Volume I - Annexes 254-278

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CERTAIN IRANIAN ASSETS
(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
REJOINDER
SUBMITTED BY
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
May 17, 2021
ANNEXES
VOLUME I
Annexes 254 through 278

ANNEX254

Draft articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
with commentaries
2001
Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in
2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission's report
covering the work of that session (A/56/10). The report, which also contains
commentaries on the draft articles, appears in the Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, as corrected .
• Copyright© United Nations
2008
Annex 254
34 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
conduct may be attributable to several States at the same
time. Under chapter IV, one State may be responsible for
the internationally wrongful act of another, for example
if the act was carried out under its direction and control.
Nonetheless the basic principle of international law is that
each State is responsible for its own conduct in respect of
its own international obligations.
(7) The articles deal only with the responsibility of
States. Of course, as ICJ affirmed in the Reparation for
Injuries case, the United Nations "is a subject of international
law and capable of possessing international
rights and duties ... it has capacity: to maintain its rights
by bringing international claims".55 The Court has also
drawn attention to the responsibility of the United Nations
for the conduct of its organs or agents. 56 It may be that the
notion of responsibility for wrongful conduct is a basic element
in the possession of international legal personality.
Nonetheless, special considerations apply to the responsibility
of other international legal persons, and these are
not covered in the articles. 57
(8) As to terminology, the French term fait internationalement
illicite is preferable to de/it or other similar
expressions which may have a special meaning in internal
law. For the same reason, it is best to avoid, in English,
such terms as "tort", "delict" or "delinquency", or
in Spanish the term delito. The French termfait internationalement
illicite is better than acte internationalement
illicite, since wrongfulness often results from omissions
which are hardly indicated by the term acte. Moreover, the
latter term appears to imply that the legal consequences
are intended by its author. For the same reasons, the term
hecho internacionalmente ilicito is adopted in the Spanish
text. In the English text, it is necessary to maintain the expression
"internationally wrongful act", since the French
fait has no exact equivalent; nonetheless, the term "act" is
intended to encompass omissions, and this is made clear
in article 2.
Article 2. Elements of an internationally
wrongful act of a State
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State
when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) is attributable to the State under international
law; and
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation
of the State.
Commentary
(1) Article 1 states the basic principle that every internationally
wrongful act of a State entails its international
responsibility. Article 2 specifies the conditions required
to establish the existence of an internationally wrong-
55 Reparation for Injuries (see footnote 38 above), p. 179.
56 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 62, at pp. 88-89, para. 66.
57 For the position of international organizations, see article 57 and
commentary.
ful act of the State, i.e. the constituent elements of such
an act. Two elements are identified. First, the conduct in
question must be attributable to the State under international
law. Secondly, for responsibility to attach to the act
of the State, the conduct must constitute a breach of an
international legal obligation in force for that State at that
time.
(2) These two elements were specified, for example,
by PCIJ in the Phosphates in Morocco case. The Court
explicitly linked the creation of international responsibility
with the existence of an "act being attributable to the
State and described as contrary to the treaty right[ s] of
another State".58 ICJ has also referred to the two elements
on several occasions. In the United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran case, it pointed out that, in order
to establish the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of
Iran:
[f]irst, it must determine how far, legally, the acts in question may be
regarded as imputable to the Iranian State. Secondly, it must consider
their compatibility or incompatibility with the obligations oflran under
treaties in force or under any other rules of international law that may
be applicable. 59
Similarly in the Dickson Car Wheel Company case, the
Mexico-United States General Claims Commission noted
that the condition required for a State to incur international
responsibility is "that an unlawful international act be
imputed to it, that is, that there exist a violation of a duty
imposed by an international juridical standard". 60
(3) The element of attribution has sometimes been
described as "subjective" and the element of breach as
"objective", but the articles avoid such terminology.61
Whether there has been a breach of a rule may depend
on the intention or knowledge of relevant State organs
or agents and in that sense may be "subjective". For example,
article II of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that: "In the
present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such ... "
In other cases, the standard for breach of an obligation
may be "objective", in the sense that the advertence or
otherwise of relevant State organs or agents may be irrelevant.
Whether responsibility is "objective" or "subjective"
in this sense depends on the circumstances, including
the content of the primary obligation in question. The
articles lay down no general rule in that regard. The same
is true of other standards, whether they involve some degree
of fault, culpability, negligence or want of due diligence.
Such standards vary from one context to another
for reasons which essentially relate to the object and
purpose of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise
to the primary obligation. Nor do the articles lay down
any presumption in this regard as between the different
58 See footnote 34 above.
59 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, at p. 29, para. 56. Cf. page 41,
para. 90. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (footnote 36 above), pp. 117-118, para. 226; and GabcikovoNagymaros
Project (footnote 27 above), p. 54, para. 78.
60 See footnote 42 above.
61 Cf. Yearbook ... 1973, vol. II, p. 179, document A/9010/Rev.l,
paragraph (1) of the commentary to article 3.
Annex 254
State responsibility 35
possible standards. Establishing these is a matter for the
interpretation and application of the primary rules engaged
in the given case.
(4) Conduct attributable to the State can consist of actions
or omissions. Cases in which the international
responsibility of a State has been invoked on the basis of
an omission are at least as numerous as those based on
positive acts, and no difference in principle exists between
the two. Moreover, it may be difficult to isolate an "omission"
from the surrounding circumstances which are relevant
to the determination of responsibility. For example,
in the Corfu Channel case, ICJ held that it was a sufficient
basis for Albanian responsibility that it knew, or must have
known, of the presence of the mines in its territorial waters
and did nothing to warn third States of their presence. 62
In the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran case, the Court concluded that the responsibility
of the Islamic Republic of Iran was entailed by the "inaction"
of its authorities which "failed to take appropriate
steps", in circumstances where such steps were evidently
called for. 63 In other cases it may be the combination of
an action and an omission which is the basis for responsibility.
64
(5) For particular conduct to be characterized as an internationally
wrongful act, it must first be attributable
to the State. The State is a real organized entity, a legal
person with full authority to act under international law.
But to recognize this is not to deny the elementary fact
that the State cannot act of itself. An "act of the State"
must involve some action or omission by a human being
or group: "States can act only by and through their agents
and representatives."65 The question is which persons
should be considered as acting on behalf of the State, i.e.
what constitutes an "act of the State" for the purposes of
State responsibility.
( 6) In speaking of attribution to the State what is meant
is the State as a subject of international law. Under many
legal systems, the State organs consist of different legal
persons (ministries or other legal entities), which are regarded
as having distinct rights and obligations for which
they alone can be sued and are responsible. For the purposes
of the international law of State responsibility
the position is different. The State is treated as a unity,
consistent with its recognition as a single legal person in
international law. In this as in other respects the attribution
of conduct to the State is necessarily a normative operation.
What is crucial is that a given event is sufficiently
62 Corfu Channel, Merits (see footnote 35 above), pp. 22-23.
63 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (see
footnote 59 above), pp. 31-32, paras. 63 and 67. See also Velasquez
Rodriguez v. Honduras case, Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
Series C, No. 4, para. 170 (1988): "under international law a State is
responsible for the acts of its agents undertaken in their official capacity
and for their omissions"; and Affaire relative a l 'acquisition de la
nationalite polonaise, UNRIAA, vol. I (Sales No. 1948.V.2), p. 401, at
p. 425 (1924).
64 For example, under article 4 of the Convention relative to the
Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague Convention
VIII of 18 October 1907), a neutral Power which lays mines off its
coasts but omits to give the required notice to other States parties would
be responsible accordingly.
65 German Settlers in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.LJ.,
Series B, No. 6, p. 22.
connected to conduct (whether an act or omission) which
is attributable to the State under one or other of the rules
set out in chapter II.
(7) The second condition for the existence of an internationally
wrongful act of the State is that the conduct
attributable to the State should constitute a breach of an
international obligation of that State. The terminology of
breach of an international obligation of the State is long
established and is used to cover both treaty and non-treaty
obligations. In its judgment on jurisdiction in the Factory
at Chorz6w case, PCIJ used the words "breach of
an engagement".66 It employed the same expression in its
subsequent judgment on the merits.67 ICJ referred explicitly
to these words in the Reparation for Injuries case. 68
The arbitral tribunal in the "Rainbow Warrior" affair referred
to "any violation by a State of any obligation".69
In practice, terms such as "non-execution of international
obligations", "acts incompatible with international obligations",
"violation of an international obligation" or
"breach of an engagement" are also used.7° All these formulations
have essentially the same meaning. The phrase
preferred in the articles is "breach of an international obligation"
corresponding as it does to the language of Article
36, paragraph 2 (c), of the ICJ Statute.
(8) In international law the idea of breach of an obligation
has often been equated with conduct contrary to the
rights of others. PCIJ spoke of an act "contrary to the treaty
right[s] of another State" in its judgment in the Phosphates
in Morocco case.71 That case concerned a limited
multilateral treaty which dealt with the mutual rights and
duties of the parties, but some have considered the correlation
of obligations and rights as a general feature of
international law: there are no international obligations of
a subject of international law which are not matched by an
international right of another subject or subjects, or even
of the totality of the other subjects (the international community
as a whole). But different incidents may attach to
a right which is held in common by all other subjects of
international law, as compared with a specific right of a
given State or States. Different States may be beneficiaries
of an obligation in different ways, or may have different
interests in respect of its performance. Multilateral
obligations may thus differ from bilateral ones, in view of
the diversity of legal rules and institutions and the wide
variety of interests sought to be protected by them. But
whether any obligation has been breached still raises the
two basic questions identified in article 2, and this is so
whatever the character or provenance of the obligation
breached. It is a separate question who may invoke the responsibility
arising from the breach of an obligation: this
question is dealt with in Part Three. 72
66 Factory at Chorzow, Jurisdiction (see footnote 34 above).
67 Factory at Chorzow, Merits (ibid.).
68 Reparation for Injuries (see footnote 38 above), p. 184.
69 "Rainbow Warrior" (see footnote 46 above), p. 251, para. 75.
70 At the Conference for the Codification of International Law, held
at The Hague in 1930, the term "any failure ... to carry out the international
obligations of the State" was adopted (see Yearbook ... 1956,
vol. II, p. 225, documentA/CN.4/96, annex 3, article 1).
71 See footnote 34 above.
72 See also article 33, paragraph 2, and commentary.
Annex 254
36 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
(9) Thus there is no exception to the principle stated in
article 2 that there are two necessary conditions for an
internationally wrongful act-conduct attributable to
the State under international law and the breach by that
conduct of an international obligation of the State. The
question is whether those two necessary conditions are
also sufficient. It is sometimes said that international responsibility
is not engaged by conduct of a State in disregard
of its obligations unless some further element exists,
in particular, "damage" to another State. But whether such
elements are required depends on the content of the primary
obligation, and there is no general rule in this respect.
For example, the obligation under a treaty to enact a uniform
law is breached by the failure to enact the law, and
it is not necessary for another State party to point to any
specific damage it has suffered by reason of that failure.
Whether a particular obligation is breached forthwith
upon a failure to act on the part of the responsible State,
or whether some further event must occur, depends on the
content and interpretation of the primary obligation and
cannot be determined in the abstract. 73
(10) A related question is whether fault constitutes a
necessary element of the internationally wrongful act of a
State. This is certainly not the case ifby "fault" one understands
the existence, for example, of an intention to harm.
In the absence of any specific requirement of a mental
element in terms of the primary obligation, it is only
the act of a State that matters, independently of any
intention.
(11) Article 2 introduces and places in the necessary
legal context the questions dealt with in subsequent
chapters of Part One. Subparagraph (a)-which states
that conduct attributable to the State under international
law is necessary for there to be an internationally wrongful
act---corresponds to chapter II, while chapter IV deals
with the specific cases where one State is responsible for
the internationally wrongful act of another State. Subparagraph
(b)-which states that such conduct must
constitute a breach of an international obligation-corresponds
to the general principles stated in chapter III,
while chapter V deals with cases where the wrongfulness
of conduct, which would otherwise be a breach of an
obligation, is precluded.
(12) In subparagraph (a), the term "attribution" is used
to denote the operation of attaching a given action or omission
to a State. In international practice and judicial decisions,
the term "imputation" is also used. 74 But the term
"attribution" avoids any suggestion that the legal process
of connecting conduct to the State is a fiction, or that the
conduct in question is "really" that of someone else.
73 For examples of analysis of different obligations, see United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (footnote 59 above),
pp. 30---33, paras. 62-68; "Rainbow Warrior" (footnote 46 above),
pp. 266-267, paras. I 07-11 O; and WTO, Report of the Panel, United
States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (WT/DS152/R),
22 December 1999, paras. 7.41 et seq.
74 See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(footnote 59 above), p. 29, paras. 56 and 58; and Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (footnote 36 above), p. 51,
para. 86.
(13) In subparagraph (b), reference is made to the breach
of an international obligation rather than a rule or a norm
of international law. What matters for these purposes is
not simply the existence of a rule but its application in the
specific case to the responsible State. The term "obligation"
is commonly used in international judicial decisions
and practice and in the literature to cover all the possibilities.
The reference to an "obligation" is limited to an obligation
under international law, a matter further clarified
in article 3.
Article 3. Characterization of an act of a State
as internationally wrongful
The characterization of an act of a State as internationally
wrongful is governed by international law.
Such characterization is not affected by the characterization
of the same act as lawful by internal law.
Commentary
(1) Article 3 makes explicit a principle already implicit
in article 2, namely that the characterization of a given
act as internationally wrongful is independent of its characterization
as lawful under the internal law of the State
concerned. There are two elements to this. First, an act of
a State cannot be characterized as internationally wrongful
unless it constitutes a breach of an international obligation,
even if it violates a provision of the State's own
law. Secondly and most importantly, a State cannot, by
pleading that its conduct conforms to the provisions of its
internal law, escape the characterization of that conduct as
wrongful by international law. An act of a State must be
characterized as internationally wrongful if it constitutes a
breach of an international obligation, even if the act does
not contravene the State's internal law-even if, under
that law, the State was actually bound to act in that way.
(2) As to the first of these elements, perhaps the clearest
judicial decision is that of PCIJ in the Treatment of
Polish Nationals case.75 The Court denied the Polish
Government the right to submit to organs of the League
of Nations questions concerning the application to Polish
nationals of certain provisions of the Constitution of the
Free City of Danzig, on the ground that:
according to generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as
against another State, on the provisions of the latter's Constitution, but
only on international law and international obligations duly accepted
... [C]onversely, a State cannot adduce as against another State its own
Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under
international law or treaties in force ... The application of the Danzig
Constitution may ... result in the violation of an international obligation
incumbent on Danzig towards Poland, whether under treaty stipulations
or under general international law ... However, in cases of such a nature,
it is not the Constitution and other laws, as such, but the international
obligation that gives rise to the responsibility of the Free City. 76
(3) That conformity with the provisions of internal
law in no way precludes conduct being characterized as
internationally wrongful is equally well settled. Interna-
75 Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin
or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932, P.C.I.J.,
Series A/B, No. 44, p. 4.
76 Ibid., pp. 24-25. See also "Lotus", Judgment No. 9, 1927, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 10, p. 24.
Annex 254
State responsibility 57
He claimed that he had not had a fair hearing, contrary
to article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The Court noted that:
The Contracting States enjoy a wide discretion as regards the choice of
the means calculated to ensure that their legal systems are in compliance
with the requirements of article 6 § 1 in this field. The Court's task
is not to indicate those means to the States, but to determine whether
the result called for by the Convention has been achieved ... For this to
be so, the resources available under domestic law must be shown to be
effective and a person "charged with a criminal offence" ... must not be
left with the burden of proving that he was not seeking to evade justice
or that his absence was due to force majeure.210
The Court thus considered that article 6, paragraph 1,
imposed an obligation of result.211 But, in order to decide
whether there had been a breach of the Convention
in the circumstances of the case, it did not simply compare
the result required (the opportunity for a trial in the
accused's presence) with the result practically achieved
(the lack of that opportunity in the particular case). Rather,
it examined what more Italy could have done to make the
applicant's right "effective".212 The distinction between
obligations of conduct and result was not determinative
of the actual decision that there had been a breach of article
6, paragraph 1.213
(12) The question often arises whether an obligation is
breached by the enactment of legislation by a State, in
cases where the content of the legislationprimafacie conflicts
with what is required by the international obligation,
or whether the legislation has to be implemented in the
given case before the breach can be said to have occurred.
Again, no general rule can be laid down that is applicable
to all cases.214 Certain obligations may be breached by the
mere passage of incompatible legislation.215 Where this
is so, the passage of the legislation without more entails
the international responsibility of the enacting State, the
210 Colozza v. Italy, Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 89 (1985),
pp. 15-16, para. 30, citing De Cubber v. Belgium, ibid., No. 86 (1984),
p. 20, para. 35.
211 Cf. Plattform ",frzte far das Leben" v. Austria, in which the
Court gave the following interpretation of article 11:
"While it is the duty of Contracting States to take reasonable and
appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed
peacefully, they cannot guarantee this absolutely and they have a
wide discretion in the choice of the means to be used ... In this area
the obligation they enter into under article 11 of the Convention
is an obligation as to measures to be taken and not as to results to
be achieved" (Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 139, p. 12, para. 34
(1988)).
In the Colozza case (see footnote 210 above), the Court used similar
language but concluded that the obligation was an obligation of result.
Cf. C. Tomuschat, "What is a 'breach' of the European Convention on
Human Rights?", The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights
in Europe: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Lawson and
de Blois, eds. (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), vol. 3, p. 315, at
p. 328.
212 Colozza case (see footnote 210 above), para. 28.
213 See also The Islamic Republic of Iran v. The United States of
America, cases Al5 (IV) and A24, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 32, p. 115
(1996).
214 Cf. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21
of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947 (footnote
83 above), p. 30, para. 42.
215 A uniform law treaty will generally be construed as requiring immediate
implementation, i.e. as embodying an obligation to make the
provisions of the uniform law a part of the law of each State party:
see, e.g., B. Conforti, "Obblighi di mezzi e obblighi di risultato nelle
convenzioni di diritto uniforme", Rivista di diritto internazionale
privato e processuale, vol. 24 (1988), p. 233.
legislature itself being an organ of the State for the purposes
of the attribution of responsibility.216 In other circumstances,
the enactment of legislation may not in and
of itself amount to a breach,217 especially if it is open to
the State concerned to give effect to the legislation in a
way which would not violate the international obligation
in question. In such cases, whether there is a breach will
depend on whether and how the legislation is given effect.
218
Article 13. International obligation in force for a State
An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an
international obligation unless the State is bound by
the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.
Commentary
(1) Article 13 states the basic principle that, for responsibility
to exist, the breach must occur at a time when the
State is bound by the obligation. This is but the application
in the field of State responsibility of the general principle
of intertemporal law, as stated by Judge Huber in another
context in the Island of Pa/mas case:
[A] juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary
with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in
regard to it arises or falls to be settled.219
Article 13 provides an important guarantee for States in
terms of claims of responsibility. Its formulation ("does
not constitute ... unless ... ") is in keeping with the idea of
a guarantee against the retrospective application of international
law in matters of State responsibility.
(2) International tribunals have applied the principle
stated in article 13 in many cases. An instructive example
is provided by the decision of Umpire Bates of the United
States-Great Britain Mixed Commission concerning the
216 See article 4 and commentary. For illustrations, see, e.g., the
findings of the European Court of Human Rights in Norris v. Ireland,
Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 142, para. 31 (1988), citing Klass and
Others v. Germany, ibid., No. 28, para. 33 (1978); Marckx v. Belgium,
ibid., No. 31, para. 27 (1979); Johnston and Others v. Ireland,
ibid., No. 112, para. 42 (1986); Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, ibid.,
No. 45, para. 41 (1981); and Modinos v. Cyprus, ibid., No. 259, para.
24 (1993). See also International responsibility for the promulgation
and enforcement of laws in violation of the Convention (arts. 1 and 2
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-14/94,
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 14 (1994).
The Inter-American Court also considered it possible to determine
whether draft legislation was compatible with the provisions of human
rights treaties: Restrictions to the Death Penalty (arts. 4(2) and 4(4)
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83,
Series A, No. 3 (1983).
217 As ICJ held in LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above),
p. 497, paras. 90-91.
218 See, e.g., WTO, Report of the Panel (footnote 73 above),
paras. 7.34-7.57.
219 Island of Palmas (Netherlands/United States of America),
UNRIAA, vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.l), p. 829, at p. 845 (1928).
Generally on intertemporal law, see resolution I adopted in 1975 by
the Institute of International Law at its Wiesbaden session, Annuaire
de l'Institut de droit international, vol. 56 (1975), pp. 536-540; for
the debate, ibid., pp. 339-374; for M. S0rensen's reports, ibid., vol. 55
(1973), pp. 1-116. See further W. Karl, "The time factor in the law of
State responsibility", Spinedi and Simma, eds., op. cit. (footnote 175
above), p. 95.
Annex 254
58 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
conduct of British authorities who had seized United States
vessels engaged in the slave trade and freed slaves belonging
to United States nationals. The incidents referred to
the Commission had taken place at different times and the
umpire had to determine whether, at the time each incident
took place, slavery was "contrary to the law of nations".
Earlier incidents, dating back to a time when the
slave trade was considered lawful, amounted to a breach
on the part of the British authorities of the international
obligation to respect and protect the property of foreign
nationals.220 The later incidents occurred when the slave
trade had been "prohibited by all civilized nations" and
did not involve the responsibility of Great Britain.221
(3) Similar principles were applied by Arbitrator Asser
in deciding whether the seizure and confiscation by
Russian authorities of United States vessels engaged in
seal hunting outside Russia's territorial waters should be
considered internationally wrongful. In his award in the
"James Hamilton Lewis" case, he observed that the question
had to be settled "according to the general principles
of the law of nations and the spirit of the international
agreements in force and binding upon the two High Parties
at the time of the seizure of the vessel".222 Since, under
the principles in force at the time, Russia had no right
to seize the United States vessel, the seizure and confiscation
of the vessel were unlawful acts for which Russia was
required to pay compensation.223 The same principle has
consistently been applied by the European Commission
and the European Court of Human Rights to deny claims
relating to periods during which the European Convention
on Human Rights was not in force for the State concerned.
224
(4) State practice also supports the principle. A requirement
that arbitrators apply the rules of international law
in force at the time when the alleged wrongful acts took
place is a common stipulation in arbitration agreements, 225
and undoubtedly is made by way of explicit confirmation
of a generally recognized principle. International law
writers who have dealt with the question recognize that
the wrongfulness of an act must be established on the ba-
220 See the "Enterprize" case, Lapradelle-Politis (footnote 139
above), vol. I, p. 703 (1855); and Moore, History and Digest,
vol. IV, p. 4349, at p. 4373. See also the "Hermosa" and "Creole" cases,
Lapradelle-Politis, op. cit., p. 704 (1855); and Moore, History and
Digest, vol. IV, pp. 4374--4375.
221 See the "Lawrence" case, Lapradelle-Politis, op. cit., p. 741; and
Moore, History and Digest, vol. III, p. 2824. See also the "Volusia"
case, Lapradelle-Politis, op. cit., p. 741.
222 Affaire des navires Cape Horn Pigeon, James Hamilton Lewis,
C. H White et Kate and Anna, UNRIAA, vol. IX (Sales No. 59.V.5),
p. 66, at p. 69 (1902).
223 See also the "C.H. White" case, ibid., p. 74. In these cases the arbitrator
was required by the arbitration agreement itself to apply the law
in force at the time the acts were performed. Nevertheless, the intention
of the parties was clearly to confirm the application of the general
principle in the context of the arbitration agreement, not to establish
an exception. See further the S.S. "Lisman" case, ibid., vol. III (Sales
No. 1949.V.2), p. 1767, at p. 1771 (1937).
224 See, e.g., Xv. Germany, application No. 1151/61, Council of
Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, Recueil des decisions,
No. 7 (March 1962), p. 119 (1961) and many later decisions.
225 See, e.g., Declarations exchanged between the Government of
the United States of America and the Imperial Government of Russia,
for the submission to arbitration of certain disputes concerning the
international responsibility of Russia for the seizure of American ships,
UNRIAA, vol. IX (Sales No. 59.V.5), p. 57 (1900).
sis of the obligations in force at the time when the act was
performed. 226'
(5) State responsibility can extend to acts of the utmost
seriousness, and the regime of responsibility in such cases
will be correspondingly stringent. But even when a new
peremptory norm of general international law comes
into existence, as contemplated by article 64 of the 1969
Vienna Convention, this does not entail any retrospective
assumption of responsibility. Article 71, paragraph 2 (b),
provides that such a new peremptory norm "does not affect
any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties
created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination,
provided that those rights, obligations or situations
may thereafter be maintained only to the extent that
their maintenance is not in itself in conflict with the new
peremptory norm".
(6) Accordingly, it is appropriate to apply the intertemporal
principle to all international obligations, and article
13 is general in its application. It is, however, without
prejudice to the possibility that a State may agree
to compensate for damage caused as a result of conduct
which was not at the time a breach of any international
obligation in force for that State. In fact, cases of the retrospective
assumption of responsibility are rare. The lex
specialis principle (art. 55) is sufficient to deal with any
such cases where it may be agreed or decided that responsibility
will be assumed retrospectively for conduct which
was not a breach of an international obligation at the time
it was committed.227
(7) In international law, the principle stated in article
13 is not only a necessary but also a sufficient basis for
responsibility. In other words, once responsibility has accrued
as a result of an internationally wrongful act, it is
not affected by the subsequent termination of the obligation,
whether as a result of the termination of the treaty
which has been breached or of a change in international
law. Thus, as ICJ said in the Northern Cameroons case:
[I]f during the life of the Trusteeship the Trustee was responsible for
some act in violation of the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement which
resulted in damage to another Member of the United Nations or to one
of its nationals, a claim for reparation would not be liquidated by the
termination of the Trust. 228
Similarly, in the "Rainbow Warrior" arbitration, the arbitral
tribunal held that, although the relevant treaty obli-
226 See, e.g., P. Tavernier, Recherches sur !'application dans le temps
des actes et des reg/es en droit international public: problemes de droit
intertemporel ou de droit transitoire (Paris, Librairie generale de droit
et de jurisprudence, 1970), pp. 119, 135 and292; D. Bindschedler-Robert,
"De la retroactivite en droit international public", Recueil d 'etudes
de droit international en hommage a Paul Guggenheim (University of
Geneva Law Faculty/Graduate Institute oflnternational Studies, 1968),
p. 184; M. S0rensen, "Le probleme intertemporel dans l'application de
la Convention europeenne des droits de l'homme", Melanges offerts
a Palys Modinos (Paris, Pedone, 1968), p. 304; T. 0. Elias, "The doctrine
of intertemporal law", AJIL, vol. 74, No. 2 (April 1980), p. 285;
and R. Higgins, "Time and the law: international perspectives on an
old problem", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 46
(July 1997), p. 501.
227 As to the retroactive effect of the acknowledgement and adoption
of conduct by a State, see article 11 and commentary, especially
paragraph ( 4). Such acknowledgement and adoption would not, without
more, give retroactive effect to the obligations of the adopting State.
228 Northern Cameroons, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.CJ.
Reports 1963, p. 15, at p. 35.
Annex 254
State responsibility 59
gation had terminated with the passage of time, France's
responsibility for its earlier breach remained. 229
(8) Both aspects of the principle are implicit in the ICJ
decision in the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case.
Australia argued there that a State responsibility claim relating
to the period of its joint administration of the Trust
Territory for Nauru (1947-1968) could not be brought
decades later, even if the claim had not been formally
waived. The Court rejected the argument, applying a liberal
standard of laches or unreasonable delay.230 But it
went on to say that:
[I]t will be for the Court, in due time, to ensure that Nauru's delay in
seising [sic] it will in no way cause prejudice to Australia with regard to
both the establishment of the facts and the determination of the content
of the applicable law. 231
Evidently, the Court intended to apply the law in force at
the time the claim arose. Indeed that position was necessarily
taken by Nauru itself, since its claim was based on
a breach of the Trusteeship Agreement, which terminated
at the date of its accession to independence in 1968. Its
claim was that the responsibility of Australia, once engaged
under the law in force at a given time, continued
to exist even if the primary obligation had subsequently
terminated. 232
(9) The basic principle stated in article 13 is thus well
established. One possible qualification concerns the progressive
interpretation of obligations, by a majority of
the Court in the Namibia case.233 But the intertemporal
principle does not entail that treaty provisions are to be
interpreted as if frozen in time. The evolutionary interpretation
of treaty provisions is permissible in certain cases, 234
but this has nothing to do with the principle that a State
can only be held responsible for breach of an obligation
which was in force for that State at the time of its conduct.
Nor does the principle of the intertemporal law mean that
facts occurring prior to the entry into force of a particular
obligation may not be taken into account where these are
otherwise relevant. For example, in dealing with the obligation
to ensure that persons accused are tried without undue
delay, periods of detention prior to the entry into force
of that obligation may be relevant as facts, even though no
compensation could be awarded in respect of the period
prior to the entry into force of the obligation.235
229 "Rainbow Warrior" (see footnote 46 above), pp. 265-266.
23° Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.CJ. Reports 1992, p. 240, at pp. 253-255,
paras. 31-36. See article 45, subparagraph (b), and commentary.
231 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, ibid., p. 255, para. 36.
232 The case was settled before the Court had the opportunity to consider
the merits: Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Order of 13 September
1993, I.CJ. Reports 1993, p. 322; for the settlement agreement,
see Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Nauru for the
Settlement of the Case in the International Court of Justice concerning
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru, 10 August 1993) (United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1770, No. 30807, p. 379).
233 Namibia case (see footnote 176 above), pp. 31-32, para. 53.
234 See, e.g., Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., Series A,
No. 26, pp. 15-16 (1978).
235 See, e.g., Zana v. Turkey, Eur. Court H.R., Reports, 1997-VII,
p. 2533 (1997); and J. Pauwelyn, "The concept of a 'continuing violation'
of an international obligation: selected problems", BYBIL, 1995,
vol. 66, p. 415, at pp. 443--445.
Article 14. Extension in time of the breach
of an international obligation
1. The breach of an international obligation by an
act of a State not having a continuing character occurs
at the moment when the act is performed, even if its
effects continue.
2. The breach of an international obligation by an
act of a State having a continuing character extends
over the entire period during which the act continues
and remains not in conformity with the international
obligation.
3. The breach of an international obligation requiring
a State to prevent a given event occurs when
the event occurs and extends over the entire period
during which the event continues and remains not in
conformity with that obligation.
Commentary
(1) The problem of identifying when a wrongful act
begins and how long it continues is one which arises
frequently236 and has consequences in the field of State
responsibility, including the important question of cessation
of continuing wrongful acts dealt with in article 30.
Although the existence and duration of a breach of an
international obligation depends for the most part on the
existence and content of the obligation and on the facts
of the particular breach, certain basic concepts are established.
These are introduced in article 14. Without seeking
to be comprehensive in its treatment of the problem, article
14 deals with several related questions. In particular, it
develops the distinction between breaches not extending
in time and continuing wrongful acts ( see paragraphs (1)
and (2) respectively), and it also deals with the application
of that distinction to the important case of obligations of
prevention. In each of these cases it takes into account
the question of the continuance in force of the obligation
breached.
(2) Internationally wrongful acts usually take some time
to happen. The critical distinction for the purpose of article
14 is between a breach which is continuing and one
which has already been completed. In accordance with
paragraph 1, a completed act occurs "at the moment
when the act is performed", even though its effects or
consequences may continue. The words "at the moment"
are intended to provide a more precise description of the
time frame when a completed wrongful act is performed,
236 See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2,
1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 35; Phosphates in Morocco (footnote
34 above), pp. 23-29; Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria,
Judgment, 1939, P.C.IJ., Series A/B, No. 77, p. 64, at pp. 80-82;
and Right of Passage over Indian Territory (footnote 207 above),
pp. 33-36. The issue has often been raised before the organs of the
European Convention on Human Rights. See, e. g., the decision of the
European Commission of Human Rights in the De Becker v. Belgium
case, application No. 214/56, Yearbook of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 1958-1959, p. 214, at pp. 234 and 244; and the Court's
judgments in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., Series
A, No. 25, p. 64 (1978); Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece,
ibid., No. 260---B, para. 40 (1993); andAgrotexim and Others v. Greece,
ibid., No. 330---A, p. 22, para. 58 (1995). See also E. Wyler, "Quelques
reflexions sur la realisation dans le temps du fait internationalement
illicite", RGDIP, vol. 95, p. 881 (1991).
Annex 254
88 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
that these arise towards or are invoked by a person or entity
other than a State. In other words, the provisions of
Part Two are without prejudice to any right, arising from
the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue
directly to any person or entity other than a State, and
article 33 makes this clear.
Article 29. Continued duty of performance
The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful
act under this Part do not affect the continued duty
of the responsible State to perform the obligation
breached.
Commentary
(1) Where a State commits a breach of an international
obligation, questions as to the restoration and future of the
legal relationship thereby affected are central. Apart from
the question of reparation, two immediate issues arise,
namely, the effect of the responsible State's conduct on
the obligation which has been breached, and cessation of
the breach if it is continuing. The former question is dealt
with by article 29, the latter by article 30.
(2) Article 29 states the general principle that the legal
consequences of an internationally wrongful act do not
affect the continued duty of the State to perform the obligation
it has breached. As a result of the internationally
wrongful act, a new set of legal relations is established
between the responsible State and the State or States to
whom the international obligation is owed. But this does
not mean that the pre-existing legal relation established
by the primary obligation disappears. Even if the responsible
State complies with its obligations under Part Two
to cease the wrongful conduct and to make full reparation
for the injury caused, it is not relieved thereby of the
duty to perform the obligation breached. The continuing
obligation to perform an international obligation, notwithstanding
a breach, underlies the concept of a continuing
wrongful act (see article 14) and the obligation of cessation
(see subparagraph (a) of article 30).
(3) It is true that in some situations the ultimate effect
of a breach of an obligation may be to put an end to the
obligation itself. For example, a State injured by a material
breach of a bilateral treaty may elect to terminate
the treaty.424 But as the relevant provisions of the 1969
Vienna Convention make clear, the mere fact of a breach
and even of a repudiation of a treaty does not terminate
the treaty.425 It is a matter for the injured State to react
to the breach to the extent permitted by the Convention.
The injured State may have no interest in terminating the
treaty as distinct from calling for its continued performance.
Where a treaty is duly terminated for breach, the
termination does not affect legal relationships which have
accrued under the treaty prior to its termination, includ-
424 See footnote 422 above.
425 Indeed, in the Gabc(lwvo-Nagymaros Project case, ICJ held that
continuing material breaches by both parties did not have the effect of
terminating the 1977 Treaty on the Construction and Operation of the
Gabcik:ovo-Nagymaros Barrage System (see footnote 27 above), p. 68,
para. 114.
ing the obligation to make reparation for any breach.426 A
breach of an obligation under general international law is
even less likely to affect the underlying obligation, and indeed
will never do so as such. By contrast, the secondary
legal relation of State responsibility arises on the occurrence
of a breach and without any requirement of invocation
by the injured State.
(4) Article 29 does not need to deal with such contingencies.
All it provides is that the legal consequences of
an internationally wrongful act within the field of State
responsibility do not affect any continuing duty to comply
with the obligation which has been breached. Whether and
to what extent that obligation subsists despite the breach
is a matter not regulated by the law of State responsibility
but by the rules concerning the relevant primary obligation.
Article 30. Cessation and non-repetition
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful
act is under an obligation:
(a) to cease that act, if it is continuing;
(b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees
of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.
Commentary
(1) Article 30 deals with two separate but linked issues
raised by the breach of an international obligation: the
cessation of the wrongful conduct and the offer of assurances
and guarantees of non-repetition by the responsible
State if circumstances so require. Both are aspects of the
restoration and repair of the legal relationship affected by
the breach. Cessation is, as it were, the negative aspect
of future performance, concerned with securing an end
to continuing wrongful conduct, whereas assurances and
guarantees serve a preventive function and may be described
as a positive reinforcement of future performance.
The continuation in force of the underlying obligation is
a necessary assumption of both, since if the obligation
has ceased following its breach, the question of cessation
does not arise and no assurances and guarantees can be
relevant.427
(2) Subparagraph (a) of article 30 deals with the obligation
of the State responsible for the internationally wrongful
act to cease the wrongful conduct. In accordance with
article 2, the word "act" covers both acts and omissions.
Cessation is thus relevant to all wrongful acts extending
in time "regardless of whether the conduct of a State is
426 See, e.g., "Rainbow Warrior" (footnote 46 above), p. 266, citing
Lord McNair (dissenting) in Ambatielos, Preliminary Objection,
I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 28, at p. 63. On that particular point the Court
itself agreed, ibid., p. 45. In the Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project case,
Hungary accepted that the legal consequences of its termination of
the 1977 Treaty on the Construction and Operation of the GabcikovoN
agymaros Barrage System on account of the breach by Czechoslovakia
were prospective only, and did not affect the accrued rights of either
party (see footnote 27 above), pp. 73-74, paras. 125-127. The Court
held that the Treaty was still in force, and therefore did not address the
question.
427 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 70, para. I.
Annex 254
State responsibility 89
an action or an omission ... since there may be cessation
consisting in abstaining from certain actions".428
(3) The tribunal in the "Rainbow Warrior" arbitration
stressed "two essential conditions intimately linked" for
the requirement of cessation of wrongful conduct to arise,
"namely that the wrongful act has a continuing character
and that the violated rule is still in force at the time
in which the order is issued".429 While the obligation to
cease wrongful conduct will arise most commonly in the
case of a continuing wrongful act,430 article 30 also encompasses
situations where a State has violated an obligation
on a series of occasions, implying the possibility of
further repetitions. The phrase "if it is continuing" at the
end of subparagraph (a) of the article is intended to cover
both situations.
(4) Cessation of conduct in breach of an international
obligation is the first requirement in eliminating the consequences
of wrongful conduct. With reparation, it is
one of the two general consequences of an internationally
wrongful act. Cessation is often the main focus of the
controversy produced by conduct in breach of an international
obligation.431 It is frequently demanded not only
by States but also by the organs of international organizations
such as the General Assembly and Security Council
in the face of serious breaches of international law. By
contrast, reparation, important though it is in many cases,
may not be the central issue in a dispute between States as
to questions of responsibility. 432
(5) The function of cessation is to put an end to a violation
of international law and to safeguard the continuing
validity and effectiveness of the underlying primary rule.
The responsible State's obligation of cessation thus protects
both the interests of the injured State or States and
the interests of the international community as a whole in
the preservation of, and reliance on, the rule of law.
(6) There are several reasons for treating cessation as
more than simply a function of the duty to comply with
the primary obligation. First, the question of cessation
only arises in the event of a breach. What must then occur
depends not only on the interpretation of the primary
obligation but also on the secondary rules relating to rem-
428 "Rainbow Warrior" (see footnote 46 above), p. 270, para. 113.
429 Ibid., para. 114.
43° For the concept of a continuing wrongful act, see paragraphs (3)
to (11) of the commentary to article 14.
431 The focus of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is on cessation
rather than reparation: Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization, annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures
governing the Settlement of Disputes), especially article 3, paragraph 7,
which provides for compensation "only if the immediate withdrawal of
the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the
withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a covered agreement".
On the distinction between cessation and reparation for WTO
purposes, see, e.g., Report of the Panel, Australia-Subsidies Provided to
Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather (WT/DS126/RW and
Corr.I), 21 January 2000, para. 6.49.
432 For cases where ICJ has recognized that this may be so, see,
e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland),
Merits, Judgment, IC.J Reports 1974, p. 175, at pp. 201-205,
paras. 65-76; and Gabc{kovo-Nagymaros Project (footnote 27 above),
p. 81, para. 153. See also C. D. Gray,Judicial Remedies in International
Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 77-92.
edies, and it is appropriate that they are dealt with, at least
in general terms, in articles concerning the consequences
of an internationally wrongful act. Secondly, continuing
wrongful acts are a common feature of cases involving
State responsibility and are specifically dealt with in article
14. There is a need to spell out the consequences of
such acts in Part Two.
(7) The question of cessation often arises in close connection
with that of reparation, and particularly restitution.
The result of cessation may be indistinguishable
from restitution, for example in cases involving the freeing
of hostages or the return of objects or premises seized.
Nonetheless, the two must be distinguished. Unlike restitution,
cessation is not subject to limitations relating to
proportionality.433 It may give rise to a continuing obligation,
even when literal return to the status quo ante is
excluded or can only be achieved in an approximate way.
(8) The difficulty of distinguishing between cessation
and restitution is illustrated by the "Rainbow Warrior"
arbitration. New Zealand sought the return of the two
agents to detention on the island of Hao. According to
New Zealand, France was obliged to return them to and
to detain them on the island for the balance of the three
years; that obligation had not expired since time spent
off the island was not to be counted for that purpose. The
tribunal disagreed. In its view, the obligation was for a
fixed term which had expired, and there was no question
of cessation.434 Evidently, the return of the two agents to
the island was of no use to New Zealand if there was no
continuing obligation on the part of France to keep them
there. Thus, a return to the status quo ante may be oflittle
or no value if the obligation breached no longer exists.
Conversely, no option may exist for an injured State to renounce
restitution if the continued performance of the obligation
breached is incumbent upon the responsible State
and the former State is not competent to release it from
such performance. The distinction between cessation and
restitution may have important consequences in terms of
the obligations of the States concerned.
(9) Subparagraph (b) of article 30 deals with the obligation
of the responsible State to offer appropriate assurances
and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances
so require. Assurances and guarantees are concerned with
the restoration of confidence in a continuing relationship,
although they involve much more flexibility than cessation
and are not required in all cases. They are most commonly
sought when the injured State has reason to believe
that the mere restoration of the pre-existing situation does
not protect it satisfactorily. For example, following repeated
demonstrations against the United States Embassy
in Moscow from 1964 to 1965, President Johnson stated
that:
The U.S. Government must insist that its diplomatic establishments and
personnel be given the protection which is required by international
law and custom and which is necessary for the conduct of diplomatic
relations between states. Expressions of regret and compensation are no
substitute for adequate protection.435
433 See article 35 (b) and commentary.
434 UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 217, at p. 266, para. 105 (1990).
435 Reprinted in ILM, vol. 4, No. 2 (July 1965), p. 698.
Annex 254
90 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session
Such demands are not always expressed in terms of assurances
or guarantees, but they share the characteristics of
being future-looking and concerned with other potential
breaches. They focus on prevention rather than reparation
and they are included in article 30.
(10) The question whether the obligation to offer assurances
or guarantees of non-repetition may be a legal consequence
of an internationally wrongful act was debated
in the LaGrand case. This concerned an admitted failure
of consular notification contrary to article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In its fourth
submission, Germany sought both general and specific
assurances and guarantees as to the means of future compliance
with the Convention. The United States argued
that to give such assurances or guarantees went beyond
the scope of the obligations in the Convention and that
ICJ lacked jurisdiction to require them. In any event, formal
assurances and guarantees were unprecedented and
should not be required. Germany's entitlement to a remedy
did not extend beyond an apology, which the United
States had given. Alternatively, no assurances or guarantees
were appropriate in the light of the extensive action it
had taken to ensure that federal and State officials would
in future comply with the Convention. On the question of
jurisdiction, the Court held:
that a dispute regarding the appropriate remedies for the violation of
the Convention alleged by Germany is a dispute that arises out of the
interpretation or application of the Convention and thus is within the
Court's jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction exists over a dispute on a particular
matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required by the Court
to consider the remedies a party has requested for the breach of the
obligation . . . Consequently, the Court has jurisdiction in the present
case with respect to the fourth submission ofGermany.436
On the question of appropriateness, the Court noted that
an apology would not be sufficient in any case in which a
foreign national had been "subjected to prolonged detention
or sentenced to severe penalties" following a failure
of consular notification.437 But in the light of information
provided by the United States as to the steps taken to comply
in future, the Court held:
that the commitment expressed by the United States to ensure implementation
of the specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations
under Article 36, paragraph I (b), must be regarded as meeting
Germany's request for a general assurance ofnon-repetition.438
As to the specific assurances sought by Germany, the
Court limited itself to stating that:
if the United States, notwithstanding its commitment referred to ...
should fail in its obligation of consular notification to the detriment
of German nationals, an apology would not suffice in cases where the
individuals concerned have been subjected to prolonged detention or
convicted and sentenced to severe penalties. In the case of such a conviction
and sentence, it would be incumbent upon the United States to
allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by
takin,§ account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention.
9
436 LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above), p. 485, para. 48,
citing Factory at Chorz6w, Jurisdiction (footnote 34 above).
437 LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above), p. 512,
para. 123.
438 Ibid., p. 513, para. 124; see also the operative part, p. 516,
para. 128 (6).
439 Ibid., pp. 513-514, para. 125. See also paragraph 127 and the
operative part (para. 128 (7)).
The Court thus upheld its jurisdiction on Germany's fourth
submission and responded to it in the operative part. It
did not, however, discuss the legal basis for assurances of
non-repetition.
(11) Assurances or guarantees of non-repetition may be
sought by way of satisfaction ( e.g. the repeal of the legislation
which allowed the breach to occur) and there is thus
some overlap between the two in practice.440 However,
they are better treated as an aspect of the continuation
and repair of the legal relationship affected by the breach.
Where assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are
sought by an injured State, the question is essentially the
reinforcement of a continuing legal relationship and the
focus is on the future, not the past. In addition, assurances
and guarantees of non-repetition may be sought by a State
other than an injured State in accordance with article 48.
(12) Assurances are normally given verbally, while guarantees
of non-repetition involve something more-for example,
preventive measures to be taken by the responsible
State designed to avoid repetition of the breach. With
regard to the kind of guarantees that may be requested,
international practice is not uniform. The injured State
usually demands either safeguards against the repetition
of the wrongful act without any specification of the form
they are to take441 or, when the wrongful act affects its
nationals, assurances of better protection of persons and
property.442 In the LaGrand case, ICJ spelled out with
some specificity the obligation that would arise for the
United States from a future breach, but added that "[t]his
obligation can be carried out in various ways. The choice
of means must be left to the United States".443 It noted
further that a State may not be in a position to offer a firm
guarantee of non-repetition. 444 Whether it could properly
do so would depend on the nature of the obligation in
question.
(13) In some cases, the injured State may ask the responsible
State to adopt specific measures or to act in a
specified way in order to avoid repetition. Sometimes the
injured State merely seeks assurances from the responsible
State that, in future, it will respect the rights of the injured
State.445 In other cases, the injured State requires specific
instructions to be given,446 or other specific conduct to be
440 See paragraph (5) of the commentary to article 36.
441 In the "Dogger Bank" incident in 1904, the United Kingdom
sought "security against the recurrence of such intolerable incidents",
G. F. de Martens, Nouveau recueil general de traites, 2nd series,
vol. XXXIII, p. 642. See also the exchange of notes between China
and Indonesia following the attack in March 1966 against the Chinese
Consulate General in Jakarta, in which the Chinese Deputy Minister
for Foreign Affairs sought a guarantee that such incidents would not be
repeated in the future, RGDIP, vol. 70 (1966), pp. 1013 et seq.
442 Such assurances were given in the Doane incident ( 1886), Moore,
Digest, vol. VI, pp. 345-346.
443 LaGrand, Judgment (see footnote 119 above), p. 513, para. 125.
444 Ibid., para. 124.
445 See, e.g., the 1901 case in which the Ottoman Empire gave a
formal assurance that the British, Austrian and French postal services
would henceforth operate freely in its territory, RGDIP, vol. 8 (190 I),
p. 777, at pp. 788 and 792.
446 See, e.g., the incidents involving the "Herzog" and the "Bundesrath
", two German ships seized by the British Navy in December
1899 and January 1900, during the Boer war, in which Germany drew
the attention of Great Britain to "the necessity for issuing instructions
Annex 254
State responsibility 91
taken.447 But assurances and guarantees of non-repetition
will not always be appropriate, even if demanded. Much
will depend on the circumstances of the case, including
the nature of the obligation and of the breach. The rather
exceptional character of the measures is indicated by the
words "if circumstances so require" at the end of subparagraph
(b). The obligation of the responsible State with
respect to assurances and guarantees of non-repetition is
formulated in flexible terms in order to prevent the kinds
of abusive or excessive claims which characterized some
demands for assurances and guarantees by States in the
past.
Article 31. Reparation
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to
make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act.
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material
or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act
of a State.
Commentary
(1) The obligation to make full reparation is the second
general obligation of the responsible State consequent
upon the commission of an internationally wrongful act.
The general principle of the consequences of the commission
of an internationally wrongful act was stated by PCIJ
in the Factory at Chorz6w case:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation
therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a
convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention
itself. Differences relating to reparations, which may be due by
reason of failure to apply a convention, are consequently differences
relating to its application. 448
In this passa§e, which has been cited and applied on many
occasions,44 the Court was using the term "reparation"
in its most general sense. It was rejecting a Polish argument
that jurisdiction to interpret and apply a treaty did
not entail jurisdiction to deal with disputes over the form
and quantum of reparation to be made. By that stage of the
dispute, Germany was no longer seeking for its national
the return of the factory in question or of the property
seized with it.
to the British Naval Commanders to molest no German merchantmen in
places not in the vicinity of the seat of war", Martens, op. cit. (footnote
441 above), vol. XXIX, p. 456 at p. 486.
447 In the Trail Smelter case (see footnote 253 above), the arbitral
tribunal specified measures to be adopted by the Trail Smelter, including
measures designed to "prevent future significant fumigations in
the United States" (p. 1934). Requests to modify or repeal legislation
are frequently made by international bodies. See, e.g., the decisions of
the Human Rights Committee: Torres Ramirez v. Uruguay, decision of
23 July 1980, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth
Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/35/4O), p. 126, para. 19; Lanza v.
Uruguay, decision of 3 April 1980, ibid., p. 119, para. 17; and Dermit
Barbato v. Uruguay, decision of21 October 1982, ibid., Thirty-eighth
Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/38/4O), p. 133, para. 11.
448 Factory at Chorzow, Jurisdiction (see footnote 34 above).
449 Cf. the ICJ reference to this decision in LaGrand, Judgment
(footnote 119 above), p. 485, para. 48.
(2) In a subsequent phase of the same case, the Court
went on to specify in more detail the content of the obligation
of reparation. It said:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal
act-a principle which seems to be established by international practice
and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation
must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this
is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment
in place of it-such are the principles which should serve to determine
the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international
law.450
In the first sentence, the Court gave a general definition of
reparation, emphasizing that its function was the re-establishment
of the situation affected by the breach.451 In the
second sentence, it dealt with that aspect ofreparation encompassed
by "compensation" for an unlawful act-that
is, restitution or its value, and in addition damages for loss
sustained as a result of the wrongful act.
(3) The obligation placed on the responsible State by
article 31 is to make "full reparation" in the Factory at
Chorz6w sense. In other words, the responsible State must
endeavour to "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability,
have existed if that act had not been committed"452
through the provision of one or more of the forms ofreparation
set out in chapter II of this part.
(4) The general obligation of reparation is formulated
in article 31 as the immediate corollary of a State's responsibility,
i.e. as an obligation of the responsible State
resulting from the breach, rather than as a right of an injured
State or States. This formulation avoids the difficulties
that might arise where the same obligation is owed
simultaneously to several, many or all States, only a few
of which are specially affected by the breach. But quite
apart from the questions raised when there is more than
one State entitled to invoke responsibility,453 the general
obligation of reparation arises automatically upon commission
of an internationally wrongful act and is not, as
such, contingent upon a demand or protest by any State,
even if the form which reparation should take in the circumstances
may depend on the response of the injured
State or States.
(5) The responsible State's obligation to make full reparation
relates to the "injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act". The notion of "injury", defined in paragraph
2, is to be understood as including any damage
caused by that act. In particular, in accordance with paragraph
2, "injury" includes any material or moral damage
caused thereby. This formulation is intended both as inclusive,
covering both material and moral damage broadly
understood, and as !imitative, excluding merely abstract
concerns or general interests of a State which is individu-
45° Factory at Chorzow, Merits (see footnote 34 above), p. 47.
451 Cf. P.-M. Dupuy, "Le fait generateur de la responsabilite internationale
des Etats", Collected Courses ... 1984-V (Dordrecht, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1986), vol. 188, p. 9, at p. 94, who uses the term restauration.
452 Factory at Chorzow, Merits (see footnote 34 above), p. 47.
453 For the States entitled to invoke responsibility, see articles 42
and 48 and commentaries. For the situation where there is a plurality of
injured States, see article 46 and commentary.
Annex 254

ANNEX255

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
-v-
AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL,
aka "Abu Omran,"
(Counts 1-46)
ALI AL-HOURI,
• (Counts 1-46)
HANI AL-SAYEGH,
(Counts 1-46)
IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB,
(Counts 1-46)
ABDEL KARIM AL-NASSER,
(Counts 1-46)
MUST AF A AL-QASSAB,
(Counts 1-46)
SA'ED AL-BAHAR,
(Counts 1-5)
ABDALLAH AL-JARASH,
(Counts 1-46)
HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS,
(Counts 1-46)
ALI Af:,-MARHOUN,
(Counts 1-5)
SALEH RAMADAN,
(Counts 1-5)
MUSTAFA AL-MU'ALEM,
(Counts 1-5)
FADEL AL-ALA WE, and
(Counts 1-5)
JOHN DOE, further described as a Lebanese
male, approximately 175 cm tall, with fair skin,
fair hair, and green eyes,
(Counts 1-46)
Defendants.
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CRIMINAL NO: 01-2.ZB-A
Conspiracy to Kill United States Nationals
(18 u.s.c. § 2332(b))
(Count One)
Conspiracy to Murder United States Employees
(18 U.S.C.ᤤ 1114, 1117)
(Count Two)
Conspiracy to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction
Against United States Nationals
(18 U.S.C. §§ 2332a(a)(l), (a)(3))
(Count Three)
Conspiracy to Destroy Property of United States
(18 U.S.C. § 844(n))
(Count Four)
Conspiracy to Attack National Defense Premises
(18 u.s.c. § 2155(b))
(Count Five)
Bombing Resulting in Death
(18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f)(l), (f)(3))
(Count Six)
Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Against United
States Nationals
(18 u.s.c; §§ 2332a(a)(l), (a)(3))
(Count Seven)
Murder While Using Destructive Device During
Crime ofViolence
(18 u.s.c. § 924(j))
(Counts Eight through Twenty-Six)
Annex 255
'
) Murder of Federal Employees
) (18 U.S.C. §§ ll 11, 1114)
} (Counts Twenty-Seven through Forty-Five)
)
) Attempted Murder of Federal Employees
) (18 U.S.C. §§ ll 13, ll 14)
) (Count Forty-Six)
INDICTMENT
June 2001 TERM-AT ALEXANDRIA
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT:
COUNT ONE
Conspiracy to Kill United States Nationals
Introduction
Saudi Hizballah
1. From some time in the 1980s until the date of the filing of this Indictment,
Hizballah, or ''Party of God," was the name used by a number of related terrorist organizations
operating in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Bahrain, among other places. These Hizballah
organizations were inspired, supported, and directed by elements of the Iranian government.
Saudi Hizballah, also known as Hizballah Al-Hijaz, was a terrorist organization that operated
primarily in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and that promoted, among other things, the use of
violence against nationals and property of the United States located in Saudi Arabia. Because
Saudi Hizballah was an outlaw organization in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its members
frequently met and trained in Lebanon, Syria, or Iran.
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Annex 255
2. A regular gathering place for members of Saudi Hizballah was the Sayyeda
Zeinab shrine in Damascus, Syria, which was an important religious site for adherents of the
Shi'ite branch oflslam. Saudi Hizballah drew its members primarily from among young men of
the Shi'ite faith who resided in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, near the Persian Gulf.
Those young men would :frequently have their first contact with Saudi Hizballah during religious
pilgrimages to the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine. There, they would be approached by Saudi Hizballah
members to gauge their loyalty to Iran and dislike for the government of Saudi Arabia. Young
men who wished to join Saudi Hizballah then would be transported to Hizballah-controlled areas
in Lebanon for military training and indoctrination.
The Defendants
3. Saudi Hizballah organized itself into departments, or ''wings," each headed by a
Hizballah member and each reporting to the leader of Saudi Hizballah, ABDEL KARIM ALNASSER.
4. The "military wing" of Saudi Hizballah was headed at all relevant times by
AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL, aka .. Abu Omran," a native of Qatif, in the Eastern Province of
Saudi Arabia. In his role as military commander, AL-MUGHASSIL was in charge of directing
terrorist attacks against American interests in Saudi Arabia. AL-MUGHASSIL was actively
involved in recruiting young Saudi Shi'ite men to join the ranks ofHizballah; arranging for those
men to undergo military training at Hizballah camps in Lebanon and Iran; directing those men in
surveillance of potential targets for attack by Hizballah; and planning and supervising terrorist
attacks.
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Annex 255
5. ALI AL-HOURI was a member of Saudi Hizballah who served as a major
recruiter for the Hizballah party; scheduled party functions; and transported explosives for the
party. He also acted as a liaison for the party with the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria, which
was an important source of logistics and support for Saudi Hizballah members traveling to and
from Lebanon. AL-HOURI was a close associate of AL-MUGHASSIL and participated directly
in surveillance, planning, and execution of terrorist attacks.
6. HANI AL-SAYEGH was a prominent member of Saudi Hizballah. He was
actively involved in recruiting young Saudi Shi'ite men to join the ranks of Hizballah; arranging
for those men to undergo military training at Hizballah camps in Lebanon and Iran; assisting in
the surveillance of potential targets for attack by Hizballah; and carrying out terrorist attacks. ALSAYEGH
also spoke fluent Farsi and enjoyed an unusually close association with certain military
elements of the Iranian government
7. IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB was a prominent member of Saudi Hizballah,
actively involved in recruiting young Saudi Shi'ite men to join Hizballah, and in planning and
carrying out terrorist attacks. He also served as a liaison between Saudi Hizballah and the
Lebanese and Iranian Hizballah organizations.
8. MUSTAFA AL-QASSAB was a Shi'ite Muslim from Qatif, Saudi Arabia. He
joined Saudi Hizballah in the late 1980s after traveling from Saudi Arabia to Iran and meeting
AL-MUGHASSIL and others. Over time, AL-QASSAB came to play an important role in the
military affairs of Saudi Hizballah.
9. SA'ED AL-BAHAR was a Qatif native who first became associated with
Hizballah in 1988, when AL-YACOUB arranged for him to travel to Iran for religious study. He
4
Annex 255
also spent time with AL-YACOUB in Damascus. In Damascus, he met and became close friends
with AL-SAYEGH, who introduced him both to Hizballah and to elements of the Iranian
government. In Qom, Iran during 1989 or 1990, he also met AL-HOURI, who accompanied him
to military training sponsored by the Iranian government in southern Iran.
10. ABDALLAH AL-JARASH was recruited into Hizballah at the Sayyeda
Zeinab shrine in Damascus. At the time of his recruitment, AL-JARASH met AL-MUGHASSil..,
AL-HOURI, AL-YACOUB, and AL-SAYEGH, all of whom were important party members. ALJARASH
learned that, as a member of Hizballah, he would need to be loyal to the party and to
Iran; he also l~ed that the goal of the party was to target foreign interests, American in
particular, in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. In about 1989, AL-JARASH was sent to Lebanon in a
Mercedes supplied by the Iranian embassy in Damascus for military training provided by
Lebanese Hizballah members. After being trained, he was assigned to recruit others who felt a
strong connection to Iran.
11. HUSSEIN AL-MUGIDS was a native of Qatif, Saudi Arabia who came into
contact with Hizballah in about 1990, when he traveled to the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus
and met AL-MUGHASSil.., AL-HOURI, and AL-SAYEGH, among others. With ALMUGHASSil..'
s support, AL-MUGms underwent religious training in Qom, Iran, where he met
AL-YACOUB. Then, in about 1992, AL-MUGHASSil.. arranged for AL-MUGIDS to spend two
weeks in Lebanon receiving weapons and explosives training. At that time, he filled out a
Hizballah membership form provided by AL-MUGHASSil.._ and learned that Hizballah Hijaz and
Lebanese Hizballah were both part of Iranian Hizballah. After this training, AL-MUGHASSil..
directed AL-MUGIDS to secretly recruit others for Hizballah.
5
Annex 255
12. ALI AL-MARHOUN was another Shi'ite Muslim from the town ofQatifin
Eastern Saudi Arabia. His first contact with the organization came in about 1991, when he met
AL-YACOUB at the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus. After AL-MARHOUN discovered that
both he and AL-YACOUB wished to be martyrs for Islam, AL-YACOUB introduced ALMARHOUN
to AL-MUGHASSll.,, who arranged for AL-MARHOUN to travel to Lebanon for
Hizballah training and indoctrination.
13. SALEH RAMADAN and MUSTAFA MU' ALEM were recruited into Saudi
Hizballah in approximately 1992 by AL-MARHOUN, whom they knew from their common
hometown of Qatif, Saudi Arabia. RAMADAN was chosen because he was very religious and a
great admirer of Ayatollah Khomeini, the former Supreme Leader of Iran. Both RAMADAN and
AL-MU' ALEM agreed to join Hizballah and form a "cell" under AL-MARHOUN. After being
recruited by AL-MARHOUN, RAMADAN and AL-MU' ALEM traveled to Lebanon for military
training, where they met AL-MUGHASSll.,, who had them fill out written applications for
Hizballah membership.
14. FADEL AL-ALA WE was a Qatif native who joined Hizballah in about 1992
at the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus. He was recruited by AL-QASSAB, who introduced
him to AL-MUGHASSIL. Shortly thereafter, AL-MUGHASSIL arranged for AL-ALA WE to
undergo military training in Lebanon.
15. JOHN DOE was a member of Lebanese Hizballah who assisted Saudi
Hizballah with the construction of the tanker truck bomb used to attack the American military
residences at Khobar Towers. He is described as a Lebanese male, approximately 175 cm tall,
with fair skin, fair hair, and green eyes.
6
Annex 255
Hizballah Seeks a Target
16. In about 1993, AL-MUGHASSIL instructed AL-QASSAB, AL-YACOUB,
and AL-HOURI to begin surveillance of Americans in Saudi Arabia. As a result, AL-QASSAB
and AL-YACOUB spent three months in Riyadh conducting surveillance of American targets.
AL-SAYEGH joined them during this operation. They produced reports, which were passed to
AL-MUGHASSIL, then on to Saudi Hizballah chief AL-NASSER, and to officials in Iran. At the
end of their mission, AL-MUGHASSIL came in person to meet with them and review their work.
17. Also in about 1993, AL-YACOUB assigned AL-JARASH to conduct
surveillance of the United States Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and to determine where
Americans went and where they lived. Also at AL-YACOUB's direction, AL-JARASH and ALMARHOUN
conducted surveillance of a fish market frequented by Americans, located near the
U.S. Embassy in Riyadh. They reported the results of their surveillance to AL-YACOUB.
18. In early 1994, AL-QASSAB began conducting surveillance, focusing on
American and other foreign sites in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, an area that includes
Khobar. He prepared written reports, which were passed to AL-NASSER and Iranian officials.
19. In about Fall 1994, AL-MARHOUN, RAMADAN, and AL-MU' ALEM began
watching American sites in Eastern Saudi Arabia at AL-MUGHASSIL's direction. They passed
their reports to AL-MUGHASSIL, who was then spending most of his time in Beirut, Lebanon.
At about the same time, AL-BAHAR began conducting surveillance in Saudi Arabia at the
direction of an Iranian military officer.
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Annex 255
Discovery: of the Americans at Khobar Towers
20. Khobar Towers was a housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which the
United States, among other countries, used to house military personnel assigned to Saudi Arabia.
Building # 131 was an eight-story structure within the Khobar Towers complex that United States
Air Force personnel, among others, used as their place of residence while serving in Saudi Arabia.
21. In late 1994, after extensive surveillance in Eastern Saudi Arabia, ALMARHOUN,
RAMADAN, and AL-MU' ALEM recognized and confirmed Khobar Towers as an
important American military location and communicated that fact to AL-MUGHASSIL. Shortly
thereafter, AL-MUGHASSIL gave RAMADAN money to find a storage site in the Eastern
Province for explosives. During the course of the cell's surveillance, AL-MUGHASSIL reported
to AL-MARHOUN that he had received a phone call from a high Iranian government official
inquiring about the progress of their surveillance activity.
The Surveillance Continues
22. In 1995, AL-BAHAR and AL-SAYEGH conducted surveillance at the
direction of an Iranian military officer of the area of Jizan, Saudi Arabia, located on the Red Sea
near Yemen; they also surveilled American sites in the Eastern Province. Their goal was to gather
information to support future attacks against Americans. AL-SAYEGH took their surveillance
reports and passed them to the Iranian officer.
23. In about April or May 1995, AL-MARHOUN attended four days oflive-fire
drills sponsored by Hizballah in Lebanon. While he was there, he met with AL-MUGHASSIL at
his Beirut apartment. During that meeting, AL-MUGHASSIL explained to AL-MARHOUN that
Hizballah's goal was to expel the Americans from Saudi Arabia. AL-MUGHASSIL also
8
Annex 255
explained that he had close ties to Iranian officials, who supplied him with money and gave him
directions for the party. AL-MUGHASSIL then gave AL-MARHOUN $2000 in $100 United
States bills to support AL-MARHOUN's cell in their surveillance activity in Saudi Arabia. ALMARHOUN
used the money to finance a trip to Riyadh with RAMADAN to look for American
sites.
Planning the Khobar Attack
24. In about June 1995, the Hizballah cell composed of AL-MARHOUN,
RAMADAN, and AL-MU' ALEM began regular surveillance of K.hobar Towers at ALMUGHASSIL's
direction. Shortly thereafter, RAMADAN traveled to Beirut to brief ALMUGHASSIL,
who instructed the cell to continue surveillance.
25. At about the same time in 1995 that RAMADAN went to Beirut to update ALMUGHASSIL
on surveillance activities, AL-ALA WE was summoned to Beirut by ALMUGHASSIL.
Although AL-ALA WE did not see RAMADAN, he noticed surveillance reports
from RAMADAN on AL-MUGHASSIL's desk. During their meeting, AL-MUGHASSIL
explained to AL-ALA WE that explosives were going to be used against Americans in Saudi
Arabia and he instructed AL-ALA WE to drive a vehicle he said contained explosives from
Lebanon to Saudi Arabia AL-ALA WE did so, only to discover that the car held no explosives;
AL-MUGHASSIL explained that he had only been testing him.
26. In about October 1995, an unknown man visited AL-ALA WE at his home in
Eastern Saudi Arabia and d.elivered a map of Khobar, saying AL-MUGHASSIL wanted ALALA
WE to check its accuracy. A short time later, the same man retrieved the map and left a
package weighing about one kilogram. AL-ALA WE kept the package until AL-MUGHASSIL
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Annex 255
called and told him to deliver it to another man unknown to him. AL-ALA WE did as instructed
and did not look inside the package.
27. In the late fall of 1995, RAMADAN brought more surveillance reports to ALMUGHASSIL
in Beirut. It was then that RAMADAN, AL-MARHOUN, and AL-MU' ALEM
learned from AL-MUGHASSIL that Hizballah would attack Khobar Towers, using a tanker truck
loaded with a mixture of explosives and gasoline.
28. At the end of 1995 or the beginning of 1996, RAMADAN again returned to
Beirut, where he and AL-MUGHASSIL again discussed the planned tanker truck attack on
Khobar Towers and the fact that RAMADAN, AL-MARHOUN, and AL-MU' ALEM would each
have a role in the attack. AL-MUGHASSIL said they would need enough explosives to destroy a
row of buildings and that the attack was to serve Iran by driving the Americans out of the Gulf
region.
29. In January or February 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL traveled to Qatif, in the
Eastern Province, and instructed AL-MARHOUN to find places to hide explosives. In about
February, at AL-MUGHASSIL's direction, RAMADAN met AL-MUGHASSIL in Beirut and
drove back to Saudi Arabia with a car loaded with hidden explosives. He delivered the car to a
man in Qatif who wore a veil over his face.
The Spring 1996 Arrests
30. In March 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL summoned AL-ALA WE to Beirut and
again outfitted him with a car that was to contain explosives. AL-ALA WE drove the car from
Lebanon, through Syria and Jordan, to the Al-Haditha border crossing in northern Saudi Arabia.
There, on March 28, 1996, Saudi border guards discovered 38 kilograms of plastic explosives
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Annex 255
hidden in the car and arrested AL-ALA WE. Saudi investigators then arrested AL-MARHOUN,
AL-MU'ALEM, and RAMADAN on April 6, 7, and 8, 1996, respectively.
Al-Mugbassil Finds Re.placements
31. After the arrests of AL-ALA WE and the AL-MARHOUN cell, ALMUGHASSIL
went back to Saudi Arabia in April or May 1996 to continue the planning for the
K.hobar attack. On or about May 1, 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL appeared unannounced at ALJARASH's
home in Qatif, explaining that he had come as part of a pilgrimage and was traveling
on a false passport. AL-MUGHASSIL told AL-JARASH of the plot to bomb K.hobar Towers,
gave him a forged Iranian passport, and asked for his help. He told AL-JARASH that ALALA
WE and AL-MARHOUN had been arrested. He also showed him a map ofKhobar and
described a plan in which AL-HOURI and AL-QASSAB would be involved; he told ALJARASH
to be ready for a call to action at any time.
32. Three days later, on about May 4, 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL showed up
unannounced at AL-MUGIDS's home in Qatif to tell him of a plan to attack an Americ31! housing
complex. AL-MUGHASSIL explained that AL-JARASH, AL-HOURI, AL-SAYEGH and a
Lebanese Hizballah member would help. AL-MUGHASSIL then gave AL-MUGlllS a timing
device to hide at his home.
33. Also during the first half of 1996, AL-HOURI arrived at AL-MUGIDS's home
on at least two occasions and enlisted AL-MUGIDS's help in hiding large amounts of explosives.
They buried 50-kilo bags and paint cans filled with explosives at various sites around Qatif, near
K.hobar.
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Annex 255
Building the Bomb
34. In early June 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL and the Lebanese Hizballah member,
JOHN DOE, started staying at AL-MUGIDS's home in Qatif. Also in early June, a conspirator
purchased a tanker truck from a car dealership in Saudi Arabia, using stolen identification. The
conspirator paid about 75,000 Saudi riyals for the truck. Over the next two weeks, the
conspirators worked at a farm in the Qatif area to convert the tanker truck into a large truck bomb.
Present at the farm were AL-MUGHASSIL, AL-HOURI, AL-SAYEGH, AL-QASSAB, and
JOHN DOE. AL-MUGHIS assisted by returning the timing device and retrieving hidden
explosives, while AL-JARASH supplied tools and wire to the group. During the bomb
construction, AL-MUGHASSIL also discussed plans to bomb the United States Consulate in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
35. Between June 7 and June 17, 1996, key members of the conspiracy attended a
meeting at the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus. Present were AL-NASSER, ALMUGHASSIL,
AL-HOURI, AL-YACOUB, AL-SAYEGH, AL-QASSAB, and other highranking
Saudi Hizballah leaders. At that meeting, AL-NASSER, the head of Saudi Hizballah,
discussed the bombing with, among others, AL-MUGHASSIL, AL-HOURI, AL-YACOUB, ALSA
YEGH, and AL-QASSAB; AL-NASSER also confirmed that AL-MUGHASSIL was in charge
of the Khobar attack.
The Khobar Attack
36. On the evening of June 25, 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL, AL-HOURI, ALSA
YEGH, AL-QASSAB, AL-JARASH, and AL-MUGIDS met at the farm in Qatif to review
final preparations for the attack that evening. The group then executed the bombing plan.
12
Annex 255
3 7. Shortly before 10:00 p.m. on the evening of June 25, 1996, AL-SAYEGH
drove a Datsun with AL-JARASH as his passenger. The Datsllll entered the parking lot adjoining
Khobar Towers building # 131 as a scout vehicle and parked in the far comer. Next to enter the
parking lot was the getaway car, a white four-door Chevrolet Caprice that AL-JARASH had
borrowed froni an acquaintance. The Datsun containing AL-SAYEGH and AL-JARASH
signaled that all was clear by blinking its lights. With that, the bomb truck, driven by ALMUGHASSIL,
with AL-HOURI as passenger, entered the lot and backed against a fence just in
front of Khobar Towers building# 131. After parking the truck, AL-MUGHASSIL and ALHOURI
quickly exited and entered the back seat of the white Caprice, which drove away from the
lot, followed by the Datsun from the comer. Within minutes, the truck bomb exploded,
devastating the north side of building# 131, which was occupied by American military personnel.
The explosion killed nineteen members of the United States Air Force and wo1U1ded 372 other
Americans.
The Conspirators Flee and Al-Sayegh Obstructs
38. As planned, the attack leaders immediately left the Khobar area and Saudi
Arabia using a variety of false passports .. Only AL-JARASH.and AL-MUGIIlS remained behind
in their hometown of Qatif. AL-SAYEGH reached Canada in August 1996, where he remained
until his arrest by Canadian authorities in March 1997. In May 1997, AL-SAYEGH met with
Americ:an investigators at bis request. Among other things, AL-SAYEGH falsely denied
knowledge of the Khobar Towers attack and falsely described a purported estrangement between
Saudi Hizballah and elements of the Iranian government. After he was removed to the United
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Annex 255
States in June 1997 on his promise to assist American investigators, AL-SAYEGH reneged on
that promise and unsuccessfully sought political asylum in the United States.
The Charge
39. From at least 1988 until the filing of this Indictment, in Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Lebanon, Iran, Jordan, and elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district,
AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL, aka ''Abu Omran," ALI AL-HOURI, HANI AL-SAYEGH,
IBRAIDM AL-YACOUB, ABDEL KARIM AL-NASSER, MUST AF A AL-QASSAB, SA'ED
AL-BAHAR, ABDALLAH AL-JARASH, HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS, ALI AL-MARHOUN,
SALEH RAMADAN, MUSTAFA AL-MU' ALEM, FADEL AL-ALA WE, and JOHN DOE,
defendants, at least one of whom was first brought to and arrested in the Eastern District of
Virginia, together with other members and associates of Hizballah and others known and
unknown to the Grand Jury, while outside the United States, wilfully and knowingly combined,
conspired, confederated and agreed to murder nationals of the United States, unlawfully and with
malice aforethought, as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 111 l(a).
40. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that the defendants, and others
known and unknown, would and did: (i) murder United States nationals in Saudi Arabia; and (ii)
kill United States nationals employed by the United States military who were serving in their
official capacity on the Saudi Arabian peninsula.
Overt Acts
41. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its illegal objects, the following
overt acts, among others, were committed:
a. In about the late 1980s, AL-QASSAB joined Saudi Hizballah.
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b. In about 1988 or 1989, AL-BAHAR.joined Saudi Hizballah.
c. In about 1988 or 1989, AL-JARASHjoined Saudi Hizballah.
d. In about 1990, AL-MUGHIS joined Saudi Hizballah.
e. In about 1991, AL-MARHOUN joined Saudi Hizballah.
f. In about 1992, RAMADAN joined Saudi Hizballah.
g. In about 1992, AL-MU'ALEMjoined Saudi Hizballah.
h. In about 1992, AL-ALA WE joined Saudi Hizballah.
i. In about 1993, AL-MUGHASSIL instructed AL-QASSAB, AL-YACOUB, and
AL-HOURI to start surveillance of Americans in Saudi Arabia.
j. In about 1993, AL-QASSAB, AL-YACOUB, and AL-SAYEGH conducted
surveillance of American targets in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
k. In about 1993, AL-YACOUB assigned AL-JARASH to conduct surveillance of
the United States Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and instructed him to determine where
,Americans went and where they lived.
L In about 1993, at AL-YACOUB 's direction, AL-JARASH and AL-MARHOUN
conducted surveillance of a fish market frequented by Americans, located near the U.S. Embassy
in Riyadh.
m. In early 1994, AL-QASSAB began conducting surveillance focusing on
American and other foreign sites in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.
n. In about the fall of 1994, AL-MARHOUN, RAMADAN, and AL-MU' ALEM,
working as a group, began watching American sites in Eastern Saudi Arabia at ALMUGHASSIL
's direction.
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o. In about the fall of 1994, AL-BAHAR began conducting surveillance in Saudi
Arabia at the direction of an Iranian military officer.
p. In late 1994, following extensive surveillance in Eastern Saudi Arabia, ALMARHOUN,
RAMADAN, and AL-MU' ALEM recognized and confirmed Khobar Towers as an
important American military location and communicated that fact to AL-MUGHASSIL.
q. In late 1994 or early 1995, AL-MUGHASSIL gave RAMADAN money to find
a storage site in the Eastern Province for explosives.
r. In 1995, AL-BAHAR and HANI AL-SAYEGH conducted surveillance at the
direction of an Ipmian military officer of the area of Jizan, Saudi Arabia.
s. In 1995, AL-BAHAR and HANI AL-SAYEGH conducted surveillance of
American sites in the Eastern Province.
t. In about April or May 1995, AL-MARHOUN met in Beirut with ALMUGHASSIL,
who gave AL-MARHOUN $2000 in $100 United States bills to support ALMARHOUN's
cell in their surveillance activity in Saudi Arabia.
u. In about June 1995, the Hizballah cell composed of AL-MARHOUN,
RAMADAN, and AL-MU' ALEM began intense surveillance of Khobar Towers at ALMUGHASSIL's
direction.
v. In about mid-1995, RAMADAN traveled to Beirut to brief AL-MUGHASSIL,
who instructed the cell to continue surveillance.
w. In about October 1995, an unknown man visited AL-ALA WE at his home in
Eastern Saudi Arabia and delivered a map of Khobar from AL-MUGHASSIL.
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x. In about the second half of 1995, AL-ALA WE met with AL-MUGHASSIL in
Beirut.
y. In about the second half of 1995, AL-ALA WE drove a car for ALMUGHASSIL
from Beirut to Saudi Arabia.
z. In about the late fall of 1995, RAMADAN brought more surveillance reports to
AL-MUGHASSIL in Beirut.
aa. At about the end of 1995 or the beginning of 1996, RAMADAN returned to
Beirut, where he and AL-MUGHASSIL met.
bb. In about January or February 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL traveled to Qatif, in the
Eastern Province, and instructed AL-MARHOUN to find places to hide explosives.
cc. In about February 1996, at AL-MUGHASSIL's direction, RAMADAN met
AL-MUGHASSIL in Beirut and drove back to Saudi Arabia with a car loaded with hidden
explosives.
dd. In March 1996, AL-ALA WE drove a car containing 38 kilograms of plastic
explosives for AL-MUGHASSIL from Beirut to Saudi Arabia.
ee. On or about May 1, 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL appeared at AL-JARASH's
home in Qatif to discuss a plan to attack K.hobar Towers.
ff. On or about May 4, 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL appeared at AL-MUGIIlS's home
in Qatif to discuss a plan to attack K.hobar Towers.
gg. In about the first half of 1996, AL-HOURI and AL-MUGIIlS hid explosives
around Qatif.
17
Annex 255
hh. In early June 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL and JOHN DOE started staying at ALMUGHIS'
s home in Qatif.
ii. In early June 1996, a conspirator purchased a tanker truck from a Saudi car
dealer for about 75,000 Saudi riyals.
jj. In early June 1996, the tanker truck was converted into a bomb at a farm near
Qatif.
kk. At some time between June 7 and June 17, 1996, AL-NASSER presided over
a meeting at the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus, Syria concerning the Khobar Towers attack.
11. On the evening of June 25, 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL, AL-HOURI, ALSA
YEGH, AL-QASSAB, AL-JARASH, and AL-MUGHIS met to review final preparations for
the attack that evening.
mm. On the evening of June 25, 1996, AL-SAYEGH drove a Datsun into the
parking lot adjoining Khobar Towers building# 131.
nn. On the evening of June 25, 1996, AL-MUGHASSIL, with AL-HOURI as
passenger, parked a tanker truck bomb against a fence in front of Khobar Towers building # 131.
oo. At about 10:00 p.m. on June 25, 1996, a truck bomb exploded next to Khobar
Towers building #131.
pp. In or about August 1996, AL-SAYEGH arrived in Canada.
qq. In or about May 1997, AL-SAYEGH met in Ottawa, Canada with American
investigators.
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Annex 255
rr. In or about June 1997, AL-SAYEGH arrived at Dulles Airport, in the Eastern
District of Virginia.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332(b).)
COUNTTWO
Conspiracy to Murder Employees of the United States
42. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 are repeated.
43. From at least 1988 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, in Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Jordan, and elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular state
or district, AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL, aka "Abu Omran,'' ALI AL-HOURI, RANI ALSA
YEGH, IBRJ\HIM AL-YACOUB, ABDEL KARIM AL-NASSER, MUSTAFA ALQASSAB,
SA'ED AL-BAHAR, ABDALLAH AL-JARASH, HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS, ALI ALMARHOUN,
SALEH RAMADAN, MUSTAFA AL-MU' ALEM, FADEL AL-ALA WE, and
JOHN DOE, defendants, at least one of whom was first brought to and arrested in the Eastern
District of Virginia, together with other members and associates of Hizballah and others known
and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired,
confederated and agreed unlawfully to kill officers and employees of the United States and
agencies and branches thereof, while such officers and employees were engaged in, and on
account of, the performance of their official duties, and persons assisting such employees in the
performance of their duties, in violation of Section 1114 of Title 18, United States Code,
including members of the American military stationed in Saudi Arabia.
19
Annex 255
Overt Acts
44. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its objects, the defendants, and
others known and unknown to the grand jury, committed the overt acts set forth in Count One of
this Indictment, which are fully incorporated by reference.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1114 and 1117.)
COUNT THREE
Coll§Piracy to Use Weapons of Mass
Destruction Against Nationals of the United States
45. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 are repeated.
46. From at least 1988 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, in Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Jordan, and elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular state
or district, AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL, aka "Abu Omran," ALI AL-HOURI, HANI ALSA
YEGH, IBRAIIlM AL-YACOUB, ABDEL KARIM AL-NASSER, MUST AF A ALQASSAB,
SA'ED AL-BAHAR, ABDALLAH AL-JARASH, HUSSEIN AL-MUGIDS, ALI ALMARHOUN,
SALEH RAMADAN, MUSTAFA AL-MU' ALEM, FADEL AL-ALA WE, and
JOHN DOE, defendants, at least one of whom was first brought to and arrested in the Eastern
District of Virginia, together with other members and associates ofHizballah and others known
and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired,
confederated and agreed to use weapons of mass destruction, namely, bombs, without lawful
authority against nationals of the United States while such nationals were outside the United
20
Annex 255
District of Virginia, together with other members and associates ofHizballah and others known
and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired,
confederated and agreed unlawfully to maliciously damage and destroy, and attempt to damage
and destroy, by means of fire and explosives, buildings, vehicles and other personal and real
property in whole or in part owned and possessed by, and leased to, the United States and
departments and agencies thereof, and as a result of such conduct directly and proximately caused
the deaths of at least nineteen persons, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections
844(t)(1) and (t)(3).
Overt Acts
51. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its objects, the defendants, and
others known and unknown to the grand jury, committed the overt acts set forth in Count One of
this Indictment, which are fully incorporated by reference.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 844(n), 844(t)(1) and 844(t)(3).)
COUNT FIVE
Conspiracy to Attack National Defense Premises
52. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 are repeated.
53. From at least 1988 until the date of the filing of this Indictment, in Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Jordan, and elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular state
or district, AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL, aka .. Abu Omran," ALI AL-HOURI, HANI ALSA
YEGH, IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB, ABDEL KARIM AL-NASSER, MUSTAFA ALQASSAB,
SA'ED AL-BAHAR, ABDALLAH AL-JARASH, HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS, ALI AL-
22
Annex 255
MARHOUN, SALEH RAMADAN, MUST AF A AL-MU' ALEM, FADEL AL-ALA WE, and
JOHN DOE, defendants, at least one of whom was first brought to and arrested in the Eastern
District of Virginia, together with other members and associates ofHizballah and others known
and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired,
confederated and agreed to injure and destroy, and to attempt to injure and destroy, nationaldefense
premises, with intent to injure, interfere with, and obstruct the national defense of the
United States.
Overt Acts
54. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to effect its objects, the defendants, and
others known and unknown to the grand jury, committed the overt acts set forth in Count One of
this Indictment, which are fully incorporated by reference.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2155(a) and (b).)
COUNT SIX
Bombing of Khobar Towers Resulting in Death
55. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 are repeated.
56. On or about June 25, 1996, in Saudi Arabia, and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular state or district, AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL, aka "Abu Omran," ALI AL-HOURI,
HANI AL-SAYEGH, IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB, ABDEL KARIM AL-NASSER, MUSTAFA
AL-QASSAB, ABDALLAH AL-JARASH, HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS, and JOHN DOE,
defendants, at least one of whom was first brought to and arrested in the Eastern District of
Virginia, aided and abetted by one another and by other members and associates of Hizballah and
23
Annex 255
others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did
maliciously damage and destroy, by means of fire and explosives, buildings, vehicles and other
personal and real property in whole and in part owned and possessed by, and leased to, the United
States and departments and agencies thereof, to wit, the defendants, together with other members
and associates of Hizballah, detonated an explosive device that damaged and destroyed Khobar
Towers building # 131, and as a result of such conduct directly and proximately caused the deaths
of at least nineteen people.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 844(f)(l), 844(f)(3) and 2.)
COUNT SEVEN
Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Against Nationals of the United States in Saudi Arabia
57. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 are repeated.
58. On or about June 25, 1996, in Saudi Arabia, and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular state or district, AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL, aka "Abu Omran," ALI AL-HOURI,
HANI AL-SAYEGH, IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB, ABDEL KARIM AL-NASSER, MUSTAFA
AL-QASSAB, ABDALLAH AL-JARASH, HUSSEIN AL-MUGlllS, and JOHN DOE,
defendants, at least one of whom was first brought to and arrested in the Eastern District of
Virginia, aided and abetted by one another and by other members and associates of Hizballah and
others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, wilfully, knowingly, and without lawful authority,
did use a weapon of mass destruction against nationals of the United States while such nationals
were outside of the United States, and against property that was owned, leased and used by the
24
Annex 255
United States, and by departments and agencies of the United States, to wit, the defendants
attacked with a bomb the residence of American military personnel at Khobar Towers, and
employees of the American Government stationed at this residence, which use of such weapon of
mass destruction resulted in the deaths of at least nineteen persons.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2332a(a)(l), 2332a(a)(3) and 2.)
COUNTS EIGHT THROUGH TWENTY-SIX
Murder While Using Destructive Device During Crime of Violence
59. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 are repeated.
60. On or about June 25, 1996, in Saudi Arabia, and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular state or district, AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL, aka "Abu Omran," ALI AL-HOURI,
HAN! AL-SAYEGH, IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB, ABDEL KARIM AL-NASSER, MUSTAFA
AL-QASSAB, ABDALLAH AL-JARASH, HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS, and JOHN DOE,
defendants, at least one of whom was first brought to and arrested in the Eastern District of
Virginia, aided and abetted by one another and by other members and associates ofHizballah and
others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, during and in relation to a crime of violence for
which the defendants may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, namely, Conspiracy to
Kill United States Nationals as charged in Count One of this Indictment, did knowingly use a
destructive device, and in the course of such use did commit murder as defined in Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1111, that is, the defendants unlawfully killed the persons listed below
through the use of a destructive device with malice aforethought, such murder being willful,
deliberate, malicious, and premeditated:
25
Annex 255
Count
EIGHT
NINE
TEN
ELEVEN
TWELVE
THIRTEEN
FOURTEEN
FIFTEEN
SIXTEEN
SEVENTEEN
EIGHTEEN
NINETEEN
TWENTY
TWENTY-ONE
TWENTY-TWO
TWENTY-THREE
TWENTY-FOUR
TWENTY-FIVE
Victim
Captain Christopher J. Adams
Staff Sergeant Daniel B. Cafourek
Sergeant Millard D. Campbell
Senior Airman Earl F. Cartrette, Jr.
Technical Sergeant Patrick P. Fennig
. Captain Leland T. Haun
Master Sergeant Michael G. Heiser
Staff Sergeant Kevin J. Johnson
Staff Sergeant Ronald L. King
Airman First Class Christopher B. Lester
Master Sergeant Kendall K. Kitson, Jr.
Airman First Class Brent W. Marthaler
Airman First Class Brian W. McVeigh
Airman First Class Peter J. Morgera
Technical Sergeant Thanh V. Nguyen
Airman First Class Joseph E. Rimkus
Senior Airman Jeremy A. Taylor
Airman First Class Justin R. Wood
TWENTY-SIX Airman First Class Joshua E. Woody.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 924(1) (formerly 924(i)), 924(c) and 2.)
26
Annex 255
COUNTS TWENTY-SEVEN THROUGH FORTY-FIVE
Murder of Employees of the United States
61. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 are repeated.
62. On or about June 25, 1996, in Saudi Arabia, and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular state or district, AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL, aka "Abu Omran," ALI AL-HOURI,
HANI AL-SAYEGH, IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB, ABDEL KARIM AL-NASSER, MUST AF A
AL-QASSAB, ABDALLAH AL-JARASH, HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS, and JOHN DOE,
defendants, at least one of whom was first brought to and arrested in the Eastern District of
Virginia, aided and abetted by one another and by other members and associates of Hizballah and
others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully, deliberately, and maliciously,
and with malice aforethought and premeditation, did murder officers and employees of the United
States Government in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111, while such officers
and employees were engaged in and on account of the performance of their official duties,
namely, the defendants caused the deaths of the following persons by bombing Khobar Towers in
Saudi Arabia:
Count
TWENTY-SEVEN
TWENTY-EIGHT
TWENTY-NINE
THIRTY
THIRTY-ONE
THIRTY-TWO
Victim ..
Captain Christopher J. Adams
Staff Sergeant Daniel B. Cafourek
Sergeant Millard D. Campbell
Senior Airman Earl F. Cartrette, Jr.
Technical Sergeant Patrick P. Fennig
Captain Leland T. Haun
27
Annex 255
THIRTY-THREE
THIRTY-FOUR
THIRTY-FIVE
THIRTY-SIX
THIRTY-SEVEN
THIRTY-EIGHT
THIRTY-NINE
FORTY
FORTY-ONE
FORTY-TWO
FORTY-THREE
FORTY-FOUR
Master Sergeant Michael G. Heiser
Staff Sergeant Kevin J. Johnson
Staff Sergeant Ronald L. King
Airman First Class Christopher B. Lester
Master Sergeant Kendall K. Kitson, Jr.
Airman First Class Brent W. Marthaler
Airman First Class Brian W. McVeigh
Airman First Class Peter J. Morgera
Technical Sergeant Thanh V. Nguyen
Airman First Class Joseph E. Rimkus
Senior Airman Jeremy A. Taylor
Airman First Class Justin R Wood
FORTY-FIVE Airman First Class Joshua E. Woody.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1111, 1114 and 2.)
COUNT FORTY-SIX
Attempted Murder of Employees of the United States
63. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 are repeated •.
64. On or about June 25, 1996, in Saudi Arabia, and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular state or district, AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL, aka "Abu Omran," ALI AL-HOURI,
HANI AL-SAYEGH, IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB, ABDEL KARIM AL-NASSER, MUSTAFA
AL-QASSAB, ABDALLAH AL-JARASH, HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS, and JOHN DOE,
28
Annex 255
defendants, at least one of whom was first brought to and arrested in the Eastern District of
Virginia, aided and abetted by one another and by other members and associates of Hizballah and
others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, deliberately, and maliciously, and with
malice aforethought and premeditation, did attempt to murder officers and employees of the
United States Govennnent in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111, while such
officers and employees were engaged in and on account of the performance of their official duties,
and persons assisting such United States Govennnent officers and employees in the performance
of such duties, and on account of that assistance, by bombing-Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1113, 1114 and 2.)
~~ NNETH E.MELsoN
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
29
Annex 255
ANNEX256

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
AG
THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2001
(202) 514-2007
WWW.USDOJ.GOV
TDD (202) 514-1888
ATTORNEY GENERAL STATEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. Attorney General John Ashcroft today released the following
statement regarding today's indictment in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing:
• "Today a federal grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia returned an indictment
charging fourteen individuals with murder, attempted murder of federal
employees, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to use a weapon of
mass destruction related to the June 25, 1996 terrorist bombing of the Khobar
Towers dormitory complex in Saudi Arabia. As a result of this terrorist act,
nineteen United States Airmen were killed and 372 Americans were wounded."
• "Named as defendants are the leader of the Saudi Hizballah terrorist
organization, as well as several prominent members, including the head of the
Saudi Hizballah's military wing, along with members of terrorist cells in
Saudi Arabia who planned and carried out the Khobar attack.
• "The indictment explains that the terrorist activities leading to the 1996
Khobar blast began as early as 1993, when members of Hizballah began
extensive surveillance to find American targets in Saudi Arabia.
• "In 1995, according to the indictment, the terrorists focused on Khobar
Towers, which housed U.S. Air Force personnel assigned to the Gulf region.
After amassing large amounts of plastic explosives, the terrorists, assisted
by an as-yet unidentified member of Lebanese Hizballah - referred to in the
indictment as "John Doe" - converted a tanker truck into a huge bomb. They
detonated that bomb near the north face of building #131 at Khobar Towers
shortly before 10 p.m. on June 25, 1996.
• "The indictment explains that elements of the Iranian government inspired,
supported, and supervised members of the Saudi Hizballah. In particular, the
indictment alleges that the charged defendants reported their surveillance
activities to Iranian officials and were supported and directed in those
activities by Iranian officials. This indictment does not name as defendants
individual members of the Iranian government.
• "Let me add at this point, that as always, every decision in this case has
been made under the normal standards we apply to every criminal case. The
only limitation on this case -- as with any criminal case -- is what we
believe we can prove in a court of law. While Federal District Court rules
prohibit my commenting on the evidence available to us at the present time, I
can say that this investigation is continuing and we will continue to bring
Annex 256
additional charges as appropriate. Today's indictment is however, an
important milestone in this ongoing investigation.
• "For five years, the Department of Justice and the FBI have worked to develop
the evidence necessary to bring these charges for this terrible crime. This
indictment comes at a time of legal and personal significance for this case.
• "As a legal matter, important charges arising out of the Khobar attack, if
not filed promptly, might have been lost under our statute of limitations on
the fifth anniversary of this tragedy, which is next Monday. As a personal
matter for the victims and their families, the indictment returned today
means that next week's five-year anniversary of this tragedy will come with
some assurance to victim family members and to the wounded that they are not
forgotten.
• "I know that all of America joins me in once again offering our condolences
for the terrible losses endured by the families of Americans killed or
injured in this tragedy.
• "For America it is also an important reminder of the tremendous sacrifices
made by those who bravely serve to protect our nation and its freedom. This
indictment underscores the commitment of the Bush Administration and the
Department of Justice to bringing terrorists to justice. Americans are a high
priority target for terrorists. Our nation will vigorously fight to preserve
justice for our citizens here at home and abroad.
• "I would like to thank the Saudi government for its assistance throughout
this investigation.
• Today's charges would not have been possible without their help and we look
forward to working with them as the investigation continues.
• "I would also like to thank the prosecution team and the men and women of the
FBI whose hard work on this investigation has been indispensable. Finally, I
would like to thank FBI Director Freeh. Since the horrific attack on Khobar
Towers five years ago, the Director has not wavered in his pursuit of this
investigation. His personal involvement and tireless commitment are
substantial reasons why we stand here today. He has also reached out to the
victims and their families, meeting with them personally to listen to their
concerns, share information, answer questions, and pledge his continuing
support.
• "This investigation exemplifies the leadership, integrity, and compassion
that Louis Freeh delivered over the past eight years as Director of the FBI.
Together with his colleagues, he has moved this institution forward into the
twenty-first century, building law enforcement cooperation and investigative
capacities respected across the nation and around the world."
KHOBAR INDICTMENT, 6/21/01
###
01-275
Annex 256
ANNEX257

Middle East
Lebanese Bristle Over Iran
Commander's Comments
Regarding Hezbollah Missile
Capabilities
By Dale Gavlak
January 04, 2027 02:43 PM
AMMAN - Lebanese Sunni Muslims, Christians, and others are condemning
recent remarks by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force
Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, who claimed that Lebanon owed its missile
capabilities to Iran and that Lebanon was in the front line in Iran's fight against
Israel.
Political leaders and citizens alike say the remarks raise questions about
Lebanon's sovereignty and threaten to further complicate its already-stalled
Cabinet formation process.
Hussein al-Wajeh, the media adviser to Lebanon's Sunni Prime Ministerdesignate,
Saad Hariri, lashed out at Hajizadeh, saying that Lebanon was not and
would not be the front line for Iran's battles.
"The Lebanese will not pay any price on behalf of the Iranian regime. Despite
this, some Iranian officials insist on considering Lebanon an Iranian
province;' Hussein Al-Wajeh said.
1 Annex 257
Christian politician Sarni Gemayel of the Kataeb Party said, "Lebanon and the
Lebanese are a hostage in Iran's hands through Hezbollah. They are using us as
human shields in their battle, which Lebanon has nothing to do with. The
presidency, the government and parliament are false witnesses and are covering
up controlling Lebanon."
Earlier, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said his Iran-backed Shi'ite militia
now had twice as many precision-guided missiles as it did a year ago, adding
that Israel's efforts to prevent it from acquiring them had failed. Israel considers
Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran and Lebanon, to be its most immediate
terrorist threat.
Paul Salem, president of the Washington-based Middle East Institute, who is also
Lebanese, said Iran uses its client Hezbollah in Lebanon and beyond to achieve
its own ends.
"As far as Iran is concerned, the Lebanon and Syria space for them is their way to
put pressure on Israel and the United States. And they don't see them as
separate," he said. "The fundamental flaw in the Lebanese state is that it is a state
that doesn't have sovereignty. We don't control our borders, our airport, the
port; we cannot collect electricity tariffs. We are enthralled [ meaning
enslaved] to a domestic army that follows an external force:'
2 Annex 257
MuditO..ffl.J IIOOII
JORDAN
SYRIA
IRAQ
Beirut's An-Nahar daily said it was stunned by Lebanese President Michel Aoun's
initial silence on Hajizadeh's remarks. But Aoun is a key ally of Hezbollah, the de
facto powerbroker in the country.
Salam Yamout, who heads the secular National Bloc Party, said that putting
Lebanon in battles associated with regional disputes directly threat not only
Lebanese interests, but the fight to restore its sovereignty.
Walid Joumblatt, leader of the Druze community and an outspoken critic of Iran,
warned against pushing Lebanon into a new military conflict on Tehran's behalf.
He tweeted, asking why Lebanon should get "involved in participating [in a
confrontation] where we have no decision on anything?"
Hezbollah has been criticized by its Lebanese and Arab opponents for
participating in the war in Syria and other regional conflicts on behalf of Iran.
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ANNEX258

court of first instance Antwerp, section Antwerp
file number 20A003763 wing D, 3rd floor
anonymized version
Verdict number / registry number
2021/ [--]
Repertory number / European
[--]
Date of decision
February 4, 2021
Name of the defendant( s)
S.A.
System number Public Prosecutor's office
18RF666
Docket number
20A003763
Public Prosecutor's Memorandum number
FD/ A/35/97 /19/2018
Court of First Instance Antwerp,
Section Antwerp
Court ACS
Decision
Handed down on
[--]
Not to be registered
[--]
p. 1
Decision nr. [--] /
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court of first instance Antwerp, section Antwerp
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In the case of the Office of the Public Prosecutor
AND CIVIL PARTY IP ARTIES:
1) E.Z.
XXX
civil party
2) R.T.
XXX
civil party
3) G.T.
4)
XXX
civil party
R.G., erroneously subpoenaed as G.
XXX
civil party
5) W.M.
XXX
civil party
6) N.I.W
XXX
civil party
7. I.B.
XXX
civil party
8) A.G.
XXX
civil party
9) L.C.
XXX
civil party
10) T.K.
XXX
civil party
11) R.B.
XXX
civil party
12) Y.B.
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XXX
civil party
13) T.B.
XXX
civil party
14) F.H.
XXX
civil party
15) S.A.J.
XXX
civil party
16) G.T.
XXX
civil party
17) R.J.
XXX
civil party
18) M.R.
XXX
civil party
19) R.H.
XXX
civil party
20) M.P.
XXX
civil party
21) A.T.
XXX
civil party
22) S.S.
XXX
civil party
23) J.L.
XXX
civil party
24) H.A.
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court of first instance Antwerp, section Antwerp
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XXX
civil party
25) M.J.D.
XXX
civil party
26) P.B.
XXX
civil party
The civil parties:
* sub 1 through 13, 15 through 26 represented by:
* counsel sub 14
-xxx
versus:
XXX
currently detained in Antwerp prison
defendant, represented by Mr. xxx, LL.M.
2) N.N.
XXX
currently detained in Antwerp prison
defendant, represented by Mr. xxx, LL.M.
3) M.A.
XXX
currently detained in Mechelen prison
defendant, represented by Mr. xxx, LL.M.
4) A.A.
XXX
currently detained in Beveren prison
defendant, represented by Mr. xxx, LL.M.
CHARGE(S)
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As perpetrator or co-perpetrator within the meaning of Article 66 of the Penal Code [PC];
A. Attempted terrorist attack as referred to in Art. 137 § 2.1° PC (murder)
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By violation of Articles 51, 52, 137, §1 and §2, 1°, 138,393 and 394 of the Belgian Penal Code, having
attempted, to the harm of at least and including the civil parties listed above, attending the congress of the
National Iranian Resistance Council at Villepinte (France) on June 30, 2018, to kill with the intention to
kill and with premeditation, as well as with a terrorist objective within the meaning of Article 137, § 1 of
the Penal Code, where the intention to commit the criminal act became evident by overt acts constituting
initiation of the performance of this criminal act and only ceased or failed to have effect as a consequence
of circumstances outside the will of the perpetrators.
In the judicial district Antwerp and Brussels and/or elsewhere in the Realm and outside the Realm, in
particular at least in Austria, Iran, Germany, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and France, at least in the
period from 03/01/2018 through 06/30/20018
by the first (A.S.), the second (N.N.), the third (M.A.) and the fourth (A.A.) [defendants]
B . ... .
C . ... .
D. Participation in the Activities of a Terrorist Group
Having participated in any activity of a terrorist group, being a structured association of more than two
persons, which has been in existence for some time and which acts in mutual consultation to commit
terrorist crimes, as referred to in Article 137 of the Penal Code, and the actual purpose of which is not
exclusively political, professional, charitable, philosophical, or religious, or which does not exclusively
pursue some other legitimate objective, be it only by providing information or material resources to this
terrorist group or by any form of financing any activity of this terrorist group, while they:
were aware that their participation contributes to the commission of a criminal act or offense by
the terrorist group (for the period of 01/01/2015 through 12/31/2016)
were aware or should have been aware that their participation could contribute to the commission
of a criminal act or offense by the terrorist group (for the period Of 01/01/2017 though 06/30/2018).
Art. 139 and 140 § 1 Sw)
In the judicial district Antwerp and Brussels and/or elsewhere in the Realm and outside the Realm, in
particular at least in Austria, Iran, Germany, Italy, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and France,
by the first (A.S.), the second (N.N.), the third (M.A.) and the fourth (A.A.) [defendants]
PROCEDURE
The Court notes the decision of the closed session of this Court of July 15, 2020, in which mitigating
circumstances were granted.
The proceedings and arguments of the case took place in public session.
The proceedings were held in the Dutch language, except with respect to the translated part.
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The Court has appointed as sworn translator Parijs D.A., in order to assist the civil party H.F. for
translation of everything being said from English into Dutch and vice versa.
The Court has appointed as sworn translators S.F. and S.M.E., in order to assist the defendants S.A., N.N.,
and A.M. for translation of everything being said from Dutch into Farsi and vice versa.
The Court has noted the documents of the proceedings and heard all parties present.
PRIOR MATTERS:
It has become evident during the consultations that:
* The civil parties sub 3) T.G. and 16) T.G. are one and the same civil party;
* The civil party sub 4) was identified on the summons as R. G., while this should be read as R.G.; The
Court corrects this material error.
* In the minutes of the public sessions of November 27, 2020, and December 3rd, 2020, the family name
of the civil party sub 21 was given as A., while is appears from the summary findings of the civil parties
that this must be read as "T.". The Court corrects this material error as well.
* The summary findings of the civil parties also mention the [person] named: P.B., xxx. The Court
determines that this civil party - for whom motions were promptly received - was by material error not
mentioned in the minutes of the public sessions of November 27, 2020, and December 3rd, 2020. The
Court directs that this civil party be entered into the records (sub 26) and determines that this civil party
was in effect represented by his attorneys and was heard as a civil party at the public sessions of
November 27, 2020, and December 3, 2020.
WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL LAW
PROCEDURE
I. SPECIAL INVESTIGATION METHODS CHECK
By judgment of June 4th, 2020, of the Indictments Chamber, a Special Investigation Methods check was
performed and no irregularities were found.
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II. Exclusion of the finding of the Public Prosecutor
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[The] second defendant requested at the public session of November 27, 2020, that the findings of the
Public Prosecutor be excluded, as they had not been imparted to the defense of [the] second defendant.
The attorneys of the civil parties as well as the other defendants received the decisions of the Office of the
Public Prosecutor in good time, but apparently a mistake was made with respect to sending the decisios to
the defense of [the] second defendant.
As the decisions of the Office of the Public Prosecutor were timely indeed, the Court, in agreement with
all parties, granted the defense of [the] second defendant the opportunity to respond to the decisions as yet
by the public session of December 3rd, 2020.
Therefore, the Court will not exclude the decisions of the Office of the Public Prosecutor.
III. Inadmissibility of the criminal indictment for reason of obscuri libelli [ obscure
pamphlets] and violation of the right to [al defense.
The defense of the third defendant raises this in the decisions. At the public session, the third defendant
states that he no longer insists on this exception and abandons it.
For completeness' sake, the Court ascertains this for all defendants.
The acts of the charges must be described in such manner that their object appears from them with
adequate clarity for the defendants and that their right to defend themselves is preserved.
There is no question of obscuri libelli. The defendants can clearly gather from the charges what they are
being prosecuted for. The defendants can defend themselves with respect to the criminal acts described in
the charges.
There is no provision in the Law stipulating that the defendants should exclusively be informed by the
summons or by the referral order.
The defendants may also be informed by reading the summons together with the documents from the
criminal file which have been shared with them and on which they have been able to claim their right to a
defense before the Court on the merits. Moreover, the Office of the Public Prosecutor first submitted a
comprehensive statement which explained everyone's part in detail. Therefore, the defendants were
sufficiently informed.
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Moreover, the closing statement of the Office of the Public Prosecutor was sufficiently clear and the
defense of the defendants was perfectly able to counter this, which in fact they did.
Therefore, the Court cannot find any violation.
IV. The invocation of personal immunity and immunity as diplomatic officer.
The fourth defendant asserts that he is a diplomatic officer and enjoys immunity pursuant to the Vienna
Convention on diplomatic relations of April 18, 1961. Moreover, he argues that he could not be arrested
in Germany and subsequently extradited to Belgium in view of his personal immunity, to which he is
entitled pursuant to the aforesaid convention.
In view of his immunity, he cannot be prosecuted before the Belgian Courts either.
There is no question that at the time of his arrest, the fourth defendant was a member of the diplomatic
personnel (third Counsel since June 23, 2014 - diplomatic passport D9016657 of April 26, 2014) and that
he was accredited in Austria for the State of Iran. He had a diplomatic passport. He can be considered a
diplomatic officer (Article 1.e Vienna Convention), and this until July 2, 2018 (date ofrevocation of
immunity by the Austrian government.)
Pursuant to the Belgian Penal Code, anyone who commits a criminal act on Belgian soil is punishable,
regardless of the citizenship of the perpetrator(s). The Belgian Courts are competent to take cognizance of
all elements and circumstances of the criminal act which are inextricably bound up with this criminal act
on Belgian soil. This means that physical criminal acts committed partly in Belgium and partly abroad
can be prosecuted in Belgium. Perpetrators who participate abroad in a criminal act in Belgium can be
prosecuted in Belgium.
International Law assumes the sovereignty of independent states, which are all treated equally. The
Vienna Convention is a special arrangement with respect to this sovereignty and determines the way in
which states treat diplomatic personnel.
From the manner in which the convention was arrived at and later interpretation of the convention, it is
evident that the Vienna Convention codified customary law regarding diplomatic personnel and that all
(important) rules are contained in this convention.
The provisions regarding diplomatic relations are bilateral agreements between the state of origin and the
receiving state and are based on the principle of reciprocity. In that sense,
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the Vienna Convention must be interpreted restrictively, and this does not create obligations toward other
states which are not part of the bilateral agreements between the state of origin and the receiving state,
with the exception of Art. 40 of the Vienna Convention.
In Article 31, the Vienna Convention provides that:
"The diplomatic officer enjoys immunity with regard to the judiciary in criminal cases of the receiving
state."
The immunity obtained by a diplomatic officer is only an immunity with respect to criminal prosecution
in the receiving state, being an immunity of enforcement.
A diplomat can indeed commit punishable acts in another country and can be prosecuted for these in any
other country than the receiving state (in this case Austria). The acts he committed as an accessory from
Austria can perfectly well be prosecuted in Belgium.
Precisely because of the sovereignty of the independent states, Austria cannot provide immunity to
criminal prosecution in another country.
Austria revoked the immunity (mandate immunity) of the fourth defendant on July 2, 2018 (application of
Art. 9 Vienna Convention), but this exclusively applies to any criminal prosecution in Austria for
punishable acts for which the Austrian judiciary is competent.
The diplomat involved is then declared "persona non grata" and is given the opportunity to leave the
country within a well-described limited period.
However, this is entirely irrelevant to the case, as it involves Belgian criminal acts which were partly
committed in Belgium and partly in other EU countries, such as Luxembourg and Italy, and this has
nothing to do with the immunity which the fourth defendant enjoyed in Austria.
All in all, the fourth defendant does not enjoy any immunity whatsoever with regard to criminal
prosecution for punishable (accessory) acts in Belgium.
The fourth defendant argues that he was unjustly arrested in Germany and invokes Art. 40 of the Vienna
Convention. Because of his unjust arrest in Germany, he was unjustly extradited to Belgium and unjustly
stands trial before this Court.
In this matter, the Court refers to the decision of the Antwerp Chamber of Indictment [Col] and the
subsequent judgment of the Court of Cassation in the context of the pre-trial detention.
In a judgment of December 18, 2018, the Col determined: "It appears from the factual information in the
criminal record that the defendant was on vacation in Belgium and Germany. He was arrested in
Germany
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on July 1, 2018, when he was on the way to his diplomatic station in Austria ... , the suspect did not use his
diplomatic immunity. He was arrested and detained regularly. The arrest warrant is regular.".
In its judgment of January 2, 2019, the Court of Cassation decided:
"It follows from these provisions that the inviolability and the immunities are granted by the receiving
state of the diplomat and by a third State, when the diplomat is passing through the territory of a third
State to accept his duties at his posting or to return to his posting or when he returns to his own country.
"Passing through" as described in Art. 40.1, first sentence [,of the] Vienna Convention, to be strictly
interpreted, is understood to mean solely the passage related to the exercise of the diplomatic assignment
of the diplomat, in particular the journey from the country of origin to reach the diplomatic station or to
return to the home country, or the journey from the station to the country where the diplomat is to fulfill a
diplomatic mission or, after fulfillment of this mission, to return from said country to the diplomatic
station.
A return from a third country where the diplomat is staying on vacation, is alien to the exercise of the
diplomatic assignment and, therefore, is not a passage as described in Art. 40, first sentence, Vienna
Convention. "
The German judiciary as well came to the conclusion, with the detention/arrest as with the subsequent
procedure which led to his extradition, that the defendant was on vacation, did, moreover, not have a
diplomatic function in Germany and, therefore, could not invoke his diplomatic status.
Because it is raised again by the fourth defendant, the Court concurs completely with the judgment of the
Court of Cassation in the context of the pre-trial detention.
The diplomatic relations and all rights (for the diplomat) and obligations for the receiving state ensuing
from this are bilateral agreements between the sending state and the receiving state, as provided by the
Vienna Convention.
The Convention does not require direct passage between the sending and the receiving state. One can pass
through a third country to go to one's diplomatic posting in the receiving state or to return to the sending
state. This is, therefore, an exception to the rule of the bilateral agreement between the sending state and
the receiving state. The Vienna Convention provides that third countries, who are foreign to the
diplomatic relation between the sending state and the receiving state, must grant passage to diplomatic
officers and, therefore, must respect the immunity/personal inviolability of the diplomatic officer in a
certain sense. This exception must, therefore, be interpreted restrictively. The passage is, therefore,
strictly limited to this specific relocation or a relocation to a country other than the receiving state for the
sake of a specific diplomatic mission.
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One does not enjoy immunity when one is in a third country for purely personal reasons.
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From the findings during the observation, the road checks, rental of the vehicle (from June 25 through
July 2nd, 2018) and their itinerary (Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Liege, .. ), it appears irrefutably
that the fourth defendant was vacationing with his family and, therefore, was not on a diplomatic mission
or diplomatic trip.
The argumentation attempted by the fourth defendant that his immunity as a diplomat is comparable to
the total immunity of foreign heads of state and ministers in all countries does not fly and cannot be
deduced from any international legal provision, case law, or custom. It is not provided anywhere that
diplomatic immunity has such a wide scope.
Finally, one may refer to Art. 38 [ of the] Vienna Convention: "Except to the extent a receiving state
grants supplemental rights and immunities, a diplomatic officer who is a citizen of that state or resides
there permanently, only enjoys immunity from the rule of law and inviolability with regard to official
activities carried out in the discharge of his function. "
It appears from the statement of the Public Prosecutor that the fourth defendant is suspected not to be a
diplomat in reality. He is alleged to be an Iranian intelligence officer, who functioned as a runner for his
European informers. His stature as a diplomat was possibly misused to allow the commission of
punishable acts elsewhere in Europe and even [to] smuggle an explosive device from Iran to Europe
under diplomatic cover.
He is suspected to be the ( co-)organizer of a potential foiled deadly attack in France. These actions cannot
possibly be considered as (normal) diplomatic activities performed in the context of his function.
The actual activities of which the defendant is suspected, if proven, even contravene Art. 3 of the
Convention.
This Article provides that the functions of a diplomatic mission include: " .... protecting in the receiving State
the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law. " His
unofficial activities, of which he is suspected, do not fit at all within the limits permitted by international law and the
intention of the participants in the treaty cannot be to cover by some diplomatic immunity the actions of which the
fourth defendant is suspected.
V. The invoked state immunity and the Court's lack of jurisdiction
The fourth defendant states more precisely that he does not invoke immunity as a government official,
because according to him he enjoys immunity as a diplomat.
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However, he does argue that the Court is not competent to make judgment on the involvement of the State
of Iran or one of its agencies (such as the intelligence service MOIS or department 312), and this, based
on the international-law principle of state immunity.
As already set forth above, international law is based on the sovereignty of states. All states are equal and
states are not to judge each other and this is supported in international law by state immunity.
Said state immunity dies not only apply to the national state, but also to its agencies and even, possibly,
its officials. Initially said state immunity was interpreted quite absolutely in international law, but because
of, among other things, the expanding trade relations in which states participated, exceptions to this
principle have arisen.
The Court finds that neither the State of Iran, nor the intelligence service MOIS, nor department 312 of
the Iranian intelligence service are on trial here as defendants, so that the principle of state immunity has
not been violated.
The Court does not agree that it would be a violation of state immunity if the Court would find on the
basis of a criminal record that there is a certain involvement of a foreign state, its agencies or officials.
Obviously, the Court cannot convict the State of Iran or its agencies, but then, they are not on trial here as
defendants. Any other view would result in a restriction on the sovereignty of the Belgian constitutional
state, which in itself would already contravene state immunity.
The Court notes that the fourth defendant does not invoke his immunity as a state official for himself. He
invokes his diplomatic immunity, but as already stated above, this immunity does not apply in the
criminal case at hand.
For completeness' sake, he cannot invoke his immunity as a state official either.
The fourth defendant is on trial for his personal criminal involvement. This involvement may be personal,
but may also fit within a certain illegal task assigned to him by his principals, for instance people in the
intelligence services.
Obviously, the immunity of state officials of a foreign state in the area of criminal law could only apply to
the punishable actions performed by a state official in the context of the performance of his official
government duties (functional immunity).
The fourth defendant is suspected of having organized an attack or at least of having taken the lead in
planning a terrorist attack in
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France with potential fatalities. We may assume that this activity does not belong among the official
activities of an official of the State of Iran in general and an intelligence service in particular. Certainly it
will not belong to the duties of a diplomatic official, but neither to the official duties of intelligence
services, which in principle should only gather, analyze and process intelligence.
Moreover, neither the State of Iran nor any other agency in the Iranian administration has claimed the
activities of which the fourth defendant is suspected. Not at any time has the State of Iran recognized that
these activities took place in the context of the official function of the defendant. The State of Iran has
never recognized that it wanted to make an attack on a conference of the Iranian opposition on June 30,
2018.
One can also wonder whether state immunity can be invoked for terrorist activities. The right to life is an
absolute basic right of a citizen, wherever in the world. Infringing this universal basic right by terrorist
activities can hardly be covered by state immunity. International terrorist crimes must be considered as
"crimes belonging to the ius cogens" and the fight against it, which in every country belongs to the
priority in crime fighting, is an exception to the principle of state immunity. It would hardly be acceptable
that exceptions to state immunity would be permitted for commercial reasons, but that this does not apply
to crimes which harm humanity in its absolute right to life.
Finally, the fourth defendant mentions in his defense that the civil party NCRI is a terrorist organization
itself or is at least responsible for various attacks through its sister organization.
This is not included in the Court's finding. The Court only has to determine whether any punishable acts
were committed and whether there is a causal correlation between the potential damage suffered by the
civil party and the punishable acts.
The Court should not make a determination of the moral compass of said civil party. Neither the civil
party nor her sister organization is on trial here.
VI.
a)
Violation of the right to a fair trial and the right to a defense.
Initial interrogations of the fourth defendant without counsel
The fourth defendant argues that in his first interrogation in Germany and his interrogation with respect to
his arrest, was not aided by an attorney, which violated his right to a defense and at least his right to a fair
trial. The fourth defendant refers for this to the European directive and the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights.
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At the start of his first interrogation, the fourth defendant was advised time and time again that he had the
right to assistance from an attorney. The fourth defendant was offered an attorney, to wit an attorney from
Wtirzburg, who was also prepared to assume the defense, but the fourth defendant did not want this
mediation, because he wanted to engage an attorney appointed by his own embassy. Indeed, he was
ultimately questioned without (prior) legal assistance. Moreover, it appears from the documents from the
German Courts that the arresting officers tried to reach the Iranian consulate in Germany on Sunday ( day
of his arrest) and on Monday, but that they could not make contact. It appears from the remaining
documents that one was able to reach the consulate a few days after his arrest and that from then on the
consulate had the opportunity to get into contact with the fourth defendant.
The fourth defendant also argues in his defense that he did not get the assistance of a Farsi interpreter. It
appears from the implementation documents that only a single Farsi interpreter was present and that this
person was assigned to the interrogation of the wife and children of the fourth defendant.
The fourth defendant was questioned in English and there is no information to show that he objected to
this at that time. On the contrary, it was expressly reported that he was prepared to conduct his
interrogation in English. He expressly asked that the Iranian consulate be informed. The arresting officers
reported that they contacted the consulate on Sunday and Monday, but without result.
The evidence shows that he'd been receiving assistance from members of the Iranian Embassy since
Tuesday, July 3, 2018.
The fourth defendant does not show that the rules of German criminal law were violated in the case at
hand by failing to note expressly that he waived legal assistance.
The information present does not show that, taking the concrete circumstances into consideration, the
right to a defense or the right to a fair trial were violated in the case of the fourth defendant. Moreover,
one should look at the procedure in its entirety and the Court does not find any irreparable violation of the
rights [ sic J to a defense and, therefore, no violation of the right to a fair trial either.
b) First interrogation of the spouse and the children of the fourth defendant without
legal counsel.
The spouse and the children of the fourth defendant were deprived of their freedom, because the police
dog reacted positively to the potential presence of explosives in the vehicle of the fourth defendant.
At the start of their first interrogation, the spouse and the adult son of
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the fourth defendant were advised time and time again that they had the right to legal counsel. Although
the evidence does not show that they did so expressly, but the [record of the] interrogation shows
implicitly that they waived [that right]. Also, they were questioned with the assistance of a Farsi
interpreter. The interrogation of the son shows that his rights were explained to him in English,
notwithstanding the presence of an interpreter.
Moreover, the fourth defendant objects strenuously against the way the interrogation of his 17-year old
son was conducted and argues that this is not in compliance with the European directives. At the start of
the interrogation, the minor son of the fourth defendant (17 years) was advised that he had the right to the
assistance of an attorney and that, prior to the interrogation and during the interrogation, he could demand
the presence of his "guardians/legal representatives." The report shows that the fourth defendant and his
spouse were invited to attend the interrogation, but that they refused. This son was questioned with the
assistance of a Farsi interpreter as well.
Ultimately it became clear that they could not be charged and they were released.
To determine whether a defendant's right to a defense or his right to a fair trial were violated, one has to
consider the procedure in its entirety.
The Court finds that the wife and children of the fourth defendant were initially questioned as suspects,
but [are] currently not prosecuted as defendants. At the present state of the procedure, therefore, they can
be considered as witnesses only. The Office of the Public Prosecutor did not hold back any elements of
the charges against the fourth defendant on the basis of these statements. Similarly, the Court will not
base its determination of guilt on these statements either.
Under those circumstances, the Court finds that, to the extent there would be any question of irregularities
at all, there is no question of a violation of the rights [ sic J to a defense with respect to the fourth
defendant, nor of a violation of the right to a fair trial.
c) No confidential interview with consular officials at the time of his arrest
Here as well, the fourth defendant invokes a European directive providing a right to consular assistance.
The records of the German judiciary show that attempts were made to contact the Iranian consulate on
Sunday (day of his arrest), July 1, 2018, and Monday, July 2, 2018, but that this failed.
From July 3, 2018, the fourth defended received assistance from the Iranian consulate. The evidence
shows that an unsupervised interview was conducted on July 3, 2018. Later contact was always allowed,
but under strict security measures. Considering the
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status of the file and its content, as known to the German judiciary, it was evident that the fourth
defendant was suspected of involvement in a foiled attack in France and that he committed these
potentially punishable acts under a diplomatic cover and possibly with knowledge of the State of Iran.
The visit of members of the Iranian consulate was allowed, but under specific security measures, and this,
to prevent the exchange of documents or objects.
The fourth defendant did not show concretely in what way German Law was violated. The European
directive was respected as well. Neither the European directive nor the 1963 Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations prescribes that these interviews be held confidentially.
Of course, such interviews should really be confidential, but in view of the specific nature of this case and
the potential involvement of the State of Iran or one of its agencies, the extra security measure was
appropriate and necessary.
The rights [ sic J to a defense or the right to a fair trial were not violated with respect to the fourth
defendant. The evidence shows that he had contact with the Iranian consular services multiple times.
d) Detention conditions in Germany
The fourth defendant condemns the detention conditions in Germany.
In the various interviews with the consular official the fourth defendant complained about his detention in
the German prison.
A report was always drawn up of this and attached to the criminal file, so that there is complete
transparency.
The fourth defendant was under a special detention regimen, considering the acts of which he was
suspected.
These specific security conditions appear appropriate and necessary. It is understandable that the fourth
defendant does not find his imprisonment agreeable and that the security measures certainly are not
agreeable [to him].
The reports also show that he is particularly upset that his diplomatic immunity, on which he mistakenly
tried to build his defense, was not accepted.
Neither the fourth defendant nor the consulate have initiated a civil/administrative procedure against the
German government with respect to the implementation of his detention, which is perfectly feasible in the
German constitutional state.
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The Court does not find any violation of the rights [ sic J to a defense or the right to a fair trial.
e) The detention conditions in Belgium
The fourth defendant is dissatisfied with the detention conditions in Belgium as well.
The fourth defendant is under a special security regimen, considering the acts of which he is suspected.
These specific security conditions appear appropriate and necessary. It is understandable that the fourth
defendant does not find his imprisonment agreeable and that the security measures certainly are not
agreeable [to him].
The reports also show that he is particularly upset that his diplomatic immunity, on which he mistakenly
tried to build his defense, was not accepted.
There is a law in Belgium with respect to the legal position of detainees, which the fourth defendant can
invoke. Neither the fourth defendant nor the consulate have initiated a civil/administrative procedure
against the Belgian government with respect to the implementation of his detention, which is perfectly
feasible in our constitutional state.
The Court does not find any violation of the rights [ sic I to a defense or the right to a fair trial.
f) Freeze of the financial assets of the fourth defendant
The fourth defendant argues that his rights were violated, because he was included on the European list of
terrorists, resulting in a freeze on all his financial assets.
According to the defense, this is a violation of his right to a fair trial, a violation of the presumption of
innocence, a violation of the ban on torture and a violation of the right to property.
The fourth defendant instituted proceedings before the Council of State specifically with respect to the
Belgian consequences, but this was dismissed for lack of urgency and because this is a European decision.
The fourth defendant alleges that this European decision is based on this criminal file.
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Such a decision is not taken lightly by the European Council and is a temporary precaution.
The Court is not competent to give judgment on this listing and the consequences of this listing and this is
not the forum where this view should be tested.
There are other forums where the fourth defendant can test this for legality or appropriateness.
All in all this inclusion on the European list of terrorists will not affect the decision in any way. The Court
always maintains the presumption of innocence and this right was respected in the criminal iinvestigation
as well.
g) No accurate description of the search of the car of the fourth defendant
The fourth defendant argues that no accurate description was provided of the search of the car.
All sorts of objects were retrieved either during the body search or during the search of the car and these
objects were indeed described in detail.
The fourth defendant argues that it is important to know which objects were found where, the location in
the vehicle being of particular interest.
The Court remarks that the fourth defendant was given the opportunity to make objections to this and to
show to what extent the evidential value was prejudiced by the lack of this description.
The determination whether this is significant or not is part of the assessment of merits with respect to the
potential guilty verdict by the Court. If this constitutes a problem, the Court will rule as necessary with
respect to the evidential value and possibly the ensuing guilty verdict.
VII. Information provided by the Security of the State
The defendants argue that the criminal file is largely based on information from the Security of the State
and that this cannot be considered as [an] evidential basis, the more so because the way this information
was obtained cannot be established.
Information from the Security of the State must be regarded as intelligence. This can be perfectly well
regarded as a crime report, and when this information is concrete and
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detailed, far-reaching investigative measures may be ordered on the basis of this information.
The culpability of the defendants must always be judged on the basis of objective and tested evidence and
cannot be solely based on this information. However, this information from the Security of the State can
be a significant supplement to the body of evidence as a whole.
The defendants were given the opportunity to submit objections to all information originating from the
Security of the State.
It is the Court's province to determine to what extent this information is reliable, certainly when the
information comes from the gathering of intelligence only. With respect to information from foreign
intelligence services, the Court must assume that this information was gathered in compliance with the
customary legislation abroad unless there are indications to the contrary.
VIII. The consequences of the decision of the [EU] Court of Justice
The defense of the third defendant argues that all evidence against the third defendant is directly or
indirectly based on phone records obtained in contravention of Union Law, including the right to respect
for privacy (Art. 7 of the EU Charter). Consequently, the defense argues, the third defendant should be
acquitted of all charges, [or] at least all parties should have the opportunity to review the evidence to be
excluded and the associated consequences.
On this matter the defense refers to the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of October 6, 2020 ( case
C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18) comprising the decision that the undifferentiated and general retention
of traffic and location information, even with a view to serious crimes, transgresses the limits of the
strictly necessary. The Court of Justice states that undifferentiated general retention of traffic and location
data of all users of electronic means of communication may be imposed by order of a judicial authority in
case of a serious, actual, current or foreseeable threat to national security, providing that this retention
order is temporally limited to what is strictly necessary (without prejudice to the possibility of extending
the period), is foreseeable and constitutes the object of an actual review by a judge or independent
administrative agency with decisive authority. As regards the fight against serious crime and the
prevention of serious threats against public safety, a specific retention obligation of traffic and location
data may be imposed on condition that this retention is limited to what is strictly necessary with respect to
the categories of the information to be retained, the targeted means of communication, the persons
involved and the retention period. On the basis of
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objective and non-discriminatory factors, certain groups of persons or geographic zones may be identified
for that purpose and there must always be a strict limitation on the period.
But even if the national statute on which retention of telecommunication data is based, in the case at hand
Article 126 of the Act of June 13, 2005, on electronic communication, should contravene the fundamental
rights provided in Articles 7, 8 and 52, 1st paragraph, of the EU Charter, this would not automatically
entail that such data should be considered as illegitimately obtained evidence which would be void or
should be excluded.
The Court of Justice holds that in criminal proceedings against persons suspected of the commission of
serious crimes, it is first and foremost the province of the national legislator to determine the rules
regarding the admissibility and the assessment of information and evidence obtained on the basis of data
retention legislation in contravention of Union Law.
Therefore, it falls to the national legal systems to provide procedural rules so that the fundamental rights
enjoyed by the citizens are guaranteed in compliance with Union Law, with the understanding that this
rules should not be more disadvantageous than the rules with respect to evidence obtained in
contravention of national law ( equivalence principle) and that the exercise of the European fundamental
rights should not be impossible or extremely difficult (efficiency principle). The rules with respect to
using data retained in contravention of Union Law as evidence may, thus, not be more disadvantageous
than the rules with respect to the use of evidence obtained in contravention of national law.
The Court of Justice states, moreover, that Article 15, paragraph 1 of the EU Privacy Directive, when
interpreted in the light of the efficiency principle, requires concretely that, in the context of criminal
proceedings against persons suspected of the commission of punishable acts, national criminal Courts
exclude information and evidence obtained by means of the general and arbitrary retention of traffic and
location data in contravention of EU Law, when these persons are not able to effectively formulate
comments on the matter and the information and the evidence concern an area of which the Courts have
no knowledge and are likely to have a decisive effect with regard to the factual findings.
The Court finds concretely that the traffic and location data in the file at hand were requested by the
Examining Magistrate on the basis of substantiated rulings pursuant to Article 88bis Sv. and taking the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality into account.
As regards the admissibility as evidence of these requested data, which were retained in contravention of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by Union Law, Article 32 V.T.Sv. applies. After all, as regards
illegitimately obtained evidence, our Belgian rule of law requires testing [this] always in accordance with
Article 32 V.T.Sv., regardless of the nature of the statute (national, European or international) which was
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violated (Refer in that sense to Cass. 19 April 2016, nr. P.15.1639.N). It is incorrect, therefore, to assume
that retention of telecommunication data in contravention of fundamental basic rights always weighs so
heavily that it automatically constitutes a violation of the right to a defense and by extension the right to a
fair trial.
The Court finds that in the light of the criteria of Article 32 V.T.Sv., there is no reason to proceed to
exclude evidence. The use of telecommunication data is admissible, as the retention obligation does not
violate a formal condition prescribed under penalty of nullification, as the irregularity involved has not
prejudiced the reliability of the evidence, and as its use does not contravene the right to a fair trial. After
all, the rights [sic] to a defense were not irrevocably violated.
The Court finds that retention of traffic and location data in contravention of the right to protection of
privacy and personal information in itself do not cast doubt on the reliability of such retained data. The
defense does not contest the quality and correctness of these retained and requested telephone records
either. As regards the right to a fair trial, the Court finds that there is no question of an (intentional)
irregularity committed by the prosecuting or investigating authority.
As stated previously, the Examining Magistrate had a legal basis for retrieving the records. The retrieval
of telecommunication records took place, therefore, by court order and under strict supervision of an
independent judicial agency, which has laid down the reasons and motives on which the decision was
based in a clear and substantiated warrant, in accordance with the statutory regulations. Neither did the
telecom operator who retained the records intentionally violate the right to protection of privacy and of
personal information, but acted in accordance with the statutory obligations prevailing in Belgium at the
time. The statutory provisions on which the Examining Magistrate as well as the operators relied were
recently amended by the Act of May 29, 2016 (BS July 18, 2016) after the Constitutional Court by a
ruling of June 11, 2015, had nullified the Act of June 30, 2013, which included amendment of, among
others, Article 126 WEC for violation of the respect of privacy and protection of personal information.
Moreover, the seriousness of the acts with which the defendants are charged, attempted terrorist murder
and participation in a terrorist group, amply outweighs the seriousness of the alleged irregularities. After
all, the fight against serious crime and the prevention of substantial threats against public safety are of
such nature that they can justify limitation of the right to privacy and the right to protection of personal
information.
Finally, the defendants have had the opportunity during the preliminary investigation as well as during the
assessment of the merits to contest the correctness, the reliability and the credibility of the data with
respect to telecommunication, as well as the findings of the investigators and the Office of the Public
Prosecutor on the basis of these data. They had the opportunity to ask questions, formulate remarks and
introduce elements and arguments themselves that they deem useful in the assessment of the acts with
which they are charged. One should also note that telecommunication records
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can yield not only evidence for the prosecution, but also for the defense. Therefore, performance of a
telephone investigation is in many cases a necessary component of an independently conducted judicial
investigation, in which elements are gathered for both the prosecution and the defense.
Moreover, the criminal file contains several other evidentiary elements in addition to those obtained from
(retroactive) telephone investigations. The Court always includes the telecommunication records when
testing all elements in the file and the arguments put forward by the defense.
In the light of the criminal file as a whole, therefore, the "evidentiary weight" of these telecommunication
records is limited.
The defense of the third defendant, parenthetically, does not concretely contest the telephone records, but
only argues that the retention of telephone records is so technical that essentially the defendant cannot
effectively and usefully defend himself against it and that the Court is not knowledgeable about it.
However, for there to be an effective contestation with respect to technical and scientific research, it is not
necessary that the defense and the Court possess the same technical and scientific knowledge as the
experts in the matter. By the introduction of the technical results of such research and by the account and
analysis of this by the investigators in [their] reports, as well as the possibility for the defense to formulate
remarks in this regard and/or introduce dissenting elements or documents during the judicial inquiry as
well as during the assessment of the merits, effective contestation is guaranteed.
The fact that the retrieved records were retained in contravention of the respect for privacy and the
protection of personal information, therefore, has not been an obstruction to the right to a defense with
respect to the defendants. The Court does not find a violation of the right to a fair trial and, therefore, no
evidentiary elements should be excluded from the discussion.
IX. Addition of reports
The second defendant also requests that the interrogations of the German friend of the second defendant
be added. The Office of the Public Prosecutor has done so in the public session of December 3, 2020.
X. The petition to hear witnesses
The second defendant requests the Court to hear witnesses, more particularly about the explosive nature
of the device used. It will become evident below that the lack of clarity which could possibly arise with
respect to the explosive device was created by the defense of the second defendant itself by an incomplete
perusal of the file.
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An incomplete perusal of the criminal file by the defense of any of the parties cannot be a reason to hear
additional witnesses.
The Court has enough information available from, among others, DOVO [the EOD Service] and the
German expert to arrive at an opinion with respect to the explosive nature of the device.
It is not necessary for the remaining assessment that more witnesses should be heard on this issue and the
defense had the opportunity to contest the findings of these experts and to supply expert counter-opinions
as appropriate.
Additionally, the second defendant requests hearing of her German friend as well, but considering the
extensive interrogation, the Court will not grant this request, because the second defendant also does not
show why a hearing under oath as a witness is concretely necessary for her defense. The Court will not
take the statement of her German friend in consideration in case the Court finds against the defendant and
will only touch upon the statement if it is to the benefit of the defendant.
XI. Unlawful telephone taps pursuant to Art. 8 ECHR
The second defendant argues that the information from the Security of the State was insufficient to start
up tapping operations, which violated Article 8 ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights]
The Court disagrees. The information of the Security of the State is sufficiently concrete and precise to
order this extreme method of investigation.
XII. The violation of the right to a fair trial because of the media attention
The second defendant argues that her right to a fair trial was violated by the extensive media coverage
before the trial, where the reporters evidently had possession of part of the criminal file.
It is not clear who is behind these leaks to the media.
In assessing the acts and the sentence, the Court only takes into account the information contained in the
criminal file, the findings and the evidence produced, the Public Prosecutor's oral closing speech, the oral
arguments of the civil parties and the defense and, finally, the oral statements of the parties in person
themselves.
The Court does not take the information appearing in the media into account, nor the views of public
opinion.
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Therefore, the Court does not find any violation of the right to a fair trial with respect to the second
defendant.
XIII. The inadmissibility of the criminal procedure
Considering the position of the Court with respect to the procedural arguments described above, the Court
cannot determine that the criminal procedure is inadmissible.
The Court, taking the content of the criminal file into account, does not find a violation of the rights [ sic J
to a defense, the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, or any other provision under national
or international law since, globally speaking, the start of the investigation or in the court proceedings.
The criminal procedure is in all ways admissible.
MERITS
The defendants are on trial for attempted terrorist murder (charge A) and membership in a terrorist group
(charge D).
The defendants are prosecuted because they were allegedly involved in an attempt to make an attack on
June 30, 2018, on a busy conference organized by the Organisation des Moujahidines du Peuple
Iranien/Mujahedin-e Khalq/Conseil National de la Resistance Iranienne in Villepinte (near Paris).
The organizations: Organisation des Mouiahidines du Peuple Iranien (OMPI)/Muiahedin-e Khalg)
and Conseil national de la Resistance iranienne
The "Organisation des Moujahidines du Peuple Iranien (OMPI)/Mujahedin-e Khalq) (MEK)", "MEK"
hereinafter, is an Iranian opposition party, established in 1965 in Iran. Initially this organization
conducted opposition against the Iranian Shah, but after the fall of this regime, this organization quickly
turned against the new Islamic regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini. After a series of large demonstrations
and their possible involvement in a serious attack in Tehran in 1981, MEK was outlawed and the
members went into exile.
MEK had a military wing, which fought at the side of Saddam Hussein from 1986 through 1988 during
the Iran/Iraq war (1980-1988). Thousands of MEK members lived in camps in Iraq (Camp Ashraf and
Camp Liberty) well into 2016. Since 2016, these members relocated to European countries, including a
camp in Albania. MEK was included on the European Union's list of terrorist organizations between 2002
and 2009 and until 2012 on the American list of terrorist organizations. Allegedly, MEK officially
abandoned armed combat since 2000.
The political wing of MEK is the Conseil National de la Resistance Iranienne, "CNRI" hereinafter.
They have their headquarters in France (Auvers-sur-Oise).
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Iran considers these opposition parties to be terrorist organizations and according to the State of Iran,
these organizations are responsible for several (deadly) attacks and rioting in Iran.
In the past, the (executive) members of MEK and CNRI were frequent targets of several assassinations or
attempts thereto. On March 22, 2018, an attempted attack on the MEK camp in Albania was thwarted.
MEK and CNRI ascribed this attack and all other (attempted) attacks to the State of Iran or one of its
security services, such as MOIS.
As regards the intelligence service [ of the] Iranian Ministry of intelligence and Security and
department 312
Information provided by the Security of the State in the criminal file shows that the "Iranian Ministry of
Intelligence and Security", MOIS hereinafter, was established in 1983 and comes under the authority of
the Minister of intelligence since 2013. MOIS is supposed to have its roots in the Shah's old secret
political police (the infamous Savak). MOIS occupies a central position among the Iranian security
services and is thought to have substantial funds. Department 312 is thought to be a directorate focusing
on the Iranian opposition abroad. There may be other government agencies in Iran so engaged.
As regards the start of the investigation
The criminal file [ sic] started with an urgent report from the Security of the State on June 25, 2018, to the
Office of the Federal Prosecutor. Security of the State received information through a partner agency that
a Belgo-Iranian couple could be involved in an act of violence or an attempt thereto in France. The info
also gave the concrete identity of the couple, to wit the first and second defendants.
On June 27, 2018, additional information was received from the Security of the State, based on [its] own
investigation.
They could give a little more information about the persons potentially involved.
The first defendant was of Iranian origin and had resided in Belgium since June 27, 2003. He has applied
for asylum five times, but was refused every time. He also tried to apply for asylum in Sweden.
He applied for political asylum because he fled Iran for political reasons, as he claimed. It is not clear
what the true course of events was surrounding his departure from Iran, because he stated several causes
as the reason for his political asylum. For instance, the initial reason he gave in 2004 was that he had
gotten into trouble with the Iranian security services/ religious police, because he had helped a wounded
student during a student demonstration he happened to pass by. Because this was insufficiently concrete,
he indicated in his subsequent applications for asylum that he had been active in MEK since his arrival in
Belgium, but this was not considered sufficient either. Ultimately he was able to profit from the
humanitarian regularization in 2010 and
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His spouse, the second defendant, came to Belgium in 2007. She travelled from Turkey to the
Netherlands, where she was picked up because she allegedly had a counterfeit Swedish Schengen visa.
She applied for political asylum in Belgium because she had problems with the Iranian security services
because of her husband's activities for MEK in Belgium. She claimed she had lost her job because of this
as well. She allegedly sympathizes with MEK, but was not deeply involved in the organization. Her
asylum was denied for reason of being insufficiently credible, opportunistic, and disingenuous.
Ultimately, the second defendant also profited from the humanitarian regularization in 2010 and obtained
Belgian citizenship subsequently.
The Security of the State also found it remarkable that the first and second defendants returned to Iran,
even though they had problems with the Iranian security services.
On the basis of further investigation, the Security of the State suspected that the violent action might
involve the busy conference ofMEK/CNRI in Villepinte (near Paris) on June 30, 2018. This congress
was to be attended by internationally prominent (political) VIPs sympathetic to the Iranian opposition.
The investigation
On June 28, 2018, the Office of the Federal Prosecutor requested an Examining Magistrate, ordering,
among other things, immediate surveillance of the first and second defendants, as well as a tap on the
known telephone numbers.
On June 28, 2018, it was established during the internationally conducted surveillance that the first and
second defendants were moving to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, where they had contact with an
unidentified person. After the contact, this person was identified during a traffic check as the fourth
defendant who was in possession of an Austrian identity card. At the time he was accompanied by his
spouse and his two sons.
On June 29, 2018, additional information was received from the Security of the State alleging that the
first defendant had contacts with an unidentified person using coded language.
These contacts would evidence that first defendant was focused on his assignment and was convinced that
they will succeed. There was a discussion about a meeting in Luxembourg and about a Playstation 4,
which could be code words for a device that could be used to commit a violent act. Allegedly, the second
defendant had disposal of a large sum of money, in the amount of 15,000 Euros in cash, and an advance
of 2,500 Euros was paid out for the purchase of a new Mercedes coupe.
The third defendant was mentioned for the first time in this information as well, as possibly involved in
the events about to take place.
The first and second defendants were still under surveillance on June 30, 2018.
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Review of the telephone records shows that the first defendant was called on 11 h 07. About seven
minutes later, the first and second defendants departed with their vehicle in the direction of Brussels.
On the way, the first and second defendants received several suspicious text messages in their vehicle
from an Austrian number, using coded language. They mentioned a "tool" which was to be installed.
They mentioned "advancing from 20 hours to 17 h 30." The first defendant also mentioned "2 o'clock
until 17 h 30" and "regular cleaning." The latter could be a code word for potential contra-surveillance
techniques.
When following the vehicle, it was indeed determined that the first defendant was performing contrasurveillance
techniques by switching his speed regularly from 130 km/h to 180 km/h, which made the
vehicle hard to follow.
Around 12 h 24 the vehicle of the first and second defendants got stuck in a traffic jam on the Brussels
beltway, upon which they took an exit to Sint-Pieters-Woluwe. The vehicle was stopped a few minutes
later and the first and second defendants were intercepted and arrested.
A perimeter of 200 meters was established immediately and the DOVO explosives disposal service
arrived at the site.
At 14 h 49 DOVO found in the trunk of the vehicle a suspicious toilet bag from which wires protruded.
DOVO made an X-ray of the toilet bag.
Around 15 h 15, the explosives disposal service reported that it might possibly be a detonator and that
they were going to open the pack and examine it.
Around 16 h 25 DOVO reported a suspicious white powder, the weight of which was estimated at ca. 500
grams. During manipulation and dismantling of the device involved, the white powder had exploded. The
DOVO robot was heavily damaged. In spite of the wide perimeter, a member of the special units became
unwell (headache, flushed face and auditory damage) after he was hit by the pressure wave.
A yellow/gold notebook was retrieved from the vehicle, as well as a mobile phone with only a single
contact, an Austrian number stored under "Daniaaal."
At the same time several house searches were performed, including of the address in Wilrijk in the
residence of the first and second defendants, where three wrappers were found in a travel suitcase
containing a total of 35,690 Euros in cash.
A house search in Ukkel at the address of the third defendant produced numerous CDs, video equipment,
photo cameras, and video cassettes and spyware.
The third defendant was arrested by the French police on June 30, 2018, in the parking lot of the congress
in Villepinte and was immediately extradited to Belgium.
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The fourth defendant was apprehended on July 1, 2018, on the German Autobahn at Weibersbrunn, when
he returned from Austria with his family. They were redirected to a roadside restaurant, where they were
further inspected. Because the police dog responded to the potential presence of explosives in the vehicle,
the entire family was arrested.
No explosives were found in the vehicle and after preliminary questioning, the family members of the
fourth defendant were released.
The fourth defendant was ultimately extradited to Belgium by the German judiciary.
The first and second defendants stated during preliminary questioning that they were afraid of the fourth
defendant, whom they know as "Daniel." The fourth defendant would wait for a text message after
completion of the assignment. After their assignment they were to go to Cologne, where they would have
another meeting with the fourth defendant.
The first as well as the second defendant claimed that they were not aware that the device was a bomb.
According to them it was a device to produce a lot of noise.
In her initial statement, the second defendant claimed that the device was to be thrown at the concession
stands. The first defendant claimed that he was to put it in the parking lot in the vicinity of the buses.
The bomb
Information from DOVO shows that it was an operational improvised explosive device ("improvised
explosive device"-IED) that was concealed in a toilet bag.
DOVO:
"Technical evaluation: The JED was composed of components freely available commercially. However, a
good basic knowledge of electronics is required to make this kind of JED. The general construction of the
device can be considered highly professional and attests to an awareness with respect to subsequent
forensic investigation. For instance, all components of the JED were placed in direct contact with the
explosive charge. This ensure maximum damage and uselessness of the evidentiary material
subsequently. "
It had two electric detonators to insure correct operation of the device with certainty.
It had an explosive charge estimated not to exceed ca. 500 gr. TATP (triacetone triperoxide). TATP is a
"Home Made Explosive" made from acetone, hydrogen peroxide, and an acid. A firing mechanism
triggered by a remotely controlled transmitter was provided. This transmitter was sufficiently powerful to
work at a distance of hundreds of meters and it could not be ruled out that there were multiple remote
controls.
A remote control was found in a toilet bag belonging to the second defendant
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for said device. The remote control was in a protective cover in order to prevent it from engaging by an
accidental push on the button.
Subsequent investigation
The investigation was continued subsequently, predominantly network research with the intention to
retrieve the emails exchanged by the first and second defendants with the fourth defendant. There were
more tapping operations and a warrant for direct monitoring of conversations between the second and
third defendants and between the first and second defendants while awaiting questioning. Several
witnesses were questioned and reconstruction of the correct course of events was predominantly
attempted through telephone research (retro-active investigation) and analysis of the recovered digital
devices.
The first and second defendants made extensive statements in which they admitted the acts to a certain
extent. The intention was to detonate the device, which they described as "fireworks."
This then would cause chaos, which would disrupt the congress and would scare the Iranian participants
out of participation in later editions.
In this and subsequent statements, the first and second defendants claimed that they were pressured by the
Iranian intelligence service MOIS to gather information about the activities of MEK and its members.
The first and second defendants claim that, in order to ensure their cooperation, the Iranian intelligence
service MOIS used threats against their Iranian family, particularly the father of the second defendant, on
one hand and on the other the defendants were remunerated for the information they provided which
enticed them to do more work for the intelligence service.
According to the statements of the first and second defendants, it all started in 2007, when an Iranian
agent "Jawad" asked them for information by telephone. Their statements and the information with
respect to their flight data show that the first and second defendants departed for Iran together in February
of 2010, where they allegedly had a meeting with several MOIS agents during which they were again put
under pressure.
The stamps in their passports show that they flew to Tehran in December of 2010 as well.
Back in Belgium they were contacted by telephone by a new Iranian "runner." This [person] always
operated from Iran. In 2012 they were summoned back to Iran.
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There the pressure on them was increased to provide more information about the organization
MEK/CNRI. The first defendant claims that he flew to Tehran in December of 2013 as well. During this
encounter he noticed that the Iranian agents also knew when the first defendant was present at the
MEK/CNRI, from which he inferred that there were other informants in the MEK/CNRI. From 2013 on
they were remunerated more systematically for the information they provided. For instance, the first
defendant received sums of money in the amount of 6,000 Euros.
The first and second defendants claim that they were contacted in 2015 by an Iranian agent in Europe,
who called himself "Daniel." This was the fourth defendant. The couple met him for the first time in
Munich in the summer of 2015. The fourth defendant had mentioned that he worked for the Iranian
embassy in Vienna. They then received the sum of 4,000 Euros for expenses. They were to contact each
other by email. At the end of November of 2015, another meeting took place at MOIS in Iran, which was
also attended by the fourth defendant. They were asked to gather more information about the MEK/CNRI
headquarters in Auvers-sur-Oise (France). From that time the meetings took place all over Europe,
including Munich, Milan, Luxembourg, and Vienna.
Subsequent investigation, including the exploitation of the confiscated mobile phones and computer,
analysis of the recovered email messages and the statements of the first and second defendants, shows
that most communications involved the fourth defendant by email, forwarding or handing over movies or
audio fragments about the activities of the MEK members. The first defendant used the email address
"[email protected]" and the fourth defendant "[email protected]." The emails
were in code, but it is clear that the first and second defendants gave information about the activities of
the MEK/CNRI members. Additionally there were operational mobile phones which only served to
exchange short messages or to meet each other. This took place in several European locations, often
outside Austria, where one always made certain that there were no surveillance cameras and not too many
people. At a certain moment a meeting was arranged on a train as well. Information was exchanged by
Telegram as well. They themselves state that they were now paid more regularly. The first defendant
mentioned 3,500 to 4,000 Euros every other three or four months, in another interrogation he mentioned
1,500-1,700 Euros monthly.
Exploitation of a yellow notebook shows several amounts, which the first defendant claims were expenses
(usually travel costs) which were partly reimbursed by the fourth defendant.
Analysis of the email messages shows that the first and second defendants negotiated with the fourth
defendant about their remuneration, especially when they received this specific assignment. It was clear
that the first and second defendants were after a large financial recompense. Analysis of the bank
accounts of both defendants showed that both defendants made cash deposits of enormous amounts. A
large sum of money was also recovered from their residence.
In the course of the investigation the first and second defendants maintain their claim that they were
abused, because they thought the device involved was only going to produce noise and that it was not
their intention to maim or kill people. They always
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call it fireworks.
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The first defendant states that the information he provided to the reporting officers during his
interrogation was 100% reliable, but monitoring of the conversations between the first and second
defendants evidences clearly that they matched their statements and that second defendant also gave
instructions about the way in which the first defendant should make his statements, which he had to keep
her out of as much as possible.
The third defendant denied in all his interrogations that he had anything to do with the attempted attack or
with espionage for the Iranian security services. He is an Iranian political refugee, who has already
resided in Belgium for years. He supposedly is a poet/writer and living on a limited allowance and does
some black-market renovation work here and there.
He had regular contact (almost daily) with the Belgian branch of MEK, including via the VZW Iran Ref.,
and did all sorts of assignments for them, such as, among other things, movie recordings and poster
design. He also performed tasks sometimes at the annual MEK conference in Villepinte. A search of the
residence of the third defendant produced all sorts of spyware, including USB-sticks with the capability to
make recordings, as well as a pair of glasses with a hidden camera. He made several recordings of the
MEK demonstrations, but just as much of the various participants. Photographs were found as well,
which were made in sequence in such a way that they can be regarded as directions to a building used by
MEK members. One witness did not understand why he was filming all the people participating in MEK
demonstrations. Another witness tried to keep him at a distance, having mistrusted the third defendant for
some time already. For instance, the third defendant wanted to attend MEK demonstrations in the
Netherlands, but this was refused by the person in charge in Belgium. Several managerial persons also
found it strange that he visited the MEK camp in Albania in 2017, which apparently was unusual.
The third defendant used to help out with the security of the MEK congress which was organized
annually, and supposedly assisted in the protection of the leader of CNRI.
However, this year he was barred from security work of the congress. He was only allowed to accompany
the Belgian delegation with the bus. However, it attracted attention that he had said that he was not going
to return to Belgium with the bus. One witness also found it curious that the third defendant was not
sitting with the Belgian delegation during the congress, but that he hung around the exit the entire time.
Att the time of his arrest in the parking lot he was in possession of a mobile phone with an Austrian
number and with only a single contact. This contact turned out to be the fourth defendant and the SIM
card cover of the SIM card of this "operational mobile phone" of the third defendant was recovered from
the vehicle of the fourth defendant as well.
The fourth defendant did not really collaborate with the investigation and denied any involvement. He
complained that he was not treated as his diplomatic status required. He did not have anything to do with
the acts.
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In his last interrogation, at his own request, he warned that armed groups were thought to be ready to
undertake something in Belgium, in case he would be convicted.
His defense minimalizes this statement as an emotional aberration caused by the special and heavy prison
regimen he is undergoing.
As regards the charge of attempted murder
In order to discuss attempted murder, an intent to kill must be proven and that there was premeditation.
As regards the intent to kill
The defense of the second defendant tries to convince the Court that a "bomb" was not really involved.
They say that it had insufficient explosive force, that it would assumedly not have harmed anyone or that
the damage would at most have been quite limited. The defense claims that the first and second
defendants would not be far off the mark when they constantly talk about "fireworks." They say it would
only produce a loud bang to cause chaos. In order to support this position, the defense submits pictures of
the vehicle immediately after the explosion. There was no damage to the vehicle, nor to the toilet bag
containing the explosive, nor to the road surface. The defense examined the impounded vehicle right
before the public session and concluded once again that there was no damage to the rear of the vehicle.
However, the argument that the explosion occurred at the rear of the vehicle is not justified.
The defense of the second defendant completely rejects the content of the criminal file here and in
particular the DOVO technical report. The criminal file shows that a perimeter of (at least) 200 meters
was established. The device was removed from the toilet bag by the DOVO robot. At about 6 meters from
the vehicle, the bomb accidentally exploded, while the robot held the explosive at a height of more than 1
meter. That was the reason no crater was formed in the road surface. This occurred, moreover, at the front
of the vehicle and not at the rear of the vehicle. The toilet bag did not get damaged indeed, because it had
been removed from the trunk by the robot and placed behind the vehicle. The robot removed the
explosive from the toilet bag after an X-ray scan had been made first, and then moved to about 6 meters
in front of the vehicle.
The defense of several defendants also states that it is not known how many grams of explosive material
was actually present. DOVO mentions 500 gr. at most. In their estimate of the explosive material, the
DOVO experts take into account the size of the toilet bag in which the explosive device was housed.
It is indeed not known how much explosive material was present.
However, it is an objective fact that, despite the controlled condition in which the bomb was
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dismantled, it damaged the DOVO robot to such an extent that the robot was put out of action.
It has also been established that someone from the special units of the police, in spite of the established
perimeter, incurred physical damage as a consequence of the pressure wave caused by the explosion.
Of course, DOVO cannot establish how much explosive material was present, but estimated this on the
basis of its knowledge and the specific factual situation at ca. 500 grams.
It is also known that TATP is an explosive which has 88% of the explosive force of TNT. This means that
1 gram of TATP equals 0.88 grams of TNT.
According to a report from a German expert, TATP is an explosive highly sensitive to shocks and friction
which only is produced by home laboratories. When detonating a quantity of 500 grams, one should allow
for a detonation conversion. This means that in an enclosed space, this can possibly result in fatal injuries
to persons in the immediate vicinity.
It has been established, therefore, that detonation of this device at a congress attended by thousands of
people would result in fatalities. Not only because of the explosion itself, but also because of the ensuing
chaos.
Analysis of the messages of the first and second defendants shows that the "bomb" was made in Iran. It
was fine-tuned there and tested multiple times. According to information form the Security of the State,
the device was brought in in a diplomatic suitcase on a regular scheduled flight between Tehran and
Vienna.
It has been established that the fourth defendant had the intention to commit a deadly attack on a busy
congress, by giving orders to have this device, taking into account its specific content and function,
detonated. He gave clear instructions to the first and second defendants about the way in which the device
should be charged, how the device had to be wrapped in plastic wrap and how the antenna should be
aimed during transport so that the device would not receive a WiFi signal. Moreover, the note book
recovered from the vehicle of the fourth defendant not only contained notes on the operation of the
device, but also on a potential attack with acid or other toxic pathogenic substances. This unequivocally
show the intent to kill.
The first and second defendants are co-perpetrators in this attempted homicide, considering the factual
acts they committed: taking custody of the device, its transport to Belgium, charging the device pursuant
to the instructions, and then, upon command, departure for Villepinte with the explosive material.
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The first and second defendants cannot be prosecuted [because] the intention was not to inflict fatalities
and they only thought that it was some sort of fireworks that would produce a loud bang.
As yet the first and second defendants are not truthful in their statements where they were supposed to
place the device.
The first and second defendants make varying statements, and they contradict each other as well.
For instance, they discussed detonating the device near the concession stands ( original statement of the
second defendant immediately after arrest) or near the book stands. These two locations are inside a small
room next to the auditorium. The first defendant said in his first statement that the device was supposed to
explode near the buses, on a lawn near the buses. In a later statement he spoke about the outside tent,
before one had to pass through security, where the visitors had to leave their bags. There was also security
personnel present in this tent, however, to keep watch on the baggage.
It appears from the investigation, from the interrogations among other things, that the device was
supposed to be detonated at a time when many visitors would be entering the auditorium.
The defendants sometime speak of "placing" and sometimes of "throwing" the device between the chairs.
In any case it was impressed upon them to keep sufficient distance (up to 300 meters) themselves.
According to a certain statement, the first defendant was to place the device outside first and then go in
through security.
The recovered chat messages exchanged between the first and second defendants and a certain "Negar"
are noteworthy. The first defendant thinks that "Negar" is an Iranian woman in Iran, with whom he chats
in a loving way and has an amorous (platonic) relationship. The relationship between the first defendant
also arose by chat (according to what the first and second defendants say). The first defendant is very
open toward "Negar" and she is clearly aware of the plans.
From the results of the search of the residence of the first and second defendants, which produced a
certain smartphone belonging to the second defendant , from an overheard conversation (from the prison)
between the second defendant and her sister and finally from the statements of the second defendant, it
appears that she conducted chat conversation with first defendant in secret, in which she presented herself
as "Negar." The first defendant had no notion of this at all.
These conversations are of importance for determining where the attack was to occur, but these
conversations will also be of importance in assessing the personalities of the first and second defendants:
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- Chat conversations on June 28, 2018:
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o First defendant: "If it happens inside, he himself personally goes to his man. He said
that I will request his calls for you guys. "
o First defendant: "I just wanted to ask, give me your final decision what we should do.
Are we going inside or outside?"
- Chat conversations on June 29, 2018:
o Negar (second defendant): "Amir, first check out the situation and the surroundings
thoroughly there."
o Negar (second defendant): "If it succeeds inside, with stress from below, ok." "lfyou
see that is difficult, outside, ok my dear?"
o First defendant: "Ok dear."
- Chat conversations on June 29, 2018 (a little later):
o Negar (second defendant): "Go very easy with Nasim." "Tomorrow if you see that's
going to work, do it inside.
If not. Outside. Ok? Go very easy"
o First defendant: "Ok."
o Negar (second defendant): "Go very easy."
o First defendant: "ok"
o Negar (second defendant): "And don't worry. Be very good mentally as well. Don't
make each other nervous. "
These messages show that they had orders to detonate it inside and that the second defendant also urges
the first defendant to try it inside first.
This shows clearly that the defendants were to detonate the device in the vicinity of human presence,
regardless whether this was to happen inside the auditorium or by the buses on the parking lot or in the
luggage tent.
They knew, moreover, that they had to get out of range before detonating the device, so that they could
not see whether there were people in the vicinity of the device when [the button] on the remote control
was pushed.
It does not appear at all that the first and second defendants were misled and really assumed that it was
just "fireworks." The Court refers to the results of the direct monitoring, which show that they matched
their statements in this respect:
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Second defendant: "Say that you were misled, that you were deceived by a diplomat from
Etekaa 'at .. We must prove that. We must prove. They must understand that neither did we
know it was something dangerous and neither that we intended to murder anyone."
First defendant: "Aslo say that there is a lot of security there that you can't even go in
there with a camera. Say it as truth. That they are going to check that out. "
First defendant: "I've never even stolen anything, how could I murder people? It is not a
joke, isn't it? We should tell the truth. Nasim, why would we lie?"
Second defendant: "Yes, I know, but alas, alas that thing has indeed been in our car. And
you and I, like two fools, accepted that from him. "
First defendant: "I know."
Second defendant: How gullible we are. How come you did not even check inside that
bag?"
Say it too, when I went to Luxembourg, I was only thinking of a map. I was even in shock
when he gave me a bag, but when he said that it is the same thing and is a cracker I
accepted it just like a simple stupid person."
Quite noteworthy is the following result of direct monitoring:
First defendant: "Say, why did he not tell us the truth, actually?"
Second defendant: "Amir, do you remember? I asked him: "it is not something
dangerous, is it? He replied: "no, no, perhaps it will damage the underside of the car a
little. "
First defendant: "Nasim never tell this. I have already told things about it. I said it was to
give the Iranians who came there this year a little shock so that they won't return next
year. That's it!"
This exchange shows clearly that they knew it would do more than just give a bang, but that this should
not by any means be told to the police services.
Moreover, even if the Court would accept that they thought that it would be some sort of fireworks, that
would only produce a bang, the first and second defendants should have asked themselves some serious
questions at any rate.
For instance, according to their statements, the fourth defendant took a charge card and a key from the
second defendant with them to Iran. It is not clear that the intention was to put the "fireworks" in there or
that this would be used as spyware, because the statements diverge here as well.
They even talk at a certain moment of the possibility of special make-up. They were surprised that all the
same they were given a rather large device, which they were to handle with great caution, that they were
to charge the night before it was to be used and the antenna of which
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they were to manipulate in such a way that it would not make contact with another signal.
They also discuss this during direct monitoring:
Second defendant: "It is our own fault. He told you: "between the makeup stuff" Why
did we accept that anyway Thursday when we saw that it is a bag?"
First defendant: "We made a mistake."
Second defendant: "And also. Why [ did we I not take a peek inside what it is when we
took it home?
First defendant: "Precisely."
Second defendant: "And that we don't consider the fact that it is something dangerous."
The first and second defendants carry out orders knowingly and of their own volition, don't even check
out the device they were transporting. The way in which they were to manipulate the device shows
irrefutably that they should know that it was more than just "fireworks."
Moreover, continuing on the implausible arguments of the first and second defendants, that considering
the bang it would produce (according to the first defendant, it would have been heard inside the
conference hall), the distance they should maintain from the device (so that one had insufficient view of
the human presence) and the moment that the device was supposed to produce a bang, this could even io
that hypothesis result in human victims, at least as a result of the panic and the chaos.
For completeness' sake, the Court refers to the overheard conversation from the prison of the second
defendant with her sister:
"How stupid you guys were that you did not see that it had a detonating mechanism? A
firecracker does not have a detonating mechanism, dies it?"
The issue here is not "stupidity" but "unwillingness to know." One is a co-perpetrator when one directly
collaborates with a criminal act and one is aware that one is participating in an illicit act, without further
specification or detailed knowledge.
The defendants have knowingly and of their own volition agreed to detonate a device, of which they knew
very well that it would inflict damage to the underside of a vehicle in case of accidental detonation and
that it was not ordinary "fireworks" considering the way in which the device was to be manipulated, at a
location with substantial human presence. Fatalities would be a normal and foreseeable consequence of
the violence applied.
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As regards premeditation
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There can be no dispute that there was premeditation in the case of the first, second, and fourth
defendants. Allegedly, there were two encounters in Austria, one in Vienna and one in the train between
Vienna and Salzburg.
Analysis of the email traffic of the first and second defendants with the fourth defendant shows that the
first and second defendants negotiated about the remuneration. For instance, the email traffic of March
25, 2018, shows that they even imposed conditions such as an increased monthly compensation of 2,000
EUR and a supplementary compensation for their share in placing the bomb and finally the comment that
the compensation should be preserved because they wanted to buy a house. They brought in the extra
argument that they had great stress with regard to their family and that the first defendant feared for his
position as an informant at MEK. They also extolled their own specific position as informants at MEK.
On April 26, 2018, the fourth defendant replied that there had been internal consultations with a certain
"Mohsen", but that those conditions were not feasible. They were to: "continue cooking as before."
Further analysis of the email traffic shows that in the meantime the first and second defendants continued
to provide information about MEK, including about the annual congress on June 30, 2018.
A new encounter took place abroad on May 12, 2018. Perusal of the messages shows that preparation of
everything for the attack continued.
On May 25, 2018, the first defendant reconfirmed their agreement to the fourth defendant:
"Saeid [sic] and Monshi have thought a lot about the card game for the wedding party and they have
decided that it must be very professional, in order to be able to win the match!", but they imposed new
conditions indeed: "Both of them agree, but if Mohsen were to promise that he can arrange a big surprise
then Saied [sic] will be delivered from his fatigue of those past years. "
With a view to this compensation they searched for a new apartment in that period and ordered a new
Mercedes coupe, for which they made a down-payment. This appears on one hand from a recovered note,
for an appointment to visit two apartments; they were in possession of a business card of a real estate
agency and there was a
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telephone conversation on June 25, 2018, which shows that the second defendant expected payment of a
large sum of money when the work was completed and that they wanted to buy a residence with it.
On June 20, 2018, the first defendant participated in a meeting of the Belgian division of MEK in
preparation for the congress. His duties included renting a refrigerator truck and transport rolls and
beverages of the Belgian participants. He was also assigned to transport people to Paris.
It appears from the international observation and the interrogation of the first and second defendants that
they met the fourth defendant in the City of Luxembourg, where in a Pizza Hut a USB-drive with the
latest information was handed over, a wrapper with 18,000 EUR, a new operational mobile phone and the
"bomb", The explosive was in a blue ladies' toilet bag and the second defendant put this together with the
remote control in her handbag.
The fourth defendant gave clear instructions how the bomb was to be charged and made operational. It
was to be packaged in a black plastic wrap and there was a safety perimeter to be observed. For
activation, the remote control needed to be pressed for 3 minutes. The antenna had to be pushed down
during transport, so that it would not pick up any wifi signals.
On June 29, 2018, several messages were exchanged between the two operational mobile phones of the
first and fourth defendant. It appear from those that the explosive was charged pursuant to the instructions
and wrapped in plastic wrap.
Right before their departure on June 30, 2018, the fourth defendant sent a text message with the latest
instructions. They were to leave the operational mobile phone in the parking lot in Villepinte in their
vehicle. The agreed to make contact again at 17 h 30 and were to see each other again in Cologne after the
attack. The investigation has shown that the fourth defendant stayed in the vicinity of Cologne with his
family.
The first defendant charged the device at their home pursuant to the instructions of the fourth defendant
and made the device operational for use.
The first and second defendants put the explosive in a small travel suitcase in their vehicle and the remote
control went into the handbag of the second defendant.
The Court refers here as well to the noteworthy chat conversations which the second defendant, posing as
"Negar" conducted with the first defendant:
- Chat conversations on June 11, 2018:
o Negar (second defendant): "You guys must accept the thing. You will get so much
cash money for it. We must act correctly."
- Chat conversations on June 27, 2018:
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o Negar (second defendant): "You guys must be very relaxed for Saturday. Even during
the performance of the assignment. So that you are caught nowhere."
This account of the acts shows unequivocally the premeditation of the first, second, and fourth defendant.
The Court finds that the second defendant tried to minimalize her involvement after her arrest and
manipulated the first defendant in this respect.
The Court refers to the direct monitoring and to the chat conversations of the so-called "Ne gar", in which
she really encouraged the first defendant to take action.
As regards the terrorist criminal offense
Article 137 PC provides: "Defined as a terrorist criminal offense is the criminal offense described in§§ 2
and 3, which by its nature or context can cause serious harm to a country or an international
organization and is intentionally committed with the objective to instill serious fear in a population or to
force the government or an international organization in an illegitimate manner to perform or refrain
from an act, or to seriously disrupt or destroy basic political, constitutional, economic, or social
structures of a country or an international organization."
From the reading of Article 137 § 2, 1° and Article 51 PC, the criminal offense is an offense that can be
regarded as a terrorist criminal offense.
To make an attack from Belgium in France on a conference where more than thousands of people are
present and which would have caused casualties is indisputably a crime which by its nature and context
would seriously harm France and Belgium. Moreover, this attack was planned in a period when France
was suffering under multiple terrorist attacks. The attack would instill serious fear in the population and
certainly the Iranian political refugees who are residing in the European countries and who feel protected
by our democratic constitutional state.
The Court has not been able to determine whether this attack was directed at the VIP visitors or the
regular visitors of the convention.
As regards the role of the third defendant on this charge
The judicial inquiry, including the results of the house search (where spyware was recovered), the
analysis of digital carriers and various testimonies about the behavior of the third defendant show that he
as well gathered information for the fourth
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defendant about MEK/CNRI.
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The Court refers to the information which was provided via the Security of the State and in which the
third defendant was mentioned as involved in the attack about to be carried out.
In previous editions, the third defendant was always involved in the organization and specifically the
security of the congress. Allegedly, he even used to be among those responsible for the safety of the
leader of the CNRI.
This year he was not allowed to participate in the organization. The only assignment given to him was to
accompany the bus with Belgian participants to the congress and back.
On the day itself it attracted attention, according to several witnesses, that the third defendant behaved
differently. He was nervous and was said to be absent-minded. It also drew attention that he stated that he
would not go back with the bus with Belgian participants.
One witness noticed that the third defendant did not join the Belgian delegation in the auditorium, but that
he stayed apart at the back of the auditorium near the exit.
The third defendant was, at the time of his arrest, in possession of an operational mobile phone with an
Austrian number with only a single contact, to wit with the operational mobile phone of the fourth
defendant. This mobile phone was used exclusively for his contacts with the fourth defendant.
Moreover, the SIM card cover of the SIM of the operational mobile phone of the third defendant was
recovered from the vehicle of the fourth defendant at the time of his arrest.
The inquiry was able to recover some text messages which were exchanged between the third and the
fourth defendant on June 17, 2018.
Messages originating from the third defendant on June 17, 2018, to the fourth defendant:
"I am your humble"
"The new one, no not yet"
"I forwarded the new one"
"Ok."
Messages originating from the fourth defendant on June 17, 2018, to the third defendant:
"At 18 ': the store is closed. Can you come Monday and get groceries? At 18 hours. "
"Send a text message to the number 6700, so that 10 eu becomes charge [sic]"
"Notice, if it succeeds, I will tell you, is that new?"
"Then when I get OK again, I will send you something or I will go Monday at this time to the
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store."
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In the exchange of these messages in code, the fourth defendant inquired whether there was any news.
The inquiry clearly shows that this timing of these messages is significant, as the fourth defendant left for
Iran a few days later to pick up the explosive. The fourth defendant also notified the first and second
defendants by email on June 18, 2018, that he was going to Iran in order to finalize the preparations with
respect to the attack.
Moreover, a witness statement shows that the third defendant took the initiative around June 17, 2018,
with the person in charge of the Belgian branch of MEK to be involved again in the organization of the
security of the event.
On June 30, 2018, the third defendant was at least the eyes and ears of the fourth defendant on site during
the attack that was to be carried out. He was also assigned to take care of other matters for the fourth
defendant at the moment the attack took place. At least he was on watch, but his task must have been
more extensive. His role was crucial in the preparations as well, as he, because of his role in previous
editions, had concrete information with respect to the organization and the security of the congress.
From all these facts the Court deduces unequivocally that the third defendant was aware and actively
involved in the attack which was to occur on June 30, 2018, and is in that manner complicit in the
attempted terrorist murder.
It is not out of the question, even, that still more people were involved in or were prepared for this attack.
As regards the charge participation in a terrorist group (charge D)
Art. 139, paragraph 1, PC, provides: "A terrorist group is any structured association of more than two
persons which has been in existence for some time and which acts in mutual consultations to commit
terrorist crimes. "
The first and second defendants constantly try to hide behind the pressure exercised by the Iranian
regime, including on their family and specifically the father of the second defendant.
The Court is unable to adequately assess this heavy pressure. There may have been some pressure indeed,
but the pressure was certainly not as great as the defendants try to make it appear, and was certainly not
so great that the first and second defendants could not refuse to cooperate. This pressure was only
mentioned in their interrogations and is hardly evidenced by the file for the rest. No pressure at all can be
inferred from the email messages exchanged with the fourth defendant, on the contrary. The interrogation
of the sister of the second defendant, but also the content of the monitored conversations between the
second defendant (from
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prison) and her sister do not really show that pressure was exercised on the Iranian family, but that, rather,
there was pressure with respect to their Belgian residence situation which was inconsistent with their trips
to Iran. In the end, it appears that there was only a limited pressure and the financial earnings were
actually the dominant motive to offer their information-gathering services.
Moreover, the analysis of the internet browser shows the first defendant looked on his own initiative for
information about spyware on the internet. Moreover, reference may be made to the analysis of the email
messages, in which the first and second defendants expressly stated financial conditions with respect to
the attack which was to be mounted, which is hard to reconcile with the pressure from the Iranian
authorities.
The Court also refers to the chat conversations between the alleged "Negar" (second defendant) and the
first defendant, in which money was mentioned and how important this was to them.
The third defendant provided his services for purely monetary gain as well, without any ideological
conviction.
According to the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the civil parties, the attack was organized by the
Iranian intelligence service MOIS and specifically department 312. These constitute, according to the
Office of the Public Prosecutor and the civil parties, the terrorist group which was responsible for the
foiled attack.
The Office of the Public Prosecutor, which refers to the information from the Security of the State and
OCAD and the civil parties which refer additionally to their own sources of information, claim that MOIS
and specifically department 312 are responsible for several fatal attacks or attempts at these in Europe on
leaders or prominent members of the Iranian opposition.
The Court is unable to objectively assess this information adequately about attacks all over Europe on the
basis of the elements brought in to the criminal file. From the summary of these suspicions, which point
in the direction of the Iranian state or MOIS, the Court cannot conclude that MOIS is a terrorist group.
Fatal attacks can just as well be mounted by other intelligence services or by rival opposition parties.
The Court finds the various reports and articles are insufficiently objectifiable as well.
The only objective information is the verdict of the German Court in 1997, which associates MOIS with a
fatal attack in Germany on the basis of a German criminal file.
It has certainly been established that the first, second, third, and fourth defendants formed a terrorist
group. They collected information about the organizations and the members of these organizations. On
the basis of the information so obtained, they organized in order to mount an attack on one of the most
important annual gatherings of these Iranian opposition parties.
However, it can be inferred unequivocally from the criminal file that there was a more extensive
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involvement than these four defendants.
The Court refers, among other things, to the remarks included below.
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The statements of the first and second defendants show clearly that initially they were
recruited and run by agents operating from Iran. Both stated that they worked for the
intelligence service MOIS. They regularly returned to Iran, where they had meetings with
various individuals from MOIS.
Their statements also show that the fourth defendant was also employed by the
intelligence service MOIS and that they had to go to Iran under him as well for
consultations. In Iran they not only met the fourth defendant, but other MOIS agents as
well.
The fourth defendant operated from an Iranian political cover. He did not perform any
diplomatic activities, but ran informants in Europe. Working under diplomatic status
without in fact performing these duties is only possible with the consensus of those
responsible with the Iranian state.
The statements for the first and second defendants and the analysis of the email messages
and the audio recordings made by the first, second, and third defendant show that initially
the original runners and later the fourth defendant gathered information about MEK.
Neither Iran nor MOIS have distanced themselves from the activities of the fourth
defendant.
Analysis of the email messages between the first/second and the fourth defendant and the
statements of the first and second defendants show sufficiently that the explosive device
was manufactured and certainly tested in Iran. On the basis of the classified
memorandum from the Security of the State of September 7, 2020, it may be deduced
with objective certainty that the fourth defendant brought the explosive in diplomatic
luggage on a commercial flight from Iran to Austria.
The fourth defendant had disposal of substantial sums of money to pay the first, second
and third defendants and these monies were, considering their magnitude, not personal
funds of the fourth defendant.
Analysis of the email messages shows that, with respect to the financial demands made
by the first and second defendants to take action, the fourth defendant himself had to
obtain approval from his principals.
According to information from the Security of the State, which the Court deems reliable,
the fourth defendant is thought to be a MOIS intelligence officer and running sources in
Europe as an intelligence officer for department 312.
On the basis of these elements, the Court concludes that there is a group within department 312 of the
intelligence service MOIS, which engaged in information gathering about the MEK/CNRI and used this
information to select targets
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and ultimately proceed to organize an attack on a convention of these Iranian opposition parties.
This group, of which the first, second, third, and fourth defendants were part, together with an
indeterminable number of Iranian MOIS agents, is a terrorist group pursuant to Art. 139, first paragraph,
PC. Certainly the first, second, third, and fourth defendants have made an active contribution to this
terrorist group.
The Court cannot deduce on the basis of the information available from the criminal file how large this
group is and how this group is supported within the Iranian political structure and who was the ultimate
(highest) principal of the foiled attack.
As regards declaring the charges A and D proven
Therefore, the attempted terrorist murder (charge A) and membership [in a] terrorist group (charge D) has
been sufficiently proven with respect to the first, second, and fourth defendant on the basis of the
determinations of the reporting officers:
the initial info from the Security of the State,
the apprehension in the act,
the results of the surveillance in Luxembourg on June 28, 2018,
the analysis of the email messages exchanged between the first and second defendants on
one hand and the fourth defendant on the other,
the results of the search or the residence of the first and second defendants,
the results of the search of the vehicle of the fourth defendant,
the communication in code and the deletion of messages,
the finding regarding the mobile phone contacts between the first and fourth defendant
around the time of the acts,
the large amounts of cash at the disposal of the first and second defendants,
the analysis of the chat messages between "Negar" (second defendant) and the first
defendant,
the result of the direct monitoring between the first and second defendants,
the technical and expert report about the IED,
the manner in which the defendants were to manipulate and arm the IED,
the statements of the first and second defendants about their own role, about each other's
role, and about the role of the fourth defendant.
As regards the fourth defendant, additional reference can be made to:
his contacts with the third defendant as unique contact,
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the text messages exchanged on 6/17/2018,
and the communication in coded language.
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Therefore, participation in attempted terrorist murder (charge A) and membership [in a] terrorist group
(charge D) has been sufficiently proven with respect to the third defendant on the basis of the findings of
the reporting officers:
the initial info from the Security of the State and the specific info about the involvement
of the third defendant,
his presence at the scene and his behavior there,
the recovery of an operational mobile phone with the fourth defendant as only contact,
the analysis of the text messages which were exchanged between the third and fourth
defendants on June 17, 2018,
the use of coded language,
the results of the search of the residence of the third defendant, where spyware was
found,
the large amounts of cash at the disposal of the third defendant,
the regular trips to Austria and the deposit of funds, immediately after is return from
abroad,
the recordings and =es which the third defendant made of the activities of the members
of MEK/CNRI,
and finally his implausible statements.
As regards the sentence
The acts of the charges A and D intermingle with respect to the first, second, third, and fourth defendants
as having been committed with a single punishable intention, so that only a single sentence must be
pronounced.
The acts of the charges are extremely grave. Attempted terrorist murder is among the most serious crimes
in the Belgian Penal Code.
The defendants not only violated the sovereignty of the Belgian and French States. By mounting an attack
on a busy conference of Iranian opposition parties, they undermine not only the freedom of expression,
but they erode the sense of security of Iranian refugees who sought safe haven in various European
countries.
The first, second, and third defendants should realize that on the basis of the information they provided
certain people were and still are in physical danger.
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Moreover, the first, second, and third defendants considered human life secondary to their financial
motives. In determining the penalty and sentence for each defendant individually, the Court will consider
the nature and the gravity of the acts, the circumstances in which the acts took place, [and] the respective
contribution, personality, age, and criminal record of each.
The sentence with respect to the first defendant
The first defendant made statements immediately and cooperated with the legal inquiry.
The first defendant makes a naive and gullible impression on the Court. He declares that he has a genuine
sense of guilt.
However, considering the nature and gravity of the acts, a substantial effective prison sentence is called
for.
The sentence with respect to the second defendant
The second defendant also made statements.
The second defendant makes a highly manipulative impression on the Court. In that sense, the Court
refers to the direct monitoring between the first and second defendants and to the following chat
conversations of "Negar" (second defendant):
that the second defendant influences her husband to participate in the acts, and to
detonate the explosive device inside.
that the financial rewards are important to the second defendant and are even a more
serious motive to collaborate with the secret service than for the first defendant.
Therefore, her role is certainly not limited. She also forwarded information to the fourth defendant.
Moreover, the direct monitoring shows that the second defendant made another trip to Iran herself,
without the first defendant, and met with MOIS agents there. The criminal file shows that the fourth
defendant sometimes wanted to speak with the second defendant alone.
In the opinion of the Court, the second defendant has more ties to MOIS than she allows. This is shown
by the chat conversations, in which she pretended to be "Negar", by her trip to Iran without the first
defendant, and by the subtle pressure on and influencing of the first
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defendant by the second defendant. Therefore, her role in and contribution to the acts is larger than those
of the first defendant.
Considering the nature and gravity of the acts and her concrete role in them a substantial effective prison
sentence is called for.
The sentence with respect to the third defendant
The third defendant worked for the Iranian intelligence services for years, and this only from purely
financial motives. He was at the scene and considering the findings regarding his operational mobile
phone, it is evident that he was the ears and eyes of the fourth defendant on site. There is no doubt,
considering his key position, that he was completely informed about the plans to be carried out and that at
least he was on the lookout to keep the operational leader of the attack meticulously informed and if
necessary steer him on site. His important role can be seen from the amounts of money he received from
his principals as well.
Considering the nature and gravity of the acts a substantial effective prison sentence is called for.
The sentence with respect to the fourth defendant
The fourth defendant is the operational brain behind the attack. It did not weigh on his conscience at all
that there would be fatalities.
He abused his diplomatic status to commit terrorist crimes and eroded in that way the confidence one may
have in the exchange of official government emissaries.
A substantial effective prison sentence is the only suitable penalty.
As regards the revocation of citizenship
The Office of the Public Prosecutor requests revocation of citizenship with respect to the first, second,
and third defendants.
When handing down an effective prison sentence of at least 5 years for terrorist crimes, the Court can
pronounce revocation of citizenship.
The Court is not under obligation to do so.
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The first, second, and third defendants have Belgian citizenship. Additionally, they have Iranian
citizenship. That Iran does not accept the double citizenship means that the Iranian authorities refuse to
recognize the other citizenship of their citizens. It does not mean at all, therefore, that the defendants
would no longer be Iranian citizens by acquiring Belgian citizenship.
The first, second, and third defendants will not become stateless if they lose their Belgian citizenship.
The first, second, and third defendants ask that the revocation not be pronounced, for humanitarian
reasons. Their lives would be in danger if they are sent back to Iran. Certainly the first and second
defendants, considering the statements they have made accusing MOIS in general and the fourth
defendant in particular.
Revocation of citizenship does not mean that the defendants will actually be sent back to Iran. The loss of
Belgian citizenship does not automatically lead to revocation of the permit to reside in Belgium. In that
area there are separate procedures under the authority of the Alien Residents Service, where in the context
of a potential deportation the presence or absence of respect for human rights in the country of origin may
be an element in the assessment. When making a decision about the revocation of citizenship, the Court
should not consider this. The defendants, therefore, will still be able to contest a potential deportation to
Iran in a later phase. They also still have the option to request asylum in another country.
The first, second, and third defendants each have abused the hospitality of our country to mount an attack
in a friendly nation. By their respective contributions to this foiled terrorist act, they truly intended to
harm Belgium and France in their values. It would have been an attack on the democratic constitutional
state and on freedom of expression. They wanted to upset the sense of security of Iranian refugees who
have found a safe haven in the European Union.
Participation in the activities of a terrorist group can be interpreted as a form of rejection of the values and
institutions of our Belgian and of French society.
The Court finds that the conditions of Article 23/2 [ of the] Belgian Citizenship Code are fulfilled.
Therefore, the Court pronounces the revocation of the citizenship of the first, second, and third
defendants.
As regards confiscation
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As regards the first defendant and the second defendant
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The first defendant and the second defendant deposited substantial amounts in cash in their bank
accounts. A search of their residence produced a large sum of money as well. The first and second
defendants are entirely unable to justify these cash deposits by their own income. Their combined legal
income is just sufficient to pay recurring expenses and live in a normal way.
Several witness statements show that the first and second defendants maintained a life style which
puzzled everyone.
The criminal file, to wit their own statements and the analysis of the recovered notebook and the analysis
of the email traffic between the first defendant and second defendant with fourth defendant show that
money was indeed paid out and that they even negotiated to get more money. The analysis of, among
other things, the chat messages between "Negar" (second defendant) and the first defendant mentioned
previously also show that they were about to receive a lot of money, that they wanted to buy a house and
that money was an important motive for both defendants. They also intended to buy a new vehicle.
They are trying to find some justification by referring to funds they allegedly received from Iran and they
refer especially to the father of the second defendant. There is not a single objective element that attests to
this. On the contrary, the monitored conversations between the second defendant (from prison) and her
sister show that their parents in Iran are not well off. Other statements about this cannot provide a
justification for these large cash deposits either.
These funds were always paid out in cash and deposited in their [bank] accounts. It can also not be from
unreported work on the side, because there are no indications of this, but, moreover, also because they
were gathering information for the fourth defendant on such a regular schedule that no time was left to
perform other activities.
The Court refers here explicitly to the findings of report 504284-2020, on which the confiscation is based,
and, therefore, grants it entirely.
As regards the third defendant
The third defendant deposited considerable cash amounts in his bank accounts. The third defendant
cannot justify these cash deposits at all by his own income. The legal global family income cannot explain
these deposits.
The third defendant stated that he did a lot of unreported jobs in construction and also did paid jobs for
MEK. The recovered messages show that for months he refused
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a construction job, because his arm was bothering him too much. The assignments for MEK were limited
in number and in the compensation as well.
The third defendant was almost daily gathering information for the fourth defendant at MEK. There can
hardly be any doubt that he was richly paid for this, just like the first and second defendants. It is also
noteworthy that the money deposits often occurred after he returned from a trip to Austria (meeting with
the fourth defendant).
The third defendant cannot substantiate the story that the money came from his father or a good [female]
friend either.
The Court expressly refers here to the findings in report 501185-2020, on which the confiscation is based,
and therefore grants it entirely.
As regards the fourth defendant
The confiscation of the seized funds of the fourth defendant is essential as well, considering the content of
the criminal file and his involvement.
FROM A CIVIL PERSPECTIVE
Each of the civil parties requests compensation of court costs. All civil parties which enjoy compensation
of court costs from the defendants within the same legal context, are counseled by the same attorneys who
through a joint action submit the same request for each of them. It is therefore suitable to provide a single
compensation of court costs for all civil parties and distribute it among them.
1) As regards the position of civil party E.Z.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
2) As regards the position of civil party R.T.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
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3 - 16) As regards the position of civil party G.T.
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This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
4) As regards the position of civil party R.G.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
5) As regards the position of civil party W.M.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
6) As regards the position of civil party N.I.W.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
7) As regards the position of civil party I.B.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
8) As regards the position of civil party A.G.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
9) As regards the position of civil party L.C.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
10) As regards the position of civil party T .K.
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This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
11) As regards the position of civil party R.B.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
12) As regards the position of civil party Y.B.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
13) As regards the position of civil party T .B.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
14) As regards the position of civil party F.H.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
15) As regards the position of civil party S.A.J
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
17) As regards the position of civil party R.J.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
18) As regards the position of civil party M.R.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
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The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
19) As regards the position of civil party R.H.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
20) As regards the position of civil party M.P.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
21) As regards the position of civil party A.T.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
22) As regards the position of civil party S.S.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
23) As regards the position of civil party J.L.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
24) As regards the position of civil party H.A.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
25) As regards the position of civil party M.J.D.
This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
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26) As regards the position of civil party P.B.
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This civil party suffered moral harm as a consequence of the acts of charge A declared proven.
The requested amount of 1 Euro provisional has been sufficiently proven on the basis of the criminal file
and the evidence submitted and is granted.
STATUTES APPLIED
The Court takes into account the following articles which determine the components of the criminal
offenses and the sentence, and regulate the linguistic usage in legal cases:
Art. 1, 2, 11, 12, 14, 16, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 41 Act of Jun5 15, 1935; □
Art. 1, 2, 3, 25, 31, 32, 42, 43, 43bis, 44, 45, 50, 65, 66, 79, 80 Penal Code
Art. 4 V.T.Sv [PC] D
Article 162bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
article 1382 of the Civil Code,
as well as the statutory provisions mentioned in the introductory act and in the verdict.
Articles 152bis, 182, 189 PC
The Court:
[Judging] in a defended action with regard to A.S., N.N., M.A., A.A., E.Z., R.T., G.T., R.G., W.M.,
N.I.W., LB., A.G., L.C., T.K., R.B., Y.B., T.B., F.H., S.A.J., G.T., R.J., M.R. R.H. M.P., A.T., S.S., J.L.,
H.A., M.J.D., P.B ..
Finds that the civil parties sub 3) T.G. and 16) T.G. refer to one and the same civil party;
Corrects the material errors mentioned above.
Directs that civil party sub 26 P.B. be entered into the record and finds that this civil party was heard as a
civil party.
With respect to Criminal Law
As regards A.S., first defendant
Sentences A.S. for the combined acts of the charges A and D:
to a term of imprisonment of 15 years.
Pronounces with regard to A.S. the revocation of Belgian citizenship, pursuant to Article 23/2 § 1 of the
Code of Belgian Citizenship.
Deprives A.S. FOR LIFE of the rights as described in Article 31 of the Penal Code;
Pronounces forfeiture pursuant to Articles 42, 3° and 43bis PC as criminal proceeds:
of a monetary amount of 17,896.90 Euros, being half of the amount of 35,793.80 Euros
(found during a search of the premises) (managed by the COIV [Central Agency for
Seizure and Confiscation])
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of a monetary amount of 120,167.00 Euros, which includes the balance on his accounts in
the amount of 9,277.36 Euros, in possession of and managed by the COIV (Protocol
504284-2020).
Sentences A.S. to payment of:
a contribution of 1 times 200.00 EUR, being the sum of 1 times 25.00 EUR increased by
70 indexed surcharges for funding of the Fund for aid to the victims of intentional acts of
violence and the occasional responders [Good Samaritans]
a fixed compensation for administrative costs in criminal cases. This compensation is in
the amount of 50.00 EUR.
The costs of the criminal proceedings, estimated to date at 1/4x 21464.23 = 5366.06
EUR.
As regards N.N .• second defendant
Sentences N.N. for the combined acts of the charges A and D:
to a term of imprisonment of 18 years.
Pronounces with regard to N.N. the revocation of Belgian citizenship, pursuant to Article 23/2 § 1 of the
Code of Belgian Citizenship.
Deprives N.N. FOR LIFE of the rights as described in Article 31 of the Penal Code;
Pronounces forfeiture pursuant to Articles 42, 1°, and 43 PC:
-of the vehicle Mercedes CLC200 CDI with license number 1EGZ339, stored at Depannage 2000
(impoundment record 2000 D2018/01238/C) as having served to commit the criminal offense and being
her property.
Pronounces forfeiture pursuant to Articles 42, 3° and 43bis PC as criminal proceeds:
an amount of 2,500 Euros (down payment [for] purchase [of a] new vehicle) (managed by the
COIV).
a monetary amount of 17,896.90 Euros, being half of the amount of 35,793.80 Euros (found
during a search of the premises) (managed by the COIV)
an amount of 106,498.57 Euros, which includes the balance on her accounts in the amount of
26,135.87 Euros, in possession and managed by the COIV (Protocol 504284-2020).
Sentences N.N. to payment of:
a contribution of 1 times 200.00 EUR, being the sum of 1 times 25.00 EUR increased by 70
indexed surcharges for funding of the Fund for aid to the victims of intentional acts of violence
and the occasional responders [Good Samaritans]
a contribution of 20.00 EUR to the Budget Fund for second-tier legal aid
a fixed compensation for administrative costs in criminal cases. This compensation is in the
amount of 50.00 EUR.
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The costs of the criminal proceedings, estimated to date at 1/4x 21464.23 = 5366.06 EUR.
As regards M.A., third defendant
Sentences M.A. for the combined acts of the charges A and D:
to a term of imprisonment of 17 years.
Pronounces with regard to M.A. the revocation of Belgian citizenship, pursuant to Article 23/2 § 1 of the
Code of Belgian Citizenship.
Deprives M.A. FOR LIFE of the rights as described in Article 31 of the Penal Code;
Pronounces forfeiture pursuant to Articles 42, 3° and 43bis PC as criminal proceeds:
of 1,500 Euros found during the house search (managed by the COIV)
of226,084.50 Euros, which includes all the seized monies (also via accounts) which are
managed by the COIV (Protocol 501185-2020).
Sentences M.A. to payment of:
a contribution of 1 times 200.00 EUR, being the sum of 1 times 25.00 EUR increased by 70
indexed surcharges for funding of the Fund for aid to the victims of intentional acts of violence
and the occasional responders [Good Samaritans]
a contribution of 20.00 EUR to the Budget Fund for second-tier legal aid
a fixed compensation for administrative costs in criminal cases. This compensation is in the
amount of 50.00 EUR.
The costs of the criminal proceedings, estimated to date at l/4x 21464.23 = 5366.06 EUR.
As regards A.A., fourth defendant
Sentences A.A. for the combined acts of the charges A and D:
to a term of imprisonment of 20 years.
Deprives A.A. FOR LIFE of the rights as described in Article 31 of the Penal Code;
Pronounces forfeiture pursuant to Articles 42, 1 ° and 43 PC, property of the defendant and used for the
commitment of the acts:
of 10,463.22 Euros, managed by the COIV.
Sentences AS. to payment of:
a contribution of 1 times 200.00 EUR, being the sum of 1 times 25.00 EUR increased by 70
indexed surcharges for funding of the Fund for aid to the victims of intentional acts of violence
and the occasional responders [Good Samaritans]
Annex 258
court of first instance Antwerp, section Antwerp
file number 20A003763 wing D, 3rd floor
a contribution of 20.00 EUR to the Budget Fund for second-tier legal aid
p.58
Decision nr. [--] /
a fixed compensation for administrative costs in criminal cases. This compensation is in the
amount of 50.00 EUR.
The costs of the criminal proceedings, estimated to date at l/4x 21464.23 = 5366.06 EUR.
With respect to Civil Law
1) As regards the position of civil party E.Z.
Declares the request of the civil party Z.E.betta [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party Z.E.betta [sic]
the amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
2) As regards the position of civil party R.T.
Declares the request of the civil party T.R .. [ sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party T.R .. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
3-16) As regards the position of civil party G.T.
Declares the request of the civil party T.G. [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party T.G. [ sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
4) As regards the position of civil party R.G.
Declares the request of the civil party G.R. [ sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party G.R. [ sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
5) As regards the position of civil party W.M.
Declares the request of the civil party M.W. [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party M.W. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
6) As regards the position of civil party N.I.W.
Declares the request of the civil party N.I.W. sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party N.I.W. the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
Annex 258
court of first instance Antwerp, section Antwerp
file number 20A003763 wing D, 3rd floor
7) As regards the position of civil party I.B.
Declares the request of the civil party B.I. [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
p.59
Decision nr. [--] /
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party B.I. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
8) As regards the position of civil party A.G.
Declares the request of the civil party GHOZALI Ahmed sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. - AM. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party GHOZALI
Ahmed the amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
9) As regards the position of civil party L.C.
Declares the request of the civil party CHAVEZ Linda sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. - A.M. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party CHAVEZ Linda
the amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
10) As regards the position of civil party T .K.
Declares the request of the civil party K.T. [ sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party K.T. [ sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
11) As regards the position of civil party R.B.
Declares the request of the civil party B.R. [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party B.R. [ sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
12) As regards the position of civil party Y.B.
Declares the request of the civil party B.Y. [ sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party B.Y. [ sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
13) As regards the position of civil party T .B.
Declares the request of the civil party B.T. [ sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party B.T. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
14) As regards the position of civil party F.H.
Annex 258
court of first instance Antwerp, section Antwerp
file number 20A003763 wing D, 3rd floor
Declares the request of the civil party H.F. [ sic J sustainable and partly well-founded.
p.60
Decision nr. [--] /
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party H.F. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
15) As regards the position of civil party S.A.J.
Declares the request of the civil party A.J. [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party A.J. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
17) As regards the position of civil party R.J.
Declares the request of the civil party J.R. [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party J.R. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
18) As regards the position of civil party M.R.
Declares the request of the civil party R.M. [ sic J sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party R.M. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
19) As regards the position of civil party R.H.
Declares the request of the civil party H.R. [ sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party H.R. [ sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
20) As regards the position of civil party M.P.
Declares the request of the civil party P.M. [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party P.M. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
21) As regards the position of civil party A.T.
Declares the request of the civil party T.A. [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party T.A. [ sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
22) As regards the position of civil party S.S.
Declares the request of the civil party S.S. sustainable and partly well-founded.
Annex 258
court of first instance Antwerp, section Antwerp
file number 20A003763 wing D, 3rd floor
p.61
Decision nr. [--] /
Sentences S.A. - N.N. - A.M. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party S.S. the amount
of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
23) As regards the position of civil party J .L.
Declares the request of the civil party L.J. [ sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party L.J. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
24) As regards the position of civil party H.A.
Declares the request of the civil party A.H. [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party A.H. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
25) As regards the position of civil party M.J.D.
Declares the request of the civil party J.M. [ sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party J.M. [sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
26) As regards the position of civil party P.B.
Declares the request of the civil party B.P. [sic] sustainable and partly well-founded.
Annex 258
court of first instance Antwerp, section Antwerp
file number 20A003763 wing D, 3rd floor
p.62
Decision nr. [--] /
Sentences S.A. - N.N. - A.M. - A.A. collectively to pay compensation to the civil party B.P. [ sic] the
amount of: one Euro and zero cents (1.00 EUR) provisionally.
Sentences S.A. - N.N. -A.M. -A.A. collectively to pay jointly as compensation of court costs to the civil
parties sub 1 through 26 the amount of 180.00 EUR (Art. 1022 Civil Code -Art 1 through 13 Act of
4/21/2007 -Art 162 bis - 194, Code of Criminal Procedure).
Dismisses any additional and different requests.
OooO
This verdict has been handed down by the Court of First Instance of Antwerp, section Antwerp, chamber
ACS:
XXX
and pronounced in public session on February 4, 2021, by the Presiding Judge, in the presence of a
magistrate from the Office of the Public Prosecutor,
with assistance of the Clerk of the Court xxx
Annex 258
Annex 258
Vonnisnummer / Griffienummer
2021/
Repertoriumnummer / Europees
Datum van uitspraak
4 februari 2021
Naam van de beklaagde(n)
S.A.
Systeemnummer parket
18RF666
Rolnummer
20A003763
Notitienummer parket
FD/A/35/97/19/2018
Aangeboden op
Niet te registreren
geanonimiseerde Versie
Rechtbank van eerste
aanleg Antwerpen,
afdeling Antwerpen
Kamer ACS
Vonnis
Annex 258
rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen p. 2
Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr I
lnzake het Openbaar Ministerie
EN BURGERLIJKE PARTIJ(EN) :
1) E.Z.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
2) R.T.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
3) G.T.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
4) R.G. 1 verkeerdelijk gedagvaard als G.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
5) W.M.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
6) N.I.W.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
7) I.B.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
8) A.G.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
9) LC.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
10) T.K.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
11) R.B.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
12} Y.B.
Annex 258
rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen p.3
Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
XXX
burgerlijke partij
13) T.B.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
14) F.H.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
15) S.A.J.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
16) G.T.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
17) R.J.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
18) M.R.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
19) R.H.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
20) M.P.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
21) A.T.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
22) S.S.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
23) J.L.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
24) H.A.
Annex 258
rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen
Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping
XXX
burgerlijke partij
25) M.J.D.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
26) P.B.
XXX
burgerlijke partij
De burgerlijke partijen :
* sub 1 tot en met 13, 15 tot en met 26 vertegenwoordigd door :
* sub 14 bijgestaan door :
- XXX
tegen:
A.S.
XXX
thans aangehouden in de gevangenis te Antwerpen
beklaagde, bijgestaan door Meester xxx
2) N.N.
XXX
thans aangehouden in de gevangenis te Antwerpen
beklaagde, bijgestaan door Meester xxx
3) M.A.
XXX
thans aangehouden in de gevangenis te Mechelen
beklaagde, bijgestaan door Meester xxx
4) A.A.
XXX
thans aangehouden in de gevangenis te Beveren
beklaagde, vertegenwoordigd door Meester xxx
TENLASTELEGGING(EN}
Als dader of mededader in de zin van artikel 66 van het strafwetboek;
A. Poging terroristische aanslag bedoeld in art. 137 § 2. 1 ° Sw (moord}
p.4
Vonnisnr /
Annex 258
rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen p.5
Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
Bij inbreuk op de artikelen 51, 52, 137, §1 en §2, 1 °, 138, 393 en 394 van het Belgisch
Strafwetboek, gepoogd te hebben ten nadele van minstens en onder meer hierboven
vermelde burgerlijke partijen, aanwezig op het congres van de Nationale lraanse
Weerstandsraad te Villepinte (Frankrijk) op 30 juni 2018, te doden met het oogmerk om te
doden en met voorbedachten rade, alsook met een terroristisch oogmerk in de zin van artikel
137, §1 van het Strafwetboek, waarbij het voornemen om het misdrijf te plegen zich
geopenbaard heeft door uitwendige daden die een begin van uitvoering van dat misdrijf
uitmaken en alleen ten gevolge van omstandigheden, van de wil van de daders onafhankelijk
zijn gestaakt of hun uitwerking hebben gemist.
In het gerechtelijk arrondissement Antwerpen en Brussel en/of elders in het Rijk en buiten het
Rijk, met name minstens in Oostenrijk, Iran, Duitsland, Groothertogdom Luxemburg en
Frankrijk, minstens in de periode vanaf 01/03/2018 tot en met 30/06/2018
door de eerste (A.S.), de tweede (N.N.), de derde (M.A.) en de vierde (A.A.)
B . ....
C . ....
D. Deelname aan de activiteiten van een terroristische groep
Deelgenomen te hebben aan enige activiteit van een terroristische groep, zijnde een
gestructureerde vereniging van meer dan twee personen die sinds enige tijd bestaat en die in
onderling overleg optreedt om terroristische misdrijven te plegen, als bedoeld in artikel 137
van het Strafwetboek, en waarvan het feitelijk oogmerk niet uitsluitend politiek,
vakorganisatorisch, menslievend, levensbeschouwelijk of godsdienstig is of die niet uitsluitend
enig ander rechtmatig oogmerk nastreeft, zij het ook door het verstrekken van gegevens of
materiele middelen aan die terroristische groep of door het in enigerlei vorm financieren van
enige activiteit van die terroristische groep, terwijl zij :
wisten dat hun deelname bijdraagt tot het plegen van een misdaad of wanbedrijf door
de terroristische groep (voor de periode van 01/01/2015 tot en met 31/12/2016)
wisten of moesten weten dat hun deelname zou kunnen bijdragen tot het plegen van
een misdaad of wanbedrijf door de terroristische groep (voor de periode van 01/01/2017 tot
en met 30/06/2018).
art. 139 en 140 § 1 Sw)
In het gerechtelijk arrondissement Antwerpen en Brussel en/of elders in het Rijk en buiten het
Rijk, met name minstens in Oostenrijk, Iran, Duitsland, ltalie, Groothertogdom Luxemburg en
Frankrijk,
door de eerste (A.S.), de tweede (N.N.), de derde (M.A.) en de vierde (A.A.)
PROCEDURE
De rechtbank neemt kennis van de beschikking van de raadkamer van deze rechtbank van 15
juli 2020 waarin verzachtende omstandigheden werden aangenomen.
De behandeling en de debatten van de zaak hadden plaats in openbare terechtzitting.
De rechtspleging verliep in de Nederlandse taal, behalve wat het vertaald gedeelte betreft.
Annex 258
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Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
De rechtbank heeft als beedigd tolk aangesteld Parijs D.A., teneinde de burgerlijke partij H.F.bij
te staan voor vertaling van alles wat gezegd wordt van het Engels naar het Nederlands en
omgekeerd.
De rechtbank heeft als beedigde tolken aangesteld S.F. en S.M.E., teneinde de beklaagden S.A.,
N.N.en A.M. bij te staan voor vertaling van alles wat gezegd wordt van het Nederlands naar
het Farsi en omgekeerd.
De rechtbank nam kennis van de stukken van de rechtspleging en hoorde alle aanwezige
partijen.
VOORAF:
Tijdens het beraad is gebleken dat :
* De burgerlijke partijen sub 3) T.G. en 16) T.G., een en dezelfde burgerlijke partij betreft;
* De burgerlijke partij sub 4) op de dagvaarding werd vermeld als R. G., terwijl
dit gelezen dient te worden als R.G.; De rechtbank herstelt deze materiele
vergissing.
* Op de processen-verbaal van de openbare terechtzitting van 27 november 2020 en
3 december 2020 als familienaam van de burgerlijke partij sub 21) A. werd vermeld,
terwijl uit de syntheseconclusies van de burgerlijke partijen blijkt dat dit dient te worden
gelezen als "T.". De rechtbank herstelt ook deze materiele vergissing.
* De syntheseconclusies van de burgerlijke partijen tevens de genaamde : P.B.,
XXX
vermelden. De rechtbank stelt vast dat deze burgerlijke partij - voor wie tijdig conclusies
werden neergelegd - bij materiele vergissing niet werd vermeld op de processenverbaal
van de openbare terechtzitting van 27 november 2020 en 3 december 2020. De
rechtbank verleent akte van deze burgerlijke partijstelling (sub 26) en stelt vast dat deze
burgerlijke partij wel degelijk vertegenwoordigd werd door zijn raadslieden en werd
gehoord als burgerlijke partij op de openbare terechtzittingen van 27 november 2020 en
3 december 2020.
OP STRAFGEBIED
PROCEDURE
I. BOM-controle
Bij arrest van 4 juni 2020 van de Kamer van lnbeschuldigingstelling werd een BOM-controle
uitgevoerd en werden er geen onregelmatigheden vastgesteld.
Annex 258
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Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
II. Het weren van de conclusie van het openbaar ministerie
Tweede beklaagde vroeg op de openbare terechtzitting van 27 november 2020 dat de
conclusies van het openbaar ministerie zouden geweerd worden, aangezien zij niet
meegedeeld waren aan de verdediging van tweede beklaagde.
De raadslieden van zowel de burgerlijke partijen als de overige beklaagden hebben tijdig de
besluiten van het openbaar ministerie gehad, maar er was blijkbaar een vergissing gebeurd
met betrekking tot het verzenden van de besluiten naar de verdediging van tweede beklaagde.
Omdat de besluiten van het openbaar ministerie wel degelijk tijdig waren, gaf de rechtbank,
met instemming van alle partijen, de verdediging van tweede beklaagde de mogelijkheid om
nog te antwoorden op de besluiten tegen de open bare terechtzitting van 3 december 2020.
De rechtbank gaat dan ook niet over tot wering van de besluiten van het openbaar ministerie.
Ill. Onontvankelijkheid van de strafvordering wegens obscuri libelli en schending
van recht op verdediging.
De verdediging van derde beklaagde werpt dit op in de besluiten. Op de openbare
terechtzitting geeft derde beklaagde aan niet meer aan te dringen op deze exceptie en er
afstand van te doen.
Volledigheidshalve gaat de rechtbank dit na voor alle beklaagden.
De feiten van de tenlasteleggingen moeten op een zodanige wijze zijn omschreven dat het
voorwerp ervan voldoende duidelijk blijkt voor de beklaagden en dat hun rechten van
verdediging gewaarborgd worden.
Er is geen sprake van obscuri libelli. Uit de tenlasteleggingen kunnen beklaagden duidelijk
afleiden waarvoor ze vervolgd worden. Beklaagden kunnen zich verdedigen met betrekking
tot de in de tenlasteleggingen voorziene misdrijven.
Er is geen enkele wetsbepaling die bepaalt dat de beklaagden uitsluitend moeten ingelicht
worden door de dagvaarding of door de beschikking tot verwijzing.
Het inlichten van beklaagden kan ook gebeuren door samenlezing van de dagvaarding met de
stukken uit het strafdossier, waarin zij inzage kregen en waarop zij hun rechten van verdediging
hebben kunnen laten gelden ten opzichte van de rechter ten gronde. Bovendien werd door
het openbaar ministerie een uitgebreide conclusie neergelegd, met ieders aandeel
gedetailleerd uiteengezet. Beklaagden waren dan ook voldoende ingelicht.
Annex 258
rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen p.8
Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
Bovendien was oak het rekwisitoor van het openbaar ministerie voldoende duidelijk en was
de verdediging van beklaagden perfect in staat om zich hierop te verdedigen, wat ze in
concrete oak hebben gedaan.
De rechtbank kan dan oak geen schending vaststellen.
IV. De ingeroepen persoonlijke onschendbaarheid en immuniteit als diplomatiek
ambtenaar.
Vierde beklaagde werpt op dat hij een diplomatiek ambtenaar is en immuniteit geniet
overeenkomstig het Verdrag van Wenen inzake diplomatiek verkeer van 18 april 1961.
Bovendien argumenteert hij dat hij niet kon aangehouden warden in Duitsland en vervolgens
uitgeleverd warden aan Belgie, gelet op zijn persoonlijke onschendbaarheid, waarop hij recht
heeft volgens het hogervermeld verdrag.
Gelet op zijn immuniteit, kan hij dus oak niet vervolgd warden voor de Belgische rechtbanken.
Er bestaat geen discussie over dat vierde beklaagde op het ogenblik van zijn aanhouding deel
uitmaakte van het diplomatiek personeel (derde raadgever sedert 23 juni 2014-diplomatiek
paspoort D9016657 van 26 april 2014) en dat hij geaccrediteerd was voor de lraanse staat in
Oostenrijk. Hij beschikte over een diplomatiek paspoort. Hij kan als diplomatiek ambtenaar
beschouwd warden (artikel 1.e Verdrag van Wenen) en dit tot 2 juli 2018 (datum intrekking
immuniteit door de Oostenrijkse overheid).
Volgens het Belgisch strafrecht is al wie op Belgisch grondgebied een misdrijf pleegt strafbaar,
ongeacht de nationaliteit van de dader(s). De Belgische rechtbanken zijn bevoegd om kennis
te nemen van alle elementen en omstandigheden van het misdrijf die een ondeelbaar geheel
vormen van dat misdrijf op Belgisch grondgebied. Dit betekent dat feitelijke gedragingen van
een misdrijf die deels gepleegd warden in Belgie en deels in het buitenland, in Belgie kunnen
vervolgd warden. Daders die deelnemen in het buitenland aan een misdrijf in Belgie, kunnen
in Belgie vervolgd warden.
Het internationaal recht gaat uit van de soevereiniteit van onafhankelijke staten, die allemaal
op het gelijke voet warden behandeld. Het Verd rag van Wenen is een bijzondere regeling met
betrekking tot deze soevereiniteit en bepaalt de wijze waarop staten omgaan met het
diplomatiek personeel.
Uit de wijze waarop het verdrag tot stand is gekomen en de latere interpretatie van het
verdrag, blijkt duidelijk dat het Verd rag van Wenen het gewoonterecht inzake het diplomatiek
personeel codificeerde en dat alle (belangrijke) regels in dit verdrag vervat zijn.
De bepalingen aangaande de diplomatieke uitwisseling zijn bilaterale afspraken tussen de
zendstaat en de ontvangende staat en berusten op het principe van wederkerigheid. In die zin
Annex 258
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Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
moet het Verdrag van Wenen ook beperkend worden ge"interpreteerd en schept dit geen
verplichtingen naar andere staten, die vreemd zijn aan de bilaterale afspraken tussen de
zendstaat en de ontvangende staat, met uitzondering van art. 40 van het Verd rag van Wenen.
Het verdrag van Wenen bepaalt in haar artikel 31 :
"De diplomatieke ambtenaar geniet immuniteit ten aanzien van de rechtsmacht in strafzaken
van de ontvangende stoat."
De immuniteit die een diplomatieke ambtenaar verkrijgt, is slechts een immuniteit naar de
strafvervolging in de ontvangende staat, zijnde een uitvoeringsimmuniteit.
Een diplomaat kan wel degelijk strafbare feiten plegen in een ander land en kan hiervoor
vervolgd worden in een ander land dan de ontvangende staat (hier Oostenrijk). Ook de feiten
die hij als mededader pleegde vanuit Oostenrijk, kunnen perfect vervolgd worden in Belgie.
Oostenrijk kan juist omwille van de soevereiniteit van de onafhankelijke staten, geen
immuniteit van strafvervolging aanbieden in een ander land.
Oostenrijk heeft op 2 juli 2018 de immuniteit van vierde beklaagde ingetrokken
(machtigingsimmuniteit) (toepassing van art. 9 Verd rag van Wenen), maar dit heeft uitsluitend
betrekking op eventuele strafvervolging in Oostenrijk voor strafbare feiten, waarvoor de
Oostenrijkse justitie bevoegd is.
De betrokken diplomaat wordt dan "persona non grata" verklaard en wordt in de mogelijkheid
gesteld om het land te verlaten binnen een welbepaalde beperkte periode.
Dit is echter totaal niet ter zake dienend, aangezien het hier gaat om Belgische misdrijven die
deels gepleegd werden in Belgie en deels in andere landen van de EU, zoals Luxemburg en
ltalie, en dit volkomen los staat van de immuniteit die vierde beklaagde genoot in Oostenrijk.
Alleszins geniet vierde beklaagde geen enkele immuniteit ten aanzien van strafvervolging voor
strafbare (deelnemings-) feiten in Belgie.
Vierde beklaagde werpt op dat hij ten onrechte werd aangehouden in Duitsland en hij beroept
zich op art. 40 Verdrag van Wenen. Door zijn onterechte aanhouding in Duitsland, werd hij
onterecht uitgeleverd aan Belgie en staat hij onterecht terecht voor deze rechtbank.
De rechtbank verwijst hiervoor naar het arrest van de Kamer van lnbeschuldigingstelling van
Antwerpen en het daaropvolgend arrest van het Hof van Cassatie in het kader van de
voorlopige hechtenis.
Bij arrest van 18 december 2018 besliste de K.I. : "Uit de feitelijke gegevens van het strafdossier
blijkt dat verdachte op vakantie was in Belgie en Duitsland. Op 1 juli 2018 werd hij in Duitsland
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gearresteerd toen hij op weg was naar zijn diplomatische standplaats in Oostenrijk ... , genoot
verdachte niet van zijn diplomatieke onschendbaarheid. Hij werd regelmatig gearresteerd en
aangehouden. Het bevel tot aanhouding is regelmatig".
In haar arrest van 2 januari 2019 besliste het Hof van Cassatie :
"Uit deze bepalingen volgt dat de onschendbaarheid en de immuniteiten door de
ontvangststaat van de diplomaat en door een derde Staat wordt verleend, wanneer de
diplomaat op het grondgebied van een derde Staat op doorreis is om zijn werkzaamheden op
zijn post te aanvaarden of om naar zijn post terug te keren of wanneer hij naar zijn eigen land
terugkeert.
Onder doorreis als bedoeld in het strikt uit te leggen art. 40.1, eerste zin Verdrag van Wenen,
wordt enkel verstaan de doorreis die verband houdt met de uitoefeningen van de diplomatieke
opdracht van diplomaat, met name de reis vanuit het land van herkomst om de diplomatieke
standplaats te vervoegen of om naar het thuisland terug te keren, ofwel de reis vanuit de
standplaats naar het land waar de diplomaat een diplomatieke missie dient te vervullen of om,
na de vervulling van die missie, vanuit dit land naar de diplomatieke standplaats terug te keren.
Een terugkeer uit een derde land waar de diplomaat op vakantie verblijft naar de standplaats,
is vreemd aan de uitoefening van de diplomatieke opdracht en is bijgevolg geen doorreis als
bedoeld in art. 40, eerste zin, Verdrag van Wenen."
Oak de Duitse justitie kwam zowel bij de vrijheidsberoving/aanhouding, als bij de verdere
procedure die leidde tot zijn uitlevering, tot de conclusie dat beklaagde op vakantie was,
bovendien geen diplomatieke functie had in Duitsland en dus oak geen aanspraak kon ma ken
op zijn diplomatieke status.
Omdat het opnieuw opgeworpen wordt doorvierde beklaagde, sluit de rechtbank zich volledig
aan bij het arrest van het Hof van Cassatie in het kader van de voorlopige hechtenis.
Het diplomatiek verkeer en alle rechten (voor de diplomaat) en verplichtingen voor de
ontvangende staat die hieruit voortvloeien zijn bilaterale afspraken tussen de zendstaat en de
ontvangende staat, zoals bepaald in het Verd rag van Wenen.
Het verdrag vereist geen rechtstreekse doorvoer tussen de verzendende en de ontvangende
staat. Men kan via een derde land passeren om naar zijn diplomatieke post in de ontvangende
staat te gaan of om terug te keren naar de zendstaat. Hier is dus een uitzondering op de regel
van de bilaterale overeenkomst tussen de zendstaat en de ontvangende staat. Het verdrag van
Wenen bepaalt dat derde landen, die vreemd zijn aan de diplomatieke relatie tussen de
zendstaat en de ontvangende staat, doorgang moeten verlenen aan diplomatieke ambtenaren
en dus in zekere zin de immuniteit/persoonlijke onschendbaarheid van de diplomatieke
ambtenaar moeten respecteren. Deze uitzondering moet dan oak beperkend ge"interpreteerd
warden. De doorgang is dus strikt beperkt tot deze specifieke verplaatsing of een verplaatsing
naar een ander land dan de ontvangende staat omwille van een specifieke diplomatieke
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missie.
Men geniet geen immuniteit wanneer men in zich in een derde land bevindt louter om
persoonlijke redenen.
Uit de vaststellingen tijdens de observatie, de wegcontrole, het huren van het voertuig (van
25 juni 2018 tot en met 2 juli 2018) en hun reisweg (Duitsland, Luxemburg, Nederland, Luik, .. ),
blijkt ontegensprekelijk dat vierde beklaagde met zijn familie op vakantie was en dus niet op
diplomatieke missie of diplomatieke reis was.
De argumentatie die vierde beklaagde tracht te maken dat zijn immuniteit als diplomaat
vergelijkbaar is met de totale immuniteit van vreemde staatshoofden en ministers in alle
landen gaat niet op en kan uit geen enkele internationale rechtsregel, rechtspraak of
gewoonterecht warden afgeleid. Nergens wordt bepaald dat de diplomatieke immuniteit zo'n
ruime draagwijdte heeft.
Tenslotte kan er nog verwezen warden naar art. 38 Verdrag van Wenen : "Behalve voor zover
een ontvangende staat aanvullende rechten en immuniteiten verleent, geniet een diplomatiek
ambtenaar die onderdaan is van, of duurzaam verblijf houdt in, die staat s/echts immuniteit
van rechtsmacht en onschendbaarheid ten aanzien van officie/e handelingen verricht in de
uitoefening van zijn functie".
Uit de vordering blijkt dat vierde beklaagde er van verdacht wordt in werkelijkheid geen
diplomaat te zijn. Hij zou een lraans inlichtingenofficier zijn, die als runner fungeerde voor zijn
Europese informanten. Zijn statuut als diplomaat werd mogelijk misbruikt om elders in Europa
strafbare feiten te kunnen plegen en zelfs een explosief toestel te smokkelen van Iran naar
Europa ender de diplomatieke dekking.
Hij wordt verdacht de (mede-) organisator te zijn van een mogelijke verijdelde dodelijke
aanslag in Frankrijk. Deze handelingen kunnen onmogelijk als (normale) diplomatieke
activiteiten beschouwd warden, die verricht warden in het kader van zijn functie.
De daadwerkelijke activiteiten waarvan beklaagde wordt verdacht, indien bewezen, zijn zelfs
strijdig met art. 3 van het verdrag.
Dit artikel bepaalt dat de functies van een diplomatieke zending o.a. omvatten: " .... het
behartigen van de belangen van de zendstaat en zijn onderdanen, binnen de door het
volkenrecht toegestane grenzen in de ontvangende staat". Zijn onofficiele activiteiten,
waarvan hij verdacht wordt, passen totaal niet in de volkenrechtelijke toegestane grenzen en
het kan niet de bedoeling zijn van de verdragsluitende partijen de handelingen waarvan vierde
beklaagde verdacht wordt, te laten dekken door een diplomatieke immuniteit.
V. De ingeroepen staatsimmuniteit en de onbevoegdheid van de rechtbank
Vierde beklaagde preciseert dat hij zich niet beroept op de immuniteit als staatsambtenaar,
omdat volgens hem hij een immuniteit geniet als diplomaat.
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Hij argumenteert echter wel dat de rechtbank niet bevoegd is om te oordelen over de
betrokkenheid van de lraanse staat of een van haar organen (zoals de inlichtingendienst MOIS
of het departement 312) en dit op basis van het volkenrechtelijk principe van de
staatsimmuniteit.
Zoals hierboven reeds uiteengezet gaat men in het internationaal recht uit van de
soevereiniteit van staten. Alie staten zijn gelijk en staten hebben niet over elkaar te oordelen
en men steunt zich hierbij in het internationaal recht op de staatsimmuniteit.
Deze staatsimmuniteit heeft niet alleen betrekking op de nationale staat, maar ook op haar
organen en zelfs eventueel haar ambtenaren. Oorspronkelijk werd deze staatsimmuniteit in
het internationaal recht heel absoluut ge"interpreteerd, maar onder meer door het toenemend
handelsverkeer waaraan staten deelnamen, zijn er uitzonderingen ontstaan op dit principe.
De rechtbank stelt vast dat noch de lraanse staat, noch de inlichtingendienst MOIS, noch
departement 312 van de lraanse inlichtingendienst hier terecht staan als beklaagde, zodat het
principe van de staatsimmuniteit niet geschonden werd.
De rechtbank is het er niet mee eens, dater een schending van een staatsimmuniteit zou zijn,
wanneer de rechtbank op basis van een strafdossier zou vaststellen dat er een bepaalde
betrokkenheid is van een buitenlandse staat, haar organen of ambtenaren. De rechtbank kan
uiteraard de lraanse staat of haar organen niet veroordelen, maar zij staan hier oak niet
terecht als beklaagden. Er anders over oordelen zou leiden tot een beperking van de
soevereiniteit van de Belgische rechtsstaat, wat op zich al zou ingaan tegen de
staatsimmuniteit.
De rechtbank neemt er akte van dat vierde beklaagde voor zichzelf niet zijn immuniteit als
staatsambtenaar inroept. Hij beroept zich op zijn diplomatieke immuniteit, maar zoals
hierboven reeds aangegeven, geldt deze immuniteit in onderhavige strafzaak niet.
Volledigheidshalve kan hij oak geen beroep doen op de immuniteit als staatsambtenaar.
Vierde beklaagde staat terecht voor zijn persoonlijke strafrechtelijke betrokkenheid. Deze
betrokkenheid kan persoonlijk zijn, maar kan oak passen binnen een bepaalde illegale taak die
hij gekregen heeft van zijn opdrachtgevers, bijvoorbeeld mensen binnen de
inlichtingendiensten.
De immuniteit van staatsambtenaren van een vreemde staat op strafgebied zou uiteraard
alleen maar kunnen gelden voor de strafbare feiten die een staatsambtenaar verricht in het
kader van de uitoefening van zijn officiele overheidstaken (functionele immuniteit).
Vierde beklaagde wordt verdacht van een aanslag te hebben georganiseerd of minstens de
operationele leiding te hebben genomen van het plannen van een terroristische aanslag in
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Frankrijk met mogelijk dodelijke slachtoffers. We mogen er van uitgaan dat deze activiteit niet
behoort tot de officiele activiteiten van een ambtenaar van de lraanse staat in het algemeen
en een inlichtingendienst in het bijzonder. Het zal zeker niet behoren tot de taak van een
diplomatiek ambtenaar, maar oak niet tot de officiele taken van inlichtingendiensten, die in
principe alleen maar inlichtingen dienen te verzamelen, te analyseren en te verwerken.
Bovendien heeft de lraanse staat, noch enig ander orgaan in het lraanse overheidsapparaat de
activiteiten waarvan vierde beklaagde verdacht wordt, zich toegerekend. Op geen enkel
ogenblik heeft de lraanse staat erkend dat deze activiteiten kaderden in de officiele functie
van vierde beklaagde. De lraanse staat heeft nooit erkend een aanslag te hebben will en plegen
op een conferentie van de lraanse oppositie op 30 juni 2018.
Men kan zich oak de vraag stellen of de staatsimmuniteit kan ingeroepen warden voor
terrorisme-activiteiten. Het recht op leven is een absoluut basisrecht van een burger, waar oak
ter wereld. Dit universeel basisrecht aantasten door terroristische activiteiten, kan moeilijk
afgeschermd warden door de staatsimmuniteit. lnternationaal terroristische misdrijven
dienen beschouwd te warden als "misdaden die behoren tot het ius cogens" en het bestrijden
hiervan, wat in elk land behoort tot de prioriteit in misdaadbestrijding, vormt een uitzondering
op het principe van de staatsimmuniteit. Het zou moeilijk aanvaardbaar zijn dater omwille van
commerciele redenen, uitzonderingen warden toegestaan op de staatsimmuniteit, maar dat
dit niet geldt voor misdaden die de mensheid in haar absoluut recht op leven schaadt.
Tenslotte haalt vierde beklaagde in zijn verdediging aan dat de burgerlijke partij NCRI zelf een
terroristische organisatie is of minstens verantwoordelijk is voor diverse aanslagen via haar
zusterorganisatie.
Dit maakt geen onderdeel uit van de beoordeling van de rechtbank. De rechtbank dient a Ileen
te oordelen of er strafbare feiten zijn begaan en of er een oorzakelijk verband is tussen de
mogelijke schade die de burgerlijke partij heeft geleden en de strafbare feiten.
De rechtbank moet geen beoordeling ma ken van de morele ingesteldheid van deze burgerlijke
partij. Noch de burgerlijke partij, noch haar zusterorganisatie staan hier terecht.
VI. Schending van het recht op een eerlijk proces en het recht van verdediging.
a) Eerste verhoren van vierde beklaagde zonder bijstand van een raadsman
Vierde beklaagde werpt op dat hij bij zijn eerste verhoor in Duitsland en zijn verhoor omtrent
zijn aanhouding, geen bijstand heeft gekregen van een raadsman, waardoor zijn recht van
verdediging is geschonden en minstens zijn recht op een eerlijk proces. Vierde beklaagde
verwijst hiervoor naar de Europese richtlijn en de rechtspraak van het Europees Hof voor de
Rechten van de Mens.
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Bij aanvang van zijn eerste verhoren werd vierde beklaagde er tel kens op gewezen dat hij het
recht had zich te laten bijstaan door een raadsman. Vierde beklaagde heeft een raadsman
aangeboden gekregen, namelijk een advocaat uit Wurzburg, die ook bereid was de
verdediging op zich te nemen, maar vierde beklaagde wenste deze tussenkomst niet, omdat
hij een advocaat wilde krijgen, aangesteld door zijn eigen ambassade. Hij werd inderdaad
uiteindelijk verhoord zonder (voorafgaandelijke) bijstand. Uit de stukken van de Duitse justitie
blijkt bovendien dat de verbalisanten op zondag (dag van zijn aanhouding) en op maandag
getracht hebben het lraans consulaat te bereiken in Duitsland, maar dat ze geen contact
kregen. Uit de verdere stukken blijkt dat men enkele dagen na zijn aanhouding het consulaat
heeft kunnen bereiken en dat het consulaat vanaf dan ook contact heeft kunnen krijgen met
vierde beklaagde.
In zijn verdediging werpt vierde beklaagde ook op dat hij geen bijstand heeft gekregen van een
tolk Farsi. Uit de uitvoeringsstukken, blijkt dat er slechts een tolk Farsi aanwezig was en dat
deze aangesteld werd in het verhoor van de vrouw en de kinderen van vierde beklaagde.
Vierde beklaagde werd verhoord in het Engels en uit geen enkel gegeven blijkt dat hij op dat
ogenblik zich hiertegen verzet heeft. lntegendeel, er werd uitdrukkelijk geacteerd dat hij
bereid was zijn verhoor in het Engels te voeren. Hij vroeg ook uitdrukkelijk om het lraanse
consulaat te verwittigen. De verbalisanten acteerden dat het consulaat zondag en maandag
gecontacteerd werd door hen, maar zonder resultaat.
Uit de stukken blijkt dat hij sedert dinsdag 3 juli 2018 bijstand kreeg van leden van de lraanse
ambassade.
Vierde beklaagde toont niet aan dat de regels van het Duitse strafprocesrecht in onderhavig
geval geschonden werden door niet uitdrukkelijk te noteren dat hij afstand deed van de
bijstand van een advocaat.
Uit de voorliggende gegevens blijkt niet dat rekening houdend met de concrete
omstandigheden het recht op verdediging of het recht op een eerlijk proces in hoofde van
vierde beklaagde werd geschonden. Bovendien moet men kijken naar het geheel van de
procedure en stelt de rechtbank daarbij geen onherstelbare schending van de rechten van
verdediging vast en dus ook geen schending van het recht op een eerlijk proces.
b) Eerste verhoor van de echtgenote en de kinderen van vierde beklaagde zonder
bijstand van een raadsman
De echtgenote en de kinderen van vierde beklaagde werden van hun vrijheid beroofd, omdat
de politiehond positief reageerde op de mogelijke aanwezigheid van explosieven in het
voertuig van vierde beklaagde.
Bij aanvang van hun eerste verhoor werden de echtgenote en de meerderjarige zoon van
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vierde beklaagde er telkens op gewezen dat zij het recht hadden zich te laten bijstaan door
een raadsman. Weliswaar blijkt niet uit de stukken dat zij dit uitdrukkelijk deden, maar uit het
verhoor blijkt impliciet dat ze afstand deden. Ze werden ook beiden verhoord met bijstand van
een tolk Farsi. Uit het verhoor van de zoon blijkt dat hij zijn rechten in het Engels kreeg
uitgelegd, ondanks dater een tolk aanwezig was.
Vierde beklaagde maakt bovendien heel veel bezwaar over de wijze waarop het verhoor van
zijn 17-jarige zoon gebeurde en stelt dat dit niet conform de Europese richtlijnen is. Bij aanvang
van het verhoor werd de minderjarige zoon van vierde beklaagde (17 jaar) erop gewezen dat
hij recht had op de bijstand van een raadsman en dat hij voorafgaand aan het verhoor en
tijdens het verhoor de aanwezigheid kon eisen van zijn "opvoeders/wettelijke
vertegenwoordigers". Uit het proces-verbaal blijkt dat vierde beklaagde en zijn echtgenote
uitgenodigd werden om bij het verhoor aanwezig te zijn, maar dat ze hiervan afstand hebben
gedaan. Ook deze zoon werd verhoord met bijstand van een tolk Farsi.
Uiteindelijk bleek dat hun niets ten laste kon gelegd warden en werden ze in vrijheid gesteld.
Om te kijken of een beklaagde zijn recht op verdediging of zijn recht op een eerlijk proces
geschonden werd, meet men kijken naar het geheel van de procedure.
De rechtbank stelt vast dat de vrouw en kinderen van vierde beklaagde aanvankelijk verhoord
werden als verdachten, maar thans niet vervolgd warden als beklaagden. Zij kunnen in de
huidige stand van de procedure aldus beschouwd warden als loutere getuigen. Door het
openbaar ministerie werden geen elementen a charge lastens vierde beklaagde op basis van
deze verklaringen weerhouden. De rechtbank baseert zich bij de beoordeling van de schuld
evenmin op deze verklaringen.
In die omstandigheden stelt de rechtbank vast dater, voor zover er al sprake zou zijn van enige
onregelmatigheid, geen sprake is van een schending van de rechten van verdediging in hoofde
van vierde beklaagde, noch van een schending van het recht op een eerlijk proces.
c) Geen vertrouwelijk gesprek met consulaire ambtenaren op het moment van zijn
aanhouding
Ook hier beroept vierde beklaagde zich op een Europese richtlijn, die voorziet in een recht op
consulaire bijstand.
Uit de stukken van de Duitse justitie blijkt dat zondag (dag van zijn aanhouding) 1 juli 2018 en
maandag 2 juli 2018 getracht werd het lraans consulaat te contacteren, maar dat dit niet lukte.
Vanaf 3 juli 2018 kreeg vierde beklaagde bijstand van het lraanse consulaat. Uit de stukken
blijkt dat op 3 juli 2018 een onderhoud heeft plaats gevonden zonder toezicht. De latere
contacten werden steeds toegestaan, maar ender strikte veiligheidsmaatregelen. Gelet op de
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stand van het dossier en de inhoud ervan, zoals het bekend was voor de Duitse justitie, bleek
duidelijk dat vierde beklaagde ervan verdacht werd betrokken te zijn bij een verijdelde aanslag
in Frankrijk en dat hij deze mogelijke strafbare feiten pleegde onder een diplomatieke cover
en mogelijk met medeweten van de lraanse staat. Het bezoek van leden van het lraans
consulaat was toegelaten maar onder specifieke veiligheidsmaatregelen, en dit om te
vermijden dater stukken of voorwerpen zouden word en uitgewisseld.
Vierde beklaagde toont niet concreet aan op welke manier de Duitse wetgeving werd
geschonden. Ook de Europese richtlijn werd gerespecteerd. Noch de Europese richtlijn, noch
het Verdrag van Wenen inzake consulaire betrekkingen van 1963, schrijven voor dat deze
gesprekken vertrouwelijk dienen te geschieden.
Uiteraard zouden deze gesprekken best vertrouwelijk dienen te gebeuren, maar gelet op de
specifieke aard van deze zaak en de mogelijke betrokkenheid van de lraanse staat of een van
haar organen, was de extra beveiligingsmaatregel opportuun en noodzakelijk.
De rechten van verdediging of het recht op een eerlijk proces werden in hoofde van vierde
beklaagde niet geschonden. Uit de stukken blijkt dat hij meermaals contact gehad heeft met
de lraanse consulaire diensten.
d) Detentieomstandigheden in Duitsland
Vierde beklaagde klaagt de detentieomstandigheden in Duitsland aan.
Bij de verschillende gesprekken met de consulaire ambtenaar, kloeg vierde beklaagde over zijn
detentie in de Duitse gevangenis.
Hiervan werd telkens een proces-verbaal gemaakt en gevoegd aan het strafdossier, waardoor
er volledige transparantie is.
Vierde beklaagde bevond zich in een speciaal detentieregime, gelet op de feiten waarvan hij
verdacht werd.
Deze specifieke veiligheidsomstandigheden lijken opportuun en noodzakelijk. Het is
begrijpelijk dat vierde beklaagde het niet aangenaam vindt om in een gevangenis te zitten en
dat zeker de extra veiligheidsmaatregelen niet aangenaam zijn.
Uit de proces-verbalen blijkt bovendien dat hij vooral boos is dat zijn diplomatieke immuniteit,
waarop hij zich juridisch ten onrechte trachtte te steunen, niet aanvaard werd.
Noch vierde beklaagde, noch het consulaat hebben een burgerlijke/administratieve procedure
ingespannen tegen de Duitse overheid met betrekking tot de uitvoering van zijn detentie, wat
perfect mogelijk is in de Duitse rechtsstaat.
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De rechtbank stelt geen schending van de rechten van verdediging of het recht op een eerlijk
proces vast.
e) De detentieomstandigheden in Belgie
Ook over de detentievoorwaarden in Belgie is vierde beklaagde ontevreden.
Vierde beklaagde bevindt zich in een speciaal detentieregime, gelet op de feiten waarvan hij
verdacht wordt.
Deze specifieke veiligheidsomstandigheden lijken opportuun en noodzakelijk. Het is
begrijpelijk dat vierde beklaagde het niet aangenaam vindt om in een gevangenis te zitten en
dat zeker de extra veiligheidsmaatregelen niet aangenaam zijn.
Uit het strafdossier blijkt bovendien dat hij vooral boos is dat zijn diplomatieke immuniteit,
waarop hij zich juridisch ten onrechte trachtte te steunen, niet aanvaard werd.
In Belgie bestaat er een wet met betrekking tot de rechtspositie van gedetineerden, waarop
vierde beklaagde zich kan steunen. Noch vierde beklaagde, noch het consulaat hebben een
burgerlijke/administratieve procedure ingespannen tegen de Belgische overheid met
betrekking tot de wijze waarop zijn detentie wordt uitgevoerd, wat perfect mogelijk is in de
onze rechtsstaat.
De rechtbank stelt geen schending van de rechten van verdediging of het recht op een eerlijk
proces vast.
f) Bevriezing van de financiele middelen van vierde beklaagde
Vierde beklaagde werpt op dat zijn rechten geschonden werden, omdat hij opgenomen werd
op de Europese lijst van terroristen, waardoor ook al zijn financiele middelen bevroren zijn.
Dit is volgens de verdediging een schending van zijn recht op een eerlijk proces, een schending
van het vermoeden van onschuld, een schending van het verbod op faltering en een schending
van het recht op eigendom.
Vierde beklaagde had een procedure aangespannen voor de Raad van State, specifiek met
betrekking tot de Belgische gevolgen, maar dit werd afgewezen bij gebrek aan
hoogdringendheid en omdat dit een Europese beslissing is.
Deze Europese beslissing zou volgens vierde beklaagde gebaseerd zijn op dit strafdossier.
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Zo'n beslissing wordt niet lichtzinnig door de Europese Raad genomen en is een voorlopige
voorzorgsmaatregel.
De rechtbank is niet bevoegd om te oordelen over deze opname en de gevolgen van deze
opname en dit is niet het forum waar de toetsing van deze opname dient te gebeuren.
Er zijn andere fora waar vierde beklaagde dit kan toetsen op wettelijkheid of opportuniteit.
Alleszins zal deze opname op de Europese terreurlijst de rechtbank geenszins be"invloeden bij
de beoordeling. De rechtbank gaat steeds uit van het vermoeden van onschuld en ook tijdens
het strafonderzoek werd dit recht steeds gerespecteerd.
g) Geen nauwkeurige beschrijving van het doorzoeken van de wagen van vierde
beklaagde
Vierde beklaagde werpt op dat er geen nauwkeurige beschrijving is gegeven van het
doorzoeken van de wagen.
Allerlei voorwerpen werden ofwel bij fouillering ofwel bij doorzoeking van de wagen
teruggevonden en deze voorwerpen werden wel van naderbij beschreven.
Vierde beklaagde werpt op dat het van belang is om te weten welke voorwerpen waar werden
aangetroffen, vooral de plaats in het voertuig is van belang.
De rechtbank merkt op dat vierde beklaagde in de gelegenheid werd gesteld om hierover
tegenspraak te voeren en aan te voeren in welke mate de bewijswaarde werd aangetast door
het gebrek aan deze beschrijving.
De beoordeling of dit al dan niet van belang is maakt deel uit van de beoordeling ten gronde
met betrekking tot de eventuele schuldigverklaring door de rechtbank. lndien dit een
probleem vormt, zal de rechtbank desgevallend de nodige juridische besluiten met betrekking
tot de bewijswaarde en de daaropvolgende eventuele schuldigverklaring trekken.
VII. lnformatie verstrekt door de Veiligheid van de Staat
Beklaagden werpen op dat het strafdossier grotendeels gebouwd is op informatie van de
Veiligheid van de Staat en dat dit niet als basis van bewijs kan beschouwd worden, te meer er
niet kan gecontroleerd worden op welke wijze deze informatie werd bekomen.
lnformatie van de Veiligheid van de Staat dient beschouwd te worden als inlichtingen. Dit kan
perfect als een aangifte beschouwd worden en wanneer deze informatie concreet is en
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gedetailleerd kunnen op basis van deze informatie verregaande onderzoeksmaatregelen
bevolen worden.
De schuld van beklaagden dient steeds beoordeeld te worden op grond van objectieve en
getoetste bewijzen en kan niet uitsluitend gebaseerd zijn op deze informatie. In het geheel van
de bewijsvoering kan deze informatie van de Veiligheid van de Staat wel een belangrijke
aanvulling zijn.
Beklaagden werden in de mogelijkheid gesteld om tegenspraak te voeren over alle informatie
afkomstig van de Veiligheid van de Staat.
Het is aan de rechtbank om te bepalen in welke mate deze informatie betrouwbaar is, zeker
wanneer deze informatie afkomstig is van het louter verzamelen van inlichtingen. De
rechtbank dient met betrekking tot informatie van buitenlandse inlichtingendiensten,
behoudens tegenindicaties, ervan uit te gaan dat deze informatie werd verzameld conform de
gebruikelijke buitenlandse wetgeving.
VIII. De gevolgen van de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie
De verdediging van derde beklaagde stelt dat al het bewijs lastens derde beklaagde
rechtstreeks of onrechtstreeks is gesteund op telefoniegegevens die werden verkregen in strijd
met het Unierecht, onder meer het recht op de eerbiediging van het priveleven (artikel 7 EUHandvest).
Bijgevolg dient derde beklaagde volgens de verdediging te worden vrijgesproken
van alle hem ten laste gelegde feiten, minstens dienen alle partijen de mogelijkheid te krijgen
om standpunt in te nemen over de stukken die dienen geweerd te worden en de gevolgen die
daaraan verbonden moeten worden.
De verdediging verwijst hiervoor naar het recent arrest van het Hof van Justitie van 6 oktober
2020 (zaak C-511/18, C-512/18 en C-520/18) waarin geoordeeld werd dat de
ongedifferentieerde en algemene bewaring van verkeers- en locatiegegevens, zelfs met het
oog op de strijd tegen de zware criminaliteit, de limieten van het strikt noodzakelijke
overschrijdt. Een ongedifferentieerde algemene bewaring van verkeers- en locatiedata van alle
gebruikers van elektronische communicatiemiddelen kan volgens het Hof van Justitie
opgelegd worden bij bevel van een gerechtelijke autoriteit in het geval van een ernstige,
daadwerkelijke, actuele of voorzienbare bedreiging van de nationale veiligheid, mits dit bevel
tot bewaring temporeel beperkt is tot het strikt noodzakelijke (onverminderd een mogelijke
verlenging van de termijn), voorzienbaar is en het voorwerp uitmaakt van een daadwerkelijke
controle door een rechter of onafhankelijk administratief orgaan met beslissingsrecht. Wat
betreft de strijd tegen de zware criminaliteit en de preventie van zware dreigingen tegen de
publieke veiligheid kan een gerichte bewaarplicht van verkeers- en locatiedata worden
opgelegd op voorwaarde dat dergelijke bewaring beperkt is tot het strikt noodzakelijke voor
wat betreft de categorieen van te bewaren gegevens, de beoogde elektronische
communicatiemiddelen, de betrokken personen en de duur van de bewaring. Op basis van
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objectieve en non-discriminatoire elementen dienen bepaalde groepen van personen of
geografische zones daartoe ge'identificeerd te worden en er dient steeds een strikte beperking
in tijd te zijn.
Maar zelfs als de nationale wetsbepaling waarop het bewaren van telecommunicatiegegevens
gesteund is, in voorliggend geval artikel 126 van de Wet van 13 juni 2005 betreffende de
elektronische communicatie, in strijd zou zijn met de grondrechten zoals voorzien in de
artikelen 7, 8 en 52, 1 e lid van het EU-Handvest, heeft dit niet automatisch tot gevolg dat deze
gegevens dienen te worden beschouwd als onrechtmatig verkregen bewijs dat nietig zou zijn
of geweerd zou moeten worden.
Volgens het Hof van Justitie komt het in de eerste plaats toe aan de nationale wetgever om in
strafprocedures tegen personen die verdacht worden van het plegen van ernstige misdrijven,
de regels te bepalen inzake de toelaatbaarheid en de beoordeling van informatie en bewijzen
verkregen op basis van dataretentiewetgeving in strijd met het Unierecht.
Het komt dus aan de nationale rechtsordes toe om procedureregels te voorzien zodat de
grondrechten die de burgers genieten overeenkomstig het Unierecht gegarandeerd worden,
met dien verstande dat deze regels niet nadeliger mogen zijn dan de regels inzake bewijs
verkregen in strijd met het nationale recht (equivalentieprincipe) en dat de uitoefening van de
Europese grondrechten in de praktijk niet onmogelijk of uiterst moeilijk mag zijn
(effectiviteitsprincipe). De regels inzake het gebruik als bewijs van data bewaard in strijd met
het Unierecht mogen aldus niet nadeliger zijn dan deze inzake het gebruik van bewijs
verkregen in strijd met het nationale recht.
Verder stelt het Hof van Justitie dat artikel 15, lid 1 van de E-Privacyrichtlijn ge'interpreteerd in
het licht van het effectiviteitsprincipe concreet vereist dat nation ale strafrechters in de context
van strafrechtelijke procedures tegen personen die ervan worden verdacht strafbare feiten te
hebben gepleegd, informatie en bewijzen die zijn verkregen door middel van de algemene en
willekeurige bewaring van verkeers- en locatiegegevens in strijd met het EU-recht, uitsluiten
wanneer die personen niet in staat zijn om effectief opmerkingen hieromtrent te formuleren
en de informatie en de bewijzen betrekking hebben op een gebied waarvan de rechters geen
kennis hebben en die waarschijnlijk een doorslaggevende invloed zullen hebben wat betreft
de feitelijke vaststellingen.
Concreet stelt de rechtbank vast dat de verkeers- en locatiegegevens in voorliggend dossier
werden opgevraagd door de onderzoeksrechter op basis van gemotiveerde beschikkingen
conform artikel 88bis Sv. en rekening houdend met de principes van subsidiariteit en
proportionaliteit.
Wat betreft de toelaatbaarheid als bewijs van deze opgevraagde gegevens die werden
bewaard in strijd met de door het Unierecht gewaarborgde grondrechten, dient toepassing
gemaakt te worden van artikel 32 V.T.Sv. Wat betreft onrechtmatig verkregen bewijs dient in
onze Belgische rechtsorde immers steeds de toets overeenkomstig artikel 32 V.T.Sv. te worden
gemaakt, ongeacht de aard van de bepaling (nationaal, Europees of internationaal) die werd
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geschonden (zie in die zin Cass. 19 april 2016, nr. P.15.1639.N). Ervan uitgaan dat de bewaring
van telecommunicatiegegevens in strijd met fundamentele grondrechten steeds dermate
zwaarwichtig is dat dit automatisch een schending uitmaakt van het recht van verdediging en
bij uitbreiding het recht op een eerlijk proces, is dan oak onjuist.
De rechtbank stelt vast dater in het licht van de criteria van artikel 32 V.T.Sv. geen reden is om
tot bewijsuitsluiting over te gaan. Het gebruik van de telecommunicatiegegevens is
toelaatbaar gezien de bewaarplicht geen op straffe van nietigheid voorgeschreven
vormvoorwaarde schendt, gezien de begane onregelmatigheid de betrouwbaarheid van het
bewijs niet heeft aangetast en gezien het gebruik ervan niet in strijd is met het recht op een
eerlijk proces. De rechten van verdediging zijn immers niet onherroepelijk geschonden.
De rechtbank stelt vast dat een bewaring van verkeers- en locatiegegevens in strijd met het
recht op de bescherming van het prive-leven en de persoonsgegevens op zich niet doen
twijfelen aan de betrouwbaarheid van deze bewaarde gegevens. De verdediging betwist oak
de kwaliteit en de juistheid van deze bewaarde en opgevraagde telefoniegegevens niet. Wat
betreft het recht op een eerlijk proces stelt de rechtbank vast dat er geen sprake is van een
(opzettelijke) onregelmatigheid begaan door de vervolgende of onderzoekende overheid.
Zoals hoger gesteld was er voor de onderzoeksrechter een wettelijke basis voor het opvragen
van de gegevens. De opvraging van de telecommunicatiegegevens gebeurde dus op vordering
en onder strikt toezicht van een onafhankelijke gerechtelijke instantie, die conform de
wettelijke voorschriften bij een duidelijk en gemotiveerd bevelschrift uiting heeft gegeven aan
de redenen en motieven die aan de grondslag lagen van de beslissing. Oak de telecomoperator
die de gegevens bewaarde, schond niet doelbewust het recht op bescherming van het
priveleven en van de persoonsgegevens, maar handelde conform de op dat ogenblik geldende
wettelijke verplichtingen in Belgie. De wetsbepalingen waarop zowel de onderzoeksrechter als
de operatoren zich steunden werden net gewijzigd door de wet van 29 mei 2016 (BS 18 juli
2016) nadat het Grondwettelijk Hof bij arrest van 11 juni 2015 de wet van 30 juli 2013 tot
wijziging van onder meer artikel 126 WEC had vernietigd wegens de schending van de
eerbiediging van het priveleven en de bescherming van de persoonsgegevens.
Bovendien overstijgt de ernst van de aan de beklaagden ten laste gelegde feiten, paging
terroristische moord en deelname aan een terroristische groep, ruimschoots de ernst van de
beweerde onregelmatigheden. De strijd tegen de zware criminaliteit en de preventie van
zware dreigingen tegen de publieke veiligheid zijn immers van die aard dat ze inperkingen van
het recht op priveleven en van het recht van bescherming van de persoonsgegevens kunnen
rechtvaardigen.
Beklaagden hebben tenslotte zowel tijdens het vooronderzoek als bij de behandeling ten
gronde de mogelijkheid gehad om betwisting te voeren wat betreft de juistheid, de
betrouwbaarheid en de geloofwaardigheid van de data inzake telecommunicatie, alsook wat
betreft de gevolgtrekkingen van de onderzoekers en het openbaar ministerie op basis van deze
gegevens. Ze waren in de mogelijkheid vragen te stellen, opmerkingen te formuleren en zelf
elementen en argumenten aan te voeren die ze nuttig achten bij de beoordeling van de hen
ten laste gelegde feiten. Hierbij kan oak warden opgemerkt dat telecommunicatiegegevens
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niet alleen bewijzen a charge kunnen opleveren, maar uiteraard ook a decharge. Het uitvoeren
van een telefonieonderzoek vormt in vele gevallen dan ook een noodzakelijk onderdeel van
een onafhankelijk gevoerd gerechtelijk onderzoek waarbij zowel elementen a charge als a
decharge worden vergaard.
Bovendien bevat het strafdossier ook verschillende andere bewijselementen naast deze
verkregen uit (retroactief) telefonieonderzoek. De rechtbank toetst de
telecommunicatiegegevens ook steeds mee af aan alle elementen in het dossier en de door
de verdediging opgeworpen verweermiddelen.
Het "bewijsgewicht" van deze telecommunicatiegegevens is in het licht van het volledige
strafdossier dan ook beperkt.
De verdediging van derde beklaagde voert overigens ook geen concreet verweer inzake de
telefoniegegevens maar stelt enkel dat de retentie van telefoniegegevens dermate technisch
is dat beklaagde zich daar in wezen niet effectief en nuttig kan tegen verdedigen en dat de
rechtbank daar geen kennis van heeft. Opdat sprake is van effectieve tegenspraak wat betreft
technisch en wetenschappelijk onderzoek is echter niet vereist dat de verdediging en de
rechtbank de technische en wetenschappelijke kennis hebben zoals de experten ter zake. Door
het voorleggen van de technische resultaten van dergelijk onderzoek en door de weergave en
analyse ervan door de onderzoekers in pv's, alsook door de mogelijkheid voor de verdediging
om hieromtrent opmerkingen te formuleren en/of andersluidende elementen of stukken bij
te brengen, zowel tijdens het gerechtelijk onderzoek als tijdens de behandeling ten gronde, is
effectieve tegenspraak gegarandeerd.
Het feit dat de opgevraagde telefoniegegevens werden bewaard in strijd met het recht op de
eerbiediging van het priveleven en de bescherming van de persoonsgegevens, heeft het recht
op verdediging in hoofde van beklaagden dan ook niet in de weg gestaan. De rechtbank stelt
geen schending van het recht op een eerlijk proces vast en er dienen dan ook geen
bewijselementen uit het debat te worden geweerd.
IX. Voegen van proces-verbalen
Tweede beklaagde verzoekt ook om de verhoren van de Duitse vriend van tweede beklaagde
te voegen. Het openbaar ministerie heeft dit gedaan op de openbare terechtzitting van 3
december 2020.
X. Het verzoek tot horen van getuigen
Tweede beklaagde verzoekt de rechtbank om getuigen te horen, meer bepaald over het
explosief karakter van de het gebruikte toestel. Hieronder zal blijken dat de onduidelijkheid
die mogelijk zou ontstaan met betrekking tot het explosief toestel door de verdediging van
tweede beklaagde zelf gecreeerd werd door een onvolledige lezing van het dossier. Een
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onvolledige lezing van het strafdossier, door de verdediging van een van de partijen, kan geen
reden zijn om getuigen extra te horen.
De rechtbank beschikt over voldoende informatie, onder meer van DOVO en de Duitse expert,
om met betrekking tot het explosief karakter van het toestel een standpunt in te nemen.
Het is niet noodzakelijk voor de verdere beoordeling dat hieromtrent nog getuigen dienen
gehoord te worden en de verdediging werd in de mogelijkheid gesteld om tegenspraak te
voeren over de besluiten van deze experts en desgevallend tegenexpertises aan te leveren.
Daarnaast verzoekt tweede beklaagde om ook haar Duitse vriend te horen, maar gelet op het
uitgebreide verhoor, gaat de rechtbank niet in op dit verzoek, aangezien tweede beklaagde
ook niet aantoont waarom een verhoor onder eed als getuige, concreet noodzakelijk is voor
haar verdediging. De rechtbank steunt zich bij een eventuele beoordeling ten laste ook niet op
de verklaring van haar Duitse vriend en raakt alleen de verklaring aan wanneer deze ten
ontlaste is.
XI. Onrechtmatige telefoontaps overeenkomstig art. 8 EVRM
Tweede beklaagde werpt op dat de informatie van de Veiligheid van de Staat onvoldoende
was om tapmaatregelen op te starten, waardoor artikel 8 EVRM geschonden werd.
De rechtbank is het hiermee niet eens. De informatie van de Veiligheid van de Staat is concreet
en precies genoeg om deze verregaande onderzoeksmaatregel te bevelen.
XII. De schending van het recht op een eerlijk proces omwille van de media-aandacht
Tweede beklaagde werpt op dat haar recht op een eerlijk proces geschonden werd door de
uitgebreide verslaggeving voor het proces, waarbij de journalisten blijkbaar beschikten over
een gedeelte van het strafdossier.
Het is niet duidelijk wie achter deze lekken naar de media toe zit.
De rechtbank houdt bij de beoordeling van de feiten en straftoemeting, alleen rekening met
de gegevens die voorkomen in het strafdossier, de besluiten en neergelegde stukken, het
mondelinge rekwisitoor, de mondelinge pleidooien van de burgerlijke partijen en de
verdediging en ten slotte met de mondelinge verklaringen van partijen in persoon zelf.
De rechtbank houdt geen rekening met de informatie die verschijnt in de media of met de
standpunten van de publieke opinie.
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De rechtbank stelt dan oak geen schending van het recht op een eerlijk proces in hoofde van
tweede beklaagde vast.
XIII. De onontvankelijkheid van de strafvordering
Gelet op het standpunt van de rechtbank met betrekking tot bovenstaande procedurele
argumenten, kan de rechtbank niet vaststellen dat de strafvordering niet ontvankelijk zou zijn.
De rechtbank stelt rekening houdend met de inhoud van het strafdossier, globaal genomen
sedert de start van het onderzoek, alsook met de behandeling ter zitting geen schending vast
van de rechten van verdediging, het recht op een eerlijk proces, het vermoeden van onschuld,
of enige andere nationaalrechtelijke of internationaalrechtelijke bepaling.
De strafvordering is alleszins ontvankelijk.
TEN GRONDE
Beklaagden staan terecht voor paging terroristische moord (tenlastelegging A) en
lidmaatschap terroristische groep (tenlastelegging D).
Beklaagden warden vervolgd omdat ze betrokken zouden zijn bij een paging om een aanslag
te plegen op 30 juni 2018 op een drukbezochte conferentie die georganiseerd werd door de
Organisation des Moujahidines du Peuple lranien/Mujahedin-e Khalq/Conseil National de la
Resistance lranienne te Villepinte (nabij Parijs).
De organisaties : Organisation des Moujahidines du Peuple lranien (OMPl)/Mujahedin-e
Khalg) en Conseil national de la Resistance iranienne
De "Organisation des Moujahidines du Peuple lranien (OMPl)/Mujahedin-e Khalq) (MEK)",
hierna "MEK", is een lraanse oppositiepartij, opgericht in 1965 in Iran. Oorspronkelijk voerde
deze organisatie oppositie tegen de lraanse Sjah, maar na de val van dit regime keerde deze
organisatie zich snel tegen het nieuwe lslamitisch regime ender leiding van ayatollah
Khomeini. Na een reeks grate betogingen en hun mogelijke betrokkenheid bij een zware
aanslag in Teheran in 1981 werd MEK buiten de wet gesteld en gingen de leden in ballingschap.
MEK had een militaire vleugel, die van 1986 tot en met 1988 aan de kant van Saddam Houssein
vocht tijdens de lraaks/lraanse oorlog {1980-1988). Tot in 2016 woonden duizenden leden van
MEK in kampen in lrak (Camp Ashraf en Camp Liberty). Sedert 2016 verhuisden deze leden
naar Europese landen, ender meer naar een kamp in Albanie. MEK stand op de terreurlijst van
de Europese Unie tussen 2002 en 2009 en tot 2012 op de Amerikaanse terreurlijst. Sedert
2000 zou MEK officieel afzien van de gewapende strijd.
De politieke vleugel van MEK is de Conseil National de la Resistance lranienne, hierna "CNRI".
Ze hebben hun hoofdkwartier in Frankrijk (Auvers-sur-Oise).
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Door Iran worden deze oppositiepartijen beschouwd als terroristische organisaties en volgens
de lraanse staat zijn deze organisaties verantwoordelijk voor diverse (dodelijke) aanslagen en
oproer in Iran.
De (leidinggevende) leden van MEK en CNRI waren in het verleden regelmatig slachtoffer van
verschillende moordaanslagen of pogingen daartoe. Op 22 maart 2018 kon een poging tot
aanslag op het kamp van MEK in Albanie verijdeld worden. Deze aanslag en andere (pogingen)
aanslagen werd tel kens door MEK en CNRI of door de Ian den waar de aanslagen plaats vonden,
toegeschreven aan de lraanse Staat of een van haar veiligheidsdiensten, zoals MOIS.
Wat betreft de inlichtingendienst lraans Ministerie voor lnlichtingen en Veiligheid en
departement 312
Uit informatie die door de Veiligheid van de Staat werd aangeleverd in het strafdossier, blijkt
dat het "lraans Ministerie voor lnlichtingen en Veiligheid", hierna MOIS, werd opgericht in
1983 en sedert 2013 onder het gezag staat van de Minister voor lnlichtingen. MOIS zou haar
wortels hebben in de oude geheime politieke politie van de Sjah (de beruchte Savak). MOIS
bekleedt een centrale positie binnen de lraanse veiligheidsdiensten en zou over belangrijke
inkomsten beschikken. Het departement 312 zou een directoraat zijn dat zich bezig houdt met
de lraanse oppositie in het buitenland. Mogelijk zijn er nog andere overheidsdiensten binnen
Iran die zich hiermee bezig hielden.
Wat betreft de start van het onderzoek
Het strafdossier startte met een dringende melding van de Veiligheid van de Staat op 25 juni
2018 aan het Federaal Parket. De Staatsveiligheid had via een partnerdienst informatie
gekregen dat een Belgo-lraans koppel mogelijk betrokken zou zijn bij een daad van geweld of
een poging daartoe in Frankrijk. De info gaf ook de concrete identiteit op van het koppel,
namelijk eerste en tweede beklaagde.
Op 27 juni 2018 kwam er bijkomende informatie binnen van de Veiligheid van de Staat,
gebaseerd op eigen onderzoek.
Men kon iets meer informatie geven over de mogelijke betrokkenen.
Eerste beklaagde was van lraanse afkomst en verbleef sedert 27 juni 2003 in Belgie. Hij had
een vijftal keer asiel aangevraagd, maar werd telkens geweigerd. Ook in Zweden had hij
getracht asiel aan te vragen.
Hij vroeg politiek asiel aan omdat hij zou gevlucht zijn uit Iran wegens politieke redenen. Het
is niet duidelijk wat de ware toedracht was van zijn vertrek uit Iran, aangezien hij verschillende
oorzaken opgaf als reden voor zijn politiek asiel. Zo gaf hij oorspronkelijk in 2004 als reden op
dat hij in de problemen was gekomen met de lraanse veiligheidsdiensten/religieuze politie,
omdat hij als toevallige passant bij een studentenbetoging een gewonde student had
geholpen. Omdat dit onvoldoende concreet was, gaf hij in zijn latere asielaanvragen aan dat
hij sedert zijn komst in Belgie actief was bij MEK, maar ook dit werd niet als voldoende
beschouwd. Uiteindelijk kon hij genieten van humanitaire regularisatie in 2010 en werd hij in
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2016 genaturaliseerd tot Belg.
Zijn echtgenote, tweede beklaagde, kwam in 2007 naar Belgie. Ze reisde van Turkije naar
Nederland, waar ze werd opgepakt omdat ze een vervalst Zweeds Schengen visum zou hebben
gehad.
Ze vroeg in Belgie politiek asiel aan omdat ze problemen had met de lraanse
veiligheidsdiensten omwille van de activiteiten van haar man voor MEK in Belgie. Ze zou
hierdoor ook haar werk hebben verloren. Ze zou sympathiseren voor het MEK, maar was niet
diep betrokken bij de organisatie. Haar asiel werd afgewezen wegens te weinig geloofwaardig,
opportunistisch en onoprecht. Uiteindelijk genoot tweede beklaagde ook van de humanitaire
regularisatie in 2010 en verkreeg ze later de Belgische nationaliteit.
De Veiligheid van de Staat vond het ook opmerkelijk dat eerste en tweede beklaagde nog
terugkeerden naar Iran, ondanks dat ze problemen hadden met de lraanse
veiligheidsdiensten.
Op basis van verder onderzoek vermoedde de Veiligheid van de Staat dat de gewelddadige
actie mogelijk betrekking zou hebben op de drukbezochte conferentie van MEK/CNRI te
Villepinte (nabij Parijs) op 30 juni 2018. Dit congres zou bezocht warden door internationale
vooraanstaande (politieke) VI P's, die de lraanse oppositie genegen waren.
Het onderzoek
Op 28 juni 2018 werd door het Federaal parket een onderzoeksrechter gevorderd, waarbij
ender meer een onmiddellijke observatie werd bevolen op eerste en tweede beklaagde,
alsook een tapmaatregel op de gekende telefoonnummers.
Op 28 juni 2018 werd tijdens de internationaal gevoerde observatie vastgesteld dat eerste en
tweede beklaagde zich naar het Groot-Hertogdom Luxemburg verplaatsten, waar ze contact
hadden met een onbekende persoon. Na het contact werd deze persoon ge'identificeerd bij
een verkeerscontrole als vierde beklaagde die in bezit was van een Oostenrijkse
identiteitskaart. Hij was op dat ogenblik vergezeld van zijn echtgenote en zijn twee zonen.
Op 29 juni 2018 kwam er nog bijkomende informatie van de Veiligheid van de Staat dat eerste
beklaagde contacten zou hebben met een onbekende persoon waarbij in codetaal werd
gesproken.
Uit deze contacten zou blijken dat eerste beklaagde zou gefocust zijn op zijn opdracht en ervan
overtuigd was dat ze zullen slagen. Er werd gesproken over een afspraak in Luxemburg en over
een Playstation4, dat mogelijk een codewoord zou kunnen zijn voor een toestel dat gebruikt
zou kunnen warden om een daad van geweld te plegen. Tweede beklaagde zou over een grote
geldsom van 15.000 euro cash beschikken en er zou een voorschot zijn betaald van 2.500 euro
voor de aankoop van een nieuw voertuig Mercedes coupe.
In deze informatie werd voor de eerste keer ook derde beklaagde genoemd, als mogelijk
betrokken bij de feiten die gingen plaats vinden.
Op 30 juni 2018 stonden eerste en tweede beklaagde nog steeds ender observatie. Uit het
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telefonie-onderzoek blijkt dat eerste beklaagde om 11 u 07 een oproep kreeg. Een zevental
minuten later vertrokken eerste en tweede beklaagde met hun voertuig richting Brussel.
Onderweg kregen eerste en tweede beklaagde in hun voertuig verschillende verdachte smsberichten
van een Oostenrijks nummer, waarbij in codetaal werd gesproken. Men sprak over
een "tuig", dat moest ge"installeerd worden. Men sprak van "vooruittrekken van 20 uur naar
17 u 30". Eerste beklaagde sprak ook over van "2 uur tot 17 u 30" en over "regelmatig
schoonmaken". Dit laatste zou een codewoord kunnen zijn voor mogelijke contraobservatietechnieken.
Bij het volgen van het voertuig stelde men inderdaad vast dat eerste
beklaagde contra-observatietechnieken aan het uitvoeren was, door zijn snelheid regelmatig
te switchen van 130 km/u naar 180 km/u, waardoor het voertuig moeilijk te volgen was.
Rond 12 u 24 kwam het voertuig van eerste en tweede beklaagde op de Brusselse ring in een
file terecht, waarna ze een afrit namen in Sint-Pieters-Woluwe. Het voertuig werd enkele
minuten later tegengehouden en eerste en tweede beklaagde werden ge"intercepteerd en
aangehouden.
Er werd onmiddellijk een perimeter van 200 meter ingesteld en de ontmijningsdienst DOVO
kwam ter plaatse.
Om 14 u 49 vond DOVO in de koffer van het voertuig een verdachte toiletzak waaruit draden
steken. DOVO maakte een RX van de toiletzak.
Omstreeks 15 u 15 meldde de ontmijningsdienst dat het mogelijk een detonator zou kunnen
zijn en dat ze het pakket gingen openen en doorzoeken.
Om 16 u 25 maakte DOVO melding van een verdacht wit poeder, waarvan het gewicht
geraamd werd op +/- 500 gram. Tijdens het manipuleren en ontmantelen van het bewuste
toestel was het wit poeder tot ontploffing gekomen. De robot van DOVO werd zwaar
beschadigd. Ondanks de grote perimeter werd een lid van de speciale eenheden onwel
(hoofdpijn, rood aangezicht en gehoorschade) nadat hij geraakt werd door de drukgolf.
In het voertuig werd een geel/goud notitieboekje teruggevonden, alsook een gsm-toestel met
maar een contact, een Oostenrijks nummer opgeslagen onder "Daniaaal".
Ondertussen werden diverse huiszoekingen verricht, onder meer op het adres te Wilrijk in de
woning van eerste en tweede beklaagde, waar in een reiskoffer 3 omslagen werden gevonden
met in totaal 35.690 euro cash geld.
Bij een huiszoeking te Ukkel op het adres van derde beklaagde werden talrijke cd's, videoapparatuur,
fotocamera's en videocassetjes en spyware teruggevonden.
Derde beklaagde kon aangehouden worden door de Franse politie op 30 juni 2018 op de
parking van het congres te Villepinte en werd onmiddellijk uitgeleverd aan Belgie.
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Vierde beklaagde kon onderschept worden op 1 juli 2018 op de Duitse autostrade te
Weibersbrunn, toen hij met zijn gezin terugkeerde naar Oostenrijk. Ze werden afgeleid naar
een baanrestaurant, waar ze verder gecontroleerd werden. Omdat de politiehond reageerde
op het voertuig op mogelijke aanwezigheid van springstoffen werd het hele gezin
aangehouden.
In het voertuig werden geen springstoffen gevonden en na een eerste verhoor werden de
gezinsleden van vierde beklaagde terug vrijgelaten.
Vierde beklaagde werd uiteindelijk door de Duitse justitie uitgeleverd aan Belgie.
Eerste en tweede beklaagde gaven bij hun eerste verhoor aan dat ze schrik hadden van vierde
beklaagde, die ze kennen als "Daniel". Vierde beklaagde zou op een sms aan het wachten zijn,
nadat de opdracht was uitgevoerd. Ze zouden zich na hun opdracht moeten begeven naar
Keulen, waar ze terug een ontmoeting zouden hebben met vierde beklaagde.
Zowel eerste en tweede beklaagde beweerden dat ze niet op de hoogte waren dat het toestel
een born was. Volgens hen ging het om een toestel dat veel lawaai zou maken.
In haar eerste verklaring beweerde tweede beklaagde dat het toestel diende gegooid te
warden aan de eetkraampjes. Eerste beklaagde beweerde dat hij het op de parking in de buurt
van de bussen moest plaatsen.
De born
Uit informatie van DOVO blijkt dat het ging om een operation eel ge"improviseerd explosief tuig
("improvised explosive device"-IED), dat verstopt zat in een toiletzak.
DOVO:
"Technische evaluatie : Het /ED was samengesteld met onderdelen die vrij verkrijgbaar zijn in
de handel. Echter, een goede basisnotie van elektronica is nodig om dit soort /ED te maken. De
a/gemene opbouw van het tuig is a/s zeer professionee/ te beschouwen en getuigt van een
bewustzijn betreffende eventue/e sporenonderzoek achteraf Zo werden bijvoorbee/d a/le
onderde/en van het /ED in rechtstreeks contact met de exp/osieve lading gep/aatst. Dit zorgde
voor een maxima le verwoesting en onbruikbaarheid van het bewijsmateriaa/ achteraf"
Het had twee elektrische ontstekers om zeker de correcte werking van het tuig te garanderen.
Het had een explosieve lading, geraamd op maximaal +/- 500 gr. TATP (triacetontriperoxide).
TATP is een zelf gemaakt "Home Made Explosive" van aceton, waterstofperoxide en een zuur.
Er was een afvuursysteem voorzien dat werkte met een op afstand bediende zender. Deze
zender was krachtig genoeg om op honderden meters afstand te werken en het was niet
uitgesloten dater meerdere afstandsbedieningen waren.
In een toiletzakje van tweede beklaagde in het voertuig werd een afstandsbediening gevonden
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voor dit toestel. De afstandsbediening zat in een beschermhoes, om te voorkomen dat het
toestel zou afgaan bij een accidentele druk op de knop.
Verder onderzoek
Er volgde verder onderzoek, voornamelijk netwerkonderzoek met de bedoeling de mails te
achterhalen die door eerste en tweede beklaagde werden uitgewisseld met vierde beklaagde.
Nieuwe tapmaatregelen werden genomen en er kwam een beschikking tot het directafluisteren
van gesprekken tussen tweede en derde beklaagde en tussen eerste en tweede
beklaagde, terwijl ze aan het wachten waren op hun verhoor. Diverse getuigen werden
verhoord en men trachtte voornamelijk via telefonie-onderzoek (retro-actief onderzoek) en
de analyse van de teruggevonden digitale toestellen de juiste toedracht van de feiten te
achterhalen.
Eerste en tweede beklaagde legden uitgebreide verklaringen af, waarin ze de feiten toegaven
tot op zekere hoogte. Het was de bedoeling dat het toestel, dat zij omschrijven als "vuurwerk",
zou tot ontploffing gebracht worden.
Dit zou dan chaos veroorzaken, waardoor het congres zou verstoord worden en de lraanse
deelnemers zouden afgeschrikt worden om nog deel te nemen aan latere edities.
In deze en latere verklaringen gaven eerste en tweede beklaagde aan dat ze onder druk
werden gezet door de lraanse inlichtingendienst MOIS om informatie te verzamelen over de
activiteiten van MEK en haar leden.
Om zich van hun medewerking te verzekeren, werd er volgens eerste en tweede beklaagde,
door de lraanse inlichtingendienst MOIS gebruik gemaakt van enerzijds bedreigingen naar hun
lraanse familie toe, voornamelijk de vader van tweede beklaagde, en anderzijds werden
beklaagden vergoed voor de informatie die ze gaven en werden ze hierdoor verleid om verder
voor de inlichtingendienst te werken.
Volgens de verklaringen van eerste en tweede beklaagde zou het allemaal begonnen zijn in
2007, waarbij ze telefonisch om informatie werden gevraagd door een lraanse agent "Jawad".
Uit hun verklaringen en de informatie met betrekking tot hun vluchtgegevens, blijkt dat eerste
en tweede beklaagde in februari 2010 samen vertrokken naar Iran, waar ze een ontmoeting
zouden hebben gehad met verschillende agenten van MOIS en waarbij opnieuw druk op hen
werd uitgeoefend.
Uit de stempels in hun paspoort blijkt dat ze ook in december 2010 naar Teheran gevlogen
zijn.
Terug in Belgie werden ze telefonisch gecontacteerd door een nieuwe lraanse "runner". Deze
opereerde steeds vanuit Iran. Ze werden in 2012 gesommeerd om terug naar Iran te komen.
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Daar werd de druk op hen opgevoerd om meer informatie te geven over de organisatie
MEK/CNRI. Ook in 2013 zou eerste beklaagde, volgens eigen zeggen, naar Teheran zijn
gevlogen. Tijdens deze ontmoeting merkte hij dat de lraanse agenten ook op de hoogte waren
wanneer eerste beklaagde aanwezig was bij het MEK/CNRI, waaruit hij afleidde dat er nog
andere informanten bij het MEK/CNRI waren. Sedert 2013 werden ze meer stelselmatig
vergoed voor de informatie die ze aanleverden. Zo kreeg eerste beklaagde in 2013
geldsommen ten bedrage van 6.000 euro.
Volgens eerste en tweede beklaagde werden ze in 2015 gecontacteerd door een lraanse agent
in Europa, die zich "Daniel" noemde. Dit betrof vierde beklaagde. Het koppel ontmoette hem
de eerste keer in Munchen in de zomer van 2015. Vierde beklaagde had aangegeven te werken
voor de lraanse ambassade in Wenen. Ze kregen toen een geldsom van 4.000 euro voor de
onkosten. Ze zouden elkaar contacteren via e-mail. Er vond eind november 2015 opnieuw een
ontmoeting plaats bij MOIS in Iran, waar ook vierde beklaagde aanwezig was. Daar werd
gevraagd om meer informatie te verzamelen over het hoofdkwartier van MEK/CNRI in Auverssur-
Oise (Frankrijk). Sedertdien vonden de ontmoetingen overal in Europa plaats, zoals onder
meer Munchen, Milaan, Luxemburg en Wenen.
Uit het verder onderzoek, onder meer de exploitatie van de in beslag genomen gsm's en
computer, de analyse van de teruggevonden email-berichten en de verklaringen van eerste en
tweede beklaagde, blijkt dater vooral met vierde beklaagde werd gecommuniceerd via email,
waarbij filmpjes of audio-fragmenten over de activiteiten van de leden van MEK werden
doorgestuurd of overhandigd. Eerste beklaagde gebruikte het email-adres
"[email protected]" en vierde beklaagde "[email protected]". In de
mails werd codetaal gebruikt, maar het is duidelijk dat eerste en tweede beklaagde informatie
gaven over de activiteiten van de leden van MEK/CNRI. Daarnaast waren er operationele gsm's
die slechts dienden om korte berichten uit te wisselen of om elkaar te ontmoeten. Dit vond op
diverse Europese locaties plaats, vaak buiten Oostenrijk, waarbij telkens gekeken werd dater
geen bewakingscamera's waren en niet teveel volk. Op een bepaald ogenblik werd er ook
afgesproken op een trein. Ook via Telegram werden er gegevens uitgewisseld. Volgens eigen
zeggen werden ze nu meer regelmatig betaald. Eerste beklaagde sprak over 3.500 a 4.000 euro
om de drie a vier maanden, in een ander verhoor sprak hij over 1.500-1.700 euro per maand.
Uit de exploitatie van een geel notaboekje, blijken verschillende bedragen, die volgens tweede
beklaagde onkosten waren (meestal verplaatsingskosten), die deels werden terug betaald
door vierde beklaagde.
Uit de analyse van de e-mailberichten blijkt dat eerste en tweede beklaagde onderhandelden
met vierde beklaagde over hun vergoedingen, zeker toen ze deze specifieke opdracht kregen.
Het was duidelijk dat eerste en tweede beklaagde uit waren op een grote financiele
vergoeding. Uit de analyse van de bankrekeningen van beide beklaagden werd vastgesteld dat
door beide beklaagden voor enorme bedragen aan cash-stortingen werden verricht. In hun
woning werd ook een grote geldsom aangetroffen.
In de loop van het onderzoek blijven eerste en tweede beklaagde bij hun verklaring dat ze
misbruikt waren, omdat ze dachten dat het om een toestel ging dat alleen lawaai zou maken
en dat het niet hun bedoeling was om mensen te verwonden of te doden. Ze blijven tel kens
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spreken over vuurwerk.
Eerste beklaagde geeft aan dat hij volledige en 100 % betrouwbare informatie gaf aan de
verbalisanten tijdens zijn verhoren, maar uit het direct afluisteren van de gesprekken tussen
eerste en tweede beklaagde, blijkt duidelijk dat ze hun verklaringen op elkaar afstemden en
dat tweede beklaagde ook instructies gaf over de wijze waarop eerste beklaagde zijn
verklaringen diende af te leggen, waarbij hij haar zoveel mogelijk buiten schot diende te
houden.
Derde beklaagde ontkende in al zijn verhoren iets te maken te hebben met de poging tot
aanslag of met spionage voor de lraanse veiligheidsdiensten. Hij is lraanse politiek vluchteling,
die reeds jaren in Belgie woonde. Hij zou een schrijver/dichter zijn en leven van een beperkte
uitkering en hier en daar wat verbouwingswerken in het zwart doen.
Hij had regelmatig contact (bijna dagelijks) met de Belgische tak van MEK, onder meer via de
VZW Iran Ref., en voerde voor hen allerlei opdrachten uit, zoals onder meer filmopnames en
ontwerpen van affiches. Hij voerde soms ook taken uit bij de jaarlijkse conferentie van MEK te
Villepinte. Bij een huiszoeking bij derde beklaagde werd allerlei spyware gevonden, onder
meer USB-sticks waarmee men opnamen kon maken, alsook een bril met een verborgen
camera. Hij nam verschillende opnamen van de manifestaties van het MEK, maar evenzeer van
de verschillende deelnemers. Er zijn ook foto's teruggevonden, die op zo'n wijze
achtereenvolgens werden getrokken, dat ze als een wegbeschrijving kunnen beschouwd
worden naar een pand dat door leden van MEK werd gebruikt. Een getuige begreep niet
waarom hij alle mensen die deelnamen aan manifestaties van MEK filmde. Een andere getuige
trachtte hem op afstand te houden, omdat hij derde beklaagde al langer niet meer
vertrouwde. Zo wilde derde beklaagde ook graag manifestaties van MEK in Nederland
bijwonen, maar dit werd door de verantwoordelijke in Belgie geweigerd. Verschillende
leidinggevende personen vonden het ook vreemd dat hij het MEK-kamp in Albanie bezocht in
2017, wat blijkbaar niet gebruikelijk was.
Derde beklaagde hielp vroeger mee bij de veiligheid van het MEK-congres dat jaarlijks werd
georganiseerd en zou vroeger geholpen hebben bij de beveiliging van de leidster van CNRI.
Dit jaar mocht hij echter niet meewerken aan de veiligheid van het congres. Hij mocht a Ileen
de Belgische delegatie met de bus begeleiden. Het viel echter op dat hij had gezegd dat hij niet
met de bus naar Belgie ging terug keren. Een getuige vond het ook vreemd dat derde
beklaagde tijdens het congres niet bij de Belgische delegatie zat, maar dat hij zich de hele tijd
bij de uitgang ophield.
Bij zijn arrestatie op de parking was hij in het bezit van een gsm met een Oostenrijks nummer
en met slechts een contact. Dit contact bleek vierde beklaagde te zijn en bij vierde beklaagde
werd in zijn voertuig ook de simkaarthouder teruggevonden van de simkaart van deze
"operationele gsm" van derde beklaagde.
Vierde beklaagde werkte niet echt mee aan het onderzoek en ontkende elke betrokkenheid.
Hij kloeg erover dat hij niet behandeld werd zoals zijn diplomatieke status vereiste. Hij had
met de feiten niets te maken.
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In zijn laatste verhoor, op zijn eigen verzoek, waarschuwde hij dat er gewapende groepen
zouden klaar staan om in Belgie iets te ondernemen, wanneer hij veroordeeld zou worden.
Zijn verdediging minimaliseert deze uitspraak als een emotionele uitschuiver, ten gevolge van
het speciaal en zwaar gevangenisregime dat hij ondergaat.
Wat betreft de tenlastelegging poging terroristische moord
Om over poging moord te spreken moet er bewezen worden dat er een oogmerk was tot
doden en dat er voorbedachtheid was.
Wat betreft het oogmerk om te doden
De verdediging van tweede beklaagde tracht de rechtbank te overtuigen dat het niet echt om
een "born" ging. Het zou onvoldoende explosieve kracht hebben gehad, er zouden
vermoedelijk geen slachtoffers gevallen zijn of er zou hoogstens slechts beperkte schade zijn
geweest. Eerste en tweede beklaagde zouden volgens de verdediging er niet ver van af zijn als
ze constant spreken over "vuurwerk". Het zou slechts een luide knal geven om chaos te
veroorzaken. Om deze stelling hard te ma ken, legt de verdediging foto's neer van het voertuig,
onmiddellijk na de ontploffing. Er werd geen schade veroorzaakt aan het voertuig, noch aan
de toilettas waarin het explosief zat, noch aan het wegdek. De verdediging is vlak voor de
openbare zitting nog het inbeslaggenomen voertuig van naderbij gaan bekijken en stelde
opnieuw vast dat er geen schade was achteraan het voertuig. Ten onrechte wordt echter
geargumenteerd dat de ontploffing vlak achteraan de wagen had plaats gevonden.
De verdediging van tweede beklaagde gaat hier volledig in tegen de inhoud van het
strafdossier en in het bijzonder het technisch rapport van DOVO. Uit het strafdossier blijkt dat
er een perimeter van (minstens) 200 meter werd ingesteld. Het toestel werd door de robot
van DOVO uit de toilettas gehaald. Op ongeveer 6 meter van het voertuig ontplofte de born
incidenteel, terwijl de robot het explosief op meer dan 1 meter hoogte vast had. Om die reden
werd er ook geen krater geslagen in het wegdek. Dit gebeurde bovendien voor het voertuig
en niet achteraan het voertuig. De toiletzak raakte inderdaad niet beschadigd, aangezien deze
door de robot uit de koffer was gehaald en achter het voertuig was gelegd. De robot had het
explosief uit de toiletzak gehaald, nadat er eerst een RX-scan was gemaakt, en had zich dan
verplaatst naar een 6-tal meter voor het voertuig.
De verdediging van diverse beklaagden haalt ook aan dat niet geweten is hoeveel gram
explosief materiaal er echt aanwezig was. DOVO spreekt over maximaal 500 gr. De experten
van DOVO houden in hun raming van het explosief materiaal rekening met de grootte van de
toilettas waarin het explosief toestel werd ondergebracht.
Het is inderdaad niet geweten hoeveel explosief materiaal aanwezig was.
Wei staat objectief vast dat, ondanks dat de born in gecontroleerde toestand werd
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ontmanteld, deze de robot van DOVO heeft beschadigd in die mate dat de robot onbruikbaar
was.
Tevens staat vast dat iemand van de speciale eenheden van de politie, ondanks de perimeter
die werd ingesteld, lichamelijke schade heeft opgelopen ten gevolge van de drukgolf die de
explosie veroorzaakte.
DOVO kan uiteraard niet achterhalen hoeveel explosief materiaal aanwezig is, maar raamde
dit op basis van haar kennis en de specifieke feitelijke situatie op+/- 500 gram.
Het is ook geweten dat TATP een springstof is die 88 % van de explosieve kracht heeft van TNT.
Dit wil zeggen dat 1 gram TATP overeenkomt met 0,88 gram TNT.
Volgens een verslag van een Duitse expert is TATP een zeer stoot- en wrijvingsgevoelig
explosief data Ileen voorkomt in een zelfgemaakt labo. Bij het ontsteken van een hoeveelheid
van 500 gram, moet men rekening houden met een detonatieconversie. Dit betekent dat in
een gesloten omgeving, dit mogelijk kan leiden tot dodelijke letsels van personen in de
onmiddellijke omgeving.
Het staat dan ook vast dat dit toestel laten ontploffen op een congres, waar duizenden mensen
aanwezig waren, zou leiden tot dodelijke slachtoffers. Niet alleen door de explosie zelf, maar
ook door de chaos die daarna zou zijn ontstaan.
Uit de analyse van de berichten en de verklaringen van eerste en tweede beklaagde blijkt dat
de "born" gemaakt werd in Iran. Deze werd daar op punt gesteld en meermaals getest. Volgens
informatie van de Veiligheid van de Staat werd het toestel meegebracht in een diplomatieke
koffer op een gewone lijnvlucht tussen Teheran en Wenen.
Het staat vast dat vierde beklaagde de intentie had om een dodelijke aanslag te plegen op een
drukbezocht congres, door de opdracht te geven om dit toestel, gelet op haar specifieke
inhoud en werking, tot ontploffing te laten brengen. Hij gaf duidelijke instructies aan eerste
en tweede beklaagde over de wijze waarop het toestel moest opgeladen worden, hoe het
toestel in een plastieken folie moest gewikkeld worden en hoe de antenne moest gericht
worden tijdens het vervoer zodat het toestel geen wifi-signaal zou ontvangen. Meer nog, uit
het notitieboekje dat teruggevonden werd in de wagen van vierde beklaagde bij zijn
interceptie, werden niet a Ileen aantekeningen gevonden over de werking van dit toestel, maar
ook over een mogelijke aanval met zuur of andere giftige pathogene stoffen. Hieruit blijkt
ontegensprekelijk de intentie tot doden.
Eerste en tweede beklaagde zijn mededaders aan deze poging tot doodslag, gelet op de
feitelijke handelingen die ze stelden : het in bewaring nemen van het toestel, het over- brengen
naar Belgie, het toestel opladen conform de instructies en dan op bevel met het explosief
materiaal naar Villepinte vertrekken.
Annex 258
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Eerste en tweede beklaagde kunnen niet gevolgd warden dat het niet de bedoeling was om
dodelijke slachtoffers te ma ken en dat ze alleen maar dachten dat het een soort vuurwerk was,
dat een luide knal zou geven.
Vooreerst zijn eerste en tweede beklaagde niet eerlijk in hun verklaringen over waar ze het
toestel dienden te plaatsen.
Eerste en tweede beklaagde leggen hierover uiteenlopende verklaringen af en spreken elkaar
ook tegen.
Zo werd erover gesproken over het toestel te laten ontploffen bij de eetkraampjes
(oorspronkelijke verklaring van tweede beklaagde onmiddellijk na de arrestatie) of bij de
boekenstandjes. Deze twee locaties bevinden zich binnenin in een zaaltje naast de grote zaal.
Eerste beklaagde zei in zijn eerste verklaring dat het toestel diende te ontploffen bij de bussen,
in een grasveld bij de bussen. In een latere verklaring sprak hij over de tent buiten, voordat
men de beveiliging meet passeren, waar de bezoekers hun tassen dienden achter te laten. In
deze tent was echter ook bewaking aanwezig om toezicht te houden op de bagage.
Uit het onderzoek, ender meer uit de verhoren, blijkt dat het toestel diende tot ontploffing
gebracht te warden rend een moment dat vele bezoekers de zaal gingen binnen gaan.
Beklaagden spreken soms over het toestel "plaatsen" en soms over "gooien" tussen de
stoelen. Alleszins was hun ingegeven dat ze zelf voldoende afstand (tot 300 meter) moesten
nemen. Volgens een bepaalde verklaring zou eerste beklaagde het toestel buiten moeten
plaatsen en dan naar binnen gaan via de beveiliging.
Opmerkelijk zijn de teruggevonden chatberichten die gevoerd werden tussen eerste
beklaagde en een zekere "Negar". Eerste beklaagde meent dat "Negar" een lraanse vrouw in
Iran is, waarmee hij op een liefdevolle manier chat en een amoureuze (platonische)
verhouding heeft. Via chat was oorspronkelijk (volgens zeggen van eerste en tweede
beklaagde) de relatie tussen eerste en tweede beklaagde ook ontstaan. Eerste beklaagde is
heel open ten aanzien van "Negar" en ze is duidelijk op de hoogte van de plannen.
Uit de resultaten van de huiszoeking in de woning van eerste en tweede beklaagde, waarbij
een bepaalde smartphone werd aangetroffen toebehorende aan tweede beklaagde, uit een
afgeluisterd gesprek (vanuit de gevangenis) tussen tweede beklaagde en haar zus en
uiteindelijk uit de verklaringen van tweede beklaagde, blijkt dat zij heimelijk met eerste
beklaagde chatgesprekken voerde, waarbij zij zich uitgaf voor "Negar". Eerste beklaagde had
dit totaal niet door.
Deze gesprekken zijn van belang om te bepalen waar de aanslag diende te gebeuren, maar
deze gesprekken zullen ook van belang zijn bij de beoordeling van de persoonlijkheid van
eerste en tweede beklaagde:
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Chatgesprekken op 28 juni 2018:
o Eerste beklaagde: "Ats het binnen gebeurt, gaat hij zelf persoonlijk naar zijn
meneer. Hij zei van zijn gesprekke zal ik voor ju/lie aanvragen."
o Eerste beklaagde: "Jk wou gewoon vragen, zeg mij jouw finale beslissing wat we
moeten doen. Gaan we naar binnen of buiten ?"
Chatgesprekken op 29 juni 2018:
o Negar (tweede beklaagde): "Amir, morgen eerst de situatie en omgeving goed
controleren daar".
o Negar (tweede beklaagde): "Mocht het, met stress van beneden, binnen lukken,
ok'~ "Mocht je zien dat het moeilijk is, buiten, ok mijn sch at ?".
o Eerste beklaagde : "Ok schat".
Chatgesprekken op 29 juni 2018 (even later):
o Negar (tweede beklaagde): "Wees heel ontspannen met Nasim'~ "Morgen als je
ziet dat dat lukt, doe het binnen.
Ats niet. Buiten. Ok? Wees heel ontspannen"
o Eerste beklaagde: "Ok"
o Negar (tweede beklaagde):"Wees heel ontspannen".
o Eerste beklaagde: "ok"
o Negar (tweede beklaagde): "En maakjullie geen zorgen. Wees ook mentaal heel
goed. Maak elkaar niet zenuwachtig".
Uit deze berichten blijkt dat ze de opdracht hadden om het binnen te laten ontploffen en dat
tweede beklaagde oak aandringt bij eerste beklaagde om het eerst binnen te proberen.
Hieruit blijkt duidelijk dat beklaagden het toestel tot ontploffing dienden te brengen in de
buurt van menselijke aanwezigheid, of dit nu gebeurde binnenin de zaal of aan de bussen op
de parking of in de bagage-tent.
Bovendien wisten ze dat ze afstand moesten nemen, alvorens het toestel tot ontploffing te
brengen, waardoor ze ook geen zicht hadden of er mensen in buurt van de toestel waren,
wanneer er gedrukt zou warden op de afstandsbediening.
Het blijkt helemaal niet dat eerste en tweede beklaagde misleid waren en er werkelijk van
uitgingen dat het gewoon "vuurwerk" was. De rechtbank verwijst naar de resultaten van het
direct afluisteren, waaruit blijkt dat ze de verklaringen hieromtrent op elkaar afstemden:
Annex 258
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Tweede beklaagde: "Zeg dat je misleid bent geweest, dat je bedrogen bent geweest
door een diplomaat van Etekaa'at" We moeten dat bewijzen. We moeten bewijzen. Ze
moeten begrijpen dat we noch niet wisten dat dit iets gevaarlijk was en noch dat we
van plan waren om iemand te vermoorden".
Eerste beklaagde: "Zeg ook dater daar veel security is dat je zelfs daar met een camera
niet binnen mag. Zeg het als waarheid. Oat ze dat gaan navragen ."
Eerste beklaagde: " ... lk heb zelfs nooit een diefstal gepleegd, hoe kan ik mensen
vermoorden? Het is toch geen grap. We moeten toch de waarheid vertel/en. Nasim,
waarom zouden we liegen ?''
Tweede beklaagde: "Ja, ik weet het, maar helaas, helaas, helaas is dat ding in onze
auto we/ geweest. En ik en jij hebben, zoals 2 dommeriken dat van hem in ontvangst
genomen."
Eerste beklaagde: "lk weet het."
Tweede beklaagde: "Wat zijn we goedgelovig. Hoe kan jij nu binnen die tas niet eens
controleren ?''
"Zeg het ook toen ik naar Luxembourg ging, dacht ik enkel aan een kaart. lk was zelfs
in shock toen hij mij een tas gaf, maar toen hij zei dat het hetzelfde is en kraker is heb
ik het zoals een simpele domme persoon aanvaard".
Zeer opmerkelijk is het volgend resultaat van het direct afluisteren:
Eerste beklaagde: "Seg, waarom heeft hij ons eigenlijk de waarheid niet verteld?"
Tweede beklaagde: "Amir, herrinner je je ? lk vroeg aan hem : "het is toch niet iets
gevaarlijk? Hij antwoordde "neen, neen, misschien beschadigd het de onderkant van
de auto een beetje".
Eerste beklaagde: "Nasim vertel dit nooit. lk heb hierover reeds dingen verteld. lk zei
dat het was om de lraniers die dit jaar naar daar gekomen zijn wat schok te geven zodat
ze vo/gend jaar niet meer komen. Oat is het!"
Uit dit gesprek blijkt duidelijk dat ze wisten dat het meer dan een gewone knal zou geven,
maar dat dit vooral niet aan de politiediensten mocht gezegd worden.
Bovendien zelfs indien de rechtbank nog zou aannemen dat men dacht dat het een soort
vuurwerk zou zijn, dat alleen een knal zou geven, hadden eerste en tweede beklaagde zich
toch ernstige vragen moeten stellen.
Zo zou volgens hun verklaringen vierde beklaagde van eerste beklaagde een klantenkaart en
een sleutel hebben meegenomen naar Iran. Het is niet duidelijk dat het de bedoeling was om
hier " het vuurwerk" in te steken of dat dit zou gebruikt worden als spyware, want ook hier
zijn de verklaringen niet gelijklopend.
Ze spreken zelfs op een bepaald moment over mogelijke aangepaste make-up. Ze waren
verrast dat ze toch een vrij groot toestel kregen, waar ze zeer voorzichtig dienden mee om te
gaan, dat ze dienden op te laden de nacht voordat het gebruikt zou worden en waarbij ze de
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antenne zo dienden te manipuleren dat het geen contact zou ma ken met een ander signaal.
Ze spreken hier oak over tijdens het direct afluisteren :
- Tweede beklaagde : "Het is ons eigen fout. Hij zei tegen jou "tussen de make-up
spullen'~ Waarom hebben we donderdag als we zagen dat het een tas is, dat toch
aanvaard?"
Eerste beklaagde : "We zijn fout geweest".
- Tweede beklaagde: "En daarbij. Waarom toen we het naar huis meenamen niet eens
binnengekeken wat het is ?"
Eerste beklaagde : "Precies".
- Tweede beklaagde : "En dat we niet denken aan het feit dat het iets gevaarlijk is."
Eerste en tweede beklaagde voerden wetens en willens orders uit, doen zelfs geen controle
van het toestel dat ze vervoerden. Uit de wijze waarop ze het toestel dienden te manipuleren,
blijkt ontegensprekelijk dat ze dienden te weten dat het meer dan gewoon "vuurwerk" was.
Bovendien voortgaande op de niet geloofwaardige argumentatie van eerste en tweede
beklaagde, dat gelet op de knal die het zou geven (volgens eerste beklaagde zou men het
binnen in de conferentiezaal hebben gehoord), de afstand die men diende te nemen van het
toestel (waardoor men onvoldoende zicht had op de menselijke aanwezigheid) en het moment
dat het toestel een knal zou moeten geven (moment dat veel mensen rondliepen op de
parking om naar de conferentiezaal te gaan), dit zelfs in die hypothese aanleiding zou kunnen
geven tot menselijke slachtoffers, minstens ten gevolge van de paniek en de chaos.
Volledigheidshalve verwijst de rechtbank naar het afgeluisterde gesprek vanuit de gevangenis
van tweede beklaagde met haar zus:
- "Hoe dom waren ju/lie dat ju/lie niet gezien dat onstekingsmidde/ had ? Rotje heeft toch
geen ontstekingsmidde/."
Het gaat hier niet om "domheid", maar minstens om "niet willen weten". Mededader is men
wanneer men rechtstreeks meewerkt aan een misdrijf en men zich bewust is dat men
deelneemt aan een ongeoorloofde handeling, zonder nadere precisering of gedetailleerde
kennis.
Beklaagden hebben wetens en willens ingestemd om een toestel, waarvan ze wel wisten dat
het schade aan de onderkant van een voertuig zou aanbrengen bij accidentele ontploffing en
dat het geen gewoon "vuurwerk" was gezien de wijze waarop het toestel diende
gemanipuleerd te warden, tot ontploffing te willen brengen op een plaats met veel menselijke
aanwezigheid. Dodelijke slachtoffers zou een normaal en voorzienbaar gevolg zijn van het
toegepaste geweld.
Annex 258
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Wat betreft de voorbedachtheid
Er kan geen betwisting over bestaan dater voorbedachtheid was in hoofde van eerste, tweede
en vierde beklaagde.
Uit de verklaringen van eerste en tweede beklaagde blijkt dater ongeveer in maart 2018 door
vierde beklaagde werd gesproken over een toestel dat tot ontploffing diende gebracht te
worden. Er zouden twee ontmoetingen zijn geweest in Oostenrijk, een in Wenen en een op de
trein tussen Wenen en Salzburg.
Uit de analyse van het mailverkeer van eerste en tweede beklaagde met vierde beklaagde
blijkt dat er door eerste en tweede beklaagde onderhandeld werd over de verdiensten. Zo
blijkt uit het mailverkeer van 25 maart 2018, dat er zelfs voorwaarden werden gesteld
zoals een verhoogde maandelijkse vergoeding van 2.000 EUR en een bijkomende vergoeding
voor hun aandeel bij het plaatsen van de born en tenslotte de melding dat er moest gewaakt
worden over de vergoeding omdat ze een huis wilden kopen. Ze haalden als extra argument
aan dat ze grote stress hadden ten aanzien van hun familie en dat eerste beklaagde vreesde
voor zijn informatiepositie bij MEK. Ze prezen ook hun eigen specifieke informatiepositie bij
MEK aan.
Op 26 april 2018 antwoordde vierde beklaagde dat er intern was teruggekoppeld met een
zekere "Mohsen", maar dat die voorwaarden niet haalbaar waren. Ze moesten : "verder koken
zoals voordien".
Uit verdere analyse van het email-verkeer blijkt dat eerste en tweede beklaagde ondertussen
informatie bleven geven over MEK, onder meer over het jaarlijks congres op 30 juni 2018.
Er had een nieuwe ontmoeting plaats op 12 mei 2018 in het buitenland. Uit de uitlezing van
de berichten blijkt data lies verder voorbereid werd voor de aanslag.
Op 25 mei 2018 bevestigde eerste beklaagde opnieuw hun akkoord aan vierde beklaagde :
"Saeid en Monshi hebben vee/ nagedacht over het kaartspe/ voor het huwelijksfeest en ze
hebben bes/oten dat het moet heel professionee/ zijn, om te kunnen de wedstrijd winnen!",
maar ze stelden wel nieuwe voorwaarden : "Ze zijn beiden akkoord, maar a/s Mohsen zou
be/oven dat hij kan zorgen voor een grote verrassing dan zal Saied verlost geraken van zijn
vermoeidheid van die afge/open jaren".
Met het oog op deze vergoeding keken ze in die periode uit naar een nieuw appartement en
bestelden ze een nieuw voertuig Mercedes coupe, waarvoor ze een aanbetaling deden. Dit
blijkt enerzijds uit een notitie die werd aangetroffen, voor een afspraak om twee panden te
bezoeken, ze waren in bezit van een visitekaartje van een immobilienkantoor en er was een
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telefoongesprek op 25 juni 2018, waaruit blijkt dat tweede beklaagde de uitbetaling van een
grote geldsom verwachtte wanneer het werk gedaan was en dat men hiermee een woning zou
kopen.
Op 20 juni 2018 nam eerste beklaagde dee I aan een vergadering van de Belgische afdeling van
MEK, ter voorbereiding van het congres. Hij kreeg onder meer de taak een koelwagen te huren
en broodjes en drank te vervoeren van de Belgische deelnemers. Hij kreeg ook de opdracht
mensen te vervoeren naar Parijs.
Uit de internationale observatie en het verhoor van eerste en tweede beklaagde, blijkt dat zij
vierde beklaagde ontmoetten in Luxemburg-Staci, waar in een Pizzahut een USB-stick werd
overhandigd met de laatste informatie, een omslag met 18.000 EUR, een nieuwe operationele
gsm en de "born". Het explosief zat in een blauw damestoilettasje en tweede beklaagde stak
dit samen met de afstandsbediening in haar handtas.
Vierde beklaagde gaf duidelijke instructies hoe de born moest opgeladen en operationeel
gemaakt worden. Deze diende verpakt worden in een zwarte plastic folie en er moest een
veiligheidsperimeter gerespecteerd worden. Voor de activatie moest er 3 minuten lang
gedrukt worden op de afstandsbediening. De antenne moest tijdens de verplaatsing naar
beneden gedrukt worden, zodat deze geen verbinding zou ma ken met wifi-signalen.
Op 29 juni 2018 werden er tussen de twee operationele gsm's van eerste en vierde beklaagde
diverse berichten uitgewisseld. Hieruit blijkt onder meer dat het explosief conform de
instructies opgeladen was en in plastic folie gewikkeld.
Vlak voor hun vertrek op 30 juni 2018 stuurde vierde beklaagde een sms met de laatste
instructies. Ze moeten de operationele gsm op de parking in Villepinte in hun voertuig
achterlaten. Ze spraken af om terug contact te nemen om 17 u 30 en zouden elkaar na de
aanslag terug zien in Keulen. Het onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat vierde beklaagde met zijn
gezin in de buurt van Keulen logeerde.
Eerste beklaagde laadde het toestel bij hen thuis op conform de instructies van vierde
beklaagde en maakte het toestel operationeel voor gebruik.
Eerste en tweede beklaagde stopten het explosief in een kleine reiskoffer in hun voertuig en
de afstandsbediening ging in de handtas van tweede beklaagde.
De rechtbank verwijst ook hier naar de opmerkelijke chatgesprekken die tweede beklaagde,
zogenaamd als "Negar" voerde met eerste beklaagde :
Chatgesprekken op 11 juni 2018:
o Negar (tweede beklaagde): "Ju/lie moeten het ding in ontvangst nemen. Ju/lie
gaan zoveel cashgeld voor krijgen. Er moet correct gehandeld warden".
Chatgesprekken op 27 juni 2018
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o Negar (tweede beklaagde): "Ju/lie moeten heel ontspannen zijn voor zaterdag.
Ze/fs tijdens het uitvoeren van de opdracht. Je hoeft helemaal geen angst en
stress te hebben. Oat ju/lie nergens betrapt warden".
Uit dit feitenrelaas blijkt ondubbelzinnig de voorbedachtheid van eerste, tweede en vierde
beklaagde.
De rechtbank stelt vast dat tweede beklaagde na haar arrestatie trachtte haar betrokkenheid
te minimaliseren en eerste beklaagde hierin manipuleerde.
De rechtbank verwijst naar het direct afluisteren en naar de chatgesprekken van zogenaamd
"Negar", waarin zij eerste beklaagde echt aanmoedigde om tot actie over te gaan.
Wat betreft het terroristisch misdrijf
Artikel 137 Sw. bepaalt : "Als terroristisch misdrijf wordt aangemerkt het misdrijf bepaald in
de §§ 2 en 3 dat door zijn aard of context een land of een internationale organisatie ernstig
kan schaden en opzettelijk gepleegd is met het oogmerk om een bevolking ernstige vrees aan
te jagen of om de overheid of een internationale organisatie op een onrechtmatige wijze te
dwingen tot het verrichten of het zich onthouden van een handeling, of om politieke,
constitutionele, economische of sociale basisstructuren van een land of een internationale
organisatie ernstig te ontwrichten of te vernietigen".
Uit de lezing van artikel 137 § 2, l 0 en artikel 51 Sw. is het misdrijf poging moord een misdrijf
dat als een terroristisch misdrijf kan beschouwd worden.
Een aanslag plegen vanuit Belgie in Frankrijk op een conferentie, waar meer dan duizenden
mensen aanwezig zijn en waarbij slachtoffers zouden gevallen zijn, is ontegensprekelijk een
misdrijf dat uit zijn aard en context Frankrijk en Belgie ernstig zou schaden. Bovendien was
deze aanslag gepland in een periode dat Frankrijk gebukt ging onder meerdere terroristische
aanslagen. De aanslag zou de bevolking ernstig vrees aanjagen en zeker de lraanse politieke
vluchtelingen die woonachtig zijn in de Europese landen en zich beschermd voelen door onze
democratische rechtsstaat.
De rechtbank heeft niet kunnen vaststellen of deze aanslag gericht was tegen de VIP-bezoekers
of de gewone bezoekers van de conventie.
Wat betreft de rol van derde beklaagde bij deze tenlastelegging
Uit het gerechtelijk onderzoek, onder meer de resultaten van de huiszoeking (waar spyware
werd aangetroffen), de analyse van digitale dragers en verschillende getuigenissen over de
gedragingen van derde beklaagde, blijkt dat ook hij informatie verzamelde voor vierde
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beklaagde over MEK/CNRI.
De rechtbank verwijst naar de informatie die via de Veiligheid van de Staat werd aangeleverd
en waarbij derde beklaagde genoemd werd als betrokken bij de aanslag die ging gebeuren.
Derde beklaagde was bij de vorige edities steeds betrokken bij de organisatie en specifiek de
veiligheid van het congres. Hij zou zelfs vroeger hebben mee ingestaan voor de veiligheid van
de leidster van CNRI.
Dit jaar mocht hij niet meewerken aan de organisatie. Hij kreeg als enige opdracht de bus met
Belgische deelnemers te begeleiden naar het congres en terug.
De dag zelfs viel volgens verschillende getuigen op dat derde beklaagde zich anders gedroeg.
Hij was zenuwachtig en zou verstrooid zijn geweest. Het viel ook op dat hij aangaf niet terug
te keren met de bus met Belgische deelnemers.
Het viel ook een getuige op dat derde beklaagde zich in de zaal niet voegde bij de Belgische
delegatie, maar dat hij zich afzijdig hield achteraan in de zaal bij de uitgang.
Derde beklaagde was, op het ogenblik van zijn arrestatie, in het bezit van een operationele
gsm met een Oostenrijks nummer met maar een contact, namelijk met de operationele gsm
van vierde beklaagde. Deze gsm werd ook a Ileen maar gebruikt voor zijn contacten met vierde
beklaagde.
Bij vierde beklaagde werd bovendien, bij zijn arrestatie, in zijn voertuig de simkaarthouder van
de simkaart van de operationele gsm van derde beklaagde gevonden.
Het onderzoek heeft enkele sms-berichten kunnen achterhalen die tussen derde en vierde
beklaagde werden uitgewisseld op 17 juni 2018.
Berichten uitgaande van derde beklaagde op 17 juni 2018 naar vierde beklaagde:
"Jk ben jouw nederige"
"de nieuwe, neen nag niet"
"de nieuwe heb ik doorgestuurd"
II Ok".
Berichten uitgaande van vierde beklaagde op 17 juni 2018 naar derde beklaagde:
"At 18': de winke/ is dicht. Kan je maandag inkopen komen doen? Om 18 uur."
"Stuur een SMS naar het nummer 6700, zodat 10 eu charge wordt"
"Mededeling, als het lukt, zeg ik hetje, is dat nieuw?"
"dan als ik volgen wee ok wordt, stuur ik je iets of ik ga maandag om dit uur naar de
Annex 258
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Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
winkel".
Bij de uitwisseling van de2e berichten in codetaal, informeerde vierde beklaagde of er nieuws
was.
Uit het onder2oek blijkt duidelijk dat de timing van de2e berichten van belang is, aange2ien
enkele dagen later vierde beklaagde naar Iran vertrok om het explosief te gaan ophalen. Vierde
beklaagde liet op 18 juni 2018 oak weten per mail aan eerste en tweede beklaagde dat hij 2ich
naar Iran begaf ten einde de voorbereidingen te finaliseren aangaande de aanslag.
Bovendien blijkt uit een getuigenverklaring dat derde beklaagde rand 17 juni 2018 initiatief
nam bij de verantwoordelijke van de Belgische tak van MEK om opnieuw betrokken te warden
bij de organisatie van de veiligheid van het evenement.
Derde beklaagde was op 30 juni 2018 minstens de ogen en de oren van vierde beklaagde op
het terrein tijdens de aanslag die diende te gebeuren. Hij diende oak andere 2aken te
verrichten voor vierde beklaagde op het ogenblik dat de aanslag plaatsvond. Hij stand
minstens op uitkijk, maar 2ijn taak moet uitgebreider 2ijn geweest. Oak bij de voorbereiding
was 2ijn rol cruciaal ge2ien hij, gelet op 2ijn rol bij de vorige edities, over concrete informatie
beschikte met betrekking tot de organisatie en de beveiliging van het congres.
Uit al de2e gegevens leidt de rechtbank ondubbel2innig af dat derde beklaagde op de hoogte
was en actief betrokken bij de aanslag die ging gebeuren op 30 juni 2018 en op die manier
mededader is aan de paging terroristische moord.
Het is 2elfs niet uitgesloten dater nag andere personen betrokken waren of klaar stonden voor
de2e aanslag.
Wat betreft de tenlastelegging deelname aan een terroristische groep (tenlastelegging D)
Art. 139, eerste lid Sw bepaalt: "Een terroristische groep is iedere gestructureerde vereniging
van meer dan twee personen die sinds enige tijd bestaat en die in onderling overleg optreedt
om terroristische misdrijven te plegen".
Eerste en tweede beklaagde trachten 2ich constant te verschuilen achter de druk die het
lraanse regime uitoefende, onder meer naar hun familie toe en specifiek de vader van tweede
beklaagde.
De2e 2ware druk kan de rechtbank onvoldoende vaststellen. Er 2al mogelijk wel enige druk 2ijn
geweest, maar de druk was alles2ins niet 20 groat als beklaagden trachten te doen uitschijnen
en was 2eker niet 20 groat dat eerste en tweede beklaagde niet konden weigeren om mee te
werken. De2e druk werd alleen maar aangehaald in hun verhoren en blijkt voor het overige
nauwelijks uit het dossier. Uit de email-berichten uitgewisseld met vierde beklaagde kan geen
enkele druk afgeleid warden, integendeel. Uit het verhoor van de zus van tweede beklaagde,
maar oak uit de inhoud van de getapte gesprekken tussen tweede beklaagde (vanuit de
Annex 258
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gevangenis) en haar zus, blijkt niet echt dater druk werd uitgeoefend op de lraanse familie,
maar dater eerder druk was met betrekking tot hun Belgische verblijfssituatie die in strijd was
met hun reizen naar Iran. Uiteindelijk blijkt er maar een beperkte druk te zijn geweest en
waren gewoon de financiele verdiensten voor eerste en tweede beklaagde het belangrijkste
motief om hun informatie-vergaringsdiensten aan te bieden.
Uit de analyse van de internet-zoekfunctie, blijkt bovendien dat eerste beklaagde op eigen
initiatief op het internet informatie zocht over spyware. Bovendien kan verwezen worden naar
de analyse van de email-berichten, waarbij eerste en tweede beklaagde uitdrukkelijk
financiele eisen stelden met betrekking tot de aanslag die diende gepleegd te worden, wat
moeilijk te vereenzelvigen is met druk vanuit de lraanse autoriteiten.
De rechtbank verwijst ook naar de chatgesprekken tussen de vermeende "Negar" (tweede
beklaagde) en eerste beklaagde, waar over geld gesproken werd en hoe belangrijk dit was voor
hen.
Ook derde beklaagde leverde zijn diensten louter uit puur geldgewin, zonder enige
ideologische overtuiging.
Volgens het openbaar ministerie en de burgerlijke partijen werd de aanslag georganiseerd
door de lraanse inlichtingendienst MOIS en specifiek het departement 312. Deze vormen
volgens het openbaar ministerie en de burgerlijke partijen de terroristische groep die
verantwoordelijk was voor de verijdelde aanslag.
Volgens het openbaar ministerie dat zich steunt op informatie van de Staatsveiligheid en OCAD
en volgens de burgerlijke partijen die zich bijkomend steunen op hun eigen
informatiebronnen, zou MOIS en specifiek het departement 312 verantwoordelijk zijn voor
diverse moordaanslagen of pogingen daartoe in Europa op leidinggevenden of prominenten
van de lraanse oppositie.
De rechtbank kan deze informatie over aanslagen overal in Europa onvoldoende objectiveren
op basis van de elementen die aangedragen werden in het strafdossier. Uit de opsomming van
deze vermoedens die wijzen in de richting van de lraanse staat of MOIS, kan de rechtbank niet
besluiten dat MOIS een terroristische groep is. Moordaanslagen kunnen even goed gepleegd
zijn door andere inlichtingendiensten of door rivaliserende oppositiepartijen.
Ook de verschillende rapporten en artikelen zijn voor de rechtbank onvoldoende
objectiveerbaar.
De enige objectieve informatie is het vonnis van de Duitse rechtbank in 1997 waar op basis
van een Duits strafdossier MOIS in verband wordt gebracht met een dodelijke aanslag in
Duitsland.
Het staat alleszins vast dat eerste, tweede, derde en vierde beklaagde een terroristische groep
vormden. Ze verzamelden informatie over de organisaties en de leden van deze organisaties.
Op basis van deze verkregen informatie organiseerden zij zich om een aanslag te plegen op
een van de belangrijkste jaarlijkse bijeenkomsten van deze lraanse oppositiepartijen.
Uit het strafdossier kan echter ondubbelzinnig afgeleid worden dat er een grotere
Annex 258
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Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
betrokkenheid is dan deze vier beklaagden.
De rechtbank verwijst onder meer naar de hierna vermelde opmerkingen.
Uit de verklaringen van eerste en tweede beklaagde blijkt duidelijk dat zij eerst
geronseld en gerund werden door agenten die opereerden uit Iran. Zij verklaarden
allebei dat zij werkten voor de inlichtingendienst MOIS. Ze keerden regelmatig terug
naar Iran, waar ze ontmoetingen hadden met verschillende mensen van MOIS.
Uit hun verklaringen blijkt oak dat vierde beklaagde eveneens voor de
inlichtingendienst MOIS werkzaam was en dat ze oak onder hem naar Iran dienden te
gaan voor overleg. In Iran ontmoetten ze niet alleen vierde beklaagde, maar oak
andere agenten van MOIS.
- Vierde beklaagde opereerde vanuit een lraanse diplomatieke cover. Hij voerde geen
diplomatieke activiteiten uit, maar runde informanten in Europa. Het werken onder
diplomatenstatuut zonder effectief deze werkzaamheden uit te voeren, kan alleen met
instemming van verantwoordelijken binnen de lraanse staat.
Uit de verklaringen van eerste en tweede beklaagde en uit de analyse van de emailberichten
en de audio-opnames die werden gemaakt door eerste, tweede en derde
beklaagde blijkt dat eerst de oorspronkelijke runners en later vierde beklaagde
informatie verzamelden over MEK.
Iran, noch MOIS hebben zich gedistantieerd van de activiteiten van vierde beklaagde.
Uit de analyse van de email-berichten tussen eerste/tweede en vierde beklaagde en
uit de verklaringen van eerste en tweede beklaagde blijkt voldoende dat het explosief
tuig gemaakt en zeker getest werd in Iran. Op basis van de gedeclassificeerde nota van
de Veiligheid van de Staat van 7 september 2020, mag met een objectieve zekerheid
afgeleid warden dat het explosief door vierde beklaagde in diplomatieke bagage werd
meegenomen op een commerciele vlucht van Iran naar Oostenrijk.
- Vierde beklaagde beschikte over aanzienlijke geldsommen om eerste, tweede en derde
beklaagde te betalen en deze gelden waren, gelet op hun omvang, geen persoonlijke
gelden van vierde beklaagde.
Uit de analyse van de email-berichten blijkt dat met betrekking tot de financiele eisen
die eerste en tweede beklaagde stelden om tot actie over te gaan, vierde beklaagde
zelf bij zijn opdrachtgevers toestemming diende te krijgen.
- Volgens, voor de rechtbank betrouwbare, informatie van de Veiligheid van de Staat zou
vierde beklaagde een inlichtingenofficier zijn van MOIS en als inlichtingenofficier in
Europa bronnen runnen voor departement 312.
Op basis van deze elementen komt de rechtbank tot het besluit dat er een groep bestaat
binnen het departement 312 van de inlichtingendienst MOIS, die zich bezig hield met
informatie verzamelen over het MEK/CNRI en die deze informatie gebruikte om doelwitten uit
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te zoeken en uiteindelijk ook effectief over te gaan tot het organiseren van een aanslag op een
conventie van deze lraanse oppositiepartijen.
Deze groep waarvan eerste, tweede, derde en vierde beklaagde deel uitmaken, samen met
een niet nader te bepalen aantal lraanse agenten van MOIS, is een terroristische groep
overeenkomstig art. 139, eerste lid Sw. Alleszins hebben eerste, tweede, derde en vierde
beklaagde een actieve bijdrage geleverd aan deze terroristische groep.
Op basis van de informatie uit het strafdossier die de rechtbank voorhanden heeft, kan ze niet
afleiden hoe groot deze groep is en hoe deze groep gedragen wordt binnen de lraanse
staatsstructuur en wie de uiteindelijke (hoogste) opdrachtgever was van de verijdelde aanslag.
Wat betreft het bewezen verklaren van de tenlasteleggingen A en D
De paging terroristische moord (tenlastelegging A) en lidmaatschap terroristische groep
(tenlastelegging D) is dan ook lastens eerste, tweede en vierde beklaagde voldoende bewezen
aan de hand van de vaststellingen van de verbalisanten:
- de initiele info van de Veiligheid van de Staat,
de betrapping op heterdaad,
de resultaten van de observatie in Luxemburg op 28 juni 2018,
de analyse van de email-berichten die verstuurd werden tussen eerste en tweede
beklaagde enerzijds en vierde beklaagde anderzijds,
de resultaten van de huiszoeking bij eerste en tweede beklaagde,
de resultaten van de doorzoeking van het voertuig van vierde beklaagde,
het spreken in codetaal en het wissen van berichten,
de vaststelling aangaande de gsm contacten tussen eerste en vierde beklaagde rond
het moment van de feiten,
- de grote cash-bedragen waarover eerste en tweede beklaagde beschikten,
- de analyse van de chatberichten tussen "Negar" (tweede beklaagde) en eerste
beklaagde,
de resultaten van het direct afluisteren tussen eerste en tweede beklaagde,
het technisch en deskundig verslag over het EID,
- de wijze waarop beklaagden het EID dienden te manipuleren en operationeel te ma ken,
- de verklaringen van eerste en tweede beklaagde over hun eigen rol, over elkaars rol en
over de rol van vierde beklaagde.
Wat vierde beklaagde betreft kan bijkomend verwezen warden naar :
- zijn contacten met derde beklaagde als uniek contact,
Annex 258
rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen
Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping
de uitgewisselde sms-berichten van 17/6/2018,
en het spreken in codetaal.
p.46
Vonnisnr /
De deelname aan poging terroristische moord (tenlastelegging A) en lidmaatschap
terroristische groep (tenlastelegging D) is dan ook voldoende bewezen lastens derde
beklaagde aan de hand van de vaststellingen van de verbalisanten:
de initiele info van de Veiligheid van de Staat en de specifieke info over de
betrokkenheid van derde beklaagde,
- zijn aanwezigheid ter plaatse en zijn gedrag aldaar,
het aantreffen van een operationele gsm metals enig contact vierde beklaagde,
de analyse van de sms-berichten die verstuurd werden tussen derde en vierde
beklaagde op 17 juni 2018,
het gebruik van codetaal,
de resultaten van de huiszoeking bij derde beklaagde, waar spyware werd gevonden,
- de grote cash-bedragen waarover derde beklaagde beschikte,
- de regelmatige verplaatsingen naar Oostenrijk en zijn starting van gelden, onmiddellijk
na zijn terugkeer uit het buitenland,
- de opnames en het beeldmateriaal dat derde beklaagde maakte van de activiteiten van
de leden van MEK/CNRI,
- en tenslotte zijn ongeloofwaardige verklaringen.
Wat betreft de straftoemeting
De feiten van tenlasteleggingen A en D vermengen zich in hoofde van eerste, tweede, derde
en vierde beklaagde als zijnde gepleegd met eenzelfde strafbaar opzet, zodat maar een straf
dient opgelegd te worden.
De feiten van de tenlasteleggingen zijn bijzonder ernstig. Poging terroristische moord behoort
tot een van de zwaarste misdrijven in het Belgisch strafwetboek.
Beklaagden schenden niet a Ileen de soevereiniteit van de Belgische en Franse staat. Door een
aanslag te plegen op een drukbezochte conferentie van lraanse oppositiepartijen,
ondermijnen ze niet alleen de vrije meningsuiting, maar tasten ze het veiligheidsgevoel aan
van de lraanse vluchtelingen die een veilige haven zochten in verschillende Europese landen.
Zowel eerste, tweede als derde beklaagde dienen er zich rekenschap van te geven dat op basis
van de informatie die ze gaven bepaalde mensen fysiek gevaar liepen en nog steeds lopen.
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Bovendien vonden eerste, tweede en derde beklaagde mensenlevens ondergeschikt aan hun
financiele drijfveren.
De rechtbank zal bij het bepalen van de straf en de strafmaat voor iedere beklaagde persoonlijk
rekening houden met de aard en de ernst van de feiten, de omstandigheden waarin de feiten
plaatsvonden, ieders respectievelijk aandeel, persoonlijkheid, leeftijd en strafrechtelijk
verleden.
De straftoemeting betreffende eerste beklaagde
Eerste beklaagde heeft onmiddellijk verklaringen afgelegd en meegewerkt met het
strafonderzoek.
Eerste beklaagde komt bij de rechtbank na"ief en be"invloedbaar over. Hij geeft aan oprecht
schuldbesef te hebben.
Gelet echter op de aard en de ernst van de feiten is een ernstige effectieve gevangenisstraf
gepast.
De straftoemeting betreffende tweede beklaagde
Tweede beklaagde legde oak verklaringen af.
Tweede beklaagde komt de rechtbank zeer manipulatief over. De rechtbank verwijst in die zin
naar het direct afluisteren tussen eerste en tweede beklaagde en naar de volgende
chatgesprekken van "Negar" (tweede beklaagde) :
- dat tweede beklaagde haar echtgenoot be"invloedt om deel te nemen aan de feiten, en
om het explosief toestel binnen te laten afgaan.
- dat de financiele verdiensten voor tweede beklaagde belangrijk zijn en zelfs voor haar
een grater motief zijn tot samenwerking met de geheime dienst dan voor eerste
beklaagde.
Haar rol is dus zeker niet beperkt. Zij stuurde oak informatie door naar vierde beklaagde.
Bovendien blijkt uit het direct afluisteren dat tweede beklaagde zelf nag naar Iran is gegaan,
zonder eerste beklaagde, en daar agenten van MOIS heeft ontmoet. Uit het strafdossier blijkt
dat vierde beklaagde soms a Ileen met tweede beklaagde wilde spreken.
Tweede beklaagde heeft volgens de rechtbank meer bindingen met MOIS dan ze doet
uitschijnen. Dit blijkt uit de chatgesprekken, waarbij ze zich uitgaf voor "Negar", uit haar reis
naar Iran zonder eerste beklaagde en uit de subtiele druk op en be"invloeding van eerste
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Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
beklaagde door tweede beklaagde. Haar rol en aandeel in de feiten is dan ook groter dan deze
van eerste beklaagde.
Gelet op de aard en de ernst van de feiten en haar concrete rol hierin is een ernstige effectieve
gevangenisstraf gepast.
De straftoemeting betreffende derde bek/aagde
Derde beklaagde werkte jaren mee voor de lraanse inlichtingendiensten en dit louter uit puur
geldgewin. Hij waster plaatse en gelet op de bevindingen omtrent zijn operationele gsm, blijkt
dat hij de oren en ogen van vierde beklaagde was op het terrein. Het kan niet anders, gelet op
zijn sleutelpositie, dat hij volledig op de hoogte was van de plannen die dienden uitgevoerd te
worden en dat hij minstens op uitkijk stond om de operationele leider van de aanslag
nauwgezet op de hoogte te houden en desgevallend op het terrein bij te sturen. Zijn
belangrijke rol blijkt ook uit de geldbedragen die hij kreeg van zijn opdrachtgevers.
Gelet op de aard en de ernst van de feiten is een ernstige effectieve gevangenisstraf gepast.
De straftoemeting betreffende vierde bek/aagde
Vierde beklaagde is het operationeel brein achter de aanslag. Hij had er totaal geen
gewetensproblemen mee dater dodelijke slachtoffers zouden vallen.
Hij misbruikte het diplomatieke statuut om terroristische misdrijven te plegen en ondermijnde
op die manier het vertrouwen dat men mag hebben in de uitwisseling van officiele
overheidsmandatarissen.
Een ernstige effectieve gevangenisstraf is de enige gepaste bestraffing.
Wat betreft het vervallen verklaren van de nationaliteit
Door het openbaar ministerie wordt het vervallen verklaren van de nationaliteit gevorderd ten
opzichte van eerste, tweede en derde beklaagde.
De rechtbank kan wanneer ze voor terreurmisdrijven veroordeelt tot een effectieve
gevangenisstraf van minstens 5 jaar de vervallen verklaring van de nationaliteit uitspreken.
Het is geen verplichting voor de rechtbank.
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Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
Eerste, tweede en derde beklaagde beschikken over de Belgische nationaliteit. Daarnaast
beschikken ze over de lraanse nationaliteit. Dat Iran de dubbele nationaliteit niet aanvaardt,
houdt in dat de lraanse autoriteiten weigeren de andere nationaliteit van hun onderdanen te
erkennen. Het betekent dus geenszins dat beklaagden door het verwerven van de Belgische
nationaliteit geen lraans staatsburger meer zijn.
Eerste, tweede en derde beklaagde warden niet staatloos, wanneer ze de Belgische
nationaliteit verliezen.
Eerste, tweede en derde beklaagde verzoeken om de vervallen verklaring niet uit te spreken,
om humanitaire redenen. Hun leven zou in gevaar zijn, wanneer ze terug gestuurd warden
naar Iran. Zeker eerste en tweede beklaagde, gelet op de verklaringen die ze hebben afgelegd
lastens MOIS in het algemeen en vierde beklaagde in het bijzonder.
De vervallenverklaring van de nationaliteit betekent niet dat beklaagden daadwerkelijk terug
gezonden warden naar Iran. Het verlies van de Belgische nationaliteit leidt niet automatisch
tot de intrekking van het verblijfsrecht in Belgie. Op dat vlak bestaan er aparte procedures
ender de bevoegdheid van de Dienst Vreemdelingenzaken, waarbij in het kader van een
mogelijke uitwijzing het al dan niet respecteren van de mensenrechten in het land van
herkomst een element bij de beoordeling kan zijn. Bij de beslissing over de vervallen verklaring
van de nationaliteit dient de rechtbank hier geen rekening mee te houden. Beklaagden
kunnen zich in een latere fase dus nag steeds verzetten tegen een mogelijke terugzending naar
Iran. Ze hebben oak steeds de mogelijkheid om asiel aan te vragen in een ander land.
Eerste, tweede en derde beklaagde hebben elk misbruik gemaakt van de gastvrijheid van ans
land om een aanslag te plegen in een bevriende natie. Door hun respectief aandeel in deze
verijdelde terreurdaad, hebben ze Belgie en Frankrijk recht in hun waarden willen treffen. Het
zou een aanval zijn geweest op de democratische rechtsstaat en op de vrije meningsuiting. Ze
wilden lraanse vluchtelingen, die een veilig onderkomen hebben gevonden in de Europese
Unie, raken in hun veiligheidsgevoel.
Het deelnemen aan de activiteiten van een terroristische groep kan warden ge"interpreteerd
als een vorm van verwerping van de waarden en instellingen van onze Belgische en van de
Franse samenleving.
De rechtbank stelt vast dat de voorwaarden van artikel 23/2 Wetboek van Belgische
nationaliteit vervuld zijn.
De rechtbank spreekt dan oak de vervallenverklaring van de nationaliteit uit van eerste,
tweede en derde beklaagde.
Wat betreft de verbeurdverklaring
Annex 258
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Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
Wat betreft eerste beklaagde en tweede beklaagde
Eerste beklaagde en tweede beklaagde stortten aanzienlijke bedragen cash op hun
bankrekeningen. Er werd oak een grate geldsom aangetroffen bij de huiszoeking. Eerste en
tweede beklaagde kunnen deze cash-stortingen totaal niet verantwoorden door hun eigen
inkomsten. Hun gezamenlijke legale inkomsten zijn juist voldoende om de vaste kosten te
betalen en op een normale manier te leven.
Uit verschillende getuigenverklaringen blijkt dat eerste en tweede beklaagde een levensstijl
aanhielden waar iedereen bedenkingen over had.
Uit het strafdossier, namelijk hun eigen verklaringen en de analyse van het notitieboekje dat
teruggevonden werd en de analyse van het email-verkeer tussen eerste beklaagde en tweede
beklaagde met vierde beklaagde, blijkt dat er inderdaad geld werd betaald en dat ze zelfs
onderhandelden om meer geld te krijgen. Uit de analyse van ender meer de hogergenoemde
chatberichten tussen "Negar" (tweede beklaagde) en eerste beklaagde blijkt eveneens dat zij
veel geld gingen krijgen, dat ze een huis wilden kopen en dat geld een belangrijke drijfveer
was van beide beklaagden. Ze gingen oak een nieuw voertuig kopen.
Ze trachten enige verantwoording te vinden door te verwijzen naar gelden die ze zouden
gekregen hebben uit Iran en men verwijst voornamelijk naar de vader van tweede beklaagde.
Er is geen enkel objectief element dat dit aantoont. lntegendeel, uit de getapte gesprekken
tussen tweede beklaagde (vanuit de gevangenis) en haar zus blijkt dat hun ouders in Iran het
financieel niet breed hebben. Oak andere verklaringen hieromtrent kunnen geen
verantwoording geven voor deze grate cash-stortingen.
Deze gelden werd steeds cash betaald en gestort op hun rekeningen. Het kan oak niet van
ander zwartwerk zijn, omdat hiervan geen aanwijzingen zijn, maar bovendien oak omdat ze
op zo'n regelmatige tijdstippen informatie aan het verzamelen waren voor vierde beklaagde,
dater geen tijd overbleef om andere werkzaamheden uit te voeren.
De rechtbank verwijst hier uitdrukkelijk naar de vaststellingen in proces-verbaal 504284-2020,
waarop de verbeurdverklaring is gebaseerd en kent deze dan oak integraal toe.
Wat betreft derde bek/aagde
Derde beklaagde stortte aanzienlijke bedragen cash op zijn bankrekeningen. Derde beklaagde
kan deze cash-stortingen totaal niet verantwoorden door zijn eigen inkomsten. Het legaal
globaal gezinsinkomen kan deze stortingen niet verklaren.
Derde beklaagde verklaarde dat hij veel zwartwerk deed in de bouw en oak voor MEK betaalde
jobs deed. Uit teruggevonden berichten blijkt dat hij gedurende maanden bedankte voor een
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(zwarte) job in de bouw, omdat hij te veel last had van zijn arm. De opdrachten voor MEK
waren beperkt en ook in vergoedingen.
Derde beklaagde was bijna dagelijks informatie aan het inwinnen voor vierde beklaagde bij
MEK. Het kan ook niet anders dan dat hij hiervoor rijkelijk betaald werd, net zoals eerste en
tweede beklaagde. Het valt ook op dat de geldstortingen vaak gebeurden, wanneer hij terug
kwam van een reis naar Oostenrijk (ontmoeting met vierde beklaagde).
Ook het verhaal dat het geld afkomstig is van zijn vader of een goede vriendin, kan derde
beklaagde niet hard maken.
De rechtbank verwijst hier uitdrukkelijk naar de vaststellingen in proces-verbaal 501185-2020,
waarop de verbeurdverklaring is gebaseerd en kent deze dan ook integraal toe.
Wat betreft vierde beklaagde
Ook de verbeurdverklaring van de in beslag genomen gelden bij vierde beklaagde dringt zich
op, gelet op de inhoud van het strafdossier en zijn betrokkenheid.
OP BURGERLIJK GEBIED
Elk van de burgerlijke partijen vordert een rechtsplegingsvergoeding. Alie burgerlijke partijen
die binnen eenzelfde rechtsband een rechtsplegingsvergoeding lastens beklaagden genieten,
worden bijgestaan door dezelfde raadslieden die via een gezamenlijke akte voor elk van hen
dezelfde vordering stellen. Het past dan ook een rechtsplegingsvergoeding te voorzien voor
alle burgerlijke partijen samen en deze tussen hen te verdelen.
1) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van E.Z.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
2) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van R.T.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
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3 16) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van G.T.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
4) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van R.G.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
5) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van W.M.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
6) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van de N.I.W.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
7) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van I.B.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
8) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van A.G.
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Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
9) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van L.C.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
10) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van T.K.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
11) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van R.B.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
12) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van Y.B.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
13) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van T.B.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
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Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
14) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van F.H.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
15) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van S.A.J.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
17) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van R.J.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
18) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van M.R.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
19) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van R.H.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
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20) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van M.P.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
21) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van A.T.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
22) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van S.S.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
23) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van J.L.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
24) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van H.A.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
25) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van M.J.D.
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Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
26) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van P.B.
Deze burgerlijke partij leed morele schade ten gevolge van de bewezen verklaarde feiten van
de tenlastelegging A.
Het gevorderde bedrag van 1 euro provisioneel is voldoende bewezen aan de hand van het
strafdossier en de voorgelegde stukken en wordt toegekend.
TOEGEPASTE WETTEN
De rechtbank houdt rekening met de volgende artikelen die de bestanddelen van de
misdrijven en de strafmaat bepalen, en het taalgebruik in gerechtszaken regelen:
art. 1, 2, 11, 12, 14, 16, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 41 wet van 15 juni 1935;
art. 1, 2, 3, 25, 31, 32, 42, 43, 43bis, 44, 45, 50, 65, 66, 79, 80 strafwetboek
art. 4 V.T.Sv
artikel 162bis van het Wetboek van Strafvordering,
artikel 1382 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek,
alsook de wetsbepalingen aangehaald in de inleidende akte en in het vonnis.
artikelen 152bis, 182, 189 Sv
De rechtbank:
op tegenspraak ten aanzien van A.S., N.N., M.A., A.A., E.Z., R.T., G.T., R.G., W.M., N.I.W., I.B.,
A.G., LC., T.K., R.B., Y.B., T.B., F.H., S.A.J., G.T., R.J., M.R. R.H. M.P., A.T., S.S., J.L., H.A., M.J.D.,
P.B ..
Stelt vast dat de burgerlijke partijen sub 3) T.G. en 16) T.G., een en dezelfde burgerlijke partij
betreft;
Herstelt de materiele vergissingen zoals hoger vermeld.
Verleent akte van burgerlijke partijstelling aan de burgerlijke partij sub 26 P.B. en stelt vast
dat deze burgerlijke partij werd gehoord als burgerlijke partij.
Op strafgebied
Ten aanzien van A.S., eerste beklaagde
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Veroordeelt A.S. voor de vermengde feiten van de tenlasteleggingen A en D:
tot een gevangenisstraf van 15 jaar.
Spreekt ten aanzien van A.S. de vervallenverklaring van de Belgische nationaliteit uit,
overeenkomstig artikel 23/2 § 1 van het Wetboek van de Belgische Nationaliteit.
Ontzet A.S. LEVENSLANG uit de rechten zeals vermeld in artikel 31 van het Strafwetboek;
Verklaart verbeurd overeenkomstig artikel 42, 3° en 43bis Sw. als vermogensvoordelen :
een geldsom van 17.896,90 euro, zijnde de helft van het bedrag van 35.793,80 euro
(aangetroffen tijdens huiszoeking) (beheerd door het COIV)
- een bedrag van 120.167,00 euro, hierin begrepen het saldo op zijn rekeningen ten
bedrage van 9.277,36 euro, in beslag en beheerd door het COIV (PV 504284-2020).
Veroordeelt A.S. tot betaling van:
een bijdrage van 1 maal 200,00 EUR, zijnde de som van 1 maal 25,00 EUR verhoogd
met 70 opdeciemen, ter financiering van het Fonds tot hulp aan de slachtoffers van
opzettelijke gewelddaden en de occasionele redders
- een bijdrage van 20,00 EUR aan het Begrotingsfonds voor juridische
tweedelijnsbijstand
een vaste vergoeding voor beheerskosten in strafzaken. Deze vergoeding bedraagt
50,00 EUR
- de kosten van de strafvordering tot op heden begroot op 1/4 x 21464,23 = 5366,06
EUR.
Ten aanzien van N.N., tweede beklaagde
Veroordeelt N.N. voor de vermengde feiten van de tenlasteleggingen A en D:
tot een gevangenisstraf van 18 jaar.
Spreekt ten aanzien van N.N. de vervallenverklaring van de Belgische nationaliteit uit,
overeenkomstig artikel 23/2 § 1 van het Wetboek van de Belgische Nationaliteit.
Ontzet N.N. LEVENSLANG uit de rechten zeals vermeld in artikel 31 van het Strafwetboek;
Annex 258
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Verklaart verbeurd overeenkomstig artikel 42, 1 ° en 43 Sw. :
- het voertuig Mercedes CLC200 CDI met kenteken 1EGZ339, gestald bij Depannage 2000
(beslagstaat 2000 D2018/01238/C), als hebbende gediend om het misdrijf te plegen en diens
eigendom zijnde.
Verklaart verbeurd overeenkomstig artikel 42, 3° en 43bis Sw. als vermogensvoordelen :
- een bed rag van 2.500 euro (voorschot aankoop nieuwe wagen) (beheerd door het COIV).
- een geldsom van 17.896,90 euro, zijnde de helft van het bedrag van 35.793,80 euro
(aangetroffen tijdens huiszoeking) (beheerd door het COIV)
- een bedrag van 106.498,57 euro, hierin begrepen het saldo op haar rekeningen ten
bedrage van 26.135,87 euro, in beslag en beheerd door het COIV (PV 504284-2020).
Veroordeelt N.N. tot betaling van:
een bijdrage van 1 maal 200,00 EUR, zijnde de som van 1 maal 25,00 EUR verhoogd
met 70 opdeciemen, ter financiering van het Fonds tot hulp aan de slachtoffers van
opzettelijke gewelddaden en de occasionele redders
- een bijdrage van 20,00 EUR aan het Begrotingsfonds voor juridische
tweedelijnsbijstand
een vaste vergoeding voor beheerskosten in strafzaken. Deze vergoeding bedraagt
50,00 EUR
- de kosten van de strafvordering tot op heden begroot op 1/4 x 21464,23 = 5366,06
EUR.
Ten aanzien van M.A., derde beklaagde
Veroordeelt M.A. voor de vermengde feiten van de tenlasteleggingen A en D:
tot een gevangenisstraf van 17 jaar.
Spreekt ten aanzien van M.A. de vervallenverklaring van de Belgische nationaliteit uit,
overeenkomstig artikel 23/2 § 1 van het Wetboek van de Belgische Nationaliteit.
Ontzet M.A. LEVENSLANG uit de rechten zoals vermeld in artikel 31 van het Strafwetboek;
Verklaart verbeurd overeenkomstig artikel 42, 3° en 43bis Sw. als vermogensvoordelen :
- 1.500 euro aangetroffen bij de huiszoeking (beheerd door het COIV)
- 226.084,50 euro, hierin begrepen al de in beslaggenomen gelden (ook via rekeningen) die
beheerd worden door het COIV (PV 501185-2020).
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Veroordeelt M.A. tot betaling van:
een bijdrage van 1 maal 200,00 EUR, zijnde de som van 1 maal 25,00 EUR verhoogd
met 70 opdeciemen, ter financiering van het Fonds tot hulp aan de slachtoffers van
opzettelijke gewelddaden en de occasionele redders
- een bijdrage van 20,00 EUR aan het Begrotingsfonds voor juridische
tweedelijnsbijstand
een vaste vergoeding voor beheerskosten in strafzaken. Deze vergoeding bedraagt
50,00 EUR
- de kosten van de strafvordering tot op heden begroot op 1/4 x 21464,23 = 5366,06
EUR.
Ten aanzien van A.A., vierde beklaagde
Veroordeelt A.A. voor de vermengde feiten van de tenlasteleggingen A
en D:
tot een gevangenisstraf van 20 jaar.
Ontzet A.A. LEVENSLANG uit de rechten zoals vermeld in artikel 31 van het Strafwetboek;
Verklaart verbeurd overeenkomstig artikel 42, 1 ° en 43 Sw., eigendom van beklaagde en
dienstig voor het plegen van de feiten:
- 10.463,22 euro, beheerd door het COIV.
Veroordeelt A.A. tot betaling van:
een bijdrage van 1 maal 200,00 EUR, zijnde de som van 1 maal 25,00 EUR verhoogd
met 70 opdeciemen, ter financiering van het Fonds tot hulp aan de slachtoffers van
opzettelijke gewelddaden en de occasionele redders
- een bijdrage van 20,00 EUR aan het Begrotingsfonds voor juridische
tweedelijnsbijstand
een vaste vergoeding voor beheerskosten in strafzaken. Deze vergoeding bedraagt
50,00 EUR
- de kosten van de strafvordering tot op heden begroot op 1/4 x 21464,23 = 5366,06
EUR.
Annex 258
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Op burgerlijk gebied
1) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van E.Z.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij Z.E.betta ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij Z.E.betta de som van: een euro en nul cent {1.00 EUR) provisioneel,
2) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van R.T.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij T.R .. ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij T.R .. de som van: een euro en nul cent {1.00 EUR) provisioneel,
3 16) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van G.T.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij T.G. ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij T.G. de som van: een euro en nul cent {1.00 EUR) provisioneel.
4) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van R.G.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij G.R.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij G.R.de som van: een euro en nul cent {1.00 EUR) provisioneel.
5) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van W.M.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij M.W.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij M.W.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
6) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van de N.I.W.
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Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij N.I.W. ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij N.I.W. de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
7) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van I.B.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij B.l.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij B.l.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
8) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van A.G.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij GHOZALI Ahmed ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij GHOZALI Ahmed de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
9) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van L.C.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij CHAVEZ Linda ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij CHAVEZ Linda de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
10) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van T.K.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij K.T.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.so/idair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij K.T.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
11) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van R.B.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij B.R.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.so/idair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij B.R.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
12) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van Y.B.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij B.Y.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
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Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij B.Y.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
13) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van T.B.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij B.T.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij B.T.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
14) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van F.H.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij H.F.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij H.F.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
15) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van S.A.J.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij A.J.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij A.J.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
17) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van R.J.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij J.R.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij J.R.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
18) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van M.R.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij R.M.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.so/idair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij R.M.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
19) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van R.H.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij H.R.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.so/idair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij H.R.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
20) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van M.P.
Annex 258
rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen p.63
Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij P.M.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij P.M.de som van: een euro en nul cent {1.00 EUR) provisioneel.
21) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van A.T.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij T.A.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij T.A.de som van: een euro en nul cent {1.00 EUR) provisioneel.
22) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van S.S.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij S.S.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.so/idair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij S.S.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
23) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van J.L.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij L.J.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij L.J.de som van: een euro en nul cent {1.00 EUR) provisioneel.
24) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van H.A.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij A.H.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.so/idair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij A.H.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
25) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van M.J.D.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij J.M.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.so/idair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij J.M.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
26) Wat betreft de burgerlijke partijstelling van P.B.
Verklaart de eis van de burgerlijke partij B.P.ontvankelijk en deels gegrond.
Annex 258
rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen p.64
Dossiernr 20A003763 vleugel D, 3de verdieping Vonnisnr /
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als schadevergoeding te betalen aan de
burgerlijke partij B.P.de som van: een euro en nul cent (1,00 EUR) provisioneel.
Veroordeelt S.A. - N.N.- A.M. - A.A.solidair om als gezamenlijke rechtsplegingsvergoeding aan
de burgerlijke partijen sub 1 tot en met 26 te betalen de som van 180,00 EUR (art.1022
Gerechtelijk Wetboek - art.l tot 13 Wet van 21/4/2007 - art.162 bis - 194 Wetboek van
Strafvorderi ng).
Wijst het meer- en anders gevorderde af.
OooO
Dit vonnis is gewezen door de rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen,
kamer ACS:
XXX
en uitgesproken in openbare terechtzitting op 4 februari 2021 door de voorzitter,
in aanwezigheid van een magistraat van het openbaar ministerie,
met bijstand van griffier xxx
Annex 258

ANNEX259

Iranian Diplomat Is Convicted in Plot to Bomb Opposition Rally
in France
A court in Belgium sentenced Assadollah Assadi, an envoy based in Vienna, to 20 years in prison
for his role in a thwarted attack on a group that seeks to overthrow the Iranian leadership.
By Steven Erlanger
Published Feb. 4, 2021 Updated Feb. 15, 2021
BRUSSELS — A Belgian court on Thursday stripped a senior Iranian official of his diplomatic
immunity, convicted him of organizing a thwarted bomb attack aimed at an Iranian opposition
rally in France in 2018 and sentenced him to 20 years in prison.
The Iranian official, Assadollah Assadi, a Vienna-based diplomat detained in Belgium, invoked
his diplomatic status in refusing to testify during his trial, which began in November. Mr. Assadi,
now 49, received the maximum sentence on charges of attempted terrorist murder and
participation in the activities of a terrorist group. He did not attend the hearing on Thursday at
the courthouse in Antwerp.
The conviction is a blow to the Iranian government as it tries to persuade the United States to reenter
the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal before Iranians vote in presidential elections in June.
Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, claimed in 2018 that the bomb plot
allegations were a “false flag” operation designed to embarrass Iran as President Hassan
Rouhani prepared to travel to Europe to rally support for the nuclear deal that President Donald
J. Trump had recently abandoned.
The target of the bomb plot was an annual convention in Villepinte, outside Paris, of the National
Council of Resistance of Iran, the political wing of the Mujahedeen Khalq, or M.E.K. The leader
of the council, Maryam Rajavi, is a controversial figure who has been compared to the leader of a
cult, as has her husband, Massoud Rajavi, who disappeared during the Iraq war in 2003 and is
believed to be dead.
Ms. Rajavi has long argued for a revolution in Iran and says she would act as interim president
of a new government. Prosecutors say the bomb plot was aimed at killing her and well-known
international figures who also attended the 2018 convention.
1 Annex 259
Those included Rudolph W. Giuliani, the former mayor of New York; Newt Gingrich, the former
House speaker; Louis J. Freeh, the former F.B.I. director; Bill Richardson, the former governor
of New Mexico; Stephen Harper, the former prime minister of Canada; and Ingrid Betancourt, a
Colombian politician. In the past, such figures have been paid large sums of money for their
appearances and lobbying activities.
The M.E.K., which Ms. Rajavi also leads, has a complicated history. The group began in
opposition to the shah of Iran and later was considered a terrorist organization by the European
Union until 2009 and by the United States until 2012.
The Belgian court also convicted three accomplices of Mr. Assadi, all dual citizens of Iran and
Belgium, who were given jail terms of 15 to 18 years and stripped of their Belgian citizenship. All
three are believed to be agents of the Iranian intelligence ministry, prosecutors said.
The head of Belgium’s State Security Service, Jaak Raes, said in a letter to the prosecutors that
intelligence officials had determined the planned bombing was a state-sanctioned operation,
approved by Tehran.
A spokesman for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the verdict, calling Mr.
Assadi’s detention and sentence illegal under international law. “Iran reserves the right to resort
to legal and diplomatic means to realize the rights of Assadollah Assadi and hold governments
accountable for violating their international obligations,” said the spokesman, Saeed
Khatibzadeh, according to the semi-official Fars News Agency.
About 25,000 people attended the convention in Villepinte, France, in 2018, including
several prominent Americans. Zakaria Abdelkafi/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
2 Annex 259
Mr. Assadi was attached to the Iranian mission in Austria when he supplied explosives for the
planned attack. Prosecutors said that he brought about a pound of the explosive triacetone
triperoxide, or TATP, and a detonator from Iran to Vienna in his luggage and then drove it to
Luxembourg. There, he handed it over on June 30, 2018, to an Iranian-Belgian couple at a Pizza
Hut. Mr. Assadi was arrested at a service station in Germany, where he did not have diplomatic
immunity, as he drove back to Austria.
The couple, Amir Saadouni, 40, and his wife, Nassimeh Naami, 36, had been granted political
asylum and later citizenship in Belgium. They were arrested as they drove to Paris from
Antwerp on the day of the rally. The fourth defendant, Mehrdad Arefani, 57, was an associate of
Mr. Assadi who was supposed to guide the couple at the rally.
Iran has been accused in the past of trying to eliminate opponents abroad. Denmark called for
sanctions against Iran for planning another assassination there in 2018.
Mr. Assadi was in contact with Iranian agents all over Europe, according to documents provided
to Belgian prosecutors by the police in Germany and the Netherlands, according to Belgium’s
Flemish broadcaster, VRT. The documents include a notebook found in his car containing
numerous receipts for payments to people identified only by aliases.
A note from Belgium’s intelligence and security agency identified Mr. Assadi as an officer of
Iran’s intelligence and security ministry who operated undercover at the Iranian Embassy in
Vienna, according to The Associated Press. Belgium’s state security officers said he worked for
the ministry’s so-called Department 312, the directorate for internal security, which is on the
European Union’s list of terrorist organizations.
Elian Peltier contributed reporting from London.
3 Annex 259

ANNEX260

3/19/2021 Belgian court sentences Iranian diplomat to 20 years over bomb plot I Iran I The Guardian
News Opinion Sport Culture Lifestyle
Iran
Belgian court sentences Iranian diplomat to 20 years
over bomb plot
Daniel Boffey in Brussels
Thu 4 Feb 202111.31 EST
An Iranian diplomat who masterminded a failed bomb attack at a rally outside Paris
attended by five British MPs has been sentenced to 20 years in jail by a Belgian court
for attempted murder and involvement in terrorism.
Assadollah Assadi, 49, had been attached to the Iranian mission in Vienna when he
supplied explosives for the intended atrocity at an Iranian opposition rally in France in
2018.
The courtroom was heavily guarded during sentencing, with armoured vehicles
outside and police helicopters overhead, despite Assadi refusing to appear at any point
Annex 260
hllps://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/04/assadollah-assadi-belgian-court-s…... 1/4
3/19/2021 Belgian court sentences Iranian diplomat to 20 years over bomb plot I Iran I The Guardian
in the trial.
Assadi, believed to be an officer of the so-called department 312 in Iran's intelligence
and security ministry, had warned authorities last year of possible retaliation if he was
found guilty.
"This would have been an attack on the democratic state of law and freedom of
speech;' the judge in Antwerp said. "When the army bomb squad wanted to make the
bomb safe, it exploded. A robot was incapacitated. Thousands of people were present
at the rally in Paris. This would have resulted in many fatalities due to the explosion
but also the subsequent chaos;'
Assadi was found guilty alongside three accomplices of trying to bomb a rally
organised by the exiled National Council of Resistance of Iran on the orders of Iran's
government, a claim denied by Tehran.
The Conservative MPs Bob Blackman, Matthew Offord, Theresa Villiers and Sir David
Amess attended along with Labour's Roger Godsiff. Donald Trump's lawyer Rudy
Giuliani was also at the rally.
Belgian police officers foiled the attack on 30 June 2018 after receiving a tipoff and
stopping a couple, Amir Saadouni, 40, and Nasimeh Naami, 36, travelling in a
Mercedes car in which they found 550 grams of the unstable TATP explosive and a
detonator hidden in luggage in the vehicle's boot.
---- - - ----------------------------1a:.-nnex----2-6-0----
https:11www.theguardian.comtwor1d120211tebto4tassado11ah-assadi-be19ian…... 2/4
3/19/2021 Belgian court sentences Iranian diplomat to 20 years over bomb plot I Iran I The Guardian
,._ People gesture and wave former flags of Iran as they protest outside the Antwerp criminal court. Photograph: Belga/AFP/Getty
Images
Assadi was arrested the next day in Germany, where he was deemed unable to claim
diplomatic immunity as he was on holiday and outside the country where he had been
posted.
The court heard that Assadi had smuggled in the explosives on a commercial flight to
Austria then handed the bomb over to Saadouni and Naami during a meeting in a Pizza
Hut restaurant in Luxembourg two days before their arrest.
The court was shown surveillance pictures of Assadi dressed as a tourist, in a hat and
with a camera, handing the Belgian-Iranian couple a package.
It is believed the target was a Free Iran rally being staged in the French town of
Villepinte, north of Paris, where about 25,000 people had gathered.
Naami, described in court as highly manipulative, received an 18-
year sentence and Saadouni 15 years.
Mehrdad Arefani, a former Iranian dissident based in Belgium, was found to have been
an accomplice of Assadi's who had been due to guide the couple at the rally.
He was the only defendant to agree to appear in court for the sentencing and sat
impassively as he was jailed for 17 years.
Annex 260
hllps://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/04/assadollah-assadi-belgian-court-s…... 3/4
3/19/2021 Belgian court sentences Iranian diplomat to 20 years over bomb plot I Iran I The Guardian
Georges-Henri Beauthier, a lawyer for the prosecution, said: "The ruling shows two
things: a diplomat doesn't have immunity for criminal acts ... and the responsibility of
the Iranian state in what could have been carnage;'
A spokesman for Iran's foreign ministry told the semi-official Iranian Students News
Agency last month that Assadi's diplomatic immunity from prosecution had been
violated and that he had been a victim of a western trap.
Annex 260
hllps://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/04/assadollah-assadi-belgian-court-s…... 4/4
ANNEX261

AP AP NEWS - Top Stories Topics v Video Listen @
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Iranian diplomat convicted of planning attack on opposition
By SAMUEL PETREQUIN February 4, 2021
ANTWERP, Belgium (AP) -An Iranian diplomat identified as an undercover secret agent was
convicted Thursday in Belgium of masterminding a thwarted bomb attack against an exiled Iranian
opposition group in France and sentenced to 20 years in prison, a legal outcome that infuriated
Tehran.
A Belgian court rejected the Vienna-based official's claim of diplomatic immunity. The official,
Assadollah Assadi, contested the charges and refused to testify during his trial last year, invoking
his diplomatic status. He did not attend Thursday's hearing at the Antwerp courthouse.
Prosecutors had requested the maximum prison sentence of 20 years on charges of attempted
terrorist murder and participation in the activities of a terrorist group.
1
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Annex 261
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During the trial, lawyers for the plaintiffs and representatives of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq
opposition group, or MEK, claimed without offering evidence that the diplomat set up the attack
on direct orders from Iran's highest authorities. Tehran has denied having a hand in the plot.
A spokesman for Iran's Foreign Affairs Ministry, Saeed Khatibzadeh, condemned the court
decisions and said Iran did not recognize the sentence because it considers the Belgian
proceedings against Assadi to have been illegal.
The court in Antwerp rejected Assadi's claims of individual immunity and said the case did not
violate state immunity principles since neither Iran nor an Iranian security service stood trial.
In its ruling, it made clear Iran was not on trial, but insisted the quartet of defendants were
members of a cell operating for Iran's intelligence services gathering information about the
opposition group to identify targets and set up an attack.
Assadi's conviction comes at a critical time and has the potential to embarrass his country as U.S.
President Joe Biden's administration weighs whether to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal between
Tehran and world powers. Iran also said last month it expects Washington to lift economic
sanctions that former President Donald Trump imposed on the country after pulling America out
of the atomic deal in 2018.
The European Union centered its reaction on Assadi specifically and did not draw in Iran as a
nation. "The acts committed by this person are completely unacceptable. That's a fact. The other
aspect I can add is that the person in question is already on the EU counter-terrorism list," said EU
spokesman Peter Stano.
The Belgian government said the ruling stood on its own, separated from diplomacy and
international relations.
"What matters is that today the justice system has ruled on facts of terrorism and made a clear
statement about it. And it must be able to do that in complete independence. Otherwise, we no
longer live in a constitutional state," said Justice Minister Vincent Van Quickenborne.
On June 30, 2018, Belgian police officers tipped off by intelligence services about a possible attack
against the annual meeting of the MEK, stopped a couple traveling in a Mercedes car. In their
luggage, they found 550 grams of the unstable TATP explosive and a detonator.
Belgium's bomb disposal unit said the device was of professional quality. It could have caused a
sizable explosion and panic in the crowd, estimated at 25,000 people, that had gathered that day in
the French town ofVillepinte, north of Paris.
Among dozens of prominent guests at the rally that day were Trump's lawyer, Rudy Giuliani; Newt
Gingrich, former conservative speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; and former
Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.
Assadi was arrested a day later in Germany and transferred to Belgium. The court said since Assadi
was on vacation at the time of his arrest - and not in Austria, where he was accredited- he was
not entitled to immunity.
A note from Belgium's intelligence and security agency seen by The Associated Press identified
him as an officer of Iran's intelligence and security ministry who operated undercover at the
Iranian Embassy in Austria. Belgium's state security officers said he worked for the ministry's socalled
Department 312, the directorate for internal security, which is on a European Union list of
organizations the EU regards as terrorist groups.
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Annex 261
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Prosecutors identified Assadi as the alleged "operational commander" of the planned attack and
accused him of recruiting the couple -Amir Saadouni and Nasimeh Naami -years earlier. Both
were of Iranian heritage.
Saadouni was sentenced to 15 years in prison while Naami received an 18-year prison term.
According to the investigation, Assadi carried the explosives to Austria on a commercial flight
from Iran and later handed the bomb over to the pair during a meeting at a Pizza Hut restaurant in
Luxembourg. The ruling confirmed that the explosives were made and tested in Iran.
The fourth defendant, Mehrdad Arefani, was sentenced to 17 years in prison.
The National Council of Resistance oflran is a part of the Mujalledeen-e-Khalq, an exiled Iranian
opposition group largely based in Albania and Paris.
It was formed in 1965 by college students who embraced both Marxism and Islamic governance
while seeking to overthrow the ruling shall. They've been blamed for killing Americans in the 1970s
and later assassinations and bombings, attacks in which the group now denies being involved.
They were pushed out oflran in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, then joined Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein in battling Iran, becoming incredibly unpopular in their country. The group has
sought to rehabilitate its image in recent years, paying tens of thousands of dollars in speaking fees
to American politicians. The MEK says it renounced violence in 2001.
The organization's leader, Maryam Rajavi, welcomed the ruling and reasserted her claims that
Assadi's plot had been approved by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Supreme Leader
Ayatollall Ali Khamenei.
"The time has come for the European Union to take action," she said, urging EU countries to recall
their ambassadors from Tehran in light of the ruling.
Amir Valldat in Tehran, Angela Charlton in Paris, Raf Casert in Brussels and Jon Gambrell in Dubai
contributed to this report.
AP Top Articles
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4 Annex 261
ANNEX262

3/19/2021 Two Individuals Plead Guilty for Working on Behalf of Iran I OPA I Department of Justice
IE§ An official website of the United States government
Here's how Y.OU know
THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT5 JUSTICE
TICE NEWS
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs
Wednesday, November 6, 2019
Two Individuals Plead Guilty for Working on Behalf of Iran
Ahmadreza Mohammadi-Doostdar, 39, a dual U.S.-lranian citizen, and Majid Ghorbani, 60, an Iranian citizen and
resident of California, have entered pleas of guilty to charges stemming from their conduct conducting surveillance of
and collecting identifying information about American citizens and U.S. nationals who are members of the Iranian
dissident group Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).
On Oct. 8, 2019, Doostdar entered a guilty plea to one count of acting as an agent of the Government of Iran without
notifying the Attorney General, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951, and one count of conspiring to violate that statute, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. On November 4, 2019, Ghorbani entered a guilty plea to one count of violating the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1705, and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560.
"The defendants both have admitted to conducting surveillance and collecting identifying information on behalf of Iran
about Americans, and in particular, individuals who were exercising their First Amendment rights to oppose the Iranian
government," said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers. "The Department of Justice is
committed to holding accountable governments like Iran that would threaten and intimidate Americans who criticize
them."
"The Iranian government thought it could get away with conducting surveillance on individuals in the United States by
sending one of its agents here to task a permanent resident with conducting and collecting that surveillance," said
Jessie K. Liu, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. "This case highlights our efforts to pursue those who
threaten national security and disrupt foreign governments that target U.S. persons."
"This alleged activity demonstrates a continued interest in targeting the United States, as well as potential opposition
groups located in the United States," said Acting Executive Assistant Director Jay Tabb. "The FBI will continue to
identify and disrupt those individuals who seek to engage in unlawful activity, on behalf of Iran, on US soil."
As part of his plea, Doostdar admitted under oath that he traveled to the United States from Iran on three occasions in
order to meet with Ghorbani and to convey directions for Ghorbani's activities on behalf of the Government of Iran.
Prior to Doostdar's first trip to the United States, his handler with the Government of Iran identified Ghorbani by name,
showed Doostdar a photograph of Ghorbani, and told him where Ghorbani worked.
During Doostdar's first trip to the United States in July 2017, Doostdar met Ghorbani at Ghorbani's workplace.
Doostdar admitted that during a subsequent conversation, Ghorbani told Doostdar that he was willing to work for the
Government of Iran in the United States.
On Sept. 20, 2017, Ghorbani attended an MEK rally in New York City. The rally consisted of constitutionally protected
activity, including U.S. citizens denouncing the Iranian regime. At the rally, Ghorbani photographed rally attendees,
including MEK leaders.
Annex 262
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-individuals-plead-guilty-working-beh… 1/2
3/19/2021 Two Individuals Plead Guilty for Working on Behalf of Iran I OPA I Department of Justice
During Doostdar's second trip to the United States as part of the conspiracy, in December 2017, Doostdar met with
Ghorbani and collected the rally photographs from Ghorbani. The photographs depicted MEK leaders, and included
hand-written notes identifying the individuals and listing their positions in the group. Ghorbani and Doostdar also
discussed Ghorbani's planned travel to Iran in March 2018, and Ghorbani offered to provide an in-person briefing on
rally attendees during this trip. Under oath, Ghorbani admitted to attending the September 2017 MEK rally and to
photographing and gathering information on rally attendees to provide to Doostdar and ultimately to individuals in Iran.
In December 2017, Doostdar departed the United States for Iran with the photographs and the handwritten notes
provided by Ghorbani. Doostdar paid Ghorbani $2,000 for his work, which Doostdar admitted had been provided by
Doostdar's Government of Iran handler.
In May 2018, Ghorbani traveled to another MEK rally in Washington, D.C., where he again collected information on
participants critical of the Iranian regime. Following that rally, Doostdar admitted that he and Ghorbani spoke by
telephone and discussed the methods that Ghorbani could use to provide information collected at that rally to Doostdar
in Iran.
Doostdar further admitted that during his travel to the United States to task Ghorbani with collecting information on U.S.
persons on behalf of the Iranian regime, he communicated with his Government of Iran handler through another coconspirator.
Doostdar's handler relayed instructions and encouragement, and answered Doostdar's questions that
came up during his mission to the United States.
Doostdar is scheduled to be sentenced on Dec. 17, 2019, at 2:00 p.m., before the Honorable Paul L. Friedman of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Ghorbani is scheduled to be sentenced before Judge Friedman on Jan.
15, 2020, at 10:00 a.m.
The maximum penalty for conspiracy is five years; the maximum penalty for acting as an agent of a foreign power is 10
years; and the maximum penalty for violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act is 20 years. The
maximum statutory sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes. Each
defendant's sentence will be determined by the court based on the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other
statutory factors.
The investigation into this matter was conducted by the FBl's Washington Field Office and Los Angeles Field Office.
The case is being prosecuted by the National Security Section of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
and the Counterintelligence and Export Control Section of the National Security Division of the Department of Justice.
Topic(s):
Counterintelligence and Export Control
National Security
Component(s):
National SecuritY. Division (NSD).
USAO - District of Columbia
Press Release Number:
19-1197
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-individuals-plead-guilty-working-beh…
Updated November 22, 2019
Annex 262
2/2
ANNEX263

Media Industry
NOVEMBER 6, 2019 / 6:39 AM / UPDATED A YEAR AGO
Sweden charges man with spying on Ahwazi community for
Iran
By Reuters Staff
STOCKHOLM (Reuters) - Sweden’s state prosecutors have charged an Iraqi Swede with
spying on the Ahwazi community in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe and passing the
information to Iranian authorities.
The Ahwazi are an Arab minority mostly living in the Iranian province of Khusestan and face
persecution and discrimination from authorities there, according to Amnesty International.
The prosecution authority said on Wednesday that the 46 year-old man was charged with
collecting personal information about members of the Ahwazi community under the pretence
of working for an online publication.
Some of the information was passed to members of the Iranian security services, the
prosecutor said in a statement. The man denies the charges.
The man’s activities included filming conference delegates and demonstrators at Ahwazi events
in Sweden and around Europe, photographing number plates and obtaining internet log-in
details of members of the community during a four-year period from 2015 to 2019, the
prosecutors said.
Figures for the size of the Ahwazi community in Sweden were not available.
World Business Markets Breakingviews Video More
f w
1 Annex 263
Unrest in the province of Khusestan goes back at least 100 years when the local leader rebelled
against the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi and has flared up numerous times since.
In 2018, the Ahwaz National Resistance, an Iranian ethnic Arab movement which seeks a
separate state in oil-rich Khuzestan province, claimed responsibility for an attack on a parade
in the regional capital of Ahvez that killed 25 people.
That led Iran to arrest hundreds of Ahwazi Arabs.
In January this year, the European Union froze the assets of an Iranian intelligence unit after
the Netherlands accused Iran of two killings on its soil and joined France and Denmark in
alleging Tehran plotted other attacks in Europe.
Reporting by Simon Johnson; Editing by Angus MacSwan
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
2 Annex 263
ANNEX264

World News
JUNE 26, 2020 / 6:33 AM / UPDATED 8 MONTHS AGO
Norwegian found guilty of spying for Iran in Denmark
By Reuters Staff
COPENHAGEN (Reuters) - A Danish court on Friday sentenced a Norwegian citizen to seven
years in jail after convicting him of spying for an Iranian intelligence service and complicity in a
suspected plot to kill an Iranian Arab opposition figure in Denmark.
Slideshow ( 11 images )
World Business Markets Breakingviews Video More
f "JI
1 Annex 264
Mohammad Davoudzadeh Loloei, a 40-year-old Norwegian with Iranian heritage, was arrested
in October 2018 after a major police operation in which Denmark temporarily closed its
international borders.
For several days in late September that year, Loloei observed and took photos of the home of
an Iranian exile in Denmark, as well as the streets and roads surrounding the home, Roskilde
District Court said in a statement.
“The court found that the information was collected and passed on to a person working for an
Iranian intelligence service, for use by the intelligence service’s plans to kill the exile,” the
court said.
Loloei was sentenced to seven years in prison and permanent expulsion from Denmark, public
prosecutor Soeren Harbo told Reuters. Loloei will be denied entrance to Denmark after serving
his sentence.
“It’s a historic case,” Harbo said. “And it’s a powerful message to (foreign) intelligence
services: they have to handle their conflicts among themselves and stop involving us.”
Harbo added that Danish authorities had filed an international arrest warrant with the
International Criminal Police Organization, Interpol, for Loloei’s Iranian case officer.
Loloei, who has denied all charges, immediately appealed against the verdict, Harbo said.
The exile, who was not named in the statement, is the leader of an Iranian Arab resistance
group known as the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA).
Separately, Danish police have charged three members of ASMLA, including the group’s leader,
with spying for Saudi intelligence services and financing and supporting terrorism in Iran.
Reporting by Nikolaj Skydsgaard; Editing by Mark Heinrich
2 Annex 264
ANNEX265

Iran Issues Death Sentence for Opposition Journalist
Ruhollah Zam once ran a popular news service that helped share information about the widespread protests in 2017. He had been exiled in
France until October, when he traveled to Iraq and then disappeared.
By Elian Peltier
June 30, 2020
An Iranian opposition journalist who played an active role in widespread protests that engulfed the country in 2017 and 2018 has been
sentenced to death, Iranian authorities said on Tuesday, months after he disappeared in neighboring Iraq and ended up in his home
country under murky conditions.
The activist, Ruhollah Zam, was found guilty by a court in Tehran of “corruption on earth,” a term often used to describe attempts to
overthrow the Iranian government, according to Gholam Hossein Esmaili, a judiciary spokesman who announced the death sentence at a
news conference on Tuesday, Iranian news outlets reported.
Mr. Zam spent years exiled in France as a refugee before his sudden disappearance and detention by Iranian authorities. It was unclear
when Mr. Zam was convicted, but the sentencing is the latest move by Iranian authorities cracking down on dissenting voices that have
challenged its ruling elite.
Mr. Zam ran Amad News, a website and popular channel on the messaging platform Telegram, out of France, where he had lived since 2011
as a refugee. His Telegram account had more than 1 million followers, and he used it to post information about Iranian officials and share
logistics about the protests that rocked the country.
Telegram shut down the channel at the request of Iranian authorities in December 2017, arguing that it incited violence by encouraging
protesters to use Molotov cocktails during the demonstrations. Mr. Zam created a new channel, according to Reporters Without Borders,
which Telegram refused to close down.
Mr. Zam is a divisive and controversial figure in Iran and in the broader Iranian diaspora. Reporters Without Borders said in a statement
denouncing his sentencing that he had been accused of being manipulated by Iranian intelligence into publishing false information.
The 2017 protests were triggered by a jump in food prices and started in the city of Mashhad, where the country’s supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was born. Initially led by disaffected young people in rural areas and towns, the protests soon grew to an antigovernment
movement that turned against the country’s entire ruling class and spread to dozens of cities, with some demonstrators
calling for Mr. Khamenei to step down.
The Telegram messaging app played a major role as millions of protesters used its channels and groups to disseminate information and
plan the protests.
Students clashed with police officers around Tehran University during anti-government
protests in 2017. Associated Press
1 Annex 265
Security forces swiftly cracked down on the protests, thousands were arrested and at least two dozens protesters were killed during one
two-week period at the height of the unrest. Iran blocked the Telegram app in May 2018, but many in the country have circumvented the
blockage by using virtual private networks, or VPNs.
Mr. Zam’s own story of how he ended up in Iranian detention in the first place remains murky. He left France on Oct. 11, according to the
French foreign ministry. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said days later that Mr. Zam had been arrested in a complex operation, according to
Iranian news outlets. Mr. Zam’s wife, Mahsa Razani, who is still living in Paris with the couple’s child, said he had disappeared not long
after arriving in Baghdad from Paris.
Reza Moini, head of the Iran-Afghanistan desk at Reporters Without Borders, said Mr. Zam was looking for funds to create a television
channel and had been lured into a trip to Iraq to meet with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, an influential Shia cleric and Khamenei rival who could
finance his media venture.
Mr. Zam had received various threats in recent years, Mr. Moini said, and until he left France, he was under police protection.
“Ruhollah Zam was publishing damaging information for Mr. Khamenei’s entourage,” Mr. Moini said. “He had been manipulated a few
times by publishing erroneous information coming from the Revolutionary Guards, and he was desperately looking for funds.”
Iraqi intelligence sources said they had no information about his arrest and had not been involved in the operation.
Mr. Zam’s trial began in February, without a defense lawyer, according to Reporters Without Borders. He was accused of spreading
propaganda against the Iranian regime, cooperating with the United States and spying for the Israeli and French intelligence services,
among other charges.
Iran has long sought to silence opponents, both at home and abroad. In January, the country’s most famous rapper, Amir Tataloo, was
detained in Turkey and faced deportation, but was ultimately released. In November, Masoud Molavi, an Iranian dissident who also ran a
Telegram channel critical of the leadership, was shot dead in Istanbul in an operation orchestrated by Iranian intelligence services,
according to Turkish officials cited by Reuters.
Mr. Esmaili, the judiciary spokesman, also said on Tuesday that an appeals court had upheld the sentence for Fariba Adelkhah, a renowned
French-Iranian academic who was arrested in Tehran in June, 2019.
Ms. Adelkhah, whose detention has strained an already fraught relationship between France and Iran, was sentenced to five years in
prison in May on national security charges, with an additional one-year jail term for disseminating “propaganda against the Islamic
Republic.”
She will serve five years, Mr. Esmaili said, because she has already been in detention for over a year, according to the semiofficial Fars
news agency.
Alissa J. Rubin contributed reporting from Baghdad.
2 Annex 265
ANNEX266

2/24/2021 Federal Foreign Office on the Execution of the Blogger Ruhollah Zam - Federal Foreign Office
Federal Foreign Office on the Execution of
the Blogger Ruhollah Zam
12.12.2020 - Press release LB
A Federal Foreign Office spokesperson issued the following statement today (12 December)
on the execution of the blogger Ruhollah Zam: ,, The Federal Government is horrified about the execution of the
blogger Ruhollah Zam carried out today in Iran. Our sympathy goes
out to his family and friends. We are shocked by the circumstances
surrounding the conviction, particularly by the preceding kidnapping
from abroad. The Federal Government's position on the death
penalty is clear, namely that it is a cruel and inhumane form of
punishment that we reject in all circumstances. We call upon Iran to
respect the freedom of opinion of its citizens, to release all political
prisoners and to refrain from handing down or carrying out further
death penalties.
Background information:
The dissident and blogger Ruhollah Zam who had been granted asylum in France, was
kidnapped abroad in unclear circumstances in October 2019 and shown a few days later on
Iranian state television wearing a blindfold. In June 2020, he was sentenced to death by an
Iranian revolutionary court. On 8 December, it was announced that the supreme court had
upheld the death sentence.
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2426522 Annex 266 1/1

ANNEX267

France in the United Kingdom
AMBASSADE
DE FRANCE
AU ROYAUME-UNI
3/19/2021 France condemns execution of Iranian journalist - France in the United Kingdom - La France au Royaume-Uni
Home > Newsroom > Latest News > France condemns execution of Iranian journalist
France condemns execution of Iranian journalist
Iran - Execution of Ruhollah Zam - Statement by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs Spokesperson
Paris, 12 December 2020
Ruhollah Zam, a journalist who had been sentenced to death, was executed in Iran today.
France utterly condemns this serious infringement of the freedom of expression and freedom of the press in Iran. This is a barbaric and unacceptable act that is contrary to
Iran's international commitments. France reaffirms its unwavering opposition to the death penalty everywhere and under all circumstances./.
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Annex 267
https://uk.ambafrance.org/France-utterly-condemns-execution-of-lranian-… 1/1

ANNEX268

Iran: Statement by the Spokesperson on the
execution of Mr Ruhollah Zam
Statements by the Spokesperson
Brussels, 12/12/2020 - 16:56, UNIQUE ID: 201212_ 4
On 12 December 2020, Ruhollah Zam, convicted of playing a role in provoking violent riots, was
executed in Iran. The European Union condemns this act in the strongest terms and recalls once
again its irrevocable opposition to the use of capital punishment under any circumstances. It is also
imperative for the Iranian authorities to uphold the due process rights of accused individuals and to
cease the practice of using televised confessions to establish and promote their guilt.
The EU believes that the death penalty is a cruel and inhumane punishment, which fails to act as a
deterrent to crime and represents an unacceptable denial of human dignity and integrity. The
European Union calls on Iran to refrain from any future executions and to pursue a consistent policy
towards the abolition of the death penalty.
. . Annex268 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/90498/Iran-st… 1/2

ANNEX269

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Iran: UN experts condemn execution of Ruhollah Zam
Persian version
GENEVA (14 December 2020) - UN human rights experts* condemned the execution of Ruhollah Zam,
an Iranian dissident and founder of AmadNews,calling his conviction and execution "unconscionable"
and a serious violation of Iran's obligations under international law.
In July 2020, the Iranian judiciary announced that Mr. Zam had been sentenced to death on the vague
charge of "spreading corruption on earth". Iranian authorities convicted Mr. Zam over information
released on AmadNews that they allege helped inspire nation-wide anti-government protests in 2017,
and which revealed damaging accusations about State officials. Iranian state media said on 12
December he had been executed.
"The conviction and execution of Mr. Zam are unconscionable," the experts said. "The reports of his
arrest, his treatment in detention, and the process of his trial, as well as the reasons for his targeting
by the Iranian authorities, are a serious violation of Iran's obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the
right to life," the experts said.
In October 2019, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced they had detained Mr. Zam while
he was travelling to Iraq and returned him to Iran. Mr. Zam had been granted refugee status and had
been living in France prior to his detention. Soon after his detention, an alleged forced confession by
Mr. Zam was broadcast on state-affiliated news outlets, before an investigation or judicial process had
commenced.
The Special Rapporteur on the situation of the human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran raised
concerns regarding Mr. Zam's detention and forced confession in his report to the Human Rights
Council in 2020.
"It is clear that Ruhollah Zam was executed for expressing opinions and providing information on
AmadNews that dissented from the official views of the Iranian Government," the experts said.
"There are serious and credible concerns that judicial proceedings against him breached fair trial
rights, including the broadcast of an alleged forced confession when he was detained. His execution is
an arbitrary deprivation of his right to life. We strongly condemn the Iranian Government's actions."
The Special Rapporteur had raised his serious concerns regarding Mr. Zam's death sentence in recent
engagement with the Iranian Government. On 8 December 2020, Iran's judiciary announced that Mr.
Zam's death sentence had been upheld by Iran's Supreme Court.
"Iran must end its systematic use of the iudicial orocess to imoose arbitrarv detention and death
1 Annex 269
Home
sentences against human rights defenders, journalists and other individuals who express dissent
against the Government through the free exercise of their internationally-recognised human rights."
ENDS
* The UN experts: Javaid Rehman, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
the Islamic Republic of Iran; Agnes Callamard, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions.
The Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of
the Human Rights Council. Special Procedures, the largest body of independent experts in the UN
Human Rights system, is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring
mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world.
Special Procedures' experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a
salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their
individual capacity.
UN Human Rights, Country Page - Iran
For more information and media requests, please contact Mr. Ciaron Murnane
( [email protected])
For media inquiries related to other UN independent experts, please contact Jeremy Laurence
([email protected])
Follow news related to the UN's independent human rights experts on Twitter@UN_SPExperts.
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2 Annex 269
ANNEX270

High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 21 February
2020
~ Send ~ Print ,I Tweet
High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all
countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and in the most serious cases,
countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing money laundering, terrorist financing, and
proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the "black list". *
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK's failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism
(AMUCFT) regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and
meaningfully address its AMUCFT deficiencies. Further, the FATF has serious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK's illicit activities related to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing.
The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business
relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies, financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced
scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance
with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD
proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and
representative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC
resolutions.
Iran
In June 2016, Iran committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Iran's action plan expired in January 2018. In February 2020, the FATF noted Iran has not
completed the action plan.[1]
In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of
financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased
external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.
Now, given Iran's failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of
counter-measures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with Recommendation 19.[2]
Iran will remain on the FATF statement on [High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action] until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the
Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend
countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action
Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.
[1] In June 2016, the FATF welcomed Iran's high-level political commitment to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and its decision to seek technical
assistance in the implementation of the Action Plan. Since 2016, Iran established a cash declaration regime, enacted amendments to its Counter-Terrorist
Financing Act and its Anti-Money Laundering Act, and adopted an AML by-law.
In February 2020, the FATF noted that there are still items not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including
by removing the exemption for designated groups "attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism"; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in
line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) demonstrating
how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (5) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF
Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (6) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain
complete originator and beneficiary information.
[2] Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply
countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks.
The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19 specifies examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries.
* This statement was previously called "Public Statement"
Annex270

ANNEX271

High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 23 October
2020
~ Send ~ Print ,I Tweet
High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all
countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and in the most serious cases, countries
are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation
financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the "black list".
On 2 August 2020, FATF decided to pause the review process for the list of High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action. Therefore, please refer to the
statement on these jurisdictions adopted in February 2020. While the statement may not necessarily reflect the most recent status in Iran and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea's AML/CFT regime, the FATF's call for action on these high-risk jurisdictions remains in effect.
• High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 21 February 2020
More on:
• Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring
• Outcomes FATF Plenary 23 October 2020
Annex271

ANNEX272

United Nations
(~) Security Council
~~ ~
Dis tr.: General
10 December 2019
Original: English
Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
Eighth report of the Secretary-General
I. Introduction
1. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear issue is an
important multilateral diplomatic achievement, which enjoys the broad support of
Member States and was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2231
(2015). Diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America
and the European Union with the Islamic Republic oflran culminated in an agreement
to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. An essential
part of the Plan is the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions on the Islamic Republic of
Iran, allowing for the normalization of trade and economic relations.
2. On 16 January 2016 (Implementation Day), upon completion of certain actions
by the Islamic Republic of Iran (stipulated in the Plan) 1 as verified by the Agency, a
decade of United Nations sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions
related to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic oflran were lifted. Between
16 January 2016 and 14 June 2019, the Agency reported 15 times (most recently in
S/2019/212 and S/2019/496) to the Security Council that the Islamic Republic oflran
had been fully implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan.
3. I regret that the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action on 8 May 2018, that it reimposed all of the national sanctions that had been
lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan and that it has since continued to implement its
decision not to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic
of Iran and not to fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the
framework of the Plan. These actions continue to be contrary to the goals set out in
the Plan and in resolution 2231 (2015) and may also impede the ability of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to implement certain provisions of the Plan and of the resolution. I
note the most recent concerns expressed in the letter dated 4 November 2019 from
the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to me
(S/2019/863 ).
1 As specified in paragraphs 15.1 to 15.11 of annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action .
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Plei se re.cyde ' ¢
S120191934
Annex 272
S/2019/934
2/11
4. I regret the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran under the monitoring of
the Agency since 1 July 2019 - further to its announcement on 8 May 20192 - to
reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan (see para. 7). I continue to
believe that full and effective implementation of the Plan by all participants is the
best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and to secure tangible economic benefits for the Iranian
people. I note that the Islamic Republic of Iran has stated that it wants to remain in
the Plan and has emphasized that all of its measures since I July are reversible. It is
important that the Islamic Republic of Iran reverse all of the measures and that it
refrain from taking further steps to reduce its agreed commitments.
5. During both the meetings of the Joint Commission held in Vienna on 28 June
and 6 December 2019 and the ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+2 (China, France,
Germany, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland) and the Islamic Republic oflran held in New York on 25 September
2019, all participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reaffirmed their
continued commitment to preserving the Plan. I welcome their continuing efforts to
protect the freedom of their economic operators to pursue legitimate business with
the Islamic Republic oflran in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015) and their
other initiatives in support of trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic
of Iran. These initiatives should be given full effect as a matter of urgency. I am also
encouraged by the operationalization of the Instrument in Support of Trade
Exchanges, the interest expressed by European Union and other Member States in
joining France, Germany and the United Kingdom as shareholders, and efforts to open
the special purpose vehicle to economic operators from third countries. It is essential
that the Plan continue to work for all of its participants.
6. I also stress the important contribution of other Member States to preserve the
Plan and continue to encourage them to work effectively with the participants in the
Plan towards creating the conditions necessary for their economic operators to engage
in trade with the Islamic Republic oflran in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015).
7. The International Atomic Energy Agency plays an important role in supporting
the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, especially by
providing the international community with reports on its verification and monitoring
activities in the Islamic Republic oflran in line with resolution 2231 (2015). I commend
its impartial, factual and professional work. In its reports issued since 1 July 2019, 3
the Agency has confirmed the activities announced and undertaken by the Islamic
Republic of Iran to reduce its commitments under the Plan. The Agency has also
reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and
that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities
remained ongoing. The Agency has further reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran
continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement
and to apply the transparency measures contained in the Plan. The Agency indicated
that it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the
sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.
8. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015) are
essential for nuclear non-proliferation, and for regional and international security. I
2 Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, statement of 8 May 2019,
available at www.president.ir/en/109588 .
3 See reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency entitled "Verification and monitoring in
the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)"
dated 1 and 8 July (S/2019/559 and S/2019/560), 30 August (S/2019/737), 8 and 26 September
(S/2019/738 and S/2019/899), 7, 11 and 18 November 2019 (S/2019/900, S/2019/901 and
S/2019/902).
19-20758
Annex 272
19-20758
encourage the Islamic Republic oflran to carefully consider and urgently address the
concerns of Member States in relation to the restrictive measures contained in annex B
to the resolution. I call upon all Member States to avoid provocative rhetoric and
actions that may have a negative impact on regional stability.
9. The present report, my eighth on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015),
provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings
and recommendations, since the issuance of my seventh report ( S/2019/492) on
13 June 2019. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on
the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), which include
restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers
and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as asset
freeze and travel ban provisions.
II. Key findings and recommendations
10. The procurement channel continues to be a vital transparency and confidencebuilding
mechanism for the legitimate transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of
nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods and related services pursuant to resolution
2231 (2015). All participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Joint
Commission have a special role to play to ensure its success. To support its effective
and efficient functioning, it is also important for the Security Council, through the
Facilitator and with the assistance of the Secretariat, to increase awareness of and
confidence in this important mechanism. I call upon Member States and the private
sector to fully utilize and support this channel.
11. The United States announced on 18 November 2019 that participation in
activities related to the modification of infrastructure at the Fordow facility may now
be exposed to its national sanctions. The United States had previously announced on
3 May 2019 that participation in other activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B
to resolution 2231 (2015) may be exposed to its national sanctions. I note again that
the exemptions set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to the resolution are designed to
provide for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology
required for the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Plan.
12. The Secretariat continued its review of the arms and related material seized by
the United Arab Emirates in Aden in December 2018 (see S/2019/492, para. 31).
Information provided by the State of manufacture indicates that the seized PGO-7V-type
optical sights for RPG-7-type rocket-propelled grenade launchers were delivered to
the Islamic Republic oflran in 2016. This suggests that these optical sights seized in
Aden may have been retransferred from the Islamic Republic oflran after 16 January
2016.
13. The Secretariat was able to examine the debris of the weapons systems used in
the attacks on an oil facility in Afif (May 2019), on Abha International Airport (June
and August 2019) and on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Khurays and Abqaiq
(September 2019). At this time, it is unable to independently corroborate that the
cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles used in those attacks were of Iranian
origin and were transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). The
Secretariat is still collecting and analysing additional information on these cruise
missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, and I intend to report to the Security Council
on further findings in due course, as appropriate.
14. Information from Iraqi media outlets suggests that Major General Soleimani has
undertaken travel inconsistent with the travel ban provisions of the resolution. I call
S/2019/934
3/11
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S/2019/934
4/11
upon all Member States to diligently implement the restrictive measures imposed on
the individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
15. Since 13 June 2019, no new proposals to participate in or permit the activities
set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) were submitted to the
Security Council for approval through the procurement channel. Of the 44 proposals
received from 16 January 2016 to 13 June 2019, 30 were approved by the Council, 5
were not approved and 9 were withdrawn by the proposing States. It is vital that the
procurement channel continue to work effectively and efficiently, and in a manner
that promotes increased international engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
16. In addition, the Security Council received four new notifications pursuant to
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities
consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that do not require approval,
but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint
Commission. As previously reported, on 3 May 2019, the United States announced
that involvement in some of the above-mentioned activities may now be exposed to
its national sanctions, specifically assistance to expand the Bushehr Nuclear Power
Plant beyond the existing reactor unit and any involvement in transferring enriched
uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium. 4 The
United States also announced that other activities, such as the redesign of the Arak
reactor, modification of infrastructure at the Fordow facility and work at the existing
unit of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, would be permitted to continue for a
renewable duration of 90 days but that it reserved the right to modify or revoke its
policy covering these non-proliferation activities at any time. Consequently, the
United States announced on 18 November 2019 that it "will terminate the sanctions
waiver related to the nuclear facility at Fordow, effective December 15th, 2019".5
Subsequently, in a letter dated 5 December 2019 addressed to me (A/74/575-
S/2019/928), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic oflran noted that,
by taking this action, the United States "not only violates resolution 2231 (2015), but
also coerces other countries to stop implementing their relevant international
commitments".
IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic
Republic of Iran
17. In identical letters dated 29 August 2019 addressed to me and the President of
the Security Council (S/2019/705), the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the United States
Mission brought to my attention information regarding two ballistic missiles
launches, reportedly conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 25 July and
9 August 2019. The Charge d'affaires a.i. noted that both missiles were designed to
4 United States Department of State, "Advancing the Maximum Pressure Campaign by Restricting
Iran's Nuclear Activities", Fact sheet, 3 May 2019, available at www.state.gov/advancing-themaximum-
pressure-campaign-by-restricting-irans-nuclear-activities/.
5 "Secretary Michael R. Pompeo Remarks to the Press" on 18 November 2019, available at
https :/ /www.state.gov/ secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press/.
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be category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime 6 and therefore
were designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The Charge d 'affaires a.i.
observed that the Council, in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), called
upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake launches with these types of
ballistic missiles. In response, in a letter dated 19 September 2019 addressed to me
and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/752), the Permanent Representative
of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that there was no implicit or explicit
reference in paragraph 3 of annex B to the Missile Technology Control Regime and
the criteria contained therein. He reiterated the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran
that none of its ballistic missiles were "designed to be capable of delivering nuclear
weapons" and therefore that its related activities were not inconsistent with paragraph 3
of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). He also noted that when previous missile
launches by the Islamic Republic oflran were discussed in the Security Council, there
was no consensus on how these launches related to resolution 2231 (2015).
18. In identical letters dated 19 November 2019 addressed to me and the President
of the Security Council (S/2019/895 ), the Permanent Representative of Israel
informed me of three additional flight tests of ballistic missiles reportedly conducted
between March and June 2019. He stated that two of these flight tests were
inconsistent with the resolution because the tested missiles crossed the threshold of
300 km range and 500 kg payload and, therefore, violated annex B restrictions on the
ballistic activity of the Islamic Republic oflran. The Permanent Representative of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, in identical letters dated 26 November 2019 addressed to
me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/907), stated that the Islamic
Republic of Iran had "neither launched any missile nor conducted any other action
inconsistent with annex B" and strongly rejected the information contained in the
aforementioned letters from the Permanent Representative of Israel.
19. In a letter dated 21 November 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/911 ), the
Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom brought to
my attention recent actions undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran. They stated
that undated footage released on social media on 22 April 2019 revealed a previously
unseen flight test of a new Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile variant equipped
with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle. They also stated that, on 24 July 2019, the
Islamic Republic oflran flight-tested a ballistic missile that flew over 1,000 km and
that media reporting indicated that this flight test involved a Shahab-3 missile. They
noted that, as a category I system under the Missile Technology Control Regime, the
Shahab-3 "is designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons". They further
stated that, if confirmed, the test would constitute an activity inconsistent with
paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). They also noted that media
reporting indicated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had unsuccessfully attempted to
launch a Safir satellite launch vehicle at the end of August 2019. They recalled the
technical analysis of the Safir satellite launch vehicle provided in their letter dated
25 March 2019 (S/2019/270) and concluded that, if confirmed, this attempted launch
would also constitute an activity inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015).
20. In identical letters dated 4 December 2019 addressed to me and the President of
the Security Council (S/2019/926), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic
Republic oflran referred to the aforementioned letter ( S/2019/911 ) and reiterated the
view that "there is no implicit or explicit reference in paragraph 3 of annex B to
Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) either to the Missile Technology Control
6 Category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime are defined as "complete
rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets)
capable of delivering at least a 500 kg 'payload' to a 'range' of at least 300 km" (see l .A.1 of the
Equipment, Software and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime).
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Regime itself or to its definitions". The Permanent Representative noted that, given
the fact that "none oflran 's missiles are 'designed to be capable of delivering nuclear
weapons', paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) does not limit, in any
way, the activities related to the conventional ballistic missiles of the Islamic
Republic of Iran". The Permanent Representative also stated that there was "no
implicit or explicit reference or language" in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015) pertaining to space launch vehicles. He further recalled that, as noted in
the third and fourth six-month reports of the Facilitator on the implementation of
resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/515 and S/2017/1058), there was no consensus in the
Security Council on how previous launches by the Islamic Republic oflran of ballistic
missiles and space launch vehicles related to resolution 2231 (2015). Finally, the
Permanent Representative re-emphasized the view that "Iran has not conducted any
activity inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)".
21. In identical letters dated 26 November addressed to me and the President of the
Security Council (A/74/565- S/2019/909), the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of the Russian Federation reiterated the position of his country regarding the
implementation of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). He underscored
that the Islamic Republic oflran was not prohibited by multilateral non-proliferation
mechanisms or resolution 2231 (2015) from developing missile and space
programmes. He stated that the Russian Federation continued to consider that the
Islamic Republic of Iran "is respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in
paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) to refrain from activities related to
ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons". He
reiterated that the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime were never
intended to be used in the context of resolution 2231 (2015) to ascertain whether
certain missiles were designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons and that
"such types of missiles should include certain specific features and, up until now, no
evidence of their existence on Iranian ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles" had
been presented to the Council.
B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with
the Islamic Republic of Iran
22. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), provided that
they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis,
all States may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the
Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology. At the time of reporting, one proposal had been
submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph ( see also report of the Facilitator
S/2019/xxx).
23. In identical letters dated 3 and 7 September 2019 addressed to me and the
President of the Security Council (S/2019/704 and S/2019/716), the Permanent
Representative of Israel stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hizbullah have
redoubled their efforts to convert and produce precision-guided missiles in Lebanon
by attempting to build manufacturing and conversion facilities in a number of
locations in Lebanon. He also stated that the components necessary for manufacturing
and converting the precision-guided missiles were being transferred from the Islamic
Republic of Iran through different routes. The Permanent Representative of Israel
further stated that, on 3 September 2019, the Israel Defense Forces exposed a facility
located near Nabi Shit in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon designed to manufacture
motors and warheads of precision-guided missiles and that the Islamic Republic of
Iran provided "cutting-edge equipment and expertise to the manufacturing crews" of
that facility. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in
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identical letters dated 6 September 2019 (S/2019/714) and identical letters dated
23 October 2019 (S/2019/836) addressed to me and the President of the Security
Council, rejected all claims made in the aforementioned letters from the Permanent
Representative of Israel.
24. In October 2019, the authorities of the United States informed the Secretariat
that, in their assessment, several shipments of a commodity to the Islamic Republic
of Iran were undertaken contrary to paragraph 4 of annex B. According to the United
States, two shipments of hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene were transferred to the
Research and Self-Sufficiency Jehad Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps in July and August 2017 without prior approval of the Security Council.
The Secretariat is examining the information provided by the United States and will
update the Council, as appropriate, in due course.
25. In their letter dated 21 November 2019 addressed to me ( S/2019/911 ), the
Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom also brought
to my attention that Houthi forces, on 2 August 2019, announced the launch of the
Borkan-3, a new liquid-propelled medium-range ballistic missile. They noted that
video of the launch showed that the Borkan-3 was "clearly an adaptation of earlier
Borkan-2H missiles". Pointing to similar features on both the Borkan-2H and Borkan-3
missiles and the Qiam-1 missile launched in September 2018 by the Islamic Republic
of Iran against targets in the Syrian Arab Republic, they stated that the Islamic
Republic of Iran "may be acting in breach of relevant provisions of annex B to
Council resolution 2231 (2015) barring the transfer of missile technology from Iran".
In his letter dated 4 December 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security
Council (S/2019/926), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
stated that the argument contained in the aforementioned letter ( S/2019/911 ) that
"annex B to Council resolution 2231 (2015) barr[ed] the transfer of missile
technology from Iran" was a "distortion of the text of that resolution". Instead, he
recalled that "all States may participate in and permit" such activities with prior
approval of the Security Council. He also stated that "the actual operationalization of
the necessary mechanism for making required decisions to permit such activities" had
been prevented "for clear political reasons". He further stated that the Islamic
Republic of Iran refuted the charges related to a possible Iranian transfer of missile
technology to the Houthis.
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
26. In my most recent report, I informed the Security Council that the Secretariat
had examined (in the United Arab Emirates) samples of an arms shipment that had
been seized in Aden in December 2018. The samples of the shipment included rocketpropelled
grenade launchers with characteristics similar to Iranian-produced RPG-7-
type launchers (see S/2019/492, para. 31). The samples also included 23 PGO-7Vtype
optical sights for RPG-7-type rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The
Secretariat has since confirmed that serial numbers observed on the sights matched
those of semi-knock-down kits for PGO-7V-type optical sights delivered to the
Islamic Republic oflran in 2016. The State of manufacture informed the Secretariat
that the importer was an entity located in Tehran and that the end user was the
"Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Iran". This suggests that these optical
sights seized in Aden may have been retransferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran
after 16 January 2016.
27. In a letter dated 13 June 2019 addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/2019/489), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia called attention to the
attack carried out on 12 June 2019 on Abha International Airport in south-western
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Saudi Arabia. He stated that the Houthis had claimed responsibility for the attack,
saying that they had used a cruise missile, and that the attack proved the continued
support provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthis. In a letter dated
14 June 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/494), the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejected the
information contained in the aforementioned letter.
28. In identical letters dated 18 September 2019 addressed to me and the President
of the Security Council (S/2019/758), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia
brought to my attention the attacks on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Abqaiq and
Khurays on 14 September 2019. He informed me that "all preliminary signs and
indicators reveal that this attack did not emanate from Yemeni lands", as claimed by
the Houthis, and that "the weapons used were Iranian-made". In identical letters dated
2 October 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council
(S/2019/785), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
categorically rejected the claim by Saudi Arabia that the weapons used in the attack
against the Abqaiq and Khurays oil facilities were Iranian-made.
29. In response to invitations from the authorities of Saudi Arabia, members of the
Secretariat travelled to Riyadh in September and November 2019 to examine if arms
or related materiel used in the above-mentioned attacks were transferred in a manner
inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). While in Riyadh, on 19 September 2019,
the Secretariat was informed that at least 18 unmanned aerial vehicles were used in
the attack on Abqaiq, four cruise missiles were used in the attack on Khurays and
three more cruise missiles fell short of their target, for a total of at least 25 weapons
systems. The Ministry of Defence also provided the Secretariat with its assessment
(based on photographic comparison) that the "misfired land attack cruise missile"
bore similarities with the Iranian cruise missile "Ya Ali". The Secretariat was also
shown a photograph from an Iranian exhibition in May 2014 of a possible mock-up
of a delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicle, which Saudi Arabia considered to be similar
to the ones used in the Abqaiq attack. On 22 November 2019, at the invitation of the
United States, the Secretariat visited Washington D.C. and was informed that, owing
to the maximum range of the cruise missiles (which they assessed to be 700 km) and
of the unmanned aerial vehicles (which they assessed to be 900 km), it was highly
unlikely that the weapons systems used in the attacks against the oil facilities in
Abqaiq and Khurays had been transferred to and subsequently launched by the
Houthis. The authorities of the United States also stressed that the number and nature
of the weapons systems involved in the attacks on 14 September 2019 were
inconsistent with statements made by the Houthis. 7
30. Consistent with its mandate, when reviewing these attacks, the Secretariat
focused on arms-related restrictive measures in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)
and not on other circumstances of the attacks. During these visits, the Secretariat was
able to conduct a first-hand and in-depth examination of the debris recovered by Saudi
authorities of the weapons systems used in the attack on Abha International Airport
on 12 June 2019 and in the attacks on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Abqaiq and
Khurays on 14 September 2019. The examination also included the debris of the
weapons systems used in a second attack on Abha International Airport in August
2019 and in an attack on another oil facility in Afif in May 2019. The Secretariat
observed that the number of impact points at the oil facilities in Khurays and Abqaiq
was inconsistent with the statements made by the Houthis but more consistent with
7 See "Second Deterrent Balance Operation Hits Abqaiq, Khurais Oil Refineries East of Saudi
Arabia", Almasirah, 14 September 2019, available at https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?
es_id=8774&cat_id=l ; and "Armed Forces Warn Foreign Companies Not to Be Present in
Abqaiq, Khurais Refineries", Almasirah, 19 September 2019, available at https://english.
almasirah.net/details.php?es id=881 0&cat_ id= 1 .
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the figures provided by Saudi Arabia regarding the number of unmanned aerial
vehicles and cruise missiles involved.
31. In relation to the cruise missiles, with the aim of ascertaining the manufacturer
and a possible transfer of these arms and related materiel, the Secretariat:
(a) Observed that a similar type of cruise missile was used in the attacks on
both Abha International Airport and the Saudi Aramco oil facility in Khurays. The
Secretariat notes that these cruise missiles have similar design characteristics and
configuration8 to the mock-up of the Quds cruise missile that the Houthis displayed
on 7 July 2019;9
(b) Identified the manufacturer of two subcomponents of the jet engines of the
cruise missiles used in the attacks on 14 September 2019. The manufacturer informed
the Secretariat that both subcomponents were part of two similar jet engines that it
had manufactured and exported to another Member State in 2010 and 2011;
( c) Was informed by that manufacturer that it had not produced the jet engines
examined by the Secretariat (excluding the above-mentioned components). Two of
these engines had manufacturing date markings of January 2019 and April 2019,
respectively.
32. The Secretariat is still conducting its review of the components and
subcomponents retrieved from the debris of the cruise missiles with a view to
establishing their supply chain. At this time, the Secretariat is unable to independently
corroborate that the aforementioned components or the cruise missiles are of Iranian
origin and were transferred from the Islamic Republic oflran in a manner inconsistent
with resolution 2231 (2015). 10 The Secretariat is still collecting and analysing
additional information on these cruise missiles, and I intend to report to the Security
Council on our further findings in due course, as appropriate.
33. Similarly, in relation to the unmanned aerial vehicles, the Secretariat:
(a) Observed that a similar type of delta-wing-type unmanned aerial vehicle
was also used in the attacks on both the oil facility in Afif and the Saudi Aramco oil
facility in Abqaiq;
(b) Noted that the Houthis have not been shown to be in possession of, nor
been assessed to be in possession of, such a delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicle;
( c) Observed that these unmanned aerial vehicles were equipped with a
"Model V9" vertical gyroscope. As noted in my most recent report, the Secretariat
observed that an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle, reportedly recovered in
Afghanistan in 2016, was also equipped with a "Model V9" vertical gyroscope
(S/2019/492, para. 29). The manufacturer of the "Model V9" is yet to be determined;
(d) Identified that a subcomponent (servo motors) used in the unmanned aerial
vehicles had been produced between December 2014 and the end of2018; that other
subcomponents (flowmeters) were identified to have been transferred to two Member
States in July 2017, but the Secretariat is unable to determine if or when they were
subsequently retransferred to other Member States since that time; and that other
8 The number of sections, approximate length and diameter per section examined, layout of wings,
control surfaces and jet engine.
9 See Almasirah video, published on 7 July 2019, available at https://almasirah.net/gallery/
preview.php?file_id=28295 and photo, available at https://www.newsit.gr/wp-content/uploads/
2019/09/SAUDI-ARAMCO-HOUTHIS.jpg.
10 Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic oflran after 16 January 2016 would also be relevant
to the implementation of paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) .
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subcomponents (pressure regulators) were identified to have been produced in
February 2018 and transferred to another Member State later that month.
34. The Secretariat is also still conducting its review of the components and
subcomponents retrieved from the debris of the unmanned aerial vehicles with a view
to establishing their supply chain. At this time, the Secretariat is unable to
independently corroborate that these components or the unmanned aerial vehicles are
of Iranian origin and were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner
inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).11 The Secretariat is still collecting and
analysing additional information on these unmanned aerial vehicles and I intend to
report to the Security Council on further findings in due course, as appropriate.
35. In identical letters dated 27 August 2019 addressed to me and the President of
the Security Council (S/2019/688), the Permanent Representative oflsrael informed
me that, on 24 August 2019, Israel had thwarted "the threat of launching [ of] armed
drones" from the Quds Force and Shiite militia site in Aqrabah, south-west of
Damascus. According to the Permanent Representative oflsrael, prior to this, "Iranian
Quds Force operators had arrived in Syria via Damascus International Airport
equipped with drones and explosives". In identical letters dated 6 September 2019
addressed to me and the President of the Security Council ( S/2019/714), the
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic oflran rejected "all claims raised"
in the aforementioned letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel.
36. My earlier reports referred to the remnants of two unmanned aerial vehicles that
were recovered in Yemen and assessed by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates
to be of Iranian origin (see S/2018/1089, para. 23, and S/2019/492, para. 29). In
September 2019, the Secretariat was invited by the United Arab Emirates to examine
the engines of the two unmanned aerial vehicles. The Secretariat ascertained that both
engines were exported from the State of manufacture to another Member State, and
subsequently re-exported to the Islamic Republic oflran in July 2015. The Secretariat,
as yet, has no indication as to whether these engines were transferred from the Islamic
Republic oflran in a manner and at a time inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).
3 7. In identical letters dated 19 November 2019 addressed to me and the President
of the Security Council (S/2019/895), the Permanent Representative oflsrael stated
that the Islamic Republic of Iran had transferred the Sadad-103 electro-optic
surveillance system to the Iraqi military and that this transfer most probably
constituted a violation of arms transfer restrictions. Photographs published by an Iraqi
media outlet show that a new thermal security camera system deployed in the Najaf
province in November 2017 12 has some external design features similar to those of
the Iranian Sadad-103 monitoring system. 13 The Permanent Representative of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, in identical letters dated 26 November 2019 addressed to
me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/907), "strongly rejected" the
information contained in the aforementioned letters from the Permanent
Representative of Israel.
VI. Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze provisions
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38. During the reporting period, information surfaced regarding additional travel by
Major General Soleimani. According to Iraqi media outlets, he travelled a number of
11 Likewise, any such transfer from the Islamic Republic oflran after 16 January 2016 would also
be relevant to the implementation of paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
12 See, for example, pictures published by the Iraqi Alforat News Agency on 14 November 2017,
available at https://alforatnews.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid= 154080.
13 Catalogue of the Export Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Available at http://www.mindexcenter.ir/frontpage.
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times to Baghdad in October 2019. The Secretariat has sought clarification from the
Permanent Mission of Iraq, and I will report to the Council in due course.
39. The Secretariat is aware of information released by an academic organization
indicating that, in 2017, it had signed a memorandum of understanding with an entity
that is on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). The memorandum
of understanding establishes a framework for academic cooperation and joint
activities, but leaves the details of financial arrangements to future, separate
agreements. The Secretariat has written to the Member State concerned to seek
clarification and will provide an update to the Security Council in due course, as
appropriate. The Secretariat is also aware of several cooperation agreements in the
construction sector involving entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution
2231 (2015). The Secretariat has requested clarification from the relevant Member
States and will report to the Council in due course, as appropriate.
VII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
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40. During the reporting period, the Security Council Affairs Division of the
Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs continued to support the work of
the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation
ofresolution 2231 (2015). The Division also continued to liaise with the Procurement
Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement
channel. In addition, the Division provided induction briefings for the incoming
members of the Security Council to assist them in their work on the implementation
of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division continued to respond to queries from Member
States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the provisions of
resolution 2231 (2015).
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ANNEX273

United Nations
(;-~ Security Council
I· lJ ~ di
Dis tr.: General
11 June 2020
~ Original: English
Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
Ninth report of the Secretary-General
I. Introduction
1. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, concluded on 14 July 2015, was the
result of 12 years of intense diplomacy and dialogue. The Plan was subsequently
endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2231 (2015) , in which the Council
called upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations
to support the implementation thereof. Since then, the international community has
expressed strong support for the Plan. The Plan is a testament to the efficacy of
multilateralism and is a success in nuclear non-proliferation. It remains the best way
to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and secure tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people. It is
essential that the Plan continue to work for all its participants, and that issues not
directly related to the Plan be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement
and its accomplishments.
2. I regret the withdrawal of the United States of America from the Plan in May
2018, as well as the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran since July 2019 to
cease performing its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. I remain concerned
that these actions by the United States and the Islamic Republic oflran do not advance
the goals set out in the Plan and in resolution 2231 (2015) . I call upon all Member
States to avoid provocative rhetoric and actions that may have a further negative
impact on regional stability.
3. Since May 2018, the United States has reimposed all of its national sanctions
that had been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan and has continued to implement
its decision not to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic
Republic oflran and not to fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects
in the framework of the Plan. These actions continue to be contrary to the goals set
out in the Plan and in resolution 2231 (2015) and may also impede the ability of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to implement certain provisions of the Plan and of the
resolution. I note the most recent concerns expressed in the letter dated 8 May 2020
from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United
Nations addressed to me (A/74/850-S/2020/380), and the concerns contained in the
letter dated 27 May 2020 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation to the United Nations addressed to me and to the President of the Security
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Council (S/2020/451 ), as well as the concerns expressed in the letter dated 8 June
2020 from the Permanent Representative of China addressed to me and to the
President of the Security Council (S/2020/517).
4. Since July 2019, the Islamic Republic oflran has taken a series of steps to cease
performing its nuclear commitments under the Plan. These steps have been
undertaken under the monitoring and verification by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) (see also para. 7 below). On 5 January 2020, the Islamic Republic of
Iran announced 1 that it had taken its fifth and final step to "withdraw from its last
operational limitation within the (JCPOA) scope, in other words, the limitations on
the centrifuges numbers". It was further indicated in the statement that "from now on,
the Iran nuclear program will merely progress according to its technical
requirements", but that "Iran cooperation with IAEA will continue as in the past. In
case of the imposed sanctions resolving and Iran's subsequent benefiting from the
(JCPOA) concerned privileges, then the country is ready to assume its admitted
commitments". I note that the Islamic Republic of Iran has stated that it wants to
remain in the Plan and has emphasized that all of its measures since 1 July 2019 are
reversible. I appeal again to the Islamic Republic of Iran to return to full
implementation of the Plan. I also urge the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully take
into account and urgently address the other concerns raised by other participants in
the Plan and by Member States in relation to resolution 2231 (2015).
5. On 6 January 2020, France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland jointly issued a statement in which they called upon the Islamic
Republic of Iran to reverse all measures inconsistent with the Plan. On 14 January,
the three countries announced that they had referred the matter to the Joint
Commission under the dispute resolution mechanism, as set out in paragraph 36 of
the Plan. During the meeting of the Joint Commission, held in Vienna on 26 February,
to address both the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran in terms of nuclear
commitments under the Plan and long-standing concerns regarding the impact of the
withdrawal of the United States from the Plan and the reimposition of its national
sanctions, all participants reaffirmed the importance of preserving the Plan as a "key
element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture". I urge them to resolve
all differences within the dispute resolution mechanism under the Plan.
6. I am encouraged by the positive developments in the Instrument in Support of
Trade Exchanges, which started to process its first transactions. It is important that
initiatives in support of trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic of
Iran continue and be given full effect as a matter of urgency, especially during the
current economic and health challenges posed by the coronavirus disease (COVID-
19) pandemic. I also stress the important contribution of other Member States to
preserving the Plan and continue to encourage them to work effectively with the
participants in the Plan towards creating the conditions necessary for their economic
operators to engage in trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran in accordance with
resolution 2231 (2015).
7. The International Atomic Energy Agency plays an important role in supporting
the full implementation of the Plan. Reports on its verification and monitoring
activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in line with resolution 2231 (2015), provide
transparency and are important confidence-building measures. Since 1 July 2019, the
Agency confirmed the activities announced and undertaken by the Islamic Republic
of Iran to cease performing its commitments under the Plan. In its two most recent
reports (see S/2020/307 and S/2020/548), the Agency reported that it continued to
1 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, "I.R. of Iran's fifth step statement on JCPOA commitments
reduction", 6 January 2020, available at https://aeoi.org.ir/EN/portal/home/?news/45799/69280/
295927 /i.r.-of-iran-s-fifth-step-statement-on-jcpoa-commitments-reduction.
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verify the non-diversion of nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations
outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, as declared by the
Islamic Republic of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. The Agency also reported
that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional
Protocol pending its entry into force, and that it continued to evaluate the declarations
made by the Islamic Republic oflran under the Additional Protocol. I commend IAEA
for its impartial, factual and professional work.
8. The present report, my ninth on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015),
provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings
and recommendations, since the issuance of my eighth report ( S/2019/934 and
S/2019/934/Corr.1 ) on 10 December 2019. Consistent with previous reports, the focus
of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution 2231
(2015), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic
missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of
Iran, as well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.
II. Key findings and recommendations
9. Since 10 December 2019, four new proposals have been submitted to the
Security Council for approval through the procurement channel. The procurement
channel continues to be a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism,
providing assurances that the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods
and related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran is consistent with resolution 2231
(2015), as well as the provisions and objectives of the Plan. I continue to encourage
all participants in the Plan, Member States and the private sector to fully support and
utilize the channel.
10. The United States announced on 27 May 2020 that participation in additional
activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), namely the
modernization of the Arak reactor, might now be exposed to its national sanctions. I
wish to reiterate that the exemptions set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to the resolution
are designed to provide for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods
and technology required for the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran
under the Plan.
11. Several of the items in the two seizures of arms and related materiel by the
United States, in November 2019 and February 2020, have been assessed by the
Secretariat as follows: (a) they were of Iranian origin ( container launch units of the
anti-tank guided missiles with production dates in 2016, 2017 and 2018); (b) they had
been delivered to the Islamic Republic oflran (15 POSP-type optical weapon sights)
between February 2016 and April 2018; (c) they had design characteristics (such as
thermal optical weapon sights) similar to those also produced by a commercial entity
in the Islamic Republic of Iran; or ( d) they bore Farsi markings ( on a keyboard of a
computer terminal associated with the anti-ship missile, the relay box tester of an
unidentified missile, as well as the navigation antenna and navigation module of the
cruise missile). The items may have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with
resolution 2231 (2015).
12. The Secretariat observed that some items in the two seizures by the United
States were identical or similar to those found in the debris of the cruise missiles and
the delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2019
(see S/2019/934, paras. 27-34).
13. The Secretariat assessed that the examined cruise missiles and/or parts thereof
used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia and those seized by the United States were of
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Iranian origin. Components of the fuel-feed system of the examined cruise missiles
used in the attacks were exported to the Islamic Republic oflran in March 2018. The
sections of the cruise missiles recovered after the attacks and the sections seized by
the United States in November 2019 form part of the same missile system, and it is
highly likely that they were produced by the same entity. The cruise missile jet
engines recovered after the attacks, as well as those seized in November by the United
States, are similar to an Iranian jet engine exhibited by the Islamic Republic of Iran
on 21 August 2016. The control mechanism and some of the electronics of the
examined debris, as well as the navigation module and some of the electronics of the
cruise missile seized in November, show similarities to those of the Iranian shortrange
ballistic missile "Labbayk-1", as displayed in October 2019 in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
14. The Secretariat assessed that the examined delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles
and/or parts thereof used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia were of Iranian origin. The
engines found in the uncrewed aerial vehicles show similarities to an Iranian engine
designated as "Shahed 783", presented by the Islamic Republic of Iran at a military
exhibition held in May 2014. The gyroscopes and some of the engines recovered from
among the debris are similar to the gyroscope and the engine seen in an Iranian
uncrewed aerial vehicle reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016. In addition, one
of the ignition coils recovered from among the debris of the attacks was exported to
the Islamic Republic oflran in 2016.
III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
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15. Since 10 December 2019, four new proposals to participate in or permit the
activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been
submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement channel. Of
the 48 proposals received from 16 January 2016 to 11 June 2020, 33 were approved
by the Council, five were not approved, nine were withdrawn by the proposing States
and one is currently under review. It is vital that the procurement channel continue to
work effectively and efficiently, and in a manner that promotes increased international
engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
16. In addition, the Security Council received six new notifications pursuant to
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities
consistent with the Plan that do not require approval, but do require a notification to
the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. As previously reported,
in May and November 2019, the United States announced that involvement in some
of the above-mentioned activities might now be exposed to its national sanctions,
specifically assistance to expand the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant beyond the
existing reactor unit, any involvement in transferring enriched uranium out of the
Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium, and the modification of
infrastructure at the Fordow facility. 2 On 27 May, the United States further announced
that participation in activities related to the modernization of the Arak reactor would
also be exposed to its national sanctions after a 60-day period for companies to wind
down their activities. 3 At the same time, the United States announced its intention to
issue a 90-day extension of the waiver covering activities related to the existing unit
2 United States Department of State, "Advancing the Maximum Pressure Campaign by Restricting
Iran's Nuclear Activities", Fact sheet, 3 May 2019, available at www.state.gov/advancing-themaximum-
pressure-campaign-by-restricting-irans-nuclear-activities/; and "Secretary Michael R.
Pompeo Remarks to the Press" on 18 November 2019, available at www.state.gov/secretarymichael-
r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press/.
3 "Keeping the World Safe from Iran's Nuclear Program", Press statement, 27 May 2020, available
at www.state.gov/keeping-the-world-safe-from-irans-nuclear-program/.
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at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, while noting that the waiver could be modified
at any time.
IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic
Republic of Iran
17. In letters addressed to me and the President of the Security Council from the
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, dated
20 February 2020 (S/2020/138) and 20 May 2020 (S/2020/428), from the Permanent
Representative of Israel to the United Nations, dated 8 May 2020 ( S/2020/382) and
from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to
the United Nations, dated 3 June 2020 (S/2020/400), I was informed about the
launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran of a Simorgh space launch vehicle on
9 February 2020 and of a Qased space launch vehicle on 22 April 2020. These
Member States mentioned that both space launch vehicles incorporate virtually
identical technologies to those used in ballistic missiles designed to be capable of
carrying nuclear weapons, the latter classified by the Permanent Representatives of
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States as Missile Technology
Control Regime category-I systems.4 These Member States reiterated that the
Council, in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), called upon the Islamic
Republic of Iran not to undertake launches using such ballistic missile technology.
The involvement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the 22 April launch
was also noted as a point of concern.
18. In a letter dated 16 March 2020 addressed to me (A/74/752- S/2020/212), the
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations reiterated
the position of his country regarding the implementation of paragraph 3 of annex B
to resolution 2231 (2015). He underscored that the Islamic Republic oflran was not
prohibited by multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms or resolution 2231 (2015)
from developing missile and space programmes. He stated that the Russian Federation
continued to consider that the Islamic Republic of Iran "is respecting in good faith
the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) to refrain
from activities related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of carrying
nuclear weapons". In a letter dated 28 May 2020 addressed to me and the President
of the Security Council (S/2020/454), the Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran is "fully entitled to the advantages
of space science and technology" as "none of the existing international instruments
and mechanisms, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
and Missile Technology Control Regime, either directly or implicitly, prohibit Iran to
peacefully explore space for the purposes of development". In a letter dated 9 June
2020 (S/2020/522) addressed to me and to the President of the Security Council, the
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation reiterated that the Islamic
Republic of Iran "is fully entitled to the advantages of space science and technology"
and that none of the international instruments or mechanisms "directly or implicitly
prohibit Iran from developing missile and space programmes". He further stated that
applying "the Missile Technology Control Regime category-I systems criteria" would
effectively "prohibit any non-State actor, including private entities, from
manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using
4 Category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime are defined as "complete
rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) capable
of delivering at least a 500 kg 'payload' to a 'range' of at least 300 km" (see l.A.1 of the
Equipment, Software and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime).
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any space launch vehicles" "regardless of claimed intent", affecting private-public
partnerships in the area of space exploration. Noting that all provisions of resolution
1929 (2010) had been terminated, including the provision that "prohibited Iran from
undertaking 'any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear
weapons"', the Permanent Representative stated that concluding that "the Qased
'shares these inherent design features thereby making it nuclear-capable"' was a
"deliberate fallacy".
19. In a letter dated 26 May 2020 addressed to me and the President of the Security
Council (S/2020/443), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the United Nations "categorically rejected" all the allegations made by the United
States and Israel regarding their launches of space launch vehicles on 9 February and
22 April 2020. The Permanent Representative stated that paragraph 3 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015) does not concern the space launch vehicles as "there is no
explicit reference to 'space launch vehicles"', and that "space launch vehicles do not
incorporate technologies identical to 'ballistic missiles designed to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons"'. Moreover, "space launch vehicles, which are
exclusively designed to place satellites into orbit, are not 'designed to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons' and [ ... ] 'space launch vehicles are not capable of
delivering nuclear weapons"'. The Permanent Representative also noted that the
addition of the phrase "designed to be" to the wording "capable of delivering nuclear
weapons" was "a deliberate modification following lengthy negotiations in order to
exclude Iran's defensive missile programme that is 'designed' to be exclusively
capable of delivering conventional warheads". The Permanent Representative
re-iterated that "there is no implicit or explicit reference" in paragraph 3 of annex B
to resolution 2231 (2015) "to the Missile Technology Control Regime itself or to its
definitions." In a letter dated 8 June 2020 addressed to me and the President of the
Security Council (S/2020/513), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic
of Iran reiterated the previously raised points, including that the Iranian missile
programme "falls outside of the purview or competence of the Security Council
resolution and its annexes". The Permanent Representative said that those who had
cited "the name of certain places in Iran, referring to the launch of the space launch
vehicle by Iran from a 'mobile launch pad', as well as mentioning the name of the
organization involved in the development and launch of the space launch vehicle
concerned" were to "make their own arbitrary conclusions". Finally, the Permanent
Representative underscored that "activities related to ballistic missiles and space
launch vehicles" were within "inherent rights under international law" and
highlighted "the right to the peaceful use of outer space, and its space programme".
20. The Security Council discussed the launch of the Qased space launch vehicle on
13 May 2020. There was no consensus among Council members on how that launch
related to resolution 2231 (2015).
B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with
the Islamic Republic of Iran
21. In a letter dated 31 March 2020 addressed to the President of the Security
Council (S/2020/257), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United
Nations reported that on 28 March 2020, "Iran-backed Houthi militia" launched two
ballistic missiles towards civilians and civilian objects in Saudi Arabia. The
Secretariat received from the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia photographs of the
debris of the two ballistic missiles launched at Jazan and Riyadh on 28 March 2020.
The photographs of the debris from the launch at Riyadh showed parts of a liquidpropellant
ballistic missile that had similarities with the Borkan-3 ballistic missile,
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the first launch of which the Hou this announced on 2 August 2019. 5 In their letter
dated 21 November 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/911 ), the Permanent
Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the United Nations
stated that the Borkan-3 was "clearly an adaptation of earlier Borkan-2H missiles"
with similar features to the Iranian Qiam-1 missile. In a letter dated 3 June 2020, the
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic oflran to the United Nations stated
that the above-mentioned information was "baseless allegations and disinformation",
which he rejected "unequivocally". The Secretariat will continue its analysis of this
issue and I intend to report to the Council in due course, as appropriate.
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
Arms and related materiel seized by the United States, 25 November 2019
22. In December 2019, at the invitation of the United States, the Secretariat
examined arms and related materiel which the United States indicated were seized on
25 November 2019 in "international waters (seaward of the territorial sea of Yemen
and any other State)" and assessed to be "evidently of Iranian origin" ( S/2020/322).
The arms and related materiel shown to the Secretariat consisted of:
• Two portable surface-to-air missiles ( one fully assembled, the other partly
disassembled)
• Sections and components of a cruise missile
• Sections of two types of anti-ship cruise missiles and items (assessed by the
United States to be) associated with these anti-ship cruise missiles
• 21 anti-tank guided missiles
• Three thermal optical weapon sights with accessories
• Components of uncrewed aerial vehicles
• Components (assessed by the United States to be) used in the assembly of
uncrewed surface vessels
• More than 80 boxes of non-electric detonators
Analysis of arms and related materiel seized on 25 November 2019
23. The Secretariat observed that the disassembled surface-to-air missile was fitted
with a digital air data computer identical to those found among the debris of the deltawing
uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the attacks on the Saudi oil facilities in Afif in
May 2019 andAbqaiq in September 2019 (S/2019/934, para. 33). This disassembled
missile was also equipped with a "Model Vl0" vertical gyroscope (manufacturer
unknown). A "Model V9" (manufacturer unknown) of that same vertical gyroscope
had been observed in an Iranian uncrewed aerial vehicle, reportedly recovered in
Afghanistan in 2016 (S/2019/492, para. 29) as well as among the debris of the deltawing
uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the aforementioned attacks on Saudi Arabia
(S/2019/934, para. 33).
24. Based on the Secretariat's analysis, the sections and components of the cruise
missile seized by the United States form the front section of the cruise missile used
in the attacks on Saudi Arabia (S/2019/934, para. 31) at Abha International Airport in
June and August 2019, and inAbqaiq and Khurays in September 2019. The debris of
5 See "Unveiling of Ansar Allah's new long-range missile 'Borkan 3 "', Islamic World News,
2 August 2019, available at https://english.iswnews.com/6561/images-unveiling-of-ansar-allahsnew-
long-range-missile-borkan-3/.
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the rear section of this cruise missile was examined by the Secretariat in 2019 in Saudi
Arabia. These front and rear sections are identical in structure, material and assembly,
in addition to having identical reference numbers and project labels. Other seized
parts of this cruise missile (the control surfaces and the section fitted with a jet engine)
are also identical to the corresponding parts of this same type of cruise missile used
in the aforementioned attacks on Saudi Arabia. The jet engine is also similar
(dimensions, design characteristics and configuration) to an Iranian jet engine
exhibited in the Islamic Republic of Iran on 21 August 2016. 6 The Secretariat further
observed that the digital air data computer in a section of the seized cruise missile is
identical to those found among the debris of the delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles
(S/2019/934, para. 33) and also to that in the surface-to-air missile detailed in
paragraph 23 above. In addition, Farsi markings were observed on a quality control
sticker on the navigation antenna and on two navigation modules of the seized cruise
missile.
25. In relation to the seized anti-ship missiles and associated items, the Secretariat
noted that one of the items (a computer terminal) included a keyboard modified with
Farsi markings. In terms of the 21 anti-tank guided missiles (one of which was a
training unit), the container launch units of the missiles had characteristics consistent
with those of the Iranian-produced Dehlavieh anti-tank guided missile (see
S/2018/1089 and S/2018/1089/Corr.1 , para. 24). Twenty of the container launch units
had 201 7 and 2018 production dates ( the training unit did not reflect a production
date). The thermal optical weapon sights (one marked as RU90/120G and two units
marked as RU60G) had 2017 production dates on their rechargeable batteries, and
had design characteristics similar to thermal optical weapon sights also produced by
a commercial entity in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Arms and related materiel seized by the United States, 9 February 2020
26. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic oflran informed the Secretariat
that the "allegedly seized anti-tank guided missiles and thermal optical weapon sights
do not conform to the products manufactured by the Islamic Republic oflran".
27. In February 2020, at the invitation of the United States, the Secretariat examined
arms and related materiel which the United States indicated were seized on 9 February
2020 in "international waters (seaward of the territorial sea of Yemen and any other
State)" and assessed to be "evidently of Iranian origin" ( S/2020/322). The arms and
related materiel shown to the Secretariat consisted of:
• Three portable surface-to-air missiles
• 150 anti-tank guided missiles
• 17 thermal optical weapon sights with accessories
• 15 optical weapon sights
• Ground support and test systems of an unidentified missile
• Items (assessed by the United States to be) associated with an anti-ship cruise
missile and components of uncrewed surface vessels
Analysis of arms and related materiel seized on 9 February 2020
28. The anti-tank guided missiles examined by the Secretariat (90 of the 150) had
container launch units with characteristics consistent with those of the Iranian-
6 "President of the Republic inspects the aircraft capacities of the Ministry of Defence" ('.1;..l jl./
u•:!:U u_)_¼A;I,, jl u4-...ll.o.ll~ u)jJ t\J..i _;..l •jJ.:>. u-:1IJA'), Official website of the President of the
Islamic Republic oflran, 21 August 2016, available at http://president.ir/fa/94798 .
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produced Dehlavieh anti-tank guided missile and had 2016, 2017 and 2018 production
dates. The 17 thermal optical weapon sights ( one marked as RU90/120G and 16 units
marked as RU60G) had 2017 production dates on their rechargeable batteries and had
design characteristics similar to thermal optical weapon sights also produced by a
commercial entity in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
29. The Secretariat was able to confirm, with the assistance of the manufacturing
State, that the serial numbers of the 15 POSP-type optical weapon sights (ten 4x24
models and five 8x42 models) matched those delivered to the Islamic Republic of
Iran between February 2016 and April 2018. The State of manufacture informed the
Secretariat that the importer of the 4x24-model sights was the "State Purchasing
Organization of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Support of Iran", while
the importer of the 8x42-model sights was a commercial entity located in Tehran. This
same commercial entity was previously identified as the importer of the semi-knockdown
kits for PGO-7V-type optical sights, seized in Aden in December 2018, for the
end user listed as "Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Iran" in 2016
(S/2019/934, para. 26). In addition, the Secretariat examined a flight computer tester,
a relay box tester and a missile simulator of an unidentified missile and observed that
the relay box tester contained an electronic component with an inspection sticker in
Farsi from the Iranian "Ministry oflndustry, Mining and Trade".
30. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran shared information with
the Secretariat relating to the anti-tank guided missiles and thermal optical weapon
sights (see para. 26 above), and noted that "similar optical sights ... claimed to be
exported to Iran and later seized in Aden, were examined ... and it was verified that
the imported optical sights -- distributed to different military units -- are still in use".
31. In a letter dated 22 May 2020 addressed to me and the President of the Security
Council (S/2020/434), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic oflran
to the United Nations indicated that "it has not been the policy of Iran to export
weapons in violation of relevant arms embargoes of the Security Council" and that it
will "continue to actively cooperate with the United Nations in that regard". The
Permanent Representative referred to "false assumptions and distorted speculations
regarding the characteristics and markings of Iranian weapons" which "clearly
indicate how unreliable the relevant information is and how incredible the relevant
assessments are". He also stressed that "Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) does
not prohibit the transfer of arms from Iran" and that "the temporary arrangements in
paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to that resolution were set only to authorize, on a case-bycase
basis, the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from Iran".
Updates on 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia
32. Since the publication of my eighth report (S/2019/934, paras. 27-34), the
Secretariat has continued its analysis of the debris of the cruise missiles and deltawing
uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the attacks on Saudi oil facilities in Afif (May
2019), in Abqaiq and Khurays (September 2019), and in the attacks on the Abha
International Airport in south-western Saudi Arabia (June and August 2019).
33. On the cruise missiles used in the attacks, the Secretariat:
(a) Identified the manufacturer of two fuel pressure sensors ( of the fuel-feed
system) of these missiles, who indicated that these subcomponents were exported to
its distributor in the Islamic Republic oflran in March 2018;
(b) Ascertained that the jet engines of these cruise missiles (seen in both the
debris from the attacks as well as the arms and related materiel seized by the United
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States in November 2019)7 are similar ( dimensions, design characteristics and
configuration) to an Iranian jet engine exhibited by the Islamic Republic of Iran on
21 August 2016; 8
(c) Observed that the control mechanism, the navigation module (also
observed in the arms and related materiel seized by the United States in November
2019) and some of the electronics of the cruise missile show similarities (markings,
dimensions, configuration) to those of the Iranian short-range ballistic missile
"Labbayk-1", as displayed in October 2019 in the Islamic Republic oflran; 9
(d) Noted that the debris of the cruise missiles recovered from the attacks and
the sections and components of the cruise missiles seized by the United States in
November 2019, form part of the same missile system (see para. 24 above), and were
highly likely made by the same entity - based on identical structure, material and
assembly, in addition to having identical reference numbers and project labels.
34. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic oflran informed the Secretariat
that "the concerned pressure transmitter is not a dual-use item to be monitored by the
government".
35. Taking into consideration the above findings (and the information provided to
the Security Council in S/2019/492, para. 31 ), the Secretariat assessed that the cruise
missiles and/or parts thereof used in the four attacks were oflranian origin.
36. In terms of the delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the attacks on Saudi
oil facilities in May and September 2019, the Secretariat:
(a) Observed that some of the engines found on these uncrewed aerial vehicles
show similarities ( design characteristics, dimensions and configuration) to an Iranian
engine designated as "Shahed-783", presented by the Islamic Republic of Iran in a
military exhibition in May 2014; 10
(b) Identified that the ignition coils of the engines recovered from among the
debris are the same type of ignition coil observed in a similar engine of an Iranian
uncrewed aerial vehicle, reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016 (S/2019/492,
para. 29);
( c) Confirmed that one of the ignition coils recovered from among the debris
of the uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the May 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia was
exported to the Islamic Republic oflran in 2016.
37. Taking into consideration the above findings (and the information provided to
the Security Council in S/2019/492, para. 33), the Secretariat assessed that the
uncrewed aerial vehicles and/or parts thereof used in the two attacks were oflranian
origin.
7 The Secretariat has identified the manufacturer of some components of the jet engines. The
manufacturer informed the Secretariat that it had only produced these components but not the jet
engines, and that these components were exported as part of similar jet engines to a Member
State in 2010 and 2011 (S/2019/934, para. 31).
8 "President of the Republic inspects the aircraft capacities of the Ministry of Defence" ('~..lJ\-!
U"±!.J (S.J~ jl 1..54-:l.l.l...llji w_jlj_, tl!..i .J..l •jy. c.r-1.JA'), Official website of the President of the
Islamic Republic oflran, 21 August 2016, available at http://president.ir/fa/94798 .
9 "Iran's army unveils new military gear", Tasnim News Agency, 3 October 2019, available at
www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2019/10/03/2110500/iran-s-army-unveils-new-m….
10 "Preparations for an exhibition of the achievements of the Aerospace Force of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps" ('wl~ .~w 1..5\.\..i.J_,l:l....i (SJ.Ji' 1..51.....:.!l_y\ _;;_,t.......::, + ul).l..½ •~ '),
Young Journalists Club, 12 May 2014, available at www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4836689/-wl~
_;;_,l.......:i-u I .J l.l..½-•~-1..5 l........91 y\-(S J.J:!,i-1..51.A. ..i .J_,1.:l.....i-o~W.
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Other notifications by Member States
38. In his letter dated 8 May 2020 (S/2020/382), the Permanent Representative of
Israel noted the existence of imagery of four Iranian Dehlavieh anti-tank guided
missiles being employed in Libya. In response, in a letter dated 26 May 2020
(S/2020/443), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
"categorically rejected" the "so-called violation" ofresolution 2231 (2015) as "totally
baseless". The Secretariat is still in the process of reviewing the information in
connection to this report and I will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate.
39. In a letter dated 17 March 2020 addressed to the President of the Security
Council (S/2020/217), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia shared
information regarding the "Houthi militia backed by Iran" and "an attempted terrorist
attack that was planned to target an oil tanker[ ... ] south-east of the Yemeni port of
Nishtun" on 3 March 2020. In a letter dated 3 June 2020, the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the abovementioned
information was "baseless allegations and disinformation", which he rejected
"unequivocally". The Secretariat has contacted Saudi authorities for further details
and I will report back in due course, as appropriate.
40. On 19 May 2020, the Australian authorities provided to the Secretariat relevant
information pertaining to the seizure in June 2019 of arms and related materiel. 11 The
authorities informed the Secretariat that while on operations in the Middle East
region, the HMAS Ballarat, an Australian vessel, boarded a dhow in international
waters off the Gulf of Oman, about 150 km south-east of Muscat. The materiel seized
onboard included "approximately 476,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, and 697
bags of chemical fertiliser". The crew of the dhow had Iranian passports and
identification cards and claimed to have sailed on 19 June 2019 from Bandar Abbas
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, en route to Somalia and Yemen. A crew member also
claimed that the materiel had been delivered to the dhow by Iranian military
personnel. The Secretariat is reviewing the information provided and I will report
back to the Security Council, as appropriate.
VI. Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze provisions
41. In a letter dated 3 January 2020 addressed to me and the President of the Security
Council (S/2020/13 ), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
referred to the "assassination of Major General Qasem Soleimani, the Commander of
the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps[ ... ] on 3 January 2020 at
Baghdad International Airport". Major General Soleimani is on the list maintained
pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015); no travel exemption requests were received or
granted by the Security Council in relation to this travel undertaken by Major General
Soleimani to Iraq.
42. In my most recent report, I shared information about an academic organization
in a Member State which, in 2017, signed a memorandum of understanding with an
entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). In response to the
Secretariat's request for clarification, the concerned Member State explained that the
signed memorandum of understanding is not legally binding and does not involve any
financial commitment. During the reporting period, the Secretariat received new
information indicating that additional memorandums of understanding were signed
with the same entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) and has
11 "HMAS Ballarat conducts boarding", 28 June 2019, Australian Government Department of
Defence, available at https:/ /news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/hmas-ballarat-conductsboarding.
S/2020/531
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reached out to the Member State for clarification; I will report back to the Council in
due course.
43. In my most recent report, I informed the Council that the Secretariat was aware
of several cooperation agreements in the construction sector between companies in
several Member States and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231
(2015) (S/2019/934, para. 39). A Member State informed the Secretariat that it had
conducted an investigation of the concerned company in its territory and concluded
that, since 16 January 2016, the company has not engaged with any entities on the list
maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) . I will report back if further updates
become available from other relevant Member States.
44. I previously reported to the Council regarding an entity on the list maintained
pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters,
which signed a memorandum of understanding with an entity in the Syrian Arab
Republic in 2017 (S/2018/602, para. 47). Local media reports from 2019 12 indicate
that the Ministry of Transport of the Syrian Arab Republic conducted a study for a
project related to the establishment of a port in Tartus Governate and held several
meetings with Khatam al-Anbiya for this purpose. Another media report also
described that there are several bids from foreign companies, the most important of
which is a bid from the Iranian Khatam al-Anbiya company. 13 The Secretariat sought
further clarification from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic. I intend
to report back to the Council, as appropriate.
45. The United States informed the Secretariat of a possible financial transaction
involving a subsidiary of an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231
(2015), which occurred in 2018. The Secretariat is reviewing the information
provided and will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate.
VII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
46. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and
Peacebuilding Affairs has continued to support the work of the Security Council, in
close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231
(2015). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working
Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel.
During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from
Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the
provisions ofresolution 2231 (2015).
12 See "Iranian port on the Syrian Mediterranean coast", Alalam TV, 16 August 2019, available at
www.alalamtv.net/news/4381061/(,?"_)_,..ll-h.J1-J1-_;.:,,.;l1-J:,..l....-u-k-._..ll..>.ll-l.!_y, ; and "Ministry of
Transport considers establishing a multi-purpose port in Hamidiyah district" ('Ji;.ll lY".J..i:i 4-4\..ij
l.!y .i.i.u.. U""ly:-YI~~ '-;!~I '), Al-Baath, 29 August 2019, available at
http ://newspaper. albaathmedia. sy /2019/08/2 9 / Ji;.!Li.Y' _;..i:i-4-4\..ij_ \.! .JA-.l.l.u.o-U"" I y:-Y \_~/.
13 Inas Abdulkareem, "Syria will establish new sea port in South Tartous", Syria Times,
2 September 2019, available at http://syriatimes.sy/index.php/tourism/43419-syria-will-establishnew-
sea-port-in-south-tartous.
20-07491
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