INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CERTAIN IRANIAN ASSETS
(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
COUNTER-MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
October 14, 2019
ANNEXES
VOLUME I
Annexes 1 through 32
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ANNEX 6
8/20/2019 France expels Iranian diplomat over failed bomb plot: sources - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-iran-security/france-expels-i… 1/10
WORLD NEWS
OCTOBER 26, 2018 / 7:45 AM / 10 MONTHS AGO
France expels Iranian diplomat over failed bomb plot: sources
John Irish
PARIS (Reuters) - France has expelled an Iranian diplomat in response to a failed plot to carry
out a bomb attack at a rally near Paris organized by an exiled Iranian opposition group,
diplomatic and security sources say.
France’s foreign ministry said on Oct. 2 there was no doubt the Iranian intelligence ministry
had been behind the plot against the June 30 rally. It subsequently froze assets belonging to
Tehran’s intelligence services and two Iranian nationals.
About a month ago it went a step further, expelling an Iranian diplomat based in Paris, five
sources said. Two of the sources said the diplomat was an Iranian intelligence operative under
diplomatic cover.
A spokesman at the Iranian embassy in Paris did not respond when asked about the diplomat’s
expulsion. Iran has previously said it had nothing to do with the attempt to carry out a bomb
attack at the rally. One Iranian official, who declined to be identified, denied there had been
any expulsion.
French President Emmanuel Macron’s office referred all enquiries to the foreign ministry,
which said it would not comment.
The fallout from the failed plot has further strained ties between Paris and Tehran, especially
as France has been one of the strongest advocates of salvaging the nuclear deal between Iran
and world powers, which U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from in May.
Annex 6
8/20/2019 France expels Iranian diplomat over failed bomb plot: sources - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-iran-security/france-expels-i… 2/10
The initial move by France to impose asset freeze was deemed relatively symbolic since neither
diplomat targeted was based in France or had assets in the country.
French officials at the time said Paris considered the matter closed, although they were still
trying to determine how high up the hierarchy the order to carry out the attack came from.
The decision to expel a suspected intelligence operative raises attention to the issue again.
“Yes, it’s true,” one diplomat said of the expulsion, declining to give further details because of
the sensitivity of the issue.
The two sides agreed not to divulge details of the expulsion fearing it could undermine talks
between the remaining parties to the nuclear deal - France, Britain, Germany, Russia, China -
who are working on ways to continue trading with Iran, two diplomats said.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATION
Two diplomats and one Western security source said the move was directly linked to the plot,
which targeted a meeting of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).
A co-ordinated intelligence operation between French, German and Belgian services thwarted
the planned attack in the days prior to the rally which attracted many VIPs, including Trump’s
lawyer Rudy Giuliani and several former European and Arab ministers.
Belgium on Oct. 10 charged an Iranian diplomat, who was one of the two sanctioned by Paris,
and three other individuals with planning to bomb the gathering.
Any hardening of relations with France could have wider implications for Tehran as a new
round of even tougher U.S. sanctions targeting the oil sector and financial transactions come
into effect from Nov. 4.
France had warned Tehran to expect a robust response to the thwarted bomb plot. Macron and
Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian spoke to their Iranian counterparts about the issue at the
Annex 6
8/20/2019 France expels Iranian diplomat over failed bomb plot: sources - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-iran-security/france-expels-i… 3/10
U.N. General Assembly meeting after demanding explanations over Iran’s role.
An internal French foreign ministry memo in August told diplomats not to travel to Iran,
Reuters reported, citing the bomb plot and a toughening of Iran’s position toward the West.
Paris has suspended appointing a new ambassador to Iran and has not responded to Tehran’s
nomination of a new envoy in France, underscoring how sensitive the issue is.
No appointments are expected until France receives more detailed information on who was
behind the bombing attempt, two senior French diplomats said.
“We are still following up with Tehran on the Villepinte affair to draw all the necessary
consequences, but the political and diplomatic dialogue between Iran and France continues,”
said one senior French diplomat.
Additional reporting by Marine Pennetier and Emmanuel Jarry in Paris, Andrea Shalal in Berlin; Editing by
Richard Balmforth
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Annex 6
ANNEX 7
8/20/2019 Exclusive: France restricts travel by diplomats to Iran - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-iran-exclusive/exclusive-fran… 1/11
WORLD NEWS
AUGUST 28, 2018 / 9:11 AM / A YEAR AGO
Exclusive: France restricts travel by diplomats to Iran
John Irish
PARIS (Reuters) - France has told its diplomats and foreign ministry officials to postpone
indefinitely all non-essential travel to Iran, citing a foiled bomb plot and a hardening of
Tehran’s attitude towards France, according to an internal memo seen by Reuters.
Any hardening of relations with France could have wider implications for Iran. France has been
one of the strongest advocates of salvaging a 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world
powers, which U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of in May.
Annex 7
8/20/2019 Exclusive: France restricts travel by diplomats to Iran - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-iran-exclusive/exclusive-fran… 2/11
Iran’s economy has been hammered by the prospect of the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions that
had been lifted under the deal. European countries including France have pledged to try to
soften the economic blow, but have been unable so far to persuade their firms to defy
Washington and stay in Iran.
French oil and gas major Total and its carmakers PSA and Renault have led an exodus of
European companies from Iran, fearful of the extra-territorial reach of Washington’s sanctions.
The memo cites a foiled plot to bomb a rally held by an exiled Iranian opposition group near
Paris that was attended by Trump’s lawyer Rudy Giuliani as a sign of Tehran’s more aggressive
stance towards France.
“The behavior of the Iranian authorities suggests a hardening of their position vis-a-vis our
country, as well as some of our allies,” Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, the ministry’s secretary
general wrote in the notice dated Aug. 20.
“Given the known security risks ... all departmental officers, whether from headquarters or
(overseas) posts, are required to defer until further notice, except for urgent work, any travel
plans in Iran,” Gourdault-Montagne added.
The instructions were also relayed to officials in government departments outside the foreign
ministry to be passed on to staff who intended to travel to Iran, a separate memo obtained by
Reuters showed.
The French foreign ministry declined to comment on the memo or say whether embassy staff
had been asked to repatriate their families.
Iranian officials at the Embassy in Paris did not respond to a request for comment on Tuesday
but, reacting on Wednesday, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said Iran should be vigilant
against “enemies” trying to affect ties between the countries.
“The relations between Iran and Europe, especially Iran and France, have some enemies, and
we should be vigilant against their actions,” Bahram Qasemi was quoted as saying by the state
news agency IRNA. “The restriction on the French diplomats’ travel (to Iran) is not correct.”
Annex 7
8/20/2019 Exclusive: France restricts travel by diplomats to Iran - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-iran-exclusive/exclusive-fran… 3/11
France’s latest travel advisory for its citizens, published on May 10, cautions against visitors
entering Iran with electronic equipment such as drones and walkie-talkies and taking too many
photographs.
RELATIONS SOUR
The memo underscores how confidence in the Tehran government has been eroded in Paris as
relations between the two become increasingly strained, even as President Emmanuel Macron
talks up preserving the nuclear accord.
Iran has said it had nothing to do with the alleged plot to attack a National Council of
Resistance of Iran (NCRI) meeting on June 30. Germany has detained an Iranian diplomat
based in Austria. Belgium, where the plot was uncovered, has sought the diplomat’s
extradition.
French officials have not commented on the matter but diplomatic sources have said privately
that if Iran’s involvement were proven then it would be difficult for France not to react
strongly.
Since pulling out of the nuclear accord, Trump has expressed a readiness to negotiate a new
deal while warning Tehran of dire consequences “the like of which few throughout history have
suffered before” if it made threats against the United States.
It was Macron who led efforts to persuade Trump to stick with the agreement, arguing it was
the best means Western powers had to check Iran’s nuclear activities.
Rouhani on Monday urged the remaining signatories to the nuclear agreement to act to save
the pact.
Annex 7
8/20/2019 Exclusive: France restricts travel by diplomats to Iran - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-iran-exclusive/exclusive-fran… 4/11
Macron reiterated France’s commitment to maintaining the accord, but Europe’s leaders have
appeared powerless to prevent the U.S. sanctions inflicting pain on Iran’s economy.
The ministry memo said any staffer who traveled to Iran for personal reasons would not be
shielded by diplomatic immunity, even if holding a diplomatic passport. It made specific
reference to tourism and language classes.
Britain’s foreign ministry said its advice on Iran to diplomats was the same as to the British
public. It flags the risks of terrorist attacks and arbitrary detentions and advises against all
travel to the frontiers with Iraq and Afghanistan.
Reporting by John Irish; Writing by Richard Lough; Editing by Peter Graff
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
An Iranian flag flutters as worshippers attend Friday prayers in Tehran, August 2011. REUTERS/Morteza Nikoubazl
Annex 7
ANNEX 8
8/20/2019 Iranian Diplomat Extradited To Belgium To Face Charges In Bomb-Plot Case
https://www.rferl.org/a/iranian-diplomat-extradited-belgium-face-charge… 1/3
IRAN
Iranian Diplomat Extradited To Belgium To Face Charges In
Bomb-Plot Case
October 10, 2018 00:45 GMT
UPDATED October 10, 2018 15:18 GMT
By RFE/RL
An Iranian diplomat who is the suspected mastermind of an attack that allegedly was
planned on Iranians living in exile in France has been extradited from Germany to
Belgium, security ocials said.
Previously identified as Assadollah Assadi by AFP, the 46-year-old diplomat based in
Austria was arrested in the southern German state of Bavaria on July 1.
He was extradited to Belgium on October 9 after a court in Bamberg approved an
extradition request last week, police and prosecutorial ocials said.
Assadi will appear before a Belgian judge in charge of the case on October 10, the Federal
Prosecutor's Oce in Brussels told AFP. France announced last week it had frozen
Assadi's assets for six months.
Assadi is suspected of passing a device containing 500 grams of explosives to a couple
living in Belgium who allegedly planned to use the explosives to carry out the terrorist
attack.
The planned attack allegedly targeted a rally of the National Council of Resistance of Iran
in the Paris suburb of Villepinte on June 30, which was attended by some 25,000 Iranians
opposed to the government in Tehran.
The rally was also attended by leading U.S. figures, including President Donald Trump's
personal lawyer, former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and other close allies of
Trump.
Annex 8
8/20/2019 Iranian Diplomat Extradited To Belgium To Face Charges In Bomb-Plot Case
https://www.rferl.org/a/iranian-diplomat-extradited-belgium-face-charge… 2/3
A Belgian special unit stopped the couple in their car in Brussels allegedly before they
could carry out the attack. German police arrested the diplomat the next day at a highway
service station near the town of Aschaenburg.
Iran last week strongly denied French accusations that one of its diplomats was involved
in the alleged plot that took place just ahead of a visit to Europe by Iranian President
Hassan Rohani.
Iran has accused one of the opposition groups participating in the rally, the Mujahedin-e
Khalq Organization (MKO or MEK), of being a "terrorist" group and orchestrating a plot to
discredit Rohani.
"We deny the accusations and forcefully condemn the Iranian diplomat's arrest and call
for his immediate release," the Iranian Foreign Ministry said on October 2.
European police say Assadi had been accredited since 2014 to the Iranian Embassy in
Vienna, working for Iran's intelligence agency, which monitors opposition groups in the
country and abroad.
Since his diplomatic-immunity status applied only in Austria, he was arrested in Germany
on a European arrest warrant issued by Belgium.
Belgian authorities have also requested the extradition of a man identified as Merhad A.,
who was detained in Paris when the alleged plot was uncovered.
Belgian police believe Merhad A. is an accomplice of the husband-and-wife team caught
in Brussels in possession of 500 grams of the powerful explosive TATP and a detonator.
All three are Belgian nationals of Iranian origin, police said.
The U.S. State Department welcomed the extradition.
"We support our European allies in exposing and countering the threat that Iranianbacked
terrorism poses around the world," U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a
statement on October 10. "The United States will continue working with our partners and
allies to confront the threat posed by the Iranian regime."
With reporting by AFP and Reuters
Annex 8
ANNEX 9
Letter of 8 January 2019 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stef Blok, and the Minister
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Kajsa Ollongren, to the President of the House of
Representatives on sanctions against Iran on the grounds of undesirable interference
On 8 January 2019 the European Union, partly at the recommendation of the Netherlands, imposed
sanctions in the context of the EU sanctions lists (Common Position 2001/931/CFSP) on the Iranian
Ministry of Intelligence and Security and two Iranian nationals. This means that funds and other
financial assets of the Ministry and both individuals have been frozen.
On the basis of information gathered by the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and
foreign intelligence services, the Netherlands considers it probable that Iran had a hand in the
preparation or commission of assassinations and attacks on EU territory.
When the sanctions were announced today, the Netherlands, together with the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Denmark and Belgium met with the Iranian authorities to convey their serious
concerns regarding Iran’s probable involvement in these hostile acts on EU territory. Iran was
informed that involvement in such matters is entirely unacceptable and must be stopped
immediately. Iran is expected to cooperate fully in removing the present concerns and, where
necessary, in aiding criminal investigations. If such cooperation is not forthcoming, further sanctions
cannot be ruled out.
The AIVD has strong indications that Iran was involved in the assassinations of two Dutch nationals
of Iranian origin, in Almere in 2015 and in The Hague in 2017. These individuals were opponents of
the Iranian regime. In the Dutch government’s opinion, hostile acts of this kind flagrantly violate the
sovereignty of the Netherlands and are unacceptable. When confronted by the Netherlands, Iran
denied any involvement in these assassinations.
On the basis of the AIVD’s findings, the Netherlands took firm diplomatic measures in June 2018. The
Iranian ambassador was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and two members of the
Iranian embassy’s staff were expelled. These diplomats were not expelled because of any confirmed
involvement in committing or directing the assassinations, but as a clear signal that the Netherlands
regards Iran’s probable involvement in these serious cases as unacceptable.1
Following these developments, the Netherlands, together with other European countries affected by
Iranian interference – including a thwarted bomb attack in Paris and a thwarted assassination in
Denmark in 2018 – has now taken further measures against Iran with the aim of halting these Iranian
activities.
In the interests of facilitating this common EU action, confidentiality was required. This is why the
government decided not to disclose sooner the reason for expelling the two Iranian diplomats.
Criminal investigations into the above assassinations are under way in the Netherlands. The
appraisal of evidence in the context of the criminal justice system differs from the appraisal of
intelligence obtained by the intelligence services. So far, the ongoing criminal investigations have not
confirmed, in a criminal law sense, the intelligence that suggests interference by Iran.
It was emphasised at the meeting in Tehran that these measures are not linked to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal. As long as Iran
1 See also the letter to parliament on Undesirable Foreign Interference of March 2018, Parliamentary Papers,
House of Representatives 2017/18, 30 821, no. 42.
Annex 9
fulfils its obligations under the deal, the European Union will do the same. Nevertheless, Iran will be
held to account for matters that affect EU and international security interests, as is the case with the
acts described above, as well as with respect to its ballistic missile programme and the country’s role
in the region.
Annex 9
ANNEX 10
9/3/2019 E.U. Imposes Sanctions on Iran Over Assassination Plots - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/world/europe/iran-eu-sanctions.html 1/3
By Michael Schwirtz and Ronen Bergman
Jan. 8, 2019
LONDON — The European Union penalized Iran on Tuesday over allegations that the country’s intelligence service
orchestrated a series of assassination plots in Europe in recent years, including the killing of two Iranians in the
Netherlands with ties to anti-government extremist groups.
In a letter outlining its justification for sanctions, the Dutch Foreign Ministry cited “strong indications that Iran was
involved in the assassinations of two Dutch nationals of Iranian origin,” one in 2015 in the city of Almere and another
in 2017 in The Hague.
European intelligence officials have also linked the Iranian government to unsuccessful plots in Denmark and
France.
“In the Dutch government’s opinion, hostile acts of this kind flagrantly violate the sovereignty of the Netherlands
and are unacceptable,” the letter said.
The sanctions were imposed under steps devised by the European Union to combat terrorism after the Sept. 11,
2001, attacks in the United States. They involve freezing assets connected to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and
Security and two Iranian officials: Saeid Hashemi Moghadam, a senior Iranian intelligence official, and Assadollah
Asadi, an Iranian diplomat arrested in connection with a plot to bomb a rally of an Iranian opposition group in Paris
last year, according to officials familiar with the sanctions.
Iran has long been suspected of covertly carrying out violence against opponents living outside its borders. In
remarks delivered shortly after becoming secretary of state last year, Mike Pompeo accused Iran’s elite
Revolutionary Guards force of conducting “covert assassination operations in the heart of Europe.”
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But it is unusual for the 28-member European Union to confront such an issue so directly.
On Tuesday, ambassadors from Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands visited the
Iranian Foreign Ministry in Tehran “to convey their serious concerns” about Iran’s behavior, according to the Dutch
letter.
In response, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, did not deny the allegations, but accused European
countries in a Twitter post of harboring militants from the Mujahedeen Khalq, or M.E.K., a group that seeks the
violent overthrow of the Iranian government.
M.E.K., designated as a terrorist group by the United States until 2012, has been praised by John R. Bolton,
President Trump’s national security adviser, and Rudolph W. Giuliani, the president’s personal lawyer and former
New York mayor.
“Accusing Iran won’t absolve Europe of responsibility for harboring terrorists,” Mr. Zarif wrote.
E.U. Imposes Sanctions on Iran Over
Assassination Plots
Annex 10
9/3/2019 E.U. Imposes Sanctions on Iran Over Assassination Plots - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/world/europe/iran-eu-sanctions.html 2/3
The decision to impose sanctions underscores the difficult balancing act facing the European Union as it tries to
counter suspected Iranian misbehavior and preserve the Iran nuclear accord.
Under that accord, reached in 2015, Iran is supposed to receive economic incentives in exchange for verifiable
promises of peaceful nuclear work.
The Trump administration, which withdrew the United States from the accord last year and reimposed tough
sanctions on Iran, has pressured Europe to adopt a similarly hard line. The Europeans have so far resisted, vowing
to create ways for companies to circumvent American sanctions.
In its letter, the Dutch Foreign Ministry said the European Union would treat the assassination plots and the nuclear
accord as separate issues. But that position could become increasingly untenable. If Iran’s suspected misbehavior
persists, Europe could be forced to come into alignment with the United States, said Sjoerd Sjoerdsma, a Dutch
member of Parliament.
“I think ultimately that would not be a good thing,” he said, “but it’s up to Iran to make sure that that doesn’t
happen.”
The two Iranian nationals killed in the Netherlands were tied to groups accused by Iran’s government of
involvement in violence. In December 2015, the body of Ali Motamed, 56, was discovered in the street in front of his
house in Almere. He had been living in the Netherlands since the 1980s, had obtained Dutch citizenship and had
been working as an electrician.
The Dutch authorities later determined that Mr. Motamed was actually Mohammad Reza Kolahi Samadi, an M.E.K.
member sentenced by Iran to death for involvement in a 1981 bombing that killed 73 people in Tehran.
His death was followed a few years later by the fatal shooting of Ahmad Mola Nissi in The Hague. Mr. Mola Nissi
was the leader of the Arab Struggle movement for the liberation of al-Ahvaz, an armed Iranian opposition group
accused of carrying out several bombings in Iran, and an attack by gunmen on a military parade in September that
killed at least 25 people.
In response to the killings, the Dutch government expelled two Iranian diplomats in June last year.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards force last year
of conducting “covert assassination operations in the heart of Europe.”
Kevin Hagen/Getty Images
Annex 10
9/3/2019 E.U. Imposes Sanctions on Iran Over Assassination Plots - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/world/europe/iran-eu-sanctions.html 3/3
The European authorities thwarted several planned attacks on opponents of the Iranian government beginning last
summer. In June, police officials from France and Belgium disrupted a plot to bomb a rally organized by a Parisbased
group dominated by the M.E.K. The rally was attended by Mr. Giuliani and Newt Gingrich, a former House
speaker. A Belgium couple of Iranian origin were arrested in connection with the plot, along with Mr. Asadi, the
Iranian diplomat.
Mr. Asadi, based in Vienna, was an officer of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry who used the alias Daniel, said a
senior Middle Eastern intelligence official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a continuing
intelligence operation. He was detained by Germany’s antiterrorism police and extradited to Belgium.
In November, Denmark’s government accused Iran of trying to assassinate the head of the local branch of the Arab
Struggle Movement, which seeks an independent state in Iran’s oil-rich Khuzestan Province. A Norwegian man of
Iranian descent was arrested, prompting a congratulatory Twitter post from Mr. Pompeo.
The Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, provided the tip that led to the disruption of the plots, the senior
intelligence official said.
Thomas Erdbrink contributed reporting from Tehran.
A version of this article appears in print on Jan. 9, 2019, Section A, Page 4 of the New York edition with the headline: E.U. Imposes Sanctions on Iran Over Assassination Plots in 2015
and 2017
Annex 10
ANNEX 11
8/20/2019 In shift, EU sanctions Iran over planned Europe attacks - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions/in-shift-eu-sanctions… 1/5
WORLD NEWS
JANUARY 8, 2019 / 5:12 AM / 7 MONTHS AGO
In shift, EU sanctions Iran over planned Europe attacks
Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen, Robin Emmott, Anthony Deutsch
COPENHAGEN/BRUSSELS/AMSTERDAM (Reuters) - The European Union on Tuesday froze
the assets of an Iranian intelligence unit and two of its staff, as the Netherlands accused Iran of
two killings on its soil and joined France and Denmark in alleging Tehran plotted other attacks
in Europe.
FILE PHOTO: Danish Foreign Minister Anders Samuelsen speaks during a news conference in Copenhagen, Denmark,
October 30, 2018. Martin Sylvest/Ritzau Scanpix/via REUTERS
Annex 11
8/20/2019 In shift, EU sanctions Iran over planned Europe attacks - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions/in-shift-eu-sanctions… 2/5
The move, although in part symbolic since one of the men is in prison in Belgium, marks the
first time the EU has enacted sanctions on Iran since lifting a host of curbs on it three years
ago following its 2015 nuclear pact with world powers.
The decision, which includes designating the unit and the two Iranians as terrorists, follows
last year’s disclosure by Denmark and France that they suspected an Iranian government
intelligence service of pursuing assassination plots on their soil. Copenhagen sought an EUwide
response.
“EU just agreed to enact sanctions against an Iranian Intelligence Service for its assassination
plots on European soil. Strong signal from the EU that we will not accept such behavior in
Europe,” Denmark’s Foreign Minister Anders Samuelsen said on Twitter.
France, which has already hit the two men and the ministry unit with sanctions, has said there
was no doubt the Iranian intelligence ministry was behind a failed attack near Paris.
On Tuesday, the Dutch government publicly accused Iran of the plots, as well as two killings in
2015 and 2017, sending a letter to parliament to warn of further economic sanctions if Tehran
did not cooperate with European investigations.
The letter signed by the Dutch foreign and interior ministers said Britain, France, Germany,
Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium met Iranian officials to convey “their serious concerns
regarding Iran’s probable involvement in these hostile acts on EU territory.”
“Iran was informed that involvement in such matters is entirely unacceptable and must be
stopped immediately ... further sanctions cannot be ruled out,” the letter said.
Iran has denied any involvement in the alleged plots, saying the accusations were intended to
damage EU-Iran relations.
“Accusing Iran won’t absolve Europe of responsibility for harboring terrorists,” Iranian Foreign
Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said on Tuesday in a tweet.
Annex 11
8/20/2019 In shift, EU sanctions Iran over planned Europe attacks - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions/in-shift-eu-sanctions… 3/5
“Europeans, incl(uding) Denmark, Holland and France, harbor MEK,” he added, referring to
an exiled Iranian opposition group Mujaheedin-e Khalq.
Paris accused Iran of a plot to carry out a bomb attack at a rally near Paris organized by the
MEK. Denmark says it foiled a Iranian intelligence plan to assassinate an Iranian Arab
opposition figure on its soil.
On Tuesday, the Netherlands said it had “strong indications” that Iran was behind the
assassinations of two Dutch nationals of Iranian origin, in 2015 and in 2017. The latter was
dissident Iranian Arab activist Ahmad Mola Nissi who was gunned down by an unidentified
assailant in front of his home in The Hague.
Iran denies any involvement in the killings.
SANCTIONS SENSITIVE
The decision to impose the curbs was taken without debate at an unrelated meeting of Europe
ministers in Brussels and the asset freeze comes into effect on Wednesday, EU officials said.
The Danish Foreign Ministry named the two employees as the deputy minister and director
general of intelligence, Saeid Hashemi Moghadam, and a Vienna-based diplomat, Assadollah
Asadi. Their names are to appear in the EU’s Official Journal on Wednesday.
Sanctions on the intelligence ministry, which is under the control of Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, are unlikely to change what the European Union says are Iran’s destabilizing
activities in Europe and the Middle East.
The deputy minister and director general of intelligence is in Iran, while the Iranian diplomat
was charged and is being held by Belgian authorities. Neither appear to have assets in France,
which first imposed the asset freeze late last year.
Annex 11
8/20/2019 In shift, EU sanctions Iran over planned Europe attacks - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions/in-shift-eu-sanctions… 4/5
But imposing economic sanctions on Iran, once the EU’s top oil supplier, remains highly
sensitive for the bloc.
The EU has been straining to uphold the 2015 nuclear accord between Iran and world powers
that U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of in May. It has been less willing to consider
sanctions, instead seeking talks with Tehran.
Iran has warned it could ditch the nuclear deal if EU powers do not protect its trade and
financial benefits.
Reporting by Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen, Emil Gjerding Nielson in Copenhagen, John Irish in Paris, Robin
Emmott in Brussels, Anthony Deutsch in Amsterdam, Stephanie van den Berg in The Hague, Bozorgmehr
Sharafedin in London; Editing by Catherine Evans, William Maclean, Andrew Cawthorne
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif delivers his statement, during the Geneva Conference on Afghanistan, …
Annex 11
ANNEX 12
8/20/2019 Read statement by Foreign Minister Samuelsen on illegal Iranian intelligence activities in Denmark
um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=81e3e573-6f80-4bbe-910e-0d838fb1b6a1 1/4
Read statement by Foreign Minister Samuelsen on
illegal Iranian intelligence activities in Denmark
31.10.2018 11:54
Press conference about illegal Iranian intelligence activities in Denmark 30 October
2018.
CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
I have called this press conference to inform you about the steps the Government has taken and
will take in connection with the very serious matter, which the Head of the Danish Security and
Intelligence Service has disclosed today. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service assesses that
an intelligence agency of a foreign country has been planning to assassinate a person on Danish
soil. Let me be frank about this: That is completely unacceptable and extremely serious. Words can
hardly describe the gravity of the matter.
So the Danish government has now reacted, and has reacted sharply.
First of all, it is an unusual step that the government and the Danish Security and Intelligence
Service today have disclosed the matter with maximum transparency, and have made it
completely clear that the arrow is pointing at the Iranian intelligence service. We have tried as
clearly as possible to highlight what is at stake. That has already been noticed abroad.
Secondly, I have decided to recall the Danish ambassador in Teheran for consultations. Allow me
to stress that this is a very strong and very unusual diplomatic step.
ⓘ Cookies
Annex 12
8/20/2019 Read statement by Foreign Minister Samuelsen on illegal Iranian intelligence activities in Denmark
um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=81e3e573-6f80-4bbe-910e-0d838fb1b6a1 2/4
Thirdly, earlier today we summoned the Iranian ambassador to Denmark to a meeting in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the meeting it was made crystal clear that Denmark cannot under
any circumstances accept that persons connected with an Iranian intelligence agency plan an
assassination against persons in Denmark.
At the same time, regretfully, it seems that the Iranian behavior is not limited to Denmark. Several
other countries share our concern. That’s why – fourthly – Denmark has contacted a group of likeminded
countries who share our concerns. We will continue the close cooperation with these
countries and discuss common measures towards Iran.
And fifthly: When we discussed whether to introduce further sanctions against Iran in the spring, I
was in favor. So far, however, that has not gained full support among EU countries. But in light of
recent events, Denmark will now be heading efforts to have the EU discuss the need for further
sanctions against Iran once again.
Today, Iran has denied that Iran’s intelligence service could be behind the attempted
assassination in Denmark. Iran is ruled by several fractions, and it is possible that parts of the
government are unaware about the Iranian activities. But that does not change the fact that Iran
as a state is behind it. And it does not change the fact that it is completely unacceptable.
The government has been concerned about Iran for a long time: About Iran’s regional behavior.
About the country’s ballistic missiles program. And about the human rights situation in the
country. I have expressed myself publicly about this before.
What has been disclosed by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service today shows that Iran is
also behaving unacceptably on Danish soil – and that behavior needs to stop.
Tomorrow, the heads of the Middle East departments of the EU-countries will meet in Brussels. I
have asked the Danish representative account for the Danish case and make it entirely clear how
seriously we take this case in Denmark, and how utterly unacceptable the Iranian intelligence
activities in Europe are. I have also asked the Danish representative to make the Danish desire to
resume discussions about further sanctions against the Iranian regime completely clear.
Already tomorrow, I will raise the issue of Iran’s unacceptable behavior when I will be meeting my
Nordic colleagues in Oslo.
I would also like to add a comment to the information disclosed by the head of the Danish Security
and Intelligence Service made public today: Danish authorities are, naturally, paying attention to
whether members of the group ASMLA have violated the Criminal Code. For example by expressly
approving the terrorist-attack in Ahwaz. That is under investigation by the police and the Danish ⓘ Cookies
Annex 12
8/20/2019 Read statement by Foreign Minister Samuelsen on illegal Iranian intelligence activities in Denmark
um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=81e3e573-6f80-4bbe-910e-0d838fb1b6a1 3/4
Security and Intelligence Service. That cannot be allowed to take place in Denmark. In Denmark,
we condemn all kinds of terrorism – regardless of who is behind. Both the Prime Minister and I
have made ourselves quite clear on this issue before.
Over the next few days, the the government will be assessing the situation. We have already taken
the first steps today. I will not rule out that we will take more. And at this point, I will not rule out
further steps in advance.
However, we are also convinced that in handling this case, it will have the greatest impact if we
can act together with our like-minded partners in the EU.
That is why we discuss the case closely with our partners and allies, before we take new decisions
and, possibly, take additional steps.
I am grateful that we have already seen such a strong signal of support for Denmark today from
the US and UK governments among others. That means a lot for Denmark.
Finally, I would like commend the Danish Security and Intelligence Service for its work. Huge
efforts have been put into unravel this case. That makes Denmark a safer place. By the way, this
case also shows how vitally important it is for Denmark to cooperate with like-minded countries.
Not only in diplomacy, but, indeed, also among intelligence agencies.
LATEST NEWS
Comments from the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense concerning
the situation in the Strait of Hormuz
26.07.2019 14:11
David Malpass elected to become the next President of the World Bank Group
05.04.2019 18:38
Ready for a new era for development financing shaped by technology?
05.04.2019 14:50
April Fools: Denmark builds North Sea fence Brits will pay Danish minister says
01.04.2019 06:00 ⓘ Cookies
Annex 12
ANNEX 13
8/20/2019 Netherlands recalls ambassador to Iran | News | DW | 04.03.2019
https://www.dw.com/en/netherlands-recalls-ambassador-to-iran/a-47764023 1/2
NEWS
Netherlands recalls ambassador to Iran
The Dutch ambassador to Iran was recalled for consultations after diplomats at its embassy in Tehran were expelled, Foreign
Minister Stef Blok said. Two months ago Iran was accused of being behind political killings.
The Netherlands recalled its ambassador to Iran on Monday after Iran expelled two members of its diplomatic staff.
"The government has decided to recall the Dutch ambassador in Tehran for consultations," Blok said in a statement. "This decision follows the
announcement by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that two Dutch diplomats at the embassy in
Tehran have been declared persona non grata and have to leave the country."
Iran expelled the two staff members in February amid a row between the two countries about the murders of two Iranian dissidents in 2015
and 2017.
The foreign minister said Iran's move was itself a tit-for-tat response to the Netherlands' expulsion of two Iranian embassy workers in June
2018 "due to strong indications from [Dutch intelligence] that Iran has been involved in the liquidations on Dutch territory of two Dutch
people of Iranian origin."
EU sanctions
The EU last month approved sanctions against two Iranian nationals for their involvement in thwarted assassination attempts in France and
Denmark.
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Annex 13
8/20/2019 Netherlands recalls ambassador to Iran | News | DW | 04.03.2019
https://www.dw.com/en/netherlands-recalls-ambassador-to-iran/a-47764023 2/2
Date 04.03.2019
Related Subjects Iran, The Hague
Keywords Netherlands, Iran, diplomats, ambassador
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The two were Assadollah Asadi and Saeid Hashemi Moghadam. Asadi is a diplomat accredited to the Iranian embassy in Vienna who was
arrested last year and extradited to Belgium. Moghadam is a deputy chief in Iran's Ministry for Intelligence and Security.
Iran has denied any involvement in alleged plots in Europe.
Read more: EU sanctions Iran over thwarted attacks on European soil
kw/amp (AP, AFP)
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DW RECOMMENDS
EU sanctions Iran over thwarted attacks on European soil
Brussels has backed sanctions against Iran for its involvement in assassination attempts in France and Denmark. For some European governments, the
measures are long overdue. (09.01.2019)
Denmark foils 'Iranian intelligence agency' attack
Danish security officials have accused Iranian intelligence of "planning an attack on Danish soil" against Iranian Arab dissidents. Tehran has linked recent
terrorist attacks inside Iran to European-based separatists. (30.10.2018)
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Annex 13
ANNEX 14
9/5/2019 https://www.business-standard.com/article/printer-friendly-version?arti…
https://www.business-standard.com/article/printer-friendly-version?arti… 1/1
Bahrain court overturns stripping of 92 Shiites'
citizenship: judicial source
AFP | Dubai June 30, 2019 Last Updated at 17:15 IST
A Bahraini appeals court overturned a decision to strip the citizenship of 92 Shiites jailed for plotting to form an
Iran-linked "terror" group, a judicial source said Sunday.
The 92 were among 138 sentenced to prison terms and the revocation of their citizenship after being convicted
of trying to build a Bahraini version of Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Shiite militia active in Lebanon.
"The appeals court overturned the decision to strip the 92 people of their citizenship," a judicial source told AFP.
"But their prison terms remain the same," the source added.
The Court of Cassation, Bahrain's highest court, will issue a final verdict, but the timing of that decision is not
known.
In April's court ruling, the prosecutor said 69 defendants were sentenced to life in jail, 39 to 10 years, 23 to
seven years and the rest to between three and five years imprisonment.
Ninety-six of the defendants were also fined 100,000 Bahraini dinars (USD 265,000) each.
The verdict was swiftly condemned by the Bahraini opposition, while human rights group Amnesty International
decried a "mockery of justice" and "mass arbitrary denaturalisation".
The opposition Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD) said the mass sentencing was "the largest
single incident" since the Bahraini government began revoking nationalities of opponents in 2012.
Since 2012, Manama has stripped the nationalities of 990 people, including 180 this year, the institute said.
Ruled for more than two centuries by the Sunni Al-Khalifa dynasty, Bahrain is mostly Shiite Muslim, according
to unofficial estimates contested by the government.
The small Gulf state, a key US ally, has been gripped by bouts of unrest since 2011, when authorities cracked
down on Shiite-led protests demanding political reform.
Since then, hundreds of protesters have been jailed, with Bahrain claiming Iran trained and backed
demonstrators in order to topple the Manama government -- an accusation Tehran denies.
All opposition groups have been banned and disbanded.
Annex 14
ANNEX 15
9/3/2019 Bahrain arrests 116 on charges of terrorism, Iran collusion | News | DW | 03.03.2018
https://www.dw.com/en/bahrain-arrests-116-on-charges-of-terrorism-iran-… 1/2
NEWS
Bahrain arrests 116 on charges of terrorism, Iran collusion
Bahraini security forces have arrested 116 people on charges of terrorism, accusing them of being part of a network
established by Iran's Revolutionary Guard. The suspects allegedly plotted attacks on state officials.
A riot policeman in Bahrain
Bahrain authorities have busted a network "formed and supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard," the official BNA agency reported on
Saturday.
The Bahraini interior ministry said 116 people were arrested, with security forces seizing weapons and explosives in raids across the Gulf state.
The crackdown thwarted multiple terror plots, according to the report.
"The network was planning to target Bahraini officials, members of the security authorities and vital oil installations, with the objective of
disturbing public security and harming the national economy," the interior ministry said in a statement.
Read more: Bahrain top activist jailed for 5 years over tweets
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Annex 15
9/3/2019 Bahrain arrests 116 on charges of terrorism, Iran collusion | News | DW | 03.03.2018
https://www.dw.com/en/bahrain-arrests-116-on-charges-of-terrorism-iran-… 2/2
Bahrain faced mass protests in 2011
Date 03.03.2018
Related Subjects Iran, Saudi Arabia
Keywords Bahrein, Iran, Saudi Arabia, terror network
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During the raids, police seized 42 kilograms (93 pounds) of high explosives, 757 kilograms of explosive-making materials, grenades, magnetic
bombs, as well projectiles and vehicles. The authorities also discovered weapons, including pistols and several Kalashnikov rifles.
Officials claim that 48 of the 116 suspected militants received training in facilities ran by Iran's Revolutionary Guard and its allies.
A country divided
Bahrain is ruled by Sunnis despite having a Shiite-majority population. The country
holds a key strategic position Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf and serves as
the host for the US 5th fleet.
The Manama government has repeatedly accused Iran of trying to destabilize it, with
Tehran denying the charges.
Read more: Bahrain shuts down newspaper amid opposition crackdown
Oil-rich Bahrain is still struggling with the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring. During
the unrest, the country's Shiite population rallied against the Sunni-dominated
government. In response, authorities launched a massive crackdown and called Saudi
military to quash protests.
In recent years, Bahrain has faced bombings and small-scale attacks by Shiite militias. The country also launched a wave of arrests on against
dissidents as well as suspected militants, with 47 people detained on terrorism charges in January.
dj/rc (dpa, AP, AFP, Reuters)
DW RECOMMENDS
Bahrain: Top activist jailed for 5 years over tweets
Nabeel Rajab was on trial for posting tweets that were critical of the Bahraini government. He had denounced the alleged use of torture in Bahraini prisons
and abuses in Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen. (21.02.2018)
Bahrain says pipeline explosion 'terrorist sabotage' linked to Iran
The Gulf kingdom accused Tehran of being behind an oil pipeline fire that it termed a "terrorist act." Iran rejected the claims as "false talk and childish
accusations." (12.11.2017)
Bahrain shuts down independent newspaper amid opposition crackdown
The Bahraini government has shut down Al-Wasat, a prominent independent newspaper "until further notice" after the paper published a piece about
unrest in Morocco. Authorities are cracking down on dissent in the country. (04.06.2017)
Bahrain police kill protester at sit-in for Shiite cleric
Police in Bahrain have killed a protester at a sit-in to support a Shiite cleric. Witnesses say multiple people were wounded when officers shot at
demonstrators who threw stones and Molotov cocktails in response. (23.05.2017)
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Annex 15
ANNEX 16
9/3/2019 Bahrain arrests four linked to pipeline blast: ministry - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-oil-pipeline-saudi/bahrain-a… 1/2
WORLD NEWS
FEBRUARY 7, 2018 / 11:24 AM / 2 YEARS AGO
Bahrain arrests four linked to pipeline blast: ministry
DUBAI (Reuters) - Bahraini authorities have arrested four members of cell behind a bomb
attack on an oil pipeline, the interior ministry said on Wednesday, adding two of the group had
been trained in Iran, an adversary of the Gulf Arab state.
Iran denies any role in Bahrain’s unrest.
The explosion on November 10 caused a fire at Bahrain’s main pipeline near Buri village, 15 km
(10 miles) from the capital Manama, forcing the evacuation of residents.
A ministry statement said authorities had arrested four people, two of whom had received
intensive training in Iran to carry out attacks to harm Bahrain’s economy and its oil pipeline.
“Immediately after their return from Iran, they planned and got ready to blast the oil pipeline
...in addition to committing a series of other terrorist acts. They checked out the location and
remotely bombed the pipeline,” the ministry said.
Authorities were searching for three others “involved in the financing, planning, and
implementation” behind the attack, the statement said, two of which live in Iran.
A key Western ally and host to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Sunni Muslim-ruled Bahrain has for years
grappled with protests mainly by members of its Shi’ite Muslim majority who demand a bigger
Annex 16
9/3/2019 Bahrain arrests four linked to pipeline blast: ministry - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-oil-pipeline-saudi/bahrain-a… 2/2
Apps Newsletters Advertise with Us Advertising Guidelines Cookies Terms of Use Privacy
All quotes delayed a minimum of 15 minutes. See here for a complete list of exchanges and delays.
© 2019 Reuters. All Rights Reserved.
share in running the kingdom.
Several Bahraini dissidents reside in Iran, calling for armed struggle to uproot Bahrain’s ruling
Al Khalifa monarchy in a holy war.
Iran has called accusations that it had any role in supporting violent acts in Bahrain “baseless
and fabricated”, but it has allowed the exiled Bahrainis to promote their ideas on Iranian
official media and hold mourning ceremonies for those involved in deadly attacks in the
country.
Reporting by Sami Aboudi, writing by Hadeel Al Sayegh, Editing by William Maclean
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Annex 16
ANNEX 17
9/3/2019 Bahrain says deadly bus attack engineered by Iran - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-security/bahrain-says-deadly… 1/9
WORLD NEWS
NOVEMBER 15, 2017 / 11:32 AM / 2 YEARS AGO
Bahrain says deadly bus attack engineered by Iran
DUBAI (Reuters) - Bahrain said on Wednesday a bomb attack on a police bus which killed an
officer and wounded nine last month was carried out by a militant cell trained by its arch-foe
Iran.
After authorities quashed Shi’ite Muslim-led “Arab Spring” protests on the Sunni-ruled island
in 2011, militants have launched deadly bombing and shooting attacks against security forces
that Bahrain blames on Tehran’s Shi’ite theocracy.
Iran denies any role in Bahrain’s unrest.
There was no immediate Iranian reaction to Wednesday’s Bahraini interior ministry statement,
which added that authorities had arrested one member of the cell while others were fugitives
in Iran.
“The terrorist cell received extensive training in Iranian Revolutionary Guard camps on the use
and manufacture of explosives and firearms, as well as material and logistical support,” the
ministry said.
Annex 17
9/3/2019 Bahrain says deadly bus attack engineered by Iran - Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-security/bahrain-says-deadly… 2/9
Bahrain said earlier this week that an explosion at its main oil pipeline on Friday was caused by
“terrorist” sabotage, linking the unprecedented attack to Iran.
A key Western ally and host to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Gulf Arab monarchy Bahrain has for years
grappled with protests and sporadic violence coming from its Shi’ite majority.
Reporting By Ali Abdelaty and Noah Browning, Editing by William Maclean
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Annex 17
ANNEX 18
9/3/2019 Bahrain accuses Iran of harboring 160 'terrorists' | The Times of Israel
https://www.timesofisrael.com/bahrain-accuses-iran-of-harboring-160-ter… 1/2
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — Bahrain’s interior minister accused Iran of harboring 160 Bahrainis convicted of
terrorism and stripped of their citizenship, in an interview published Wednesday.
All 160 “fugitives” had been stripped of citizenship in “terrorism cases” targeting Bahraini police and security forces,
told the Arabic-language daily Asharq Al-Awsat.
He accused Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards of having trained the group, who were convicted of attacks that killed 25
security personnel and wounded 3,000 others, according to Asharq Al-Awsat.
Bahrain, a Shiite-majority kingdom ruled by a Sunni dynasty, has seen sporadic violence since the repression in 2011
of a protest movement demanding a constitutional monarchy and an elected prime minister.
Authorities have since tightened their grip on dissent, jailing hundreds of protesters and stripping a string of highpro
le activists and clerics of citizenship.
Bahrain has drawn harsh criticism for its treatment of demonstrators but maintains it does not discriminate against
the country’s Shiites.
Bahrain accuses Iran of harboring 160
‘terrorists’
Minister says Tehran has trained Bahraini ‘fugitives’ to target police and security forces
By AFP
18 October 2017, 2:26 pm
Members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps are seen at an annual military parade in front of the mausoleum of the late Ayatollah Khomeini just outside Tehran on September
22, 2014. (AP/Ebrahim Noroozi/File)
Annex 18
9/3/2019 Bahrain accuses Iran of harboring 160 'terrorists' | The Times of Israel
https://www.timesofisrael.com/bahrain-accuses-iran-of-harboring-160-ter… 2/2
Bahraini demonstrators attend a protest against the revocation of the citizenship of
top Bahraini Shiite cleric Sheikh Isa Qassim, near his house in the village of Diraz,
west of the capital Manama, June 20, 2016. (AFP/MOHAMMED AL-SHAIKH)
The kingdom, a key US ally located across the water from
Iran, regularly accuses Shiite Iran of meddling in its
internal affairs, an allegation Tehran denies.
US President Donald Trump has eased restrictions on arms
sales to Bahrain, which on Tuesday announced it had
signed a $3.8 billion deal with US company Lockheed
Martin to acquire 16 upgraded F-16 ghters.
Bahrain is home to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet and a British
army base is currently under construction.
READ MORE: · Israel & the Region · Bahrain · Shiite · Sunni · Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC · terror
COMMENTS
2 Comments Sort by
Good to Know
Ann, I am really shocked by how uninformed about the whole thing you are!
That was IRAN's money which was blocked for man years that we have
returned. So we did not pay them a bonuce, we paid them what we owed
them.
Like · Reply · 1y
Georges Ocon
another clown, talking trash and threatening Israel, written these Israel is
going to destroy the new Persian empire, God says so bless those who bless
you and curse those who curse you or destroy it
Like · Reply · 1 · 1y
Frank Nadjar
Don't say persian empire, this people who are ruling Iran are not
even Iranians, they are Arab decended and are trying to erase
persian culture and everything stands for, this people has hijacked
Iran for 40 years now, they are hated by 90% of people in Iran only
their brainwashed ones support these terrorists.
Like · Reply · 1y
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Annex 18
ANNEX 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
Annex 19
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ANNEX 20
9/3/2019 Hezbollah's 1992 Attack in Argentina Is a Warning for Modern-Day Europe - The Atlantic
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/hezbollahs-19… 1/7
GLOBAL
Hezbollah's Attack in Argentina Is a
Warning for Modern-Day Europe
Rescue workers scour the rubble of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires on March
17, 1992. (Don Rypka/AP Images)
Around 2:45 p.m. on March 17, 1992, a Ford F-100 panel van drove down Arroyo
Street in tranquil neighborhood of Buenos Aries. It approached the front of the
Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires--then drove up onto the sidewalk and blew up. The
explosion wreaked havoc up and down the street, destroying the front of the
building, causing the entire consulate building and part of the attached embassy
building to collapse. The 220 pounds of high explosives and shrapnel, concentrated
in the back right section of the vehicle, left twenty-three people dead and another
242 injured. Most of the people killed and injured were in the embassy but some
were pedestrians, including a priest from the Roman Catholic Church across the
street and children at a nearby school.
Twenty-one years ago, a van blew up the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aries, and
few saw it coming. Here's how the EU can prevent similar tragedies.
MATTHEW LEVITT MAR 19, 2013
Annex 20
9/3/2019 Hezbollah's 1992 Attack in Argentina Is a Warning for Modern-Day Europe - The Atlantic
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/hezbollahs-19… 2/7
Hezbollah's most recent international terrorist plots targeted Bulgaria and Cyprus,
EU member states on the continent's eastern periphery, prompting debate over
designating Hezbollah as a terrorist group at the EU. For those European leaders
who remain undecided, this week provides a timely reminder of what happens
when the international community fails to respond to Hezbollah terrorism.
This week marks the 21st anniversary of the 1992 Israeli embassy bombing. Failure
to respond to that attack emboldened Hezbollah, which incurred no cost for the
attack. Two years later Hezbollah struck again, this time escalating from a
diplomatic to civilian target and blowing up the AMIA Jewish community center in
Buenos Aires.
Yaacov Perry, former director of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), visited
Argentina just a week before the embassy bombing for liaison meetings with his
intelligence counterparts. At a polo match and luncheon, the intelligence chiefs
discussed "the menace posed by terrorists," though neither had any idea how close
the menace was or how soon it would be realized. Within days, Israeli
counterterrorism teams would be back in Buenos Aires investigating the embassy
bombing alongside Argentinean and American law enforcement and intelligence
experts. An American International Response Team, including U.S. explosives
experts, deployed to the site of the bombing and determined the type of explosive
used by examining the charred remnants of the car bomb. Within hours of the
bombing, investigators found the front section of the vehicle's engine block in a
garden below the staircase of an apartment building down the street.
In time, investigators would determine that the Ford van had been parked at a
parking lot located just a couple of blocks from the Israeli embassy for the hour and
a half immediately preceding the bombing--to be precise, from 1:18 p.m. to 2:42
p.m., according to the stamp on the ticket. Three minutes after the van's departure,
the vehicle bomb exploded outside the embassy.
In its claim of responsibility, delivered to a Western news agency in Beirut,
Hezbollah's Islamic Jihad Organization declared "with all pride that the operation
of the martyr infant Hussein is one of our continuing strikes against the criminal
Israeli enemy in an open-ended war, which will not cease until Israel is wiped out
of existence." Hussein was the five-year-old son of Hezbollah leader Abbas
Moussawi, both of whom were killed in an Israeli air strike on his car on February
Annex 20
9/3/2019 Hezbollah's 1992 Attack in Argentina Is a Warning for Modern-Day Europe - The Atlantic
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/hezbollahs-19… 3/7
16, 1992. Speaking at Moussawi's funeral, Hezbollah leader Sheikh Mohammad
Hussein Fadlallah warned that "Israel will not escape vengeance. We have received
the message that there is no need to respond in an emotional fashion." Fadlallah
assured his listeners in another statement that "there would be much more
violence and much more blood would flow."
The CIA noted in a July 1992 intelligence report that Hezbollah held the United
States and Israel equally responsible for Moussawi's death and threatened to target
American interests in retaliation. According to the CIA, this was no empty threat:
"Hezbollah elements began planning a retaliatory operation against U.S. interests
in Lebanon shortly after Moussawi's death." Hezbollah, the CIA reminded
policymakers in a July 1992 report, had executed two successful attacks targeting
U.S. interests in Lebanon the previous year--firing missiles at the U.S. embassy on
October 29, 1991, and destroying the administration building at the American
University of Beirut in a car bombing on November 8, 1991.
These plans never did materialize, perhaps because Hezbollah was supremely
focused on an attack it was planning well beyond Lebanon's borders. Just eight
days after the assassination, the vehicle used in the embassy bombing was
purchased in Buenos Aires by an individual with a Portuguese accent who signed
documents with a last name different from the one on his identification. Three
weeks later, the embassy was in ruins. The speed at which the operation was
executed is easier to understand, however, in light of evidence that Iran decided to
carry out an operation in Argentina well before Moussawi was killed. Mohsen
Rabbani--an Iranian operative based in Buenos Aires who would play a key role in
the bombing--spent ten months in Iran from January to December 1991. According
to Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman, Hezbollah used the Moussawi
assassination to justify the embassy bombing to its supporters, but the attack was
carried out at the behest of Tehran in response to Argentina's suspension of nuclear
cooperation with Iran.
Now, as then, the strategic relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is resulting in
a campaign of terrorism across the globe. Hezbollah seeks to murder Israeli
tourists, often targeting them in places frequented by American and other tourists,
while Iran has set its sights on Western diplomats, including American, British,
Israeli, Saudi and other officials. Thankfully, the only successful attack to date was
in Bulgaria, where a Hezbollah bus bombing killed five Israelis and a Bulgarian.
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9/3/2019 Hezbollah's 1992 Attack in Argentina Is a Warning for Modern-Day Europe - The Atlantic
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/hezbollahs-19… 4/7
Two weeks earlier, a Swedish Hezbollah operative was arrested in Cyprus, where
he was surveilling Israeli tourists boarding buses at the airport.
Hezbollah is watching Europe closely, much as it watched Argentina 21 years ago
this week. Argentina failed to respond to Hezbollah's challenge then, and suffered
the repercussions two years later. Europe has an opportunity now to avoid that
same mistake and should designate Hezbollah--in whole or in part--a terrorist
group for executing terrorist plots in Europe. History suggests that failure to do so
could result in still more attacks by an emboldened Hezbollah.
We want to hear what you think about this article. Submit a letter to the editor or write
to [email protected].
Annex 20
ANNEX 21
Latin America: Terrorism Issues
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
June S. Beittel
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
December 15, 2016
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21049
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Summary
Compared to other parts of the world, the potential threat emanating from terrorism is low in most
countries in Latin America. Most terrorist acts occur in the Andean region of South America,
committed by two Colombian guerrilla groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—and one Peruvian guerrilla group, the Shining
Path (SL). All three of these groups have been designated by the U.S. State Department as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The FARC, however, has been engaged in peace
negotiations with the Colombian government since 2012, culminating in a peace accord signed in
September 2016. Although the accord was narrowly rejected by a national plebiscite in early
October, both sides hammered out a new peace accord in November 2016, which was ratified by
Colombia’s Congress at the end of that month. Negotiations between the Colombian government
and the smaller ELN had several false starts in 2016, although to date formal talks with the
government have not started. The Shining Path has been significantly diminished because of
Peruvian military operations.
For a number of years, there has also been U.S. concern about Iran’s increasing activities in the
region as well as those of Hezbollah, the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group with close ties to
Iran. Both are reported to be linked to the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual
Association (AMIA) that killed 85 people in Buenos Aires. More recently, U.S. concerns have
included financial and ideological support in South America and the Caribbean for the Islamic
State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS), including the issue of
individuals from the region leaving to fight with the Islamic State.
The United States employs various policy tools to counter terrorism in the region, including
sanctions, antiterrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral
cooperation through the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition to sanctions against
U.S.-designated FTOs in the region, the United States has imposed an arms embargo on
Venezuela since 2006 because the Department of State has determined that Venezuela is not fully
cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. The United States has also imposed sanctions on
several current and former Venezuelan officials for assisting the FARC and on numerous
individuals and companies in Latin America for providing support to Hezbollah. Cuba had been
on the State Department’s so-called list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, but in May
2015, the Obama Administration rescinded Cuba’s designation as part of its overall policy shift
on Cuba.
Legislative Initiatives and Oversight
The 114th Congress continued oversight of terrorism concerns in the Western Hemisphere, with
House hearings on the activities of Iran and Hezbollah, the peace agreement in Colombia, border
security management and concerns, and terrorist financing in South America.
Several legislative initiatives were introduced in the 114th Congress but ultimately not approved.
The House passed H.R. 4482 (McSally) in April 2016, which would have required the Secretary
of Homeland Security to prepare a southwest border threat analysis and strategic plan, including
efforts to detect and prevent terrorists and instruments of terrorism from entering the United
States.
With regard to the AMIA bombing and Iran, two Senate resolutions were introduced: S.Res. 167
(Rubio) would have called for an internationally backed investigation into the January 2015 death
of the AMIA special prosecutor in Argentina, Alberto Nisman, and urged the President to
continue to monitor Iran’s activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, and S.Res. 620 (Coons)
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would have, among its provisions, encouraged Argentina to investigate and prosecute those
responsible for the AMIA bombing and the death of Nisman.
Several initiatives dealt with Cuba’s harboring of U.S.-wanted fugitives, an issue that had been
noted for many years in the State Department’s annual terrorism report. A provision in the House
version of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), H.R. 4909, would have
prohibited funding for any bilateral military-to-military contact or cooperation pending
certification that Cuba had fulfilled numerous conditions, including Cuba’s return of U.S.
fugitives; ultimately, the language regarding fugitives was not included in the conference report
to the FY2017 NDAA. (For more information on these and other bills, see “Legislative Initiatives
and Oversight,” below.)
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Contents
Terrorism in Latin America: An Overview...................................................................................... 1
Colombia................................................................................................................................... 3
Cuba .......................................................................................................................................... 6
Peru ........................................................................................................................................... 7
Venezuela .................................................................................................................................. 8
Iran’s Activities in Latin America ............................................................................................. 9
Iran’s Latin America Overtures Under Ahmadinejad........................................................ 10
AMIA Bombing Investigation and Death of Special Prosecutor ...................................... 13
U.S. Policy..................................................................................................................................... 16
U.S. Sanctions ......................................................................................................................... 17
U.S. Assistance, Support, and Regional Cooperation ............................................................. 18
Legislative Initiatives and Oversight............................................................................................. 20
Figures
Figure 1. Colombia and Neighboring Countries ............................................................................. 5
Figure 2. Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay...................................................... 10
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 22
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Terrorism in Latin America: An Overview
Over the years, the United States has been concerned about threats to Latin American and
Caribbean nations from various terrorist or insurgent groups that have attempted to influence or
overthrow elected governments. Although Latin America has not been the focal point in efforts to
deter global terrorism, some countries in the region have struggled with domestic terrorism for
decades, and international terrorist groups have at times used the region as a battleground to
advance their causes.
The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism (hereinafter referred to as the
terrorism report) highlights U.S. concerns about terrorist threats around the world, including in
Latin America.1 According to the 2015 terrorism report (issued in June 2016), transnational
criminal organizations (such as drug trafficking organizations) continued to pose a more
significant threat to the region than terrorism, and most countries made efforts to investigate
possible connections with terrorist organizations. In terms of Latin American countries’ abilities
to combat terrorism, the State Department maintained in the 2015 report that in some countries a
lack of significant progress on countering terrorism occurred because of “corruption, weak
government institutions, insufficient interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation,
and a lack of resources.”
As in recent years, the State Department maintained in the 2015 terrorism report that the primary
terrorist threats in Latin America stemmed from two Colombian guerrilla groups—the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—
responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks in the region. The Colombian government has
been involved in peace talks with the FARC since 2012, and it concluded and signed a peace
agreement with the FARC in September 2016. Colombian voters rejected the agreement in a
national plebiscite in early October 2016, but the Colombian government and the FARC reached
a new agreement on November 12, 2016, which was approved by Colombia’s Congress at the end
of that month. Although preliminary talks between the Colombian government and the ELN were
initiated in 2014, the opening of official talks has stalled. (See “Colombia” section, below.)
For a number of years, U.S. policymakers have expressed concerns about Iran’s deepening
relations with several Latin American countries, especially Venezuela, and Iran’s activities in the
region. A June 2013 State Department report to Congress pursuant to the Countering Iran in the
Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-220) described Iranian influence in Latin America and
the Caribbean as “waning.” Many analysts contend that Iranian relations with the region have
diminished since current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani took office in 2013. In presenting the
2016 posture statement of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to Congress in March
2016, Admiral Kurt W. Tidd stated that “as a state sponsor of terrorism, Iran’s nefarious
involvement in the Western Hemisphere is a matter for concern.” He noted that although Iranian
engagement has waned in recent years, President Rouhani has pledged several times his intent to
increase economic, scientific, and culture ties with Latin America.2 (See “Iran’s Activities in Latin
America,” below.)
One of the main concerns about Iran’s increasing relations with the region has been Iran’s ties to
Hezbollah, the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group that the Department of State designated a
1 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, June 2016, at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/
index.htm.
2 Posture statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress, Senate
Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2016, at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/tidd_03-10-16.
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Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997. The State Department asserted in its 2015
terrorism report that Hezbollah “continued to maintain a presence in the region, with members,
facilitators, and supporters engaging in activity in support of the organization,” including efforts
to build the organization’s “infrastructure in South America and fundraising, both through licit
and illicit means.” It noted Hezbollah fundraising activities in the tri-border area (TBA) of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay and the presence of Hezbollah supporters and sympathizers in
Venezuela.
Beyond Hezbollah, the report noted that the TBA “remained an important regional nexus of arms,
narcotics, pirated goods, human smuggling, counterfeiting, and money laundering—all potential
funding sources for terrorist organizations.”
The 2015 terrorism report also stated that South America and the Caribbean served as areas of
financial and ideological support for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other
terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia. It touched on the issue of individuals from
South America and the Caribbean leaving the region to fight with the Islamic State. In March
2016, SOUTCHOM Commander Admiral Tidd estimated that some 100-150 foreign fighters had
traveled from the region to Syria and Iraq.3 By October 2016, however, Admiral Tidd noted in a
press conference that the outflow of foreign fighters from the region had been “significantly
curtailed” because of the significant success in Iraq and Syria by the U.S.-led coalition.4
From 1982 until May 2015, Cuba was on the State Department’s so-called state sponsors of
terrorism list pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 and other
provisions of law. As part of President Obama’s shift on Cuba policy announced in December
2014, the State Department conducted a review of Cuba’s designation on the state sponsors list,
and in April 2015, President Obama submitted a report to Congress justifying the rescission of
Cuba’s designation. The President certified that the Cuban government “has not provided any
support for international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period” and “has provided
assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” This ultimately led
to the Secretary of State rescinding Cuba’s designation in May 2015. (See “Cuba” section,
below.)
Venezuela currently is on the State Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not
cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
Control Act. The most recent annual determination was made by the Secretary of State on May
11, 2016.5 Venezuela has been on the list since 2006 and, as a result, has been subject to a U.S.
arms embargo. (Cuba had been on the Section 40A list since 1997, when the annual determination
was first established, but was taken off the list in 2015.) U.S. officials have expressed concerns
over the past decade about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations
with Iran, and the involvement of senior Venezuelan officials in supporting the drug and weapons
trafficking activities of the FARC. (See “Venezuela” section, below.)
3 “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Adm. Tidd in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” Federal Information & News
Dispatch Inc., March 10, 2016.
4 “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Adm. Tidd on Joint Task Force-Matthew Relief Efforts in Haiti,” Federal
Information & News Dispatch Inc., October 18, 2016; and Carla Babb, “U.S. Admiral: Fewer Latin Americans Joining
IS Fight in Mideast, Voice of America Press Releases and Documents, Federal Information & News Dispatch Inc.,
October 18, 2016.
5 U.S. Department of State, “Determination and Certification Under Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act,” 81
Federal Register 35436, June 2, 2016.
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Colombia6
Three violent Colombian groups have been designated by the Secretary of State as FTOs. Two of
these, the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the leftist National
Liberation Army (ELN), were designated in 1997 and are active guerrilla groups. A third group,
the rightist paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), was designated an FTO
in 2001, but the group has been demobilized for nine years. In July 2014, the AUC was de-listed
as an FTO by the U.S. Secretary of State.
The FARC, a leftist guerrilla group heavily involved in drug production and trafficking, was
established in the mid-1960s. Over the past several years, the FARC has been weakened
significantly by the government’s military campaign against it. Yet, the FARC is estimated to
have about 7,000-8,000 fighters remaining who have operated in various locations throughout
Colombia. The group has been responsible for terrorist attacks, including the destruction of
infrastructure, kidnapping, and extortion, and, in recent years, it has diversified into illegal
mining.7 In the aftermath of the killing of FARC leader Alfonso Cano by Colombian security
forces in November 2011, the FARC chose Rodrigo Londoño, also known as Timoleón Jiménez
or Timochenko, as its new leader.
Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos initiated formal peace talks with the FARC in 2012
concentrating on a six-part agenda, including land and rural development; political participation;
illicit drugs; victims’ reparations and transitional justice; and the demobilization, disarmament,
and reintegration of the FARC. In September 2016, the government and the FARC signed a peace
accord that ultimately was rejected by a slim majority in a plebiscite in October. Peace accord
critics, led by popular former president and now Senator Álvaro Uribe, had mobilized a campaign
to reject the accord. They highlighted many perceived weaknesses of the accord, such as
inadequate punishment for FARC violations, lack of an appropriate appeal for forgiveness from
FARC fighters, and overly generous guarantees for the FARC’s future political role.
A second peace accord, which the government maintained responded to criticisms of the No
campaign, was signed and then ratified by Colombia’s Congress on November 30, 2016. The
U.N. Security Council, which had sent a mission to help with the anticipated FARC
demobilization, was redirected to serve as a guarantor of the bilateral cease-fire through the end
of 2016. An immediate concern is whether the cease-fire will hold. Some observers maintain that
a swiftly enacted peace accord leading to FARC disarmament and reintegration into rural
communities will reduce violence and have many benefits, including enhanced economic growth.
Critics of the second accord, however, contend that the Santos Administration still gave too many
concessions to the FARC, especially in allowing the FARC’s top leadership to enter politics and
avoid prison.
The State Department’s 2015 terrorism report maintained that terrorist incidents in the country—
perpetrated largely by the FARC (Colombia’s largest active terrorist group) and the ELN—
decreased considerably during the year compared to 2014 and that government statistics showed
that infrastructure sabotage was down. According to the report, the FARC reportedly focused on
low-cost, high-impact attacks, such as launching mortars at police stations or the military, placing
explosive devices near roads or paths, and conducting ambushes. The report notes that the
Colombian government gradually reduced military operations against the FARC during the year,
6 For additional information, see CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel.
7 Historically the FTO has been responsible for numerous kidnappings, but it claimed to end the practice in early 2012
in an overture to open peace talks with the Colombian government.
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including suspension of aerial bombardments as a de-escalation measure in response to unilateral
cease-fires declared by the FARC. This resulted in less violence, except for an interlude in April
and May 2015 after a FARC attack on Colombian soldiers in Cauca. The 2015 report maintained
that the number of FARC and ELN guerrilla fighters who were captured, killed, or demobilized
decreased slightly during 2015 in comparison to 2014 and that civilian deaths caused by the
guerrilla organizations also decreased.
The FARC has continued to use the territory of several of Colombia’s neighbors—Ecuador,
Panama, and Venezuela—according to the State Department’s 2015 terrorism report, although all
the governments worked with Colombia and in some cases independently to reduce the presence
of Colombian insurgents and drug trafficking groups. Border areas with Venezuela, Panama, and
Ecuador reportedly are used for incursions into Colombia, and Venezuelan and Ecuadorian
territory reportedly is used for safe haven, according to the report. (See Figure 1.)
The ELN, a Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1965, reportedly has a membership of around
2,000 fighters but has continued to undertake attacks and inflict casualties despite diminished
resources and reduced offensive capability. In recent years, the ELN has been involved in joint
attacks with the FARC. Like the FARC, the group derives its funding from drug trafficking as
well as from kidnapping and extorting oil and gas companies. In 2015, the ELN increased its
attacks on oil pipelines and equipment and continued to kidnap for ransom, a factor that continues
to be at issue with opening a formal peace process with the current Colombian government. The
ELN has been located largely in the rural and mountainous areas of northern, northeastern, and
southwestern Colombia and in the eastern border region with Venezuela, where the group
reportedly has its base. In June 2014, the ELN and the Colombian government confirmed that
they were engaged in exploratory peace talks, but official talks slated to begin in Ecuador at the
end of March 2016 were delayed. Formal peace talks slated to open in late October 2016 had to
be deferred as well because the ELN would not release all kidnap victims that it held, which was
a Santos government precondition to start official talks.
The AUC was formed in 1997 as a loose affiliation of right-wing paramilitary groups targeting
leftist guerrillas. It carried out numerous political killings and kidnappings and was heavily
involved in the drug trade. Although more than 32,000 AUC members demobilized between 2003
and 2006 and the group’s paramilitary chiefs stepped down, the organization remained on the
FTO list until 2014. Consequently, many former paramilitaries joined criminal groups, called
criminal bands or Bacrim, by the Colombian government. The Bacrim are primarily involved in
drug trafficking but also participate in extortion and other violent crimes. In 2013, Los Urabeños
emerged as the dominant Bacrim (sometimes referred to as the Clan Úsuga), gaining nearly 3,000
members by 2015.8 A Colombian NGO Indepaz has anticipated that there could be a territorial
reorganization of the “narco-paramilitary groups” in the aftermath of a peace accord with the
FARC with the Bacrim groups vying to take over FARC drug and illegal mining businesses.9
8 The group members sometimes refer to themselves by an old name, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), or
their name as part of the umbrella organization of paramilitaries, the AUC, that demobilized formally between 2003
and 2006.
9 Indepaz, XI Informe de Presencia de Grupos Narcoparamilitares en 2014,” December 8, 2015.
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Figure 1. Colombia and Neighboring Countries
Source: CRS.
Notes: The map shows Colombia’s departments and the bordering departments, provinces, and states of
neighboring Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, and Panama.
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Cuba10
Cuba had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America
and Africa, but, in 1992, then Cuban leader Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for
insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Most analysts accept that Cuba’s policy generally did
change, largely because the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in
subsidies.
From March 1982 until May 2015, the Department of State, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 and other laws,11 had included Cuba among its list of states
sponsoring terrorism. For a number of years, Cuba’s retention on the terrorism list had been
questioned by some observers. In general, those who supported keeping Cuba on the list pointed
to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies and continued
hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of
retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintained that it was a holdover of the Cold War. They
argued that domestic political considerations kept Cuba on the terrorism list and maintained that
Cuba’s presence on the list diverted U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats.
In December 2014, President Obama unveiled a new policy approach toward Cuba that would
move U.S. policy away from sanctions and toward a policy of engagement. One element of the
changed policy was ordering a review of Cuba’s designation by the State Department as a state
sponsor of international terrorism. President Obama directed Secretary of State Kerry to review
Cuba’s designation “guided by the facts and the law.” The President stated that “at a time when
we are focused on threats from al Qaeda to ISIL, a nation that meets our conditions and renounces
the use of terrorism should not face this sanction.”12 The State Department review was completed
in April 2015, and the President transmitted to Congress a report justifying the rescission of
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. No resolutions of disapproval were introduced
in Congress to block the rescission, which took place on May 29, 2015, 45 days after the
submission of the report to Congress.
In the Administration’s report, President Obama, following the process set forth by terrorist-list
provisions of law cited above, certified that the Cuban government “has not provided any support
for international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period” and “has provided assurances
that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” The memorandum of
justification accompanying the report maintained that Cuba had taken steps in recent years to
fully distance itself from international terrorism and to strengthen its counterterrorism laws. The
justification stated there was no credible evidence that Cuba had, within the preceding six
months, provided specific material support, services, or resources to members of the FARC or
ELN, two Colombian guerrilla groups, outside of facilitating the peace process between those
organizations and the government of Colombia. It also stated that the Cuban government
continued to allow approximately two dozen members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a
Spanish terrorist group, to remain in the country, with most of those entering Cuba following an
agreement with the government of Spain. The justification also noted the problem of Cuba’s
harboring of fugitives wanted in the United States and stated that the “strong U.S. interest in the
return of these fugitives” would be served by entering into a bilateral law enforcement dialogue
10 For additional information, see CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
11 Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act. See CRS
Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne E.
Rennack.
12 White House, “Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes,” December 17, 2014.
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with Cuba to resolve these cases. (For additional information, see CRS Report R43926, Cuba:
Issues for the 114th Congress.)
In addition to Cuba’s removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list, in May 2015, Secretary of
State Kerry dropped Cuba from the annual determination (pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms
Export Control Act and due by May 15 of each year) identifying countries that are not fully
cooperating with United States antiterrorism efforts.13 Cuba had been designated annually since
that annual determination was established in 1997.
Peru
The brutal Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, or SL) Maoist insurgency has operated as a terrorist
group in Peru since 1980 and was designated by the Department of State as a foreign terrorist
organization in 1997. The group was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its
leader, Abimael Guzman, who, after a new trial in 2006, was sentenced to life in prison.
According to the 2015 State Department terrorism report, although SL remained active, its
strength was reduced and its “ability to conduct coordinated attacks and its membership both
continued to decline with successful Peruvian military operations.” The group reportedly had just
one active faction, with its area of operation limited to the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro River
Valley (VRAEM) in south-central Peru. SL is reported to sustain itself through its involvement in
drug production and trafficking and extortion of taxes from others involved in the drug trade. Its
strength was reported to number 250-300 combatants, including some 60-100 hardcore fighters,
according to the terrorism report. It reportedly committed 13 terrorist acts in 2015 compared to 20
in 2014.
In addition to the SL’s designation as an FTO, in June 2015, the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control identified SL as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker pursuant to the
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, and sanctioned three SL leaders—Victor Quispe
Palomino (Comrade José), Jorge Quispe Palomino (Comrade Raúl), and Florindo Eleuterio Flores
Hala (Comrade Artemio, who has been imprisoned in Peru since 2012).14 All three SL leaders had
been indicted by a U.S. federal court in New York in July 2014 on charges including conspiring to
provide material support to the SL and conspiracy to commit narco-terrorism.15
In November 2016, the State Department designated Victor and Jorge Quispe Palomino and
Tarcela Loya Vilchez as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under Executive Order 13224,
which authorizes sanctions on foreign persons and groups who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism. The sanctions block all property of the individuals subject to U.S. jurisdiction
and prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with them.16
13 U.S. Department of State, “Determination and Certification Under Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act,” 80
Federal Register 30319, May 27, 2015.
14 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Peruvian Narco-Terrorist Group and Three Key Leaders,”
June 1, 2015.
15 U.S. Department of Justice, Offices of the United States Attorneys, Southern District of New York, “Manhattan U.S.
Attorney Announces Charges Against Three Leaders of Peruvian Terrorist Organizations Shining Path,” July 2, 2014.
16 U.S. Department of States, “State Department Terrorist Designations of Victor Quispe Palomino, Jorge Quispe
Palomino, and Tarcela Loya Vilchez,” November 22, 2016.
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Venezuela17
U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of
cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, the involvement of senior Venezuelan government officials
in supporting the drug and arms trafficking activities of the FARC, and Venezuela’s relations with
Iran. Since May 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela
has not been “cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A
of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The most recent determination was made in May
2016.18 As a result, the United States has imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela since 2006,
which ended all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela. (Other countries
currently on the Section 40A list include Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused
with the “state sponsors of terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 and other provisions of law.) The United States has also imposed various sanctions on
Venezuelan individuals and companies for supporting the FARC, Iran, and Hezbollah.
As it has for several years, the State Department maintained in its 2015 terrorism report that,
although Venezuela is not classified as a state sponsor of terrorism, “there were credible reports
that Venezuela maintained a permissive environment that allowed for support of activities that
benefited known terrorist groups.” It further stated that individuals linked to such terrorist groups
as the FARC, ELN, and ETA, as well as Hezbollah sympathizers and supporters, were present in
Venezuela.
According to the 2015 terrorism report, the FARC often uses Colombia’s border areas with
Venezuela for incursions into Colombia and also used Venezuelan territory for safe haven. The
State Department also stated, however, that the foreign ministers of Venezuela and Colombia met
several times to address such issues as the activity of illegally armed groups, the smuggling of
illegal goods, and narcotics trafficking. It further noted Venezuela’s participation in support of
ongoing negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government.
As in previous reports, the State Department maintained in the 2015 terrorism report that
Venezuela’s border security at ports of entry is vulnerable and susceptible to corruption. It noted
that the Venezuelan government did not perform biographic and biometric screening at ports of
entry or exit and that there was no automated system to collect advance passenger name records
on commercial flights.
With regard to Venezuela’s relations with Iran, there was significant concern among policymakers
about the growing relationship between the two countries during the rule of Venezuelan President
Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) during
which Venezuela arguably served as Iran’s entry to the region. In the aftermath of the departure of
Ahmadinejad from office and the death of Chávez in 2013, many analysts contend that Iranian
relations with the region have diminished since current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani took
office in 2013. Nevertheless, Iranian activities in the region remain a concern for U.S. officials.
(For more see “Iran’s Activities in Latin America,” below.)
17 For additional background on Venezuela, see CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Mark P. Sullivan.
18 Federal Register, “Determination and Certification Under Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act,” June 2,
2016, p. 35436.
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Iran’s Activities in Latin America
For a number of years, there has been concern among policymakers about Iran’s activities in
Latin America. During the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), Iran worked to
increase its ties with Latin American countries, centered on Iran’s attempts to work with regional
governments to circumvent international sanctions. During this period, Venezuela under President
Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) arguably served as Iran’s gateway to the region. (See “Iran’s Latin
America Overtures Under Ahmadinejad,” below.) Both Iran and Hezbollah, the radical Lebanonbased
Islamic group and U.S.-designated FTO with which Iran has strong ties, are reported to be
linked to two bombings against Jewish targets in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in the early 1990s: the
1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy, which killed 30 people, and the 1994 bombing of the
Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA), which killed 85 people. (See “AMIA Bombing
Investigation,” below.)
In the aftermath of Ahmadinejad’s departure from office and Chavez’s death in 2013, many
analysts contend that Iranian relations with the region have diminished. Current Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani, who took office in August 2013, has not prioritized relations with Latin
America. Rouhani undertook his first trip to the region in September 2016, three years after he
first took office, stopping in Venezuela for a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement and then
traveling to Cuba for a two-day official visit before heading to the U.N. General Assembly
meeting in New York. Iran’s Foreign Minister traveled to seven Latin American countries in
August and September 2016—Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, and
Mexico—with the goal of strengthening trade and cooperation in the aftermath of international
sanctions on the country being lifted.19
Despite the waning of Iranian engagement in the region, U.S. officials remain vigilant about
Iran’s activities in Latin America. SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral Kurt Tidd stated in the
command’s 2016 posture statement that “as a state sponsor of terrorism, Iran’s nefarious
involvement in the Western Hemisphere is a matter for concern.” He noted that President Rouhani
has pledged to increase economic, scientific, and culture ties with Latin America.20
Middle East analysts point out that Iran’s key foreign policy focus remains its immediate region.
It is in the Middle East, and South and Central Asia, where the Iranian regime perceives potential
threats to its survival, and in which Iran has, for ideological, religious, and political motives, tried
to alter political outcomes in its favor. Whatever efforts Iran has made to engage like-minded
leaders in Latin America, these efforts do not approach its level of involvement in countries such
as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, or Lebanon.21
As noted above, another reason for U.S. concern about Iran’s relations with Latin America has
been its ties to Hezbollah, which, along with Iran, reportedly is linked to two bombings against
Jewish targets in Argentina in the early 1990s. In recent years, U.S. concerns regarding Hezbollah
in Latin America have focused on its fundraising activities among sympathizers in the region,
19 Sabina Di Muro, “Spotlight: Emerging Iran Looks to Latin America for Cooperation,” Xinhua News Agency, August
29, 2016; “Iranian Official Discusses FM’s Visit to Latin American Countries,” BBC Monitoring Middle East (text of
report from E’temad, [Iran]), September 5, 2016; and “Zarif in Mexico, Later to Depart for Venezuela,” Mehr News
Agency, September 14, 2016.
20 Posture statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2016, at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/tidd_03-10-
16.
21 For additional background on Iran and its foreign policy, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense
Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.
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particularly the tri-border area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay (see Figure 2), but also
in other parts of the region.22 (At the same time, U.S. officials point out that Hezbollah’s primary
funding is from Iran and not from fundraising activities in Latin America.) The Brazilian city of
Foz do Iguaçu and the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este have large Muslim populations. The
TBA has long been used for arms and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, document and
currency fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of pirated goods.
Figure 2. Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay
Source: CRS.
The State Department’s 2015 terrorism report states that Hezbollah has continued to maintain a
presence in the region, “with members, facilitators, and supporters engaging in activity in support
of the organization.” This activity, according to the report, included “efforts to build Hezbollah’s
infrastructure in South America and fundraising, both through licit and illicit means.” Some
observers view Hezbollah’s regional involvement in illicit activities as a means to raise money, as
opposed to the organization having an ideological agenda in Latin America or pursuing one on
behalf of Iran.23
Iran’s Latin America Overtures Under Ahmadinejad
Venezuela’s relations with Iran have been long-standing because they were both founding
members of OPEC in 1960. In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Iran fostered closer
22 For additional background, see Threat Convergence in South America’s Tri-Border Area (TBA), The Fund for Peace,
Center for the Study of Threat Convergence, Factsheet Series, January 11, 2010; and Rensselaer Lee, “Dispatches: The
Tri-Border-Terrorism Nexus,” Global Crime, Vol. 9, No 4, November 2008.
23 For example, see Steven Dudley, co-director, Insight Crime, “Terrorism and Crime in the Americas – ‘It’s
Business,’” Remarks before the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, Organization of American States,
February 26, 2014.
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relations with Cuba and with Nicaragua (after the 1979 Sandinista revolution). Under the
government of President Mohammed Khatami (1997-2005), Iran made efforts to increase its trade
with Latin America, particularly Brazil, and there were also efforts to increase cooperation with
Venezuela. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez visited Iran in 2001 and 2003, which led to a joint
venture agreement to produce tractors in Venezuela.24
Not until President Ahmadinejad’s rule began in 2005, however, did Iran aggressively work to
increase its diplomatic and economic linkages with Latin American countries. A major rationale
for this increased focus on Latin America was Iran’s efforts to overcome its international isolation
and reduce the effect of increasing sanctions. The personal relationship between Ahmadinejad and
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez also drove the strengthening of bilateral ties. The two nations
signed a variety of agreements in agriculture, petrochemicals, oil exploration in the Orinoco
region of Venezuela, the manufacturing of automobiles, and housing. Weekly flights between the
two countries began in 2007 but were curtailed in 2010.25 The State Department had expressed
concern about these flights, maintaining that they were only subject to cursory immigration and
customs controls.
Venezuela under Hugo Chávez also played a key role in the development of Iran’s expanding
relations with other countries in the region. This outreach largely focused on leftist governments
that share the goal of reducing U.S. influence in the region. Iran’s relations have grown with
Bolivia under President Evo Morales, with Ecuador under President Rafael Correa, and with
Nicaragua under President Daniel Ortega. While Iran has promised assistance and investment to
these countries, observers maintain that there is little evidence that such promises have been
fulfilled.26
From 2006-2013, Iranian President Ahmadinejad visited Latin America eight times, most often
Venezuela, but he also visited Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Cuba. In 2012,
Ahmadinejad undertook two trips to the region: a visit in January to Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua,
and Venezuela and a June trip to Brazil to attend the U.N. Conference on Sustainable
Development in Rio de Janeiro (which notably did not include bilateral meetings with the
Brazilian government) along with side trips to Bolivia and Venezuela.
While Ahmadinejad’s January 2012 trip to Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador increased
concerns of some U.S. policymakers about Iran’s efforts to deepen ties with Latin America, some
policy analysts and U.S. officials contend that the trip was not successful. Analysts point out that
leaders’ statements during these trips were largely propaganda, with the official Iranian press
trumpeting relations with these countries in order to show that Iran is not isolated internationally
and that it has good relations with countries geographically close to the United States.27 The
24 Farideh Farhi “Tehran’s Perspective on Iran-Latin American Relations,” in Iran in Latin America: Threat or ‘Axis of
Annoyance’?, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009 (based on July 2008 conference), edited by
Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari, and Adam Stubits, at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/
Iran_in_LA.pdf.
25 “House Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, and Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
and House Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations Hold Joint Hearing on Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activity,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, June 24, 2011;
and “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Threats and Security in the Western Hemisphere,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, October 13, 2011.
26 For example, see Kavon “Hak” Hakimzadeh, “Iran & Venezuela: The Axis of Annoyance,” Military Review, May 1,
2009; and Anne-Marie O’Connor and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Iran’s Invisible Nicaragua Embassy; Feared Stronghold
Never Materialized,” Washington Post, July 13, 2009. Also see “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on
Democracy in Nicaragua,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, December 1, 2011.
27 Comments by Stephen Johnson, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Afshin Molavi, New America
(continued...)
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January 2012 trip was restricted to meeting with four leftist governments that have often opposed
U.S. policy in the region and have limited regional influence. The fact that the tour notably did
not include a trip to Brazil to meet with President Dilma Rousseff detracted from the significance
of the visit to the region. A close adviser to Ahmadinejad maintained in an interview in the
Brazilian press that President Rousseff had “destroyed years of good relations” between Iran and
Brazil.28 Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress in late January
2012 that while the U.S. intelligence community remained concerned about Iran’s connection
with Venezuela, Ahmadinejad’s trip to Latin America “was not all that successful.”29
On the diplomatic front, Iran under President Ahmadinejad opened six embassies in Latin
America by 2009—Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay. These added to
existing embassies in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela.30 In 2012, Iran also
launched a Spanish-language satellite TV network as part of its ideological battle to counter what
it views as biased reporting—then-President Ahmadinejad said that it would help end the West’s
“hegemony” of the airwaves.31 Reports that Iran was building a large embassy in Managua,
Nicaragua, turned out to be erroneous.32 Other reports that Iran’s embassy in Venezuela is one of
the largest in the world were also inaccurate. State Department officials maintained that there are
many embassies in Caracas that have a diplomatic presence far larger than that of Iran, including
the U.S. Embassy.33
A 2010 unclassified Department of Defense report to Congress on Iran’s military power (required
by Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, P.L. 111-84) maintained
that Iran’s Qods Force, which maintains operational capabilities around the world, had increased
its presence in Latin America in recent years, particularly in Venezuela.34 At the same time,
however, then-commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General Douglas Fraser, maintained
that the focus of Iran in the region was diplomatic and commercial and that he had not seen an
increase in Iran’s military presence in the region.35 In 2012, General Fraser maintained in a press
(...continued)
Foundation, at a January 19, 2012, event sponsored by the Council of the Americas (Washington, DC) on “Iran in the
Americas: A Readout of the Visit.”
28 Simon Romero, “Iranian Adviser Accuses Brazil of Ruining Relations,” New York Times, January 24, 2012.
Subsequently, the Iranian adviser denied part of the interview and stressed that relations between Iran and Brazil are
good; see “Iranian Aide Says Foreign Media Distorted His Interview on Ties with Brazil,” BBC Monitoring Newsfile
(text of report by Iranian official government news agency IRNA), January 24, 2012.
29 “Senate Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing on Worldwide Threats,” CQ Congressional Transcripts,
January 31, 2012.
30 Anne-Marie O’Connor and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Iran’s Invisible Nicaragua Embassy; Feared Stronghold Never
Materialized,” Washington Post, July 13, 2009.
31 Jim Wyss, “Iran’s HispanTV Aims to Woo Latino Viewers,” Miami Herald, January 31, 2012.
32 Ibid.; and Sylvie Lanteaume, “Iran’s Hand in Latin America Not as U.S. Feared,” Agence France Presse, July 14,
2009.
33 “House Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, and Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
and House Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations Hold Joint Hearing on Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activity,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, June 24, 2011.
34 Department of Defense, “Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” April 2010. For the full text of the report,
see http://www.politico.com/static/PPM145_link_042010.html. For background on the Qods Force, see CRS Report
RL32048, Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
35 Anne Flaherty, “Pentagon Says Iran’s Reach in Latin America Doesn’t Pose Military Threat,” AP Newswire, April
27, 2010. General Fraser reiterated that Iran’s focus in Latin America has been “primarily diplomatic and commercial,”
in March 30, 2011, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. See “Hearing of the House Armed
Services Committee; Subject FY2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests for the U.S. Southern
(continued...)
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interview that Iran’s relationship with Venezuela was primarily diplomatic and economic and that
Iran’s ties with Venezuela did not amount to a military alliance.36
In 2011, the Department of Justice filed criminal charges against a dual Iranian-American citizen
from Texas, Manssor Arbabsiar, and a member of Iran’s Qods Force in Iran, Gholam Shakuri, for
their alleged participation in a bizarre plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, DC. The
indictment alleged that Arbabsiar met several times in Mexico City with an informant of the U.S
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) posing as a member of one of Mexico’s most violent
drug trafficking organization, Los Zetas, and had arranged to hire the informant to murder the
ambassador with the financial support of Shakuri.37 Arbabsiar subsequently pled guilty and was
sentenced in 2013 to 25 years in prison.38
At the time, U.S. officials expressed concern about the implications of the failed Iranian plot on
the nexus between terrorist and criminal groups as well as on Iran’s intentions. The DEA testified
in 2011 that the alleged plot “illustrates the extent to which terrorist organizations will align
themselves with other criminals to achieve their goals.”39 Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
James Clapper stated before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2012 that the plot to
kill the Saudi Ambassador shows that “some Iranian officials … are now more willing to conduct
an attack in the United States,” and he expressed concern “about Iranian plotting against U.S. or
allied interests overseas.”40 In 2013, DNI Clapper again testified before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence that the failed 2011 plot against the Saudi Ambassador in Washington
showed that Iran may be willing to attack in the United States in response to perceived offenses
against the regime.41
AMIA Bombing Investigation and Death of Special Prosecutor
Argentine Special Prosecutor Alberto Nisman was appointed to lead the AMIA investigation in
2004. Until then, progress on the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the 1994
bombing had been stymied because of the government’s mishandling of the case. In September
2004, a three-judge panel acquitted all 22 Argentine defendants in the case and faulted the
shortcomings of the original investigation. With Nisman’s appointment in 2004, however, the
government moved forward with a new investigation. As a result, an Argentine judge issued arrest
warrants in November 2006 for nine foreign individuals: an internationally wanted Hezbollah
militant from Lebanon, Imad Mughniyah (subsequently killed by a car bomb in Damascus, Syria,
in 2008), and eight Iranian government officials. INTERPOL, the International Criminal Police
(...continued)
Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. European Command,” Federal News Service, March 30, 2011.
36 Frank Bajak, “Top U.S. General: Venezuela Not a National Security Threat,” Associated Press, July 31, 2012.
37 U.S. Department of Justice, “Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the
United States,” press release, October 11, 2011, at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-ag-1339.html.
38 U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, “Manssor Arbabsiar Sentenced
in Manhattan Federal Court to 25 years in Prison for Conspiring with Iranian Military Officials to Assassinate the Saudi
Arabian Ambassador to the United States,” May 30, 2013.
39 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of U.S. Law Enforcement, Part II, 112th Cong., 1st sess., November 17, 2011,
Serial No. 112-81 (Washington: GPO, 2011), written testimony of Derek S. Maltz, Special Agent in charge of the
Special Operations Division, Drug Enforcement Administration.
40 Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, January 31, 2012, op. cit.
41 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community,” Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013.
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Organization, subsequently posted Red Notices (international wanted persons notices) in 2007 for
Mughniyah and five of the Iranian officials: Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Rabbani, Ahmad Reza
Asghari, Ahmad Vahidi (Iran’s current defense minister), and Mohsen Rezai.42 In 2009, Argentina
also issued an arrest warrant for the capture of Samuel Salman El Reda, a Colombian citizen
thought to be living in Lebanon, alleged to have coordinated a Hezbollah cell that carried out the
bombing; he was subsequently added to the INTERPOL Red Notice list. Current Argentine
President Mauricio Macri in Argentina, inaugurated in December 2015, has maintained these Red
Notices.
Under the previous Argentine government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Argentina
had shifted its stance in 2011 with respect to engagement with Iran over the AMIA bombing
issue. Then-President Fernández indicated Argentina’s willingness to enter into a dialogue with
the Iranian government despite its refusal to turn over suspects in the case. Several rounds of talks
with Iran were held in 2012, with then-Argentine Foreign Minister Hector Timerman leading the
effort. In January 2013, Argentina announced that it had reached an agreement with Iran and
signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a joint Truth Commission made up of
impartial jurists from third countries to review the bombing case. After extensive debate,
Argentina’s Congress completed its approval of the agreement in February 2013. Argentina’s two
main Jewish groups, AMIA and the Delegation of Israeli Associations (DAIA), strongly opposed
the agreement because they believe that it could guarantee impunity for the Iranian suspects.43
Several Members of the U.S. Congress also expressed their strong concerns about the Truth
Commission because they believed it could jeopardize Argentina’s AMIA investigation and
charges against the Iranians.
In May 2014, an Argentine court declared unconstitutional the agreement with Iran to jointly
investigate the AMIA bombing. Special Prosecutor Nisman had maintained that the agreement
with Iran constituted an “undue interference of the executive branch in the exclusive sphere of the
judiciary.”44 The Fernández government maintained that it would appeal the ruling to Argentina’s
Supreme Court. In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on September 24, 2014, President
Fernández acknowledged the 20th anniversary of the AMIA bombing and expressed support for
the memorandum of understanding with Iran, maintaining that it would enable the accused
Iranian citizens to make statements before an Argentine judge. Soon after his election in 2015,
however, President Macri said that his government would drop the appeal.
Nisman’s Report on Iran. In May 2013, Nisman issued a 500-page report alleging that Iran has
been working for decades in Latin America, setting up intelligence stations in the region by
utilizing embassies, cultural organizations, and even mosques as a source of recruitment. In the
report, Nisman highlighted the key role of Mohsen Rabbani (one of eight Iranian officials wanted
by Argentina for the AMIA bombing) as Iran’s South America “coordinator for the export of
revolution,” working in the tri-border countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay as well as in
Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay.45 The report also highlighted the role of Guyanese national Abdul
Kadir, who Nisman maintained was an intelligence agent working for Iran and a follower of
Rabbani, in establishing an Iranian intelligence network in Guyana. Kadir, a former member of
42 INTERPOL, media release, “INTERPOL General Assembly Upholds Executive Committee Decision on AMIA Red
Notice Dispute,” November 7, 2007. The three other Iranians wanted by Argentina not included on INTERPOL’s red
notice list are former President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and
former Iranian Ambassador to Argentina Hadi Soleimanpour.
43 “A Perverse Manoeuvre in Argentina,” LatinNews Daily, February 28, 2013.
44 “Argentine Court Declares Bombing Probe with Iran Unconstitutional,” Agence France Presse, May 16, 2014.
45 Alberto Nisman, Fiscal General, Ministerio Público de la Nación, Argentina, Dictamina, May 29, 2013.
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Guyana’s parliament, is serving a life sentence in the United States for his role in a 2007 plot to
bomb a jet fuel artery at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. The Nisman report
contended that the 1994 AMIA bombing was not an isolated act but was part of a regional
strategy involving Iran’s establishment of intelligence bases in several countries utilizing
political, religious, and cultural institutions that could be used to support terrorist acts.
Nisman’s Death. On January 14, 2015, Nisman made explosive accusations that President
Fernández and other government officials attempted to whitewash the AMIA investigation to
secure oil supplies from Iran and restore Argentina’s grain exports to Iran. Four days later, and
one day before he was to testify before Argentina’s Congress, Nisman was found dead in his
apartment from a gunshot wound. Although preliminary reports indicated that Nisman committed
suicide, a majority of Argentines, including President Fernández, contend that Nisman was
murdered. The president maintained that Nisman was misled into making the accusations against
her government by elements in Argentina’s Intelligence Secretariat (SI) that had conducted illegal
wiretaps of government officials. Fernández called for the dissolution of the SI, and in February
2015, Argentina’s Congress approved a measure setting up a new intelligence service, the Federal
Agency of Investigations (AFI). Nisman’s death prompted a massive demonstration in Argentina,
with tens of thousands of participants. A federal prosecutor in Argentina pursued Nisman’s case
against President Fernández related to Iran, but the case was thrown out by several Argentine
courts and dismissed by the country’s highest appellate court in April 2015.46
The investigation into Nisman’s death continues, although many observers are skeptical that the
truth will be uncovered. In December 2015, a week after President Macri took office, Judge
Fabiana Palmaghini took over the investigation of Nisman’s death from the prosecutor in the
case.47 On the anniversary of Nisman’s death in January 2016, President Macri ordered the
declassification of all state information related to Nisman since September 2012, when
Argentina’s talks with Iran over AMIA reportedly began.48 Palmaghini reportedly had been
expected by many observers to issue a ruling that Nisman’s death was the result of a suicide. In
March 2016, however, reportedly just hours after former SI head Antonio Stiuso testified that
Nisman had been killed by a group with ties to former President Fernández, Judge Palmaghini
ruled that the case should be elevated to the federal courts.49 The case went to Argentina’s federal
court in April 2016, but in June 2016 was returned to Judge Palmaghini’s jurisdiction until
September 2016, when the case was once again elevated to the federal courts.
President Macri has said that he will be respectful of the judicial process but stated in a
September 2016 press interview that he believes Nisman was murdered. The President said that a
“definitive investigation” is needed to find out how Nisman died and that he wants Argentina’s
justice system to carry out the investigation with total independence.50
AMIA Investigation. In the aftermath of Nisman’s death, Argentina’s attorney general appointed
a team of lawyers in February 2015 to continue the work of the AMIA investigation. Court
proceedings began in Buenos Aires in August 2015 against 13 former officials alleged to be
involved in efforts to cover up the 1994 bombing investigation. The suspects include former
46 Jonathan Gilbert, “Federal Prosecutor Drops Kirchner Conspiracy Case,” New York Times, April 21, 2015.
47 “Judge Takes over Nisman Investigation,” Buenos Aires Herald, December 18, 2015.
48 “Macri Puts CFK in Nisman Spotlight,” Buenos Aires Herald, January 16, 2016.
49 “Nisman Case Sent to Federal Court,” Buenos Aires Herald, March 2, 2016; and Nick Miroff, “Argentina Still
Gripped by Death of Prosecutor Probing Terrorism Case,” Washington Post, March 20, 2016.
50 Andrés Oppenheimer, “Argentine President: Death of Prosecutor in Bombing Case Likely Murder, Not Suicide,”
Miami Herald, September 30, 2016.
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President Carlos Menem (1989-1999), former judge Juan José Galeano, two former prosecutors
who conducted investigations during the 1990s, three former intelligence officials, two former
police officials, a former head of DAIA, and the owner of a van used in the AMIA bombing.51
In December 2015, President Macri established a special unit within the Justice Ministry to
investigate the AMIA bombing. The head of the new unit, former Radical Civic Union leader
Mario Cimadevilla, maintained that Macri’s election opened up a new route into solving the case
and praised President Macri’s decision to drop the agreement with Iran to jointly investigate the
AMIA bombing.52
U.S. Policy
As in other parts of the world, the United States has assisted Latin American and Caribbean
nations over the years in their struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the
region. For example, in the 1980s, the United States supported the government of El Salvador
with significant economic and military assistance in its struggle against a leftist guerrilla
insurgency. In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat
terrorism in the Latin America and Caribbean region, including sanctions, antiterrorism assistance
and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the OAS.
Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that assistance
and sanctions aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the Andean region have also
been a means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist
organizations. The same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in
the region.53
U.S. attention to terrorism issues in Latin America increased in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington. Antiterrorism assistance increased along with bilateral and
regional cooperation against terrorism. Congress approved the Bush Administration’s request in
2002 to expand the scope of U.S. assistance to Colombia beyond a counternarcotics focus to
include counterterrorism assistance to the government in its military efforts against drug-financed
leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitaries. Border security with Mexico also became a prominent
issue in bilateral relations, with attention focused on the potential transit of terrorists through
Mexico to the United States.
Since 2011, some in Congress have focused extensively on concerns regarding the activities of
both Iran and Hezbollah in the region. Several House and Senate committee hearings have been
held, and most significantly, in December 2012, Congress enacted the Countering Iran in the
Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-220). As enacted, the measure required the Secretary
of State to conduct an assessment within 180 days of the “threats posed to the United States by
Iran’s growing presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere” and to develop a strategy to
address these threats.
Submitted to Congress in June 2013, the State Department report was mostly classified but, as
specified in the law, also included an unclassified summary of policy recommendations that
51 “Trial on Cover-Up of Bombing Set to Begin Next Week,” Buenos Aires Herald, July 30, 2015; “AMIA Cover-Up
Case Reaches Trial Phase,” Buenos Aires Herald, August 2, 2015.
52 “New Head of AMIA Unite Announces ‘Paradigm Shift’ in Probe,” Buenos Aires Herald, January 4, 2016.
53 For background on interaction between criminal organizations and terrorist groups, see CRS Report R41004,
Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress, by John W. Rollins and Liana W. Rosen.
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included border security and enforcement, diplomacy, sanctions, and intelligence sharing.54 The
State Department maintained in the unclassified portion of the report that “Iranian influence in
Latin America and the Caribbean is waning” because of U.S. diplomatic outreach, the
strengthening of allies’ capacity to disrupt illicit Iranian activity, international nonproliferation
efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations. The report
also stated that current U.S., European Union, and U.N. Security Council sanctions had limited
the economic relationship between the region and Iran.
U.S. Sanctions
The United States currently imposes sanctions on two groups in Colombia (ELN and FARC) and
one group in Peru (SL) designated by the Department of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
Official designation of such groups as FTOs triggers a number of sanctions, including visa
restrictions and Treasury Department sanctions blocking any funds of these groups in U.S.
financial institutions. The designation also has the effect of increasing public awareness about
these terrorist organizations and the concerns that the United States has about them. Numerous
groups, individuals, and companies in the region with links to the above and other terrorist groups
(such as Hezbollah) have also been sanctioned by the Treasury Department for drug trafficking
under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, Executive Order 13224 (Blocking Property
and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support
Terrorism), and Executive Order 12978 (Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with
Significant Narcotics Traffickers). As discussed above, the United States included Cuba on its list
of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the EAA and other laws, but
rescinded Cuba’s designation in May 2015. Venezuela currently remains on the annual Section
40A AECA list of countries that are not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts.
With regard to Venezuela, the Treasury Department has imposed financial sanctions against eight
current or former Venezuelan government and military officials for providing support to the
FARC’s weapons and drug trafficking. The State Department also maintains sanctions against the
Venezuelan Military Industries Company (CAVIM) pursuant to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 109-353) for allegedly violating a ban on technology that could assist
Iran in the development of weapons systems. The sanction, which prohibits any U.S. government
procurement or assistance to the company, was last renewed in December 2014 for a period of
two years.55 Sanctions against two other Venezuelan companies because of their support for
Iran—the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, C.A., and the state-run oil company, Petróleos de
Venezuela, S.A.—were removed in the aftermath of the comprehensive nuclear accord with Iran
negotiated in 2015. (For more on sanctions on Venezuela, see CRS Report R43239, Venezuela:
Background and U.S. Relations.)
With regard to Hezbollah, the Treasury Department also has imposed sanctions on numerous
individuals and companies in Latin America for providing support to Hezbollah. These have
included sanctions against individuals and entities in the tri-border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay as well as in Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela. At times, sanctions have been
connected to law enforcement cases, including cases involving the DEA. (For discussion of
54 U.S. Department of State, “Annex A, Unclassified Summary of Policy Recommendations,” included in report to
Congress required by the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-220), June 2013.
55 U.S. Department of State, “Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on
U.S. Government Procurement,” 79 Federal Register 78548, December 30. 2014.
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Hezbollah-linked trade-based money laundering, see CRS Report R44541, Trade-Based Money
Laundering: Overview and Policy Issues.)
U.S. Assistance, Support, and Regional Cooperation
The United States provides assistance to improve Latin American countries’ counterterrorism
capabilities through several types of programs administered by the Department of State, including
an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, an Export Control and Related Border Security
(EXBS) program, and a Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) program. The programs are
funded through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)
foreign aid funding account.
The ATA program has provided training and equipment to Latin American countries to help
improve their capabilities in such areas as airport security management, hostage negotiations,
bomb detection and deactivation, and countering terrorism financing. Such training was expanded
to Argentina in the aftermath of the two bombings in 1992 and 1994. Assistance was also stepped
up in 1997 to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in light of increased U.S. concern over illicit
activities in the tri-border area of those countries. In recent years, ATA for Western Hemisphere
countries amounted to almost $8 million in FY2014, almost $5.1 million in FY2015, and $2.2
million in FY2016. For FY2017, the Administration requested almost $5.1 million, with $1.75
million for Mexico, $0.8 million for Colombia, and $2.5 million for other Latin American
countries through a State Department regional program.
The EXBS program helps countries develop export and border control systems in order to prevent
states and terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems, and destabilizing conventional weapons. Latin American countries received $3 million
in EXBS funding in each of FY2014 and FY2015 and $2.87 million in FY2016. For FY2017, the
Administration requested $2.87 million, with assistance slated for Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Mexico, Panama, and a regional program.
The sole recipient of CWD funding in Latin America is Colombia, where the program is helping
government’s demining program become self-sufficient. U.S. assistance increases Colombia’s
ability to successfully clear mines and improvised explosive devices placed by the FARC and the
ELN. Colombia received $3.5 million in CWD funding for each of FY2014, FY2015, and
FY2016, while the Administration’s request for FY2017 was for $21 million.
In addition to these specific types of counterterrorism assistance, other U.S. assistance provided
to Latin American countries likely helps countries to improve their capabilities to deter potential
threats emanating from terrorist groups. This includes assistance to combat drug trafficking and
other transnational crime and advance citizen security through such programs as the Mérida
Initiative for Mexico, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, and the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative. It also includes assistance aimed at strengthening democratic governance,
including improvements in the capacity of state institutions to address citizens’ needs through
responsive legislative, judicial, law enforcement, and penal institutions.
A number of Latin American countries participate in U.S.-government port security programs
administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Container Security Initiative
(CSI) operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of DHS uses a security regime to
ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at
foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States. Ten Latin American
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ports in Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica,
and Panama participate in the CSI program.56
The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has
partnered with several Latin American countries to establish Trade Transparency Units (TTUs)
that facilitate exchanges of information in order to combat trade-based money laundering. TTUs
have been established in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. (Also see CRS Report R44541,
Trade-Based Money Laundering: Overview and Policy Issues.)
The United States also participates in the multilateral Financial Action Task Force, an
intergovernmental body established in 1989 to set standards and promote effective
implementation of measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.57 Two of
FATF’s regional bodies in the Americas are the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America
(GAFILAT) and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). The organizations conduct
evaluations or assessment of countries’ efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing.
In addition to its annual Country Reports on Terrorism, the State Department also examines
countries’ efforts worldwide to counter money laundering and terrorist financing in its annual
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.58 In its 2016 report, the State Department
identified 20 countries or jurisdictions in Latin America or the Caribbean as “major laundering
countries” or “jurisdictions of primary concern,” meaning the country has financial institutions
engaging in financial transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from all forms of
serious crime. The report includes a discussion of money laundering in each country and its
efforts taken to combat money laundering and potential terrorist financing.
In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the United States
joined with Latin American and Caribbean nations and took action through the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against
terrorism. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru at the time, swiftly condemned the
attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat terrorism, and
expressed full solidarity with the United States. At a special session on September 19, 2001, OAS
members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the
Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories to the treaty to come to one another’s defense in case of
outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on Rio Treaty
signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish those
individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support to the United
States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also to prevent future terrorist
acts.” In June 2002, OAS members signed the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism,
which had the objective of improving regional cooperation against terrorism. Among its
provisions, the treaty committed parties to sign and ratify U.N. antiterrorism instruments, take
actions against the financing of terrorism, and deny safe haven to suspected terrorists.59
56 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CSI: Container Security Initiative,” June 2014, at https://www.cbp.gov/
border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/csi/csi-brief.
57 Financial Action Task Force, website, at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/home/.
58 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume II, Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes, March 2016, at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2016/vol2/index.htm.
59 President Bush submitted the Convention to the Senate on November 12, 2002, for its advice and consent, and the
treaty was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Treaty Doc. 107-18). In the 109th Congress, the
(continued...)
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In the aftermath of 9/11, OAS members also reinvigorated efforts of the Inter-American
Committee on Terrorism (CICTE), first established in 1999, to combat terrorism in the
hemisphere. CICTE has cooperated on border security mechanisms, controls to prevent terrorist
funding, and law enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence and information.60 It has worked
on a wide range of capacity building and training programs, including border controls (covering
maritime and aviation security, customs, and immigration), critical infrastructure protection
(covering cybersecurity, major events security, and tourism security), counter-terrorism legislative
assistance and combating terrorism financing, and strengthening strategies on emerging terrorist
threats. At its 16th regular session held in February 2016, CICTE focused on the use of the
Internet for terrorist and criminal purposes and the issue of cybersecurity.61
Legislative Initiatives and Oversight
Over the past several years, Congress has introduced legislative initiatives and held oversight
hearings pertaining to terrorism issues in the Western Hemisphere.
Iran, Hezbollah, and the AMIA Bombing. With regard to Iran, the 111th Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Disinvestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195),
which included a provision making gasoline sales to Iran subject to U.S. sanctions. The measure
led to the sanctioning of Venezuela’s state oil company in 2011 for sales to Iran. (As noted above,
the sanctions were lifted in the aftermath of the 2015 comprehensive nuclear accord negotiated
with Iran.) The 112th Congress enacted the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of
2012 (H.R. 3783, P.L. 112-220), which required the Administration to conduct an assessment and
present “a strategy to address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western
Hemisphere.” The law also stated that
it shall be the policy of the United States to use a comprehensive government-wide
strategy to counter Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western
Hemisphere by working together with United States allies and partners in the region to
mutually deter threats to United States interests by the Government of Iran, the Iranian
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the IRGC’s Qods Force, and Hezbollah.
For many years, Congress expressed concern about progress in Argentina’s investigation of the
1994 AMIA bombing, with the House often passing resolutions on the issue around the time of
the anniversary of the bombing in July. In the 111th Congress, the House approved H.Con.Res.
156 (Ros-Lehtinen), which condemned the AMIA bombing and urged Western Hemisphere
governments to take actions to curb the activities that support Hezbollah and other such extremist
groups.
In the 114th Congress, two Senate resolutions were introduced related to the AMIA bombing.
S.Res. 167 (Rubio), introduced in May 2015, would have called for a swift, transparent, and
internationally backed investigation into the tragic death of Alberto Nisman (the special
prosecutor in the AMIA investigation); expressed concern about Iran’s activities in Argentina and
(...continued)
committee formally reported the treaty on July 28, 2005 (Senate Exec. Rept. 109-3), and on October 7, 2005, the
Senate agreed to the resolution of advice and consent. The United States deposited its instruments of ratification for the
Convention on November 15, 2005.
60 See the website of the CICTE at http://www.cicte.oas.org/Rev/en/.
61 U.S. Department of State, Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE): Sixteenth Regular Session,
Remarks by Christopher Painter, Coordinator for Cyber Issues, February 26, 2016, at https://www.state.gov/s/
cyberissues/releasesandremarks/253727.htm.
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all of the Western Hemisphere; and urged the President to continue to monitor Iran’s activities in
Latin America and the Caribbean. S.Res. 620 (Coons), introduced November 29, 2016, would
have, among its provisions, encouraged the government of Argentina to investigate and prosecute
those responsible for the 1994 AMIA bombing as well as the death of Nisman.
Cuba. With regard to Cuba, H.R. 274 (Rush), introduced in January 2015, would, among its
provisions, have rescinded any determination of the Secretary of State in that Cuba has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism. As noted above, in May 2015, President
Obama rescinded Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and Congress did not take
any legislative action to block the Administration’s action.
As discussed above, for a number of years, the State Department had noted in its annual terrorism
report Cuba’s harboring of fugitives wanted in the United States. The House-passed version of the
FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), H.R. 4909, had a provision that would
have prohibited funds in the act for any bilateral military-to-military contact or cooperation
pending certification from the Secretaries of State and Defense that Cuba has fulfilled numerous
conditions, including Cuba’s return of U.S. fugitives wanted by the Department of Justice;
ultimately the language regarding fugitives was not included in the conference report to the
FY2017 NDAA (H.Rept. 114-840 to S. 2943). Among other initiatives: H.Res. 181 (King),
introduced in March 2015, would have called for the immediate extradition or rendering to the
United States of all fugitives from justice who are receiving safe harbor in Cuba to escape
prosecution or confinement for criminal offenses in the United States; H.R. 2937 (Nunes)/S. 1489
(Rubio), introduced in June 2015, included a provision that would have called for the Attorney
General, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to work with INTERPOL to pursue the
location and arrest of U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba; and H.R. 4772 (Pearce), introduced in
March 2016, would have prohibited funding to accept commercial flight plans between the
United States and Cuba until Cuba extradited U.S. fugitives from justice. Another bill, H.R. 2189
(Smith, NJ), would have required a report from the President regarding information on U.S.
fugitives from justice abroad (not just Cuba) and U.S. efforts to secure the return of such
fugitives.
Mexico. In April 2016, the House approved H.R. 4482 (McSally), which would have required the
Secretary of Homeland Security to prepare a southwest border threat analysis and strategic plan,
including efforts to detect and prevent terrorists and instruments of terrorism from entering the
United States.
Oversight Hearings. The 114th Congress continued its oversight of terrorism concerns in Latin
America and the Caribbean. In March 2015, two subcommittees of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs—the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and the Subcommittee
on the Western Hemisphere—held an oversight hearing on Iran and Hezbollah in the Western
Hemisphere with private witnesses.62 In June 2015, the House Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee held a hearing on prospects for a peace accord between the Colombian
government and the FARC.63 In March 2016, the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee held
a hearing on border security challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean.64 In June 2016, the
62 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and Subcommittee
on the Middle East and North Africa, Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere, Joint Hearing, 114th Cong., 1st
sess., March 18, 2015, Serial No. 114-34 (Washington: GPO, 2015).
63 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Colombia: Peace
with the FARC? Hearing, 114th Cong., 1st sess., June 24, 2015, Serial No. 114-58 (Washington: GPO, 2015).
64 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Potential Terrorist
Threats: Border Security Challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean, Hearing, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., March 22,
(continued...)
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Latin America: Terrorism Issues
Congressional Research Service 22
House Financial Service Committee’s Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing held a
hearing on terrorist funding in South America.65
The SOUTHCOM Commander usually testifies before the Armed Services Committees annually.
In presenting the command’s 2016 posture statement to Congress in March 2016, Admiral Kurt
Tidd testified that “as a state sponsor of terrorism, Iran’s nefarious involvement in the Western
Hemisphere is a matter for concern.” He also noted a number of individuals and families leaving
the region to join the Islamic State in Syria or Iraq.66
Author Contact Information
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
[email protected], 7-7689
June S. Beittel
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
[email protected], 7-7613
(...continued)
2016, Serial No. 114-155 (Washington: GPO, 2016).
65 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, Hearing
entitled “The Enemy in Our Backyard: Examining Terror Funding Streams from South America,” June 8, 2016,
testimony at http://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=40….
66 Posture statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2016, at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/tidd_03-10-
16.
Annex 21
ANNEX 22
9/24/2019 GxMS Friendly Print
1/1
Report: Hizbullah and Iran behind Buenos Aires
bombings
26 Oct 2006
Hundreds were killed and wounded in an attack on the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and the Buenos Aires Jewish
community center in 1994.
Close
(Communicated by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Bureau)
The government yesterday (Wednesday, 25 October) welcomed the publication of the results of the special investigation
into the terrorist attack on the Buenos Aires Jewish Community Building (AMIA) in Argentina on July 18, 1994. The
investigation determined unequivocally that the attack was carried out by Hizbullah, with the support of the leaders of
Iranian government. Eighty-five persons were murdered and hundreds wounded in the bombing.
Israel had claimed for years that Hizbullah and Iran, both of which continue to perpetrate terrorism today, were
responsible for both the AMIA attack and a deadly assault on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992, in
which 29 were murdered and some 300 wounded.
With the release of the report, Israel expects the Argentinian government to take the necessary steps to bring those
responsible for these atrocities to justice.
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9/3/2019 Macri wants those behind the AMIA attack to be tried in Argentina — MercoPress
https://en.mercopress.com/2019/07/19/macri-wants-those-behind-the-amia-… 2/4
The Argentine flag flew at half mast before the Casa
Rosada in mourning for those killed in 1994.
Argentine President Mauricio Macri Thursday pledged to continue to seek that the people involved in the 1994 bombing of the Israeli Social Service Associacion (AMIA)
“be tried in Argentine territory” to bring impunity to an end, once “the weight of the law has reached those responsible.”
Macri made these statements upon presenting at the Casa Rosada Museum the book “Justicia Perseguirás” (Justice Thou Shalt Seek), a collection of reflections from world
leaders about the deadliest terrorist attack in the country, which left 85 people dead.
”We will continue to look for those accused of these acts to be tried in Argentine territory and we will keep the red alerts (from Interpol) on them, and we ask the Islamic
Republic of Iran to collaborate in the investigation,“ Macri said.
During the ceremony, the president also wondered ”what happened to [prosecutor] Alberto Nisman,“ who was in charge of the AMIA case unit and was found dead in his
apartment in 2015 with a gunshot to his head in what the administration of then President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner tried to portait as a suicide.
As per a decree signed by Macri earlier this week, Thursday the Argentine flag flew at half mast in mourning for those killed in the AMIA attack on July 18, 1994.
At 9:53 am, the exact time of the explosion, hundreds of sirens sounded throughout the city of Buenos Aires, particularly at the site of the AMIA building and at police
stations and cars as well as at fire brigade baracks while bells tolled at schools and churches.
At the site on Pasteur street, survivors and relatives of the victims gathered in the now usual yearly ritual to pray.
The Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo and other organisations held a separate event on Plaza Lavalle just in front of the main federal courthouse to outline the lack of justice
in the AMIA bombing case.
Diana Wassner, whose husband Andrés Malamud died in the attack, delivered the closing speech: ”I've been standing in the same place for 25 years, [still] detained on the
same page.“
That lack of justice should be less surprising in a country where as rescuers did a humanitarian work in the ruins of the building, all valuable items seeemed to have been
vanished under the expansive wave.
Diana Malamud recovered her dead husband's watch, his wedding ring and his wallet, but it only contained six pesos. ”My husband always had a lot of money with him,
someone took the money and left only his credit cards and personal papers,“ she said in a newspaper interview. According to survivors, Andrés Malamud, who was the
architect in charge of the repair works of the building - had six thousand dollars in his pocket.
In a separate event, AMIA President Ariel Eichbaum stressed that ”we must take dimension of the passage of time and what it means not to have justice.”
Eichbaum has taken part in several tributes abroad this year and spoke before a special session of the United Nations in New York.
In Tel Aviv, Ilan Sztulman, who has just returned from a three-year term as Israel’s ambassador in Buenos Aires, noted approvingly that Argentinian lawmakers are now
considering legislation to enable the trial in absentia of suspects in the bombing, in reference to a decision to advance legislation providing for such trials.
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Annex 24
ANNEX 25
United Nations S/2017/515
Security Council Distr.: General
20 June 2017
Original: English
17-09630 (E) 270617
*1709630*
Third report of the Secretary-General on the implementation
of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
I. Introduction
1. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council, in its resolution 2231 (2015), endorsed
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action concluded by China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
United States of America, the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
2. At the start of my tenure as Secretary-General, I am encouraged by the
continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I hope that
ongoing commitments to the Plan can provide an example of the benefits of
diplomacy, which leads to the reduction of tensions among States. I encourage al l
States to act in accordance with and support this historic agreement, and avoid
provocative actions and speech.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to verify and
monitor the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related
commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. On 15 January 2017,
IAEA announced that it had verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had removed,
within one year from Implementation Day, as required by the Plan, all excess
centrifuges and infrastructure from the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and
transferred them to storage at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant under IAEA
continuous monitoring.
4. In March and June 2017, the Agency issued quarterly reports on its
verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution
2231 (2015) (S/2017/234 and S/2017/502). The Agency reported that it has been
verifying and monitoring the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its
nuclear-related commitments since Implementation Day and that the Islamic
Republic of Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its
Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and the transparency measures
contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Agency also reported that
it continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its
evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for
the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing.
5. I welcome the recent recommitment by the participants in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, in Vienna on 25 April 2017, to the full and effective
implementation of the Plan. I call upon them to continue to work together in good
faith and reciprocity to ensure that all participants benefit from the Plan. In
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2/9 17-09630
resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council called upon all Member States,
regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may
be appropriate to support the implementation of the Plan. It is in the interest of the
international community, writ large, that this achievement of multilateral diplomacy
endures transitions and implementation challenges, cementing our collective
commitment to diplomacy and dialogue.
6. The present report, the third on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015),
provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings
and recommendations, since the second report of the Secretary-General, issued on
30 December 2016 (S/2016/1136). Consistent with the first and second reports, the
focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution
2231 (2015), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers,
ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic
Republic of Iran, as well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.
II. Key findings and recommendations
7. Since 16 January 2016, my predecessor and I have not received any report on
the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear or dual -
use items, materials, equipment, goods or technology undertaken contrary to
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
8. Since 30 December 2016, 10 additional proposals to participate in or permit
activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran for nuclear or non-nuclear civilian end
uses were submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement
channel. Five of the proposals have been approved by the Council.
9. On 29 January 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched a Khorramshahr
medium-range ballistic missile. As in the case of the ballistic missile launches by
the Islamic Republic of Iran in March 2016 (see S/2016/649, paras. 17-22), there
was no consensus in the Security Council on how this particular launch related to
resolution 2231 (2015). I call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to avoid such
ballistic missile launches, which have the potential to increase tensions. I appeal to
all Member States to redouble their efforts to promote peace and stability in the
region.
10. The Secretariat has examined the weapons and analysed the information
related to the arms shipment seized by the French frigate Provence in the northern
Indian Ocean in March 2016 (see S/2016/1136, para. 27). On the basis of the
information analysed, the Secretariat is confident that the weapons seized are of
Iranian origin and were shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
11. Iranian entities, including the Defence Industries Organisation, which is on the
list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), once again participated in the
International Defence Exhibition in Iraq. The present report also provides
information on additional travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. I reiterate my
call upon all Member States to fully implement their obligations in relation to
resolution 2231 (2015), including those regarding the travel ban and asset freeze of
individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
12. In resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the establishment of
a dedicated procurement channel, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to
review proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual -
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use goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Through this channel, the Council reviews and decides on recommendations from
the Joint Commission established under the Plan regarding proposals by States to
participate in or permit activities set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015).
13. Since 30 December 2016, 10 new proposals to participate in or permit the
activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) were
submitted to the Security Council, bringing to 16 the total number of proposals
submitted since Implementation Day for approval through the procurement channel.
At the time of reporting, 10 proposals were approved by the Council, two were
withdrawn by the proposing States and four are currently under review by the Joint
Commission.
14. In addition, the Security Council received six new notifications pursuant to
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related
activities that do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security
Council or to both the Security Council and the Joint Commission.
IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic
Republic of Iran
15. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council
called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to
ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including
launches using such ballistic missile technology.
16. On 1 February 2017, the Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran
confirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had flight-tested a ballistic missile,
while stressing that the launch did not contradict the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action or resolution 2231 (2015).1 In the same period, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that the Islamic Republic of Iran ’s
ballistic missiles “have not been designed to be capable of carrying a nuclear
weapons” and therefore were not in violation of resolution 2231 (2015).2
17. On 7 February 2017, I received a joint letter from France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and the United States on the launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran of a
Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missile on 29 January 2017. Those States
underscored that the phrase “ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering
nuclear weapons” in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) included all
Missile Technology Control Regime Category I systems, defined as those capable of
delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km, which are
inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction. Those States considered that since the Khorramshahr is designed to be
capable of delivering a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km, the launch of
the missile constituted an “activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be
capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and “[a] launch using such ballistic missile
technology”, which the Islamic Republic of Iran has been called upon not to
undertake pursuant to paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In the
letter it was also stated that the launch was destabilizing and provocative and that it
had been conducted in defiance of resolution 2231 (2015).
__________________
1 Fars News Agency, “Iran Confirms Missile Test”, 1 February 2017.
2 Mehr News Agency, “Iran not to hesitate in reinforcing defense capabilities”, 31 January 2017.
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18. In identical letters dated 10 February 2017 addressed to me and the President
of the Security Council (S/2017/123), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the
United Nations expressed Israel’s strong condemnation of the ballistic missile test
conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 29 January 2017. He indicated that the
Khorramshahr medium-range missile had travelled a distance of 1,000 km. He also
stated that the Khorramshahr is a Missile Technology Control Regime Category I
missile “capable of delivering a nuclear payload of 500 kilograms for a range of
over 300 kilometres”. He concluded that the test constituted “yet another flagrant
violation” of resolution 2231 (2015) and that “the development of surface-to-surface
missiles with nuclear warhead capability reveals the true intentions of Iran not to
comply with resolution 2231 (2015)”.
19. In a letter dated 9 March 2017 addressed to the President of the Security
Council (S/2017/205), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the United Nations stated that the above-mentioned letter from the Permanent
Representative of Israel was “replete with baseless speculations about the name,
range, performance and technical characteristics of a missile”. He also stated that
“Iran’s indigenous missiles are an indivisible part of its conventional deterrence and
defensive capabilities” and underlined that “no universal norm, treaty or agreement
bans or limits the development and testing of missiles equipped with conventional
capabilities for self-defence requirements”. He further stated that “nothing in
Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) prohibits Iran’s conventional missile
activities” and concluded that “in this context, any demand for the cessation of
Iran’s legitimate and conventional defence activities is groundless and
unwarranted”.
20. The Security Council discussed the Iranian ballistic missile launch on
31 January and 2 March 2017. There was no consensus among Council members on
how that particular launch related to resolution 2231 (2015). The third six-month
report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231
(2015) provides the details of Council deliberations on this issue.3
B. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related transfers or activities with
the Islamic Republic of Iran
21. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), provided that
they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case
basis, all States may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from
the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology,4 the provision of various services or assistance,
and the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain
commercial ballistic missile-related activities. At the time of reporting, no proposal
had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.
22. In his identical letters dated 10 February 2017, the Permanent Representative
of Israel stated that the Khorramshahr missile originated from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, which had also conducted several tests of the same
kind of missile in 2016. He added that “this serves as additional proof of the
cooperation between Iran and DPRK on the development and transfer o f surface-tosurface
missile technologies”. In his letter dated 9 March 2017, the Permanent
__________________
3 Document symbol not yet assigned.
4 The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile
Technology Control Regime list (S/2015/546, annex) and any items, materials, equipment, goods
and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems.
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Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the aforementioned letter
from the Permanent Representative of Israel contained “misleading information, lies
and allegations”.
23. In a letter dated 7 June 2017, the United States brought to the attention of the
Secretariat information on a shipment of ballistic missile-related items that, in its
assessment, was undertaken contrary to resolution 2231 (2015). The letter stated
that “in October 2016, an Iranian firm that supports the ballistic missile program
received a consignment of controlled carbon fiber”. The letter concluded that
“because this shipment did not receive advance, case-by-case approval as specified
in Annex B of UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), this export to Iran’s
ballistic missile program was a violation of that resolution”.
24. The Secretariat has not been able to independently corroborate these reports. I
will provide a further update on these issues should additional information become
available to the Secretariat.
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
A. Restrictions on arms-related transfers to the Islamic Republic
of Iran
25. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States,
provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a
case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the
Islamic Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, largecalibre
artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or
missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts. Prior approval from
the Council is also required for the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of
technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or
assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of
those arms and related materiel.
26. On 20 January 2017, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine announced the
discovery of 17 boxes containing missile system components and aircraft parts
without accompanying documents in a cargo plane in Kyiv bound for the Islamic
Republic of Iran. In its interactions with the Secretariat, the Permanent Mission of
Ukraine to the United Nations confirmed that competent Ukrainian authorities had
prevented an unauthorized shipment of suspected military items on 19 January
2017, including possible component parts of the “Fagot” anti-tank missile system,
had initiated criminal proceedings on 30 January 2017 and were in the process of
determining whether the confiscated items were covered by paragraph 5 of annex B
to resolution 2231 (2015). On 13 June 2017, during consultations in Kyiv, Ukrainian
authorities shared additional information on the unauthorized shipment with the
Secretariat, including on the status of the judicial proceedings and classification
process of the confiscated items. I intend to report to the Security Council in due
course as additional information becomes available.
27. In a letter dated 1 June 2017, the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the
United Nations confirmed to the Secretariat that on 27 April 2017, in the port of
Zonguldak, Turkish authorities confiscated component parts of 9K111 Fagot and
9K113 Konkurs anti-tank guided missiles concealed in a truck that was transiting
from Ukraine to the Islamic Republic of Iran on board a vessel named CENK Y.
According to Turkish authorities, the Iranian truck driver stated that he had obtained
the items from another Iranian citizen in Kyiv, to be transported to the Islamic
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Republic of Iran. A criminal investigation has been launched by the Office of the
Prosecutor of Zonguldak Province. On 9 June 2017, during consultations in Ankara,
Turkish authorities confirmed to the Secretariat that judicial proceedings were
ongoing. I will report to the Security Council accordingly as additional information
becomes available, including on whether the confiscated items are covered by
paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
28. With regard to the provision of services or assistance related to the
maintenance of arms and related materiel specified in paragraph 5 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015), open-source information indicated that services had been
provided to a warship5 of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the port of
Durban, South Africa, in late 2016.6 In a letter dated 16 May 2017, the Permanent
Representative of South Africa to the United Nations confirmed to the Secretariat
that “following a distress call from the Iranian vessel Bushehr, the vessel was
allowed to enter Durban port on 15 November 2016” and “departed on 22 January
2017 following emergency repairs on its hull”. He also indicated that “its
accompanying vessel, the Alvand, requested access to the Durban Port on
19 November 2016 to support the Bushehr and departed on 10 January 2017”. The
Permanent Representative stressed that “the assistance provided to the Bushehr
related to emergency repairs undertaken in accordance with South Africa ’s
international obligations to assist a vessel in distress and was not related to ‘the
supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related
materiel’ as provided for in paragraph 5 of Annex B of UN Security Council
resolution 2231 (2015)”.
B. Restrictions on arms-related transfers from the Islamic Republic
of Iran
29. In paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council
decided that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as
decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply,
sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the
time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that
paragraph.
30. In July 2016, France brought to the attention of my predecessor information on
the seizure of an arms shipment on board a stateless dhow on 20 March 2016 in the
northern Indian Ocean. In its assessment, the arms shipment had originated in the
Islamic Republic of Iran and was likely bound for Somalia or Yemen. In January
2017, France provided to the Secretariat additional information regarding the dhow,
including its course prior to its interception, documents found on board and the
identity of some of the crew members. The Secretariat notes that the dhow was
stopped by the frigate Provence at a point on the most direct and economical route
between its home port, Konarak, Islamic Republic of Iran, and its destination off the
coast of Somalia, as declared by the crew master, an Iranian individual.
__________________
5 Warships are defined in the Register of Conventional Arms as “vessels or submarines armed and
equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 500 metric tons or above, and those
with a standard displacement of less than 500 metric tons, equipped for launching missiles with a
range of at least 25 kilometres or torpedoes with similar range”. It is the understanding of the
Secretariat that the Iranian vessel involved had a displacement of more than 500 metric tons and
was armed and equipped for military use.
6 Jeremy Binnie, “Iranian navy flotilla stuck in South Africa”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 January
2017.
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31. In March 2017, French authorities granted full access to the Secretariat to
examine the assault rifles, sniper rifles, light machine guns and anti-tank missiles
seized. The Secretariat was able to independently ascertain that the 2,000 assault
rifles and 64 sniper rifles were in new condition. Although lacking country or
factory marking, the weapons corresponded to known features of Iranianmanufactured
weapons. The 2,000 assault rifles have characteristics identical to
Iranian-produced KLS-7.62 mm,7 an assault rifle type AK-47. The 64 sniper rifles
have characteristics identical to those of the Iranian-produced SVD sniper rifle.
Furthermore, the Secretariat confirmed with the foreign manufacturer of the optical
sights fitting the sniper rifles that they were produced as recently as 2015 and were
sold to an Iranian company.
32. My predecessor and I received several letters regarding the arms shipments
seized by Australia and the United States in early 2016, information that was
already provided to the Security Council in the first and second reports on the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). They include identical letters dated
15 May 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council from the
Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations (S/2017/427), as
well as a note verbale dated 27 October 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the
United Arab Emirates to the United Nations (A/71/581). The latter brought to the
attention of my predecessor a letter dated 18 October 2016 addressed to the
President of the General Assembly from the Permanent Representatives of Bahrain,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the United
Arab Emirates and Yemen (ibid., annex).
33. In a letter dated 18 February 2017 addressed to me, the Permanent
Representative of Yemen to the United Nations stated that “multiple reports of
similar interceptions documented the seizure of considerable quantities of weapons
and ammunition” that, in the assessment of Yemen, included “Iranian-made
anti-tank missiles, assault rifles, Dragunov sniper rifles, AK-47s, spare barrels,
mortar tubes, and hundreds of rocket-propelled grenades, and RBG launchers”. He
also stated that three disassembled spy drones found concealed in a truck at the
Yemen-Oman border on 12 December 2016 by Yemeni armed forces and a spy
drone belonging to the Houthis intercepted in-flight by coalition forces in the
Al-Mokha area on 28 January 2017 were a “clear manifestation of the involvement
of Iranians in providing the Houthis with weapons and expertise”. The Government
of Yemen was invited to provide detailed information, documents and images. I will
report thereon to the Council accordingly as additional information becomes
available.
34. In a letter dated 18 May 2017, the Permanent Representative of the United
Arab Emirates to the United Nations brought to the attention of the Secretariat
information regarding arms and related materiel seized or recovered by the armed
forces of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen since 16 January 2016 that, in the
assessment of the United Arab Emirates, were Iranian-made or sourced. This
included detailed information and images of anti-tank missiles and unmanned aerial
vehicles reportedly seized or recovered by the Presidential Guard forces of the
United Arab Emirates. The Secretariat is examining the information and will
provide an update to the Council, as appropriate, in due course.
35. In the second report of the Secretary-General, information was provided that
arms and related materiel are shipped by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to
Hizbullah using commercial flights from the Islamic Republic of Iran, either
directly to Beirut or via Damascus (see S/2016/1136, para. 32). In a statement dated
24 November 2016, the Chair of Rafic Hariri International Airport strongly refuted
__________________
7 The KLS is the fixed stock version of the Iranian-produced KL-7.62 mm assault rifle.
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those allegations. In identical letters dated 25 January 2017 addressed to me and the
President of the Security Council (A/71/770-S/2017/80), the Permanent
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that the letter of the
Permanent Representative of Israel dated 21 November 2016 (S/2016/987)
contained fabrications and false claims and reiterated that his Government respects
its obligations pursuant to international resolutions.
36. Information released by the organizers of the sixth International Defence
Exhibition in Iraq, held in Baghdad from 5 to 7 March 2017, indicates that several
Iranian entities participated in the exhibition for the second year in a row. According
to press coverage of the event, items displayed by those entities appear to have
included small arms, artillery ammunition, rockets, anti-tank guided missiles and
man-portable air defence systems. The Secretariat again raised the issue with the
Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations. The Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations had previously stated that it believed
that no prior approval was required from the Security Council for that activity since
the Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. I intend to
report thereon to the Council in due course as additional information becomes
available.
VI. Implementation of the asset freeze provisions
37. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all
States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the
individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015)8
and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available
to those individuals and entities.
38. It appears that an entity presently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution
2231 (2015), the Defence Industries Organisation, may have participated again in
the International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, which was held in March 2017 (see
para. 36 above). Its name is on the exhibitors list released by the organizers of the
exhibition and, according to images released by the Iraqi and Iranian media, its
official company logo appears on several visual displays next to exhibited items. All
of the entity’s funds, other financial assets and economic resources on Iraqi territory
on the date of adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or at any time
thereafter should have been frozen by the Iraqi authorities. The issue was raised
again with the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations. I intend to report
thereon to the Council in due course.
VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision
39. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States are
to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their
territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231
__________________
8 Available from www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. The list maintained pursuant to resolution
2231 (2015) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under Security
Council resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the
exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231
(2015), who were delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities,
and list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined in
resolution 2231 (2015). There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained
pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
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(2015). At the time of reporting, no travel exemption requests had been received or
granted by the Security Council in relation to individuals presently on the list.
40. Since the issuance of the second report of the Secretary-General, additional
information has surfaced regarding travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. New
pictures and video showing the General in the vicinity of Aleppo, Syrian Arab
Republic, in late December 2016 were reproduced in early January 2017. In February
2017, in an interview with an Iranian media outlet (Tasnim News Agency), the
President of Iraq, in response to a question about the presence of the General in Iraq,
reportedly stated that “the presence of General Qasem Soleimani is in the context of
the presence of foreign military advisors in Iraq”. He stressed that Iranian military
advisers, including the General, had a right to be present in Iraq, as did advisers from
other countries, to provide military advice in the fight against terrorism.
41. Furthermore, in early April 2017, Iranian and Arab media outlets (Fars News
Agency, Al-Masdar News) reproduced a picture allegedly showing Major General
Soleimani in the central province of Hama in the Syrian Arab Republic for a meeting
with officers of the Syrian Arab Army. A few days later, media from the Kurdish
region of Iraq (Rudaw Media Network) reported that Major General Soleimani had
visited Sulaymaniyah, in Iraqi Kurdistan. Several Iranian and Arab media outlets (Fars
News Agency, Al-Masdar News) also reported that the General had been
photographed with Iraqi popular mobilization forces in north-western Iraq on 29 May
2017. According to those reports, Major General Soleimani was present in the area as
part of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps advisory mission during an operation of
the popular mobilization forces along the Iraq-Syrian Arab Republic border crossing.
VIII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
facilitator for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
42. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs
has continued to support the work of the Security Council and of its facilitator for
the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has also continued to
liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters
related to the procurement channel.
43. The Division continued to promote publicly available information on the
restrictions imposed by resolution 2231 (2015) through the Security Council website.9
Relevant documents were regularly added in all official languages to the website. The
Division also continued to use outreach opportunities to promote information on the
resolution, in particular the procurement channel, in line with paragraph 6 (e) of the
note by the President of the Security Council dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). On
18 January 2017, the Division participated in an export control seminar organized by
the Awa Aussenwirtschafts-Akademie (Foreign Trade Academy) in Frankfurt,
Germany. On 12 June 2017, the Division also participated in a public awarenessraising
seminar related to the procurement channel organized by the Vienna Centre for
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, held in Vienna.
44. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from
Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the
provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the procedures for the
submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.
__________________
9 www.un.org/en/sc/2231/.
Annex 25
ANNEX 26
United Nations S/2017/1030
Security Council Distr.: General
8 December 2017
Original: English
17-21508 (E) 141217
*1721508*
Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
I. Introduction
1. Almost two years after Implementation Day (16 January 2016), I continue to
believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is the best way to ensure the
exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and to realize the aspirations of the Iranian people. The Plan constitutes a major
achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and diplomacy in addressing issues that
could have an impact on regional and international peace and security, and it is my
hope that it will be preserved.
2. Since 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported
nine times to the Security Council that the Islamic Republic of Iran is impleme nting
its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In its
most recent quarterly reports (S/2017/777 and S/2017/994), the Agency again
reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and
that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities
for the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing. The Agency also reported that the
Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to
its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and to apply the transparency
measures contained in the Plan. In its latest report, the Agency further indicated that
it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the
sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.
3. Against this backdrop of diplomatic achievement, compliance and robust
verification, the decision of 13 October by the President of the United States of
America not to certify that the suspension of its national sanctions pursuant to the
agreement is “appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures
taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear programme”, and the
potential legislative actions that the Congress of the United States may take to
reimpose those national sanctions, have regrettably created considerable uncertainty
regarding the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. At present, these
national executive actions do not affect the validity of the Plan or the respective
commitments of the participants contained therein. I am reassured that the United
States has expressed its commitment to stay in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action for now.
4. I call upon all participants to remain steadfast in their commitment to the full
implementation of the agreement and to work through differences and challenges in
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a spirit of cooperation and compromise, good faith and reciprocity. It is important that
the Plan continue to work for all its participants, including by delivering benefits to
the Iranian people.
5. I encourage all Member States and regional and international organizations to
act in accordance with and support the implementation of this historic agreement,
which is in the interest of the international community at large. I welcome the
commitment of the European Union to the continued full and effective
implementation of all parts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I also welcome
the affirmative statements by China, the Russian Federation and numerous other
Member States in support of the Plan. I encourage the United States to maintain its
commitments to the Plan and to consider the broader implications for the region and
beyond before taking any further steps. Similarly, I encourage the Islamic Republic
of Iran to carefully consider the concerns raised by other participants in the Plan.
6. The present report, the fourth on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015),
provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings
and recommendations, since the issuance of the third report of the Secretar y-General
(S/2017/515), on 20 June 2017. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the
present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015),
which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missilerelated
transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as
well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.
II. Key findings and recommendations
7. Since 16 January 2016, the Secretariat has not received any reports on the
supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear or dual -use
items, materials, equipment, goods or technology undertaken contrary to paragraph 2
of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In relation to alleged inconsistent Iranian
procurement activities in Germany, the Government of Germany confirmed to the
Secretariat in November 2017 that it had no indications of any activities inconsistent
with paragraph 2 of annex B and had no evidence of any transfers or activities
inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B.
8. Since 20 June 2017, eight additional proposals to participate in or permit
activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran for nuclear or non-nuclear civilian end
uses have been submitted to the Security Council for approval through the
Procurement Channel.1
9. On the basis of interactions that took place during outreach activities carried out
by the Secretariat, it appears that there remains a general lack of understanding of
resolution 2231 (2015), especially in the private sector. This lack of understanding,
coupled with a sense of political uncertainty, appears to have adversely affected the
decisions of some Member States and private sector entities to engage in activities
requiring prior approval from the Security Council. Member States should undertake
greater efforts to promote awareness and understanding of the specific restrictions, in
particular the Procurement Channel, the procedures for the submission of proposals
and the process for review. The Secretariat stands ready to assist Member States in such
efforts, in line with the arrangements and procedures outlined in the note by the
President of the Council dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44).
10. Regarding the emerging information on the possible transfer by the Islamic
Republic of Iran of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related technology to the
__________________
1 All nuclear-related proposals and other documents related to the Procurement Channel are treated
as confidential.
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Houthis in Yemen that may have been used in the ballistic missile launches aimed at
the territory of Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017, the Secretariat has
examined the debris of the missiles launched at Yanbu‘ and Riyadh and is carefully
reviewing all the information and material available. The Security Council should
consider a joint meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 2140 (2014) and the Council in the “2231 format”, to be jointly briefed by
the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the Secretariat on their respective findings at the
appropriate time.
11. The Secretariat was provided with an opportunity to examine the arms and
related materiel seized by the United States aboard a dhow in the vicinity of the Gulf
of Oman in March 2016 (see S/2016/589, paras. 29–31). The Secretariat is confident
that close to 900 of the assault rifles seized by the United States are identical to those
seized by France, also in March 2016, which the Secretariat had assessed to be o f
Iranian origin and to have been shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran
(see S/2017/515, para. 10).
12. The Defence Industries Organisation, an entity on the list maintained pursuant
to resolution 2231 (2015), 2 participated in a foreign exhibition, the International
Aviation and Space Salon, held in Zhukovsky, Russian Federation, in July 2017. In
November, the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
informed the Secretariat that an investigation into the issue had found no action
inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).
13. Since the issuance of my previous report, Major General Qasem Soleimani has
continued to travel to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, despite the travel ban
provision of resolution 2231 (2015) and previous reporting to the Security Council
on this issue. The Council should call upon the Government of the relevant Member
States in the region, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to take the steps necessary
to ensure proper implementation of the travel ban and other provisions of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015).
14. The list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) has not been reviewed
or updated by the Security Council since 17 January 2016. To ensure proper
implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban provisions, I recommend that the
Council review and update the list as appropriate and consider appropriate options for
delisting processes.
15. In a letter dated 28 August 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/739), the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that the
Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, signed into law on
2 August 2017, violated the terms of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015). While the allegations raised in the letter have been duly considered, it
is my assessment that this information does not fall within the scope of the present
report, unless guidance to the contrary is provided by the Security Council.
__________________
2 Available from www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. The list maintained pursuant to resolution
2231 (2015) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under
resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the
exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231
(2015), who were delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities
and list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined by
resolution 2231 (2015). There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained
pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
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III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
16. In resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the establishment of a
dedicated Procurement Channel, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to
review proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual -
use goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Through
this Channel, the Council reviews and decides on recommendations from the Joint
Commission established under the Plan regarding proposals by States to participate
in or permit activities set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
17. Since 20 June 2017, 8 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set
forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the
Security Council, bringing to 24 the total number of proposals submitted since
Implementation Day for approval through the Procurement Channel. At the time of
reporting, 16 proposals had been approved by the Council, 3 had not been approved,
and 5 had been withdrawn by the proposing States.
18. In addition, the Security Council received four new notifications pursuant to
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities
that do not require approval but require a notification to the Council or to both the
Council and the Joint Commission.
19. During the reporting period, following the publication of German domestic
intelligence reports, various media outlets alleged that Iranian entities might have
attempted to procure nuclear or dual-use items, materiel, goods and technology in
Germany outside the Procurement Channel. In its interactions with the Secretariat,
including during meetings in Berlin in early November 2017, the Government of
Germany recalled the 2016 report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution according to which, as far as the Federal Office was able to verify such
evidence, it did not reveal any violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
On 27 November 2017, the Government of Germany informed the Secretariat that it
had no indications of any activities inconsistent with paragraph 2 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015) conducted in Germany by the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was
also reiterated that German authorities would continue to rigorously explore and
assess any possible activities inconsistent with paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution
2231 (2015).
IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic
Republic of Iran
20. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council called
upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches
using such ballistic missile technology.
21. On 2 August 2017, I received a joint letter from France, Germany, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States on the launch
by the Islamic Republic of Iran of a Simorgh space launch vehicle on 27 July 2017.
Those States underscored that the phrase “ballistic missile designed to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons” in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)
included all Missile Technology Control Regime Category I systems — defined as
those capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km —
that are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
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destruction. They noted that space launch vehicles such as the Simorgh were
“inherently capable of delivering a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km if
configured as a ballistic missile” and “inherently capable of delivering nuclear
weapons”. Therefore, those States considered that the launch was inconsistent with
paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
22. Through a letter dated 16 August 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/720), the
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
transmitted a position paper in which it was underscored that there was “no legal
prohibition on the development by the Islamic Republic of Iran of missile and space
programmes”, as resolution 2231 (2015) contained only a call, which was “by all
means not a prohibition”, to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that
were designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It was also stated in the
paper that there was no information that Iranian ballistic missiles were specifically
designed to carry nuclear weapons and that, as verified by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, “Tehran does not possess nuclear weapons, and it does not carry out
work on the development thereof”. The Russian Federation also noted that “no
prohibition on cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran on missile -related items”
was in existence, but that there was the requirement for Member States to seek prior
approval of the Security Council for the activities set forth in paragraph 4 of annex B
to resolution 2231 (2015).
23. In a letter dated 23 August 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/731), the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran underscored that the launch of a
Simorgh space launch vehicle on 27 July 2017 was “part of a scientific and
technological activity related to the use of space technology” and that the Islamic
Republic of Iran was “determined to continue to exercise this right for its
socioeconomic interests”. He also stated that the definition of the Missile Technology
Control Regime was not an internationally agreed definition and that the “technical
characteristics and operational requirements of the satellite launch vehicles clearly
make them distinct from ballistic missile systems”. The Permanent Representative
concluded that the test launch could not be regarded as inconsistent with the
resolution.
24. The Security Council discussed the launch of the Simorgh space launch vehicle
on 8 September 2017. There was no consensus among Council members on how that
launch related to resolution 2231 (2015). The fourth six-month report of the facilitator
for the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) will provide the
details of Council deliberations on this issue.
25. In addition to the above, several launches of ballistic missiles by the Islamic
Republic of Iran were brought to my attention. In identical letters dated 28 June 2017
addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2017/555), the
Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations brought to my attention
information that had reportedly recently come to light regarding the flight test of a
Qiam ballistic missile on 15 November 2016 that used a Star of David as the intended
target. In the same letter, the Permanent Representative referred to the ballistic
missiles reportedly launched by the Islamic Republic of Iran at targets in the Syrian
Arab Republic on 18 and 19 June 2017. He considered that the test-firing of those
ballistic missiles, all of which were Missile Technology Control Regime Category I
systems, was in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). A joint statement by France,
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, issued on 28 July 2017, referred
to the same launches at targets in the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as to an alleged
flight test of a medium-range ballistic missile on 4 July 2017.
26. In identical letters dated 17 August 2017 addressed to me and the President of the
Security Council (S/2017/719), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic
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of Iran stated that the claim made “regarding the test launch of a ballistic missile on 15
November 2016 and the use of a specific marking as target practice is a sheer
falsehood”. He also underscored that “Iranian military capabilities, including ballistic
missiles, have not been designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and were
thus “outside the purview of the Security Council resolution”. In addition, he referred
to the terrorist attacks by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as
Da’esh) in Tehran on 7 June 2017 and to the determination of the Islamic Republic of
Iran to fight terrorism and violent extremism.
B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with
the Islamic Republic of Iran
27. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States,
provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a case -
by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the
Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology,3 the provision of various services or assistance,
and the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial
ballistic missile activities. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted
to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.
28. In identical letters dated 7 November 2017 addressed to me and the President of
the Security Council (S/2017/937), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to
the United Nations stated that the authorities of Saudi Arabia had confirmed, through
the examination of the debris of the missiles launched from within Yemeni territory
on 22 July and 4 November 2017 at Yanbu‘ and at Riyadh, respectively, “the role of
the Iranian regime in manufacturing the missiles”. He also stated that this was “a
flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015)”. In
a letter also dated 7 November 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security
Council (S/2017/936), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects such baseless and
unfounded accusations”.
29. In October and November 2017, the authorities of Saudi Arabia invited the
Secretariat to examine the debris of the ballistic missiles launched at its territory on
22 July and 4 November 2017. During those visits, the authorities of Saudi Arabia
indicated that, according to their assessment, those missiles were Iranian Qiam-1
ballistic missiles (a variant of the Scud missile). The Secretariat observed that the
diameter of both missiles was consistent with that of the Scud family and that the
missiles had similar structural and manufacturing features, which suggested a
common origin. The Secretariat noted that markings found on the missiles indicated
that the oxidizer tank was situated above the fuel tank. The Secretariat also observed
that, under the blue overpaint, the missile launched on 4 November had paint and
markings resembling those of the one launched on 22 July. The Secretariat was
informed that no tail fins had been recovered in either instance. The Secretariat
observed remnants of mounting plates on the tail unit of the missile of 22 July, which
suggest that the missile was finless. The Secretariat also observed three actuators that
bore the castings of a logo similar to that of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, an
entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) and a subordinate to
the Aerospace Industries Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to
__________________
3 The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile
Technology Control Regime list (see S/2015/546, annex) and any items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear -
weapon delivery systems.
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Saudi authorities, the actuators belonged to the missile of 4 November. The
Secretariat is still analysing the information collected and will report back to the
Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.
30. During the reporting period, following the publication of German domestic
intelligence reports, various media outlets alleged that Iranian entities might also have
attempted to procure ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods or
technology in Germany. On 27 November 2017, the Government of Germany informed
the Secretariat that it had no evidence of any transfers or activities inconsistent with
paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) conducted by the Islamic Republic
of Iran in Germany. It was also reiterated that German authorities would continue to
rigorously explore and assess any possible transfers or activities inconsistent with
paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
31. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States,
provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a case -
by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic
Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as
defined for the purpose of the Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel,
including spare parts. Prior approval from the Council is also required for the
provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technical training, financial resources or
services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture, maintenance or use of those arms and related materiel. At the time of
reporting, no proposal had been approved by the Council pursuant to that paragraph.
32. In paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council
decided that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as
decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale
or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the time
of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that
paragraph.
33. In June 2016, the United States brought to the attention of my predecessor
information on the seizure, on 28 March 2016, of an arms shipment on board a dhow,
the Adris, transiting international waters in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman (see
S/2016/589, paras. 29–31). According to the assessment of the United States, the arms
shipment had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In October 2017, United
States authorities invited the Secretariat to examine the arms and related materiel
seized, consisting of 1,500 AKM type assault rifles, 200 rocket propelled grenade
launchers, 21 heavy machine guns and miscellaneous other items. The Secretariat
could independently ascertain that close to 900 of the assault rifles and the 21 machine
guns were in new condition. The 900 assault rifles were identical to those seized by
France in March 2016, which had characteristics of the Iranian-produced KLS 7.62 x
39 mm (furnishing made of dark brown synthetic material, fire selector and rear sight
markings, slanted screw-on compensator and dot-peen marking style), which the
Secretariat has assessed were of Iranian origin and shipped from the Islamic Republic
of Iran (see S/2017/515, paras. 10 and 31). In addition, the serial numbers of the
assault rifles seized by France and the United States fall within the same productio n
batch and include sequential numbers. More than 100 of the grenade launchers
appeared to have characteristics similar to Iranian-produced launchers (for example,
paint markings and heat shields). Among the miscellaneous items examined by the
Secretariat, which included gun covers, tools and cleaning kits, were two foreignmade
neodymium sirens that appeared to have been modified after sale by the addition
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of a cable, bearing markings indicating Iranian manufacture, with a military-type
electrical connector. An identical siren was also observed by the Secretariat in a
separate incident (see para. 34 below), as well as a fuse plate and a detonation device
booster identical to those seen in photographs taken on board the Adris and provided
to the Secretariat by United States authorities. The Secretariat is still analysing the
remaining information, and I will report back to the Council accordingly as additional
information becomes available.
34. During its visits to Saudi Arabia in October and November 2017, the Secretariat
received information on unmanned surface vessels laden with explosives allegedly used
against the Saudi-led coalition. Saudi authorities indicated that one such vessel had
been recovered by the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates in Yemeni waters.
Reportedly, the vessel itself and the explosives were from Yemen, but parts of the
guidance and detonation systems had been supplied by the Islamic Republic of Iran. In
November 2017, the Secretariat examined parts of the detonation and guidance
systems. It observed that the computer terminal (part of the guidance system) had a
dual English/Farsi keyboard and characteristics (design and construction features,
graphical user interface and programme icon) similar to those of terminals produced
by an Iranian company. The Secretariat also observed that some of the electrical cables
bore markings indicating Iranian manufacture and that the detonation system included
a neodymium siren, a fuse plate and a detonation device booster identical to those
seized on board the dhow Adris (see para. 33 above). The Secretariat was also presented
with a selection of photographs and geographical coordinates reportedly extracted from
the guidance system computer. At the time of reporting, the Secretariat had not been
able to independently confirm the authenticity of the photographs and geographical
coordinates. The Secretariat is still analysing the available information and will provide
an update to the Council in due course.
35. Also during its visits to Saudi Arabia, the Secretariat was given the opportunity
to examine two unmanned aerial vehicles reportedly recovered in Yemen after
Implementation Day. Saudi authorities determined that one was an Iranian-made
unmanned aerial vehicle of the Ababil-II family. The Secretariat observed that the
vehicle appeared to have characteristics (for example, design and construction
features, serial number prefixes and engine) identical to those of others reportedly
seized or recovered in Yemen after Implementation Day that had been brought to its
attention by the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United
Nations in letters dated 18 May 2017 (see S/2017/515, para. 34) and 8 November
2017. The Secretariat is still analysing the information provided by the Government
of Saudi Arabia and looks forward to the opportunity to examine the other unmanned
aerial vehicles reportedly seized or recovered by the Presidential Guard forces of t he
United Arab Emirates, in order to independently ascertain their origin.
VI. Implementation of the asset freeze provisions
36. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all
States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the
individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) and
ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available to
those individuals and entities.
37. It appears that the Defence Industries Organisation, an entity presently on the
list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), once again participated in a
foreign exhibition, the International Aviation and Space Salon held in Zhukovsky,
Russian Federation, in July 2017. Its name is on the list of exhibitors released by the
organizers and, according to images released by Iranian and Russian media outlets,
its official company logo appears on several visual displays next to exhibited items.
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38. The Secretariat raised this issue with the Permanent Mission of the Russian
Federation. In November, the Permanent Mission informed the Secretariat that an
investigation into the issue had found no action inconsistent with resolution 2231
(2015). The Permanent Mission indicated that no financial transactions had been
carried out with the Defence Industries Organisation because no fee had been charged
to Iranian participants by the hosts. The Permanent Mission also indicated that all
samples of Iranian-made military equipment exhibited were mock-ups that had been
returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran after the exhibition.
VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision
39. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States are
to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their
territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
At the time of reporting, no travel exemption requests had been received or granted
by the Security Council in relation to individuals presently on the list.
40. Since the issuance of my previous report, additional information has surfaced
regarding travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. In mid-June, pictures of the
General on a pilgrimage to the holy shrine of Imam Husayn in the city of Karbala’,
Iraq, were published by Iraqi media outlets. In October, pictures of him visiting the
tomb of the former President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, were also
published by Iraqi media outlets. In addition, according to media from the Kurdish
region of Iraq, the General reportedly visited Iraqi Kurdistan several times in
September and October.
41. Furthermore, in mid-June, pictures showing Major General Soleimani in the
Syrian Arab Republic, allegedly with members of the Afghan militia known as the
Fatemiyoun Division along the border with Iraq, were published by Iranian media
outlets. In early November, pictures of the General, allegedly with members of the
Syrian militia known as the Baqir Brigade, in Dayr al-Zawr, Syrian Arab Republic,
were reproduced by Arab media outlets. In mid-November, the Iraqi militia known as
Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujaba published pictures of the General posing with militia
members in the vicinity of Albu Kamal, Syrian Arab Republic. In late November,
video footage of him in Albu Kamal after its liberation from ISIL (Da’esh) was
reproduced by Arab media outlets.
42. The Secretariat raised the topic of travel by Major General Soleimani with the
Permanent Missions of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations. In
November 2017, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic informed
the Secretariat that his Government had not granted the General any visas to enter the
territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.
VIII. List maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015)
43. During the reporting period, the Secretariat was provided with information on
an individual who may be acting in support of a designated entity on the list
maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). The Secretariat was also provided
with information indicating that another designated entity on the list had used
subsidiaries to circumvent the asset freeze provision of annex B to the resolution. The
Secretariat is seeking further information and will report to the Security Council in
due course. An updated list would facilitate the implementation of the restrictive
measures.
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IX. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
facilitator for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
44. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs
continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the
facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division also
continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on
all matters related to the Procurement Channel. In addition, the Division provided
induction briefings for the incoming facilitator and members of the Security Council,
to assist them in their work on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).
45. The Division continued to promote publicly available information on the
restrictions imposed by resolution 2231 (2015) through the Security Council website.4
Relevant documents were regularly added to the website and updated in all official
languages. The Division also continued to use outreach opportunities to promote
information on the resolution, in particular the Procurement Channel, in line with
paragraph 6 (e) of the note by the President of the Council dated 16 January 2016. In
October 2017, the Division participated in two forums organized by the World Export
Controls Review, held in London and Washington, D.C. Also in October 2017, the
Secretariat participated in a public awareness-raising workshop on resolution 2231
(2015) and the Procurement Channel, held in Seoul and organized by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies. The interactions of the Division with representatives of
Member States and private sector entities at these events showed that there remains a
general lack of understanding of resolution 2231 (2015), of the restrictive measures
that came into force on 16 January 2016, in particular the Procurement Channel
process, and of the respective roles of the Joint Commission, the Security Council and
its facilitator and the Secretariat. This lack of understanding, as well as a sense of
political uncertainty, appears to have adversely affected the decisions of some Member
States and private entities to re-engage with the Islamic Republic of Iran in trade
activities relating to items, materials, equipment, goods and technology requiring the
prior approval of the Security Council.
46. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from
Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the
provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the procedures for the
submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.
__________________
4 See www.un.org/en/sc/2231.
Annex 26
ANNEX 27
United Nations S/2018/602
Security Council Distr.: General
12 June 2018
Original: English
18-09410 (E) 200618
*1809410*
Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
Fifth report of the Secretary-General
I. Introduction
1. Almost three years ago, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America,
the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran concluded the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, marking the culmination of 12 years of intense
diplomatic efforts to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the
Iranian nuclear issue. The Plan, which was unanimously endorsed by the Security
Council in its resolution 2231 (2015), laid out reciprocal commitments.
2. Since 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported
11 times to the Security Council that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been
implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action. In its most recent quarterly reports (see S/2018/205 and S/2018/540), the
Agency again reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared
nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing. The Agency
also reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the
Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and to
apply the transparency measures set out in the Plan. In its latest report, the Agency
further indicated that it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional
Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to
visit.
3. Notwithstanding the continued adherence by the Islamic Republic of Iran to its
nuclear-related commitments, the agreement is unfortunately at a crossroads. On
8 May 2018, the United States of America announced its withdrawal from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and the re-imposition of all national sanctions that had
been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan. I deeply regret this setback to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation that
has contributed to regional and international peace and security. I believe that issues
not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving
the agreement and its accomplishments.
4. I take note of the letter dated 11 May 2018 addressed to me by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (see A/72/869-S/2018/453), in which
he indicated that the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue to abide by the
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agreement as long as the full benefits that the Iranian people were entitled to were
guaranteed. I welcome the reaffirmation by the remaining participants, on 25 May
2018 in Vienna, of their commitment to the continued, full and effective
implementation of the Plan.
5. It is important to recall that the Security Council, in its resolution 2231 (2015),
urged the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the
timetable established in the Plan. The Council further called upon all Members States,
regional organizations and international organizations to support its implementation
and to refrain from actions that undermine the implementation of commitments under
the Plan. In this regard, it is important that the withdrawal of one country not impede
the ability of others to fully implement their commitments under the Plan or to engage
in activities consistent with resolution 2231 (2015) and the provisions and objectives
of the Plan.
6. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is only one part of resolution 2231
(2015). A number of Member States that support the Plan have expressed concerns
about Iranian activities allegedly undertaken contrary to the restrictive measures set
out in annex B to the resolution. Therefore, I again encourage the Islamic Republic
of Iran to carefully consider those concerns.
7. The present report, the fifth on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015),
provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings
and recommendations, since the issuance of the fourth report of the Secretary-General
(S/2017/1030), on 8 December 2017. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of
the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015),
which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missilerelated
transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as
well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.
II. Key findings and recommendations
8. Since 8 December 2017, 13 additional proposals to participate in or permit
activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran for nuclear or non-nuclear civilian enduses
have been submitted to the Security Council for approval through the
procurement channel. Meanwhile, the Secretariat received information from two
Member States on the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran
of dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods and technology allegedly undertaken
contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The
Secretariat has sought clarification on that information from all relevant Member
States, and I intend to report back to the Security Council accordingly.
9. In relation to the above, and on the basis of feedback received by the Secretaria t
during its outreach activities, I call upon all Member States to continue their efforts
to promote awareness and understanding of the procurement channel, the procedures
for submission of proposals and the process for their review. The Secretariat stands
ready to further assist Member States in such efforts, in line with the arrangements
and procedures outlined in the note by the President of the Security Council dated
16 January 2016 (S/2016/44).
10. The Secretariat has carefully reviewed all information and material available
regarding the allegations of the transfer of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related
technology by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthis in Yemen that may have
been used in ballistic missile launches aimed at the territory of Saudi Arabia. On the
basis of the information and material analysed, it is the assessment of the Secretariat
that the debris of five missiles launched at Yanbu‘ and Riyadh since July 2017 share
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key design features with a known type of missile manufactured by the Islamic
Republic of Iran. It is also the assessment of the Secretariat that some component
parts of the debris were manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the
Secretariat has not yet been able to determine when such missiles, parts thereof or
related technology may have been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran, and
in particular whether the transfer(s) occurred after 16 January 2016, the day the
restrictions set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) came into force.1
11. In February 2018, Israel brought to my attention information regarding the
possible presence of an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the Syrian Arab
Republic, which Israel stated had been intercepted and shot down after entering Israeli
airspace. While the Secretariat has not yet had the opportunity to examine the debris,
Iranian media outlets have reported that various Iranian UAVs have been deployed in
the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat has no information regarding the owner or
operator of that UAV.
12. The Secretariat was invited to examine arms and related materiel seized by
Bahrain after 16 January 2016. The Secretariat also concluded its review of the
unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives recovered by the armed forces of the
United Arab Emirates. In both instances, the Secretariat is confident that some of
the arms and related materiel it examined are of Iranian manufacture. However, it has
found no indications of whether those items were transferred from the Islamic
Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.2
13. On 21 May 2018, the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar,
stated in a televised interview that the Islamic Republic of Iran had provided the Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and other armed groups in Gaza with “money, [military]
equipment and expertise”, including after the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. Any Iranian
arms transfers after 16 January 2016 would have been undertaken contrary to the
provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
14. Iranian entities continue to participate in foreign arms exhibitions, including the
Defence Industries Organization, an entity on the list maintained pursuant to
resolution 2231 (2015). Since the issuance of my previous report, Major General
Qasem Soleimani appears to have continued to travel to Iraq despite the travel ban
provisions of the resolution and previous reporting on this issue. I reiterate my call
upon all Member States in the region to take the steps necessary to fully implement
their obligations in relation to resolution 2231 (2015), including those regarding the
travel ban and asset freeze with respect to individuals and entities on the list
maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
15. In its resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the establishment
of a dedicated procurement channel, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
to review proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual -
use goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Through
that channel, the Council reviews and decides on recommendations from the Joint
__________________
1 Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council
resolution 1737 (2006) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 7 of that
resolution. The provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and those of other previous Security
Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue were terminated on 16 January 2016.
2 Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council
resolution 1747 (2007) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 5 of that
resolution.
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Commission established under the Plan, regarding proposals by States to participate
in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
16. Since 8 December 2017, 13 new proposals to participate in or permit the
activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been
submitted to the Security Council, bringing to 37 the total number of proposals
submitted since Implementation Day (16 January 2016) for approval through the
procurement channel. At the time of reporting, 24 proposals had been approved by
the Council, 3 had been disapproved, 7 had been withdrawn by the proposing States
and 3 were currently under review.
17. In addition, the Security Council received 13 new notifications pursuant to
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities
that do not require approval, but do require a notification to the Council or to both
the Council and the Joint Commission.
18. Since my previous report, the Secretariat received information on the supply,
sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of dual -use items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology that may have been undertaken contrary to the
provisions of paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In a letter dated
19 April 2018, the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates brought to
the attention of the Secretariat information and documents related to four shipments
of dual-use items. Those shipments were seized by the authorities of the United Arab
Emirates while in transit to the Islamic Republic of Iran in May 2016 and in April,
July and December 2017. The authorities of the United Arab Emirate s assessed, on
the basis of the declared technical specifications or specialized tests, that the items
involved (40 cylindrical segments of tungsten, 1 inductively coupled plasma mass
spectrometer, 10 capacitors, and 1 titanium rod) met the criteria set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 and that their transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran
would have required prior approval from the Security Council.
19. In addition, on 27 April 2018, the authorities of the United States informed the
Secretariat that, in their assessment, two commodities (carbon fibre and aluminium
alloys) that had been transferred to the Islamic Republic of Iran over the past year
without prior approval from the Security Council met the criteria set out in the above -
mentioned information circular.
20. In response to requests for clarification on the above-mentioned information,
several Member States informed the Secretariat that they had initiated internal
reviews and would provide additional information as soon as those reviews were
concluded. In a letter dated 1 June 2018, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic
Republic of Iran stated, inter alia, that it was “the responsibility of the exporting State
to seek approval through the procurement channel” and encouraged the Secretariat to
undertake more outreach activities to address the lack of awareness among some
Member States. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course as more
information becomes available.
IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic
Republic of Iran
21. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council called
upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches
using such ballistic missile technology.
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22. In identical letters dated 23 May 2018 addressed to me and the President o f the
Security Council (S/2018/495), the Permanent Representative of Israel brought to my
attention information regarding two flight tests of ballistic missiles by the Islamic
Republic of Iran. According to the information provided, a Shahab-3 variant and a Scud
variant were flight tested on 2 and 5 January 2018, respectively. The Permanent
Representative of Israel considered that those two ballistic missiles were both category
I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime “capable of delivering a
nuclear payload of 500 kg with a range of over 300 km,” and that their test-firing was
in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). In a letter dated 29 May 2018 addressed to me
and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/511), the Permanent Representative
of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that there was no reference to the criteria of the
Missile Technology Control Regime in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231
(2015) and underscored that “none of the ballistic missiles of the Islamic Republic of
Iran have been designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”.
B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with
the Islamic Republic of Iran
23. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States,
provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case -
by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the
Islamic Republic of Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods a nd technology set
out in S/2015/546,3 the provision of various services or assistance, and the acquisition
by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial ballistic missile
activities. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council
pursuant to that paragraph.
24. In my previous report, I informed the Council of the possible transfer of ballistic
missiles, parts thereof or related technology by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Houthis in Yemen that may have been used in the ballistic missile launches aimed at
the territory of Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017 (see S/2017/1030,
paras. 28 and 29). Since then, Saudi authorities have brought to the attention of the
Secretariat nine additional launches of ballistic missiles by the Houthis, which, in
their assessment, were Iranian Qiam-1 ballistic missiles (see S/2017/1133,
S/2018/266, S/2018/337 and S/2018/448).4
25. In letters addressed to me and the Security Council (see S/2018/123,
S/2018/145, S/2018/278, S/2018/424 and S/2018/533), the Permanent Representative
of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that, inter alia, the Islamic Republic of Iran
“neither has a policy nor seeks to transfer arms or military equipment in Yemen or
manufacture them therein”. In addition, he noted that the Yemeni Government had
“notable stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles that could have been utilized by
its local expertise as technical bases for further upgrades”. In this regard, the
Secretariat notes that, in an interview with France 24 on 31 March 2018, the head of
the Houthi revolutionary committee, Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, stated that the
Houthis were developing and manufacturing their own missiles based on missiles
provided by the former Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
prior to the outbreak of the current conflict.
__________________
3 The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile
Technology Control Regime list (S/2015/546, annex) and any items, materials, equipment, goods
and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems.
4 The nine additional launches reportedly occurred on 19 Dece mber 2017 (1), and on 5 January
(1), 30 January (1), 25 March (3), 11 April (1) and 9 May 2018 (2).
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26. During the reporting period, Saudi authorities invited the Secretariat to examine
the debris which they stated were of three ballistic missiles launched at its territory
on 19 December 2017 and on 5 and 30 January 2018. The Secretariat also had the
opportunity to re-examine the debris of the two missiles launched at the territory of
Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017. It is the assessment of the Secretariat
that the debris of the five missiles share key design features with a known type of
missile manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is also the assessment of the
Secretariat that some component parts in the debris had been manufactured in the
Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the Secretariat has not yet been able to determine
when such missiles, parts thereof or related technology may have been transferred
from the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular whether the transfer(s) occurred after
16 January 2016.
27. The Secretariat conducted first-hand and in-depth examinations of debris
recovered by Saudi authorities and collected all other information and material
available, including photographs and videos of the debris in situ. The Secretariat
visited several locations in and around Riyadh to confirm impact sites and that the
debris seen in images and videos provided by the Saudi authorities or available on
social media corresponded to the debris presented to the Secretariat. Whe never
possible, the Secretariat carried out a visual comparison to determine whether the
features of the debris of the missiles examined were consistent with those of the
missiles seen in the videos of the launches released by the Houthis.
28. The Secretariat observed that the debris of the missiles airframes were made of
aluminium, painted a tan colour and bore similar markings in English script and in
white lettering. Other than the debris of the missile launched on 22 July 2017, the
Secretariat observed that the airframes had been painted over in blue. The Secretariat
further observed that the debris of the five missiles examined had identical internal
and external design characteristics, with the following features that are consistent
with those of the Scud-B missile and all its variants:
(a) They were all single stage and liquid-fuelled missiles;
(b) They had a diameter of 880 mm;
(c) They were powered by a single-chamber rocket engine fed by a turbopump;
(d) The steering mechanism consisted of four graphite vanes in the motor
exhaust section.
29. The Secretariat also determined from its observations of the debris that the
missiles had the following specific features:
(a) The fuel and oxidizer tanks were longer than those of the Scud -B missile,
while the guidance section was shorter;
(b) The oxidizer tank was split in two sections and located above the fuel tank;
(c) The fuel tanks had three external valves, while the oxidizer tanks had six
(due to the split sections), bringing the total number of external valves per missile to
nine (the positioning pattern was consistent across all five missiles);
(d) They were finless and had no observable features suggesting that the fins
had been removed post-factory production;5
__________________
5 On four of the missiles examined, small stabilizers had been affixed to the jet vane housings.
Paint and markings observed underneath the stabilizers indicate that they had been added after
the tan paint and white markings were applied.
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(e) Retrieved guidance components had been built with modern digital
subcomponents;
(f) They had a separable re-entry vehicle.6
30. On the basis of all available information and material at its disposal, including
information and photographs published by Iranian media outlets, it is the
understanding of the Secretariat that the above-mentioned features are consistent with
those of the Iranian Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missile. In addition, it is the
understanding of the Secretariat that the Qiam-1 is the only known Scud variant with
nine external valves and without fins.
31. In addition, all examined jet vane actuators bore the casting of a logo and the
abbreviation “S.B.I”. The logo matches that of an Iranian entity, Shahid Bagheri
Industries.7 The abbreviation is consistent with the name of that entity. The Secretariat
also observed partly burned yellow safety labels with the words “quality assurance”
in Farsi and the number “6000” on some actuators parts. Burn marks consistent with
the dimensions of those safety labels were observed on the other actuators parts. The
Secretariat observed similar yellow safety labels with the number “6000” on other
retrieved guidance components. The Secretariat further observed that one printed
circuit board in another guidance component was marked “SHIG 6081”. As indicated
in the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), “SHIG” is a known
abbreviation for the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which is reportedly responsible
for the liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
32. Moreover, according to the information provided to the Secretariat by foreign
manufacturing companies, most of the retrieved guidance subcomponents had been
produced between 2002 and 2010.8 This production date range is incompatible with
that of the Scud missiles provided by the former Soviet Union and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea to Yemen and that were known to be in Yemeni stockpiles
prior to the outbreak of the current conflict in early 2015. The latest delivery of Scud
missiles to Yemen by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reportedly occurred
in late 2002.9
33. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), since 16 January
2016, prior approval of the Security Council is also required for, inter alia, the supply,
sale or transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran of complete UAV systems (including
target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of a range equal to or greater than
300 km. 10 In identical letters dated 10 February 2018 addressed to me and the
President of the Security Council (S/2018/111), the Permanent Representative of
Israel stated that the UAV intercepted and downed that same day after entering Israeli
airspace was an Iranian UAV launched from a site in eastern Homs, Syrian Arab
Republic. In follow-up identical letters dated 13 April 2018 addressed to me and the
President of the Security Council (S/2018/349), the Permanent Representative of
Israel indicated that further analysis of its flight path and debris had led Israeli
authorities to conclude that the UAV “was armed with explosives and was intended
to attack Israeli territory”. In letters dated 20 February and 9 May 2018 addressed to
me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/142 and S/2018/445), the
__________________
6 According to videos of the launches released by the Houthis, the separable re -entry vehicle had a
triconic shape.
7 As seen on the website www.shahidbagheri.ir/, accessed through the website of Wayback
Machine (https://web.archive.org/).
8 Some subcomponents had been produced in the 1990s. None appears to have been produced after
July 2010.
9 See “Yemeni rebels enhance ballistic missile campaign”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 10 July
2017.
10 See S/2015/546, item 19.A.2.
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Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the
aforementioned letters from the Permanent Representative of Israel contained
“misleading information and accusations”. The Permanent Representative of the
Islamic Republic of Iran further stated that “operational details that were provided to
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran illustrate that the unmanned aerial
vehicle was flying inside Syria near the border with Jordan and the occupied
Palestinian territories for the purpose of monitoring and surveillance of ISIL and other
terrorist groups there”, and that it had been unarmed and not intended to engage in an
attack anywhere.
34. Images of the debris of the UAV downed on 10 February 2018 provided to the
Secretariat by Israeli authorities showed that its wing configuration appeared to be
consistent with that of the Iranian Sae’qeh (Thunder) UAV, which, according to
Iranian media outlets, had been unveiled in October 2016.11 According to information
provided by Israeli authorities, the UAV flew at a range that meets the specified
criteria before its interception. No information is available to the Secretariat as to the
owner or operator of that UAV. The Secretariat notes that, according to Iranian media
outlets, other UAVs, including the Shahed-129, had been previously deployed by the
Islamic Republic of Iran in the Syrian Arab Republic.12 It is also the understanding of
the Secretariat that the Shahed-129 meets the specified range criteria. One Shahed -
129 was reportedly shot down in southern Syrian Arab Republic on 20 June 2017. 13
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
A. Restrictions on arms-related transfers to the Islamic Republic
of Iran
35. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States,
provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case -
by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic
Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as
defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or
related materiel, including spare parts. Prior approval from the Council is also
required for the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technical training,
financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the
supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of those arms and related
materiel. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been approved by the Council
pursuant to that paragraph.
36. In a letter dated 15 May 2018, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine
indicated to the Secretariat that the Security Service of Ukraine had prevented an
attempt by two Iranian nationals to procure and transfer to the Islamic Republic of
Iran component parts of the “Kh-31” (AS-17 “Krypton”) air-to-surface missile and
__________________
11 For example, see Mehr News Agency, “IRGC inaugurates its latest drone ‘Thunder’”, 1 October
2016. Available from https://en.mehrnews.com/news/120176/IRGC-inaugurates-its-latest-drone-
Thunder.
12 See Fars News Agency, “Iran’s Shahed-129 drone in combat operations in Syria”, 4 February
2016. Available at http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13941115000734; and Mehr News
Agency, “Iran’s Mohajer-6, Qaem bomb deadly weapons against terrorists”, 10 February 2018.
Available at https://en.mehrnews.com/news/132045/Iran-s-Mohajer-6-Qaem-bomb-deadlywe…-
against-terrorists.
13 See U.S. Central Command, “Coalition shoots down armed UAV in Syria”, 20 June 2017.
Available at http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-
View/Article/1219863/coalition-shoots-down-armed-uav-in-syria/.
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related technical documents. The Permanent Representative noted in his letter that no
Ukrainian individual or entity had engaged in an illegal activity or action inconsistent
with resolution 2231 (2015). The letter further noted that that missile type had not
been in use in Ukraine since 1991 and that all remaining component parts were stored
under the proper control of its armed forces.
B. Restrictions on arms-related transfers from the Islamic Republic
of Iran
37. In paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council
decided that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as
decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale
or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the time
of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that
paragraph.
38. In a letter dated 24 May 2017, the Permanent Representative of Bahrain brought
to the attention of the Secretariat information regarding multiple seizures of arms and
related materiel in Bahrain after 16 January 2016 that, in its assessment, had been
produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran and transferred in a manner inconsistent
with paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The authorities of Bahrain
invited the Secretariat to examine those items in May 2018. The Secretariat observed
that two assault rifles and ammunition rounds had characteristics of the Iranian -
produced KL 7.62 x 39 mm assault rifles (featuring furnishing made of dark brown
synthetic material, fire selector and rear sight markings, slanted screw-on
compensator and dot-peen marking style) and 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition (featuring
brass cartridge case and green primer annulus lacquer, and identifiable by the nature,
position and format of the head stamp markings). The Secretariat also observed that
three hand grenades, the packaging of C-4 explosive blocks, and electronic and
electrical equipment that could be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices,
were similar to those found in various arms shipments seized previously and assessed
to have been shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the Secretariat is
confident that some of the arms and related materiel it examined in May 2018 were
manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has found no indication of whether
those items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.
The Secretariat is still analysing other information collected and will report back to
the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.
39. The Secretariat obtained additional information on the unmanned surface vessel
laden with explosives recovered by the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates (see
S/2017/1030, para. 34). In a letter dated 12 March 2018, the Permanent
Representative of the United Arab Emirates confirmed to the Secretariat that the
vessel had been recovered on 19 September 2016, six miles east of the port of Assab,
Eritrea (and not in Yemeni waters as previously indicated to the Secretariat). The
Secretariat was provided with the opportunity to examine the vessel and to re-examine
the guidance and detonation systems. In both the computer and the dome camera (both
integral parts of the guidance system), the logo and/or name of an Iranian entity that
produces terminals with characteristics similar to those found in the vessel were
observed. The Secretariat confirmed that some of the previously presented
photographs and geographical coordinates, including for locations in Tehran and in
Iranian territorial waters, had originated from the recovered hard drive of the
computer found in the unmanned surface vessel. However, the Secretariat could not
confirm the actual dates on which they had been captured. The Secretariat has also
received documentary evidence indicating that identical fuse plates and detonation
device boosters seized in a separate incident had been shipped from the Islamic
Republic of Iran (see S/2017/1030, para. 33). The Secretariat is confident that at least
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parts of the detonation and guidance systems of the unmanned surface vessel had been
manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, no indications have been
found of whether those items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after
16 January 2016.
40. In March 2018, the Secretariat was invited by the authorities of the United Arab
Emirates to examine UAVs reportedly recovered in Yemen after 16 January 2016,
which, in their assessment, were Iranian-made and had been transferred from the
Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). One
was a composite assembly of parts from various seizures. The other one had
reportedly crashed in Mukha‘, Yemen, in February 2018. The Secretariat observed
that those were identical to the one examined during the previous reporting period
(see S/2017/1030, para. 35) and had the same design features as the Iranian-made
Ababil-2 UAV (featuring a pusher propeller, high-mounted canards at the front and
larger wings at the rear, each fitted with a vertical stabilization fin with a rudder). 14
They had similar serial number prefixes and were built using identical material,
component and subcomponent parts. The Secretariat is still analysing the information
collected on all three vehicles and will report back to the Security Council, as
appropriate, in due course.
41. In identical letters dated 10 and 23 May 2018 addressed to me and the President
of the Security Council (S/2018/443 and S/2018/495), the Permanent Representative
of Israel stated that rockets launched from the Syrian Arab Republic towards Israel
on 10 May 2018 had been launched “by the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard” and constituted an “Iranian breach” of resolution 2231 (2015). In a letter dated
14 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/459),
the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran recalled the identical
letters dated 10 May by the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the
Syrian Arab Republic (S/2018/447), in which it had been indicated that the Syrian
Army had exercised its right to self-defence, and stated that the claim by Israeli
authorities of “military action by Iran from the Syrian territory against their military
positions in the occupied Golan Heights is false and unfounded ”.
42. In identical letters dated 28 November 2017 addressed to me and the President
of the Security Council (S/2017/1000), the Permanent Representative of Israel
expressed concern at what he said was a statement by the Commander of the Iranian
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Major General Mohamed Ali Jafari, which he
said expressed “Iran’s intentions and actions taken to continue arming Hizbullah” in
violation of Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2231 (2015). In
response, in a letter dated 5 December 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/1019), the
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran accused Israel of making
“false and baseless accusations”.
43. In a televised interview broadcasted on 21 May 2018, the political leader of
Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had
provided the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and other armed groups in Gaza with
“money, [military] equipment and expertise” before and after the 2014 Israel-Gaza
conflict.15 That statement suggests that transfers of arms and related materiel from the
Islamic Republic of Iran may have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of
annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
44. It appears that Iranian entities continue to exhibit what appears to be arms and
related materiel in foreign exhibitions. Information released by the organizers of the
seventh International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, held in Baghdad from 10 to
__________________
14 Catalogue of the Export Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Available at http://www.mindexcenter.ir/product/ababil-2-uav-system.
15 Available at http://www.almayadeen.net/episodes/ -حركة-رئیس---السنوار-یحیى_خاص-حوار/ 880421
.غزة-في-حماس
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13 March 2018, indicates that several Iranian entities participated in the exhibition
for the third year in a row. Items displayed by those entities during previous
exhibitions appeared to include small arms, artillery ammunition, rockets, anti -tank
guided missiles and man-portable air defence systems. Furthermore, information
released by the organizers of the Eurasia Airshow 2018, held in Antalya, Turkey, from
25 to 29 April 2018, indicates that several Iranian entities participated in that
exhibition. According to Iranian media outlets, the items exhibited included
reconnaissance drones. 16 The Secretariat raised these issue with the Permanent
Missions of Iraq and Turkey to the United Nations. The Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran had previously stated that it had believed that no prior
approval had been required from the Security Council for that activity since the
Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. I intend to report
thereon to the Council in due course as additional information becomes av ailable.
VI. Implementation of the assets freeze provisions
45. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all
States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the
individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015)17
and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available
to those individuals and entities.
46. It appears that an entity presently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution
2231 (2015), the Defence Industries Organization, may have participated again in the
International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, which was held in March 2018 (see para. 44
above). Its name is on the exhibitors list released by the organizers of the exhibition.
Any of the entity’s funds, other financial assets and economic resources on Iraqi
territory, on or after the date of adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
should have been frozen by the Iraqi authorities. The issue has been raised again with
the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, and I will provide an update
thereon to the Council in due course.
47. It also appears that another entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution
2231 (2015), Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, signed a memorandum
of understanding in 2017 with the Syrian Engineers Syndicate “for joint cooperation
in building sector, services and developmental projects, training cadres, conducting
researches and holding symposiums”.18 The Syrian authorities are to ensure that any
funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made
available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to
or for the benefit of the entity. The Secretariat has sought clarification from the
__________________
16 Fars News Agency, “Iran displays 2 reconnaissance drones in Eurasia 2018 Airshow in Turkey”,
25 April 2018. Available at http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13970205001259.
17 Available at www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. The list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231
(2015) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under resolution
1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the exception
of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015),
who had been delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities, and
list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined by
resolution 2231 (2015). There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained
pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
18 Syrian Arab News Agency, “Syria, Iran to enhance cooperation on urban development”,
26 September 2017. Available at https://sana.sy/en/?p=114661; and Financial Tribune, “Iran
seeking role in Syria’s power grid reconstruction”, 7 November 2017. Available at
https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/75756/iran-seeking-role-in….
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Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic. I intend to report thereon to the
Council in due course.
VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision
48. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States are
to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their
territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
At the time of reporting, no travel exemption requests had been received or granted
by the Security Council in relation to individuals presently on the list.
49. Since the issuance of my previous report, additional information has surfaced
regarding travel by Major General Soleimani. According to Iraqi media outlets, the
General reportedly travelled to Baghdad in mid-May 2018. The Secretariat sought
clarification from the Permanent Mission of Iraq.
VIII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
Facilitator for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
50. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Politica l Affairs has
continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has also
continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission
established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on all matters related to the
procurement channel. In addition, the Division has provided induction briefings for
the incoming Facilitator and members of the Security Council to assist them in their
work on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).
51. Through the Security Council website, the Division continued to promote the
dissemination of publicly available information on the restrictions imposed by
resolution 2231 (2015).19 Relevant documents in all official languages were regularly
added to and updated on the website. The Division also continued to use outreach
opportunities to promote the dissemination of information on the resolution, in
particular the procurement channel, in line with paragraph 6 (e) of the note by the
President of the Council dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). In February 2018, the
Division participated in the Twenty-fifth Asian Export Control Seminar, held in
Tokyo, and jointly organized by the Centre for Information on Security Trade
Controls, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In April 2018, the Division also participated in an outreach event, organized
by the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to United Nations organizations in
Vienna and hosted by the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, on
the margins of a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The interactions of the
Division with representatives of Member States and private sector entities during
those events showed that outreach activities remained important to increasing
awareness and allaying misunderstandings with respect to provisions set out in annex
B to resolution 2231 (2015), including regarding the procurement channel, and the
actors involved in the implementation of the resolution and their respective roles.
52. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from
Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the
provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the procedures for the
submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.
__________________
19 See http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/.
Annex 27
ANNEX 28
United Nations S/2018/1089
Security Council Distr.: General
6 December 2018
Original: English
18-20501 (E) 101218
*1820501*
Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
I. Introduction
1. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, endorsed by the Security Council in
its resolution 2231 (2015), stands out as a demonstration of successful multilateralism.
It is a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and in dialogue and diplomacy.
The Plan and the resolution remain in effect. The participants in the Plan, the Council,
all Member States and regional and other international actors must ensure the
continuity of this agreement that is fundamental to regional and international peace
and security. I remain of the view that issues not directly related to the Plan should
be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.
2. I welcome the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues the
implementation of its nuclear-related commitments, as verified by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, in the face of considerable challenges brought about by the
withdrawal of the United States of America from the Join Comprehensive Plan of
Action and its subsequent decisions to reimpose all its national sanctions that had
been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan. I regret these actions and firmly believe
that they do not advance the goals set out in the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015), in
which all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations were
called upon to support the implementation of the Plan and to refrain from actions that
undermine it. I note the concerns expressed in the letter dated 5 November 2018
addressed to me by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
(A/73/490-S/2018/988).
3. In this regard, I welcome the reaffirmation by participants in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, during the meeting of the Joint Commission held in
Vienna on 6 July 2018 and during the ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+2 and the
Islamic Republic of Iran held in New York on 24 September 2018, of their
commitments to the full and effective implementation of the Plan. I welcome and am
encouraged by their initiatives to protect the freedom of their economic operators to
pursue legitimate business with the Islamic Republic of Iran, in full accordance with
resolution 2231 (2015). It is essential that the Plan continue to work for all its
participants, including by delivering tangible economic benefits to the Iranian people.
It is critical that these initiatives be given full effect as soon as possible.
4. The continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action an d
resolution 2231 (2015) also enjoys the full support of the broader international
community. Statements in support of the Plan were made by numerous Member
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States, including during the general debate of the seventy-third session of the General
Assembly. These statements demonstrate the broad and deep support for multilateral
and cooperative approaches to addressing threats to international peace and security.
I call upon all Member States to work effectively with the participants in the Plan
towards its preservation, including in creating the conditions necessary for their
economic operators to engage in trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran, in
accordance with the resolution.
5. I acknowledge the important contribution of the International Atomic Energy
Agency in providing the international community with reports on its verification and
monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015).
Since January 2016, the Agency has reported 13 times to the Security Council. In its
most recent reports (S/2018/835 and S/2018/1048), the Agency again reported that it
continued to verify and monitor the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran
of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
The Agency also reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared
nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing. The Agency
further reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisi onally apply the
Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and to
apply the transparency measures contained in the Plan. In its most recent reports, the
Agency also indicated that it had conducted complementary accesses under the
Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that
it needed to visit.
6. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is only one part of resolution 2231
(2015). Staunch support for the Plan among the participants and Member States
continues to be accompanied with concerns about Iranian activities in relation to the
restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution. Therefore, I again
encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider and address these
concerns.
7. The present report provides an assessment of the implementation of the
resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of my fifth
report (S/2018/602), on 12 June 2018. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of
the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015),
which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missilerelated
transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as
well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.
II. Key findings and recommendations
8. The procurement channel continues to be a vital transparency and confidence -
building mechanism ensuring that transfers of certain goods, technology and/or
related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran are consistent with resolution 2231
(2015) and the provisions and objectives of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Since 12 June 2018, five additional proposals have been submitted to the Security
Council. The channel is operational and effective, and I encourage all States and the
private sector to fully utilize and support this channel.
9. The Secretariat received further information on two shipments of dual -use
items, previously brought to the attention of the Security Council. Th e authorities of
two manufacturing States confirmed that, in their assessment, the items did not meet
the criteria set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 and therefore did not require prior
approval of the Council through the procurement channel.
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10. During the reporting period, the Secretariat examined the debris of three
additional ballistic missiles launched at the territory of Saudi Arabia on 25 March and
11 April 2018. The Secretariat observed design characteristics and component parts
consistent with those of the missiles that it had examined previously. The debris of
the three missiles had internal and external features consistent with those of the
Scud-B missile and all its variants, as well as specific key design features consistent
with those of the Iranian Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missile. However, the
Secretariat has not been able to determine whether such missiles, parts thereof or
related technology were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January
2016, the day on which the restrictions set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)
came into force.1
11. The Secretariat also examined two container launch units for anti-tank guided
missiles recovered by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The Secretariat found that
they had characteristics of Iranian manufacture and that their markings indicated
production dates in 2016 and 2017. The Secretariat also examined a partly
disassembled surface-to-air missile seized by the Saudi-led coalition and observed
that its features appeared to be consistent with those of an Iranian missile. The
Secretariat is still analysing the information available on this disassembled missile,
and I intend to report back to the Security Council accordingly.
III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
12. Since 12 June 2018, 5 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set
forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the
Security Council, bringing to 42 the total number of proposals submitted since
Implementation Day (16 January 2016) for approval through the procurement
channel. At the time of reporting, 28 proposals had been approved by the Council,
4 had not been approved, 9 had been withdrawn by the proposing States and 1 was
currently under review. The Council also received five new notifications pursuant to
the same provision for certain nuclear-related activities that only required a
notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission.
13. Since my previous report, the Secretariat received further information related to
three of the four shipments of dual-use items seized by the United Arab Emirates in
May 2016 and April 2017 while in transit to the Islamic Republic of Iran (see
S/2018/602, para. 18). Contrary to the original assessment by the authorities of the
United Arab Emirates, the authorities of two of the States of manufacture have
confirmed that, in their assessment, the 40 cylindrical segments of tungsten and the
10 capacitors did not meet the criteria set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 and that
their re-export to the Islamic Republic of Iran did not require prior approval of the
Security Council. 2 The authorities of another State of manufacture informed the
Secretariat that, in their assessment, the inductively coupled mass spectrometer met
the criteria set out in the above-mentioned information circular, but that their internal
review was ongoing. I intend to report thereon to the Council as more information
becomes available on this shipment and on the shipment of one titanium rod.
__________________
1 Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council
resolution 1737 (2006) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 7 of that
resolution. The provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and those of other previous Council
resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue were terminated on 16 January 2016.
2 According to one State of manufacture, the 40 cylindrical segments did not contain more than
90 per cent tungsten by weight (see 2.C.14 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2). According to the
other States of manufacture, the 10 capacitors do not meet the voltage rating and energy storage
criteria of 6.A.4.(a) or the voltage rating criteria of 6.A.4 (b) of INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2.
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14. In addition, on 30 October 2018, the United States provided the Secretariat with
additional information on the transfer of two commodities that, in their assessment,
would have required prior approval from the Security Council (see S/2018/602,
para. 19). According to this information, at least 50 tonnes of aluminium alloys were
shipped to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2016 and 2017, and the carbon fibre was
shipped in 2017. The Secretariat has sought clarification on that additional
information from relevant Member States and will report to the Council in due course.
IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic
Republic of Iran
15. During the reporting period, I received information regarding ballistic missiles
reportedly launched by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 30 September and 1 October
2018 at targets in the Syrian Arab Republic. In identical letters dated 19 October 2018
addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/939), the
Permanent Representative of Israel noted that, according to Iranian media outlets, at
least five ballistic missiles with a range of 700 km were launched. He considered that
those missiles “crossed the Annex B threshold” of resolution 2231 (2015) and called
upon the Council to condemn the activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a joint
letter dated 20 November 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/2018/1062), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stressed that those ballistic missiles
were category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime3 and therefore
inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons. They concluded that the launches
of those missiles constituted an “activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be
capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and “launches using such ballistic missile
technology”, which the Islamic Republic of Iran has been called upon not to undertake
pursuant to paragraph 3 of annex B to the resolution. In the letter, they also stated that
those launches were destabilizing and increased regional tensions.
16. I also received information regarding flight tests of ballistic missiles by the
Islamic Republic of Iran. In identical letters dated 23 November 2018 addressed to
me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1047), the Permanent
Representative of Israel brought to my attention information regarding seven flight
tests reportedly conducted in 2018, in addition to those of a Shahab -3 variant and a
Scud variant in January 2018 (see S/2018/602, para. 22). According to the information
provided, one Khorramshahr, two Shahab-3 variants, one Qiam and three Zolfaghar
ballistic missiles were flight-tested between February and August 2018. The
Permanent Representative stated that their test-firing was in violation of resolution
2231 (2015) because those ballistic missiles were all category I systems under the
Missile Technology Control Regime and therefore inherently capable of carrying
nuclear weapons.
17. In a letter dated 29 October 2018 addressed to me and the President of the
Security Council (S/2018/967), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic
of Iran recalled that “the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, acting in
legitimate self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
took limited and measured military action on 1 October 2018 in Syria, targeting
__________________
3 Category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime are defined as “complete
rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) capable
of delivering at least a 500 kg ‘payload’ to a ‘range’ of at least 300 km” (see 1.A.1 of the
Equipment, Software and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime).
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terrorist elements that are also linked to the terrorist act in Ahvaz ”. However, in
reference to the letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel dated
23 November, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 29 November addressed to me and the President of
the Council (S/2018/1073), stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had “not launched
any type of such missiles on any of the dates specified in the letter”. The Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his letter dated 29 October, also
reiterated the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran that none of its missiles were
“designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”, but rather, as the Chargé
d’affaires a.i. had indicated in a letter dated 28 November addressed to the President
of the Council (S/2018/1061), “‘designed’ to be exclusively capable of delivering
conventional warheads”, and thus fell outside the purview of resolution 2231 (2015).
The Chargé d’affaires a.i., in his letter dated 28 November, also stressed that there
was no implicit or explicit reference to the Missile Technology Control Regime in
paragraph 3 of annex B to the resolution and concluded that none of its criteria were
applicable to the paragraph.
18. In a letter dated 30 November 2018 addressed to me and the President of the
Security Council, the Chargé d’affaires a.i of the Permanent Mission of the Russian
Federation underscored that the Islamic Republic of Iran was not prohibited by
resolution 2231 (2015) to develop missile and space programmes and that it had been
respecting in good faith the call to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles
designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. He noted that there was no
evidence that the Islamic Republic of Iran was developing or producing a nuclear
weapon or means of its delivery. He underlined that the category I parameters of the
Missile Technology Control Regime were never intended to be used in the context of
the resolution to ascertain whether certain missiles are designed to be capabl e of
carrying nuclear weapons. He further stated that missiles designed to be capable of
carrying nuclear weapons included certain features and that no “evidence of the
existence of such features on Iranian ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles ” was
presented to the Council.
19. On 4 December 2018, the Security Council discussed the reported test firing of
a medium-range ballistic missile by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 1 December 2018.
B. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related transfers or activities with
the Islamic Republic of Iran
20. In relation to the possible transfer of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related
technology by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthis in Yemen, Saudi Arabia
brought to the attention of the Secretariat two additional launches of ballistic missiles
by the Houthis, aimed at the territory of Saudi Arabia, on 24 June 2018 ( S/2018/636),
which, in their assessment, were Iranian Qiam-1 missiles.4 The Islamic Republic of
Iran had previously stated that it “neither has a policy nor seeks to transfer arms or
military equipment in Yemen or manufacture them therein” (S/2018/145). In
September 2018, Saudi authorities invited the Secretariat to examine the debris that
they stated was of three missiles reportedly launched at Riyadh on 25 March and
11 April 2018. The Secretariat conducted first-hand examinations of the physical
debris presented by Saudi authorities and collected all other information and material
available, including photographs and video of the debris in situ, to confirm that the
debris seen in those images corresponded to the debris presented to the Secretariat.
__________________
4 The 12 previous launches reportedly occurred on 22 July (1), 4 November (1) and 19 December
2017 (1), and on 5 January (1), 30 January (1), 25 March (3), 11 April (1), 9 May (2) and 5 June
2018 (1).
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The Secretariat observed that the debris of the three missiles had design characteristics
and component parts consistent with all those that it had previously examined and
reported thereon to the Security Council (see S/2018/602, paras. 28 to 30). The
Secretariat is still working on establishing the production date range of guidance
subcomponents with the assistance of the foreign manufacturers and will report back
to the Council in due course.
21. In August 2018, media outlets reported that a ship ment to the Islamic Republic
of Iran of at least two items with potential missile-related applications had been halted
at London Heathrow airport.5 In response to a request for clarification, the Permanent
Mission of the United Kingdom informed the Secretariat that several goods (seal kits,
packing rings, packing sets and O-rings) had been seized by customs after having
been presented for export to the Islamic Republic of Iran without a valid licence.
However, the Permanent Mission added that the exporter later applied for, and was
granted, an export licence.
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
22. In a press conference on 26 March 2018, the Saudi-led coalition publicly
displayed a partly disassembled missile that it indicated had been found in a
consignment destined to the Houthis and seized earlier in March 2018. Saudi
authorities alleged that it was an Iranian-made Sayyad 2C surface-to-air missile.
While in Riyadh in September 2018, the Secretariat examined the partly disassembled
missile, which was missing its forward guidance nose section and fins. The Secretariat
observed that its length and other external features (e.g., mounting for the rear fins,
mounting notches and brackets for the long mid-section fins) appeared consistent with
those of the Iranian Sayyad-2C visible in video and photographs published by Iranian
media outlets. The Secretariat further observed that the paint, serial numbering and
other markings also appeared to be consistent with those of the Sayyad -2C. The
Secretariat also observed that markings on the missile airframe and quality control
labels on internal components were in Farsi. The Secretariat continues to analyse the
information available on this missile, and I will report back to the Security Council,
as appropriate, in due course.
23. In June and August 2018, the authorities of the United Arab Emirates brought
to the attention of the Secretariat information about additional unmanned aerial
vehicles, reportedly recovered in Yemen, including some fitted with an expl osive
charge. In their assessment, those unmanned aerial vehicles were Iranian -made and
had been transferred in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 6 (b) of resolution 2231
(2015). In September 2018, the Secretariat was invited to examine the remnants of
those unmanned aerial vehicles in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The Secretariat observed a
number of unmanned aerial vehicles with characteristics consistent with those of the
unmanned aerial vehicles examined during the previous reporting periods, which had
the same design features as the Iranian-made Ababil-2 unmanned aerial vehicles (see
S/2018/602, para. 40). Furthermore, the Secretariat examined the remnants of two
different unmanned aerial vehicles. The Secretariat is still analysing the information
collected on all these unmanned aerial vehicles and on their foreign-made components
and will report to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.
24. While in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in September 2018, the
Secretariat was presented with two container launch units — one in each of the
aforementioned countries — for anti-tank guided missiles, whose production dates
__________________
5 Martin Bentham, “Heathrow Airport border staff ‘seize missile parts that were being sent to
Iran’”, Evening Standard, 2 August 2018. Available at www.standard.co.uk/news/london/
heathrow-border-staff-seize-missile-parts-that-were-being-sent-to-iran-a3902096.html.
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were marked on the units as 2016 and 2017, respectively. According to the United
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, both had been recovered in Yemen by forces of the
Saudi-led coalition. The Secretariat observed specific characteristics consistent with
those of the container launch units for the Iranian-produced Dehlavieh anti-tank
guided missile visible in video and photographs published by Iranian media outlets
(left-aligned marking without spaces between lines; location of marking in upper third
of unit; indication of missile type code, missile type, lot, date, serial number and
temperature range; font type indicative of Iranian markings; and pronounced end cap
chamfer).
25. In October 2018, United States authorities invited the Secretariat to examine an
arms shipment, which they believed was relevant to the implementation of resolution
2231 (2015), consisting of approximately 2,500 AKMS-type assault rifles, seized on
28 August 2018 en route towards Yemen in international waters in the Gulf of Aden.
The Secretariat established that the seized assault rifles did not have the
characteristics of Iranian production. The Secretariat will continue to analyse new
information should it become available, and I will report to the Security C ouncil, as
appropriate.
26. In identical letters dated 22 November 2018 addressed to me and the President
of the Security Council (S/2018/1046), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated
that, in April 2018, one Iranian-produced Khordad air defence system was delivered
to the “T4 airbase” in the Syrian Arab Republic. According to Israel, the system was
delivered using an Iranian transport plane and unloaded in the presence of senior
officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Permanent Representative
concluded that the air defence system had been transferred by the Islamic Republic
of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). In the letter dated
29 November 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Council ( S/2018/1073),
the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran
stated that the allegations in the aforementioned letter from the Permanent
Representative of Israel were “entirely false”.
27. In my previous report, I brought to the attention of the Security Council the
participation of Iranian entities in foreign exhibitions, including the Eura sia Airshow
2018, held in Antalya, Turkey, in April 2018. In July 2018, the Permanent Mission of
Turkey informed the Secretariat that Iranian participants only exhibited mock -up
unmanned aerial vehicles and that no commercial transaction had taken place wi th
regard to those items. Meanwhile, information released by the organizer of the third
Azerbaijan International Defence Exhibition, held in Baku in September 2018,
indicated that an Iranian entity also participated in the exhibition. 6 According to
media coverage of that exhibition, the items displayed by that entity appear to have
been tactical and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles. The Secretariat has raised
this issue with the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan. The Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran previously stated that it believed that no prior approval was
required from the Council for that activity, given that the Islamic Republic of Iran
retained ownership of the items exhibited. I intend to report thereon to the Council in
due course as additional information becomes available.
VI. Implementation of the travel ban provision
28. Regarding the previously reported travel of Major General Soleimani to
Baghdad in mid-May 2018, the Permanent Mission of Iraq informed the Secretariat
in July 2018 that he had been denied permission to enter Iraqi territory through
__________________
6 List of participants at the exhibition available at https://adex.az/en-content/11.html.
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Baghdad International Airport and that he left the country without entering Iraqi
territory.
VII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
29. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs
continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division also liaised
with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related
to the procurement channel. In October 2018, the Division participated in the
European Union second Dialogue on Export Control Governance, organized by the
European Commission, and the 2018 Nuclear Export Control Practices Forum,
organized by the United Arab Emirates Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation.
During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from and
provided relevant support to Member States regarding the provisions of the
resolution, in particular on the procedures for the submission of nuclear-related
proposals and its review process. The Secretariat continues to assist Member States
in such efforts, as needed.
Annex 28
ANNEX 29
United Nations S/2019/492
Security Council Distr.: General
13 June 2019
Original: English
19-09323 (E) 250619
*1909323*
Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
Seventh report of the Secretary-General
I. Introduction
1. On 14 July 2015, 12 years of intense diplomatic efforts and detailed technical
negotiations by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European
Union with the Islamic Republic of Iran culminated in the agreement on the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was subsequently endorsed by the Security
Council in its resolution 2231 (2015). On 16 January 2016, upon completion of certain
actions by the Islamic Republic of Iran (stipulated in the Plan) as verified by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a decade of United Nations sanctions
as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to the nuclear programme of the
Islamic Republic of Iran were lifted in accordance with the Plan. As resolution 2231
(2015) came into effect, Member States and regional and other international actors
mobilized in support of the resolution and the Plan, which are widely regarded as
fundamental to regional and international peace and security, a major achievement in
nuclear non-proliferation and in dialogue and diplomacy.
2. It is essential that these diplomatic efforts and hard-won achievements be
preserved and built upon. In this regard, I regret that the United States – further to its
withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 8 May 2018 – has further
decided not to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic
of Iran, and not to fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the
framework of the Plan. These actions are contrary to the goals set out in the Plan and
resolution 2231 (2015). These actions may also impede the ability of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to implement certain provisions of the Plan and of the resolution. I
also note the concerns expressed in the letter dated 23 May 2019 (S/2019/429) from
the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to me and in
the letter dated 11 June 2019 (S/2019/482) from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation addressed to me and the President of
the Security Council.
3. I regret the 8 May 2019 announcement by the Islamic Republic of Iran to “not
commit itself to respecting the limits on the keeping of enriched uranium and heavy
water reserves at the current stage” and that it will further “suspend compliance with
the uranium enrichment limits and measures to modernise the Arak Heavy Water
Reactor” should the other participants not fulfil its demands, especially in areas of
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banking and oil, within 60 days.1 It is my firm belief that such actions are not in the
interest of the participants and may not help preserve the Plan nor secure tangible
economic benefits for the Iranian people. Thus far, as verified by IAEA, the Islamic
Republic of Iran has continued to implement its nuclear-related commitments, albeit
in the face of considerable challenges. I encourage it to stay the course.
4. I acknowledge again the important contribution of IAEA in sup porting the full
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, especially by providing
the international community with reports on its verification and monitoring in the
Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015), and commend its
impartial, factual and professional work. Since January 2016, the Agency has reported
15 times to the Security Council (most recently in S/2019/212 and S/2019/496) that
the Islamic Republic of Iran has been implementing its nuclear-related commitments
under the Plan. The Agency also reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion
of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities remained ongoing. The Agency further
reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the
Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement and to apply the transparency
measures contained in the Plan. The Agency also indicated that it had conducted
complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations
in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.
5. I welcome the statement by the Chair of the Joint Commission following its
6 March 2019 meeting, which inter alia acknowledged that, alongside implementation
by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments, the lifting of
sanctions allowing for the normalization of trade and economic relations constitute
an essential part of the Plan. I also appreciate and share the deep sense of urgency and
the need for tangible results expressed in the statement by the participants in the Plan
regarding trade and economic relations. I am encouraged by their efforts to protect
the freedom of their economic operators to pursue legitimate business with the Islamic
Republic of Iran in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015), and their other
initiatives in support of trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic of
Iran. They should be given full effect as a matter of priority. It is essential that the
Plan continue to work for all its participants, including by delivering tangible
economic benefits to the Iranian people.
6. The continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and
resolution 2231 (2015) continues to enjoy the full support of the broader international
community. I again call upon all Member States to work effectively with the
participants in the Plan towards its preservation, including in creating the conditions
necessary for their economic operators to engage in trade with the Islamic Republic
of Iran in accordance with the resolution. I also urge all Member States to avoid
provocative rhetoric and actions that may have a negative impact on regional stability.
7. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is only one part of resolution 2231
(2015). Staunch support for the Plan among the participants and Member States
continues to be accompanied with concerns about Iranian activities in relation to the
restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution. Therefore, I again
encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider and urgently address
these concerns as well.
8. The present report, my seventh on the implementation of resolution 2231
(2015), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including
findings and recommendations, since the issuance of the sixth report of the Secretary -
__________________
1 Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, statement of 8 May 2019,
available at www.president.ir/en/109588.
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General (S/2018/1089) on 6 December 2018. Consistent with previous reports, the
focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution 2231
(2015), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic
missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of
Iran, as well as assets freeze and travel ban provisions.
II. Key findings and recommendations
9. Since 6 December 2018, two new proposals have been submitted to the Security
Council for approval through the procurement channel. I welcome the reaffirmation
in March 2019 by participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of the
readiness of the procurement channel to evaluate proposals for transfers of certain
goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The
procurement channel is a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism
ensuring that those transfers are consistent with resolution 2231 (2015) and the
provisions and objectives of the Plan. I again encourage all States and the private
sector to fully utilize and support this channel.
10. The United States announced on 3 May 2019 that participation in certain
activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), such as the
transfer of enriched uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for
natural uranium or assistance to expand the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant beyond the
existing reactor unit, may now be exposed to its national sanctions. I wish to note that
the exemptions set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to the resolution are designed to
provide for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology
required for the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Plan.
11. The Secretariat has not received new reports on the supply, sale or transfer of
nuclear or dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods or technology to the Islamic
Republic of Iran undertaken contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B. Regarding the
transfer of two commodities previously brought to the attention of the Security
Council, the authorities of the States of manufacture and of a State of re -export
informed the Secretariat that they found no indication of actions inconsistent with
resolution 2231 (2015).
12. During the reporting period, the Secretariat examined additional arms and
related materiel recovered in Yemen, including a second partly disassembled surface -
to-air missile, three sets of wings pertaining to a new type of unmanned aerial vehicle,
and a new unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives. The Secretariat is
confident that these arms and related materiel or parts thereof are of Iranian
manufacture. However, it has no indication as to whether those items were transferred
from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.
13. A televised speech by the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya
Sinwar, and a statement by the Al-Quds Brigades spokesperson in the Gaza Strip, both
in May 2019, point to ongoing Iranian military support to Hamas and the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Any Iranian arms transfers after 16 January 2016 would have
been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
14. Since the issuance of my previous report, Major General Soleimani appears to
have continued to travel despite the travel ban provisions and previous reporting on
this issue. Another individual on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231
(2015)2 appears to have engaged in foreign travel during the reporting period. In this
instance, the lack of relevant identifiers may have hampered implementation of the
__________________
2 Available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list. There are currently 23 individuals
and 61 entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).
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travel ban provision. To ensure its proper implementation, as well as that of the assets
freeze provision, I reiterate my recommendation that the Security Council review and
update the list as appropriate.
III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions
15. Since 6 December 2018, 2 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities
set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) were submitted to the
Security Council, bringing to 44 the total number of proposals submitted si nce
Implementation Day for approval through the procurement channel. At the time of
reporting, 29 proposals were approved by the Council, 5 were not approved and 9
were withdrawn by the proposing States. In a letter dated 11 June 2019 from the
Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation addressed
to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/482), he conveyed the view
of his country that “in order to raise efficiency and ensure the stable work of the
‘procurement channel’ it is imperative to increase international trust in this
mechanism” and “necessary to promptly elaborate, within the Procurement Working
Group and the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, special security mechanisms in order to negate the effects of unilateral
sanctions and thus ensure the continued implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)”.
Annexed to the letter was a proposal submitted to the Procurement Working Group of
the Joint Commission to that end.
16. In addition, the Security Council received 7 new notifications pursuant to
paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities
consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that do not require approval,
but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint
Commission. These activities include transfers of certain equipment for light water
reactors, as well as certain transfers related to the modification of the two cascades at
the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, the export of the Islamic Republic
of Iran’s enriched uranium in excess of 300 kg in return for natural uranium, and the
modernization of the Arak reactor. On 3 May 2019, the United States announced that
involvement in some of the above-mentioned activities may now be exposed to its
national sanctions, specifically assistance to expand the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
beyond the existing reactor unit and any involvement in transferring enriched uranium
out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium. 3 It also
announced that other activities, such as the redesign of the Arak reactor, modification
of infrastructure at the Fordow facility, and work at the existing unit of the Bushehr
Nuclear Power Plant, would be permitted to continue for a renewable duration of 90
days but that it reserved the right to modify or revoke its policy covering these
non-proliferation activities at any time. In a letter dated 23 May 2019 addressed to
me (S/2019/429), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted
that these “sanctions and policies have prevented the implementation of relevant
nuclear-related provisions of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) by Member
States, including the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
17. Since my most recent update regarding the dual-use items seized by the United
Arab Emirates in May 2016 and April 2017 while in transit to the Islamic Republic
of Iran (see S/2018/1089, para. 13), the Secretariat has received additional
information about one of these items, a titanium rod. The authorities of the State of
manufacture confirmed to the Secretariat that it was intended for an Iranian company
__________________
3 United States Department of State, “Advancing the Maximum Pressure Campaign by Restricting
Iran’s Nuclear Activities”, Fact sheet, 3 May 2019, available at www.state.gov/advancing-themaximum-
pressure-campaign-by-restricting-irans-nuclear-activities/.
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and that they would need to physically examine the rod to confirm the assessment of
the exporting company that it did not meet the criteria set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 and thus did not require prior approval from the Security
Council. In addition, the authorities of the State of manufacture of the inductively
coupled plasma mass spectrometer have recently advised the Secretariat that their
investigation is ongoing.
18. With regard to the information provided by the United States on the transfer of
two commodities (carbon fibre and aluminium alloys) that, in their assessment, would
have required prior approval from the Security Council (see S/2018/1089, para. 14),
the authorities of the State of manufacture of the carbon fibre indicated to the
Secretariat that, in their assessment, it did not meet the criteria set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 and therefore that its export to the Islamic Republic of
Iran did not require prior approval from the Council.
19. The authorities of the State of manufacture of the aluminium alloys informed
the Secretariat that they had conducted an investigation and that no actions
inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015) had been identified on the part of their
manufacturers or companies, as they did not transfer the aluminium alloys to the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Meanwhile, the authorities of the State from which the
aluminium alloys were reportedly re-exported informed the Secretariat that while a
number of exports of aluminium to the Islamic Republic of Iran had taken place prior
to May 2017, they had no indication that these items met the criteria set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 and would therefore have required approval from the
Security Council prior to their transfer.
IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions
A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic
Republic of Iran
20. In my most recent report, I noted that the Security Council discussed on
4 December 2018 the reported test firing of a medium-range ballistic missile by the
Islamic Republic of Iran on 1 December 2018 (see S/2018/1089, para. 19). During
the reporting period, I also received a letter dated 18 December 2018 from the
Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom
(S/2018/1171) and a letter dated 7 March 2019 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the
United States Mission (S/2019/216) regarding this test firing. According to those
States, the missile was a category I system under the Missile Technology Control
Regime 4 and therefore inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons. They
concluded that this test firing was inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015). In letters dated 14 January and 12 April 2019 addressed to
me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/49 and S/2019/315), the Chargé
d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that
there is no implicit or explicit reference in paragraph 3 of annex B to the Missile
Technology Control Regime or to the criteria contained therein. He also reiterated the
view of the Islamic Republic of Iran that its missiles programme “is ‘designed’ to be
exclusively capable of delivering conventional warheads” and thus not inconsistent
with paragraph 3 of annex B, but also falls outside the purview of the resolution.
__________________
4 Category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime are defined as “complete
rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) capable
of delivering at least a 500 kg ‘payload’ to a ‘range’ of at least 300 km” (see 1.A.1 of the
Equipment, Software and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime).
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21. In identical letters dated 2 April and 31 May 2019 addressed to me and the
President of the Security Council (S/2019/288 and S/2019/452), the Permanent
Representative of Israel brought to my attention information regarding additional
flight tests of ballistic missiles reportedly conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
According to the information provided, one Khorramshahr variant, o ne Shahab-3
variant, one Qiam, one Scud variant and three Zolfaghar ballistic missiles were flight -
tested between December 2018 and February 2019. The Permanent Representative
stated that their test-firing was inconsistent with the resolution because those missiles
were all category I system under the Missile Technology Control Regime. In his
letters dated 12 April and 3 June 2019 addressed to me and the President of the
Security Council (S/2019/315 and S/2019/457), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected the “fabrications” and
“claims” raised in the aforementioned letters from the Permanent Representative of
Israel.
22. I also received information on the launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran of
Simorgh and Safir space launch vehicles on 15 January and 6 February 2019,
respectively. In identical letters dated 18 January and 20 February 2019 addressed to
me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/62 and S/2019/168), the
Permanent Representative of Israel stated that these were also category I systems
under the Missile Technology Control Regime and that their launch constituted
“another stage in Iran’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of
carrying nuclear weapons”. He further stated that the transporter erector launcher
used to launch the Safir space launch vehicle was identical to that of the Shahab -3
ballistic missile. In letters dated 20 February and 25 March 2019 addressed to me
(S/2019/177, annex, and S/2019/270), the Permanent Representatives of France,
Germany and the United Kingdom stressed that the Simorgh and Safir space launch
vehicles are based on technologies shared with the Shahab-3 and Khorramshahr
medium-range ballistic missiles. They further stated that “the technologies necessary
for the conception, fabrication and launch of a space launch vehicle are closely related
to those required for the development of long-range and intercontinental ballistic
missiles” and that such launches provide the Islamic Republic of Iran “with empirical
results that can be used to optimize capabilities related to the development of these
missile systems”. They concluded that these launches were inconsistent with
paragraph 3 of annex B. In his letter dated 7 March 2019 addressed to the President
of the Security Council (S/2019/216), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the United States
Mission also stressed that space launch vehicles use “technologies that are virtually
identical and interchangeable with those used in MTCR Category I ballistic missiles ”,
and underscored that these launches constituted “activities using technologies related
to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons ”, which the
Islamic Republic is called upon not to undertake by the resolution.
23. In his letter dated 12 April 2019 (S/2019/315), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that paragraph 3 of annex B
does not contain implicit or explicit references to space launch vehicles. He further
stated that the technical characteristics and operational requirements of space launch
vehicles are distinct from those of ballistic missile systems. He further stressed that the
Simorgh is designed and developed exclusively for placing satellites into orbit and
therefore does not “fall into the category of ballistic missiles, let alone one ‘designed
to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons’”. He concluded that its launch cannot be
considered inconsistent with the resolution. He underscored that the use of space launch
vehicles by the Islamic Republic of Iran is “part of a scientific and technological
activity related to the use of space technology” and that the country is “determined to
continue to exercise this inherent right for its socioeconomic interests”. He also
recalled that, as noted in the fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the
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implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/1058), there was no consensus in
the Security Council on how a previous Simorgh launch related to the resolution.
24. In their letter dated 25 March 2019 (S/2019/270), the Permanent
Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom brought to my attention
other recent actions that they considered inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B.
They stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran revealed in early February 2019, in a
public display in Tehran during the Ten Days of Dawn celebrations marking the
anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, a variant of the Khorramshahr ballistic missile
with a manoeuvring re-entry vehicle that is likely to have increased its maximum
range “to approximately 3,000 kilometres”. They also stated that a newly unveiled
Dezful ballistic missile, with a purported range of 1,000 kilometres, is “highly likely
to meet the Missile Technology Control Regime category-I criteria”. In identical
letters dated 22 April 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council
(S/2019/330), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the Islamic Republic
of Iran, during the same annual celebrations in Tehran in early February 2019, also
showcased the Sejil, Emad and Ghadr in addition to the Khorramshahr. He stated that
all these ballistic missiles are designed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads.
He further stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran unveiled the production line of the
Dezful missile. He considered that these activities “clearly violate” the resolution. In
his letter dated 12 April 2019 (S/2019/315), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected speculations made by the
Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom “regarding
Iran’s space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles, including their type and range”.
25. In a letter dated 18 April 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security
Council (S/2019/339), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation
reiterated the position of his country regarding the implementation of paragraph 3 of
annex B. He underscored that the Islamic Republic of Iran is not prohibited by
multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms or resolution 2231 (2015) to develop
missile and space programmes. He also noted that IAEA has consistently reported
that Iran is in full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments and that there is
no evidence that the Islamic Republic of Iran is developing or producing a nuclear
weapon or means of its delivery. He concluded that the Islamic Republic of Iran was
“respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to
resolution 2231 (2015) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles designed
to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”. He reiterated that the parameters of the
Missile Technology Control Regime were never intended to be used in the context of
the resolution to ascertain whether certain missiles are designed to be capable of
carrying nuclear weapons and that such types of missiles included certain features
and that no “evidence of the existence of such features on Iranian ballistic missiles or
space launch vehicles” was presented to the Council.
B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with
the Islamic Republic of Iran
26. As indicated in my previous report, the Secretariat worked on establishing the
production date range of guidance system subcomponents retrieved from ballistic
missiles launched at the territory of Saudi Arabia by the Houthis between March and
June 2018 (see S/2018/1089, para. 20). According to the information provided to the
Secretariat by the foreign manufacturing companies, all of the retrieved guidance
subcomponents traced by the Secretariat had been produced between 2000 and 2010,
and some were sold as recently as 2012. As noted in my fifth report, that production
and sale date range is incompatible with that of the Scud missiles provided by the
former Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Yemen and
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that were known to be in Yemeni stockpiles prior to the outbreak of the current
conflict in early 2015 (see S/2018/602, para. 32).
V. Implementation of arms-related provisions
A. Restrictions on arms-related transfers to the Islamic Republic
of Iran
27. In November 2018, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
informed the Secretariat that three individuals had recently been found guilty in a
United Kingdom court of knowingly exporting “prohibited military or dual use
goods”, namely aircraft parts, to the Islamic Republic of Iran between February 2010
and March 2016. According to additional information since provided to the
Secretariat, the three individuals transferred aircraft parts, including for MiG and F4
Phantom jets, from the United States to the Islamic Republic of Iran through several
companies located in various countries to conceal the final destination of those
transfers. Since 16 January 2016, the transfer of spare parts for combat aircraft as
defined for the purpose of the Register of Conventional Arms requires prior
authorization of the Security Council.5
B. Restrictions on arms-related transfers from the Islamic Republic
of Iran
28. In my most recent report (see S/2018/1089, para. 22), I brought to the attention
of the Security Council that the Secretariat had examined in Riyadh in September
2018 a partly disassembled surface-to-air missile reportedly found in a consignment,
seized in March 2018, destined for the Houthis. The Secretariat had observed that its
features were consistent with those of the Iranian Sayyad-2C missiles seen in videos
and photographs published by Iranian media outlets. 6 In December 2018, in
Washington, D.C., the Secretariat examined a second partly disassembled surface -
to-air missile which was also missing its forward guidance nose section and fins. The
Secretariat observed that its dimensions, other external features, paint and mark ings
were consistent with that of the missile examined in Riyadh. The Secretariat observed
that markings on that second missile’s airframe and quality control labels on internal
components were also in Farsi. The Secretariat was also presented with photogr aphs
of that second missile’s components (flight computer, main relay box, navigation
system and self-destruct unit) and subcomponents, which showed production date
markings ranging between 2011 and 2015, including in Persian calendar format.
According to United States authorities, that missile had been part of the above -
mentioned consignment seized in March 2018. The serial numbers of the two missiles
examined were a few digits apart from each other and from two missiles visible in a
video on military exercises published by Iranian media outlets, suggesting that all
these missiles came from the same production lot.7 The Secretariat is confident that
the missiles it examined in Riyadh and Washington, D.C., are of Iranian manufacture.
__________________
5 Any such transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of resolution 1929 (2010)
and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 8 of that resolution.
6 See, for example, Press TV, “Iran puts new military equipment on production line”, 6 February
2017, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZMTGXU02FI; and Fars News Agency,
“Commander: Iran mulling change in Sayyad missiles to mount it on Mowj-class vessels”,
27 January 2014, available at http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921107000722.
7 See, for example, Press TV, “Iran puts new military equipment on production line”, 6 February
2017, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZMTGXU02FI.
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However, it has not been able to confirm whether these missiles were transferred from
the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.8
29. In May 2019, the Secretariat was provided with the opportunity to examine the
gyroscope of a new type of unmanned aerial vehicle previously examined in Riyadh
in September 2018 (see S/2018/1089, para. 23). The Secretariat observed that this
extended-range unmanned aerial vehicle, like other unmanned aerial vehicles
reportedly recovered in Yemen it examined thus far, was equipped with a “Model
V10” vertical gyroscope (manufacturer unknown). The Secretariat further observed
that an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016
(see para. 30 below) was equipped with a “Model V9” of that same vertical gyroscope.
The Secretariat is still analysing the information collected on this and other unmanned
aerial vehicles and will report to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.
30. During its visits to Riyadh in September and December 2018, the Secretariat
observed two similar sets of wings belonging to another new type of unmanned aerial
vehicle, which, according to Saudi authorities, were part of the above -mentioned
consignment seized in March 2018 destined to the Houthis. While in
Washington, D.C., in December 2018, the Secretariat observed a third similar set of
wings reportedly originating from the same seized consignment. The Secretariat also
observed the remnants of an unmanned aerial vehicle which, according to United
States authorities, was an Iranian Shahed-123 recovered in Afghanistan in October
2016. The Secretariat observed that all three sets of wings had the same dimensions
and design features (anhedral, single-piece, V-shaped high wing; top-mounting
configuration; ball and socket mounting system) as the wings of the unmanned aerial
vehicle reportedly recovered in Afghanistan. The Secretariat further observed that the
paint, numbering and other markings on the three sets of wings were consistent with
those of the recovered unmanned aerial vehicle and that the serial numbers on all
examined wings were only a few digits apart. The Secretariat also observed that the
features of that recovered unmanned aerial vehicle (single round fuselage, high wing,
V-shaped tail and pusher propeller) are consistent with those of an Iranian unmanned
aerial vehicle visible in video and photographs published by Iranian media outlets. 9
The Secretariat also observed markings in Farsi on internal components of that
recovered vehicle. The Secretariat is confident that the three sets of wings it examined
in Riyadh and Washington, D.C., are of Iranian manufacture. However, it has not been
able to confirm whether these wings were transferred from the Islamic Republic of
Iran after 16 January 2016.10
31. In April 2019, United Arab Emirates authorities invited the Secretariat to
examine samples of an arms shipment which they believed was relevant to the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). According to the United Arab Emirates,
the shipment was seized in Aden in December 2018 and consisted of 178 automatic
weapons, 48 rocket-propelled grenade launchers and 45 electro-visual systems for the
launchers. The samples shown to the Secretariat, which consisted of assault rifles,
rocket-propelled grenade launchers and optical devices for those launchers, were all
in new condition. The Secretariat observed that the grenade launchers, like those
__________________
8 Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council
resolution 1747 (2007) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 5 of that
resolution.
9 See, for example, Press TV, “Iran’s IRGC holds massive drone drills in Persian Gulf region”,
14 March 2019, available at www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/03/14/591010/Iran-IRGC-combatdrone-
drill; and IRIB News Agency, 1 October 2016, available at www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/
.بازدید-دبیر-شورای-عالی-امنیت-ملی-از-نمایشگاه-تبدیل-تھدید-بھ-فرصت/ 1317539
10 Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council
resolution 1737 (2006) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 7 of that
resolution.
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seized by the United States on 28 March 2016 on board a dhow, the Adris (see
S/2017/1030, para. 33), had characteristics similar to Iranian-produced RPG-7-type
launchers (for example, markings and heat shields). The Secretariat established that
the assault rifles did not have the characteristics of Iranian production, but were of
the same make and manufacture as the AKMS-type assault rifles seized by the United
States on 28 August 2018 en route towards Yemen in international waters in the Gulf
of Aden (see S/2018/1089, para. 25) and that their serial numbers fell within the same
production batch and included sequential numbers, which indicated that they came
from the same production lot. The Secretariat continues to analyse the information
available on the shipment seized by the United Arab Emirates, and I will report back
to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.
32. During its visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2018, the Secretariat examined the
hull and engine of a custom-built unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives. The
vessel was recovered in September 2018 by Saudi forces off the coast of Yemen close
to the Saudi-Yemeni maritime border. In May 2019, the Secretariat was provided with
the opportunity to re-examine the vessel, together with its detonation and guidance
systems, as well as its warhead container. The Secretariat observed that the detonation
system included a fuse plate identical to that of the unmanned surface vehicle
recovered by the United Arab Emirates in 2017 (see S/2017/1030, para. 34), as well
as to those seized on board the Adris (see S/2017/1030, para. 33). As I previously
reported, documentary evidence provided to the Secretariat indicated that the fuse
plates found on board the Adris had been shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran
(see S/2018/602, para. 39). The Secretariat also observed that the guidance system
consisted of commercially available components and that some elements of the
guidance and detonation systems used electrical cables bearing markings indicating
Iranian manufacture. Data retrieved by the Secretariat shows that geographical
coordinates were programmed into the guidance system in late August 2018. The
Secretariat is confident that at least part of the detonation system of the unmanned
surface vessel, recovered by Saudi forces in September 2018, was also manufactured
in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, no indications were found as to whether
these items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.
33. In identical letters dated 4 April 2019 addressed to me and the President of the
Security Council (S/2019/292), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that on
20 January 2019 “the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps”
launched a surface-to-surface missile from the area of Damascus towards the Israelioccupied
Golan and that the missile had been transferred from the Islamic Republic
of Iran to the Syrian Arab Republic after January 2016, in a manner inconsistent with
resolution 2231 (2015). In his letter dated 12 April 2019 (S/2019/315), the Chargé
d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected “the
allegations and fabrications” raised in the aforementioned letter from the Permanent
Representative of Israel. If additional information becomes available, I will report
back to the Council accordingly.
34. In a letter dated 28 February 2019 addressed to the Under-Secretary-General for
Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the
Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations conveyed, on behalf of her
Government, that “the Iranian regime continues to bolster Hezbollah’s weapons
capabilities in various ways, including through the precision-guided missile conversion
programme it has established inside civilian population centres across Lebanon, and
the proliferation of mass weapons manufacturing capabilities to Hezbollah i n Lebanon
and the Syrian Arab Republic”. In the letter it was alleged that reports over the past few
months had revealed a drastic increase in weapons transfers from Tehran to Rafic Hariri
International Airport in Beirut. It was further stated that the “Iranian regime is also
providing Hezbollah with technical training and assistance to manufacture, maintain
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and use these weapons and advanced capabilities independently”. The Secretariat has
not been able at this stage to corroborate this information and will report to the Security
Council if new information becomes available.
35. On 30 May 2019, in a televised speech, the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza
Strip, Yahya Sinwar, stated that rockets launched at Tel Aviv in 2014 were either
“provided by Iran” or “locally made, with financial and technical support from Iran”.
He also stated that, in case of another conflict, “Tel Aviv will be struck with several
times the number of [missiles] than in 2014”. He further stressed that “if not for the
support of Iran for the resistance in Palestine, we would not have obtained these
capabilities”.11 In addition, in a video release earlier in May 2019, the spokesman of
the Al-Quds Brigades of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group claimed that a “new
missile (Bader 3)” was developed with support of the Islamic Republic of Iran “in all
disciplines”.12 Those statements suggest that transfers of arms and related materiel
from the Islamic Republic of Iran may have been undertaken after January 2016
contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
36. In my previous report, I brought to the attention of the Security Council the
participation of an Iranian entity in the third Azerbaijan International Defence
Exhibition, held in Baku in September 2018 (see S/2018/1089, para. 27). In January
2019, the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan informed the Secretariat that the
“Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran” only exhibited mock-up
military products and unmanned aerial vehicles, which were exported back to the
Islamic Republic of Iran upon completion of the exhibition. Meanwhile, information
released by the organizer of the eighth International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, held
in Baghdad in March 2019, indicates that at least one Iranian entity participated again
in the exhibition. According to media coverage of that exhibition, the items displayed
by that entity appear to have been various arms-related materiel, including rifle scopes
and other optical devices. The Secretariat has raised this issue with the Permanent
Mission of Iraq. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran previously
stated that it believed that no prior approval was required from the Council for that
activity, given that the Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items
exhibited. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course as additional
information becomes available.
37. In addition, in his above-mentioned identical letters dated 31 May 2019
(S/2019/452), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the Islamic Republic
of Iran had transferred unmanned aerial vehicle technology to Iraq and that this transfer
had been undertaken contrary to the provision of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In
his letter dated 3 June 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/457), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected this claim.
VI. Implementation of the travel ban and assets
freeze provisions
38. In his above-mentioned letter dated 31 May 2019 (S/2019/452), the Permanent
Representative of Israel stated that several entities also on the list maintained pursuant
to resolution 2231 (2015) “have been violating […] the assets freeze restrictions”. In
his letter dated 3 June 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/457), the Chargé d’affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected this claim. T he
Secretariat is still analysing the information received during the reporting period,
__________________
11 Available at www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/ السنوار-في-یوم-القدس--الأمة-العربیة-/ 955543
.تخلت-عنا-وإیران-زودتنا-ب
12 Available at http://saraya.ps/play/2033/2019-5-8-% كلمة-الناطق-باسم-سرایا-القدس-أبو-حمزة- 20
.بتاریخ
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including information that listed entities may have engaged in financial agreements
with foreign entities, or changed name in order to thwart implementation of the asse ts
freeze provisions. I intend to report back to the Security Council accordingly.
39. Since the issuance of my previous report, information has surfaced regarding
additional foreign travel by Major General Soleimani. According to local media
outlets, he reportedly travelled to Baghdad in late December 2018 and Lebanon in
January 2019. The Secretariat sought clarification from the Permanent Mission of Iraq
and Lebanon, and I will report back to the Security Council in due course.
40. Information available to the Secretariat suggests that another individual
inscribed on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) may have travelled
during the reporting period to several countries. The lack of rele vant identifying
information for that individual, including date and place of birth and current function,
may have hampered proper implementation of the travel ban provision. In this regard,
updated and more detailed list entries would facilitate the imple mentation of the
restrictive measures of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
VII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
41. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and
Peacebuilding Affairs has continued supporting the work of the Security Council, in
close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231
(2015). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working
Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel. I n
addition, the Division has provided induction briefings for the incoming Facilitator
and members of the Council to assist them in their work on the implementation of
resolution 2231 (2015).
42. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from
Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the
provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the procedures for the
submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.
Annex 29
ANNEX 30
9/3/2019 Iranian support of Afghan Taliban targeted by new US sanctions | Asia| An in-depth look at news from across the continent | DW | 25.10.20…
https://www.dw.com/en/iranian-support-of-afghan-taliban-targeted-by-new… 1/5
ASIA
Iranian support of Afghan Taliban targeted by new US
sanctions
US-Iranian relations have taken a major plunge under President Trump and observers say Tehran has expanded its backing
of the Afghan Taliban to stymie US action against the militant group in Afghanistan.
On Tuesday, the US Treasury Department issued a statement announcing new sanctions targeting Taliban members involved in suicide
attacks and other lethal offensives in Afghanistan, along with Iranians who have provided material and financial support to the militant
group.
Read more: US sanctions Iran networks accused of supporting child soldiers
Two Iranian nationals linked to the Quds Forces of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, two Pakistanis and four Afghans are among the newly
sanctioned individuals, meaning the US government can now freeze any of their assets or property under American jurisdiction.
However, it is unlikely that the newly sanctioned individuals own assets in the US. And sanctions are only marginally effective in stopping the
flow of Taliban financing because the insurgent group has many avenues of funding, for example, with the record-high opium harvests in
Afghanistan.
Advertisement
TOP STORIES / WORLD / ASIA
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Annex 30
9/3/2019 Iranian support of Afghan Taliban targeted by new US sanctions | Asia| An in-depth look at news from across the continent | DW | 25.10.20…
https://www.dw.com/en/iranian-support-of-afghan-taliban-targeted-by-new… 2/5
Iranian President Rouhani is coming under pressure at
home as US sanctions cut off Iran from global capital
A different perspective on sanctions is that they highlight US frustration with Iran's role
in Afghanistan.
Both Kabul and Washington consider Pakistan to be the Taliban's main supporter, and
the country is a known sanctuary for militants.
However, in recent years the Taliban have extended links to other countries, including
Iran and Russia, in an attempt to expand regional backing.
Read more: UN reports 8,000 Afghan civilian casualties so far in 2018
The group's former leader, Mullah Mansoor, was killed by a US drone strike in May
2016, shortly after returning to Pakistan from Iran.
"The US has enough to worry about with the support the Taliban derives from Pakistan," Michael Kugelman from the Washington-based
Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars said, adding the US does not want the Taliban to have a second external partner.
"But that's what seems to be evolving now as Iran often plays a double game in Afghanistan," Kugelman told DW. "Iran engages heavily with
the government in Kabul, but at the same time it provides episodic levels of small arms support to the insurgents," he said.
How close are the Taliban to
Iran?
As international pressure on
Pakistan increases, the Taliban
continue to look for other
countries that could provide the
support needed to ensure
their existence, in case
Islamabad turns away.
On the other hand, with the USIran
relationship taking a
nosedive under US President
Donald Trump's administration,
there's good reason to believe
that the Iranians are increasing
support for the Taliban and
other groups that are fighting US
forces in Afghanistan.
"The Quds Forces are a Taliban
contact point with Iran, but their
support to the insurgent group has so far remained secretive," Kabul-based military analyst Jawid Kohistani told DW.
"The Quds Forces have been able to launch operations in Syria and Iraq, and they are very well capable of doing the same in Afghanistan," he
added.
A surge in Taliban activity in western Afghan provinces that share a border with Iran also points to potential cooperation between the Taliban
and Iranian forces.
Read more: Afghanistan election: Multiple blasts reported at Kabul polling stations
According to Kugelman, the Taliban's recent offensive in western Farah province — near the border with Iran — could indicate that the group
was receiving some degree of assistance from Iranian intelligence operatives across the border.
"We certainly have to assume that the Revolutionary Guard could be making covert forays into Afghanistan to provide some form of support
to the insurgents," he said.
Afghan voters defy Taliban threats of violence
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Annex 30
ANNEX 31
8/19/2019 The Iranian Regime's Transfer of Arms to Proxy Groups and Ongoing Missile Development - United States Department of State
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FPC BRIEFING
BRIAN H. HOOK, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR IRAN AND SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
JOINT BASE ANACOSTIA-BOLLING
WASHINGTON, DC
NOVEMBER 29, 2018
The Iranian Regime’s Transfer of Arms to Proxy
Groups and Ongoing Missile Development
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0:00 / 36:50
Travelers
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MODERATOR:Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for waiting. Your excellencies,
members of the diplomatic corps, and members of the press, we’re very pleased to welcome
Special Representative Hook, who will be briefing today on the Iran Materiel Display. We will have
brief remarks followed by questions. This event is on the record for the press. Let me turn it over
to Special Representative Hook for his remarks. Thank you.
MR HOOK:Good morning, and thank you all for coming. I want to thank Secretary Mattis and the
men and women of our armed forces for their brave service to our nation and for making this
display possible. I want to recognize members of the diplomatic corps from several countries,
including South Korea, Japan, Israel, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Italy, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Afghanistan.
I want to also extend a special welcome to His Excellency Yousef Al Otaiba, the UAE ambassador;
to Ambassador Ron Dermer of Israel; and to His Excellency Ambassador Shaikh Abdullah bin
Rashed Al Khalifa of Bahrain. The United States deeply values our partnerships with the UAE and
Bahrain and Israel, and I thank all of you for coming today.
In December of last year, UN Ambassador Nikki Haley stood here to highlight the dangers posed
by Iran’s dangerous proliferation of missiles across the Middle East. She highlighted how Iran was
illegally providing weapons to Houthi militants in Yemen. It was a clear violation of UN
resolutions then, and it remains so today. She also spoke of the threat these weapons pose to
peace and security and to the innocent civilians caught in the crossfire.
Today, the United States is unveiling new evidence of Iran’s ongoing missile proliferation. The
Iranian threat is growing and we are accumulating risk of escalation in the region if we fail to act.
In the time since Ambassador Haley’s remarks, Iran’s support of the Houthi militants has
deepened. Its backing of terrorist activities across the world has increased, and its efforts to
undermine regional stability have expanded.
The inventory in this display has expanded since December. This is a function of Iran’s relentless
commitment to put more weapons into the hands of even more of its proxies, regardless of the
suffering. Iran has been prohibited by several UN resolutions from exporting arms for a decade.
These restrictions were in place starting in 2006 under UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and
1747, which I helped to negotiate. The prohibitions have continued since 2015 under UN
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Resolution 2231. This display and the items we have added to it reveal an outlaw regime
exporting arms as it pleases.
Today we are unveiling Iran’s Sayyad 2C surface-to-air missile, which you see behind me. This
missile was designed and manufactured in Iran, and the writing in Farsi on its side translates as
“the hunter missile.” The conspicuous Farsi markings is Iran’s way of saying they don’t mind being
caught violating UN resolutions. The Sayyad 2C is one of two identical systems interdicted by
Saudi Arabia in Yemen earlier this year. The Iranians wanted to deliver this to the Houthis, who
would have used it to target coalition aircraft up to 46 miles away. Given the Houthis’ reckless use
of other advanced weapons provided by the Iranians, these missiles pose a clear and present
danger to civil aviation in the region.
We are also unveiling anti-tank guided missiles. On display in front of me are two of the three
types of anti-tank guided missiles that Iran produces and transfers: the Toophan and the Tosan.
One of the Toophan rockets that is newly added was seized in an arms cache aboard a dhow in
the Arabian Sea. The other was found by Saudi Arabia during a raid in Yemen.
The Tosan rocket on display is also new, and is one of five that were seized in a stockpile by Saudi
forces in Yemen. These missiles enhance the Houthis’ capabilities and further intensify the
conflict in Yemen.
Fajr rockets have also been added to the display and are located next the anti-tank guided
missiles. These weapons were recovered in Helmand, near Kandahar Air Field, by the Afghan
National Army from the Taliban. Iran has been providing materiel support to the Taliban since at
least 2007. These same rockets have been used by Hamas in the past.
To my left is a new unmanned aerial system: the Shahed 123. We have debris from a Shahed
which was recovered by coalition forces in Afghanistan after it crashed, as well as Shahed
components that were interdicted in Yemen in early 2018. This missile system is primarily
designed to conduct covert reconnaissance and surveillance missions, potentially putting
American and coalition forces at risk. There are several new small arms of Iranian origin included
here, such as sniper rifles, RPGs, AK variants, and hand grenades. These have been provided to
us by Bahrain. Iran gave these weapons to Shia militant groups to carry out attacks against the
government. I would like to thank Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Hahmed Al Khalifa for his
commitment to exposing the Iranian regime’s activities.
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In 2016, senior Iran Revolutionary Guard commander Saeed Qassimi publicly called Bahrain an
Iranian province and said Iran is a base, quote, “for the support of revolution in Bahrain.” In a
microcosm, this is exactly how Iran destabilizes the Middle East. But the United States stands
with Bahrain to protect its sovereignty, and we will continue to work together to identify and
intercept arms shipments in the region. This ongoing collaboration with Bahrain, which is home
to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, is critical to the safety of the region.
I want to also highlight the recovered pieces of an Iranian Qiam missile fired by the Houthis into
Saudi Arabia, which Ambassador Haley unveiled last December. The missile’s intended target
was the civilian airport in Riyadh, a G20 airport through which tens of thousands of people travel
each day. Imagine a missile of this size and power hitting a civilian aircraft or terminal one at the
airport.
The new weapons we are disclosing today illustrate the scale of Iran’s destructive role across the
region. The same kind of rockets here today could tomorrow land in a public market in Kabul or
an international airport. As the Bahraini victims of attacks carried out with some of the weapons
here could tell you, the Iranian regime uses arms to export revolution, prolong crises, and inflict
death and suffering. The tools of Tehran’s foreign policy are here before you today. Tehran is
intent on increasing the lethality and reach of these weapons to deepen its presence throughout
the region.
This is why it is especially important that we get the de-escalation of conflicts in places like Yemen
right. Secretaries Pompeo and Mattis have called for a ceasefire in Yemen, and the United States
is committed to the efforts led by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Iran has no legitimate
interest in Yemen, other than to expand its sphere of influence and to create a Shia corridor of
control. Although Iran’s role in Yemen has been underreported by the media, there is no
question Iran has intensified the humanitarian catastrophe and prolonged the conflict. Iran has
been funding, arming, and training the Houthis, which has allowed them to continue to fight well
beyond what would have made any sense at all.
The United States and our coalition partners have provided billions in aid to the Yemenis, while
Iran has provided nothing but weapons and fighters. Just today Houthi rebels fired missiles into
Saudi Arabia. This strike is an example of the destabilizing agenda the Houthis are pursuing in
partnership with Iran. They act in this way even as UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths is exerting
maximum effort with our full support to bring the parties together for talks. Annex 31
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In the months ahead, we must be careful not to affirm Iran’s role as a legitimate political actor in
Yemen. The clerics in Tehran will exploit any opening to gain a foothold in Yemen, a place where
it has no business being in to begin with. Historically, there has not been a religious connection
between Iran’s Twelver Shiites and Yemen’s Houthis, who are Fiver Shiites. In fact, Iran’s religious
authorities have long been dismissive of the Fiver Shiites.
Just imagine what Yemen would look like in the future with an entrenched and enduring Iranian
presence. We already know how this movie ends, and we cannot watch a new version of
Lebanese Hizballah slowly emerge in the Arabian Peninsula. Since the end of 2006, Iran has
supplied Hizballah with thousands of precision rockets, missiles, and small arms. It now has
more than 100,000 rockets or missiles in its stockpile. If Iran were allowed to operate with similar
freedom in Yemen, we can expect the Lebanization of Yemen. The Houthis have launched
Iranian-origin missiles at Riyadh, with an estimated range of 560 miles. Iran has funded the
Houthis with hundreds of millions of dollars since the conflict broke out. With Iran’s ongoing help,
the Houthi threat will grow as their capabilities steadily expand.
Iran could use such newfound influence as a power broker and arms dealer to threaten our allies
and partners in the region and unravel the stability that we have worked so hard to achieve in
the Gulf. It could also create challenges in the Bab al-Mandab Strait in much the same way
Tehran leverages its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. An estimated 4.5 million barrels of oil per
day transits through the Bab al-Mandab, while about 17 million barrels a day flow through the
Strait of Hormuz. Iran has threatened repeatedly over many years to close the Strait of Hormuz.
Give Iran a free hand in Yemen and it can threaten to close both straits and commit acts of
maritime aggression with impunity. Just as we must constrain Iranian expansion in Syria, the
Golan Heights, and in Iraq, we must also prevent Iran from entrenching itself in Yemen.
I want to now highlight the Iranian regime’s investment in missile testing and development. It is
increasing. The regime’s pace of missile launches did not diminish after implementation of the
Iran nuclear deal in January of 2016. Iran has conducted numerous ballistic missile launches and
space launches since this time as it continues to prioritize missile development as a tool of
revolution. We assess that in January of 2017, Iran launched a medium-range missile, believed to
be the Khorramshahr. It can carry a payload of more than 500 kilograms and could be used to
carry nuclear warheads. Its suspected range is over 1,200 miles, which is far enough to target
some European capitals. Iran’s ongoing missile development puts Europe in its range.
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Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the region, with more than 10 ballistic missile systems
either in its inventory or under development. Any environment where Iran is able to operate
freely can become a forward-deployed missile base for such systems and for many other kinds
of weapons that you see here today. This threatens Israel and other partners, especially Saudi
Arabia and the UAE.
Just this month, rockets rained down on Israel from territory controlled by Iran’s Palestinian
partner Hamas. In Lebanon, we have evidence that Iran is helping Hizballah build missile
production facilities. In Iraq, credible reports indicate that Iran is transferring ballistic missiles to
Shia militia groups. This comes as these militias carried out highly provocative attacks on U.S.
diplomatic facilities in Baghdad and Basra in September, which we know that Iran did nothing to
stop.
Iran is also dumping cash and forces into conflict zones to support its proxies from the Levant to
the Arabian Peninsula. It has extended $4.6 billion in lines of credit to the Assad regime, provided
more than $100 million to Palestinian groups including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and
manages as many as 10,000 Shia fighters in Syria, some of whom are children as young as 12
years old.
As the world strives toward peace and security in the Middle East, we are working to reverse
advances made by Iran and its proxies over the last several years. In fact, we are using the full
scope of our sanctions authorities to inflict real costs on Iran. In July of 2017, we sanctioned 18
key individuals and entities for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program. In January, the U.S.
designated four additional entities. In May, we designated five Iranians for providing missile
expertise to the Houthis. These individuals were also responsible for transferring weapons to
Yemen on behalf of the Qods Force.
While we are sanctioning Iran’s missile activity and weapons transfers, our economic pressure is
much broader. Earlier this month, the United States reimposed the remaining sanctions that
were lifted by the Iran deal. This is the largest ever single-day action targeting the Iranian regime.
Our sanctions went back into place on more than 700 individuals, entities, vessels, and aircraft.
This sanctions campaign puts us in a much stronger position to be confronting the same threats
that I have described to you today. Our maximum pressure campaign will continue until Iran –
the Iranian regime – decides to change its destructive policies. The regime can change its policies,
or it can continue to watch its economy crumble. Annex 31
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For 39 years, the Iranian regime has shaped events in the region through illegal weapons
transfers, proxies, and terror – a deadly trifecta. President Trump has made it clear that the
United States will no longer tolerate the status quo. We seek a new and comprehensive deal with
Iran that addresses the full range of Iran’s destructive activities in the region. As Secretary
Pompeo said in his speech announcing our new strategy in May, Iran must stop testing and
proliferating missiles, stop launching and developing nuclear-capable missiles, and stop
supporting militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen. Iran needs to start behaving like
a normal country and surrender its title as the world’s number one sponsor of terrorism.
As the special representative for Iran, I have met with partners and allies across the globe to
share the concerns that I have shared today and explain the purposes of our pressure campaign.
Most of the countries I meet with share our assessment of the Iranian threat, and I invite any
who remain on the fence to visit this weapons display to see the evidence for themselves.
Delegations from nearly 70 countries have already visited here, and we welcome more.
Despite this clear evidence, not all countries are convinced of the need to take action. Too many
remain on the sidelines, arguing that now is not the time to pressure the regime. But this
approach has enabled – and will continue to enable – Tehran to expand its presence in the
region and become a more destructive force in the Middle East, to say nothing of Europe. The
current international environment has created unacceptably low expectations for the regime in
Tehran. If, as some people argue, the demands of the United States for the Iranian regime seem
too many, it is because Iran’s malign activities are too numerous. If our demands seem too
unrealistic, it is because the world’s expectations are too low. We cannot simply admire the
Iranian threat any longer.
The United States has a positive vision for the Middle East, where every state retains the right to
defend itself. But no outlaw regime, like the one in Tehran, can freely undermine the sovereignty
of other nations. This is not foreign policy; it is state-sponsored, revolutionary terrorism. The
Middle East will be best served when an Iranian Government respects the rule of law, abides by
fundamental standards and commitments, and rejects terrorism.
It is now up to the supreme leader to do something out of character and act in the interests of
the Iranian people. Is it better to remain isolated from the world as an international pariah or to
benefit and prosper from inclusion in the international community? It should not be a difficult
choice. There is nothing noble about driving a great and proud nation into the ground. Annex 31
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The Iranian people have a rich legacy and a culture dating back to Cyrus the Great, and they
deserve a government that represents their interests and not just the interests of their corrupt
leaders. This room could just as easily been used to display the artifacts from Persian history or
renowned contemporary artists from Iran, but instead we see only missiles, rockets, and small
arms. The clerical regime in Iran has chosen this path, but the Iranian people are not destined to
follow it. If Tehran changes its policies, a better future awaits the Iranian people.
History shows us clearly that America has no permanent enemies. Throughout our history,
enemies torn apart by conflict often become the best allies united in peace, as Japan and others
can attest. We hope for the same future with the Iranian people. The choice is now for their
government to make. Thank you.
MODERATOR:Thank you very much. We have time for a few questions. May I ask please that
you wait for a microphone, that you state your name and outlet, and please – so that we can get
as many questions as possible – limit to one question. And I’ll also say that if you have very
technical questions about the equipment, we may take those for later. And we’ll start with
Reuters please.
QUESTION:Idrees Ali from Reuters. One of the missiles that you mentioned here was launched
five days after Ambassador Haley gave her presentation last year. What benefit do you think
there is of showing these weapons publicly, and how do you respond to critics who say this is
simply a political stunt and propaganda that actually increases tensions in the region?
MR HOOK:I haven’t heard anybody say this is a political stunt. This is simply putting out in broad
daylight Iran’s missiles and small arms and rockets and UAVs and drones. That missile right there
landed right next to Riyadh’s international airport, and it’s very important for nations to see with
their own eyes that this is a grave and escalating threat. We are one missile attack away from a
regional conflict. These missiles – we’ve been very lucky – for the most part have not hit their
intended target. But luck is not a strategy, and the international community needs to do more to
get after the proliferation of Iran’s missiles.
The Iran nuclear deal has created a climate where so long as Iran is in compliance with a
nonproliferation deal of modest gains and temporary benefits, that so long as Iran is in
compliance with this deal, somehow they’re in compliance with all sorts of international norms
and standards.
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The fact of the matter is, is that during the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, Iran has
expanded its threats to peace and security in almost every category: terrorism, terror finance,
cyber attacks, maritime aggression, human rights violations. And so we are now out of the deal
and it gives us a great deal of freedom and leverage to address the entire range of Iran’s threats
to peace and security.
And so our pressure campaign that the President and the Secretary have put in place really yield
two very, very concrete benefits: One, it will starve the regime of the revenue it needs to
destabilize the Middle East and terrorize other nations. We need to starve these militias of
funding. The other thing it does is it creates pressure on the regime to come back to the
negotiating table so that we can get a new and better deal that doesn’t just address the nuclear
threat that Iran presents, but also addresses the entire range: the terrorism, the nuclear threat,
the cyber aggression, maritime aggression, the entire range. And we are very confident that we
have the right strategy with the right diplomacy in place.
MODERATOR:Nadia, please.
QUESTION:Thank you. Nadia Bilbassy with Al Arabiya. Now that you’re showing us an expanded
evidence of Iran involvement, what mechanism do you have to stop these weapons from
reaching proxies, in particular the Houthis in Yemen? And what leverage do you have on allied
countries like Iraq, for example? You just said that there’s weapons that goes through to the
Shiite militias in Iraq, and Iraq is a close ally of the United States.
MR HOOK:Right.
QUESTION:Thank you.
MR HOOK:Now that our sanctions are back in place, the President and the Secretary of State will
be resolutely focused on sanctions enforcement, and we are doing everything we can to deter
and discover sanctions evasion. All of our diplomatic posts in the region, especially in the Middle
East and in Europe, are putting in place strategies to detect and to prevent sanctions evasion,
and that includes the missile proliferation, the missile shipments that you described.
It also is very much going after the money. Eighty percent of Iran’s revenue comes from oil
exports. We have taken over a million barrels of oil off of Iran’s export list and many more barrels
will be coming off very soon. And so we have – our maximum economic pressure campaign is
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focused on the economics. We also need to be restoring deterrents. This display today helps
educate people on this clear and present threat that we face. And we urge all nations, especially
the European Union, to move missile sanctions through the European Union so that we can start
managing the risk of a regional conflict through missile proliferation.
MODERATOR:Let me take VOA, please.
QUESTION:Hi, I’m with the VOA, Farhad Pouladi, Persian Service. Two questions: First of all, are
there more actions coming in the way towards the Iranian authorities to stop their malign
activities? If you can go briefly over that, whether they are from Treasury or from the Pentagon.
And what leverage do you have to convince others to join the campaign of maximum pressure
against Iran? Thank you.
MR HOOK:Well, on the first question, we never give advance notice on our sanctions. That’s
something which is held very closely until they’re announced. What I can say is that since we have
reimposed our sanctions on November 5th, we have already done two rounds of designations
targeting individuals and entities who are trying to evade sanctions, and that we worked very
closely with Secretary Mnuchin at Treasury on these efforts. And so yes, there will be more
sanctions. We have already done two rounds just since we’ve restored the sanctions lifted under
the Iran nuclear deal.
In terms of leverage, I think we’ve been very successful so far with putting in place an economic
pressure that is going to drive the Iranian economy into a place that’s going to really force the
regime to decide: Is the cost-benefit of their revolutionary behavior in their favor? Our policy in
the Middle East is to reverse the balance of power in favor of our friends and our partners. Iran
has had a really good run over many years, partly enabled by the cover that the Iran nuclear deal
provided.
And so I think now we are in a much better position with our regional partners, with the United
States. We have had enormous cooperation from European companies. Over 100 major firms
have announced that they are ending business in Iran and, if given the choice between doing
business in the United States and doing business in Iran, it’s the fastest decision you’ll ever make
as an executive. And so we have been very pleased with the progress we’ve made so far on our
sanctions.
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MODERATOR:Let me take AFP, and then I will take one last over here.
QUESTION:Thank you. Tom Watkins, AFP. Can you explain a little bit about the timing of today’s
presentation? Why now, why today? As you know, there’s obviously been a tremendous amount
of criticism in the media recently about Saudi Arabia. Is this to try and sort of shift the narrative a
bit, or can you just talk about why you’re doing this again? Thank you.
MR HOOK:Well, we’re doing it again because our inventory has expanded. That’s just the nature
of this regime. As this regime continues its aggressive and revolutionary foreign policy, we
interdict more and more equipment. And so at some point, we hope to have this room no longer
build its inventory. We need to reduce the inventory here. And so it’s just a function of Iran’s
campaign to export arms in violation of UN embargoes across the Middle East.
In terms of the timing, it’s – there isn’t anything tied to what’s happening in Saudi Arabia. The
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense testified yesterday before Congress, had a very
fulsome discussion about Saudi Arabia. Secretary Pompeo published an op-ed in The Wall Street
Journal yesterday explaining our policy. And so today, of course it’s related. Many of the missiles
here were interdicted by Saudi Arabia, which illustrates just how much of a threat it’s under and
how much of a threat UAE and Bahrain and Israel are under because of these kinds of weapons,
whether it’s in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen. And we need to get serious about going after this
stuff.
MODERATOR:So our last question is Al Hurra.
QUESTION:Hisham Bourar, Al Hurra TV. First I have a question, but I want to follow up on the
AFP question first. To what extent the vote yesterday in the Senate to sort of stop the support for
Saudi Arabia in Yemen hurt your efforts to curb these Iranian activities?
And my question is: You spoke about the risk accumulating if you fail to act. What would that look
like? Would it look like a military strike at some point? And given that you have tried the sanctions
and the maximum pressure, could anything short of a military strike against Iran stop Iran from
continuing its proliferation?
MR HOOK:On the first question about Yemen, abandoning Yemen right now would do immense
damage to U.S. national security interests and to those of our partners in the Middle East. Right
now in Yemen we are carrying out three vital missions. We are trying to assist the coalition in
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fighting Iranian-backed Houthi fighters, we are decapitating al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula,
and we are promoting Americans – we are protecting Americans who are working in Saudi Arabia
or transiting the strategic waterways around Yemen.
We definitely want to bolster the conditions for peace in Yemen. We have a number of goals
which I would describe as working in parallel tracks. Secretary Mattis has talked about the need
to build capacity of legitimate Yemeni security forces. We need to strengthen the defensive
capabilities of our regional partners. We need to support our partners’ right to defend
themselves against Houthi attacks supported by the Iranian regime. And at the same time, we
are calling for an urgent end to the fighting, and we hope that all parties will attend the
consultations next month in Sweden under the good offices of UN Special Representative Martin
Griffiths.
What was the second part of your question?
QUESTION:The other question, you spoke about, if the risk is actually accumulating if you fail to
act…
MODERATOR:Please wait for the mic, sir.
QUESTION:…would that take the form of a military strike? Is it – is the – going to war with Iran an
option given that the sanctions and the maximum pressure policies have failed so far to curb
Iran and to stop it from smuggling weapons to these militias?
MR HOOK:After the Shia militia attacks on our diplomatic facilities in Basra and Baghdad, the
President put out a statement that promised swift and decisive action if any of our diplomatic
facilities or diplomats are attacked or injured. And so we have been very clear with the Iranian
regime that we will not hesitate to use military force when our interests are threatened. I think
they understand that. I think they understand that very clearly. I think right now, while we have
the military option on the table, our preference is to use all of the tools at our disposal
diplomatically. And as I said earlier, being out of the Iran deal has given us a great deal of
diplomatic freedom to address the full range of Iran’s threats.
And so we are working very closely with partners around the world. We have had road show
teams from State and Treasury that have visited I think almost 40 countries now, and that’s
helping to explain our sanctions regime and its purposes. And we’ve been very pleased with the
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progress that we’ve made so far. There’s a lot of work that remains to be done, and one of the
messages that we’ve been consistently delivering is that preserving the Iran nuclear deal cannot
come at the expense of regional stability, and just because Iran is in compliance with the deal
does not mean that everything else is fine. And as we see here today and the missile here behind
me, this is a grave and escalating threat that we must do more to address.
Thank you very much.
MODERATOR:Thank you. That is the conclusion of our press conference. I want to thank Special
Representative Hook and also want to thank the Department of Defense and our hosts here at
Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling. If I could ask the media please to hold your seats for a moment,
we’re going to have some instructions for you, and then we can allow the dip corps to depart.
Thank you.
Arms Control Arms Control and Nonproliferation
Bureau of Arms Control, Verication and Compliance
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau of Near Eastern Aairs
Foreign Press Centers Iran Nonproliferation Nuclear Nonproliferation
Nuclear Weapons Oce of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation
Oce of the Spokesperson Weapons
TAGS
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Volume I - Annexes 1-32