the Military Investigation Committee, a number of
FSB officers were questioned with regard to their actions performed in Mr Paralamov’s house
on 13 September 2017 and thereafter. All the officers engaged in investigative actions brought
against Mr Paralamov, were questioned and confirmed that he had not been detained that day, and
after his questioning he was free to leave the FSB office. The next morning, on 14 September 2017,
Mr Paralamov identified the place where he kept explosives and ammunition. No physical violence
or torture were applied towards Mr Paralamov during these two rounds of questioning.131
57. Therefore, the military investigator refused to open a criminal case on Mr Paralamov’s
allegations and concluded that Mr Paralamov’s claims were groundless and should be considered as
a part of his defense strategy aimed at escaping accountability.132 The results of this preliminary
inquiry were thoroughly reviewed by the 309th Military Prosecutor’s office of garrison, which
confirmed that the decision not to initiate the criminal case was legitimate due to the absence of
evidence that a crime had been committed.133
129 Record of inspection of premises, buildings, structures, terrain and vehicles, 14 September 2017 (Annex 348);
534th Military Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Resolution on the
refusal to initiate a criminal case, 27 October 2017 (Annex 371).
130 Inquiry Organization Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea, Resolution No.
11701350001009033 on the initiation of a criminal case against R.R. Paralamov, 28 September 2017 (Annex 351).
131 534th Military Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Resolution on
the refusal to initiate a criminal case, 27 October 2017 (Annex 371). See also Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of
Crimea, Letter No. 27-239-2017/Np10860-2017 to the Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Black Sea Fleet, 20
December 2017 (Annex 584); Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 27-239-2017/On6074-2017 to
E.M. Kurbedinov, 20 December 2017 (Annex 585).
132 534th Military Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Resolution on
the refusal to initiate a criminal case, 27 October 2017 (Annex 371).
133 Military Prosecutor of the 309th Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Garrison, Report on the examination of the
legality of the decision to refuse to initiate criminal proceedings, 20 February 2018 (Annex 395).
190
APPENDIX B
NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
MEASURES (DETENTIONS AND SEARCHES), LET ALONE A SYSTEMATIC
CAMPAIGN THEREOF
1. The law enforcement measures that Ukraine complains of under CERD have been adopted
for legitimate reasons, to fight against extremism and terrorism.1 As the record shows, there is no
plausible case to make that these measures breach CERD and constitute acts of racial discrimination
against Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group. It is noteworthy that, generally speaking, Crimean Tatars
and Ukrainians do not account for a disproportionate part of committed offences in relation to their
ethnic proportion of the overall population of Crimea.2 The present Appendix will present the
relevant factual and legal elements (I) on the basis of which each of the said measures were
legitimately taken (II).
I. Factual and Legal Relevant Elements
2. As has been developed elsewhere in relation to the ban of the Mejlis, the imposition of
legitimate limitations to the exercise of human rights is a general standard of international human
rights law that is also directly applicable in the Russian domestic legal order.3 The fight against
extremism and terrorism is a classic circumstance that gives rise to such legitimate limitations.
Legitimate limitations placed on the exercise of human rights do not entail a violation of such rights
and cannot thus constitute discriminatory treatment under CERD, since no individual right is
impaired nor nullified. The Russian law applicable to the fight against extremist and terrorist
activities in Russia includes in particular Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 “On
counteracting extremist activities” and Federal Law No. 35-FZ of 6 March 2006 “On combatting
terrorism”. A federal list of extremist materials has been established and is being maintained by the
Russian Ministry of Justice under Article 13 of Federal Law 114-FZ of 2002.4 In Crimea, one may
1 See also Chapter VI, paras. 347-376.
2 N. Vodorezov, Deputy Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation to the Crimean
Federal District, Letter No. A-80-1313, 26 April 2016, to A.D. Viktorov, Director of the Department for Humanitarian
Cooperation and Human Rights of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Documents submitted to the Registry of the ICJ
by the Russian Federation in connection with Ukraine’s Request for the indication of provisional measures and Judges’
Folder submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures, 6-9 March 2017 (Annex 1267),
p. 5-6.
3 See Chapter IV, paras. 152-154.
4 Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, Excerpts from the Federal list of extremist materials in accordance
with Federal Law of 25 July 2002 No. 114-FZ “On countering extremist activities” (List as at 8 June 2021) (Annex
511).
Appendix B
191
also mention, among other measures, the adoption of a complex plan to counter the ideology of
terrorism in 2015.5
3. Ukraine’s general line of argument consists in claiming that the reasons for the law
enforcement measures at stake are pretextual or arbitrary. In so doing, it takes liberty with the facts.
A. THE EXISTENCE OF MUSLIM RADICALISM IN CRIMEA BEFORE 2014
1. Ukraine’s Position
4. Ukraine alleges that one of the defining elements of Crimean Tatars is “adherence to a
moderate form of Islam”6 and that there was no religious extremism in Crimea before 2014, which
would suggest, in Ukraine’s view, that today’s measures with respect to the fight against extremist
religious organizations are only pretextual.7
2. The Facts
5. The existence of manifestations of religious extremism in Crimea has been a reality much
before 2014.8 Ukraine faced the threat of the radicalisation of Muslim Crimean Tatars as far back as
2004.9
6. Mr Dzhemilev, then the chairman of the Mejlis, admitted as early as 2004 that while
Crimean Tatar Islam indeed used to follow a moderate form, “stricter forms, notably the
Wahabbism [sic] of Saudi Arabia, is being preached by missionaries from the Middle East who
have plenty of money to build mosques and set up religious education establishments”.10
5 Decree of the Head of the Republic of Crimea No. 26-U “On approval of the Comprehensive Plan countering the
ideology of terrorism in the Republic of Crimea, for 2015 – 2018”, 30 January 2015 (Annex 81). The plan has since
been replaced by a number of similar if less global plans and measures.
6 MU, para. 357 (emphasis added). See also paras. 603 and 608.
7 MU, para. 449.
8 Expert Report of Ilshat Amirovich Mukhametzaripov on Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat associations (Annex
23), p. 30, 41, 89, 135, 140; Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel, 21 June 2021 (Annex 22), paras. 315, 348,
399-402.
9 Askold Krushelnycky, Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty, “Ukraine: Crimea`s Tatars - Clearing The Way For
Islamic Extremism? (Part 4)”, 26 August 2004 (Annex 1033 to MU). This article confirms that as early as 2004
religious radicalization was already an ongoing phenomenon in Crimea and had been affecting the Muslim community,
which is mainly composed of Crimean Tatars, for some time.
10 As reported in Askold Krushelnycky, Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty, “Ukraine: Crimea`s Tatars - Clearing
The Way For Islamic Extremism? (Part 4)”, 26 August 2004 (Annex 1033 to MU). The rise of religious extremism, in
particular groups related to Hizb ut-Tahrir, during the Ukrainian period and their manipulation by the Mejlis for
political purposes has also drawn criticism from Crimean Tatar representatives: Qirim Birligi, “Restoration of the
Rights of the Crimean Tatars and Creation of Conditions for their Revival and Development as Part of the Integration of
Crimea into the Russian Federation”, Report submitted to CERD Committee, 93rd session, 31 July – 25 August 2017,
doc. INT/CERD/NGO/RUS/28092, p. 4-5, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/RUS/
Appendix B
192
Mr Dzhemilev also admitted that the spreading of extremist literature within the Crimean Tatar
community was a reality: “Brochures of a provocative nature have appeared which say things like
Muslims don’t have to obey laws if the head of the state is not a Muslim. So what does that mean?
That I should not obey Ukrainian law? That is provocation designed to spark a conflict. Fortunately,
we are able to keep such things under control for the moment”.11
7. The Russian Federation’s current fight against organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (an
organization against which the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that it was legitimate to
take measures based on security concerns)12 relates to a situation in Crimea that Ukraine was
already faced with in the past.
B. THE BANS ON HIZB UT-TAHRIR AND TABLIGHI JAMAAT
8. As part of the fight against terrorist and extremist activities, a number of public
organizations and associations have been banned in Russia for extremist activities.13 Searches and
detentions are among the legitimate legal means at a State’s disposal to fight against suspected
unauthorized, extremist activity – like participating in public organizations that have been banned
and the activities of which have been declared prohibited. The mere fact that these measures imply
certain restrictions and inconveniences does not render them discriminatory or illegal.14 They apply
to all suspicions of unauthorized and extremist activities as defined under applicable law, i.e.
activities that threaten public order and safety, public health, other citizens’ lawfully protected
rights and interests, or the integrity and legal order of the Russian Federation. Searches in relation to
an individual are carried out when sufficient suspicion arises as to his/her possible extremist or
terrorist activities, based on the information available to the investigating authorities. Obviously,
not all searches lead to detentions and eventually convictions, and the absence of the latter does not
mean that searches or detentions are pretextual. Moreover, Ukraine’s accusations in the Memorial
regarding the manner in which searches were carried out in various individual cases rely on a
misconstruction of the measures, which are taken out of their context. In fact, the impugned
INT CERD NGO RUS 28092 E.doc; "Arria Formula" VTC of the member States of the UN Security Council on
Crimea, 21 May 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dh5qqqLVrB0 (at 11:39 to 13:17).
11 Askold Krushelnycky, Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty, "Ukraine: Crimea`s Tatars - Clearing The Way For
Islamic Extremism? (Part 4)", 26 August 2004 (Annex 1033 to MU).
12 See paras. 17-18 below.
13 See Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, List of public associations and religious organisations in respect
of which the court has taken a legally effective decision to liquidate them or ban their activities on the grounds provided
for by Federal Law of 25 July 2002 No. 114-FZ “On counteracting extremist activities”, as at 7 April 2021 (Annex
503). This list contains not only the Mejlis, but also a vast majority of non-Crimean Tatar organizations, mostly
extremist nationalist Russian movements. It also contains violent hooligan groups and religious extremist organizations.
14 Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1993 (Annex 28), Article 55(3), according to which the
human and civil rights and freedoms may be limited by federal law to such an extent to which it is necessary for the
protection of the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of
other people, for ensuring defence of the country and security of the State.
Appendix B
193
measures are in line with the standards usually applied in such situations in the context of
combating terrorism and extremism.
9. It is also worth mentioning that the Russian Federation’s approach to countering extremism
is in line with the European approach, which not only seeks to prevent and eliminate acts of
terrorism but also attempts to detect and prevent radicalization phenomena that are first steps
towards the possible commission of extremist and terrorist acts.15
1. The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir
10. Ukraine takes particular issue with the Russian Federation’s measures to enforce the ban on
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami and Tablighi Jamaat, which are terrorist and extremist organizations,
respectively, banned in the Russian Federation.16
11. Hizb ut-Tahrir, established in Jerusalem in 1953, is an international Islamist movement that
seeks to establish a worldwide caliphate based on the Sharia,17 functioning as a totalitarian State in
which there can be no civil and political rights and where non-Muslims are not tolerated. While it
publicly denounces violence as a means to achieve its goal, its objective is obviously incompatible
with non-violent methods. It considers modern Muslim authorities as apostate and enemies to be
overthrown, not to mention non-Muslim regimes and the West in its broader sense.18
12. Generally speaking, while some of the existing fundamentalist movements believe that the
transition to the desired regime is possible by peaceful means – as a result of effective preaching,
the majority is striving for revolution, the differences in opinions within this majority touching upon
the degree of participation in modern politics. The well-known Muslim Brotherhood movement
belongs to this majority.
13. The ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir is based on two basic positions. The first is the rejection of
all participation in the political life of non-Muslim societies. The second is the nominal rejection of
violence, although this point is belied by the movement’s documents, positions and actions.19 For
example, the movement does not call for killing Jews in general, but it calls for their extermination
in Israel, it categorically rejects Israel’s right to exist, and its statements are replete with anti-
Semitic language.20 Antisemitism is indeed the reason that ultimately led to the movement’s ban in
15 Engel Report (Annex 22), paras. 83-111, 126-314; see also para. 28.
16 MU, paras. 409, 410, 447 and 448.
17 Human Rights Watch, “Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies”, 14 November 2017 (Annex 964 to
MU).
18 For a detailed account of the history and ideological bases of the organization, see Expert Report of Valery
Viktorovich Engel, 21 June 2021 (Annex 22), paras. 350-422.
19 Engel Expert Report (Annex 22), paras. 363-368.
20 Engel Expert Report (Annex 22), para. 407.
Appendix B
194
Germany in 2003.21 The movement has also repeatedly approved terrorist acts and refused to
condemn crimes committed by the so-called Islamic State.
observed that Hizb ut-Tahrir is banned in most Muslim countries in the world and in
other countries because “their activity is aimed to destroy the political system, opposing Muslims to
other people and deny the political and religious freedom of men.”22
14. In 2003, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation banned fifteen organizations as
terrorist organizations, including Hizb ut-Tahrir and other groups such as Al Qaida.23 In reaching its
decision, which is in conformity with United Nations anti-terrorism action, the Supreme Court
relied on the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s goals included overthrowing non-Muslim governments in
order to establish a universal Muslim Caliphate, first covering countries that have Muslim
populations including Russia, intolerance towards other religions, and purposeful work to bring
about social divisions, among others. The banned organization was consequently included into the
Unified federal list of organizations recognized in accordance with applicable Russian legislation as
terrorist organizations.24
15. While Hizb ut-Tahrir is not banned in Ukraine or in most countries of Europe, it is banned
in Germany – where its assets have also been seized –, in several former Soviet republics, including
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as China, and most Muslim countries and countries with a large
Muslim population, including Egypt. As an example among many others, 35 of Hizb ut-Tahrir
members and supporters, including key leaders, were arrested in October 2009 under anti-terrorism
legislation in Pakistan, where the movement is banned.25 In countries where it is not banned, Hizb
ut-Tahrir is nevertheless under strict surveillance by special services and regularly causes
controversy in the media with radical statements, like in Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands or the
United Kingdom, among others. Ukraine itself considered prohibiting Hizb ut-Tahrir before 2014,
apparently due in particular to the activities of this organization in Crimea.26
21 ECtHR, Hizb ut-Tahrir and others v. Germany, Application No. 31098/08, Decision, 12 June 2012, para. 6.
22 “Arria Formula” VTC of the member States of the UN Security Council on Crimea, 21 May 2020,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dh5qqqLVrB0 (at 11:14 to 11:24). See also OSCE Human dimension
implementation meeting (Warsaw, 16-27 September 2019), Written Contribution by the Spiritual Directorate of
Muslims of Crimea, HDIM.CS/0404/19/EN, 24 September 2019 (Annex 835).
23 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. GKPI 03-116, Decision, 14 February 2003 (Annex 119).
24 Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, Unified federal list of organizations, including foreign and
international organizations, recognized terrorist according to the laws of the Russian Federation, 31 August 2020
(Annex 499), also available in Russian at: http://www.fsb ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm.
25 Houriya Ahmed and Hannah Stuart, "Hizb ut-Tahrir: Ideology and Strategy", Centre For Social Cohesion,
London, 2009, p. 55, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/HIZB.pdf.
26 Kommersant, “Security Service of Ukraine is demanded to ban Islamic party Hizb ut-Tahrir”, 16 September 2009
(Annex 867).
Appendix B
195
16. The European Court of Human Rights has confirmed, in unequivocal terms, that bans on
Hizb ut-Tahrir in Germany and the Russian Federation do not violate the European Convention on
Human Rights.
17. In Hizb ut-Tahrir and others v. Germany, the Court concluded that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ends
“are clearly contrary to the values of the Convention, notably the commitment to the peaceful
settlement of international conflicts and to the sanctity of human life.”27 As a result, the Court found
that Article 17 of the Convention (which is resorted to by the Court in exceptional circumstances
only)28 prevented Hizb ut-Tahrir from enjoying the protection afforded by Article 11 of the
Convention with respect to the freedom of association. This conclusion led the Court to also reject
allegations of violation of the freedom of religion under Article 9 and of the freedom of expression
under Article 10 of the Convention.29
18. In the case of Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, the Court likewise agreed with the
ban declared by the Russian Federation on Hizb ut-Tahrir, recalling its earlier decision with regard
to the German ban. Specifically, the Court found Article 17 to be applicable and denied that the
criminal convictions of the two applicants for incitement to participating in the activities of a
terrorist banned organization violated Articles 9, 10 or 11 of the ECHR.30 These decisions confirm
that States have a right to prosecute and ban organizations that reject human rights and democratic
values and that support aggressive wars and methods.31
2. The Case of Tablighi Jamaat
19. Tablighi Jamaat, the other organization Ukraine refers to in the Memorial, was declared as
an extremist organization and its activities banned by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
in 2009, long before the 2014 events and the measures Ukraine takes issue with.32 Prior to the
imposition of such restrictions on this organization in Russia, some of the western intelligence
authorities had already expressed their substantive concerns on Tablighi Jamaat as an Al-Qaeda’s
major secret recruitment agency, which adopted an extremely radical interpretation of Sunni
27 ECtHR, Hizb ut-Tahrir and others v. Germany, Application No. 31098/08, Decision, 12 June 2012, para. 74.
28 According to Article 17, on “Prohibition of abuse of rights”: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction
of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.” (Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 11 April
1950).
29 ECtHR, Hizb ut-Tahrir and others v. Germany, Application No. 31098/08, Decision, 12 June 2012, para. 78.
30 ECtHR, Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, Applications nos. 26261/05 and 26377/06, Judgment, 14 March
2013, paras. 106-114.
31 ECtHR, Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, Applications nos. 26261/05 and 26377/06, Judgment, 14 March
2013, para. 105.
32 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. GKPI 09-525, Decision, 7 May 2009 (Annex 126),
recognizing Tablighi Jamaat as an extremist organization and forbidding its activities in Russia.
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Islam.33 Having cooperated with Al-Qaeda as early as the 1980’s, Tablighi Jamaat is also thought
to maintain close links with other extremist and terrorist active organizations, such as Harkat ul-
Mujahideen, which is banned in countries such as India, the United Kingdom and the United States
and is included in the sanctions list of the United Nations, and with Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami,
which is also included in the UN sanctions list and is said to have been financially involved in the
9/11 terrorist attacks.34
20. The prohibition of organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat long predates
2014 and the measures Ukraine complains of in the present case. Any person involved in a
prohibited, extremist, terrorist organization breaches the law and is liable to prosecution. It is the
same for every citizen. It should be emphasized that these bans equally apply everywhere on the
territory of the Russian Federation.35 This is evidenced, inter alia, by the fact that members of such
organisations are criminally prosecuted in equal manner and without any double standards not only
in Crimea, but in other regions of Russia as well.36
21. It is evident from the objectives and activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat that
their realization poses a direct threat to public order and safety, the integrity and legal order of the
Russian Federation, which are legitimate and lawful basis under Russian and international law for
declaring an organization to be extremist and prohibit its activities. Fighting against organizations
such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat does not entail targeting of Crimean Tatars as an ethnic
group, the majority of whom traditionally follow a moderate form of Islam, as Ukraine itself
admits.37 The Russian Federation has publicly expressed its opposition to any form of
discrimination, including targeting based on the Islamic faith.38
22. Ukraine considers that Hizb ut-Tahrir does not publicly advocate for violence as a means to
reach its objectives and that it is not banned in Ukraine or in other countries. Non-violence is not
what a mere look at Hizb ut-Tahrir’s website suggests, which is replete with heinous, pejorative and
33 The Telegraph, “Army of darkness”, 20 August 2006, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1526793/Army-ofdarkness
html (Annex 852). For a detailed account of the history and ideological bases of the organization, see Expert
Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel, 21 June 2021 (Annex 22), paras. 326-349.
34 Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel, 21 June 2021 (Annex 22), para. 345.
35 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. GKPI 03-116, Decision, 14 February 2003 (Annex 119);
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. GKPI 09-525, Decision, 7 May 2009 (Annex 126), recognizing
Tablighi Jamaat as an extremist organization and forbidding its activities in Russia.
36 See, for instance, Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 5-004-227, Decision, 13 January 2005
(Annex 120), Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 5-APU14-78, Apellate Decision, 11 December 2014
(Annex 202), Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 92-APU15-4, Appellate Decision, 26 May 2015
(Annex 237), Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 9-APU15-17, Appellate Decision, 7 October 2015
(Annex 248), Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 201-APU15-17, Appellate Decision, 24 December
2015 (Annex 263).
37 MU, para. 581.
38 Statement of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Working Meeting of OSCE to Review the
Implementation of Human Dimension Commitments (Warsaw, 16-27 September 2019), Doc. HDIM.DEL/0576/19/EN,
27 September 2019 (Annex 490), HDIM.DEL/0576/19/EN, p. 2.
Appendix B
197
offensive language.39 In any event, openly admitting and promoting the use of violence is not a
necessary prerequisite for identifying an organization as violent, extremist or terrorist, nor is the
absence of any admission of violence – or even the express rejection thereof – an unmistakable sign
that the organization is indeed peaceful. In this regard, the ECHR rejected Hizb ut-Tahrir’s
argument that it had formally accepted peaceful methods and found that organization to be
extremist based on its actual deeds as reviewed by the German Federal Administrative Court.40
23. Nor is Ukraine’s own treatment of Hizb ut-Tahrir relevant since countries other than Russia
have also banned Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the ECtHR has accepted that measures of this sort against
Hizb ut-Tahrir do not violate the ECHR.
24. It may also be added that what Ukraine terms as “activism” for the purpose of its pleadings
also include violent and extremist acts that are prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation
as in Ukraine. The Russian Federation has no doubt that such acts would not be tolerated by any
democratic society. This is the case for example of the Automaidan, which is a pro-Ukrainian selfstyled
group of motorists in Ukraine that oppose the rule of law and police public order operations
against demonstrators: in principle they carry out illegal activities and cannot invoke in Ukraine any
right to peaceful gathering.41 Ukraine cannot at the same time consider that it has the right to
prohibit such activities and that Russia is not allowed to do it.
25. The enforcement of the ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat by the law enforcement
authorities necessarily involves operations such as searches of suspects that, based on their results,
may lead to detention and questioning. The main legal basis for undertaking searches is suspicion of
membership in the organization itself. In particular, Article 282.2 of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation, entitled “organizing the activities of an extremist organization”, provides
liability for any participation in an organization that has been banned as extremist.42 Article 205
specifically provides for conditions of liability in relation to terrorist activities. The seizure of
extremist literature or weapons during the search may constitute indicia or even aggravating factors
pointing to the possible preparation of violent action, taken together with other relevant
circumstances.
39 See for instance Media Office of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Wilayah, "Neither America, nor Russia, nor Europe, Trusting
these Kuffar is a Political and Military Suicide!", 29 February 2020 (Annex 1274).
40 ECtHR, Hizb ut-Tahrir and others v. Germany, Application No. 31098/08, Decision, 12 June 2012, paras. 67-70
and 73-74.
41 MU, footnote 827, referring to Iryna Stelmakh and Claire Bigg, RFE/RL, "Activists on Wheels: Ukraine`s
Embattled Automaidan Protesters", 24 January 2014 (Annex 1035 to MU).
42 According to Article 1(1) of Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On Counteracting Extremist Activities”, 25 July 2002
(Annex 876 to MU), terrorism is one of the forms of extremism.
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198
II. The Lawful, Objective, and Reasonable Grounds of the Measures
Ukraine Complains of
A. ALLEGED SEARCHES OF HOMES OF CRIMEAN TATARS
26. The first series of alleged measures Ukraine complains of cover searches of homes of
Crimean Tatars.43
27. Ukraine shoehorns a number of unconnected instances of searches by Russian authorities on
private premises into its brief section on “searches of homes of Crimean Tatars”. Ukraine has put
no primary evidence of the searches in question before the Court. In fact, Ukraine does not even
identify – or indeed appear to be aware of the identity of – most of the individuals who it claims to
have suffered grievances. Nor do the “reports” on which Ukraine relies provide further particulars,
or specify the sources of their factual allegations. Ukraine’s claims are thus unsubstantiated.
28. In these circumstances, Russia expended its best efforts to ascertain which events Ukraine
refers to in particular. It fully reserves its rights to bring further evidence to the Court’s attention at
a later stage of the proceedings as may be appropriate.
1. The Case of Mr Ibraim Ibragimov
29. The first home search mentioned by Ukraine took place on 28 August 2014 in
Bakhchisaray.44 The search in question, on the premises of Mr Ibraim Ibragimov, was conducted in
the context of criminal proceedings opened on 9 June 2014 and concerning goods stolen from
another resident of Bakhchisaray.45 The search itself was duly authorized by a Russian court, which
thoroughly considered the circumstances of the criminal investigation and decided that there was a
justified suspicion that the stolen goods could be found at Mr Ibragimov’s home.46 A reasonable
suspicion to that effect provides sufficient basis to conduct searches in human rights law.47 Contrary
to Ukraine’s insinuations, in addition to extremist literature, firearm and ammunition were found in
the course of this search, which resulted in the commencement of further investigations48 and
eventually the opening of another criminal case for illegal possession of a firearm.49
43 MU, paras. 444-449.
44 MU, para. 444, fn. 940.
45 Acting Investigator of the Investigative Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea,
Resolution on the initiation of a criminal case, 9 June 2014 (Annex 151).
46 Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Ruling authorizing the search in Mr Ibragimov’s house, 25
August 2014 (Annex 171).
47 ECtHR, Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 4158/05, Judgment, 12 January 2010, paras.
83-86.
48 Lead Investigator of the Centre for Countering Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of
Crimea, Record of search in Mr Ibragimov`s house, 28 August 2014 (Annex 172), describing the results of the search;
Explanatory note of M.I. Yamkova, witness to the search conducted at Mr Ibragimov’s house, 3 September 2014
Appendix B
199
30. The literature of extremist nature that was discovered during the search in Ibraim
Ibragimov’s home50 was recognized as extremist by the Russian courts long before the events of
2014. For instance, “Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Call” and “General Perception of Islam” were recognized as
extremist in 2010,51 the “Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Program” in 2009,52 and “Democracy: The System of
Disbelief”, “Islamic State” and the “Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Political Concept” in 2007.53 In this like in
other cases where Ukraine erroneously refers to the publications seized as mere “religious
literature”,54 the overwhelming majority of such publications originates or claims inspiration from
the same author, Mr Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-1977), who is the founder and ideologist of Hizb
ut-Tahrir.55 As already mentioned, Hizb ut-Tahrir itself was deemed to be a terrorist organization as
early as 2003.
2. Home Searches of September 2014
31. The second category of “home searches” singled out in Ukraine’s Memorial took place in
September 2014.56 Except for the cases of Mr Eskender Bariiev and Mr Mustafa Asaba,57 Ukraine
provides no further details of these alleged “incidents”, nor as to the factual basis of its proposition
that the premises in question belonged to Crimean Tatar individuals. Besides, Ukraine’s record is
contradictory and fails to establish a proper factual account.58 Upon inquiry, the Russian
Federation’s law enforcement authorities have identified a number of searches conducted in
September 2014. If these are indeed the measures Ukraine purported to challenge in these
(Annex 174), describing the results of the search; Explanatory note of R.Sh. Sarasha, witness to the search conducted at
Mr Ibragimov’s house, 3 September 2014 (Annex 175), describing the results of the search.
49 Inquiry officer of the Inquiry Department of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the
Bakhchisaray District, Resolution on the initiation of a criminal case, 8 December 2014 (Annex 200).
50 Lead Investigator of the Centre for Countering Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of
Crimea, Record of search in Mr Ibragimov`s house, 28 August 2014 (Annex 172).
51 Moskovskiy District Court of Kazan of the Republic of Tatarstan, Case No. 2-320/10, Decision, 17 September
2010 (Annex 131); Maykop City Court of the Republic of Adygeya, Case No. 2-2/2010, Decision, 24 November 2010
(Annex 133).
52 Kalininskiy District Court of Ufa of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Decision, 29 July 2009 (Annex 127).
53 Tuimazinsky District Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Case No. 2-1508/2007, Decision, 5 September 2007
(Annex 123).
54 MU, para. 445.
55 Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel, 21 June 2021 (Annex 22), para. 350. For an analysis of the openly
violent, intolerant and hateful ideology proselytized by some of these books, see Ibid., paras. 352-368;
Mukhametzaripov’s Expert Report, pp. 45-69.
56 MU, para. 444, fns. 940-941.
57 MU, para. 423.
58 In particular, Ukraine relies on Witness Statement of Eskender Bariiev, 6 June 2018 (Annex 15 to MU) and a
report of Human Rights Watch, “Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea” (Annex 943 to MU) of November 2014.
Mr Bariiev allegedly declared to Human Rights Watch that a group of approximately 15 men came to his home to
participate in the search, which lasted for 2 hours (Annex 943 to MU, p. 16). By contrast, Mr Bariiev now claims in his
Statement that 8 people came to his home to take part in the search, including witnesses, and that the search lasted for 4
hours (Annex 15 to MU, para. 28).
Appendix B
200
proceedings, the relevant procedural record confirms that these measures were entirely appropriate
and justified in the circumstances, as further explained below.
32. The searches were part of criminal proceedings59 concerning the violent attack on law
enforcement authorities that had been carried out at the border on 3 May 2014 by a group of
individuals, at the instigation of Mr Chubarov, which is described elsewhere in the present
submissions.60 The courts authorising the searches carefully assessed the submissions by law
enforcement authorities, and concluded that the authorities had sufficient grounds to conclude that
the premises in question may “store weapons and ammunition, objects excluded from civil use” and
that “objects of potential importance to [a] criminal case might be located at the indicated address
which makes it necessary to conduct the search of the living premises”.61 Thus, contrary to
Ukraine’s misleading portrayal of the facts,62 the search was not limited to weapons but extended to
any objects of potential relevance for the investigation. Ukraine has adduced no evidence which
would cast into doubt these elements. It is also important to point out that Russian authorities had
every reason to investigate Mr Mustafa Dzhemilev’s potential affiliates, including within the Mejlis,
who may have been involved in the aforementioned violent border incident. To recall, the riots of 3
May 2014 originated from an unauthorized public event called by the Mejlis.63
33. As for Ukraine’s allegations concerning “a 10 September 2014 search of two Crimean Tatar
homes in the village Kamenka (Leninskiy district)”,64 this case bears no signs of racial or any other
discrimination as well. In September 2014, Russian investigative authorities conducted a number of
59 Investigative Department for the city of Armyansk of the Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee
of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea, Resolution on the initiation of a criminal case No. 2014687003,
4 May 2014 (Annex 138).
60 As described in Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision, 26 April 2016 (Annex
913 to MU), p. 2. See Chapter IV, para. 166.
61 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/6-336/2014, Ruling authorizing the search in Mr Bariev`s
house, 3 September 2014 (Annex 176); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/6-342/2014, Ruling
authorizing the search in Mr Asaba`s house, 3 September 2014 (Annex 177); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol,
Case No. 3/6-331/2014, Ruling authorizing the search in Mr. Ablaev`s house, 3 September 2014 (Annex 178); Kievskiy
District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/6-337/2014, Ruling authorizing the search in Ms. Bogutskaya`s house
(Lozovoye villiage), 3 September 2014 (Annex 179); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/6-335/2014,
Ruling authorizing the search in Ms. Bogutskaya`s house (Mirnoye villiage), 3 September 2014 (Annex 180); Kievskiy
District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/6-330/2014, Ruling authorizing the search in Mr. Paralamov`s house,
3 September 2014 (Annex 181); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/6-339/2014, Ruling authorizing the
search in Mr. Salmanov`s house, 3 September 2014 (Annex 182); and Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No.
3/6-340/2014, Ruling authorizing the search in Mr. Hairedinov`s house, 3 September 2014 (Annex 183), p. 1,
paras. 4, 9. The later searches conducted at Mr Asaba’s home in April 2015 and mentioned in Witness Statement of
Eskender Bariiev, 6 June 2018 (Annex 15 to MU), para. 29, relates to the entirely distinct case of the riots that occurred
on 26 February 2014, as Mr Bariiev himself admits; see Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/6-266/2015,
Ruling authorizing the search in Mr. Asaba`s house, 10 April 2015 (Annex 226).
62 MU, para. 444.
63 Website of the Mejlis, Resolution of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people “On the situation regarding the
Russian official travel ban for Mustafa Dzhemilev, prohibiting Dzhemilev from entering his native land — Crimea”,
2 May 2014 (Annex 1251). See also Chapter IV, para. 167, fn. 341.
64 MU, para. 444, fns. 940-941.
Appendix B
201
inquiries regarding illegal arms trafficking, within the framework of which two Kamenskoe village
residents were questioned and their homes inspected.65 During the inspection, one of the residents
voluntarily handed an unregistered firearm to the authorities. This fact did not lead to his or the
other resident’s detainment or criminal prosecution and neither of the residents had any complaints
regarding the authorities’ actions.66 The notebooks and other seized items, which Ukraine mentions,
were in fact returned shortly after the inspection.67
3. Home Searches of 12 October 2016
34. Ukraine’s third allegation relates to a number of supposedly “arbitrary” home searches that
are said to have taken place two years later, on 12 October 2016.68 Far from being arbitrary, a
number of searches were carried out within the framework of a criminal case initiated on 11
October 2016 against several individuals for organizing and participating in activities of Hizb ut-
Tahrir,69 a terrorist organization banned in numerous jurisdictions, as described above.70
35. The searches carried out within the criminal case in question, as it was established by the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, were duly authorized by the Russian court and were
conducted in the presence of witnesses in full conformity with applicable Russian legislation.71
During the review of the requests for the searches authorization, the court thoroughly considered the
circumstances of the criminal investigation and decided that there was a justified suspicion that the
objects and documents of importance to the investigation can be found at homes of the suspects.72
36. The materials seized in these proceedings were not “religious literature”, as Ukraine
contends,73 but propaganda materials of Hizb ut-Tahrir, i.e., documents replete with incitement of
65 Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol, Letter No. AE 0097952, 15 March 2021 (Annex 643).
66 Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol, Letter No. AE 0097952, 15 March 2021 (Annex 643).
67 Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol, Letter No. AE 0097952, 15 March 2021 (Annex 643). I.I. Ametov, Acknowledgement of receipt of the
seized items, 23 September 2014 (Annex 190).
68 MU, para. 445.
69 Senior Criminal Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Directorate of the Federal Security Service of
Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Resolution on the initiation of criminal case No.
2016427051, 11 October 2016 (Annex 300).
70 See paras. 14-18 above.
71 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 224-APU19-13s, Appellate Decision, 24 December 2019
(Annex 416).
72 See for instance Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/6-593/2016, Ruling authorizing the search in
Mr. Abdullaev’s house, 11 November 2016 (Annex 301).
73 MU, para. 445.
Appendix B
202
hatred, advocating intolerance towards the opponents of the “Caliphate”.74 Respondent notes that
the discovered literature, reflecting and promoting Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology, had been recognized
as extremist by the Russian courts long before the events of 2014, and in a context unrelated to
Crimea, or the position of Crimean Tatars. In particular, the “Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Concept” and the
“Islamic Personality” were recognised as extremist in 2010,75 while the “Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Political
Concept”, the “Basics of the training program in the Islamic State” and the “Islamic State” were
designated as extremist materials in 2007.76 Based on this and other evidence the Russian courts
found the accused guilty of organizing and participating in activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a terrorist
organization banned in Russia, and convicted them to imprisonment.77
37. It results from the above that investigations into Hizb ut-Tahrir do not point to any plausible
case of “racial discrimination” against Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group.78 The ethnicity or
national background of individuals is clearly entirely irrelevant in sanctioning the dissemination of
such materials under Russian law and in international law.
38. For Ukraine, “[a]s the United Nations monitoring mission in Ukraine recently observed,
these intrusive raids of private homes have “disproportionately affected the Crimean Tatars.””79 But
the OHCHR report in question does not point to any evidence to support the allegation that Crimean
Tatar ethnic identity was the reason for the measures taken.
39. In fact the very same paragraph in the report states that “Crimean Tatars were particularly
targeted [by the alleged actions] especially those with links to the Mejlis, which boycotted the
March 2014 referendum and initiated public protests in favour of Crimea remaining a part of
Ukraine”.80 This statement calls for two observations.
40. First, the report merely states but does not establish that the three considerations listed are
indeed reasons that motivated and explain the searches and detentions. By contrast, it does not
74 North Caucasus District Military Court, Decision, 18 June 2019 (Annex 412); Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation, Case No. 224-APU19-13s, Appellate Decision, 24 December 2019 (Annex 416).
75 Moskovskiy District Court of Kazan of the Republic of Tatarstan, Case No. 2-320/10, Decision, 17 September
2010 (Annex 131).
76 Tuimazinsky District Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Case No. 2-1508/2007, Decision, 5 September 2007
(Annex 123); Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow, Decision, 26 October 2007 (Annex 124).
77 North Caucasus District Military Court, Decision, 18 June 2019 (Annex 412); Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation, Case No. 224-APU19-13s, Appellate Decision, 24 December 2019 (Annex 416).
78 MU, para. 446.
79 MU, para. 445, fn. 944, quoting OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017) (Annex 759 to
MU), para. 12.
80 MU, para. 445, fn. 944, quoting OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017) (Annex 759 to
MU), para. 12.
Appendix B
203
mention the issue of extremist religious organizations that remain active in the Russian Federation
despite their having been banned by the authorities.
41. Secondly, even if Ukraine’s claim were to be true, as has been abundantly shown in Chapter
IV of the Counter-Memorial, the violent and extremist activities of the Mejlis and its leaders
justified the ban. These activities resulted in the imposition of legitimate limitations on the exercise
of human rights, including searches and questionings of Mejlis individual members.
42. In these like in all other cases in this Appendix, the record indisputably shows that the
searches and detentions were not based on the Crimean Tatar ethnic identity of the suspects, but on
suspicions of their being involved in illegal activities including with various banned extremist or
terrorist organizations, in particular the Mejlis, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat.
4. The Case of Mr Marlen Mustafayev
43. Ukraine’s fourth allegation refers to the case of Crimean Tatar activist Marlen Mustafayev
whose home was allegedly searched by the authorities on 21 February 2017.81 The documents relied
on by Ukraine confirm that the measures taken had a legitimate basis as he was suspected of
extremist activity.82
44. The administrative escorting and detention of Mr Mustafayev were part of proceedings
against Mr Mustafayev concerning the dissemination of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s propaganda on social
media,83 an administrative offence under Article 20.3(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of
the Russian Federation. He was subsequently charged and convicted by Russian courts for the
public dissemination of the symbols of the terrorist organization, and sentenced to 11 days of
administrative arrest.84 Notably, in 2018, Mr Mustafayev pleaded guilty to committing actions
directed at incitement of hatred and enmity against other people on radical religious grounds.85
45. Ukraine also complains that certain other individuals – whom Ukraine again simply labels
“Crimean Tatars” without any further specifications – were detained and sanctioned for their
interference with the authorities’ activities.86 On the basis of the factual circumstances of the case,
81 MU, para. 446.
82 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2017) (Annex 774 to MU),
para. 144; RFE/RL, "Russia Detains 11 Crimean Tatars", 22 February 2017 (Annex 1064 to MU).
83 Chief Operative Investigator of the Centre for Countering Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the
Republic of Crimea, Report on discovery of the publication of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s symbols by Mr Mustafayev on a social
network Vkontakte, 9 January 2017 (Annex 305); Chief Operative Investigator of the Centre for Countering Extremism
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea, Certificate of inspection of the Internet resource,
9 January 2017 (Annex 306).
84 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 5-479/2017, Decision, 21 February 2017 (Annex 321); Supreme
Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-505/2017, Decision, 1 March 2017 (Annex 322).
85 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Decision, 1 October 2018 (Annex 405).
86 MU, para. 446.
Appendix B
204
witness statements, video footage and other evidence, the court found the above-mentioned activists
to have committed the offence of participation in a mass gathering leading to public nuisance under
Article 20.2.2(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation and convicted
them to five days of administrative arrest. It found in particular that the individuals in question
disrupted public order, impeded the movement of civilians and prevented law enforcement officials
from performing their duties, while also disobeying the latter’s legitimate orders and repeatedly
ignoring their warnings.87 Again, these cases have nothing to do with CERD and racial
discrimination.
5. Home Searches in January 2018
46. As a fifth assertion, Ukraine alleges that “all nine house searches conducted in Crimea in the
month of January 2018 were of houses of Crimean Tatars”.88 Ukraine’s point of reference in this
regard is a slideshow authored by a so-called “Crimean Tatar Resource Center”.89
47. There are a number of circumstances undermining the reliability of this “data set”.
Mr Bariiev himself is acting “Head of the Board” of the Center. The Center receives substantial
funding from the United States Embassy to Ukraine and it openly supports Ukraine’s territorial
87 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 5-483/2017, Decision, 21 February 2017 (Annex 310), Supreme
Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-504/2017, Decision, 2 March 2017 (Annex 323); Kievskiy District Court
of Simferopol, Case No. 5-484/2017, Decision, 21 February 2017 (Annex 311), Supreme Court of the Republic of
Crimea, Case No. 12-508/2017, Decision, 2 March 2017 (Annex 324); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No.
5-489/2017, Decision, 21 February 2017 (Annex 312), Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-
513/2017, Decision, 2 March 2017 (Annex 325); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 5-488/2017,
Decision, 21 February 2017 (Annex 313) Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 5-488/2017, Ruling on
correcting a typo, 21 February 2017 (Annex 314) Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-506/2017,
Decision, 2 March 2017 (Annex 326); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 5-487/2017, Decision, 21
February 2017 (Annex 315), Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-511/2017, Decision, 2 March 2017
(Annex 327); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 5-485/2017, Decision, 21 February 2017 (Annex 316),
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-509/2017, Decision, 2 March 2017 (Annex 328); Kievskiy
District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 5-480/2017, Decision, 21 February 2017 (Annex 317), Supreme Court of the
Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-503/2017, Decision, 2 March 2017 (Annex 329); Kievskiy District Court of
Simferopol, Case No. 5-482/2017, Decision, 21 February 2017 (Annex 318), Supreme Court of the Russian Federation,
Case No. 12-569/2017, Decision, 25 April 2017 (Annex 332); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 5-
481/2017, Decision, 21 February 2017 (Annex 319), Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-570/2017,
Decision, 6 April 2017 (Annex 331) and Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 5-486/2017, Decision, 21
February 2017 (Annex 320), Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-512/2017, Decision, 2 March 2017
(Annex 330). All the accused were sentenced each to 5 days of administrative arrest. The appeals lodged were
dismissed.
88 MU, para. 446. This assertion is logically unrelated to the rest of the paragraph that contains it, which confirms the
erratic character of Ukraine’s narrative.
89 MU, para. 446, referring to Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Analysis of Human Rights Violations in the Occupied
Crimea over January 2018 (presentation), 15 February 2018 (Annex 971 to MU), p. 5 of the pdf file.
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claims against the Russian Federation.90 For all intents and purposes, the publications of this
organization must be considered with extreme caution.
48. In any event, the Russian Federation has applied its best efforts to ascertain the
circumstances of the searches that took place in January 2018. The Center’s “report” appears to
refer to searches that have affected Mr Girai Kulametov, Mr Kemal Saityaev, Mr Enver Krosh and
Mr Ebazer Islyamov.91 These proceedings concerned, yet again, investigations into Hizb ut-Tahrir’s
activities. All of the above individuals were eventually found guilty and convicted for the
dissemination of the symbols of Hizb ut-Tahrir or other extremist materials.92 Searches were
conducted at their homes on account of a reasonable suspicion of their involvement in public
incitement to terrorist activity, incitement of hatred and enmity against other people, as well as
participation in the activity of a terrorist organization, acts that are regarded as crimes under
Articles 205.2, 205.5 and 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.93 In particular, every
search was duly authorized by the court in order to verify the investigative authorities’ reasonable
suspicions of involvement of Messrs Kulametov, Saityaev, Krosh and Islyamov in such criminal
conduct.
6. Home Searches and Arrests of 2 October 2017
49. Sixth, Ukraine refers to the house search and arrest of four Crimean Tatars on 2 October
2017 for engaging into extremist activities, being suspected members of Tablighi Jamaat,94 a
radical Muslim organization that was declared extremist and banned by the Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation in 2009.95 On 2 October 2017, searches were conducted at the premises of four
individuals, where a substantial amount of extremist literature was found.96 The suspects were
90 Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Annual report, 2019,
https://ctrcenter.org/upload files/Annual%20report 2019.pdf?fs=41108c6d6f116f4b894e92448fa77c98, p. 4-6, 28.
91 MU, para. 446, referring to Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Analysis of Human Rights Violations in the Occupied
Crimea over January 2018 (presentation), 15 February 2018 (Annex 971 to MU), p. 5 of the pdf file.
92 Kirovskое District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Сase No. 5-11/18, Decision, 18 January 2018 (Annex 389);
Nizhnegorskiy District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-12/2018, Decision, 25 January 2018 (Annex 392);
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-217/2018, Decision, 20 March 2018 (Annex 397);
Dzhankoyskiy District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-49/2018, Decision, 25 January 2018 (Annex 393);
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-202/2018, Decision, 31 January 2018 (Annex 394); Belogorsk
District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-32/2018, Decision, 18 January 2018 (Annex 390).
93 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Resolution No. 735, 16 January 2018 (Annex 385) (authorizing
Mr Kulametov’s house search); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Resolution No. 736, 16 January 2018 (Annex
387) (authorizing Mr Saityaev’s house search); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Resolution No. 738, 16 January
2018 (Annex 386) (authorizing Mr Krosh’s house search) and Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Resolution No.
739, 16 January 2018 (Annex 388) (authorizing Mr Islyamov’s house search).
94 MU, para. 447, relying on OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 August - 15 November
2017) (Annex 776 to MU), para. 136 and footnote 218.
95 See para. 19 above.
96 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 1-1/2019, Decision, 22 January 2019 (Annex 407), which
provides a summary of the offences committed by the individuals in question; Norilsk City Court of the Krasnoyarsk
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subsequently found to have held meetings of their cell, disseminated extremist materials and
encouraged people to join Tablighi Jamaat and were convicted based on Article 282.2 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.97 In the course of the proceedings, three out of four
accused pleaded guilty and confessed that they were aware of the restrictions and prohibitions,
proceeding with their activities regardless, whereas one of the accused made a partial admission.98
Most importantly for the present purposes, similar proceedings concerning Tablighi Jamaat have
been conducted broadly in the same period in other regions of the Russian Federation that are not
characterized as being inhabited by Crimean Tatars.99 This circumstance contradicts any suggestion
that these measures would have been targeted at Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group. Instead of
racial discrimination or a pretextual motive, this episode points once again to legitimate and lawful
basis for the measures carried out by the law enforcement authorities, as explained previously.100
Krai, Case No. 2-3545/2014, Decision, 29 December 2014 (Annex 206) (on the recognition of “The Values of
Ramazan” as an extremist literature); Abakan City Court of the Republic of Khakassia, Case. No. 2-3563/2009,
Decision, 11 August 2009 (Annex 129) (on the recognition of “The Values of Tablighi” as an extremist literature);
Pervouralsk City Court of the Sverdlovsk Region, Case No. A-235(2-259)2015, Decision, 16 February 2015 (Annex
217) (on the recognition of “The Values of Zikr” as an extremist literature); Kurgan City Court of the Kurgan Region,
Case No. 2-3782/15, Decision, 6 April 2015 (Annex 225) (on the recognition of “The Fortress of the Muslim. From the
words of remembrance of Allah, found in the Qur'an and Sunnah” as an extremist literature); Buguruslan City Court of
the Orenburg Region, Case. No. 554/07g, Decision, 6 August 2007 (Annex 122) (on the recognition of “The
Fundamentals of the Islam” as an extremist literature); Petukhovsky District Court of the Kurgan Region, Case No. 2-
625/2014, Decision, 16 December 2014 (Annex 203) (on the recognition of “Abu Bakar As-Siddiq. The first righteous
Caliph” as an extremist literature); Uspenskiy District Court of the Krasnodar Krai, Case No. 2-161/2009, Decision,
4 August 2009 (Annex 128) (on the recognition of “The Personality of the Muslim as Defined in Islam through Qur'an
and Sunnah” as an extremist literature); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 2-1201/2016, Decision,
9 February 2016 (Annex 267) (on the recognition of “The beliefs of the four imams” as an extremist literature);
Sovetskiy District Court of Ulan-Ude, Case No. 2-3635/16, Decision, 22 August 2016 (Annex 295) (on the recognition
of “The Fortress of the Muslim. Prayers to Allah. Treatment with spells, found in the Qur'an and Sunnah” as an
extremist literature); Ussuriysk District Court of the Primorskiy Krai, Case. No. 2-5588/2014, Decision, 31 July 2014
(Annex 165) (on the recognition of “Call”, “Three fundamentals”, “Islam is the reality”, “Muhammad in the Bible”,
“The Pearl of faith” as an extremist literature); Kotelnich District Court of the Kirov Region, Case No. 2-396/2015,
Decision, 16 April 2015 (Annex 227) (on the recognition of “Interpretation of the beautiful names of Allah in the light
of the Qur'an and Sunnah”, “The Boundary of the prayer” as an extremist literature); Kirovskiy District Court of Ufa of
the Republic of Bashkortostan, Case No. 2-900/2017, Decision, 1 February 2017 (Annex 308) (on the recognition of
“The Selected Hadiths” as an extremist literature); Sol-Iletsk District Court of the Orenburg Region, Decision, 20 April
2010 (Annex 130) (on the recognition of “The Virtues of Salaat” and “Faza’il-e-Amal” as an extremist literature).
97 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 1-1/2019, Decision, 22 January 2019 (Annex 407), which
provides a summary of the offences committed by Messrs Suleymanov, Abdurakhmanov, Kurbedinov, and Mustafaev.
98 Ibid.
99 Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of Barnaul of the Altai Krai, Case No. 1-112/2018, Decision, 21 February 2018
(Annex 396); Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Barnaul, Case No. 1-242/16, Decision, 26 July 2017 (Annex 336);
Chekmagush Interdistrict Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Case No. 1-3/2017, Decision, 30 June 2017 (Annex
334).
100 See paras. 19 and 21 above.
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207
7. Home Searches and Detentions of 11 October 2017
50. Lastly, Ukraine presents an equally misleading account of home searches and detentions
which allegedly took place on 11 October 2017, and that are suggested to be arbitrary or
pretextual.101 Ukraine refers to the “arrest of six Crimean Tatar men” and proceedings concerning
certain activists. This represents another example of proceedings concerning suspected activities in
relation to Hizb ut-Tahrir. A number of individuals were detained as part of a criminal investigation
that had been opened on 9 October 2017.102 They were suspected of having organized a terrorist cell
linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bakhchisaray. Individuals implicated in the underlying offences were
found to have taken part in conspiracy gatherings, during which they studied the ideology of this
terrorist organization, developed and adjusted further plans, goals and objectives of cell’s activity in
the region and induced citizens to take part in this terrorist organization’s activity.103 It is clear from
the court decisions that the above finding was based on the assessment of extensive factual
evidence, including expert findings, and thus rested on legitimate and lawful grounds.104 All this
suggests that the detentions were well-founded, justified, and relied on prior elements of
information. Beyond the speculative assertion that the above measure would point to a “pretext for
discrimination”,105 Ukraine remains silent on the findings of Russian courts.
51. As for the other activists, whose administrative prosecution Ukraine mentions,106 it is
important to point out that they were charged before the court with participation in a mass gathering
that lead to public nuisance, an offence prohibited in Russia and punishable by up to 15 days’
101 MU, para. 448, relying on OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 August - 15 November
2017) (Annex 776 to MU), para. 137.
102 Investigative Department of the Federal Security Service Directorate of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the
City of Sevastopol, Case No. 11707350001427055, Record of detention, 11 October 2017 (Annex 352); Investigative
Department of the Federal Security Service Directorate of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol, Case No. 11707350001427055, Record of detention, 11 October 2017 (Annex 353); Investigative
Department of the Federal Security Service Directorate of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol, Case No. 11707350001427055, Record of detention, 11 October 2017 (Annex 354); Investigative
Department of the Federal Security Service Directorate of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol, Case No. 11707350001427055, Record of detention, 11 October 2017 (Annex 355); Investigative
Department of the Federal Security Service Directorate of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol, Case No. 11707350001427055, Record of detention, 11 October 2017 (Annex 356).
103 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/1-274/2017, Ruling, 12 October 2017 (Annex 365); Kievskiy
District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/1-271/2017, Ruling, 12 October 2017 (Annex 366), Kievskiy District Court of
Simferopol, Case No. 3/1-273/2017, Ruling, 12 October 2017 (Annex 367); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol,
Case No. 3/1-275/2017, Ruling, 12 October 2017 (Annex 368) and Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No.
3/1-272/2017, Ruling, 12 October 2017 (Annex 369), p. 2.
104 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/1-274/2017, Ruling, 12 October 2017 (Annex 365); Kievskiy
District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/1-271/2017, Ruling, 12 October 2017 (Annex 366); Kievskiy District Court of
Simferopol, Case No. 3/1-273/2017, Ruling, 12 October 2017 (Annex 367); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol,
Case No. 3/1-275/2017, Ruling, 12 October 2017 (Annex 368); Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Case No. 3/1-
272/2017, Ruling, 12 October 2017 (Annex 369), p. 2.
105 MU, para. 449.
106 MU, para. 448.
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208
administrative arrest under Article 20.2.2(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian
Federation.107 On the basis of the factual circumstances of the case, witness statements, video
footage and other evidence, the court found the above-mentioned activists liable of the
aforementioned offence and imposed fines because, contrary to Ukraine’s assertion, it was satisfied
that the implicated individuals disrupted public order, impeded the movement of civilians and
prevented law enforcement officials from doing their work.108
B. ALLEGED RAIDS IN PUBLIC SPACES TARGETING CRIMEAN TATARS
52. Lawful grounds and legitimate reasons also explain the second set of law-enforcement
measures that Ukraine portrays – on the basis of nothing more than second-hand, untested
information – as alleged “raids in public spaces targeting Crimean Tatars”.109 Here again, the record
shows that these allegations have nothing to do with racial discrimination.
1. Measures at the Café “Bagdad”, Pionerskoe, 1 April 2016
53. Ukraine contends: “On 1 April 2016, for example, a group of armed and masked individuals
entered a café in the village of Pionerske (Simferopol district) and began destroying furniture,
allegedly in search of drugs. In connection with this search, dozens of Crimean Tatars were
detained at the Simferopol police’s Centre for Countering Extremism, where they were interrogated,
107 Code on Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation, No. 195-FZ, 30 December 2001 (Annex 41), Article
20.2.2(1).
108 Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-354/2017, Decision, 11 October 2017 (Annex
357), Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-1243/2017, Decision, 27 October 2017 (Annex 372);
Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-356/2017, Decision, 11 October 2017 (Annex 358),
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-1240/2017, Decision, 7 November 2017 (Annex 378);
Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-362/2017, Decision, 11 October 2017 (Annex 359),
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-1247/2017, Decision, 7 November 2017 (Annex 379);
Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-357/2017, Decision, 12 October 2017 (Annex 370),
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-1242/2017, Decision, 1 November 2017 (Annex 375);
Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-361/2017, Decision, 11 October 2017 (Annex 360),
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-1245/2017, Decision, 1 November 2017 (Annex 376);
Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-359/2017, Decision, 11 October 2017 (Annex 361),
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-1241/2017, Decision, 27 October 2017 (Annex 373);
Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-355/2017, Decision, 11 October 2017 (Annex 362),
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-1246/2017, Decision, 27 October 2017 (Annex 374);
Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-358/2017, Decision, 11 October 2017 (Annex 363),
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-1239/2017, Decision, 1 November 2017 (Annex 377) and
Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-360/2017, Decision, 11 October 2017 (Annex 364),
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-1244/2017, Decision, 7 November 2017 (Annex 380).
109 MU, para. 450-454.
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209
photographed, and required to provide DNA samples and fingerprints.”110 It alleges that in this
episode like in others, “Crimean Tatars have particularly been targeted”.111
54. The OHCHR report Ukraine relies on indicates that it was compiled based on work in Kiev
and through “contacts”.112 Russia submits that, as a matter of principle and as already made clear,113
absent further clarification as to the sources of such reports, they lack evidentiary value, and their
content in relation to the events in question cannot be relied upon.
55. That being said, even if it was possible to rely on this OHCHR report, it contradicts
Ukraine’s version of events. The report repeatedly indicates that the real reason and context of the
operation is the search for suspects as part of defined preventive operations to combat religious
extremism, which Ukraine avoids to mention. In this regard the report states that, during their
detention at the Center for Countering Extremism, the suspects were “asked what form of Islam
they followed and what mosque they attended. […] They reported seeing other Muslim men –
Chechens, Dagestanis, Azeris – who had previously been detained. […] Attempts were reportedly
made to recruit some as police informants. The Crimean ‘prosecutor’ declared on 2 April 2016 that
actions of a ‘preventive’ character had been conducted in various night clubs and places of
entertainment in the peninsula, stating that the police were looking for people who appeared in
various ‘wanted’ lists.”114 Again, this points to a lawful and legitimate basis for the measures.
56. In fact, the 1 April 2016 operation was part of an ordinary preventive operation, conducted
by officers of the Crimean offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Drug Control
Service, and the Federal Migration Service and was aimed in particular at combatting illegal drugs
circulation and countering illegal migration.115 In early 2016, i.e., in the period preceding the
measure in question, there had been a noticeable increase in number of registered crimes as
110 MU, para. 450.
111 MU, para. 450.
112 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2016) (Annex 771 to MU),
para. 183, para. 8.
113 See Counter-Memorial, Introduction, paras. 14-17.
114 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2016) (Annex 771 to MU),
para. 183. The other cited document with respect to this set of measures is unspecific and refers to that contained in
Annex 771 to MU: OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017) (Annex 759 to MU), para. 96.
115 Regnum, “Poklonskaya refutes reports of Ukrainian media regarding detentions of Crimean Tatars”, 2 April 2016
(Annex 952). See also Head of the Department of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, Reply No. 27-259-
2016/Оn3727-2016, 22 July 2016 (Annex 288), Head of the Department of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of
Crimea, Reply No. 27-257-2016/Оn3725-2016, 22 July 2016 (Annex 289) and Head of the Department of the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, Reply to No. 27-258-2016/Оn3726-2016, 22 July 2016 (Annex 290).
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210
compared to the same period of the previous year,116 including a large number of crimes related to
circulation of illegal drugs. This explains the authorities’ focus on preventive operations.
57. The Russian Federation attaches to the present submission explanatory statements of several
individuals, who were among allegedly detained persons. These documents confirm that the said
individuals were in fact cooperating with the state officials and answered the questions on a
voluntary basis, without any sign of coercion.117 None of them mentioned that during the operation
officers would have destroyed furniture or demonstrated any aggressive behaviour – and none of
them claimed that they were targeted on an ethnic basis. Generally speaking, individuals affected by
such drug prevention operations include Russians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and other ethnic
groups.118 Thus, the ethnic identity of the checked individuals was clearly immaterial to these
measures.
2. The Operation “Barrier-2015”, April 2015
58. Ukraine’s second contention on “public raids” alleges the imposition by the Russian
Federation of “blockades around towns” as well as searches and “full or random checks” of passing
individuals in April 2015, qualifying them as “arbitrary”.119 Ukraine however fails to mention the
nature and context of these measures.
59. In fact, in April 2015, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted a large-scale
strategic training exercise under the theme “use of forces in the circumstances of deteriorating
operational environment in the regions of the Russian Federation” and entitled “Zaslon-2015” (the
“Barrier-2015”).120 No claims or complaints in relation to any actions undertaken by the Russian
authorities during the course of the exercise in question have been filed.121 It is striking that Ukraine
omits to mention such an essential fact.
116 Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea official website, Information on criminal environment in
Crimea for the period from January to March 2016 (Annex 465) showing an increase in number of registered crimes
and reflecting a large number of crimes related to illegal drugs circulation.
117 Explanation, 13 July 2016 (Annex 284), Explanation, 14 July 2016 (Annex 285), Explanation, 14 July 2016
(Annex 286) (describing circumstances of the MIA’s preventive operation in café “Bagdad” on 1 April 2016 and the
consequent questioning).
118 Regnum, “Poklonskaya refutes reports of Ukrainian media regarding detentions of Crimean Tatars”, 2 April 2016
(Annex 952).
119 MU, para. 451.
120 Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation official website, “The internal troops of the Russian
Ministry of Internal Affairs began the operational-strategic exercise ‘Zaslon-2015’ the day before”, 3 April 2015
(Annex 457).
121 Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 24/3549 to the Head of the Directorate of the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, 30 July 2018 (Annex 604) to the Crimean Prosecutor’s Office;
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. Isorg 15/3-7209-2015 to Mr Fedotov, Adviser to the
President of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, 28
August 2015 (Annex 556) to the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights.
Appendix B
211
60. As the Ministry of Internal Affairs explained, this exercise was carried out by its internal
troops between 2 and 10 April 2015 in at least six federal districts of the Russian Federation,
including the then Crimean Federal District.122 Thus, Crimea was not the only area within the
Russian Federation where “Barrier 2015” took place. Therefore, Crimea’s inclusion in the exercise
was obviously not governed by any discriminatory intent or systematic campaign of discrimination
towards the Crimean Tatar community, and it is absurd for Ukraine to portray this nationwide
training exercise as an operation “targeting Crimean Tatars”.123
61. Ukraine contends that Crimean Tatars have been particularly targeted during random
inspections as part of this exercise.124 Ukraine however indicates that “Slavic-looking people needed
only to show government-issued IDs” and “Crimean Tatars with the same documentation were in
many cases accompanied to their homes, where authorities conducted searches”.125 “Slaviclooking”
is a dubious and subjective criterion, to say the least, when differentiating between
Crimean Tatars and the rest of the Crimean population.126
62. Further, Ukraine does not substantiate its allegation that all Slavic-looking persons were
more lightly treated. Moreover, Ukraine is silent on the overall number of checks relied on to make
these assertions, the criteria followed by the police in carrying out its exercise, whether other,
objective factors could explain the checks allegedly performed, etc.
63. Besides, the Crimean Prosecutor confirmed being unaware of any acts targeting citizens
based on their ethnic identity, and that no claims or complaints in relation to any actions undertaken
by the Russian authorities during the course of the exercise in question have been filed.127
Therefore, the “Barrier 2015” operational strategic exercise obviously did not constitute
discriminatory treatment, not to mention a systematic campaign of racial discrimination.
122 Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation official website, “The internal troops of the Russian
Ministry of Internal Affairs began the operational-strategic exercise ‘Zaslon-2015’ the day before”, 3 April 2015
(Annex 457); TASS, “Exercises of Russian internal troops commence in six federal districts, including Crimea”, 2 April
2015 (Annex 919). Established in 2014, the Crimean Federal District was abolished in 2016 and Crimea was
incorporated into the Southern Federal District.
123 MU, p. 263, title of section 2.
124 MU, para. 452.
125 MU, para. 452 (emphasis added).
126 Expert Report of Dmitry Anatolievich Funk, Roman Alexandrovich Starchenko, Valery Vladimirovich Stepanov
and Sergey Valeryevich Sokolovsky (Annex 21), Addendum 1.
127 Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 24/3549 to the Head of the Directorate of the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, 30 July 2018 (Annex 604), to the Crimean Prosecutor’s Office;
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. Isorg 15/3-7209-2015 to Mr Fedotov, Adviser to the
President of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, 28
August 2015 (Annex 556), to the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights.
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3. Episode of 23 November 2017
64. The third specific instance of alleged “public raids” mentioned by Ukraine took place on 23
November 2017 at a café in Simferopol.128 Again, Ukraine omits to mention the larger factual
context of this episode, including the legitimate reasons for the operation of the law enforcement
authorities. One of the materials produced by Ukraine points to circumstances that Ukraine omits
from its narrative, namely that “Crimean Tatar activist Nariman Dzhelalov told RFE/RL that the
Turkish citizen had duped Kashka out of a large amount of money, and that the detained men were
trying to convince him to return the sum”.129 The term “convince” does not properly depict the
reality of the four detained men’s behaviour. Indeed, the law-enforcement operation that was
carried out that day aimed at establishing facts as part of a criminal investigation into extortion of
money from Mr Aitan in the amount of USD 7,000.130 In particular, the point was to officially trace
the fact of the money transfer and to confirm the identification of those persons involved in the
misconduct forming the subject of the investigation. As a result, Messrs Ametov, Degermendji,
Trubach and Chapukh were detained in accordance with Russian laws and eventually found
guilty.131 The existence of a financial dispute between Ms Kashka and Mr Aitan is attested by
further court proceedings between Mr Aitan and Ms Kashka’s heir.132
65. In any event, whatever their causes, there was a legitimate and lawful ground for the
measures taken, as part of a regular law enforcement procedure under Russian law and as part of a
criminal investigation, as opposed to a “raid” targeting persons on ethnic grounds. To recall, the law
enforcement authorities have the duty to investigate into any event or complaint that raises
suspicions of criminal activities.
66. In relation to the regrettable passing of Ms Vedzhie Kashka shortly after the above
operation, contrary to Ukraine’s misleading insinuation, the cause of Ms Kashka’s death was an
ischemic heart disease and it was found to be unrelated to the law-enforcement operation at the
128 MU, para. 454.
129 RFE/RL, "Veteran Crimean Tatar Activist Dies As Associates Detained By Russia", 23 November 2017 (Annex
1071 to MU), p. 2.
130 Investigator of the Investigative Unit of the Investigative Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the
Republic of Crimea, Record of detention, 23 November 2017 (Annex 381); Investigator of the Investigative Unit of the
Investigative Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea, Record of detention, 23
November 2017 (Annex 382); Investigator of the Investigative Unit of the Investigative Directorate of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea, Record of detention, 23 November 2017 (Annex 383); Investigator of the
Investigative Unit of the Investigative Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea, Record
of detention, 23 November 2017 (Annex 384).
131 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Decision (operative part), 17 April 2019 (Annex 410).
132 Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol, Decision (operative part), 17 April 2019 (Annex 410); Simferopol District
Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2-1123/2019, Ruling, 23 May 2019 (Annex 411) (on reversal of the decision
rendered in absence of the defendant); Yu. Aitan, Case No. 2-1123/2019, Counter-claim, 18 June 2019 (Annex 413);
Simferopolskiy District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2-1941/2019, Ruling, 24 September 2019 (Annex
415) (pausing the civil proceedings).
Appendix B
213
café.133 In fact it was with the help of Russia’s authorities that an ambulance was called to her as
she felt unwell, even though this could not ultimately save her life.134 To be sure, the Russian
Federation deeply regrets Ms Kashka’s tragic passing. However, this regrettable incident and the
context in which it occurred do not point to racial discrimination. The ethnic identity of the suspects
are immaterial to Ukraine’s claim; the fact that the FSB had grounds to suspect their involvement in
a criminal conduct at the time of the intervention is dispositive for explaining the operation, which
thus does not reflect any arbitrary or pretextual targeting attesting to racial discrimination.
4. The Case of Mr Velilyaev and Mr Bariev
67. The last allegation cited by Ukraine as an example of “pervasive pattern of searches” is a
law-enforcement measure taken in relation to a major food distributor in Crimea in relation to
sanitary issues.135 Ukraine asserts that: “On 26 April 2018, the Russian occupation authorities
carried out a series of armed searches at the homes and businesses of Crimean Tatars, and detained
prominent members of the Crimean Tatar community, on the absurd pretext that they possessed
food products that were beyond their sell-by dates.”136 Ukraine’s presentation is again clearly
misleading. Actually, the very materials Ukraine refers to provide elements that discredit Ukraine’s
characterization of this episode as reflecting a policy of racial discrimination, or a specific intent at
targeting Crimean Tatars.137 In fact Ukraine’s allegation relates to one single event that relies on
lawful considerations and a legitimate concern for public health, and that is unrelated to
discriminatory considerations or the ethnic identity of the suspects. One of the two articles on which
Ukraine relies confirms that Ukraine’s claim is based on speculations as it admits having no
knowledge of the precise specifics of the case: “[t]he motives remain unclear.”138
133 Senior investigator of the Investigative Department for the Kievskiy District of Simferopol of the Main
Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea,
Resolution on the refusal to initiate a criminal case, 20 April 2018 (Annex 398) (upon Ms Kashka’s death describing the
measures that were taken to establish the circumstances and the reasons of her death).
134 Senior investigator of the Investigative Department for the Kievskiy District of Simferopol of the Main
Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea,
Resolution on the refusal to initiate a criminal case, 20 April 2018 (Annex 398) (upon Ms Kashka’s death describing the
measures that were taken to establish the circumstances and the reasons of her death).
135 MU, para. 454.
136 MU, para. 454.
137 Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, "Crimean Tatar Businessman & Philanthropist Seized and New FSB
Offensive in Russian-Occupied Crimea", 3 May 2018 (Annex 973 to MU); Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organization, "Crimean Tatars: Russian Repression Continues with Arrest of Crimean Businessman", 8 May 2018
(Annex 974 to MU).
138 Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, "Crimean Tatar Businessman & Philanthropist Seized and New FSB
Offensive in Russian-Occupied Crimea", 3 May 2018 (Annex 973 to MU).
Appendix B
214
68. The law enforcement measures at stake were taken as part of a criminal case initiated on 25
April 2018.139 Mr Resul Velilyaev at that time was the owner of the company KrymOpt, the leading
food wholesaler in Crimea since the 1990’s, and the indirect owner of the retail network named
Guzel, which consisted of over thirty stores across the peninsula. His business partner, Mr Ali
Bariev, at that time was the director of KrymOpt. On 26 April 2018, both of them were detained.140
They and employees of the business were charged for storage and sale of food products beyond
their sell-by dates – spoilt products – under Article 238(2) of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation. Thus the measures were obviously based on lawful and legitimate grounds. Moreover,
the important size and position of Mr Velilyaev’s KrymOpt/Guzel supply network, being allegedly
a leading local supplier in Crimea with more than 6,000 customers,141 amply justified the decision
to investigate the matter as well as the handling of the case by the law enforcement authorities on
the indicated legal basis due to the obvious serious risk for public health that would pose the sale of
spoilt food to the population of the peninsula at large. Poisoning a population through a large food
supply network is a serious crime and sanitary issue, and the authorities have an obvious duty to
investigate any allegations or suspicions thereof.
69. In the course of the investigation, both Mr Velilyaev and Mr Bariev fully admitted their
guilt.142 Mr Resul Velilyaev, Mr Ali Bariev and employees of KrymOpt were found guilty of the
charges raised against them by decision of the Belogorskiy District Court of the Republic of Crimea
on 26 March 2020.143 The court took due account of mitigating circumstances, such as admission of
guilt, infant children and active assistance to the investigation of the crime when deciding the
sentence.144 Both Mr Velilyaev and Mr Bariev were released upon delivery of the judgment as their
sentence had been fully served during pre-trial detention.
139 Senior Investigator of the Directorate for Investigation of crimes related to the use of prohibited means and
methods of war, the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation,
Resolution on initiation of a criminal case No. 11802007703000117, 25 April 2018 (Annex 399).
140 Senior Investigator of the Directorate for investigation of crimes related to the use of prohibited means and
methods of warfare, the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation,
Record of detention of Mr. Velilyaev, 26 April 2018 (Annex 400), (describing the scope of the charges); Senior
Investigator of the Directorate for investigation of crimes related to the use of prohibited means and methods of warfare,
the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Record of detention of Mr.
Bariev, 26 April 2018 (Annex 401) (describing the scope of the charges).
141 Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, "Crimean Tatar Businessman & Philanthropist Seized and New FSB
Offensive in Russian-Occupied Crimea", 3 May 2018 (Annex 973 to MU).
142 Senior Investigator of the Directorate for investigation of crimes related to the use of prohibited means and
methods of warfare, the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation,
Record of interrogation of Mr. Bariev, 21 March 2019 (Annex 408); Senior Investigator of the Directorate for
investigation of crimes related to the use of prohibited means and methods of warfare, the Main Investigative
Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Record of interrogation of Mr. Velilyaev, 21
March 2019 (Annex 409).
143 Belogorsk District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 1-53/2020, Decision, 26 March 2020 (Annex 421).
144 Ibid.
Appendix B
215
70. To conclude, the individual law enforcement measure that Ukraine complains of, once put
back into their real context, show that there is no plausible case of racial discrimination in relation
to these measures. Ukraine’s contention that “[b]y carrying out this pervasive pattern of searches,
the Russian Federation undermines the Crimean Tatar community’s basic sense of safety and
belonging in their indigenous homeland”145 is thus clearly misplaced. Available statistics confirm
that there was no significant increase in criminal prosecutions initiated under Article 238 of the
Criminal Code since 2014 and that Crimea is not disproportionally concerned by these measures
than other parts of Russia.146 As is also evident from these statistics as well as from the Russian
case law,147 criminal prosecutions initiated under Article 238 of the Criminal Code are far from
being unique to Crimea. Actually, Ukraine concedes that the said measures were clearly not taken
for racial motives by, for instance, annexing to its Memorial Mr Chubarov’s statement expressing
the view that the Crimean Tatar activists were detained and charged for “activities related to
terrorist and extremist organizations”, not for racial motives.148
145 MU, para. 454.
146 Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Statistics on consideration of criminal cases
under Article 238 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (from 2010 to the first half of 2020) (Annex 493).
147 See, for instance, First General Jurisdiction Court of Cassation, Case No. 77-375/2021 (77-3313/2020), Decision,
3 February 2021 (Annex 431); Third General Jurisdiction Court of Cassation, Case No. 77-671/2021, Decision, 13
April 2021 (Annex 434); Eighth General Jurisdiction Court of Cassation, Case No. 77-874/2020, Decision, 19 May
2020 (Annex 423).
148 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, "Crimean Tatars: Russian Repression Continues with Arrest of
Crimean Businessman", 8 May 2018 (Annex 974 to MU), pp. 1-2. To be sure, Mr Chubarov’s characterization of the
charges in the case are factually erroneous, as is visible form the record.
Appendix C
216
APPENDIX C
NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO CITIZENSHIP, LET ALONE A
SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN THEREOF
1. The present Appendix1 shows that, contrary to Ukraine’s allegations, Russian citizenship
law and practice in Crimea is not discriminatory (I) and that Ukraine’s individual claims do not
evidence any discrimination either, a fortiori racial discrimination (II). The relevant legal and
factual elements show that Ukraine’s related claims under the CERD lack any merits at all.
I. Russian Citizenship Law and Practice in Crimea Is Not Discriminatory
A. UKRAINE’S ACCUSATIONS
2. According to Ukraine, “the Law of Admission’s provision for permanent residents of
Crimea to automatically receive Russian nationality laid a foundation for systematic discrimination
against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea.”2
B. THE APPLICABLE RUSSIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK
3. Ukraine provides an incomplete and incorrect picture of the relevant domestic legal
framework in the Russian Federation that is relevant in Crimea. It focuses exclusively on – and
distorts – the provisions of the Admission Law3 and the transitional system that in fact enabled
residents of Crimea to acquire Russian citizenship quickly and en masse, while preserving the
possibility to opt out of Russian citizenship.4
4. The system of access to citizenship in Crimea that has been put in place pursuant to the
Admission Law – the “2014 special regime” – is an ad hoc mechanism that was designed to address
the change of status of all citizens who live permanently on the peninsula, as an accompanying
measure to Crimea’s change of status. As such, it was a step the object of which was to promptly
bring the permanent population of Crimea to an equal position with the rest of the Russian
population. Today the legal framework governing citizenship, including issues of granting,
renouncement and dual citizenship, is the same for the Crimean population and in the rest of the
Russian Federation (with measures of positive discrimination for previously deported Crimeans or
their relatives).
5. Like elsewhere, the possibility for an individual to acquire Russian citizenship under the
general regime is subject to a series of requirements making it a rather complex and lengthy
1 See this Counter-Memorial, Chapter VI, paras. 378-389.
2 MU, para. 455.
3 MU, paras. 455-476, inter alia; Federal Constitutional Law No. 6-FKZ “On the admission of the Republic of
Crimea into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation - the
Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol”, 21 March 2014 (Annex 61) (“Admission Law”).
4 MU, paras. 456-463.
Appendix С
217
procedure (the applicant is required to be resident in Russia for at least five consecutive years, have
a lawful source of income, renounce his or her foreign citizenship and demonstrate sufficient
proficiency in Russian, among others).5 In the case of the Crimean population, however, the
situation was singular. Under the 2014 special regime, Russian citizenship was granted to Crimeans
automatically by virtue of two cumulative conditions: their having Ukrainian citizenship or being
stateless and their permanently living in Crimea as of 18 March 2014.6 Such simplified procedure
reflected a pragmatic choice in face of the administrative challenge created by a Crimean population
of about 2.3 Million suddenly falling within Russia’s jurisdiction with the need to integrate it into
the Russian system as quickly and smoothly as possible.
6. In this perspective, the simplified transitional regime aimed at avoiding the administratively
more burdensome character of the ordinary procedure of applying for Russian citizenship, which
would undoubtedly have been the source of challenges and disruptions if applied to the whole
Crimean population at once, not to mention that it was manifestly unsuitable for the “new”
population of the Russian Federation that had not met the ordinary requirements.7 The 2014 special
regime fully preserved individuals’ freedom of choice and each person’s preferences, without
affecting their foreign citizenship and without any distinction as to ethnicity, race or others.
7. Ukraine takes special grievance with the Admission Law.8 In reality, that instrument9
allowed Crimeans to forego various cumbersome requirements including that of renouncing their
previous citizenship in order to be admitted into Russian citizenship.10 Thus, under the key
provision of the 2014 scheme (Article 4(1) of the Admission Law),
“Since the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the
formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation, Ukrainian nationals
and stateless persons permanently residing in the Republic of Crimea or the federal city
of Sevastopol shall be recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation, with the
exception of individuals who within one month from that date declare their intention to
preserve their other citizenship and (or) that of their minor children or to remain
stateless.”
8. In effect, those who met the two basic conditions and wished to acquire Russian citizenship
did not need to take any steps to express their agreement to become Russian citizens. They only
5 See Federal Law 62-FZ “On citizenship of the Russian Federation" (as amended on 2 November 2013), 31 May
2002 (Annex 43), Article 13.
6 Admission Law (Annex 61), Article 4(1).
7 The ordinary procedure of acquisition of Russian citizenship is also obviously inadequate to the case of Crimea, in
particular because it requires the applicant to be resident in the Russian Federation for at least 5 consecutive years since
the acquisition of a residence permit: see Federal Law 62-FZ “On citizenship of the Russian Federation” (as amended
on 2 November 2013), 31 May 2002 (Annex 43), Article 13. An older version of the law is contained in Annex 875 to
UM.
8 MU, paras. 456-463.
9 Admission Law (Annex 61), Article 4.
10 Federal Law 62-FZ “On citizenship of the Russian Federation” (as amended on 2 November 2013), 31 May 2002
(Annex 43), Article 13(1).
Appendix C
218
would be required to demonstrate the presence of the two requirements (Ukrainian citizenship or
statelessness and permanent residence in Crimea on the date of Crimea’s accession to the Russian
Federation) once they apply for a Russian passport.
9. Those Crimeans who chose to declare that they wish to preserve their Ukrainian citizenship,
i.e. to remain Ukrainian citizens solely, or remain stateless, were not losing their right to reside in
Crimea. They could obtain permanent residence permit in a simplified manner11 and did in fact use
such option.12
10. As for Crimean residents who were not Ukrainian citizens, nor stateless persons, they could
continue to reside in Crimea based on Russian permanent residence permits issued in place of
analogous Ukrainian documents.13 For those who did not have such (including Ukrainian citizens
without proof of permanent residence in Crimea), permanent or temporary residence permits could
be issued according to the general regime.14
11. In addition to the above, those Crimeans who opted out of Russian citizenship in 2014 or
were not eligible in the first place under the 2014 special regime (for instance, because they were
not resident in Crimea at the time), could apply for Russian citizenship any time afterwards in
accordance with the general procedure, which was later additionally simplified for those Ukrainians
or stateless persons who left the peninsula before 18 March 2014, but were born and permanently
resided in the territory of the Republic of Crimea or Sevastopol (as well as their children, spouses
and parents), along with Crimean Tatars and other peoples deported from Crimea in Soviet times
(as well as their lineal descendants, adopted children and spouses).15
12. Ukraine’s contention that the Admission Law operated “a deviation from the general
Russian practice of recognizing dual citizenship”16 does not stand for several reasons. While
Russian law indeed does not prevent individuals from having two or more citizenships,17 this was at
11 See below, fn. 109.
12 See below, para. 22.
13 See below, fn. 109.
14 See Federal Law No. 115-FZ “On the legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation” (as amended on 28
December 2013), 25 July 2002 (Annex 47), Articles 6, 6.1, 8.
15 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 187 “On certain categories of foreign citizens and stateless
persons entitled to apply for citizenship of the Russian Federation under the simplified procedure”, 29 April 2019
(Annex 117), paras. 1(a), 1(b), 1(d). Foreign citizens who had themselves been formerly deported from Crimea or are
relatives of formerly deported persons are also exempted from obtaining a temporary residence permit before they can
apply for a permanent residence permit (Federal Law No. 115-FZ “On the legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian
Federation” (as amended on 24 April 2020), 25 July 2002 (Annex 47), Article 8(2)(8).
16 MU, para. 457.
17 Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1993 (Annex 28), Article 62.1; Federal Law 62-FZ “On
citizenship of the Russian Federation” (as amended on 2 November 2013), 31 May 2002 (Annex 43), Article 6(1).
Under the general rule, unless provided for under an international treaty or federal law, a Russian citizen also having the
citizenship of another State is regarded by the Russian Federation as a Russian citizen. There is no such treaty between
the Russian Federation and Ukraine. This principle is common in many countries and does not constitute in any way a
denial of a citizen’s other nationality. The expression “dual citizenship” or “dual nationality” in the present Counter-
Memorial is used in its common meaning as referring to the fact of having two citizenships or nationalities, without
Appendix С
219
the time limited to Russian citizens acquiring a second citizenship; on the other hand, acquisition of
the Russian citizenship by way of naturalization used to be in most cases conditioned upon
renouncement of any prior nationality.18 Under the 2014 special regime, Crimeans benefitted from a
more liberal regime and were not required to renounce their Ukrainian citizenship as a condition to,
or upon receiving Russian citizenship. By way of this regime, Russian citizenship is not called upon
to replace Crimeans’ previous Ukrainian citizenship, and accepting Russian citizenship did not and
could not entail a forced renouncement of one’s Ukrainian citizenship.
13. This is evident when looking at Article 4(3) of the Admission Law which confirms that dual
citizenship is possible since it is based on this very premise. Article 4(3) provides:
“Restrictions on public and municipal offices, positions in the state and municipal
government bodies provided for by the laws of the Russian Federation for citizens of
the Russian Federation holding a foreign citizenship or a residence permit or another
document confirming the right of a citizen of the Russian Federation to permanently
reside in the territory of a foreign state, shall be applicable in the Republic of Crimea
and the federal city of Sevastopol upon the expiry of one month since the date of
admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the formation of
new constituent entities within the Russian Federation.”
The above limitation applies on all parts of the Russian territory and is also standard and quite
typical in most countries with respect to the occupation of public office by individuals having a
foreign citizenship. This provision would make no sense if Article 4(1) were to be interpreted as
excluding dual citizenship for Crimeans.
14. Such understanding has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation. Article 4 of the Admission Law is based on Article 5 of the Accession Treaty19 that it
transposes into Russian domestic law. Called upon to examine the constitutionality of the Accession
Treaty, the Constitutional Court confirmed that Article 5 did not require Crimeans to renounce the
citizenship they had when Crimea acceded to the Russian Federation and that it guarantees the
possibility for Crimeans to acquire Russian citizenship should they so desire without having to
undertake any specific step. It also confirmed that this approach was in line with the Russian
Constitution.20
15. Therefore, not only did the Admission Law expressly allow for Crimeans to retain their
Ukrainian citizenship, with or without obtaining Russian citizenship; such retention was indeed the
prejudice to its specific use in Russian domestic law in certain circumstances, including in relation to dual citizenship as
recognized and organized by an international treaty between the Russian Federation and another State.
18 Federal Law 62-FZ “On citizenship of the Russian Federation” (as amended on 2 November 2013), 31 May 2002
(Annex 43), Article 13(1)(d). This condition was repealed as from 24 July 2020.
19 Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to
the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014
(Annex 24), Article 5.
20 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Decision No. 6-P, 19 March 2014 (Annex 136).
Appendix C
220
default regime. Not opting out did not entail renouncing Ukrainian citizenship. Under the default
regime, Ukrainian citizens living in Crimea were granted Russian citizenship, but this did not affect
their existing nationality, and in law like in practice, no Crimeans were stripped of their Ukrainian
nationality upon receiving Russian nationality.
16. Whereas the 2014 special regime removed the general requirement of renouncement of
previous citizenship, it did not prevent in any way individual Crimeans from renouncing their
Ukrainian citizenship, if they were willing to do so. Nor did it affect the right of any Crimean
resident under the general regime to renounce his or her newly acquired Russian citizenship –
subject to some commonly applied conditions.21 Therefore, no option in terms of nationality has
been closed to Crimeans by way of the 2014 special regime and thereafter. Since 2014 Crimeans
have had the possibility to retain only Ukrainian citizenship, to have only Russian citizenship or to
have both, a wide choice that leaves no room to Ukraine’s allegations of discrimination.
17. The specificity of the situation in Crimea and the need for time to adapt and bring Crimea to
the level of the general regime applicable in the Russian Federation have been recognized with
further regulatory efforts and legislative activity, which apply in Russia as a whole. For example,
Federal Law No. 142-FZ of 4 June 2014 introduced a new requirement for all Russian citizens who
also have or obtain another nationality or permanent residency abroad to declare such other
nationality or permanent residency to the competent authorities within 60 days of obtaining it.22
Likewise, Russian citizens who possess another nationality or permanent residency abroad on the
day of entry into force of the said Federal Law are subject to the same declaration requirement.23
Such notification in practice allows the authorities to monitor compliance with restrictions
introduced by law for those holding foreign citizenships – such as prohibition to hold public offices,
for example. Russians who permanently live abroad are not subject to the disclosure obligations.
18. In relation to this general notification requirement that applies to all Russian citizens,
Crimeans enjoyed a transition period, as well as simplified obligations.24 Indeed, as an exception to
the general regime, the notification obligation applies to Crimeans only from 1 January 2016 and
only in respect of any foreign citizenship acquired after Crimea’s accession to the Russian
Federation; Crimeans are not required to notify their Ukrainian citizenship existing at the time of
21 Federal Law 62-FZ “On citizenship of the Russian Federation” (as amended on 2 November 2013), 31 May 2002
(Annex 43), Articles 19-20.
22 Federal Law No. 142-FZ “On introducing amendments into Articles 6 and 30 of the Federal Law ‘On citizenship
of the Russian Federation’ and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”, 4 June 2014 (Annex 69), Article
1(1)(a); Federal Law 62-FZ “On citizenship of the Russian Federation” (as amended on 13 July 2020), 31 May 2002
(Annex 43), Article 6(3).
23 Federal Law No. 142-FZ “On introducing amendments into Articles 6 and 30 of the Federal Law ‘On citizenship
of the Russian Federation’ and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”, 4 June 2014 (Annex 69), Article 6.1.
The Law entered into force on 3 August 2014.
24 Federal Law No. 142-FZ “On introducing amendments into Articles 6 and 30 of the Federal Law ‘On citizenship
of the Russian Federation’ and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”, 4 June 2014 (Annex 69), Article 6.5.
Appendix С
221
accession.25 Therefore, here as well Crimeans have been benefiting from a more, and not a less,
favourable regime during the transition period and today.
19. A special regime was also developed for the renunciation of Ukrainian citizenship in
Crimea. As noted above,26 Ukrainian citizens residing in Crimea would normally be restricted from
entering Russian state service. However, effective renunciation of Ukrainian citizenship under the
general rules would require confirmation from the Ukrainian authorities, and the latter do not accept
the choice of Russian citizenship in Crimea. A simplified procedure was, therefore, introduced in
December 2014 whereby Crimeans may simply notify to the Russian authorities their desire to
renounce Ukrainian citizenship. The formalities are limited to filing a statement with the FMS of
Russia to the effect that the applicant is not willing to remain a citizen of another state.27 Such
statement is sufficient to lift foreign nationality restrictions in Russia. However, Ukraine may, of
course, still consider these people to be its nationals, irrespective of the renunciation statement.
20. This special regime is another example of positive discrimination that ensures for all
interested uninhibited access to employment in state civil service, municipal civil service,28 standing
for election for a public position in federal or regional state authorities.29
25 See for example statement by Mr P. Yarosh, head of the Federal Migration Service of Russia for the Republic of
Crimea, presenting the official position of this agency: see Kommersant, “Peninsula residents are allowed not to declare
their second passport”, 23 October 2015 (Annex 933).
26 See above, para. 13.
27 Admission Law (as amended by Federal Constitutional Law No. 19-FKZ of 29 December 2014) (Annex 61),
Article 4(4). Addressing the situation of civil servants and other employees in public office was precisely a reason
underlying the establishment of this simplified procedure: see Explanatory note to the revised draft no. 588277-6 of the
Federal Constitutional Law “On amending the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the admission of the Republic of Crimea
into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation - the Republic
of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol’”, http://sozd.duma.gov.ru/download/32D93D37-959D-46E6-8E13-
4C6AE0722375, 14 August 2014 (Annex 445). See also Federal Migration Service of Russian Federation, Instruction
No. NS-1/6-197 “On the persons recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation in accordance with the Federal
Constitutional Law No. 6 FKZ of 21 March 2014” (with exemplary forms of application and confirmation attached
thereto), 15 January 2015 (Annex 453).
28 For example, Russian law restricts access to employment in state civil and municipal service (including to state
positions) to persons possessing only Russian citizenship. This rule is established at the federal level without
discrimination between citizens, groups of citizens or federal subjects: see Federal Law No. 79-FZ “On state civil
service in the Russian Federation” (as amended on 28 December 2013), 27 July 2004 (Annex 49), Articles 3(1),
16(1)(6), 16(1)(7), 21(1). Exceptions may exist for dual citizens with respect to state or municipal civil service
employment to the extent provided by an international treaty, which is not the case between the Russian Federation and
Ukraine: Federal Law No. 79-FZ “On state civil service in the Russian Federation” (as amended on 28 December
2013), 27 July 2004 (Annex 49), Article 16(1)(7); Federal Law No. 25-FZ “On municipal service in the Russian
Federation”, 2 March 2007 (Annex 50), Articles 13(1)(6), 13(1)(7).
29 Citizens of the Russian Federation who hold citizenship of a foreign state, a residence permit or any other
document confirming the right of permanent residence of a citizen of the Russian Federation on the territory of a foreign
state do not have the right to participate in elections and take part in the Government – see Article 4(3.1) of Federal
Law No. 67-FZ “On basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to participate
in a referendum”, 12 June 2002 (Annex 44). By exception, citizens with foreign citizenship may stand for election in
municipal (local self-governance) bodies if so provided by an international treaty, which is not the case between the
Russian Federation and Ukraine, ibid.
That these restrictions can be effectively dis-applied by the special renunciation regime is confirmed by case law. See,
for example, concerning the ability to stand for election for state and municipal parliaments, Judicial Chamber for
Appendix C
222
21. To sum up, the following options have been available to all Crimeans under the 2014 special
regime and the general regime:
• to opt in Russian citizenship (retaining or not their Ukrainian citizenship) or to opt out of
Russian citizenship (retaining Ukrainian citizenship, or their stateless status) – for Ukrainian
citizens and stateless persons permanently residing in Crimea as at 18 March 2014;
• to obtain a permanent residence permit through a simplified procedure – for those who opted
out of Russian citizenship or those who were not eligible (were not Ukrainian citizens or
stateless) but resided in Crimea on the basis of Ukrainian residence permits;
• to acquire a temporary residence permit – for those who could not prove their permanent
residence in Crimea as of 18 March 2014;
• to obtain Russian citizenship in accordance with the general procedure – for those who did
not accept Russian citizenship automatically, or were not eligible in the first place;
• to renounce Russian citizenship under the general regime for those who failed to timely opt
out.
22. As statistical data shows, an overwhelming majority of people in Crimea opted for Russian
citizenship, of which a significant part logically ended up having both Ukrainian and Russian
citizenships. As confirmed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, as at the
first trimester of 2020, over 2 million Crimeans (with 2,284,769 recorded residents in Crimea
according to the 2014 census)30 had been recognized Russian citizens under the 2014 special
regime. This number includes 83,369 persons who had to undergo a verification procedure before
the courts in respect of their Ukrainian citizenship and/or their permanent residence in Crimea when
primary evidence to either of these two elements was lacking.31 3,968 persons opted out of Russian
citizenship before the deadline of 18 April 2014 (of these, 1,322 persons received permanent
residence permits), 107,827 persons among those having obtained Russian citizenship notified the
authorities of their desire not to remain citizens of a foreign State, and six persons renounced their
Russian citizenship.32
Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 2A-102/2019, Appellate Decision No.
127-APA19-23, 26 August 2019 (Annex 414). See also Federal Constitutional Law No. 1-FKZ “On the admission of
the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian
Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol”, 11 June 2021 (Annex 1316).
30 Federal Service of State Statistics of the Russian Federation, Results of the Population Census of 2014 in the
Crimean Federal District, 2015 (Annex 440), p. 2.
31 See below, paras. 26-29.
32 Information and reference material on procedure of acquiring citizenship of the Russian Federation by Crimean
residents as attached to the Letter of the Main Migration Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian
Federation No. 20/25495, 27 July 2021 (Annex 1330), Section 5. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian
Federation has succeeded to the functions and powers of the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation in the
sphere of migration in 2016. See also Types of Migration Statuses Acquired by Crimean Residents as a Result of
Crimea’s Accession to the Russian Federation (Annex 1234).
Appendix С
223
23. Contrary to Ukraine’s allegation,33 the 2014 special regime, and Russian domestic law more
generally, did not impose Russian citizenship on everyone without offering citizens an opportunity
to opt out. Therefore, speculations over the allegedly short deadline or procedural shortcomings of
the 2014 special regime miss the point because Crimeans have been continuously enjoying a
genuine chance to opt out and to retain the citizenship(s) of their choice, either within the option
period or at any moment thereafter under the general regime, albeit under different procedures. At
the same time Russian citizenship remains available, mostly through simplified procedure. Nobody
was forcefully deprived of their citizenship, and all Crimeans were offered a choice of whether to
become Russian citizens (in a simplified – automatic fashion) or rather remain (only) Ukrainian
citizens and receive a residence permit, thus settling their status for continued residence in Crimea.
In this regard, the competent migration authorities have confirmed not being aware of any instances
in which their implementation of the relevant regulations had been challenged in administrative or
judicial proceedings, including for pressuring anyone to accept citizenship of the Russian
Federation or to obtain a Russian passport, to declare one’s unwillingness to retain Ukrainian
citizenship, or for refusals of opting-out applications.34
C. THE LIBERAL APPROACH OF RUSSIAN LAW AND RUSSIAN COURTS REGARDING THE EVIDENCE OF
PERMANENT RESIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING RUSSIAN CITIZENSHIP
24. Ukraine points to those Crimeans who allegedly were not able to obtain Russian citizenship
because they had no valid documents proving their permanent residence in Crimea.35
25. The Russian Federation cannot be held responsible for a situation created by Ukraine’s prior
deficient administration of Crimea, in particular its long failure to ensure adequate conditions and a
proper legal framework for the return of Crimean Tatars to Crimea, including registration of their
residencies. As detailed elsewhere in this Counter-Memorial, the Russian Federation has addressed
the situation immediately upon assuming sovereignty in Crimea and has taken an unprecedented set
of measures for the redress of the Crimean Tatars and other minority ethnic and oppressed groups.36
26. Those Crimeans who were unable to produce formal evidence of their permanent residence
in Crimea on 18 March 2014 were met with a pragmatic and accommodating approach of the law
and Russian authorities. In order to be eligible for Russian citizenship under the applicable
simplified regime, Crimeans had to meet two cumulative criteria, namely to be a Ukrainian national
or stateless as of 18 March 2014, and to live permanently in Crimea on that date. While the
conferral of Russian citizenship to eligible persons was automatic and did not require them to
33 See MU, para. 458.
34 Information and reference material on procedure of acquiring citizenship of the Russian Federation by Crimean
residents as attached to the Letter of the Main Migration Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian
Federation No. 20/25495, 27 July 2021 (Annex 1330), Section 2.
35 MU, para. 461.
36 See this Counter-Memorial, Chapter I, paras. 55-80; Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 268
“On measures aimed at rehabilitation of Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and
state support of their revival and development” (as amended on 12 September 2015), 21 April 2014 (Annex 63).
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undertake any step, evidence of these criteria does become important when a person needs to prove
his or her citizenship for any reason or requests certain administrative documents, such as passport.
27. The criterion of permanent residence does not relate to any specific legal status but is rather
a matter of fact. This criterion would usually be satisfied based on documents such as a Ukrainian
passport or other identity documents having appropriate marks (stamps), extracts from the house
register, or copies of financial personal accounts.37 When no such documents are available, the
migration authorities conduct a standard citizenship verification procedure,38 consisting in locating
and examining other means of evidence, such as employment record book, a copy of an
employment agreement, certificates of employment, records from educational institutions, records
from medical institutions, certificate of marriage, testimonies of relatives, neighbours,
acquaintances, among others.39 In case this procedure does not lead to the desired result, a person
may seek a finding confirming the fact of permanent residence in court, where such fact could be
proved by a variety of evidence, as any other fact of legal significance in accordance with the
general provisions of Russian law.
28. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation40 adopted a flexible approach as regards
the application of the relevant rules, allowing persons who did not previously comply with the law
to benefit from the new regime. In its decision of 4 October 2016,41 a case in point, the Court was
confronted with the case of a person who lived in Crimea but who was not registered there as a
permanent resident on 18 March 2014. The Court considered that the existence of a factual, stable
territorial link of the individual with Crimea is sufficient to accept the granting of Russian
citizenship. Interpreting the condition for obtaining Russian nationality under Article 4(1) of the
Admission Law, it held in particular: “Securing this condition, aimed at granting citizenship of the
Russian Federation to those who are in the territory of the Republic of Crimea or in the territory of
the city of federal significance of Sevastopol, who have a real connection with this territory or have
expressed a clear desire to establish it and are part of the permanent population of the corresponding
territory, which means, from 18 March 2014, with the Russian Federation as a whole, the federal
37 Information and reference material on procedure of acquiring citizenship of the Russian Federation by Crimean
residents as attached to the Letter of the Main Migration Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian
Federation No. 20/25495, 27 July 2021 (Annex 1330), Section 2.
38 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1325 “On approval of the Regulation on the procedure for
addressing the issues of citizenship of the Russian Federation”, 14 November 2002 (Annex 48), paras. 51-52.
39 Information and reference material on procedure of acquiring citizenship of the Russian Federation by Crimean
residents as attached to the Letter of the Main Migration Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian
Federation No. 20/25495, 27 July 2021 (Annex 1330), Section 2.
40 The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, upon requests of the authorized state bodies and state officials,
considers cases on compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation of, inter alia, federal laws and
regulations of the President of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, the State Duma, the Government of the
Russian Federation.
41 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 18-P in the case of the constitutional review of
Part 1 of Article 4 of the Federal Constitutional Law “On the admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian
Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the
Federal City of Sevastopol” in connection with the appeal of A.G. Olenev, 4 October 2016 (Annex 299).
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legislator relied on an understanding of the citizenship of the Russian Federation as a stable legal
link of the person with the Russian Federation, which is expressed in the totality of their mutual
rights and obligations (Article 3 of the Federal Law of 31 May 2002 No. 62-FZ “On citizenship of
the Russian Federation”)”.42
29. The Court thus admitted that permanent residency for the purpose of Article 4(1) of the
Admission Law is a matter of fact and does not necessarily mean registered permanent residency.
Permanent residency may be established based on any relevant factual evidence such as proof of
continued life on the territory, evidence of work, housing, interpersonal relation or social
interaction, evidence of daily activities and interests, testimonies from acquaintances, etc.43
Therefore, prior regular status is not a precondition for a physical person to obtain Russian
citizenship provided such person is able to present evidence of his or her permanent residency in
Crimea. Evidence of effective residence and the expressed wish of the applicant are to be taken into
account when formal registration is lacking. Such burden of proof is quite low, as suggested by the
broad categories of evidence that the Court listed as acceptable.44 This position from the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the highest-ranking jurisdiction to address the issue,
irrigates the whole citizenship regime and practice in the Russian Federation, including in Crimea.45
This way, persons unable to produce evidence of registered residence saw their naturalization made
easier. Thus, the citizenship regime is not discriminatory towards persons without settled legal
status in Crimea, whatever ethnicity they might have.
D. THE ABSENCE OF PRESSURE ON CRIMEANS’ CHOICE OF CITIZENSHIP
30. As illustrated above, the Russian Federation has a quite liberal legal regime of citizenship.
While this system does provide for limitations, these are reasonable and legitimate. In fact the only
limitations in the Russian system are common and standard practice in most countries. They
42 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 18-P in the case of the constitutional review of
Part 1 of Article 4 of the Federal Constitutional Law “On the admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian
Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the
Federal City of Sevastopol” in connection with the appeal of A.G. Olenev, 4 October 2016 (Annex 299), para. 3.2.
43 Ibid., para. 3.2 and point 1 of the operative part.
44 The Court also emphasized that, by virtue of Article 2 of the Russian Constitution, state authorities, including
courts, are encouraged to minimize excessive formalities in their approach to the establishment of the existence of a
person’s connection with the relevant territory: Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 18-P
in the case of the constitutional review of Part 1 of Article 4 of the Federal Constitutional Law “On the admission of the
Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian
Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol” in connection with the appeal of A.G. Olenev,
4 October 2016 (Annex 299), para. 3.1.
45 Para. 2 of the operative part of the Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 18-P in the
case of the constitutional review of Part 1 of Article 4 of the Federal Constitutional Law “On the admission of the
Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian
Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol” in connection with the appeal of A.G. Olenev,
4 October 2016 (Annex 299) specifies that the Court’s interpretation of the meaning of Article 4.1 of the Admission
Law “is binding, which excludes any other interpretation in law enforcement practice”.
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certainly do not point to any form of discrimination, let alone a systematic campaign of racial
discrimination targeting Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians.
31. Ukraine contends that Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians sometimes felt a conflict of
loyalties, which placed them in an uncomfortable situation.46 The alleged uncomfortable situation of
conflict of loyalties is blatantly disproved by the fact that, according to Messrs Funk, Starchenko,
Stepanov and Sokolovsky, the absolute majority of Crimeans including ethnic Ukrainians and
Crimean Tatars identified themselves as Russian citizens – 97.5%.47
32. Besides, Ukraine’s allegations of pressure exercised on Crimean Tatars and ethnic
Ukrainians not to opt out of Russian citizenship are supported by no evidence. Ukraine’s portrayal
of loyalties and fear of pressure is not credible in a context where, as explained above, access to
citizenship is open and where individual choices are all freely available and all reversible.
33. As has been observed, “[a] key to ameliorating the situation of non-citizens is to grant
citizenship – part of the ‘reserved domain’ intimated by [Article] 1(3)” of the CERD.48 This is
exactly what the Russian Federation did by simplifying its procedure for the granting of Russian
citizenship to Crimeans, while at the same time making arrangements for aliens to have one or
different citizenships, including retaining only their foreign citizenship, if they so desire. While
containing accommodations to respect the will of each individual Crimean, the automatic granting
of citizenship to the population living permanently on its territory has the advantage of alleviating a
problem that has often been pointed as laying potential ground to discrimination, namely the
unequal chances of access to citizenship for foreigners.49
34. The above presentation of the Russian domestic law regarding citizenship confirms that
Crimeans were given and retain a genuine and meaningful choice over their citizenship(s). There
can be no discrimination when persons have the choice, and, in fact, Ukraine does not evidence any
concrete discrimination. Far from being arbitrary, the Russian framework respects the will of
persons concerned and prevents the occurrence of cases of statelessness, in line with international
standards. Even thus if issues of nationality were to be considered as coming within the scope of the
CERD (quod non), it is clear that there has been no nationality-based discrimination or ethnicitybased
discrimination through the citizenship regime in the present case.
46 See for example MU, para. 612.
47 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), para. 20.
48 Patrick Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination:
A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 153.
49 Patrick Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: A
Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 153-154.
Appendix С
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II. Ukraine’s Individual Claims Do Not Evidence Any Discrimination
35. Ukraine puts forward a series of individual claims in relation to its allegation of forced
Russian citizenship and subsequent discrimination against non-Russians.50 The relevant facts
confirm the absence of any plausible relation between Ukraine’s allegations and racial
discrimination.
A. UKRAINE’S ALLEGATIONS IN RESPECT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP REGIME
36. Ukraine makes a certain number of accusations with respect to the implementation of the
Admission Law and the 2014 special regime.51
37. Ukraine contends that “the number of people who were able to declare their desire to retain
Ukrainian citizenship likely represented only a fraction of those who wanted to do so”.52 The use of
hypothetical language, in particular the term “likely”, confirms the speculative nature of Ukraine’s
allegation. Ukraine attempts to justify this allegation by adding that “[a]ccording to the Russian
Federal Migration Service, 3,427 permanent residents of Crimea successfully opted out of Russian
citizenship.”53 The number relied on does not support what Ukraine says. Besides, as the OHCHR
report Ukraine relies on also highlights, Crimeans who did not opt out within the deadline set under
the 2014 scheme were allowed to opt out after the close of the 2014 scheme by following the
regular procedure under the Federal Law on citizenship.54 Only six persons did so.55
38. Ukraine also attempts to suggest the existence of discriminatory treatment by comparing the
practicalities of the opting-out procedure with those of the application to obtain a Russian
passport.56 But Ukraine compares what is not comparable. Opting out was a specific –
nonburdensome – procedure that determined the citizenship situation of individual Crimeans, and
for which, expectedly, a very low demand existed. Besides, it did not require personal presence for
filing an application. By contrast, application for a Russian passport is a routine, formal procedure
that was called upon to meet a substantial demand, in fact that of the overwhelming majority of the
Crimean population, who were to apply, in person, for Russian passports within a relatively short
50 MU, paras. 455-476, 611-618, 623-626.
51 MU, paras. 456-463.
52 MU, para. 458.
53 MU, footnote 969, relying on OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine), A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017) para. 59 (Annex 778
to MU), relying in turn on RIA Novosti Ukraine, “[Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation]: 3427
Crimeans opted out of Russian citizenship”. The number relied on by Ukraine does not reflect the final counting. The
correct number of Crimeans who opted out of Russian citizenship under the 2014 special regime is 3,968 (see para. 22.
above).
54 OHCHR, Situation of Han Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of
Sevastopol (Ukraine), A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017) para. 60 (Annex 778 to MU).
55 See above, para. 22.
56 MU, para. 458.
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period of time.57 In light of this, a difference in capacities deployed between these two situations
with incomparable demands is only natural. Therefore, since the two situations cannot be equated,
suggestions of discriminatory treatment are unfounded.
39. Ukraine lists a series of considerations that are supposed to explain the low number of
Crimeans who elected to opt out.58 These considerations include the alleged short deadline,
deficient procedure, lack of facilities and other logistical difficulties for opting out,59 an alleged fear
of pressure, a deterrence induced by “likely implications”, an intimidating climate fuelled by a hatespeech
and disinformation campaign led by the Russian media and government against
Ukrainians,60 the material disadvantages of opting out, the situation of becoming a foreigner in
one’s own country, the inability to occupy government or municipal positions, and other
unspecified forms of alleged discrimination.61 Ukraine further refers to alleged difficulties for
Crimeans unable to evidence permanent residency in Crimea to obtain Russian citizenship,62 and
the reluctance to lend legitimacy to Russian occupation by participating in its procedure.63 Ukraine
then concludes with the assertion that “[t]hese harms were generally not borne by members of the
ethnic Russian community who supported annexation.”64
40. This series of allegations calls for several observations.
41. First, no comparative exercise is carried out in support of them and Ukraine provides no
material or reference to substantiate its discrimination claim.
42. Second, Ukraine’s allegations are contradicted by the fact that, at all material times since
Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation, Crimeans have been provided with a meaningful and
free choice regarding determination of their status (citizenship) for future residence in the Russian
Federation. That the transitional opting-out procedure was limited in time is thus immaterial. This
situation has not ended with the close of the 2014 special regime but continues nowadays under the
general regime. Therefore, it is disingenuous for Ukraine to complain on the status of foreigner that
indeed logically results for anyone who freely made the choice to opt out from the default regime.65
43. Third, some purported explanations are simply not credible or are overly subjective to carry
any real explanatory weight. This is the case for instance of the allegation that some Crimeans
57 It may be noted that the state fee for issuing a passport, which is due under the general regime, was not levied
upon persons recognised as Russian citizens in accordance with Article 4(1) of the Admission Law: see Tax Code of the
Russian Federation, part 2 (amended as of 29.12.2015), 5 August 2000 (Annex 37) as modified by Federal Law No.
157-FZ of 29 June 2015, Article 333.35(3)(29).
58 MU, paras. 458-463.
59 MU, para. 458.
60 MU, para. 459.
61 MU, para. 460.
62 MU, para. 461.
63 MU, para. 462.
64 MU, para. 463.
65 MU, para. 460.
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might have abstained to participate in the opt-out process out of reluctance to lend legitimacy to
Crimea’s new authorities, or of the allegation that people could have felt pressure not to opt out.
Additional objective or quantitative data would be particularly needed when seeking to establish
claims that rely essentially on subjective feelings as explanations, but Ukraine provided none.
Instead, it unilaterally attributes intentions and feelings to abstract, unidentified and unquantified
groups of persons. No reference to any source is given to evidence these allegations.66
44. Fourth, other considerations are pure speculations that are unsupported by evidence. This is
the case for example of the alleged link between the coup d’État in Kiev and the nationality choice
of Ukrainians in Crimea, or the alleged hate speech and disinformation campaign as well as the
latter’s attribution to the Russian Federation.67
45. Fifth, Ukraine’s portrayal of the facts is simply incorrect. For instance, Ukraine’s allegation
that “the Russian occupation authorities allowed people to opt out of Russian nationality at only
four locations in the entirety of Crimea”68 is plainly disproved by the facts. In the territory of
Crimea opting-out applications could be submitted to any one of nine specifically identified
divisions of the FMS of Russia in the Republic of Crimea and in Sevastopol,69 which were available
7 days a week and sufficiently equipped to process the actual amount of applications received. In
addition, Crimeans were allowed to submit their applications by registered post or via the Russian
consulates abroad. The population was duly informed of these procedural options, including
through the media and on the internet.70
46. Sixth, other purported difficulties are in fact directly attributable to Ukraine itself, such as
the alleged disadvantage suffered by individual Crimeans who had not been properly registered at
their place of residence in comparison with those who had been.71
B. POSITION OF THOSE WHO DID NOT OPT OUT AND WHO BECAME RUSSIAN CITIZENS
47. With regard to the alleged harms suffered by those who did not opt out and were
subsequently deemed to be Russian citizens,72 Ukraine contends that “[f]or those self-identifying
66 MU, paras. 459 (containing an unqualified reference to Chapter 8, Section A, which is irrelevant) and 462.
67 MU, para. 459.
68 MU, para. 458.
69 Applications could be submitted to the Directorate of the FMS of Russia in the Republic of Crimea (main office
located in Simferopol), to any one of the seven divisions of the Directorate of the FMS of Russia in the Republic of
Crimea (the Saki District, Evpatoria, the Belogorsk District, the Bakhchisaray District, Kerch, Yalta, Dzhankoy), and to
the Directorate of the FMS of Russia in Sevastopol.
70 Information and reference material on procedure of acquiring citizenship of the Russian Federation by Crimean
residents as attached to the Letter of the Main Migration Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian
Federation No. 20/25495, 27 July 2021 (Annex 1330), Section 1.
71 MU, para. 461. On the way how this “disadvantage” was effectively addressed by the Russian Federation for the
benefit of these individuals see also above, paras. 28-29 and 39 and footnote 77.
72 MU, paras. 464-469.
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Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians who for these or other reasons did not opt out, the forcing upon
them of Russian citizenship created an invidious conflict.”73
48. Issues of nationality are distinct from issues of ethnicity. Therefore, the conferral of
citizenship has no relationship whatsoever with Ukraine’s case of a systematic campaign of racial
discrimination against ethnic groups as such. The Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian ethnic identities are
separate from a person’s nationality or citizenship. It is perfectly possible for a person to be
Crimean Tatar or ethnic Ukrainian and to have Russian nationality. This is precisely what the
overwhelming majority of Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea opted for.74 It is
important to recall that they were given a choice in this regard. Nothing in Ukraine’s evidence
establishes that Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians who did not opt out from Russian citizenship did it
against their will.
C. MILITARY SERVICE AND MILITARY OBLIGATIONS
49. Ukraine alleges that the group of Crimeans who did not opt out and have become Russian
citizens “now faces the prospect of being conscripted into the Russian armed forces and potentially
being made to fight against the very country with which they most identify.”75
50. Conscription is unrelated to racial discrimination because it is citizenship-based. There is no
room thus to equate in the present case a pure nationality-based rule with the scope of the CERD. In
any event, the assessment of the relevant facts shows that there is nothing discriminatory in the
application of the law.
51. Under applicable Russian law, all Russian citizens are called to fulfil their military
obligations, including their military service, with a few exceptions provided for by law, which is
quite standard in most countries.76 However, those Crimeans who have completed their military
service in the state of their previous nationality (meaning Ukraine), are exempted from the duty to
perform it in Russia.77 Subject to this and to eligibility criteria such as age, those Crimeans who
have received and elected to keep Russian nationality while also electing to retain their Ukrainian
73 MU, para. 464.
74 As described by Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky, after Crimea’s admission to the Russian
Federation the absolute majority (97.5%) of Crimeans including ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars identified
themselves as Russian citizens. See, Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21),
para. 20.
75 MU, para. 465.
76 Federal Law No 53-FZ “On military duty and military service”, 28 March 1998 (Annex 35), Articles 22-23. Such
exceptions may be based, inter alia, on health reasons or when the citizen has effectuated his military service in another
State. For the sake of completeness, a modification brought to the Federal Law on military obligations and military
service after Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation also exonerated from military obligations Crimeans who had
been exempted under Ukrainian law for health reasons (see Federal Law No 58-FZ “On specifics of the legal regulation
of relations pertaining to the performance of military duty by certain categories of citizens of the Russian Federation in
connection with the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the formation of new
constituent entities – the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol, within the Russian Federation, and
amending the Federal Law ‘On military duty and military service’”, 30 March 2015 (Annex 86), Articles 1-2).
77 Federal Law No 53-FZ “On military duty and military service”, 28 March 1998 (Annex 35), Article 23(1(d)).
Appendix С
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nationality are thus called in principle to perform their military obligations, including their military
service, in the Russian armed forces, on an equal footing with any other Russian citizens who also
possess another citizenship, without any discrimination. Under certain conditions, they may instead
opt for performing an alternative service.78 Additionally, until 2017, Crimeans enjoyed a transition
period throughout which their military service took place exclusively on the territory of Crimea and
Sevastopol.79 As has been amply shown above, obtaining and retaining Russian citizenship – to
which military obligations are attached – ultimately reflect a person’s own choice. Thus, electing to
retain Russian citizenship entails accepting the obligation to perform their military service and the
possibility of being conscripted in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
D. THE CASE OF DETAINEES AND PRISONERS
52. Just like any other Crimeans, those Crimeans who were being detained or serving a prison
sentence during the application of the 2014 special regime were provided with a meaningful
opportunity to opt out of Russian citizenship, if they so desired, contrary to what Ukraine alleges.80
Persons serving their sentences in penitentiary facilities or those temporarily in detention facilities
were informed of the applicable procedure and fully enabled to file their applications through the
administration of the relevant facility. In particular, they were provided with a leaflet against
signature explaining the procedure and were offered explanatory work organized by the
administration of penitentiary institutions.81 One copy of such application was placed in their
personal files, while another was forwarded to the Directorate of the FMS of Russia for the
Republic of Crimea.82 Thus the opting-out procedure was fully adapted to the conditions of the
penitentiary system and did not provide for, or result in, any differential treatment, and certainly not
based on race. The Federal Penitentiary Service confirmed that no administrative or judicial appeals
were received by the bodies of the penitentiary system of the Republic of Crimea or Sevastopol in
respect to any allegation of forced acquisition of the citizenship of the Russian Federation,
impediment to submissions of applications by the convicts or detainees for opting out of Russian
citizenship – for example, by means of refusal to accept the relevant application – within the
established time-limit.83 Twenty-three detainees and convicts availed themselves of the opting out
78 Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1993 (Annex 28), Article 59(3).
79 Interfax Russia, “Crimean residents are to serve in the Russian Army in all regions of the country”, 31 March 2017
(Annex 971).
80 MU, para. 466.
81 Directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, Information
note on measures taken to assist people confined in the penitentiary institutions of the Republic of Crimea and
Sevastopol in exercising their right to obtain Russian citizenship in accordance with Federal Constitutional Law of 21
March 2014 No. 6-FKZ “On the Admission to the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and Formation of New
Constituent Entities in the Russian Federation – the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol” and to
decline to obtain it, 15 July 2021 (Annex 1328). See also an example of the leaflet (Annex 1246).
82 Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, Information note on measures to assist people confined in the penitentiary
institutions of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol to obtain or decline to obtain Russian citizenship (Annex 1328).
83 Ibid.
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232
procedure and submitted applications, while 2,987 did not do so and thus became Russian
citizens.84
E. THE CASE OF TRANSFER OF PRISONERS SERVING THEIR SENTENCE FROM ONE PENITENTIARY
FACILITY TO ANOTHER
53. Ukraine contends that “[b]ecause they are now considered Russian citizens, such prisoners
[namely Ukrainian citizens who were in prison in Crimea between 18 March 2014 and 18 April
2014] are vulnerable to forced transfer to prisons anywhere in the Russian Federation, in
contravention of international humanitarian law”.85 As explained elsewhere and as the Court
recalled in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections, it is not called upon to decide on anything other
than CERD obligations, and Ukraine’s claims premised on international humanitarian law, as well
as on issues of nationality, fall outside of the Court’s jurisdiction.86 In any event, the Russian penal
enforcement legislation in general, and rules for transfer of convicts in particular, apply uniformly
both to Russian and foreign citizens as well as to stateless persons in the entire territory of the
Russian Federation, and Crimean residents are subject to no special treatment in this respect.87
54. Ukraine adds that “[t]he disproportionate use of such threats, and actual transfers, against
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian prisoners additionally constitutes racial discrimination within the
meaning of the CERD.”88 But as is shown in the present Appendix, in the relevant part of its
Memorial on this matter89 Ukraine has only referred to unfounded allegations made by others as
well as one individual case, that of Mr Sentsov – which is addressed below. Ukraine relied on a
selected mediatized, though irrelevant, individual case, but it does not hold that the same alleged
measures were not applied more generally or were not also applied to members of other ethnic
groups. Therefore, Ukraine has not even provided the start of any evidence establishing the
disproportionate use of threats and actual transfers against specific ethnic groups, let alone evidence
that such conduct, if established, would be part of a systematic campaign of racial discrimination
directed at Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians.
F. THE CASE OF MR OLEG SENTSOV
55. Ukraine contends that Mr Sentsov suffered harm because of his Russian citizenship.90 Not
only is distinction based on nationality excluded from CERD protection by Article 1.2; it is in any
event difficult to see how Ukraine’s allegations in respect of Mr Sentsov, including his prosecution
84 Ibid.
85 See MU, para. 466. See also footnote 981.
86 See this Counter-Memorial, Chapter VI, paras. 383-387.
87 See for example Penal Enforcement Code of the Russian Federation, No. 1-FZ, 8 January 1997 (Annex 34),
Articles 73(1), 73(2), 73(4), 81(1), and 81(2).
88 MU, para. 469.
89 MU, paras. 466-469.
90 MU, paras. 467 and 617.
Appendix С
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and conviction in relation to terrorism, his transfer91 and alleged denial of a consular meeting,92
relate to racial discrimination at all. Mr Sentsov’s case only involved the application of the law
without any discrimination and without any targeting. While Mr Sentsov had become a Russian
citizen under applicable law, he had an opportunity to opt out until 18 April 201493 , but had elected
not to do so.94 Having been recognized as a Russian citizen, Mr Sentsov could obviously not benefit
from a foreign state’s consular protection. In its judgment determining the sentence to be imposed
on Mr Sentsov in relation to his activities related to terrorism, the Court carefully examined the
issue and confirmed Mr Sentsov’s Russian nationality based on available evidence and applicable
law, and took due account of the fact that he had also retained Ukrainian nationality.95
56. More essentially, the status of a person as a Russian citizen or a foreigner does not bear any
significance for purposes of applying the Criminal Code or Penal Enforcement Code, particularly
when this person is also a Russian citizen. Likewise, the issue of Mr Sentsov’s citizenship(s) is
immaterial to his transfer to facilities outside Crimea conducted in full accordance with the Russian
penal enforcement legislation due to the occupancy level of the relevant penitentiary institutions in
Crimea and the alleged threat to Mr Sentsov’s personal safety.96 Indeed, those Russian citizens
having a second (or multiple) citizenship are treated on the territory of the Russian Federation as
Russian citizens only,97 and the Russian penal enforcement legislation applies uniformly both to
Russian and foreign citizens alike on the entire territory of the Russian Federation.
91 In order to ensure the safety of convicts and to prevent dissemination of terrorist propaganda, the penitentiary
authorities may place persons convicted of especially serious crimes – including terrorist and extremist activities – to a
designated penitentiary institution, based on the location and availability of such specifically adapted facility, regardless
of the convict’s place of residence or the place of conviction. See footnote 87 above.
92 Under rules of Russian law applicable to the treatment of Russian citizens (including dual nationals), there is no
basis for the State to arrange consular meetings of a Russian citizen with officials of a foreign consulate. See Federal
Law 62-FZ “On citizenship of the Russian Federation” (as amended on 2 November 2013), 31 May 2002 (Annex 43),
Article 6(1).
93 Even on Ukraine’s own case alleging arbitrary restrictions placed on detained persons’ and convicts’ ability to opt
out of Russian citizenship – which the Russian Federation strongly rejects and has proved to be unfounded –, Mr
Sentsov’s right of option could not have been impeded by his detention as part of the case opened against him as he was
arrested on 11 May 2014, almost a month after the expiry of the transitional opt-out period on 18 April 2014.
94 Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation, Letter to the Investigative Directorate of the Federal Security
Service of the Russian Federation No. Ms-2/6-6602gr, 18 July 2014 (Annex 528); Federal Migration Service of the
Russian Federation, Letter No. Ms-2/6-3374gr to Penal Correction and Special Records Directorate of the Federal
Penitentiary Service of Russia, 6 May 2016 (Annex 564); Senior Investigator for High-Priority Cases of the
Investigative Directorate of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Resolution on clarification of personal data, 3 June
2014 (Annex 149); Main Migration Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Letter No.
20/5610gr to International Law and Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, 30
May 2016 (Annex 568).
95 North Caucasus District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don, Case No. 1-39/2015, Decision, 25 August 2015 (Annex
244), p. 36. The appellate Decision is silent on the question of nationality, which suggests that this was not a key point
in issue: Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Case No. 205-APU15-12s, Decision, 24
November 2015 (Annex 260).
96 Directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, Information
note on places where the convicts O.G. Sentsov and A.Z. Chiygoz served their sentences, 15 July 2021 (Annex 1329).
97 See fn. 17 above.
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G. THE CASE OF MR CHIYGOZ
57. Ukraine quotes Mr Chiygoz’s report of alleged threats of detention transfer supposedly
made to force him to withdraw his appeal.98 While Ukraine advances this accusation within the
section of its Memorial dedicated to Crimeans who allegedly suffered disadvantages as a result of
being recognised as Russian citizens, it is unclear how Mr Chiygoz’s case relates to such
allegations, aside from the alleged violation of international humanitarian law claimed by Ukraine,
which is outside the scope of the CERD and of the Court’s jurisdiction in the present case.
Moreover, Mr Chiygoz’s citizenship is immaterial to Ukraine’s claim as Russia’s penal rules apply
uniformly to its citizens and foreigners alike across its whole territory.
58. Mr Chiygoz’s witness statement lacks credibility for the purpose of evidencing Ukraine’s
argument of prison transfers as illustration of a systematic campaign of racial discrimination against
Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians. Mr Chiygoz, a Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, has been
encouraging and sponsoring many extremist actions that present a threat to the Crimeans’ rights and
safety and to Russia’s essential interests of national security, and has persisted in such conduct
despite the ban on the Mejlis. Additionally, Mr Chiygoz himself confirmed that he “ha[s] received
no threats from either personnel or cell mates”.99 In any event, even if Mr Chiygoz’s statement was
accepted as true, quod non, it does not evidence that he was targeted based on his Crimean Tatar
ethnic identity. To be clear, Mr Chiygoz was not transferred outside the constituent entity in which
he had been convicted, and the Russian Federation is not aware of any threats Mr Chiygoz claims to
have received to that effect.100
H. THE POSITION OF CRIMEANS WHO DID NOT BECOME RUSSIAN NATIONALS
59. Ukraine then purports to report alleged harms suffered by inhabitants of Crimea who did not
“receive Russian nationality”, i.e., according to Ukraine, “either because they opted out or because
they did not qualify for it”.101
60. The mere fact “not to qualify” for receiving Russian nationality is nothing more than the
product of the application of the law. It does not amount to discrimination. In addition, Russia has
recognized the difficulties of Crimeans whose residency in Crimea had not been duly registered,
and has followed a pragmatic and flexible approach taking into account evidence of effective
98 MU, para. 468, referring to Witness Statement of Akhtem Chiygoz, 4 June 2018 (Annex 19 to MU), para. 28. In
relation to Mr Chiygoz’s case, see also Counter-Memorial, Chapter IV, paras. 210-216.
99 Mr. Chiygoz’s Explanatory Statements on the absence of claims on the conditions of the detention (Annex 210).
See also Directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol,
Information note on places where the convicts O.G. Sentsov and A.Z. Chiygoz served their sentences, 15 July 2021
(Annex 1329).
100 Directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, Information
note on places where the convicts O.G. Sentsov and A.Z. Chiygoz served their sentences, 15 July 2021 (Annex 1329).
101 MU, paras. 470-476.
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residence and the wishes expressed by the applicants.102 Bearing this in mind, it cannot be expected
from the Russian Federation, or from any State for that matter, to treat foreigners and its own
citizens alike since the two categories are not in a like position.103
61. The issue whether Crimeans who had opted out of Russian citizenships and who applied for
and obtained residency permits as foreigners did, or did not, enjoy equal treatment with Russian
citizens, is irrelevant. Besides the fact that such distinction between nationals and foreigners is
precisely excluded from the scope of the CERD by Articles 1.2 and 1.3, such distinction does not
constitute a discrimination. Differences of treatment between nationals and foreigners generally
exist in all countries in the world, such as the ability to take employment in government or
municipal positions, the ability to run for government or municipal office, the ability to “apply[…]
to hold a public gathering or [to] own[…] a media entity”.104 The same goes for the fact that
foreigners are subject to migration controls.105
62. As has been underlined, the Russian citizenship system being quite liberal, what Ukraine
describes are in fact some of the basic features of the treatment of aliens by most, if not all, States,
including itself. The Russian Federation has already recalled before the CERD Committee that the
slightly more than 0.1% of Crimeans who opted to only retain Ukrainian citizenship “were able to
obtain Russian residence permits that allowed them to work, to receive medical assistance, to access
education and legal protection and to conduct business transactions”,106 in short, to live a normal
life.
63. Besides, the OHCHR Report referred to by Ukraine confirms that “[r]esidents of Crimea
who opted out of Russian Federation citizenship became foreigners. They could obtain residency
permits through a simplified procedure, giving them certain rights enjoyed by Russian Federation
citizens, such as the right to pension, free health insurance, social allowances, and the right to
exercise professions for which Russian Federation citizenship is not a mandatory requirement.”107
Other measures of social support also apply to those individuals who qualify as victims of political
repression, be they Russian citizens or foreigners having a permanent residence permit.108 This
102 See above, paras. 26-29.
103 See MU, para. 470, alleging that Crimeans who did not receive Russian nationality “suffered in different ways”.
104 To clarify Ukraine’s ambiguous wording (MU, para. 471), foreigners are not barred from taking part in a public
gathering; they are only barred from acting as organizers of public gatherings: see Federal Law “On Assemblies,
Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing” No. 54-FZ of 19 June 2004 of the Russian Federation, as amended by
Federal Law No. 65-FZ of 8 June 2012, art. 5-6 (Annex 877 to MU).
105 Contrary to Ukraine’s suggestion, see MU, para. 471.
106 CERD Committee, 93th session, Summary record of the 2553rd meeting held on 4 August 2017,
CERD/C/SR.2553, para. 23 (Mr Lukiyantsev).
107 OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (2017), Annex 778 to MU, para. 61, cited in MU, footnote 989.
108 Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 218-ZRK “On measures of social support for rehabilitated persons and persons
who have suffered from political repression”, 18 February 2016 (Annex 101), Article 3. Such measures of social
support include, among others, a monthly monetary payment (500 RUB); a 50 % reimbursement of expenses for
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points to a rather liberal, not restrictive, regime, which includes necessary provisions to
accommodate the special situation of Crimeans who have opted out or otherwise did not receive
Russian citizenship.109 As Crimeans have been continuously enjoying a genuine choice in terms of
citizenship since 2014, there is no ground to claim that the statutory differences between citizenship
and residency permit evidence the existence of racial discrimination, let alone a systematic
campaign of racial discrimination aimed at Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in breach of
CERD.
64. While persons who could not evidence permanent residence in Crimea on 18 March 2014
did not receive Russian citizenship and were considered foreigners, the Russian Federation refers to
what was already said above on the issue of non-compliance with applicable residency law by some
Crimeans prior to 2014 as well as its flexible and pragmatic approach to these cases since 2014.110
I. THE CASE OF MR SINAVER KADYROV
65. Ukraine refers to the case of Mr Sinaver Kadyrov as a purported example of
“[d]iscriminatory enforcement of Russia’s immigration laws.”111
66. However, as is obvious from the judicial decisions related to this case,112 nothing supports
Ukraine’s allegation of selective or arbitrary application of the law in Mr Kadyrov’s case. Ukraine
payment of residential premises and utilities; reduced prices (50 %) for utilities’ connections; special reduced fares on
public transport, etc.
109 The simplified regime for obtaining permanent residence permits applied to Crimeans who were eligible to obtain
the Russian citizenship under Article 4(1) of the Admission Law but who opted out and decided to retain their
Ukrainian citizenship or remain stateless as well as foreigners who had a valid permanent residence permit issued by
Ukrainian authorities as of 18 March 2014: Information and reference material on procedure of acquiring citizenship of
the Russian Federation by Crimean residents as attached to the Letter of the Main Migration Directorate of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation No. 20/25495, 27 July 2021 (Annex 1330), Section 3; Russian Federal
Migration Service, Internal instruction No. AK-1/2/2-5770 “On the issuance of residence permits and temporary
residence permits”, 22 April 2014 (Annex 441), and Russian Federal Migration Service, Internal instruction No. AK-
1/2/2-8358 “On the organization of work with foreign citizens permanently residing in the Republic of Crimea and
Sevastopol”, 9 June 2014 (Annex 444). The requirement of one-year prior residence in Russia were not applicable to
them. A simplified procedure for obtaining residence permits was similarly adopted in 2017 for the benefit of persons
who had been illegally deported from Crimea, their relatives and descendants: they could obtain permanent residence
permits without first having to seek temporary residence permits: Federal Law No. 77-FZ “On introducing amendments
into Articles 8 and 9 of the Federal Law ‘On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation’”, 17 April
2017 (Annex 108), para 1(a).
110 See above, paras. 25-29.
111 MU, para. 473.
112 Armyansk City Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-49/2015, Decision, 23 January 2015 (Annex 207);
Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-225/2015, Decision, 6 February 2015 (Annex 214); Supreme
Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 4a-285/2015, Decision, 3 September 2015 (Annex 246); Armyansk City
Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 5-369/2015, Decision, 7 December 2015 (Annex 261); Supreme Court of the
Republic of Crimea, Decision No. 12-123/2016, 13 January 2016 (Annex 264); Armyansk City Court of the Republic of
Crimea, Case No. 5-22/2016, Decision, 22 April 2016 (Annex 273). See also Appeal of Mr Kadyrov against the
Decision of the Armyansk City Court of the Republic of Crimea of 23 January 2015 in Case No. 5-49/2015, 30 January
2015 (Annex 208); Appeal of Mr Alexander Lesovoy against the Decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Crimea of 6 February 2015 in Case No. 12-225/2015, 21 July 2015 (Annex 239); Explanation of Sinaver Kadyrov in the
case on the administrative offence envisaged by Part 1.1 of Article 18.8 of the Code on Administrative Offences of the
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does not even establish any connection whatsoever between this individual case and racial
discrimination against the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group. Whatever grievances Mr Kadyrov
may have had, his claimed rights were eventually accepted and restored by the Russian judicial
domestic system despite his erratic attitude and changing positions with regard to having the
Russian citizenship. Ukraine has thus no claim at all to make under international law in relation to
this individual case.
J. THE SECOND CASE INVOKED BY UKRAINE
67. Ukraine purports to establish the discriminatory character of the Kadyrov case by referring
to another case in which a Ukrainian citizen living in Crimea was not expelled.113 However,
Ukraine overlooks the essential facts that distinguish this case from that of Mr Kadyrov.
68. In this second case, the applicant was a Ukrainian national who had been living in Crimea
for six years, had a Russian wife and one child living there as well, and had relatives in Russia.
However, he had never formally registered as a permanent resident in Crimea. He had not taken
steps to prove his permanent residence in Crimea as of 18 March 2014 either – prior to the
initiation of the administrative case against him, which is a prerequisite for being recognized as a
Russian citizen. In 2016 the City Court of Sevastopol granted his appeal in part and quashed the
order to deport him from Crimea, based on the requirement to protect his right to private and family
life.114
69. Unlike Mr Kadyrov, the applicant in this case did not argue that he should have been granted
Russian citizenship in 2014 and treated accordingly. Rather, while admitting his guilt, he only
pleaded that the administrative sanction imposed upon him – expulsion to Ukraine – was inadequate
to the offence he had committed. Specifically, it interfered with his right to family life guaranteed
by the ECHR and posed a threat to his life and health, while other, less severe sanctions were
available.
70. The applicant’s mention of his role in the “Crimean Spring” was not made as an argument
and did not induce the Court in extending an undue favourable treatment to the applicant or in
giving him the benefit of the doubt in order to reward him. Rather, the applicant submitted that his
past participation in the “Crimean Spring” was one among several elements that contributed to
increase his fear for his and his family’s safety in case of expulsion to Ukraine. In particular, the
places in Ukraine where he had relatives were areas of armed conflict in Donbass, and he had also
been in Ukrainian captivity for some time due to his participation in the “Anti-Maidan” movement.
The OHCHR report that Ukraine invokes in support of its claim confirms that the court took its
Russian Federation before the Armyansk City Court, Case No. 5-369/2015, 18 October 2015 (Annex 252); Appeal of
Sinaver Kadyrov against the Decision of the Armyansk City Court of the Republic of Crimea in Case of 7 December
2015 No. 5-369/2015, 24 December 2015 (Annex 262).
113 MU, para. 474.
114 Court of Appeal of Sevastopol, Case No. 12-401/2016 (administrative appeal), Appellate Decision, 17 November
2016 (Annex 302). The Court affirmed the fine he had been sentenced to pay by the Leninsky district Court.
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decision based on the applicant’s argument pertaining to his right to private and family life, not to
his claimed role in the “Crimean Spring”.115
71. Far from applying the law arbitrarily, the Russian court took into account the claimant’s
family ties and fears of threat to his life or health in case of expulsion. As an ancillary point, the
Court took note of the applicant’s effective permanent residency in Crimea, and of the fact that he
had recently submitted a formal request with the authorities for regularizing his situation and
obtaining Russian citizenship.
K. UKRAINE’S ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS AND TAKE
PART IN THE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 5(C) OF CERD
72. In the Memorial, Ukraine makes a series of allegations with respect to the right to participate
in elections and take part in government under Article 5(c) of CERD.116 Ukraine insists on what it
depicts as discrimination prohibited under CERD in relation to the difference of treatment between
citizens and aliens.117
73. The distinction between citizens and aliens is legitimate and indeed common, including in
Ukraine.118 It is certainly not unlawful under the CERD since it falls within Articles 1.2 and 1.3,
and thus outside of the scope of this instrument. Further, there can be no discrimination in this
respect against those Crimeans who freely elected to opt out. In any event, under international law
States are entitled to make distinctions between their citizens and foreigners, including in respect of
access to public office and civil service.
74. Ukraine adds that “[t]here is no reasonable justification for this different treatment of non-
Russian citizens and Russian citizens who hold a second nationality”.119 This assertion flies in the
face of international law and State practice, which overwhelmingly upholds the principle of a
different treatment to nationals and to aliens. The reasonable justification is obvious: both
categories are not in the same position. In fact, their positions are very different. Many States
exclude dual nationals from holding public or government employment, public office, do not allow
them to participate in elections, or subject them to additional requirements or checks;120 As
115 OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (2017), Annex 777 to MU, para. 67.
116 MU, paras. 611-613.
117 MU, para. 612.
118 See e.g. Law of Ukraine № 889-VIII “On civil service”, 10 December 2015, available at: http://www.center.
gov.ua/en/press-center/articles/item/download/545 0821b8518898627786a8e9e7f5036425, Article 19.
119 MU, para. 613.
120 See for example U.S. Department of State, Dual Citizenship – Security Clearance Implications, 2016, available at:
https://careers.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Dual-Citizenship.pdf; Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
Act, (as amended on 29 July 1977), 9 July 1900, Section 44(i), available at:
https://www.aph.gov.au/~/link.aspx? id=074367F0015D42C2B005207F5642376A& z=z#chapter-01 part-04 44; the
Republic of the Philippines, Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act, 29 August 2003, Section 5(2), available at:
https://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2003/ra 9225 2003.html.
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previously explained,121 enabling many Crimeans to continue working in the public office was one
of the very reasons122 for establishing a simplified procedure of notifying one’s wish not to retain
foreign citizenship in late 2014 since dual nationals are not allowed to hold public office in the
Russian Federation.
L. UKRAINE’S ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND
RESIDENCE WITHIN THE BORDER OF THE STATE AND THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN TO ONE’S
COUNTRY UNDER ARTICLES 5(D)(I) AND (II) OF CERD
75. The Judgment on Preliminary Objections of 8 November 2019 clarified that claims premised
on an alleged violation of international humanitarian law are beyond the object of the dispute and
the jurisdiction of the Court.123 This applies to all claims, including in respect of Articles 5(d)(i) and
(ii) on the right to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the State and on the
right to leave and return to one’s country.124
76. In any event, residents in Crimea do not face any additional immigration barriers to the
extent they have obtained Russian citizenship, a permanent residence permit or a temporary
residence permit.125 Ukraine’s claims in this respect are thus baseless, even taken at face value.
M. UKRAINE’S ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY UNDER ARTICLE
5(D)(III) OF CERD
77. The same observations are relevant with respect to Ukraine’s allegations based on Article
5(d)(iii) of CERD on the right to nationality.126 The Russian Federation has already rebutted
Ukraine’s wrong and unfounded allegations on the 2014 special regime and the various options that
it entailed for Crimeans,127 on the right to nationality and conflicting loyalties of dual citizens,128 on
military conscription,129 on prisoner transfers,130 on the role of international humanitarian law,131 on
121 See above, para. 19.
122 Explanatory note to the revised draft no. 588277-6 of the Federal Constitutional Law “On amending the Federal
Constitutional Law ‘On the admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the formation of new
constituent entities within the Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol’”,
http://sozd.duma.gov ru/download/32D93D37-959D-46E6-8E13-4C6AE0722375, 14 August 2014 (Annex 445).
123 Judgment of 8 November 2019, I.C.J. Reports 2019, p. 594-595, para. 93.
124 MU, paras. 614-615.
125 Additionally, Ukrainian citizens are allowed to stay in the Russian Federation without a visa for a duration of up to
90 days within a 180-day period: Federal Law No. 115-FZ “On the legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian
Federation” (as amended on 24 April 2020), 25 July 2002 (Annex 47), Article 5(1).
126 MU, paras. 616-618.
127 MU, para. 616; see paras. 7-21 above.
128 MU, para. 617; see paras. 30-34 above.
129 MU, para. 617; see paras. 49-51 above. The “right to nationality” is primarily intended at avoiding cases of
statelessness as far as possible. The transitional provisions with respect to citizenship in Crimea, including the 2014
scheme and the opting-out system, indeed guaranteed that no Crimean would become stateless. In any event, these
measures also respected the Crimeans’ wishes and preferences with respect to nationality.
130 MU, para. 617; see paras. 53-54 above.
131 MU, para. 617; see Counter-Memorial, Chapter VI, paras. 383-387.
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the alleged specific impairment of Crimean Tatars’ and ethnic Ukrainians’ right to nationality,132
and on the absence of similar treatment of ethnic Russians who welcomed Crimea’s new status.133
N. UKRAINE’S ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHT TO WORK AND FREE CHOICE OF
EMPLOYMENT UNDER ARTICLE 5(E)(I) OF CERD
78. Ukraine contends that the system of citizenship conferral in Crimea impaired the enjoyment
by Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians of their right to work and free choice of employment
under Article 5(e)(i) of CERD.134
79. For the purpose of CERD, equal enjoyment of these rights under Article 5(e)(i) is
guaranteed subject to the persons being in a similar situation. Citizens and non-citizens are
obviously not in the same situation or even in a comparable situation. This explains the rationale of
the exceptions carved out by Articles 1.2 and 1.3 of CERD. As the Russian Federation has
explained, the requirement in Article 1.3 that measures taken by States with respect to non-citizens
must not discriminate against any particular nationality is complied with.135 The operation of Article
4(3) of the Admission Law precisely brings Crimea on an equal level with the rest of Russian
territory, and therefore there is no discrimination against any particular nationality. To the extent
Ukraine refers to dual citizens, they are treated in Crimea like on all other parts of the territory of
the Russian Federation.136 The Russian Federation’s treatment of dual citizens is also in accordance
with international standards, for example with respect to access to public employment and public
office.137 Such provisions distinguishing between citizens and aliens in the field of employment
may be found in the domestic legislation of other States in the world.138 In this respect, dual citizens
with Ukrainian nationality are treated on an equal footing with dual citizens with any other
nationality. Ukraine cannot simultaneously allege that Crimeans who opted out and those who
accepted Russian citizenship were victims of discrimination.139
80. In any event, as explained in some detail above, the Russian Federation has made steps to
facilitate access to the state service for those willing to renounce their Ukrainian citizenship by a
simple application. If anything, there is positive discrimination in this field for the Crimeans.140
132 MU, para. 618; see paras. 35 et seq. above.
133 MU, para. 618; see paras. 67-71 above.
134 MU, paras. 623-625.
135 See para. 61. above.
136 The provision of Article 4(3) of the Admission Law extends to Crimea the general restriction in Russian law
concerning access to public office and employment in public services of Russian citizens who also hold the nationality
of another State, and of Russian citizens who are permanent residents abroad.
137 See para. 12. above.
138 See for example French Administration official website, Conditions for access to public service, as a public
servant or as a contractor in France, as at 2 June 2021 (Annex 805).
139 MU, para. 624.
140 See above, para. 19.
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241
O. UKRAINE’S ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC HEALTH, MEDICAL CARE,
SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL SERVICES UNDER ARTICLE 5(E)(IV) OF CERD
81. Finally, the same goes for Ukraine’s allegations with respect to the right to public health,
medical care, social security and social services under Article 5(e)(iv) of CERD.141
82. Not only does the distinction between citizens and non-citizens with respect to these rights
reflect universal international practice, including in Ukraine; it is also excluded under Articles 1.2
and 1.3 of CERD.142 A difference of treatment between Russian citizens and dual citizens, on the
one hand, and foreigners, on the other, is subject to this exclusion. To be sure, the Russian legal
framework guarantees access to various levels of health-care, social security and social services to
foreigners with temporary and permanent residence permits in the Russian Federation, depending
on the foreigner’s situation and eligibility;143 this regime applies equally to all foreigners alike on
all parts of its territory, and no foreign nationality is treated discriminatorily in relation to other
foreign nationalities.
83. With the above-examined special rules and transitional simplified procedures established by
the Russian Federation in order to grant Russian citizenship or otherwise adequately settle the status
of Crimean residents in Russia, the Russian legislation effectively ensured the availability and full
applicability of the standard social security, healthcare insurance and employment opportunities to
the vast majority of the Crimean population. In fact, in order to exclude himself/herself from this
coverage, a Crimean who had been permanently residing in Crimea on 18 March 2014 would have
to opt out of the Russian citizenship and abstain from applying for a permanent or temporary
residence permit, and thus resolve deliberately to live in Crimea illegally, i.e. in defiance of Russian
immigration laws.
84. As has been highlighted above, Crimean permanent residents who are not Russian citizens,
like other foreigners permanently residing in Russia, enjoy to a large extent the same benefits as
Russian citizens do.144 These measures do not point to racial discrimination and are a fortiori
contradictory with the existence of an alleged systematic campaign of racial discrimination directed
at Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians.
141 MU, para. 626.
142 In MU, para. 626 like elsewhere in Ukraine’s Memorial, the reference to international humanitarian law and the
alleged “occupation” of Crimea are addressed by the Russian Federation’s observations thereon in this Counter-
Memorial.
143 Federal Law No. 165-FZ “On the fundamentals of compulsory social insurance”, 19 July 1999 (Annex 36),
Articles 1, 8; Federal Law No. 166-FZ “On state pensions in the Russian Federation”, 15 December 2001 (Annex 38),
Article 3.1; Federal Law No. 167-FZ “On compulsory pension insurance in the Russian Federation”, 15 December 2001
(Annex 39), Article 7.1; Federal Law No. 326-FZ “On compulsory health insurance in the Russian Federation”, 29
November 2010 (Annex 54), Article 10(1)-(2); Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 186 “On
approval of the rules for provision of medical assistance to foreign citizens in the territory of the Russian Federation”,
6 March 2013 (Annex 59), paras. 2-7; Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation, Letter No. 11-8/3077 “On
compulsory health insurance of certain categories of citizens temporarily staying in the territory of the Russian
Federation”, 20 July 2017 (Annex 476).
144 See para. 63 above.
242
APPENDIX D
NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC EVENTS AND
CULTURAL GATHERINGS, LET ALONE A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN THEREOF
1. Ukraine opens Chapter 10 of its Memorial with the grave accusations that the Russian
Federation “choked off cultural expression” in Crimea and “cracked down hard” on public events,
which is claimed to threaten with the “total erasure” of the distinct cultures of the region.1 These
allegations lack any factual basis, credibility or plausible merit.2
2. Ukraine’s arguments on public and cultural gatherings fall under two headings. First,
Ukraine generally takes issue with the substance of what it claims to be a “repressive” Russian
legislative framework “governing public gatherings”.3 Since Ukraine does not claim that the
Russian legislative framework is as such discriminatory, Ukraine’s contentions on this point are of
no relevance for its “racial discrimination” claim under CERD. Adjudicating upon such allegations
would fall beyond the remit of this Court’s jurisdiction. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the
Russian Federation provides in the present Appendix a brief and accurate description of its pertinent
laws for the Court’s benefit and to set proper context for rest of Russia’s responses.
3. Second, the linchpin of Ukraine’s “racial discrimination” case is a small number of events
which could not proceed in the exact form, at the exact time or at the exact location their organizers
would have preferred them to proceed. Ukraine’s account of these events is outright deceptive.
Many cultural events have been held in Crimea by Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians since 2014 –
most of which are conveniently overlooked in Ukraine’s biased narrative. As part of supporting
measures that are described elsewhere, the authorities have adopted legal acts that specifically
provide for these ethnic groups to celebrate culturally significant events.4 The actual state of affairs
1 MU, paras. 477-478.
2 See also Chapter VI of this Counter-Memorial, paras. 390-397.
3 MU, para. 481.
4 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 268 “On measures aimed at rehabilitation of Armenian,
Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state support of their revival and development” (as
amended on 12 September 2015), 21 April 2014 (Annex 63); Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea,
Information note on measures taken to implement the Decree No. 268 of the President of the Russian Federation and
other activities aimed at promoting cultures of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar peoples, as attached to the Letter No. 1/01-
46/8775/3/1, 5 June 2020 (Annex 498); Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Resolution No. 103 “On
measures aimed at the development of social and cultural spheres of life of the deported citizens and ensuring interethnic
harmony in the Republic of Crimea for 2014”, 27 May 2014 (Annex 67); Order of the Council of Ministers of the
Republic of Crimea No. 332-r “On events dedicated to Day of Remembrance of the victims of the deportation of the
peoples of Crimea”, 22 April 2014 (Annex 64); State Committee on Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea,
Information on the events held in the Republic of Crimea in implementation of Order of the Council of Ministers of the
Republic of Crimea of 22 April 2014 No. 332-r “On events dedicated to the Day of Remembrance for the victims of the
deportation from Crimea” (Annex 507); Decree of the Head of the Republic Crimea No. 136-U “On holding events
dedicated to the Day of Remembrance of victims of deportation from Crimea”, 13 May 2015 (Annex 89); Order of the
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No. 227-r “On approval of the Event Plan for the implementation in the
Republic of Crimea of the Set of Measures for the restoration of historical justice, political, social and spiritual revival
of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples, who were illegally deported and politically
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in Crimea is thus irreconcilable with the Claimant’s case of a systematic campaign of racial
discrimination. In addition, as the Russian Federation demonstrates below, none of the specific
measures referred to by Ukraine entails racial discrimination.
4. Ukraine indeed has not established that in relation to public events, the law that is applicable
in Crimea is racially discriminatory or arbitrary (I) or that it has been discriminatorily or arbitrarily
applied against the Crimean Tatars (II) and ethnic Ukrainians (III) on ethnic grounds, in comparison
to ethnic Russians (IV), let alone as part of a systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination
against these groups. No such racially discriminatory or arbitrary application of the law occurred
with respect to the individual incidents relied on by Ukraine. In each case, the measures taken by
the Russian authorities regarding the holding of public events were justified and rested on legitimate
grounds. Ukraine’s allegations have nothing to do with racial discrimination and have no basis
under CERD.
I. Peaceful Assembly under Russian Law
5. At the outset the Russian Federation reiterates that the issue of whether it is entitled to apply
its own laws in Crimea is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction.5 Ukraine’s repeated attempts to contest
repressed on ethnic and other grounds, for 2015-2016 years”, 23 March 2015 (Annex 85); Council of Ministers of the
Republic of Crimea, Information on the number and content of events held pursuant to Order No. 227-r “On approval of
the Event Plan for the implementation in the Republic of Crimea of the set of measures for the restoration of historical
justice, political, social and spiritual revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples,
who were illegally deported and politically repressed on ethnic and other grounds, for 2015-2016 years” (Annex 506);
Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No. 451-r “On approval of the Event Plan for the
implementation in the Republic of Crimea of the set of measures for the restoration of historical justice, political, social
and religious revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples, who were illegally
deported and politically repressed on ethnic and other grounds, for 2016”, 5 May 2016 (Annex 104); Decree of the
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No. 452-r “On holding events dedicated to the Day of Remembrance of
Victims of the Deportation from Crimea”, 5 May 2016 (Annex 105); Order of the Council of Ministers of the Republic
of Crimea No. 968-r “On the Event Plan for the implementation in the Republic of Crimea of the Set of Measures for
the restoration of historical justice, political, social and religious revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian,
Crimean Tatar and German Peoples, who were illegally deported and politically repressed on ethnic and other grounds,
for 2017-2019”, 29 August 2017 (Annex 110); State Committee on Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea,
Information on the events held in implementation of Order of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea of 29
August 2017 No. 968-r “On the Event Plan for the implementation in the Republic of Crimea of the Set of Measures for
the restoration of historical justice, political, social and religious revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian,
Crimean Tatar and German Peoples, who were illegally deported and politically repressed on ethnic and other grounds,
for 2017-2019” (Annex 508); Order of the Government of Sevastopol No. 578 “On approval of the Set of Measures for
the restoration of historical justice, political, social and spiritual revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean
Tatar and German peoples, who were illegally deported and politically repressed on ethnic and other grounds, for 2014-
2016 in Sevastopol”, 31 December 2014 (Annex 79); Department of Public Communications of the City of Sevastopol,
Information on the number and context of events held in implementation of Resolution of the Government of
Sevastopol of 31 December 2014 No. 578 “On the approval of the set of measures for the restoration of historical
justice, political, social and spiritual revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples,
subjected to illegal deportation and political repression on ethnic and other signs, for 2014-2016 in Sevastopol”, 17
February 2021 (Annex 640).
5 Judgment of 8 November 2019, paras. 23, 29 and 93.
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the applicability of Russian laws to Crimea on international humanitarian law grounds6 thus fall
beyond the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae.
6. Contrary to Ukraine’s position, Russian law governing public gatherings is not
“discriminatory” and is not incompatible thus with CERD.
7. Although Ukraine confuses these matters, there are in fact two distinct and relevant
regulatory regimes in place under Russian law: a regulatory framework governing so-called “public
events” and a distinct regime which applies to cultural gatherings. The legislation on public events
does not apply to other mass events, such as cultural, entertainment, sporting or other similar
events. As a rule, the relevant procedure for the latter category of events is determined by local selfgovernment
bodies.
8. Under Russian law, the distinguishing feature of a “public event” is its purpose. The purpose
of public events is exercising the freedom of expression, shaping public opinion and articulating
demands concerning various issues of political, economic, social and cultural life of the country or
issues of foreign policy.7 Such events are governed by federal laws, which apply uniformly and
without discrimination in the entire territory of the Russian Federation. Under international law, the
right to peaceful assembly is not absolute nor unlimited.8 While it is guaranteed under Article 31 of
the Russian Constitution, this guarantee is subject to Article 55(3) of the Constitution which reflects
applicable international human rights standards and common State practice by providing that
“[h]uman and civil rights and freedoms may be limited by federal law only to the extent necessary
for the protection of the basis of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights and lawful interests
of other people, and for ensuring the defence of the country and the security of the State.”
9. Russian legislation explicitly regulates the procedure for organizing and holding public
gatherings, while allowing citizens to exercise their constitutional rights to peaceful assembly. At
the federal level, the Russian legislator establishes the forms and objectives of public gatherings,9
the procedure for organizing a public event,10 the list of places prohibited to hold public
gatherings,11 the composition of persons participating in the organization and holding of a public
6 MU, para. 483.
7 Federal Law No. 54-FZ "On Assemblies, Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing", 19 June 2004 (Annex
877 to MU) (“Federal Law on Public Events”), Article 2(1). See also Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 56-ZRK "On
Creating Conditions for the Exercise by Citizens of the Russian Federation of the Right to Hold Assemblies, Rallies,
Processions, or Small Protests in the Republic of Crimea", 21 August 2014 (Annex 895 to MU) (“Crimean Law on
Public Events”), Article 1(1)(1).
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, Article 21, UNTS, vol. 999 (1976), p.
178, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf.
9 Federal Law on Public Events (Annex 877 to MU), Articles 2(1)-2(6).
10 Ibid., Articles 4, 7.
11 Ibid., Article 8(2).
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event, their rights and obligations as well as the competence of state bodies.12 Such detailed
regulation of public gatherings is aimed at providing the organizers and participants of public events
with clear and precise rules for holding public gatherings. It also ensures the legality of actions of
the authorities at all stages of the organization and conduct of public events in a peaceful manner.
10. Like in many countries, Russian law requires the organizers of an intended public event to
notify the competent authorities in advance and to provide them with a series of specific
information about the planned public event in order to enable the authorities to ensure security and
law and order throughout of such public event.13 In principle such notice should be addressed to the
authorities within a period not earlier than fifteen and not later than ten days prior to holding of the
public event.14
11. Ukraine erroneously suggests that the duty to notify Russian authorities in advance of public
events unduly restricts the freedom of assembly.15 This interpretation is erroneous. In fact, this very
issue was raised before the European Court of Human Rights for instance in Berladir and Others v.
Russia. The Court confirmed that notification and authorization procedures are per se consistent
with human rights law:
“[N]otification, and even authorization, procedures for a public event do not
normally encroach upon the essence of the right under Article 11 of the Convention
[i.e., the freedom of assembly and association] as long as the purpose of the
procedure is to allow the authorities to take reasonable and appropriate measures in
order to guarantee the smooth conduct of any assembly, meeting or other gathering,
be it political, cultural or of another nature.”16
12. In Molnár v. Hungary, the Court explained that notification or authorization procedures are
in fact “common practice” among State parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, and
12 Ibid., Articles 5-6, 12-14.
13 Ibid., Articles 2(7), 4(1), 7(1) and 7(3). See also Crimean Law on Public Events (Annex 895 to MU), Article 2(2).
In particular, the notice shall indicate the purpose of the public event; the form of the public event; the place (places) of
holding the public event, routes of passage of participants, and, if the public event to be held with the use of means of
transport, information on the use of means of transport; date, time of commencement and termination of the public
event; expected number of participants in the public event; forms and methods to be used by the organiser of the public
event to ensure public order, the organization of medical aid, intention to use sound-amplifying technical devices when
holding the public event; family name, first name, patronymic or denomination of the organiser of the public event, data
on his residential address or location and telephone number; family name, first name and patronymic of persons
authorized by the organiser of the public event to perform managerial functions associated with the organization and
holding of the public event; date of submission of the notice on holding the public event.
14 Federal Law on Public Events (Annex 877 to MU), Article 7(1). See also Crimean Law on Public Events (Annex
895 to MU), Article 2(1).
15 MU, para. 483. Ukraine is inconsistent with its own practice, which, in the same way as Russian regulation,
requires prior notification of authorities of a public event. See Ukrainian Constitution, 8 December 2004 (Annex 732 to
MU), Article 39: “Citizens shall have the right to assemble peacefully without arms and to hold rallies, meetings,
processions, and demonstrations upon notifying executive or local self-government bodies in advance.”
16 ECtHR, Berladir and Others v. Russia, judgment, 10 July 2012, application No. 34202/06, paras. 40, 42.
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246
serve “the aim of reconciling, on the one hand, the right to assembly and, on the other hand, the
rights and lawful interests (including the right of movement) of others, but also the prevention of
disorder or crime”.17 By contrast, in 2014, the European Court of Human Rights found that Ukraine
– not Russia – had lacked an adequate legislative framework to secure the freedom of assembly.18
13. Consistent with the foregoing, the notification procedure under Russian law is not aimed at
unduly restricting the rights of citizens to peaceful assembly. The purpose of the procedure is to
provide public authorities with the necessary information about the public event, well in advance of
the event in question.19 Without such information at the disposal of the authorities (including, for
instance, on the expected turnout and the purpose of the event), a risk exists that state authorities
may not be able to take appropriate steps to ensure safe conditions for both the participants of the
public event and other persons. For completeness, the Russian Federation also notes that prior
notification, or authorisation, is not even a necessary precondition in the case of smaller scale public
events which do not raise such concerns.20
14. While every domestic regime has its own peculiarities, similar regulations of public events
exist in most countries, including for instance in France, Germany, Italy, the United States or
Ukraine. This is the case for the requirement of prior authorizations or permits for holding public
events and the requirement for the organizer to provide specific information, to take specific steps
beforehand and to ensure compliance with certain requirements during the public event.21 This is
17 ECtHR, Éva Molnár v. Hungary, judgment, 7 October 2008, application No. 10346/05, para. 37. Nothing in the
opinion of the Venice Commission, cited by Ukraine as Annex 816, undermines these points made by the Court. This
opinion is immaterial to Ukraine’s case of a systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination.
18 ECtHR, Vyerentsov v. Ukraine, judgment, 11 April 2013, application No. 20372/11, para. 55; Shmushkovych v.
Ukraine, judgment, 14 November 2013, application No. 3276/10, para. 40.
19 The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has confirmed a number of times that without the requisite
knowledge of proposed public events (including their nature and scope), the public authorities would be unable to fulfill
their obligations under Article 2 of the Russian Constitution, requiring that they observe and protect human and civil
rights and freedoms and take necessary measures, including preventive and organizational measures, aimed at ensuring
safe conditions both for the participants of the public event and other persons. See Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation, Decision No. 4-P, 14 February 2013 (Annex 135), para. 2.2; Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,
Decision No. 12-P, 18 May 2012 (Annex 134), para. 3; Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Ruling No.
1428-O, 7 July 2016 (Annex 283), para. 3.
20 Federal Law on Public Events (Annex 877 to MU), Articles 7(1), 7(1.1), 8(1.1).
21 See Boston City Hall official website, “Rules and regulations for public events”, 12 April 2021 (Annex 812), also
available at https://www.boston.gov/departments/consumer-affairs/rules-and-regulations-public-events and
https://www.boston.gov/departments/consumer-affairs-and-licensing/how-apply-host-public-event-boston; French
Administration official website, “Organization of demonstrations, parades or public gatherings”, 12 April 2021 (Annex
813), also available in French at https://www.service-public.fr/associations/vosdroits/F21899; Law of Hamburg on the
protection of public security and order, HmbGVBl. S. 77, 14 March 1966 (Annex 809), section 31, also available in
German at http://www.lexsoft.de/cgi-bin/lexsoft/justizportal nrw.cgi?xid=170635,43; Italy, Royal Decree No. 773
“Adoption of the consolidated legislation on public security”, 18 July 1931 (Annex 808), Articles 68-69, also available
in Italian at http://www.prefettura.it/FILES/AllegatiPag/1160/NORM%20A%20-%20R.D.%2018-06-
1931%20N.%20773%20-%20TULPS.pdf.
Appendix D
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also the case in respect of sanctions for holding of unauthorized public events or for carrying out
illegal conduct during a public event.22
15. Holding a public event without securing prior authorization or failure to ensure that the
public event proceeds in line with the approved format will result in the imposition of
administrative sanctions to the organizer and participants, as appropriate. This is standard practice,
including in Ukraine.23
16. As regards the venue, as a general rule, a public event can be held at any place suitable for
the proposed event, provided that it does not give rise to risk to the integrity of buildings or
structures (for example, collapse), nor poses any other threat to participants’ security during the
event.24 Article 8(1.1) of the Federal Law on Public Events provides for the designation of places
that are specially assigned or equipped for public events (hereinafter – the “Specially Assigned
Places”). Such places are designated by executive state power bodies of the constituent entities of
the Russian Federation, and importantly due to their characteristics allow for more effective security
support from the authorities, thereby making them more suitable for public events.25 The definition
of Specially Assigned Places does not prevent the organizer of a public event from choosing
another place, not restricted by law, to hold it by sending a notice to the public authority in
accordance with the general procedure.26 However, it is easier to hold public events in Specially
Assigned Places. For example, in order to hold a public event in a Specially Assigned Place, no
22 When amending its legislation on public events in 2012 (through Federal Law No. 65-FZ of 8 June 2012), the
Russian Federation took into account sanctions applied in several other countries. See President of the Russian
Federation official website, “Sanctions for offenses during the preparation and conduct of mass demonstrations,
comparative table” (Annex 1281). In this respect, sanctions provided for under Russian law are reasonable when
compared to those in force in these other countries. See Code on Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation,
No. 195-FZ, 30 December 2001 (Annex 41), Articles 20.2(1),(2) and (5) (as of 9 June 2012), and Plenum of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 28 “On certain issues encountered by the courts in
consideration of administrative cases and of cases on administrative offences pertaining to application of legislation on
public events”, 26 June 2018 (Annex 403), para. 33.
23 See for example Ukraine, Leninsky District Court of Sevastopol, case No. 3-21573/2008, Decision, 24 October
2008 (Annex 775); Ukraine, Central District Court of Simferopol, case No. 3-2317/09, Decision, 24 June 2009 (Annex
776); Ukraine, Central District Court of Simferopol, case No. 3-3575/09, Decision, 8 October 2009 (Annex 777);
Ukraine, Court of Appeal of the Kharkov Region, case No. 33-554/2010, Decision, 20 July 2010 (Annex 778); Ukraine,
Kiev Court of Appeal, case No. 33-2182, Decision, 14 December 2010 (Annex 780).
24 Federal Law on Public Events (Annex 877 to MU), Article 8(1).
25 As an example, see the list of Specially Assigned Places for Simferopol: Resolution of the Council of Ministers of
the Republic of Crimea No. 452 “On approval of the list of places specially assigned for public events in the territory of
the Republic of Crimea”, 12 November 2014 (Annex 74).
26 Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 28 “On certain issues encountered by the
courts in consideration of administrative cases and of cases on administrative offences pertaining to application of
legislation on public events”, 26 June 2018 (Annex 403), para. 17. This resolution addressed certain issues that arise in
courts when considering administrative cases and cases of administrative offenses relating to the application of
legislation on public events. This resolution refers to legal regulation, which has been in force long before 2018,
including during the period from 18 March 2014 to the present.
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248
notification is even required if the number of participants does not exceed the maximum number, as
established by law of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation.27
17. If there are any suspicions of a possible violation of public order, the public authority may
issue a written warning to the organizer on the inadmissibility of violating the law and potential
liability.28 Such warning is an additional way to inform the organizers about the provisions of the
current legislation, allowing them to bring their actions in accordance with the requirements of the
law.
18. As a reliable guarantee of the right to peaceful assembly there is a strictly limited list of
grounds for refusal to hold a public event provided for by law.29
19. Citizens’ right to freedom of peaceful assembly is further ensured by an effective judicial
protection mechanism, allowing the adjudication of any disputes prior to the date of the public
event.30
II. No Racial Discrimination in Respect of Cultural Gatherings and Public Events of the
Crimean Tatar Community
20. Ukraine contends that the “authorities have applied these repressive laws to systematically
suppress the ability of the Crimean Tatar community to mark events of cultural significance.”31 As
is confirmed below, these allegations are baseless; the Russian Federation has not applied its laws
discriminatorily in respect of the specific situations referred to by Ukraine.
A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
21. Before turning to the particular events Ukraine singles out, a number of cross-cutting
observations are warranted (in respect of the public events of both the Crimean Tatar and the
Ukrainian communities).
22. First, Ukraine generally does not compare and contrast the conduct of the Russian
authorities in relation to Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian events with their treatment of the events
organized by other national or ethnic communities, apart from a few misleadingly presented events.
There is no evidence before the Court that in the Russian Federation public events organized by
27 Federal Law on Public Events (Annex 877 to MU), Article 8(1.1).
28 Ibid., Article 12(2). See also Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On counteracting extremist activities”, 25 July 2002
(Annex 876 to MU), Article 16.
29 Federal Law on Public Events (Annex 877 to MU), Article 12(3). See also Articles 5(2), 5(5), 12(1)(1) and
12(1)(2).
30 Ibid., Article 19. See also Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 28 “On certain
issues encountered by the courts in consideration of administrative cases and of cases on administrative offences
pertaining to application of legislation on public events”, 26 June 2018 (Annex 403), paras. 1-4.
31 MU, para. 485.
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249
ethnic Russians or any other national or ethnic groups enjoy more beneficial treatment in any
respects when compared with the public events of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities. As
the Russian Federation has explained at length in the present submission, absent a comparator
Ukraine’s discrimination claim is without any basis. To the extent Ukraine purports to draw
comparisons, its arguments are unavailing, and the parallels it purports to draw are inapposite, as
demonstrated in section IV below.
23. Second, Ukraine does not point to a single instance where the parties organizing the public
events in question challenged the conduct of the Russian authorities before Russian courts on the
specific basis that they have been discriminated against on racial grounds. Actually, in the vast
majority of cases, the actions and responses of the Russian authorities have not even been
challenged and recognized illegal on any grounds.32 This undermines Ukraine’s attempts to portray
retrospectively these events and instances as “racial discrimination”, a claim that was not made
when the events took place.
24. Third, while Ukraine glosses over the factual details of the particular events, as will be
demonstrated below, the Russian authorities at all times attempt to provide participants and
organizers of public events with full support to the extent an option exists, for example by
suggesting alternative timing or venues whenever possible.33
25. Fourth, it is important to put the record straight concerning facts that Ukraine simply
ignores. Ukraine claims that Crimean Tatars were obstructed in commemorating the Sürgün.34 In
fact, in May 2014, thousands commemorated the Sürgün in Simferopol at a meeting organized at
that time by the Mejlis.35 Similar events, such as a meeting of 1,500 people in Sudak,36 combined
with cultural events, including prayer services in mosques and laying flowers at the monuments,
32 Public Order Protection Department of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the City of
Sevastopol, Note on the legality of actions of officers of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for
the city of Sevastopol when taking public enforcement action in respect of participants and organisers of public events
(Annex 633); Public Order Protection Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea, Note
on the principles and legal regulation of the police (Annex 651).
33 For example, see the description of episodes related to the celebration of Sürgün in the Voinka village in 2016, as
well as the holding of a picket on 10 December 2014, dedicated to the International Human Rights Day, paras. 30 and
34.
34 MU, paras. 485-486.
35 YouTube, Video footage of the rally in Simferopol dedicated to Sürgün, 18 May 2014 (Annex 1211), also available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOjXkcF8T7o&t=. The caption to the video on the YouTube page indicates that
the meeting took place in Aqmescit, which is Simferopol in Crimean Tatar. See also Official website of the Mejlis,
Photos of the rally in Simferopol dedicated to Sürgün, 18 May 2014,
http://qtmm.org/ru/%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B
8%D0%B0/gid/629 (Annex 1213).
36 YouTube, Video footage of the rally in Sudak dedicated to Sürgün, 18 May 2014 (Annex 1212), also available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N17ILFo5V74. See also State Committee on Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic
of Crimea, Information on the events held in the Republic of Crimea in implementation of Order of the Council of
Ministers of the Republic of Crimea of 22 April 2014 No. 332-r “On events dedicated to the Day of Remembrance for
the victims of the deportation from Crimea” (Annex 507), table line 9.
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250
were held simultaneously all over Crimea.37 The significant observable scale of the gatherings in
question contradicts Ukraine’s allegations. For the Court’s convenience, and by way of illustration,
the Russian Federation provides below a photograph of the Sürgün commemoration held on 18 May
2014 in Simferopol38 – a commemoration that Ukraine claims was banned:39
Figure 1. Meeting dedicated to the Sürgün, held in Simferopol on 18 May 201440
26. Similarly, in 2015, the following commemorative events were held in Crimea: (i) prayer
services in mosques41; (ii) laying flowers at the monuments42; (iii) the event called “light a fire in
37 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, “In Crimea, Day of Remembrance of the victims of the deportation was commemorated
without incidents”, 18 May 2014 (Annex 904).
38 Official website of the Mejlis, Photos of the rally in Simferopol dedicated to Sürgün, 18 May 2014,
http://qtmm.org/ru/%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B
8%D0%B0/gid/629 (Annex 1213).
39 MU, para. 485.
40 According to the information from the official website of Mejlis at http://qtmm.org/ru, 30,000 people took part in
the meeting.
41 YouTube, Video footage of the prayer service dedicated to the victims of the deportation that took place in
Simferopol, 18 May 2015 (Annex 1215), also available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cP6FE-QhupI.
42 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, “Crimea commemorates the victims of the deportation”, 18 May 2015 (Annex 924).
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251
your heart”43; (iv) requiem concerts44; (v) foundation of the memorial to the victims of deportation
in Bakhchisaray45; (vi) the climbing of Mount Chatyr-Dag46 and other events.
27. Ukraine takes issue with the fact that an application by the Mejlis for a public event to
commemorate the Sürgün was rejected in 2015,47 but fails to mention that it was rejected because
another organization, the Interregional Public Movement of the Crimean Tatar People, had
previously notified the authorities of its intent to organize another event at the same time and at the
same location, and due to a lack of alternative available specially designed venues.48
28. There has been no judicial challenges of any supposed refusal to commemorate Sürgün in
2015.49 The Court ought to consider Ukraine’s accusation of a systematic campaign of racial
discrimination against this background. The Sürgün has continued to be one of the regularly
celebrated events in Crimea in the subsequent years.50
43 Kryminform, “‘Light a fire in your heart’ event was held in Simferopol in memory of the victims of the deportation
/PHOTO/”, 18 May 2015 (Annex 922).
44 State Council of the Republic Crimea official website, “A requiem meeting dedicated to Day of Remembrance of
victims of the deportation from Crimea was held in Simferopol”, 18 May 2015 (Annex 459).
45 Kryminform, “In the Bakhchisaray district, a capsule was laid in the foundation of a future monument to the
victims of the deportation”, 18 May 2015 (Annex 923). See also YouTube, Video footage entitled “Crimean authorities
promise Crimean Tatars a memorial to the victims of the deportation (video)”, that shows the foundation of the
memorial to the victims of the deportation in Bakhchisaray, 18 May 2015 (Annex 1216), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ba2Q96mBk9o.
46 Krym.Realii, “Thousands of Crimean Tatars began ascent of Chatyr-Dag in memory of the victims of the
deportation”, 16 May 2015 (Annex 921).
47 MU, para. 486.
48 Interregional Public Movement of the Crimean Tatar people “Qirim”, Notification No. 3 to the Administration of
the City of Simferopol on holding a rally on 18 May 2015 in Simferopol, 5 May 2015 (Annex 546), received by the
administration of Simferopol at 9.15 a.m.; Administration of the City of Simferopol, Response No. 5646/24/01-66 to the
notification of Interregional Public Movement of the Crimean Tatar people “Qirim” on approval of the rally, 7 May
2015 (Annex 548); N.E. Dzhelyalov, Notification to the Administration of the City of Simferopol on holding a rally on
18 May 2015 in Simferopol, 5 May 2015 (Annex 547), received by the administration of Simferopol at 02.39 p.m.;
Administration of the City of Simferopol, Response No. D-217/6597 to the notification of Mr Dzhelyalov, 7 May 2015
(Annex 549), according to which a previously agreed event of another Crimean Tatar organization is due to be held at
the indicated place and time.
49 Department of Judicial Support for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Note
confirming the absence of cases challenging the decisions of the Crimean authorities not to approve the holding of
certain events (Annex 649), para. 1.10.
50 As an example, see YouTube, Video footage of the mourning event dedicated to Sürgün, held in Sudak, 18 May
2017 (Annex 1226), also available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A5mBJyUFxn0; Crimean Tatars Club
website, Video footage of the commemorative events dedicated to Sürgün in Aqmescit (Simferopol), 18 May 2018
(Annex 1228), also available at https://www.crimeantatars.club/life/society/v-den-skorbi-krymskih-tatar-podderzhivaetedinstvo.
See also State Committee on Inter-ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, Information on the events held
in implementation of Order of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea of 29 August 2017 No. 968-r “On the
Event Plan for the implementation in the Republic of Crimea of the Set of Measures for the restoration of historical
justice, political, social and religious revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German
Peoples, who were illegally deported and politically repressed on ethnic and other grounds, for 2017-2019” (Annex
508).
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29. With respect to the commemoration of the Sürgün generally, besides commemorations by
citizens, this day is also officially marked in Crimea, including in particular under the form of State
commemoration events attended by the Crimean authorities at their highest level, and also in
schools.51 This is a direct consequence of the Presidential Decree on rehabilitation adopted in
2014.52 The Crimean Tatar flag is proudly displayed during these commemorations.53
B. SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS
1. The Case of the Voinka Village Administration in 2016
30. Turning now to the specific events mentioned by Ukraine, Ukraine takes issue with a
decision of the Voinka village administration of Krasnoperekopsky in 2016 concerning an
application for a public gathering related to the Sürgün.54 The Voinka village administration did not
reject a request to hold a meeting for a commemoration of Sürgün. Since the request in question
related to an area where development works were underway at the time (and lasted for weeks),55 the
authorities offered the organizer other options, including to hold the planned meeting in the
morning at 9 a.m. before the works commence so as to avoid their interruption,56 or to hold with
other citizens a joint cultural event of laying flowers at the commemorative plaque, which had
previously been planned at the indicated place and time.57 The applicant refused to agree to any
suggested solutions.58 While it is the applicant’s right to do so, the town administration cannot be
51 See this Counter-Memorial, Chapter V, paras. 329 and 332.
52 See this Counter-Memorial, Chapter I, paras. 57-63.
53 As an example, see photos from the official website of the Bakhchisaray city administration, available at
https://bahchisaray.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/1246 or https://archive md/ONNDl.
54 MU, para. 486.
55 Decision of the Voinka Village Administration No. 361 “On the works to improve the park territory”, 29 April
2016 (Annex 103).
56 Notification of Ms Ametova to the Voinka Village Administration on holding a rally in the park of the Voinka
village on 18 May 2016 from 3:00 p m. to 5:00 p m., 4 May 2016 (Annex 563); Voinka Village Administration,
Response to the notification of Ms Ametova with the proposal to hold a joint event of laying flowers at the memorial
plaque in the Voinsky rural settlement on 18 May 2016 at 3:00 p m., 10 May 2016 (Annex 565); Letter of Ms Ametova
to the Voinka Village Administration consenting to hold a rally on 18 May 2016 from 11:00 a m. to 12:30 p.m., 12 May
2016 (Annex 566); Voinka Village Administration, Response to the letter of Ms Ametova, 13 May 2016 (Annex 567),
that (i) confirms the fact that the administration has proposed to Saniye Ametova the second option to hold the meeting
on 18 May 2016 at 9:00 a m., (ii) states that it was impossible to hold the meeting at another time due to land
improvement works in the park of the village of Voinka.
57 Voinka village administration, Decree No. 111 “On holding events on 18 May 2016”, 28 April 2016 (Annex
1265); Division for Culture and Inter-ethnic Relations of the Administration of the Krasnoperekopsky District of the
Republic of Crimea, Information on the activities performed in the village of Voinka for the purpose of implementing
Resolution of 29 April 2016 No. 111, 9 June 2020 (Annex 624).
58 Krasnoperekopsk District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2a-932/16, Decision, 17 May 2016 (Annex
274); Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 33a-5959/2016, Appellate Decision, 5 September 2016
(Annex 296); Krasnoperekopsk District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 2a-1578/16, Decision, 4 October
2016 (Annex 298); Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 33a-267/2017, Appellate Decision, 11 January
2017 (Annex 307).
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blamed for their decision. In such context the authorities’ decision was objective and reasonable;
and it has clearly nothing to do with racial discrimination.
2. The 2017 Unauthorized Public Event in Bakhchisaray
31. In relation to another event in 2017 in Bakhchisaray, Ukraine alleges that the authorities
imposed sanctions for “driving cars displaying the Crimean Tatar flag”.59 This allegation represents
another blatant falsehood. The modest administrative fines60 were imposed as the event in
question61 had not been notified to Russian authorities in advance pursuant to the requirement
discussed above.62 These administrative measures had nothing to do with the display of flags or
symbols which are otherwise routinely displayed at various events in Crimea without any
restriction.63 The activists have not appealed the decisions against them before higher courts.64
3. Celebration of Human Rights Day in 2014
32. Ukraine extensively dwells on the alleged obstruction of celebrations of the International
Human Rights Day in December 2014 and 2015 (the “December 2014 Events” and the “December
2015 Events” respectively).65
33. As to the December 2014 Events,66 upon receipt of an application from the Committee on
the Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatar People (hereinafter the “Committee”), which was
59 MU, para. 486.
60 Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, case No. 5-239/2017, Decision, 8 June 2017 (Annex 919
to MU); Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, case No. 5-238/2017, Decision, 8 June 2017 (Annex
918 to MU); Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea, case No. 5-236/2017, Decision, 8 June 2017
(Annex 920 to MU).
61 Video footage of the public event in the form of a demonstration using automobiles in Bakhchisaray, 18 May 2017
as attached to the Letter of the Acting Chair of the Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea No. 2020-
2/1265 of 20 May 2020 (Annex 1225).
62 Administration of the City of Bakhchisaray, Note No. 021-22/1786 confirming the absence of notifications on
holding public events dedicated to commemoration of Sürgün in Bakhchisaray on 18 May 2017, 18 May 2017 (Annex
582).
63 As an example, see the description of the episode related to the celebration of the Crimean Tatar Flag Day in 2015,
paras. 39.
64 Judicial Chamber for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Letter on the absence
of complaints challenging the decision of the Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea of 8 June 2017 in
case No. 5-239/2017, 22 May 2020 (Annex 620); Judicial Chamber for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of
the Republic of Crimea, Letter on the absence of complaints challenging the decision of the Bakhchisaray District Court
of the Republic of Crimea of 8 June 2017 in case No. 5-238/2017, 22 May 2020 (Annex 621); Judicial Chamber for
Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Letter on the absence of complaints challenging
the decision of the Bakhchisaray District Court of the Republic of Crimea of 8 June 2017 in case No. 5-236/2017, 22
May 2020 (Annex 622).
65 MU, paras. 487-491.
66 MU, paras. 488-489.
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dated 28 November 201467, the Crimean authorities ascertained that the notice of the Committee did
not contain an indication of the form of the event and the number of its participants.68 As described
earlier69, this information is necessary to ensure the safety of the participants of the event and to
take preparatory measures for holding the event. Rejection of the notification in such circumstances
was not definitive. Subsequently, the Committee had several possible options in light of the
response it received from the authorities, in particular making the necessary adjustments to its
notification or challenging the response in courts. The Committee has done neither. Instead, the
Committee decided to hold a different event – a picket on Lenin Square on 10 December 2014.
34. Having considered the notice of the Committee on the picket70, the competent authorities
were not in a position to issue an approval due to the simple fact that a number of events had
already been scheduled to be held on the territory of Lenin Square by that time.71 This prompted the
authorities to propose another place for the picket – the Gagarin Park72, which is one of the places
specially assigned to host public events73 and, contrary to Ukraine’s suggestion, is by no means
“peripheral”.74 The designation of Gagarin Park as a Specially Assigned Place for public events is
due to the characteristics of this venue, including its good transport accessibility, large capacity, and
the ability of authorities to ensure the safety of public events’ participants. One of the most
important characteristics of Gagarin Park is its location. As can be seen from the map below, the
Park is located in the central part of Simferopol and is approximately a kilometer away from the
administrative center of the city where the building of the highest legislative body of the Republic
of Crimea is located. It remains unclear to date which reasons prompted the rejection of this
alternative venue by the Committee. The counter-proposal of the Committee to hold the event in
three alternative locations,75 taking into account the time of its submission, did not allow the
67 Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People, Notification No. 001/11 on holding
events on 10 December 2014, 28 November 2014 (Annex 531).
68 Executive Committee of Simferopol City Council of the Republic of Crimea, Response No. 9818/24/01-66 to the
notification of the Committee on the Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatar People dated 28 November 2014,
2 December 2014 (Annex 841 to MU).
69 See para. 13.
70 Committee on the Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatar People, Letter No. 001/12 on holding the picket in
Lenin square in Simferopol on 10 December 2014, 5 December 2014 (Annex 844 to MU).
71 Acting Head of the City Administration of Simferopol, Order No. 217-r “On celebration of the New Year 2015
and Christmas”, 25 November 2014 (Annex 449).
72 Administration of the City of Simferopol, Response No. 24/01-66/12 to the notification of the Committee on the
Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatar People of 5 December 2014, 8 December 2014 (Annex 532).
73 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No. 452 “On approval of the list of places
specially assigned for public events in the territory of the Republic of Crimea”, 12 November 2014 (Annex 74).
74 MU, para. 489.
75 Committee on the Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatar People, Letter No. 003/12 with a counter-proposal to
hold the picket in alternative locations, 9 December 2014 (Annex 847 to MU).
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authorities to ensure the safety of participants of the public event and to take preparatory measures
for event.76 Each time, the reasons for the decision were duly explained in the letters.
Figure 2. Location of the Gagarin Park in Simferopol77
4. Allegations in Relation to Private Events
35. In respect of the December 2014 Events, Ukraine also refers to certain altercations which
took place at a press conference on 10 December 2014. The events in question did not involve the
Russian authorities. As Ukraine itself states, the press conference was held in a private building.78
Accordingly, it was the organizers themselves, and not the Simferopol authorities, who made
security arrangements and controlled entry into and departure from the facility. The Russian
Federation is not aware of any request or complaint by the organizers towards the Russian
authorities in relation to the events which unfolded at the press conference. As a result, there is no
conduct which could be attributed to the Russian Federation as a matter of State responsibility, nor
was there any basis for investigating something that was never formally reported to the authorities.
76 Administration of Simferopol, Response No. 12154/24/01-66 to the Committee for Protection of Rights of the
Crimean Tatars, 9 December 2014 (Annex 846 to MU).
77 Source: Google Maps at https://www.google ru/maps (accessed on 26 February 2021).
78 MU, para. 491.
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256
36. Ukraine mentions in passing another conference organized in a private hotel in January
2015, stressing this time the presence of Russian police, and alleging its inaction in the face of
disruptive conduct.79 This is untrue. The police was not initially present at the conference and was
called only after the scuffle started, as confirmed by video evidence. Once at the conference, police
forces swiftly restored order and the conference could continue. In fact, based on the video evidence
supplied by Ukraine, the altercations appear to have occurred as between conference attendees who
had been affiliated with each other.80
5. Celebration of Human Rights Day in 2015
37. As to the December 2015 Events, the Court will note that Crimean authorities were
compelled to introduce emergency laws on 22 November 2015, which temporarily interrupted the
holding of public events during the state of emergency.81 This was due to an energy system
malfunction caused by destruction of four power line pylons in Kherson region of Ukraine as part of
the so-called energy blockade committed by Ukrainian nationalist groups as well as members and
associates of the Mejlis,82 resulting in an almost complete shutdown of electricity supply to the
Crimean Peninsula.83 This state of affairs, which Ukraine made no efforts to alleviate and in fact
only aggravated by its simultaneous water and food blockade at the time,84 imposed an immense
burden on the local population and the authorities alike and created a serious humanitarian situation.
Due to the state of emergency, the Simferopol city authorities, as well as the authorities of several
other regions of Crimea, were compelled to corresponding restrictions, including restrictions on
holding mass gatherings,85 which apply to anyone.86 The authorities’ reply to the Mejlis’s
79 MU, para. 491.
80 Video footage entitled “Bariiev Instructing the Crimean Tatars to Show Their Peaceful Intentions in the Face of
Provocation”, 17 January 2015 (Annex 1101 to MU). See also Table of contradictions in the evidence presented by
Ukraine in connection with the scuffle that occurred at the conference in Simferopol on 17 January 2015 (Annex 1280).
81 Order of the Head of the Republic of Crimea No. 454-rg “Оn imposing the man-made emergency situation
regime”, 22 November 2015 (Annex 93).
82 Ekho Kavkaza, “Leader of the Crimean Tatars named the condition for lifting the blockade of Crimea”, 23
November 2015 (Annex 938). See Chapter IV, para. 167and fn. 354 et seq.
83 BBC, “Video footage confirming the lack of urgent measures of the Ukrainian authorities required to restore
power supply to Crimea”, 26 November 2015 (Annex 1221). See also Chapter IV, para. 167 and fn. 354 et seq.
84 VZGLYAD, “UN: Ukrainian authorities violated human rights during the food ‘blockade’ of Crimea”, 9 December
2015 (Annex 942). See also Chapter IV, para. 167, fns. 347-348 and 361.
85 Resolution of the City Administration of Simferopol No. 1347 “On restriction of mass, public, cultural,
entertainment and other events in the territory of the municipality - the urban district of Simferopol of the Republic of
Crimea”, 22 November 2015 (Annex 94); Resolution of the City Administration of Simferopol No. 1348 “On imposing
emergency situation regime for the forces of the municipal unit of the territorial subsystem of the unified state system of
prevention and elimination of emergency situations (RSChS) in the municipality - the urban district of Simferopol of
the Republic of Crimea”, 22 November 2015 (Annex 95). Restrictions were not limited to public events, see also in
other fields of life and activity: Resolution of the City Administration of Simferopol No. 1368 “On taking measures to
eliminate the emergency situation in the territory of the municipality - the urban district of Simferopol of the Republic
of Crimea”, 24 November 2015 (Annex 96); Resolution of the City Administration of Simferopol No. 1377 “On the
regulation of certain issues in connection with the emergency situation”, 25 November 2015 (Annex 97); Resolution of
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notification of 3 December 2015 regarding the organization of a public event for Human Rights
Day 2015 was thus objective and reasonable and has certainly nothing to do with racial
discrimination.87
38. It is misleading for Ukraine to contrast the treatment of an event held on 27 November 2015
with the International Human Rights Day.88 That is because starting on 27 November 2015 the
overall situation further deteriorated, and the availability of power supply was then reduced to 4
hours per day.89 The authorities had no human resources to spare and would have been thus unable
to ensure the safety of the participants of the event planned for 10 December 2015. In particular, the
police, which ensures the safety of citizens during public events90, were deployed to protect socially
significant objects and life-support facilities that were without energy supply given the disruption in
the energy transmission system.91 The circumstances described above plainly constitute an
emergency situation.92 Neither the resolutions which understandably restricted mass events in
Simferopol in the light of the prevailing extraordinary circumstances, nor the position of the
administrative bodies regarding the celebration of the International Human Rights Day have been
challenged before Russian courts.93 Once again, Ukraine’s contention that this incident illustrates
and forms part of a systematic campaign of racial discrimination lacks any credibility.
6. Crimean Tatar Flag Day 2015
39. Ukraine also complains about measures allegedly affecting the celebrations of the Crimean
Tatar Flag Day on 26 June 2015.94 There is no basis for such complaints. Cultural events that were
held in Simferopol to commemorate the Crimean Tatar Flag Day in 2015 were unprecedented in
the City Administration of Simferopol No. 1 “On the regulation of certain issues in connection with the emergency
situation”, 5 January 2016 (Annex 99).
86 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Information on the number and context of public events in the city
of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea scheduled for the period from 22 November 2015 to 22 March 2016, which
were not approved by the Administration of the City of Simferopol due to the adoption of Decree of the Head of the
Republic of Crimea of 22 November 2015 No. 454-rg, Resolutions of the Administration of the City of Simferopol of
22 November 2015 No. 1348, of 22 November 2015 No. 1347 (Annex 650).
87 Administration of the City of Simferopol, Letter No. U-160/20140 to Mr Ilmi Umerov, 3 December 2015 (Annex
560).
88 MU, para. 492.
89 MKRU, “In Simferopol, the power supply was reduced to 4 hours”, 27 November 2015 (Annex 940).
90 Federal Law on Public Events (Annex 877 to MU), Article 14(3)(2).
91 Operational headquarters of the City Administration of Simferopol for the elimination of emergency situations,
Minutes No. 4, 22 November 2015 (Annex 462), para. 8.
92 Federal Law No. 68-FZ “On protection of population and territories from natural and man-made emergency
situations”, 21 December 1994 (Annex 29), Article 1(1).
93 Department of Judicial Support for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Note
confirming the absence of cases challenging the decisions of the Crimean authorities not to approve the holding of
certain events (Annex 649), paras. 1.2, 1.4-1.7.
94 MU, para. 493.
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scale and number of participants, and included raising the largest Crimean Tatar flag in the history
of Crimea,95 the largest motor rally in the history of Crimea96 and a festive concert.97
40. Ukraine’s version of the events is plainly at odds with the facts. The reply letter of the
authorities of 29 May 2015 to the notice of 27 May 2015 confirms that at the date and place notified
another Crimean Tatar organization had already submitted a notice of public event; therefore the
Russian authorities could not approve two cultural events for the exact same time at the exact same
location – which is what Ukraine appears to be complaining about.98 Not only is this reason
legitimate. It also makes the Ukrainian allegation of racial discrimination targeted against the
Crimean Tatars unfounded because, as it appears from the reply letter, it is also a Crimean Tatar
organization that had submitted an earlier notice. That blatantly contradicts Ukraine’s allegation of
racial discrimination.
7. Commemoration of the Death of Noman Ḉelebicihan in 2015
41. Lastly, Ukraine engages in a further array of misrepresentations in relation to the
commemoration of the death of Noman Ḉelebicihan on 23 February 2015.99 In the corresponding
short section of its Memorial, Ukraine showcases its ignorance of Crimean Tatar history and
tradition. Contrary to Ukraine’s statements, the traditional location for paying tribute to the memory
of Noman Ḉelebicihan is Sevastopol, and not Simferopol (where there had not been any monument
to him at the time): a bas-relief is located on the wall of the prison in Sevastopol where
Noman Ḉelebicihan was held before his death.100 Moreover, public and cultural events dedicated to
95 YouTube, Video footage on raising the largest Crimean Tatar flag in the world, 27 June 2015 (Annex 1217);
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, “Huge Crimean Tatar flag was unfurled in Simferopol”, 27 June 2015 (Annex 926).
96 YouTube, Video footage entitled “Rally with Crimean Tatar flags” that shows the largest motor rally dedicated to
Crimean Tatar Flag Day, 26 June 2015 (Annex 1218), also available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41qI6vsk-
0Q; Kryminform, “Largest motor rally in Crimea dedicated to the Day of the Crimean Tatar Flag will be included in the
Simferopol Book of Records”, 27 June 2015 (Annex 927).
97 YouTube, Video footage of the concert dedicated to Crimean Tatar Flag Day, 26 June 2015 (Annex 1219), the full
video available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuRbl2HlMs0.
98 Interregional Public Movement of the Crimean Tatar people “Qirim”, Notification No. 10 on holding cultural
events to celebrate Crimean Tatar Flag Day on 26-28 June 2015, 25 May 2015 (Annex 550); Administration of the City
of Simferopol, Response No. 6651/24/01-48 to the notification of Interregional Public Movement of the Crimean Tatar
people “Qirim” No. 10 of 25 May 2015, 27 May 2015 (Annex 551); Administration of the City of Simferopol,
Response No. 6651/24/01-48 to the notification of Interregional Public Movement of the Crimean Tatar people “Qirim”
No. 10 of 25 May 2015, 3 June 2015 (Annex 554); Application of Mr Medzhitov and Ms Kefileva on holding cultural
events to celebrate Crimean Tatar Flag Day on 26 June 2015, 27 May 2015 (Annex 552); Administration of the City of
Simferopol, Response No. M-487/8040 to the application of Mr Medzhitov and Ms Kefileva of 27 May 2015, 29 May
2015 (Annex 553).
99 MU, para. 494.
100 Wikipedia, “Noman Ḉelebicihan”, 4 March 2021 (Annex 1278), also available at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noman %C3%87elebicihan.
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259
the memory of Noman Ḉelebicihan are held annually throughout Crimea.101 The main annual events
involve commemorative rally and laying flowers at the bas-relief of Noman Ḉelebicihan in
Sevastopol.102
42. Contrary to the erroneous claims of Ukraine, 2015 was not an exception. However, in 2015,
mainly cultural events were held.103 At the same time, the Sevastopol authorities did not in any way
prevent the Mejlis or any other organization from holding a public event. By agreement of the
governments of Sevastopol and the Republic of Crimea with the Crimean Tatar community, it was
decided that the rally would be held in the Khan’s Palace in Bakhchisaray.104 Taking into account
the history of the Khan’s Palace, where the first Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People was held
under the chairmanship of Mr Ḉelebicihan105, the Khan’s Palace was undoubtedly a suitable place
for holding the event in question. However, eventually, the organizers decided not to hold the rally
in the Khan’s Palace. Ukraine’s allegation that the event was not approved by the authorities of
Bakhchisaray is thus not supported by any evidence.
101 Municipality - the urban district of Evpatoria of the Republic of Crimea official website, “The memory of Noman
Ḉelebicihan was honored in Evpatoria”, 26 February 2020 (Annex 495); Krym.Realii, “Mosques in Crimea honored the
memory of Noman Çelebicihan with prayers”, 24 February 2017 (Annex 967); Kryminform, “Prayers in memory of the
First Mufti of Crimea will be held in Crimean mosques”, 22 February 2019 (Annex 997); Krym.Realii, “Simferopol:
children’s literature competition in memory of Noman Çelebicihan ‘Ant etkenmen!’ [I’ve pledged] (+photo)”, 23
February 2019 (Annex 999); YouTube, Video footage entitled “A requiem evening in memory of Noman Ḉelebicihan
was held the CEPU”, that shows the requiem concert held in Simferopol in memory of Noman Ḉelebicihan, 24
February 2015 (Annex 1214); Krym.Realii, “In Sevastopol, the memory of Noman Çelebicihan was honored (+ photo)”,
22 February 2020 (Annex 1017).
102 YouTube, Video footage entitled “Memory of Noman Ḉelebicihan has been honored in Sevastopol” that shows the
ceremony of laying flowers at the memorial plaques of Mr Ḉelebicihan in Sevastopol and the concert, 23 February 2019
(Annex 1230), also available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XbKmhmQYl6s; Regional Public Organisation
“Association of Crimean Tatars of the Sevastopol Region ‘AK-YAR’”, Notification No. 42 on holding a rally dedicated
to the anniversary of the death of Noman Çelebicihan on 24 February 2018, 12 February 2018 (Annex 588);
Department of Public Communications of the City of Sevastopol, Response No. 164/63-03-25/18 to the notification of
the Regional Public Organisation “Association of Crimean Tatars of the Sevastopol Region ‘AK-YAR’” of 12 February
2018 No. 42 on approval of the rally, 14 February 2018 (Annex 590); Regional Public Organisation “Association of
Crimean Tatars of the Sevastopol Region ‘AK-YAR’”, Notification No. 77 on holding an event dedicated to the
anniversary of the death of Noman Çelebicihan on 24 February 2019, 7 February 2019 (Annex 608); Department of
Public Communications of the City of Sevastopol, Response No. 157/01-08-01-18/02/19 to the notification of the
Regional Public Organisation “Association of Crimean Tatars of the Sevastopol Region ‘AK-YAR’” of 7 February
2019 No. 77 on approval of the event, 13 February 2019 (Annex 609); Regional Public Organisation “Association of
Crimean Tatars of the Sevastopol Region ‘AK-YAR’”, Notification on holding a rally dedicated to the anniversary of
the death of Noman Çelebicihan on 22 February 2020, 11 February 2020 (Annex 611); Department of Public
Communications of the City of Sevastopol, Response No. 215/01-08-01-16/02/20 to the notification of the Regional
Public Organisation “Association of Crimean Tatars of the Sevastopol Region ‘AK-YAR’” of 11 February 2020 on
approval of the rally, 20 February 2020 (Annex 612).
103 IslamNews, “On 23 February, Crimean Tatars commemorated the national hero and the first imam”, 23 February
2015 (Annex 915).
104 Internal Policy Department of Sevastopol, Response to the notification of Mr Mamutdinov with a proposal to hold
the event in the Khan’s Palace in Bakhchisaray, 19 February 2015 (Annex 539).
105 Wikipedia in Russian, “Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People”, 4 March 2021 (Annex 1279).
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43. As for alleged threats of administrative penalties in case of non-compliance,106 Ukraine in
fact refers to the standard procedure previously explained which is systematically applied in all
relevant cases and which consists in reminding applicants of their legal obligations as organizers of
a public event.107 Warnings reminding the legal framework may also be sent to the organizers when
the authorities become aware of indicia that they are planning to go ahead with an unauthorized
event in spite of the authorities’ prior refusal. Far from conveying any threat, such advance
reminder is in fact a transparent and diligent way for the authorities to attempt precisely to avoid
any situation which would give rise to such administrative penalties. Reminding the law to
organizers, who in assuming this role accept additional obligations and responsibilities in
comparison to a mere participant or any other citizen, is only reasonable and amounts to nothing
more than applying the law.
III. No Evidence of Racial Discrimination in Respect of Cultural Gatherings and Public
Events of the Ukrainian Community
44. Ukraine paints a similarly misleading picture of public events and cultural gatherings
organized by the Ukrainian community and its representatives.108
45. Contrary to what Ukraine alleges, no application of the law was based on a plan “to impede
the celebration of anniversaries of cultural significance to ethnic Ukrainians”.109 As for Ukraine’s
allegation that the Russian Federation has “punished those who nonetheless sought to peacefully
honor these occasions”,110 the truth is that the authorities have brought citizens who broke the law
to accountability, including those who held unauthorized public events despite the authorities’ prior
refusal and those who performed illegal acts during public events. Once again, there is manifestly
no basis to claim that these measures constitute racial discrimination under CERD.
1. Commemoration of Taras Shevchenko’s Birthday in 2014
46. The first of those allegations relates to the commemoration of Taras Shevchenko’s birthday
on 9 March 2014.111 It is unclear on what basis Ukraine seeks to attribute any alleged interference
106 MU, para. 484.
107 Issuing a warning has nothing to do with the agenda of a public event. As mentioned above (para. 17), such a
warning serves as an additional reminder to the organizer of the public event and its participants of their legal
obligations. See also Chapter IV, para. 161. As an example, see Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea, Warning
to Mr Orlov on the impermissibility of violating the legislation during the public event to be held on 15 April 2017, 14
April 2017 (Annex 581).
108 MU, paras. 495-502.
109 MU, para. 495.
110 MU, para. 495.
111 MU, paras. 495-499. Taras G. Shevchenko (1814-1861) was a poet, writer, painter and engraver. While his figure
is sometimes manipulated for political ends by Ukrainian nationalists, he is not generally associated with nationalism,
and his works and poetry have been studied in schools both during the Soviet times and in Ukraine and the Russian
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with this commemorating event to the Russian Federation. Russian authorities were neither
responsible for, nor were they involved in, the regulation of public events or cultural gatherings in
Crimea at the time. Russian Law did not apply in Crimea on this date. Regulatory conduct in this
regard cannot be attributed thus to the Russian Federation.112 Ukraine does not even appear to
advance a clear case for attribution on this particular point. Thus, Ukraine’s position is
unsubstantiated and untenable. The cases of Mr Shchekun and Mr Kovalsky who were among the
organizers of the public event planned in Simferopol,113 are addressed in details under Appendix
A.114
47. When it comes to the incidents that happened during the public event in Sevastopol, an
event that did take place,115 none of the acts of any participants in the riots is attributable to the
Russian Federation, and Ukraine does not establish that the Russian Federation has planned,
organized or encouraged the incidents in any way. The BBC video that Ukraine relies on116
provides a good sense of this low-level incident between demonstrators, an episode that only
opposes small groups of private individuals.
2. Commemoration of Taras Shevchenko’s Birthday in 2015
48. As to the allegations concerning Shevchenko’s birthday in 2015, the fact is that the meeting,
organized by Mr Kuzmin, was approved and actually held.117 The specially assigned venue of the
Gagarin park was requested by the organizers themselves. The Simferopol authorities did not in any
way intervene until the order of the meeting was violated. As confirmed by Ukraine’s own
pleadings and record118 and contrary to the prior notification of the organizers, certain individuals
Federation today. His life within the 19th-century Russian Empire was influenced by several cultures, and it is safe to
consider that Shevchenko himself would probably hesitate in answering the question whether he identified as a
Ukrainian or a Russian poet. That he is not considered as a symbol of nationalists and extremists in Russia is confirmed
by the many monuments and streets that are named after Taras Shevchenko in the Russian Federation today. The
Ukrainian community of Crimea does celebrate Taras Shevchenko’s birthday, holds public rallies and lays flowers to
his monument without interference from the authorities, provided the legislation on the holding of public events is
complied with, just like for any citizens. As an example, see House of Peoples’ Friendship official website, “Solemn
meeting on the occasion of the 203rd anniversary of the birth of Taras Shevchenko”, 9 March 2017 (Annex 970).
112 See this Counter-Memorial, Chapter II, para. 89, Chapter VI, para. 391 above.
113 MU, para. 497.
114 See Appendix A, paras. 34-39 above.
115 MU, para. 498.
116 MU, footnote 1034, referring to BBC News, “Pro-Ukraine activists beaten up in Crimea”, 9 March 2014, Annex
1040 to MU.
117 Notification of Mr Kuzmin and Ms Popova on holding a rally dedicated to the celebration of Taras Shevchenko’s
201st anniversary on 9 March 2015, 26 February 2015 (Annex 540); Administration of the City of Simferopol,
Response to the notification of Mr Kuzmin and Ms Popova on approval of the rally scheduled for 9 March 2015, 27
February 2015 (Annex 541). Contrary to Ukraine’s assertion (MU, para. 499), the notification was not made by the
Ukrainian Cultural Center, which did not exist at the time.
118 MU, para. 499; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Freedom of Assembly in Crimea Occupied
by the Russian Federation, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting, 17 April 2015 (Annex 810 to MU). See also
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attending this event converted a peaceful gathering to celebrate the poet’s birthday into a forum for
political agitation. The approved purpose of the event was to celebrate the birthday of Mr
Shevchenko. Contrary to that purpose, some participants began to conduct political agitation in
favor of the fact that Crimea is part of Ukraine. Since these actions did not correspond to the
purpose of the meeting, the violators and Mr Kuzmin as the organizer of the event were brought to
administrative responsibility with a minimum amount of administrative fines.119 The actions of the
authorities were reasonable and lawful. The risk for public order is proven by the events of 9 March
2014 in Sevastopol, when the celebration of Mr Shevchenko’s birthday was turned into political
confrontation, which ended in a scuffle.120
49. In its Memorial Ukraine omits to mention that the initiator of the political agitation was
Kurtseit Abdullayev, a person known to its law-enforcement authorities and notorious for his
criminal activities in Crimea. In particular, in 2004 (under Ukraine’s sovereignty), Mr Abdullayev
was the organizer of riots with the use of weapons, for which he had been sentenced to 5 years. Mr
Abdullayev and his accomplices had beaten a group of journalists who were making a film and, a
few weeks later, also under the leadership of Mr Abdullayev, a group of criminals organized a
massacre at the Simferopol bar “Cotton club”.121
50. Moreover, Ukraine has not provided any evidence of any connection between Mr Kuzmin’s
dismissal from the position of a school teacher and his participation in the meeting on 9 March
2015. On the contrary, as can be seen from the evidence, he actually resigned from his job
voluntarily, at his own request.122 In any case, while Russia has an effective mechanism for judicial
protection of employees’ rights in the event of illegal dismissal,123 Mr Kuzmin’s dismissal has not
OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National
Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015), 17 September 2015
(Annex 812 to MU).
119 Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-455/2015, Decision, 20 April 2015 (Annex 229); Supreme
Court of the Republic of Crimea, case No. 12-454/2015, Decision, 21 May 2015 (Annex 234); Supreme Court of the
Republic of Crimea, Case No. 12-580/2015, Decision, 26 May 2015 (Annex 236); Supreme Court of the Republic of
Crimea, Case No. 12-450/2015, Decision, 19 May 2015 (Annex 233). The presence of Ukrainian flags at the event was
not at issue – almost all participant held Ukrainian flags. The issue was the inscription that “Crimea is Ukraine” on the
flags held by the apprehended individuals and related slogans shouted – and the organizer’s failure to bring an end to
these acts – that form the basis of the administrative offence.
120 MU, para. 498.
121 Supreme Court of Ukraine, case No. 1-750/04, Decision, 17 May 2007 (Annex 773).
122 Mr Kuzmin’s employment record book (Annex 1244); Municipal State Budgetary General Educational Institution
“Secondary School – Kindergarten No. 15”, Certificate of confirmation No. 60, 3 June 2020 (Annex 623).
123 Labour Code of the Russian Federation, No. 197-FZ, 30 December 2001 (Annex 42), Articles 381-382, 394.
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been challenged,124 nor has Mr Kuzmin complained to the police with regard to his dismissal, which
Ukraine attempts to present as forced and unlawful.125
3. Commemoration of Taras Shevchenko’s Birthday in 2016
51. In respect of the commemoration of Shevchenko’s birthday in early 2016, the Russian
Federation respectfully refers the Court to the description of the emergency laws in place at that
time.126 Russia reiterates that it is not aware of any judicial challenge of the restrictions on holding
mass events at the time, which signals that all interested parties fully appreciated the gravity of the
then prevailing circumstances.127
4. Commemoration of Taras Shevchenko’s Birthday in 2017
52. Lastly, Ukraine simply misstates the factual context of the 2017 commemoration, incorrectly
contending that the notification was simply denied, without any explanation.128 The Simferopol
administration returned the notification filed by Mr Kuzmin and Ms Popova explaining that it did
not comply with the requirements of specific provisions of the Federal and Crimean Laws on public
events, and invited the applicants to submit an updated notification which would be duly
considered.129 The organizers had an opportunity to try to fix their notification or, in the event they
considered their rights violated, challenge the Administration’s response in court. They had not
done so. Incidentally, it is worth pointing that there was in fact a commemoration of Shevchenko’s
birthday in 2017 in Simferopol, organized by the “Ukrainian Community of Crimea.”130
124 Judicial Chamber for Civil Cases of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 05-01/2020 to the
Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, 22 May 2020 (Annex 619).
125 Police Operations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Crimea, Note on the absence
of complaints in connection with Mr Kuzmin’s dismissal from the position of a schoolteacher (Annex 646).
126 See para. 37. The emergency situation decided at the end of 2015 was extended in early 2016: see Resolution of
the City Administration of Simferopol No. 372 “On introducing amendments into Resolution of the City Administration
of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea of 22 November 2015 No. 1347 ‘On restriction of mass, public, cultural,
entertainment and other events in the territory of the municipality - the urban district of Simferopol of the Republic of
Crimea’”, 7 March 2016 (Annex 102).
127 Department of Judicial Support for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Note
confirming the absence of cases challenging the decisions of the Crimean authorities not to approve the holding of
certain events (Annex 649), paras. 1.2, 1.4-1.7.
128 MU, para. 499.
129 Administration of the City of Simferopol, Response No. K-212/2910 to the notification of Mr Kuzmin and Ms
Popova with the request to submit a notification containing the information required by the federal legislation on public
events, 2 March 2017 (Annex 580).
130 House of Peoples’ Friendship official website, “Solemn meeting on the occasion of the 203rd anniversary of the
birth of Taras Shevchenko”, 9 March 2017 (Annex 970).
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5. The Case of Mr Sergei Dub (Ukrainian Flag Day 2014)
53. Claimant further alleges that Mr Sergei Dub – his surname was erroneously translated into
Mr Oak in Ukrainian submissions – was fined 1,000 Rubles for using a Ukrainian flag on 23
August 2014, the Ukrainian Flag Day.131 Ukraine claims, without evidence, that this fine (of a mere
500 Rubles132 in reality) was based on a “false testimony” against Mr Dub accusing the latter of
using foul language. On what basis Ukraine claims that evidence before local courts was falsified is
left unexplained. The Russian Federation produces the relevant court decision – which Ukraine did
not – which carries no hallmarks of impropriety, and was in fact left unchallenged by Mr Dub
himself.133 To the extent that Mr Dub had reasons to suspect that he was being subjected to
discrimination or to doubt the veracity of the testimony against him, he would have been expected
to pursue a challenge, but he has not done so.134 Ukraine also insinuates that Mr Dub was removed
from his prior position as a result of these events, but other than a bare assertion to that effect, this
claim is not made out at all. Mr Dub’s demotion has been left unchallenged.135
6. Celebration of Ukrainian Independence Day in 2014
54. Lastly, Ukraine refers to certain events on the Ukrainian Independence Day.136 This point
can be disposed of in short order. On 24 August 2014, a number of individuals held a public event
in Sevastopol without complying with the prescribed notification rules, which have been addressed
above.137 Moreover, this was not a peaceful event. Participants of the meeting behaved
aggressively, sprayed gas from a gas can on ordinary passers-by and threatened them with a stun
gun.138 In this circumstances, the administrative sanctions imposed on Mr Neganov (the organizer),
and upheld by courts,139 were proportionate and appropriate. The other individual mentioned by
131 MU, para. 501.
132 Equivalent to roughly 10 Euro, at the exchange rate applicable on 24 September 2014 (49,6912).
133 Central District Court of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea, case No. 5-930/2014, Decision, 24 September
2014 (Annex 191).
134 Simferopol Central District Court of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. K-2 on the entry into legal force of the
court decision of 24 September 2014 in case No. 5-930/2014 on holding Sergey Dub administratively liable, 19 May
2020 (Annex 618).
135 Judicial Chamber for Civil Cases of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, Letter No. 05-01/2020 to the
Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, 22 May 2020 (Annex 619).
136 MU, para. 502.
137 Public Order Protection Department of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the City of
Sevastopol, Note on the legality of actions of officers of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for
the city of Sevastopol when taking public enforcement action in respect of participants and organisers of public events
(Annex 633), stating the reasons for the detention of Mr Neganov and Mr Kornienko.
138 Gagarinsky District Court of Sevastopol, case No. 5-373/2014, Complaint of Alexey Eskov, 24 August 2014
(Annex 170); Gagarinsky District Court of Sevastopol, case No. 5-373/2014, Explanations of Alexey Eskov (Annex
435).
139 Gagarinsky District Court of Sevastopol, Case No. 5-373/2014, Decision, 8 September 2014 (Annex 184);
Sevastopol city Court of Appeal, Case No. 77-50/2014, Decision, 15 October 2014 (Annex 196).
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265
Ukraine in connection with this “incident”, Mr Sergey Kornienko, was not subject to any
administrative sanctions. As for allegations of threats on Mr Neganov by the police,140 Ukraine has
adduced no evidence to support this allegation.
IV. No Favourable Treatment Accorded to the Russian Community on Racial Grounds
55. Ukraine claims that in four instances Russian authorities approved certain events organized
by who Ukraine claims were “Russian groups”, and argues on this basis that the fact that such
events were permitted reveals a discriminatory approach prohibited by CERD.141 However, Ukraine
fails to carry out a genuine comparative exercise to support its case of racial discrimination – and a
fortiori its case of a systematic campaign or policy thereof –, not only because of the slim number
of cases relied on but also because these cases do not evidence any more favourable treatment of the
Russian community, as is shown below. Ukraine’s case of a pattern of discrimination cannot be
drawn or inferred from comparing a few individual cases. As CERD Committee practice
confirms,142 to evidence racial discrimination, recourse is needed to a sufficiently representative
sample. Despite this well-established evidential requirement, Ukraine is silent on essential data such
as the total number of events authorized, refused, suspended and terminated, by ethnicity and reason
for the measure taken. By contrast, the elements provided below manifestly show that Ukraine’s
allegations are without any merit.
56. First, referring to Decree No. 29 of 16 May 2014143 that temporarily prohibited mass
gatherings in Crimea from 16 May 2014 to 6 June 2014 on public safety grounds due to the events
and continued armed conflict in South-Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine states that Russian authorities
should not have allowed public gatherings that took place in Simferopol on 6 June 2014 to mark the
215th anniversary of Alexander Pushkin’s birthday and to dedicate a monument to Sergius of
Radonezh.144 Ukraine compares these events with public gatherings to commemorate the Sürgün on
18 May 2014, which, according to Ukraine, were not approved in view of the above-mentioned
140 MU, para. 502.
141 MU, para. 503.
142 See e.g. CERD Committee, General Recommendation XIV on Article 1(1), 1993, para. 2, Official Records of the
General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/48/18), p. 115; L.-A. Sicilianos, “L’actualité et les
potentialités de la Convention sur l’élimination de la discrimination raciale”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme,
Vol. 2005(61), 2005, p. 873. The CERD Committee regularly exhorts States Parties to provide statistical data as part of
their reporting obligations; see e.g. Concluding observations on the twenty-second and twenty-third periodic reports of
Ukraine, 4 October 2016, CERD/C/UKR/CO/22-23, para. 14(c).
143 Head of the Republic of Crimea, Decree No. 29 “On Restrictions On Mass Gatherings In Connection With Events
In Ukraine’s Southeast” (Annex 890 to MU). As Decree No. 29 clearly indicates, the ban on holding mass gatherings
was introduced in order to eliminate possible provocations by extremists and to avoid disruption of the holiday season
in Crimea and in connection with recent events in many cities in the southeast of Ukraine as a result of which there have
been victims including injured civilians. See Public Order Protection Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for
the Republic of Crimea, Note on the activities of destructively-minded individuals in the territory of the Republic of
Crimea, 2 June 2021 (Annex 652).
144 MU, para. 503, first point.
Appendix D
266
Decree No. 29145. However, as previously mentioned, despite the official temporary ban on mass
events, the authorities were determined to allow citizens to hold peaceful gatherings, provided that
the state had full confidence in its ability to ensure the safety of events’ participants. Contrary to
Ukraine’s false statements, the Russian authorities did not prevent Crimean Tatars from marking the
Sürgün in 2014. Thanks to the security measures undertaken by the Russian authorities, massive
public events dedicated to the Sürgün were held all over Crimea.146
57. Second, Ukraine alleges that, in February 2015, the Russian authorities permitted an event at
a location in the center of Simferopol which is “not a permitted location for gatherings”.147 These
allegations are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Federal Law on Public Events and
specifically the nature of the “Specially Designated Places” for holding public events. As a matter
of Russian law, the fact that so-called “Specially Assigned Places” are designated for holding public
events does not preclude the organizer of a public event from selecting other places to hold it.148
The list of “Specially Assigned Places” is a list of recommended venues, not exclusive ones. It
merely points to public venues that are especially adapted for the organization of public events, in
particular those entailing a higher number of participants. However, as a general rule, a public event
may be carried out at any place suitable for the purposes of the given event. Ukraine fails to point to
any specific rule which would have prevented organizing the event in question at the location where
it took place.
58. Third, Ukraine raises again the false comparison between a public event on 27 November
2015 in Simferopol and the December 2015 Events at the occasion of Human Rights Day.149 Russia
reiterates that the December 2015 restrictions were due to the emergency situation at that time, as
already explained above.150
59. Fourth, Ukraine surprisingly complains about the fact that a Russian language international
festival, the “Great Russian Word”, was held in June 2017 in several municipalities in Crimea151.
The festival in question is a cultural event with longstanding history in the region dating back to
2007152 and that had been organized annually and budgeted by the Crimean authorities long before
145 MU, para. 485.
146 See para. 25.
147 MU, para. 503, second point.
148 Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution No. 28 “On certain issues encountered by the
courts in consideration of administrative cases and of cases on administrative offences pertaining to application of
legislation on public events”, 26 June 2018 (Annex 403), para. 17.
149 MU, para. 503, third point.
150 See para. 37.
151 MU, para. 503, fourth point.
152 Official website of the International Festival Great Russian Word, “Overview on the International Festival
GREAT RUSSIAN WORD”, 14 February 2020 (Annex 1273).
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267
2014.153 Such event is not a public event organized by private individuals or organizations and that
is not subject to the notification obligation. The purported “comparator” of Ukraine is an unnotified
– and thus unauthorized – public event in May 2017 in Bakhchisaray. The comparison is plainly
inapposite, and reveals no discrimination whatsoever.
60. Ukraine finally relies on celebrations that were held for the first anniversary of the Self
Defence Forces and the referendum.154 But again, it overlooks the fact that these were official
events and ceremonies organized by the authorities, not citizens’ public gatherings, as is evidenced
by Ukraine’s own materials.155 These episodes do not point to any discriminatory treatment, and
certainly not on basis of race. To the contrary, the authorities have also provided for the
organization of events that are important in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian cultures and traditions.156
61. To sum up, Ukraine’s allegations do not lend any basis for finding any violations of CERD
by the Russian Federation. Where restrictive measures were provisionally applied, or where certain
notifications or applications were not approved, there is no evidence to suggest that the Russian
authorities acted in a manner that is inconsistent with or different from their approach in other
cases, in other regions of the Russian Federation, let alone on racial grounds. On the contrary, the
above confirms that the measures were taken on an objective and reasonable basis, relied on
legitimate considerations and were proportionate to the aim pursued.
62. The interpretation and application of relevant Russian laws are consistent regardless of the
topic of an event or the ethnicity of the organizers, and public events with a so-called “pro-Russian”
agenda have not been treated more favourably. For example, a great number of events in support of
153 See for example Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Resolution “On the organization of the
International Festival GREAT RUSSIAN WORD in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” No. 290-6/11, 16 March
2011 (Annex 781); Resolution of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea No. 445-1/15 “On the organization of the
International Festival Great Russian Word in the Republic of Crimea”, 11 February 2015 (Annex 83); Resolution of the
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No. 195 “On the organization of the International Festival Great
Russian Word”, 10 April 2015 (Annex 87); Program of Events of the XI International Festival “Great Russian Word”,
approved by the Head of the Republic of Crimea - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea and
the Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea, 16 May 2017 (Annex 474).
154 MU, para. 504.
155 Official website of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea, Photos of the first anniversary of the
establishment of the People’s Militia, 23 February 2015 (Annex 1095 to MU), also available at
http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/anniversaries/230220155; Official website of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea,
Photos of the First Anniversary of the Crimean Spring, 16 March 2015 (Annex 1098 to MU), also available at
http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/anniversaries/151503; Official website of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea, Photos
of the Anniversary of the General Referendum, 16 March 2015 (Annex 1097 to MU), also available at
http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/anniversaries/160315; Official website of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea, Photos
from a Crimean Spring Photo Exhibition, 16 March 2015 (Annex 1099 to MU), also available at
http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/society/16032015205; Official website of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea, Photos
of an event celebrating Crimea and Russia, 16 March 2015 (Annex 1096 to MU), also available at
http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/anniversaries/16032015090316. See also Order of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Crimea No. 43-r “On preparation and holding events dedicated to celebrating the anniversary of the “Crimean Spring”
in the Republic of Crimea”, 2 February 2015 (Annex 82).
156 See para. 3.
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268
the Russian President,157 as well as events dedicated to the celebration of Russian holidays, in
particular Defender of the Fatherland Day on 23 February,158 Unity Day on 4 November,159 Victory
Day on 9 May,160 National Flag Day of the Russian Federation on 22 August,161 and Russia Day on
157 Public Movement “Civil Headquarters in support of President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin”, Notification
on holding a public event in the form of a rally, 5 March 2018 (Annex 592); Department of Public Communications of
the City of Sevastopol, Response No. 277/63-03-25/18 to the notification of the Public Movement “Civil Headquarters
in support of President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin” of 5 March 2018 No. KOL-2853/p on changing a place of
the rally, 6 March 2018 (Annex 593); Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the
City of Sevastopol, Letter No. 6/311 to the Chairman of the Public Movement “Civil Headquarters in support of
President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin” on the non-approval of holding the rally in an unauthorized location, 12
March 2018 (Annex 594); Notification of Mr Fedotov on holding a public event in the form of a rally in support of
Vladimir Putin on 15 March 2020 in Sevastopol, 27 February 2020 (Annex 613); Department of Public
Communications of the City of Sevastopol, Letter No. 281/01-08-01-15/02/20 to the Directorate of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Russia for the City of Sevastopol in connection with Mr Fedotov’s notification, 27 February 2020
(Annex 614); Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the City of Sevastopol, Letter
No. 6/323 to the notification of Mr Fedotov on the non-approval of holding an unauthorized rally, 11 March 2020
(Annex 615).
158 Regional Public Organization for the Promotion and Prosperity of the Republic of Crimea “Crimea-New Life”,
Notification No. 11/02 on holding a rally to celebrate Defender of the Fatherland Day and the first anniversary of the
establishment of the People’s Militia on 23 February 2015, 5 February 2015 (Annex 536); Administration of the City of
Simferopol, Response No. 1100/24/01-66 to the notification of the Regional Public Organization for the Promotion and
Prosperity of the Republic of Crimea “Crimea-New Life” of 5 February 2015 No.11/02, 9 February 2015 (Annex 537);
Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation, Notification No. 3 on holding a rally dedicated to Defender of the
Fatherland Day on 23 February 2016, 11 February 2016 (Annex 561); Administration of the City of Simferopol,
Response No. 2571/24/01-28 to the notification of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation No. 3 of 11
February 2016, 12 February 2016 (Annex 562); Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Notification No. 3 on
holding a public event dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the creation of the Soviet Army and Navy on 23 February
2018, 12 February 2018 (Annex 589); Administration of the City of Simferopol, Response No. 2699/24/01-28 to the
notification of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation of 12 February 2018 No. 3 on holding a public event, 15
February 2018 (Annex 591).
159 Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation, Notification No. 165-PSH on holding a rally to celebrate
Unity Day on 4 November 2015, 21 October 2015 (Annex 557); Administration of the City of Simferopol, Response
No. 16189/24/01-48 to the notification of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation No. 165-PSH of 21
October 2015, 23 October 2015 (Annex 558); Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation, Notification on
holding a public event to celebrate Unity Day on 4 November 2016, 20 October 2016 (Annex 576); Administration of
the City of Simferopol, Response No. 23123/24/01-28 to the notification of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian
Federation of 20 October 2016, 21 October 2016 (Annex 577).
160 All-Russian Public Civil and Patriotic Movement “Immortal Regiment of Russia”, Notification No. 22/03-18a on
holding a public event in the form of a march on 9 May 2018 in Simferopol, 22 March 2018 (Annex 595);
Administration of the City of Simferopol, Response No. 4885/24/01-28 to the notification of the All-Russian Public
Civil and Patriotic Movement “Immortal Regiment of Russia” of 22 March 2018 No. 22/03-18a, 26 March 2018
(Annex 598); All-Russian Public Civil and Patriotic Movement “Immortal Regiment of Russia”, Notification No.
23/03-18d on holding a public event in the form of a march on 9 May 2018 in Yalta, 23 March 2018 (Annex 596);
Administration of the City of Yalta, Response No. 09-15/39 to the notification of the All-Russian Public Civil and
Patriotic Movement “Immortal Regiment of Russia” of 23 March 2018 No. 23/03-18d, 29 March 2018 (Annex 600);
All-Russian Public Civil and Patriotic Movement “Immortal Regiment of Russia”, Notification No. 23/03-18g on
holding a public event in the form of a march on 9 May 2018 in Feodosia, 23 March 2018 (Annex 597); Administration
of the City of Feodosia, Response No. 2-41/5693/1 to the notification of the All-Russian Public Civil and Patriotic
Movement “Immortal Regiment of Russia” of 23 March 2018, 27 March 2018 (Annex 599).
161 United Russia Political Party, Notification No. 010-1-12/95 on holding a public event to celebrate National Flag
Day of the Russian Federation on 22 August 2016, 15 August 2016 (Annex 573); Administration of the City of
Feodosia, Response No. 2-14/9242/1 to the notification of the United Russia Political Party of 15 August 2016 No. 010-
1-12/95, 17 August 2016 (Annex 574).
Appendix D
269
12 June,162 were not authorized when their organizers failed to comply with the relevant procedure
applicable in Crimea. There is thus no indication that the Russian legal system, either by design or
by effect, would accord on ethnic grounds a differential, let alone detrimental, treatment to Crimean
Tatars or Ukrainians as ethnic groups as opposed to the representatives of other national or ethnic
groups.
162 Russian Commune “Sobol”, Notification on holding a public event to celebrate Russia Day on 12 June 2016,
1 June 2016 (Annex 570); Administration of the City of Simferopol, Response No. 11501/24/01-28 to the notification
of the Russian Community “Sobol” of 1 June 2016, 3 June 2016 (Annex 571).
270
APPENDIX E
NO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO MEDIA, LET ALONE A
SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN THEREOF
1. The present Appendix addresses the relevant factual and legal elements in respect of
Ukraine’s unfounded claims of racial discrimination in relation to the activities of media outlets,
including an alleged systematic campaign or policy of racial discrimination and harassment aiming
at bringing about cultural erasure of the Crimean Tatar and ethnic Ukrainian communities in
Crimea.1 In light of the applicable Russian legal framework, which is very similar to Ukraine’s (I)
and of the diverse and vibrant media landscape in Crimea (II), it is manifest that Ukraine’s
individual claims are baseless (III).
I. The Russian Legal Framework Governing Media Activities
A. THE RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
2. The general legal framework currently applicable for the operation of the Media in the
Russian Federation, including in Crimea, was adopted in 1991.2 Pursuant to this framework, a
media outlet may only carry out its activities upon registration with the authorities’ competent
agency.3 This general obligation is subject to exemption in specific cases, including for media
outlets established by public authorities and local self-governing authorities solely for publishing
their regulations, for official communications and materials, for printed periodic Medias with a
circulation of less than one thousand copies, for radio and television programs distributed via cable
networks and limited by premises or territory of one state institution, one educational organization
or one industrial enterprise or having no more than ten subscribers, and for audio and video
programs circulated in no more than ten copies.4 Therefore, satellite and internet TV and radio
channels, including those operating from abroad, are not subject to prior registration. The competent
authority to carry out the registration process and media supervision is the Federal Service for
Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media – “Roskomnadzor” –
which is an agency of the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass
Media. Depending on the intended coverage of the media outlet, registration will either be with
Federal Roskomnadzor in Moscow, or a regional department of Roskomnadzor.5
1 MU, paras. 505-521. See also Chapter VI of the present Counter-Memorial, paras. 398-412.
2 Law of the Russian Federation No. 2124-1 “On mass media”, 27 December 1991 (Annex 26) (“Media Law”).
3 Media Law (Annex 26), Article 8. The registered mass media can be found on the website of the Federal Service
for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) at
https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/.
4 Media Law (Annex 26), Article 12.
5 Ibid., Article 8. See also Article 8 of the Media Law as amended by the Federal Law No. 239-FZ “On introducing
amendments into the Law of the Russian Federation ‘On mass media’”, 29 July 2017 (Annex 109), and Order of
Roskomnadzor (the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media) No.
255 “On approval of the procedure for filing an application for registration of a mass media outlet whose products are
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1. The Registration Process and Roskomnadzor’s Role
3. The registration process is subject to procedural conditions that are all provided for by law.
The registration application shall indicate the required information, shall include the required
supporting documentation, and shall be submitted by the authorized representative of the media
outlet in person or sent by certified mail with proof of delivery to the competent office of
Roskomnadzor.6 The authorities shall process the application within thirty days from its receipt and
the media outlet shall be deemed registered on the date of the decision of the authorities to validate
the application and make a corresponding entry in the register of media outlets.7 As part of the
required information, the application shall indicate such information about the founder or cofounders
as necessary to establish his/her/its compliance with the requirements of the Media Law,
the name or title of the media; the diffusion language(s), editorial address, the form of periodic
dissemination of the media outlet; the envisaged territory of coverage, the approximate topics and
(or) specialization, the estimated frequency of release, the maximum volume of the media outlet,
the sources of financing, information on other media outlets of which the applicant is the founder,
owner, principal editor, editing board, publisher or distributor, the domain name of the website for
online publications, information on the payment of state duty.8 The application shall also include
supporting documentation as defined by an order of the Russian Government.9 The list of required
information and supporting documents to be provided is cumulative, which means that the
application’s failure to meet one of the procedural criteria will result in Roskomnadzor returning it
to the applicant without consideration, as the Media Law mandates it to do.10 Roskomnadzor can
request additional clarifications or corrected documents as may be necessary in order to make sense
intended for distribution mainly in the territories of two or more constituent entities of the Russian Federation”, 18
December 2017 (Annex 111), paras. 4 and 5.
6 Article 8 of the Media Law as amended by the Federal Law No. 239-FZ “On introducing amendments into the
Law of the Russian Federation ‘On mass media’”, 29 July 2017 (Annex 109).
7 Ibid.
8 Media Law (Annex 26), Article 10. The last requirement was introduced in 2017 by the Federal Law No. 239-FZ
“On introducing amendments into the Law of the Russian Federation ‘On mass media’”, 29 July 2017 (Annex 109). For
all practical purposes and unless otherwise specifically indicated, in the present Counter-Memorial the term “founder”
in this context is equivalent to the term “owner” and indicates the founder’s overall control over a given media outlet.
9 Media Law (Annex 26), Article 10 (requirements at the relevant time). The list of documents to be submitted is
determined by the Russian Government, see Order of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1752-r approving
the list of documents to be attached by the applicant to the application for registration (re-registration) of a mass media,
6 October 2011 (Annex 56). Information for applicants on the procedure, required supporting documents and payment
details is provided online at both Federal Roskomnadzor and the regional offices websites. As an example, see
Roskomnadzor official website, Information on mass media registration, retrieved on 19 May 2021, 19 May 2021
(Annex 505), also available in English at http://eng.rkn.gov ru/mass-communications/mass media registration/. See
also Roskomnadzor official website, “Details for paying the state duty for registration of mass media outlets”,
6 February 2015 (Annex 455); Roskomnadzor Directorate for the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol official
website, “On filling in the details of payment order for payers – individuals and legal entities”, 1 October 2014 (Annex
447).
10 Media Law (Annex 26), Article 13.
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of elements or documents contained in the application when such appear to be unclear or
incomplete.11
4. Registration may only be refused in a limited number of cases, namely when the application
was not submitted by a person authorized to establish media outlets under statutory law, when the
application does not reflect factual reality, when the mentioned approximate topics and (or)
specialization violates Article 4(1) of the Media Law, or when a prior registration already exists for
the same name.12 Article 4(1) prohibits any use of media outlets that constitutes or leads to the
commission of criminal offences, the disclosure of lawfully protected state secrets, the distribution
of materials or content calling for terrorist activities or justifying terrorism, the distribution of other
extremist materials, or materials promoting pornography, the cult of violence and cruelty, or
containing foul language.13 Among restrictions on the founder’s capacity, a founder or an editor-inchief
of a media outlet cannot be a person serving a criminal sentence or an organization conducting
activities prohibited by law.14 The refusal of registration is thus strictly limited by objective and
legitimate criteria, that apply equally to all applicants, the list of which in the relevant provision is
limitative.15 Roskomnadzor’s decisions refusing registration is subject to judicial review and may
be challenged in court.16 Refusal of registration on one of the above-mentioned grounds is distinct
from a return without consideration, which is made on procedural grounds and is without prejudice
to any future corrected applications.
5. At the same time, Roskomnadzor’s role is not limited to administrative or procedural aspects
as its mission is also that of a watchdog.17 In this capacity of oversight authority, Roskomnadzor
supervises and contributes to ensure, within its sphere of competence, compliance of media
activities with statutory law.18 In this respect, Roskomnadzor communicates with other State
administrations and may receive for example communications from the Office of the General
11 Such additional requests for clarification may be necessary, as in the cases advanced by Ukraine, when the
information or documentation provided proves to be insufficient or contradicted by data known to the authorities, for
instance in order to verify the capacity of the founder against the requirements of Article 7 of the Media Law by
checking the founder’s citizenship, interest in the media outlet or link with extremist or other illegal activities.
12 Media Law (Annex 26), Article 13.
13 Ibid., Article 4(1).
14 Ibid., Article 7. Since 2017, the prohibition was extended to citizens convicted for criminal use of media or for
extremist activities (for a certain period after the conviction): see Article 7 of the Media Law as amended by the Federal
Law No. 239-FZ “On introducing amendments into the Law of the Russian Federation ‘On mass media’”, 29 July 2017
(Annex 109).
15 Media Law (Annex 26), Article 13: “Refusal to register a mass media outlet is possible only on the following
grounds” (emphasis added).
16 Ibid., Article 61.
17 Statute of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media,
approved by the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 228, 16 March 2009 (Annex 51), paras. 4,
5.1.1, and 5.1.1.1, also available at http://eng.rkn.gov ru/about/.
18 Ibid., para 5.1.1.1.
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Prosecutor calling its attention to particular cases of non-compliant conduct of specific media
outlets that have come to the Prosecutor’s knowledge as part of its mandate.19
6. Once registered, a media outlet is obliged to operate in accordance with the registered
information. The registration of a media outlet may be declared invalid by administrative court
proceeding upon request of the registering authority when representations made in the application
do not reflect the reality, when the media outlet does not publish or broadcast during a period
exceeding one year, when the charter of the editorial office or any agreement replacing it is not sent
to the registering authority within three months from the start of publishing or broadcasting by the
media outlet, or when re-registration of the media outlet has taken place.20
7. The activities of a mass media outlet may only be terminated or suspended by a decision of
its founder or by court order upon the application of the registration body. A repetition of breaches
of the requirements of Article 4 of the Media Law (abuse of the freedom of the press) within 12
months of an initial written notification by the registration body to the founder and/or the editorial
commission (editor-in-chief) or the non-fulfillment of a court ruling on the suspension of a mass
media outlet shall be grounds for terminating the activity of a mass media outlet by court.21
According to the Media Law, a warning is a non-normative act of the registering authority issued
with the aim of preventing violations of the legislation on the media and indicating their
impermissibility.22 The activities of a mass media outlet can also be terminated on the grounds
established by the Federal Law “On countering extremist activities.”23 The activities of a mass
media outlet may also be suspended by court at the request of the registering authority on grounds
of violation of other prohibitions and restrictions established by the Media Law.24
2. The 2013 Legislative Amendment
8. At paragraph 510 of the Memorial, Ukraine complains of the adoption of Federal Law No.
433-FZ of 28 December 2013 introducing Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, that makes “public calls for the violation of territorial integrity of the Russian
19 Federal Law No. 2202-1 “On the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation”, 17 January 1992 (Annex 27),
Article 27(3).
20 Article 15 of the Media Law as amended by the Federal Law No. 239-FZ “On introducing amendments into the
Law of the Russian Federation ‘On mass media’”, 29 July 2017 (Annex 109).
21 Media Law (Annex 26), Article 16.
22 Article 16 of the Media Law as amended by the Federal Law No. 239-FZ “On introducing amendments into the
Law of the Russian Federation ‘On mass media’”, 29 July 2017 (Annex 109).
23 Media Law (Annex 26), Article 16. See also Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On counteracting extremist activities”, 25
July 2002 (Annex 876 to MU), Article 11.
24 Article 16 of the Media Law as amended by the Federal Law No. 239-FZ “On introducing amendments into the
Law of the Russian Federation ‘On mass media’”, 29 July 2017 (Annex 109); Media Law (Annex 26), Articles 7, 19,
19.1.
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Federation” a criminal offence, punishable by up to 5 years in prison.25 To recall, a similar
modification had been brought to Article 4 of the Media Law as early as 2002 in order to take
account of the newly adopted Federal Law on counteracting extremist activities.26 Moreover, the
2013 amendment occurred prior to Crimea’s change of status, having been introduced as early as
autumn 2013. It is difficult to see on what basis the adoption of these prior amendments could
evidence a systematic campaign of racial discrimination in Crimea since March 2014.
9. While the same provision had been in existence in the Ukrainian legal framework governing
media activities before the Russian 2013 amendment,27 in any event this amendment does not
modify the legal situation or increase limitations on media activities. The 2013 amendment did not
bring any substantive change to the existing law but merely clarified the regime established with the
2002 Federal Law on counteracting extremist activities. Newly inserted Article 280.1 in the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation addresses explicitly under a separate heading what had
been hitherto covered more generally and by reference under Article 280, which refers to extremist
activities in general and relies on the definition of extremism under Article 1(1) of the 2002 Federal
Law “On counteracting extremist activities,”28 the latter in turn defining extremism or extremist
activities as consisting, among other forms of conduct, in “forcible change of the foundations of the
constitutional system and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation.”29
3. The Transition Period for Media Registration in Crimea
10. With the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation, a transition period allowed for
media outlets in Crimea to operate under their existing Ukrainian registration until 1 April 2015. All
media outlets that are required to register under Russian law were required to do so by that deadline,
following a simplified procedure with benefits, including exemption from the registration state
duty.30 Therefore, during the transition period Crimean media benefited from a more, not less,
flexible framework than Russian media generally.
25 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 13 June 1996 (Annex 928 to MU), Article 280.1, as amended by Federal
Law No. 433-FZ “On amending the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation”, 28 December 2013 (Annex 60),
introducing Article 280.1 that makes “public calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation” a criminal offense, punishable by up to 5 years in prison. The amendment applies from 9 May 2014.
26 Federal Law No. 112-FZ “On amendments and additions to the legislative acts of the Russian Federation in
connection with the adoption of the Federal Law ‘On countering extremist activities’”, 25 July 2002 (Annex 46), Article
1.
27 Law of Ukraine No. 2657-XII “On information”, 2 October 1992 (Annex 745), Article 46 (Inadmissibility of
Abuse of the Right to Information): “Information cannot be used to call for overthrow of constitutional order, violation
of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, propaganda of war, violence, cruelty, incitement to racial hatred, national or
religious hatred, commission of terrorist acts, encroachment on human rights and freedoms.”
28 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, No. 63-FZ, 13 June 1996 (Annex 32), Article 280.
29 Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On counteracting extremist activities”, 25 July 2002 (Annex 876 to MU), Articles 1 (1).
30 Federal Law No. 402-FZ “On Specifics of Regulation in the Sphere of Mass Media in Connection with the
Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Formation within the Russian Federation of
the New Subjects of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol”, 1 December 2014 (Annex
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275
11. Moreover, even those media outlets which, for any reason, were not able to register or
complete their registration by the deadline were not prevented from doing so at any time thereafter.
Indeed, the return of an application for reasons of procedural non-compliance did not prevent
applicants from re-submitting corrected applications until the application is procedurally valid and
can be processed. As confirmed by the individual cases examined further below, when returning an
application on procedural grounds, the authorities indicated clearly the said grounds as well as,
where applicable, the way in which the application may be corrected.31
B. THE UKRAINIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK
12. Ukraine’s legal framework governing activities of the media is strikingly similar to the
Russian framework. Contrary to what Ukraine claims in the Memorial,32 its own laws show that
both countries consider as legitimate efforts to limits the use of the Media for spreading extremist
materials or conduct otherwise extremist activities. For example, the Ukrainian Law on Print Media
provides limits to print media activities by specifying a series of restrictions and prohibited
activities (see in particular Articles 2 and 3).33 The Law on Print Media also refers to Ukraine’s Law
on Information, including its Article 46.34
13. Ukraine’s Law on Print Media further provides that any person whose legal rights and
capacity have not been restricted may establish a media outlet.35 No individual may found, co-found
or control over 5% of a national or regional socio-political print media outlet.36 As a matter of
principle, all print media outlets have an obligation to register with the competent authorities before
starting their activities.37 Like under Russian Law, the application shall specify a series of
information. The registering authority may ask the founder (co-founder) to submit documents that
prove his (their) legal capacity and powers (passport of the citizen of Ukraine, charter, co-founders’
agreement, agreement with a successor, power of attorney, etc.). Any change in the submitted
information must also be notified.38
879 to MU); Tax Code of the Russian Federation, No. 117-FZ, 5 August 2000 (Annex 37), Article 333.35(3)(26) as
amended by Federal Law No. 381-FZ of 29 November 2014. According to Article 2(1) of Federal Law No. 402-FZ, the
transitional exemption of the payment of state duty for registration applied only in cases where a media outlet planned
to operate exclusively in Crimea. Media outlets with nationwide dissemination had to register with the central office of
Roskomnadzor in Moscow and could not benefit from the exemption of the state duty.
31 Media Law (Annex 26), Article 13.
32 MU, para. 510.
33 Law of Ukraine No. 2782-XII “On print mass media (press) in Ukraine”, 16 November 1992 (Annex 746)
(“Ukrainian Law on Print Media”).
34 Law of Ukraine No. 2657-XII “On information”, 2 October 1992 (Annex 745), Article 46 (Inadmissibility of
Abuse of the Right to Information).
35 Ukrainian Law on Print Media (Annex 746), Article 8.
36 Ibid., Article 10.
37 Ibid., Article 11. The registration application must be submitted by the founder. Exceptions to the registration
requirement are specified under Article 14.
38 Ibid., Article 12.
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14. In Ukraine, the authorities must take their decision within a month from the application and
notify the applicant in writing of their decision.39 Registration may not be granted as long as the
founder has not submitted all required documents supporting the application.40 A granted
registration may be declared invalid, in particular when the media outlet fails to start its activities
within a year of registration.41 Finally, the activities of a print media outlet may be terminated by
court order in several cases, including when the print media outlet undertake prohibited activities in
violation of Article 3.42
C. THE STRONG SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
15. As it appears from this overview of both Russian and Ukrainian legislation governing media
activities and contrary to Ukraine’s assertions,43 apart from minor divergences which are immaterial
to Ukraine’s claims, the legal frameworks of both States are virtually identical with respect to the
two essential questions that underlie Ukraine’s case.
16. First, both States require registration as a prerequisite for the activities of media outlets.
They establish very similar procedures to govern this registration process, with a similar degree of
formalism and procedural requirements. Both systems envisage return and refusal of registration,
including on similar procedural grounds.
17. Secondly, both legal frameworks provide for legitimate limitations to the exercise of the
right to freedom of expression and freedom of the media. In particular, they provide for termination
of activities of a media by court order on similar grounds, such as impermissibility of extremist
materials and language, incitement to violence, language against the state territorial integrity and
legal order, disruption of public order, among others. While specific requirements obviously vary,
registration procedures and legitimate limitations to the exercise of freedom of expression and
freedom of media are quite standard in most democratic systems in the world.44 A fortiori, there is
absolutely no basis to consider, as Ukraine surprisingly and artificially claims, that these rules and
regulations on media outlets form part of a systematic campaign of racial discrimination specifically
targeted at Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians as ethnic groups.
39 Ibid., Article 13.
40 Ibid., Article 13.
41 Ibid., Article 16.
42 Ibid., Article 18.
43 MU, paras. 506, 509-510.
44 See for example ECHR, Association Ekin v. France, Application No. 39288/98, Judgment, 17 July 2001, paras. 22
and 29-30 (that the Court found a breach of Article 10 of the ECHR in that case is immaterial); ECHR, Perna v. Italy,
Application No. 48898/99, Judgment, 6 May 2003, paras. 16, 39, and 48 (in regard of defamation); ECHR, Stoll v.
Switzerland, Application No. 69698/01, Judgment, 10 December 2007, para. 44 (in relation to the unauthorized
disclosure of State secrets); ECHR, Leroy v. France, Application No. 36109/03, Judgment, 2 October 2008, paras. 11-
21; ECtHR, Resul Taşdemir v. Turkey, Application No. 38841/07, Decision as to admissibility, 23 February 2010
(apology of terrorism through slogans); ECHR, Annen v. Germany, Application No. 3779/11, Judgment, 18 October
2018, paras. 12-13. See also Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, General Comment No. 34 (Article 19:
Freedoms of opinion and expression), 102nd session, UN doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, para. 21.
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D. CONCLUSION
18. To conclude, the registration procedure in Russia is accessible to all media outlets and
applies equally to them without any distinction or disadvantage for Crimean Tatars or Ukrainians
based on the information or documents to be provided. Furthermore, an application for registration
may be submitted at any time; a returned application may be resubmitted with corrections an
unlimited number of times and without any deadline for that. When the authorities return an
application on procedural grounds, they clearly specify the ground for return and what steps may be
taken to correct the application, should the media outlet so wish.
19. When it comes specifically to the transition regime established for Crimean media outlets,
the deadline of 1 April 2015 only applied to the validity of Ukrainian registration documents;
however, this deadline is immaterial to the question of Russian registration. Indeed, applications for
Russian registration could be submitted at any time before and after this date, and application
returned on procedural grounds could be resubmitted an unlimited number of times.
20. While media that had failed to register under the Russian system by 1 April 2015 may have
decided to adjust their activities or close operations in Crimea and move to Ukraine, this was purely
a business decision in order to avoid having their activities suspended until they could file a valid
application and carry out registration under Russian law. Such decision is based on business and
revenue considerations, in other words, on reasons of expediency and opportunity that only belong
to the investor. They, again, have nothing to do with acts of racial discrimination.
II. The General Situation of the Media in Crimea: A Diverse and Vibrant Activity
A. THE GENERAL LANDSCAPE
21. The real situation of the media in Crimea is characterized by the existence of many media
outlets with various editorial lines, languages of diffusion, including media outlets addressing the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities. During the proceedings on provisional measures, the
Russian Federation has already pointed to the existence of more than eighty registered media outlets
in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian language in Crimea as of the middle of 2016.45 Overall, since 18
March 2014, more than one hundred mass media outlets have been registered in Crimea, whose
products are primarily aimed at the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities.46 In addition, this
figure does not include small and local media outlets which are not subject to the requirement to
45 List of Crimean Media Outlets in the Crimean Tatar and in the Ukrainian Language, in Documents submitted to
the Registry of the ICJ by the Russian Federation in connection with Ukraine’s Request for the indication of provisional
measures and Judges’ Folder submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures, 6-9 March
2017 (Annex 1267), pp. 12-26.
46 Mass media outlets registered during the Period from 18 March 2014 to 3 June 2021, whose products are mainly
aimed at the Crimean Tatar and/or Ukrainian Community and are distributed/ was distributed (i) on the territory of the
Republic of Crimea, (ii) on the territory of the city of Sevastopol, or (iii) on the territory of the Russian Federation with
the editorial office address in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Annex 1312).
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278
register and which exit in large numbers in Crimea.47 Moreover, while some rare TV, print and
radio outlets have opted to preserve their Ukrainian registration and move their operations in
Ukraine, they mostly still broadcast in Crimea through cable networks and the Internet.48
22. The availability of media outlets in Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, or any other language in
Crimea should be compared with the proportion of Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians, as well as
native speakers of these languages, with the rest of the Crimean population, taking in particular into
account that the number of persons who identify themselves as members of a given ethnic
community usually does not coincide with the number of native speakers of the corresponding
language. For example, Ukraine admits that the number of Ukrainian speakers in Crimea is much
lower than the number of persons who identify as Ukrainian; in this regard it affirms that “[t]he
census taken by the Ukrainian authorities in 2001 recorded some 492,000 Ukrainians,
approximately 24 percent of Crimea’s population. Only 40.4 percent of these, approximately
199,000 people, described Ukrainian as their native language.”49 In the 2014 census taken by the
Russian Federation, there were 344,515 persons who identified themselves as Ukrainians – 15.1%
of the population –,50 of which 79.7% identified Russian as their native language and 20.3%
identified Ukrainian as their native language.51 In that respect, most of those who identify Ukrainian
as their native language usually speak Russian, name Russian as their second native languageand,
therefore, do not form a totally separate community inclined to generate a significant demand for
maintaining media outlets for itself in Ukrainian language.52 Taking this element into account, the
very significant number of media outlets that use Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian language in their
activities, as well as the continued capacity of some media outlets that have moved their operations
to Ukraine to further cover Crimea, confirm that Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians are certainly
not the target of a campaign of racial discrimination aimed at their cultural erasure, as Ukraine
claims.
47 YouTube, Statement of Ervin Musaev, Deputy Director-General of the Crimean Tatar TV channel “Millet”, at the
“Arria Formula” VTC of the member States of the UN Security Council on Crimea, 21 May 2020 (from 23:11 to
23:37), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dh5qqqLVrB0. In this video, Mr Musaev gives various examples of media
outlets from different ethnic communities and notes that over 400 media outlets operate in Crimea.
48 See examination of the individual cases alleged by Ukraine at paras. 28-31. See also Deputy Head of
Roskomnadzor, List of Ukrainian Printed Periodicals Which Were Issued a Permit to Distribute the Products of Foreign
Periodicals on the Territory of the Russian Federation, 3 June 2021 (Annex 1313).
49 MU, para. 360.
50 Federal Service of State Statistics of the Russian Federation, Results of the Population Census of 2014 in the
Crimean Federal District, 2015 (Annex 440), p. 108. The census was conducted on 14 October 2014.
51 Ibid., p. 118.
52 See Expert Report of Dmitry Anatolievich Funk, Roman Alexandrovich Starchenko, Valery Vladimirovich
Stepanov and Sergey Valeryevich Sokolovsky (Annex 21), paras. 133-134, 183. For instance, as described by Messrs
Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky, in 2000s Ukrainian-language newspapers “Krymska Svitlytsia” and
“Dzvin Sevastopolya” [“Bell of Sevastopol”] “had a circulation of no more than 1.5 thousand copies, with a low level of
public demand being the reason behind that”, Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky
(Annex 21).
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279
23. As of September 2015, Roskomnadzor’s records identified 369 registered media outlets in
Crimea, including 282 print media, 25 TV channels, 44 radio channels, 14 online publications and 4
news agencies. Of the total number of outlets, 44 registered media outlets worked in the Crimean
Tatar language, including 6 TV channels, 8 radio channels and 30 periodicals.53 Minorities are also
well represented in State Medias. For example, the State Television and Radio Company “Crimea”
broadcasts Crimean Tatar content 11 hours per week (44 hours per month), which represents
approximately 10% of total TV broadcasting time. This proportion corresponds to the percentage of
the Crimean Tatar population in the Republic.54 In addition, as experts observe, “Russian-language
media outlets absolutely dominated the mass media in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
throughout the entire post-Soviet period and until 2014. The total circulation of newspapers in
Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, and other languages did not exceed 5%. The Krym State Television and
Radio Broadcasting Company and commercial television and radio broadcasting companies
broadcast most of their programmes in Russian. By 2008, there were only five print media outlets in
Crimea published in Ukrainian only; whereas there were 987 Russian-language ones.”55
24. As these elements show, the situation of the Media in Crimea is diverse and the opposite to
Ukraine’s accusations of Russia conducting a campaign of systematic racial discrimination and
cultural erasure against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians as ethnic groups. Statistical information
confirms that Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian media outlets do not suffer ethnic discrimination. As a
matter of fact, in October 2015, well after the close of the re-registration process in Crimea, the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea confirmed that it had received no complaints
concerning pressure on the media.56
25. The authorities have also adopted supporting measures. For example, in 2015, the State
Committee on interethnic relations and deported citizens of the Republic of Crimea adopted the
Public Crimean Tatar TV and Radio Broadcaster as an autonomous non-profit organization, the aim
of which is to assist in developing the capacities of Crimean Tatar TV and radio channels, and
supporting their activities in Crimea.57 As another example, the Millet TV channel was launched on
1 September 2015 under the auspices of the authorities.58 Millet emits in Crimean Tatar and Russian
languages and is viewed by the Council of Europe as reflecting the “recognition of the needs and
53 Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Information on the outcomes of the analysis of arguments
set out in the letter of the Permanent Delegation of Ukraine to UNESCO, 23 October 2015 (Annex 911 to MU), p. 2.
54 Ibid., p. 7-8.
55 Expert Report of Messrs Funk, Starchenko, Stepanov and Sokolovsky (Annex 21), para. 133.
56 Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Information on the outcomes of the analysis of arguments
set out in the letter of the Permanent Delegation of Ukraine to UNESCO, 23 October 2015 (Annex 911 to MU), p. 3.
57 Charter of the Public Crimean Tatar TV and Radio Broadcaster adopted by Order No. 5-r of the State Committee
on interethnic relations and deported citizens of the Republic of Crimea of 30 June 2015, in Documents submitted to the
Registry of the ICJ by the Russian Federation in connection with Ukraine’s Request for the indication of provisional
measures and Judges’ Folder submitted by the Russian Federation for the Hearings on Provisional Measures, 6-9 March
2017 (Annex 1267).
58 See Millet TV channel’s website at http://trkmillet ru.