INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME III OF THE ANNEXES TO THE REPLY
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
29 APRIL 2022
- i -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OF THE VOLUME III OF THE ANNEXES TO THE REPLY
D. SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES
Page
Taras Hunczak, ed., The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977)
1
Vasyl Markus, “International Legal Status of the Ukrainian State,” in
Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1971)
11
Jurij Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917-1923 (Edmonton:
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980)
17
Theofil I. Kis, Nationhood, Statehood and the International Status of
the Ukrainian SSR/Ukraine (Ottawa, London, and Paris: University
of Ottawa Press, 1989)
27
Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and
Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 2001)
35
Dominique Arel, “Demography and Politics in the First Post-Soviet
Censuses,” Population, Vol. 57, No. 6 (2002)
41
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, L’actualité et les Potentialités de la
Convention sur L’élimination de la Discrimination Raciale, Revue
Trimestrielle des Droits de L’homme, Vol. 64 (2005)
49
Patrick Thornberry, Universal Minority Rights: A Commentary on
The Jurisprudence of International Courts and Treaty Bodies
(Oxford University Press 2007)
59
Vasyl Kuchabsky, Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and
Bolshevism, 1918-1923 (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute
of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2009)
65
Paul Robert Magocsi, History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples,
2nd revised and expanded ed. (Toronto, Buffalo, and London:
University of Toronto Press, 2010)
71
Svitlana Mel’nyk and Stepan Chernychko, Etnichne ta movne
rozmaïttia Ukraïny (Uzhhorod: PoliPrint, 2010)
81
Oleh Wolowyna, “The Famine-Genocide of 1932-33: Estimation of
Losses and Demographic Impact,” in Bohdan Klid and Alexander J.
Motyl, eds., The Holodomor Reader (Edmonton and Toronto:
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2012)
87
- ii -
Atlas istoriï ukraïns’koï derzhavnosti (L’viv: Naukove tovarystvo
imeni Shevchenka, 2013)
93
William A. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A
Commentary (2015)
99
A. Peters, Has the Advisory Opinion's Finding that Kosovo's
Declaration of Independence was not Contrary to International Law
Set an Unfortunate Precedent?, in The Law and Politics of the
Kosovo Advisory Opinion (OUP, M. Milanović & M. Wood, eds.,
2015)
117
Patrick Thornberry, Article 1: Definition of Racial Discrimination¸
in THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (Oxford
University Press 2016)
125
Patrick Thornberry, Article 5: Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights: A Commentary¸ in THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A
COMMENTARY (Oxford University Press 2016)
135
Gabrielyan A. M., The Implementation of Language Policy in the
Sphere of Secondary Education in the Crimea, Archon, Vol. 5 (2018)
141
Theodore Christakis & Katia Bouslimani, National Security,
Surveillance, and Human Rights, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GLOBAL SECURITY (Robin Geiss & Nils Melzer
eds., Oxford University Press 2021)
155
Intentionally Omitted
E. PRESS REPORTS
Page
Kryminform, Residents of Crimea Who Are Abroad Can Apply for the
Retention of Ukrainian Citizenship to the Consular Services of the
Russian Federation - FMS of the Russian Federation (8 April 2014)
161
Center for Investigative Journalism, TRK Chernomorskaya Paid the
Debt to the RTPC Before the Court. “The Arrest and Removal of
Equipment Was Blackmail” - Zhuravleva (6 August 2014)
165
Vladislav Maltsev, “Crimea Is Ours” for Mufti Ablaev, Nezavisimaya
Gazeta (4 January 2015)
173
Bezformata, Metropolitan Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea
Performed a Litia in Memory of Those Who Died in the Battles for
the Motherland (23 February 2015)
177
QHA, Crimean Tatar Newspaper “Avdet” Did Not Receive
Registration (27 March 2015)
181
- iii -
Gleb Shemovnev, Only One Crimean Tatar Media Has Passed
Registration in Russia, KP.ua (3 April 2015)
185
Vadim Nikiforov, Crimean Tatars Will Mourn Without Mejlis,
Kommersant.ru (12 May 2015)
191
Vadim Nikiforov, Crimean Tatar Mourning Is Not Allowed on the
Streets, Kommersant.ru (18 May 2015)
195
Radio Svoboda, Chubarov: The New Crimean Tatar Channel in
Crimea Will Be a Tool of the Occupiers (9 June 2015)
199
Viktor Vorobyov, Monopoly on the Holidays: The “Authorities” of the
Crimea Coveted the Flag of the Crimean Tatars, Krym.Realii (25
June 2015)
203
Facebook Post by Refat Chubarov (23 Sept. 2015) (Official Statement
of the Headquarters of the “Public Blockade of Crimea”)
209
Ukrainska Pravda, Chubarov: Mejlis Did Not Make a Decision on
Blockade of Crimea (19 February 2016)
213
Radio Svoboda, Lesya Ukrainka Museum in Yalta Closed, Russian
Authorities Say – for Repairs, Writers – Forever (15 March 2016)
217
Vadim Nikiforov, The Anniversary of the Deportation of the Crimean
Tatars was Celebrated Without a Mourning Rally, Kommersant.ru
(18 May 2016)
225
Credo Press, The Loyal to Moscow Mufti of Crimea Ablayev Is
Accused by the World Congress of the Crimean Tatars In Reporting
on Muslims (19 October 2016)
229
Gulnara Bekirova, Red Paradise: Bloody Way Home, Krym.Realii
(23 October 2016)
233
Gulnara Bekirova, Red Paradise: Bloody Way Home (Ending),
Krym.Realii (24 October 2016)
239
TASS, A Year After the Blackout: How the Energy Blockade Helped
to Modernize the Crimean Energy Sector (22 November 2016)
247
Kherson.life, Kherson Police for a Year Did Not Find Those
Responsible for Blowing up Power Lines on the Border with Crimea
(17 December 2016)
253
Vadim Nikiforov, Victims of the Deportation of the Crimean Tatars
Are Remembered in Crimea, Kommersant.ru (18 May 2017)
257
Editorial Avdet, School No. 44 Named After Alime Abdennanova Met
its First Students, Avdet (1 September 2017)
261
Krym.Realii, Khan's Palace: Restoration or Destruction? (28
December 2017)
267
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Movement News Simferopol, Collecting the Column on May 9, 2018
(19 April 2018)
273
Ivan Zhilin, Trample Other People's Bonds, New Newspaper (5 July
2018)
277
Taurica.net, Qurultai of Muslims of Crimea Will Take Place on
October 27 (2 August 2018)
285
RIA Novosti, Kurultai of Crimea Asked to Transfer the Property of
the “Mejlis” to the SAMK (27 October 2018)
289
Tatiana Ivanovich, Khan's Barbaric “Restoration,” From the Palace to
the Barn, QHA (7 December 2018)
293
RIA Novosti, Crimea Warns Turkey Against Supporting Mejlis (16
December 2018)
307
Portal Big Yalta, Museum of Lesya Ukrainka in Yalta (24 July 2019) 311
Andriy Gevko, “State Crimean Tatar Language in Crimea -
Imitation”: Problems of the Language of the Indigenous People on
the Peninsula and the Mainland, Krym.Realii (19 January 2020)
315
Krym.Realii, Cut Out Pages: Scandalous History Textbooks Returned
to Crimean Schools (+ Photo) (24 January 2020)
321
Sanko V.G. et al., Return the Ukrainian Gymnasium Back to Us!,
Iskra Pravdy (2 February 2020)
327
Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, Educational Centers
“Crimea-Ukraine” and “Donbas-Ukraine” Have Started Working, in
2020 They Will Work Until October 23 (9 June 2020)
331
Julia Stets et al., Every Fifth Budget Place for Crimea and Donbass,
RFE/RFL (16 August 2020)
335
Krym.Realii, Pro-Government TV Channel “Millet” Was Transferred
to the Subordination of the New Department (21 August 2020)
347
RIA Novosti, Cells of Tablighi Jamaat Were Liquidated in Three
Regions of Crimea* (2 October 2017)
351
Elena Removskaya, “Vandalism Masquerades as Restoration.” New
Contractors From Russia in the Khan’s Palace, Krym.Realii (17
February 2021)
355
Victoria Veselova & Maxim Stepantsov, Anniversary with a Leaky
Ceiling. What Is Left of the Legacy of Lesya Ukrainka in Crimea,
Krym.Realii (25 February 2021)
365
TASS, Crimean Authorities Said that Foreigners Will Be Able to Keep
Property in the Region (24 March 2021)
373
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Igor Tokar, “This Is Linguocide”: How Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
Languages Disappear in Crimea, Krym.Realii (22 June 2021)
379
Vladimir Putin, On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,
Presidential Executive Office (12 July 2021)
385
Radio Svoboda, The UN has counted the number of victims of
hostilities in Donbass (19 February 2021), accessed at
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-oon-kst-gerty-boyovyhdonbas/
31110937.html
397
Timofey Sergeytsev, What Should Russia Do With Ukraine?, Ria
Novosti (3 April 2022)
401
Kultura.RF, Houses of Culture and Clubs of Krasnoperekopsky
District, Ministry of Culture of Russia (2022)
411
Denys Karlovsky, The Occupiers in the Occupied Territories Are
Fighting With History Books, Pravda (24 March 2022)
415
M. Kanarskaya, The temple of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the
Kyiv Patriarchate in Perevalne was taken away. In whose favor?,
Krym.Realii (1 June 2014)
419
Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, The Ministry of
Culture Conducts Certification of Amateur Groups of Crimea (9
December 2015)
425
Appeal of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People to All Residents of
Crimea (Simferopol) (7 October 1992)
429
F. OTHER DOCUMENTS
Page
Video Footage of the Detention of Crimean Tatars (2 October 2017) 433
FSB Video Footage of the Detention of Crimean Tatars in Simferopol
(23 November 2017)
435
Letter from S.V. Krivenko, Member of the Council Under the
President of Russia for the Development of Civil Society and Human
Rights to the Chairman of the Council under the President of the
Russian Federation for the Development of Civil Society and Human
Rights M.A. Fedotov, excerpted for translation from Ukraine’s
Memorial, Annex 949
437
Certificate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate
No. 390 (3 July 2017)
441
Certificate of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea No. 064-3 (20 March 2014)
445
- vi -
State Statistical Services of Ukraine, “Zahal’noosvitni navchal’ni
zaklady Ukraïny na pochatok 2013/14 navchal’noho roku,” sheet 64
449
Social Media Page (VKontakte) with 21 March 2014 Photo, excerpted
for translation from Russia’s Counter-Memorial Part II, Annex 306
453
Crimean Tatar Resource Center, The Russian Federation
Systematically Destroys Freedom of Speech in Crimea - Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (4 May 2020)
457
Law of Ukraine No. 1207-VII “On Securing Rights and Freedoms of
Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory
of Ukraine” (15 April 2014)
461
Valentina Samar, Zone of Special Inattention, ZN.UA (11 September
2015)
465
Facebook Post of Rustem Irsay (16 January 2016) 473
Refat Chubarov, Speech given at Meeting 38, Session Hall of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (09 December 2015) (Video)
477
Electronic message from S. Kavtan (21 March 2014) 481
Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea No. 1801-2/01 “On transfer to the Crimean Eparchy of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate of part of the
building located at 17 Sevastopolskaya St., in the city of Simferopol”
(16 May 2001)
485
Contract of lease of real property that belongs to the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea (13 November 2002)
489
Annex 109
Taras Hunczak, ed., The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 1 -
- 2 -
Taras Hunczak, editor
with the assistance of John T. von der Heide
The Ukraine, 1917-1921:
A Study in Revolution
Distributed by Harvard University Press
for the
Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute 1977
- 3 -
Publication of this volume was made possible in part by the financial
support of the Ukrainian National Association, Jersey City, New Jersey.
Copyright 1977, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
ISBN 0-674-92009-0
Library of Congress Catalog Number 77-073710
Printed in the United States of America
The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute was established in 1973 as an
integral part of Harvard University. It supports research associates and
visiting scholars who are engaged in projects concerned with all aspects
of Ukrainian studies. The Institute also works in close cooperation with
the Committee on Ukrainian Studies, which supervises and coordinates the
teaching of Ukrainian history, language, and literature at Harvard University.
- 4 -
386 The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution
people, recognizing each nation's right to self-determination, and
deferring the establishment of the final form of this [right] to the
Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Government extends its
hand to the representatives of the Ukrainian democracy—to the
Central Rada—and calls upon it to create, in agreement with it, a
new life in the Ukraine for the benefit of the entire revolutionary
Russia.
We, the Central Rada, having always stood for the Ukraine's nonseparation
from Russia, in order that we and all her peoples might
jointly strive toward the development and welfare of all Russia and
toward the unity of her democratic forces, accept with satisfaction
this call of the [Russian Provisional] Government to common action
and declare the following to all citizens of the Ukraine:
The Ukrainian Central Rada, elected by the Ukrainian people
through its revolutionary organizations, will soon be expanded on
a just basis by representatives of the revolutionary organizations of
the other peoples who live in the Ukraine: subsequently, it will
become that single supreme body of revolutionary democracy in the
Ukraine which will represent the interests of the entire population
of our land.
From its own midst, the expanded Central Rada will select anew
a separate body—the General Secretariat—which will be responsible
to the Rada and which will be subject to confirmation by the
Provisional Government as the repository of the highest regional
authority of the Provisional Government in the Ukraine.
All rights and means [of governance] will merge in this body,
so that, as the representative of Democracy in all the Ukraine and
as, at the same time, the supreme governing body in the land, it
might be empowered to fulfill the complex task of organization
and to establish order throughout the land, in accord with the entire
revolutionary Russia.
In harmony with other nationalities of the Ukraine, and acting
as an organ of the Provisional Government in the sphere of state
administration, the General Secretariat of the Central Rada will
follow steadfastedly the road of strengthening the new order created
by the revolution.
Striving toward an autonomous order for the Ukraine, the
Central Rada, in agreement with the national minorities of the
Ukraine, will prepare drafts of legislation for the Ukraine's autonomous
structure, which will then be submitted for confirmation to
the Constituent Assembly.
- 5 -
Appendix: The Four Universals 387
Considering that the establishment of a territorial branch of
the Provisional Government in the Ukraine assures, within a
plausible framework, the desired closeness of the administration
of the Land (Ukraine) to the needs of the local population prior
to the Constituent Assembly and recognizing that the fate of all the
peoples of Russia is firmly tied to the overall achievements of the
revolution, we emphatically oppose any plans to establish autonomy
arbitrarily in the Ukraine before [the convocation of] the All-
Russian Constituent Assembly.
As for the formation of Ukrainian military units, the Central
Rada will have its representatives attached to the offices of the
Minister of War, the General Staff, and the Supreme Commander,
who will take part in the formation of separate units composed exclusively
of Ukrainians insofar as such formation will be deemed
technically feasible by the Minister of War, and will not jeopardize
the fighting capacity of the army.
In making this known to the citizens of the Ukraine, we firmly
believe that the Ukrainian democracy, which transferred to us its
will, together with the revolutionary democracy of all Russia
and her revolutionary government, will exert all its strength to
lead the entire state, and particularly the Ukraine, to the full
triumph of the revolution.
Kiev, in the year 1917, 3 July
The Ukrainian Central Rada
Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada
Ukrainian people and all peoples of the Ukraine!
A heavy and difficult hour has fallen upon the land of the
Russian Republic. In the capitals to the north a bloody civil
struggle is raging; the Central Government has collapsed, and
anarchy, lawlessness and ruin are spreading throughout the state.
Our land is also in danger. Without a single, strong national authority,
the Ukraine may also fall into the abyss of civil war,
slaughter and ruin.
Ukrainian people! You, together with the other fraternal peoples
of the Ukraine, have placed us to guard the rights acquired through
your struggles, [empowered us] to create order and to build new
life on our land; and, we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, by your
- 6 -
392 The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution
continues to wage a bloody struggle with our People and [our] Republic;
moreover, this same Petrograd Government of People's
Commissars has begun delaying the peace and is calling for a new
war, which it characterizes as holy [war]. Again, blood will flow,
again the ill-fated working people shall be forced to lay down their
lives.
We, the Ukrainian Central Rada, elected by the congresses of
peasants, workers, and soldiers of the Ukraine, cannot agree to this
at all, we will not support any wars, for the Ukrainian People want
peace; and a democratic peace must come about promptly. Moreover,
in order to ensure that neither the Russian nor any other government
shall obstruct the Ukraine's efforts to institute this desired
peace, to be able to lead our country to order, to creative work, to
the strengthening of the revolution and of our freedom, we, the
Ukrainian Central Rada, proclaim to all citizens of the Ukraine:
From this day forth, the Ukrainian People's Republic becomes
independent, subject to no one, a Free, Sovereign State of the Ukrainian
People.
We want to live in harmony and friendship with all neighboring
states: Russia, Poland, Austria, Rumania, Turkey, and others, but
none of these may interfere in the life of the Independent Ukrainian
Republic—power in it shall belong only to the People of the
Ukraine, in whose name, we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, the representatives
of the toiling people of peasants, workers, and soldiers
and our executive arm, henceforth called "the Council of People's
Ministers," shall govern until the convocation of the Ukrainian
Constituent Assembly.
First of all, we direct the government of our Republic, the Council
of People's Ministers, to continue on an independent basis the
peace negotiations already begun with the Central Powers, to carry
them through to conclusion without regard for the interference by
any other part of the former Russian Empire, and to establish peace,
so that our Country may begin its economic life in tranquility and
harmony.
As to the so-called bolsheviks and other aggressors who destroy
and ruin our Country, we direct the Government of the Ukrainian
People's Republic to take up a firm and determined struggle against
them, and we call upon all citizens of our Republic to defend their
welfare and liberty without sparing their lives. Our Ukrainian People's
State must be cleared of the violent intruders sent from Petrograd,
who trample the rights of the Ukrainian Republic.
The inestimably difficult war, begun by the bourgeois govern-
- 7 -
Appendix: The Four Universals 393
ment, has greatly wearied our People; it has already destroyed our
Country, ruined the economy. An end must come to this now.
While the army is being demobilized, we order that some [members
of the armed forces] be released; after the ratification of the peace,
the army is to be disbanded completely. Later, instead of a standing
army, a people's militia is to be formed, so that our fighting forces
may serve as defenders of the working people, and not at the pleasure
of the ruling strata.
Localities destroyed by war and demobilization are to be rebuilt
with the aid and through the initiative of our State Treasury. When
our soldiers return home, new elections to the people's councils,
district, county and city dumas will be called at a time which will be
prescribed, so that our soldiers may have a voice in them: meanwhile,
such local administration should be established which can be
trusted and which will be based on all revolutionary-democratic
strata of the people. The government should encourage the cooperation
of the councils of peasants', workers' and soldiers' deputies
elected from among the local population.
On the matter of land [reform], the commission elected at our last
session has already worked out legislation concerning the transfer
of the land without compensation to the working people, taking as
its base our resolution on the abolition of property and the socialization
of the land which was passed at the eighth session. In a few
days the whole Central Rada will study this legislation.
The Council of People's Ministers will use all means to ensure
that the transfer of land from the land committees to the working
people take place without fail before the beginning of spring tilling.
Forests, waters and all mineral resources—the wealth of the
Ukrainian working people—are transferred to the jurisdiction of
the Ukrainian People's Republic.
The war has also taken all the manpower resources of our country.
Most of the factories, enterprises and shops have been producing
only that which was necessary for the war, and the nation has been
left completely without goods. Now the war has ended. We direct
the Council of People's Ministers to begin immediately the change
over of all factories and enterprises to peace-time production of
goods most needed first and foremost by the toiling masses.
This same war has proliferated hundreds of thousands of unemployed
and invalids. In the Independent People's Republic of the
Ukraine no working man should suffer. The government should increase
the industry of the State, it should begin creative work in
all areas in which the unemployed may find work and to which they
- 8 -
394 The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution
may apply their strength and—[the government] should use all
means to ensure [the welfare of] the maimed and of those who have
suffered from the war.
During the old order, merchants and all sorts of middlemen
gained huge capital from the poor oppressed classes. Henceforth, the
Ukrainian People's Republic takes into its hands the most important
branches of commerce, and all profit derived from them shall
be used for the benefit of the people. Our State itself will supervise
goods imported and exported so as to prevent the high prices [set]
by speculators which are [such a] hardship to the poorest classes. To
achieve this aim, we direct the Government of the Republic to prepare
and present for approval legislation on this [matter], as well as
on the establishment of monopolies in iron, leather, tobacco and
other products and merchandise on which the greatest profit has
been drawn from the working classes for the benefit of the nontoilers.
Likewise, we order the establishment of state-people's control over
all banks whose credits and loans to the non-working masses aided
in the exploitation of the toiling classes. Henceforth, bank loans
are to be granted primarily to support the working population and
the economic development of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and
not for speculation and various exploitations by the banks or for
profiteering.
Because of anarchy, anxiety in life, and shortage of goods, discontent
is growing in a certain segment of the population. Various
dark forces are using this discontent and trying to attract unenlightened
people to the old system. These dark forces want to put back
all free peoples under the unified tsarist yoke of Russia. The Council
of People's Ministers should struggle firmly against all counterrevolutionary
forces. Anyone who calls for an uprising against the
independent Ukrainian Republic, for a return to the old order,
must be punished for treason of the state.
All democratic freedoms proclaimed by the Third Universal are
reaffirmed by the Ukrainian People's Republic, which particularly
proclaims: in the Independent Ukrainian People's Republic all nations
enjoy the right of national-personal autonomy, granted to
them by the law of January 9.4
4 January 9 (according to the Julian calendar) or January 22, 1918, by
present-day reckoning, has gone down in history as the date of Ukraine's
independence, i.e., the proclamation of the Fourth Universal. In fact, the
- 9 -
Appendix: The Four Universals 395
Whatever matters enumerated in this Universal which we, the
Central Rada, will not have time to accomplish will be completed,
rectified, and brought to a final order by the Ukrainian Constituent
Assembly. We order all our citizens to conduct the elections most
assiduously, to use all means to ensure the fastest tabulation of votes
possible, in order that our Constituent Assembly—the highest ruler
and administrator in our Land—may convene within a few weeks to
establish freedom, harmony, and welfare by a constitution of the
Independent Ukrainian People's Republic for the benefit of the
whole toiling people, now and in the future.
This our Highest body will decide on the federative ties with the
people's republics of the former Russian state.
Until that time we call upon all citizens of the Independent
Ukrainain People's Republic to stand relentlessly on guard of the
freedom and rights won by our People and to defend their fate with
all their might from all enemies of the peasants'-workers' Independent
Ukrainian Republic.
Kiev, 9th January, 1918.
Ukrainian Central Rada
third reading of the Fourth Universal was presented as a bill of the
Ukrainian Central Rada, and the vote on it was taken shortly after midnight
on January 12 (January 25), 1917.
It seems that the Founding Fathers of the Ukrainian People's Republic
were attached to the January 9 (January 22) date because it had been
the date set for the convocation of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.
Since the Constituent Assembly failed to be elected, the Central Rada
began its deliberation on the Fourth Universal on that date. Work on this
legislation was held up when, on January 10 (January 23)—not January 9,
as stated in the Fourth Universal—representatives of national minorities
in the Rada demanded that the draft legislation on national-personal
autonomy should be passed before the final vote on the Fourth Universal.
The law on national-personal autonomy was passed the next day (January
11), and the second reading of the Fourth Universal followed. By then it
was almost midnight, and a short recess was called. Before the third
reading, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, president of the Central Rada, made a
brief introduction in which he informed the galleries that work on the
Fourth Universal had begun on January 9 (January 22). This was also the
date that appeared on the document when it was published.
- 10 -
Annex 110
Vasyl Markus, “International Legal Status of the Ukrainian State,” in Ukraine: A
Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 11 -
- 12 -
UKRAINE
A Concise Encyclopaedia
Prepared by
SHEVCHENKO SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY
Edited by
VOLODYMYR KUBIJOVY6
Foreword by
ERNEST J. SIMMONS
VOLUME II
Published for
THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
- 13 -
All Rights Reserved
1971
Copyright in all countries subscribing
to the Berne Convention
ISBN 0-8020-3261-3
Printed in Canada
- 14 -
Despite the fact that between March
and November, 1918, Ukraine was politically
and militarily dependent on the
German Reich and Austria-Hungary, her
existence as a state was effective in the
light of the fundamental attributes of a
sovereign state: territorial supremacy,
treaty-making powers, the right of legation,
and the power to wage war and
make peace. The status of independence
existed until the government and its
military forces left the Ukrainian territory
at the end of 1920. As a government-
in-exile in Poland, the Ukrainian
government enjoyed a brief period of
limited international status (immunities
of state were recognized) until Poland
signed a peace treaty with Russia and
Soviet Ukraine in Riga in March, 1921.
BOUNDARIES. The Ukrainian National
Republic had internationally recognized
boundaries in the southwest ( Brest-
Litovsk Peace Treaty) and in the north
(peace treaty between the Central
Powers and Soviet Russia of March 3,
1918). The northern boundaries with
Russia were confirmed in the preliminary
peace treaty between Ukraine and the
Russian SFSR of June 12, 1918. The definitive
settlement of the boundaries was
left to the Russo-Ukrainian peace conference
in Kiev which, however, failed
to produce a peace treaty.
Boundaries with the newly established
Don Cossack Republic were also provisionally
delineated by the Ukrainian-
Don Cossack agreement of August 7,
1918. No boundary settlement took place
in the Rumanian sector. Ukraine upheld
her claims to Bessarabia in the southwest
(occupied by Rumanians) and in the
south to the Crimean peninsula which
did not come under Ukrainian jurisdiction
until 1954.
RECOGNITION. The recognitions granted
!o Ukraine were numerically and qualitatively—
sufficient to consider her a fullfledged
subject of international law.
Between 1917 and 1921, 25 states accorded
recognition to Ukraine. Nineteen
of them extended full recognition (de
UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD 1917-20 67
lure), four a tentative one (de facto),
and in two cases the nature of the recognition
was controversial (between de
facto and de jure) and subsequently
withdrawn (Britain and France before
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty).
De jure recognition was granted to
Ukraine under the government of the
Central Rada by the following states:
Soviet Russia (diplomatic notes, Brest-
Litovsk Treaty, and preliminary peace
treaty with Ukraine); Central Powers—
German Reich, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and the Ottoman Empire (peace
treaty); under the Hetman government
the Ukrainian state was recognized by
Rumania, the Don Cossack Republic,
Kuban (commercial and other agreements,
establishment of diplomatic relations),
and Poland ( exchange of"
representatives); under the Directory,
Ukraine acquired additional recognition
from Georgia, Azerbaidzhan, Czechoslovakia,
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland,
the Holy See (exchange of
diplomatic representatives), and Argentina
(decree of Argentinian government
of February, 1921, when the Ukrainian
government was already in exile).
TREATY-MAKING POWERS. The Ukrainian
state under three constitutional regimes
(Central Rada, Hetmanate,
Directory) concluded a series of international
treaties, thus enjoying and exercising
full treaty-making powers. Among
those agreements the most important one
FIGURE 11. DELEGATION OF THE UNR AT THE
BREST-LITOVSK PEACE CONFERENCE
- 15 -
68 THE LAW
was the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty
which Ukraine signed with the Central
Powers on February 9, 1918. A series of
economic and trade accords with Germany
and Austria-Hungary followed.
Ukraine also negotiated a commercial
agreement with Rumania and trade and
transportation accords with the Don
Cossack Republic, Kuban, and Georgia.
The preliminary peace agreement with
Soviet Russia signed in Kiev on June
12, 1918, and the accords on the resumption
of transportation as well as on the
consular relations were aimed at the
normalization of relations with Russia.
By denouncing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty
and by initiating hostilities against
Ukraine at the end of 1918, Russia also
abrogated these agreements unilaterally.
On April 21, 1920, the Directory concluded
a political and military alliance
with Poland known as the Warsaw
Treaty. In addition, the Ukrainian trade
missions abroad negotiated a number of
technical transactions, relating to commerce.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. As an
independent state Ukraine joined the
following international organizations and
agencies: the International Commission
of Maritime Navigation on the Black
Sea in 1918; the Universal Postal Union
in 1919; the International Telegraph
Union; and the International Radio-
Telegraph Union. In 1920, the Ukrainian
government applied for membership in
the League of Nations. The Council postponed
its decision for a year and then
took no action because the Ukrainian
National Republic did not have effective
control over the territory.
INSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
In December, 1917, the Central
Rada established a separate secretariat
for foreign affairs (formerly nationality
affairs) and appointed a delegation to
the peace conference in Brest-Litovsk.
In January of 1918, the secretariat became
the ministry of foreign affairs. At
the same time it gave accreditation to
the first foreign diplomatic representatives
in Ukraine: John Picton B,
(Representative of Great Britain) 'sgg .e,
General Tabouis (Commissaire
Republique Francaise aupres du de01la
vernement de la Republique t nienne). After the i Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty the Ukrainian government ke
ceeded to exchange diplomatic r missions with the Central Powers. During
Hetmanate, Ukraine was th
10 foreign countries, representedie and the govern.
ment accredited 11 foreign missions in Kiev. In September, 1918, Hetman Paul
Skoropadsky made the first and only
state visit of a Ukrainian head of state
to a foreign country when he visited
Germany and met with Wilhelm II. In
the summer and fall of 1918, Kiev was
also the site of a peace conference
between Ukraine and Soviet Russia.
Under the Directory, Ukraine maintained
11 legations abroad which had
official status. The names of Ukrainian
diplomats were included in official diplomatic
lists and they enjoyed diplomatic
immunity. In a number of other countries
Ukraine had unofficial missions which
developed informal relations with local
authorities. The heads of Ukrainian missions
abroad met in a series of nonperiodic
conferences.
The Ukrainian state maintained consular
relations with other countries, particularily
in 1918. In addition to those
countries which had their diplomatic
representatives in Kiev, the following
states maintained consulates in Ukraine:
Belorussia, Denmark, Estonia, Greece,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Persia,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Thes
Ukrainian government opened consu
lates
mainly on the territories of the
successo.ar
states of former Russia. In Soviet Russ'
alone there were more than 30
consul;
ates and consular agencies in additionc.
to two consulates-general in mosc
and Petrograd. Beyond the territoiy.ar
the former Russian empire, Ukia_inani
consular offices were opened in Pol.
Germany, Sweden, and Switzerlan_da;
other countries with which Ulor
- 16 -
Annex 111
Jurij Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917-1923 (Edmonton: Canadian
Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 17 -
- 18 -
THE SOVIETIZATION OF UKRAINE
1917-1923
The Communist Doctrine
and
Practice of National Self-Determination
Revised Edition
Jurij Borys
The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
Edmonton 1980
- 19 -
THE CANADIAN LIBRARY IN UKRAINIAN STUDIES
A series of original works and reprints relating to Ukraine, issued under the
editorial supervision of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of
Alberta, Edmonton.
Editorial Board:
Bohdan Bociurkiw, Carleton University (Social Sciences)
George S. N. Luckyj, University of Toronto (Humanities)
Manoly R. Lupul, University of Alberta (Ukrainians in Canada)
Ivan L. Rudnytsky, University of Alberta (History)
Copyright e 1980 The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
The University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Borys, Jurij, 1922—
The Sovietization of Ukraine 1917-1923
(Canadian library in Ukrainian studies)
Originally presented as the author's thesis, Stockholm, 1960. under title: The Russian
Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-920862-01-2 bd.
ISBN 0-920862-03-9 pa.
I. Ukraine—Politics and government—I917— 2. Nationalism—Ukraine.
3. Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza. 4. Self-determination, National.
I. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. II. Title. III. Series.
JN6599.U4B6 1980 947%71084' I C80-091020-6
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in
any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise
without the prior permission of the copyright owner.
Cover design: Larisa Sembaliuk
Printed in Canada by Printing Services, University of Alberta
Distributed by the University of Toronto Press
5201 Dufferin St.
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- 20 -
184 Sovietization of Ukraine
In Popov's opinion, the Bolsheviks in Ukraine before the seizure of
power were badly off both quantitatively and qualitatively. In
November 1917, in his opinion, the party "relied only on the proletariat,
and moreover even this proletariat was much less controlled by it than in
the north and the centre. The party's influence on the army was much
less, and there was almost no influence on the peasantry. That was all we
had on the eve of the `October' in Ukraine." Popov wrote that "there were
no strong Ukrainian cadres in the ranks of the party," and that "the
historical peculiarity of our party is that it has a weak connection with the
masses of Ukrainian nationality."" Elsewhere he wrote that "in 1917 the
Bolshevik party conquered the working masses." But it had not yet started
to conquer the peasantry and the village proletariat,"" so that "the active
base of the Bolsheviks during their struggle was still only the working
class."" Popov acknowledges that the party had against it "a united front
of Ukrainian nationalist socialist parties that depended on compact masses
of the Ukrainian petty bourgeoisie, chiefly the peasantry."" And elsewhere
he admits that the government of the Central Rada "no doubt depended
for support on numerous peasant masses and had under its command
rather large military forces; moreover, extending its struggle with the
Bolsheviks, it had every reason for expecting whole-hearted assistance from
the non-Ukrainian local bourgeoisie."60 To this Kulyk adds that the
Bolsheviks had support only in large cities, while the periphery was
dominated by the Ukrainian "chauvinists."61 Even Trotsky later admitted
that during the initial years of the Soviet regime Bolshevism in Ukraine
was weak.62
These testimonies, plus the fact that the Central Rada mastered the
situation and became the de facto government of Ukraine, while the
Bolsheviks were compelled to move to the periphery of Ukraine nearest to
Russia, refute the assertions of later Soviet historiography that the
establishment of the Soviet regime in Ukraine was the result of the
struggle of the Ukrainian proletariat itself under the leadership of the
Communist party of Ukraine.67 That the united Ukrainian national front
was not broken is regarded by Soviet historians as the Bolsheviks' worst
mistake in the "October" period in Ukraine.
The Military Action of Soviet Russia against the Rada
Having failed to sovietize Ukraine through the soviets, the Russian
Bolsheviks decided to carry out their plans by military force. That the
Soviet government was formed in Kharkiv and not elsewhere reflected not
- 21 -
First Attempt at Sovietization 185
only the proletarian character of that region, but chiefly Kharkiv's
occupation by the Red Guards under Antonov. This occupation was the
immediate link in the chain of the RCP's policy against the Rada. As is
known, the reply of the General Secretariat to the People's Commissars'
ultimatum of 17 December was considered at the meeting of the CPC on
18 December, when it resolved "to regard the Rada's reply as
unsatisfactory, to consider the Rada in a state of war with us."" In their
resolution of 1 January 1918 the People's Commissars declared that "only
the soviets of the Ukrainian poor peasantry, workers, and soldiers can
create in Ukraine a government under which any disagreements between
fraternal nations will be impossible."" This intention of the RCP was later
repeated by Krylenko, the commander-in-chief, on 25 January 1918, in an
interview with a delegation of Ukrainian soldiers: "We fight against the
Rada for the establishment of the government of soviets of workers',
soldiers', and peasants' deputies over the entire territory of the Russian
federative republic . . . . As soon as the government in Ukraine is
transferred to the Ukrainian soviet of workers', soldiers', and peasants'
deputies, all military operations against Ukraine will cease."" This meant
that as long as the Rada did not recognize Soviet power, the CPC
considered itself in a state of war with the Rada. This policy was a
distortion of the principle of the self-determination of nations. That is why
the General Secretariat of the Rada wrote in its reply to the ultimatum:
"It is impossible to recognize the right to self-determination to the point of
secession and at the same time to make a crude attempt upon this right,
imposing its forms of political order, as does the Council of People's
Commissars of Great Russia in respect of the Ukrainian People's
Republic."67
It is manifest from Bolshevik sources themselves that at the same time
as the People's Commissars made declarations on the right of national
self-determination and also on the right of Ukraine to secession, it was also
working out a plan to overthrow the Rada by force. According to the
testimony of Antonov himself, several days before the ultimatum, on
8 December, Lenin appointed Antonov "to be in direct charge of
operations against Kaledin6° and his `helpers" ("by `helpers'," writes
Antonov, "were meant counter-revolutionary Ukrainians supporting
Kaledin").69 After this, Antonov left for general headquarters where,
together with Krylenko, he worked out the plan of the offensive against
Ukraine that was later approved by Lenin.7° Antonov concentrated forces
and prepared a wide "'encircling' of Ukraine by the units of the
southwestern and Romanian fronts." On 14 December, the general staff,
led by Krylenko, had already made a number of decisions on this matter.
- 22 -
Russian SFSR and Ukrainian SSR 309
representative of the RSFSR subordinate to him. Corresponding to this,
the trade representative of the Ukrainian commissariat for foreign trade in
Turkey was appointed the chairman of the united mission of the Ukrainian
SSR and the RSFSR.64
The trend towards the unification (or rather the subordination) of the
Soviet republics that were connected with the RSFSR by treaties was even
more marked in the international field. For instance, Ukraine had
independent diplomatic relations as late as the end of 1922, although this
independence was rather relative in view of the relation between the
RCP(B) and the CP(B)U examined earlier. During this short period of
independent diplomatic relations, the Ukrainian Soviet republic, being
bound by party directives, was unable to pursue a foreign policy
independent and different from that of the RSFSR. It is quite possible
that the whole campaign of the Ukrainian SSR on the external front was
determined, as was admitted later by the acting Ukrainian commissar for
foreign affairs, Iakovlev, by the struggle for recognition of the Soviet
government of Ukraine to prevent thereby the recognition of Petliura's
government, then in exile, as the legal government of Ukraine.65 At that
time Iakovlev openly declared:
The foreign policy of Ukraine has not and cannot have any interests other
than those common with Russia, which is just such a proletarian state as
Ukraine. The heroic struggle of Russia, in complete alliance with Ukraine,
on all fronts against domestic and foreign imperialists, is now giving way to
an equally united diplomatic front. Ukraine is independent in its foreign
policy where its own specific interests are concerned. But in questions that
are of common political and economic interest to all Soviet republics, the
Russian as well as the Ukrainian commissariats for foreign affairs act as the
united federal power."
The Comintern yearbook, referring to the treaty of 1920, spoke of "the
first international action" of the Ukrainian republic which "served as a beginning
to a whole series of agreements concluded by the government of
the Ukrainian SSR with other foreign countries. . . . An important task fell
to the lot of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Moscow, as the first
foreign representation of the Ukrainian SSR, to mediate in the matter of
formulating and establishing the international position of the Ukrainain
SSR by concluding a whole series of diplomatic agreements."67
The first diplomatic representative of the Ukrainian SSR abroad was
M. Levytsky, appointed to Prague in April 1920. This is curious, since the
Czechoslovak government at that time recognized neither Soviet Russia
nor Soviet Ukraine. Such de facto recognition took place only as late as
1922, when a provisional treaty was signed between the Ukrainian Soviet
- 23 -
310 Sovietization of Ukraine
republic and the Czechoslovak republic, in accordance with which both
states established diplomatic relations.68 Also in 1920, Vladimir Aussem
was appointed the Ukrainian SSR's ambassador in Berlin. By the end of
1921 Shumsky arrived in Warsaw as the representative of the Ukrainian
SSR.69 These representatives of the Ukrainian SSR were separate, although
it may be assumed that they worked in agreement with the Russian
people's commissar for foreign affairs. It was only in 1923 that Ukrainian
diplomatic missions ceased functioning, as a consequence of the creation of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The Ukrainian Soviet republic, during the period 1920-23, signed a
series of political agreements whereby Ukraine was recognized as an
independent state. The recognition of Ukraine as an independent state was
expressly mentioned in the armistice and in the preliminary peace
conditions between Russia and Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland, on
the other (signed on 12 October 1920 in Riga).70 This recognition is also
repeated in the text of the final peace treaty between the above-mentioned
states in Riga on 18 March 1921.71 In the provisional agreement with
Austria of 7 December 1921, Ukraine was recognized de facto as an
independent state; for, according to the agreement, there had to take place
an exchange of diplomatic representatives between these countries.72 "The
heads of representations," the agreement said, "enjoy the privileges and
prerogatives of the heads of accredited missions." The representatives
received the following consular powers:
1) The protection of the interests of their citizens in accordance
with the norms of international law.
2) The issue of passports, certificates of identity, and visas.
3) The drawing up of documents, including testaments, the
witnessing of the signatures of institutions or private persons,
the drawing up or testifying to the correctness of translations,
and the authentication of copies from documents.73
The Ukrainian SSR was also recognized in a treaty it signed with the
Lithuanian republic on 14 February 1921.'4 Similar recognition was
accorded by Latvia in the treaty of 3 August 1921," by Estonia in the
treaty of 25 November 1921,76 as well as by Czechoslovakia in the
above-mentioned treaty of 6 June 1922.77 On 21 January 1921 a treaty of
friendship and brotherhood with Turkey was signed in Ankara; in it
Turkey declared its "recognition of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic
- 24 -
Russian SFSR and Ukrainian SSR 311
as an independent and sovereign state."" Apart from these states, Ukraine
concluded agreements with Hungary—an agreement concerning the
repatriation of prisoners of war (21 May 1920), a treaty about the
exchange of prisoners of war and civilian internees (28 July 1921), and a
protocol concerning the mutual exchange of prisoners of war
(3 October 1921); with Germany—a treaty dealing with repatriation
(23 April 1921) and an agreement concerning the extension of the treaty
of 16 April 1922 to the union republics (5 November 1922); with Italy—a
preliminary agreement (26 December 1921); with France—an agreement
concerning the mutual evacuation of subjects (20 April 1920). On
10 May 1922 the Ukrainian SSR, together with the RSFSR and the
Belorussian SSR, signed an agreement with the epidemics commission of
the League of Nations concerning aid for the people's commissariats of
health of the above-mentioned republics.79 It must be noted that many of
these treaties were signed by Ukraine together with the RSFSR and
sometimes also with the Belorussian Soviet republic; this created an
impression that Ukraine was merely an appendage of Russia. The peace
treaty with Turkey and the treaties with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and
Czechoslovakia were signed by Ukraine independently.
The last independent international action of the Ukrainian republic was
the signing in Kharkiv on 17 February 1923 of the additional protocol to
the treaty between the Ukrainian and Estonian republics of
25 November 1921. This was followed on 27 October 1923 by the
exchange of documents of ratification.8° On 19 August 1923 the Ukrainian
people's commissar for foreign affairs informed the representatives of
foreign states in Ukraine that the international relations of the Ukrainian
SSR had been transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR.81
However, even earlier the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of
the RSFSR was preparing to take over the republics' diplomatic functions.
The first such steps were the measures of the government of the RSFSR to
obtain the authorization of the Soviet republics to represent them at the
Genoa conference. During January 1922 the politburo of the CC RCP(B)
elaborated through its branches, the CCs of the Communist parties in the
republics, the question of common action at the Genoa conference. On
22 February 1923 at a conference of the representatives of the republics in
Moscow a protocol was signed, in accordance with which Azerbaidzhan,
Armenia, Belorussia, Bukhara, Georgia, the Far East Republic,fl2 Ukraine,
and Khorezm authorized the delegation of the RSFSR to defend their
interests in Genoa.83 Although these authorizations referred to the Genoa
conference only, they seemed to be a preparation for a further unification
of the foreign policy of the republics in Moscow. In fact, the international
- 25 -
- 26 -
Annex 112
Theofil I. Kis, Nationhood, Statehood and the International Status of the
Ukrainian SSR/Ukraine (Ottawa, London, and Paris: University of Ottawa Press,
1989)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 27 -
- 28 -
UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA UKRAINIAN STUDIES
Occasional Papers No. 1
Nationhood, Statehood and
the International Status of the
Ukrainian SSR/Ukraine
Theofil I. Kis
University of Ottawa Press
Ottawa • London • Paris
Trent
UniversItl L1101/214
P0101bOtOUgh, Ont.
- 29 -
x Luys ut.k . \c* -1,
The publication of this volume is made possible by the Ukrainian Studies
and Research Endowments, Iwachniuk Fund, at the University of Ottawa.
Editorial Board:
Theofil I. Kis
Irene Makaryk
Orest Subtelny
George Bolotenko
©University of Ottawa Press, 1989
Printed and bound in Canada
ISBN 0.7766-0193-8
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Kis, Thcofil 1., 1927-
Nationhood, statehood and the international status of Ukrainian
S.S.R./Ukraine
(Etudes ukrainiennes de l'Universite d'Ottawa = Ukrainski studii Ottayskoho
universytetu = University of Ottawa Ukrainian studies; no. 10)
Includes indexes.
Bibliography: p.
ISBN 0-7766-0193-8
1. Ukraine—International status. I. Title. II. Series: University of Ottawa
Ukrainian studies; no. 10
DK508.13.K48 1989 341.26'0947'71 C88-090210-8
Cover design by wendesigns, Ottawa
- 30 -
UkSSR Viewed Internationally 57
The fact that the UkSSR—conjointly with the USSR—subsequently
signed some major international treaties8 and participated in several
important international conferences convened by the UN's specialized
agencies9 further consolidated its newly-acquired "international
status." The UkSSR is also party to certain other conventions, such
as the United Nations Convention on Civic and Political Rights and
the United Nations Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, both dated December 19, 1946 (ratified by the UkSSR on
November 12, 1973). The UkSSR continuously participated during
the 1970s and 1980s in international conferences convened by the UN's
specialized agencies, with the aim of producing international conventions.
In the early 1980s, for example, following the adoption of the
International Maritime Code, the UkSSR participated in the preparatory
committee on the establishment of the Seabed Authority and of
the International Maritime Tribunal. Moreover, the UkSSR has been
elected twice to the Security Council of the UN, in 1947-1948, after
the signing of the Paris peace treaties, and in 1984-1985. Finally, the
UkSSR is represented on some committees and commissions established
by UN agencies, or on intergovernmental organizations outside
the UN system. These include the Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Commission on
Human Rights, the Commission on Human Settlements, and the
UNCTAD Committee on the Transfer of Technology. The Ukrainian
representative was also elected to the special committee of the UN
dealing with racism and served as acting chairman of that body at
the international seminar in Siofok, Hungary, in 1985, discussing
apartheid in South Africa. (The UkSSR's participation in these
committees seems suspiciously selective, in political terms.)
8. Among them, the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 with the European allies of Nazi
Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland; the Danubian
Convention of 1948; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide of 1948, which went into effect in 1951 but has not
been ratified by the USSR and consequently by the UkSSR; the Geneva
Convention of 1949; and the important Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, concluded at Moscow,
August 5, 1963. In the 1970s and 1980s the UkSSR has signed and ratified
about twenty-five other conventions, mostly with regard to technology, ecology,
labour, transportation, and education. One of the most important treaties signed
in the 1980s is the UN Maritime Convention.
9. Among them, the Paris Conference of 1946, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
and Consular Relations of 1961 and 1963, the Conferences on the Law
of the Sea of 1958 and 1960, and that of the period 1973-1982 (Brownlie, 124;
A Decade . . . , 72ff, 79ff; Martens, XII, 606; AJIL, 1951, I, 7ff; Aj/L, 1953,
XLVII, 119; AJIL, 1963, LVII, 995; UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 [May 23, 1969]).
- 31 -
58 UkSSR Viewed Internationally
It is certainly worth noting again in this connection that the UkSSR
is also party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
came into force in 1980. In 1966 the International Law Commission
(established in 1949) completed the task of drawing up draft articles
that formed a comprehensive code of the Law of Treaties. Here,
"treaty" means all binding agreements between states governed by
international law (Gotlieb, 12), although the word sometimes refers
to one particular type of agreement.
However, the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties convened
by the UN in 1969 failed to resolve the issue of the treaty-making
capacity of constituent units of a federation.1° Had it succeeded, the
Conference would certainly have clarified the status of the UkSSR.
Instead, it reaffirmed, in Article 6 of the Convention, the principle
according to which only states, and eventually intergovernmental international
organizations created by states and recognized under international
law, can enjoy this capacity. At the behest of many participating
federations, the Conference rejected a clause that would have
explicitly recognized the treaty-making capacity of constituent units
of a federal state. In the absence of a clear rule, customary law
continues to prevail. Present customary international law does not
recognize constituent units as fully-fledged states, but it does allow
them some limited, derivative treaty-making capacity by delegation
(see Chapter 16 of the Law of Treaties). Third-party states, however,
are not obliged to recognize these qualified treaty-making capacities of
the constituent members of any federal state, or to regard agreements
with such entities as treaties in the sense of the Vienna Convention.
Obviously, this customary law applies to the UkSSR.
It is within these political and legal parameters that the UkSSR
has exercised—and continues to exercise—its competence in numerous
specialized agencies of the UN, and in certain international governmental
organizations that are recognized under international law
(Fennessy). Participation of the UkSSR in non-governmental international
organizations is, however, extremely rare. There is, for
example, a Ukrainian Republic Peace Committee that works with
the pro-Soviet World Peace Council by means of the All-Soviet Peace
Council. The UkSSR is also a signatory of a number of multilateral
10. As previously noted, the Vienna Convention of 1982 (Article 6) decided to
reject the draft provision of the International Law Commission, which would
have expressly recognized that federal states may provide, in the constitution,
for a limited treaty-making power for their constituent units. However, the
customary law applicable continues to apply and permits it (see the Preamble).
But the UkSSR is not in any way affected by international customary laws.
- 32 -
UkSSR Viewed Internationally 59
treaties, and since the mid-1950s it has joined most of the UN specialized
agencies that were initially boycotted by the Soviet Union and
its East European allies. The UkSSR is a member of the International
Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health
Organization (WHO), the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations
Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Universal Postal Union,
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the
World Organization of Intellectual Property, and so forth (see
Mezhdunarodnoe pravo . . .). The organization where the UkSSR is
permitted to play the most active role is, probably, UNESCO. However,
the UkSSR stands aside from more important economic international
bodies, such as the World Bank and the International Finance
Corporation. At the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties of
1969, the Ukrainian representative declared that the UkSSR is party
to more than one hundred international treaties and agreements that
"engaged the international responsibility" of Ukraine (Jacomy-
Millette, 337).
A more detailed analysis of the UkSSR's participation in the UN
will be the subject of the next section. However, we need to allude
to the matter briefly here. Given that states, not governments, are
members of the UN, the distinction between admission (state) and
representation (government) is important. A state cannot be represented
simultaneously by two governments. But this is in fact what
has happened in the case of the UkSSR: it is represented by the Soviet
total state (USSR), but also individually, by virtue of a confused
mixture of politics, international law, and internal law. It is a double
representation for the USSR as well, since the "government" of the
UkSSR is, for the purpose of international law, an emanation of the
USSR's government, as well as of the "state" of the UkSSR. (In
this respect, an interesting question can be raised concerning the
enforcement of international treaties and conventions signed by the
UkSSR since, in most cases, a treaty in which the UkSSR is a party
is binding on both the USSR and the UkSSR, and applies to the same
territory.).
In the final analysis, then, the UN membership of the UkSSR does
not amount to a recognition of its statehood or government. Article 4
of the UN Charter provides for admission to membership in the UN
of "all peace-loving states" that are "able and willing to carry out
the obligations prescribed by the Charter." This is, however, not an
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Annex 113
Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the
Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
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- 36 -
The Affirmative
Action Empire
Nations and Nationalism in
the Soviet Union, 1923-1939
TERRY MARTIN
Cornell University Press ITHACA AND LONDON
- 37 -
Copyright © 200I by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or
parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission
in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell
University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York
1.4850.
First published 2001 by Cornell University Press
First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2001
Printed in the United States of America
Martin, Terry (Terry Dean)
The affirmative action empire : nations and nationalism in the Soviet
Union, 1923-1939 / Terry Martin.
p. cm. — (The Wilder House series in politics, history, and
culture)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8014-3813-6 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-8014-8677-7
(pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Minorities-Soviet Union. 2. Nationalism and socialism—Soviet
Union. I. Title. II. Series.
IN6520.M5 M27 2001
947.084'2 - dC21 2001003232
Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible
suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of
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- 38 -
8o Implementing the Affirmative Action Empire
April 1923 party congress and June 1923 nationalities conference forced a
second and more decisive turn toward Ukrainization. These events marked the
defeat of Lebed's theory. On the eve of the April 1923 Ukrainian Party conference,
an authoritative article by Nikolai Popov, then head of the all-union
Agitprop Department, denounced Lebed's theory as "mindless Russian chauvinism
(rusotiapstvo)", adding that "it is shameful to have to write about such
elementary truths six years after the revolution.»16 At the conference itself,
Lebed was further attacked by Frunze (then assistant head of Ukraine's
Sovnarkom and the conference's official speaker on nationalities policy) and
Rakovskii (who had converted to an extremely pro-Ukrainian stance), as well
as by Lebed's long-standing rivals, Zatonskyi and Skrypnyk. The Ukrainian conference
officially declared Lebed's theory to be "chauvinist" and "the inevitable
development of Luxemburgist views." This resolution marked a decisive
rejection of Lebed's advocacy of state and party neutrality on the nationalities
question.
The period from April 1923 to April 1925 was subsequently known as the era
of "Ukrainization by decree," a pejorative reference to the flood of decrees
issued and then largely ignored.18 The first such decree, a July 27, 1923 resolution
on the Ukrainization of education and culture, aimed to extend the Ukrainian
language beyond rural primary schools.19 Five days later, a landmark
VUTsIK decree was issued: "On measures for guaranteeing the equality of languages
and for aiding the development of the Ukrainian language." This decree
declared that "the previously existing recognition of the formal equality of the
two most widespread languages in Ukraine—Ukrainian and Russian—[was]
insufficient [and would result in] the factual domination of the Russian language."
Although the decree recognized both Ukrainian and Russian as
official languages of Ukraine, it demanded "a variety of practical measures" to
establish Ukrainian as the sole language of government in all central state
organs, as well as all local organs in regions where ethnic Ukrainians formed a
plurality.20
The August x decree marked a decisive break with the policy of linguistic
neutrality. To drive home this point, Ukrainian first party secretary Emmanuel
Kviring wrote a lead editorial, in which he reiterated the decree's assertion that
"we cannot confine ourselves to recognizing the formal equality of nations, for
this formal equality will lead to factual inequality." Instead, the new task was
"positive work on behalf of the development of [Ukrainian] national culture."'
16N. Popov, "Natsional'nyi vopros na Ukraine," Kommunist, no. 75 (05.04.23): 3.
"Andrii Khvylia, Do rozv'iazannia natsional'noho pytannia na Ukraini (Kharkov, 1930): 16.
"N. Kalizzhnyi, "Ukrainizatsiia i NKRSI," Visti VUTsIK, no. 124. (03.06.25): I.
19 P. Solodub, "Spravy ukrainizatsii," Bi1'shovyk, no. 160 (18.07.24): 1.
"Andrii Khvylia, Natsional'nyi roopros na Ukraine (Kharkov, 1926): 115.-z2z; 116.
21 Kviring, "Praktychni zasoby v spravy natsional'nii," Bil'shooyk, no. 121 (03.06.23): I.
22S. Shchupak, "Praktychne percvedenniia natsional'noi spravy na Kyivshchyni," Bi1'shovyk, no.
13! (15.06.23): 1; the phrase "active Ukrainizatsiia" also came into use, "Postanova
TsK KP/b/U shchodo ukrainizatsii," Bi1'shovyk, no. 72 (30.03.24): I.
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Annex 114
Dominique Arel, “Demography and Politics in the First Post-Soviet Censuses,”
Population, Vol. 57, No. 6 (2002)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
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per
s e
Citer ce document / Cite this document :
creative
commons
Population (English edition)
;
doi : 10.2307/3246617
https://www.persee.fr/doc/pop_1634-2941_2002_num_57_6_18422
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Résumé
Resumen
Abstract
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0 0 creative
commons
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812 D. AREL
In other words, while nationality was defined by language (the
German concept, prevalent in eastern Europe), an individual's language
was not accepted in the Soviet census as indicative of nationality. What
counted was the presumed language of one's ancestors. A third-generation
Ukrainian in Kazakhstan, who knew no other language than Russian, was
still counted as a Ukrainian, even though, for Ukrainian nationalists, language
is the indisputable core of national identity. Linguistic assimilation,
while real in urban areas (outside of the Baltics and the southern
Caucasus), actually left very few traces in Soviet census statistics (Silver,
1986).
Theoretically, the post-Soviet countries could have attempted to do
away with a direct question on nationality in the census, while maintaining
one on language. This would have brought them in line with the practice of
a number of western multi-ethnic states such as Canada and Spain, where
ethnic nationalists are deriving national identity from language data in the
census. This is not to say that post-Soviet states are breaking any
international standard. While international organizations such as the UN
and Eurostat have devised standards for non-identity categories on the
census form, and while post-Soviet countries are attempting to meet these
standards scrupulously in order to be eligible for the funding they so desperately
need to conduct their censuses, there are no standards for ethnic
nationality (or, for that matter, for race, language, or religion) (United
Nations Statistical Commission, 1998). This absence reflects partly the
rejection by some countries (such as France) of the concept of nationality
or national minority on philosophical grounds, and partly the inherently
political nature of the definition of what constitutes a nationality, as discussed
above.
2. Nationality and territory
While there are no conventions on whether or how the census should
enquire into ethnic nationality, a clear standard has evolved in the past
decade regarding the labelling of national identities. National identity,
according to this standard, is a matter of self-definition and cannot be
imposed by the state. This had led the European Union to view the use of
ethnic or religious categories on identity cards as incompatible with
human rights(' 7). "Internal passports" in the Soviet Union had an entry for
nationality. They no longer do, except in Kazakhstan. The census question
on nationality, on the other hand, was based on self-declaration, but within
clear bounds. The most politically consequential of all restrictions is that
not all national categories volunteered by respondents are recognized as
17 The EU stance created a storm of controversy in Greece in 2000, when the government
announced that identity cards would no longer have an entry for religion. The Greek Orthodox
Church led demonstrations denouncing the new policy as an attack by Europe on Greek Orthodox
identity (Smith, 2000).
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DEMOGRAPHY AND POLITICS IN THE FIRST POST-SOVIET CENSUSES 8 13
valid by enumerators. As we will see, all Soviet censuses used an exclusive
list of recognized nationalities and detailed instructions on how to
recode unrecognized categories into official ones. For instance,
"Cossacks" were counted as Russians if they claimed Russian as their
"native language," or as Ukrainians if they claimed Ukrainian, but never as
"Cossacks" since the term was not accepted as a nationality. A "dictionary
of nationalities," listing all recognized and unrecognized categories, was
prepared and updated prior to each census. All countries in this study have
maintained the practice, for the simple and fundamental reason that
nationality, in the post-Soviet context, continues to be linked to territorial
sovereignty .
Shortly after the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet authorities endowed
recognized nationalities with formal sovereignty over an administratively
demarcated territory. The expectation was that the "nationalization" of territory
would satisfy national demands and thereby make them irrelevant in
the long run. Instead, a sense of unfulfilled entitlement set in. In the post-
Soviet era, the crucial linkage between nationality and territory has
remained intact. Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Estonia, and Latvia all
legitimize their independence on the grounds that their country constitutes
the homeland of the "titular" nation, namely, the ethnic nationality after
which the state is named. The ethnically defined autonomous "republics"
of the Russian Federation, such as Tatarstan or Bashkortostan, do the
same. While in some cases, legal documents blur the distinction between
the ethnic and the civic nation as agents of self-determination, that is as
the group in whose name sovereignty is proclaimed, other instruments of
nation-building such as public speeches and school textbooks unambiguously
emphasize the ethnic element(' s).
3. The imperative to create statistical majorities
The claim of ethnic entitlement to a territory entails a need to produce
ethnic majorities. This is arguably the main reason why post-Soviet
countries have kept a nationality category in their census. National elites
understand the power of official statistics very well. Even though the claim
of prior settlement is conceptually distinct from contemporary demographics,
the ability to construct statistical majorities is a critical tool for
strengthening a state's hold on territories. The case of Kazakhstan illustrates
this point strikingly well. Between the censuses of 1926 and 1959,
(18) In Ukraine, for instance, the Constitution rather tortuously indicates that the right of
self-determination is exercised "by the Ukrainian nation" (with a small U in the Ukrainian-language
text, giving the expression an ethnic connotation) as well as "all the Ukrainian people"
(with a capital U in the original, and a more inclusive meaning). The Declaration of Independence,
on the other hand, suggests that Kievan Rus' was a Ukrainian state, and state-sponsored
textbooks intimate that the Rus' inhabitants are the ancestors of ethnic Ukrainians. In other
words. Ukraine has a historic right to independence because ethnic Ukrainians settled there first
(Arel, 2002b). In Kazakhstan, the Constitution defines the national territory as "the ancestral land
of the Kazakhs" (Dave and Sinnott, 2002).
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Annex 115
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, L’actualité et les Potentialités de la
Convention sur L’élimination de la Discrimination Raciale, Revue
Trimestrielle des Droits de L’homme, Vol. 64 (2005)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
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Annex 116
Patrick Thornberry, UNIVERSAL MINORITY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY
ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TREATY
BODIES (Oxford University Press 2007)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
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OXFORD PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law
Content type: Book content
Product: Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL]
Published in print: 27 December 2007
ISBN: 9780199208517
Education
Patrick Thornberry
From: Universal Minority Rights: A Commentary on the Jurisprudence of
International Courts and Treaty Bodies
Edited By: Marc Weller
Subject(s):
Freedom of expression — Ethnicity — Minorities — Race — Right to education — Human rights remedies
- 61 -
(p. 325) Education
I. General Introduction 325
II. Content of the Right 328
A. Historical and Theoretical Background 328
B. Delineation of the Content 331
C. Analysis of the Existence of this Right in Different Regional/
International Documents 336
D. State Duties 349
III. Analysis of Case Law 350
A. Comparison over Time between Courts 350
B. Analysis and Criticism, Possible Evolution of Interpretation by Courts 359
C. Application of the Right (Enforcement by States) 360
IV. Conclusion 361
I. General Introduction
State policies towards minorities have ranged from attempts to eliminate groups by
physical means or forced assimilation, through neglect—benign or otherwise—
discrimination, and forcible segregation,to positive attempts at integration, protection,
and promotion and even celebration of minority identity.Following a post-1945 period of
relative neglect of minority issues (p. 326) in terms of recognition and endorsement of
group presence, international law now robustly insists that minorities have rights to exist
and maintain their identity. They also have the right to be free from discrimination, and are
deemed to enjoy general human rights including those with a cultural aspect, and those
specifically directed to them. The contemporary formulation of rights is individualist though
there are collective rights such as self-determination, and collective exercise of individual
rights is generally recognized—the overall collective imprint being heavier in instruments
on indigenous peoples.International law recognizes various categories of right-holder, of
which members of minorities are only one, producing an interconnected family of
instruments and principles. Processes of text reading are complex in that particular
minority rights are only imperfectly understood without a wider frame of reference to other
texts in the human rights ‘family’.Even in the limited framework of the League of Nations,
the treaties and declarations integrated rights of inhabitants and nationals with those of
nationals belonging to ‘racial, religious or linguistic minorities’.Those who ignore such
complexity can fall into ‘the Brownlie trap’, laid for those ‘super-specialists’ with ‘super
tunnel vision’, when: ‘it does not seem to occur to them that their subject of special interest
belongs to a much wider world of normative development’.It may also be noted that the
more specific norms can also lend content to the general (p. 327) instruments, especially
where the latter make little more than passing reference to the right in question.In the present chapter, emphasis is placed on the development of norms through
jurisprudence. However, it may be noted that, with some treaty bodies,the contribution of
case-based jurisprudence is limited, so recourse will be had to snapshots of the concluding
observations of such bodies. Secondly, despite demands made on monitoring bodies to
achieve an integrated approach to human rights, in practice a treaty body will commence
norm interpretation from within the four corners of ‘its own’ treaty, so that convergence of
norms may represent an ideal rather than describe reality. The complexity of the legal
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than temporary measures.The same is true for indigenous rights.Indigenous groups
and minorities enjoy their own rights in international law which stand independently of the
case for special measures, though some state policies for such groups may be brought
within this framework. Accurate appraisal of the situation of minority and indigenous
groups is indispensable for the fulfilment of international obligations on special measures
(p. 340) and minority rights, and highlights the importance of collecting disaggregated
data.3. Specific Minority Rights
(a) Curriculum Content
Recurring elements in curriculum standards for and about minorities include the following:
First, the multicultural essence of education for minorities is the provision of means by
which the groups can protect and promote their identity. The Commentary on the UN
Declaration on Minorities recognizes that in the protection of the identity of minorities, the
‘language and educational policies of the State are crucial’; further, to deny to minorities
‘the possibility of learning their own language and of receiving instruction in their own
language, or excluding from their education the transmission of knowledge about their own
culture, history, tradition and language, would be a violation of the obligation to protect
their identity.’Promotion of identity requires ‘special measures to facilitate the
maintenance, reproduction and further development of their culture’.Secondly, Article
4.4. of the UN Declaration on Minorities is interpreted in the commentary by the UN
Working Group on Minorities to call for intercultural education, ‘by encouraging knowledge
in the society as a whole of the history, tradition and culture of the minorities living there.’The education of the population at large is to be complemented by education for members
of minorities—‘the complementary duty to ensure that persons belonging to minorities gain
knowledge of the society as a whole’,within the overall purpose of ensuring ‘egalitarian
integration based on non-discrimination and respect for each of the cultural, linguistic or
religious groups which together form the national society’.(p. 341) A similar spirit informs Article 7 of CERD; accordingly, CERD/C has made many
recommendations to the effect that state parties ensure that school curricula foster
understanding, tolerance, and friendship among nations and ethnic groups,the overall
message being one of the inherent dignity and equality of human beings.The intercultural
element is complemented by recommendations for ‘multicultural’ programmes in relation to
opportunities for learning minority and indigenous languages, etc. The lack of provision in
educational curricula for indigenous or minority languages has been a matter of regular
concern.Other UN treaty bodies have made similar recommendations—the CRC/C for
example has insisted on the importance of adapting school curricula to suit the
particularities of local communities;CESCR/C recommended Greece to ensure adequate
staffing with teachers specialized in multicultural education.The Framework Convention’s account of intercultural education implies that the general
population should be aware of minority presence, history, culture, etc.; and equally that
minorities should not retreat into psychological ghettos where they take no interest in
fellow citizens.The Advisory Committee has taken the view that history taught in schools
should reflect a country’s ethnic diversity,and that education materials which contain
negative stereotypes of minorities should be revised.Since history teaching is a natural
forum for evoking national memories,texts should be drafted with (p. 342) special
sensitivity to the historical role of minorities. Inter alia, UNESCO has also paid attention to
questions surrounding the teaching of history which focuses too narrowly on national
aspects of history ‘to the detriment of giving due account of periods of peaceful coexistence,
cooperation and cultural exchange, of mutual enrichment between different groups as well
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as between nations’.General principles to be applied in curriculum development are set
out in Recommendation 19 of the Hague Recommendations.A third element not to be neglected in the curriculum area is the imparting to members of
minorities of the necessary knowledge and skills to enhance possibilities of succeeding in
the wider society. This requirement pertains to education rights—including the issue of
adequate knowledge of the state or official language—as well as to rights of effective
participation of minorities in ‘cultural, religious, social, economic and public life’,and
participation in development.Hence the widespread approval by treaty bodies of bilingual
education.
(b) Participation
In many countries, decisions on syllabuses are taken at central government level. The texts
on minority rights mandate or encourage participatory processes, so that there is a bottomup
as well as a top-down element in educational decision-making. Participation principles
are widely recognized in international law.The principles go beyond general
participation in public life to participation in national and local decisions which affect
minorities.Education ‘decisions’ may have a profound effect on minority communities
and are clearly within the (p. 343) language of the texts.The Hague Recommendations
put the matter simply: ‘The curriculum content related to minorities should be developed
with the active participation of bodies representative of the minorities in question’.The
message is reinforced by the Lund Recommendations.Inter alia, Lund Recommendation
17 identifies education as among areas particularly appropriate for institutions of selfgovernance.
The message is further elaborated through sundry recommendations of
treaty bodies. CERD/C has called specifically for the participation of minorities in the
elaboration of educational and cultural policies.Besides political and decisional aspects of participation in education, questions of nonattendance,
school exclusions, etc., are also to be considered in the context of both
participation and access. Participation in the school system means that groups should not
be effectively excluded, and that drop-out rates should be reduced. School exclusions are
also an aspect of the participation nexus. All of these aspects may be directly linked to
discrimination, whether direct or indirect. CERD/C is only one among many treaty bodies to
be greatly exercised by discrimination against the Roma, issuing a general recommendation
on this group in 2000.107 Paragraph 17 of the Recommendation recommends that states
parties ‘support the inclusion in the school system of all children of Roma origin and…act to
reduce drop-out rates, in particular among Roma girls, and, for these purposes,…cooperate
actively with Roma parents, associations and local communities.’ Among many (p. 344)
deprivations recorded or alleged, the question of so-called ‘special schools’ has aroused
widespread concern: specifically, the practice of placing Roma pupils in schools or special
remedial classes for mentally handicapped children. Principles such as avoiding segregation
while keeping open the possibility of mother-tongue education are recalled by the
Committee, and among remedies suggested are recruitment of more Roma teachers, and
‘sensitization of teachers and other education professionals to the social fabric and world
views of Roma children’.This suggests a point that the roots of the discrimination lie in
divergent cultural assumptions concerning the role of education in the larger and smaller
community, and the nature of the educational structures. Following its earlier comments,
CERD/C issued a particularly robust observation in 2007 on the special schools
phenomenon in the Czech Republic:
The Committee…notes with particular concern that a disproportionately large
number of Roma children attend ‘special schools’. While noting the views of the
State party that this results from the vulnerable situation of the Roma and the need
to adopt special measures to respond to their needs…the Committee remains
concerned that this situation also seems to result from discriminatory practices and
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Annex 117
Vasyl Kuchabsky, Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism,
1918-1923 (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
Press, 2009)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
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Western Ukraine in Conflict with
Poland and Bolshevism, 1918-1923
Vasyl Kuchabsky
Translated from the German
by Gus Fagan
[ KlYC
CIUS
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press
Edmonton 2009 Toronto
Published in cooperation with the Wirth Institute for Austrian
and Central European Studies, University of Alberta
- 67 -
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2H8
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5T 1N7
Copyright © 2009 Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
ISBN 978-1-894865-12-8 (bound).—ISBN 978-1-894865-13-5 (pbk.)
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Kuchabs'kyi, Vasyl', b. 1895
Western Ukraine in conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918-1923 / Vasyl
Kuchabsky; translated from the German by Gus Fagan.
Translation of: Die Westukraine im Kampfe mit Polen and dem Bolschewismus
in den Jahren 1918-1923.
"Published in cooperation with the Wirth Institute for Austrian and Central
European Studies, University of Alberta".
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-894865-12-8 (bound).--ISBN 978-1-894865-13-5 (pbk.)
1. Ukraine—History-1917-. 2. Ukraine—History—Revolution, 1917-1921.
3. Ukraine—Foreign relations—Poland. 4. Poland—Foreign relations—Ukraine.
I. Fagan, Gus II. Wirth Institute for Austrian arid Central European Studies
III. Title.
DK508.9.U37K8313 2009 947.7'0841 C2008-906349-X
This book has been published in cooperation with the Wirth Institute for Austrian
and Central European Studies, University of Alberta. A generous grant toward this
publication has been provided by the W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute
(Philadelphia).
Cover photo: members of the Supreme Command and officer staff of the Ukrainian
Galician Army, photographed in Khodoriv, Galicia, in February 1919. (Photo courtesy
of Oleh Pavlyshyn, Institute for Historical Research, Lviv National University.)
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.
Printed in Canada
- 68 -
CHAPTER 2: THE WESTERN UKRAINIAN STATE 57
influence. The most necessary reforms were accomplished with great care.
The very moderation with which the Western Ukrainians approached
the transformation of the old tried and tested political system showed
'that they possessed a higher degree of political statecraft than their
%Eastern Ukrainian counterparts. A school system was also established.
The school law of 13 February and the law on official languages of 15
'February 1919 both protected minority language rights. In spite of their
hostile or neutral attitude at the time, the later political influence of the
minorities was guaranteed. The constitutional law of 15 April 1919 on
the future parliamentary assembly (Seim), which was to be elected in the
usual radical-democratic manner on the basis of a general, equal, secret,
direct, and proportional franchise by citizens of both sexes, protected the
minorities from Ukrainian majority rule by establishing national curias
for them. The parliament was to be made up of 226 representatives, of
whom 160 were to be Ukrainians (70.8 percent), 33 were to be Poles (14.6
'percent), 27 Jews (11.9 percent), and 6 Germans (2.7 percent). It was
the standing policy of the State Secretariat to bring Polish officials and
experts into the Western Ukrainian state service. And this policy was
not without success, for later, when the Poles conquered Eastern Galicia,
,quite a number of Poles had to,pay the price for having been c6opted
into the service of the Western Ukrainian state.7°
The Ukrainian National Rada lacked the political ability to create
a constitutional and legal order that was original and adapted to the
specific character and needs of the nation. It followed the schematic
conceptions of international radical democracy in every respect. As a
result, the whole form of the Western Ukrainian state was internally weak
,and unable to avoid the kind of constitutional crisis that was to affect all
the national states established in 1919. For the time being, however, the
Western Ukrainian radical-democratic order remained stable.
It was within the framework of its radical-democratic politics that
the Ukrainian National Rada carried out its most unfortunate and
questionable action—the agrarian law of 14 April 1919. It took account of
a variety of circumstances. Agrarian relations in Western Ukraine were
indeed extremely unsound: for the most part, the peasants were without
adequate land. The harshness of the new law was influenced, however,
not only by the agrarian revolution in Eastern Ukraine but also by the
fact that the large estates were almost exclusively in Polish hands, which
meant, in the given circumstances, that they were hostile to the state.
The law was also meant to serve the highly dubious purpose of goading
the peasants into battle with the prospect of agrarian reform. It provided
for the dispossession of the large landowners and the partition of their
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Annex 118
Paul Robert Magocsi, History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples, 2nd revised
and expanded ed. (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press,
2010)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 71 -
- 72 -
A History of
Ukraine
The Land and
Its Peoples
Second, Revised and Expanded Edition
Paul Robert Magocsi
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
Toronto Buffalo London
- 73 -
© University of Toronto Press 1996, 2010
Toronto Buffalo London
www.utppublishing.com
Printed in the U.S.A.
First edition published 1996, reprinted in paper 2000
Second edition published 2O1o, reprinted 2012
ISBN 978-1-4426-4085-6 (cloth)
ISBN 978-1-4426-1021-7 (paper)
Printed on acid-free paper
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Magocsi, Paul R.
A history of Ukraine : the land and its peoples / Paul Robert Magocsi. — 2nd ed.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4426-4085-6 (bound). - ISBN 978-1-4426-1021-7 (pbk.)
1. Ukraine — History. I. Title.
DK5O8.51.M34 2010 947.7 C2009-906664-5
University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing
program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council.
Canada Council Conseil des Arts
for the Arts du Canada it\ ONTARIO ARTS COUNCIL
CONSEIL DES ARTS DE L'ONTARIO
University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing
activities of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund.
- 74 -
The National Movement after the Era of Reforms 407
•
outbreak of World War I in 1914 the Ukrainian national movement in
13y the
niePer
Ukraine at most had gone through the first, heritage-gathering stage of
intelligentsia
entsia--iinnssppiirree dd nationalism. Political circumstances in the Russian Empire
ther precluded its further evolution outright or allowed the early organization!:
and political stirrings insuffient time in which to develop. The result was that
die
Ukrainian-oriented intelligentsia, with its conceptual framework of mutually
exclusive identities, was effectively cut off from working with and educating the
population at large in a Ukrainian national spirit. Meanwhile, that same populat
i on was subjected to a state-imposed national movement and was continually
exposed to the Russian imperial ideology, whether in schools, churches, or the
army And if an ethnic Ukrainian peasant ever left the village, he or she entered
"Russian" towns and cities, albeit on Ukrainian territory, where all official transactions
— in factory workplaces, in governmental offices, on the railroads, and so on
- were conducted in Russian.
Given this environment, it is not surprising that the conceptual framework of
a hierarchy of multiple loyalties continued to prevail in Dnieper Ukraine until
World War I. Ukrainianness as something distinct from Russianness had no prestige,
and being a Ukrainian brought no tangible social, economic, or cultural
advantages in the nineteenth-century Russian Empire. Those ethnic Ukrainians
who were socially mobile could improve their status only by becoming completely
russified or, at the very least, by being Russians from Little Russia. As for the idea of
an exclusive Ukrainian ethnic identity, it prevailed only among the intellectual and
political fringes of Dnieper-Ukrainian society. Accordingly, before 1914 it was not
in the Russian Empire but rather in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, particularly in
Galicia, that Ukrainian nationalism survived and even prospered.
- 75 -
The Postwar Reconfiguration of Ukrainian Lands 563
TREATY OF UNION BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN SOVIET
FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND THE
UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
The governments of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (S.ES.R.)
and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (S.S.R.), proceeding from the declaration
on the rights of peoples to self-determination as declared by the Great Proletarian
Revolution, and recognizing the independence and sovereignty of each
other as well as the need to consolidate their power for purposes of self-defense
and of economic reconstruction, have decided to conclude the present workers' and
peasants' treaty of union for which they have nominated the following representatives:
For the Soviet Russian government — the chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, and the People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, Georgii Vasilevich Chicherin; for the Soviet Ukrainian government— the chairman
of the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissars for Foreign
Affairs, Khristiian Georgievich Rakovskii.
The aforementioned representatives, with the powers invested in them,
have agreed to the following:
r. The Russian S.ES.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. agree to a military and
economic union.
2. Both states consider it necessary to declare that the obligations which they
are taking upon themselves in relationship to each other can only serve the general
interests of the workers and peasants, inclusive of the present union treaty between the
two republics, although the fact that the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R previously
belonged to the former Russian Empire does not imply any obligations on the
part of the Ukrainian S.S.R toward that former entity, whatever such obligations
might be.
3. For the better realization of the goals set out in paragraph 1, both governments
declare the formation of the following joint commissariats: (I) defense; (2)
national economy; (3) foreign trade; (4) finances; (5) employment; (6) transportation;
(7) postal and telegraph services.
4. The unified people's commissariats of both republics are part of the Council
of People's Commissars of the Russian S.ES.R. and they have in the Council
of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian S.S.R. their own authorized representatives
who have been approved and are responsible to the All-Ukrainian Central
Executive Committee and Congress of Soviets.
5. The procedure and form of internal administration for the joint commissariats
will be decided upon by mutual agreement between the two governments.
6. The leadership and control of the united commissariats will be determined
,
by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers,' Peasants,' and Soldiers
- 76 -
64 The Interwar Years
Deputies as well as by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, to which
the Ukrainian S.S.R. will send its representatives on the basis of a decision of
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
7. The present treaty is subject to ratification in compliance with the highest
legal authorities of both republics.
The original text is presented for signature on two copies in the Russian and
Ukrainian languages in the city of Moscow, 28 December 192o.
SOURCE: Radians'kr budivnytstvo na v roky hnomadians'kolviiny,1919-192o:zbirnyk dokumentiv
materialiv (Kiev 1957), pp. 182-183.
placed military and economic affairs entirely in the hands of Moscow. The 1924
Soviet constitution reduced further Soviet Ukraine's powers, giving to the central
government (1) authority to lay down general principles controlling education,
justice, and health; (2) control over the exploitation of natural resources, including
the use of surface land; (3) power to annul decisions of the union republics;
and (4) authority to handle the foreign affairs of each republic. Thus, by the
beginning of 1924, Soviet Ukraine and the other Soviet republics had become
little more than regional entities within the Moscow-dominated Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. Still, at least during the first few years of the Soviet Union's
existence Soviet Ukraine managed to maintain a degree of control over its own
economic, political, and, especially cultural destiny. It is these aspects of Ukrainian
development that will be addressed next.
- 77 -
688 World War II to Independent Ukraine
Czechoslovakia according to its 1938, pre-Munich boundaries. This meant that all
of Transcarpathia (Subcarpathian Rus') would once again become Czechoslovak
territory. The Allies, including the Soviets, agreed in principle, and when the Red
Army entered the region in October 1944, it permitted a Czechoslovak govern_
mental delegation to function there for a few weeks. Before long, however, the
Czechoslovak delegation was severely restricted in its activity. Local Communists
under the protection of the Red Army — and with the encouragement of Soviet
political officers — organized peoples' councils, which by 25-26 November 1944
had called for union of the region with its "Soviet Ukrainian motherland." As for
the rest of Czechoslovakia, it was restored as a sovereign state, and although it was
influenced but not yet fully controlled by the Communists, it nonetheless felt a
sense of loyalty to its Soviet ally and "liberator." In such circumstances, the restored
government in Prague was certainly not going to jeopardize Czechoslovak-Soviet
relations. Hence, on 29 June 1945, Czechoslovakia's provisional parliament formally
ceded Subcarpathian Rus' (Transcarpathia) to Soviet Ukraine.
Owing to postwar Soviet military and political prestige, Soviet Ukraine increased
its territory by one-quarter (64,50o square miles [165,300 square kilometers])
and its population by an estimated 11 million. As elsewhere in the country, the
new territorial acquisitions were divided into oblasts, which for the most part had
no relationship to historical regions. By 1946, Soviet Ukraine had a total of twentyfour
oblasts. The new territories also included a significant number of inhabitants
other than ethnic Ukrainians, the largest group being the Poles, who numbered
about 1.5 million.
The minority question
National minorities were of particular concern to the leaders of many post-1945
European countries, who were convinced that the very existence of minority
populations had been one of the main causes of World War II. If future conflicts
over national minorities were to be avoided, it seemed, more decisive action was
needed. As a result, many countries embarked on a policy of population transfers.
These were either voluntary or, more often, involuntary - forced deportations.
The largest and most publicized deportation in Europe during this period was the
expulsion of 6.3 million Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet government also participated in population transfers following
agreements with Poland (1 October 1944) and Czechoslovakia (io July 1946) on
the exchange of populations. Between 1945 and 1948, several exchanges — some
voluntary, others involuntary— took place. The largest departure from Ukraine was
that of nearly 1.3 million Poles from Volhynia and eastern Galicia. There were also
35,000 Czechs who left Volhynia and Transcarpathia. Conversely, nearly 500,000
Ukrainians arrived from Poland (including two-thirds of the Lemko population),
and another 12,000 from Czechoslovakia. Finally, there was the question of the
Ostarbeiter (Eastern workers), POWs, and survivors of concentration camps who at
the close of the war found themselves as refugees on German and Austrian territory
controlled by four of the Allied Powers (the United States, the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, and France). The Allies agreed on the principle of repatrat10n'
- 78 -
From Devolution to Independence 723
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the on the Ukrainian S.S.R. Declaration of Independence of Ukraine
The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic rules:
To declare Ukraine an independent democratic state on September 24, 1991.
From the moment of declaration of independence only the Constitution of Ukraine, its
laws, resolutions of the government, and other legislative acts of the republic are active
on its territory.
To hold on December I, 1991 a republican referendum on the confirmation of the declaration
of independence.
L. Kravchuk, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R.
Kiev, August 24, 1991
Act of Ukraine's Independence Declaration
Proceeding from the mortal danger that threatened Ukraine as a result of the coup
d'aat in the U.S.S.R. on August 19, 1991:
- developing the centuries-old tradition of the Ukrainian state formation;
- proceeding from the right to self-determination, envisioned by the United Nation-
Charter and other international legal documents;
- acting in compliance with the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, the
Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declares:
The independence of Ukraine, and the formation of a sovereign Ukrainian state —
Ukraine.
The territory of Ukraine is integral and inviolable.
From now on only the constitution and laws of Ukraine are applicable on its territory.
This act comes into force from the moment of its approval.
The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine
August 24, 1991
souRcE: News from Ukraine (Kiev), September 1991, p. i.
countries bet,
western E
ore the end of the year, and Kravchuk embarked on several visits to
ent Europe and North America, acting as if he were the head of an independslate.
The
ed in question of Ukraine's relationship with the Soviet Union was finally decid.:
cessfoi ugust 1991, when conservative political forces in Moscow staged an
unsu.e
con r'" °uP (putsch) to overthrow Gorbachev. After n
some initial
decisively.
hesitat la ion
n
de—ping the leaders of the failed putsch, Kravchuk
acted
24
- 79 -
Independent Ukraine 745
53'3
DABernow Phi c change among the largest nationalities in Ukraine, 1989 and 2001' T LE
Nationality
Ukrainians
Russians
Belarasans
Moldovans
Crimean Tatars
Bulgarians
Magyars/Hungarians
Romanians
Poles
Jews
Armenians
Number
1989
37,419,000
11,356,000
440,000
324,000
44,000
234,000
163,000
135,000
219,000
486,000
54,000
2001
37,542,000
8,334,000
276,000
259,000
248,000
205,000
157,000
151,000
144,000
104,000
100,000
Percentage of the
total population
1989
72.7
22.1
0.8
0.6
0.0
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.4
0.9
0.1
2001
77.8
17.3
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
Percentage of
absolute
gain/loss
+0.3
—26.6
—37.3
—20.1
+ 463.6
—12.4
—3.7
+11.9
—34.2
—78.7
+85.1
former Communist-ruled states in central and eastern Europe, a declining birth
rate has led to the stagnation or even decline in population. In the case of Ukraine
the decline has been as high as 3 million, from 51.4 million inhabitants in 1989 to
48.4 million in 2001, and down even further to 46.2 million in 2008. Aside from
a low birth rate, the other factor contributing to population decline is emigration.
There could be as many as 7 million people who since independence have left
Ukraine on a temporary or permanent basis in search of employment and a better
life in Russia, the European Union, and North America.
With regard to the multinational composition of Ukraine's population, during
the first decades of independence the general trend has been toward a decrease in
the size of the country's numerically largest nationalities (see table 53.3).
The most dramatic decreases have occurred among Russians and Jews. The 26.6
percent decrease in Russians between the 1989 and 2001 censuses can be attributed
to various factors, the most important of which are: (i) a change in identity of
many citizens — often Russian-language speakers whose parents might be of mixed
national background — from a Russian to a Ukrainian national identity; and (2)
emigration, whether to neighboring Russia or to the European Union and North
America. The decline in the number of Jews is due primarily to emigration largely
to Israel and North America. At the same time the number of ethnic Ukrainians
remained static, with losses because of birth rate and emigration being counterbalanced
with the addition of a large number of former "Russians" who now declared
themselves to be ethnic Ukrainians.
There are a few exceptions to the general trend of numerical decline, as among
Armenians and Romanians. The increase among the latter is in part the result of a
number of Moldovans now claiming Romanian national identity. But the most dramaticdem
, ographic change has occurred among the
Crimean Tatars, who between
g89 and 2OO1 experienced a stunning 463 percent increase from 44,OOO to
- 80 -
Annex 119
Svitlana Mel’nyk and Stepan Chernychko, Etnichne ta movne rozmaïttia Ukraïny
(Uzhhorod: PoliPrint, 2010)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
- 81 -
- 82 -
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian College of Higher Education
Melnyk Svitlana, Chernychko Stepan
ETHNIC AND LANGUAGE
DIVERSITY OF UKRAINE
Analytical review of the situation
The work was carried out within the framework of the project “Dimensions of Linguistic Otherness: Prospects of
Maintenance and Revitalization of Minority Languages within the new Europe”
PolyPrint
Uzhhorod, 2010
- 83 -
tP ‹),
PoLP
UDC [Universal Decimal Classification] 39(477)+81'286(477)
LBC [Library-Bibliographical Classification] 63.5(4UKR) +81(4UKR)
M-48
The monograph examines the demographic situation and legal status, analyzes the educational system of
national and linguistic minorities of Ukraine, and outlines theoretical and practical issues of the ethnic and
linguistic diversity of the state. The work was carried out within the framework of the project “Dimensions of
Linguistic Otherness: Prospects of Maintenance and Revitalization of Minority Languages within the new Europe”
Melnyk Svitlana, Candidate of Philological Sciences, Taras Shevchenko National University of
Kyiv
Chernychko Stepan, Candidate of Philological Sciences, Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian
Hungarian College of Higher Education
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ISSUE: OROS I., SHOVSH K.
EDITOR: SHESTAK A.
LAYOUT: HIRESH-LASLOV K.
Sponsor of the monograph:
ISBN 978-966-7966-98-0
© Melnyk Svitlana, 2010
© Chernychko Stepan, 2010
- 84 -
/Handwritten text:
Chapter I
entire chapter, pp. 11-57/
12
Table 1
National composition of the population of Ukraine (1959-2001)
Source: http://www.uncpd.kiev.ua/ucipr/ukr/stat/census/01/01.pdf
1959 1970 1979 1989 2001
persons % persons % persons % persons % persons %
Total 41869046 100 47126517 100 49609333 100 51452034 100 48240902 100
Ukrainians 32158493 76.81 35283857 74.87 36488951 73.55 37419053 72.73 37541693 77.82
Russians 7090813 16.94 9126331 19.37 10471602 21.11 11355582 22.07 8334141 17.28
Belarusians 290890 0.69 385847 0.82 406098 0.82 440045 0.86 275763 0.57
Moldovans 241650 0.58 265902 0.56 293576 0.59 324525 0.63 258619 0.54
Crimean Tatars no data - 3554 0.01 6636 0.01 46807 0.09 248193 0.51
Bulgarians 219409 0.52 234390 0.50 238217 0.48 233800 0.45 204574 0.42
Hungarians 149229 0.36 157731 0.33 164373 0.33 163111 0.32 156566 0.32
Romanians 100863 0.24 112141 0.24 121795 0.25 134825 0.26 150989 0.31
Poles 363297 0.87 295107 0.63 258309 0.52 219179 0.43 144130 0.30
Jews 840311 2.01 775993 1.65 632610 1.28 486326 0.95 103591 0.21
Armenians 28024 0.07 33439 0.07 38646 0.08 54200 0.11 99894 0.21
Greeks 104359 0.25 106909 0.23 104091 0.21 98594 0.19 91548 0.19
Tatars 61527 0.15 72658 0.15 83906 0.17 86875 0.17 73304 0.15
Gypsies 22515 0.05 30091 0.06 34411 0.07 47917 0.09 47587 0.10
Azerbaijanis 6680 0.02 10769 0.02 17235 0.03 36961 0.07 45176 0.09
Georgians 11574 0.03 14650 0.03 16301 0.03 23540 0.05 34199 0.07.
Germans 23243 0.06 29871 0.06 34139 0.07 37849 0.07 33302 0.07
Gagari 23530 0.06 26464 0.06 29398 0.06 31967 0.06 31923 0.07
Koreans 1341 0.00 4480 0.01 6061 0.01 8689 0.02 12711 0.03
Uzbeks 8472 0.02 10563 0.02 9862 0.02 20333 0.04 12353 0.03
Chuvash 8925 0.02 13610 0.03 16456 0.03 20395 0.04 10593 0.02
Slovaks 13991 0.03 10204 0.02 8744 0.02 7943 0.02 6397 0.01
Other 99910 0.24 121956 0.26 127916 0.26 153518 0.30 323656 0.67
An important indicator of internal processes in the ethnic communities of Ukraine is the language
characteristics and the level of language stability. 67.53% of the population of Ukraine considers Ukrainian as
their native language, 29.59% prefer Russian. Census data suggest that ethnic self-identification does not always
coincide with linguistic self-identification. Thus, 14.77% of ethnic Ukrainians consider Russian as their native
language. The same situation is observed among Belarusians (62.46%), Bulgarians (30.34%), Jews (82.98%) and
Greeks (88.47%). Instead, Ukrainian is the native language of 70.96% of Poles, 21.1% of Gypsies, 22.1% of
Germans, etc. (Table 2, Figure 1).
Interestingly, since the 1989 census, the number of Ukrainians has increased (from 72.73% in 1989 to
77.82% in 2001), as has the number of Ukrainian speakers (from 64.67% to 67.53%). The percentage of Ukrainians
who consider Ukrainian as their native language has decreased (from 87.72% to 85.16%), while in
- 85 -
- 86 -
Annex Oleh Wolowyna, "The Famine-Genocide of 1932-33: Estimation of Losses and
Demographic Impact," in Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl, eds., The
Holodomor Reader (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian
Studies Press, 2012)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
Annex 120
Oleh Wolowyna, “The Famine-Genocide of 1932-33: Estimation of Losses and
Demographic Impact,” in Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl, eds., The
Holodomor Reader (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian
Studies Press, 2012)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 87 -
- 88 -
The Holodomor Reader
A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine
Complied and edited by
Bohdan Mid and Alexander J. Motyl
KlYC
CIUS
' Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press
Edmonton 2012 Toronto
- 89 -
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2H8
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5T 117
Copyright O 2012 Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
ISBN 978-1-894865-28-9 (bound).—ISBN 978-1-894865-29-6 (pbk.)
Library and Archives Canada. Cataloguing in Publication
The Holodomor reader: a sourcebook on the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine /
compiled and edited by Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-894865-28-9 (bound).--ISBN 978-1-894865-29-6 (pbk.)
1. Ukraine-History-Famine, 1932-1933.
I. Klid, Bohdan, 1951- II. Motyl, Alexander!, 1953-
DK508.8377.H63 2012
°444,,
fc)
947.7'0841 C2012-903012-0
Cover: Holodomor victims, Kharkiv, 1933. Photographs from the archive of Cardinal Theodor
lnnitzer (Vienna Diocesan Archives). Reproduced by permission of the Hordii Pshenychny
Central State CinePhotoPhono Archives of Ukraine, Kyiv (items 5120, 5132, 5136).
The publication of this book has been funded by a generous donation from the estate of
Edward Brodacky (1926-2007), who settled in London, England, after the Second World War.
A grant for this publication has also been provided by the Temerty Family Foundation.
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of the copyright owner.
Printed in Canada
- 90 -
1. SCHOLARSHIP 63
According to the 1926 census, the total population of the Kuban region was 3.3
million, and the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians was estimated at 60 percent, or
2 million persons. if we assume that losses due to the Famine constituted about
15 percent of the Kuban's total population (as in Ukraine) and affected exclusively
Ukrainians (an extreme assumption), then the number of Holodomor losses in
the Kuban would be about 300,000 (15 percent of 2 million). This would leave 2.7
million direct losses of Ukrainians in the rest of the Soviet Union (outside Ukraine
and Kuban). As Ukrainians in the Soviet Union outside these two areas numbered
6.3 million according to the 1926 census, this means that more than 40 percent of
them were victims of the Holodomor, clearly an unrealistic result.
Summary and Conclusions
Careful demographic analysis based on the most complete set of data available and
using a sophisticated estimation methodology shows that the number of direct
Holodomor losses in the Ukrainian SSR was close to four million, and the number of
lost births an additional 0.6 to 1.0 million, for a total loss ranging between 4.5 and
4.7 million. This represents 15 percent of the total population of the country. These
are staggering figures, unique in the history of twentieth-century Europe.
The impact of the 1932-34 Famine is further aggravated by differential mortality
effects on various age groups. These effects are captured by the indicator "life
expectancy at birth," which is usually calculated separately for males and females.
This indicator is defined as the average number of years a person born in a specific
year is expected to live, assuming that mortality conditions prevailing in that year
remain constant throughout the person's lifetime.
Life expectancy at birth can also be interpreted as the weighted average
of mortality levels at different ages. During years previous to the Famine, life
expectancy at birth in Ukraine was about 42 years for males and about 45 years for
females. According to the analysis by Libanova et al., in 1933 these values dropped
to 4.4 years for males and 6.5 for females. These extremely low values are due to
the fact that half of all deaths caused by the Holodomor in Ukraine in 1933 claimed
persons under 25 years of age, and that 40 percent of all newborns died during
their first year of life. (The respective life expectancies at birth estimated by the
2002 study were somewhat higher but equally dramatic: 7.3 years for males and
10.8 years for females.)
In order to put these life-expectancy values in perspective, we offer two
comparisons: a) with average values of life expectancy at birth for West European
countries in 1933; b) with respective values for Ukraine in 1942, the worst year in
terms of World War it casualties. in 1933 the average life expectancies at birth for
West European countries were 56.1 years for males and 58.7 for females, compared
to 4.1 and 7.3 years for Ukraine, respectively; that is, in 1933 the average life span
in Western Europe was from 9 to 12 times longer than the expected life span in
Ukraine, assuming that Holodomor mortality conditions continued to prevail at the
1933 level. In 1942 these values were 17.7 years for males and 25.6 for females, that
is, more than three times higher for males and about four times higher for females,
compared with the 1933 values. The comparisons with West European figures
provide a mortality standard that Ukraine was expected to reach some years later,
while the comparisons with 1942 illustrate the age-specific mortality impact of the
- 91 -
- 92 -
Annex Atlas istorif ukraIns'kof derzhaunosti (L'viv: Naukove tovarystvo imeni
Shevchenka, This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
Annex 121
Atlas istoriï ukraïns’koï derzhavnosti (L’viv: Naukove tovarystvo imeni
Shevchenka, 2013)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
- 93 -
- 94 -
t I ":-4atc, ,, Jel
VS,LP
A
11
11
j
.... • „....
4 4
UKRAINIAN LANDS FROM
ANCIENT TIMES TO THE
PRESENT
ATLAS
[collection of maps]
OF THE HISTORY OF THE
UKRAINIAN STATE
- 95 -
• ofXVIII • • • © Hrytselyak V.P., 2013
© Maps and Atlases Scientific and Production Firm, 2013
UDC [Universal Decimal Classification] 912.43 (477)
LBC [Library-Bibliographical Classification] 63.3 (4Ukr) ya64
A92
Shevchenko Scientific Society
Editorial Board:
Kupchynskyi Oleh Antonovych - Doctor of Historical Sciences
Loza Yuriy Ivanovych - Chairman of the Editorial Board
Shabliy Oleh Ivanovych - Doctor of Geographical Sciences
Editorial board:
Voytovych Leontiy Viktorovych - Doctor of Historical Sciences, Co-Chairman of the Editorial Board
Hrechylo Andrii Bohdanovych - Doctor of Historical Sciences
Hrytselyak Volodymyr Petrovych - Executive Editor
Dykyi Ihor Volodymyrovych - Director of Maps and Atlases Scientific and Production Firm
Lytvyn Mykola Romanovych - Doctor of Historical Sciences
Novozhenets Rostyslav Pavlovych - President of Ukraine-Rus Charitable Foundation
Rovenchak Ivan Illich - Doctor of Geographical Sciences, Co-Chairman of the Editorial Board
Shust Roman Maryanovych - Candidate of Historical Sciences
Author-compiler:
Hrytseliak Volodymyr Petrovych
Reviewers:
Hrytsak Yaroslav Yosypovych - Doctor of Historical Sciences
Dnistrianskyi Myroslav Stepanovych - Doctor of Geographical Sciences
Artwork on covers:
• mace of hetman Pylyp Orlyk (beginning of XVIII century);
• Small coat of arms of the Ukrainian People's Republic (Vasyl Krychevskyi, 1918);
• Kyiv St. Sophia Cathedral (1011-1037);
• Peresopnytsia Gospel (1556-1561).
ISBN 978- 966-2325-19-5 © Hrytselyak V.P., 2013
© Maps and Atlases Scientific and Production Firm, 2013
- 96 -
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Proclamation of independence of Ukraine on 24 August 1991
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90,3-1 December 1991 (the share of persons who voted "for"), by region
Belavezha Agreement between Ukraine, Russia and Belarus on the
dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the CIS dated 8 December 1991
▪ Adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine on 28 June 1996
Rallies of the action 'Ukraine without Kuchmar, 15 December 2000 and
9 March 2001.
▪ Conflict with Russia over the island of Tuzla, 9 November 2003
A The largest rallies against the falsification of elections during the Orange
Revolution, 22 November - 26 December 2004
7 Siverodonetsk Congress of deputies of all levels, 28 November 2004
Kharkiv Agreement between Ukraine and Russia, 21 April 2010
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The territory of Ukraine inherited from the Ukrainian
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The main borders and administrative structure are
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(names of oblasts consonant with the names of their
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Oxon
de -
STATES OF MODERN AGE
On 28 November 2000, the Cassette Scandal broke
out. Records on audiotapes of a former major of the
States Security Service Oleksandr Melnychenko,
published by the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine Oleksandr Moroz, allegedly testified to the
involvement of senior officials, including President
Leonid Kuchma, in the disappearance of journalist
Georgy Gongadze. In response, the opposition
organized mass de- --------------------------------
of the President of Ukraine. However, the next day
the Orange Revolution broke out, the participants of
which demanded fair elections (the authorities
falsified the will in favor of their candidate Viktor
Yanukovych). Large peaceful protests took place at
Independence Square in the capital [21] and other
major cities. During the political crisis on 28
November in Siverodonetsk,
at the initiative of the Party of Regions, a Congress of
Deputies of all levels was held, at which separatist
slogans were heard. On 3 December, the Supreme Court
of Ukraine ordered a re-vote, as a result of which the
opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko became the new
President on 26 December.
However, due to constant strife within the new
government team (mainly between President and Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko)
December 1991 (the share of persons who voted “for”), by region
Rallies of the action “Ukraine without Kuchma!”, 15 December 2000 and
MAIN EVENTS
Scape: 1:5,500,000 (1 cm equals 55 km)
- 97 -
- 98 -
Annex William A. Schabas, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY (2015)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
Annex 122
William A. Schabas, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY (2015)
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex is
comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 99 -
- 100 -
Oxford Public International Law
Part 'Iwo Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, s.I Rights and
Freedoms, Art.11 Freedom of assembly and
associationalberte de reunion et d'association
From; Contention Rights; & Sehahas
Contem t type: Hook cordent
Product Ortird Scholarly Authorities on International Law [MAIL]
Series: afford Commentaries on International Law
Published in print: 24 September 2015
ISBN: 9780199594O61
Subject(s):
Freedom of association — Right to peaceful assembly — Human rights remedies — Treatlee.
Interpretation
Thrall. Orford PUblIC Trite/metier& Law antylionn.00piew.com). (0)O313rd Vise/tiny Frees. 2022. A]] Righte Rene/vest
Subscriber. Covington & Hurling Library; date. 09 Feb/very 2O22
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: February 2022
Content type: Book content
Product: Oxford [OSAIL]
Series: Oxford Commentaries on Law
Published in print: 24 9780199594061
Part Two Convention for the of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art.11 Freedom of assembly and
association/Liberté réunion d’association
From: The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary
William A. Schabas
interpretation
- 101 -
Convention—which anyway are not conclusive-speak only of "undesirability" and so do not
enable one to conclude that the negative aspect of trade union freedom was intended to be
excluded from the ambit of Article 11'.Nevertheless, the case law is quite clear that (p.
508) closed-shop agreements whereby a monopoly is granted to one trade union as a
representative of employees are not permitted.In some legal systems, an individual may not be required to join the trade union but must
nevertheless contribute financially to it, either directly or indirectly. According to one
decision, 'the imposition on non-union members of an obligation to pay fees to a trade union
and Government measures entailing favouritism towards or discrimination against a trade
union may in certain circumstances be considered incompatible with the right to organise
and the right to join an organisation of one's own choosing'.194
There is no explicit right to strike in the European Convention, nor has the Court
considered it to be implied by article 11(1). According to the Court, '[t]here is no express
inclusion of a right to strike or an obligation on employers to engage in collective
bargaining. At most, Article 11 may be regarded as safeguarding the freedom of trade
unions to protect the occupational interests of their members.'The Court has said that
while 'the ability to strike represents one of the most important of the means by which
trade unions can fulfil this function, there are others'.196A right to strike is set out in other
international human rights and labour instruments, such as the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, where it is explicit,and International Labour
Organisation Convention No. 87, where it has been deemed incorporated by interpretation
as something inherent in the right to organize.Article 28 of the European Union's
Charter of Fundamental Rights provides: 'Workers and employers, or their respective
organisations, have, in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices,
the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in
cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including
strike action.' In a recent judgment, the Court referred to the importance of these
international law sources for the construction of article 11, stating that it would be
'inconsistent for the Court to adopt in relation to Article 11 an interpretation of the scope of
freedom of association of trade unions that is much narrower than that which prevails in
international law'.Accordingly, the Court said, 'the taking of secondary industrial action
by a trade union, including strike action, against one employer in order to further a (p. 509)
dispute in which the union's members are engaged with another employer must be
regarded as part of trade union activity covered by Article 11'.200
No distinction is made between the State as the instrument of public power and the State
as employer; those who work for the State are entitled to the same freedom of assembly as
those who work in the private sector.If confirmation is required, this is made apparent in
the final words of article 11(2).
Restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association
Like articles 8, 9, and 10 of the Convention, article 11 contains a second paragraph setting
out the scope of permissible restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
Article 1 1(2) is the longest of the four restriction clauses in the Convention, mainly because
of the final sentence of paragraph 2 dealing with limitations on freedom of association in
the armed forces and the police. The term 'restrictions' as it is used in article 1 1(2) may
apply to measures taken before an assembly, during an assembly, and after it, for example
punitive measures.2°2 Such restrictions are only acceptable to the extent that they are
prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim listed in article 11(2), and are deemed necessary
in a democratic society.
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
&
192
In some legal
and There is no explicit right to
bargaining. At most, 11
A international human as something inherent in the right to organize.
11,
narrower than that which prevails in
sector.of article 11(2).
Restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association
11 11(
it, for example
11(2), in a 193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
- 102 -
The ancestor of the restrictions and limitations clauses is article 29(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: 'In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society' The
limitations clause in the Universal Declaration applies generally to all rights set out in the
instrument, whereas the specific clauses of this nature in the European Convention, of
which article 11(2) is an example, are tailored to the right at issue.
The restriction clauses in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are similar
to article 11(2). There are two separate provisions, one dealing with freedom of peaceful
and assembly and the other with freedom of association.Where the European
Convention speaks of 'the prevention of disorder or crime' the Covenant refers to 'public
order (public)'. The Covenant also allows lawful restrictions on members of the armed
forces and the police, but it does not extend this to the administration of the State. Also, the
Covenant's freedom of association provision contains an additional paragraph: 'Nothing in
this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation
Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a
manner as to prejudice the guarantees provided for in that Convention.'Article 11(2) of
the European Convention is also more extensive than the restriction (p. 510) clauses
dealing with labour rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.205
Prescribed by law
It is a preliminary condition for any restriction upon freedom of peaceful assembly that the
interference be 'prescribed by law'. The restriction must be authorized by a rule recognized
in the national legal order. This includes 'written law', including various forms of delegated
legislation, and unwritten law as interpreted and applied by the courts.But there is also
a qualitative requirement for the legal rule. It must be accessible and foreseeable and be
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct.Factors such as a failure by national courts to refer to a legal provision in support of the
interference and inconsistencies between the legislation itself and case law may inform the
Court's conclusion that the measure is not prescribed by law.2°8 If the law grants discretion
to public authorities, it must be framed with sufficient clarity and specify the manner in
which it is to be exercised.Accordingly, the domestic law must provide protection
against arbitrary interference by the authorities with rights that are enshrined in the
Convention. This is fundamental to the rule of law, a seminal concept that is basic to
democratic governance.
If the Court determines that there is no legal authorization for a restriction on freedom of
assembly, it will conclude there has been a breach of article 11 without further
consideration of the proportionality. Where the participation of a Turkish Cypriot in bicommunal
meetings was stymied by the denial of permits to cross the green line into
southern Cyprus, the Court concluded that there was no law applicable to the issuance of
permits.21° Measures preventing meetings and a march to promote equality for gays were
not founded on legal provisions.In a case concerning the Non-governmental
Organisation Act in force in Azerbaijan, the Court raised serious questions about the
foreseeability of the law in question, notably because it allowed for warnings by the
Ministry of Justice that activities were 'incompatible with the objectives' of the legislation.
This could result in the dissolution of an association. The Court did not reach a definitive
conclusion on the issue, however.From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
&
limitations clause in which article 11(2) is an on Civil and Political Rights are similar
association.
ordre public
Article 11(2) of
the dealing with labour Rights.law
It is a preliminary condition
a case law may inform the
clarity and specify the manner in
Convention. This is Turkish Cypriot in bicommunal
210
211
governmental
Organisation Act
212
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
- 103 -
(p. 51 1) The Court held that the `prescribed by law' requirement was not met when the
authorities failed to register an association within time limits set by the legislation. The law
did not specify with sufficient precision the consequences of this failure to respond within
the legal time limits, in effect enabling an arbitrary prolongation of the registration
procedure. As a result, `the law did not afford the applicants sufficient legal protection
against the arbitrary actions of the Ministry of Justice'.Russian law governing the
requirements for amending the State Register of political parties did not provide
applications with sufficient provision enabling them to foresee which documents they would
need to submit and the adverse consequences if the submission as deemed defective by the
authorities.By declining to provide a religious institution with clear reasons for the
rejection of its application for re-registration, the Court said the Moscow Justice
Department had `acted in an arbitrary manner'and breached an express requirement of
domestic law that such refusal should be reasoned.Russian authorities also denied
registration to the Salvation Army, invoking a legal provision that prohibited foreign
nationals from being founders of a Russian religious institution. But the Court did not find
this to be the case and said the refusal of registration had `no legal foundation'.In a case dealing with disciplinary action taken against a judge who belonged to a legal
Masonic lodge, the Court said that legislation prohibiting membership of secret associations
was insufficient to meet the foreseeability requirement.In another Italian case involving
the secret masonic lodge known as P2, the Court said that disciplinary provisions
concerning judges were not sufficiently foreseeable. A general text imposed punishment
upon a judge who `fails to fulfil his duties'. Guidelines adopted by the National Council of
the Judiciary addressed the issue of membership in masonic lodges, saying that this `raises
delicate problems'. The Court concluded that the guidelines were `not sufficiently clear to
enable the users, who, being judges, were nonetheless informed and well-versed in the law,
to realise—even in the light of the preceding debate—that their membership of an official
Masonic lodge could lead to sanctions being imposed on them'.In a Macedonian case where a political association denied the Macedonian ethnic identity,
the Court found provisions in the Constitution dealing with violent destruction of the
constitutional order, or to the encouragement of or incitement to military aggression or
ethnic, racial, or religious hatred or intolerance, to be sufficiently precise.22°
Legitimate purpose
The second component of the analysis under article 1 1(2) is the existence of a legitimate
purpose or aim. The inquiry involves the enumeration of purposes set out in paragraph 2,
namely the interests of national security or public safety, the prevention of disorder or (p.
512) crime, the protection of health or morals, and the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. The enumeration is exhaustive, and is to be interpreted narrowly.221
In practice, this issue is rarely very important. It is not uncommon for the Court simply to
pass over the issue entirely and move to the heart of the debate, which takes place under
the rubric `necessary in a democratic society', finding that it violates the final component of
the test regardless of whether it fulfils a legitimate purpose.The Grand Chamber has
explained that it is the Court's practice `to be quite succinct when it verifies the existence of
a legitimate aim within the meaning of the second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 of the
Convention'.Often several of the legitimate aims listed in article 1 1(2) may be relevant. In a Turkish case
involving dissolution of a political party because of its threat to `the importance of the
principle of secularism for the democratic system in Turkey', the Court cited protection of
national security and public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, and protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.Italian legislation required candidates for public office to
declare that they were not members of a masonic lodge. The government explained that this
measure had been introduced in order to `reassure' the public at a time when there was
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
& 511)
legislation. The law
within
the legal time limits, in effect enabling an
Russian law governing the
Army, invoking a legal provision that prohibited foreign
nationals from requirement.In another Italian case involving
well-versed in the law,
aggression or
ethnic, 11(purpose 512)
a legitimate aim within the 11 11(In a Turkish case
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
- 104 -
controversy about the role certain freemasons played in public life. The Court considered
this purpose as legitimate for the protection of national security and prevention of
disorder.The first of the listed objectives is the interests of national security or public safety These
two grounds appear in the three other limitations clauses of the Convention with the
exception of freedom of religion, where national security is not a legitimate purpose for
limitation of the right. Within this context, the Court has also accepted as a legitimate
purpose the State's territorial integrity, a concept closely linked with the protection of
national security.The Court has been especially strict in admitting 'national security' as
a legitimate purpose for interference with freedom of peaceful assembly or association. In
the context of meetings of a secessionist group, it said that '[d]emanding territorial changes
in speeches and demonstrations does not automatically amount to a threat to the country's
territorial integrity and national security'.In a Bulgarian case, the Court said that an
organization's position favouring 'abolition' or 'opening' of the country's border with
Macedonia could not be thought to jeopardise in any conceivable way those countries'
territorial integrity or national security'.The Court rejected Turkey's claim that the
imposition of a legislative requirement upon members of organizations (p. 513) seeking to
travel abroad that they inform the government of their plans fulfilled a legitimate purpose
of protecting national security and public safety.The prevention of disorder or crime also appears in the limitations clauses governing the
right to private and family life and freedom of expression. Instead, article 9(2) uses the
expression the protection of public order'. An interesting distinction has been made
between the English and French versions of article 11(2). One of the justifications for
restrictions in the English version is the prevention of disorder or crime', while in the
French version the text refers to 'la defense de l'ordre et a la prevention du crime'. The
Court has said that the protection of a State's democratic institutions and constitutional
foundations relates to "the prevention of disorder", the concept of "order" within the
meaning of the French version of Article 11 encompassing the "institutional order"'.23° A
religious organization occupying a church, with some members conducting a hunger strike,
was evacuated on the grounds of a number of public order considerations. Concluding that
the evacuation was ordered to put an end to the continuing occupation of a place of
worship by persons, including the applicant, who had broken French law', the Court said
that this measure pursued the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder.The protection of the rights and freedoms of others was invoked in a case involving
squatters who operated as part of an organization. The Swiss authorities dissolved the
applicant association, a measure the Court noted was quite inadequate to deal with the
circumstances, and to address the rights of the property owners.In a case involving
dissolution of a separatist organization, the Court referred to the Constitutional Court,
holding that the real objective of the group violated the free expression of the national
affiliation of the Macedonian people'. It said this fulfilled the legitimate aim of protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.Necessary in a democratic society
Most decisions concerning the application of article 1 1(2) to infringements of freedom of
peaceful assembly and association involve assessing whether the impugned measure is
'necessary in a democratic society'. The objective is to consider whether the authorities
have struck 'a fair balance between the competing interests of the individual and of society
as a whole'.It is the most subjective part of the application of paragraph 2, involving
subtle distinctions about the proportionality of measures taken by the State that limit or
restrict human rights. There is an important relationship between 'necessity' and
'democratic society', of which the hallmarks are pluralism, tolerance, and
broadmindedness.Indeed, because democracy is the only political model contemplated
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
& disorder.safety. limitation of the right.
imposition of a legislative The right to private and family
between the 11(2).
invoked in a case involving
In a case involving
11(infringements of freedom of
is
application of paragraph 2, involving
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
- 105 -
in the Convention and the only one compatible with it...the only necessity capable of
justifying an (p. 514) interference with any of the rights enshrined in those Articles is one
that may claim to spring from a "democratic society"'.236
The term 'necessary' does not have the flexibility of such expressions as 'useful' or
'desirable'.Although individual interests may sometimes be subordinated to those of a
group, democracy cannot be reduced to a simplistic proposition by which the majority
always prevails. There must be a balance that ensures 'the fair and proper treatment of
minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position'.Disciplinary measures imposed
upon civil servants who posted announcements on the walls of their offices of an event
commemorating the first of May was not necessary in a democratic society. The employees
did not engage in 'un affichage sauvage generant une pollution visuelle dans l'ensemble du
lieu de travail', the event being announced was a peaceful one, and nothing on the posters
was unlawful or susceptible of shocking the public.The Court found that a decision
transferring a civil servant from one part of the country to another on the grounds of his
membership in a legally constituted trade union was not necessary in a democratic
society.240
Punishment of individuals for being 'present and proactive' at a demonstration but who
were not charged with doing 'anything illegal, violent or obscene', and where the
demonstration itself was not prohibited, threatened to impair 'the very essence of the right
to freedom of peaceful assembly' and was therefore not necessary in a democratic
society.According to the Court, 'where demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence,
it is important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards
peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention
is not to be deprived of all substance'.242
Pressing social need
The Court frequently begins its consideration of 'necessity in a democratic society' by
questioning whether the interference responds to a 'pressing social need'. The term seems
to be little more than a gloss on the word 'necessity'.For example, in determining
whether a restriction of the right to organize meets a 'pressing social need', there must be
plausible evidence that the establishment or activities of a trade union represent 'a
sufficiently imminent threat to the State or to a democratic society'.244
The assessment of whether there is a 'pressing social need' is primarily for the national
authorities. They are entitled to a margin of appreciation, but this cannot displace judicial
supervision by the European Court of Human Rights. The Court is concerned both with (p.
515) the law and the decisions that apply it at the national level. It does not substitute its
own view for that of the national authorities, who are deemed better placed to rule on
matters of legislative policy and measures of implementation. As the Grand Chamber has
explained,
This does not mean that it has to confine itself to ascertaining whether the
respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; it
must look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and
determine whether it was 'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' and
whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are "relevant
and sufficient". In so doing, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national
authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles
embodied in Article 11 and, moreover, that they based their decisions on an
acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.245
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Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
&
justifying an (p. 514) interference with
majority
commemorating
transferring a civil membership in society.
society.
11
example, in determining
own view for
were in conformity with the principles
11 facts.236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
- 106 -
The Court has accepted that where an association is permitted by law to participate in
elections with the possibility of acceding to power, it may be necessary to require its
registration as a political party. In this way, rules concerning financing, public control, and
transparency may be brought to bear. But if the association cannot participate in elections,
the Court has said there is no 'pressing social need' to require it to register as a political
party, something that 'would mean forcing the association to take a legal shape which its
founders did not seek'.In a Polish case concerning the refusal to allow an association to
call itself an 'organisation of a national minority', because of possible consequences in
terms of participation in elections, the Grand Chamber said the national authorities 'did not
overstep their margin of appreciation in considering that there was a pressing social need,
at the moment of registration, to regulate the free choice of associations to call themselves
an "organisation of a national minority", in order to protect the existing democratic
institutions and election procedures in Poland and thereby, in Convention terms, prevent
disorder and protect the rights of others'.In determining whether the dissolution of a political party responds to a pressing social
need, the Grand Chamber has said that the analysis should focus on three points: the
imminence of a risk to democracy; the attribution of the acts of leaders to the party itself;
and 'whether the acts and speeches imputable to the political party formed a whole which
gave a clear picture of a model of society conceived and advocated by the party which was
incompatible with the concept of a "democratic society"'.248A Turkish trade union for civil
servants invoked article 11 when it was dissolved by the courts on the ground that civil
servants were not entitled to form trade unions. The Court said that Turkey had failed to
demonstrate a 'pressing social need'. The fact that the law did not permit such unions was
not sufficient to justify 'a measure as radical as the dissolution of a trade union'.The
Court took into account Turkey's ratification of International Labour Organisation
Convention No. 87 where the right of all workers to form trade unions without distinction
between the private and public sectors is acknowledged. It also noted the interpretation of
article 5 of the European Social Charter by the Committee of (p. 516) Independent Experts
recognizing a right of public employees to form unions, saying it could 'only subscribe to
this interpretation by a particularly well-qualified committee'.25°
Prohibition of the right to form certain types of associations, notably trade unions, also
raises issues under article 11. Clergy and laity working for the Orthodox Church in Romania
were prohibited from forming a trade union, with the local court basing its refusal of
registration upon an ecclesiastical rule that it said was necessary to protect religious
tradition. The Court said that priests and lay staff who worked for the Church under
individual employment contracts could not simply be excluded from the ambit of article
11.251
Proportionality
The interference must respond to an assessment of its proportionality, something that
involves balancing the right of the individual against the interest of the State and the
society that it represents. Furthermore, the reasons given by the national authorities must
be 'relevant and sufficient', which means that the national authorities 'applied standards
which were in conformity with the principles embodied in article 11 and, moreover, that
they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts'.Where the
Court is considering the positive dimension of the right in question, in other words, the
obligation upon the State to take measures to ensure enforcement of the right, it must
usually consider the rights of others in the balance as well. If other less severe measures
could have fulfilled the same objective, there will be a problem with proportionality.
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
& financing, public control, and
In a
overstep their margin
Convention terms, prevent
In determining whether the imminence
A Turkish trade union for civil
11
Prohibition of the right 11. for the Orthodox Church in Romania
were prohibited from forming a staff 11.251
involves balancing the
which were in conformity with the principles 11 252
a problem with proportionality.
246
247
248
249
250
251
- 107 -
In its assessment of the proportionality of measures that interfere with a public
demonstration, where a requirement of authorization has not been respected, the Court will
take into account the genuineness of the claim of urgency,the level of fine or other
sanction imposed,security concerns relating to the location of the demonstration,the
length of time of the demonstration before its dispersal by the authorities,the fact that
despite the absence of notice the authorities were in fact well informed of the planned
demonstration,and the impatience of the authorities in resorting to force.Part of the proportionality assessment involves determining whether there existed
'effective, less intrusive measures' capable of achieving the legitimate aim.In one case,
the Court said that rather than suppress a demonstration because the police judged (p. 517)
the slogans on banners to be illegal, they could simply have seized the banners in question.
This might have had a 'chilling effect' on the production of new banners, thereby restricting
freedom of expression, but it would not have made the demonstration impossible.26° Where
an organization of squatters was dissolved, the Court noted that given a lengthy period in
which occupation of buildings had been tolerated by the authorities, as well as the
association's statutory objectives, the State had failed to show that the actions taken were
the only available option.Even if the harm done by an infringement on freedom of
association is quite minimal, this does not necessarily assist in arguing for its
proportionality. Where Italian law required candidates for public office to declare they were
not members of a masonic lodge, the government argued that the damage this might do to
the organization by discouraging people to join was quite minimal. But the Court said
freedom of association 'is of such importance that it cannot be restricted in any way, even in
respect of a candidate for public office, so long as the person concerned does not himself
commit any reprehensible act by reason of his membership of the association'.262
In assessing proportionality, the nature and severity of the sanction imposed are important
factors to be considered.Dissolution of an association is a drastic measure that will often
fail the proportionality test.Less severe measures, such as a fine or withdrawal of tax
benefits, are alternatives that may adequately fulfil the legitimate purpose.When small
fines were imposed on demonstrators after their refusal to move the venue of a protest was
deemed an administrative offence, the Court said the decisions of the national authorities
in the present case were based on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts and
contained relevant and sufficient reasons which justified the interference with the
applicants' right of assembly and freedom of expression' and was therefore proportionate
and necessary to prevent disorder or protect the rights and freedoms of others.Margin of appreciation
In applying the 'necessary in a democratic society' test, the Court will allow the State a
margin of appreciation, recognizing that its role is not to sit as a Tribunal of fourth instance
and that it is in one sense not as well positioned as the national legal institutions to assess
many of the relevant factors. Often, especially in sensitive matters that concern morality,
ethics, and social policy, the Court refers to the practice in European jurisdictions in
determining whether or not any consensus exists. Where there is none, the margin of
appreciation will almost invariably be much greater. But although the national authorities
make the initial assessment of necessity, the final evaluation as to whether the reasons
cited for the interference are relevant and sufficient remains subject to review by the Court
for conformity with the requirements of the Convention'.Invoking the notion of margin of appreciation, the Court often shows considerable
deference to States in how they deal with problems related to public assemblies. This is (p.
518) especially true where there is evidence of incitement to violence against an individual
or a public official or a sector of the population, in which case the margin of appreciation is
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Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
& level of fine or other
length informed of the planned
the only available option.Even if the harm done by an infringement on freedom of
proportionality.
When small
fines were
margin of appreciation, appreciation will almost
Invoking the notion of margin of an individual
of appreciation is
253
254 255
256
257 258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
- 108 -
broader. Otherwise, there is little scope under the Convention for restrictions that impact
upon political activities.Typically, States rely upon the margin of appreciation as a final argument in defence against
charges they have violated the Convention. Russia invoked the lack of a European
consensus on issues relating to the treatment of sexual minorities in response to a
complaint of interference with an advocacy organization that planned to hold a public
demonstration. The Court noted that there was in fact consensus on a number of important
matters concerning sexual orientation, such as the impermissibility of criminal sanctions for
homosexual relations between adults, access to the armed forces, and the granting of
parental rights. But in any case, the Court said, 'the absence of a European consensus on
these questions is of no relevance to the present case because conferring substantive rights
on homosexual persons is fundamentally different from recognising their right to campaign
for such rights'. Rejecting the margin of appreciation argument, the Court said that '[t]he
only factor taken into account by the Moscow authorities was the public opposition to the
event, and the officials' own views on morals'.269
The Court has accepted that 'in certain cases, the States' margin of appreciation may
include a right to interfere—subject to the condition of proportionality—with an
association's internal organisation and functioning in the event of non-compliance with
reasonable legal formalities applying to its establishment, functioning or internal
organisational structure'.It may also be justified in intervening in the case of a serious
and prolonged internal conflict of the organization.However, the authorities should not
intervene in the internal organisational functioning of associations to such a far-reaching
extent as to ensure observance by an association of every single formality provided by its
own charter'.The observance of internal formalities 'should be primarily up to the
association itself and its members, and not the public authorities'.In a Polish case concerning the refusal to allow an association to call itself an 'organisation
of a national minority', because of possible consequences in terms of participation in
elections, the Grand Chamber said the national authorities 'did not overstep their margin of
appreciation in considering that there was a pressing social need, at the moment of
registration, to regulate the free choice of associations to call themselves an "organisation
of a national minority", in order to protect the existing democratic institutions and election
procedures in Poland and thereby, in Convention terms, prevent disorder and protect the
rights of others'.(p. 519) Militant democracy
The term 'militant democracy' was introduced by the German philosopher, Karl
Loewenstein.275 His perspective was providing democratic societies with the means to deal
with anti-democratic elements in general and fascists in particular in light of the threat that
they would exploit freedoms of assembly and association in order to destroy democratic
government.Judgments of the Court have referred to the term 'militant democracy',
although it has never been formally endorsed.There is an inherent tension between the
protection of democracy and recognition of freedom of association to the extent that
political parties may advocate dramatic change to the established order. Recalling that
'[f]reedom of association is not absolute', the Court has said that where an association
jeopardizes the State's institutions or the rights and freedoms of others, article 11 does not
deprive the State of the power to protect those institutions and persons. It has noted that
this follows both from article 1 1(2) and from the State's positive obligations under article 1
of the Convention.In addition, of course, article 17 is a means by which the Convention
can resist being exploited by groups determined to undermine its very principles. Invoking
article 17, the Court held that a racist organization known as the National and Patriotic
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Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
& impermissibility of criminal sanctions for
fundamentally different from recognising their right to campaign
establishment, functioning or internal
and prolonged
intervene in the internal provided by its
Loewenstein.with anti-
undermine its very principles. Invoking
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
- 109 -
Association of Polish Victims of Bolshevism and Zionism, claiming to represent persons
persecuted by Jews, could not invoke article 11 in order to contest its prohibition.According to the Court,
[O]ne of the principal characteristics of democracy [is] the possibility it offers of
resolving a country's problems through dialogue, without recourse to violence, even
when they are irksome. Democracy thrives on freedom of expression. From that
point of view, there can be no justification for hindering a political group solely
because it seeks to debate in public the situation of part of the State's population
and to take part in the nation's political life in order to find, according to
democratic rules, solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.The Court has said that a political party may promote a change in the law or the legal and
constitutional structures of the State on two conditions: first, the means used to that end
must be legal and democratic; second, the change proposed must itself be compatible with
fundamental democratic principles. A political party 'is not excluded from the protection
afforded by the Convention simply because its activities are regarded by the national
authorities as undermining the constitutional structures of the State and calling for the
imposition of restrictions'.But where a political party incites violence or puts forward a
policy that does not respect democracy or is aimed at its destruction, and that flouts the
rights and freedoms recognized in a democracy, it cannot demand the protection of (p. 520)
the Convention.As the Court has noted, 'it is not at all improbable that totalitarian
movements, organised in the form of political parties, might do away with democracy, after
prospering under the democratic regime, there being examples of this in modern European
history'.Furthermore,
a State cannot be required to wait, before intervening, until a political party has
seized power and begun to take concrete steps to implement a policy incompatible
with the standards of the Convention and democracy, even though the danger of
that policy for democracy is sufficiently established and imminent. The Court
accepts that where the presence of such a danger has been established by the
national courts, after detailed scrutiny subjected to rigorous European supervision,
a State may 'reasonably forestall the execution of such a policy, which is
incompatible with the Convention's provisions, before an attempt is made to
implement it through concrete steps that might prejudice civil peace and the
country's democratic regime'.284
In determining the objectives and intentions of a political party as justification for
restrictions on its activity, the constitution and the programme are not the only factors to be
considered in evaluating whether the political party may invoke article 11. History has
shown that 'political parties with aims contrary to the fundamental principles of democracy
have not revealed such aims in their official publications until after taking power'.285 The
programme of a political party 'may conceal objectives and intentions different from the
ones it proclaims'.Analysis of the actions and stances of the leaders of the party must
also be considered.In a case dealing with a Basque nationalist party, the Court referred
to conduct that bore 'a strong resemblance to explicit support for violence and the
commendation of people seemingly linked to terrorism'.In addition, a 'refusal to
condemn violence against a backdrop of terrorism that had been in place for more than
thirty years and condemned by all the other political parties amounted to tacit support for
terrorism'.From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
& Association of Polish Victims of Bolshevism and Zionism, claiming to represent persons
11 prohibition.
when they are irksome. Democracy
But
movements, organised in the examples of this in modern European
political party has
implement it 11.
The
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
- 110 -
However, if the impugned decision by a State is based solely on the programme of a
political party, the Court will not consider statements by its leaders in determining whether
the measures were proportionate.29° Political parties 'animated by the moral values
imposed by a religion cannot be regarded as intrinsically inimical to the (p. 521)
fundamental principles of democracy, as set forth in the Convention'.The Court has
applied article 11 in recognizing the right to establish new communist parties in Central
and Eastern Europe as part of the democratic debate.Where political parties are concerned, the exceptions set out in article 11 are to be strictly
construed.Restrictions on the freedom of association of political parties can only be
justified by 'convincing and compelling reasons'. Accordingly, a variety of sanctions 'may be
imposed on those political parties that use illegal or undemocratic methods, incite to
violence or put forward a policy which is aimed at the destruction of democracy and
flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy'.The most drastic forms
of restriction on political parties involve their dissolution or prohibitions on the political
activities of their leaders. Such measures may only be taken 'in the most serious cases'.Moreover, 'the Court must scrutinise very carefully the necessity for imposing a ban on a
parliamentary political party's activities, even a ban of fairly short duration'.In
determining whether restrictions are necessary, in accordance with article 11(2), States
have only a limited margin of appreciation. Still, the European Court 'must exercise
rigorous supervision embracing both the law and the decisions applying it, including those
given by independent courts'.The Court acknowledges that national authorities may be better placed than an
international court to assess of matters such as the appropriate timing for interference.An assessment needs to be made of the danger a political party may pose for democracy
before irreparable damage is done. In this assessment, the Court is prepared to show
considerable deference to the national courts. The Court has associated such preventive
intervention with the positive obligations upon the State to control the conduct of non-State
entities: 'A Contracting State may be justified under its positive obligations in imposing on
political parties, which are bodies whose raison d'être is to accede to power and direct the
work of a considerable portion of the State apparatus, the duty to respect and safeguard the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention and the obligation not to put forward a
political programme in contradiction with the fundamental principles of democracy.'(p. 522) Lawful restrictions on public employees
The final sentence of article 1 1(2) states that 'the imposition of lawful restrictions on the
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State' is not prohibited. According to the Court, 'the restrictions
imposed on the three groups mentioned in Article 11 are to be construed strictly and should
therefore be confined to the "exercise" of the rights in question. However, these restrictions
must not impair the very essence of the right to organise.'As a result, civil servants are
entitled to form trade unions and to exercise their rights under article 1 1(1) of the
Convention like any other worker.3°1
Pursuant to the final sentence of article 11(2), employers are entitled, in certain
circumstances, to place restrictions on freedom of association of employees in order to
maintain the political neutrality of civil servants.When civil servants are concerned, the
right to strike may not be absolute, and it is possible for some categories of public
employees to be prohibited from taking such industrial action.A prohibition on a police
officer belonging to a political party was considered an acceptable restriction on freedom of
association.3°4
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Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
& determining whether
intrinsically inimical to the (p. 521)
applied article 11 in 11
violence or put
determining 11(2),
intervention
(p. 522) Lawful
11
11(like any other worker.11(2), certain
maintain the political neutrality of civil action.a police
association.290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
- 111 -
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is worded in a similar
manner to article 11(2) of the European Convention except that it only restricts the exercise
of freedom of association to members of the armed forces and of the police and makes no
reference to members of the administration of the State. There is a similar provision,
applicable to the police and members of the armed forces, in the European Social Charter
(revised).Other international law sources, notably International Labour Organisation
Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 and the European Code of Police Ethics, provide
confirmation that it has been 'generally acknowledged that the duties and responsibilities
inherent in the position and role of the police justify particular arrangements as regards the
exercise of their trade union rights'.306
If the notion of members of the armed forces and the police seems to raise no great
problems of interpretation, the same cannot be said of 'the administration of the State'.
Construed broadly, it has the potential to provide a huge loophole in the protection provided
by article 11. In this respect, the Court has taken note of the practice of European states:
[I]n the vast majority of them, the right of civil servants to bargain collectively with
the authorities has been recognised, subject to various exceptions so as to exclude
certain areas regarded as sensitive or certain categories of civil servants who hold
exclusive powers of the State. In particular, the right of public servants employed by
local authorities and not holding State powers to engage in collective bargaining in
order to determine their wages and working conditions has been recognised in the
(p. 523) majority of Contracting States. The remaining exceptions can be justified
only by particular circumstances.307
Basing itself on these and other sources, the Grand Chamber has in effect removed the
words 'or of the administration of the State' from the final sentence of article 11(2).308
Consequently, the notion of 'administration of the State' is to be interpreted narrowly and
the position of the victim of an infringement of article 11(1) scrutinized carefully in order to
determine whether it falls under the exception of the final sentence of article 11(2). For
example, teachers are public employees but they are not considered to be part of the
'administration of the State'.Similarly, nominations and appointments to regional
organizations do not follow under the exception.31° In the context of article 6(1) of the
Convention, the Grand Chamber has adopted a functional criterion for determining the
scope of 'public servants', a notion that seems cognate with 'administration of the State'.
Adopting a restrictive interpretation, it has said that this applies only to persons 'whose
duties typify the specific activities of the public service in so far as the latter is acting as the
depositary of public authority responsible for protecting the general interests of the State
or other public authorities', adding that la] manifest example of such activities is provided
by the armed forces and the police'.The term 'lawful' in the second sentence of article 11(2) denotes the same concept of
lawfulness found elsewhere in the Convention, where the expressions 'in accordance with
the law' and 'prescribed by law' are employed, in articles 9, 10, and 11.312 This implies
qualitative requirements, notably foreseeability and an absence of arbitrariness. The
European Commission of Human Rights took the position that the word 'lawful' meant that
a restriction need only have a basis in national law and need not be arbitrary, and that it did
not also entail a requirement of proportionality.The Grand Chamber adopted a more
progressive position, considering that the State was required to show the legitimacy of any
restrictions to the right to organize. In particular, it said that municipal civil servants who
are not engaged in the administration of the State as such should not be treated as
'members of the administration of the State'.From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
& Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is worded in a similar
manner to the State. There is a similar provision,
inherent in the If the notion of
civil servants to bargain collectively with
who hold
collective bargaining in
circumstances.
the position of the victim of an infringement of article 11(1) scrutinized carefully in order to
determining the
This implies
municipal civil servants who
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
- 112 -
Discrimination
Article 14 of the Convention sets out a protection against discrimination that is subsidiary
in that it requires a relationship with the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set out
elsewhere in the Convention. Even if there is no breach of article 11 taken alone, the
Strasbourg organs may consider that there is an infringement of the Convention when
article 11 is associated with article 14, as if article 14 formed an integral part of article
(p. 524) The general principles for the application of article 14 include recognition
that there is prohibited discrimination only if different treatment lacks a reasonable and
objective justification.Different treatment must not only pursue a legitimate aim or
purpose but there must also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means that are employed and the objective of the measures.States enjoy a margin of
appreciation in this respect, although the Court remains the final arbiter.As a general
rule, if the Court finds that there is a violation of article 11 it will not also consider the case
under article 14 unless 'a clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right in
question is a fundamental aspect of the case'.The Court held there was a violation of article 11 and article 14 with respect to Italian
legislation applicable in Friuli-Venezia Giulia that required members of an association of
freemasons to declare their affiliation in applying for public positions given the absence of
any similar obligation on members of other secret organizations.32° However, in Tuscany,
where the requirement that membership in secret organizations be revealed only applied in
a general sense, the Court did not consider this to be contrary to the Convention. Nor was
there discrimination because the same rule did not apply to similar positions in other
regions of Italy because the possibility that certain issues be addressed differently from one
region to another was merely the natural consequence of administrative autonomy.The
Court did not rule out the possibility that prohibited discrimination might result from
exceptionally strict or rigid application to certain groups of regulations that were not in
themselves discriminatory,but it held that in the circumstances this had not been proven
satisfactorily.In a labour relations context, the Swedish Engine Drivers complained that they were victims
of discrimination because the Swedish National Collective Bargaining Office (Statens
Avtalsverk), which favoured larger trade union bodies in the conclusion of collective
agreements, would not negotiate with them. Because of the high degree of centralization in
the Swedish trade union movement, the government argued that it preferred to reach
collective agreements with the most representative organizations. The Court considered
this to be legitimate and said there was `no reason to think that the Swedish State had
other and ill-intentioned designs in the matter'.Similar conclusions were reached in a
case concerning Belgium.In neither of these cases was one of the (p. 525) enumerated
grounds listed in article 14 invoked or discussed by the Court. The assumption seems to
have been that a discussion on discrimination should proceed based upon the differential
treatment of a union without the need to specify the prohibited ground.
A requirement that candidates for public office declare their membership in a masonic
lodge was deemed discriminatory and a breach of article 11 in conjunction with article 14.
In an earlier case, the Court had held that a prohibition on membership in a masonic lodge
for holders of public office was a breach of article 11 taken alone. Italy argued that in the
second case there was no prohibition and all that was required was a form of public
disclosure. The Court said the measure was discriminatory because it only applied to
freemasons, whereas if the justification of protection of national security advanced by the
State were applied consistently, it should also be used for members of political parties and
groups with racist or xenophobic ideas, and this was not the case.From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
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& Discrimination
in that it requires elsewhere in the infringement of the Convention when
11.315 (p. 524) The general principles for the that there legitimate aim or
arbiter.general
legislation applicable in Friuli-Venezia any similar obligation on 320
discrimination might result from
satisfactorily.complained that they were victims
which favoured centralization in
324
325
membership in a masonic
conjunction with article 14.
masonic lodge
form of public
326
315
316
317
318
319
321
322
323
- 113 -
The mayor of Warsaw refused permission to hold a demonstration from the Foundation for
Equality, whose aim was to alert public opinion to the issue of discrimination against
minorities-sexual, national, ethnic, and religious—and also against women and disabled
persons. At the same time, permits were granted for six other demonstrations on the
following themes: `For more stringent measures against persons convicted of paedophilia';
`Against any legislative work on the law on partnerships'; `Against propaganda for
partnerships'; `Education in Christian values, a guarantee of a moral society'; `Christians
respecting God's and nature's laws are citizens of the first rank'; `Against adoption of
children by homosexual couples'. Bearing in mind that the mayor had expressed his
negative views on `propaganda about homosexuality', the Court said `that it may be
reasonably surmised that his opinions could have affected the decision-making process in
the present case and, as a result, impinged on the applicants' right to freedom of assembly
in a discriminatory manner'. Consequently, there was a violation of article 14 in conjunction
with article Reservations
Andorra formulated a reservation with respect to its legislation governing professional and
trade union organizations.San Marino made a reservation concerning the two active
trade unions in the country and the requirement that they obtain registration with the Law
Court.Spain's reservation makes article 11 subject to two provisions of the Spanish
Constitution. These permit restricting the right to organize within the armed forces and
prevent serving judges, law officers, and prosecutors from belonging to trade unions.330
Portugal formulated two reservations to article 11, sheltering provisions of its Constitution
that prohibit lock-outs and that forbid organizations with allegiance to a fascist ideology.Portugal's reservations were withdrawn in 1987.332
(p. 526) Further reading
Charles Barrow, Demir and Baykara v Turkey: Breathing Life into Article 11', [2010]
EHRLR 419.
Violeta Bairevio, 'A Short Guide to Militant Democracy: Some Remarks on the
Strasbourg Jurisprudence', in Wolfgang Benedek, Florence Benoit-Rohmer, Wolfram
Karl, and Manfred Nowak, eds, Antwerp:
Intersentia and Vienna-Graz, Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2012, pp. 243-57.
Antoine Buyse, `Contested Contours: The Limits of Freedom of Expression from an
Abuse of Rights Perspective—Article 10 and 17 ECHR', in Eva Brems and Janneke
Gerards, eds, Shaping Rights in the ECHR, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013, pp. 183-210.
Council of Europe, Freedom of Association, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1994.
Vincent Coussirat-Coustere, `Article 11§2', in Pettiti et al., La Convention europeenne,
pp. 431-2.
Filip Dorssemont, `The Right to Take Collective Action under Article 11 ECHR', in
Filip Dorssemont, Klaus Lorcher, and Isabelle Schomann, eds, Convention on Human Rights and the Employment Relation, Oxford and Portland, OR:
Hart, 2013, pp. 333-66.
Andrew Drzemczewski and Frank Wooldridge, The Closed Shop Case in Strasbourg',
(1982) 31 396.
K.D. Ewing and J. Hendy, The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara', (2010)
39 Industrial Law Journal 2.
Frowein/Peukert, pp. 373-85.
Grabenwarter, European Convention, pp. 297-318.
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Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
&
article 11.327
Reservations
unions. reading
Demir Turkey
419.
European Yearbook on Human Rights,
Nijhoff, 1994.
européenne,
Filip Dorssemont, Lörcher, Schömann, The European
(1982) ICLQ
Journal 2.
Frowein/Peukert, MenschenRechtsKonvention,
Convention
327
328
329
330
331
332
- 114 -
[GC], no. 44158/98, § 64, ECHR 2004-I; N.F. no.
37119/97, § 29, ECHR 2001-IX.
208 Mkrtchyan v. no. 6562/03, §§ 39-43, 11 January 2007.
209 The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 49, Series A no. 30;
Miloslaysky 13 July 1995, § 37, Series A no. 316-B; Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 52, ECHR 2000-V; Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no.
30985/96, § 84, ECHR 2000-XI; [GC], no. 39748/98, § 30, ECHR 2004-I.
210 Djavit An v. Turkey, no. 20652/92, § 67, ECHR 2003-III.
211 Bqczkowski and Others v. Poland, no. 1543/06, §§ 69-73, 3 May 2007.
212 Tebieti Miihafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, no. 37083/03, §§ 60-65, ECHR
2009.
213 Ramazanova and Others v. Azerbaijan, no. 44363/02, § 66, 1 February 2007.
214 no. 12976/07, § 85, 12 April 2011.
215 Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, no. 302/02, § 176, 10 June 2010.
216 Ibid., § 175; no. 18147/02, § 91, 5 April 2007.
217 Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, no. 72881/01, §§ 82-86, ECHR 2006-
XI.
218 Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, §§ 37-42, ECHR 2004-I.
219 N.F. Italy, no. 37119/97, § 31, ECHR 2001-IX.
220 Association of Citizens Radko and Paunkovski v. 'the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia', no. 74651/01, § 59, ECHR 2009 (extracts).
221 Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, 10 July 1998, §§ 37-39, Reports of Judgments and
1998-Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria,
nos 29221/95 and 29225/95, § 84, ECHR 2001-IX; Galstyan v. Armenia, no. 26986/03, § 114,
15 November 2007.
222 For example, Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], no. 23459/03, § 117, ECHR 2011; Ercep v.
Turkey, no. 43965/04, § 53, 22 November 2011.
223 S.A.S. v. France [GC], no. 43835/11, § 114, 1 July 2014.
224 [GC], nos 41340/98, 41342/98,
41343/98, and 41344/98, § 67, ECHR 2003-II.
225 Grande Oriente d'Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani v. Italy, no. 35972/97, § 26, ECHR 2001-
VIII. Also Grande Oriente d'Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani v. Italy (no. 2), no. 26740/02, § 51,
31 May 2007.
226 Republican Party of Russia v. Russia, no. 12976/07, § 101, 12 April 2011; United
30 January 1998, § 40, Judgments and Decisions 1998-I.
227 Bulgaria, nos 29221/95 and
29225/95, § 97, ECHR 2001-IX.
228 no. 57045/00, § 48, 21 June 2007.
229 Izmir Sava KarWlan Derneji and Others v. Turkey, no. 46257/99, §§ 36-37, 2 March
2006.
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 18 April 2022
& Library; date: 18 April 2022
Gorzelik and Others v. Poland v. Italy, 29, ECHR 2001-IX.
Armenia,
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, Rotaru v.
V; Maestri v. Italy 2004-I.
no. 20652/92, § 67, ECHR 2003-III.
Mühafize
Republican Party of Russia v. Russia, 12 April 2011.
Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, no. 18147/02, § 91, 5 April 2007.
XI.
v. no. ECHR 2001-IX.
A
Greece Judgments Decisions IV; Stankov and the United Macedonian nos 29221/95 and 29225/95, § 84, ECHR 2001-IX; no. 26986/03, § 114,
For [GC], no. 23459/03, § 117, ECHR 2011; Erçep no. § 53, 22 November 2011.
43835/11, § 114, 1 July 2014.
Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey and ECHR 2003-II.
no. 35972/97, § 26, ECHR 2001-
VIII. Also no. § 51,
31 May April 2011; Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Reports of
Judgments Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. nos 29221/95 and
ECHR 2001-IX.
Zhechev v. Bulgaria,
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
- 115 -
- 116 -
Annex 123
A. Peters, Has the Advisory Opinion's Finding that Kosovo's Declaration of
Independence was not Contrary to International Law Set an Unfortunate
Precedent?, in The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (OUP, M.
Milanović & M. Wood, eds., 2015)
Pursuant to the Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex
is comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 117 -
- 118 -
The Law and Politics
of the Kosovo Advisory
Opinion
Edited by
MARKO MILANOVI
and
MICHAEL WOOD
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS 1
- 119 -
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1
- 120 -
15
Has the Advisory Opinion's Finding that
Kosovo's Declaration of Independence was
not Contrary to International Law Set an
Unfortunate Precedent?
Anne Peters
1. Introduction
The declaration of Crimean independence by the Supreme Rada of Crimea of 11
March 2014 explicitly relied on the ICJ's Kosovo Advisory Opinion by stating:
We, the members of the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the
Sevastopol City Council ... taking into consideration the confirmation of the status of
Kosovo by the United Nations International Court of Justice on July 22, 2010, which says
that a unilateral declaration of independence by a part of the country does not violate any
international norms, make this decision.1
After the Crimean referendum of 16 March 2014, in which the population
pronounced itself in favour of joining Russia, the Russian President, Vladimir
Putin, addressed the public in a long speech in which he explained and justified
the Russian action in political, historical, and legal terms. He relied particularly on
the `Kosovo precedent':
Moreover, the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent—a precedent
our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation,
when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea
is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country's central
authorities ... [T] he UN International Court agreed with this approach ... They wrote
this, disseminated it all over the world, had everyone agree and now they are outraged.
Over what? The actions of Crimean people completely fit in with these instructions, as it
1 Transl. by rt.com, 11 March 2014 (Rt.com, `Crimea parliament declares independence from Ukraine
ahead of referendum, <http://rt.cominews/crimea-parliament-independence-ukraine-086/0>.
The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. Marko Milanovio and Michael Wood.
© Oxford University Press 2015. Published 2015 by Oxford University Press.
- 121 -
An Unfortunate Precedent? 295
statements about the precedential value of that `humanitarian intervention' (which
it famously qualified as being `illegal but legitimate'). On the one hand, the report
noted that `[t]he Kosovo "exception" now exists, for better and worse, as a contested
precedent'. On the other hand, the report concluded: `If, therefore, we stand back
from the Kosovo intervention, it becomes clear that it did not so much create a
precedent for intervention elsewhere as raise vital questions about the legitimacy
and practicability of the use of force to defend human rights and humanitarian
values in the 21st century'.16 And in 2003, the ICJ highlighted the csui generis
position' of Yugoslavia between 1992 and 2000 vis-a-vis the United Nations and
international law instruments.17 (This was in the context of state dissolution and
possible succession, and did not have anything to do with Kosovo. The possible
precedential value of the break-up of the state and/or the NATO intervention will
not be dealt with in this chapter.)
Second, Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence (DoI) of 17 February
2008 was, first of all by its authors, and then by many commentators, qualified as
a `non-precedent', as will be examined in detail below.18 And third, the question
arose whether the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2010 constituted a precedent or not.19
In the following, I will deal with the possibly `precedential' value of the Advisory
Opinion first (although it came later in time), because this question is less complex
(Section 3). Afterwards, I will discuss the precedential value of the 2008 DoI, as
`sanctioned' by the Opinion (Section 4).
3. The Advisory Opinion as a Precedent?
A. Legal effects of advisory opinions
Advisory opinions issued by the ICJ are not legally binding judicial pronouncements.
It is the `essential characteristic' of advisory opinions that they, `as the term
implies ... constitute advice, i.e. they do not legally bind either the requesting
16 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International
Response, Lessons Learned (OUP 2000) at 175 and 297.
17 ICJ, Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11July 1996 in the Case concerning the Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), Judgment of 3 February
2003, ICJ Reports 2003, 7, para. 71.
18 See the references below in notes 44-73.
19 Referring to the Advisory Opinion as a non-precedent, the German Foreign Minister (Guido
Westerwelle), during a visit to Cyprus, shortly after the issuance of the opinion, stated on 26 July
2010: `It's a unique decision in a unique situation with a unique historical background ... This was
very specific expertise it has nothing to do with any other cases in the world ... It has a special historical
background and this opinion of judges has something to do with this special historical background
and with this specific situation ... It is not a decision for other countries or other regions in the world'.
<http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfahnfa2006.nsf/0/88B9C658146E783DC225776C002B0777?OpenDo
cument&print>; <http://www.expatica.com/de/news/german-news/german-fm-un-court-ruling-onkosovo-
unique-decision-_85299.html>. In contrast, the Russian President referred to the Advisory
Opinion as a precedent in his 18 March 2014 address concerning Crimea (supra note 2).
- 122 -
296 Anne Peters
party or any other body or State to take any specific action pursuant to the opinion'.
2° For this reason alone, an advisory opinion cannot constitute a precedent in
the common law sense discussed above.
Advisory opinions are, however, `judicial decisions', and thus a subsidiary source
of international law in terms of Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute.21 Also, advisory opinions
may contribute to the identification or even formation of customary law to the
extent that they manifest or confirm practice and opinio juris of international legal
persons, notably states. Finally, the opinions enjoy a certain institutional authority,
i.e. their substance is acknowledged by other participants in the system as being
worthy of respect. Overall, it can be said that advisory opinions have a `real legal
significance'22 and `will normally have important legal effects'.23 Statements made
therein may have Tar-reaching legal consequences'.24
Generally speaking, decisions of the ICJ have the function of, on the one hand,
resolving a concrete legal dispute (adversarial judgment) or answering a legal question
(advisory opinion), and on the other hand, developing the law further (at
least to a limited extent25). These two functions may stand in tension. Indeed, a
number of advisory opinions have been crucial to the development of international
law, for example the Reparations for Injuries Opinion (1949), the opinion concerning
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (1951), and the Namibia Opinion (1970). The ICJ itself regularly
cites its own advisory opinions and relies on them in the same manner as on its
previous adversial judgments. Finally, the Court itself has ascribed some political
importance to its own opinions. For example, it stated that the Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion would have relevance for the continuing debate on the matter in
the General Assembly and would present an additional element in the negotiations
on the matter'.26
Overall, it would thus not be owing to the formal status and de facto authority
of advisory opinions in general, but rather to its substance (or lack of substance),
20 Thirlway, Advisory Opinions', Max Planck Encyclopedia Online Edition <http://opil.ouplaw.
com/view/10 .1093/law: epi1/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e4 ?rskey= T6AfKq8cresult=l8cpr
d=EPIL>.
21 Art. 38(1)(d) says that the Court shall apply `judicial decisions ... as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law'.
22 T. D. Gill et al (eds), Rosenne's The World Court: What It is and How It Works (6th edn, Martinus
Nijhoff 2003), at 88.
23 Frowein and Oellers-Frahm, `Article 65', in A. Zimmermann et al (eds), The Statute of the
Intenational Court of Justice: A Commentary (2nd edn 2012), para. 45.
24 Ibid., para. 50.
25 Cf. ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports 1996
226, para. 18: `It is clear that the Court cannot legislate and, in the circumstances of the present case,
it is not called upon to do so. Rather its task is to engage in its normal judicial function of ascertaining
the existence or otherwise of legal principles and rules applicable to the threat or use of nuclear
weapons. The contention that the giving of an answer to the question posed would require the Court
to legislate is based on a supposition that the present corpus juris is devoid of relevant rules in this matter.
The Court could not accede to this argument; it states the existing law and does not legislate. This is
so even if, in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify its scope and sometimes
note its general trend' (emphasis added).
26 Ibid., para. 17.
- 123 -
An Unfortunate Precedent? 297
that the Kosovo Opinion might contribute a little or a lot to the development of
international law, and be in that untechnical sense a `precedent'—or not.
B. Legal effects of the Kosovo opinion in particular
In the Kosovo case itself, the ICJ described an opinion's effects as follows: `The
advisory jurisdiction is not a form of judicial recourse for States but the means by
which [organs of the UN] may obtain the Court's opinion in order to assist them
in their activities'.27 But ' [t] he Court cannot determine ... what effect that may
have in relation to those steps' of the General Assembly.28 This self-description
relates to the political rather than to legal effects of the opinion.
One possible political effect could theoretically have been to bolster Kosovar
statehood (although this was not explicitly a topic of the Opinion). The Advisory
Opinion might have had a discernible effect for the recognition of Kosovo, i.e.
for the international community's acknowledgment of Kosovar statehood—simply
because the judicial statement on the legality of the DoI might factor in the states'
legal and political considerations when deciding whether to recognize the entity
or not. Before the Advisory Opinion, Kosovo had already been recognized by 69
states. One year after the Opinion, in August 2011, only 12 additional recognitions
had come about (in total 81). Three years after the Opinion (in August
2013), 106 states had recognized Kosovo. So apparently, the Opinion did not
really accelerate the speed of recognitions, and did not impact much on the recognition
calculus of individual states.
So what about the `precedential' value of the Opinion in the untechnical
sense explained above? During the proceedings, in the camp of states opposing
Kosovar independence, four states contradicted the csui generis/uniqueness argument'
and warned against setting an undesirable precedent through the Opinion
itself (Serbia,29 Cyprus,3° Argentina,31 and Bolivia32). Clearly, they thought such
a `precedent' to be pernicious because it accepted the fracturing of a state. In that
sense, Serbia commented: `The destabilising factor of this argument is immediately
evident, and no argument claiming that the Kosovo case is not a precedent can
cure this'.33 From the bench, dissenting Judges Skotnikov and Koroma went in
27 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, 403, para. 33.
28 Ibid., para. 44.
29 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, 403, Written Comment of Serbia
(submitted until 17 July 2009), at 66—8, 71, paras. 128-30, 133, 139.
3° Cyprus, Verbatim Record (VR) (CR 2009/29 December, 7, 2009, 10 a.m.), at 47 para. 57, at
48, para. 64-5.
31 Argentina, VR (CR 2009/26 December, 2, 2009, 10 a.m.), at 47—8, paras. 30-1.
32 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, 403, Written Statement of Bolivia
(submitted until 17 April 2009), at 1.
33 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, 403, Written Comment of Serbia
(submitted until 17 July 2009) (note 29), at 71, para. 139 (emphasis added).
- 124 -
Annex 124
Article 1: Definition of Racial Discrimination, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY 2016)
Pursuant to the Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex
is comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
Annex 124
Patrick Thornberry, Article 1: Definition of Racial Discrimination, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION ALL FORMS RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (Oxford University Press 2016)
Pursuant to the Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex
is comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 125 -
- 126 -
Oxford Public International Law
6 Article 1: Definition of Racial Discrimination
From; The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination; A Commentary
Patrick Thcraberry
Context type: Book content
Product Orb rd Scholarly Anthcaltles on International Law [MAIL]
Seder: Qxfca-d Ccao.ments ilea on International Law
Publtabed in print: 14 July 2016
ISBN: 9780199265336
Subject(s):
Religion — Etbrdcity — Minorities — Race — Human rights remedies
rtmm; Osicad Pub& Internathael Law (kitty :ffordL otggew.ccao). (c) Othxd Unix= ity Prom, 2022. All Rights Remand.
Writer: Covington & Burling ti brew; date: 30 March 2022
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 30 March 2022
Content type: Book content
Product: Oxford Scholarly Authorities on International Law [OSAIL]
Series: Oxford Commentaries on International Law
Published in print: 14 July 2016
ISBN: 9780199265336
6 Article 1: Definition of Racial Discrimination
From: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: A Commentary
Patrick Thornberry
Religion — Ethnicity — - 127 -
(p. 97) 6. Article 1
Definition of Racial Discrimination
The present chapter focuses on the definition of racial discrimination in paragraph 1 of
Article 1. The limitations on the reach of the definition in paragraphs 2 and 3 are
considered in the chapter immediately following; Article 1(4) is discussed together with
paragraph 2 of Article 2 in Chapter 9 on special measures. The text of Article 1(1) is as
follows:
In this Convention, the term 'racial discrimination' shall mean any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field
of public life.
A. Introduction
Equality and non-discrimination are intrinsic to the architecture of human rights law, hence
the statement in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): 'All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.' The principles of equality, and nondistinction
on the grounds of 'birth, nationality, language, race or religion',figured in the
minorities system of the League, in addition to the specific clauses on positive minority
protection. In the era of the United Nations, the focus on universal human rights initially
resulted in a significant atrophy of 'positive' elements, reflecting tendencies to treat
equality and non-discrimination as promoting simple uniformity of treatment. According to
Capotorti, the concept of equality and non-discrimination implies a formal guarantee of
uniform treatment for all individuals—who must be ensured the enjoyment of the same
rights and accept the same obligations'.Nuanced concepts of equality and discrimination
pre- and post-date Capotorti's in protean guises such as formal and substantive
equality; equality before (or under) the law and equal protection of the law; equality of
results; de jure and de facto equality and their analogues in the prohibitions of
discrimination: direct and indirect discrimination; structural discrimination; positive action,
affirmative action, etc.(p. 98) The Charter of the United Nations and the UDHR incorporate basic equality and
non-discrimination principles.The UDHR expands the Charter 'grounds' of prohibited
distinctions: 'race, sex, language, or religion', to 'race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status',as well
as providing for equality before the law and equal protection of the law.Following the
model of the Charter and the UDHR, virtually all general human rights instruments contain
an equality or a non-discrimination clause,or both.The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), for example, includes a prohibition of discrimination,a
provision on the equal rights of men and women,and a broad-based equality provision in
Article 26 that demands 'equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status'; the provision on discrimination in Article 2(1)
is limited to the rights 'recognized' in the Covenant, while the guarantee in Article 26
applies to human rights in genera1.12 Grounds of discrimination appear in both 'open' and
'closed' lists, the former characterized by the inclusion of 'such as' before a list of
grounds,the latter confining discrimination to a single element such as 'sex' in the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), or
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 30 March 2022
& March 2022
(p. 97) 6. Article 1
Definition of Racial Discrimination
racial discrimination in paragraph 1 of
Article 1. The limitations on the reach paragraph 2 of Article In this Convention, the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction,
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
and
public life.
Equality and the statement in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): ‘All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.’ The principles of equality, and nondistinction
on the grounds of ‘birth, nationality, language, race or religion’,figured in the
universal human rights initially
resulted in a significant atrophy of ‘positive’ elements, reflecting tendencies to treat
equality and non-discrimination as promoting simple uniformity of treatment. According to
Capotorti, ‘the concept of equality and non-discrimination implies a formal guarantee of
uniform treatment for all individuals—who must be ensured the enjoyment of the same
rights and accept the same obligations’.pre- and post-date Capotorti’s statement3 de jure de facto prohibitions of
non-discrimination principles.The UDHR expands the Charter ‘grounds’ of prohibited
distinctions: ‘race, sex, language, or religion’, to ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’,Following the
human rights instruments contain
both.International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), for example, includes a prohibition of discrimination,a
Article 26 that demands ‘equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status’; the provision on discrimination in Article 2(1)
is limited to the rights ‘recognized’ in the Covenant, while the guarantee in Article 26
applies to human general.Grounds of discrimination appear in both ‘open’ and
‘closed’ lists, the former characterized by the inclusion of ‘such as’ before a list of
the latter confining discrimination to a single element such as ‘sex’ in the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), or
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 9
10
11
12
13
- 128 -
concepts applied by the Committee extend to `naming names'-self-designation—on the
basis that groups have a right to the dignity of their name as opposed to other names,
possibly pejorative, imposed by those outside the group.Hence the practice of
requesting information on the acceptance by group members of particular group
designations.
De minimis, States should, according to the Committee, recognize ethnic groups when the
evidence of ethnicity adequately presents itself. In the case of Ireland, the Committee
expressed concern at the State party's position on the Travellers—not recognized as an
ethnic group—and encouraged concrete work towards such recognition, bearing in mind
that recognition had important implications under the Convention.With regard to ethnic
or national minorities, Italy was urged to recognize Roma on an equal footing with
`historical' minorities;Ecuador was subject to a similar recommendation.Comments
were made to Ukraine regarding the absence of official recognition of the (p. 1 10)
Ruthenian minority, despite their distinct minority characteristics.The recognition of
indigenous peoples gains enhanced force from the principle of self-determination expressed
in the UNDRIP, an instrument endorsed by the Committee. The Committee has insisted that
if a group falls under a particular designation such as `indigenous people', and there is a
demand to be recognized as such, then they should be so recognized.In the case of Laos,
the Committee recommended that the State party `recognize the rights of persons
belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples as set out in international law, regardless of
the name given to such groups in domestic law'.In its recommendation to Denmark
regarding recognition of `the Thule Tribe' of Greenland, the Committee proposed that
concrete measures be taken 'to ensure that the status of the Thule tribe reflects established
international norms on indigenous peoples' identification'.CERD's approach extends to
support for demands by groups for recognition in State constitutions.The Committee has
congratulated States parties when recognition in line with international standards is
forthcoming.122
The Committee's observations on recognition are largely directed towards determinations
made by States in their assessments of demographic data, regarded by the Committee as
required in order to concretize anti-discrimination programmes including special
measures.123
For individuals, self-identification discourages the State from assigning them to categories
in a deterministic manner that would subvert the objects and purposes of the Convention.
Criticisms of the scope of self-definition have been articulated by groups, concerned by
what they see as its undue extension to individuals who have little or no (p. 1 1 1) evident
connection with the group in question.For collectives, self-identification challenges State
prerogatives to deflect the application of established rights. Challenges to the Committee's
position have been forthcoming. Turkey stated that it `did not adhere to the "selfidentification"
approach advocating the granting of minority status on the basis of the
purely subjective perceptions or feelings of its members. Every State had the sovereign
right to decide which groups of citizens it viewed as constituting minorities'.The
Committee in turn reiterated the relevance of GR 8, also expressing concern at the
application of restrictive criteria to determine the existence of ethnic groups.IV. Discrimination
`Discrimination' is a term that may be used in positive, neutral, or negative senses. The
Latin discriminare means simply 'to distinguish between',and there is a positive sense in
referring to 'a person of discrimination': one who displays a fineness or subtlety of
judgement in intellectual or material matters. While international instruments vary in their
use of `distinction' and `discrimination',ICERD incorporates `distinction' into the concept
of racial discrimination. The definition of discrimination in ICERD and elsewhere in
international human rights is essentially negative: unjust or unfair discrimination against a
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 30 March 2022
& March 2022
concepts applied by the Committee extend to ‘naming names’—self-designation—on the
designations.
De expressed concern at the State party’s position on the Travellers—not recognized as an
ethnic group—and encouraged concrete work towards such recognition, bearing in mind
or national minorities, ‘historical’ minorities;110)
Ruthenian minority, despite in the UNDRIP, an if a group falls under a particular designation such as ‘indigenous people’, and there is a
the Committee recommended that the State party ‘recognize the rights of persons
the name given to such groups in domestic law’.its recommendation to Denmark
regarding recognition of ‘the Thule Tribe’ of Greenland, the Committee proposed that
concrete measures be taken ‘to ensure that the status of the Thule tribe reflects established
international norms on indigenous peoples’ identification’.CERD’s approach extends to
international standards is
forthcoming.The Committee’s observations on recognition are largely directed towards determinations
programmes including special
For little or no (p. 111) evident
prerogatives to deflect the application of established rights. Challenges to the Committee’s
position have been forthcoming. Turkey stated that it ‘did not adhere to the “selfidentification”
approach advocating the granting of minority status on the basis of the
right to decide which groups of citizens it viewed as constituting minorities’.The
IV. Discrimination
‘Discrimination’ is a term that may be used in positive, neutral, or negative senses. The
Latin discriminare means simply ‘to distinguish between’,referring to ‘a person of discrimination’: one who displays a fineness or subtlety of
material matters. While international instruments vary in their
use of ‘distinction’ and ‘discrimination’,ICERD incorporates ‘distinction’ into the concept
of racial discrimination. The definition of discrimination in ICERD and elsewhere in
international human rights 113
114
115 116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
- 129 -
person or group/category of persons.Accordingly, GR 32 treats 'positive discrimination'
as an oxymoron.139 The injustice or detriment associated with discrimination is calibrated in
terms of 'nullifying or impairing' the recognition, etc, 'on an equal footing' of human rights.
In order to find discrimination that affects individuals or groups under Article 1, it needs to
be established that individuals or groups are subject to distinctions, etc. 'based on' race,
colour, etc. 'Based on' sits well with intentional discrimination in signifying motivations or
reasons for action, but less well with discrimination in effect or indirect discrimination; the
reformulation of 'based on' to 'on the grounds of in GR 14 softens the discrepancy only a
little. Makkonen contends that the recognition of indirect discrimination in L.R. v Slovakia
implies the rejection of the approach according to which discrimination 'must be linked to
acts which...single out...members of a particular group'.In other circumstances, when
categorization as indirect discrimination was avoided, the Committee has insisted that
groups should be 'singled out' in order to engage the prohibitions in the (p. 112)
Convention,a narrow approach to the 'targeting' of groups. The Committee's general
understanding of discrimination is summarized in GR 32:
On the core notion of discrimination, general recommendation No. 30 (2004) of the
Committee observed that differential treatment will 'constitute discrimination if the
criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of
the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not
proportional to the achievement of this aim' (para. 4). As a logical corollary of this
principle, General Recommendation No. 14 (1993) observes that 'differentiation of
treatment will not constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation,
judged against the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are legitimate' (para.
2). The term 'non-discrimination' does not signify the necessity of uniform
treatment when there are significant differences in situation between one person or
group and another, or, in other words, if there is an objective and reasonable
justification for differential treatment. To treat in an equal manner persons or
groups whose situations are objectively different will constitute discrimination in
effect, as will the unequal treatment of persons whose situations are objectively the
same. The Committee has also observed that the application of the principle of nondiscrimination
requires that the characteristics of groups be taken into
consideration.A separation should be made between 'differentiation' simpliciter, and (unfair)
discrimination: the prevention of discrimination and the right to equality do not require
identical treatment without regard to circumstances;the nuanced understanding of
equality since the time of the League of Nations has already been referred to here. The
edifices of minority and indigenous rights and other categories of rights in international law
rest upon nuances in the understanding of equality.Objective and reasonable
justifications for differential treatment may arise from appraisals of factual circumstances
or by operation of law—the latter is evidenced by the acceptance under ICERD of rights
applicable to members of specific groups or categories.As an example of the former, in
Sefic v Denmark the Committee decided that a requirement to speak Danish in order to
purchase car (p. 113) insurance was reasonable in the circumstances. CERD considered
that the reasons advanced by the company concerned, 'including the ability to communicate
with the customer, the lack of resources of a small company to employ persons speaking
different languages, and the fact that it is a company operating primarily through telephone
contact', were reasonable and objective grounds for the requirement.In L.G v Korea,
with regard to the mandatory testing of foreigners—except ethnic Koreans-for drugs and
HIV/AIDS, the Committee noted that the policy did not 'appear to be justified on public
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Accordingly, GR 32 treats ‘positive discrimination’
terms of ‘nullifying or impairing’ the recognition, etc, ‘on an equal footing’ of human rights.
In order to find be established that individuals or groups are subject to distinctions, etc. ‘based on’ race,
colour, etc. ‘Based on’ sits well with intentional discrimination in signifying motivations or
indirect discrimination; the
reformulation of ‘based on’ to ‘on the grounds of’ in GR 14 softens the discrepancy only a
recognition of indirect discrimination in L.R. v Slovakia
implies the rejection of the approach according to which discrimination ‘must be linked to
acts which…single out…members of a particular group’.In groups should be ‘singled out’ in order to engage the prohibitions in the (p. 112)
132
a narrow approach to the ‘targeting’ of groups. The Committee’s general
discrimination is summarized in GR 32:
Committee observed that differential treatment will ‘constitute discrimination if the
proportional to the achievement of this aim’ (para. 4). As a logical corollary of this
principle, General Recommendation No. 14 (1993) observes that ‘differentiation of
judged against the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are legitimate’ (para.
2). The term ‘non-discrimination’ does not signify the necessity of uniform
constitute discrimination in
nondiscrimination
133
A separation should be made between ‘differentiation’ simpliciter, and (unfair)
discrimination: 134
135
or by operation of law—the latter is evidenced by the acceptance under ICERD of rights
136
example of the former, in
Sefic v Denmark that the reasons advanced by the company concerned, ‘including the ability to communicate
through telephone
contact’, were reasonable and objective grounds for the requirement.137
In L.G v Korea,
with regard to the mandatory testing of foreigners—except ethnic Koreans—for drugs and
HIV/AIDS, the Committee noted that the policy did not ‘appear to be justified on public
129
130
131
- 130 -
health grounds or any other ground'.Differentiation may also be legitimated through the
operation of a specific treaty or legal regime such as the European Union.Lerner reads the travaux to the effect that the four categories of discriminatory action
—`distinction, exclusion, restriction and preference'—were intended to cover all types of
acts based on racial motivations,140 which suggests that they should not be interpreted
restrictively. `Distinctions' between national and ethnic minorities are referred to above;
social, educational, and other forms of `exclusion' have attracted Committee comment,and support has been expressed for `inclusion'.An archival search for `restriction' turns
up instances of governmental restrictions on NGOs but also restrictions on non-citizens in
the labour market,on freedom of movement,and caste restrictions.As regards
`preferences', GR 32 generalizes that discrimination `is constituted not simply by an
unjustifiable "distinction, exclusion or restriction" but also by an unjustifiable "preference",
making it especially important that States parties distinguish "special measures" from
prohibited "preferences"'.146
The application of legal preferences was discussed in D.F. v Australia, a case concerning
changes in Australian legislation affecting, inter alia, eligibility for certain social security
payments. The petitioner, a New Zealand citizen resident in Australia, lost special status on
account of legislative amendments to rules that previously favoured New Zealand citizens
and was required to apply for a permanent residence visa to access certain social security
benefits. In rejecting the claim of racial discrimination, Australia argued that whereas New
Zealand citizens had previously received preferential treatment, the withdrawal of such
advantages could not constitute discrimination, as it merely placed New (p. 1 14) Zealand
citizens `on an equal footing with people of other nationalities'an argument criticized
by the petitioner as one of `equality by deprivation'.In finding no discrimination on the
ground of national origin, the Committee observed that the distinction which had been
made in favour of New Zealand citizens no longer applied: the changed provisions `did not
result in the operation of a distinction, but rather in the removal of such a distinction which
had placed the petitioner and all New Zealand citizens in a more favourable position
compared to other non-citizens'.Discrimination under Article 1 is expressed in terms of its purpose or effect, and CERD has
been critical of jurisdictions that insist that claims of discrimination must be accompanied
by evidence of intention.150 The Committee continues to refer to `purpose or effect' in its
recommendations to States parties.In order to determine whether there is
discrimination in effect, GR 14 states that the Committee `will look to see whether [an]
action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group' distinguished by race, colour,
etc.Citations of `disparate impact' include observations on the impact of mandatory
sentencing of aboriginals in Australia,the disparate impact of natural disasters on lowincome
African-Americans,and of felon disenfranchisement laws on persons belonging to
minorities in the US.While continuing to employ the terms `intention' and `effect', a parallel terminology of
direct and indirect discrimination has emerged in practice. In L.R. v. Slovakia, it was
recalled that `the definition of racial discrimination...expressly extends beyond measures
which are explicitly discriminatory to encompass measures that are not discriminatory at
face value but are discriminatory in fact and effect, that is, if they amount to indirect
discrimination'.Here, discrimination in effect is taken as equivalent to indirect
discrimination, and discrimination in fact equated with discrimination in effect. Concluding
observations on the US appear to erase distinctions between indirect and de facto
discrimination, together deemed to occur `where an apparently neutral provision, criterion
or practice would put persons of a particular racial, ethnic or national origin at a
disadvantage compared with other persons'.In CERD practice, the essence of de facto
discrimination (discrimination in fact) is the existence of discrimination in practice;
analogously, de facto equality refers to equality in the enjoyment of human rights in
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health grounds or any other ground’.travaux —‘distinction, exclusion, restriction and preference’—were intended to cover all types of
motivations,140
restrictively. ‘Distinctions’ between national and ethnic minorities are referred to above;
social, educational, and other forms of ‘exclusion’ have attracted Committee comment,and support has been expressed for ‘inclusion’.An archival search for ‘restriction’ turns
‘preferences’, GR 32 generalizes that discrimination ‘is constituted not simply by an
unjustifiable “distinction, exclusion or restriction” but also by an unjustifiable “preference”,
making it especially important that States parties distinguish “special measures” from
prohibited “preferences”’.D.F. v changes in Australian legislation inter benefits. In New (p. 114) Zealand
citizens ‘on an equal footing with people of other nationalities’147—an argument criticized
by the petitioner as one of ‘equality by deprivation’.In finding no made in favour of New Zealand citizens no longer applied: the changed provisions ‘did not
distinction which
position
compared to other non-citizens’.Discrimination under purpose or intention.The Committee continues to refer to ‘purpose or effect’ in its
discrimination in effect, GR 14 states that the Committee ‘will look to see whether [an]
action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group’ distinguished by race, colour,
Citations of ‘disparate impact’ include observations on the impact of mandatory
African-Americans,and of felon minorities While continuing to employ the terms ‘intention’ and ‘effect’, a parallel terminology of
direct and indirect discrimination practice. In L.R. v. Slovakia, it was
recalled that ‘the definition of racial discrimination…expressly extends beyond measures
which are explicitly discrimination’.Here, de facto
discrimination, together deemed to occur ‘where an apparently neutral provision, criterion
origin at a
disadvantage compared with other persons’.de facto
discrimination (discrimination de facto enjoyment of human rights in
138
139
141
142
143 144 145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
- 131 -
practice. Committee statements on de facto discrimination suggest that the obligations
under the Convention reach down into the social matrix, subject to the limitation to 'public
life'. References to de facto discrimination have been particularly common in the context of
immigration,descent-based communities,and Roma.160
(p. 115) The amalgamation of terms has been the subject of comment. Frostell distinguishes
between the purpose-effect axis and the direct-indirect axis, commenting that 'direct and
indirect discrimination...might occur both in the presence and in the absence of a
discriminatory purpose'.161 De Schutter distinguishes between indirect discrimination:
'instances of conscious discrimination which hide behind the use of apparently neutral
criteria', and 'disparate effect discrimination', rules/practices which 'although not
calculated to produce such effect, impose a specific disadvantage on certain groups, or
have a disproportionate impact' on them.Irrespective of the provenance of the
terminology,163 the use of direct and indirect discrimination is strongly embedded in
current human rights practice.Definitions of these concepts in the human rights canon
exhibit broad similarities with each other,165 even if the terminology employed may wash
over the distinctions appraised by de Schutter.CERD has not advanced a stand-alone definition of 'direct' and 'indirect' discrimination.
Both terms appear as a heading in CERD's GR 32 on special measures but the explanation
offered is couched in terms of 'purposive or intentional discrimination and discrimination in
effect', suggesting that CERD has not drawn clean lines between the two pairings.1fi7 In
assessing whether indirect discrimination is operative 'in fact and (p. 116) effect', CERD
stated that it 'must take account of the particular context and circumstances...as by
definition indirect discrimination can only be demonstrated circumstantially'.168 While the
Committee has not provided States parties with elaborate guidance on the evidence to
demonstrate the presence of indirect—or structural—discrimination, general group-based
data are regularly called for,169 as well as scrutiny of the overall circumstances of
particularly vulnerable groups,17° or in relation to specific policies.In its exploration of the facets of racial discrimination, the Committee has highlighted
structural discrimination or structural inequalities, notably regarding the situations of Afrodescendants
and indigenous peoples in the Americas.The position regarding Afrodescendants
is summarized in GR 34, adopted in 2011:
Racism and structural discrimination against people of African descent, rooted in
the infamous regime of slavery, are evident in the situations of inequality affecting
them and reflected, inter alia, in the following domains: their grouping, together
with indigenous peoples, among the poorest of the poor; their low rate of
participation and representation in political and institutional decision-making
processes; additional difficulties they face in access to and completion and quality
of education, which results in the transmission of poverty from generation to
generation; inequality in access to the labour market; limited social recognition and
valuation of their ethnic and cultural diversity; and a disproportionate presence in
prison populationS.The Committee observes that overcoming the structural discrimination that affects
people of African descent calls for the urgent adoption of special measures
(affirmative action)...174
This extract highlights a multitude of epiphenomenal effects and takes the Committee close
to a formal analysis of structural discrimination. The use of the term by the Committee
frequently relates to discrimination as a product of historical processes that have
marginalized populations from the institutions of the State and the enjoyment of basic
rights.175 The larger story in many cases, notably that of indigenous peoples, is that
structures of State and society were crafted around models that offered little sense of (p.
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de facto under the Convention reach down into the social matrix, subject to the limitation to ‘public
life’. References to de facto immigration,Roma.(p. 115) The between the purpose–effect axis and the direct–indirect axis, commenting that ‘direct and
indirect discrimination…might occur both in the presence and in the absence of a
discriminatory purpose’.discrimination:
‘instances of conscious discrimination which hide behind the use of apparently neutral
criteria’, and ‘disparate effect discrimination’, rules/practices which ‘although not
have a disproportionate impact’ on them.with each other,even if the terminology employed may wash
CERD has not advanced a stand-alone definition of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ discrimination.
Both terms appear as a heading in CERD’s GR 32 on special measures but the explanation
offered is couched in terms of ‘purposive or intentional discrimination and discrimination in
effect’, suggesting that CERD has not drawn clean lines between the two pairings.In
assessing whether indirect discrimination is operative ‘in fact and effect’, CERD
stated that it ‘must take account of the particular context and circumstances…as by
definition indirect discrimination can only be demonstrated circumstantially’.demonstrate the presence of indirect—or structural—discrimination, general group-based
for,highlighted
structural discrimination structural The position regarding Afrodescendants
adopted in 2011:
inter domains: their grouping, together
institutional decision-making
prison populations.(affirmative action)…This extract highlights marginalized rights.The larger 158 159 160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170 171
172
173
174
175
- 132 -
1 17) ownership or participation on the part of non-dominant populations; indigenous
peoples may regard the development of compensatory legal and constitutional practice in
this respect as an aspect of 'belated State-building'.Structural discrimination is also
seen to impact on non-citizen, immigrant populations.As a descriptor, 'structural' has
been preferred by the Committee to 'systemic', the latter being used more commonly to
refer to 'systemic inadequacies' in social programmes.'Institutional discrimination',
focusing on results of the actions of 'institutions' as opposed to broader 'structures', is not
part of CERD's regular repertoire.The cultural and economic embeddedness of
discriminatory 'structures' in many States suggest that the measures required to address
such discrimination within a State will require the deployment of the full resources of the
Convention.
V. Grounds of Discrimination
1. Race and colour
Whereas the use of the term 'grounds' (of discrimination) is commonplace, Article 1 refers
to discrimination 'based on' race, colour, etc. 'Grounds' of discrimination are, however,
referred to in the preamble to the Convention, and GR 14 states the Committee's opinion
that the words "based on" do not bear any meaning different from "on the grounds of" in
preambular paragraph 7'.186 The list of grounds in Article 1 is expressed as limited.
While the Committee is critical of racist epithets,`race as such has seldom been
explicitly mentioned as a prohibited ground',and where it is referred to, is usually placed
in a list along with other grounds, together constituting 'racial discrimination'. The
Committee has set itself against notions of 'pure blood' and 'mixed blood', concerned by the
idea of racial superiority that such terminology may entail.Concern was also expressed
regarding language appearing in the report of the Dominican Republic referring to the
'racial purity' and 'genetic characteristics' of different ethnic groups.In contrast (p. 1 18)
to its response to biological expressions of 'race', no equivalent expression of discomfort
was advanced by the Committee in response to the statement by Cuba interpreting race as
a social construct:
The naturalistic biological aspect of race, which reduces the human person to a
number of specific features, is of little ideological or functional use when it comes to
placing individuals in categories in order to establish a social record of the
phenomenon...all the racial classifications are to some degree arbitrary and vary
considerably depending on the taxonomic principle on which they are built...the
classifications with which people act and function in concrete contexts do not
always coincide fully with the classifications which may result from the application
of a given 'scientific' criterion. The notion of race is thus taken to be a social
construct.Notwithstanding sensitivities as to concept and language, CERD insists that national
legislation should address all the grounds of discrimination in Article 1, including race.
Norway explained the absence of 'race' from its Anti-Discrimination Act:
the Government has supported the view that the concept of race should not be
used...The reason for this is that the concept of race is based on biological,
hereditary characteristics, grounded in theories that have no justifiable scientific
basis or content. Moreover, the concept has strong negative connotations...The
Government therefore sees no need to use the term 'race' in the text of the
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117) ownership or participation on this respect as an aspect of ‘belated State-building’.also
seen to As a descriptor, ‘structural’ has
been preferred by the Committee to ‘systemic’, the latter being used more commonly to
refer to ‘systemic inadequacies’ in social programmes.‘Institutional discrimination’,
focusing on results of the actions of ‘institutions’ as opposed to broader ‘structures’, is not
part of CERD’s regular repertoire.discriminatory ‘structures’ in many States suggest that the measures required to address
such discrimination within Convention.
V. Grounds of Discrimination
1. Whereas the use of the term ‘grounds’ (of discrimination) is commonplace, Article 1 refers
to discrimination ‘based on’ race, colour, etc. ‘Grounds’ of discrimination are, however,
referred to in the preamble to the Convention, and GR 14 states the Committee’s opinion
that ‘the words “based on” do not bear any meaning different from “on the grounds of” in
preambular paragraph 7’.The list of While the ‘race as such has seldom been
explicitly mentioned as a prohibited ground’,and in a list along with other grounds, together constituting ‘racial discrimination’. The
Committee has set itself against notions of ‘pure blood’ and ‘mixed blood’, concerned by the
the Dominican Republic referring to the
‘racial purity’ and ‘genetic characteristics’ of different ethnic groups.118)
to its response to biological expressions of ‘race’, no equivalent expression of discomfort
placing phenomenon…all the racial classifications are to some degree arbitrary and vary
considerably depending on the taxonomic principle on which they are built…the
result from the application
of a given ‘scientific’ criterion. The notion of race is thus taken to be a social
discrimination in Article 1, including race.
Norway explained the absence of ‘race’ from its Anti-Discrimination Act:
used…The reason for this is that the concept of race is based on biological,
basis or content. Moreover, the concept has strong negative connotations…The
Government therefore sees no need to use the term ‘race’ in the text of the
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
- 133 -
- 134 -
Annex 125
Patrick Thornberry, Article 5: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A
Commentary, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (Oxford University Press 2016)
Pursuant to the Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex
is comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
Annex 125
Patrick Thornberry, Article 5: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A
Commentary, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (Oxford University Press 2016)
Pursuant to the Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex
is comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 135 -
- 136 -
Oxford Public International Law
13 Article 5: Civil and Political Rights
From: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: A Commentary
Patrick Thcrnberry
Content type: Hook content
Product Oitrd Scholarly Authorities on International Law WISAILJ
Serbia: Orford Commentaries on International Law
Published in print: 14 July 2(116
ISBN: 9780199265336
Sablect(s):
Freedom of association — Freedom of enression — Ethnicity — Minorities — Race
FICall; Orford PUblIC Intecruilkirel Lew (1:41efiordLouglevr.com). (c) Orti Untvenstty Prete, 2021. Al] Rights ReeersecL
Subscriber: Covington & Hurling Libnny; Bete: 29 December 2021
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Burling Library; date: December 2021
Book Product: Oxford [OSAIL]
Series: Oxford Published in print: July 2016
13 Article 5: Civil and Political Rights
Racial Patrick Thornberry
Subject(s):
- 137 -
(p. 315) 13. Article 5
Civil and Political Rights
The first three sets of rights in Article 5 are not placed under the rubric of 'civil' or 'civil
and political'; paragraph (d) however, in referring to 'other civil rights', suggests the
appropriate nomenclature.
Chapeau: Prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination...
guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race,
colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law
International standards on equality and non-discrimination are referred to throughout the
present work. Commencing with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
specific provisions in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
substantive articles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), plus the preamble, make reference to equality; the notion of
equality similarly infuses the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD).The standards are replicated and developed in regional instruments—including the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR), the Arab Charter on Human Rights, and the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR).The account of equality in the Inter-American Convention against
Racism and Racial Discrimination is among the more extensive in the international canon,
and includes equality before the law as well as 'equal protection against racism, racial
discrimination and related forms of intolerance',together with the right to equal
'recognition, enjoyment, exercise, and protection' of human rights and fundamental
freedoms 'at both the individual and collective levels'.Specialized instruments regarding
groups the subject of standard Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) concerns, such as International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169, the
UNDRIP, the United Nations Declaration on Minorities (UNDM), and the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), are also underpinned by
notions of equality and non-discrimination, as may be expected in instruments dedicated to
the promotion of the rights of self-identifying peoples and communities.
'Equality before the law' in the chapeau of Article 5 may be contrasted with phrases
elsewhere in the Convention such as 'equal protection of the law' in the preamble, 'on an
equal footing' in Article 1, 'full and equal enjoyment of human rights' in Article 2 as well (p.
316) as other references, and might suggest a certain narrowing of conception. De Schutter
comments that, while 'equality before the law' is 'addressed to law enforcement
authorities',whether executive or judiciary, 'equal protection of the law' is addressed to
the lawmaker.On the other hand, the scope of 'equality before the law', which was
adopted in part to cover the alleged vagueness of 'equal justice before the law', was not
discussed to any great extent and appears to have been accepted as a principle that was not
to be interpreted narrowly.? In practice, 'equality before the law' does not appear to be
highlighted by the Committee with any frequency and, in any case, represents only one
aspect of the vision of equality in Article 5, which also accounts for 'equal treatment before
the tribunals', 'equal suffrage', 'equal access to public service', 'equal pay for equal work',
and 'equal participation in cultural activities'. On one reading, the deployment of multiple
references to equality in Article 5 may express little more than an accumulation of
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Civil and Political Rights
Chapeau: Prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination…
guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race,
colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law
present work. Commencing with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), plus the equality similarly infuses the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD).
Rights (ACHR), the Arab Human Rights (ECHR).The account of equality Racism and Racial Discrimination is among the more extensive in the
instruments regarding
Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(UNDM), and the Framework
notions
(p.
narrowly.
highlighted by the Committee
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
- 138 -
constituent elements of the crime.While freedom of expression was not referred to in
concluding observations that focused on legal certainty and predictability, they may be
inferred therefrom.406
Boyle and Shah underline the foundational nature of freedom of expression as the
touchstone of all rights. Not only is freedom of expression inseparable from freedom of
thought, association, and assembly, it is essential for the enjoyment of all rights.'With
regard to the persons and communities recognized in CERD practice, rights in the field of
language, culture, information, participation, education, health, freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion, and freedom of assembly and association, all depend for their
effective fulfilment on the non-discriminatory enjoyment of freedom of expression. While an
equivalent claim could be made for principles of equality and non-discrimination as
foundational to the human rights enterprise, and for others such as the right to education,
the stress should preferably be placed on interdependence and indivisibility of rights rather
than the construction of a competitive hierarchy. The effects of discrimination flow
simultaneously or sequentially into disparate areas of life that are not easily segmented into
neat packages of rights.
In the context of Article 5, the two principles of freedom of expression and equality
theoretically coalesce, so that practice should ideally demonstrate their integration,
especially in the pluralistic setting of communities protected by the Convention. In the
context of such pluralism, and integrated with cultural and linguistic rights in general, the
Committee has moved incrementally towards a more rounded appreciation of the virtues of
freedom of expression as a protective device for communities, even if the right is not always
defined, or named as such.
(p. 361) 5(d)(ix) The Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and
Association
Following the model of Article 20 of the UDHR, ICERD combines freedoms of peaceful
assembly and association into one statement of rights,whereas, as noted in Chapter 11,
the ICCPR splits them into distinct articles on peaceful assembly and freedom of
association; the ICCPR model is followed in other instruments.Freedom of assembly has
its roots in the trade union movement; the right to form and join trade unions is also part of
Article 5, listed under 'economic, social and cultural rights', a further illustration of the
interconnections among protected rights, transcending any limiting categorizations.
Freedom of assembly is closely related to freedom of expression,and, in specific
circumstances, to identity rights.All international instruments with the exception of the
ACHR require that the right be exercised peacefully.412 Logically, assemblies consist of
more than one person.Freedom of association is also historically linked to trade union
rights, but is understood as broader and not confined to them.Protection from
discrimination with regard to the right to form and join trade unions is separately
addressed under economic, social and cultural rights in Article 5(e)(ii) of ICERD. Freedom
of association also implicitly figures in the notions of community adumbrated from the era
of the League of Nations,and has thus been 'seen as central from the outset to
international minority group protection'. 416
While the UDHR, the ICCPR, and ICERD do not specify any teleological basis for the right,
Article 16 of the American Convention Human Rights refers to the right to establish
associations for 'ideological, religious, political, economic, labour, social and cultural,
sports, or other purposes'.With regard to minorities and indigenous peoples, Article 27
of the ICCPR implies a right of association through the reference to rights being enjoyed
'individually or in community'; the UNDM specifies that '[p]ersons belonging to minorities
have the right to establish and maintain their own associations',while the UNDRIP is
shot through with formulations of rights that presuppose and reach beyond freedom of
association to implicate larger forms of political association, communities or nations, up to
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 29 December 2021
& December 2021
referred to in
inferred therefrom.
inseparable from freedom of
With
practice, rights in the field of
on the non-discriminatory enjoyment of freedom of expression. While an
non-discrimination as
indivisibility of rights rather
effects of discrimination flow
linguistic rights in general, the
Committee (p. 361) 5(d)(ix) The Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and
Association
Following the model of Article 20 of the
expression,410
411
412
413
414
discrimination with Article 5(e)(ii) of ICERD. Freedom
415
416
While the UDHR, the ICCPR, and Article 16 of the American
417
peoples, Article 27
of the ICCPR
418
while the UNDRIP is
405
406
407
408
409
- 139 -
and including the right of self-determination. In the words of Boyle and Shah, the right of
peaceful assembly 'protects non-violent, organized (p. 362) gatherings in public and
private', including protests and counter-protests, while assemblies encompassed include
'political, economic, artistic, and social' gatherings.Freedom of association, a linked but
distinct concept, protects the right 'to form associations for common purposes, free from
government interference'.The rights are not unlimited: restrictions may be imposed on
assembly and association under Article 21(2) and 22(2) of the ICCPR. In the case of ICERD,
the major line of restriction stems from Article 4(b), while common restrictions found in
other international standards are implicitly accepted by the Committee provided they do
not involve racial discrimination.
It will be recalled that the Committee takes the view that the freedom set out in Article 5(d)
(ix) does not extend to racist organizations; a position further elaborated in paragraph 21 of
GR 35. Protection of the right to freedom of assembly and association remains as an issue in
reservations linked to Article 4, particularly 4(b) which requires States parties to prohibit
racist organizations and punish participation in them.
Article 5(d)(ix) is not further explicated in the CERD cases under Article 14, and is rarely
referred to.Practice normally takes the twin aspects of 5(d)(ix) together; the implicit
racial or ethnic connections to engage the provisions of the Convention concern, as with
other rights, the full span of groups under its protection. On 'peaceful' exercise of the right,
rare references in concluding observations include the appeal to indigenous protesters in a
dispute over natural resources 'to make their demands and hold their demonstrations in a
peaceful manner, respecting the human rights of others'.On the other side of the
equation, the Committee has recommended that counter-terrorism legislation should not be
applied to peaceful protest and legitimate assertions of rights.Threats from public or
private sources to human rights defenders, including defenders working for the elimination
of racial discrimination, are a frequent subject of concern.In one case, the State party
was called upon to 'consider releasing those in detention for activities that would, under
international standards, constitute the peaceful exercise' of rights.The link between the enjoyment of cultural rights and freedom of association also attracts
comment. In the case of Greece, concern was expressed regarding the obstacles
encountered by some ethnic groups in exercising this right, noting information 'on the
forced dissolution and refusal to register some associations including words such as
"minority", "Turkish" or "Macedonian"',428 as well as the explanation for such refusa1.427 (p.
363) Measures were accordingly recommended for the effective enjoyment 'by persons
belonging to every community or group of their right to freedom of association and of their
cultural rights'.428A recommendation to Libya suggested enhancement of the right of
association 'for the protection and promotion of Amazigh culture' as among remedies for
the denial of their linguistic and cultural identity.429 Freedom of association is also stressed
in relation to the right to work, bearing in mind questions of collective bargaining and
trades unions in the labour market, and the concerns generated by the treatment of migrant
workers.
Equally, political parties are encouraged to open their membership to ethnic minorities, or
broaden their appeal to the diverse communities of the State; diversified political parties
would satisfy criteria for the integrationist multiracial organizations referred to in Article
2(1)(e). While political parties are regarded as vital to democratic processes, valorization
does not extend to racist parties: the Committee regards their prohibition as an obligation
under Article 4(b) and sundry aspects of Article 2.
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 29 December 2021
& December 2021
and determination. in public and
The rights of the ICCPR. In the case of ICERD,
the major line of restriction stems from Article 4(b), while common restrictions found in
not involve racial discrimination.
paragraph 21 of
reservations participation in them.
from public or
including defenders working for the elimination
of racial
The link between the
refusal.
belonging A
the denial of their ethnic minorities, or
organizations referred to in Article
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426 427
428
429
- 140 -
Annex 126
Gabrielyan A. M., THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE SPHERE OF
SECONDARY EDUCATION IN THE CRIMEA, Archon, Vol. 5 (2018)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
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36
POST-SOVIET SPACE
Gabrielyan A.M.
Graduate student of the Department of Political Science and International Relations
Taurida Academy of the CFU named after V. I. Vernadsky
(V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University)
[email protected]
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE FIELD OF SECONDARY
EDUCATION OF CRIMEA1
Abstract: the aim of the study is to identify the features of the language policy in the field of
school education and to reveal the main trends in the manifestation of this policy at the present stage
of its implementation. Thus, the article discusses the regulatory framework of the language policy of
Crimea and its implementation in the field of secondary education in Crimea. The language policy of
Crimea to a certain extent is aimed at creating conditions for learning the native languages of the
peoples. Within the framework of the Russian Humanitarian Foundation project, the author conducted
a field study aimed at studying issues of teaching and learning native languages in secondary schools
of Crimea, which allows evaluating the effectiveness of the process of learning and teaching native
languages, the range of opportunities for teaching native language provided by schools of Crimea. The
volume of materials studied allows us to characterize the language situation in the field of education in
Crimea; identify the circumstances affecting the formation of the modern education system in the
framework of teaching (learning) native languages in Crimea.
In Crimea, the need to develop relevant proposals for creating conditions for the preservation
and development of the languages of the peoples of Crimea is of great importance in the process of
harmonizing interethnic relations and belongs to the system tasks of the region. Language education is
one of the forms of implementation of language policy in Crimea.
Keywords: language policy, secondary education, native language in schools of Crimea
A feature of modern language policy is the desire, on the one hand, to preserve the native
languages and cultures of the peoples of Crimea, on the other - the need to adapt to the realities of
modern society. In multi-ethnic and multicultural Crimea, one of the priorities is to build a fair language
policy. First of all, we are talking about the need to further improve the study of the native languages
of the younger generation, taking into account the needs and processes taking place in the region.
In Crimea, special attention is paid to language policy, since the region is polyethnic and
multilingual. The self-consciousness and character of each Crimean ethnic group have been formed
over the centuries in the process of interaction with other peoples.
The language situation, vectors and trends in the development of language policy in Crimea
have been changing dynamically in recent years. Significant changes have affected the field of
education. The number of Ukrainian schools and classes with the Ukrainian language of instruction is
falling sharply, secondary education is switching to Russian standards, at the same time the status of
the state language is assigned to Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages. The issue of drafting
a new law "On languages" caused a long-term controversy among the government and public corps,
and it took several years to reach a consensus. Finally, in May 2017, the Law "On the Functioning of
the State Languages of the Republic of Crimea and Other Languages in the Republic of Crimea" was
adopted in the first reading.
Language policy at all levels and especially at the regional level is becoming strategically
important. In Crimea, the need to develop relevant proposals for creating conditions for the preservation
and development of the languages of the peoples of Crimea is of great importance in the process of
harmonizing interethnic relations and belongs to the system tasks of the region. Language education is
one of the forms of implementation of language policy in Crimea.
1 The article is published with the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, the project "Language
Policy in Crimea. Retrospective and perspective" No. 16-31-01073
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The relevance of the topic of studying native languages in the field of education, firstly, is
determined by the needs of society as a whole, and secondly, by the fact that the viability of
multinational, ethnically diverse regions depends on the strategy of language policy based on a broad
basis of educational trends.
The language policy in the field of school education in Crimea is to a certain extent aimed at
creating conditions for teaching native languages and studying them.
In August 2018, the State Duma of the Russian Federation also adopted a draft law on native
languages. Now, in Crimean schools, students will study the subject of "Native language" asmandatory.
According to the "Roadmap for Choosing the Language of Instruction (study) in Educational
Institutions of the Republic of Crimea" dated December 28, 2017, as well as the certificate "On learning
native languages and teaching in native languages in educational institutions of the Republic of Crimea"
dated May 14, 2018, the organization of work on the study of native languages, teaching in native
languages in Crimea, shall be carried out in accordance with the following legislative acts:
1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation (Article 26);
2. Federal Law of the Russian Federation "On Education in the Russian Federation" (Art.
5, Art. 14);
3. The Law of the Russian Federation "On the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian
Federation" (Articles 2, 9, 10);
4. Constitution of the Republic of Crimea (Article 10, Article 19);
5. The Law of the Republic of Crimea "On Education in the Republic of Crimea" (Article
11);
6. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures for the rehabilitation
of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and support for their revival
and development" No. 268 dated April 21, 2014;
7. Lists of instructions of the President of the Russian Federation;
8. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea "On Approval
of the State program for the development of education in the Republic of Crimea for 2016-2018".
According to Article 14 of Federal Law No. 273-FZ of December 29, 2012 "On Education in
the Russian Federation", Russian citizens have the right to receive preschool,
primary (grades 1-4) and basic general (grades 5-9) education in native languages, as well as the right
to study native languages (grades 1-11) within the possibilities provided by the education system.
Based on the free, voluntary, informed choice of the language of instruction and learning, each
educational organization shall determine the languages of education for the academic year by local
regulations.
The Constitution of the Republic of Crimea contains a provision stating that three state
languages shall be effective on the territory of the Republic: Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar,
however, until 2017 there was no basic law on languages.
The Law "On the State Languages of the Republic of Crimea and other languages in the
Republic of Crimea", which was repeatedly amended and disputed at the stage of its development (the
issue of compulsory study of three state languages by all Crimean schoolchildren was particularly acute
in this regard) provides for the provisions of both federal and republican laws as regards this field. This
is a basic law that shall clearly define all areas of application of state languages.
At the present, Article 9 of the above-mentioned Law provides that citizens may receive
preschool, primary, basic general and secondary education in the state languages of the Republic of
Crimea; may receive preschool, primary and basic general education in their native language from
among the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation within the possibilities provided for by
the system education.
Article 10 of this Law stipulates that, firstly, educational activities shall be carried out in
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educational organizations of the Republic of Crimea in the state language of the Russian Federation,
and secondly, "in educational organizations with the Russian language of instruction and learning of
the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages as the state languages of the Republic of Crimea shall be
provided as a compulsory subject, not in damage to teaching and learning of the Russian language."
As part of the implementation of the Russian Humanitarian Foundation project "Language
Policy in the Crimea. Retrospective and Perspective" in the spring of 2018, the author of the article
conducted a study to research the issues of teaching languages and teaching them in general educational
institutions of Crimea. Thanks to in-depth interviewing of the administration and staff of secondary
schools in Simferopol, analysis of the processes of learning native languages and teaching in native
languages in Crimean schools; comparative analysis of documents, including analysis of data from the
regulatory framework of the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea and
local acts of educational institutions (including language curricula, provisions on "languages of
instruction", curricula, student body, statute of schools), etc. it was possible to draw some meaningful
conclusions as regards the implementation of language policy in the field of secondary education in
Crimea. The volume of materials studied allows us to characterize the language situation in the field of
education in Crimea; identify the circumstances affecting the formation of themodern education system
in the framework of teaching (learning) native languages in Crimea. The array of the sample
comprised 6 secondary schools in Simferopol.
The sample of schools was formed based on the goals and objectives of the study, taking into
account the following characteristics:
1. Schools (classes) with the language of instruction in the Crimean Tatar language.
2. Schools (classes) with the language of instruction in Ukrainian.
3. Schools (classes) with the study of Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian and other languages as part of
extracurricular activities.
In this article, we will consider the first part of the study, namely, the range of native language
teaching opportunities provided by schools in Crimea. This block includes the study of the degree of
realization of the constitutional right to teach native languages in schools of Crimea, as well as the
degree of effectiveness of the educational process in languages through the disclosure of the following
aspects:
1. The degree of familiarity of parents (legal representatives) with the regulatory framework
governing language policy and their rights to teach (learn) their native languages and in secondary
schools of Crimea (openness and informativeness)
2. The number of hours allocated for the study of native languages, the scheduling of classes
in the native language (availability)
3. The number and qualification of teachers in their native language (a component of the
effectiveness of teaching native languages)
1. The degree of familiarity of parents (legal representatives) with the regulatory
framework governing language policy and their rights to teach (learn) their native languages
and in secondary schools of Crimea (openness and informativeness)
According to the "Roadmap for Choosing the Language of Instruction (study) in Educational
Institutions of the Republic of Crimea" (the Roadmap") dated 28 December 2017, Section II "Language
Selection Procedure", paragraph 2.1 provides for the "the information on the implementation of the
constitutional right of citizens to choose the language of instruction (learn) in an educational institution
(...) shall be timely notified parents (legal representatives)."
Openness and awareness as regards the enforcement of the right to choose the language of
instruction (learn) shall be a prerequisite for its implementation. One of the objectives of our study was
to identify how parents (legal representatives) of children learn about the possibility of learning their
native languages in schools. According to the decree of the Government of the Republic of Crimea, the
issues of determining the language of instruction (learning) shall be considered in February-March of
this year at parent meetings with parents of future first-graders, as well as at parent meetings of 4th and
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9th grades (in paragraph 2.2. of the Roadmap), as well as during classroom and school-wide parent
meetings (clause 2.4.)
As part of this study, it was revealed that in 5 out of 6 schools studied, according to the
administration, parents learn about the possibility of learning/teaching in their native language at parent
meetings. 5 out of 6 schools reported the possibility to get information on the official website of the
school, for example, through the Articles of Association of the school, or through the schedule of
extracurricular activities.
In 3 out of 6 schools, you can learn about this possibility at school-wide meetings. One of the
schools shall conduct annual monitoring of those who want to learn their native languages.
One of the six schools within the framework of the meeting for parents of future first-graders
shall notify of these opportunities and shall also hold an "open day" at which such opportunities are
announced.
In addition, in 3 out of 6 schools, parents shall be interested in the possibility of teaching
(learning) their native languages themselves. In this event, they can get advice from the school director
or from the school director's secretary.
Thus, awareness and openness of the possibility of learning native languages and the realization
of the right to learn in their native language are generally ensured, but in different ways in each
individual case. In some schools, all the sub-items of the Roadmap of the Ministry of Education of the
Crimea shall be used to familiarize parents (legal representatives) with the possibilities of
teaching/learning in their native language, in some only a part of them.
Information on measures to implement the constitutional right of citizens to choose the
language of instruction (learning) in educational institutions shall be brought to the attention of parents
(legal representatives) by annually posting and updating information on the school stand and thewebsite
of the educational institution (paragraph 2.5. of the Roadmap). Nevertheless, the information on the
official websites of most schools is rather scarce and is located in different sections, local acts,
schedules, etc., i.e. such information requires a thorough search, attempts to find it do not always end
in success; information on the sites is rarely updated.
2. Scheduling of classes in the native language (availability)
Back in October 2017, The Public Chamber of Crimea has developed a number of amendments
to the draft basic law on state and other languages in the Republic of Crimea. Most of the amendments
then concerned the study of state languages and languages of national minorities in schools. The Public
Chamber recommended the Government of Crimea to create all the necessary conditions for language
learning, in particular, to eliminate the situation when the study of Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian
languages is transferred to the very end of the school day for the seventh or eighth lesson.
During this study, it became known that most of the studied schools conduct classes on the
learning of native languages at least 40 minutes after the end of the main lessons (according to school
staff, this is required by the norms). As a rule, this time is no earlier than 13.00. Some classes that are
engaged in the second shift have the opportunity to learn their native language as part of extracurricular
activities in the morning.
An example of the distribution of clubs for the study of the native language is given in the tables
(see Appendices, Fig. 1).
The schedule of extracurricular activities confirms that some of the subjects for the study of
native languages are taught after the main lessons. For example, the Crimean Tatar language in the 4th
grades of one of the schools studied is taught from 17:15 to 17:50. In another school, as follows from
the school schedules and the words of the school administration, children from the first grade learn their
native language in the 7th lesson. It is obvious that at such a young age, conducting classes by means
of the 7th, 8th, or 9th lesson is a high load and a factor affecting the demand for learning native
languages. Moreover, according to most school leaders, children "already have a huge teaching load",
which complicates the processes of learning their native language.
For example, according to one of the directors: "children in the 9th grade take a mandatory
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exam in the Russian language." The load on children, according to him, is very high, and children have
little time to learn their native language. "Maybe if children did not do anything else, but only learned,
then, of course, there would be a very great demand for learning their native language. And since we
have a school wherewe develop talents, i.e. almost every child is given the opportunity to develop some
of their talents, then in parallel, where there are 100 people, there are only 10 children who want to
learn their native language, and this is 10%. If we take into account both Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar,
then this is 20% of the total number of schoolchildren."
Schools note that children are quite loaded with basic subjects, so they are not always willing
to attend additional classes to learn their native language.
When assessing the demand for the study of the native language, one more factor should be
taken into account that influences its formation – the presence of other clubs/activities that take place
at the same time as additional courses in language learning.
In 2018, the State Duma adopted in the final, third reading the law on the study of native
languages. Before the implementation of the new law, in the regions of Russia, schoolchildren, in
addition to the state Russian language, also studied the subject "Native speech" (the national language
of the region), and all or part of the training took place in the same language. After the adoption of the
new law, students in all types of educational institutions will have the opportunity to choose Russian as
their native language. Parents will only need to submit an appropriate application to a kindergarten or
school1.
"The subject area "Native language and literature" is mandatory for learning. At the same time,
voluntary nature does not consist in refusing to study the native language, but in the possibility of
choosing it (for example, to choose from Russian, Bashkir, Tatar, Chuvash, and other languages of the
peoples of the Russian Federation) (Letter of the First DeputyMinister of Education and Science, 2018).
In Russian Crimea, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages have never been mandatory to learn
for all schoolchildren of the region. The Crimean Tatar language is mandatory for all schoolchildren to
learn in schools with the Crimean Tatar language of instruction. Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar are also
required to be studied in the appropriate classes, at the parents' choice.
Since native languages were previously learned optionally in Crimea, as part of the introduction
of the subject "native language" as compulsory in all schools of the Crimea from
the 2018/2019 academic year, appropriate changes should be made to the curricula. It is not yet clear
what the real implementation of the law will be in educational institutions. The subject "Native
language" provides for the free choice of the language of the peoples of the Russian Federation,
including Russian, so it is possible that most classes will learn Russian as part of this subject.
2.1. The number of hours allocated to the study of native languages
Within the framework of the analysis of curricula and the information provided by the school
administration, it was possible to determine the amount of time allocated to the study of native
languages of secondary schools in Simferopol.
So, in the Simferopol Academic Gymnasium, according to the weekly curriculum for the 2017-
2018 academic year, in elementary school (grades 1-4) in classes with the Russian language of
instruction, 5 hours a week are allocated for learning the Russian language, studying Ukrainian or other
native languages is not provided for in the compulsory educational part (only within the framework of
extracurricular activities).
According to the weekly curricula for the 2017-2018 academic year, in elementary school
(grades 1-4) in classes in Ukrainian, two hours a week are allocated for learning Russian, three hours a
week for learning Ukrainian (i.e. one hour more), and it is studied within the framework of a subject
called "Native language" and "literary reading in the native language" (Ukrainian – 3 hours a week,
Literary reading in Ukrainian 1.5 hours a week).
1 Koroleva E. Language choice: schoolchildren were allowed not to speak Tatar, the State Duma adopted the law
on the native language in schools, 2018. URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2018/07/25/11869531.shtml?updated
] (date of request: 11 November 2018).
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Within the framework of basic general education, in grades 5-6 with the Ukrainian language of
instruction, the ratio of the number of hours allocated to the study of Russian and Ukrainian languages
is levelled and is 3 hours (3 hours/week for Russian and 3 hours/week for Ukrainian), and Russian
literature is studied for one hour more than Ukrainian (in the ratio of 3/2). In grades 8-9 with Ukrainian
as the language of instruction, 2 hours are allocated for learning Russian and 2 hours for learning
Ukrainian. In grades 10-11, there are no classes in Ukrainian.
According to the plan of extracurricular activities for primary school for the 2017-
2018 academic year, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages are studied in the Simferopol Academic
Gymnasium in the amount of 1 hour per week.
At School No. 7, 1-2 hours are allocated for learning the native language (see Appendices,
Fig. 2).
In School No. 42, in classes with Russian as the language of instruction, the Crimean Tatar
language is included in the mandatory teaching load (see Appendices, Fig. 3).
From the curriculum (see Annexes, Fig. 4) it follows that in grades 1-3 with the Russian
language of instruction of the Crimean Tatar language, the Russian language is taught for 4 hours/week,
the Crimean Tatar language — for 3 hours/week. In classes with the Crimean Tatar language of
instruction, the Russian language is taught in the amount of 2 hours/week, Crimean Tatar — 2.5
hours/week.
As part of the basic general education of School No. 42 named after Eshrefa Shemyi–zade, the
number of hours allocated for language learning in classes with Crimean Tatar language of instruction
is illustrated by the following table:
Class Russian language Crimean Tatar language Foreign language
5-6 4 hours/week. 4 hours/week. 3 hours/week.
7 3 hours/week. 3 hours/week. 3 hours/week.
8-9 2 hours/week. 2 hours/week. 2 hours/week.
Table 1. Distribution of hours allocated for the study of native languages at School No. 42 in classes
in the Crimean Tatar language
For classes with the Russian language of instruction of the Crimean Tatar language by all
schoolchildren of the class:
Class Russian language Crimean Tatar language Foreign language
5-6 4 hours/week. 3 hours/week. 3 hours/week.
7 4 hours/week. 1 hour/week. 3 hours/week.
8 3 hours/week. 1 hour/week. 3 hours/week.
9 2 hours/week. 1 hour/week. 3 hours/week.
Table 2. Distribution of hours allocated for the study of native languages at School No. 42 in classes
with Russian as the language of instruction accompanied with the study of the Crimean Tatar
language by all schoolchildren of the class
According to the school's management, due to the absence of academic and methodological
commission and the need to prepare for the Unified State Exam in Russian, there are no
grades 10 and 11 in the Crimean Tatar language, but the school has a so-called "component of the
general education organization" due to which the Crimean Tatar language and literature are studied in
grades 10 and 11 (see Appendices, Fig. 5).
According to the management of School No. 42, the elective courses presented in this
curriculum are mandatory to attend, are evaluated by teachers and are included in the certificate.
The greatest variety of classes with teaching in native languages and the study of native
languages is available in School No. 29.
We are considering variants of curricula with two and three languages of instruction (learning)
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in this school (see Appendices, Fig. 6-10)
Thus, at the expense of the component of the educational institution of School No. 29,
additional hours were allocated for the following subjects:
– Russian language: 10A — 1 hour, 11A — 1 hour due to the need for speech practice and
for preparation for the final essay, state final certification;
– Crimean Tatar language: 10A – 1 hour, 11A – 2 hours;
– Crimean Tatar literature: 10A – 1 hour;
The subjects "Crimean Tatar language" (10-A, 11-A), "Crimean Tatar literature" (10-A) are
learned by a group of schoolchildren of grades 10-A, 11-A (according to applications) and are
subject to mandatory assessment.
From 1st to 7th grade, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages are studied as part of
extracurricular activities, 2-3 hours a week are allocated.
In 2017-2018 academic year, 9 classes are learning the Crimean Tatar language in School
No. 29 as part of extracurricular activities, 11 groups have been formed.
In the 2017-2018 academic year, three classes are learning the Ukrainian language as part of
extracurricular activities, 3 groups have been formed, a total of 32 students are learning (13+10+9).
In one of the 5th grades and in one of the 7th grades, Ukrainian is compulsory to learn, but in
the 6th grade, the whole class learns Ukrainian as part of extracurricular activities.
According to the director of the school, 3 hours are given to learn the native language (2 hours
to learn the language and 1 hour to learn literature). Therefore, as part of the interview, we asked the
question if "the amount of 3 hours per week is sufficient to learn the native language". "Sure, 3 hours
is not enough to learn your native language," notes the school director. "But let the children learn at
least some, at least Russian."
The amount of time allocated to language learning is an essential indicator of the effectiveness
of teaching native languages, especially since language subjects are practically the only methods of
teaching native languages in schools. In classes with Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar language of
instruction, where all subjects must be taught in the language being learned, de facto all educational
activities are held in Russian.
According to one of the school directors, "in classes with Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian as
languages of instruction, all subjects are studied in Russian with elements of learning Crimean Tatar
and Ukrainian in the framework of subjects in languages and literature. As for Crimean Tatar, there are
no teachers who could teach basic subjects in Crimean Tatar and there are no necessary schoolbooks. I
believe that this is not necessary, a child should be ready for university and for further work, and why
does he need knowledge of these subjects in his native language?"
According to the staff of another Crimean school, "there are not enough specialists in the school
who could teach disciplines in the Crimean Tatar language. That is, there are no specialists in
geography, history, and other subjects who could teach these subjects in Crimean Tatar, although we
really need them. There are also no schoolbooks on subjects in Crimean Tatar."
According to the school administration, in primary grades teachers manage to communicate
more in Crimean Tatar with children, but in high school teachers try to introduce the Crimean Tatar
language only as a component, mostly, the learning is held in Russian. In fact, after primary school,
classes taught in Russian and in Crimean Tatar do not differ in the language of instruction.
Thus, classes in a language other than Russian are factually absent, real teaching in all classes
is carried out in Russian, only differ the number of hours for the study of certain languages and the ratio
of the number of studies of Russian and native languages, as well as the presence of subjects in the
native language in the compulsory teaching load in classes with a language of instruction other than
Russian, which clearly illustrates the analysis of school curricula presented above. Therefore, the
effectiveness of teaching (learning) of native languages, we can rather assess not by the presence or
absence of classes in a language other than Russian, but only by the hours allotted for the study of the
native language in these classes, as well as the presence or absence of subjects for the study of native
- 149 -
Electronic scientific journal "Archon"
Issue No. 5 (8). 2018
43
languages in the mandatory teaching load.
The presence of classrooms, the provision of premises for classes in the study of native
languages to some extent reflects the degree of involvement of school administrations in the process of
granting and exercising the right to teach native languages.
For example, in School No. 42, the number of classes is 40. Of which, there are 4 Crimean
Tatar language classrooms, 4 Russian language classrooms, 3 English language classrooms, according
to the school administration, there are not enough classes.
There are no subject classes as such in School No. 3, because this school is large, has 71
classes, and each class is having lessons in its own classroom. There are subject classes in biology,
chemistry, physics, etc., and all the others learn in their classrooms. Nevertheless, in those rooms where
national holidays are held (and the school holds a lot of them—according to the director, for example,
the Festival of the Peoples of the Crimea, the Festival of Folk Cuisine of the Crimea, etc.), national
attributes are present, in addition, there are national corners in all those classes where the native
language is learned.
According to the teachers at another school we studied, "there are no classes for teaching the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian language and literature, where there are free classes, they are learning."
3. The number and qualification of teachers in their native language (a
component of the effectiveness of teaching native languages)
The table below reflects and takes into account the number of teachers in the state and local
languages of the Republic of Crimea (excluding teachers in foreign languages).
1. (school
with
Russian as
language of
instruction)
2. (school
with
Russian as
language of
instruction)
3. (school
with
Russian as
language of
instruction)
4. (school with
Russian and
Crimean Tatar
as languages of
instruction)
5. (school with
Russian, Ukrainian,
and Crimean Tatar
as languages of
instruction)
Russian
language
teachers
12 (9%) 6 (7%) 9 (10%) 9 (13%) 7 (8%)
Crimean
Tatar
language
teachers
1 (0,75%) 1 (1,1%) 1 (1,1%) 5 + 3 (on
maternity leave),
7%/ 11%
6 (7%)
Ukrainian
language
teachers
2 (1,5%) 0 (0%) 4 (4,4%) 0 (0%) 2 (2,2%)
Other
languages
1
(Armenian),
0.75%
2 (1 Greek
and 1
German),
2,3%
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (Greek), 1,1%
The ratio of
the number
of teachers in
the Russian
language /
"native
languages"
9% / 3% 7% / 3,4 % 10% / 5,5% 13% / 7-11% 8%/ 10,3%
Total number
of teachers
133 88 90 70 90 (7 of them are on
maternity leave)
- 150 -
Electronic scientific journal "Archon"
Issue No. 5 (8). 2018
44
Table 3. Number of language teachers in 2017/2018 academic year
From the above table it can be seen that in schools with Russian as the language of instruction,
the number of teachers of the Russian language is 2-3 times higher than the number of teachers of the
Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, and other languages. The number of Russian language teachers in a school
where the lessons are in two languages slightly exceeds the number of teachers of the Crimean Tatar
language. In a school where the lessons are in three languages, the number of teachers of Ukrainian,
Crimean Tatar and other "native" languages exceeds the number of teachers of Russian.
All school teachers are required to take advanced training courses, including in their native
languages.
Advanced training courses lead to the strengthening of professional motivation and training.
After completing the training course, the teacher can improve not only his/her level of knowledge, but
also perform the tasks better and faster (see Appendices, Fig. 11,12).
Article 2 of Federal Law No. 273-FZ dated 29 December 2012 "On Education in the Russian
Federation" provides for the advanced training courses as follows: "Advanced training is the updating
of theoretical and practical knowledge, improving the skills of specialists in connection with the
constantly increasing requirements for their qualifications."
The right of teaching staff to receive additional professional education in the profile of
pedagogical activity at least once every three years shall be established by the Law on Education
(paragraph 2 of Part 5 of Article 47). The frequency of professional development during this period
shall be determined by the employer. According to the regulations on the scheduled certification of
teachers, teacher certification shall be carried out 1 time in 5 years. Accordingly, in 2018, the
examination of knowledge, skills and psychological training will be mandatory for all those teachers
who passed it in 2013.1
Within the framework of this study, we studied the question of whether language teachers take
advanced training courses, and if so, in the Crimea or in other regions. Improving one's knowledge
outside of one region and one educational institution using a variety of sources contributes not only to
expanding one's horizons, but also is an effective means of developing and updating the educational
process and educational programs, and therefore improving the quality of education, including in
matters of teaching (learning) in native languages.
In 4 out of 6 schools, the teachers take advanced training courses once every three years. One
school failed to provide an answer to the question on the frequency of courses by teachers, and in one
of the schools, according to the administration, "teachers take courses every five years, but so far there
has been no such need in the Russian Crimea."
In all the schools studied by us, teachers take advanced training courses at the Crimean
Republican Institute of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education (CRIPPE).
In three of the six schools, in addition to Crimea, some teachers take advanced training courses
in mainland of Russia, in Turkey (teachers of the Crimean Tatar language), remote courses, and also
take various other courses on their own initiative, attend seminars.
It is obvious that the development and improvement of teaching staff in the field of teaching
(learning) of native languages play an important role in the formation of demand for teaching (learning)
of native languages; affects the quality of education and, ultimately, is a component of the effectiveness
of teaching (learning) of native languages.
The professional development of teaching staff today is limited to the Crimean region, mostly
to one educational institution (in Crimea it is CRIPPE), which is rather related to the financial and
economic component of educational institutions. Improving the qualifications of a school employee
outside of their region requires a lot of financial costs. Nevertheless, some teaching staff have already
begun to use modern educational opportunities, including taking remote courses, using electronic
educational programs, attending seminars on the subject of their educational specialty.
After the reunification of Crimea with Russia in 2014, teachers of the Ukrainian language, of
whom there had previously been a significant number (after all, all Crimean schoolchildren were
1 Labor Code of the Russian Federation
- 151 -
Electronic scientific journal "Archon"
Issue No. 5 (8). 2018
45
required to study the Ukrainian language, and in schools and classes with the Ukrainian as the language
of instruction, all subjects were taught in Ukrainian) found themselves in a difficult situation, because
the entire educational system of Crimea switched to Russian standards, the Ukrainian language has
ceased to be compulsory to study and has lost its relevance.
The study revealed that most of the Ukrainian language teachers who worked in Crimea before
2014, after the reunification of Crimea with Russia, "retrained" (retrained, in particular in CRIPPE) for
Russian language teachers. Some of them retrained as teachers of the Crimean Tatar language (for
example, at School No. 42), some of them went on a well-deserved retirement, some left the Crimea,
and some teachers left school.
In one of the schools, according to the administration, "there were never teachers of the
Ukrainian language at all", but only teachers with a basic education" — a teacher of the Russian
language, "who did not have enough hours", and therefore they, having previously completed advanced
training courses, taught Ukrainian language. Therefore, they did not have to undergo retraining.
Conclusion
So, today in Crimea the main documents in the field of regulation of language policy in the
field of education have already been adopted. These are the Law "On Education in the Republic of
Crimea", the Law "On the Functioning of the State Languages of the Republic of Crimea and Other
Languages in the Republic of Crimea"; Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea
"On approval of the State Program for the Development of Education in the Republic of Crimea for
2016-2018", etc. Thus, we can say that in terms of legal and regulatory terms, the language policy in
Crimea has a clear framework.
According to the study, the factors influencing the demand for native language teaching are
awareness and openness. According to the "Roadmap for Choosing the Language of Instruction (study)
in Educational Institutions of the Republic of Crimea" dated 28 December 2017, Section II "Language
Selection Procedure", schools shall as openly as possible provide information on the possibility of
studying in the state languages of the Crimea, as well as opportunities to study native languages within
extracurricular activities provided by educational institutions. The means of notification shall schoolwide
meetings, parent meetings, school stands, websites, personal conversations with parents, etc. As
our study has shown, the degree of openness in providing information on the study of native languages
varies in different schools. Information on the official websites of schools is rather scarce or absent at
all.
All schoolteachers are required to attend advanced training courses at least once every three
years, including in their native languages.
Advanced training courses lead to the strengthening of professional motivation and training.
After completing the training course, the teacher can improve not only his/her level of knowledge, but
also perform the tasks better and faster.
In 4 of the 6 schools we studied, teachers take advanced training courses once every three years.
One school failed to provide an answer to the question on the frequency of courses by teachers, and in
one of the schools, according to the administration, "teachers take courses every five years, but so far
there has been no such need in the Russian Crimea."
It is obvious that the development and improvement of teaching staff in the field of teaching
(learning) of native languages play an important role in the formation of demand for teaching (learning)
of native languages; affects the quality of education and, ultimately, is a component of the effectiveness
of teaching (learning) of native languages.
The professional development of teaching staff today is limited to the Crimean region, mostly
to one educational institution (in Crimea it is CRIPPE), which is rather related to the financial and
economic component of educational institutions, because the initiative to send an employee outside of
their region is associated with increased costs. Nevertheless, some teaching staff have already begun to
use modern educational opportunities, including taking remote courses, using electronic educational
programs, attending seminars on the subject of their educational specialty.
The number of teachers involved in the process of teaching languages andwithin the framework
- 152 -
Electronic scientific journal "Archon"
Issue No. 5 (8). 2018
46
of language learning, as well as the ratio of hours allocated for language learning is an integral part of
the characteristics of the effectiveness of language teaching.
The study showed that in schools where the lessons are held in Russian, the number of teachers
of the Russian language is 2-3 times higher than the number of teachers of the Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian,
and other languages. The number of Russian language teachers in a school where the lessons are in two
languages slightly exceeds the number of teachers of the Crimean Tatar language. In a school where
the lessons are in three languages, the number of teachers of Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar and other
"native" languages exceeds the number of teachers of Russian. Thus, the number of teachers is adequate
in relation to the teaching load.
The amount of time allotted to learning the native language plays an important role in its
effectiveness, especially since in classes in Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar, teaching is actually held in
Russian. In classes held in Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian language, the amount of time allocated to study
the native language varies from 1 to 4 hours per week, depending on the class and school. As part of
extracurricular activities, 1-2 hours a week are allocated for language learning. Certainly, this time is
not enough for full-fledged language learning, however, given the large teaching loads that are imposed
on students today, it is not possible to increase the hours for learning their native language. The
implementation of the new Law on the study of "native tongue" as a compulsory subject in Crimean
schools can increase the amount of time devoted to the study of the native language within the
framework of educational activities. However, it is not yet clear what its real implementation will be in
educational institutions. The subject "Native language" provides for the free choice of the language of
the peoples of the Russian Federation, including Russian, so it is possible that most classes will learn
Russian as part of this subject.
Acknowledgments
1) The study was conducted with the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic
Research, the project "Language Policy in Crimea. Retrospective and Perspective" No. 16-31 01073.
2) The author expresses gratitude for the assistance in conducting the study to the
leadership of the V. I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University, as well as to the Department of
Education of the Simferopol City Administration of the Republic of Crimea.
References:
1. Law “On the Functioning of the State Languages of the Republic of Crimea and Other
Languages in the Republic of Crimea”, 2017
2. The Constitution of the Republic of Crimea (Art.10, Art.19)
3. Koroleva E. (2018). Language choice: schoolchildren were allowed not to speak Tatar,
the State Duma adopted a law on the native language in schools // Electronic resource. Access mode:
https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2018/07/25/11869531.shtml?updated]
4. Letter of the First DeputyMinister of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
3’3’ 26@6D6@F6D4 7@>< *-’)+’+)*. K32&,)/(). G1= B96 ABC5E >7 B96 =4B:D6 ;4=8C486H B> B96 4??64;
of the Head of the Republic of Crimea S.V. Aksenova
5. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea “On Approval of the
State Program for the Development of Education in the Republic of Crimea for 2016-2018”.
Appendices:
- 153 -
- 154 -
Annex 127
Theodore Christakis & Katia Bouslimani, National Security, Surveillance, and
Human Rights, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GLOBAL
SECURITY (Robin Geiss & Nils Melzer eds., Oxford University Press 2021)
Pursuant to the Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex
is comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
Annex 127
Theodore Christakis & Katia Bouslimani, National Security, Surveillance, and
Human Rights, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GLOBAL
SECURITY (Robin Geiss & Nils Melzer eds., Oxford University Press 2021)
Pursuant to the Rules of the Court Article 50(2), this annex
is comprised of such extracts of the whole document as are
necessary for the purpose of the pleading. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 155 -
- 156 -
Oxford Public International Law
Part TIT Security Governance Tools, Ch.38 National
Security, Surveillance, and Human Rights
Theodore Christakts, Katla Bouslirnani
From; The Orford Handbook of the International law of Global Security
Edited By; Rubin GeiS, Nils Melzer
Conten t type: Hook content
Product Oitrd Scholarly Authoridee on Internatkinal Law [MAIL]
Series: Ward Handbooks
Published in print: 16 February 2021
ISBN: 9760 lillitr27276
Sablect(s):
Right to privacy — Democracy
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Subscriber. Covington & Hurling Library; date. 09 February 2022
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Content Book Product: Oxford Authorities International [OSAIL]
Oxford Published in 2021
9780198827276
Part III Security Governance Tools, Ch.38 National
Security, Surveillance, and Human Rights
Theodore Christakis, Katia Bouslimani
From: The Oxford Handbook of the International Law of Global Securit
yEdited By: Robin Geiss, Nils Melzer
Subject(s):
- 157 -
(p. 699) Chapter 38 National Security, Surveillance, and
Human Rights
A. Setting the Scene: A National Security/Surveillance
Psychosis in the Post 9/11 World?
THE Snowden leaks regarding the existence of mass electronic surveillance programmes
operated for 'national security' purposes by the US and other States, revealed the
impressive extent of bulk-data collection in our 'digital' world. According to the leaked
information, governmental agencies such as the US National Security Agency or Britain's
Government Communications Headquarters, allegedly monitored millions of individuals and
a variety of targets in more than 60 countries.Programmes such as 'Prism' or 'Tempora' were, however, just the tip of the 'National
Security Iceberg': in the post-9/11 world, we have witnessed a kind of psychosis concerning
security policies. And the US is not the only democracy running a strong surveillance
programme. Such programmes have also been used in, amongst others, France, Germany,
and Britain, the latter having been described as 'one of the most heavily surveilled
countries in the world'.Governments often brag about how many terrorist attacks they
were able to counter through their surveillance arsenal.
(p. 700) It must be emphasized from the beginning that it is perfectly legitimate and even
essential for any legal regime to allow for security exceptions and considerations. Law,
including human rights law, cannot regulate every single situation in detail. Both the
domestic and international legal orders thus include 'safety valves' which allow States to
evade the application of a rule in a particular case, or to mitigate its effects, in order to
safeguard their own legitimate interests. Consequently, exceptions, reservations,
derogations, restrictions, and other similar mechanisms are both necessary and beneficial:
they encourage States to accept international obligations and thereby to contribute to the
universality of international law, while tempering the excesses of law and allowing the legal
system to 'breathe'. National security is one of the most important legitimate aims used to
protect the State and should be given pre-eminence. The right of any State to protect its
essential security interests, especially in times of crisis, by employing otherwise unavailable
means is a 'bedrock feature of the international legal system'.The possibility to adopt
restrictive measures in case of threats to national security (such as the fight against
terrorism) is thus an essential component of the legal system and one of those 'adjustment
variables' that allow international human rights law (IHRL) to accommodate and ascertain
its social functions.
The abuse of these mechanisms, however, is also a major threat to the legal order, judicial
security, and the rule of law. History has revealed that national security is a concept with
significant potential for abuse. Indeed, domestic rulers and security agencies have often
used 'national security' as a pretext to violate human rights and fundamental freedoms; to
monitor political opponents; to conceal embarrassing or illegal behaviour; to bypass
investigation by independent and democratic bodies; or to suppress political and social
unrest. Extraordinary circumstances, such as those following a terrorist attack, may be
used to obtain massive public support in order to limit the application of legal frameworks
for the protection of human rights and, therefore, to enable governments to use farreaching
measures legally unavailable in normal circumstances. To convince their
population to accept restrictions on human rights, States not only brag about the efficiency
of surveillance measures, but also use the 'nothing to hide' argument. Even if the intentions
of governments within democratic States are honest, the possibility that they may overreact
is ever-present.This can undermine democratic governance and threaten the effectiveness
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Human A. Setting the Scene: A National Security/Surveillance
Psychosis in the Post 9/11 World?
THE Snowden leaks regarding the existence of mass electronic surveillance programmes
‘security’ ‘digital’ Britain’s
Government Communications Headquarters, allegedly monitored millions of individuals and
a variety of targets in more than 60 countries.Programmes such as ‘Prism’ or ‘Tempora’ ‘Iceberg’: concerning
security policies. And the US is not the only democracy running a strong surveillance
programme. Such programmes have also been used in, amongst others, France, Germany,
‘world’.Governments often brag about how many terrorist attacks they
were able to counter through their surveillance arsenal.
(p. 700) It must be emphasized from the beginning that it is perfectly legitimate and even
essential for any legal regime to allow for security exceptions and considerations. Law,
including human rights law, cannot regulate every single situation in detail. Both the
‘valves’ evade the application of a rule in a particular case, or to mitigate its effects, in order to
safeguard their own legitimate interests. Consequently, exceptions, reservations,
derogations, restrictions, and other similar mechanisms are both necessary and beneficial:
they encourage States to accept international obligations and thereby to contribute to the
universality of international law, while tempering the excesses of law and allowing the legal
‘breathe’. protect the State and should be given pre-eminence. The right of any State to protect its
essential security interests, especially in times of crisis, by employing otherwise unavailable
‘system’.3
The possibility to adopt
restrictive measures in case of threats to national security (such as the fight against
‘variables’ that its social functions.
The abuse of these mechanisms, however, is also a major threat to the legal order, judicial
security, and the rule of law. History has revealed that national security is a concept with
significant potential for abuse. Indeed, domestic rulers and security agencies have often
‘security’ monitor political opponents; to conceal embarrassing or illegal behaviour; to bypass
investigation by independent and democratic bodies; or to suppress political and social
unrest. Extraordinary circumstances, such as those following a terrorist attack, may be
used to obtain massive public support in order to limit the application of legal frameworks
for the protection of human rights and, therefore, to enable governments to use farreaching
measures legally unavailable in normal circumstances. To convince their
population to accept restrictions on human rights, States not only brag about the efficiency
‘hide’ the intentions
of governments within democratic States are honest, the possibility that they may overreact
is ever-present.4
This can undermine democratic governance and threaten the effectiveness
1
2
- 158 -
of international human rights treaties. In France, Christian Estrosi, mayor of Nice, claimed
recently that the massive deployment of facial recognition surveillance is an 'unavoidable
means' to fight 'all types of barbarism'.(p. 701) In a democracy, surveillance must be balanced with public liberties, and especially
with privacy. In this context, privacy corresponds to the classical definition proposed by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis: 'the right to be left alone'.Surveillance is an intrusion
on the intimacy of people, which became more and more sophisticated with the
technological evolutions; from protecting people's houses from unwarranted searches,
privacy today has evolved to also regulate the use of CCTV, facial and voice recognition,
collection of personal data, etc. A lot of public liberties other than the right to privacy may
also be affected by surveillance. Recently, in a report on facial recognition, the EU
Fundamental Rights Agency stressed that 'people may feel uncomfortable going to public
places under surveillance', affirming that if surveillance has a wide scope, it can affect
people's 'capacity to live a dignified life'.Widespread surveillance can also violate people's
ability to exercise their democratic rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom to
protest. The recent Chinese surveillance activities during the Hong Kong protests, where
protesters were obligated to counter facial recognition surveillance using masks and other
means in order to be able to exercise their political rights, is a reminder of such issues. The
effect of surveillance on political rights does not happen exclusively in undemocratic States.
Many privacy advocates address the 'chilling effect on [people's] rights to assemble and to
free speech, because people may not want to exercise these rights if it means they will end
up on a watchlist'.8
The Snowden revelations have raised public awareness about the potential abuses in cybersurveillance.
They have shown the limits of the 'trust us to protect you' argument often
used by governments and have sparked a global debate about protection of privacy and the
need for enhanced transparency and oversight of intelligence activities. They have also led
to several policy changes and legal reforms and an improvement on the overall control and
oversight of surveillance in democratic States. For example, the United States introduced
the USA Freedom Act, which provided for more checks and balances in the government's
domestic surveillance activities. From this point of view the impact of the Snowden
revelations cannot be neglected.
On the other hand, the intrusive government surveillance programmes around the world
not only remain largely intact but are also supported by new legal frameworks. Indeed,
governments worldwide have enacted new intelligence and surveillance laws providing
adequate legal cover to cyber-surveillance activities. As The Guardian, which published the
initial Snowden revelations, stated, 'the principal change on the agenda is (p. 702) granting
the intelligence agencies formal licence to continue doing what they were caught doing'.It is of course far beyond the scope of this chapter to examine in detail the content of each
national surveillance law enacted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and its compatibility with
IHRL. We will focus instead here on the situation in Europe and, more precisely, on the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This focus on the ECtHR is justified
by the fact that the Court was the only one at the international level that has had the
opportunity to analyse on numerous occasions relevant domestic laws and to proceed to a
balancing of interests in such detail.
We will start with an overview of the case law of the ECtHR in this field (Section B); we will
continue with a successive presentation of the three main criteria used by the Court to
assess the compatibility of surveillance laws with the European Convention of Human
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Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
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Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
of international human rights treaties. In France, Christian Estrosi, mayor of Nice, claimed
‘means’ ‘barbarism’.(p. 701) In a democracy, surveillance must be balanced with public liberties, and especially
with privacy. In this context, privacy corresponds to the classical definition proposed by
‘alone’.Surveillance is an intrusion
on the intimacy of people, which became more and more sophisticated with the
people’s privacy today has evolved to also regulate the use of CCTV, facial and voice recognition,
collection of personal data, etc. A lot of public liberties other than the right to privacy may
also be affected by surveillance. Recently, in a report on facial recognition, the EU
‘places under surveillance’, people’s ‘life’.7
people’s
ability to exercise their democratic rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom to
protest. The recent Chinese surveillance activities during the Hong Kong protests, where
protesters were obligated to counter facial recognition surveillance using masks and other
means in order to be able to exercise their political rights, is a reminder of such issues. The
effect of surveillance on political rights does not happen exclusively in undemocratic States.
‘people’s] free speech, because people may not want to exercise these rights if it means they will end
watchlist’.The Snowden revelations have raised public awareness about the potential abuses in cybersurveillance.
They ‘you’ used by governments and have sparked a global debate about protection of privacy and the
need for enhanced transparency and oversight of intelligence activities. They have also led
to several policy changes and legal reforms and an improvement on the overall control and
oversight of surveillance in democratic States. For example, the United States introduced
government’s
domestic surveillance activities. From this point of view the impact of the Snowden
revelations cannot be neglected.
On the other hand, the intrusive government surveillance programmes around the world
not only remain largely intact but are also supported by new legal frameworks. Indeed,
governments worldwide have enacted new intelligence and surveillance laws providing
adequate legal cover to cyber-surveillance activities. As which published the
‘(p. 702) granting
doing’.9
It is of course far beyond the scope of this chapter to examine in detail the content of each
national surveillance law enacted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and its compatibility with
IHRL. We will focus instead here on the situation in Europe and, more precisely, on the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This focus on the ECtHR is justified
by the fact that the Court was the only one at the international level that has had the
opportunity to analyse on numerous occasions relevant domestic laws and to proceed to a
balancing of interests in such detail.
We will start with an overview of the case law of the ECtHR in this field (Section B); we will
continue with a successive presentation of the three main criteria used by the Court to
assess the compatibility of surveillance laws with the European Convention of Human
5
6
- 159 -
Rights (ECHR) (Section C); and we will end with some thoughts on the way forward
(Section D).
B. The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic
Surveillance Laws: An Overview
Since its first judgment concerning surveillance laws, in the 1978 Klass v Germany10 case,
the ECtHR has developed a solid case law about secret surveillance. This case law now
seems to be at a crossroads.
The ECtHR's consistent position has been that surveillance measures can be essential in the
fight against terrorism. In the 2016 Szabo and Vissy v Hungary judgment, for instance, the
Court emphasized that 'it is a natural consequence of the forms taken by present-day
terrorism that governments resort to cutting-edge technologies in pre-empting such
attacks, including the massive monitoring of communications susceptible to containing
indications of impending incidents'.On the other hand, it has also constantly emphasized
that 'a system of secret surveillance designed to protect national security entails a risk of
undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it'.The big issue
at stake, at the moment of drafting this chapter, is how far the ECtHR is ready to go in the
direction of controlling bulk surveillance activities and how robust its scrutiny of such laws
could be.
(p. 703) Since 2001, the Court has found that the surveillance laws of several countries
(including Hungary,Russia,14 Romania,15 Bulgaria,Moldova,and did not
meet ECHR requirements. In its important 2016 Szabo the Court went even
further, considering that the margin of appreciation of States in deploying massive
surveillance techniques is limited by a 'strict necessity' test. However, two more recent
judgments, rendered in 2018 in the Centrum for Rattvisa2° and Big Brother cases,
caused some doubt in this regard. In these two cases the Court seemed to abandon the
'strict necessity' test and endorsed the policy of bulk surveillance as a 'valuable means' to
protect national security.
These two decisions have been challenged by the applicants and are now pending before
the ECtHR Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber held hearings in these two cases in July
with the judgments being expected in 2020. These will be particularly important in
understanding the direction of the future case law of the Court on surveillance. At the same
time several other important applications are pending in the ECtHR, including that against
the Austrian Police Powers Act,one challenging the UK Intelligence Services Act,and
fourteen challenging the new French Intelligences Laws passed in July 2015
after the Paris terrorist attacks.(p. 704) Such surveillance laws raise several issues in relation to the rights guaranteed by
the ECHR. Setting aside other rights that might be affected, like freedom of expression or
the right to a fair trial, we will focus here on the right to privacy as guaranteed by Article 8
ECHR.
The ECtHR has adopted a very flexible approach on legal standing allowing a great variety
of persons to challenge the different surveillance laws. The Court has held that an applicant
can claim to be the victim of a violation of the Convention if they fall within the scope of the
legislation permitting secret surveillance measures either because they belong to a group of
persons targeted by the legislation or because the legislation directly affects everyone and
they are potentially at risk of being subjected to such measures.From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington Sr Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: Covington & Burling Library; date: 09 February 2022
Rights (ECHR) (Section C); and we will end with some thoughts on the way forward
(Section D).
B. The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic
Surveillance Laws: An Overview
Since its first judgment concerning surveillance laws, in the 1978 case,
the ECtHR has developed a solid case law about secret surveillance. This case law now
seems to be at a crossroads.
ECtHR’s fight against terrorism. In the 2016 Szabó judgment, for instance, the
‘terrorism that governments resort to cutting-edge technologies in pre-empting such
attacks, including the massive monitoring of communications susceptible to containing
indications of impending incidents’.11
On the other hand, it has also constantly emphasized
‘undermining or even it’.12
The big issue
at stake, at the moment of drafting this chapter, is how far the ECtHR is ready to go in the
direction of controlling bulk surveillance activities and how robust its scrutiny of such laws
could be.
(p. 703) Since 2001, the Court has found that the surveillance laws of several countries
(including Hungary,Russia,Romania,Bulgaria,Moldova,and Turkey18) did not
meet ECHR requirements. In its important 2016 Szabó judgment19 the Court went even
further, considering that the margin of appreciation of States in deploying massive
‘necessity’ judgments, rendered in 2018 in the för Rättvisa20 and Watch21 cases,
caused some doubt in this regard. In these two cases the Court seemed to abandon the
‘necessity’ ‘means’ protect national security.
These two decisions have been challenged by the applicants and are now pending before
the ECtHR Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber held hearings in these two cases in July
2019,22 with the judgments being expected in 2020. These will be particularly important in
understanding the direction of the future case law of the Court on surveillance. At the same
time several other important applications are pending in the ECtHR, including that against
the Austrian Police Powers Act,one challenging the UK Intelligence Services Act,and
fourteen applications25 challenging the new French Intelligences Laws passed in July 2015
after the Paris terrorist attacks.(p. 704) Such surveillance laws raise several issues in relation to the rights guaranteed by
the ECHR. Setting aside other rights that might be affected, like freedom of expression or
the right to a fair trial, we will focus here on the right to privacy as guaranteed by Article 8
ECHR.
The ECtHR has adopted a very flexible approach on legal standing allowing a great variety
of persons to challenge the different surveillance laws. The Court has held that an applicant
can claim to be the victim of a violation of the Convention if they fall within the scope of the
legislation permitting secret surveillance measures either because they belong to a group of
persons targeted by the legislation or because the legislation directly affects everyone and
they are potentially at risk of being subjected to such measures.10
13 16 17 18
19
20 21
22
23 24
25
26
27
- 160 -
Annex 129
Kryminform, Residents of Crimea Who Are Abroad Can Apply for the Retention of
Ukrainian Citizenship to the Consular Services of the Russian Federation - FMS of
the Russian Federation (8 April 2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 129
Kryminform, Residents of Crimea Who Are Abroad Can Apply for the Retention of
Ukrainian Citizenship to the Consular Services of the Russian Federation - FMS of
the Russian Federation (8 April 2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 161 -
- 162 -
3/31/22, 4:44 PM Residents of Crimea who are abroad can apply for the preservation of Ukrainian citizenship to the consular services of the Russia...
KPbIM
fr -KI)opmaLimoHHoe areHTCTBO
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KBAPTHPbI
B AnYWTE
ApriL 8, 2014 02:42 pm Simferopol
Residents of Crimea who are abroad can apply for the retention of Ukrainian
citizenship to the consular services of the Russian Federation - FMS of the
Russian Federation
IIEPErITH ma CArIT
Simferopol, 8 April. Kryminform. Residents of Crimea who are abroad can submit applications about their desire to retain Ukrainian citizenship to
the consular services of the Russian Federation. Fedor Karpovets, head of the department for organizing passport work of the Federal Migration
Service of the Russian Federation, announced this at a press conference at the Kryminform news agency today.
"In order to express their wishes, they must apply to the consular service of the Russian Federation abroad," he explained. "For this, it is not
necessary to come to Crimea."
In response to the remark of journalists that consular offices of the Russian Federation do not accept applications from Crimeans, referring to the
Lack of official explanations and the form for submitting a document, Karpovets promised to inform the leadership of the FMS about this.
"I heard you. If there are such facts, we will respond to them," he assured.
Karpovets added that filing applications by mail with notification is possible, but in this case, the applicant must be aware that he relies on the
postal service. "If a person is sure that this letter will reach us, this option can also be used. But I cannot bear responsibility for the actions of the
mail," the official emphasized.
According to him, the task of the migration service is to provide an opportunity to apply directly at the departments. "On the day of the appeal on
this issue, we will solve this problem, even if we have to work until 12 am," the FMS representative concluded.
E LUX H 0 BO CT
https://www.c-inform.info/news/id/3165 1/1
- 163 -
- 164 -
Annex 130
Center for Investigative Journalism, TRK Chernomorskaya Paid the Debt to the
RTPC Before the Court. "The Arrest and Removal of Equipment Was Blackmail" -
Zhuravleva (6 August 2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 130
Center for Investigative Journalism, TRK Chernomorskaya Paid the Debt to the
RTPC Before the Court. “The Arrest and Removal of Equipment Was Blackmail” -
Zhuravleva (6 August 2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 165 -
- 166 -
4/20/22, 5:49 PM TRK Chernomorskaya paid the debt to the RTPC before the court. "Arrest and removal of equipment was blackmail" - Zhuravleva
(https://investigator.org.ua/ua/)
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removal of equipment was blackmail" - Zhuravleva
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4/20/22, 5:49 PM TRK Chernomorskaya paid the debt to the RTPC before the court. "Arrest and removal of equipment was blackmail" - Zhuravleva …
https://investigator.org.ua/ua/news/134023/ 1/7
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TRK Chernomorskaya paid the debt to the RTPC before the court. "The arrest and
removal of equipment was blackmail" - Zhuravleva
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- 167 -
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4/20/22, 5:49 PM TRK Chernomorskaya paid the debt to the RTPC before the court. "Arrest and removal of equipment was blackmail" - Zhuravleva …
https://investigator.org.ua/ua/news/134023/ 2/7
(http://investigator.org.ua/news/133665/attachment/chtrk2-300x191-3/)TRK "Chernomorskaya"
transferred to the RTPC of Crimea the amount stated in the company's claim as a debt for services
rendered, before consideration in court, although it continues to consider it unfounded. seizure
of all the equipment under the guise arrest, which stopped broadcasting, was a dirty blackmail, but
the equipment can be returned only in this way, said the Acting Center for Journalistic
(http://investigator.org.ua/) Investigations. President the TV and Radio Company Lyudmila
Zhuravleva.
LLC TRK "Chernomorskaya" transferred to the RTPC Crimea the amount of 3,152,351 rubles,
stated in the company's lawsuit as a debt for services rendered in 2013, August 5, on the eve of the
trial.
- 168 -
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- 169 -
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"We still consider the amount of the debt claimed in the lawsuit of the ROCC to be unfounded, but
they were forced to pay it under the pressure of, in fact, blackmail, which was a total arrest to secure
the claim of the TV and radio company's equipment. All studio and hardware equipment, filming and
editing equipment were barbarically taken away, which led to the cessation of broadcasting of the TV
company and radio "Assol". The easiest way to return the equipment is to pay the declared debt and
lift the arrest, but we will continue to sue, defending our rights and interests, "said Lyudmila
Zhu ravleva.
According to her, the declared amount of debt was paid in full, including annual interest and inflation
deductions, although the RTPC "for some reason opposed the early receipt of the debt.
'Our legal adviser asked the RTPC to provide an invoice for payment. But we were not exposed to it,
saying that they would answer within 30 days! And this despite the fact that the RTPC court states
that the amount of debt for the company is significant and affects the activities. That is, we can
assume that this is not the case, and the declared debt is just a reason to close the broadcasting of
"Black Sea". But we have paid the entire amount, including accruals, and we have the right to expect
the case to be closed today, "Lyudmila Zhurnaleva said.
The session of the Economic Court of Crimea on the claim of the RTPC to the ChTRK is scheduled
for August 6, 2.30 pm (Judge N. Ilyichov). According to Zhuravleva, a representative of
"Chernomorskaya" will file a petition to lift the arrest imposed in support of the claim on all
equipment of the broadcaster.
https://investigator.org.ua/ua/news/134023/ 3/7
4/20/22, 5:49 PM TRK Chernomorskaya paid the debt to the RTPC before the court. "Arrest and removal of equipment was blackmail" - Zhuravleva …
https://investigator.org.ua/ua/news/134023/ 3/7
"We still consider the amount of the debt claimed in the lawsuit of the ROCC to be unfounded, but
they were forced to pay it under the pressure of, in fact, blackmail, which was a total arrest to secure
the claim of the TV and radio company's equipment. All studio and hardware equipment, lming and
lift the arrest, but we will continue to sue, defending our rights and interests, "said Lyudmila
Zhuravleva.
According to her, the declared amount of debt was paid in full, including annual interest and in ation
““Our saying that they would answer within 30 days! And this despite the fact that the RTPC court states
that the amount of debt for the company is signi cant and affects the activities. That is, we can
that this is not the case, and the broadcasting of
”The session of the Economic Court of Crimea on the claim of the RTPC to the ChTRK is scheduled
for August 6, 2.30 pm (Judge N. Ilyichov). According to Zhuravleva, a representative of
"Chernomorskaya" will le a petition to lift the arrest the claim on all
- 170 -
4/20/22, 5:49 PM TRK Chernomorskaya paid the debt to the RTPC before the court. "Arrest and removal of equipment was blackmail" - Zhuravleva
A session of the Economic Court is scheduled for August 7 on the claim of TRK Chernomorkaya
against the RTPC with a demand to resume broadcasting of the TV company's programs, which was
illegally terminated on March 3, 2014. The ownership of TRK Frequencies and 13 transmitters, as
well as six leased ones, were illegally provided to the RTPC
(http://investigator.org.ua/news/121156/) to provide services to the Russian TV channel.
We will remind, on August 1 representatives of Federal service of bailiffs arrested all movable and
immovable property of TRK "Chernomorskaya", thereby having stopped broadcasting of the
(http://investigator.org.ua/news/133645/) company.
During the seizure of the seized equipment, which resembled the loading of stones
(http://investigator.org.ua/news/133679/) , all the equipment belonging to the public organization
"Information Press Center" (IA "Center for Journalistic Investigations")
(http://investigator.org.ua/news/133680/) , which rented premises for the editorial office in the
building of the TRC, was taken out of the premises.
The OSCE, represented by the Representative on Freedom of the Media , Dunja Mijatovi6, condemned
the seizure of the (http://investigator.org.ua/news/133892/) property of TRK Chernomorskaya and
the Center for Journalistic Investigations.
"Continued attempts to put pressure on the independent media in Crimea are clear evidence of
censorship, and this is unacceptable... This creates an atmosphere of fear in which free journalism
cannot exist," Mijatovi6 said.
Noting that the property of the Information Press Center (IA Center for Journalistic Investigations)
was confiscated during the seizure of Chernomorka's property, Dunya Mijatovi6 called on "Crimean
authorities to refrain from steps that threaten media freedom and severely limit media pluralism.''
Tags: Crimea (https://investigator.org.ua/ua/tag/%dO%ba%d1%80%d1%8b%dO%bc/), OSCE
(https://investigator.org.ua/ua/tag/%d0%be%d0%b1%d1%81%d0%b5/) , RTPC
(https://investigator.org.ua/ua/tag/%d1%80%d1%82%d0%bf%d1%86/) , TRK Chernomorskaya
(https://investigator.org.ua/ua/tag/%d1%82%d1%80%d0%ba-
%dl%87%d0%b5%d1%80%d0%bd%d0%be%d0%bc%d0%be%d1%80%d1%81%d0%ba%d0%b0%d1%8f/) ,
ChTRK (https://investigator.org.ua/ua/tag/%d1%87%d1%82%d1%80%d0%ba/)
lo%93+%1)o%96%1)4%83%1>1%8001)o%11ocklo%1.2%10%11,11%-Do%115%1)(0073.2%-Do%1So+)
All
https://investigator.org.ua/ua/news/134023/ 4/7
4/20/22, 5:49 PM TRK Chernomorskaya paid the debt to the RTPC before the court. "Arrest and removal of equipment was blackmail" - Zhuravleva …
https://investigator.org.ua/ua/news/134023/ 4/7
of TRK Chernomorkaya
illegally terminated on March 3, 2014. The ownership of well as six leased ones, were illegally provided to the RTPC
(http://investigator.org.ua/news/121156/) to provide services to the Russian TV channel.
We will remind, on August 1 representatives of Federal service of bailiffs arrested all movable and
immovable property of TRK "Chernomorskaya", thereby having stopped broadcasting of the
(http://investigator.org.ua/news/133645/) company
During the seizure of the seized equipment, which resembled the loading of stones
(http://investigator.org.ua/news/133679/) , all the equipment belonging to the public organization
Center" (IA o ce in the
building Mijatovi, seizure of the of TRK unacceptable… fear in which free journalism
cannot exist," Mijatovi said.
con scated Mijatovi called on "Crimean
authorities to refrain from steps that threaten media freedom and severely limit media pluralism." .
Tags: Crimea (https://investigator.org.ua/ua/tag/%d0%ba%d1%80%d1%8b%d0%bc/) , OSCE
(https://investigator.org.ua/ua/tag/%d0%be%d0%b1%d1%81%d0%b5/) , RTPC
(https://investigator.org.ua/ua/tag/%d1%80%d1%82%d0%bf%d1%86/) , TRK Chernomorskaya
(https://investigator.org.ua/ua/tag/%d1%82%d1%80%d0%ba-
%d1%87%d0%b5%d1%80%d0%bd%d0%be%d0%bc%d0%be%d1%80%d1%81%d0%ba%d0%b0%d1%8f/) ,
ChTRK (https://investigator.org.ua/ua/tag/%d1%87%d1%82%d1%80%d0%ba/)
80%D0%D1%83%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B0+)
- 171 -
- 172 -
Annex 131
Vladislav Maltsev, "Crimea Is Ours" for Mufti Ablaeu, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (4
January This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 131
Vladislav Maltsev, “Crimea Is Ours” for Mufti Ablaev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta January 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 173 -
- 174 -
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The authorities of the peninsula maintain the monopoly of one spiritual administration of
Muslims
VIsclislav Maftsev
Reviewer of the application "NG-Religions" (/authors/75t77/)
Tags: Crimea (/searchttags/?tags=pum) , sergey aksenov (/searchttags/?tags=ceprea ascenoa)
, ruslan balbek (/search/tagsntags=pycnaH 6anh6es) , ravil gaynutdin (/search/tagst?
tags=paenra. reauyoluu) , mufti emir' ablaev (/search/tagsr≥tags=mydwaa sompana afonaea) , mufti ruslan satnaliev (/search/tagsr?
tags=rawlyrna pycnaH camasrmee) , spiritual administration of the muslims of (/searchriagstNags=mxoanoe ynpanneame wycymmau puma)
crimes , dumk (/search/tags/?tags=nwas) tauride murtiate (/searclVtagsatags,aspw.eckaR myclyran-r) , Main (/searchitagsr?tags=wcriam) ,
muslims (/searchrtags/?tags=mycyn6maue) , wahhabis 0search/tags/?tags=amombanm) , mosques (/searchitagsr•tags=meveni) , milli
(/searchttags/?tags=mnrusi *mesa) ftrka , vasvi abduraimov (/searchttags/?tags=eaceN abaypaRmoe) , mejlis (/searchitagsr?tags=mmesmic) ,
mustafa (/searchttags/?tags=mycTacba)
"According to the decision of the
head of Crimea, all mosques will
t•'" _ _ be transferred to the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims of
Crimea," Ruslan Balbek, Deputy
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the Republic of
Crimea, said on March 25 at a
yyy meeting with a Turkish delegation
consisting of business
representatives and politicians. As
can be understood from this
the "Crimean spring the
statement, on the anniversary of
decided to leave the only religious
authorities of the peninsula
association of local Muslims in the
According to Ruslan Balbek (right), Sergei Aksyonov (center) hands over all the mosques of
the peninsula to Mufti Emirali Ablaev (left). Photo from the (Adel website of the Government legal field.
of the Republic of Crimea
It should be noted that an Islamic
organization was chosen to build the vertical of spiritual power, a year ago, together with the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar people, it advocated the preservation of Crimea as part of Ukraine and sharply opposed
the politicians now in power in Simferopol. At the rallies held in January-February 2014 in the capital of
Crimea in support of European integration and the unity of Ukraine, the head of the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims of Crimea (DUMK) Emirali Ablaev spoke.
However, a year later, on February 19 of this year, Ablaev stated that "over the past 200 years, there has
not been such a positive attitude towards the muftiate on the part of the authorities as it is now" and that
"the government is doing everything necessary" to ensure that its multate " received title documents for
more than 300 mosques." The mufti's statement was made at a meeting with representatives of the
Mejlis, an organization that is in close alliance with the SAMK not only legally, but also in practice, as
Associate Professor of the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Tauride
Academy of the Crimean Federal University named after M. V.I.Vemadsky, member of the Civic Chamber
of the Republic of Crimea Andrey Nikiforov. According to the Charter of the SAMK of 2001, which was in
force until very recently, the head of it "the mufti in his activities is guided by the decisions of the Kurultai
of the Muslims of Crimea, council of the SAMK, as well as the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people.
According to Nikiforov, in this alliance, "the Mejlis looked like the main partner, supporting and helping the
SAMK in an effort to monopolize the Muslim space on the peninsula, which has always been
heterogeneous." "There were communities that did not recognize the Spiritual Administration of Muslims
of Crimea, a number of them were oriented towards the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine,
some were not oriented towards any muftiats," says Nikiforov. "In relation to these structures, the tactics
of inciting the authorities were used - they were all accused of Wahhabism in a crowd." which has always
been heterogeneous. "There were communities that did not recognize the Spiritual Administration of
Muslims of Crimea, a number of them were oriented towards the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of
Ukraine, some were not oriented towards any muftiats," says Nikiforov. "In relation to these structures, the
tactics of inciting the authorities were used - they were all accused of Wahhabism in a crowd." which has
always been heterogeneous. "There were communities that did not recognize the Spiritual Administration
of Muslims of Crimea, a number of them were oriented towards the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of
Ukraine, some were not oriented towards any muftiats," says Nikiforov. "In relation to these structures, the
tactics of inciting the authorities were used - they were all accused of Wahhabism in a crowd."
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- 175 -
The argument of the fight against radicalism is actively used even now: explaining the decision to transfer
all the mosques of the peninsula to the SAMK, Ruslan Balbek said that this was done to prevent "the
possibility of various radical movements to participate in raider seizures of places of worship."
Earlier, the Spiritual Center of Muslims of Crimea participated in competition with the SAMK. On the basis
of this association, on August 21, 2014, the Tauride Muftiate was created, headed by Ruslan Saitvaliyev.
In an interview with NGR (dated September 3, 2014), Saitvaliyev said that the Tauride Muftiate had
concluded an agreement on cooperation with the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims (TsDUM) of
Russia. Also, according to the website of the Taurida Muftiate, on March 16-18 this year. his delegation
visited Grozny and "had a meeting with the mufti of the Chechen Republic, during which they discussed
the current situation in Crimea and further cooperation."
Initially, the republican authorities were ready to interact with the new muftiate, which positioned itself as
a "pro-Russian" organization - in defiance of the SAMK. "Someone creates a similar organization?
Russian legislation does not prohibit the creation of any organizations of a religious nature," — this is how,
on September 6, 2014, the head of the Republic of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, reacted to the claims
made against the Taurida Muftiate that the new organization was "splitting Muslims" on the peninsula.
"Let's see if they can earn some respect," Aksyonov added. However, a month and a half later, his
position changed. "The only iconic body, respected, authoritative, which all the time serves in terms of the
veneration of Islam in the territory of Crimea, is the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea",
The head of the republic then stated that the authorities "are ready to provide assistance and legislative
support to the Muftiate (DUMK. — NGR) for the process of liberation of the mosque" Khan-Jami in
Evpatoria, the largest on the peninsula, whose community in August 2014 went to the Tauride Muftiate.
The fact that February 17 of this year. The Yevpatoriya City Court ruled in favor of the SAMK, which many
regarded as evidence that Mufti Ablaev "fell in favor" with power. Moreover, as Mufti Saitvaliyev told
NGR, the authorities have never visited the events held by his communities.
February 27 this year Crimean media reported that the SAMK received title documents to operate under
Russian law. "I do not rule out that thanks, among other things, to the unequivocal position of the
Crimean authorities in support of the SAMK," said Vasvi Abduraimov, leader of the Milli Firka party, in a
conversation with an NGR correspondent, pointing out that "the Tauride Muftiate was not registered ".
"The position of the Crimean authorities on the monopoly support of the SAMK is determined not by an
objective assessment of the state of the Islamic community of Crimea," Abduraimov said, "but exclusively,
firstly, by bureaucratic logic (it's easier to interact with one organization. - NGR) and, secondly, by a hint
from the Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia Ravil Gaynutdin. On October 14, 2014, Aksenov
received a delegation of muftis led by Gainutdin.
The "pivot" of the Crimean authorities towards the SAMK may also be connected with their attempts, as
Andrey Nikiforov told NGR, to "reset the Mejlis, find support points in it and identify loyal people." "The
authorities adopted the concept of "reforging" the Mejlis into a pro-Russian organization," Abduraimov
confirms. "That's why they started flirting with the SAMK and its leader, Emirali Ablaev." However,
according to the head of Milli Firka, this idea is initially doomed to failure, because the mufti of the SAMK
is "closely devoted to Mustafa Dzhemilev", who headed the Mejlis in 1991-2013, and who is now in Kyiv
and became Petro Poroshenko's adviser on the affairs of the Crimean Tatars . Earlier, Abduraimov
proposed a different scheme for building a new spiritual administration of Muslims on the peninsula:
"First, register local communities - there were about 400 of them at the beginning of 2014, and then help
them hold a unifying congress, create a unified spiritual administration and elect its head." "Mosques
belong to local Muslim religious communities and they are the ones who have the right to choose with
whom they work and how to develop," Mufti Saitvaliyev told NGR. "Therefore, I consider Balbec's
statement a gross violation and illegal interference of state officials in the activities of religious
organizations." However, the Crimean authorities decided to go the other way, cooperating only with one
of the already existing Islamic structures on the peninsula. "Therefore, I consider Balbec's statement a
gross violation and illegal interference of state officials in the activities of religious organizations."
However, the Crimean authorities decided to go the other way, cooperating only with one of the already
existing Islamic structures on the peninsula. "Therefore, I consider Balbec's statement a gross violation
and illegal interference of state officials in the activities of religious organizations." However, the Crimean
authorities decided to go the other way, cooperating only with one of the already existing Islamic
structures on the peninsula.
No comments were found for the element.
READ ALSO
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OTHER NEWS
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- 176 -
Annex Bezformata, Metropolitan Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea Performed a Litia in
Memory of Those Who Died in the Battles for the Motherland (23 February 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 132
Bezformata, Metropolitan Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea Performed a Litia in
Memory of Those Who Died in the Battles for the Motherland (23 February 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 177 -
- 178 -
To find
The main thing | Archive | Sources | Weather | Coronavirus | Incidents | fires | On the water
Metropolitan Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea
performed a litia in memory of those who died
in the battles for the Motherland
Metropolitan Lazar of
Simferopol and Crimea
performed a litia in
memory of those who
died in the battles for the
Motherland -
http://crimea.orthodoxy.su
Photo: crimea.orthodoxy.su
On February 23, on Defender of the Fatherland Day, Metropolitan
Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea, at the request of the Regional
Public Organization for the Promotion and Prosperity of the
Republic of Crimea " Crimea-New Life " in the Victory Square of
the city of Simferopol, performed a funeral litia for all the soldiers
on the battlefield who laid down their lives, and at the end of the
service addressed the audience with an archpastoral word, in
which he said: “Today we prayerfully honored the memory of
those who gave their lives defending our Fatherland.
For many centuries, the Orthodox clergy blessed the soldiers for
the feat of arms. During the wars, the Church prayed for the
granting of victory and God's help to the Russian army. And the
memory of those who defended our Fatherland at the cost of their
lives will live forever among the people. Prayers will always be
offered for them. After all, these people, at the cost of their lives,
created peace on our earth.
Let us remember that the life of all of us and the peaceful sky
above our heads is a great gift of God. But our people paid a
heavy price for it. But this sacrifice is especially valuable in the
eyes of God. The Lord Himself addresses us with the words that
there is no greater love than if someone laid down his life for his
friends (Jn, 15, 13).
Eternal memory to the heroes! May their souls rest in the villages
of the righteous! And now to the living defenders of our
Fatherland - many and good summers!
God's blessing be with you."
Photo - Alexander Vozny
It became known how public
transport will run in Sevastopol on
Easter night
Crimea-news.com
Weekend itinerary
Crimea-news.com
Metropolitan Lazar of Simferopol and
Crimea read the 12 Gospels of the
Holy Passion of Our Lord Jesus
Christ
On April 21, on the eve of Good Friday,
in the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in
the city of Simferopol, Metropolitan
Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea read the
12 Gospels of the Holy Passion of Our
Lord Jesus Christ.
Simferopol and Crimean diocese
In Sevastopol, traffic will be limited
during the celebration of Holy Easter
Crimea-news.com
Simferopol ▼ Select category ▼
- 179 -
Source: Simferopol and Crimean diocese 23.02.2015 14:34
This material was published on the BezFormata website on January 11, 2019,
below is the date when the material was published on the source website!
Feast of Feasts Miraculous Easter
In "Orlovka" a series of events "Great Day -
Easter" was held, timed to coincide with the
Bright Resurrection of Christ.
Children's Library. V.N. Orlova
Weekend itinerary
Surb-Khach Monastery The most beautiful
ancient Armenian monastery of Surb-Khach is
located in a picturesque forest valley on the
northwestern slope of Mount Saint, about
three kilometers from the city of Stary Krym.
Crimea-news.com
APRIL 24 - BRIGHT CHRISTMAS
SUNDAY
Dear residents of the Black Sea region! Please
accept my warmest congratulations on the
bright holiday of the Resurrection of Christ -
Holy Easter!
Newspaper Chernomorskiye Izvestia
ts Religion
- 180 -
Annex 133
QHA, Crimean Tatar Newspaper Moder Did Not Receive Registration (27 March
2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 133
QHA, Crimean Tatar Newspaper “Avdet” Did Not Receive Registration (27 March
2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 181 -
- 182 -
3/1 ern 797 test
POLMCS
Maxch 27, 2015 03:31 PM
Crimean Tatar newspaper "Avdet" did not receive
registration
AXMESCIT/SCMFEROPOL (QBA) -
The Crimean TOW rewspaix r Avdet did not receive a media reg.:nuke certificate linzo Roskoireada The edi tec-k-chief of the
publication Shevicet gmbuilayev told a QBA comma:dem about this.
Amoral to him. dootamatt were submitted to Roskoireadax ibr re-agitation twice. and twice they were reclined wtbxtt
ccesidsrati
- We filed documents twice, and twice they were renamed to us due to Sect =inch — The fitt time a ttw words were omitted ki ofroore complete i nibrcoatice that what we want In the second oast, the duty was sent to the wraag departmaat Therefixe. they
realm with= ccesidsration. - said Raybaev.
glue e weeks asp. the editors once rgein sent don:cacti tbr re-registration. There has been no rcapaass yet At the en time. Kaybul laev
cotes that "Ix ktect to submit doatcoceta ilx the third and iburth dme at/ he receives a =trete aerwer."
In general. the paper's employees are optimistic. they turd to coed= worldey leoldeg fix caw tbema of tit pipers =Ion
- As fix cur rempaix r. if we ore eat metered, I wW eat aver. I lemair ftamexperietwe that there is always a way out of any &cation
—Perms of weft with the public, end fOrma of triaging your thoughts to sock ty. they alvasys exist and will be. Still, there ia hope that
linzo the beer:Lei:4 of next mot& many ofour newt ive will coed= to wok they will mix mopped immediately. And. apparently.
they wan look at the ruction of the public. I that there is a dux= that we will be able to centre cur acti vi tka. -,aid Snybullec v.
The cc wcapers coansgetocet pl era to acthely work ee the Werra version of publicatke. The materials it the =wiper's webite
will be updated daily.
-The Internet version retoei cc we have reached a tannin I eve]. We are cunt ttly updati eg our site, we wiD tau m it8x sometime. we
will mdse it everyday. If row we publish our coactrial s once a week. tont where ki other groups. on Pacthook we vividly discus ar
articles. them ki this ante we will work daily.- the editor of Arta note&
12
3/16/22, 5:35 PM
1/2
POLITICS
March Crimean Tatar newspaper "Avdet" did not receive
registration
AKMESCIT/SIMFEROPOL QHA) The Crimean Tatar newspaper Avdet did not receive a media registration certificate from Roskomnadzor. The editor-in-chief of the
publication Shevket Kaybullayev told a QHA correspondent about this.
According to him, documents were submitted to Roskomnadzor for re-registration twice, and twice they were returned without
consideration.
- We filed documents twice, and twice they were returned to us due to minor remarks ... The first time a few words were omitted in terms
of more complete information about what we want. In the second case, the state duty was sent to the wrong department. Therefore, they
return without consideration, - said Kaybullaev.
Three weeks ago, the editors once again sent documents for re-registration. There has been no response yet. At the same time, Kaybullaev
notes that “he intends to submit documents for the third and fourth time until he receives a concrete answer.”
In general, the paper's employees are optimistic, they intend to continue working, looking for new forms of the paper's existence.
- As for our newspaper, if we are not registered, I will not despair. I know from experience that there is always a way out of any situation
... Forms of work with the public and forms of bringing your thoughts to society, they always exist and will be. Still, there is hope that
from the beginning of next month, many of our newspapers will continue to work, they will not be stopped immediately. And, apparently,
they will look at the reaction of the public. I hope that there is a chance that we will be able to continue our activities, - said Kaybullaev.
The newspaper's management plans to actively work on the Internet version of the publication. The materials on the newspaper's website
will be updated daily.
- The Internet version remains, we have reached a certain level. We are currently updating our site, we will focus on it for some time, we
will make it everyday. If now we publish our materials once a week, somewhere in other groups, on Facebook we vividly discuss our
articles, then in this case we will work daily, - the editor of Avdet noted.
- 183 -
3/16/22, 5:35 PM
Recall that on September 19 last year, the building of the Mejlis on Schmidt Street, 2, which also housed the office of the BO "Crimea
Fund" and the editorial office of the newspaper "Avdet", was sealed.
As previously reported, a number of Crimean Tatar media cannot be re-registered under Russian law. Roskomnadzor returned documents
for re-registration to the ATR TV channel three times, each time citing formal reasons. Thus, the ATR TV channel, as well as the Lale TV
channel, the Meydan radio and the Leader radio, the 15 minutes portal, which are part of the ATR media holding, are under threat of
closure.
Roskomnadzor refused to register media outlets for the Krymskiye Novosti news agency QHA.
The Crimean Tatar newspaper Yanyy Dunya has not yet received a media registration certificate from Roskomnadzor.
As is known, in November the State Duma of Russia extended the transitional period for the Crimean media until April 1, 2015. Until that
time, they will be able to function on the basis of documents issued by the state bodies of Ukraine.
QHA
2/2
3/16/22, 5:35 PM
2/2
Recall that on September 19 last year, the building of the Mejlis on Schmidt Street, 2, which also housed the office of the BO "Crimea
Fund" and the editorial office of the newspaper "Avdet", was sealed.
As previously reported, a number of Crimean Tatar media cannot be re-registered under Russian law. Roskomnadzor returned documents
for re-registration to the ATR TV channel three times, each time citing formal reasons. Thus, the ATR TV channel, as well as the Lale TV
channel, the Meydan radio and the Leader radio, the 15 minutes portal, which are part of the ATR media holding, are under threat of
closure.
Roskomnadzor refused to register media outlets for the Krymskiye Novosti news agency QHA.
The Crimean Tatar newspaper Yanyy Dunya has not yet received a media registration certificate from Roskomnadzor.
As is known, in November the State Duma of Russia extended the transitional period for the Crimean media until April 1, 2015. Until that
time, they will be able to function on the basis of documents issued by the state bodies of Ukraine.
QHA
- 184 -
Annex 134
Gleb Shemovnev, Only One Crimean Tatar Media Has Passed Registration in
Russia, KP.ua (3 April 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 185 -
- 186 -
3/30/22, 5:19 PM Only one Crimean Tatar media has passed registration in Russia
https://www.printfriendly.com/p/g/zmPHNu 1/3
Gleb SHEMOVNEV
Only one Crimean Tatar media has passed registration in
Russia
kp.ua /life/496946-rehystratsyui-v-rossyy-proshlo-tolko-odno-krymskotatarskoe-smy
home
Society
Gleb SHEMOVNEV
April 3, 2015 04:08 PM 0
Photo: The main Crimean media were banned. Photo: politkuhnya.info
The ATR channel, closed on April 1, was not the only media outlet in Crimea that Russia
refused to issue a license to. A similar fate befell almost all Crimean Tatar media. Of the
main publications and channels, only the newspaper Golos Kryma. New was registered with
Roskomnadzor, which radically changed its previous editorial policy. This was reported by
activists of the recently created human rights group "International Committee for the
Protection of Independent Crimean Tatar Mass Media".
- The rest of the national media were either denied registration (QHA news agency,
information resources of the ATR media holding, as well as the Avdet newspaper), or these
publications have not yet received a final response from the registration authority, the report
says.
In particular, the fate of the newspapers "Yanyy Dunya" and "Kyrym", as well as the
magazines "Armanchik", "Kasevet" and "Yyldyz" is still unknown. Among the local
publications published in the Crimean Tatar language, only the supplement to the "Sudak
- 187 -
3/30/22, 5:19 PM Only one Crimean Tatar media has passed registration in Russia
https://www.printfriendly.com/p/g/zmPHNu 2/3
News" - "Suvdag Sesi" - was registered. At the same time, along with ATR, the Internet
portal 15.minutes.org, the children's channel Lale, the radio stations Meydan and Leader
were left without a license.
- Thus, today we can say that there are actually no national mass media on the territory of
Crimea that provide an opportunity to receive information in the Crimean Tatar language.
Consequently, the Crimean Tatars are deprived of their usual sources of information, human
rights activists sum up.
WHAT'S NEXT?
Earlier, the owner of ATR, Lenur Islyamov, said in an interview with Yod that he was not
going to sell the holding, transfer it to Ukraine, or dissolve the team.
- We have decided to temporarily stop broadcasting until we figure out how we can continue
to work. We will sue, demand that Roskomnadzor issue a license," he said.
The leadership of the QHA news agency also intends to sue.
- We will sue Roskomnadzor, first of all, to express our disagreement. We worked in Crimea
for ten years, and now we are outlaws, - says editor-in-chief Gayana Yuksel.
And the editor-in-chief of "Avdet" Shevket Kaybullayev stressed that he would continue to
publish the newspaper without registration.
- Let's work for a while. We cannot be turned off as a TV channel. What can they do to me?
Well, the equipment will be taken away, searches will be carried out. They can arrest me,
don't worry. No worse than living in Crimea now,” the editor said.
At the same time, the majority of media outlets that were denied registration note that the
licenses were not issued for formal reasons. Either they put a comma in the wrong place, or
they allegedly made a mistake when filling in the data. Moreover, in such cases, documents
are usually sent for revision, but Roskomnadzor did not do this.
As for the "Voice of Crimea" - even its future is vague. From a socio-political newspaper, it
has been reclassified as a culturological-historical one, which will invariably affect the
number of subscribers. Despite the fact that there are so few of them - about 6 thousand. So
far, the proceeds are only enough for production costs and an almost symbolic salary for
employees.
- I'm not sure that the newspaper will be able to exist for a long time in such austerity mode, -
editor-in-chief Eldar Seitbekirov sighs.
READ ALSO:
- 188 -
3/30/22, 5:19 PM Only one Crimean Tatar media has passed registration in Russia
https://www.printfriendly.com/p/g/zmPHNu 3/3
In the United States, they demanded to resume broadcasting of media closed in Crimea
The United States condemned the decision of the Crimean authorities to close the Crimean
Tatar TV channel ATR . This is stated in a statement by the US State Department. The
document states that ATR was the last independent television station that served the
Crimean Tatar population of the peninsula.
Related news: News of the Crimea Media News of Russia
Related Articles
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supported us
- 189 -
- 190 -
Annex 135
Vadim Nikiforov, Crimean Tatars Will Mourn Without Mejlis, Kommersant.ru (12
May 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 135
Vadim Nikiforov, Crimean Tatars Will Mourn Without Mejlis, Kommersant.ru (12
May 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 191 -
- 192 -
3/16t22, 5:40 PM Crimean Tatars will mourn without Me& - Po'Mos - Kommersant
The situation in Crimea (httos://kommersant,ru/theme/2018)
05/12/2015, 00:12
Crimean Tatars will mourn without Mejlis
Organizations banned holding a mourning rally
The Simferopol city administration refused the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people
to hold a rally on the anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars on May
18. Officials motivated the refusal by the fact that another organization had filed
a notice earlier. The Mejlis believes that the authorities, with the help of the Krym
movement under their control, occupied all the sites in Simferopol in order to
prevent the Mejlis from holding the rally. The Krym movement assures that no
events for May 18 have yet been agreed upon.
4
Photo: Viktor Korotaev, Kommersant / buy photo (https://photo.kommersant.ru/photo/buyphotol
number=KM0 147560 00082 1)
A notice of a mourning meeting for 5,000 people on the square near the house of
culture of trade unions was filed in early May on behalf of the first deputy head of
the Mejlis, Nariman Jelyalov. On May 8, the organizers received a response that all
sites in the city were occupied, and a Crimean Tatar organization that had applied
earlier would hold a rally at this site. According to Nariman Dzhelyalov, on May 18,
https://www.lcommersantru/doc/27244 88 112
3/16/22, 5:40 PM Crimean Tatars will mourn without Mejlis - Politics - Kommersant
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2724488 1/2
The situation in Crimea (https://kommersant.ru/theme/2018)
05/12/2015, 00:12
Crimean Tatars will mourn without Mejlis
Organizations banned holding a mourning rally
The Simferopol city administration refused the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people
to hold a rally on the anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars on May
18. O cials motivated the refusal by the fact that another organization had led
a notice earlier. The Mejlis believes that the authorities, with the help of the Krym
movement under their control, occupied all the sites in Simferopol in order to
prevent the Mejlis from holding the rally. The Krym movement assures that no
events for May 18 have yet been agreed upon.
A notice of a mourning meeting for 5,000 people on the square near the house of
culture of trade unions was led in early May on behalf of the rst deputy head of
the Mejlis, Nariman Jelyalov. On May 8, the organizers received a response that all
sites in the city were occupied, and a Crimean Tatar organization that had applied
earlier would hold a rally at this site. According to Nariman Dzhelyalov, on May 18,
Photo: Viktor Korotaev, Kommersant / buy photo (https://photo.kommersant.ru/photo/buyphoto?
number=KMO_147560_00082_1)
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3/16/22, 5:40 PM Crimean Tatars will mourn without Mejlis - Politics - Kommersant
all four sites for holding mass actions in Simferopol were occupied by the progovernment
movement "Crimea". Members of the Mejlis will not participate in
their rally. "We have tried many times to find points of contact with the
authorities, but this has not been possible. We do not separate the Crimean
movement from the authorities, because among its leaders there are many acting
high-ranking officials!' Mr. Dzhelyalov explained to Kommersant. According to
him,
Which organizations planned actions for May 18, the city administration did not
say to Kommersant. One of the leaders of the Crimean movement, Vice Speaker of
the Crimean State Council Remzi Ilyasov, told Kommersant that this organization
has not yet decided on an action plan: "We have not yet met and have not
considered this issue" Recall that last year the Crimean Tatars were also not
allowed to hold a rally in the center of Simferopol on May 18. The head of the
Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, banned mass events until the beginning of June "in
order to eliminate possible provocations by extremists," as well as "in order to
avoid disrupting the holiday season." The Crimean Tatars were only allowed to
hold small actions near the monuments to the victims of deportation and an all-
Crimean rally-prayer on one of the outskirts of Simferopol.
Deputy Chairman of the Civic Chamber of Crimea Oleksandr Formanchuk told
Kommersant that the Mejlis has always used the May 18 rally as a "tool of political
struggle", "now it will be a day of remembrance for those who died in the
deportation, and not an event that is used for PR:' Political scientist Andrey
Nikiforov does not consider it "mandatory" that the funeral rally be held by the
Mejlis: "Let it be a different organization, but such a mass action on the
anniversary of the deportation must be ensured. This is important for the
Crimean Tatars!'
Vadim Nikiforov, Simferopol
Just All Tape
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2724488 2/2
3/16/22, 5:40 PM Crimean Tatars will mourn without Mejlis - Politics - Kommersant
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2724488 2/2
all four sites for holding mass actions in Simferopol were occupied by the progovernment
movement "Crimea". Members of the Mejlis will not participate in
their rally. “We have tried many times to nd points of contact with the
authorities, but this has not been possible. We do not separate the Crimean
movement from the authorities, because among its leaders there are many acting
high-ranking o cials,” Mr. Dzhelyalov explained to Kommersant. According to
him,
Which organizations planned actions for May 18, the city administration did not
say to Kommersant. One of the leaders of the Crimean movement, Vice Speaker of
the Crimean State Council Remzi Ilyasov, told Kommersant that this organization
has not yet decided on an action plan: “We have not yet met and have not
considered this issue.” Recall that last year the Crimean Tatars were also not
allowed to hold a rally in the center of Simferopol on May 18. The head of the
Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, banned mass events until the beginning of June "in
order to eliminate possible provocations by extremists," as well as "in order to
avoid disrupting the holiday season." The Crimean Tatars were only allowed to
hold small actions near the monuments to the victims of deportation and an all-
Crimean rally-prayer on one of the outskirts of Simferopol.
Deputy Chairman of the Civic Chamber of Crimea Oleksandr Formanchuk told
Kommersant that the Mejlis has always used the May 18 rally as a “tool of political
struggle”, “now it will be a day of remembrance for those who died in the
deportation, and not an event that is used for PR.” Political scientist Andrey
Nikiforov does not consider it “mandatory” that the funeral rally be held by the
Mejlis: “Let it be a di erent organization, but such a mass action on the
anniversary of the deportation must be ensured. This is important for the
Crimean Tatars.”
Just All Tape
- 194 -
Annex 136
Vadim Nikiforov, Crimean Tatar Mourning Is Not Allowed on the Streets,
Kommersant.ru (18 May 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 136
Vadim Nikiforov, Crimean Tatar Mourning Is Not Allowed on the Streets,
Kommersant.ru (18 May 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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3/29/22, 1:02 PM KpbinackciraTapasei Tpayp He nyckaicir Ha yruntbi — raseTa KommepcaHT-b N2 84 (5594) OT 18.05.2015
The situation in Crimea (https://kommersantsu/theme/2018)
05/18/2015, 00:00
Crimean Tatar mourning is not allowed on the streets
On the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Deportation, Mass Actions Banned in
Simferopol
On May 18, there will be no traditional funeral procession and rally in Simferopol. The head of the
Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, said that he was asked by the "Crimean Tatar community" to refuse to
hold mass actions on the 71st anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in order not to
politicize the day of mourning. Representatives of the Crimean Tatar public organizations believe
that the cancellation of the rally causes a negative attitude towards the authorities among the
Crimean Tatars.
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Photo: Viktor Korotaev, Kommersant / buy photo (https://photo.kommersant.ru/photo/buyphoto?number=KMO 148300 00044 1)
According to Sergei Aksyonov, the "Crimean Tatar community" asked not to hold mass actions on
May 18 (the procession and rally have been held for 23 years). As Kommersant was told in the
Council of Ministers, the Krym movement, headed by Vice Speaker of the State Council of the
Republic Remzi Ilyasov, and a number of other public organizations addressed the head of the
republic with such a request. The idea not to hold mass actions on the day of mourning was
supported by Mufti of Crimean Muslims Emirali Ablaev. He asked "not to politicize this day, as
before, by rallies and standing in the squares" and called on the Crimean Tatars to come to the
mosques, where mourning prayers will be held.
The decree on holding events on the 71st anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars
Sergey Aksenov signed on May 13. On Monday, state flags will be flown at half mast on
administrative buildings in Simferopol. In the Bakhchisaray district, at the Siren railway station,
from where many people were deported, the authorities will lay a capsule at the site of the future
memorial complex. The mourning events will end with a requiem evening at the State Academic
Musical Theatre. "On May 18, resolutions were adopted aimed at adopting a law on restoring the
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3/29/22, 1:02 PM KpbinackciraTapciadoi Tpayp He nyckaior Ha wimp — raseTa KommepcaHT-b N2 84 (5594) OT 18.05.2015
rights of the deportees on a national basis. Such a presidential decree was adopted in April last
year. This means that the rehabilitation of the people has taken place;' Remzi Ilyasov told
Kommersant.
A meeting of five thousand people near the center of Simferopol was going to be held by the
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people. But the city authorities refused him, citing the fact that all four
sites for mass actions were already occupied. And 14 members of the Mejlis who submitted an
application received a warning from the Crimean prosecutor's office about the inadmissibility of
holding unauthorized mass actions on May 18.
Ali Khamzin, a member of the Presidium of the Mejlis, told Kommersant that the rally should have
been held in any case, since it was a tribute to the memory of the victims of deportation, and the
decree on the rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars was "declarative 'The local authorities are
afraid that we will come and tell about our problems. They do not want this, because on paper
they have already solved all the problems of the Crimean Tatars:' he said. "We are used to
gathering on May 18 to honor the memory of the dead, to meet with the living. I don't understand
who we could interfere with;' says Seitumer Nimetullayev, head of the Crimean Unity public
organization. Elzara Islyamova, general director of the ATP TV channel, believes that the tradition
of holding a commemoration rally on May 18 has never "beared any danger." According to the
leader of the public organization "Milli Firka"
Recall that last year the Crimean Tatars were also not allowed to hold a rally in the center of
Simferopol on May 18. The head of Crimea banned mass events until early June "in order to
eliminate possible provocations by extremists" and "to avoid disrupting the holiday season:'
Crimean Tatars were allowed to hold small actions near the monuments to the victims of
deportation and an all-Crimean rally-prayer on the outskirts of Simferopol. Andrey Nikiforov,
director of the Institute of the CIS countries in Crimea, believes that the Crimean authorities are
acting haphazardly, and by canceling the traditional mourning meeting, they have turned away
from themselves and public figures who take a pro-Russian position and are opponents of the
Mejlis. The expert explains the ban by the "uncertainty" of the Crimean authorities about whether
people who are "appointed as leaders" of the Crimean Tatar movement will be able to organize a
rally and prevent it from becoming anti-government or anti-Russian. "Responsibility has been
shifted to the federal authorities: law enforcement agencies must control that there are no
unauthorized actions;' the expert says.
Vadim Nikiforov, Simferopol
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2728664 2/3
- 198 -
Annex 137
Radio Svoboda, Chubarou: The New Crimean Tatar Channel in Crimea Will Be a
Tool of the Occupiers (9 June 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 137
Radio Svoboda, Chubarov: The New Crimean Tatar Channel in Crimea Will Be a
Tool of the Occupiers (9 June 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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9/24/21, 5:08 PM Chubarov: the new Crimean Tatar channel in Crimea will be a tool of the occupiers
9
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NEWS POLICY
Chubarov: the new Crimean Tatar channel in Crimea will be a
tool of the occupiers
09 June 2015, 23:02
IP'
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(© Shutterstock)
The leader of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, Refat Chubarov, says that the new
Crimean Tatar television and radio company created by the Russian authorities in the
occupied Crimea will be another tool for propaganda of the occupiers of the peninsula.
"They are creating nothing more than a company completely controlled by the illegal
authorities of the annexed Crimea," Chubarov said in a telephone interview with Radio
Svoboda.
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NEWS POLICY
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9/24/21, 5:08 PM Chubarov: the new Crimean Tatar channel in Crimea will be a tool of the occupiers
"They promise to create a new, as they say," public "television and radio corporation. But it
will be fully overseen by their Committee on Nationalities. So what can you expect from a
state-controlled company? " Said Chubarov.
Earlier on Tuesday, June 9, the Russian "Council of Ministers" of the occupied Crimea created
an autonomous non-profit organization "Public Crimean Tatar Television and Radio
Company" (OCT), the project of Radio Liberty "Crimea.Realities" reported.
The founder of the TV channel is the State Committee for Interethnic Relations and Deported
Citizens of the Occupation "Government" of Crimea.
On April 1, 2015, the first Crimean Tatar TV channel, ATR, was forced to stop broadcasting
due to the fact that by the end of March it had failed to register as a media outlet under
Russian law for several attempts. Immediately after the termination of ATR's broadcasting,
the occupying authorities of Crimea took the initiative to create their own "public Crimean
Tatar television."
© Radio Liberty, 2021 I All rights reserved.
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Annex 138
Viktor Vorobyov, Monopoly on the Holidays: The "Authorities" of the Crimea
Coveted the Flag of the Crimean Tatars, Krym.Realii (25 June 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 138
Viktor Vorobyov, Monopoly on the Holidays: The “Authorities” of the Crimea
Coveted the Flag of the Crimean Tatars, Krym.Realii (25 June 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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3/29/22, 2:50 PM Monopoly on the holidays: the "authorities" of the Crimea coveted the flag of the Crimean Tatars
Kpbuti.Peanmm
POLITICS
Monopoly on the holidays: the "authorities" of
the Crimea coveted the flag of the Crimean
Tatars
June 25, 2015, 23:32
Viktor Vorobyov
Simferopol - Traditional events on the occasion of the day of the Crimean Tatar flag this
year will be held at the initiative of organizations dose to the Crimean authorities. The
administration of Simferopol refused to the previous organizers who applied for holding
the holiday. In the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, such actions are considered
unacceptable, but at the same time they support the organization of events related to the
celebration of the flag day.
The idea of celebrating the day of the Crimean Tatar flag (a blue cloth with a tamga in
the left corner) arose in 2009. According to Krym.Realii , one of the initiators, at that
time a member of the Crimean Tatar youth organization "Yashlar Shurasy", and now the
executive secretary of the Crimean Muftiate and deputy head of the Mejlis Ayder
Adzhimambetov , during a conversation with a colleague Alim Emirsaliev, they came to
the conclusion that the Crimean Tatars no holidays.
a We thought about an event that would unite our people and
become a real holiday
Aider Adzhimambetov
"We thought about an event that would unite our people and become a real holiday. Then
the idea came to push off from national symbols. Almost all peoples have Flag Day, but
we don't, but no one bothers us to celebrate it," Adzhimambetov shared.
According to him, then young people began to collect various information about the
origin of the flag in order to determine the most suitable date for the celebration. "After
long discussions, we came to two dates: in December - in honor of the holding of the first
Kurultai in 1917 (the national congress of the Crimean Tatar people, - author ) and in
June - in honor of the second Kurultai in 1991 (after the mass return of the Crimean
Tatars to historical homeland, - ed . )," said Adzhimambetov.
The first working day of the second Kurultay, according to the deputy head of the Mejlis,
fell on June 26. "At that Kurultai, a resolution was adopted to recognize the Crimean
Tatar flag as national. Therefore, we determined June 26 as the day of the flag,"
explained the executive secretary of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea.
Ai Ai
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3/29/22, 2:50 PM Monopoly on the holidays: the "authorities" of the Crimea coveted the flag of the Crimean Tatars
III For the first time, the day of the Crimean Tatar flag was celebrated
in Simferopol on June 26, 2010
For the first time, the day of the Crimean Tatar flag was celebrated in Simferopol on June
26, 2010. "That day, a stage was set up on Lenin Square for a festive concert and a huge
Crimean Tatar flag with a total area of 288 square meters (24 meters long, 12 meters
wide, - author ) was unfurled, which was sewn to order in Turkey," recalls Ajimambetov.
According to him, it was difficult and expensive to order such a canvas in the Crimea at
that time. It was also planned that a large flag would be included in the Book of Records
of Ukraine, whose representatives were invited to the event, but, as the source notes,
they considered that "there is politics here and abandoned this idea."
"Subsequently, the Mejlis decided to celebrate the flag day, and the Kurultai approved
this date. Thus, Flag Day has become a national holiday," Adzhimambetov added.
Flag of record size
On Friday, June 26, Simferopol will celebrate the day of the Crimean Tatar flag for the
sixth time. This time, the events were initiated by pro-government public organizations,
including the Kyrym public movement, led by Vice Speaker of the Crimean State Council
Remzi Ilyasov
At the same time, the authorities of Simferopol refused the former organizers of the
festive events three times .
In this regard, the organizing committee issued a statement saying that it will not hold
any mass events on June 26, 2015. However, the competitions traditionally organized as
part of the celebration of the Flag Day will take place. At the same time, they did not
specify where they will go.
ifir A rally is planned with the participation of about 100 cars, as well
as the launch of the Crimean Tatar flag of record size into the sky
At the same time, the organizing committee suggested that compatriots "in order to
unite the people and raise the spirit of patriotism on the eve of June 26 and after this
date, to popularize the Crimean Tatar national symbols as much as possible by hanging
Crimean Tatar flags in residential buildings, decorating cars with them, using elements
of national symbols in clothes."
The organizing committee, which includes representatives of the authorities, intends,
on the contrary, to hold festive events in the park. Gagarin in Simferopol. In addition, a
rally with the participation of about 100 cars is planned, as well as the launch of the
Crimean Tatar flag of record size into the sky. According to representatives of the
organizing committee, the rally and the size of the flag will be recorded by the experts of
the Book of Records of Simferopol.
Celal: They obstruct others
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3/29/22, 2:50 PM Monopoly on the holidays: the "authorities" of the Crimea coveted the flag of the Crimean Tatars
The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people is outraged that certain organizations in Crimea
are trying to "monopolize the celebration of the flag day, while interfering with others."
"Over the past six months, when the Mejlis intended to hold a number of events, starting
from the day of memory of Noman Chelebidzhikhan (Crimean Tatar politician, one of
the organizers of the first Kurultay, - ed. ), May 18, Flag Day, our position remained
unchanged: we believe that all Crimean Tatars have the right and should honor the
memory of outstanding people and, on the contrary, celebrate positive days like the day
of the flag. And they never expressed the idea that someone should conduct, and
someone should not, "notes Nariman Dzhelal, First Deputy Head of the Mejlis , in a
commentary for Crimea.Realities
But, according to Dzhelal, in the representative body of the Crimean Tatars they
consider it unacceptable when "certain public forces, having administrative resources
today, obstruct others in holding certain events."
"When the organizing committee for holding events met, I immediately told them: do
not try to come up with the idea that only you are monopolists. The more people
celebrate Flag Day at different venues, in different cities, the better. But everything
turned out differently. The guys who from year to year traditionally held this day of the
event were refused. As it was on May 17, when the Crimean Tatar Youth Center, which
invented the "Light a Light in Your Heart" action and always carried it out, was refused,
giving the opportunity to hold another youth organization. Now the same thing
happened. They interfere, and then they say: now you join us. I can't call it anything
other than fraud or political fraud. I am very pleased that a significant part of our youth
does not want to participate in these fraudulent cases," said the 1st Deputy Head of the
Mejlis.
Ift Events on the occasion of the celebration of the day of the Crimean
Tatar flag will be held in many cities of Ukraine
In turn, Adzhimambetov believes that "the politicization of the holiday is pointless." "If
the authorities want to carry it out, let them carry it out, if the public organizers want it,
let them carry it out. The more such events not only in Simferopol, the better. This is a
national holiday," said the executive secretary of the Muftiyat.
Adzhimambetov himself has been raising the Crimean Tatar flag over his house in the
Saki region for five years now. "This is how I celebrate a holiday date for the entire
Crimean Tatar people. This year will be no exception," he says.
It should be noted that events on the occasion of the celebration of the day of the
Crimean Tatar flag will be held in many cities of Ukraine. In particular, a rally and a fair
will be held in Kyiv on June 26, and a rally will be held in Kherson, during which a huge
Crimean Tatar flag will be unfurled, specially sewn on the mainland of Ukraine for this
event.
Copyright Crimea.Realities, 2022 I All rights reserved.
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Annex 139
Facebook Post by Refat Chubarov (23 Sept. 2015) (Official Statement of the
Headquarters of the “Public Blockade of Crimea”)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 209 -
- 210 -
27<4:!3;54986
· Kyiv, Ukraine ·
OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE ACTION HEADQUARTERS "Public
Blockade of Crimea"
CRIMEA IS UKRAINE!
THERE IS NO UKRAINE WITHOUT CRIMEA!
Dear fellow countrymen!
On September 20 at 12.00 we - citizens of Ukraine - started the
action of the civil blockade of Crimea.
The form of the action is a ban on freight transport of goods from
mainland Ukraine to the temporarily occupied Russian Federation
of Crimea.
The main purpose of the action is deokupacíâ of Crimea,
restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Realizing that the de-occupation of Crimea will take place only as a
result of further coordinated actions of Ukraine and international
cooperation, aimed at Russia's aggression towards Ukraine and
other free peoples of the world, feeling their public responsibility t
for the future of the independent Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian
nation, the Crimean Tatar people - the indigenous people of Crimea
and all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of ethnic origin, language and
religion, we are the participants of the action Civil Blockade of
Crimea - direct our actions for:
- effective protection of the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian
citizens living in the territory of temporarily occupied Crimea;
- immediate end of repression and discrimination carried out by
the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea in relation to the
citizens of Ukraine - residents of Crimea, activists of the Crimean
Tatar national movement, members of the Majlis of the Crimean
Tatatar people and local authorities of the Crimean Tatars national
self-government;
- immediate release of political prisoners Akhtem Chiygoz, Ali
Asanov, Rustem Vaitov, Mustafa Degermenzhi, Ruslan Zeytullaev,
Alexander Kolchenko, Nuri Primova, Ferata Saifullaev, Nadezhda
Savchenko, Oleg Sentsov;
- lifting the ban on entry to Crimea leader of the Crimean Tatar
people Mustafa Dzemilev, the head of the Majlis of the Crimean
Tatar people Refat Chubarov, activists of the public movement
Ismet Yukselj and Sinaveru Kadyrovu;
- closure of falsified criminal cases against residents of Crimea -
activists of the public movement;
September 23, 2015
%
- 211 -
- ensuring conditions for a permanent presence in the territory of
temporarily occupied Crimea of international missions, including
UN missions.
We urge the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine to repeal the Law of Ukraine "on the creation
of a free economic zone " Crimea " and on the features of
economic activity in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine "
as such that does not vi corresponds to the goals and objectives of
the de-occupation of Crimea and the restoration of the territorial
integrity of Ukraine.
In the face of an actual war unleashed by the Russian Federation
against Ukraine and in order to protect the rights of Ukrainian
citizens living in the territory of temporarily occupied Crimea, we
suggest the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to open in brief terms
of the territory x districts of Kherson region directly adjacent to the
Crimea, special logistics and shopping centers.
At the same time, we appeal to the Ukrainian society, including the
volunteer movement, to join the Crimea Civil Blockade action and
provide comprehensive assistance to its participants.
For all proposals for taking part in the Public Blockade of Crimea
and providing assistance to its participants, please contact directly
to the headquarters of the action located at the Chongar
checkpoint or by phone 096 34 777 77
Financial support stock Public blockade of Crimea - account of
recipient 29244825509100 in PrivatBank: MFO 305299, code OKPO
Bank 14360570, to refill the card 5168757298457922 LUMANOV
LENUR ISMAILOVYCH.
Crimea is Ukraine!
There is no Ukraine without Crimea!
Approved at the meeting of the headquarters of the action Public
Blockade of Crimea
September 21, 2015, chongar checkpoint
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- 212 -
Annex 140
Ukrainska Pravda, Chubarou: Mejlis Did Not Make a Decision on Blockade of
Crimea (19 February 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 140
Ukrainska Pravda, Chubarov: Mejlis Did Not Make a Decision on Blockade of
Crimea (19 February 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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- 214 -
Ukrainska Pravda
Chubarov: Mejlis did not make a decision on blockade of Crimea
FRIDAY, 19 FEBRUARY 2016, 13:01
The head of the Mejlis Refat Chubarov calls the accusations of the prosecutor's office of the
occupied Crimea in the organization of the blockade of Crimea by the Mejlis nonsense.
He said this in a comment to the Ukrainian service of Deutsche Welle .
"It was an initiative of several people, including the head of the Mejlis, but this has nothing to do
with the Mejlis itself," Chubarov said.
Chairman of the pro-Russian organization "National Cultural Autonomy of the Crimean Tatars
in the Sudak City District" Umerov does not agree with this. In his opinion, at all actions
Chubarov associated himself with the Mejlis.
"That's why we decided that it would be good to ban this organization and deprive Chubarov and
Dzhemilev of the tool they use to incite ethnic hatred on the peninsula."
As you know, five Crimean Tatar organizations wrote a letter to the prosecutor's office of the
Crimea annexed by Russia demanding to ban the activities of the Mejlis in early February, at
least three of which were created after the occupation of Crimea. There is almost no information
about the two organizations at all.
Representatives of the Mejlis are convinced that the prosecutor's office of the annexed Crimea
encroached on this structure, because they see it as a mouthpiece for those who disagree with the
actions of the occupying authorities.
According to them, since the first days of the annexation, Moscow has been fighting this
authoritative representative body of the Crimean Tatars, which does not officially recognize the
results of the referendum and thus hinders the Kremlin.
According to Chubarov, to ban the Mejlis is the same as to ban the entire Crimean Tatar people,
since the Mejlis is the executive body of the Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar people and has been
operating since 1991.
Neither Chubarov, who is on the Ukrainian mainland, nor his deputy Dzhelalova, who lives in
Crimea, believe that Russia will achieve anything by banning the Mejlis.
They recalled that this body has no registration, and its decisions are not legally binding.
"This ban will not prevent members of the Mejlis from continuing to engage in public activities,
but simply not to be called the Mejlis. Therefore, I believe that the authorities are fighting
windmills," said Dzhelyalov.
- 215 -
According to experts, the decision to ban the Mejlis will hurt Moscow more internationally. The
representative body itself will at least be able to move its office to the mainland of Ukraine and
continue its activities there.
- 216 -
Annex 141
Radio Svoboda, Lesya Ukrainka Museum in Yalta Closed, Russian Authorities Say
— for Repairs, Writers — Forever (15 March 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 141
Radio Svoboda, Lesya Ukrainka Museum in Yalta Closed, Russian Authorities Say
– for Repairs, Writers – Forever (15 March 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 217 -
- 218 -
9/26/2021 Lesya Ukrainka Museum in Yalta closed, Russian authorities say — for repairs, writers - forever
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say - for repairs, writers - forever
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Lesya Ukrainka Museum in Yalta, March 14, 2016
To remove monuments and close museums ostensibly for restoration - a typical curtain to
destroy them - Zabuzhko
Ivanna Tkachuk
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9/26/2021 Lesya Ukrainka Museum in Yalta closed, Russian authorities say — for repairs, writers - forever
Ukrainian cultural figures were outraged by the closure of the Lesya Ukrainka Museum in
'Yalta. The founder of the museum Svetlana Kucherha fears that it may no longer be opened,
or completely change the concept of the institution. Ukrainian writers and literary critics
believe that the museum was closed for ideological reasons, and do not expect it to be
restored.
The official reason for the closure of the museum is its state of emergency. According to
Larysa Kovalchuk, head of the Culture Department ofthe Russian Administration of Yalta, the
ceiling collapsed in the building, and the museum itself is included in the list of objects
requiring major repairs. She assured that the building would be repaired and the exposition
would return to operation.
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Vira Ageeva, a Ukrainian literary critic and researcher of Lesya Ukrainka's work, explained in
a comment to Radio Liberty why, in her opinion, a museum dedicated to poetess was closed in
Crimea. This is not the first time, she recalled, because back in 1963, the Soviet Union
authorities banned demonstrations in honor of lesya's 50th birthday.
ifir In modern Russia, such a museum cannot exist
V V
"Lesya Ukrainka is consistent in defending the Ukrainian position, so in modern Russia such a
museum cannot exist," Ageeva said.
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9/26/2021 Lesya Ukrainka Museum in Yalta closed, Russian authorities say — for repairs, writers - forever
For example, in the pom we see a completely frank indication of Ukrainian-Russian relations,
says the literary critic. And in the dramatic porn "Boyarina" the Unvuilized Ukrainian world is
shown as a free world, and Russian - as a world of captivity. According to Vera Ageeva, the
closure of this museum means that Crimea is not only moving away from Ukraine, but also
the space of freedom in it is rapidly decreasing.
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Vitally Kapranov
According to the writer and public figure Vitaly Kapranov,what is currently happening in
Crimea is the traditional behavior of Russian invaders in the occupied territories, which has
been observed for hundreds of years. He believes that the museum has "lasted a long time",
because usually Russia arranges a cultural pogrom immediately after the occupation.
_ A "Russian World" is people without historical memory
Vitaliy Kapranov
"Russian Peace" is people without historical memory and without understanding their
cultural priorities," Kapranov stressed.
But the writer is convinced that since Ukrainian culture has not been destroyed so far, it will
not be destroyed. If, he says, it failed the tsars Catherine and Peter and everyone who forbade
the Ukrainian language and literature, fueled libraries, then Putin will not succeed. The
phenomenon of Ukrainian culture is that it is transmitted by mouth, and not by the media,
Kapranov adds.
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9/26/2021 Lesya Ukrainka Museum in Yalta closed, Russian authorities say — for repairs, writers - forever
However, Yalta will not rebel in defense of the museum, Kapranov said. They have the
experience of Crimean Tatars, so their outrage will remain at the level of kitchen
conversations.
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eons Fansiknra (RFEIRL
Oksana Zabuzhko
Oksana Zabuzhko, a writer and researdier of Lesya Ukrainka's work, is convinced that the
museum will be opened only when Ukraine returns the Crimea. She said in comments to
Radio Liberty that in this style Russia always cleanses cultural monuments. Similarly, in
Donetsk, a memorial plaque to Vasyl Stus was removed and somewhere, as well as in 1934, a
monument to Ellan-Blue was taken for restoration in Kharkiv, and never returned again.
Ifir It's a painting in absolute barbarity
Oksana Zabuzhko
"This is an indicator for the whole world, what is the policy of the "Russian world", not less
than the abduction and imprisonment of people. This is a painting in absolute barbarity,"
Zabuzhko emphasized.
The museum is important for Ukrainian culture because it contains a large number of
original monuments from the life of Lesya Ukrainka in the Crimea.
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9/26/2021 Lesya Ukrainka Museum in Yalta closed, Russian authorities say — for repairs, writers - forever
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Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Sevastopol, Crimea
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- 223 -
- 224 -
Annex Vadim Nikiforov, The Anniversary of the Deportation of the Crimean Tatars was
Celebrated Without a Mourning Rally, Kommersant.ru (18 May 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 142
Vadim Nikiforov, The Anniversary of the Deportation of the Crimean Tatars was
Celebrated Without a Mourning Rally, Kommersant.ru (18 May 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 225 -
- 226 -
3/29/22, 1:05 PM ropioeumy rtenop-raHni KplaINICOIX TaTap oTMeTH1lH 6e3 TpaypHoro MIITYIFIre — O61.1.1eCTB0 - KOMMepCal-ITb
The situation in Crimea (https://kommersantsu/theme/2018)
05/18/2016, 03:43 PM
The anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars was
celebrated without a mourning rally
Crimean authorities consider it inappropriate
Today, mourning events are held in Crimea on the occasion of the 72nd anniversary of the
deportation of the Crimean Tatars. Mourning prayers were held in all mosques and Orthodox
churches of the peninsula, flowers were laid at the monuments to the victims of deportation, and
the first stage of the memorial complex at the Siren railway station was opened. There was no
funeral procession and meeting in Simferopol. The new Crimean authorities, after the annexation
of Crimea to the Russian Federation, insist on a different format for holding mourning events. And
the opposition organizations did not try to hold a mass action, because they were sure that it
would be refused.
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Photo: Kommersant/ Viktor Korotaev / buy a photo (https://photo.kommersant.ru/photo/buyphoto?number=KMO 153665 00056 1Rhoto: Koi
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Funeral events on the 72nd anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars began with
morning prayers in the Crimean mosques. In all cities and regions of Crimea, flowers were laid at
the monuments to the victims of deportation. The thousands-strong rally and procession, which
traditionally took place on May 18 in Simferopol, did not take place this year. Since 2015, the
Crimean authorities have not organized a rally because they consider it a political action that is
inappropriate on a day of mourning. In 2015, the event was tried to be held by the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatars, but the city authorities refused the organization, saying that all sites for mass
actions in the city were busy that day. This year, the city administration of Simferopol did not
receive applications for holding rallies and marches on May 18.
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2990037 1/2
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3/29/22, 1:05 PM rogoeuitomy rtenopTaHm KpbIMCDIX TaTap OTMeTliFIll 6e3 TpaypHoro MIITYIHM — O6LLteCTB0 - KOMMepCeHTb
The first deputy chairman of the Mejlis (the organization is banned in the Russian Federation)
Nariman Dzhelyalov told Kommersant that this year he and other civil activists did not apply for a
mass action. According to him, they are confident that the authorities will refuse to hold it, as they
previously refused to hold public events organized by the Mejlis or its individual members. "In the
resolution of the mourning meeting on May 18, we always assessed the attitude of the authorities
towards the Crimean Tatars and put forward our demands to it. This is what the authorities are
now afraid of," said Mr. Dzhelyalov. Also, in his opinion, the Crimean government is afraid of a
gathering of many thousands of Crimean Tatars, because such actions evoke a "feeling of unity" in
people.
Today, the first stage of the memorial to the victims of deportation at the Siren railway station was
opened in the Bakhchisarai region. It was from here that from May 18 to May 20, 1944, more than
150 thousand Crimean Tatars were taken from the Crimea to Central Asia. On the site of the
memorial, a site was prepared and landscaped and a "teplushka" was installed - a railway car of the
late 19th century model. In such wagons, people were deported from the peninsula. The head of
the Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, promised that work on the complex would be completed in a year
and would cost the budget 400 million rubles.
Mr. Aksenov laid flowers at the memorial monument on the railway station alley in Simferopol.
Mufti of Crimea Emirali Ablaev and Metropolitan Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea were also
present. Prayers in memory of those who died during the years of deportation will also be held
today in Orthodox churches in Crimea. In the evening, in the center of Simferopol, the action
"Light a fire in your heart" will take place. Crimean Tatar youth will light candles in memory of the
victims of deportation.
No unauthorized actions were recorded in Crimea. On the eve of the Deputy Prime Minister of
Crimea Ruslan Balbek said that about 30 radicals arrived in Crimea from Ukraine. Their task,
according to him, was to organize provocations on May 18. However, Crimean prosecutor Natalya
Poklonskaya denied this information. The press service of the Crimean branch of the Communist
Party of the Russian Federation reported that on the night of May 17-18, unknown people poured
paint on a memorial plaque to Joseph Stalin, placed on the wall of the party office in Simferopol,
by order of which the deportation of Crimean Tatars was organized.
Vadim Nikiforov, Simferopol
Why the descendants of those deported from Crimea will receive a residence
permit in a simplified manner
In May 2015, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) prepared a draft law that greatly facilitates the
procedure for obtaining a residence permit for the descendants of national minorities expelled
from the peninsula in the 1940s. The document gives the right to deported Crimean Tatars,
Armenians, Greeks or their relatives to legalize in the Russian Federation on the basis of a
certificate of rehabilitation only. Read more (https://kommersant.ru/Doc/2728305)
Just All Tape
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2990037 2/2
- 228 -
Annex 143
Credo Press, The Loyal to Moscow Mufti of Crimea Ablayev Is Accused by the
World Congress of the Crimean Tatars In Reporting on Muslims (19 October 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 229 -
- 230 -
The Loyal to Moscow Mufti of Crimea Ablayev was caught by the World Congress of Crimean
Tatars in denunciation of Muslims
Emirali Ablayev, the chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the annexed Crimea and
Sevastopol, was caught denouncing the Muslims of the peninsula. A facsimile of the denunciation,
dated July 29 of this year, was posted (https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?
story_fbid=1720200761637737&id=100009434909856) on his Facebook page by Vice President of the
World Congress of Crimean Tatars Lenur Islyamov, as reported on October 18 by Grani.Ru
(http://mirror712.graniru.info/Politics/World/Europe/Ukraine/m.255666.html).
Ablayev's denunciation was addressed to Viktor Palagin, the head of the Federal Security Service for
Crimea and Sevastopol, Sergei Abisov, the head of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs of Crimea,
and Natalia Poklonskaya, the then prosecutor. The statement said that in 12 jamaats of the peninsula,
part of the believers independently, without submitting to the Spiritual Administration, elected imams for
themselves. On June 5, during the celebration of Eid al-Fitr, supporters of the pro-Moscow Spiritual
Administration were not allowed in mosques there, the mufti claimed.
In 8 of the 12 jamaats, Ablayev also noted, supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir predominate, in the remaining
four - supporters of the Habashite movement, who formed a special Tauride Muftiate, which, as
emphasized in the denunciation, is "unregistered". The names and, in some cases, mobile phone
numbers of imams were mentioned.
According to the mufti, these clerics are guilty of extremism, obstruction of the exercise of the right to
freedom of religion, and illegal missionary work.
None of the imams mentioned by Ablayev, as far as we know, has yet become a person involved in the
criminal case. At the same time, among the settlements mentioned in the denunciation, there is the
village of Orlinoye within the boundaries of Sevastopol. The Habashit imam is said to be operating
there. Meanwhile, Ruslan Zeytullayev
(http://mirror712.graniru.info/Politics/Russia/Politzeki/m.254359.html), who was convicted as a member
of not the Habashite community, but Hizb ut-Tahrir, lived in this village before his arrest.
As early as Friday, Emil Kurbedinov, a lawyer who defends several defendants in the cases of Crimean
Muslims, spoke about Ablayev’s denunciation (http://www.5.ua/interview/ye-dokazy-shcho-obshuky-irepresii-
musulman-vidbuvaiutsia-za- pidpysom-i-z-sanktsionuvannia-muftiia-krymu-advokat-emilkurbedinov-
128383.html) in an interview with Channel 5. He stated that he held several denunciations
of the mufti, which the mufti intended to publish a little later.
“Ablayev,” the lawyer noted, “sometime after the “referendum” on the “annexation” of Crimea... said:
the muftiate will not let anyone offend, the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir are Muslims, and we will defend
them. But just six months have passed, and Emirali Ablayev has turned coat and has already forgotten
about his words."
After the annexation of the peninsula, the Crimean muftiate began to actively cooperate with the illegal
Russian authorities. Refat Chubarov, the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, met with
Ablayev in Ankara in August 2015, and a few days later made a public appeal to him, stating that his
compatriots were dissatisfied with his collaborationism.
In early January of this year, the Muftiate Council called on the Crimean Tatars not to join
(http://mirror712.graniru.info/Politics/World/Europe/Ukraine/m.247561.html) the Volunteer Battalion
- 231 -
named after Noman Chelebidzhikhan, formed by Islyamov in continental Ukraine. "Geopolitical maps
are redrawn by the strongest of this world, and the Almighty allows this to be done by one against the
other, providing a certain balance. It is not the wisest position to rush into the role of a tool with which
these maps are redrawn" the appeal stated.
On the eve of the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation on the territory of the annexed
peninsula, Ablayev urged the Crimean Tatars to take part in the voting and himself appeared at the
elections (http://mirror712.graniru.info/Politics/World/Europe/Ukraine/m.254621.html) on September
18. However, most of the indigenous population of Crimea, following the call of the Mejlis, ignored the
elections.
Formally, Ablayev, like a number of other collaborators, until recently continued to be a member of the
Mejlis, banned in the Russian Federation. On September 22, a few days after the Duma elections, the
mufti was expelled from this structure
(http://mirror712.graniru.info/Politics/World/Europe/Ukraine/m.254940.html).
On January 4 this year, Mustafa Dzhemilev, the national leader of the Crimean Tatars, announced that
a new Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea was being established in Kyiv. He explained that
"the Muftiate of Crimea now does not reflect the aspirations and thoughts of the Muslims of Crimea,"
since "it is in complete subordination to the occupier."
Published: October 19, 2016, at 13:00
Category: News Feed (https://credo.press/category/lenta-novostej/)
- 232 -
Annex 144
Gulnara Bekirova, Red Paradise: Bloody Way Home, Krym.Realii (23 October
2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 144
Gulnara Bekirova, Red Paradise: Bloody Way Home, Krym.Realii (23 October
2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 233 -
- 234 -
3/23/22, 10:58 PM KpacHbili Pain': kpoaaablin nyTb Ha poarnHy
Kpbum.Peantim
CTPAHMU,131 KPIANICKOR ACTOPMM
Red Paradise: bloody way home
October 23, 2016, 22:30
Gulnara Bekirova
Almost half a century, the path of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland after the deportation
of 1944 lasted. However, the long-awaited return to the Crimea was overshadowed by the fact
that no one was waiting for them here. I had to start from scratch...
a The authorities took a tough stance to prevent the Crimean Tatars from
entering their places of historical residence
Despite public assurances and decisions that were correct on paper, which were supposed to
facilitate the resettlement of repatriates, in practice, local authorities took a tough stance to
prevent the Crimean Tatars from entering their places of historical residence, primarily on
the southern coast of Crimea. Literally every piece of land the Crimean Tatars had to win
back.
In April 1990, the chairman of the Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement,
Mustafa Dzhemilev , stated that the Crimean authorities were conducting "feverish
distribution of land plots for dachas and gardens to the Russian-speaking population": "At the
same time, they find enough building materials for them and, as a result, they grow like
mushrooms all over Crimea after rain country towns. At the same time, chauvinist
associations and "committees" of Russian-speakers who openly oppose the return of the
Crimean Tatars to their homeland are encouraged and directly organized by the party bodies.
In this situation, the OKND considered such actions as squatting and self-returns (in the
interpretation of the authorities, "self-occupations") of land plots to be fair and justified,
motivating its position as follows: they immediately give away land for the construction of
dachas for Russians living in Crimea or resettlement houses for new migrants from Russia
and Ukraine."
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3/23/22, 10:58 PM KpacHbiii Palk kpoaaabiii nyrb Ha poravy
Ifir Often, the authorities tried to resolve the issue with the help of force,
brutal physical reprisals and lawsuits.
In accordance with the fifth paragraph of the Action Plan adopted at the meeting of the
Central Council on June 9-10, 1989, OKND provided all possible assistance and support to
compatriots who occupied empty land plots and built tent camps. The integrity and even a
certain rigidity with which the representatives of the OKND defended the interests of their
compatriots ultimately justified themselves: "So, in the village of Sevastyanovka, Bakhchisarai
district, where the first tent city appeared in August 1989, by the end of April 1990, 58 new
houses were already being built Crimean Tatars. The occupation of land in the village of
Zalankoy (Kholmovka) of the Bakhchisaray district also ended with the construction of more
than fifty houses. In those areas where sane and relatively far-sighted leaders were in power,
the issue of land plots after their occupation by the Crimean Tatars was resolved with the help
of mutual compromises and agreements. However, often the authorities tried to resolve the
issue with the help of forceful methods, brutal physical reprisals and lawsuits."
One of these tragic cases was the massacre of a handful of Crimean Tatars on December 14,
1989 in the tent camp of the village of Degirmenkoy (Zaprudnoe). Hundreds of soldiers,
policemen and drunken crowds of people from nearby villages were thrown at them. For four
months, the authorities kept six beaten participants in the Degirmenkoy epic in prison,
fabricating a criminal case against them on charges of hooliganism, resistance to the
authorities and other crimes.
Events unfolded dramatically in the Red Paradise area near Alushta in July-October 1992.
After the adoption of the Declaration and the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in
1989 on the deported peoples, the Crimean Tatars - natives of Alushta - had to defend a sevenmonth
picket in 1990, so that some of them could receive land plots in late 1990-early 1991.
The city authorities assured them that in the future they would guarantee the allocation of
land plots for returning Crimean Tatars freely under the state program according to the
resettlement scheme, but this did not happen.
ifir There was a tendency: on the one hand, to slow down the process of
the return of the Crimean Tatars, on the other hand, to prevent their
settlement in Alushta and nearby villages
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3/23/22, 10:58 PM KpacHbiii Palk kpoaaabiii nyrb Ha poravy
Since 1989, 2,196 families have been put on the waiting list for receiving land plots for
individual construction, and only 800 families have received land plots, most of them after a
months-long picket. In 1991, only a third of the planned 150 plots were allocated to the
Crimean Tatars. In 1992, under the plan (according to the settlement scheme, taking into
account debt), it was necessary to allocate 370 sites, and about 80 were allocated. Thus, there
was a tendency: on the one hand, to slow down the process of the return of the Crimean
Tatars, on the other hand, to prevent their settlement in Alushta and nearby villages.
All this forced the Crimean Tatars (and there were already more than 2,200 of them on the
waiting list in the city executive committee) on July 5 to picket on the road near the peach
orchard in the village of Krasny Rai. A provocation by the police on the night of July 5-6 and
the blocking of the road on July 7 forced the picketers to fence off the camp.
On July 7, a meeting of the workers of the state farm - the plant "Alushta" was held, at which,
according to the participants who told this to the picketers, there was an open call to "drive
the Crimean Tatars." After the meeting, representatives of the workers (the "workers" turned
out to be the foreman and the manager) arrived at the camp and announced their
disagreement with giving the field to the Crimean Tatars. On the same day, a meeting of the
executive committee of Alushta was held, at which a decision was made:
"one. Oblige the initiative group of persons of Crimean Tatar nationality.., as well as persons
participating in the unauthorized occupation ofland, to voluntarily fulfill the decision... to
vacate this piece ofland... in the area of the settlement of Krasny Rai.
2. In case of non-fulfillment of the decision ... to propose to the land user - s /z 'Alushta" until
07/09/92 to take measures to release the land plot arbitrarily occupied by persons of Crimean
Tatar nationality.
3. Alushta GOVD (comrade Voevodkin A.S.), upon vacating the land plot, take all measures
provided for by the Law of Ukraine "On Police" to maintain public order."
The decision was made...
On July 10, 1992, a pogrom of the Crimean Tatar camp was carried out, as a result of which 17
picket participants received serious injuries, tents and money were confiscated. But the
picket survived.
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3/23/22, 10:58 PM KpacHbili Pain': kpoaaablin nyTb Ha poarnHy
On August 8, a month after the pogrom and five days after the meeting in Mukhalatka of two
presidents - Ukrainian Leonid Kravchuk and Russian Boris Yeltsin - special forces again
appeared on the field of Red Paradise. Led by the head of the Alushta Department of Internal
Affairs , Voevodkin , they began to surround the fortified camp of the Crimean Tatars. The
picketers defended the makeshift houses that they had already built - the people hurried to
the territory of the camp, and in order not to let the punishers into it, they set fire to the
rubber slopes around them. This did not stop the commandos. Tragedy almost happened.
Three Crimean Tatars, dousing themselves with gasoline and taking burning torches in their
hands, went towards the special forces. Voevodkin ordered the attackers to stop and began
negotiations with representatives of the picket headquarters.
a All 13 proposals of picketers on land masses were rejected for various
reasons
To resolve the conflict situation between the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people and the
Alushta City Council, a conciliation commission was created. The results of its more than a
month of work: 5 meetings (3 of which were disrupted due to the absence of land users,
although the minutes of the first meeting stipulate that the presence of land users is
mandatory) and one visit to the proposed land for consideration. All 13 proposals of picketers
on land were rejected for various reasons: either there are gardens, vineyards, or a sanitary
territory, or a reference to the general scheme for the development of the city, approved, by
the way, in 1984, when the question of the return of the Crimean Tatar people was not yet
raised, then the failure of the land users.
For example, the Crimean Tatars were denied land plots near the highway, referring to
sanitary standards, although such plots were allocated for Russian-speakers in the village.
Upper Kutuzovka. The patience of the picket participants was overwhelmed by the last
decision at the meeting of the town-planning council about the impossibility of allocating
land for areas of low forests. It became obvious that what happened next was just a delay in
the decision...
(Ending to follow)
Copyright Crimea.Realities, 2022 I All rights reserved.
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- 238 -
Annex 145
Gulnara Bekirova, Red Paradise: Bloody Way Home (Ending), Krym.Realii (24
October 2 016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 145
Gulnara Bekirova, Red Paradise: Bloody Way Home (Ending), Krym.Realii (24
October 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 239 -
- 240 -
3/23/22, 11:03 PM KpacHbili Pain': kpoaaabiin nyrb Ha poRmy (okoHHaHrne)
Kpbum.Peantim
CTPAHMU,131 KPIANICKOR ACTOPMM
Red Paradise: Bloody Way Home (ending)
October 24, 2016, 13:00
Gulnara Bekirova
Insufficient understanding, and often open disregard by the authorities of Ukraine and
Crimea, of the aspirations of the Crimean Tatars returning after a long exile sometimes led to
the fact that the so-called "Crimean Tatar issue" was resolved by force. The events in the Red
Paradise area near Alushta in July-October 1992 developed dramatically ( read the beginning
of the article here).
Only after the blood was shed did the negotiation process between the conflicting parties
begin. In the process of work, a joint statement of the Alushta City Executive Committee and
the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people "On the settlement of the situation in the village of
Krasny Rai" was developed, where both sides decided to create a conciliation commission,
which will include representatives of the City Executive Committee and Crimean Tatars with
equal rights.
The main task of the commission was to find and allocate for the Crimean Tatars land plots
suitable for the start of construction in a short time. The Alushta City Executive Committee
stated in the Statement that all Crimean Tatars included in the picket lists, with the exception
of those who already have permanent housing or land in Crimea, will be given legal
guarantees to receive land.
a Why did the "indignant working people", mentioned more than once
during the month by the executive committees, show up on the very day
when, it seemed, a way out of the situation was outlined?
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However, the next day, when work on the text of the Statement was still in progress, the
situation around the picket began to escalate again. About 50 residents - state farm workers -
blocked the Alushta highway for half an hour, and then some of them went to the city
executive committee, and some went to the field to picketers - Crimean Tatars. Why did the
"indignant working people", mentioned more than once during the month by the executive
committees, show up on the very day when, it seemed, a way out of the situation was
outlined? Who organized them this time?
The newspaper "Avdet" at that time wrote: "For the second month, the Crimean Tatars in
Alushta live as in the front line: between war and peace, between disappointment and hope.
Such a borderline state, on the line of exacerbation of all feelings, would suit an artist, writer,
scientist, but certainly not people who finally want to find peace in their native land, under
the roof of their own home. But it suits, apparently, Alushta thrill seekers. Therefore, they
keep both the local residents and the Crimean Tatars on the field of Red Paradise in constant
tension, as if they are waiting for a thin thread of patience to break somewhere and then it
will be possible to apply power "with a clear conscience."
By the evening of August 19, 1992, a joint Statement of the Alushta City Executive Committee
and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people was signed. The statement "On the Settlement of
the Situation in the Krasny Rai Settlement" stated that "as a result of the negotiations held in
order to resolve the conflict situation in the area of the Krasny Rai settlement, the Alushta
City Executive Committee guarantees that all Crimean Tatars, indicated in the list dated
21.07.92, except for those who already have permanent housing or a land plot in Crimea, after
consideration of their documents in the conciliation commission, legal guarantees will be
provided (decision of the commission approved by the city executive committee) for the
allocation of land plots for individual construction.
It seemed that such a long-awaited decision had been made. But it was not there. On October
1, 1992, at about 9 o'clock in the morning, a unit of the Crimean special-purpose police, on the
orders of the Crimean administration, carried out an armed attack on the camp of repatriates
located in the open field of the Krasny Rai area.
ifir On October 1, 1992, a special-purpose unit of the Crimean police, on the
orders of the Crimean administration, carried out an armed attack on the
camp of repatriates
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Punishers in the amount of about 600 people, dressed in helmets, body armor, equipped with
shields and batons, with the help of heavy equipment, using poison gas and hoses, broke into
the camp ...
Lilya Budzhurova in the Avdet newspaper described this crime of the authorities as follows:
"... And then the beating began, or rather the murder. They beat them on the head, liver and
kidneys, beat those who were lying down and lost consciousness, beat young and old people,
beat them first near their temporary huts, and then on the road they finished them off. And
the workers of the state farm, whom, as the police commander Voevodkin would later say,
were "protected" by the special forces from the Tatars, peacefully dismantled, despite the fire
and blood, the temporary houses. Then the Crimean Tatars were loaded into buses and taken
to the hospital. In a fit of mercy, they were dragged out by the collars and thrown into the
hands of the doctors, stunned by the wounds they saw. Hastily bandaged dragged, then into
the car and taken away. They left only four, who were scary to look at that day: Tokhtarov
Dilyaver with a broken liver; Temeli Abdullah with his back battered with batons and his head
broken; Kaneev Ali's face and chest were burned, and in order to say a word, you need to force
yourself to open your lips bursting from the fire. Chobanov Died with a face sharpened with
pain, looking up with only one eye, instead of the other - a lump of caked blood wrapped in a
bandage. What happened to the rest is unknown. Some say they took it to the refrigerator of
the winery. Others - to the military camp in Frunzenskoye. Only one thing is known, people
are terribly beaten, and they probably need help. For 5 days we did not know anything about
their fate. For 5 days, relatives and friends tried to break through the indifferent walls of the
Alushta police to see at least one of the 28. They were lied to: there are none in Alushta."
instead of another - a lump of caked blood wrapped in a bandage. What happened to the rest
is unknown. Some say they took it to the refrigerator of the winery. Others - to the military
camp in Frunzenskoye. Only one thing is known, people are terribly beaten, and they
probably need help. For 5 days we did not know anything about their fate. For 5 days, relatives
and friends tried to break through the indifferent walls of the Alushta police to see at least
one of the 28. They were lied to: there are none in Alushta." instead of another - a lump of
caked blood wrapped in a bandage. What happened to the rest is unknown. Some say they
took it to the refrigerator of the winery. Others - to the military camp in Frunzenskoye. Only
one thing is known, people are terribly beaten, and they probably need help. For 5 days we did
not know anything about their fate. For 5 days, relatives and friends tried to break through
the indifferent walls of the Alushta police to see at least one of the 28. They were lied to: there
are none in Alushta."
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On October 5, Crimean Tatars held mass protests in Simferopol, accompanied by the blocking
of the main roads around the Crimean capital. However, the Crimean authorities did not give
instructions on the release of the Crimean Tatars they had taken hostage. Now it became
obvious to everyone that the main reason for their concealment from the public was the
presence on each of them of terrible traces of severe beatings.
ifir Thousands of Crimean Tatars gathered on the square in front of the
Supreme Council of Crimea demanding the release of the hostages and
punishment of those responsible for the October 1 pogrom
On October 6, thousands of Crimean Tatars gathered in the square in front of the Supreme
Council of Crimea with the same demands - to release the hostages and punish those
responsible for the October 1 pogrom. The confrontation resulted in an assault on the
Supreme Council of Crimea and an open clash with the police forces. And only after the
protesters, having moved away from the building of the Supreme Council of Crimea,
completely occupied the square in front of the Council of Ministers of Crimea, an order was
issued to release the hostages - the Crimean Tatars ... Soon the courageous defenders of the
Red Paradise united with their compatriots who were waiting for their heroes on the square
The appeal of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, adopted on the same night, said: "The
bloody massacre perpetrated by the Crimean authorities on October 1, 1992 in the village of
Krasny Rai over a group of defenseless Crimean Tatars overflowed the patience of hundreds of
thousands of people who constantly experience bullying and humiliation from the authorities
. On October 5 and 6, 1992, Crimean Tatars held mass protests in Simferopol against
arbitrariness. The main goal of these actions was to bring the organizers of the pogrom in the
village of Krasny Rai to personal criminal liability and to secure the release of 26 Crimean
Tatar hostages."
The protest actions of the Crimean Tatars were directed exclusively against the arbitrariness
of the Crimean authorities in order to force the Crimean authorities to stop the dangerous
policy of inciting the inhabitants of the peninsula of different nationalities against each other.
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"We are seeking and will continue to seek the restoration of the rights of the Crimean Tatar
people only in such forms that do not pose any danger or threat to citizens, no matter what
nationality they belong to," the statement of the representative body of the Crimean Tatars
said.
Almost a quarter of a century has passed since then... A few tens of meters from the place
where the tragic events took place, the ancient Aziz has been restored, testifying to the
inseparability of the deeds of our ancestors and the courage of the current generation of
Crimean Tatars, step by step defending the dignity and right of their people to live in their
homeland ...
The views expressed in the "Opinion" section convey the point of view of the authors
themselves and do not always reflect the position of the editors
Copyright Crimea.Realities, 2022 I All rights reserved.
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Annex 146
TASS, A Year After the Blackout: How the Energy Blockade Helped to Modernize
the Crimean Energy Sector (22 November 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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3/29/22, 2:55 PM A year after the blackout: how the energy blockade helped to modernize the energy sector of Crimea - In the country - TASS
Ta cc
Nov 22, 2016, 04:15
A year after the blackout: how the energy blockade helped modernize the Crimean energy
sector
Print version, full: https://tass.ru/v-strane/3801467
A year after the blackout: how the
energy blockade helped modernize
the Crimean energy sector
On November 22, 2015, Ukraine began the energy blockade
of Crimea. But it had the opposite effect - the peninsula was
integrated into the Russian energy system at an accelerated
pace.
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Balaklava during the power blockade, November 28, 2015
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The energy system of Crimea at the time of its entry into Ukraine has
always been in short supply. About 70-80% of electricity came from the
mainland (from the Zaporizhzhya TPP, Zaporizhzhya NPP, from the
power system of the Mykolaiv region), and four high-voltage lines
ensured its supply.
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3/29/22, 2:55 PM A year after the blackout: how the energy blockade helped to modernize the energy sector of Crimea - In the country - TASS
At the end of 2014, Russia and Ukraine signed two contracts, according to
which our country assumed obligations to supply electricity to Ukraine in
the amount of up to 1,500 MW, and Ukraine to supply Crimea
uninterruptedly. But "civil activists" intervened in the matter.
Sabotage and emergency mode: how it was
On November 22, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar extremists blew up three
energy branches in the Kherson region with anti-tank mines, and then
interfered with the repair work.
A state of emergency was introduced on the peninsula. Rolling blackouts
began, because local power plants could provide a little less than a third
of the needs of the peninsula. Industrial enterprises have stopped.
Trolleybuses stopped running in the cities. The hardest hit were small
settlements, 70% of which were not supplied with gas.
De-energized were the settlements in which lived almost 2 million
people. It was the largest emergency in the history of the Crimean
peninsula, Sergey Shakhov, head of the Crimean Emergencies Ministry,
told TASS. "The operational situation on the peninsula was monitored
literally every minute," he said.
All medical institutions with round-the-clock stay of people were
connected to backup power sources. The Ministry of Emergency
Situations of Russia deployed 39 life support points, in which citizens
were provided with medical and psychological assistance, heating and
hot food. 2318 autonomous power supply sources, more than 210
thousand tons of fuel were delivered to the peninsula.
When the pillars were blown up in Ukraine, it was a surprise
for the city. The headquarters for the elimination of the
consequences of emergencies were constantly assigned
emergency tasks, which were solved with such enthusiasm
that it is even difficult to imagine
Boris Kolesnikov
Deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol
The Crimeans also used alternative energy. Back in the "pre-blockade"
time, many local residents installed solar panels on their roofs or in their
yards. Solar and wind power plants operated on the peninsula. There are
as many as seven of the latter in Crimea.
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"When the pillars were blown up in Ukraine, it was a surprise for the
city," says Boris Kolesnikov, deputy of the Legislative Assembly of
Sevastopol. "Emergency tasks were constantly set before the emergency
response headquarters, which were solved with such enthusiasm that it's
hard to even imagine."
According to him, a variety of issues had to be resolved: food spoiled in
supermarkets, people lost their food, there were kilometer-long queues
at gas stations. Then, Kolesnikov notes, the governor set a strict
requirement for everyone: not to raise prices, since you can't profit from
people.
Prices jumped up except for candles and electric generators - the most
popular and sought-after goods in the Crimean cities and towns in those
days. For example, the price for one candle reached 60-70 rubles, and a
low-power modest generator cost about 30 thousand rubles.
On December 8, the Ministry of Energy of Russia announced the
restoration of power supply to all consumers, it was decided to turn off
backup sources of power supply. Russia had to speed up the construction
of the Crimean energy bridge as much as possible. The first line was put
into operation, connecting the Crimea with the Unified Energy System of
the South of Russia. On December 2,2015, Russian President Vladimir
Putin flew to Simferopol on purpose to launch the first stage of the
energy bridge. Thanks to this, it was possible to fully start the heating
season. On December 15, the second line of the first stage of the energy
bridge was launched, thanks to which an additional 200 MW began to
flow to the peninsula.
Energy bridge from the mainland: what has been done in a year
In the first half of 2016, the second stage of the energy bridge was
launched (April 14 - the third line, May 11 - the fourth, final), which
brought it to full capacity and finally allowed the Russian authorities to
announce the abolition of the state of emergency on the peninsula.
One of the sections of the energy bridge is laid along the
bottom of the Kerch Strait. It is located at great depths. The
entire territory is guarded by warships. In places where
sabotage is possible, divers work. Speaker systems work in
such a way that no one can even swim up to the cable
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Rostov NPP is used as the main point of connection and power source of
the power bridge, the end point is Simferopol. One of the sections is laid
along the bottom of the Kerch Strait and is heavily guarded to prevent
the possibility of sabotage.
"Physically, it is impossible to blow it up. It is located at great depths. The
entire territory is guarded by warships. Divers work in places where
sabotage is possible. In general, the acoustic systems work in such a way
that no one can even swim," the head of the territorial and structural
units for the construction of special facilities of the CIUS South branch
Oleg Matsora.
In addition to laying four 220 kV lines of the submarine cable circuit, a
new 500 kV substation and a 500 kV transmission line from the
Kubanskaya substation to the Taman substation were built to supply the
peninsula.
Today, the energy bridge provides 85% of Crimea's electricity needs. The
next step is to modernize the energy system of Crimea itself. The last time
this was done was in the 1950s. More than 50 billion rubles have now
been allocated for these purposes. Two power plants are being built in
Simferopol and Sevastopol, in September 2017 one unit will be put into
operation at each of them, and the total capacity of the two stations after
that will be 470 MW. By 2018, more will be added.
Thus, a powerful infrastructure reserve will be formed on the Crimean
peninsula - there will be enough electricity not only for current
consumers, but also for new industrial enterprises and social facilities.
The integration of the Crimean energy system into the Unified Energy
System (UES) of Russia will be completed, according to the plans of the
Russian authorities, by January 1, 2017. From now on, it will lose the
status of territorially isolated.
A year later, it is safe to say that the blackout has seriously accelerated
the acquisition of energy independence by Crimeans, Andrey Kozenko,
State Duma deputy from Crimea, believes. According to him, electricity
was the last "thread" that allowed Ukraine to manipulate Crimea. "It was
a test of strength, and we passed it with dignity," he said in a comment to
TASS.
TAGS
The situation in Crimea
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Annex 147
Kherson.life, Kherson Police for a Year Did Not Find Those Responsible for
Blowing up Power Lines on the Border with Crimea (17 December 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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fmd "region," [...] "Realii"
Kherson.life
Kherson police did not find those responsible for blowing up power lines on
the border with Crimea during a year
17 December, 2016
More than a year after the blowing up of a power line pylon in Kherson region, the National
Police of Ukraine says that the perpetrators have not been found, and the pre-trial investigation
continues. The Investigative Department of the Police in Kherson region reports this in response
to an information request from Krym.Realii.
“The Investigation Department of the Main Directorate of the National Police in Kherson region
is investigating criminal case No. 12015230140002112, information about which is included in
the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations on the grounds of a crime under p. 2 of art. 194 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine based on the fact of damage to reinforced concrete pylons
supporting high-voltage power lines in the territory of Genichesk , Chaplynka and Kakhovka
districts of Kherson region,” the answer says.
Inserted document:
Investigative Department
[…] “Krym.Realii”
of the Main Directorate
of the Kyiv Bureau of
of the National Police
Radio Liberty
in Kherson Region
No. 10164/02/8-2016
12 December, 2016
Having reviewed the request of 24 November, 2016 on provision of information in the
criminal investigation based on the fact of explosion of electric line on the border with the
temporary occupied territory of the Republic of Crimea, we are informing about the following.
The Investigative Department of the Main Directorate of the National Police in
Khesron region is investigating criminal case No. 12015230140002122, information about
which is included in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations on the grounds of crime
under p. 2 of art. 1941 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine based on the fact of damage of
reinforced concrete pylons supporting high-voltage power lines in the territory of Genichensk,
Chaplynka and Kakhovka districts of Kherson region.
Persons who committed the crime were not identified based on the conducted
investigative (search) activities.
The pre-trial investigation in the criminal case continues.
Acting Head of the Investigative Department
of the Main Directorate of the National Police
in Khesron region [Signed] M.L. Verbytskyi
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As a result of the explosion of power lines in the Kherson region on November 22, 2015, power
supply to Crimea was stopped and resumed after the repair of the power line on December 8.
On December 30, 2015, the power line was damaged again. However, after the repair, the line
was not put into operation, and electricity is not supplied to Crimea due to the termination of the
relevant contract.
The national energy company Ukrenergo spent 1,211,880 UAH for the emergency recovery
work of the Kakhovskaya-Titan, Melitopol-Dzhankoy, Kakhovskaya-Ostrovskaya,
Kakhovskaya-Dzhankoy overhead lines, which were damaged in November-December 2015 in
the Kherson region near the annexed Crimea.
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Annex 148
Vadim Nikiforov, Victims of the Deportation of the Crimean Tatars Are
Remembered in Crimea, Kommersant.ru (18 May 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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3/29/22, 1:07 PM B Kpbimy ecnommHatoT >keine genovraw Kpb1MCKPIX Tamp - HOBOCTH - O6LiteCTB0 - KOMMepCaHTb
Society (https://kommersantsu/rubric/7)
05/18/2017, 02:21 PM
Victims of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars are remembered
in Crimea
On May 18, mourning events are held in Crimea, timed to coincide with the 73rd anniversary of the
deportation of the Crimean Tatars. In the morning prayers were held in the mosques and churches
of the peninsula. In the settlements of the republic, local residents and officials laid flowers at the
monuments to the victims of deportation. A requiem concert was held at the construction site of
the memorial complex at the Lilac railway station in the Bakhchisarai region. He was visited by the
head of the Crimea Sergey Aksyonov.
Recall that in May 1944, about 180,000 Crimean Tatars were deported from Crimea to Central Asia
on charges of collaborating with the Nazis. Crimean Germans, Bulgarians, Greeks and Armenians
were also deported.
After returning to the peninsula in 1989, the Crimean Tatars held a mourning meeting in the
center of Simferopol for more than 20 years in a row on May 18. However, since 2015 it has been
banned by the local authorities. The day before, about ten Crimean Tatar civil activists (most of
them are former members of the Mejlis, which was recognized as an extremist organization and
banned in the Russian Federation) received warnings about the inadmissibility of violating the law
on meetings, rallies and demonstrations. Unauthorized mass actions in Crimea have not yet been
recorded.
Vadim Nikiforov, Simferopol
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3299644 1/1
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Annex 149
Editorial Avdet, School No. 44 Named After Alime Abdennanova Met its First
Students, Avdet (1 September 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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Annex 150
Krym.Realii, Khan's Palace: Restoration or Destruction? (28 December 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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3/17/22, 2:16 PM XaHCKIAlii gBope4: pec-raepaymq HIM yi-my-roweHme?
Pa;Imo
A3CITTbIK
TEMbI
Khan's Palace: Restoration or Destruction?
December 28, 2017, 11:10
Crimean activists are outraged by the progress of the restoration of the Khan's Palace in
Bakhchisarai. The former head of the Bakhchisarai Historical and Cultural Reserve calls the
restoration work the destruction of the national heritage.
The Khan's Palace in Bakhchisarai is a unique architectural monument of the 16th century,
the only example of the Crimean Tatar palace architecture in the world. The Khan's Palace has
a main building with the Khan's office, an official reception hall, a harem, two mosques, a
mufti's house, towers, courtyards, gardens, and fountains. "Here the Muslim representation
of paradise on earth is embodied," guides like to repeat.
But now no one is allowed to enter the territory of the ancient mosque - allegedly,
reconstruction is underway. Its beauty is hidden by scaffolding.
Crimean activists took a photo of how the reconstruction is taking place on the territory of the
Bakhchisaray historical and cultural reserve in the Khan's Palace. The photographs show that
the structural elements of the historical building were dismantled and destroyed. The beams,
which are 300 years old, have been sawn, although the sections show that they are intact -
not even an old nail has rusted.
- The beams were destroyed - some were cut, some were taken away. We will not restore
them, although they are an object of cultural heritage, they had to be preserved. And,
according to UkrNllrestavratsiya, it was necessary to replace only four beams, and they
replaced 100 percent. It's already irreparable. We will never again see the Khan's Palace the
way you still see it," says Crimean Tatar activist Edem Dudakov. He calls these works
"vandalism".
RESTORATION WITHOUT... RESTORERS
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The restoration project was prepared by the Kiramet company from Simferopol, the general
contractor is the Moscow-based Atta-group. Before that, they did not engage in restoration. At
the same time, the project is classified.
"Work is underway on some project that is not made public. It is enough to look at the
composition of the project team - there are no restoration specialists there, "says the former
head of the restoration committee of the Department for the Protection of Cultural Heritage of
Ukraine Yakov Dikhtyar.
ifir it is enough to look at the composition of the design team - there are
no restoration specialists there.
The restorers are planning to replace the old tiles with modern ones - Spanish, stylized as
antique ones.
"We have samples of tiles that will be laid on the roof of a large khan's mosque," Vadim
Martynyuk, director of the Bakhchisaray Historical and Cultural Reserve, demonstrated the
samples to local journalists.
Experts say: this is a deliberate destruction of authenticity. This should not be allowed, and
every tile that is missing must be made by hand, according to ancient technology. "It is not a
problem to organize and manufacture several dozen, several thousand tiles on the model of a
Tatar woman! There are companies in Turkey that specialize in the manufacture of historical
roof tiles," points out Yakov Dikhtyar.
The Bakhchisaray Palace did not manage to get into the list of UNESCO World Heritage Sites.
Before the annexation of Crimea, it was only being prepared for submission to the main list.
But if modern tiles are used for its restoration, it will lose this chance.
"Destruction under the guise of restoration": Ukraine fears that the Khan's Palace in Crimea
will be destroyed
DESTRUCTION OF WALLS AND murals
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The photo from the reconstruction shows that pieces of the 16th-century walls have been
broken off under the roof of the mosque, and ancient stones are scattered like garbage, says
Elmira Ablyalimova, former head of the Bakhchisaray Historical and Cultural Reserve.
"In the photo, the backing from the walls is just lying around. The main rule of restoration is
not to harm the monument, the restoration of such objects must be carried out very carefully.
What we are seeing now is a crime," says Ablyalimova.
According to the restoration rules, the workers had to make protective frames for the
tombstones, which stand right next to the walls of the Great Khan's Mosque. But they were
only covered with cellophane. The calligraphic wall paintings of the temple, made in the 18th
century, were no longer protected from damage, they are no longer a reconstruction, but a
new construction, activists point out.
"It should be made of wood, and not of concrete, as they are trying to do anew now, and
reinforce everything. If they are going to strengthen the walls, and there is such a technology,
then there are special structures for this - lanyards are installed and tied, but not in the way
they did. This suggests that we are getting a new building," said Dudakov, a Crimean activist.
Contracting firms do not respond to requests from Crimeans. At the same time, the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims of Crimea oversees the work in Crimea, which approves the
reconstruction.
"We hope that it will continue to exist for a long time, and all the people, and all the peoples of
Russia, will come to us and marvel at these riches. Month a month, probably two or three
times, there is control from the side of the Spiritual Directorate. And what is said today is
collapsing - this is politics already, it does not concern us, "Emirali Ablaev, Mufti of the
Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea, said in the local media.
CANOPY OVER THE PALACE - SALVATION OR A THREAT?
Around the main building of the palace, Russian workers are erecting a heavy metal frame,
and they plan to cover it with a canopy on top. It must stand for five years while the
reconstruction continues. Experts fear that the soil can prosest under the weight of the
structure. The restorers, who have been working on the palace for 15 years, have registered a
petition asking them to stop construction.
https://rus.azattyq.org/a/krym-khanskiy-dvorec-restavracia-voprosy/28942043.html 3/4
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3/17/22, 2:16 PM XaHCKIAlii gBope4: pec-raepaymq HIM yi-my-roweHme?
"The construction of the canopy weighing 1,080 tons stands on 6 supports close to the walls of
the monument, the bearing area of each support is 16 square meters. When installing a
canopy, the existing landscaping of the Basin, Harem and Embassy courtyards will be
destroyed, and the drainage system from the palace territory will be disturbed. At the same
time, such a construction will not protect the building from moisture and frost," the activists
point out.
APPEAL TO UNESCO
According to Ablyalimova, these works not only destroy the monument of architecture, but
also kill the Crimean Tatar heritage.
a I'm afraid that the question is not just about the destruction of this
object, but much more broadly. It is very important to make every effort
and stop the work, just stop it.
"This is a crime, this is the destruction of cultural heritage, this is the destruction, the erasure
of national memory. I'm afraid that the question is not just about the destruction of this
object, but much more broadly. It is very important to make every effort and stop the work,
just stop it. It is very important to draw the attention of international organizations to this,"
says the former head of the Bakhchisaray Historical and Cultural Reserve.
Ukraine appealed to UNESCO with a request to influence the Russians and stop work on the
territory of the Bakhchisarai Khan's Palace. After all, such an activity can simply destroy him.
Material of the Crimean edition of RFE/RL - the site "Krym.Realii".
Radio Azattyk © 2019 RFE/RL, Inc. I All rights reserved.
https://rus.azattyq.org/a/krym-khanskiy-dvorec-restavracia-voprosy/28942043.html 4/4
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Annex 151
Movement News Simferopol, Collecting the Column on May 9, 2018
(19 April 2018)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 273 -
- 274 -
M O V E M E N T N E W S
S I M F E R O P O L
Dear residents of Simferopol!
Phone "hot" line Immortal Regiment (Simferopol)
+7 (978) 729 87 38
Do not forget to leave information about your family hero on the Polk website.
The procession of the Immortal Regiment in Simferopol will take place on May 9 at 11:00.
The formation of the column begins at 08:45 on Sevastopolskaya Street, from the building of the Council of Ministers of
Crimea (the intersection of Chekhov Street to Kozlov Street).
Column route: st. Chekhov - st. Kirov - st. Karl Marx - st. Pavlenko - Gagarin Park, Eternal Flame.
MOVEMENT NEWS SIMFEROPOL
Collecting the column on May 9, 2018
04/19/2018
SHARE THE PAGE
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Annex 152
Ivan Zhilin, Trample Other People's Bonds, New Newspaper
(5 July 2018)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 277 -
- 278 -
- 279 -
- 280 -
- 281 -
- 282 -
- 283 -
- 284 -
Annex 153
Taurica.net, Qurultai of Muslims of Crimea Will Take Place on October 27
(2 August 2018)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 285 -
- 286 -
Taurica.net
Kurultai of the Muslims of Crimea will take place on October 27
August 2, 2018
The date of October 27, 2018 for holding the VI Kurultai of the Muslims of Crimea, to
hear reports and elect officials, was unanimously approved by decision of the Council of the
Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol. This is reported by the press
service of the Centralized Religious Organization Spiritual Administration of Crimea, writes the
Crimean News Agency.
Items related to holding the VI Kurultai of the Muslims of Crimea were approved at a
meeting of the Council of Representatives of Local Muslim Religious Organizations in the capital
of Crimea. It is emphasized that the Regulation on the election of delegates of the VI Kurultai of
the Muslims of Crimea and the Regulation on the organizational committee of the Kurultai were
approved.
As part of the Regulation on the election of Kurultai delegates, local religious organizations
were recommended to prepare lists of delegates from districts and settlements by September 4. At
the same time, religious organizations that are in the registration stage have the right to delegate
an imam and a mullah, who conducts worship and religious ceremonies in a settlement.
It is reported that representatives of the diasporas of the Crimean Tatar people plan to
participate in the VI Kurultai of the Muslims of Crimea.
IA " Crimean News Agency"
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Annex 154
RIA Novosti, Kurultai of Crimea Asked to Transfer the Property of the “Mejlis” to
the SAMK (27 October 2018)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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3/23/22, 10:51 PM Курултай Крыма попросил передать ДУМК имущество "Меджлиса"* - РИА Новости, 27.10.2018
https://ria.ru/20181027/1531603458.html
14:41 27.10.2018
Kurultai of Crimea asked to transfer the
property of the "Mejlis" to the SAMK*
Read ria.ru in
11008
© RIA Novosti / Alexey Malgavko / Go to photo bank
SIMFEROPOL, October 27 - RIA Novosti. The kurultai (general meeting) of
Crimean Muslims will appeal to the authorities of the republic with a request to
transfer property belonging to the Crimean fund on the peninsula to the
Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea (DUMK), Raim Gafarov, a
participant in the congress, imam of the Simferopol region, told RIA Novosti.
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3/23/22, 10:51 PM Курултай Крыма попросил передать ДУМК имущество "Меджлиса"* - РИА Новости, 27.10.2018
https://ria.ru/20181027/1531603458.html
Earlier, Russian State Duma deputy Ruslan Balbek said that the kurultai of the
Crimean Tatars may decide to nationalize and transfer the property of the
Crimea fund, the founder of which is the former head of the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar people banned in Russia,* Mustafa Dzhemilev, to the ownership
of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea.
"The decision was made by the kurultai, with a request to the authorities to
transfer the rights (to this property. - Ed.) to the Spiritual Administration of
Muslims of Crimea. The decision says that this property is considered as the
property of the Crimean Tatar people," Gafarov told RIA Novosti.
Gafarov did not specify what kind of property in question.
According to State Duma deputy Ruslan Balbek, the list of property that can be
transferred to the SAMK includes apartments, premises equipped for a medical
clinic, as well as a building in the center of Simferopol, where the leadership of
the Mejlis was located until 2014*. Previously, it was planned to house the
Crimean Tatar Museum in it, but the building has been sealed for several years.
Deputy Mufti of Crimea Ayder Ismailov said in a commentary to journalists that
by decision of the Kurultai of the DUMK, a building in Simferopol on Schmidt
Street, where the Mejlis* leadership was previously located, as well as real
estate in the village of Pionerskoye, where a hospital was supposed to be
opened, as well as several other objects.
"This building (in Simferopol. - Ed.) was purchased with charitable funds, it
belongs to the people. It is not the property of any person. The Kurultai decided
that the SAMK should take over this property," Ismailov said.
He noted that in the future, the legal registration of the change of ownership
will take place in consultation with the Crimean authorities. He added that it is
planned to house a museum of Crimean Tatar culture in the former building of
the Mejlis* in Simferopol.
*Extremist organization banned in Russia.
Read more about Crimean news at crimea.ria.ru >>
one 0 0 0 0 0
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Annex 155
Tatiana Ivanovich, Khan's Barbaric “Restoration,” From the Palace to the
Barn, QHA (7 December 2018)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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- 294 -
1/11
Tatiana Ivanovich December 7, 2018
Barbaric "restoration" of Khan: from the palace to the
barn
qirim.news / po-polochkam-uk / varvarska-restavratsiya-hanskogo-vid-palatsu-do-sarayu /
News
Tatiana Ivanovich QHA
07 December 2018, 13:01
Tatiana Ivanovich QHA
07 December 2018, 13:01
Under the guise of restoration, the Russian occupation authorities continue to destroy the
world's only monument of Crimean Tatar palace art - the Khan's Palace in Bakhchisarai. This
is not the first time that Russia has destroyed Khan Sarai. Historians recall that the
"modernization" prepared in 1783 by Prince Gregory Potemkin before the visit of Catherine II
caused great damage to the buildings of the complex. This happened after Catherine II
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2/11
signed a decree on the "inclusion" of Crimea in the Russian Empire. Almost two hundred and
thirty years later, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Khan's palace is under
construction again. According to the words, the occupying power calls them "restoration",
according to documents they pass as "urgent anti-accident works", and historians and
restorers speak in one voice about the destruction and destruction of the monument,
Emergency "restoration" is involved in politics
If the Khan's palace needed restoration, it was not so immediate and not so barbaric. The
current work on the Khan's Palace has a predominantly political basis, Ukrainian and
international experts say.
- The Bakhchisaray ensemble is the only witness in the world to the statehood of the
Crimean Tatars as a nation, as a people. The loss of this monument is equivalent to the loss
of the nation's genetic code, and such a thing cannot be allowed under any circumstances,
says Anatoliy Antonyuk , national coordinator of the International Center for Research,
Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) in Ukraine .
By starting work on the Khan's barn, the Crimean "authorities" also tried to attract Crimean
Tatars who were disloyal to them, demonstrating their concern for their historical past.
Delegate Kurultay, a member of the Crimean government in 2009-2012, an active defender
of the Khan's Palace Edem Dudakov suggests that Russia hastened to reverse the
restoration work for the Russian presidential election, which took place this spring to attract
Crimean Tatars to the polls. However, it did so in such a way that it had only the opposite
effect - the Crimean Tatars not only massively ignored Putin's illegal elections in Crimea, but
also received the most negative impressions from the ostentatious restoration.
I am a former citizen of the USSR, I was in deportation, I know all the propaganda
methods used by the Soviet Union. The same thing is happening now. Nothing
changed. This is a classic propaganda trick - before the election to show the people
who do not go to the polls that, you see, the state seems to be worried about you. In
fact, they had the opposite effect, - says Dudakov.
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3/11
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4/11
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5/11
Photo-fixation of the roof of the Great Khan's Mosque in 2015. According to Edem Dudakov,
the roof was in satisfactory condition.
Currently, work in Bakhchisarai, which lasted more than a year and a half, has been
suspended. The contractor company has changed - instead of Kiramet and ATTA Group, it
will develop research and design documentation and conduct the work of Meander LLC.
However, Ukrainian historians suggest that this will not lead to positive changes in the
restoration work. Crimean historian Oleksiy Motov notes that although Meander has a
license for restoration work, the company already has a rather negative background not only
in Crimea but also in Russia.
Meander has already had a negative impact when it acted as a general contractor and
accepted work at the Khan Uzbek mosque in the Old Crimea. There, on the masonry
of the XVI-XVII centuries, this company laid a plaster plastic mesh, and cemented the
top with cement mortar. There are many questions about them, including in the
Russian Federation regarding their restoration work in St. Petersburg.
At the same time, Motov adds that from a purely construction point of view, the company was
positive during the work on the Swallow's Nest. However, those works did not require any
professional restoration qualities, it was necessary to strengthen the rock itself, on which the
castle is located, so that it does not slip into the sea.
Spanish "nun" against the Crimean "Tatar"
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6/11
Old beams were just sawn into firewood
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7/11
Posted by Edem Dudakov Saturday, December 1, 2018
Experts state that the Khan's Palace, which did not manage to get on the UNESCO list due
to the annexation, has already partially lost the grounds for inclusion in it.
Now Russian companies are turning the Khan-Saray Palace into a "barn" in a purely
Russian, worst sense of the word.
- The main thing missing in the Khan's Palace is the philosophy of restoration and
preservation of authenticity. The philosophy of the restoration is to pass on to future
generations the technology used by ancient masters. What they are doing in the Khan's barn
has nothing to do with the restoration, because the restoration is the preservation of
technology and the preservation of maximum materials , - said the defender of the Khan's
Palace Edem Dudakov.
The complex as a whole is being destroyed, its individual objects are being destroyed.
According to experts, the Great Khan's Mosque (Biyuk Khan Jami - one of the oldest
buildings in the Khan's Palace, built in 1532 during the reign of Khan Sahib I Hero, a
prominent figure in the history of Crimea) was almost destroyed by restoration.
Work on it was carried out in winter, although restoration is usually not carried out in winter.
The work site was not properly arranged and protected from the weather, the necessary
protective cover was not made. When the roof of the mosque was removed, its interiors
began to be flooded with rain and covered with snow, as the protective film was made in
such a way that it did not protect against anything. Moisture got into the ceiling and floor of
the prayer hall. For several months, the Mihrab (place for the imam), as well as the paintings
on the south and west facades of the building, made by Master Omer in the 18th century,
remained virtually open. After the roof was removed, the archaic beams were dismantled
with the help of heavy construction equipment, they were not restored, but replaced with new
ones. And the loss of beams experts record as irreversible.
Unfortunately, we will not be able to return such elements of cultural heritage as the
roof and beams of the mosque, because they have already been sawn, - says Edem
Dudakov.
After removing the
authentic roof of the
mosque, dismantling the
so-called "Tatar" -
handmade tiles, "restorers" instead partially made the roof of modern Spanish tiles. Instead
of the traditional technique of restoration works, modern construction methods were used -
poured concrete and reinforcement, modern construction solutions and mixtures were used.
Edem Dudakov says that the replacement of the old tile with a modern stylized forgery was
designed in advance.
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8/11
- The project clearly stated that this cultural heritage site will have a modern Spanish
tile "Monk and Nun". This is nonsense when a project destroys an element of cultural
heritage. And handmade tiles are an element of cultural heritage, it was protected by
the laws of both the Soviet Union and Ukraine. And even the current laws that Russia
brought there.
Historian Oleksiy Motov emphasizes that the loss of authenticity of a building or an element
of an ensemble leads to the loss of authenticity of the entire historical complex.
- If we lose one thing, we lose the complex, we lose the ensemble, we lose the
authenticity of the palace as a whole. I saw Biyuk Khan Jami already under a new roof
and at the same time with floating paints painted around the windows, with a
destructed layer of plaster under the roof - it no longer fits into the complex.
Former director of the museum complex Elmira Ablyalimova said that they received an act
of inspection of dismantling works, which are written off as "non-historical value" part of the
tile, and rubble masonry is considered a "stone trifle." Among the signatories of this act was
not a single scientist, employee, restorer, representative of the fund accounting department.
Instead of handing it over to the museum, some "trifle" was simply taken to a landfill.
Oleksiy Motov says that elements of modern infrastructure or buildings have started to
appear around historical monuments, which also destroy the complex historical appearance
of monuments. For example, in Bakhchisarai, a pipeline of an external gas pipeline was built,
which sharply disagrees with the construction of two or three hundred years ago.
Unfortunately, the same Bakhchisarai, its authentic appearance with those vertical
poplars on the background of minarets, it is already lost. Poplars have already been
cut down, they are no longer in Bakhchisarai, they are almost gone in the old city. And
the air pipeline was thrown over the old city. Imagine a picture - a yellow pipe with a
diameter of 15-20 cm goes on the facades of buildings of the XVIII-XIX centuries.
Architectural monument with signs of modern renovation, against the background of gas
pipelines loses its historical value in the eyes of experts and the chance to get on the
UNESCO list. Now the Khan's Palace is working on the main building, the harem building,
the Durbe tomb, but Alexei Motov notes that the barbaric restoration has already caused a
chain reaction of unpredictable destruction in the Khan's Palace.
- We may lose the Khan's Palace in general, not even as a UNESCO site, but in general.
Now there, after all the "restorations", the subsidence of the ground under the palace begins,
there are cracks in the administrative building.
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9/11
The nonsense is that at the stage of the project "Priority emergency work" bypassing
the procedure of comprehensive state examination, the contractor received a positive
opinion on the exclusion of the cultural heritage "TATARKA TILES" from the cultural
heritage site Buyuk Khan Jami. The customer - "Committee for the Protection of
Cultural Heritage of the Republic of Kazakhstan", agreed to replace the cultural
heritage object with Spanish factory-made tiles, despite the fact that according to their
own order №116 from 13.06.2017 "Tatar tiles" on Khan Jami are protected by law. .
Let's talk about TATARKA again, while she is safe
Posted by Edem Dudakov on Monday, February 19, 2018
However, the Khan's Palace is not limited to all the losses that Ukraine has suffered since
the Russian occupation of Crimea, and may still suffer. Historians say that most of the
outstanding cultural heritage sites in the Crimea, one way or another were included in the socalled
Federal Target Program of the Russian Federation, and for work on them was
allocated 3 million rubles. These include the Uzbek Mosque in the Old Crimea, the building
of the Art Museum in Simferopol, etc. Given the "restoration" that is taking place at the
Khan's Palace, historians see these buildings as a threat rather than a benefit. And not
without reason. For example, the building of the Art Museum in Simferopol, the former
building of the Officers' Assembly of the 51st Cavalry Regiment, has already lost its authentic
balconies: they were cut down along with ancient stucco.
Stop Russia…
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10/11
Palace for "restoration"
The "restoration" of the Khan's Palace should be completed by 2020. Activists, experts,
representatives of Crimean Tatar organizations, the Ukrainian side, the public are trying to
prevent the final destruction of the historic buildings of the complex. But the set of tools to
influence Russia is small - mostly now everything is limited to public statements, attempts to
draw attention to the problem of the international historical and cultural community.
Former director of the Bakhchisaray Cultural Reserve Elvira Ablyalimov has been trying to
stop the barbaric restoration in court for more than six months. However, Crimean and
Russian courts are skillfully resolving lawsuits.
"There is a vicious circle in which Moscow courts demand documents from the Crimea,
but in the Crimea these documents are not issued," - says lawyer Nikolai Polozov.
Attempts to sue will continue, although in general Polozov admits that defending the Khan's
barn, stopping its barbaric restoration through Russian courts is almost impossible. However,
as well as through international ones, Russia will block such proceedings at home and in
Crimea, and will ignore the decisions of international courts. In the same way, Russia ignores
and will continue to ignore the appeals of Ukraine and the international community. Polozov
agrees with Crimean historians that the maximum that can be done so far is to record.
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11/11
The material was prepared with the support of the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine
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Annex 156
RIA Novosti, In Crimea, Turkey Was Warned Not to Support the Mejlis (16
December 2018)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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- 308 -
3/18/22, 10:00 AM В Крыму предостерегли Турцию от поддержки "Меджлиса"* - РИА Новости, 16.12.2018
https://ria.ru/20181216/1548065625.html 1/4
17:03 12/16/2018
Crimea warns Turkey against supporting
Mejlis*
Read ria.ru in
31797
© RIA Novosti / Alexey Malgavko / Go to photo bank
SIMFEROPOL, December 16 - RIA Novosti . Support by the Turkish leadership
of representatives of the recognized extremist organization "Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar people" * banned in Russia is a dangerous anti-Russian move,
said Georgy Muradov, Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of Crimea,
Permanent Representative of the Republic under the President of Russia.
Earlier, Ukrainian media reported on the meeting of one of the leaders of the
Mejlis * Mustafa Dzhemilev with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, at
which the parties "discussed the latest acts of aggression by the Russian
Federation and the latest detentions of Crimean Tatars."
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3/18/22, 10:00 AM В Крыму предостерегли Турцию от поддержки "Меджлиса"* - РИА Новости, 16.12.2018
https://ria.ru/20181216/1548065625.html 2/4
"I would characterize support for extremist forces that question Russia's
sovereignty and territorial integrity as a dangerous anti-Russian move,"
Muradov told RIA Novosti.
He recalled that when in history representatives of the Turkish pro-government
elite questioned the territorial integrity of Russia, this always led to negative
consequences and ended badly, primarily for Turkey.
"I would not like this experience to be lost in history. History is a teacher and
our indicator of behavior for the future," he stressed.
Muradov also noted that the so-called Mejlis does not exist even legally.
*Extremist organization banned in Russia.
"I would like to remind you that there is no such organization as the Mejlis
for a long time. The Crimean Tatars held a kurultai (congress), at which
they elected a new governing body - the shura (council) headed by the
spiritual leader Mufti Emirali Ablaev, so citizen Dzhemilev is an impostor
and is holding hostile extremist activity against all Crimeans, including
against the Crimean Tatars," the Deputy Prime Minister stressed.
2 0 0 0 0 0
Popular comments
The duplicity of the Turkish rulers will hiccup us more than once, no one
ever knows what to expect from them at any moment.
December 16, 2018, 17:55 15
vovan buyvolov
All comments
- 310 -
Annex 157
Portal Big Yalta, Museum of Lesya Ukrainka in Yalta
(24 July 2019)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 311 -
- 312 -
9/26/2021 Museum of Lesya Ukrainka in Yalta - Big Yalta
https://www.bigyalta.net/blog/muzey-lesi-ukrainki-v-yalte/
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9/26/2021 Museum of Lesya Ukrainka in Yalta - Big Yalta
https://www.bigyalta.net/blog/muzey-lesi-ukrainki-v-yalte/
Photo album: Historical and Literary Museum
This literary-memorial museum complex is located in Yalta itself. It is located
on the second floor of the former manor house, which then became one of
the so-called apartment houses of E. F. Lishchinskaya - a local rich
merchant. A very young poetess stayed in it during her first visit to Yalta - in
1897. To the centenary of the birth of Lesya Ukrainka (in 1971), a monument
in her honor was erected next to the building of the mansion. The official
opening of the museum took place on February 25, 1991 - it was timed to the
120th anniversary of the birth of the Ukrainian outstanding poetess.
As you know, Lesya Ukrainka suffered from a serious ailment - a severe type
of bone rheumatism. Therefore, she visited the Crimea many times, where
she was treated and rested in Yalta, Balaklava, Evpatoria, etc. In total, Lesya
lived for three years on the Crimean peninsula. And they were very fruitful in
creative terms.
Here are just some of the "Crimean pearls" of the creative heritage of the
talented poetess: "Iphigenia in Taurida" (dramatic poem), the story "Over the
Sea", "Crimean Echoes" (a cycle of poems). While in the Crimea, the poetess
also worked on translations from English into Ukrainian of Shakespeare's
Macbeth and Byron's Cain. In addition to her native and English, Lesya was
fluent in eight other languages.
The Museum of Lesya Ukrainka has several expositions. Almost all of them
are dedicated to her life and work. Everyone can get acquainted with the
lifetime editions of the works of the poetess, the preserved photo archive,
correspondence, etc. In addition, the museum complex has an exhibition hall
with national Ukrainian costumes, household items ofthat era, etc. The halls
of the museum are furnished and decorated in the style of the late XIX - early
TWENTIETH centuries.
Over the past few years, the Lesya Ukrainka Museum itself has been
closed, as it is written at the entrance "for technical reasons". A small
exposition of the poetess has been moved to the Yalta Historical and
Literary Museum, which is located on the first floor of the same
building.
MUSEUM OF LESYA UKRAINKA IN YALTA ON THE MAP
POINT ON THE MAP ꜛ
ATTRACTIONS AND HOTELS NEAR ꜛ
- 314 -
Annex 158
Andriy Gevko, “State Crimean Tatar Language in Crimea - Imitation”: Problems
of the Language of the Indigenous People on the Peninsula and the Mainland,
Krym.Realii (19 January 2020)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 315 -
- 316 -
- 317 -
- 318 -
- 319 -
- 320 -
Annex 159
Krym.Realii, Cut Out Pages: Scandalous History Textbooks Returned to Crimean
Schools (+ Photo) (24 January 2020)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 321 -
- 322 -
3/24/22, 2:18 PM Cut out pages: scandalous history textbooks returned to Crimean schools (+ photo)
https://ua.krymr.com/a/news-krym-v-shkoly-povernuly-skandalnyj-pidruchnuk/30394603.html
- 323 -
3/24/22, 2:18 PM Cut out pages: scandalous history textbooks returned to Crimean schools (+ photo)
https://ua.krymr.com/a/news-krym-v-shkoly-povernuly-skandalnyj-pidruchnuk/30394603.html
- 324 -
3/24/22, 2:18 PM Cut out pages: scandalous history textbooks returned to Crimean schools (+ photo)
https://ua.krymr.com/a/news-krym-v-shkoly-povernuly-skandalnyj-pidruchnuk/30394603.html
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Annex 160
Sanko V.G. et al., Return the Ukrainian Gymnasium Back to Us!, Iskra Pravdy
(2 February 2020)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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Re turn the Ukrainian Gymnasium Back to Us!
Almost six years have passed since Crimea transitioned to Russia. There was good and bad
during this period of time.
The big problem, that became apparent during this time is that the Crimean authorities closed all
Ukrainian schools, Ukrainian kindergartens, Ukrainian theater, Ukrainian gymnasium, Ukrainian
newspaper - this all in the time when more than 500,000 Ukrainian are living on the peninsula.
Such things did not happen even during war. All of this point to the fact that the ethnocide of
Ukrainian began in Crimea, violating their rights for communication, culture and religious
believes...
The Ukrainians of Crimea made a notable impact in the development of the peninsula and
continue making such an impact now by their selfless and honest effort. We are proud of such
communist Ukrainians as I.K. Lutak. N.K. Kirichenko. V.S. Makarenko, L.I. Grach and many
more, who lived and worked to make Crimea reach its highest point and glory: two airports were
busy working in Simferopol, plants, collective farms, millions of vacationers, Crimea shipping
peaches, apricots, grapes, apples, chicken and rabbit meat, and wine to the entire Soviet Union...
Not a single vacationer left Crimea "empty-handed". It was the communist L.I. Grach who
initiated, with others, the amendments to the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea naming three state languages: Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar to be equal and
being applied equally in all areas of life.
So why our children cannot study, speak, read and write in their native language? Why the
authorities are doing everything to destroy everything Ukrainian in Crimea? How will the
children speak, write, read in their native Ukrainian language if there are no school, no text
books, no teachers, etc. This is in violation of the currently valid Art. 10 of the Crimean
Constitution! We have everything written on paper, but nothing in the reality. This is violation of
rights and dignity of the citizens.
All the civilize d countries in the world - USA, Canada, Germany, Australia, etc. - provide the
national minorities with their native schools, theaters, churches, they speak, write and read in
their native language, but why don’t we have it?
That is why, we, parents of the Ukrainian children, are asking the Crimean authorities, the
ministries of education and culture to revive the Ukrainian gymnasium, as it used to be, and open
a Ukrainian school in every district. The fact that the gymnasium is needed is supported by
history of its existence during the last few years - 10-15 candidates for each place were
competing to study in it. There is a different time now, but the Ukrainian gymnasium should be
revived, and we, the parents, are demanding it! The children should not be deprived from
learning in the native language. Not many teachers are left who know the Ukrainian language
and know how to solve this task successfully, but there are still some.
We appeal to the respected L.I. Grach, a person highly respected by the Crimeans to help us with
resolving this very important for us issue.
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We also appeal to decent, cultured Russians to help and support us in solving this problem. We
all need to understand that a person’s most intimate in life is his mother, speech and song, and if
he does not have this, then the person lives an inferior life, does not receive moral satisfaction,
which means that he will not respect and love anyone.
At the council on the Russian language, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that no one has
the right to forbid people to speak, read and write in their native language, so we appeal to V.V.
Putin - to help solve our problem with the revival of the Ukrainian gymnasium and Ukrainian
schools on the peninsula, and thank him for that in advance.
A positive solution to this issue will show the whole world that the Republic of Crimea respects
the dignity and human rights that meets the requirements of the UN Charter, and that peace and
friendship between nations flourish on the peninsula.
We love Russian language and culture. But we and our children want to learn and not forget our
native Ukrainian language. The more languages a person knows, the more literate, cultured and
orderly he is. Learn all languages and we will understand each other, value and respect each
other. And in Crimea there will be peace and harmony between peoples.
Sanko V.G., Oleinik E.I, Trunova N.A., Gavrilova N.D., Semashko M.D., Losev N.P.
The city of Simferopol
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Annex 161
Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, Educational Centers “Crimea-
Ukraine” and “Donbas-Ukraine” Have Started Working, in 2020 They Will Work
Until October 23 (9 June 2020)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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EDUCATIONAL CENTERS "CRIMEA-UKRAINE" AND "DONBAS-UKRAINE"
HAVE STARTED WORKING, IN 2020 THEY WILL WORK UNTIL OCTOBER 23
Published June 9, 2020 at 9:19 p.m.
Today, June 9, 2020, the educational centers "Crimea-Ukraine" and "Donbas-Ukraine" began
their work. Applicants from the temporarily occupied territories can enter Ukrainian universities
without external evaluation after contacting these centers.
“Employees of educational centers have started their important work today. Applicants only need
to choose the specialty and educational institution where they would like to enter, and apply to
the educational center in this institution between June 9 and October 23, 2020. A visit to the
educational center can be arranged in advance, the contacts of the centers are posted on the
website of the Ministry of Education and Science," said Oleh Sharov, General Director of the
Directorate of Higher Education and Adult Education of the Ministry of Education and Science
of Ukraine.
In 2020, residents of the temporarily occupied territories can apply under a simplifie d procedure
to more than 100 universities under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and Science, the
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Culture and Information
Policy.
Applicants wishing to participate in the competition for sports financed from the state budget
must submit an application and fill out an educational declaration in educational centers:
entrants from the Crimea - no later than August 20;
entrants from Donbass - no later than August 22.
Those who do not have time to do so in August can apply for a paid form of eudcation by
October 23.
Residents of the temporarily occupied territories do not need to have a Ukrainian passport to
enter, it is enough to have a birth certificate. And entrants who do not have a Ukrainian
document on education can get it through the educational center, which will send them to the
school at the educational center to pass two exams of the state final certification in the Ukrainian
language and history of Ukraine. They will also need to pass one entrance exam, required by a
higher education institution.
On working days of Mon - Thu from 9:00 to 18:00, Fri from 9:00 to 17:00 there is a hotline for
entrants from the temporarily occupied territories (0-800-504-425).
We would like to remind that in 2020, residents of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions that are outside of Ukraine’s control and the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea
can enter any of the authorized educational institutions where the Crimea-Ukraine and Donbass-
Ukraine educational centers operate without external evaluation.
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Annex 162
Julia Stets et al., Every Fifth Budget Place for Crimea and Donbass, RFE/RFL
(16 August 2020)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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3/16/22, 7:02 PM Every fifth budget place for Crimea and Donbass
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30784024.html 1/10
SOCIETY
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3/16/22, 7:02 PM Every fifth budget place for Crimea and Donbass
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“Senior students sang the anthem of Ukraine on the square,
even tried to raise the yellow and blue flag, so they were expelled
from school
“ - 340 -
3/16/22, 7:02 PM Every fifth budget place for Crimea and Donbass
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30784024.html 5/10
I like it more here, first of all, there are more opportunities here
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3/16/22, 7:02 PM Every fifth budget place for Crimea and Donbass
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30784024.html 6/10
“It is necessary to stimulate such graduates as much as possible
to move to the territory controlled by Ukraine
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3/16/22, 7:02 PM Every fifth budget place for Crimea and Donbass
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30784024.html 7/10
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3/16/22, 7:02 PM Every fifth budget place for Crimea and Donbass
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30784024.html 8/10
“To what extent should we provide benefits when entering
universities when other applicants enter on a competitive basis?
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3/16/22, 7:02 PM Every fifth budget place for Crimea and Donbass
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30784024.html 9/10
“It was fundamentally important that all residents of the
occupied territories have access to education in all universities
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3/16/22, 7:02 PM Every fifth budget place for Crimea and Donbass
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30784024.html 10/10
- 346 -
Annex 163
Krym.Realii, Pro-Government TV Channel "Millet" Was Transferred to the
Subordination of the New Department (21 August 2O2o)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Annex 163
Krym.Realii, Pro-Government TV Channel “Millet” Was Transferred to the
Subordination of the New Department (21 August 2020)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 347 -
- 348 -
9/24/21, 5:09 PM Pro-government TV channel "Millet" was transferred to the subordination of the new department
wir K pbIM.Peanmm
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Pro-government TV channel "Millet" was transferred to the
subordination of the new department
21 August 2020, 12:43
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Illustrative photo
The pro-government Crimean Tatar TV channel Millet was transferred to the subordination
of the Russian Ministry of Information of Crimea. This is stated in the order of the Crimean
government controlled by the Kremlin.
Previously, the TV channel was run by the State Committee for Nationalities of the Crimea.
The reason for the transfer of media from one department to another is not specified.
In July, in Crimea, officers of the Russian police and the Accounts Chamber conducted
searches on the pro-government Crimean Tatar TV channel Millet.
https://ru.krymr.com/a/news-millet-pereveli-v-podchinenie-mininforma-kryma/30795316.html 1/2
9/24/21, 5:09 PM Pro-government TV channel "Millet" was transferred to the subordination of the new department
https://ru.krymr.com/a/news-millet-pereveli-v-podchinenie-mininforma-kryma/30795316.html 1/2
- 349 -
9/24/21, 5:09 PM Pro-government TV channel "Millet" was transferred to the subordination of the new department
The head of Crimea, previously controlled by Russia, Sergei Aksenov, introduced a new leader
to the Millet team - Lilya Vejat .
MORE ON TOPIC:
"The burden of a collaborator in Crimea is heavy"
ID
She previously led author projects and newscasts on Millet, after which she worked as a
correspondent for another pro-government Crimean TV channel, Crimea 24 , and for some
time headed its bureau in Yalta.
In February, the previous general director of the pro-Russian Crimean Tatar TV channel
Millet, Ervin Musaev, resigned . He was appointed CEO of the pro-Russian Crimean Tatar TV
channel Millet in July 2017.
On April 22, 2015 by the decree of Aksenov, an autonomous non-profit organization "Public
Crimean Tatar TV and Radio Company", named "Millet", and radio "Vetan Sedasy" were
created. On August 28, Roskomnadzor issued to the Crimean Tatar Public TV and Radio
Company universal licenses for broadcasting the Millet TV channel and the Vetan Sedasy
radio station. On September 1, 2015, the Millet TV channel began broadcasting in test mode.
https://ru.krymr.com/a/news-millet-pereveli-v-podchinenie-mininfon-na-kryma/30795316.html 2/2
9/24/21, 5:09 PM Pro-government TV channel "Millet" was transferred to the subordination of the new department
https://ru.krymr.com/a/news-millet-pereveli-v-podchinenie-mininforma-kryma/30795316.html 2/2
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Annex 164
RIA Novosti, Cells of Tablighi Jamaat Were Liquidated in Three Regions
of Crimea* (2 October 2020)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 351 -
- 352 -
3/23/22, 3:06 AM В трех регионах Крыма ликвидировали ячейки "Таблиги Джамаат"* - РИА Новости, 03.03.2020
https://ria.ru/20171002/1505981902.html 1/2
10:23 02.10.2017
Cells of Tablighi Jamaat were liquidated in
three regions of Crimea*
Read ria.ru in
5995
SIMFEROPOL, October 2 - RIA Novosti. The activities of the cells of the
religious extremist organization Tablighi Jamaat * have been suppressed in
three regions of Crimea, Zaur Smirnov, head of the Crimean government's state
committee on interethnic relations, told RIA Novosti.
Earlier, the Crimean department of the FSB reported that the activity of a cell of
the Tablighi Jamaat* organization had been suppressed in Crimea. A criminal
case has been initiated under the article "Organization of the activities of an
extremist organization", which involves long terms of imprisonment. An
investigation is underway.
"Tablighi Jamaat* cells operated on the territory of Simferopol, Simferopol and
Belogorsk districts. There are several detainees," Smirnov said.
According to him, law enforcement officers continue to conduct operational
and investigative measures.
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3/23/22, 3:06 AM В трех регионах Крыма ликвидировали ячейки "Таблиги Джамаат"* - РИА Новости, 03.03.2020
https://ria.ru/20171002/1505981902.html 2/2
Tablighi Jamaat* was banned in Russia in 2009. The Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation ruled that the activities of the religious association are
aimed at "violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and
discriminating against Russian citizens on religious grounds, as well as
providing support to international terrorist organizations."
The fundamentalist organization claims to promote a return to early Islamic
behavior and has been repeatedly accused of links to terrorist groups.
According to open sources, the majority of Tablighi Jamaat* supporters live in
South Asia.
*Extremist organization banned in Russia.
0 0 0 0 0 0
Popular Comments
Here, but we are afraid that there are not enough workers in the mines of
Magadan. They create "cells" themselves, just send them to the address
and, preferably, one way. There, no one except the guards will interfere…
October 2, 2017, 13:07 17
P peter-f-52
All comments
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Annex 165
Elena Removskaya, “Vandalism is Disguised as Restoration.” New Contractors
From Russia in the Khan’s Palace, Krym.Realii (17 February 2021)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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Annex 166
Victoria Veselova & Maxim Stepantsov, Anniversary with a Leaky Ceiling.
What Is Left of the Legacy of Lesya Ukrainka in Crimea, Krym.Realii
(25 February 2021)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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Annex 167
TASS, The Crimean Authorities Said that Foreigners Will Be Able to Keep Real
Estate in the Region (24 March 2021)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 373 -
- 374 -
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- 375 -
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SIMFEROPOL, March 24. /TASS/. Foreigners have the opportunity to keep
real estate in the Republic of Crimea, even taking into account the new
rules prohibiting the ownership of land by those who are not citizens of
the Russian Federation. They can retain ownership of the house by
leasing the land under it, TASS was told in the State Council of the
Republic of Crimea.
On March 20, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 201
"On Amendments to the List of Border Territories Where Foreign
Citizens, Stateless Persons and Foreign Legal Entities Cannot Own Land
Plots" came into force . . No. 26". According to the document, foreign
citizens and stateless persons are prohibited from owning land in the
Crimea, Sevastopol, Astrakhan and Kaliningrad regions.
“Citizens had a year to fulfill the decree: donate, sell, or somehow dispose
of the land. Now, no one restricts them in their desire to do this, there are
no repressive measures yet. Moreover, the ban on ownership applies
only on land, and if a foreigner owns a house, he can only give up the
land in favor of the municipality and rent it, continuing to own the
house," Yevgenia Dobrynya, chairman of the committee on property and
land relations, explained to TASS.
She explained that if the owner of the house applies for the lease of the
plot on which it is built, then it has priority over other applicants. Thus,
the owners can keep their property in the Crimea.
The interlocutor added that the new order will not affect the owners of
flats and apartments. In addition, if a citizen of another country inherits
land, he has a year to dispose of it.
Forced sale
- 376 -
According to the State Council, the changes affected 11 out of 14 districts
of the republic and eight out of 13 city districts. Including it extends to
the most popular resorts of the southern coast of Crimea.
Dobrynya explained that if the foreign owner does not resolve the issue
with the land on their own, then the authorities may, by a court decision,
sell the land forcibly. To do this, an appraisal will be carried out and an
auction organized, and the former owner will receive the proceeds from
the sale, minus legal and other costs.
First Deputy Chairman of the State Council of Crimea Yefim Fiks, in turn,
noted that the main owners of land plots in Crimea from among
foreigners are citizens of Ukraine. Earlier, the Crimean authorities
indicated that former and current Ukrainian politicians and oligarchs,
including the wife of the current president of the neighboring state,
Vladimir Zelensky, own real estate in the region.
As the regional parliament added, lists of those who own land in Crimea
without Russian citizenship are now compiled by local authorities.
TAGS
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Annex 168
Igor Tokar, “This Is Linguocide”: How Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Languages
Disappear in Crimea, Krym.Realii (22 June 2021)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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Annex 169
Vladimir Putin, On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,
Presidential Executive Office (12 July 2021)
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Annex 170
Radio Svoboda, The UN has counted the number of victims of hostilities in
Donbass (19 February 2021), accessed at https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/newsoon-
kst-gerty-boyovyh-donbas/31110937.html
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 397 -
- 398 -
4/13/22, 2:23 PM The UN has counted the number of victims of hostilities in Donbass
9
Pamio r c.3.6O,ia
NEWS POLICY
The UN has counted the number of victims of
hostilities in Donbass
February 19, 2021, 09:50
In response to a request from Radio Svoboda , the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights counted the total number of victims of hostilities in Donbas from
April 14, 2014 to February 10, 2020.
"According to UNHCR estimates, the total number of casualties related to the conflict in
Ukraine (from 14 April 2014 to 31 January 2021) is 42,000-44,000: 13,100-13300 dead
(at least 3375 civilians, approximately 4150 Ukrainian military and approximately 5,700
members of armed groups); and 29,500-33500 wounded (7000-9000 civilians, 9700-
10700 Ukrainian military and 12700-13700 members of armed groups), "the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said in response to a request from Radio
Svoboda.
SEE ALSO:
The militants used grenade launchers and
machine guns in the Donbass - 00S
During the entire period of the conflict, from April 14, 2014 to January 31, 2021, civilians
accounted for 25-26 percent of the total number of people killed in the conflict (3375 out
of 13100-13300). The same ratio applies to injuries.
It should be noted that this ratio has changed significantly over the years: from 33-34
percent in 2014 (one civilian killed for two killed Ukrainian soldiers or members of
armed groups), to 4-5 percent in 2019-2020: one civilian , killed in artillery shelling, fire
from SZLO (small arms and light weapons - ed.) and incidents involving mines on 20-22
Ukrainian soldiers or members of armed groups killed in artillery shelling, fire from
SZLO and incidents "related to mines," the UN said.
According to the UN, the statistics of military deaths include cases not directly related to
hostilities, in particular, due to careless handling of weapons, traffic accidents, diseases
while serving in the conflict zone, murders and suicides, which are about 30 percent of
the total.
SEE ALSO:
Zelensky convenes the National Security and
Defense Council. What can be prepared for
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-oon-kst-gertv-boyovyh-donbas/31110937.html 1/2
- 399 -
4/13/22, 2:23 PM The UN has counted the number of victims of hostilities in Donbass
Donbass?
It is also reported that in 2019 and 2020, up to 40 percent of military deaths in the
conflict zone are caused by disease, murder, suicide, traffic accidents and other noncombat
causes. They are not included in the specified ratio.
Fighting in eastern Ukraine began after Russia illegally annexed Crimea, and pro-
Russian militants backed by it began seizing government offices and storming military
units in the Donbas.
Ukraine and the West accuse Russia of armed support for the militants. The EU, the
United States and other countries have imposed economic and political sanctions on
Russia.
The Kremlin denies the allegations and says there may be "Russian volunteers" in
Donbas.
© Radio Liberty, 2022 I All rights reserved.
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-oon-kst-gertv-boyovyh-donbas/31110937.html 2/2
- 400 -
Annex 171
Timofey Sergeytsev, What Should Russia Do With Ukraine?, Ria Novosti
(3 April 2022)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 401 -
- 402 -
What Should Russia Do With Ukraine?
RIA NOVOSTI
08:00 April 3, 2022 Seen by 1,170,867
© RIA Novosti / Ivan Rodionov / Go to photo bank
Flags of Ukraine and “The Right Sector”* found in the former location of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine near Mariupol. Archive photo.
Timofey Sergeytsev
Even back in April of last year, we wrote about the inevitability of the denazification of Ukraine.
We do not need Nazi, Bandera Ukraine, an enemy of Russia and a tool of the West to destroy
Russia. Today, the issue of denazification has moved into a practical plane.
- 403 -
Denazification is necessary when a significant part of the people - most likely the majority - has
been mastered and drawn by the Nazi regime in its politics. That is, when the hypothesis "the
people are good - the government is bad" does not work. Recognition of this fact is the basis of
the policy of denazification, of all its measures, and the fact itself is its subject matter.
Russia is responsible for Ukraine
Ukraine is in just such a situation. The fact that the Ukrainian voter voted for the "peace of
Poroshenko" and "peace of Zelensky" should not be misleading - the Ukrainians were quite
satisfied with the shortest path to peace through the blitzkrieg, which the last two Ukrainian
presidents transparently hinted at when they were elected. It was this method of "appeasement"
of internal anti-fascists - through the total terror - that was used in Odessa, Kharkov,
Dnepropetrovsk, Mariupol, and other Russian cities. And this quite suited an average Ukrainian.
Denazification is a set of measures in relation to the nazified volume of the population, which
technically cannot be subjected to direct punishment as war criminals.
The Nazis who took up arms should be destroyed to the maximum on the battlefield. No
significant distinction should be made between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the so-called
national battalions, as well as the territorial defense that joined these two types of military
formations. All of them are equally involved in extreme cruelty against the civilian population,
equally guilty of the genocide of the Russian people, and do not comply with the laws and
customs of war. War criminals and active Nazis should be exemplarily and publically punished.
There must be a total lustration. Any organizations that have associated themselves with the
practice of Nazism have been liquidated and banned. However, in addition to the top, a
significant part of the people, which are passive Nazis, accomplices of Nazism, are also guilty.
They supported and indulged Nazi power. The just punishment of this part of the population is
possible only through suffering the inevitable hardships of a just war against the Nazi system,
carried out with the utmost care and discretion in relation to civilians. Further denazification of
this mass of the population consists in re-education, which is achieved by ideological repression
(suppression) of Nazi attitudes and strict censorship: not only in the political sphere, but also
obligatory in the sphere of culture and education. It was through culture and education that a
deep mass nazification of the population was prepared and carried out, secured by the promise of
dividends from the victory of the Nazi regime over Russia, Nazi propaganda, internal violence
and terror, as well as the eight-year war with the people of Donbass who rebelled against
Ukrainian Nazism.
Denazification can only be carried out by the winner, which implies (1) his absolute control over
the denazification process and (2) the power to ensure such control. In this respect, a denazified
country cannot be sovereign. The denazifying state - Russia - cannot proceed from a liberal
approach with regard to denazification. The ideology of the denazifier cannot be disputed by the
guilty party subjected to denazification. Russia's recognition of the need to denazify Ukraine
means the recognition of the impossibility of the Crimean scenario for Ukraine as a whole.
- 404 -
However, this scenario was not possible in 2014 in the rebellious Donbass either. Only the eight
years of resistance to Nazi violence and terror led to internal cohesion and a conscious
unambiguous mass refusal to maintain any unity and connection with Ukraine, which defined
itself as a Nazi society.
The period of denazification can in no way be less than one generation, which must be born,
grow up and reach maturity under the conditions of denazification. The nazification of Ukraine
continued for more than 30 years, beginning at least in 1989, when Ukrainian nationalism
received legal and legitimate forms of political expression and led the movement for
"independence", moving towards Nazism.
The peculiarity of modern nazified Ukraine is in amorphousness and ambivalence, which allow
Nazism to be disguised as a desire for "independence" and a "European" (Western, pro-
American) path of "development" (in reality - to degradation), to assert that in Ukraine "there is
no Nazism, only private individual excesses". After all, there is no main Nazi party, no Fuhrer,
no full-fledged racial laws (only their truncated version in the form of repressions against the
Russian language). As a result, there is no opposition and resistance to the regime.
However, all of the above does not make Ukrainian Nazism a "light version" of German Nazism
during the first half of the 20th century. On the contrary, since Ukrainian Nazism is free from
such "genre" (essentially political technology) frameworks and restrictions, it freely unfolds as
the fundamental basis of any Nazism - as European and, in its most developed form, American
racism. Therefore, denazification cannot be carried out as a compromise, on the basis of a
formula like " NATO - no, EU - yes." The collective West itself is the designer, source and
sponsor of Ukrainian Nazism, while the Western Bandera cadres and their "historical memory"
are just one of the tools for the Nazisification of Ukraine. Ukronazism carries not less, but a
greater threat to the world and Russia, than the Hitler’s version of the German Nazism.
The name "Ukraine" apparently cannot be retained as the title of any fully denazified state entity
in a territory liberated from the Nazi regime. The people's republics newly created in the space
free from Nazism should and will grow from the practice of economic self-government and
social security, restoration and modernization of systems that support life of the population.
In fact, their political aspirations cannot be neutral - expiation of guilt before Russia for treating
it as an enemy can be realized only by relying on Russia in the processes of restoration, revival
and development. No "Marshall Plans" should be allowed for these territories. There can be no
"neutrality" in the ideological and practical sense, compatible with denazification. The cadres
and organizations that are the instrument of denazification in the newly denazified republics
cannot but rely on Russia's direct military and organizational support.
- 405 -
Denazification will inevitably also be a de-Ukrainization - a rejection of the large-scale artificial
increase of the ethnic component of self-identification of the population of the territories of
historical Little Russia and New Russia, begun by the Soviet authorities. Being an instrument of
the communist superpower, after its fall, artificial ethnocentrism did not remain ownerless. In
this official capacity, it passed under the authority of another superpower (the power standing
over the states) — the superpower of the West. It must be returned to its natural boundaries and
deprived of political functionality.
Unlike, for example, Georgia and the Baltic countries, Ukraine, as history has shown, is
impossible as a nation state, and attempts to "build" one naturally lead to Nazism. Ukrainism is
an artificial anti-Russian construction that does not have its own civilizational content, a
subordinate element of an alien and foreign civilization. Debanderization by itself will not be
enough for denazification - the Bandera element is only a tool and a screen, a disguise for the
European project of Nazi Ukraine, therefore the denazification of Ukraine means also its
inevitable de-Europeanization.
The Bandera elite must be eliminated, its re-education is impossible. The social "swamp", which
actively and passively supported it by action and inaction, must survive the hardships of the war
and assimilate the experience as a historical lesson and atonement for its guilt. Those who did
not support the Nazi regime, suffered from it and from the war unleashed by it in the Donbass,
must be consolidated and organized, must become the vertical and horizontal pillar of the new
government. Historical experience shows that the tragedies and dramas of wartime benefit
peoples who have been tempted and carried away by the role of an enemy of Russia.
Denazification as the goal of a special military operation within the framework of this operation
itself is understood as a military victory over the Kiev regime, the liberation of territories from
armed supporters of the Nazis, the elimination of implacable Nazis, the capture of war criminals,
and the creation of systemic conditions for the subsequent denazification in peacetime.
The latter, in turn, should begin with the organization of local self-government, militia and
defense bodies, cleansed of Nazi elements, launching on their basis the processes of founding a
new republican statehood, integrating this statehood into close cooperation with the Russian
department for the denazification of Ukraine (newly created or converted, say, from
Rossotrudnichestvo [Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States
Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation]), with the
adoption, under Russian control, of the republican regulatory framework (legislation) on
denazification, the definition of the boundaries and framework for the direct application of
Russian law and Russian jurisdiction in the liberated territory in the field of denazification, the
creation of a tribunal for crimes against humanity in the former Ukraine. In this regard, Russia
should act as the guardian of the Nuremberg Trials.
- 406 -
All of the above means that in order to achieve the goals of denazification, the support of the
population is necessary, its transition to the side of Russia after liberation from terror, violence
and ideological pressure of the Kiev regime, after the withdrawal from informational isolation.
Of course, it will take some time for people to recover from the shock of hostilities, to be
convinced of Russia's long-term intentions - that "they will not be abandoned." It is impossible to
foresee in advance exactly in which territories such a mass of the population will constitute a
critically needed majority. The "Catholic province" (Western Ukraine as part of five regions) is
unlikely to become part of the pro-Russian territories. The dividing line, however, will be found
empirically. Behind it will remain hostile to Russia, but forcibly neutral and demilitarized
Ukraine with formally banned Nazism. The haters of Russia will go there. The threat of an
immediate continuation of the military operation in case of non-compliance with the listed
requirements should serve as the guarantee of the preservation of this residual Ukraine in a
neutral state. Perhaps this will require a permanent Russian military presence on its territory.
From the dividing line to the Russian border there will be a territory of potential integration into
the Russian civilization, which is anti-fascist in its internal nature.
The operation to denazify Ukraine, which began with a military phase, will follow the same logic
of stages in peacetime as a military operation. At each of them, it will be necessary to achieve
irreversible changes, which will become the results of the corresponding stage. In this case, the
necessary initial steps of denazification can be defined as follows:
—liquidation of armed Nazi formations (which means any armed formations of Ukraine,
including the Armed Forces of Ukraine), as well as the military, informational, educational
infrastructure that supports their activity;
—the formation of public self-government bodies and militia (defense and law enforcement) of
the liberated territories, protecting the population from the terror of underground Nazi groups;
—installation of the Russian information space;
—the withdrawal of educational materials and the prohibition of educational programs at all
levels containing Nazi ideological guidelines;
—mass investigative actions to establish personal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, the spread of Nazi ideology and support for the Nazi regime;
—lustration, publication of the names of accomplices of the Nazi regime, involving them in
forced labor to restore the destroyed infrastructure as punishment for Nazi activities (from
among those who will not be subject to the death penalty or imprisonment);
- 407 -
—the adoption at the local level, under the supervision of Russia, of primary legislative acts of
denazification "from below", a ban on all types and forms of the revival of Nazi ideology;
—the establishment of memorials, commemorative signs, monuments to the victims of
Ukrainian Nazism, perpetuating the memory of the heroes of the struggle against it;
—the inclusion of a complex of anti-fascist and denazification norms in the constitutions of the
new people's republics;
—creation of permanent denazification bodies for a period of 25 years.
Russia will have no allies in the denazification of Ukraine. Since this is a purely Russian
business. And also because not just the Bandera version of Nazi Ukraine will be eradicated, but
also, and above all, the Western totalitarianism, the imposed programs of civilizational
degradation and disintegration, the mechanisms of subjugation to the superpower of the West
and the United States .
In order to put the plan of denazification of Ukraine into practice, Russia itself will have to
finally part with pro-European and pro-Western illusions, and realize itself as the last instance of
protecting and preserving those values of historical Europe (the Old World) that deserve it and
which the West ultimately abandoned, losing the fight for himself. This struggle continued
throughout the 20th century and was expressed in the world war and the Russian revolution,
inextricably linked with each other.
Russia did everything possible to save the West in the 20th century. It implemented the main
Western project, an alternative to capitalism, which won the nation-states - the socialist, red
project. It crushed German Nazism, the monstrous offspring of the crisis of the Western
civilization. The last act of Russian altruism was the outstretched hand of friendship from Russia,
for which Russia received a monstrous blow in the 1990s.
Everything that Russia has done for the West, it has done at its own expense, by making the
greatest sacrifices. The West ultimately rejected all these sacrifices, devalued Russia's
contribution to resolving the Western crisis, and decided to take revenge on Russia for the help
that it selflessly provided. Going forward, Russia will go by its own way, not worrying about the
fate of the West, relying on another part of its heritage - leadership in the global process of
decolonization.
As part of this process, Russia has a high potential for partnerships and alliances with countries
that the West has oppressed for centuries and which are not going to put on its yoke again.
Without Russian sacrifice and struggle, these countries would not have been liberated. The
denazification of Ukraine is at the same time its decolonization, which the population of Ukraine
- 408 -
will have to understand as it begins to free itself from the intoxication, temptation and
dependence of the so-called European choice.
* An extremist organization banned in Russia.
Source: https://ria.ru/20220403/ukraina-1781469605.html
- 409 -
- 410 -
Annex 172
Kultura.RF, Houses of Culture and Clubs of Krasnoperekopsky District, Ministry
of Culture of Russia (2022)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 411 -
- 412 -
3/17/22, 10:24 AM Крымскотатарский культурный центр с. Воинка. Подробная информация: расписание, фото, адрес и т. д. на официально…
https://www.culture.ru/institutes/31442/krymskotatarskii-kulturnyi-centr-s-voinka 1/2
Crimean Tatar cultural center with. Warrior
Rep. Crimea, Krasnoperekopsky district, with. Voinka, st. Lenina, d. 54
Houses of culture and clubs of Krasnoperekopsky district
To the Rymsko-Tatar cultural center with. Voinka was established in 2014 by renaming the
Military Rural House of Culture, which was opened in 1985 for the 100th anniversary of the
village of Voinka.
Today the Crimean Tatar cultural center with. Voinka is the leisure center of the Military rural
settlement. There are 12 art circles and two hobby clubs for the villagers. A large number of
events are held annually, folk holidays and mass folk festivals held in the village are very
popular. Collectives of amateur performances take an active part in the creative life of the
settlement, as well as in regional and republican competitions and festivals, are their laureates
and diplomats.
The work of the Crimean Tatar cultural center with. The military can be divided into several
main areas:
- 413 -
3/17/22, 10:24 AM Крымскотатарский культурный центр с. Воинка. Подробная информация: расписание, фото, адрес и т. д. на официально…
https://www.culture.ru/institutes/31442/krymskotatarskii-kulturnyi-centr-s-voinka 2/2
TAGS: folk culture National cultures Ещё...
SEE ALSO
activities for youth, work with children and adolescents;
concert activity of amateur art groups;
work on the preservation and development of folk traditions, holidays and rituals.
Kultura.RF is a humanitarian educational project dedicated to the culture of Russia. We talk about interesting and
significant events and people in the history of literature, architecture, music, cinema, theater, as well as folk
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- 414 -
Annex 173
Denys Karlovsky, Occupiers in the Occupied Territories Are FightingWith
the History Books, Pravda (24March 2022)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 415 -
- 416 -
OCCUPATION
Most of the deputies of the Cit
Council of Energodar ha e
resigned
The Ukrainian Armed F ces
destroyed a large Russian ship:
thousands of tons of fuel and
ammunition were burning
The oc upiers want to turn the w
into a "protracted phase" - OP
LATEST NEW
23:2
Shmygal invited IFC to join the
reconstruction of Ukraine
23:13
Zelensky returns to the liberated
Ukrainian cities
23:05
In the e st and south, the f e of
our state is being decided -
Zelensky
22: 9
Russia's st ements on Donb s
have acknowledged the failure of
its plans for Ukraine - British
intelligenc
22: 5
Zelensky formulated the dr am of
the Russians: "steal the toilet and
die
22: 3
The Ministry of Defense of the
Russian Federation counted a
many as one lost on the sunken
"Moscow"
22: 2
The Zaporizhzh a O A named the
cause of the AN-26 cr sh
22:33
"This is not toilet paper":
Ukrposhta CEO explains why there
will be no new cir ation of the
brand with the ship
22:
The EU is pr aring to hit Putin
with a new pack ge of sanctions -
Politico
22:
The EU has blocked a total of 35
billion euros in Russian assets
ALL NEWS ...
51606
The occupiers in the occupied
territories are fighting with history
textbooks, Stus and Bander
DENIS KARLOVSKY - THURSDAY, MARCH 24, 2022, 18:11
V. KIPIANI'S BOOK "THE CASE OF VASYL STUS" IN THE COURTROOM IN 20 PHO O: GETTY IMA S
The Russian occupiers in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine
confiscate from textbooks and destroy school textbooks on the history of the
book, as well as books about Vasily Stus and Simon Petliura.
Source : telegram channel of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry
of Defense of Ukraine
Literally : "In the libraries of the temporarily occupied territories of Luhansk,
Donetsk, Chernihiv and Sumy regions, the seizure of Ukrainian historical and
fiction literature has begun, which does not coincide with the postulates of
Kremli propaganda.
The police are most interested in books on the history of Ukrainian Maidans,
ATO / OOS, and the history of Ukrainian liberation struggles. "Extremist"
literature includes school textbooks on Ukrainian history, scientific and
popular historical literature. "
Details : In addition, the occupiers compiled a list of famous Ukrainians whose
mentions should be erased. In particular, among them:
Ukrainian intelligence has noted that Russian invaders confiscated a book by
historian Vakhtang Kipiani, The Case of Vasyl Stus, "from the captured
Rubizhne and Kreminna in the Luhansk region, as well as in Hrodna in the
Chernihiv region.
The seizure and destruction of books are carried out by units of the Russian
"military police", which perform ideological tasks other than repressive ones.
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Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army in 1687-1709 Ivan Mazepa;
Simon Petliura, head of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic
during the Liberation War of 1917-1921;
Stepan Bandera, head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in
Poland and a prisoner of German concentration camps;
Roman Shukhevych, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
and chairman of the Ukrainian nationalist resistance in 1943-1950;
Soviet dissident, political prisoner and chairman of the People's Movement
of Ukraine, Hero of Ukraine Vyacheslav Chornovil.
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- 417 -
The GUR reports that the Russians are trying to establish occupation
administrations and are looking for ATO / OOS veterans and patriotic citizens
in the captured cities.
In Starobilsk, Luhansk region, the Russian occupation administration is trying
to put Russian rubles into circulation for settlements by citizens.
It will be recalled that in the 1930s, members of the National Socialist Workers'
Party of Germany, led by Adolf Hitler, burned books in German cities that
contradicted the ideology of the Nazi Reich. In particular, works of art by
prominent German writers Franz Kafka, Thomas Mann, Heinrich Heine, Erich
Maria Remarque, etc. were burned.
Prehistory:
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In the fall of 2020, Viktor Medvedchuk, a People's Deputy from the
Opposition Platform For Life faction and godfather of the Russian
president, filed a lawsuit against Kipiani's book The Case of Vasyl Stus. The
politician disagreed with the historian's coverage of his involvement in the
political imprisonment and assassination of Ukrainian poet and dissident
Stus. After an intermediate victory in court, the Ukrainians bought out the
entire edition of the book in one day.
Journalists learned about the plans of the Russian special services for the
great terror in captured Kherson. The invaders plan to forcibly deport to
Russia all those who oppose the Russian occupation of the city.
In the Chernihiv region, the occupiers handed out propaganda leaflets to
the population, saying that the Russian army allegedly "does not fight the
civilian population" but "brings peace and comfort."
In the occupied Crimea, Russians are preparing cells in jails for Ukrainians
who will be forcibly deported from the occupied southern regions of
Ukraine.
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- 418 -
Annex 174
M. Kanarskaya, The temple of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate in
Perevalne was taken away. In whose favor?, Krym.Realii (1 June 2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 419 -
- 420 -
- 421 -
- 422 -
- 423 -
- 424 -
Annex 175
Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, The Ministry of Culture
Conducts Certification of Amateur Groups of Crimea (9 December 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 425 -
- 426 -
The Ministry of Culture conducts certification of amateur
groups of Crimea
mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/1896
09.12.2015
The Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea continues the certification of amateur art
groups-applicants in order to confer the title of "folk", "exemplary" group, studio of the
Republic of Crimea.
Certification of teams-applicants for the titles of "people's", "exemplary" is carried out by the
certification commission in accordance with the approved schedule .
So, the next attestation work was carried out in the city of Krasnoperekopsk and the
Krasnoperekopsky district on the basis of the Municipal Budgetary Institution of Culture of
the Republic of Crimea "Krasnoperekopsky City Palace of Culture".
The groups, which are very popular with the audience and are constantly working to increase
their creative potential, during the certification presented concert programs in accordance
with the Regulations .
Seven creative teams took part in the certification: the Ice-Crim modern dance ensemble
(headed by Inna Kurilich), the AzArt Theater for Young Spectators (headed by Lyudmila
Timoshenko), the Mandarin pop song theater studio (headed by Valentina Shpareva) of the
Municipal Budgetary Institution culture of the Republic of Crimea "Krasnoperekopsky City
Palace of Culture"; the Crimean Tatar dance ensemble "Arzu" (headed by Elvina Aliyeva), the
vocal and instrumental ensemble "Phaeton" (headed by Seyar Adzhiumerov) of the structural
unit No. 3 "Crimean Tatar cultural center with. Voinka" of the Municipal Budgetary
Institution of Culture of the Republic of Crimea "Center for Folk Art of the Krasnoperekopsky
District"; dance ensemble "Molodist" of the structural unit No. 6 of the "Krasnoarmeisky
rural House of Culture" of the Municipal Budgetary Institution of Culture of the Republic of
Crimea "Center for Folk Art of the Krasnoperekopsky District" (head Irina Zhikhareva); vocal
and instrumental ensemble "Jannet" of the structural unit No. 5 "Ishunsky rural House of
Culture" of the Municipal Budgetary Institution of Culture of the Republic of Crimea "Center
for Folk Art of the Krasnoperekopsky District" (headed by Riza Alitarov).
Based on the results of the attestation, the draft decision will be submitted for consideration
by the Collegium of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea.
- 427 -
- 428 -
Annex 176
Appeal of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People to All Residents of Crimea
(Simferopol) (7 October 1992)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 429 -
- 430 -
February 25, 2022, 2:22 PM APPEAL
APPEAL
OF THE MEJLIS OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE
TO ALL RESIDENTS OF CRIMEA.
OCTOBER 7, 1992, SIMFEROPOL.
Fellow citizens!
The bloody massacre committed by the Crimean authorities on
October 1, 1992 in the village of Krasny Rai over a group of
defenseless Crimean Tatars has overwhelmed the patience of
hundreds of thousands of people who are constantly being bullied
and humiliated by the authorities. On October 5 and 6, 1992,
Crimean Tatars held mass protests in Simferopol against
arbitrariness. The main purpose of these actions was to bring the
organizers of the pogrom in the village of Krasny Rai to personal
criminal responsibility and to achieve the release of 26 hostages
of the Crimean Tatars.
These protests were directed exclusively against the
arbitrariness of the Crimean authorities. We are trying to force
the Crimean authorities to stop the policy of inciting Crimean
residents of different nationalities against each other, which is
dangerous for all of us. We are consistent in implementing the
decisions of the Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar people, which
unequivocally stated that the path to the full restoration of the
rights of the Crimean Tatar people lies through respect for the
legitimate rights and interests of all residents of Crimea,
regardless of their nationality. We seek and will seek the
restoration of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people only in such
forms that do not pose any danger or threat to citizens, no matter
what nationality they belong to.
Do not believe the false statements of the authorities that
allegedly the Crimean Tatar people and its highest authorized
representative body — the Mejlis — poses a threat to the population
of Crimea. This is another attempt by the authorities to pit the
residents of Crimea against each other and, using this, continue
to create lawlessness and arbitrariness in Crimea.
We appeal to people's deputies of the Crimea at all levels,
to those who really take to heart all the problems of Crimea and
its inhabitants.
We urge you to look together for ways and mechanisms to
resolve these problems.
We are convinced that only our joint efforts will allow all
of us to maintain peace and prosperity in Crimea.
Output data.
- 431 -
- 432 -
Annex 177
Video Footage of the Detention of Crimean Tatars (2 October 2017)
- 433 -
- 434 -
Annex 178
FSB Video Footage of the Detention of Crimean Tatars in Simferopol (23 November 2017)
- 435 -
- 436 -
Annex 179
Letter from S.V. Krivenko, Member of the Council Under the President of Russia
for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights to the Chairman of the
Council under the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Civil
Society and Human Rights M.A. Fedotov, excerpted for translation from Ukraine’s
Memorial, Annex 949
This excerpt has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the
whole document has been deposited with the Registry.
- 437 -
- 438 -
Annex 3
To the Chairman of the Council under the President of the Russian Federation
for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights
M.A. Fedotov
Dear Mikhail Alexandrovich!
The Human Rights Working Group in Crimea of the Council under the President of the
Russian Federation for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights received and
considered an appeal about mass searches in certain settlements of Crimea in the first half of April
of this year and human rights violations that accompanied these events.
We are referencing the events that took place on the territory of Crimea from April 2 to
April 10 as part of the operational strategic exercises "Barrier-2015" of the internal troops of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.
A certain concern is caused by the fact that the exercises affected settlements with a
predominantly Crimean Tatar population.
Thus in the village of Zhuravki, of the Kirov District, in which about 500 Crimean Tatars
live, on April 2, at 9:00, checkpoints were set up on all three roads leading to the village (from
Pervomaiskoe, Kirovskoe and Privetnoye). The servicemen of the traffic police and riot police
stopped all passing cars at checkpoints, and checked the documents of passengers. There is
evidence of a "differentiated approach": people of Slavic appearance only had their documents
checked, while Crimean Tatars were escorted home where the so-called "inspections" were carried
out (essentially, searches in their houses). In total, there were 5 buses, 10 police cars and 5 utility
vehicles in the village. All of them were filled with people with machine guns, dogs and riot police.
Helicopters flew over the village. Full searches took place in at least 10 houses. At least in two of
them computer system blocks were seized. In addition to private houses, a number of public places
were searched - for example, a gym, shops. All these activities continued until about 14:00. At the
same time, no explanation of the purpose and grounds for what was happening was given to the
residents.
Similar actions, including searches in about 10 houses, also took place on April 3 in the
village of Yarkoe Pole approximately from 9:00 to 13:30.
Reports on similar events were also received from the settlements of Shchelkovo, Lenino,
Battalionnoe, Semisotka, Voikovo, Bagerovo, in the area of Simferopol Fountains and in Saki. In
these settlements, "exercises" followed the same scenario. About 100-150 servicemen of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs came to a village: servicemen of the internal troops, district police
officers, riot police officers, traffic police, all of them were armed. On all roads leading to the
village or from the village, sandbags were installed, in some cases (at least in two villages) -
machine guns, auto-blockers. Passing cars were checked for documents, and searched. In some
cases the total check was done; in other cases - only a random check. In the case of a random
check, law enforcement officers paid special attention to the Crimean Tatars.
- 439 -
Residents of Crimean settlements note that they were not informed about the “exercises”,
and learned that the ongoing events were exercises only from press reports after the start of the
“exercises”.
It seems that “exercises” conducted in this way do not create a sense of security among
citizens, but, on the contrary, contribute to escalating tension, fear and a sense of insecurity, which
can ultimately lead to an aggravation of interethnic relations and an increase in citizens' distrust of
the authorities of the Russian Federation.
I ask you to send an appeal to the relevant state authorities of the Russian Federation in
order to clarify the legal status of these exercises and to check the legality and validity of the
actions of employees of the internal affairs bodies and military personnel of the internal troops
during these exercises on the territory of Crimea.
Sincerely,
Member of the Council under the President of Russia for the Development of Civil Society and
Human Rights S.V. Krivenko
- 440 -
Annex 180
Certificate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate No. 390
(3 July 2017)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
- 441 -
- 442 -
UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
KYIV PATRIARCHY
OFFICE
36 Pushkinska St. tel. (044) 234-10-96
the city of Kyiv, 01004 tel./fax (044) 234-30-55
______________________________________________________________________________
__
3 July 2017 No. 390
CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that Archbishop of Simferopol and Crimea KLYMENT, secular name
Kushch Pavlo Mykolayovych, was appointed as the head of Crimean Eparchy based on the
decision of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchy, log No. 7
of 6 July 2000.
The Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchy is
present on the territory of Crimea since 1996.
The certificate is issued to whom it may concern.
MANAGER OF [Seal] ARCHBISHOP OF VYSHHOROD
THE KYIV PATRIARCHY [Signed] AHAPIT (HUMENYUK)
- 443 -
- 444 -
Annex 181
Certificate of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
No. 064-3 (20 March 2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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- 446 -
UKRAINE
AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
Council of the Ministers
_________________________________________________________________
Kirov Avenue, 13 phone: 27-42-10
the city of Simferopol, 95005 fax: 24-80-20 email:
[email protected]
No. 064-3 of 20 March 2014
CERTIFCATE
This is to certify that His Eminence KLIMENT, the Archbishop of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), by the Office of the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, has been entrusted with full
responsibility for the safety and operation of all facilities of the UOC-KP on the
territory of the Republic of Crimea.
For the information of all officials of the Republic of Crimea, it is certified
that any actions aimed at illegal seizure of property of the UOC-KP and its individual
representatives on the territory of the republic that have not been agreed with the
office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea will
be considered illegal and prosecuted in accordance with the law.
In the event of disputable and conflict situations, His Eminence Archbishop
KLIMENT is vested with the right of personal appeal to the Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea Serhii Aksenov.
The legal status of the Diocese of the UOC-KP in the Republic of Crimea will
be determined during additional negotiations between the Government of the
Republic of Crimea and the Office of the Diocese of the UOC-KP.
Advisor to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for Defense and Security
Colonel I.I. Strelkov
20 March, 2014 [Signed]
[Seal: Council of Ministers of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea
Service Department of the Head of Council]
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Annex 182
State Statistical Services of Ukraine, “Zahal’noosvitni navchal’ni zaklady Ukraïny na
pochatok 2013/14 navchal’noho roku,” sheet 64
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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c3-i-cd-%51'tc_cli r`cori „ 6 61-4
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1
DISTRIBUTION OF DAYTIME AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 2013/2014
2 ACADEMIC YEAR BY LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION
3
4
5
Total schools, units1
Of these, having the following language of instruction2 Share of schools having the following
language of instruction, %
6
7
8
9 Ukrainian Russian several Ukrainian Russian
11 Ukraine 18.699 16.045 1.275 1.205 85.8 6.8
12
Autonomous Republic of
13 Crimea 558 7 354 181 1.3 63.4
14 Vinnytsia 877 872 - 5 99.4 -
15 Volyn 761 760 - 1 99.9 -
16 Dnipropetrovsk 973 846 102 25 86.9 10.5
17 Donetsk 1.067 472 204 391 44.2 19.1
18 Zhytomyr 786 783 - 3 99.6 -
19 Zakarpattia 658 540 1 38 82.1 0.2
20 Zaporizhzhia 589 453 84 52 76.9 14.3
21 Ivano-Frankivsk 719 718 - 1 99.9 -
22 Kyiv 733 723 - 10 98.6 -
23 Kirovohrad 528 519 4 5 98.3 0.8
24 Luhansk 667 309 156 202 46.3 23.4
25 Lviv 1.382 1.371 5 2 99.2 0.4
26 Mykolaiv 542 520 15 7 95.9 2.8
27 Odesa 851 594 112 140 69.8 13.2
28 Poltava 685 677 1 7 98.8 0.1
29 Rivne 664 664 - - 100.0 -
30 Sumy 521 501 14 6 96.2 2.7
31 Ternopil 844 843 - 1 99.9 -
32 Kharkiv 823 637 122 64 77.4 14.8
33 Kherson 464 422 30 12 90.9 6.5
34 Khmelnytsky 791 783 1 6 99.0 0.1
35 Cherkasy 631 627 1 3 99.4 0.2
36 Chernivtsi 427 340 1 17 79.6 0.2
37 Chernihiv 613 611 - 14 99.7 -
38 Kyiv 474 452 8 10 95.4 1.7
39 Sevastopol 71 1 60 10 1.4 84.5
40 1 Does not include special schools (boarding schools) and sanatorium schools.
41
2 In addition, in 12 schools in Zakarpattia Region and in 69 schools in Chernivtsi Region the language of instruction is Romanian, in 67 schools in Zakarpattia Region -
Hungarian, in 15 schools in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea the language of instruction is Crimean Tatar language and in 1 school - English, in 4 schools in Lviv
Region and in 1 school in Khmelnytsky Region the language of instruction is Polish, in 5 schools in Odesa Region the language of instruction is Moldovan.
Ukrainian 16,045
Russian 1,275
Several languages 1,205
Other languages 174
18,699
85.3
6.8
- 6.5
0.9
100.0
Secondary schools in Ukraine at the beginning of the 2013-2014 academic year
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Annex 183
Social Media Page (VKontakte) with March 2014 Photo, excerpted for translation
from Russia's Counter-Memorial Part II, Annex 306
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
Annex 183
Social Media Page (VKontakte) with 21 March 2014 Photo, excerpted for translation
from Russia’s Counter-Memorial Part II, Annex 306
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
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- 454 -
2017, p. 4
Russia's Counter-Memorial Part II, Annex Screeoshot No. 5 in the "Records" section, there is a hoto of 21 March 2014 with Nazi symbols
https://vk.com/id 193426780? - hoto-6649204 326118305%2 wal1193426780 535
• • • • •
IMIIIMMT/111,11PAMM welzgrirywr3w. EBEINIIIIIIME I
rt uobrii-F, ribITNI4
Et;VI•44b4X MYCYAhMI114
ATAKTAWAlit, .
1
In the course of the inspection, electronic copies of the web page il tips://vk.com/id 193426780" and
the "desktop and time" submenu were made on 6 pages, which were printed with an HP LaserJet PI 102
printer on 6 pages and certified by signatures of those present.
1. /Signature/ (Ponomarev)
/Signature/ 2. /Signature/ (Samsonova)
[T]PEBYEM HEMEATIEHHO [O]CTAHOBHTI3 IMITKR [H]EBREIHIDC MYCYJII3MAH
[T]ATAPCTAHA !!! YKF'AITRA. lebIM
LTKRAINE. TATAPM BOH YI3 lebIMA.
Excerpt from Centre for Countering Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the
Republic of Crimea, Certificate of inspection of the Internet resource, 9 January (Russia’s 306).
Translation
WE DEMAND TO IMMEDIATELY STOP TORTURES OF INNOCENT MUSLIMS OF
TATARSTAN !!! UKRAINE. CRIMEA
TATARS GET OUT OF CRIMEA!
- 455 -
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Annex 184
Crimean Tatar Resource Center, The Russian Federation Systematically Destroys
Freedom of Speech in Crimea - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (4 May
2020)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Crimean Tatar Resource Center, The Russian Federation Systematically Destroys
Freedom of Speech in Crimea - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of (4 May
2020)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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- 458 -
3/10/22, 12:51 AM The Russian Federation systematically destroys freedom of speech in Crimea -Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine I CTRC
CRIMEAN TATAR
RESOURCE CENTER
(/en)
CRIMEAN TATAR
RESOURCE CENTER
QT (Iqt) I UA (luk) I EN len I RU (In,)
+38 067 343 74 54 (tel:+380673437454)
+38 044 489 61 25 (tel:+380444896125)
SHOP
Home (/m) / News (/en/news) / The Russian Federation systematically destroys freedom of speech in Crimea -Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victims of the occupation of Ukraine of Crimea
The Russian Federation systematically
destroys freedom of speech in Crimea -
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
4 May 2020
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls on the Russian authorities to release the Crimean Tatar independent journalists
Remzi Bekirov, Osman Arifmemetov, Rustem Sheykhaliev, Nariman Memedeminov, human rights activist Server
Mustafayev and remove all the unlawful charges.
e••••- - .0. -
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238 political prisoners and persecuted in
the criminal cases over the occupation
period of Crimea, 169 of them are the
representatives of the Crimean Tatar
people
Sentenced ands... 1/5 ►
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Show more charts (/enlzhertvyokkupacii)
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3/10/22, 12:51 AM The Russian Federation systematically destroys freedom of speech in Crimea -Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine | CTRC
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Home (/en) / News (/en/news) / The Russian Federation systematically destroys freedom of speech in Crimea -Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Ukraine
4 May 2020
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls on the Russian Remzi Bekirov, Osman Arifmemetov, Rustem Sheykhaliev, Nariman
(/en)
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- 459 -
3/10/22, 12:51 AM The Russian Federation systematically destroys freedom of speech in Crimea -Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine I CTRC
"In order to hide from the world the real situation in the temporarily occupied Crimea, the Russian occupation
administration introduced an information ghetto from the beginning of the occupation — it systematically destroys
freedom of speech on the peninsula, harasses and imprisons journalists and bloggers under the pretext of
combating extremism or separatism and impedes their work in every way possible",- the message claimed.
Of the 3 thousand media outlets that officially operated on the peninsula until 2014, only 232 were able to re-register at
the request of the invaders. Thus, Russia actually deprived the population of the opportunity to hear an alternative
opinion, blocking signals from Ukrainian radio stations and access to online publications.
Classification of people,
responsible for human
rights violations in the
occupied Crimea
CLASSIFICATION
FSB empl... • Employee...
Prosecutors • Judges
• Court secr... — Experts /...
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"We call on the international community to take decisive actions against the abolition of freedom of speech and
gross violation of human rights of the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied Crimea. We express full
support to journalists, bloggers and all those who, despite repressions, are not afraid to publicly express their
citizenship", the Foreign Ministry added.
(https://vk.com/share.php?url=https%3A%2F%2Fctrcenter. org%2Fen%2Fnews%2F431741-sistematicheski-unichtozhaet-svobodu-s al
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| /
“In order to hide from the world the real situation in the temporarily occupied Crimea, the Russian occupation
administration introduced an information ghetto from the beginning of the occupation – it systematically destroys
freedom of speech on the peninsula, harasses and imprisons journalists and bloggers under the pretext of
combating extremism or separatism and impedes their work in every way possible”,- the message claimed.
Of the 3 thousand media outlets that officially operated on the peninsula until 2014, only 232 were able to re-register at
the request of the invaders. Thus, Russia actually deprived the population of the opportunity to hear an alternative
opinion, blocking signals from Ukrainian radio stations and access to online publications.
“We call on the international community to take decisive actions against the abolition of freedom of speech and
gross violation of human rights of the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied Crimea. We express full
support to journalists, bloggers and all those who, despite repressions, are not afraid to publicly express their
citizenship”,- the Foreign Ministry added.
(https://vk.com/share.php?url=https%3A%2F%2Fctrcenter.org%2Fen%2Fnews%2F4317-rf-sistematicheski-unichtozhaet-svobodu-slova-na-okkupirovannom-poluostrove-mid-ukrainy&title
(https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?src=sp&u=https%3A%2F%2Fctrcenter.org%2Fen%2Fnews%2F4317-rf-sistematicheski-unichtozhaet-svobodu-slova-na-okkupirovannom-poluostro
(https://connect.ok.ru/offer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fctrcenter.org%2Fen%2Fnews%2F4317-rf-sistematicheski-unichtozhaet-svobodu-slova-na-okkupirovannom-poluostrove-mid-ukrainy&tit
(https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&url=https%3A%2F%2Fctrcenter.org%2Fen%2Fnews%2F4317-rf-sistematicheski-unichtozhaet-svobodu-slova-na-okkupirovannom-poluo
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FSB empl… Employee…
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Court secr… Experts /…
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Annex 185
Law of Ukraine No. 1207-VII “On Securing Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the
Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” (15 April 2014)
This excerpt has been translated from its original language
into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to
Rules of the Court, Article 51. A copy of the whole document
has been deposited with the Registry.
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- 462 -
L A W O F U K R A I N E
{ The Hague Convention of 1907 - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
{New Clause 2 is added to Article 1 under Law No. 685-VIII of September 15, 2015}
TRANSLATION
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TRANSLATION
- 464 -
Annex 186
Valentina Samar, Zone of Special Inattention, ZN.UA (11 September 2015)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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- 466 -
ZN.ua
Zone of Special Inattention
Author : Valentina Samar
11 September 2015 00:00
The action announced by the leaders of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people
to block the supply of goods to the annexed peninsula caused a great resonance and an
instant reaction from the occupation administration of Crimea. However, the leadership
of Ukraine remains silent, like it holds water in their mouth. Neither yes nor no, no
attempts to understand what is happening. The absence of a prompt official response
from the President and the Prime Minister is not a good symptom, although it is already
familiar.
The action announced by the leaders of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people
to block the supply of goods to the annexed peninsula caused a great resonance and an
instant reaction from the occupation administration of Crimea.
From Aksyonov's capricious "Russia feeds us well anyway" coming from the lips of
Aksyonov to the threat of criminal prosecution of the organizers and accusations of Ukraine
in an attempt to starve the inhabitants of Crimea from collaborators of various calibers.
Social networks exploded with posts of patriots from the occupied territories: "It's
high time! Press - we will tolerate. Let the refrigerator turn off the TV in their heads."
Experts, journalists and bloggers write texts with a lot of questions, including those
requiring extremely honest answers: will the blockade aggravate a) the situation of the
Crimean Tatars and all political Ukrainians in Crimea; b) whether it will lead to a
humanitarian catastrophe; c) if the law on FEZ Crimea is canceled - what instead? d) is the
blockade agreed with the president? The latter also takes into account the fact that both Refat
Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev are members of parliament from the Petro Poroshenko
Bloc, and Mustafa-aga, moreover, is the presidential envoy for issues of the Crimean Tatar
people. Both leaders diligently avoid a direct answer to this question, which gives rise to
conspiracy theories.
And the leadership of Ukraine acts like it holds water in its mouth. Says neither yes
nor no, and makes no attempts to understand what is happening. The absence of a prompt
official response from the President and the Prime Minister is not a good symptom, although
it is already familiar. Waiting for roasted rooster. Or in the form of a deeply concerned call
from our European and American friends, or a sharp "answer" from the Kremlin, something
like another FSB visit to Lipetsk "Roshen". Or, in the event of a complete blockage of the
movement of trucks to the Crimea, persistent requests to "do something" from businessmen
friends - producers and sellers of alcohol, chicken meat and building materials, modest
smugglers and bigwigs of shadow schemes with VAT and "gray" exports...
So, until it starts, there is a great need to lay out the demands of the organizers of the
protest - for an adequate understanding of its purpose, addressees, possible consequences and
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planning the next and proactive steps of the authorities. Considering that ZN.UA has been
publishing a lot of materials on the topic of Kyiv’s dislocated policy towards the occupied
Crimea for a year and a half, I will allow you to list many points separated by commas. For a
better perception of the answers to the eternal (alas!) question "what do the Crimean Tatars
want?", but in this particular action, with the permission of the chairman of the Mejlis Refat
Chubarov, some of his meaningful quotes will be presented in a concise and structured way.
First of all, let's clarify the essence of the action announced by the leaders of the
Mejlis. This is not a food blockade of Crimea, as the media report, interpreting the words of
the leaders of the Crimean Tatars for various reasons (including for ease of presentation of
information). Refat Chubarov especially emphasizes that we are talking about a civil
blockade, which implies a set of measures and a list of requirements for both the authorities
of the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
The second significant point: the blockade of supplies to the Crimea is not an action
exclusively of the Crimean Tatars and is not an action of the Mejlis, despite the fact that it
was announced by its leaders. This will be an action of all Crimean politically active
Ukrainians who are tired of waiting for real steps from the authorities to de-occupy the
peninsula and protect the rights of its inhabitants on both sides of Perekop, but who do not
forget to take care of the interests of the beneficiaries of the "Crimean offshore", born by the
law on the FEZ "Crimea". Note: in the voiced demands of the initiators of the blockade, there
are no traditional political demands of the Mejlis on the status of the Crimean Tatar people,
national-territorial autonomy, protection of the rights of this people only - there are demands
relating to every Crimean, regardless of nationality. And every Ukrainian who would like the
most bloodless way out of the war with Russia, but this war will a priori end only when
Crimea is returned.
"All the actions taken up to this point - both on the part of Ukraine and the
international community - have not yielded results not only in terms of the de-occupation of
Crimea, but also in respect of human rights and freedoms in the occupied territory.
Repressions against Crimean Tatars and other Ukrainian citizens - kidnappings, murders,
arrests, searches, "squeezing out" dissenters from Crimea, violation of the rights to freedom
of speech and peaceful assembly, the activities of religious organizations - continue and
intensify. At the same time, Ukrainian goods are delivered to the peninsula on preferential
terms (duty-free - thanks to the law on the FEZ “Crimea", i.e. at a loss to the budget of
Ukraine). And at the same time, Ukraine demands from the EU and the US to strengthen
sanctions in order to make the price of the annexation of Crimea unbearable for Russia," says
Refat Chubarov.
Let us recall what has been written more than once: the dependence of Crimea on the
supply of vital resources from mainland Ukraine (electricity, water, food - from 60 to 80% of
the need) made it possible for Ukraine from the first days of occupation to exercise effective
economic pressure on the aggressor, but it was not used. Both the leaders of the Mejlis and
representatives of civil society have repeatedly appealed to the Ukrainian authorities to use
the formula "food in exchange for human rights" at least in order to stop repressions on
political and ethnic grounds in Crimea. Therefore, the first goal of the blockade is protection
of human rights.
Its organizers demand from the Russian Federation:
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1. Release of Ukrainian political prisoners who are under arrest both in Crimea and in
Russia: Akhtem Chiygoz, Mustafa Degermendzhi, Ali Asanov, Tair Smedlyaev, Alexander
Kostenko, as well as Nadezhda Savchenko, Oleg Sentsov, Alexander Kolchenko, Gennady
Afanasiev and others.
2. Termination of politically motivated criminal and administrative prosecution of
Ukrainian citizens in Crimea.
3. Elimination of illegal obstacles for the work of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
media, unimpeded admission of foreign journalists and international observers to Crimea.
4. Removing the ban on entry into Crimea to the leaders of the Crimean Tatar people
Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov, activists of the national movement Ismet Yuksel
and Sinaver Kadyrov.
The second purpose of the blockade is economic. It is aimed at a radical change in the
state policy of Ukraine regarding the activities of legal entities and individuals in the
occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, the procedure for
the movement of goods and people. As a result, the Russian administration in Crimea should
receive maximum problems for maintaining Crimea, and Ukrainian citizens - a minimum of
problems for moving across the administrative border and providing themselves with
essential products.
In principle, it was supposed to be so a year and a half ago, when the law on
guarantees of the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens in the temporarily occupied
territories was adopted. In order to speed up its adoption, the section on economic activity
was removed from the draft, with a purpose to draft it out qualitatively and without haste.
However, as a result of it, instead of a draft by the government, a lobbying law on the FEZ
"Crimea" (authored by K. Lyapina and S. Terekhin) was thrown in and pushed through,
thanks to which the oligarchs were able to keep their assets and work "on two fronts", having
received Russian registration, and some - a "permit" from Aksyonov for illegal exports from
Ukraine in transit through Crimea (according to expert data, up to 80% of supplies to Crimea
are exported duty-free). At the same time, the Cabinet of Ministers made it as difficult as
possible for people to cross the "border" and the National Bank, in accordance with the law
on the SEZ, awarded Ukrainians with Crimean registration (individuals and legal entities) the
status of non-residents, depriving them of banking services. Therefore, the goal of the action
is not just to block supplies, but to force the Ukrainian authorities to repeal the law on the
"Crimea" zone, eliminating the corruption abscess at the administrative border, as well as in
the fiscal and border departments, and creating transparent conditions for the movement of
people and goods.
Answering a question often rhetorically asked in publications and media comments -
how will the blockade work, and what is proposed instead of the FEZ? - we inform you that
everything has already been developed.
Firstly, two draft laws have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada, proposing the
abolition of the law on the FEZ "Crimea" - we wrote about them in detail in the materials
"Lock on the interior door" and "Free economic blockade". There is plenty to choose
from, the main thing is that members of parliament have political will and the absence of
selfish interests.
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The detailed "program" of the blockade was developed by the experts of the "Maidan
of Foreign Affairs" Foundation and set out on many pages while developing the Foundation’s
own Strategy for the de-occupation of Crimea. The program includes information campaign,
which so far is a weak link in the activities of the initiators of the action - hence so much
misunderstanding and phobias. The main one - the threat of a "humanitarian catastrophe" - is
already being used with might and main for counter-propaganda.
Refat Chubarov, in turn, reports that after the July meeting in the Cabinet of Ministers
on the issue of economic relations with the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbass, the
State Service for Crimean Affairs submitted its own proposals to the Ministry of Economic
Development.
“A week after the meeting, the State Service sent detailed proposals to change the
procedure for crossing the administrative border with Crimea by citizens and moving goods
(with three tables). A complete ban on the import of excisable goods into Crimea is proposed.
It is also proposed to allow entry of all other goods that cost up to 10 thousand Hryvnias and
weigh up to 50 kg (this is for farmers and small entrepreneurs), and food items for personal
needs that cost up to 5 thousand UAH and weigh up to 50 kg. The list of permitted goods for
personal needs includes flour, bread, pasta, cereals, meat, lard, poultry, dairy products, sugar,
potatoes...Thus, the humanitarian aspect will be ensured, but trading "on blood" with the
occupiers is excluded, as well as "shady" transit, and corruption at the checkpoint," says
Refat Chubarov.
He talks well - only the Cabinet is silent. The proposals of the State Service,
according to the member of parliament, were first posted on the website of the Ministry of
Economy for public discussion, and after a press conference on the blockade, they were
removed without explanation. There is the same lack of response to proposals sent to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs to change the procedure for crossing the administrative border
with Crimea for citizens of Ukraine and foreigners, removing all illegal and even
discriminatory restrictions that they managed to apply during the year and a half of
occupation. "The proposals are laying like a dead weight. And on the eve of Eid al-Adha,
representatives of our diaspora constantly call me: how can we enter Crimea - through
Moscow or Kherson, and how long does it take to obtain special permits? I don't know what
to answer," complains Chubarov, believing at the same time that the protest action will be the
impulse that will "turn on" the government entities for solving the problems that violate
citizens’ rights.
The key question is how safe and therefore expedient is it to deploy mass actions in a
zone bordering Crimea stuffed with Russian troops and weapons? We hope that the initiators
of the action adequately assess both their own potential to control the implementation of
blockade activities within the framework of Ukrainian law, to ensure security measures for
their participants, and the degree of threat from outside in the form of possible provocations.
However, after the bloody events at the Verkhovna Rada, threats cannot be ruled out, and not
only those that come from the outside, but also those that come from the inside, including the
"private armies" of the oligarchs, who can be blocked from illegal export channels. Once
again, we will voice the price of the issue, which only partly gives an understanding of the
volume of supplies - we can only operate with official data from the State Fiscal Service. In
the first five months of existence of the law on the FEZ, more than half a billion dollars’
worth of goods were delivered to Crimea from the Ukrainian mainland. Experts say that at
- 470 -
least the same number passes by without being counted it. Not a penny gets into the budget of
Ukraine. In fact, a system has been created under which it is much more profitable for
domestic producers to trade with the occupied Crimea and invest in their business in Crimea
(the Russians also created their own "FEZ") than in Ukraine.
On the other hand, thanks to the action, the Ukrainian authorities will finally see (at
least on TV!) all the unsettledness and holey nature of the "border". And, hopefully, they will
immediately begin to equip it, promptly considering the appeal of the Kherson members of
parliament, who ask the Cabinet of Ministers to create a working group to develop a program
for the development of areas bordering Crimea, where the greatest costs for today, as it
seems, are road repairs. The roads are broken, first of all, by thousands of trucks carrying
goods to the peninsula. And, by and large, they realize that cleaning up the Kherson region
from corruption and slovenliness is also a security issue, along with the creation of defense
system along the entire length of the "border". In this regard, one cannot fail to recall the
statements of President Poroshenko that the administrative border with Crimea should be
strengthened by units from the Crimean Tatars. There was no movement to put Mustafa
Dzhemilev's idea into practice - volunteers from the "Crimea" unit of Isa Akaev were then led
around the office circle for a long time. Well, now, it turns out, they themselves will come ...
And the last. The organizers of the action will have to make a lot of effort to turn
attention of not only the authorities, but also of ordinary Ukrainians to the "Crimean
problem". To do this, information about goals and actions must come first, before people take
real actions. Every resident of the Kherson region, where such a protest contingent lands for
the first time, must understand that this and other actions do not pose a threat to him
personally, his family, property and business. On the contrary, the fight against corruption
and the creation of transparent rules on the "border" will benefit him, help make the state
stronger, and it will better protect him. For this, among other things, the Kherson region
should become a showcase for European Ukraine and a springboard for the return of Crimea.
It will inevitably happen that the habitual way of life of the inhabitants of the Kherson
region will change. And, in order to avoid speculations and provocations, experienced by the
Crimeans since the beginning of the 90s of the last century, today the leaders of the Mejlis
simply must today make every effort to explain, having reached the consciousness of every
inhabitant of the Kherson region, that the Crimean Tatars are not going to take away their
land, not to claim social benefits, etc. They want to return to Crimea and return it to Ukraine.
Then the war will end.
© 1994–2022 “Zerkalo Nedeli. Ukraine". All rights reserved.
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Annex 187
Social Media Page (Facebook) of Rustem Irsay (16 January 2016)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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Facebook
Rustem Irsay is with Lenur Islyamov and Refat Chubarov
January 16, 2016
The last day of the Crimea blockade. Now the government services will take over it.
The civil blockade won!
[English version of the post:
Last day of the civil blockade of occupied Crimea. Now it’s the government responsibility to
take care of it.
We won!]
#crimeablockade #success #putingetoutofcrimea
201 Likes 12 Comments 23 Shares
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Annex 188
Refat Chubarov, Speech given at Meeting 38, Session Hall of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine (09 December 2015) (Video)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Official web portal of the Parliament of Ukraine
THIRTY-EIGHTHS MEETING
Session Hall of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
December 9, 2015, 10 a.m.
The meeting is chaired by V.B. GROYSMAN, Chairman of The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
10:18:32
CHUBAROV R.A.
Dear colleagues, dear voters! Today is the 82nd day of the action "Civil blockade of Crimea". The
essence of this action is to make the occupiers' maintenance of Crimea as expensive as possible,
to force them to respect basic human rights, to return Crimean issues to the agenda of Ukraine's
domestic political life and international politics.
Thus, on September 20, there was a de facto cessation of the movement of goods from mainland
Ukraine to the occupied Crimea. It is expected that at today's meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine a resolution will be adopted, which will fix the state of termination of the movement
of goods from the mainland to the occupied Crimea. As you know, from November 22 to
yesterday, the electricity supply to the Crimea was also cut off for 2 weeks. Based on many factors,
including the fact that the failure of the line "Kakhovka-Titan" interferes with the supply of
electricity to several districts of Kherson region; based on other issues, including humanitarian,
the participants in the blockade of Crimea decide to provide an opportunity to ensure supply from
only one line, which currently supplies 220 megawatts to the Crimea instead of 850, which were
provided before November 22. But, dear friends, this is only for 2 weeks, so that both the
government and local authorities could work to strengthen the energy supply of the Kherson
region.
I would like to say that our colleague Oksana Syroid and a group of other colleagues registered
the Law of Ukraine on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine yesterday, in case of
adoption of which the supply of energy resources, including electricity, to the occupied territories
is prohibited. And if we do not have time to pass this law, and I am very much asking the
committees to work, so that we manage to pass it by the end of this month, there is a second
safeguard, I want to announce it. I think that this very hall, my colleagues, will not allow any
minister or government to conclude an agreement on the supply of electricity, if necessary, until it
says "Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine."
So, we are working hard to resolve all these issues by January 1 and make the maintenance of
Crimea more expensive for Russia, the occupiers. Thank you.
https://www.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/6064.html
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Annex 189
Electronic message from S. Kavtan (21 March 2014)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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[email protected]
_____________________________________________
Fw:
archbishop <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
---Forwarded message--
From whom: “Sergey Kavtan” <[email protected]
Date: 21 March 2014, 18:12:00
Archbishop of Simferopol and Crimean Kliment, Kyiv Patriarchate
Regarding the situation in the village of Perevalnoye, where the Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate is
located in the military unit, I would like to inform you that at the moment there are no threats of violent
actions against our Church.
We managed to establish a fraternal dialogue with representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of
the Moscow Patriarchate on the basis of mutual respect. I am convinced that in difficult times of
political crisis, we, the clergy, should set an example of good relations between believers, no matter
what confession they belong to and what language they speak.
I hope that wherever the communities of the Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates neighbor, they will be able
to find a common language without conflicts and threats, as is happening now in Crimea.
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Annex 190
Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea No.
1801-2/01 “On transfer to the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
of the Kyiv Patriarchate of part of the building located at 17 Sevastopolskaya St., in
the city of Simferopol” (16 May 2001)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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RESOLUTION
of the Verkhovna Rada
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
On transfer to the Crimean Eparchy
of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate
of part of the building located
at 17 Sevastopolskaya St., in the city of Simferopol
In accordance with sub-paragraph 4 of paragraph 2 of article 26 of the Constitutions
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Regulation on management of property that
belongs to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or the property that was transferred under its
management, approved by the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea No. 459-2/99 of 21 April 1999,
the Verkhovna Rada
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea r e s o l v e s:
1. To transfer to the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv
Patriarchate the previously leased by them part of property of the total area of 1,475.7 m2,
described in the property plan under letter “a”, the building located at 17 Sevastopolskaya St.,
in the city of Simferopol, that belongs to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, into free of
charge temporary use until 2050.
2. The Property Fund of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to complete transfer of
the part of property described above in due order.
3. Control for execution of this Resolution to be delegated to the Permanent
Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for Economic,
Budget, Finance and Tax Policies.
Speaker [Seal]
of the Verkhovna Rada
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea L.
GRACH
The city of Simferopol
16 May 2001
No. 1801-2/01
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Annex 191
Contract of lease of real property that belongs to the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea (13 November 2002)
This document has been translated from its original
language into English, an official language of the Court,
pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
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CONTRACT FOR LEASE
OF REAL PROPERTY,
which belongs to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
13 November 2002
The Property Fund of the Republic of Crimea, thereinafter referred to as the Lessor,
represented by Deputy Head of the Fund KHKHLOV Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich, acting on
the basis of power of attorney No. 01/2397 of 13 September 2002, on one side, and Crimean
Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate, thereinafter referred to as the
Lessee, represented by the Managing Archbishop of Simferopol and Crimea Klyment (Kushch
Pavlo Mykolayovych), acting on the basis of the Charter of Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate, on the other side, entered into this contract about the
following.
1. Subject of the contract
1.1 The Lessor, in order to implement the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea “On transfer to the Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate of part of the building located at 17 Sevastopolskaya
St., in the city of Simferopol” No. 1801-2/01 of 16 May 2002, with amendments made by
Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea No. 126-3/02 of 19
June 2002, Order of the Property Fund of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea No. 615 of 30
July 2002 “On transfer of the part of building located in the city of Simferopol, 17
Sevastopolskaya St., defined as property that belongs to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
for lease to Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate” transfers
the real property that belongs to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and is managed by the
Property Fund of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea that includes - part of a building of the
area of 1,217.48 sq.m, including service facilities of the total area: basement - 66.5 sq.m.,
canopy - 66.2 sq.m., canopy - 60.5 sq.m., of the first floor - 329.18 sq.m., of the second floor -
497.9 sq.m., of the third floor - 197.2 sq.m., located in the city of Simferopol, 17,
Sevastopolskaya St., and the Lessee accepts it for limited use under the certificate of delivery
and acceptance (Annex 1) for placing the Office of Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate in the interest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of
Kyiv Patriarchate.
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2. Terms of transfer and return of the leased property
2.1 The Lessee shall begin using the property from the moment of signing by the parties
of the contract and the certificate of delivery and acceptance of the indicated property.
2.2 Transfer of the property for lease does not lead to transfer of the right of ownership
of the property by the Lessor. The Autonomous Republic of Crimea remains the owner of the
property, and the Lessee shall use it for the duration of the lease.
2.[3] In case of the contract termination the property shall be returned by the Lessee to
the Lessor. The Lessee shall return the property following the procedure established during the
transfer of the property under this contract.
3. Lease payment
3.1. The lease payment shall be determined on the basis of the Methodology of
calculating and use of pay for lease of property that belongs to the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea. Based on paragraph 4 of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea No. 126-3/02 of 19 June 2002, the lease payment is established in the
amount of 1 Hryvnia. (Annex 2). VAT shall be calculated in accordance with the existing law.
[…]
8. The period of duration and terms of amending and terminating the contract
8.1. The contract is valid during 48 (forty eight) years, beginning from 1 September
2002 and until 1 September 2050.
8.2. The terms of contract shall remain in force during the entire period of duration and
in cases, when after its signing, the rules established by law worsen position of the Lessee.
8.3. Changes or termination of the contract may take place upon consent of the parties.
Changes and amendments that are made to the contract shall be reviewed by the parties during
20 days and shall be recorded as additional agreements to the lease contract. A unilateral refusal
from implementation of the contract and additional agreements to it shall not be permitted.
8.4. The contract can be terminated upon demand of one of the parties by decision of
Arbitration court in cases provided for in the law.
[…]
9. Legal addresses of the parties
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The Lessor
The Property Fund of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
95015, the city of Simferopol, 17 Sevastopolskaya St.
Code OKPO 00036860
The Lessee
Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate
the city of Simferopol, 17 Sevastopolskaya St.
[Seal]
THE LESSOR THE LESSEE
[Signed] V. Khokhlov [Signed] Klyment
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Volume III - Annexes 109-191