Separate opinion of Judge Charlesworth

Document Number
164-20230330-JUD-01-11-EN
Parent Document Number
164-20230330-JUD-01-00-EN
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE CHARLESWORTH
Article IV, paragraph 2  Criteria for the assessment of the exercise of regulatory powers in matters of unlawful expropriation  Reasonableness  A measure of discretion enjoyed by the domestic authorities/regulator  Article X, paragraph 1  Broad interpretation of the freedom of commerce  Requirement for an “actual impediment”  Article X, paragraph 1, does not preclude regulatory measures with indirect or incidental effects on the freedom of commerce.
1. I agree with much of the Court’s reasoning in this case. In this separate opinion, I address two questions on which I differ from the majority.
2. When discussing Iran’s claims concerning unlawful expropriation under Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity, the Court’s analysis is premised on sound criteria: that the bona fide non-discriminatory exercise of regulatory powers with a legitimate public welfare purpose does not give rise to compensation, and that such regulatory powers are not unlimited (Judgment, para. 185). Yet the Court does not then apply the criteria that it heralds and that are commonly applied in international practice. Instead, it turns its attention to an enquiry into the unreasonableness of the United States’ measures. I have no doubt that “[r]easonableness is one of the considerations that limit the exercise of the governmental powers” (Judgment, para. 186). It does not follow, however, that (un)reasonableness should displace the elaborate criteria for the assessment whether State regulation amounts to unlawful expropriation.
3. The Court relies simply on the breach of Article IV, paragraph 1, to find a breach of Article IV, paragraph 2. In a few lines in paragraph 186, the Court explains that a finding of breach in the context of the obligation against unreasonable measures suffices for the conclusion that the obligation against unlawful expropriation has also been breached. In my view, it is not obvious that the applicable standard under the two obligations is identical, nor that breach of one will necessarily entail breach of the other. As the Court acknowledges in its discussion of the claim under Article IV, paragraph 1, reasonableness is highly contextual (Judgment, para. 146).
4. I note that international jurisprudence tends to recognize that the domestic regulator is vested with a measure of discretion in this connection. In the case of Philip Morris v. Uruguay, for example, the tribunal’s finding that the impugned measures were adopted in good faith, directed at the legitimate public welfare aim of public health protection and capable of contributing to its achievement, was sufficient to defeat a claim of unlawful expropriation1. It is up to Iran to demonstrate that the United States’ measures “‘crosse[d] the line’ that separates valid regulatory activity from expropriation”2. In my view Iran has not done so here.
5. I am also unable to agree with the Court’s finding that a series of measures adopted by the United States violated its obligations under Article X, paragraph 1.
6. Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity provides: “Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation.” I share the Court’s
1 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. & Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award of 8 July 2016, para. 306.
2 Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2001-4, Partial Award of 17 March 2006, para. 264.
- 2 -
endorsement of the broad interpretation of Article X, paragraph 1, adopted in Oil Platforms (Judgment, para. 212). I would add that this provision prohibits not only acts impeding commerce but also any act that would impede the freedom of commerce
3.
7. The Court has also, however, identified limits on the scope of Article X, paragraph 1. In the merits phase of Oil Platforms, the Court insisted that there be evidence of “an actual impediment [une entrave effective] to commerce or navigation”4. It rejected the United States’ claim of a breach of that provision for lack of evidence that there were actual breaches of commerce or navigation between the territories of the United States and Iran.
8. Following the same approach in this case, the question is whether the United States’ measures created an actual impediment to commerce between the Parties. The Court points to three instances of legal interference with commerce between the Parties: Executive Order 13599’s blocking of property and interests in property; the FSIA’s subjection to attachment and execution of the assets of any Iranian company in which the State holds an interest; and the enforcement proceedings with respect to contractual debts in the telecommunications industry and in the credit card services sector (Judgment, paras. 220-222).
9. In my view, however, Iran did not produce adequate evidence to establish its claim. Many types of governmental action will affect the conduct of commerce in a multitude of ways. Article X, paragraph 1, cannot be taken to preclude activities that are a regular feature of commercial life, such as the enforcement of judgment debts. It can also not be taken to preclude any regulatory measure that may have indirect or incidental effects on commerce. As the Court held in the preliminary objections phase of the present case, “freedom of commerce cannot cover matters that have no connection, or too tenuous a connection, with the commercial relations between the States Parties to the Treaty”5.
10. For that reason, I am not convinced by the Court’s terse finding that Executive Order 13599 and Section 1610 (g) (1) of the FSIA constituted actual impediments to commerce “by [their] own terms” (Judgment, paras. 220-221). As my votes show, I think that the enactment of these measures violated other provisions of the Treaty of Amity. It does not follow, however, that those measures were also in breach of Article X, paragraph 1.
(Signed) Hilary CHARLESWORTH.
___________
3 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 819, para. 50.
4 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 217, para. 123 (emphasis in the original); see already Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 819, para. 50: “the possibility must be entertained that [freedom of commerce] could actually be impeded as a result of acts . . .” (emphasis added).
5 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), p. 34, para. 79.

Bilingual Content

233
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE CHARLESWORTH
Article IV, paragraph 2 — Criteria for the assessment of the exercise of
regulatory powers in matters of unlawful expropriation — Reasonableness
— A measure of discretion enjoyed by the domestic authorities/
regulator — Article X, paragraph 1 — Broad interpretation of the freedom
of commerce — Requirement for an “actual impediment” — Article X, paragraph
1, does not preclude regulatory measures with indirect or incidental
effects on the freedom of commerce.
1. I agree with much of the Court’s reasoning in this case. In this separate
opinion, I address two questions on which I differ from the majority.
2. When discussing Iran’s claims concerning unlawful expropriation
under Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity, the Court’s analysis is
premised on sound criteria: that the bona fide non-discriminatory exercise of
regulatory powers with a legitimate public welfare purpose does not give
rise to compensation, and that such regulatory powers are not unlimited
(Judgment, para. 185). Yet the Court does not then apply the criteria that it
heralds and that are commonly applied in international practice. Instead, it
turns its attention to an enquiry into the unreasonableness of the United
States’ measures. I have no doubt that “[r]easonableness is one of the considerations
that limit the exercise of the governmental powers” (ibid., para. 186).
It does not follow, however, that (un)reasonableness should displace the
elaborate criteria for the assessment whether State regulation amounts to
unlawful expropriation.
3. The Court relies simply on the breach of Article IV, paragraph 1, to find
a breach of Article IV, paragraph 2. In a few lines in paragraph 186, the
Court explains that a finding of breach in the context of the obligation
against unreasonable measures suffices for the conclusion that the obligation
against unlawful expropriation has also been breached. In my view, it
is not obvious that the applicable standard under the two obligations is identical,
nor that breach of one will necessarily entail breach of the other.
As the Court acknowledges in its discussion of the claim under Article IV,
paragraph 1, reasonableness is highly contextual (Judgment, para. 146).
4. I note that international jurisprudence tends to recognize that the
domestic regulator is vested with a measure of discretion in this connection.
233
OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE Mme LA JUGE CHARLESWORTH
[Traduction]
Paragraphe 2 de l’article IV — critères permettant d’apprécier l’exercice
de pouvoirs de réglementation en matière d’expropriation illicite — Caractère
raisonnable — Marge de discrétion reconnue aux autorités nationales et
de réglementation — Paragraphe 1 de l’article X — Interprétation extensive
de la liberté de commerce — Exigence d’une « entrave effective » — Paragraphe
1 de l’article X n’excluant pas des mesures de réglementation
produisant des effets indirects ou incidents sur la liberté de commerce.
1. Je souscris largement au raisonnement de la Cour en l’espèce. Dans le
présent exposé, je traiterai de deux points sur lesquels je m’écarte de la
majorité.
2. Dans son examen des griefs d’expropriation illicite formulés par l’Iran
au titre du paragraphe 1 de l’article IV du traité d’amitié, la Cour se fonde sur
des critères éprouvés, à savoir que l’exercice de certains pouvoirs de réglementation,
de bonne foi, de façon non discriminatoire et en vue de protéger
un intérêt public légitime, n’ouvre pas droit à indemnisation et que lesdits
pouvoirs ne sont pas illimités (arrêt, par. 185). Cependant, elle se dispense
ensuite d’appliquer ces critères qu’elle préconise et qui sont couramment utilisés
dans la pratique internationale, préférant se livrer à une analyse du
caractère déraisonnable des mesures prises par les États-Unis. Certes, « [l]e
caractère raisonnable ou déraisonnable est l’une des considérations qui
limitent l’exercice des pouvoirs de l’État » (ibid., par. 186), mais il ne s’ensuit
pas que ce caractère raisonnable ou déraisonnable doive être substitué aux
critères éprouvés qui servent à apprécier si une mesure de réglementation
adoptée par l’État est assimilable à une expropriation illicite.
3. La Cour se fonde simplement sur la violation du paragraphe 1 de l’article
IV pour conclure à la violation du paragraphe 2 du même article. En
quelques lignes du paragraphe 186, elle explique que la constatation d’une
violation de l’obligation de ne pas prendre de mesures déraisonnables est suffisante
pour conclure que l’obligation interdisant l’expropriation illicite a elle
aussi été violée. Selon moi, il n’est pas évident que le critère applicable soit
le même pour les deux obligations et que la violation de l’une entraîne nécessairement
la violation de l’autre. Comme le reconnaît la Cour dans son
examen de la demande formulée au titre du paragraphe 1 de l’article IV, ce
qui est raisonnable dépend largement du contexte (arrêt, par. 146).
4. Je relève que la jurisprudence internationale tend à reconnaître que l’autorité
nationale de réglementation jouit d’une certaine marge de discrétion
234 certain iranian assets (sep. op. charlesworth)
In the case of Philip Morris v. Uruguay, for example, the tribunal’s finding
that the impugned measures were adopted in good faith, directed at the
legitimate public welfare aim of public health protection and capable of contributing
to its achievement, was sufficient to defeat a claim of unlawful
expropriation1. It is up to Iran to demonstrate that the United States’ measures
“‘crosse[d] the line’ that separates valid regulatory activity from
expropriation”2. In my view Iran has not done so here.
5. I am also unable to agree with the Court’s finding that a series of measures
adopted by the United States violated its obligations under Article X,
paragraph 1.
6. Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity provides: “Between the
territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of
commerce and navigation.” I share the Court’s endorsement of the broad
interpretation of Article X, paragraph 1, adopted in Oil Platforms (Judgment,
para. 212). I would add that this provision prohibits not only acts
impeding commerce but also any act that would impede the freedom of
commerce3.
7. The Court has also, however, identified limits on the scope of Article X,
paragraph 1. In the merits phase of Oil Platforms, the Court insisted that
there be evidence of “an actual impediment [une entrave effective] to commerce
or navigation”4. It rejected the United States’ claim of a breach of that
provision for lack of evidence that there were actual breaches of commerce
or navigation between the territories of the United States and Iran.
8. Following the same approach in this case, the question is whether the
United States’ measures created an actual impediment to commerce between
the Parties. The Court points to three instances of legal interference with
commerce between the Parties: Executive Order 13599’s blocking of property
and interests in property; the FSIA’s subjection to attachment and
execution of the assets of any Iranian company in which the State holds an
interest; and the enforcement proceedings with respect to contractual debts
in the telecommunications industry and in the credit card services sector
(Judgment, paras. 220-222).
1 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award of 8 July 2016, para. 306.
2 Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2001-4, Partial Award of
17 March 2006, para. 264.
3 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 819, para. 50.
4 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2003, p. 217, para. 123 (emphasis in the original); see already Oil Platforms (Islamic
Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (II), p. 819, para. 50: “the possibility must be entertained that [freedom of commerce]
could actually be impeded as a result of acts . . .” (emphasis added).
234
certains actifs iraniens (op. ind. charlesworth)
en la matière. Dans l’affaire Philip Morris v. Uruguay, par exemple, la
conclusion du tribunal arbitral selon laquelle les mesures contestées avaient
été adoptées de bonne foi, visaient le légitime objectif d’intérêt général qu’est
la protection de la santé publique et étaient capables de réaliser cet objectif,
lui a suffi pour rejeter un grief d’expropriation illicite1. Il appartenait donc à
l’Iran de démontrer que les mesures américaines avaient « franchi la ligne »
de démarcation entre une mesure de réglementation valide et une expropriation2.
À mon sens, il ne l’a pas fait.
5. Je ne peux pas non plus souscrire à la conclusion de la Cour selon
laquelle une série de mesures adoptées par les États-Unis auraient violé les
obligations qui leur incombent au regard du paragraphe 1 de l’article X.
6. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article X du traité dispose ce qui suit : « Il y aura
liberté de commerce et de navigation entre les territoires des deux Hautes
Parties contractantes. » Je partage la décision de la Cour de reprendre l’interprétation
large du paragraphe 1 de l’article X qu’elle avait adoptée dans
l’affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières (arrêt, par. 212). J’ajouterai que cette
disposition interdit non seulement les actes qui entravent le commerce, mais
encore tout acte qui entrave la liberté de commerce3.
7. La Cour a cependant posé des limites à la portée du paragraphe 1 de
l’article X. Dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu au fond en l’affaire des Plates-formes
pétrolières, elle a souligné qu’il fallait démontrer qu’il y avait eu « une
entrave effective [an actual impediment] au commerce ou à la navigation »4.
Elle a rejeté le grief tiré par les États-Unis de la violation de cette disposition
au motif qu’ils n’avaient pas démontré qu’il y avait des entraves effectives au
commerce entre leur territoire et celui de l’Iran.
8. Si l’on suit la même approche en l’espèce, la question qui se pose est
de savoir si les mesures américaines ont créé une entrave effective au
commerce entre les Parties. La Cour a relevé trois cas d’entrave juridique au
commerce entre les Parties : le décret présidentiel no 13599, qui a bloqué tous
les biens et intérêts dans des biens de l’Iran ; les mesures de saisie et
d’exécution auxquelles la FSIA soumet les actifs détenus par une société
iranienne à l’égard desquels l’État iranien détient un intérêt ; et les procédures
d’exécution relatives à des dettes contractuelles dans le secteur des
télécommunications et dans le secteur du service des cartes de crédit (arrêt,
par. 220-222).
1 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental
Republic of Uruguay, affaire CIRDI no ARB/10/7, sentence du 8 juillet 2016, par. 306.
2 Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, affaire CPA no 2001-4, sentence partielle
du 17 mars 2006, par. 264.
3 Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), exception
préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 819, par. 50.
4 Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 217, par. 123 (les italiques sont dans l’original) ; voir déjà Plates-formes
pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), exception préliminaire,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 819, par. 50 : « il faut considérer qu[e la liberté de commerce]
pourrait être effectivement entravée du fait d’actes » (les italiques sont de moi).
235 certain iranian assets (sep. op. charlesworth)
9. In my view, however, Iran did not produce adequate evidence to establish
its claim. Many types of governmental action will affect the conduct of
commerce in a multitude of ways. Article X, paragraph 1, cannot be taken to
preclude activities that are a regular feature of commercial life, such as the
enforcement of judgment debts. It can also not be taken to preclude any
regulatory measure that may have indirect or incidental effects on commerce.
As the Court held in the preliminary objections phase of the present
case, “freedom of commerce cannot cover matters that have no connection,
or too tenuous a connection, with the commercial relations between the
States Parties to the Treaty”5.
10. For that reason, I am not convinced by the Court’s terse finding that
Executive Order 13599 and Section 1610 (g) (1) of the FSIA constituted
actual impediments to commerce “by [their] own terms” (Judgment,
paras. 220-221). As my votes show, I think that the enactment of these
measures violated other provisions of the Treaty of Amity. It does not follow,
however, that those measures were also in breach of Article X, paragraph 1.
(Signed) Hilary Charlesworth.
5 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), p. 34, para. 79.
certains actifs iraniens (op. ind. charlesworth) 235
9. Selon moi, cependant, l’Iran n’a pas produit de preuves suffisantes pour
établir le bien-fondé de sa demande. De nombreux types d’action publique
ont une incidence sur la conduite du commerce, et ce, de toutes sortes de
façons. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article X ne saurait s’interpréter comme excluant
des activités qui sont une composante régulière de la vie commerciale, telle
que le recouvrement forcé de créances judiciaires. Il ne saurait non plus
s’interpréter
comme excluant toute mesure de réglementation susceptible de
produire des effets indirects ou incidents sur le commerce. Comme l’a dit la
Cour dans son arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires en l’espèce, « la liberté
de commerce ne saurait couvrir des questions qui ne présentent aucun lien,
ou qui présentent un lien trop ténu, avec les relations commerciales entre les
États parties au traité »5.
10. C’est pourquoi je ne suis pas convaincue par la conclusion sommaire
de la Cour selon laquelle le décret présidentiel no 13599 et l’alinéa 1 du paragraphe
g) de l’article 1610 de la FSIA constituent, « de par [leurs] termes
mêmes », des entraves effectives au commerce (arrêt, par. 220-221). Comme
le montrent mes votes, je considère que l’adoption de ces mesures a violé
d’autres dispositions du traité d’amitié. Il ne s’ensuit cependant pas que ces
mesures constituaient aussi des violations du paragraphe 1 de l’article X.
(Signé) Hilary Charlesworth.
5 Certains actifs iraniens (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2019 (I), p. 34, par. 79.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Separate opinion of Judge Charlesworth

Order
11
Links