Dissenting opinion of Judge Sebutinde

Document Number
164-20230330-JUD-01-05-EN
Parent Document Number
164-20230330-JUD-01-00-EN
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SEBUTINDE
I agree with subparagraphs (1) and (9) of the operative paragraph 236 but disagree with the remaining subparagraphs of that paragraph  As a jurisdictional matter, the Court should have determined which of the USA’s impugned measures and judicial proceedings are relevant to its analysis of the case  Iran’s claims pursuant to Articles III, IV and V of the 1955 Treaty are inadmissible in as far as they relate to Iranian companies that failed to exhaust local remedies in the USA  The obligations under Articles III and IV of the 1955 Treaty are distinct and should not be conflated  United States courts are entitled, in the interests of justice, to lift the corporate veil of Iranian State-owned companies  Iran has not established that the USA denied Iranian companies fair and equitable treatment, or subjected them to unreasonable or discriminatory measures or impeded the enforcement of their contractual rights  Iran has not established that Executive Order 13599 actually prevented Iranian companies from disposing their real property in the USA within the meaning of Article IV (1)  The attachment of Iranian assets by the USA does not amount to compensable “expropriation” within the meaning of Article IV (2)  Article VII (1) relates solely to exchange restrictions and Iran has not established that the USA violated its obligation under that Article  Iran has not established that there was ongoing commerce between the territories of Iran and the USA that was impeded by the USA in violation of Article X (1)  Executive Order 13599 qualifies as a measure that is necessary to protect the security interests of the USA within the meaning of Article XX (1) (d) and should be exempted from the scope of the 1955 Treaty  The USA is under no obligation to compensate Iran.
INTRODUCTION
1. I have voted in favour of operative paragraphs (1) and (9) of paragraph 236 of the Judgment because I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Court in relation thereto. However, I have voted against operative paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) thereof because I disagree with the reasoning and conclusions of the Court in relation thereto. In this dissenting opinion, I give my reasons for not voting with the majority. Where certain abbreviations, acronyms and short forms have been used in the Judgment, I have adopted the same in this opinion, unless otherwise specified.
I. SCOPE OF THE DISPUTE FOLLOWING THE 2019 JUDGMENT
2. I begin with a few preliminary issues that were not dealt with in the Judgment. Iran’s claims for the alleged breach of Articles VII and X of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran, signed at Tehran on 15 August 1955 (“1955 Treaty”), are made in Iran’s own right as a State. However, Iran’s claims for the alleged breach of Articles III, IV and V of the 1955 Treaty are diplomatic protection claims brought on behalf of its “nationals” under a bilateral commercial treaty. Those claims concern the alleged violation of the rights of Iranian State-owned companies, as well as the consequences that these violations have had on Iran’s ability to trade with the United States of America (“United States”) as envisaged under the 1955 Treaty. Iran claims that the legislative and executive measures adopted by the Respondent since 2002 have “severely impeded” Iranian trade with or through foreign branches of the Respondent’s companies, inter alia, because Iran cannot use the United States banking system for international payments; and neither Iran nor Iranian financial institutions are able to use or dispose of Iranian properties in the United States1.
1 Memorial of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“MI”), para. 1.19.
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3. In my view, the Court should, as a preliminary matter, have determined which of the Respondent’s executive and legislative measures as well as judicial proceedings are relevant to the determination of Iran’s claims on the merits, following the Court’s 2019 Judgment on preliminary objections2 (“2019 Judgment”). First, the provisions of the FSIA of 19963, including the amendments thereto introduced in 2002 and 2008 which, according to Iran, violate its sovereign immunity or that of its entities, relate solely to the removal of immunity from Iran and its agencies and instrumentalities from legal and enforcement proceedings before United States courts4. Iran’s claims challenging these provisions were, in the 2019 Judgment, adjudged to fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae5.
4. Notwithstanding its previous ruling on jurisdiction regarding the FSIA, the Court makes a blanket statement in the present Judgment that,
“[g]iven the combination of the legislative character of the contested measures and the primacy accorded to a more recent federal statute over the treaty in the jurisprudence of the United States, . . . in the circumstances of the present case, the companies in question had no reasonable possibility of successfully asserting their rights in the United States court proceedings”6 (emphasis added).
In my respectful view, the Court should have made it clear this finding did not apply to Iran’s sovereign immunity claims arising out of the impugned FSIA provisions, having previously ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to do so.
5. Similarly, the Court should have expressly excluded from its jurisdiction Iran’s claims against the Respondent arising from the provisions of the National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (“NDAA of 2020”), as that law was enacted in December 2019 after the termination of the 1955 Treaty. In sum, there are only three legislative and executive measures directly relevant to the Court’s analysis, namely the 2002 TRIA; the 2012 ITRSHRA; and the 2012 Executive Order 13599.
6. Furthermore, given the Court’s rejection of Iran’s sovereign immunity claims in its 2019 Judgment7, it is necessary to determine which of the Respondent’s judicial proceedings complained of by Iran are relevant to the Court’s analysis. In this regard, the cases listed in Attachments 18 and 49 are irrelevant as they relate to Iran’s claims of sovereign immunity. Likewise, the cases listed in Attachment 310 are not relevant as they were filed outside the United States.
2 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), p. 7 (as in the main text, hereinafter the “2019 Judgment”).
3 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Sections 1605 (a) (7) and 1610 (b) (2).
4 Paragraph 25 of the present Judgment recalls that after the United States removed the immunity from suit before its courts of States designated as “State sponsors of terrorism”, Iran declined to appear before United States domestic courts in the ensuing lawsuits against it, including in the Peterson case, on the grounds that the provisions of the FSIA were in violation of the international law on State immunities.
5 2019 Judgment, pp. 34-35, para. 80.
6 Judgment, para. 72.
7 2019 Judgment, pp. 34-35, para. 80.
8 Reply of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“RI”), Att. 1, US courts judgments against Iran and Iranian State entities as of 31 December 2019.
9 RI, Att. 4, Claims pending before US courts against Iran and Iranian State entities as of 31 December 2019.
10 RI, Att. 3, Actions filed in other jurisdictions for recognition and enforcement of US judgments against assets of Iran and Iranian State entities as of 31 December 2019.
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However, the enforcement cases listed in Attachment 2
11, as well as the nine cases12 listed in the new document submitted by Iran during the oral proceedings, are relevant to the Court’s analysis as they were filed within the United States and involve actions for the enforcement of judgments. Nonetheless, the Court need not decide during this phase of the present case which enforcement actions have given rise to injuries suffered by Iran or Iranian State-owned companies. Such matters can be determined at a subsequent reparations phase, if necessary.
II. ISSUES OF JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
A. Defences of the United States based on Iran’s alleged “unclean hands” and alleged abuse of rights
7. Regarding the defence based on the “doctrine of unclean hands”13, I agree with the Court that the United States has not shown a sufficiently close link or nexus between Iran’s claims under the 1955 Treaty and the Applicant’s alleged wrongful conduct. The United States’ claims of wrongful conduct of Iran, including its alleged sponsorship and support of international terrorism, and its presumed actions in respect of nuclear non-proliferation, are not reciprocal to the obligations under the 1955 Treaty that Iran seeks to enforce. Indeed, the Court explained as much in its 2019 Judgment14, where it rejected  on similar grounds  the largely identical argument raised by the United States as a preliminary objection to admissibility. I therefore agree with the conclusion of the Court in paragraphs 82-84 of the present Judgment.
8. Similarly, I agree that the Court should reject the United States’ defence based on Iran’s alleged abuse of rights. The abuse of rights doctrine applies in circumstances where a right is exercised by a State for a purpose other than that for which the right was created15. Assuming arguendo that the United States’ terrorism allegations against Iran have any bearing on the issue, that conduct does not, in my view, appear sufficient to dismiss Iran’s claim based on a valid title of jurisdiction. I agree with the Court’s conclusion in paragraph 93 that the United States has not met the high threshold required to establish Iran’s alleged abuse of rights.
B. Objections of the United States to the admissibility of Iran’s claims based on the alleged failure by Iranian companies to exhaust local remedies
9. The United States does not dispute that Iran’s claims pursuant to Articles VII and X of the 1955 Treaty are made in Iran’s own right as a State and therefore do not require the exhaustion of
11 RI, Att. 2, Actions filed with US courts to enforce judgments against assets of I.R. Iran and Iranian State entities as of 31 December 2019.
12 According to the Reply of Islamic Republic of Iran, paras. 2.63-2.120, the nine cases are: (1) Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Case No. 02-mc-00237; (2) Bennet v. Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Case No. 11-cv-05807; (3) Levin v. Bank of New York, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No. 09-cv-5900; (4) Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No. 10-cv-4518; (5) Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 00-cv-2329; (6) Heiser v. Bank of Baroda, New York Branch, U.S. District Court for Southern District of New York, Case No. 11-cv-1602; (7) Heiser v. The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No. 11-cv-1601; (8) Heiser v. Mashreqbank PSC, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:11-cv-01609 and (9) Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, Case No. 3:98-cv-01165.
13 2019 Judgment, p. 44, paras. 122-123.
14 Ibid., p. 44, para. 122.
15 A. Kiss, “Abuse of Rights”, in Max Planck Encyclopaedias of International Law.
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local remedies before the seisin of the Court
16. However, it argues that the exhaustion of local remedies requirement is applicable to Iran’s claims pursuant to Articles III, IV and V of the 1955 Treaty, an argument disputed by Iran. In relation to the requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies, I disagree with the conclusion of the Court that the Iranian companies in question did not have any effective means of redress that they failed to pursue, in the legal system of the United States (Judgment, paras. 67, 73 and 236 (2)), along with the reasons underlying that conclusion. In line with the test laid down in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy)17, the first issue for determination is whether Iran’s claims for diplomatic protection are interdependent with its own rights under the 1955 Treaty and thus do not require those companies to exhaust local remedies, or whether they are in fact claims that are not interdependent with the rights of Iran, in which case they would require the prior exhaustion of local remedies.
10. Articles III, IV and V of the 1955 Treaty, by their terms, protect only the rights of the companies of the High Contracting Parties and do not provide direct rights to those States. In its pleadings and arguments, Iran more than merely asserts a general claim that the 1955 Treaty has been violated: it claims that specific Iranian companies have had their rights violated and that the United States must provide reparation for the specific assets of those companies seized pursuant to the allegedly wrongful conduct of Iran. It does not discuss harm caused to the Iranian State as such. Thus, while the Court declined to expressly apply the test laid down in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI)18, I am of the view that Iran’s claims made under Articles III, IV and V of the 1955 Treaty were brought on behalf of Iranian State-owned companies solely for the diplomatic protection of their rights and are not interdependent with the rights of Iran under the Treaty. Consequently, the Iranian State-owned entities in respect of which Iran has brought these claims are required, under customary international law, to have exhausted local remedies in the United States before the seisin of the Court, unless it can be shown that the “futility” or “ineffectiveness” exception19 to the local remedies rule applies.
11. Article 14 (1) of the International Law Commission’s 2006 Articles on Diplomatic Protection (“ILC Articles”) states that “[a] State may not present an international claim in respect to an injury to a national . . . before the injured person has, subject to draft article 15, exhausted all local remedies”20. Furthermore, Article 15 (a) of the ILC Articles provides that local remedies need not be exhausted where “the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of . . . redress”21 (for example, where the local court has no jurisdiction over the dispute in question; or where local courts are notoriously lacking in independence; or where there is a consistent and well-established line of precedents adverse to the claimant). However, as the ILC recognized in its commentary to this Article, for the exception to apply,
“[i]t is not sufficient for the injured person to show that the possibility of success is low or that further appeals are difficult or costly. The test is not whether a successful
16 The United States’ claim that Iran has failed to exhaust local remedies is limited to claims made under Articles III, IV and V of the Treaty. CR 2022/20, pp. 59-60, para. 14 (Visek).
17 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 42, para. 51.
18 See para. 67 of the present Judgment.
19 See Articles 14 and 15 (a) of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Diplomatic Protection. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work at its Fifty-Eighth Session, Chapter IV, “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection”, UN doc. A/61/10, 2006 (“ILC Articles”).
20 Ibid., p. 70.
21 Ibid., p. 76.
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outcome is likely or possible, but whether the municipal system of the respondent State is reasonably capable of providing effective relief.”
22
12. In the present case, Iran has not produced any evidence impugning the competence or independence of the United States court system as such or establishing a consistent and well-established line of precedents adverse to the claimants23. Moreover, the fact that some entities whose assets were attached on grounds of terrorism successfully challenged the attachment in those courts (a fact acknowledged by the Court24) is, in my view, sufficient to preclude a conclusion that the negative outcomes in the Peterson, Bennett and Weinstein cases necessarily meant that Iranian State-owned companies had “no reasonable prospect of redress” in other cases. In my view, what is relevant is not whether a successful or favourable outcome for the Iranian companies was likely or possible, but whether the municipal system of the United States is reasonably capable of providing effective relief. I disagree with the conclusion of the Court that “the companies in question did not have any effective means of redress, in the legal system of the United States, that they failed to pursue”25. The exception of futility or ineffectiveness does not apply. Consequently, any Iranian State-owned company that chose not to participate in the United States proceedings in which its assets were the subject of attachment failed to exhaust local remedies, and Iran’s claims in relation thereto are, in my view, inadmissible26. Accordingly, the United States’ objection to the admissibility of Iran’s claims based on the failure of Iranian State-owned companies to exhaust local remedies should have been upheld.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE 1955 TREATY
A. Alleged violation of Article III
1. Alleged violation of Article III, paragraph 1
13. I voted against the finding of the Court in paragraph 236 (3) because I am not convinced that the United States has violated its obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. The obligation imposed by Article III, paragraph 1, upon each contracting party to recognize in its territory the distinct corporate or legal personality of a company incorporated in the territory of the other party, is distinct from the obligations of reasonableness and non-discrimination imposed by Article IV, paragraph 1. In my respectful view, the Court should not have conflated the distinct obligations arising under the two provisions as it appears to have done in the Judgment27.
22 ILC Articles, UN doc. A/61/10, 2006, p. 48.
23 In this regard, I disagree with the majority’s reading and interpretation  as found in paragraphs 70-72 of the Judgment  of the Weinstein and Bennett decisions by the Respondent’s domestic courts. Those courts clearly found that there was no conflict between the 1955 Treaty and the applicable subsequent legislation, and accordingly did not have to use the legislation to override the said Treaty.
24 CR 2022/17, p. 32, paras. 52-55 (Bethlehem); CR 2022/20, pp. 16-17, paras. 22-23 (Bethlehem). See also Judgment, para. 71.
25 Judgment, para. 67.
26 It is not clear from Iran’s pleadings which of the Iranian State-owned companies have or have not exhausted local remedies. Iran merely lists in Attachment 2 a list of enforcement actions, without indicating the parties to those proceedings or the procedural status of the actions. Similarly, the new list provided during the oral proceedings lacks the requisite clarity. Be that as it may, the onus remains on Iran to demonstrate, in respect of each company, that it exhausted local remedies, before its claims can be entertained.
27 See paragraph 159 of the Judgment where without much prior analysis of the alleged violation of Article III (1), the Court simply concludes: “In light of all of the foregoing, the Court also concludes that the United States has violated its obligation to recognize the juridical status of Iranian companies under Article III, paragraph 1.”
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14. So what is the nature and extent of the obligation created or envisaged under Article III, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty? The provision, read in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the Treaty28, ordinarily means that the United States and Iran each has a duty to recognize in its territory the juridical status (distinct corporate or legal personality) of a company incorporated in the territory of the other party. However, the obligation is not absolute and, as stipulated in the second sentence of that Article, the recognition of a company’s juridical status “does not of itself confer rights upon companies to engage in the activities for which they are organized”. Thus, the United States, in recognizing the corporate or juridical status of Iranian companies in its territory, is not obliged to grant to those companies the full range of rights to which they may be entitled under Iranian law, and vice versa.
15. This narrow reading of Article III (1) is confirmed by the 1955 Treaty’s travaux préparatoires29. Specifically, an internal United States State Department cable explained that Article III (1) “merely provides [for the] recognition [of corporations] as corporate entities principally in order they may prosecute or defend their rights as corporate entities”30. This statement was subsequently conveyed by representatives from the United States Government to the Iranian Foreign Secretary31. The travaux support the understanding that Article III (1) was intended to enable the companies of each party to access the courts of law, and to perform such functions as enforcing contracts, holding property and collecting debts, in the territory of the other. In the present case, the United States indisputably recognized the legal status of Iranian companies as distinct legal entities for purposes of litigation in domestic courts. As the Court itself noted in the Judgment32, the rights of Iranian companies to appear before United States courts, make legal submissions and lodge appeals were not curtailed. Indeed, the very existence of the attachment proceedings challenged by Iran — which involved lawsuits initiated by plaintiffs against Iranian companies as separate legal entities — demonstrate the compliance of the United States with Article III (1).
16. However, while it is a well-established principle in company law to distinguish the juridical status of a company from that of its individual shareholders, there is also a well-established exception in both common law and civil law domestic jurisdictions known as the “piercing or lifting of the corporate veil”, whereby courts go behind the legal personality of the company and proceed against the assets of individual shareholders “in the interests of justice”. This practice has also been applied in international law in Barcelona Traction where the Court stated as follows:
“Forms of incorporation and their legal personality have sometimes not been employed for the sole purposes they were originally intended to serve; sometimes the corporate entity has been unable to protect the rights of those who entrusted their financial resources to it; thus inevitably there have arisen dangers of abuse, as in the case of many other institutions of law. Here, then, as elsewhere, the law, confronted with economic realities, has had to provide protective measures and remedies in the interests of those within the corporate entity as well as of those outside who have dealings with it: the law has recognized that the independent existence of the legal entity cannot be treated as an absolute. It is in this context that the process of ‘lifting the corporate veil’ or ‘disregarding the legal entity’ has been found justified and equitable in certain circumstances or for certain purposes. The wealth of practice already
28 The provision is interpreted according to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which reflect the applicable customary international law.
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 32.
30 Telegram No. 936 from US Department of State to United States Embassy in Tehran, 9 November 1954; Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (“CMUSA”), para. 13.8 and Ann. 135.
31 Aide-memoire of the US Embassy in Tehran dated 20 November 1954, p. 2 (MI, Ann. 3).
32 Judgment, para. 143.
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accumulated on the subject in municipal law indicates that the veil is lifted, for instance, to prevent the misuse of privileges of legal personality, as in certain cases of fraud or malfeasance, to protect third persons such as a creditor or purchaser, or to prevent the evasion of legal requirements or of obligations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In accordance with the principle expounded above, the process of lifting the veil, being an exceptional one admitted by municipal law . . ., is equally admissible to play a similar role in international law.”33
In my view, the domestic courts of the United States were entitled to lift the corporate veil of Iranian State-owned companies in the interests of justice (namely, for the purposes of enforcing various judgments obtained against the Iranian State), in order to access the assets of the Iranian State as a shareholder in those companies. In the circumstances, Iran has failed to establish that the United States violated its obligation owed to Iran under Article III (1).
2. Alleged violation of Article III, paragraph 2
17. I agree with the reasoning of the majority in relation to Article III, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty and with its conclusion, in paragraph 168 of the Judgment, that Iran has not established a violation by the United States of its obligations under that provision. I can only add that the cases cited by Iran in support of its interpretation of the provision34 are, in my view, distinguishable in that they interpret legal provisions that are broader in scope than Article III (2). They are therefore not applicable to the present circumstances. The record makes clear that those Iranian State-owned entities that chose to appear before the United States courts were afforded significant opportunities to make their case within the United States legal system. Those companies were represented by experienced counsel and had the opportunity to present evidence, call witnesses, make full and detailed submissions and appeal judgments rendered against them, including in one case to the United States Supreme Court35. The fact that many of these companies opted not to appear before the United States courts or to challenge the outcome does not negate their ability to access the judicial system.
B. Alleged violation of Article IV
18. I respectfully disagree with the findings of the Court in paragraphs 159, 187, 192 and 236 (4) and (5) of the Judgment, relating to the alleged violation by the United States of its obligations under Article IV of the 1955 Treaty. Article IV guarantees traditional investment law protections, including those of fair and equitable treatment, most constant protection and security, and protection from unlawful expropriation. It appears that the parties understood these to be terms of art when drafting the Treaty. There is also limited jurisprudence applying similar standards present in other bilateral commercial treaties concluded by the United States with other States around the same period.
33 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, pp. 38-39, paras. 56-58.
34 RI, paras. 5.18-5.25 (citing ECtHR, National & Provincial Building Society et al. v. United Kingdom, Judgment, 23 October 1997; ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, Judgment, 9 December 1994). See also The Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), 6 March 1956, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol XII, p. 111.
35 RI, Att. 2; Rejoinder of the United States of America (“RUSA”), para. 13.29, App. 1.
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1. Alleged violation of Article IV, paragraph 1
19. In its ordinary meaning read in the context of the rest of the 1955 Treaty, Article IV, paragraph 1, consists of three separate clauses, each separated with a semicolon and beginning with the word “shall”. This suggests an intention to incorporate three distinct obligations. This interpretation is also supported by the Treaty’s negotiating history36. The first strand of Article IV, paragraph 1, sets out a free-standing “fair and equitable treatment” standard (“FET standard”) that contains no express reference to customary international law. Accordingly, the Court should interpret this first strand as prescribing an autonomous FET standard that need not correspond precisely with the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law. The Parties agree that the FET standard prohibits denial of justice, by promoting respect for fair procedure and due process37.
20. The second strand of Article IV, paragraph 1, sets out the prohibition against “discriminatory or unreasonable treatment”. For treatment to be deemed “discriminatory”, the claimant must demonstrate that similarly situated companies were subject to differential treatment without reasonable or justifiable cause38. The standard of “unreasonableness” is largely equivalent to that of “arbitrariness”39. Evaluating whether a given measure is unreasonable or arbitrary requires reviewing the measure’s stated purpose, determining the legitimacy of that purpose and assessing whether the measure bears a reasonable relationship with that purpose40.
21. Regarding the obligation encapsulated in the third strand of Article IV, paragraph 1, investment tribunals have generally interpreted the “effective means” provisions as being similar to the obligations to provide due process and to refrain from denial of justice41. Such a requirement could be breached, for example, by the failure to ensure the presence of legislation and secondary rules of procedure that facilitate the enforcement of contractual rights through the legal system42 or
36 A document memorializing discussions between representatives of the United States and Iran notes that the United States rejected an Iranian proposal to replace the term “unreasonable and discriminatory” in Article IV (1) with the term “unlawful and discriminatory”. Aide-memoire of the US Embassy in Tehran dated 20 November 1954, p. 3 (MI, Ann. 3). The United States explained that the clause was intended to express a “general requirement for careful regard . . . for legitimate interests of foreign investors without interference with the country’s right of proper regulation”. Ibid. This suggests that the United States understood at the time that the separate clauses of Article IV (1) imposed their own distinct standards of treatment.
37 RUSA, para. 10.5; RI, para. 6.9.
38 See Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 27 August 2008, para. 184: “With regard to discrimination, it corresponds to the negative formulation of the principle of equality of treatment. It entails like persons being treated in a different manner in similar circumstances without reasonable or justifiable grounds.”
39 See National Grid p.l.c. v. Argentine Republic, Award, 3 November 2008, para. 197: “It is the view of the Tribunal that the plain meaning of the terms ‘unreasonable’ and ‘arbitrary’ is substantially the same in the sense of something done capriciously, without reason.” In ELSI, the Court explained that concept of arbitrariness is distinct from illegality under domestic law: “It is a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety”. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 76, para. 128.
40 See e.g. Cairn Energy PLC and Cairn UK Holdings Limited v. The Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2016-7, Award, 21 December 2020, para. 1787: “This entails not only a requirement that the State’s policy be rational and non-arbitrary, but also that the measure in question bear a reasonable relationship with that policy”; Mr. Joshua Dean Nelson v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. UNCT/17/1, Award, 5 June 2020, para. 325“[T]he arbitrariness analysis consists in reviewing the stated purposes of a certain measure and whether the measure effectively addresses the stated purposes.”
41 Rudolf Dolzer et al., Principles of International Investment Law, Third Edition (2022), Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 289.
42 See Limited Liability Company AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Final Award, 26 March 2008, paras. 75 and 87.
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by undue delays in local proceedings
43. I will address the alleged violations of each of the three obligations or protections guaranteed by the provision, in turn.
(a) Alleged lack of fair and equitable treatment of Iranian companies
22. Iran claims that the United States, by enforcing adverse retrospective legislation, has deprived Iranian companies of their right to raise certain defences, resulting in a denial of justice and a violation of due process44. The obligation to afford due process, by its nature, encompasses predominantly procedural obligations. It generally does not concern itself with the merits (or lack thereof) of the substantive claims at issue, but with access to the courts, delays in court proceedings or manifestly unjust applications of the law. As already discussed above, Iran has, in my view, not provided any evidence of due process violations by United States domestic courts. Iranian State-owned companies were provided the opportunity to defend their rights in United States courts as part of the execution proceedings brought against them. Besides, Iran has not alleged that United States courts manifestly failed to properly apply the applicable law.
(b) Alleged discriminatory or unreasonable treatment
23. The obligation to refrain from discriminatory and unreasonable measures provides Iran with the most plausible basis for its claim that the United States has violated Article IV, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. Each of the measures challenged by Iran will be examined in turn.
(a) Section 502 of the 2012 ITRSHRA: This provision specifically targeted the assets of Bank Markazi and rendered them subject to attachment and execution for the purpose of satisfying default judgments against Iran in the Peterson case45. Bank Markazi unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the provision before United States courts, as well as its constitutionality before the United States Supreme Court46. In view of the Court’s findings that claims relating to the treatment accorded to Bank Markazi fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court, Iran’s claim of alleged discriminatory or unreasonable treatment based on the ITRSHRA cannot succeed.
(b) The 2002 TRIA and 2008 Amendments to the FSIA: These provisions (whose effects are similar)47 were not discriminatory in as far as they did not apply to Iranian companies only, but also to entities belonging to several other States that were also designated by the United States as “State sponsors of terrorism”, including, at the time, North Korea, Cuba, Syria and Sudan. Regarding Iran’s argument that the United States was unreasonable or arbitrary in applying its policy of corporate veil piercing, as well as its enforcement of the TRIA and the FSIA to individual Iranian State-owned companies not responsible for Iran’s impugned conduct, I refer to the quotation in Barcelona Traction referred to earlier in this opinion. In the present case, the veil was lifted, according to the Respondent, to prevent the misuse of the privileges of legal personality, to protect third persons that had obtained default judgments against the State of Iran (a shareholder in the companies), and to prevent Iran as well as other “State sponsors of terrorism” from evading
43 See White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, Final Award, 30 November 2011, para. 11.4.19.
44 RI, para. 6.60.
45 Subsection 502 (b) of the Act specifically defined the property subject to the Act as
“the financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 . . . that were restrained by restraining notices and levies secured by the plaintiffs in those proceedings, as modified by court order dated June 27, 2008, and extended by court orders dated June 23, 2009, May 10, 2010, and June 11, 2010, so long as such assets remain restrained by court order.”
46 2019 Judgment, p. 21, para. 26.
47 Ibid., p. 20, paras. 23-24.
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compensating victims of terrorist attacks. The enforcement of the TRIA and the FSIA followed similar objectives as those underlying corporate veil piercing. In the premises, Iran’s claim that the 2002 TRIA and 2008 Amendments to the FSIA were “unreasonable and arbitrary” and therefore violate Article IV, paragraph 1, cannot succeed.
(c) Executive Order 13599: This measure blocked or “froze” property in the United States belonging to the Government of Iran (including its agencies and instrumentalities) and Iranian financial institutions48. Iran argues that the Order was both discriminatory and unreasonable. With respect to discrimination, the Executive Order by its terms targeted only the Government of Iran. On its face, this is suggestive of discriminatory treatment. However, the Order cannot be examined in isolation. In this regard, other United States measures have, at various times, frozen the assets of nationals of other States49. Moreover, the United States has credibly argued that the money-laundering risks posed by the Iranian financial sector were not necessarily commensurate with the risks posed by banks of other States. Specifically, the Respondent points to 2011 findings by the Financial Actions Task Force (“FATF”) — an intergovernmental anti-money-laundering body — that Iran posed a particularly severe terrorism-financing risk, noting that Iran is one of only two jurisdictions (along with North Korea) against which the FATF has specifically called for States to take action50. In the same vein, the United Nations Security Council stated in 2010 that there was a need to “exercise vigilance” regarding Iranian financial institutions51. In that context, it was rational for the United States to implement stricter measures against Iranian banks than against the financial sector of other States. Iran has provided no evidence of its own challenging the credibility of the Respondent’s contention that the Iranian financial sector posed a cumulative money-laundering risk. Accordingly, it appears that Iran has not met its burden to show that the Executive Order was arbitrary or unreasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, Iran’s claim in this regard must also fail.
(c) Alleged lack of effective means of enforcement
24. Iran contends that the United States measures have “rendered illusory” the contractual rights of two Iranian entities, Bank Melli and TIC, to receive moneys owed by United States companies because those funds were attached in execution proceedings. Iran’s claim that this constituted a violation of Article IV, paragraph 1, is not very persuasive. As discussed above, “effective means” obligations are generally interpreted as primarily concerning themselves with rules of procedure, similar to the obligation regarding access to justice. The measures at issue did not directly affect the procedural rights of Iranian State-owned companies to seek enforcement of their contractual rights. Iranian companies retained access to the United States court system and the ability to bring contractual claims therein although many chose not to do so.
25. In my view, Iran has not established a violation by the United States of its obligation under Article IV, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, and Iran’s claims in this regard should have been dismissed.
48 United States Executive Order 13599, 5 February 2012 (MI, Ann. 22).
49 For example, a 2001 executive order broadly froze the assets of foreign persons that support or associate with foreign terrorists (Executive Order 13224, 23 September 2001).
50 Financial Action Task Force, High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions (CMUSA, Ann. 134). There have been numerous US sanctions implemented against North Korea, including measures blocking the property of North Koreans operating in the financial services industry. See e.g. Executive Order 13810 of 20 September 2017.
51 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, UN doc. S/RES/1929, 9 June 2010.
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2. Alleged violation of Article IV, paragraph 2
26. Article IV, paragraph 2, contains two protections: the first relating to the obligation to provide “the most constant protection and security” and the second relating to the obligation not to take property “without the prompt payment of just compensation” “except for a public purpose”. With respect to the first of these protections, Article IV, paragraph 2, does not define the phrase “most constant protection and security” (“MCPS”). Likewise, the travaux préparatoires of the 1955 Treaty shed little light on how that standard was understood by the Parties. However, the MCPS obligation and related obligations, such as the obligation to ensure “full protection and security” (“FPS”)52, are present in a wide range of bilateral and multilateral investment agreements. Such clauses have been traditionally understood as obligating the host State to ensure the physical protections of the property of nationals or companies of the investor State.
27. However, more recently, several investment tribunals have interpreted such clauses to also extend to legal protections, in particular the existence of a secure legal environment53. Arbitral tribunals that have interpreted MCPS and FPS obligations to apply to legal security claims have generally focused on the existence of a stable legal environment in the host State that provides the investor with legal protections for their investment54.
28. The Parties agree that a “taking” of property under Article IV, paragraph 2, is equivalent to expropriation, as understood in international law55. This is also supported by the travaux of the 1955 Treaty56. Expropriation is defined as the governmental taking of property for which compensation is required57. Expropriation usually takes the form of administrative or executive action by the State. However, claims of expropriation based on conduct of a State’s judiciary require an element of “illegality” or “arbitrariness” in the conduct of the State’s court system, such as conduct amounting to denial of justice, for a judicial decision to qualify as an expropriation58. It is also a widely accepted norm of international law that a bona fide, non-discriminatory regulation, enacted as an exercise of a State’s police powers, will not be deemed to be an expropriation59. I will address the alleged violations of each of the two obligations or protections guaranteed by Article IV, paragraph 2, in turn.
52 These different textual variations of the obligation have generally been interpreted similarly. See Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, Final Award, 12 November 2010, para. 260.
53 See e.g. Global Telecom Holding S.A.E. v. Canada, Award, 27 March 2020, paras. 664-665; Anglo American plc v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Award, 18 January 2019, para. 482; Biwater v. Tanzania, Award, 24 July 2008, para. 729; Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, Award, 14 July 2006, para. 408.
54 See e.g. Christoph Schreuer, “Full Protection and Security”, in Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 1 (2), 2010, p. 369: “Under this interpretation the host State is under an obligation to provide a legal framework that enables the investor to take effective steps to protect its investment.” Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, Award, 14 July 2006, para. 406, referring to “the stability afforded by a secure investment environment”.
55 RI, para. 7.13; CMUSA, para. 14.84.
56 One document prepared by the United States during negotiations notes that “[t]he provision on compensation in case of expropriation in paragraph 2 is basic in all US treaty proposals of this type” (Instructions from US Department of State to U.S. Embassy, Tehran (CMUSA, Ann. 227)).
57 Campbell McLachlan et al., International Investment Arbitration (2nd Edition): Substantive Principles (2017), p. 360.
58 See Vid Prislan, “Judicial Expropriation in International Investment Law”, in International & Comparative Law, Vol. 70, 2021, p. 177; Krederi Ltd. v. Ukraine, Award, 2 July 2018, para. 713; Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Award, 30 June 2009, para. 134.
59 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed., 2012), p. 621.
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(a) Alleged violation of the “most constant protection and security” obligation
29. As discussed previously in the context of Iranian claims regarding violations of Article III, paragraph 2, and Article IV, paragraph 1, the United States measures did not deprive Iranian State-owned companies of access to the courts or result in a denial of justice or of effective means to enforce their contractual rights. Those reasons are equally applicable to the alleged violation of the most constant protection and security obligation (legal security). Based on the above reasons, I am of the view that Iran has not proved that the impugned United States measures deprived Iranian companies of legal security. Iran’s claim in this regard fails.
(b) Alleged expropriation of property belonging to Iranian State-owned companies
30. Iran’s claim is essentially one of direct and unlawful expropriation. It contends that the attachment of the assets of certain Iranian State-owned companies by United States courts and their transfer to victims of terrorist attacks resulted in a taking of property without compensation in violation of Article IV (2). As stated earlier, Iran’s claims of expropriation, with regard to measures that solely affected Bank Markazi or Iran’s sovereign immunity, fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction. Secondly, the challenged legislative and executive measures, in my view, amount to a bona fide, non-discriminatory exercise of the United States police power aimed at achieving legitimate regulatory purposes. Through those measures, the Respondent intended to provide victims of terrorist attacks with the ability to obtain legal redress while, at the same time, addressing the national security threats posed by Iran’s alleged arms trafficking and support for terrorism. Moreover, regarding the effect of the impugned judicial decisions on the Applicant’s property, Iran has not provided any evidence of “illegality” or “arbitrariness” in the conduct of the United States’ court system amounting to judicial expropriation. Accordingly, the attachment by the United States of Iranian assets, including those belonging to Iranian State-owned companies, does not amount to compensable “expropriation” within the meaning of Article IV, paragraph 2. Iran’s claim in this regard also fails.
31. In my view, Iran has not established a violation by the United States of its obligation under Article IV, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty.
C. Alleged violation of Article V, paragraph 1
32. I agree with the conclusion of the Court in paragraph 201 of the Judgment that Iran has not established a violation by the United States of the Applicant’s right to dispose of property under Article V, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, albeit for different reasons. Article V, paragraph 1, contains three guarantees or protections. The provision obligates the Parties to permit each other’s companies and nationals (a) to lease real property for residential or business purposes; (b) to purchase or otherwise acquire personal property; and (c) to dispose of property of all kinds by sale, testament or otherwise, all subject to the “most-favoured-nation” standard. In the present case, Iran’s claim is limited to alleged breach of the obligations under clause (c) relating to the disposal of property.
33. I agree with the majority that the obligation incumbent upon a party under Article V, paragraph 1, is not absolute, and does not prevent a host State from exercising regulatory control over the lease, purchase, acquisition or disposal of property by the companies of the other State60. A
60 Judgment, para. 197.
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host State is thus not precluded, for example, from implementing rules and procedures that purport to regulate such activity.
34. I also agree that on its face, Executive Order 13599 does appear to entirely prohibit the disposition of certain Iranian property that has been “blocked” pursuant to that Order61. However, as referred to earlier, the Executive Order was deemed necessary after less stringent measures had failed to curb money-laundering activities of particular financial institutions. In fact, the Order seems to have been targeted at freezing financial assets rather than real property.
35. Furthermore, in order to demonstrate a breach by the United States of its obligations, Iran must show more than a mere hypothetical interference with the right of its companies to dispose of their real property. In the Oil Platforms case, which dealt with the interpretation and application of Article X (1) of the 1955 Treaty, the Court explained that for that provision to have been breached, there must have been an actual impediment to freedom of commerce62. The same is true regarding the interpretation and application of Article V, paragraph 1. To establish a breach of this obligation, Iran must demonstrate that an Iranian State-owned company that has been in possession of certain real property was actually prevented from disposing of that property within the United States, as a result of Executive Order 13599. Except with respect to assets of Bank Markazi which fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction, Iran has not established its claim that the impugned Executive Order has deprived Iranian companies of their right to dispose of their property, within the meaning of subparagraph 1 (c). Its claim is based entirely upon a hypothetical argument. It is for the above reasons that I would join the majority in rejecting Iran’s unsubstantiated claim regarding the United States’ alleged violation of Article V, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.
D. Alleged violations of Article VII
36. I agree with the Court’s conclusion in paragraph 208 of the Judgment rejecting Iran’s claim relating to the alleged violation by the United States of Article VII, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. I also agree with the Court’s interpretation of Article VII, paragraph 1, and would only add that the negotiating history of the said provision confirms that interpretation. Iran does not refer to a single instance in the provision’s negotiating history supporting its interpretation of Article VII (1).
E. Alleged violations of Article X, paragraph 1
37. I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the Court in paragraph 223 and its findings in paragraph 236 (6) of the Judgment. Regarding the scope of this provision, the Court’s previous interpretations of the scope of Article X, paragraph 1, in the Oil Platforms case and in the 2019 Judgment are highly relevant. In the Oil Platforms preliminary objection Judgment, the Court stated:
“The Court must indeed give due weight to the fact that, after Article X, paragraph 1, in which the word ‘commerce’ appears, the rest of the Article clearly deals with maritime commerce. Yet this factor is not, in the view of the Court sufficient to restrict the scope of the word to maritime commerce, having regard to other indications in the Treaty of an intention of the parties to deal with trade and commerce in general. The Court also takes note in this connection of the recital in Article XXII of the Treaty which states that the Treaty was to replace, inter alia, a provisional agreement relating
61 Judgment, para. 200, referring to Executive Order 13599, Sec. 1.
62 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp. 204-205, para. 92.
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to commercial and other relations, concluded at Tehran on 14 May 1928. The Treaty of 1955 is thus a Treaty relating to trade and commerce in general, and not one restricted purely to maritime commerce.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In these circumstances, the view that the word ‘commerce’ in Article X, paragraph 1, is confined to maritime commerce does not commend itself to the Court.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Court must now consider the interpretation according to which the word ‘commerce’ in Article X, paragraph 1, is restricted to acts of purchase and sale. According to this interpretation, the protection afforded by this provision does not cover the antecedent activities which are essential to maintain commerce as, for example, the procurement of goods with a view to using them for commerce.
In the view of the Court, there is nothing to indicate that the parties to the Treaty intended to use the word ‘commerce’ in any sense different from that which it generally bears. The word ‘commerce’ is not restricted in ordinary usage to the mere act of purchase and sale; it has connotations that extend beyond mere purchase and sale to include ‘the whole of the transactions, arrangements, etc., therein involved’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, Vol. 3, p. 552).
In legal language, likewise, this term is not restricted to mere purchase and sale because it can refer to
‘not only the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities, but also the instrumentalities and agencies by which it is promoted and the means and appliances by which it is carried on, and transportation of persons as well as of goods, both by land and sea’ (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 269).
Similarly, the expression ‘international commerce’ designates, in its true sense, ‘all transactions of import and export, relationships of exchange, purchase, sale, transport, and financial operations between nations’ and sometimes even ‘all economic, political, intellectual relations between States and between their nationals’ (Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international (produced under the authority of President Basdevant), 1960, p. 126 [translation by the Registry]).
Thus, whether the word ‘commerce’ is taken in its ordinary sense or in its legal meaning, at the domestic or international level, it has a broader meaning than the mere reference to purchase and sale.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Court concludes from al1 of the foregoing that it would be a natural interpretation of the word ‘commerce’ in Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of 1955 that it includes commercial activities in general  not merely the immediate act of purchase and sale, but also the ancillary activities integrally related to commerce.”63
63 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 817-819, paras. 41, 43, 45, 49.
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38. According to the Court’s jurisprudence in Oil Platforms, the word “commerce” as used in Article X (1) covers all forms of commercial transactions, including trade in services, as well as financial transactions, and not merely the immediate act of purchase and sale.
39. Moreover, in its 2019 Judgment the Court made clear that it saw “no reason to depart now from the interpretation of ‘freedom of commerce’ that it adopted in the [Oil Platforms] case”64. Recognizing that, in order to establish a breach of obligation under Article X (1), there must be a sufficiently close relationship between the impugned conduct and the acts of commerce, the Court stated that “freedom of commerce cannot cover matters that have no connection, or too tenuous a connection, with the commercial relations between the States Parties to the Treaty”65. The Court has also observed that it must be established that there is actual and ongoing commerce that was impeded by the impugned activities; and that Article X, paragraph 1, “is in terms limited to the protection of freedom of commerce ‘between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties’”66. Such commerce must be sufficiently direct67. Lastly, the Court has stated that in order to demonstrate a violation of Article X (1), a party must do more than plead a “generic” claim of breach and must identify specific conduct that impeded commerce68.
40. Iran argues that the United States’ measures resulting in the freezing or seizure of the assets belonging to Iranian financial institutions and State-owned entities have “rendered impossible” commerce between the United States and Iran with respect to those entities69. Iran specifically refers to the attachment proceedings in relation to contractual debts owed by United States companies to TIC, Bank Melli and the Iranian Ministry of Defence70. For Iran’s claim to succeed, it must demonstrate that a sufficiently direct nexus exists between the impugned United States measures and freedom of commerce. In my view, however, many of the measures challenged by Iran — particularly those legislative measures that merely authorize the attachment of the assets of Iranian State-owned entities to enforce judgments rendered against Iran — do not directly affect trade or commerce between the two States. Firstly, while the Court has made clear that Article X (1) does not only cover purchase and sale, but also applies to “ancillary activities integrally related to commerce”71, the impugned measures are not analogous to the conduct in Oil Platforms. That case concerned conduct amounting to interference with the antecedent activities to a commercial transaction; specifically, the production of oil that would later be traded on the international market. By contrast, the attachment of assets of Iranian companies does not target an element in the commercial process. Such measures, in Iran’s own words, merely affect “the products of commerce”72.
41. Secondly, to the extent that one or more of the impugned measures are capable of directly affecting commerce, Iran has not demonstrated that there has been actual interference with then-existing and ongoing commerce. Taken in isolation, Executive Order 13599 has the potential to
64 2019 Judgment, p. 34, para. 79.
65 Ibid.
66 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 200, para. 82 (emphasis added).
67 Ibid., p. 207, para. 97.
68 Ibid., p. 217, para. 123.
69 RI, para. 8.34.
70 Ibid.
71 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 819, para. 49.
72 RI, para. 8.34.
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interfere with commerce by “blocking” all assets belonging to the Iranian Government and Iranian financial institutions located in the United States. However, by 2012 when the Order was issued, there were already a range of existing sanctions and other measures (not challenged by Iran in these proceedings) that made commerce between Iran and the United States extremely difficult. For example, Iran complains about the treatment of certain assets of Bank Melli. But those assets were blocked in 2007 and were therefore unaffected by Executive Order 13599
73. Similarly, financial transactions between Iran and the United States were severely restricted in 2008 by a regulation that prohibited so-called “U-turn” transfers that had previously been used by United States banks74. There is therefore reason to believe that there was little, if any, commerce left between Iran and the United States in 2012 that could have been impeded by the Executive Order75. Iran refers generally to the fact that United States census data demonstrates that a small amount of trade existed between the United States and Iran in 2016, the year Iran initiated these proceedings76. However, it provides no specific evidence as to how this ongoing trade was affected by the Executive Order or other measures at issue.
42. Thirdly, some of the examples of “commerce” cited by Iran are not in fact commercial in nature. In view of the Court’s finding that Bank Markazi is not a company for purposes of Articles III, IV and V of the Treaty, it follows that the Bank’s investments in the United States do not qualify as “commercial” for purposes of Article X, paragraph 1. Lastly, regarding the requirement for commerce “between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties” to be sufficiently direct, there is evidence on record that, from as early as 1995, there were no direct transactions between United States and Iranian banks and that the investments made by Bank Markazi took place through various intermediaries located outside the territories of the Parties, a fact not challenged by Iran77. In my view, Iran has not established that there was commerce between the Parties on their territories as required by Article X, paragraph 1, let alone that it was impeded by Executive Order 13599.
43. For the above reasons, Iran has, in my view, not demonstrated that the United States has violated its obligations under Article X (1) of the 1955 Treaty of Amity.
IV. DEFENCES UNDER ARTICLE XX, PARAGRAPH 1
Application of Article XX, paragraph 1 (c) and (d), of the 1955 Treaty
44. Whilst I agree with the Court’s conclusion in paragraph 103 regarding the non-applicability of Article XX, paragraph 1 (c) to the present case, I disagree with its conclusion in paragraph 109 regarding Article XX, paragraph 1 (d).
45. Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) exempts from the scope of the 1955 Treaty measures that are “necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests”. The Court has previously interpreted the scope of both Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) and an identically worded
73 RUSA, para. 8.34.
74 CMUSA, Ann. 232.
75 Iran also references in its Reply debts owed by Sprint to TIC. However, these funds were money owed by Sprint not subject to Executive Order 13599, as the payments in question were made under a US licence permitting telecommunications payments as an exception to the Executive Order. Heiser v. Iran, 807 F. supp. 2d 9, p. 18 fn. 6, (RUSA, Ann. 338).
76 CR 2022/16, pp. 34-35, para. 36 (Aughey).
77 CMUSA, paras. 17.14-17.20.
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provision in the Military and Paramilitary Activities and Oil Platforms cases. In both cases, the Court made clear that the exception is not self-judging, explaining that it is for the Court to determine whether there existed essential security interests at the time of the challenged measures and whether such conduct measures were “necessary” to protect such interests
78.
46. The United States asserts that the “essential security interests” at issue here are its interests in preventing terrorist attacks against the United States and its nationals, preventing terrorist financing and the supply of arms to terrorist groups, and combating Iran’s development of a ballistic missile programme. In Military and Paramilitary Activities, the Court stated that “the concept of essential security interests certainly extends beyond the concept of an armed attack, and has been subject to very broad interpretations in the past”79. Even interpreted relatively narrowly, it is likely that the interests alleged by the United States in this case, which relate to counterterrorism, prevention of arms trafficking and arms production, safely fall within the category of “essential security interests” to which the exception in Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) applies. Accordingly, Executive Order 13599 is, in my view, a measure falling within Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) of the Treaty and is therefore not subject to the terms of the said Treaty.
V. REMEDIES
47. I disagree with the conclusions of the Court in paragraph 231 as well as its findings in paragraph 236 (7) and (8) of the Judgment. In view of my opinion above that Iran has failed to substantiate any of its claims or to establish that the United States has violated the provisions of the 1955 Treaty, I am of the view that the Respondent is under no obligation to compensate Iran.
(Signed) Julia SEBUTINDE.
___________
78 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 141, para. 282 (“But by the terms of the Treaty itself, whether a measure is necessary to protect the essential security interests of a party is not, as the Court has emphasized . . . purely a question for the subjective judgment of the party”); Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 183, para. 43.
79 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 117, para. 224.

Bilingual Content

158
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SEBUTINDE
Agreement with subparagraphs (1) and (9) of the operative paragraph 236
but disagreement with the remaining subparagraphs of that paragraph —
As a jurisdictional matter, the Court should have determined which of the
United States’s impugned measures and judicial proceedings are relevant to
its analysis of the case — Iran’s claims pursuant to Articles III, IV and V of
the 1955 Treaty are inadmissible in as far as they relate to Iranian companies
that failed to exhaust local remedies in the United States — The
obligations under Articles III and IV of the 1955 Treaty are distinct and
should not be conflated — United States courts are entitled, in the interests
of justice, to lift the corporate veil of Iranian State-owned companies — Iran
has not established that the United States denied Iranian companies fair and
equitable treatment, or subjected them to unreasonable or discriminatory
measures or impeded the enforcement of their contractual rights — Iran has
not established that Executive Order 13599 actually prevented Iranian companies
from disposing their real property in the United States within the
meaning of Article IV (1) — The attachment of Iranian assets by the United
States does not amount to compensable “expropriation” within the meaning
of Article IV (2) — Article VII (1) relates solely to exchange restrictions and
Iran has not established that the United States violated its obligation under
that Article — Iran has not established that there was ongoing commerce
between the territories of Iran and the United States that was impeded by the
United States in violation of Article X (1) — Executive Order 13599 qualifies
as a measure that is necessary to protect the security interests of the United
States within the meaning of Article XX (1) (d) and should be exempted from
the scope of the 1955 Treaty — The United States is under no obligation to
compensate Iran.
Introduction
1. I have voted in favour of operative paragraphs (1) and (9) of paragraph
236 of the Judgment because I agree with the reasoning and conclusion
of the Court in relation thereto. However, I have voted against operative paragraphs
(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) thereof because I disagree with the
reasoning and conclusions of the Court in relation thereto. In this dissenting
opinion, I give my reasons for not voting with the majority. Where certain
abbreviations, acronyms and short forms have been used in the Judgment, I
have adopted the same in this opinion, unless otherwise specified.
158
OPINION DISSIDENTE DE Mme LA JUGE SEBUTINDE
[Traduction]
Accord avec les points 1 et 9 du dispositif, mais désaccord avec les autres
points — Regret que, sur le plan de la compétence, la Cour n’ait pas déterminé
quelles étaient, parmi les mesures et les procédures judiciaires américaines
contestées, celles qui étaient pertinentes aux fins de l’analyse de l’affaire — Irrecevabilité
des demandes de l’Iran fondées sur les articles III, IV et V du traité de
1955 dans la mesure où elles concernaient des sociétés iraniennes n’ayant pas
épuisé les voies de recours internes aux États-Unis — Obligations énoncées aux
articles III et IV du traité de 1955 étant distinctes et ne devant pas être
confondues — Juridictions américaines ayant la faculté, dans l’intérêt de la justice,
de lever le voile social des sociétés propriété de l’État iranien — Iran n’ayant
pas établi que les États-Unis avaient privé les sociétés iraniennes de leur droit à
un traitement juste et équitable, ou les avaient soumises à des mesures déraisonnables
ou discriminatoires, ou avaient empêché l’exécution de leurs droits
contractuels —Iran n’ayant pas établi que le décret présidentiel no 13599 avait
effectivement empêché les sociétés iraniennes d’aliéner leurs biens immobiliers
aux États-Unis au sens du paragraphe 1 de l’article IV — Saisie d’actifs iraniens
par les États-Unis ne constituant pas une « expropriation » ouvrant droit à une
indemnisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l’article IV — Paragraphe 1 de l’article
VII n’ayant trait qu’aux restrictions en matière de change et Iran n’ayant pas
établi
que les États-Unis avaient violé l’obligation que leur imposait cet article —
Iran n’ayant pas établi l’existence de relations commerciales courantes entre les
territoires de l’Iran et des États-Unis qui auraient été entravées par ces derniers
en violation du paragraphe 1 de l’article X — Décret présidentiel no 13599
constituant une mesure nécessaire à la protection des intérêts vitaux des
États-Unis sur le plan de la sécurité au sens de l’alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de
l’article XX et devant être exclu du champ d’application du traité de 1955 —
Absence d’obligation pour les États-Unis d’indemniser l’Iran.
Introduction
1. J’ai voté en faveur des points 1 et 9 du dispositif de l’arrêt, car je souscris
au raisonnement et à la conclusion adoptés sur ces points par la Cour. J’ai
cependant voté contre les points 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 et 8, car je suis en désaccord
avec le raisonnement et les conclusions que la Cour a exposés à leur égard.
Dans le présent exposé, j’expliquerai les motifs pour lesquels je me suis
dissociée
de la majorité. Certains acronymes, abréviations et formes abrégées
sont utilisés dans l’arrêt ; sauf indication contraire, j’en ai fait le même usage
dans le présent exposé.
159
I. Scope of the Dispute Following the 2019 Judgment
2. I begin with a few preliminary issues that were not dealt with in the
Judgment. Iran’s claims for the alleged breach of Articles VII and X of the
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the
United States of America and Iran, signed at Tehran on 15 August 1955
(“1955 Treaty”), are made in Iran’s own right as a State. However, Iran’s
claims for the alleged breach of Articles III, IV and V of the 1955 Treaty are
diplomatic protection claims brought on behalf of its “nationals” under a
bilateral commercial treaty. Those claims concern the alleged violation of
the rights of Iranian State-owned companies, as well as the consequences
that these violations have had on Iran’s ability to trade with the United States
of America (“United States”) as envisaged under the 1955 Treaty. Iran claims
that the legislative and executive measures adopted by the Respondent
since 2002 have “severely impeded” Iranian trade with or through foreign
branches of the Respondent’s companies, inter alia, because Iran cannot use
the United States banking system for international payments; and neither
Iran nor Iranian financial institutions are able to use or dispose of Iranian
properties in the United States1.
3. In my view, the Court should, as a preliminary matter, have determined
which of the Respondent’s executive and legislative measures as well as
judicial
proceedings are relevant to the determination of Iran’s claims on the
merits, following the Court’s 2019 Judgment on preliminary objections2
(“2019 Judgment”). First, the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1996 (“FSIA”)3, including the amendments thereto introduced
in 2002 and 2008 which, according to Iran, violate its sovereign immunity
or that of its entities, relate solely to the removal of immunity from Iran and
its agencies and instrumentalities from legal and enforcement proceedings
before United States courts4. Iran’s claims challenging these provisions
were, in the 2019 Judgment, adjudged to fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction
ratione materiae5.
1 Memorial of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“MI”), para. 1.19.
2 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), p. 7 (as in the main text, hereinafter the “2019
Judgment”).
3 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Sections 1605 (a) (7) and 1610 (b) (2).
4 Paragraph 25 of the present Judgment recalls that after the United States removed the
immunity from suit before its courts of States designated as “State sponsors of terrorism”, Iran
declined to appear before United States domestic courts in the ensuing lawsuits against it,
including in the Peterson case, on the grounds that the provisions of the FSIA were in violation
of the international law on State immunities.
5 2019 Judgment, pp. 34-35, para. 80.
certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 159
I. Portée du différend à la suite de l’arrêt de 2019
2. J’aborderai pour commencer quelques questions préliminaires qui n’ont
pas été traitées dans l’arrêt. C’est en son nom propre en tant qu’État que l’Iran
a présenté ses demandes fondées sur la violation alléguée des articles VII
et X du traité d’amitié, de commerce et de droits consulaires entre les
États-
Unis d’Amérique et l’Iran, signé à Téhéran, le l5 août 1955 (ci-après le
« traité de 1955 »). En revanche, les demandes fondées sur la violation alléguée
des articles III, IV et V du traité de 1955 étaient des demandes de protection
diplomatique soumises par l’Iran au nom de ses « ressortissants » en vertu
d’un traité de commerce bilatéral. Ces demandes portaient sur les violations
alléguées des droits de sociétés appartenant à l’État iranien et sur les conséquences
que celles-ci avaient eues sur la capacité de l’Iran à entretenir des
échanges commerciaux avec les États-Unis d’Amérique (ci-après les « États-
Unis »), au sens du traité de 1955. L’Iran prétendait que les mesures législatives
et exécutives adoptées par le défendeur dès 2002 avaient « gravement
entravé[] » le commerce iranien pratiqué avec des succursales étrangères de
sociétés américaines ou par l’intermédiaire de celles-ci, notamment parce
qu’il ne pouvait utiliser le système bancaire américain pour effectuer des paiements
internationaux, et que ni lui-même ni les institutions financières iraniennes
ne pouvaient jouir des biens iraniens aux États-Unis, ni les aliéner 1.
3. Je suis d’avis que la Cour aurait dû commencer par déterminer quelles
étaient, parmi les mesures exécutives et législatives ainsi que les procédures
judiciaires du défendeur, celles qui étaient pertinentes aux fins de la décision
qu’il lui fallait prendre sur le fond des demandes de l’Iran, à la suite de l’arrêt
qu’elle avait rendu en 2019 sur les exceptions préliminaires2 (ci-après l’« arrêt
de 2019 »). Premièrement, les dispositions de la loi sur l’immunité des États
étrangers [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, ci-après la « FSIA »] de 19963,
de même que les modifications qui y ont été apportées en 2002 et 2008, qui,
selon l’Iran, emportaient violation de son immunité souveraine ou de celle
de ses entités, portaient uniquement sur la levée de son immunité et de celle
de ses organismes et agences dans le cadre de procédures judiciaires et de
procédures d’exécution engagées devant les juridictions américaines4. Or, la
Cour avait jugé, dans son arrêt de 2019, que les demandes de l’Iran visant ces
dispositions ne relevaient pas de sa compétence ratione materiae5.
1 Mémoire de la République islamique d’Iran (MI), par. 1.19.
2 Certains actifs iraniens (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2019 (I), p. 7 (comme dans le corps du texte, ci-après l’« arrêt
de 2019 »).
3 Loi sur l’immunité des États étrangers, art. 1605, par. a), al. 7, et 1610, par. b), al. 2.
4 Au paragraphe 25 du présent arrêt, il est rappelé que, après que les États-Unis ont privé les
États désignés en tant qu’« États soutenant le terrorisme » d’immunité devant les juridictions
américaines, l’Iran a refusé de comparaître devant les tribunaux internes américains dans des
procès intentés à son encontre, notamment dans l’affaire Peterson, au motif que les dispositions
de la FSIA constituaient une violation du droit international sur les immunités de l’État.
5 Arrêt de 2019, p. 34-35, par. 80.
160 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
4. Notwithstanding its previous ruling on jurisdiction regarding the FSIA,
the Court makes a blanket statement in the present Judgment that,
“[g]iven the combination of the legislative character of the contested
measures and the primacy accorded to a more recent federal statute over
the treaty in the jurisprudence of the United States, . . . in the circumstances
of the present case, the companies in question had no reasonable
possibility of successfully asserting their rights in United States court
proceedings”6 (emphasis added).
In my respectful view, the Court should have made it clear this finding did
not apply to Iran’s sovereign immunity claims arising out of the impugned
FSIA provisions, having previously ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to
do so.
5. Similarly, the Court should have expressly excluded from its jurisdiction
Iran’s claims against the Respondent arising from the provisions of the
National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (“NDAA of 2020”),
as that law was enacted in December 2019 after the termination of the
1955 Treaty. In sum, there are only three legislative and executive measures
directly relevant to the Court’s analysis, namely the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002 (“TRIA”); the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012 (“ITRSHRA”); and the 2012 Executive Order 13599.
6. Furthermore, given the Court’s rejection of Iran’s sovereign immunity
claims in its 2019 Judgment7, it is necessary to determine which of the
Respondent’s judicial proceedings complained of by Iran are relevant
to the Court’s analysis. In this regard, the cases listed in Attachments 18
and 49 are irrelevant as they relate to Iran’s claims of sovereign immunity.
Likewise, the cases listed in Attachment 310 are not relevant as they were
filed outside the United States. However, the enforcement cases listed in
6 Judgment, para. 72.
7 2019 Judgment, pp. 34-35, para. 80.
8 Reply of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“RI”), Attachment 1, “U.S. courts judgments of
courts against Iran and Iranian State entities as of 31 December 2019”.
9 RI, Attachment 4, “Claims pending before U.S. courts against Iran and Iranian State entities
as of 31 December 2019”.
10 RI, Attachment 3, “Actions filed in other jurisdictions for recognition and enforcement of
U.S. judgments against assets of Iran and Iranian State entities as of 31 December 2019”.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 160
4. Alors même qu’elle s’était déclarée incompétente en ce qui concerne la
FSIA, la Cour a, dans le présent arrêt, formulé la déclaration générale
suivante :
« Étant donné la combinaison entre le caractère législatif des mesures
contestées et la primauté conférée à la loi fédérale plus récente sur le
traité par la jurisprudence américaine, … les sociétés en question, dans
les circonstances de la présente affaire, n’avaient aucune possibilité raisonnable
de faire valoir leurs droits avec succès dans les procédures
judiciaires américaines. »6 (Les italiques sont de moi.)
À mon humble avis, la Cour aurait dû préciser que cette conclusion ne
s’appliquait
pas aux demandes relatives à l’immunité souveraine présentées
par l’Iran sur la base des dispositions contestées de la FSIA, puisqu’elle
s’était déjà déclarée incompétente à cet égard.
5. De la même façon, la Cour aurait dû exclure expressément du champ de
sa compétence les demandes introduites par l’Iran contre le défendeur sur le
fondement des dispositions de la loi sur le budget de la défense nationale
pour l’exercice 2020 [National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020, la « NDAA de 2020 »], puisque ce texte a été promulgué en décembre
2019, après la dénonciation du traité de 1955. En résumé, seules trois mesures
législatives et exécutives revêtaient une pertinence directe aux fins de l’analyse
de la Cour, à savoir la loi de 2002 sur l’assurance contre les risques
associés au terrorisme [Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, ci-après la
« TRIA »], la loi de 2012 sur la réduction de la menace iranienne et les droits
de l’homme en Syrie [Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act,
ci-après la « ITRSHRA »] et le décret présidentiel no 13599 de 2012.
6. En outre, étant donné que la Cour avait rejeté les demandes de l’Iran
relatives à l’immunité souveraine dans son arrêt de 20197, il était nécessaire
de déterminer quelles étaient les procédures judiciaires pertinentes du défendeur
dont l’Iran tirait grief aux fins de l’analyse effectuée dans le présent
arrêt. À cet égard, les affaires répertoriées dans les pièces jointes nos 18
et 49 ne l’étaient pas, puisqu’elles se rapportaient aux prétentions d’immunité
souveraine de l’Iran. De même, les affaires citées dans la pièce jointe no 310
6 Voir le paragraphe 72 du présent arrêt.
7 Arrêt de 2019, p. 34-35, par. 80.
8 Réplique de la République islamique d’Iran (RI), pièce jointe no 1, « Jugements rendus par
des juridictions américaines contre l’Iran et des entités de l’État iranien, au 31 décembre
2019 ».
9 RI, pièce jointe no 4, « Procédures en cours devant des tribunaux des États-Unis contre
l’Iran et des organismes de l’État iranien, au 31 décembre 2019 ».
10 RI, pièce jointe no 3, « Actions engagées dans d’autres juridictions pour la reconnaissance
et l’exécution de jugements de tribunaux des États-Unis contre des actifs de l’Iran et d’autres
entités de l’État iranien, au 31 décembre 2019 ».
161 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
Attachment 211, as well as the nine cases12 listed in the new document
submitted
by Iran during the oral proceedings, are relevant to the Court’s
analysis as they were filed within the United States and involve actions
for the enforcement of judgments. Nonetheless, the Court need not decide
during this phase of the present case which enforcement actions have given
rise to injuries suffered by Iran or Iranian State-owned companies. Such
matters can be determined at a subsequent reparations phase, if necessary.
II. Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility
A. Defences of the United States Based on Iran’s Alleged
“Unclean Hands” and Alleged Abuse of Rights
7. Regarding the defence based on the “doctrine of unclean hands”13,
I agree with the Court that the United States has not shown a sufficiently
close link or nexus between Iran’s claims under the 1955 Treaty and the
Applicant’s alleged wrongful conduct. The United States’ claims of wrongful
conduct of Iran, including its alleged sponsorship and support of
international terrorism, and its presumed actions in respect of nuclear
non-proliferation, are not reciprocal to the obligations under the 1955 Treaty
that Iran seeks to enforce. Indeed, the Court explained as much in its
2019 Judgment14, where it rejected  on similar grounds  the largely identical
argument raised by the United States as a preliminary objection to
admissibility. I therefore agree with the conclusion of the Court in paragraphs
82-84 of the present Judgment.
11 RI, Attachment 2, “Actions filed with U.S. courts to enforce judgments against assets of
I.R. Iran and Iranian State entities as of 31 December 2019”.
12 According to the Reply of Islamic Republic of Iran, paras. 2.63-2.120, the nine cases are:
(1) Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, Case No. 02-mc-00237; (2) Bennet v. Islamic Republic of Iran, United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, Case No. 11-cv-05807; (3) Levin v. Bank of New York,
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No. 09-cv-5900;
(4) Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Case No. 10-cv-4518; (5) Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 00-cv-2329; (6) Heiser v. Bank of Baroda,
New York Branch, United States District Court for Southern District of New York, Case No. 11-cv-
1602; (7) Heiser v. The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd., United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Case No. 11-cv-1601; (8) Heiser v. Mashreqbank PSC, United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:11-cv-01609 and (9) Ministry
of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems,
United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Case No. 3:98-cv-01165.
13 2019 Judgment, p. 44, paras. 122-123.
14 Ibid., p. 44, para. 122.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 161
étaient dénuées de pertinence, puisqu’elles avaient été introduites en dehors
des États-Unis. En revanche, les procédures d’exécution énumérées dans la
pièce jointe no 211, ainsi que les neuf affaires12, citées dans le nouveau document
soumis par l’Iran au cours de la procédure orale, étaient pertinentes aux
fins de l’analyse de la Cour, car elles avaient été introduites sur le territoire
des États-Unis et visaient des actions en exécution de jugements. En revanche,
il n’était pas nécessaire que la Cour décide, à ce stade de la présente affaire,
quelles étaient les actions en exécution qui avaient causé un préjudice à l’Iran
ou aux sociétés lui appartenant. Ces questions pouvaient, le cas échéant, être
tranchées lors d’une phase ultérieure consacrée aux réparations.
II. Questions de compétence et de recevabilité
A. Moyens de défense des États-Unis fondés sur le fait que l’Iran n’aurait
pas les « mains propres » et aurait commis un abus de droit
7. En ce qui concerne le moyen de défense tiré de la « doctrine des “mains
propres” »13, je partage l’avis de la Cour selon lequel les États-Unis n’ont pas
réussi à démontrer qu’il existait un lien suffisamment étroit entre les demandes
de l’Iran fondées sur le traité de 1955 et le comportement illicite allégué du
demandeur. Il n’existe pas de lien de réciprocité entre le comportement illicite
imputé à l’Iran par les États-Unis, notamment le parrainage et le soutien que
celui-ci aurait apportés au terrorisme international, ainsi que ses activités présumées
au regard de la non-prolifération nucléaire, et les obligations énoncées
dans le traité de 1955 dont il cherchait à obtenir l’exécution. De fait, la Cour
l’a expliqué dans son arrêt de 201914, dans lequel elle a rejeté, par des motifs
similaires, l’argument quasiment identique que les États-Unis avaient avancé
à titre d’exception d’irrecevabilité. Par conséquent, je souscris à la conclusion
que la Cour a exposée aux paragraphes 82 à 84 du présent arrêt.
11 RI, pièce jointe no 2, « Actions intentées devant des juridictions américaines pour faire
exécuter les décisions de justice sur des actifs de la République islamique d’Iran et d’entités de
l’État iranien, au 31 décembre 2019 ».
12 Selon les paragraphes 2.63-2.120 de la réplique de la République islamique d’Iran, ces neuf
affaires sont les suivantes : 1) Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, tribunal fédéral du district est
de l’État de New York, affaire no 02-mc-00237 ; 2) Bennet v. Islamic Republic of Iran, tribunal
fédéral du district nord de la Californie, affaire no 11-cv-05807 ; 3) Levin v. Bank of New York,
tribunal fédéral du district sud de l’État de New York, affaire no 09-cv-5900 ; 4) Peterson v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, tribunal fédéral du district sud de l’État de New York, affaire no 10-cv-
4518 ; 5) Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, tribunal fédéral du district de Columbia, affaire
no 00-cv-2329 ; 6) Heiser v. Bank of Baroda, New York Branch, tribunal fédéral du district sud
de l’État de New York, affaire no 11-cv-1602 ; 7) Heiser v. The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ,
Ltd., tribunal fédéral du district sud de l’État de New York, affaire no 11-cv-1601 ; 8) Heiser v.
Mashreqbank PSC, tribunal fédéral du district sud de l’État de New York, affaire no 1:11-cv-
01609 ; et 9) Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran
v. Cubic Defense Systems, tribunal fédéral du district sud de la Californie, affaire
no 3:98-cv-01165.
13 Arrêt de 2019, p. 44, par. 122-123.
14 Ibid., p. 44, par. 122.
162 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
8. Similarly, I agree that the Court should reject the United States’ defence
based on Iran’s alleged abuse of rights. The abuse of rights doctrine applies
in circumstances where a right is exercised by a State for a purpose other
than that for which the right was created15. Assuming arguendo that the
United States’ terrorism allegations against Iran have any bearing on the
issue, that conduct does not, in my view, appear sufficient to dismiss Iran’s
claim based on a valid title of jurisdiction. I agree with the Court’s conclusion
in paragraph 93 that the United States has not met the high threshold
required to establish Iran’s alleged abuse of rights.
B. Objections of the United States to the Admissibility of Iran’s Claims
Based on the Alleged Failure by Iranian Companies to Exhaust Local
Remedies
9. The United States does not dispute that Iran’s claims pursuant to Articles
VII and X of the 1955 Treaty are made in Iran’s own right as a State and
therefore do not require the exhaustion of local remedies before the seisin of
the Court16. However, it argues that the exhaustion of local remedies requirement
is applicable to Iran’s claims pursuant to Articles III, IV and V of the
1955 Treaty, an argument disputed by Iran. In relation to the requirement for
the exhaustion of local remedies, I disagree with the conclusion of the Court
that the Iranian companies in question did not have any effective means of
redress that they failed to pursue, in the legal system of the United States
(Judgment, paras. 67, 73 and 236 (2)), along with the reasons underlying that
conclusion. In line with the test laid down in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI)
(United States of America v. Italy)17, the first issue for determination is
whether Iran’s claims for diplomatic protection are interdependent with its
own rights under the 1955 Treaty and thus do not require those companies to
exhaust local remedies, or whether they are in fact claims that are not interdependent
with the rights of Iran, in which case they would require the prior
exhaustion of local remedies.
10. Articles III, IV and V of the 1955 Treaty, by their terms, protect only
the rights of the companies of the High Contracting Parties and do not provide
direct rights to those States. In its pleadings and arguments, Iran more
than merely asserts a general claim that the 1955 Treaty has been violated: it
claims that specific Iranian companies have had their rights violated and that
the United States must provide reparation for the specific assets of those
15 A. Kiss, “Abuse of Rights”, in Max Planck Encyclopaedias of International Law.
16 The United States’ claim that Iran has failed to exhaust local remedies is limited to claims
made under Articles III, IV and V of the Treaty. CR 2022/20, pp. 59-60, para. 14 (Visek).
17 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1989, p. 42, para. 51.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 162
8. De même, je considère que la Cour devait effectivement rejeter l’allégation
d’abus de droit invoquée en tant que moyen de défense par les États-Unis.
La théorie de l’abus de droit s’applique dans des circonstances où un droit est
exercé par un État dans un but autre que celui pour lequel ledit droit a été
créé15. Même à supposer, arguendo, que les allégations de terrorisme formulées
par les États-Unis contre l’Iran aient une incidence sur la question, ce
comportement ne me semble pas suffisant pour rejeter la demande de l’Iran
fondée sur une base de compétence valable. Je souscris à la conclusion énoncée
par la Cour au paragraphe 93, à savoir que les États-Unis n’ont pas satisfait au
niveau de preuve élevé requis pour établir que l’Iran avait abusé de ses droits.
B. Exceptions d’irrecevabilité des demandes iraniennes soulevées
par les États-Unis sur le fondement du défaut allégué d’épuisement
des voies de recours internes par les sociétés iraniennes
9. Les États-Unis ne contestaient pas que c’est en tant qu’État et en son
nom propre que l’Iran avait soumis ses prétentions au titre des articles VII et
X du traité de 1955 et que, partant, il n’était pas nécessaire que les voies de
recours internes aient été épuisées avant la saisine de la Cour16. Toutefois, ils
faisaient valoir que la règle de l’épuisement des voies de recours internes
était bien applicable aux demandes formulées par l’Iran au titre des articles
III, IV et V du traité de 1955, argument que contestait le demandeur. En
ce qui concerne ladite règle, je ne souscris ni à la conclusion de la Cour selon
laquelle les sociétés iraniennes en cause ne disposaient, dans le système
judiciaire
américain, d’aucun recours efficace qu’elles se seraient abstenues
d’exercer (arrêt, par. 67, 73 et point 2 du dispositif), ni aux motifs avancés
pour étayer cette conclusion. Conformément au critère énoncé dans l’affaire
de l’Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (États-Unis d’Amérique c. Italie)17, la
première question à trancher était celle de savoir si les demandes de protection
diplomatique de l’Iran étaient interdépendantes des droits que celui-ci
tient du traité de 1955 et si, partant, elles pouvaient être présentées sans que
les sociétés en question aient épuisé les voies de recours internes, ou si ces
demandes n’étaient en fait pas interdépendantes des droits de l’Iran, auquel
cas la règle de l’épuisement des recours internes s’appliquait.
10. Il ressort du libellé des articles III, IV et V du traité de 1955 que ceux-ci
protègent uniquement les droits des sociétés des hautes parties contractantes
et ne confèrent aucun droit direct à ces États. Dans ses écritures et plaidoiries,
l’Iran ne s’est pas contenté d’avancer la thèse générale d’une violation
du traité de 1955 : il a prétendu que les droits de certaines sociétés iraniennes
avaient été violés et que les États-Unis devaient accorder réparation
pour les
15 A. Kiss, « Abuse of Rights », dans Max Planck Encyclopaedias of International Law.
16 La prétention des États-Unis selon laquelle l’Iran n’avait pas épuisé les voies de recours
internes se limitait aux demandes fondées sur les articles III, IV et V du traité. CR 2022/20,
p. 59-60, par. 14 (Visek).
17 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (États-Unis d’Amérique c. Italie), arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1989, p. 42, par. 51.
163 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
companies seized pursuant to the allegedly wrongful conduct of Iran. It
does not discuss harm caused to the Iranian State as such. Thus, while the
Court declined to expressly apply the test laid down in Elettronica Sicula
S.p.A. (ELSI)18, I am of the view that Iran’s claims made under Articles III,
IV and V of the 1955 Treaty were brought on behalf of Iranian State-owned
companies solely for the diplomatic protection of their rights and are not
interdependent with the rights of Iran under the Treaty. Consequently, the
Iranian State-owned entities in respect of which Iran has brought these
claims are required, under customary international law, to have exhausted
local remedies in the United States before the seisin of the Court, unless it
can be shown that the “futility” or “ineffectiveness” exception19 to the local
remedies rule applies.
11. Article 14 (1) of the International Law Commission’s 2006 Draft
Articles on Diplomatic Protection (“ILC Articles”) states that “[a] State may
not present an international claim in respect of an injury to a national . . .
before the injured person has, subject to draft article 15, exhausted all local
remedies”20. Furthermore, Article 15 (a) of the ILC Articles provides that
local remedies need not be exhausted where “the local remedies provide no
reasonable possibility
of . . . redress”21 (for example, where the local court
has no jurisdiction over the dispute in question; or where local courts are
notoriously lacking in independence; or where there is a consistent and
well-established line of precedents adverse to the claimant). However, as the
ILC recognized in its commentary to this Article, for the exception to apply,
“[i]t is not sufficient for the injured person to show that the possibility of
success is low or that further appeals are difficult or costly. The test is
not whether a successful outcome is likely or possible, but whether the
municipal system of the respondent State is reasonably capable of providing
effective relief.”22
12. In the present case, Iran has not produced any evidence impugning the
competence or independence of the United States court system as such or
establishing a consistent and well-established line of precedents adverse to
the claimants23. Moreover, the fact that some entities whose assets were
18 See paragraph 67 of the present Judgment.
19 See Articles 14 and 15 (a) of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Diplomatic
Protection. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work at Its Fifty-Eighth Session,
Chapter IV, “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection”, UN doc. A/61/10, 2006 (“ILC Articles”).
20 Ibid., p. 70.
21 Ibid., p. 76.
22 Ibid., p. 79 (emphasis added).
23 In this regard, I disagree with the majority’s reading and interpretation  as found
in paragraphs 70-72 of the Judgment  of the Weinstein and Bennett decisions by the
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 163
actifs particuliers desdites sociétés qui avaient été saisis à raison du comportement
illicite imputé à l’Iran. Il n’a pas abordé la question du préjudice causé
à l’Iran en tant qu’État. Bien que la Cour ait expressément décidé de ne pas
appliquer le critère énoncé dans l’affaire de l’Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI)18,
je suis donc d’avis que les demandes de l’Iran fondées sur les articles III, IV et
V du traité de 1955 ont été soumises au nom de sociétés propriété de l’État
iranien aux seules fins de la protection diplomatique de leurs droits et qu’elles
n’étaient pas interdépendantes des droits que le traité confère à l’Iran. En
conséquence, les sociétés appartenant à l’État iranien visées par les demandes
de l’Iran étaient tenues, au regard du droit international coutumier, d’épuiser
les voies de recours internes aux États-Unis avant la saisine de la Cour, à
moins qu’il pût être démontré que l’exception à la règle de l’épuisement des
recours internes dite de « futilité » ou d’« inefficacité »19 s’appliquait.
11. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article 14 du Projet d’articles sur la protection
diplomatique de la Commission du droit international (2006) (ci-après les
« articles de la CDI ») dispose qu’« [u]n État ne peut présenter une réclamation
internationale à raison d’un préjudice causé à une personne ayant sa nationalité
… avant que la personne lésée ait, sous réserve du projet d’article 15,
épuisé tous les recours internes »20. En outre, l’alinéa a) de l’article 15 dispose
que les recours internes n’ont pas à être épuisés lorsqu’ils « n’offrent aucune
possibilité raisonnable d[e] … réparation »21 (par exemple, lorsque le tribunal
interne est incompétent à l’égard du différend considéré, lorsque les tribunaux
internes manquent notoirement d’indépendance, ou lorsqu’une
jurisprudence constante et bien établie est défavorable au demandeur). Toutefois,
comme la CDI le reconnaît dans son commentaire sur cet article, pour
que l’exception soit applicable,
« il ne suffit pas que la personne lésée établisse que la probabilité d’obtenir
gain de cause est faible ou qu’il serait difficile ou coûteux d’interjeter
appel. Il ne s’agit pas de savoir si un résultat favorable est probable ou
possible mais si l’ordre juridique interne de l’État défendeur est raisonnablement
en mesure d’offrir une réparation efficace. »22
12. En la présente espèce, l’Iran n’a produit aucun élément de preuve mettant
en cause la compétence ou l’indépendance du système judiciaire
américain en tant que tel ou démontrant l’existence d’une jurisprudence
constante et bien établie défavorable aux demandeurs23. De plus, le fait que
18 Voir le paragraphe 67 du présent arrêt.
19 Voir les articles 14 et 15 a) des articles sur la protection diplomatique de la Commission
du droit international. Rapport de la Commission du droit international sur les travaux de sa
cinquante-huitième session, chap. IV, « Protection diplomatique », Nations Unies, doc. A/61/10,
2006 (« articles de la CDI »).
20 Ibid., p. 70.
21 Ibid., p. 76.
22 Ibid., p. 79 (les italiques sont de moi).
23 À cet égard, je suis en désaccord avec la lecture et l’interprétation que fait la majorité 
aux paragraphes 70-72 du présent arrêt  des décisions rendues dans les affaires Weinstein et
164 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
attached on grounds of terrorism successfully challenged the attachment in
those courts (a fact acknowledged by the Court24) is, in my view, sufficient to
preclude a conclusion that the negative outcomes in the Peterson, Bennett
and Weinstein cases necessarily meant that Iranian State-owned companies
had “no reasonable prospect of redress” in other cases. In my view, what is
relevant is not whether a successful or favourable outcome for the Iranian
companies was likely or possible, but whether the municipal system of the
United States is reasonably capable of providing effective relief. I disagree
with the conclusion of the Court that “the companies in question did not have
any effective means of redress, in the legal system of the United States, that
they failed to pursue”25. The exception of futility or ineffectiveness does not
apply. Consequently, any Iranian State-owned company that chose not to
participate in the United States proceedings in which its assets were the subject
of attachment failed to exhaust local remedies, and Iran’s claims in
relation thereto are, in my view, inadmissible26. Accordingly, the
United States’ objection to the admissibility of Iran’s claims based on the
failure of Iranian State-owned companies to exhaust local remedies should
have been upheld.
III. Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty
A. Alleged Violation of Article III
1. Alleged violation of Article III, paragraph 1
13. I voted against the finding of the Court in paragraph 236 (3) because
I am not convinced that the United States has violated its obligations under
Article III, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. The obligation imposed by
Article
III, paragraph 1, upon each contracting party to recognize in its
territory
the distinct corporate or legal personality of a company incorporated
in the territory of the other party, is distinct from the obligations of
Respondent’s domestic courts. Those courts clearly found that there was no conflict between
the 1955 Treaty and the applicable subsequent legislation, and accordingly did not have to use
the legislation to override the said Treaty.
24 CR 2022/17, p. 32, paras. 52-55 (Bethlehem); CR 2022/20, pp. 16-17, paras. 22-23 (Bethlehem).
See also Judgment, para. 71.
25 Judgment, para. 67.
26 It is not clear from Iran’s pleadings which of the Iranian State-owned companies have or
have not exhausted local remedies. Iran merely lists in Attachment 2 a list of enforcement
actions, without indicating the parties to those proceedings or the procedural status of the
actions. Similarly, the new list provided during the oral proceedings lacks the requisite clarity.
Be that as it may, the onus remains on Iran to demonstrate, in respect of each company, that it
exhausted local remedies, before its claims can be entertained.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 164
certaines des entités dont les actifs ont été saisis pour des raisons de terrorisme
soient parvenues à contester avec succès cette saisie devant les
juridictions américaines (ce qui a été reconnu par la Cour24) est, à mon sens,
suffisant pour invalider la conclusion selon laquelle l’issue défavorable des
affaires Peterson, Bennett et Weinstein signifiait nécessairement que les
sociétés propriété de l’État iranien ne disposaient d’aucune « possibilité
raisonnable
de réparation » dans d’autres affaires. Selon moi, ce qui importe,
c’est de savoir non pas s’il était probable ou possible que les sociétés iraniennes
obtiennent gain de cause, mais si l’ordre juridique interne américain était
raisonnablement en mesure d’offrir une réparation efficace. Je ne souscris
pas à la conclusion de la Cour selon laquelle « les sociétés en cause ne disposaient,
dans le système judiciaire américain, d’aucun recours efficace qu’elles
se seraient abstenues d’exercer »25. L’exception de futilité ou d’inefficacité
n’était pas applicable. Par conséquent, toute société propriété de l’État iranien
qui a fait le choix de ne pas prendre part aux procédures aux États-Unis
ayant abouti à la saisie de ses actifs n’avait pas épuisé les voies de recours
internes, et les demandes présentées par l’Iran à cet égard étaient à mon sens
irrecevables26. Par conséquent, l’exception d’irrecevabilité des demandes
iraniennes soulevée par les États-Unis sur le fondement du défaut d’épuisement
des voies de recours internes par les sociétés propriété de l’État iranien
aurait dû être accueillie.
III. Violations alléguées du traité de 1955
A. Violation alléguée de l’article III
1. Violation alléguée du paragraphe 1 de l’article III
13. J’ai voté contre la conclusion énoncée par la Cour au point 3 du dispositif,
car je ne suis pas convaincue que les États-Unis aient violé les obligations
qui leur incombaient au regard du paragraphe 1 de l’article III du traité de
1955. L’obligation que cette disposition fait à chaque partie contractante de
reconnaître sur son territoire la personnalité morale ou juridique distincte
d’une société constituée dans le territoire de l’autre partie se distingue de
Bennett par les juridictions internes du défendeur. Ces dernières ont clairement conclu qu’il
n’y avait pas de conflit entre le traité de 1955 et la législation ultérieure applicable et que,
partant, elles n’avaient pas à se prévaloir de la législation pour déroger au traité.
24 CR 2022/17, p. 32, par. 52-55 (Bethlehem) ; CR 2022/20, p. 16-17, par. 22-23 (Bethlehem).
Voir également le paragraphe 71 du présent arrêt.
25 Voir le paragraphe 67 du présent arrêt.
26 Sur la base des écritures de l’Iran, il est difficile de déterminer quelles sont les sociétés
propriété de l’État iranien qui ont ou n’ont pas épuisé les voies de recours internes. L’Iran s’est
contenté de dresser dans sa pièce jointe no 2 une liste des actions en exécution, sans préciser
les parties aux procédures mentionnées ou l’état de celles-ci. De même, la nouvelle liste
fournie lors de la procédure orale était insuffisamment claire. Quoi qu’il en soit, il incombait à
l’Iran de démontrer, pour chaque société, qu’elle avait épuisé les recours internes avant que ses
demandes puissent être examinées.
165 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
reasonableness and non-discrimination imposed by Article IV, paragraph 1.
In my respectful view, the Court should not have conflated the distinct obligations
arising under the two provisions as it appears to have done in the
Judgment27.
14. So what is the nature and extent of the obligation created or envisaged
under Article III, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty? The provision, read in
its context and in light of the object and purpose of the Treaty28, ordinarily
means that the United States and Iran each has a duty to recognize in its territory
the juridical status (distinct corporate or legal personality) of a
company incorporated in the territory of the other party. However, the obligation
is not absolute and, as stipulated in the second sentence of that Article,
the recognition of a company’s juridical status “does not of itself confer
rights upon companies to engage in the activities for which they are organized”.
Thus, the United States, in recognizing the corporate or juridical
status of Iranian companies in its territory, is not obliged to grant to those
companies the full range of rights to which they may be entitled under
Iranian
law, and vice versa.
15. This narrow reading of Article III (1) is confirmed by the 1955 Treaty’s
travaux préparatoires29. Specifically, an internal United States State Department
cable explained that Article III (1) “merely provides [for the]
recognition [of corporations] as corporate entities principally in order they
may prosecute or defend their rights as corporate entities”30. This statement
was subsequently conveyed by representatives from the United States
Government to the Iranian Foreign Secretary31. The travaux support the
understanding that Article III (1) was intended to enable the companies of
each party to access the courts of law, and to perform such functions as
enforcing contracts, holding property and collecting debts, in the territory
of the other. In the present case, the United States indisputably recognized
the legal status of Iranian companies as distinct legal entities for purposes
of litigation in domestic courts. As the Court itself noted in the Judgment32,
the rights of Iranian companies to appear before United States courts, make
legal submissions and lodge appeals were not curtailed. Indeed, the very
existence of the attachment proceedings challenged by Iran — which
27 See paragraph 159 of the Judgment where without much prior analysis of the alleged
violation of Article III (1), the Court simply concludes: “In light of all of the foregoing, the
Court also concludes that the United States has violated its obligation to recognize the juridical
status of Iranian companies under Article III, paragraph 1.”
28 The provision is interpreted according to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which reflect the applicable customary international law.
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 32.
30 Telegram No. 936 from United States Department of State to United States Embassy in
Tehran, 9 November 1954; Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (“CMUSA”),
para. 13.8 and Ann. 135.
31 Aide-memoire of the United States Embassy in Tehran dated 20 November 1954, p. 2 (MI,
Ann. 3).
32 Judgment, para. 143.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 165
l’obligation prévue au paragraphe 1 de l’article IV de s’abstenir de prendre
des mesures déraisonnables ou discriminatoires. À mon humble avis, la
Cour n’aurait pas dû, comme elle semble l’avoir fait dans l’arrêt, mélanger les
obligations distinctes découlant de ces deux dispositions27.
14. Quelles sont alors la nature et la portée de l’obligation créée ou prévue
par le paragraphe 1 de l’article III du traité de 1955 ? Selon le sens ordinaire
à attribuer à cette disposition, lue dans son contexte et à la lumière de l’objet
et du but du traité28, les États-Unis comme l’Iran ont l’obligation de reconnaître
sur leur territoire le statut juridique (la personnalité morale ou
juridique distincte) d’une société constituée dans le territoire de l’autre partie.
Cette obligation n’est cependant pas absolue et, comme indiqué dans la
deuxième phrase dudit paragraphe, la reconnaissance du statut juridique
d’une société « ne donnera pas aux sociétés le droit de se livrer à l’activité en
vue de laquelle elles sont organisées ». Les États-Unis, en reconnaissant la
personnalité morale ou le statut juridique des sociétés iraniennes sur leur
territoire, n’ont donc pas l’obligation d’accorder à celles-ci toute la gamme de
droits auxquels elles peuvent prétendre en droit iranien, et vice versa.
15. Cette lecture restrictive du paragraphe 1 de l’article III est confirmée
par les travaux préparatoires du traité de 195529. En particulier, il était précisé
dans un télégramme interne du département d’État des États-Unis que le
paragraphe 1 de l’article III « ne fai[sai]t que garantir l[a] reconnaissance
[des sociétés] en tant que personnes morales, principalement pour qu’elles
puissent faire valoir ou défendre leurs droits en justice en tant que telles »30.
Cette explication a par la suite été communiquée au secrétaire aux affaires
étrangères de l’Iran par des représentants du Gouvernement des États-Unis31.
Les travaux préparatoires étayent donc l’interprétation selon laquelle le
paragraphe 1 de l’article III était destiné à garantir aux sociétés de chaque
partie l’accès aux tribunaux et l’exercice de fonctions telles que l’exécution
de contrats, la possession de biens et le recouvrement de créances, dans le
territoire de l’autre partie. En la présente espèce, les États-Unis ont sans
conteste reconnu le statut juridique des sociétés iraniennes en tant qu’entités
juridiques distinctes aux fins d’actions en justice devant leurs juridictions
internes. Ainsi que la Cour elle-même l’a observé dans son arrêt32, les droits
27 Voir le paragraphe 159 du présent arrêt, où la Cour, sans autre forme d’analyse de la
prétendue violation du paragraphe 1 de l’article III, conclut simplement ce qui suit : « Au vu de
l’ensemble des considérations qui précèdent, la Cour conclut également que les États-Unis ont
manqué à l’obligation de reconnaître le statut juridique des sociétés iraniennes que leur impose
le paragraphe 1 de l’article III. »
28 La disposition est interprétée conformément aux articles 31 et 32 de la convention de
Vienne sur le droit des traités, qui reflète le droit international coutumier applicable.
29 Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, art. 32.
30 Télégramme no 936 en date du 9 novembre 1954 adressé à l’ambassade des États-Unis à
Téhéran par le département d’État américain ; contre-mémoire des États-Unis d’Amérique
(CMEU), par. 13.8 et annexe 135.
31 Aide-mémoire de l’ambassade des États-Unis à Téhéran en date du 20 novembre 1954
(MI, annexe 3).
32 Voir le paragraphe 143 du présent arrêt.
166 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
involved lawsuits initiated by plaintiffs against Iranian companies as separate
legal entities — demonstrate the compliance of the United States with
Article III (1).
16. However, while it is a well-established principle in company law to distinguish
the juridical status of a company from that of its individual
shareholders, there is also a well-established exception in both common law
and civil law domestic jurisdictions known as the “piercing or lifting of the
corporate veil”, whereby courts go behind the legal personality of the company
and proceed against the assets of individual shareholders “in the
interests of justice”. This practice has also been applied in international law
in Barcelona Traction where the Court stated as follows:
“Forms of incorporation and their legal personality have sometimes
not been employed for the sole purposes they were originally intended to
serve; sometimes the corporate entity has been unable to protect the
rights of those who entrusted their financial resources to it; thus inevitably
there have arisen dangers of abuse, as in the case of many other
institutions of law. Here, then, as elsewhere, the law, confronted with
economic realities, has had to provide protective measures and remedies
in the interests of those within the corporate entity as well as of those
outside who have dealings with it: the law has recognized that the independent
existence of the legal entity cannot be treated as an absolute.
It is in this context that the process of ‘lifting the corporate veil’ or ‘disregarding
the legal entity’ has been found justified and equitable in
certain circumstances or for certain purposes. The wealth of practice
already accumulated on the subject in municipal law indicates that the
veil is lifted, for instance, to prevent the misuse of privileges of legal
personality, as in certain cases of fraud or malfeasance, to protect third
persons such as a creditor or purchaser, or to prevent the evasion of legal
requirements or of obligations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In accordance with the principle expounded above, the process of lifting
the veil, being an exceptional one admitted by municipal law . . ., is
equally admissible to play a similar role in international law.”33
In my view, the domestic courts of the United States were entitled to lift
the corporate veil of Iranian State-owned companies in the interests of justice
(namely, for the purposes of enforcing various judgments obtained
against the Iranian State), in order to access the assets of the Iranian State as
33 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962)
(Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, pp. 38-39, paras. 56-58.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 166
des sociétés iraniennes de comparaître devant les tribunaux américains, de
présenter des moyens et de former des appels n’ont pas été entravés. De fait,
l’existence même des procédures de saisie contestées par l’Iran  qui
concernaient des procès intentés par des demandeurs contre des sociétés iraniennes
en leur qualité d’entités juridiques distinctes  démontrait le respect
par les États-Unis du paragraphe 1 de l’article III.
16. Toutefois, s’il est bien établi en droit des sociétés qu’il convient de distinguer
le statut juridique d’une société de celui de ses actionnaires, il existe
également une exception bien établie tant dans les systèmes de common law
que dans ceux de droit romano-germanique, appelée « levée du voile social »,
au titre de laquelle les juridictions peuvent, « dans l’intérêt de la justice »,
outrepasser la personnalité juridique de la société pour ouvrir une procédure
contre les actifs des différents actionnaires. Cette pratique a aussi été appliquée
en l’affaire relative à la Barcelona Traction, dans laquelle la Cour a
déclaré ce qui suit :
« Il s’est trouvé parfois que la forme de la société anonyme et sa personnalité
morale n’aient pas été employées aux seules fins initialement
prévues ; parfois la société anonyme n’a pu protéger les droits de ceux
qui lui confiaient leurs ressources financières. Il en est inévitablement
résulté un risque d’abus, comme cela a été le cas pour bien d’autres institutions
juridiques. Là comme ailleurs, le droit a dû devant la réalité
économique prévoir des mesures protectrices et des recours, aussi bien
dans l’intérêt de ceux qui font partie de la société que de ceux qui, se
situant au-dehors, ont à traiter avec elle : le droit a reconnu que l’existence
indépendante de la personnalité morale ne saurait être considérée
comme un absolu. C’est dans cette perspective que l’on a estimé justifié
et équitable de “lever le voile social” ou de “faire abstraction de la personnalité
juridique” dans certaines circonstances ou à certaines fins.
Les nombreux précédents du droit interne montrent que le voile est levé,
par exemple, pour empêcher qu’on abuse des privilèges de la personne
morale, comme dans des cas de fraude ou d’agissements coupables, pour
protéger des tiers tels que le créancier ou l’acheteur, ou pour assurer le
respect de prescriptions légales ou d’obligations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conformément au principe énoncé ci-dessus, on peut admettre que la
levée du voile, procédé exceptionnel admis par le droit interne … joue
un rôle analogue en droit international. »33
Selon moi, les juridictions américaines étaient en droit de lever le voile
social des sociétés propriété de l’État iranien dans l’intérêt de la justice
(à savoir l’exécution des différentes décisions de justice prononcées contre
l’État iranien), afin d’accéder aux actifs de l’État iranien en tant qu’actionnaire
33 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (nouvelle requête : 1962)
(Belgique c. Espagne), deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1970, p. 38-39, par. 56-58.
167 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
a shareholder in those companies. In the circumstances, Iran has failed to
establish that the United States violated its obligation owed to Iran under
Article III (1).
2. Alleged violation of Article III, paragraph 2
17. I agree with the reasoning of the majority in relation to Article III,
paragraph
2, of the 1955 Treaty and with its conclusion, in paragraph 168 of
the Judgment, that Iran has not established a violation by the United States
of its obligations under that provision. I can only add that the cases cited by
Iran in support of its interpretation of the provision34 are, in my view,
distinguishable in that they interpret legal provisions that are broader in
scope than Article III (2). They are therefore not applicable to the present
circumstances. The record makes clear that those Iranian State-owned entities
that chose to appear before the United States courts were afforded
significant opportunities to make their case within the United States legal
system. Those companies were represented by experienced counsel and had
the opportunity to present evidence, call witnesses, make full and detailed
submissions and appeal judgments rendered against them, including in one
case to the United States Supreme Court35. The fact that many of these companies
opted not to appear before the United States courts or to challenge
the outcome does not negate their ability to access the judicial system.
B. Alleged Violation of Article IV
18. I respectfully disagree with the findings of the Court in paragraphs
159, 187, 192 and 236 (4) and (5) of the Judgment, relating to the
alleged violation by the United States of its obligations under Article IV of
the 1955 Treaty. Article IV guarantees traditional investment law protections,
including those of fair and equitable treatment, most constant
protection and security, and protection from unlawful expropriation. It
appears that the parties understood these to be terms of art when drafting
the Treaty. There is also limited jurisprudence applying similar standards
present in other bilateral commercial treaties concluded by the United States
with other States around the same period.
34 RI, paras. 5.18-5.25 (citing ECtHR, National and Provincial Building Society et al. v.
United Kingdom, Judgment of 23 October 1997; ECtHR, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis
Andreadis v. Greece, Judgment of 9 December 1994). See also The Ambatielos Claim (Greece,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Reports of International Arbitral
Awards (RIAA), 6 March 1956, Vol. XII, p. 111.
35 RI, Att. 2; Rejoinder of the United States of America (“RUSA”), para. 13.29, App. 1.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 167
de ces sociétés. Dans les circonstances de l’espèce, l’Iran n’est pas parvenu à
établir que les États-Unis avaient violé l’obligation que le paragraphe 1 de
l’article III leur imposait à son égard.
2. Violation alléguée du paragraphe 2 de l’article III
17. Je souscris au raisonnement de la majorité au sujet du paragraphe 2 de
l’article III du traité de 1955 et à la conclusion qu’elle a énoncée au paragraphe
168 de l’arrêt, à savoir que l’Iran n’a pas établi que les États-Unis
avaient manqué aux obligations que leur imposait cette disposition. J’ajouterai
simplement que, à mon sens, les affaires citées par l’Iran à l’appui de son
interprétation de celle-ci34 se distinguent de la présente espèce en ce que les
dispositions juridiques qui y étaient examinées ont une portée plus large que
celle du paragraphe 2 de l’article III. Elles n’étaient donc pas applicables aux
circonstances de l’espèce. Il ressort clairement du dossier de l’affaire que les
sociétés propriété de l’État iranien qui ont fait le choix de comparaître devant
les juridictions américaines ont eu amplement la possibilité de présenter leurs
arguments au sein du système judiciaire des États-Unis. Ces sociétés étaient
représentées par des conseils expérimentés et ont pu présenter des éléments
de preuve, citer des témoins à comparaître, soumettre des arguments complets
et détaillés, et faire appel des décisions rendues en leur défaveur,
notamment dans une affaire portée devant la Cour suprême des États-Unis35.
Le fait que nombre de ces sociétés aient choisi de ne pas comparaître devant
les juridictions américaines ou de ne pas contester les décisions de celles-ci
ne les privait pas de la faculté d’accéder au système judiciaire.
B. Violation alléguée de l’article IV
18. Avec tout le respect que je dois à la Cour, je ne peux souscrire aux
conclusions énoncées aux paragraphes 159, 187 et 192 ainsi qu’aux points 4
et 5 du dispositif, en ce qui concerne la violation alléguée, par les États-Unis,
des obligations que leur imposait l’article IV du traité de 1955. Cet article
garantit aux investissements les formes classiques de protection juridique,
notamment celles du traitement juste et équitable, de la protection et de la
sécurité les plus constantes, et de la protection contre une expropriation illicite.
Il apparaît que, au moment de la rédaction du traité, les parties
considéraient qu’il s’agissait là de formules normalement employées en la
matière. En outre, la jurisprudence est peu diserte sur l’application de critères
similaires figurant dans d’autres traités de commerce bilatéraux conclus
par les États-Unis avec d’autres États au cours de la même période.
34 RI, par. 5.18-5.25 (citant la CEDH, National and Provincial Building Society et al. c.
Royaume-Uni, arrêt (23 octobre 1997) ; CEDH, Raffineries grecques Stran et Stratis Andreadis
c. Grèce, arrêt (9 décembre 1994). Voir également La réclamation Ambatielos (Grèce c.
Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord), Recueil des sentences arbitrales
(RSA), 6 mars 1956, vol. XII, p. 111.
35 RI, pièce jointe no 2 ; duplique des États-Unis d’Amérique (DEU), par. 13.29, appendice 1.
168 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
1. Alleged violation of Article IV, paragraph 1
19. In its ordinary meaning read in the context of the rest of the
1955 Treaty, Article IV, paragraph 1, consists of three separate clauses,
each separated with a semicolon and beginning with the word “shall”. This
suggests an intention to incorporate three distinct obligations. This interpretation
is also supported by the Treaty’s negotiating history36. The first
strand of Article IV, paragraph 1, sets out a free-standing “fair and equitable
treatment” standard (“FET standard”) that contains no express
reference to customary international law. Accordingly, the Court should
interpret this first strand as prescribing an autonomous FET standard that
need not correspond precisely with the minimum standard of treatment
under customary international law. The Parties agree that the FET standard
prohibits denial of justice, by promoting respect for fair procedure and
due process37.
20. The second strand of Article IV, paragraph 1, sets out the prohibition
against “discriminatory or unreasonable treatment”. For treatment to be
deemed “discriminatory”, the claimant must demonstrate that similarly situated
companies were subject to differential treatment without reasonable or
justifiable cause38. The standard of “unreasonableness” is largely equivalent
to that of “arbitrariness”39. Evaluating whether a given measure is unreasonable
or arbitrary requires reviewing the measure’s stated purpose,
36 A document memorializing discussions between representatives of the United States
and Iran notes that the United States rejected an Iranian proposal to replace the term
“unreasonable and discriminatory” in Article IV (1) with the term “unlawful and discriminatory”,
Aide-memoire of the United States Embassy in Tehran dated 20 November 1954,
p. 3 (MI, Ann. 3). The United States explained that the clause was intended to express a
“general requirement for careful regard . . . for legitimate interests of foreign investors
without interference with the country’s right of proper regulation”, ibid. This suggests
that the United States understood at the time that the separate clauses of Article IV (1)
imposed their own distinct standards of treatment.
37 RUSA, para. 10.5; RI, para. 6.9.
38 See Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24,
Award of 27 August 2008, para. 184: “With regard to discrimination, it corresponds to the
negative formulation of the principle of equality of treatment. It entails like persons being
treated in a different manner in similar circumstances without reasonable or justifiable
grounds.”
39 See National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, Award
of 3 November 2008, para. 197: “It is the view of the Tribunal that the plain meaning of the
terms ‘unreasonable’ and ‘arbitrary’ is substantially the same in the sense of something done
capriciously, without reason.” In ELSI, the Court explained that concept of arbitrariness is
distinct from illegality under domestic law: “It is a wilful disregard of due process of law, an
act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety”. See Elettronica Sicula
S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 76,
para. 128.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 168
1. Violation alléguée du paragraphe 1 de l’article IV
19. Suivant le sens ordinaire à lui attribuer dans le contexte du reste du
traité de 1955, le paragraphe 1 de l’article IV se compose de trois dispositions
distinctes, séparées par un point-virgule et contenant chacune un
verbe au futur valant impératif. Cette structure semble indiquer une intention
d’intégrer trois obligations distinctes, interprétation qui est aussi
étayée par l’historique de la négociation du traité36. La première partie du
paragraphe 1 de l’article IV énonce le standard autonome de « traitement
juste et équitable », sans référence expresse au droit international coutumier.
Ainsi, la Cour aurait dû considérer que cette première partie
prescrivait un standard indépendant de traitement juste et équitable ne
devant pas nécessairement correspondre à la norme minimale de traitement
prévue par le droit international coutumier. Les Parties convenaient
que le standard de traitement juste et équitable conférait une protection
contre le déni de justice, en ce qu’il encourage le respect de l’équité et de
la régularité de la procédure37.
20. La deuxième partie du paragraphe 1 de l’article IV porte interdiction
de prendre des « mesure[s] déraisonnable[s] ou discriminatoire[s] ». Pour
qu’une mesure soit jugée « discriminatoire », le demandeur doit démontrer
que des sociétés se trouvant dans une situation similaire ont, sans motif
raisonnable
ou justifiable, fait l’objet d’un traitement différencié38. La notion
de caractère « déraisonnable » correspond en grande partie à celle de
l’« arbitraire »39. Pour évaluer si une mesure donnée est déraisonnable ou
36 Dans un document faisant état des discussions tenues entre des représentants des
États-
Unis et de l’Iran, il est rapporté que les États-Unis avaient rejeté une proposition de
l’Iran visant à remplacer l’expression « arbitraire ou discriminatoire » figurant au paragraphe 1
de l’article IV par « illégale ou discriminatoire ». Aide-mémoire de l’ambassade des États-Unis
à Téhéran en date du 20 novembre 1954, p. 3 (MI, annexe 3). Les États-Unis ont précisé que la
disposition était destinée à énoncer une « exigence générale visant à tenir dûment compte … des
intérêts légitimes des investisseurs étrangers, sans que cela n’interfère avec le droit du pays à
une réglementation adéquate », ibid. Cela donne à penser que les États-Unis considéraient à
l’époque que les clauses distinctes énoncées au paragraphe 1 de l’article IV imposaient chacune
un standard de traitement distinct.
37 DEU, par. 10.5 ; RI, par. 6.9.
38 Voir Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, affaire CIRDI n° ARB/03/24,
sentence du 27 août 2008, par. 184 : « S’agissant de la discrimination, ce terme correspond à la
formulation négative du principe d’égalité de traitement. Il s’applique lorsque des personnes
similaires sont traitées différemment dans des circonstances analogues sans motif raisonnable
ou justifié. »
39 Voir National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic (CNUDCI), sentence du 3 novembre
2008, par. 197 : « Le tribunal est d’avis que, dans leur acception ordinaire, les termes “déraisonnable”
et “arbitraire” sont en substance identiques, au sens où ils désignent une chose faite
par caprice, sans raison. » En l’affaire ELSI, la Cour a précisé que la notion d’arbitraire se
distinguait de l’illicéité en droit interne : « Il s’agit d’une méconnaissance délibérée des procédures
régulières, d’un acte qui heurte, ou du moins surprend, le sens de la correction juridique
». Voir Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (États-Unis d’Amérique c. Italie), arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1989, p. 76, par. 128.
169 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
determining the legitimacy of that purpose and assessing whether the measure
bears a reasonable relationship with that purpose40.
21. Regarding the obligation encapsulated in the third strand of Article IV,
paragraph 1, investment tribunals have generally interpreted the “effective
means” provisions as being similar to the obligations to provide due process
and to refrain from denial of justice41. Such a requirement could be breached,
for example, by the failure to ensure the presence of legislation and secondary
rules of procedure that facilitate the enforcement of contractual rights
through the legal system42 or by undue delays in local proceedings43. I will
address the alleged violations of each of the three obligations or protections
guaranteed by the provision, in turn.
(a) Alleged lack of fair and equitable treatment of Iranian companies
22. Iran claims that the United States, by enforcing adverse retrospective
legislation, has deprived Iranian companies of their right to raise certain
defences, resulting in a denial of justice and a violation of due process44. The
obligation to afford due process, by its nature, encompasses predominantly
procedural obligations. It generally does not concern itself with the merits
(or lack thereof) of the substantive claims at issue, but with access to the
courts, delays in court proceedings or manifestly unjust applications of the
law. As already discussed above, Iran has, in my view, not provided any evidence
of due process violations by United States domestic courts. Iranian
State-owned companies were provided the opportunity to defend their rights
in United States courts as part of the execution proceedings brought against
them. Besides, Iran has not alleged that United States courts manifestly
failed to properly apply the applicable law.
40 See e.g. Cairn Energy PLC and Cairn UK Holdings Limited v. The Republic of India,
PCA Case No. 2016-7, Award of 21 December 2020, para. 1787: “This entails not only a
requirement that the State’s policy be rational and non-arbitrary, but also that the measure
in question bear a reasonable relationship with that policy”; Joshua Dean Nelson v. United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. UNCT/17/1, Award of 5 June 2020, para. 325 “[T]he arbitrariness
analysis consists in reviewing the stated purposes of a certain measure and whether the
measure effectively addresses the stated purposes.”
41 Rudolf Dolzer et al., Principles of International Investment Law, Third Edition (2022),
Oxford University Press, p. 289.
42 See Limited Liability Company AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Final Award
of 26 March 2008, paras. 75 and 87.
43 See White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL Arbitral
Tribunal, Final Award of 30 November 2011, para. 11.4.19.
44 RI, para. 6.60.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 169
arbitraire, il convient d’examiner le but déclaré de la mesure, de déterminer
si ce but est légitime et d’apprécier si la mesure a un lien raisonnable avec le
but poursuivi40.
21. S’agissant de l’obligation contenue dans la troisième partie du paragraphe
1 de l’article IV, les tribunaux saisis d’affaires relatives à des
investissements ont généralement interprété la clause relative aux « voies
d’exécution efficaces » comme étant analogue à l’obligation de garantir une
procédure régulière et à l’interdiction du déni de justice41. Il peut y avoir manquement
à cette obligation en cas, par exemple, de non-garantie de la présence
de lois et de règles de procédure secondaires facilitant l’exécution des droits
contractuels dans l’ordre juridique42 ou en cas de retard excessif dans les procédures
locales43. Je traiterai tour à tour des violations alléguées de chacune
des trois obligations ou protections prévues dans cette disposition.
a) Défaut allégué de traitement juste et équitable des sociétés iraniennes
22. L’Iran faisait valoir que les États-Unis, en mettant en vigueur une
législation préjudiciable avec effet rétroactif, avaient privé les sociétés iraniennes
de leur droit de présenter certains moyens de défense, aboutissant à
un déni de justice et à une violation de leur droit à une procédure régulière44.
Par nature, l’obligation de garantir une procédure régulière recouvre pour
l’essentiel des obligations d’ordre procédural. En général, elle concerne non
pas le bien-fondé (ou l’absence de bien-fondé) des demandes matérielles en
cause, mais l’accès aux tribunaux, les retards de procédure ou les applications
manifestement injustes du droit. Comme indiqué ci-dessus, l’Iran n’a,
selon moi, fourni aucune preuve de la violation du droit à une procédure
régulière par les juridictions américaines. Les sociétés propriété de l’État
iranien ont eu la possibilité de faire valoir leurs droits devant les juridictions
américaines dans le cadre des procédures en exécution engagées contre
elles. En outre, l’Iran n’a pas allégué que les juridictions américaines auraient
manifestement manqué à leur obligation d’appliquer comme il se doit le droit
en vigueur.
40 Voir, par exemple, Cairn Energy PLC and Cairn UK Holdings Limited v. The Republic of
India, affaire CPA no 2016-7, sentence du 21 décembre 2020, par. 1787 : « Cela signifie non
seulement que la politique de l’État doit être rationnelle et non arbitraire, mais aussi que la
mesure en question doit avoir un lien raisonnable avec ladite politique » ; Joshua Dean Nelson
v. The United Mexican States, affaire CIRDI no UNCT/17/1, sentence du 5 juin 2020, par. 325,
« [L]’analyse de l’arbitraire consiste à apprécier les buts déclarés d’une mesure donnée et à
déterminer si celle-ci permet effectivement de les atteindre. »
41 Rudolf Dolzer et al., Principles of International Investment Law, Third Edition (2022),
Oxford University Press, p. 289.
42 Voir Limited Liability Company AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, sentence
finale du 26 mars 2008, par. 75 et 87.
43 Voir White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, sentence finale du
30 novembre 2011, par. 11.4.19.
44 RI, par. 6.60.
170 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
(b) Alleged discriminatory or unreasonable treatment
23. The obligation to refrain from discriminatory and unreasonable measures
provides Iran with the most plausible basis for its claim that the
United States has violated Article IV, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. Each
of the measures challenged by Iran will be examined in turn.
(a) Section 502 of the 2012 ITRSHRA: This provision specifically targeted
the assets of Bank Markazi and rendered them subject to attachment
and execution for the purpose of satisfying default judgments against
Iran in the Peterson case45. Bank Markazi unsuccessfully challenged
the validity of the provision before United States courts, as well as
its constitutionality before the United States Supreme Court46. In view
of the Court’s findings that claims relating to the treatment accorded
to Bank Markazi fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court, Iran’s claim
of alleged discriminatory or unreasonable treatment based on the
ITRSHRA
cannot succeed.
(b) The 2002 TRIA and 2008 Amendments to the FSIA: These provisions
(whose effects are similar)47 were not discriminatory in as far as they
did not apply to Iranian companies only, but also to entities belonging
to several other States that were also designated by the United States
as “State sponsors of terrorism”, including, at the time, North Korea,
Cuba, Syria and Sudan. Regarding Iran’s argument that the United States
was unreasonable or arbitrary in applying its policy of corporate veil
piercing, as well as its enforcement of the TRIA and the FSIA to
individual Iranian State-owned companies not responsible for Iran’s
impugned conduct, I refer to the quotation in Barcelona Traction
referred to earlier in this opinion. In the present case, the veil was
lifted, according to the Respondent, to prevent the misuse of the privileges
of legal personality, to protect third persons that had obtained
default judgments against the State of Iran (a shareholder in the companies),
and to prevent Iran as well as other “State sponsors of terrorism”
from evading compensating victims of terrorist attacks. The enforcement
of the TRIA and the FSIA followed similar objectives as
those underlying corporate veil piercing. In the premises, Iran’s claim
that the 2002 TRIA and 2008 Amendments to the FSIA were
45 Subsection 502 (b) of the Act specifically defined the property subject to the Act as
“the financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 . . . that were restrained by restraining
notices and levies secured by the plaintiffs in those proceedings, as modified by court
order dated June 27, 2008, and extended by court orders dated June 23, 2009, May 10,
2010, and June 11, 2010, so long as such assets remain restrained by court order”.
46 2019 Judgment, p. 21, para. 26.
47 Ibid., p. 20, paras. 23-24.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 170
b) Allégation de traitement discriminatoire ou déraisonnable
23. L’obligation de s’abstenir de prendre des mesures discriminatoires ou
déraisonnables offrait à l’Iran la base la plus plausible pour affirmer que
les États-Unis avaient violé le paragraphe 1 de l’article IV du traité de 1955.
Les différentes mesures contestées par l’Iran seront examinées tour à tour.
a) Article 502 de la ITRSHRA de 2012 : Cette disposition visait spécifiquement
les actifs de la banque Markazi, qu’elle rendait saisissables et
susceptibles de mesures d’exécution en application de décisions prononcées
par défaut contre l’Iran en l’affaire Peterson45. La banque Markazi a
contesté sans succès la validité de cette disposition devant les juridictions
américaines et sa constitutionnalité devant la Cour suprême des
États-Unis46. Compte tenu de la conclusion de la Cour selon laquelle les
demandes relatives au traitement réservé à la banque Markazi échappaient
à sa compétence, la demande de l’Iran fondée sur l’allégation de
traitement discriminatoire ou déraisonnable dans l’application de la
ITRSHRA devait être rejetée.
b) TRIA de 2002 et modifications apportées en 2008 à la FSIA : Ces dispositions
(dont les effets sont similaires)47 ne revêtaient pas de caractère
discriminatoire au sens où elles ne s’appliquaient pas seulement aux
sociétés iraniennes, mais aussi aux entités appartenant à plusieurs autres
États qualifiés par les États-Unis d’« États soutenant le terrorisme »,
notamment, à l’époque, la Corée du Nord, Cuba, la Syrie et le Soudan.
En ce qui concerne la thèse de l’Iran selon laquelle les États-Unis se sont
montrés déraisonnables ou arbitraires dans leur application de la levée
du voile social, ainsi que dans l’exécution de la TRIA et de la FSIA à
l’égard de sociétés propriété de l’État iranien qui ne sont pas responsables
du comportement imputé à l’Iran, je me référerai à l’extrait de
l’affaire relative à la Barcelona Traction précité dans cet exposé. Dans la
présente affaire, le voile a été levé, selon le défendeur, pour éviter l’utilisation
abusive des privilèges de la personne morale, pour protéger des
tiers qui avaient obtenu un jugement par défaut contre l’État iranien
(actionnaire des sociétés en cause) et pour empêcher l’Iran et d’autres
« États soutenant le terrorisme » de se soustraire à leur obligation d’indemniser
les victimes d’attentats terroristes. L’exécution de la TRIA et
de la FSIA poursuivait des objectifs similaires à ceux sous-tendant la
45 Au sens du paragraphe b) de l’article 502 de la ITRSHRA, les actifs visés par la loi sont :
« les actifs financiers en cause dans l’affaire Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et
al. (affaire no 10 Civ. 4518), portée devant le tribunal fédéral du district sud de l’État de
New York, et mis sous main de justice à l’initiative des demandeurs en l’espèce, compte
tenu des modifications apportées par l’ordonnance du 27 juin 2008 et des prorogations
opérées par les ordonnances en date des 23 juin 2009, 10 mai 2010 et 11 juin 2010, tant
qu’ils demeurent sous l’autorité de la justice ».
46 Arrêt de 2019, p. 21, par. 26.
47 Ibid., p. 20, par. 23-24.
171 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)

unreasonable and arbitrary” and therefore violate Article IV, paragraph
1, cannot succeed.
(c) Executive Order 13599: This measure blocked or “froze” property in
the United States belonging to the Government of Iran (including its
agencies and instrumentalities) and Iranian financial institutions48. Iran
argues that the Order was both discriminatory and unreasonable. With
respect to discrimination, the Executive Order by its terms targeted
only the Government of Iran. On its face, this is suggestive of discriminatory
treatment. However, the Order cannot be examined in isolation.
In this regard, other United States measures have, at various times, frozen
the assets of nationals of other States49. Moreover, the United States has
credibly argued that the money-laundering risks posed by the Iranian
financial sector were not necessarily commensurate with the risks
posed by banks of other States. Specifically, the Respondent points to
2011 findings by the Financial Actions Task Force (“FATF”) — an
intergovernmental anti-money-laundering body — that Iran posed a
particularly severe terrorism-financing risk, noting that Iran is one of
only two jurisdictions (along with North Korea) against which the FATF
has specifically called for States to take action50. In the same vein, the
United Nations Security Council stated in 2010 that there was a need to
“exercise vigilance” regarding Iranian financial institutions51. In that
context, it was rational for the United States to implement stricter measures
against Iranian banks than against the financial sector of other
States. Iran has provided no evidence of its own challenging the credibility
of the Respondent’s contention that the Iranian financial sector
posed a cumulative money-laundering risk. Accordingly, it appears that
Iran has not met its burden to show that the Executive Order was arbitrary
or unreasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, Iran’s
claim in this regard must also fail.
48 United States Executive Order 13599, 5 February 2012 (MI, Ann. 22).
49 For example, a 2001 executive order broadly froze the assets of foreign persons that
support or associate with foreign terrorists (Executive Order 13224, 23 September 2001).
50 Financial Action Task Force, High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions (CMUSA,
Ann. 134). There have been numerous US sanctions implemented against North Korea,
including measures blocking the property of North Koreans operating in the financial
services industry. See e.g. Executive Order 13810 of 20 September 2017.
51 United Nations Security Council resolution 1929, UN doc. S/RES/1929, 9 June 2010.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 171
levée du voile social. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, la prétention de
l’Iran selon laquelle la TRIA de 2002 et les modifications apportées en
2008 à la FSIA étaient « déraisonnable[s] et discriminatoire[s] » et, partant,
contraires au paragraphe 1 de l’article IV, devait être rejetée.
c) Décret présidentiel no 13599 : Cette mesure a eu pour effet de bloquer ou
de « geler » les biens sis aux États-Unis qui appartenaient au Gouvernement
iranien (y compris à ses organismes et agences) et aux institutions
financières iraniennes48. L’Iran soutenait que le décret était à la fois
discriminatoire
et déraisonnable. S’agissant du caractère discriminatoire,
il ressort du libellé du décret que celui-ci visait uniquement le Gouvernement
iranien. De prime abord, on pourrait donc penser qu’il y a bien eu
traitement discriminatoire. Le décret ne saurait toutefois être examiné de
façon isolée. À cet égard, les États-Unis ont, à diverses reprises, pris
d’autres mesures leur permettant de geler les actifs de ressortissants
d’autres États49. De plus, ils ont soutenu de manière crédible que les
risques de blanchiment de capitaux posés par le secteur financier iranien
n’étaient pas nécessairement équivalents à ceux posés par les banques
d’autres États. En particulier, le défendeur s’est appuyé sur les conclusions
émises en 2011 par le Groupe d’action financière (GAFI) — organisme
intergouvernemental de surveillance du blanchiment de capitaux — selon
lesquelles l’Iran présentait un risque particulièrement élevé de financement
du terrorisme, notant qu’il était l’une des deux seules juridictions
(l’autre étant la Corée du Nord) à l’égard desquelles le GAFI avait expressément
appelé les États à prendre des mesures50. De même, le Conseil de
sécurité des Nations Unies avait souligné en 2010 la nécessité de « faire
preuve de vigilance » face aux institutions financières iraniennes51. Dans
ce contexte, le fait que les États-Unis aient appliqué contre les banques
iraniennes des mesures plus strictes que celles visant le secteur financier
d’autres États revêtait un caractère rationnel. L’Iran n’a fourni aucun
élément de preuve pour étayer sa contestation de la crédibilité de la thèse
du défendeur selon laquelle le secteur financier iranien posait un risque
cumulatif en matière de blanchiment de capitaux. Ainsi, il apparaît que
l’Iran ne s’est pas acquitté de la charge qui lui incombait de démontrer le
caractère arbitraire ou déraisonnable du décret présidentiel dans les circonstances
de l’espèce. En conséquence, la prétention de l’Iran à cet égard
devait également être rejetée.
48 Décret présidentiel américain no 13599, 5 février 2012 (MI, annexe 22).
49 Par exemple, un décret présidentiel adopté en 2001 a eu pour effet le gel généralisé des
actifs de personnes étrangères soutenant des terroristes étrangers ou associées à ces derniers
(décret présidentiel no 13224, 23 septembre 2001).
50 Groupe d’action financière, « Juridictions à haut risque et autres juridictions surveillées »
(CMEU, annexe 134). Les États-Unis ont appliqué de nombreuses sanctions contre la Corée du
Nord, dont des mesures visant à bloquer les actifs de Nord-Coréens ayant une activité dans le
secteur des services financiers. Voir, par exemple, le décret présidentiel no 13810 en date du
20 septembre 2017.
51 Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, résolution 1929, doc. S/RES/1929, 9 juin 2010.
172 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
(c) Alleged lack of effective means of enforcement
24. Iran contends that the United States measures have “rendered illusory”
the contractual rights of two Iranian entities, Bank Melli and TIC, to
receive moneys owed by United States companies because those funds were
attached in execution proceedings. Iran’s claim that this constituted a violation
of Article IV, paragraph 1, is not very persuasive. As discussed above,
“effective means” obligations are generally interpreted as primarily concerning
themselves with rules of procedure, similar to the obligation
regarding access to justice. The measures at issue did not directly affect the
procedural rights of Iranian State-owned companies to seek enforcement of
their contractual rights. Iranian companies retained access to the
United States court system and the ability to bring contractual claims therein
although many chose not to do so.
25. In my view, Iran has not established a violation by the United States of
its obligation under Article IV, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, and Iran’s
claims in this regard should have been dismissed.
2. Alleged violation of Article IV, paragraph 2
26. Article IV, paragraph 2, contains two protections: the first relating to
the obligation to provide “the most constant protection and security” and the
second relating to the obligation not to take property “without the prompt
payment of just compensation” “except for a public purpose”. With respect
to the first of these protections, Article IV, paragraph 2, does not define the
phrase “most constant protection and security” (“MCPS”). Likewise, the
travaux préparatoires of the 1955 Treaty shed little light on how that standard
was understood by the Parties. However, the MCPS obligation and
related obligations, such as the obligation to ensure “full protection and
security” (“FPS”)52, are present in a wide range of bilateral and multilateral
investment agreements. Such clauses have been traditionally understood as
obligating the host State to ensure the physical protections of the property of
nationals or companies of the investor State.
27. However, more recently, several investment tribunals have interpreted
such clauses to also extend to legal protections, in particular the existence of
a secure legal environment53. Arbitral tribunals that have interpreted MCPS
52 These different textual variations of the obligation have generally been interpreted
similarly. See Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, Final Award of
12 November 2010, para. 260.
53 See e.g. Global Telecom Holding S.A.E. v. Canada, Award of 27 March 2020,
paras. 664-665; Anglo American PLC v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Award of 18
Janucertains
actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 172
c) Absence alléguée de voies d’exécution efficaces
24. L’Iran soutenait que les mesures adoptées par les États-Unis avaient eu
pour effet de « rendre ... illusoire[s] » les droits contractuels de deux entités
iraniennes  la banque Melli et TIC  de percevoir les sommes que leur
devaient des sociétés américaines, étant donné que ces fonds avaient été
saisis
dans le cadre de procédures d’exécution. Il faisait valoir, de façon peu
convaincante, que c’était là une violation du paragraphe 1 de l’article IV.
Comme indiqué ci-dessus, les obligations de fournir des « voies d’exécution
efficaces » sont généralement interprétées comme visant essentiellement les
règles de procédure, au même titre que l’obligation de garantir l’accès à la
justice. Les mesures en cause n’ont pas directement porté atteinte aux droits
procéduraux des sociétés propriété de l’État iranien quant à l’exécution de
leurs droits contractuels. Les sociétés iraniennes ont conservé leur droit
d’accéder au système judiciaire américain et leur capacité de faire valoir
leurs créances contractuelles au sein de ce dernier, bien que nombre d’entre
elles aient choisi de ne pas le faire.
25. À mon sens, l’Iran n’a pas établi que les États-Unis avaient violé l’obligation
que leur imposait le paragraphe 1 de l’article IV du traité de 1955, et
les demandes présentées par l’Iran à cet égard auraient dû être rejetées.
2. Violation alléguée du paragraphe 2 de l’article IV
26. Le paragraphe 2 de l’article IV prévoit deux protections : la première a
trait à l’obligation d’assurer « [l]a protection et la sécurité … de la manière la
plus constante » et la seconde, à l’obligation de ne pas exproprier de biens hormis
« moyennant le paiement rapide d’une juste indemnité » et « pour cause
d’utilité publique ». En ce qui concerne la première de ces deux protections,
le paragraphe 2 de l’article IV ne définit pas ce que sont « [l]a protection et la
sécurité … assurées de la manière la plus constante ». De même, les travaux
préparatoires du traité de 1955 n’apportent guère d’éclairage sur l’interprétation
que les Parties faisaient de ce standard. Toutefois, l’obligation d’assurer
la protection et la sécurité de la manière la plus constante et les obligations
connexes, telles que celle d’accorder une protection et une sécurité complètes52,
figurent dans un large éventail d’accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux
d’investissement. Ces clauses ont été traditionnellement interprétées comme
faisant obligation à l’État hôte d’assurer la protection physique des biens des
ressortissants ou des sociétés de l’État investisseur.
27. Dernièrement, plusieurs tribunaux d’investissement ont cependant
interprété ces clauses comme s’étendant aussi à des formes de protection
juridique, en particulier l’existence d’un environnement juridique sûr53. Les
52 Les différentes variations textuelles de l’obligation ont généralement été interprétées de
manière similaire. Voir Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, sentence
finale du 12 novembre 2010, par. 260.
53 Voir, par exemple, Global Telecom Holding S.A.E. v. Canada, sentence du 27 mars 2020,
par. 664-665 ; Anglo American PLC v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, sentence du 18 jan173
certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
and FPS obligations to apply to legal security claims have generally focused
on the existence of a stable legal environment in the host State that provides
the investor with legal protections for their investment54.
28. The Parties agree that a “taking” of property under Article IV, paragraph
2, is equivalent to expropriation, as understood in international law55.
This is also supported by the travaux of the 1955 Treaty56. Expropriation is
defined as the governmental taking of property for which compensation is
required57. Expropriation usually takes the form of administrative or executive
action by the State. However, claims of expropriation based on conduct
of a State’s judiciary require an element of “illegality” or “arbitrariness” in
the conduct of the State’s court system, such as conduct amounting to denial
of justice, for a judicial decision to qualify as an expropriation58. It is also a
widely accepted norm of international law that a bona fide, non-discriminatory
regulation, enacted as an exercise of a State’s police powers, will not be
deemed to be an expropriation59. I will address the alleged violations of each
of the two obligations or protections guaranteed by Article IV, paragraph 2,
in turn.
(a) Alleged violation of the “most constant protection and security”
obligation
29. As discussed previously in the context of Iranian claims regarding violations
of Article III, paragraph 2, and Article IV, paragraph 1, the United
ary 2019, para. 482; Biwater v. Tanzania, Award of 24 July 2008, para. 729; Azurix Corp. v.
The Argentine Republic, Award of 14 July 2006, para. 408.
54 See e.g. Christoph Schreuer, “Full Protection and Security”, in Journal of International
Dispute Settlement, Vol. 1 (2), 2010, p. 369: “Under this interpretation the host State is under
an obligation to provide a legal framework that enables the investor to take effective steps to
protect its investment.” Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, Award of 14 July 2006,
para. 406, referring to “the stability afforded by a secure investment environment”.
55 RI, para. 7.13; CMUSA, para. 14.84.
56 One document prepared by the United States during negotiations notes that “[t]he provision
on compensation in case of expropriation in paragraph 2 is basic in all US treaty proposals
of this type” (Instructions from United States Department of State to US Embassy, Tehran
(CMUSA, Ann. 227)).
57 Campbell McLachlan et al., International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles
(2nd Edition) (2017), p. 360.
58 See Vid Prislan, “Judicial Expropriation in International Investment Law”, in International
& Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 70, 2021, p. 177; Krederi Ltd. v. Ukraine, Award
of 2 July 2018, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/17, para. 713; Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic
of Bangladesh, Award of 30 June 2009, para. 134.
59 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed., 2012), p. 621.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 173
tribunaux arbitraux qui ont interprété l’obligation d’assurer la protection et la
sécurité de la manière la plus constante et l’obligation d’accorder une
protection
et une sécurité complètes comme étant applicables aux demandes
fondées sur la sécurité juridique ont généralement mis l’accent sur l’existence
d’un environnement juridique stable dans l’État hôte, assurant à
l’investisseur la protection juridique de ses investissements54.
28. Les Parties convenaient que la « dépossession », au sens du paragraphe
2 de l’article IV, revenait à une expropriation au sens du droit
international55. C’est aussi ce que confirment les travaux préparatoires du
traité de 195556. L’expropriation s’entend de la prise de possession d’un bien
par un État moyennant le paiement d’une indemnité57. Elle s’effectue généralement
dans le cadre d’une procédure administrative ou exécutive engagée
par l’État. Toutefois, les demandes contestant une expropriation sur la base
du comportement du pouvoir judiciaire d’un État doivent démontrer l’existence
d’un élément d’« illicéité » ou d’« arbitraire », tel qu’un déni de justice,
pour établir qu’une décision de justice est constitutive d’expropriation58. En
outre, selon une norme largement admise en droit international, une disposition
réglementaire non discriminatoire et adoptée de bonne foi dans l’exercice
des pouvoirs de police d’un État ne saurait être considérée comme une expropriation59.
Je traiterai tour à tour des violations alléguées des deux obligations
ou protections prévues par le paragraphe 2 de l’article IV.
a) Violation alléguée de l’obligation d’assurer la protection et la
sécurité de la manière la plus constante
29. Comme exposé ci-dessus au sujet des demandes iraniennes relatives
aux violations du paragraphe 2 de l’article III et du paragraphe 1 de l’article IV,
vier 2019, par. 482 ; Biwater v. Tanzania, sentence du 24 juillet 2008, par. 729 ; Azurix Corp. v.
The Argentine Republic, sentence du 14 juillet 2006, par. 408.
54 Voir, par exemple, Christoph Schreuer, « Full Protection and Security », dans Journal of
International Dispute Settlement, vol. 1, no 2, 2010, p. 369 : « Conformément à cette interprétation,
l’État hôte a l’obligation de fournir un cadre juridique qui permet à l’investisseur de
prendre des mesures efficaces pour protéger ses investissements. » Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine
Republic, sentence du 14 juillet 2006, par. 406, qui fait référence à « la stabilité conférée
par un environnement d’investissement sécurisé ».
55 RI, par. 7.13 ; CMEU, par. 14.84.
56 Dans un document rédigé au cours des négociations, les États-Unis avaient relevé que
« [l]a disposition du paragraphe 2 prévoyant une indemnisation en cas d’expropriation [étai]t
une disposition de base qui figur[ait] dans tous les projets de traité de ce type proposés par les
États-Unis » (instructions adressées à l’ambassade des États-Unis à Téhéran par le département
d’État américain (CMEU, annexe 227)).
57 Campbell McLachlan et al., International Investment Arbitration : Substantive Principles
(2nd Edition), 2017, p. 360.
58 Voir Vid Prislan, « Judicial Expropriation in International Investment Law », dans International
& Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 70, 2021, p. 177 ; Krederi Ltd. v. Ukraine,
sentence du 2 juillet 2018, par. 713 ; Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh,
sentence du 30 juin 2009, par. 134.
59 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8e éd., 2012), p. 621.
174 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
States measures did not deprive Iranian State-owned companies of access to
the courts or result in a denial of justice or of effective means to enforce their
contractual rights. Those reasons are equally applicable to the alleged violation
of the most constant protection and security obligation (legal security).
Based on the above reasons, I am of the view that Iran has not proved that
the impugned United States measures deprived Iranian companies of legal
security. Iran’s claim in this regard fails.
(b) Alleged expropriation of property belonging to Iranian Stateowned
companies
30. Iran’s claim is essentially one of direct and unlawful expropriation. It
contends that the attachment of the assets of certain Iranian State-owned
companies by United States courts and their transfer to victims of terrorist
attacks resulted in a taking of property without compensation in violation of
Article IV (2). As stated earlier, Iran’s claims of expropriation, with regard
to measures that solely affected Bank Markazi or Iran’s sovereign immunity,
fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction. Secondly, the challenged legislative and
executive measures, in my view, amount to a bona fide, non-discriminatory
exercise of the United States police power aimed at achieving legitimate regulatory
purposes. Through those measures, the Respondent intended to
provide victims of terrorist attacks with the ability to obtain legal redress
while, at the same time, addressing the national security threats posed by
Iran’s alleged arms trafficking and support for terrorism. Moreover, regarding
the effect of the impugned judicial decisions on the Applicant’s property,
Iran has not provided any evidence of “illegality” or “arbitrariness” in the
conduct of the United States’ court system amounting to judicial expropriation.
Accordingly, the attachment by the United States of Iranian assets,
including those belonging to Iranian State-owned companies, does not
amount to compensable “expropriation” within the meaning of Article IV,
paragraph 2. Iran’s claim in this regard also fails.
31. In my view, Iran has not established a violation by the United States of
its obligation under Article IV, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty.
C. Alleged Violation of Article V, Paragraph 1
32. I agree with the conclusion of the Court in paragraph 201 of the Judgment
that Iran has not established a violation by the United States of the
Applicant’s right to dispose of property under Article V, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty, albeit for different reasons. Article V, paragraph 1, contains
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 174
les mesures adoptées par les États-Unis n’ont pas empêché les sociétés propriété
de l’État iranien d’accéder aux tribunaux, ni engendré un déni de
justice, ni privé ces sociétés de voies d’exécution efficaces pour faire valoir
leurs droits contractuels. Ce raisonnement s’applique tout autant à la violation
alléguée de l’obligation d’assurer la protection et la sécurité de la manière la
plus constante (sécurité juridique). Dès lors, je suis d’avis que l’Iran n’a pas
apporté la preuve que les mesures américaines contestées avaient privé les
sociétés iraniennes de sécurité juridique. La demande de l’Iran à cet égard
devait donc être rejetée.
b) Allégation d’expropriation de biens appartenant à des sociétés
propriété de l’État iranien
30. Pour l’essentiel, la demande de l’Iran revenait à dire qu’il y avait eu
expropriation directe et illicite. L’Iran soutenait que la saisie des actifs de
certaines sociétés propriété de l’État iranien sur décision des juridictions
américaines et leur transfert aux victimes d’attentats terroristes constituaient
une expropriation de biens sans indemnisation, en violation du paragraphe 2
de l’article IV. Ainsi que je l’ai indiqué plus haut, les demandes de l’Iran relatives
aux expropriations, s’agissant des mesures visant uniquement l’immunité
souveraine de la banque Markazi ou de l’Iran, échappaient à la compétence
de la Cour. Ensuite, les mesures législatives et exécutives contestées relevaient,
à mon sens, de l’exercice non discriminatoire et de bonne foi du
pouvoir de police des États-Unis pour atteindre un but réglementaire légitime.
Par ces mesures, le défendeur entendait accorder aux victimes d’attentats
terroristes la faculté d’obtenir réparation devant la justice, tout en répondant
aux menaces que faisaient peser sur la sécurité nationale le trafic d’armes
auquel se serait livré l’Iran et le soutien qu’il aurait accordé au terrorisme.
De plus, concernant l’effet des décisions de justice contestées sur les actifs du
demandeur, l’Iran n’a pas apporté la moindre preuve de l’élément d’« illicéité »
ou d’« arbitraire » dans le comportement du système judiciaire américain de
nature à le rendre constitutif d’expropriation judiciaire. En conséquence, la
saisie par les États-Unis des actifs iraniens, y compris ceux appartenant aux
sociétés propriété
de l’État iranien, ne constituait pas une « expropriation »
ouvrant droit à indemnisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l’article IV. Là
encore, la prétention de l’Iran à cet égard ne pouvait être retenue.
31. Je suis d’avis que l’Iran n’a pas établi de violation, par les États-Unis,
de l’obligation qui leur incombait au regard du paragraphe 2 de l’article IV
du traité de 1955.
C. Violation alléguée du paragraphe 1 de l’article V
32. Je souscris, quoique pour des raisons différentes, à la conclusion énoncée
par la Cour au paragraphe 201 de l’arrêt, selon laquelle l’Iran n’a pas
établi que les États-Unis avaient violé le droit du demandeur d’aliéner des
biens, tel que prévu au paragraphe 1 de l’article V du traité de 1955. Cette
175 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
three guarantees or protections. The provision obligates the Parties to permit
each other’s companies and nationals (a) to lease real property for residential
or business purposes; (b) to purchase or otherwise acquire personal property;
and (c) to dispose of property of all kinds by sale, testament or
otherwise, all subject to the “most-favoured-nation” standard. In the present
case, Iran’s claim is limited to alleged breach of the obligations under
clause (c) relating to the disposal of property.
33. I agree with the majority that the obligation incumbent upon a party
under Article V, paragraph 1, is not absolute, and does not prevent a host
State from exercising regulatory control over the lease, purchase, acquisition
or disposal of property by the companies of the other State60. A host State is
thus not precluded, for example, from implementing rules and procedures
that purport to regulate such activity.
34. I also agree that on its face, Executive Order 13599 does appear to
entirely prohibit the disposition of certain Iranian property that has been
“blocked” pursuant to that Order61. However, as referred to earlier, the
Executive
Order was deemed necessary after less stringent measures had
failed to curb money-laundering activities of particular financial institutions.
In fact, the Order seems to have been targeted at freezing financial
assets rather than real property.
35. Furthermore, in order to demonstrate a breach by the United States of
its obligations, Iran must show more than a mere hypothetical interference
with the right of its companies to dispose of their real property. In the Oil
Platforms case, which dealt with the interpretation and application of Article
X (1) of the 1955 Treaty, the Court explained that for that provision to
have been breached, there must have been an actual impediment to freedom
of commerce62. The same is true regarding the interpretation and application
of Article V, paragraph 1. To establish a breach of this obligation, Iran must
demonstrate that an Iranian State-owned company that has been in possession
of certain real property was actually prevented from disposing of that
property within the United States, as a result of Executive Order 13599.
Except with respect to assets of Bank Markazi which fall outside the Court’s
jurisdiction, Iran has not established its claim that the impugned Executive
Order has deprived Iranian companies of their right to dispose of their
property,
within the meaning of subparagraph 1 (c). Its claim is based entirely
upon a hypothetical argument. It is for the above reasons that I would join the
majority in rejecting Iran’s unsubstantiated claim regarding the United States’
alleged violation of Article V, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.
60 Judgment, para. 197.
61 Ibid., para. 200, referring to Executive Order 13599, Sec. 1.
62 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2003, pp. 204-205, para. 92.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 175
disposition comprend trois garanties ou protections. Elle fait obligation aux
Parties d’autoriser les sociétés et les ressortissants de l’autre partie à :
a) prendre à bail des biens immeubles à des fins de résidence ou professionnelles
; b) acquérir, par voie d’achat ou par tout autre moyen, des biens
mobiliers ; et c) aliéner des biens de toute nature par voie de vente, de testament
ou par tout autre moyen, sous réserve, pour ces trois points, du respect
du standard de « traitement de la nation la plus favorisée ». En la présente
espèce, la demande de l’Iran se limitait au manquement allégué aux obligations
créées par le point c), qui a trait à l’aliénation des biens.
33. Je partage l’avis de la majorité selon lequel l’obligation incombant à
une partie en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’article V n’est pas absolue et n’empêche
pas l’État hôte d’exercer son contrôle réglementaire sur la prise à bail,
l’achat, l’acquisition ou l’aliénation de biens par les sociétés de l’autre État60.
Il n’est donc pas interdit à l’État hôte, par exemple, de mettre en oeuvre des
règles et des procédures censées réglementer ces activités.
34. Je suis aussi d’accord pour dire que, à première vue, le décret présidentiel
no 13599 semble bel et bien proscrire entièrement l’aliénation de
certains actifs iraniens qui ont été « bloqués » en application dudit décret61.
Toutefois, ainsi que je l’ai mentionné plus haut, le décret présidentiel a été
jugé nécessaire dans le sens où l’adoption antérieure de mesures moins
strictes n’avait pas permis de limiter les activités de blanchiment de capitaux
de certaines institutions financières. De fait, il apparaît que le décret ciblait
le gel d’actifs financiers et non de biens immobiliers.
35. En outre, pour démontrer que les États-Unis avaient manqué à leurs obligations,
l’Iran ne pouvait se contenter d’invoquer une entrave purement
hypothétique au droit de ses sociétés d’aliéner leurs biens immobiliers. Dans
l’affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières, qui portait sur l’interprétation et l’application
du paragraphe 1 de l’article X du traité de 1955, la Cour a en effet précisé
que, pour qu’il y ait manquement à cette disposition, il fallait que la liberté
de commerce ait été effectivement entravée62. Il en va de même s’agissant de
l’interprétation et l’application du paragraphe 1 de l’article V. Pour établir qu’il
y a eu manquement à cette obligation, l’Iran devait démontrer qu’une société
propriété de l’État iranien qui avait été en possession d’un certain bien immobilier
avait été effectivement empêchée de l’aliéner sur le territoire américain en
raison du décret présidentiel no 13599. Or, hormis pour ce qui concerne les
actifs de la banque Markazi, lesquels échappaient à la compétence de la Cour,
l’Iran n’a pas établi que le décret présidentiel contesté avait privé les sociétés
iraniennes de leur droit d’aliéner leurs biens au sens de l’alinéa c) du paragraphe
1. Sa prétention était entièrement fondée sur un argument hypothétique.
C’est pour les motifs exposés ci-dessus que je me suis ralliée à la majorité pour
rejeter la demande infondée de l’Iran relative à la prétendue violation par les
États-Unis du paragraphe 1 de l’article V du traité de 1955.
60 Arrêt, par. 197.
61 Ibid., par. 200, se référant à l’article 1 du décret présidentiel no 13599.
62 Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 204-205, par. 92.
176 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
D. Alleged Violations of Article VII
36. I agree with the Court’s conclusion in paragraph 208 of the Judgment
rejecting Iran’s claim relating to the alleged violation by the United States of
Article VII, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. I also agree with the Court’s
interpretation of Article VII, paragraph 1, and would only add that the
negotiating
history of the said provision confirms that interpretation. Iran
does not refer to a single instance in the provision’s negotiating history
supporting
its interpretation of Article VII (1).
E. Alleged Violations of Article X, Paragraph 1
37. I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the Court in paragraph
223 and its findings in paragraph 236 (6) of the Judgment. Regarding
the scope of this provision, the Court’s previous interpretations of the scope
of Article X, paragraph 1, in the Oil Platforms case and in the 2019 Judgment
are highly relevant. In the Oil Platforms preliminary objection
Judgment, the Court stated:
“The Court must indeed give due weight to the fact that, after Article
X, paragraph 1, in which the word ‘commerce’ appears, the rest of
the Article clearly deals with maritime commerce. Yet this factor is not,
in the view of the Court, sufficient to restrict the scope of the word to
maritime commerce, having regard to other indications in the Treaty of
an intention of the parties to deal with trade and commerce in general.
The Court also takes note in this connection of the recital in Article
XXII of the Treaty which states that the Treaty was to replace, inter
alia, a provisional agreement relating to commercial and other relations,
concluded at Tehran on 14 May 1928. The Treaty of 1955 is thus a Treaty
relating to trade and commerce in general, and not one restricted purely
to maritime commerce.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In these circumstances, the view that the word ‘commerce’ in Article
X, paragraph 1, is confined to maritime commerce does not commend
itself to the Court.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Court must now consider the interpretation according to which
the word ‘commerce’ in Article X, paragraph 1, is restricted to acts of
purchase and sale. According to this interpretation, the protection
afforded by this provision does not cover the antecedent activities which
are essential to maintain commerce as, for example, the procurement of
goods with a view to using them for commerce.
In the view of the Court, there is nothing to indicate that the parties to
the Treaty intended to use the word ‘commerce’ in any sense different
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 176
D. Violations alléguées de l’article VII
36. Je souscris à la conclusion énoncée par la Cour au paragraphe 208 de
l’arrêt, dans lequel elle a rejeté la demande de l’Iran relative à la violation
alléguée par les États-Unis du paragraphe 1 de l’article VII du traité de 1955.
Je partage également l’interprétation faite par la Cour du paragraphe 1 de
l’article VII, me contentant d’ajouter que l’historique de la négociation de
cette disposition confirme cette interprétation. L’Iran n’a mentionné aucun
exemple tiré des travaux préparatoires qui serait venu étayer son interprétation
du paragraphe 1 de l’article VII.
E. Violations alléguées du paragraphe 1 de l’article X
37. Je fais part respectueusement de mon désaccord avec la conclusion
énoncée par la Cour au paragraphe 223, ainsi qu’avec celle formulée au
point 6 du dispositif. S’agissant de la portée du paragraphe 1 de l’article X,
les interprétations que la Cour en a faites antérieurement dans l’affaire des
Plates-formes pétrolières et dans son arrêt de 2019 apportent un éclairage
particulièrement pertinent. Dans l’arrêt sur l’exception préliminaire rendu
en l’affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières, la Cour a déclaré ce qui suit :
« La Cour doit tenir dûment compte de ce que le paragraphe 1 de l’article
X, où figure le mot “commerce”, est suivi d’autres paragraphes, qui
traitent manifestement du commerce maritime. Toutefois, elle estime que
cet élément n’est pas suffisant pour restreindre la portée de ce mot au
commerce maritime, le traité renfermant par ailleurs des indications
d’une intention des parties de régler les questions commerciales de
manière générale. À cet égard, la Cour prend également acte des dispositions
de l’article XXII du traité, qui précise que celui-ci remplace
notamment un accord provisoire relatif aux relations commerciales et
autres, conclu à Téhéran le 14 mai 1928. Le traité de 1955 est donc un
traité relatif au commerce en général, qui ne se borne pas au seul commerce
maritime.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dans ces circonstances, la thèse selon laquelle le mot “commerce”, au
paragraphe 1 de l’article X, ne viserait que le commerce maritime n’emporte
pas la conviction de la Cour.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
La Cour doit maintenant examiner l’interprétation suivant laquelle le
mot “commerce”, au paragraphe 1 de l’article X, ne désignerait que les
activités d’achat et de vente. Selon cette interprétation, la protection
offerte par cette disposition ne s’étendrait pas aux activités en amont qui
sont essentielles au commerce, telles que par exemple l’obtention de
biens en vue d’une utilisation commerciale.
De l’avis de la Cour, rien n’indique que les parties au traité aient entendu
utiliser le mot “commerce” dans un sens différent de celui généralement
177 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
from that which it generally bears. The word ‘commerce’ is not restricted
in ordinary usage to the mere act of purchase and sale; it has connotations
that extend beyond mere purchase and sale to include ‘the whole of
the transactions, arrangements, etc., therein involved’ (Oxford English
Dictionary, 1989, Vol. 3, p. 552).
In legal language, likewise, this term is not restricted to mere purchase
and sale because it can refer to
‘not only the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities, but also
the instrumentalities and agencies by which it is promoted and the
means and appliances by which it is carried on, and transportation of
persons as well as of goods, both by land and sea’ (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 1990, p. 269).
Similarly, the expression ‘international commerce’ designates, in its
true sense, ‘all transactions of import and export, relationships of
exchange, purchase, sale, transport, and financial operations between
nations’ and sometimes even ‘all economic, political, intellectual relations
between States and between their nationals’ (Dictionnaire de la
terminologie du droit international (produced under the authority of
President Basdevant), 1960, p. 126 [translation by the Registry]).
Thus, whether the word ‘commerce’ is taken in its ordinary sense or
in its legal meaning, at the domestic or international level, it has a
broader meaning than the mere reference to purchase and sale.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Court concludes from all of the foregoing that it would be a natural
interpretation of the word ‘commerce’ in Article X, paragraph 1, of
the Treaty of 1955 that it includes commercial activities in general  not
merely the immediate act of purchase and sale, but also the ancillary
activities integrally related to commerce.”63
38. According to the Court’s jurisprudence in Oil Platforms, the word
“commerce” as used in Article X (1) covers all forms of commercial transactions,
including trade in services, as well as financial transactions, and not
merely the immediate act of purchase and sale.
39. Moreover, in its 2019 Judgment the Court made clear that it saw “no
reason to depart now from the interpretation of [the concept of] ‘freedom of
commerce’ that it adopted in the [Oil Platforms] case”64. Recognizing that,
in order to establish a breach of obligation under Article X (1), there must
be a sufficiently close relationship between the impugned conduct and the
acts of commerce, the Court stated that “freedom of commerce cannot cover
63 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 817-819, paras. 41, 43, 45 and 49.
64 2019 Judgment, p. 34, para. 79.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 177
admis. Or le mot “commerce”, dans son acception usuelle, ne se limite
pas aux seules activités d’achat et de vente ; il a des connotations qui
dépassent le simple fait d’acheter et de vendre, et comprend “l’ensemble
des transactions, arrangements, etc., nécessaires à cette fin” (Oxford
English Dictionary, 1989, vol. 3, p. 552).
Dans le langage juridique, ce terme n’est pas non plus limité aux
activités
d’achat et de vente puisqu’il peut viser
“non seulement l’achat, la vente ou les échanges de marchandises,
mais aussi les instruments et les agents qui favorisent ces échanges et
les moyens et opérations par lesquels ceux-ci s’effectuent, ainsi que le
transport des personnes et des marchandises, que ce soit par voie terrestre
ou par voie maritime” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 269).
De même, l’expression “commerce international” désigne, dans son sens
propre, “l’ensemble des transactions à l’importation et à l’exportation,
des rapports d’échange, d’achat, de vente, de transport, des opérations
financières, entre nations” et, parfois même, “l’ensemble des rapports
économiques, politiques, intellectuels entre États et entre leurs ressortissants”
(Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international (établi
sous l’autorité du Président Basdevant), 1960, p. 126).
Ainsi, que le mot “commerce” soit pris dans son sens le plus commun
ou au sens juridique, au plan interne ou international, il revêt une portée
qui excède la seule référence aux activités d’achat et de vente.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
La Cour conclut de tout ce qui précède qu’il serait naturel d’interpréter
le mot “commerce” au paragraphe 1 de l’article X du traité de 1955
comme incluant des activités commerciales en général  non seulement
les activités mêmes d’achat et de vente, mais également les activités
accessoires qui sont intrinsèquement liées au commerce. »63
38. Selon la jurisprudence établie par la Cour dans l’affaire des Platesformes
pétrolières, le mot « commerce », tel qu’employé au paragraphe 1 de
l’article X, désigne toutes les formes de transactions commerciales, notamment
le commerce de services et les transactions financières, et non
uniquement l’acte immédiat d’achat et de vente.
39. En outre, dans son arrêt de 2019, la Cour a clairement fait savoir qu’elle
ne voyait « aucune raison de s’écarter à présent de l’interprétation de la
notion de “liberté de commerce” qu’elle avait retenue dans l’affaire [des
Plates-formes pétrolières] »64. Reconnaissant que, pour établir une violation
de l’obligation créée par le paragraphe 1 de l’article X, il fallait qu’il existe
un lien suffisamment étroit entre le comportement contesté et les activités
63 Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique),
exception préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 817-819, par. 41, 43, 45 et 49.
64 Arrêt de 2019, p. 34, par. 79.
178 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
matters that have no connection, or too tenuous a connection, with the commercial
relations between the States Parties to the Treaty”65. The Court has
also observed that it must be established that there is actual and ongoing
commerce that was impeded by the impugned activities; and that Article X,
paragraph 1, “is in terms limited to the protection of freedom of commerce
‘between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties’”66. Such commerce
must be sufficiently direct67. Lastly, the Court has stated that in order
to demonstrate a violation of Article X (1), a party must do more than plead
a “generic” claim of breach and must identify specific conduct that impeded
commerce68.
40. Iran argues that the United States’ measures resulting in the freezing
or seizure of the assets belonging to Iranian financial institutions and Stateowned
entities have “rendered impossible” commerce between the
United States and Iran with respect to those entities69. Iran specifically refers
to the attachment proceedings in relation to contractual debts owed by
United States companies to TIC, Bank Melli and the Iranian Ministry
of Defence70. For Iran’s claim to succeed, it must demonstrate that a sufficiently
direct nexus exists between the impugned United States measures
and freedom
of commerce. In my view, however, many of the measures
challenged
by Iran — particularly those legislative measures that merely
authorize the attachment of the assets of Iranian State-owned entities to
enforce judgments rendered against Iran — do not directly affect trade or
commerce between the two States. Firstly, while the Court has made clear
that Article X (1) does not only cover purchase and sale, but also applies to
“ancillary activities integrally related to commerce”71, the impugned
measures are not analogous to the conduct in Oil Platforms. That case concerned
conduct amounting to interference with the antecedent activities
to a commercial transaction; specifically, the production of oil that would
later be traded on the international market. By contrast, the attachment of
assets of Iranian companies does not target an element in the commercial
process. Such measures, in Iran’s own words, merely affect “the products of
commerce”72.
65 Ibid.
66 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2003, p. 200, para. 82 (emphasis added).
67 Ibid., p. 207, para. 97.
68 Ibid., p. 217, para. 123.
69 RI, para. 8.34.
70 Ibid.
71 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 819, para. 49.
72 RI, para. 8.34.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 178
commerciales, la Cour a précisé que « la liberté de commerce ne saurait
couvrir
des questions qui ne présentent aucun lien, ou qui présentent un lien
trop ténu, avec les relations commerciales entre les États parties au traité »65.
Elle a également observé qu’il devait être établi qu’il existait des relations
commerciales effectives et courantes qui avaient été entravées par les activités
mises en cause ; et que le paragraphe 1 de l’article X « se limit[ait]
expressément à la protection de la liberté de commerce “entre les territoires
des deux Hautes Parties contractantes” »66, ce commerce devant avoir un
caractère suffisamment direct67. Enfin, la Cour a indiqué que, pour démontrer
une violation du paragraphe 1 de l’article X, une partie ne pouvait se
contenter de présenter une réclamation « de caractère général » et devait préciser
le comportement particulier qui avait entravé le commerce68.
40. L’Iran soutenait que les mesures américaines ayant eu pour effet le gel
ou la saisie des actifs appartenant aux institutions financières iraniennes et
aux sociétés propriété de l’État iranien avaient « rendu impossible » le commerce
entre les États-Unis et l’Iran pour ces entités69. L’Iran se référait en
particulier aux procédures de saisie concernant les dettes contractuelles dues
par des sociétés américaines à TIC, à la banque Melli et au ministère iranien
de la défense70. Pour que la demande de l’Iran puisse prospérer, celui-ci devait
démontrer l’existence d’un lien suffisamment direct entre les mesures américaines
contestées et la liberté de commerce. À mon sens, toutefois, nombre
des mesures contestées par l’Iran — en particulier les mesures législatives
qui autorisaient simplement la saisie des actifs des sociétés propriété de l’État
iranien en vue de l’exécution des jugements rendus contre l’Iran — n’avaient
aucune incidence directe sur les échanges ou le commerce entre les deux
États. Premièrement, bien que la Cour ait clairement indiqué que le paragraphe
1 de l’article X couvrait non seulement les activités d’achat et de vente,
mais également « les activités accessoires qui sont intrinsèquement liées au
commerce »71, les mesures contestées ne pouvaient être assimilées au comportement
en cause dans l’affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières. Cette affaire
portait en effet sur un comportement constituant une entrave aux activités
menées en amont d’une transaction commerciale, en l’occurrence la production
pétrolière qui serait plus tard échangée sur le marché international. La
saisie des actifs des sociétés iraniennes, en revanche, n’avait pas pour objet
un élément du processus commercial. Ces mesures ne visaient, pour reprendre
les termes de l’Iran lui-même, que « les produits des échanges »72.
65 Ibid.
66 Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 200, par. 82 (les italiques sont de moi).
67 Ibid., p. 207, par. 97.
68 Ibid., p. 217, par. 123.
69 RI, par. 8.34.
70 Ibid.
71 Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique),
exception préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 819, par. 49.
72 RI, par. 8.34.
179 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
41. Secondly, to the extent that one or more of the impugned measures are
capable of directly affecting commerce, Iran has not demonstrated that
there has been actual interference with then-existing and ongoing commerce.
Taken in isolation, Executive Order 13599 has the potential to
interfere with commerce by “blocking” all assets belonging to the Iranian
Government and Iranian financial institutions located in the United States.
However, by 2012 when the Order was issued, there were already a range of
existing sanctions and other measures (not challenged by Iran in these
proceedings)
that made commerce between Iran and the United States
extremely difficult. For example, Iran complains about the treatment of
certain
assets of Bank Melli. But those assets were blocked in 2007 and
were therefore unaffected by Executive Order 1359973. Similarly, financial
transactions between Iran and the United States were severely restricted in
2008 by a regulation that prohibited so-called “U-turn” transfers that had
previously been used by United States banks74. There is therefore reason to
believe that there was little, if any, commerce left between Iran and the
United States in 2012 that could have been impeded by the Executive
Order75. Iran refers generally to the fact that United States census data
demonstrates that a small amount of trade existed between the United
States and Iran in 2016, the year Iran initiated these proceedings76. However,
it provides no specific evidence as to how this ongoing trade was affected by
the Executive Order or other measures at issue.
42. Thirdly, some of the examples of “commerce” cited by Iran are not in
fact commercial in nature. In view of the Court’s finding that Bank Markazi
is not a company for purposes of Articles III, IV and V of the Treaty,
it follows
that the Bank’s investments in the United States do not qualify
as “commercial” for purposes of Article X, paragraph 1. Lastly, regarding
the requirement for commerce “between the territories of the two High
Contracting
Parties” to be sufficiently direct, there is evidence on record
that, from as early as 1995, there were no direct transactions between
United States and Iranian banks and that the investments made by Bank
Markazi took place through various intermediaries located outside the
territories of the Parties, a fact not challenged by Iran77. In my view, Iran
has not established that there was commerce between the Parties on their
73 RUSA, para. 8.34.
74 CMUSA, Ann. 232.
75 Iran also references in its Reply debts owed by Sprint to TIC. However, these funds were
money owed by Sprint not subject to Executive Order 13599, as the payments in question were
made under a US licence permitting telecommunications payments as an exception to the
Executive Order. Heiser v. Iran, 807 F. supp. 2d 9, p. 18 fn. 6, (RUSA, Ann. 338).
76 CR 2022/16, pp. 34-35, para. 36 (Aughey).
77 CMUSA, paras. 17.14-17.20.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 179
41. Deuxièmement, pour autant qu’une ou plusieurs des mesures contestées
aient pu avoir une incidence directe sur le commerce, l’Iran n’a pas démontré
qu’il y avait eu une entrave effective aux relations commerciales courantes
entretenues alors. Pris isolément, le décret présidentiel no 13599 est susceptible
d’entraver le commerce en « bloquant » tous les actifs appartenant au
Gouvernement iranien et aux institutions financières iraniennes situées aux
États-Unis. Toutefois, en 2012, lorsque ce texte a été promulgué, une série de
sanctions et d’autres mesures (non contestées par l’Iran dans la présente procédure)
étaient déjà en vigueur et rendaient extrêmement difficile le commerce
entre les deux États. Par exemple, l’Iran tirait grief du traitement de certains
actifs de la banque Melli. Or ces actifs avaient été bloqués en 2007 et ne pouvaient
donc subir les effets du décret présidentiel no 1359973. De même, les
transactions financières entre l’Iran et les États-Unis avaient été fortement
limitées en 2008 par une disposition réglementaire qui interdisait les
transferts dits « U-turn » auxquels recouraient auparavant les banques américaines74.
Par conséquent, il y a lieu de croire qu’il ne restait guère en 2012
de relations commerciales, si tant est qu’il y en eût encore, entre l’Iran et les
États-Unis susceptibles d’être entravées par le décret présidentiel75. De
manière générale, l’Iran se référait au fait que, selon les données statistiques
américaines, un petit volume d’échanges commerciaux subsistait entre les
deux États en 2016, année où l’Iran a introduit la présente instance76. Toutefois,
il n’a apporté aucune preuve spécifique de la façon dont le décret
présidentiel ou d’autres mesures en cause auraient eu une incidence sur ces
échanges commerciaux courants.
42. Troisièmement, certains des exemples de « commerce » cités par l’Iran
ne revêtaient en réalité aucun caractère commercial. La Cour ayant conclu
que la banque Markazi n’était pas une société au sens des articles III, IV et
V du traité, il s’ensuit que les investissements de la banque aux États-Unis ne
pouvaient être considérés comme étant de nature « commerciale » aux fins
du paragraphe 1 de l’article X. Enfin, s’agissant du caractère suffisamment
direct que doit revêtir le commerce « entre les territoires des deux Hautes
Parties contractantes », il ressort du dossier de l’affaire que, dès 1995, il n’y
avait plus de transactions directes entre les États-Unis et les banques iraniennes
et que les investissements effectués par la banque Markazi l’ont été
par le biais de divers intermédiaires situés en dehors des territoires des Parties,
ce que l’Iran ne contestait pas77. À mon sens, ce dernier n’a pas établi
73 DEU, par. 8.34.
74 CMEU, annexe 232.
75 L’Iran s’est également référé dans sa réplique aux dettes dues par Sprint à TIC. Toutefois,
ces sommes dues par Sprint ne tombaient pas sous le coup du décret présidentiel no 13599,
étant donné que les paiements en question ont été effectués dans le cadre d’un permis amé-
ricain autorisant les paiements relatifs aux télécommunications par exception au décret
présidentiel.
Heiser v. Iran, 807 F. supp. 2d 9, p. 18, note 6 (DEU, annexe 338).
76 CR 2022/16, p. 34-35, par. 36 (Aughey).
77 CMEU, par. 17.14-17.20.
180 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
territories as required by Article X, paragraph 1, let alone that it was
impeded by Executive Order 13599.
43. For the above reasons, Iran has, in my view, not demonstrated that
the United States has violated its obligations under Article X (1) of the
1955 Treaty of Amity.
IV. Defences under Article XX, Paragraph 1
Application of Article XX, Paragraph 1 (c) and (d), of the 1955 Treaty
44. Whilst I agree with the Court’s conclusion in paragraph 103 regarding
the non-applicability of Article XX, paragraph 1 (c) to the present case,
I disagree with its conclusion in paragraph 109 regarding Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d).
45. Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) exempts from the scope of the 1955
Treaty measures that are “necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High
Contracting Party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace
and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests”. The
Court has previously interpreted the scope of both Article XX, paragraph
1 (d) and an identically worded provision in the Military and
Paramilitary Activities and Oil Platforms cases. In both cases, the Court
made clear that the exception is not self-judging, explaining that it is for the
Court to determine whether there existed essential security interests at the
time of the challenged measures and whether such conduct measures were
“necessary” to protect such interests78.
46. The United States asserts that the “essential security interests” at issue
here are its interests in preventing terrorist attacks against the United States
and its nationals, preventing terrorist financing and the supply of arms to
terrorist
groups, and combating Iran’s development of a ballistic missile
programme.
In Military and Paramilitary Activities, the Court stated that
“the concept of essential security interests certainly extends beyond the
concept
of an armed attack, and has been subject to very broad interpretations
in the past”79. Even interpreted relatively narrowly, it is likely that the
78 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 141, para. 282 (“But by the terms
of the Treaty itself, whether a measure is necessary to protect the essential security interests
of a party is not, as the Court has emphasized . . . purely a question for the subjective judgment
of the party”); Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 183, para. 43.
79 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 117, para. 224.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 180
qu’il existait un commerce entre les Parties sur leurs territoires, ainsi que
l’exige le paragraphe 1 de l’article X, ni, a fortiori, que ce commerce aurait
été entravé par le décret présidentiel no 13599.
43. Pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus, l’Iran n’a, selon moi, pas démontré
que les États-Unis avaient violé les obligations que leur imposait le paragraphe
1 de l’article X du traité d’amitié de 1955.
IV. Moyens de défense tirés du paragraphe 1 de l’article XX
Application des alinéas c) et d) du paragraphe 1 de l’article XX
du traité de 1955
44. Bien que je souscrive à la conclusion énoncée par la Cour au paragraphe
103 quant à la non-applicabilité de l’alinéa c) du paragraphe 1 de
l’article XX dans la présente affaire, je ne peux en dire autant de celle qui
est formulée au paragraphe 109 au sujet de l’alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de
l’article XX.
45. L’alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l’article XX exclut du champ d’application
du traité de 1955 les mesures « nécessaires à l’exécution des obligations
de l’une ou l’autre des Hautes Parties contractantes relatives au maintien ou
au rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité internationales ou à la protection
des intérêts vitaux de cette Haute Partie contractante sur le plan de la sécurité
». La Cour a déjà eu l’occasion d’interpréter la portée de l’alinéa d) du
paragraphe 1 de l’article XX et celle d’une disposition au libellé identique
dans l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires et dans celle des Platesformes
pétrolières. Dans ces deux affaires, elle a clairement indiqué que
l’exception ne revêtait pas un caractère discrétionnaire, précisant que c’est à
la Cour qu’il appartenait de déterminer si des intérêts vitaux en matière de
sécurité étaient en jeu au moment de l’application des mesures contestées et
si lesdites mesures étaient « nécessaires » à la protection de ces intérêts78.
46. Le défendeur soutenait que les « intérêts vitaux sur le plan de la sécurité
» en cause en l’espèce étaient de prévenir les attentats terroristes contre
les États-Unis et leurs ressortissants, de prévenir le financement du terrorisme
et la fourniture d’armes à des groupes terroristes, et de contrer la mise
en place par l’Iran d’un programme de missiles balistiques. En l’affaire des
Activités militaires et paramilitaires, la Cour a affirmé que « la notion d’intérêts
vitaux en matière de sécurité déborde certainement la notion d’agression
armée et a reçu dans l’histoire des interprétations fort extensives »79. Même
78 Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c.
États-
Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 141, par. 282 (« Mais, d’après les
termes du traité lui-même, la question de savoir si une mesure est nécessaire à la protection
des intérêts vitaux de sécurité d’une partie ne relève pas de l’appréciation subjective de la
partie intéressée, ainsi que la Cour l’a déjà souligné ») ; Plates-formes pétrolières (République
islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 183, par. 43.
79 Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c.
États-
Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 117, par. 224.
181 certain iranian assets (diss. op. sebutinde)
interests
alleged by the United States in this case, which relate to counterterrorism,
prevention of arms trafficking and arms production, safely fall
within the category of “essential security interests” to which the exception in
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) applies. Accordingly, Executive Order 13599 is,
in my view, a measure falling within Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) of the
Treaty and is therefore not subject to the terms of the said Treaty.
V. Remedies
47. I disagree with the conclusions of the Court in paragraph 231 as well as
its findings in paragraph 236 (7) and (8) of the Judgment. In view of my opinion
above that Iran has failed to substantiate any of its claims or to establish
that the United States has violated the provisions of the 1955 Treaty, I am of
the view that the Respondent is under no obligation to compensate Iran.
(Signed) Julia Sebutinde.
certains actifs iraniens (op. diss. sebutinde) 181
à supposer que l’on en fasse une interprétation relativement restrictive, il est
fort probable que les intérêts invoqués par les États-Unis en la présente
espèce, qui avaient trait à la lutte antiterroriste et à la prévention du trafic et
de la production d’armes, entrent dans la catégorie des « intérêts vitaux sur
le plan de la sécurité », à laquelle s’applique l’exception prévue à l’alinéa d)
du paragraphe 1 de l’article XX. Ainsi, le décret présidentiel no 13599 constituait,
à mon sens, une mesure entrant dans le champ de ladite disposition et
n’était donc pas soumis aux termes du traité.
V. Remèdes
47. Je ne souscris pas aux conclusions énoncées par la Cour au paragraphe
231 ni à celles formulées aux points 7 et 8 du dispositif. Étant d’avis
que l’Iran n’est parvenu à étayer aucune de ses demandes et n’a pas établi que
les États-Unis avaient violé les dispositions du traité de 1955, le défendeur
n’a, à mon sens, aucune obligation d’indemniser l’Iran.
(Signé) Julia Sebutinde.

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Dissenting opinion of Judge Sebutinde

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